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Ethnicity, Religion, and the State

Material Information

Title:
Ethnicity, Religion, and the State Intermarriage between the Han and Muslim Hui in Eastern China
Creator:
Cui, Zhongzhou
Place of Publication:
[Gainesville, Fla.]
Florida
Publisher:
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Language:
english
Physical Description:
1 online resource (449 p.)

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Doctorate ( Ph.D.)
Degree Grantor:
University of Florida
Degree Disciplines:
Anthropology
Committee Chair:
SHIH,CHUAN-KANG
Committee Co-Chair:
MURRAY,GERALD
Committee Members:
KANE,ABDOULAYE
HARRIS,VICTOR
Graduation Date:
8/8/2015

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Divorce ( jstor )
Imams ( jstor )
Intermarriage ( jstor )
Islam ( jstor )
Marriage ( jstor )
Mosques ( jstor )
Muslims ( jstor )
Parents ( jstor )
Religion ( jstor )
Women ( jstor )
Anthropology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
ethnicity -- intermarriage -- muslim
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
Anthropology thesis, Ph.D.

Notes

Abstract:
This dissertation examines patterns of intermarriage between members of a Chinese Muslim ethnic group (the Hui) with non-Muslims (mostly Han) in eastern China. More specifically, the research documents how Islamic affiliation and ethnic identity are negotiated and changed at marriage in the context of strong interventions by the Chinese State into the affairs of ethnic minorities. There were several research questions. 1) How do State policies that benefit ethnic minorities motivate members of the Han majority to change their ethnic identification to minority status at the time of marriage? 2) How do intermarried minority members maintain their Islamic identity despite strict Islamic intermarriage prohibitions, particularly with regards to women? 3) Why do all intermarried couples choose minority status for their children? 4) What type of religious and ethnic education is offered to these children of intermarried couples? The study is based on three years of intensive fieldwork (2010-13) and nearly 10 years of contact. The research was conducted in Bozhou, a city in eastern China, with a population of 1.41 million, 40,000 of whom are Muslims. Research methods included participant observation and interviews with more than 150 intermarried couples. Typical marriage and family customs of both ethnic groups were observed and compared. Information was also gleaned from government statistics, historical records, and Chinese ethnographies. Most of the Muslims that marry non-Muslims in Bozhou are women, and intermarried Han change their ethnic status to that of Hui. These are serious departures both from Islamic law, which forbids Muslim women to intermarry, and from Chinese law, which forbids adults to change their ethnic status. The consequences of these anomalies for personal and group identity are explored. It is hoped that this research will 1) contribute to our understanding of the meanings and consequences of intermarriage between two ethnic groups, and 2) enrich the literature on the State and ethnicity, the State and religion, and the fluidity of ethnic and religious identities. In addition, by focusing on Chinese Muslims in an inland area, this research fills a gap in Chinese Muslim studies, which usually concentrate on border areas. ( en )
General Note:
In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note:
Includes vita.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description:
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description:
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2015.
Local:
Adviser: SHIH,CHUAN-KANG.
Local:
Co-adviser: MURRAY,GERALD.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Zhongzhou Cui.

Record Information

Source Institution:
UFRGP
Rights Management:
Copyright Cui, Zhongzhou. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Classification:
LD1780 2015 ( lcc )

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ETHNICITY, RELIGION, AND THE STATE: INTERMARRIAGE BETWEEN THE HAN AND MUSLIM HUI IN EASTERN CHINA By ZHONGZHOU CUI A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 201 5

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© 201 5 Zhongzhou Cui

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To my Parents

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4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS When I put the finishing touches on this dissertation and turned off my computer, thousands of powerful feelings welled up from inside. But I simply could not find the words to express them. For the past nine years, I have been the beneficiary of incredibly generous help from many people in many places . I first thank my p arents who, as traditional and semi literate Chinese farmers in a rural area , hid from me their myriad misgivings about my departure. Who could predict whether I would be able to obtain a doctoral degree and bring honor to our family and our ancestors? The y have tolerated an incredibly prolonged separation. Now it is time to go home. Secondly, I am profoundly grateful to my mentor, my committee chair, Dr. Chuan kang Shih. Without hundreds of hours of give and take discussion s in which he shared his advice , it would have been impossible to identify this marvelous dissertation topic or to design the beautiful outline to logically capture it on paper. My one regret is that my limited ability in terms of language capacity, logical thinking, and academic writin g prevents me from reaching in these pages the level of thinking and writing that characterizes the work of Dr. Shih. All imperfections in these pages are my responsibility. I am deeply grateful for his skillful guidance during the past years. Next, I owe particular thanks to Dr. Gerald Murray, one of the best professors I have ever had in my academic career. From fine tuning the dissertation topic, to the conduct of fieldwork, the task of dissertation writing, and words of psychological wisdom during mome nts of discouragement, he provided me much needed help devoid of personal criticism. He treated all students equally and kindly. He has always

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5 encouraged me and on several occasions has bolstered my tottering self esteem. I walked away from each of our con versations filled with positive energy. My other committee members, Dr. Abdoulaye Kane and Dr. Victor Harris, offered me numerous insightful suggestions concerning my dissertation writing. Without their help, this dissertation would not have taken on its present form. Additionally, I wish to thank Dr. John Moore and Dr. Gwendolyn Simmons who kindly agreed to serve on my degree from UF and was able to continue on to docto ral studies. Other professors in the Anthropology Department at UF, such as Drs. Susan deFrance, Peter Collins, Russell Bernard, Brenda Chalfin, and Anita Spring, also gave me much needed help at different times. No words can adequately express my gratitu de to them all. members, -Karen Jones, Juanita Bagnall, Pamela Freeman, and Patricia King -are without question the best support team that any student could hope to have. It is hard to imagine that only four people can run such a huge department and give such high quality service to all faculty and students. I also wish to thank the Graduate School at UF for granting me a dissertation award that freed me from tuition, other costs, and other tasks. With this much nee ded help, I was able to concentrate on my dissertation writing and bring it to completion. My deepest gratitude of course goes to my informants, my contacts in the field, who opened their homes and shared with me their insight into the Hui of Bozhou. Among these are the married couples Wang Yuntao and Qiang Jing, Guo Liang and Chen Yan, Wang Yuling and Hong, Imams Bai Xiangqi and Yang Yan, and individuals

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6 such as Suo Jinghu, Jiang Shaoliang, Meng Zhaopeng, Mo San, Li Qiang, Wang Huiliang, Luo Cui, Zhou Xia o, and dozens of others. Without their help and cooperation and logistical support, my research would not have gone so smoothly. As is common practice, out of respect for their privacy I have disguised their names in the pages that follow. My gratitude g oes also to my colleagues at UF. Xing Haiyan, Jiao Yang, Liu Meng, Zhao Hanchao, and Professor Wu Zongyou offered me constant support during my PhD studies and during the write up of my dissertation. Thank you so much, my friends. And finally the person t o whom I owe, and gladly give, my deepest gratitude is my wife, Liu Haiyan. More than twenty years of selfless soul support create a bond and a debt that is simply beyond any human words. Without her, this research would never have come to fruition.

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7 TAB LE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 12 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ........................... 14 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 15 C H A P T E R S 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 17 Research Problem ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 17 Statement of Research Problem ................................ ................................ ...... 17 Background of the Hui and the City of Bozhou ................................ ................. 19 Marriage and Intermarriage of the Muslim Hui ................................ ................. 24 Literatur e Review ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 28 Historical and ethnographic accounts about the Hui in Bozhou ........................ 28 Theoretical Frameworks of Ethnicity ................................ ................................ 32 Ethnic Identity vs. Ethnic Identification ................................ ............................. 36 Intermarria ge: Theories and Practice ................................ ............................... 41 Two Controversial Patterns ................................ ................................ .............. 45 The Impact of Secularization on Religion ................................ ......................... 48 Methodology ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 49 O utline of the C hapters ................................ ................................ ........................... 57 2 THE HUI AND HAN IN BOZHOU ................................ ................................ ............ 63 Ethnic and Religious Landscapes of Bozhou ................................ .......................... 63 Field Site ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 63 Ethnic Groups ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 66 Diversity of Religions ................................ ................................ ........................ 68 The Hui in Bozhou ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 77 Ethnic Relationship between the Hui and the Han ................................ .................. 80 Emergence of the Muslim Hui the First Two Stages ................................ ...... 81 Relationship between the Hui and the Han during the Qing Dynasty (1644 1911) ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 84 Fifth Stage: Cooperation and Confrontation ................................ ..................... 91 Relationship of the two ethni c groups in Bozhou ................................ .................... 94 Before the anti rightist campaign ................................ ................................ ...... 95 From the anti rightist campaign to the Cultural Revolution ............................... 96 After the Cultural Revolution ................................ ................................ ............. 98

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8 Shihe Town event in Oct. 21 22, 1990 ................................ ....................... 99 An event on August 30, 1992 ................................ ................................ ... 100 An event in Guantang in 1996 ................................ ................................ .. 102 Ethnic Relationships in B ozhou ................................ ................................ ...... 104 Economic change and increased social mobility ................................ ...... 105 Growth of ethno religious awareness and underground powers .............. 106 Governmental strategies for dealing with the Hui and their underworld powers ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 108 Summary of the section ................................ ................................ .................. 110 3 INTERMARRIAGE BETWEEN THE MUSLIM HUI AND HAN: AN OVERVIEW ... 114 Marriage and Intermarriage in Islam ( Shariah ) ................................ ..................... 114 What is an Islamic Marriage? ................................ ................................ ......... 114 Whom You Cannot Marry ................................ ................................ ............... 118 Intermarriage and the Muslim Hui: the Silenced Memory ................................ ..... 121 Formation of the Muslim Hui in History ................................ ........................... 123 Silencing the Past with Respect to Intermarriage among the Northwest Hui .. 129 Silencing the Current Practice of Intermarriage among the Southeast Hui ..... 131 Regional Differences in Collective Silence about Intermarriage ..................... 137 4 MOTIVATIONS OF INTERMARRIAGE AND MATE SELECTION ........................ 142 Motivations ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 142 Criteria of Mate Selection ................................ ................................ ...................... 146 bles ................................ ................................ .. 146 The impact of Ethnicity When Socio economic Status is Controlled .............. 1 47 Lifestyle Factor ................................ ................................ ............................... 148 Socioeconomic Status has an Impact. ................................ ............................ 150 al or Unnecessary for Marriage ................................ ........ 153 Marry a Right Man or a Rich Man? ................................ ................................ . 154 Fear of remaining unmarried motivates Shanhun Marriage ............................ 156 Marriage without Legal Documents ................................ ................................ 159 Initial Contact ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 160 Schooling ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 160 Occupational Settings ................................ ................................ ..................... 162 Social settings ................................ ................................ ................................ 163 On line introductions ................................ ................................ ....................... 165 The Role of Matchmaker/Go betwe en ................................ ............................ 167 Decision Making ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 168 Difference before and after 1990 ................................ ................................ .... 169 Decision Making in Hui Families ................................ ................................ .... 170 Marital Decision Maki ng in Han Families ................................ ........................ 172 Impact of the One Child Policy on Parental Attitudes toward Marriage .......... 173 Engagement ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 175 Engagement as Required ................................ ................................ ............... 175 Setting the Engagement Date ................................ ................................ ........ 177

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9 Betrothal Party ................................ ................................ ................................ 181 Agreements over Dowry, Bride Price, and other Requirements ..................... 182 5 THE MARITAL TRANSACTION ................................ ................................ ........... 185 Dowry and Bride Price ................................ ................................ .......................... 185 s China in General ................................ ....... 187 Transition of the Bride price in Bozhou ................................ ........................... 188 ................................ ................................ ........ 191 Dowry ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 196 Marriage Payments in Bozhou: Analyses ................................ ....................... 200 The Wedding Ceremony ................................ ................................ ....................... 204 Preparation of the Wedding Ceremony ................................ .......................... 205 Setting the date of the wedding ceremony ................................ ............... 205 Reserving the restaurant and sending out the invitation letters ................ 206 Marriage registration ................................ ................................ ................ 209 Family meeting ................................ ................................ ......................... 210 Making the bed ................................ ................................ ........................ 214 The day before the wedding ................................ ................................ ..... 216 The Wedding Day ................................ ................................ ........................... 217 Nao dongfang (to tease the bride) ................................ ........................... 226 Feast/Banquet of a wedding ................................ ................................ .... 228 Rituals of the wedding ................................ ................................ .............. 231 age ................................ ............................. 236 ................................ ............... 238 The Economics of Gift Giving ................................ ................................ ............... 241 Huimen ................................ .................... 245 6 FAMILY LIFE ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 248 Gender Roles in Family ................................ ................................ ........................ 248 Five Status Transitions of Chinese Women in Modern China ........................ 248 The Gender Culture of Bozhou Women ................................ ......................... 253 Cultural Alignment of Domestic Behavior ................................ .............................. 257 Religious Pra ctice in the Family ................................ ................................ ............ 261 Social and Economic Life in the Context of the Family ................................ ......... 263 7 CHILDREARING AND ETHNO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION ................................ .. 270 Ethnic Identification(s) of Children in Intermarried Families ................................ .. 270 Family Education of Ethnic religious Knowledge ................................ .................. 275 Nationality/Minzu Schools ................................ ................................ ..................... 281 Ethnic Schools before the Founding of the PRC ................................ ............ 281 Nationality/Minzu Schools in the PRC ................................ ............................ 282 The first Huimin elementary school in Bozhou ................................ ......... 282 The second Huimin elementary school ................................ .................... 283 The third Huimin elementary school ................................ ......................... 283

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10 The fourth Huimin elementary school ................................ ...................... 283 The minzu middle school ................................ ................................ ......... 284 C urrent Situation: Decline of Minzu Schools ................................ .................. 284 Summer and Winter Ethno Religious Schools ................................ ...................... 290 Traditional Vehicles of Ethno Religious Education in Hui History ................... 290 Ethno Religious Education Efforts in the Beijing Mosque ............................... 293 Ethno Religious Education Efforts in the CLS ................................ ................ 296 Other Issues in Ethno Religious Education ................................ ........................... 304 8 DIVORCE ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 311 Reasons to Get Divorced ................................ ................................ ...................... 311 Scholarly Research ................................ ................................ ........................ 312 The Legal Context of Divorce ................................ ................................ ......... 314 General Divorce Situation of Bozhou ................................ ............................. 317 Divorce in Islam ................................ ................................ .............................. 318 Categories of Reasons for Divorce ................................ ................................ . 320 Settlement or Throu gh the Court ................................ ................................ .......... 321 Ways of Divorce ................................ ................................ ............................. 321 Juridical Predicament in Divorce ................................ ................................ .... 322 Divorce Trend ................................ ................................ ................................ . 323 Ethno religious Divorce ................................ ................................ .................. 324 Divorces that did not involve ethnicity or religion ................................ ............ 326 Division of Property ................................ ................................ ............................... 331 ................................ ................................ 331 Enforcement of Divorce Laws in Bozhou ................................ ........................ 33 2 Relatively Fair Property Partition ................................ ................................ .... 334 Relatively Unfair Property Partition ................................ ................................ . 335 Responsibility of Childrearing ................................ ................................ ............... 339 Gender and Ethnicity Factors D etermining C hild C ustody after Divorce ........ 339 ................................ ................ 341 Commitm ent Situation of Childrearing ................................ ............................ 342 Consequences of Divorce on gender balance ................................ ...................... 345 For Men ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 346 For women ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 347 9 CHANGE OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION THROUGH INTERMARRIAGE ........... 351 Change of Ethnic Identification as a Common Phenomenon ................................ 351 Procedures and Practice ................................ ................................ ....................... 359 ................................ ................................ .............................. 359 ........... 361 Imam and DACM ................................ ................................ ............................ 366 Ethnic Identification Change .. 373 Motivations: Utilitarianism and Other Explanations ................................ ........ 373 ................................ ................................ ................................ 375 Consequences of Widely Existing Ethnic Identification Change ..................... 380

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11 De Politicization of the Term Minzu ................................ ................................ ...... 388 Anti depoliticization ................................ ................................ ........................ 392 Anti anti depoliticization ................................ ................................ .................. 393 1 0 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 398 Two Competing Causal Models about Intermarriage ................................ ............ 399 Education ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 402 State defined Imagined Identity and Community ................................ .................. 405 Further Questions for Future Study ................................ ................................ ....... 409 Reconstruction of Religious Faith and Ethnic Identity ................................ ..... 409 Ruptures between Muslims ................................ ................................ ............ 410 Ruptures and confrontation between Bozhou Hui and other Muslims (including Hui) ................................ ................................ ....................... 411 The rupture between secular Hui (who constitute a majority) and observant Hui (who are a small minority) ................................ .............. 411 The rupture between ordinary Hui and those who control the mosque .... 412 The separation of Hui ethnicity from observance of Isla m ....................... 412 The rupture between Bozhou trends and worldwide Islamic trends ......... 413 The rupture between the peaceful Islam of Bozhou and Islamic armed militancy elsewhere ................................ ................................ .............. 414 Separate Identities and/or E thn ic F ragmentation ................................ .................. 414 APPENDIX A ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 417 B ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 427 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 429 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 449

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12 LIST OF TABLES Table page 3 1 Frequency of intermarriages in Lanzhou ................................ .......................... 140 4 1 Economic status and intermarriage orientat ion ................................ ................. 184 7 1 (1986) ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 310 8 1 Divorce records of Bozhou fr om 2001 2010 ................................ .................... 349 8 2 Divorce through settlement or the court at ages ................................ .............. 349 8 3 Gender specific about children custody at divorce i n mixed families ............... 349 8 4 Gender specific about children custody at divorce in Hui husband mixed families ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 350 8 5 Gender specific about children custody at divorce in Han husband mixed families ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 350 8 6 Gender and Ethnicity specific about Remarriage ................................ ............. 350 9 1 Survey of ethnic identification change in marriages ................................ ........ 396

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13 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2 1 Location of Bozhou in Anhui , China Source:http://www.china facttours.com/photo/maps/map of anhui 1.html ......... 111 2 2 City map of Bozhou (google map) ................................ ................................ .... 112 2 3 The monument (left) and its inscripti on written with hand by the priest. ........... 113 2 4 ................................ ............................. 113 3 1 Population distribution of the Muslim Hui (2000) ................................ .............. 141 8 1 2007. Adapted from: Wang & Zhou (2010) ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 350 9 1 Layer ed circl e structure of t identity/ identification ................................ 397

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14 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BJS Beijingsi, the Beijing Mosque, located in the northwestern sector of the city CLS Chenglisi, the Inner City Mosque, the major mosque in the Bozhou community D ACM T he Democratic Administrative Committee of Mosque, called in Chinese. GBS Guobeisi, a mosque on the northern side of the Guohe River, located in the north of the city , Bozhou MZJ Minzu Zongjiao Ju, the Bureau of Minzu (nationalities) and Religio ns TAS Three Ahongs ( imam ) System TCM Traditional Chinese Medicine XGS Xiguansi, the Western Gate Mosque, located in the western sector of the city

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15 Abstract of a Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ETHNICITY, RELIGION, AND THE STATE: INTERMARRIAGE BETWEEN THE HAN AND MUSLIM HUI IN EASTERN CHINA By Zhongzhou Cui August 201 5 Chair: Chuan kang Shih Major: Anthropology Thi s dissertation examines patterns of intermarriage between members of a Chinese Muslim ethnic group (the Hui) with non Muslims (mostly Han) in eastern China. More specifically, the research documents how Islamic affiliation and ethnic identity are negotiate d and changed at marriage in the context of strong interventions by the Chinese State into the affairs of ethnic minorities. There were several research questions. 1) How do State policies that benefit ethnic minorities motivate members of the Han majority to change their ethnic identification to minority status at the time of marriage? 2) How do intermarried minority members maintain their Islamic identity despite strict Islamic intermarriage prohibitions, particularly with regards to women? 3) Why do all intermarried couples choose minority status for their children? 4) What type of religious and ethnic education is offered to these children of intermarried couples? The study is based on three years of intensive fieldwork (2010 13) and nearly 10 years of contact. The research was conducted in Bozhou, a city in eastern China, with a population of 1. 41 million, 4 0,000 of whom are Muslims. Research methods included participant observation and interviews with more than 150 intermarried couples. Typical marria ge and family customs of both ethnic groups were observed and compared.

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16 Information was also gleaned from government statistics, historical records, and Chinese ethnographies. Most of the Muslims that marry non Muslims in Bozhou are women, and intermarried Han change their ethnic status to that of Hui. These are serious departures both from Islamic law, which forbids Muslim women to intermarry, and from Chinese law, which forbids adults to change their ethnic status. The consequences of these anomalies for personal and group identity are explored. It is hoped that this research will 1) contribute to our understanding of the meanings and consequences of intermarriage between two ethnic groups, and 2) enrich the literature on the State and ethnicity, the State and religion, and the fluidity of ethnic and religious identities. In addition, by focusing on Chinese Muslims in an inland area, this research fills a gap in Chinese Muslim studies, which usually concentrate on border areas.

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17 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Research Problem Statement of Research Problem Since its emergence in the 7th century, Islam has mandated religious endogamy. Interfaith marriage is forbidden. marry unbelieving women ( idolaters), until they believe: a slave woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she is alluring to you. Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers until they believe: a man slave who believes is better than an unbeliever, even though An exception is made with regard to those labelled People of the Book, principally Jews and Christians. This exception, however, is partial. Muslim men may marry Jewish or Christian women, but the converse is not true. For many centuries Chinese Muslims abided by this rule. As these pages will show, however, the rule of religious endogamy is widely ignored by some Chinese Muslims, particularly in eastern China. In the Muslim group to be documented here, intermarriage wi th non Muslims is the rule. Marriage occurs with non Muslims who being Han Chinese -are not people of the book. And Muslim women marry outside of the faith with the same frequency as Muslim men. There is a close association in China between religion and ethnicity . An interreligious marriage is consequently often an interethnic marriage. The ethnic group to be described here are the Hui. Though it is legally forbidden for an adult to change ethnic membership, in actual fact the non Muslim spouse usuall y finds ways to adopt the Hui ethnic affiliation as well at the time of marriage . Some of them incorrectly

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18 believe that this automatically makes them a Muslim as well. The children of ethnically mixed unions can be registered in whichever group the parents prefer. In virtually all cases the parents choose to register them as Hui rather than as members of the dominant ethnic group, the Han, to which the non Muslim spouse generally belongs. We will see that this practice of widespread intermarriage in a so cial setting where religion and ethnicity are conflated creates identity dilemmas. It not only weakens care about Islamic practice. It also creates ethnic ambiguity wit hin the Hui group and created dilemmas with regard to the policies of the Chinese State with regard to ethnicity. It is the intent of this research to document and analyze these patterns, which in many ways differ from what is found in the Islamic world outside of China. In terms of causal analysis we need not search very far afield to understand the forces which have brought about this anomalous situation. The idiosyncrasies of the interethnic and interreligious dynamics among the Hui can be largely attr ibuted to the behavior of the Chinese State, which has involved itself directly in matters of the ethnic membership and religious affiliation of its citizens. We shall see that it has been Chinese State policy principally but not exclusively its One Chi ld Policy with respect to ethnic minorities that has created a distinct advantage to minority status and has led many Han, via intermarriage, to seek minority status for their children and in many cases for themselves. The research will therefore contrib ute not only to ethnographic documentation of religious, ethnic, and marriage customs in eastern China ; i t will also be a local case study documenting the power of the State.

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19 Background of the Hui and the City of Bozhou Though there are several ethnic gro ups in China that practice Islam, the Hui are by far the largest, as seen in the latest national census (2010). The Hui live scattered all over the country, but most of them are concentrated in northwest China. The Hui have a population of about 10 million . Their scattered geographical distribution has led to the emergence over time of diverse subcultures, despite their common ethnic name and their identity as Muslims. The interregional cultural differences have led at least one ore I travelled, the less I found that tied all of these diverse idiosyncracies also characterize the Muslim Hui in Bozhou. As we shall see, the major distinguishing feature of this group is their widespread practice of religious exogamy. The research was carried out principally in the city of Bozhou , in Chinese. Bozhou is located in the northwest corner of Anhui Province, in east central China. It is surrounded by Henan provi nce on three sides, north, west and southwest. The whole area belongs to Yellow River Huai River Plain. One of main branches of the Huai River, the Guo River, cuts across the city in the north. The major political, economic and cultural organizations and a ctivities center in the southern part of the city. Bozhou did not become an independent prefecture until 2000. In these pages references to Bozhou deal with the central part of the prefecture, the Qiaocheng District, which was once time called Boxian (i.e ., Bo County). The local population of Muslim Hui (around 40,000) is concentrated in this District. Other counties within this district are also reported to contain Hui. Earlier research, however, has cast doubt on the accuracy

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20 of official statistics in t his matter 1 . Unless otherwise specified, allusions to Bozhou Muslims hereafter in these pages refer exclusively to the Muslims in the Qiaocheng District. Where the term Bozhou is being used to refer to the whole prefecture, this will be specifically pointe d out. The registered population of the whole Prefecture reached 6.1 million in 2010. About 4.85 million of these currently reside there, the remainder living elsewhere but maintaining their status as residents of their home Prefecture. The registered i nhabitants of Bozhou are about 1.65 million in total of whom 1.41 million currently 2 59,905 current residents, spread out into three urban districts and 22 towns. The three districts are Xuege, Huaxilou, and Tan gling. The demographically largest and socio politically most important of these districts is Xuege, which occupies the central, eastern, southern and southeastern part of the city. Huaxilou district covers the western and northwestern area, while Tanglin g is located on the north side of the river. Most Muslim Hui are concentrated in Xuege and Huaxilou districts. Bozhou Prefecture has the heaviest concentration of Muslim Hui in Anhui province. The official government website lists the population of Musli m Hui in the whole Prefecture as exceeding 90,000 in 2012 2 . This accounts for approximately 1/3 of all Muslim Hui in Anhui Province. There is a discrepancy, however, between these figures and those of the sixth national census. According to the latter the Hui population of the 1 Cui, Zhongzhou, 2005, The Continuation of Traditions and Customs of Minzu Mix dwelled in Hinterland China A Case Study on Huizu Community at Yimen Town . Master Degree thesis , Anhui University . 2 This is from Bozhou government s official website . I t says that there are 29 m in zu (ethnic minorities) in Bozhou amounting to more than 90,000 individuals . The Hui are listed as constituting about 97.5% of total population. S ee: http://www.bozhou.gov.cn/content/detail/529d49007f8b9ae218bcfd4e.html

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21 entire prefecture was much smaller: 49,102 ; t he Hui in Bozhou County totaled 39,254. This indicates that about 80% of the local Hui are concentrated in Bozhou County. Unfortunately, there are no official data available at district le vel so that we do not know the exact population of the Hui in each of the three sectors. In terms of their local dispersion, most of the local Hui are concentrated in the western, northwestern, and northern parts of the city in the vicinity of four mosque s: Inner City Mosque (denoted by CLS, Chenglisi in pinyin , which North River Mosque (GBS). The CLS community is the largest, accounting for about hal f of the population of the Hui. The XGS and BJS communities account for another two fifths of the local Hui population. The smallest group is the GBS community. It is not only geographically marginalized. It has a lower level of influence in local Hui disc ussions concerning matters of group interest. In terms of climate, Bozhou is located in the warm temperate zone, which determines its agriculture and even certain aspects of local industrial development. Local food production is carried out on dry land r ather than on the perpetually moist paddy field characterizing many other regions. Wheat is the major crop. In 2012, the reported wheat harvest was about 3.7 billion kilograms. Local farmers specialize in the planting of herbal medicinal plants. Hosting t he largest traditional Chinese medicine market in all of China, Bozhou spearheaded the planting of medicinal herbs back in the 3rd century. Today about half a million residents of Bozhou including towns as well as rural area are involved in the traditional medicinal economy whether planting, processing, transporting or marketing. More

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22 than 400 species and varieties of medical plants are planted in 52,280 acres (2012) or 54,500 acres (2013) . This accounts for about 10 percent of all medicinal plants produced in China as a whole. The most commonly planted item is the paeonia lactiflora , a type of herbaceous perennial flowering plant. Bozhou produces more than 90% of this crop that is grown in the entire country. It is estimated that the production and sale of this crop, as well as other medicinal herbs, contribute more than 10 billion 3 . Because of the unusual importance of medicinal plants in the local economy, local government policy and strategy with respect to economic development focus on the medicinal sector. As is true of most regions in China, Bozhou also has its linguistic idiosyncrasies. Because of its geographical location, the local dialect is a variety of central China Man darin, which is widely intelligible in all of northern Anhui province, Henan province, and Shandong province. It can be understood even farther north up to the Huai River. Central China Mandarin is also the vernacular of the Hui in Bozhou. In terms of the languages of Islam, a small number of local Hui are able to say a few words in Arabic or Farsi because of their exposure to the religious languages used in local mosques. Some have learned these phrases from their parents. These are isolated phrases rende red in phonetic notation of similar sounding characters in Mandarin. By no way can they communicate with native speakers of Arabic or Farsi. Individual Hui may greet each other with Salaam which is the brief of Anseliamu erlaikumu 3 2012 2013 (Statistical Communique of Bozhou on the 2012 and 20 13 National Economic and Social Development)

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23 be wi th you , Anseliamu ahlaikong The Bozhou Hui not only lack fluency in the languages of Islam. Unlike many other ethnic minorities, the Hui also lack a distinct et hnic language. They speak whatever dialect of Mandarin is used by the surrounding Han population. They nonetheless can choose other ways of distinguishing themselves from the majority Han. Observant Hui men may wear white hats. Hui women may cover themselv es, especially when preparing typical Hui food such as a certain noodle dish, fried pancakes, etc. Some Hui intentionally let their beard grow long (but without growing a moustache 4 ). Their neighbors, the Han, occasionally claim to be able to identify the Hui from certain physical features. For example, a Han informant asked me in private to observe the Hui, their eye socket is deeper. Their nose is higher and more upright, and they are more However, in to s Bozhou, most Hui are phenotypically indistinguishable from the majority Han. Very few of them still wear white hats in public. Some of them do not even know the meaning of Salaam nor do they know how to say qingzhenyan (Shahada), nor the meaning of the word Islam. All know that they are not supposed to them do not even know or pretend not to know that alcohol is specifical ly prohibited in Islam. It is not unusual to see an Avalokiteshvara statue a strictly forbidden type of 4 It seems that different regions have different expectations or requirements in this regard. For example, in the Northwest, Gedium Hui and Dongxiang Hua consider shaving the moustache as a taboo, while ihewali in contrast consider the keeping of a moustache as a taboo. http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/617113262387864172.html

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24 Buddhist iconography put in the most conspicuous place in a house of worship, right next to an Arabic Shahada sign hung at the top of the same entra nce. On some occasions, such as a wedding ceremony or a funeral, fireworks are also used to celebrate also forbidden. If an imam is invited to the ceremony, the hosts will be warned against such use of firecrackers. . Marriage and Intermarriage of the Muslim Hui All of these religious infractions pale in importance to the major departure of Bozhou Hui from traditional Islam: their violation of the prohibition against interfaith marriage . As pointed out earlier, marriage to a non believer, whether male or female, is prohibited in Islam with the exceptions mentioned. However, according to the imams and the local Hui whom I interviewed during my fieldwork, the rate of intermarriage is ated to be below 15%. At present informants place the rate somewhere between 30% and 40% . This appears to be a vast underestimation. I collected from the government marriage registration records a sample of 3 , 500 marriage cases among the Hui in Bozhou in t he past seven years (500 cases a year) . According to this data intermarriage occurred in more than 80% of the cases. Far from being the deviant behavior of a few, it is now the heavy statistical norm. It is most noteworthy that the cases of Muslim women ma rrying Han men accounted for over 65% of all the intermarriages of the Hui . (Details will be given in Chapter 3). This constitutes an extreme collective violation not only against Islamic law, but also against the former traditions of the Chinese Hui, a s one commentator put it, the

PAGE 25

25 emerged as a new newly formed Chinese ethnic group in the 13th century. Their adherence to the endogamy tradition of Islamic law was put to the test as early as the 17th century when the Q ing Dynasty began to implement a harsh er policy against other ethnic groups . Although the endogamy tradition was not str ictly followed by the earliest groups of Sino 1997), it had been adhered to for at least three as early as AD 651. Brought by Muslims who mig rated to China via coastal cities such as Guangzhou and Quanzhou. They functioned not only as traders but also as missionaries for Islam. The large scale immigration of Muslims, however, did not begin until the Mongol conquest in the 12th century. Many Mus lims from central Asia and Persia and Arabia were recruited to serve in the army to conquer the Southern Song Dynasty. Among these Islamic newcomers were soldiers, artists, carpenters, and other technicians. They stayed in different regions of China when t he Mongols completed the conquest. Because most of the newcomers were male, they had to marry local women. to marry the newly arrived Muslims only on the condition that the y should convert to Islam. At the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, after the Mongolians were driven out to the upper north, the Emperor promulgated an imperial edict that all minorities henceforth had to marry individuals from outside their ethnic group. Dur ing some two hundred years of intermarriage, adoption, and conversion, a new ethnic group, the Huihui, was taking shape.

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26 The intermarriage edict was disregarded after the Manchu took power in the country. From that period on, the Huihui began again to pra ctice endogamy. Two factors came into play. On the one hand, persecution from the government had created a greater sense of protective unity. On the other hand, their population size was now also large enough to make endogamy demographically viable. This t radition of in marriage thus reasserted itself and survived until recent decades. It was threatened particularly in the east and southeast of China, and in urban areas. To this very day this endogamy tradition has retained its power and obligatory characte r amongst northwest Muslims. When Huo Da, a Hui writer, published her novel that gave approval to intermarriage in the 1980s, she was continually bombarded with malicious critique, including earning the title of Hui Jian ( , a traitor of the Hui). In star k contrast to the Hui reaction, she has received abundant praise and multiple awards from the government for this work. Beyond religious laws, the issue of ethnicity in China, of officially recognized minority status, also has an impact on the phenomenon of intermarriage. In the case of children of intermarried couples, Chinese government policy allows their parents to choose the parent from which their ethnic identification will be derived. In Bozhou, however, Hui Han couples have all invariably chosen t he Hui identification for their children. But in many cases the in marrying Han adult also takes steps to change his or her own ethnic identification to that of Hui. Many Han explicitly marry a Hui spouse in order to change their own ethnic identification into the Hui. In the past there was no strong policy ba nn ing this maneuver. Therefore applications to become a Hui on the occasion of intermarriage were usually approved. This preference for, and conversion to, the Hui identification through intermarriage (or through other legal maneuvers) may

PAGE 27

27 be a major contributor to Hui population growth in the past three decades (from 7 million in 1982 to 10 million in 2010). Because Hui ethnicity is popularly associated with Islam, adults who change their ethnic identi fication to Hui are assumed as well to be converting to Islam, though they have no knowledge of or interest in the Islamic faith. Sino Muslims (in Lipman) in the West, the Hui ethnicity is associated in popular view with th e Islamic faith and practices. However, recent scholarship has noted that a distinction must be made between the Hui as an ethnic group and Islam as a religion (Fan 2001, 2006; Jaschok & Shui 2000; Mackerras 2003, etc.). The case of the Hui in Bozhou stron gly validates this distinction. Most of the parents who identified their children as Hui or those Han who changed their identification to the Hui did so without any religious interest. They were motivated rather by certain policies from the government whic h now endow minority status with practical benefits. Among these are greater flexibility in local economic practices, heavier state subsidies in ethnic minority settings for local development projects, disproportional access to political office, priority i n admission to educational institutions, exemption from birth planning restrictions, and permission to bury rather than cremate the dead (Dreyer 1976, Mackerras 1995). A Han who switches ethnic identification to that of Hui has sudden access to the above m entioned benefits. These benefits do not in the least depend on any level of Islamic observance on the part of the beneficiary. Local Hui, even those that were born Hui, ritu als or commandments. Very few Hui in Bozhou still go to the mosque. Restrictions on pork and alcohol are loosely obeyed.

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28 This secularization has had important causal impact. Earlier mention was made of the impact of government policy on the rate of inte rmarriage. We must also add the phenomenon of radical secularization that was pursued during the Cultural Revolution and that had the result of lowering the general level of religiosity in the Chinese population independently of current State policies. Had the Hui remained highly observant and insisted on a high level of religious observance for converts, State policy would have encountered socio clear therefore that a combination of the government po licy favoring minorities and the secularization of the local Muslim population have both contributed to an increase in intermarriage between the Hui and the Han. In that light it is instructive to note that , similar government policies have not produced si milar intermarriage effects in Tibet, whose population has remained much more committed to Buddhism than the Hui to Islam. Furthermore secularization in Iran in the 1970s only led to a backlash and to subsequent Islamic fundamentalism. Our examination of t he various social and cultural aspects related to intermarriage between the Hui and the Han in Bozhou will therefore hopefully provide material for interesting comparative analysis in this regard. Literature Review Historical and ethnographic accounts abo ut the Hui in Bozhou This research will also fill in a gap in the literature on Chinese Muslims. Research on Chinese Muslims has been overwhelmingly done in northwest, southwest, northern and southeast China. The Hui in eastern and east central China are a lmost completely ignored. In historical perspective, however, eastern China was one of the major centers of Muslim concentration. Two of the four earliest mosques were built in eastern China: Xianhe Mosque in Yangzhou of Jiangsu province and Phoenix Mosque in Hangzhou of

PAGE 29

29 Yuan shi huihui bian tia n xia ) is well recognized in Chinese historic records. The northwest did not become heavily populated with Muslims until the Qing Dynasty, when State policies were issued to punish those who were unwilling to submit their reli gious beliefs and practices to centralized state power. Thus large sectors of Hui were driven to the more marginal lands of Western China. With regard to the Muslim in central China, no knowledge of them existed in the literature until the early 20th cen tury, when missionaries began conversion efforts to bring Muslims to Christianity. Until that time the Muslims of central China had been Islam in China: A Neglected Problem (1910) said he travelled to a bo hour drive from Bozhou). His text, however, gives no detail about the Muslims encountered there. Recent academic work on Master Thesis in 2005. She did her fieldwork in the summers of 2003 and 2004. She describes multifaceted dimensions of Islamic identity and multi dimensional manners of self expression. She argues that Hui ethnic identity is no longer confined to religious symbols. Religion can no longer be seen as the core value in their ethnic identity. Instead, she argues, their identity is shifting from an emphasis on religion which is weakening to other cultural dimensions s uch as consanguinity, state citizenship (as manifested in household registration), and other cultural dimensions.

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30 In the thesis, she mentions that there is no census information with respect to Hui Huaxilou district refers to an approximate 40% intermarriage rate. This estimation corresponds to that made by most Imams and Hui o n my first field trip in the winter of 2005. This figure has also frequently been repeated and confirmed more recently by many Hui whom I have interviewed. However, as pointed out earlier, my survey in 2008 and add itional data collected in 2013 from the official, records on Bozhou marriage registration office c hallenges these estimates ( Chapter 3 for de tails). Intermarriage rates appear to be substantially higher than the common 40% estimate, particularly in recent years. We can also see in the records themselves that the percentage of intermarried couples was stable from 2006 2012, with no significant f luctuations. In other words, there is no apparent trend of a significant increase in intermarriage paralleling socioeconomic changes. This strongly suggests that the estimates made by the director in 2003 or 2004 regarding the percentage of intermarriage m ight have already been an inaccurate underestimation. this research. What is the impact of socioeconomic development on ethnic solidarity and intermarriage? What domestic disputes arise in an intermarried family and how are they resolved? What kind of education do Hui parents prefer to offer their children ethnic, religious, or mainstream secular Chinese edu cation? Is there any difference between older and younger generations with regard to their identity? Is there any difference in religiosity between those who live near a mosque and those who live in

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31 scattered areas? How do the Hui from birth view and trea t newly converted Muslims? What is their psychological reaction on encountering Muslims from the Northwest, the region that is viewed as more authentically Islamic? Are there any differences in religiosity or in ethnic identity among different ummahs (comm unities)? If yes, are such differences related to the personality, capacity, or performance of Imams? What is the role of government, as well as the organizations supervising the mosques, in determining the developmental trajectory of the mosques? All thos e questions are related to the issue of Hui Islamic identity that have not been thoroughly covered in previous studies and that will be touched on in this research. Not only academics, but also the Hui themselves are interested in documenting their histo ry and daily practice. The most prominent work was written by a Hui lawyer, Mr. Huacheng Li. In the name of the Bozhou Islamic Association, Li compiled a book, Historiography of Minorities and Religions in Bozhou . It was completed in 2003, but is yet unpub lished. The author, Mr. Li also holds the position of secretary in the Bozhou Islamic Association , the only member in the Association responsible for writing up documents and proposals. As a matter of fact, Mr. Li is also the author of most of the document s about the Hui found in the Bozhou Minzu 5 and Zongjiao (meaning religion) government bureau) know nothing about the Hui. Each time when they need some documents, they w His book has 9 sections. It begins with the history of Muslim ethnic groups and with the immigration history of the Hui in Bozhou. Then the book successively describes 5 Minzu, in Chinese , refers to an officially recognized ethnic group, or nationality in Chinese political discourse. I t will be further discussed in a later part of this chapter.

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32 the population, customs (marriage, funeral, language, and festival s), economic life, education, sports and recreation, and the currently most famous local Hui individuals. information about Islam is summarized as well. In the final secti on, the book provides a chronology of major events and describes some legendary stories about Bozhou Hui. Although the academic quality of the book has shortcomings, the materials presented therein are valuable. As to the critique that the document entai led a great the history of the local Hui. It presents and validates the de sire on the part of some local Hui to clarify or strengthen local ethno religious identity. Theoretical Frameworks of Ethnicity Ethnicity itself is a topic that has had ample coverage, both empirical and theoretical, in the sociological and anthropologica l literature. According to John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (1996), the study of ethnicity attracted little attention in Western scholarly circles until the 1960s. The 1950s saw the beginning of an academic interest in ethnicity among Africans and As ians, though the phenomenon of ethnicity itself long antedated academic interest therein. Ethnicity is easily blurred with related concepts such as consanguinity, tribe, race, nation, state, and culture. Different from those concepts, the study of ethnicit y has by now been well developed within its own theoretical frameworks. Generally, research on ethnicity has fallen into five major frameworks: cultural, boundaries. A classic a

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33 territorial contiguity, political organization, language, ecological adjustment, and local impositio n of static concepts that are unable to deal with changes in ethnicity through time (Moerman 1965). Frederick Barth (1969) shifted scholarly attention to the question of ethnic boundaries, as set by self ascription and ascription by others. 6 Certainly, Bar th avoids analyzing ethnicity in terms of ontology or cultural content. represented by Edward Shils and van den Berghe, and dialectical, which is represented by Clifford Geertz. The fi rst branch argues that ethnicity derives from a primordial sentiment that leads to the search for a natural, genetically based origin for ethnic group sentiment. This approach was reflected in the West by an obsession on the part of many people, whether wh ite or black, to seek their roots in Europe or Africa (Thompson sentiment, not because ethnicity is a natural, biologically based identity, but because ethnicity is a historica lly important cultural identity that, in certain parts of the world, has identity/iden tification in light of circumstances change for example, Kachin in Thailand (Leach 1954), Sulu in Philippines (Bentley 1981), Zhuang in China Guangxi (Kaup 2000), and Hui in southeast China (Fan 2001, Gladney 1996) etc. The understanding of such processes presupposes attention to issues of State power and other social 6 One could argue that this approach may have its roots in the concepts of the Social P sychologist G.H. of 934). Though they focus a broader view of what

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34 dynamics. The framework of instrumentalism has emerged in response to these analytic needs. Abner Cohen (1969) argues that ethnicity takes its origin from intergroup confrontation and competit ion over limited resources. More clearly, he believes that ethnicity emerges from intergroup communication and interaction rather than from the isolation of different ethnic groups (1974). Another representative of this perspective, Paul R. Brass (1991) e mphasizes the importance of elites in rousing and activating dynamics of ethnic identity. This perspective indeed pays attention to external factors in the creation of ethnic groups. It fails, however, to take into account a phenomenon which is discussed in the primordial perspective, namely, the pattern by which some groups do in fact harbor strong sentiments of ethnic uniqueness. The ideal analytic framework would be broad enough to encompass all such phenomena. Charles Keyes tries to bridge the three pe rspectives cultural, primordial and instrumental by following a non Western fundamentally on the idea of shared descent, they take their particular form as a consequence o :207 ). Brackette F. Williams (1989) goes further in her approach by emphasizing the issue of ethnic identification, rather than ethnicity or ethnic identity. In analyzing ethnicity Williams takes into account the relation between the nation state and ethnic groups. Almost all those theoretical arguments have in one form or another been invoked in the discussion of Hui ethnicity. Generally, there are three issues that have been debated in discussion of Hui ethn icity. In the first place, ethnic minority status in China is not simply a matter of self ascription or primordial sentiment. Minority status is also the

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35 component standards. However, the Hui violate those conventional requirements of minority status by virtue of the fact that they do not possess a distinct territory, language, or economy. concept from Ge 6), was adapted minzu has connotat ion of ethnicity or ethnic identity. It is hoped that this research project can contribute to a clearer definition of the boundaries of each of these concepts. Beyond this question of the role of the State in defining ethnic groups, a second debate concern s the role of religion in the definition of ethnicity. Some scholars claim that the status of Hui entails an ethnoreligious identity in terms of traditional Islamic belief (e.g., Galdney 1991, 1996). However, other scholars point out that in different loca tions the Hui appear to be non Muslim (e.g., Alles 2000; Gillette 2000; Mackerras 1998; Fan 2001, 2006, etc.). In this light cultural feature such as religious belief and practice cannot be exclusively invoked to define this ethnic group. Particularly, wi th regard to those who change their ethnic identification from non Hui, their new identity is based neither on traditional Hui ethnicity nor on Islamic religion. A third debate concerns explanations of endogamy. Some scholars tend to assume that the Hui g enerally resist intermarriage in order to preserve their ethnic purity. They do this through an emphasis on ethnic and religious endogamy (Gillett 2000; Gladney 1996). Other scholars explain endogamy in terms of the tense relations between the Han and ethn ic minorities and the heightened ethnic sentiments in China

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36 since the 1980s (Bovingdon 1998, 2002; Smith 2000, 2002). However, such arguments concerning the causes of endogamy run into the empirical dilemma that the rate of intermarriage is increasing rath er than decreasing (Li 2004; Jiang 2006). In Bozhou, over 50% of Hui couples were created via intermarriage. At the turn of the new century, the percentage was estimated at less than 15% . Furthermore, as was already pointed out, the marriage of many Hui wo men to nonreligious Han men deeply contradicts traditional Islamic practice. In short, scholarly arguments as to the causes of ethnic endogamy are becoming increasingly less relevant to the situation of the Hui in Bozhou. Ethnic Identity vs. Ethnic Identi fication literature, suffers from definitional ambiguity. It is useful to distinguish the concept of distinct concepts. One finds, in the scholarly literature, a variety of definitions for ethnic identity or . It is here proposed that, though the two concepts are related, it is analytically useful to distinguish them. One does frequently encounter the term ethnic identification in scholarly discussions, though it is dealt with less frequently than the concep t of ethnic identity. It seems to be taken for granted in the literature that everyone agrees on the boundaries of the two concepts. concept. This unusual phenomenon can be found in other stu dies of ethnicity as well.

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37 aum 2000), journal. None of these articles, however, attempts to define (or to challenge) the concept. A clear definitional distinction between ethnic identity and ethnic identification, however, is required for the analysis to be presented in these pages. As we mentioned in the beginning, many people prefer to change their eth nic affiliation from majority Han to minority Hui at the moment of intermarriage. Although intermarriage is not the only occasion on which individuals maneuver to change their ethnic status from Han to minority, State policy in that regard makes intermarri age a convenient occasion for doing so. In the course of this research, many successful cases were observed of individuals who on the occasion of marriage changed their official ethnic status from that of Han to that of Hui. In doing this, did they change ethnicity? How do they identify themselves after making the switch? Is ethnic ? Is there any difference between the image by which they personally identify themselves and the identity attributed to them by others? Are we dealing with ethnic identity or with ethnic identification? Is there any empirical basis for distinguishing the t wo? To clarify matters it is important to repeat that the concept of minzu as used in China,

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38 or nationality or ethnicity. Minzu ( ) as a term was imported in 1903 fro m the Japanese term for people or nation, minzoku ( ) (Gladney 1996: 85). This was introduced at the turn of the 20th century when the Chinese nation felt threatened by incursions from the West. The term minzu was thus adopted by Sun Yat sen and later, by his successor Chiang Kai shek. The term even entered the lexicon of their major adversary, the Communist Party. The term was used to express the ideology of nationalism. Nationalism became the major concern and political slogan of Kuomintang, the National ist Party. It is critical to note in this regard that before the 1950s, when the minzu recognition movement was triggered off by Communist authorities, the Hui people were not viewed as an ethnic group but a religious group , even though they were often jux taposed with four other ethnic groups, the Han, Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongolian), and Zang (Tibetan) (ibid: 83 85). At that moment, the term Hui was used to refer to all Muslims. It was a religious term, not an ethnic designator. It was applied to other ethn ic groups such as the Uyghur and Kazak as well. They were called Huihui or Huimin Hui Jiaotu ( minzu recognition movement authorized by the Chinese Communist Party classified all Muslims into 10 distinct minzu, such as the Uyghur, Kazak, Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tatar, Sala, Don gxiang, ; t he Hui do not. They basically speak Mandarin or local dialects related to Mandarin. There are members of other recognized minzu who also are Muslims, such as the Bai, Tibetans, Mo name. They are called Baihui, Zanghui, Menghui , and Hanhui respectively. Here the

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39 n the case of the Hui of Bozhou, the term Hui is both an ethnic designator and a religious designator as well. The two concepts are merged under one term. recognition. It is an identification. One cannot change this label without official governmental authorization. minzu, there is a level of State control in China that is absent from most countries in which ethnicity is discussed. Even in China members of minzu may indeed have their own subjective sense of ethnic belongingness. But their status of being members of a minzu is a product of official recognition by the hegemonic power of the State. here proposed that we use ethnicity as a genera l concept and redefine the two related concepts, ethnic identity and ethnic identification, as sub categories under the general rubric of ethnicity. This way of classification corresponds to the categories given by Frederick Barth, who distinguished betwee n self ascription and ascription by others (1969). More broadly, this classification also corresponds to the concept proposed by glass . d on a g roup i personal self then be seen as a combination of his/her own subjective awa reness and the image

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40 attributed externally by others. The two images are not always identical. People will be under pressure to accommodate their own self image to their awareness of the image being attributed (or imposed) by others. When the adjustment be own self awareness and of the images imposed by others. whic awareness. This self awareness, however, is heavily infl uenced of intersubjective interaction. As Parenti (1967) put it, involved process. Previous scholarship appears to recognize, at least implicitly, the distinction between internally generated identity and externally imposed identification. For exa identification here refers to something that comes from outside and is subsequently intern alized. When discussing ethnic preference between majority status or minority status, Brand & Ruiz (1974) summarized nine variables that appear to influence a internaliza tion. In other words, these authors seem to sense the difference between

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41 internal identity and external identification, though they make no attempt at precise definition. This distinction between externally imposed and internally applied labels will be see n as relevant to understanding the situation of the Hui. It is particularly useful when dealing with those who change their ethnic membership from majority to minority. They are intentionally demonstrating the importance of governmentally recognized ethnic transition to formal minzu status, is more complicated. But the distinction between two sub analytically useful. Intermarriage: Theories and Practice Ethnicity and intermarriage are two anthropologically distinct phenomena, though they are linked in China. The preceding section discussed the literature on ethnicity. Let us now examine the l those married persons whose religious, racial or ethnic background is or was different And a marriage in which one of the parties has not formally converted to the faith of the oth documented in this dissertation have to be classified mixed marriages rather than intermarriage. Such a differentiation is valuable with respect to those Han spouses who do not formally convert to Islam after marriage.

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42 What makes the Chinese situation somewhat unusual is that ethnically mixed marriages will entail an ethnic switch on the part of one of the spouses, usually the Han. Ethnically mixed marriages e.g. a marriage between an Irish American and an African American in the U.S. do not require or even permit a subsequent ethnic shift. The African American cannot declare himself/herself to be henceforth Irish or vice versa. In China, however, such an ethnic switch of ten occurs. For terminological convenience all varieties of marriage between a Hui and a Han will be called Interethnic marriage is forbidden of discouraged in situations of strict ethnic endo gamy . When interethnic marriage becomes common, it reveals changes in the interaction across group boundaries as well as changes in ethnic relations . Interethnic marriage may specifically signal a decline in ethnic prejudice and inter group antagonism (Dav is 1941, M. Gordon 1964, Simpson & Yinger 1985, R. Ma 2004, etc.). Increasing intermarriage between two ethnic groups may also indicate growing intimacy in the relation between social groups and the closing of the gap between two ethnic groups (Merton 1941 , Kalmijn 1998, Zang 2005, Spörlein et al 2013, etc.). In other words, a higher rate of interethnic marriage may indicate a decrease in social distance and closer ethnic relations. Some scholars predict interethnic stability and harmony when the intermarri age rate reaches 10 percent (Ma 2004:437). When the rate of intermarriage goes higher, it may indicate that acculturation or even assimilation is feasible measure of assimilation (1964:71).

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43 As distinct from interracial marriage which is comparatively lower, interfaith and interethnic marriage can be higher in Europe and the United States (Qian 2010, in Cherlin ed. 2010:124). Hui Han intermarriage cannot generally be classified as interracial marriage. As for the rate of interreligious marriage, no statistics exist in China on this matter, as religious affiliation is not elicited in the census. Even statistics on the rate of interethnic marriage are unreliable. (This w ill be discussed in more detail in the this Chapter). Despite statistical ambiguities, we can say that patterns of i ntermarriage among the Hui have varied by time period and by geographical location. As we discussed above, the eme rgence of the Hui is predominantly due to the enforcement of intermarriage during the Ming dynasty (AD. 1368 1644). Let it be noted that not all stating that people are supposed to marry outside their ethnic group. This occurred in Chinese history during the Ming Dynasty, with the enforcement of the Hongwu Forbidden Creed ( ) Qing Dynasty. However, the historical record shows that even during the Qing Dynasty interethnic marriage was high in certain isolated areas. For example, a Hui village in Fujian Province, southeast China, had made intermarriage common in each generation during the Qing dynasty (Ding 2007). There is evidence that such an elevated intermarriage rate occurred because many Hui hid their Hui identity and acted as Han to avoid persecution from the Manchu government. Currently, intermarriage among the Hui in ge neral has a higher rate in urban areas and in eastern China. The rate of

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44 intermarriage will vary by the size of the Hui population and by the extent of their geographical concentration. The larger the size and the greater the local concentration of the loc al Hui population, the lower the rate of intermarriage. For example, the Hui in Bozhou have a higher intermarriage rate than those in Shangqiu, 80km away in Henan province (Jiang 2013). Likewise the rate of Hui Han intermarriage in Lanzhou is much less tha n in both above mentioned areas (Zang 2005). In general a larger local population provides more opportunities t o adhere to rules of endogamy. people to seek mates outside the group (Merto n 1941, Gordon 1964, Qian 2010, Spörlein et al 2013, etc.). This notwithstanding, the size of the Hui population does not always correlate negatively with rates of intermarriage. Other factors may alter this general trend. For example, the Hongwu Forbidd en Creed under the Ming Dynasty invoked the power of the State to override rules of endogamy though the Hui population was large enough to have permitted endogamy. Conversely, a stronger emphasis on ethnic or religious differences can decrease the interm arriage rate. (For the Hui in Lanzhou, see Zang 2005; for the Hui in Na, Homestead, Gladney 1996: 158 9). Cultural to marry same race immigrants rather than same race na generation is slowing down as its members not apply to third plus generations (Lichter et al 2011). Other factors may also influence

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45 the intermarriage rate, such as socioeconomic dev elopment, social mobility, immigration status, etc. None of the research cited above, however, shows any instances in which ethnic identity/identification is changed after intermarriage. This pattern seems somewhat unique to China. Why do the Han prefer to change their status to Hui? And what and how do they identify themselves after the change is made ? What impact does State policy and rapid socioeconomic development have upon collective behavior in this regard? These questions will be pursued in the fo llowing chapters. Two Controversial Patterns Other authors who explored the dynamics of intermarriage have attempted to find associations between intermarriage rates and socioeconomic indicators. There are two contradictory hypotheses which have been expl ored. The first hypothesis suggests that internal ethnic solidarity will become stronger under conditions of socio economic development, leading to a decrease in the rate of intermarriage. The second hypothesis, however, posits that as social mobility and communication become more frequent with socioeconomic development, ethnic solidarity will decrease and/or religious affiliation will weaken. As a result the intermarriage becomes more tolerable and acceptable. Both hypotheses can find support from the avai lable empirical evidence. With respect to increases in internal ethnic solidarity, for example, Emberling members. Socially, this leads to a greater sense of belonging to the group. Economically this might lead to a decreased likelihood of cheating or stealing between members of a group. among business partners. Such trust is much easier to build in a conte xt of similar

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46 cultural and/or ethnic ties. For this reason, Xinjiang Uyghur Muslims have established close economic relations with Central Asia (Dorian et al. 1997), and Muslim Hui in Southeastern China have close economic ties to the Philippines, Indonesi a, and Singapore (Gladney 1995). My field trip in southwest China also shows that the Hui in Yunnan have established very intimate and exclusive economic relations with Malaysian and Indonesian Muslims. However, the opposite pattern can find empirical sup port as well. As mentioned by Gladney (1995), in the former Soviet Union as minorities developed economically their sense of ethnic solidarity did not follow suit. This pattern can even be found in the literature on Chinese Muslims. Mackerras (1998) argues that economic reform triggered by the Chinese Communist government can be viewed as a process of modernization which brings minorities to stronger political integration instead of separation. In that sense ethnic boundaries grow weaker. Which of these app arently contradictory findings is more convincing? If both of them have been empirically documented, there may be additional conditioning factors in operation. Two questions can be posed in that regard. (1) Can ethnic solidarity influence the rate of inte rmarriage? (2) Can socioeconomic development lead to the strengthening of ethnic solidarity? It seems that the answer to the first question is affirmative, that is, ethnic solidarity and intermarriage are correlated, and more precisely, the relationship is inverse. The answer to the second question is less certain. Socioeconomic development may or may not result in stronger ethnic solidarity. It can create stronger bonds between members and the ethnic group for livelihood or simple survival purposes, a s is found

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47 among Muslims in Southeastern and Northwestern China. On the other hand socioeconomic development can also loosen ethnic affiliation, as occurred, for example, among minorities in the former Soviet Union. We can also pose parallel questions wit h respect to religious solidarity, as distinct from ethnic solidarity. With the spread of science and modern education (Lerner 1958, Gordon 1964), socioeconomic development has been found to increase the secularization of religious groups (Norris 2004/2011 ), as is seen in the secularization of Jews in the United States (Sharot 1991). The religious beliefs and practices of the Muslim Hui can hardly avoid influences from those modernization factors . In this light one would predict an increase in the rate of i nterfaith marriage. From an Islamic perspective, prior conversion to Islam is in principle required before an interfaith marriage . (If both parties are now Muslims, there is no longer an issue of interfaith marriage.) At the other extreme are cases in whi ch both parties in an interfaith nuptial relation are completely alienated from Islamic faith or from any other faith that might impede their marriage. In other words, both of the above two patterns can occur among different couples. One of the objectives of this research is to identify the conditions that will lead to different outcomes in this regard. A Marxist perspective, which continues to be the official paradigm in China despite the radical transformation of the economy, views economic forces as the infrastructure which fundamentally determines the superstructure and all other aspects of social behavior and thought. From a Marxist perspective, a change in economic and productive relations will sooner or later lead to changes in the superstructure, in cluding ideology and matters of ethnicity and religious faith. Even amongst the four Stalinist

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48 recognizing minzu in China since the 1950s), the feature of a shared economy is of fundamental importance. Knowledge that the Chinese people are more easily driven by economic rather than religious motives (Arthur Henderson Smith 1894/2003, Ong 2006, Rofel 2007, etc.) leads one to suspect that socioeconomic change will have a strong impact upon Hui ethnic identity, The Impact of Secularization on Religion The preceding discussion focuses on the impact of secularization on ethnic solidarity. What about its impact on religion? Secularization is often linked analytically to understood not as the decline of religion, but a s the declining scope of religious ve emerged, such as the ones promoted by William Sims Bainbridge, Roger Finke, Laurence Iannaccone, and Rodney Stark. The latter one is referred to by Ellway (2005) as Rational Choice Theory or Supply Side Theory . It has an alternative name: Market Place Theory . This theory a market for competitively meeting the demands of different religious consumers (Stark 2007, Wortham 2004). Some proponents of this theory are economists instead of anthropologists or sociologists (e.g., Laurence Iannaccone). They claim that human being has a constant potential demand for religious goods over time and across

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49 societies (see Ellway 2005); there is no empirical evidence to assume th at religion is What will happen if we apply such paradigms to the religious situation in China? Which paradigm has more analytic or explanatory power for use among Chinese Muslims? Has religion maintained its s trength under modified forms? Or has secularization instead led to a decrease in religiosity among this group? The situation of the Chinese Muslims in Bozhou seems to match the second secularization model. That is, Bozhou Muslims have gradually distanced themselves from Islam in the wake of socioeconomic development, modernization, and growth of scientific awareness and the spread of modern education. In other words, intermarriage of Muslim Hui with Han is ordinarily a cross ethnic marriage. It cannot be called a religious intermarriage if neither party observes any religion. Methodology The preceding sections have briefly explored the literature on ethnicity, intermarriage, the impact of secularization, and the impact of economic development as it relat es to Islam among the Bozhou Hui. I will now discuss the methodology employed for the gathering of field data. My interest in the Bozhou Muslim Hui arose somewhat accidentally. In 2003 when I was doing my Master degree in sociology as well as supervising an undergraduate team for summer social investigation, an unexpected flood interrupted our research plans. By chance, a graduate fellow, Mr. Zhou Xiao gave me a call. When he learned of our dilemma, he delivered a kind invitation to a town where his fathe r used to be a governor, Yimen in Guoyang County, Bozhou Prefecture. Yimen Town was reported to have around 8,000 Hui . Their mosque can reportedly be traced back to the end of Yuan Dynasty. Our team was astounded to learn that about

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50 half of the Hui popula tion had been reclassified from their former birth status as Han. Favorable state policies were given as the explanation. If they become Hui, elderly Han need not fear that they will be cremated rather than buried after death. This factor alone drove many elderly Han to change their minzu membership. Most astonishing was that a very large number of those who changed their minzu status did so at the request and invitation of the town government . Why? A Minority Minzu township would bring more opportunities for party cadres to get promoted and more financial support for the town from government s at higher levels . As a requirement to be classified as a Minority Minzu Township, the minority population in the town must reach 3 0% of the total 7 . Thus municipal au thorities had actively encouraged Han citizens to change their minzu identification to that of Hui. The township application was eventually rejected by higher to switch th eir identification back to Han. During three weeks of observation, survey research, and extended interview s , our team concluded that the Hui in this community (not including the spurious Hui) had been completely secularized. Their sense of identity as Hu i was purely ethnic, without any religious connotations . This investigation helped me obtain my Master degree in sociology. One year later in the summer of 2004, after our team visited the town , however, I accident al ly met Ma Sha n who was also working on her M in anthropology at the Central University for Nationalities. She was trying to locate a field site in which to 7 According to Notification about Some Issues on Founding Minzu Township ( ) issued by the State Council in 1983, there are some conditions that must be met: the population size of the minority group is supposed to reach 30% of the total population; the township is decided by provincial, autonomous, or zhixiashi (Municipality directly under the Central Government) government.

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51 do her fieldwork. As a Hui girl, she preferred to learn more about the Hui in that town. I thus paid the town a visit again i n her company. Her initial impressions did not differ greatly from mine . A week later, a friend of her father introduced her to Bozhou, a city about 30 miles away from Yimen, to do more investigation . She considered Bozhou to be more relevant for Muslim st udies . She concluded that the Hui in Bozhou are still maintaining their ethno religious identity. This surprised me. How was this possible? How could two Hui groups living in cities so close to each other differ so strongly on the issue of ethno religious identity? In the winter of 2005, again by chance, I met a young scholar in Nanjing University, Dr. Yang Deruey, who had just earned his PhD in anthropology from London School of Economics and Political Science . Dr. Yang asked me to assist him in a visit t o Bozhou to fulfill his obligation for some Hui individuals whom he had met in Taiwan when he was growing up. After one week of observation and interview, both of us agreed that the Bozhou Hui are largely secularized, though some of them still maintain the ir ethno religious identity. We discussed the possible causes underlying these patterns. The political environment and the process of modernization were obviously playing a role. But we sensed that other factors may have been at play as well. Was education playing a role? Or was it intermarriage? Or were perhaps both operative? We had no way impressionistically to decide which hypothesis is more relevant to interpret the situation of the Bozhou Hui. I decided to pursue this question when I was admitted to t he PhD program in Anthropology at the University of Florida. I hesitated before adopting this as my research focus. Research on Muslims in China is a sensitive topic in terms of political discourse . I became aware of that during

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52 my fieldwork at Yimen Town , a warning bell that was further strengthened in Bozhou. Each household visit made at Yimen was done in the presence of an accompanying government cadre . He was helpful in assisting us in establishing good relationship with respondents. However, we notice d that some Hui cast a secret and quick glance toward him while answer ing some questions cautiously. So later we split into several group s to work separately, thus avoiding his supervision. Having just finished the fieldtrip as we were preparing to return home, we were asked to submit a report to the county government about our findings. A graduate classmate warned me that the report should avoid sensitive findings. Compared with Bozhou, the problems and sensitivities in Yimen turned out to have been rela tively mild. When I first arrived at Bozhou to do my dissertation research, I tried to obtain some official documents about the Hui. The relevant administrative department at each level of the government is the minzu zongjiao ju ( , Bureau of Minzu and Religions , denoted by MZJ ). I initially introduced myself (accurately) as a teacher from my affiliated university , Anhui U niversity. Two officers tried to drive me away as soon as possible, even though they already had read the Letter of Introduction ( jieshao xin intolerance were easily visible on their face and in their tones mandatorily have certain kin to the higher level of government . They evidently did not trust me and did not want to share materials with me. I was not sure whether it was simply a negative reaction towards visitors or (more lik ely) a matter of official policy. I was therefore delighted when Mr. Li Huacheng

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53 (mentioned above) told me that almost all materials the MZJ has are based on his reports. Lack of official reports would clearly therefore not be a major barrier. (More detail s of this visit are given in Chapter 9). The investigation did not go smoothly in the beginning. The first problem was that some Hui and Han viewed me as a spy working for the American government when they learned that I was pursuing a doctoral degree in t he United States. The second problem was many of those who had been born Hui felt uncomfortable or even ashamed to talk about their intermarriage experience and obviously preferred to remain silent on the issue. They perceived correctly that intermarriage violates their religious tradition. Talking about it might constitute a moral breach. See Chapter 2 for more details . It was clear to me, however, that intermarriage was a very important factor in local ethno religious identity . I felt compelled to devis e some strategies to increase their willingness to discuss the matter. A third problem arose in terms of the quality of official intermarriage data. Not only was it hard to obtain the data. It was also impossible to get accurate data. First of all, as had occurred in the office of the MZJ , all official data is kept confidential ly and cannot be publicized, even the census data. Information about the population is often viewed as a governmental top secret. Up till present the data from the sixth governmental census at county level continues to be unavailable from the National Bureau of Statistics. The government does have this kind of data but it is not made available. With the help of one informant, the local bureau agreed to provide some population informat ion at county level, but not the district level. However, I was told that census data was not from the original survey but extracted from a 10% sample of that

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54 census. The accuracy of such data would be extremely dubious. For that reason, one sees that the Hui population can vary from 90,000 8 to 40,000 9 in different official sources. Fortunately, with regard to intermarriage, I was given the opportunity to check the original documents and the records in their computer system. However, these statistics do no t document those who have changed their ethnic identification; and they do not correctly and completely document all marital registrations. Data from some years are missing from their database. Apart from some who did not successfully obtain official Hui s tatus but individually claim themselves as a Hui, all information regarding those who did change their ethnic membership from the Han to the Hui is also out of reach, if not actually missing from the records. Additionally, those who failed to meet the age requirement to register a marriage at the time of the wedding are not documented either. Those whose age may not have qualified them to legally get married are of course missing in the records as well . S ee Chapter 3 for further description and discussion . For these reasons, it is unwise to rely heavily on official data to support an argument regarding marriage among the Hui. In other words, it is absolutely necessary to go to the field and observe their daily practices as well as participate in their daily life and carry out household interviews. The fieldwork underlying the current research took place during several years. Fieldwork of one or two months was carried out each summer from 2007 2009. Longer fieldwork took place from July 2010 to November 20 11 and from July 2012 to June 2013. A total of 27 months were spent gathering field data. 8 http://www.bozhou.gov.cn/content/detail/529d49007f8b9ae218bcfd4e.html 9 The 6 th National Census data

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55 During the short term field trips in the summers from 2007 2009, I established a solid rapport with local Hui and Han informants. Especially in the summer of 2008, I made a great breakthrough with the Hui in Bozhou. In view of their obvious nervousness in the face of questions, I did not attempt intensive interviews at the beginning of fieldwork. Observation was the major task. Through the family members of my host, I was able to develop more contacts who served later as informants and other resources. These contacts constituted important support for the major fieldwork. During my fieldwork I developed three data collection networks. Many secular Hui informants were c ontacted through my host. As a Hui, he had married a Han woman. With his introductions and those of his elder sister I carried out laobiao (cousin), a Hui medical busi nessman, accompanied me for interviewing of the Hui in the Xiguan area. And through this cousin, I became acquainted with a Christian Hui family, and thus interviewed more informants about that sector of the Hui people. The second network was in Hui relig ious sector . Through the introduction of one informant, I was able to frequently visit the central mosque and to converse with the former principal Imam, a man close to my own age. Our membership in the same age cohort caused us to share many things in com mon. He even provided me an accommodation in the mosque. I was kindly moved to the South Hall room which had been specifically set up as a Museum to demonstrate their distinctive martial arts tradition and current practices. Through th e Museum, I was able to meet the two competing branches of the martial arts, Xiyang Zhang . Through the introduction of the Imam, I also got acquainted with a Buddhist Hui and some Han who had converted to

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56 Islam, either with or without marriage . I also met several more observa nt Hui who lived in the streets surrounding the mosque. Through the Buddhist Hui I encounter ed several other ordinary people who more or less still maintained their ethno religious practices. The most observant Hui whom I met had been contacted via the connection to the mosque, including imams from other mosques. Through long term participation in the prayer services alongside of Muslim Hui in the mosque, I was kindly treated and eventually well accepted to the community. Through the introduction of the imam, I fortunately was able to meet The third network of informants came through spontaneous visits . My frequent visits to a store frequented only by Muslims brought me to Muslims in the northwestern co rner of the city. As a result, I was able to meet the most influential imam, the most powerful heads of the Democratic Mosque Administration Committee, and some Hui who were involved in an underground society. I was also able to do some household interview s in the Beijing Mosque community, the northwest area of the Bozhou Hui. Some information about local variants of Christianity was also collected in this manner as well. I visited the two churches in the city and interviewed some believers and pastors. D uring the major fieldwork from 2010 to 2013, I expanded my three networks of contacts. And more recently I visited some neighboring cities and villages of Bozhou. I participated in and observed their business links, education practices, ethno religious obs ervance, and more rituals such as weddings and funerals. In addition, I enjoyed valuable opportunities to visit other Chinese Muslim communities. For instance, during the IUAES conference in 2009, with the support of

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57 the conference, I visited the prestigi ous cultural center of Chinese Muslims, Najiaying in Yunnan Province. In the summer 2011, I was able to visit Northwestern Muslim Hui , Qinghai, to see the tradition of Sufi sm and Yihewali (one of the two major branches of Chinese Muslims). In the fall of 2011, with an invitation from my friends, I visited Kaifeng and Zhengzhou Muslims in central China. Those three areas have exerted a powerful influence over Chinese Muslim c ulture and tradition. Some other contacts allowed me to learn more about Muslims and to compare the differences between different localities. For instance, in the winter of 2011, before returning to the United States, I stopped by Beijing and made some co ntacts with Muslims there. In 2012 and 2013, I visited Nanjing twice and made contact there with also important to this research because of various interviews, discussio ns, and interactions conducted there. Of special importance, my contact with a Han Muslim in Guangzhou provided me a valuable opportunity to know more about another group of Han Muslims, as well as about newly converted and re converted Chinese Muslims. Th ese additional contacts with observant Muslims outside of Bozhou gave indications of a possible revival of Chinese Islam as a religious force. The fact that for some the status of Hui is simply a marker of ethnic identity with no religious content should n ot obscure the potential of a revival of Islam as a religious system in China. O utline of the C hapters I will end this chapter by providing an overview, a conceptual map, of the entire document. In this first chapter, I have identified the research ques tions through a discussion of the unusual intermarriage customs of the ethnic Hui of Bozhou, my

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58 principal research site. I have placed these patterns as well in the context of the available literature on Islam in China. I have paid particular attention to a review of historical and ethnographic accounts of the Hui in Bozhou. I then dealt with the scholarly literature on ethnicity and intermarriage. I have placed particular attention on developing the other. I have also discussed competing paradigms for analyzing intermarriage, as well as competing theories about the impact of secularization and modernization on religious belief and practice. These concepts and theore tical frameworks will play an important role in analyzing the information to be presente d. In the final secti on of the C hapter, I reviewed the history of my research, the dilemmas encountered, the groups contacted, and the methods used in gathering informa tion. Chapter 2 outlines the ethnic and religious landscapes of Bozhou, including a discussion of geographical and demographical details, the history and distribution of different ethnic groups, and the diversity of religious beliefs. The chapter then rev iews the ethnic relations of the Hui and the Han throughout history and at present, both nationally and locally. Three conflicts between the two ethnic groups will be dealt with specifically to help understand the current relation between the two ethnic gr oups. From those accounts, readers will develop an understanding of the general condition of minority Hui in a city with a Han majority. Chapter 3 examines the history of intermarriage among the Hui. The chapter will first examine, by way of background, I slamic religious law concerning marriage and intermarriage. The chapter will then deal with the history of the Hui, showing that in fact the emergence of the Hui as a distinct ethnic group came principally as a result of

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59 intermarriage. The current generati on of Hui, however, particularly in Western China, endeavor to silence discussions of historical and current patterns of intermarriage. Chapter 4 begins by discussing the motivations for intermarriage and for mate selection as dealt with in the scholarly literature. The chapter then deals ethnographically with the marriage patterns of the Bozhou Hui, describing each step from initial contact, decision making, to engagement. We will observe the impact of the local marriage market on bring young people into contact with each other. Young people with similar backgrounds are more likely to come together. Such a shared background also provides a better opportunity for romantic love and marriage. Love was not a necessary condition for contracting marriage in olde r generations. A new decision making procedure also appears to be emerging. Parents whether from Hui or Han families and religious background checks have a small impact on the marital choices of the younger generation. Of particular importance is the religious norm, still enforced when other religious norms have lost their importance, by which both parties to the marriage have to agree to abstain from pork. Engagement is sti ll contracted traditionally, with a matchmaker, even among couples who entered their relationship from romantic interest. Some of the traditional requirements for engagement however may now be omitted. There appears to be a gradual transition from traditio Chapter 5 presents many details about the marriage transaction itself, including dowry and bride price, the wedding ceremony, the economics of gift giving, and traditional Huimen custom. Chinese culture is one of the fe w ethnographic cases in which both dowry and bride price are required. Other cultures that maintain the

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60 treatment of this phenomenon has lost much of its relevance t o the Chinese situation as general remains as a symbolically important stage on which ethnic and religious performance is displayed. Different couples have different preferences fo r the particular style of the wedding. A secular wedding ceremony is now becoming the preferred option. Imams now rarely are invited to participate in the wedding . However, no matter which style of a wedding is adopted, the economics of gift giving is stil l traditionally maintained and even intensified. Wedding related gift giving has in fact become a heavy burden on the people of Bozhou. Chapter 6 describes the family life of intermarried couples, including gender roles within the household, cultural alig nment in cases of domestic confrontation, the impact of ethnicity and religion on family life, and the importance of socio economic senses the patriarchal norms among the significantly changed. As far as Bozhou is concerned, women usually play a dominant role in family life and often control the family respected. Han spouses who marry in and change their ethnicity to Hui have to capitulate to Hui cultural norms no matter what con flicts this will cause in their families of origin. .

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61 Chapter 7 deals with education, examining the childrearing practices and ethno religious education within families and in school. Without exception, all children in intermarried families are registered with a minority membership; however, most of them never have a chance to receive ethnic or religious education. Their parents were also deprived in this regard. The Cultural Revolution destroyed ethno religious schools and the ethno religious educational opportunities of their parents. The quality of education in regular schools is known to surpass that of minzu schools. The desire to acquire a higher quality of education for their children drives most parents to send their children to regular schools rath er than ethno religious schools that take into account ethnic issues. Efforts made by a female imam in the Central Mosque of Bozhou had triggered off a However the schoo l was short lived due to conflicts among the imams themselves. Chapter 8 describes divorce patterns, focusing on the issue of dissolving an intermarried family. The chapter discusses the scholarly literature on divorce and discusses the divorce related r egulations of both religious and secular laws. The chapter examines two modes of divorce: settlement through negotiation and settlements custody were conflictive, most divo rces among the Hui are settled through negotiation. In the process of negotiation, ethno religious factors occasionally play a powerful role, though this is the exception, rarely occurring. The chapter will discuss the manner in which current divorce law p uts women in a disadvantageous situation. Chapter 9 explores the unusual marital phenomenon, perhaps unique to China, of the post marital change of ethnic identification of the Han spouse to Hui minority

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62 status. This phenomenon, though not universal, is q uite common in Bozhou. It entails certain procedures which will be described. Generally, there are three ways to change ethnic identification: legal, illegal, and self attribution. Up until the present, legal procedures for an adult to change his or her et hnic identification were almost nonexistent. In the case of a neonate or a teenager less than 18 years old who was Those who avoid legal procedures and simply de clare themselves Hui cannot obtain religious or official recognition of their claim. Most adults who change their ethnic identification do so via illegal means. Intermarriage is a major strategy in that regard. People are not deeply concerned about the leg ality of the strategies which they used. Their principal concern is how to ensure that the change of ethnic identification works for them and their families. The chapter will discuss the problematic dilemmas which such behavior creates in terms of Hui ide ntity, the relationship between the Hui minority and the Han majority, and State minzu policy. Chapter 10 concludes the research. It first summarizes the work and singles out the research problem. Secondly it discusses and reaches conclusions . It shows th at ethnic and religious considerations no longer play a heavy role in determining mate selection among the younger generation ; Personal considerations heavily outweigh ethnic or religious considerations in selecting a spouse . Thirdly it reasons the extrins ic and intrinsic factors in support of the conclusions. And the last it provides several questions inspiring the future research.

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63 CHAPTER 2 THE HUI AND HAN IN BOZHOU This chapter is divided into three parts. First, it describes the ethnic and religious l andscapes of Bozhou. Second it provides an overview of the historical and current relationship of the two ethnic groups, the Hui and the Han, in a national perspective. And finally, it specifically reviews the relationship of the two ethnic groups in Bozho u. Ethnic and Religious Landscapes of Bozhou This section will provide some basic information about the field site, as well as a panoramic overview of ethnic groups and religions in Bozhou. The objective of the section is to give readers a clear idea of how the Muslim Hui relate to the ethno religious and secular culture of the majority Han. Field Site Bozhou ( in Chinese ) is one of 17 prefectures of Anhui province, China. It is located in the northwestern corner of Anhui province, bordering Huaibei prefecture to the east, Bengbu and Huainan to the southeast, Fuyang to the south, and the province of Henan to t he north (Shangqiu prefecture) and west (Zhoukou prefecture). It was part of the large prefecture of Fuyang before 2000. Four counties within this prefecture Bo County, Guoyang, Mengcheng, and Lixin were separated out and merged into a new prefecture, Bozh ou. The new prefecture takes Bo County as its capital, whence its name, that is, Bozhou 1 , while Bo County turns into Qiaocheng district instead 2 . Qiao , 1 zhou, literally means a prefecture here. The size of the typical z hou has varied o ver time . Depending on the historical period, i t could have the size of a county, a prefecture, a province, or even a broader area in terms of civilian and military administration . For example, all of China was divided into 9 zhou before the Han dynasty, i .e., the 3 rd century BC. 2 When I refer to Bozhou in these pages I am referring to Qiaocheng district instead of all four counties, except when I specify otherwise .

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64 was another name of Bo used in history, for instance, Qiao Commandery ( ) at the time of the Sui Dynasty (581 618 AD). Cheng Guo River (Guo Hé, ), the second largest branch of Huaihé River, flows through the northern part of the city. Bozhou has a famous history. The earliest record of Bozhou comes from the time when a grandson of the legendary Father of the Chinese Han, the Yellow Emperor, established a kingdom here. Subsequently King Tang of Shang ( ), the legendary founder of the Shang Dynasty (around 17 th 11 th century BC), was said to have set up his capital at Bo as well (Zhong and Zong 1998). A large memorial park is named after him, the Cemetery of King Tang (or Tang Ling in pinyin), located in the northern part of Bozhou. The community near park area is also named after him as well, King Tang Co mmunity ( ). During the Tang Dynasty (618 907 AD), Bozhou was one of the ten most prosperous zhou ( ). In 1355, toward the end of Yuan Dynasty (1271 1368), Bozhou was chosen to be the capital of Great Song ( , a reference to the Song Dynasty that was o verthrown in 1271 AD). It later became the major power base of Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Dynasty (1368 1644 AD), who rebelled against and eliminated Mongol rule. . In addition to these historical events, Bozhou has also been the home of many important people in Chinese history. The two most important founders of Daoism, for example, Lao tzu ( ) and Zhuang tzu ( ), and one of their most prominent successor s Chen Tuan ( ) were born here. The last chancellor and de facto ruler of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25 220 AD), the military figure Cao Cao ( ), was from

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65 Bozhou as well. A colossal statue o f Cao Cao stands in the middle of the plaza near the train station of Bozhou. It is the first symbolic image of Bozhou seen by passengers on a train to Bozhou. Bozhou is also associated with the development of Traditional Chinese Medicine. Hua Tuo ( ), a doctor of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), hailed from Bozhou. It was he who discovered the earliest anesthetics and who invented the health dynasty . l contributions explain in part the status of Bozhou today as the largest TCM market in China. A Himalayan medicine market near the train station GDP derives from trade i n traditional medicines and from related businesses or services. After his death Hua Tuo later emerged as one of the most highly respected Chinese folk deities. Many local communities build a Hua Tuo Temple instead of a Buddhist or Daoist temple for worshi p. lan 3 . She even inspired Walt Disney to create a specific cartoon figure for her ( Mulan 1 in 1998 and Mulan 2 in 2010). In short , Bozhou is a place that deserves mention a nd recognition in any discussion about the origins of the Chinese civilization, particularly that of the Han, whose culture continues to dominate Bozhou. The Islamic culture of the Hui arrived much more recently. 3 Her birthplace is disputable. For the purpose of attracting tourists, at least four areas claim to be her birthplace . Bozhou, however, may have the strongest claim in that regard. In the northwest sector of

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66 Ethnic Groups Though Bozhou is a multi et hnic city, the two most important ethnic groups are the Han majority and the Hui minority. The recent national census (2010) shows that there are 29 minzu who reside in Bozhou -28 ethnic minorities plus the majority Han. Following the Han and the Hui in size are the Manchu. They account, however, for only 347 individuals. Most of the other minority people came from outside through marriage or through the marriage of their parents. The first census (1953) shows that there were 12,421 Hui in Bozhou County (1.7% of the total population). In the second census (1964), the Hui increased to 13,034 (2.02% of the total). Besides the Hui there were also two Zhuang individuals, one Miao, and one Uyghur. In the third census (1982), the Hui sector had remained relativ ely stable (21,717, around 2.04% of the total). At that moment, there were only four other minority minzu : represented 2 Mongolians, 10 Zhuang, 1 Manchu, and 1 Japanese who was naturalized in China. All of the above data Bozhou Historiography (2003). The fourth c ensus in 1990 shows that there were 27 other minorities with 92 individuals (male 37, female 55) in Bozhou , while the population of the Hui had reached 27,315 (Li 2003:15 19). In 2000, the fifth national census data shows that the Hui were 45,593 in the entire Bozhou prefecture and 34,818 in Qiaocheng 4 in particular . By the time of the sixth census (2010), the Hui in Bozhou prefecture had increased to 49,102, 39,254 of whom lived in Qiaocheng district. These census figures are probably claims that Hui in Bozhou number about 90,000 in total 5 . To assess the demographic 4 The source is from: http://www.2muslim.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=285848 5 S e e the website: http://www.bozhou.gov.cn/content/detail/529d49007f 8b9ae218bcfd4e.html

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67 prominence of the Hui in Bozhou, it is useful to point out that all other 27 minorities total only 659 people in Qiaocheng, while the Hui constitute over 98% of the local minority population. From the above mentioned census data, we can see the relative growth of child per implemented more har shly and strictly among the Han majority. At the same time, however, the annual total fertility rate (TFR) of the Hui remains modest. For example, the nationwide TFR of the Hui between November of 1999 and the end of October of 2000 was 1.41/1.46. Ten year s later the TFR was 1.48/1.50. These figures indicate a modest population increase through natural fertility. Bozhou has the heaviest concentration of Hui in all Anhui Province. But when compared with the majority Han, their population percentage is extrem ely small. For example, the Hui accounted for less than 1% (0. 57%) percent of the total population of Anhui (337,521 out of a total population of 5 8,999,948 ) in 2000, and 0.55% in 2010 (328,062 out of a total population of 59,500,468). The residential dis tribution of the Hui appears to be becoming less concentrated and more dispersed. In the 1990s more than 56.3% (15, 384 out of a total of 27,513) of the Hui lived in the urban area. As the economy has developed, however, a larger number of Hui have move d to urban Bozhou. Other changes are also occurring to the Hui living in the urban area. Muslims typically prefer to live in proximity to a mosque. ummah in Arabic. In are four urban mosques and thus four small ummahs have been formed, though they are not completely separated. Muslim x ianglao ( or , believers) can visit and pray at any mosque of their choice. The biggest and also the

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68 most important mosque is called C hengli Qingzhen Si ( or simply Chengli Si , which means the Inner City Mosque , denoted hereafter by CLS ). The second most important mosque is called Beijing Si ( , designated by BJS ). The remaining two mosques have been recently rebuilt after being co mpletely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution: the West Gate Si ( , designated by XGS ) and Guo Bei Si ( , designated by GBS ). Before the 1990s, the Hui in urban Bozhou were for the most part concentrated in the western, northwestern, and northern s ectors, particularly in the that particular area living in that area. But gradually, from 1980s on wards, a small number of Hui began moving out of the Hui neighborhoods to seek out better career opportunities. Those who acquire wealth subsequently prefer to build or buy houses in other parts of the city rather than continue confining themselves to life in the vicinity of a mosque. Those Hui who continue to live near the mosques tend to be poorer, older, and socially less dirty, disorderly, shabby, backward, and somet imes troublesome neighborhood. Those streets create challenges to municipal officials attempting to remove or demolish old houses in order to sell land to real estate developer s. Part of the scheme is to build new apartments elsewhere for relocating the pr evious residents. Diversity of Religions actively practice Islam. Islam is not the only religion in Bozhou. And the Bozhou Hui who practice a religion do not necessarily prac tice Islam. There are other religions in Bozhou

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6 9 and some Hui practice these other religions. The complicated issue of religion in China merits a brief general discussion. Religions in China have experienced oscillations between periods of heavy State rest riction and periods of official permission. Currently the Chinese government actively supports officially recognized religious centers. Currently there are only five state recognized religions in China: Daoism, Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Isl am 6 . Other religious traditions are either officially restricted or completely prohibited. During the Cultural Revolution even the five recognized religions were severely controlled and suppressed. Most temples, mosques, and churches were destroyed or oc cupied for other uses. Most clergy were forced to leave their office, to live a secular life, and to feign atheism or at least cease professing any religion in public. State policy toward religion has changed since the end of the Cultural Revolution. In principle, all five religions can now reclaim their properties that were occupied or confiscated by the government during the Cultural Revolution. In addition, all five religions can organize their own associations at county, prefecture, or provincial leve ls, and they can also apply for and receive a certain amount of financial support from the government to (re)build or repair or expand their temples or mosques. They are allowed to publish religious pamphlets or books or journals as long as they do not con tain messages critical of the government or of the Communist Party. The government has also created a system of qualification for employment in a religious setting. Clergy now have to pass the occupational examinations designed by the government and receiv e a 6 Confucianism is not viewed as a religion in Chinese context. I n CPC history, Kong Jiao (the religion of Confucius) was mentioned and even brought up to the front by some group of people, such as, the Gang of Four, for cracking and beating down. I n general, however, Confucianism is not a religion to Chinese people as well as government .

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70 certificate as a qualified member of the religious clergy. Those certified can receive a financial subsidy from the government. Those who fail to pass the examination cannot run an office in a religious establishment. All members of the clergy who pass the examination will be registered in their respective provincial religious association. Each occupant of a new position must report to the corresponding religious association and to the Minzu Religious Bureau at each level . And at the same time those who pass the certification exam can seek a job recommendation from the association supervising their religion. The official anti religious hostility of the Cultural Revolution is a thing of the past. Religion has now become an accepted state sponsored establi shment and, at least for some, a lucrative business in China. The five official state recognized religions are all present in Bozhou. Islam is the largest. Following Islam in organizational importance and institutional influence is Protestantism. Chinese Protestants usually call themselves Christians rather than Protestants. The impression is that few of them can tell the difference between Protestantism, Catholicism, Greek Orthodoxy or other branches of Christianity. Some of them apparently cannot even te ll the difference between Christianity and Buddhism. A pusa have to go to the hospital if we There are currently two Protestant churches in urban Bozhou. The one on the north bank of the Guo River is a Baptist church. The original building of this church can be traced back to as early as 1897. According to the book produced in 2010 for the

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71 Bai Taili ( ) arrived in Bozhou in 1897 and began preaching along both sides of the Guo River. He quickly built a church, which he named the Guo Bei Jiaotang (North Guo Church). It is a Gothic church, with a height of 11 meters and area of 258 m 2 . In 1910, the chur ch became one of four parishes of the American Missionaries in China. It was called the Inner Parish, which was responsible for covering Henan and Northern Anhui. The missionary Wade Dobbins Bostick 7 (Chinese name Bao Wande ) and his wife, Flora Hollow ay Bostick (Chinese name Bao Fuluowa ), his brother George Pleasant Bostick (Chinese name Bao Shipi ) and his wife, and their sister Attie Texas Bostick (Chinese name Bao Aide ) served in this church from 1904 to 1943. A memorial monument ( F i gure 2 3) with a worn inscription inlaid on the wall by the entrance door in the south says that it was repaired in March, 1941, the time when Attie T. Bostick was serving (ibid) before she was interned by the Japanese. W. D. Bostick established an Evangelical school, which was later renamed the First Middle School . The church was confiscated and assigned to the middle school during the Cultural Revolution. It became separated again when it ended. When the Middle School celebrated its 100 years anniversary in 20 10, the school invited the descendants of Mr. Bostick from the United States. Currently, the church is administered by the Anhui Christianity Association in Hefei. It has approximately 30 sub churches in Bozhou and claims at least 3000 adherents. Another church, the Xuege Christianity Church, is located in the western suburb. It is a new church, built around the year of 2000 with donations from believers and with financial support from the Christian Association of Anhui Province as well as from a 7 Carter, Reginald. 2012. Wade Dobbins Bostick. http://www.fbchillsborough.org/wade d bo stick

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72 local ass ociation. The church is about 1.5 miles from the XGS. Given that this area is not far from the Muslim Quarter, the church has attracted some adherents from among the Hui. The Chinese government classifies Protestantism and Catholicism as two separate reli gions, rather than branches of one. There is no Catholic church in urban Bozhou. The nearest Catholic church is the one in Guoyang County in the prefecture. It Church recor ds, this church was built in 1895. The first priest was from France and was the pastor from 1904 to 1917. Before 1952, there were four Italian priests and two Chinese priests. During the Cultural Revolution, there were only two nuns caring for the church w hich was occupied by some organizations. (Guoyang Xianzhi 1989, Yang 1996) In the 1980s the church was returned to the diocese. Available statistics show that Gguoyang Catholics in 1949 numbered 7,670. By 1960 the number had dropped to slightly more than 3 0. In 1974 only 16 Catholics remained. By 1982 the number had ascended to 200. (Guoyang Xianzhi 1989: Vol. 7) Another important religion in Bozhou is Buddhism. Buddhism arrived in China a round the 1 st century A.D. through the Silk Road. Chinese Buddhism h as over the centuries incorporated many elements from Confucianism and Daoism. It is now considered by people , along with Confucianism and Daoism, to be the kernel of Chinese culture (e.g. Chen 2001) . Sometime during the 7 th or 8 th century, Buddhism was br ought to Tibet and incorporated elements from Tibetan indigenous religion, Ben Jiao (the religion of Ben, ). This branch o f Tibetan Buddhism thus separated itself from Buddhism among the Chinese Han and is now called Tibetan Buddhism, while the

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73 Buddhism practiced among the Han is called Han Chuan Fojiao (Buddhism transmitted among the Han). This latter is origin of the Zen Buddhism found in Korea and Japan. Tibetan Buddhism is more influential in Tibet, as well as in three provinces: Qinghai, Sichuan, an d Yunan. Nowadays, it is better known in the West than Han Chuan Fojiao. It can also be pointed out that there is another small branch of Buddhism observed in some small minorities in southwest China. This branch, referred to as Hinayana or Theravada, ente red China from Thailand and Burma. Tibetan Buddhism and Han Buddhism belong to the stream referred to as Mahayana. Buddhism has been present in Bozhou since time immemorial because Bozhou is located in the heartland of ancient Chinese culture. Since Buddh ism is almost completely syncretized with Confucianism and Daoism, most of the Han practice some variant of Buddhist rituals, though they may not take seriously the classic Buddhist doctrine that underlies these rituals. The religions brought to China afte r Buddhism, particularly Protestantism and Catholicism, are proselytizing religions. Most Protestants in Bozhou are converts from Buddhism. After conversion Bozhou Protestants are more serious about the teachings and rituals of their religion than Buddhist s. Another interesting point is that the Hui discourage members of other ethnic group s from converting to Islam 8 while the Buddhists do not. The Buddhists however do not proselytize with the aggressiveness of the Protestants. In terms of Buddhist religio us sites, there were two temples before the 1970s, the Guanyin (Avalokitesvara) Temple and the Baiyi Lüyuan. The Guanyin Temple is a 8 See the discussion about Ruptures between Muslims in Chapter 10 .

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74 standard Buddhist temple where ordinary Buddhists of any stream can pray. Baiyi Lüyuan on the other hand is a specialized B uddhist temple that tonsures monks. (The Lü in its title means law or jurisprudence.) The Guanyin Temple is located in Guantang Town , and is close to the urban Bozhou. It is said that the temple was firstly built in early Ming Dynasty (1368 1644), but was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. A popular legend about the abbot of the temple is that he was forced during the Cultural Revolution to marry a nun at the age of eighty. He subsequently committed suicide. The temple was rebuilt and was reopened in November 2013. Baiyi Lüyuan, as mention ed, is a specialized Buddhist temple that focuses on Buddhist jurisprudence. It is located in the eastern part of the city. It was built in 1649, and is one of only four juridical temples in China. The sign hanging above the entrance door was written by a famous calligrapher in the Qianlong Period (AD 1736 1795) of the Qing Dynasty, Deng Shiru ( ). The temple was almost completely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution and rebuilt in the 1980s with funds donated from a Bozhou merchant living in Hong Kon g. In terms of the Bozhou population as a whole, Buddhist beliefs are more influential than the beliefs of other religions. This reflects the widespread prevalence of Buddhism throughout China. Buddhist beliefs and practices even make their way into the r eligious life of Islamic Hui. S ome observant Hui who regularly go to the mosque to pray also hang Buddhist pendants in their cars on their cell phones, or keep Buddhist pictures or statues in their home or office . In many cases, such Hui that straddle two

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75 traditions may hang an Arabic talisman alongside with Buddhist pendants or pictures. It is interesting to point out that we can frequently see the Hui using Buddhist s ymbols, and even Christians may use Buddhist beads. The Hui however do not use Christian symbols, nor do Christians use Muslim symbols. Christianity and Islam are both exclusive, condemning other religions. Buddhist symbols, however, have taken on a cultur al value rather than a strictly religious value, so that even Christians and Muslims may use them. In that sense Buddhism has become somewhat like Confucianism, part of Chinese culture rather than Chinese religion. Chinese Christianity places heavy empha sis on converting Muslims. However, such proselytization gives rise to resistance and self criticism among Muslims. Hui in Hui Xuan Preaching to the Hui , as though lims. The Hui view Islam as their ethnic religion. Conversion to other religions is viewed as a form of ethnic treason. Nor are they interested in converting non Hui to Islam. The only religion i n China that aggressively seeks converts is Protestantism. T behavior on the part of Protestants heightens the concern of the Hui with ethnic solidarity, ethno religious purity, and in some instances even with religious piety. A secular Hui may be mildly criticized for his/her failure to practice Isla m. A Christian Hui, however, will be much more heavily criticized, even more than a Hui who practices Buddhism. Buddhism is seen as being aligned with Chinese culture. A Christian Hui, in contrast, is usually viewed as Hui Jian, a traitor.

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76 The fifth state recognized religion is Daoism. One would expect Daoism to be important in Bozhou in light of the fact that the two major founders of Daoism and one of their most important successors were born here. However, Daoism has a very minor presence in contemporar y Bozhou. There are three Daoist temples, the Shang Qing G ong (Upper Temple, also called Tian Jing Gong) in Guoyang Country, Daode Zhong Gong (Middle Temple of Daoism) in Bozhou, and Tai Qing Gong (the Highest Heaven p rovince. Thi s latter temple, Tai Qing Gong, is also called Laojun Gong (Laojun is a respectful name of Lao Tzu) or Xia Qing Gong (Lower Temple). There are many disputes concerning the birthplace of Lao Tzu, Bozhou and hou was a broad area which included from Bozhou was for centuries included as part of the Western Bo (Li, Tang Dynasty; Chen, Qing Dynasty) . No matter where the founder was actually born, Bozhou has great significance for the origin of Daoism in China. Another important figure in Daosim, Zhuang Tzu was born in a sub county of Bozhou prefecture, Meng c heng. One might therefore expect Daoist practice to be strong in Bozhou. How ever , the Daoist temples have few adherents. The Daoist temple in Bozhou is very shabby, inactive, and physically run down. It functions as a tourist attraction with no active t and expanded. They are now physically impressive. But there are few Daoist clergy serving there and there are only occasional ceremonies held in the two temples. Buddhist temples, Islamic mosques, and even Protestant churches may have small business

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77 sta nds set up in their vicinity. Almost no stands can be found in front of the Daoist temples. The Hui in Bozhou Islam, in contrast to Daoism, plays an important role in Bozhou. Only a small percentage of the population is Hui. But in terms of public manifes tations of religiosity, Islam in Bozhou has a more prominent presence than any other religion. The presence of Muslim Hui in Bozhou has a long history. Earliest historical records of Muslims in Bozhou date back to the Tang Dynasty (618 907 A . D). As one o f ten most prosperous zhous with the people of Bozhou. In one of the volumes of A Historical Research of Chinese Hui (1935) 9 the author Jin Jitang says, Hu 10 merchants turned to the Great Canal dug in Sui Dynasty from Yangzhou, and then entered into southeast Henan through northwest western Gate. ( See Li 2003:10) Specific documentation on Bozhou Muslims goes back to the Song Dynasty (960 1279). A relevant passage is found I Qing Dynasty (1644 ( qing bao biao Qing Zhen Zhi Nan ( , The Compass of Islam ), ) offered tribute to the capital city for the King Bu Knara in Arabic. The Emperor was pleased. He thus allowed my ancestor to live in the area 9 Therefore, Jin Ji tang (1935) named that period as The Alien Period of the Hui in Chinese History in the first chapter of an early volume of A Historical Research of Chinese Hui. 10 Hu , , a general racial categorical name for foreigners . H ere it specifically refers to Arabian or Persian merchants.

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78 betw een the Huaihe River and the Sishui River, by granting to him the status of liege lord of Ning city. (ibid) belongs to the drainage area of the Huaihe River. During the most impo rtant period for the formation of the Muslim Hui, the Yuan Dynasty, the Hui constituted an essential element in the population of Bozhou. Gulan Jianshen Shu ( , which literarily m eans Technique ) it is stated that these martial arts were invented by the imam in the CLS mosque no later than 1317 A . D. Nowadays some legendary stories are still widely recalled among s t the Muslim Hui in Bozhou concerning the sophisticated ways in which the imam wisely deal t rebel army at the end of Yuan Dynasty and protected the Hui people and the mosque . From th is evidence , we can surmise that the CLS mosque may hav e been built earlier than 1317 AD. In Bozhou Historiography (Li 2003:10) , Muslims are said to have arrived in Bozhou during the Yuan Dynasty in the year 1259 A . D. The emperor sent a Huihui away in the northwestern corner . The founding emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1368 1644), Zhu Yuanzhang, originated in the northern and northwestern parts of Anhui province. Many Muslim generals such as Chang Yuchun ( ), Tang He ( ), Deng Yu ( ), Hu Dahai ( ), Mu Ying ( ) etc. also came from this area. Even his wife, Empress Ma, was also born into a Muslim family. In other words, we can affirm with no danger of

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79 exaggeration that the participation of Muslim soldi ers and generals contributed heavily many Hui go so far as to claim that the Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang himself was Muslim 11 . In any case, at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, th e social status of the Hui was quite high. However the extraordinary military skills and group solidarity of his Muslim warriors created pressure on the Emperor. He attempted to ensure that all Hu people (a racial title for foreigners) would integrate into the culture of the Chinese Han. He therefore promulgated a decree was in effect one of the rare historical laws that mandated ethnic exogamy. Hu people were not allowed to marry within their group but were obliged to marry Han Chinese. The population of Muslims nonetheless increased significantly. This was the period that saw a heavy settlement of Muslims in China. Muslim immigrants also constituted an important element in the Muslim population of Bozhou, particularly Muslims from the Northwest and fro m Shandong province. In some towns, such as Yimen Town in Guoyang County, almost all of the Muslims were immigrants from Shandong. During the Qing Dynasty, the Muslim Hui were one of the targets of negative governmental policy from very beginning. The go vernment issued punitive laws such as Law for Hui ( ), Law for Bo ( , Bo here means Tibet) , Law for Mongols, etc. In 1750, the Qing Emperor Qianlong promulgated a decree to prohibit the expansion or even the reparation of mosques, to prohibit a Muslim family from adopting a Han child, 11 For example, in a footnote of Mr. Bai Shouyi s book Historical Outline of Chinese Muslim (1946) mentioned that It is a popular saying that the Founder of Ming Dynasty was a Huihui; the running away of Jianwen Emperor (his grandson) was for pilgrimage to Mecca. And someone believes Wu Emperor [in Ming Dynasty ( ). In Anthology of Minzu and Religion. Hebei Education Publishing House. 2001: 412

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80 and to punish Hui i ndividuals for a double crime if more than three Hui individuals were seen walking together with weapons. Governor of Anhui province submitted a memo to the throne recommendin g that henceforth all Muslims mu st dress like Manchu. They would have to eliminate their white head cover. The front half of their hair would have to be cut completely. The back part of the hair would have to hang down in a braid. All mosques would be dest royed. No Islamic calendar would henceforth be allowed. Failure to obey these edicts would ally removed from the post (Yang 1991:453). To sum up: Muslims arrived in Bozhou as early as the Tang Dynasty. Their presence increased during the Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties. Before the Qing Dynasty, measurers to suppress Bozhou Muslims were relative ly mild. Their situation becomes more difficult, however, during the Qing Dynasty, and particularly during the period from 1950s to 1970s, including the period of the Cultural Revolution (now retrospectively repudiated even by the Communist government) . C urrently, their living conditions have been significantly improved and they enjoy special privileges from the government, more so than the majority Han. The privileges which they continue to receive from the government have caused problems in the relations hip between the Hui and the Han. We will now turn to a discussion of that issue. Ethnic Relationship between the Hui and the Han We have briefly discussed the origins of the Hui in Bozhou. The following section will expand on that discussion. The history of the Hui continually unfolded in the context

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81 of constant interaction with the Han. In this section we will examine the evolution of the relationship between the two ethnic groups, particularly during the period of the Communist rule since 1950s, focusin g on the research site, Bozhou. Emergence of the Muslim Hui the First Two Stages The presence of Islam in China can be divided into six stages 12 . The first stage is from the middle of seventh century (651 AD) to the upper half of thirteenth century, that is, from the early Tang Dynasty (618 907) to the late South Song Dynasty (1127 1279) or to the early conquest period of the Mongol army (1235 1242). The second stage extends from the early Mongol Empire to the end of the Ming Dynasty (1644). This was the m ost significant stage for the formation of the Hui as an ethnic group as well as for the evolution of Islam in China. The remaining four stages are critical for understanding the ethno political condition of Chinese Muslims as well as their relation with the majority Han. In general terms the third stage extends from the beginning to the end of Qing Dynasty (1644 1911). During this stage the Hui were targeted and persecuted by the Manchu government, provoking patterns of resistance (Israeli 1980/2003, Lipm an 1997, Atwill 2003). It was during this stage that the relationship between the Hui and Han reached the highest level of tension. 12 I n Jin Jitang s A Historical Research on the Chinese Hui (1932), he divided the Later, Zhao Zhenwu ( ) d ivided it into four stages in his article General Introduction of Chinese Hui s Religio us Culture in Recent 30 Years ( ) , The period from the last 10 years of the Qing Dynasty to the 1930s was seen as a new stage. In 1943, Bai Shouyi divided Hui history into three periods in his Brief History of Chinese Huijiao . Here Huijiao obviously did not include subsequent Hui history. The situation of the Hui in China cannot simply be taken as a single period. It should be divided into two or more periods.

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82 The fourth stage extends from the late Qing Dynasty to the Anti Rightist Campaign of the Communist government in 1957. A we akened central government in the pre Communist period had gradually loosened State control over minorities, including the Hui. But some Hui felt a strong nationalist obligation to emancipate the country from foreign invasions, particularly by Japan. The ri se to power of the Communist Party was closely linked to the support by Muslim Hui. We can then posit a fifth stage beginning in 1957 and extending to the end of 1970s. During t his period the Hui, along with most ordinary Chinese, suffered a great deal f rom governmentally instituted suppression. The last stage begins in the 1980s and extends to the present. From the outset of this period, the Hui began to experience a higher level of prosperity. On the other hand, they have recently been subjected to ne gative stereotypes because of the worldwide association between Islam and terrorism. Let us begin in the beginning. During the first stage, the Muslim presence in China was sporadic. From the middle of the 7 th century to the end of South Song Dynasty, mos land route of the Silk Road. The population size was comparatively limited. They were for the most part residentially clustered in coastal areas such as Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Yangzh ou, as well as in the city that was at that time the political center Chinese society. They had little if any influence on mainstream society. There were times, particularly during the Song Dynasty, that they were not accepted by the

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83 Chinese. Male foreigners, for example, were prohibited from marrying Chinese women on some occasions (Lipman 1997:26). During the second stage, Muslims entered China on a larger scale. In the cour se of demographic growth, the Hui as an ethnic group emerged. They were at that time called Huihui or Huimin During the Yuan Dynasty (1260 1368) many Muslims immigrated from central Asia or fro If it was difficult for them to reach China, it was equally difficult for them to leave China once they had arrived and settled. It was this period of heavy settlement that laid the groundwork for the emergence of a substantial Musl im minority in several parts of China. They dispersed around the entire country . As one observer Yuan shi huihui bian tianxia The period of strongest population gro wth of Chinese Muslims was the Ming Dynasty (1368 1644). After coming into power, the emperor Zhu Yuanzhang issued a hostile decree in 1368 to control the spread and growth of minorities by legislating Hu dressing, Hu language, Hu Hu ere is an insulting term that originally referred to northern barbarian tribes in China. In 1372, he issued the above are allowed to marry Chinese but not allowed to marry wi of exogamy was imposed only on minorities. The majority Han were not obliged to marry outside of their ethnic group. Here, Semu minorities. As one of these g

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84 order. As a result, the Huihui intermarried with Han . By the end of the Ming Dynasty, endogamy when the decree was aband oned right after the downfall of the Ming in 1644. The Hui are thus a newly formed ethnic group that did not exist before Islam came to China. This feature sets them apart from the other nine Muslim groups . These were autochthonous minorit ies with their own language that had existed in China before the arrival of Islam. Most of these groups had practiced Buddhism before their conversion to Islam. We can see, therefore, that the above two stages were critical to the formation of the ethnic Hui. Before this stage, Muslims in China were basically migrants and their descendants, but not viewed as a separate ethnic group. At most, they were a distinct religious group. After this stage, however, their numbers increased to the degree that they wer e able to separate themselves from others and to coalesce into the status of a recognized ethnic group. Unlike Jewish migrants during the Song dynasty or later who completely merged into other ethnic groups, the Hui emerged as a separate ethnic group, desp ite the lack of the distinctive language and customs that characterize most other ethnic minorities in China. Relationship between the Hui and the Han during the Qing Dynasty (1644 1911) To some degree, the relationship between the Hui and the Han majorit y was peaceful and harmonious during the above two stages, in line with a classic Confucian viewpoint (Lipman 1997:101). Eventually, however, the relationship between the two s presence in China.

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85 The third stage is the period of the Qing Dynasty. Most research identifies this period as the critical turning point in the relationship between Muslim Hui and the Han majority. A shared scholarly assumption is that the accommodation and acculturation of Chinese Muslims was not successful. Some scholars attribute this friction to a tendency on the part of the Hui to distance themselves from the Han government and to an unwillingness or inability to completely integrate into Chinese cu lture (Israeli 1979, 1980, 1981; Gladney 1996, 2004, 2007; Benite 2000; etc.). When discussing the relationship between the Hui and the Han, it is useful to recall the governance strategy of the Manchu. As discussed in the previous section, the Qing gover nment developed specific laws to deal with minority issues. Some officials applied this perspective to the Hui. Besides the earlier mentioned governor in Anhui province, the Chief Prosecutor ( ) Chen Shiguan ( ) also decreed a ban against Islam. He described Islam as a heresy ( ) or evil road ( ), like Bailianjiao ( , the White Lotus, a religiously motivated rebellion against the Manchu government which aimed to restore the reign of the Ming Dynasty). He listed seven crimes or sins of Islam: They do not show respect to heaven and earth, and do not offer sacrifice to gods . They do not follow the calendar but have a calendar of their own. They set up a different Lord. They declare pork t o be taboo. They have a secret curse when slaughtering domestic animals. They do not dress properly after death. They draw the bottom board out of the coffin at burial. (Yang 1991:458 9) Statements such as this suggest a view of Muslims as being more viol ent and ferocious than other groups. But to place matters in historical perspective, we must also recall the attitude of the highest authority, the Emperor. In responding to the memos

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86 submitted by those officials, the Emperor Yongzheng rejected their view and reiterated what his father had often stated: Muslims living under Qing rule fall within the bounds of civilization, among benevolence as all his subjects. The differences between min (non Muslim 1997:97) And Yongzheng stated it clearly: Why should the Muslim people alone be provoked and made the subject o f criminal charges? If the Muslim people indeed transgress, laws and when the Muslims have basically done nothing wrong but officials, whether high or low, seize on the pretext of mino r differences in customs in order to make wild claims, I shall certainly administer severe punishment. 13 And his successor, Emperor Qianlong had a similar view toward Islam. The sacred texts which they regularly recite consist of books handed down from o f old containing no really scurrilous or plainly seditious language. Furthermore, the phrases in these books to which Zhu Chun has drawn attention are on the whole crude expressions which cannot be described as violent and rebellious. These are simple, ign orant Muslim people, The sacred books which they revere are household knowledge among the Muslims. There is no difference here with the Buddhists, Daoists, and Lamas. Surely they could not be exterminated and their books b urned! 14 Islam itself, or against law Muslim sentiments or practices of his officials 13 Shilu , 94:4b 5b, is widely cited in works on the Chinese Muslims, includin g Leslie, Islam, Familiar Strangers, 1997, 97 8. 14 The edicts may be found in the Qianlong Shilu. See Lipman:99. The translation is said to be from Leslie, Islam, 128.

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87 by many officials (ibid), particularly when rebellions occurred across the country. rd Muslims as a group that encouraged communal violence in the northwest by inciting officials to Hui zei ) a tattoo was to be branded on the face of the Hui criminals who committed a crime. In official documents, min (people, civilian) was usually separated from the Hui ( ) to Hui z ei Hui fei ) were frequently used. Sometimes an animal radical was put on the left of the Chinese character designating the Hui, e.g. (Bai 2007:130). This radical is used to indicate animals, such as dog, pig, cat, and the like. When it is attached to the character for a group of people, it means uncivilized, barbarous, or violent. The Hui obviously resented this insult and refused to tolerate it. ion of Qing officialdom had a great deal to do with rapidly increasing violence in society after the mid Qinding Lanzhou Jilue we seek the cause, it lies in the Gansu officials, high and low, who official misbehavior was and is a direct cause for the tense relationship, though it may not have been the only cause of widespread riots. Particular ly in the northwest, the Qing government intentionally made legal distinctions between the Hui and the Han. For example, in Da Qing Lu Li (Law of Qing, ), there were different punishments for crimes committed by the Hui and those committed by the Han. A Han thief who stole

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88 less than 6kg of silver goods as a first offender would be whipped and perhaps exiled as well. If a Hui committed the same theft, he would be sent to an army in a remote area in the south or southwest, even if he were a first offender and no matter how much he stole (Ma 1951:8). On occasion the Qing government would even intentionally distinguish between different groups of Muslims, teaching ( , new religion) by supporting the old teaching ( , old religion). (Lipman 1997, Han 2006) As a result of this official Qing hostility, Muslims revolted on different occasions. The first revolt occurred in 1647, three years after the Manchu came to pow er. Two Hui generals Milayin ( ) and Ding Guodong ( ) assassinated the supreme down in 1649. Another uprising occurred in Xunhua, Gansu, in 1781 and was put down within 5 m onths. It was originally an insurgency within the Salar, a small Muslim ethnic group. The riots later spread among Huihui from Shanxi and Gansu. It began as an internal conflict between an older and a newer Islamic branch. When officials decided to support the older branch, the new branch revolted. In 1783 an ahong (imam) revolted to avenge the death of an ahong from the newer branch who had been killed in 1781. This revolt was quickly put down. In 1789 the local government issued statutes aimed at preventi ng further conflicts between them (Bai 2007:130 5). The most serious Hui uprisings occurred in Yunnan between 1856 and 1872 and in the Northwest in 1862 and 1873. There are contradictory accounts about the two uprising s. The context of both uprisings wa s the involvement by the Qing government in

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89 a combat against the Taiping Rebellion (1850 1864). Most Qinq soldiers from different version depicts both uprisings as positive s truggles against feudalism and against ethnic chauvinism. This version of history gives a rationale to the suppression of religion and the opposition to capitalism that would eventually become the policy of the Chinese Communist Party. In reality, however, the two uprisings were quite different. The Yunnan rebellion was against the Manchu government, as explained by the leader of appease Han, and third to eliminate trait the Han but against the Manchu government. Du would later issue a second denunciation of the Manchu government, I have reflected on the manner in which the Hui, Han, and Yi (a general name for barbarous gr oups in eastern China) have lived in Yunnan for hundreds and thousands of years. We treated each other as friends, helped each other, without any territorial separation. However, after maliciously seizing the throne, the Manchu have mistreated our people f or two hundred years. Monstrous officials have always behaved with were stronger, or helped Hui to kill Han when the Hui were stronger. Witnessing such harshness and concerned with peop a commander cannot tolerate innocent Hui being killed by Han or innocent Han being hurt by Hui. Thus I call for an army of justice to eliminate these monsters to save our people from such misfortunes and to bring harmony between the ibid ) As Bai has pointed, this is the most explicit announcement in the multiple Hui uprisings that called for unity among different ethnic groups. The rebellion in the Northwest, however, was completely different, despite the conflation of

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90 version, however, ignores the fact of genocide conducted by many Hui against the Han before the suppre ssion of the revolt by the Qing government. According to Lu A Monographic Study on the Qing dynasty population in Shanxi Gansu Region (2011), in Lintong County from 1862 massacre along two sides of the Wei River . i n Fuping County . T here were 46,579 households and 254,257 individuals i n 1855, b ut there are only 28,543 households and 120,302 individuals left by 1876 . Excluding those born after 1869, about 60 percent of the Ha n populations were killed by the Hui. In 1861 there had been 69,000 households in Gaoling County. By 1864 only 32,192 were left (ibid). In October 1863, when Hui conquered Ningxia, they slaughtered more than 100,000 Han. When they conquered Lingzhou, 20, 000 Han were slaughtered. In 1866, when Jinyuan 70 percent of (Huang 2008)) In g eneral, ac cording to Zhongguo Renkou Shi ( History of the Chinese Population ) (Cao 2001:645) , in 1861 before the war, the population in Gansu was over nineteen million , but was reduced to fewer than five million in 1880. Most of those killed ( about 74.5% ) were Han. T he population of Shaanxi was about fourteen million in 1861. Fewer than eight million people were left by 1879. The impact of the rebellion on the Hui was severe as well. More than 60 percent of the Hui died in the war. Obviously, the Northwest rebellion and its subsequent suppression entailed a heavy element of ethnic

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91 The causes of the differences are somewhat difficult to identify. One could speculate that differences betwe en the rebel leaders played a role. Du Wenxiu, the leader of the Yunnan rebellion, was a xiucai ( , a degree for one who passed a loyalty to China (he wished to restore the reign of the Ming Dynasty) was obvious, whereas leaders in the Northwest were committed t o religious and ethnic unity, not national unity. Whatever the case, however, one thing is clear: the relationship between the Hui and the Qing government was confrontational. Therefore, when the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party, began to overthrow the r ule of the Manchu, the Hui responded positively. Among the most enlightening books about the decline of the Qing Dynasty, the expulsion of the Manchu, and the opening of China to Western thought, is the book Xing Hui Pian ( To Wake up the Hui, ). Fifth Stage: Cooperation and Confrontation During the fifth stage, the Muslim Hui had to confront multiple challenges from outside, not only from the Han and the government, but also from imperialist countries, particularly Japan. The Hui also h ad problems with different groups of Chinese troops, particularly the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. This fifth stage began during the late Qing Dynasty and ended at the Anti Rightist Campaign of the Communist Party. In his campaign to overthrow the Manchu government, the spiritual leader of the Kuomintang, Sun Tibetan zu zu refers to a group of people with certain common features, not e xactly an ethnic group, or a nationality. (See

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92 the discussion of zu Lipman 1997, Gladney 1996, etc.) As the most prestigious Hui scholar Bai Shouyi pointed out in nt the term Huizu is nowadays, at that moment this term indicated all Chinese Muslims. This is the first time that Huijiao (literarily means Hui teaching, other non Huijiao peop le in China. (Bai 1943, see 1982:41). Chang Kai shek would later attempt to change the meaning of the term to have it mesh with Han chauvinism. He claimed that there is only Han Chinese as nationality in China; other ethnic groups were in his view simply s ub groups of the Han. This view was shared by other prestigious Chinese scholars such as Gu Jigang and Fu Sinian. But such definitional maneuvers did not change the attitude of the Hui as a self conscious ethnic group rather than as members of a unified na tion. On the contrary, Chinese Muslims cared little for nationalist sentiments. What they fought for was an independent status for their religion rather than for a nation. This Huimin Xing Hui Pian ( To Wake up the Hui ) in 1908. It is true that on occasion the Hui were widely involved in anti imperialist patriotic activities. For example, in 1930, 1934, and 1945, Xinjiang Muslims tried to separate from the Republic of China incited and s upported by British and former Soviet Union respectively. But such conspiracies and fights for political autonomy found little support among the Hui. As a matter of fact, Muslim leaders fought to halt such separatist movements. The Hui, in short, have been interested in defending the rights of the Hui as an ethnic group. But lacking a defined

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93 territory within China, they have not been sympathetic to movements for political separation. 15 The relationship of the Hui with the Communist Party has shifted ove r time. Before 1957 there were opposing viewpoints within the Hui. One group supported the Communist Party and the other opposed it. When the Red Army army) had just arrived in Shaanxi, they were fragile and in desperate need of sup port. Their policy towards the Hui was therefore very conciliatory. For example, A Guideline s, a prohibition of pork, a prohibition against destroying Arabic classics, a mandate to be physically clean, to respect the traditions and customs of the Huimin, a prohibition against using Huimin utensils, and a mandate to respect minzu unity. An anecdot e is often cited to demonstrate the good relationship between the Hui and the CPC: in 1940, Chairman Mao Zedong wrote a calligraphy piece for a newly built mosque: Qing Zhensi ( F igure 2 4) . It is frequently pointed out that this is the only piece of ca lligraphy that Chairman Mao ever wrote for a religious site. s Huihui minzu wenti ) was subsequently composed. It stated that on the one hand the Han must do away with the Great Han Chauvi nism and on the other hand the Han must cooperate with the H ui to fight against suppression from Kuomintang separatists and Japanese aggressors . Equal ethnic status would be granted to the Hui in exchange for their fighting against Japanese invaders. In ot 15 This does not include the Hu i and Uyghur in Xinjiang. The Liberation and suppression of Xinjiang Uyghur was carried out with blood and iron.

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94 ethnic sentiments toward loyalty to a nation and to national defense. The CPC, so to speak, attempted to harness the Hui to its own cart and the relationship between them was positive. However there was anothe r theme in the Hui portrait. The most powerful Hui warlord, Ma Bufang, along with others in his family, accepted appointments from the Kuomintang and fought against the so , the CPC army. Particularly ., the civil war of 1946 Liberation Army many times and killed top military commanders. When the CPC took Taiwan to Saudi Arabia. It should be pointed out that the governmental policies toward the Hui in most of the country are different from policies toward the Muslims of Xinjiang in the far west. In most of China the Hui have been beneficiaries of favorable government policies and have been government encountered many obstacles in early 1950s, General Wang Zhen conducted a blood and iron po licy and killed numerous Muslim Uyghurs. Even as late as Huzi Relationship of the two ethnic groups in Bozhou To discus s the remaining periods in the evolution of Hui / Han relations, we will focus on Bozhou. There is justification in this since all State policies toward religions and ethnic groups became relatively homogeneous throughout China after the CPC took power in 1949.

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95 This section will discuss three phases of the evolving Hui / Han relations in Bozhou: the period before the Anti Rightist Campaign in 1957, the period up to the end of the Cultural Revolution, and the years following that up until the present. Bef ore the anti rightist campaign This section will supplement the information already presented about the Hui in Bozhou during the Qing period and during the subsequent period of the Republic of China. Let us briefly return to the rebellion of the Hui during Xianfeng (1851 1861) and Tongzhi (1862 1874) periods in the late Qing Dynasty. One of the branches of the ), was originally from Bozhou. Both leaders of the Nian A rmy, Zhang Lexing and Su Tianfu, were Muslims. Zhang Lexing was a Hui from Bozhou, while Su Tianfu was from a neighboring city, Guoyang County. They were later defeated and fled to Gansu and Ningxia. Their final defeat came at the hands of Zuo Zongtang, a general who had earlier suppressed Hui rebellions in the Northwest. According to the Historiography of Minzu and Re ligion in Fuyang District Anhui Province ( Wang 199 6 ), there were three events that caused the Muslim uprising. The first occurred when a Qing officer deliberately killed a pig in a mosque. He was challenge d by a Hui, whom he was subsequently killed. On an other occasion a landlord threw a nugget of revenge by killing about 120 Hui people. Some Hui fled to another province and some began hiding the fact that they were Hui (Wang 1994:24). The thir d factor is a

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96 widespread popular expression heard throughout several neighboring counties in Western Shandong, northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and southeastern Henan It literally means that Yongch eng never accommodate s the Hui. The most likely causal factor is the behavior of the Nian Army rebellion, which prompted Yongcheng officials to drive out the Hui. Even today, as a city surrounded by many Hui communities, Yongcheng remains a city to which H ui are reluctant to migrate 16 . The Hui had divided loyalties during the struggle against the Japanese in the in Bozhou. It functioned under the supervision of the Fuyang Branch of the Anhui Huijiao Association. This organization was founded at the behest of the Hui leader in the Kuomintang, Bai Chongxi. Some Hui joined the CPC army and others joined the Kuomintan g army. Some armed clashes occurred between the Hui and the Kuomintang army, but none with the CPC (Wang 199 6 :25 6). From the anti rightist campaign to the Cultural Revolution Rightist Campa ign, which was started in 1957. Part of this campaign entailed the suppression of religion and of ethnic minorities. In 1957 the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee of Anhui Province ( Sheng wei tongzhan bu ) issued a document criticizing 16 Anonymous, 2013, (A Review of Yongbu Liuhui ), ( Today s Yongcheng ) , July 4th, · (Culture and Reading) , also see: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_83d4e82f0101f8kf.html

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97 Tian Xia Huihui Shi Yi Jia ). The second statement Huizu). In April, the Nationality Committee of Anhui Province summoned 241 prominent Hui, including all Hui literati, to Hefei (the capital city of Anhui) to participate in the anti Rightist campaign. Forty five of those summoned were classified as righti sts, two of whom 17 were from Bozhou. An imam from one of the mosques, Yao Jinmin, was sent to Songyou, was judged to be a counter revolutionary. Both of them were rehabilitated and r estored in 1979. (ibid: 35) The suppression of the Hui after that became quite severe. During the Great Leap Forward Campaign in 1958, the government of Bozhou convened a county level evolution cadres Jinbu and Luohou Hui according to whether they were willing to eat pork or not. They forced imams to cut off their symbolic beard and to publicly disavow their religious val ues. Some imams were forced to leave the clergy and to become teachers or even Party cadres. An imam from Taihe County was forced to be photographed embracing a pig. In December of 1976, the prefecture head went to a Hui community to verify Hui willingness to raise pigs and to inspect their piggery. Furthermore the Hui were forbidden to maintain their custom of burying the dead. They were forced to cremate, as was done by the Han. (ibid: 35 6) 17 According to Li Huacheng ( 2003), another imam, Hong Baoming, was classified as a rightist as well. The judgment was not overturned and corrected until 1980 (p. 97). One interesting point is that Imam Hajj Gong was credited as a was even appointed to be a member of the CPPCC Bozhou County Committee during the Anti Rightist Campaign (p. 94).

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98 Eighteen of the nineteen mosques in Bozhou were destroyed. The o nly one left standing, the Beijing Mosque, was converted into an iron mill. A stone monument erected at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty and a brick monument inscribed in the third year of Kangxi period (1664) commemorating the reparation of the mosque we re both smashed. Almost all 81 halls of the Central City Mosque were torn down. The mosque was subsequently confiscated and converted into a primary school and the headquarters of a branch of the Red Guard. And i t eventually became a pickles factory. (Li 2 003:52). In short this was a stressful period for members of all religious groups, including the Hui. As we will see when we discuss the following period, the Communist Party now publicly repudiates the measures carried out during this period. After the C ultural Revolution After the Cultural Revolution, the government took steps to undo the harm caused by its destructive policies. For example, in February 1979, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the State Nationalities Affairs Commission issued a notificati on A Notice of not F orcing the Hui to C remate. In August 1985, the government sent out another notification giving Hui communities land on which they could bury the dead. In February 1979, the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee of Anhui Province issued a document A Notice Correcting Wrongly Categorized Rightists in Religions. Most of those who had been classified as rightists were reclassified back to the 6) Document #118 in 1980 and Document #11 9 in 1984, both issued by the Anhui Provincial Government, returned the occupied mosques to the Hui (Li 2003:52). Between 1980 and 2002, t he three major mosques and 19 smaller mosques in and around Bozhou Prefecture were restored, repaired, rebuilt, or bui lt anew. Imams of mosques began receiving a monetary allowance from

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99 the government. Religion was converted from the status of personal belief into a State controlled matter. Religion in effect became a functional department of government. This has been a positive period for Islam in Bozhou. Many Hui now participate publicly in politics and in social administration. The Bozhou Hui organized an Islamic Association in 1987, and some Hui were elected to be the member of the CPPCC nsultative Committee). Ordinary Hui are allowed once again to be entrepreneurs, a role that was prohibited since 1957. Their economic situation has significantly improved. This is the same period in which intermarriage between Muslims and non Muslims becam e more acceptable. The frequency of confrontations between Hui and Han has noticeably decreased. All is not rosy, however. There have been three subsequent confrontations between Hui and Han that deserve to be documented. Shihe Town event in Oct. 21 22 , 1990 In the afternoon of Oct. 21, 1990, a drunken Han youth went out to buy a cane from a Hui teenager with a worn 1 Yuan bill. The Hui teenager refused to accept it. The and not let him go. Another Han peasant, who had just finished his lunch in a restaurant and was somewhat intoxicated as well, tried to separate them to stop their fighting. But one of his hands was holding potatoes and he (intentionally or unintentionally ) spread it father was infuriated. His father returned to the place of the confrontation and wrestled with the drunken Han man. On seeing the struggle, more than sever al dozen of the villagers. As a result, five Han villagers were hurt while those wounded among the Hui

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100 were seven in number. This angered the Hui villagers who decided to take re venge. They called on support from neighboring Hui communities, including some villages and cities in Henan province. On the morning of Oct. 22, more than 600 Hui people gathered around and drove directly to the Han village. A Hui cadre, seeing that the matter was getting out of control, thus rushed to the government office in Bozhou to find solution. But by the time that government officials reached the Han village, all of the Han families who had taken part in the previous fighting had already been atta cked. Their utensils had been smashed, causing a 10,000 yuan loss (over $2,000 at the then prevailing currency rate) 18 . The matter was eventually resolved peacefully. The drunken young man who had started the altercation paid the medical charges and was sen t to jail for several days. The loss caused by the Hui villagers was paid by the Hui, but only 3100 yuan instead of 10,000 yuan. The government considered the matter settled. (Wang 1994:42 45) An event on August 30, 1992 In the afternoon of August 27, 1992 , two Han youth blocked the road and wanted to forcibly rent a tricycle of two Hui children. When their offer was refused, they pretended to be traffic policemen and beat the two boys. The uncle of the two boys heard of the matter and approached to ask for an explanation. He was beaten as well and ended up with a broken nose. leaders who subsequently denounced the two Han young men and told them to pay for the medical expens e. The two men, however, agreed to pay only 200 or 300 Yuan for 18 A t that time, a household with RMB wan yuan hu similar to a millionaire today . I t was a substantial loss.

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101 compensation. Mr. Li was dissatisfied with this offer and he thus reported the matter to the police. The police then issued a summons to the two young men. One of them was distained, but the o ther ran away. The fathers of the two boys and other Hui decided to recruit other Hui relatives to August 30, about 300 Hui eholds. They other man. The local government and police made efforts to persuade them to leave, urging all to reach an agreement by which the two families would apologize to t he victims, compensate all medical charges, and punish the two offenders who had impersonated the police. But that same night the police station learned that the Hui villagers were planning inst the families of the two offenders. The police arrested 50 individuals including 9 Han and 41 Hui who had been involved in the previous confrontations. Some of the Hui who had been detained claimed that policemen had pushed and shoved them during th e arrest. They furthermore were angered that whereas only one of the two Han offenders had been detained, dozens of Hui had been arrested. They therefore made an appeal to the provincial level, and apparently to the state level as well, since many higher l evel bureaucrats, including the provincial governor and party representative, became personally involved in the dispute. By September 7 pressure from above had caused the local police to release 47 detainees without any trial, retaining only three of the principal culprits. When the

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102 second culprit who had fled was eventually captured, the event was moving toward a reconciliation. The reconciliation ended with all lawsuits being withdrawn, all liability waived, those injured being required pay their own me dical expenses, and the Han villagers agreeing to repair their houses on their own as well. This event was considered to be the most serious incidence of ethnic conflict since 1949 (Wang 1994:46 50). An event in Guantang in 1996 The following event occur red in April 1996 but was not documented in the Wang historiography. The Li historiography alluded to it briefly. But the date given there is different from the date given in the lawsuit after the Guantang event. I first interviewed Mr. Li in 2008. He is a Hui and a lawyer as well. He was also the appointed attorney for Guantang event. He gave me access to the file with the original documents which I was able to copy by hand. According to the file, the event occurred on April 30, 1996 , in the village of We stern Ding, a Hui village some 3km away from a paved road. There was talk of paving a road through Eastern Ding Village. The shortcut, however, would go through the land of Mr. Shao. The Western Ding village reached an agreement with the peasant Shao by co mpensating him with land five times as large as the land which he would lose. He would in addition receive 50 yuan. However when Western Ding Village began preparations to pave the road, the leader of Eastern Ding Village mobilized dozens of people to prev ent the activity. They appealed to town authorities but no agreement could be reached despite several attempts at negotiation. Therefore the villagers of Western Ding, who were Hui, appealed to the Bozhou government. When the mayor of Bozhou made an inspec tion trip to the village, he criticized the local town leaders when he learned about the cause of the conflict. The town leader who had been reprimanded developed a grudge against the Hui involved.

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103 (At the end of the document that was shown to me, evidence was presented that he had engaged in illegal behavior, including bribery.) The town official found a pretext for moving against the Hui. On April 3, 1996, a Hui family was holding a wedding ceremony, but no guests were willing to attend, probably because the groom was an unpleasant person who was unpopular in his own village. He was therefore unable to collect the traditional money gifts from his relatives, neighbors, and friends. He cursed them out publicly, angering the neighbors and provoking a fight. T his gave the town government a pretext for sending a group of policemen. On April 24 the police found another excuse, this time a violation of the Family Planning regulations by a Hui man. The accusation turned out to be invalid since all the villagers kne w that the Hui man still did not have any child after 8 years marriage. There was no way that he could have violated Family Planning policy. The above two excuses that Han police fabricated against Hui villagers created anger at the police. At 3:00 am on April 30, around 400 policemen surrounded the village, 18 Hui were arrested. During the detention some were severely tortured. In the morning the villagers found that some houses had been burned, the eyes of some villagers were bruised, and some cartridge cases had been left on the ground. Almost the entire village panicked and fled. Some of them appealed to the Bozhou government. The government issued a cease and desist order to the police. On May 2 nd , Bozhou leaders from the Politics and Law Committee, the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee, the Minzu and Religious Bureau, and the Islamic Association all went to the town to calm down matters. But after they left, the police arrested another 8 people. The government reissued the ceas e and desist order.

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104 However, the police ignored the order and even used the radio to announce that Western Ding villagers were all criminals. Later, people said that the police had been enticed with a bounty of 1 , 000 yuan for each Western Ding villager tha t they arrested. Moreover, the Han villagers in neighboring Eastern Ding offered a prize of 3,000 yuan for each Hui villager arrested. Four Hui villagers then made a petition to Beijing. The General Office of the CPC Central Committee, the State Nationa lities Affairs Commission, and the Ministry of Public Security declared that the government of Anhui Province must deal adequately with the problem. However, on May 23 rd , the four villagers who had appealed to Beijing were arrested. On May 24 th , when polic e arrested Ding Haiqiang, his father, Ding Jingxian died from fright. There were only seven individuals left in the Muslim village when the most respected Imam, Hajj Gong, went to take care of the body. The entire case was being adjudicated by June 1 st an d had been resolved by January 8, 1997. All arrested villagers were released. The road was paved. The Bozhou Ethnic and Religious Bureau offered gifts and other incentives to appease all parties and bring the matter to an end. To sum up: economic develo pment in the years after the Cultural Revolution led to a lessening of intergroup tension between Hui and Han. But as we can see from the above incidents, ethnic tensions and the potential for conflict remain close beneath the surface and conflicts can an d do occur . Ethnic Relationships in Bozhou Confrontations such as those mentioned above are referred to by the Qunti xing shijian mass disturbance. These occurred in the rural areas. But other intergroup tensions in urban areas revolv e around issues of public

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105 security. The Hui are believed, for example, to have powerful underground networks. Such perceptions also influence interethnic relations because they deal with issues of public security. We will see, however, that the strategy of the government in dealing with public security issues is quite different from the measures taken in the above mentioned mass disturbance events. Economic change and increased social mobility The economy of Bozhou rests on two pillars: alcohol and medic ine. Abstinence from alcohol is a major requirement in classical Islam. The Hui can and do violate that prohibition in their personal lives. And some Hui stores and restaurants do sell alcoholic drinks. But the Hui will not publicly become involved in the alcohol production industry. Medicine. Quite unlike their ancestors, who were on the whole much poorer than the Han, ozhou has the largest and most famous Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) market, and several of the major local TCM industries are run by the Hui. For instance, Anhui Xiehecheng Pharmaceutical Lt. Co. is a Hui industry which accounts for about 50 percent o f the medicine exported from Anhui province. The biggest pharmaceutical chain, Gaishengxiang, is also run by a Hui businessman. The Gai family, owners of the above company, are owners of a huge family business which covers various fields, including medicin e, supermarkets, real estate, etc. The family almost monopolizes retail business, even surpassing the influence of Walmart in Bozhou. Hui families have, in short, benefited from the development of the economy in the post Mao decades. One often hears the st ereotyped

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106 claim that the Hui are born to be businessmen. They were the first to become wealthy in post 1980 Bozhou. Along with economic development comes social mobility. Villagers have moved into the urban area and many merchants from elsewhere visit Boz hou. The villages of Bozhou are also a source of the outmigration of peasant workers to eastern coastal areas. More than 1 million people are reported to be on the move each year. According to the 2010 national census, the current residents of Bozhou prefe cture number about 4.9 million, whereas registered residents have reached 6.1 million. (Emigrants to the coast remain officially registered in their home communities, not in their new communities.) It is not at all unusual to see Northwestern Hui and Uyghu rs involved in medicine trade or running restaurants in Bozhou. In other words, the interaction of the Bozhou Hui with other Muslims as well as with the Han has intensified. One consequence has been a growing secularization of the Hui. Many young Hui in f act never receive a solid religious education from their parents, who themselves had been raised in a context of official State atheism. Growth of ethno religious awareness and underground powers In the years of the Cultural Revolution the only identity t hat could be publicly expressed was one of universalist socialist fervor. That is long past. The Hui now publicly identify with their ethnic group. Ethnic networks often play a role in economic specialization. Since Hui all over China share a similar ethn o religious background, it is not surprising that they have organized several interest groups. Given the lower education level of the Hui ( Chapter 7 for details) as well as a lower rate of participation in government, alternative networks, some of them that would be classified as part of the underworld, have emerged.

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107 A major protagonist of Hui underworld power was Li Xuanchuan and his group. He was the eldest of six siblings, pale and elegant in his appearance. However, he was known to be a violent ma n who had hacked opponents with a machete. Before being arrested in 2004, he gathered about 300 young men and with mafia like tactics monopolized the transportation industry in Bozhou as well as part of the medicinal industry. The Bozhou transportation sec tor moves more than 10 billion yuan each year. out. But he ended up killing his opponent as he held his guts with one hand. It is an honor for a young gangster to follow him. His organization was hierarchically structured with a core membership of some 27 men. This underworld group was wiped out by the police in the wake of an inciden members publicly murdered with machetes one of his opponents in a hospital. He and his group were tracked down in 2006. He was subsequently sentenced to death. Another Hui underworld power was Yufu. He was and is the head of the Democratic Administrative Com mittee of the Mosque (DACM, details in Chapter 7 ). His group members were all Hui. He monopolized the fish market of Bozhou. All his opponents, including his sister, were forcibly and br utally driven out from the fish market business. Hui underworld activities are often linked to Hui ethno religious symbols. He was very active in Hui religious and ethnic issues. An example is seen in the case where the Imam Hajj Gong was attacked by a Ha n as he was attempting to deal with a conflict between a Hui and a Han. Yufu led a group of Hui brandishing clubs and machetes and rushed to the Bozhou city hall. He coerced the mayor to promise severe

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108 punishment to the Han man who had attacked the imam. T he mayor had no option but to agree. Yufu had, however, gone too far. He annoyed the government authorities and later he was arrested under the pretext of his monopolization of the fish market. He was sent to jail for 8 years. Unlike Li Xuanchuan, Yufu em phasized Hui symbolism and identity. With his support, the Beijing Mosque in Bozhou was repaired, and a summer school for Islamic studies was opened in the mosque as well. He even forced some Hui to attend mosque worship services on Fridays. The Imam priva tely criticized the government for incarcerating this loyal Muslim. Since his removal the ethno religious revival which he promoted has dwindled. Governmental strategies for dealing with the Hui and their underworld powers The attitude of governmental aut horities toward the Hui and other religious groups is one of mixed signals. On the one hand the government now gives financial support to restore religious architecture and to fund the clergy. On the other hand, the official governmental website contains s carcely a word about ethnic minorities or their religions. The government now appears superficially to give ample space for the development of religion and ethnic issues. However both religion and ethnicity are under close State supervision. It is called " wai song nei jin , loose outside but tight inside). My interviews with several government officials indicate clearly that the Han run government keeps tight surveillance over ethnic and religious affairs . The incidents Minzu and Rel igion Bureau is a good example ( C hapter 7

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109 Fa Wei ( They usually like to gather in groups to resolve any dispute. A big scale one is called Jihad , a small one is just called a fight. Sometimes ahongs (imams) lead [the fight] . He added and gave me an example: Islam is rude, lower educated. Once hundreds of Hui gathered in t he angry. Later [the government] arrested a (Hui) fish trader who buys and sells fish coercively. He as judged i[and sent to jail]. [They] thus dare not to make trouble anymore. He co ntinued: Huimin (Hui people) gather very quickly, [and] like to escalate a small dispute into a minzu conflict, to politicize it, enlarge it, and broaden i t Hanmin (Han people) perceive that we have higher suzhi ( , quality or morality) and we do not de al with them unless it is absolutely necessary. Generally, the Han are more forbearing and conciliatory to the Hui. Bozhou Huimin have low suzhi , no job, not concern with observing Jihu a Shengyu (fertility control), bearing five or six or seven kids. Those kids are stronger [ because ] they practice martial arts. Hanmin have only one child per family, [thus they] dare not to fight against the Hui. In recent years, [some] Huimin have become rich but get involved in underworld powers and [thus] are cracked down on by the government. This shocks the Huimin into softer behavior. Otherwise, [they] would be more changjue ( , rampant). His statement illustrates the attitude of some employees in the government. It is also a reflection of the attitude of some Han toward the Hui. In my interviews I encountered frequent evasions when asking a Han, What do you t hink of the Hui? One Han man who was often bullied by his Han neighbors in his earlier years solved the problem by marrying out his two daughters to Hui spouses. He himself changed his ss with me; all

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110 my sons in Many Han dislike having to interact with Hui. several actions against underworld networks, local police have become more effective in maintaining law and order. For example, the police publicize an unwritten rule in Bozhou. In the case of any fight, no matter who is the aggressor and who is acting in self defense, both parti es must deposit 80,000 100,000 yuan cash into the police before the troublemakers will be detained. The compensation for any injury will be withdrawn control their temper s . Summary of the section After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government relaxed its policies regarding economic activity and ethno religious issues. This led to significant improvement for the Hui in Bozhou both economically and ethnic ally. Their ethno religious awareness has been strengthened to some degree. Illegal underworld networks emerged among the Hui, some of them marshalling ethnic symbols. These networks, and the reputation of the Hui for violence, have created tension between the two ethnic groups. The situation changed somewhat after 2000, when the Bozhou prefecture was established and the new government launched actions against police bribery on the one hand and illegal underworld networks on the other. Grudges and prejudice s remain to somewhat, b ut they are often handled in a conciliatory way . The new phenomenon of large scale intermarriage may further improve interethnic relations.

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111 Figure 2 1: Location of Bozhou in Anhui , China Source: http://www.chinafacttours.com/photo /maps/map of anhui 1.html

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112 Figure 2 2: City map of Bozhou (google map)

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113 Figure 2 3: The monument (left) and its inscription written with hand by the priest. Figure 2 Source: http://www.noorislam.org/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=75359

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114 CHAPTER 3 INTERMARRIAGE BETWEEN THE MUSLIM HUI AND HAN: AN OVERVIEW This chapter will deal with the central topic of the research: interm arriage between the Hui and the Han. We will first examine the issue of religious regulations concerning intermarriage. We will then examine in some detail the available intermarriage practices of Chinese Muslims, especially the Hui. Intermarriage with non Muslims is prohibited in Islamic tradition. The second Surah of clearly states that marriage is strictly confined to members of the Islamic faith. Subsequent interpretations have slightly softened the prohibition. It remains in force for all Mus lim women, who are forbidden to marry non Muslim men. There is a loophole for men, who can marry non Other women are considered idolat ers. Chinese Han women would on the whole, of course, be excluded from this loophole; not being Jewish or Christian they are not candidates for marriage without prior conversion. Whatever Islamic law says, however, marriage of non Muslims is common among Chinese Muslims in eastern and southeastern China. We will say that intermarriage was in historical fact largely responsible for the emergence of the Hui as a large independent ethnic group, even the more observant Muslims of the Northwest who today main tain strict norms of endogamy. Marriage and Intermarriage in Islam ( Shariah ) What is an Islamic Marriage? Hui intermarriage is in heavy violation of Islamic law. What exactly does that law mandate? Some brief observations will be made.

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115 In the first pla nikah beloved in the sight o get married and have chosen their wives, and the worst people of my nation are those who have kept away f 1 Accordingly, monasticism and celibacy are strongly rejected. Marriage is taken as a divine right and a divine command from Allah. Key Islamic texts present marriage, and sex within marriage, as a nat ural and desirable part of human life. The Prophet specifically claimed marriage as part of his S unnah, or authoritative practice. The , was criticized by his wife in front of straight command [Shariah]. I fast, pray and also have intimate relations with my wife. So whosoever likes my tradition, then he should follow it; and marriage is one of my 1 Mustadrakul Wasael, Muhaddith Noori, vol. 2, p. 531 quoted in A Gift for the Youth, Shabeeb Rizvi . S ee: http://www.al islam.org/islamic marriage syed athar husain sh rizvi/importance marriage islam#footnote3_iii23br

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116 Secondly, in Islam a marriage is a contract between a Muslim male and a Muslim female. The contract must be witnessed by at least two males or by a male and two females. The contract must be bas ed on mutual consent and entails multiple responsibilities. The women (on marriage) their dow of the dower will depend on the status of the woman as a free woman or a slave. A man who cannot afford the d ower of a free woman may and should marry a Muslim slave for a lower dower. Verse 25 of the same Surah means wherewith to wed free believing women, they may wed believing girls from among those whom your right hand pos sesses (an expression indicating a slave). You are one from another: wed them with the leave of their owners, and give them their wealth to marry a free Muslim woman, he ca n marry a Muslim slave. The hadith, a narrative record of the sayings or customs of Muhammad and his companions, discusses a range of dower possibilities ranging from an inexpensive symbolic gift of no economic value (an iron ring) to a minimal gift (a qua rter dinar or three dirhams) to an ideal amount (the dower paid by the Prophet to his wives or that received by his daughters). No maximum amount is stipulated. For the most part, these texts are silent on the logic behind these gifts at marriage, although the does refer to the ajr 4:24).

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117 The dower ( mahr ) is often interpreted as a fulfillment of the prescription (Esposito 2001: 23). Originally, mahr Ali (2006: 4) has a more jaundiced view of the dower, pointing out that it affords United States. She says, Following through on enforcement of dower obligations in the wake of divorce is much less common, in part because these same religious figures have no role in civil divorce. Other reasons include the nominal amount of dower often allocated to the bride, the informality of verbal or written dower agreements that do not meet standar ds for enforceable contracts, and the fact that U.S. courts have proven ambivalent in their treatment of dower obligations. The practical impact of these factors belies an instance of Esposito also believes that dower could be used as a means for controlling the (2001: 23). Ali disagrees with this claim as well. She continues, The linkage of divorce with dower may seem old, but the husband, in the lawful. The wife may not dissolve unless specific conditions to the contrary, escape clauses of a sort, were included in the contract. Given that the full dower becomes obligatory after consummation, and could represent a significant sum of money, i t makes a certain kind of sense that only the husband would be able to release the wife from the marriage. Otherwise, a woman could simply marry, consummate the marriage (or rather, allow it to be consummated), and then divorce her husband while claiming t he full dower amount to which she was entitled.

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118 This calls into question the claim by the them before the consummation of marriage, but after fixing a dower, then [give them] Many s tereotypical accusations of inequality between Muslim women and men forbidden by her husband from showing herself in public; women are only allowed to marry one man whereas men can practice polygyny; Muslim women can only marry Muslim men but Muslim men are not strictly bound by this rule; women generally do not have the right to vote; and so on. Thus, two hierarchies appear: Muslims were to be dominant over non Muslims and husba nds over wives. Friedmann explains the prohibition against Muslim women marrying non Muslim men in terms of contradictory hierarchical arrangements that would violate the principle of Muslim superiority over non man to a non Muslim man would result in an unacceptable incongruity between the superiority which the wife should enjoy by virtue of being Muslim, and her unavoidable wifely subjection to her infidel In short, marriage in Islam is vie wed not only as virtually obligatory. It is also viewed as being essentially linked to asymmetrical power relations between husbands and wives. Whom You Cannot Marry As we have seen, non Muslim men cannot marry Muslim women. This imposes stringent restri ctions on Muslim women concerning mate selection. Other restrictions are based on incest prohibitions and some are based on legally enforceable marital

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119 restrictions. The following quotation is often cited to illustrate and justify marriage prohibitions in Sura 4:22: Henceforth you will not marry the women who were married to your fathers. That was an evil practice, indecent and abominable. Sura 4:23: You are forbidden to take in marriage your mothers, your daughters, your sisters, your paternal and maternal aunts, the daughters of your brothers and sisters, your foster mothers, the mothers of your wives, your step daughters who are in your charge, born of the wives with whom you have lain (it i s no offence for you to marry your stepdaughters if you have not consummated your marriage with their mothers), and the wives of your own begotten sons. Henceforth you are also forbidden to take in marriage two sisters at one and the same time. Allah is fo rgiving and merciful. Sura 4:24: You are also forbidden to take in marriage married women, except captives whom you own as slaves. Such is the decree of Allah. All women other than these are lawful to you, provided you seek them with your wealth in modest conduct, not in fornication. (Donnan 1988:115, cited 39) The incest taboo overrides the permission to marry Muslim women. Close relatives cannot marry even though both are Muslim. Beyond that candidates for leaves him in his own condition, and one who marries her (only) for her beauty, wi ll find in her (things) which he dislikes (unpleasing manners) and Allah will gather up all these belief is the marriage ideal. In addition to Muslims, women who a Christians and Sabians 2 can be considered viable candidates for mate selection by Muslim men, but no polytheists or idolaters. This is derived from the notion that Jews 2 Most sources say only Jewish and Christian women are permitted, while others include Sabian . See Char, S. V. Desika. 1997: 127

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120 and Christians share with Muslims some simil ar religious understandings a belief in One God, an obligation to follow divine commandments, a belief in revealed scripture, marriage are not only chaste women who are be lievers, but chaste women among the (Qur'an 5:5). This exception is basically made for Muslim men to marry chaste or pious Jewish and Christian women, without any mention of a requirement on their part to convert. In contrast a Muslim woman can marry a non Muslim man only if he embraces Islam. This would ensure the Muslim paternity of their children (Ayoub 2004:187), because the status of Muslim at birth is transmitted patr ilaterally. Despite the loophole concerning Jewish and Christian women, the People of the Book are not always held in honor in many Muslim communities. In fact, early Sunni discussions of intermarriage 3 between Muslim men and Jewish or Christian women are more complex than the simple statement that, while Muslim women are forbidden to intermarry, Muslim men may marry Christian or Jewish women. The early jurists also devoted substantial discussion to the issue of conversion of one of the spouses to Islam. Ali, whose skepticism concerning the fairness of Islamic law to women has been cited above, also critiques the disparity between hadith and Quran . As Alalwani states is that it is forbidden for a Muslim 3 An interesting point is that out marrying was not discussed by Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Rushd, Almad b. Naqib al century transmitter of the text ( Reliance of the Traveler ) adds it as a clarification for the English translation. ( See Ali 2006: 15) The pre modern tradition suggests the importance of context as a factor in determin ing the (im)permissibility of particular types of marriage. At the same time, a reconsideration of the relevant passages in isolation from their t raditional interpretation suggests that the text is less categorical than generally assumed; sunnah may also provide a model of flexibility with respect to female marital choices.

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121 woman t o be married to a non the explicitly forbids such marriages is misleading. The does not address specific Clearly, despite the loophole for Muslim m en with respect to Jewish and Christian women, Islam does not encourage intermarriage, even between Muslim men and non not marry unbelieving women until they believe. A slave woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she allures you.... Unbelievers beckon you to the Fire. But Allah beckons by His Grace to the garden of bliss and forgiveness. And He makes His signs clear to mankind, that they may Qur'an 2:221) In current Islamic practice, under no conditions is a Muslim woman permitted to marry a non Muslim man. The same verse cited above (2:221) mentions that, "Nor marry your girls to unbelievers until they believe. A man s lave who believes is better than an unbeliever...." Since the verse does not specifically mention Jews and Christians, the conventional understanding is that a Muslim woman may only be allowed to marry a believing (Muslim) man. Since, as we shall see, Chin ese Muslim women consistently violate this prohibition, the sensitivity of this topic among knowledgeable Chinese Muslims, their hesitation to discuss current practice, is understandable. Intermarriage and the Muslim Hui: the Silenced Memory Returning to the situation of Chinese Muslims, it is essential to point out the central role that intermarriage played in the formation of the Muslim Hui. Yet this topic

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122 of intermarriage creates embarrassment and dynamics of denial. The denial occurs among observant Muslims of the Northwest, and among the less observant Muslims of the East and Southeast, though each group engages in denial for a different reason. Scholars have already researched the phenomenon of silencing the past among non Muslim populations. It ha s been dealt with in Haiti (Trouillot 1995) and among the Banda (Wilks (2003) and Schmidt (2007). Ann B. Stahl illustrated how power relations suggests manipulation over the past by those in positions of hegemonic power, by the Pinochet (Natzmer 2002), as well as the traumatic experience of the Tutsi under the control of the Rwandan Pa triotic Front (RPF) in the period following the genocide (Longman and Rutagengwa 2006). In such situations those in positions of political power are able to impose at least temporary collective silence over aspects of the past. Different dynamics of denia l, however, can also come into play unrelated to conscious manipulation of history for political purposes. The experience of Hiroshima citizens (Yoneyaman 2006) is illustrative in that regard. The (partial but not total) silence concerning the traumatic im pacts of the nuclear attack during World War II cannot be dismissed as a product of opportunistic State manipulation. Furthermore in foraging or tribal societies without writing, there is no guarantee that all aspects of group history will be encoded in or al tradition. Silence may be a product of forgetfulness. In short, we may have to seek for alternative explanations when we encounter elements of the past that have been filtered out.

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123 f the intentional silence imposed by Chinese Muslim on the topic of intermarriage. Given that Chinese Muslims are so heterogeneous (Gladney 1998), we will see how and why the different sectors of the same religious group have a similar reaction toward the same emphasis. In particular, we want to explore why the northwestern Hui simply try to silence the history of intermarriage in their past, while the Hui in eastern and sou theastern China focus instead on maintaining silence about their intermarriage practices in the present (a silence that created challenges for the current research.) Formation of the Muslim Hui in History The Chinese State under the Communist Party began classifying ethnic groups in the 1950s. With respect to the Hui, there was a terminological shift. Formerly referred to as of Huihui ( ) or Huimin ( , meaning Hui people ), they are now called the Huizu ( They are distinguished from nine other Islamic ethnic minority groups. They are by far the largest Islamic bloc in terms of population size . With over 10 million members , they constitute about half of the entire Muslim population in China according to the latest national census (2010). Paradoxically there are more Muslims in China than that in Saudi Arabia itself, more in fact than any Arab country except Egypt. M ost of the Chinese Muslims are concentrated in northwestern China and the rest are scattered around the country. Different from other state classified Muslim ethnic groups, the Muslim Hui do not have their own native language but share Mandarin (as well as its many dialects) with the majority Han. This distinction by itself the lack of their own ethnic language -would be enough to differentiate the Hui from

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124 the other nine Muslim groups in the ethnic classification system. Before the State mandated class including Uyghur were considered as a unified group of people who believe in Islam (Lipman 1997, Gladney 1996). Both the founders of the Republic of China, Sun Yat sen, as well as his successor, Chiang Kai Chinese Nation from the western imperialist countries. Here, those five represented all ethnic groups in 4 were viewed as encompassing all Muslims, including the Uyghur. (This is no longer the case.) Muslims in China cannot be so easily lumped into one group. Though sharing a generalized religious belief system, the Hui and other Muslim s are from other perspectives an internally heterogeneous collection of different ethnic groups, which in no way fit into the artificially neat criteria framed by Stalin (1913/1972) and adopted by the Chinese government. Despite official socialist proclam ations, Muslims in China are common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a not share a territory or a distinct economy. Nor do they share a common language different from that of the Chinese mainstream. The Hui have a sui generis history that defies neat Stalinist Let us return briefly to the histo rical past. Islam arrived in China in the middle of the 7 th century. Soon after the spread of Islamic hegemony in the Near Eastern 4 e classification in the 1950s.

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125 heartland of Islam, the third caliph, the Caliph Uthman (644 656), dispatched his ambassadors to China (651 A.D.). This is th e earliest record of Arab visits to China (Yang 1991, Bai 2007) . Through the Sea Silk Road, many Arabian and Persian merchants came to Guangzhou, Quanzhou, Yangzhou . They congregated in those four areas during the Tang Dynasty and the Song Dynasty and subsequently spread to other important commercial and political cities, such as Luoyang, Kaifeng, and Nanjing Fanke ( ) However in the mid 8th century, the Emperor Suzong ( ) made a critical decision that would lead to the creation of an indigenous Islamic population. He requested military assistance from central Asian Mus lims outside of China. This assistance (according to different documents), took the form of about 3,000 soldiers (or perhaps more) to suppress a rebellion which had seriously crippled the prosperous empire. These soldiers subsequently stayed in China afte r putting down the rebellion and they were allowed to marry local Chinese women. Some legends even say that Muslim soldiers and their ethnically mixed offspring constitu ted the first wave of Chinese had to convert to Islam. Their children, though ethnically mixed, would in any case have been considered fully Islamic because of patrilineal descent principles). In subsequent years hundreds and even thousands of Arabian and Persian Muslims came to China via two routes. The first was the sea route, from the Persian Gulf and the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula across the Indian Ocean to Canton

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126 the land route, the fabled "Silk Road" that extended from the Eastern Mediterranean across Central Asia to Bukhara and Samarkand before reaching Northwest China and endin also the territorial expansion of China itself into Central Asia, was an early factor that contributed to the growth of the Muslim population in China. Muslims tended to clu ster into their own communities. Along with the appearance of more Muslim umma hs (communities) throughout China, the population growth of Muslims was not only a result of natural increase but also a consequence of the large scale absorption of native Chine se, largely through intermarriage but also through adoption, and occasional conversion (Pillsbury 1981). Those who came to China by land were mostly soldiers, diplomats, scholars, artists, traders, and religious leaders. They became deeply involved in Chin ese politics, armies, commerce and family life. Although the population was not large during the Tang and Song (960 1276) periods, and though sometimes male foreigners were prohibited from marrying Chinese women (Lipman 1997:26), their population grew slow ly. And their descendants gradually adapted to life within this culturally, linguistically, and religiously different territory (Lipman 1997:29 31). Settlement was particularly strong during the period of Yuan Dynasty (1260 1368). Whether they had come i n time of peace or war, most immigrants who had come by land settled permanently, married Han Chinese woman, owned land, were employed by civil or military authorities, established stores and served as ahong (imams) in mosques that they built. If it had be en difficult for them to reach China by land, it would

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127 have been equally difficult for them to leave China. The descendants of these Muslims who had come by land were the principal demographic element in the formation of Conversely the Muslims who specialized in commerce in the coastal cities of China during the Tang, Song and Yuan (1260 1368) periods were not the major element in the population growth of Chinese Muslims. This feat was achieved instead by the Arabs, Persi ans and Central Asians who came to China by land (Pillsbury 1981). Let us fast forward to a more recent historical period. Before the establishment of heaviest population gro wth of Chinese Muslim was the Ming Dynasty (1368 1644). Although many Muslim generals and soldiers had joined the rebel army of the first emperor of the Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang, to overthrow the minority empire, the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang issued a hostile decree in 1368, immediately after the establishment of the Mongolian Empire, to control the spread and growth of minorities. Hu dressing, Hu language, and Hu here is an insulting allusion to northern barbaria n tribes in China. But it became a lexical designator for all minorities. In 1372, he issued another decree which specifically addressed requirements for the marriage of minorities: People who are from Mongolians as well as Semu are allowed to marry Chine se but not allowed to marry within (their own group) given that they are residing in China. Disobedience of the law by either males or females must be punished by confiscating all their properties and enslaving all family members. (Bai 2007:127) Here, Sem u Han minorities. The descendants of Muslim immigrants from Arabia and Persia were

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128 certainly included under this label. The Mongolian regime instituted a stratified social system in which the hig her stratum was reserved for Mongolians, and in which semus occupied the lower level. Semus were allowed to occupy positions in government that were rarely open for Han Chinese. The latter were clustered at the two lower levels of the social hierarchy, dep ending on when their region in China was conquered. The impact of this imposed rule of ethnic exogamy not only diversified the genotype of those minorities, as intended by the emperor. It also contributed to the growth and internal genetic diversity of the Muslim Hui. Eventually the population pool of the semus was large enough to reinstate religious and ethnic endogamy when the ethnic exogamy rule was abrogated after the downfall of the Ming in 1644. It was during the nearly three hundred year reign of t he Ming Dynasty that the Muslim Hui were gradually able to achieve the status of a separate and independent ethnic group . The Mongolian conquest had brought many Muslims from central Asia ry short (only about one century). In addition, the Mongolian government did not institute a policy of forced intermarriage. That was imposed during the Ming Dynasty. Furthermore it was the Ming Dynasty that adopted a xenophobic foreign policy by isolatin door policy was continued by the Qing Dynasty as well until the national borders were forcibly opened in the 1840s by the British colonists in their enforcement of their unrestricted right to sell opium to China.

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129 Muslim immigration to China therefore was curtailed from the earliest years of the Ming Dynasty. Furthermore, Chinese Islam, as practiced by earl ier generations of immigrants, was never a religion of the sword, to be spread by conquest and imposition. (Cf. Lipman 1997, Yang 1991, Bai 2007). It is true that some indigenous Chinese ethnic groups did convert to Islam after the arrival of Muslim mercen aries in the service of the Emperor; however, it was the intermarriage of soldiers and other male Muslim immigrants with Chinese women, not the imposition of Islam by the sword, that was the major source of growth of the Muslim population of China. Stated differently, the Chinese Hui are mainly a product of intermarriage. It is a genotypically mixed ethnic group that did not exist before Islam came to China. In this regard the Hui differ profoundly from the other nine Muslim minority groups. These other gr oups were indigenous Chinese minorities, with their own languages and territories, who converted to Islam, generally from Buddhism. The Hui, a product not of mass conversion but of intermarriage with Chinese women, have an entirely different origin. To re peat: intermarriage was central to the formation of the Hui. Silencing the Past with Respect to Intermarriage among the Northwest Hui This particular process of ethno genesis entailed violation of classic Islamic practice. For this reason religiously obs ervant Hui in Northwest China are reluctant to mention this aspect of their ethnic past. They now practice a very strict variant of religious endogamy. Even during the period of religious suppression in the Cultural Revolution (1966 1976), the intermarriag e rate of Muslims in the Northwest remained at a very low level. As recorded by Gladney in the 1980s, in a Sufi village in Northwestern China, there had been only one case of intermarriage that occurred in 1984. This despite the fact that under pressure fr om the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution

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130 occurred between a Hui man and a Han w oman who married into the Hui family and converted to Islam as well. Hui families would not permit their daughters to marry out. Even during a conflictive period of time in which a large number of ethnic intermarriages did occur in China, the village leade r of this community could recall only one marriage between a Han man and Hui woman which took place in 1972. And significantly, this man converted to Islam at marriage and that he is now regarded as a Hui. His contact with his Han relatives is seldom activ ated. In other words, intermarriage in this area is decreasing rather than increasing. The strong practices of religious endogamy that characterize this village coincide with that of urban Hui in Northwest China. Zang (2005) did a household survey among Mu slim Hui in Lanzhou, the city with the biggest population of Muslim Hui, in 2001. Of all valid cases of marriage, only 16 out of 1,745, i.e., fewer than one percent, resulted from intermarriage during the period of 1949 2001. Figures are given in Table 2 1 . It is obvious that the intermarriage rate in this urban area is as low as that found in Hui villages of the Northwest. Hui in this region do not want their children to marry Han. A e Han: We do not eat pork and we do not give them our women 1996: 230) Findings from a household interview conducted in 2007 by two doctoral students from the University of Michigan also confirmed this phenomenon . The two students told me that they were shocked to see a Hui girl suddenly burst into tears when she was asked about her mate selection preferences

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131 for marriage because of strong disapproval from her parents, even though her boyfriend agreed to convert t o Islam and she truly had a deep affection for him. Her parents yelled at her an d settled the matter by informing her that their Muslim family never married Han. The girl eventually accepted a marriage arranged by her parents. A similar story was heard from a Hui villager of the Northwest. We are all Muslims in this village. Most of us are surnamed Na. The surnames, and this proves that we are descended not from Han Chinese but from a foreign Muslim from the west. Our ancestor was none other than Nasredin, the son of of Yu nn an under the Yuan dynasty. (Gladney 1996:133) They simply pass over in silence that part of their origin that is from Han Chinese women. They apparently prefer to view themselves as descendants of Ar abs, Persians, or Central Asians instead of Han Chinese. Their Muslim identity is more important to them than their Chinese roots despite their obvious Chinese phenotypes produced by centuries of inter marriage with the Han. Silencing the Current Practice of Intermarriage among the Southeast Hui Unlike the Hui in the Northwest who practice strict ethno religious endogamy, intermarriage is frequent among the Hui in the Southeast where this research was carried out. Official marriage records indicate that Int ermarriage is now the statistical norm among the Hui of Bozhou. Historical research was also carried out by Ding (200 7 ) in a village of Fujian Province. This region was one of the earliest settled by Arab and Persian merchants who came to China via the se a route. Each generation of Hui families was found to have married local Chinese Han women. Furthermore, the

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132 Muslims of this area, including this particular family, the Ding family, concealed their identity as descendants of Muslim from the early years of the Qing Dynasty. When the Communist government started to implement some favorable policies toward ethnic minorities at the end of the Cultural Revolution, they suddenly rediscovered their Muslim roots. These Muslim families even claimed to be a Hui and p etitioned to restore their Hui status based on genealogical records which show that their remote ancestors were from Arabia and Persia. These Muslims of the eastern coast have through the centuries intermarried freely with the Han with no pretense of conve rsion to Islam. The only genealogical record. Their behavior is exactly like that of Han Chinese, including the eating of pork, which in other parts of Muslim China is avoided ev en by non observant Muslims. The only differentiation between the Han Chinese and the Muslims of the eastern coast is that, unlike the Han, they refrain from using pork in sacrifices to the ancestors. (Gladney 1996, Fan 2001). In the 1980s these Fujian Mu slims reclaimed their official Hui identity through State recognition. To establish their authenticity, they even went through the motions of establishing some mosques and inviting imams from elsewhere. But they have no intention of adopting Islamic practi ces. According to the imam whom I interviewed in my fieldwork, who had applied for the imam slot at a Fujian mosque, the pork eating which even non observant Muslims avoid in most parts of China, alcohol consumption is

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133 alive and well among the Hu i and other Muslims.) The imam eventually decided to Later this same imam accepted an invitation from the Inner City Mosq ue in Bozhou, where the level of observance is higher than on the coast. Even non observant Bozhou Muslims abstain from pork. Their high intermarriage rate, however, weddings. In my first term (that is, from 2002 2004), I was only invited twice to preside y investigation of official marriage records validated his shock: As seen in Table 3 2 more than 80 percent of the Hui in this community are involved in interma rriage with non Muslim Han Chinese. In search of such official marriage data, I went to the Marriage Registration Office at the Minzheng Ju ( Minzheng , literally means Civil Affairs) which documents all registered marriage cases. This bureau is the only place where a marriage can be legally registered. 5 Their records show that i n recent years, there were about 10,000 marriages registered in the bureau e ach year. The bureau archived them into volumes with 100 cases in each. Five volumes, i.e., 500 cases were randomly drawn out each year. Of all 3,500 marriage sampled during 2006 2012, only 273 (7.8%) were registered as inter ethnic marriages. But if we fo cus only on the Hui subsample of 265 marriages, 5 The right to register a marriage was released from county level down to town level for the sake of fangbian qunzhong ( for qunzhon g s convenience . Qunzhong means the common people), but resulted in registration chaos. Som e cases were not calculated due to erro r s made at registration , and thus the cost for this job went higher. Therefore the Bozhou government lately decided to retake the right and county level governments reassure its lowest level in marriage registration s ervice.

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134 a different picture emerges. Only 14% of the Hui married another Hui while 86% of them This extraordinarily high percentage of Bozhou Hui who marry Ha n exceeds by far even the informal estimates made by the imam and others who place the intermarriage rate at 30% or 40%. The discrepancy may be a product of statistical errors in the official data, or sampling errors, or phony marriage registrations by Han wanting to switch their ethnicity to Hui, though it is hard to imagine such errors producing a discrepancy of this magnitude. What is clear is that the intermarriage rate of Bozhou Hui is astronomically higher than that of the endogamous Hui of the Northw est and may be equal to that of the non observant pork eating Hui of the eastern sea coast. Of even greater interest is the higher tendency of Hui women to marry Han men than the converse. No fewer than 155 out of the 272 intermarriages (57%) involved Hui women marrying Han men. (They would have been stoned or beheaded in much of the Mideast). An imam estimated that half of the intermarriages involved Hui women (an estimate close to what the records show), but also estimated that two decades ago only 5% of the intermarriages involved Hui women. Also noteworthy is the pattern by which most Han who marry a Hui change their own ethnic identification to that of Hui at the time of marriage, but rarely undergo formal conversion to Islam. Two things should be poi nted out, however. In the first place, Han who have switched their ethnic identification to the Hui by no means receive full acceptance by the Hui. Secondly, even in the case of those who undergo a conversion ritual, very few seriously practice the religio n. Those who were born Hui will in private dismiss the converts as Han who are pretending to be Hui. But this will not be said in

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135 public. It is considered impolite to ask people if they are Han or Hui. We have already pointed out that all children from int ermarried families are declared officially by their parents to be Hui. However, almost no child from an intermarried family actively practices Islam. even private discourse. P eople recognize that they are intermarried, but they do not talk about it. The husband of my host family is a Hui. His wife was Han but is currently ethnic identity. Nobody w Coming from a person who received a college education, this answer is quite prudent. Another informant who had received a junior middle sc hool education gave me in China, the ethnic membership of a child is determined by his/her parents. If both of them are members of a minority group, the child is automatically a minority as well. If the couple belongs to different minzu, the minzu membership of the children can be determined by the minzu membership of either parent. No other minzu/ethnic membership is allowed except those of her/his parents; however, many intermarried couples whom I interviewed

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136 mistrust this policy. The assumption is that if both partners become Hui, the minzu membership of their child would have a 100 percent guarantee of being Hui. The couple and their children will then be assured of eligibility from benefits that the government now directs towards minorities. Among these are the exemption from the One Child policy, lower entrance requirements for admission to a university, and others. The general practice is to pretend that the marriage is endogamous from the outset. This recalls a warning that I received at the beginning of my research. When I told a person that I intended to study the motivations underlying intermarriage between remained silent on the issue for much of the conversation and was reluctant to discus s motives. After talking about his business and other topics, I tried to return to the previous topic of intermarriage. He handed me a cigarette and pulled out another one for himself, lit up, and said, I know you want to study this phenomenon. But I am s ure it will be very hard for you to get honest answers. People would not like to tell you the truth. And most importantly, you cannot tell which couple is intermarried and which one is not. There is no difference in external appearance. Like me, how can yo be studied. No one wants to mention this issue. After a little while, he added, We are not a typical Hui; you should go to the Northwest. They are authentic/true Hui . Fortunately, he later chang ed his attitude and became willing to tell me his personal story and to discuss his perception of intermarriage. Interestingly, he admitted that the formation of the Hui occurred largely through intermarriage. His awareness, I believe, is due to his educat ional level. Those of a lower educational level with little knowledge of history are either unaware of or indifferent to the issue of Hui origins.

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137 We have seen that in traditional Islam a non Muslim must first convert before marrying a Muslim. This rule i s followed in most Islamic areas. Among the Bozhou Hui, in contrast, neither pre marriage conversion non post marriage observance are the rule. In only one case among all the intermarried couples whom I interviewed did a religious conversion ceremony occu r at marriage. This has happened only once during the past five years in the largest Bozhou mosque. The convert is a male, a middle school teacher. His wife was a college classmate and is a colleague right now. What is interesting is that, despite the conv ersion, he refuses to change his ethnic membership from Han to Hui, though his only child is registered as a Hui. The previous imam asked his permission to speak publicly about his situation but permission was refused. The man wants to maintain a low profi le in the Muslim community and assists quietly at each Friday prayer service. Regional Differences in Collective Silence about Intermarriage Muslims from the two areas, northwestern and southeastern / eastern China, both maintain collective silence abou t intermarriage but do so with a different emphasis. The Muslims in the Northwest tend to avoid discussion of intermarriage in their past, while Muslims in the Southeast and East maintain silence about the current practice. What factors may have brought ab out this regional difference? Recall that in the Northwest intermarriage was common in the past but is avoided in the present. The Muslim immigrants were all males; the non Muslim wives were all women. Intermarriage was a demographic necessity in the foun ding generations of Chinese Islam. If Islamic law was followed, the Chinese women (not being Christians or Jews) were converted before their marriage to the Muslim immigrants; however, the Muslim population had grown sufficiently by the Qing Dynasty and th e Republic of

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138 China that intermarriage was no longer demographically necessary and the traditional rules of religious endogamy could be reinstated. In the Northwest endogamy continued to be observed, even despite the pressures placed on Muslims during the Cultural Revolution to eat pork and intermarry in the name of socialist solidarity. In other words, the only potentially embarrassing non Northwest is the intermarriage of the founding generation in the di stant past. easily get publicized 6 . Huo Da ( ) , a female Muslim writer, wrote a famous (or infamous) novel Funeral of the Muslims . The novel writes sympathetically about a non Muslim who pretended to be Muslim and married an observant Muslim woman. The apparent approval which the author gave to thi s deception offended the sensitivities of many Muslims and earned for her an avalanche of curses and death threats from many Chinese Muslims. Other critiques of the novel were directed toward mistakes made by the author concerning Islamic rituals and scrip tures. 7 But it was the approval given to intermarriage which elicited the strongest reactions from observant Muslims. Mackerras 1998; Dillon 1999; Israeli 2002; etc.) among Musl ims of the Northwest, it is best to avoid the topic of the intermarriage of the past that in fact brought their group 6 Similar exp ressions can be easily found in ( www.2muslim.com ) which is the biggest virtual 7 The typical questions are referred to: http://www.2muslim.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=402675 , and http://www.2muslim.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=393218 where she http://www.2muslim.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=63493

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139 supposed Arabian and Persian origins. The equally rea l Chinese Han element in their biological past is not emphasized. Dad, Han (paternal) grandpa, Han antagonistic resentment among the H ui. The slurs allude only to Han women being taken in rather than to Hui women marrying out. Ironically, those same quips about mixed Hua / Han origins may also be mentioned by some Hui, especially by some respectable elites, when tensions arise between th e Hui and the Han. These allusions by Hui to their mixed ancestry serve to defuse the tension by citing close biological relations between the two groups. The government actually calls on members of the Hui elite to make such public statements of biologica l unity during moments of public interethnic tensions. But on the whole the intermarriage of the past clashes with the strict endogamy of the present among Northwest Muslims. It is incompatible with their prise that the intermarriage of the past is cloaked in collective silence. In contrast, the embarrassment of the Hui of the East and Southeast focuses less on the intermarriage of the past than on their intermarriage practices in the present. They cannot marshal religious justifications for their current practices. They simply avoid discussion of the topic. If someone asks: was your wife or husband born Hui, a typical The Muslims of the Northwest have no such d ilemma with their current strictly endogamous marital practices. They simply adhere to the strict ethno religious endogamy that emerged historically during the Qing Dynasty and that is more in line

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140 with classic Islamic tradition. For the Muslims in the eas t and southeast, in contrast, it is the intermarriage of the present, rather than of the past, that causes most embarrassment. They are often embarrassed in the presence of Hui from the s so strong that many eastern and southeastern Hui are reluctant to enter into contact with the In short, each group of Muslims maintains silence about the matters that embarrass them. But it is clear that previously discussed theories concerning the role of State hegemony in motivating selective historical silence have little relevance to the situation of Chinese Muslims. They maintain silence on intermarriage, not because of governmental pressure, but because of dyna mics internal to the Muslim groups. In this sense the forces behind Hui silence on intermarriage are less like the governmental power of the Pinochet government or the RPF government which opportunistically suppressed certain memories for political reasons . It is instead similar to the collective forces that have led the inhabitants of Hiroshima to maintain silence on their traumatic past. Selective memory in such cases, including that of the Hui, is a product of collective choice, not of governmental manip ulation. Table 3 1 : Frequency of intermarriages in Lanzhou Period of marriage Intermarriages Total marriages Percent of intermarriages 1949 1959 0 155 0.00 1960 1969 3 317 0.94 1970 1979 3 345 0.86 1980 1989 6 546 1.10 1990 2001 4 382 1.05 Total 16 1,745 0.92 Source: adapted from Zang, 2005

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141 Table 3 2: Marriage samples of Qiaocheng District, 2006 2012 * Year Sample Total Intermarriage Total endogamy Other marriages** 2012 500 41 5 2 2011 500 36 6 1 2010 500 39 5 2009 500 43 4 2 2008 500 38 5 1 2007 500 41 6 2 2006 500 35 7 Total 3500 273*** 38 8 Note: * Sources: Qiaocheng District Marriage Registration Office ** Except for one case registered in 2007 of a marriage between a Han and a whereas the ID card showed that the person was actually Han. *** The number of bona fide intermarriage between a Hui and a Han is 265, if th e seven faked intermarriage cases and the one case non Hui intermarriage are excluded. Figure 3 1: Population distribution of the Muslim Hui (2000) Source : Based on the fifth national census data (2000). One point indicates 1000 people. http://www.2muslim.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=292397

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142 CHAPTER 4 MOTIVATIONS OF INTERMARRIAGE AND MATE SELECTION C hapter 3 gave an overview of the history of intermarriage among Chinese Muslims and its differential importance in different regions of China . This chapter will turn to an ethnographic discussion of the stated motives and step by step procedures steps that bring about an intermarriage. Motivations Char (1977) has wel l summarized the motivations behind intercultural marriage, including love, chance and availability, the need to be different, practical reasons, problems related to the Oedipus Complex, parental control, beliefs about other cultures, feelings of superiori ty and inferiority, sentiments of aggression toward another race, idealism, and sadomasochistic reasons. However, in practice, a particular act of intermarriage may be motivated by a combination of several reasons. And the reasons may change over time in t he course of a relationship. For example, the intermarriage of one of my interviewees, Leo, cannot be said to have been driven by any single reason. The principal reason, at least the stated reason, that his Han father in law allowed his daughter to marry a Hui was the bullying to which marriages as a vehicle for support against such bullying. After marrying his two daughters out to Hui men and taking in a Hui woman as a wife for h is only son, he whose reputation is one of ethnic solidarity and aggressiveness. As a result, his m ore. His decision to have his fami ly intermarry is at

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143 least partially based on factors such as feelings of inferiority, belief about other cultures, the need to be different, and parental control . The issue of availability is also one of the operative factors. Economic factors also enter into play . business undertakings. Leo recently became successful in the medicine business and shared his business secrets with his H an father in law. Now his father in law is the biggest provider i n Bozhou of a type of traditional Chinese medicinal substance. There were obvious economic dimensions or at least consequences to the decision to intermarry his children with Hui. There are also spatial temporal factors that influence the rate of Hui / H an intermarriage. As already pointed out the intermarriage rate in the Northwest is apparently lower than that in the Southeast. In discussing motives for intermarriage, we must remind ourselves that romantic sentiments, which are now a precondition even in China, have not been the traditional (Gordon 1964:58) is largely true today. But in traditi onal societies organized around unilineal clans, a marriage was first and foremost a contract between two kin groups. In this light the motivations behind Hui / Han intermarriage must be analyzed both individually and socially. Individual motives and soci al pressures can interact. It was no mystery that intermarriage rates plummeted in northwest China during the Qing dynasty, characterized by tense ethnic relationship ( C hapter 3). In the Southeast, in hemselves from Manchu governmental

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144 persecution (Gladney 1996, Fan 2001, etc.). In that light intermarriage rates soared. Intermarriage rates on the southeast coast reached as high as 90 percent (Ding 2007), as Hui struggled to hide their ethnic identity. But the mate selection was not spreading but constrained to a certain group of people (Ding 2007). In short, The Hui of the Southeast reacted differently from those of the Northwest to tense ethnic relationships. In both cases, however, the Hui community w as responding to sociopolitical pressures in their marriage choices. The issue of romantic love played a secondary role within constraints set by sociopolitical variables. In a similar vein intermarriage rate may increase when social mobility increases in exogamous marri ag questionable. Exoga my is a rule that obliges people to marry outside of a group. Hui and Han are not obliged to marry each other. A Hui / Han marriage is intermarriage, but intergroup contact s and intermarriage is well taken. some people, confronted in the main by similar factors, will intermarry while others do into play in specific individual choices (Gordon 1964:58). For example, the head of the DACM in the BJS, Mr. Yufu, publicly announced that he will never marry his daughter to a Han man. His personal philosophy determines his stance on this matter and incl ines him to encourage fellow Muslims not to harm the ethnic solidarity of the Hui by intermarriage. He feels a personal concern

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145 for, and personal pride in, religiosity, ethnicity, and ethnic solidarity. In forging his attitude, his personal preferences in this matter override societal pressure in the in law to marry his daughters out to Hui men was also based on idiosyncratic personal considerations. Conditions of heavy sociopolitical pressure can drive personal factors into the background. Personal factors in marital choice can become more important in the absence of strong external pressures. There is a parallel in the literature on Jewish intermarriage. In discussing Jewish intermarriage, which is also forbidden in Judaism, but which was becoming strong among American Jews, Resnick (1933) classified intermarriage into four types (See Gordon 1964:59): (1) The emancipated person who has freed himself from the Jewish religious influence. (2) The rebellious person who intermarries in order to remove his identity as a Jew. (3) The detached person who has broken away from the Jewish primary group, resulting in a weakening of the old standards opposing intermarriage. (4) The adventurous person who does not care about the identity of his spouse while regarding marriage as a new experience. Another scholar, Slotkin (1942) added four other types (See Gordon ibid ): (1) The unorganized or demoralized person. His nonconformity is expressed through intermarriage. (2) The promiscuous person who develops affection for a person outside his own religious group. (3) The marginal person who intermarries in order to raise his status or that of his children to that of the majority 1 group. 1 This is against the situation of Hui Han intermarriage.

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146 (4) The acculturated person whose newly acquired standards ca use him to believe that there is no one in the Jewish group who is any longer acceptable to him and who, as a consequence, intermarries. It is eas y to find variants of intermarriage in Bozhou that correspond to all of the types listed by Resnick, Slotkin, and Char. In the following section, I will give case studies of specific intermarriages that either support or deviate from the above scholarly analyses. I will also give comparative statistics gathered by other researchers in Lanzhou, a Muslim concentrat ed city with a very low intermarriage rate. Criteria of Mate Selection In his survey research in Lanzhou , Zang tested two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 was: The Han are less likely than the Hui to support endogamy; and Hypothes is 2: The Hui Han differences in perceptions about intermarriage will disappear if we control for socio economic status. Treating endogamy as the dependent variable (as well as marital stability), ten associations were predicted between: (1) ethnicity and endogamy, (2) ethnicity and marital stability, (3) religion and endogamy, (4) cultures and endogamy, (5) lifestyles and endogamy, (6) parental disapproval and endogamy, (7) community opposition and endogamy, (8) contact and endogamy, (9) socio economic sta tus and endogamy, and (10) educational attainment and endogamy. Other independent variables include: age, gender, married, income, cadre status, profession, state worker, u r ban status, education, and Hui ethnicity. In his examination of the above factors, Zang found that, even when socioeconomic status is controlled, 1) Hui men are more likely than their Han counterparts to assert that in group marriages are more solid than out group marriages; 2) the Hui are more likely than the Han to use religious belie fs to explain endogamy;

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147 and 3) Hui cadres are less likely than the Han counterparts to attribute endogamy to to intermarriage if they are at the same level of soci o The impact of Ethnicity When Socio economic Status is Controlled These patterns are similar to those of Bozhou. The common perception there is that if intermarriage is discouraged by parents or the community, the causal factors are ethnicity and religion. Mr. Bin , a Hui man who is living close to BJS and has three children firmly states that he will never allow his daughters to marry a non Muslim man. His concern is for ethnic solidarity rather than religion. Without conversion, his family will not accept a man or woman. All of the xiangqin , a kind of arranged blind date by parents or friends, for his son are with Hui families. For the Hui who reject intermarriage, their ethnicity is on the whole more important to them than Islamic religion and the core element in Hui identification is abstention from pork. year old boy, married a Hui girl from Henan province. Neither family observes Islam to any degree. The boy has in fact never been to a mosque . The wedding was totally secular. No imam was invited to preside over the wedding. At the same time, his family insists that they are a typical Hui family because they do not eat pork. They considered the wedding ceremony to be a e absence of a religious element, because both bride and groom ar e from traditional Hui famil ies . Religious observance was not part of the calculus. Abstention from pork has become the core symbol of loyalty to Hui ethnicity (rather than abstention from al cohol or praying at a mosque). director of the Bureau of Minzu and Religions of B ozhou, a Hui cadre, was not

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148 , his son was killed in a street battle by a young Uyghur man involved in the medicine business in Bozhou. He was enraged that the Uyghur killer was not tried immediately and convicted of murder in Bozhou but was simply deported to Xinjiang Autonomous Regi on. T wo years later , that same Uyghur man return ed to Bozhou . As an old cadre (obedient to governmental policy and state law) towards militant Uyghur Muslims of the far Northwest is qui te lenient . When one f rom their group is accused of a crime in Bozhou, the Uyghur maneuver to extradite the suspect to X injiang Autonomous Region (their homeland) rather than have him tried locally. Lifestyle Factor Mr. B an, a Hui cadre in the CLS commun ity, holds similar laissez faire attitudes toward inter marriage. In his interview, he clearly states that lifestyle issues particularly Hui pork abstention rules -rather than other reasons hinder the intermarriage of the prohibit us from eating pork, while the Han and their relatives usually eat pork. They may not do that in front of you, but will seek out the chance to do that at all times , especially when they meet Han friends, classmates, or You cannot say who is right or who is difference between the two ethnic groups. Nowadays Hui Han marriage is very With his permission his son married a typical They did not invite an imam to p reside over it, but no pork was served for the Hui friends

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149 and relatives, although alcohol drinking was se r ved at each table. Abstention from pork has become the core symbol, for some the only symbol, of Hui ethnicity. The Islamic commandment to avoid alco hol is routinely ignored, with no sense of betrayal to Hui ethnicity. There appears to be no exception to the tradition that a Han who marries a Hui must comply with the pork taboo. As indicated by Zang, the Hui are more likely than the Han to agree that such cultural differences between ethnic groups lead to a reluctance does not specify concrete examples of lifestyle. His statistic s nearly 58 percent more likely than the Han to argue that endogamy is caused by mentioned more frequently than other factors by Bozhou Hui in explaining their reluctance to marry s to the chairman of a tribunal, Mr. T o ng, who was born a Han but who switched his ethnic identity to Hui when he married a Hui woman 20 years ago. He obviously knows what it means to hold a H ui ethnic identification (to be discussed in C hapter 9) . However, he still sees himself as a Han rather than a Hui. He adheres to the pork prohibition but not to the alcohol prohibition. Most Hui in fact ignore the alcohol taboo. One interesting point i s that relatives from pork dishes for him when he visits her family. She keeps a separate bowl and chopsticks for pork eaters . ( I am not sure whether she does the same thing for other Han relatives.) The reason for her behavior, I assume, is because Mr. T o ng has se r ved

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150 in 2 as a Hui, though he h as held a Hui ethnic identification for many years. Socioeconomic Status has an Impact. disapproval, different religious beliefs and different lifestyles as three major barrie rs to identifies religious belief and ethnic traditions as the major barriers, the principal causes of parental disapproval. (Zang 2005, Jaschok & Shui 2000). However, he concludes from analysis of his data that fade away with socio relate to comparatively lower socio economic status of the Hui? research site, are reportedly of lower socio economic status than the Han. A different result might emerge if their relative socio economic status were reversed. Th The Hui in Bozhou own many important factories. For example, the largest industry producing medicine, Xie h e c heng ( ), is owned by a Hui man; the biggest loca l chain department stores, Gaishengxiang ( ) and the biggest medical chain department stores, Gaifuxiang ( ) are run by a Hui clan. Bozhou is the biggest traditional Chinese medicine market in China, with more than 100,000 people frequenting the market 2 Ordinary Chinese people view all people who hold a position in all state run administrative organizations, including law and congress departments, as Guan ( ), important employees in government, a title that connotes a higher social status.

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151 nation on the back of camel s ability to do business. When Mr. Wood Yuan , not including other properties such as a restaurant and a hotel, were confiscated. Two million Yuan in 1990 was about $418,147.61 at the going exchange rate (1:4.783), while the average annual per capita income of that period was only 310 Yuan , that is , $64.81. The property confiscated from this Hui individua l roughly equaled the annual income of 6,451 individuals. His family was the first to become wealthy in Bozhou when the economic hui zuo shengyi know hou are on the whole wealthier than the Han. One can hardly attribute their criticism of intermarriage to presumably lower economic standing. Of all 151 intermarried couples whom I interviewed, in 93 cases (i.e., 62%) the man and the woman had approximate ly equivalent income at marriage. Economic status may play an important role in spouse selection in inter marriage. Of 86 Hui male Han female marriages, 51 (55%) had similar economic status; of all 65 intermarriages in which the female was a Hui, 42 (45%) w ere of approximately similar economic status at marriage. is much higher than vs. 14 % ). A male is more likely than a female to intermarry with someone po orer. This differs, however, by ethnicity. From Table 4 1, we can see that Han women are more involved in hypergamy -than the Hui women (55% vs. 46%) , but the disparity is not very large. In contrast , the percentage of Han women marrying down is higher than that of the Hui women (71%

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152 vs. 29%). It may indicate the attractiveness of Hui identity for a Han family. Hui women may have more options than Han women for choosing a wealthier spouse. ion. On the whole, equal economic status is a major condition for intermarriage. There is a Chinese saying, men dang hu dui ( ) , similar socio economic status is highly expected in a marriage. Some 59% of Han women and 65% of Hui women are engaged in an equal status marriage. Hypergamy for Han women is just 23%, and for Hui women just 26%. The difference is not significant. In contrast women in the two groups differ in terms of hypogamy, marrying someone poorer. Only 9% of Hui women marry someone poorer, whereas the corresponding percentage of Han women is nearly double that (17%). There are several possible explanations for this inter ethnic female disparity: 1) the achievement of Hui minority status may be more important for Han women than finding some one at or above their economic level; 2) cultural factors may prevent Hui women from marrying men of lower economic status; 3) a higher socio economic status on the part of Han men may not be that important for Hui women. On the whole, equal economic statu s is the statistical norm in both groups. Economic equality seems more important to Hui women than to Han women. Han women in contrast may be willing to sacrifice short term economics for the long term benefits that will go to their children because of mi nority status. To some extent, it seems the existence of a large percentage of equal status attitudes to intermarriage when socio economic variables are controlled. My findings in Bozhou are compatible with this conclusion. But the causal relation can be reversed.

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153 The weakening of ethno religious differences seems to elevate the power of socio economic variables in determining attitudes to intermarriage. However, there a re numerous causal factors in the equation that preclude neat causal statements: religious or ethnic variables, variables such as age, gender, social (cadre) status, and ultimately, the growing importance of romantic affection in marital choices, all crea te explanatory ambiguity. We will discuss those factors case by case by looking at specific marriages later in this chapter. In my findings, there is an apparent trend for young people to emphasize romantic love rather than other factors as their prime consideration for marriage, while old er people continue to stress the importance of ethnic and religious factors in Hui marriages. For example, the daughter of Ms. S itoo, Ms. Yang ignored all objections from he r family to marry a Han man, a cadre who held a position in the local government. As a traditional Hui, her mother objected to the marriage. After several with her lover or completely break off with her birth family. At the age of 20 in 2007, Ms. Yang g o t marri ed and her husband still maintain ed his Han ethnic status. Ms. S ito o herself had been married through contacts made by her father , an observant Muslim. It was an ar ranged marriage. Her father established the criteria from the very beginning : her suitor had to be a Huizu. She agreed. Her parents chose for her a young Hui man whose father was a business colleague of her own father. They finally married in 1986. Unlike their parents, neither Ms. Sitoo nor her husband visits the mosque with any frequency.

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154 to be based primarily on romantic love either . Constant business contacts on the one hand, and his father in law intentional steps for a n arranged marriage, motivated Leo and his wife to establish a family in 1997. Older Hui are more conservative concerning marriage arrangements while younger Hui are more open to new modes. In traditional Chinese culture, mention of the discussing marriage was likely to cause embarrassment. Marriage was a private social contract between two families to legally produce offspring. It was surrounded by discreet silence both for reasons of privacy and for prevailing cultural norms concernin g shame. Take, for example the article Qie Du Ji ( ), which literally means Stories about Study ing through S tealing W ays , written by Lin Haiyin ( ), a famous When this article, however, was was deleted. Love is a sensitive topic for many people and is not mentioned in readings for children. 3 Marry a Right Man or a Rich Man? The younger generation of Chinese now discusses love openly and frequently. rich man, to marry a man who loves you rather than a man whom you love, to marry a men dang h u dui ( , a man with close socioeconomic status) or marry for 3 See the editorial authored by Pan Caifu, http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2014/0313/c1053 24622722.html

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155 ethnicity rarely make their way into discussions thereof. We should not, however, oversimplify and assume that romance is the only factor. The decisions actually made with respect to marriage hinge around multiple factors, including physical attractiveness, wealth, and personality. Research in other parts of th e world has physical attractiveness. Females are more likely to be concerned about the wealth or socio economic status of males (Buss 1989, Feingold 1992, Sprecher et al 1994, Shackelford et al 2005 , Furnham 2009 etc.) . Women in Bozhou have similar preferences. However, as Table 4 1 illustrates, economic hypogamy by Han women is frequent, particularly in cases of intermarriage. This goes against the general trend of a female preference for hypergamy. The higher rate of women who marry poorer men may be related not only to patterns of parental marriage arrangement but also to romantic love. In some cases women have shown themselves to be more sentimental, more likely to fall in love without consideri ng economic or social factors. Some researchers have even found that, when economic factors are controlled for, women may be as equally inclined as males to take into account the physical attractiveness of a potential spouse (Moore 2006/2010). This, however, is not always the case . In recent decade s in China , high pressure on males to accumulate wealth before marriage leads to the breakup of many romances. Sometimes the absence of male wealth cuts off any further contact after a blind date. In the mea ntime, especially in metropolitan cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, etc., wom e n usually expect males to hav e chezi, fangzi, piaozi (

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156 , a car, a condo, and cash) already in hand by the time of the first date. Otherwise there will be no further contact. There is a popular TV show in China, Fei Cheng Wu Rao ( ) would prefer to be will discuss these matters further in the chapter on Marriage Transactions. Fear of remaining unmarried moti vates Shanhun Marriage marriage. Shanhun , in Chinese , means blitz marriage (Kurzban & Weeden 2005). The age of 30 is viewed in China as the critical watershed age for a woman, beyond which marriage will be difficult. If they cannot successfully find a Mr. Right as that age approaches, they may date a man for a brief period of time and rush into a marriage. Leta Hong Fincher has pointed out that the Chinese State, concerned with the increasingly imbalanced sex ratio which has led to a shortage of women, has made 4 State controlled media have repeatedly told women over the last seven years that if they are unwed by the age of 27, they will be leftover and unwanted. Despite weaknesses in much of her analysis, the fact is that women do feel strong public press ure to marry by a certain age. Ironically, current laws forbid women from marrying before the age of 20. This leaves women in a dilemma . 4 See: http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/05/01/eight questions leta hong fincher leftover women/ , http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/q a leta hong fincher on leftover women/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 etc.

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157 Other research (Zhang Yi, 2013) based on data from the sixth national census dimensions. In the first place industrialization and modernization in general lead to a e likely to be living in towns, whereas the more numerous unwed males are more likely to be living in rural areas. Both geographical and social separation makes it difficult to create links between the two. another barrier to matching. Barring extraordinary wealth on the part of a man, it is unacceptable for most women to marry a man of lower educational achievement. ou. A well educated man in the city has a much easier time finding an acceptable spouse than a well educated woman. It is not only the woman who would be embarrassed by an educational mismatch. Given traditional Chinese cultural norms a man could comfortab ly marry a woman with less money or a lower education. But he might feel socially embarrassed in marrying a better educated woman or one with a higher salary. The willingness or even preference by women to marry up economically and educationally creates a dilemma for young men in their early 20s just beginning their career. The male dilemma is exacerbated by the tendency of elderly men in a higher socioeconomic status to pursue younger, prett ier girls rather than women of their own age. A Han girl whom I met in Bozhou had been trapped in this dilemma for several years. In appearance she is attractive, graceful, and elegant. She was born in 1980 and

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158 job in Beijing and worked there for two years. At last she decided to come back home because she could not obtain a Beijing Hukou (residence permit) which is essential in Chinese life. She worked in several positions in companies in Bozhou, including the largest medical com pany. Her job evaluations were excellent, until her boss, the highest representative of the company in Bozhou, sexually harassed her in an attempt to take her as his mistress. She could not accept that and left the company. She does not have any prejudice or stereotyped concept about ethnicity or religion. But it is very hard for her to find a suitable partner. Bozhou is not only a small city but also one that is driven by business. Bozhou men begin working at an early age. Few of them seek a college educ ation. Furthermore, those men who receive higher education prefer not to come back to Bozhou. When they do come back, they are usually already married. The woman in question refuses to accept a xiangqin , a blind date with someone who is introduced by her friends or relatives. She meets few people in her job. She is as undesirable in Chinese culture . Furthermore available men of her age and socioeconomic status would prefer to pursue a younger, physically more attractive woman. Although there is no specific data on the matter, most older unmarried women are well educated. In contrast well educated and available single men are, as it were, a scarce resource. One might incorrectly assume that, with the imbalanced sex ratio prevailing in China, Chinese women would have their choice in marriage. This is not the

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159 case with women who pursue a college or higher education. Particularly, a woman with a doctor degree is often ba nteringly called the third gender beyond male and female. Marriage without Legal Documents Many young people are entering into marriage at an earlier age than is legally permitted, without obtaining the legal documents. An officer in the Marriage Registra tion Office told me a story. One day a lady came to his office and asked him whether she could register to marry . He asked her to present her ID card and hukou ben (household registration). It showed that she was 19 years old, which is lower than the legal marriage age. He had to tell her that she had not reached the legal age for marriage and had to wait for one more year. Since the documents she brought with her showed that her intended husband was also 20, it meant that they would have to wait for at lea st three years to register their marriage, because the legal marriage age for men is 22. What is noteworthy is that the young lady was holding a young boy in her arm who was at least two year s old . B , it appeared that the young lady had enter ed into marriage at the age of 17 or younger. . His story corresponded to my observations. Around half of young people were entering into their first marriage below the legal age. This is particularly true of youn g people, male and female, who discontinued their education after junior middle school. They do not want to stay at home playing online games or simply dating each other until they reach the marriage age set by the State. They follow their hormones rather than marital virginity. Young teenagers or people in their early 20s are eager to explore sex. A doctor in the largest state hospital in Bozhou told me that abortion requests surge from August to October each year, and most of them are from teenagers ranging in age from 14 to 17 (the age range of junior middle school to

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160 early senior middle school in China). Sometimes they come to the hospital in a middle school uniform . Sometimes several male teenagers may compete to pay the abortion fee. To sum up , we can see how the criteria of mate selection have shifted from traditional emphasis on parental control and ethnic religious factors, to broader variables including socioeconomic status, romantic love, education, personality, etc . Societal factors such as ethnicity and religion are fading in importance. Personal factors are becoming increasingly important. Initial Contact We will now examine how young people make initial contacts before marriage . Initial contact for marriage can occur in four settings: school, work, social venues, and online. Each of these has several sub categories. I will discuss these settings with respect to their relevance to intermarriage. Schooling School is not only the most common setting for meeting po tential spouses; it is also the socially most acceptable. One of the traditional Chinese dreams of romantic love is called Qingmei Zhuma ( , which refers to male female friendships made during childhood while playing games together ) where extended schooling is so important, love of Qingmei Zhuma usually takes the form of classmate relationships. Compulsory 9 year education is now well implemented around the country. School based romance is a major stimulus for intermarriage by the Hu i. Within the

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161 in school appear to be increasingly important as a stimulus for intermarriage. Of all 151 intermarriage cases in my interviews, nearly one out of five b egan in school. Couples under the age of 40 have a higher percentage of school initiated encounters than those in older cohorts. For example, Mr. Moore , a Han, a chemistry teacher in a private school, met his Hui wife in college. He was not from Bozhou but from Chaohu County in the religious concern , he was exact ly in the same situation. His sister and his Han brother i n law met in coll e ge. His brother in law migrated to Bozhou as well. But he was not required to convert to Islam. religion). S ito g couple became sweethearts in ethnic prejudices and married her Han husband. Not e the United States. There are few electives in Ch ina, particularly before college. Students are with the same classmates in almost every course. Furthermore several students (sometimes up to eight) share the same dormitory for three or four years after middle school. They have to elect classmates as moni tors and other assistants from the student body, which endows those elected with some power. Most activities, whether inside or outside the classroom, are organized on the basis of the whole class. This provides abundant opportunities for students to devel op intimate relationship that can lead to marriage.

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162 School can be the context for relationships between students in different classes as well. In a comparatively enclosed environment, even students in different grades or classes can get to know each other . For example, Mr. Wudao and his wife (a Han woman originally) is a case in point. He is three years older than his wife. Both of them are from the same school. They met each other in school and later developed a deeper relationship as colleagues in busine ss. Occupational Settings Worksites are also venues for the establishment of relationships between future spouses. This can happen not only when people are employed in the same working units but also when they collaborate in commercial activities. They ca n also relocate to the same economically developed cities as migrant workers ( dagong , , or peasant/farmer workers). Fang met his wife while they both worked in a local bank. Having the s ame well paid occupation brought the two young people together quite easily. Although Fang is Hui girl, smiled while tell ing their love stories. Their relationship developed very quickly. Within one year, the parents on both sides met each other and the two young people got engaged. They got married on the same da te as that of their first meeting. Mr. Guan and his Hui McDonald . Mr. Guan had falsely reported his age as 18 years old when he joined the army at his real age of 16. Therefore he was still very young when he retired from the military two years later, that is, at age 1 8. He did not want to take a serious job at that moment. Once he went to the local McDonald and saw a charming girl so he decided

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163 to apply for a job there and was lucky enough to get the job . When they started to date each other seriously, Mr. Guan learned that the girl was from a Hui family. He felt some initial hesitation; he knew that he could not eat pork at home if they were married . That was the only barrier between the two of them and between the two families as well. They finally got married when he was 19 , i.e. three years below the legal marriage age . Shortly before the wedding both of them resigned from McDonald . Now Mr. Guan has taken another job while his wife reports that she i s happy to be a full time housewife. As we discussed before, the intermarriage of Mr. Leo with his wife, Red , occurred as a result of their working together in the medical business. s father was intent on securing a Hui spouse for his daughter. This f acilitated their decision to get married. Social settings introductions; blind dates organized by parents, relatives, friends, or teachers; introduction through parental social networ ks, social activities such as volunteer activities or religious festivals; and parties with friends. amateurs. By professional I refer to Hunyin Jieshao Suo ( , i.e. taking it as a serious business to introduce two individuals to each other ) . By amateur matchmakers I refer to the Gong h ui ( , W orkers U nion, a type of clubhouse that can be found in each state owned working unit). These locales are often use d as venues to introduce young employees in the working unit to each other for purposes of dating and eventual marriage. The Gong h ui is now losing its matchmaker function because there are fewer and fewer people still working in state owned companies as a result of the prosperous

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164 development of the private economy and the collapse of the collective economy. Professional matchmaker s have been prominent since the 1990s. They usually had an office in a community and a dossier of information about men or women who were seeking spouses. Information is posted on a blackboard each day. As more modern technologies of matchmak ing emerge, this type of blackboard advertisement is now either disappearing or is being technologically upgraded, such as virtual lists. (This will be discussed in the following section). Many Chinese women are eager to play the role of matchmaker. In traditional Chinese culture a person who successfully motivates two people to marry is considered both virtuous and meritorious. In the course of my research, more than one woman volunteered to introduce me to some girls, including to some observant Muslim girls . Muslim men would make the same offer to me. As a matter of fact, a very famous Muslim scholar who was an Imam and now has emigrated to th e United States asked me twice whether I was married. If not he had some Muslim girls to whom he wished to introduce me. The girls to whom he tried to introduce me were well educated, one of them being an associate professor who was in hard for them to find a learned that I was not available, he asked me if I knew any educated and available Muslim men to introduce to these educated women. Other matchmaking occasions can occur during business transactions , or during parties with such as a Karaoke party, at a dinner table, during volunteer activities, neighborhood events, and some traditional secular or religious festivals. For came about through contact in the course of business, while marriage came

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165 about through an introduction to his sister. marriage came from an introduction made by his middle school teacher. Mr. Fortune met his future wife through a middle Hassam met his wife during a dinner party; t hey decided to stay around for a Karaoke party after the dinner. Young people nowadays, whether Muslim or non Muslim, are more likely to me et prospective spouses on their own rather than through an introduction. Despite this, local custom requires the service of a matchmaker at a wedding ceremony (to be discussed in Chapter 6 ) . Most Muslim marriages in the past came about through thi rd party introductions. On line introductions On line introductions via the internet are a recent phenomenon. Since it is based on the developments of high technology and media, it is alien to most people in the older generation, whereas young people are totally comfortable meeting people on line. Through efforts of the one female imam in Bozhou, Imam Mo Mosque that is attached to the CLS, a QQ group for volunteer s emerged in 2011 based on the platform run by the biggest instant messaging s ystem in China. Many young Muslims have applied to join. The members of the QQ group now number 190, and most of them are Muslims. Imam Mo also established another QQ group, the Bozhou Muslims, which has 140 members. The function of both of these online gr oups is communication and the organization of activit ies among Muslims as well as for contact between unwed young people. Some members end up dating each other when they get acquaint ed during activities. I have not yet heard of any marriages that have occu rred through this vehicle.

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166 Both QQ instant message exchanging groups are attached to the virtual community that is built on the biggest Islamic cyber community in China , Zhongmuwang ( ) . (This will be further discussed in C hapter 7) . In short, such vehicles can provide many young Muslims a special space in which to get to know each other. They can result in dates between young males and females. Some Muslim and Islamic organizations, in fact, also post xiangqin (blind date) information on those platforms. to date each other. Because of the small local Muslim population, non Muslim vir tual communities are of little relevance to them. In contrast this kind of Islamic virtual dating platform provides unwed Muslims a valuable chance to meet each other in a manner that defies the imagination of elderly Muslims. This new manner of dating, h owever, has yet to win widespread approval from the parents of young Muslims. Many parents view it as bu kaopu (unreliable). They continue to prefer traditional methods based on direct contact. Traditionally, when a man or woman was recommended by someone but before the young man and woman had met, relatives from one of the families would arrange to visit the household of the other. Usually, those relatives were women. They would ask questions and make observations and then provide the other family with de tailed information as well as suggestions. In that context the visitors were treated very well. household less important ; b ut the practice has not yet been complete ly abandone d. Either relatives or the matchmakers that are subsequently approached will be asked to make such a visit.

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167 A date can also be arranged by a professional dating website, such as zhenai.com, jiayuan.com, 0019.com, baihe.com, etc. Some of these websites are cooperating with the most popular TV dating shows on TV stations in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Given that public displays of individualism are now widely accepted i n any young individuals thoroughly enjoy standing on a stage and being showered with attention and applause. However, that kind of show is largely directed to urban people. When I asked some of my less urbane contacts whether they watched such shows on TV, many of them said yes. When I asked them whether they would participat e , m that ha s no truth behind it. The aggressive comments of many girls on such shows handle i man replied to me smiling. The value system displayed on the show not only to be good looking. He also has to demonstrate that he possesses the three ondo, a car, and cash. The Role of Matchmaker/Go between The role of matchmakers in bri ng ing two young individuals to marriage is still very important. The obtaining of matchmaker services is in fact a must in a marriage in Bozhou. Matchmaker s , usually ca lled mei ren ( ) or mei hong ( ) in Bozhou, are those who are invited to establish a formal premarital contact of two individuals, to encourage both sides including the two families to enter an engagement, and finally to witness the wedding. In Bozhou, even couples w ho met on their own have to provide matchmakers at the moment of engagement. Usually, four meiren, so

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168 in the process from engagement to wedding ceremony. The major functions of the meiren include: 1) connecting the two individuals and their families; 2) negotiating dowry and bride price between the two families; 3) adjusting and negotiating the relations between the two families if some disagreements occur; 4) arranging and witnessing the formal engage ment ceremony; and 5) witnessing the wedding ceremony. The matchmaker has to ensure the fulfillment of all cultural requirements surrounding a marriage. The marriage cases mentioned earlier required matchmakers, whether for the bride or the groom , and whe ther the couple were under or above the legal marriage age. A marriage without a legal document but supervised by al and socially accept able. On the other hand, a marriage without matchmakers could cause gossip in the community, even when the marriage may already be legally approved. marriage without orders from parents or arrangements from matchmakers but through peeking through a hole or eloping by crossing walls should be disdained by parents and 5 More detail s about the matchmaker in Bozhou will be discussed in C hapter 5 , the marriage transaction. Decision Making We shall now examine how the status of women can be manifested through their role in marriage, espec ially at the crucial decision making phase. In that regard it is useful to distinguish between different historical periods. 5 Original text: ·

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169 Difference before and after 1990 As mentioned earlier the younger generation is more likely to meet each other on their own and to search for romantic love rather than to accept a parental arrangement. Most of the post 1990 marriages on which I gathered information were determined by the couple themselves. The pre 1990 marriages were for the most part arranged by parents. Of the 15 1 intermarriages on which I collected information, 47 of them took place before 1990 and the remainder after 1990 . Of the 47 pre 1990 cases, 32 were arranged by parents. This means that only 32% (15 decisions. Interest ingly those older individuals who had made their own marriage decisions were in anomalous situation: children of single parents (7) from different socio economic strata (5), possessing unusually strong influence within the household (2), or motivated by r eligious reason s (1). Additionally, 13 of these 15 Han spouses from single female parent families, and their socioeconomic status at marriage was comparatively lower th an that of their spouses. The marriages after 1990 have a significantly different profile. Of all 104 intermarriages that occurred after 1990, 71 (68%) of them were decided by the young people themselves and only 33 by their parents. The percentages are a lmost exactly reversed with relation to the earlier marriages. However, most of those 71 marriage decisions, though entered into by the young couple, did involve negotiation, agreement, and compromise between new couples and their parents. Only a few of th ose marriages were decided without agreement or despite disagreement by their parents. The remaining one third of the younger couples who went through parents, matchmakers, or

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170 some third party procedure had probably not had opportunity for ample contact wi th potential spouses. In such cases parental decisions will play a heavier role. Socio economic factors, such as the inability of most young people to pay for their wedding, may also have played a role. Decision Making in Hui Families Marriage decisions in Hui families are often influenced by ethnic and/or religious considerations. This derives from both internal family identity issues and from external community pressure. Green is a Hui girl. She was not told by her father that she must marry only a Hui man until she reached adult hood . Despite this insistence her family has been almost totally secular, except, for the pork taboo. Her father knows nothing about other food taboos (dog meat, donkey meat, etc.). He drinks alcohol , though he is aware of the pr ohibition . Green told me that she never recalled her father even showing her the location of the mosque. But she has been to the Inner City M osque because some classmates lived near that mosque and she went to visit their families. But as an adult she has never visited a mosque. Green met her husband in a restaurant. Her husband is a government employee. fanju ( , meal invitation, which literally , with proud smil es interested in him at the when talking about that. After the dinner they exchanged phone numbers and started to date.

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171 After about 8 months, she decided to marry her bo yfriend. She told her parents one night. Her father asked her several things about the boy, including his age, his job, his hometown, his educational level, his minzu , and the feeling of the girl towards the boy. Since the boy had a stable job, her father had little to say. But he did make one father agreed to meet minded Hui , Green said. The boy obviously left a very good impression on Gree agreed for their daughter to marry a Han . Shortly after that, in the spring of 2009, Green got married at the age of 21 while her husband was 22. r of dating, he knew it was time to consider cap able lady ( neng gan de nü ren ). His mother wa s actually maintaining the family through the beef business before fenjia (division of the household) . She is also a well kn own traditional Chinese medical doctor and very good at cur ing massaging acupuncture points. But she never accepts payment from patients except some gifts like fruits or milk. Therefore, she has a great reputation in the neighbo rhood. And she is also a domin ant person. As a result, Leo acquired a passive personality. The mother did not say anything when Leo mentioned Red . She just asked Leo to bring Red t o her. After about half an hour of private conversation, she agreed to the marriage. to be a strict Muslim family, as none of them currently goes to the mosque, they still comply with the pork taboo. In this case,

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172 thou gh the couple met and dated on their own, the marriage decision was formally Red told me , the most important rule r k taboo. So far, Red has f aithfully followed the taboo at home and her mother in law never criticizes her on that account. Red said that her mother in we are a Hui family. We cannot bear any gossip ( about pork eating ) behind our back. ( ) Marital Decision Making in Han Families Ethnic or religious factors do not play a prominent role among Han families in deciding on intermarriage with a Hui. Most Han parents do not care about the ethnic background of a future son or daugh ter in law. The o nly inconvenience to Han parents is that the family may have to abandon pork even at their own home if their children marry a Hui. Some of them are assured that they need not comply with additional food taboo s that would be required if the ir son or daughter in law or their families adhered more to Islamic food traditions. The decision to let their child marry a Bozhou Hui is quite easy for most Han families. thei r best educat ed individual in his family. Accord ingly he has been honored with a kind of authoritative role within his own family by other family members. When he told his parents that he was pla his family provided all the traditionally required support for his engagement and wedding.

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173 Red ut took her preferences into account as well. Since Red and Leo had met each other in their business, frequent contact enabled both of them to get know each other. However, the very beginnin g. His intention was to marry his daughter to a Hui. Therefore, her contact with Leo was strongly encouraged. Her father even urged her to get marri ed as soon as possible. For promised Im pact of the One Child Policy on Parental Attitudes toward Marriage their marriage because most of them are the only child in the family. Their parents seldom deny their only c dating. They simply give them suggestions. In some families the list of suggestions to a girl can be very long. On this point, concepts of the individual rights of young people become evident to parents. Parental denial of th e wishes of their only child could lead to suicide or to abandonment of the family by s truly unbearable or unacceptable, parents are usually compromising or yielding, much more so th an in times past. response to suitors, particularly with respect to daughters. Many parents do not want their daughters to live far away from their home after marriage. During past g enerations of multi child families and unavailability of long distance transport, parents might accept a daughter marrying into a distant family ; t hey would still have other children nearby. At present, however, although long distance travel is more conven ient, many parents are reluctant to have their only daughter marry out at a great distance.

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174 The socioeconomic status of the man and his family is another important factor in rtable economic status for their daughter. For this reason, men dang hu dui , which means the two families have similar socio economic status, is the basic expecta tion in mate selection. In a family with several sons, the eldest or youngest son may stay beh ind and live in the same house as his parents. Other couples usually live separatel y . The expenses are covered from the dowry and bride price received from both parents as , cash gifts) from friends and relatives who attended the wedding ceremony. The combination of these income sources must be sufficient to support the running of the new family. Equal socioeconomic status on the part of both families is preferred, as ther e will be equivalent sharing in providing for the establishment of the household of their newly married children. An only son in a one child family is expected to stay near his parents after getting married. There will thus be no disputes in the division of the family property. The only son assumes that all family properties belong to him. If the parents are wealthy the son may not feel constrained to work hard to make money on his own. For example, Guan always assumed that his parents property will beco me his. Therefore, he never tried hard to earn money on his own. His main consideration in choosing employment was to hotel will eventually end up in his own pocket, alt hough his parent s are still very young. He will of course be obliged to support them in their old age. In this light, his parents principal consideration in approving his marriage was that both families should have

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175 comparable socioeconomic status so that advantage of wealthier in laws. In this light, it must be said that parents in Bozhou would be quite happy to see their children marry up into better was n family was actually from a suburban area of Bozhou rather than from the urban area. Her family was poorer and in addition had two daughters and one son in the family. To su pport three see his daughter marry Leo. He urged his daughter to marry Leo as soon as possible, probably to prevent any last minute change of mind. Engagement In the matter of eng agement practices, there is at present no significant difference between the practices of the Hui and the Han, except with regard to the pork taboo. All other procedures of both ethnic groups are on the whole exactly the same. Even in a comp l ete ly Islamic marriage in Bozhou, engagement does not involve the participation of an imam. The following section describes the common engagement procedure. Engagement as Required Although romantic love is now the basis for marriage among the young of Bozhou, a traditio nal formal engagement ritual is still required in most Hui and Han families, including the involvement of a traditional matchmaker. When the relationship of two young individuals gets serious, both parents expect a formal engagement. It is a ritual to publ icize the relationship of two young individuals. From then on, their relationship is stabilized and neither can date any one else. The engagement ritual

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176 to witness the re Usually, the engagement ritual is arranged by matchmakers. Matchmakers are expected to be familiar with relatives on both sides as well as familiar with other involved matchmakers to facilit ate communication and exchange of information between the two families. Custom requires that each family provide two matchmakers for negotiations. The matchmaker role was usually the prerogative of females, but now male relatives or friends usually provide the service. People with youtoulian ( , or higher social status ) in the community are more preferred for the role of matchmaker, especially those who hold a position in local government, because they are considered to be socially superior in the eyes of ordinary peop le. A position in government endows an individual lord like status and power. And in reality such individuals have more social connections with others because of their governmental position. They are in a better position to organize and arrange activities such as a betrothal party and a wedding ceremony. Matchmakers are responsible for almost all matters from engagement to the itself takes place. Furthermore, when a marria ge runs into problems, the matchmakers are often unfairly singled out and blamed. Traditionally, one of the responsibilities of matchmakers is to be picky in evaluating each family, including information about the property and reputation of the family in t he community, the personality of the boy and girl, etc. A failure to report shortcomings makes them vulnerable to later criticism from the couple or their family members. Today, however, matchmakers are generally

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177 chosen from among relatives or friends, and they become involved only after a romantic attachment has been established. Therefore it is rare for them now to be blamed in the case of unsuccessful marriages. This role of matchmaker is volunteer work . They do not in general receive any monetary compe nsation for their time. They will receive instead some fruits or foods, usually guo zi ( , a kind of round fried wheat ball) from both families, or cigarettes, or alcohol, or other material goods. Few of them receive cash compensation from the two families. The situation in rural area s , however, may be different. According to a report from a PhD student in Shanghai University who returned to his village home during the Spring Festival in 2015, the matchmaker role in rural areas is an important and sensitive occupation because of the skewed sex ratio that makes it hard for boys to find availa ble ensure that their son gets particular attention (Wang 2015 ). In contrast , highly educated urban girls are themselves pressed to find a good match, as discussed earlier. B ut in that context the traditional matchmaker is of little utility. Setting the Engagement Date When a marriage has been approved by either of the two families, the matchmakers of that side will be asked to propose to the other side. In the case of a roma ntic love match, there are often no objections from either family. In such cases a matchmaker will arrange a meeting with parents on both sides to discuss issues such as the wedding date, the dowry and bride price, the place to hold the wedding ceremony, e tc. Sometimes, the two young individuals may iron out the details with each

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178 very important. There have been cases in which even love matches have come to naught when agreem ent cannot be reached between the two families. Traditionally, there are two steps in the engagement procedure in Bozhou. The first step is called ding qin ( ), which means two individuals as well as their families formally commit themselves to a future marriage. It is very similar to engagement in the West. The ding qin formalizes the relationship between the two individuals. Members of both families as well as people in both communities will perceive, confirm and witness their relationship. The second step is called ding rizi ( ), which means to fix a day for the wedding ceremony. This tradition of two separate rituals is still kept in rural Bozhou. But in urban areas, the two steps have been combined into a single step. Ordinarily the engagement ritual and the setting of the wedding date are held from one month to half a year ahead of the wedding ceremony. The waiting period can even be as short as half a month, for example, if the girl has been pregnant for several months. The waiting period usually does not extend to more than one year. That would fiancée during each traditi onal festival such as the lunar New Year, Yuanxiao (or Lantern) Festival, Duanwu (or Dragon Boat) Festival, the Mid Autumn (or M oon C ake) fiancée (usually clothes). In rural area s , the boy in addition may be asked to do some matters have been known to cause serious interfamilial fights. Murders have even occurred if the relationship en d s over these disputes . The presiding judge of the First

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179 Court in Bozhou, Mr. Tong, told me of a case that occurred in 2008 in which five members of a family were killed during a quarrel over the above expenditures during the engagement period. The most i mportant traditional reference used for setting a wedding date is the zodiac calendar. The chosen date is expected to be a huangdao jiri ( or auspicious day). Today the zodiac and its astrological complications are often bypassed by use of the wan nian li ( , which is a calendar for 10,000 years ) . Several auspicious dates will be proposed to the families. Besides traditional calendrica l dates the menstrual period of the girl is also taken into account. Menstruation is traditionally viewed as polluting. A wedding should not take place during that period. Furthermore custom and tradition strictly prohibit intercourse before the wedding ce remony. The first night of the marriage was used as the occasion to verify the virginal state of a bride. An intact hymen is viewed as a symbol of purity as well as fidelity to the spouse. Marriage during menstruation would complicate this inspection. The matchmakers from the male side will provide at least two alternative dates to disparity of half a month to accommodate the menstrual period. Sometimes, the ers may propose an entire month as an alternative. The final A date with an even number -numbers such as 2, 6, or even 0 was considered auspicious for a wedding. The number 8, in contrast, was see n as

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180 ei bai, and thus was avoided for weddings. In recent decades, however, the number 8 has acquired positive connotations. In Cantonese, the language spoken in the economically developed regions of southern China, the numbe fa W ith the rapid economic development of Canton since the 1980s as well as the popularization of Cantonese movies and TV shows from Hong Kong, Cantonese as a dialect of the Chinese l anguage has exerted a great impact on the Chinese spoken in until the economic boom in Shanghai and other coastal areas. As a result, other dialects have become popularized a nd compete with Cantonese as fashionable dialects. Chinese Muslims have become deeply involved in these economic trends in Shanghai and Canton. As a result they now view the number 8 together with other even numbers as auspicious number s for weddings. Som e dates will often be avoided for weddings such as days during the lunar months of March, July and September. These three months contain the days in which ghosts are believed to wander about. Furthermore days such as the third, seventh, thirteenth, eightee nth, twenty second, and twenty seventh in each lunar month should be avoided as well. On those days san niang ( ), a female celibate who received no help from the supernatural matchmaker, yue lao ( ), will come up to break up a

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181 ( ) refers to a year of curtailed spring. Spring is symbolically associated with the fecundity of human beings. A year with Traditionally, the pe riod of two or three years following a is also viewed as inauspicious for a wedding, in accordance with norms of filial piety ( ). Betrothal Party The betrothal party for an engagement can bring to light stylistic differences between Han a nd Hui marriage customs. Usually, a Hui betrothal party offers only Hui food; no pork or donkey or dog meat will be served. In contrast, a betrothal party that involves both Hui and Han has to offer two kinds of foods, both Hui food and Han food. The Han d present ed at the Han table. Guests can choose the table at which they will sit. Members of the two different ethnic groups at different tables may nonetheless propose a toast to ea ch other. Despite formal Islamic rules, alcohol is freely consumed in this Hui community. Toasts are commonly proposed between members of the different ethnic groups. A toast at a wedding ceremony or at another event is a common vehicle for reducing tensio n between individuals who may have had some previous zhan qin dai gu ( ) , which litera l ly mean s that relationships such as new friendships or new marriage relationships can be found in social networks of both Hui and Han g Damon, the assistant of the Bureau of Minzu an d Religion (abbreviated MZJ) of Bozhou confrontation, because some people on one side will know some people on the other t offend the assistant, Mr. Damon.

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182 widespread social connections in Bozhou. As a result, he does not have to stay in his office for the entire workday. The betrothal part for the festivity. During betrothal rituals, apart from the four matchmakers, almost no friends will be invited to the party. Relatives are the major eyewitnesses. The invited relatives inclu whether will be invited ; m ale cousins are not generally invited to this event. Agreements over Dowry, Bride Price, and other Requirements been a substantial increase in the material exchanges required on the occasion of an engagement. Before the 1990s the basic requirements from the groom included a sewing machine, a bicycle, a radio, and one or more pieces of jewelry. These gifts are colle ctively referred to as si jian tao ( , a package of four items ) . A wealthier family would often buy other gifts for the bride, such as a large clock, additional jewels, more new clothes, etc. Ordinary families needed to provide only the four customary gi fts. But today, the list of requirements has grown longer. Specific detailed transactions will be discussed in C hapter 5 . But the following summarizes the list that is now supposed to be discussed by matchmakers at the engagement phase.

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183 Si s e li ( ), which litera l ly mean s four color ed guo zi (a round fried lamb . Hong bao dan ( ), which litera l ly mea n s a red package). This is Hong bao dan usually has two boxes. One box is for clothes, shoes, and jewels. The other is for books, peanuts, lily, sugar, salt, longan fruit (similar to lychee), seeds of the cypress tree, et c. Four or eight sets of clothes, to be purchased from the bride price. Poorer families may buy only two sets of clothes for the bride. Those clothes are called nuan yi ( ,) warm clothes, and they are supposed to be kept tightly wrapped inside the house. amount can range from 20,000 Yuan to several hundred thousand Yuan . (At the 2015 exchange rate, 20,0 00 Yuan would be about US$3,200). Pin Shu ( ), an engagement letter, which includes the lunar birthdays of the two individuals, and information concerning auspicious wedding dates, according to the above description of huang dao jiri. A new house. This is on the must list in rural area s . Currently, the requirement for a house has been upgraded to a two story structure with at least four rooms (two rooms on each floor ). The former requirement was a one story bungalow with three linked rooms. mily may in some cases expect a four door car from the Besides the above list, other matters may be negotiated as well, depending on additional discussio n. The amount of the expected dowry is often based on the amount Sometimes, the do wry may amount to only half of the bride price. Sometimes the

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184 quarrels may occur. daughter rather than marrying her out. It is disadvantageous to the bride as well. In such right to do as he wishes, even to the extent of domestic violence. Table 4 1: Economic status and intermarriage orientation Economic status Han woman vs. Hui man Hui woman vs. Han man Total Equal economic status 51 54.84% /59.30% 42 45.16% /64.6 2% 93 61.59% Hypergamy 20 54.05% /23.26% 17 45.95% /26.15% 37 24.50% Hypogamy 15 71.43% 17.44% 6 28.57% /9.23% 21 13.91% Total 86 56.95% /100% 65 43.05% /100% 151 100%

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185 CHAPTER 5 THE MA RITAL TRANSACTION This chapter will examine the steps in bringing a Hui / Han intermarriage from engagement to the finalization of the marriage. I will pay special attention to the economic and other marriage related transactions conducted before and durin g the wedding . I will examine traditional Hui marriage and traditional Han marriage on their own, as a prelude to discussing what occurs in the case of an inter marriage. Dowry and Bride Price Economic transfers at marriage are abundantly documented in the anthropological literature. They can be broadly classified into two categories: dowry (a transfer of property from the family of the bride to that of the groom) and bride price (a es spelled as a single word, brideprice) (Anderson 2007). It may also be called bridewealth. Usually, the two types of marriage payments are mutually exclusive. According to Murdock (1967) in World Ethnographic Atlas , two thirds of 1,167 preindustrial soci eties required only brideprice while less than 4 percent required only dowry (Anderson 2007). Coexistence of dowry and bride price is not common . China is an exception. There is a further point on which China is an exception. Marriage payments are often c haracterized by some scholars as gradually disappearing in the process of modernization . In China, however, they are re emerging and becoming even more widespread (and more burdensome) than before. Regarding Islamic marriage, it is perhaps better to use t connotations of purchasing the bride or her services, which is not the conceptualization

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186 found in China; however, I will use both terms interc hangeably. The dowry is money that tradition is found in most Islamic areas around the world, including Chinese Muslims. But Chinese Muslims in addition expect a dowr marriage. dower and dowry payments. This will force us to critically reexamine some of the propositions by Jack Goody (1973) on these mat ters, such as those concerning marriage payments. Let us examine her proposition and see whether they apply to China. (2007 : 163 ) Th is discussion of marriage payment practices has established four main sets of facts. First, brideprice paying societies have the following characteristics: they are relatively homogeneous, women have a prominent role in agriculture, and polygyny is practi ced. Dowry, in contrast, is found in socially stratified, monogamous societies that are economically complex and where women have a relatively small productive role. Second, brideprices are relatively uniform within societies and do not vary by familial w ealth. Dowries, however, increase with both the wealth and social status of both sides of the marriage bargain. Third, there have been episodes of rising real dowries both in the historical record and in contemporary times. In contrast, there seem to be n o comparable instances of real brideprice increases. Fourth, there is substantial variation over the property rights of marriage transfers. Moreover, these rights can transform within a society over time.

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187 Engel (1984) points out that the bride price in most Chinese settings is more compulsory while dowry is more voluntary in nature, typically financed with a return from part of the bride price. Of 451 observations in rural China during 1950 2000 (Brown 200 3), 79 percent shows that bride price is prevalent while the ratio (9%) in urban China is significantly lower, based on 586 observations during 1933 1987 (Whyte 1993). However, previous data about marriage payments, especially the bride price, do not refl ect recent changes. Marriage payments in some places and in some social groups can now cost up to millions of RMB. (A million RMB is in 2015 worth about $160,000.) Only one study claims that no brideprice is collected in the research community. 1 A report r (Guilford et al 2013) . The statistical data shows that Shanghai may have the heaviest requirements. Beside at least RMB100, 000 cash as bride price, an independent house or a either remain bachelors or marry a girl from outside Shanghai. Along with an increase in bride price, the amount of the expected dowry has also gone up significantly in some places. In 2006, Howard W. French wrote a piece in the (French 2006) The owner of a coal mine in Shanxi province ma rried out his daughter with a dowry and wedding costs that reached 70 million Yuan (i.e., nearly $11.5 million) 2 . This 1 http://www.echinacities.com/china media/The Price of Marriage in China Infographi c Shows Astounding Data 2 http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzcwMDQ3NzYw.html

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188 record was broken in 2013. A billionaire married out his daughter with a dowry and ceremony expenditures that totaled 210 million Yuan (i .e., around $ 34 million) 3 . This trend is still in fashion, and there is no end in sight, especially in places continues to be important. There are cultural and social dimens ions to bride price and dowry that transcend simple economic calculations. Transition of the Bride price in Bozhou Given that obligatory marriage transfers, including bride price and dowry, were criticized by the Communist Party as relics of feudalism, th ey were discouraged by the State from the 1950s to the 1970s. Some remnants of the practice survived, especially in rural areas. However, the use of cash as the bride price was rare in Chinese traditions. ningful food gifts of fish, cattle, pig, or sheep, etc. Cash payments for the bride price have become popular only recently. The bride price in Bozhou is popularly conceptualized as having two li jin ( gai kou fei ( , (the fee for changing Li jin as, 10,000 Yuan , 50,000 Yuan gai kou fei for example, 10.10 Yuan or 101.00 Yuan which means that the spouse is the one chosen from 10 or 100 or 1,000 even more candidates ( or , etc.), or 3 Shenzheng Guangdian Jituan. 2013. A Fujian Richer Mrried Daughter Out with 210 Million and Glamours Wedding Cerem ony Exposed. Jan. 18. http://www.s1979.com/caijing/guonei/201301/1972221219.shtml . Xinlang Yule ( Sina Entertainment) 2013. A Fujian Richer Mrried Out His Daughter in 210 Millon Yuan and Stars such as Jiang Yuheng Attended. Jan. 21 http://video.sina.com.cn/p/ent/s/m/2013 01 21/130161982509.html

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189 10.50 or 100.50 which means the companionship will last forever (here 0 .50 means companionship because 0 .50 is pro , which means companionship). swirling devices and one sound ), wh ich means three whirling machines, such as a watch, bicycle, and sewing machine), and one machine that can produce sound, namely, a radio. Those gifts were popular in the 1960s and the 1970s, but sometimes could not be obtained. In the first place, most fa milies were too poor to afford the four gifts. Another factor was governmental discouragement of anti material gifts. According to the first marriage law issued in 1950, dowry is paid are forbidden. According to observations made by Parish and White (1978), in rural areas of China at that period, bride price was still common, whereas dowries became smaller and less common than in the past. At the same time the bride price was maintained in urban areas in the form of gifts to the bride or her family, while the dowry customs had nearly disappeared (Manni 1981) or took the substitute form of expensive wedding feasts (Salaff 1973). Young men in love sometimes decried their ina bility to afford a wedding, indicating the survival of expected gifts (Honolulu Star Bulletin 1980). The 1984).

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190 Agrarian labor was another type of bride price in rural areas . Labor shortages created stress for some farmers during the busy agricultural seasons. Therefore, the future son in engagement. Such labor inputs can continue even after marriage. It is one of the most important ways to strengthen the bond of two families. If the engagement is broken, the a form of compensation. At each traditional festival in bonds between two kin groups. In the pas t engagements might be arranged between two young children (which is called wawa qin , i.e., baby betrothal). An engagement was sometimes arranged before birth. This latter practice was regarded as virtuous. It was zhifu weihun trothal, , which literally means to point at the bellies of two pregnant mothers to get the unborn children engaged). In any case the longer the engagement period , the more money and agrarian labor was required , or even early teenage betrothals could be relationship. Early engagement was often resisted by teenage children who had been engaged by their parents. The girl would take a risk by having sex with someone else before entering into marriage, thus losing her virginity, the most highly valued state for women in traditional Chinese culture. These traditions of early engagement have been gradually abandoned since the 1980s .

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191 Hui marriage traditions did not require bride price. Under strong Han influence, devices and one sound ds can now be requested. But some differences still exist. For example, pork is strictly excluded but is replaced by other meats, usually beef or lamb . Another example is a special fried flour youxiang , usually fried with sesame oil). Youxiang is viewed as an ethnic or food with religious meaning. It can be found in round and flat; the other is half empty rhombus. The youxiang youxiang youxiang, ). Sanjiao youxiang, sometimes called guozi ( , fruits), is perhaps unique to the Hui of Bozhou. Other places have only the flat, round variety. ( In some Hui communities of Sichuan, it can be cylindrical.) The round flat y ouxiang can be as large as a frisbee, or as small as the cover of a paper cup. As one of the components of bride price, there have to be at least sanjiao youxiang, which amounts to about 200 cakes. a television, an air conditioner, and/or even an automobile. The amount of bride price will depend on several factors, including the time of the engagement, the economic situation of the participants, and the negotiations by the

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192 match makers from both sides. The social status of the participants also contributes to the final outcome of the negotiations. For Mr. Damon , a Hui, his engagement in 1987 was relatively inexpensive. What he paid in bride price included a watch, a bi ke, a sewing machine, and a trousseau (a set of clothes, called nuan yi price from him, because he could not afford it . H is family had almost abandoned him and he did not have any income at that mo ment. But he still followed the conventional or habitual ways of Bozhou marriage by paying a modest bride price. Additional traditional expenditures were covered by foster 4 parents for the marriage. Leo and Red 7 was obviously different f rom Damon Because level, and most importantly, because Red social advantages by marrying his eldest daughter to a Hui man, Re d accept a lower bride price. Through negotiation of matchmakers, they finally reached an agreement: L eo Yuan as the bride price and provide siseli ( , or four col which amounted to an additional 20,000 Yuan ). They also had to provide a house and several conventional presents such as youxiang and some fruits such as Chinese date (jujube), peanuts, longan, and lotus seeds. (These four items comb ined are believed to bring good luck in the form of a son early in the marriage.) At the same time, for the sake of saving face, Red eo about 10,000 Yuan before the 4 He was aware of that till teenager. His personal and f amily stories are full of legendries, but cannot be covered here.

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193 matchmakers meeting. Yet, as we shall see below, the dowry of Red was also not insignificant. Guan & T marriage was based on romantic love rather than parental arrangement. Guan were at first reluctant to have a Hui daughter in law because of the pork taboo which they would have to honor even in their own home. The attitude of Guan towards the marriage of the two young people caused worry to Ting . Therefore, Ting requests. Given that the beloved son is the only child in the family, Guan i ncluded cash (50,000 Yuan ), a set of jewelry (gold ring, earring, necklace, and two jade siseli story building where they run a famil y inn. They do not hire anyone but run it by themselves. On the one hand the family had enough rooms to accommodate the new couple. And on the other hand the family needed labor force to maintain the inn. The family did not buy a new car for the couple. B ut the family has one electric motor car, one motor scooter, and one electric tricycle. Those vehicles are enough for them to travel anywhere within the small city. However, not all families are prosperous enough to pay such a high bride price. The case off at the time of their wedding in October 2012; therefore, the bride price was a modest 10,000 Yuan . The groom did not buy his wife a valuable gold ring either. His wife did not reproach him for

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194 th is but willingly accepted a golden ring worth 300 Yuan . There was no necklace or valuable new bracelet. But she did reproach him for something else that will be Siseli hong bao dan were automatically included. One positive element was that Tan was given a new apartment by his work unit, a state owned enterprise. He was able to take this dwelling xin fang new household for a newly married couple; it can be an independent house or simply a bedroom apartment. They decorated it before the wedding with about 60,000 Yuan , a cost that is lower th an average. The new apartment was equipped with basic utensils and furniture, though it was below the standards of most families. In Bozhou, face is very important. For the sake of saving face, some families prefer to luxuriously decorate a new house or co ndominium by borrowing money from relatives, friends, or a bank, though they may prestig ious education from a local junior college. Young men with a higher education are in general able to marry wealthier or more beautiful girls. Because of their college degree, they sometimes do not have to pay any bride price at all but can still command a At the same time, there are instances when an extremely high bride price can be demanded in Bozhou. For example, Red the south suburban area of Bozhou, was asked for 200, 000 Yuan as a condition for getting engaged with his fiancée, a Hui girl, in 2011. kn e

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195 in the southern part of the city is much higher than in other neighborhoods. It was therefore not very surprising . wedding. L ee is son and daughter in law were only 17 years old in 2010, far below the legal marriage age. But L ee business is one of the largest in Bozhou. A shabby bride price would cause him to lose story building with 8 room s. A brand new Audi Q5 was bought for the new couple. Jewelry and other items required for the wedding cost around 500,000 Yuan (including cash 200,000 Yuan wedding ceremony had more than 500 invited guests. s marriage was quite different. The marriage was almost cancelled. Besides 100,000 Yuan in cash, a new house, and other gifts requested in Yuan for picking up the bride on the already borrowed more than 50,000 Yuan from their relatives and immediate family and he could not afford it any more. So when he heard the request, he simply and suddenly asked all bride picking up cars to turn back and gave up the marriage (which had alr eady officially been registered before the auspicious time had passed by the time she arrived. For tunately, the marriage is still cautiously maintained.

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196 Dowry marital contract in Chinese history can be traced back to as more than 2000 years ago when the most influential Chinese philosophies (Daoism, Confucianism, and others) w ere emerging in the context of major societal changes. It was in this period that dowry became a requirement for marrying out a daughter. Some males or femal es even engaged in fraudulent wedding transactions. 5 The dowry during the Song Dynasty (960 AD 1279) usually was around half of the bride price (Ebrey 1993). Recent studies show that average bride prices are equal to 2.2 times average dowries (Brown 2003) . Similar proportions can be found in Harrell (1992) and Lavely (1988). However, this proportion may not hold in the case of Bozhou marriages. on the occasion of marriage. T he gift given to the bride is called Mahr, which becomes the property of the bride herself. Verse 4 of Surah 4, An the dower. And give the women (on marriage) their Mahr [obligatory bridal money given by the husband to his w ife at the time of marriage] as a free gift; but 5 Original text: Translation: Recently a new practice has been created for earning money through fictitious marriage payments, such as damaged coins to cheat relatives . Out of concern for the appearance of the bride, her side of the family may ask the to lend jewel ry , precious clothes etc.as dowry . T hen , they may cut off or shorten the clothes or remove something from the jewelr y or pawn or even sell those borrowed properties . The bride will then have to tolerate abuse from her husband. As a result, two families that had been on good terms end up in mutual hostility. (In Historiography of Hongdong County, Tongzhi Emperor in Qing Dynasty).

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197 if they, of their own good pleasure, remit any part of it to you, take it and enjoy it without fear of any harm. and of female e quality. The dower can permit a woman to live on her own even when she is divorced by her husband or becomes a widow (Anderson 2007), though in actual practice this right can be easily curtailed. 6 According to Tambiah (1989), dowry can be categorized into three broad classes: (I) A fairly substantial portion consists of the clothing and jewelry which the bride brings with her and retains as her personal property (which in the Tambiah Goody thesis could be merged in the conjugal fund); (2) In addition ther e are often household furnishings, cooking and eating vessels, and prestige goods, which become the joint family and may be used by his parents in the future irculating This list does not take into account cash or more valuable items, such as gold bars. Money, however, has become an important part of the dowry in a Chinese marriage. Both bride price and dowry are now each laden with symbolic meaning. When the bride to be receives 10,001 Yuan s , the groom to be will receive the same amount or doubl 6 However, on some occasions (haram for a husband), the mahr right of the bride can be abrogated by consent . In my view these regulati ons are vulnerable to the accusation that they objectify women. In other words, women are seen to some extent as property rather than standing on equal footing with her husband .

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198 return. It has all the appearances of an exchange. The exchange can be made before or right at the moment when the bride and the groom change their ways of addressing the , au , m a m a ) and bà ba ( , papa gaikoufei ( , the fee for difference creates initial difficulties for a Han that joins a Hui family. Some newly wed young daughters in law simply abandon those terms of address. The dowry payment is not the only money that the bride brings to her new family. Yuan with her as the cas h dowry, and Red in law also brought in 100,000 Yuan (half of the money received in brideprice). In general, dowry and bride price are usually kept in a mutually agreed on ugh no cunzhe ( provided an independent house as the largest item in the bride price. T his had a value of around 50,000 Yuan provided all the furniture and the costly appliances, including a refrigerator (worth 3,500 Yuan ), two air conditioners (worth 9,000 Yuan in total), a 42 inc h LED TV (a good brand, which was worth more than 5,000 Yuan in 2012), and two standing electric fans

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199 (worth around 1,500 Yuan siseli boxes of white rice liquor, and youxiang etc., amounted possibl y to no less than 20,000 Yuan . That is, the sum total of dowry items was worth no less than the bride price. Another marriage registered on January 4, 2013 7 illustrates the same dynamic. Together with 50,000 Yuan saved another 50,000 Yuan in the newly opened account in the name of Tang and thus a 100,000 Yuan cunzhe was brought to the new household. (Of course other dowry items were brought as well). s not mean that it is her exclusive property. It is more like a startup fund for the new household, analogous to the startup research fund for a new faculty member in universities. Since this conjugal fund is pooled from two parties, the new couple usually deals with it through negotiation. It may, however, generate serious tension in a family if one side considers it as a private fund. In Islamic tradition his could generate tensions in the Chinese context. However, in reality, particularly in a Hui community like Bozhou where the Han personal property any more, a Hui wife usually does not claim exclusive control over the fund. 7 This date has auspicious meaning for young people rather than in traditiona l culture. T he day, 201314 in numerical notation , is phonetically similar to the pronunciation of ai ni yi sheng yi shi , which means love you for a lifetime . A lthough a number ending in 4 is regarded as un auspicious in traditional culture because 4 is pronounced in Chinese as si which is the same to the character d ead ( ) , some fashion savvy youths prefer to interpret it in a different way when it appears in strings like 1314 which impl ies that the love can last for of the two indivi duals ( .

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200 Marriage Payments in Bozhou: Analyses I will present now several case studies to alert us to the fact that many academic theories about marriage payments are on the whole not applicable to marri age practices in Bozhou and perhaps to some degree in China as a whole. Let us return to As Anderson concluded, first, brideprice homogeneous, women have a pro The association between bride price and polygy ny does not apply in contemporary China. The bride price custom is increasing though marriage laws now forbid polygyny in China. Furthermore, dowry traditions were present in China even during periods of widespread polygyny, challenging another element in theory. In addition, the dowry was reduced to insignificance between the 1950s and the 1970s. However it was eliminated not because the productive role of women was relatively small, but because governmental power suppressed the tradition. Sec and do not vary by familial wealth. Dowries, however, increase with both the wealth and As we can see from the cases discu ssed above, the bride prices do appear to vary strongly in terms of familial wealth. Some families may not need to pay a significantly high brideprice, while in other families a young man may have to remain single until he can afford it. As a matter of fac t, the level of brideprice appears to be

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201 closely related to that of dowry. That is, a higher brideprice leads to expectations of a Her third conclusion is also inapplica rising real dowries both in the historical record and in contemporary times. In contrast, generalization is sabotaged by current Chinese marriage practice. As I mentioned in the beginning, brideprice has soared so high that it has frightened many bachelors from the two forms of marriage exchange can increase and have i ncreased at the same time. H is substantial variation over the property rights of marriage transfers. Moreover, these e are patterns which weaken the applicability even of this proposition. applicable in some so group can scarcely be said to be seeking the labor of a daughter in law. The motivation traditio inapplicable to China. (typically brothers) in order that they can themselves take a wife...What goes out for a

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202 applicability in the one child families of China. Are parents of Chinese daughters perhaps interested in money for support in old age? Could this be the logic of growing bride prices? Support in old age is a major issue adequate social security from their employers. Social security is usually distributed through the employer ra ther than through a government bureau. This arrangement is a survival of the decades of the collectivized economy. Since 2000, more and more state owned or collective enterprises have gone bankrupt and those workers have to seek privatized support on their own. The country has also been shaken by reports of the embezzlement of the social security fund in Shanghai and other places in 2006 8 , and the disappearance from the retirement fund of up to 2,000 billion Yuan in 2012 9 (The missing funds in 2014 are repo rted to amount to up to 156.3 billion Yuan according to the budget of the Ministry of Finance 10 ). National confidence in the social security system has collapsed completely. Elderly people with only one child are justifiably concerned about support. If the ir one child is a daughter who marries out, their worries increase. 8 Anonym ous . 2007. Zhongyang Jueding Kaichu Chenliangyu Dangji Gongzhi (The Center of Party Decided to Expel the Party Membership and Governmental Position of Chen Liangyu). Xinhuawang http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007 07 26/215013534725.shtml 9 Zhang Ran . 2012. Zhongguo 14 Shengfen Yanglaojin Quekou 767yi Yuan (Embezzlement of Social Security of 14 Provinces has reached 76.7 billion Yuan. Jinghua Shibao ( ) Dec. 16. http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2012 12/18/content_1956457.htm#news. In the article, the author listed the embezzlement amount of personal account which has been above 2 trillion Yuan . 10 Sun, Bo . 2014. Z hongguo Yanglaojin Kuikong Zenmeban How to Deal with the Embezzlement of Social Security Fund in China? http://finance.sina.com.cn/zl/china/20140419/105618853030.sht ml

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203 Support of elderly parents is regarded as one of the most important duties of filial piety in Confucianism. To some degree parental concern is partially mitigated by strong social pressur es on couples to support their parents. Research has documented the dilemma of young couples from single child families to support four elderly individuals and one child. This has become a high visibility social issue; the One Child Policy has caused dilem mas in recent years. In Bozhou the situation has not reached crisis level. Many families, particularly Hui, have more than one child. Even Han parents, who want to have a second child, manage to find a way, even illegally, or by simply giving birth to a c hild without public heihu ian civilians C hapter 9 ). The recent policy that permits rural people to ha ve a second child if the first one is a girl allows those registered 11 as rural residents to have another child legally. This option is particularly important in a family whose first child is a girl. 12 A male child continues to be the preference, as in the Chapter 9 ). In any case , speculation concerning the function of the bride price as support in old age has little empirical support in Bozhou . The situation of aging parents who have married out their only daughter is in fact 11 Commonly, some urban people register their hukou (household registration ) as rural. 12 In Nov. 2013, a new policy was issued: by which a couple in which both are from a n only child family can apply to have a second child, no matter what the sex of t he first child is . This policy will have some yet undetermined impact on Chinese population growth. S ome empirical evidence seems to indicate that the new policy has not cause d a feverish reaction . For example, one report said that fewer tha n 5% of eligibl e couple s submitted an application . http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2015 02/03/c_127450459.htm , http://news.qq.com/a/20150213 /002108.htm

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204 themselves on the one hand, and on the other, can still rely somewhat on the workers. In any case the desi re for support in old age is not a driving factor in the recent surge in bride price and dowry practices. The Wedding Ceremony We will now examine the wedding itself in terms of three detailed case studies of specific weddings that were observed. One wa s completely secular, another totally traditional, and another mixed. married at his age of 17 in 2010, and his wife, Ms. Fang, was 17 years old as well. Yong is a Han, and hi s wife is a Hui. As classmates, they dated each other from junior middle school. Both of them discontinued their school education after the compulsory 9 year education . Another family in this study is Ma. He is a Hui and his wife, Wei, is a Han. Their wedd ing followed the Hui tradition of inviting an imam to witness it. What is noteworthy is that Mr. L ee is a successful businessman, while Ma is an ordinary laborer in the city and his family is relatively poor. Therefore to begin with the two weddings contra st sharply . With respect to the third wedding, Tan represents economically comfortable Hui people who are nonetheless not as wealthy as Mr. L e Those living near the mosques are genera lly poorer, while those who have moved out and built new houses are generally wealthier. reason that Tan was able to afford a new apartment before his wedding is because he is employed in a state owned company. He was thus eligible to purchase an apartment

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205 at a subsidized price. Ordinarily such young Hui have to depend more on their parents for economic support and correspondingly give up much of the right of decision maki ng. Tan had already broken up with a girl to whom he been engaged through parental arrangement. He sensed a growing disparity of interests between them . For paying almo st 50,000 Yuan , part of it in cash, and part of it in money lost from the non family would not have released him from the engagement. 13 parents a gre at deal of money. They were unwilling to contribute heavily to his current wedding. With this background let us examine the wedding ceremony step by step. A complete wedding ceremony is generally composed of three parts: pre wedding preparation, wedding ( Huimen filled with rituals and traditional symbols. Preparation of the Wedding Ceremony Setting the date of the wedding ceremony After their engagement in July, Tan and Qing started to prep are for what they hoped would be an ideal wedding ceremony. There was much to do in advance. The wedding date was set for Oct. 2, 2012 . The second day of October falls in the middle of National Day, which usually lasts 7 days (Oct. 1 7). Friends and relati ves would have time to make a trip to attend the ceremony. The year 2012 was the Year of the Dragon, 13 take place, at least according to a judicial ruling by the local court. See detail s in Chapter 8 .

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206 lichun, , the day signifying the beginning of spring) within one year. This was viewed as a good omen for fertility. In this light that particular year witnessed a surge in wedding ceremonies. More than 11,000 couples registered their marriage during that year a ccording to the marriage registration office. An interesting point is that a traditional Hui wedding day should preferably occur on Friday, the day of zhuma (congregation). However, according to wannianli, the Friday during the national holiday period was Oct. 5, which was not suitable for a wedding ceremony. Finally they decided to refer to Wannianli rather than to Hui tradition. Reserving the restaurant and sending out the invitation letters There is competition to reserve space in a good restaurant for the wedding celebration. Tan and Qing reserved the restaurant immediately after the engagement. Since they had little economic support from their families, the restaurant for the wedding ceremony was not the most magnificent one in Bozhou, but it was abov e average. More importantly, the name of the restaurant signifies that it is a qingzhen restaurant, compatible with Hui dietary restrictions, thus ensuring the attendance of Hui relatives and friends. They reserved 25 tables for guests and 1 table for fami ly members. That was sufficient table space for around 260 guests with four additional backup tables. They deposited 10,000 Yuan , about 330 Yuan per table). The cost of food per table is set to be on the average between 400 Yuan and 600 Yuan (excluding alc ohol) for 10 individuals. This per meal cost was reasonable by Bozhou standards.

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207 After fixing the date of the wedding ceremony and reserving the restaurant, the next task was to invite guests. Since I was a friend of Tan and was known to be skillful in c alligraphy, he asked me to write the invitation letters for him. The invitation letter was bought from a store, with a fixed format. The cover of the letter is red and the inside sheet is pink. The fixed format is printed in ink. My job was to fill in the blank left inside the boiler plate text. On the cover of the letter, a red double happiness symbol with a yellow margin of the double happiness signs ( ) were artfully designed in the shape of heart. The margin strokes were smooth rather than stiff. The letter can be folded and thus arriage with The inside sheet has the following printed lines: To XXX (lady or gentleman), We sincerely invite you to attend the wedding ceremony of Ms. XXX and Mr. XXX, which will be held (somewhere) at (a certain time). We are looking forward to your witness of our love. Respectfully yours The format can be varied, with different styles in different invitation letters, but the basic information is set like that. The first XXX somet imes can be written like Mr. or Ms. XXX and your girlfriend or boyfriend in the case of unmarried guests. If the invited guest names of the bride and the groom. The br

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208 Another feature on the upper left of the cover was a picture of Tan and Qing, who were dressed in wedding apparel and leaned on each ot her intimately. In Yong and invitation letter. They wanted customized rather than store bought invitations. In contrast, Ma did not send invitation letter to his frien ds and relatives. To have that type of picture Tan and Qing went out to take wedding pictures wedding design and celebration company. They gave Tan and Qing a discount for tak ing the pictures and for all the other related services. A complete service package ordinarily costs from 10,000 to 15,000 Yuan but they were given a bargain price of 6,800 Yuan itself was also an auspicious number). A complete service package includes taking the wedding pictures and videos, making up the bride, finding vehicles of the same color and similar models to transport the bride, officiating at the wedding ceremony, making the bed, preparing the setting for the wedding, etc. More and more wedding ceremonies in Bozhou and other cities in China are entrusted to this kind of company. We spent two days in filling in all the blanks with the names given by Tan and Qing. They chose th e names carefully. Almost all important relatives and friends of both sides must be included. It was particularly important to include those who had been given gifts in the past. It was their turn to return the favor. Most relatives of the bride will not a ttend the wedding ceremony itself but instead, right after the bride leaves for the ceremony, they will proceed to the place where they will prepare the meal (usually a

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209 Huimen (see below for details). In that case, when the bride departs for the wedding, her relatives simply return home. The invitation letters were written up and sent out in early September. This gave friends and relatives adequate time to prepare and left them no excuse for not attending. Such timely invitations are an effective way to secure reciprocity for the gifts that someone has made to friends and relatives earlier. (The increasingl y heavy gift burden is in fact shared by all parties . This will be specifically addressed below in section three). Marriage registration The law requires a marriage to be registered to protect the legal rights of both parties, which includes the right to spend the night together in a hotel room. (In recent decades it could be considered as prostitution without the certificate of marriage.) As mentioned earlier, h owever, marriage registration in Bozhou is not well documented. Most elderly and many middle ag ed couples do not have the records of their marriage. A traditionally witnessed wedding ceremony was considered sufficient without official registration. Marriage registration rules are more closely adhered to among the educated young generation. Therefore , Tan and Qing went to the Marriage Registration Office to register their marriage. Both of them were old enough to get married. The minimum age is 22 for a male 20 for a female. Tan was 27 while Qing was 23. This is very late in the eyes of many Bozhou p eople. In comparison, Yong and Fang had gotten married at the age of 17. Almost half of my informants got married before the legal age. For example, Ma was 20 and his wife Wei was 18 years old when they got married.

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210 Showing the Hukou Ben (Household Registr ation booklet) and ID cards (Qing was and is still Han), and paying a 9 Yuan registration fee and a 30 Yuan photo fee, they received the legal proof of their marriage: the Marriage Certificate. They did not purchase other souvenir products offered by the r egistration office; those would have cost them about another 200 Yuan . Although the registration office in theory cannot collect more money from applicants beyond the simple cost of the certificate (9 Yuan ), they can charge fees for other items, such as a photo service. The office does not accept pictures that applicants taken on their own. A separate photo studio is incorporated into the office. It is said that the studio is run by a third party, but it is located on the second floor of the Marriage Reg istry Office. Other customers would rarely come to take pictures here besides the required marriage photos. Family meeting make preparatory arrangements. Almost at the same time Tan is the only child in the family. His parents did not want to have more children because of their relative poverty as well as political e xhortations from the government to have fewer children in line with the ideology of the one child per family policy. Both of owned company. They were expected to l. The meeting was not very formal, according to Tan. But all issues had to be discussed and arranged. First of all, they confirmed the reliability of the booked restaurant. And then they needed to ask the dazong to order standard foods for guests

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211 at each table. The dazong is the manager for events like engagements, weddings, or dazong is a reputable male chef. They are experienced persons who know how to cook (if the wedding is taking place at home) or how to order appropriate food (if the reception will be in a restaurant). This time, Tan assigned the role of dazong to a friend of his who was a chef and who was running a small scale restaurant. Beside the preparation for the reception, the decoration of t he new home had to months earlier, his family began decorating it. In China, a new apartment is usually not in move in condition. The new residents must first decorate it. After two months of work, the new apartment was ready to use, but still unfurnished. Most furniture usually comes from the dowry and is therefore the responsibility o bought a new television, two air conditioners (one hanging on the wall of the bed room and one standing on the floor of the living room), two electric fans, a refrigerator, and other items. Purchase of other furniture su ch as beds, desks, chairs, sofa, and utensils The decoration of the xinfang (bridal chamber) requires special attention. It includes putting some auspicious signs (the double happiness sign) on doors, windows, beds, in the kitche n, and on the entrance of the building. Those signs are usually posted on the day before the wedding day. Four coins will be put on the four corners in each drawer or container to symbolize the hope that those containers/drawers will accumulate much fortun e (money) in the future. A bundle of noodles will be put in the

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212 kitchen for cooking on the wedding night. The noodles, called changshou mian ( long life noodles), symbolize hope for the longevity of the new couple. They are also supposed to light two oi l lamps in the living room and two red candles in the xinfang bedroom. The lamps are called changshou deng ( , long life lamps). Beyond the preparation of the reception and the decoration of the new home, there is yet a third task. A division of labor wi ll be assigned to friends and relatives for home, keeping a record of the gifts (usually cash) from guests, and other tasks. A wedding ceremony has heavy labor demands. asked to act as ushers during the cer emony because they could recognize almost all convoy to bring the bride. Four married women (whose four parents must still be alive) were assigned the task of making the marriage bed. Several young boys (usually 7 or 8 , to press, or to sleep on) the new bed. . An additional task was the preparation of cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, candies, peanuts, and hongbao ( , red envelopes containing some folded money). All of this had to be prepared in advance. The cigarettes a nd hongbao were the most important etiquette, it is unacceptable to omit them on the occasions of weddings, burials, and other events. Alcoholic drinks cannot be omitted either. Bozhou in particular is renowned as one of the most important cities for producing alcoholic drinks in China.

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213 Residents are proud to toast with high quality liquors (with an alcohol content that varies from 38 to 65). To be able to drink large qu antities of strong alcohol is an important symbol of masculinity throughout China. The strong liquor, usually called baijiu ( , means white liquor) in most parts of China, is called in Bozhou lajiu ( ) , spicy liquor. A man who cannot drink lajiu is dismi ssed as a weakling. The earlier mentioned hongbao with its folded money is another important gift. The groom is expected to give hongbao to anyone he meets while transporting the bride from her parental home to her xinfang , though the gifts are usually re stricted to the relatives of the bride, especially the four bridesmaids. There is no best man in Bozhou weddings, but there are four bridesmaids. These girls usually plant themselves in front g the groom from taking hongbao can vary from 10 to 100 Yuan , amily wishes to display. family: Qing, her little brother, and her parents. The responsibiliti were relatively light. Her family had three tasks: to decorate the new household, to buy request from them. Qing herself had to purchase nuanyi ( , bride price, i.e., the RMB 10,000 which she had received pillows and sets of sheets, quilt covers, etc. The quilts and pillows mu st be matched and

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214 even in number, four, six or eight. Quilts are ordinarily supposed to be red, while sheets pu l ü gai hong ( present the color can be variations, such as purple, of the above two colors. The quilts custom from other places where ji ujiu quilts. The quilts were usually 6 or 8 jin (i.e., 3 or 4 kg). But recently quilts have become lighter with the greater availability of silk quilts. Aunts of the groom, whether from the covers. One interesting point is that one corner of the quilts is left unsewn. The bride is supposed to complete it. I posed this question to several women but received different explana this custom suggest themselves. One function would be to display the sewing skills of the bride, assuring her in laws of her ability to manage the new household and maintain ha rmony. Another function might be to demonstrate that the bride has undergone a Making the bed Making the bed for the new couple is a task carried out one day before the wedding day. The only people permitte d to come help make the bed are women whose parents are both still alive and who themselves have a son. Such women symbolize full blessings and through their hands, the blessings can be transmitted to the new couple, who will have a son in the future. It i women.

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215 When they are making the bed, they need to sing together a song , whose lyrics who was in charge of the wedding service is as follows: ( Entering into the xinfang with ) ; ( [We] are specifically dressed in red clothes fo r the purpose of auspiciousness ); ( How colorful the bed is and it mus t be made by skillful craftsmen ); ( How beautiful the bed is and silk qu ilts and blankets are piling up ); supposed to bring some candies to the four women. Those candies include Chinese dates, peanuts, longans, and lotus seeds. The acronyms of those four items stand for the birth of a precious child (preferably a son) as soon as possible. The lyrics then continue. ( How swee t those happiness candies are and how good the peanuts smell, [please] bring candies and let me spread [them] on the bed ) ; ( The first spreading will get flowers blossoming and [family] wealth , The second spreading will get a son and a daug hter ) ; ( The third spreading will bring great blessings , The fourth spreading will bring happiness and longevity ) ; ( The fifth spreading will be on the square table which makes descendants uphold filial piety ) ; ( The sixth spreading will be on the writing desk which makes descendants be able to read and write ) ;

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216 ( The seventh spreading will be thrown to the inside of the bed which makes the child become a military attaché ) ; ( The eighth spreading will be thrown to the outside of the bed which makes the child become a champion scholar [ title conferred to the student who achieved first place in the highest imperial examination ] ); ( The ninth and tenth spreading will be thrown everywhere which will bring twins ); ( Do not be standoffish toward bed makers. Invite us to eat red eggs (to celebrate a new childbirth) in ten months ) . The whole song is full of blessings and symbolic auspiciousness. When the bed is made, 8 years old) to sleep on it. It is called yachuang (pressing the bed). (In the past those children were expected to urinate on the bed. it is prohibited now because the new couple does not w ant to bear the smell of urine on new quilts). This ritual of bed pressing by young boys is a good luck measure to assist the new couple to quickly have a boy. The day before the wedding On the day before the wedding all arrangements must be completed. Th is includes the bed making, the decoration of the xinfang, etc. If the wedding ceremony is going to be held at home, relatives will come to put up a row of arch gates made with ide. Many red flowers (sometimes plastic, sometimes real) are hung on each gate. The arch he distance from the restaurant plaza to the main road. When the bride steps off the car, she is not allowed to step on the ground directly but on the carpet or some other

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217 covering. If the wedding ceremony is held in a restaurant, the arch gates and red ca rpet Besides setting up the place, as part of the service package, the company also provides shaving and hair cutting s ervices for the groom, and cosmetic service for the bride. Hair cutting and shaving will be done on the previous day, while cosmetic preparation of the bride is usually done on the morning of the wedding day. The bride is invited to go try on the wedding d ress before the wedding day. The Wedding Day At around 8 a.m. , the people who were expected to go with the groom to company sent someone to dress and make up the bride. A him. The cars were rented from private owners, not from the wedding company. This has become a new business in many cities in contemporary China. Someone buys a car not just for his own family but for commercial purpose. They sign a contract with a wedding company and agree to provide transportation services for wedding Yuan to 1,000 Yuan depending on th e model of the car. The companies choose the car model and color (red is most popular) carefully in order to maximize uniformity in the if the payment is large enough. The company can charge from 100 Yuan to 300 Yuan for each car used.

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218 The process of bring ing is called Jie qin ( ). It is a ritual that announces that the groom is at the most exhilarating moment of his life. If the two families live a very short distance from each other, the procession will take a roundabout way rather than go directly to transport the bride to th e xinfang . In times past the jieqin procession used to have two sedan chairs in Bozhou: one for the bride, and the other for the wife of her elder brother or cousin who was going to make up the bride. Eight men (or a minimum of four) would carry the sedan chair. Sedan chairs have been usually replaced by four door cars. Two door sports cars are even more desirable, but they cost more money. Traditionally, in addition to the sedan chairs and the relatives char ged with carrying them, the procession included four unmarried girls as attendants of the bride. These girls are called laibin ( , attendants to welcome guests). Their task is to carry the goods of bride price payments, such as siseli, baijiu (white liqu or), and so on . Another person lights fireworks. A band plays lively music. And a boy sits in the sedan chair for the bride . This boy symbolizes the hope that the new couple will have a male child in the near future. Hui tradition in theory forbids three of these elements, the hard liquor, the fireworks , and the band. A traditional Hui wedding ceremony is supposed to be quieter The purpose of the band is simply to reinforc e the festive atmosphere and to bring entertainment rather than to display musical prowess. The instruments they play are popular, such as drums, bo ( , Chinese

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219 violin), cha ( ), so na ( , Chinese trumpet), etc. The ban d is often composed of amateur musicians who make themselves available to add a musical element to events like funerals or weddings. Their performance can earn for them from 800 Yuan to 2,000 Yuan , depending on how long they asked to play. The melodies the y play are mostly pop songs with moods that match the atmosphere of a particular event. . A special feature of wedding ceremonies in Bozhou is that they are usually held before 12:00 pm. In some other areas, they are held in the evening, usually between er hun (second marriages) somewhat embarrassing for a man. first marriage is with a woman who had a marri age before whether she was divorced or widowed , he is viewed as losing face in the community. On the other hand he may enjoy a higher status at home if his wife is to some extent embarrassed at the situation. In any case, an er hun wedding is generally do ne in a low key manner. 00am. The company started to decorate the cars. The lead car, which is specifically for the bride and groom, m the company. Audi cars have a good reputation in China. Other cars in the procession were black Chevrolets or Toyotas. Two slightly overlapping heart shaped flower chains were put on flower was set in the middle and in front of a chain of smaller pink flowers. A red double happiness sign was put on each window of the car and two red plastic flowers with red silk ribbons were

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220 tied to the external rearview mirrors on both sides. Other ca rs simply had two side flowers (with ribbons) and the double happiness signs. At 10:00 a. m., the jieqin firework was lit when the cars started. The truck led the procession with the band. The loud noise which they made alerted all other cars and pedestrians as to what was going on. The procession did not take the shortest route but traveled along the widest and most heavily trafficked road . The procession moved at a slow speed. All passersby paid attentio n to them . Aunts of the bride opened the car door for the groom. At that moment, the gr oom needs to symbolically show siseli and fried guozi ). story building and the walls were as yet unpainted. The appearance of the house was a bit shabby but th e mood was delightful. Two sides of the front gate were posted with two double happiness signs, as was each door and window. The bride was on the second floor. The groom Tan had to figure out oir. As he proceeded toward the house, a path opened for Mr. Tan as the crowd of father was sitting on the left side of the square dinner table. Her mother was sitting on honored position that faced outside.

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221 ai (grandma), ba (dad), gave Tan a hongbao (red envelope/packet) containing 10,001 Yuan as the gaikoufei . help dress the bride. the moment at which Tan was first supposed to ask for the bride. However, the parents would not give up their daughter so easily. After drinking the tea, the four matchmakers were supposed to go upstairs to ask the bride to come out. This was the second request for her. The bride was supposed to insist on staying in her chamber. Then, the third was able to ascend to the second floor to ask the bride to come out. Four invited bridesmaids, who are called songbin , ( , other female relatives were blocking the door of the boudoir, however. Some of them were standing outside of the room while some were inside. They tested and teased the groom with questions such envelope containing 10 Yuan playful pushing in front of the door, the groom successfully edged his way into the chamber. At that moment, with songbin and the wedding company, the bride had almost

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222 finished getting dressed. Only one task remained, that Ta n was to complete: putting on her beautiful brand new red shoes. The clothing of the bride was completely westernized. Rather than a red dress, as is traditional among the Han or a black and green dress traditional among the Hui, Qing was dressed in a wh ite wedding gown. The bride was not supposed to step on the floor after completing her preparations. The groom went to the bed, picked up the bride in his arms, and took her downstairs. Friends and relatives were applauding and making a lot of noise. Afte r the groom placed the bride down on a carpet in the main room on the first floor, the bride ther was Qing herself who cried. She hugged her family members and wept lightly. and carry h is sister on his back to the car. But he did not. Qing herself walked towards the car instead. The groom was carrying a red umbrella over the bride. The one who opened the curtain of the sedan chair or the door of the car wa s the wife of a cousin of the gr oom. The woman who does this is supposed to have both parents alive and she is supposed to have a son as well. When taking the bride to the car or to the sedan chair, shang jiao qian ( , xia jiao qian ( , money for getting off the seda

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223 As mentioned earlier, one groom was so irritated that he turned back without bringing shang jiao qian shang jiao qian expected to upset ), i.e., he was a mean person said he had felt quite embarrassed, if not angry, when r. It delayed him for about 20 minutes. On the one hand, the questions were not easy to answer. On the other hand, it took so long that he was afraid that they might miss the auspicious time to hold the wedding ceremony before 12:00 pm. If that happened, i t could forebode disaster. Dowry goods had been moved to the xinfang before the wedding. Traditionally, dowry goods were supposed to be put on display in the procession. When the dowry goods have for convenience already been sent to the xinfang, it is the custom of some families to display the empty boxes of those goods during the procession. It daughter. Those goods included the above mentioned furniture, electron ics, and half of the siseli. Siseli was now returned to the new family. This included 10 boxes of white liquor, two carps, one lamb leg, and 20 small bags of guozi. The gift of carps is particularly important as it augurs a harmonious life and abundant wealth.

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224 The bride does not go alone with the groom in the jieqin procession. Traditionally, half an hour later. Those who come up to pick up the bride must be of the same gen eration as the groom (except for the matchmakers). Both the bride and the groom shared the back seat of the lead car. The young boy had moved to another car. When the motorcade arrived at the xinfang, open the car door and hold the arm of the bride. Since Tan does not have a sister, one of his agnate cousins undertook the task. This sister is supposed to have a son and both of her parents are supposed to be alive. She wears a red coat to symbolize an auspicious future. T an opened the red umbrella and held it over Qing as they walked from the car to the entrance of the building. some gifts such as a new fac ial towel and two packets of cigarettes . A gift is also given to the young boy who came along with the procession. This can vary from RMB 200 to Qing walked on the red carpet toward the xinfang already waiting. However, the door of the xinfang had not yet been opened for the bride. in law. The bride was in law would then come to open the door and give the b ride gaikoufei (the money given when new terms of

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225 address are used). When Qing began to knock at the door, however, she heard some yaya xingzi parents in law). Qing felt uncomfortable with that phrase suppress my individuality/personality would not succeed. In the end you will have to not give in. She was silently standing in fron t of the door and kept her mouth tightly closed. The embarrassing deadlock was broken by one female relative of the groom five minutes later who opened the door for the bride. As a matter of fact, she had been the one who had proposed closing the door to t he bride in the first place. Because of this is too strong for her to be an obedi ent wife, and that he had to work on that and When the door was finally opene d, all of the relatives entered into the new Yuan as the gaikoufei ba and ma respectively. Then the sister of Tan bride to the bridal chamber room of the newlyweds.

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226 Nao dongfang (to tease the bride) Nao dongfang ( ) or nao xinfang means to tease the bride (and groom) at the bridal room during the wedding ceremony. One ex planation of this practice sees it as a vehicle for establishing balance between the newlyweds and their relatives or friends. As the receivers of happiness, the new couple presumably has more happiness than the others, thus disturbing the balance among th em. Teasing the bride is a way of restoring the balance, or neutralizing the balance breaker. It could also be seen as a way of sharing happiness with some friends. It may also simply serve to preserve wedding traditions among the younger generation. The details of nao dongfang in Bozhou are somewhat unique. In most places it is usually done at night, whereas in Bozhou it is done right before the wedding ceremony. And in Bozhou it only lasts half an hour, whereas in other places it may go on for hours afte r the ceremony. Those who are allowed to tease the bride are mainly male cousins from the laobiao ( ). reports have been heard in recent years of brides being humiliated seve rely and even raped during nao dongfang. But in Bozhou close friends rather than other relatives of the groom are more eager to join in the teasing activity. Relatives of the bride may house a half excessive teasing by turning the wedding celebration into a virtual brawl.

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227 Nao dongfang towards Qing was comparatively light. More than 30 people, male an d female, friends and relatives, were crowded inside and outside the bridal room. The dazong was making a speech to the crowd and people in the audience were making noise. Qing, dressed in her white wedding gown, stood by the bed silently facing the corner standing one step away from the bride, interrupted the words of the dazong and tried to create a distraction. He pretended that he was going to ask the bride to light a cigarette for him and make his way towards her. The bridesmaids and matchmakers paid little attention to him. All of a sudden, he stepped forward kissing the left cheek of the bride and stepping back immediately. The bride was very shy and turned her head towards h er bridesmaids. One bridesmaid put her arms around her, and two female matchmakers raised their hands pretending to beat the prankster. Everyone but the bride burst into laughter, especially the fellow who had kissed the bride. Some in the group were even applauding him. The teaser pretended to avoid the beating by finding a way to escape. Two female relatives of the groom smiled and made way for him. Their smiles indicated that they saw such behavior quite often and felt no surprise. But as a shy person, Q ing was still too embarrassed to have a conversation with the prankster almost two years later. Fortunately for Qing, nao dongfang did not last very long and there were no further actions. All of the relatives were obviously aware of the introverted perso nality of the bride and realized that it was best not to continue. One suspects that the education level of the bride was also a factor. Most participating relatives and friends were less

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228 educated than the bride. Feeling inferior in this sense, they may ha ve been inclined to show more respect to her. After the nao dongfang at the new apartment of the newlyweds, all relatives and friends left for the restaurant. It was there that the actual wedding ceremony would take place, as well as the subsequent banque t. Feast/Banquet of a wedding The move from the new apartment to the restaurant was done in a way that combined the traditional with the new. Traditional weddings and banquets usually took for his wedding ceremony . If it is held in a restaurant, the bride is not required to go first to the xinfang. In rural and suburban areas these events are still usually held in homes, whereas in urban areas restaurants are now preferred. In addition to the wedding banquet, there is another meal called daike ( ). In Bozhou this meal is still usually done at home, less frequently in a restaurant. On the lunch of the actual wedding day is the formal one , referred to as hunyan ( , wedding banquet) or jiuxi ( , liquor banquet). The wedding rituals come to an end at the hunyan. There is a later dinner on the wedding day that is expected to be held at the held in a restaurant, this lunch banquet is now all that is required. After that, no further meal needs to be provided. but on a smaller scale. Usually, those who assisted the bride will be treated to a lunch

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229 huimen simply disperse and return to their own homes. However, both groups, those who went s parents to have the huimen lunch . Hui tradition , which means no pork. In a typical Han weddin g banquet, two items must ) and fish. Because of the Hui pork taboo, lamb chops ( yangpai in Mandarin) are served as a substitute. Hui and Han to all guests were ushered to different tables or they themselves chose their seats. Since people generally knew ea ch other, guests would be careful to sit at their proper ethnic table to avoid gossip. When they arrived from their new home to the restaurant, the newlyweds stood written in yellow on a red emblem hanging on the top of the restaurant gate. On that day there were three wedding ceremonies held at the same restaurant. Three new couples were standing separately, with a square poster on a whiteboard displaying the new ames. One relative and one classmate of the groom were serving as ushers. The tables inside the ballroom were organized into four categories and a tag was placed

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230 on each table: relatives of the groom, relatives of the bride, colleagues, and classmates & friends. Guests were easily able to find their table. There were two tables specifically set in the first row for parents and family members of the groom as well as for the matchmakers, for the yingbin and the songbin , and for relatives who escorted the b ride. (The parents, however, were absent). A long red carpet was laid on the floor in the middle of the two groups of tables, extending to a platform that had been constructed in the far corner of the ballroom. Two men were sitting behind the newlyweds, o ne for registering the gifts and hongbao ( uncle, who was not only good at calligraphy but also knew most guests. The registry for recording the gifts was a red book with a double happi ness symbol on it. This book will serve as a source document for the newlyweds in gauging their future social connections and obligations. They are expected to reciprocate with gifts of equal value in future events hosted by those who have given gifts toda y. (This will be further discussed below). The chief witness, as well as the host of the ceremony, is in principle supposed and Qing had not converted to Islam, there was to be no imam at this wedding. Tan instead had invited his boss, the highest authority in his company, to be the chief witness. Around 11:20 a.m., a crisis was looming. Most guests had arrived but not the chief witness. The auspicious time for the ceremon y was about to pass and they could not wait any more. They decided to start the ceremony immediately.

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231 Rituals of the wedding The emcee announced loudly through the microphone that the most solemn part of the wedding was starting. When the melody of Wagner through electronic speakers inside the ballroom, and a ten thousand crack firework was ignited outside the restaurant, the bride and the groom were standing at the far end of the red carpet. A cute little girl and a gentleman like little boy (the one who was supposed to urinate on the sheet of the wedding bed on the previous day) were in front of the new couple, holding flowers and spreading colorful confetti from decorated baskets in their hands. Bridesmaids were also spreading con fetti as well as candies behind the bride and groom. Keeping pace with the rhythm of the melody, the new couple slowly made their way through guests, whose eyes were all fixed on the procession, while the experienced emcee was speaking encouraging words of blessing to the new couple and to the audience as well. The emcee, a man from the wedding host company, was a program host at the local TV station. His voice was loud and clear and he used standard Mandarin, as had been requested, rather than the Bozhou dialect. It made the wedding more formal and elegant, to match the educational background of the groom and bride who were the pride of both families. Some in the audience were standing and others were sitting in their chairs, but without exception, all ent husiastically applauded the new couple. This exemplified the reputation of Bozhou for its enthusiasm and kind treatment of friends. There is a popular play on words: Bozhou ren bu bo ( bo concerned that they may be nicknamed misers.

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232 Standing on the platform, the bride and groom turned to face the audie nce. Two children finished their tasks as ushers and went back to their families. Four bridesmaids were standing on the both sides of the newlyweds, with flowers in hand. The emcee eloquently repeated words that he had spoken countless times in each weddin g ceremony, in a strong and confident voice: Dear friends and relatives, respectable leaders, and ladies and gentlemen, how are you doing! On this auspicious day, we are here witnessing the wedding ceremony of two distinguished young people, Mr. Tan and M s. Qing, the handsome groom, and the pretty bride. First, I must thank all of the distinguished guests for attending this wedding. Second, let me introduce myself. After shortly and humorously introducing himself, he turned to the bride and groom who were standing a little behind him to his left. He first praised the higher education they had received and then their physical appearance. After that, as is customary, he raised questions about how they met each other and when they fell in love. Obviously the emcee did not know Tan and Qing in person so that these routine questions did not get complete answers. Tan cleverly dodged the question by saying and a bashful smile, n ot saying a word. The clever emcee quickly caught on to the situation and immediately discontinued those questions. He switched to the next step, teasing the new couple. He asked someone to bring an apple tied to a string. An apple signifies peace in Chine se because the first phonemes of the two words are homophones. He raised the apple in the air and urged the new couple to eat it up but not touch it. In the beginning, the new couple felt so shy that they refused to comply. When the rest of the audience ur ged them on, they had no choice but to eat the apple. In the end, of course, their lips

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233 touched each other, provoking loud applause. When the apple was finished, the emcee brought a small candy for them to eat as well. Within 10 minutes the atmosphere had risen to an enthusiastic peak. Then he brought the atmosphere to yet another level, the traditional one. He witnessing their solid and faithful love in front of parents, relat asked the two young people to introduce their beloved one to the guests. When the ai ren ( loudly, he turned to the elicitation of vows. r happiness to him, give birth to son(s) and daughter(s) for sickness and in health, for richer or for poor When the affirmative answers were heard, the emcee called on a blessing from w in our country requires each couple to have a marriage

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234 marriage certificate at your hands, you can go to the end of the world; bringing the marriage certificate to your home Those words were a clear statement of the law governing marriage: a marriage must be registered. (We will see that this did not occur in the next two marriages to be described). The next step was supp osed to be a statement from the chief witness attesting to the marriage. Since he still had not arrived, the emcee simply mentioned but omitted this step. Of course, according to Islamic tradition, an imam should have been the witness. He is expected to sp eak a few words to legitimize the marriage from a religious and traditional standpoint. long feng tai ( , dragon and phoenix twins, meaning male and female twins), around this time no late evenings out socializing with friends and no holding hands with other women. The gr oom was urged to come home before 8 p.m. each day. The next step was to drink jiaobeijiu ( ), that is, to drink wine with their arms entwined. The bride and the groom were asked to face each other. One bridesmaid handed a tray with two glasses of red wi ne over to the emcee. He gave each of them a glass of wine and asked them to drink it up. They were using right hands to take the wine while their right arms were crossing over each other. Eye to eye, they drank the wine. (It did not occur to anyone to que stion whether alcohol is proper or not for Hui at that moment).

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235 a custom believed to have been brought from the West rather than a local tradition. The emcee took the box with the rings from his back pocket and handed them to the couple. er the emcee nor the guests noticed this anomaly, or were perhaps unaware of the practice of wearing wedding rings on the left hand. In the final step of the ceremony, the couple thanked the invited guests by bowing three times. In Han tradition the newly weds do not bow first towards the guests but rather toward heaven and earth first, then to their parents, and then to each other. Some Chinese Hui also follow this tradition. But the first bow is to Allah. What was done in this wedding, therefore, bowing o nly to the invited guests, violated both Han and Hui tradition. The emcee, however, was running the show. He did not ask about preferred procedures. He simply ignored the tradition. The emcee then announced that the banquet was about to begin. The guests were invited to return to their tables and enjoy the meal. Then the bride changed clothes from her white wedding dress to a tight red (auspicious) dress. Accompanied by the dazong, the bride and groom went to each table to propose a toast. They are suppose d to drink the traditional strong white alcohol like the guests being toasted. To maintain their sobriety, however, they often replace the liquor with cold water. After the feast, most guests simply returned home. The wedding ceremony was over.

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236 dding: A teenage marriage patterns. In the first place it illustrates what occurs in the case of a wealthy Han family whose child marries a less wealthy Hui spouse. Secondly, thei r wedding also illustrates a frequent occurrence in Bozhou, marriage before the legal age. In this sense their marriage illustrates conflicts between institutional marriage law and local customs. Thirdly, it underscores the dilemma, widespread in Chinese s ociety, of teenagers who have completed their required 9 year compulsory education and who, lacking other activities, become involved in romantic love or sexual adventures (but without proper sexual knowledge) . This produces many unprepared young parents a s well as unexpected children. The year 2010 was a wuchunnian ( , a year without spring within the solar year calendar ). It was therefore viewed traditionally as a bad year for a marriage. However, Yong could not wait anymore because his girlfriend was already pregnant. Thus two teenagers, both of them 17, got marri ed below the legal age and in a year that was considered inauspicious for a marriage. ee, utilized the wedding of his son as an occasion on which to demonstrate his wealth. Mr. L ee received only two years of primary school education. He studied martial arts with a master for several years in his youth. At the age of 19, with help from his friends and master, he st arted his medicine business. Now his business network has reached Shanghai and Guangzhou, the most prosperous medical cities. As a matter of

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237 fact, a Guangdong medical company has set up a branch at his store in the enormous medicine market of Bozhou. His s tore occupies a street corner with three gates. In general, one gate indicates at least RMB 2 million (around USD 320,000) in medical materials. The second floor of the store is set as a family inn specifically for his business part n ers . In the newly estab lished and government promoted medicine market, he bought 20 gates /stores (at half a million RMB per store), which cost him a total of about 1 0 million Yuan . His home wa s more like a palace rather than a condominium, the latter being the most popular resi dential style for urban residents. More than 10 rooms are located in the rear of the two storied building and 6 rooms in the two storied front yard. However, the decoration of the house for the wedding was visibly substandard. Except for the chamber room p repared for the bride and groom, the other rooms had almost no decorations besides the double happiness signs. The walls were colored either white or cement grey. It was clearly an old building. On the other hand the lavish jewelry which he gave to his so demonstrated the wealth of his family. Almost all fingers bore gold rings. The necklace wa s gold as well. And the bride was also wearing a jade male Buddha statue as a neck pendant. From the color and craftsmanship of the pendant, the jade was clearly of high value. Like the jade Buddha beads on his own wrist, it cost him about 500,000 Yuan . The wedding of his son Yong was completely Han style. One difference wa s that the tables were divided into Han and Hui tables in order to serve different food. But all tables were served with high quality white liquor. None of the guests whom I observed were wearing a white hat, the symbolic dressing of the Hui. Although the white hat is

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238 often worn on the street, flouting this kind of symbol was perhaps fel t to be inappropriate while drinking liquor or sitting in a room where forbidden food was served. served 18 kinds of dishes for each table. I was told that s ometimes there were as many as 12 dishes, so18 dishes was an exception. In accordance with Bozhou practice, no empty bowl or plate was given to guests until rice or noodle was present on the table. Each person had a pair of chopsticks, a spoon, and an empty cup (plastic or cera mic). The cup was not for hot water or tea but for liquor, though tea was also served with plastic cups. The procedure of the wedding ceremony itself was not significantly different from their marriage in advance. The emcee was not invited from outside or from a company but was a friend of Mr. L ee , an experienced dazong who knew the situation of the bride and groom. The dazong of course did not ask the new couple to bow to or worship Allah ; he could not do that since he was not an imam. There was no religious dimension to the wedding. invited to witness his marriage. On e Friday afternoon Ma and his agnate uncle made a Muslims congregate. Imam Chi in the Inner City Mosque agreed to witness it after confirming that the bride was willing to convert to Islam. went to the mosque. After Zhuma worship, all of them went to a side hall room of the mosque. Ma, with a white hat on his head, was wearing a white short sleeved shirt

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239 rather than a westernized business suit; the bride , Wei, with a pink scarf covering her head, was wearing a white long sleeved shirt. Both of them were wearing jean s and running shoes. Imam Chi, dressed in a white gown, was sitting on the rosewood co uch in the middle of the room. On the left side of the table, another imam, Sam , who came to pray male relatives sitting quietly. Two of them were holding video cameras to film the procedure individually. Two red certificates of Muslim marriage were placed on the tea table in front of Imam Chi. The certificate had a red leather cover and inside were double pages where some words were printed on both sides. On its cover page, it is a rhombus Islamic geometrical design in which a blank circle was embedded and the phrases of Islamic Marriage Contract in both Arabic and Chinese were printed within the blank circle. At ness and On the first inside page there were two rows of blanks for writing the names of the groom and the bride, the first blank being for the groom and the second for the Arabic name at page were the words Democratic Administration Committee of the Inner City Mosque at page was written: In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful Islamic Marriage Contract Master of Wedding Ceremony:

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240 The New Couple: Witness: Bride Price ( or dower): Guests: May Allah bestow happiness on the new couple All praise be to Allah, the Lord of the World At the start of the service imam Chi asked the two young people if, in accordance with Islamic marriage laws, the marriage was based on their own consent. When assured of their consent, he then explained in Chinese the meaning of Islamic marriage. He emphasized that Islam encourages marriage and condemns celibacy. He also said Islam requires the groom to pay dower ( Mahr ) to the bride as insurance for her wellbeing. At that point the imam asked the bride whether or not she had received the dower. When getting an affirmative answer, he moved on, though he did not enquire as to how much she received. observance of Islam. Allah is pleased to see that. I hope your conve rsion is not just for marriage, but also from the bottom of your heart. Allah will bestow happiness and appeared to have little knowledge of Islam, though before the zhuma Imam had taught her how to clean her body and how to worship. Imam Chi realized that as well. He added that she can learn Islamic knowledge step by step, and the door of Islam and mosque is open to her at all times. Imam Chi asked her whether she ca n recite the Qingzhenyan ( Shahada ) and then taught her again when he realized that she was not familiar with it.

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241 Then the imam recited a paragraph from the Koran in Arabic. The paragraph is yizhabu, s called Nikah, or in nian nü ge. The groom proposes to the bride in front of at least two witnesses, stating the details of Mahr . (But Ma did not reveal the amount of the dower). Repeating words said by the imam, the bride and groom demonstrat ed their free will by qubul sign their names on the second page of the certificate after Imam Chi signed his name. However, the new couple did not do that in front of witnesse s, but simply collected the certificate. that it does not matter whether one has a government registration or not. It is sufficient to have an imam as witness. That also co unts as a kind of registration. When the above rituals had all been completed, the new couple and their relatives stood up to open a bag with many kinds of candies inside. Imam Chi, rather than the newlyweds, grabbed some candies and passed them to all oth er guests as gifts. The whole process thus had been completed. They left the mosque together. I later learned that they did not call the Imam to preside over their civil wedding ceremony. The Economics of Gift Giving Gift giving is now usually done in th e form of cash rather than goods. It has an important role in constructing guanxi (social network or connection) in Chinese society (Gold T, et.al, 2002, Xin, K and Jone L. Pearce, 1996). As a reciprocal way of maintaining social connections, gift giving c an balance a relationship and strengthen a

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242 become a heavy burden for many families. In popular speech , an invitation letter from a friend or relative to celebrate some event is called fakuandan ( , a punishment ticket). year on average, or even more in some years. Currently, a one hundred Yuan gift is too small to give, though it is still acceptable in rural areas. An eld erly lady from a rural area told me that gift giving cost her family no less than 4,000 Yuan in 2011, which is more Yuan can be from 10% to 30% of his annual income, depending on the prosper ity of his business. He frowned and shook his head each time when he talked about his expenditures on gift giving. It is more difficult for families who cannot find a way to recuperate the gifts which they have given. Relationships may deteriorate and gr udges may arise if one side is become worthy of celebration. In Bozhou this can include life cycle moments such as the twelfth day after childbirth, the first birthday, t he third birthday, the twelfth birthday (some may even celebrate the tenth birthday), an engagement, a wedding, and a gathering for a deceased person on the seventh, fortieth, and one hundredth day after death as well as the first, third, and tenth anniver sary of death. On all of these events relatives and friends may be invited to attend. Leo told me two stories in this regard. The first is that one of his classmates sent them an invitation letter saying she was going to marry. When the friends arrived, s he

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243 told them she had been cut off from the financial support from her parents and had no other way than this to gather funds. The reward was to treat her friends to a dinner. On as waiting for his dog to give birth to puppies . I knew it was a joke. But it vividly expresses local feelings on the burdens of reciprocal gift giving. Sometimes, close relatives and friends may compete with each other to give more money as a symbol of c loseness. Other relatives and friends will rank behind them a bit and thus gift giving can express a social hierarchy. It has become a cultural convention with no relation to ethnicity or religion. A violation of these cultural conventions by giving more t han normal can offend other friends and relatives because it means that they also have to raise the size of their gifts. On some occasions, the host family has immediately returned part of the gift back to someone who gave too much. Breaking the establishe d balance and order by excessive generosity will not be well received by most parties concerned. ganba (similar to a godfather but without religious i mplications) and/or a ganma (godmother). A ganba ganma is usually the wife of a ganba. The occasion of confirming a ganba or ganma relationship may cost RMB 1,000 to RMB 10,000. The nts for a ganba and ganma. On those occasions they have to spend five or ten times the amount of money on gifts given by ordinary guests. To balance this kind of cost, it is common to see that close friends are often made ganba

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244 T he most striking fact is that the ganba relationship can cross religion and ethnicity. Based on their personal connection, a Han teacher from a middle school has taken the D ACM head of the CLS ganba. Surprisingly, I asked the teacher and the D ACM negative from both of them. But the teacher also said that the boy likes to stay with his ganba and learns something about the Hui . (only 1 0 years old in 2012) and to receive regular education is more important to him. My observations indicate that the reason that boy enjoys staying close to his ganba is partly because his ganba circles than his own father. Staying close to a Hui ganba also protects him from bullies at school. Sometimes he joins his Hui school mates in bullying other children. Gift giving for weddings is a major part of personal expenditures. Since Leo is a close friend of Tan, RMB 200 is too small a gift. He gave RMB 400, which was actually criticized by others who for the most part gave 600 Yuan (a more auspicious sum). ganba gave RMB 10,000. As a result, the earnings from the gift giving brought Tan more than RMB wedding was even more than that for many of Mr. L ee Control over monetary gifts from relatives and friends will vary by individual e has more control over the fund since most of the guests were his own friends and in the future he has to reciprocate. In contrast the funds collected in ee because as a young man Yong does not have to and he must be responsible for his own social connections. In other words, the role of

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245 Yong in the family business is relatively minor. Mr. L ee does not want to transfer his family le gacy (money) to his only son who is obviously still immature, even though his marriage indicated a step forward in terms of maturity. If an imam is invited to preside over a ceremony, he will be paid with some his relatives as well as Ma himself donated a certain amount of money to Imam Chi right on the spot. Since those attending were few in number, the donations to Imam Chi did not amount to much. quhuo songsi ( two occasions are the major source of income from families for services rendered. However, as Imam Chi lamented, the first function, quhuo (marriage), has disappeared. Requests for that are very few. An imam in a suburb of the capital city of Anhui Province told me in 2009 that he wa s never once invited to preside over a wedding during his nine years as local imam, even though the ummah of his mosque has more than 9,000 Hui individuals. Imam Chi had only two invitations in his first term at the mosque during 2002 2004. At present he h as been invited no more than 10 times in his second term, even though his influence has grown greater than ever. Huimen Huimen ( ceremony, is a c ustom that can be found in many cultures. Huimen , however, is not

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246 viewed rather as a symbol that the two individuals will always appear together as a couple, even tho ugh they have to separate themselves and live neolocally as a new independent family, which has now become the norm for newlyweds in China. In ordinary Han tradition huimen occurs on the third day after the wedding; Hui people in Bozhou have a different t iming for Huimen , such as, on the forth, sixth, or eighth day. The matter is negotiated between the two families. The third day is also an option for the Hui. On the morning following the wedding the new couple must rise early and prepare two cups of tea that the daughter in law has become a member of the family. In Han tradition the new couple should kneel down to offer the tea. In Hui tradition, however, kneeling down is not allowed: nobody but Allah deserves a genuflection. On the morning of huimen , the brother (whether elder or younger) of the bride is oil, however, now entails not just oil, but include s a set of brand new cosmetic products and some other goods which all are packed into a red suitcase. The mission of the Th e greeting and transporting of the new couple cannot be completed all at once stays put in the house. The brother will go out and walk around and then come back to ask the couple again. Only after the third or fourth invitation will the new couple go with

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247 the brother. A common explanation is that on that day the groom has to demonstrate that he is the boss and cannot easily be commanded to do something. But the new invite several friends with a high tolerance for alcohol consumption. Those friends must protect the groom from getting drunk, because the natal family of the bride must show their enthusi asm for the groom by feeding him the best food and alcohol. His companions are supposed to get drunk. In local terminology they have to come in vertically and exit horizontally ( , ). On the day of huimen, attend . It should be one feast i f it is held at a restaurant or two feasts on separate days if at home. To some extent, the feast for huimen is more ceremonious t han that of the feast will serve 10 bowls and 10 different food platters in the lunch of the first day and 10 bowls without platters in the other feast. During the meal the bride and groom must go from table to table to propose a toast. The guests should attempt to intoxicate the groom and his friends. For the sake of huimen was held in a restaurant. Tan and all his four friends complied with t radition by getting drunk while at table. In the month following the huimen, turn invite the new couple to a meal. The new couple is not required to bring any gift to those relatives. This gathering permi relatives, thus establishing and strengthening a closer bond between the two families.

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248 CHAPTER 6 FAMILY LIFE This chapter will look at how intermarried spouses deal with several domestic issues such as gender roles, cultural alignments, religious practices, as well as socioeconomic issues that arise in family life. Family life is a kind of art; its quality determines the depth and length of a marriage. As we shall see, the proper handling of domestic issues re quires higher skills in an intermarried family. Gender Roles in Family It is useful to discuss five historical transitions of the status of Chinese women since the 1840s. The fifth transition will be addressed in detail. That will pave the way for a descr norms concerning gender. Five Status Transitions of Chinese Women in Modern China different crite movement in China can be traced back to the 1840s when the closed gates of the feudal 1 Qing dynasty were forced open. Some male politicians initiated a movement called Constitution 1 One can question the terms t , was not incorporated into Chinese until the late 19th or early 20th century when Japan first translated the term into Japanese, It was later adopted by Chinese scholars when translating works from Jap an. Since Japanese largely uses Chinese characters in the writing system, many Chinese translators did not generate a new term to match the meaning of the original term but simply adopted the original Japanese term. However, the connotation of the two word s is different. Therefore, questions concerning the definition of feudalism and its origins in China have been matters of controversy among Chinese scholars since the 1980s. Li & t that time. One could Instead, it was instead aimed at helping their political reform movement through attracting more attention to resisting traditional poli tical institutions and, to some extent, its ideological basis, Confucianism.

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249 nogamy and were opposed to foot (p. 138) the Constitutional Reform and Moderni (ibid) in 1898. The second attempt to alter the status of Chinese women was made during the May Fourth Movement (in 1919), which is viewed by many scholars as the most profound revolution in Chinese social thinking. Topics about wo and foot participants, and intellectual discussions, to social institutions including schools, acknowledged concern and attracted a great deal of scholarly energy and output. However, female participants were still few. And more importantly the discussions and ibid: 138 ). The fundamental patriarchal social structures and ideologies were still unquest ioned. The third revolutionary phase is marked by two historical events: the establishment of the Communist government in 1949 and the implementation of the first Marriage Law in 1950. Chinese women were then for the first time legally guaranteed the same rights as men, including the equal right to choose their own spouse and file for divorces. They were allowed and even encouraged to work outside their homes and

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2 50 which bel ibid: 139 ) led some of the Western feminists and Chinese male therefore, had no pr :139 , see also Judith Stacey 1976), although some scholars disagreed (e.g., Li & Zhang 1994, Shu 2004, etc.). However, we have to admit the fact that the position of women in society had significantly improved in both economy and ideology during the 1950s in comparison with the past. blossoming that took place after the late 1970s. Under the pressure of extreme policies (such as fertility contro l) and the strong impact of the new emphasis of seeking wealth (1994 : 139 [T]he first includes female infanticide impell ed by the birth control policies, and abduction of women by illegal traders, commercial marriage by which education opportunities for girls and young women in rural areas. The most ri diculous assertion is that those problems disappeared after the issuing of the Marriage Law in 1950. The consequence of these persistent phenomena common male superiority still is in China, even after women allegedly have been (ibid) employees who lose their positions for discriminatory reasons or otherwise, female college graduates who find it difficult to get employment, and women who are shut out (ibid) The problems reflected above show that

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251 women rights such as equal education, employment, and political administration obtai ned in the past thirty years have been gradually lost. In other words, the claim of impossible to achieve in the context of patriarchal culture, despite communist disc ourse. millennium. When fertility control policies were implemented all over the country, a secondary consequence was that girls (especially in urban areas) were given more opportunities for education. As a result of more education, a contradictory trend has , old and unmarried) in cities. At the same time, imbalances in the sex ratio (some places have soared to 120: 100 male/female ratio or more) increase panic and fears of guanggun ( , celibacy) among young males and their parents. An offshoot of this is that women with lower education have a privileged position in the marriage market while women who received higher education have a harder time in the marriage market. More and more women in urban areas prefer to remain single rather than demean themselves by marrying a less educated man perceived as having a lower level of refinement, although they frequently receive pushes from their parents and other friends to compromise. (Yeung 2014, To 2013, Gupta et al 2010, Fong 2002, etc.) Job opportunities available for women can generally support their independence. Along with the increase of working opportunities brought by rapid economic development, gender differences with respect to job participation in private enterprises are not impressive. This does not mean that gender discrimination is disappearing. It instead takes the form of discrimination by the age and physical appearance of women

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252 rather than discrimination against all women. Younger, educated, and better looking women can find a job more easily, whether being employed or self employed. Additionally, parents in their forties are still in the prime of life and ar e able to support their only child if they are holding a position in some enterprise or organization, including government. As a matter of fact, such parents are now the major contributors for paying the mortgage on a new house for their children. As we di scussed before, a new house is now a must for a male seeking to get married. Many women have simply given up on the effort to fight for equal pay in the some young girls prefer to become the mistress of some rich and successful men rather than to go to work. Currently, extramarital affairs have become a major problem not only for many families, but also for government and society, because many government cadres are involve d in such entanglements and their families are dissolved. The Furthermore, many old concepts held by women in the past have changed substantially, such as traditional norms regarding the virginity of a girl before marriage. It is still preferred but not a major obstacle for many young men if the girl lost her virginity before marriage. Cohabitation before marriage is widely practiced and accepted for both male and female you ngsters and their parents. In fact, the cheapest family inns and lower quality hotels surrounding college campuses are always booked by young lovers, although they are supposed to live in campus dormitories. Cohabitation is a more common phenomenon among f armer workers in cities. (Gaetano 2008)

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253 However, married women in smaller cities, particularly in rural areas, have not experienced a major change in their social status. In the first place, they spend most of their time raising children and doing housewo rk when not at their salaried job. Their husbands may go to coastal cities as peasant workers. If they stay at home they will not help out in household chores. Housewives have to work hard to make a living for their families despite unequal payment even if in cities they go out to work side by side with at reserve of labor power in China"(Mao 1977, see Hooper 1984). Quite frequently married women are left behind in the village with elderly grandparents to do agriculture works while their husband and younger children emigrate to the cities to do factory o r construction work. And as is also true of new The Gender Culture of Bozhou Women Bozhou women are bold and less inhibited. They widely violate the stereotype of Chi nese women who have received thousands of years of Confucian influences. In Confucianism women are expected to be soft spoken and obedient to males, especially , i.e., the ruler guides his subjects, the father guides his sons, and the husband guides his wife. In some Confucian texts, a woman must be obedient to not just her husband, but also to her son. Almost n one of this is visible among Bozhou women. On the c ontrary one frequently encounters women in positions of informal power. With respect to the value

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254 drink as much as or even more than men. As a warning given by Leo who was trying to ject of flirtation from any Bozhou woman.) It is more common to see the dominance of women in domestic affairs. practices martial arts, his wife Red practically dominates everyth ing at home as well as outside. Once a female graduate student from a renowned Chinese university came to do fieldwork on traditional Chinese medicine, and Leo was asked to be interviewed as a medicine dealer. During the interview at a hotel, Red burst int o the room and spoke to graduate student but rather completely ignored her. This could be interpreted as the jealous reaction of a woman in love. At home, Red decides on practical ly everything, is rare to see her smile when she talks to her husband. To some degree, Leo is like an employee of Red in the medicine business, and Red is like a hen watching her nest at all times or like a queen issuing orders to Leo. boxer, Hassam was still in very good physical shape when I met him in 2008. His religious observance also e arns for him a good reputation among other Hui. This s restaurant. After marriage he appeared to occupy the dominant role at home and left home for early morning martial arts practice

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255 (from 2 AM to 4 AM) almost every morning. In the beginning his wife did not feel alarmed at his early morning practice because she knew he did this since they started to date. She later became worried when Hassam also left for practice when it was raining. On one occasion she follow ed him in a car and was astounded to find that he was going to meet his mistress. A domestic war thus broke out. The woman was forced hands after that conflict. Since 2010 his athletic physique disappeared. From his current appearance, it is hard to imagine that he was once a very good kick boxer. Each time when we went to his restaurant, he was very tame in the presence of his wife. too old, they can run their family inn on their own. Neither Guan nor Ting needs to go out to make money, though Guan does hold a position in the Bureau of Urban Order Maintainer ( ). Ting did not do any work at ho me. She delivered two children after they got married in 2007. To some degree having children was her major job in the past years. This gives her a superior domestic status. But at the same time, she does not give the impression of being happy with her sta tus. Over the years I never saw a smile on her face when I talked with her. She can hardly be called a childbirth machine. The age disparity between her two children is about 3.5 years, the first having been born in 2008 and the second in 2011. Despite her high status as a fruitful mother, her life seems neither fulfilled nor enjoyable. She has lost contact with most of her friends. She is unable to receive psychic satisfaction from any successful career. Though she is Hui she has virtually no familiarity w ith religious traditions, particularly in view of the decline of Islamic belief and practice in the community and the mild disapproval given to the

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256 presence of a woman at Islamic events. Therefore, she often feels unwanted and invisible in her own home, va lued only for being the mother of two children. Her superior domestic status gives her little satisfaction. Of course not all women enjoy her superior status. Qing does not enjoy that kind Hang serv ed as a sailor on a cargo ship before marriage. After marriage she gave up all personal career interests to pursue a role as a full time housewife. She collections. She prepa res meals for guests but is not present at table during the meal. After the meal it is her responsibility to clean the table and to make tea for the guests. From the perspective of an observer, she has the appearance more of a servant than of a hostess. Sh e is playing a somewhat traditional Confucian role enforced since the Ming Dynasty. Females must be obedient to all males. She does not have a beautiful face or st. Even with such trust on the part of Damon, however, she is functioning more as a trustworthy housekeeper. Their relationship is clearly imbalanced. Damon has two children with Hang. But it might also be true, as he confided to me, that the child of hi s former mistress Min also is his. He showed the picture of that relationship betwee character. It could also be a product of the toughness of Damon as well as Min. Min is running a successful medical business. She simply gave a share of RMB 10 million to

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257 Damon as a gift, though Damon almost has no knowledge about the medicine business. What he focuses on is still martial arts training as well as the security of the Buddhist temple. His wife had a quarrel with Damon when she learned of the secret relationship between him a nd Min, but she did not get the hoped for confession. Damon only admitted that they are business partners and nothing more than that. This answer of course obviously did not satisfy Hang, but she did not take further steps, such as requesting a divorce. Th is stems partially from her position of economic dependence and partially because she could not bear the loss of her two children. She appears to have accepted the relationship between Damon and Min if it is kept in bounds. Cultural Alignment of Domestic B ehavior Almost without exception, the Han spouse must respect and follow the Hui spouse in the family if the Hui spouse is committed to religious and ethnic observances. init any pork at home. A commitment in that regard was made at the time of the engagement parents can go out to eat pork and other prohibited food but not at home. The dinner to which the whole family treated me was held in a Hui restaurant, though the extent of qingzhen of th e restaurant is doubtful. religion seriously. She has never entered a mosque after the one occasion on which her father brought her to the mosque when she was 7 or 8 years old. Except for the food

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258 taboo she and the members of the new family are not required to change any of their chabuduo, haixing, morning martial arts practice before 2008, she gives him a great deal of freedom to go to the mosque, to do physical exercise, and to participate in other activities. His wife insists on only two things: she takes charge of the restaurant business (which means she takes charge of finances in the family) and he must get her consent for any major dec ision. Therefore Hassam can go freely to the mosque to pray and he is allowed to go talk to the imam in the XGS at his convenience. Absolutely no pork is served in the restaurant, but alcohol is openly served. No alcohol no business is a well recognized law for restaurant runners in Bozhou, even including restaurants that specialize in Lanzhou lamian (Lanzhou style Islamic noodle). The chief judge of the Bozhou court, Mr. T o ng, told me of an interesting As an observant Hui family, his wife o ng likes sister cooks pork for him when he visi ts her family. They have set aside for him a special set of eating utensils including a bowl, chopsticks, and an alcohol cup. Her family does not use them unless he is visiting . family is not so observ ant of their tradition, the situati on is more flexible. This is the case, for example, with a Hui woman cadre named Chen. She

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259 is a veteran and now works in the economics unit in the local government. She has no knowledge about Halal nor even of the location of mosques in Bozhou. She never h eard of xiyangzhang, the proud Hui martial arts tradition in Bozhou. In the beginning I doubted whether she was really a Hui or even really native to Bozhou. Clearly her family did descend from Hui according to her family history and her official ethnic ID card. However she openly asserts that she is a jia Hui fake Hui ) because she eats everything and does not observe any religious practices. When she told us the story about the special meal prepared for her by her supervisor when she was in military s ervice, she felt embarrassed after bursting into loud laughter in front of us. This attitude is understandable because her mother is a Han and her husband is a Han as well . Nonetheless her child is registered as a Hui. To respect and follow Hui customs at home makes sense for intermarried Bozhou Han, though not all Han people necessarily agree. A Han cadre who was a colleague of why force them to eat pork?! It is like accepting only the strong points of an individual seemed to be implying that eating pork is a fault according to his metaphor. He peeked nervously at the Hui listeners, Ting and Leo, but re laxed when he saw that they did not react. He then clarified his opinions, saying that everything about the Hui is good. A couple of minute s earlier, actually, he had shared his ideas about the Hui and ethnicity there was no minzu. Dividing people into minzu and religions was a requirement of rulers ; on earth Hanzu (Han nation) or Huizu (Hui nation)? All of us are zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation) ;

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260 is enough (and it is unnecessary to cl assify people into nations or religions) ; Because we have to live side by side with each other, it is better to respect their However, there are some exist ing factors that prevent a Han from marrying a Hui. More than one Han individual told me that if a girl is married to a Hui family it to her household; it would be inconvenient for her and her relatives to eat together. If she may be interrogated by her Hui family whether she ate pork at her natal haixing words, they have to follow Hui food traditions whether they like it or not. It is nonnegotiable, unless the Hui spouse does not want to follow his/her tradition either. Otherwise, it would create domestic tension and the Han spouse must capitulate. In extr eme cases it could lead to a divorce. Fortunately this outcome rarely more than five cases of divorce. She did tell of one case that had happened five years earlier, inv olving an observant Hui girl who discovered her husband eating pork outside with his friends. Her husband refused to admit it. She thus returned to her natal home until he promised that he would not eat pork anymore. However, he could not keep his promise and again drank alcohol and ate pork. This time his wife grabbed all her personal belongings and returned to her natal family. In addition, she asked her brothers and some relatives to beat up her husband. Then she demanded a divorce, to which her husband quickly

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261 acquiesced. The two families severed all contact. The man was afraid to report his injuries to the police and has avoided all Hui people since then. Religious Practice in the Family Religious practice in an intermarried family is more likely when t he couple got married in a religious wedding ceremony. For the most part religious observance will be found only in a family where the non Muslim spouse had converted to Islam at the time of marriage. Han who did not convert usually do not observe Islam a t all. My interviews and observations indicate that most non Muslim spouses never attend mosque after their marriage, though most of them switch to Hui ethnic identification. Even more problematic from the perspective of observant Muslims, the Muslim spou ses in mixed families do not go to mosque either. Some Hui individuals like Leo, who considers himself as an atheist, had even asked his child and wife not to go to mosque (before my contact with them). Later he changed his mind and suggested for his child to go to mosque to observe the fast breaking feast of Ramadan in 2012. His son, however, did not go, though he admitted to me later that he is interested in learning more about the Hui customs. Leo himself also got instructions from Hassam about how to pr ay. He later did his first prayer together with Hassam and the Imam at the XGS mosque . However, not all intermarried families behave in this fashion. Some intermarried families do observe Islam to some degree. The chemistry teacher in a junior middle sch ool, Mr. Moore , converted to Islam at marriage. His spouse, a Hui girl in Bozhou, was his college classmate. He moved to Bozhou thereafter. It turns out that his observance of Islam is much more advanced than most of those who were born Hui. He would come to mosque almost every Friday. His prayer was always done silently and

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262 properly. He hardly communicated with anyone else except former Imam Chang and lately Imam Chi . Sometimes he brought his son to the mosque as well. From the conduct of the child in the mosque, it is apparent that they pray at home as well. His wife, a Muslim woman in an elementary school, was active on the Muslim virtual community. She joined and organized some projects during 2011 and 2012, until the decline of the community in 2013. B ut she admitted that her husband, the Han man, was more observant than she herself. Sometimes he urged her to worship and reminded her of some ethnic/religious events. However , this phenomenon is rare in intermarried families. It is clear that the religio us observance of the non Muslim spouse is highly affected by the attitude of the Hui spouse. If the Hui spouse does not make a clear request or practice the religion strictly, the non Muslim spouse usually would not take the initiative to do so. Particula rly for the non Muslim female, it is more difficult to observe the religion. This is in part because the worship requirements for Muslim women are less visible than those of men. Men have a large mosque in which to worship. With the exception of China, how ever, Muslim women around the world do not have their own separate mosque. The fact that Chinese Muslim women have their own mosque does not s are a relatively small appendage to the mai n mosque. In Bozhou, there is only one relatively From its appearance, it is independent, because the mosque has its own locale and its own imam, rather than being embedded with in a mosque for men. However, this

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263 religious affairs. The worship is not led by the woman im am either ; instead, the male imam in the Beijing Mosque leads the worship through a wired speaker set up in the The female imam receives her payment from the D ACM of the Beijing Mosque. And she is not invited to do zoufen (veneration for deceased ancestors/relatives) or to preside over a wedding ceremony. In fact, almost no Muslim would invite her for those rituals. Her major role appears to be that of washing the body of deceased women in preparation for burial. In this vein the religious life of women is generally less visible and less demanding, though we cannot say that they are therefore less observant. As a fu rther point, except for the Friday prayer for which all Muslims are expected to congregate in the mosque, other prayers are based on self consciousness and discipline. According to Islamic doctrine, with the exception of the two angels above your two shoul ders nobody will physically come to supervise you. It is difficult to assess whether a particular person seriously practices Islam at home or not. Judging from their daily conduct and scant knowledge about Islam, I would assume that most of them do not o bserve Islam at home. Social and Economic Life in the Context of the Family There has been much scholarly research on the Importance of socioeconomic factors in determining the role of women within families. Feminist scholars in particular have focused att ention on the strategies that women mobilize to pursue equal rights and power within the context of the family. Blumberg (1988), for example, proposes several

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264 hypotheses about gender stratification. It will be interesting to compare her findings with those that emerged in my own fieldwork. (1988:54) Additiona lly, she points out that control over resources, rather than sole ownership, is the key parameter that governs whether women will have economic power. My fieldwork unearthed empirical data that supports this general argument. For example, Red is not owner of the family resources. But she nonetheless controls the to her. Despite her power, one cannot say that she is in total control of the family business. All medicine mu acts more like a professional m anager or supervisor whose major duty is to guarantee the stability of the business. That is to say, she is not an independent economic actor, though she gives the clear appearance of dominating family life. The situation of Ting, Hang, and others is simil ar to that of Red. The wealth of the Their public status remains more or less subordinate . is able to control almost everything in the family and in the restaurant itself after the

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265 and in running the family business. Their relative status vis à vis each other has b een completely reversed. Qing has her own job in a government division rather than a private or state owned enterprise. Although her position is not important within her working unit, she does have an independent source of income. This, however, does not bring her automatic equality at home. In the first place, her husband Tan has a higher salary (in fact, one of the highest in state owned companies). His high salary can ensure a prosperous family future. In addition, in early 2013.he took out a mortgage o n a new apartment in the capital city of Anhui province. He claims that this is in order for his son to go to a better school in the capital city rather than in backward Bozhou. Secondly, the infant baby rather than go to work. They think the most important duty as a married woman is to take care of the offspring. They asked Tan several times to urge Qing to resign from her job. It made Qing very uncomfortable and she firmly refused each t private). In short, she exerts control over certain parts of the domestic economy, but not overt all. It gives her some freedom and independence. But as the salaries of the two are not on the same level, they have unequal status at home. Because of this Qing feels dissatisfaction with some aspects of her life. concerning the impact of income on female power. However, there are other catalyzed by a specific incident -not necessarily related to

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266 the variable of economic power economy is a reflection of her strong personality as well as of the guilt of Hassam. Her ability in business certainly contributes to her current power as well. But the cause effect dynamics cannot be attributed to any pre existing power on her part within the domestic economy. What she has overthrown is a Confucian patriarchal ideology result of her personality rathe r than the independent control of resources posited as a prerequisite in feminist theory. of her lack of economic power. It may be safer to say that she is restricted by pat riarchal tradition and ideology. Even if her salary were higher than that of Tan, it might not guarantee her a higher status at home. By now it has become a common practice, at least among urban couples, for the wife to control the income of the husband. That is, the wife keeps the cunzhe (bank account passbook) of the husband and allocates a daily or weekly allowance to him. Most families do not have a credit card to permit overspending. It is now seen as the over the cunzhe to the wife. There are income. Anecdotes also abound about husbands secretly retaining over part of his income. Such stories are heard among the young and the old, and in urban and rural

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267 which the husband retains. This is particularly p How have women come to enjoy this control over the domestic bank account? In the first place, traditionally, all household income was supposed to merge into one fund , unless the family property was formally divided. In a big, extended family (especially before the era of the one child policy), the fund was controlled by the head of the extended family, usually, a grandfather or grandmother with family authority. smaller nuclear family, however, the new couple can act with financial independence. Therefore, after marriage, many new couples put their cunzhes together and manage them via mutual negotiation. That accounts for the emergence of the separate h ousehold bank account. Secondly, for those who take out mortgages on a new house, this kind of merged family fund gives a higher guarantee of timely payments. Third, many wives have found that husbands with too much money get involved in extramarital affa irs. It is safer for family unity to bring most of his income under spousal control. Finally, the man with less spending money comes under less pressure from friends to i nacceptable except in metropolitan cities like Shanghai or Beijing. The one who initiated a dinner invitation is always expected to pick up the bill. Some men are too poor to afford this; others are too stingy to accept the custom. Pointing out that his wi fe controls his income gives him an excuse, though he may lose some face. However the control of the family bank account does not guarantee women an equal or superior social position in the family. It may be a necessary but not sufficient condition.

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268 Prob ably for that reason, Blumberg gives her second hypothesis to compensate: Relative male/female economic power varies and not always in the same direction macro continuum. These levels extend from th e male/female dyad, to the household, the community, the class, the ethnic group, the state and even our world capitalist economy. (1988:55) In other words, societal or structural power is more important in determining the role of a woman in the family. Th macro levels influence the micro levels more than vice versa once they emerge (1988:55) In contemporary Chinese culture, this process has taken form of a collapse or a partial change in t raditional patriarchal ideology. According to Fincher (2014), however, the (gradually) collapsing patriarchal culture has been intentionally restored in political sheng nu emerge d in China in the recent decade as male power has been reasserted on the basis of gender considerations per se rather than on the basis of economic power. The status of Bozhou seems not to have been affected by this new gender culture. Blumberg has yet a (1988:55) And there are two interpretations: he r fertility pattern will reflect her own perceived utilities and preferences (rather than those of her mate, family, state, etc.). The greater her relative economic power, the greater her control over a variety of divorce, sexuality, overall household authority, and various types of household decisions. (1988:55) Although the second interpretation may hold in other societies, it emphatically no longer reflects Chinese social reality. The fertility of Chinese women is under the control

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269 its One Child Policy and its requirement that even married couples get governmental permission to have their one and only child, has overridden other causal factors in the determination of female fertility.

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270 CHAPTER 7 CHILDREARING AND ETHNO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION This chapter discuss es how intermarried families raise their children, particularly with respect to the transmission of ethno religious knowle dge. Education takes place in three contexts: family, school, and social events. The education level and ethno religious awareness of the intermarried couples themselves partially determines what kind of education their children will receive. I will pay p articular attention to the social environment insofar as it affects the transmission of ethno religious knowledge. Ethnic Identification(s) of Children in Intermarried Families The first matter to discuss is the establishment of the ethnic identification of children who come from intermarried families. In the introductory chapter I discussed the difference between the concepts of ethnic identity and ethnic identification. This distinction, as I will be operationalizing it in these pages, is critical for th e following the set of labels, which others apply to the individual or th awareness. This self awareness, however, is heavily influenced by, and expressed through, linguistic labels. So in my discussion I will focus on ethnic labeling practices . To begin, it is use identification must be clearly established at birth. It is not a matter of voluntary self reporting, but rather a legal issue. Some choice is allowed in the case of children of ethnically mixed marriages. After every birth in the PRC, a birth certificate is issued and

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271 the ethnic identification of the neonate is specified on the certificate. However, laws were issued in 1981 and revised in 1990, followed by amendments in 1986 and in 2009 that permit the ethnic identification of an individual of mixed parentage to be confirmed and changed. The parents may decide to confirm or change the identification of the chi ld up until the age of 18. From the ages of 18 through 20, the children themselves 20 th birthday, no more changes are allowed . In practice, however, it is more compli cated. There was no discussion of children ethnically mixed family before 1980, because, firstly , ethnic identity as well as religious identity was suppressed by the Chinese government and few people were willing to take the risk of publicly pro claiming their ethno religious identity; and secondly , many observant Hui avoided intermarriage with non Muslims and thus intermarriage was not so common . Even if accepted by a Muslim family, the non Muslim spouse would first have to c onvert to Islam at marriage. Given that the rules governing ethnic identification were not clearly defined , i n case of intermarriage, according to tradition , a Han marrying a Hui would be viewed and naturally identified as a Hui, and their children wer e na turally identified as Hui as well their religious identity. From 1980 onward when favorable policies offered by the S tate benefited minorities, minority status suddenly became desir able. Thus, the ethnic identification of children gradually became an issue. Those favorable policies include the exemption from one child per family policy, a lower threshold for university entrance, more

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272 opportunity to be promoted in a state owned workin g unit (company, school, or government), etc. Minority status facilitated a more successful future for a child. Those special benefits aroused the interest of many Han, who determined to achieve minority status for themselves and their families. Th us, the government has to issue amend ments to plug loopholes (e.g. in 1986, 2009) . T he new policy was designed to stop the majority Han from wrongly identifying as minorities. In r ecent years, the media have paid particular attention to minority who took the gaokao. The g aokao in China is a nationwide exam, the only way to access higher education. Each year the Ministry of Education announce s the invalidity of the scores of students who took the gaokao with fraudulent minority identification. As a punishment such students are not allowed to take the gaokao again for the following two to five years. The person who helped the student change the ir ethnic identification usually receives equivalent punishment. In 2008, for example, a director f or the Bureau of Education in a county of Hubei Province was removed from his office because he fabricated a fraudulent Hui identification for his son, though his family is completely Han (Zhan 2008) . S imilar cases are still frequently reported and exposed each y ear. In light of the desirability of minority status, almost no child from an intermarried family is identified to be a member of majority Han. All children from intermarried families in my investigation are registered as Hui. Other research echoes my find ings ( e.g., Gladney 1996, Zang 2005, Ma 2004 ). The u nidirectional nature of the ethnic identification change from Han to Hui, never the converse clearly reveals parental intention. This phenomenon is at odds with two other patterns that have been found in

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273 some other parts of the world: 1) usually change of identity is from minority to majority (Nagata 1974) ; 2) social capital theory generally holds that majority status confers more opportunity for success (Lamont & Lareau 1988, Goulbourne & Solomos 2003 , Perna & Titus 2005) . Many Chinese Han are intent on obtaining for themselves minority status. It is analogous to the advantages that come from being a member of the Communist Party. Membership in the CPC opens the door to promotion to the highest positi on in an institution. Likewise, to have a Han status in many ethnic autonomous regions in China means an individual is eligible to be promoted to the highest leadership position ( which is always the shuji (secretary) of the Party 1 ). In contrast as a membe r of the majority group but living with minorities, some Han in Moso area found that their majority status was causing harm rather than good in terms of gaining access to some opportunities which were only open for minorities. (Shih 2003) ssion of social capital potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less (1983) His treatment focuses on the practical advantages to possessors of social capital and the (Portes 1998). In a multiethnic society, therefore, majority status is generally preferred because it co nfers more benefits. Even when minority status confers benefits, it is generally 1 In the bureaucratic administration system in Chinese government, the operational leader, who is usually called the xingzheng lingdao (administrative leader) and usually runs th e institution, may not the leadership (or the supervision) of the Party. Usually, the secretary of the Party in a dan wei (working unit) represents the Party.

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274 crucial for success to speak the majority language. For example, some research shows that minority students in northwest China are more capable of achiev ing success in their future if they study the Chinese language as well (Ma 2004, Wu 2006 ). Those who only study their own ethnic language have limited college and career opportunities. This seems to apply in multiethnic societies around the world. Large scale ethnic classific ation has been conducted by the S tate in other regions, such as Manchu in Hebei or Liaoning (Shi 2009:118 121) , and Hui in Fujian (Gladney 1996, Fan 2012) . However most ethnic identification changes have occurred among the Hui, rather than other ethnic gr oups, though the Hui are not the largest ethnic minority in terms of population size . Why have the Hui become the favored ethnic group for Han ethnicity change? Obviously, their location all over China can contribute to that. But this is not the only reaso n, because Manchu can also be found all over the country. However, the reported cases of fake ethnic identifications among the Manchu are apparently fewer than among the Hui. I do not have a solid answer for it. One contributing factor could be a special p rivilege given only to the Hui: They do not have to cremate their dead. The permission to be buried is particularly attractive to many older Han. To burn the body into ash in Islam means that the individual committed some unforgivable sin when he/she was a live. Respect for a dead body is also very important to most Han Chinese, especially to those influenced by Zen Buddhism, which values burial. 2 Without a physical body, the soul or ghost cannot rest in peace. The ghost cannot be reincarnated and may wande r around causing harm to the living. For this 2 P reserving the body of Chairman Mao is not a Chinese tradition but an Orthodox tradition borrowed from the former Soviet Union. F rom the view of traditional Chinese ideology , h owever , cannot rest in peace .

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275 specific reason , the Hui permission to bury is so attractive that many elderly changed their ethnic identification from Han to Hui at Yimen Town, 30 miles away from urban Bozhou (Cui 2005). The instrumental mo tives behind ethnicity manipulation became clear during the Qing dynasty and the Cultural Revolution when the Hui hid their identity for fear of persecution. For a long time, particularly during the Qing dynasty, the Hui in Fujian province hid their identi ty from the government until the 1980s. They could do this because by that time, they had assimilated both physically and culturally to the Han (with the exception of not sa c rif icing their ancestors as the Han do). They also intermarr ied wi th the Han. The only evidence they could marshal when they later wanted to reclaim Hui identity came from the genealogical records. Family Education of Ethnic religious Knowledge It will be useful to provide some ethnographic observations on ethnic religi ous education within the family . Child can take place in the family, in school, and in society at large. S chool education is formal education, family education is informal education, and social education is non formal education. Family educa tion is family education. In a religiously or ethnically mixed family, the ethnicity as well as the religious belief(s) of both parents can contribute to the forma tion of the child. Mr. Woods is raising a nephew. His marriage produced two daughters; but neither survived for more than three months due to genetic factors. For this and for other reasons ( C hapter 8), they divorced. He lives with his elderly parents , and his nephew, the son of his divorced and disabled younger brother.

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276 The ways he fosters the boy (born in 2002) shows elements of ethnicity, religion, and influence from the social environment. Mr. Woods is highly sensitive to ethnicity. He makes the b oy wear the symbolic white hat at home but not necessarily at school, death. He frequently emphasizes the difference between the Hui and the Han with the terms Huimin (Hui people) and Hanmin (Han people) . big meat ( , permi ssion to play outside with two little friends who are ethnic Han. Later the boy began making more Hui friends at school. The above concerns ethnicity. His religious requirements for the boy, however, are not so clear. He has taught him only simple greetin g words rather than complex phrases or texts. This is partly because of the age of the boy. Compared to most Hui, Mr. Woods is more knowledgeable about Islam because he was sent to Mosque and studied the religion every summer between the ages of 12 and 16. He can still recite some ritual phrases that he could have taught to the child. However, he chose not to. at that moment ). I may send him to mosque to receive a zhenggui (normal or standardized) train ing if he does not succeed in his (secular) studies. I was too young when I studied them so that most of them have slipped away from my memory. Complete training would be helpful, but a half boy is very smart

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277 and does a good job in his studies. His uncle has no pretext to send him to school in the mosque, alt hough to computer games is a cause for concern. Mr. Woods had been admitted to a community college but explained th at he gave up th at dream because of problems which his famil y was having. His family was targeted by someone who was jealous of their wealth . The adversary conspired with the police to swindle his family. His family was totally ousted from the first group of millionaires in Bozhou. It is very possible that he wanted his nephew to fulfill his dreams and remedy his loss. their school performance, or more precisely, the scores ea rned in examinations. Therefore, he pushes the child very hard and sometimes uses harsh words such as ncerned about such language and tried to change his ways but did not succeed. He was venting his anger and taking it out on the poor boy. At the same time, he frequently bought the boy gifts and food. Sometimes he was very kind to the boy and treated him a s his son. He would oscillate between spoiling and verbally abusing the child, The childrearing in my host family presents a different picture. The head of my host family, Mr. Leo, is a Hui, and his wife, Ms. Red was a Han but is now Hui. Within the famil y, their only child is brought up in a totally secular environment. Both of them have very limited knowledge about their ethnicity and about Islamic belief. Mr. Leo went to a mosque when h e was 8 years old but he rarely returned to mosque until I urged him to show me where the mosque was. He obviously knows something about the Mosque,

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278 such as which one is the biggest, and what he should call the imam (ahong in their terminology), but his knowledge is limited. For example, he knew nothing about how to pray u ntil someone else showed him. Yet, he viewed himself a s a good ethnic Hui because he did not eat pork or other forbidden meats, but not a religious Hui because he did not believe in religion. Each time his wife had to cook additional food for him when he w as invited out to attend some social activities, including wedding ceremon ies . t hat his grandfather had been one of the most knowledgeable and prestigious Muslims in Bozhou. His grandfather may have been the only person in Bozhou who was able to as a traditional Muslim. His parents moved of the mosque neighborhood about 30 years C hapter 9). Therefore, Mr. Leo raises his own child in a secular way. He has taught him about the food taboos but nothing else. He takes it as a tradition, as part of being a Hui, which does not necessarily mean being a Muslim. H e actually claims that Islam is not a fascination with only one book, the forward. How can you expect a book wr itten a thousand years ago to be able to answer the

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279 His wife contributes nothing more either command ( Chapter 4 for details). S h e knows no more about the Hui , or about Islam , than her husband, who never asked her to be an observant Hui. As a result, her attitudes toward their only derived from h aving their son score e xcellent ly on their school examinations. Fortunately the boy does fairly well at school. He wa s admitted to the most prestigious private middle school and has even won for himself a seat in the gifted class without paying any additio n al 3 . The private middle school does not have to regarding 9 years of compulsory education. Each child who wants to go to this kind of school must pay full tuition. As far as this school is concerned, each child must pay 2,000 Yuan (roughly $300) a semester, excluding other fees, such as reading or exercise materials, or so than that of Mr. Woods for intermarried Hui families in Bozhou . In all my collected intermarried cases, very few of them push their children to learn anything about Islam or the Hui. Those who push their children to learn something about Islam are satisfied with 3 China implements a 9 year c ompulsory education system, which means no tuition fee for students from elementary to junior middle school (9 th grade) . However, the policy is only open to residents with local hukou (household registration) . Someone who has a different hukou penses for selecting a the urban areas to which they migrated. These fees prevent parents from sending their children to a high quality school. The M inistry of Education issued a new regulation that no fee of any kind shall be collected. Obviously, this new rule damages the revenue of schools. Therefore, they have fabricated the e willing to donate a certain amount of money to the school, unrelated to any entry requirement. It is a confidential agreement. If the parents renege the child will be driven out of the school. So far, there has been no report about any parents defaulting on this confidential agreement. A n ordinary studen t who wants to be sent to a gifted class or Zhongdian Ban ( , Most Significant Class) in their terminology may have to pay additional fees.

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280 just two phras es, the greetings and Shahada . But even these two simple phrases are not taught by most Hui parents, but rather by grandparents on the Hui side. knowledge of Hui ethnicity or Islamic religion. Some people learn later in life. For a me more interest ed in the Hui and in Islam when I was staying with his household. He frequently asked me about Islam and Hui ethnicity after finishing his homework. Mr. L eo even laughed at himself in front of his son and said that es not know the Hui as well the Hui or Islam) Mr. Thunder , an undergraduate in a Minzu School, is another case. He became enthus ed about Islamic studies after entering a minzu program in the capital city of Anhui province . He admits that he did not have a clear ethno religious identity before that. This kind of self (re)awareness or (re) a wakening pull s th is pe rson back into his ethnic roots and bring s hope for the continuity of ethnic identity. At the same time, this partially alienates individuals from their parents. This will be discussed below. An Imam in a rural mosque made an insightful observation to me. Chinese character Huizu means [ a group of people who are ] returning to the faith in their old age. This is because young people are busy in pursuit of a career and have no time to become involved with their faith. When they become older and have mor e leisure time, they will turn back to their religion. That is why we call is an interesting and inspiring interpretation.

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281 Nationality/Minzu Schools From the above we can s ee that the transmission of ethno religious knowledge through family education among most inter married families is not a viable way of education? This section examine s the history and the current condition of ethno religious school education of the Hui in Bozhou , and explores why school education is an insufficient vehicle for sustaining Hui ethno religious identity. Ethnic Schools before the Founding of the PRC Public s chool education in Bozhou was very weak before 1949. There w ere no public school s until 1906, i.e., five years before the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644 1911), when the first senior primary school was founded. A specific school for the Hui did not emerge until 1913, a little later than the public school. This school was set up within the Beijing Mosque (BJS) . But it was not a public, but a private elementary school. The name was Baoshan Private Elementary School. In the same year, another elementary schoo l named Tongzhen Guan Elementary School was founded by a Hui intellectual. In 1917, a portion of the students from Baoshan private Elementary School were selected out and sent to establish another school within the Nanjing Mosque (destroyed during the Cult ural Revolution and not yet restored) named Kaiming Elementary School. Simultaneously, the Baoshan Private Elementary School was moved to the Inner City Mosque (CLS) . At the Tongzhen Guan Elementary School ¸ there was only one class, one teacher, and four grades sharing the same room . Baoshan was a low grade elementary school with four grades: grades one and two were held together , and grades three and four were in separate rooms. Kaiming was a complete elementary school. It had four

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282 lower grades in the Nan jing Mosque and two higher grades in the Beijing Mosque. All these schools mentioned above were shut down in 1937 when Japan invaded China. In 1928, some Hui intellectuals on the north side of the Guo River founded the Peixin Elementary School in the ir lo cal mosque , and a ll students came from Hui families. In 1930, when civil war broke out between several warlords, the school was shut down. S chool education in Bozhou was barely developed before 1949. From 1906 to 1949, less than 50 Hui students graduate d from middle school and o nly four Hui students graduated from college. One reason was the instability of society during wartime, and an other wa s the poor reputation of public school education. A private school , called the sishu , was the predominant educati onal establishment before the 20 th century , while t he few public schools , called Shu Yuan , were less accessible and affordable for ordinary people. The relationship between the instructor and students was similar to that of master apprentice. Nationality/ Minzu Schools in the PRC After the P was established in 1949 , public school education became more available as public schools began to open. In the urban area of Bozhou, four state sponsored minzu elementary schools and one minzu m iddle school have been built since 1949. The first Huimin elementary school in Bozhou The First Huimin Elementary School was a successor to a n earlier elementary school founded by Hui people in 1949 , with classrooms taken from a Christian church. In 1952, the school was taken over by the government and turned into the First Huimin Elementary School , which became the earliest Huimin school in the PRC. The school

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283 was renamed as the Anti Imperialist Elementary School in 1966 when the Cultural Revolution was b egun and its original name was not restored until 1973. The second Huimin elementary school Th e Second Huimin Elementary S chool has the longest history among current Huimin schools. B uilt originally near the north city gate of Bozhou in 1943 , i n 1946 the s chool was named the Shuangming Town Central Completed Elementary School , the founded after 1949 . In 1954, it was combined with two other elementary schools and renamed the County Bo Second Elementary School. Today, th e scho ol is the only Hui M inzu S chool still in operation in Bozhou. The third Huimin elementary school The Third Huimin Elementary School was originally a private elementary school , named County Bo Mosque Elementary School , which opened in the backyard of the In ner City Mosque in 1964. In 1973, the school was renamed the Third Huimin Elementary School . From 1980 to 1983, the Bureau of Education of Bozhou, the provincial Minzu and Religious Committee as well as the United Front allocated 63,000 Yuan to rebuild the school with a new two story building and six classrooms. The fourth Huimin elementary school A private school, located in the Nanjing Mosque, but under the administration of the Beijing Mosque in 1963, was called the Nanjing Mosque Elementary School, but was renamed the Anti Revisionist Elementary School during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. In 1973, it was given the name of the Fourth Huimin Elementary School.

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284 The minzu middle school A government sponsored public middle school especially fo r the Huimin was built in the West Gate Hui residential area in 1986. By 1986, there were five elementary minzu schools and one middle school for the Hui in Bozhou . Four of the five elementary schools were located in the urban area of the city. Mr. Li Huac heng, a Hui lawyer, provided a brief table of those schools in his unpublished book, Minorities and Religions Historiography of Bozhou. From the table ( Table 7 1) , we can clearly see the percentage of students and teachers in those schools. The largest number of students and teachers was found in the Third Elementary School , located in the CLS . T he percentage of Hui teachers was not high. According to statistics given by Mr. Li Huacheng, by 2001 there were 2 , 500 students and 152 teachers in all seven minzu schools ( including two rural schools ( 2003:82). Today , however, only one minzu school is still open; the others were shut down or merged with other schools. Current Situation: Decline of Minzu Schools Of the five minzu schools located in urban areas , only the S econd M inzu S chool maintains its original name; the rest offer no clues as to their Minzu characteristics . Two of the schools were closed along with the restoration of the mosque, and the others were hard to sustain because of their lower quali ty of education and a lack of student enrollment. The T hird M inzu S chool was not shut down when the application to restore the CLS was approved by the government by 1980. In fact, the school even received a certain amount of financial support from differe nt departments of the county and

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285 provincial government to expand its scale during 1980 1983 . However, the school was shut down in the subsequent restoration of the mosque. The mosque recuperated some of the rooms and nearby Hui families occupied the others . The poor quality of the education offered by the school also failed to attract parents to send children there. The F ourth M inzu S chool , which was located in the Nanjing Mosque , was demolished during the Cultural Revolution and has never been restored. T oday, a sign hangs in front saying Those houses are the property of the Nanjing Mosque, and are rented out for business. Money from the rent belongs to the Beijing Mosque. The building of the F irst M inzu Elementary S chool has physically survived, but it has been incorporated as a branch of the best elementary school in Bozhou , the Xiahou Elementary School. Some lower grade pupils are sent t here and are moved to the main campus of the Xiaho u School when they reach the third grade. The Hui Middle School was merged with the Second Middle School in Bozhou at the end of the 20 th century. The Second Middle School has become the second largest battle in Bozhou. This school continues to grow stronger and needs space to expand. Therefore, the M inzu M iddle S chool, which had nothing left but beautiful buildings, became the suitable choice of the Second Middle School. Now the M inzu S chool has become one of the bases for se nior students who are focused on the Gaokao. The only remaining Hui elementary school in Bozhou, the Second Huimin Elementary School is experiencing difficulties. There are problems with the building

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286 itself, with the skill of the teachers, with the qualit y of the education, with the curriculum, and with other issues of concern to parents. I was able to interview the headmaster of the school , a man in his 50s. The headmaster had a thick beard and looked like an imam. He was very cooperative and happy to answer my questions. The classroom building has two stori es. Al though it was renovated in the 1980s and the 1990s, the building is not as well maintained as one would hope. The front walls of the school had recently received a fresh coat of paint, but pa int was peeling off, bit by bit. Desks and benches were heavily worn out , and s ome c ould hardly bear the weight of a single student. There are eight class rooms . The lower grades have one class room each , while the fifth and sixth grades have two class rooms each . There are no more than 300 students currently enrolled, and that number i s gradually decreasing. Most parents prefer to send their children to a school with better quality of education. S tudents who attend this school are: a) C hildren who have been left behind by parents who have migrated to jobs elsewhere, being looked after by grandparents . Many parents have to work in coastal areas to make a living. Schools for the children of peasant workers in coastal areas are limited. They have to leave their child with grandparents. Furthermore there are residential restrictions that govern education. Middle school students are allowed to attend the university entrance examinations only in the district where they were born and thus have their hukou (household registration) . Many parents thus prefer their child to go to school in their hometown.

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287 b) Distance from school is also an issue. Given that most schools do not have a school bus to pick up the children, adults have to bring the child in person . Therefore , a school close to home is preferable. c) Children of p overty required if their children choose a school in a different district. As discussed above , payment of this sponsorship fee is a confidential arrangement between parents and schools . A child s education is thus restricted by the location of the family hukou . Given that the hukou Thus, many families compete to buy a house near a be tter school. amount of money headmaster of the Hui school told me. He smile t seems he feel s embarrassed about the lower quality of education at his school . The mega schools in his words are surely very big. Ta ke , for example, the Xiahou Elementary School, which has more than 2,300 registered students. Most students are from other districts, including rural areas. Nearby h ouses and some family inns are rented out to grandparents for housing th ose children when s chool is over. Officially, all pupils can move up to a public middle school without taking an entrance examination. The disparities in educational quality, however, push many parents to choose a better school for their child. S chools like the Fenghua Midd le

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288 School, a private middle school with the highe st quality of education in Bozhou, do have their own criteria, i.e. , examinations designed on their own to filter students. Students who fail to pass the examination but still want to attend the school must pay an extra fee, which is calculated by points. It can range from 200 to 2,000 Yuan per point, depending on the exam score attained by the students . Regular public schools face problems due to the quality of education. On the one hand, public schools wit h high quality education cannot refuse entry to students who reside in their district. This means that many mediocre students automatically go to public schools. As a result, these less talented students go to ordinary classes instead of gifted classes tha t require higher scores or an extra sponsorship fee. Thus, those schools become larger. An additional problem occurs when students and parents avoid schools with low education quality. Parents who cannot afford the extra fee for their child have no other c hoice but to send their child to this kind of local public school. In contrast, p arents who care deeply usually try to avoid public schools, even if they have to pay more money. Thus, this kind of poor public school diminishes in both quality and size. The two problems motivate some excellent teachers to abandon the public schools and open their own private schools. This has led to a change in the allocation of educational resources. Therefore elementary schools like the Seco nd Huimin School fail to attract students ; the First Huimin School was merged with the Xiahou Elementary School. Thus, t he better schools grow larger while weak er schools decrease in enrollment. Local governments usually distribute more resources to larger schools, rather than to giv e support to underperforming schools. The Second Huimin Elementary School remain s

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289 open because the residents in this area are not wealthy enough to afford to send their child to the better schools . supply any ethnic or religious education in school, is no difference between a minzu school and a non minzu school. We use state mandated standa asked again . After Most significantly is that Hui teachers are given some leeway b y the government. T o be a minzu school, the number of minority students is supposed to be at least 30 percent in total. We certainly reach th at level . About 75% of our minzu ethnic knowledge is understood what I was going to say. related to Islam. But according to our ot be taught in a public school. So how can we teach The fact that a school is called a M inzu School does not mean that only Huizu children are enrolled. Restrictions about food do not apply to the school either, because this school does not provide food service for students. Restrictions may apply on food stands or stores on the nearby street s where no religiously forbidden food is allowed to

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290 be sold. Students are warned by teachers at the orientation for new students not to bring any pork to school. qualified t o teach ethnic knowledge . A s a matter of fact , t hey know nothing about the Hui, because they learned their knowledge from regular schools, from books. They may have a Hui identification card ( shen fen teacher of Islam is an imam. I n China, however, no religious preaching can be spread out side of religious places. That is, any religious activities must be restricted to approved religious sites or within families, not in public spaces , a lthough no one is going to s . In some places, like the Northwest area, religious activities are widespread and are well accepted by the public. But the constraints on public school s are clear and strong. In short, the Hui receive n o support from public schools for ethno religious education. They must go elsewhere to acquire this knowledge. Summer and Winter Ethno Religious Schools Traditional Vehicles of Ethno Religious Education in Hui History Historically p rivate and mosque ba sed ethno religious education was the major source of knowledge for a Muslim Hui. Before the mid Ming dynasty (1368 1644) , constant migration from central Asia sustain ed the Arabic and Persian languages principally as vehicles for the transmission of Islam ic knowledge. But subsequently some Muslim communities felt threatened by Han culture and feared that their children would not receive adequate Islamic education. Therefore some educators began using the Chinese language to teach about Islam . Thus a new ty pe of educational venue appeared called jingtang jiaoyu ( scripture hall education ), which combine d Arabic and

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291 Persian with Chinese . It gradually emerg ed in Shaanxi and spread throughout Chinese Muslim communities. The major promotor of this teaching wa s Hu Dengzhou, a hajj from Shaanxi province. u and his disciples developed the intellectual and curricu lar traditions used in the instruction , as well as arranging for the financing of tuition, room, board, and study materials (ibid: 50) The prominent feature of teaching was the use of Chinese phonetic pronunciation of Arabic. The students learned the Muslim holy books in the original Arabic orthography; however, they were taught to recite them with Chinese sounds. For example, the Arabic word salam (peace) is thus pronounced with three Chinese syllables se liang mu , and the spelling can either be se l iang mu ( ) or sai liang mu ( ) or simply selan ( ) . Due to a large number of illiterate Hui in the northwest, the written transliteration s were not widespread. Thus, another type of language, Xiaojing , or xiaoerjin the first pinyin , or systematic al phabetic representation of Chinese -was invented in the mid to late Ming dynasty (1368 1644) . This system enabled Muslims who could not read Chinese to represent its sounds in an orthography they knew from their mosque education. They could simply take no tes on texts written in characters that they could read but could not speak or write. In other words, those Muslims achieved linguistic adjustment to China in two innovative ways: jingtang jiaoyu utilized Chinese phonetics to represent Arabic pronunciation ; and xiaojing adapted the Arabic script to represent

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292 spoken Chinese. T hese two methods are still generally used among Gedium Muslims, that is, Hanafi Sunnis. When Sufism 4 was brought to China, it was also confronted with the challenges of language adapta tion in preaching. N orthwestern Muslims have continued to use jingtang jiaoyu , but in Suzhou, Beijing, and especially Nanjing, Muslims created a new genre of texts called Han kitab , Chinese, half teaching in China . In the late Qing dynasty (1644 1911) and the period of Kuomintang (1911 1949) , Muslim intellectuals were heavily influenced by the West and thus tried to create new ways of teaching by building schools and by printing texts in Chinese. For example, by co mbining Islamic ( the Han kitab tradition) and Confucian teaching with western ideas, Ma Fuxing published new editions of many major Islamic texts, and thus brought the writings of scholars a udiences in China . T he small branch of Sufism in China, called Xidaotang , concentrated mostly in Gansu and Ningxia, combined the secular education of Chinese texts, with Islamic instruction in Arabic and Persian, and Sino Islamic education in the Han kita b , through establishing modern schools. Their practice of emphasizing the Han kitab earned for them the nickname Hanxue pai (the Chinese studies faction), distinguishing them from other northwestern Muslims (Lipman 1997:199). 4 T h e school s of Sunni and Sufism dominate Chinese Islam . Shi i had a significant impact on Chinese Muslims before the 18 th century . H owever there are almost no ethnic group practices Shia except Tajik and a few Uyghurs .

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293 T hose schools , h owever , were shut down during the 1950s to the early 1980s. In recent years, some jing xueyuan (inscription school s ) were allowed to reopen and some new schools were established throughout northwestern, southwestern, middle China , and Beijing. M ost of them are not call , To many , they appear to be a language school rather than a religious school. Ethno Religious Education Efforts in the Beijing Mosque When Imam Minbo accepted the invitation from the Democratic Administration Committee of the Mosque ( DACM ) of the Beijing Mosque (BJ S ) , he felt a strong obligation to do something for this community in particular because many famous imams from late Qing onward had come from Bozhou . H e knew many imams in Henan province were from t his city as well. Two of his predecessors were hajj (Muslims who had made a pilgrimage to Mecca) and one of them was the director of the Islamic Association of Bozhou (founded in 1989). At the same time, the imam was aware of the importance of establishing a good collaborative relationship with the head of the DACM who is in charge of the employment of the Imam . Therefore, after taking office in 2003, he positively responded to the requests of the head of the DACM, Mr. Yufu 5 , who wanted him to strengthen t he solidarity and religiosity of the Hui in the community. For example, Mr. Yufu wanted him to visit Huimin households and encourage them to practice prayer on Fridays, and to open a summer and winter Islamic school for children, etc. A n Islamic summer sch ool was established in the mosque to encourage ethnic and religious loyalty among the Muslim s in Bozhou, as Mr. Yufu had wished . Imam 5 See more discussion about him in C hapter 1 with respect to Islamic underground power.

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294 Minbo told me that initially student enrolment oscillated between 20 and 50 students , and participants attended free of ch arge. The curriculum consisted of two parts: supervision of students who were doing summer homework assigned by schools, and instruction in fundamental knowledge about Islam and Hui ethnicity. At first, t he school seemed to run smoothly . As Imam Minbo prou dly emphasized, more than 50 Muslims Zhuma , and young children had begun to learn basic Islamic knowledge. Some practices that violated Islamic principles had been discontinued . closed by because its major supporter, Mr. Yufu , was accused of qihang bashi ( , monopolization of the market) and was sent to jail in 2005. imprisonment was mystery, and no one seemed willing to talk about it. After asking dif ferent people about the mystery, I manage to piece together the following story . A member of a Han family had passed away and his family had laid a , because the house was empty and undecorated. This action was considered as huiqi ( , bad fortune ) in Han culture , and c ould n ot be accepted by a Han family, especially if the deceased did not die from natural causes. This tradition is shared by the Hui as well. Therefore, it is no surprise that this led to a quarrel between t he two families, and t he highly respected hajj imam was i nvited to resolve the argument. Asking an imam to consult was a very common way for the Hui to handle a situation when an ethnic dispute arose .

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295 However, when the imam led a group of Hui to the meeti ng place, it appeared as though he had led a group of people to start a fight with the Han families. Startled by the action of the group of Hui, a young Han man jumped out to protect his family members by grabbing a broken brick and hitting the hajj, the l eader of the group of Hui. This was a simple overreaction by the young Han man, but was unforgivable from a Hui perspective. The imam wounded and he was sent to the hospital immediately 6 . Late r , he was diagnosed with apoplexy and bec a me an aphas iac. The outraged Hui immediately attacked the Han family and attacked several police cars that were sent to resolve the problem . Following that, Mr. Yufu led a group of nearly several hundred Hui, consisting of local Hui and Hui from Henan province, into office and demanded action . The mayor had the young Han man arrested and sen t him to jail, and arranged compensat ion for the imam for his medical bills. The demands of Mr. Yufu and the group he led to his office upset the mayor so much that he decided to market and harming the functioning of the market economy, Mr. Yufu was sent to jail and sentenced to eight years. He was finally released from prison after serving six years. His early release , in August 2, 201 1, surprised the prosecutor, who exclaimed to Whatever the truth is, the direct result was the closing of the Islamic summer sc hool. Imam Minbo said he received a slight hint and decided not to continue it. Was that hint from the government? He did not give me a clear answer. Probably he felt 6 Another anecdote says the young man was from a neighboring family and was incited to attack the imam. The weapon held on his hand was said to be a knife instead of a broken brick. And the imam was not hit by the brick but got a stroke caused by fright at the sight of the knife.

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296 under threat . Furthermore since he himself and nearby Hui families no longer received e ncouragement from Mr. Yufu, it was harder to recruit children. Another discouraging factor was the awareness that many of the families who sent their children to the summer school did so not for ethno religious studies, but for caretaker services needed du ring the summer when the regular school was closed. At any rate the facial expression of imam Minbo in the Beijing Mosque was clearly resentful during the conversation. Ethno Religious Education Efforts in the CLS With the arrival of the new imam , and in imam in the mosque which is located in a south corner of the CLS , e thno religious education efforts were initiated. The decline of this education , however, illustrates in group conflicts among imams and the comm unities which they serve. . The current leading imam in the CLS , named Chi , has been in this office since April 9, 2011. His previous service was in a Henan prefecture. But this was not his first term in Bozhou. From 2002 to 2004 , he act ed as the princip al imam, or Jiao Zhang or Zuowei ahong or simply Da ahong , when the previous hajj imam resigned. Jiao means religion; Zhang means leader; Zuowei means positioning, ahong means imam. He is called Jiao Zhang , because he is supposed to be the Number one ahong of all ahongs T he community is called the shou fang ( ). Shou means the first or the principal ; Fang means ummah or community. In short this indicates that this is the principal community of all ummahs in Bozhou. He was born in 1972, and his wife was born in 1973 ; b oth of them were born and raised in a trad itional Anhui Muslim family.

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297 They first opened the mosque school in the winter of 2011, during the winter vacation when Han Chinese celebrated their traditional lunar new year . Traditionally Muslim families were supposed to avoid that celebration. The ima ms gathered 18 children for instruction from families of those who frequently prayed in the mosque , and the imams themselves acted as the instructors. The curriculum provided a fundamental knowledge of Islam. The woman imam, Ms. Mo , also provided help to t he children for their regular homework assignments from local schools. After two weeks of study, on Feb. 1 st , 2012 , they organized a contest to test children . The a udience had about 60 people , in cluding those who came to pray, the some college students who had returned home to spend the winter vacation with their families. The a udience also included teachers from college or middle or elementary schools, journalists, governm ent employees, northwestern Muslims, and some members of a non governmental organization in Bozhou. The program was composed of three parts: the imam recited the children rec it ed some Islamic texts and s ang religious songs; the last part, their favorite, was the contest. Th e se 28 young Muslims, including 13 college students, were divided into 4 groups and competed against each other. Winners were rewarded with white hats, a no tebook, pens, and Islamic pamphlets. The champion, a college student, was rewarded with a Chinese version of

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298 The winter school had been quite successful, but its impact did not extend beyond this community. Based on this experience, the husban d and wife imam team decided to hold a more ambitious summer school in Bozhou. For the summer school, the imams not only called on the support from Muslims at prayer, but also posted an advertisement ( Appendix B ) on the newly built virtual community a ffiliation in Zhong Mu Wang ( , a W ebsite for Chinese Muslims). In the post, the woman imam Ms. Mo wrote: Dear Muslim Fellows: Children are the future and hope of our minzu (nationality). [I] believe each one who loves Huihui minzu expects that the minz u culture will be rooted in their hearts from a young age, so that they w ill not go foundations of the Huihui . The annual summer vacation is coming. After working hard for a semester, summer vacation is relaxation and leisure by sending them to tutorial classes? Are you worried that your child will forget to study because of their addiction to video games? Are you worried your child will becom e addicted to the internet or dangerous online games? Do you want your children to learn Huizu culture that they would otherwise not learn? Do you want your children to learn martial arts and keep healthy? To end your worries, and to ensure that your child ren spend a relaxing but meaningful summer vacation, the Inner City Mosque will offer a summer school with a brand new face for you and your children. In terms of age, two classes are scheduled: Juvenile and Youngster 1) Juvenile Class A. Registration Date: Jun e 22 nd July 1 st B. Class Beginning: July 2 nd July 20 th C. Courses: a. Chinese, Math, English tutorial class (for summer homework): taught by current distinguished students in famous universities. English instruction will be taught by students who study abroad. b. Basic knowledge of Islam. This will be taught by volunteer teachers who have experience and dedication; the methods will be singing, story telling, games, and watching movies. [Th is ] will enable children to learn Huizu culture and knowledge in a relaxing and pleasant environment. c. Martial arts training: personally taught by Bozhou famous martial arts master s , to enable children to improve their health. E (supposed to be D). Course schedule:

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299 Each Morning: 8:00 10 :30am, Afternoon: 4:00 6:00pm F. Friendly Reminder: all courses are free, additionally, each child will receive a complimentary piece of watermelon or cold drink , e ach child will receive a gift, and awards will be offered to excellent children. 2) Youngster Class A. Date of Registration: July 1 st 5 th B. Class Beginning: to be arranged at the registration C. Courses Will be organized via a group interview. At the moment, [we] will invite main leader s from the provincial Islamic Association as well as a fa mous ahong and Muslim scholars to join the discussion. During the summer vacation, college students can participate in charitable activities organized by the [virtual] Bozhou community in Zhong Mu Wang to strengthen their belief, as Muslims, and to commit themselves to put their belief into practice. D. All participating undergraduates at the party will be awarded a gift. At the end of the summer school, a performance and an Islamic knowledge contest will be held. All participants will be rewarded w ith gifts. We are looking forward to your participation. [Please] send [your] child to the mosque. The m the future of our children, for the hope of our minzu ! May Allah ble ss the children with healthy and pleasant growth! May Allah offer peace and happiness to each family. From: the Inner City Mosque June 21, 2012 The post , as well as a printed handout circulated at the Friday prayer s received an enthusiastic response. Hundreds of comments from Muslims nationwide were posted online to praise this newly estab lished summer school. About 100 children were registered and at least 50 of them stayed for the entire course . The post also attracted two college students from Nanjing Agricultural University to be volunteer instructors. Both of them were from northwester n Muslim communities and ha d good training in Islamic knowledge. Together with the imams, they designed many materials for the children to study. The school was receiving considerable attention from Muslims online. The summer school program was carried out as scheduled.

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300 At the Friday congregation at the end of Ramadan (July 16, 2012) , all children gathered in the mosque. Their parents , as well as many Muslims in the community, were invited to attend the Islamic knowledge contest as well as the closing cerem ony. The best students were rewarded with many gifts, such as religious books, a book bag, and a writing case. The two week study period was short, but long enough to give their parents a big surprise : their knowledge about the religion was better than tha t of most parents ! When the achievements of the school were reported by imam Mo to the virtual community, she received tons of praises, admirations and blessings from her fans. In the following summer (2013), the school was opened again with a similar sch edule. Imam Mo invited a student from Arabic School to teach children Islamic knowledge and a Muslim teacher from a middle school to help children with their summer homework. More significantly, two non Muslim children who rent a house near the Mosque also registered and were accepted into the class. And their parents were invited and at the end they attended the closing ceremony. One important reason that the school was able to open and run so well wa s due wife, the female imam. Different from many Muslim women and different from many Chinese women, Imam Mo is a special woman with independent thoughts. She dropped out of middle school right before the Gaokao and decided to study Arabic with a famous Islamic province. This made her father quite angry, but there was nothing he could do about her decision . After staying for half a year, she found the Arabic school was nothing but a money making scam. She thus made up her mind to leave the school and went alone to Beijing. She was told that some Chinese Muslims were frequenting some universities

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301 in Beijing, such as, Peking University, Renmin University, and audited some classes that they considered inspiring . She joined them. Those young Muslims were hungry to explore many fields of knowledge, particularly Islamic teaching and literature. Th ese young Muslims often discussed and argued with each other about what they were learn ing . They called themselves mice interested in stealing knowl edge instead of food . Some of them are now quiet prominent preaching circles . For example, they organized the biggest Chinese Muslim website, the Zhong Mu Wang ; another Muslim (also an imam) bec a me one of the most i mportant translators for Chinese Muslims , and more than 20 Islamic books so far have been translated through him , or his team , from English, Arabic, or Japanese ; and a Han Chinese established the first and the most important virtual online ew (mostly , Han Muslims ) . Imam Mo played an active role in interacting with them. She loves to write various types of literary works, such as poems and prose (s he was the friend of one of the most famous Chinese poets in the country during the 199 0s ), and she posted her writings on several Muslim virtual communities that earned her a tremendous reputation among Muslims . But s he lapsed into silence when she married Imam Chi , ey were introduc ed , fell in love and got married. She almost turned into a full time housewife until they moved back to Bozhou. Before taking this term, they had a short term at this mosque for two years ( 2002 2004 ) . That short term, however, was not a pleasant and successf ul experience from their point of view. Imam Chi was young, but quite ambitious and skillful in Islam ic preaching. He tried to unite all four urban mosques and attract all those who frequently

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302 prayed to the Inner City Mosque ( CLS ) once a month to listen to a l Wa'z (preaching) , because the CLS is the Shoufang , the principal community . Through his efforts, attendance at Friday prayers grew to more than 230 people. His efforts however encountered resistance from the imams of other mosques, jealous of his grow ing fame and influence. Additionally, h is insistence on financial disclosure did not sit well with some other imams . It prevented them from pocketing the money earned in religious rituals. As a result, he was driven out by the Democratic Administration Com mittee of the Mosque ( DACM ) within two years, one year before his contract finished . Imam Chi was strongly motivated to regain his own position of importance. He immediately agreed to resume his role when he was invited by the current director of DACM, alt hough he had been quite successful in his previous tenure in a Henan mosque. Imam Chi put a great amount of energy into maintaining or rescuing Hui religious belief. Meanwhile , his wife, the impressive Ms. Mo returned to her mission and her enthusiastic p romotion of Islam . Working with a northwestern Muslim who was doing business in Bozhou , as well as with a local Muslim, they built the virtual online Bozhou Muslim community in August 2011. Through this platform, they brought many young Muslims together to discuss Bozhou ethno religious issues, share knowledge, exchange their thoughts, and organize some activities. By integrating social charity activit ies into Islamic preaching, the y organized an Islamic Volunteer Organization and fostered a cooperative rel ationship with other non Muslim NGOs of Bozhou. They worked together and helped many disadvantaged people in both rural and urban Bozhou. Activities from 2011 through 2013 were so prominent that the Muslim virtual community was voted as

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303 the Number 10 commu nit y in 2011 and the Number one community in 2012 in the Muslim Community Competition organized by Zhongmuwang . By 2012, it seemed that the imam couple had already achieved their hoped success. Unfortunately, the ir initial success did not last , though the y had prepared well when they decided to accept the position. For example, the number of students registered for the 2013 summer school w as not as numerous as the previous year. And only 20 students stayed to the end of the session. Most important wa s the decline of the virtual community. Its ranking fell to No. 89 by the end of 2013 from No. 1 in 2012. All three founders, including imam Mo , were forced to leave the website administrator position s . I mam Mo has lost her most powerful and influential platform . The reason s that the imam couple felt disempowered are not hard to find. S ome imams were reluctant to permit the reputation of the imam couple to shine so strongly. Some of them rallied northwestern Muslims who are doing business in Bozhou to oppose the work of this couple. Those imams promised to provide protection to the northwestern Muslims if they have any trouble with local Han or government officials . Indeed to some degree those imams do have sufficient influence to resolve troubles Muslims may enc ounter. An imam in another mosque rather than imam Chi in the Shoufang (prime Muslim community) acted as the representative in the CPCC. That endowed this particular imam with the power to influence governmental decision. Competition for political power is a major cause of in group conflicts among Muslims. Another factor comes from the opposite direction. S ome imams are deeply involved with the local Hui underworld . The younger brother of an imam was the head of a gangster organization. Bozhou police detes ted him but did not want to make a large

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304 scale minzu shijian ( minzu event) by arresting him . The police simply threatened him with imprisonment if he did not leave Bozhou within a day. The individual th en le ft for Henan province and act ed as imam there . He frequently visits Bozhou now . He and his brother imam have a tremendous influence on Hui underworld activities in Bozhou, including the activities of Muslims from the northwestern area. The imam couple could not stop sighing when they talk ed with me about this issue. They felt like their hands and feet were tied . Imam Mo said she could not believe it when the founder of the virtual community, the northwestern Muslim, told her that he had received demands to leave Bozhou immediately and never get involved w ith Bozhou Muslim issues again . After receiving the threats, he had closed his business and left Bozhou without saying a thing. From then on, everything ha d changed. In the winter of 2013, the ethno religious winter school for Muslim children did not open. Other Issues in Ethno Religious Education Formal school based education in ethnic and religious matters is not confined to the two methods listed above. Some Hui families send their children to Arabic school to learn Islamic theology , or have them tuto red privately, similar to an apprenticeship, by an imam in a mosque. Those who study with an imam are called Hailifan . This kind of study is primarily designed to train future imams , and therefore the number of students is limited, usually no more than th ree students per imam at the same time . More often, imams simply teach students basic knowledge and lead them a cross the threshold . Late r , if the student wants to learn more, the imam will recommend that the student attend a religious school, which is usua lly call ed an Arabic language school. As more Arabic schools have been allowed to open , Muslim children have had the opportunity to

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305 acquire religious knowledge in Arabic. Students in this kind of school , however, do not have the same degree of commitment t o Islam that their parents do to become imams in the future. T he curriculum at these schools is quite flexible, from short term to long term, from diploma to non year old son , for instance, was sent to a Ningxia Arabic school to study language and religion for a year. Another informant, Mr. Bin , sent his daughter to a Henan Arabic school for four years where she received a diploma in 2009. She acted as a prayer leader at the GBS after graduation. Four months later, she was inv ited to take a position in an Arabic transnational company in Zhejiang province. In her spare time, she help ed edit the Islamic journal issued by the Phoenix Mosque in Hangzhou, one of the oldest mosques in China , built during the Tang Dynasty. She also ac cepted the role of actively participate d in the operation of the Bozhou virtual community in Zhongmuwang ; however, her activity ceased when the community decline d. It should be noted that students who stud y privately with imams or attend Arabic language schools are usually those who have been unsuccessful in regular education settings. In other words, those students did not successfully survive the current governmentally promoted education system. This does not necess arily mean that they students . To nianjing considered a good choice by some Hui parents because it makes it easier for children to find a job as an imam. A career as an imam is ordinarily well respected. Bu t undoubtedly, these hailifan secular knowledge, particularly about science and social science, is limited. They therefore often make mistakes when they preach regarding things that are common knowledge to most people. The public display of this lack of knowledge

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306 damages their reputation and authority, causing some young people to turn away . At present the dominant trend is that students do not want to study privately with an imam but instead prefer to attend an Arabic language school, or , if possible, to an Arabic country or to Malaysia. The eldest son of the imam in the BJS , f or example, studied in the Shadian Arabic School in Yunnan province and received a unique opportunity to attend Medina University , in South Arabia . One observant Muslim sent her son and daughter to Malaysia. The director of the CLS DACM was considering sending h is daughter to either Malaysia or Australia ; h e asked me over to his house to seek my counsel on how best to study abroad. Religious training of this kind rarely occurs among intermarried families. Bozhou is not a place where education is held in high regard, even though it is an ancient city with a long , honorable history . F or most common Bozhou people, knowing some basic mathematic s to calculate bills while doing business is enough. Although state policy clearly states that nine years of education is compulsory, many students simply drop out of the school often in the first or second year of middle school. Their parents constitute vivid examples that an adult can become prosp erous without receiving a formal education. For example, one of my wealthy informants wa s completely illiterate. None of his children completed the nine years of compulsory education, but joined his medical business anyway . Two of his children married befo re the age of 18, which is against the law that sets the age of 20 years as the minimum marriage age for females and 22 for males. From a very young age, many children are deeply medicine or food businesses. The parents do not pu sh their children hard in school, and they also lack sophisticated skills to illustrate to children the importance of study ing .

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307 Instead, the parents wait until the child does poorly on an examination before expressing their thoughts on the matter. More oft en than not, the parents resort to corporal punishment to express their emotion s if the child does poorly . For example, I witnessed a mother on a riverbank threatening to drown her 7 or 8 year old son because the boy only got a passing score o n his examina tions. She pushed the boy into the river. The poor child was sobbing uncontrollably as he tried to crawl back onto the riverbank. Another important fact that should be pointed out is that being identified as a Hui appears to be an unpleasant experience f or children from intermarried families. Interviews I conducted at the best school in Bozhou showed that most students from intermarried families were unwilling to expose their ethnic background. During one private talk, one youngster from an intermarried f amily said he wa za zhong with strong pejorative meaning ). The words are usually used to curse someone. Furthermore, t hose children may even be discriminated against by pure blood children at the same time . Some of them consider the blood of these chi ldren to be tainted and no longer pure . This usually occurs in the higher level elementary grades or among junior middle school students. By the time the se students reach senior middle school, this stereotyped image is not discussed publicly , although it is difficult to tell if their perception has faded or the truth is being hidden. Negative perceptions held by Han people towards the Hui prevent some Han spouses in an ethnically mixed family from sending their children to receive a religious education . Repeated denial s of interview request s by ordinary Han about their perceptions of the Hui confirm that. M any Hui complain that they are discriminated

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308 against by the Han, while some Han claim that they are often bullied by the Hui. I was told by a Han man that, the reason to cause the two contradictory images is those Huizi 7 usually gang up to bully one Hanmin , he said . Conversely Hui people can also be heard small number of people. We need to unite so the Hanmin appear more united in higher ethnic solidarity. The Han people simp ly do not want to have more contact with them . Many may have relatives or friends who have been injured in confrontations with the Hui. As a result , some intermarried families are reluctant to expose their identity, including the identity of their children , when confronting a group of Han people or when offering an alcohol ic drink to save face in terms of local culture. In this social environment, some intermarried couples do not believe an ethno religious education is the best choice for their children. A privately ask ed his children to learn more about Buddhism. [Buddhism] can teach you how to be a human ( jiao ni ruhe zuo ren ). It can help you deal with frustration in your li discussed in the first section of this chapter, an ethno religious education cannot bring Hui children more social capital; and instead, it sometimes may even hurt their social capital. Because fewer and fewer Hui parents observe religi ous pr actices at home ( C hapter 6 ), how can we expect the ir children to take religion seriously ? Leo i s an 7 Huizi instead of Huizu is believed an insulting name for Hui people. See Bai (2007)

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309 example . H ow can his child be motivated to be more interested in ethnic customs and Islam when Leo himself is almost completely ignora nt on these matters? His son once that about the M ost intermarried couples have moved away from the neighborhood surrounding a mosque. The long distance to a mosque pr events them from easily going there to pray. But this does not mean that the Hui remaining in the old neighborhood are necessarily more observant. On the contrary, those people are considered by some pious Hui to be lazy, stubborn, backward, and sometimes greedy. A warning given by their son was to the mosque] . The people there are thoroughly rotten ( ta men huai tou le ). All they want is money . service on Friday, it is common to see many Hui hang ing a round the street in front of the mosque instead of entering the mosque. It is very common to see wreaths being sent to and accepted by the families of those who have died . And Hui family members ning. Furthermore firecrackers are used almost at each event and celebration. Imams emphasize, again and again that those behaviors should be discontinued. Nobody seems to really listen or to heed their admonitions.

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310 Table 7 1: A brief overview of th (1986) School The First The Second The Third The Fourth Middle School Founded in 1949 1943 1964 1963 1986 Became a Hui school 1952 1954 1973 1973 1986 Classes 9 7 7 5 1 Teachers 26 23 16 9 6 Hui Teac hers 1 2 5 2 3 Students 380 290 342 152 60 Hui Students 153 160 327 82 36 Enrollment Rate 40.3% 76% 70% 62% Note: The T able has been modified to include urban schools only. Resource: Li (2003:81)

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311 CHAPTER 8 DIVORCE Some marriages between Hui and Ha n end in divorce. In discussing this topic, it is useful to begin with a discussion of scholarly analyses of the multiple causes of divorce and the relevance of this literature to the different categories of divorce that are found in Bozhou. We shall see t hat Islamic divorce has its own subculture. Reasons to Get Divorced This section examines research about the causes of divorce, Chinese laws surrounding divorce, and the different categories of divorce that occur locally. As pointed out by Quach and And improvements in living standards, the Chinese are experiencing a shift from collectivism to individualism, with greater tolerance for premarital sex, non marital cohabitation, and (See Xu, Zhang, & Amato 2 011: 289) Divorce has become more widespread than ever before in China. Statistical data collected by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs show that divorce has increased significantly in recent years ( F igure 8 1). In 2012, 3.1 million couples disman tled their marriage. The crude divorce rate 1 is 2.3% , that of the previous year; while the crude rate for marriage is 9.8%, which means that divorc ed couples in 2003 totaled only 1.33 million and the rate was 1.1%. (Cui et al. 2013) According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2009, the divorce rate has reached 1.71% in 2008 (Xu, Zhang, and Amato 2011). In some places, the divorce 1 The crude divorce rate is the number of divorces occurring among the population of a given geographical area during a given year, per 1,000 m id year total population of the given geographical area during the same year.

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312 rate was 3% at the end of the Cultural Revolution and increased to 20% in 1990s (Palmer 2007). All research shows that divorce in China has reached unprecedented levels. The matter warrants a thorough discussion. Scholarly Research The question of the causes of divorce has attracted high attention in academia. Changes in the reasons for divorce parallel other social change in recent decades. There are two reasons for divorce that are most frequently mentioned. The first reason concerns communication difficulti es between the two spouses. The second reason is communication problems, incompatibility, changed lifestyle desires and instance of rce. Research conducted in Holland revealed (Graaf & Kalmijn 2006) Rather, relational and psychological motives are more important, which in particular lie behind wom . Their third finding important motives for a divorce . divorce. This finding corresponds to Amato a nd Hohmann They identify poor relationship quality and a weak commitment to marriage as the most important reasons. A survey of 886 Minnesota individuals indicates that the two most common reasons given for seeking a divorce are divorce, infidelity is the most commonly reported cause, followed by incompat ibility, alcohol or drug abuse, and growing apart. A report (2012) about Chinese divorce given

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313 in a newspaper, Life Time, shows that infidelity is the most significant factor (40%) as well, followed by incompatibility in personality (38%), lack of agreemen t about domestic chores (16%), and finances, relations with in laws, and gambling (10% respectively). Reasons such as unsatisfactory sex life or geographical separation account for only 3 percent. A record (220 cases) 2 from an officer at the marriage reg istration office in Henan Province shows that incompatibility in personality that causes arguments or fights at home is the major reason for divorce (89 cases ), and infidelity is less important (42 cases ). This data set identifies communication problems as the principal reason behind divorce. A U.S. national survey (National Fatherhood Initiative 2005, see Hawkins et al. significant factors included too much arguing (56%), infidelity (55%), marrying too young (46%), unrealistic expectations (45%), lack of equality in the relationship (44%), lack of premarital preparation (41%), and domestic violence refers here to household chores and domestic division of labor as well as to support for the family, particularly from the husband. All of this research identifies some causal factors leading to divorce. None of it, however, cites religious or ethnic factors. Nor are cultural differences explicitly taken into account. In the case of Bozhou those factors will have to be taken into account as contributing to divorce. 2 Anonymous , See Marriage Crisis through Chinese Style Divorce [ ] http://www.360doc. com/content/13/0201/10/4249226_263540214.shtml

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314 The Legal Context of Divorce In Chinese history, women did no t have the right to initiate divorce until the 1930s. But men had always had that right. In December 1930, the Kuomintang government issued a Civil Code which was implemented as of January 1 st , 1931. The new law offered women the equal right to declare a d ivorce in writing in the presence of two witnesses. Almost at the same time, the Red Army led by the Communist Party also issued a marriage law. In December 1931, the government issued the Chinese Soviet Republic Marriage Regulation which was later revised in April 1934. The new regulation was considered to be a revolution in marriage because it stipulated the freedom of marriage and the dismantling of enforced and mercenary marriages. It mandated monogamy, prohibited polygyny, and assumed gender equality. However, with respect [by a woman] upon right of women to initiate divorce. When the Communist Party took power in mainland China, the new government promulgated a marriage law in 1950 and later revised it in 1980 (effective in 1981). The 1950 Marriage Law had three chapters regarding divorce, later (1980) combined into one single chapter (Chapter IV) containing 12 articles. Chapter Five of the 1950 law, which contained 3 articles, regulated the procedure for divorce. The law first establishes the equal right of husbands and wives to request a divorce, though ideally it would be agreed upon by both . The same article specified the requirements of a divorce procedures to take place at the same time. Mediation is required even when court

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315 proceedings are occurring. The current law also allows divorce because of lack of mutual affection . The earlier 1950 law did not stipulate that. The current law identifies several causes that justify d ivorce. a) Where one party commits bigamy or cohabits with another person of the opposite sex; b) Where one party indulges in family violence or mistreats or abandons family members c) Where one party indulges in gambling, drug use , etc. and refuses to reform aft er repeated persuasion; d) Where both parties have separated from each other for two full years for lack of mutual affection; e) Other causes which lead to the shattering of affection between husband and wife. f) Where one party is declared to be missing and the o ther party starts divorce proceedings, divorce shall be granted. However, a divorce from a soldier has additional complications. Article 33 of the the matter shall The new Marriage Law also gives some special protection to women in matters of divorce. For example, a woman cannot be divorced when she is pregnant or within one year after t he birth of a child or within six months after the termination of her pregnancy. But the wife can apply for a divorce at those periods. The 1980 Marriage Law clearly facilitated divorce. Nonetheless the divorce rate did not increase significantly until 20 03. The number of divorces in 2002 was 1.177 million while it was 1.331 million in 2003. The number increased to 1.665 million in 2004, 1.785 million in 2005, and 1.913 million in 2006. Compared with the number of

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316 divorces in 1978, which was .285 million, the rate of increase from 2003 to the present has accelerated. See F igure 8 1 for trends in the growing divorce rate. The cause of the increase is arguably related to two factors 3 . The first is a change in the laws. In 2003, the government promulgated a M arriage Registration Regulation which simplified divorce proceedings. Before 2003, each divorce required proof from neighborhood administrative officials confirming that the relationship of the inciple, this step put a stop to many divorces. On the one hand, divorce is traditionally viewed negatively. One light local residential street or village officials tri ed their best to persuade the couple not to divorce. Furthermore if only one of the parties wanted a divorce, the other party could ask those local officials to withhold consent for the divorce. By eliminating the requirement of consent from neighborhood o fficials, the new law facilitates divorce. An additional factor in the increasing divorce rate is a shift in family values. Although the Marriage Law granted individuals the right, divorce was still viewed as shameful or symbolic of a failure in life. In the past romantic love was not a major consideration. A partnership was a more accurate word to describe husband / wife relationships in most families. Nowadays there is less concern for the preservation of the patrilineal line. Marriages based on love are partner and his or her value system are more important to new couples. Partly for that 3 Xia, Yinlan. 2008. (A Cost Analysis of the Rising Divorce Rate). Gansu So cial Sciences . Vol. 1. In her article, Xia identified four factors in causing the rising divorce rate: weakening of soc ial cohesion, changes in attitudes about marriage, legal changes concerning divorce, and improve I consider the second and the third factors to be the most important.

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317 reason, the No.1 divorce reason in 2003 was incompatibility in personality which accounted for 60% of all the divorces (Wu 2004) . On Oct. 1, 2003, a new regulation stipulated that divorce requests can be taken to the Civil Affairs Bureau directly if mutual agreement has been reached. Additionally the cost for a divorce decreased to RMB 10 4 (less than $2) rather than a calculation based on property (.5% if more than RMB 200,000 is involved) or based on an Moreover, the approval period through the Civil Affairs Bureau is much shorter now while previously it took at least one month, whether through the court or the Civil Affairs Bureau. One hard to explain phenomenon is a sudden decrease, in the year 2002, in the number of divorces nationwide after a consistent annual rise in the preceding 30 years. Xu Anq i, a specialist in Chinese marriage studies, attributed it, in an interview, to a decrease in the marriage rate as of the late 1990s ( (Yu 2005) ) . Though it is an interesting hypothesis, the logic of the link to the sudden drop in divorces remains to be dem onstrated . General Divorce Situation of Bozhou Before September 30, 2010, neither marriage nor divorce records of the prefecture were available on the website of the Civil Affairs system. Data on marriages and divorces in each province, prefecture, and cou nty were not unified. The situation did not change until October 2010. Before that therefore a man practicing polygamy could 4 Some literatures say it is RMB 10.00, while in the Regulation it is RMB 9.00. As a matter of fact, the Civil Affairs Bureau asks RMB 40 as the documenting fee. That is, in total RMB 49 will be collected in a divorce case.

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318 go undetected if he got married in another prefecture or province. Additionally, if the marriage was not registered, their divorce was not documented as suchl but was called Affairs Bureau is limited. With this precaution official data on d ivorces in Bozhou are given in T able 7 1. In this regard the deputy director of the Civil Affairs Bureau in charge of the Marriage Registration Office warned me , a you to write down those data. Data from xiang (towns) are not collected yet. And, data before 2006 are incomp lete. Normally, there were nearly 2000 divorces a year. There data should therefore be taken with a grain of salt. Divorce in Islam Divorce in Islam is called Talaq , whic h means untying or releasing from a knot. nature of both, Sacrament and a Civil Contr Quran ( C hapter IV, S Condi physical being, or if she lacks the moral conduct that is prescribed by the social ver, in contrast, the husband is usually forced into dissolution of a

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319 But divorce, as with marriage and freeing a slave, is a serio us legal matter in (puberty or fifteen for a man) and be of sound mind. The procedure for divorce is for a hree times, t hey then must divorce. But a man who says that when drunk may not be bound since Islam prohibits alcohol. Postponed Dower 5 which means it is only paid in the case of dissolution of marriage (Wilson 1979). However, there is another alternative. In marriage bonds (ibid). It seems that women also ha ve the right to dissolve a marriage, though it is hard to carry off. In practice, however, Islam allows the husband to dissolve his marriage tie without giving any explanation or having any reasonable ground for divorce. In some cases, the husband is not liable for the payment of the dower (Wilson 1979): If the wife or her guardian has been guilty of fraud. If a minor husband under guardianship has been wed for an unreasonably high dower. When a non Muslim wife refuses, if requested, to espouse her husban d's religious beliefs. When the wife is suffering from physical, social or mental illness. The wife has the right to dissolve her marriage by requesting the Qadi (jurist) to grant a decree in her favor in the following cases (Wilson 1979): 5 T hose paid to a woman from a man upon signing the marriage contract and before he was sexually i ntima te with her are called Advanced Dower . T his is the same as the more commonly used term, the bride price. See Wilson 1979.

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320 If the husband' s conduct has been disapproved of by society. If the husband suffers from serious mental or physical defect. If she was given into marriage with an unreasonably low dower. If a Muslim wife requests her non Muslim husband to espouse Islam and he refuses to do so. When a Muslim wife chooses a Muslim country for her domicile, and her non Muslim husband remains a non Muslim. When the husband accuses his wife of infidelity. When the husband absents himself from conjugal domicile for a period of four years or wh en missing and his whereabouts are unknown. When the husband is accused of unequal treatment of two or more wives. Generally, Islam disapproves of divorce, but grants both men and women approximately the same right to dissolve an unhappy marriage, although in practice there are gender inequalities. Given that this right was not found in most cultures before the 20 th Categories of Reasons for Divorce There are several possible ways of categorizing the causes of divorce. The factors can include socioeconomic causes, gender, domestic violence, interpersonal alienation and others. Here I will categorize the causes along three dimensions: personal, parenta l, and religious/ethnic. The personal factors include all reasons arising from the two individuals, or from members of the nuclear family. Parental factors include causes emanating from the extended family, especially from the parents of the spouse. Religi ous/ethnic factors simply refer to all reasons deriving from Islam or from Hui/Han

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321 differences. The three clusters of causes are not mutually exclusive, particularly when discussing the impact of religious and ethnic variables on the decision to divorce. T here are other causal factors which fall outside these categories, such as urbanization and modernization (which may not be heavily correlated to the divorce rate, see Zhang et al. 2014), government policy restricting each couple to ownership of only one h ouse 6 , and others. Factors such as economic stress, extramarital affairs and infidelity, growing apart, personality incompatibility, family violence, etc. will be discussed under the appropriate category. Settlement or Through the Court There are two ways of getting a divorce in China: agreement negotiated between the spouses and recourse to the courts. These two avenues can be discussed in the context of the above mentioned three scales: personal, parental, and ethno religious. Ways of Divorce Currently, dissolution of a registered marriage can be achieved via two different legal routes: settlement via private agreement or resolution in court. Both pathways can stamp of the Bureau of Civil Affairs will be given to the two parties respectively and their registered in the Bureau of Civil Affairs can be dissolved in either way as well, but m ore frequently those marriages are dissolved through private negotiation. Those kinds of 6 The Chinese government issued a policy in 2013 that each famil y is allow ed to own only one house . T hey will have to make a h igher down payment and pay a higher interest rates for mortgages if they try to buy one or more additional house s . To get around this law many couples get a fictitious divorce and register the current household under the husband or wife and the sp ouse is thus allowed to buy a second home for investment purposes without making higher payments . T hey may register to remarry after the new home is bought under the other spouse s name. This is called Jia lihun ( fake divorce), see: http://www.qianzhan.com/indynews/detail/214/130410 16d1bc10.html

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322 marriages are more frequent among old couples. And their marriage is called shishi hunyin ( de facto marriage) which was entered via traditional wedding rituals witnessed by neighbors and relatives. Dissolution of a marriage is usually not only an issue between two individuals, but also between two families or clans. When ethnicity comes in to play in a divorce, it may trigger off dynamics between two ethnic groups. The trend however is that in increasingly fewer divorces do families or clans or ethnic groups get involved. In other words, divorce is more likely to be exclusively done between two individuals, especially among educated people in urban areas. In contrast, less educated people in less urbanized areas are more likely to invite relatives or friends to their divorce proceedings. This happens more frequently in the case of a woman who is in a disadvantageous situation. Juridical Predicament in Divorce As reported by a Bozhou court, infidelity due to a long distance separation is the major reason for divorce in recent years. The law officer of the Bozhou First Court told me that most divorce cases that they dealt with are caused by long distance separation. There are two types. One occurs in the case of a spouse working in a coastal city and unable to return and adequately look after family. The other often occurs in the case of male m edicine merchants who frequently travel to sell or purchase medicine. In the former cases, it will not be easy to determine when the stay at home wife gets involved in an extramarital affair, unless co workers return home and bring bad news to the absentee husband or he suddenly returns home without notifying his wife in advance. The latter scenario, however, has caused a juridical predicament.

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323 There are two principles in the Chinese legal system: In the first place, if there is no written documentation fr om the plaintiff, no legal investigation or prosecution will be initiated ( ). Secondly the burden of proof is on the plaintiff ( ). T hose two principles make it virtually impossible for women who want to divorce an unfaithful absentee husband. On the one hand, the women can rarely prove that their husband has another family in some other city, since marriage databases are not nationally shared. On the other hand household income in merchant families is usually controlled by the husband who there fore has a great deal of flexibility to distribute or hide or transfer their property. As a result, the offended wife cannot claim her fair share words that man has violated the law against bigamy but is not vulnerable to prosecution if his legally registered wi fe does not sue him. The law officer told me in 2008 that this situation was fairly common in Bozhou divorces. It may become less common now that marriage database can be shared at least at provincial level. This makes it legally impossible for both marria ges to be legally registered. Without registration it will be impossible for their child to go to school according to the law, though in practice they Divorce Trend Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain complete divorce records from the local court. Here I will discuss some cases which I learned about through interviews with divorced individuals, though the validity of the information may be dubious. From T able

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324 8 2 we can see, o f all 26 divorce cases on which I have interview data, settlements through personal negotiation occurred in 11 cases, while 8 cases brought in parents and/or other relatives. Of all 8 of these cases, 5 were finalized through the court. In other words, sett lements in private occurred in 14 cases, while 12 cases were through the court. Apparently young couples are more likely to resolve their problems on their own , while older couples are more likely to ask their parents to become involved , and t he eldest can resolve their problem on their own as well (6:1 vs. 4:2 vs. 0:0). At the same time, parents involving divorces are more likely to be resolved through the court rather than through individual negotiation (5:3). In addition young couples are more likely to dissolve their marriage with apparent whimsy. The shortest duration of a marriage of 20 year olds was only 2 months. In contrast, older people know what marriage means to each other because they have lived together for such a long time. Since their obliga tions such as children and property are more complicated, their divorces are usually ended through court. In other words, the more potential complications there are in a divorce because of economic entanglements, the more likely will it be dissolved throug h the court. For divorces involving people in their 20s, four out of eleven marriages were dissolved through the court, while it was half (six out of twelve) for marriages involving people in their 30s. Ethno religious Divorce Of all divorces on which I i nterviewed people, only one of them was caused by ethno religious reasons. One young couple had married three years earlier, and the man promised to respect Muslim traditions. He converted to Islam at marriage and changed his ethnic identification to Hui a s well. However after the wedding he rarely

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325 returned to the mosque. Furthermore after two years, he ate pork and drank alcohol outside. His wife found out and reproached him. He promised to change. Unfortunately, he was not able to keep his promise for ver y long. When his wife found out that he had broken his promise, she simply returned to her natal home. And she asked her two brothers together with several Hui people to come back and beat up her husband. Then she divorced him, gaining possession of most o f the valuable objects in the house but not the real estate itself. Her husband felt guilty and was also afraid of being beaten up again. So he did not contest the divorce but simply signed the papers. He did not go to court to sue his wife and her brother s either. On the contrary, he considered the whole situation as a nightmare and felt that the divorce was a kind of emancipation for him. Similar divorce experience was wife was slightly observant in her religion, bu viewed her not as a Muslim, but more as a Hui woman without Islamic belief. They quarreled with each other at home on many issues, especially on his social activity. Together with his friends, Minton h ad organized a badminton association in Bozhou. When some national or worldwide badminton conferences or tournaments were held elsewhere, he would always try to attend and, if lucky enough, interview some star players and coaches and have his picture taken with them. He would then mount and frame the pictures and hang them in his badminton sports shop. This ploy did bring some additional business to him. However, it also meant that he was frequently absent from home. This absence angered his wife and she t hreatened to divorce him. Minton tried to reach an agreement with her. But ultimately she accused him of offending her Hui life

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326 style. She thought that that particular accusation would prevent him from resisting her threats because other approaches had fai led. However, this accusation brought her natal family and Hui relatives into the domestic conflict and thus completely irritated Minton. He made no attempt to rescue the marriage by explaining the situation to her families and relatives. Through the court he simply asked for the custody of his son and the property of his badminton sports shop, leaving the house and most other property to his wife. He divorced when his son was 7 years old and he later remarried a Han woman and his second son was born in 201 about ethno was smiling at me. Divorces that did not involve ethnicity or religion Ethno religious factors rarely are the trigger for a divorce in a mixed marriage. Factors such as infidelity, growing apart, incompatibility, or health etc. are more likely to cause divorce. And more often, those factors w ork together rather than alone to dissolve a marriage. even any connection to his crippled left leg. The defect in his leg was not a barrier for marriage. As a matter of fact, both he and his ex wife are physically attractive. He is considered a successful provider as well. Besides his staff position in a government department, he also runs a small clothing shop in the city. The problems between him and his wife were caused pri ncipally by disagreements concerning his siblings and parents. Having apparently received a great deal of help from his siblings and parents in his early life, he was very generous to them and gave them a great deal of money

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327 without consent from his wife. When his wife finally expressed dissatisfaction, he was offended by her words and her attitude. Of particular importance was the fact that his younger brother was unable to make money to support the family and his father was in poor health. He considered i t his obligation to give money to his brother and parents. On the other hand, however, Zheng is not the oldest child in the family. He is the fourth child and three elder siblings are in a better economic situation. With the exception of one brother, his other siblings did not give as much money to the family as he did. In addition, Zheng sometimes gave his parents the money secretly without notifying his wife. The last straw for his wife came when he refused either to purchase a house for themselves with their own money or to take his share of the inheritance to have a separate house assigned to his father (who was a worker in train station). (They were still living with his parents.) His angry wife thus purchased a small new apartment on her own and left the family. She then asked for a divorce and Zheng immediately and furiously signed the agreement. At that moment, his son was only three years old. Now five years have passed. This angry divorced couple is still separated and at present both remain un r emarried. two ex spouses appears to have somewhat subsided. There is no hostility between them. Although the son lives with his father, Zheng sometimes has stayed at his e x Mr. due to at least two reasons. The principal reason,

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328 dependence by his wife on her mother. The sec ond reason was their inability to have a child because of genetic factors. . Mr. Woods met his future wife at the medicine market. He was viewed as a by someone in the gov ernment of smuggling gold. His family suddenly plummeted from being one of the richest families in Bozhou to one of the poorest. According to Woods, his parents had been set up and framed by someone. Whatever the cause, both of his parents fell into ill he alth and hid themselves outside Bozhou. All of his real estate holdings, including a 20 room restaurant, were confiscated. In addition a savings account with some 2 million Yuan was frozen and no one knows where the money ended up. With the exception of his oldest brother, who was serving in the army, none of his six other siblings had any resources with which to live. At that time (1993) Woods was only 20 years old. He undertook the entire responsibility for the family, including finding shelter for hi s sick parents and finding food and supplies for two older sisters and two younger brothers and for one younger sister. After myriad failures and frustrations and struggles, in 1999, he was able to extricate his siblings from this horrible situation. So he was naturally viewed as an able man by his neighbors. When his ex and at the same time his own parents were urging him to get married, in 2001, he married the girl. However, it seemed obvious that he felt no great love for the girl. He confided to itself. He had only one thought in his mind: he might be able to meet his destined girl

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329 someday and then he c ould leave this girl without hurting her. (In China, as in the romantic onset migh t be a contributing factor behind their eventual divorce. The major reason, however, may be the genetic inability of the two individuals to produce healthy children. In 2002 their first daughter was born. However, within a month they found that the little creature could not breathe. They spent more than RMB 100,000 and went to many hospitals (from Traditional Chines Medicine centers to modern hospitals). In Beijing they were eventually told that the child was inherently unable to produce and absorb sugar i n her blood. He himself took the baby in his arms and watched her moribund on his train trip from Beijing. He told me that he could sense that the baby was struggling to survive by extending her arms and hands to him, but he had no way to keep her alive. H e was very heartbroken and frustrated and did not dare to ask to his wife to conceive another child. Someone told him that the reason probably was because of the rigorous dietary practices of his wife before the pregnancy so that the baby had some innate f laws. He simply took that opinion as fact and blamed his suggested that a baby might be a good m easure to revive the waning intimacy. She insisted on having a second child. He asked her repeatedly whether her health had been restored or not and she always replied yes. However, within one week after the birth of the second child, the same symptoms wer e found in the new baby. Although

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330 he did not want to experience that kind of pain again. He left home, hid himself from others, and did not go to the burial of the litt le creature, leaving the sorrowing mother unattended. Two months later, he returned home but remained very silent. He had no desire to communicate with his wife. At that difficult time, his mother in law suspected that he would divorce her daughter. He in fact did not and tried hard to convince his wife that they could stay childless or adopt a child. His wife believed him when he spoke to her. However, she was a not a steadfast person. She changed her mind quickly when she returned to her parental home an d listened to her mother. She later asked her husband for control over family income. This request deeply irritated Mr. Woods, who had suffered a lot from the unforgettable pain how his parents had lost control of their resources. He refused to relinquish control. He had a heart to heart conversation with her and she appeared to agree. However, she changed her mind again when she met with her mother. After going back and forth on this issue several times, he felt exhausted and decided to terminate the relat ionship and to initiate divorce proceedings. Though she did not want to lose him, she could not win him back. In 2006, one year after his second daughter passed away, the couple divorced. There were no apparent ethnic or religious dimensions in the breaku p of his marriage. He had not requested that she change her ethnic ID nor had he asked her to convert to Islam at marriage. He did not nag her about mistakes she might have made. In his mind, she was his partner, a woman in the family, and the potential mo ther of children. It was not clear whether he did or did not love her. He was willing to accept her as a wife, without turning her into a religious or ethnic fellow. As a matter of fact, he felt

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331 more religious guilt about his own behavior than from marryin g a non Muslim. He was ashamed of his addiction to alcohol and cigarettes. Having been an apprentice in a mosque for four years (from the age of 12 to the age of 16), he felt guilty about these habits. Once a Muslim from the Northwest was looking forward t o meeting him , h e After the divorce she tried to reunite with him, but he refused, though he is still to meet them. But he has not yet found the right woman for himself. Division of Property Divorce also entails negotiations for the division of property. The Hui in principle should take into account Islamic law. Though this is not necessarily the case, it will be of interest to briefly examine Islamic divorce law, in particular insofar as it deals with , a Muslim f emale is assured of adequate care. A wealthy wife is supported by her husband, a needy sister by her brother, and a daughter by her father. Muslim women in Islamic societies are taken care of by the male relatives whole expected to have more financial responsibilities in a marriage, though a woman is sometimes

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332 required to pay her husband as well if she initiates a divorce. Wilson 1979). As Sodiq (1996) puts it like this way, A male receives two thirds to discharge his "financial" duties toward his wife, children, and parents. If he fails to provide adequately for his dependents when he is able, the authority has a legal right to take these allowances from him by force. If he cannot provide for his wife because of p overty, then she has a right to seek divorce. In contrast, a woman is not charged with the economic responsibility for herself or for her husband. If she possesses some property, she is not, in any sense, legally bound to feed her husband. She owns her mon ey or property separately and spends it on whatever she wishes. This is how the Islamic family structure has been built. This Islamic tradition in these matters is often cited as proof of progressive Islamic values with respect to marriage and famil y. Traditional Islamic law, it is argued, vulnerable party. A female should have the same rights as a male in the shared family property. In practice, the male usually need s to pay the female a certain amount of money as compensation. This is close to the practice of Chinese courts when they deal with bigamy on the part of a man. Enforcement of Divorce Laws in Bozhou The law officer in the Bozhou First Court told me that th ere are many flaws in We have already alluded to the bigamy that some traveling medicine merchants engage in. There is no law to sanction that kind of misconduct if the l egal wife withdraws the not be eligible to sue her husband. With regard to the amount of financial compensation that the offender must pay to the other party, however , there is no specific law. The matter is governed by informal codes. The courts follow local cultural practice in dealing with property division after

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333 divorce. Traditionally the bride price or dowry needs to be returned. Extra compensation ranges from RMB 1,000 to 80,000. The variation can be very large depending on the judgment of a particular law officer on the court. If the compensation is judged to be too appeals. The deliberations by those law officers are effect and law (enforcement) effect. The law officer said that there are many appeals each year but more than 70% of them are ignored. Some plaintiffs may go to a higher govern ment department or even to Beijing for an appeal. There are individuals who give community based legal assistance. This is in high demand. These individuals themselves sometimes go to the community to mediate quarrels and advocate for amicable agree ments. They will offer some legal advice to couples unable to reach an agreement on their own. This type of mediation is preferred by some experienced law officers. With help from community cadres, they tried to calm down tempers. Some recently graduated i nexperienced young law officers, however, are more likely to make judgments without considering their social effect. Thus judgments are often made whose implementation proves to be impossible, because the court itself does not have the power of implementat ion. This is the role of a separate law enforcement team, which is usually controlled by the local police department or government. Therefore, experienced law officers are more likely to opt for conventional solutions acceptable in the community rather tha n insist on strict adherence to the law. In their view a case brought to conclusion in three months is likely to have the best

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334 However even this community based approach sometimes cannot calm excited emotions, Bozhou people in particular have a reputation for being easily irritated. From 2003 to 2006, five families were completely wiped out in the course of conflicts related to issues of economic compensation, according to the law officer. Relatively Fair Property Partition Most divorce c ases, however they are resolved, keep a balance between the two parties. There are three principles. (1) The female in general is supposed to receive a bit more in the form of compensation. (2) A miscreant, in contrast, is to be punished by receiving a sm aller portion. (3) The party who is responsible for raising the child will have a larger part, or the other party must pay child care expenses. The above mentioned cases such as Mr. Zheng, Mr. Minton, and Mr. Woods generally adhered to the three rules. The re were some arguments at the moment of divorce, but it was not difficult to reach an agreement concerning property division. Amended Explanation of the Marriage Law in Aug. 2011, which stipulates that the real estate registered to one spouse before the marriage belongs to this party, and the real before/after the marriage cannot be viewed as shared proper ty. Those regulations deal with real estate, the most disputed issue in divorce. However, this regulation protects the rights of those who made the down payment but fails to take into account who pays the instalments. Someone who succeeds in switching the title to joint ownership but does not pay anything gets a favorable real estate partition division simply because his/her name is on the registry.

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33 5 Relatively Unfair Property Partition In practice, however, imbalanced or unfair property divisions always o ccur. The reasons vary with different situations. Here are some cases. The first case is Ms. Wang who divorced her husband at the age of 42 in 2009. The responsibility for the divorce, however, can be attributed to Ms. Wang rather than to her ex husband. Their marriage was arranged. Ms. Wang is a Hui woman while her husband was a Han who became a Hui after the wedding . But he did not go to the mosque or observe any other religious practices except abstinence from pork at home . He was uxorilocal to his wife at marriage. T hen the couple separated from other brothers and sisters and lived with her parents in the next door. The couple was involved in the beef business together with parents. They have two sons. One son discontinued his studies after junior middle school and married a Hui girl from Henan province at the age of 18 in 2008. The second son was a good student and in 2012 he was admitted to a university. An astonishing event happened in 2009 when the eldest son was starting to learn the beef trade with his mother, Ms. Wang. Ms. Wang decided to divorce her husband and drove him out of the house to marry her father in disowned her. Her siblings broke off all contact with her as well. This odd situation was completely collapsed. The old couple thus moved out and rented a house in a market and continued their beef business. Ms. Wan to another city. He left almost all properties to his ex wife and two sons taking only a small amount of money. Now he is said to be doing a small business in that city.

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336 had interfered in the issue. I met the couple at the divorce office in the Civil Affairs Bureau. A paralyzed woman was sitting in a wheelchair. She looked beautiful but her face appeared pale and the first impression was that she was very vulnerable. Her husband was sitting on the bench with a stiff face and said nothing about the procedure. But he was neatly dressed. I thought that the man might have been guilty of some misconduct towards the woman. So I tried to talk to the woman and asked her some questions. She replied to me softly. I became aware that her leg was broken in a divorce quarrel with her husband. But she did not give me a direct answer about the reason they decided to divorce. My compassion towards this lady was obvious and the tried to see if her face indicated any disagreement. Her face showed no emotion. She remained silent without saying anything. Her husband did not say anything else until they were finally called up to get divorced. My curiosity drove me to ask the officer who was in charge of the case. He told me a totally differen t version of the story and corrected my original dramatic imagination. The lady was under such familial influence that she could not stop bringing goods her Hui husban d was skillfully managing a medicine processing business whereas the economic condition of her natal family was only average. Her husband could no longer stand her behavior and asked her to desist. However, she got angry and argued with

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337 him and asked why h e was so mean. She also threatened to divorce him. She wrote up a contract about the property division including the car, their two story building and half of the business. She and her natal family demanded all the properties as their shared property, whet her they had been acquired before or after the wedding. Her husband would not agree to that, nor did the judgment of the court support the so called inflicted injuries failed to win her many benefits from her husband. Finally she was forced to accept RMB 100,000 from her husband as the compensation. Her husband simply did not want to be bothered any more, though he viewed the whole affair more as a farce. This man also did not in voke his status as a Hui to threaten the other party. He considered that setting her free was to set himself free. medical business is valued at about RMB 20 million. Since most of his materials are from the Northwest and he sells his materials in Shandong Province (and from there to South Korea), he frequently travels between Bozhou, Qinghai, and Shandong. He stays in Bozhou for no more than four to five months a year, sometimes as few as two months. His business partners in Bozhou know that in addition to his legal family in Bozhou, he has another family in Shandong and another family in Qinghai. The woman in Shandong has produced a son for him. The woman in Qinghai is the youngest of the three and they met each other two or three years ago. His first wife in Bozhou had given him two sons. The eldest son now is working with him and the second son is in high middle school. Since he has the son to take care of the business in Bozhou, h e stays in Shandong most of the time. The woman in Qinghai, however, only spends time with him

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338 when he travels there. He treats the woman in Qinghai more like a mistress but the her. Each of the women has her own house bought by Mr. Hai. When his first wife learned of his secret, she refused to accept it and tried hard to fight against him, including initiating a lawsuit against him. However he hid and transferred most of h is property and she could not find any evidence. The buildings he left in Bozhou were very small and most of them were in disrepair. The court did not help her discover the hidden property. His wife was in a desperate situation. Probably for the sake of hi s two sons, he agreed to give her money to support her. He also agreed to transfer his main business to his eldest son, on the condition that she withdraw ed the lawsuit. His first wife had no alternative but to agree with him. In other words, he at least ha s two current wives and three sons. His youngest son was 7 years old in 2008. There are some other kinds of relatively unfair divorces, such as the one mentioned above concerning ethno be considered as a kind of property during the division of property. Since patriarchal culture is still dominant among the Hui as well as the Han, a son is very important to a family to continue the male lin e, especially in the context of the one child per family policy. Therefore, the male side usually is willing to pay more to have custodial rights over the boy. In contrast, if the offspring is a girl, the male side will not insist on custody. This will be discussed in the next section.

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339 Responsibility of Childrearing This section will analyze how the custody of children is determined in divorced families. The gender issue is of particular importance, because it dramatically illustrates the male centered pat riarchal culture in both Islam and in Chinese Han tradition. Gender and Ethnicity Factors D etermining C hild C ustody after Divorce Negotiations concerning the placement of children after divorce illustrate well culturally determined gender norms. Although the divorce sample is small in my research, the data can nonetheless document inequalities in this regard. There is a widespread belief, especially among the Han There are three forms of un filial conduct, of which the worst is to have no descendants men, especially in north China and in less developed areas. Table 8 3 shows da ta on the placement of children after divorce. In the T able, we can see that more children are under the custody of their father. Fewer children stay with their mother since sons are generally assigned to their father. In only seven out of a total of 44 ca ses was the son given to the mother. The percentage is highly comparative apportionment . The analysis reflects the gender ratio among children as well. In this particular sample there are 30 male children and 14 fem ale children. Many couples still prefer to have a son instead of a daughter. Many of them therefore had a diagnosis done of the sex of the fetus. The techniques can be modern medical techniques, or traditional cultural techniques. Medical techniques inclu de a type B ultrasound examination, which is legally prohibited; however, some clandestine procedures are available. There are also traditional cultural strategies for determining the sex of children. For example, it is believed that the pregnant mother who has a craving for spicy food

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340 will have a daughter while it will be a son if she prefers to eat sour food. The shape of boy while a round or flat belly indicates a girl. The skin of the pregnant mother is also a daughter; otherwise, it will be a son. Mr. Woods told me another way to ensure a son. The husband and wife shoul d drink as much vinegar as possible at the time of sexual contact. Three of his friends produced sons by following this method, he said. I cannot find any scientific proof to support their arguments, but they strongly believe that this technique works. Pr eferences with respect to the sex of children in intermarried families also reflect the patriarchal culture. The 18 Hui husband Han wife families that I interviewed have produc ed 22 sons and 9 daughters. In T able 8 than 86% of the sons were assigned to their father while only 14% of the sons were under the custody of their mother. In contrast, more girls are assigned to their mot her. These data illustrate the continual power of patriarchal culture in Hui families, The above data dealt with intermarried couples in which the husband is Hui. In contrast there is no significant evidence about gender bias in the placement of children after divorce in mixed families where the husband is Han. The number of children under the custody of father is the same as that of the mother. With respect to girls, it is significant that all girls from those 8 Han husband Hui wife families are assigned to their mother. However, this statistic must be interpreted carefully. As a matter of fact, none of the four sons assigned to their mother violated the patriarchal norms upheld by the Han.

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341 One Han man gave up custody of his son to his wife because later h e had one son and one daughter with his second wife. The second case entails a Han husband who married into a Hui family. When they got divorced, he simply left the two sons to his wife. The third case entailed an uxorilocal marriage in which the husband s imply left home, including his only son after getting a divorce. Therefore we cannot assert that the extreme cases, all other sons were placed with their father after divo rce. Though the small sample may weaken its generalizability, the data show that even Han husband Hui wife families may prefer to have the son stay with the Han father. In other words, the intermarried families with a Han husband still maintain a patriarch al culture as strong as that of the Hui. The Marriage Law has several stipulations about the placement of children after fed infants should stay with the mother. R ule two is that all arrangements are negotiable except for rule one. Rule three, if agreement cannot be reached, an arrangement will be imposed by law. The marriage law has no rule regarding the sex of children to be placed after divorce. On the contrary, it stipulates that even after divorce, both father and mother have responsibility for the children before they reach adulthood (18 years of age). No matter which parent ends up with which child, the other parent is legally obliged to assume responsibility for helping in the support of the underage child by giving financial or other necessary support. Regarding rule three, action by the court is usually needed. A judgment made by the current

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342 two as well. But there is a great deal of room for maneuver by parents and others. For example, the male child usually ends up staying with father in line w ith the patriarchal culture both in Islam and in Han tradition. Sometimes, the custody of a child is used to may not be given the house. But this is not the case at all times. Sometimes the woman can have both the child and the house, while the father may or may not have to give includes living expenses and education. Both parties must r each an agreement on the amount and duration of such payment. If they do not, the court will step in. Currently there is a trend for women to expect custody of the child but they usually achieve custody only of daughters. At the same time, the party who has a better economic situation is usually given custody of children. If there is more than one child, the two parties may divide them. However, it is apparent that women who insist on custody of a child will find it more difficult to remarry. Commitment Situation of Childrearing Divorce has been found to be associated with various types of parental stress. Among these are greater challenges in raising children (Fisher, et al 1998, Hetherington & Clingempeel 1992), difficulties in maintaining parental au thority (Ellwood & Stolberg 1993, Simons & Associates 1996, Thomson, et al 1992), and greater parental role strain among noncustodial as well as custodial parents. My observations in Bozhou are compatible with these findings.

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343 Trend one : if the divorced pa rent does not remarry and lives by her/himself, childrearing arrangements are easier than for those who have remarried, at least in terms of the emotional wellbeing of children. This is probably because the attention of the parent is not distracted by oth er children. If the parent still has the same income, the family standard of living will stay the same. If the other parent gives some financial support, the situation the financial situation will at least not be worse. But if the custodial parent has a g ood income, and the remarried step parent is not a difficult person, the child can still live well. We can take as an example the son of Mr. Minton. Although he has the second son, his eldest son still has a lot of freedom to do what he enjoys. The contact and intimacy between the son and his step mother is not particularly strong, but there is no resentment between them. In fact the step mother became more affectionate toward her stepson when she realized that the boy could help her bring up the infant bro ther. An age gap of 10 years between two children appears to be healthy for such a relationship in the family. give the child as much attention as before, especially those who have a new child with a new spouse. Though the situation is unpleasant, it occurs frequently. Trend two : if the child stays with the father rather than mother, financial contributions from the mother are usually received on time. On the other hand if the child stays with mother, financial support from the father will depend from his current marital status as well as on his current economic situation.

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344 The fact is that the father often has to be pushed by the child and her/his mother, although sometimes th e mother uses this as a vehicle for reconnecting with the man. But the financial support usually arrives on time if the father is still single and his income level has stayed at the same. Otherwise, it may be harder to get financial support. For example, q uarrels frequently occurred between Ming and his ex wife, because he is always late in paying the expense for his 12 year old son who now is staying with his mother. As a matter of fact, his ex wife would be able to support her son on her own. But she sti ll keeps asking for money because she is dissatisfied with her current status in comparison with Ming who already got remarried. In contrast, Salim receives extra money from his ex wife who already remarried another man. Given that he is raising all four bit beyond his capacity and his economic status. He depends mostly on financial support from the mosque and from the funeral services which he provides for those whose family members passed away. His name is alway s on the list of zakat aid from mosques to certain families. According to the court judgment, his wife is not required to provide child care expenses, but his ex wife still regularly and secretly gives him a certain amount of money to support the children. Trend three : children who stay with their mothers usually have better educational opportunities than those who stay with fathers. In contrast, children who stay with their fathers are more likely to drop out of school and enter the workforce at a younger age. father. It is perhaps related to the attitude toward education that is general in Bozhou.

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345 Making money is viewed as more important than getting educated at school. Par tly for that reason, I was laughed at several times for spending so much time on dushu (studying for a degree). The female emphasis on education may in part be due to the fact that it is harder for a mother to provide their children with opportunities for making father. It could also be that women have a harder time finding a new spouse while a divorced male can get remarried much more easily. Perhaps as a result, a re married children who stay with their mother usually have better educational opportunities, unless poverty or poor health stand in the way. As we shall see below, su ch differentiation by gender occurs in other ways as well. Consequences of Divorce on gender balance This section will discuss the differential consequences of divorce toward men and women respectively. Our analysis will focus on the situation of Muslim w omen. Research has documented the negative psychological consequences of divorce (Amato 2000, Clarke Stewart 1990, etc.). Its differential consequence for males and ed with married individuals, divorced individuals report more social isolation, a lower standard of living, possess less wealth, and experience greater economic hardsh Guangzhou, China, comes to a different conclusion (Cheung & Liu 1997). In their research, their hyp othesis 5

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346 was rejected. From their limited sample ( N= 45), they found that the correlation between sex and social pressu re and social support is not significant in explaining distress. It seems that the conclusion reached in the West does not apply to the situation in China. Furthermore if we compare southern and northern China, and take into account variables such as ethn icity and religiosity, even more variations might emerge. For Men When being asked about the experience of divorce, no men appeared to be happy. Even those who initiated the divorce and got remarried later clearly stated that the experience was negative. However, to some extent, it appears easier for men to get remarried. Of all 26 divorced cases, 12 men of remarried within three years and another 4 men within five years, whereas only 7 women got remarried in three years and another 4 females in five year s. That is, the remarriage rate of men in five years is 62%, w hile that of women is 42%. ( Table 8 6) Those in comfortable economic circumstances are more likely to be introduced to potential spouses by relatives and friends and they are quicker to rema rry. Those in less favorable economic circumstances have a harder time getting remarried. Regarding ethnicity, the percentage of Hui men who remarry is significantly lower than that of Han. Of all 16 remarried men, 7 out of 8 Han men have remarried within five years, while only 9 out of 18 Hui men have remarried in the same time period. The different male remarriage rate between the two ethnic groups may derive from their different social situations. Mr. Woods has pointed out that it is more likely that t he minority status of the Hui makes them relatively isolated; they are not good at communication with others. Mr. Woods himself is an example. More than 20 girls were

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347 introduced to him after his divorce. Most of them could not tolerate his temper. He is c ritical of others and is very easily irritated. Paradoxically he also has a negative self image as well. Once he invited a girl to his small room. He changed the quilt before her arrival because he knew that as a nurse she had a preference for cleanliness. Probably out of habit, she spread her hand on the quilt before sitting on the bed. He felt insulted comfortable with my I could not refrain from criticizing him. He admitted that he had made a stupid mistake, but at that moment he could not control himself. He expressed an interest in resuming the relationship with her. However, he apparently had scared the girl off. She l ater refused to stay in touch with him. Such personality foibles are sometimes the major obstacle for men to get remarried. Part of this personality, however, derives from their ethnic culture. Mr. icult for him to find a new partner from the Han. Later I recommended that he join a Muslim dating chat group. I heard that he is currently dating someone via that chat group. For women The remarriage rate of divorced women is somewhat lower than that of men. 11 out of 26 women got remarried in five years, in addition to one of them who is now living with her ex husband.

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348 In recent years, acceptance of divorce for men is increasing and is stronger than the acceptance of divorce for women. The same is true of attitudes toward remarriage. But my interviews indicate that most men still prefer to marry a girl who has never been married. Whether a man is entering his first marriage or is remarrying, it is looked upon with disfavor for him to marry a divorced wom an unless he has no alternative. This is especially true for those in less favorable economic circumstances. The virginity of women is still highly valued in this patriarchal culture, though it is not as important as before in Bozhou. The result is that it is more difficult for divorced women to get remarried. In other words, their situation does not appear to coincide with Cheung & Hui women have an easier time getting remarried than Han women. Five of eight Hui women h ave been remarried within five years, while among eighteen Han women only six have been remarried within five years after divorce. In addition, in only one case did a Han woman remarry a Hui man; the rest married Han men instead. In five years, thirteen H an individuals and fourteen Hui individuals got remarried. However, the difference between men and women is dramatic. 62 percent of Hui women married again in five years, while only 50 percent of Hui men remarried. At the same time, the difference between the two ethnic groups also reflects a gender differentiation in the remarriage rate. Only 30 percent of Han women were able to remarry. In all, based on the above data, though admittedly incomplete, Hui women and Han men are much more likely to remarry whi le Han women and Hui men are less likely to do so.

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349 Among the 11 remarried females, only four of them brought a child with them into the new marriage. Single divorced women have an easier time finding a new spouse. Sometimes, it may also be because a moth er with custody of a child fears that the stepfather may not treat her child kindly. Such women may be hesitant to get remarried, more so than men and childless divorced women. Table 8 1: Divorce records of Bozhou from 2001 2010 Year Divorce Notes 201 0 1806 Up to Oct. 1 st , 2010 2009 1985 2008 1535 2007 1327 2006 397 Data lost; estimation was more than 1000 2005 808 Data incomplete 2004 715 Data incomplete 2003 333 Data incomplete 2002 379 Data incomplete 2001 21 Data incomplete Table 8 2: The Divorce through settlement or the court at ages Ages Duration of marriage Divorces Settlement through negotiation Through the court Individual exclusive Parents involved Parents involved Individual exclusive 20+ 3.7 11 6 1 2 2 30+ 7.4 12 4 2 3 3 40+ 19 3 1 0 0 2 Total 26 11 3 5 7 Table 8 3: Gender specific about children custody at divorce in mixed families Gender of Children Custody to Father Custody to Mother Total Male 23 7 30 Female 6 8 12* Total 27 15 42 Note: Two girls had pas sed away so that the total number of females is short of 2 and total children should be 44.

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350 Table 8 4: Gender specific about children custody at divorce in Hui husband mixed families Gender of Children Custody to Father Custody to Mother Total Male 19 3 22 Female 3 6 9* Total 22 9 31 Note: Since the two deceased female infant s were from Hui husband family, the total female number is supposed to be 11 instead of 9 and total children number should be 33 instead. Table 8 5: Gender specific about children custody at divorce in Han husband mixed families Gender of Children Custody to Father Custody to Mother Total Male 4 4 8 Female 0 3 3 Total 4 7 11 Note: The small sample requires caution in drawing conclusions. One Han man ceded to his wife custody over their son and later had one son and one daughter with his second wife. The second case is the Han husband who had married into a Hui family. When they got divorced, he simply left the two sons to his wife. The third case is the same as the second case but only with one male child. Table 8 6: Gender and Ethnicity specific about Remarriage Gender Ethnicity 3 Years 5 Years Male (16/26) Han (7) 5 2 Hui (9) 7 2 Female (11/26) Han (6) 4 2 Hui (5) 3 2 Figure 8 1979 2007. Adapted from: Wang & Zhou (2010)

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351 CHAPTER 9 CHANGE OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION THROUGH INTERMARRIAGE This chapter describes the practice of ethnic identification change through intermarriage as well as its consequences. The chapter is composed of four sections. I will first present information on how common ethnic identification change is in Bozhou. I will then describe how the practice of ethnic identification change actually occurs, both legally and illegally. Thirdly, I will examine the reaction on the part of the Hui toward the Han practice of ethnic identification change. Finally, I will discuss the motivation behind ethnic identification change, examining in particular the great impact which state policies have on attitudes toward ethnic membe rship. Change of Ethnic Identification as a Common Phenomenon a whole and in Bozhou in particular. The introductory chapter discussed the distinction between the concepts of ethn ic identity and ethnic identification. In Chapter 7 those distinctions were briefly reviewed. To repeat briefly, refer to the label, or sets of labels, which a person or group apply to themselves. other hand, is the label, or the set of labels, which others apply to inner self awareness, it is operationally useful to focus on the labels used to generate this awar eness. Additionally, we have pointed out in Chapter 7 that in legal terms, the changing of marriages. According to laws issued in 1981 and revised in 1986, 1990, and 200 9, the ethnic identification of an individual can be changed only between the ages of 18 and 20

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352 registered. Except for this circumstance, unless one has certain pr oofs that his ancestors were from an ethnic group different from his present one, no individual can be re identified as a member of a different ethnic group. To effect such a change currently several pieces of information are required: the ethnic membersh county and provincial levels, and the age of the child. However, in practice, people try to find ways to skirt the official rules and to change their ethnic identification in a manner t hat technically violates the rules. Examples of these maneuvers will be given later. When the official switch of ethnic membership has been achieved, the individuals themselves may even change their ethnic identity that is, if their papers say they are H ui, they will begin calling themselves Hui as well (What people actually think in private is, of course, harder to tell .) In any case both the ethnic identity and the ethnic identification of the individual are affected by this maneuver. There has been a statistical increase in the Hui population. For example, the population of the Hui in 1982 ( the third census) was 7.23 million, in 1990 (the fourth census) 8.60 million, in 2000 (the fifth census) 9.62 million, and in 2010 (the sixth census) 10.59 million. T he Hui population exceed ed that of the Manchu in the sixth census and became the second largest minority ethnic group. It is difficult, however, to determine whether the increase came principally through changes in ethnic identification or through natura l demographic growth . On the one hand, official statistics are hard to obtain. They may furthermore be incomplete even when available. The

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353 administration office and the household registration office located in police stations refuse to publicize the record s of ethnic identification change. It is unlikely that they would even be able to document the changes except in cases of large scale governmental reclassification such as happened to the Hui in Fujian in the 1980s (see Gladney 1996, Fan 2000) . Other resea rch methods including participant observation are thus called for in the study of this phenomenon. There is a theory that the main motivation of many Han for joining the Hui is because minorities are allowed to have two or more children thanks to favorabl e ethnic policies toward minorities. However, the validity of the data is too weak to prove this. Additionally, if of questionable validity , for example, that is, if they obtained minority status through i llegal ethnic identification change, then the ethnic identification of the children can also be called into question . Official statistics have too many gaps for them to be helpful in analyzing the factors behind the unusual growth of the Hui population. A t any rate, ethnic identification change has become a common phenomenon in Bozhou , though these changes are not fully visible in the official records. Of the 151 intermarried cases on which I have interview data, 98 have changed their ethnic memberships fr om Han to Hui. Only 20 Han spouses chose not to attempt to change their ethnic membership, whereas 16 of them tried to change but failed to get approval from the police station. The remaining 17 did not give me a clear answer . According to the survey of 19 7 households conducted among members of three mosques (the CLS , BJS and XGS ), ethnic identification change occurred at in as many as 65 percent (i.e., 98 out of all 151 intermarried cases) . Furthermore, this data reflect s only those that

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354 have been confirme d or reconfirmed. Many respondents were reluctant to mention their changed their ethnic membership or not. The information reported here was elicited through methods such as building double checks into the questionnaire and checking official records, such as the hukou ben (household registry) or Shenfen zheng (I.D. card). However, the ethnic membership of some elders is documented only in the hukou ben rather than the Shenfen zheng because they had never appl ied to obtain the latter . This usually happens among elder females. A Hukou is required (particularly for children to go to school), while the possession of a Shenfen Zheng was not required until recent decades. In fact, ch ildren under 18 years of age did not have the right to have a Shenfen Zheng until 4 years ago. The Shenfen Zheng became more popular and has been required only since the 1990s. Even today, a Hukou Ben is more useful than a S henfen Zheng on some occasions. For example, a Hukou Ben instead of Shenfen Zheng must be presented for children to receive the compulsory nine years of education. In any case, if respondents in my survey refused to show their Shenfen zheng or the hukou ben , their statements concerning t heir ethnic identification as Hui or Han could not be easily verified. Table 9 1 clearly illustrates how common the change of ethnic identification is in Bozhou through intermarriage. Some features are particularly noticeable. 1. All ethnic identification c hanges without exception go in only one direction, i.e., from Han to Hui 1 . 1 But one of my respondents, a Hui, wanted to be a Han, because it would be easier for him to join the army. He was a deactivate d solider, now serving in a state owned company as a driver. He just complained that there were many zhengzhi shencha (political vetting) when he applied to join the army. And also, the food taboos create inconveniences for him when he goes out with the bo ss. He said that if he could choose, he would prefer to be Han rather than Hui.

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355 2. Though the frequency of intermarriage has been increasing over time, the percentage of those who change their ethnic identification has been decreasing. 3. Female Han have an easier ti me changing their ethnic identification than male Han when involved in intermarriage. 4. The phenomenon of the Hui husband Han wife was dominant in the past whereas the situation seems reversed among young couples; more Hui women have been marrying out. But i t does not change the male to female ratio of those who change their ethnic identification. That is, more female than male Han have changed their ethnic identification at intermarriage. 5. Fewer and fewer Han men are now changing their ethnic identificatio n. The reasons may lie in stricter implementation of minzu policies rather than because the solidity of their ethnic identity has somehow been strengthened or their ethnic awareness has become more important. Besides intermarriage, there are several other identification. A driver of a local state owned company told me that his wife was in charge of the local hukou registry and the issuing of shenfen zheng in the local police station . He thus witnessed many cases and said that it document (to support your request of ID change) was really needed, if I introduce you to Another Hui policeman confirmed his words. Once we talked about the one child per family policy. I said that he must feel lucky that he i s allowed to have two children. ble? My wife is not a Hui either. Even my hukou hukou to Bozhou first; I will do the

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356 of cake for him. One of my informants, Mr. Zhao, provided me with another case. His immediate family has seven members: his parents, two daughters, and one son. The eldest daughter was 20 years old in 2013, the second daughter 19 years old, and his son 14 years old. According to the fertility law in recent years, ethnic Han from rural areas are allowed to have two children if the first one is a girl. Zhao was therefore able to have a second child because his first child was a girl . His second child, however, was also a girl. Although e thnic minorit ies such as Hui are in theory supposed to legitimately have only two children , in practice, some Hui family have more than 2 children . Therefore, for the purpose of having a third child, particularly, a male descendant, Zhao changed the ethnic identificati on of his entire family from Han to Hui. According to the law this is not allowed . However, Mr. Zhao contacted a friend of his who worked in government. His friend was in charge of establishing ethnic identification. Mr. Zhao treated his friend to a dinne that Mr. Zhao successfully switched the ethnic identifications of his family members. In his new status as a Hui, he was now able to have a third child, who, as he hoped, is a son. In our conversation, Mr. Zhao denied a t first that the purpose of his switch was for have a male descendant. What he wanted, according to his explanation, was a lower entrance grade requirement for his daughters in the future. As we pointed out earlier, ethnic minorities have a lower threshold for university entrance. Later on, however,

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357 when we talked about his son, he admitted how important the son was for carrying on his clan name in future generations. worked. His eldest daughter decided to drop out of high school right before Gaokao ; his second daughter did poorly in school and the Gaokao scores which she received were too low to qualify for university admission even with the extra 30 points added for an ethni c minority. She finally went to a technical community college in another province a less prestigious educational option than university studies. Mr. Zhao felt very disappointed in his daughters. Now he puts all his hope on his only son, a boy in the seco nd year at a junior middle school. However, his son is unlikely to fulfill his expectation either. Based on my observation, it would appear that the boy is far more interested in martial arts and electronic games than in his studies. ience illustrates is the existence of informal ways to break the law regarding change of ethnic identification. This particular case illustrates the guanxi guanxi ordinary Han people , eve n if he/she comes from an intermarried family, would not be able to get the approval for ethnic identification switch beyond the age of 20 or for purposes of having a third child. A middle school teacher, Mr. Ted , who is teach ing Chinese literature in the Bozhou Second Middle School, failed to get approval of his application for a change of ethnic identification. He is a Han but his wife is a Hui. They had a son, 13 years old (in 2008 ) . But they wanted to have a girl, a second child. Supposedly, there was no

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358 problem for them to have a second child because of However, he claimed: just one person to hold minority membership in the family. You can see that the rules concerning minority status are now more restricted. I really more. As it is, I am afraid that I would be expelled (from the school 2 if I have a second child). In 2010, his second child, a little girl, was born , which thrilled him greatly . (He was hoping for a girl.) Both of h is children are registered as Hui , yet his own status is still that of Han. The door to change ethnic identification seems open to certain people, but not to him. For example, a Han deputy judge in a Bozhou court, who had just gotten engaged with a Hui girl in the winter of 2012, wa s strongly urged by Hui relatives, and question in the spring of 2013. Another Han lady who was working in a department of the Bozhou government had a similar experience. Her h usband is Hui. When they got married in 2004, their friend working in the police department voluntarily changed her ethnic status. In a contrary example, in 2008, a Han man on his own knocked at the door of the imam to seek his support to change his ethnic status but was refused. He had been (incorrectly) told earlier that certification from an imam was required if he examine that question. 2 I t is clear that those who are strictly following the one child per family policy are mainly those who are working in state owned working units such as government departmen ts, schools, and companies, because those parents are afraid of being driven out of the work unit . If they violate the fertility policy, the leaders of their working units would be removed from their position and also los e the opportunity for promotion in the future.

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359 Procedures and Practice A 37 year old villager named Pang burst into the Inner City Mosque in 2008. He ha d two sons. One wa s 17 and the other wa s 15. He live d in a suburban area of Bozhou, the Shiba li (18 li ) town, which means t he town is 18 li (i.e., 9 km) away from the center of the city. Because of the expansion of the city since the 1980s, the distance from Bozhou to Shibali is shrinking to half an hour bus ride or less. Pang rode his motorcycle, without shaving the beard on the cheek. His hair was dirty and visibly dusty. Apparently, he just fled from work on a construction site and rushed to the mosque. Right after Dhuhr , the noon prayer on Wednesday, as the imam Chang was coming out of the Hall, Pang was already waiting out side. He approached the imam with high wo xiang ru jiao loudly. Chang was dumbfounded. Nearby xianglao (elder Muslims) felt strange as well, but no one said anything, and left quietly w ith a smile on their faces. After briefly hesitating, Imam Chang led Pang to the side hall on the north side of the mosque. Qingzhenyani very clear about one fact, namely, that Hui children can receive extra points in entrance , this simple man, did not know ho w to hide his true purpose. agree to that, especially in my presence, quite aside from the fact that to develop the jiao men (religion) is one of the highest expectations and one of the most urgent responsibilities of imams. He tried insistently to explain to Mr. Pang what Islam is and

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360 how to be a good Muslim. He was recounting the importance of the faith, have Mr. Mr. Pang asked in the next minute. Huizu (Hui nat Huizu The imam felt that he could not ignore the question any more. Otherwise, Pang would can enly filled with emotion and his tone became harsh. Paichusuo (Police Station) . do. Just please give me a certificate. I will go back to read Qingzhenyan (Shahada), I will pray five times a day. I will come to participate in zhuma (Friday congregation ) He pushed his palms out back and forth when mentioning each requirement, with obvious eagerness and concern on his face. imam told me late r . Apparently, the

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361 you still want to study Islam. The door is open to you at all times. But I cannot write a certificate for study [Islam] the conversation while still standing. Pang simply did not understand why he could not convert to Islam immediately and why being a Muslim would not automatically make him a Hui. H e walked away from the mosque but has never returned in the past five years. I am not sure, but he may have tried other mosques and may now be officially a Hui. is not an isola ted case. Requests for changing ethnic identification were often made, Imam Chang said. When it happens at a marriage, it is viewed as many cases passed through his hands. He served as principal imam ( da ahong or jiaozhang ) from 2007 through the end of 2010. During this period he issued at most 10 He appeared quite certain abo ut that. His credibility on these matters is quite high. Of all ahongs whom I have met, his score on the examination required for becoming an ahong 3 was the highest, 95/100. He is probably more knowledgeable than 3 The passing score for the examination is 60. A hailifan (student) within the CLS took the test three times and finally passed with a low score.

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362 his colleagues not to mention most ordinar y Muslims about issues concerning religion and ethnic identification. asked the question in this way, he did not give me a n af firmative answer immediately. He murmured somethi ng and changed the topic. I tried to elicit the answer to that question at least three times, but each time he dodged the question. identity to Hui. An applicant needs to submi t a written request to the Si Guan Hui, the Democratic Administration Committee of Mosque (abbr., D ACM) or directly to the imam. The DACM takes the request to the imam to get his endorsement for becoming a Hui. nt as well as other supporting documents Hui. Otherwise, he/she would not be recognized a difference between ethnic identification and religious belief, and also he knows that those who believe in Islam are not necessarily Hui. However, he misunderstood the policy about the required endorsement. In any case, the rules concerning these matters were changed in 2009. Approval Process for Changing Nationality for Bozhou Citizens (trial) 4 , which was issued in August 2009, there is no mandatory involvement of a 4 The whole text is not available online right now. B ut we can refer to: Bozhou Committee of Min zu Affairs, Bozhou Bureau of Religious Affairs ( ). 2015. (An Interpretation of a Policy: A Regulation on Strict Execut ion of the Change of the Minzu Identification). http://www.bzsmz.com/fagui.asp?id=231

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363 identification. The only required materials concern the ethnic identification of the cunweihui (village committee) or juweihui (street/ community committee ) whe re the applicant lives. The documents provided by the cunweihui or juweihui cadres must be based on a thorough recognized evidence to support ethnic identification change. In addition, article 5 in the between adults from different nationalities do not change their respective nationality gnized by the imam, namely, conversion after marriage, can no longer be considered as grounds for ethnic identification change in terms of the new regulations. His endorsement cannot be used as evidence at present. sed on the many requests made by individuals who wanted to change their ethnic identification. They believed that the imam would be able to imam stated that the person is a Muslim, he/she co indicates that in the eyes of most Muslim Hui as well as many Han Chinese, to say that someone is a Hui is tantamount to saying that he is Muslim, or vice versa. This common sense assumption is not correct or legal in actual fact . It was this misunderstanding that led someone to recommend that Pang go to I mam Chang to make the request. This strategy has been used for a long time. Imam Chang obviously understood the difference between religion and ethnic identification , but he appeared to be in error concerning the validity of his testimony. If a knowledgeable man like him can make this

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364 kind of mistake, it is understandable why so many Han Chinese and Hui Muslims also misunderstand the policy. However, to some extent, sense. Pang came to him before the new policy had been issued. Furthermore his endorsement was accepted for many years. Local government officials relied on 5 imams because the officials themselves were unable t o verify the identity of the applicants. They were in need of help. An endorse ment from an Imam for an applica n t was considered reliable. A nd thus applicants themselves assumed that it was a valid step for getting their application approved. A bidirectiona l and interdependent mechanism was thus forged. I cannot find any credible official policy statement about the effectiveness of , however, their interventions in the past may have bolstered the credibility of some applicants . . w as introduced to his future wife by a maternal uncle. However, he had just been deeply wounded by his first girlfriend , Ms. Min . Min refused to wait for him any longer after a ten year relationship when he simply ran off to learn martial arts in Henan Prov ince and hid himself from Min when she tried to locate him. Despairing of ever seeing him again and under pressure from her parents, Min decided to accept an arranged marriage 5 The government may simply realize the importance of an imam among Muslims on the one hand, and knowledge of officers in local government about Islam and the Hui may contribute to this as well. As we discussed in C hapter 1 , almost all official information about the Bozhou Hui are provided by Mr. Li Huacheng rather than by government officials. It seems t hat their major concern is to ensure that the Hui make no trouble. If the Hui d o make any trouble, their reaction is to contact the Imam and the director of the D ACM to calm matters down.

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365 instead of waiting for Damon. One month after her wedding, Damon suddenly return ed to Bozhou. Damon was totally crushed and he could not open his heart to anyone else for a long time. So when his uncle introduced Hang to him, he made a very hasty decision to rush into marriage. But in his heart he was unable to completely accept Hang until their first child was born two years later . However, his clan has a long tradition of observing Islam. His grandfather was viewed as one of the top 100 famous imams in the country before 1949. All the spouses of his clan, if they were Han, had witho ut exception converted to Islam. In accordance with this tradition, he made a request to the imam, Hajj Gong application. It was immediately approved by the (Police Station) across the street from them. This was seen as t he default process for couples wanting to intermarry. That is, the non Hui spouse was supposed to change ethnic status to that of Hui after the wedding . This was viewed as a common sense move by most Hui and Han in Bozhou. For example, five out of six int ermarried spouses in kin group have changed their minzu status from Han to Hui. This change was made at the wedding , except in the case of Mr. Woods himself. His youngest brother, 33 years old (in 2008), minzu status . This occurred in 2004. However, Mr. Woods himself did not try to do so, though he assured me that it would have been easy for him if he had wanted to. He explained that he simply felt no love for the woman, and , he did not feel comfortable doing th at. As we discussed in C hapter 8 , he sensed that his mother in law was motivated by greed and he suspected that his marriage might be

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366 returned from her mother, I coul d sense that there was trouble brewing. I knew subconsciously that we could not live together for much longer. She was too ready to yield to her mother. How can you expect to live with such a ruan gutou (soft bones) ll felt angry and disappointed as he discussed minzu shenfen ( membership ) Besides these issues , there were other considerations. For instance, he had studied Islamic doctrines with an Imam in the Beijin g Mosque for four years. Therefore , his knowledge about Islam is better than that of his siblings. He is well aware that intermarriage cannot guarantee that a non Muslim woman will automatically be viewed as a Muslim . Although he is aware that many Han spo minzu Qingzhenyan ( Shabadah ) . Qingzhenyan or anything else . been quite easy for me. You know that my best huoji (friend or brother) works at the Imam and DACM The situation changed as of the 1990s. As a religious leader, an imam is generally believed to have sacred status and is viewed as unapproachable in the eyes of many people (esp. the Han). Ordinary people do not have many opportunities to make the acquaintance of an imam. Additionally, many Han have a negative image of the Hui and of their imams. They wi ll not approach an imam directly on their own. In that Mr. Pang had received is not unusual. Usually, this contact is mediated by the DACM, because there are many DACM members and they are easier for applicants to approach to make some social

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367 endorsement became less relevant. The DACM, known as Si Guan Hui ( ), associated with each mosque, is a non governmental organ ization. The director of the DACM is in principle supposed to be elected by local Muslim residents but actually is publicly or privately appointed by the Bureau of Minzu and Religion (MZJ) . All other committee members are also supposed to be elected from a mong the most observant and respectable local believers. Similar to that of an imam, the membership period is supposed to be for three years. However, those rules are never strictly abided by. For example, the current director of the CLS DACM , Mr. Kong , h as held his office for more than 10 years. The director of the BJS DACM , Mr. Yufu , has held his office for about 15 years. Even when he was sent to prison for five years nobody else dared to claim the director position. None of the committee members of the CLS have apparently stepped down since its founding (though some have passed away). It is interesting to note that local government officials rarely interfere in the management of the DACM, unless the DACM makes some kind of trouble. The DACM is a power ful and influential organization, parallel to the traditional Ahongs ( imam was created during the Ming Dynasty (1368 1644). Alt hough the functions of the three ahongs had changed during the Q ing Dynasty, it paralleled the basic administration structure of a mosque. TAS signifies that each mosque is equipped with three ahongs and the principal ahong (usually called Da Ahong or sometimes Jiao Zhang ) is in charge

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368 of religious affairs. The other t wo manage other tasks, such as finances, education, slaughtering animals for sacrifice, washing the dead before a funeral, etc. This system worked very well until the DACM was brought in. The DACM is on the whole now more powerful than the TAS, because it controls not only the economy of the mosque but also the rights of its personnel. The hiring and firing of an ahong is now position of ahong in a mosque must be reported to the MZJ first. An ahong who fails to get their approval would not be hired. As a result, the power structure of Chinese Islam now has a dual dimension. The imam stands in the front, while the DACM stands behind controlling and supervising. Because of their broader social contacts more people now come to the DACM directly for help if they need to change their ethnic identification. In the 1990s and thereafter, an applicant is expected to pay a certain fee to the DACM members. When imam Chang took his of fice, the going rate was about 1,500 Yuan 6 per person. When a work to the endorsement . Sometimes the imam would question the authenticity of the request, but most of the time he was forced to sign his name. He had no apparent authority to reject the request. (By the way, only a male imam has this type of authority to endorse a request). Imams tend to feel uncomfortable with this arrangement. However, the existence of have caused a lowering of the role of imam from that of a religious and spiritual leader 6 It was about US $200 according to the currency rate at that time.

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369 to a more mundane role, though they still enjoy a certain authority and superior s tatus in the eyes of ordinary believers. When they compare their current status with their former status under the TAS system before 1949 , they lament their decline in prestige and power . They no longer have the authority to punish violations of Islamic sh aria or of Hui tradition. Their embarrassing status is also determined by their education and by the job market. They studied Islam and Hui culture either in a mosque or with teachers in Arabic schools. They subsequently took an examination organized by the central government and obtained a certificate if they passed. Through recommendations from a provincial Islamic association or from their imam friends, they may be employed by a mosque. Otherwise they struggle to find other jobs. The prestige that imam s enjoyed among Muslims in pre 1949 days has disappeared with little trace particularly in eastern China. Everyone is aware of the negative impact of the Cultural Revolution and of its hostility towards religion. However, the improper behavior of many ima ms may have contributed to the decline of their status. For example, during his tenure for more than two decades (1981 2002), the previous Ahong, Hajj Gong , completely integrated his rule document presented by the director of the DACM would be signed by the imam without any inspect the document submitted through the DACM, regardless of the legality or i llegality of a particular request for ethnic change. They have become embedded within a web of power(s). They have little space

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370 The limitation of their powers is also found in Sunni Islam. The role of imams is s context, in contrast, imams have a more central role in the community. Under the impact of Chinese Sufism from the 19 th century onward, the role of Chinese Sunni imams became restricted by the DACM whose influence is encouraged and supported by the State and whose behavior is often characterized by greed. Human greed leads to occasional competition between imams and the DACM. Sometimes one side wins, sometimes the other. The situations in two of the mosques, the GBS and XGS, provide a good example. For a long time, GBS Muslims did not organize a formal DACM until they were no longer able to tolerate the misbehavior and greed of the imam. In 2011, they organized a new DACM and invited a new imam, removing the old one who had held office for almost 10 years. By contrast, the XGS has never seriously organized a DACM. The imam is a powerful man and has c ontrolled all aspects of the mosque since 2000 when he first took office. He maintains a very good personal relationship with the director of the DACM of the CLS , who is a very successful banker and influential politician and who holds a position in govern ment. In accordance with the recommendation of that director, the imam from the XGS was elected as the religious the resignation of the former representative, the old ima m of the CLS . Given that his mosque is very small and the CLS is the major mosque in Bozhou, the imam from the CLS is expected to take the position of the Bozhou CPPCC. Therefore, the current

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371 imam in the CLS privately complains about this arrangement but h e cannot do much. In any case he appears to have no great desire for the position. The conflict between imams and the DACM causes suffering to many observant Muslims. The parents of my host family decided to move out of the mosque neighborhood 3 0 years thoroughly rotten ( ta men huai tou le back to the mosque . ( Of course, Red endorsement of an imam but through his own guanxi, a childhood friend who works in the police station . well ). His son follows t his advice up to this very day. He asked his friend to bring him and me to the XGS committed, a skeptical glan ce passed over their face. But they obviously had heard Chi closer to the mosque. Nowadays, it s eems that neither imams nor the DACM any longer have a predominant role in supporting an ethnic identification change; it is no longer considered part of their role. There are four steps in the application process according to the latest instruction (2009 7 ): 7 Refer to: Bozhou Committe of Minzu Affairs, Bozhou Bureau of Religious Affairs ( ). 2015. (An Interpretation of a Policy: A Regulation on Strict Execut ion of the Change of the Minzu Identification). http://www.bzsmz.com/fagui.asp?id=231

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372 1) The applicant or his agent should acquire the form Application and to Change the Nationality Membership and should present a valid ID card and some copies. 2) The applicant or agent fills out the form. 3) The applicant or agent su bmits the form with all required supporting Nationality and Religions Bureau will give some written suggestions and then stamp the f orm. 4) and Religions Bureau by submitting all required materials, including the suggestions given by the county level Nationality and Religions Bureau. Each of these steps is irrelevant to the roles of the imam or of the DACM. Moreover, it seems that the police station is no longer directly involved in the process actual fact, the police station still plays a role because all changed or re identified nationality memberships must be registered through the police station because of the hukou system. In other words, at least two out of the three important institutions that formerly determined ethnic identification before 2009 appear to have lost their roles. People can still take advantage of loopholes in the policy. Guanxi (personal connections), however, have continued to play a very important role in the application, as indicated in the case of th e deputy judge mentioned above. alter the frequency of the change. The current decrease in the frequency of changes of ethnicity is due to the tightening of the policy rather than any diminishing in the interests of many Han people. Those with financial and social capital are still able to change or help others change their ethnic identification, though it is now done less publicly.

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373 Ethnic Identification Change : Motivations, H In this section, I will specifically discuss the motivations behind such widespread and frequent changes in ethnic identification as well as the consequences of these changes. The reactions of ordinary Hui are of particular interest in this regard, Motivations: Utilitarianism and Other Explanations Motivations to change ethnic identification through intermarriage are diverse, but utilitarian motives seem to predominate. utilitarianism is: A doctrine that the useful is the good and that the determining consideration of right conduct should be the usefulness of its consequences; specifically : a theory that the aim of action should be the largest possible balance of pleasure over pain or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In this regard, the cases we discussed in previous chapters apparently illustrate this approach, because the major purpose of some Han in changing their ethnic membership is to take advantage of special benefits which government policies give to ethnic minorities. For example, we can re examine the case of L eo in law discussed in Chapter 3. He admitted that his decision to marry out his two daughters to Hui husbands was a strategy to stop his peers and n eighbors from bullying him. Now he can prevent mistreatment by warning people Now I am a Huimin (Hui people) , and both of my daughters are married with Huimin. girl in the winter of 201 1 . Now all his family members have become Hui. His motivation for chang ing the ethnic identification of his family members lies in the social reputation of the Hui in th e community , namely, that Huimin are more united and easier to irritate but harder to appease. This reputatio n coincides in another case, a taxi driver, who puts

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374 a small Qingzhenyan ( Shabadah ) board in the front of his taxi to prevent being bullied or robbed by criminal passengers. He said that this was a gift from a Hui friend of his who obtained it from an imam . Since putting this amulet in his car, he has never encountered any bad treatment from passengers , whether Han or Hui Hanmin (Han people) become careful when they see the board and nobody dares not to pay the know how to read the words on the board. In other words, Hui reputation is very negative. Throughout the country, the Hui are well known for their great ethnic solidarity. And among the Han, the Hui are reported to be aggressive toward the Han more often than vice versa. Since this negative image has become widespread throughout the country, one can use it to intimidate others, just as Leo in law did. Even if the Hui will not protect you, they themselves will at least not bully you. Such cases ca n be considered examples of utilitarianism: taking advantage of favorable policies toward minorities, intimidating opponents, or avoiding aggression from rude passengers. But can utilitarianism explain all ethnic changes? Apparently, some other cases ind icate different motives. For example, the old lady who was working for Mr. Leo in his medicine business was not taking advantage of benefits provided by government policies. The reason for which she changed her ethnic identification was to follow tradition , which assumed that all people would convert to Islam when getting intermarried with a Muslim Hui, even when the Hui may not observe Islam strictly and the converted party may not observe either. After intermarriage, the other party usually a woman wa

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375 identification was not necessary until the 1950s when all people were encouraged to be officially classified or reclassified with respect to their minzu identification and identity. This obse rvance of tradition can also apply to those who requested to change their ethnic identification from the Han to the Hui in southwestern China (See Gladney 1996, Fan 2000), and to the Manchu in northeastern China (Shi 2009:118 121), etc. When a hostile envi ronment ceased to exist, they obviously preferred to restore their personal Hui identity (and their public identification as Hui). There are probably some utilitarian motives operating, but we cannot deny the operation of emotional factors linking them to their ancestors. I will discuss this issue further in the conclusion. How do the Hui react toward the Han who change their ethnic identification? Different motives provoke different reactions. ic identification change at the time of marriage fall into three groups: acceptance, rejection, and indifference. Acceptance occurs when other family members or close relatives have been involved in intermarriage and already changed their ethnic identifica tion. For example, almost all by Islamic law and even their ancestors served as imam in mosques. Taking non Muslims into the family and having them convert to Islam is a tradition upheld for another example. His family also has a long history of inte rmarriage with Han people; and currently, his other two siblings are intermarried with Han spouses as well. Marriage to Han women is a family tradition, and it is not difficult for them to accept that.

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376 An attitude of rejection can be found among many obse rvant families who consider that their Hui ethnicity is linked with religious belief. An individual who is called a Hui is automatically a Muslim, and vice versa. For instance, Mr. Yufu strongly illustrates this attitude, so much so that some Hui families in the BJS community occasionally try to avoid him. The current jiaozhang (major imam) in the CLS, a highly eloquent imam, also holds the same attitude. He clearly understands the difference between ethnic membership and religious affiliation. He never acc epts a request like that of Mr. Pang to endorse an ethnic identification change. As a result, he eventually changes. This power has been completely transferred to the DACM as well as to other imams. The store owner Mrs. Bin also falls into this category. The couple clearly stated jiaomen daughter/son in law. And they also put this convic tion into practice. The girls whom his son dated and the boys whom her two daughters dated are from Muslim families. The third attitude, the neutral or indifferent one, is held by those who have little knowledge about the Hui and Islam. Some of them have even converted to other religions. Damon is an example. His knowledge about Islam and the Hui is apparently influenced by his understanding of Buddhism which he studied for three decades. He doctrine that there whose ethnic identification is changed or whose is not. He classifies people, whether But actually he does know the difference between ethnic identification and religious belief. In the beginning,

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377 however, he did not want to answer my questions about that and simply said that changing ethnic identification was a tradition among Hui famili es if a Han woman married into a Hui family. Late r , he explained further to me that it is incorrect to confuse ethnic identification with religious belief. But he admits that even nowadays nobody Hui reaction t oward those who have changed their ethnic identification through other ways besides marriage is negative. But at the same time, they feel powerless. In played an importan t role in it. However, the situation changed when the requirement of an imam was no longer mandatory permitting Han to find alternative ways (e.g. bribery, social connections, etc.) to reach their goal. Furthermore, the requirement of an imam has been eli minated. Any strateg y does not sit well with the Hui. In their view all other ways of changing ethnic identification are improper. They assume that Han who do this simply want to take a dvantage of government policies toward minorities. Such behavior may not necessarily be considered evil. They object to the Han taking advantages of policies that should In other words, if you want to enjoy the privilege offered by the government, you are supposed to become a Muslim/Hui first. Otherwise, your motivation is suspect, though not necessarily evil Unfortunately, they cannot prevent this type of conduct, although most of them feel uncomfortable with it. This occurs because the prerogative of becoming a Hui is no

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378 longer under Muslim control but under governmental control, more precisely, under the control of people in a few governmental offices. The loss of power by the Hui themselves to determine who can become a Hui is perceived as leading to a weakening of their status and power in government, politics, and society. As a minority group embedded in a majority, the power of the Hui is too small for them to freely express their opinion, even though the government has promised and guaranteed certain privileges, such as more opportunities for promotion as minority Consultativ them, etc. However, these privileges do not significantly change their status in society. Sometimes they are intentionally ignored by local governments. For example, though they are a majo r sector of Bozhou residents and a group of people with distinct features prefecture . Why does the local government avoid this group of people? The attitude of the officers working in the Nationality and Religions Bureau can perhaps provide some clues. In the summer of 2008 I had just arrived in Bozhou and was attempting to obtain some o fficial documents from a government office. I showed them a letter of introduction issued by my host university, Anhui University. The two employees at the office were very unfriendly in their response to my request. A man in his 40s was sitting behind a d esk. He had been soft spoken when an officer from another department ushered me in to his office. When I stated the purpose of my visit, however, he raised

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379 some wrinkles cross ed his forehead, but his tone was as stiff as a rod. I restated my research purpose about Hui intermarriage as well as other issues. He said, still very Probably this direct but indelicate way of asking made him more uncomfortable What are you doing? I told you they are very g ood. The relationship is very good as him. A lady in her 50s and sitting opposite to the man turned an indifferent face to me after hearing my question. I strongly fe lt that I was being inspected by both of them. and persisted in asking. statement with an emphatic tone, putting her hands in her two coat pockets. When they slowly but firmly approached me from their chairs behind their desks, I had to stand up as well. I murmured a q uestion as to where I might find any sources. difangzhi (annals of local history) Later Mr. Li Huacheng, the author of Ethnic and Religious Historiography of the Hui in Bozhou, told me that all the materials that they have were written and provided by

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380 y contact with us. You are an outsider obviously. If you say anything based on their words, you may get them in trouble with their superiors. weathered the hard times during the C ultural Revolution without getting into any trouble, his words of wisdom indicated knowledge of how to stay out of trouble. The strategy of avoiding or ignoring Hui issues might be a secret trick of government officials , even if it is not a direct order fr comments. But it still leaves unanswered the question as to why there is very little information about the Hui on the official web sites of local government. Consequences of Widely Existing Eth nic Identification Change However, the impact of the ethnic identification change on both Hui and Han ethnic identity is beyond question. First, it mixes (rather than melts) new elements into the population pool of the component has totally integrated into the other, early 1900s to describe the assimi lation of immigrants with different national, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds into American society. It is a cultural process that converts which many parts are simply stay clear.

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381 Although to some degree, the culture of the Hui is fairly heterogeneous in different localiti es (Gladney 1996, Mackerras 1998), those who have become Hui through intermarriage or through other means without conversion are not viewed as a new group of Hui. The Islamic faith is the kernel of Hui ethnicity. Blood links are important among Muslims and Hui (Pillsbury 1981, Gladney 1996). In Islam, all descendants of a male Muslim automatically become Muslims. In the long history of the Hui, as we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, consanguine connections were heavily emphasized in local understandings of th e formation of Hui Therefore, any act which Historically all intermarriage between a Muslim and a non Muslim (at least in China) eventually resulted in the transformation of the non Muslim into a Muslim. It ent ailed cultural assimilation beginning at the time of intermarriage rather than simply the assimilation of Han to Islamic culture. An intermarriage that involves religious conversion is a genuine act of melting, rather than simply mixing, with the Hui. In contrast, Hui who have become secular and no longer observe Islam create resentment on the part of many observant Hui Muslims towards the non Muslim Han. For example, Mr. L eo prefers to make friends with Han rather than with Hui. Mr. Thunder feels extremely uncomfortable when he sees mistakes and disobedient behavior on the part of his fellow Hui minzu classmates in their Hefei school. Those who changed their ethnic identifi cation without conversion simply increase Strictly speaking they are Han with a Hui ID card. In fact, most of them do not identify

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382 themselves as Hui (knowing that Hui do not accept them), but at the same time they are embarrassed to say that they are Han. No matter what their personal sense of ethnic identity may be, given the increasingly strict implementation of laws about ethnic identification, those newly arrived Hui who attained their new ethnic membership without conversion can no longer switch back to a Han identification on their own. At the same time they cannot be driven out by the Hui, no matter how unpleasant the sentiments toward them that most Hui may have. Officially, they have become a part of the Hui. As a result, such people complicate and increase the internal heterogeneity of the Hui. From another perspective, objectively, those newly arrived Hui are viewed as Qing Zhen in pinyin), are among the words most frequently mentioned by Chinese Muslims. As provided the starting point for his study of Hui ethnicity (Gladney 1996:9). As a matter of fact, the Shabadah , the oath in Arabic that is used in conversion to Islam the affirmation that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet has been Qing Zhen Yan , the very words of qing zhen. The concept of qing zhen , I argue, reveals two aspects of Islam in China central to Hui community interests and self understanding; purity ( qing ), in the sense of ritual cleanliness and moral conduct; and truth ( zhen ), in the sense of authenticity and legi timacy. This wider meaning of qing zhen goes beyond the Arabic term halal, qing zhen governs tabára (ritual or moral purity) is perhaps a better translation for this all compassing concept. However, for the H ui, the two aspects of qing zhen, purity and truth, define important tensions in

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383 their identity: Islamic moral purity and the authenticity of ethnic ancestry, lifestyle, and heritage. (Gladney 1996:13) Other research on Qing Zhen, y, reveals possible encryptions of the term. 8 when ethnic identification change occurs, neither qing n or zhen can be guaranteed. The spiritually or ethnically. intermarriage as currently practiced. Figur e 9 1 represents a second consequence, the addition of a somewhat alien outer layer to Hui religiosity and ethnicity. Religious leaders would constitute the innermost core of the circle linking Hui ethnicity to Islam. The outermost ring would be those newl y arrived Hui who have no connection to Islam. They are basically Han with Hui ID cards. In between these extremes, the second layer would be those who converted to Islam at the same time that they became Hui. They joined the Hui at marriage but have limit ed knowledge and shaky beliefs with regard to Islam. Those who converted to Islam with solid belief could be considered as belonging to the inner layer. In the third layer are those Hui who were born Hui and value Hui ethnicity but who are completely secul arized and alienated from Islam. In terms of 8 Hui scholars in China today generally suggest that qing zhen zhenshi), emphasizing both the sanitary and authoritarian aspects of the ter m. Matthews translates qing as clear, pure, and lucid. Zhen, Matthews informs us, refers to what is true, real, unfeigned, and genuine. (Gladney 1996: 12) Donald Leslie suggests that qing zhen might have originated with the Chinese Jews and referred to the Yuan dynasty, its meaning was generally restricte d to the religious of the Hui people. The French Qing Zhenjiao (The Pure and True Religion) was the name officially given to Islam in a fourteenth century edict. (Gladney 1996:12)

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384 religion or customs, there is a difference between this sector of Hui and the secular Han. They simply view themselves as ethnic Hui but have no religious commitment. As secular Hui generally view the newly Emotionally they refuse to see them as part of the Hui. At least they view them as less authentic and pure than they are. Within this structure, there is a special group of people worthy of particular attention, i.e., the newly converted Muslims, including newly converted Han and re converted Hui. They are usually the most pious Muslims, that is, they supposedly belong to th e inner circle. However, their relationship with traditional Hui is not always harmonious. As for the newly converted Han, people who change their ethnic identification from Han to Hui are usually considered outsiders by traditional Hui. This rejection is paradoxical, since many new converts know and care more about Islam than those that were born Hui. Basically, many newly converted Muslims are well educated in Islam through personal study. They obtain their religious knowledge from their own reading and reciting rather than simply from the preaching of imams. Their knowledge about Islam is often solid and unshakeable. Sometimes they can catch errors on the part of imams, unlike traditional Hui who receive their religious knowledge only from the preaching of imams or from their parents. For example, the quan hua zhe cultivates others to be Muslims) simply types or cuts & pastes some words and phrases from the hadith or the Sharia but cannot respo nd to challenges or answer questions from new Muslims on an instant online chatting platform, Group Chatting of QQ. Newly converted

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385 Muslims at first complained. Now they have accepted indifference on the part of those who were born Muslim. They frequently express their disappointment, even resentment, about criticism from many traditional Hui and Muslims on online chat forums. On the basis of the Islamic tradition which they have learned from other sources, they declare themselves different from traditional Chinese Muslims. They establish specific independent internet spaces on instant chat rooms, blogs, and other cyber forums. lack of religious knowledge or observance. Recognizing thi to accept the newcomers as genuine Hui, even though they are stricter in their observance of Islam. As for those Hui who have adopted a stricter level of observance, they elicit a similar reaction as the newly converted Han Muslims. On the one hand, they have an unquestionably deep tradition from their parents and from their community of origin; on the other hand, having increased their kn owledge of Islam, they have become more pious and self confident, and they have even come to enjoy more authority within their community. Mr. Zheng and Mr. Thunder are good examples. Mr. Zheng went to college. He ege in Shandong Province. His family has upheld a long Islamic tradition, though apparently the traditions are fading away in recent decades. His awareness of and concern for Islam was not awakened until he went to college and encountered some challenges f rom his classmates as well as his fellow Muslims. In that community a stronger Islamic environment prevailed than back in

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386 Bo zhou . He decided to devote his life to Islam. When he learned that the virtual community of Bozhou had been organized, he was very a ctive and frequently communicated with several moderators, by posting some notes, sharing his own experiences, or actively writing comments to other posts. After graduation in 2012, he almost immediately enrolled in a religious school in Yunnan Province, w hich is considered as one of the most prominent religious centers in Islamic education in China. It was the hometown of many Chinese Islamic scholars in the past two centuries. The interpreter of the most common and authoritative Chinese version of Ma Jian, was from Yunnan as well. From his new base in Yunnan, Zheng continuously posts his reflections about his studies on the virtual community. He expects people to respond to his posts. However the responses are becoming less frequent as the virtual community itself has begun to dwindle. Zheng now simply separates himself from his former Hui Mr. Thunder has had a similar experience. He is a student in a normal school in the capital c ity of Anhui Province . His classmates are all Hui, because it is a class specifically for Hui students. There are 30 students in his class. However, less than half know how to say Shabadah , and some of them are Han who are simply registered as Hui. They ha ve no connection with Islam or the Hui but simply want to take advantage of the class because the required entry score was lower than that of other non ethnic classes. Mr. Thunder did not have much knowledge of Islam either when he first entered the progra m. He frankly admitted that he started to learn something about Islam

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387 three of those 30 students go to Mosque to pray on Friday. Those three students are thus somewhat separated from their classmates, as well as from their non religious Hui themsel ves from the newly converted. In other words, they identify more with Islam than with the Hui ethnic group. the one in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when Sufism wa s brought to China and conflicts occurred between Gedimu (from the Arabic qadîm (Chinese for the Ikhwan al Muslimin). Gedimu followed the traditional Sunni, Hanafi ng their identity as Newly arriv ed Hui, or Han who converted without taking on a Hui identification, can be generally set in the outside layer of the above discussed identity structure. A strong controversy within the Hui at the moment is the question of which affiliation is more importa nt to them, ethnicity or the Muslim religion? Or more precisely, why, in general, is the ethnic affiliation of the Hui on the whole more important to them than their religious identity? That being the case, why do the Hui still consider Islam as the core factor in their ethnic identity even though most do not practice it? It is interesting to observe the dilemmas of the Chinese State with respect to ethnic issues. The government has to strike a balance, particularly in the case of the Hui, between promo ting or suppressing ethnicity and religiosity. The global phenomenon of

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388 Islamophobia makes the State leery of Muslim religiosity and in particular of current ethnic tensions in northwestern and western China. More specifically, the Uyghur and Tibetan prob lems make the State highly cautious in dealing with ethnic issues. At the ethnic policies upset the Chinese government. Therefore a great deal of scholarly attention i De Politicization of the Term Minzu The (Ka up 2000, Fan 2001, Gladney 1996, Litzinger 2000, Harrell 2001, McKhann 1995). However, this seemingly unquestionable assumption rarely receives agreement from scholars in mainland China. A mindset has emerged based on the assumption of gradual acculturatio n into Han culture. Furthermore the role of communist ideology as well as ideological education for more than half a century regarding the /minzu s a heavy impact (Fei 1980, 1981; Connor 1984; Duara 1995; Ma 2004, 2007). Unfortu as they are defined in China differ from Western views. The Chinese use of the term a concept deal with the change of ethni c identification with which we have been dealing here. Gaps between Western and Oriental views of ethnicity frustrate many Chinese scholars. On the one hand, they are forced to use terms like ethnicity, nation, and race, translated from the West, but with different connotations that create embarrassing barriers to communication with scholars from the West. On the other hand, some nationalist

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389 effectively address question s or dou bt s posed from the West. Some scholars have attempted to bridge the gap. Ma Rong, a professor from Peking University, being a major contributor in this regard. From 2004 until the present he has published at least seven Chinese language papers plus three English papers to build up and defend his argument. ( H is English papers basically repeat his major arguments first published in Chinese.) In 2010, another professor, Xie Lizhong, brought together his six Chinese papers together with seven other critical papers and published them together in a volume titled New Perspective to Understand Ethnic Relations: De politicalization 9 of Ethnicity. Here I will refer to the English version of his argument for the convenience of English readers. The ew perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the 21 st of Nottingham in 2007, expresses well his ideas. The premise of argument is that the terms e thnicity (or ethnic group, translated to zuqun ), nation ( minzu ), etc. invented and widely used in the West are not being correctly translated. When speaking of the Zhonghua minzu , in Chinese discourse to express the concept of all people in Chin adopted as the translation of minzu. But when speaking of a specific ethnic group, ated to the concept of a political nation state. This creates confusion. The use of the words nation and 9 the original term the book used.

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390 nationality are associated with European movements of national self determination that began in the 17 th century. groups in China, it naturally leaves the Western readers an impression that they are supposed to have the right to determine for themselves whether or not to be independent. This radically violates the assumptions of Chinese nationalist scholars. It also violates official discourse that asserts that all ethnic groups in China must be under the umbrella (or metaphorically chia, uld not seek a status as an independent nation state, separate from China. It is a challenge for Chinese scholars to formulate the matter in a manner that avoids or at least lessens criticism from the West. He argues that there are two approaches to ethni c policies in modern China. One is the route of culturalism proposed by Sun Yat sen and inherited by Chiang Kai shek. The other is the route of nationalism proposed by Sun Yat sen also, but adopted by Communist leaders when the Soviet Union exerted its inf luence on them. Ma Rong posits that the route taken by the traditional Chinese as well as by the modern United States and India is the route of culturalism respect for local ethnic cultures within the umbrella of the nation state -which has met with so me success. The other one is the nationalistic and politicized view of minzu which is considered problematic and somewhat out of touch with current realities in China. . China has countered politicized or nationalistic approaches to ethnicity by instituti Ma

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391 e and when the ethnic status is related to some favorable or discriminatory policies, ethnic ( p. 14 ) The consequence of th is ins his ideal nation ethnicity pattern (p. 18) Another practice of the Chinese State is to offer favorable poli cies toward Ma argues , These policies helped the minorities to speed up socioeconomic development and reduced the disparities between ethnic groups. But since these policies were targeted clearly at specific groups, they also strengthened ethnic consciousness while the boundaries between ethnic groups became clearer and more stable than they had earlier been. (2007:17) He adds some exam ples of people taking advantage of the policies. His research minority group. From 1982 to 1990, several minority groups doubled their population size mainly by reregistr ation (e.g. the Manchu population increased from 4.3 million to (p. 17) Apparently, instrumentalism or utilitarianism plays an important role in these maneuvers, as we discussed in the previous chapters. He thus concludes ( ibid ) : The process of establishing and implementing these policies and the politicize and institutionalize these groups and strengthen their group consciousness. This will have the .

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392 The strategy of culturalizing rather than politicizing ethnic minorities has met, as he said, with some success in the United States, and China should follow this route as well. The idea of strengthening the national identity on the one hand and decreas ing (or However, his approach has not convinced all of his Chinese colleagues. On the contrary, he is constantly r eceiving critiques and challenges from many quarters. Anti depoliticization The critiques and challenges are dominated by one single theme: the success presumably enjoyed by Chinese Marxism and the CPC with regard to minzu policies. Representatives of this position are Hao Shiyuan (2005), Chen Jianyue (2005), Wang The well imitate his tone, and som e of them make numerous logic mistakes. Here I will provide socialist society; (2) its relation to the prosperity of all minzu and minzu autono mous achieved in current minzu policies. The major point is his emphasis and his warnings not to follow the experience of the United States with its many unsolved et hnic problems. adopted in the U.S. is not in fact a policy of culturalization; it has many political elements instead. And in fact, the U.S. policy adopts a multiculturalism a pproach, which enables many ethnic groups to have a clearer ethnic awareness and a stronger motivation for

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393 political participation. He thus constructs a formula: Americanization failure to acknowledge ethnic minorities and their rights to re emphasize Amer icanization. Furthermore he argues that the multicultural approach inherently contradicts the core American social value: individualism, which is based on notions of cultural relativism. He simply creates many subnational identities which in the final analysis deconstruct the United States (c.f. Chapter 7 in Huntington 2004 10 ). Anti anti depoliticization His argument is full of problems. First, Ma did not say that the U.S ethnic policy is p point to an extreme. Second, Ma did not say that there are only two ways of formulating ethnic polices: politicization vs. culturalization or de politicization. Hao and his fellows Zhonghua Minzu (Chinese nation) is a Nation with Han as the f rame and virtually constructed and all minorities are subject to the majority Han. But he does not 991). He considers socialist minzu relations to be equal, unified, and mutually supportive. However, his argument appears contradictory when he mentions in the last part of his article the poor conditions of most minzu autonomous regions. 10 e.g. , Etzioni 2005 .

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394 The arguments o f Hao and his followers have strong political and ideological implications. But their arguments do not win unanimous applause from other scholars. During December of 2007, the Minzu University of China organized a symposium titled Ethnic Group, Minzu: Comp lementation or Overthrowing of a Concept. More than 16 materials about the developme nt of the concepts ethnicity/ethnic group and nation, prosperity of newly emerged ethnic groups indicates the importance of subjective self recognition rather than external political recognition. The case provided by Fan Ke about Brazil proves that the policies in Brazil place a higher priority on social and economic problems rather than on cultural or racial or ethnic problems. Prof. Ye Jiang, a scholar in Political Science , made arguments similar to those of Ma. My research for this dissertation has uncovered serious problems in the methods implemented for ethnic recognition and registration for several decades. To some extent, the gap between a subjective sense of ethnic identity and externally imposed ethnic identification takes most ethnic groups by surprise. It creates not only a subjective sense of angst, but also objective practical problem. Chi nese government. There are several dilemmas. In the first place, it would be a gargantuan task to switch from the terminology of minzu to that of ethnic group. It would entail changing the terminology used by boards in

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395 each autonomous region. It would a lso be out of touch with the terminology found in multiple historical documents. Historical documents cannot be simply changed. Second, minzu as a concept has been well accepted by Chinese, both by minorities as well as by the majority Han. In addition, t he concept of ethnic group (as distinct from minzu) Minzu is the most frequently mentioned concept regarding race, ethnicity, nationhood, and even peoplehood. Rac e is rarely mentioned in daily discourse except in discussion of some northwestern minorities, such as Uyghur, Kazak, etc. who have more obvious phenotypical differences. Third, political context would not allow for alternative terms to replace minzu. The suggested might partially replace minzu , citizen, is not allowed to be mentioned in universities, according to a report ( Li: May 10, 2013) in the South China Morning Post. It is forbidden to encourage people to talk about gongmin (citizen) rather than minzu. Fourth, several scholarly authorities will not allow that to happen. Those scholars hold positions in shaping ethnic policies. They are state sponsored think tanks. The theoretical framework of Chinese Marxism maintains its lofty and unchallengeable 11 will not easily be accepted by them. and Chin ese views of ethnicity cannot be pushed forward in present day China His proposal is theoretically attractive to those who agree with academic research in the 11 Marxism in China is generally not considered to be from the West. The argument is made that it has been adapted to Chinese reality a nd is now a variety of Marxism based on Chinese social reality and practice.

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396 West concerning nation state and ethnic issues. But his approach will be rejected by guardians o f the current discourse. In other words, the problems discussed in this dissertation will not be easily resolved in the coming decades. Some laws might be amended to cover the flaws of current policies. But it will be difficult to enforce any new laws a Table 9 1: Survey of ethnic identification change in marriages Ages Group Marriages Intermarriages (ID change/int m) M Hui, F Han (ID change/int m) M Han, F Hui (ID change/int m ) Total 226 98/151 64.9% 73/86 84.9% 25/65 38.5% 17 12 33 (born b/t 1996 80) 103 41/87 47.1% 30/42 71.4% 11/45 24.4% 34 43 (born b/t 1970 1980) 64 39/45 86.7% 28/29 96.6% 11/16 68.8% 44 53 (born b/t 1960 1970) 50 16/17 94.1% 13/13 100% 3/4 75% 54 (born before 1960) 9 2/2 100% 2/2 100% 0 0% 12 17 is not the legal age for marriage, however. But marriage at this age is not so rare. To obtain an official certificate to legitimize a marriage is not a high priority for ma ny traditional families.

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397 Figure 9 1: Layer ed circl e identity/ identification impious newly joined Hui Pious newly joined Hui Secularized Hui Not so Pious Hui Most Pious Hui

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398 CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION In this ethnograph ic study I have presented a comprehensive account of the intermarriage practice s of the Muslim Hui with non Muslim Han ethnic group in the city More specifically, the research documents how Islamic affiliation and ethnic identity are negotiated and chang ed at marriage in the context of strong intervention s by the Chinese State into the affairs of ethnic minorities. The local marriage system is completed throughout its multiple phases: initial contact between future spouses , negotiations between the two fa milies before the marriage, the wedding ceremony itself , subsequent family life, the raising of children , and when it occurs -divorce . The research has also dealt heavily with related questions, such as ethnic identity and identification, religious aff iliation, ethno religious education for children, state policies regarding minzu and religion, internal relationship s within the local Muslim community . The dissertation also discusses, when relevant to the central themes, the historical, cultural, and soc ial background of the Hui as well as shifts that have occurred in the local political environment as well as in the broader society . Most of the Muslims that marry non Muslims in Bozhou are women, and intermarried Han change their ethnic status to that of Hui. These are serious departures both from Islamic law, which forbids Muslim women to intermarry, and from Chinese law, which forbids adults to change their ethnic status . These issues frame the context in which certain Muslim Hui practices such as intere thnic and interfaith marriage, changes in the official ethnic status of individuals, the ethno religious education of children have been unfolding.

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399 The dissertation will thus hopefully shed light on patterns of intermarriage between Hui and Han in Bozhou, a city in Eastern China. Anthropology seeks not only to describe, but also to explain to identify the multiple causes that make a culture veer in a particular direction, whether similar to or different from that of other cultures. In this final chapter I will briefly discuss the possible causes first underlying the special situation encountered in Bozhou , and then reach some conclusions . Two Competing Causal Models about Intermarriage In the introduction we identified two models by which socio economic development could have an impact on ethnic solidarity and rates of intermarriage. We identified two alternative and contradictory causal models that could conceivably occur. Model one predicts that ethnic solidarity will intensif y under conditions of soci o econom ic development, resulting in a decrease in the rate of intermarriage . Model two predicts that increased social mobility and intergroup communication will lead to a decrease in ethnic solidarity and religious affiliation, leading to a greater accept ance and frequency of intermarriage . Data from Bozhou clearly demonstrate the greater predictability of the second model. For example, Leo met his future wife at his place of business . He had already expanded his social contacts after his parents chose to move out of the mosque area. into contact with his wife. Contact between Ma and Wei also illustrates this process , though eventually Ms. Wei converted to Islam. Mr. Woods got acquainted with his ex wife also during a business event . And his broth ers met their respective wives during business events as well.

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400 This is part of a general social process. S ince the 1980s, the overall socio economic condition of the Hui in Bozhou has significantly improved, except fo r those who still remain in the comparatively isolated and impoverished West Gate area. However, some Hui families in the West Gate area are fairly rich. For instance, a Hui martial arts master whom I interviewed has a magnificent house in the West Gate ar ea. His house has at least 12 rooms plus a rectangle yard of 50m 2 at least. The main building has two floors with 6 rooms. The master has three sons and two daughters. All but one of his children married Han spouses. In other words, the residential situati on of the Hui took a turn for the better during the period of economic reform and development. At the same time their intermarriage rate increase d as well. This phenomenon is compatible with the causal trajectory of model two. Why has not model one been a ctivated ? Let us examine further the context of intermarriage the business in which the future spouses were involved and the occasion s on which Hui have decide d to become engaged with Ha n. A lmost without exception a marital relation was established through workplace contacts in which both parties worked in the same or related business es . If they were in different fields, their contact usually came through an introduction by matchmakers. For example, Leo and Red , as well as , were involved in th e medicine business before meeting each other. In addition, they share d a common secret about a formula that produce s the same kind of medicine for sale. Leo and his father in law control nearly 25 percent of the market for this particular medicine . ( They used to control about 60%).

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401 Mr. Wudao is similar to that of Leo and Red. His business is much bigger than that of Leo and Red. His business contacts extend to some countries in Southeast Asia. He met his wife also in the enormous Bozhou medicine m arket. Currently his wife handles the accounting of the business rather than the purchase or sale of medicines. Ma and Wei are from more modest social origins . Both were hired by someone else. The ir similar background s brought them together in a friendship that eventually led to marriage. Given that Ms. Wei (a Han) had neither a strong awareness of ethnic ity nor an advanced education (less than 5 years), she apparently did not feel uncomfortable becom ing a Hui or a Muslim. It was thus no problem for Mr. Ma to have his wife become a Hui. All above cases share the same feature. They were aware that strengthen ing a business connection through marriage can contribute to a more secure future. Since popular attitudes toward ethnic intermarriage were no longer neg ative , their option s for mate selection were unimpeded by ethnic factors . The difference between Muslims in the S outheast and the Northwest Muslims thus begins to make sense . In the Northwest they prefer to choose spouses with the same ethno religious bac kground . In that region (unlike Bozhou) those in the same business usually share the same ethnic background . In such a context a connection through marriage can be beneficial to business . As a result an increase in their socioeconomic status will not resul t in an increase in the rate of intermarriage . In such a also good for business.

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402 Correspondingly, the Hui in Bozhou who are doing business in a domain that happens to be a traditional Hui specialization, such as a business somehow related to Islam, are more likely to marry within the Hui group married a Hui girl from Henan province whose family was doing beef business as well. These cases sho partner s in the workplace constitute the crucial parameter that determine s the intermarriage rate . Certainly, the social setting, including population size and the overall ethno religious environment, also has a strong i nfluence on the intermarriage rate. But workplace contact s are the major predictor of the decision as to whom to marry. In the case of the Bozhou Hui , their intermarriage rate will predictably continue to rise since their principal economic contact s are no t with fellow Muslims. Education is largely determined by the education an individual has received, including formal, informal, and non formal education. Basically, formal education means school based tematic, organized education model, structured and administered according to a given set of laws and norms, ganized and systematic view of education; does not necessarily include the objectives and subjects usually encompassed by the traditional curricula. It is aimed at students as much as at the public at large and imposes no obligations whatever their nature. There generally being no control over the performed activities, informal education does not of necessity regard the providing of degrees or diplomas; it merely supplements both formal and non formal As for this last one, non formal education, it is an educational process

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403 lacking one or more of formal education features. (Dib 1988:300 315) Based on the above distinctions between three types of education, we have already seen in Chapter 7 that none of the three educational settings in Bozhou is c onducive to maintaining ethno religious identity . As we discussed in Chapter 7, no formal school education about ethno religious knowledge is permitted, even in minzu schools. Informal education , on the other hand, is heavily influenced by the social envi ronment. My observation s and interview s elicited complaints from northwestern Muslims traveling to or living in Bozhou that the local Hui community has lost most of its connection to Islam. Efforts made by Imams are insufficient to change this situation. A s that we make to hold them up cannot match the speed with Each time he said this, his voice was full of helplessness, although each time he always ended by stating ( inshallah in Arabic. The summer and winter ethno religious schools held in m osques belong to the sphere of non formal education. Unlike the minzu schools, these were neither required nor sponsored by the State educational system . They were a self sponsored education al attempt and experiment. Unfortunately, their attempts and experiments failed due to several reasons that we have already discussed. Another non formal education al undertaking was the virt ual community embedded on Zhongmuwang. Similar to summer and winter ethno religious schools, the virtual community that flourished between 2011 and 2013 also faded into nothing . Except for those two attempts, almost no non formal education al venues have ever come into existe nce .

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404 In addition, as we discussed in Chapter 7, those who assume the role of religious leadership have usually failed in their regular education. It would be ridiculous to formance in t he formal education al system in China is not necessarily a universally valid failure on an earlier stage does not always predict failure on a later stag e; the ability to te intelligence and rationality can increase with age . But a problematic result of their early exit from school is a pattern of embarrassing naiveté about the workings of this world . In p articular their unfamiliarity with newly emerge nt social phenomena, including technolog ical development s , damages their authority among the young er generation. For example, several imams once discussed the legitimacy of investment in the stock market, questioning whether it might not be a form of forbidden gambling. They w ere unable, however, to cite authoritative Islamic texts on the matter. They had to guess on their own what Islam says about the matter . Another example is chuanxiao, pyramid selling. This selling practice is lawful in the West but unlawful and forbidden i n China. However, Imam Chi and another imam revealed to me in a conversation that one imam in Bozhou start ed precisely such a business after being removed from his position. Apparently, these new social phenomena create challenges for them and they are ra rely able to give coherent, convincing answer s . As a result, they often find that they are gradually losing younger people in their Friday speeches in the mosque. Ironically, the Friday sermon is traditionally the most important venue that an imam has for build ing up his credibility and authority. Failure to impress fellow Muslims on those occasions could have catastrophic results for an imam in the community. Members of

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405 the community may begin challeng ing them. Imam Chi experienced that during his first te rm but he skillfully defended himself. So where do the Bozhou Hui stand in terms of educational opportunities to learn about Islam? The situation is quite problematic. They do not receive adequate education from imams, parents, or the social environment s ufficient to maintain their traditional ethno religious identity. In short, their knowledge and feelings about Islam are too weak to counterbalance the previously discussed forces that are drawing them away into assimilation. The boundaries by which they c an differentiate themselves from others are growing increasingly blurry. State defined Imagined Identity and Community The above analysis forces us to conclude that the Hui identity is becoming increasingly fragmented. Based on my observation and analysi s, and on the research of other scholars, I would like to propose that the currently fragmented identity of the Huizu in the social context in current China is defined imagined identity , arbitrary and non negotiable, with a veneer of superficial I slamic elements. The matter is worth discussing at least briefly. The use of the phrase is justified . In the f irst place , hegemonic S tate power now defines Hui boundaries. The boundary is officially confirmed and thus it can be certified . Second, this boundary is unidirectional, i.e., from the S tate to an individual. An individual cannot challenge the authority of the given title. It is only changed through the state. An individual cannot change his/her identity without governmental perm ission. Third, therefore, it is arbitrary and non negotiable . These features differentiate the Hui situation from most self claimed identities, which may be more or less blurred. In

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406 other words, there is no grey zone , no oscillation between different iden tities that are available to minorities in many other countries. In China, because of the intrusion of the legally defined and fixed. Fourth, your identity is based on a definition given by oth ers and is subsequently frozen . You are ultimately force d, if not to internalize it , to at least publicly accept it. Fifth, to say that it is S tate that there can be no ascription. Being Hui can includ e a sense of essential belongingnes s. But it can also include those Han who have no primordial feeling of belonging to the Hui but who simply got certified, whether legal ly or illegally. The point is that it does not matter how much you have internalized H ui identity. Once it is legally defined, it is frozen. I have said that Hui identity is now an identity. Let me defend that proposition. In the first place , Hui identity is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. As Gladney and other researche rs or travelers have observed , the Hui appear quite diverse in different localities. The capacity for imagination is clearly needed when you try to claim a unified ethnic title for such diverse peo ple . S ome of them are confused as to what an authentic Hui be, and some of them even doubt their own authenticity as a Hui, particularly those who joined the Hui without the least bit of knowledge or sense of prior identification with the Hui. However, all of them are exclusively , and in some cases arbitrarily , classified as Hui.

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407 Although some scholars claim that the core element in Hui identity is Islam, average understanding and observance of Islam has to be classified as weak and in man y cases nonexistent. Particularly for most Hui in southeast regions such as Bozhou, perceptions by the Hui themselves concerning Hui in other regions are based more on anecdotes, oral history from parents, legendary stories from imams, or good or bad repor ts in the media. stories is divorced from personal empirical experience or reasoned cognition . Thus, they depend on their imagination to romanticize the Hui as a unified ethnic group with homogeneous culture and identity. There i Hui identities applies not only to interregional differences but even to differences among people living nea r each other . The Bozhou case fully demonstrates how diverse the Hui can be eve n within the same community. To consider those diverse people as a unified ethnic group requires imagination as well. Third ly , an identity is when it is socially or politically constructed rather than flowing from a primordial feeling based on historical facts. Objective h istor ical experiences admittedly play a role in the emergence of a group identity . However, history -is often manipulated in a way that influences the way a group views and fee ls about itself the construction of the identity of a group (or even of an individual), current s ocial and political forces may have more formative power than objective historical events in the distant past. There is, in short, a great deal of imagination in the construction of identities, including those of the Hui.

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408 The imagined identity of the Bozhou Hui does not aim to build a nation state (as least it is not the dream of the Hui ) . T hus the situation differ s somewhat f rom Benedict members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members , meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their as part of the same nation. The Chinese Hui as an ethnic group do share those features , even though their focus is not the entire Chinese nation. Additionally, this imagined identity is strengthened through the current media . The e xample s of the summer and winter ethno religious schools described in Chapter 7 illustrated the role of media in creating an imagined community . T he teachers and students were all enrolled through the virtual community rather than via conventional print advertisement or other direct marketing. Such online activities demonstrated the power of modern media to contribu te to identity construction and group solidarity . This strategy was discontinued when the virtual community dissolved . But the power of such media to catalyze collective imagination is unquestionable. One p oint must be clarified. Islam has objectively played and continues to play a key role in constructing even the imagined identity of the Hui . When they discuss their identity, Islam still stands at the core of their self presentation as the force that b rought the Hui into existence, even though the commitment of many to Islam is highly attenuated and some of them even explicitly reject it in their personal lives. But they still describe their group first and foremost in terms of Islam, about which they m ay know

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409 little. E ven those who have a strong commitment to Islam may have internecine quarrels regarding Islamic orders and schools (Yang 1991, Lipman 1997, etc.). Those Hui of southeastern China who do not practice Islam do not deny the role of Islam in t he formation of their core culture . If they seem reluctant to talk about Islam, it is not because of hostility to the religion but because of their embarrassm ent at their lack of ommitted Hui of the Northwest. Islam, in short, is central to Hui identity, even among those who do not practice it. Further Questions for Future Study Hui Han intermarriage in Bozhou , along with the associated switch in ethnic identity, has several dim ensions and implications that have not been specifically dealt with here but which could be matter for future study. Here I will conclude by list ing some possible topics. Reconstruction of Religious Faith and Ethnic Identity As we discussed in Chapter 7 , since 2011, imam Chi began his second term in Bozhou. His wife, imam Mo founded a virtual community in Zhongmuwang, the cyber space of Chinese Muslims, with help from two other Muslims. The virtual community had achieved a great success at Zhongmuwang by receiving honors such as Top 10 communities in 2011 and Top 1 community in 2012 among all communities throughout the country. Additionally, imam Mo established the QQ messaging system for Muslims and Volunteers based on available internet support. Dozens of social and Islamic activities won the community a lot of applause and praise and it thus had a positive impact on people in Bozhou. For example, it caused the growth of Friday prayer attendees from 20 or 30 in 201 0 to more than 200 in 2013 . It also brou ght younger and

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410 more educated Muslims closer to the mosque and to Islam . S ome of them ritually re converted to Islam through studying ; some of them decided on careers in Islamic preaching by studying in northwestern and southeastern Arabic/religious school s, and some Han even converted to Islam after seeing them in action . All this seemed to augur a revival of Islam in Bozhou. However, the revival collapsed when Imam Mo and the other two founders were forced to resign from their positions in the virtual com munity . The reasons behind the revival of the community and the subsequent resignation of the leaders are topics highly worthy of further exploration in the future. I have written a paper to explore the reasons behind their resignation and have reached at least two conclusions : 1) A male imams built through traditional male power structures; 2) The coopting by the State of traditional religious figures such as the Imam , and the grabbing by the State of the prerogative of assigning roles of Islamic authority within the CPPCC and NPC has created an environment hostile to movements of religious development or revival. But at the same time, we have observed, somewhat in astonishment, the potentialit y latent in modern online technology to serve as a catalyst of religious reviv al in a community heretofore indifferent. It would be useful to explore further the potential impact that a virtual community can exert on an ordinary community , and the research procedures that would be needed to assess that impact. Ruptures between Muslims The question of a growing trend of ruptures among Muslims is another topic worth y of explor ation in the future . Among the relevant questions are the following.

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411 Ruptures and confrontation between Bozhou Hui and other Muslims (including Hui) Hui in other parts of China, particularly in the Northwest, are critical and disdainful of the low level of religious observance among the Bozhou Hui. Although the image of Bozhou Hui had been changed significantly since the arrival of this dynamic imam couple, the stagnation of the virtual community catapulted this community back to the past. Northwestern Muslims in Bozhou are more likely to maintain social and religious connections w ith each other but not with the local Hui of Bozhou. Accordingly, those northwestern Muslims prefer to visit the XGS mosque and its imam rather than imam Chi and CLS. This is paradoxical and puzzling. The imam in the XGS is no more traditional , a nd has no more religious authority , than imam Chi in CLS. On the contrary, the worship atmosphere in the CLS was significantly improved after imam Chi arrived, while the religious atmosphere in XGS , frequented by the observant Northwestern Hui, has almost complete ly degenerated. E ven the Friday congregational prayer is often started one or two hours behind schedule and sometimes is simply cancelled. Whatever the case , the rupture between northwestern Hui and local Hui is persistent. It would be useful to explore th e complex cluster of causes. The rupture between secular Hui (who constitute a majority) and observant Hui (who are a small minority) The gap between them is hard to bridge. Apparently, most of Hui in Bozhou have become totally secularized and the observa nt Hui are few and far between . S ecular Hui are resistant to the religious rules and the words of the imam . There are two possible clusters of reasons. In the first place Imams try to put restrictions on the conduct of the Hui without opening avenues to ec onomic advancement.

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412 Secondly, the as mediat or in interethnic conflicts between Hui and Han has gradually been lost because of more cordial relationships between the two ethnic group s. This appears to be partially due to the higher rate of inte rmarriage, which almost never involves the services of an imam. As a result, the two major functions of the qu huo song si , the imam becomes a symbolic figur e most of the time. Similar to the rupture between northwestern Hui and Bozhou Hui, observant Hui look down upon those secular Hui as well. It seems they are living in different worlds within the same community. Will this rupture between the two groups of people lessen, or will the two groups become more antagonistic in the future? The rupture between ordinary Hui and those who control the mosque This rupture includes widespread hostility to ward the administrative committee of the mosque which is viewed a s profit oriented. M any Hui refuse to interact with those leaders because they consider the latter to be the mosque for their personal benefits rather than for public concerns. However, the latter group of people has institu tionalized and perpetuated their power base and has achieved quasi permanent control of the mosque and the DACM . They therefore have no reason to be concerned with the criticisms of ordinary Hui. The separation of Hui ethnicity from observance of Islam T here is a growing percentage of intermarriage s that are totally secular and a dwindling number of conversions among offspring . Thus, the concept of is being converted (at least in Bozhou) into an ethnic designator devoid of religious content . If this situation continues the Hui ethno religious group This would be a major transformation that is worthy of research attention.

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413 The rupture between Bozhou trends and worldwide Islamic trends The dwindling of the Islamic content of Hu i identity is at odds with the global tendency in the Islamic world for Muslim identity to strengthen. What is behind this disparity ? We might hypothesize the following . In the first place, the control exercised by the Chinese government over the two larg est world religions, Christianity (including Protestantism and Catholic ism ) and Islam, disrupt their connection with outside religious organizations . In the case of Chinese Muslims, most are not sufficiently educated in Islam to forge connect ions with the Islamic world at large. Chinese Muslims would have a hard time forging links of solidarity with Muslims from other countries . Secondly, two periods of destructive persecution occurred in the late Qing dynasty and in the early years of the Communist gover nment . Despite current government sponsorship of the construction of many temples and mosques, the social memory of the Hui inclines them to avoid or hide any connection with international Islamic organizations. Third ly , Chinese Hui also realize that they are first and foremost citizen s of China un like their ancestors who came from Central Asia and the Middle East. They prefer to identify them selves as Chinese who happen to be Muslims rather than Muslims who happen to be Chinese. Fourthly, m ost Hui do not approve of extremist action s , that is, fundamentalism or terrorism, although they have strong resentment towards the West, particularly, the USA. But along with these anti Western sentiments they also hold some unrealistic illusions about Western advances in science and technology and an admiration for these advances.

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414 The rupture between the peaceful Islam of Bozhou and Islamic armed militancy elsewhere There is one final characteristic of Bozhou Islam (and of most Chinese Islam in general) that will be of particular interest to the world at large: the absence of any calls to jihad. It would be interesting to explore the causes of the historically peaceful orientation of Chinese Islam, at the polar opposite of movements such as ISIS. The recent (and unprece dented) calls to jihad in the far west of China raise another research question. It would be interesting to analyze the factors that could lead to an appearance in China of militant movements of Islam unlike the peaceful variants of Islam that have existed in China for well over a millennium. Separate Identities and/or E thnic F ragmentation At this stage of research, I would like to conclude some points of this study. First, there is an increasing separation between ethnicity and religion. To be a Hui i s no longer necessary to be a Muslim. Second, the possession of an official ethnic identification does not mean th at one has a personal sense of ethnic identity as a member of that group . Third, traditional restrictions against interethnic marriage have virt ually disappeared among Bozhou Hui. Han: We do not eat pork and we do not give them to Rules of ethno religious e ndogamy, however, can not survive in some ar eas, especially in southeastern areas and urban areas with a higher level of socioeconomic development and a lower density of the local Hui population.

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415 My research has shown that ethnic and religious considerations no longer play a heavy role in determin i ng mate selection among the young er generation. Except for a few observant Muslims, most of the Hui are indifferent to ethnic and religious restrictions , as long as the Han spouse agrees to respect Hui ethnic and religious tradition . Some young Hui are uns ure of what traditions are supposed to be restricted (besides the pork prohibition). P ersonal consideration s heavily outweigh ethnic or religious considerations in selecting a spouse. I argue that the Hu i, even those who do not practice their religion, co ntinue to maintain respect for their identity as Hui. However, their attachment to their ethnicity is of secondary importance in their selection of a mate. S ocioeconomic development has led to residential mixing of formerly separate groups. This increases interethnic interaction and is a major factor in the extensive and frequent intermarriage that now occurs between the two ethnic groups. E thnic and religious restrictions cannot possibly stop people now from getting intermarried. Since many Hui no longer observe their religion, theories of assimilation and/or acculturation are now frequently cited to interpret changers in Hui ethnicity (Gillette 2000, Lipman 1997, Israeli 1980, etc.) The current practice s surrounding intermarriage indicate a relaxation o f the religious and ethnic bonds among the Hui in Bozhou . They feel no religious commitment towards Islam. T hose less attached to ethno religious tradition are more likely to engage in intermarriage. In this context ethnic and religious considerations play a clearly subordinate role to family value s and spousal bond s in marriage. Personal choice

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416 becomes more important than adherence to traditional norms, whether ethnic or religious. At the same time, many Han have decided to become Hui on their own. Both l egal and illegal maneuvers to acquire Hui minority status abound in Bozhou . There is no interest in Hui religion or Hui ethnic traditions. P ragmatic consideration s inspired by State policies drive the process . T he Hui no longer have the unified and exclu sive identity which they had kept for centuries since their emergenc e. During pre vious periods ( Chapter 3), Huihui signified Muslims, whether being persecuted or fairly treated. The two terms that had the same connotation throughout China for centuries currently go their separate ways. T he Hui no longer have the unified and exclusive identity which they had kept for centuries since their emergence. The ethno religious identity of the Hui is by no means homogeneous. D ifferent groups of Hui adopt differen t variants o f ethno religious identity ( Chapter 9) . ragmentation might be a more useful term to describe the different varieties.

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417 APPENDIX A THE INTERMARRIAGE LAW (Adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National People 's Congress on September 10, 1980 and promulgated by Order No.9 of the Chairman of the Standing in accordance with the Decision on Amending the Marriage Law of the People's Repu blic of China, adopted at the 21st Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on April 28, 2001) Contents Chapter I General Provisions Chapter II Marriage Contract Chapter III Family Relations Chapter IV Divorce Chapter V Sal vage Measures and Legal Liabilities Chapter VI Supplementary Provisions Chapter I General Provisions Article 1 This Law is the fundamental code governing marriage and family relations. Article 2 A marriage system based on the free choice of partners, on mo nogamy and on equality between man and woman shall be applied. The lawful rights and interests of women, children and old people shall be protected. Family planning shall be practised. Article 3 Marriage upon arbitrary decision by any third party, mercenar y marriage and any other acts of interference in the freedom of marriage shall be prohibited. The exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage shall be prohibited. Bigamy shall be prohibited. Anyone who has a spouse shall be prohibited to cohabit with another person of the opposite sex. Family violence shall be prohibited. Maltreatment and desertion of one family member by another shall be prohibited. Article 4 Husband and wife shall be loyal to each other and respect each other; family members sh all respect the old and cherish the young, help each other, and maintain the marriage and family relationship characterized by equality, harmony and civility.

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418 Chapter II Marriage Contract Article 5 Marriage must be based upon the complete willingness of bo th man and woman. Neither party may use compulsion on the other party, and no third party may interfere. Article 6 No marriage may be contracted before the man has reached 22 years of age and the woman 20 years of age. Late marriage and late childbirth sha ll be encouraged. Article 7 No marriage may be contracted under any of the following circumstances: (1) if the man and the woman are lineal relatives by blood, or collateral relatives by blood up to the third degree of kinship; or (2) if the man or the wom an is suffering from any disease which is regarded by medical science as rending a person unfit for marriage. Article 8 Both the man and the woman desiring to contract a marriage shall register in person with the marriage registration office. If the propos ed marriage is found to conform with the provisions of this Law, the couple shall be allowed to register and issued marriage certificates. The husband and wife relationship shall be established as soon as they obtain the marriage certificates. A couple sha ll go through marriage registration if it has not done so. Article 9 After a marriage has been registered, the woman may become a member of the man's family or vice versa, depending on the agreed wishes of the two parties. Article 10 the marriage shall be invalid if: (1) either of the married parties commits bigamy; (2) there is the prohibited degree of kinship between the married parties; (3) before marriage either of the parties is suffering from a disease which is regarded by medical science as rending a person unfit for marriage and which has not yet been cured after marriage; or (4) one of the married parties has not reached the statutory age for marriage. Article 11 where marriage is contracted by coercion, the coerced party may appeal to the marriage registration office or the People's Court for annulment of such marriage. Such an appeal for annulment of marriage made by the coerced party shall be submitted within one year from the date of marriage registration. Where the party concerned whose personal freedom is illegally restrained, such an appeal for annulment of marriage shall be submitted within one year from the date of the restoration of the personal freedom.

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419 Article 12 Any marriage that is invalidated or annulled is null and void from the very b eginning. The parties concerned are devoid of any rights or duties of a husband and a wife. The property acquired by them during the period of their cohabitation shall be disposed of by agreement between the parties; if they fail to reach an agreement, the People's Court shall make a judgment on the principle of giving consideration to the unerring party. Where property is to be disposed of because marriage is invalidated as a result of bigamy, the rights and interests in respect of the property enjoyed by the party under lawful contract of marriage may not be encroached on. With regard to the children born by the party concerned, the provisions of this Law on parents and children shall apply. Chapter III Family Relations Article 13 Husband and wife shall ha ve equal status in the family. Article 14 Both husband and wife shall have the right to use his or her own surname and given name. Article 15 Both husband and wife shall have the freedom to engage in production and other work, to study and to participate i n social activities; neither party shall restrict or interfere with the other party. Article 16 Both husband and wife shall have the duty to practise family planning. Article 17 The following property acquired by the husband and the wife during the period in which they are under contract of marriage shall be in their joint possession: (1) Wages and bonuses; (2) Proceeds of production and business operation; (3) Incomes of intellectual property rights; (4) Property acquired from inheritance or presentation, with the exception of such property as stipulated by the provisions of the third item of Article 18 of this Law; and (5) Other property which should be in their joint possession. Husband and wife shall enjoy equal rights in the disposition of their jointly possessed property. Article 18 The property in the following cases shall belong to one party of the couple: (1) the property that belongs to one party before marriage;

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420 (2) payments for medical expenses received by one party who suffers physical injury, su bsidies for living expenses granted to the disabled subsidies, etc.; (3) the property to be in the possession of one party as determined by will or by an agreement on gift; (4) articles for daily use specially used by one party; and (5) other property whic h should be in the possession of one party. Article 19 The husband and the wife may conclude an agreement that the property acquired by them during the period in which they are under contract of marriage and the property acquired before marriage shall be i n their respective possession separately or jointly or part of the property shall be in their possession separately and the other part jointly. Such an agreement shall be in written form. Where such an agreement is lacking, or the provisions in the agreeme nt are not clear, the provisions of Articles 17 and 18 of this Law shall apply. The agreement concluded by the husband and the wife with regard to the property acquired during the period in which they are under contract of marriage and the property acquire d before marriage shall be binding on both parties. Where the husband and the wife agree that the property acquired by them during the period in which they are under contract of marriage shall be in their possession separately, debts contracted by the husb and or the wife shall be paid off with the property in the possession of the party of the husband or the wife, if the third person knows that there is such an agreement. Article 20 Husband and wife shall have the duty to maintain each other. If one party f ails to perform this duty, the party in need of maintenance shall have the right to demand maintenance payments from the other party. Article 21 Parents shall have the duty to bring up and educate their children; children shall have the duty to support and assist their parents. If parents fail to perform their duty, children who are minors or are not capable of living on their own shall have the right to demand the costs of upbringing from their parents. If children fail to perform their duty, parents who a re unable to work or have difficulty in providing for themselves shall have the right to demand support payments from their children. Infanticide by drowning, abandonment of infants and all other acts causing serious harm to infants shall be prohibited. Ar ticle 22 Children may adopt either their father's or their mother's surname.

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421 Article 23 Parents shall have the right and duty to protect and educate their children who are minors. If children who are minors cause damage to the State, the collective or indi viduals, their parents shall have the duty to bear civil liability. Article 24 Husband and wife shall have the right to inherit each other's property. Parents and children shall have the right to inherit each other's property. Article 25 Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy the same rights as children born in wedlock. No one may harm or discriminate against them. The natural father or mother who does not directly bring up a child born out of wedlock shall bear the child's living and educational expenses until the child can live on his or her own. Article 26 The State shall protect lawful adoption. The relevant provisions of this Law governing the relationship between parents and children shall apply to the rights and duties in the relationship between fo ster parents and foster children. The rights and duties in the relationship between a foster child and his natural parents shall terminate with the establishment of his adoption. Article 27 Maltreatment and discrimination shall not be allowed between step parents and step children. The relevant provisions of this Law governing the relationship between parents and children shall apply to the rights and duties in the relationship between step fathers or step mothers and their step children who receive care an d education from them. Article 28 Grandparents and maternal grandparents who can afford it shall have the duty to bring up their grandchildren and maternal grandchildren who are minors and whose parents are dead or have no means to bring them up. Grandchil dren and maternal grandchildren who can afford it shall have the duty to support their grandparents and maternal grandparents whose children are dead or have no means to support them. Article 29 Elder brothers and elder sisters who can afford it shall have the duty to maintain their younger brothers and sisters who are minors, if their parents are dead or have no means to bring them up. Younger brothers or sisters who are brought up by their elder brothers or sisters and can afford it shall have the duty to maintain their elder brothers or sisters who lack not only the ability to work but also source of income. Article 30 Children shall respect their parents' right of marriage, they are not allowed to interfere in the re marriage of their parents or their li fe after re marriage. The duty of the children for supporting their parents shall come not to an end with the change in the marriage contract of their parents. Chapter IV Divorce

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422 Article 31 Divorce shall be granted if husband and wife both desire it. Both parties shall apply to the marriage registration office for divorce. The marriage registration office, after clearly establishing that divorce is desired by both parties and that appropriate arrangements have been made for the care of any children and the disposition of property, shall issue the divorce certificates. Article 32 If one party alone desires a divorce, the organization concerned may carry out mediation or the party may appeal directly to a People's Court to start divorce proceedings. In dealing with a divorce case, the People's Court shall carry out mediation; divorce shall be granted if mediation fails because mutual affection no longer exists. In one of the following cases, divorce shall be granted if mediation fails: (1) where one party commi ts bigamy or cohabits with another person of the opposite sex; (2) where one party indulges in family violence or maltreats or abandons family members ; (3) where one party indulges in the gambling, drug taking, etc. and refuses to reform after repeated pe rsuasion; (4) where both parties have separated from each other for two full years for lack of mutual affection; (5) other cases which lead to the shattering of affection between husband and wife. Where one party is declared to be missing and the other par ty starts divorce proceedings, divorce shall be granted. Article 33 If the spouse of a soldier in active service desires a divorce, the matter shall be subject to the soldier's consent, unless the soldier has made grave errors. Article 34 A husband may not apply for a divorce when his wife is pregnant, or within one year after the birth of the child, or within six months after the termination of her gestation. This restriction shall not apply in cases where the wife applies for a divorce, or where the Peopl e's Court deems it necessary to accept the divorce application made by the husband. Article 35 If, after divorce, both parties desire to resume their husband and wife relationship, they shall apply for registration of remarriage with the marriage registrat ion office.

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423 Article 36 The relationship between parents and children shall not come to an end with the parents' divorce. After divorce, whether the children are directly put in the custody of the father or the mother, they shall remain the children of both parents. After divorce, both parents shall still have the right and duty to bring up and educate their children. In principle, the mother shall have the custody of a breast fed infant after divorce. If a dispute arises between the two parents over the cus tody of their child who has been weaned and they fail to reach an agreement, the People's Court shall make a judgment in accordance with the rights and interests of the child and the actual conditions of both parents. Article 37 If, after divorce, one pare nt has been given custody of a child, the other parent shall bear part or the whole of the child's necessary living and educational expenses. The two parents shall seek agreement regarding the amount and duration of such payment. If they fail to reach an a greement, the People's Court shall make a judgment. The agreement or court judgment on the payment of a child's living and educational expenses shall not prevent the child from making a reasonable request, when necessary, to either parent for an amount exc eeding what is decided upon in the said agreement or judgment. Article 38 After divorce, the father or the mother who does not directly bring up the child shall have the right to visit his or her child, and the other party shall have the duty to cooperate. The manner and time for exercising the right to visit a child shall be decided by the parties through consultation; if they fail to reach an agreement upon in this regard, the People's Court shall make a judgment . Where the visit to a child paid by the f ather or the mother is not conducive to the physical and mental health of the child, the People's Court shall terminate the right to visit; after the cause of such termination disappears, the right to pay visit to the child shall be resumed. Article 39 At the time of divorce, the husband and the wife shall seek agreement regarding the disposition of their jointly possessed property. If they fail to reach an agreement, the People's Court shall, on the basis of the actual circumstances of the property and on the principle of taking into consideration the rights and interests of the child and the wife, make a judgment. The rights and interests enjoyed by the husband or the wife in contracting land management on a household basis shall be protected in accordance with law. Article 40 Where the husband and the wife agree in writing that the property acquired by them during the period in which they are under contract of marriage is in

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424 their separate possession, if one party has performed more duties in respect of br inging up the child, taking care of the old and assisting the other party in work, it shall, at the time of divorce, have the right to request the other party to make compensation for the above, and the other party shall do so accordingly. Article 41 At th e time of divorce, debts incurred jointly by the husband and the wife during their married life shall be paid off jointly by them. Where their jointly possessed property is insufficient to pay the debts, or the property is in their separate possession, the two parties shall discuss alternative ways of payment; if they fail to reach an agreement, the People's Court shall make a judgment. Article 42 If, at the time of divorce, one party has difficulty in supporting himself or herself, the other party shall re nder appropriate assistance with his or her own property such as his or her residential house. Specific arrangements shall be made by both parties through consultation. If they fail to reach an agreement, the People's Court shall make a judgment. Chapter V Selvage Measures and Legal Liabilities Article 43 Where a person indulges in family violence or maltreats a family member, the victim shall have the right to advance a request; the neighborhood committee, villagers committee or the unit where they belong to, shall persuade the person to stop doing it and conduct mediation. Where a person is committing family violence, the victim shall have the right to advance a request; the neighborhood committee or the villagers committee shall persuade the person to sto p doing it; the public security organ shall stop such violence. Where the victim advances a request, the public security organ shall, in accordance with the legal provisions on administrative penalties for public security, impose an administrative penalty on the person who commits family violence or maltreatment of a family member. Article 44 The family member who is abandoned shall have the right to advance a request and the neighborhood committee, villagers committee or the unit where they belong to, shal l persuade the person to stop doing it and conduct mediation. Where the abandoned family member advances a request, the People's Court shall, in accordance with law, make the judgment on payment by the person who abandons the family member to the victim fo r the costs of maintenance, upbringing or support. Article 45 The person who commits bigamy, family violence, maltreatment or abandonment of a family member, if it constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with la w. The victim may, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, lodge a private prosecution with the People's Court; the public security organ shall investigate the case in accordance with

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425 law, and the People's Procuratorate shall institute public prosecution in accordance with law. Article 46 Where one of the following circumstances leads to divorce, the unerring party shall have the right to claim compensation: (1) bigamy is committed; (2) one party who has a spouse cohabits with another person of the opposite sex; (3) family violence is committed; or (4) a family member is maltreated or abandoned. Article 47 If, at the time of divorce, one party conceals, transfers, sells off or destroys the property in the joint possession of the couple, or forge debts in an attempt to encroach upon the property of the other party, the former may get less or no property when the property in the joint possession of the couple is partitioned. After divorce, if the other party discovers the above, it may bring a suit in the People's Court to demand re partition of the property in the joint possession of the couple. With respect to acts that hinder civil procedures as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the People's Court shall mete out sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law. Article 48 Where a person refuses to abide by the judgment or ruling on the costs of maintenance, upbringing or support payments, or on the partitioning or inheritance of property, or visit to a ch ild, the People's Court shall enforce the execution of the judgment or ruling in accordance with law. The individuals and unit concerned shall have the duty to assist such execution. Article 49 Where there are other provisions by other laws on illegal acts against marriage or family and on legal liabilities for the acts, such provisions shall apply. Chapter VI Supplementary Provisions Article 50 The people's congresses of national autonomous areas shall have the power to formulate adaptations in the light o f the specific conditions of the local nationalities in regard to marriage and family. Adaptations formulated by autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties shall go into effect only after approval by the standing committee of the people's congress of t he relevant province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government. Adaptations formulated by autonomous regions shall go into effect only after approval by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Article 51 Th is Law shall go into effect as of January 1, 1981.

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426 The Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China promulgated on May 1, 1950 shall be invalidated as of the date when this Law goes into effect.

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427 APPENDIX B Pos ter of Summer School in Mosque by women Imam : A) First Part of the Post

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428 Poster of Summer School in Mosque by women Imam : B) Second Part of the Post (Resource: Bozhou community in the Zhongmuwang ).

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449 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Zhongzhou Cui earned his Bachelor of Arts in h istory from Anhui University in 1998. He r eceived his first Master of Arts in s ociology from Anhui University in 2005 and his second Master of Arts degree in a nthropology from the University of Florida in 2008. In the spring of 2009 he entered the doctoral program in a nthropology at the University of Florida. He has been the recipient of numerous honors and awards including the Alumni Fellowship from the University of Florida, Excellency Award for the work presented at the Graduate Research council at the University of Florida, James C. Waggoner J r. Award, a John M. Goggin Scholarship, and a Dissertation Writing Award from the Graduate School of the University of Florida. While pursuing his Ph.D, he worked as a research associate and assistant instructor for the D epartment of Anthropology. Before join ing the program at the University of Florida, he had been a lecturer at Anhui University from 1998 to 2006. During that period, he taught three courses and he was considered by students to be one of the most popul ar instructors. He has presented his r esearch at both international and domestic conference s and workshops including the 16th International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) and the 2nd International Congress on Chinese Studies. He has presented papers three times at t he Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association. Additionally, during his doctoral studies, he has published four papers in peer reviewed journals and one translated book in China. His dissertation, titled Ethnicity, Religion and the State: Intermarriage between the Han and Muslim Hui in Eastern China, was supervised by Dr. Chuan kang Shih.