Between National Attachments, Rooted Globalism, and Borderless Utopias: Searching for Imagined Communities in Latin America's Booming Economic Relations with the Arab World

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Between National Attachments, Rooted Globalism, and Borderless Utopias: Searching for Imagined Communities in Latin America's Booming Economic Relations with the Arab World
Funk, Kevin B
University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Political Science
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It is often suggested that the spread and consolidation of the global capitalist system is compressing space and time, leading to the creation of an increasingly flat and borderless world economic geography. Of the relatively few thinkers who have analyzed the agents at the commanding heights of this system, many have argued that this global power elite is coalescing into a transnational capitalist class, that is, one whose members are divorcing themselves from the state and other place-based communities, and instead are developing a sense of belonging with class peers the world over. This study aims to interrogate the oft-repeated notion that contemporary global economic elites display such a cosmopolitan class consciousness through careful empirical analysis of their goals, motivations, and life-worlds. Based on dozens of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Colombian economic elites who have business ties with the Arab world, I present, with an ethnographic sensibility, an interpretive analysis of the mental frameworks that guide their profit-seeking behavior. As I argue, they exhibit only nascent signs of transnationalization. While there is indeed a trend toward the decentering of national imaginaries among many interviewees, they have not been replaced to a significant extent by a positive, cosmopolitan identification with transnational class peers. In turn, and in contrast to much existing literature on the topic, the largest group of actors retains a largely national and place-based interpretive framework. Thus, reports of the death of the nationalist imaginary under globalization have been greatly exaggerated. Further, while economic elites are fond of flaunting their transnational credentials, I argue that they do so not because they have genuinely transnational identities, but as a political strategy to present themselves as incapable of being contained, and thus regulated, by the state. Nonetheless, I detect an inchoate transnationalizing process among capitalist elite identities that will likely become increasingly manifest in the not-too-distant future. I elaborate the concept of rooted transnationalism to capture how new, transnational axes of identity are slowly rising, but without painting over the place-based attachments that preceded them, instead generating complicated forms of consciousness that fall somewhere in between.

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2016 Kevin B. Funk


To Macarena our growing family, and the struggle for a better world


4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research project, like all products of human creation, represents the collectively harvested fruit of the efforts of many It has benefited enormously from the participation and interventions of countless family members, friends, compaeros students, and colleagues, only some of whom I am able to acknowledge here In particular, I would like to recognize the direct and indirect contributions of: my dissertation chair, Ido Oren, for his incisive comments, critical disposition, and ready willingness to allow me to pursue my interests in accordance with my values, along with my other commit tee members Aida Hozic, Leann Brown, Philip Williams, and Matthew Jacobs for their guidance, support, and mentorship; Sue and Pat, for their behind the scenes efforts; the many teachers, ranging from Chris Warnick to Dan O'Neill, who labored doggedly to cu ltivate my critical faculties and challenged me to set out on my own intellectual journeys along with the many students for whom I hope to have done the same; my fellow activists in the union movement, for their dedication solidarity, and unwillingness to be atomized and alienated through the inhospitable and individualistic professionalization structures and practices that surround us; and Mauro Caraccioli and Sebastin Sclofsky, for their amistad along with sunny disposition in the face of adversity and righteous indignation over the injustices that surround criticism of everything I would be remiss if I d id not also acknowledge the numerous contacts academic and otherwise in the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and the United Arab Emirates who made my fieldwork experiences both possible and more productive, as well as my (unremunerated) research a ssistants Andy Garca, Jany


5 Mndez, Stephanie Quintao, and Juan Diego Tibaduiza for their careful investigatory work and creative insights, and m y dozens of interviewees, who generously made time in their busy schedules to allow me a stranger to ask probin g questions about their goals, ambitions, and inner worlds. A note of appreciation is also due to the University of Florida Department of Political Science, Graduate School, Honors Program, and Center for the Humanities and the Public Sphere for having fun ded this research including several internatio nal trips at its various stages, as well as to the Center for Latin American Studies for its provision of a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship, awarded through the U.S. Department of Education, that e nabled my further study of Brazilian Portuguese. Special praise is owed to my family: to my late mother, Margaret, whose kindness, compassion, and endless reservoirs of loving support will forever be a source of inspiration; to my father, Bruce, paragon o f the Pennsylvania Dutch values of hard work, selflessness, and humility, to whom I will always be thankful not only for having instilled these traits in me, but for always being there, through thick and thin; to my sister, Jessica, for her many years of p utting up and engaging with a thoroughly contrarian younger brother, her unwavering commitment to education, and that surprise trip to Chile ; and to my aunt Judy for her unparalleled generosity Finally, to Macarena, my eternal interlocutor and companion e ver since our paths unexpectedly and fatefully crossed during a bohemian night in el puerto H er ability to deliver well timed reality checks, her boundless love, support, sincerity, patience, sense of adventure, and yes her lack of pelos en la lengua have made both this intellectual effort and indeed all of


6 had thought possible. I will forever be fortunate for having found tanta buena onda And to the pequeo regalito and the lifetime of escapades, que nos espera n here is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining t he luminous Tucker 1978, p. xix) To the extent that I have begun the ascent, I have not done so alone. Any shortcomings in the below analysis are my own.


7 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTI ON ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 11 Attention to Global Capitalism and Global Capitalist Elite s ................................ .. 15 The Argument: On Rooted Globalism and the Stickiness of National Imaginaries in a Globalizing World ................................ ................................ .......................... 20 Methodology and Case Selection ................................ ................................ ........... 28 Chapter Outline ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 34 2 PROGRESS AND LACUNAE IN THE STUDY OF THE GLOBAL CAPITALIST CLASS ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 36 Global and Transnational Capitalists: The Genesis of a Concept ........................... 39 ...................... 46 national Capitalists ................................ .......... 54 ................................ ................................ ...................... 67 ........................... 74 3 HOW LATIN AMER ICA MET THE ARAB WORLD ................................ ................. 90 The Global North Discipline of IR and the Specter of South South Relations ......... 94 Immigration and Diaspora: The Making of a Political Economic Elite ................... 103 Foreign Poli cy and Commercial Relations ................................ ............................ 113 Toward a Political Economy of Arab Latin American Relations ............................ 118 4 BETWEEN GOD, COUNTRY, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS: THE COMPETING ...................... 127 Turco Race/ Ethnicity (and Class) in Neoliberal Latin America .............................. 135 God before Class? ................................ ................................ ................................ 137 On National, Transnational, and Global Class Identities ................................ ....... 139 Summary of Argument ................................ ................................ .......................... 142 5 THE TRADITION OF DEAD GENERATIONS: ON THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL LONGINGS ................................ ................ 145 Vignette #1: Antonio Aramouni ................................ ................................ ............. 148


8 Vignette #2: Nawfal Assa Mos sa Alssabak and Jalal Jamel Dawood Chaya ........ 156 Vignette #3: Jorge Daccarett ................................ ................................ ................ 166 Analysis and Conclusions ................................ ................................ ..................... 188 6 .............................. 195 Vignette #1: Daniel Melhem ................................ ................................ .................. 198 Vignette #2: Miche l Alaby ................................ ................................ ..................... 206 Vignette #3: Jos Seplveda Torres ................................ ................................ ..... 216 Analysis and Conclusions ................................ ................................ ..................... 225 7 ROOTED GLOBALISM, FUTURE HORIZONS, AND THE SPECTER OF THE GLOBAL CAPITALIST CLASS ................................ ................................ ............. 231 y ................................ .................. 233 Catch Me if You Can: On the Political Uses of Global Discourses ........................ 239 Conclusions ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 250 8 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 253 LIST OF REFERE NCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 258 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 279


9 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy BETWEEN NATIONAL ATTACHMENTS, ROOTED GLOBALISM AND BORDERLESS UTO BOOMING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD By KEVIN B. FUNK May 2016 Chair: Ido Oren Major: Political Science It is often suggested that t he spread and consolidation of the global capitalist system is compressing space and time, leading to the creation of an increasingly flat and borderless world economic geography. Of the relatively few thinkers who have analyze d the agents a t the commanding heights of this system, many hav e argued that global that is, one whose members are divorcing themselves from the state and other place based communities, and instead are developing a sense of belonging with class peers the world over. This study aims to interrogate the oft repeated notion that contemporary global economic elites display such a cosmopolitan class consciousness throug h careful empirical analysis of their goals, motivations, and life worlds. Based on dozens of in depth, semi structured interviews with Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Colombian economic elites who have business ties with the Arab world, I present with an ethnographic sensibility an interpretive analysis of the mental frameworks that g uide their profit seeking behavior. As I argue, they exhibit only nascent signs of global identity formation While there is indeed a trend toward the


10 decentering of national imaginar ies among many interviewees, they have not been replaced to a significant extent by a positive, cosmopolitan identification with global class peers. In turn, and in contrast to much existing literature on the topic, the largest group of actors retains a mostly place based (that is, either national or transnational) interpretive framework. Thus, reports of the death of the nationalist or place based imaginary under globalization have been greatly exaggerated. Further, while economic elites are fond of flaunting their global credentials, I argue that in general they do so n ot beca use they have genuinely global identities, but as a political strategy to present themselves as incapable of being contained and thus regulated by the state. Nonetheless, I detect an inchoate globalizing process among capitalist elite identities that will likely become increasingly manifest in the not too distant future. I globalism global axes of identity are slowly rising, but without painting over the place based attachments that preceded them instead generating complicated forms of consciousness that fall somewhere in between.


11 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Who belongs to the would be global capitalist ruling class of our time and how do its members the inte rnational incarnation of p. (1867, p. 362) (1956) (2004) parlance understand thei r own roles within the (global capitalist) order that their very actions are conceiving and propagating? To what extent do these actors form a truly global capitalist class that (Sassen 2007, p. 187), and instead p. 47)? To frame the matter more generally and open endedly, how does the process of (capitalist) globalization affect how people an see the world and their place in it ? At a conceptual level, these are fairly simple questions (if, as we shall see, rather difficult ones to actually study). Furth er, they have undeniably significant implicati ons both for our attempts to analyze, theorize, and imagine alternatives to the global capitalist system of which we are all a part, as well as for any efforts that we may wish to undertake to regulate the behavior of global capitalist elites and their ins titutions and prevent the recurring crises that their activities engender (Harvey 2011). And yet, for reasons that need not detain us long here among them one may speculate, a congenital predilection for state centrism, a longstanding aversion to class a p. 91) in the mainstream


12 of postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and cultural studies in recent decades (Chibber 2013a; Dirlik 2000, p. 9), and finally what John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt identify as t (quoted in: Oren 2016 1 ) both Inte rnational Relations (IR) and the larger discipline of political science of which it is typically a part in the U.S. have made disappointingly few theoretical or conceptual innovations in the study of the growth and evolution of the global capitalist system or the life worlds and tremendous class power wielded by global capitalist elites, let alone efforts to rein in their activities. There are exceptions, to be sure. 1 Yet they are so few and far between that one reaches the unfortunate conclusion that IR and political science have largely abandoned cutting edge globalization and particularly global clas s research to the sociologists. 2 In this and many other regards, to be properly explicated in the following pages, the present study is intended as a (hopef ully) useful corrective of standard operating procedures in and potentially beyond. The present task, then, is to both start if only modestly to fill this disciplinary gap as well as contribute to broader efforts to capture the empirical nuances and theorize the contours of the evolving global capitalist system. Necessarily, and per th e question posted at the outset, here I will hone in on only one small piece of the puzzle: 1 They include: Adrian Budd, Robert Cox, Kees van der Pijl Mark Rupert, Manfred Steger, and indeed, though his work in this area was more directed toward a popular audience and did not resonate to a significant extent in the discipline, Samuel Huntington. 2 See, for example, the works of such globalization lumin aries read widely beyond their home discipline as Saskia Sassen and Manuel Castells along with key thinkers to be cited frequently below including William I. Robinson, Leslie Sklair, and William K. Carroll.


13 the identities and class conscio usness of the very capitalist elites who dedicate their daily routines and entire lives to participating in and promoting international trade and finance. Specifically, the question I hope to address is: in our current era of capitalist globalization, to w hat extent have the protagonists of this global system developed a global mindset? Are the many scholars, public thinkers, media commentators, and divorced themselves from t he state and are congealing into a hegemonic class with a global consciousness correct ? That is, to restate the question, are the interpretive frameworks of global es have they traded place based attachments for place less ones? Do they thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose (Huntington capital rather than of any real or imagined nation p. 295) or, fo r that matter, national favor of identifying with a set of global class fellow travelers ? To borrow from Benedict Anderson (2006, pp. 6 7) that peer group whose national transnational global or something else entirely? At least for capitalist elites, i s nationalism that great ideational attachment produced by mo dernity, ma [de] it


14 possible for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die those who have only in the past two centuries become our compatriots dead ? What about, in tur imited imaginings ethnic groups? What we want to know, to start, is how a particular internationalizing population of capitalist actors understands its place in the world, whether its profit se eking activities pass through national, transnational, or global filters, or perhaps a lens of some other And for reasons that will be delineated below, we will attempt to know this by conducting a fi ne grained empirical analysis of the life worlds of the Latin American protagonists who are responsible for the Latin American economic relations may be an unusual starting place, y et the broader set of linkages between Latin America and the larger Middle East are indeed beginning to pique interest in the academic mainstream as demonstrated, to give one example, by the recent publication of an edition of the Latin American Studies Association Forum newsletter focusing on the connections between the regions 3 Further, as we will see, this is an alluring case for the study of capitalist identities, and holds the promise of shedding light on how economic elites in general with intern ational business interests conceptualize their participation in the global capitalist system of their own making. Again, such efforts at understanding the life worlds of protagonists hold a self evident importance vis vis both the need for academic 3 This refers to volume xlvii, issue 1 published in winter 2016.


15 knowledge regarding global elites as well as, no less importantly, real world efforts to regulate and control their behavior. Before proceeding to provide a brief overview of my overall argument, as well as the case selection and meth odology that lead us to it, I will frame the broader cultural and intellectual context of the present work. Here, my principal interest is in exploring corporate and media narratives concerning the growth and consolidation of the global capitalist system, making the case that structural analysis of global capitalism must be combined with awareness of the agents who are pulling t he lever s behind this very system, and hopefully demonstrating to the reader that all of this merits our collective attention for b oth inte llectual and political reasons. nks Borders A re S 4 : O r, Why We Should Pay Attention to Global Capitalism and Global Capitalist Elites In a world in which both space and time appear to be rapidly compressing, e verything and particularly capitalism, capital, and capitalists seems to be global or at least globalizing. We bear witness to corporate mergers leading to the creation of a headquart ers from the U.S. to Ireland to lower its tax burden) and ( BBC News 2015a; Chappell 2015). A BBC business reporter poses the question: g [the answer appears to be yes hotchp (Thomas 2016) 4 As I will discuss below, this quote comes from an advertisement by Emirates Airline. It can be viewed at: tomorrow/ (accessed January 17, 2016).


16 Globality (Magee 2015) which features Al Gore on its team of investors, predicts not just the arrival, but its own inauguration of a new and 5 Al (Magee 2015), and, as proclaimed in a bank advertisement that is analyzed stands 6 As it is with the corporation so it is with the capitalist. According to recent figures, now own more wealth than the other Combined Meanwhile, another milestone: the 50 percent, equating to several billion people (Elliott 2016) As the inequality speciali st e could end up with a kind of a global p lutocracy, this global one per cent or even half a per cent that are very similar among themselves, ( BBC News 2016a). In this scenario of extreme and increasing concentrations and inequalities of money and in fluence, even establishment figures such as David Rothkopf (2008) CEO and editor of the Foreign Policy Group, publisher of the namesake publication has observed the rise to n its Today's superclass has achieved unprecedented levels of wealth and power. They have globalized more rapidly than any other group. But do 5 (acces sed February 1, 2016). 6 This and other relevant ads are available at: airport ads (accessed February 1, 2016).


17 they have more in common with one another than with their own count rymen, as nationalist critics have argued? They control globalization beyond national laws? 7 As I will analyze in Chapter 7, perhaps the fact that as of now there is of course no such Le viathan that could in a truly enforceable way at the global level goes some distance in explaining why corporate actors appear to be salivating over the idea of a future world order in which borders per a recent poster advertisement by Emirates Airline. 8 Predictions of such a utopian or dystopian borderless, capitalist future are not entirely new. In 1972, less than a year before he died in a U.S. backed coup, then Chilean president (and socialist) Salvador Allende warned, in a speech be he corporations are global organizations that do not depend on any state and whose activities are not controlled by, nor are they accountable to any parliament or any other institution represent ative of went n short, all the world political structure is being Providing the ideological undergirding for th is advance of global capitalism and its corporate shock troops is the familiar if amorphous conce pt of neoliberalism which, as noted by the historian Greg Grandin (2015) maximization in the Or, in the starker phrasing of the Zapa tistas, a largely indigenous autonomist movement based in southern Mexico that burst onto the international scene following its 7 at: (accessed February 1, 2016). 8 This advertisement can be viewed at: tomorrow/ (accessed January 17, 2016).


18 January 1, 1994 uprising against the Mexican state and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agre ement (NAFTA) globalization system, their political system, and it also destroys the ways in which those who live in that country relate to each other. So everything that makes a country a country is left p. 291). The media have also started to notice that we live in hyper capitalist and increasingly unequal ti mes For those interested in conducting some armchair sociological analysis, the BBC Two Rich super ing website, private jets, yacht parties, and 9 curiosity may be piqued by an exploration of the strength of network ties between the lusive annual meetings of the World Economic Forum ( BBC Capital 2016) 10 9 This and other information about the show is available at: (acce ssed February 1, 2016). 10 Other transnational or global projects take us in a different direction, such as the would be country of i n an age where people increasingly are unified by common interests and purposes across rather than within traditional national boundaries, Atlantium offers an alternative to the discriminatory historic practice of assigning nationality to individuals on the ba In other words, n o more place based conception of citizenship (Robson 2015). For his part, Yasiin Bey the U.S. born rapper and actor formerly known as Mos Def attempted to leave he was arrested for overstaying his visa) ( BBC News 2016b).


19 Meanwhile, opposition to the notion that borders are being made to resemble 11 seems to arise mostly or at least, most loudly from demagogic, right wing (Chak 2015). Several time U.S. presidential candidate and leading light of political movement Pat Buchanan chimes in, optimistically: n ationalism and tribalism and faith th ese are the driving forces now, and they are (Urban 2015). Per Donald Trump, then, it is hig h ti me to start building walls. Returning to Marx, the workers of the world were supposed to be the ones uniting to create a new society in the shell of the old, but it seems like the capitalists are having a better go of it. Although some of the analyses and comments cited above are naturally based more on alarmism than sober appraisal, there is no doubt that these have been triumphant (if crisis filled) years for the global capitalist system and its protagonists, a new Gilded Age on a nearly worldwide scale. While most scholarship, as we will see, has responded to this era of global creative destruction by analyzing the structural system level dynamics of capitalist globalization, there has been a definitive lack of sociological analysis of the very agents w ho are at the commanding heights of this system. In that sense, the aim of the present work is to globalize Mills (1956) In a very different context, the so globalism based on its call for members of the global Muslim com munity in Arabic, ummah to leave their homes and take up residence within its self declared caliphate. 11 This formulation was put forth by Bill Clinton (Eggert 2015).


20 global to engage in fine grained empirical analysis of the life worlds of which they have developed a global capitalist class consciousness. In a world torn asunder by massive and ever increasing wealth disparities, power ineq ualities, and class cleavages, it is my position that any light that can be shed on the inner worlds of those at the top represents effort well spent. The Argument: On Rooted G lobalism and the Stickiness of National Imaginaries in a Globalizing World What leads me to the present research question, then, is a sense that we live in particularly interesting times, and that there is much too much that we do not know about the life worlds, inner worlds, and interpretive frameworks of global capitalist elites. P er the above, this is a political and normative statement insofar as it is based on a particular conception of what matters in the world. Yet it is also academic and theoretical in that I am motivated by the lack of scholarly engagement again, especially i n my home disciplines of political science and IR with the study of the ( Stevens 2015, p. 725 ) This statement in fact must be further unpacked, for while there is a general lack of scholarship that subjects to critical scrutiny the power and wealth wielded by global capitalist elites, the need for analysis of the ideational as opposed to material qualities of this class is particularly acute. While a smattering but growing number of studies mostly from outside of political scien ce, do analyze the global in that is, its objective existence in the global class structure (for example, through global chains of accumulation) markedly fewer works seriously tackle the notion th at for


21 have a subjective [and intersubjective] consciousness of this objective existence), even though such assertions are made frequent ly, including in many of the references cited above. Further, as we will also see the brave few analyses of the latter question the subject of the present study also tend to suffer from serious methodological flaws, a malady that I of course seek to remedy here. To put my cards on the table, I should note that I embarked on this study of the would be global consciousness of capitalist elites without any particular axe to grind, beyond the desire to begin to address what clearly seemed to be a lacuna in this burgeo ning literature. I have not been motivated by a desire to either confirm or refute the commonly made assertion that global capitalist elites have mentally divorced themselves from the state and other place based logics R ather for the aforementioned, varie d reasons I simply wanted to know and t o begin to provide empirical evidence concerning a topic about which much is said but with apparently little factual basis. I must confess, then, that while I am intellectually prone to think in terms of a globally i ntegrated and coherent elite that is highly cognizant of its status, privilege, and class position, I have been surprised to discover through my research that at least among the present population of interest, the Latin American economic elites behind the such reflexivity is the exception rather than the rule, and that in fact place based attachments display a persistence a stickiness that contradicts many commonly held beliefs about global capitalis t elites. But before providing a fuller retelling of the main arguments, it is necessary to take a conceptual detour so that I may clarify how certain key words are understood in


22 this research area and in the context of the present study, which will in tu rn allow for a clearer explanation of what we are looking for and why Most importantly, we must distinguish between: N ATIONAL A n actor who is rooted in only one place based imaginary (that is, a particular state, or perhaps ethnic, cultural, or people gr oup) Trump at least per his campaign rhetoric, is an obvious example. As we will see in Chapter 5, to refer to their own nacin T RANSNATIONAL A place based category, like the previous but one in which dual (or potentially multiple ) national imaginaries coexist. That is, s uch figures are also simultaneously embedded in two (or more) national communities As has been said regarding Their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societ Glick Schiller et al. 1992, p. 1). Per the below whe n an interviewee interrupts my description of my research project to deliver a monologue about the exceptionalism and superiority of both Argentina and Lebanon vis vis their regional peers, this is a clear example of a trans national interpretive framewor k. D ENATIONAL A n interpretive framework in which national/place based attachments have been displaced, and do not or no longer orient to any meaningful extent the activities of th e actor(s) under consideration. In other words, w rowd apart is that it lack s any such national anchor or anchors of sentimentality toward particular countries, ethnic groups, and so on, display a denational identity, that is, one with no (or relatively few) needs G LOBAL A that is, a positive identification with a nonterritorial peer group (in the present context, fellow capitalist elites from across the globe). Second, an ideological commitment to globalization that goes beyond the mere parochial concern with profits that is, o those of a place based capitalist system, national or otherwise. Thus, an interviewee who identifies with a borderless imagined community, and who views his/her economic activities as contributing to the viability, strengthening, and spread of a worldwid e capitalist system, belongs to the global capitalist class Another word also merit s our brief attention:


23 G LOBALIZATION T he political economy of globalization, meaning the process by which the hegemonic model the global capitalist system spreads into the For the sake of further clarification, let me emphasize that a denational capitalist may be (but is not necessarily) a global one, and in the following pages we will indeed hear from actors for whom place based identities have been decentered without any apparent, concomitant rise in a globa l set of attachments. This is a crucial distinction, and one that as we will see is ignore d in much of the literature, leading to what I will argue is an over identification of global any categorization scheme, these are ideal type, overly neat definitions that are meant to facilitate the ana present endeavor it is of course the case that human identities are messy, multiple, intersecting, and more reminiscent of continuums than binaries. I will explore this complexity in great er detail in Chapter 7. But for now, let us leave disclaimers aside and proceed to a brief and broad overview of the overall argument which features two principal components The first is that, b ased on careful analysis of the in depth conversations I he ld commercial relations with the Arab world, I find little evidence for the existence of a global for aganda, as well as the contention put forth in many lay and scholarly accounts (including those cited above), these actors think primarily in place based ( national or transnational ) or denational terms. Respectively, one uncovers interpretive frameworks th at are primarily state and/or ethnicity based (either singular or plural) or that exhibit few attachment s of


24 any kind, except to profit. But, considering the totality of the interviews, there are only a few and very nascent global signs. These capitalist elites may or may not have congealed into a global in an issue that goes beyond the scope of the present research but there is little indication at least in these cases, of global identity formation The notion of a global capitalist class for itself, as I argue, thus does not appear to be an accurate rep resentation of present reality. This (unexpected) finding pits my research against or at least on the more skeptical side of most scholars who have sought evidence for the existence of such a class, including well cited sociologists such as Robinson and Sklair. Later, I will explore reasons for this discrepancy, including my focus on the class for itself instead of the class in itself argument, general methodological difficulties and what I would regard as recurring methodological problems in some of the aforementioned works, and even, perhaps, case selection. On the other hand I do hypothesize in later chapters that capital ist worldviews may indeed be movin g in a global direction, and provide some preliminary evidence for this assessment T o borrow from the British historian E. P. Thompson (1966), in the not so distant future we may indeed bear witness to the making of a glo bal capitalist class I proceed from here globalism referring to the complicated amalgamations of national, transnational global, and other identity axes that could be generated to attempt to theorize how this process m ay unfold and, hopefully, guide future efforts to wrestle with the effects of capitalist globalization on human consciousness. Thus, given my arguments that the would be global capitalist


25 class does not appear to currently exist as a class for itself, and further that to the extent that one rises, its identities will still contain place conclusion is that much of the rhetoric concerning the global credentials of power elite appears to be ov erblown. Accordingly the present results resonate with those who have adopted more nuanced conceptualizations of the would be making of the global capitalist class. Most prominent among them is global ization specialists who has argued that denationalized will proliferate and begin to produce overall dynamics we have not yet signifi A nd to the extent that global identities emerge, they will be (Sassen 2011). The results of my study provide unequivocal support for her assertions what he refers to as be superseding of place based categories) i stated and one e use for the analyst of global political economy. The second principal element of my argument is a response to an empirical puzzle that emerges after digesting the above finding. At issue is how to reconcile my skeptical (but not dismissive) response to the notion of a global capitalist class for itself with the indisputable reality that corporate actors are so fond of flaunting their global credentials for example, the aforementioned Emirates Airline ad, which baldly asserts t omorrow thinks borders based imaginaries


26 are so sticky, then what could explain such frequent proclamations of the opposite that time and space are being compressed to such an extreme extent that all notions of geographic space have lost or are rapidly losing any and all meaning. My response, to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable, is to suggest that we must interrogate the political uses of globalization discourses. For as it turns out, declarations of a new, borderless world order i n which transnational corporations may roam unfettered, unhindered by our present scheme of mostly national regulations, is a capitalist utopia precisely the ideal, flat, ungoverned and seemingly ungovernable milieu in which profit seeking behavior, the st ructurally determined lifeblood of any capitalist, can find its highest, and most lucrative, expression. My analysis suggests that it is no happy coincidence that the very actors who would most benefit from such a globalized landscape are also its evangeli sts. Rather, they do the latter (spread the borderless, capitalist gospel) precisely because of the former (their own material drive for profit ). Such apparent manifestations of global identities media reports, corporate advertisements, carefully cultivate d public images are thus less an empirical reality and more of a political project to further their own capitalist interests. It is, as Aihwa Ong (1999, p. Now, let me say a few words about the broader intellectual context for the present work. Chapter 2 will delve into the genealogy of the concept of a global capitalist class in some detail, and through own thought (both in a compl imentary and dissenting fashion). However there are other


27 theoretical influences and interlocutors some lurking in the shadows, and not specifically named in the following pages who ar e worthy of cursory mention here. Insofar as this project focuses on the capitalist superstructure the role of ideational attachments and interpretive frameworks material base, and is concerned with the extent to which the wou ld be global capitalist class has achieved cultural hegemony the universalization of its ideology vis vis its place based capitalist counterparts, much is owed to the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, who more than any other thinker p ioneered the former analytical approach and developed the latter concept. In its (more limited) pretension to shed light on the life worlds of global economic elites, my research also owes a debt of gratitude to the great sociologist C. Wright Mills, whose previously of this time, though less focused on capitalist elites in particular, has served to inspire both the selection of this topic and my (sociological) mode of analyses Finally, the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukcs (1 972), who in the classic work History and Class Consciousness offers an appropriately nuanced reading of Marx and Marxist theory and suggests that class consciousness is not entirely reducible to material circumstances, provides both a theoretical framewor k for understanding class consciousness as well as a justification for why it and not just the material base is a worthy object of study in the first place. Cumulatively, the above arguments and theoretical influences speak against overly strident argument s and instead t o what the sociologist William K. Carroll (2012) ion of this introduction demonstrates how an interpr etive methodological approach readily


28 lends itself to the study of such complex, context based, and subtle phenomena, and economic r elations with the Arab world. Methodology and Case Selection Another astute observation by C arroll (2010, p. 19) captures the present dilemma, for it is undoubtedly the case that o prove the existence [or not] of a Let alone a truly global one. All the more so, one may note, when we are c oncerned not with this would material existence (as a class in itself) but its ideational qualities (as a class for itself), which leads us headfirst into the muddy waters of human consciousness. While I will save for Chapter 2 a more substantive discussion and critique of the methodological issues that afflict existing scholarship, and in my view cause it to perceive signs of global identities where they do not necessarily exist, here it is fitting to provide a brief overview of my own interpreti ve approach and explain why it is up to the task of shedding light on the potential existence of a global capitalist class for itself. I nterpretivism from a proud legacy of social theori zing, and draws inspiration most specifically from the argument made by Max Weber and cited approvingly by Clifford Geertz 2006, p. 6). As such, studying human beings living, breathing, sentient, and contemplative creatures requires a fundamental concern with questions of meaning and with how they as well as we as researchers utilize language and other symbolic systems to construct their (and our) own, meaning filled worlds. This, as the argument goes, sets the social sciences apart from their natural counterparts, and suggests that


29 the former should in turn follow its own, indigenous logic of inquiry. Or, to put it another way, and borrow from Jam 2007, p. 382) summary of an argument made by Thu p. 5) suggestion that in order to depth interviews As such, I engaged in deep, semi structured, and context sensitive conversations with Latin commercial relationship with the Arab world. This focus on meaning, context, and entering into the life worlds of my interlocutors informs not only my methodology, but also the pr in the form of ethnographically inspired vignettes. Thus, as opposed to reproducing cherry picked quotes in the service of an overly tidy argument, I allow the interviewees thems elves to tell their stories, accompanied by my own thoughts, reactions, observations, and analysis as a reflexive researcher. Further, I reproduce all quotes in the language in which they were spoken English, Spanish, or Portuguese so that bi or multiling ual readers may make their own determinations concerning my translations. Indeed, as Frederic Schaffer (2016, p. 55) Throughout, I ask probing, ope n ended questions, and pay special attention to various forms of obvious and subtle evidence, including: how interviewees use and what they mean and whom


30 they are referring to as part of their peer group when they speak of we and us ; careful analysis of goals and motivations; references to, invocations of, and switching between national transnational and global symbols, ranging from soccer teams and languages to vacation destinations and family bac kgrounds; body language, tone of voice, and other observational cues; and even what books are sitting on the office shelf or what they post on LinkedIn and Twitter Finally, a word about the (somewhat unorthodox) case social group I have chosen for analysis: those Latin American business elites predominantly merchant capitalists, who are responsible for the current surge in Arab Latin American economic relations. P art of the purpose in choosing this particular case, as we will see in Chapter 3, is p recisely to reverse the commonplace and pernicious practice of exclusively utilizing Global North cases to develop theories and concepts that are then applied to the South, without considering how the South itself may also be a source of theoretical and co nceptual innovations that are of general relevance However there are also features specific to Arab Latin American relations, and the actors involved therein, that make this particularly fertile ground for analysis of national transnational and global identities. In brief, we may point to the fact that many, if f ar from all, of my interviewees are themselves Latin Americans of Arab descent, 12 which adds an intriguing ethnic angle to the equation and allows us to see how ethnicity interacts and intersect s with other axes of identity; the longstanding association in Latin America and elsewhere of Lebanese 12 Of those whom I profile below in vignettes, all but one reveal Arab ancestry. Among the others I cite more briefly, the group is more mixed in terms of national and ethnic backgrounds.


31 emigrants in particular and many others in the Arab diaspora more broadly with merchant capitalism, trading, and peddling, which makes this, at the level of popular imaginaries and stereotypes a group that is expected to be perhaps the consummate capitalist class, and one whose members have few place based attachments ; and finally, the concentration of Arab Latin Americans at the top of the regional socio economic pyramid, including Carlos Slim, a Mexican business magnate of the Brazilian Joseph Safra, of Lebanese (Gelles and Horch 2015). A further motivating factor for the selection of this case is that, w ith notable exceptions to be discussed later, the re is a dearth of English language sources that profile the fortunes of the Arab Latin American economic elite. My interviewees ma y not have amassed comparable levels of wealth to Slim and Safra but they nonetheless comprise a capitalist elite both in terms of their business interests and their efforts to promote, grease the wheels of, and serve as midwives for increased Arab Latin American exchange. Here, it is natural to entertain the notion or objection that since I am analyzing the ideational qualitie s of actors who are engaged in Arab Latin American commerce, many but far from all of whom are of Arab Latin American descent, this is hardly an auspicious place to look for global identities. That is, if the material realities of these actors appear to largely be defined by place based relations, and their particular region of economic interest happens to be precisely th e land of their ancestors, then why expect their ideational realities to be global notion of a global capitalist class for itself?


32 I will leave a theoretical discussion of materialism and idealism for later cha pters, now that there is of course a link between material circumstances and ideational frameworks. And I will readily concede that I did not choose this parti cular case because it is where we are most likely to observe the phenomenon under investigation which would mean that if we did not find global identities here, we should not expect them to exist anywhere However, while my analysis does produce some perh for example, a Lebanese Argentine man at the helm of a Lebanese Argentine organization who evinces strong currents of both Lebanese and Argentine nationalism and, indeed, exceptionalism along with a Chilean international trade specia list who reveals no Arab ancestry and displays stronger global tendencies than his Arab Latin American counterparts many of the other stories that emerge in the following chapters reveal material ideational relationships that are much looser, if perceptibl e at all. For example, as we will see: a Syrian Argentine financial capitalist whose commercial focus is the countries of the Gulf, who has no economic interest in Syria, and who is ultimately more interested in Asian markets than he is in the Arab world i tself; and, the Syrian Brazilian leader of the most important Arab Brazilian commercial organization, who in fact displays no national or ethnic sympathies for the Arab world, and who in his private business focuses primarily on the U.S. and European marke ts. The re is of course a fundamental association between the material and ideational but the relationship is hardly so slavish. It must be interrogated not assumed


33 eyebrows in terms of its potential generalizability. If the broader interest here is in the global capitalist class, then why not look in London, New York, and Tokyo instead of So Paulo, Santiago, and Buenos Aires? As I note below, I agree with the suggestion that we could expect Northern capitalists who are presumably closer to forming a global capitalist class in itself in that, one can imagine, they are better integrated int o globe spanning accumulation chains to display a more global consciousness than their Southern counterparts. Yet in a world of rising Southern actors (Acharya 2014) who happen to tend to go largely igno red in IR and political science the re is an intrinsic value to premising this study on a Global South case. As Javier Santiso (2013, p. 30) comments, South years, and Arab are another illustration of this global trend towards a more decentralized world And while the finding that place based identities are stickier than commonly argued cannot be applied robotically to Northern or other cases, it at least provides us with a reason to be more skeptical of the argument that this cl ass exists elsewhere to the extent that scholarly and lay sources suggest. At any rate, when we are faced with questions of exporting knowledge that arises from one context to another context, we should always retain a healthy degree of skepticism whether the original case was in the North or the South. Nevertheless, as I will also argue, the continued universalization of the global capitalist system at least provides grounds for considering that, at some fundamental level, the dynamics analyzed in this pr oject do indeed retain a baseline of similar ity across culture and space.


34 Chapter Outline Having framed, in very broad strokes, the ideas and arguments that I will present in the following pages, it is time to tell the full story from the beginning. In Cha pter 2, I review the idea of the global capitalist class, along with its intellectual history, what it does (and does not) mean, and how we can identify it when we see it. Here, I construct and methodological the Arab world. The aim is to historicize these relations (with a focus on migration and the development of political and economic ties), bring to an English speaking audience the relatively vast Spanish and Portuguese language literature that has been produced contemporary relations as well as the ir economic protagonists to be profiled in subsequent chapters. In turn, Chapter 4 consciousness with an analysis of the specific role that other interpretive frameworks, ranging from race and ethnicity to religion and national ism/transnationalism /globalism play, or may play, in the Latin American context. In Chapters 5 and 6, I present my empirical material long form, ethnographic inspired vignettes of selected and representative Latin American business elites along wit h an analysis of what the life worlds of the profiled actors reveal about the notion of a global capitalist class for itself. These chapters, respectively, are organized around figures with predominantly place based (national or transnational) ties, and th ose with increasingly denationalized and/or incipiently global worldviews. After concluding that the balance lies with the former instead of the latter, Chapter 7 tackles two pending questions. First, it looks to the future of capitalist class identities, and argues that we are


35 globalism corporate discourses that suggest a global identity in the here and now, arguing that for elite economic actors, projecting such globality serves as a political economic strategy for the further accumulation of wealth and power. Finally, in the conclusion, I provide a very brief summary, speculate on where this project and its findings leave us, and suggest avenues for future research.


36 CHAPTER 2 PROGRESS AND LACUNAE IN THE STUDY OF TH E GLOBAL CAPITALIST CLASS For those of us concerned with global political economy, we are cursed to live in interesting times. During the past few decades capitalism and, parti cularly, neoliberal capitalism has cont inued and hastened its march across the globe while compressing space and time through rapid technologic al and communications advances (Harvey 1990). Of course, debate rages over the implications of its spread. For example, as some argue, does order of free markets and free peoples conflict (Fukuyama 1992)? Or is it generating recurrent crises, soaring inequality, and a rt resistance (Davis 2006)? My point is not to analyze the merits of these different positions per se. Rather, what is of immediate concern for present purposes is the shared and problema tic one sidedness that is common to works on the globalization of capitalism from across the ideological spectrum. People, scholars, and analysts of all persuasions often discuss capitalism as an impersonal force that exists beyond any and all human voliti on, capitalist interests will make dissenting approaches nearly impossible if not also No one is in charge and neither can you except at a huge cost to your society and its prosp


37 (Friedman 2012, p. 112). In the face of such historical inevitability and teleological certainty, one might as well join the winning team. What these accounts describe is a world of all structure and no agency. It is capitalism without a w orking class or social movements to contest it. And in its description of a world defined in its totality by an amorphous, omnipresent, and omnipotent capitalist behemoth, it is even a capitalism without real living and breathing capitalists. Yet this hype r structuralist notion of capitalism goes too far. History is not over, for as Karl Marx (1852, p. 595) famously noted m ency within the capitalist juggernaut. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the bourgeoning literature of what has been global capitalist 1 to further the interests of global capital rather than of any real or imagined nation (Sklair 2001, p. 295). Thus as t national loyalty, view[s] national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see[s] national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite's 1 tions reviewed in the introductory chapter, the phenomenon they are referring to is actually generally much closer to a global capitalist class, at least in regards to its ideational characteristics. Thus, I favor utilization of the latter term, though I a


38 This chapter proceeds as follows in its analysis of the scholarship on the would be global capitalist class: First, I explore the origins of this concept, along with its broader intellectual context. This includes dive rse influences ranging from Marx to Adam Smith and Samuel Huntington. Second, I review and analyze the key concept of school to make an original argument concerning our understanding of the political economy of globalization. Third, I make a substantive critique of this body of literature by interrogating the empirical basis for claims of the existence of such a class, particularly in regards to the idea that the global for global capitalist consciousness. I also delineate and offer a critique of the different arguments within this school of thought concerning who is and is not considered a global capitalist. Based on these critiques, I lay the groundwork for my own research in this area by making the case for interpretive research that focuses on questions of identity and analyzes the oft ignored participation of Global South capitalists in these would be tran snational or global networks. I conclude by previewing my own empirically based argument that the rhetoric surrounding the growth of the global capitalist class is greatly exaggerated, particularly insofar as it fails to account for the stickiness of place based imaginaries Thus, as I will elaborate upon in later chapters, to the relatively limited extent that their mental frameworks are at all global the class consciousness of these rooted globalism hey exhibit only a nascent globalism or cosmopolitanism and one that is firmly rooted and embedded in a place based framework. I also note the ideological implications of this conversation


39 which tend to reinforce the notion that capitalism cannot be cont rolled Indeed, as I argue, capitalist elites make hyperbolic statements concerning their global credentials precisely as a political strategy to evade regulation and oversight. Overall, then I seek to contribute to an active scholarly and popular debate concerning the global elites who are shaping our world. In pointing to the strengths and weaknesses of the literature of the global capitalism school, I hope to contribute to its development, particularly as it regards questions of global capitalist class consciousness. As of now, we understand too little about the world views of these powerful actors. It is important that we know more about them because it will add to academic and theoretical understandings of the global capitalist system, and show how the thought processes of these actors are linked to how they act in the world. Additionally, this research has a strong normative bent. As I argue, the idea of a global capitalist class that has seceded from the state bo th materially and ideationally plays th e ideological function of presenting elites as global cosmopolitan, and thus, ungovernable. As I argue in later chapters the global capitalist class is less of a concrete empirical reality though it is slowly evolving in that direction and more of a rhetorical 1999, p. 6). Global and Transnational Capitalists: The Genesis of a Concept For years, thinkers from across the political spectrum ranging from the conservative political s cientist Samuel Huntington to critical Marxist inspired polit ical economists like the widely cited sociologist William I. Robinson have argued that there is a global class of capitalists who do not identity with any particular country. To take perhaps the most famous and enduring formulation of this idea, Huntington coined the


40 s of the World Economic Forum, fittingly held in a heavily fortified ski resort in the Swiss Alps. See th ing with populist rage, Huntington (2004) in a piece appropriately en titled by The National Interest transnationalists as t as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues These groups (Huntington 2004). discussions concerning the actions and identities of the global elite. 2 Other, similar incarnations abou nd. For example the economist Lawrence Summers (2008 ; emphasis added ) the former president of Harvard University, and subsequent director of the National Economic Council growth in the global economy encourages the development of stateles s elites whose allegiance is to global economic success and their own prosperity rather than the interests of the nation where they are Meanwhile, the far right French gadfly and recent presidential candidate Marine Le Pen has boosted her p opulist credentials by railing against the 2 To take one example, a recent article in the Financial Times Davos man?


41 (Astier 2014) Positioning his thesis as an updated and globalized (1956) classic text The Power Elite the foreign policy commentator and public thinker David Rothkopf (2008) has sounded the alarm bells over the existence and rise of a and, crucially, are o nalist pp. xiii, 14). Scattered but recurrent news stories appear to speak to this trend. Common are (Coomes 2015; Marston 2012) Some corporate executives such as Facebook co founder Eduardo Saverin, have even renounced their citizenship for business reasons in his case, apparently, to avoid U.S. taxes ( BBC News 2012) hea (Zurcher 2014). Indeed, citizenship and wealth are increasingly becoming linked. In fact, many countries including the U.S. offer Wall Street Journal note s in recent years such U.S. (Jordan 2014)


42 Witness also the coast of California will be able to ply their trade without encumbrance (Florida 2011) According to the and his fellow inste ad of governments (E. Robinson 2014) 3 Ours is American and other capitalist elites take advantage of fiscal paradises, change their broad (Justo 2014) and ( The Economist 2012) all with the goal of avoiding taxes and state regulation. Parallel to these lay invocations, recent decades have also borne witness to a growing and now thriving scholarly conversation concerning the same fundamental idea. Referring to an ascendant global capitalist class, these scholars mostly Marxist inspired sociologists, with a smattering of political economists and contributors from other fields have carved out a distinct research niche for st global capital ism and global 3 Another media report elaborates: Backed almost entirely by venture capitalist Peter Thiel, who co founded PayPal, the team plans to seastead, colonize the sea beyond the reach of existing nations. Friedman's mission is to open a political vacuum into which people can experiment with startup governments that are "consumer oriented, constantly competing for citizens," he says. "I envision tens of millions of people in an Apple or a Google country," where the high tech giants would govern and residents would have no vote. "If people are allowed to opt in or out, you can have a successful dictatorship," the goateed Friedman says, wiggling his toes in pink Vibram slippers. (Bowles 2011)


43 That this now represents a bona fide research program is clear from its level of institutionalization and the publication record of associated scholars (Struna 2013) The Network for Critical Studies of Global Capitalism founded in 2011, holds biennial 4 Many key figures also participate and hold leadership positions in the Global Studies Association 5 and publish in its Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies More broadly, and beyond in house forums, there is a steady stream of books and articles within this research area sometimes referred to as the flowing onto the pages of both critical and mainstream publications. Along the way, foundational works in this research area have garnered significant attention and amassed substantial citation counts. Kees v Transnational Classes and International Relations A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational World have both garnered breaking The Tra nsnational Capitalist Class has well over twice that number. 6 Interest ingly, this blooming scholarly literature makes little to no mention of what is essentially the same topic. This curious omission can perhaps be explained by the fact that Huntington did not develop his ideas on 4 For background information about t he organization, see: (accessed February 1, 2016). 5 For example, Leslie Sklair is the president of the United Kingdom branch (I found this inf ormation on the [accessed February 1, 2016]), while virtually all of the main players have pro minent roles in its North American counterpart (found at: [accessed February 1, 2016]). 6 These figures are from the Google Scholar database. I conducted these searches on January 14, 2014.


44 or publish them in academic journals However, one may also suspect a id any appearance of commonality with a man who held notoriously noxious political views 7 That Huntington (2004) standard right wing attacks on the professoriate, surely did little to facilitate such cross pollination. Adam Smith is a further unacknowledged influence He is recognized as such and cited accordingly by Huntington, but not in most of the academic scholarship on global capitalism. As Smith argued in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations necessarily a citizen of the particular country in which his estate lies . the proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular or at least have the potential to become 8 In terms of historical influences, Karl Marx of course looms larger in this which are staples of the business press and mainstream, educated thought more generally most of the academic work in this research area emerges from Ma rxist inspired sociologists and political economists. Yet it is important to note that while this 7 O pp. 1 5). 8 A quote commonly attributed to Napoleon frames the issue in much starker, but still familiar, terms: oney has no motherland; financiers are without patriotism and without decency; their sole object is gain


45 school of thought is steeped in the Marxist tradition, it also departs from it and seeks to push it in a new direction. In the Manifesto of the Communist Part y Marx memorably describes the n characteristic imitable prose: products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle p. 476). buzzword, he had already encapsulated the core of at least the economic aspects of this fuzzy concept. on international capitalism but rather his framing of the bourgeoisie. In the very next paragraph, Marx observes that : The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. which it stood. All old established na tional industries have been destroyed no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at hom e, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one sidedness and na rrow mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature. (Marx 1888 pp. 476 477) What Marx describes here is precisely the globalization of capital by the bourgeoisie. While pe rhaps hyperbolic dependence of


46 the basic description is apt. As the the production and consumption of both m aterial and cultural goods everything from food to literature became, to a significant and unprecedented extent, international. This of course was not border or cross frontier exchanges have always been a part of human history and indeed, commerce precedes the entire state system The difference with the period that Marx describes is more of degree than kind. S uch virtually worldwide econom ic system. It is here that the contemporary literature on the global capitalist class enters the between Marx and contemporary theorists As noted, Marx discussed capit alism as a the global capitalism school capitalist system and more profound respect. Further, the global though it is its modern day personification It embodies, according to the strongest separates the capitalism and capitalists of Marx from those of Robinson, Sklair, and fellow travelers is precisely t which, somewhat confusingly, marks the shift to a global economy. As a definitive m arker of the zeitgeist of the past two decades, few terms have become more stubbornly lodged in contemporary discourse both lay and scholarly


47 topic to be prefaced with apologies. As one scholar introduced his own contribution, In turn, critics have pointed to a lack of conceptual clarity in the very term hyperbolic ideas espoused particularly in earlier works (for skeptical voices, see, inter alia : Hirst et al. 2009; Rosenbe rg 2000). This latter category has included Thomas p. national security at the conc lusion of the twentieth century, and Arjun Appadurai 1996, pp. 21 the nation state a terminal crisis postnational political In response to the overall tenor of this literature, the IR scholar Justin Rosenberg (2005; 2007) has gone so far as to forsake use of the term On the other hand, even IR and IPE realists such as Robert Gilpin (2001, p. 362) who are heavily invested in the notion of a state centric world have acknowledged that t the beginning of the twenty first century, the nation state is clearly under serious attack from both above and 9 9 In general, of course, Gilpin (1975, p. 220) and other IR realists have pushed back against those who ites, in somewhat nuanced fashion: One the one hand, powerful economic and technological forces are creating a highly interdependent world economy, thus diminishing the traditional significance of national boundaries. On the other hand, the nation state co a nd to be the basic unit of political decision making (Gilpin 1975, pp. 20 21).


48 The contou rs of this exchange need not detain us here. What is of concern in my study is not to wade into the muddy waters of the scattered literature on theo debate. Rather, for present purposes, what is salient is to shed light on the intellectual context from which th is particular idea of transnationalism and global capitalists arose. For Robinson, Sklair, and others, globalization understood in terms of political economy, and, specifically, the spre ad of capitalist relations is both new and old. It is ever increasing economic exchange between far flung peoples, states, and regions. And yet it is new in that, unlike transnational system. Robinson (2008 pp. culmination of the 500 year process of the spread of He points to two key features of this epoch: first, virtually everything has been (or is in the process of being) commodified, meaning that particularly to the extent that no significant geographical space exists outside of its confines (Robinson transnational actors have been able to play an important role in world affairs because it has been in the interest of the predominant or hegemonic powers for them to do so Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye describe, in part, how world politics was indeed being transformed by the development of cross border linkages of different kinds.


49 2008, pp. 6 7) The point is not that literally all economic relations in the world have been subjected to a capitalist logic. Rather, it is that ger anything remain outside of world capitalism or still to be incorporated through original accumulation and (2) there is no longer autonomous accumulation outside of the sphere p. 7). It is in this sense that capitalism, as the argument goes, has p. 7). the culmi p. 13). While this crisis was felt in terms of a global recession, rising unemployment, stagflation, and so on, previous decades had b orne wi tness to another kind of crisis (Robinson 2008, p. 13). I n short, this earlier era marked an ideological crisis for the capitalist class, as increasing mobilization by the working class and popular sectors had led to the achievement of concrete impr fulfill its structurally determined end of profit seeking (Robinson 2008, p. 13). As Robinson (2008, p. 13) notes in this regard, during this earlier period, rganized lab or, increased taxes on profits and income, state regulation, revolutions in the Third World, and the explosion of social movements and counter hegemonic cultural practices From the perspective of the capitalist class, these impediments could only be tolerated prevented their undoing (Robinson 2008, p. 13).


50 The crisis in the Keynesian order provided just such an opportunity. As popularized by Naomi Klein (2008) in The Shock Doctrine l known. The premise is clear. W hat cannot easily be times such as neoliberal reforms in Latin America is forced o nto the agenda during times of crisis, when powerful interests are able to assert themselves in ways that previous constraints would not allow. So it was with the crisis in Keynesianism. As Rob inson (2008, pp. 9 15) argues, during this crisis the capitalist class sought to overturn the legal, social, ideological, and cultural barriers to continued capital n ation state capitalism had placed on accumulation and to break free of the class compromises and concessions that had been imposed by working and popular classes has shed its national character for a transnational one In so doing, it has managed to limit (such as higher taxation to support social welfare programs), as it is now able to cros s borders with relative ease and shift to locales where costs are lower, workers are more easily repressed, and regulatory framework s are virtually nonexistent. The policy vehicl push is neoliberalism, the aim of which is to impose structural adjustment on societies in order to remake them in the image of an extreme market fundamentalism (Robinson 2008, p. 17). According to this worldview, as then British prime minister Margaret Thatcher once famously is no soci and, more specifically, a particular kind of hyper


51 pursuit of material gains (Robinson 2008, p. 17). And who is thus transformed from a citize n to a consumer ( Moulin 2014) In Robinson (2008, p. 19) framing the goal of activities, to tear down all barriers to the movement of goods and capital, and to crea te a single unified field in which global capital can operate unhindered across all national This process began in earnest with the coup against the democratically elected socialist president Salvador Allende of Chile in 1973 U nder the subseque nt Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973 1990), the country served as a Petri dish for radical experimentation by Friedrich Hayek, 10 Milton Friedman and the Chicago Boy economists, who sought to create a model neoliberal state (Robinson 2008, p. 21; Valds 20 08). From there, of course, neoliberalism would spread not only across the region but throughout the world, thus demonstrating, according to the geographer David Harvey (2005, p. for the formulation o p. 25 ; italics in original ) argument that this represents a new world economy (in which nation states are linked to each other via trade and financial flows) and] a global economy Thinking in terms state relations 10 On the Hayek Pinochet connection, see five part series on Hayek in Chile hayek met pinochet/ (accessed February 1, 2016).


52 that: w hen copper goes from Chi le to China or oil from Venezuela to China it goes to p. 200). That is, was characterized by interactions between distinct national economies (e.g., U.S. companies owned by U.S. investors producing chains 11 are increasingly transnational in the sense that they embrace and bring together capitalists without regard to national boun daries (Robinson 2008, pp. 25, 27). 12 In other words, this represents the end of the world as mainstream realist and liberal IR knows it, in which the unit of analysis i s the sovereign state. Rothkopf (2008, p. 11) makes broadly the same point, noting that while elite connections across national n forming, at the same time that economies are spilling across borders global entities are proliferating, and the worl d is, 11 exa mple, see a 2014 special issue of the Review of International Political Economy Global Value Chains and Global Production Networks in the Changing International Political Economy However, there appears to be relatively little collaboration between these scholars and the global capitalism school. 12 Here one notices a certain resonance between the global capitalism school and the analysis of cross border networks (Castells 2000). For example, William Carroll (2010) utilizes network analysis in his study such a class transnational or global exists in objective terms. Here, of co urse, my concern is with the extent to which global identities have arisen out of the existence of such networks. It bears noting, however, that while capitalist elites may be linked through different types of networks, a proper conceptualization of class dynamics of course requires a broader understanding of social relations that is not reducible to network analysis.


53 13 It also helps to clarify some of the conceptual confusion in discussions of global political economy. As Sklair (2001, p. or many writers the terms international, transnational, and global are used interchangeably, but this can be confusing for Sklair ( 2001, p. 3 ) is that it refers to an ideal type of a perfectly globalized world borderless global economy, the complete denationalization of all corporate procedures and activities, and p. 3). For global t he global is the goal, while the transnational transcending nation states in an international system in some respects but still having to cope with them in p. 3 ; italics in 13 T particularly in terms of pre World War I exchan ge in the North Atlantic has attracted significant criticism. Take, for example a series of claims by Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson, and Simon Bromley (2009), from the seminal text Globalization in Question national p. ecently begun shifting investment and employment from the advanced to the developing countries, and here it is d financial flows are concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan/East migration flows have in fact decreased over time (Hirst et al. 2009 pp. 3, 20, 31 32; Fulcher 2004). From the perspective of analyzing the global capitalism school on its own terms, these cri tiques miss the point. What is new about global capitalism is not merely the quantity of international trade, financial flows, or migration waves or whether the Global South will catch up with the Triad. Rather, it is a qualitative shift. At issue is not w hether international economic exchange was greater in the 1870 1914 period Rather, what is important is that while money and goods used to move between discrete, national economies, the very entities that produce and distribute them are now transnational or globa l Likewise, whether or not migration has risen in absolute terms, the change that Robinson (2008, p. 203) sees is the dramatic increase exploitable labor drawn from globally dispersed labor reserves into similarly globally dispersed nodes of intensive or n coasts of China. Finally, this line of thinking does not of course foresee a quick flattening out of global inequalities between states, nor does it Howev er, it does suggest a refocusing of our level of analysis from states to classes


54 original ). 14 capitalist system (Skl air 2001, p. 3). To clarify, Sklair must mean here not a shift from national to private interests private interests have of course been present all along but from national to global ones (that is, from a world of national economies to one where production, service, and accumulation chains are organized globally ) The argument of the global capitalism school is of course that this transformation has occurred or is at least in the process of occurring This understanding of as referring to a process in which the economy is increasingly denationalized and remade along transnational lines provides the conceptual foundation for this school of thought, and thus, for my study. As no ted, many scholars have theorized the c lass or, more precisely, the fraction of the capitalist class that has both pushed for the spread of global capitalism, and risen to prominence alongside of it, as the transnational or global capitalist class. Direct references to this class go a s far back as the early 1970s, when p. 14 Confusingly, according to this usage, the position of Robinson and other thinkers in this tradition is capitalist class, even though they typically use the latter term instead of the former. For example, in the recently cited quote, it is not at t ransnational accumulation taking place in Chinese territory not and logically cannot be one and the same. Again, given the common assertion that its members share a positive identification with fellow capitalist elites from across the globe and an ideological commitment to globalization that goes beyond parochial concerns with profits, analytical precision sug definition and refer to this would


55 35). The idea devel oped with the passing of time and the further globalization of capitalism In 1987, for example, the political economist Robert Cox referred to the (cited in: Budd 201 3, p. 67) as well as a larger 15 ; his p. 16). The same basic idea though not without variat ions has been espoused by and gained currency among many critically minded scholars of global political economy from a variety of disciplines (in addition to those already cited see, for example: Carroll 2010; Hardt and Negri 2000; Rupert and Solomon 2006 ). It has also spawned a small number of more empirical works related to The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class Aihwa (1999) Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality 16 and Monica Indian Entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley: The Making of a Transnational Techno Capitalist Class What, then, defines this purported global capitalist class ? What makes it a global class and not the national bourgeoisie of Let us consider perhaps the two most invoked definitions. For Sklair (2001, p. 295), what captures the essence of transnational capitalists 15 On a perhaps related note, Cox later described how during his 25 years of work with the Int ernational Labour Organization, which took him across the globe, he had come to develop his own seemingly global I had come to see myself as looking upon the world as a whole from a universal perspective, transcending any specifically 301). 16 the dynami c construction of new kinds of transna resonate here.


56 interests of global capital rather t han of any real or imagined nation (or, we might add, of their compatriot capitalists). In turn, Robinson (2004, pp. 47 48) argues that the transnational capitalist class 17 involved in globalized production and manages globalized circuits of accumulation, which gives it, spatially and politically, an objective class existence and identity in the global system above any loca l territories There is little breathing room between these characterizations (2004) who again that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past At the most bas ic level, t wo characteristics capture the essence of global capitalists First, t hey are the protagonists in a globally organized capitalist system that supersedes and is rendering obsolete the demarcation of political economic space based on state borders They exist materially through spaces such as globally organized production and accumulation chains. which Robinson refers. In this sense, to return to in 17 For Robinson (2008, pp. 29 30), i t is not the only bloc within the capitalist class, but it is increasingly the dominant one: There are, of course, still local and national capitalists, and there will be for a long time to come. But they must de localize and link to transnational capital if they are to survive. Territorially restricted capital cannot compete with its transnationally mobile counterpart. To paraphr ase the academic slogan publish or perish, in the case of global capitalism, capitalists in any part of the world beyond the smallest of scale find that they must g lobalize or perish. As the global circuit of capital subsumes through numerous mechanisms an d arrangements, these local circuits, that is, the local capitalists who manage these circuits, become swept up into the process of transnational class formation.


57 ctively share a similar position in the economic structure of society independent of the degree to which they are aware of their collective condition or to p. 38). Second, they do common global class status. That is: t hey identify not with the state, but with their ( global ) class. On a subjective level, they perceive themselves as global capitalists. Per for a class whose constituting a particular group with shared interests and would be expected to act collectively i p. 38). 18 In other w ords to pp. 6 7) classic phrase they form an global exists among them. 19 affinities, identities and forms of capitalist organi zation fall away in the process of 18 in class for itself lizing apital and labor increasingly confront each p. 29). For her part, Saskia Sassen (2007, p. 189) asserts that is not emergent [global] class of disadvantaged or resource poor workers and activists, including key sectors of global civil society, diasporic any detail (for exceptions, see: Chomsky 2008; Hrtgen 2014). Further study is clearly needed on this topic. 19 van der Pijl (1998) also utilizes the concept of


58 this is precisely the (novel) argument of the global capitalism school (Carroll 2010, p. 1). To summarize this research program, global capitalists exist both materially a nd ideationally. 20 In order to demonstrate the veracity of the former assertion that global scholars have proposed and analyzed a number of indicators that are to serve as proxies f or the existence of a transnational capitalist economy. These include: the suggest the transnationalization of production (Rupert and Solomon 2006, p. 43); the extent to wh ich the ownership and management of a given corporation is composed of individuals from are said to create a transnational capital ist network (Carroll 2010, p. 7). For its part, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) domestic ratios of the assets, sales, and employment of transnational corporations ( TNCs ) (C arroll 2010, p. 91). These studies have tended to confirm the hypothesis of a global capitalist class. Yet the sum total of these works does not justify the bold claims of many of the aforementioned scholars See, p. 48) strident assertion that transnational and 20 None of this suggests the end of intracapitalist competition. Rather, competition occurs on a different plane. Per this line of argument, global capitalists collaborate and compete based on their positions in globe spanning accumulation chains Less and less competition occurs on the basis of national boundaries.


59 institutions, and controls the levers of global policymaki Indeed, as acknowledged by the sociologist William K. Carroll (2010, p. 37), who is a supporter of a milder version of the transnational capitalist class rom all sides of the current debate [over the existence of this class] it is agre And Carroll (20 10, p. o prove the existence of a transnational Regrettably, as most of the work on this topic has been written by believers, th ese claims have not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny. Existing scholarship is limited by methodological choices and often advances arguments through anecdotes instead of systematic analysis As Carroll (2010, p. Robin primarily on aggregated statistical evidence, supplemented by citation of instances of transnational corporate mergers and quotation of corporate CEOs, rather than on soci ological a One of the few outsider perspectives comes from the globalization luminary Saskia Sassen (2007, p. 169), who argues that the would further investigation (Sassen 2007, pp. 169 170). However, she makes these arguments only in passing and does not undertake sustained analysis of this would be class. Adrian Budd (2013, pp. 145 146) engages with this issue at much greater length,


60 s [for transnationalization] is, sided account that glosses over persistence of state p W hile a review of the available literature do es suggest sympathy for the position of Sassen and Budd my study is not concerned with the material existence of a global capitalist class. Instead, the aim is to interrogate its ideational and subjective basis that is, the identity, self perception, and consciousness of the purported global capitalists. This, as noted, is the second pillar of the would be global capitalist class that its members for have a global capitalist class consciousness Robinson (2004, p. 48) is particularly clear on this point, arguing that 21 Yet the evidence that this class exists subjectively is even weaker than th e case for its objective, material existence. In fact, Leslie Sklair appears to be the only thinker in this tradition to have engaged seriously with this question. As a result, as Alexander Anievas (2008, p. this class] is a gl obally hegemonic class for p. 198) suggests that this orialising logic to capital accumulation ignoring for 21 in itself and a class for han a fait accompli


61 example, p. 4; Sassen 1991). also overlooks the fact that classes are mutually constituted through exploitation processes, often local or regional in scope, which fundamentally affect the global reproduction of (Anievas 2008, p. 198). It is thus reasonable my focus here may not go th rough the same process of consciousness formation as their counterparts across the globe Potentially relevant factors that may set them apart include: their concentration in certain industries (such as food or raw materials); their domestic and internatio nal environment s (including the strength of working class movements in and the foreign po licies of their home countries); their Global South provenance (which means that they may be affected and conditioned by various colonial and imperial legacies and pre sent day practices) Schneider 2013). I t may also be that race and other axes of oppression which have been almost completely ignored in this literature 22 play a differentiatin g role. And indeed, as the prominent Brazilian economist, and former finance minister, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira (2015, p. developing countries, particularly those of Latin America, suffer to varying degrees from cultural and in ways, of course, that Global North elites do not. Further, i f the history and pedigree of global capitalism matter, th en we should not be surprised if 22 2013). However, there do not seem to be any existing works that examine issues of race within this class.


62 Gindin 201 2 p. 331) means that it takes different forms around the globe. Capitalism in the U.S. does not look precisely the same as capitalism in Brazil. As Vivek Chibber (2013 b p. 285) argues, w hile capitalism is a universal force, Global capitalis b p. 285). These include, I may add, elite identities. As noted, Sassen (2007, p. 169 ) shares this skeptical reading of the for gument and refers and s ubjective authority of national states over people, their imaginaries, and their sense of w (2007 pp. 170, 187) also notes that the would be global cities This cuts against floating co p. 187). Nevertheless, she argues that there is a trend in the direction of global consciousness formation and that p. 170). Among extant studies, again, Sklair (2001) takes us the furthest towards demonstrating the subjective existence of a transnational capitalist class His approach is to conduct meaning of th (Sklair 2001, p. 47) Thus, he seeks to link class consciousness with material acts. Yet while he invokes and seeks to provide evidence


63 particularly of the latter is unsatisfactory (Sklair 2001, p. 49). Typical is the response he reports from a senior Hewlett Packard executive who globally p. 68). While Sklair takes this as unambiguous evidence in support of the global capitalism school it is unclear : first, what this term even means; second, if its use understanding an d presentati on of the same term ; and third, whether the mere assertion that a corporation has a global mindset should lead us to acce pt his argument for this us very little about whether a global capitalist class exists in ideational terms. As I will argue, more scholarship of an explicitly interpretivist bent is needed so that we may truly to borrow from Sassen (2007, p. 5) i Two further maladies plague the arguments of the global capitalism school in relation to this topic. First, there is an underlying and hidden assumption that the material existence of a global capitalist class mechanically implies that it exists subjective ly as well, and engages in purposive action on that basis. This perhaps explains the relative focus in these writings on the material instead of the subjective side of the argument, as these components are assumed to essentially be one and the same. 23 For e ingly cursory arguments on the transnational capitalist class 23 An additional contrib uting factor may be that identifying a global capitalist class consciousness presents immediate and serious methodological difficulties. I will discuss and address these below.


64 rise little above the level of anecdotes. He cites Rothkopf who comments that : Business leaders in Buenos Aires, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Johannesburg, Istanbul, Los Angeles, Mexico City, Moscow, New Delhi, New York, Paris, Rome, Santiago, Seoul, Singapore, Tel Aviv, and Tok yo all read the same newspapers, wear the same suits, drive the s ame cars, eat the same food, fl y the same airlines, stay in the same hotels, and listen to the same music. 24 (Robinson 2008, p. 31) D espite his assertions to the contrary, it is not clear what this suggests about the notion of a shared global capitalist class consciousness. It may or may not be the case that ( and indeed, he provides no evidence for these cla ims ). Yet even if true, the objectively global nature of this class does not necessarily mean that its subjective outlook has stopped being national transnational, regional, local, ethnic, or something else entirely 25 As Benedict Anderson (2006, pp. 51 52) argues, newspapers help explain the newspaper develops the same consciousnes s and loyalties. Again, we cannot merely assume that objective structural forces will condition thought in predetermined ways Aida Hozic (2014, p. 24 Similarly, Sklair (2001, pp. 20 transnational capitalist class are a convergence in educational patterns (especially in terms of particular business schools), favored vacation destinations, a primary residence in exclusive gated (and segregated) communities, and a global (as opposed to local) outlook on political, economic, and cultural issues. 25 This is not to say that such sociological analysis of objective circumstances ranging from educational and marriage patterns to t he topography of business networks is irrelevant to the present story. Far from it. However, due to the focus of the current project, it will have to be left for future research.


65 alone may not be sufficient to transform p olitical horizons as long as the institutions and Long ago, in for This link between the material and ideational existence of the would be global capitalist class needs to be carefully analyzed not assumed. Second, there is a fundamental confusion in this literature concerning the purported global consciousness of this class. As noted, for a global capi talist class to exist in ideational terms, we should expect that its members will have a shared identity based around their global class status y real or imagined nation state or nationally organized class. Yet the (scant) arguments on this topic tend to conflate cosmopolitanism with profit seeking. Sklair (2001, p. [transnation al capitalist class] is transnational in character, [and that] it is not necessarily connected with the specific sites where it does business and certainly not identical with However, t his sets concerning a transnational capitalist class as what he describes does not differ O nly a crudely determinist ic theory of political economy could sustain that the interests of me rchants and other capitalist groups have always home states. Capitalists, after all, are interested in profits. This is their structurally determined raiso n d'tre nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, [and]


66 This does not mean that they do not have other interests or motivations It is merely the behavior that the capitalist system produces. It But having international, transnational, or global interests based on the desire for profit does not equate to a global c onsciousness The latter requires a shared global identity, not merely a shared global drive for profit. If t he latter is the standard for establishing the existence of a global capitalist class, then it does not take us far beyond Marx and Smith. This is a feature of inter national capital in general, and says little about global capital p 3) is really only testing whether these individuals are capitalists, not global capitalists. chairman of Dow Chemical that Sklair (2001, p. 50) cites: I have long dreamed of buying an island owned by no nation and of establishing the World Headquarters of the Dow Chemical Company on the truly neutral ground of such an island, beholden to no nation or society. If we were located on such truly neutral ground we could then really operate in the United States as US citizens, in Japan as Japanese citizens and in Brazil as Brazilians rather than being governed in prime by This is an eyebrow raising statement, at least insofar as it demonstrates the extent to which glob alizing capital seeks, and has been able, to remove any and all impediments to its circulation. It evokes the establishment of spaces in the global capitalist system that exist precisely to evade meaningful state regulation, ranging from tax havens and off shore banking centers to new financial hubs such as Dubai. As Sklair (2001, p. 49) vis


67 e are no longer in an era to quote a famous misquote hat's good for General 26 Yet the fact that capital and capital ists tells us that corporate leaders prior itize profit seeking above state interests. And, in turn, it suggests that they will attempt to influence state policies in accordance with their own interests. This is not new. It does not necessarily establish the existence of a coherent global capitalis t class that transcends state borders, seeks consciousness. As Sassen (2007, p. that is, they a re f profit rather than a genuine globalism To attempt to locate the Latin American based global capitalist class, as my study seeks to do it is apparent that we must both strive for greater conceptual clarity and go much de eper to interrogate the subjective dimensions of the argument that there is an imagined community of global capitalists. Global Capitalist? Toward the former end, it is important to delineate the boundaries of the global capitalist class. Notably, the main works in this research area often use differing criteria justifications for their choices. Here, I review these different positions before ultimately argui ng for an in between definition of global capitalists. 26 On the origins of this axiom, see Hyde (2008).


68 On one end of the spectrum, Robinson (2004, p. 47) the group that owns the leading worldwide means of production as embodied principally capital represents a straightforwardly Marxist definition of capitalists, as suggested by mention of the owners of Yet this is only one position among many. For his part, Sklair (2001, p. 17) divides the transnational capita list class into four principal fractions : corporate is class (Sklair 2001, p. 17). As he ome Marx ist scholars may object that only the ownership of money capital is augmented with ownership and control of other types of capital, notably political, organizational, cultural, and knowledge capital (Sklair 2001, p. 17). In other words the other groups in order to pursue their economic agenda (Sklair 2001, p. 295). Further complicating efforts to focus solely on the owners of financial and industrial capital, it is also the case that while these groups is significant overlap among them (Sklair 2001, p. 17). In practice, however Sklair (2001) focuses almost entirely on the corporate transnational capitalists (Sklair


69 200 1, p. 17). Indeed, as he argu he making of a transnational capitalist class depends on the emergence of transnational corporations that are demonstrably p. 49). A more expansive view of the transnational nomenclature that again varies by author capitalist class is also taken up by others. p. 6) analysis centers on interwoven networks of corporate leaders. Yet as he notes, organic intellectuals (Carroll 2 010, p. 6; italics in original). T (Carroll 2010, p. 6). They are worthy of business 2010, p. 6). However, l Though a cknowledging their relevance, they say little about the role of these other groups. includes companie s, as well as successful high those as transnational elites. Nevertheless, giv he radical students of the 1960s have become left wing dominance of academia more generally, it is difficult to identify the supposed overla p between the worldviews of his imagined radical professoriate and those of the


70 global capitalist leaders who actually attend Davos (Huntington 2004). that is, uge majorities of Americans notes that patriotism, it is only with great conceptual stretching that he is able to lump the sup posed cosmopolitanism of the far left (and presumably anti capitalist) academic elite of his imagination with s. While recognizing the tendency of the global capitalism literature to focus on the existence of a class of p. p. 168). These include everyone from judges and immigration officials to trade and finance ministers (Sassen 2007 pp. 168, 179). she argues that t hey are part of the infrastructure of the global capitalist system. This literature is thus far from a consensus on how to define the transnational row framing which refers is that it allows for greater conceptual coherence and a relatively clear delineation between who is and is not a


71 transnational capitalist. Only industrial and financial capita lists need apply. This However at least for present purposes, it is too narrow. Most importantly, it largely overlooks the role of the merchant or trading class as capitalist actors, and in turn that commerce is a distinct sphere of capitalism that is worthy of analysis and inclusion (see, for example: Hozic 2006). 27 While merchants of co urse tend to be private actors, their activities in turn depend fundamentally on the state and certain other include (public) export promotion agencies and (private) business organizations (such as chambers of commerce) which also constitute a type of merchant class Even those who are n essential role in the promotion of commerce. As such, they grease the wheels of global capitalism Further, given that these actors are thus international by definition, they are a high ly appropriate place to look for globa l capitalist identities To establish the importance of such a trading class, l et us take the example of times over in the past decad e. 28 This has been the result of a concerted effort by both public and private groups. In regards to the former, Apex Brasil the state run Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency was founded in 2003, and in that same year opened business support and 27 For his part, Sklair (20 01) mentions, but does not dwell on, the role of merchant capitalists. 28 For current trade figures, see: online/en/home.aspx (accessed February 1, 2016).


72 29 The importance of me 1.5 billion potential customers around the Arabian Gulf and WAM 2011). More generally, the Brazilian state with its emphasis on South South relations, particularly during the presidency of Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (2003 2011) has been instrumental in fomenting these relations. Celso Amorim (2011, p. 52) who served as foreign affairs minister, and is the current Brazilian defense ministe Often leaders wave the flag and businessmen follow 30 On the private side are actors such as the Arab Brazilian Chamber of find new markets and to do busi 31 Among other activities, commercial missions for Brazilian state and business elites to the Arab world, represents Brazil in Arab sp onsored international fairs, and organizes seminars that pp. 36 37). A similar case is presented by the now dormant Chilean Arab Business Council, 29 See Apex we are/scope of activities (accessed September 1, 2014). 30 This is in a sense the oppo Marx 1888, p. the state has been refa shioned to promote the inte rests of global capital. 31 brasil/en/about us.fss (accessed February 1, 2016).


73 which defined up of visionary Chilean businesspeople of Arab descent, with the objective of bringing Chile and the Arab countries closer together in terms of commercial exchang F ittingly, it refer red to itself as the 32 Neither of these sets of public and private groups is sense. But they are precisely the on the ground enablers that make economic exchange happen. They are the midwives of the global capit alist system. Indeed their role is so crucial that they cannot be excluded from consideration as part of the would be global capitalist class. capitalists 33 who allow capital to travel in the first place. This definition thus includes the leaders of corporations and financial companies but also the merchants, government officials, and pri vate business groupings that make global capitalism possible and foment its growth. Other groups play a role in this system ranging from immigration officials to academics. However, at least for present purposes, their inclusion would sap the coherence of this concept. My focus here is on those who directly and materially enable facilitate, and carry out the management and movement 32 I found t defunct website, previously available at: (accessed September 1, 2014). Translations are my own. 33 Sklair (2001, p. 17) uses th class. Yet, as argued above, there are many private actors such as the aforementioned chambers of commerce that also play this role.


74 Argument : The Need for Nuance and an In terpretive Approach To build off of the literature of the global capitalism school, m y study thus seeks to shed light on the life worlds of the capitalist elites (according to the above definition) who run, dominate, and maintain the global economic system I aim to analyze the identities of these actors in order to determine if there is indeed a class of global capitalists whose members have at an ideational level seceded from the state system and place based imaginaries In so doing, I seek to correct a n umber of the deficie ncies in the literature of the global capitalism school, including: the weak empirical basis for asserting the existence of such a class; a near exclusive focus on objective indicators for its existence objective existence necessarily implies its subjective existence ; and a lack of conceptual clarity concerning the global capitalist class and what it would mean for it to have a As I argue below, my study also seeks to make broader contributions to the discipline of IR, along with political science and the interdisciplinary field of global political economy more generally Among these are: a demonstration of the validity and appro priateness of interpretive methods; an affirmation of the agency of Global South actors wh o are generally ignored in the global capitalism literature and the need to take them seriously as actors in global politics and economics; and an unprecedentedly com elations with the Arab world. But why study global capitalist elites in the first place? The answer may (and should) seem self evident. Yet there is a relative dearth of scholarship in this area. An outside observer may be tempted to think that global capitalists given the tremendous power that they wield would be the subject of endless dissertations, journal articles,


75 and books This is simply not the case particularly within political science (sociology, per the works cited above, fares somewhat better). Perhaps unsurprisingly, critically minded scholars in the social sciences have often focused on who they believe to be domestic and international politics, such as left wing social move ments and presidents In the realm of Latin American politics, one can point to mounds of scholarship on groups such as the Zapatistas and on Hugo Chvez in Venezuela) Critical s cho lars often applaud these actors for their resistance (real or imagined) to neoliberal policies and, in some cases, to the global capitalist system more broadly. The focus on the subaltern subject is such that it has even inspired its own well known joke. A s one scholar begins a review essay about the favelas of Rio de Janeiro: You've probably heard the one about Eskimo demography: how many Eskimos in the typical igloo? Five a mother, father, two kids, and an anthropologist. The same joke might be made abo ut Rio de Janeiro's favelas, but it would vastly undercount the anthropologists, to say nothing of the sociologists, political scientists, and assorted external agents of nongovernmental org anizations. (McCann 2006, p. 149) The question remains: why are c orporate boardrooms and elite government offices not packed with similar numbers of Northern academics? If I may speculate, in addition to the understandable desire to highlight and draw attention to how the weak fight back against the onslaught of the pow erful, disciplinary norms also play a role. P ostmodern and particularly postcolonial approaches with their frequent focus on subaltern agency, have displaced Marxist inspired analysis as the standard bearer for radical critique in the social sciences. Concurrently there has been a decrease in the analytical focus on class (Chibber 2013a), and thus, on capitalist elites.


76 One may also conjecture that within Latin American Studies where the majority of scholars sympathize with the region and lament its su bservient position in the oppressive global political and economic systems there is reluctance to countenance how certain actors in the region in fact participate in the maintenance of those very systems. As is the case in the global capitalism literature, we are used to thinking of capitalist agents as a phenomenon of the North. This romantic view of the Latin American subject as untainted by the system and lacking in agency in fact bears a certain resemblance to the myth and t Yet studying the rich and powerful of the North or the South while perhaps less immediately satisfying, provides needed insight into their worldviews and activities. We know too little about either. Such studies also hold potential normative appeal: namel y, the possibility of subjecting these actors to greater public scrutiny. Here, I am reminded of the words of the scholar activist Susan George (2005, p. 8), who noted that: a lthough wealth and power are in a better position to hide their activities and a re therefore more difficult to study, any knowledge about them will be valuable to the global capitalist class. Whether or not this is a fully global class in itself or for itself, its members wield a n extreme amount of power in global politics and economics. It is thus of the utmost importance that we understand their thoughts, actions, and means of influencing all of our lives As noted, the great lacuna within this literature is its general failure to examine the would be global for Analyzing the identity and consciousness of these actors in turn, is the crux of my project. Certain epistemo logical and methodological choices follow from this focus. Namely, I seek to address these


77 questions by adopting an interpretive approach that is sensitive to context, the complexities of inferring class consciousness, and my own positionality as a researc her. In so doing, to borrow from James Scott (1985, p. the actors who constitute that system. This represents an attempt to gain an actor centric, micro level perspective on the global capitalist system, as opposed to the structuralist approaches that have often predominated in this area (Ong 1999, p. 3). At the moment of justifying an interpretive approach, it is justifiably commonplace b elieving, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take . the analysis of [those webs] to be therefore not an experimen tal science in : Yanow 2006, p. 6). My study is precisely oriented in this direction : the would be global capitalist class. Insofar as my focus here is on meaning in human life Yanow and Schwartz She a 2006, p. xii ). The overriding critique of this approach is that while mainstream social science overzealously emulates the logic of the natural sciences ( for a famous example, see: King et al. 1994 ), the human and social realms are unique for the aforeme ntioned reasons and must follow a distinct logic of inquiry ( Yanow and Schwartz Shea 2006 ). This is the approach that interrogating the class consciousness of capitalists demands. Specifically, as Sassen (2007, p. 5) suggests in passing, this


78 req depth interviews that decipher individual imaginaries about p. 47) nods in this general direction by seeking the responses of interviewees at face value and is insufficiently sensitive to the contexts reports what he suggests or that this usage has anything to do with the arguments of the global capitalism school. To really address the notion that global capitalists form a class for itself, we need a form of interviewing that is faithful to the goal of deciphering the richness of human consciousness. This, again, calls for an interpretive approach. Instead of proceeding formulaically with a standardized q uestionnaire, as conventional social science would have it, addressing this research question requires that we enter into fluid and dynamic conversations with interviewees. Proceeding in this manner does not imply that should not prepare questions or other materials. Interpretive research, properly executed, requires a great deal of preparation, and is in this sense as studies that f ollow the natural science model. 34 Rather, w hat this app roach means is that one cannot merely make a tick mark global 34 table, interpretive analysis of nationalism in Yemen was based on attending and participating in more than 270 khat chews. There is thus no basis for the claim that is only remotely empirical world and abstract, theoretical understandings of important political phenomena (Yanow and Schwartz Shea 2006, p. xii).


79 Gaining analytical leverage vis vis the admittedly thorny question of how these actors perceive their identities re quires a much greater sense of context and nuance than the natural science model allows It means engaging in the art of interpretation based on open ended conversations not merely asking them about their identities and recording the responses. Two partic ular frameworks from the interpretive tradition are of use for ructured 2006, p. follow up question s as opposed to the structured interviews one might find in a survey or some other study that prioritizes reliability as uniformity over flexible, detailed p. 135). I nstead of coding keywords according to a one size fits all templa statements by locating them within a broader web of narratives, explanations, telling to take advantage of this open endedness to (Soss 2006, pp. 128 129). Second is p. to use particular words of interest in ways that reveal their various meanings An interpretive approach suggests that we cannot merely assume the meanings of key terms or that the interviewer and interviewee have the same meaning in mind when using the m the meaning of that word based on contextual factors. Mechanically identifying


80 keywords in interviews is not enough. Asking respondents for their conceptualizations of terms, and interpreting their responses and usages, will yield much richer data concerning individual beliefs and cognitive processes. what Frederic Sc haffer ( 2016, p. 22) grounding The story that emerges will doubtless be a complex one, as befits the human experience. Yet this does not mean that theoretical knowledge cannot emerge as a result. As the leading dependency theory scholar and subsequent president of Brazil Fernando Henriq ue Cardoso (1977, p. 21) rightly not t is day butterfly collectors who abound in the social sciences and who stroll through llusion that their findings can remove from history all its unexpected revelations lambasting of theoretical kn owledge R ather, it is a call for theoretical knowledge that is empiri cally informed and disciplined by context. His own classic work, Dependency and Development in Latin America co authored with the Chilean sociologist Enzo Faletto (1979), is emblematic i n this regard. Such is my aim. The empirical referent for my study is the booming axis of relations between Latin America and the Arab world. In particular, I focus on Brazil, Argentina, and Chile the three South American countries, in order, with the lar gest amount of trade and overall economic exchange with the Arab world. Brazil is by far the leader in this regard, with its


81 annual exports to and imports from Arab countries increasing from less than $10 billion to over $25 billion in the last decade. 35 Ca pturing the novelty and transformative nature of these relations, the Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim has noted with some exaggeration, p. 174). More broadly, recent years have borne witness to the establishment of political and economic forums (such as the Summits of South American Arab Countries, which represent the first ever institutionalized gathering between the regions), as well as the dramatic growth of diplomatic ties Several factors make this set of relations appropriate for analyzing the class consciousness of would be global capitalists. The first has to do with their novelty. As I describe in later chapters, t hough it has attracted little attention from Global North scholars there is a history of Arab Latin American relations. This includes: the arrival of waves of Arab imm igrants to Latin America starting at the end of the 19th century; the flow of Arab petrodollars into the region in the 1970s; and finally, the broader history of relations between different areas of the then the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), and UNCTAD (including the associated idea of a New International Economic Order [NIEO] ) relations are witho ut historical antecedent. They are thus a worthy topic of study in their own right 35 These figures are from the website of the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce See: online/en/home.aspx (accessed February 1, 2016).


82 fomented is also enticing, as they provide an ideal vantage point from which to observe how global economic relations are made and, in turn, conceived of by actors on the ground in tangible, observable circumstances. Second, as is well known, there is a dearth of IR scholarship on South South alism school theorizes the as almost exclusively a Global North phenomenon. While this is The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class it is also a feature of broader b ased and more contemporary writings. Carroll (2010 pp. Northern actors by noting that lantic ruling class retained its cogency p. 100) also recognizes that the transnational capitalist class; however, his analysis is almost entirely centered on th Japan/Southeast Asia/Australia. 36 p. of glob North however justified it may be in empirical terms serves not only to obscure the 36 Latin America and Global Capitalism provides a somewhat useful corrective in this regard, as he focus es on the existence of a However, in his strident accounts of the global capitalist system, Robinson (2004; 2008) goes as far as to argue chapter, his work is thus of limited appeal in this regard for postcolonial scholars and others myself included who think that colonial legacies and contemporary imperialist practices exist and matter. An additional rece nt volume edited by Jeb Sprague (2016) and Oceania.


83 gl obally, but also to buttress the longstand ing and pernicious premise that Global South actors lack agency. My study moves beyond critique of the Northern centric status quo in IR to actually engaging in empirical work that foregrounds the experiences of th e South in order to theorize the world from a Southern basis In so doing, I hope to contribute to efforts to by decolonizing it ( Tickner and Blaney 2012 b ; Gruffydd Jones 2006). To interrogate the idea of an imagined community of global capitalists, I conducted a series of in depth, semistructured interviews with dozens of Brazilian, Argentine and Chilean economic elites who are at the forefront of fostering relations between their respective countries and the Arab world. Intervie wees include: financial capitalists; leaders and managers of private sector business networks (such as the Gulf Latin America Leaders Council the Chilean Federation of Industry [SOFOFA], and the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce); and, government bureauc rats employed in trade official Trade Commission, in Dubai). 37 For background, and to become more sensitive to local contex t, I also spoke with a cademic specialists from these countries For th for global capitalists to hold water, these interviews should reveal a cosmopolitan identity that supersedes local, regional, ethnic, religious, or state based subjective moorings. It sh ould be an identity that does not boil down to mere profit seeking the structurally determined hallmark of every capitalist 37 Crucially, lest this be a factor that needs to be controlled for, there is a mix of Arab descendant and non Arab descendant Brazilians, Chileans, and Arg entines among the interviewees.


84 but hints at belonging to an imagined community of global capitalists whose interests are in the functioning, maintenance, and spread of the global capitalist system, ins tead eschews territorial based accumulation in favor of that which is truly global To borrow from the Greek philosopher Diogenes of Sinope, a global capitalist should be a of the [ global To preview my argument from subsequent chapters, t he interviews uncovered little evidence of this. In sum: global is overblown as the se actors think primarily (but not exclusively) in place based terms 38 Thus, while there are hints of a nascent global consciousness among some of these capitalist elites, most retain an identity that is largely based on their home countr y (or countries) They in itself for in that they This is important, for it suggests that wh ile our world is becoming more global in terms of economic and political relations, elite ident ities at least of the actors that I analyze here continue to revolve mostly around a nation state paradigm that is often argued to be increasingly obsolete (Sklair 2001). Nationalism is far stickier than those who see an all encompassing capitalist globali zation would allow from liberal apologists such as Thomas Friedman to the Marxist inspired global capitalism school (Budd 2013, p. 153) In regards to the latter, I find few reasons to disagree with the 38 Yet there are also reasons to think that Global South capitalist elites may be different from their Global for exaggerated in regards to Global North capitalists, it may be the case that they have a stronger glo bal identity. This is a matter for future research.


85 observation of Anderson (2006, p. 3; italics in origi has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and, precisely for that reason, However, for itsel global capitalists is completely without merit. First, though the process of global identity formation is not nearly as advanced as these scholars suggest, there still seems to be a nascent trend in this direction. In other words while this class is far from being global it is nevertheless apparently globalizing p. 164) suspicion that instead of speaking of the global capitalist class as a fait accompli classes. Carroll p. 233) argument t s a class for itself, the transnational capitalist class is in the making [and perhaps only slowly, we might add] This body of l iterature thus points to an important if much exaggerated trend (Budd 2013, p. 146) Second, inste ad of thinking of the global capitalist class as a current empirical reality, it is more valuable to conceive of this concept as what Max Weber referred to as globalizin g processes, but is ultimately a one sided accentuation of a particul ar facet of reality and should not be confused with reality itself (Weber 2004). Indeed, w e all have a complex mixture of identities and it would be more fruitful for us to conceive of n ational transnational denational global consciousness as a continuum rather than discrete


86 categories The global capitalism school thus offers key insights into what a global capitalist economy, peopled by capitalist actors on the global end of the identity spectrum would look like. But crucially, this is not an accurate description of the world that we currently inhabit. By demystifying the identities of capitalist elites, my study serves a normative purpose. Robinson (2004, pp. 48 49) is right to criticize Thomas Friedman and other a self interested capitalism as a reality external to their o p. 49) highlights his own focus on the transnational capitalist class as a way to Having identified the actors who make the global capitalis t world spin, Robinson (2004, p. transnational capital and its agents their control over the material and cultural resources of humanity and the enormous power that control brings. global count er h egemonic struggle against transnational capital has to become a global struggle for p. 178 ; italics in original ). Yet it is worth noting that hi s own bold arguments which Anievas (2008, p. fall into the same trap. By presenting the consolidation of the global capitalism system and the ascendancy of the transnational capitalist class a s disempowers the very resistance movements that he both encourages and praises After all, if confronted by a fully mobile global capitalist class that operates materially and ideationally beyond the


87 state, and in fact controls the state, then what is an oppositional popular movement to hegemonic capitalist class is so global that regulation seems impossible In this regard, he argues that p. 177) I do not wish to appear myopic or fall prey to presentism, but given our inability to foster more meaningful national social governance, the od ds of a historic bloc rising to take on this task in the short term seem slim. Little actual hope seems to exist beyond waiting for the dialectic and teleology of the more deterministic forms and caricatures of Marxism to run their course. The idea of the global capitalist class thus has ideological implications that contradict the Marxist inspired goals of these theorists. 39 What this analysis is missing is that it is in the material interests of global capitalists to present themselves in this way as glob al cosmopolitan, and hence, virtually ungovernable by the state. As Ong (1999, p. edentials, it may be as Sklair and other s would have it evidence in favor of the arguments of the global capitalism 39 In turn, arguments for the end of sovereignty and the state system in fact are a boon for neoliberalism, which posits that states should and must cede power to the market and abdicate social welfare re sponsibilities in order to be competitive in the modern global capitalist economy. Yet what neoliberalism really advocates for is not a weaker state but rather a reconfigured state: one dedicated to the promotion of capitalist interests. In many ways such as social control, r epressive apparatuses, and anti worker legislation the neoliberal state is actually stronger. Hayek was only saying a t times it is necessary for a country to have, for a time, some form or oth logical extension of this sentiment (Robin 2013) As one of the actual freedom can only be ensured through an author itarian regime that exercises power by p. 30).


88 school. Or in contrast, it may be a strategy to demonstrate that they and their activities are beyond regulation and control. My argument h ere is the latter. 40 After all, a capitalist who is still materially and ideationally tied to the state p. 177) is a capitalist whose activities are much more susceptible to popular oversight. Thus, while capitalist rhetoric per the aforementioned political strategy is often global the realities of their worldviews are much more territorial. To summarize, as I will argue in later chapters, far from being global This appears to be true both materially and especially ideationally. Reports of the death of place based imaginaries have been greatly exaggerated. The imagined community of the nation state has proven to be a sticky concept despite the globalization of capital and the slow rise of globally organized classes. Reports of the demise are both promoted by and play into the hands of those who seek the creation of a truly borderless world in whi ch capital can roam unfettered. In other words, Sassen (2011) the national continues to be probably the most significant and encompassing condition, the imbrications of global, national, and denationalized will proliferate and begi n to produce overall dynamics we have not yet seen. ascent of the global or transnational, but it is important to recognize that these rising imaginaries are not painting on blank canvases. As these identities emerge, they are condit ioned by the 40 This of course suggests methodological difficulties in researching this topic, as interviewees thus have an incentive to lie and misrepresent their worldviews. There is no true escape from this pitfall. Nevertheless, the more holistic interpretive approac h that I advocate for is more sensitive to such evasive tactics.


89 national imaginaries that predate them. As a result globalism Th thus yet to accomplish what Marx long ago unite in terms of a shared cosmopolitan consciousness. They are chased around the globe by a profit seeking impulse, but not or at least not yet as a global for For that, we can be thankful. That capitalist elites have yet to mentally divorce themselves from the state and place based imaginaries is both a cause for relief and a motive to consider how to contain th eir rise.


90 CHAPTER 3 HOW LATIN AMERICA MET THE ARAB WORLD W ithin what Stanley Hoffman (1977) once 1 to the extent the Global South is mentioned at a ll, it exists primarily as a site for the exercise of Northern power. 2 The idea that Southern actors not only have agency, but may interact among themselves in meaningful ways, is largely beyond the pale. This chapter attempts to expose and break mainstrea m usual silence concerning South South relations by turning to a particular example that has been mostly overlooked by Northern scholars: Such has been the substantive increase in these relations that high level officials claim that the two regions perhaps with some exaggeration, are Karam 2007, p. 174). Yet this current rise is linked to what the former Brazilian president Luiz Incio Lula da Silva refe two civilizations with a history of linkages (Karam 2007, p. 174). These include more than a century of Arab migration, the flow of Arab petrodollars to Latin America in the 1970s, and the oft ignored broader history of Sou th South relations through institutions 1 (and could be the subject of an entire book in its own right), here I use this nebulous concept as a useful though not unproblematic label for scholarship in the field of IR broadly defined that is the most cited, most commonly read, most often assigned in IR classes (in the U.S. and indeed around the world), and most influential in affectin entirely in English by Global North scholars based at Global North institutions, focusing on Global North topics. 2 whose usage often occludes more than it elucidates. Their appearance here is merely meant as shorthand for those regions characterized by: greater levels of poverty (at both the national and individual levels); colonial legacies; ongoing imperial practices ; and a subservient position in the global economy (that is, based on raw material exports). For further analysis of the North South divide, see Funk (2015a).


91 such as the Non Aligned Movement. This chapter literature to recover this overlooked history of Arab Latin American relations T hus, in addition to providing a general framew ork for comprehending current issues in Arab marginalization of South South relations. By analyzing the history and present status of these relations, I thus hope to contribute to t he decolonization of IR and the establishment of a more globally inclusive field. In addition to analyzing its marginalized position within the field this chapter seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature on Arab Latin American r elations, which has been produced almost entirely by Southern scholars. While the sum of this scholarly production presents a useful overview of both the historical trajectory and contemporary status of these relations, it is largely unknown to Northern sc holars. Further, this literature it is not without shortcomings. Here, I identify four main gaps the latter three of which I in turn address through my own work Not all works succumb to these pitfalls; rather, these critiques apply to this literature as a whole. First, this literature is insufficiently historical, at least in regards to interstate ch Latin American and Arab countries have interacted, including institutions such as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), the New International Economic Order (NIEO), and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Prashad 2007; 2013). Few wor ks have seriously explored these linkages (for an exception focusing on Brazil, see: Karam 2012). Likewise, it largely overlooks past episodes of economic exchange, limited as they may have been, such as the injection of Arab petrodollars into Latin Americ a in the


92 1970s (Howe 1974), or even remittance flows. There is thus a need here to historicize contemporary relations. Second, the literature on Arab Latin American relations is overly state centric and devotes in sufficient attention to how non state actor s are also involved in promoting these ties (for an exception, see again : Karam 2007) As such, there is insufficient discussion of the fundamental contributions made by private actors (particularly economic ones) as well as emerging networks of private an these relations. Here, we may point to the oft overlooked role of merchant capitalist groups including business federations (such as the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce), state economic bureaucracies (e.g. export promotion ag encies), and facilitators of investment flows (for example, the Gulf Latin America Leaders Council) and how they, as globalizing elites, play a fundamental role as agents in enabling inter regional economic exchange. Third, there is a tendency for scholars in this area to focus excessively on what Latin American relations can be accurately grasped purely through foreign policy analysis. Accordingly, as I argue below, what is needed is for analysts of these relations to adopt a political economy approach that is able to account for how political and economic factors interact and intersect to serve as the impetus for these relations. 3 This analytical focus on foreign policy issues takes us back to the aforementioned issue with this literature: its excessive state centrism. 3 Scholarship in fields such as economics and business could potentially provide a useful correc tive in these regards. However, very few works from these or similar fields focus on Arab Latin American relations or the actors responsible for promoting them.


93 Finally, this literature is overwhelmingly empirical, as opposed to theoretical, in nature. That is: while it uncovers interesting dynamics concerning an axis of relations that is largely unknown in the Global North, it neglects to draw broader conclusions based on these realities, or even to situate them within a comparative context. For better or worse, this is symptomatic of a larger issue with Latin Ame rican IR: it is (Tickner 2008, p. 745). 1997), nor to imply that local knowledge must serve some supposedly higher and more so forth. Rather, my position is that Arab Latin American relations present a fascinating case that could indeed help to she d light on broader dynamics, including how capital globalizing actors of a variety of ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds the subject of this project perceive their id entities. Further, engaging in theoretical work based on Global South cases provides a useful corrective in the field of IR in particular, where there is an equally longstanding, dominant, and pernicious tendency to foreground and theorize on the basis of Global North histories, cases, and perspectives. In very broad strokes, the existing literature on Arab Latin American relations can be divided into two thematic categories. They are: first, immigration and diaspora, which focuses on the experiences of Ar ab immigrants and their descendants in Latin America, as well as the cultural history produced by interactions between these populations; and second, foreign policy and commercial relations, which deals mainly with Latin


94 nd trade with the Arab world, its posture concerning the Israeli where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet Two caveats are in order: this is of course a simplistic rendering and there is overlap among the categories (for example, the recent landmark volume The Middle East and Brazil: Perspectives on the New Global South treats both topics in fairly equal measure [Amar 2014]). Nonetheless, this categorization scheme provides a useful general sketch of the central topics of concern in this literature and gives an overall impression of what is (and is not) known about these relations based on existing scholarship 4 The Global North Discipline of IR and the Specter of South South Relations With few exceptions, mainstream Global North IR ignores or denies the reality or possibility of meaningful South South relations, or Southern agency more generally. Given that Global South ac as Robert Keohane ( quoted in : Carranza 2006, p. 814) once noted about Latin America there is little reason to pay attention to them. 5 This marginalization is based, in part, on the perceived ont ological threat that Southern agency poses to Northern domination of the global system (Krasner 1985). In other words, the South is ignored precisely because it threatens the idea of Northern hegemony. What makes South 4 For a more detailed listing of sources on these and other topics, see the bibliographies mai ntained by RIMAAL, the Red de Investigacin Interdisciplinaria sobre el Mundo rabe y Amrica Latina (Network for Interdisciplinary Research on the Arab World and Latin America) : category/bibliographies/ (accessed February 1, 2016). 5 Even if Keohane is right, this does not necessarily mean we should ignore the South. For example, i n disciplines such as anthropology it is entirely normal for scholars to lend their voices to those w ho lack power and agency


95 South relations dangerous, in turn, i s that they call into question the notion that the North is always central in questions of interna tional politics and economics. This is unfortunate, for the study of South South relations could shed light on research topics that are of perennial interest even in mainstream IR. For example, scholars concerned with bread and butter issues such as the causes of war and peace (and how to prevent the former and promote the latter) should be intrigued by South peace and internal violence par p. 143). Thus, while the famed IR theorist Kenneth Wal tz (1979, p. 72) once wrote that t would be as ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica as it would be to construct an economic theory of oligopolistic competition based on the minor firms sonably conclude the opposite: it would be ridiculous not to. classics of political science Weapons of the Weak is not only based on a Malaysian case study, but is esteemed for having made a major theoretical contribution to general conceptions concerning Gramscian h agency. At the very least, the South demands our attention given that it is home to the vast majority of the experiences in international politics are thus essential for any attempts at global understanding. In turn, the idea that it is exclusively European history that is foundational to the field and a sanitized version of it, which downplays the experiences


96 and legacies of imperialism, colonialism, racism, and slavery occludes the many histories of international relations that exist around the globe. 6 Even if we grant that e organization of and interaction among nation states that w, as the ny examination of how world politics came to attain its present form must therefore begi p. 61). Rather than likening a economy example, is that we can somehow un derstand capitalism without theorizing from the per spective of the working class. If the South is largely invisible in mainstream IR and associated disciplines, then the idea of South South relations suffers from a double marginalization. To summarize the implicit argument: if the South lacks agency, as is commonly presumed, then Southern regions are incapable of interacting with one another in meaningful ways. Thus, while the South does appear with some regularity in mainstream scholarship as an agency le ss site for the exercise of Northern power, the issue of South South relations is ignored with virtual unanimity. 7 Relations between Latin America and the Arab world are of course no exception to this trend. There is by now in fact a relatively voluminous body of literature that focuses on or at least makes substantive mention of Arab Latin American relations and how 6 Indeed, IR eart and Gruffydd Jones 2006, p. 2). As Brian Schmidt and others have documented, IR in fact was born as the would 7 An exception here is the case of China and particularly its relations with Africa and Latin America, topics that have caused much hand wringing in the North.


97 all of this scholarly production has taken place in West true literally, as the vast majority of specialists in this area are Latin Americans who are based at Latin American universities. Beyond the level of individual scholars, several of academic units dedicated, at least in part, to the study of the Arab world and its relations with Latin America. These include: Universidad de Chile ( Centro de Estudios rabes ; Center for Arab Studies); Universidade de So Paulo ( Centro de Estudos rabes ; Center for Arab Studies); Universidade Federal Fluminense in Rio de Janeiro ( Ncleo de Estudos do Oriente Mdio ; Center for Middle East Studies); El Colegio de Mxico ( Centro de Estudios de Asia y frica ; Center for Asian and African Studies); and, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica (CEMOAN C entro de Estudios de Medio Oriente y el Norte de frica ; Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies). 8 As a result of the resources, visibility, and community building afforded by these academic units th ere is thus limited but significant institutional infrastructure in Latin America for the study of relations with the Arab world. Other scholarly and lay organizations again, predominantly within Latin America also contribute to the production of knowledg e on the intersections between the two regions. Most prominent among them are: BibliASPA, the Biblioteca e Centro de Pesquisa Amrica do Sul Pases rabes (Arab and South American Library and Research Center), located in So Paulo, which also administers i ts own publishing house, Edies BibliASPA; RIMAAL, the Red de Investigacin Interdisciplinaria sobre el 8 There is at least one coun terpart in the Arab world: the Latin American Studies and Cultures Center at The Holy Spirit University of Kaslik in Lebanon.


98 Mundo rabe y Amrica Latina (Network for Interdisciplinary Research on the Arab World and Latin America), an online community for Latin American and o ther scholars conducting research in this area; and the Centro de Estudios del Medio Oriente Contemporneo (CEMOC; Center for Contemporary Middle Eastern Studies) in Crdoba, Argentina. Both CEMOAN and CEMOC publish academic journals on the Arab world and Arab Latin American relations entitled, respectively, Revista Al Kubri and ANMO: frica del Norte y Medio Oriente The Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce also publishes its own magazine and administers the online Brazil Arab News Agency both of which cont ribute substantially to the diffusion of news and analysis concerning these relations. To summarize, Arab Latin American relations have ceased to be an unknown phenomenon if one knows where to look. Yet virtually all of the knowledge production concerning these relations has occurred within Latin America. Given that mainstream IR as is by now well known is so parochial and North centric that it is largely unwilling or unable to see, assimilate, or valorize Southern scholarship, these Latin American and oth er efforts have almost all been for naught from a disciplinary scholarship is thus peripheral not just geographically but intellectually As commented by the Colombia based scholar Arlene Tickner (2003, p. 296) who as co editor of Worlding beyond the West series and author of numerous articles on similar topics has been instrumental in attempting to bring Latin American and other select number of academics hailing primarily from


99 That is, even though an enterprising group of mostly Latin American scholars has amassed a significant body of work on Arab Latin American relations, with few exceptions it has not been debated or cited or even, presumably, read by their Northern counterparts. Hence the narrower question raised by Evelyn Hu DeHart turcos [i.e. Arab descendant Lati dominated field of Latin American Studies? This, again, is symptomatic of a larger malady affecting IR: the disjuncture between the idea of IR as a global discipline and its reality into the realm of intellectual production, just as much of Latin America is stuck in the hamster wheel of commodity exports, so is its academic position cemented as a recipient of ideas from abroad rather than a producer of them (Dorfman and Mattelart 1991; Mignolo 2005). The problem is less individual than structural. It is of course unreasonable to ask that each scholar Northern or otherwise be familiar with literally every pote ntial topic of interest in international politics and economics (or be capable of reading articles in Spanish and Portuguese). Yet at a collective level, the fact that so few Northern scholars study these relations (or South South relations more generally) or at least consider them relevant enough to mention in even a cursory manner, is highly problematic. In addition to serving as yet another indication of the myopia of Western IR, this ignorance of Arab Latin American relations is also troubling both in tellectually and politically. In regards to the former, insofar as we desire to know more rather than less about the world, there must be some recognition of the fact that this is a growing axis of

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100 relations that attracts a significant amount of attention from the involved actors. If the collectivity of IR scholars intends to progressively accumulate knowledge about the world, then surely someone among us should start listening. As is, it appears that many Latin Americans care about these relations, but mai nstream IR does not. As for the latter, the silence concerning Arab Latin American relations has real political consequences. To demonstrate, let us take the slightly broader but related issue of Latin American Middle Eastern relations (thus including Ira n in the equation). These relations, for the first time ever, have risen from obscurity to become a major topic of concern for numerous political elites in Washington. Central here are accusations that Latin America rea where Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina meet is a hive of activity for Middle groups, which could use the region as a base from which to attack U.S. interests. This idea has indeed become an article of faith in the hawkish wing of th e U.S. foreign policy establishment, as the following examples demonstrate. During a 2011 Republican Party presidential primary debate on national security and foreign policy, Mitt Romney echoed the concerns of the other candidates in asserting that the wo uld be actions of Hezbollah and similar groups in the Triple Frontier and other parts of Latin CNN vernor machinations of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran in the region ( CNN 2011). Not to be outdone, hat national security issue do you worry about that

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101 America. I'm very concerned about the militant socialists and the radical Islamists join CNN 2011). To summarize, major U.S. political figures with significant bases of influence and of Latin American Middle Eastern relatio ns that they are apparently willing to countenance the (likely disastrous) use of military force. And yet neither the U.S. government nor anyone else has provided serious evidence to support the notion that the Triple Frontier is a significant staging grou nd for terrorist groups (Karam 2011). Instead, concerned reporters, analysts, and politicians constantly cite each other in a repeated allegations that Osama bin Laden spent time in the T riple Frontier and as incorrectly speculated by CNN that a picture of the nearby Iguau Falls had been found in Afghanistan at an al Qaeda training camp (Karam 2011, p. 263). To be sure, the Triple Frontier has long been a haven for smuggling and unmonito red economic exchanges. It would to some extent be surprising if, at the very least, there were not some individuals in the region who contribute financially and perhaps in other ways to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas (as may have occurred with the 199 2 attack on the Israeli embassy and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association, both in Buenos Aires). Yet we know little about what actually occurs around the Triple Frontier. Instead, policy debates are being informed by wild speculat ion rather than honest, fact based analysis. The collective ignorance in mainstream IR concerning Arab Latin American relations (real or imagined) thus does

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102 not exist in a vacuum. Rather, the lack of studies on this topic allows unsubstantiated claims to b ecome authoritative knowledge, as there are virtually no Northern academics of this purported crime terror nexus provides a valuable opportunity for academic resear chers to question the assumptions and assertions of policy makers and pundits, push for transparency of information on the reality of the region and even help political cons equences, and potentially dangerous ones, for our lack of understanding of these relations. Again, the issue is not precisely that there is no literature on Arab Latin American relations. A significant number of sources exist, many of high quality. However given that South South relations are seen as unimportant, and that the scholars who engage languages other than English, they are rarely cited by Northern scholars or pract itioners. That is, these works are about international relations but are in effect excluded from the field of International Relations U.S. concerns, U.S. graduate programs, and U.S. based journals dominate the field (Tickner and Blaney 2012 a p. 5). As Arlene Tickner and David Blaney (2012 a p. 5) he sheer muscle of the academic community in U.S. IR, as measured in numbers of scholars, Ph.D. programs, conferences and publications is palpabl

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103 Bridging the academic North 9 As follows, then, I attempt to provide a relatively comprehensive literature review concerning hi storical and contemporary interactions between Latin America and the Arab world. This survey is inclusive of literature that has been published in English, Spanish, and Portuguese (and predominantly in the latter two). 10 The aim is not to delve into the int ricacies of individual sources, but to provide a broad overview of what is and is not known based on existing literature, isolate recurring themes, identify areas in need of improvement, and provide a conceptual framework (based on a political economy appr oach) for guiding future research in this area. Immigration and Diaspora: The Making of a Political Economic Elite The first and largest group of literature tells the stories of the waves of Arab immigrants who have arrived to Latin America and analyzes how they and their descendants have navigated, shaped, and been shaped by political, economic, and cultural terrain s Arab Latin Americans form a relatively small minority group throughout the region, though one of disproportionate politica l and economic significance. This makes it all the more surprising that Northern scholars have largely overlooked their role, leading Evelyn Hu the turcos [i.e. Arab the Global North dominated mainstream of Latin American Studies? In this sense, one may again lament that 9 a Global IR International Studies Asso ciation. See the conference website, available at: (accessed February 1, 2016). 10 For Arab sources on these relations, fo cusing on cultural issues, see ALECSO (2004).

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104 scholars have done relatively little to draw larger theoretical implications based on the Arab Latin American experience to inform our understanding of nationali sm, transnationalism, globalization, ethnic politics, an d similar issues. Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republican, Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras Michel Temer, is of Lebanese descent economic, cultural, intellectual, and athletic elites can also trace their origins back to the Arab world, including: Carlos Slim, a Mexican business magnate of Lebanese descent and currently the world richest person; the Mexican actress Salma Hayek, partially of Lebanese ancestry; the global pop star Shakira, whose paternal grandparents also hail from Lebanon; the famed Chilean director and novelist Miguel Littn, of Palestinian and Greek heri tage, whose daring secret return to Chile from exile in 1984 to capture the brutal reality of life under the Pinochet regime was immortalized La aventura de Miguel Littn clandestino en Chile ( Clandestine in Chil e: The Adventures of Miguel Littn ); and the two time Olympic gold medalist in tennis Nicols Mass, also is Palestinian and whose Jewish maternal grandparents were survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. Arab Latin Americans are also present in works of popular and high Latin American culture Such representations include: th e Arab merchants of Garca Cien aos de soledad ( One Hundred Years of Solitude ) (1967), or the subject, Santiago Nasar, of his Crnica de una muerte anunciada ( Chronicle of a Death Foretold ) (1981); the famed Brazilian novelist Jorge Amado (2008) A Descoberta da

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105 Amrica pelos Turcos ( T he Discovery of America by the Turks ), which narrates the romantic and economic exploits of two Arab i mmigrants upon their arrival in Brazil at the beginning of the twentieth century; the hit Brazilian soap opera O Clone ( The Clone ), which featured a Muslim Moroccan Brazilian family; and the kindly elderly gentleman Farid Assad from the Chilean television drama Los 80 ( The 80s ), who displayed a small Palestinian flag in his clothing store in downtown Santiago. Different facets of the Ara b Latin American experience have a constant presence in the region through recurring events such as the South American Fes tival of Arab Culture and the LatinArab Film Festival. Social institutions like the ritzy Club Palestino (Palestinian Club) of Santiago de Chile also have a hand in organizing cultural and other events. The Latin American country with the largest Arab descendant population is Brazil, where it is estimated, probably with some exaggeration, at up to 10 million (though it is not uncommon to hear even higher figures) (Karam 2007, p. 10). Not surprisingly, a r elatively large number of sources focus on the Brazilian case ( Amar 2014; Hilu da Rocha Pinto 2010; Karam 2007; Lesser 2013; Morrison 2005). Most of the Arab Brazilian population is of Lebanese, and to a lesser extent Syrian, ancestry, with the bulk having arrived in the early twentieth century with passports from the Ottoman Empire hence the enduring nickname, also used in Spanish speaking countries, turcos (Turks) (Karam 2007, p. citizens of Syrian origin than Damascus, and more inhabitants of Lebanese origin than 11 11 In Brazil and elsewhere, many millions of other Latin Americans also have an (often unknown) Arab background through the long Moorish presence in the Iberian Peninsula. In seeking to make the case that first came to us (Karam 2007, p. 174). Interestingly, as Walter

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106 Other Latin American countries with particularly sizable Arab descendant populations include: Argentina (Brgain 2011; Civantos 2006; Hyland, Jr. 2011), Mexico (Alfaro Velcamp 2007), Chile (Bray 1962; Elsey 2011), 12 Colombia (Vargas and Suaza 2007), and Honduras (Amaya Banegas 1997; Gonzlez 1993; Gutirrez Rivera 2014; Luxner 2001). For example, estimates range up to several million for the Arab Argentine population while there are said to be between 500,000 1 million Arab Chileans (though in both cases, again, the real figures are probably somewhat lower). Syrian Lebanese ancestry tends to predominate in most countries, including Argentina; however, in co untries such as Chile and Honduras, Palestinians form the largest group (indeed, population). Smaller populations also exist throughout the region. In addition to the co untry specific literature cited above, a number of works have sought to analyze Arab Latin Americans together, in some cases, with other Latin Americans of Middle Eastern and/or Jewish ancestry in a multi country or regional context (Alsultany and Shohat 2 013; Karam 2013b; Klich and Lesser 1998; Raheb Mignolo ( early twentieth century Mexican thinker and racial theorist Jo s Vasconcelos, best known for his essentialist celebration of mestizaje heritage was to be, in its own curious and Orientalist way, a celebrated component of the new national identity. H Judaic striae hidden within the Castilian blood since the days of the cruel expulsion now reveal themselves, along with Arabian melancholy, as a remainder of the sickly Muslim sensuality Who has not a little of all this, or does not wish to hav presence also explains the existence of very large numbers of Arabic loanwords in Spanish, Portuguese, and associated languages ingredient 12 Crnicas palestinas ( Palestinian Chronicles ) and the 2008 Chilean documentary, Palestina al Sur ( Palestine in the South ).

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107 2012). 13 As I discuss below, common themes within this literature include identity, elite formation, and Latin American Oriental ism vis Though Arab descendant Latin Americans as a grou p now occupy a relatively circumstances of the arrival of the first waves of immigrants were often less than glamorous. While the post World War I fall of the Otto man Empire and the continued colonial presence in the region would later send Arabs to Latin America in larger numbers, the first such immigrants arrived in preceding decades in a trickle, and, in many cases, unintentionally. In the words of a businessman large Palestinian descendant community: Many of our fathers and grandfathers in Palestine were saving their class tickets, which were all they could afford. They weren't too smart geographical ly. The first stop was either the Caribbean or Central America. They didn't speak English, and they didn't speak Spanish. So they came without any papers, and without a penny in their pockets, and were admitted to a country that really opened its arms to t hem. (Luxner 2001) Similarly, according to Helmi Nasr, then director of the Universidade de So Paulo they were heading for North America. After quickly recovering from the initial shock of discovering Washington Times 2005). Most of these immigrants belonged to Christian families; in recent decades Muslims have comprised an increasing percentage of Arab immigration to 13 At least two special issues of journals have sought Together Yet Apart: Arabs and Jews in Latin America Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies (2011, volume 6, issue Arab Women in Latin America Al Raida (spring summer 2011, issue 133 134 ).

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108 Latin America, which has declined sharply but not ceased entirely. 14 In one contemporary manifestation of continuing migratory flows, several thousand Syrians have recent ly arrived in Latin America and particularly Brazil as refugees, fleeing the violence, chaos, and instability of their home country (Brodzinsky 2014; Lissardy 2015) Smaller groups of Palestinian refugees have also been resettled in Latin America in recent years, mainly in Chile and Brazil (Henrquez 2008; Wellbaum 2007) Arab immigrants in the region quickly established themselves as merchants, So Paulo city almanac, con Rua 25 de Maro (Karam 2007, p. Saara district would form an additional locus of activity for Arab Brazilian merchants (Luxner 2005). As Brazil industrialized under the protectionist policies of Getlio Var gas during the early mid twentieth century Arab Brazilians came competition from Asia, they diversified into other sectors, such as real estate and imports, while la ter generations in particular would increasingly join the ranks of the professional class (as doctors, lawyers, politicians, and so forth), and now run some of pp. 27 33; Morrison 2005, pp. 432 434). The anthropolog ist John Tofik Karam (2007, p. 2) explains the current status of Arab Brazilians in no uncertain terms: Nearly a half century after the last major waves of immigration, Middle Easterners have attained an unprecedented kind of privilege throughout Brazil. T hey oversee multimillion dollar business ventures, constitute an estimated 10 percent of both the City Council in So Paulo and the federal congress in Braslia, own advertising and television enterprises, star in the 14 On Islam in Latin America, see the recent volume, Crescent over Another Horizon: Islam in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Latino USA ( Logroo Narbona et al. 2015).

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109 top rated soap opera O Clone ( The Clon e ), and run some of the most envied country clubs among national elites. The history and evolution of other Arab Latin American communities follows a broadly similar trajectory, with initial waves of immigrants engaged in commerce and light industry, in some cases also concentrated in specific neighborhoods, such as Patronato in Santiago de Chile (on the Chilean case, see: Bray 1962). In turn, subsequent generations have often branched out into positions of broader poli tical and economic power in their respective societies. As this literature suggests, Arab Latin Americans have come to occupy a distinct space within the imaginaries of their respective countries. Based in part on this story of economic mobility, but also drawing from a longer history of Arab stereotypes, the general Latin American population has often associated turco ethnicity and identity with shrewdness, thriftiness, and a pathological propensity for commerce. In her account of the politics of soccer in modern Chile, which included the formation of Arab Chilean immigrant sports clubs, 15 the historian Brenda Elsey (2011, p. magazines, newspapers, and comic strips depicted Arab Chileans as parasitic. They caricatured Arab business l eaders as voracious social climbers who built empires by These clubs were founded as a response to (and to counteract) discrimination, as well as within popular pp. 149 164). They were also an avenue for political involvement, 15 Palestinian immigrants in Chile founded what is now a first division soccer team called Club Deportivo Palestino The club still maintains ties to the Palestinian Chilean population, for example through uniforms that use the colors of the Palestinian flag (green, red, black and white). In a recent controversy, the Chilean football aut had been replaced with the image of historic Palestine.

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110 as the Arab p. 160). As oppose d to other immigrant groups in Chile, such as the Spanish and Italians, Arab Chileans were seen were unable to fully incorporate themselves into the [that is, the dominant racial mixtur e] 2011, pp. 162 163). In other word s, Latin American Orientalism i majority groups have (Camayd Freixas 2013). Indeed, so extreme is the imagined ass ociation between Arab Latin Americans and a cutthroat, blood sucking entrepreneurial mentality that these groups have often been national community is in doubt (Karam 2007). Karam (2007, p. ix), hi mself of Lebanese Brazilian desce turco They are also see n as being prone to financial misconduct Thus, the massive corruption scandal involving Paulo Maluf the Lebanese Brazilian former mayor of So Paulo has often been portrayed through an ethnicized lens (Karam 2007). Going back more interested in peddling their wares and accumulating wealth than contributing to the based on agriculture (Karam 2007, p. 26). As the

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111 famed Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro (2000, pp. 317 318) noted, in a passage worth quoting at length: The Arabs have been the most successful immigrants, quickly becoming integrated into Brazilian life and attaining positions in the government. They have even forgotten where they came from and their miserable life in the countries of their origin. They are blind to the fact that their success can be explained to a large degree by the casual attitude they have in addressing and working with the local society: armed with prejudices and incapable of any solidarity, detached from any loyalty and family or social obligations. All of this allows them to concentrate their entire effort on getting rich. The attitude of these immigrants is frequently one of disdain and incomprehension. Their tendency is to consider poor Brazilians responsible for their own poverty and to view the racial factor as what sinks the descendants of Indians and blacks into misery. Th ey even state that the Catholic religion and the Portuguese language have contributed to a result of crises that rendered them superfluous, discarded from the workforce in their home lands, and that here they found a huge country already opened, with fixed frontiers, autonomously governing its destiny. Of course, Arab Brazilians are used here as a convenient foil for other Brazilian elites. According to this highly misguided construct, Arab elites have evinced Brazilians aside, there corroded by the rise of Arab Brazilians, who, in his account, do not share the traditional non dark skinned masses. It is in this sense that Arab occupying a space in the Brazilian imaginary that is reminiscent of anti Jewish stereotypes in Europe, the U.S. and e lsewhere.

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112 Yet, as Karam (2007) argues in one of the more theoretically minded works in this area, perceptions of Arab Brazilian ethnic identity have shifted in recent years, n into the global economy. Once seen as pariahs (some) Arab Brazilians have now become partners of the Brazilian state and business community, as each seeks to expand its footprint in the Arab world (Karam 2007, p. 23). W ith the Brazilian government and e Arab descendant population to serve as intermediaries; the presumption is that they (and only they) possess the necessary cultural capital to reach economic and politic al p. 41). Thus, interested state and private sector parties found their way to the doorsteps of existing and newfound groups who had already b een promoting Arab Brazilian relations on their own T he breadth and depth of the private network, united behind the notion that Brazil and Brazilian companies needed to pay more attention to the Arab world. While their supposed capitalist proclivities are still the target of suspicion in other Brazilians, and this particular underst anding of Arab Brazilian identity, are to be valorized, not disparaged. Whether for this or less cynical reasons, the Brazilian state has on occasion presented a more sanguine reading of the history of Arab immigration to Brazil. Accordingly, at the openin g of the first Summit of South American and Arab Countries, held in Braslia in 2005, Lula noted that : [T]here are few countries that have

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113 ram 2007, p. 174). Here, the literature on immigration and diaspora leads us to our second category: foreign p olicy and commercial relations. Foreign Policy and Commercial Relations As noted, Karam (2007) argues that Arab Brazilian economic elites including high level groups such as the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce have been able to insert themselves into the national imaginary by offering their ethnic and cultural capital to the Brazilian state as it seeks to reach out to the Arab and Muslim worlds. to the Middle East, plans commercial missions for Brazilian state and business elites to the Arab world, represents Brazil in Arab sponsored international fa irs, and organizes 2007, pp. 36 37). Thus, his account demonstrates how private actors participate in the construction of economic, political, and cultural ties between these two regions. Most of the literature in this area, however, focuses on state actors in Latin America, and especially how they have engaged with the Arab world in terms of foreign policy often relating to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. As noted, t here is also a smaller body of literature concerning U.S. Schulmeister 2007; Karam 2011). In both cases, the concerns of this research are largely empirical instead of t heoretical. The general foreign policy literature on Arab Latin American relations is mostly a recent phenomenon. This reflects moves by numerous Latin American governments since the end of the Cold War to diversify their political and economic partners beyond

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114 the typical cast of characters primarily the U.S. and Europe and reach out to Global South regions to which, with some exceptions, they had previously paid relatively little attention (Funk 2013) For some, this has been motivated by a deliberate st rategy of fomenting a more multipolar world order in which Northern countries are no longer the central node through which all linkages must pass. As noted by Celso Amorim who foreign a ffair s minister, and is the current defense m inister u nder president Dilma Rousseff p. 174). iation of regular summits between the Arab League and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a landmark in the institutionalization of these relations. As Amorim (2011, p. 52) commented, the Summits of South American and Arab Countries (ASPA, per th e these political ties that, as Amorim (2011, pp. 48 49) noted, the Middle East has c ome la himself became the first Brazilian head of state to make official visits to the Arab world, where he traveled to 10 different countries, sh ook countless hands and opened several embassies (Amorim 2011, pp. 50 51). Numerous works have contemplated this new era in Arab Latin American relations. These tend to either focus on the foreign policies of the big, more internationally active Latin American states such as Brazil ( Amar 2014; Amorim 2 011; Amorim 2015; Brun 2011; FUNAG 2001; Haffner and Holand 2012), Mexico (Tawil

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115 2013), Chile (Baeza and Brun 2012), and Venezuela (Herrera Navarro 2008) or analyze these relations from a broader or pan Latin American perspective (Botta 2012; DeShazo and M endelson Forman 2010; Moya Mena 2011; SELA 2012 ; Vlez 2015 ). There is broad agreement here that contemporary Arab Latin American relations are of unprecedented breadth and scope (Moya Mena 2011), though Brazil stands head and shoulders above its neighbors by all accounts Other countries, such as Chile, are only p. 63). 16 We must add the further caveat that Rousseff is notoriously less interested in international affairs than her predecesso r Lula and has been distracted by a stalled economy and the preparations for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics now to consolidate gains in building relations with the Arab world as opposed to ma king more dramatic ad vances. Meanwhile, commercial exchange between the regions has soared, with South American Arab trade more than tripling in the past several years ( Al Jazeera 2009; MercoPress 2012). 17 Indeed, the Arab world is now a larger export market than Western Europe for Brazilian agricultural products (dos Santos Guimares 2012). Linking the worlds of immigration and commerce, Arab imports of South American mate a caffeine rich tea that is widel y consumed throughout much of the Southern Cone have also blossomed in recent years, having been introduced to Syria and Lebanon in particular by Arab immigrants to South America who subsequently returned to their 16 Translation is my own. 17 See, for example, the trade figures compiled on the pages of the Arab Brazilian ( online/en/home.aspx ) and Arab Argentine Chamber s of Commerce ( ) (both accessed October 31, 2014 ).

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116 homelands. Personifying the trend, Abu Wa' el Dhiab, a Syrian national and former detainee at the U.S. run Guantnamo Bay detention camp who in December 2014 was released to Uruguay, noted through his lawyer that mate that he used to drink it about three times a day (de los Reyes 2014) 18 Further, t here is an increasing trade in manufactured goods, typified by the Brazilian firm Embraer, whose model 170 jet is currently the second most used aircraft in the Middle East ( MercoPress 2011a). Recent years have also borne w itness t o the establishment of non stop flights linking these regions 19 Summarizing the novelty and potentially transformative nature of these growing ties, Amorim declares that the two Karam 2007, p. 174). Predating the current boom in Arab Latin American relations, the Israeli Palestinian conflict has long been and continues to be of particular interest for Latin American foreign policies (Sharif 1977). Indeed, Latin America has for years been a di plomatic battleground for Israeli and Palestinian influence (Glick 1959). As a Peruvian Question has grown considerably, up to the point of being one of the few issues invar 1982, p. 117). Just as generations of left wing Latin American leaders and thinkers have 18 Translation is my own. 19 For example, t he carrier Emirates launched daily flights between So Pa ulo and Dubai in 2007. Subsequently, Qatar Airways initiated flights from So Paulo to Doha in 2 010, while direct service with Eti had Airways to Abu Dhabi began in 2013 followed by flights to Casablanca on Royal Air Maroc Beyond So Paulo, Emirates has extended service to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, while Royal Air Maroc has added service to the former, and Qatar Airwa ys to the latter. Emirates has also announced flight. It is in turn set to be overtaken in duration by an announced Qatar Airways route between Doha and Santiago de Chile.

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117 openly sympathized with the Palestinian c ause, inspired by a shared anti colonial /impe rial narrative, Latin American conservatives have often sided with Israel. During the 1970s and 1980s, when much of Latin America was ruled by far right military regimes, Israeli arms dealers were a frequent sight in the region (Bahbah 1986). Military to military ties continue to be tight, particularly between Israel and Colombia. In turn, Arab descendant and Jewish populations in Latin America have to varying extents over time mobilized around and lobbied their governments about the conflict (Baeza 2014). Latin America would also be affected in other ways. For example: i n the wake of the Six out p. 756). More recently, Latin American states have become increasingly active in critiquing U.S. ownership over diplomatic efforts t o resolve the conflict (Burton 2013). move to do so in December 2010 spurred nine other South American states all except Colombia to do the same in the following two months. Whatever the eff ect on was clearly to assert the ability to operate independently from the U.S. decision as part of a foreign policy appro ach to the Middle East that is free of U.S.

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118 then Middle E to discuss its policies towards the region, with the then foreign m inister replying that MercoPres s 2011 b ). 20 The general tenor of this literature is highly normative, implying that as opposed states particularly Brazil could play a more productive role in addressing the conflict. Because of this and the aforementioned migratory ties between the regions, it should come as no surprise, as the BBC well known and loved by the Palestinians BBC Mundo 2014). 21 Toward a Political Economy of Arab Latin American Relations There is, then, a substantial body of literature on Arab Latin Amer ican relations. By quantity of production, one can happily observe that much has changed since the Latin American relations have in political and economic exchange has not received adequate attention in academic institutions or p. xi). Yet to the extent s observation 20 For a general assessment of contemporary U.S. Latin American relations, see Funk (2015b). 21 Amrica Latina es una regin bastante conocida y querida por los palestinos

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119 not in the Northern based Leaving this critique of Northern IR aside what, then, can we say in g eneral and more theoretical terms about Arab Latin American relations and the motivations of these various Latin American actors for reaching out to and strengthening ties with the Arab world? As specified in the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, 22 is the goal to create a order ? Is Latin America adding to its stable of partners to lessen its traditional reliance on the North and of a less U.S. and Europe dominated global sce nario? To put the question more broadl y, as well as to engage with common academic and lay arguments about Latin American foreign policy, are these countries p ursuing relations with the Arab world for reasons ( Gardini 2011, p. 17 )? That is, are Latin American Gardini 2011, p. 17 )? Th e question is itself ideological, or at the very least has strong ideological undertones This is clear from the juxtaposition of a foreign policy that is term planning and a personalized with one that involves more rational, m broader national interests ( Gardini 2011, p. 17 ). 22 The text of the treaty is available at: constitu tivo english version.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014).

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120 For years it has indeed been commonplace (2006) classic essa to se parate left leaning modern, open minded, reformist, and internationalist born of the great tradition of Latin American populism, that nationalist, strident, and close minded According to this Manichean worldview, the former such as Chile (the perennial Latin American poster state), Uruguay, and Brazil comprise the latter Venezuela, Ecuador, Boliv ia Castaeda 2006 ). 23 engage with the outside world based on ill conceived and myopic strategies. Presumabl y it is mere coincidence that the great pragmatic ideological divide neatly al igns with those countries that, respectively: A) are more closely aligned with Washington, wholeheartedly embrace neoliberal reforms, and do not actively seek to build political and economic relations with what the U.S. considers to be pariah states; list, are at least mildly critical (rhetorically, if not in practice) of neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization, and for better or worse, (Iran, Cuba, etc.). Yet in this latter regard, it is not immediately clear whether Venezuela, for 23 American states which in general signals closer adherence to a neoliberal model, with fewer ta riffs and trade barriers and less state regulation ideological as their opposites. definition.

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121 or both in seeking to diversify its pool of allies I will leave this question to others What is of more immediate concern is a nother ideological assumption lurking is the notion that in order to understand Arab Latin American relations or any other such axis what is needed is merely to evaluate a primary focus on the state as the unit of analysis and the concomitant overlooking of the role of other actors in questions of international/global politics and economics. Here, we return to my prior critique of the literature on Arab Latin American relations : its excessive state centrism. This focus is problematic for several reasons. First, as I argue above, framing Arab Latin American relations merely in terms of state policies and interactions blinds us to the equally large if not larg er role played by other actors, namely the aforementioned economic elites many of whom hail from the private sector A fuller account of these relations must explore how these different sets of public and private actors both work together and compete to promote their visions, goals, and interests vis vis the Arab world. Based on my own research, the most important actors in this regard include: government export agencies (such as Apex Chamber of Exporters and Fundacin General Direct orate of International Economic Relations [DIRECON]); international business organizations (for example, the Gulf Latin America Leaders Council, based in Buenos Aires); and business networks, both sector

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122 Industry [SOFOFA ]) and those based on particular country or regional relationships (most prominently, the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce and the Arab Argentine Chamber of Commerce, but also many smaller organizations such as the Argentine Lebanese Chamber of Commerce and the Brazilian Iraqi Chamber of Commerce and Industry ). As I have identified, this is precisely the web of public and private actors that enables commercial flows between the regions and is largely responsible for promoting Latin American commerce with the Arab world. Second, by overlooking the role of private sector business elites, this lite rature does not fully grasp how central economic factors are to explaining and understanding Arab Latin American relations. 24 Instead, it implies a statist account in which politics is naturally privileged over economics. According to this reading of Arab Latin American relations, the have largely revolved around how to respond to and potentially play a role in resolving the geopolitical maladies affecting the former region, including the Israeli Palestinian conflict, fallout from the Arab Spring, or, in the broader These are real issues of concern for at least a number of Lati states and there is no reason to doubt that foreign policy gurus in the region are sincere more independent foreign policies. However, this storyline fails to capture the economic interests of Latin American actors again, both public and private in pursuing closer ties with the Arab world or 24 Though this project focuses specifically on the Latin American side of the equation, the same broad point presumably also applies to how Arab and Middle Eastern actors approach Latin America.

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123 Middle East. In some cases, the above logic may apply to economic relations, insofar as certain Latin American commercial elites also seek to reduce their commercial dependency on the U.S. and other traditional powers. Yet the question of trade relations cannot be reduced to a national or reg ional interest in autonomy. The global capitalist system both produces and is peopled by actors with different interests and concerns, ranging from individ ualistic and parochial (that is, the profit motive) to transnational global, and cosmopolitan. Fin ally, parsing Latin American foreign policies without accompanying analysis of dominant economic interests, and how the two interact, smuggles in the highly problematic assumption that Latin American states are autonomous from domestic class forces That i s, by viewing Arab Latin American relations through the prism of policy, we may ignore the question of whether the state is the proper unit of analysis in the first originates not from an autonomously generated state policy, but rather from the globalizing economic elite which through various forms of structural, political, a nd economic power has been able to turn its provincial class interests into those of the Chilean state? This is not an argument but rather a question that requires investigation. Focusing on foreign policy may lead us to hone in on the visible (state) while overlooking the submerged (private) My goal is not to promote a vulgar Marxist account in which states are mere empty vessels for capitalist elite interests yet it would be just as problematic to assume that the st ate, and state foreign policy, are autonomo us from these powerful groups.

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124 As the above comments suggest, what we need is to understand the political economy of Arab world, we must ask not just what kind of foreign policy or goals it is pursuing. We must go deeper and interrogate where those policies or goals come from in the first place, whose interests they serve, and how different sets of public and private elites w ho may or may not be of Arab descent 25 cooperate goals through nongovernmental means. The idea is not to argue for the primacy of either political and state based interests, on one hand, or economic and private ones, on the other. Rather, it is to capture the dynamic interplay between them. A political economy approach is all the more salient given recent developments in Arab Latin America n relations. First, there has been a clear tendency for Latin the Arab world. In their visits to the region it is customary for Latin American political leaders to travel with entourages of interested business elites Further, the third of which held in October 2012 in Lima drew more than 500 attendees from both 25 While a disproportionate number of these elites do claim Arab ancestry ( vis vis their representation in the overall population), many do not. For example, although many of the directors of the Arab Argentine Chamber of Commerce to day administration share this ethnic background. Other such organizations such as the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, are almost entirely composed of individuals of Arab descen t: in this case, Syrians and Lebanese. Within the realm of corporations and other economic institutions that engage with but do not focus exclusively on the Arab world, there is again an overrepresentation of Arab Latin Americans, though many of the releva nt actors are from non Arab backgrounds. Building bridges between these different groups elites of Arab and other ancestries is often recognized as an important goal. The former leadership of the now defunct Chilean Arab Business Council, for example, has pointed to its own failure to expand its base beyond the Arab Chilean community as one of the primary reason that the organization did not gain more traction.

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125 regions. 26 To further drive h ome the point usinessmen are very attentive to the p. 52 ) notes Often leaders wave private sector groups are activ ely engaged in ing ing establish new axes of trade relations where the state is paying relatively little attention, and pressur ing the state to adopt the very deregulatory policies that allow for increased trade and f inancial flows between the regions in the first place. Given this protagonist role, we should not be surprised that while political ties between Latin America and the Arab world have stagnated or p erhaps declined in recent years with the departure of more activist administrations such as Lula in Brazil and Hugo Chvez in Venezuela, economic relations though somewhat affected by the recent global crisis, are playing an increasingly prominent role in defining Arab Latin American r elations. in this regard is that both Latin America and the Arab world are becoming increasingly integrated into the web of global capitalist relations. Thus, this project aims to shed light on the mix of political and economic interests that will conti nue to propel these relations. Beyond the brief summary and critical analysis presented here, I will leave it to other s to more fully historicize our understanding of Arab Latin American relat ions. Indeed, some of the above cited works aim to perform this very task. In turn, my project 26 Latin America Mid East Investors Forum LatinF inance http://www Us.html [accessed February 7, 2016]). For information on the third (and apparently latest) such forum, held in Abu Dhabi in 2011, see: 3rd Latin America Mid East Investors Forum.html#/.VVePs_lViko (accessed February 7, 2016).

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126 intends to address the other three critiques centrism, its privileging of politics over economics, and its neglect of theory To summarize in seeking to construct a political economy of these relations, I reveal a network of both public and private economic actors who are instrumental in a more complete portrait of the merchant and other capitalist elites who occupy posts both in the private and public sectors and are the real midwives of these booming trade relations. Notably, this analytical focus also moves us beyond Arab Latin American relations as being the exclusive domain of Arab Latin Americans, for while perhaps a majority of these actors do indeed assert Arab ancestry, a significant number do not. In this sense, I seek to add to current understandings of what is at stake in Arab L atin American relations, who the key actors are, what motivates their actions, and how and why this growing axis of relations may be significant and worthy of attention in the fir st place. Additionally I utilize the empirics of these relations based on dozens of in depth conversations with the aforementioned actors to pursue a broad theoretical question in the field of global political economy. In other words: based on the Arab Latin American case, to what extent is there evidence for a global capitalist class that exists as a class for itself, with a shared, global and cosmopolitan class consciousness? It is to this topic that I now turn.

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127 CHAPTER 4 BETWEEN GOD, COUNTRY, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS: THE COMPETING GLOBAL Per the above political economy account, the driving force behind the contemporary surge in Arab Latin American relations is a small yet dynamic network of public and private economic elites The ir often hidden efforts toward encouraging promoting, and making possible globa l commerce qualify them as the midwives of an increasingly globalized capitalist system. Accordingly, as defined above, many of them comprise global the global cap italism school is unknown. As I have argued scholars are still struggling with mixed and uneven success to develop meaningful indicators that capture whethe r elite economic actors the world over (Robinson 2004, pp. 47 48 ). More work is clearly needed in this regard. D eveloping clear and accepted indices of globality in this materi al sense is of course beyond the scope of my project and is necessarily a topic for future research. Regardless, what is clear is that these Latin American merchant and other capitalist groups are deeply embedded in the globalization of capital through the tasks they carry out in their daily lives. That is, they live and breathe global economic relations through their day to day, lived experiences in objective terms through these trade relations according to a given index actors such as these are largely responsible for it. My project aims to reveal, then, how these globalizing capitalist elites in Latin America view their own participation in globalization, understood again in political

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128 economic terms as the spread of capitalist relations and increased capitalist exchange. 1 What is the link between their objective realties daily routines and entire lives dedicated to bringing down economic barriers, signing trade deals, building cross border relationships and training business elites, all with the end goal of more interregional trade, more interregional financial flows, and more interregional economic intertwining and how they understand, process, and construct their own activities and worlds? Having figured out what they are doing, the question becomes: why are they doing it? In this sense, though my analytical focus is on ascertaining the extent to which these actors form a g lobal capitalist class for itself I seek to shed light not only on their class consciousness but also on what it is that they actually do. Thus, through studying the ideational, the material also manifests itself. Standard Marxist accounts provide a com pelling if obvious answer to the question of how to explain capitalist behavior : through the establishment of competitive markets in which there are winners and losers, capitalism operates as a structural power to discipline and indeed determine human acti on Capitalists are, and must necessarily be, interested in profit above all else for this is the only way to prosper or even survive in a world that is defined by a cold, economic logic In this sense, as Marx would have it, it is not only the worker who is alienated under capitalism. Capitalists themselves ety which would abolish the pre conditions and thus the very possibility of huckstering b pp. 46, 48). To borrow f rom the anarchist thinker Emma 1 One could also, of course, analyze the Arab elites who are at the forefr Latin America, though this topic goes beyond the scope of the present study.

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129 Goldman (1917, p. 68 For these thinkers, f reeing humanity from a dehumanized existence of utter servility to the profit motive thus requires transforming the structures that bring those behaviors into being in the first place. While t h is standard Marxist inspired structuralist story helpfully put s the spotlight on the economic structures that fundamentally condition human action, it of course does not and indeed, at least in its more sophisticated variations, does not intend to account for the gamut of human behavior or the complexity and diversit y of the human experience We are multifaceted creatures with complicated identities, goals, motivations, and thoughts, which themselves are the product of social interactions and are always, to some greater or lesser extent, in flux. The capitalist system certainly does demand that its elites participate in markets and engage in profit seeking behavior, in the process turning them homo economicus (or woman). Yet this does not relieve us of the analytical burden of u nderstanding the diverse In other words: the idea is not to l analysis, but rather to add to it by deciphering how structures manifest themselves in the worldviews and actions of real living and breathing capitalists In turn, this leads to a demystification of the p olitical uses of globalization discourses, which, as I will delineate later, oft en proffer a hyper structural account of the global capitalist system as part of a self serving rhetorical strategy to demonstrate the futility of any attempts to regulate or exercise control over that system or the activities of its agents. The cap italist system does indeed

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130 their raison d'tre pp. 336, 343). As Marx (1867, pp. 362 363 ) describes in Capital s fir st volume: As capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. But capital has one single life impulse, the tendency to create value and surplus value, to make its constant factor, the means of produc tion, absorb the greatest possible amount of surplus labor. Capital is dead labour, that, vampire like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks. The capitalist may be many things of the Society pp. 363 364). Yet the p. 364). The logic of profit governs his/her behavior only the mercantile value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the mine p. 89). m (Marx 1844, p. 93). ideal typical, but it is not precisely the behavior that the capitalist system demands and produces. The capitalist who eschews profit seeking for sentimentalist concer ns will in all probability, but perhaps not universally be outcompeted (wo) (2008, p. 264) a ll for ourselves Yet the plodding, subsuming structural juggernaut that is the capitalist system does not tell us all that we need to know about capitalist behavior. To return to the use of metaphor, at the level of the individual within t he system there are sieves, filters, and

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131 actual human behavior. Indeed, as the Marxist sociologist Erik Olin Wright (2015) class, by itself, explains consciousness. Consciousness is shaped by all sorts of other things besides the particular mechanisms subsumed under the concept of class. Even Marx despite the caricatured prevailing versions of his thought displayed a respecta ble sensitivity for his time concerning how class, race, and gender intersect within national societies (Anderson 2015) What then, would Marx hi mself make of such an analysis? By focusing on the would be global capitalist class as a class for itself, d o es the present line of inquiry amount to what he denounced that overlooks the l 1846, p. 155)? Are we falling into the trap of German i that is, from the ideational to the material instead of more properly p. 154)? Why not confine ourselves to studying a given class as a class in itself? If the id eational is epiphenomenal, why not focus on the material? As Marx (1846, p. 154) forthrightly elaborates his position in The German Ideology : we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, not from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the development o f the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. On the one hand, Marx (184 6, p. 154) is correct to argue that t he production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity And indeed, in the

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132 ethnographic vig nettes that follow, I aim precisely to link the ideational qualities of these capitalist elites with their material realities. is too aggressive here he latter (Marx 1846, p. 154). In other writings, Marx helpfully adopts a more properly nuanced posture concerning the relation between the material and the ideational. 2 Indeed, part of the critique that I offer is of the notion common to the literature on the global capitalist class and to less sophisticated readings of Marx in general that a seamless, one to one relatio nship exists between seemingly global practices and a global consciousness. To return to a previous example, the extent to which busine ss cars, eat the same food, fly the same airlines, stay in the same hotels, and listen to the p. 31) does not necessarily allow us to p resume t hat they have become a global capitalist class for itself at a precisely corresponding level. The lationship is not so slavish. 2 Overall, Marx is in fact somewhat ambiguous and perhaps inconsistent, on the material ideational link (and in general, is a much more nuan ced thinker than contemporary [mis]readings of his works by political scientists and many others suggest). In short, he does not always present the relation between the material and ideational as being so automatic. For example, although he writes in the Manifesto of the Communist Party that pp. 482 500 ) closes the that the workers of the world have developed a global working class consciousness, but rather attempting to spur it into existence with his revolutionary pamphleteering. In other words, workers the world over may formulation, there is thus of course no one to one relationship between the material and ideat ional. That Marx was in fact not precisely the crude materialist of modern day caricatures is a point made repeatedly by David Harvey in his well regarded lectures on Capital that supposedly most materialist of texts (available at: capital/ [accessed February 7, 2016]).

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133 My own extensive empirical analysis presented below, prov ides no room for doubting the idea that the capitalist system produces class consciousness among the bourgeoisie, as Marx would have it. powerful structural analysis must be complemented by a deeper interro gation of other axes of identity, such as nationalism transnationalism and globality The question, again, is how class consciousness is numerous subjective factors re lated, for example, to race, ethnicity, religion, and national belonging. In regards to the latter category, I find few reasons to disagree with the observation of Benedict Anderson (2006, p. 3; italics in original), who comments that anomaly for Marxist theory and, precisely for that rea predominance of class based identities of course served as the inspiration for 006, p. 10) iconic question in Imagined Communities : why is there no In other words: profit seeking, yes but that is not all that defines human beings and their life worlds. In turn what is needed to understand capitalist b ehavior not if, but where they choose to accumulate capital is to go beyond viewing the profit motive in isolation by conducting fine grained empirical analysis that allows us to capture how this particular goal is filtered through the other aforementioned prisms of identity (as well as others that are beyond the scope of my project)

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134 It is here that our story begins. The following two chapters present ethnographic inspired vignettes that delve into the life be globa l capita list class. Based on dozens of in depth, semi structured interviews with Latin American elites who have significant economic relationships with the Arab world, th ese chapter s explore how these actors make sense of their own protagonism in the global capita list system. Are they the stateless, free global of the global capitalism school? If not, what is the complex mix that defines their identities? Alongside the profit motive, w hat motivates them to rise every morning and toil away as the midwives of a global capitalist system the whole surface of the globe and drives nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, [and] p. 476)? B efore addressing these questions through an interpretive analysis of the stories of s even be global capitalist class, we must pause to consider the potentially significant role played by other axes of identit y, lest we construct a false narrative in which class and a stylized nationalism transnationalism globality divide crowd out all other mental frameworks. Based on a comprehensive analysis of these interviews, the two most relevant factors are ethnicity (an d particularly, Arab ethnicity) and religion. Here, I discuss them in turn followed by a review of the nationalism transnationalism globality debate At this point, a most important caveat is in order: while different forms of identity may indeed compete for predominance in the minds of the respondents, we cannot claim that they represent a zero sum game. That is, to take one example: a strong religious identity may supersede

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135 a class based one or it may mingle with it, reinforce it, and combine with it in novel ways. The task of the analyst, again, is to attempt to make sense of these complex arrangements. Finally, to close the chapter, I present an ov erview of my overall argument. Turco Race/ Ethnicity (and Class) in Neoliberal Latin America Unlike many ot her formerly colonized areas, Latin America is a region of relativ ely strong national identities (and, in turn, relatively few ethnically based social or separatist movements). Accordingly, from the Japanese in Brazil to J ews in Argentina have generally become recognized if not always accepted, components of the national imaginar ies of countries throughout the region So it is with Arab Latin Americans, who have integrated themselves into national life and, in many cases, mestizo elites w hile Here, race ethnicity, and class intersect in myriad ways. Their extensive intertwining is indeed a feature of both the world in gener al and perhaps Latin America in particular, where skin color ethnic traits, and socioeconomic status have been profoundly and inextricably linked since the colonial period (Mignolo 2005; Quijano 2000) In the case of Arab Latin Americans, the nexus betwee n popular understandings of turco pp. 317 318) aforementioned observations concerning Arab immigrants to Brazil who, as he arity, [and] detached from any loyalty and family or social obligations This, in turn Indeed, as noted above, it has long been the case that certain groups Arabs, Jews, etc. have been per ceived (or vilified ) as cosmopolitans

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136 the proper, national based concerns (such as the Portuguese in Brazil, Basque in Chile, etc.) Thus, the current analysis rejects any forced and false analytical separation of ethnic/racial and class based identities. Rather, the point for the moment is to isolate artificially the racial/ethnic axe s in the spirit of an ideal type in order to wrestle with their relative import vis vis the sight of the fact, again, that separating ethnicity, race and class at least in the Latin American context As noted, a great many of the protagonists behind these trade relations are themselves, un surprisingly, of Arab descent mostly Syrian or Lebanese in the Brazilian and Argentine cases, and Palestinian in Chile. One may reasonably suspe ct, then, that t urco ethnicity provides the subjective mooring that motivates these actors to serve as conduits for Arab Latin American exchange This ethnic angle as noted at the outset, is one of the very factors that makes the Arab Latin American case an intriguing one for analyzing capitalist identities. In other words, it is tempting to surmise that the day to day economic activities of Arab Latin American economic elites revolve around the Ar ab world precisely because their Arab background motivates them consciously or not, to focus on trading with Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine or, further afield, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco instead of China, North America, or Europe. Such is the case with opening vign ette, which frames one particular figure raison

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137 d'tre in terms of an identity dominated by notions of both Argentine and Lebanese exceptionalism. This place based worldview flies in the face of the hypothesis of a global capitalist class as a class for itself, which posits a global identity based on class lines and shared participation in particular global chains of accumulation For its part, a n Arab Latin American identity c ould represent a transnational consciousness th at is filtered by an ethnic lens Perhaps, in turn, both axes Arab identity and ( global ) class consciousness may exist simultaneously, overlapping with and to a large extent reinforcing one another. God before Class ? At the level of popular stereotype s bu siness and religion do not mix. The latter is a drag on the former as it introduces ethical reasoning and other extraneous considerations into the fundamentally amoral realm of buying and selling. As the nuclear power magnate C. Montgomery Burns from The S impsons once remarked while Family. Religion. Friendship. These are the three demons you must slay if you wish to succeed in business. When ernity hospital or sitting in some pho ny baloney church. Or synagogue (Ewalt 2005). Marx (1888, p. 475) is similarly religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of p hilistine sentimentalism, in the icy water p. 475). In reality, of course, many businesspeople are of course religious, and indeed many religious d en ominations and practices such as prosperity gospel provide convenient spiritual justifications for the accumulation of vast personal fortunes. In the

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13 8 United States, we are highly accustomed to this marriage of faith and opulence, embodied by elegantly dressed eschew traditional asceticism in favor of preach ing In the Latin American context, while traditional elites have often participated in exclusive sects such as the ultraconserva tive Catholic order Opus Dei, recent years have borne witness to the explosion of U.S. style charismatic Evangelical churches for P entecostal Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (Universal Church of the Kingdom of God). Appropriately fo r an organization that preaches (Chesnut 2003). While the lower classes were in many cases the first to convert, Evangelical congregations now draw from a range of socioeconom ic classes. Few works have seriously analyzed the religiosity of Arab Latin Americans, beyond the general story as noted earlier that many of the Arab immigrants who arrived to Latin America adhered to Orthodox Christianity. In recent years Islam has predo minated among the much smaller numbers of arrivals. As part of their general social cultural integration, Catholicism and, presumably, Evangelical Christianity have taken root among many of the longer standing pop ulations. Again, to the extent that religi on is a dominant motivator and axis of identity among these groups, it is an argument against the global capitalism school, which asserts a primary identity based on belonging to a global capitalist class. However, one could also conceptualize religion as its own sort of global identity This much is suggested by the Arabic term ummah which refers to the supranational Muslim community. Though this is not necessarily the case, religion thus at least has the

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139 potential to represent a distinct form of globality As is the case with prosperity gospel, class and religion may also intermingle in profound ways. On National Transnational and Global Class Identities More than religion, my analysis indicates that w hat defines the worldviews of the L atin Ame rican capitalist groups under investigation here is the lived tension between place based (national, ethnic transnational ) and place less ( global ) class identities. In other words religious affiliation (Orthodox Christian, Muslim Catholic, etc.) and oth er axes that I have left unexplored (including gender, sexual orientation, and so on) of course matter in how Latin American capitalists define, construct, and understand their own identities However national / ethnic transnational and global concerns an d the frictions between them weigh particularly heavily on the brains of these actors. It is to exploring the dynamic relationship between these mental frameworks, as well as evaluating their relative import for this segment of the Latin American capitalis t class, that I now turn. In so doing, the concern is again the extent to which they qualify as a global capitalist class. Making analytical sense of fluctuating and intersecting identities is of course no easy task Indeed, the difficulty of studying thi s topic p erhaps gives us a partial explanation as to why scholars laboring in this research area have mostly chosen to focus on objective instead of subjective aspects of globality This task my task is rendered even more difficult by two additional compli cations. First, these competing worldviews do not manifest themselves as merely an national transnational denational global continuum. Rather, as Manfred Steger (2008, p. 24

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140 observers confusing spectacles of social fragmentation and integration that cut across thus far from a static picture. Rather, it is a snapshot of a process that is very much in flux, and whose elements nationalism, transnationalism, globality, etc. come into contact in a dialectical process that creates new amalgamations of identity. To further extend the visual metaphor if global identities are on the rise, they are obviously not being painted onto blank canvases, as if the human mind were a tabula rasa a veritable Etch A Sketch whose lines fade away with a few shakes or, in this case, with the development of an increasingly interconnected global capitalist system. To the extent globality emerges inside of, and is conditioned by, the rse, to make sense of this dynamic and complicated process. The second complicating factor has to do with one of my core contentions: that capitalist elites utilize discourses about globalization, and presentations of their own d public opinion and serve their own material interests Specifically, as I argue, these groups spread the notion that they are globe trotting, cosmopolitan actors who are at the helm of a system to which per Margaret Thatcher The point is to demonstrate that the global capitalist juggernaut is a structural force that cannot be stopped and that its protagonists cannot be regulated by (territorially based) states. The self serving nature of these arguments and skepticism regarding the veracity of claims regarding global capitalist identities

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141 The reality, however, is even more convoluted: for capitalist elites have incentives to present their global discussed the latter. If ours is a world of fully global capitalist elites and yet nation based governance, then capitalists and capital are largely free to roam unfettered. This assertion of a glo bal to borrow again from the anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1999, p. 6). This becomes clear, as I will show in the following chapters through the recurrent (and often hyperbolic) concerns express ed by interviewees concerning the regulation of busi ness activities by the state. In regards to the former, there are also material benefits to the presentation of a A rooted patriotic sentiments. In much of the world, capitalists reside and operate within national contexts where the masses are becoming increasingly restive and suspicious of elite behavior Indeed, in many pla ces, capitalism as a system or at least its financialization is coming under fire for being the cause of periodic economic crises, inequality is becoming a common talking point on the national political agenda, and ris ing social movements are pushing back against decades of neoliberal reforms and general attacks on the welfare state and material wellbeing of the working class. It might be too much to speak of a crisis of ruling class hegemony, as some Gramsci inspired t hinkers would have it (see, for example: W. Robinson [ 2014 ] ). Yet cracks and new fault lines are clearly emerging as they perpetually do In this context, draping themselves in the language of the state, nation, and patriotism is a means as it has always been for

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142 Navigating between these two perspectives, in which there are structural incentives for these actors to present the mselves as both national and global comprises a further methodological and empirical challenge for this project. While inescapable, recognition of this difficulty provides further justification for my aforementioned methodological choices: the pursuit of an interpretive approach with an ethnographic sensibility, which as opposed to much contemporary political science research is highly attuned to context and well suited for the task of allowing us to enter into the constructed life worlds of these human ag ents. Summary of Argument Naturally, t he interviewees present complex identities in which ethnicity, religion, and numerous other factors are clearly present. However, overall, and based on the present analysis, class is the ubiquitous and inescapable invisible hand that serves as the primary, first order motivator of their behavior. In other words, at least in the present This, however, does not answer the guiding question of this study: is there such a thing as a (Latin American) global capitalist class? To phrase the query more usefully: what, again, are the interpretive frameworks through which this overriding class identity is filtered? Is the are behind Latin denational, global some mixture thereof, or something else entirely? To put the argument that emerges into its mo st stripped down form: the death of the nationalist imaginary has been greatly exaggerated. Place based capitalist mental

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143 framework s ( national and transnational ) con tinue to predominate; scattered hints of global belonging emerge, but are only nascent and inchoate; and even these continue to be dressed in national clothing. Based on the interviews, I speculate about the slow rise of a global capitalist class identity, though in the absence of longitudinal research, this is little more than a preliminary hyp othesis. While I will not engage in reckless generalizations based on these case specific findings this study provides ample reason to at least be skeptical of a weighty and diverse body of theoretical work ranging from that suggests that capitalist elites have unilaterally filed for divorce from the state. The last part of my argument confronts a remaining puzzle I f global capitalist identities are less real t han the conventional story told by conservatives, Marxists, and others in between suggests, then why do capitalist elites brag about their global credentials, and why has the idea of a stateless, free floating, cosmopolitan capitalist class permeated both lay and scholarly discourse? What in the material world explains the recurring appearance of this ideational construct, even when there is so little in the way of evidence to support it? To borrow from the celebrated economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman the interest of powerful groups (cited in: Chomsky 1996). As I will argue, global elites promote the idea of the globa l capita list class precisely because of its ideological content: it posits an ungovernable world in which capitalist elites have no material or ideational attachments to the state. Thus, it lays the ideological groundwork for a capitalist fantasyland in which

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144 regulation is both unthinkable and impossible. I do not mean to sugges t, naturally, that Marxist scholars of global political economy also intend to encourage such defeatism Yet through its at times overly aggressive assertions concerning the rise to hegemony of a seemingly omnipotent global capitalist class the global cap italism school has precisely the effect of disempowering those who seek to regulate the activities of capitalist elites or indeed imagine a different, alternative form of globalization. Before arriving at this endpoint, in the next two ch apters I tell the stories of seven representative figures from Latin Am be global capitalist class

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145 CHAPTER 5 THE TRADITION OF DEAD GENERATIONS: O N THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL LONGINGS My skeptical arguments concerning the existence of a global capitalist class are based on a careful analysis of the worldviews and actions of the Latin American this and the subsequent chapter, I tell several of their stories. Given the interpretive philosophy and approach that undergird this project, I present them in the following pages as ethnographic vignettes that are rich in context, sensory details, and meaning This format allows me to foreground the complexities of the conversations as well as provide my own analysis and reactions a living, breathing and situated human being (and interviewer, researcher, and conv ersation partner) who is engaging in a fluid and dynamic exchange of words and ideas. At least for present purposes, in which questions of meaning are paramount, this format is superior to the traditional political science approach toward interviewing, whi ch involves: A) speaking for interviewees instead of allowing their own voices and lived experiences to shine through; B) reproducing selected quotations without the surrounding context ; and C ) presenting an overly linear argument buttressed by univocal ev idence from interlocutors while foregoing the complexity of the real world. methodological advice again comes to mind As he argues : i avoid the simplistic reductionism so common among the present day butterfly collectors illusion that their findings can remove from history all its ambigui ties, conjectures, and p. 21). What the researcher needs instead

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146 (Cardoso 1977, p. 21). intersubjective understandings that shed light on how people construct, navigate, and p. 16). T he two following chapters both contain three ethnographic ally informed vignettes, one from ea ch of the principal countries Argentina, Brazil, and Chile under consideration. Most focus on particular individuals while another present s the stories of multiple figures within the same organization. In all instances, the actors under analysis are precis ely the merchant and other capitalist elite s who are responsible for the recent boom in Arab Latin American economic exchang e. I have chosen to portray these specific figures for two reasons. First, they are representative of the much larger body of interv iews and conversations And second, they bring to the foreground particular emblematic moments that will help draw our atten tion to important overall features of the subjective existence of the would be Latin American global capitalist class. In this firs t chapter, I present the stories of three suc h individuals and organizations. The first is Dr. Antonio Aramouni, an economist by training who founded and for decades has served as director of the Cmara de Comercio Argentino Libanesa (Argentine Lebanese Chamber of Commerce) Next are Nawfal Assa Mossa Alssabak and Jalal Jamel Dawood Chaya respectively, the president and administrative vice president of the Cmara de Comrcio e Indstria Brasil Iraque (Brazil Iraq Chamber of Commerce and Industry) The fin al interlocutor is J orge Daccarett, former executive director of International Cooperation Agency and founding executive director of the private sector Consejo Empresarial Chileno rabe ( Chilean

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147 Arab Business Council ) who is curre ntly a corporate consultant, international business professor, and advisor for Latin America with the Bank of Palestine. Together, these vignettes represent those whose mental frameworks display a strong place based (national and/or transnational) conscio usness, a subgroup that, as I argue, comprises a narrow majority within the larger population of the Latin American capitalist elite. It is important to note that even here t here are hints of denationalizing and, to a lesser extent, globalizing trends. Yet the class consciousness evinced by these actors is clearly filtered through an interpretive framework that is predominantly national or transnational In turn, t he next chapter analyzes three sets of actors whose class consciousness is less national or transnat i onal than denationalized or global I t is again fitting to note that i dentities are composed of complex mix tures of diverse, competing, and intermingling ideas. The national transnational denational global distinction thus cannot be reduced to dis crete categories For the sake of analysis, it is much more akin to a continuum, in which one expects to find different levels of all such phenomena coexisting within the mind of the same individual. At the conclusion of the empirical chapters, I proceed t o analyze these cases as a whole and develop my overall argument that this evidence does not suggest the existence of a global capitalist class To return to the present task the focus is on how the very same place based longings that a diverse group of t hinkers ranging from Samuel Huntington to leading lights of the global capitalism school and indeed including many globalization theorists in general argue are rapidly becoming obsolete are in fact a sticky and persistent feature of the contemporary world It is for this reason that the title of this chapter invokes Marx (1852, p. he tradition of all the dead generations

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148 This statement emphasizes the extent to which inherited st ructures constrain and condition human agency in the present. In (1852, p. 595) en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under cir cumstances directly found, given and transmitted and even transnational longings may appear pass in ingly hyper globalized world of free trade, cross border interconnectivity, and time space compression (Harvey 1990) place based interpretive framework, far from melting into air, continues to filter the profit seeking activities of many of But we are getting ahead of ourselves. To find out whether they fo rm a truly global and motivations that lay behind their economic activities. I also s ought out subtle verbal and non verbal cues. What follows are illustrative vignettes f rom the aforementioned interviewees, presented again with an ethnographic and interpretive sensibility. Together, they begin to tell the story of how this group of Latin American economic elites understands its globalizing activities and shed light on the complex amalgamations of diverse interpretive frameworks through which the se activities are filtered. Vignette #1: Antonio Aramouni Of the nearly $7 billion in annual Argentine exports to the Arab world representing more than a fourfold increase from a decade prior a relatively small but

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149 not insignificant amount of mostly agricultural and other food products (including mate 1 ), valued at just over $100 million, is destined for Lebanon. 2 Since its f ound ing in 1977 on the thirty fourth anniversary of Leban Cmara de Comercio Argentino Libanesa (Argentine Lebanese Chamber of Commerce) has labored to build these commercial and also social and cultural ties, el complejo y exigente contexto de la globalizacin demanding context of globalization). 3 To that end, the Cmara performs consulting work for businesses, connects sellers and buyers, issues certificates of origin for Argentine exports, and when practical, which, for reasons to be enunciated later, it is often not collaborates with the Argentine government. The Cmara 1990), as a breakaway organization from a now defunct Syrian Lebanese chamber of commerce. 4 Syria, as I am later inform ed has always wanted to Since its inception, the Cmara has been led by Dr. Antonio Aramouni, an la primera ola de inmigrantes (the first wave of immigrants) to arrive in Argentina from Lebanon. Indeed, among the 1 This refers to a caffeinated drink, nearly ubiquitous in Argentina, Uruguay, and some other parts of the Southern Cone, which is made from the dried l eaves of the yerba mate plant. 2 These figures are available at: (accessed February 1, 2016). By comparison, Argentina imports less than $3 million in Lebanese goods annually. 3 These quotes are drawn from different sections of the Cmara See: servicios/ and camara/nuestro emblema/ (both accessed February 1, 2016). 4 During its 29 year occupation of Lebanon, from 1976 gained almost exclusive control of Lebanon's politics and economy also maintained a military presence, which, at its high point, consisted of 30,000 soldiers. Lebanese reactions to the Syrian presence were mixed from those who celebrated brothers in arms in the face of the Israeli enemy as my interviewee, who decried Syrian involvement in Lebanon on national (as well as, at least implicitly, religious) grounds. For additional background, see Fattah (2005).

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150 up to several million Argentines who claim Arab descent, Lebanon, along with Syria, are by far the most common countries of origin. As we chat over tea, a dark wooden mural occupying nearly the entirety of the rear wall sta res back at me. It features an etching of the famous Lebanese cedar tree, accompanied by images of Phoenician merchants and their trading ship. Lest the symbolism be lost on us, the Cmara notes: The typical merchant vessel of the Phoen icians was used by these traders par excellence to crisscross all the seas of the Old World, exchanging goods, art, and culture. The cedar an ancient tree, almost eternal, praised time and again in the Bible is the national symbol of glorious LEBANON. 5 W e may assume that this capitalization of the country name was not accidental. Likewise, the Cmara wrapped aro und the outside in English, Spanish, and Arabic, the evocation of the Lebanese people as preternaturally gifted merchants is clear. 6 The traditional Argentine sun which occupies the center of the national flag radiates outward from the ship. 5 Translation is my own. Original text La tpica nave mercante de los fenicios es la que estos comerciantes por excelencia utilizaron para surcar todos los mares del antiguo mundo, intercambiando bienes, arte y cultura. El cedro, rbol milenario, casi eterno, alabado una y otra vez en la Biblia, es el smbolo nacional del glorioso LI BANO It is available at : camara/nuestro emblema/ (accessed February 1, 2016). 6 Indeed, a propensity for commerce is often held by Lebanese and non L ebanese alike to be firmly exploits of the Phoenicians in sailing and commerce, and has its contemporary equivalent in parts of the Lebanese diaspora, suc h as in West Africa. As the BBC notes, the Lebanese West African population is one of the most difficult and dangerous places to do business the Lebanese tenacity, aptitude for business and drive to succeed story of the arrival of the Lebanese in West Africa. As legend has it: Sometime toward the end of the 19 Century, a ship l oad of Lebanese immigrants was heading to Brazil, seeking profit from the booming new world. The first stop after several weeks sailing was

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151 The office bu ilding that hosts the Cmara like much of the teeming microcentro (downtown) of Buenos Aires, appears tired and faded. Yet it maintains a stately, old European air that evokes the Argentina of 100 years prior, when the country was among the top 10 global economies. With the fastest economic growth rates of any country during the pre World War I period, according to The Economist (2014) or, more precisely, endless cycles of booms and busts, as well a s democracy and dictatorship. and stereotypes concerning its people, n one more than the (in)famously brash inhabitants of Buenos Aires, known as porteos (literally, port dwellers). As The New York Times heir European ancestry and culture to their Latin Thus, as any viewer of an intra regional ftbol (soccer) match can (Sims 1998). If nationalist sentiment should abound anywhere in Latin America, Argentina is a prime candidate. My interlocutor does not disappoint. After our initial exchange of pleasantries, I begin to answer his question about the topic of my research only to be promptly interrupted upon my mention of Arab Latin American relations. He interjects: Lebanon is I am made to Senegal and the story goes the somewhat unworldly Lebanese passengers got off believing they had arrived in Sout h America. (Walker 2010)

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152 feel that f orcing these singular countries into such broad, plebeian regional categories is clearly a sign of sloppy thinking. As I learn, t igualar between Lebanon and its would bajar and thus demean) them. As he sits behind his massive wooden desk, concluding his speech on Lebanese and Argentine exceptionalism while opening a recently arrived letter from cristianos como l his fellow Leban ese Catholics, he later tells me are not like (read: are superior to) other religious minorities in Argentina, as they intermarry with other groups thus achieving a deeper sociocultural integrat ion with the local society. I take advantage of a brief pau se, while he struggles to print me a copy of the Cmara of which he is clearly quite proud to peruse the office. As I glance at the well ordered bookshelves that surround the outside window, I am greeted with titles such as Crimes a gainst Business and You Can Negotiate Anything On cue, he erupts with a litany of accusations against the populist and statist Argentine government of then president Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner hace todo lo posible por no exportar not mejores corruptos no hay absolutamente physically, mentally, and even genetically, down to the level of her cells; t estupideces As I discover later, what Argentina should be doing is following the example of Chile, the perennial Latin American neoli beral poster Chile es mejor

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153 clima social climate). Based on this narrative of reverence for what he understands to be the uber 7 curious moments, he even Elegiste bien Indeed, so common are fawning, hagiographic invocations of the Chilean model by Latin American elites as being a source of inspiration for all matters economic that I the profound authoritarian legacies left behind by the Pinochet regime (including the constitution, which was imposed under authoritarian rule but is still in use, or impunity for perpetrators of massive human rights abuses), or the fact that for the hundreds of thousands por una educacin gratuita y de calidad quality education), Chile is less a model to be followed than an ominous forewarning of how neoliberal reforms punish everyone from the poor to the middle class and have produced what has been called (Loofbourow 2013). But why work so hard to promote business in a country that in his view unlike the Chilean foil throws up endless obstacle s to his success (and, apparently, his 7 Though subjected to an extreme market fundamentalism during the Pinochet regime (1973 1990) by the Chilean economy continues to fe ature several anomalies that complicate the narrative of Chile as a neoliberal Eden on earth. These include national ownership of a significant portion of the highly lucrative copper industry and a publicly funded national healthcare plan ( Fondo Nacional d e Salud ; National Health nearly universal health coverage World Bank 2013), the likes of which would provoke fire and brimstone warnings of a communist takeover if attempted in the U.S.

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154 todo lo que se puede trade relations between Lebanon and Argentina? He may earn his living as a management consultant, he remarks B ut what he lives for presidente Cmara por amor a la tierra de mis padres una cuestin patritica reservoir of feelings and nostalgia concerning his family and ancestors who happen to hail from Lebanon, el pas ms importante del mundo rabe c ountry in the Arab world). At no other point in our conversation does he refer to Lebanon or the Lebanese people as belonging to a larger Arab collective. Such is his love of Lebanon that he is even willing to partially overcome his deep seated aversion to Islam and Islamism the two being synonymous in his mind to express muted appreciation to Hezbollah for what he perceives to be its role in helping to defend Lebanon from Israel. s in absolutamente unlike in Saudi Arabia, hated Syria, or todos son trilinges (everyone is trilingual). As the entire population of Lebanon is not really trilingual, o f todos cannot apparently refers to whom he later calls a largely anachronistic term to mo ney aristocrats who belong to the traditional nobility and view themselves as models of

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155 moral rectitude. Tellingly, few Latin Americans beyond those who actually belong to such groups that is, people like my interviewee use this highly classist expression in public without at least a tinge of irony. Argentina and more specifically, the Argentine government un impedimento Lebanon, yet it is still a place that he claims as his own. Are you patriotic, I ask? He por supuesto times in quick succession. Throughout our conversation, he asserts a strong Argentine identity the kind one expects to find among porteo s He refers to nuestra our Argentine pope, and a personal friend (indeed he offers to send me a picture of them of trickle in the goodness of those wielding economic (Downie 2013). National identity apparently trumps political ideology. Overall, he cl aims a shared nationalism (and exceptionalism) between the Lebanon of his ancestors and the Argentina that he calls home. In fact, the first nationalism reinforces the latter, as evidenced by his interest in highlighting the contributions of Lebanese immig rants and their descendants to all facets of Argentine society, ranging from music to government. As he notes, the argentinos libaneses

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156 (Lebanese todo el pas nuestro duty as a member of this group to build relations between servir patriticamente them. In other words, he is like the local Maronite church that he frequents: as he puts it, a piece of Lebanon in Bu enos Aires (he willingly recounts that the church was designed by Lebanese architects, the stones were imported from Lebanon, and even no es nada fcil easy). But it is where his cedar t ree has put down its roots. Vignette #2: Nawfal Assa Mossa Alssabak and Jalal Jamel Dawood Chaya I had become convinced that the Cmara de Comrcio e Indstria Brasil Iraque (Brazil Iraq Chamber of Commerce and Industry) either did not exist, or at best a mounted to little more than a shell organization My several a ttempts during 2013 to contact the Cmara elicited no response. Further, w scope seemed too limited to warrant anything beyond the most skelet al of operations name, website, and little else. After all, given the seemingly hegemonic presence of the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce which I discuss in the next chapter in the gamut of matters linking Brazil with the Arab world, what room could there be for a chamber with a partially overlapping and much narrower, purview? The following year, after another attempt at contact, I received a prompt response from the Cmara leadership and an offer to devise a comprehensive itinerary for my visit To my surprise t hey took me under their wing for more than a week of interviews, guided visits to related organizations (including the nearby Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce and the further afield Arab and South American

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157 Library and Research Center [ BibliASPA]), shared trays of baklava and invited buffet lunches at the Al Maza Arab restaurant on the corner. Such was my level of access that I found myself sharing birthday cake wit h the Cmara dozen employees and student interns while Portuguese and Arabic office banter filtered over the cubicle walls. In addition to its robustly staffed Brazil office which is home to more than twice as many employees as the much older and more br oadly based Arab Argentine Chamber of Commerce the Cmara maintains an Iraq based representative. The So Paulo headquarters occupies what appears to be the better part of a Resting upon rows of dark columns, the high plate glass. It is the sort of generic skyscraper that would not be out of place in any business district within a global mega city and this is exactly where we are From Al Maza a quick right leads to the bustling Avenida Paulista (Paulista Avenue), So most emblematic street and traditional economic hub, and one of Latin estate markets. Once I pass t hrough the revolving doors a security team demands my passport and fingerprints and makes a quick phone call to verify that the Cmara has indeed solicited my presence. At the Cmara Ch aya, both Iraqi born middle aged men who have called Brazil home for over three decades the latter having arrived in 1978 to avoid military service, and the former in mulher The gregarious, chatty, and smooth talking Alssabak my primary interlocutor over the course of the visit, i s a busy man and frequently keeps me waiting as he fields phone calls, prances from office to office and

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158 alternates between dictating orders to and telling jokes with his staff Along with directin g the Brazi l Iraq Chamber, he presides over the Cmara de Comrcio e Indstria Islmica Brasileira (Islamic Brazilian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), is a successful entrepreneur and is pursuing graduate studies in business administration with a focus at the Universidade Paulista (Paulista University) Together, Alssabak and Chaya lead an organization whose Brazilian products sold t o the Iraqi market 8 And w ith what Alssabak describes as an increase from $42 million in Brazilian exports to Iraq at the Cmara to $1.5 billion today, business is booming. It is no coincidence that the Cmara opened its doors the same year as the U.S. invasion of Iraq. the country culminated not only in the toppling of the 24 year Saddam Hussein dictatorshi p, but also heralded the end of a strict U.S. led and United Nations imposed sanctions regime that had prevented any significant growth in Brazilian Iraqi commercial flows. Yet economic obstacles to Brazil Iraq ties were not exclusively external. Chaya re based on an ideological mixture of socialism and pan Arabism controlled some 95 percent of Iraq Order 39, as decreed by U.S. diplomat and then de 8 Original Portuguese a Cmara Brasil Iraque amplia a pauta de exportaes e os volumes de produtos brasileiros vendidos ao mercado iraquiano The translation is my own. See (accessed February 1, 2016).

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159 fact o ruler of Iraq Paul Bremer, to paraphrasing Marx (1888, pp. 476 477) batter[] down all [Iraqi] walls that 200 Iraqi state companies would be privatised; decreed that foreign firms can retain 100% ownership of Iraqi banks, mines and factories; and allowed these firms to move 100% of their profits out of Iraq. The Economist declared the new rules a (Klein 2003). Now, a percent of what Iraqis consume is imported. 9 instabilidade igual tem 32 milhes de consumidores que tm que consumir still has 32 millio n consumers who have to consume ). and budding halal superpower. fifth (Gomes 2014). For both men, and the Cmara privatizao (privatization) of nearly everything in Iraq servios pblicos services) divulgar produto s brasileiros (promote Brazilian products) in the land of their birth everything from food and construction materials to cars and health and safety services. 10 9 (accessed February 1, 2016). 10 between the two countries, see the following report from the Chamber (accessed February 1, 2016).

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160 Yet theirs are not precisely the politics of exiles waiting in the wings who attached themselv es Ahmed Chalabi style 11 to an invading force with the hope and expectation of future spoils. Neither speaks with any elation about the U.S. invasion nor let s their apparent distaste for the Hussein regime color their overall opinions of the Iraq that they left behind. As we s i t across from each another at one en d of a long conf erence room table, Chaya remarks era um pa s muito industrializado under predecessors Iraqi citizens were more educated than Brazilians. The government, he notes premier universities. 200 8, he returned to Baghdad the city of his birth for the first time in decades, accompanying Eduardo Suplicy, a senator from the left Paulo. 12 Suplicy recounts that Alssabak grew desapontado for he could no longer recognize the Baghdad of his youth, which he regarded as the most um sinal da diviso que hoje marca o Iraque today ) ( O Estado 2008). Nothing better captures his complicated emotional bond with Iraq than the famously difficult to translate Portuguese word and Lusophone cultural marker 11 A recurring figure in Iraqi politics until his recent death, Chalabi rose to fame (and notoriety) in the U.S. as a darling of the neoconservative movement. He helped to sell the 2003 invasion to both the U.S. government and general public through the provision of false intelligence c oncerning the Hussein be terrorist links and weapons of mass destruction program. 12 See the aforementioned report, available at: http://www. (accessed February 1, 2016).

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161 saudade can i t often carries an assurance that this thing you feel nostalgic for will never happen again (Garsd 2015). Accordingly, Alssabak may have physically returned to Iraq, but to borrow from the eponymous Thomas Wolfe novel, on a spiritual level he truly to an Iraq that perhaps only partially ever was and that more certainly now no longer is. What he and they can fomentar o comrc io between the two countries they have called home [ contribuir] para o estabelecimento de um canal direto entre empresrios brasileiros e iraquianos ([contribute] to the establishment of a direct channel between Brazilian and Iraq i businesspeople). 13 In practice, this entails everything from conducting and publicizing market research to shaking the important hands of po litical and economic elites from visiting delegations and making regular business trips (some 7 times a year, in Brazilian Chamber is reportedly unwilling and /or unable to do. And it is here, by charging interested business es for services rendered, Iraq bound Brazilian goods, that Alssabak and Chaya have found their apparently profitable niche (though the Cmara itself is not a profit seeking entity). 14 13 Quem Somos http: // (accessed February 1, 2016). 14 Ibid.

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162 Th is dialectical interplay between two seemingly opposing (but ultimately intertwined) forces the nostalgia inducing Iraq that percolates through childhood memories and the cold, economic logic of the business world plays itself out repeatedly during our conversations. Here, responses to my iterations of question that is, why do you do what you do? yield illustrative, if complicated, responses. Let us take, for example, the genealogy that Chaya presents of his own involvement with the Cmara The first round of questioning reveals a compelling and ajudar a populao necessidade this kind of help, and 4) wants to reconstruir o pas Given my social science training, I wonder, h ow does Chaya operationalize and measure the success of his altruistic endeavors? How does he know if he, and the Cmara are succeeding? He succinctly reports the f resultados balana com ercial vis its imports. He makes no mention of rebuilding reconstruction helping or other turn, he responds only by citing the aforementioned increase from $42 million to $1.5 billion in annual Brazilian exports. Whether the Cmara omoting this astronomical growth in Brazilian trade with Iraq, or creating an export surplus for Brazil actually has any salutary effects for Iraq (let alone the general population of Brazil) is beside the point. What is relevant here is the underlying as sumption that it is so obvious that this must be the case that one need not present any supporting evidence. In this

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163 sense, Alssabak and Chaya are the living as they believe that their individual actions will au tomatically bring social benefits to their (suffering) Iraqi compatriots. 15 From here, the waters continue to muddy. T [Brazilian] trade equals [Iraqi] absent the provision of an explanation of this would be causal link, even when I ask, appears self serving. This is, after all, the Brazil Iraq Chamber of Commerce and Industry not a beneficence society. And yet the Cmara tem desenvolvido e facilitado atividades culturais e sociais que reforaram a cooperao entre o Brasil e o Iraque em muitas reas 16 (has developed and facilitated cultural and social activities that strengthened cooperation between Brazil and Iraq in many areas) should not fall on totally deaf ears as exemplified by references to having provided aid to an Iraqi hospital or its role in organizing the first ever soccer match between the two countries, an international friendly held in Sweden in October 2012. Such was the symbolic importance of the latt er that Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lists the occurrence though without referencing the results, a 6 0 Brazilian thrashing of the Iraqi side in its 15 The same ideological framework rears its head to a perhaps even greater extent on the Cmara website. Consider the desenvolvimento (development) a Cmara Brasil Iraque promove o desenvolvimento atravs da aproximao comercial entre Brasil e Iraque he Brazil Iraq Chamber promotes development through closer commercial ties between Brazil a nd Iraq). To clarify, a few lines later, we learn that the Cmara promove continuamente o comrcio entre o Brasil e o Iraque como forma de levar o desenvolvimento aos mercados e empresas dos dois pases q as a way of bringing development to the markets and business of both countries ; emphasis added). See the Mensagem do Presidente (accessed February 1, 2016). 16 See, again: (accessed February 1, 2016).

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164 17 It is precisely on the terrain of having a s ocial and not just commercial mission that this Cmara carves out an identity for itself that differs from that of its much larger Arab Brazilian counterpart 18 Indeed, t he Cmara transferncias ers) that may bring Brazil and Iraq together, as Chaya frames it, even when the profit motive is not involved. Yet the fact that they are unable to explain the link between the economic activities from which they do profit, and the social ones from which t hey do not does not make them hypocrites (though it does, perhaps, suggest a certain lack of reflexivity concerning their everyday activities and place in the world). Rather, it is a well timed reminder for us to recognize that the profit motive is translated into real world action only after passing through a series of interpretive frameworks, the sum o f which may lack a degree of internal coherence to the outside observer. ters indeed. Perhaps we should not be surprised then that Alssabak could salivate over the business opportunities hasty privatization scheme while simultaneously suggesting that the famous Bolsa Famlia (Fam ily Allowance) program, which 17 See: of iraq&catid=155&l ang=en&Itemid=478 (accessed February 1, 2016). 18 Though Alssabak later organizes and whisks me away to a cordial meeting with the Arab Brazilian Alssabak histor y of all matters related to Arab Brazilian commerce, which I have not been able to verify independently, the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce is the product of a fusion that occurred several decades ago between predecessor Iraqi and Syrian chambers. Per this account, the agreement was to rotate the presidency in three year terms between leaders from the two communities; however, the called to enter the office of the Arab from the Brazil Iraq Chamber who had been helping to facilitate the logistics surrounding my visit, had to wait outside.

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165 establishes a system of conditional cash transfers to low income households, could be social maladies. Or that Chaya could shift effortlessly from that is, to a lar ge extent, his and own initiative in promoting Iraqi Brazilian ties to declaring that the Cmara need s and get s from the staging of trade fairs, workshops, and commercial missions to organizing meetings and signing relevant accords. ajuda com os neg cios While my Argentine interviewees in particular stressed the ideological and personal conflicts that define their relationship with the government, here the Cmara has made common cause with the left leaning president Dilma Rouss eff, a portrait style photo of whom along with one of her Iraqi counterpart is displayed prominently in the office waiting room. From ideology to identity, theirs is a mixed, fluid, dynamic, and hybrid world. tem medo asserts that money is money for businesspeople. There are invocations of recon struction, aid for an Iraqi hospital, and building goodwill through staging a futebol (soccer) match, all in support of the notion that this Cmara has a particularly social mission B ut loja comrcio and agricultor no sangue A nd then there is the Alssabak who leaves me

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166 waiting in a nearby cubicle as he lays out his prayer rug, closes the office blinds, and begins his ritual act of worship, but who also as both a Muslim and president of the Islamic Brazilian Chamber, is keenly aware per a recent academic paper that he jointly authored t he rapid growth of Muslim directed food markets and the da Cunha et al. 2013, p. 282) of which he is naturally a part. How, then, to classify their worldviews? What are the interpretive filters through which their profit motive passes? How do they navigate between the Iraqi and Brazilian flags and presidential photos that adorn the walls of the office waiting room ? Searching for a more tangible heuristic, I ask for the Cmara Alssabak responds: the Cmara brasileira origem iraquiana alguns dos fundadores so brasileiros tambm founders are also Brazilian). Such is the intricate latticework of intersecting and at times competing Iraqi and Brazilian ties that largely defines not only the Cmara founding, but also the capitalist worldviews of its entrepreneurial leaders. And while I have been at pains to disentangle them, the more telling point for present purposes is that either way, it is one or another set of place based (national and transnational) allegiances and the interactions between them that largely defines their life worlds and guides the trajectory of their capitalist behavior. Vignette #3: Jorge Daccarett As a freshly minted PhD Candidate with grant funds in my pocket, a fast approaching departure date for a one way ticket to Santiago de Chile, and stacks of English Spanish and Portuguese language Institutional Review Board stamped consent forms awaitin g the opportunity to be read and signed by eager would be

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167 interviewees, I had made all of the logistical preparations but none of the actual contacts for my initial, multi country research sojourn Hoping and needing to break into the seemingly esoteric w orld of Arab Latin American business connections, the multi hatted Jorge Daccarett political appointee, university professor, business consultant, and charity administrator became my lifeline. As I would soon learn, t he Consejo Empresarial Chileno rabe (C hilean Arab Chilean Daccarett was the founding executive director had recently gone into hibernation, thus providing a retroactive explanation for my unanswered phone calls ( and the concerns over the viability of my project that accompanied them). Yet once a Google search led me to his government email account, only seven minutes separated my initial, introductory message and his amiable response It included both his personal e ncantado de apoyar [me] en el tema In June 2013, a few days after I stepped off the plane in Santiago, he would become the first of my several dozen interviewees a mong the Latin American business elite; two years later, when I was back in Chile for a variety of personal and professional reasons, he would also become the last. Then serving as the executive director of the governmental Agencia de Cooperacin Internac ional de Chile (AGCI; Chilean International Cooperation Agency) 19 a position to which he was appointed by the right wing government of Sebastin Piera in 2011, Daccarett invited me for our first encounter to his eighth floor 19 It has since been rechristened as the Agenci a Chilena de Cooperacin Internacional para el Desarrollo (AGCID; Chilean Agency for International Cooperation for Development)

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168 office within the greying but stately Ministry of Foreign Affairs in downtown Santiago. So regular would become my presence in the Ministerio (Ministry) due to a steady stream ies that I was soon on a first name basis with the morning security guard, who began to grant me single use, building access cards without the requisite inspection of my passport. st ated lesser development and articulate opportunities for cooperation in favor of Chile to overcome areas defined as pressing 20 Ac cordingly, the A the dual function or at least goal of simultaneously promoting both national and international development. As he explains, this position has nothing to do with the Arab world, save for a few small projects with Pale As helpfully delineated in his English language LinkedIn profile, 21 other roles have included a stint as executive director of Beln 2000 Fundacin Palestina ( Bethlehem 2000 Palestinian Foundation), a Santiago based charity that seeks to harness the resources of Palestinian descendant and other Chileans to 22 and an ongoing part time 20 de agci/quienes somos (accessed February 1, 2016). Translation is my own. Original Spanish Coordina[r] la cooperacin que entrega Chile a pases d e igual o menor desarrollo y articula oportunidades de cooperacin en favor de Chile para superar reas definidas como prioritarias y deficitarias del desarrollo nacional 21 See: https://cl.linked (accessed December 1, 2015). 22 fundacion/mision y vision/ (accessed D ecember 1, 2015). Translation is my own. Original Spanish t rabajamos por mejorar

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169 professorship in intern ational business at the exclusive Opus Dei affiliated Universidad de los Andes (University of the Andes) There, on a privileged, 52 hectare campus in the foothills of the longest mountain range located within the posh, east side municipality of Las Condes the same high powered neighborhood that is home to the Sanhattan Daccarett and Bogot so that t 23 However, Daccarett and to an extent still is the Chilean Arab Busin Returning to the same metaphor, the Consejo 24 Lamentablemente (Regrettably), n umerous factors led Daccarett to m ore or less pull the plug on the Consejo in 2011 including his own assumption of public office, as well as a perceived lack of substantive interest among the Consejo Chilean membership base. Yet la calidad de vida del pueblo palestino, a travs de ayuda solidaria orientada a las familias de ms escasos recursos 23 See, again: (accessed December 1, 2015). 24 LinkedIn page, available at: arab business council (accessed December 1, 2015).

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170 increased Arab Latin American economic exchange lives on through wistful references to one day relaunching the organization as a proper he took on just months before our wi th the Bank of Palestine. Eager to avoid a late arrival to my first meeting, I allowed well over an hour for the late morning commute by bus and then subway core from my cousin in though earthquake scarred apa rtment in the mixed class, southeastern Santiago municipality of Macul My abundance of caution afforded me a few minutes in the mid winter cold to admire La Moneda the same presidential palace that only four decades prior had been subjected to intense bo mbing by the military coup and a seventeen 25 and savage repression at the hands of the Augusto Pinochet regime (1973 1990) During the short walk from the seat of government to the Ministry, I pass a monument to the deposed socialist president Salvador Allende. I ts base bears an Tengo fe en Chile y su destino Only minute s but worlds away Plaza de la Constitucin (Constitution Square), I find myself seeking to build rapport by accepting a cup of tea and making banal conversation about crowded conditions on Line 1 of the Santiago Metro 25 This phrase antologa del horror is attributed to the celebrated Argentine writer Ernesto Sbato, experience with authoritarian rule during the same period (de Ramn 2010, p. 239).

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171 hemisphere He shrugs off my attempt to establish common ground, commenting that an unspecified number of years ha ve passed since his last ride. Allen destiny since the pacted and fragmentary 1990 tr ansition to democracy than an unwavering commitment to the free movement of goods and capital. The details of the M ilton Friedman and Chica go Boy led authoritarian imposition of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as its subsequent universalization across mainstream Chilean politics in the post Pinochet democratic order, need not detain us here (Funk 2012; Harvey 2005; Haughney 2006 ; Valds 2008). Rather, what is germane fo r present purposes is that post dictatorship, neoliberal Chile is said to have more free trade agreements than any other country in the entire world ( AmricaEconoma 2013). As Daccarett later notes approvingly the together comprise a staggering 92 percent of global GDP. 26 His subsequent declaration that Chile tiene un inters en tener una apertura comercial con la mayor cantidad de pases del mundo in having open trade with the largest number of countries around the world) thus r equires no further elaboration. In the admiring jealous words of the right wing Argentine intellectual Mariano Grondona (2003) Chile no se casa con nadie. vender adonde pueda [i.e. intimate ] ). 26 86.3 percent. See the website of DIRECON (or Direccin General de Relac iones Econmicas Internacionales General Directorate of International Economic Relations ), available at: (accessed December 1, 2015).

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172 commercial policy with an Arab world and particularly Gulf region, that is thirsting for : 1) reliable suppliers of agricultural goods thus improving depends heavily on imports to satisfy domestic consumption and ; 2) attractive investment destinations that can absorb the seemingly endless stream of petrodollars shipping, and so on) spewing from the overflowing coffers of its sovereign wealth funds. 27 Chile, with its bountiful harvests of agricultural products ranging from apples, grapes, pears, almonds, and avocados to wine and farm raised salmon and its reputation as an economi abierto, serio y confiable (open, serious, and trustworthy) adjectives that are repeated ad nauseam by the political class ( La Nacin 2015) 28 thus seems to fit the bill nicely. In other words, as Daccarett notes at the very beginning of our conversation, he quickly realized aqu hay una oportunidad interesante que hay que explotar opportunity here that needs to be taken advantage of). 29 Indeed, he would repeat the keywords ies again during our visits. And th e 2008 founding of the Consejo under the auspices of the powerful Sociedad de Fomento Fabril or SOFOFA ( the Chilean Federation of Industry according to the official translation, bu t whose name more precisely equates to the 27 For more information on such fu nds and their arrival to Latin American markets, see Santiso (2013). 28 In this case, the speaker was the current president Michelle Bachelet, though one does not need to search long nor hard to encounter virtually identical utterances of Chilean exception alism from other 29 He was not alone. Before leaving for a trade fair in Brazil, my cousin in law handed me a sampler of frutos secos (dried fruit and nuts) to present to Daccarett during our meeting. I politely demurred.

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173 Society for Manufac turing or Industrial Promotion), the stated mission of which is to 30 marked a definite step forward in the efforts of the Chilean busine ss class to attempt to seize them. T he Consejo could certainly claim a blue blooded pedigree First, i t was born within SOFOFA after a series of back and forth exchanges with the sector leading, organization, the Arab Braz ilian Chamber of Commerce Second, its founding came York alongside Bill Clinton, Jordan's King Abdullah II, the Crown Prince of Bahrain, and 100 CEOs from both the U.S. and the Arab world, as well a s his organization of a business forum that included such luminaries as president Michelle Bachelet and the Lebanese (Daccarett excitedly recounts that the two ate breakfast together i n response to my question, he confirms that Slim paid) In sum, the stars seemed to align for a dramatic surge in Arab Chilean trade. Initial signs were indeed auspicious. Adopting the model of the Arab Brazilian Chamber, which had presented then president Lula with a well received plan to fomentar el comercio working relationship with his administration, the Consejo entered into dialogue with Bachelet and the various arms of the stat e international trade bureaucracy The aim was hay oportunidades participation, along with a (n) delegacin empresarial importante important business 30 See the SOFOFA website, available at: (accessed February 1, 2016).

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174 delegation), in the second ASPA summit (held in Doha in 2009). Daccarett et al. placed particular emphasis on (successfully) using a government grant to obtain halal certification, which involved working with a local mosque, conducting seminars and workshops, and helping the Chilean business communit de qu se trata el halal He quickly adds that halal certification brings access to markets beyond the Arab world, as there are also many halal consumers in Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and India (and indeed, in Europ Yo no soy musulmn Pero es un mercado interesante Though Arab Chilean trade, as noted, has indeed experienced a significant increase in recent years, Dacca muy incipiente [s] road to realizing his ambition of replicating the Brazilian success story. First, w hile Brazil tom una poltica de aper tura hacia el mundo rabe muy intensa intense policy of openness toward the Arab world), s commitment was never more than lukewarm, its gaze firmly dir ected toward more geographically immediate Asian Pacific growth market s Chile no tiene inters he declares. By way of supporting evidence, he points to a string of missed opportunities and bungled interactions such as the two occasions on which the Emir of Qatar had Sabes la respuesta de Chile ? response was?), Daccarett asks me rhetorically. With a mocking incredulous tone, he recounts the message that the government transmitted to the Qataris: that they could

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175 not receive him because it was summer and everyone was on vacation. Instead, the Emir went to Venezuela, Uruguay, Brazil and he reports with a special brand of geopolitical rivals even Peru Thus, when he hay mucho por hacer Chile est very behind expressing concern not only with missed opportunities for Arab Chilean trade, but that Chile is starting to lag vis vis its peers. P rospectors from the Gulf are circling the dismay that the Peruvian port of Callao has received hundreds of millions of dollars in investments from DP World a Dubai based corporation that op 31 while Chile appears as empty space on the company map. 32 Another rhetorical question follows, this time reflecting his tendency to sprinkle his native Spanish wit h key business terms in English : Sabes cuntos investments estn recibiendo esos pases ? are receiving?). To stop the economic bleeding he suggests choosing diplomats perhaps, I wonder, like himself who are linked to the business sector and actually understand the Arab world. 33 31 I found this information on the DP World website, availabl e at: dp world/ (accessed December 1, 2015). 32 See: business/marine terminals/ (accessed December 1, 2015). 33 estaba newly assigned al mundo rabe, y tena un mapa del mundo rabe que inclua Afganistn y Paquistn, y yo dije no, no, no, no, no, e sos no son rabes assigned to the Arab world, and had a map of the Arab world that included Afghanistan and Pakistan, and [ countries ] ). Hay mucho desconocimiento ignorance), he su seor con turbante que habla raro (man with a turban who talks weird).

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176 The unexpected second issue was precisely the Arab Chilean composition of the Arab Chilean Consejo While its membership base essentially consisted of empresarios de muy buenos nombres, todos de origen ra be un link commercial region or even a particular interest in developing one. Lesson learned: ethnic Arab Chilean capital will not carry the day. Entonces obviamente que no importa si el empresario es o no es rabe, lo que importa es que el empresario tenga un inters comercial e n la regin b, what matters is if the businessperson has a commercial interest in the region). As he later explains contemplating my future meetings si t vas a ver a algn empresario rabe, what are you really doing [to promote relations with the Arab world] ? Nada [ to promote relations with the Arab world]? Nothing). All of the preceding translated both into difficulties with funding the Consejo operations and its conversion into a one man operation. By the end el Consejo era yo I was the Council). Next time and one imagines that there will indeed be a next time he will try to establish a proper Cmara Me encantara to), he gushes. all est el tema como dormido asleep), and ye oportunidad interesante de negocios opportunity) remains. How about a halal lamb slaughterhouse in the Chilean outpost of

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177 For reasons (geographic or otherwise) that he does not explain, t puede ser un tremendo negocio huge business). And what about importing Qatari gas to curry favor so that the Emir will Chile. I think that h e thinks that he can make it all happen. necesito funding And he says mockingly, for the Chilean business class which obsesses over Orientalist images of halal certification, in which a curious figure from the mosque pon[e] [ and says weird things) to overcome its exportndoles a estos musulmanes and realize that the Arab world represents once agai n, una oportunidad interesante de negocios This is not to say that his efforts including preparing reports for high level officials, r eceiving visiting delegations of political and economic leaders, organizing busin ess forums, participating in international trade fairs, literally taking Chilean businesspeople to Dubai and training a new generation of trade promoters in cultural awareness and sensitivity w ere for naught. And indeed, he points to certain successes, based Gulfood, which describes itself as and the place 34 While the horrible n ow his se tomaron en serio el tema de 34 (accessed December 1, 2015).

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178 verdad really), and recently won an award for their exhibition. But there is an opportunity to do much, much more. At this point, I wonder why he is such a stickler for cultural knowle dge or what el tema rabe beyond profit, he does any of this in the first place. What does he make of himself as a Chilean of Palestinian descent who speaks Arabic, has a local cell phone in Dubai, and displays a health y obsession with promoting Arab Chilean economic exchange? And when I comment that very little is known in the U.S. about Arab Latin American relations, why does he stress that this is obvio r Latin America or the Arab world, before breaking into a derisive laugh? What meaning does he attach est lleno, lleno, lleno de personas de origen rabe cristiano ople of Arab Christian descent)? T hat Arab Latin Americans are a prominent if not dominant business class in countries throughout the region (he observes perhaps with a touch of exaggeration los grandes empresarios Central all Arabs])? That he is part of this diaspora? A nd that his business dealings in the Arab world are facilitated by a cultural relationship muy fcil (very easy) to navigate as a result of the common bond and shared values produced by the long Moori sh presence in southern Spain? Admittedly, my initial forays did not yield any epiphanic moments. Though he at no somos rabes, somos chilenos s ) or chilenos de origen rabe los abuelos llegaron hace 100

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179 aos They speak Spanish, eat Chilean food, and are fully integrated into mainstream Chilean society no es un gueto When I inquire about the maintenance of the la cultura cristiana Levantine Levantine, Christian culture) of his ancestors wit h that of the Gulf countries where he pursues interesting opportunities On business trips to the region, they may ask him if he is Lebanese due to his accent and dress, but he professes not to feel the connection. Es otra cultura, es otra gente ), he declares. I make a mild amount of progress by annoyingly interrupting him mid sentence. No, una mezcla fact that when he sits down for dinner a t a Dubai restaurant he knows both how to order and how to eat undoubtedly unsettles the stable categorization schemes of his interlocutors. And, on three separate occasions, Arab CEOs have pulled him aside by the arm after meetings involving non Arab figu res in order to ask him es de los nuestros if the others confiable s returns to discussing interesting opportunities a topic that dominates much of the rest of our encounter. Even after direct qu estioning about his motives, I am able to glean little beyond the fact that he is inspired by some mixture of A) a business recognition that hay una oportunidad B) a personal genuflection towa orgenes me gusta la regin But where does the balance lay?

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180 Fortunately, two years later, by the time our second and final meeting rolls around, I have become much more adept at staying on message and subtly eliciting the revelation by near strangers of potentially sensitive personal information. After a flurry of last minute, early morning Twitter messages, during which we made several time and venue changes in order to accommodate his cram p ed and ever morphing schedule, I grabbed my messenger bag and speed walked from my central plaza adjacent residence in the coa stal city of Via del Mar, some 120 kilometers to northwest, t o the nearby bus terminal. Two hours later, I emerged from a subway escalator immediately east of downtown Santiago and found myself sitting across a Starbucks table from Daccarett in the plate glass filled business district abutting the green, urban oasis of Cerro Santa Luca (Santa Luca Hill). This is his third consecutive meeting in this very caf, and with his legs already shaking from two previous coffees, we refrain from joi ning the long line of suit clad patrons clamoring to order (occupying a table without consuming must be a violation of corporate policy, I muse, though I decide it is unlikely for such rules to be applied i n these classier surroundings). A cross the street language institute, and though we are half a dozen subway stops from Sanhattan the clusters of clean cut, black suited patrons s every nook evoke the same regimented, manicured, and homogenous presentation of self into which the power elite has apparently been socialized into adopting the world over. Sporting frizzy, curly blond hair and a goatee, and lacking a proper suit jacket, I feel both undergroomed and underdressed.

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181 Over the steady din of the early afternoon coffee crowd, and with a flui dity and frankness that suggests a regular gathering with an acquaintance or, dare I say, friend the conversation immediately turns to our topic of economic relations with the Arab world and his role in promoting them. If Daccarett was not exactly restrained during our previous encounter in his assessment of the as the executive director of the aforementioned Chilean Agency for International Cooperation for Development upon the left 2014 has only furthered the tendency. And it would later allow him to str ay as far afield as engaging in conversations concerning the reasoning behind suit purchases and family vacation destinations, both of which, perhaps unexpectedly, proved to be fertile vantage points from which to observe national transnational and globa l longings. I am quickly brought up to speed. The framework of the una estupidez no sirve para nada (useless), since the participating countries do not really world diplomatic corps who are not based at one of the relevant embassies Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are apparently neither given nor can devise on their own anything to do, and se aburren 35 formidable business class, maintain s its Asia Pacific focus. At ProChile, the official state Trade Commission, the highly praised halal expert and fellow two time interviewee Diego 35 By process of comparing lists, the would diplomatic network would thus include Algeria, Egypt Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Syria. (accessed December 1, 201 5).

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182 Osses has been transferred from Santiago to Bangkok, where he is now the co nadie para halal en ProChile (nobody for halal in ProChile). In general, the continually constipated nature of Arab Chilean trade ms de lo mismo no hay ninguna presin de parte del sector privado sector) to break the logjam and allow this axis of ties to surge forward As such, plans for a Cmara which still figure prominently on his crowded to do list, are en standby (on standby). Yet Daccarett has not exactly been sitting on his hands, staring wistfully out the window as unattainable oportunidad interesante oportunidad interesante speeds by. This familiar phrase still peppers his speech (according to a comment I scrawled in my fieldwork notebook at the halfway point of our second conversation, he had already repeated it by this point ). A nd he continues to discuss Arab Chilean exchange trade promotion, deals through which nosotros Chile ) captar investment and so on with the unbridled optimism of a motivational speaker. But having recently returned from Palestine, he also has a new job and a new business card, in Arabic on one side and English on the other catalizador interesante entre las regiones As there appears not to be a single Arab bank in all of Lati independent states, I initially have a hard time imagining why out of all the former Palestine would become the first, or why it would choose Why a Palestinian

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183 bank in Santiago instead of an Emirati bank in So Paulo? ha sido un sueo tener una presencia en terreno aqu en Chile in Chile) both c uando venimos aqu y vemos a nuestra gente teniendo xito en un hermoso pas como Chile, nos hace sentir nostalgia por la Palestina con la que desearamos soar, que desearamos tener success in a beautiful country like Chile, it makes us feel nostalgia for the Palestine that h ay mercados muy grandes aqu para que los exportadores y las compaas de Med io Oriente hagan negocios exporters and companies may do business) (Morales 2015) According to Shawa, then, the idea is not merely to connect Chile and Palestine, but to establish this axis as a br idge by which (to) fortalecer las relaciones de negocios entre Latinoamrica y el Golfo Arbigo to strengthen business relations between Latin America and the Persian Gulf) and apoyar las inversiones entre Medio Oriente y Amrica Latina tments between the Middle East and Latin America) ( El Mercurio 2015) Given his previous experience with bridging w hat is entirely un surprising is that the Bank has appointed Daccarett as its consultant and advisor for Latin America, precisely to traverse this now nostalgia mercados Out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and back into the perhaps friendlier environs of the private sector (and Starbucks), the freewheeling Daccarett is now in a contemplative, almost ph ilosophical mood. I learn more about him that afternoon than

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184 what I have garnered from many long term acquaintances. About his childhood nios suean con ser astronautas, bomberos astronauts, firefighters) but he wanted to be like Michel Alaby, secretary general and CEO of the marvelous Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce (and the subject of a vignette in the following chapter ), who has dedicated his life to promoting economic relations between Brazil and the Middle East. About what gets him out of bed in the morning: lo que me motiva no es el comercio en s, sino la relacin entre las regiones (what motivates me is not trade in and of itself, but rather the relation between the regions) not just economic an d political, but also cultural and personal. About his own c uando se te empiezan a borrar las fronteras, no es normal when he observes, almost worriedly. It is thus with palpable u nease instead of triumphalism that he notes that at a certain point, t e sientes local en cualquier lugar del mundo world). Para qu es el trabajo ( W hat is work for?). He has friends who have struck it rich (er) but . why? Granted, at least if the gated quasi mansion that appears in Google Maps when I type in his address located far to the northeast of downtown, in subway most exclusive neighborhoods is any indication, his is not precisely an to the Yet there is an authentic reflexivity in his discourse. He leans in C entroamrica me encanta Centra l America), he enthuses. Family trips could be spent in Miami or Milan, or Doha or Dubai, but he prefers to take his kids on three week jaunts to rural Costa Rica, where

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185 the goal is to avoid the beach tourism of nearby Tamarindo while meeting everyday peop le and shopping at the everyday corner stores w La gente es ms clida Mientras ms pobre el pas, mejor me siento and the more genuine and un a ssuming its inhabitants. Any critiques about this implicit glorification of poverty or for a class obsessed internationalizing bus iness elite. His subsequent recollection of seeing a child sleeping o n the streets of Phnom Penh, surrounded by dogs, while an unspecified international development official immediately on the other side of the fence sports a Rolex, is also ideological I ndeed, I would be shocked if Daccarett does not also own a nice watch, and part of what motivates t el sector privado [business] sector not governments NGOs or aid workers by themselves) is necessary genera desarrollo ut we must not be so cynical as to entirely dismiss the humanistic streak that both reveals itself in our conversation and propels, to some extent, his economic activitie c reo en Palestina, creo en [sic] Middle East something more than a concocted self justification for seeking profit. To summarize, national and transnational ties loom large interpretive frameworks. His economic and personal activities are filtered through a range of constructs that include both Chilean and Palestinian nationalism, a vague sense of allegiance to a larger Middle East, and even personal commitmen ts to

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186 idealized Central American campesinos (rural dwellers) the global poor and an ill When I ask about h is time in the Chilean government, the bitterness over s e pas a bien porque uno est trabajando por su pas country). W hen I make small talk about the Chilean national ftbol lackluster 3 3 tie with Mexico in the round match of the Copa Amrica (America Cup) regional tournament, he begins to make animate d hand and arm gestures devastating second round departure from the 2014 World Cup. And w hen I ask what he makes of the Bank of Palestine branded cards that he has been promoting in Chile, he responds that even if this were para sentir que mis hijos tengan un nexo After he posted a pic ture of one of the bank card s on Facebook, people went crazy Within the Palestinian a los ricos se les olvidaron sus races pero no a la clase media, en Patronato t he middle class, in Patronato [ ] ). The simbolismo of the card is important, as is the fact that the Bank invests in and donates to relevant charitable ventures in both countries. These range from dedicating 5 percent of annual prof 36 to spending millions of dollars to sponsor 36 (accessed December 1, 2015).

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187 jerseys of the Santiago based, first division ftbol (soccer) team, Club Deportivo Palestino (Palestin i an Sports Clu b), founded by Palestinian immigrants in 1920. 37 He has not forgotten about the profitable oportunidades interesantes (interesting opportunities) for Arab curioso that there is no Arab Chilean Chamber of Commerce, and has recently developed a new idea to link the Pacific Alliance 38 with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 39 And ego bring Chile and the Arab world together. Bu t as he intimates that in life you must do te haga sentido a la vez ayudar coherente en valores values), it becomes clear that his miss ion is not trade for the sake of trade itself, or to further the efforts of fellow internationalizing entrepreneurial elites the world over. On the other hand, it is perhaps ironic that his very actions to further open Chile to the world Chile tiene que crecer hacia afuera, no hacia adentro toward the outside, not toward the inside) appear to be reify ing the same global 37 For additional ba ckground on the deal, see Emol center/newsroom/details/270 (accessed December 1, 2015). On the club itself, see its official history, available at: (accessed December 1, 2015). 38 Established in 2011 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, the Pacific Alliance is a mostly economic mechanism for increasing integration between these free market oriented member states, as well as projection to the world, with emphasis on the Asia Pacific region es la alianza/#what is the pacific alliance [accessed December 1, 2015]). Costa Rica is also in the process of joining. In ideological terms, the Pacific Alliance is seen as the foil for the more statist regional bloc Mercosur, comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Bolivia is currently being incorporated as 39 The GCC is a Persian Gulf based regional organization focusing on political and economic coordination. Its member states Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabi a, and the United Arab Emirates enjoy relatively strong economies and together comprise an important market for imports and source of investments, and include several major international trade hubs.

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188 capitalist order whose onward march is said to be undermining those local cultures Chilean, Palestinian, Middle Easte rn, and even Central American where he feels most at home. Yet here again we must be careful to separate the material (globalizing) nature of his activities from the (mostly, but far from exclusively, place based ) ideational constructs that undergird them. Toward the end of our encounter h seora (wife) over the purchase of a new suit. Should he buy Chilean? Or perhaps one that is locally made during an upcoming trip to Miami or Buenos Aires? The anguish that goes into the decision he does not reveal the outcome gives lie to his concluding facile assertion that he has a global mindset. As does the fact that while he views it as part of his pedagogical and capitalist mission to globalize Chilean business students by taki ng them to Peru and Colombia pases del futuro them the motivating factor behind the mission is that this is the mentality that Chilean companies need. Analysis and Conclusions T that the preceding vignettes tell the stories of four capitalist elites whose interpretive filters can most fittingly be labelled or in orientation. To be sure, any act of classification obfuscates certain characteristics for the p urpose of allowing the analyst to construct (hopefully) useful images of reality ; thus, we must strive to studiously avoid the worst practices of the and real human agents is a scourge to be shorn away for the sake of parsimony and would be analytical clarity rather than an ontological reality to be embraced (and explained). And there are undoubtedly less than national /transnational moments in the

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189 above narratives the desire to the complex and demanding context of professed support for state involvement in the economy / Brazilian style social programs in Iraq and salivation over the windfalls to be reaped as a result of U.S. imposed privatization and austerity schemes, and the dilemmas raised by suit purchases or how to keep Chile growing However taken as a whole, these vignettes reveal mental frameworks that are significantly more national and transnational than denational or global As is constitutive of capitalists, theirs is profit seeking behavior. But the point is that it is mostly filtered through place based lenses Argentina and Lebanese, Brazilian and Iraqi, and Chilean, Palestinian, Ara b, and Middle Eastern. Relatively l ittle evidence points to the decent ering of the national imaginary and even less to its replacement with a new set of global attachments These processes may indeed be under way, and in fact own ( apparently burgeoning ) global credentials provide a tentative indication of such. Yet in the present cases these hints are the exception rather than the rule. Before p roviding further substantiation from other interviewees, let us strip down the prece ding vignettes to their bare, national essence: A NTONIO A RAMOUNI A thoroughgoing embodiment of the national / transnational imaginary. Ideological references to the superiority of the Chilean model aside, p aeans to Argentin e and Lebanese exceptionalism perm eate every nook and cranny of our conversation. So uncomplicated and unadulterated is his place based discourse vis vis those of any of my dozens of interviewees that one suspects that, if his type was ever commonplace, it is now a dying breed. Lacking the mores of modern political correctness, h is is the old school and brazen class consciousness of the latifundista (landed gentry) or nineteenth century factory owner, and he inhabits a world where everyone la gente bien matter) talk s ab out polo, speak s multiple languages, and similarly idealize s Chile. Yet so utterly nationalist is his thought that the fact that Pope Francis is

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190 Argentine matters more to him than the would be communist demagoguery for which he has been lambasted by U.S. e lites. N AWFAL A SSA M OSSA A LSSABAK AND J ALAL J AMEL D AWOOD C HAYA N avigators of the choppy waters that separate profit seeking and ( transnational ) altruism. Both on their website and in speech, they premise their economic activities on the notion that Iraq a nd the Iraqi people need them and their Brazilian wares, that linking import dependent Iraqi consumers with producers from Brazil, the export nation and budding halal superpower, will cause the tide to rise, thus lifting all boats. Yet they are strangely i ncapable of explaining why or how. Nonetheless, nostalgia for the homeland looms large in their mindsets, reflected in part in a desire to build cultural linkages. their native Iraq i s almost beside the point, for while contradictory statements concerning neoliberal reforms in Iraq reveal a perhaps inchoate, denationalized commitment to profit, for purposes of categorization they are most transn ational mindset. J ORGE D ACCARETT A n atypically reflexive thinker who is keenly aware of the global directions in which his economic activities and lifestyle are pulling him, and who appears bent on resisting them. According to the present analysis, he is winning at least for now A sampling of posts from his busy Twitter account 40 provides a useful window into his soul: innocent people. Media kills (sic) palestinian pas (October 13, 2015; image also included, this time of the top of a bottle of Glenfiddich Scotch in the foreground, and a large flat screen television showing the World Cup qualifying match between Chile and Peru in the background); my grandma used to say: you're a different person for every language you speak; does that make me schizofrenic (sic) [prime m inister] would 2015). His des ire to build a Cmara no con rabes, sino con chilenos que se interesan en los mercados who are interested in the markets), his str hub from otros lugares and his angst over his identity may oportunidades interesantes (interesting opportunities) that he identifies are, without coincidence, located in a region that he holds dear. And it is precisely because he holds this region dear that he has identified these opportunities in the first place. That is, much like the previous interlocutors, his mental frameworks are also predominantly place based: Chilean, Palestinian, Middle Eastern, Ar ab, and even Central American. 40 His account can be found at: (accessed December 1, 2015).

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191 Again, I have chosen these figures to explore in depth precisely because they best illustrate the stubb ornly sticky nature of place based imaginaries within a globalizing world. In their own ways and to varying extents, the above inter locutors all see the world through primarily place based lenses, and their profit motives and class based interests which, unsurprisingly, are constant among the entire body of interviewees are mostly filtered through national, transnational and regional interpretations. In other words: they are of course chased around the globe by profit, but where precisely they choose to make money depends largely on a series of national, transnational, ethnic, and family ties. It is thus through the se ac tors and many others like them, that t lives on. Though my original intention was to classify all of my Latin American capitalist interviewees in a similarly, and relatively, unequivocal fashion, my honest engagement wit easy classification. Neverthe less, in the interest of further categorization I can report that over half of interviewees equating to more than a dozen people were more national or transnational than either denational or global As this analysis s uggests, there is overlap between the various groups, even with pe rsistence will also appear in the next chapter to support the opposite assertion. Such is the complexity of human life a richness that again is to be embraced and accounted

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192 for rather than simplified away. What follows, then, are further examples of place based longings: D IEGO O SSES (the aforementioned halal expert with ProChile, now based at the Thailand office and responsible for trade promotion in Southeast Asian markets ) S omos el futuro del mundo Chile quiere ser un pas elite country) and does not see itself as part of the sur Nonetheless, given en la vanguardia market, free trade nos sentimos referentes en Amrica Latina ( we the Chilean people feel like a model in Latin America). A NDREA S APAG (at the time of our interview, the head of ProCh Oceania, and Middle East department, and since October 2015 its New York based trade manager) T ser funcionaria pblica apoyando al pas She recalls almost crying when a business deal was signed not because of inters personal interest) or monetary gain, but rather out of the conviction con la mano del sector privado sector), she can assist small and medium sized businesses, work to address neglected peripheral regions. P ABLO F ODARO (man a ger of the Cmara de Comercio Argentino rabe or Arab Argentine Chamber of Commerce, which as of 2015 is celebrating its eighty sixth anniversary 41 ) G nos ayuda y nos perjudica us ) nosotros en Argentina la nacin argentina (the Argentine ing trade relations with the Arab world apparently represent more good than harm given that as he recounts concerning their surplus heavy economic relationship some 99 percent of total Arab Argentine trade consists of the latter former. T his (im)balance is thus overwhelmingly a favor de Argentina Accordingly if the sentiments expressed in this chapter are any indication, the death of place based imaginaries among capitalist elites has been greatly exaggerated. happily in some cases, 41 (accessed December 1, 2015).

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193 unreflexively in others are performing their structurally determined role as profit seekers within a market economy. All have earned the right to the moniker, as Marx (1867, pp. 336, tendency to create value and surplus value, to make its constant factor, the means of production, absorb the greatest possible am ount of surplus p. 362). he need of a constantly expanding market (Marx 1888, p. 476). Yet this crystal clear class position only turns into real world action once it passes through a series of interpretive filters. For the figures portrayed in the above vignettes, those lenses have a distinctly place based tint. Together, based on si mplified coding, transnational capitalists form the largest group among my interviewees. Yet it may be a mistake to assume their continued (or even perhaps current) hegemony, for as the next chapter demonstrates there is a notable den ationalizing streak among many Latin American based on the present analysis Knowing for sure would of course r equire a longitudinal study. Nonetheless, at the level of broad speculation, one does perceive a trend toward denationalizing, based both on what we know about the growing protagonism of Latin American actors in the global economy, as well as the globalizing thoughts that are invading the life worlds of Daccarett and fellow travelers provoking torment in some, and either passing imperceptibly or stirring up feelings of globalist pride in others precisely as a result of such participation. The next chapter seeks out and analyzes evidence for a denationalized and/or global mindset among my interviewees, uncovering significant signs of the former but

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194 relatively few of the latter. Based on these findings, the arguments made by a motley crew of thinkers ranging from the Marxist inspired global capitalism school to Samuel for a global for place based imaginaries thus persist to an unexpected extent bu t not without qualification.

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195 CHAPTER 6 [HOMELAND] THEY ONLY HAVE BANK ON DENATIONALIZATION AND GLOBALITY The aim of this chapter is to provide and evaluate available evidence for the argument that there exist, among my interviewees, figures whose interpretive frameworks are predominantly denational or global Let us pause to parse this crucial distinction. As we saw in the previous chapter, i f a national or transnational capitalist is one whose profit seeking activities follow a place based logic, meaning that her/his economic activities are directed toward at least one particular and delimited geographic spac e such as a country or region because the actor in question is drawn there through a personal and/or collective linkage, then a denational capitalist is in a sense its opposite. To be denational, denationalized, or denationalizing refers to the decentering of the national imaginary. That is, national and other place based subjective moorings no longe r influence seeking activities, or at least only do so to a reduced extent. What one would thus expect from a denational denational izing, or denationalized capitalist is profit seeking behavior that passes through little to no filtering of a geographic, affective nature. Returning to the example suggested by Marx (1867, pp. 336, 343) o pursue profit across space and time with decreasing or no regard for territorial sentimentality. S/he is will ] establish p. 476), so long as the price is right. To be clear, the national transnational and denational capitalist are all species within the same Marx 1844, p. 93)

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196 national or transnational capitalist will concentrate profit seeking endeavors within a particular space (or spaces) of personal or collect ive relevance, the denational capitalist has shed any such territorial logic, and will go more or less (Friedman 2005). It is this idea that provides the title for the cur rent chapter, which refers to the fact that certain elites (that is, for present purposes, denational capitalists) p. 293). 1 If we imagine accurately or inaccurately capitalist identities as existing in logical, and chronological, order, then the final group under consideration here is the global capitalist class. Locating such a class is of course the primary motivator behind this project. Continuing with the thought largely defined by a single national/place based set of attachments, then he can be labeled a national capitalist. If plural, then a transnational capitalist. In turn, i f this place based subjective mooring we re to be decentered for Mr. Moneybags, we would call him a denational capitalist. A global Mr. Moneybags represents the next leap. Not only have place based imaginaries lost much if not all of their subjective pull for him, but this void 1 These words are drawn from a much longer communiqu issued by the Ejrcito Zapatista de Liberacin Nacional or EZLN ( Zapatista Army of National Liberation ), a largely indigenous autonomist movement based in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico. The EZLN planned to coincide with the start date of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) shook the foundations of the Mexican state and, to a perhaps even greater extent, the confidence of international investors. The phras plundering their country.

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197 has also been fill ed by global attachments: first, to a set of global capitalist peers; and second, to a globally organized economy. We may thus conceive of a global capitalist as a denational capitalist who has subsequently developed a new class consciousness based on belonging to an may seek profits anywhere and everywhere, but only the global capitalist identity in the glob al (Robinson 2004, p. 47) and knowingly works in concert with peers to further the interests of global capital rather than of any real or imagined nation might again add, of their compatriot capitalists) (Sklair 2001, p. 295). If an interviewee were to display profit seeking behavior that has no territorial logic, positively identify with a global cohort of globally oriented capitalist elite s (for work jointly for the establishment of an ever flatter capitalist world, then s/he would have the profile of an actor who belongs to a global for To again return to this territorial sense, as is also the case with denational capitalists. What sets them apart is that they do have a patria but one that takes the form of a shared identity with other globally organized class peers, forming a nationless nation whose political project is to inaugurate a borderless world in which capital a nd capitalists may roam free. Let us now search for evidence of either menta lity denational or global among our interlocutors. Replicating the format of the l ast chapter, here we will delve into the life worlds of a series of carefully chosen actors through the presentation of

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198 ethnographically inspired vignettes. They are: 1) the Argentine Daniel Melhem, cofounder and president of the Buenos Aires based Gulf Latin America Leaders Council; 2) Michel Alaby, secretary general and CEO of the So Paulo based Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce; and, 3) the less typical case of Jos Seplveda Torres, an adviser in the Europe, Africa, and Middle East Department of DIRECON, or Direccin General de Relaciones Econmicas Internacionales (the Chilean national Economic Relations). As we shall see, while the first two figures are most solidly in the denational camp, the last interviewee rare among my interlocutors displays a budding global identity. However, and with the aforementioned caveat that separ ating these figures thusly is decidedly less straightforward than developing a taxonomy of butterflies, the overall argument remains: such denational and especially global moments are less frequent than their national or transnational counterparts. But for now, let us stand aside and allow these denational and global stories to be told. At their conclusion, I will pursue a broader analysis of their contents and return to the larger argument. Vignette # 1 : Daniel Melhem A brisk half an hour walk to the north west of the office of the aforementioned Argentine Lebanese Chamber of Commerce and overlooking the sprawling Retiro bus Avenida del Libertador (Liberator Avenue). I have come to visit the offices of the English titled Gulf Latin America Leaders Council (GLLC). Here, we have traded the fading continental European architecture and steady din cambio, cambio ge) of the microcentro proliferating street moneychangers for the glass covered skyscrapers and

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199 well manicured lunch goers of the rarified, tony neighborhood of Recoleta These are e, many of whose aristocratic forbearers are resting in elaborate mausoleums in the nearby Cementerio de la Recoleta (La Recoleta Cemetery). A few doors down from the high rise tower that Patio Bullrich Shopping which lures consumers refinamiento cultural argentino una autntica experiencia de lujo The building itself is staffed by a uniformed security team; it is only af ter showing my passport and informing them of my destination that I am afforded a single use privileged eleventh floor office suite, flanked by views of the staid waters of th e Ro de la Plata (River Plate), is co founder and president Daniel Melhem. 2 With his gently graying hair and an expensive looking suit, he gives every appearance of his past roles at Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers. As he starts explaining, Latin Americ a and the Gulf countries as well as the broader Middle East had traditionally been linked mostly through European and North American institutions. He helped establish the GLLC in 2009 to capitalize on growing opportunities for inter regional investment flow s, 3 He fires off several examples of increased Gulf investment in an iron ore plant in Oman; the establishment of direct flights li nking the 2 If LinkedIn is to be believed, Daccarett account is found at: (accessed December 1, 2015). 3 available at : (accessed January 9, 2016). As he notes, while the Cmaras focus on trade, the GLLC exists to court and encourage investment.

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200 overflowing sovereign wealth funds. 4 As quickly becomes clear, the GLLC is no mere neighborhood financial broker. a ll members must be highly regarded, not only in their own countries but also 5 tier leaders and decision mak need apply. 6 the record, private meetings w ith government officials, heads of business and cultural 7 As if to reinforce my preexisting impression of the elitist waters in which I am swimming, our conversation is soon interrupted by a hurried phone call in which vast sums of money are bein g discussed. At this point, I dutifully comply with the request to turn off my digital recorder. The U.S. educated Melhem is affable and fast talking. Though I approach him using Spanish, he replies in fluent English, which becomes the sole language of our interactions. For business reasons, it is also the default language of the GLLC. He effortlessly punctuates his frank, salesman like overview of Gulf Latin American 4 For additional information, see a gain: (accessed January 9, 2016). 5 (accessed January 9, 2016). 6 d=2 (accessed January 9, 2016). 7 See: (accessed January 9, 2016).

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201 economic exchange with disarming references to his alma mater (Babson College he is the p resident of the Argentine alumni club), recent in flight movies, and even my (relatively long) hair which prompts him to suggest that I must be a member of the Democratic Party. Looking out over the r o (river) toward the Uruguayan coast, he muses jokingly, I hope about how easy it would be for Argentina to invade and conquer such a small country, recalling an earlier time in which what is now independent Uruguay was ruled from Buenos Aires. As becomes especially clear in a subsequent phone convers ation, he shares so gentle assessment of the then current Argentine government. He view, is its handling of the economy. Taxes which the state uses as p art of a are too high. Companies are going discourages imports, thus turning Mercosur composed of Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, P araguay, and Venezuela nationalizations of property belonging to foreign companies (such as the Spanish energy giant Repsol YPF, in 2012), as well as drawn out international legal battles with hedge and less foreign investment. It is no surprise then that he had been presidential elections then scheduled for October 2015, 8 as of July 2014 he had already 8 the right wing opposition would indeed triumph in these elections, bringing Mauricio Macri to power as the new president.

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202 met with several potential opposition candidates who, if elected, would undo the damage from Kirchner Cuba, Russia, China, Angola while poisoning relations with the U.S. and Europe. It is a replay, in his mind, of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War junta (1976 1983). In other words: stop picking fights, whether over islands, foreign debt, or the tryi ng to force a return to t he pre solution: foreign investment and global markets. These of course can be accessed for a price by people like hi ike us. According to his analysis, the state appears to have two roles. First: help businesses succeed. Here, he cites the example of U.S. based Boeing which, as he t he economy is like a wedding understand the purported causal mechanism by which low cake consumption correlates

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203 with an enjoyable celebration of marriage vows, the message is nevertheless clear: keep your hands off the economy. There is an obvious contradiction between these roles. Indeed, the European Union has spent the last decade pursuing the U.S. government through the World Trade Organization with some amount of success for (Drew and Clark 2012; Miles 2014). Of course, he is not the first, and will not be the last, to place profit above ideol ogical or logical consistency. T the offices of Knightsbr founder and senior partner. 9 Among his current ( FINalternat ives 2014). Yet it is still not clear to me what makes him tick. Inviting a patriotic response, I ask : Might these efforts help to return Argentina to its glory days of a century prior? structure, which earlier, there is an unnatural pause before his response. When it comes, it sounds as though he is re citing one of the business first platitudes that p epper the website, and I t he Arab Gulf States and Latin America are vibrant 9 http://www.knightsbridgepartners.c o/our team/1 and we are/ (both accessed January 9, 2016).

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204 growing regions with substantial economies and natural synergies . 10 Soon, he is Latin American economic relations. In no time, he has again everything it can to destroy the productivity of compan I try once more, but with a reconsidered approach and a more direct question. by to Europe, Chin a, the U.S., or anywhere else? His own past starts to emerge. Me lhem was born in Mexico to a Syrian Argentine does mean something to prof ile country of his ancestors, because of civil strife and a lack of business opportunities and contacts. But it is precisely because of his Syrian past that he has been able to become a conduit for exchange between Latin America and the Gulf, as he is recogniz ed throughout the 10 See, again: lish/?page_id=25 (accessed January 9, 2016).

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205 we trip to Egypt, taken at the request of he throws in obligatory references to footballing legends Messi and Maradona for good measure. a significant portion of those funds should be invested in Latin America naturally, under his opportunity for 11 After all, supplying Gulf markets is small potatoes compared to the Asian behemoths that lay beyond, where billions of con sumers beckon a pot further sweetened by abundant and cheap labor, open tracts of land, and Gulf itself is also a bridge between the GLLC and China, India, and other rising e conomies. Thus, while his own familial past and personal interest have led him to the Gulf, the Arab world in general is epiphenomenal vis vis his larger ambition of making and he quickly in dicates 11 Ibid.

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206 he would have been the one to create the BRICS grouping, thus earning himself a privileged position as a mediator of exchange between the key Arab wo rld lose their starring roles. Vignette #2: Michel Alaby As a diminutive and hunchbacked elderly man with a receding white hair line and seemingly permanent dour facial expression Michel Alaby does not immediately evoke superhero. And yet when Jorge Daccarett founding executive director of the Consejo Empresarial Chileno rabe (Chilean Arab Business was himself coming of age, he forewent the tried and true childhood fantasies of becoming an astronaut or firefighter, and instead fixed his sights on the secretary general and CEO of the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce as his North Star. As Daccarett e xplains all too excitedly, Brazil has been exporting approximately $10 billion worth of goods to the Arab world per year, 12 and since the Chamber earns a 0.1 percent commission on these exports for providing the mandated certificates of origin, there has be en a steady flow of funds as of late into its revenue stream. He explains that 0,1 por ciento de comisin son 10 millones de dlares, de ingresos para la C mara and precisely the model he year n s to replicate one day in Chile. 12 Given more recent challenges such as the subsequent downturn in the Brazilian (and global) economy and downward once again, if only gently. These figu online/en/home.aspx (accessed January 9, 2016).

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207 On second thought, as far as Arab Latin American business leaders go, Alaby and the Chamber that he leads are not such bad role models for the budding international trader. Unlike the relative p man and now dormant Consejo the well resourced Chamber years with the objective of boosting economic, cultural and tourist exchange between 13 employs a robust staff of 7 5, spread over four sprawling floors of one of the countless generic, slightly drab high rises that fill the horizon for as far as the eye can see in both directions along Avenida Paulista (Paulista Avenue), So and business friendly thoroughfare Downstairs is the office of Abdouni (a fellow interviewee who, curiously enough, is of Lebanese descent). The So Paulo headquarters is c omplemented by branch offices in the prosperous Brazilian cities of Belo Horizonte and Curitiba. Business own bilingual magazine (printed in Portuguese and Arabic), 14 online news agency (Por tuguese and English), 15 videos) 16 and a well stocked if somewhat disheveled on site library whose several rows of bookshelves include all manner of materials, ranging from writings on Arab, Latin 13 brasil/en/about us.fss (accessed January 9, 2016). 14 Background infor mation about the magazine is available at: brasil/en/home/arab brazilian chamber magazine.fss (accessed January 9, 2016). 15 Its po rtal is located at: (accessed January 9, 2016). 16 http://www. brasil/en/home/arab brazilian chamber tv.fss and (both accessed January 9, 2016).

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208 A merica n and Arab Latin American politics, economics, and culture, to travel guides, dictionaries, and country specific file holders. With cover images of former president language texts, and flanked by Relatrio de atividades ( Activities Report ), I find myself t he Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce is the quickest and safest way for you to find new markets and to do business with the Arab c ountries. 17 These very same activities exude further power influence, and success To interest Brazilian exchange, the Chamber had presented then president to 1989 to 2012 (Carrieri 2013). To draw the attention of Arab business leaders to the economic opportunities that were waiting to be seized in the Brazilian promised land, as recounted by former Chamber market intelligence manager Rafael Abdulmassih, the Cha mber successful title run during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup To teach Brazilian business elites (Rocha 2015), 18 coincidentally at the very time and on the very day that I am sitting down to write this, 17 brasil/en/about us.fss (accessed January 9, 2016). 18 a presena duma autoridade presence of an authority figure) is fundamental, which goes part of the way toward explaining the

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209 exclusivo (exclusive) workshop Chamber members only para que sua empre sa possa iniciar ou expandir seus negcios nestes mercados your company can initiate or expand its business in these markets). 19 attendees at the Renaissance So Paulo Hotel will be treated to a networking breakfast (Rocha 2015) For companies seeking to diversify their stable of partners, the exporters and Arab importers (Santos 2015 a ) And to push for Latin America as a region ter mais negcios com o mundo rabe also become secretary of the newly created Federao das Cmaras de Comercio rabes Sul Americanas (Federation of Arab South American C hambers of Commerce), the aim of which is not only to promote collaboration among existing chambers but to foment the founding of additional ones in countries such as Uruguay, Peru As Alaby recounts at the beginning of our con enfoque (focus) during its 60 governos e empresrios (governments and businesspeople) to put the Arab world on their respective radars T o that end over its lifespan the Chamber has organized an estimated 400 delegations and participated in approximately 170 trade fairs, both of which make for impressive annual rates. 19 Event information is available at: (accessed January 9, 2016).

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210 diretoria for literally half of its existence, happening to coincide with its most productive and successful years. His gives all the appearances of having been a lifetime of holding closed door business meetings with political and economic elites showing Brazilia n capitalists how to navigate Arab markets and then literally organizing the ir way there (including inviting them to accompany Lula on official visits), and signin g free trade agreements, expanding trade delegations, creating bilateral ( Carrieri 2013; Carrieri 2014; Daniel 2009). It is for all of the preceding that the very day after hi s hotel workshop by the sponsoring Council of Arab Ambassadors during an invitation only dinner celebration in the capital, Brasilia (Santos 2015b) Beyond overall increases in trade and financial flows successes rece nt advances in Arab Brazilian economic relations include the signing of free trade agreements with Egypt (2010) and Palestine (2011) (Baldissarelli 2014). 20 20 A database of trade agreements is available at: (accessed January 9, 2016). However, at least the former agreement has apparently not yet entered into effect (Santos 2016). Percentage wise, Brazil is not a hugely signi r 68 percent of imports), this number is still good enough for eleventh place overall (just behind France and ahead of from Palestine are numerically insi gnificant in relative terms. billion annually), just behind Kuwait, and ahead of countries such as France, the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea. A gain, Egypt is not a significant source of Brazilian imports. These figures are drawn from the highly useful website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity available at: (accessed February 6, 2016).

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211 At this point, in the last and climatic interview of my second fieldwork tour of great not what are you doing, but why are you doing it? Friday evening traffic jams. 21 And I have reason to suspect that this part of my conversation with Alaby wil l be a relatively smooth ride. With a lifetime of experiences in his briefcase, he must have a lifetime of experiences to share his own ethnographic vignettes about sending Brazilian businesses to the Arab world and bringing Arab businesses to Brazil, fron tline tales of capitalist intrigue, folksy anecdotes about deals that have either succeeded or gone sour, and behind the scenes disclosures about lobbying the government for fewer and lower taxes, more free trade agreements, and increased attentio n to be p aid to the Arab world. And I expect his comments to be p unctuated throughout by revealing, Daccarett esque reflections in which he bares his soul and provides a compelling and coherent account from the privileged perch of a childhood superhero who is now looking down from the apex of a mountain that he has climbed for decades of why business class that he is now to be honored for this very dedication. With these as my expectations, our conversation leaves me disappointed, a feeling that returns as I page through my interview notes. One word responses. A lack of deep engagement with my questions. No epiphanies, no moments in which I feel that ns about who or what led him to be sitting 21 According to the BBC all the tailbacks in and out of the city extend for a total of 180km (112 miles), on average, according to local traffic engineers, and as long as 295km (183 miles)

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212 across from me in a central, glassy expansive four floor headquarters. ascendncia sria (Syrian No ). And in fact in his own company about which he shares no other information they export much more to the U.S. and Europe. Is it all about profit? Does cash rule everything around him? no tem fins de lucro non profit). Why is any of investimentos (investments) from the Arab world to sharpen my question. Why is any of this important para o Brasil aforementioned stay in the Cmara de Com rcio e Indstria Brasil Iraque (Brazil Iraq Chamber of Commerce and Industry) on the opposite side of Avenida Paulista (Paulista Avenue), I earn a spirited and number laden exportaes esto crescendo orts are growing). I want depth but am only being met with platitudes spoken with a gravelly yet soporific inflection. only of their ambition to again double trade within the next six years, and in a mixture of Spanish and Portuguese 22 that he attributes to the fact that he used to live in Venezuela that he aposentar pronto retire soon). Sim, lgico course). Seguinte t pico Next topic. As far as loquaciousness is concerned, he is 22 This amalgamation is often referred to as portuol (in Spanish) or portunhol (in Portuguese), a combination of the words for Portuguese and Spanish in each respective language.

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213 certainly no Aramouni, Alssabak, Chaya, Daccarett, or Melhem. In a sense, he offers wonder whether my dogged email and in person efforts to reach the top of the culminating in a virtual tongue lashing by Abdulmassih f or bothering too many of his co workers with my messages 23 were in the end worth so many of my valuable fieldwork hours. Having by this point reviewed, processed, and analyzed field notes, recordings, and personal recollections from and about my many interviews I am struck by a revelation of my own After months of international travel, dozens of interviews, and careful refinement of my subtly probing questions, confidence building techniques, and presentation of self, I arrive at the conclusion that Alaby disappoints me because I assume that he has share. Quick and somewhat superficial readings of Marx had taught me to expect that an award winning international trade specialist who has dedicated his adult life to the deepening of capita list relations both at home in Brazil again, free trade agreements, expanding trade delegations, creating bilateral companies and and abroad would have naturally developed a corresponding self awar eness he phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their 23 To quote from his unfavorable respons e Vamos tentar focar o seu contato em apenas uma pessoa? Voc envolveu nossa assessoria de imprensa, que tem interlocuo apenas com veculos de mdia. Consideramos que esta no a melhor prtica. ( Yo u involved our press officer, who only dialogues with media outlets. We do not consider this to be the best practice breve confounds my expectations by turning out to be both fairly lengthy and cordial.

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214 material life (Marx 1846, pp. 154 155 ). What is initially disorienting about Alaby, then, is the seemingly insignificant extent to which his capitalist, globalizing material circumstances have ascended from earth to heaven his waking, thinking, and conscious being. He is a capitalist, to be sure, and has a class based worldview. But the depth of his reflexivity concerning this longstanding, material reality is so shallow as to be nearly imperceptible to the naked eye of the observer. But what if Alaby is more of an unthinking than a thinkin g capitalist? What if there is little there to be discovered by the eager analyst? What if Alaby wakes up, puts his pants on one leg at a time, grabs his figurative lunch pail from the refrigerat or and goes to work just like rich people, so a bsorbed in his daily, capitalist grind that he muddles through without subjecting his own work, goals, and activities to meaningful scrutiny? What if he is the proverbial dog that did not bark, neglecting to engage in Daccarett esque public figure, but rather because he is not thinking such reflexive thoughts in the first place? What if not all capitalists are supermen and superwomen of reflexivity? lshit ( Bates 2007, p. 511). Such is Michel Alaby, the childhood superhero. As I wrote at the conclusion of I was wrong in my initial assessment of Alaby as an especially tough nut to crack, for it turns out that his terse responses speak volumes. When he denies the

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215 relevance of his Syrian heritage, he means it. When nearly the entirety of his discourse centers on investimentos exportaes trade figures, he is not concealing deeply held Brazilian, Syrian, or pan Arab attachments. And when after provocatively ( and presumably unknowingly) mimicking insero nas cadeias [globais] de produo e servio he fails to mention any actual global affiliations, it is be cause he neither has nor feels them. Though he may indeed desire them. Rather, he is loudly and clearly focusing on what matters most to him: trade for s sake, and taking the actions ( holding export seminars, drafting government briefs) and pushing for the policies (trade agreements, lower taxes, pro business state intervention in the economy) that will (supp osedly) help to bring it about As Karam (2007) argues concerning contemporary, among Arab desc endant business elites has recently coalesce d among many such figures into a more general form of pan Arab cultural capital for reasons including the demands of the Brazilian state for the requisite knowledge that will allow for increased exports to the o verall Arab world (as opposed to specific countries such as Syria and Lebanon) Alaby is virtually a paragon in this regard: whatever may be the personal import of his Syrian heritage, he declares that it is unrelated to his business activities. But an instrumental invocation of that same ethnic background has allowed him to rise thro ugh the ranks of the Arab Brazilian Chamber, as well as to be a sought after

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216 He is an Arab Brazilian man engaged in Arab Brazilian trade, but this is an epiphenomenal link, for his true desire is to follow the m oney. reference to the beyond the economic. 24 Such is the life wo rld of this capitalist antihero, and the formidable, sector Despite occasional hints of all three h is goals are thus neither national tran snational nor global to any significant degree Rather, they center on a denationalized quest for capitalist exchange. He may be a reluctant and taciturn man with a weathered, tired voice. But in a way, I wish that all of my interviewees had been so clear and forthcoming about their worldviews and ambitions Vignette #3: Jos Seplveda Torres Twice I excitedly scheduled an interview meeting with Carla Henrquez, who has served since September 2012 as head of the Europe, Africa, and Middle East Department of the Direccin General de Relaciones Econmicas Internacionales or DIRECON Relations). Twice she failed to show: in 2013, due to a trip, and the following year, as I learned from se tomar esa semana When I reached out again in 2015, I received no response. 24 See, again: brasil/en/about us.fss (accessed January 9, 2016).

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217 In what turned out to be an act of fie ldwork serendipity, on each occasion she sent in her stead Jos Seplveda Torres, an adviser from the same Department who turned out to be the great anti Alaby: loquacious, gregarious, an d seemingly happy to be exploring his sentimental state while speakin g into the digital recorder of a stranger. Such was his level of engagement with our conversation that at the end of the second round, he thanked me the opposite of every other interview ee for my time and for giving him the chance to take a step back and r eflect about his day to day activities. le gust la chance de salir de lo cotidiano na die los critica broadly]). It was and remains a sublime moment of fieldwork glory in which rather than struggling to pull teeth, I was able to e licit revealing personal reflections even through asking the long ago discarded, pedantic, paragraph length questions that I Review Board. As a veterinarian by tr aining, Seplveda may be an odd subject of analysis for a work that is explicitly concerned with the life worlds of capitalist elites. Yet given the vasta experiencia en negociaciones comerciales internacionales international trade negotiations) that he has gained during his nearly 15 years in this advisory role, which has included participating in talks leading to and helping to manage over a dozen free trade agreements (including with the U .S. and European Union, as

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218 well as, currently, the Trans Pacific Partnership 25 ) along with what he claims on his LinkedIn permanente visin global del comercio internacional (permanent global vision about international trade), and his will ing, sunny disposition, Seplveda makes for an intriguing, if slightly unconventional, interviewee. 26 And a highly fitting subject to be profiled in this work Created by the Pinochet dictatorship in 1979 as dissident and othe r inconvenient bodies co ntinued to be exiled, tortured, disappeared, and piled up, and in the same year as the implementation of a controversial labor law that codified the neutering of the (Kremerman 2013) DIRECON ejecutar la poltica que formule el Presidente de la Repblica en materia de relaciones econmicas con el exterior policy that the President of the Republic formulates in regards to internation al econom ic relations). Through the post dictatorship period, this commercial policy has displayed a remarkable and perhaps disquieting continuity with that of the military regime, reflecting the fact that be stamped into the DNA of Chilean parties from across the mainstream political spectrum. T his degree of unanimity and singularity of voice in a society with deep 25 As the culmination of a decade long negotiation process, the agreement to create the Trans Pacific Partnership, or TPP, was reached in October 2015. Composed of twelve countries that together account one of the most ambitious free trade agreements ever signed groups, the TPP has also drawn criticism due to its secrecy shrouded negotiation process. The agreement is currently awaiting ratification by participating go vernments, which are comprised of: Australia, Brunei Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S., and Vietnam See: BBC News (2015b). 26 See: sep%C3%BAlveda torres 0a32b697 (accessed January 9, 2016).

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219 social, economic, racial, and ideological divisions indeed makes one question the What is undisputable is that the results of this non consensual consensus have been nothing less than spectacular. As cited in the previous chapter, Chile has perhap s more free trade agreements than any country in the entire world 25 in total, per 64 mercados, que representan el 64,1% de la poblacin mundial y el 86,3% del PIB global which represent 64.1 percent of the world population and 86.3 percent of global GDP) 27 28 If the Chilean state and its economic arms are married to anyone or anything, it is definitively the free market i deal. Seplveda cum negotiator of major internati onal trade deals may seem low key, or even inconsequential. Y et he is precisely the type of merchant capitalist actor whose behind the scenes efforts launc hed from deep within the DIRECON headquarters, on the twelfth floor of the same Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in downtown Santiago where my presence was so frequent that I was on a first name basis with the security staff are essential for the functioning and pr opagation of the global capitalist system. mucha negociacin administracin With noticeable contentedness, he comments that the current administration of Michelle est ms cerca del mundo rabe han its right 27 These figures are provided on the DIRECON website, available at: (accessed January 9, 2016). 28 See: de acuerdos/ (accessed January 9, 2016).

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220 wing predecessor. In particular, he cites a [ n ] acercamiento poltico rapprochement) with the region trade agreements with Middle Eastern countries, and a more activist foreign policy vis vis Israeli human rights abuses against the Palestinians, itself the product of the father, an air force general who was loyal to the Allende government, died in military custody after months of torture at t he hands of the Pinochet regime, and Bachelet herself was subsequently detained, tortured, and exiled). In fact during the same fieldwork trip, while I descended the red was met with a seemingly impromptu standing press conference held by several 2014 Israel Gaza conflict. Y et ultimately, of course, I am much less concerned with what Seplveda does about which I can learn a suffici ent amount from his previously cited LinkedIn profile than with why he does it. And unlike the tiring psychoanalytic gymnastics required to inspire Alaby to begin to openly consider his place in the world, Seplveda was more than happy to oblige from the v ery beginning as I peppered him with unconventional questions about place based imaginaries and his own globalizing role. Indeed, the dialectical interplay between these two seemingly opposing forces national /transnational longings and global consciousnes s became clearer through my exchanges with Seplveda than it was with perhaps any other intervi ew. As I jotted down in my post

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221 between them. Let us explore where the balance l ies There is in fact a recurring nationalist tic k in his speech that surfaces in the forms of both the now means the as well as even balder pronouncement s of Chilean interests and/or exceptionalism. Thus, in regards to the former, Seplveda refer un nuevo acercamiento que estamos tratando de hacer we [Chileans] are trying to make; emphasis added) with the Arab world. As he comments similarly near the beginning of queremos ser una potencia agro (we want to be an agro power). Again, b una mina de oro agricultural producers have only started to tak e notice. He goes on, evincing a seemingly left of center ideology that is at odds with my nosotros vamos a seguir en subdesarrollo sin educacin de calidad inv oking the sustained, mass student movement that for years has mobilized against the political class for its collective failure to improve overall standards and address Nos est co ndenando Time and again, he repeats: nos (us), nosotros (we), este pas (this country) Chileans, the Chilean people, Chile seleccin And just as he laments apropos of Keohane quoted in : Carranza

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222 2006, p. 814 ) Chile es un tomador de regulacin regulation), he pone en jaque a un pas desarrollado in regards to a matter of international political or economic import. un pas serio [y] estable tranquilidad seguro menos problemas sociales t is almost enough to expect that he will in any moment break into a stirring rendit ion of the copia feliz del Edn futuro esplendor (future splendor) for Chile. F ortunately, our second and much more revealing conversation, which unlike the fi rst did not include the participation of other DIRECON interlocutors, quickly turns to the topic of globalization and what it means both for him and for the Chilean state that contracts his labor to promote international trade. While he had previously defi ned our las ideas viajan rpidamente citing the examples of world spanning protest movements and the global repercussions of Middle Eastern conflicts, he now hones in on the economic angle of the globalization of ideas and mindsets that motivates my researc h and presence in his office. Chile may be geographically isolated al fin del mundo red de acuerdos etwork of [free trade] agreements), linear to draw, sketch, and outline the contours of a globally inserted economy. What about Seplveda the veterinarian and S, sin duda (Yes, without a doubt). Through his international trade promotion activities, he has

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223 red de contactos en todo el mundo world). As he observes, they see each other three times a year at international meet ings, much more often than he crosses paths with fellow public sector employees in Chile who happen to work in the relatively nearby Ministerio de Salud (Ministry of Health). Based on his (material) global meeting schedule and global assemblage of merchant capitalist peers, he has developed a(n) (ideational) global consciousness to boot. Yet he acknowledges that this globalization is an uneven process, for not all similarly placed trade officials either in Chile or around the world participate in these glob e spanning networks. This globalization process is also lumpy in a further sense that he does not no hay conflicto the level of his own mindset there is at least a hint of tension that it behooves us to interrogate in the following paragraphs. Indeed, it is precisely by exploring these seemingly contradictory yet in reality intertwining axes of identity that we may sta rt to establish where precisely his own sympathies lie, as well as begin to approach the much larger question of how place based and global allegiances rise, fall, and interact in capitalist elites the world over. people as the Chilean nation, and to being trabajar por, [y] levanta r el pas for, [and] raise/build/lift up the country). But as his material circumstances changed trade bureaucracy, his goal morphed into something quera alimentar el mundo

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224 while quickly jotting down his exact words during our interview, I took the time to mundo notes. He immediately clarifies that his concern with seguridad alimentaria those whose current lack of educational opportunities also concern him have reliable access to a healthy food supply. One can thus deduce that he does not subscribe to a facile local/global binary. Rather, he consistently and deliberately asserts the peaceful coexistence of both identity axes in his own minds e t. Seplveda is paid by the Chilean state producto chileno imagen pas defender a Chile great p assion and aplomb. Yet when he subsequently reflects that his labor is directed toward benefitting everyone mi pas el mundo s being composed of interlocki ng networks, stretching from regional to global, so are simultaneously identifiable as distinct and yet coherent parts of the same mass. As h e closes by asserting that todo est conectado todo lo que hacen tiene repercusin global do has a global repercussion), I cannot help but think that the same is true of Seplveda and his identity. His nearly 15 years of participation in international trade negotiations have clearly internationalized his own worldview as well and led to his incorporation into

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225 global networks that have elevated his interpretive framework beyond the Chilean nation state container that used to more or less exclusively filter his reality. It would be too much to speculate that, these initial moves aside, he is moving in the direction of a full fledged globa l identity. Rather, at least for the time being, he is perfectly content to allow the local and global to coexist within himself, a further indication, if any were needed by this point, that human identities in general and class consciousness in (Cardoso 1977, p. 21) would have us believe. Analysis and Conclusions At the previously stated risk of oversim plifying for the sake of categorization, this chapter argues that the three figures profiled above can be most accurately conceptualized as denational or global capitalists. To be sure, there is great diversity among them, with a particularly noticeable ga is that in one or another form, the place based interpretive filter has been decentered to a significant extent. Whereas the last chapter analyzed interlocutors for whom national or transnational concerns were paramount, in the present cases, there is a noticeable supersession of parochial national and/or ethnic concerns in favor of either a (partially) denationalized quest for prof it or a (partially) global set of identifications and attachments. National moments that are not dissimilar to those uncovered in the last chapter again rear their heads here, but they are now in the minority. Overall, then, this chapter interrogates case s that provide at least partial validation of the global capitalist class hypothesis. That is, one finds s ome evidence

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226 obinson 2004, pp. 47 48) or at least for whom place based imaginaries have to a significant degree been decentered As I have argued, this is in fact a minority position, for the national or transnational imaginary is far stickier among my interviewees th an suggested by proponents of the global capitalism school. But before evaluating the overall balance of evidence concerning the notion of a global for s by the above interv iewees. D ANIEL M ELHEM A p. desire the need eyed sentimental longings for particular homelands or compatriots surface occasionally vis vis and the almost comically nationalist tendencies that are so often attributed to A rgentines in general and residents of Buenos Aires in particular. Yet ultimately what has led him to the Arab world is not a Daccarett Aramouni Alssabak or Chaya style quest to reconnect with the hal lowed lands of ancestors and co ethnics nor a deep many maladies Rather, it is a denationalized quest for profit, and the fact that it is in the Arab world that he is able to turn his cultural ca pital his Syrian family background and ascribed, corresponding ability to harness business opportunities in the larger Arab world into capital itself. At least, that is, until Asian or other markets prove more attractive. According to his supremely class c us Though inchoate, there are indication s that he understands that this imagined community exist s beyond M ICHEL A LABY F rom childhood superhero to unthinking capitalist. In terms of reflexivity (or, in his case, the lack thereof), he is no less than the anti Daccarett. As i t turns out, the motives driving the actions of this award winning, seasoned, and weathered interviewee ultimately responsible, perhaps more than any other were not buried deep below the interpretive surface. Rather, one sees what one gets with Alaby: a straightforward, largely denationalized capitalist desire to exclusive workshops, spread th e Arab Brazilian Chamber model throughout the region, and pursue a general, business friendly agenda of pushin g for lower

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227 taxes and more free trade agreements. At the level of demeanors, his soporific flowing brashness and charm Yet if a mutual conversation were to turn to the strategic use of cultural capital in support of a largely denationalized quest for profits, the t wo would have much to discuss. J OS S EPLVEDA T ORRES A n endearingly reflective, obliging, and perhaps unlikely negotiator for a country that pursues international trade deals with dogged and unmatched enthusiasm. And who embodies both the local and the global, as well as how the latter may arise alongside of and not precisely to repla ce the former. Indeed, h e is nearly equally at home among nosotros (us) we, an atypical class inclusive rendering of the Chilean people and a global epistemic network of trad e contacts. Seplveda wants to simultaneously feed the world and ensure that Chil eans of all socioeconomic statuses have access to todo est conectado connected) in both his world and his interpretive frameworks. As has become clear from the preceding, I have chosen to portra y the three above figures in this chapter precisely because of how their interpretive frameworks differ from those depicted previously. Whereas the last chapter showed us how heavily capitalists, through the corresponding place based attachments to nations, states, cultures, and homelands of various kinds in the present chapter we witness a distinct, if not entirely contradictory, trend. That is, these are the capitalist elit es who most closely resemble Davos Man and the global capitalist class for itself of the Among these interviewees, ability to determine much of the direction of capitalist flows (Me lhem, Alaby) or exists as only one part of a larger, mixed, and intertwined local global framework (Seplveda). Here, the usual caveats are once again in order. It is not that national or ethnic ties are irrelevant in these cases, for even among Melhem an d Alaby they are still par t of the general background of cultural capital that has led them to the particular and successful niche of Arab Latin American relations. Also, decidedly un global moments

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228 continue to make appearances, particularly in the form of to come but nevertheless and true Chilean nationalist tendencies. Further, if one accepts the ontological starting point that identities are not binaries but r ather take the form of continuums and pieces of latticework, then the entire categorization process itself becomes inherently thorny The present work, after all, is concerned with complex cognitive processes among living, breathing, and reflexive human ag ents, not the labeling of butterfly specimens. Taking into account the nuances that characterize human life, the present analysis suggests that the three figures under consideration display significant denationalizing (Melhem, Alaby) or globalizing (Seplveda) trends. Particularly in regards to the former, they are not alone, as demonstrated by the following and brief examples from other interviewees. A NDREA S APAG (as cited in the last chapter: at the time of our interview, the head a, Oceania, and Middle East department, and since October 2015 its New York based trade manager) T o my inquiry about her global nunca lo haba pensado as (I had never thought about it that way [before ]). Yet she is quick to note that the experiences of promoting international trade, traversing the globe, and finding her bearings when arriving in foreign airports have caused her to realize that we conectividad mundial total rldwide connectivity) and to apertura mental become her life transmitir al sector privado M ARA DEL R OSARIO S OLARI (director of international and technical relations for the private sector Cmara de Exportadores de la Repblica Argentina [Argentine Chamber of Exporters]) D isplays precisely the denational streak that one would expect from a merchant capitalist without a particul ar national or regional focus, along with a Melhem esque though less incendiary appraisal of then president Kirchner. They at the Cmara donde sea (wherever), she observes and w ill go wherever the going is good, including but of course not limited to Estamos inmersos

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229 in globalization. Invoking the folksy and previously cited New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, no es elegible la globalizacin motor para todo el mundo predetermined context, her role is to export whenev er, however, and to whomever. Denational and to a lesser extent global capital ists that is, those for whom the place based imaginary has largely been decentered leaving them without a patria [homeland], only bank accounts) and those with a positive set of global attachments, respectively are thus real. Further, as I have speculated earlier, among capitalist elite identities there appears to be a (perhaps nascent) trend away from nationalism /transnationalism and in both of these directions. Thus, the arguments of the global capitalism school are no t without merit and bear consideration as we contemplate the contours of our present, and especially future, world. However, after carefully coding my interviewees, it is clear that these are still minority positions, with only a handful of my interlocutors beyond those profiled in the preceding pages fitting most comfortably into the denational or global categories. In fact, among the entire universe of my interviewees, Seplveda is the only one whose interpretive frameworks can be said to be global to a significant degre e. Indeed, place based filters for profit seeking activity continue to resonate to an extent that ca lls into processes, ranging from the arguments of the global capitalism school to proponents of In other words: based at least on the present case a global capitalist class for itself has yet to supersede its place based counterpart s Instead, as Adrian Budd (2013, p.

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230 inter penetration of the national and global that has characterized its entire histo ry This chapter thus brings to a c lose my empirical engagement with the fundamental question of the extent to w hich we can speak of and identif y a global capitalist class for itself among Latin American bus iness elites, and, perhaps by extension, in the world more broadly. Going forward, there is indeed much room for meth odologically sophisticated and regionally diverse works that continue to move the ball forward and add to our collective understanding of t his important but mostly neglected topic. However, I find my own conclusion a skeptical but not dismissive response to the ideational half of the global capitalist class hypothesis to be strangely unsatisfying. For both before and especially during the completion of this project, I had and have become accustomed to being confronted by cases of elites asserting global identities, the very phenomenon on whose existence I have ended up throwing some amount of cold water through this study. The last sub stantive chapter, before the moment arrives to present my concluding remarks, thus tackles this seeming paradox: if such global bombarded with tales of their existence? As I discuss below, squaring this circle requires that we analyze the material benefits that may accrue to capitalist elites through their ideational assertions of global identities.

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231 CHAPTER 7 ROOTED GLOBALISM FUTURE HORIZONS, AND THE SPECTER OF THE GLOBAL CAPITALIST CLASS The two previous chapters delved deeply into the ideational qualities of the Latin American merchant financial and other capitalist elites who are most responsible for b world. The principal finding, as noted, is that while denational and very occasionally global interpretive frameworks do indeed manifest themselves among the above interlocutors, national and transnational imaginar ies continue to filter the profit seekin g activities of the majority of interviewees to an unexpected ly significant exte nt. Thus, if we are to take these case s as any indication, th is stickiness of place based attachments leads to a skeptical, but not entirely dismissive, response to those who a dvance arguments for the existence of a global capitalist class for itself. In turn, the present chapter seeks to tie up two theoretical loose ends that arise out of this analysis First, in the interest of converting critique of mainstream IR into action, I will invert (and subvert) the longstanding practice of building theory only on the basis of Global North realities by instead utilizing the present Latin American and South South case to attempt to make a broader theoretical contribution to the field of global political economy. As such, the aim is to explore what the study of the would be global identities of Latin American capitalist elites can potentially contribute to our understanding of this same phenomenon the world over The idea, naturally, is n ot to blindly export these Latin America based findings around the globe, but rather to engage in a nuanced, context sensitive theory building exercise in order to free my analysis from its regional cage and see what it does or does not seem to suggest abo ut the broader phenomenon under investigation. As I explore below, the conceptual framework that arises out of the

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232 preceding empirical chapters globalism nuanced category that intends to account for how the global and local interact and intersect in diverse geographical contexts. Second, I take up the challenge of addressing the puzzle that surfaces at the end of the last chapter: if my findings suggest a skeptical (but again, not dismissive) response to the strong globali zation thesis, at least as it concerns elite identities, then why do I so often find myself being bombarded with media and visual references to global capitalist (Sassen 2007, p. 187)? What co uld explain the apparent contradiction between my own research and the prevalence of newspaper quotes and corporate advertisements printed in magazines and posted in the jet bridges of major international airports that assert in unequivocal terms that such elite global entities exist and have cut the national umbilical cord? As I will argue, there is in fact no contradiction between these empirical realities. For while it is indeed the case that elite identities at the global level appear to be less global than is commonly thought, these same elites stand to gain materially from global materially and ideationally global but most forms of meaningful national these actors would be able to sidestep such place based regulatory mechanisms with relative ease. Thus, while global capitalist elites may not in fact form a highly developed global capitalist class for itself, many such figures and entities indeed prese nt themselves as global For them, globality is both an aspiration and a political project

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233 meant to demonstrate the futility of efforts to regulate both their activities and the broader global capitalist sys tem of which they are a part. Globalism : A Latin American Category To again summarize my empirical findings, while place based imaginaries are the dominant interpretive filters among this group of Latin American globalizing capitalist elites, there are important ideational forces denational and, to a lesser extent, global pushing in contradictory, or at least, differing directions. As I have suggested, identities are complicated and the results that emerge from the present anthropological and sociological analysis suggest that see mingly opposite filters often operate simultaneously within the same individual. To invoke the logic of continuums, at the end of the day we may all have at least a little bit of everything. Within this lumpy framework, as I have speculated, we may indeed be witnessing early signs of a trend toward the denationalization of identities, and even more speculatively their potential subsequent globalization Corroborating evidence appears in the form of witnessing how globalizing material circumstances are tran sforming the mental frameworks of actors/ thinkers as diverse as Daccarett and Seplveda, albeit in distinct ways. What is the analyst, motivated by the desire to impose a category onto the hodgepodge, to make of the apparent coexistence and intermingling of the place based (national, transnational, ethnic, etc.) and the place less ( denational or global ) ? It is here global classes. Though hers are abstract, philosophical rumi nations that do not ostensibly enjoy the firsthand empirical backing that the present work has attempted to provide, it is nevertheless apparent that her general and nuanced contributions to this

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234 debate are essentially correct and closely approximate the r eality that has emerged from my own painstaking research into this topic. Let us consider a sample of previously cited observations: While it is also the case that he imbrications of global, national, and denationalized will proliferate and begin to produce overall Global identi ti es, as they emerge, 11) W ould They are thus though the phenomenon of still important and merits further study (Sassen 2007, pp. 169 170) authority of national states over people, their imaginaries, and their sense of be global insertion into territorially bounded contexts global cities and national floating cosmopolitan classes with no national global con sciousness formation (Sassen 2007 pp. 170, 187). How prescient. Though at the beginning of this project I had no particular end the outcome has been precisely to buttress both her nuanced conceptualizations of identity transformation processes and her overall argument about where the balance l ies Both the local and global are real, can and do coexist, and are seemingly undergoing transformation. It is thus worth our time, energy, and attention to watch the process unfold. To aid our efforts to identify what we see and, perhaps more importantly, likely will see in the future when we stare out at the vast expanse of global capitalist

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235 identities, I have arrived at globalism 1 It is relevant here globalism s the direct ion in which elite (and perhaps other ) identities are headed, and indeed the denationalization of national capitalist identities observed in some of the above cases, is logically a first step. T here is no ironclad telos or implied suggestion i n the preceding that such a denationalization process is guaranteed to eventually occur, nor that if (not when) it does, it will inevitably lead to the development of globalism Rather, I offer these arguments in the spirit of empirically informed conjectu res concerning the path and paths that future capitalist elite identities seem likely to take. 1 Per a Google search that been used previously to any significant extent. rooted trans diaspora populations d o and do not adapt to their host societies (see, for example, a recent conference held in Australia: ai/international conference asian migration and rooted transnationalism/ [accessed January 17, 2016]). I developed the concept independently of such considerations but nonetheless am happy to extend the conversation into the present area of interest, conce rooted trans thank Philip Williams for making this point. My It refers to the attempt by scholars to reconcile global, unive rsal ethics with local ties and attachments without giving up on either. See, for example, Kwame Anthony Appiah The Ethics of Identity (for a brief review focusing on rooted cosmopolitanism, see Freedman [2005]), as well as Will Kymlic Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World For the origins The New Transnational Activism (2005, pp. 42 Transnational activists are a subg roup of rooted cosmopolitans, whom I define as people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that involve them in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts alics in original). Both of these terms wrestle with a similar, macro dynamic the intermingling of the local and the global/transnational/cosmopolitan/universal and thus bear at least a surface resemblance to my use of this broader area of inquiry, aside from the focus on the identities and class consciousness of capitalist elites, is a specific empirical hypothesis, as articulated above, concerning their apparent future evolution, as well as an ontological argument abou

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236 And yet it is also relevant to specify such globalism will grow within the shell of the national and/or transnational It will write over it, but also write alongside of it, producing not just a fundamentally and ahistorically new global identity, but one in which the local and global cohabit within the same mental space, in spite of any ontological tensions that may exist between them. rooted globalism refers to an identity formation in which to significant and observable extents: 1) place based filters have in some sense been denational ized; 2) global attachments and longings have developed; but 3) local, national, transnational, ethnic and/or other such axes continue to resonate, thus 4) producing complicated, aracteristics appear contradictory, and indeed are but as we have seen, so are human identities. In these regards, Seplveda emerges as the closest we have to a real life personification of this category, for it is through his person that we are able to witness: trabajar por, [y] levantar el pas alimentar el mundo accompanied by permanente visin global del comercio internacional global vision about international red de contactos en todo el mundo while simultaneously 3) he continues to s peak in terms of nos (us), nosotros (we), este pas (this country), and la seleccin to mean Chileans, Chile, and its national soccer team. The product, as we no hay

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237 conflicto (there is no conflict) between them. Returning to Sassen, it is in these ways hat] we Notably, t his is not or would not be precisely the global capitalist class for less nuanced o pp. 47 48). In this conjectural vein, at least for the foreseeable future, my argument is that global identities can be expected to exist alongside their place based counterparts, not above them. Just as global capitalist elites ind environments their material circumstances a good Marxist account should infer that, clothing of the national, tabulae rasae but rather on a lready colored slates, in the process creating what are As described in earlier pages, perhaps the greatest contributi on of the global capitalism school or Huntington, in putting forth a strident rendering of a global capitalist class is that very stridency. By shearing away the surrounding context, nuance, and shades of grey, they have proffered an image of global elite s that they hold to be true but that the above analysis suggests is not. Nonetheless, such a formulation vision of a flat world peopled by global actors with fully glo bal mindsets that aids our efforts to engage in analytical exercises concerning potential future trajectories of the

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238 world system that surrounds us. That is, by accentuating certain (global) features at the expense of others (place based), just as Weber ha d intended, we may engage in useful thought exercises relating to both our current world and its future possibilities. as an analytical tool, we are not to lose sight of the fact that ideal types are not accurate clarify certain features through the bracketing of others. Though the desires of Robinson et al. were not, as far as one can tell, to devise such an analytical construct, but rather presumably to capture empirical reality, my own argument is that they have done the former instead of the latter. In turn, the present study has been to capture with the greatest possible precision the empiric al contours of global elite identities culminating not in the elaboration of its own ideal type, but rather an empirically based category that hews as closely to possible to the stories and realities that I have explored in the preceding pages. It is in t globalism identity amalgamations in all of their nuanced, t angled, and convoluted glory. It is, as I have noted, a Latin American category, generated through deep, interpretive, and context sensitive engagement with the region and its history, politics, and culture s Thus, as also explained earlie r, all the usual caveats about generalizability, and the reservations about blindly applying conce pts derived from the experiences of one place to another, certainly apply here as well. And yet, to reverse the typical flow patter n of Western academia, which presumably since its very beginning has been developing ideas based on its own geographic surrou ndings and

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239 applying them with perhaps no better than mixed results to other places, peoples, and contexts, my desire in the preceding is to have utilized these Latin American and Global South experiences in order to contribute ideas that may be of broader Including the Global North. Catch Me if You Can: On the Political Uses of Global Discourses As briefly reviewed above, and as the below examples will further demonstrate, contemporary media ranging from news stories to corporate ads surround us with tales of globalism of nomadic, globetrotting capitalist elites, of wealthy investors who trade cash for citizenship, of businesspeople who and businesses themselves that shed flags and host countries wi th nary a second thought, and even seasteaders right wing libertarians on steroids who are seeking to create an anarcho capitalist paradise in international waters. The fevered pitch is enough for many to inspire conversion to (2004) vision of economic elites, of course, but accompanied by converts among the professional classes and (wait for it) academics flat world economics (and, at least in the latter cases, their universal values ) All that is left is for we, the people, to stand up to the rootless cosmopolitans by maintaining our steadfast national alternative and to preserving and strengthening the Americ an identity of hopefully date the present work, is to vote for Donald Trump so that he can or because he will To formulate an unlikely phrase in the present conte xt Huntington actually has a point at least insofar as he offers a sort of challenge to the aggressive globalizing discourses of capitalist (and other, seemingly unrelated) elites, instead of accepting

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240 them as a fait accompli per the theoretical framewor k of the global capitalism school. Whatever the other (and many) faults of his position on this and other matters, Huntington at least thus understands the political salience of global discourses, even if he does relatively little to tell us about where th ey come from, let alone why, and how they can be used strategically. But before we go down this path, let us first establish the precise nature of the aforementioned empirical puzzle that now confronts us. At issue is how to reconcile A) the stickiness of national and place based imaginaries that I have identified through the present research with B) the prevalence of discourses by and about elite capitalist actors, bold l y asserting their global identities. Surely, there appears to be a fundamental contradi ction between these positions, insofar as they point in opposite directions concerning the great national transnational denational global debate that I have sought to address in the preceding pages. But p erhaps there is in fact no such contradiction, as i nstead I have merely erred in one of my premises. Here, at least three possibilities arise. First, it could be that my empirical conclusions are simply wrong much closer to forming a global capitalist class f or itself than the above analysis suggests. Second, my case selection could be leading me to an idiosyncratic conclusion global or there is something peculiar going on with Arab Latin American relations and the protagonists I have profiled above And finally, it could be that I have too aggressively stated the claim that assertions of global

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241 capitalist identities are indeed all a round us, and the reality is instead that such examples are relatively few and far between. In brief, and after careful consideration, I am not swayed by such objections. My meticulous and thorough empirical analysis of representative cases from within the chosen population does indeed point in the direction of sticky place based imaginaries and only (very) nascent global ones. While, as noted, we may speculate with some basis that Global North capitalist elites global their Southern colleagues, if for n o other than the simple, Marx derived reason that to the extent that a globally organized economy exists, they are more likely to be more deeply plugged into it ( that is, their material circumstances), t hese Northern and Southern elites are nonetheless all protagonists in the same universal story of capitalist globalization (Chibber 2013b) elites are increasingly entangled in the transnational class formation pr and to the extent that we recognize that global capitalism is indeed a universalizing force, but not a homogenizing one (Funk 2015a), we have every reason to expect that the life worlds of Northern an d Southern capitalists are of course different but intrinsically connected at the same time as they coexist within a larger, shared, global capitalist structure. A s such, though we should naturally expect some diversity of thought among them, we should als o presume that there is a fundamental relation and similarity in their interpretive frameworks. Likewise while Arab Latin American relations which feature a disproportionate presence of actors with ethnic and nationa l/transnationa l ties to the region of their

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242 ostensible commercial interest may constitute a particularly challenging case for attempting to locate a global capitalist class, further examination demonstrates that in fact these attachments do not play such an overbearing role, or perhaps not pre cisely the one we may expect. To return to the vignettes, Daccarett may love all things Palestinian, but he also speaks glowingly of the broader Middle East, and even Central America; the Syria of his ancestors, in business terms, is irrelevant to Melhem; in Seplveda reveals no familial ties whatsoever with the Arab world. Thus, the very ethnic and national /transnational linkages that make Arab Latin American relation s a particularly compelling case for analysis in the present circumstances do not, at least in general, drown out the profit motive of these actors. Thus, while we may again expect place based sentimentality to be stronger here than would presumably be the case with a de ethnicized, white Anglo Saxon Protestant capitalist elite actor in the U.S. who heads a multinational corporation that has truly global business interests, we must not lose sight of the fact that all of these figures are fundamentally related as part of the but connected manifestations of capitalist globalization. Accordingly as is the case with the first would be objection, while the issue of generalizability is always a legitimate concern, it should not derail us here from discussing the potential extension of the present analysis to a broader set of cases, at least for the sake of argument. The final putative objection is the easiest to addr ess Beyond the above cited examples of media stories that conjure images of a border hopping, and indeed to the

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243 business community itself for even more dramatic presentations of tr ansnational selves. Specifically, business propaganda commercials, promotional posters, and text from websites proves to be fertile ground for identifying cases of elite economic entities asserting global identities, both for themselves and potential clien ts. The point is not to interrogate the veracity of these media and corporate discourses, or of course to suggest that anarcho capitalist seasteaders do not exist and that there are no such cases of economic elites who change their citizenship for business reasons. All of the Rather, the present aim is to understand why corporations feel the need to sell us the general population on their own would globality discover what motivates the desire t o emit such a public image, and to interrogate the political calculations behind and ramifications of these decisions. As I have noted, my contention is that global capitalist elites are driven to display, and indeed exaggerate, their global credentials in both material and ideational terms for the very simple reason that doing so is in their self interest. In other words, the practices of 999, p. be significantly harder to regulate than those of their nationally oriented counterparts. Not because teary eyed patr iotic appeals have lost their resonance with the former, but due to the fact that actors with fewer national ties of any kind will be better able to dodge efforts at regulation of their economic activities, centered as these regulatory efforts are on national laws and national means of enforcement.

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244 Further, these global discourses feed into the public image also beneficial for such elites that we live in a capitalist fantasyland in which meaningful global regulation appears both unthinkable and imposs ible, and thus is not worth even attempting. Naturally, even social movements with an interest in fighting for alternative, politically progressive forms of globalization are more likely to feel disempowered rather than energized by the implicit message th at capitalist elites cannot be tamed by the state apparatus. S olving the aforementioned empirical puzzle thus requires that we understand the material incentives that motivate such a global presentation of self. Let us pause to consider two cases of corpo rate actors that have invested heavily in the cultivation of a global image. The Dubai based Emirates Airline, which international carriers, is a particularly media conscious entity, and as I peruse its website I am greeted by the trustworthy face of former Friends actress Jennifer Aniston (notably, the commercial in which she was paid a reported $5 million to star centers irlines match the amenities 2 ). Emirates is also a prolific producer of poster advertisements, the most telling of which for present omorrow thinks bord ers are so 3 Leaving aside a visual analysis of the background image, which displays adolescent skateboarders including a hijab wearing girl careening their way down a 2 The video is available at: (accessed January 17, 2016). 3 This advertisement can be viewed at: tomorrow/ (accessed January 17, 2016).

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245 mostly barren street, what explains this rather forthright statement of borderless creed? What does it mean and why is Emirates paying to disseminate this meaning ? Our main clue lies in the fact that Emirates, like all other airlines, is of course forced to navigate a world order in which nationally produced pieces of paper in the form of passports and visas determine who can and cannot enter a given country, or, in turn, fly on one of their planes. A borderless world is thus an appealing utopia for a business that profits from increasing global connectivity. Yet in the more mundane real world of today, borders are not actually of course a relic of yesteryear, and o possession of a given national document is still an ironclad determinant of whether you can purchase a given Emirates ticket or enjoy the apparently glamourous inflight Nevertheless, at least at the level of aviation policy, the aspiration to create a borderless world remains, an ideal that Emirates seeks to start concretizing tion and 4 the latter of which, perhaps not so coincidentally, happens to also be the 5 It is a global ethos that even filters down to hiring websi ur employee diversity of over 160 nationalities is our unique strength as a global 6 4 Information on this campaign is drawn from th nternational and g overnment a ffairs and gov a ffairs/international and government affairs new.aspx (accessed January 17, 2016). 5 skies/issue/2866682/january 2016 (January 17, 2016). 6 See: (accessed January 17, 2016).

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246 The immediate ambition, as stated in fine print at the bottom of the F ly Emirates to 6 But the larger political project is to tear down state based legal obstacles to the freer circulation of people, goods, capital, and indeed airlines, a position that would further buttress fast global 7 It is in this rhetorical and of course self interested sense that, to 8 Second, let us take the case of the Hong Kong born and London based HSBC 9 w w e brought together different countries and cultures, as we 10 According to the 11 with s 12 Having until recently anointed itself through a global marketing 7 See: (accessed January 17, 2016). 8 See: (accessed January 17, 2016). 9 hsbc/company history (accessed January 17, 2016). 10 See: and inclusion (accessed January 17, 2016). 11 See: hsbc (accessed January 17, 2016). 12 See: hsbc/our purpose? (accessed January 17, 2016).

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247 pressures have since caused HSBC to scale back such retail operations and focus inst (Farrell 2011). international conne ctions going in li 13 Typical are those ads with trivia style yet politically suggestive statistics and observations e people are learning English in China, than there are people in 14 followed by a call for Other slogans bear even less resemblance to th e head from Snapple bottle caps and instead evince clearer normative assumptions about the evolving world order, with prodding implications about how we can all get in on the (profitable) action We read: In the future, South South trade will be norm not novelty ( accompanied by the message and balder 13 See: hsbc/advertising (accessed January 17, 2016). 14 These and other such slogans are available at: airport ads share remarkable insight to our world/ (accessed January 17, 2016).

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248 (accompany ing 15 In other words: Corporate globalization is real. It is inevitable. Everyone is involved (or at least should be). And it is creating a flat world. For those passengers make their way through the jet bridge, and absorb in corresponding fashion the aforementioned ideological implications of these pithy statements, rewards i nclude precisely the heightened global awareness that will be necessary to stay ahead of the business landscape. According to this utopian vision, e very geographical space in the world will be fully integrated into the global capitalist system, and even the neighborhood lemonade stand a currencies will have globalized accordingly. 16 Indeed, b usiness opportunities know no boundaries A nd given that as another ad puts it Over 138 million people work outside their country of birth 17 and you as a viewer of these ads are on your way to or from an airplane at a global aviation hub neither should you It is almost as if we are back in Bu enos Aires, listening to Daniel Melhem profiled in the previous chapter delivering an impassioned 15 The advertisements can be viewed at: http: // airport ads/ (accessed January 17, 2016). 16 The blog post is available at: /globalisation promoted at airports/ (accessed January 17, 2016). 17 See, again: airport ads share remark able insight to our world/ (accessed January 17, 2016).

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249 There is after all, a big capitalist world out there, and those passengers who adopt a proper global mindset and break free of their antiquated and parochial place based concerns will be well situated to reap substantial material rewards. 18 The argument, again, is that Emirates, HSBC, and other global actors invest in the diffusion of suc h global presentations of self and their customers for reasons that globality (which may or may not be a part of their interpretive frameworks) and are more related to the material benefits (that is, profits ) to be reaped by assuming a global identity. As Ong (1999, p. 6; emphasis i n their quest to accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobilit After all, per the observation of the Argentine thinker Nstor Garca Canclini (2014, 42), they In this context, to again borrow from Krugman, globalism the utopian vision of a borderless and flat world ful Thus, these media efforts serve as a forum through which global elites not only T hey also 18 Playing more of the middle ground between the local (or, in this case, regional) and global is the So Paulo based Ita Global Latin American bank l website: [accessed January 17, 2016]). Reflecting the same spirit, it has developed 13). I wou ld like to thank Jany Mndez for bringing this and some of the other above examples to my attention.

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250 take the further step of suggesting that they cannot be caught or regu lated, or contained As the economist Dani Rodrik puts it, business elites (and economists (P earlstein 2011) Taking this analysis one step further, the present argument is that one way in which this business friendly agenda is advanced is precisely through corporate propaganda that stresses the global credentials of their own institutions as well as of cap italist elites more generally. require insider knowledge and evidence of a kind that at least to my knowledge, is not currently available, and whose collection is be yond the scope of the current project. Further, it may be the case that, at least for some, this is not an entirely conscious process, in the same way that we have discovered that global capitalist elites do not always display the robust levels of reflexiv ity that one may expect from actors who are situated thusly. Yet just as the detective seeks to establish a motive as part of t he attempt to solve a crime, we may work backward from the empirical anomaly largely place based identities coupled with very public assertions of global identities and surmise that there are material interests at play that must go some amount of distance toward squaring the circle. It will be up to future research to provide a ful ler explanation of the present puzzle and uncover evidence directly implicating the material interests of global elites in their decisions about how to project th emselves into the public eye. Conclusions To conclude the present study, this chapter seeks t o tie together two theoretical loose ends relating to issues raised by the above analysis of the global credentials (in

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251 ideational terms) of Latin American capitalist elites. While both cursory and speculative, these theoretical threads speak to highly sal ient issues for consideration of, respectively, the transformative (yet nuanced) processes that I suggest have begun and will continue to morph the interpretive frameworks of globally oriented capitalist actors, and how we are to reconcile the continued pr evalence of largely place based identities alongside firm and frequent assertions by globalizing institutions of the reality and desirability of our increasingly borderless world. As a brief summary, I first utilize this Latin American empirical material to derive globalism nascent trend toward the denationalization and subsequent globalization of capitalist elite identities, but which still occurs as I argue, agreeing with Sassen within the shells of sticky national and transnational imaginaries. My dual hopes, again, are to work toward the establishment of a precedent through which Global South realities are better integrated into theoretical understandings of our evolving global political economic order, as well as to accurately capture a developing phenomenon through suggesting a conceptual label that should facilitate efforts to figure out, what are the effects of globalization (the material) on elite identities (the ideational) ? In regards to the second, I have made the suggestion that certain corporations publicize the idea of the global capitalist class precisely because of its ideological content: it posits an ungovernable world in which capitalist elites have no material or ideational attachments to the state. Thus, it lays the ideological groundwork for a capitalist fantasyland in which regulation is both unthinkable and impossible. I do not mean to suggest, naturally, that Marxist scholars of global political economy promot e

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252 such an idea. Yet through its at times overly aggressive assertions concerning the rise to hegemony of a seemingly omnipotent global capitalist class, the global capitalism school has precisely the effect of disempowering those who seek to regulate the a ctivities of global capitalist elites or indeed imagine a different, alternative form of globalization. of a shared cosmopolitan consciousness. Indeed, global capitalist elites are increasingly chased around the globe by a profit seeking impulse, but not or at least not yet as a global for e thankful. That capitalist elites have yet to mentally divorce themselves from the state and construct a global imagined community is both a cause for relief and a motive to consider how to contain their rise. But we may very well be heading in s uch a direction, from place based interpretive frameworks to rooted globalism and then, perhaps, beyond. And indeed, based on the above analysis, at least certain global elites already seem to recognize the territorial baggage. It is a haunting specter, and serious efforts from combative social movements to new forms of global governance will be needed to confront it.

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253 CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION (Stevens 2015, p. 725) or, indeed, about their beliefs and actions in general. Yet s uch an oversight is not apparently limited to either political science or U.S. academia. As the Brazilian sociologist Antonio David Cattani comments, despite the fact that his is one of elp to influence 99 percent of research in the 1 Through analyzing (and exploring the histori es and contexts surrounding) the this project has sought to begin to fill this gap and contribute toward our understanding of the life worlds and interpretive frameworks of inter nationally oriented economic elites both in the region and the world over. Indeed, while various studies attempt to measure the extent to which globalization as an objective, material economic phenomenon is spreading around the planet (for example: Figge a nd Martens 2014), we know much less about the ideational qualities of To briefly recapitulate, I have argued to borrow from Latha Varadarajan (2014, p. 377) is persistence of the territorial nati on state system. And indeed, in regards to capitalist 1 The original quotations are in Portuguese. Translations are my own.

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254 class consciousness, the pull of the latter is stronger than that of the former, at least at present In other words, and in contradiction to many lay and scholarl y accounts, place based motivating imaginaries continue to reverberate among the predominantly merchant capitalist elites analyzed in this study to a more frequent extent than their place less counterparts Accordingly, the argument for the existence of a fully formed imagined community of global capitalist s retains analytical utility as an ideal type, and perhaps as a representation of a class that has yet to coalesce but one day will. However, it does not appear to be an accurate description of living and breathing capitalist elites as they exist today. Further, I have argued that corporate discourses promoting globality along with may in fact often be a political performance by capitalist entities to promote their own material, profit seeking interests. Thus, the idea of a global capitalist class for . regulatory ideational, and otherwise that prevent further capital accumulation. And finally I have developed a conceptual framework globalism with the aim of aiding our collective understanding of ongoing and likely future changes i n global capitalist identities. Given the apparent trends toward denationalization and, much more nascently, globalization that my analysis reveals, my hope is that the idea of rooted globalism will serve as a useful reference point for others who wish to shed additional light on ongoing changes in the interpretive frameworks and life worlds of global capitalist elites.

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255 While we may raise the (reasonable) objection that what these actors are doing (the material) is of much greater relevance then why they think they are doing it (the ideational), my contention has been that there are real, political consequences to the above story. Two are particularly worthy of mentioning here. First, though it was not my aim to make such an argument at the outset to the extent that I have demonstrated the mythology behind the aforementioned borderless utopias and the stickiness of place based imaginaries there are stronger grounds for considering how to engage in more meaningful forms of global governance. A class that s till has some level of national p. 187) will be easier to regulate. And second, by constructing actor centered accounts of the capitalist system, instead of overly structural ones that appear deterministic and teleol ogical, we counter the arguments of those who see the current power and economic inequalities that have risen alongside global capitalism as fait accompli From here, many ideas and future projects beckon. Indeed, m y interest has been piqued by multiple to pics throughout this process of study, learning, and analysis, including: the spread of new global infrastructure, such as Bitcoins, that could one day lay the basis for a truly globally integrated economy (and perhaps a corresponding shift in capitalist i dentities) ; from Santiago to So Paulo, as hubs for economic exchange; the potential formation of South South linkages (Karam 2007, p. 174) ; and the need for critically minded, policy as well as consideration of how the global power elite can be not just conceptualized as my

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256 project has sought to accomplish, but also regulated Further, I would of course welcome efforts by others to conduct serious studies of global class consciousness in their regions of expertise. Any limitations of this study aside, my aspiration is that the present methodolo gical approach, the notion of rooted globalism and the conceptual clarity that I have sought to provide, will all be of some utility in such endeavors. Also, it would hearten me to witness an avalanche or even a steady trickle of political science researc elites. Embedded within the current project just like any other, is a series of critiques, normative assumptions, and political aspirations To give voice to some of them here: F acing the IR tide of foregrounding Global North cases, experiences, and realities, I decided to swim in the opposite direction Thus, I chose to tackle what I regard to be an important and general theoretical question with a Latin American Global South case stu dy. Standard, positiv ist methodologies at least by themselves, are inadequate for addressing questions that involve meaning and identity. This is perhaps to observe and analyze (Emerson et al. 1995, p. 138). Based on its context sensitivity, ethnographic se nsibility, and more realistic and fluid view of human thought and action, interpretivism is much better suited as a general It is not my position that interpretivism is the only methodological game in town, or that all scholarship should adopt such an approach, but rather that our methodological choices should match our research questions and ontologies (Hall 2003). To the extent, then, that we are interested in human cognition and consciousness, and that we ificance he himself an interpret ive approach is a natural fit. Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street we have much to learn by close ly observing the agents who labor within, anonymous structures. Further focusing too much on structure as opposed to agency can reinforce the (undesirable) status quo by strengtheni ng the presentist bias and making change seem impossible. Global capitalism and neoliberalism like much else, ha ve in order for a serious movement to

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257 po p. 519). As implied above a n intellectual project of this kind is also an act of hope for a more inclusive IR, a more methodologically pluralistic political science, and a more equal and democratic world. My aim with this work has been not only to interpret the less than desirable status quo in these and other regards, but to change it, if only in small and hardly perceptible but nevertheless meaningful ways. This is undoubtedly entire academic career, let alone a solitary dissertation. Yet here, we can perhaps deservedly well known

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279 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Kevin graduated in the spring of 2016 with a doctorate in political science and a graduate certificate in Latin American studies ( summa cum laude ) in political science, English writing, and Latin American studies from the University of Pittsburgh. As part of his undergraduate and graduate education, he also completed studies at the Universidad de la Habana (Cuba), the Universidad Catlica de Valparaso (Chile), and the Instituto Brasil Estados Unidos in Rio de Janeiro.