1 GRINDING IT OUT: NEOCONSERVATIVES, STRATEGIC ARMS, AND PROTECTING AMERICA, 196 8 1980 By ROGER E. CAREY A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMEN TS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2014
2 Â© 2014 Roger E. Carey
3 This dissertation is dedicated t o Coralyn , with great love .
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS To paraphrase some PBS programs, thi s dissertation was made possible by the contributions of many people over the past several years. The work here is mine, and mine alone, along with any errors of fact or judgment. T o the extent that this study represents an original contribu tion to histo rical knowledge, several individuals and groups supported me during my research and writing . I want to begin by thanking my dissertation advisor, Matthew F. Jacobs. He has been a constant source of encouragement and advice, putting up with my slow pace an d challenging me to think more closely and more deeply about what I was trying to argue. At each step of the process, his sage advice and direction have guided my efforts to write the best work I could generate. I also am grateful for the contributions o f my committee, William A. Link, Frederick Gregory, Ido Oren, and Norman J.W. Goda, and my original advisor, Robert McMahon (now at Ohio State University). Finally, I owe who started me on the road of historical inquiry. My research for this project was greatly facilitated by two grants: a Moody Grant from the LBJ Foundation at t he Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum in Austin, TX, and a Milbauer Grant in Aid from the Milbauer Program in Southern History at the University of Florida . The staff and librarians at several institutions gave me invaluable assistance as I waded through thousands of feet of documents at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum , the Nixon Presidential Materials at National Archives II (the collection has since moved to the Nixon Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, CA), the Gerald R. Ford Library, the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, and Special Collections at the University of Washington Li brary.
5 Several friends and colleagues provided support, encouragement, and advice during this project. In particular I want to thank David Tegeder of Santa Fe College for his support and the opportunity to adjunct while writing. I also greatly appreciate the friendship of fellow graduate students Sean P. Cunningham (now at Texas Tech University) and Anthony Moffett. Many friends here in Gainesville helped me persevere to the end, in particular Joel Fick, Steve Reeves, Bill Montgomery, and the people of R edemption OPC. Finally, my best friend from my days in Las Vegas, Brian Etheridge, also has been a steady source of encouragement . The most important people in my life are my family, and it is to them that I owe the greatest debt. My daughter Becca was b orn while I was editing what would become a chapter of my M.A. thesis ; she has never known a time when I was not a graduate student, and I look forward to showing her a new side to her father. She is a constant source of joy. My son Nick attended the Uni versity of Florida during my time in graduate school, and it was great fun to eat lunch with him between our classes. He finished before I did, and I could not be prouder of him and his job as a police officer in Jacksonville. Finally, m y wife Coralyn ha s sacrificed a great deal for me to get through graduate school, and her patience and resolve are beyond measure. She is the single most important person on earth to me, and words fail me to describe the depth of my love for her. She is an amazing indivi dual, and I am blessed beyond measure that she is in my life. This work is dedicated to her.
6 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 8 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ............................. 9 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 10 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ............................. 12 2 PART I GENESIS ................................ ................................ ............................ 37 3 OUT OF THE SHAKER: STARTING TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS ............... 42 Beginning from Strength ................................ ................................ ................... 43 Whither Neoconservatives? ................................ ................................ .............. 61 4 IMPROVING THE MIX: SALT I AND MOVING TOWARD SALT II ................. 72 The Road to SALT ................................ ................................ ............................ 73 Contesting SALT ................................ ................................ .............................. 95 5 PART II EMERGENCE ................................ ................................ ................ 114 6 SWITCHING BRANDS I: THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ........................ 118 ................................ ............................ 119 ................................ .............. 132 7 SWITCHING BRANDS II: THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 149 8 PART III OPPOSITION ................................ ................................ ................ 169 9 A TIME OF SEASONING: DEBATE OVER SALT II ................................ ..... 173 The Warnke Nomination ................................ ................................ ................. 173 Ongoing Discussion ................................ ................................ ....................... 191 10 AT THE PEAK OF FLAVOR: A TREATY AND HEARINGS .......................... 231 Agreement at Last? ................................ ................................ ........................ 232 The Senate Hearings ................................ ................................ ..................... 254 11 PART IV TRANSFORMATION ................................ ................................ .... 270
7 12 LOSING SAVOR: THE END OF SALT ................................ .......................... 274 Ongoing Opposition ................................ ................................ ........................ 278 Post Afghanistan Priorities ................................ ................................ ............. 288 13 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ............................... 301 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 309 Archival and Manuscript Sources ................................ ................................ ......... 309 Oral History Sources ................................ ................................ ............................. 310 Databases and Websites ................................ ................................ ...................... 310 Printed Pr imary Sources ................................ ................................ ....................... 311 Secondary Sources ................................ ................................ .............................. 315 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 323
8 LIST OF TABLES Table page Table 4 1 SALT I Interim Agreement ................................ ................................ .... 113 Table 4 2 Vladivostok Framework ................................ ................................ ........ 113 Table 9 1 Deep Cuts Proposal ................................ ................................ .............. 230 Table 10 1 Memorandum of Understanding for the SALT II Treaty ........................ 269 Table 10 2 Co mpilation of Nitze SALT II Comparison Data ................................ .... 269
9 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ABM Anti Ballistic Missile ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency CDM Coalition for a Democratic Majority CPD Committee on the Present Danger ICBM Int ercontinental Ballistic Missile MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles NPT Nonproliferation Treaty SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks SLB M Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
10 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy GRINDING IT OUT: NEOCONSERVATIVES, STRATEGIC ARMS, AND PROTECTING AMERICA , 1968 1980 By Roger E. Carey August 2014 Chair: Matthew F. Jacobs Major: History This study argues that neoconservatives provided the intellectual leadership for the domestic opposition to U.S. strategic arms limitations policy during the 1970s. Neocons saw approaches rooted in dÃ©tente and human right s as threatening to America. This danger required individuals who supported the idea of strategic arms control to work against official U.S. policy in order to protect the nation. The organizations and networks utilized to acc omplish this task coordinate d an opposition effort focused on the primacy of peace through strength as the necessary bedrock assumption missi ng from the official negotiating efforts. The opposition believed that t he danger inherent in failing to maintain this concept allowed the cre ation of two flawed strategic arms agreements, SALT I and SALT II. This study further contends that the existing historiographies either overlook or insufficiently appreciate the key role that neoconservatives played in general, and in the particular case of hindering the general signing of the second treaty, but the delay did allow external circumstances to influence U.S. arms control efforts and ultimately bring it to a h alt. Finally, a greater
11 understanding of the important role neoconservatives played in the progress of the domestic debate on nuclear arms control through the 1970s helps explain how the movement gained growing influence in government circles over the nex t several decades.
12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION M any observers of America, historians and non historians alike , are fascinated by the reasons foreign relations decisions . The presidency of George W. Bush generated significant int erest in this regard , due to the formative event of the September 11 , 2001 policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. James Mann in his book Rise of the Vulcans : The sought to explain the un derlying motivations for those 11 military and foreign policy actions . Well received by reviewers across the ideological spectrum, the book presents the approach of the Bush pres 1 He argues that the people working for a president significantly shape that important object of study for 2 Mann suggests that neoconservativism played an important role in shaping the key figures, the Vulcans, who advised Bush . the people and eve nts during the Bush presidency, but the description begins with an initial sketch during the 1970s. In the midst of his description of the early neoconservative influence o n the Bush adviso rs , Mann uses language similar t o his initial description of the Vulcan s foreign policy, it was the beginning of an epochal shift. The neoconservatives were 1 Jam es Mann, (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), xii. 2 Mann, Vulcans, xviii.
13 3 This argument about the neocons rightly suggests a greater understanding of their political participation in the seventies can explain a great deal about the nature of the modern Republican Party . While many scholars share Mann the importance of neoconservatives for u nderstanding American political history since the late 1960s , neocon impact on U.S. foreign relations has not received the same level of attention. When authors do examine neocons and foreign policy, the specific is sue of their role in the debate over strategic nuclear arms in the 1970s receives even less consideration . This is a curious gap in the historical understanding of politics, one particularly odd given the prominent role neoconservatives played in recent e lectoral history. Anyone examining the literature of strategic arms control or presidential histories will find no greater clarity regarding the influence of neocons on U.S. foreign policy. A comparison of these fields yields mo re pieces of the puzzle, b ut the aggregate presents an incomplete picture. Scholarship focused on neoconservatism describes a movement largely focused on domestic issues and only marginally involved in foreign relations . This literature devotes little attention to neocon activiti es in strategic arms control, despite the fact that these individuals were an important part of U.S. foreign policy and reduction of nuclear weapons in later decades . This overall scholarly situation generates three central questions: how do the various h istoriographies mutually enhance an understanding of domestic influences on U.S. efforts to control strategic nuclear arms; what was the role of neoconservatives in the debate over the direction and nature of those efforts; and how did the discussion shape the subsequent nature of American politics? 3 Mann, Vulcans, 94.
14 This study argues that neoconservatives provided the intellectual leadership for the domestic opposition to U.S. strategic arms limitations policy during the 1970s. Neocons saw approaches rooted in dÃ©tente and human rights as threatening to America. This danger required individuals who supported the idea of strategic arms control to work against official U.S. policy in order to protect the nation. The organizations and networks utilized to accomplish this task coordinated an opposition effort focused on the primacy of peace through strength as the necessary bedrock assumption missi ng from the official negotiating efforts. The opposition believed that t he danger inherent in failing to maintain this concept allo wed the creation of two flawed strategic arms agreements, SALT I and SALT II. This study further contends that the existing historiographies either overlook or insufficiently appreciate the key role that neoconservatives played in general, and in the part icular case of hindering the general acceptance of Neocon efforts did not prevent the signing of the second treaty , but the delay did allow external circumstances to influence U.S. arms control efforts and ultimately stop advancement toward ratification approval by the Senate . Finally, a greater understanding of the important role neoconservatives played in the progress of the domestic debate on nuclear arms control through the 1970s helps explain how the movement gained growing influence in government circles over the next several decades . One aspect of the methodological approach used in this study is a variation on innovations coming out of the social history shift of t he 1960s and 1970s was the recognition that history was not determined only by individuals, groups , and organizations traditionally viewed as existing at the top
15 of a ny given power structure. Historians realized that looking at those pers ons, events, and patterns traditionally considered powerless, such as the working class, minorities, the poor, etc., yielded insights critical to creating a more inclusive, broader , atypica l ways. If the traditional power structure in American politics is the U.S. government itself, then logically those outside of the official government are in a sense less powerful. Without the advantages of the apparatus and influence of being in power, these individuals mu st use other means to pursue their goals. This activity often takes the form of contesting U.S. policy in the hope that presenting resistance to the direction and goals of those in power can bring about change with respect to the issue at hand. Such an approach is similar to those traditionally examined using analysis. This comparison is not to suggest those outside the official halls of power are equivalent to the working class, or the dispossessed; in fact the pe ople exa mined in this study often used power derived in some sense from positions and relations at the high levels of government association. However, in as much as they were not, in fact, in charge of U.S. policy, their situations require d them to pursue similar tactics to those traditionally considered at the bottom, making such efforts in a relative focuses within the ranks of government, particular ly in the White House. Traditional histor ies, even to this day, tend to focus on presidents and cabinet level officials in analyzing U.S. foreign policy and actions. Given the power and influence these individuals and groups wield, this approach has merit. However, much of what these people dec ide is based on advice
16 and information filtered, analyzed, and presented by staffers. These workers are the behind the scenes, often unsung participants in the shaping of history. In this sense, y mines the contributions, opinions, and arguments of this lower layer of government officialdom, along with those long term functionaries who d id not work for the adm inistration of the moment. These staffers serve as an important source of insight into t he role and influence of neo conservatives and those they le d as they attempt ed to influence the direction and nature of U.S. strategic arms reduction policy. T he importance of neoconservatives in this study requires some attention to the definition of the term. This effort is particularly important as most scholars and neocons agree that a specific, simple description is difficult. The result is the use of terms such explain t he wide ranging, eclectic collection of individuals, groups, and publications associated with neoconservatives. Irving Kristol, considered one of the central, who agreed w ith the concepts of the New Deal, but found themselves increasingly out of step with and critical of the Great Society and the counterculture of the sixties. 4 His focus was largely on domestic political and cultural issues . Concerning U.S. foreign policy , he argued only that the American approach was imperialistic rather than isolationist. He suggested that America needed to r ecognize this fact and accept it as something not inherently bad . Kristol claimed that t he guidance of intellectuals, 4 Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea , (New York: The Free Press, 1995), x.
17 synonymous in his mind with neoconservatives , could ensure a responsible use of that policy. 5 The other major figure associated with the establishment of neoconservatism was Norman Podhoretz, whose concerns over the advance of the New Left incorporated a greater cons ider ation of foreign relations. His primary focus was the threat of communism and the Soviet Union . Two specific concepts within this general idea dominate d his thinking : the rejection of the Cold War consensus by domestic liberals , and the dangers for t he United States associated with abandoning the globe to communism. Podhoretz viewe d the shift in domestic liberalism as happening in the late sixties and the seventies, a transformation he associated with the Democratic Party changing leadership. He con sidered neoconservatism as a movement that represented the concerns of Cold War liberals, largely Democrats, who questioned the ideas, assumptions, and policies of the New Left while continuing to support t he containment of communism. 6 Using the work of th ese two founding fathers, the following definition emerges: communist liberal marginalized both by the New Left and within the Democratic Party. This type of person viewed the Soviet Union and those who supported its goals, directly or indirectly, as a danger to the United States . The basis of this definition of neoconservatives is their views on foreign relations . M ost scholars studying neoconservatism as it 5 Kri stol, Neoconservatism , 90 DeMuth and William Kristol, eds., The Neoconservative Imagination: Essays in Honor of Irving Kristol , (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1995) and Mark Gerson, ed ., The Essential Neoconservative Reader , (New York: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1996). 6 Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir , (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1979), 170, 254, 308, 338.
18 manifested during the si xties and seventies emphasize the movement domestic policy thinking , relegating foreign relations thinking to a small subset of an overall approach to politics and society. Neocon o pposition to communism does emerge in the literature as the most importa nt driving force relating to foreign affairs . U sing a definition focused on fo reign policy for neoconservativism provides greater explanatory power in understanding the nature of the neocon role in opposing strategic arms control. 7 This perspective on neo conservatism raises an interesting question: how does an analysis of neocons and their activities fit into the history of U.S. foreign relations ? Historians of this field have debated the nature of inquiry in the field for the past two decades. Many sch olars called for greater reliance on multinational analysis, seeking to move away from a U.S. centric focus and an over reliance on traditional power relationships and players. However, not all members of the field agreed on the value of minimizing domest ic matters and considerations of the impact on American policy . Robert McMahon rightly observes or time their work concentrates on, need to choose between, or blend, internalist and externalist app 8 A balanced approach provides the greatest interpretive power, and grants legitimacy to scholarship focused on American national history as it contributes to diplomatic history. He also argues that the need to do the best U.S. 7 Varieties of Conservatism in America, ed. Peter Berkowitz, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2004), 120 122; Tod Lindberg, Varieties of Conservatism , 138; Robert Muccigross o, Basic History of American Conservatism , (Malabar, FL: Krieger Pub., 2001), 107 108; Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars , (New York: Madison Books, 1996), 66, 132 133, 190 191; Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology , (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), 8, 166 173. 8 Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2 nd ed. , Michael J. Hogan and Thomas J. Patt erson, ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 37.
19 foreign relations history requires th e analysis of domestic elements . Thi s study proceeds along th is path , examining domestic influences as a means of contributing t o the broader field of diplomatic history, as well as U.S. political history. This focus is somewhat ironic , given that scholars of neoconservativism tend to focus on , because it was neocons who provided leadership over the issues associated with opposition to SALT. This is not to suggest that neocon contributions are comple tely absent from serious study, nor that SALT is utterly ignored by those examining neocons. But the importance of foreign relations receives far less attention than domestic concerns , particularly in terms of the details relating to arms control and the leadership role of neocons . This practice minimizes a component critical to understand ing the movement . While neoc ons continued to produce analyse s and commentary on a range of domestic political and cultural issues, their work in the foreign policy aren a , specifically in discussions of strategic arms control policy, also asserted their influence, and increased their status as a significant source of ideas. This reputation served them well in subsequent decades , opening even wider the pa ths to eventual p ower in the halls of government . If there was one central idea that dominated neoconservative thinking and leadership as they protested what they considered objectionable practice s in U.S. foreign relations , it w as the danger to the coun try present in of ficial policy concerning strategic arms. T his concept is critical to understanding the rhetoric and positions of neocons throughout their involvement with SALT, from the earliest iterations of strategic arms control to the debate over the SALT II treaty. Neocons believed that t he United States in the Cold War could not afford to look weak because t he Soviet Union would
20 take advantage of any weakness ; thus, only a strong appearance would suffice. This necessity extended to negotiating positions. Neocons believed that the Soviets in general could only be trusted to honor any agreement if they respected the United States , which could be earned by negotiating from a position of strength. Without op erating in this manner, the Soviet Union would take advantag e of America due to the belief that only a strong nation deserved respect, which translated into honest discussion and agreements. Moreover, there were limits to the idea of trusting the other side. A treaty that did not result in a s trong or stronger America was not worth signing , as any accord that resulted in a weaker nation placed the country in a dangerous place . An agreement that put the home of the free in an inferior position relative to the Soviets might result in the beg inni ng of the end for the United States . Neocons feared this threat as much or more than anything else. Strength was necessary in all aspects of American policy, negotiation, and agreements. The necessity of avoiding weakness in policy derived in part from t he neocon perspective on Vietnam. Opinions varied among neoconservatives regarding U.S. participation in the conflict, but the rationale remained rooted in the threat of communist expansion. Neocons did not question the danger of either Soviet or Chinese expansion, but they did ask if communist activity in Vietnam truly posed a threat to other nations in the region. Success fall to communism appeared dubious to many of these intellectuals, and ending U.S. involvement was a w orthwhile goal. Unlike the more radical position of the anti war movement, neocons did not support communism nor compare the United States to criminals. Instead, they laid the blam e at the feet of American decision makers, suggesting that weak policy led to the
21 failure in Vietnam. For some neocons, the issue with losing the conflict was not the impact on Vietnam, but the effect on America. The lo ss of the will to be active in the world , and dependence on policies rooted in false beliefs , held the potent ial to damage the United States, perhaps irreparably. Neoconservatives held that these weak face of an ongoing need to continue containing Soviet expansionism . Hence , there was a need for p eace through strength to decrease the threat of conflic t between the two superpowers. 9 Arms control, if done correctly, was a means to reduce the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union , and hence was a desirable goal for neoconserv atives. Setting aside issues of mutual assured destruction or the possibility of winning a nuclear exchange, neoconservatives did not seek greater tensions with the Soviet Union, nor an arms race, particularly one out of control. Neoconservatives wanted peace, through strength. Two subtle points are important to grasp at this juncture. First, both sides in the debate over U.S. SALT policy and direction wanted to limit strategic nuclear arms. Neither side, certainly not those led by neocons, wanted to a llow development without restrictions and controls. The issue for neoconservatives was how limiting should happen. What were the context and assumptions under which negotiations and agreements would 9 For neoconservative thinking on Vietnam, see Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were In Vietnam , (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks , 180, 219, 250, 291, 323, 337 339; Ben Wa ttenberg, Fighting Words: A Tale of How Liberals Created Neo Conservatism Neoconservative Reader , Gerson, ed., 161; and Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics , Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2000), 169, 208, 237. Several articles in Commentary Case for http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290122424 ; (May 1971): 6, 9, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290091125 52, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290091 255 ; and Robert W. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290144880 .
22 take place? How would the United States appear to both the Soviets and the world in this process? Anything that threatened the reputation and influence of the nation was unacceptable, and the solution to these questio ns was peace through strength. The other point worth noting is that there was no question of whether or not the United States would remain powerful. Neither side sough t to diminish America , or reduce its superiority over the Soviets. Both preferred an advantage in dealing with the Soviet Union , something that neocons believed allies desired a nd neither other countries nor the United Nations could guarantee . The United States neede d to stand firm against the Soviets to accomplish any major strategic arms control agreement. The question for neoconservatives was if the proposed positions and re sulting agreements did threaten to result in a weaker United States, one that the untrustworthy Soviets arms control positions, and those advocating them, endorsed and defended approache s and stance s that seemed inevitably to point America toward an inferior position, how could neoconservatives not respond and alert the nation to the dangers? Rat her than allowing such threatening ideas to become U.S. policy, the solutio n was to pursue peace through strength. The baseline for the neoconservative perspective on U.S. strategic arms control policy was the approach of President Lyndon B. Johnson . Neocons believed that t he ideas of trusting the Soviets up to a point, the impo rtance of being able to verify outcomes, and the necessity of maintaining a strong front, all efforts . Even how he dealt with Soviet obstacles to arms control served as an example. Alt hough they did not bear fruit, hi s methods defined for subsequent neocon efforts the
23 correct direction in which to proceed. Clearly, Johnson was not a neoconservative, but his hard anti communist, containment driven policies when dealing with the Soviet Union represented the gold standard for neocon forei gn policy, particularly as a guide for strategic arms control. As they organized and worked from 1969 on , neocons looked to k ey figures who both had participated in the Johnson g and planning for initial strategic arms control talks with the Soviets . The basic approach derived from Johnson served as the basis for emerging neocon criticisms of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford in their respective approaches to SALT I and SALT I I . Opposition efforts focused broadly on draw ing attention to the dangers inherent in the Republican policies relating to communism , and the necessity of peace through strength in negotiations . Jackson initially supported the Nixon administra efforts to move forward on arms control, but as the SALT I discussions . DÃ©tente was a problematic policy for neocons , and they believed it led to dangerous positions in the SALT I accords signed by the two sides in May 1972. Jackson agreements prompted him to seek corrective measures in order to prevent future difficulties . He believed that t he diff erences in the SALT I levels which allowed the Soviets greater numbers of nuc lear weapon delivery vehicles and greater thro w weight represented a dangerous tendency to allow inequalities in future arms control discussions that threatened to put America in second place behind the Soviets. 10 This 10 weight of a missile is the sum of the weight of (a) its recovery vehicle(s), (b) any post boost vehicles or any other devices for targeting, releasing, or dispensing reentry vehicles and (c) its Calvo Goller and Michael A. Calvo, The SAL T Agreements: Content Application Verification , (Boston: Martinu s Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 56;
24 threat could be alleviated by pursuin g negotiations based on the concept of peace subsequent efforts bore little fruit. President Ford and his administration continued the general approach used by the previous administration, and believed the Vladivostok framework they achieved resolved most problems, including neocon objections. In fact , for the opposition the reverse was true as objectionable elements of the SALT I a greements were reinforced and the President appeared to trust Soviet adh erence to the treaty. The Republican struck at the heart of neoconservative belief s. The only corrective was a new president willing to pursue the need for peace through st rength. turned to despair for the neocon led opposition. As the election neared and Candidate traditional con servatives and neocons doubted his lead ership would result in a trustworthy general direction for m atters of foreign policy and national security. In response to these concerns, a bipartisan group organized behind neoconservative leadership to form the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). T his organization led the effort to challenge U.S. strategic arms policy at virtually every point throughout the Carter presidency. Other outle ts of neoconservative thinking echoed these concerns, and with Jackson, Nitze, and the CPD le ading the charge, a unified opposition sought to alert America to the dangers posed by U.S. policy and negotiating positions, calling for a change to bring the idea of peace through propel useful payload into an intercontinental traj Alerting America : The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger , Charles Tyroler II, ed., (Washington:
25 strength to bear. Challenging everything from trusting the Soviets to personnel choices and d edication to American superiority, neocons strove to derail the Carter hearings on the treaty. Ironically, a final resolution of the matter via a full Senate vote never hap pened due to external events. Yet d espite the absence of a demonstrable legislative judgment in their favor, n eoconservatives and their allies claimed victory . Continuing the debate into the 1980 presidential election cycle, neocons believed the election of Ronald Reagan proved two things about the nation . Americans recognized and they believed in the value of peace through strength. The subject of this study brings together th ree distinct areas of scholarship: analysis of neocon servatives, political histories, and arms control studies. No author has examined the specific period, subjects, actors, and ideological elements with the same emphasis , leaving a gap in historical und erstanding . However, e ach field brings unique insights to the discussion , each expands on the others, and each leaves key questions completely or inadequately answered. The scholarly examination o f neoconservatives focuses predominantly on the s domestic considerations, but the consideration of the foreign policy and SALT is not completely absent . Typically, the subject is part of a background explanation in the process of examining some other aspect of the movement. A good example of this foc us is Jean Fran Ã§ American Neoconservatism : The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism , where he devotes ten pages to a discussion of frame and one page within that span to a brief description of the CPD
26 and SALT II dur ing the Carter years . The remainder addresses neocon views regarding presidential election and Reagan. This type of focus suggests other scholarly priorities and a lack of appreciation for the significant role SALT played in the development of neoconservative involvement in American politics. 11 There are two exceptions to this minimizing trend . John Ehrman The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1 945 1994 focus es on the intellectual development of neocons . H e proceeds by focusing on specific individuals , such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The book traces the evolution of neoconservative thinking as it relates to divisions within liberalism and the reactions of movement members to left ward drift. In this context, Ehrman presents a compelling argument explaining the nature of neocon concerns about the Soviets , describing the communist nation as an expansionist threat that the Carter administration r efused to contain sufficiently in the SALT II treaty . However, despite the broader chronological emphasis, 11 Jean FranÃ§ois Drolet, American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism , (New York: Col umbia University Press, 2011) . See also Gerson, Neoconservative Vision ; Gerson, Neoconservative Reader; and Dorrien, Neoconservative Mind . This tendency extends to works by neocons; see Kristol, Neoconservatism an d DeMuth and Kristol, Neoconservative Imagination . The same is true of survey scholarship on conservatism; see Berkowitz, ed., Varieties ; Muccigrosso, Basic History ; Paul Gottfried, The Conservative Movement , rev. ed., (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993); Charles W. Dunn and J. David Woodard, The Conservative Tradition in America , (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996); and Paul Edward Gottfried, Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the America Right , (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2 007). Even some more focused examinations of A. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations , (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Ins titution, 1981) .
27 n the domestic SALT discussion. 12 Justin VaÃ¯sse Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement casts a wider net, seeking to explain neoconservatism as a series of three ages of vague chronology with different emphases and characteristics . He suggests that the first age originated in the sixties in reaction to socialism, emerging from former Trotskyites, many of whom were New York intellectuals . This age focused almost exclusively on domestic issues. second age roughly corresponds to the seventie s and eighties , with its protagonists as dissatisfied , vital center liberals. Neocon concerns during this period included foreign policy , with the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) and the CPD playing prominent roles. He also describes political staffers during this time as important sources of interaction with neoconservative opposition leaders, including Senator Henry VaÃ¯sse claims that t he third age began in 1995, and focused on foreign policy and the idea of promoting democra cy through American strength. Much like Ehrman, VaÃ¯sse limited attention on the subject of strategic arms control , which is an unsurprising condition given the broader focus on neoconservatives . This study seeks to e nhance and am plify these explorations of neocons by examining in greater detail several facets of the activity , including executive and legislative branch interactions, along with public 12 John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945 1994 , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995) . Ehrman does not address neocon opposition to SALT I or SALT II pri or to the formation of the Committee on the Present Danger, including his coverage of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. For his coverage of the SALT II treaty , see 111 113 and 132 133.
28 message presentation and the progressive nature of neocon objections to U.S. SALT approaches and assumptions. 13 Another area of scholarship relevant to the story of American strategic arms control is poli tical histories, including works focusing on individuals and actions at the presidential, cabinet , and legislative levels . The two most relevant works for the Johnson administration are by Robert Divine and John Prados. D sketches out much of the basic narrative, while in 1968 that brought Johnson Both accounts provide valuable information that serve as a basis upon which to build by incorporating the thinking on strategic arms as a foundation for neocon thinking in their subsequent arms control efforts. Additionally, this study includes nascent neoconservative analysis of that also relates to later SALT efforts. 14 13 Justin VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism: the Biography of a Movement , trans. Arthur Goldhammer, (Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010) . has three chapters devoted to the Second Age . Chapter 3 provides a helpful discussion in part of the CDM vie ws on foreign policy . Chapter 4 is extremely valuable for its analysis of the CPD , as VaÃ¯sse is one of two published scholars to date who gained access to the closed CPD papers at the Hoover Institute. SALT I is essentially absent from his account , and t he focal point for SALT II discussion is five pages, 174 179. For an intriguing challenge to on Trotskyite origins that agues for the primacy of German philosophy in and competition with the Soviets as a key focal point , see Robert L. Richardson, Neoconservatism: Origins and Evolution, 1945 1980 , (PhD Diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009). 14 The Johnson Years, Volume Three: LBJ at Home and Abroad , ed. Robert A. Divine (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994); The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam , ed. H.W. Brands, (Co llege Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999). See also Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam , (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 181 186, 205 222; Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and Hi s Times, 1961 1973 , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 432 438, 554 556; John Dumbrell, President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism , (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004) , 60 86; H. W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and th e Limits
29 While scholars have produced numerous books on Johnson olicy , the adventures spawned a veritable cornucopia of volumes. S adly , this situation has not translated when the subject is the a dministration part to archival document review and release schedules. Key works, such as William A Tangled Web : The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency and Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power , focus broadly on a wide spectrum of foreign relations issues. Both touch on SALT, though Bundy more so than Dallek, and give insight into the thinking and planning that major administration figures, including Nixon and Kissinger, devoted to arms control. This study expands on the both the administration and the nature of the executive interaction with critic s b y adding a more focused analysis of the opposition of neoconservatives, Senator Jackson , and Paul Nitze, partic ularly during the SALT II phase . 15 T he scholarship on the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter suffer s from several weaknesses both in general and specifically regarding SALT II. Three issues in particular stand out: r elative to the administrations surrounding them, these presidencies were short and by some measures less eventful; their archives are stil l in of American Power , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 119 in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963 1968 , Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds., (New York: Cambridg e University Press, 1994), 3 4; and John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush , (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 184 196. 15 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in th e Nixon Presidency , (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power , (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007). See also Conrad Black, Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full , (New York: PublicAffairs [sic], 2007); Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon , (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999); and Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: Volume 3 Ruin and Recovery, 1973 1990 , (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). For Henry Kissinger, see Jussi Hanhim Ã¤ ki, The Flawed Archit ect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy , (New York : Oxford University Press, 2004), and Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century , (Cambridge , MA : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007) .
30 the process of reviewing and releasing documents; and SALT II receives minimal attention in the existing literature . The Ford literature is sparse compared to that of other presidents, with the Vladivostok summit as the primary arms control event rec eiving scholarly attention . The Presidency of Gerald Ford is a typical presidential survey, with minimal attention devoted to the success at Vladivostok in creating a framework with the Soviets for future negotiations. More foreign p olicy Mortal Rivals , also emphasize the Vladivostok summit, with little attention to other aspects of SALT II. Scholar s give more attention nt. One of the early standard treatments was Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years , which while limited by a lack of access to substantial archival sources , n onetheless, uses publicly available information to d escribe the administrat the , and the failure to win Senate approval. The most recent Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration benefits from access to the Carter Library , and also addresses many of the opposition forces . What this present study adds is a more sustained and specific focus on neocons, the details of Congres sional hearings, and the recommendations and analysis of White House aides, in addition to greater exploration of the archival record. 16 16 John Robert Greene, The Presidency o f Gerald Ford , (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995); William G. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations From Nixon to Reagan , (New York: Random House, 1987); Gaddis Smith, Morality : American Diplomacy in the Carter Year s , (New York: Hill an d Wang, 1986); Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration , (DeKalb , IL : Northern Illinois University Press, 2008). On Ford, see also John Robert Greene, The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations , (Bloomin gton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992); Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, ,
31 A final fie ld of political history that pertains to the story of neoconservatives and SALT II is legislative history. The definitive , relevant survey of Congress, Robert David Congress and the Cold War , provides a detailed role. The book includes material on the ABM deba te during the Nixon presidency while also touching on the Jackso n amendment to SALT I, and addresses the Warnke nomination fight the possibility of the SALT II treaty passing the Senate. Individual biography is m ore typical for this type of lit erature Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics is the authoritative biography of the Senator from Washington. It contains distinguishes between Jackson and neoc ons while acknowledging the extensive connections and leadership role played by during his long involvement in the strategic arms debate The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969 1977 is a short analysis of the S Ford administrations by a former Senate staffer. The work provides additional support for ideas arrived at from the executive end of the historical relationship, and is an (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); Reichley, Conservatives ; Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect ; Ron Nessen, It Sure Looks Diff erent from the Inside , (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1978); and John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age , (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). On the status of Ford scholarship, see Justifications, and Analysis: Th e Historiography of American America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941 , ed. Michael J. Hogan, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 407 408, A Companion to American Foreign Relations , ed. Robert D. Schulzinger, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 2006), 422 439. On Carter, see also Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights P olicy , (New York: Hamilton Press, 1986); Gregg Herken, Counsels of War , expanded ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1987) ; Alexander Moens, Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision Making, (Boul der, CO: Westview Press, 1990); David Skidmore, Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform , (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996) ; Brian J. Auten, , (Columbia, MO: Universit y of Missouri Press, 2008); and Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy , (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
32 example of specific, contemporary politic al science analysis common in SALT literature. neoconservative and presidential elements enhances the Congressional scholarship, creating a fuller, more complete understanding of the story of SALT and the nature of executive legislat ive public interactions. 17 The third and final type of historiography involved in this study focuses on the study of arms control. Characteristically, these scholars trace the details of negotiations, and in many cases the minutiae of missile designs, laun cher numbers, throw weights, and other tec hnical information, seeking to explain the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union that require d such extended discussions to arrive at an agreement . The earliest standard work on SALT I that vi rtually all subsequent writers utilize to varying degrees is Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT , which surveys the U.S. effort to engage the Soviet Union 1972 agreements. Uti lizing behind the scenes, first hand accounts an d publicly available sources, he presents a contemporary account that , if somewhat li mited in sources and isolated from the larger history, p rovides a detailed account of U.S. efforts and thi nking to reach an accord with the Soviets. The SALT II counterpart to Newhouse Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II , which is a n equally detailed 17 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, (New York: C ambridge Un iversity Press, 2006; Kaufman , Jackson ; and Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969 1977, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978. For Jackson, see also William W. Prochnau and Richard W. Larsen, A Certain Democrat: Senator Henry M. Jackson: A Political Biography , (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972, and Dorothy Fosdick, ed., Staying the Course: Henry M. Jackson and National Security , (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1987). On the general lack of Congressional scholarship among foreign relations historians, aside from biographies, see Robert David Johnson, Journal of Cold War Studies 3, No. 2, Spring 2001, 76 100. Democrats controlled both houses of Congress throughout the period o the Senate, 1789 http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/ partydiv.htm , accessed 3/20/14, and Office of the 1789 Presen http://histo ry.house.gov/Institution/Party Divisions/Party Divisions/ , accessed 3/20/2014.
33 . Talbott focu ses on the back and forth of negotiations, technical details, and the work of the executive branch to complete the task. His account ends with the signing of the SALT II treaty at the 1979 Moscow summit . The standard analysis of the subsequent Senate rat ification fight is The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate . He begins essentially where Talbott ends, and focuses on the Senate hearings . The book includes an examination of the advocacy o f domestic supporters and opponents of the agreement, and an assessment of their impact . Caldwell describes the involvement of the CPD , Jackson, Nitze, and the Senate debates in some detail , arg uing that while domestic elements may not always determine the outcome of a treaty debate, those factors cannot be ignored if a president hopes to gain Senate support . 18 As important and helpful as these books are to understanding SALT from an arms contro l perspective, by far the most important book in this category is Raymond DÃ©tente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan . The author was a member of the SALT I negotiating team, and the book reflects his maste ry of both sides of the discussions, along with unique access to insider information and insights typically available only with the opening of various archival sources. The coverage of the subject is comprehensive, and Garthoff considers SALT at length in the con text of U.S. Soviet relations , including brief treatments of domestic 18 John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT , (New York: Pergamon Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II , (New York: Harper & Row , 1979); Dan Caldwell, The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 3.
34 opposition . As important as these representative works are to understand the arms control aspect of SALT, each leaves opportunities for both connection to other historiographies and expansion. All are limited in the sense of essentially making minimal use of primary archival sources. To varying degrees, they have chronological limits. With the exception of Caldwell, domestic objections receive little to no attention, and none of these works demonstrate an appreciation of the significant role played by neoconservatives in leading the opposition to U.S. SALT policy . Finally, all three a uthors at one time or another were involved in the negotiating process as members of U.S. dele gations. This study intends to fill in these gaps and strengthen the solid arguments presented by these authors. 19 The dissertation is organized in four parts. Part I (Chapters 2 and 3) lays out the origins of U.S. strategic arms control efforts and the i nvolvement of individuals who will be significant figures at the height of the neoconservative led opposition to official SALT positions. Chapter 2 details the initial approach toward strategic arms control dur ing the Johnson administration, where the ide a of a strong approach shaped U.S. policy. In addition, this chapter describes the actions and beliefs of Senator Jackson and Paul Nitze, whose proto fundamental assumptions and goals. Chapter 3 addresses the significant shift in general U.S. foreign policy during the period dominated by Presidents Nixon and Ford, 19 Raymond Garthoff, DÃ©tente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan , ( Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1994). For additional arms control studies that are less significant and possess similar limitations, see James E. Dougherty, How to Think about Arms Control and Disarmament , (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1973); Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience , (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979); William C. Potter, ed., Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception , (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); John F. Lehman and Seymour Weiss, Beyond th e SALT II Failure , (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981); Calvo Goller and Calvo, SALT Agreements ; Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell, eds., The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification , .
35 as well as Henry Kissinge r, in addition to briefly considering perspective regarding the SALT I agreements and SALT II efforts. The chapter also examines the emergence and growing neocon approach to foreign relations and SALT in particular , along with the organizational efforts of the neoconservative led CDM. Part II (Chapters 4 and 5) chronicles the major sea change that began in 1976 and fundamentally altered both the nature of U.S. SALT policy and the character of th ose seeking a more traditional approach rooted in peace through strength. Chapter 4 explains the importance of huma n rights for President Carter as a foundational concept for all U.S. foreign policy, including arms control. It also traces the extent and influence perspective. Chapter 5 de scribes the formation, membership, beliefs, and influence of the Committee on the Present Danger. Additionally, the chapter describes the links to Senator Jackson and Paul Nitze, as well as the neoconservative nature of leadership . Part III (C hapters 6 and 7) narrates the evolution of the SALT II treaty debate over the three year period from 1977 through 1979 when the discussion of arms control was most public, most defined, and mos t disputed. Chapter 6 examines the first major conflict betwee n the White House and the opposition over the nomination of Paul Warnke to the posts of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and chief SALT negotiator , including the nature of the interaction between the two sides and type of rhetoric used by neocons to drive their points home. This chapter also describes the ongoing give and take between pro and anti SALT forces as they
36 developed and refined their arguments. Chapter 7 explores the final danger warnings from neocons as the summit pr oducing the SALT II treaty arrived in 1979 and the superpowers formally agreed on the final version of the accord. The focus of this chapter is the testimony given during ratification hearings before two Senate committees, the Committee on Foreign Relatio ns and the Committee on Armed Services . It was at these inquiries that witnesses and senators debated the issues associated with th e SALT II treaty , and the neocon led opposition presented its arguments regarding the dangers inherent in the document befor e the Senate . Part IV (Chapters 8 and 9) chronicles the fate of the treaty, along with the debate that accompanied it , as the agreement apparently headed for full Senate discussion and a vote . Chapter 8 addresses the a ftermath of the Senate hearings as both sides geared up for another round of debate on the floor of the Senate. It also explains how circumstances such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 resulted in an indirect victory for the neocon led forces. Even after exte rnal events overtook the debate and rendered the treaty irrelevant, neocons continued to lead the opposition . Chapter 9 concludes the study with a brief explanation of the impact of the emergence of neoco nservatives as leaders in the SALT debate on the 1980 presidential election and Ronald Reagan specifically. The chapter ends with a short statement of the
37 CHAPTER 2 PART I G ENESIS The aftermath of the Cu ban Missile Crisis mark s the be ginning of U.S. strategi c arms control efforts with the Soviet Union Presidents Kennedy and Johns on sought to reign in the danger of nuclear annihilation. Johnson saw limiting strategic nuclear weapons as a logical next step in the series of agreements reached by the superpowers. Hi s enthusiasm for arms control clearly drove the American effort to draw out Soviet participation. But the desire for forward movement did not result in unilateral actions, concessions t ability to protect itself, hamper keeping treaty obligations, or place the country in an inferior or disadvantageous position. Instead, the administration pursued unilateral preparations, so that when the Soviet Union expressed interest in limiting nuclear arms, the United States would be ready to discuss and eventually act. This American attitude manifested during extensive planning , which included regularly probing of the other wit h no additional U.S. action until bilateral demonstrated in his reaction to the 1968 Czech crisis, both during and after the event, and his ongoing pursuit of strategic arms cont rol until the end of his time in office. Throughout the process of creating treaties with the Soviets, the P resident and his administration continued to hold to basic Cold War assumptions. The most important one was the necessity of proceeding from streng th. Nothing could be accomplished with weakness. In order to be taken seriously, the United States needed to compel the other side to negotiate. This perspective formed the foundation of the
38 bi lateral activity considerations. K ey figures in what would manifest over the next decade as the neoconservative strategic arms control opposition shared the same concerns and approach to arms control with the Soviets. Senator Henry M. Jackson and Paul Nit ze supported contributed to the discussion about the need to control nuclear weapons while being careful with the Soviet Union . They believed that s trength was the necessary pre condition to any negotiation with the Soviets to ensur e fair dealing. This was an important consideration, derived from their thinking that the other superpower could not be trusted , and the United States coul d not be allowed to lose a strategic advantage in nuclear weapons. These Cold War reservations did not prevent support for arms control talks, even in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czech oslovakia to suppress the Prague Spring reform movement. F or future neoconservatives, the li mitation discussions. D approach essentially serving as a paradigm for subsequent neoconservative thinking , a more detailed examination of his attempts to engage the Soviet Union regarding strategic arms limitations provide s a helpful basis from which to consider future U.S. efforts. Nixon. T he direction of U.S. arms control policy changed with the inauguration of the new commander in chief, and h is conceptions of both foreign relations and arms control resulted in the erosion of emerging neoconservative support . The President , aided by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger , emphasized the importance of negotiation
39 rather than confrontation. Originating in the belief that Nixon faced issues and hurdles unique in the history of the nation, the two men sough t to link U.S. foreign relations issues and policies together that had not previously been interdependent in an attempt to influence Soviet decision making. At the heart of this approach was an emphasis on dÃ©tente, or the relaxing of tensions between the two superpowers. The goal of dÃ©tente was to make linkage work, which increased the probability of success in negotiation. Both Nixon and K issinger believed in the necessity of strength for the United States. Their dependence on dÃ©tente, linkage, and negotiation changed the nature of how strategic arms talks proceeded, and what an outcome based on strength looked like in comparison with John The difference between the two presidents was not immediately clear to neoconservatives , who initial ly support ed Nixon programs , such as the Safeguard Anti Ballistic Missile ( ABM ) system. Indeed, goals with this program. The S enator continued to approach arms control based on the necessity of strength, depending on neocon analysis for some of his reasoning. His close friend Nitze serve d on the U.S. negotiating team w hile also providing Jackson information on ABM. Along with other neoconservatives, Nitze sought to advise Nixon and Kissinger, providing insights that proved more consistent that of the Republicans. His service also placed Ni tze in experienced first hand the nature of the President foreign policy and penchant for the back channel. In addition, Nitze began to devel op concerns over the issues of verification in keeping treaty obligations and equality in the
40 details of the strategic arms concessions made by both sides . Over the course of the SALT I negotiations, N itze, Jackson, and other neocons increasingly expresse d concerns from or result in a position of strength f or the United States. They began to argue that potentially dangerous compromises were emerging from the talks that if not cor rected would weaken the nation. Stopping these tendencies became a major goal, and the differences between Nixon and the neocons over SALT I resulted in a break between the arms control allies. Beginning shortly before the Senate deba te over the SALT I a greements , Nitze, Jackson, and neoconservatives in general openly opposed how the President pursued subsequent arms control efforts. The big picture issues remained the same: proceeding from strength to ensure the United States remained in a superior posi tion relative to the Soviet Union in general and with strategic arms in particular . But th e disagreements between supporters of U.S. policy and the opposition meant that issues such as a Soviet arms buildup resulted in differing interpretations and prescr iptions for policy and n egotiation. Throughout the remainder of his time in office, Nixon sought to negotiate substantial agreements like those of the 1972 summit, albeit with minimal success. Neoconservatives continued to question the basic assumptions o f the President foreign policy, as well as the specifics of SALT negotiations. The opposition saw subsequent efforts, rightly, as rooted in the belief that the SALT I agreements provided a pathway to future treaties. Thus, neocons worried that the obje ctionable SALT II c oncessions pursued by American negotiators , following the administration granted the Soviet Union advantages, thereby weakening the nation. T his fundamental
41 approach did not change once Gerald R. Ford replaced Nixon as presi dent, due in large part to the presence of Kissinger as a source of continuity . During the new administration, n eoconservatives grew increasingly concerned about the dangers of the continuing general direction of U.S. foreign policy, and strate gic arms co ntrol in particular. Ford and the Soviets managed to work out a basic framework for moving forward on SALT II in a summit at Vladivostok, but this only served to strengthen the concerns of neoconservatives moving toward 1976.
42 CHAPTER 3 OUT OF THE SHAKE R : STARTING TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS Tracing the start of U.S. strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union begin s with the first effort to engage in such talks, which took place toward the end of ideas found throughout the next . Additionally, several individuals closely involved with the process of determining American policy in the late sixties became major players in the next decade as the drama of SALT I and SALT II unfolded . Many of those and helped lead the fight aga inst both treaties . This chapter focuses on the ultimately futile efforts of the Johnson administration to beg in a dialogue with the Soviet Union to l imit strategic nuclear missiles . Additionally, it examines the perspectives of eventual opposition leaders during their initial support of U.S. arms control efforts, and illustrates the foundation of what would beco me important neocon qualifications and context about strategic arms thinking in the subsequent debate s . Identifying the specific orts is an elusive enterprise. When exactly did interest in entering discussion s with the Soviet Union to limit and reduce these weapons emerge as a distinct focus that striving for negotiated agreements ? Efforts to control nuclear energy and weapons began shortly after the end of World War II, although ideas such as the Baruch Pla n in 1946 or Dwight events often complicated some efforts, such as the Soviet Union shooting down an American U2 spy plane , derailing a planned 1960 U.S. USSR summit. M oreover, one
43 willingness to seriously pursue arms control agreements: the Cuban Missile Crisis. The conflict served as a wake up call for the United States, moving Lyndon J ohnson after he assumed the presidency to consider arms control and reduction as a maj or policy goal for the nation. Beginning in 1964, his administration sought to engage the Soviet Union at multiple points in an attempt to start a dialogue about nuclear issues in general. Limiting strategic arms was initially just a general part of this overall effort , but it evolved into a specific issue that received significant individual attention by the start of 1967 . 1 Beginning f rom Strength Exploring the elements requires combining the historiography with materials from inside and outside his administration. While there is no sustained, book length examination of the Johnson presidency strategic a rms control, several shorter treatment s describe the general narrative. Some background activity by Johnson helps set the context, but the importance of 1967 is clear from the specific intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) focus emerging though that y Glassboro Summit, the ABM effort , and the MIRV issue. Examination of these issues 1 Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Me ssage to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 8, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787 ; L yndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963 1969 , (New York: Holt, Rinehart , and Winston, 1971), 464; American in the World , 317 320; and Thom as G. Patterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895 , 4 th ed., (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 329 330, 334 336, 340 342, 346 347. See also Robert G. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century , 3 rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 234 235, 246247, 256; and Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957 1963 , (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 19 97).
44 participated in and l ater claimed as their own in pursing peace through strength. 2 Touching briefly on a few examples of pre 1967 activity helps set the scene. Johnson initiated an exchange of personal letters with Soviet P remier Khrushchev , and suggested early in his presidency that strategic arms re duction was a goal of U.S. atomic policy . While the President true, in contrast with later approaches the administration did not at the time vi ew strategic arms as a specific, unique issue . Instead, it was part of a s eries of goals within the larger priority of minimizing nuclear threats and concerns . This categorization was primarily a result of the early stage of U.S. plans for genera l arms negotiations than a haphazard approach to policy. Throughout the first ten months of 1964, Presi dent Johnson and Premier Khrushchev exchanged letters agreeing to continue to work toward progress in disarmament and arms control. Once Leonid Brezhnev and Alexi Kosygin replaced Khrushchev as general secretary and premier respectively, the exchange of senti ments shifted to the President and Kosygin. T he change in leadership did not help American leaders , who remained uncertain about Soviet willingness to enter more detailed arms control discussions. By the end of the year, future U.S. Ambassador to the Sov iet Union the most appropriate one to take up the dialogue on disarmament with the Soviet steps in 2 The best treatments of the Johnson administration and what would become known as SALT are Divine, Cold Dawn , 45 138; and Dumbrell, Johnson and Soviet Commun ism , 60 86 . One terminology clarification is necessary: the term SALT was not used until Richard Nixon became president; while SALT quickly became synonymous with strategic arms control, the Johnson administration did not use the abbreviation. For all in tents and purposes, the focus is identical for Johnson and subsequent presidents.
45 3 Any hesitation or lack of apparent interest on the other side made littl e impact on American intentions because Johnson remained committed to unilateral pursuit of Soviet involvement in strategic arms control discussions. Thus, the administration continued to plan for eventual nuclear weapons negotiations. 4 In the minds of both scholars an d the President , the series of agreements over the next several years moved the United States and the Soviet Union closer to broaching what would become SALT discussions . The U.S. position regarding strateg ic arms became clearer in 1965, despite the distractions of the inauguration of the Great Society and the deployment of American combat troops to Vietnam and the Dominican Republic . National Sec urity Action Memorandum (NSAM) 335 issued in June detailed 5 This new direction followed on the heels the United States suggested halting development of missiles in connection with other reduction efforts. Given the essen tially unilateral nature of U.S. policy and a distin ct lack of Soviet interest, the shift to NSAM 335 is unsurprising. W ith the new program 3 Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Directory of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster), 12/10/1964 , Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964 1968, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 199 7), XI: 141. Hereinafter FRUS with appropriate year, volume, and page numbers. 4 Johnson, Vantage Point , 602 603; Memorandum From the President Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 1/14/64, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 3 Folder: Control Messages Exchanged Bet ween President Johnson and Chairman, USSR Intelligence File, National Security File, LBJ Library; Memorandum of Conversation, 2/13/64, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 19 20. 5 Folder: randums, National Security File , LBJ Library.
46 came a change in focus. I n addition to freezing, nonproliferation became a primary goal for U.S. policymakers. 6 C oncluding a nonp roliferation treaty (NPT) dominated and shaped the U.S. approach to arms control until both sides signed the agreement in 1968 . Tensions with the Soviet Union over U.S. e scalation of the conflict in Vietnam significantly reduced the volume of private communications between Johnson and Kosygin in 1965 and 1966. Despite th e situati on, administration officials recommended moving forward with an emphasis on reigning in the spread of nuclear weapons. Walt Rostow suggested to the President that an attempt to gain Soviet participation in a NPT effort hel d value for the United S [sic] the Soviets will be prepared to work with us, even if approached seriously and quietly. Nevertheless, it is worth [both] --clearing our own minds as to what we ought to shoot for; [and] --gi ving 7 The National Security Advisor attached a draft of a possible private exchange from Johnson to the Soviet premier , one that focused on NPT . Rostow suggested that the President highlight the need for the two nations to act together, an app roach taking their efforts beyond discussions at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva where the majority of the negotiations took place. The administration continued this approach i n face to face meetings with Soviet Ambassador Gromyko and in additional discussions between the President and Secretary of State Rusk t hroughout the rest of 1966 . B oth nations moved toward agreement on a NPT , no doubt driven in part by the successful test of a Chinese guided nuclear missile in October of 1966 . T he 6 Memorandum of Conversation, 6/16/64, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 76 81; Dumbrell, Johnson and Soviet Co mmunism , 79. 7 Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 6/14/66, Folder: Rostow, National Security File , LBJ library.
47 United States and the Soviet Union eventually cleared major obstacles to a treaty, leaving only the task of working out minor details with each other and the non nuclear powers. For the President , an agreement on nonproliferation opened the door to ot her important efforts in arms control. Once basic agreement was reached on a nonproliferation treaty at the end of 1966, I decided to push hard for the logical and necessary next step a way to slow the race in strategic arms and eventually, I hoped, to e nd it. I considered this the most critical issue in Soviet American relations. 8 The success in moving forward on NPT made an effort toward strategic arms control possible, and the administration began pursuing a U.S. position that could ensure Soviet part icipation . 9 Moving toward the end of the year , more than just the status of the Nonproliferation Treaty stimulated the President strategic arms. I n October 1966 , CIA director Richard Helms submitted a National Intel ligence that further alerted Johnson to the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal. The prediction pointed to significant, unexpected increases in missiles and deliver y systems, possibly driven by a des ire to match U.S. levels. Johnson also heard information from other sources raising concerns about Soviet nuclear capabilities, such as a December meeting at his ranch where Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Ear le Wheeler debated the need to press forward with ABM deployment . As a 8 Johnson, Vantage Point , 479. 9 Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 6/14/66, Folder: Nat ional Security File , LBJ library; Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson, 9/15/66, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 361 362; Memorandum of Conversation, 9/22/66, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 368 374; Memorandum of C onversation, 10/10/66, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 388 391; Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, undated, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 421.
48 result of the activities of the previous years, the President began 1967 motivated to actively pursue strategic arms discussions with the Soviet Union. 10 Johnson initiated a more aggre ssive effort to jump start a conversation with the Soviets in his State of the Union address, where he proclaimed his intention to pursue both domestic and Soviet engagement in arms control and disarmament. Another private note to Kosygin followed within two weeks, announcing the appointment of Llewellyn Thompson as ambassador. In the letter, the President told the P remier that directed Ambassador Thompson as a matter of first priority to discuss with you and the appropriate members of your Governmen t the possibilities of reaching an 11 Johnson f ollowed the State of the Union Address with a description of the American commitment to continue ABM research and deployment efforts in the Ja nuary annual budg et message. After these public and private communication efforts, the President no doubt was pleased to receive a personal note containing a positive reply from Kosygin on February 28 . This response did not completely surprise the admin istration, due to earlier in the month that suggested a possible Soviet readiness to discuss arms control . What made the Kosygin letter significant was its status as the first formal suggestion of Soviet willingness to discuss arms contr ol since the initial U.S. proposals in 1964. Moreover, the Soviet response was to American messages based on both a commitment to strength through continuing ABM efforts and a n unrelenting desire to begin controlling mutual levels of strategic arms. Late r neoconservatives 10 National Security Estimate Number 11 8 Folder: National Intelligence Estimates, National Security File, LBJ Library; Divine, Foreign Policy , 244 247; Dumbrell, Johnson and Soviet Communism, 76 77. 11 Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin, 1/21/67, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI: 431.
49 could look back at these U.S. priorities as successful examples arms control efforts worthy of emulation . 12 P olitical scientist John Dumbrell notes that d espite any initial optimism such a response might generate, little cooperative effor t resulted from the mutual interest in arms control. While his observation is true, t he Johnson administration unilaterally continued work ing to generate a dia logue . The Committee of Principals , which advised Johnson on arms control, met a fter the Presid ent announcement in early March that the Sov iets expressed interest in working with the United States on strategic arms control. Members included senior administration officials and their deputies from the Departments of State and Defense, the ACDA, the Joint Chiefs, the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission, the CIA, NASA, and the United States Information Agency (USIA). W current direction of U.S. policy , their discussion reflected the President ities. The administration sent a proposal to the Soviets just a few days after the Committee meeting, expecting a quick turnaround. More than a month later, the Soviets had not yet responded. Despite this lack of a truly two sided approach, the U.S. pos ition was one of confidence that strategic arms discuss ions had begun with the Soviets and hope regarding the achievement of future agreements. Rostow reviewed the status of American efforts with Johnson shortly before the administration sent another priv ate letter from the President to Kosygin , drawing attention to the optimistic sentiment while pointing out the possible 12 Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 10, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project . http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28338 ; Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1968.," January 24, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project . http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28150 ; Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson, 2/27/67, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI:450 451; Memo from Rostow to LBJ, 2/18/67, Folder: , National Security File , LBJ Library.
50 complications of continued silence from the other side . The National Security Advisor also used the same hopeful tone regarding possibl e future discussions on arms control in a draft of the next correspondence . After setting out key points regarding the dangers revolving around Vietnam, the Middle East, and Cuba, the National Security Advisor suggested strategic arms discussions and the NPT represented opportunities for both nations to improve their strategic situations while modeling behavior likely to garner the support of non nuclear nations for the non proliferation agreement. The letter reflects the trend of the first half of 1967, where the United States attempted to encourage the Soviet Union to begin discussions, or at least agree to begin, without a response from the Kosygin led government. 13 The Soviet silen ce ended with a meeting in June at Glassboro State College in New Jersey during the premier the United States to address the United Nations about the crisis in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Six Day War . This visit, announced on June 13, presented an opportunity to the Johnson administration to follow up on a variety of issues, including the unanswered letters . The two nations began to negotiate if and when a meeting between the two leaders could take place, and the compromise site was Glassboro State College. Rusk, along with other 13 Dumbrell, Johnson and Soviet Communism, 80; Lyndon B. Johnson: "The President's News Conference," March 2, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project . http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28672 Disarmament Agency Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 3/14/67, Folder: of Principals Vol. 4, 9/1/66 [2 Subject File, National Security File, LBJ Library; Notes of Meeting, 3/14/67, FRUS 1964 1968 , XI:466 Folder: ational Security File, Folder: 5/3/67 5/2/67, Folder: 5/3 /67 Folder: Kosygin , Box 10, Files of Walt W. Rostow, National Security File , LBJ Library.
51 advisors, strongly sugg ested Johnson make an attempt to meet with the Soviet leader. One of the strongest recommendations to me et came from Rostow, who argued: With respect to ABM ICBM, Kosygin is in a position where he must give you a simple Yes No answer on whether his govern ment is willing to engage in serious talks. Again, that has probably been decided. It could be communicated diplomatically. You might, through this meeting, get authoritative word earlier than otherwise. 14 After working out a suitable site for the meet ing, the two leaders met on June 23 and again on June 25. 15 During the first meeting, Johnson described the monetary and stability issues driving him to propose strategic arms talks. Kosygin repeatedly turned the conversation to the Middle East and Vietn am , despite three separate efforts by the President to rais e the issue . After a break, the two sides met for a luncheon at which the premier for the first time suggested that the concept of limiting nuclear weapons was a good idea, without agreeing to the need for a more formal discussion. In the final session of the McNamara that implied the United States sought to limit only defensive and not offensive weapons. The tw o leaders agreed to meet again in two days. 16 At the following meeting on June 25, the issue of the Soviet perception of the United States as willing to negotiate only defensive weapon s reared its head again. Kosygin flatly rejected any talks that did not include offensive weapons, while Johnson 14 sistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 6/21/67, FRUS 1964 1968 , XIV : 500 502. 15 Washington Post , 6/14/67, A1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/143172184 ; Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 6/17/67, FRUS 1964 1968 , XIV : 495 497. Washington Post hereinafter WP . 16 Memorandum of Conversation, 6/23 /67, 11:30a.m. 1:30p.pm., FRUS 1964 1968, XIV : 514 525; Record 1:30p.pm, FRUS 1964 1968, XIV : 525 528; Memorandum of Conversation, 6/23/67, 3:44p.m. 4:35p.pm, FRUS 1964 1968, XIV : 531 536.
52 sought to assure him that the United States wanted to discuss both offensive and defensive missiles . Acco rding to the State Department translator who drafted the memo , t he premier responded with a willingness to do so, but then added another Nam war 17 As they moved to a private meeting, Johnson suggested arms control w as the primary, governing issue. Kosygin disagreed, stressing the Middle East and primarily Vietnam as directing where arms control could go, given the cost to the United States to run the war. The summit e nded without further progress on the issue of st rategic arms. For the Johnson administration, the only small glimmer of hope was the Soviet expression of interest in arms control discussions. 18 The period between the Glassboro Summit and the joint announcement of strategic arms talks on July 1, 1968 was a time of activity, albeit n either directly related to strategic arms, n or unilateral on the part of America. After investing significant time and attention to the draft language of the NPT, the United States and the Soviet Union completed a version that both sides approved on March 14, 1968. As the National Security Council conferred in preparation for the UN General Assembly debate on the agreement, there was discussion in the administration about what cam e next after the proliferation agreement. There will be strong pressure on the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to halt or limit their strategic arms race in both offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviets have indicated interest in principle to talking about the problem, but have not yet agreed to a date. Th ey have suggested that we make a 17 Memorandum of Conv ersation, 6/25/67, 1:50p.m. 3:05p.m., FRUS 1964 1968, XIV : 540. 18 Memorandum of Conversation, 6/25/67, 1:50p.m. 3:05p.m., FRUS 1964 1968, XIV : 538 543; Memorandum of Conversation, 6/25/67, 3:20p.m. 6:09p.m., FRUS 1964 1968, XIV : 544 556.
53 concrete proposal, while complaining that Viet Nam makes talks politically difficult. 19 Recognition of NPT creating arms limitation pressures in general extended from the NSC to the State Department , and both identified the U.N. Seabed I nitiative as a likely first step toward demonstrating U.S. support for nuclear weapons controls in response to the proliferation agreement. The Committe e of Principals ordered a study , resulting in a U.S. position favoring banning strategic a rms on the ocean floor by early June . D ifferent administration branches agreed on the official American statement only after the inclusion of verification language, a provision consistent with concerns about Soviet trustworthiness . 20 Additional impetus for the administration to attempt to establish a government position on strategic arms control came from recognition of the shrinking missile gap between the two sides. The idea of an eventual Soviet effort to seek greater nuclear parity with the United Stat es predated the Cuban Missile Crisis . During John F. inside the communist nation. By 1962, the Soviets had fifteen , while the United States possessed over 400. After th e Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union initiated a major transformation in their general approach to strategic arms , seeking o ver the next several years to close the missile gap through aggressive arms buildup effort, which received further impetus from the Chinese development of nuclear weapons in the early sixties. 19 on Draft Treaty on the Non Folder: th NSC MTG 3/27/68 Draft Treaty on Non Bromley K. Smith, LBJ Library. 20 Memorandum of Conversation, 5/17/68, F RUS 1964 1968, XI : 598 603; Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Committee of Principals, 4/12/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 579 580; Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 5/14/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 592 597; Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze), 6/18/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 621 622.
54 U.S. officials noted this tread in the nuclear race as early as 1964, and according to John Newhouse, both strategic arms control and ABM development during the Johnson administration were r esponses to Soviet efforts to reach parity with the United States . 21 With the Soviet U nion apparently approaching numerical parity , any talks and/or agreement that slowed the pace of th e arms race benefited the United States , which only strengthened the U.S . resolve to gain Soviet participation . Ambassador T hompson reported that the Soviet Union continued to consider formal discussions without arriving at a participation decision. The ACDA sought to develop negotiation recommendations with the goal of not only stabilizing the nuclear e nvironment, but also improving the U.S. understanding of Soviet motivations and garnering support for NPT. Messages fro m the President encouraging the communist nation to consider participating in talks flowed through the Ame rican ambassador during this period, culminating in a personal l etter from Johnson to Kosygin in May. The goal of this activity was twofold. First, the administration sought to keep pressure on the Soviets to jump on the slightest chance of arms talks. Second, should the other side prove willing to enter discussions at any point, the United States needed to be ready with acceptable positions for negotiation. 22 21 Newhouse, Cold Dawn , 67 69; Newhouse, War and Peace , 197 Thirteen Days , directed by Roger Donaldson, (Los Angeles, CA: New Line Home Entertainment, 2000), infinifilm DVD; Roger SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues, 1972 1979 , ed. Roger P. Labrie, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterpri se Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), 3 4; Memorandum of Conversation, 8/12/64, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 93 96; National Intelligence Estimate, 5/19/65, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 206 208; Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Preside FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 411 417. 22 under a 2/27/68 cover to Warnke, Folder: Mar 1968 [2 of Morton H. Halperin, LBJ Library; Transcript of Moscow 2529, 1/22/68, Folder: Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR National Security File, LBJ Library; T elegram from State Department to Moscow, 4/3/68, Folder: National Security File , LBJ Library; Memo from Rostow to Johnson, 4/23/68, Folder: f Walt W.
55 All that rema ined to start strategic arms talks was the open, formal agreement of the Soviet Uni on to engage in discussions beyond a general acknowledgement that such activities might have value in the future. The persistence of Johnson and his administration paid off when Kosygin on June 21 transmitted a note prompted by the President letters. T control talks, pointed out current discussions among the Soviet leadership on the issue, and suggested the possibility of more formal talks in the near future. After Johnson quick repl y arguing for the value of an announcement of discussions at the July 1 signing of th e NPT, Kosygin responded on June 27 with a formal agreement to announce arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. The President made the announce ment in h is remarks at the U.S. signing of the NPT . 23 With both sides committed to the idea of str ategic arms talks, U.S. officials increased their pace as they sought to prepare a unified position for negotiation. The State Department defined the directio n of the U.S. strategic arms effort s , including informational hierarchies. T he Committee of Principals agreed in a July 8 meeting to establish a deputy level working group and use the ACDA as the lead on determining policy specifics. Both Secretary of De fense Clark Clifford and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Wheeler identified verification as the primary concern with arms control Rostow, National Security File , LBJ Library; Telegram from State Department to Moscow, 4/24/68, Folder: National Security File , LBJ Library; Memo from Rusk to Johnson, 4/26/68, Fo lder: Rostow, National Security File (Rostow) to President Johnson, 4/23/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 583 584; Letter from President Johns on to Chairman Kosygin, 5/2/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 590 592. 23 Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson, 6/21/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 623; Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin, 6/22/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 623 624; Letter From Chairm an Kosygin to President Johnson, 6/27/68, FRUS 1964 1968, XI : 624; Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the Signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," July 1, 1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28970 .
56 talks. The Committee instructed the working group to put together a more formal proposal, with Clifford noting that Paul Warnke would be the point man for Defense. This group labored throughout the month, producing a draft plan, with Morton Halperin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, reporting through Deputy Secretary Nitze to Secretary Clifford on the s efforts to harmoniz e with the State ACDA version. Already moving at a rapid pace, the receipt of a July 25 letter from Kosygin proposing an initial meeting in four to six weeks prompted an accelerated effort from administration officials. Rostow began drafting a reply the next day and his initial thoughts moved in a more confrontational direction. I have drafted this with explicit references to Vietnam, the Middle East, and the Pueblo . I myself see no harm and some virtue in keeping these matter s before him and suggesting that the creation of the right international climate is a two way job. Nevertheless, wiser heads may prevail and limit the letter to the first four paragraphs and the last paragraph. 24 In the end, wiser heads did prevail, and th e July 30 version sent to the Soviet Union deleted any mention of these three problem areas. 25 to secure negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit strat egic arms. P rogress continued in the effort to lock down a unified policy position with the resolution of the final internally debated issue, verification . Discussion on the subject 24 Memo from Rostow to Johnson, 7/26/68, 5:15p.m., Folder: Rostow, National Security File, LBJ Library. erlined in original, but Note that FRUS 1964 1968 XI: 657n1 reports finding only the final draft. 25 Memo from Smith to Rostow, 7/9/68, Folder: Rostow, National Security File, LBJ Library; Meetin g of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, 7/8/68, Folder: National Security File, LBJ Library; Memo from Morton H. Halperin to Secretary Defense through Deputy Folder: Jul Cold Dawn , 111 121.
57 leading up to the August 14 Committee of Principals meeting f ocused on t he use of unilateral, U.S. based external means instead of mutual inspections as a more likely solution to the problems of protecting national secrets while assuring the other side of good intentions. This approach established a position of strength for U .S. negotiation that satisfied the Committee , and they sent their work to the P resident for his approval . Only four days after receiving the initial U.S. position statement, t he Soviet Union issued an invitation to Johnson for talks to begin in October. It appeared that the , and Johnson planned to release a press statement about the summit to the world on August 21 . However, events in Europe overtook strategic arms discussions when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovaki a on August 20 , 1968 to put down the reform minded government. Johnson decided that evening when he first heard of the attack to delay the announcement of his visit to Moscow and the anticipated arms talks. 26 What was to become of the U.S. desire for strat egic arms control ? Given the enthusiasm and importance that Johnson attached to nuclear arms , and his pragmatic nature, it is unsurprising that the P resident in particular and his administration in general continued to prepare for an eventual face to face meeting on strategic arms control with the Soviet Union. Secretary Rusk en capsulated this attitude at the August 22 meeting of the Committee of Principal s when he opened the meeting. The notes of the gathering describe him suggesting that d espite the ev 26 Memo from Paul R. Ignatius to Secretary o Folder: Clark Clifford, LBJ Library; Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, 8/1 4/68, Folder: FRUS 1964 1968 XIV : 681. See Divine, Jo hnson Years , 268 270 and Prados, Foreign Policies , 27 32 for more details on the Czech situation.
58 purpose of the Executive Committee meeting to consider that [ referring to the probability of talks and their scheduling , but to give to the President the necessary material to permit him to go ahead with the talks if and wh 27 This is not to suggest that the Johnson administration chose to ignore the Czech situation. On the contrary, the Soviet invasion from the very beginning complicated strategic arms discussions. As the next several weeks unfolded, the cir cumstances guided decisions relating to arms toward strategic arms limitations revolved around the status of events in Czechoslovakia. However, d espite the setback, the Soviet invasion and its aftermath did not permanently derail the P 28 Achieving the P arms control discussions continued to be a priority f remaini ng time in office, d espite his lame duck status . Typically scholars and the public view p residents at this point in time as being incapable of accomplishi ng major policy initiatives. Political scientis t John Dumbrell astutely labels the period from Johnson d of his presidency as lame duck . However, the President and his advisors never appear ed to view thei r remaining time in this light until af ter the November election results. E xecutive branch staffer s presented proposals concerning how the P resident could make the most of his remaining time in office, including setting out important concepts about strategic arms 27 Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, 8/22/68, FRUS 1964 1968 XI: 692. 28 Notes on the Emergency Meeting of the Natio nal Security Council, 8/20/68, 10p.m., Folder: Security File, LBJ Library; Handwritten notes on Agenda for Lunch Meeting with the President, 9/12/68 , Folder: Security File, LBJ Library.
59 control , to the American peopl e. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia held the potential to marginalize the issue of strategic arms control beyond the impact of lame duck status. Yet, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion, Morton Halperin penned a memo suggesting that si nce Soviet kindness and honesty were not the basis for U.S. pursuit of arms discussions, there was no reason not to continue to push for talks. In fact, he argued that the administration could claim the necessity of ending the arms race required that the arms negotiations move forward regardless of Soviet behavior. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow clearly sought to advance the strategic weapons limitations agenda, soliciting views from staffers about the overall area of disarmament. Included in thes e recommendations was the pursuit of limitation talks with the Soviet Union. He also began pitching possible scenarios to Johnson that could allow talks and a possible summit as early as Sept 4. The P desire to pursue negotiations for his own benefit ebbed and flowed as the presidential campaign took place. A week before the Soviet attack, he told Clifford on the phone , [and] . 29 F rom the Czech incident on, Johnson and his administr ation continued to communicate with the Soviets about moving forward. Even after the election, Rostow reported, as instructed, on how strategic arms discussions might begin under th e President . 30 29 Notes, George M. Elsey, 8/13/68, transcribed by Brian VanDeMark, Folder: rge M. Elsey, LBJ Library. Interestingly, LBJ appeared to have little faith in his vice The Elsey meeting notes are frequently just phrases and incomplete sentences intended to capture key points, and as such a re difficult to integrate into a sentence without significant modification that could create meaning not necessarily in the original. 30 Dumbrell, Johnson and Soviet Communism Folder: National Security File U.S. Folder: Dec 1968 [2 of 2], Box 3, Papers of Morton H. Halperin, LBJ Library; Memo from Spurgeon Keeny to Rostow,
60 no hurdle to starting missile talks. The P resident sought to begin negotiations with the Soviets after the election, with the recognition that Nixon would need to be brought into the discussions, a point noted in the Defense Department as well. The Repu blican proved reluctant to go along, but his perspective did not appear to slow down Johnson administration officials such as Clark Clifford, who mentioned at a December 3 staff meeting a desire to pursue strategic arms control . Once it became apparent th at the Soviets wanted to wait until the new administration was in place before continuing, Clifford and his staff considered advising the P resident to release the mutual statement of principles of both nations. However, they concluded that there might be difficulties in gaining , so the best approach was to recommend Johnson discuss strategic arms as an issue directly with Nixon. 31 In terms of the actual presidential suggestions for discussion p laced a high value on explaining the need and benefits of continuing discussions about strategic arms with the Soviets. with incoming Secretary of State William Rogers, Rostow placed talks in the same rank as Vietnam and the Middle E ast as major discussion issues that the old administration wanted the new to understand. In a memo suggesting topics fo r Johnson Folder: of Walt W. Rostow, National Se curity File , LBJ Library; Memo from Rostow to Johnson, 9/4/68, Folder: National Security File , LBJ Library; Memo from Rostow to Johnson, 11/20/68, Folder: W. Rostow, National Security File , LBJ Library. 31 Johnson, Vantage Point , 489; Notes, George M. Elsey, 11/29/68, transcribed by Brian VanDeMark, Folder: ; Notes, George M. Elsey, 12/3/68, transcribed by Brian VanDeMark, Folder: Papers of George M. Elsey, LBJ Library; Notes, George M. Elsey, 12/18/68, transcribed by Brian VanDeMark, Folder:
61 conversation with the future Secretary of Defense Mel Laird, Clifford ranked arms control as one of the top four, along with personnel, the budget, and Vietnam. Even as late as nine days before the inauguration, a memo went out from the ACDA, cleared by Clifford, Wheeler, and Rostow, to ambassadors at several key embassies concerning an agreement on principles between the Unit ed States and the Soviet Union on discu ssions did not cease until the P resident left office. 32 Whither Neoconservatives? What is missing from the above account of stra tegic arms control efforts by the Johnson administration is the contrib utions of neoconservatives. On the one hand, including ne ocons as conceived by the mid 1970s is in one sense problematic. Most scholars and writers would not describe neoconservatism as a force or movement in existence until at least the late 1960s. Whether responding to challenges to the concept of the Vital Center, or revisionist critiques of U.S. policy regarding Vietnam, what would come to be i dentified as neoconservatism in the 1 970s and beyond was in its infancy. This situation raises the obvious question : where are the neocons? On the other hand, there were individuals who would emerge as some of the leading lights in neoconservative circles, and these worked either for the J ohnson administration or with it, dep ending on their functions in government. Three key individuals who fit to varying degrees the definition of a neoconservative were Ben Wattenberg, Senator Henry M. Ja ckson, and Paul Nitze. Each would become a neocon i n some sense of the word , 32 Memo from Rostow to Johnson, 12/23/68, Folder: National Security File , LBJ Library; Memo from Clifford to Johnson, 12/23/68. Folder: , National Security File Folder:
62 and all supported Johnson, with Jackson and Nitze directly involved at this point in the issue s of strategic arms limitation . Their exposure to arms control efforts under Johnson helped shape their subsequent perspectives on SALT I and SALT II. 33 Wattenberg began his career in government as a speechwriter for Johnson , working from 1966 through the end of the administration. He describes the emergence of neoconservatism as rooted in the ideological sp l it of the Democratic Party in the 1960s, and notes conservatism is a somewhat new word. It is not a new concept. I learned a great deal about what would come to be called neo conservatism through 34 One of the most clearly identified neocons over the past several decade s viewed his perspective as essentially that of the President . Great Society programs could be called essentially neoconservative in terms of their basic assumptio ns , although criticisms of those same programs for their reach and outcome also characterized neocon thinking. Primarily focused on domestic policy during his time with the Executive branch, he communism in g neoconservatism. 35 Another politi cian whose foreign policy views appealed to Wattenberg was WA). First elected to the Senate in 1953, Jackson b uilt a reputation as an independent thinking Democrat whose loyalty did not prevent him from criticizing Executive Branch efforts that 33 Ehrman, Rise , 23; VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism , 73 74. 34 Wa ttenberg, Fighting Words , 15. 35 Wattenberg, Fighting Words , 19, 28.
63 to the Soviet Union. President Kennedy viewed his support as critical for the Limit ed Test Ban Treaty in 1963 reserve initial judgment on that agreement and use the Senate hearings as a teachable moment to educate the nation on the dangers of the Soviet Union and associated weaknesses of t he treaty. According to staffer Richard Perle in an interview with Jackson biogr apher Robert G. Kaufman , the senator used a refinement of this approach in his subsequent legislative efforts involving the Soviets, including SALT. ensure the passage of the Test Ban T reaty. When Lyndon Johnson beca me pr esident, the two men shared similar viewpoints on domestic and foreign policy. by the President and the premises of Cold War liberalism as both came increasing ly under assau lt from liberals who considered the Vietnam War a mistake and the policy of 36 When limiting strategic arms became an iss ue for the administration, the S enator followed the President in this area as well. 37 Jackson cle arly established his support for arms control throughout presidency , but not blindly nor without restrictions. To suggest reluctance or resistance s to limit nuclear weapons is to miss a fundamental aspect of his thinking. At a 1967 Memorial Day event, he used imperative language when referring to the necessity of pursuing arms control. The next summer in support for discuss ions with the Sovi ets on the subject. In July 1968, the senator addressed the soon to have favored discussions with Moscow about freezing the development of strategic 36 Kaufman, Jackson , 163. 37 Wattenberg, Fighting Words , 99; Kaufman, Jackson , 148, 150, 152.
64 38 Yet t efforts to engage the Soviet Union in arms control talks did not occur in a vacuum. In these and many other places, Jackson qualified the nature of any U.S. discussions. The need to negotiate from a posit ion of strength was one of the most important considerations. He repeatedly emphasized that only by operating from such a position could the other side be counted on to be reasonable. Whether in moving forward on Vietnam, or in arms control, the Senator made it clear that both past Soviet behavior his evaluation of negotiations an d agreements . In arms control, this assumption brought forward the issue of not acting in a unilateral fashion. To proceed in the hope that the other side would follow the America n lead could allow a Soviet advantage at the expense of the United States. Lack of trust ensured that the other side certainly would maximize any benefit, potentially harming America. For Jackson , C old W ar assumptions required that his nation always posses the advantage and remain in a dominant position. He referred to this pe rspective as a condition for deciding actions: necessary posture of [ strategic superiority ] 39 38 , 18, Accession # 3560 4, Box 232, Folder: 64, Henry M. Jackson Papers. All Jackson papers from the University of Washington Library. Jackson papers references hereinafter cited as HMJ followed by accession number / box number / folder number, page numbe r. 39 4/232/54, 21. used in place of u nderlining in original b ecause the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation ; italics are mine.
65 support of arms control. 40 Jackson he ld to these convictions despite the changing circumstances at the end of the Johnson administratio n. He believed that what happened with foreign policy olicies . How a nation resolved internal disagreements, e xpressed strength, and achieved common purposes formed the basis for success in the international arena. This perspective helps explain his dismissal of the New Left as simplistic in their analysis and prescriptions , and suggests possible dismay on his pa rt at the changes in the Democratic Party during and after 1 968 . In his talk to the War College, he described the movement as thinking in a fundamentally different way called New Left 41 Despite the rise of this type of thin king, and the impact of the movement on the Democratic Party, the Senator maintained his views on foreign policy in general and on arms control in particular. 42 If any event during this time control and turn him into an oppon ent, it was the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 40 4/234/24, 3; Henry M. Jackson, HMJ 3560 connection with the VIETNAM military procurement authorization supplemen 3560 College, 5/15/68, HMJ 3560 4/232/64, 16, 17, 19, 31. 41 ge, 5/15/68, HMJ 3560 4/232/64, 5, 6. 42 HMJ 3560 4/232/64, /9/68, HMJ 3560 6/6/74, 3.
66 20, 1968. To someone holding his assumptions, the Soviet crackdown appeared to justify ending the effort to negotiate with those who had proved untrustworthy. However, Jackson re mained supportive of engaging in strategic arms discussions, and continued to call for them . What the clampdown on democratic tendencies prompted from the Senator was a renewed call for his qualifiers and con ditions on negotiations. He reiterated h is war ning about for the need to proceed from a position of strength, citing the danger represent ed by the Soviet Union and its intentions, particularly as represented by its actions in Czechoslovakia . He drew parallels between this event and the behavior of bo th the Nazis in the late 1930s and the Soviets in 1948 . Jackson viewed these comparisons as strengthening his arguments for the untrustworthiness and duplicitous nature of the other side in potential arms talks. These claims reinforced his call for ensur ing adequate verification of any agreement, lest American security be compromised in the process. For the S enator, t he importance of these qualifications reinforce d the necessity of the United States retaining a position of strategic superiority over the Soviet Union . I n order to be tough , it was necessary for negotiators needed to proceed from strength . greater nuclear power and strength than the Soviet Union. Strategic parit y with the Soviet adversary is not good enough. The survival of our nation and our allies in freedom depends not on a parity of nuclear power but on a margin of advantage in nuclear power of the peace keepers over the peace upsetters. 43 Jackson sounded the alarm about t he importance of superiority when evidence appeared to show Soviet gains in nuclear weapons that resulted in levels nearly the same as America. Convinced that the Soviets would be less likely to negotiate if they enjoyed parity, he suggested that a U.S. advantage promoted the likelihood of 43 4/232/40, 9 10.
67 successful arms control talks, something worth pursuing in a post Czechoslovakian invasion world. 44 Jackson was not the only major figure to fit the neoconservative label during Lyndon Johnson efforts. While the Senator worked on the legislative side of the equation , Paul Nitze worked inside the administration from 1967 on as Deputy Secretary of Defense, after having served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs i n th e Kennedy administration and Secretary of the Navy shortly after Johnson became president. His roots in government, stretching back to service in World War II, included a stint in the where he helped sh ape the infamous NSC 68 memo . H e also participated in the Eisenhower era Gaither Report on the status of U.S. Civil Defense. Biographer Strobe Talbott argues contribute as the Deputy Secretary at the Defense Department. It is worth noting that Nitze and Jackson include the common denominator of Dorothy Fosdick. A fter earning a doctorate from Columbia and working in various governmental capacities , she worked for Nitze as part of the Policy Planning Staff. She later began working for Senator Jackson, serving as his senior aide, particularly for foreign policy and arms control issues, from 1955 until his death in 1983. In this capacity, Fosdick could foster connections between the two men. Talbott points out the close relationship between the two ring the Kennedy administration. He had a strong supporter in Senator Henry Jackson, Democrat of Washington. Nitze an d Jackson had known each other for some 44 4/232/40, 1, 5 6, 8 12; 4/232/58, 2, 5, 11; Henry M. Jackson, 4/232/52, 1, 5, 7, 9, 15, 17 18; Henry M. Jackson, Vital Speeches of the Day , XXXV:4 (Decembe r 1, 1968): 98 100, HMJ 3560 4/232/42.
68 clear headed, tough minded, 45 Talbott also observes that the two spent time privately process. 46 As the number two man in the Defense Department, Nitze participated in multiple discussions of the Johnson admin control talks with the Soviet Union. Although his time overlapped with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara by only six months, as he suggested the formation of a l ower level working group to assist the Committee of Principals as they sought to craft U.S. policy for arms negotiations. He noted that preparation efforts remained largely on the back burner until the Soviets expressed interest in moving forward on arms control in the spring of 1968. T contribu tions took place after the Soviet attitude changed, during the year of Clark 47 Much of the work on drafting positions and language took place lower on the food chain than the position Nitze held , but the products often moved to him for evaluation regarding whether or not to pass on proposals to the Secretary or other high level d position of Assistant Secretary for Inter national Security Affairs. Warnke was one of the 45 Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace , (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 78; Biography of Dorothy Fosdick, undated, HMJ 3560 6/52/1. 46 Talbott, Master of the Game , 78, 86, 99; Pa ul H. Nitze, with Steven L. Rearden, and Ann M. Smith, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, A Memoir , (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 7, 16, 25, 46, 50, 167. 47 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost , 288 290.
69 main individuals involved in creating drafts of policy positions for the Secretary, NSC meetings, or any need the Defense Department might have, and bringing them to . Other members of t input included the Director of the ACDA . Nitze also worked to organize department efforts to coordinate information, including working with the Joint Chiefs. Thus, while t he Deputy Secretary did not always have a hand in creating or shaping a statement, Nitze, as g atekeeper to the highest levels , could control to a degree what options moved forward and the level of en dorsement they received as he presented them to the Secre tary, the President , or other top officials . In this sense, Nitze helped shape the nature of U.S. arms control negotiation policy. 48 The individual who re ceived the greatest attention from the Deputy Secretary was his boss, the Secretary of Defense. Minu Nitze as a man who often sought to argue a point or press for an outcome, with varying degrees of success. In a June 29, 1968 meeting, Nitze suggested the department prepare an agenda for arms control talks, which th e Secretary downplayed, suggesting a long process not requiring action at that time. Although the context is somewhat unclear in terms of the speaker, the record describes Nitze as someone in a unique position of understanding arms control at that moment: 48 Memo from Paul Warnke to Pa Folder: Library; Memo for the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of D efense from Paul Warnke, Folder: of Clark Clifford, LBJ Library; Memo from Paul Nitze to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Direct or of Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Folder: rs of Clark Clifford, LBJ Library.
70 49 Clifford and his deputy did not always agree on a matter, such as in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when the Secretary suggested there was no re lationship between that nation and Vietnam. Nitze strongly disagreed, arguing in classic Cold War fashion for linkage between the two, stating what George Elsey recognized as the domino theory. Clifford even suggested the idea that the Vietnam War needed to be ended, to which his deputy reportedly [ is vital ] , I question on tactics [sic] . 50 Despite the strength of his views an d the tensions of the moment, Nitze proposed that the best course for the time being was to continue moving forward on strategic arms talks and provided a status update on the situation. In addition to his role as a counselor for Clifford, Nitze also represented him at meetings of the Committee of Principals. At a meeting on May 14, 1968, he did not hesitate to argue fo r the ease of verification as a rationale for omitting deep ocean arms from talks with the Soviets. He pursued this position, despite some disagreement, engaging in criticism of the ACDA position paper under discussion and suggesting moving consideration to a subgroup for analysis. In essence, during his time as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Nitze sought to influence U.S. best interests and security . His views mirror ed those of Johnson and Jackson as well . 51 49 Notes, Elsey, 6/29/68, Folder: rs of George Elsey, LBJ Library. Bracket and contents in original. 50 Notes, Elsey, 8/22/68, Folder: of George Elsey, LBJ Library. Brackets and content in original. Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation. 51 Notes, Elsey, 6/29/68, Folder: Library; Notes, Elsey, 8/22/68, Folder: LBJ Library; Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 5/14/68, FRUS 19 64 1968, XI : 592 597.
71 Lyndon Johnson clearly prioritized the limitation of strategic nuclear arms as an important consideration for the United States and vigorously sought to begin talks with the Soviet Union designed to accomplish this task. The reluctance of the Soviets to agree to such discussions and the importance of Vietnam, among other foreign policy issues, resulted in these negotiations receiving low priority, despite the obvious interest of many in government for pursuing this objective. Once the Soviet Union agreed to consider talks, the issue of deciding U.S. policy moved to the front burner, receiving the sustained attention of many in the executive and legislative branches, including Senator Henry Jackson and Paul Nitze. At the time, there appeared to be a large degree of unanimity among the major figures in government, such that the only major issues were how to accomplish the task, not disagreements on fundamental approaches and methods. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslo vakia killed any chance of talks beginning in government to continue the pu rsuit. It would fall to the incoming Nixon administration to engage in arms control talks. How ever, neocons soon began to view the new a potential source of danger. T he changes incorporated by Nixon and Kissinger would lead to the beginnings of a neoconservative led opposition to SALT , a position that sought to return U.S. arms control policy to a dependence on strength , and one rooted in an approach championed during the Johnson administration .
72 CHAPTER 4 IMPROVING T HE MIX: SALT I AND M OVING TOWARD SALT II The failure of Lyndon Johnson to at least begin strategic arms control talks with the Soviet Union did not initially appear to necessitate a multi year gap in the two nations moving forward. But when Richard Nixon became president, he wanted to reassess the nature of U.S. foreign policy in general and arms control in particular , despite the Soviet Union claiming it was ready to begin talks . Seeking to recast foreign relations in a new mold based on a new approach, the President and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, insisted on waiting until they could r evamp the he beginning those individuals who agreed with and approach to arms control, such as Senator Henry Jackson and Paul Nitze, supported the new Commander in C sire to limit nuclear arms. However, depart from the previous bipartisan c onsensus on the necessity of viewing the Soviet Union as a constant, grasping threat not to be trusted. 1 Early sup port for A BM legislation, a first Combined with the use of the back channel to negotiate SALT independently, circumventing the official delegation, the President and his advisor pursued discussions with goals tha t neoconservatives believed threatened to put the United States in an inferior position relative to the Soviet s. Unable to abide this dangerous direction, Jackson began to speak out critically about the U.S. SALT positions, while Nitze, working as a part of the delegation, sought 1 USSR equivalent carries the same meaning. See Garthoff, DÃ©tente USSR 11/6/75, Folder: 1978, Gerald R. Ford Library. Hereinafter GFL.
73 to direct policy toward the issues he saw as the most important for U.S. security. Nitze continued to work as part of the delegation up to and beyond the 1972 Moscow summit where Nixon signed the SALT I agreements, fearing the l ack of his input would result in an outcome even less acceptable that would pose a greater threat to the nation than anything negotiated with his assistance. Jackson, free of such restraints, became one of the most adamant critics of the Nixon / Kissinger arms control approach, battling to modify the agreements in the Senate. This period in the story of neoconservatives and SALT illustrates how the shift from support to opposition to nuclear arms control t ook place for two of the central figures of the ne ocon led opposition . These men sought to preserve peace through strength despite a government they viewed as swerving closer to weakness. Their positions would define much of the debate through the rest of decade and marshal others to the cause of opposi ng SALT II . The Road to SALT With the inauguration of Richard Nixon in 1969 , the direction of U.S. foreign policy changed significantly. Both the new President and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, believed that American diplomacy was enteri ng a new phase, one that required different thinking and approaches when compared with policies since the beginning of the Cold War. As he entered the presidential race, Nixon believed that a tendency to focus on single issues, or just a few at a time as the need arose, variety of issues by emphasizing their connectedness, a policy developed with Kissinger that they called linkage. Thus when dealing with the Soviet Unio n, progress on issues relating to the two superpowers and their influence in the Middle East would in theory pay divi dends on SALT or trade policy.
74 policy was the right one enabled him to push the Soviet Uni on to accept linkage, despite its clear reluctance . The result was a stalem ate between the two nations during the first half of the President . 2 Pursuing this type of foreign relations required another fun damental, methodological s hift. Both the President and his advisor emphasized the need to move from polic y rooted in confrontation to an approach based in negotiation. Such a change was the logical consequence of a multi policy focus where the outcome on one issue affected anothe r. In focusing on negotiation as the essence of U.S. diplomatic relations, the administration did not intend to present America as weak or subject to the whims of other nations. The opposite was true. This desire to show strength stemmed from two source s. First, Nixon and Kissinger believed that they entered the presidential scene at a time of chang e, where for the first time in post World War II America , a foreign policy consensus no longer existed. Thus, the domestic aspects of U.S. foreign relations would be subject to conflict and disagr eement . This concept dovetailed with the paranoia and secretive emphasis of the Nixon Kissinger approach. For these two men, expecting resistance to presidential leadership logically meant a more aggressive methodo logy in American debates over policy. Second, Kissinger in particular held that new administration confronted a world of turbulence and complexity, which would 2 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon , (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 343, 346 347; or a Breakfast with Republican Folder: Agreements, Testimony, Executive Privilege, Etc.,) [Mar 69 Subject Files, Nixon Presidentia l Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, MD [Hereinafter White House Years , (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 128 129.
75 require o 3 In order to was critical . Only by presenting a negotiating position of strength could discussions yiel d the results both men desired. 4 Several assumptions guided this desire to pursue negotiation as the primary While preparing talking points for the President first meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Kissinger noted regarding SALT reading of history indicates that almost all crises have been caused by political 5 Not only was Nixon so impressed by this concept that he underlined the words in the memo, but he used the phrasing himself in his memoirs. Combined with the emphasis on the need to link arms control to other issues, consistent with the broader use of linkage in general, this concept helped guide U.S. thinking on SALT as directed by the President . Two fur ther important assumptions First, t he United States held the responsibility and the ability to shape and control Soviet goals regarding nuclear arms, not the Soviets themselves, per se . This outlook is a significant departure from the thinking of previous presidents who believed that the Soviet Union created its own arms control policies . United States a major role in defining anothe Second, the function of summits held a different spot in the Nixonian u niverse. While LBJ used such 3 Kissinger, White House Years , 69. 4 Nixon, RN , 347; FRUS 1969 1976, I: 67; Kissinger, White House Years , 56, 65; While both men believed themselves to be skilled negotiators, Kissinger clearly did not think of Nixon as capable in that regard, White House Years , 142. 5 FRUS 1969 1976, XII : 33.
76 gatherings to get the negotiating ball rolling, Nixon preferred to think of a summit as a capstone event in the discussion process , an idea outlined for him by Kissinger . This approach eschew ed the individual touch in favor of concrete, thoroughly discussed conclusions as the basis for progress toward agreements. This perspective is gotiation as a foundational concept in U.S. foreign relations. An example of this belief is the ideas in NSC staffer Peter Rodman providing Kissinger with talking points for a speech to Republican Congressmen. Rodman observed that th e administrati approach clearly demonstrated that the blame for international tensions rested with other nations rather than the United States, due to the U.S. emphasis on negotiation. Thus, another benefit of negotiation as the primary means of interaction was the belief that the United States as a strong and peaceful country remained innocent of any thing that might cause crises. 6 T he Nixon Kissinger methodology changed a key aspect of the American approach to strategic weapons talks . In addition to using summits differently, the President negotiation to achieve U.S. goals. As the President wrote to ACDA head Gerard Smith, the s which will 7 On the surface, Nixon approach to negotiations appeared very similar to the general approach used by Lyndon 6 FRUS 1969 1976, XII: 33 note 5; Nixon, RN , 36 9; Kissinger, The White House Years , 141; Memo from Folder: Testimony, E xecutive Privilege, Etc.,) [Mar 69 RNM. 7 FRUS 1969 1976, I: 67.
77 Johnson, albeit with some changes in o rder and method. However, the ne w President made a fundamental ch ange in arms control discussion s when he intentionally bypassed the formal apparatus by instituting a back channel with the Soviet Union . This decision emerged specifically from presidential frustrations with the State Dep artment and it s Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) . Neither organization could be and Kissinger would circumvent the public, Congress, and the basic governme nt bureaucracy 8 However, virtually bypassing the U.S. government in foreign relations was a difficult task. The solution was to direct the Soviet Union to deal with Kissinger exclusively for the most sensitiv e and importa nt discussions. The national security advisor argued that such an arrangement allowed greater freedom of negotiation while reducing the pr obability of roadblock, and the President agreed, proposing the arrangement to Dobrynin in February of 1969 at their first meeting. From this point September 1973, the primary route of arms control discussions moved through the White House, not the State Department. 9 The first major d ebate during the Nixon administr ation concerning arms control cen tered on A nti B allistic M issiles (ABM) , rather than on the broader context of SALT. The President wanted an ABM system approved, but on a sm approach. The previous administration debated, and Johnson approved, development and deployment of a minimal ABM system, called Sentinel, designed to protect the 8 Suri, Kissinger , 223. 9 Kissinger, White House Years , 136 141; Nixon, RN , 369. On the Soviet back channel, see Suri, Kissinger , 22 2 226, and Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect , 32 40.
78 United States and its missiles from possible Chinese attack. Inspired by a Soviet effort to protect Moscow with an ABM system, the U.S. effort had the acknowledged side benefit of insulating , to a small degree , against potential Soviet activity as well. While the introduction of the Sentinel system added a new wrinkle to the Johnson gin discussions at the start of rendered ABM irrelevant as an issue. 10 Nixon believed such a weapon would strengthen the American negotiating position with the Soviets, whereas the absence of this type of missile could prove d etrimental in accomplishing U.S. goals. To the President there was more to the issue than just the strategic credibility. I knew that the vote on ABM would reverberate around the world as a 11 Thus, a vote for ABM in 1969 was a vote to show the world the strength of both the nation and the new President c ongressional support for his policies. To Nixon, this was an important point to make in the midst of domestic, international, and congressional opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which cast a long sh adow of doubt on his presidency from the beginni ng , as well as U.S. credibility . Echoing the President ABM system would help advance SALT discussions with the Soviets. Gerard Smith, 10 Divine, Johnson Years , 239 264. 11 Nixon, RN , 416.
79 head of the ACDA, voiced his opposition to ABM in a NSC meeting, ironically no doubt further substantiating in the President he wisdom of the back channel. 12 After Nixon announced his decision to move forward with developing the new, Safeguard in March 1969 , Congress took up the debate over providing the necessary appropriations. It was at this point that Senator Henry arms control that took the at the start of his presidency of Democrats who might be willing to serve in the Cabinet. Although Jackson turned down an offer to be Secretary of Defense , he remained a foreign policy ally in the Senate. As a vocal supporter of Safeguard, the senator worked both within and outside the halls of Congress to drum up support for the program. At a meeting of the Puget Sound Leagues (sic) of Women Voters, he responded to questions about dangerous adversary with ra 13 He suggested that failing to protect America with such a system was unwise, in part because S oviet leadership was regressing, moving toward communist dictators of the past. Emphasizing the defensive nature of the we apon, he ended by implying that abandoning ABMs would seriously hamper the U.S. ability to convince the Soviet Union to reduce or eliminate its similar missiles. In a letter to a constituent explaining his reasons for supporting the President , Jackson mad e it clear that his reasoning derived from the conviction that lack of an ABM system would hamper negotiations. In fact, he 12 Kissinger, White House Years , 204 209; FRUS 1969 1976, XXXII: 12. 13 Henry M. Jackson, Transcript of comments Puget Sound Leagues of Women Voters Congr essional Conference, 4/8/68, HMJ 3560 6/7/7, 2 3.
80 argued that discussions would move forward more effectively with the defensive missiles. Speaking on the ABC television network pr cited the 1968 congressional debate over the Sentinel system, pointing out that Soviet calls for talks followed closely on the heels of a vote for ABM. Although the S enator did not come out and claim that his critics fallaci ously argued that pursuing this system would hamper U.S. negotiations, the implication was clear. 14 As debate continued from April through the summer , Jackson received input from a variety of sources with neoconservative ties. He heard from John J. McCloy , head of the Council on Foreign Relations, emphasizing the need for the United States to avoid lop sided concessions in future arms control talks with the Soviets . The senator commended to his congressional colleagues testimony before the Com mittee on Armed Services agreement with the idea of a U.S. ABM system benefiting arms control negotiations. A nother major source of information was the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy. Led by D ean Acheson, Albert Woh lstetter, and Paul Nitze, the group produced several papers and reports congressional papers contained nine total, with substantial underlining of key passages relating to answering objections and summarizing basic information on the program and missiles. One of the reports appea rs to be the work of Pau l Wolfowitz, who provided intellectual ammunition aimed at answering anti ABM arguments . 15 14 Nixon, RN , 338; Jackson, Leagues Transcript, 3 4; Letter from Henry M. Jackson to constituent, 4/14/69, HMJ 3560 6/7/11, 7. 15 Letter from John J. McCloy to Henry M. Jackson, 4/23/69, HMJ 3560 6/82/12 (HMJ Folder Congressional
81 Jackson used the press to present his views on the anti missile system . One publication reprinted from a Foreign Policy Association debate with critic Senator John Sherman Cooper self defense. When the Washington Post pro ABM position, he responded with a July letter stressing the need to avoid idealized conceptions of Soviet intentions . The goal, he argued, was not negotiations merely for the sake of negotiation, but talks with concrete results beneficial to the Unite d States. Other publications reprinted his Senate floor speeches to convey the pro ABM position to th e public. With the U.S. Hou se considered a virtual lock in support of the President , the Senate vote became the focal point of the debate. Thus, by the time of the Senate vote on approving the weapons system, Jackson was a major voice approving the s . 16 The reaction to congressional approval reveals much about the personal forces at work. passed by one vote , and he sent a memo to his inner circle of Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Kissinger after the win. He instruct ed the three to make sure that th e world knew that the President should receive credit. r victory, and I want the three of you to discuss it with Harlow in terms of getting the true story as to Presidential Record , Vol. 115 , p t 8, 4/29/69, 10641 6/20/39. 16 on Trial: The Issue: Is it wrong to defend ourselves? The Witness: Sen. Cincinnati Enquirer , 6/5/69, HMJ 3560 6/7/9; Letter from Henry M. Jackson to Editor, Washington Post , 7/15/69, HMJ 3560 USSR Leadership: Vital Speeches of the Day , Vol. XXXV, No. 20, 610 613, 8/1/69, HMJ 3560 4/233/63.
82 17 Nixon detailed the specific messages to spread about his attitude, the h ours of work he performed and with whom , emphasizing his decision making guidance along the way. The President did highlight a few individuals by name, urging thanks to them for their assistance. Among these was Jackson, who received a personal note from both Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew thanking him for his efforts. The senator responded to both, and sent out his own thanks to several people, including Nitze, nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter , and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. All three testified before congressional committees and belonged to the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy. During a couple of the most crucial periods in the debate , the staff of your Committee came up with first rate material and analysis that was indispensable. Also, the highly professional and sensible printed reports prepared by the Committee helped to counteract some of the foolishness and absurdities being spr ead by the critics and opponents. 18 J ackson and the Committee sought to support Nixon and the ABM agenda at this time, sharing many of the reasons for taking such a step. Yet, in less than eight short years, their support for presidentially defined arms co ntrol would undergo a major transformation, such that thirteen of the original fifty three members of the Committee would organize another committee to combat SALT II. Their perspectives and beliefs, tempered during times like the ABM debate, served to un ify them in the need to warn the nation about the dangerous direction of U.S. policy . The experience of fighting for ABM prepared neocons to face the challenges to their vision of arms control via peace through strength . 19 T wo other aspects of the ABM deba te and their impact on the future of U.S. arms control negotiations are worth noting . First, Jackson gained a new staffer 17 Memo from Nixon to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger, 8/7/69, Folder: 18 Letter from Henry M. Jac kson to Dean Acheson, 8/8/69, HMJ 3560 4/83/9. 19 Memo from Nixon to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger, 8/7/69, Folder: Nixon 8/11/69, Paul Nitze 8/8/69, Albert Wohlstetter 8/8/69, and Dean Acheson 8/8/69, all HMJ 3560 4/83/9.
83 debate] provided him the opportunity to hire Richard Perle, a brash, young expert on nuclear strategy and American foreign policy whose views were symbiotic with 20 The presence of Perle, along with aide Doroth y Fosdick, significantly shaped and The new aide quickly became a major source o f policy ideas and aggressively promoted administrations learned that gaining his suppor t was almost as important as earning passage of a treaty or piece of legislation. S econd, the vote concluding the 1969 discussion did not end debate on ABM. The issue came up again in 1970 and 1971 during discussion of appropriation s bills. Jackson continued to defend the Safeguard system each time, citing the importance of ABM for SALT and the current workability of the technology, as well as the need to maintain U.S. credibility. However, ABM as an independent issue gradually fad ed in importance as the SALT negotiations increasingly folded the defensive missiles into a larger discussion. 21 Part of the delay that prevented t he beginning of formal negotiations until November 1969 was the Nixon administration re evaluation of U.S. a rms control policy, which included gathering individuals to represent the America position in 20 Kaufman, Jackson , 213. 21 Kissinger, White House Years , 209 210; Kaufman, Jackson , 213 Politics of Arms Control , 309 310; 6/7/86; Henry M. 9/29/71, HM J 3560 VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism , 118 122. chose it as the title of his book; see Alan Weisman, Prince of Dark ness: Richard Perle: The Kingdom, the Power, and the End of Empire in America , (New York: Union Square Press, 2007).
84 discussion s. One of the people chosen join the U.S. delegation was Paul Nitze. His work with Acheson and Wohlstetter in starting the Committee to Maintain a Pru dent Defense Policy and their activities on the part of the pro ABM crowd during the Senate debate caught the eye of the executive branch. When Secretary of State William Rogers called asking if he had interest in joining the SALT delegation , Nitze jumped at the chance to function as the representative of the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. NSC staffers also sought him out during this time, reporting his views and concerns to Kissinger . Before the formal negotiations began, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to speak with Nitze. The meeting contained an unusual request for the veteran bureaucrat, one consistent with the machinations and paranoia of the President and his A dvisor began the conversation by expressing his reservations about both Bill Ro gers and Gerry 22 Presiden t finished the meeting by reminding Nitze to use this back channel if he so desired. 23 Other members of the Committee also provide d insight to the administration. Wohlstetter submitted a memo on ABM to Kissinger in early 1969 suggesting the need to address both the functionality of the weapon system and its supposedly high costs; these items were major points of consideration in the subsequent debate. Later in 1970, Wohlstetter again approached the National Security Ad visor to offer his insights concerning the arms control process, an offer that gained him a face to face meeting, 22 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost , 298 299. See also Talbot, Master of the Game , 114 116. 23 Memo from Hal Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, un dated, Folder: November 16, 1969 Volume
85 something likely to occur only if Kissinger and NSC staffers considered worthy of attention. Wohlstetter raised interesting questi ons that held the potential to shape about different SALT approaches. However, his ideas were not received without some skepticism at the same time . NSC staffer K. Wayne Smith wrote a memo analyzing a Wohlstetter report rece ived by Kissinger and presenting talking points for an upcoming meeting between the two men . Smith suggested that many of the concerns mentioned by the nuclear expert held no real significance for the White House . This situation was due to erroneous anal part with some issues and the fact that the administration already addressed other problems . memo tended to reject present evidence to confound claims suggesting problems with U.S. negoti ators. For example, the staffer prefaced a point of analysis by quoting that n o evidence can be found in the records of the talks [ ] momentum to reverse the Russian s 24 evaluation des cribed several instances of the Soviets doing what Wohlstetter claimed they were not. In general, concerns reflect ed a less sympat hetic view of the Soviets than that held by the administration . Wohlstetter, like Nitze and Acheson, was willing at the beginning of the Nixon administration to support arms control in general and SALT specifically . A t the same 24 10/21/70, 4, Folder: Dec RNM.
86 time, however, all three m en had reservations about potentially dangerous elements in the U.S. approach to the Soviet Union. 25 one where he could exert significant influence and at a level matched as a non Republican only by Senator Jackson. Nitze entered this phase of his government service with a curious mixture of optimism and pessimism. The popular hype associated with SALT held no sway with him, but the concept of arms control held promise to ben efit America; at the same time, the talks might result in nothing. One of his area s of concern was the nature of American intelligence estimates about Soviet thinking. Believing that U.S. experts failed to think like the Soviets , Nitze sought another sou rce of insight. intelligence community was prone to assume that the Soviets would look at matters the way Americans would. I thought this unlikely. Accordingly, I persuaded ISA to put together a group of outside consultants people not involved in SALT but well versed in Soviet affairs and arms control issues to estimate what the Soviet objectives would be once the talks began. 26 This group produced predictions at odds with gover nment estimates, conclusions that he found to be the best fit in describing Soviet motives during the talks. With evidence to suppo rt his thinking, the veteran foreign policy bureaucrat pressed on, seeking to aid the delegation in making progress toward a n agreement. In his memoir, Nitze identified several factors that he believed hindered achieving an accord. Two items of particular concern at the time included the lack of domestic 25 Memo from Albert Wohlstetter to Kissinger, 3/12/69, Folder: October 22, 1970, Folder: NSC Files SALT, RNM. 26 Nitze, From Glasnost to Hiroshima International Security Affai rs section; Nitze was Assist ant Secretary for ISA during the Kennedy
87 consensus on exactly what U.S. goals were for arms control, and the pre sence of the back channel, something he did not know about until the announcement of the results His experiences during his service on the SALT I delegation also yielded two insights about negotiating a treaty that were important enough to become key concepts in his subsequent thinking about arms control. First, discussion with his Soviet counterpart made him aware of the difficulties regarding verification of agreements, particularly on site inspections. The result was a heightened sense of the importance of wor kable verification in any treaty . Second, instructions from the White House appeared to lean in a potentially dangerous direction. mportant concessions to the Soviets without concurrently assuring what we were to receive in 27 Senator Jackson would soon come to echo this same concern as the shape of the SALT I agreements became clearer . 28 to contribute to the shape of American policy though participation in various high level meetings. As part of the delegation, he periodically briefed Congress on the progress unfolding at the talks. His comments in February 1970 gained the approval of N SC staffers General Alexander Haig and Hal 29 Others working for Kissinger heard from Nitze and passed on his recommendations . He continued to press for the particular issues that to him represented potential holes or 27 Nitze, From Glasnost to Hiroshima , 310. 28 Nitze, From Glasnost to Hiroshima , 304, 308, 309. 29 Note from Alexander Haig to Kissinger, 2/26/70, Folder: SALT Files, RNM.
88 speed bumps in the negotiations . One subject that concerned him was the lack of what he viewed as an appropriate American position for deal ing with the prospective Soviet advantage in throw weight , or the weight of a fully loaded missile at time of launch . T he greater the throw weight , the more potential damage a missile can do ; larger missiles have greater throw weight . Nitze argued that the greater throw weight of Soviet missiles gave them an offensive advantage . He worried that American negotiators might allow a Soviet advantage in this area, a distinct possibility given that Kissinger thought of throw weight as a negotiating chip rather th an an area to be factored into a balanced agreement. Paul believes the S oviets would take every opportunity to seek force reductions which eliminate the throw weight 30 In addition to lobbying about his particular concerns, Nitze also p articipated in multiple meetings, such as those of the NSC Verification Panel, which worked out the technical details to establish U.S. negotiating positions once Nixon and Kissinger communicated the broad directions and goals they wanted. He also contrib uted to National Security Council meetings, including periodically answering s to explain or elaborate on a particular technical point. In this context, Nitze made multiple suggestions regarding the direction of U.S. positions . Although the d egree of persuasion he exercised appears to be minimal, those in the meetings clearly valued his expertise and input. 31 30 Folder: 31 Folder: Master of the Game , 121 122; FRUS 1969 1976, XXXII: 118 121, 153 159, 207 215.
89 Much l ike Nitze, Senator Jackson w as a figure with influence that supported SALT and yet entertained some doubts. As one dedicated to th e necessity of arms ABM and SALT. In addition to his role in garnering Senate support for ABM related legislation detailed above, he initially publicly supported Nix direction. In a speech drafted in November 1970, Jackson cited the President for a new era of negotiation approvingly, raising what to him was the pertinent question: dge Soviet policies as we enter an 32 His answer suggested two key factors he considered necessary to maintaining a perspective that avoided dangerous thinking. First, the Soviet Union was sti ll an aggressive, expansionist power, muc h like the Cold War conception under the policy of containment during the 1950s and early 1960s. To Jackson, this reality meant that negotiation was just another stage in the conflict between the implacable forces of socialism and capitali sm, or tyranny a nd democracy. H is reasoning set the stage for his second point: dÃ©tente was a myth. This particular than embracing the ue d to hold to an older, Cold War liberal perspective. Rejecting a state of relaxed tensions, he argued for an ongoing pattern where each side responded to the other while pursuing national interests and goals. Thus, the change s associated with dÃ©tente did not exist. The logica l implication of this position wa s that any negotiation which did not take this reality 32 6/8/21.
90 into account would be doomed to failure at best, and presented a very real danger to the nation. 33 Jackson worked to establish that his doubts abo ut concepts like dÃ©tente did not arrangements have a vital role to play in increasing the stability of the strategic balance, and in deepening the conviction, on both sides, that an all out nuclear war would be 34 He also held concern s that the necessarily slow pace of negotiations could cause an agreement to be obsolete by the time it was concluded . His recommendation was a quick, interim a greement in which both sides halted expansion of their nuclear forces for a year to allow talks to catch up to reality. Part of his rationale for this solution was fear of Soviet parity with the United States, a situation that in his mind would embolden communist adventurism across t he globe. The nation simply could not afford to wait until the current SALT negotiations bore fruit. 35 Speeches served as a means for Jackson to publicize his current ideas and concerns, and he reused his addresses both for the convenience and as a tool to convey d the Future of Freedom he outlined his concerns. T he most important issue was American strat egic power that will leave our security impaired by doubt and uncertainty and our 33 6/8/21. 34 29/71, 5, HMJ 3560 4/236/24. 35 Not to Negotiate with the Ussr , 4/71, 52 53, HMJ 3560 6/8/55.
91 36 Arguing that the Soviet Union made substantial gains in the previous five year s, the senator claimed that the Soviet Union had b ecome bolder while the SALT talks bogged down. America needed a new, temporary SALT agree ment to prevent the Soviets from bypassing the United States strategically while maintaining national security. In a variation on this speech given at the National W ar College in May 1971, he explained why the Soviet Union sought to nuclear straightjacket, in which our hands are tied while they are free to twist arms elsewhere in the world. That, as I see it, is the meaning of the determined Soviet effort 37 P ursuit of SALT following the of the negotiations did not suggest the effort was in vain; in fact, continuing the effort to procure an agreement on offensive and defensive weapons that kept the strength levels of the two nations the same was a desirable outcome. W hat required the United Stat es to act was the unchanging nature of the Soviet Union and the timeframe involved to prevent the situation from hurting America further . These factors necessitated a quick, temporary arms control measure. 38 As Jackson expanded his critique, Nixon , Kissing er, and the official SALT delega tion sought movement on the negotiating front while keeping abreast with the 36 4/236/28. 37 6/8/60. 38 6 6/8/64; Henry M. J 6/8/65.
92 . The call for a new agreement did not escape the notice of n ature of Jackson proposal. Helmut Sonnenfeldt noted that p ursuing such a course would create more In sum I feel that as a starter this concedes far too much in return for very little. Given the source of the proposal, our negotiating leverage could 39 Shortly after he sent this memo, the back channel emerged from secrecy with the May 20, 1971 announcement of a breakthrough . Nixon and Kissinger shared satisfaction that their efforts at last appeared t o be bearing fruit. The President reveled in the acclaim attributed to him and his leadership . In contrast, Kissinger recognized that on the one hand, the breakthrough was a relatively simple matter, but on the other, the Soviets accepted the basic U.S. , or back channel, SALT position, leaving for the most part only the technical details to be worked out . The announcement eased the pressure on the White House to accomplish something as the talks were no longer stalled . The National Security Advisor ackn owledged that the appearance of holding to a stubborn position when the other side was not moving could pressures; our critics did not know that we could do better. On the other hand, had they known they would have pressed us to accept the current Soviet proposals, which we 40 The Soviet willingness to essentially drop their objections to the key American demands benefitted Nixon and K 41 39 3/29/71, 3, Folder: XIV Jan. 1, 1971 Apr Files, RNM. 40 Kissinger, White House Years , 816. 41 Nixon, RN , 522 525; Kissinger, White House Years , 818 821.
93 which made i nforming the delegation was an unwelcome task for Kissinger . He noted that Gerard Smith showed loyalty and a commitment to the cause upon finding out how the administration bypassed the official delegation. The upset lead negotiator initially thought about stepping down, but d later noted that the White House essentially exchanged the chance at a c omprehensive, lasting treaty for two abbreviated ones of limited duration. Basically, Nitze believed that the equivalent of the 1979 permanent SALT II treaty could have been agreed on in 1971, but Nixon and Kissinger on their own ended up delaying progres s by seeking personal political benefit. Despite his misgivings, Nitze, like Smith, remained at his post, working through the May 1972 Summit to complete the agreements according to the President 42 While the administration made progress toward a SALT treaty, Jackson devoted less attention to the subject. His run for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination through the latter half of 1971 and early 1972 hampe red his ability to devote time to SALT at a level similar to his previous efforts. T he Senator still expressed unease as , and he remained unmoved despite White House efforts to keep him and other key legislators informed of the developing U.S. position. On the campaign trail, he h ad several opportunities to express his views on the threat of the Soviet Union and the state of arms control, and in these comments the nature of his views is clear. At an October 1971 address in Miami Beach, Jackson noted by implication that Russia was building up its military and nuclear capabi lities. He focused specifically on arms control, suggesting 42 Smith, Doubletalk, 243; Nitze, From Glasnost to Hiroshima , 313.
94 responsible arms limitation, in my best judgment , is for both sides to make their cutbacks simultaneously non e whatsoever that the American people favor one sided disarmament. They know , in their wisdom, that the 43 He continued his critique of U.S. SALT negotiations during an appearance on the NBC show November. Jackson began by a sserting his support and desire for an arms control agreement . He explained the Soviet arms buildup by arguing it was due to their pursuit of nuclear superiority rather than parity. He repeated the theme that delaying an arms control agreement would result in a loss of strategic balan ce and aggressive Soviet activity around the globe . For t he S enator, the key in these circumstances was to proceed from a position of strength when dealing with the Soviets w hile protecting American interests. 44 As the May 1972 summit drew closer, Jackson continued to move further away from his previous In a news release on May 1, he referred to his speech the previ ous year on Balance and the Future of Free he claimed the Soviet Union represented at that time. Now he claimed vindicat ion recently in the last several days, we have obtained from intelligen ce sources confirmation that the Soviets have brought to an advanced stage work on the awesome 43 M. Jackson to Fifteenth Annual Convention Democratic 4/235/52. 44 Folder: 1971 6 8, HMJ 3560 6/8/126.
95 45 The S enator referenced Soviet adventurism in the previous year, and his year old call for a quick, temporary agreement to try to stop just such a development. Moscow summit, Jackson suggested that Nixon and Kissinger needed to revisit the ir entire approach to arms control in the face of Soviet gains that threatened U.S. security. Thus , b the potential Secretary of Defens e from across the aisle, the senator who se efforts ensured t he benefit , and the man who initially supported several of the basic assumptions guiding the U.S. approach to SALT, stood ready to critique, demand changes, and if necessa ry oppose arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. 46 Contesting SALT A fundamental shift in the nature of the domestic SALT debate occurred on May 26, 1972 when President Nixon and Premier Brezhnev signed the two major SALT I agreements : the ABM trea ty and the five year Interim Agreement on Offensive Wea pons. The President presented the summit results as a major achievement , and b oth documents received a generally positive response from the American public . Of the two, the ABM accord, which limited both nations to two anti ballistic missile installations, received only mild criticism from opponents, and the Senate voted to approve the treaty with little controversy. The same could not be said of the Interim Agreement. Opposition critics strongly op posed the temporary measure. Senator 45 6/9/81. The weapon was a new ICBM larger than the SS 9, possibly the SS 18. 46 Henry 6/9/81.
96 Jackson la unched a broadside critique, arguing that the five year halt on increasing certain types of missiles left the United States at a disadvantage. He argued that to make matters worse, the arrangement allowed th e Soviet Union to continue to expand their arsenal, aggravating the unacceptable situation. In a television interview shortly after the signing, the S enator suggested that the other side could have deceived the negotiators. H is comments reflected his con cerns about the danger of trusting the Soviet Union and the threat that the agreement left the country in a worse situation as negotiations advanced to the SALT II stage. The SALT I Interim Agreement gave Jackson concrete, settled concepts and ideas that served as a pivot for his criticisms of U.S strategic arms policy. Similarly, f rom this point forward those individuals and groups opposing American efforts to arrive at a SALT II treaty pursued a different agenda. Now their objections no longer focused on solely hypothetical concerns. Instead, they could cite actual agreements, their fears given flesh, and on that basis proclaim with greater assurance and specificity the dangers associated with the direction of subsequent negotiations and treaties. 47 Bot h of the agreements described specific numbers of allowed strategic weapons. The Antiballistic Missile Treaty limited both sides to two ABM installations, with specific restrictions on the number of interceptor missiles and specific type radars . Both par ties intended this accord to be permanent, although a provision existed for joint reviews every five years. The two nations designed the Interim Agreement to last for 47 Wall Street Journal, 6/14/72, 2, http://search.proquest.com/docview/133721285 ; Dallek, Nixon , 398; Nixon, RN , 617 618; Platt, Senate , 24 HMJ 3560 3560 6/9/94. Wall Street Journal hereinafter WSJ .
97 five years, with the intention of continuing negotiations and creating a more comprehens ive and permanent treaty. The most prominent elements of the accord limited amounts of fixed, land based ICBMs and SLBMs, along with the number of ballistic submarines permitted each side . 48 Jackson immediately led the way in criticizing the SALT I outcome . When Nixon returned to the United States, his administration began a concerted effort to inform and sway the Congress to support the SALT I pacts. After a press conference where the President again pointed out the benefits of approving the agreements, the S enator responded by taking Nixon to task, accusing him of attempting to use fear to motivate Jackson and his staff pursued any avenue to get their message out. They sent a requested article on SALT to the magazine Sea Power , in which he simu ltaneously questioned the Interim Agreement apparent beliefs regarding future talks. After listing some of the specific limits in the document, the article noted , I States into a position of sub parity. And, what is more, there is little reason to believe that the Soviets will turn around and grant us parity during SALT II. I do not understand why the Administration assumes that the Soviets can be persuaded to give up in 1977 the advantages they won in 1972. 49 weapons was a significant threat, one to be avoided. The solution was to insist on equality in all future permanent agreement s and treaties. Putting action to though t , the S enator proposed an amendment to the Interim Agreement requiring this standard. 48 See Table 4 1 at the end of this chapter for details. 49 Sea Power Magazine, 7/5/72, 3, HMJ 3560 4/236/41.
98 Exactly what form acceptable equality eventually took varied, depending on the person or group citing it. For Jackson, equalit y was not a pure number game, where one counted the missiles , but a comparison of destructive capability and second strike survival. For others, the concept was about numbers, and the nature of the individual weapons mattered little. After consulting wit h the White House, and gaining its support upon modifyi ng the language, Jackson won the support of the Senate, and both his amendment and the Interim Agreement passed Congressional muster. This victory was not enough for the S enator. Responding to a lett er of approval from Eugene Rostow, Jackson replied that his effort to ensure the administration followed the restriction would continue throughout the SALT II process. Sacrificing equality, giving the Soviet Union an advantage over the United States, was a danger to be avoided at all costs. 50 The pattern of Nixon and Kissinger pursuing another SALT agreement and Jackson protesting their efforts continued throughout the remainder of the administration. From the resumption of negotiations in November of 1972 until the President esignation on August 9, 1974, Nixon sought another arms control foreign policy triumph like SALT I. However, at both summits in 1973 and 1974, it rapidly became clear that the two sides were nowhere near reaching major SALT agreeme nts. The effect of Watergate domestically, along with the October 1973 Arab Israeli War in 50 6/236/41; Henry M. Jackson, Letter to constituent, 8/25/72, HMJ3560 4/196/11; Platt, Senate , 26 29; Letter from Jackson to Rostow, 9/21/72, HMJ 3560 4/196/12. Inter estingly, what is probably one of the more DÃ©tente and Confrontation does not mention the Jackson amendment.
99 the Middle East, dominated the thinking of the administration, forcing arms control to a back burner status for much of the time. 51 The lack of progress despite ongo ing negot iations did not deter Jackson in his efforts to highlight for the public the problems present in U.S. SALT II policy. Speaking to the NATO Military Committee and later to a forum at California State University , the S enator suggested three lessons emerged from SALT I that needed to be applied to SALT II. First, a consistent, clear, single strategic doctrine would better serve the accomplishing of U.S. goals than the conflicting multitude of ideas about the American strategic approach that were in place . The ability to effectively react to Soviet proposals required such a chan ge. Second, the tendency among the Americans to reject possible positions before presenting them to the Soviets in an effort to gain acceptance needed to stop. The effort to convince the other side of the merits of a proposal could yield unexpected fruit in the pursuit of an agreement, so abandoning ideas without at least presenting them limited the potential effectiveness of U.S. negotiations. Finally, the United States nee ded to take a strong position and not waffle , rather than agreeing to limits and positions that otherwise would not even be considered by American experts. Jackson approvingly referenced the committee testimony of William Van Cleave that the SALT I agreem ents placed the nation in an inferior position. The solution was to The Soviets will respect us for it a 52 The 51 Nixon, RN , 875, 879, 886, 977, 1023 1024, 1031 1032; Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 468 , 475; Platt, Senate , 45, 50, 54. 52 4/236/53.
100 S enator clearly insisted on negotiation from a position of strength as a necessary precondition for success with the Soviet Union . In his mind, only such an approach protected U.S. securi ty by denying the other side opportunities to indulge the temptation to deal dishonestly, something he believed that the Soviets could not resist if given the chance . He spread his message in print, on television, and in letters to the President . If the goal of SALT II was real and meaningful reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, then the flawed SALT I Interim Agreement could not serve as the framework for a permanent treaty. 53 It is worth noting at this point that U.S. strategic arms control efforts th roughout the sixties and seventies focused on limiting the growth of these weapons, not actual reductions in numbers. Avoiding an arms race was an attractive prospect to both the United States and the Soviet Union for several reasons, such as the economic benefits from controlling spending on nuclear weapons and missile systems. Additionally, both sides had an interest in minimizing Cold War tensions, which helped allay allies, support trade, and allow the ongoing efforts to sway other nations, particular ly in the Third World, to av . Not everyone involved in the domestic debate over strategic arms control supported a limitation focus, and many, emphasis af ter SALT I was focused on decreasing the numbers of strategic arms . It can be infer red that he wanted reductions at the SALT I stage, based on two considerations. First, one of the 53 6/16/10; Henry M. Jackso 4/236/53; 6/10/99 (title and date based on Jackson papers Freedom at issue , no. 19, May June 1973, 2 3, HMJ 3560 6/10/31; Letter from Jackson to Nixon, 6/22/73, HMJ 3560 6/49/23; Letter from Jackson to Nixon, 1/29/74, HMJ 3560 HMJ 3560 5/244/43 (date from Jackson papers finding guide).
101 concerns he expressed about the Interim Agreement was inequality leading to instability, which increased the risk of nuclear war. The goal was reducing the likelihood of an atomic exchange. Limitations were a logical first step in this direction, and Jackson proposed his own version of a strategic arms freeze to permit the ne gotiations to move further toward a solid, risk reducing agreement. Second, he called for strategic arms reductions in the aftermath of SALT I. The Senator protested the 1974 Vladivostok framework, which allowed room for increasing arms to a fixed level , as something at od ds with lower nuclear weapon levels, and he supported the failed deep cuts initial proposal in 1977. additional negotiation during the SALT I stage, suggest reduction as a goal througho ut the arms control process. The United States only moved successfully toward a ctual reductions in the numbers of strategic weapons with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks . 54 Jackson was not alone in his criticism achievements and the direction of SALT II negotiations. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) also expressed concerns about the nature of U.S. strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union . In the wake of George McGovern significant loss to Nixon in the 1972 presidential election , several Democrats sought to for m an organization to 54 15, 4/15/71, HMJ 3560 in Democratic Review , 5/20/75, HMJ 3560 6/11/93; Henry M. On Signing of SALT Agreements of underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation. ; Calvo Goller and Calvo, SALT Agreements , 15, 29, 43, 50; Dinesh Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Becam e an Extraordinary Leader , (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 146; George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State , (New York: 249; Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End o f the Cold War , (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 44, 48.
102 return their party to an earlier version of itself , despite their party controlling both houses of Congress . Ben Wattenberg, one of the organizers of the CDM, described the group game and remain true to long held principles. To borrow from Reverend Jesse 55 Beginning with a December 7, 1972 newspaper ad titled sought to re turn to the ideals of FDR, Truman, JFK, and LBJ, rather than embrace those who recently gained control of the Democrat party appa ratus. The Coalition described these latter individuals as following a and essentially rejected the ideology of those running the party in favor of a more centrist orientation . T that this pers pective defined the Democrats throughout beliefs was the anti communism of that period, which resulted in the organization closely matching he agree, the S enator accepted , along with Hubert Humphrey, the position of CDM honorary co chair. 56 SALT was the Task Force on Foreign Policy. Composed of fourteen initial m embers, E ugene Rostow agreed to head the subgroup, joined by fellow neoconservatives Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Norman Podhoretz , and four former Johnson administration 55 Wattenberg, Fighting Words , 142. 56 Wattenberg, Fighting Words , 141, 137 1, Box 5, Folder: 24, Sanford Sterling Munro Papers. All M u nro papers from the University of Washington Library; Letter from Penn Kemble to Peter Rosenblatt, 12/14/72, Folder: New York Times , 12/7/72, h ttp://search.proquest.com/docview/119495992?accountid=10920 Division in the Senate, 1789 http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm .
103 members . The Task Force began work in 1974, and published its first policy paper in July, Ray mond Garthoff writes that this product on assault on the entire Nixon Kissinger policy of 57 The publication described President Nixon as wrong in his claims that dÃ©tente exi sted between the United States and the Soviet Union. Implying that both nations needed to participate for dÃ©tente to truly work, the Task Force pointed out 58 The paper expanded on the threat po sed by the communist nation , trac ing foreign policy issues in a bipolar, Cold War context. The conclusion suggested that believing dÃ©tente, allowing a weak military, and ignoring allies, all a danger to the security of the United States. 59 Unfortunately for neoconservatives, the change from Richard Nixon to Gerald R. Ford as president due to the Watergate scandal did not transform U.S foreign policy. Ford communist, Cold War p erspective changed once Nixon became president, embracing the idea of dÃ©tente. The new leader of the free world kept his made a great deal of sense given his experience with current matters and their shared beliefs about the basis of U.S. foreign 57 Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 462. 58 2, HMJ 3560 6/86/21. 59 6/86/21. Ironically, Rostow invited fellow CDM member Zbigniew Brzezinski to join the initial group. Brzezinski was happy to help and willing to be listed as a CDM member, but wanted to avoid public use of his name in CD M policy statements due to working with the Trilateral Commission. See Letter from Brzezinski to Rostow, 3/18/74, Personal Papers of Peter Rosenblatt, LBJ.
104 relations. A regrettable side effect of the new President was that the legacies of Watergate and Nixon in general some what handicapped his administration . The consensus scholarly view ues that he did not have the opportunity to create his own approach in many policy areas, particularly with foreign policy . Thus, both the good and the bad associat ed with including 60 The resu lt i n a rms control was the continuation of the previous administ approach. At Ford President admitted he held the Nixon administr ation in high regard when it came to foreign relations and wanted to continue the same approach. While it may have appeared to outsiders that the initial priority regarding SALT was low, the administration proceeded with planning for the next round of SAL T II discussions in a routine fashion, continuing where the two sides left off the pursuit of an agreement . Ford and his advisors believed that the proposal least likely to gain Soviet acceptance was the one most consistent with re quirement for equality favored in Congress. They prepared other easier to attain options with unequal numbers , preferring a fairly reasonable but unequal agreement to none. However, these concerns became irrelevant in the aftermath of the meeting between Ford and Soviet leader Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974 . 61 This summit produced a framework for a SALT II treaty that shaped much of the subsequent 60 Greene, Ford , 117; Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Date With Destiny: A Political Biography , (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1989), 127; Reichley, Con servatives, 354. 61 NSC Meeting Minutes, 8/10/74, 2, Folder: s File, National Security Advisor , GFL; Platt , Senate , 59; NSC Meeting Minutes, 10/18/74, Folder: s File, National Security Advisor , GFL. The NSC meetings do not describe how NSC staffers arrived at the options and positions presented. The Verificati on Group of the NSC worked out these options, and perhaps in those discussions some mention of opposition influences could be found. However, the vast majority of the Verification Group records remain classified.
1 05 negotiations. Kissinger me e t ing in M oscow the previous month revealed the possibility of a change in Soviet thinking . The President decided to pursue the opening, which led to the summit . At the meeting, the Soviets accepted the idea of equality, and the two sides agreed on level caps for several categories of missiles, launchers, and heavy bombers. The consensus was framed as an aide memo i re, which allowed it to function as a guide to future negotiations without requiring the more formal approval of a treaty. Bot h sides considered the re sult a victory and a step forward toward a treaty. Despite the optimism, th e meeting also indirectly planted the seeds of a treaty delay due to some excluded factors that became major hurdles to advancement: the Soviet Backfire bomber and American cruise missiles. 62 Many people in the United States received the news of s outcome with approval, but Senator Jackson and the CDM found the nature of the framework wanting. The initial issue for Jackson was not equality, but the very idea o f arms control leading to reductions. Jackson argued soon after the summit that the aide memo i re actually made the situation worse. The agreed upon levels of strategic arms resulted in a commitment to increase arms production on the part of both nations because neither possessed that many weapons. Rather than reigning in Soviet military This approach was not the intended goal of SALT. up agreement, but considering that the Administration has requested unlimited authority to extend low interest, subsidized loans to the Soviets, it is tinged with this irony: we will end up subsidizing the Soviet 62 Greene, Ford , 124 126; Schapmeiser, Date , 194 195; Platt, Senate , 60 61. For a detailed description of what happened at Vladivostok, see Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 494 505 and Hyland, Mortal Rivals , 76 97. See Table 4
106 strategic weapons program 63 Jackson wanted lower strategic arms levels on b oth sides, a concept he suggested that he first called for after the signing of the Interim Agreement . Since the ex piration date on the temporary measure was still two years away, he argued that pursuing something like the summit outcome wasted time and e ffort better spent on reaching a permanent solution. He saw this agreement as a sign of weakness rather than strength, believing that a more forceful approach with the Soviets could result in a treaty that reduced arms levels to a point lower than current , equal amounts. 64 Throughout the remainder of enator continued to rail T wo of the weapons that the Vladivostok Summit did not address, the Soviet mediu m range Backfire bomber and the American cruise missile, became important foci for the debate over what constituted a good treaty position. lify for treaty consideration, and that sacrificing cruise missiles was a worthwhile sacrifice to buy Soviet concessions. Yet, in a reflection of the advisors, some in the executive branch supported the opposite positions. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Jackson worked together to cast doubt on the Vladivostok framework, during a cabinet reorganization. Ironically, the replacement at Defense, Do n ald 63 Henry M. Jac 6/11/50. 64 Democrati c Review , 5/20/75, 27 29, HMJ 3560 6/11/93.
107 Rumsfeld, was just as, if not more, resistant to SALT as the man he replaced. For the Senator, the bomber represented the threat of Soviet dominance, something that violated the spirit of his equality amendment. As for the missiles, their absence ro bbed the nation of a potentially stabilizing measure, which presented another form of danger for America. A treaty that failed to deal with these weapons was unacceptable. 65 Another issue pursued by Jackson was Soviet violations of the SALT I Interim Agree ment . He repeatedly sounded the alarm as he received reports detailing prohibited actions by the other side. The evidence for his claims included testimony before the Arms Control Subcommittee from administration officials, a source difficult to ignore. F or Jackson these concerns reflected fears about the American ability to influence the Soviet s confidence in the willingness of the Soviet Union to accept the constraints on their behavior that l 66 A skeptical view of the Soviets was only enhanced by the superpowers taking opposite sides during the Angolan C risis in 1975 , where dÃ©tente did not seem to apply. The President and his advisors did not share T he administration knew about the issue of transgressions, and investigation during negotiations determined no real issue existed. in 1976 that not only was this problem one he pointed out at the time of the SALT I debate, but the Soviets continued to abuse the Interim Agreement while the White 65 Platt, Senate , 61, 65; Greene, Ford , 125 126; Reichley, Conservatives , 352 354; Hyland, Rivals , 101 103; Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 497 500; Kaufman, Jackson , 288 289; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir , (Ne w York: Sentinel, 2011), 229 231; Letter from Jackson to Ford, 10/23/75, HMJ 3560 6/11/135. 66 Letter from Jackson to Ford, 11/26/75, HMJ 3560 6/11/159.
108 represented evidence that t he Soviet Union was untrustworthy. Verification became an even more important consideration for any subsequent agreement. Not taking the trust issue into account during SALT II negotiations, and especially in a potential treaty, represented a significant flaw in the U.S. approach to arms control . 67 The CDM also expressed dissatisfaction with the state of U.S. arms control efforts in the post Vladivostok period. At the beginning of 1975, Richard Schifter, one of the founding members, sent a memo to the g priorities away from attempts to shape the Democratic party from within. The neoconservative character of the group gave them a specific perspective and ique contribution: the 68 focus would be educating Democratic members of Congress. This suggestion was consistent with the existing direction of the Ta sk Force on Foreign Adequate began with a basic premise : 67 6/25/7 5, HMJ 3560 6/11/104; Letter from Jackson to Kissinger, 8/22/75, HMJ 3560 6/11/122; Minutes of NSC Meeting, 3/5/75, Folder: s File, 1947 1977, National Security Advisor , GFL; Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 503 504; Lette r from Jackson to constituent, 3/2/76, HMJ 3560 things: Ja ckson was making a political mistake, and the issues at hand were the result of inherent lack of specificity or Soviet violations of non binding U.S. unilateral statements, not formal agreements. 68 Memo from Richard Schifter to Max M. Kampleman, Peter Ros enblatt, Ben Wattenberg, and Penn Kemble, 1/8/75, 8, Folder: 1982 (1976 Rosenblatt, LBJ.
109 69 The source was the Soviet Union and its ag gressive expansion , coupled with unprecedented military buildup including strategic nuclea r weapons. In the detailed discussion of nuclear and conventional military issues, the Task Force first clarified their support for dÃ©tente and arms contr ol negotiations. They then The Vladivostok summit produced a flawed framework, one that could stimulate rather than reduce arms production. Additionally, the Soviet development of the Back fire bomber and its exclusion from the agreement presented a potential hazard that needed to be addressed. The solution was to increase defense spending in ways allowed under the Interim Agreement . Only in this way could the United States be read y should a need arise. This type of budget shift yielded an additional benefit for arms control. 70 The report concluded that unless the Democrat Party faced its responsibilities squarely, the probability of a bipartisan agreement on what to do with the Soviet Union was unlikely. 71 It is worth noting that the idea of a consensus view with the Republicans was not a pipe dream for n eoconservative Democrats. Ford staffer Robert Goldwin, a self by 69 4/2 /75, 4, Folder: copy can be found in the Jackson papers as well: HMJ 3560 6/86/21. 70 Ibid., 19. 71 Richard Schifter, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs O ral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 9/8/03, 44, http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Schifter,%20Richard.toc.pdf . Democrats held both houses of the 93 rd Division in the Senate, 1789 http://www.senate.g ov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm rd http://history.house.gov/Congressional Overview/Profiles/93rd/ , a ccessed 3/14/14.
110 presenting ideas from outside traditional sources. He arranged for seminars in the White House for the Pres ident and staff where intellectuals and academics could join them to discuss topics of interest. Several neocons participated in these discussions, including Irving Kristol, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Daniel Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, Martin Diamond, and James Q. Wilson and admitted benefit from the sessions suggest that neoconservatives working in a bipartisan fashion was not a flight of fancy for CDM members. 72 In addition to the Foreign Policy Task Force, the Coalition sought to publicize their perspective on strategic arms in a variety of forums. Political Observer , reprinted a Wall Street Journal article by Task Force chair Eugene Rostow summarizing the second report. At t he end of 1975, the group sent members another Rostow paper. This release was the response to an accom panying manuscript representative of those Democrats who called for defense spending and arms control measures at odds with CDM recommendations. The cov er memo vowed to fight for representation of CDM views when the Democratic Party crafted its 1976 presidential platform. New York Times , and the Political Observer reported in the summe r that CDM election included a statement about the necessity of only supporting agreements that 72 Folder: Lecture 1978, GFL, (penciled in date in, 10/1/76, Folder: Resignation from 1978, GFL. The list of names comes from White House memos announcing the subject matter and participants for seminars. Folder: names are all Special Consultant to the President Files, 1974 1976, Robert A. Goldwin Files, Office of White House Operations, GFL. The only seminar not to include a neo con covered the world food situation; see Folder:
111 did not leave the United States in an inferior position. This perspective fit well with the s closely. 73 The President sought to move forward on SALT after the Vladivostok summit, despite the opposition from Jackson and others, with little success. Actually achieving a election , particularly in the aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 . However, several elements came together to stall SALT progress by early 1976. The specific issues of whether or not the Soviet Backfire bomber and cruise missiles should be in cluded in a SALT accord added to the existing complexities in the negotiations. Matters became more difficult when opponents began accusing the Soviets of cheating and violating the Interim Agreement . nion to allow the emigration of Jews by tying it to U.S. trade access brought him in conflict with the administration. The issue weakened dÃ©tente by increasing American skepticism about the trustworthiness of the Soviets while frustrating them, moving the m to believe that the United Another reason d Ã©tente declined was the United States and S oviet Union taking sides in the Angolan conflict during 1975 as that nation experienced a civil war between communist and non communist forces. The net impact on SALT appeared when 73 Wall Street Journal , 5/12/75, in Political Observer , 5/75, Folder: 1982 (1976 osenblatt, LBJ; Memo, 12/30/75, Folder: New York Times , 4/5/76, Folder: 1982 (1976 apers of Peter R. Rosenblatt, LBJ; Political Observer , 7/76, Folder: 1982 (1976 News From Jackson for President Committee, Press Release, 2/8/76, HMJ 3560 6/12/8.
112 Kissinger traveled to Moscow for negotiations in January 1976, and the two sides could not come to an agreement. Both concluded that a treaty would not be forthcoming that year, and the election outcome spelled the end of both the Nixon/Ford/Kissinger version of dÃ©tente and the Republican effort to limit strategic arms. Having resisted the dangers inherent in the official U.S. SALT efforts over the previous eight years, Jac kson and his neoconservative allies believed that with a new Democrat president, their vision of arms control and peace through strength might come to pass. When Jimmy Carter became the nominee rather than Jackson, neocons began to get nervous. 74 74 Garthoff, DÃ© tente , 505, 514 515, 589 593, 596 600; Hyland, Rivals , 147, 155, 161 162; Platt, Senate , 65; Vaisse, Neoconservatism , 125 128.
113 Table 4 1 SALT I Interim Agreement 75 United States Soviet Union Fixed Land Based ICBM Launchers 1054 1618 Submarine (SLBM) Launchers 710 950 Replacement SLBM Launchers 656 740 Total ICBM Launchers 1700 2400 Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarines 44 62 Table 4 2 Vladivostok Framework 76 United States Soviet Union Strategic Vectors (Delivery Vehicles ) 2400 2400 MIRVed Strategic Vectors 1320 1320 75 Calvo Goller and Calvo, SALT Agreements , 31 32, 36 Current Trends In the U.S. Sovi Tyroler, ed., Alerting America SALT Handbook , 62 65. 76 Calvo Goller and Calvo, SALT Agreements , 44; Novem SALT Handbook , 290.
114 CHAPTER 5 PART II EMERGENCE The 1976 presidential election proved to be a watershed moment for SALT. With the election of Jimmy Carter, U.S. foreign and strategic arms policy changed, transforming into what amounted to a third direction since the Cuban Missile Crisis that consciously broke with the approach of Nixon, and to a lesser degree, Johnson . Additionally, the nature of neoconservative led opposition to SALT II took on a different focus and approach. U nderstand ing how the subsequent debate over SALT II unfolded requires examining the character and approach of the administration th at completed negotiations on the second treaty , as well as the nature of and changes in those opposed to the agreement. Carter campaigned against the foreign policy of Nixon/Ford/Kissinger, and as president implemented significant changes. T he secretive nature a nd individual control associated with the previous administrations disappeared . DÃ©tente remained, but defined more as a means to peace , and associated with cooperation in general. The President to view hum an rights as the starting point for all policy. This approach was the result of in some ways to the thinking of Woodrow Wilson. The new President also saw human right s as a focus of all nations at the time. He believed that America could lead by example, and that other nations would follow. influenced the SALT II talks. A rms control was a major focus for his presidency, and the contex t for it was human rights. Improving the world for people everywhere req uired limiting, and even eliminating, the danger of
115 nuclear weapons. He combined this thinking with the idea of the United States as a leader , in spiring other nations to follow. Car ter believed that unilateral action on arms control would in all likelihood result in Soviet movement on negotiation positions. Thus, the United States needed to be ready to act alone if necessary to move the discussions forward. Neoconservatives strongly objected to s uch an approach. Initially there appeared to be some hope that Carter, a Democrat, might take up the mantle of LBJ, including his approach to foreign policy and arms control. It quickly became clear that the new President was not cut from t he same cloth as his predecessor. Part of the reason for the change was the shift in the nature of the Democratic party that generated the Coalition for a Democratic Majority response. The new President soon appear ed to favor the new breed of Democrat, c haracterized by the assumptions of the New Left , or as the CDM called it, the New Politics . This group questioned everything from the need for a Cold War to the nature of the Soviets as a threat . The neoconservatives of the CDM represented the ideals of older Democrats, those who continued to buy into the necessity of containment . They viewed the Soviet Union as an implacable foe , and Despite the hopes of the CDM, n eoconservatives by 19 76 had effectiv ely lost control of their party . Individuals like Senator Jackson, Paul Nitze, and others hoped that the Carter administration would work with the CDM, but those hopes were quickly dashed on c e the new President took office. The dismay of ne oconservatives was not unique, as both Democrats and Republicans looked at the status of the nation between 1972 and 1976 and found much
116 wanting. Frustration marked many of these people as they saw what looked like a trend toward weakness rather than stre ngth in dealing with the Soviet Union . Additionally, the Soviet Union continued to increase its military and engage in adventurism . Believing the United States needed to change its policies toward the Soviets , n eocons organized a bipartisan meeting of co ncerned individuals in the spring of 1976 to create an organization tasked with alerting the nation to the dangers of Soviet actions and current U.S. policy . Thus, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) was born. T he first issue the group chose to pu rsue was strategic arms control. Initially the organization planned to make this top ic one of many the organization address ed , but the CPD agenda ended up focused almost exclusively on opposing the Carter ment until the SALT II Treaty died at the end of 1979 . Lead ers of the new organization were familiar faces to neocons, and included Eugene Rostow and Paul Nitze, among others . I nspired by Senator Jackson and his fellow travelers, the group began a concer ted effort to refute the current thinking of both political parties on Soviet relations and strategic arms control. Intellectual overlap with the CDM , along with the infamous Team B evaluation of the CIA , reinforced a consensus that the nation needed to b e wary of the danger the Soviet Union posed . The CPD carried out many activities, including rele asing several papers and reports, holding conferences, making statements for the press, and testifying before Congress . The purpose of all these efforts was t o make the nation aware that dealing with the Soviets from a position of weakness rather than strength was inherently dangerous. Additionally, the Committee addressed t he specific i ssues of verification and equality in strategic arms control .
117 In the minds of both contemporaries and subsequent scholars, the CPD was the executive branch shared this viewpoint. O ne of the primary concerns for the President was securing Senate a pproval of an eventual treaty. T he Committee represented the most significant hurdle to that goal SALT II . According to the CPD , in addition to the problem of not proceeding from strength, recent Sov unilateral and trusting , posing a potential danger to America . The President gathering sufficient support for an agreement. To understand better how the debate over SALT II unfolded during the Carter presidency, it is helpful to explore how these two sides thought and the assumptions that drove them.
118 CHAPTER 6 SWITCHING BRANDS I: THE CARTER ADMINISTR A TION The approach to SALT by the United States underwent a significant shift w ith the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President for several reasons . The new as did the general approach to foreign policy. T he Kissinger directed methodology that previously dominated the negotiations no longer applied . Moreover, the SALT I agreements, the Vladivostok framework, and the subsequent SALT II discussions put the new administr ation at a unique starting point relative to their predecessors as they pursued a strategic arms control treaty. Finally, the nature of domestic opposition changed , and the level of domestic debate escalated. Some of thes e differences appeared immediate l y , and others manifested over the course of office . exploration of his overall foreign policy philosophy , as well as how the administration applied those gene ral ideas to SALT . The White House sought to shape public and Congressional opinion concerning the Soviet Union and the negotiations to generate support for the eventual treaty. The methods and goals of the President and his advisors stood in stark contr ast to Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger, and though different, these new elements cause d concern s for neoconservatives. A survey of t he basis of , and the specific plans for SALT that the White House pursued during his term , provide s the context needed to understand the nature with the neocon led opposition.
119 The Nature of Ford admini strations . The new Democratic President sought to move away from an emphasis on linkage, national interests, secrecy, and negotiation , preferring to focus on human rights, openness, and ideals . Carter described the natur e of his foreign policy in a spee ch at the May 1977 commencement of Notre Dame University. After establishing the concept of human rights as foundational , Carter spoke of his foreign policy views in terms of democracy, values, and humane purposes. He noted that this focus was a shift aw ay from the assumptions of policy that the American people both support and, for a change, know about and 1 Although differing from Nixon/Ford policy in clarity and transparency, this type of chan ge did not mean that Carter rejected all previous U.S. policy concepts. He embraced dÃ©tente, which had been a key aspect in U.S. foreign relations since the beginning of the Nixon administration. At the same time, Carter redefined the policy by arguing t hat the scope of dÃ©tente needed to be extended beyond relations between the United States and the Soviet Union . He based this idea in the belief that the key obstacle to dÃ©tente was governmental oppression. In this case, dÃ©tente equaled cooperation. Thi s conception derived from his understanding of human rights, which governed his approach to fo reign relations. 2 While a detailed examination of human rights is beyond the scope of this disse rtation, a brief glimpse at its role in he lps to understand how 1 PPPUS Carter , I: 955. 2 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 15; Caldwell, Dynamics , 11; Skidmore, Reversing Cou rse , xi; FRUS 1969 197 6, I: 115 .
120 the U.S. approach to SALT and dÃ©tente changed under his administration. The idea of using human rights as the starting point for foreign policy was a clear priority of the new administration. H is experiences of racism in Georgia whi le growing up, along with his observation and approval of the Civil Rights Movement, convinced the President that moral principles could transform a society. Moreover, the same arguments applied in the international arena. In surveying the landscape of p ost World War II U.S. foreign relations, Carter saw the need to shape policy in a different manner by embracing the idealism he saw in former presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman. He also viewed his commitment to human rights as focused on d eclaring Americ an beliefs, rather than pursuit of a transformational agenda to fit other nations into the U.S. mold. While presidents such as Truman were able to pursue rights on the domestic front, Carter remained less encouraged by the historic efforts of U.S. foreign policy. He believed that t he nation often seemed to follow policies based in lies, despite opportunities for the United States to focus on concern s for the treatment of people as a significant factor . Carter s cholars suggest that such a p erspective resonated with an electorate emerging from the Vietnam Conflict and Watergate. 3 s rationale for placing human rights at the center of his foreign policy rested on more than electoral advantag e or 3 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President , (Fayetteville , AR : The University of Arkansas Press, 1995) 145 PPPUS Carter, I: 850; PPPUS Carter , 958; Moens, Foreign Policy , 26; Smith, Morality , 50 53. Sarah B. Synder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network , (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) is a recent, award winning book that argues that the Helsinki Final Act created a transnational network that helped persuade national leaders from Western nations to make human rights a diplomatic factor; she also suggest that this activism helped end about government, the scandals of the CIA, such as those investigated by the Church Comm ittee, among others, are another example that no doubt added to this resonance; see Johnson, Congress and the Cold War , 216 225.
121 believed that promoting human rights exercise of U.S. foreign relations, if rooted in respect for others, could promot e values of democracy and liberty without falling into the trap of supporting oppressive regimes. Carter thus viewed human rights as a fundamental assumption necessary to establishing the count ry as a model for other nations, worthy of respect and a symbo l of hope. the wave of the future throughout the world, and I wanted the United States to be on the 4 H is emphasis received mixed reviews from the Ame rican public . Carter gained the support of some members of the Senate, reinforcing his view that his policy priorities reflected the perspective of the people. At the same time, grounding U.S. foreign relations in human rights complicated admi nistration efforts to move forward on other issues. This hindrance resulted from both f thinking about foreign policy and the perception that Congress initial ly resisted the President policy direc tion. 5 The different reaction s to placing human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy foreshadowed the effectiveness. At the beginning of his administration, Carter, along with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Securi ty Adviso r 4 Carter, Keeping Faith , 148. 5 PPPUS Carter the PPPUS Carter , I: 945; Carter, Keeping Faith , 145 155; Senate Letter to Jimmy SALT, 3/12/77 Landon Files, Jim my Carter Library (Hereinafter JCL) Note that both pro SALT Alan Cranston and anti SALT Henry Jackson were signatories; Memo from Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, 6/ 29 / 77, 2, Folder: Fil es, JCL .
122 Zbigniew Brzezinski, agreed that addressing human rights required different approaches to different problems. Both the President and his national security advisor later reflected tha t the policy led to intermittent results , a perspective shared by some scholars. A good example o on SALT. Both U.S. and Soviet leaders believed that i nfluenc ed negotiations , but academic conclusions vary regarding the impact of emphasi zing human rights . Some scholars , such as historian Timothy Maga, argue that Carter disconnected human rights and SALT in an effort to make progress toward a treaty . Political scienti st David Skidmore represents another viewpoint that suggests the admini w as essentially a tool . human rights was a failed attempt to devise an alternative strategy for rallying domestic 6 While scholarly opinions differ regarding the po the Carter administration, the emphasis clearly influenced contemporary actors . The President human rights dominated how he approached international issues, including SALT, and se rved as a source of stress in U.S. foreign relations. 7 tensions in the White House that affected his efforts . When the administration spoke with a single 6 Skidmore, Reversing Course , 86. 7 Carter, Keeping Faith , 149, 155; Cyrus Vance, , (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 33; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977 1981 , (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, 1985), 124 129, 144 145; Timothy P. Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter: U.S. Foreign Policy, 1977 1981 , (West Haven, CT: Unive rsity of New Haven Press, 1994), 136 137 ; Skidmore, Reversing Course, 51, 90 94. For additional Smith, Morality, 15, 49 55 , 64 ; Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 35 36; Caldwell, Dynamics, 12, 17, 186; Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carte r and the Making of American Foreign Policy, (Baton Rouge , LA : Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 73; Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade, 204, 212 218; and Glad, Outsider , 69 76.
123 voice that defined policy, clear suc cesses resulted, such as the Panama Canal Treaty and the Camp David Accords with Egypt and Israel . disagreed about the best approach for Soviet related foreign policy questions. They held d ifferent assumptions when it came to e valuating Soviet advent ures in the international realm. This situation led to varied opinions about appropriate U.S. responses, especially the extent to which the national security interests were at risk . As a result, relations with the Soviets presented administration opponents with opportunities to criticize both real and imagined fai . The consensus among Carter scholars is that t he single biggest source of internal tension was the conflict between the viewpo ints and advice of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Assessing this conflict can help 8 Explanations for th e Vance/Brzezinski tension vary depending on how scholars view t Alexander Moens and Gaddis Smith view Brzezinski as initially an organizer who provided a neutral coordination of policy initially, but m oved from impartiality to . The effect drew Carter toward a more hawkish perspective , proximity to the President . In this perspective , the combination argues that difficulties between the two [Vance and Brzezinski] would ultimately be crippling for the Administration. They were both a cause and a result of the President 8 Caldwell, Dynamics , 25; Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 3 4; Strong, Working, 262 263;
124 9 Opinions vary regarding the significance of the Vance B rzezinski differences . Robert Strong places important but not the defining reason for deciding on either the con sistency or success . Historian Scott Kaufman claims that the President lack of ability to direct his subordinates effectively was the key source of policy ineffectiveness, and the Vance problem. Skidmore propo ses that domestic constraints forced Carter to revise his policy direction as his term unfolded. Thus, he concludes that the policy shifts in the Carter White House were a symptom of the disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski rather than a cause . 10 T his diversity of academic opinion requires two assessments: what did the principals think after leaving office and reflecting on their work; and does the issue of the differences between Vance and Brzezinski constitute a significant element in explaining d Brzezinski all cl early were aware of disagreements between the two advisors, but varied in their estimation of the s ignificance . Carter saw the ir differences as strengths upon which he could rely in a complementary fashion to provide him with the needed insights to shape and drive U.S. foreign policy. Vance regarded the National Security Advisor as a man who wanted to move from advising to publicly defining foreign policy , something exclusive to the President and 9 Smith, Morality , 35. 10 Moens, Foreign Policy , 56 57; Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 716, 801; Strong, Working , 268 269; Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 240; Skidmore, Reversing , 11, 29. For a view suggesting the Vance/Brzezinski tension was virtually meaningl ess in the grander scheme, see Maga, World , 12.
125 increasingly public role brought confusion to U.S. foreign relations, and inhibited both a clear its effectiveness in achieving those obj ectives. Brzezinski believed Vance a man who believed that diplomacy rather than power and force defined the nature of American foreign policy. T his philosophy meant that Vance was not well suited to carrying out foreign relations in the world of the lat 11 The two men each clearly had reservat ions to function well in the Carter administration . The best explanati on for the importance of the differences between Vance and Brzezinski is that any issues of personality and individualism are rooted in the substance of the policies and decisions relating to U.S. foreign policy. 12 The answer to the other question of whethe differences affected the domestic side of U.S. foreign policy , particularly with SALT, is . While both the secretary of state and national security advisor were key players in arriving at a complete d SALT II treaty, the ir role was to provide foreign relations advice to Carter . Thus, they paid only minimal attention to the domestic end of foreign relations . Neither were the first line of advisors Carter used to help him make decisions about the domestic considerations . Brzezinski freely admits, when describing how the advisors, because the foreign policy of a democracy is effective only as long as it is sustained by strong popular support. Insensitivity to domestic concerns could produce 11 Brzezinski, Power and Principle , 43. 12 Carter, Keeping Faith , 52 57; Vance, Hard Choices , 35 39; Brzezinski, Power and Principle , 36 44.
126 13 Only Brzezinski made any sustained effort to influence the key domestic advisors in the White House: Hamilton Jordan and Press Secretary Jody Powell . He found that their perspectives mirror ed his own and advanced his agenda, particularly regarding areas where he differed with Vance. Thus, the Vance Brzezinski tensions do not represent a significant element in shaping the domestic aspe policy. 14 Before leaving an overvi understand the place of SALT in his thinking on U.S. foreign relations in general and human rights in particular . He clearly prioritized strategic arms negotiations in the context of human rights as a mai n concern of his foreign policy . During his inauguration speech, Carter set out the primacy of human rights using language of fostering would help create. 15 This rhetor ic is logically assoc iated with preservation of life. Then step toward our ultimate goal the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth. We urge all other 16 The only foreign relations issues mentioned in the inaugural addr ess were human rights and strategic arms control. The new President made videotaped remarks for foreign 13 Brzezinski, Power and Principle , 73. 14 Brzezinski, Power and Prin ciple, 68, 73 74, 222, 319, 331, 337, and see especially 167 and 326 regarding consulting Jordan about domestic issues with SALT II; Carter, Keeping Faith , 56; Memo from Fol der: Activities [Public Support], 6/2/79 Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL ; Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency , (New 1982, Berkley edition, 1983), 38 39. 15 Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 1/20/77, in PPPUS Carter I, 3. 16 Ibid.
127 nations, and chose to emphasize the U.S. role under his administration as distinct from previous presidencies. He promised that he would not attempt to dominate other countries . Instead, nations heard him describe the United States as a leader soliciting them to follow him on the issues of nuclear weapons, human rights, sharing of world resources, environmental care, and world peace. Interestingly, the threat of atomic annihilation was the first item mentioned in that small list. 17 This perspective on SALT as a major priori ty was a consistent theme during President and his two major foreign policy advisors. Brzezinski clearly portrays SALT and the Middle East as high priority, central issues for the new administration . T he context was a larger focus on human rights and improving the lives of people around the world though the application of U.S. power and influence. He argues that the administration expected pursuing human rights with the Soviets wou ld result in improved relations with an increased probability of a beneficial arms control outcome. Vance also claims that the operation of diplomacy was through the lens of human rights, and suggests S ALT as the major issue between the United States and Soviet Union was view ed in this context . Likewise, Carter in his memoir describes SALT as one of the major foreign policy objectives of his administration, one to which he was deeply committed. He contextualizes SALT when he notes th e tens ions in negotiations that resulted f rom disagreements over Soviet human rights related activities . While eschewing a direct link , Carter implicit ly acknowle dges that human rights created indirect problems with SALT . However, even if complications could be traced to his foundational beliefs , [i] n truth, this remains a irrelevant question for me. Even if our human rights policy had been a much more 17 United States Foreign Policy, 1/20/77, in PPPUS Carter I, 4 5.
128 serious point of contention in Soviet American relations, I would not have been inclined 18 All three men shar e the post presidential administration pursued a vision of strategic arms control in the larger context of human rights as a major issue for them in U.S. foreign policy. 19 Scholars differ regarding the nature of the relationship be tween human rights and SALT in the policy mind of the administration. Gaddis Smith suggests that human rights did not appear to impact arms control negotiations . While there is no direct one to one effect , the idea that the two policies were not linked i n some way does not seem to fit the evidence from the early administration . Garthoff argues that that Carter never intended to suggest or view human rights and SALT as linked , but the dual, si multaneous emphasis unintentionally led the Soviets to believe the two were connected. Thus, human rights as a concern contributed to Soviet opposition to U.S. SALT proposals due to resentment of the associated criticisms. Garthoff implies that Carter was naÃ¯ve to think that the Soviets would not find his pronouncem ents on human rights insulting, which wo uld then negatively affect SALT. However, the absence of a does not fit with the . A more careful readin g focuses on nature of the relationship between human rights and SALT, and the difference between the initial regarding the im pact of his first policy effort . As Timothy Maga r ightly notes, there was a tie between human rights and SALT in the early assumptions of the President , and a subsequent separation of links between arms control and human rights. He suggests 18 Carter, Keeping Faith , 154. 19 Brzezinski, Power and Principle , 123; Vance, Hard Choices , 46; Carter, Keeping Faith , 153 154, 220.
129 that t his shift reaction to Sovie t rejection of the new President new insight about the nature of U.S. Soviet relations as a result, specifically that t here was pragmatic value in pursuing both policies separately to elimina te Soviet reluctance to negotiate about strategic arms due to human rights complaints . This conclusion means that l inkage as the Soviet s saw it and the contextual relationship of human rights and SALT were two different things. The context did not change , but the manner in which the United States pursued both policies wit h the Soviets did. Grasping this distinction is helpful in understanding how SALT fit into the overarching policy of human rights in the Carter presidency. 20 In addition to the relationsh ip of human rights and arms control, t he other particularly relevant area that scholars of Carter and SALT address is the impact of domestic politics and voices on White House efforts to create support for a treaty. The debate between sup porters and oppon ents of U.S. arms control efforts had clearly drawn lines by 1977 , but the significance of the domestic element varies depending on the writer. Exploring this scholarship is a helpful prologue to examining in subsequent chapters the sources of opposition advice and planning in the Ca rter White House originated , and how the administration chose to respond to SALT II critics . Beyond a consensus regarding the major opposition sources , the degree of importance att ached to domestic criticism varies in the SALT II scholarship . Points of agreement include considering Senator Henry Jackson (D WA) as the leading 20 Smith, Morality , 68; Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 634 ; Maga, World , 136 137. Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 37, 41 .
130 Congressional figure among those opposing SALT, and the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) a s the primary SALT opposition group . There is also general agree ment that d omestic political machinations played some type of role in the outcome of SALT II. Beyond this level of unanimity, there is considerable variation that can be divi ded into three broad categori es of focus: tangential, equal, and primary. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II is typical of the tangential approach. The CPD is only mentioned twice, although Jackson receives more attention. The book ends before the Senate committe e hearings took place that served as the pinnacle of opposition diplomacy in general. The CPD is mentioned once, and Jackson twice. With this type of scholarship, the domes tic highlights are usually a few specific issues, such as the dispute over the Warnke nominations, the SALT ratification debate, or a general reference to disagreements between the Senate and the administration. For these writers, the domestic aspect is t angential to their focus, and as such receives only brief mention. The fact that internal political elements are referred to at all sugges ts some degree of importance, since this category of treatment does not focus on national political considerations an d machinations. Therefore, even a brief reference implies that domestic concerns cannot be completely dismissed. 21 The second category of scholars devote equal attention to domestic and foreign II efforts. There is often a greater emphasis on the importance of organizations like the CPD and individuals like Jackson . T his information is supplemented by referencing additional groups and 21 See Talbott, Endgame ; Smith, Morality ; Maga, World; Strong, Working . Moens devotes a chapter to the ratification debate as a case study, but makes very minimal reference to domestic politics , see Moens, Foreign , 63 89 .
131 persons, as well as the general importance of including inte rnal factors to explain outcomes. Raymond Garthoff argues i n DÃ©tente and Confrontation tha t domestic influences equaled any other factor for exp la in ing the progress and outcome of SALT II in the context of dÃ©tente between the United States and the Soviet Union . However, recognition is not the same as examination, and the domestic elements are only briefly mentioned at various points. He cites several events and persons , such as Team B and Eugene Rostow, along with brief descriptions of opposition efforts , but there is no description of the nature of that protest or any consideration of the neoconservative nature of the opposition leadership Plans Unraveled , a recent survey ar to Garthoff by addressing the CPD and Jackson, as well as Rostow and neoconservatives while noting the importance of domestic factors. However, perhaps unsurprisingly in a survey, he devotes less space to analysis than description. As a group, these s cholars devote more attention to national domestic politics, but without a deeper level of examination. 22 A third category of scholarly work focuses on domestic elements as primary foreign policy and SALT approach . Dan Caldwell argue s i n The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control that the SALT II treaty ratification effort failed due to the combined impact of issues related to the Executive, the Legislature, their relationships, the influence of the American public, and extern al events. He dedicates a significant portion of the work to a consideration of interest groups and their 22 Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 16, 454 456, 594 596, 607, 6 27, 800; Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 8 11, 37 39, 182 187. See also The Fall of DÃ©tente: Soviet American Relations during the Carter Years , ed. Odd Arne Westad, (Boston: Scandina vian U niversity Press, 1997), 34 71; Although Kaufman had greater access to Carter Library documents, his work is based as much or more on secondary rather than primary sources, according to Unfortunately, his sole reference to the Rostow a ssociated with CPD incorrectly refers to Walt rather than Eugene, see Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 8. His neocon references are not in the context of leadership of the opposition, see Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 4, 6, 8 10, 14, 37 38, 45.
132 influence . He also examines issues of public opinion, the focus of various interest groups, and the effectiveness of both governmental and non gover nmental efforts to influence SALT policy. While he did not make significant use of Carter administration materials, e xtensive interviews with several key individuals involved in the domestic politics of SALT II serve to provide many specifics about decisi ons relating to the SALT II treaty fight. However, the details of the opposition forces, particularly the ideology that drove them, and the ebb and flow of ideas shaping policy are not present to any s ignificant degree in his work. 23 omestic Plans for SALT dealing with domestic support issues for SALT II. Many of these individuals guided the plans throughout his presidency during the negotiation s and Senat e hearing process. One of the key staffers for domestic policy and a close Carter advisor was Hamilton Jordan, who in 1979 would officially become Chief of Staff; in reality, Jordan essentially served this function throughout the Carter presidency. Jorda n sent Carter a memo outlining key issues with regard to domestic concerns relating to foreign policy l ess than six months into the administration . He identified SALT a foreign relations agenda, equaled only by the Panama Canal and Middle East . memo came from his deputy, Landon Butler, who wrote to outline the initial planning for 23 Caldwell, Dynamics . The Fall of DÃ©tente: Soviet American Relations during the Carter Years, ed. Odd Arne Westad, 95 117. (Boston: Scandinavian University Press, 1997). See also David Skidmore, Re versing Course . Like Caldwell, Skidmore focuses on Carter and the SALT II treaty. He also claims that rising conservatism assessment of the nature of that conservatism. The CPD and Senator Jackson figure in his explanation detailed examination is absent, as i s the documentary record of Senate efforts .
133 the administration domestic activities relative to the three foreign policy topics. The primacy of SALT in this diplomatic triumvirate sug gests arms control ranked high in the foreign policy con cerns of the new administration. Clearly, understood U.S. foreign relations priorities. 24 Among the members of the Carter administration, these two individuals in particular bore the task of heading up , planning , and communicating with the President about White House efforts regarding SALT II . chief of s taff and lieutenant governor . aide with no real portfolio, and essentially functioned as the chief of staff until he was formally appointed to the position in 1979. Involved in both domestic politics and fo reign relations decisions during his time in the White House, Jordan left the administration to run the President assistant and de facto deputy chief of staff. While Jordan served as the main conduit of political consultation to the upper levels of the Carter administration, Butler focused on the domestic politics of SALT, a position he held from the beginning. Jordan oting amid in SALT activities since the spring of 1977; he drafted the master plan which has 25 Thus, Jordan and But ler served 24 Folder: JCL . 25 Memo, Hamilton Jordan to SALT Worki ng Group, 7/25/79, Folder: files, JCL .
134 policies. These staffers coordinated the efforts of many members of the administration, along with members of the State Department, Defense Department, ACDA, C IA, and NSC tasked with ensuring support for SALT in general and passage of the SALT II treaty in particular. illustrates their importance, especially the President , Brzezinski, and Vance. While others negotiated the agreement , Jordan and Butler SALT II ratification push. 26 T ked a change in the specific to a dvance SALT met with resistance. This reaction prompted a review of foreign policy efforts, and the creation of a specific plan created by Jordan and Butler to generate domestic support for an eventual treaty. The plan identified Congressional support as the key to passage of an agreement with the Soviet Union, and popular backing for SALT as the mean s to ensure a desirable outcom e. The administration put its plan in motion by the middle of 1977 guided the domestic support effort until the President withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration at the beginning of 1980. Two specific events early in Carte prompted a major re evaluation of event was Carter fo rmal nomination of Paul Warnke to be both head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief SALT negotiator . This action signaled a 26 Caldwell, Dynamics , 57, 59; Carter, Keeping Faith , 58.
135 nature of conservative concerns about the So viet threat . The President appointment crucial and clearly offered support for his nominee. T oward the end of a contentious, month long vetting process, the Senate approved his position . T he debate thoughts about arms contr ol served as the firs t salvo in the conflict with opposition forces , providing the Carter administration a sense of the landscape for moving forward on SALT. 27 The vote outcome of fifty eight in favor and forty opposed to the Warnke appointment was a weak p erformance for the administration, particularly in light of the necessity of gaining sixty six or more votes to ratify any treaty. How the Warnke vote in general, als o concerned the White House. Although the date and author are unknown, a map sho wing the fifty states and color coded to show which senators voted ag ainst Warnke as head of the ACDA is 1977 SALT files . The author also coded the map to show if one or both senators from a particular state voted against Warnke for chief SALT negotiator, and annotated a copy of the Congressional 27 PPPUS Carter , I, 93 96, 99 100; Lee WP , 2/1/77, A2 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146856012 New York Times , 2/8/77, 7, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123534701 New York Times , 2/10/77, 39, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123524772 ; WSJ , 2/10/77, 7 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/134163248 Russian Arms Debate at WP , 2/20/77, 1 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146845954 in Working in the World is an excellent summation of the Warnke nomination fight. New York Times hereinaf ter NYT .
136 vote record . These actions suggest concern on the part of White House staffers as early as March 1977 about the President 28 Butler and Jordan were well aware of the general concerns about the circumstances in which the new administration was operating. National Security Council staffer Rick Inderfurth forwarded a New York Times editorial from March 19, 1977 with annotations , reminding Butler that the opinion piece related to a previous one that required firm action on the Pr esident domestic discussion on arms control. The possibility of lo sing administration control over the policy debate stemmed from the difficulty in securing approval for Paul Warnke as head of the Arms Control and Disar mament Agency. T he editorial, and by implication Inderfurth, made a clear case for a lack of presidential direction and control office. 29 The second event influenci ng the White House take on domestic support for Carter sent a letter to Brezhnev just six days after b ec oming president, and followed it with others outlining a desire to continue SALT negotiations and pursue even deeper cuts. The Soviet leader responded by pointing out the Soviet desire to maintain the status quo of the Vladivostok framework and condemning the new American priority on 28 WP , 3/12/77, A19 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146772914 ; Carter, Keeping Faith Fo lder: , Box 37, Chief of Staff files, JCL ; Map of Paul Warnke Arms Control and Disarmament Folder: , Chief of Staff files, JCL ; Map of Paul Warnke Chair of SALT Folder: , Box 37, C hief of Staff files, JCL . 29 Note from Rick Inderfurth to Landon Butler, 3/19/77, Folder: SALT, 3/12/77 Files, JCL .
137 human rights. According to Brzezins ki, the letter exchange set the context for discussion among administration officials, although the outcome reflected the President Carter decided to propose moving beyond the positions agreed upon during the Ford presidency. When S ecreta ry of State Vance presented the idea of deep cuts in the number of nuclear missiles at a summit in March, the Soviets rejected b oth the primary plan and a backup . 30 These two problems forced the administration to re examine their SALT goals and reconsider h ow to proceed in shaping policy and negotiating positions. Uncorrected, the situation could create a climate where Americans believed that the Carter administration acted from ignorance, made fundamental mistakes, or both . A problem of this type so early in the presidency on an issue defined as a major concern could undermine the entire foreign policy agenda. feared that such a reaction would undermine domestic support for SALT, and thereby make the task of successfully concluding a SAL T II treaty more difficult . Thus, the White House domestic policy staff began to discuss how to handle both the impact of SALT on domestic policy and an anticipated ratification battle over a SALT II treaty at some point in the future. 31 Landon Butler beg an organizing meetings to determine the best strategies to generate positive domestic opinion s about SALT shortly after the President took office . Staffers focused on foreign relations supp orted this task, recognizing the importance of domestic political support for success in diplomatic actions. Zbigniew Brzezinski in 30 Carter, Keeping Faith , 222 225; Vance, Hard Choices, 50 53; Brzezinski, Power and Principle , 155 164; Kaufman, Plans , 38 41. See Table 9 1 at the end of this chapter for details of the deep cuts proposal. 31 Vance, Hard Choices , 56; Brzezinski, Power and Principle , 164 165; Joseph WP , 4/3/77, 35, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146800945 .
138 particular sought out Jordan for consultation on the domestic component of SALT. Butler referred in a memo to a meeting with Brzezinski and Deputy N ational Security Advisor David Aaron, wh ere the group agreed on the benefits of fostering domestic political support, specifically among Senators and their staffers. Good planning meant a careful approach, which would prevent problems as the administration pursued different avenues to foster pu blic support for the eventual treaty . Butler suggested several options to get the White House message on SALT out to the public, including a town hall meeting, a radio call in show, a State Department film, and increased Senate support for SALT. Involvin g legislators previously not active in generating SALT support would assist with future treaty ratification efforts . Butler pointed out that such actions provided a n additional specific political benefit . allow Senator 32 He also suggested mobilizing private groups and individuals, but through means other than direct mail , only with presidential approval, and only as a subset of the Democratic National Commi its General Advisory Council, a body composed of leaders from business and labor, persons outside of the arms control establishment could ultimately weigh heavily on the 33 Although he undoubtedly meant organizations that would support coming days rather accurately. The planning discussed by Jordan and his deputy 32 Memo, Landon Butler to Hamilton Jordan, 5/11/77, Folder: , Chief of Staff F iles, JCL . 33 Ibid.
139 considered options and ideas that were all long term in nature . Their approach implies that the ebb and flow of the actu al arms control talks was not the primary factor that dictate d the domestic efforts to increase American support for SALT . What was more important were concerns about securing sufficient popular and legislative support to ensure t reaty ratification when negotiations concluded . 34 Jordan took the opportunity after Car major foreign policy speech at Notre Dame to set out some key ideas in an important, eyes only memo for the President . He foreign policy and outline a comprehensive app roach for winning public and 35 He noted that SALT was on a short list of the most important foreign relations issues for the President , and presented the idea of gaining Congressional support by consultation . T he necessity/value of frequent high level Congressional con tact was due to one simple fact. [ Congressional support in some form is needed to accomplish most of your foreign policy objectives ] . 36 I ndividual members of the Senate could be regularly updated by a combination of the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security Advisor. The attention given Republicans and 34 Brzezinski, Power and Principle , 167; Vance reflected similar concerns about domestic factors on SALT in October of 1977, see Vance, Hard Choices Folder: LB Memos, 5/2/77 5/31/77, Box 150, Lan Files, JCL ; Memo, Landon Butler to Hamilton Jordan, 5/11/77, Folder: 3/7/77 Files, JCL . 35 M emo from Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, June 1977, pg 1, Folder: JCL . 36 Memo from Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, June 1977, pg 6, Folder: icy JCL . Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation.
140 Democrats, conservatives and liberals, virt ually all senators, would pay divid ends at the time of the treaty ratification fight . 37 Carter quickly , which Butler then folded into an overall plan for domestic support of foreign policy . Jordan forwarded this memo describing the plan to the President , noti ng the critical importance of the topics described. Butler outlined se veral key underlying concepts about how the administration would prepare and pursue creating public and Congressional support for It was important to re alize that the assumptions the President used as the basis for his goals in foreign relations differed from the commonplace thinking of many people. This concept applied to both the public and the Senate . also noted that although the admi nistration needed Congressional support throughout the entire process, the necessary sentiment was not present in the Senate of June 1977 . Finally, gaining public support for U.S. diplomatic icies. Based on these assumptions, Butler suggested specific objectives in implementing the domestic support plan: a planned course of continual Congressional interaction ; an effort to time the speeches of important administration spea kers to impact key senate votes; and setting up specific press briefings outside the confines of the capitol. 38 Moving from the general to the specific , Butler delineated similar assumptions and objectives for SALT. H e posited that liberals and conservatives in arms co ntrol did not trust one another. L iberals supported SALT without question, while conservatives 37 Memo from Hamilton Jordan t o Jimmy Carter, June 1977, Folder: JCL . 38 Folder: Work Pl JCL .
141 ask the tough questions [ ] 39 Based on this reasoning, h e argued that four objectives had to be part of any plan to educate the public and Sen ators . The White House had to take into account the key senators in creating a Senate strategy . They needed to engage in a public education plan that would increase support for SALT among larger numbers of groups and individuals . Staffers should assembl e a plan to liaise with both conservative and liberal interest groups with an eye toward directing liberal involvement and keeping conservatives up to date . Finally, the administration could create a plan to use direct mail to foster Senate support for a treaty if one wa s completed. Butler ideas to keep hard line opposition individuals updated suggests these sources of resistance constituted not only a cause of concern, but one that was viewed as such from the early days 40 T h from mid 1977 through the signing of the SALT II treaty in 1979 , carrying out the recommended objectives. T he consultative approach to Congress quickly became a focal point of the President domestic SALT support. Carter hand wrote a note of approval concerning Butler for senate consultation on a memo forwarded through Jordan. The use of this approach also explains the presence of numerous versions of a sheet in the Chief of Staff files . Eac h copy contains a breakdown of most of the Senate into five groups that assigned specific senators to either the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary 39 Folder: JCL . Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation. 40 Folder: ues JCL .
142 of Defense, or the National Security Advisor as part of a plan for an ongoing consulta tive effort. 41 The need for educating the American people to overcome resistance to a SALT agreement was also a consistent theme in White House communications. Jordan circulated comments from public affairs personnel at the State Department reflecting conc erns about domestic support and perception about SALT . In one example, officials cited polls showing Americans were suspicious about Soviet intention s, and that attitude could potentially spoil public support for any strategic arms agreement. Jordan also drew Butler he importance of press management to handle news about the opposition in an attempt to prevent the other side from using new objections to keep a story in the news . The chief of staff suggested a nother benefit of public educat ion was the value of selling the public on SALT far in advance of any agreement. notes to Butler emphasized the need, as a matte r of policy, for convincing Americans about the worthiness of a potential agreement . Other members of the administrat ion shared his conviction about the value of educating the nation. State Department officials reinforced the necessity of this approach, pointing out to Jordan a widespread belief about the supposed superiority of Soviet negotiators over Americans. Accor ding to their polling data, many people believed that any deal would be detrimental to the United States. Ongoing educational outreach was t he only way to overcome the 41 Memo, Landon Butler to Hamilton Jordan, 5/11/77, Folder: Agreement, 3/7/77 Files, JCL ; Mem Folder: JCL . In addition to the June memo, examples of a Senate consultation breakdown plan can b e found in other places, such as: Memo, Landon Butler to Hamilton Jordan, 6/3/77, Folder: JCL ; and Folder: Foreign Policy (SALT, Panama, etc.), 7/1/77 8/2 Files, JCL . Dan Caldwell Caldwell, Dynamics , 63 .
143 general skepticism and generate sufficient support for Senate passage of a n agreement. 42 problems faced by the administration as it pursued a SALT II treaty. Jordan and Congressional Liaison Frank Moore outlined for the President several of the challenges involved in garnering pu blic and Senate support for the SALT II negotiations. One of the more important issues was that senators who opposed the White House on strategic arms did so out of more than 43 They use d the Senate voting patterns from the Warnke nomination as a predictor of a SALT II treaty vote. In all probability, gaining Senate approval would be difficult, gi ven the tough fight and likely close outcome. The two staffers presented hurdles to pas sage, specifically certain important senators and the timetable for submitting a SALT agreement to the Senate . Success in minimizing timing problems depended on elimin ating anything that might inadvertently provide treaty opponents with the ammunition to shoot down or otherwise jeopardize a successful ratification outcome. The solution to these problems was public education. 44 42 Memo from William D. Blai r, Jr. to The Secretary, 7/20/77, Folder: Agency, 6/2/77 Files, JCL ; Memo from Hodding Carter III to Warnke, Vest, Lake, and Gelb, 10/11/77, Folder: ms Control and Disarmament Agency, 6/2/77 Files, JCL. 43 Memo, Hamilton Jordan and Frank Moore t o President Carter, 11/17/77, 2, Folder: 37, Chief of Staff F iles, JCL . 44 Memo, Hamilton Jordan and Frank Moore to President Carter, 11/17/77, Folder: , Chief of Staff F iles, JCL .
144 Different groups in the government coordina ted with Jordan and Butler to handle the task of moving public opinion in a direction amenable to the White House strategic plan. T he State Department followed the White House lead as it sought to ensure domestic backing for SALT . Counselor Matthew Nimet z c oordinated with Butler and other staffers in early 1978 on SALT Coordinating Group , which focused on 45 Nimetz worked to ensure his portion of the Executive Branch followed the President generate support an eventual treaty , including specific themes for his group to use in pursuit of this goal. example of a pattern that continued throughout the year . O ther White House staffers forwarded memos to Butler with their comments , pointing out examples affairs section that discussed public opinion survey s about SALT and the nature of public awareness about the strategic arms negotiations. The press noted in June the ongoing efforts of the State Department to educate the American public about SALT with an eye toward increasing support for a treaty. By th e end of the year, staffers such as Nimetz and Butler were clearly leading the effort to generate public support . The State Department domestic SALT plan following the Deputy Chief of Staf general plan. 46 45 Memo from Matt Nimetz to Landon Butler, 2/3/78, Folder: Landon puty Chief of Staff Files, JCL . 46 Memo from Matt Nimetz to David Aaron, 1/18/78, Folder: Landon Files, JCL ; Memo from Hodding Carter III to Mr. Nimetz, Mr. Warnke, Mr. Vest, Folder: SALT II, 4/11/78 6/9/78, Box 130, of Staff Files, JCL Folder: SALT II, 4/11/ 78 6/9/78, Box 130, Landon Files, JCL ; Memo from Matt Nimetz to Landon Butler,
145 Communications from the Vice the pattern of Jordan and Butle r taking the lead in following the White House plan s to shape domestic opinions on SALT. Vice President Walter Mondale functi oned as a Senatorial briefer, and his chief of staff, Richard Moe, kept Jordan and Butler up to date regarding concerns and ideas about securing passage of a SALT treaty. According to tically and internationally, than to suffer a Senate defeat on SALT. It would be an unmitigated 47 His suggestions to avoid the potential problem reflect ed and reinforce d the plan outlined by Butler and Jordan. Moe specifically noted the value of gaining greater Senate support, and argued for consulting at a level higher than staffers as a means of accomplishing this goal. Additionally, he suggested the formation of a specific White House task force to oversee issues associated with passage of a SALT II agreement and guide it through the Senate debate phase. Moe presented his concerns and recommended solutions to Jordan, Butler, Moore, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Vice Pre sident Mondale, presumably those individuals he believed held the power to in fluence domestic support efforts . 48 Butler kept Jordan abreast of problems related to the negotiations, often driving home the elements that comprised their plan as the solutions to keeping hope for domestic support alive. ns follow ed the structure of the Folder: SALT II, 1/2/79 1/19/79, Box 130, les, Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL . 47 Memo from Richard Moe to The Vice President, Hamilton Jordan, et al, 4/10/78, p.1, Folder: JCL . 48 Memo from Richard Moe to The Vice President, Hamilton Jordan, et al, 4 /10/78, Folder: Box 37, Chief of Staff files, JCL Memo from Hamilton Jordan and Frank Moore to President Carter, 11/17/77, Folder: JCL .
146 plan he and Jordan conceived. A good example involves the issues surrounding the timing for presenting a SALT II treaty and a Comprehensive Test Ban (C T B) agreement to Congress . Jordan advised the President not to submit both treaties at the same time, presidency, not only because SALT in some ways define d U.S. foreign policy with the Soviet Union, and the President SALT II, I believe it will destroy your ability to be an effective President and probably cost you re 49 Jordan went on to note the unity of the administration regarding SALT, something absent with CTB . He pointe d out much of the completed work to accomplish passage done with Congress and the public, an observation consistent with following the plan he and Butler laid out the previous year. After returning to the issue of Congressional support, Jordan ended with a rare personal appeal, ranking his office. 50 on SALT and C T B timing received the support of several other staffers, although for different reasons. White House Communications Director Jerry Rafshoon agreed with the de facto chief of staff, suggesting passage of SALT would be aided by domestic accomplishment, implying more political successes at home were needed. Press Secretary Jody Powell explicitly wrote of his agreement with Jordan, and argued that failure on SALT could lead Americans to conclude that the 49 Draft Memo, Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, Undated, Folder: JCL . 50 Memo from Landon Butler to Hamilton Jordan, 5/3/78, Folder: Files, JCL ; Memo from La ndon Butler to Hamilton Jordan, 5/8/78, Folder: of Staff Files, JCL .
147 Carter presidency was a failure. Frank Moore addressed more specific issues regardi ng passage of both SALT and CTB. He noted that success in SA LT required additional actions consistent with the plan, and that an approved SALT II treaty benefited a CTB treaty. These memos demonstrate unity, and suggest that this level of agr eem ent . 51 T he White House clearly intended to continue following the plan laid out by Butler and Jordan as negotiations neared a signed treaty. One example is t he administration plan to brief key private individuals who staffers determined possessed the influence necessary to generate support on issues of arms control policy. This element was part of a larger effort that would be guided by a collection of people from throughout the executive b ranch and the military tasked with coordinating strategy for t he expected debate on a SALT II treaty in 1979. Jordan and Butler functioned as the leadership of this assembly, the SALT Working Group, which began working to bring the plan to its logical outcome: treaty ratification. 52 s emphasis on human r ights constituted a significant shift from the previous direction of American foreign policy under Nixon and Ford. This change also shaped the initial administration approach to SALT . When the first effort stalled , the result prompted a re evaluation of how to proceed while creating the best environment 51 Memo from Rafshoon to Carter, 7/7/78, Folder: 34A, Chief of Staff Files, 7/7/78, Folder: Chief of Staff Files, JCL; Memo from Powell to Carter, 7/7/78, Folder: ehensive Test Ban JCL. 52 Folder: SALT II, 8/16/78 12/27/78, Box 130, Subject Files, Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL ; Memo from Landon Butler to Hamilto n Jordan, 12/19/78, Folder: SALT II, 1/2/79 1/19/79, Box 130, Files, JCL 12/14/78, Folder: SALT II, 1/2/79 1/ 19/79, Box 130, Files, JCL .
148 to support Senate approval of an eventual SALT II treaty. Responsibility for creating a plan to foster . A ssiste d by his chief deputy La ndon But ler, the two created a plan to focus on regular legislative consulting and public education efforts . Various parts of the executive branch followed the plan and coordinated with Jordan and Butler. This approach and the information it contained provide s t he context to understand what the neoconservative led opposition reacted and objected to ment of domestic opinion regarding a treaty . The plan also reveals the underlying assumptions driving White House responses to domestic rhetoric critical of SALT II .
149 CHAPTER 7 SWITCHING BRANDS II: THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential contest and consequent transformation of SALT and U.S. foreign policy constituted one part of the frame shift in the domestic debate over strategic nuclear arms policy . Th e other part came with the public emergence of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) shortly after the election . The organization represented a different level and type of anti SALT activi ty, and quickly became the dominant guiding force for both opposition advocacy groups and Congressional leaders. Public observers recognized that the Committee presented an important contrarian perspective in the domestic debate over strategic arms negoti ation policy by the Carter White House . The CPD, a bipartisan group led by neoconservatives, took a leadership role among SALT protesting organizations . The rhetoric and reasoning define d many of the arguments used by the opposition to counter th e Carter administration efforts to gain public support for the SALT II process and eventual treaty. 1 during the mid 1970s. Faced with a Ford administration determined to move fo rward on dÃ©tente and SALT, and convinced of the danger to inherent in the U.S. approach, three former government functionaries began sharing their mutual frustrations. Eugene V. Rostow, Charls E. Walker, and Paul H. Nitze quickly bec ame c onvinced that the situation required more than conversation . They decided to create 1 The definitive works relating to the CPD are Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment , (Boston, MA: South En d Press, 1983); Tyroler, II, ed., Alerting America, and Beth Ann Ingold, The Committee on the Present Danger: A Study of Elite and Public Influence, 1976 1980, (Ph.D. diss., Neoconservatism , Chapt er 5.
150 an organization comprised of a select group that first formally met on March 12, 1976 . Calling themselves the Committee on the Present Danger, they believed that onl y a strong United States could prevent the usurpation of American superiority by the Soviets , and that current U.S. policy threatened to make the country vulnerable to the Soviet Union . The CPD determined that embracing a nonpartisan approach of research and education would prove more effective than direct advocacy. Their purpose was alert American policy makers and opinion leaders and the public at large to the ominous Soviet military buildup and its implications, and to the unfavorable trends in the U.S. 2 This attitude reflected the bipartisan makeup of the group , as well as common understanding of the nature of the threat the nation faced. Eschewing both official alignment with other groups and supporting spe cific candidates for office, the CPD viewed itself as a citizens committee rather than a lobbying organization that focused on broader issues and objectives. After choosing Charles Tyroler II to run daily operations, the initial members discussed and deba ted a manifesto drafted by Rostow to lay out the fundamental assumptions and policy prescription of the group . Agreement emerged after a revision process that ultimately generated thirteen versions of the document . Due to fears of unduly affecting the up coming elections, the group delayed a public announcement of their existence and goals until after the election . T he Committee held a press conference on November 11, 1976 to warn the nation of the danger it faced ab out it. 3 2 Tyroler, ed. , Alerting America , xv xvi. 3 Kampelman, Tyroler, ed ., Alerting America , xvi xviii; Sanders, Peddlers , 150 154.
151 Neither the CPD nor Jimmy Carter represented a completely new approach to U.S. foreign policy or arms control. Both the Committee and Carter picked up where their predecessors left off in pursuit of, or opposition to, SALT, and operated in the co ntext established by the events, agreements, and actions of the past. However, like Carter, the CPD represented a significant change in the effort to deal with existing questions and concerns, and in a similar fashion the primary task of promoting their a genda took on a different tone . the bipartisan nature of the group and particularly the neoconservative presence in the Several high profile Democrats and Republicans figured prominently in the . Already a key figure in the he not only drafted the of the key figures in the Committee . Paul Nitze, who served in government under every president in one capacity or another from FDR to Ford, and later Reagan , bounced back and forth between Republ ican and Democrat ic affiliation . In essence, he was a Democrat holding to a consistent foreign policy perspective that left him willing to serve any president who would have him, provided he agreed with the goals. Charls Walker worked in two Republican administrations in the Treasury Department, and followed Rostow as the chair of the Executive Committee. David Packard and Richard Allen served the Nixon
152 administration in the Defense Department and in the White House on International Econ omic Affairs, respectively. 4 The bipartisan nature of CPD membership in 1976 extended to members of the Board of Directors, the only other type of participation in the group . The Executive Committee offered the opportunity to join by limited invitation , and the original membership comprised a cross section of movers and shakers in and out of government. The Board included f ormer government officials, labor leaders, business leaders , i ntellectuals and academics , and several retired general officers from the U.S. military. Those individuals with neoconservative credentials in the group in addition to Rostow and Nitze were Jeane Kirkpatrick , Richard Pipes, Leon Keyserling, Max Kampleman, Richard Shifter, John P. Roche, Seymour Martin Lipset, Norman Podhore tz, Joseph Bishop , Midge Decter, Nathan Glazer, Samuel McCracken, and Bayard Rustin . 5 T his partial listing of the 141 founding members suggests that neoconservatives represented a significant portion of the CPD , particularly at the leadership level. If th e definition of neoconservative is extended to include people who published in neocon journals , such as Commentary or The Public Interest , additional members of the Committee can be added to the neocon roster: Eugene Bardach, James T. Farrell, Andrew Good paster, Rita Hauser, Oscar Handlin, Chalmers Johnson, Whittle Johnston, Ernest Lefever, , Paul Seabury, Milan Skacel and Paul Weaver. Historian 4 Tyroler, ed ., Alerting America , xv, xxii; Nitze, From Hiroshima , 7, 141, 293. 5 Kampelman, Tyroler, ed ., Alerting America , xx, xxii; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost , 7, 103, 141, 167; Sanders, Peddlers , 150. Sanders notes that thirteen CDM Foreign Policy Task Force me mbers joined the CPD. For a full CPD membership listing, see Sanders, Peddlers , 153 160 and in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 5 9.
153 John Ehrman notes that w ith such a large number of neoconservatives in the uments found a home in Commentary 6 A n interview of CPD member observation . According to a uthor Robert Scheer , an intimate relationship between the Committee and the magazine . Co mmentary has been sort of an adjunct 7 The accumulated evidence supports the idea of the CPD as an organization with significant neoconservative influence and leadership. 8 The CPD, like many groups, followed their lead ers, and a closer examination of the leadership strengthens the argument for message. Several members oversaw the work of the Committee, and specific individuals held responsibility to formulate and guide policy pronounce ments. CPD General Counsel Max Kampleman , looking back on the early days of the organization, noted specifically the importance of the work of Rostow, Nitze, Walker, Allen, Charles Burton Marshall, Pipes, and Francis P. Hoeber. Two members of this group, Rostow and Pipes, were members of the Coalition fo r a Democratic Majority. Nitze and Marshall self identified as Democrats . Finally, Kampelman noted two members in (Chairman of the Executive Committee and Chairman of Policy Studies, respectively) played central roles in CPD from the first, and their monumental contributions have 6 Ehrman, Rise , 113. 7 Robe rt Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War , (New York: Random House, 1982), 150, n. 13. 8 Names based on a survey of authors of both magazines from 1968 to 1980 compared with th e CPD Board of Directors listed in Sanders, Peddlers , 154 1 60.
154 9 These two men functioned as both major sources of ideas and the primary directors of Committee thought . In this capacity they exerted significant influence on and support of which shaped the tone and ideas of the CPD in a manner consistent with neoconservative thought on fore ign relations. 10 originated in the experience and conclusions of the famous, or infamous, Team B. CIA Director George H.W. Bush c reated the group in the summer of 1976 at the behest of President Ford . The ir mandate was to anal yze intelligence without the bureaucratic biases of the CIA . The idea was that by providing a comparative examination of intelligence data , government officials could determine the validity of in house CIA estimates of Soviet strengt h and goals. Team B at the end of the year. Someone quickly leaked t he contents to the press , which published the information early in January 1977. 11 The objectivity and value of the Team B report varied, depending on the person(s) evaluating the findings. Groups and individuals who agreed with of the current approach to U.S. foreign policy and viewed military industrial interaction with suspicion , along with those supportive of d Ã©tente and SALT, tended to question the members of the team, their objectivity in examining and analyzing evidence, the 9 in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , xx. 10 Oral History Interview, 6/21/89, 27, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralh ist/marshall.htm ; Sanders , Peddlers, 150. For Nitze as a Democrat, see above. 11 Murr e WP , 1/2/77, 1, http://search.pr oquest.com/docview/146782362?accountid=10920 ; Sanders, Peddlers , 197 204; Caldwell, Dynamics , 102; Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics , (New York: Guilford Publications, Inc., 1990), 45 47; Ingold, 122 123 .
155 conclusions of the report, an d anyone who accepted the Team B conclusions as informative or valid. Critics of current U.S. policy laude d the Team B report as proof of what many of them suspected: the United States was in danger of being eclipsed by the Soviet Union , if that shift had not already happened, and the intelligence establishment could not be trusted to provide solid data analy sis for policy decisions . In other words, the Team B report mer ely reinforced the assumptions of whoever read it , regardless of the nature of those beliefs . The connections between Team B and the CPD extended beyond shared thinking about the Soviet Unio n . Kamp e the origins described shared personnel . and William R. Van Cleave. All three became key members of the CPD Executive 12 M any of the Team B concerns , such as Soviet missile accuracy, ICBM vulnerability, and Soviet intentions , also drove the formation of the CPD. However, the secret nature of the exercise made drawing attention to these issues difficult. The leaking of the report made it possible for team members to address, reinfor ce, and defend their concerns . One notable example of this action was an article written by Pipes specifically for Commentary magazine . The scholarly interpretation s of these connections tend to view them as either groups of similar interests or causal ly link ed with Team B to some degree generating the CPD . However , the timeframe of the formation and founding of the Committee argues against any linear or causal relationship be tween the Team and the CPD. Instead, the simu ltaneous evolution of the two groups suggests that the similarities in ideas and assumptions reflect what the Team and Committee had in common: many of the same people with very similar 12 in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America, xv.
156 concerns. What Team B and its report contributed to the formation of the CPD was the weight of intelligence analysis using official and secret data , and that information helped support v iews. 13 There is little doubt that contemporaries viewed the CPD as a major source of opposition sentiment during the Carter pre sidency, a perspective shared by subsequent academic writers. The importance of the organization is clear from the reporting patterns of The New York Times , Washington Post , and Wall Street Journal, as they collectively printed the same general level of c overage and comment on the Committee as they did for twelve other SALT opposition groups combined . Beth Ingold exemplifies a typical scholarly assessment when she argues that the Carter White House made gaining CPD approval on SALT II a key aspect of the effort to secure Senate passage of a treaty. Generally, scholars consider the group an entity that commanded the respect of bo the outstanding SALT opposition organiza tion that exercised a control efforts. 14 A robust understanding of how the CPD factors into the SALT II story requires two components. The first is use of documents from the Carter administration rather than or in addition to contemporary o r publicly available materials . Without this source 13 Ingold, 124, 126 132; Murrey WP , 1/ 2 / 77, 1, http://search.proquest .com/docview/146782362?accountid=10920 NYT , February 6, 1977, p. E15, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123144761 Soviet Union Commentary 64:1, (July 1977), 21 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290121907 . Sanders and Caldwell merely mention Team B without making a clea r connection to CPD, while Ehrman and Dalby argue a causal connection . For the timing of Team B and CPD, see Sanders, Peddlers, 197 204; Caldwell, Dynamics 102; Ehrman, Rise , 111 112; Dalby, Creating, 46 47. Scoblic and Ehrman argue that CPD formation re sulted from c oncerns over Team B conclusions, Scoblic, U.S. vs Them, 99 and Ehrman, Rise , 112. 14 Ingold, 418; Caldwell, Dynamics , 188; Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 800; Sanders, Peddlers , 264, 270. Regarding newspaper coverage, during 1977 and 1978, the Post , Time s , and Journal collectively published ~36 stories on CPD and ~31 for other groups.
157 of information, it is difficult make an accurate assessment how the White House viewed, planned for, and interacted with the Committee. Second, the focus needs to be on the CPD as it related to neoconse examining the group to illustrate some other concept or idea rather than its relationship to SALT hinders the effectiveness of that work to provide an explanation of the ey related to strategic arms negotiations and policy. However, the scholarship that addresses the Committee generally lacks one of these two components . F ew scholars have examined the CPD directly , and their analyses tend to use s a vehicle to explore other issues instead of the Committee itself . Sociologist Jerry W. Peddlers of Crisis is the standard work that focuses on the Committee itself. He based his analysis on a comparative study of the CPD with an earlier group from the 1 950s that he argues shared a name and many of the same assumptions about U.S foreign policy. Both Committees pursued the Cold War liberal ideology he calls 15 Sanders argues that neoconservatives provided the intellectu al basis of the group. The CPD provided leadership in opposing the Carter administration s arms control efforts, particularly for the vari ous groups that did the actual work of lobbying Congress and persuading the public. H is analysis is based a combinat ion of interviews with CPD members and others opposing SALT, and publicly available materials from the late seventies and early eighties. Sanders clearly establishes his disdain for the Reagan administration and the CPD members associated with it , a bias that potentially weakens the reliability of his analysis . The volume is generally helpful 15 Sanders, Peddlers , 11.
158 activities. T he analysis is limited , however, by the lack of access to internal White House docum ents. Moreover, Sanders is not concerned primarily with explaining the impact of the Committee on SALT opposition efforts , and the related question of why the administration pursued a particular pl an regarding domestic support. Instead, his focus is to e xplain the r ise of Containment Militarism with the hope of challenging and reversing that trend. 16 Scholars in t wo other areas of inquiry , arms control and neoconservatism, touch on the CPD in addition to those directly studying the group. The historiograp hy of arms control during the time of SALT addresses the CPD to varying degrees. Garthoff DÃ©tente and Confrontation is a typical example, and he identifies the CPD as a major source of domestic opposition to SALT II. His source material is a combinatio n of books, newspaper , journal articles, and presidential materials later assembled into the Public Papers of the Presidents , supplementing the information with insider content and knowledge about both sides. He did not use materials found in presidential libraries. Garthoff does not use materials found in presidential libraries, and hi s analysis, based on his knowledge of and participation in arms control history, yields a top down narrative that rele gates the CPD to a few references regarding SALT II op position on the d omestic front. Neoconservative s are virtually absent in his account , as is any consideration of . 17 16 Sanders, Peddlers Rise , 222, note 28. For other examples of this type of CPD scholarship, see Creating . Neither makes use of White House documents nor focuses on neoconservatives, and both seek to address other concerns: Ingold focuses on the effective use, or lack thereof, of political rhetoric, and Dalby examines the group in the context of how geopolitical discourse Creating , x. 17 Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 455, 595, 680, 800, 875, 89 4. See also Caldwell, Dynamics , 102 105; Talbott, Endgame , 56, 204; and Herken, Counsels , 274 287 . Caldwell uses Carter administration documents and
159 The scholarship on neoconservatives and foreign policy also examines the CPD . Neoconse rvatism places the group in his second age , a period roughly spanning from 1968 to 1980 . He argues that neocons during this time were Democratic political activists associated with the Collation for a Democratic Majority ( CDM ) and Senator Jackson. VaÃ¯sse points out that these neoconservatives devoted more attention to foreign policy, specifically issues surrounding dÃ©tente and a softening would ultimately become a hotbed of n 18 He claims that vi ewing the CPD as neocons in the same sense as the CDM results in a flawed view of the Committee, because their strategic and nuclear concerns were unique to the second age. VaÃ¯sse nd their su bsequent efforts is similar to other scholarly work on the Committee, but his work is rooted in unique access to the ir private papers . As a whole, hi s analysis contains a degree of accuracy and reliability far in excess of other scholars of neo conservatism . However, he devotes a CPD and SALT leaves room for a more detai led examination, as well as the inclusion of material from the Carter White House. 19 ary account ends before the Senate committee hearings. Herken mentions the CPD, Team B, Nitze, and Rostow, but focuses on scientists and planners with a scope of 1945 through Reagan, which prohibits a more detailed examination; he does not address neocons or Jackson, and Carter White House documents are absent. 18 VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism , 10. 19 VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism , 6 10, 149, 334, 174 179. See also Ehrman, Rise , 111 114; and J. Peter Scoblic, U.S. vs. Them: How a Half Century of Conservatism Has Unde , (New York : Viking Penguin, 2008) 82 111. Ehrman is helpful on the CPD generally, but has no detailed
160 Fully assessing the importance of the CPD as one of the major sources of SALT II opposition requires an examination of how the Committee related to other similar gro ups in the arms control debate. The most influential of these like minded organizations was the CDM . Caldwell and Ehrman are examples of scholars who do not suggest any significant interaction between the two, but Sanders correctly argues that there were major connections between the organizations. Sever al key members of CDM helped establish g Rostow, Pipes, and Kampelman. CDM members constituted nearly 10% of the CPD. The C ntributed Rostow, Pipes, and a total of thirteen members to the Committee. Sanders notes that the two organizations worked together . They submitted names for consideration by the new Carter administration for postings relating to foreign relations, attem pted to encourage the President early in his term when he made foreign policy decisions they could support , and worked in concert with groups from the right to hinder domestic SALT support. 20 t he CDM seemed willing to follow the lead of CPD . The Coalition saw an opportunity to move beyond its initial goals to pursue br oader influence among Democrats, and returned to a fully active status knowing that at times they would be at odds with the new President licies . more generally yields a ve ry brief treatment of CPD and SALT II, in addition to a lack of Carter document interaction. For sources that present very minimal information on the CPD, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology, (Philadelphi a: Temple University Press, 1993) 10, 170, 198; Confronting the New Conservatism: The Rise of the Right in America, ed. Michael J. Thompson, (New York: New York University Press, 2007) 87; John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America , (New Yo rk: The Penguin Press, 2004) 92. 20 Sanders, Peddlers , 150, 180, 227, 243. For examples of how the relationship between CPD and CDM is generally portrayed, see Caldwell, Dynamics , 101; Ehrman, Rise , 61; Herken, Counsels , 274; and Scoblic, U.S
161 The CMD utilized CPD expertise as they sought to expand their role . An example of this behavior is a Coalition meeting that held a featured panel discussion on options for a U.S. response to new Soviet challenges . The panelists included Nitze, P ipes, and Podhoretz as three of the four speakers, with Nitze identified as the policy chair for the Committee. The appearance of Nitze was a somewhat curious choice, status as the Foreign Policy guru of the CDM, and his past participation in a similar both the cross fertilization of neoc on ideas between the two groups and the position of the Committee in the forefront in anti SALT intellectual efforts. Ce rtain ly his invitation speaks to the degree of Coalition sympathy with C PD foreign relations goals . 21 One of the clearest examples of CDM reliance and subordination to the CPD is the effort of Coalition staffers to assemble material for a policy pamphlet on SALT. T he workers use d neoconservative printed materials, and cited connections with Sen ator pecifically Richard Perle, as supporting information source s . Tellingly, when CDM Executive Director Joshua Muravchik sent letters to individu als such as Nitze, Kampelman, Zumwalt, and Pipes seeking sources, all suggested looking to CPD products. While Muravchik sought out and received other recommendations for reading, the majority sourcing was C ommittee materials. After the formation of the 21 Political Observer , Summ er 1977, Untitled Folder: , Box 12, Personal Papers of Peter R. Rosenblatt, LBJ Presidential Library; Undated letter, Folder: Paul C. Warnke, Dm Folder: Papers, LBJ Library; Handwritten notes, Folder: Political Observer litics, and People. Published by Carter appointment.
162 CPD, the CDM looked to the Committee for leadership during the campaign opposing SALT II. 22 Many of the organizations opposed to SALT II relied on the CPD to do the intellectual heavy lifting . echelon o f American opinion leaders as a means to position itself as a credible organization which could debate the Carter Administration head engaged in the grass roots work of interacting with the general public and lobbying Congress. 23 T he umbr ella organization named T he Coalition for Peace through Strength (CPS) united many individuals and more than one hundred organizations in the effort to oppose SALT . Despite the proliferation of groups, many of whom acted in concert, the media and subseque nt scholars looked to the CPD as the dominant source of ideas challenging U.S. policy. 24 The White House shared this perspective on the dominance of the CPD , and it shaped their thinking throughout the entire SALT II process . When putting together a SALT b riefing book, the administration assembled information on nineteen specific groups opposed to SALT. T he anonymous author annotated many of the groups, and pointed out important relationships that connected spe cific individuals or groups . T he American Sec urity Council had two members of the Pipes Commission, otherwise known as Team B . T he Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy had three CPD 22 Letters to Muravchik from Nitze, Kampelman, Zumwalt, and Pipes, November 1978, Folder: Study Corres , Rosenblatt Papers, LBJ Library . 23 Charles Martin Kupperman, The SALT II Debate, (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1980), 192 primary source, due to his job as a CPD staffer (Caldwell, Dynamics , 102). 24 Caldwell, Dynamics 1979, ii, vii xv ; Herken, Counsel s , 288, and Sanders, Peddlers , 222 223.
163 members, in law . T a member of the CPD . T he School for Adv anced International Studies had Nitze as chair of the ir Advisory Council. The analysis linked o ther organizations with some of these specific groups, such as the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami working with the Fletche r School and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. While such linkage only indirectly connected a group to the Committee, taken as a whole the White House analysis of S ALT II opposition groups revolved to varying degrees around the CPD. Even thought the SALT briefing book missed some connections, such as the Institute having five CPD members on its fifteen member board, the Carter administration clearly hel d the Committee in a prominent place when compared with their estimation of the other organizat ions working against them on SALT II . 25 The White House considered the CPD an important organization from the beginning. Butler kept track of the group early in the administration , suggesting they were a concern . Perhaps the clearest expression of this at titude toward the Committee is an undated sheet of paper e Committee on the Present Danger . What makes this document interesting is that it is hand written in black ink, with the CPD name in red ink . The w is centered is a skull and crossbones, also in red ink. Without additional information, it is impossible to know who wrote this listing . 25 Un dated , Folder: Box 130, Subject Files, Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL. The anonymous author described the National Strategy Information Center as similar to the CPD, and noted th at the group held summer seminars that were Strategy Information Center, u ndated , Folder: Box 130, Landon Files, JCL.
164 T he characteristics suggest two important poi nts. The White House was aware of the Committee as an important SALT II opposition group ; otherwise , why bother with the effort to lampoon the organization ? Second, the author believed that the CPD was not truly exist as described. 26 The administration continued to keep track of the CPD as the year progressed, collecting the publications and media analysis of their arguments. The CPD worried officials enough to warrant some attention, demonstr ated by Secretary of speech is significant because it represented policy suggestion , one approved by Carter , that the secretary speci etc.) for a thirty . 27 The idea was to follow t he sit down with Carter with regular me etings between Brown alone and those individuals . By the end of the year, the administration staffers viewed the Committee as one of the primary opposition groups worthy of attention, and expressed the need for pro SALT advocacy groups modeled on CPD. Th e White House maintained this perspective about the Committee throughout the negotiations 28 26 Folder: SALT, 3/7/77 icers and Folder: Disarmament Agreement, 3/7/77 Files, JCL. 27 Memo from Hamilton Jordan to Jim Folder: JCL. 28 6 77, Folder: 7/16/77 11/16 Warning to Americans about U.S. U.S. News & World Report, July 18, 1977, 59 60, Folder: on Memos, 7/16/77 128, Files, JCL; Memo from Si Lazarus to Hamilton
165 T he CPD continued to be a factor in administration thinking after the President signed the Treaty and the ratification fight loomed . One example of this priority st atus in administration thinking is an NSC memo sent by An Optimist . T he anonymous message , sent to several admini stration officials and staffers , argued for optimism about Senate approval of the SALT II treaty and cited only one SALT opposition group in any context over three pages: the CPD. Moreover, this writer confidently asserted that the treaty would eventually pass . One of the factors in his/her reasoning was that in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nitze admitted, in the only direct quotation in the memo, that the Committee had not yet formally agreed to take a position . fetched, g iven the CPD opposition to the SALT II treaty throughout the entire ty of the Carter administration and the fact that the group testified before committees seventeen times at the invitation of various members of Congress resisting taking positions on issues as a general rule, so in the planned rare instances where the organization would take a position, they very likely would wait until the final version of the treaty emerged, which never happened. Finally, in March 1979 the CPD released a paper Jordan, 12/19/77, Folder: Chief of Staff Fi les, JCL. Regarding the CPD member listing typed version: although undated, the first . T existence and membership was the 11 th . Thus, a probable date ran ge of March to May of 1977 makes the early awareness conclusion a logical one. Interestingly, the skull and crossbones memo also listed retired Admiral Thomas Moorer, despite his not being part of CPD, probably due to his role in the Warnke nomination ba ttle in testifying against Warnke before the Senate Armed Services Committee; this suggests the sheet dates after February 28, 1977.
166 29 importance to the Executive Branch is clear . In general, throughout the complete Carter administration effort to advance and conclude a SALT II treaty, W hite House staffers viewed the Committee on the Present Danger as a major source of concern , and the object of advice and planning. 30 Any survey of the CPD requires Senator Henry Jackson. While the Committee and the Senator did not enjoy an official relationship, significant unofficial ties bound the two together in their opposition to SALT. B iographer Robert G. Kaufman 31 neoconservatives in 1972 and 1976 also hel ped ensure that any organization whose intellectual foundation derived from the same source would hold him in high esteem. T he bipartisan members of the CPD already viewed Jackson as the de facto Senate leader in the fight against dÃ©tente , based on his le adership in the fight against communi sm in the Senate for many years and his actions against SALT since the early seventies. a more liberal foreign policy and refusal to 29 in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 99, 118. 30 Undated , Folder: Subject Files, Deputy Chief of S taff Files, JCL; Memo from An Optimist to Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Folder: b Peddlers , 264; Kupperman, 195 196. 31 Kaufman, Jackson , 296.
167 appoint Committee friendly ind ividuals in his admin istration made Committee members even more willing to work with a man who espoused their views and held the power to influence their expertise only reinforced the already strong relationship. 32 The indirect ties between Jackson and the CPD extended in other ways. Rostow, who functioned as the chairman of the CDM F oreign P olicy T ask F orce, often sent information to the Senator, as did Nitze. The connections with these t wo, along with others, existed long before the formation of the CPD, and continued throughout the remainder of the decade . Letters, newspaper clippings, informal position r eports, and official CPD papers flowed to Richard Perle and Dorothy Fosdick, the as sistants tasked with keeping Jackson informed on arms control and foreign policy. In addition to correspondence, CPD members , including Rostow, Nitze, and Zumwalt, often met with the Senator . Jackson was the go to man for thoughts on corrective actions w hen members of Congress made erro neous comments about CPD papers . He also received draft copies intended for discussion purposes. Clearly of formal affiliation with the group did not hinder a sympathetic and mutually supportive interact ion with the Committee. 33 The announcement in November 1976 of the formation of the Committee on the Present Danger signaled a new element entering the ongoing debate about SALT that significantly transformed the nature . This infusion of neoc onservative guided thinking quickly became the received source of information for the loyal 32 Ehrman, Rise , 58, 97; Kaufman, Jackson , 360. 33 Sanders, Peddlers , 152; Cover memo from Anne Smith to Dorothy Fosdick, 1 0/24/78, HMJ 3560 6/57/11; Paul Nitze to Richard Perle, 11/1/77, HMJ 3560 6/57/11; Dorothy Fosdick to Henry Jackson, undated, HMJ 3560 6/58/3; Paul Nitze to Henry Jackson, 11/10/78, HMJ 3560 6/58/11.
168 opposition among those seeking to influence U.S. SALT policy. As such, the fundamental character of the debate over the SALT II treaty changed after 1976, even as both sides built upon the progress made prior to their arrival at the public discussion table. Over the next four years, the CPD sought to alert the nation to the dangers s efforts to negotiate an agreement. The neoc onservative after President Carter signed the SALT II Treaty.
169 CHAPTER 8 PART III OPPOSITION The debate over SALT II was never a disagreement on whether or not the United States should pursu e strategic arms limitations. Both sides agreed that some type of several questions all provoked significant disagreement . H ow should the American government go about the task ? W hat should be the goals of strategic arms control ? H ow should the United States view the Soviet Union at a basic level in t he whole process? The debate over how to proceed and what to agree on extended from the very beginning of the Carter administrati on until the death of the SALT II treaty at the end of 1979. T wo events stand out as markers in the discussion about the nature of American arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union , which ebbed and flowed between these chronological focal points th . The first took place early in 1977 with the debate over the nomination of Paul Warnke as the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the chief SALT negotiator. Several neocons either testified at the hear ings, or challenged Warnke -and thereby the President -positions on arms control. The dispute effectively accomplished two tasks. First, it dispelled any illusions that the administration would enjoy a cooperative relationship with the SALT oppos ition, and conversely that the CPD could exert insider influence on the White House. Second, the CPD emerged as the primary source of opposition thinking on arms control. The second point was the testimony at two Senate Committee hearings after Carter si to present the dangers of the SALT II agreement peaked in public before those who
170 represented the last line of defense against the threat of Soviet superiority in strategic arms. Once the scene was set , the games began. The Committee used the tried and true methods of proclaiming their objections and concerns early, often, and repeatedly. In setting out their ideas, the group enjoyed a close relationship with Senator Jackson, even though he did not fo rmally belong to the gr oup . CPD Executive Committee members Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow , a , proclaimed the threat represented by the Soviet Union . They saw the USSR military expanding its influence around the world, wh ich further substantiated the difficulty of trusting the communist nation in general and on arms control in particular. Other neocons ervatives took up the drumbeat , echoing concerns about U.S. for eign policy and pointing out differences between Soviet wor ds and actions as evidence of untrustworthiness. The iss ues of equality reductions, what that really meant, and verification represented aspects of administration policy that threatened the dominance of the United States. Even more foundational concepts like dÃ©tente came under fire. Opponents of SALT II asked, h ow could America remain safe if the government focused on treaties that weakened the nation? President Carter and his aides responded to these criticisms , seeking to rally support for SALT II on t he domestic front as the neoconservative led critics continued their assault . Opposition members expanded their critique, drawing comparisons between the appeasement of Hitler over Czechoslovakia and the Carter policy toward the Soviets. Both sides spent month after month refining their arguments and refuting the other side while the President
171 with the Soviet Union. Neoconservatives continued to declaim against unilateral action by the United State s, fearing greater weakness as an outcome. The extended time significant cross pollination of neoconservative thinking, along with a level of public information saturation that encouraged optimism among opponents for an outcome they preferred . The United States and the Soviet Union signed the treaty in May 1979 , and at that point both sides shifted gears in terms of place and focus. Attention moved to the U.S. Senate, where eve ryone assumed members would discuss the agreement and eventually vote. The Carter administration began a long planned , full court press on the Senate, hoping to persuade members to vote in favor. They also kept an eye on opponents of SALT II, particularl y Jackson and Nitze. Neocons and the CPD also benefit both sides enjoyed at this point was a completed and signed agreement, which allowed the debate to focus in a much nar row er fashion on its specific content than previously possible . The initial discussion with Senators took place in committee hearings. In general, the SALT II opposition forces emphasized that the y were not in complete opposition to arms control. They st ressed their support for limiting nuclear weapons while emphasizing the problems with the specific agreement. The major issues that the opposition presented in the hearings held from July through October included equality and verification, along with ensu ring that U.S. ability to support allies would not be compromised. The basis for these concerns remained the danger to the nation if the
172 wrong elements of the treaty became binding, and the need to reconsider those points from a position of strength. The administration spoke with senators and their staffers, seeking to promote the treaty and respond to the neocon critiques, particularly those of CPD assisted Jackson and Nitze. In the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate A rmed Services Committee, opponents argued that the SALT II treaty made many of the same mistakes as the SALT I agreement. They claimed that the SALT II accord as submitted would allow the Soviet Union to make is approach would make the nation even weaker than it was while allowing a Soviet numerical advantage , failing to ensure adequate verification and creating problems for U.S. allies. SALT critics made a variety of suggestions to fix the treaty and solve the problems it contained. These recommendations reflected fears that an unmodified treaty would put the Soviets in a superior position , leaving the United States as the number two nation in the world. T hey believed that the nation would be left weaker by t he agreement and could begin to slide to ward a worse condition , one in which the Soviets could dictate U.S. policy with little to no recourse for U.S. officials. Ironic ally, the outcome of the treaty remain ed at this point, and its final status fell subje ct to outside forces neither side could predict, but from which one side definitely benefit ed .
173 CHAPTER 9 A TIME OF SEASONING: DEBATE OVER SALT II inherited a SALT process with nearly a decade of history behind it, and a growing o pposition to the direction of negotiations. Both the supporters and opponents of SALT received a breath of fresh air with a new presi dent and a new opposition group. Due to slow progress in negotiating a treaty , 1977 and 1978 were years of skirmishes whe re Jackson, the Committee on the Present Danger and other groups sought to sway public opinion and politicians toward their particular perspective. Various aspects of the debate over arms control became clearer through these battles and the progress of th e talks . The rising tide of opposition to SALT II remained driven by neoconservatives, particularly through the efforts of the CPD , which grew during this period and achieved a status as the primary source of a contrarian perspective on the administration arms control policy. S ome members of the C ommittee , Senator Jackson , and neoconservative writers continued to contest any governmental actions that flew in the face of their key arms control and foreign policy viewpoints. The mixture of these powerful personalities and deeply held convictions ensured that until an actual treaty was concluded, the battles over the direction of U.S. negotiations, policy assumptions, and guiding principles were both enthusiastic and serious . The trends that emerged and c ontinued during this period dictated much of the outcome of the 1979 debate over the SALT II treaty. The Warnke Nomination The initial battle between the differing SALT perspectives too k place over the nomination of Paul Warnke to serve as the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ( ACDA ) and chief SALT negotiator . The debate and vote occurred within the
174 between the administration and the CPD. This skirmish began the day the President announced his choice for the posts, February 2, and lasted until a few days after the March 9 Senate vote. T his flair up between SALT supporters and opponents did not represent something entirely new , but the inclusion of new players changed the mix and flavor of the debate. Cordial interactions seemed to characterize the relationship between Carter and Jackson in the early days of the administration. Not only did the two exchange mutual congratulations for their respective vi ctories, but the new occupant of the White House President elect added a handwritten note to a standard thank you , referring to an enjoyable conversation the previous evening with Jac kson. The potentially warm relationship nomination. Carter sent a handwritten note to Jackson on several subjects, including 1 N either Carter nor Jackson initially viewed the other as beyond r edemption when working on SALT. T he President apparently thought this way with the Coalition for a Democratic arms control efforts . 2 The peaceful accord extended to the issue of SALT as well. Jackson sent a twenty three page memo detailing many suggestions regarding moving forward on arms 1 Jimmy Carter to Scoop Jackson, 2/4/77, HMJ 3560 21/1 /2. 2 Jimmy Carter to Scoop Jac kson, 11/17/76, HMJ 3560 21/1/2.
175 control with the Soviets, and the President sent the Senator another handwritten note in response. Carter apparently enjoyed the proposal, as he replied memorandum is excellent, and of great he lp to me. I will stay in touch with you 3 In fact, Carter kept the memo in his personal safe and used it often when working on determining the U.S. position on an issue. Jackson undoubtedly viewed this sentime nt as cautiously encouraging, given odds with the advice Carter would be receiving from his ad visors. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the most conservative member of the President inner circle and therefore most likely found elements of agreement and the accuracy of analysis regarding the reception of his ideas . T his apparent agr eement on where SALT should proceed between Carter and Jackson extended beyond the Senate battle in the initial months of the new administration , although it w as strongest before the Warnke nomination . 4 The cooperative interaction between the new administr ation and the Senator took control efforts remained essentially unchanged from the period before the presidential election. The tone of the debate in the news media illust rated the continuing differences between the two camps, with journalists writing op eds and columns that frequently 3 Jimmy Carter to Scoop Jackson, 2/17/77, HMJ 3560 21/1/2. 4 Folder: 1 1/27/1987, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age , WGBH Media Library & Archives, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna 7645df interview with jimmy carter 1987 ; Rowland Evans and WP , 3/14/77, A23, http://search.proquest.com/doc view/146738300 . The
176 sided with those supporting SALT and approv ing . At the same time, the opposition received c riticism from the same sou rces for embracing the Team B results a nd forming groups like the CPD, which the media viewed as alarmists at best . This portrayal drew inevitable responses from prominent opposition figures , such as Paul Nitze and Albert Wohlstetter . They defended their conclusions, clarified their associations, and expressed their concerns for the country and the dangerous road they saw ahead if their warnings went unheeded. 5 Both the CPD and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority generated attention in this regard. A n account of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reflected the status quo in January . Nitze, associated with the C PD in testimony by SALT supporter s , argued for a need to view the Soviet Union as a greater threat . He also suggested tha t the arms balance teetered on the edge of an imbalance that would not favor the United States. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority received a similar link to SALT by c olumnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak . They presciently suggested there were im plications in a complaint by Ben Wattenberg about the new CDM members . Among several ratification debate bitterly divis ive for the Democratic Party and the nation[;] 6 T he history of the SALT debate 5 WP , 1/4/77, A13, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146887385 ; WP, 1/15/77, A18, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146809469 ; WP , 1/15/77, A18, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146809469 . 6 WP , A19, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146811326 .
177 ensured that confusing signals from the Carter administration to both sides would affect the next major conflict point in U.S. strategic arms control policy. Evans and Novak correctly predicted a major debate, and the first instance was close scrutiny for any nomination for the position of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency head . The outcome could only lead to displeasure for at least some of those invol ved in the domestic discussion about 7 ef SALT negotiator functioned as a catalyst for the SALT II opposition. The ensuing debate was the largest single event in the progression toward a treaty until the actual signing, which makes an extended examination valuable to ascertain where both side s stood at this point . Additionally, this nomination was the first conflict between the new players: the Carter White House and the neoconservative led, combined forces of the CDM, Senator Jackson, and the newly formed CPD. W arnke was a lawyer who first began government service in the Defense Department during the Johnson administration. He held the position of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, where he reported to Nitze, and advisor during the 1972 presidential campaign. Despite appearing qualified to hold the positions Carter chose for him to occupy, aftermath of the Vietnam conflict raised the i re of many defense hawks, including Jackson and the CPD. beliefs of neocon led SALT opposition. According to Jackson biographer Kaufman, 7 Murrey WP , 1/20/77, A20 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146853111 .
178 Warnke saw arms races as the primary source, not a sym ptom, of political conflict, 8 Additionally, his belief that the United States bore primary responsibility for the arms race doubtless irritated neocon sensibilities. teral action and the value of a willingness to abandon American superiority in favor of arms control reflected a pers pective diametrically opposed to that of the CPD and the CDM. 9 The opposition responded rapidly and negatively to the news of nomi nation . This response is unsurprising, g iven the volatile atmosphere at the time surrounding the current and future direction of arms control discussions with the Soviet Union . Concerned groups and individuals took immediate action. B iographer and Nitze grandson Nicholas Thompson suggests that a history of bad blood between former friends Nitze and Warnke drove the former Policy Planning Staff director, at least in part, to object to the nomination of his form er col league . Nitze in his autobiography cla imed that u pon reading a newspaper account of the Senate Foreign Relations views intended to obj ect to the Warnke nomination. Jackson told me had not planned to 10 Nitze wrote and spoke to other senators, and took credit for stimulating 8 Kaufman, Jackson , 358 359. 9 Talbott, Endgame , 55 57; Garthoff, DÃ©t ente , 627; Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost , 273, 354 355; Caldwell, Dynamics , 19 20; Kaufman, Jackson , 358 NYT , 1/30/77, 9, http://se arch.proquest.com/docview/123129014 WP , 2/1/77, A2, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146856012 ; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations , Warnke Nomination, Hearings, 2/ 8 9/77, (HRG 1977 FOR 0016): 12, 15 19 , Text in: LexisNexis Congressiona l Hearings Digital Collection. Kaufman notes Warnke was a member of the Trilateral Commission, see Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 38. 10 Nitze, Hiroshima t o Glasnost , 354.
179 the resulting extended hearings, suggesting that what started as a nomination examination became a re ferendum on U.S. policy on both the Soviet Union and arms control. 11 The CDM also reacted quickly and questionably nomination . Soon after the nomination announcement, an anonymous, anti Warnke memo circulated on Capitol Hill . The u nknown author was rapidly exposed as the Coalition . Interestingly enough, this was during the period when members viewed the group as inactive. The memo quoted Warnke to suggest that he held beliefs about arms control and the Soviets that would result in his approving dangerous positions, specifically that he would support an agreement that placed the United Sta tes in an inferior position relative to the Soviet Union in the arms race . The CDM believed that endorsing this type of thinking was anathema to America and many in the nation shared their view . The combination of the memo and Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the nomination publically challenge d the idea of Warnke effectively fulfilling the jobs the Pre sident wanted him to perform. 12 11 NYT , 1/30/77, 9 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/123129014 Nucle WP , 2/2/77, A1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146851665 ; Rowland WP , 2/3/77, A21, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146874042 ; Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost , 355; Nicholas Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War , (New York: Henry Holt and Compa ny, 2009), 263 264. 12 Washington Star , 5/29/77, A3, Folder: NYT , 2/3/77, 1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123124196 NYT , 2/4/77, 6, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123126157 ; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Warnke Nomination, Hearings, 2/8 9/77, (HRG 1977 FOR 0016): 177, Text in: LexisNexis Congressional Hearings Digital Collection , www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING ID=HRG 1977 FOR 0016 .
180 The media took up the idea of reporting objections. On February 8, the New York Times published in a dual opinion piece, which contained an excerpt of from a 1975 article in Fo reign Policy magazine. In this article, Warnke defended the idea of the United States acting first in exercising restraint with nuc lear arms, arguing that the Soviet Union would in all probability respond fa vorably with its own restraint. He also pointed out that even if the Soviets did not act as he expected , the U.S. move would not really threaten national security and could be easily reversed. In the response, CDM Executive Director Penn , and argued that bo th the previous administration and the new did not support this type of thinking. He argued that such ideas needed an extended public discussion . 13 Other neoconservatives joined Kemble and the CDM in arguing against unilateral U.S. actions. Daniel Patri ck Moynihan in the February issue of Commentary presented a detailed argument for using the idea of political parties to reflect the dominant national ideologies of the day. He claimed this perspective would provide U.S. policy with a new better theoretic al construct to deal with the issues of the day. At the end of the article, he suggested that a party perspective would aid in avoiding the very type of action it is t 14 T he principle of avoiding unilateral action that worked to 13 Paul C. Warnke and Penn Kemble, NYT , 2/8/77, 31 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/123440739 . The article looks like a point counterpoint debate setup by the newspaper under one headline, but is not described as such. 14 Commentary 63:2 (February 1977): 59, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290075468 .
181 sy nchronizes with the opposition fears about . In addition to Moynihan, Richa rd Pipes spoke out on the issue of U.S. strategic inferiority by asserting the necessity of pursuin g s trategic superiority over the Soviet Union. He did not directly the Soviets would act in concert with U.S. actions only when compelled to do so. Thus, actions similar to those called for by Warnke struck at the heart of neoconservative assumptions about SALT, and by implication cast doubt on the wisdom of his nomination. 15 Both Paul Nitze and the CDM spoke in opposition to the President ACDA head at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing . Nitze was t he major voice of opposition , despite not requesting an opportunity to testify. Initially he wrote an informational letter to the chairman, Senator John Sparkman, the day before hearings commenced , and did not request the honor of testifying before the panel . Senators John Danforth and Charles Percy specifically requested to the committee tha t Nitze be asked to testify when the actual hearing began. After he completed his comments, o ther witnesses sought out the opportunity to speak against the nominee . Penn Kemble spoke, seeking to clarify and legitimize the infamous CDM memo. He expressed his willingness to answer any questions regarding the perspective of the Coalition, and noted, these matters as reflective 15 Commentary 63:2 (Febr uary 1977): 56 59 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290075468 NYT , 2/6/77, E15, http://s earch.proquest.com/docview/123144761 ; Sanders, Peddlers , 150.
182 16 This clear endorsement by a major neoconservative organization i llustrates the dominance of neocon thinking in the opposition effort. Despite statements from two mem bers of Congress in addition to the CDM, i t was . The press devoted little space to the other witnesses in reporting on the hearing . Th e desire for and reception , combined with statement, demonstrates the leadership of neocons at this point in opposing U.S. SALT policy. 17 The Senate Armed Services Committee announced its intention to hold hearings .S. government , after the conclusion of the Senate Foreig . Given he probability of the Committee not holding additional hearings was a virtual ly zero. He chaired the Arms Control S ubcommittee , and publicly expressed a desire to find out mor . As the hearings drew near, Jackson continued to walk a fine line between leaving his concerns open while maintaining cordial relations with the administration . Jackson appea red on the NBC television show Meet the Press two days before but a fter providing his SALT memo to the President . H e couched his comments with the need for more information, but made it clear he held reservations c oncerning both jobs , in part because doing so could compromise the 16 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Warnke Nomination, Hearings, 2/8 9/77, (HRG 1977 FOR 0016): 178. Text in: LexisNexis Congressional Hearings Digital Collection, www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING ID=HRG 1977 FOR 0016 . 17 WP , 2/9/77, A1 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146878447 NYT 2/10/77, 5, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123524634 WP , 2/10/77, 1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146754034 Talks WJS , 2/10/77, 7 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/134163248 .
183 effective nes s. Jackson also argued that an understanding of the basic nature of the Soviet Union w as the root of the matter . He answered one question by asser ting the importance of this point. I t is ideological in the sense that, can Mr. Warnke, in view of his past positions, negotiate effectively with the Russian s so that we 18 He suggested that e veryone supported an arms control agreement, but any accord required terms that did not favor one party over the other and possessed the ability to endure over time. Jackson claimed that Warnke was suspect in this regard, as his history would make the Sov iets disregard him as a negotiator. 19 Implicit in repeat the mistakes of SALT I . Such thinking would resul t in an agreement detrimental to the United States, thereby weakening American security. this time in speeches and letters stressed t he importance of a strong nation rooted in historical values, able to stand up to the Soviets, a nd kept t hat way through solid policies . He believed that the President intended to pursue many of the same specific goals , and undoubtedly hoped that Carter would continue taking hi s advice . Under those circumstances , the last thing Jackson needed was a negotiator who might both sway the President in arms control talks. 20 18 Henry M. Jackson, Meet the Press transcript, 2/20/77, 2, HMJ 3560 6/12/109. 19 Henry M. Jackson, Meet the Press transcript, 2/20 /77, 2, 6, 7, HMJ 3560 6/12/109. 20 Jackson to constituent, 1/31/77, HMJ 3560 5/151/1; Jackson to Kentucky writer, 2/4/77, HMJ 3560 Award, 2/22/77, HMJ 3560 5/245/38.
184 T he Commi ttee on the Present Danger also made an appearance in the public debate at the Armed Services hearing. In a sense, the group was at the forefront of the debate, due to the prominence of Nitze, the Chairman of Policy Studies. The CPD represented something significant in the minds of some observers. New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis critique d the Warnke opposition, suggest ing that a new intellectual element was present in the protests over the nomination . He argued that the opposition to resulted from t he influence of Commentary magazine and Senator Jackson, combined with traditional cons ervatives and other elements associated with a right wing view of U.S. foreign policy . W military intellectual complex, it could be called. It is symbolized by the recently formed f this coalition is intense 21 The assessment of the Warnke opposition as the Executive Committee, who respon ded in a letter to the editor. He pointed out that the group did not oppose arms control agreements per se, and in fact desired them, provided those efforts did not weaken the United States and respected the Soviet threat. Even though he did n ot mention Warnke by name , Rostow and the CPD undoubtedly believed that having in charge represented a greater possibility of agreements that diminished America. Thus, 21 Anthony Lewis, NYT , 2/10/77, 39, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123524772 .
185 amounted to an indirect indictment fitness as the head of the ACDA and c hief SALT negotiator. 22 The Armed Services Committee hearings took place over three days, and o nly three witnesses testified: Warnke, Nitze, and retired Admiral Thomas Moorer. The media consensus was that the hearings would be of relatively little importa nce since the Foreign Relations Committee approved the choice . T he full Senate vote would show and it seemed unlikely that the legislative body would fail to approve t he President choice his views and positions on arms control . media attention, although no smoking gun emerged to transform the trajectory of the nomination. T he Committee heard Nitze and Moorer testify on the third and final day . Nitze essentially repeated the themes and objections he voiced to the Foreign Relations Committee, while his points received support from the Admiral. 23 Moorer sh ared with Nitze and Jackson an objection to the President explained his own views as well. He prioritized U.S. defense posture over arms control efforts as a national security matter, an order at odds with the Adm 22 NYT , 2/17/77, 38 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/123467202 helpful account of the Warnke nomination does not include the CDM or neoconservatives as influences in his analysis, and the CPD is mentioned only as something Nitze helped start. See Strong, Worki ng , 10 44, especially 23 35. 23 Interestingly, several scholars use incendiary answer to a question about Nitze being a better American than Warnke, to show th e rancor driving Nitze See Strong, Working , 28; Caldwell, Dynamics , 20; and Talbott, Master of the Game , 152. Nitze later claimed he intended to say something else. up question , which soug ht to confirm his answer , was a better fit for the exchange, softening, at least in this instance, the suggested personal venom; see Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost , 355; and U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Servi ces, Consideration of Mr. Paul C. Warnke to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador, Hearings, 2/22 23, 28/77 , 183, www.lexisnexis.com /congcomp/getdoc?HEARING ID=HRG 1977 SAS 0035 .
186 . The admir al also suggested that holding both positions , and the dual job requirements , would harm ability to function as chief negotiator by giving the Soviets opportunities to take advantage in talks before those negotiations even began. 24 Jackson rigorously questioned Warnke and asked leading questions of Nitze during the hearing, but he also took advantage of the opportunity to clarify and add ice for the two arms control jobs. The Washington Senator interrupted an exchange betw een Senator Sam Nunn and Nitze to opine that the hearing served to address key issues of strategic philosophy. Jackson went to what he considered the heart of the matte r when he commented . I t is very clear to me that there is a total change in approach without any analysis or explanation when that occurred. I have no objection to a change of position; but we are dealing with 25 The Senator appears to be fishing for some expression of a belief or concept in c urious given that Jackson probably already decided to vote against the President choice. In this case, such comments likely served another purpose, such as providing food for thought with a senator who remained undecided. 24 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146838344 ; U.S. Senate, Committee on Ar med Services, Consideration of Mr. Paul C. Warnke to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador, Hearings, 2/22 23, 28/77, 162, 231 234, 238, 241, www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING ID=HRG 1977 SAS 0035 . 25 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Consideration of Mr. Paul C. Warnke to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador, Hearings, 2/22 23, 2 8/77 , 204, www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING ID=HRG 1977 SAS 0035 .
187 Jackson also followed the pract ice of most senators in having additional materials added to the record , and those documents illustrate the close connections between the Senator and the neocon opposition testimony, the senator sought to have two items included. The first was a letter from Eugene Rostow addressed to the chairman of the committee, John Stennis, arguing against the Warnke nomination. The head of the CPD began by noting his letter did not speak for CPD or CDM, and proceeded immediately t o agree with Nitze completely, including the Foreign Relations Committee testimony. Rostow argued that the debate was not academic, but one H e accepted as a g iven that the intention of the Soviet Unio n was to gain strategic superiority, and suggested that only by avoiding unilateral action could the United States ensure a stable international environment, which was the necessary precursor to meaningful arms control. Rostow concluded that Warnke did no t understand the complex issues at hand . He sought support for his views by including CDM and CPD reports for Stennis to add the official record. Jackson also wanted to have a CDM statement included, but Chairman Stennis, noting the length of what the Se nator from Washington wanted to add, did not include it. Collectively the evidence cited in objection to the Warnke nomination serve s to reinforce the importance of neoconservative individuals and ideas in the opposition, particularly in the context of th e Armed Services Committee hearing. 26 26 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Consideration of Mr. Paul C. Warnke to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador, Hearings, 2/22 23, 2 8/77, 263 266 , www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING ID=HRG 1977 SAS 0035 Armed WP , 3/1/77, A2 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146825709 .
188 Once the two hearings ended, the Senate moved rapidly toward a full vote. The debate on the floor of the Senate reflected the same concerns and issues as both hearings. Jackson raised many of his points from the hea positions on a variety of weapons and policy choices, and emphasized his problem with The Senator from Washington claimed the nominee no longer embraced the need for U.S. unilateral action or that th e Soviet strategic program followed the American example. Several other senators joined Jackson in arguing against the dual job nomination, including neoconservative freshman Senator Daniel Patric k Moynihan. The new legislator ions , following his own foreign policy convictions rooted in concerns for human rights and suspicion of the Soviet Union . Moynihan argued that strategic arms control depended first on the global political realities and U.S. Soviet relations. He cited Nit ze approvingly, among other dismisses the profound differences in arms control motives and objectives of the Soviet 27 Thus, he resolved to vote in favor of Warnke as ACDA head, while objecting to the position of chief SALT negotiator, a conclusion that reflected the dual job objection of Jackson, and effective in negotiation due to holding both positions. Mo remarks ensured that his new colleagues knew that his view agreed with those of his Washington associate. In the end, the influence of neoconservatives in the nomination 27 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Congressional Record , 123 (M arch 4, 1977), 6396.
189 fight is clear. A multitude of individuals on both sides used ideas and objections from neocons and neocon sources to discuss issues associated with Warnke. 28 Reports of the floor debate continued to emphasize the disagreements between C olumnist Joseph Kraft compared those prot . Writing in the Washington Post , the journalist claimed that the nomination fight illustrat ed the tendency of Senators to oversimplify the complex issues, turning them into simple black and white ideas that ignored nuances. Other accounts noted the fierce tone of the debate, calling J ackson the most strident voice and the leading opponent of Wa Media a nalysis of the s ituation before the vote agreed that the White House choice would receive more than the simple majority of fifty votes needed for approval . However , a majority of less than sixty votes, the number needed for SALT treaty approval down the road, could be seen as a moral vict ory for the anti Warnke forces. That outcome would of an ag reement with the Soviet Union. 29 T he Senate approved Warnke for both posts, although a 58 to 4 0 vote for the President , 28 H enry M. Jackson, Congressional Record , 123 (March 4, 1977) , 6391, 6394, 6406; Paul C. Warnke to be Ambassador Congressional R ecord , 123 (March 4, 1977) 6395 6396 ; Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Suzanne Weaver, A Dangerous Place , (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978) 278 282; Douglas Schoen, Pat: A Biography of Daniel Patrick Moynihan , (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979) 271 , 292; Godfrey Hodgson, The Gentleman from New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Biography , (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000) 281 283 . 29 WP , 3/6/77, 39, http ://search.proquest.com/docview/146910488 ; NYT , 3/8/77, 65, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123104529 ed to Both Posts Despite WP , 3/10/77, A6, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146794337 NYT , 3/8/77; 28, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123104692 .
19 0 the consensus shared by most scholars as well. Jackson held a positive outlook despite losing the vote . His biographer Robert Kaufman describes the s ense of good and bad the Senator felt after the nomination . He concluded two things from an interview w ith former aide Richard Perle. P rivately, Jackson expressed satisfaction with this outcome [the 58 to 40 vote] but alarm th at Carter could have nomina ted a man 30 The contemporary descriptions of the final debate and the aftermath of the vote describe Senator Jackson, and in one account the CDM, as the primary voices of the opposition to U.S. SALT policy, with no mention of the neo c onservative influence at work. In contrast, several academic and popular histories mention the involvement of neoconservatives, b ut the specifics as they relate to the Warnke nomination receive only cursory attention. For example, VaÃ¯sse notes the debate was a significant point in the evolution of neocon efforts . Ehrman virtually ignores the event , other than briefly de . Sanders argu es that the CDM functioned during the fight as a type of central clearinghouse for oppositi on groups of various stripes. He suggests that the nomination battle was an attempt to control domestic opinion on the Soviet threat . The wide variety of opinions s choice reflects more about the diffe However, what is clear is that the leadership and intimate involvement of neoconservatives guided the opposition to the Warnke nomination. With the conclusion of the debate , the st age was set for a series of skirmishes for the next two years between the supporters of U.S. SALT policy as defined by the Carter administration and 30 Kaufman, Jackson , 361.
191 their opposition. The situation remained unchanged until the negotiations ended and President Carter signe d the SALT II Treaty in June 1979. 31 Ongoing Discussion T he dispute over an appropriate policy direction for U.S. SALT policy continued at home after the nomination fight while negotiations proceeded overseas . O pponents continued to raise questions of U.S. arms control policy in different venues throughout the year, and neocon servative ideas played a major role. The two sides jousted for two years while negotiations continued, with each side refining and responding to the challenges of the other. President Carter faced another challenge to his policy choices h ard on the heels of securing a new head of the ACDA . Secretary of State Vance traveled to Moscow in March 1977 with two options for Soviet consideration in an attempt to move forward on SALT. The fir st, commonly referred to as deep cuts, called for cutting strategic arms levels significantly below the levels agreed on at Vladivostok. The second used the framework as a basis, but suggested missile levels ten percent lower. President Carter and his advisors preferred the deep cuts, and some of the original ideas for such an approach came from Senator Jackson. His involvement reflected two aspects of neoconservative thinking. T hey were not opposed to arms control, and in fact desired the reduction o f nuclear weapons . However, any agreements needed to ensure bilateral parity, U.S. primacy in strategic arms rather than establishing inferiority to the Soviets, and careful negotiation due to the inherent lack of Soviet trustworthiness. 31 WP 3/10/77, A6, http://search. proquest.com/docview/146794337 . For those scholars not focused on neocons as subject and their sense of neocons in the Warnke aftermath, see Caldwell, Dynamics , 20; Scoblic, U.S. vs. Them , 101, 104; Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 38 39. For those scholars wi th neocons as their focus, see Sanders, Peddlers , 2 0 9 210; Ehrman, Rise , 92, 103; VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism , 129 130.
192 Jackson noted i n the memo that as desirable as immediate reductions appeared, only symbolic eliminations held any likelihood of actually happening. Even such cutbacks sided and substantive U.S. concessions on other issues. They [the So viets] must not be permitted to mislead the American people about 32 J ackson wanted the new President to understand how the Soviets needed to be approached in order to make any gains without sacrificing American security . As mentioned above, Carter wrote to Jackson to explain how helpful the memo was for him. Althou gh the White House embraced the idea of deep cuts , the Soviets utterly rejected both proposals . Their reaction guarante ed an extension of the SALT process, and a need to revamp policy direction for the White House. What the deep cuts failure illustrates is that Jackson contributed significantly to U.S. SALT policy at the time without sacrificing his fundamental assumption s about how arms control should be carried out. 33 The failure of the initial Carter SALT proposal did not please Jackson. He expressed concerns to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski about how the Secretary of State made the proposal during the a . He began what became a series of letter exchanges with Brzezinski as a follow up to a lunch meeting between the two . Jackson virtually accused the U.S. delegation of circumventing a presidentially decided policy when th ey made the offer to the Soviets , 32 Folder: l, Subject Files, National Security Affairs, JCL 33 Carter, Keeping Faith , 224 225; Vance, Hard Choices , 48 55; Henry M. Jackson to Mr. President, Folder: Material, Sub ject Files, National Security Affairs, JCL; Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 39 41.
193 based on information the Senator received after the fact . The National Security Advisor replied by suggesting that the proposed positions were c onsistent with U.S. policy. As the Senator strident ly demanded answers , Brze zinski suggested Jackson was overreacting, and that the detail the Senator found objectionable was a long standing U.S. position pre dating the Carter presidency. Jackson continued to view the issue as significant, so much so that he sent a letter to Secr etary of State Vance, notifying him that the issue of cruise missile range as a component of U.S. policy in this specific instance would be a source of questions in his coming appearance before the Armed Serv ices Committee . The growing animosity between t he two sides suggests that the fundamental differences between them could be glossed over only when one side or the other backed down. Thus, any cooperation was temporary at best. The administration garding the threat to U.S. security represented by poor negotiating and the danger of agreements resulting from such efforts . 34 Jackson was not alone in challenging Union and arms control as Commentary magazine we ighed into the fray . E ditor Norman Podhoretz featured a three Laqueur argued that the United States experienced a general decline in world position, and the new president began his term at a critical time. As he surveyed the problems 34 Carter, Keeping Faith , 224 225; Vance, Hard Choices , 51 55. Jackson to Brzezinski, 4/2277, HMJ 3560 28/2/6; Brzezinski to Jackson, 4/25/77, HMJ 3560 28/1/1; Jackson to Brzezins ki, 4/27/77, HMJ 3560 28/2/6; Brzezinski to Jackson, 4/26/77, HMJ 3560 28/1/1; Jackson to Vance, 4/29/77, HMJ 3560 28/2/6. Sanders, citing a June 27 Christian Science M onitor story, points out that the Soviets viewed Jackson as a figure whose significance equaled that of the negotiators without being present; it is unclear in the text of the story whether this Soviet observation refers to March or June of 1977, see Sanders, Peddlers , 242, 272, but Sanders clearly views the sentiment as a reaction to the deep cuts proposal.
194 around the world, Laqueur looked at U .S. Soviet relations and noted that the current SALT situation held both na tions to unequal missi le levels. Although the situation remained unchanged since the 1972 Interim Agreement, his point echoed neocon concerns for any subsequent treaty. He also referenced the difference between Soviet t [the difference] by groups like 35 Laqueur drew on this information to suggest a parallel with Winsto Germany seriously in the 1930s, and connected the threat posed by ignoring Hitler with the dangers associated with supporting a flawed SALT II treaty. He noted that nuclear weapons made a parallel comparison d ifficult, but argued that remembering the historical parallel would be critical in understanding the mounting pressure to approve a SALT II treaty rooted in unsound assumptions. The solution Laqueur posited was an agreement based on equal reductions, desp ite the difficulties associated with such a treaty. 36 addressed two key questions: the nature of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the value of dÃ©tente. He s ought to explore the idea of a new world order emerging , and how the United States should view the Soviet Union as a result. Tucker explored several different o ptions, including balance of power considerations and the idea of the Soviet s as essentia lly de fensive in their thinking. His 35 Commentary , 63:3 (1977: Mar): 34 35, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290075743 . 36 Commentary , 63:3 (1977: Mar): 33 41, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290075743 .
195 conclusion was that relations between the two superpowers remained the same, unchanged since t he end of World War II. Thus, the growth of the Soviet military and the increasing activity around the world demonstrate tha t dÃ©t ente was over. He suggested that dÃ©tente itself was a form of containment , but not as effective as earlier versions. T he strategy needed in 1977 was a return to containment cannot reasonably expect the Soviet leadership to refrain from maki ng use of its newly 37 The best policy choice was to move beyond dÃ©tente to a form of containmen t similar to the earlier policy, but less expansive in its goal . Tucker admitted that a return to the foreign policy consensus of the early Cold War was unlikely, especially since such a change could be rejected by the nation, but the current world situat ion required the shift. 38 In the final Commentary argued that America needed a new defense strategy. The impact of Vietnam and Watergate caused indecision and doubt to shape the efense . This situation was dangerous, as it could allow the Soviet Union to take advantage of the uncertainty, to the detriment of the United States. Luttwak claimed the solution was t he emergence of a positive view on the military that would enable a ba lanced discuss ion of how to keep America safe. A balanced discussion was the key . After an extended , statistic driven dis cussion of the Soviet military, he suggested loudest American voices ceaselessly argue that mere numbers are meaningl ess, if not 37 Commentary , 63:3 (1977: Mar): 50, http://search.proquest.com/docview/129017501 6 . 38 Commentary , 63:3 (1977: Mar): 42 50 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290175016 .
196 that military power itself is passÃ© , the Russian s are building missiles, bombers, and 39 He noted t hat the Soviet leaders pursued this b uildup without regard for the economic consequences . Luttw ak concluded by arguing that denying the Soviet Union was on the move was difficult. As it sought to expand its sphere of influence, the West needed to formulate a strategy. 40 While it is unsurprising that a neoconservative journal should publish material critical of liberal policies, what these three articles in Commentary do is reflect and reinforce the neocon thinking in the middle of discussion on U.S. foreign policy. John and his argument that they viewed communist dictatorships as worse than non communist versions, suggests a neocon paranoia about the Soviet Union that is consistent with the thinking expressed in the pages of Commentary Tea m B, along with his indictment of those pursuing arms control in the mold of dÃ©tente, shows a profound distrust of the Soviet Union and the very people put in charge of arms s call for renewed containment not only foreshadowed actions by the Reagan administration, but again reinforced the necessity of doubting Soviet sincerity at the arms control table. Luttwak also asserted the untr ustworthy nature of the Soviet Union . All three shared an acknowledgment that moving forward with U.S. policy along the lines they preferred was a difficult task, but the specter of an expanding and shifty Soviet Union haunted their 39 Commentary 63:3 (1977 : Mar): 57, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290175067 . 40 Commentary 63:3 (1977: Mar): 51 58, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290175067 .
197 collective minds. Finally, it is striking that the three article s conveyed a perspective very much in line with both the CPD and 41 The CPD took action quickly and released its first report , for public consumption on Apri l 4, the day after Carter and Secret ary Vance spoke to the press about the deep cuts failure. The press heard the two men put general, pointing out that they were difficult and took time. Describin g the other positive outcomes of the visit, the President noted, humanly possible, to have permanent friendship with the Soviet Union and to have 42 F or the Committee, these sentiments were at odds with where U.S. policy needed to go. The paper argued that there was a premium on time, which required steady progress on arms control efforts. The report described the threat of Soviet expansion and the So viet goals of strategic superiority to achieve an eventual global Communist society . SALT I failed to affect the pursuit of these goals, and the American people needed to know of the danger. The CPD viewpoint contrast ed significantly with the President desire for friendship and confidence that arms control efforts could be effective. On the basis of these few points, the differences in perspective between the administration and the CPD is clear . 43 41 Ehrman, Rise , 114 115. 42 PPPUS Carter , I: 560. 43 PPPUS C arter , I: 559 560; The Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 10 15.
198 expanded umptions, showing sympathy for and agreement with neoconservative arguments. Their paper echoed Commentary magazine comparison of the current situation with the arms buildup of Germany in the 1930s that placed the Soviets and the Na zis in similar positions. Issuing a general indictment of U.S. policy toward th e Soviet Union, the group argued, d the 44 The paper effectively indicted virtually all of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, and closed by suggesting that negotiation from a position of strength and caution needed to come before a real opportunity to improve relations and engage in significant arms control. In this respect, CPD rhetoric shared sim ilarities with the memo from Senator Jackson to President Carter , emphasizing the need to ensure that successful, sound arms control would not endanger the nation by compromising security or increasing vulnerability. This argument implies that SALT supporters threatened to approve negotiations that took t his dangerous , conciliatory approach . 45 The media response to the CPD paper, w hile somewhat small, reflected the trend of increas ing awareness among the press and public concerning the various groups that opposed dÃ©tente and SALT. Both the Wall Street Journal and New York Times ran brief news blurbs about the report, but the Times also ran two other stories. One simply highlighted some of points the Committee made and listed the signers of the 44 in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 15. 45 The Com Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 10 15. For rhetorical comparison of goals, see Henry M. Jackson to Mr. President, Folder: ox 52, Brzezinski Materials, Subject Files, National Security Affairs, JCL, especially 3 4.
199 report, while the other article placed the group in the context of the different organizations across the conservative spectrum that opposed U.S. arms control policy. knowledged that overlap existed among some of the groups, but members of the Committee on the Present Danger, for example, are a number of prominent Jewish intellectuals, such as Norman 46 This reference to neoconservative participation reinforces both the unique nature of the Committee and the increasing prominence of neocons in efforts to inform the public and shape U.S. policy. 47 Much like the CPD, the Coalit ion for a Democratic Majority began to raise its public profile. T he group began working to capitalize on its strong performance during the Warnke nomination , moving from a relatively quiescent , post 1976 Democratic National Convention platform status to a more active role . C o chairs Midge Decter and Ben Wattenberg circulated a letter to CDM members asking for support for a letter to the President supporting his human rights and arms control efforts . The intent of that support was to encourage Carter to resist 48 The group released the letter at a press conference with Eugene Rostow as spokesman . Media outlets paid little attention 46 NYT , 4/4/77, 50, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123423041 . 47 NYT , 4/4/77, 62, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123418500 WSJ , 4/4/77, 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/134151214 NYT , 4/4/77, 50, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123431547 ; Linda Cha NYT , 4/4/77, 50, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123423041 . 48 Midge Decter and Ben Wattenberg to Friends, 4/29/1977 , Folder: Papers of Peter R. Rosenblatt, LBJ.
200 to what the CDM hoped would be rec eived as a statement of support from Democratic Party hardliners . T he White Hous e sent a letter thanking the Coalition for their letter . This message of qualified support functioned as the first evidence of a renewed active status for the CDM. 49 The group . In the aftermath of the Soviet rejection of deep cuts, the United States resumed discussions with the Soviets , and Carter wrote Jackson , outlining his goals for SALT II. At the time, the Senator a nd his allies remained silent, digesting the new policy direction. By the summer, o pposition elements began to speak out on the admini efforts . The CDM put out a newsletter, alerting members that not only had the organization retur ned to full activity, but that regular reports would begin in September. T he bulletin served as a digest of recent actions, and described the organizations rights and SALT efforts, and the plan for Senators Jackson and Moynihan to take on honorary co chair officer roles with the organization. However, as the CDM sought to gear up, the neoconservative action belonged to Commentary magazine and 50 49 NYT , 5/15/77, 25 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/123303543 Chicago Tribune , 5/15/77, 26; Joshua Muravchik to Midge Decter, 5/17/77, Folder: 49, Personal Papers of Peter R. Rosenblatt, LBJ; Joshua Muravchik to Eugene Rostow, 5/17/77, Folder: Folder: blatt, LBJ; White House to CDM, 5/24/77, Folder: Rosenblatt, LB J . 50 Vance, Hard Choices , 56; Political Observer , Summer 1977, in the left stack of Untitled Folder , Box 12, Personal Papers of Peter R. Rosenblatt, LBJ Presidential Library.
201 The shot roaring from the barrel of Commentary came under the byline of Richard Pipes. The initial drafter of the first CPD report was no stranger to controversy, but his comments in the July issue of the neocon magazine caught the attention of many. S this anti 51 Pipes wrote where he argued that the United States was ignoring So viet military and strategic doctrine, and the consequences of this attitude could rob America of any effective ability to negotiate because the Soviets would not take U.S. deterrence seriously. Pipes claimed that cost concerns and scientific understanding s about the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons supplanted military considerations about Soviet intentions , affecting U.S. policy planning. As a result, those in charge of creating U.S. policy, along with the various commentators and supporters of SALT, shared assumptions foreign to the Soviets, and vice versa. This situation meant that when the Soviet Union sought to expand its empire and its strategic arms, the United States, based on the false belief that the other side thought as they did, wil lingly sought American and Soviet strategies are traceable to different conceptions of the role of ctions which the 52 Thus, U.S. decisio n makers misunderstoo d and dismissed signs that the Soviet Union was not acting in accord with American thinking. H is analysis carried serious implications for SALT: 51 Herken, Counsels , 283. 52 Thinks I t C ould F ight and W in a N uclear W Commentary , 64:1 (1977: Jul): 25, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290121907 .
202 SALT misses the point at issue so long as it addresses itself mainly to the question of numbers of strategic weapons: equally important are qualitative improvements within existing quotas, and the size of regular land and sea forces. Above all, however, looms the question of intent: as long as the Soviets persist in adhering to the Clausewitzian maxim on the function of war, mutual deterrence does not really exist. 53 His analysis effectively challenged both past and current U.S. policy , suggesting arms co ntrol supporters fundamentally misunderstood what the Soviets thought, why they acted the way they did, and how America should plan and negotiate with them. Pipes ended his article by suggesting that U.S. policymakers essentially asked the wrong questions and arrived at the wrong conclusions . 54 New York Times reported on the article and suggested that the Harvard professor was restarting several debates in Washington, including American intelligence analysis of Soviet intentions and the importance of USSR civil defense programs as part of understanding the strategic threat. After running an excerpt of the article, the Washington Post published a reply claiming thus far, and ignored changes in have continued had the piece remained in isolation, but the CPD released its first issue specific, critical paper right on the heels of the Commentary issue. 55 T of U.S. arms control efforts . Initially authored by Paul Nitze and Richard Allen, t he 53 Ibid, 34. 54 VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism , 166. 55 NYT 6/25/77, 7 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/123484897 WP , 7/3/77, 71, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146700979 WP 7/8/77, A25, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1466 59993 .
203 report argued that the Soviets had not met U.S. unilateral actions wit h corresponding moves agreements ] ambiguities and stretched the agreed language to its full limits or 56 After describing the deep cuts proposal, the paper suggested the U.S. offer did not favor America , noting that the President mutual deterrence, not some version of equal treatment. Moreover, the CPD claimed that the latest U.S. effort also fell short , even though the new proposal wor ked differently, due to the design effectively accomplishing the same results. The Committee found particularly egregious the fact that a simple rejection based on the d the United States to almost completely restr ucture its approach to arms control. This outcome prompted the group to call for a strong demonstration of U.S. commitment . After pointing out necess ity of developing pending missile system s , the paper suggested that the United States needed to require t wo things from the Soviet Union : demonstration of a willingness to negotiate in a confirmable, equal reduction basis and agreements that served to deny the Soviet s a reason to test the li mits of any accord . The paper received widespread attention, with U .S. News and World Report publishing an excerpt . 57 The report was a broadside to the President Carter. According to a July 16 memo, the White House planned to invite several members of the Committee to meet with the President before the publication of the 56 in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 17. 57 VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservativism Soviet Arms Talks: Report U.S. Ne ws & World Report , July 18, 1977, 59 60, Folder: Action Memos, 7/16/77 Staff Files, JCL .
204 Pipes article and the CPD paper. French historian Justin VaÃ¯sse argues that the administration pursued this approach as a means of blunting and possibly silencing the group by granting special, unofficial, confidential discus sion with key administration members. He suggests that the White House fundamentally erred in pursuing such a tactic. By most accounts, the meeting went poorly . Nitze kept interrupting the President and the two sides talked past each other. According t o one report, the CPD walked away with greater concerns, while another suggested a positive outcome and encouraged members. Sanders and VaÃ¯sse agree that the meeting did not go well, with VaÃ¯sse suggesting Committee members leaked the details of the secre t meeting to columnists Evans and Novak, who cooperated in setting out the CPD perspective of the gathering. While the meeting outcome demonstrates that the White House and the Committee continued to hold differing views of what was important and how to p roceed with SALT, it also shows two other significant things. First, the audience with Carter proves the importance of the group as a challenge to the President source of concern of the administration. Second, the conference strengthens the concept of neoconservative ideas as the intellectual basis for parties opposing SALT. 58 The rising stock of the CPD in the world of SALT is illustrated by an exchange with the CDM shortly after the meeting with the President . S yndicated columnist Mar ianne Means made a seemingly negative reference to the Committee in a piece giving a good report of the Coalition. CPD member Max Kampelman, writing for the 58 Sanders, Peddlers , 244, 247 249; Charles Kupperman, The SALT II Debate, (Ph.D. diss., Un iversity of Southern California, 1981), 197; Memo from John G. Kester to Landon Butler, 7/16/77, Folder: Control and Disarmament Agency, 6/2/77 Chief of Staff Files, JCL ; VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservat ism , 171 173; Talbot, Master , 155; Rowland Evans and WP , 8/13/77, A15 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146659043 ; Godfrey Sperlin Carter on Arms, Christian Science Monitor , 8/22/77, 27. Kupperman was a CPD staffer during the Carter presidency.
205 Executive Committee, wrote to CDM chairman Ben Wattenberg , rebuking the Coalition for speaking ill of the Committee . Kampleman reminded Wattenberg of the successes of the CPD, including the meeting at the White House, and lamented the marginalization of CPD in the column. Wattenberg responded immediately, stressing his respect for the Committee and i nsisting that he said nothing disparaging to the columnist, which meant that the objectionable content of the column must be that of the author and not the CDM. This exchange demonstrates that in both opposition and SALT support circles, the Committee on the Present Danger was gaining reputation and status. 59 Other neoconservative sources continued to call attention to the idea that the Soviet Union remained a growing threat . Walter Laqueur, in an August Commentary in the midst of an analysis of USSR leadership trends that whoever took over the reins of the nation from Brezhnev would 60 Anyone who thought otherwise would seriousl y misunderstand the Soviet Union and its leadership. Catholic theologian and philosopher Michael Novak , who was a member of the CDM and a nother voice attempting to alert Americans to the Soviet threat , lamented to Jackson that the Washington Star rejected his column arms control efforts assessment of the Soviets as more da nger contention that Carter erroneously emphasi zed morality rather than power in dealing 59 Max Kampelman to Ben Wattenberg, 8/25/77, Folder: Personal Papers of Peter R. Rose nblatt, LBJ ; Ben Wattenberg to Max Kampelman, 8/27/77, Folder: R. Rosenblatt, LBJ Library. 60 Commentary , 64:2 (1977:Aug ): 43 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290136303 .
206 with them. view of the White House . He expressed his thoughts to the President in a letter outlining the problems with the administration s app roach and his concerns about moving negotiations forward on his version of a solid basis. T he note hit a sore spot with Carter, who fired back a hand written note the same day in which he thanked the Senator for his concerns about the President sense of ease regarding the arms talks, couched in purely informational and clipped phrasing. Increasingly, those showed growing frustrat ion with how the White House shaped and carried out arms control policy. 61 The rift between the opposition and the administration widened, with both sides increasingly viewing the other as stubborn and immovable. One area where this shift appeared was Congress. Secretary of State Vance appeared before various Senate committees answer the objections of the opposition forces. However, Jackson and others disagreed with much of what th ey heard. The concerns of the S enator from Washington dated back to when he learn ed of the latest U.S. negotiation plans and wrote a strongly worded letter to the President . As the date of the expiration of the SALT I Interim Agreement, October 3, neared, Jackson told Carter that several things concerned him. He listed plans for unilateral ly honoring the soon to expire accord, casting aside the deep cuts negotiators willingly forgoing demands to limit Soviet heavy missile expansion. s were a slap in the face to the administration: 61 5/151/4; Novak to Jackson, 6/1/77, HMJ 3560 5/151/4; Jackson to No vak, 6/7/77, HMJ 3560 5/151/4; Kaufman, Plans , 43; Jackson to Carter, 8/22/77, HMJ 3560 28/2/7; Carter to Jackson, 8/22/77, HMJ 3560 21/1/2.
207 Finally, I can only express my disappointment at the failure of your senior officials to consult with the Congress prior to deciding upon, and presenting to the Soviets, this most recent round of concessio ns, and by the decision to circumvent the established procedures for Congressional approval under our laws and Constitution. 62 Only a few days befor e this letter, the White House was in the middle of work ing cooperatively with members of the CPD to gain Se nate support for the Panama Canal Treaty. This proximity allowed individuals like Admiral Zumwalt to put the occasional no doubt reduced the likelihood of such interactions continuing, g ive n the well established close relationship between Jackso n and members of the Committee . He proceeded to call Vance to testify before the Senate, which the Secretary did in a session that the Washington Post suggested revealed the significant differences b etween the the increasingly chilly relationship between Jackson and the administration is clear in the relatively cold h Vance . The President comes across in references to the President obligations, what Jackson can and cannot have access to, and the formal salutation using his title and last name, rather than typical and more inform al use of nickname . 63 Norman Podhoretz shared the same concerns as Jackson, and his analysis of approach to the Soviets . In a Wall Street Journal a rticle, he drew on the legacy of Vietnam to explain anti war sentiment, anti Americanism, and an aversion to anti communism. Echoing earlier neoconservative writing, Podhoretz drew a comparison to Great Britain being lulled into appeasement in the face of Nazi Germany, suggesting that the same thing was happening with the United States. Even worse, some Soviets agreed. These attitudes left him wonder ing apocalyptic moment when the Russian s will confront us with the eq ually impossible 62 Jackson to Carter, 9/22/77, 2, HMJ 3560 28/2/7. 63 Vance, Hard Choices , 62 63; Memo from Hamilton Jordan and Land on Butler to Jimmy Carter, Folder: Memos by Butler, Landon, 6/10/77 Files, JCL; WP , 10/15/77, A1 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146752882 ; Carter to Jackson, 10/22/77, HMJ 3560 28/2/7.
208 64 Possible rhetorical excess aside, his sentiment s reflected the fears and concerns of the neoconservative led SALT opposition. Podhoretz further developed his use of past errors to illust rate weaknesses in current policy in an essay published in the October issue of . He expanded on the same analytical structure regarding the influence of Vietnam and drew a parallel between Great Britain and Germany in the 1930s, and the United St ates and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. He cited Daniel Patrick Moynihan appreciatively regarding communism as the last threat to democracy after the fall of fascism. The piece ended with Podhoretz asserting that the only way out of the morass was to rec ognize that the Soviet Union, and communism, were besieging the West. An important portion of his article was his analysis of the SALT situation . Podhoretz set out the basic case for SALT II position, mentioning Team B, Pipes, and other details, including the key players of the opposition. A few individuals like Henry Jackson, Paul Nitze, and Elmo Zumwalt, and a few small groups like the Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority keep trying to alert American public opinion to the unprecedented dimensions of the Soviet military buildup, but they are rewarded for their pains with accusations of paranoia, hysteria, servility toward the Pentagon, and worse. 65 An endorsement from one of the godfathers of neoconservatism drew the connections between t hose involved in opposing SALT and the political movement even tighter. Moreover, the use of neocon themes in the rhetorical challeng es to President Carter highlighted the distinctions between th e SALT supporters and opposition on arms control. T he Committee on the Present Danger, and specifically the Chairman of Policy Studies Paul Nitze, continued to press the neocon critique of SALT II with a new 64 WSJ , 10/19/77, 9, http://search.proquest.com/docview/134102861 . 65 255:1529 (Oct. 1977): 29.
209 publication. The organization called a press co nference in November 1977 , during which . The goal was to present for discussion the merits , or lack thereof, of the negotiations. While the report would eventually go through eighteen update s over the next two years, the primary sources of outraged reaction was how the CPD policy chair obtained the material , and how its release would affect the talks. The paper itself was a rather dry statement of where the United States and the Soviet Union were in the process . It described issues of agreement, such as number of ICBMs that each side could MIRV, and what remained to be decided , such as the acceptable number of MIRVed sea and land based missiles each country could possess. T he two nations re ached a breakthrough moment in September , settling the main points of the treaty . W hat remained was determining the specifics of each major area. If anything offensive to the Carter administration emerged in the report, it was the assessment of where the talks stood, and the meaning that the United States either agreed on or intended to propose. T he group presented a negative evaluation , describing the state of the treaty as detrimental to the United States. What separated th is particular CPD event from others was the speed and strength of the response from supporters . of details and plans about the arms talks would hurt negotiations, and at least one reporter asked Nitz e where he obtained the material, forcing him to admit that he believed the information was unclassified. Three days later, the Washington Post columnists Evans and Novak described a closed bers lambasted an apparently flustered Secretary of State. 66 66 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , xix; Vance, Hard Choices , 61;
210 SALT supporters quickly s truck back, led by Senator John Culver. The senator he was only a member of the Armed Services Committee, and pronounced a committee . He also condemne d the reporting of Evans and Novak, claiming that such lax security put the SALT negotiations in jeopardy, even if the disclosures were unint entional in nature. The follow up came the next day when outside experts came out in support Th eir associations with the arms control efforts of previous administrations strengthened their assessment . Evans and Novak weighed in at this point , suggesting that the W hite House orchestrated the response of Culver and the experts as a counterattack against the SALT critics , and to shore up Senate support for what the President and his advisors were trying to accomplish with the Soviets. The final line of the column sho wed both the telling nature of the SALT supporter response and the importance of Jackson. Noting the import of the issue, they House, will probably determine the fate 67 B oth sides possessed reasons for optimism and concern a s the debate continued . The White House possessed a framework for an eventual treaty, and the prospects of concluding it soon looked good. However, domestic support for an Folder: WP , 11/2/77, A2 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146619697 WP , 11/4/77, A19, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146610313 . Nitze also released a twelve same folder rse reaction was to both, see Kupperman, The SALT II Debate , 200. 67 WP , 11/8/77, A1 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1467 18497 WP , 11/9/77, A24, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146719125 ; Rowland Evans and WP , 11/11/77, A17, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146717483 .
211 agreement f aced considerable opposition. Hamilton Jordan received a memo in December about a conversation concerning arms control at a party . T he Washington insiders present agreed that the CPD posed a significant threa plans and the White House needed to produce a more active response. The President remained optimistic regarding successfully negotiating and gaining Senate approval of a SALT II treaty, despite the failure to convince any skeptics to sign on in support. Opponents likewise w ere encouraged as they established a presence and reputation in the public arena, with groups like the CPD leading the way , support ed by the CDM and Commentary magazine. Yet, there the challenge remained to safeguard arms control and alert the public to th weak and debilitating effort s at a treaty. Senator Jackson responded negotiations, and new SALT agreement that would enable the Soviets to retain and even expand their forces while imposing constraints on our most advanced 68 Lest the recipient think Jackson intended to ignore the iss ue in the future, he promised to continue closely follow ing arms control developments. 69 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance suggested that by the end of 1977, the various groups opposing U.S. arms control efforts coalition advocating linkage of SALT to other issues and generally opposing a SALT 68 Jackson to constituent, 12/7/77, HMJ 3560 5/150/1. 69 Memo from Si Lazarus to Hamilton Jordan, December 19, 1977, 12/19/77, Folder: 3/27/78, Box 128, Papers, JCL; Caldwell, Dynamics , 45.
212 70 While true to some extent, opposition organizations and individuals experienced a significant degree of unity, large ly due to the leadership of neoconservatives in shaping public opinion in a variety of settings. The skirmishes between the Carter administration and Senator A neocon l ed coalition was not only visible, but effectively working to stymie the efforts of the Carter Administration , based on t he actions of Senator Jackson, the CDM, and the CPD . As the debate continued, Jackson, the CPD, and neoconservatives stood well posit ioned to continue to challenge U.S. SALT policy, and perhaps shape it into something better fitting their desires. As debate rolled into the new year, the opposition gave greater attention to broader concepts and first principles , rather than honing in on a specific issue, report, speech, or paper. One of the most obvious examples was the continuing neocon frustration with the Carter administration. Conservative columnist George Will cited neoconservative writers when he suggested that a Carter victory in the 1980 election might be hampered by the influence of the far left wing of the Democratic Party. He point ed out the importance of a presidential record in gaining a second term, observing that the Senate vote on the Warnke nomination fight demonstrated the alienating effect of more liberal persuasion . Will concluded that the possible failure of an Hi s source was an article by Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammo n from the first issue of Public Opinion , which the American Enterprise Institute published . B oth authors were Democrats, and Wattenberg was a well known neoconservative voice. T hese two 70 Vance, Hard Choices , 62.
213 considered the various challenges the President could face in gaini ng voter support , given his embrace of many elements more liberal than most 1976 pro Carter voters would support , such as environmentalists, feminists , and anti war activists . They ntal. D aniel Yankelovich, a well known analyst of public opinion, argued in another article for increasing approval by Americans for a more active, involved U.S. foreign policy. He point ed out that a large majority of Americans favored arms control agree ments like SALT, and at the same time they also thought it necessary to view the Soviet Union with greater skepticism. The reason for this perspective was that Americans belie ved t hat the Soviet s would most likely seek to use dÃ©tente against the United St ates, which analysis of various sets of polling data, echo the concerns of neoconservatives . The Public Opinion articles and the analysis of a conserva tive like Will demo nstrate the analysis by others outside neocon circles. 71 Commentary approach to arms control in January 1978 . Author Edward Luttwak attempted to find the source of failed arms control efforts in order to answer a specific question : why was America moving from a position of superiority to inferiority in competition with the Soviet Union, particu larly with SALT? He established that arms control itself as a general 71 WP , 2/16/78, A19 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/146916240 Public Opinion , 1:1 (March April, 1978), 3 8; Daniel Yankelov Public Opinion , 1:1 (March April, 1978), 12 16.
214 direction for policy was not the problem, because any difficulties associated with either unilateral or bilateral arms control could be resolved . Then h e asked if concept of the Soviet Union as a specif ic partner in arms control rendered U.S. efforts irrelevant . After an examination of the peculiarities of Soviet predilections, Luttwak concluded that any asso ciated issues could be overcome. This reasoning meant that only the United States could be the culprit. Luttwak further argued that SALT no longer functioned as an aid to U.S. Soviet relations. Instead, it was an obstacle , casting doubt on the very concept of arms control in the minds of Americans. This meant that the United States made a very s ignificant error in judgment conce rning the point of arms control. Such a mistake meant that strategic competition in itself, as if the growth of strategic arsenals wer e the cause of Soviet 72 This distinction represented one of the core conceptual issues driving the neoconservative critique: if U.S. policy makers could not make the proper distinction between caus e and effect, how could they negotiate a sound agreement? He suggested that the ensuing c onfusion might allow U.S. concessions that appeared to make sense, when in fact the Soviets would gain an advantage. Neocons wondered how any rational supporter of t he United States could endorse discussions based on such flawed assumptions, as the talks would be doomed to failure, and at best spell trouble for America. Luttwak concluded his analysis by indicting the three types of individuals who pursued this errone ous version of ar ms control: technicians, who were mistakenly all owed to 72 Commentary , 65:1 (Jan. 1978), 27 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290176239 .
215 determine policy as if the issues at hand were simply a numbe rs game; isolationists who thought that giving up nuclear arms would enable the United States to become less involved in t he world; and anti Americanists who believed that America was evil, ending American hegemony was a valid goal, and disarmament was a means to that end. Luttwak suggested that instead of embracing such erroneous views about arms control, the best perspecti ve was to understand that efforts like SALT served as tools only, ones that possessed the power to advance U.S. strategic interests rather than being those interests. 73 another c ontribution in Commentary at the hands of Walter Lacquer. After describing a relations with the Soviet Union, specifically in the realm of arms control. Rebuking those o n the left who expressed puzzlement over slow negotiation progress and continuing Soviet arms buildups, Lacquer suggested that the Soviets truly believed in superiority in nuclear arms , and the y sought it , which explained the progress of events during the first year of the new administration. Thus, the complaints of groups like the CPD addressed real concerns that allies of the United States shared . The result for Lacquer was that the problems with arms control stemmed from the White House, not from the g strategic arms agreement, but the administration, in its wish to conclude a treaty as quickly as possible, seems to have made concessions which serve neither American 73 Ibid, 20, 23, 27 28.
216 interests nor, for 74 He argued that such confusion ran rampant throughout U.S. foreign policy, resulting in confusion about the . This situation was hardly a basis from which to operate and hope to accomplish meaningful improvements in arms control. Lacquer, Luttwak, Wattenberg, and the other neocon critics of Carter administration policy echoed each other as they pointed out the dominance of liberal thinking that did not hold the Soviet Union in appropriate suspicion , and the potential for such thinking to lead to agreements more harmful than helpful to long term U.S. interests. 75 Supporters of arms control, and critics of neocons, did not leave these claims unanswered , and their responses help il lustrate the nature of the discussion . H istorian Arthur Schlesinger , Jr. challenged in a general fashion the idea of a rightward shift in the American body politic . He suggested that neoconservatism added a missing intellectual component to conservatism , but predicted that liberalism would survive long past the demise of both neoconservatism and conservatism because the liberal SALT was one of the liberal leaning positions he cited as present in the Carter administration. Arizona Congressm an Morris Udall firmly endorsed an arms control perspective previously critiqued by Rostow when the Representative wrote a l etter to the editor of the New York Times , a media outlet that expressed opposition to the positions and reasoning of the CPD. The editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , Bernard T. Feld, opined one of the more critical assessments of the Committee, describing the publications and 74 Commentary 65:2 (Feb, 1978), 59 , http://search.proques t.com/docview/1290135666 . 75 Ibid, 56 59, 63.
217 statements of the group as propaganda. Suggest ing that the CPD misrepresented the race, his [t] he present danger is not to realize that the Committee is 76 These criticism s of neocon groups and ideas show the ongoing debate about the validity of the larger concepts and arguments of neoconservatives, even in the absence of more specific arms control issues . W ithin those broader conversations, SALT and arms control constitut ed mutually acknowledged points of discussion and disagreement. 77 During these exchanges, the Carter administration continued to work on refining its domestic SALT strategy , and some of its concerns demonstrated the need to shape the message carefully to av oid criticisms made by neoconservatives. New spaper accounts noted greater attention given to foreign policy issues by domestic advisor Hamilton Jordan at the President Butler worked on SALT from the early da ys of the Carter presidency, the fresh emphasis on public disclosure of their roles suggests greater concern for domestic factors influencing foreign policy in general. Additionally, Evans and Novak reported that White House staffers were unhappy with ACD A Director Warnke, and elements in the administration considered the chief neg otiator detrimental in the talks because he might have conceded too much. The two reporters also suggest ed that 76 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 34:2 (Feb., 1978), 8. Italics in the original. 77 WSJ , 2/21/7 8, 22 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/134285576 NYT , 1/15/78, SM18, http://search.pr oquest.com/docview/123859120 NYT , 1/15/78, SM18, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123859120 . Ironically, Schlesinger, in dismissing a rightward shi Ronald Reagan being president.
218 involvement in securing a SALT II treaty could result in a difficult battle for Senate approval . 78 In this setting, the State Department played an important role as a source of regular information for Senators and the public . Matt Nimetz, the point man for domestic SALT concerns, wrote to Deputy Na tional Security Advisor David Aaron about efforts by State to keep Senators and their staffers up to speed on arms control developments. The detailed breakdown describing which people participated in six meetings during the final three months of 1977 sugg ests significant concern for ensuring domestic support in the Senate for a SALT treaty. At least one meeting included aides for Senators Jackson and Moynihan . SALT friendly legislators, or their aides , received weekly updates. This devotion to ensuring Senate support is consistent with projection s of a difficult approval battle. Nimetz forwarded to Landon Butler another memo drafted for the SALT coordinating group at the State Department that described the main themes for spokesmen when engaged i n publi c communications regarding SALT. The major rationale was to argue that successful arms control did not require trusting the Soviet Union . They anticipated this approach would prove successful of the SALT process: Americans want arms control, but they have a deep seated distrust of the 79 Both memos sought to help in the task of convincing the public to 78 WP , 2/12/78, A14, htt p://search.proquest.com/docview/146942433 NYT , 2/23/78, NJ19, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123811086 ; Rowland Evans and R WP , 2/15/78, A23, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146927395 . 79 Matt Nimetz to Landon Butler, 2/3/78, Folder: La Subject Files, Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL.
219 by addressing some of the major p oints of resistance, ideas promoted by organizations like the CPD and the CDM . 80 The Nimetz note to the SALT group indirectly reveals the neoconservative opposition that the American dicho tomy s trongly resembles what Yankelovich wrote in Public Opinion . The memo contained o ther ideas considered by neoconservative s , such as the high priority of concluding a treaty, although the instructions stated the concept in somewhat absolute terms. Th is fervent desire mirrored the criticism of Lacquer that the administration sought a treaty so strongly that they were willing to make unwise compromises. also suggested pointing out the bipartisan and allied support that SALT enjoyed thr oughout its life . This approach stood in stark contrast to argument that domestic elements , such as the CPD, and European allies expressed concern about the direction of U.S. arms control policy. Nimetz concluded his memo by noting the benefit s of avoiding mentioning the cost savings advantage of SALT in speeches and discussions, suggesting that the opposition might use such an argument to suggest arms control effort w as a justification for compromising national defens e. This type of concern drove both about a decline in U.S. superiority to the point of parity and possibly inferiority. Although the administratio n in these examples was not specifically responding to neoconservative arguments, the general tenor expressed by Nimetz for State Department SALT 80 Folder: Matt Nimetz to Landon Butler, 2/3/78, Folder: Staff Files, JCL.
220 supporter communication reflected a specific concern for domestic opposition and the associated types of argum ents that neocons addressed during the same period. Thus, while there is not a direct correlation between the two sides, they are speaking in the same terms and there is an indirect interaction of ideas. 81 Throughout the spring of 1978, both supporters and opponents of the perspectives , often with more specificity regarding arms control. U.S. News and World Report published parallel interviews with War nke and Nitze, responding to the question does SALT II make the nation safer. answers challenged the received wisdom of the official U.S. positions . Warnke responded to questions rooted in the objections raised by opposition rh etoric. , Interestingly, he agreed with the n eocon objection that SALT I gave the Soviet Union an advantage. But he avoided other criticisms of SALT II by either blaming previous governmental plans, or granting a concern whil ic. Both dodges are avoidance tactics that illustrate those opposition criticisms, and perhaps suggest a degree of validity for the con cerns of the SALT opposition as if the two sides were equal demonstrates not only the popularity of the issue in the public mind, but also the prominence of the neoconservative shaped position as the prominent source of opposition sentiment. 82 81 Matt Nimetz to Landon Butler, 2/3/78, Folder: Subject Files, Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL. 82 A Safer U.S. With a SALT Treaty?; YES For the first time we will have restr aints on development of " Interview With Paul Warnke, Director, U.S. Arms Control And Disarmament Agency, Pro and Con, U.S. News & World Re port , March 13, 1978, 55; "A Safer U.S. With a SALT Treaty? ; NO It would 8 to " Interview With Paul Nitze, U.S. Delegate to SALT
221 Both t he CPD and President Carter laid ou t the ir perspectives in major events or statements , which reveal a degree of interaction between the two sides . Key representatives of the Comm ittee, Pipes, Rostow, and Nitze -along with co chairs Henry Fowler and David Packard -spoke to a lunch meeti ng of the Foreign Policy Association, an organization dedicated to the study of international issues that 83 Each of the three speakers briefly outlined their concerns with U.S. policy in general and SALT in particular. Pipes explained the fear of a Soviet military and strategic weapons buildup proceeding regardless of U.S. actions, based o n the Soviet perception of America as inferior. Nitze spoke specifically about the SALT negotiations, citing details of such factors as throw weight and explosive power to suggest that not only could SALT II accomplish nothing for the nation, but the ability to present a strategic posture summation of CPD concerns, addressing f ears of appeasement similar to actions before both World Wars , and the need for changes to restore th e United States to a position of strength from which to negotiate effectively with the Soviet Union. All three expressed the concerns driving the Committee to act, particularly the perception that the Carter licies and approach constitu ted a dangerous and flawed direction that undermined future ability to deal with the Soviet threat. 84 Talks, 1969 74, Pro and Con, U.S. News & World Report , March 13, 1978, 55. B oth available via LexisNexis Academic at http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic , and both accessed 12/11/10. 83 From the FPA website at www.fpa.org/info url_nocat2379/info url_nocat_show.htm?doc_id=37073 . 84 Tyroler, ed., Al erting America n , 24 31.
222 Three days later, Jimmy Carter gave a major speech at Wake Forest University that echoed many of the concerns expressed by treaty opposition forces, and yet subtle details showed what separated the two perspectives. His goal was to set out his ive as it related to the Soviet Union in general and the nuclear threat in particular. The P resident began by a sserting that preventing a nuclear war was his primary goal . As part of this concept, he argued an idea seemingly and must be known to be 85 apparently echoed the rhetoric of the CPD or Senator Jackson . However, it could also convey a level of ambiguity sufficient to justify critics opposed. reflected the same level of potential ambiguity regarding issues of opposition concern s about ongoing negotiations. He assured his audience that his efforts would result in an acceptable agreement. it [a treaty] preserves the stra tegic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that we will be at least as strong, relative to the Soviet Union, as we 86 While it is unrealistic to expect policy details in a general speech, the aspe on those general categories under domestic debate. He used language to describe what the administration was pursuing with SALT that very closely matched the terms of , while at the same time continuing with negotiation goals at odds with CPD positions . The choice to speak in this manner establishes one of two 85 PPPUS Carter , I: 532. 86 PPPUS Carter , I: 533.
223 ideas. E ither the subtle differences in meaning mattered, or both sides used similar terms while assuming diffe rent definitions. For instance, both proponents and the Soviet Union would follow treaty limitations. In expressing this idea, i ndividuals opposing SALT II, such as Pip es , questioned the fundamental goals of the Soviets, fearing an aggressive expansionistic methodology, while the President did not express such concerns. W hat the public comments of Pipes, Nitze, Rostow, and Carter show is that d espite these differences, both sides of the discussion addressed the same issues at the same time. 87 H e expressed to a constituent that he believed the administration changed its thinking on the issue o f cruise missiles, suggesting the new perspective threatened to allow the Soviets a position of superiority , something that the Senator and others feared since the ue to take an activ e interest these crucial matters and [ ] continue to support sensible and verifiable arms control measures, while opposing agreements that are unbalanced or otherwise 88 Jackson reiterated his concerns about cruise missiles and their role in the med Services Chair John Stennis . The Senator from Washington also continued to focus on the issue of verification, due to his While 87 iscussion by the Committee on the Present Danger Before the Foreign Tyroler, ed., Alerting America n , 25 26. 88 Letter, Jackson to constituent, 3/1/78, HMJ 3560 5/166/22.
224 not yet ready to make a public comment, Jackson clearly sought to assure those around him and with whom he had contact that the time for action on his part would come. 89 The White House focused on the importance of gaining support and answering crit ics as the actual SALT II negotiations crawled through mid 1978 . Discussion between the two superpowers reached the trade off stage by April, where resolving the differences largely became an exchange of something one side wanted for something the other n ation desired. Landon Butler wrote a memo to Hamilton Jordan outli ning the issues surrounding the probability of a successful SALT II Treaty approval effort , and of the Executive Branch, I count only eight persons whose opposition to SALT II might carry special weight with the Senate and the public: Paul Nitze, Henry Kissinger, Gerald Ford, Melvin Laird, Senator Henry Jackson, Senator Howard Baker, Senator Sam Nunn, 90 that passage could withstand the opposition of only one of the eight . Therefore, the President should take steps to gain the support of these individuals . Butler noted in particular [ If Nitze were to b ecome an ally rather than an opponent, the fight would be half over ] 91 supporting or opposing SALT II must be seen in the context of the CPD . The administration knew that his base of operations was the C ommittee , whose members supp orted giving him the task of overseeing policy studies, and considered 89 Letter, Jackson to Stennis, 4/20/78, HMJ 3560 5/166 /21; Letter to constituent, 4/5/78, HMJ 3560 5/166/21. 90 Folder: Files, JCL. 91 Landon Butler to Hamilton Jord Folder: Files, JCL. Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation .
225 him one of the ir primary voices opposing SALT II. T he White House kept track thinking , whether through direct meetings with him, tracking his writings, or reporting personal discussions with him. In , with the hope of either finding errors or securing his support . The point was to end by any means his o 92 Senator Jackson also remained a primary figure of interest for the administration. How to deal with him remained unclear because different staffers made c onflicting recommendations regarding the best course o f action , which ranged from establishing a possible working relationship to just ignoring him. wide ranging contacts ensured mutual fertilization among the SALT II opposition elements . I ndividuals and groups associated with the Senator continue d to follow his lead in expressing concerns about U.S. negotiations and the President Many listened to his voice and followed his suggestions, w hether in private, such as correspondence with Nitze, or in public, such as the r elease of official CDM statements , or in newspaper contributions , such as Norman policies . Thus, while deciding on a specific course of action was unclear, watching Jackson remain ed critical for the White House due to his influence and leadership for 92 Vance, Hard Choices , 102 104; Brzezinski, Power , 316; Alerting America Folder: 78 Files, JCL; A. Folder: II, 4/11/78 Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL; Harry Huge Folder: Files, JCL.
226 those opposing the SALT II negotiations , and U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in general. 93 T he general tenor of both opposition efforts and White House concerns remained the same a s a sense of moving toward a conclusion with the SALT II negotiations began to form. Only a few major issues and several minor ones remained to be resolved. Jackson, along with Nitze and the CPD, continued to lead the opposition efforts to contest the nature of what was being disc ussed for a possible treaty . When asked by Meet the Press panelist George Will about his position on SALT, given that most of the major issues were resolved, Jackson bluntly replied, 94 The Senator clear challenge can be traced in part to the upcoming mid term Congressional elections. While Jackson was not up for re election, the possibility of the next Congress containing more members who agreed with him certainly had to be a factor in how he st aked out his positions on issues as the election drew near. 95 93 Eugene Rostow to Landon But ler, 8/20/78, Folder: 128, Files, JCL; Rick Inderfurth to Landon Butler, Folder: , 8/10/78 Box 128, Files, JCL; Harry Huge to Landon Butler, Folder: , Deputy Chief of Staff 2 3, Folder: Liaison Files, JCL (context dated to July, 1978); Paul Nitze to Henry M. Jacks on, 4/4/78, HMJ 3560 6/83/35; Press Announcement, CDM, 6/25/78, Folder: NYT , 5/14/78, E19, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123700471 NYT , 5/31/78, A23, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123687644 d War, NYT , 6/11/78, E21, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123677205 NYT , 7/8/78, E17, http://search.proquest.com/docview/123637212 ; Henry M. Jackson, WP , A15, 7/1/78, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146806880 . 94 Meet the Press , 9/10/78, 7, HMJ 3560 6/16/9. 95 Talbott, Endgame , 178, 201.
227 Nitze also continued to expound the dangers of an unmodified SALT agreement as the probable shape of the treaty emerged . He funneled several CPD reports to Jackson, including the most recent co pies of his regularly updated SALT II Status Report , in response to possible misunderstandings of the contents by legislators. This exchange illustrates the common cause , and free flow of information and ideas , between the two, and thus Jackson and CPD . This point is also clear from the CPD report to explain why the suggested policy options did not meet with SALT II criteria. On the basis of this evidence, Jackson dou btless gest releases by the Committee and viewed by them as one of th eir major efforts, the booklet addressed in detail many of the major issues of concern for th e CPD, concluding in the affirmative to the title question. The Washington Post considered the report important enough to excerpt. 96 The neoconservative critique of U.S. policy continued unabated in the pages of Commentary magazine as well throughout the f all . While comparing dÃ©tente to the appeasement of 1930s Europe, Walter Laqueur echoed the conclusion of the CPD 96 Mid 6/58/3 and 3560 6/57/11; Paul Nitze to Henry Jackson, 11/10/78, HMJ 4560 3560 http://neoconservatism.va isse.net/doku.php ?id=the_publications_of_the_ cpd_1976 1992); Henry Jackson to constituent, 11/28/78, HMJ 3560 Alerting America WP , 10/18/78, A16, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146841885 .
228 97 This ques tioning of U.S. policy in a analysis of the propriety of using China as a policy tool to shape Soviet behavior. As an aside, he noted that the SALT negotiations had for al l intents and purposes proved failed in substance, whatever the formal outcome, since even the most ardent advocates of a new SALT treaty now concede that it will no t preserve strategic stability 98 Neoconservative influence also manifested in newspaper reports at the end of the year, when both Nitze and the CPD, along with CDM leader Ben Wattenberg, express ed similar concerns about the slipping. 99 T he White House began to shift from a responsive mode to one geared toward a summit, treaty, and future ratification battle as the negotiations moved to a close . While the strategies of opposition elements remained an item of interest, efforts focused on planning in a post election environment and influencing the views of important individuals. A hiccup shif ted the anticipated arrival of the end when the U nited States formally recognized communist China in the middle of December . This action prompted the Soviet Union to slow progress even more, resulting in a delay of 97 Commentary 66:4, (October 1978): 49, http://search.proquest .com/docview/1290077558 . 98 Commentary 66:4, (October 1978): 38, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290077534 . 99 WP , 12/15/78, A4, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146844575 WP , 12/17/78, D1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146883594 .
229 nearly half a year . The result was a Wh ite House Christmas with no SALT treaty under United States made significant progress in 1978 toward achieving a completed negotiation, the year ended much as it had begun, which constituted a form of victory for the opposition . The administration feared the negative consequences of talks that had already continued for too long in the fall, and complications at the end of the year only made matters worse. 100 T he advent of both President Cart to SALT and the rise of the CPD changed the debate over SALT II between the Warnke nomination fight and the conclusion of SALT II negotiations. Due to the slow movement of the actual negotiations, proponents and opponents of an agreement s pent significant time attempt ing to persuade the other side and the American public of their point of view. T he first two years of the Carter administration saw no SALT II treaty , and instead served as a time of skirmishes with the opposition. The CPD , a long with other groups and individuals of a neoconservative nature , took an active role in leading the fight against what they perceived as a dangerous trend in U.S. policy , a direction that threatened the historical dominance of the nation while virtually guaranteeing greater license to the Soviet Union to do whatever it wanted . In 1979 the nature of the dom estic debate over SALT II changed as the arrival of an actual treaty forced the discussi on into the halls of the Senate where each si de believed it he ld the advantage. 100 Peter Jo hnson to Bob Beckel, 1/8/79; Folder: SALT II Working File, 11/20/78 Folder: SALT II Working File, 11/20/78 2/26/ Office of Congressional Liaison Files, JCL; Caldwell, Dynamics , 49; Talbott, Endgame , 203, 244 248. For a sense of the nearness of completion at this time, see Carter, Keeping , 238 and Brzezinski, Power , 327, 329.
230 Table 9 1 Deep Cuts Proposal 101 United States Soviet Union MIRVed ICBM and SLBM 1100 1200 1100 1200 MIRVed ICBM 550 550 Heavy missiles 150 150 Total Launchers 1800 2000 1800 2000 101 SALT Handbook , 444 445. Calvo Goller and Calvo, SALT Agreements , 46 47, has the same information, citing only the SALT Handbook for source material, but listing 500 MI RVed ICBM instead of 550.
231 CHAPTER 10 AT THE PEAK OF FLAVO R: A TREATY AND HEA RI NGS T he fact that the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of completing a SALT II agreement at the beginning of 1979 notice. T he Carter administration struggled to close the deal early in the year , fighting many b attles with the Soviets over tre aty details that had dogged efforts to conclude the negotiations for the past twelve months . This delay allowed the opposition forces an opportunity to press their perspective on the public and the Senate, a tactic that too k a different turn once the administration announced the signing of the SALT II treaty in June. Once a treaty was in place, both sides focused on the specifics of the agreement as they sought to convince the public that their position was the correct one. T he neoconservative led opposition, particularly the Committee on the Present Danger, shifted its attention to the Senate and the task of convincing the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees about the dangers of the treaty as agreed upon at the Moscow summit. T he same themes and concerns animated neocon arguments during the hearings and in the public arena . Everyone involved planned to bring the contest over SALT II to a head in debate on the Senate floor. Contrary to those e xpectations, the treaty arrived for full consideration without any possibility of debate as events beyond the control of either the opposition or supporters, and reactions to those circumstances, pulled the rug out from under the pro SALT advocates. Despite the situation at the end of the year, 1979 represented a point in time where the influence of neoconservatives peaked as they led the opposition to SALT II in a desperate attempt to prevent the United States from becoming a signatory to, and then a participant in, what they considered to be a flawed
232 and potentially harmful strategic arms agreement. The ideas and approaches of neoconservative influenced and led groups and individuals guided the SALT II opposi tion. T o the extent that these arguments exercised any influ ence and shaped the debate, the discussion danced to a neoconservative tune. Agreement a t Last? T he CPD led an effort with other opposition elements to chip away at the weaknesses of the treaty, as it was then known , while the race toward the summit crawle d along and the White House continued to plan for gaining sufficient support to ensure treaty ratification . The opposition presented several common arguments in the lead up to the treaty , continuing the lines of reasoning from previous years. Dan Caldwel l argues for grouping these concerns into four general topics: treaty details that defense plans to protect the United States, and the impact on U.S. Soviet relations beyond nuclear weapons. 1 This organizational method is helpful, and he is quite correct that both side of the SALT debate used many arguments that can be grouped in this manner . At the same time, a closer examination of some of the objections illustrate s the specific types of issues driving opposition concerns, as well as providing a richer context to understand what the Carter administration heard and responded to during this time. A primary concern for opposition groups was the general category of numb ers, specifical ly the fear that SALT II might not guarantee e quality of numbers. This point manifested in several specific examples , such as throw weight, numbers of land based launchers, the number of warheads in a MIRVed missile, and how to count bomber s. 1 Caldwell, Dynamics , 110.
233 Supporters of the SALT II discussions em phasized equal numbers overall, but the opposition held concerns about the breakdown of precisely how these individual number issues would pan out in the treaty. O ne of the few CPD publications to list a single author, a release written by executive committee member Charles Burton Marshall , explained one of the fundamental problems. He argued that the numerical variations within multiple categories would give the Soviets a distinct advantage , d espite the appeara nce of an effort to keep relativ e numbers the same . The result negatively influenced an important goal of the agreement: [t] he disparities bear on a most critical aspect 2 This type of threat present in the negotiations at the time r esembled the problems identified later by Nitze and other groups, such as the Committee For Peace Through Strength. Another of the number issues that created significant concern was the idea of the Soviet Union being permitted by treaty to hold large numb ers of specific types of missiles forbidden to the United States. The opposition viewed this point as a n example of the dangerous trend toward not just numerical inequality, but incorporating a Soviet threat to U.S. national security in the treaty . SALT II opponents believed that reinforced their assum ptions about the eventual agreement repeating the error of SALT I by ensuring Soviet nuclear superiority. 3 2 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 95. 3 16/79, in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 161; The Coalition Insider, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1979): 1 2; T he Coalition for Peace Through Stren gth, An Analysis of SALT II , 2 nd ed., (Boston, VA: May 1979), 36 Commentary , 67:2 (February, 1979): 25 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/12901998 73 .
234 Numerical differences helped contribute to the comp lexity of arms control discussions, but those concerns were merely one facet of the inter related issues driving opposition rhetoric. A more fundamental problem lay in the direction of U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union. One of the bedrock issues for neocons was the fact that foreign policy regarding the Soviet s needed to take into account the differences between the two superpowers. Marshall argued for the CPD that at a fundamental level, the two sides did not agree on why SALT was a desirable end to pursue. The faÃ§ade of agreement scarcely conceals the fundamental antithesis. nuclear strategic factors in world politics. The other side presses to ensconce itself in strategic primacy so as to be in position to determine the direction of world politics. 4 By embracing this understanding, the CPD elevated both the stakes for a treaty and the need for caution with, if not outright rejection of, an agreement that failed to take in to T fostered a need to oppose SALT due to the minimal acknowledgement of these deep national differences by the Carter administration and SALT supporters II do want an agreement 5 Thus , the CPD viewed SALT as a specific application of the general belief that the United States and the Soviet Union pursued very different goals. 6 O ther members of the opposition expressed sent iments similar to the of what they considered objective differences in Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan released a statement on his view of SALT, noting the need to recognize that belief that both nations chased similar goals. Additionally, the CDM composed a draft of 4 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 96. 5 Tyroler, ed., Alerting Ame rica , 102. 6 Ibid., 100, 108.
235 a proposed SALT information pamphl et that suggested a key fact or in evaluating the eventual SALT treaty was understanding that the goal of the Soviet Union for the agreement : military supremacy. T he Coalition suggested this aim was at odds with any expressed American objective. 7 With the SALT negotiations close to r eaching a conclusion, o pponents moved beyond the generalities of policy to address the dangers associated with specific details from the discussions . The CDM published Ben Wattenberg comments on arms control, which suggested that a SALT II treaty needed to be evaluated in the context of dÃ©tente as an appropriate policy. Taking his place as a neoconservative critic of the administration, the former Jackson staffer a rgu ed that a policy of relaxed tensions between the superpowers resulted in an American do wnshift in military policy and spending, in contrast to a Soviet increase during the same period . Wattenberg sounded an alarm to the danger involved when he concluded , [ a policy designed to end the cold war is turning out to be a policy that may be losin g the cold war ] 8 Jackson aide Richard Perle II positions when he addressed the threat of becoming second best in a contest with the Soviets. This possibility reminded many neocons of the appeasement of Hitler in the late 1930s, a position echoed by Perle when he suggested the parallel was not with German y and the Soviet Union, but rather with Britain in the 1930s and the United 7 Folder: Against Which Americans Shou Folder: Rosenblatt Papers, LBJ Library. 8 Political Observer (April 1979): 3, Folder: Library. Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation .
236 States in the 1970s. He specifically linked the SALT n egotiations to British discussions with German y sense that among the men who run and staff the institutions [of the U.S. government] the early symptoms of the disease [appeasement] hav 9 Any treaty that failed to address these concerns faced an uphill battle for Senate confirmation. The neocon problem with a policy like dÃ©tente and the possibility of appeasement was that the Soviet Union could not be trusted , which meant that any agreement needed to address the issue of verification, or how each side could ascertain that the other was carrying out their treaty obligations. Failure to include the necessary means would result in an even more precarious and poten tially threatening situation for the United States. This sentiment is present throughout much of the opposition literature, behavior in particular. T he CPD critiqu ed a State Department pamphlet on SALT II, questioning negotiation goals, due to the necessity of believing Soviet claims about arms control in general. The problem was the publicat SALT I as an initial model to be built upon in SALT II verification efforts . T in getting the Soviet Union to cease activities that violated SALT I , which resulted in a flawed basis for SALT II verification . CPD co chair Rostow, writing in the pages of Commentary , noted the difficulties associated with the subject verifiability, several thoughtful students of the subject have expressed the view that technological deve lopments have by now made it altogether impossible to regulate 9 Strategic Review (Winter 1979): 11 12, HMJ 3560 6/81/12.
237 nuclear arms by verifiable arms 10 T he CPD was not alone in its concerns as other opposition organizations expressed doubts concerning verification. The CDM cited approvingly an excerpt from a Scoop Jackson speech where he expressed concerns about the ability of the United States to verify effectively several elements agreed upon in the SALT II negotiations. The Coalition for Peace Through Strength agreed, and at a January me concerns that the Administration already seems to have given up any hope of reaching 11 For opponents of SALT II, the reliance of the treaty framers on suc h a questionable methodology constituted yet another reason to attempt derailing the SALT process before the United States signed a treaty. 12 Issues with verification, numbers, and policy directions inherent in the ongoing arms control negotiations led the opposition to question the fundamental goal of achieving an agreement at all. T his perspective derived in part from the proponent argument that even a bad treaty was better than no treaty. Rostow noted that arms control supporter s suggested the lack of a n agreement would result in greater problems for national security, which logically suggested supporting an eventual SALT treaty was 10 Commentary , 67:2 (February, 1979): 28 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290199873 . 11 The Coalition Insider, vol. 1, no. 2 (January 1979): 1. 12 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America Political Observer (April 1979): 1 2, Folder: analyzed by the CPD, see U.S. Department of State, SALT and American Security , (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1978).
238 countered by suggesting that America enjoyed greater security in the years before the first SALT agreement, and in the aftermath of that accord, the world was less stable, which negated the supporter argument . Marshall ed that the potential problems associated by sup porters with a no treaty situation either did not truly make a significant difference or already existed . Thus, the idea of a bad treaty being preferable to no treaty could not be supported. The use of the bad treaty argument by proponents led some membe rs of the opposition to suggest that the Carter administration put the cart before the horse: Thus, t he spirit underlying the U.S. approach to SALT [was] shaping security policies in hope [sic] to advance arms control rather than shaping arms control p olicies to serve U.S. security 13 This analysis reinforced the perception that U.S. arms control policy was out of control, to the point of supporters using questionable reasons at virtually every level of analysis to justify approving the treaty . 14 Opp osition evaluation of polling data led them to conclude that the majority of Americans shared their concerns, concluding the SALT II treaty was a bad idea. CPD analysis of poll results illustrates this tendency. An NBC News poll released in early 1979 re flected the commonly accepted perspective on SALT II. The pollsters 13 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 106. 14 Commentary , 67:2 (February, 19 79): 23 24 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290199873 Cuckoo Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 97 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 105.
239 reject the reasoning of opposition groups. 15 The CPD reported their confusion regarding such high levels of support, and proceeded to both exam the polling information from several polls in greater detail, and conduct their own poll. According to the C ommittee, questions lik e those asked in the NBC poll presented a generalized, non specific question, one designed to elicit a strong response in support of SALT II. T hey contracted with a pollster to ask more specific questions with more answer options One example of their type of survey question was to give five options to rate the SALT II negotiations . The reported result was the majority answered with either a desire to see a stronger United States before any agreement, or no opinion. Only t wenty percent of s based on their survey were know much about it and, clearly, are not prepared to support the treaty without 16 Undoubtedly, the results encouraged the Committee , particularly since an opportunity for an education al campaign remained and their perspective appeared to reflect a gr eater percentage of the population than other polls . The CPD was not the only neoconservative portion of the opposition to reach some of these conclusions by examining survey data . The journal Public Opinion published several articles that examined or use d various polls dealing with foreign affairs and SALT. These surveys revealed a greater degree of ambiguity regarding than expected if the 15 Folder: LBJ. 16 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 122.
240 supporter arguments were correct. The results of some polls would not necessarily support the conclusions of the CPD survey, but asserting the position described by the NBC News poll became demonstrably more difficult, an encouraging outcome for opposition forces . Pat Bucha nan wrote an article opposing an arms control treaty for Public Opinion in a side by side presentation with a SALT II proponent. He argued that this situation was apparent if one looked at the facts. In describing the evidence support ing his case, Buchannan cited several opinion pol ls at various levels of marshalling men and arguments against the treaty may be pushing against an open 17 Those opposing the coming SALT II treaty had reason s to rema in optimistic and believe that their position and objections resonated with a sizable portion of the American people. 18 It is worth noting that the different elements of the opposition to SALT II did not operate completely independently. Interaction betwee n the different groups took place on at least two levels. The first and most obvious was the overlap of personnel, such as Ben Wattenberg functioning as both a founding member of the CDM and as co editor of Public Opinion . As an editor, Wattenberg intera cted with the publications board, which included Irving Kristol and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who was also a member of CPD. The interconnections of people among the opposition allowed the cross fertilization of ideas and a relatively uniform message to eme rge . The second interaction between different 17 Patrick J. Buchan Public Opinion 1:5 (November/December 1978): 43. 18 Public Opinion 1:1 (March/April 1978): 12 Public Opinion 2:2 (March/May 1979): 49 53.
241 groups was more purposeful , often taking the form of attending meetings, and especially exchanging correspondence. In some cases, the communication was through a group, such as the CDM, and in other instances, it was through an individual. Senator Jackson was a good example of such activity, as he received materials from organizations and recommended groups to various inquirers. This situation meant that significant communication occurred between members of the v arious opposition groups and individuals , yielding a collective opinion developed in discussion and reflecting agreement regarding the dangers inherent in , and any treaty that might emerge from those talks. 19 From t he start of the year until the President signed the treaty in May , the Carter administration largely focused on two items regarding domestic support for the arms control negotiations: preparing strategies for ratification , and tracking opposition efforts t o derail progress toward a treaty. T he administration devoted increasing attention to ratification plans as it became clear er that a summit and treaty were not far off . The leader of the ratification effort was Hamilton Jordan, who outlined the administr strategy to the approving President in January. The plan outlined what would be done at each step of the process , from what had been already accomplished , to actions during the summit and discussion by the entire Senate before voting. Because the general ratification plan has been well described elsewhere, analysis at this point can 19 Wattenberg, Fighting Words , 135 138; Masthead, Public Opinion 1:1 (March/April 1978); Sanders, Peddlers , 157. Letter from Jackson to correspondent, 1/31/79, HMJ 3560 5/179/22; Letter from Eugene Rostow to Jackson, 2/22/79, HMJ 3560 6/25/38.
242 shift to those elements most directly related to opposition arguments, along with the over all task of responding to, and preparing for , opposition claims. 20 The White H ouse planning effort to gain domestic support for SALT II began at negotiating process. As the treaty negotiations neared completion, t he administration plans at the level of memos to President Carter did not address any specific aspects of opposition arguments; in fact, these documents focused on a positive presentation of sena tors supported SALT. T he State Department worked to prepare these legislators for quite some time t [ it will have a significant and well prepared group of advocates ] 21 The logical reason that explain s t he need for such a group is the presence of a significant opposing person or group that remained unidentified and unmentioned in the proposed plans. A dvising their superiors by drafting memos and letters , lower rank s taffers described some of the details concerning objections that formed the background for the ratification plan . T hose internal drafts and memos reveal to a degree the adversaries of the Cranston Group were and what issues concerned the White House. P art o f the final preparations just before the formal announ cement of the Moscow Summit was a letter drafted by staffers in the Office of Congressional Liaison to be sent by the President to officially inform Senators of the upcoming summit to complete the 20 Se e Caldwell, Dynamics , 56 75. 21 Folder: Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Flo rida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation. See also Folder: an on the first page.
243 SALT II treaty. The communiquÃ© cited several issues raised by the opposition, including numerical equality, verification, and the idea that making nuclear war more difficult to wage was a major concern for Americans, and argued that the agreement had effective ly solved these issues . Additionally, the letter inferred that even a bad , each confrontation [between the United States and the Soviet Union], each point of friction will take on an adde d measure of significance and an added dimension of danger. For each will occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic 22 Each of the four topics mentioned in the letter were concerns raised by the SALT II opposition earlier in the year as ongoing points of contention between the two sides. Further evidence of the President placing a high value on responding to opposition forces, particularly Jackson, close to the time of the treaty announcement is clea r from additional Congressional Liaison preparation efforts. For example, one memo addressed issues raised by the opposition forces, suc that the Soviet Union could not be trusted , while express ing the White House view concerni Although convincing other senators, such as Sam Nunn and possibly John Stennis, seemed important for ratification, the memo stressed the idea that Jackson clearly held the greatest powe r to deny Senate approval of the treaty. The anonymous staff author, possibly 22 Folder: which matches the annot ated draft, see Memo from Jimmy Carter to Senator Scoop Jackson, 5/9/79, HMJ 3560 6/49/22.
244 concluding that while the Senator was most likely opposed to the treaty, if everything else broke in the [ possible ] 23 The administration clearly placed Jackson high on their list of important people in the Senate debate, which given his links to groups like the CPD and CDM, strengthens the idea of neoc on influence dominating and direc ting the opposition to SALT II. Much like the opposition , the Carter administration believed its positions reflected what many Americans thought, based on polling data and results. Two examples of the information that rein forced this perception were comments from the Office of Congressional Liaison and analyses of polls by the State Department . Memos from Liaison and other staffers began flowing to Carter shortly after the 1978 mid term elections. Frank Moore, Assistant t o the President for Congressional Liaison, and Hamilton Jordan wrote regardin g the likelihood of ratifying a SALT II treaty. They sought to explain doubt s present in the Senate about the successful passage of a treaty by n . increase in support for SALT, up from the low 70s to 81%) most senators feel SALT will be an unpopular political issue. They believe the poll figures will change dramatically when the final Treaty comes un 24 The two staffers believed that the poll results, combined with negative perceptions regarding White 23 Folder: Office of Congressional Liaison Files, JCL. Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation. A lthou gh undated, the context suggests the period between January and mid May as the most likely 24 Folder: JCL.
245 House readiness to push for passage of a SALT treaty , meant that many in the Senate were not ready to supp ort and vote for an agreement. 25 T he State Department sought to steer a middle course between the NBC poll on the one hand and the CPD on the other, using a Roper poll as a touchstone. After identifying what the department viewed as bias built into the poll, the memo listed respondents. The poll analysis highlighted a ddition al facts , such as the absence of th e illustrations of the overall ignorance the general population regarding what SALT was and what was being negotiated, and the clear sense that for most people there was no fundamental desire to support or oppose SALT as an issue. Because the opposition designed the CPD poll, State Department officials sought additional polling information to determine which of the more extreme polls was closer to the truth . T he Roper p oll fit this requirement , and provided an additional benefit by giving the administration the what the pollster who has the ear of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is saying to him 26 T he results were closer to what State 25 7, Folder: of C ongressional Liaison Files, JCL. 26 Folder: Department Briefing Pack Communications, JCL.
246 Department experts believed from other surveys, so they gave the Roper information greater weight than other similar data collections. 27 T he administration also kept track of SALT II opposition individuals and their arguments , i n addition to other informati on, to help prep are for the ratification effort . Senator Jackson and Paul Nitze , due to their primacy in challenging the White House version of the impact and desirability of SALT . Nitze actually sent copies of material he wrote to administration officials, including at le ast one version of his eighteen times work appeared regularly among White House staffers, such as when Finance Committee member Senator Max Baucus sent a request to respond to a speech given by Nitze on SALT to Office of Congressional Liaison staffer Bob Beckel . Baucus also source, which yielded a nine page response. The concern for and prominence of Paul represented a major contrarian voice to which the administration, or Senator Baucus, felt the need for a White House response. 28 Both opponent s and supporters of the SALT II treaty recognized by March 1979 that an announcement of a summit to sign the completed treaty was just around the 27 Fo lder: 28 Memo from Paul Nitze to Landon Butler, 1/16/79, Folder: Butle Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL; Memo from Paul Nitze, 1/15/79, Folder: 1/2/79 Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL; Memo from Senator Max Baucus to Bob Beckel, 2/22/79, Folder: Bob Beckel Subject Files, Office of Congressional Liaison, JCL; Memo from Thomas Graham to Senator Folder: Sen. Max Baucus [MT], 10/24/78 Subject F iles, Office of Congressional Liaison, JCL.
247 corner. Senator Jackson continued to pursue an agenda wrapped in caution and undergirded by neoconservative t hinking as he anticipated the news of completed negotiations . The senator claimed that while he supported an arms control treaty in the conceptual sense, the Carter administration should not expect complete uncritical acceptance of an agreement . Emph asiz advic Constitutional advic e and consent role in treaty ratifications, he laid out in a speech three keys to a treaty he could support: equality in numbers and explosive power to ensure the United States did not lose strate gic ground to the Soviet s; ensuring that U.S. support for allies could not be restricted; and full verification. The Senator argued that rms control. He described many difficulties inh erent in the positions of the anticipated treaty, emphasizing the issues associated with verification and the projected problems attendant with the treaty terms as they were known at the time. During appearances on television news/interview programs, Jack son continued to hammer away at the importance of equality and verification as issues that had the potential to scuttle the 29 T he Carter White House continued to fo cus on preparing for th e summit and planning to marshal public support while remaining aware of the arguments presented by the SALT opposition . Jordan, in his role as point man for domestic SALT support efforts, kept the President up to date with the evolving plans of the SALT Task Force , which was responsible for organizing and orchestrating the flow of information before, the day of, and after the summit announcement. The range of activities included 29 Issues and Answers 20, HMJ 3560 Meet the Press 12, HMJ 356 0 6/13/9.
248 everything fro m plans for press announcements and contacting significant for eign policy players not currently serving in the government , to a detailed breakdown of which members of Congress to inform at different times throughout the announcement day . S taffers provided regular tweaks and modifications to the overall campaign to w hich the President added his own revisions , all in a ongoing effort to fit plans to the latest information regarding the t iming of the summit announcement . While dealing with these organizational concerns, the administration also kept abreast of the lates t efforts of SALT II opponents to influence public opinion. Both the ACDA and State Department sought to keep the White House up to date about major players, such as the CPD or Nitze, and the arguments and evidence they used . However, even though they co the primary emphasis for those tasked with guiding the domestic SALT support message was preparing for events related to the summit announcement and beyond . 30 The administration informed the public about the treaty on May 11, 1979 , and that event represented the conclusion to a specific s tage in the history of SALT II . President Carter announced SALT I agreements in a letter sent to members of Congress . He acknowledged the 30 related activities on the day of Folder: aison Files, JCL; Memo from Landon Butler and Bob Beckel Folder: 10/12/78 Ha Folder: Released by the Committee on the Present Folder: to the President for Communications, JCL; Letter from Thomas Graham, Jr. to Senator Max Baucus, 3/26/79, F older: Sen. Max Baucus [MT], 10/24/78 Office of Congressional Liaison, JCL; George Moffett Exit Interview, 12/5/80, 6 7, h ttp://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/exitInt/Moffett.pdf .
249 of three Administrations. It is the next major step in the continuing process of bringing the nuclear arms race under 31 Despite the President the treaty, the essentially complete details of the treaty provided opponents with additional ammunition to justify their objections to SALT II. 32 Senator Jackson increased his critiques of the adm , a s the time for the summit, and the subse quent Senate debate, approached . T he CPD and other groups also began to shift gears from opposing a treaty in general to opposing the specific SALT II treaty, and doing so in large part as specialists who could now offer their expertise to members of the legislature more formally. In this sense, the primacy of position began to pivot, and the Senate moved toward center stage. views on the treaty, in terms of the general requirem ents, came out clearly in a variety of settings before the summit . H is assistant Richard Perle identified three areas that represented the heart of the matter in an interview with the United States International Communications Agency. The Senator reitera ted those issues in a June 5 letter to a constituent writing about SALT: In my judgment, a sound SALT II treaty must meet three central criteria: -It must be equal, not just in terms of numbers but explosive power as well. That is, it must not limit The United States to a level of strategic forces inferior to the level provided by the Soviet Union. -It must not impair our capabity [sic] to provide for theatre defenses of our forces abroad and ou r allies, particularly in Europe. 31 Letter from Jimmy Carter to Senator Scoop Jackson, 5/9/79, HMJ 3560 6/49/72. 32 PPP Jimmy Carter Vol. 1, 1979, 839. Se e Table 10 1 at the end of this chapter for details of the SALT II treaty.
250 -It must be fully verifiable so that we will be able to detect immediately any Soviet action inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty. 33 These conditions served as a mantra for Jackson, which he repeated throughout the period leading up to the Senate debate. 34 emphasis on these conditions extended beyond private correspondence to public co mmentary in several venues. H e focused in multiple speeches on the same requirements for his version of a good treaty. Speaking at the CDM Jackson opened up a broadside on the SALT II treaty one day before the summit. He repeatedly made accusations of appeasement regarding several aspects of U.S. policy toward the Soviets . Near the end of his speech, he compared negotiation efforts t o the appeasement of the Nazi s in 1938 , using a Neville Chamberlin quotation. With this approach, the Senator not only echoed the parallels to the late 1930s mentioned in the pages of Commentary less than three years previously, but earlier in the year and the sentiments of CPD members. The timing of such a speech just one day before the summit began strongly suggest s the Senator from Washington sought to pull out all the stops and make a major stat ement about what the President was about to do , particularly since he devoted the more substantial portion of the speech to SALT related details. Interestingly, several administration officials attended the dinner, including Assistant for Public Liaison A nne Wexler and Councilor of the Department of State Matthew Nimetz, both major members of the White House SALT Task Force that designed and guided the admi Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger and the President Carter were also present . 33 Henry M. Jackson, Letter to constituent, 6/5/79, HMJ 3560 5/179/22. 34 /29/79, 21, HMJ 3560 5/315/41.
251 According to the CDM newsletter The Political Observer , members could be proud of the meeting in general, including the widespread comments. 35 , with one newspaper 36 Reaction continued through the following Issues and Answers program and c ontinued to press the issue in describing administration SALT efforts as appeasement. T he Senator took every opportunity to demonstrate the problems he saw with the anticipated treaty , d espite challenges from the panel . He admitted that he did not oppose a treaty per se, and suggested the only way to get Senate approval would be to amend the agreement . W hen pressed for specifics, he said 37 were news, particularly in light of their timing, but the sentiments echoed the previous observations of his neoconservative allies. After the President signed the treaty and returned to give a formal speech to Congress present ing the treaty, Jackson respo nded with a short, one page statement emphasizing the need to amend the treaty to ensure equality and verifiability, points he 35 16, 12, HMJ 3560 7, HMJ 3560 Freedom: A Discussion by the Committee on the Present Danger Before the Foreign Policy Associat 3/14/78, in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 28 Political Observer , 7/79, 1 3; Folder: Library. On the 1930s parallel in Commentar y , see previous chapter. 36 WP , 6/13/79, A1, A14 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/147096309 . 37 Issues and Answers , 6/17/79, 16, HMJ 3560 6/13/22.
252 later emphasized to congressional colleagues. Interestingly, even Republicans like George H.W. Bush used the same arguments in c ritiquing the newly minted treaty. Thanks to a leak from SALT supporters , the New York Times reported in late June that Perle and Jackson planned for the previous six months to pursue amending the treaty as a strategy, focusing on making a treaty that mat 38 The media focused on other opposition voices in addition to the barrage , including Paul Nitze. L ike ressed concerns about where the United States would end the details of arms control reduction efforts led him to zero in on more specific issues of types of weapons and their relative strength, ra ising the problematic outcome of superiority in nuclear arms demonstrates that th e two shared a basic desire for amending the agreement. 39 The White House realized that in order to achieve victory in the Senate ratification fight, it would have to deal with both Nitze and Jackson specifically. Senate hearings would provide a venue to r espond to Nitze appeasement charges required a more immediate 38 WP , 6/19/79, A14 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/147064372 . 39 Transcript, ABC Issues and Answers , 6/17/79, 2, 10, HMJ 3560 5/335/6; Letter from Henry M. Jackson to Paul Findley, 7/19/79, HMJ 3560 0 6/20/11; Kenneth H. WSJ , 6/29/79, 1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/134447984 .
253 including questioning his claim of Soviet nuclear superiority by 1985 and his descriptions of allowed missile numbers and types of weapons that both sides could possess. Secretary Vance responded to Jackson during a morning conf erence at the State Departm ent with the longest answer of the day . He Senator engaged in linguistic excesses beyond the bounds expected from a member of Congress when discussing something serious li ke arms control. Vance went on to say that appeasement was not the right description of U.S. SALT policy in the 1970s. He also explained what he thought Jackson was actually talking about in the speech, suggesting the Senator meant arms control, and he is 40 In the White House Press briefing, reporters asked Jody Powell about the Jackson speech w ith the first several questions. T he Press Secretary responded initially with a state ment similar to Vance regarding the tone of the SALT II debate, a nd then proceeded to use the NSC talking T clearly hit a Carter administration raw spot, but the problematic portion was only the timing of the message and not the content per se , because the points were neither new nor unique to Jackson and his allies. 41 White House reaction. Th e S enator laid out his position regarding what constituted a 40 Cyrus Vance, State Department Press Conference, 6/13/79, 4, Folder: ngressional Correspondence, 10/1/78 JCL. 41 WP , 6/24/79, G1 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/147063745 Folder: National Security Advisor, JCL .
254 accomplish the very desirable goal of arms control. Nitze wrote more than once about treaty weaknesses in terms o f equality, verification, and defense of allies; moreover, he also simultaneously sounded the alarm concerning the danger of Soviet nuclear superiority by 1985. His fellow CPD member Eugene Rostow also expressed support for arms control and the same three problems Rostow described the same general concern about what the Carter approved treaty did sell the country is not a s tep toward dÃ©tente or toward peace, but an act of appeasement 42 The White House kept track of SALT II objections from these same sources over the previous years, so they knew about the ideas in t hese multiple examples of the same criticisms by CPD members and Jackso speech . Thus, the reaction to the CDM address reflects a White House conc ern about the impact of potential negative press coverage on the eve of a major summit in addition to a problem with the actual objections. 43 The Senate Hearings A signed SALT II treaty meant that the attention of both supporters and opponents shifted fully to the Senate hearings, the penultimate hurdle to an 42 ALT II 6/28/38. Italics are mine. The speech was printed by the CPD. 43 T 6/24/31; Paul A Soft 24, 26, HMJ 3560 6/25/38. The date for the Nitze piece of 12/5/78 is from the HMJ finding guide.
255 administration foreign relations victory. Examining the impact of interest group experts , and their public and private t estimony, is useful to appreciate the effect of neoconservative thinking on the S ALT II hearings before looking at the specifics of the determine the impact of pro and ant i treaty organizations. He reported that hearings constituted the least effective means of direct contact with Senators while outstripping all indirect forms. The most effective method was direct presentation to the Senator or an aide by an expert . Kurk owski concludes Paul Nitze was the most effective in face to face meetings , quoting No one affected the debate as much as Paul Nitze. Paul Nitze visited every office and showed his own data, which could no t be refuted by the White House. This was certainly very effective [ ] Nitze and Rostow seminars down town. They carry a lot of weight [ ] The Committee on the Present Danger Nitz was the most effective. Nitze had the most credibility and a good staff. 44 Kurkowski found that although most interest group efforts were relatively in ef fective, the aides gave the expert credit for making an impact on SALT II . This point el evates the Nitze/Rostow/CPD effort to the very top of the list. Senators needed information, which was members the most influential interest group members when dealing with senators, but hard to imagine how the Committee on the Present Danger, with its message firmly implanted in the public psyche, could have had more impact on the domestic 44 David C. Kurkowski, The Role of Interest Groups in the Domestic Debate on SALT II , (Ph.D. diss, Temple University, 1982), 185. This is a series of quotat ions that Kurkowski quotes without attribution. This block quotation formatted according to University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office standards. Table 10
256 45 general progress of th e hearings has been summarized elsewhere, make extensive analysis of the lengthy hearings and testimony unnecessary. The most effective method to illustrate the contri bution of the neocon led opposition at the hearing level is to survey briefly the ideas expressed during CPD memb er testimony . 46 Those witnesses who testified against the SALT II treaty ref erred to several potentially dangerous issues that crystallized for them in the time surrounding the treaty signing: a trend toward U.S. weakness; the thre at of incipient Soviet strategic superiority; the lack of equity and equality in the treaty; difficulties associated with verification; and a negative impact on NATO / U.S. allies. The opposition, showing its professed desire for an arms control treaty wi thout weaknesses, recommended solutions to the committees that required either amendment or renegotiation . The consensus testimony clearly established a concern that ratifying the treaty in an unmodified form would result in greater difficulties wit h the Soviets and make America less secure in the future. Witnesses testified over an extended period , with both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the Senate Committee on Armed Services (SCAS) holding hearings during the summer and fall. T reaty opponents appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee throughout its hearings ; the Armed Services Committee only heard witnesses against the accord in its fall meetings . A third committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , also held hearin gs on the iss ue of verification. H owever, the classified nature of the hearings meant that the only 45 Kurkowski, 155. 46 Kurkowski, 177, 184, 222, 421, 425 426, 430. For the best summary discussion of the SALT II hearings, see Caldwell, Dynamics , 124 Politics of Arms Control , 314 319.
257 unclassified product was a five page report that generally endorsed the treaty while recommending that senators read the classified report to gain a greate r knowledge of the issues involved. 47 The Committee on the Present Danger participated in different ways, including as a group with the testimony of Eugene Rostow , and as individual member s speaking in varying capacities. During initial testimony before th e SFRC, the C PD came up during eight specific CPD recommendations , gleaned from an article in Foreign Affairs , as he sought military input regarding the possibility of the United States doing what the group suggested. Biden referred to the organization i n his introduction of these points , noting 48 Senator Biden was not the only committee member to inquire about CPD recommendations . When Paul Nitze began his , spending a considerable amount of time probing the Chairman of Policy Studies views and pitting the recommendations against the testimony of the Joint Chiefs. N itze cited the CPD in a lengthy response to questions from Senator S.I. Hayakawa, as well as 47 U.S. Senate, Select Commit tee on Intelligence, Princip a l Findings on the Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty , Repo rt, October, 1979, http://congressional.proquest .com/congressional/docview/t05.d06.1979 s422 1 . SFRC held testimony hearings on July 9 12, 16 19, 25 26, 31, August 2, September 6 7, 10 12, 18 19, 21, and 24; SCAS held testimony hearings on July 23 26, 30 31, August 1 2, October 9 11, 16 18, 23 24; Alb Is Left Empty Handed On Energy As Congress Begins A One WSJ , 8/3/79, 4, http://search.proquest.com/docview/134383522 . 48 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Rel ations, The SALT II Treaty , Hearings Part 1 , July 9, 10, 11, 12, 1979, 396, http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg 1979 for 0010 . Hereinafter, all committee hearings will be referred to as SCFR for the Committee on Foreign Relations along with the part of the specific hearing and page number. The URL for part 2 is http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg 1979 for 0011 . The URL for part 3 is http://congressional .proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg 1979 for 0012 . The URL for part 4 is http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg 197 9 for 0018 .
258 queries from Senators Paul Sarbanes, George McGovern, Claibor ne Pell, and Biden, who made reference again to the recommendations he previously read to the Joint Chiefs. 49 Specific reference to the CPD ceased with but their influence did not . T presented by Admiral Relations and Armed Services hearings. O ther members of the Committee testified in other capacities, such as AFL CIO Secretary Lane Kirkland representin g his union fellows. Finally, it is worth noting that in preparing for the SASC hearings, Senator Jackson suggested in a memo to Chairman John Stennis the names of several people to call before the committee . Nine of the people on this list were from out side government, five were ex military, and the remaining four were all members of the Committee on the Present Danger. The presence of the CPD even extended to preparation efforts for the hearings. Jackson and his aides began lining up people to assist them in planning for the hearings, and they identified sixteen people who could work on SALT as staff, a number that in cluded three C ommittee members. The cumulative presence of CPD members, testimony, and ideas, and the corresponding lack of an equivalen t prese nce from any other group, serve to reinforce the idea o f the group as a major player during the hearing process. 50 49 SFRC, Part 1, 483 485, 497, 505, 512, 516 517, 523, 530. 50 SFRC, Part 2, 152, 376, 378; SFRC, Part 3, 53; SFRC, Part 4, 1, 8, 12, 26; U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strate gic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereunto (SALT II Treaty ), Hearings, Part 3, October 9, 10, 11, and 16, 1979, iii , http://congressional.proquest.com/congress ional/docview/t29.d30.hrg 1979 sas 0035 ; Henry M. Jackson to John C. Stennis, 7/12/79, HMJ 3560 3560 6/61/13. Hereinafter, all committee hearings will be referred to as SCAS for the Armed Services Committee along with the part of the specific hearing and page number.
259 As the hearings began, Senators heard more than just the CPD recommendations during testimony. They also listened to witnesses describ e their concerns that reflected the dangers the CPD associated with the SALT II trea ty as it stood . The Senate committees heard opposition testimony that fit in to three categories: fundamental concerns, specific treaty issues, and recommendations. The f oundation of neoconservative objections in general lay in the fear of Soviet advance at American expense, which appeared in testimony as raising the twin specters of Soviet superiority and U.S. weakness. The idea of the Soviet Union gaining an edge over th e United States in strategic weapons was a major point in the neoconservative message for quite some time in the SALT debate. T he hearings, and the expected floor debate, represented a high point in the general visibility of strategic arms as an aspect of the domestic discussion of U.S. foreign policy, and several witnesses took advantage of the opportunity to address the dangers of America falling behind its Cold War opponent. O ne of the leading voices in this chorus, Paul Nitze , clearly established the point in his testimony before both committees. He established the threat of Soviet superiority in strategic arms early in his exchanges with senators . The CPD Policy Chair w ent so far as to claim that SALT represented an opportunity to reconsider U.S. po licy toward the Soviet Union in an exchange with the pro SALT Senator Joseph Biden. Mr. NITZE. The debate is precisely about that, as to whether or not we, in the face of incipient Soviet strategic nuclear superiority, are going to do those things which a re necessary to keep the Soviets from getting it. That is what this debate is about. Senator BIDEN. With all due respect, that is not what the SALT debate is about. Mr. NITZE. I believe it to be about that because I believe the SALT debate is a broader debate than just a debate about the treaty. I believe it
260 is a debate about the treaty, our defense policy, and also the broad thrust of our foreign policy. 51 The differences in opinion regarding the breadth of the debate were rooted in beliefs about the na ture of the treaty and its impact on the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union. SALT could only be about larger issues if it represented both a threat to the nation and an opportunity to redress the dangers it imposed, something the opposition firmly be lieved. In addition to Nitze, Soviet historian Richard Pipes joined fellow CPD members Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Eugene Rostow, William Van Cleave, and Edward Teller in expressing concerns about the threat of Soviet superiority inherent in the agreement . For all these witnesses, the provisions of the SALT II treaty as submitted would help ensure a position of American inferiority that they all found objectionable . 52 A danger closely linked to the threat of Soviet superiority was U.S. weakness, particularly in terms of the impact on negotiation s with the Soviets. S everal witnesses echoed CPD sentiments when they spoke of a concern regarding both perceived and real weakness. Nitze , Pipes, and AFL CIO Secretary Lane Kirkland , all CPD members, shared the need for interacting with the Soviets from a position of strength to avoid compromising anything resulting from any discussions. Strategic arms control efforts played a part in the development of this weakness, according to Nitze and the Hudson Brennan, who described SALT as helping to induce a kind of ecstasy that compromised U.S. efforts to maintain a strong military. The Joint Chiefs argued along similar lines when they suggested that a good treaty would fit into a strategy dedicated to reve rsing the decline in the military balance. Van Cleave suggested a more fundamental policy change wh r first priority should not 53 Pipes agreed with this sentiment, arguing that eliminating U.S. weakness w ould produce a better outcome if the nation established the necessary components to 51 SFRC, part 1, 515. 52 SFRC, part 1, 370, 489, 496; SFRC, part 2, 155, 191; SFRC, part 3, 60 62, 68; SFRC, part 4, 2, 231, 240; SASC, part 3, 879, 947, 949, 1166 1167, 1318 13 19. 53 SASC, part 3, 1168.
261 negotiate from strength before talking to the Soviets. These witnesses shared the belief that a weak United S tates could not, by definition, achieve as desirable an outcome when dealing with the Soviet Union . They believed that the SALT II treaty, like any agreement derived from such circumstances, contained elements unfavorable to the nation because the United States did not possess the status necessary to make good agreements with an opponent looking to exploit any weakness, however small. 54 In moving from general policy objections to specific concerns relating to strategic arms control, the opposition continued to base their comments on concepts floating around the neoconservative influence d world of groups like the CPD. Testimony about the need for equity and equality came f rom two general sources : the military and the CPD. Although the definitions of the two terms carry differences of meaning, they held synonymous meanings in the context of SALT committee testimony . Early in the SFRC testimony, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General David C. Jones referred in his opening statement to the need for equity in the treaty. He suggested that equity was not equality, in the sense that public critics of the treaty cherry picked examples of apparent inequality from the midst of details that strove for a general equity , despite the technological differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. T he specific issues of concer n regarding equity raised in his statement address ed the granting of unilateral access to the Soviet s to use their modern large ballistic missile, and the exclusion of the Backfire bom ber from consideration as a means of delivering nuclear payloads. Both concerns were the type of issue considered unequal by other witnesses of similar background, such as the very recently retired General Edward L. 54 SFRC, part 1, 506; SFRC, part 2, 374, 409, 411; SFRC, part 4, 2, 7, 12, 192 193, 364; SASC, part 3, 923, 1168, 1173, 1341. Brennan was a founding member of the CPD, see Sanders, 155.
262 Rowny. Widely viewed as a Jackson man inside the Pentagon, the former officer initially summarized his objections to t A t the end of his testimony , he describe the same category of concern . terms in other testimony support the idea that, in terms of the hearings, the two words share the same meaning. 55 The members and like minded associates of the Committee on the Present Danger also raised the is sue of equality before both the SFRC and the SASC. F ormer Admiral Elmo Zumwalt , despite existing as part of both the military and CPD , established early in his testimony his allegiance with the neocon led group. He argued that the treaty before the Senat e did not guarantee strategic arms equal ity. The Admiral noted that he agreed with Nitze on the issue, in that a fair treaty, one that embraced equality , was the desired goal. CPD Executive Committee Chairman Eugene Rostow presented the same position in his prepared statement for the SFRC when he wrote, 56 He later highlighted the CPD belief that if the Soviet Unio n decided the effort was worthwhile, it would be willing to continue negotiations, which would allow the United States to proceed from a position rooted in equality. During additional testimony before the committee in September, Rostow reiterated the CPD position in pointed exchanges with both Senators Joe Biden and Jacob Javits. B oth legislators accused the witness and his grou p of being anti 55 Caldwell, Dynamics , 34 35; SFRC, part 1, 370 371, 539, 544. 56 SFRC, part 2, 378.
263 treaty. Rostow responded by emphasizing what the CPD position was regarding the SALT II treaty: The treaty is no t the essential point. The essential point, as we tried to make clear in our statement is to have a foreign policy and a defense policy that would secure the interests of the Nation. A fair and balanced and verifiable treaty might do that, but we do not think that this treaty is fair, balanced, and verifiable, and we think it would be a profound mistake for the Senate to approve its ratification, to consent to its ratification in its present form. 57 The SFRC also heard from Committee members Lane Kirkland and Donald Brennan, with the former suggesting inequality could hinder any chance at Soviet agreement to significant arms reductions, while the latter argued for the treaty not meeting the standard of the Jackson Amendment passed during the SALT I Senate a pproval process. Witnesses before the SASC expressed the same concerns, including testimony in October from Nitze, Richard Pipes, and William Van Cleave. The testimony of the CPD was not unanimous. Most members agreed with these witnesses, but one of th eir number, William Colby, t estified in favor of the treaty and denied the accusation of inequality. However, the former CIA director chose not to identify himself with the group, and ineq uality of the treaty. As a result, the message of the CPD was the threat presented by the lack of equality in the SALT II treaty. 58 The second major issue that caused consternation among opposition witnesses before the two Senate committees was verificatio n, which essentially was the ability of the United States to ensure, largely through secretive means, that the Soviet Union kept its treaty obligations regarding arms limitations and associated activities. The Foreign Relations Committee heard the Joint C hiefs argue that like equity , verification was something necessary for a good agreement . Treaty opponents also agreed with the requirement, and wanted to ensure the United States could sufficiently carry out the required surveillance. Rostow explained th at the CPD wanted a verifiable treaty. Nitze 57 SFRC, part 4, 12. 58 SFRC, part 2, 152, 158, 164, 375, 378, 396; SFRC, part 4, 9 12, 192 193, 365; SASC, part 3, 877, 931, 940, 1170 1171, 1315, 1005 the essential parity of the equitable/equal terms seems clear.
264 testified that his primary concern was verification, although in light of the degree of Soviet superiority in the treaty, he relegated the issue to a minor level of consideration. 59 Both committees heard witne sses give greater attention to verification i n the fall hearings. CPD member Dr. Edward Teller emphasized the difficulties inherent in the support for the concept. Nitz e told the SASC that he believed verification was an important issue that the agreement rendered irrelevant because cheating would benefit the Soviets less than following the treaty provisions that singularly helped them . When asked how the SALT II treaty agreements, he admitted the problem was not eventually finding out what the Soviets did . The danger was that the United States learned of Soviet violations long after the benefit from the cheating e nded, in effect noticing the open barn door some time after the horse escaped. Van Cleave echoed Nitze, unambiguous ly testifying that the United States had verifiable in many provi sions, and the verification problem is further clouded by the 60 Interestingly, former CIA Chief Colby took a supporting position on verification, much as he did with equality. He argued that verification was not, in point of fact, a problem with the SALT II treaty because it was adequately addressed Senator Howard Cannon to compare the posit ions of Nitze and the retired spy, and argue that the two men agreed 59 SFRC, part 1, 3 70, 501, 510; SFRC, part 2, 378. 60 SASC, part 3, 1170.
265 on the minimal importan ce of verification in the treaty for significantly different reasons. 61 The third specific area of concern for opposition witnesses was the impact of the pending agreement on U.S. allies, particularly NATO. Logically, this topic was also a necessary compon ent of a g ood treaty for the Joint Chiefs. The CPD recognized the issue was important, but the effect on other nations received less attention from the m than the other major concerns . Teller in his written statement to the SFRC specifically refe rred to the negative impact of allowing weapons such as the Backfire bomber to escape the limitations of the treaty . He argued that excluding such a weapon would increase the fear of NATO allies by putting them in a position of great er danger. Rostow sum marized the con cerns of the CPD when he explained the negative impact achieve a first strike strategic capability, which would paralyze our entire intercontinental arsena l , Europe an and other allied concern would become panic [sic] , 62 He continued to address the impact on allies, arguing for SALT as an example of the need to reconsider U.S. policy in a broader context, a situation driven i n part by European concerns. Protecting both U.S. and allied interests required a strong nation, bringing the basic arguments driving t he opposition full circle in evaluating the SALT II treaty. 63 Hearing the nature of opposition concerns, senato rs asked o pposition witnesses for their suggestions to move forward with the treaty, questions consistent with the 61 SFRC, part 4, 8, 232, 242; SASC, part 3, 877, 9 51 952; 1170 1171; 1006 1007, 10 34. 62 SFRC, part 2, 375. 63 SFRC, part 4, 243; SFRC, part 2, 400, 403.
266 advice and consent. The CPD consensus, with the exception of Colby, was to modify the treaty either by amendment or by returni ng to negotiations with the Soviets, r eflecting the expressed CPD desire to pursue meaningful arms control from a position of strength . At the request of Chairman Church, Nitze provided a letter with his recommendations for their consideration after the t estimony portion of the hearings ended. The former Defense Department official urged Senators to exercise the advice portion of their job description, rather than merely consenting , as he believed the White House wanted . He began with an encouragement to send the treaty back for further negotiation, and then listed several specific items to be included in the new agreement. T hese included equality and clear definitions, which would make verification easier. He also suggested including weapons such as th e Backfire bomber, which would ease the concerns of NATO members and other allies. T he details he called for corresponded with the overall nature of the opposition critique. Two other CPD members also made suggestions to the SFRC regarding the course in reporting to the President . Teller argued for voting against ratifying the treaty because such an action would identify the threat the American public faced and needed to respond to in a national sense. Rostow took a narrower view than Teller, something and recommended implementing fixes to resolve the critical issues, particularly those aspects affecting equality, deterrence, and U.S. allies . 64 Testimony before the SASC continued the themes established in previou s exchanges before both committees. Nitze commended renegotiation as the best option, 64 SFRC, part 1, 529 530; SFRC, part 4, 6, 36, 232 233.
267 for the Senate really to wrestle with the essential issues of U.S. foreign policy and 65 Pipes agreed with his fellow CPD Executive Committee member, and suggested the treaty go back to the negotiating table as a good middle ground between the extremes of utter rejection on the one hand and unquestioned acceptance on the other . 66 Both committees reported their findings after the hearings ended, with unsurprising results. The SFRC recommended that the entire Senate vote in favor of the agreement , despite the concerns of the various witnesses. T he SASC , undoubtedly influenced by the powerful presence of Senator Jackson, published a negative report and suggested the Senate reject the treaty. T he majority report mentioned s pecific areas needing improvement in the treaty , included ensuring equality and verifiability, along with cla rifications regarding specific weapons that opposition witnesses discussed as sources of unease among U.S. allies. 67 T he United States finally signed the SALT II treaty in 1979, which along with its presentation to the Senate for approval enabled the opposi tion to pursue its most formal and focused challenge. The CPD in particular argued that the t reaty failed to protect America from the dangers associated with the strategic arms competition with the Soviets. They based their objections in the neoconserva tive fears of falling behind the Soviet Union and failing to recognize . T he CPD challenged what in their view was a treaty that served to reinforce American 65 SASC, part 3, 922. 66 SASC, part 3, 923; 931 932. 67 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The SALT II Treaty , Report, November, 19, 1979 , http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t4 9.d48.13250_exec.rpt.14 ; U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications of the Proposed SALT II Treaty Relating to the National Defense , Report, December 4, 1979, http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg 1979 sas 0035 .
268 weakness. They claimed that the SALT II treaty repeated the mistakes of SALT I, violating the equality expected of an agreement in the post SALT I world, and allowing the Soviets greater liberty in the pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to use them. The resulting agreement threatened not only the United Stat es , but its allies as well, due to the advantages given the Soviet s and denied the Americans. T he neocon leaders of the group testified before two Senate committees in the hope of alert ing the nation to the dangers the agreement represented. Once the hear ings ended, everyone involved planned on the treaty debate moving to the floor of the Senate for the entire body to debate and vote. However, circumstances changed that expectation, resulting in committee testimony and discussion becoming the high point f or the second round of strategic arms control. T he outcome of the treaty and the process had more to do with the impact of events outside , d espite the efforts by neoconservative led gro ups to derail SALT II. In an ironic repeat of events from 1968 , the success of American stra tegic arms control plans hin ged on Soviet activities abroad. P rogress ground to a halt as a result, leaving many o n both sides to ask a question: What was next fo r SALT?
269 Table 1 0 1 Memorandum of Understanding for the SALT II Treaty 68 United States Soviet Union Launchers of ICBMs 1054 1398 Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1054 1398 Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs 550 576 Launchers of SLBMs 656 950 Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs 496 128 Heavy bombers 574 156 Heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers 0 0 Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs 0 0 ASBMs 0 0 ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 0 0 Table 10 2 Compi lation of Nitze SALT II Comparison Data 69 The Balance In Total * June 18, 1979 1985* * U.S. S.U. U.S. S.U. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles 2 , 053 2 , 504 2 , 130 2 , 246 Numbers of Warheads 9,514 8,226 12,504 11,728 Area Destruction Potential 3,839 6,890 4, 538 9,322 Hard Target Kill Potential 192,599 133,968 302,652 391,806 Megatonnage 3,253 7,836 3,537 10,870 Throw weight 7.51 12.15 7.93 14.45 *Excluding the Backfire bomber and all its armaments * * Consistent with SALT II 68 Goller and Calv o, SALT Agreements , 409; Labrie, ed., SALT Handbook , 654. Also located at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm Politics of Arms Control , Krepon and Caldwell, eds., 281 69 Assuming that Currently Projected U.S. and USSR Defense Programs are Continued in a Manner Consistent with SALT II Alerting America , 143 146.
270 CHAPTER 11 PART IV TRANSFORMA TION Everyone involved in the do mestic debate over the SALT II t reaty expected the next step in the ratification process would be a discussion on the floor of the Senate, followed by a vote at some point. Supporters and opponents continued their rhetorica l efforts, planning and maneuvering to maximize public opinion in their favor. the pages of Commentary . Congressional testimony from the summer and fall hearings prov ided additional material for the CPD, which the group used to push forward its agenda with SALT and U.S. foreign policy in general. Senator Jackson continued his and oth er senators to highlight what they viewed as the dangerous elements in the treaty. The White House also sought to sway senatorial opinions using any means available, even the new Iran Hostage Crisis, to reinforce the supporting arguments for the SALT II t reaty. However, by the end of the year, all the preparation on both sides became irrelevant due to the combined effect of two external events. The first incident to shape the future of the arms control agreement was the October di scovery of a Soviet comba t brigade in Cuba. Fallout from the controversy associated with this apparent intelligence failure resulted in the delay of full Senate discussion regarding the treaty. While this event alone did not result in the end of the SALT II effort, it changed th e setting for consideration of the accord sufficiently for a second event to bring the debate to a halt. In December, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and once it became clear this action was a long term operation, even treaty supporters acknowledged bringing the measure to the Senate floor for discussion
271 and a vote was extremely unlikely. Carter agreed and requested that the Senate table the agreement in January 1980. Most scholarly examinations of the SALT II treaty end with the Afghan invasion and the President both Carter and the opposition, the only real change was the priority of the accord , not the desirability of its approval . The Iran Hostage Crisis rapidly grew to demand a significant portion of the administrati and effort, as did the re election effort . Despite the shift in relative importance, the treaty remained a consideration in planning for other issues, as well as a goal in its own right. Administration officials and staffers continued to plan f or a future presentation to an important consideration during an election year. The White House pursued gaining Senate approval of the SALT II treaty throughout the y ear until the election in November. Opposition forces considered the President on treaty advocacy a positive development, and sought to capitalize on the momentum of the moment by pressing home the necessity of rejecting the agreement. Jackson a nd other opponents considered the brigade in Cuba and the invasion of Afghanistan as further proof of the validity of their concerns. He argued that the SALT II agreement only enabled Soviet adventurism , and if the United States wanted t o avoid the specter of Soviet superiority around the world, rejecting the treaty was necessary. Jackson remained a loyal Democrat, muting somewhat his criticisms as the election neared, but his reputation as a leader for a more conservative foreign policy remained intact.
272 support of the treaty in 1980 . The CPD continued many of the same arguments in several reports, calling attention to the dangers of Soviet ex pansion, the The CDM followed the example of the CPD in standing firm against the SALT II agreement, but the negative impact of a meeting with the President in January Commentary magazine also continued echoing the CPD, publishing several articles and reviews critical of the and suggesting that should the SALT II treaty be ratified , Soviet expansionism would continue, to the detriment of the United States. Throughout the year, the neocon led opposition persevered in contesting the President battling to prevent exposing the United States to the dangers they feared woul d come with support for SALT II. T he 1980 presidential election provided a high SALT policy through the candidacy of Ronald Reagan. A member of the CPD, the former Governor of California shared several characteristics wi th neoconservatives. The former Democrat deeply distrusted the Soviet Union, and in the years before his successful presidential run, Reagan used CPD resources to explain to Americans his problems with SALT II . Once his campaign began, the Republican hop eful tapped the CPD for foreign policy advice. This pattern continued once he be came president, with substantial numbers of the group holding several foreign po licy and arms control positions in the administration .
273 Finally, several key ideas emerge from t his study. Opposition to SALT provided neoconservatives with an avenue to power in the Republican P arty. This route is not surprising, considering neoconservatives had concerned themselves with foreign policy in general and arms control in particular sin ce the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. Based in fears of communism, the neocon led opposition challenged any positions or approaches that appeared to open the United States up to dangers from the Soviet Union. The effort to alert America to the threats pre sent in U.S. arms control policy gained the attention of presidential administrations and senators alike, presenting a challenge that held the potential to influence U.S. foreign policy, a concept near and dear to the minds of many neoconservatives in grou ps like the CPD. These concepts enlarge the relevant hist oriographies and explain the critical role of neoconservatives in contesting U.S. strategic arms efforts in the late sixties and seventies.
274 CHAPTER 12 LOSING SAVOR: THE EN D OF SALT T he decline of st rategic arms limitations was neither immediate nor uneventful in the aftermath of the Senate hearings in the summer and fall of 1979 , which represented the apex of SALT II activity and opposition in the United States. The Carter White House sought to resu rrect SALT, and the opposition, following the neoconservative lead, attempted to ensure the dangers of the treaty would never return. B oth sides pursue d the actions they did based in part on external factors that caused t he decline in the latter half of 1 979 . Despite these elements outside the SALT II debate, the administration and the opposition continued their respective efforts until the end of the Carter presidency . The standard narrative explaining the abrupt halt and demise of the SALT II treaty by the end of 1979 emphasizes the impact of two events outside of U.S. in fluence, particularly their ending any possibility of the agreement gaining full Senate approval. The first of these external factors was the public announcement of the discovery of a S oviet combat brigade stationed on the island of Cuba at the end of August. Although unknown to the general public at the time, Soviet troops remained in Cuba from the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. News reports began to surface in early September conc USSR troops. The controversy continued throughout the month, with media reports of rising concern s regarding tensions with the Soviets , and questions about the White House response, or apparent lack thereof , to the situation . SFRC Chairman Frank Church decided to move the start date for full Senate consideration of the SALT II treaty from October to the end of the year. Reporters speculated the agreement faced a difficult uphill battle for approval unless the
275 President acted . Carter argued for keeping the brigade situation separate from the treaty, but he faced repeated questions regarding U.S. action, how the SALT II treaty could move forward if the troops remained in Cuba, and the effectiveness of U.S. policy. As a result , he spoke to the nation on October 1, and pointedly addressed the impact of the situation on Senate consideration of the treaty. The President attempted to p lace the two issues in context when tonight i s certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest 1 He followed this assessment with a pl ea for the Senate to continue to work on ratifying the treaty, suggesting failure to do so 2 The Soviet Brigade controversy alone did not force Carter to withdraw the SALT II agreem ent from Senate consideration . Caldwell and Garthoff, among others, argue that the delay starting full Senate hearings allowed another event to impact the treaty: the invasion of Afghanistan i n December 1979. It quickly became clear to U.S . officials that the Soviets intended to make a significant co mmitment in the neighboring country . The result prompted even SALT supporters like Senator Church , as well as opponents like Jackson, to suggest that the probability of the arms control treaty moving to the Senate floor for debate and a vote was extremely low. The 1 PPUS Carter , 1:1805. 2 Caldwell and Garthoff provide detailed descriptions of the Soviet brigade situation; see Caldwell, D ynamics , 155 169, and Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 913 enlightening. See also Carter , Keeping Faith , 268 ; Vance, Hard Choices , 358 364; Brzezinski, Power , 346 352; and Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 185 187 . For t he contemporary perspective, see PP US Carter PPPUS Carter , 1:1754 PPUS Carter , 1:1802 1806; and Robert WP , 9/27/79, A14, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146984361 .
276 President and his advisors agreed, and Carter announced in his State of the Union address that while he considered the agreement a necessary component for U.S. o not believe it advisable at this time to bring up the Treaty for consideration on the Senate floor. The Congress and the Executive Branch must first 3 Despite this setback, t he President intend ed to continue pressing for Senate approval of the SALT II treaty . 4 T he brigade and the invasion created a situation from which Carter could not resurrect the agreement, and the issue of Senate approval became irrelevant with the ele ction of Ronald Reagan in November 1980. Carter described the situation as one he reaching agreements on nuclear arms control was the most profound disappointment of 5 There is little doubt that these events played the dominant role in ending the probability of an immediate hearing before the full Senate for the SALT II accord. However, the opposition used the Soviet Brigade and the Afghanistan invasio n to call for a longer , and to reiterate the dangers t hat prompted their challenge to the agreement from the start . 3 PPPUS Carter 1:114. 4 Garthoff, DÃ©tente , 1055, 107 7 1079; Kaufman, Jackson , 390; Caldwell, Dynamics , 174 176; Kaufman, Plans Unraveled , 199 201; Carter, Keeping , 270 271; Brzezinski, Power , 353; Vance, Hard Choices , 388 389. Caldwell notes the Iran Hostage Crisis affected SALT II by aff ecting both confidence in U.S. point . WP , A6, http://search.proquest.com/docview/146977076 . 5 Carter, Keeping , 271.
277 The inflammatory nature of the Soviet brigade, and the effect of Congr essional rhetoric and press coverage, essentially negated the need for groups such as the CPD or CDM to continue comment ing on what they viewed as problems with SALT. B oth supporters and foes of the agreement suggested that a failure to resolve the presen ce of Soviet troops in Cuba could very well mean the end of Senate consideration. One newspaper report cited a mix of supporting and opposing senators, Frank Church, Bob Dole, Robert Byrd, Joe Biden, and S.I. Hayakawa, who agreed that Senate consideration of the treaty required resolution of the Cuban situation . Jackson joined the chorus, going so far as to demand the removal of virtually every piece of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. After the President made his speech about the situation, the lin es in the Senate between proponents and opponents remained unchanged , with the undeci ded continuing to hold the swing votes , albeit more skeptically than before. 6 The Afghanistan invasion was simultaneously more and less significant for the SALT II treaty . T affected U.S. Soviet relations , unlike the Cuban situation . U nelected opponents did not need to speak to the issue b ecause the primary effect of the incursion on SALT was t he President ision to withdraw the treaty from Senate consideration . As with the brigade in Cuba , people like Senator Jackson registered their conclusions about the However, in contrast to the presence of Soviet troops less than 100 miles from the U. S. coast, the Afghan effect on SALT built upon previous complications . 6 NYT , 9/7/79, A1, A7 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/120716100 WP 9/12/79, A2, http://search.proquest.com/docview/147119962 ; WSJ , 10/3/79, 3, http://search.proquest.com/docview/134394544 ; Jackson Draft Statement, 10/10/79, HMJ 3560 6/13/37.
278 This situation meant the Soviet invasion merely shifted the probability of a failed Senate ratification vote from possible to certain . Most treatments of SALT II and the treaty stop w ith the impact of the Afghan invasion, rightly concluding that strategic arms control under the SALT approach was dead by January 1980 . advance the treaty, and the arguments used by the opposition during the remainder of C ittle scholarly attention. A closer examination of the administration and the neocon led opposition shows that while the arms control accord held a lower priority for the White House, the true end of the SALT discussion took pl 7 Ongoing Opposition O pponents of SALT continued their efforts to secure their preferred treaty outcome from the first summer hearings through the rest of the year. An excellent exam ple of neoconservative advocacy for withholding ratification appeared in the pages of Commentary to Congress by the administration . His take on each of the positions reflect ed the concerns laid out in the congressional testimony of CPD and other neocon influenced witnesses. H e raised the problem w ith questions fo cused on spec ific missile issues , as well as delivery systems like the Soviet Backfire bomber . 7 WP , 12/29/79, A6 , http://search.proquest.com /docview/146977076 WP , 1/3/80, A12, http://search.proquest.com/docview/147191483 tback on Arms Treaty Signals New Era NYT , 1 4 80, A6, http://search.proquest.com/docview/121151839 Shelving May Lift Defense Budget, But Big U.S. Policy C WSJ , 1/4/80, 4, http://search.proquest.com/docview/134428424 Soviet Relations: A Darkening at WP , 1/6/80, A16, http://search.proquest.com/docview/147266072 . Caldwell, Dynamics , does not address the rest of 1980 after sue SALT if re elected, see DÃ©tente , 1120.
279 Luttwak suggested that for NATO allies, an outward appearance of agreement masked significant doubts and concerns. On the topic of verification, he argued that the United S tates would be unable to confirm the nature of Soviet adherence to stipulated behavior. The remaining questions he examined dealt in various ways with the trustworthiness of the Soviet Union and the dangers of assuming the y u sed a similar thought process to U.S. policy makers. a strategy. As a result, for Soviet planners arms control is a tool of policy instead of being a policy goal in itself. It is self evident that the goal of Soviet strategy over the 8 that the Soviets were manipulative, secretive, untrustworthy, and seeking superiority at American expense, reflected a fundamental neoconservative suspicion of the So viet Union and its goals and methods, ideas reflected in the opposition Senate committee hearing s . 9 The Carter White House remained upbeat coming out of the initial hearings while noting the effects of opposition rhetoric on the Senate a nd public opinion. Reporting to Hamilton Jordan in mid August, Landon Butler continued to express a sense of forward movement regarding administration expectations for the treaty . The deputy chief of staff noted some potential Congressional problems for ratification are now troubling the Senate: the adequacy of our national will to compete militarily 8 Commentary , 88:2, (August 1979): 30 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290071002 . 9 Ibid, 21 32 .
280 10 The majority of changes recommended by Butler focused on d ealing with these two issues that he viewed as rooted in the arguments of the SALT o pposition . However, problems existed be yond the confines of the Senate according to Office of Communications Special Projects director Al an Raymond and two members of the Office of Congressional Liaison, Jerry Rafshoon and Bob Beckel . P olling data indicated a drop in public support for SALT II i n the a ftermath of the summer hearings . Raymond suggested that this decline resulted from the influence of SALT opposition , notin 11 He observed that the debate shifted . His recommendation emphasized the talking points that worked for the administ ration up to that point , in order to avoid presenting the image of the need to respond to critics guiding White House actions . Raymond pointed out t oward the end of his memo 12 Whether or not clearly indicates that staffers believed the criticisms of SALT opponents impacted the debate , and to a degree accurately reflected gener al public sentiments. 13 10 Folder: Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL. 11 Memo from Alan Raymon Folder: Files, Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL. 12 Ibid . 13 John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control : The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 163; Memo from e Folder: President for Communications, JCL.
281 Opposition forces used the Congressional committee testimony to challenge the agreement during the fall of 1979. The CPD issued two pamp hlets in September and October that both focused specifically on the SALT II treaty. The first was a short summary of Richard Pipes July testimony, emphasizing Soviet long term goals that aimed to establish superiority while simultaneously hindering U.S. defensive planning ete with several char ts to illustrate his key points . H e raised questions about the appropriateness of the treaty , ranging from the details of various missile differences and their significance , to verification issues and concerns over the balance of stra tegic and conventional arms with NATO allies . Nitze suggested in his conclusion that there was a fundamental problem in allowing present situation is the result of the American tendency toward self delusion SALT process, regrettably, has contributed to this tendency by creating the illusion that 14 The solution he recommended at the end of the CPD pamphlet was to delay ratification of the treaty and proceed to f ixing the problems he outlined before putting any agreement into place. The two Committee publications represented a major push to present to a wider audience the objections and issues addressed in the Congressional hearings. CPD m embers also worked behind the scenes, particularly with Jackson , to organize the opposition message . who could assist in hearing preparation, and of the sixteen people listed in one memo, half were CPD mem bers, although only one name, Charles Kupperman, had the 14 Assuming th at Currently Projected U.S. and USSR Defense Programs are Continued in a Manner Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 142.
282 description 15 T he idea of a link between the group and the legislator seems reasonable if f ifty percent of potential hearing preparation helpers were CPD m embers. The organization continued to send material to the Senator throughout the rest of the year. These documents varied from a transcript of a speech by Vice President Mondale that made indi 16 The ongoing effort of the Committee to alert America to the dangers of the SALT II treaty was the focus of Eugene Rostow 979 CPD Board of Directors m eeting . The Chairman of the Executive Committee efforts since its founding , while acknowledging that SALT so dominated the H e expressed hope for a broader examination of U.S. foreign policy , s uggesting their work on strategic arms would recede in importance once the Senate decided the explaining the Carter administratio were unsupportable . He pointed rationale for the treaty and the lack of legitimacy in the an example of an agreement that produced benefits for the nation. Rostow cited problems with the treaty that allowed for development of Soviet superiority, frustrated NATO allies, and rendered verification more difficult at best . 15 6/61/13. Interestingly , six of the s ixteen went on to hold official positions in the Reagan Administration. 16 CPD transcript of Vice President Mondale sp eech, 7/26/79, HMJ 3560 6/24/11.
283 role from its founding had bee n to foster an open dialogue regarding U.S. foreign policy , with the goal of improving that policy. The strategic arms effort held a particular place in Your Executive Committee has stressed, over and over again, that the modif ication of SALT is not in itself a policy, but the indispensible prelude a detour for us, but the proper focal point of out attention and our energy at this critical stage in the rest oration of American foreign policy. 17 The importance placed on arms control by a neoconservative led group, along with the high profile emphasis attached to the issue by the Carter White House, reinforces the idea that in the minds of many supporters and cr itics of SALT II , the treaty represented simultaneously clearly establishes arms control as a means to an end, one that inclusion ideas and people in the subsequent presidenti al administration could facilitate. 18 The pressure against SALT II continued on other fronts during the remainder of 1979, as reflected in the pages of Commentary magazine. In September, the journal published an article by Soviet expert Leopold Labedz that he based on his summer Congressional testimony. comparison o f the SALT situation to appeasement to Hitler and the Nazis before World War II, and proceeded to consider how efforts to counter Soviet expansionism , such as dÃ©tente or SA LT , were doomed to failure. Additionally, he suggested NATO did not support the treaty as fervently as the administration claimed. He then argued that the unequal agreement tied American hands while not equally hindering Soviet efforts . Labedz concluded by return ing to the 1930s comparison, arguing for the need to avoid the false hopes that SALT supporters attached to the treaty in the face of data to the contrary . 19 17 the Co 6/49/20. 18 Letter from Eugene Rostow to Henry Jackson, 11/14/79, HMJ 3560 6/49/20 . CPD correspondence and a Rostow CPD speech enclosed with the letter . 19 Commentary , 68:3, (September 1979): 54 6 5, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290078189 . Jackson biographer Kaufman describes Labedz as
284 The magazine continued to support the opposition view of the Soviet Union and SALT II thr oughout the remainder of the year. An October article by Francis Fukuyama suggested Soviet favoring governments in several Third World nations, including years is a f oretaste of what the international arena will be like in the face of further American retreat: not a more diverse and independent world, but one increasingly 20 Former CDM executive director Josh ua Muravch ik analyzed Democratic Party presidential challenger Senator Ted , and the Soviet Union and SALT in particular. ective bound to move readers away from supporting the Senator. Additionally, the magazine published a book review by Richard Pipe s to alert readers to a new volume by Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed , which m ade the mistake of presenting a kinder and gentler view of the Soviets. This regular publication of material opposing SALT in the final months of 1979 by Commentary illustrates the continuing importance of the issue for neoconservatives. The fact that th e magazine was not primarily a foreign policy journal adds further weight to this point. Both the magazine and the CPD maintained their efforts to challenge the ratification effort for the SALT II treaty outside the halls of government as the themes the Senator, see Kaufman, Jackson , 259, 270. 20 Commentary , 68:4, (October 1979): 58, h ttp://search.proquest.com/docview/1290137725 .
285 domin ating opposition rhetoric in the Congressional committee hearings received public promotion. 21 Efforts to determine the fate of the arms control agreement continued inside the government as well. Senator Jackson maintained his interaction with the CPD, whi ch prompted a grateful Eugene Rostow to write 22 After the Armed Services Committee finished hearing testimony, the Senator expressed his sentiments in a speech entitled He cited the problems of Soviet superiority , adequate verification, and concerns over NATO. He also drew the parallel of appeasement, citing Chamberlin and 1938. Jackson reminded his audience that he and others like him supported genuine arms control, and preferred the Carter . T he problem with that initial offer was the fact that the U.S. backed down after the initial Soviet rejection in early 1977 , pursuing another path. Jacks on argued that this reaction by the administration supported the idea that SALT II as a whole proceeded from a position and assumptions of weakness on the part of America. He concluded that the best outcome would be for the Senate to send the treaty back to the President for renegotiation, dealing with the problem areas. 23 President a December 17 letter expressing their problems with the treaty as it stood at that point. The message summarized six specific areas of U.S. policy that related to the 21 Commentary , 68:6, (December 1979): 31 43, http://search.proquest.com/docview /1290147686 Commentary , 68:4, (October 1979): 86 88, http://search.proquest.com/docview/129017864 8 . 22 Letter from Eugene Rostow to Senator Henry M. Jackson, 11/14/79, HMJ 3560 6/49/20. 23 5/246/46.
286 actual agreement, four of which reflected the issues repeatedly addressed by Jackson, the CPD, and other opposition witnesses. The Senator reiterated these points in a statement released up on the publishing of the Armed Services Committee Report, during the month that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan unfolded . 24 The other branch of government with an interest in arms control also continued to plan for an eventual Senate floor debate as the fall hearings progressed. Lloyd Cutler, appointed in August to be, among other things, the new White House point man on SALT ratification, continued to track the willingn ess and activities of SALT supporting s enator s as they sought to bring fence sitters over to support the treaty . In a n October memo to Cutler, Anne Wexler from the Office of Public Outreach outlined in detail a plan to stimulate support for the agreement, including the use of moral, newspaper, and administration voices, along with the sup porting organization, She suggested the President give an address on the eve of the full Senate debate, anticipated for early November. Wexler emphasized the need for a well thought out strategy ready for action when the treaty went to the floor. Her approach earned the and plan 25 Once the various Senate committee hearings ended, both the Senate leadership and the White House anticipated a coordinated effort during the floor debate, one that would need to incorporate some of changes outlined in the Foreign Relations investigation. These 24 Letter to President Carter, 12/17/79, HMJ 3560 ment of Senator HMJ 3560 6/13/57. 25 Folder: Chief of Staff Files, JCL.
287 modifications, modest ones that avoided the more brazen renegotiation demands of the opposition, held the potential to gain the support of several s enators who were on th e fence or s lightly opposed. 26 The Carter Administration was willing to pursue whatever might work to gain sufficient numbers for treaty passage , an attitude that meant considering how to use the new Iran H ostage C risis to provide supporting arguments in favor of SALT II. One staffer suggested linking Iran to the supporting position by suggesting to senators that the hostage situation paralleled arms control problems , such as the need for rules in the international realm, the benefit of avoiding a similar complicating situation during an unrestrained arms race, and the dangers of third world acquisition of nuclear weapons. This idea capitalized on s enators c oncerns about Iran to generate support for the Landon Butler wrote a memo to Jordan in December, repeating the arguments for using Iran to advance support for the treaty . Although events soon changed the nature of the i ssues that the White House faced, pursuing this option could have provide d reiterating the SALT ratification rationale. Correspondence between several Senators and President Carter, and ongoin g meeting planning among White House officials, suggest s that the continuing effort to gain Senate passage of the treaty remained a high priority at the end of 1979, despite potential foreign relations complications due to 26 Lloyd Cutler, interview by Charles O. Jones, Clifton H. McCleskey, Kenneth W. Thompson, James S. Young, and Erwin C. Hargrove, http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcr ipts/ohp_1982_1023_cutler.pdf , p. 3 5, 10/23/82, The Miller Center of Public Affairs Presidential Oral History Program, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/scrip ps/archive/oralhistories/detail/3261 PPPUS Carter Vol. 2, 8/17/79, 1448 1449; Memo from Anne Wexler to Lloyd Cutler, Folder: les, JCL; Memo from Lloyd Folder: Folder: Lloyd SALT II, 10 /12/79 les, Congressional Liaison, JCL.
288 events in Cuba and Iran. On this basis, only a complicating event outside the United States that fundamentally changed U.S. Soviet relations held the potential to derail the treaty . This is precisely what happened as a result of the December Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . B oth opponen ts and proponents of the SALT II treaty proceeded to plan through 1979 for an eventual Senate floor debate, seeking to keep the issue before the public and ensure their particular position emerged triumphant in the final vote. 27 Post Afghanistan Prioritie s The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought the mo mentum of the SALT II treaty to a screeching halt. Cutler recalled the initial reaction in the White House as one of 28 Administration officials rem ained optimistic in the aftermath of the fallout from the Soviet brigade in Cuba , and the hostage situation in Iran appeared survivable . However , the Afghan event forced Carter to ask Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to remove treaty consideration from President clearly viewed such a step as a temporary measure, hoping to return eventually to the passage effort once foreign events calmed down. T he once prominent issue of SALT moved into the background as an issue in the 1980 Wh ite House , but the treaty was not forgotten. O nly loss in t he 27 Folder: 12/1/78 JCL. ; Memo from Landon Folder: Box 55, Anne Wexler Subject Files, Records of Anne Wexler as Special A ssistant to the President, JCL. 28 Lloyd Cutler, interviewe d by Stephen Knott, Darby Morrisroe, Russell Riley, and Daniel Ernst, http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2003_0710_cutler.pdf , p. 13, July 10, 2003, The Mi ller Center of Public Affairs Presidential Oral History Program, University of Virginia, http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/oralhistories/detail/3257 .
289 presidential election ended the White House hope for Senate debate and passage of the agreement. 29 The relegation of SALT II to the background in light of other considerations is clear from the relative absence of references to the accord discussion of policy issues during the spring. Butler suggested to Jordan that the administration needed a general foreign policy working group to address perceived problems w ith U.S. diplomatic relations, focusing on reaching influential individuals to remind them of the President direction of U.S. policy. The intended recipient group for this type of outreach effort included SALT supporters , and he linked them with Panama Canal Treaty proponents without further elaboration. A dditional memos to and from Butler through the beginning of May regarding the group failed to mention SALT in any context, despite references to other c ategories of outreach targets mentioned in the initial missive. 30 Communication between Jordan and Carter also reflected t his tendency to eliminate SALT from foreign policy discussion. The chief of staff wrote a March memo intended to stimulate the Presi dent policy directions and garner public support . Jordan referred to the Iran hostage situation and the Olympic boycott, including the possibility of a quick trip to Europe to try 29 Cutler, 2003 in terview, p. 11 12; Letter from Jimmy Carter to Robert Byrd, 1/3/80, Folder: SALT Memoranda and Correspondence, 8/1/79 1/3/80, Box 130, of Staff Files, JCL . 30 Folder: Files, Folder: 2/25/80 5/ Files, JCL; Memo from Folder: 2/25/80 ief of Staff Files, JCL; Memo from Folder: Files, JCL.
290 to gain support there fo r the athletic sanction. SALT was absent, and the President two paragraph, hand written reply did not mention the treaty effort, focusing instead on job in schedul ing my time re [ events, press conferences ] & meetings with press & citizens groups then we will avoid a lot of potential problems in explaining facts to 31 Undoubtedly the stress of the issues facing the President led to this type of reply, but th ose same difficulties ensured that SALT, a major goal throughout the Carter administration , remained in a less prominent position on the foreign policy agenda. The change in priority did not mean SALT considerations completely disappeared from the mind of Carter or his staffers. The President possessed first hand knowledge of the difficulties associated with pursuing treaty ratification beyond the confines of Washington, D.C. Individual states organized to stimulate support for SALT as part of the White H ouse overall effort to sell the arms control agreement to the nation . One of the organizers of the Virginia state effort wrote to Carter to explain his opinion concerning why further ratification efforts would fail. The Iranian crisis and the Afghan crisi s destroyed whatever chances we might have had of moving Virginians in the direction of supporting the Treaty. In my judgment, it will be impossible to reconstitute the Virginia trouble in stating that you still support the present agreement. In better times another and newly negotiated Treaty might have some success. But the old one is, in my opinion, dead. 32 Faced with such obstacles to SALT, the President derived inspiration from a vari ety of sources, including natural disasters. After flying over the fallout area produced by the 31 Reply of Jimmy Carter to Hamilton J ordan on memo from Jordan to Carter, 4/18/80, Folder: Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a d issertation. 32 Letter to Jimmy Carter, 3/1/80, Folder: Files, Deputy Chief of Staff Files, JCL.
291 he SALT process alive and lay the groundwork for controlling the tactical weapons being focused on 33 The priority for SALT changed, but the President remained committed to continue with arms control negotiations beyond SALT II, which suggests the administration would pursue Senate ratification of the treaty. This goal resulted in staffers continuing to plan for a possible reintroduction of the treaty. Staffer David Aaron suggested in a September memo that the President approve using ideas focused on moving the agreement through the Senate produced by 34 Carter agreed, suggesting in a handwritten note that the contents be used to push vigorously for SALT support via a radio address. Even topics that only remotely related to SALT, such as a Defense Appropriations Bill debated in June 1980, needed consideration in th e light of arms control efforts . This approach to the treaty cont election presidency. T he White House consider ed when and how to return to the arms con trol treaty throughout the post Afghanistan invasion period, but the y also actively continued SALT as an agenda item even in the w eeks immediately before the presidential election. As noted above, scholars argue that events at the end of 1979 ended the pos sibility of treaty ratification. T he administration clearly did not share that view in 1980. 35 33 Carter, Keeping Faith , 544. 34 Memo from David Aaron to Jimmy Carter, 10/7/80, Folder: Subject File, National Security Affairs, JCL. 35 Folder: es, Deputy Chief of Staff PPPUS Carter II , 1110; Memo from David Aaron to Jimmy Carter, 10/7/80, Cover to Letter from McGeorge Bundy to Jimmy Carter, 9/16/80, Folder: 5, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, National Security Affairs, JCL.
292 O pponents of the SALT treaty likew ise continued many of their activities after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, seeking to prevent the administration from moving forward with the agreement . This approach was a wise decision , given the consistent effort by the President and his staffers to plan for eventual treaty presentation. Senator many seeking to prevent passage. He replied to a constituent letter early in 1980, expressing his perspective that the issues of the Iran hostage crisi s an d the Afghanistan invasion both fit in the framework of Soviet expansion . He based h is explanation on the idea that seeking to prevent Soviet adventurism addressed the root cause of both areas of concern . 36 Jackson continued his efforts to contextualize U. S. policy in a major speech to the Virginia General Assembly at Colonial Williamsburg in February . He wanted to relations with the Soviets in general, and repeated many o f the themes propounded by neoconservative opponents throughout the years of the SALT debate. The immediate context of the Afghanistan situation served as proof of his primary assumption about the nature of U.S. Soviet policy, namely that the United State s unilaterally pursued dÃ©tente, which rendered all policies based on that concept , including SALT, irrelevant . Jackson claimed that American presuppositions and desires were not shared by the Soviets , with ll the American people that manifestly [ unequal ] and [ unverifiable ] treaties favoring the Soviets are [ equal ] and [ verifiable ] and [ favorabl e ] 37 He argued that vacillation on a myriad of foreign relations incidents 36 Letter to constituent, 1/17/80, HMJ 3560 5/189/15. 37 5/246/57 . Italics used to replace und erlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation .
293 and events, including the combat brigade in Cuba, resulted in a permissible environment for the Soviet Union , one where they rightly concluded the United States would not react when invasion of another nation was possible or desirable. Jackson believed that these different circumstances , resulting from what he viewed as largely flawed policies, led to the logical question: when were those policies going to be reexamined, including arms control policy ? Both the approach and the planners of U.S. polic y needed to be held accountable, becau se according to the Senator, failed policies required a change in the minds behind those policies. O ther voices, especially those and women, more [ sober ] and [ wise ] , wh 38 By implication Jackson numbered himself in this group, and he doubtless believed those who held the correct view included the CDM and the CPD among those wh o remained on the outside . H e concluded that in a contest of streng th and will, the United States l ost to the Soviet Union. From his perspective, r eversing this trend would require recognition of the fallacy of cooperation with the Soviets and a resumption of a competitive assumption on the part of U.S. policy makers. 39 J ackson continued to speak t hroughout the spring and early summer , challenging stressing the same themes and ideas as in his February speech. He wrote an article for Strategic Review where he argued that the effect of Afghanistan on U.S. policy was ripping away t he illusions of Soviet dÃ©tente and demonstrating the apparent loss of the 38 Ibid., 14. Italics used to replace underlining in original because the University of Florida Graduate School Editoria l Office does not permit underlining in a dissertation . 39 Ibid.
294 United States in the conflict with the Soviet Union over the past few years . There was a nee d for presidential leadership in pursuing a bipartisan policy that included the voices of those both previously excluded and correct about Soviet intentions and goals. Jackson suggested that the goal was not the absence of arms control agreements, but neg otiating ones that fit his definition s of equality and verifiability. He also noted when replying to constituent letters at this time that understanding the Soviets and maintaining equal strength served as critical components in relations with them , parti cularly for the formation of strategic arms treaties. Jackson revealed that he remained concerned about the slim likelihood of Senate passage of the SALT II treaty , despite further weakening by the President al of the t reaty from Senate consider ation . 40 Unsurprisingly, Jackson reduced the frequency and tone of his commentary as the election season progressed, particularly once Carter became the Democratic nominee in August. Jackson, working as a loyal Democrat, even introduced the President at a New York campaign stop in October. However, the changes co nsistent with political reality e to support fellow Democrats did not deter him from his objectives. T he Senator clearly continued to challenge both U.S. pol icy toward the Soviets and arms control efforts, including the broad appeal in this regard is apparent in his evaluation by Republican and conservative William Buckley, 40 Strategic Review , Spring 1980, 11 16, HMJ 3560 5/320/19; Letter from Henry M. Jackson to constituent, 3/27/80, HMJ 3560 5/ 189/17; Letter from Henry M. Jackson to constituent, 5/12/80, HMJ 3560 10, 5/22/80, HMJ 3560 5/ 247/3.
295 41 the leaders looked to by both neocons and conservatives is evident . 42 O ther neoconservative groups an d voices also conti nued to challenge the . The Committee on the Present Danger released three publications during 1980 , including a January effort whe re he announced the Carter Doctrine. prevent Soviet expansion and adventurism , l inking events in Iran to Soviet pressure, and placing tensions in the Middle East in a Cold War context. Th e paper asserted the need for a return to American equality with the Soviet Union in the context of containment and American exceptional ism . Accomplishing this goal would require increased military strength and an improved economy. The report ended with a familiar reminder of the failure of Western leaders to stand up to Hitler in the 1930s, calling for the United States to prevent a similar outcome with the Soviets fifty years later . In its May release, the CPD sought to provide a brief policy statement with c ost analysis in support of the January call to arms. In November , perhaps as a reminder of its advocacy positions in light of the Reagan election win, the CPD released a compil ation of several of their previous publications with sound bite referenc es to the group. 43 41 National Review , 11/14/80, 1416. 42 10/13/80, HMJ 3560 5/247/9. 43 Ty roler, ed., Alerting America , 170 Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 178 We Have Said 1976 6/20/38.
296 T he Coalition for a Democratic Majority continued its own efforts to combat similar foreign policy problems , following the lead of the CPD. These neocon Democrats managed to meet with the President , V ice President , and staffers at the Wh ite House on January 31, 1980. T , Political Observer , reported that during the half to strengthen U.S. military power and to pursue an aggressive ideological campaign 44 Despite the upbeat report, participant Ben Wattenberg later had said that we were interested in human rights. Carter went on about a difficu lt 45 The President lack of knowledge shocked many of those present, and prompted Wattenberg to vote Republican in the upcoming presidential election. Jerry Sanders in Peddlers of Crisis describes the meeting as almost a CPD CDM meeting with Carter, equating the two groups while emphasizing that CPD members also decided to vote for Reagan as a result of the meeting. The connections between the two groups appe ared in the same issue of the CDM newsletter, with the publication an The CDM also use d other neocon interconnections when the next issue of Political Observer speech to the Virg inia General Assembly. 46 44 Political Observer , January, 1980, 1, Left Stack, Untitled Folder: , Box 12, Personal Papers of Peter R. Rosenblatt, LBJ Library. 45 Wattenberg, Fighting Words , 166. 46 Wattenberg, Fighting Words , 166 167; Sanders, Peddlers , 281 282; Political Observer , January, 1980, 2, Left Stack, Untitled Folder: , Box 12, Personal Papers of Peter R. Pol itical Observer , February March, 1980, 3, Left Stack, Untitled Folder: , Box 12, Personal Papers of Peter R. Rosenblatt, LBJ Library. Sanders emphasis reflects both the overlap between the two groups and h is primary focus on the CPD.
297 In a similar manner , Commentary magazine continued to present a neoconservative critique of U.S. policy and arms control. Over the year, several articles and book reviews reminded readers of the problems associated with the adminis F ormer Jackson staffer Charles Horner review ed Strobe I I negotiations, contextualizing his comments with references to the failures of SALT II related policies. Th e magazine published a fourteen page essay by Norman Podhoretz in its May issue where t he godfather of neoconservativism surveyed virtually the entire history of the Cold War with an eye toward the virtues and benefits of the containment approach, while emphasizing the need for a more confrontatio nal, less accommodating approach to the Soviets and arms control. His critique of the Carter administration, noting the lack of commitment to containment, que stioned whether or not the Afghan invasion had persuaded the White House to change its approach t o the Soviets and suggested optimism was not the logi cal order of the day. 47 Other articles by Commentary regulars provided additional material devoted to advancing a neoconservative critique of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the post Afghanistan wo rld. Edward Luttwak raised the issue of what the United States was to do in light of the invasion, again drawing parallels to events of the late 1930s , and suggesting that war could be avoided only by luck. In a later article , he suggested increased mili tary spending as one choice, with the other alternative being more of the same Carter policies, includi ng ratifying the SALT II treaty. According to Luttwak, [ ] 47 trategy and Survival : Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II by Strobe Talbot (Book Review), Commentary , 69:1 (Jan., 1980): 94 96, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290078392 ; Norman Podhoret Commentary , 69:3 (March 1980): 27 40, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290078616 .
298 the remedy for a weakness caused by too much emphasis on arms control and too little spendin g is m 48 Much like Podhoretz and Luttwak, Richard Pipes expressed a concern for an expansionistic Soviet Union in the pages of Commentary . He argued for containment as a tool to foster democratic reforms, and p ointed out that dÃ©tente and SALT did not achieve many of the hoped for dividends . He suggested that if the SALT II treaty w ere ratified, similar outcomes c ould be expected. 49 F rom the Afghanistan invasion to the 1980 presidential election, when for all intents and purposes Jimmy Cart control over U.S. foreign policy ended, both proponents and opponents of the SALT II treaty continued their efforts to advance their agendas. Scholars correctly view the Soviet actions at the end of 1979 as the death knell of SALT, but participants a t the time did not fully realize the impact of the invasion on U.S. arms control policy. The priority, particularly in the White House, decreased , but the issue of the treaty in the context of U.S. Soviet relations continued to be an important part of U.S . foreign relations thinking. The decline of SALT II began after the Senate hearings in the summer and fall of 1979 , but the topic of the treaty, particularly in the larger context of where U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union should move in 1980, c ontinued to play a role in the thinking of both proponents and opponents of the agreement. After the end of the hearings, both sides began to marshal forces and arguments to secure a preferred treaty outcome. Neoconservatives used comparisons to the fail ure of Western nations 48 Commentary , 70:3 (Sept. 1980): 28 , http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290148505 . 49 Commentary , 69:4 (April, 1980): 40 49, http://sea rch.proquest.com/docview/1290138049 Commentary , 70:3 (Sept., 1980): 27 34, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290148505 Global Stra Commentary , 69:4 (April, 1980): 31 39, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1290138020 .
299 to prevent war with Hitler in the late 1930s as a warning, arguing for a parallel situation with the U.S. position relative to the Soviet Union . O pponents suggest ed some variation of rejecting the treaty as it currently existed, pre ferring options such as renegotiation, Senate modif ications, or outright rejection, due to c oncerns over the equal nature of the treaty, along with verification and other issues . The Carter White House sought during this period to answer the objections ra ised by neoconservative critics during Senate testimony, and to generate public support for the SALT treaty with the hope on dealing with gaining Senate support, which necessitate d dealing with the neocon objections. T he final Senate floor debate seemed likely to happen very soon for much of the year, and for both sides the treaty rem ained a very high priority . Two external events forced the President to withdraw the treaty from S enate consideration. T he incident of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba created problems for the Carter White House in terms of public support for anything requiring a degree of trust with the Soviets . T he subsequent invasion of Afghanistan built on the C uban situation, resulting in a major change for both sides approach to the treaty. T he urgency and priority slowed considerably, but did not eliminate the agreement from calculations . Carter and his staffers continued to plan for the reint roduction of the treaty, although they were less concerned about the specific objections of neocons and more about both avoiding a downward drag on U.S. policy due to possible harmful association with SALT , and damaging the probability of treaty passage wh enever it might be reintroduced. Opponents used SALT as more of an example of problems with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union than a specific issue in and of itself.
300 Arms control became as much a part of the indictment against those shaping U.S. policy as a specific concern. However, changes regarding the nature of importance did not shift the character of the debate. T he treaty remained something to resist and contest, and in that regard, the opposition considered regular denigration the means of ensuring the status quo of treaty defeat.
301 CHAPTER 13 CONCLUSION Although the SALT II treaty effectively died in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the debate over the agreement continued to impact American politics. Both the issue an d neocon influence affected the 1980 presidential election, particularly through the candidacy of Ronald Reagan. The convergence of opposition concerns and strategic arms status quo . nuclear arms, and membership in the CPD help explain not only his beliefs before and during the campaign against SALT, but also the route of entry for neoconservative influence in the Republican P arty. senses he was a neoconservative himself. Like them, he began his political life as a Democrat. Historian Matthew Dallek Democr 1 He retained this party affiliation until 1962, at which point he registered as a Repu blican. Reagan viewed the values of New Deal liberalism as helping people domestically and internationally, and he retained those priorities despite what he President disagreed with the Great Society, not the New Deal. In this regard, his political trajectory paralleled neocons like Kristol and Podhoretz, who also became dissatisfied with the Democratic Party and embraced a more critical stance toward 1 Matthew Dallek, American Politics , (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 29.
302 s progressiv e reform efforts in the pages of Commentary and The Public Interest . 2 Two elements moved Reagan from New Deal liberalism to conservatism by 1962: his exposure to communism in Hollywood, and his training as a spokesman for General Electric (GE) . After Worl d War II, he became the president of the Screen Reagan became convinced that communists were attempting to infiltrate ommunist threats on his life. Matthew Dallek beginning of the Red Scare led him to work the Bureau and testify before the House Un American Activities Committee (HUAC). O n the heels of his interaction with communism in Hollywood came the job with GE. Reagan spent eight years working as a celebrity spokesman and representative for the company , during which time Vice P resident Lemuel Boulware guided his reading and thinking . Thomas Evans, in his study on this period in the future President life, argues that efforts, shaped by Boulware, led Reagan in his shift from liberal to conservative. The result was the Ronald Reagan associated with the 1964 s peech at the Republican National Convention, which catapulted mansion and beyond. 3 2 Reagan , 60 62. See also Dallek, Right Moment , 29, and Thomas W. Evans, The Education of Ronald Reagan: The General Electric Years and the Untold Story of His Conversion to Conservatism , ( New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 4, 10. For Kristol and Podhoretz, see Drolet, American Neoconservatism, 32; VaÃ¯sse, Neoconservatism , 74, 76; Kristol, Neoconservatism , x; Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks , 286, 294, 306 308. 3 Evans, Education , 20 21; Dallek, Right Moment , 33 Reagan , 52 55, and Will Bunch, Tear Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and Haunts Our Future, (New York: The Free Press, 2009), 36 37.
303 by groups like the CPD concern ing foreign p olicy, including SALT. His change in political orientation and his strident anti communism matched theirs, and his status as a former conservative governor and presidential candidate made him a logical choice for membership in the Committee. While not a founding member, Reagan spent the four years before his presidency as part of the group. Journalist Robert Scheer, writing in 1982, reflected the conventional wisdom of the time that considered the CPD a marginal group that Reagan did not need to pursue h interviews certainly make clear the claim of CPD leaders that the new P resident w as one of their own , and suggests the group impacted the future Chief Executive before his run by supplying material for his radio broadcasts , in addition to meetings he held with Nit ze, Rostow, and others . 4 The radio scripts, published in book form as Reagan in His Own Hand in 2001, show his use of CPD materials and ideas in the matter of strategic arms. After his second term, the former governor began a series of syndicated radio commentaries on issues of the day, writing the scripts himself. The rough drafts of his broadcast scripts clearly established his views on communism, and a large number focu sed on foreign relations issues, including eleven devot ed to SALT II from November 1977 through October 1979. Reagan suggested the U.S. position agreed on at Vladivostok hurt the nation, raised the issue of difficulties with verification, expressed concerns about the Soviet military buildup, and mentioned Sen th the emerging SALT II treaty. His connections with the CPD emerged when he cited them by name 4 Letter from Ronald Reagan to the CPD, 11 /7/80, in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America , 329; Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War , (New York: Random House, 1982), 40 41, 43; Scheer devotes one chapter to the CPD, 36 52.
304 when using their poll data and analysis to explain the need to hold the Carter proves demonstrates that a searching national debate should be held and that the admin. should give the American people the unvarnished facts about the treaty what it will & will not do. This the 5 Reagan also devoted six broadcast s to a summation of a speech by Eugene Rostow, emphasizing his liberal status while highlighting their shared concerns about the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons. This extensive use of CPD work to speak to the audience he needed to capture to pave t he way to the White arguments, and hints at the extent of hi criticisms. 6 Once the official election effort began, neocons found themselv seat due to the comfortable fit between their views, particularly on foreign policy, and T he CPD played a major role in his presidential run , particularly as an information source for speeches , according to journalist Robert S cheer. Leaders of the group confirmed to him . coordinator during the campaign, was the main conduit for this 7 5 Reag an In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America, eds. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Touchstone ed., 2002), 90. All non standard modifications in o riginal. Reagan added a note to send his commentaries using the poll data to CPD Director Charles Tyroler. 6 Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, Reagan , xiv xv, 75 99. A copy of the Rostow speech can be found in the Jackson papers at 3560 6/25/38. 7 Schee r, With Enough Shovels Reagan , 82, consistent with CPD goals.
305 Throughout the campaign, Reagan called for a return to American superiority, rejection of SALT and dÃ©tente, and an approach based on strength and resolve. These concepts echoed CPD prescriptions over the previous four years. With the ele ctoral victory in Including the President , a total of sixty CPD members served in varying capacities, although forty nine of those positions were either in arms control o r foreign policy more generally. The two major Committee figures in the SALT II debate , Nitze and Rostow, became the directors of American strategic arms policy as Chief Negotiator and ACDA Director respectively. The CPD continued to function as an inter est group and exercise influence during the Reagan presidency, a situation acknowledged by both the administration and the Committee . Clearly, arms control, and foreign policy in general, provided neocons an entry in to the ranks of the Republican P arty. Any understanding of the subsequent role of neocons in GOP ranks, particularly during the George W. Bush presidency, must be framed in the context of their initial access to the party , which came during the Reagan years. 8 Adding to the understanding of how neoconservatives moved fr om frustrated Democrats to shapers of Republican policy is only one of the arguments presented in this study. A major claim is that foreign policy in the form of strategic arms control claimed the attention of neocons from the be ginning , and played a significant role in the 8 Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture in t he Reagan Years , (New York: The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies , eds. W. Elliot Brownlee and Hugh Davis Graham, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 86 90. See also Michael J. The American Elections of 1980 , ed. Aus tin Ranney, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981); Letter from the CPD to Reagan, 6/1/82, Letter from Reagan to the CPD, 7/12/82, Letter from the CPD to Reagan, 1/11/84, Letter from Reagan to the CPD, 2/16/84, a Alerting America , Tyroler, ed., 330 336.
306 during the seventies . The specific approach of Lyndon Johnson, engaging the Soviet Union to control nuclear weapons while maintaining U.S. integrity and superiority via peace through streng th, came to define neocon thinking on arms control. To the extent that U.S. policy deviated from that approach during the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, neoconservatives were compelled to take up the banner of the loyal o pposition . The root of SALT critiques lay in perceptions of communism and the Soviet Union. General concepts like dÃ©tente appeared to grant equality of status and a degree of trust at odds with previous American Cold War policy, and thus in the minds of neoconservatives presented a danger to the nation . Treaties and agreements negotiated from such a basis yielded unacceptable outcomes for the opposition. They believed that the United States would appear weak, and the Soviet Union would take adv antage o armor, to the determent of U.S. security and international reputation. The solution was to alert the public to the dangers inherent in U.S. arms control approaches and positions, with the hope of avoiding accords that made Americ a more vulnerable. Thus, neocons sounded the alarm about the implications of relative missile numbers and issues such as verification problems that SALT and SALT related agreements contained. Only by embracing strategic arms thinking that was wary of the nesty and motives, and abandoning any pretence of unilateral action could the United States arrive at arms control treaties that did not sacrifice American security and status in the name of nuclear stability and peace .
307 This study also ar gues that the neocons provided both leadership and intellectual ammunition for the opposition to SALT, particularly with regard to action at the federal level. Neoconservative individuals, such as Senator Jackson and Paul Nitze, proved influential through out the U.S. pursuit of arms control. They did not stand alone, as other neocons, particularly in print, voiced concerns about SALT. The high point of this opposition arose through the activities of b oth the Committee on the Present Danger and the Coalit ion for a Democratic Majority. Neocons led t hese organizations and shaped their arguments, proving to be the primary voice challenging governmental thinking about SALT II. While many organizations and individuals disagreed with U.S. arms control policy du ring this period, it was neoconservative s that from both the White House and the Senate. This is a critical concept because those non governmental voices most likely to influence presidential decision making and sena te voting are the actors regarded as important enough to reckon with by a presidential administration or senators. Both the CPD and CDM, along with key neocon leaders of both groups, met with presidents and administration staffers. It was neoconservative opposition thinking that dominated executive branch thinking as they sought to move the SALT negotiations forward, both with the Soviets and with the Senate. It was neoconservative s whose testimony primarily represented opposition concerns during Senate hearings, in addition to consultation with individual senators. In essence, neoconservatives led the opposition elements and shaped the arguments most likely to influence U.S. foreign relations on the issue of arms control during the SALT era.
308 Finally, th is study adds to the existing historiography on neoconservatives, arms control, and presidential decision making by expanding and clarifying the neocon role in SALT opposition. Each area contains scholarship that addresses portions of this , but those existing works are limited by space and time, leaving gaps that hinder a clearer understanding of the history of neoconservatives and their influence on the effort to limit strategic arms from the late sixties through the seventies. It is only by integrating and expanding on this previous scholarship that an accurate picture emerges of the neoconservative led opposition to U.S. arms control policy .
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323 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Roger Carey earned his BA degree fr om Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana, majoring in biology . H e also graduated with an MA degree in history from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, writing a thesis that rhetoric in public speeches to communic ate foreign policy ideas . A t the University of Florida he received his PhD in history in the summer of 2014, where his major area was U.S. history emphasizing U.S. foreig n relations with a departmental minor concentration in the history of science.