Assessing the Long-Term Effects of Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement

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Assessing the Long-Term Effects of Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement The Case of Nuevo Arenal, Costa Rica
Stocks, Gabriela
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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Academic communities ( jstor )
Agricultural land ( jstor )
Agriculture ( jstor )
Communities ( jstor )
Community structure ( jstor )
Dams ( jstor )
Online communities ( jstor )
Retirement communities ( jstor )
Social networking ( jstor )
Tourism ( jstor )
Anthropology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
costa -- dams -- displacement -- resettlement -- rica
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Anthropology thesis, Ph.D.


This research addresses the success of resettlement projects in the aftermath of major infrastructural development. Specifically, it examines the long-term outcomes of displacement and resettlement on the community of Nuevo Arenal, Costa Rica, which was relocated as a consequence of the construction of the Arenal Hydroelectric Project in 1977. Because resettlement creates long-term impacts, assessing the success of resettlement projects on the basis of information gathered only a few years post-resettlement is premature. The research presented in this dissertation addresses this problem by analyzing the long-term outcomes of resettlement in Nuevo Arenal in the 33 years after relocation. The central question of the study is whether the Arenal resettlement project can be deemed a long-term success, and to what extent long-term resettlement outcomes are a product of the resettlement project planning. This question was answered through a combination of life history interviews, survey data, personal and whole social network analysis, and participant observation. The results of this study indicate that the Arenal resettlement project can largely be considered a success. Post-resettlement processes of economic, material, and social recovery created the conditions necessary for future generations of resettlers and new immigrants to sustain their livelihoods in the new community. Arenalenos have achieved a standard of living on par with neighboring non-resettled communities, and the community has developed a viable local economy that is integrated into the broader political economic system. The success of the Arenal resettlement project can largely be attributed to the resettlement agency's efforts at pre-project planning and participatory resettlement, which helped it overcome many of the challenges to successful resettlement. The agency's progressive and holistic approach, particularly its attention to the affective dimensions of resettlement, created an environment that facilitated resettlers' own process of social and material reconstruction. Economic recovery, on the other hand, proved to be a significant challenge. Environmental barriers to agricultural production were not identified by the resettlement agency; these barriers were then exacerbated by economic and physical constraints. Economic solvency was eventually reached approximately 15 years after resettlement because of the influence of exogenous factors, namely the emergence of a residential tourism economy. ( en )
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2014.
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by Gabriela Stocks.

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AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST TheVirtuousTourist:Consumption,Development,and NongovernmentalGovernanceinaMozambicanVillage Jo ˜ aoAfonsoBaptista ABSTRACT Thisarticleisabouttheroleoftouristmoralagencyingoverning.TheafÞliationbetweenvacationing andgoverningisillustratedthroughtheexaminationofacasestudy:thevillageofCanhaneinMozambique.The maintouristicattributeofthevillageliesinresidents'performanceofasocietyinneed,seekingoutsidesolutions andguidance.VirtuoustourisminCanhaneistheeffectofacapitalistexpansioninwhichethics,community development,andgovernanceareconßatedwithtourists'consumption.SpeciÞcally,thecommodifyinglogicthat emergesfromthepresenceofvirtuoustouristsinthevillagederivesprimarilyfromthreesubjects:tourists'selfaspirations,residents'ambitiontointegrateintothebroadersocioeconomicorder,andthepoliticizationofvirtue stimulatedbythedevelopmentindustry.Ultimately,thisarticleshowshowthecultivationofethicsthroughtourism consumptionhasbecomeanallyfortheexerciseofnongovernmentalgovernanceoverpublicspheres.[ communitybasedtourism,ethicalconsumption,development,Mozambique,governmentality ] A lmosttwodecadesago,LesterSalamonwrote,"Weare inthemidstofaglobalÔassociationalrevolution'that mayprovetobeassigniÞcanttothelattertwentiethcentury astheriseofthenation-statewastothelatternineteenth" (1994:109).Tenyearslater,shortlyafterthetsunamihit thecoastlinesoftheIndianOceaninDecemberof2004, thepresidentofthenot-for-proÞtassociationPaciÞcAsia Travel,PeterdeYong,madeaglobalappeal:"Tourists,if youwanttohelpus,bookyourtripnow."AsheclariÞed later,"Themoneyyouspendand,importantly,thehearts youtouchwillmakeadifference." 1 Morerecently,inJanuary of2011,MohanMunasinghe,whosharedthe2007Nobel PeacePrizewiththeformerVicePresidentoftheUnited States,AlGore,introducedtheMillenniumConsumption GoalsattheUnitedNations.Theideawassimple:inthe faceoftheperilsthatconsumptionpresentedtosustainable livelihoods,insteadofviewingtheconsumersasaproblem, theywouldbeconvertedintothesolution. Whatsensecanwemakeofthissequence? Muchhasalreadybeensaidaboutconsumptionandconsumers.Foroveracentury,"humans-turned-consumers" (Bauman2007:101)havebeenvariouslydescribedbyacademicsandinpublicdiscourseaspassivedupes,dopes,or theheroesofeverydaylife.Theinßuentiallate-19th-century economistJ.A.Hobson,forexample,arguedthat"consumptionwasanagentofÔaestheticandmoraladvance'" AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol.114,No.4,pp.639–651,ISSN0002-7294,onlineISSN1548-1433. c 2012bytheAmericanAnthropological Association.Allrightsreserved.DOI:10.1111/j.1548-1433.2012.01515.x (Freeden1988:100).Inthesameepoch,theFrenchpoliticaleconomistCharlesGidereferredtoconsumersasa "reignoftruthandjustice"(Hilton2008:212).However, theperilsofconsumptionwereneverascentralastheyare today.Theglobaladventoftheideologyofsustainability andthecurrentglobalizedÞnancialcriseshaveanimated politicians,activists,andprofessionalsfromawidevariety ofbackgroundsandgeneratedaburgeoningÞeldofcriticismagainstconsumercapitalism.Hence,itwasnosurprise that"consumerism,"asRichardWilk(2001:249)observed, "becamethemajorthemeofacritiqueofmodernismin general." Apartfromthedebateoverthecharacterofconsumptionandconsumers,JohnStuartMill(2007)statedinthe 19thcenturythatthedesiretoconsumeisa"generalprinciple,"meaninguniversal,irreversible,andintrinsic.This statementremainsastruenowasitwasthen.Inevitably, thesametacticsthatthreatentheconsumersystemcanbe appropriatedand,inturn,reformulatedinawaythatbeneÞtsorevenreinforcesthesystem.Aclearexampleofthis occurswhen"buycotts"emergetoreversemovements,such asboycotts,designedtodisrupttheconsumersystem.In contrasttoaboycott,abuycottoccurswhenpeopleexplicitlyconsumeproductsorservicesinmoralsupportof certaincorporations,countries,orpolitics.Despitecounteractingoneanother,buycottsandboycottsshareastructural


640 AmericanAnthropologist  Vol.114,No.4  December2012 basis:bothusethemarketinanattempttoethicallyregulate society.Indoingso,theanonymousindividualattemptsto exercisesocialpower,notthroughvotesbut,rather,through consumerbehavior. Theremaybeanexistentialcost,however,forconsumerscollectivelyexercisingsocialpower.Consumption ofcommoditiesisbecomingthepurposeofhumanexistenceandthusamajordeterminantofbothidentitiesand self-cultivation,atleastinmostofthe"North"(e.g.,Barnettetal.2005;Bauman2007;Belk1988:139;Campbell2004:27;Miller1995:15;Russ2005:142).Thislineof thoughtleadstoareasonableandextensiveareaofinquiry. Whatcreatesmeaningsinconsumption?Further,whatdoes theconsumptionofthesemeaningsinducetheconsumerto be(come)? Inthisarticle,Iexploreanswerstothesequestionsby focusingonethicalconsumptionintourism.Moreprecisely, thisworkisananalysisofvirtuoustourisminthevillageof CanhaneinsouthernMozambique.Duringanthropological Þeldworkinthisvillage,Iencounteredanunusualsubject intourismresearchÑnamely,ethicaltourismconsumption legitimizingnewmodesofgovernancebynongovernmental agents.Accordingly,virtuoustourisminvestsdelocalized nongovernmentalentitieswiththepowertogovernand, thus,maybecomeacolonizingmechanismforconquering newterritoriesandpeoples,albeitmaskedbyaveneerof ethics.Canhaneatteststothisnewdevelopment.AsaÞnal clariÞcation,Iamnotconcernedherewithwhatthevirtuous touristsortheresidentsofCanhanemakebut,rather,what makesthem. Undertheumbrellaofglobalizingideasconcerning climatechange,a"commonfuture,"andsustainability,the integrationofethicsintoconsumptionhasbecomeincreasinglycentraltoconceptionsoflifestyleandsociety.Ethical consumptionandtheconsumptionofethicsareamatter ofidentityexpressionandself-cultivationbutalsoaway forindividualstoparticipateinnewgoverningrationalities thatconsidertheentireplanet.Inmethodologicalterms, theanalysisoftheapparatusbehindtheconstitutionof ethicalsubjectsandtheforcesdraggingthesesubjectsinto themarketprovidesusnotjustwithanswersaboutthe identitiesofethicalconsumersbutalsoinformationabout themechanismsofgoverningtherealitiesinwhichthe ethicalconsumersparticipate.Inotherwords,itelucidates thewaysinwhichconsumersexercisesocialvirtueÑsuch asspendingholidaysincommunity-basedenterprises inAfricaÑandtherealitiestheyintendtoÞxthrough consumption,speciÞcallythelocalsocietiestheyvisit.These eventsarepartofandleadtoanemerginggoverningorder. Inthisneworder,governanceisnotgainedandexercised throughcoercivepower,militaryintervention,ordemocraticelections;rather,itisthroughtheuseofanethicsthat sensitizesandthereforemobilizesconsumers.Asitwillbe shown,inthisnewgoverningorder,thedutiesoffunding, auditing,regulating,educating,monitoring,disciplining, conducting,anddevelopingsocialsubjects,particularlyin the"South,"areself-assignedtonongovernmentalagents. MobilizedvirtuoustouristsÞllthisrole. ThroughtheuseoftheMozambicanexample,myintentionisnottopresentanarchetypalcasebut,instead,toprovidecredibleandreliabletheoreticalreßectionsdrawnfrom oneempiricalcase.Forthesakeofthisjourney,Iexplorea particularsubjectandoneparticularpracticeinthesphere ofethicalconsumption:localcommunitiesinthe"South"as thesubjectofmoralconcernandvirtuoustourismasthe practicethroughwhichtheconsumerexercisesethicalduty and,inturn,participatesinnongovernmentalgovernance. Ultimately,thevirtuoustouriststhatemergefromthiswork areparticipativeagentsofnongovernmentalgovernanceand shareitsresponsibilities.Theyparticipateintheworldwide expansionofsuchagoverningorderbyconsumingindistant localitiesundertheaegisofparticularethics.Therefore, theyarenotpassive:theydothingswiththoseethics.As wewillsee,thevirtuoustouristsdemonstratehowconsumerscanbemorethanjustthesubjectofgovernancebut simultaneouslyparticipateasgoverningagentsintheirown right. INTRODUCINGTOURISM WhilelecturingforonesemesterattwouniversitiesinAngola,ImadeavisittothePeaceParksFoundationinStellenbosch,SouthAfrica.Iwasconsideringpossibilitiesfor myPh.D.proposalinsocialanthropology.AttheSouth Africanfoundation,Iwasintroducedto"aninterestingwinwincaseofcommunitydevelopmentandempowerment throughtourisminMozambique,"asIwastoldbythehead ofthedepartmentworkingwithruralpopulations(August 2,2006).Attheendofourmeeting,Iwasgivenafew essentialcontactsnecessarytoreceiveauthorizationtoresearchsuchawin-wincase.Thesecontactswereallpersons workingforthedelegationoftheSwissnongovernmentalorganization(NGO)HelvetasinMaputo,thecapitalof Mozambique. Onemonthlater,IwenttoMozambiquetomeetthe NGOstaff.Inshort,alltheinformationandauthorizationsI neededforstartingtheresearchinthevillagewereprovided duringthemeetingswithHelvetas.Allexceptone:"You mayalsohavetospeakwiththecommunityleader,but thatisjustamerematterofpoliteness,forthemnottobe offended."IwasevenaskedattheNGO'sofÞceifIwanted torentahut."Isn'tbettertoinquirethelocalauthorities aboutthat?"Isuggested."Ifyouprefer,"theMozambican headoftheprojectrepliedbeforeheclariÞedanotherissue, "butifyouwishtostayalsoattheCovaneLodge,closerto thetourists,speakÞrstwithusorwiththemanagerofthe lodge,notwiththecommunity"(September1,2006). AfteracceptanceofmyPh.D.proposal,Ireturnedto CanhanefortenmonthstoconductÞeldwork 2 ;toreturn IonlyneededpermissionfromtheNGOprofessionals.All theprotocolsrequiredfordevelopingtheresearchdealtwith internationalnongovernmentalinstitutionsandnotwithany ministryoftheMozambicangovernment.Suchrequirements


Baptista  TheVirtuousTourist 641indicatedsomethingthatbecameconspicuouslaterinmy research:theintroductionoftourismactivitythatmerges virtuositywithtourists'consumptionfosteredanewwayof governanceoverthelocalsociety. Tostateitclearlyfromthebeginning,virtuoustourism fomentedoutsiders'nongovernmentalgovernanceoverthe villageofCanhane. ThetourismprojectinCanhanecarriesotherlabelsthan "virtuoustourism."Suchaterm,however,isadoptedinthis articletomakeclearthemoralsignatureofthemodality oftourisminthevillage.OfÞcially,theresidentsaredevelopingacommunity-basedtourism,whichhasbeenwidely describedas"tourismventuresthatlocalcommunitygroups manageandoperatesothattheincomeearnedfromtourism directlybeneÞtscommunitymembers,reinforcestheirculturalidentity,andprovidesopportunitiesforsustainabledevelopment"(Gmelch2010:13).Althoughthemanagement andbeneÞtsareattributedtothe"communitymembers," thetourismenterpriseinCanhanewasaninitiativeofinternationaldevelopmentprofessionals. Thisallbeganinearly2001,whentheSwissdirectorofHelvetasinMaputoconsultedtheperiodicprint-run publicationoftheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)inNelspruit,SouthAfrica.Thejournal announcedtheawardingofgrantsforcommunitydevelopmentinthesoutheastregionofMozambique."Thecontent ofUSAID'sannouncementwasverygenericanditonly mentionedbroadlytheareaofimplementation,"oneofthe staffworkingforHelvetasconÞrmedforme(September1, 2006).TheNGOdidnotwaitlongafterapplyingtoreceive anafÞrmativeresponseandobtainedaninitial$50,000in fundingfromUSAID.Theideabehindthesuccessfulproposalwassimple:theNGOintendedtoestablishatourist lodgethatwouldhelpalocalcommunity.However,the areainwhichtheprojectwouldbeimplementedwasnotyet clear.Theexactlocationandtargetpopulationwerechosen onlyafterHelvetas'consultationsin2002. Iftheissuedidnotyetdeserveparticularconsideration,whenHelvetaspubliclydeclareditsinterestinÞnding aspaceforthelodge,thelocationbecamethesubjectof disputebetweentwovillages,CanhaneandCubo.Thismatterremainsasourceofconßicttoday,andIexperiencedit. "WheredoesCubobegin?"anelderinthevillageofCanhane askedtoreßectmyquestionbackatme."Payattention,"he continuedinaserioustone,"inthisdirectionthereisa baobabwhichmarksthelimitsofCanhane.Ifyouproceed fromtheretowardtheriver,afterawhileyou'llseealotof hedgesconcentratedinonespot.That'stheotherlimitof Canhane"(February27,2008).However,accordingtothe communityleaderoftheneighborhoodvillageofCubo,the baobabtreehementionedonlystartedtobeaborderreferenceafterHelvetasinformedCanhane'sresidentsaboutthe lodge."Ourlandsgofurtherthanthebaobab,"hesaidinan irritatedmood,"Canhaneonlystartsafterthepaththatgoes downtotheriver,whichisfarafterthebaobabthatthey indicate"(October17,2008).Inhisversion,thelodge's locationisthereforeonCubolands.Morethandisputing importantspacesforcollectiveidentity,thedesiretobeincludedinthetourismprojectÑtobe"helped"Ñunderlined thequarrelbetweenthetwohistoricallysubjugatedpopulations.Fortheresidentsofbothvillages,acartographyof hopewasbeingdrawn. However,inaworldinwhichitprofoundlymatterswhocontrolsthetermsofnegotiations(Erringtonand Gewertz2010:93),theinhabitants'emergingcampaignsfor landrecognitiondidnotplayadecisiverole.Theintroductionofanovelformofmoraltourismintheregion broughtlegitimacytothedecisionsofthenewdelocalized arbiters.Accordingly,inMarchof2003,theareaforthe lodge'simplementationwasformallyrecognizedbyHelvetastobeinthejurisdictionofCanhane(Helvetas2002), hometoaround650residents.Theregulatorycharacterof theinternationalNGOthroughoutthisprocessrepresentsa broaderthemethatisatthecoreofthisarticle:nongovernmentalagentsplayanincreasingroleinconstitutingsubjects accordingtohowpeoplemaketheirlives.But,aboveall, theescalationofnongovernmentalauthorityoverthelocal camefromtheintroductionofaspecialtypologyoftourism intotheregionÑamorallysuperiorformofvacationtravel thatcarriedthemissionaryßagofethicsandsustainable development.VirtuoustourismexpeditedthenongovernmentalizationofgovernanceoverCanhane. Inpractice,byintroducingnewspatiallimitsanddeÞnitions(e.g.,communityborders,community-basedtourism, development,empowerment),thenongovernmentalinstitutionisproducingnewspatialandsociologicalrealities. Thatistosay,theNGOwaseffectively"structur[ing]the possibleÞeldsofactionsofothers,"touseMichelFoucault's (1982:21)deÞnitionof governing .Helvetas'attributionof theareaofthelodgetoonevillageÑCanhaneÑdoes,indeed,structureandenablenewpossibilities,actions,and, ultimately,realities.ItenablestheresidentsofCanhane,in thesamewaythatitfailstoenabletheresidentsofCubo, toderiveincomefromtourism.ItenablesanewÞeldof ethicalagencyfortourists.Moreover,itenablesaÞeldof nongovernmentalregulationandopportunity,inparticularfortheconsultations,courses,workshops,andexpertise interventionthatfollowed. During2008,forexample,Iexperiencedaseriesofnine externallydrivencoursesforCanhane'sresidents,designed tofacilitate"communitycapacitybuilding,"astheirproponentscalledit.Thefundingforthesecourseswenttothe institutiondirectingtheirimplementation"ontheground," whichwastheMozambicanNGOLUPA.Atthebeginning of2008,thisorganizationtookchargeofallmonitoringof thetourismprojectbecauseHelvetasdecidedtocloseitsdelegationinMaputo.Thetransitionwasaninternalprocess, mainlybecausethefoundersofLUPAwerepartofthestaff workingforHelvetas-Maputo,whowerethenredeployed afteritscessation.Consequently,atleastupuntiltheendof Novemberof2008,mostoftheresidentsinCanhanedidnot knowaboutthepassageofleadershipbetweentheNGOs."Is


642 AmericanAnthropologist  Vol.114,No.4  December2012 thatso?"amanoverhisfortiescommentedafterImentioned it."StrangethatIneverheardaboutthat:maybeitisbecause itisnotimportant."Anothermanwhohadremainedquiet duringtheentireconversationraisedhisvoiceandsaid:"The communityleadermustknownothingaswell,otherwisewe allwouldknow.Maybehissonknows.Butthey[theprofessionalsfromHelvetasorLUPA]shouldcomehereand tellusthesethings,forusnottobediminished"(November 22,2008).Thus,ironicallyintheeraofglobalizingdemocracy,asconspicuouslyadvocatedindevelopmentdiscourses byNGOs,interventionssuchasthoseinCanhanerepresent theemergenceofnewmodesofregulatingsocietiesthrough unelectedagentsratherthanstrengtheningdemocratically electedinstitutionsandofÞcialsthatareatleastinsome formcontrolledbythepeople. Thelodgebuiltonthecontestedlandtookthename oftheÞrstcommunityleaderofCanhaneÑCovaneCommunityLodgeÑanditÞnallyopenedtotouristsinMayof 2004.Withtheconcretizationofthisproject,theinternationalNGOHelvetas,astheUnitedNationsWorldTourism Organization(WTO)madeclear,"wasapioneerintheintroductionofcommunity-basedtourisminMozambique." 3 Sincethen,thelodgeandCanhanehavebeenextensively cited,particularlyindevelopmentliterature,asan"importantnewmodelforcommunitydevelopment"(Norfolkand Tanner2007:16). However,thesenarrativesaboutCanhaneareinformed byabroadercontext.ThesigniÞcanceofthelocaltourism projectliesinthefactthatitwastheresultofaformofglobalizingpoliticsthatallocatesmoralstatustotransnational consumers.Canhaneatteststotheexpansionofsuchaform ofpoliticsfrom"thesocietyofconsumers"Ñakindofsocietythatinterpolatesitsmembersprimarilyintheircapacity asconsumers(Bauman2007:52)Ñontoruralsocietiesin the"South."TheintroductionofvirtuoustourisminCanhane,wheretourists'consumptioniscelebratedforhaving ahighermoralpurpose,servestofacilitatethisexpansionof consumerpolitics.Althoughitistheethicalumbrellathat sheltersthisactivity,virtuoustourismisalsoanenabling toolofmodernglobalization.Asaconsumerintendingto dogood,thevirtuoustouristisavehiclefortheinternationalexpansionandmoralizationofproductsasdisparate asholidays,coffee,airßights,pharmaceuticals,handicrafts, orevensoftdrinkslike,aswewillseelater,Coca-Cola. Throughvirtuoustourism,theseproductsareideologically transformedfromdestructivecapitalistchoicestobenign moralchoices. CONSUMINGFORGOOD Particularlysincethe1960s,theimpactofmodernconsumerism,globalization,andcapitalismonlocalcommunitieshascapturedpublicattentionandgenerallybeendeemed destructive.Asthematerializationofsuchideals,tourismbecametheembodimentofthedefectsofmostofthedeceptive industries(Crick1989:309).Theseinsightshaveledtocontemporarycallsfortheincorporationofglobalprinciplesof ethicsintothetourismsector,whichwasformallyexpressed inAgenda21andadoptedattheEarthSummitin1992.As describedinanarticleentitled"TheNon-GovernmentalOrder"inthenewsmagazine TheEconomist (1999),theoutcome ofthisconferencerepresented"thebeginningofaseriesof victoriesbyNGOs."Sincethismoment,anewdomainof inßuencethatascribesmoralvaluetoconsumptionhasbeen incorporatedintotourism.Thissignaledthebeginningofa newerawhere"tourismisnolongeradirtyword"(Tourism Concern2009:7),andvirtuoustourismemerged. ThetourismprojectintheMozambicanvillageofCanhaneisaproductofthesetransnationalevents.Therefore, weshouldbearinmindthatwhatmakestourisminCanhane, andallotherethicalformsoftourisminthe"South,"aÞeld ofmoralagencyisundoubtedlytourists'consumption.In concreteterms,therevenuesgeneratedthroughconsumptionintheCovaneCommunityLodgearewhatmakethe tourists'presenceinCanhaneintimatelybondedtocommunitydevelopmentand,thus,morallyworthy.Insucha view,notonlyistourisminthevillagesaidtohelpthose mostinneed,butitalsoallowstouriststobecomebetter individuals.Itgivesthemaroleinformedbyvirtue:that is,theresponsibilityofimprovingthelivesofotherswhile spendingonholidaystoredresseconomicinequalities. Imustclarify,though,thatsometouristsstayingatCanhanedonotÞtthismodel.Oneexplained,"Wecameby accident.Itwaslateandthekidsneededabedtosleepin, soIturnedwhenIsawthesign(pointingatthedirectionof thelodge)ontheroad"(February13,2008).Thisfamily, forinstance,wasfromSouthAfricaandhadnointerestin Canhanebeyond"abedtosleepin."Nonetheless,theyrepresentaminority.MostofthetouristsImetatthevillage, particularlytheNorthAmericansandEuropeans,hadchosentospendtheirholidaysattheCovaneLodgeasaway toengageinaconceptionofethicaldutyleadingtoward idealizedcommunitydevelopment.Theyarethevirtuous tourists.Takethefollowingexample. ItwasoneofthehottestdaysIexperiencedinMozambique."Todayburns,"saidanelderofCanhane.AMozambicanfromthecityofMaputopassedbythevillagethatday. HeworkedforLimpopoNationalParkintheConservation Department.Hemetme,togetherwithtworesidents,in theshadowofthebiggesttreeinCanhane.Atonepointhe said,"Todayisimpossible,anditiscatastrophicnothaving anythingcoldtodrinkcloseby."Hehadarrivedbycar, soIinformedhimoftheCovaneLodge,whichwasseven kilometersfromthere."Iknowaboutthat,"hesaid,"but it'simmoralthepricestheychargeinthelodge.Ican't acceptthattheychargeinaone-starplacethesamefora beerasinachicrestaurantinMaputo."Despitehiscomplaints,weendedupgoingtothelodgewherewemeta touristwhowasintherestaurantdrinkingaCoca-Cola.The subjectofdrinkpricescameup,onceagaininitiatedbythe Mozambicanwhoreturnedtotheexpression"immoral"to classifythem.However,thistimeheencounteredacounterargument:"Immoral?"thetouristexclaimed,raisinghis


Baptista  TheVirtuousTourist 643eyebrowsathim,"Tothecontrary!Idon'tmindpayingmore ifthatmoneyisforcommunitydevelopment.Immoralisto paythispriceinarestaurantinMaputo,buthereitismoral" (September26,2008).Justafterhesaidthis,hegrabbedthe Coca-Cola,putthebottletohismouth,closedhiseyes,and swallowedtherestoftheliquid.Heingestedmorethanjust theliquid:heÞlledhimselfupwithmorality. "Signvalue"isanimportantcomponentofcommodities producedinthepostmoderneconomy.Itprovidesconsumerswithsymbolicresourcestheycanusetoconstruct, change,andreinforceidentitarianissues,asprojectsfortheir selves.Inthisview,"whatisbeingsold[andconsumed]is notjustthedirectuseofacommodity,butitssymbolicsigniÞcanceasaparticularingredientofacohesivelifestyle" (WatsonandKopachevsky1994:656).Thisiswhy,undertheeffectsofthepoliticsofbenevolencethatanimates theconstitutionofknowledgesinandaboutAfrica(Ferguson2006;Mbembe2001),agloballyubiquitousproduct likeCoca-ColaÑoftenacknowledgedforitsimperialistattributes(e.g.,see CulturalAnthropology 22[4])Ñisloaded withthecharacterofamoralcommodityatthelodgein Canhane:asthetouristsaid,hereit"isforcommunity development." TheCoca-Colaepisodeinformsthenewfaceoftourism inthe"South."Inparticular,theideaofcommunity-based tourismisaccompaniedbymoralisticassertionsthatattest tothereplacementofalanguageoffun,relaxation,and hedonismwithalanguageofvirtuosityandmoralduty.This languagetransitionintourisminformsthespeciÞcityofa marketÐamarketinwhichtheethicalpreÞx"communitybased"allowsthetourismindustrytoimproveitsownimage; amarketwhoseproductsarenotjustanykindbutspeciÞcally moralones;amarketthatintegratesthe"problemsofthe South"(Escobar1984)astheattractiveproductthatneedsto beresolvedthroughtourists'consumptionandaid;amarket directedatthecultivationofconsumerselves;amarket thatultimatelyrestsonapoliticsofrighteousnessbasedin consumption. Fundamentally,theCoca-Colaexample,alongwith manyotherconsumptionpracticesattheCovaneLodge, isanexpressionofcare,guidance,andresponsibility.The touristusedhispurchasingpowertomanifestvirtuosity withinanidealizedconceptionofhowtoacttowardthe goodofthelocalsociety.Canhaneis,indeed,asitestimulatedbyanidealandbythereproductionoftheethicsofthat ideal:virtuoustourismisnotjustaboutpurchasingduring vacationsbutalsoabouttheconsumptionoftheidealthat supportsandanimatestheseactsofconsumption.Through thisprocess,thetourist-purchasernotonlyacquiresandfortiÞeshisorhermoralselfbutalsoengagesinadevelopmental roleinthesocietywheresheorhestays.Forexample,in additiontoconsciousspendingattheCovaneLodge,tourists oftenmakedonationsinaboxatthereception.AsIwitnessedmanytimes,justbeforeorduringtheplacementof moneyinthebox,thetourist-donors(Baptista2011)stated wherethatmoneyshouldbeapplied:"thisisforthewatersupply"(September9,2006);"fortheschool"(October 15,2008);"foryoutobuyT-shirtsforthefootballteam" (September23,2008),amongmanyotherexamples.Similarly,intheguestbook,touristsrecordedtheiropinions aboutthelodge,thevillage,theresidents,and,mostimportantly,aboutwhatshouldbedoneforthebettermentofthe population. InCanhane,thevirtuoustouristsaremorethansimplytourists.Theairofvirtuethatßoatsovertheirbodies stimulatesinthemagoverningroleoverthelocalandits people."Youmustsavemoneytobuysolarpanelsbecause theyallowyoutohaveenergy,andthenyoucanÞshmore, havemilkforthechildrenandmeatfortheadultsbecause youcanhaveafridgethatconservethealiments,"anItalian touristwhowasworkinginMaputotoldagroupofwomen atCanhane.Theywerepillingcornwhenhearrived.The womensmiledathim.Attheendoftheencounter,hesaid inafriendlybutalsodidactictone,"Ihopeyouhavetaken meseriouslyandmemorizedwhatIsaid,becausethisisfor yourowngood.I'llcomeherenextyeartoseeyouagain," andheblinkedaneyeatthem(September29,2008). Whatroledoesthevillagepopulationplayinempoweringtourists?“GOANDGAINMOREFROMOURVILLAGE”WhentouristsarriveatthereceptiondeskoftheCovane CommunityLodge,theyinevitablyencountertwophrases thatareprominentlypostedonthewallclosesttothe balcony:Yourpresencecontributestotheimprovementofthelivelihoods ofthepopulationofthevillageofCanhane.Kanimamboalot!Kanimambo means thanks inShangane,thelanguagespoken intheregion.Thegreetingispostedwiththumbtacksover amatofstrawonthewall.Itsmodestoutwardaspectis coherentwithitscontent.Theasymmetriesbetween"hosts andguests"(Smith1989),AfricaandtheRestareannounced. Implicitly,thevillageispresentedastheembodimentof necessitousness,whiletouristsareendorsedasagentsof improvement.Who,itseemsreasonabletoinquire,arethe authorsofthiswelcome? Answeringthisisnotaseasyasitmightsound.Iquestionedtheresidents,themanagerandsubmanagerofthe lodge,andthestaffoftheHelvetasandLUPANGOsabout themessage'sauthorship.Therewasnoagreement.Inthe Þrstplace,theNGOs'staffdecentralizedtheauthorship.The headofLUPAsaid,"Weandthecommunityhavedecided onthat"(September17,2008).However,theCanhaners mentionedthecommunityleaderorthegeneralpopulationofthevillageastheauthorsofthetext.Afterall,one ofthevirtuesofthetourismenterpriseisthat,onpaper, itiscommunitybased,whichmeansitismanaged,controlled,andproducedbythemembersof"thecommunity." DespitetheCanhaners'assertion,evidencegatheredduring myÞeldworkindicatesthattheresidents'answerswereinsteadarhetoricalperformancesupportingandjustifyingthe


644 AmericanAnthropologist  Vol.114,No.4  December2012community-basedideologyand,thus,thevirtuousauraof thetourismproject. Putsimply,Canhanersdidnotwriteoridealizethisor anyothertextinthelodge;instead,theyauthorizedthem. Justliketheentiretourismproject,theyparticipatedinthe processbyapprovingwhattheyweretoldbyHelvetasand LUPA,notbycreatingwhatwastobeshownordone. Yetwhentheyclaimedforthemselves,orfortheÞgure ofthecommunityleader,theauthorshipofthetext,they wereparticipatinginthereproductionofarealitythatveriÞesthetourists'presence,spending,andmoralagency.In otherwords,Canhanersauthenticatethecommunity-based characteroftheprojectbyperformingstakeholdernessin thesamewaytheyembodysimplicity,commitment,purity, andneed.Subordinationhereworksnotthroughdominationbutbyconsent.Takethefollowingtext,alsodisplayed atthereceptionandinthebookletsplacedinthechalets,as anotherexample:Thewomanwakesupat5.00amandgoestofetchwaterin aborehole.AfterthatshegoestotheÞeld.At10.00amshe comesbackhomecarryingÞrewoodforcookingandtocleanthe house.Intheafternoon,ifisrainseasonshegoesbacktotheÞeld toremovethegrass.Thehusbandandthechildrenwakeupat 6.00am. ThemannormallygoestotheÞeldtohelpthewifeorhecangoto carryÞrewood,Þshingandhousemaintenance.Intheafternoon themancanrepairsomesmallthingsinthehouseandvisitfriends. Thechildrengotoschoolfrom7.30Ð12.00.Intheafternoon theyhelptheparentswithdomesticjobs. Themantakesthefamilydecisions.ButÞrst,consultingthewife particularlyrelatedwiththemarriageofthekids,schooleducation andallocationofland. Goandgainmorefromourvillage.Staywell ...Thistextfosterstheideathattheeverydaylifeofthe villageispartofwhatisofferedtotourists.Itreproducesa harmonizedimageofthesocialstructureofCanhane.The inhabitantsareorganizedintoavisionofhomogeneity,selfcontainedinanexpectedunitforthetouristsand,therefore, tractable.Thestereotypingofthevillageanditsmembers reinforcesthevisitors'imaginedsenseoftheeconomicasymmetrybetweenthemandtheresidents,whichconsequently validatesthetourists'aspirationsinassistingthelocalpopulation.However,perhapsmoreimportantly,thistextshows thecentralroleoftheinterrelationshipbetweenthetourists andtheresidentsinthetourismprogram:"Goandgainmore fromourvillage."Amongotherthings,thetextindicatesthe importancetheresidents'conducthasinthetourismexperience.Tothatend,theactionsoftheresidentsofCanhaneare essentialininforming,ifnotconÞrming,thetourists'role incommunitydevelopment.Todemonstratethisbetter,let megobacktoSeptemberof2006andrelatethestoryofthe water-supplyendeavorinCanhane. AbouttwoyearsafterCovaneLodgeopenedtotourists, Canhanersstarteddiggingalongditchandburyingßexible plasticpipestobeusedtoprovidewaterforthevillage.The constructionmaterialsweremanifestlyexposedthroughout whatmightbecalled(inßuencedbyErvingGoffman's[1959] work)the"communityfront"ofCanhane,asiftheywere partofthetouristexperienceitself.Thelodge'struck,which isusedtotransfertourists,wasalsooftenbusytransporting theCanhanersortheequipmentrelatedtothewater-supply work.Thus,wheneverthetouristsrequestedtousethe truck,theywereincludedintheprocessofcommunity developmentbyexperiencingandtestifyingtothework operation.Infact,thetouristscouldnothaveexperienced thelodgeandCanhanewithoutsupervisingtheresidents' efforts.ItwasamuseumizationofworkÑacommunity "workdisplay"(MacCannell1999:36). Thecostsofthewater-supplyinitiativewerecovered bytheproÞtsfromthelodge.Thatistosay,themoney generatedthroughtourists'consumptioninthelodgewas thenusedbytheresidentstowardtheirsocialbetterment. Thetouristscouldthenseeandexperienceforthemselves thecommitmentoftheCanhanersÑwhichwaspowerfully aestheticizedÑtotheproperallocationofthatmoneyand, inturn,justifytheirowncontribution.Hence,Canhanewas constitutedasacomprehensivedramaticlandscapeinwhich thedutytoreducelocalpovertyandimprovesocialconditionswasimplicitlytransferredfromthetraditionalmechanismsofgovernance,suchasthestate,toaspecialconsumer andnongovernmentalcategory:thevirtuoustourist. "Tourismisgood,"thecommunityleadertoldmeashe ledmetoapileofblacktubesforthewatersupplyexposed acrosshishut.Thiscommentßowedfromourprevious conversationaltopic;Ihadaskedhimaboutthewater-supply effortswithoutapproachingthetopicoftourism.Itwashis initiativetolinkbothsubjects.WhileIwaslookingatthe tubes,anothermanwhoaccompanieduscommentedina mildmanner,"Wewanttouriststoseeusbecausetheyhelp usandadviseuswhattodo:theyaregood"(September11, 2006). Canhanersweremuchmorethanjustthesubjectofa touristgaze(Urry2002).Theyparticipatedinthereproductionofarealitythatbothatteststoandcallsforthe determinantroleoftouristsintransforming,directing,and monitoringthelocalsociety.InFebruaryof2008,forexample,whenIwashavingaconversationwitharesident closetoatrailinCanhane,afour-wheelvehicletransportingtwotouristspassedbyusathighspeed.Theinelegance oftheirpassingcaughtourattention.Afterthecloudof dustthatimmersedushadvanished,thewomencloseto mecommented:"Theymaybecomingheretovisitthe community."Iaskedherwhy.Shepromptlyexplained,"Becausethetouristswanttoseewhatwearedoingwiththeir money"(February16,2008).Herreplyannunciatedwhat becameobvioustomeduringthenextmonthsofresearch: residentsestablishedintheirconsciousnessthevalueforthe virtuoustourists,thevalueofbeingaccessible,audited,and, ultimately,governablebythem. IntheMozambicanvillage,astheresidentrevealed,the processofauditingthelocalsocietyisassignednottogovernmentministries,experts,orstateagentsofanysortbutto


Baptista  TheVirtuousTourist 645 thedomainofanichemarketactivityÑnamelytothevirtuoustourists.TheyarerepresentedbytheCanhanersthrough therationalities,activities,duties,andresponsibilitiescommonlyattributedtothosedeterminingtheappropriate"conductofconduct,"touseFoucault's(2008)otherdeÞnition oftheartofgoverning.Fundamentally,theresidents'representationoftouristsshowshowtheimplementationof virtuoustourisminCanhaneintroducedthelocalpopulationtonewmodelsofleadershiprunbyexternalagentsand adisciplinarysetofethicscomingfromelsewhere. Toreturntothewater-supplyendeavor,theCanhaners' commitmentandtheaccompanimentoftheirworkwereat theheartofwhatwasbeingsold:itwasacommodiÞed simulationofauthenticityinwhichnotonlywastourists' consumptionmoralizedbuttheprocessesofauditingand participatingindevelopingthelocal(s)wereimplicitlycommodiÞedaswell.Amongotheraspects,thisisevidenced bythefactthattheapplicationoftourismrevenuestothe improvementofthelocalpopulationwasannouncedasa productatthelodge'sreception. [Tourismrevenues] Usedfor:  Constructionofoneconventionalschoolroominthevillage ofCanhane  ConstructionofawatersupplysysteminthevillageofCanhane(ongoing)  Acquisitionofimprovedbeehivesfor12villagers  CreationofaSavingsFundfortheCovaneLodge Theabovetextwaspositionedalongsidetheothertourist productsofferedatthelodge. 4 Itsexplicitalignmentwithin therecognizabletouristofferingsconÞrmstouristconsumptionasdevelopmental,purposeful,andinßuential.This consumptionmodelanditsendorsementbythetourists seemtobeindirectcontradictionwithexclusionaryvisionsoftourismas"conspicuousconsumptioninfront ofthedeprived"(Crick1989:317)orwithconsumersas merelytheembodimentof"personalentitlement[rather] thanacommitmenttosociety'scollectivewell-being"(Cohen2003:387).Onthecontrary,inCanhanetheincorporationofsocialvirtueandlegitimacyformentoringlocal developmentareacquiredpreciselythroughconsumption. Consumeristbehavioristheparamountmarkerofvirtuosity,whichsubsequentlyqualiÞesthetouriststoperform rulership.Virtuoustourismis,therefore,wrappedinthe ideathatitisformorethansimpleenjoyment,relaxation, andentertainment.ItistheÞeldofethicalresponsibilityin whichthosewhohavemoreguideandtendtothosewho haveless. Inowsealthewater-supplycaseinCanhanewithaÞnaland,perhaps,blunt,remark:theimplementationofthe watersupplysponsoredbythetouristswasneveraccomplished.Afterthewatertankthatwouldsupplywatertothe villagewasmadeoperational,itwasneglectedbytheresidents.Notably,thedramaturgicalexperienceperformedby hostsandguestsonthewater-supplyendeavorgiveshints foransweringJohnUrry'squestionof"whetheritisinfact possibletoconstructapostmoderntouristsitearoundabsolutelyanyobject"(2002:92).Indeed,thenonoperational watertankhasnotonlybecomeatouristsightinCanhane butthemostvisitedspotbytourists.Idescribedthedetailsofthisapparentlyparadoxicalstoryelsewhere(Baptista 2010). NEOLIBERALISMANDTHE NONGOVERNMENTALIZATIONOFGOVERNANCE Theperformancesofcommunity-basedentrepreneurialism andcommunitydevelopmentbytheCanhanersdomore thanjustenactmoralsubjectsforthetourists:theyauthenticatetourists'virtuositybymakingtheiroptionofconsuming vacationsinCanhaneanattributeofgoodgovernanceinthe "South."Fundamentally,touristsareprovidedwithalocal realitycapableofbeingimprovedbyconsumptionandthereforegovernablebythemastheconsumers:"Weareinyour hands,"oneschoolteachersaidtoacoupleoftouristswhen showingthemaclassroom.Shortlyafterthiscomment,aresidentcomplementedwhattheteacherhadsaid.Hepointed toa canhoeiro (marulatree)andrevealedtothetourists, "Before,childrenusedtoattendclassesunderthatbigtraditionaltree."Heallowedthemafewsecondstoimaginethat situation.Thenheconcludedbypointingtoasigninscribed attheentranceofanotherclassroombehindthem,"but nowwehavethis."ThesignsaysinPortuguese,"Primary SchoolofCanhane.Enlargementoftheclassroom.ContributionoftheCovaneLodgeandofthecommunity.2005." Thesignagereemphasizesthecausalrelationshipbetween virtuoustourismandcommunitydevelopment.Bybeing shownthesign,thevisitorswerepresentedwithprogress inCanhane,aprogressthatwasconÞrmedtothemasexplicitlybondedwiththeirvirtuousspendingattheCovane Lodge. Moreimportantly,Ithink,theconstructionoftheclassroomwiththerevenuesfromthelodgewasinlinewith virtuoustourists'wishes."Asyouhavebeentellingus,"the residentsaidlookingatthem,"theeducationofourchildren isapriority"(January1,2008).Hiscomment,however, couldhavenotbeeninmorecontradictionwithwhatadifferentteachersaidonanotheroccasion:"Theworstbattle Ihaveeverymorningsistobringthechildrentoschool, becausetheirparentswantthemrathertohelpathome, grazingcattle,orinfarming"(January29,2008).Theconstructionoftheclassroomwas,indeed,moreinlinewith visitors'ethicsthanwithresidents'aspirations.Although theyshareitasavalueinthepresenceoftourists,Canhaners relegatesuchmaterializationof"communitydevelopment" toaminormatterthroughtheirdailypractices. Onecouldsaythatthepresentationofmoraleveryday lifetovirtuoustouristsinCanhaneispartoftheemergenceoftransnationalformsofgoverningresultingfrom theincreasingroleofconsumerswhoareself-consciousof theirresponsibilitiesforsocialimprovement.Theconsumptionoffair-tradeproducts,ethicalbanking,andholidaysin community-basedschemesareexamplesofexplicitchoices


646 AmericanAnthropologist  Vol.114,No.4  December2012basedonconsumers'considerationsofjusticeandethics. However,thesechoicesultimatelyreßectalatentnormativecontextthat(in)formssubjectivities.Moredirectly,at thesametimeasvirtuoustouristsparticipateinnongovernmentalgovernanceinCanhane,theyarealsogovernedby abroaderpoliticsofsubject-formation,whichinducestheir self-aspirations. Ononeoccasion,forexample,aPortuguesewoman whostayedtwonightsattheCovaneLodgetoldme,"The tourismagencyinMaputodidn'twantmehere.Theysaid, ÔYouwon'thaveniceconditions,it'sapoorplace,they don'thaveelectricity,andblah,blah,blah.'"Shemadeher disapprovalevidentbyreproducingtheadviceshewastold intheagencyinaloud,hightone."Myanswertothemwas," shecontinuedwhileswitchingtoacalmandslowermode, "Ôit'spreciselybecauseofthatIwanttogo.'Ihadtoprove tothemI'mnotatypicaltourist."Accordingly,despitethe effortsofthetravelagent,shekeptanddefendedherchoice; shethusmanifestedheridealizedtouriststatus,contrasting withwhatshecalledthe"typicaltourist."Thebasisforthis choiceemergedlaterinourconversation,asshesaidabout theroleoftheLUPANGOinCanhane:"Ihadheardabout them[theNGO],theirwork,theirvision.Iwanttohelpthe communitytoo,andthengetbacktoPortugalfeelinggood withmyself"(October6,2008). Asmanifestedbymanyothertouristsinvariousways, theirdesirefor"help[ing]thecommunitytoo"isrelatedtoa Þnalsubject:theirselves.WhatthismeansisthatconsumptionbyvirtuoustouristsinCanhaneisemotionallylinked withasenseofethicsandpossibility,inparticularforlocaldevelopmentbutalsoforself-realization;this,Nikolas Roseargued,isemblematicoftheeraofadvancedneoliberalgovernmentalityinwhich"governingthroughsociety" hasshifted"togoverningthroughindividuals'capacitiesfor self-realization"(Barnettetal.2008:626).ZygmuntBaumansaid,"Thesecretofeverydurablesocial[and,Iwould add,governing]system ... ismakingindividualswishto dowhatisneededtoenablethesystemtoreproduceitself" (2007:68).Ifweagreewiththeseargumentsandaddtothem ColinCampbell'sideathat"individualsconsumeprincipally outofadesiretoengageincreativeactsofself-expression" (2005:24),wethenarriveatanunavoidableconclusion: governancecanbeexercisedthroughthecirculationofincentivestructuresinducingconsumers'self-aspirations.The ethicofvirtuoustourisminCanhaneisaproductofsuch structures.Theexerciseofforeigngovernanceoverthevillageiscloakedinmoralsensitizationtowardtheneedypopulationandtourists'self-realization.InCanhane,touristscan expandthemoralsigniÞcanceoftheirlivesbyconsumingfor goodwhiletheactofgoverningtheOtherdissolvesintothe activityofvirtuoustourism. Withtheconceptofgovernmentality,Foucault(2008) emphasizedthewaysinwhichsubjectscouldbemadeto internalizegovernancethroughself-regulation.Hestressed, forexample,thetechnologiesoftheself,leading"individualstoeffect,bytheirownmeans,acertainnumberof operationsontheirownbodies,ontheirsouls,ontheir selves"(1993:203).SpeciÞcally,oneofthemainpointsof thisarticleistoshowthatthemoraldutiesexercisedbythe virtuoustouristsinCanhane,whichleadtothecultivationof theirmoralselves,occurundertheauspicesofaneoliberal regimemaskedbyasetofethics.Assuch,neoliberalgovernmentalityintheMozambicanvillageinvolvesaprocess wherebythevirtuoustouristsco-exercisegovernanceover thelocalOtherwhiletheyarethemselvesunderasubtle regimethatinßuencestheirownconduct.Inotherwords, thevirtuoustouristsarebothagentsofandsubjectedtoa governingorder. Contrarytowhatneoliberaleconomistsclaim,Foucault(2008)explained,neoliberalismshouldnotbeidentiÞedwithlaissez-fairebut,rather,withvigilanceand intervention.Itinvolvessystematicformsofcontrol exercisedoverandbyindividualsmostlythroughinducement.Neoliberalgovernmentalityauthorizesexternal incentivestructuresÑthatis,structuresbeyondthestate, beyondthe"generalapparatus( dispositif )ofgovernmentality"(Foucault2008:70)Ñtomotivatedesiresand,by extension,manipulatetheconductofself-interestedindividualsthroughincentivesandideals.Inthisview,conventionalformsofgovernancehavebeenreplacedbystimulation (Bourdieu1990)and"sensibilization."RobertFletcherexempliÞedthiswhenstatingthat,withinaneoliberalgoverningframework,nongovernmental"conservationistswould simplyendeavortoprovideincentivessufÞcienttomotivateindividualstochoosetobehaveinconservation-friendly ways"(2010:176).JimIgoealsosignaledthat,"withoutresorttoauthorityorcompulsion,"thesuccessofnongovernmentalconservationcampaigns"dependsontheirseductive allure ... withouttheinconvenienceoflong-termcommitment"(2010:384).Theyinspirepassionandinduceethical agencymostlyinWesternconsumersconcernedaboutenvironmentalproblems.Theoutcomeistheemergenceof amoral"we"composedofconsumerswhoconsequently becomeparticipantsinregulatingsocieties. Followingthisperspective,thestructureoffeelingofthe tourismprojectinCanhaneisdrivenbyasetofmoralincentivesaswellasbytourists'self-aspirations.Whatthismeans isthatthelocalvirtuoustourismisnotunilateral.Rather,it isameaningfulsettingthattouristsconsumebutthatthey alsohelptoproduce.ThevillageofCanhaneexempliÞesa broadermodernparadigmbyshowingthewayinwhich, asDonTapscottandAnthonyWilliamsobserved,"thegap betweenproducersandconsumersisblurring"(Humphreys andGrayson2008:2).Tourist-consumersareconsidered hereasactiveparticipantsintheproductionofwhatthey consumeÑaprocesscommonlycalled"prosumption"(e.g., HumphreysandGrayson2008).Alongtheselines,consumptionofmeaningfultourismexperiencesinCanhane requiresvirtuoustourists'endeavors.Curiously,thisresonateswiththedirectlinguisticrelationbetween"traveler" andtheFrenchword travailleur ,whichmeansworker.The touristsofvirtuoustourismtravailtothesocialsettingthat


Baptista  TheVirtuousTourist 647theyvisit.Assuch,thetourism"prosumers"inCanhanedo morethancollect:theyprovideinaccordancewithamoral frameworkÑ"Theyhelpus,"touseacommonCanhaners' expressionÑand,subsequently,theyrule. Tobeeffective,however,ethicalprosumptioninCanhanerequiresthetouriststodrawonparticularcultural formsandidealsforwhatconstitutesagoodsociety.Virtuoustourists'agencyÞtsintoamodelofethicsandan empoweringprocessthatmakesthepromotionofapolitics ofpotentialitiesitsmainattribute.Indeed,community-based tourismisgenerallypresentedasprovidingarangeofnew possibilitiesforsolving"theproblems"thatotherwaysof governancehavenotsolved.Itrepresentsanewbelief,a newbeginning,anewhope,anewapproachforafuture betterthanthepresentandthepast. AfterseveralmonthsatCanhane,Iwasoftentoldbythe residentsoftheirdisregardforthepostcolonialMozambican government.Inaninformalgathering,aneldersaid,"We werepromisedalotwiththeindependenceofthecountry butnothinghappened."Hewasimmediatelycorrectedby another,"No,no,no,letsspeakthetruth,andthetruthis thatwewonfreedomfromthebignoses[thePortuguese]. Thiswasgood.Theproblemiswecontinuedpoorandwith morediseases."Intheheartofthediscussion,anewsubject emergedasifitwaspartofthesamesequence."Well, wehavethetouristsnow,"thedriverofthelodge'struck said,"andtheycanbeourwayoutoftheholewearein" (November2,2008). Takenfromawiderperspective,theopeningofAfrican villagestointernationalconsumersundertheaegisofvirtuoustourism,asinCanhane,representsanovelty.Thisisthe corollarytothepressingnecessitytoreplaceandthehostilitytorepetitionthatcharacterizetheconsumeristera.The moralityimplicitinthelocalcommunity-basedenterpriseis, indeed,atrumpinacontinuallyexpandingmarketsociety. Canhaners,ontheotherside,takethisasanopportunityto positionthemselveswithinaglobalsocioculturalorderthat valuesthemforneedingguidancefromothers,thevirtuous tourists.Throughthisprocess,theresidentsofthevillage hopeforrevenues,accesstodevelopment,andaconnection tomodernsociety. Nevertheless,thevirtuosityinducingtouristagencyin Canhanecannotbeinterpretedapartfromthebroaderproductiveforcesthatgenerateit.Moreconcretely,whatI haveinmindhereisoneofFoucault's(2008)mostsound ideas:powerandgovernanceareexercisednotonlythrough therestrictionofactionsbutalsopositivelybyinducing actionsÑthatistosay,notthroughinhibitionbut,instead, throughenabling. WhataretheguidingforcesinformingtheethicsofconsumptioninCanhaneand,thus,inducingvirtuoustourists' agency?ONETHICALDUTIESSystemsofconsumptioninevitablygeneratequestionsabout howsocietyshouldbe,astheyareanessentialcomponent ofsocialpracticesandofrelationshipsbetweenselvesand others.Consumption"alwaysandinevitablyraisesissuesof fairness,selfvs.groupinterests"(Wilk2001:246)andis thusaninherentlymoralmatter(Barnettetal.2005:26).At present,asglobalcritiquesofthedisparitiesbetween"northern"abundanceand"southern"scarcitybecomeentrenched inpopulardiscourses,consumersarethrownintothecoreof ethicalandunethicalprocesses.Consequently,doinggood orsimplynotcaringfortheOthercametobeinformed byconsumptionchoices;thus,thequestionofthemoment became"howyouasaconsumercanshowthatyoucare" (Brinkmann2004:130).Inevitably,theOtherthatemerges fromthesedevelopmentsisboththeobjectandsubjectof anethicsofconsumption. JustasMaxWeber(2005)creditedtheadventof"the SpiritofCapitalism"toanunderlyingmoralsystemÑ"The ProtestantEthic"Ñsocouldthespiritofconsumptioninthe emergentnongovernmentalgoverningorderinthe"South" becreditedtoaparticularethic:thisethicisinformedby amyriadofpolicies,ideologies,campaigns,andpersonal experiencesthatenlistthevirtuoustouristsinpracticesof goodgovernance.Yet,asDavidFennellwarned,"ethicstoo canbewronginitssupportofideologiesandutopiasthat havemoretodowiththeagendasofafew"(Mowforth andMunt2009:87).JacquesEllulalsosuggestedthatwhat constitutesanotionofrightandwrongalwaysemerges"in theinterestof"a"few,"whichultimately"providestheindividualwithaclearvisionofmoralduty"(1969:121).So thequestionthatstillneedsanansweris:Whoarethe"few" ascribingtheethicalmeaningstovirtuoustourists'consumptioninCanhane?Thisiswhere"development"enterstheÞeld asthepointofreference. Aspartofthevisionofempowermentthathoversover community-basedorganizationsinthe"South,"themanagementoftheentiretourismbusinessinCanhanewasformally attributedtotheCanhanersbytheNGOHelvetas.More precisely,onpaper,themanagementoftourismwasassignedtoacommitteeoftenrepresentativeselectedbythe residentsin2002.However,thiswasimpractical.Justto giveabriefexample,attheendofJanuaryof2008IattendedameetingheldinCanhaneforitsresidents.Several subjectsconcerningthevillagewerediscussed.Whenthe topicofthelodgecameup,itsexecutivemanager,whois neitherfromCanhanenoraresident,tookthelead.Hepresentedthelodge'sexpensesandincomestotheaudience. Attheend,Iaskedanearbyteacherwhythepresident,or anyothermember,oftheSocialManagementCommittee wasnotpresentingtheÞnancialreporttothepopulation, astheofÞcialstatutesofthecommunity-basedbusinessrequired.Hesaid,"Howcanthey,iftheydon'tknowhowto readthenumbers?"(January26,2008).Therefore,howcan thecommitteeberesponsibleforthemanagement,planning,andÞnancialadministrationofthelodgeifitsmembers donothaveskillsinbasicmath;donothaveaccessto computers,Internet,ornewspapers;donotknowtheprinciplesofinternationalcurrency;andareinexperiencedin


648 AmericanAnthropologist  Vol.114,No.4  December2012 commercialbusinessactivities?Afterspendingseveral monthsinCanhane,theanswerbecamequiteevident:by resortingto,beingdependenton,andremainingunderthe ruleofexternalproviders. Ononeoccasion,Iraisedtheissueofthelackofskills onthepartoftheCanhanerswhoconstitutethecommitteetoamemberoftheNGO'sstaffthatimplementedthe tourismproject."That'swhywehavetodevelopmore trainingsessionsinCanhane.Thisisthewaytoempower them,"heanswered(February20,2008).Asmentioned before,thetrainingsessionsthathereferredto,whichhad becomeabundantinthevillagesincetheimplementationof virtuoustourism,wereallsponsoredbyinternationalorganizationsdonatingtotheNGOsheworkedfor,namely HelvetasandLUPA.Whatthismeansisthat,ratherthan empowering"them,"theresidents,thecommunity-based tourisminCanhaneempowerstheNGOs.Pragmatically speaking,atthetimeofthelodge'sconstruction,Helvetas'staffaskedCanhanerstolisttheirmainprioritiesfor useoftherevenuesfromthelodge.Theanswerswerea healthcenter,watersupply,agroceryshop,andaccessto electricity.Yet,whenIleftthevillageinDecemberof2008, almostsixyearsaftertheirresponsesandafterfouryearsof virtuoustourists'visitstoCanhane,noneofthesepriorities hadbeenaccomplished. Putplainlythen,byrepresentingtheunderdeveloped community,Canhanersaredrawnintoasysteminwhich theybecomeproducersandpartnersingeneratingfunds inandfordevelopment.Assuch,Canhaneisintegrated intotourismasaneoliberaleconomicopportunityforthe developmentsector.Moreover,inthisprocessCanhaners emergeasgovernablesubjectsbyanewrulingorderof nongovernmentalagents.Thisshouldnotbesurprising,but itistheobviousconsequenceoftheincreasingroleofthe aidindustry,notonlyinCanhanebutalsointheentireregionofSouthernAfrica.AsitinÞltratesalmostallspheres ofsociallife,thenongovernmentaldevelopmentideology activelycontributestotheproductionofnewmarketsand newgoverningarrangements.Inthesearrangements,individualsfromdistantgeographiesÑvirtuoustouristsÑare inducedtoengageinmeaningfulactivitiesandcommitments asethicalconsumers.Indeed,virtuoustouristsparticipate inapeculiaractivityinthesensethattheconsumersare theoneswhotravel(travail)tocollectandproducethe goods.Basically,theemergentnongovernmentalordertakingoverCanhanedrawsonconsumptionasarealmthrough whichtransnationalagentscanparticipateingoverning projects,andvirtuoustourismistheapparatususedforthat purpose. However,theseregulatorypracticesareonlyableto gallopsuccessfullythroughoutthe"South"becausetheyare maskedbyethics.Thisisimplicit,forexample,intheEntrepreneurshipAwardtheresidentsofCanhanewon"in recognition,"Ñinthediploma'sdescription,"ofoutstandingentrepreneurialspirit."Theprizeaimedat"MakingMarketsWorkforthePoor"andorganizedbytheinternational developmentorganizationVSOwasheldinOctober2010 inBlantyre,Malawi.Theuseofthemarket,asetofethics, andthetourist-consumersformakingabetterworldand "changinglives,"asdescribedintheaward'sslogan,reßect theNGO'sultimategoal:"ParticipationandGovernance (P&G)inAfrica,Asia,thePaciÞc,LatinAmericaandthe Caribbean." 5 Allinall,whatseemsobviousinCanhaneis thatbehindthelabyrinthinepracticescarriedoutatthelocal level,theresidentshavebecomesubjugatedalliesofthenongovernmentaldevelopmentrationale.How?Byperforming agovernableandconsumablerealityinwhichnongovernmentalinstitutionsandvirtuoustouristscanexerciseruling authority. Ifitistruethattheinvolvementofdevelopmentin tourismistoacertaindegreearesponsetobothaglobalhumanitarianorderandtheexistingconsumerexpectations, thenitisalsocorrecttosaythatthisdependsonthe encounter'sprotagonistsatthelocallevel:thehostsand guests.Theiractionsexhibitastrongcommitmenttothe developmentalizationoftourismÑ"developmentourism" (Baptista2011)Ñandfosterthemeansbywhichtourism becomesamoralizingtoolofconsumptionandthevirtuoustouristaparticipativeagentofglobalizingnongovernmentalgovernance.AsImentionedabove,byalso beingco-producersof"communitydevelopmentinthe ThirdWorld"Ñtousethe"developmentalese"languageÑ virtuoustouristsareanoperationalresourcefornongovernmentaldevelopmentinstitutions.Alongwiththisprocess, andwiththehopeofbeneÞtingfromthecommoditizationof humanlifeinthemodernworld,Canhanerscapitalizeonthe potentialitiesbroughtbytheglobalizationofadisciplinary ethicsasawayofbeingincludedinthenetworkofglobal existence.Forthelocalinhabitants,virtuoustourismisaway ofgainingaccesstoandbecomingrepresentedintheglobal bybeinganexpressionofthe"South":thatis,inneed,moral, seekingdevelopment,andthusgovernablebynongovernmentalagents.CanhanersareOrientalized(Said1978)and self-Orientalizethemselvesinvirtuoustourism. Baumannotedthatthemostsalientcausalfactorin theneoliberalrevolutioningovernmentalactivitywasthe "Ôsubsidiarizing'orÔcontractingout'moreandmoreofthe functionspreviouslypoliticallydirectedandadministered [bystategovernments]infavorofexplicitlynon-political marketforces"(2007:144).InCanhane,thesenewgoverningforcesarenongovernmentalinstitutions,theirprofessionalemployees,andtransnationaltourist-consumers.In thisframework,consuming(whileon)holidaysandembodyingvirtuearenotcontradictorybecauseconsumption meansprovidingassistance.AsNeilLawsonsaid,"Asthere isnothingelsetofallbackon,itislikelythatpeoplethengive uponthewholenotionof ... ademocraticsocietyandfall backonthemarketasthearbiterofprovision"(2000:18). However,morethanthemarketitself,theincreasingnongovernmentalgoverningorderinCanhaneÑand,Ibelieve, inthe"South"Ñisbased,toquoteFrankFuredi,"onthe premisethatunelectedindividualswhopossessaloftymoral


Baptista  TheVirtuousTourist 649 purposehaveagreaterrighttoactonthepublic'sbehalf thanpoliticianselected"(Bauman2007:146). Thatsaid,theethicsandmoralpurposethatlegitimize unelectedNGOleadersandthevirtuoustouristsparticipatinginthegovernanceofCanhaneareultimatelyordered bytherationalitiesofthedevelopmentsector,whichcampaignsaroundissuesofcommunitywell-beinginthe"South." Suchethicsprovidetheincentivesandvalidityforthevirtuoustouriststoperformgovernancethroughconsumption.WhetherpropagatinghumanitarianjustiÞcationfor consumptionindeprivedsocieties,orbyself-representing theproblemsolvinginthesesamesocieties,development hereoperatesasatechniqueofrecolonizinghistoricallysubjugatedpeoplethroughinducingtheethicalaspirationsin tourist-consumers'selves. CONCLUSION Itwasnotmyintentiontogeneralizetheaccountspresented heretoallNGOsandtoalltouristsvisitingcommunitybasedenterprises.Anyefforttoprovidereliableconclusions aboutthesesubjectsmustbecarefulinviewoftheheterogeneityofthedevelopmentsector,itsnongovernmental institutions,andthenatureofethicaltourists.Nonetheless,virtuoustourisminCanhanedoesprovideevidence aboutthewaytheadventofnewethicalmodelsofconsumptiondrawsinbroaderdevelopmentforcesthathelp constitutewhatitistobemoral,aswellashowthe"South" isusedinthisprocess.NGOsandvirtuoustourists,which belongtoasectorthatobtainslegitimacythroughperformingselßessness,areatthevanguardofthismovement. However,thisarticledemonstratesthattheconsumption practicesderivedfromandinlinewithsuchanideology ofselßessnessrepresentinsteadoneofthekeysitesof moralself-formationinthecontemporaryeraofneoliberal governmentality. CanhaneexempliÞeshowtheinstitutionalizationofneed canworkasaleverfortheappropriationofpopulationsand publicsubjectsbytranslocalagents.Theethicalparadigm inherentincommunity-basedarrangements,incontextsof scarcity,allowstourismanddevelopmentindustriestolegitimatelyappropriatenewareasandexpandcapitalistgrowth. Inturn,ethicsbecomesavitalsubjectinconsumers'attempts todevelopandafÞrmtheirmeaningfulselves,aswellas intheprocessofdegovernmentalizinggovernance.Therefore,toputitsuccinctlyandconclusively,whatIsuggest inthisworkisthatAfricanstates'progressivedissociation fromgoverning(Mbembe2001)isdirectlyassociatedwith theneoliberalnongovernmentalizationofgoverningpublic spheres. ThevirtuoustouristsplayandperformaparticipatingroleingoverningCanhane.Thevaluetheyearnfrom spendingholidaysinthevillageismorethansimplytheenjoymentofcontributingtolocaldevelopment:theyderive personalmoralgratiÞcationandengageintheroleofgovernance.However,asparticularlyrevealedbytheresultsof thewater-supplyendeavorandCanhaners'negligenceofthe classroombuiltwiththelodgerevenues,myempiricalwork exposestheoutcomesofthevirtuoustourists'governingtask astransientandillusory.Mostofall,besidesbeingproducers andconsumers(prosumers),thevirtuoustouristsarealso involvedinthisprocessasproducts.Theymoveoutofethicalanonymitytobecomeaproductoftheirself-aspirations, ruledbythedisciplinaryethicsofdevelopment.Thisisin linewiththetacitpracticeofregulationthatBaumancalled "thecommoditizationofconsumers"(2007:24). Nevertheless,regardlessoftheillusorycharacteroftheir agency,whileperformingrulership,virtuoustouristscontributetothefadingagencyofinstitutionsdemocratically electedtogovernandhelpreplacethemwithnongovernmentalinstitutions.Understoodalongtheselines,thecontemporaryemergenceofnewmodelsofethicaltourism consumptioninthe"South"seemstoreplicatetherelationshipsofpowerexercisedintheadvancementofcolonizationratherthanactuallyaccomplishingtheprincipledaspirationsrhetoricallycelebratedbytheiradvocates.Thistime, however,recolonizationisdisguisedasbeingethical,most signiÞcantlythroughtheintermediaryofnongovernmental agents. Consumercapitalismisnotdead,astheformerpresidentofBrazil,LuladaSilva,declaredinFebruaryof2011at theWorldSocialForumheldinDakar.Rather,itcantake differentfacesandmasqueradeasethical.Whilepositioned asboththeobjectandsubjectofaglobalethicsofresponsibility,theOtherinthevirtuoustourismofCanhaneisreducedtobeingatoncetheinstrumentoftourist-consumers' self-investmentsandthesubjectofnongovernmental governance. Jo ˜ aoAfonsoBaptista Institutf ¨ urEthnologie,UniversityofHamburg,20146Hamburg,Germany; NOTES Acknowledgments. Iwishtothanktheeditorofthe American Anthropologist ,TomBoellstorff,andtheanonymousreviewersfor theircommitmentandenthusiastic,yetpointed,criticisms.Thiswork wouldhavenotbeenpossible,aswell,withoutthesupportofthe populationofCanhane,thestaffofHelvetasandLUPA,thetourists whovisitedthevillage,andoneofthemostimpressivepersonsI evermet,wholivedclosetoCanhane:theMuatadeMassingir.Iam deeplygratefultoallofthem.Finally,thisarticleisbasedonresearch supportedbytheGraduateSchoolSocietyandCultureinMotion. 1."Tourists:IfYouWantToHelpUs,BookYourTripNow," PR Newswire onbehalfofPaciÞcAsiaTravelAssociation,accessed November4,2011, news/release?id/137424. 2.Previously,IcarriedoutintermittentÞeldworkinCanhanefor atotalperiodofthreemonths,inbetween2006and2008. 3.UnitedNationsWorldTourismOrganization,accessedMay 18,2010, volunteers/convocatorias/mozambique2010.


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Baptista  TheVirtuousTourist 651Miller,Daniel 1995ConsumptionastheVanguardofHistory:APolemicby WayofanIntroduction. In AcknowledgingConsumption:A ReviewofNewStudies.DanielMiller,ed.Pp.1Ð57.London: Routledge. Mowforth,Martin,andIanMunt 2009[1998]TourismandSustainability:Development,GlobalisationandNewTourismintheThirdWorld.NewYork: Routledge. Norfolk,Simon,andChristopherTanner 2007ImprovingTenureSecurityfortheRuralPoor.Mozambique CountryCaseStudy.WorkingPaper,5.Rome:Foodand AgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations. Russ,AnnJulienne 2005Love'sLaborPaidfor:GiftandCommodityatthe ThresholdofDeath.CulturalAnthropology20(1):128Ð 155. Said,Edward 1978Orientalism.London:Penguin. Salamon,Lester 1994TheRiseoftheNonproÞtSector.ForeignAffairs July/August:109Ð122. Smith,Valene,ed. 1989HostsandGuests:TheAnthropologyofTourism.Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress. TheEconomist 1999TheNon-GovernmentalOrder.TheEconomist353(8149): 20Ð21. TourismConcern 2009TourismInfocus.TourismConcern,Springedition.http://Þle/In%20Focus/ Tourism%20in%20Focus%20Spring%202009.pdf,accessed March17,2010. Urry,John 2002[1990]TheTouristGaze.London:Sage. Watson,G.Llewellyn,andJosephKopachevsky 1994InterpretationsofTourismasCommodity.Annalsof TourismResearch21(3):643Ð660. Weber,Max 2005[1930]TheProtestantEthicandtheSpiritofCapitalism. London:Routledge. Wilk,Richard 2001ConsumingMorality.JournalofConsumerCulture 1(2):245Ð260.




2 © 2014 Gabriela Stocks


3 To my mother, Kathleen


4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my advisor , Anthony Oliver Smith, for introducing me to this research project and for his guidance and patience throughout my graduate career. His perspective fundamentally transformed my approach to this dissertation and to anthropology, and I will be forever grate ful. I also extend my deepest appreciation to the members of my committee for their encouragement and input. Chris McCarty was absolutely critical to the design of this research and to its successful funding. Marianne Schmink has influenced me both academi cally and personally; her classes through the Tropical Conservation and Development Program heavily informed my perspective on rural development in Latin America and her quiet but consistent support throughout the years has meant more to me than she knows. Tom Ankersen facilitated much of my professional networking in Costa Rica and, via employment in his environmental law political, social, and environmental contexts. Finally , Katrina Schwartz challenged me to think critically about the political ecology of hydropower development and has been a much needed source of encouragement at important points during the writing process. I would also like to thank the National Science F oundation and the University of Florida Tropical Conservation and Development program for funding this research. Jos é Luis Amador at the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) was an immense help from the earliest stages of this research project, as was the staff of the Environmental Law Clinic at the University of Costa Rica. Marta Obando Saborio and Gerardo Soto Bola ños at ICE were also extremely helpful in facilitating my access to the original project baseline studies and other documentation. I a lso greatly appreciate the input of


5 stages of this project. My work in Nuevo Arenal was facilitated by the support of the Asociació n de Desarrollo Integral , the local br anch of ICE, and especially Edgar Arias enormously informative. My husband, Forrest, and my mother, Kathleen, have been the consummate cheerleaders, advisors, and editors for many years. Dina made the initial stages of the writing process considerably more fun with work dates and the occasional infusion of chocolate chip cookies, and Lisa was an ever supportive distance writing buddy during the final year. Friends near and far provi ded love, support, and patience that have sustained me throughout this process, including Elizabeth, Isadora, Deb, Katy, and Kelly. My time in Costa Rica was enriched by the friendships of many, including but not limited to Franklin and Emma in San Jos é , and Conny, Ofelia, and Yami in Nuevo Arenal. The good humor of my field assistants Yerlin and Geissell made our seemingly endless survey administration infinitely more enjoyable, and I hold dear their entire Arias family, especially Chela, Lola, and Elias, who made me feel welcome from my very first visit to the community. Last but not least, my deepest appreciation goes to the residents of Nuevo Arenal for opening their homes and lives to me for so many years. I hope to do their story justice, on these pag es and in the future.


6 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKN OWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 10 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 11 LIST OF OBJECTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 15 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ........................... 16 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 17 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 19 Research Setting ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 21 Dams, Development, and Involuntary Resettlement ................................ ............... 22 Dams and Displacement in the Context of Global Development ...................... 22 The Social Consequences of Large Dams ................................ ....................... 29 The material and economi c impacts of resettlement ................................ .. 34 The non material impacts of resettlement ................................ .................. 37 Dams and Decision Making: Cost Benefit Analysis, Commensu ration, and the Ethics of Development ................................ ................................ ............ 42 Resettlement Policy: Advances and Limitations ................................ ............... 49 Frameworks for Understanding the Effects of Development Forced Displacement and Resettlement ................................ ................................ ... 60 Chapter Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ 65 2 THEORETICAL AND METH ODOLOGICAL APPROACHE S ................................ .. 67 Research Problem ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 67 ................................ ..................... 69 Re search Objectives and Hypotheses ................................ ................................ .... 72 Methods ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 76 Life and Community History Interviews ................................ ............................ 77 Data collection ................................ ................................ ........................... 7 7 Data analysis ................................ ................................ ............................. 79 Social Network Analysis ................................ ................................ ................... 80 Data collection ................................ ................................ ........................... 81 Data analysis ................................ ................................ ............................. 84 Livelihood Survey ................................ ................................ ............................. 85 Data collection ................................ ................................ ........................... 86 Data analysis ................................ ................................ ............................. 88


7 Personal Social Network Analysis ................................ ................................ .... 88 Data collection ................................ ................................ ........................... 89 Data analysis ................................ ................................ ............................. 90 Participant Observation and Other Reflections on Research ........................... 91 3 DISMANTLING COMMUNIT Y ................................ ................................ ................ 98 A Brief History of Costa Rican Hydropower Development and Energy Governance ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 98 The Symbolism of ICE ................................ ................................ .......................... 102 The Arenal Hydroelectric Project ................................ ................................ .......... 105 Dismantling Community: The Resettlement of Arenal ................................ .......... 109 ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 110 From Viejo Arenal to Nuevo Arenal ................................ ................................ 115 Phase 1: Baseline studies ................................ ................................ ........ 117 Phase 2: Information campaign and contact with affected families .......... 119 Phase 3: New settlement site selectio n ................................ ................... 121 Phase 4: Land acquisition ................................ ................................ ........ 123 Phase 5: Urban and architectural planning ................................ .............. 125 Phase 6: Financial mechanism for restitution of property ........................ 126 Phase 7: Construction of the new settlements ................................ ......... 129 Phase 8: Community development ................................ .......................... 130 Phase 9: Agricultural development ................................ .......................... 132 Phase 10: Inaugurating the new communities ................................ ......... 133 The Immediate Aftermath of Resettlement ................................ ........................... 133 Using the IRR Model to Evaluate the Design of the Arenal Resettlement Project 142 Landlessness ................................ ................................ ................................ . 143 Joblessness ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 144 Homelessness ................................ ................................ ................................ 146 Marginalization ................................ ................................ ............................... 147 Food Insecurity ................................ ................................ ............................... 148 Increased Morbidity and Mortality ................................ ................................ ... 149 Loss of Access to Common Property Assets ................................ .................. 149 Social Disarticulation ................................ ................................ ...................... 150 Chapter Conclusion: Reflections on the Resettlement Planning ........................... 151 4 RECONSTRUCTING LIVEL IHOODS: ECONOMIC REC OVERY IN NUEVO ARENAL ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 171 Economic Developm ent: 1977 2010 ................................ ................................ ..... 174 Phase 1: The Land Based Economy ................................ .............................. 175 Dairy farming ................................ ................................ ............................ 176 Beef cattle ranching ................................ ................................ ................. 180 Crop based agriculture ................................ ................................ ............ 183 Phase 2: The Service Based Economy ................................ .......................... 200 The emergence of tourism in Costa Rica ................................ ................. 201 Tourism in Nuevo Arenal ................................ ................................ ......... 203


8 Conclusions About Economic Re construction ................................ ...................... 232 5 RECONSTRUCTING COMMU NITY: MATERIAL AND S OCIAL RECOVERY IN NUEVO ARENAL ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 259 From Space to Place: Material Recons truction After Resettlement ...................... 263 The Significance of Place ................................ ................................ ............... 263 Home ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 267 Neighborhood ................................ ................................ ................................ . 272 Community ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 278 Conclusions about Material Reconstruction ................................ ................... 289 Becoming Nuevo Arenaleño: Social Reconstitution After Resettlement ............... 291 Identity and Social Reconstitution ................................ ................................ .. 293 Volunt ary Associations and Social Reconstitution ................................ .......... 301 Community Development Association (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral) ................................ ................................ ................................ 303 Administr ative Association of Rural Aqueducts ( Asociación Administradora de Acueductos Rurales ) ................................ .............. 306 School and church committees ................................ ................................ 307 Ritual s and Social Reconstitution ................................ ................................ ... 310 Memory and Social Reconstitution ................................ ................................ . 316 Conclusions about Social Reconstitution ................................ ....................... 322 Perceptions of Quality of Life in Nuevo Arenal ................................ ...................... 325 Chapter Conclusion: Revisiting the Research Hypotheses ................................ ... 333 6 THE LONG TERM OUTCOMES OF RES ETTLEMENT: SOCIAL NE TWORKS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES ................................ .......... 354 Socio Centric Network Analysis ................................ ................................ ............ 359 Social Network Analysis, Leadership, and Social Capital ............................... 359 Social Network Methods and Analysis ................................ ........................... 362 Social Network Analysis Results ................................ ................................ .... 366 Overall network centrality ................................ ................................ ......... 366 Median in degree and betweenness centrality ................................ ......... 367 Leadership and Social Capital Among Second Generation Resettlers .......... 369 Connecting Resource Access and Network Centrality ................................ .......... 374 Internal Resources: Ordinal Logistic Regression Model ................................ . 376 External Resources: Personal Social Networks ................................ ............. 384 Chapter Conclusion ................................ ................................ .............................. 391 7 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 413 Review of Previous Chapters ................................ ................................ ................ 417 The Arenal Case: An Example of Successful Resettlement? ............................... 423 Principal Lessons ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 427 From Theory to Practi ce and Back to Theory: Testing the Scudder Colson Model ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 438


9 Research Implications ................................ ................................ ........................... 442 In the Context of DFDR ................................ ................................ .................. 442 In Other Contexts ................................ ................................ ........................... 443 The Future of DFDR ................................ ................................ ............................. 445 APPENDIX A LIFE HISTORY INTERVIEW ................................ ................................ ................ 449 B WHOLE SOCIAL NETWORK SURVEY ................................ ................................ 4 53 C LIVELIHOOD SURVEY ................................ ................................ ......................... 454 D PERSONAL NETWORK INTERVIEW ................................ ................................ .. 459 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 461 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 481


10 LIST OF TABLES Table pag e 2 1 Participants in life history interviews ................................ ................................ ... 94 2 2 Description of variables used in the ordinal logistic regression mod el ................ 96 5 1 Local, regional, and national organizations in which survey participants reported participating since becoming a resident of Nuevo Arenal. .................. 337 6 1 Crosstabulation of resident category and overall centrality based on in degree centrality summed across all networks ................................ ................. 393 6 2 Crosstabulation of resident category and betweenness centrality for the Community Development network ................................ ................................ .... 393 6 3 Crosstabulation of resident category and betweenness centrality for the Participation network ................................ ................................ ........................ 394 6 4 Crosstabulation of resident category and betweenness centrality for the Emergency Recovery network ................................ ................................ .......... 394 6 5 Summary of data for ordinal logistic regressi on model ................................ ..... 395 6 6 Ordinal logistic regression model. ................................ ................................ ..... 396 6 7 Crosstabulation of observed and predicted centrality values from the o rdinal logistic regression model ................................ ................................ .................. 397 6 8 Kruskall Wallis p values for pairwise comparisons of overall centrality groups and alter location ................................ ................................ .............................. 397 6 9 Kruskall Wallis p values for pairwise comparisons of overall centrality groups and alter type ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 397 6 10 Crosstabulation of personal network alter locations and alter types ................. 398


11 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2 1 Map of study area ................................ ................................ ............................... 97 3 1 Map of hydropower developme nt in Costa Rica ................................ ............... 159 3 2 The Arenal Basin before construction of the dam ................................ ............. 160 3 3 During construction, ICE established a camp at the foot of the dam ................ 160 3 4 ICE workers in one of the conduction tunnels ................................ .................. 161 3 5 The Arenal Basin as the reservoir began to fill ................................ ................. 161 3 6 A view of the reservoir ................................ ................................ ...................... 162 3 7 Schematic of the Arenal Hydroelectric Project ................................ .................. 163 3 8 The Arenal power station soon after construction ................................ ............. 164 3 9 Cattle ranches dominated the landscape outside of the population center of Viejo Arenal ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 164 3 10 A gravel road connected Viejo Arenal to Viejo Tronadora and Tilarán ............. 165 3 11 The Catholic church in Viejo Arenal ................................ ................................ .. 165 3 12 An example of houses in Viejo Arenal. Most were wooden structures ............. 166 3 13 Seven potential resettlement sites were proposed for Nuevo Arenal on the north side of the reservoir ................................ ................................ ................. 167 3 14 ICE staff present the possible resettlement sites in Tronadora ......................... 168 3 15 The location s of the new resettlement sites were selected by popular vote ..... 168 3 16 Aerial view during the construction of Nuevo Arenal ................................ ........ 169 3 17 Homes in Nuevo Arenal were constructed of cement block with roofs of corrugated asbestos concrete ................................ ................................ .......... 169 3 18 Construction of the Catholic church in Nuevo Arenal ................................ ....... 170 3 19 An experimental agricultural plot in Nuevo Tronadora, maintained by the ICE agricultural experts ................................ ................................ ........................... 170 4 1 Distribution of residents for whom occupati on data was collected .................... 246


12 4 2 Frequency of participation in key occupations according to resident category and importance of activity to overall income ................................ ..................... 247 4 3 An agricultural plot on the Santa Maria peninsula, which was invaded by squatters in the early 1990s in order to access fertile agricultural land ............ 248 4 4 The Ti laran Coffee Cooperative, Coopetila, was established in 1981 to ............................... 248 4 5 The German Bakery was established in 1995 by a German immigran t ............ 249 4 6 The building on the left was a restaurant owned by a first generation resettler from 1986 2007 ................................ ................................ ................................ 249 4 7 The Cabinas Can finera, owned by a pair of second generation resettlers, is ............. 250 4 8 Paradise Investment Company was one of the major, and mos t disreputable, developers in Nuevo Arenal in the mid 2000s ................................ .................. 250 4 9 Residential tourism development in Nuevo Arenal ................................ ........... 251 4 10 An example of foreign expatriate construction ................................ .................. 252 4 11 Birthplaces of the residents of the Arenal district who were born outside of Costa Rica according to the 1984, 2000, and 2011 national censu ses ............ 253 4 12 Examples of the real estate signage near Nuevo Arenal in the late 2000s ....... 254 4 13 Examples of commercial spaces in N uevo Arenal ................................ ............ 255 4 14 Distribution of other occupations in Nuevo Arenal according to resident category and importance of activity to overall income ................................ ...... 256 4 15 Proportion of residents engaged in land based, service based, and public sector activities from 1977 2010. ................................ ................................ ...... 257 4 16 Number of residents engaged in land based, servi ce based, and public sector activities from 1977 2010. ................................ ................................ ...... 258 5 1 Examples of landscaping and home aesthetics in Nuevo Arenal ..................... 339 5 2 Map of the urban core of Viejo Arenal, produced by ICE in 1974 ..................... 340 5 3 Map of the urban core of Nuevo Arenal, produced by ICE during the resettlement planning phase ................................ ................................ ............. 341 5 4 Neighborhoods in Nuevo Arenal ................................ ................................ ....... 342


13 5 5 Spatial distribution of households composed of residential tourists versus Costa Ricans ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 343 5 6 The central plaza/soccer field is flanked by the Catholic Church and the elementary school ................................ ................................ ............................ 344 5 7 The central plaza is the site of signif icant social interaction ............................. 345 5 8 small park next to the central plaza ................................ ................................ .. 345 5 9 A permanent health clinic was founded in 1980 ................................ ............... 346 5 10 A community gymnasium was constructed in the mid 1980s ........................... 346 5 11 A bullring, constructed in the late 1980s, is an important feature of the community ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 347 5 12 Educational infrastructure has been a focus of community development in Nuevo Arenal ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 348 5 13 Offices for the local water utility and the Community Development Association were constructed in the late 2000s ................................ ................ 348 5 14 th , is celebrated with a parade organized by the public schools ............................... 349 5 15 The annual fiestas c í vicas are a popular local event ................................ ........ 349 5 16 The annual fiestas c í vicas include the children of the community .................... 350 5 17 The annual fiestas cívicas culminate with a tope ................................ .............. 351 5 18 A mural of the church from Viejo Arenal was painted in 2009 on the side of the social hall at the lakeside park ................................ ................................ .... 352 6 1 Proportion of first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and other residents in high, medium, and low centrality positions within the social network of Nuevo Arenal ................................ ................................ .................. 399 6 2 Whole social network of Nuevo Arenal aggregated from the three individual networks ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 400 6 3 people contribute the most ................ 401 6 4 ................................ ........... 402


14 6 5 were a major natural disaster in this community, whom would you expect to ................................ ................................ . 403 6 6 Community Development network of individuals with high in degree centrality. ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 404 6 7 Emergency Recovery network of individuals with high in deg ree centrality ...... 405 6 8 Participation network of individuals with high in degree centrality .................... 406 6 9 Distribution of personal netw ork alter locations by level of centrality in the whole social network. ................................ ................................ ....................... 407 6 10 Distribution of personal network alter types by level of centrality in the whole social network. ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 408 6 11 Personal social networks of a highly central second generation resettler and a highly central first generation resettler ................................ ........................... 409 6 12 Per sonal social networks of two highly central second generation resettlers ... 410 6 13 Personal social networks of two low centrality first generation resettlers ......... 411 6 14 Personal social networks of two low centrality female first generation resettlers ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 412


15 LIST OF OBJECTS Object page 5 1 tope (.avi file, 89 MB) ................................ ................................ ................................ 35 3 5 2 tope (.avi file, 60 MB ) .............................. 353


16 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS DFDR Development Forced Displacement and Resettlement ICE Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Costa Rican Institute of Electricity) IDB Inter American Development Bank IRR Impoverishment R isks and Reconstruction WCD World Commission on Dams


17 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ASSESSING THE LONG TERM EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENT FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT: THE CASE OF NUEVO ARENAL, COSTA RICA By Gabriela Stocks August 2014 Chair: Anthony Oliver Smith Major: Anthropology This research address es the success of resettlement projects in the aftermath of major infrastructural development. Specifically, it examine s the long term outcomes of displacement and resettlement on the community of Nuevo Arenal, Costa Rica, which was relocated as a consequence of the construction of the Arenal H ydroelectric Project in 1977. Because resettlement creates long term impacts, assessing the success of resettlement projects on the basis of information gathered only a few years post resettlement is prem ature. The research presented in this dissertation address es this problem by analyzing the long term outcomes of resett lement in Nuevo Arenal in the 33 years after relocation . The central question of the study is whether the Arenal resettlement project can be deemed a long term success, and to what extent long term resettlement outcomes are a product of the resettlement project planning. This question was answered through a combination of life history interviews, survey data, personal and whole social network analysis, and participant observation .


18 The resul ts of this study indicate that the Arenal resettlement project can largely be considered a success. Post resettlement processes of economic, material, and social recovery created the conditions necessary for future generations of resettlers and new immigra nts to sustain their livelihoods in the new community . Arenale ños have achieved a standard of living on par with neighboring non resettled communities, and the community has developed a viable local economy that is integrated into the broader political eco nomic system. The success of the Arenal resettlement project can largely be attributed to the project planning and participatory resettlement, which helped it overcome many of the challenges to successful resettlement. The process of social and material reconstruction. Economic recovery, on the other h and, proved to be a significant challenge. Environmental barriers to agricultural production were not identified by the resettlement agency; these barriers were then exacerbated by economic and physical constraints. Economic solvency was eventually reached approximately 15 years after resettlement because of the influence of exogenous factors, namely the emergence of a residential tourism economy.


19 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On a Friday night in the fall of 2009, I sit on the patio of the rustic Rumors bar in really nothing more than a single block lined with small businesses waiting for my grilled chuleta (pork chop) . The weekly barbecue event draws locals and foreign expat riates alike for drinks, food, and camaraderie. Notably, locals tend to gather inside while foreigners occupy the outdoor street side patio, a physical manifestation of the social tensions that exist in this relatively recently hybridized c ommunity. A couple of hours in to the festivities, a cabalgata clip clops through town; stocky Costa Ricans, colloquially known as Ticos , bearing cowboy garb sit atop their prized horses to collect donations for a friend who has had an accident. Just as they reach the bar, the skies open and a ferocious downpour typical of the tropical rainy season begins. The riders crowd their reluctant horses under the awning and in to sends shots of liquor into the raucous crowd . A not entirely pleasant mixture of musky anim al scents, grilled meat, rain soaked aspha lt, and alcohol infuses the air. W hen the rain finally stops, the cavalcade moves on , not a minute too soon for this particular researcher . In this moment, surrounded by lights, concrete, and boisterous festivitie s, it is easy to for get that less than 35 years ago this physical space was nothing but pasture and secondary forest. The ritual that just occurred, equally symbolic of the cowboy culture and the enactment of activities that represent community bo nds , would have taken place 11 kilometers away in another almost eponymous village, now buried under the waters of man made Lake Arenal. A s can be expected in cases of involuntary


20 resettlement, the transition from Viejo Arenal to Nuevo Arenal has not been an easy one for Arenale ños . One generation after relocation, however, the result is a community they proudly call home. While large dams play a number of important functions in the improvement of human well being , the social repercussions of these mega pr ojects have typically included the wholesale dismantling and impoverishment of local communities in their wake. Some would argue that resettlement projects have rightfully earned the moniker Smith 2010b:3). In fact, t he d isplacement and resettlement of dam affected communities is arguably the most contentious issue associated with large dams in the modern era , and has sparked debates about the ethics of a development model that causes, rather than resolves, a significant d egree of human suffering (cf. Penz et al. 2011). Despite the appalling track record of resettlement efforts, a growing demand for energy and water has triggered an increase in funding for large dams in recent years (World Bank 2009). Thus, g ive n the certa inty of hundreds, if not thousands , of new dams in the near future, re settlement policy and practice must become better at addressing the needs of the populations who are asked (and in most cases, forced) to sacrifice everything for the common good. Cases of successful involuntary resettlement are few , even in the short term, and the long term consequences of resettlement are poorly understood (Scudder 1993) . As a step toward addressing this gap in our understanding and to inform better policy making in the future, t his dissertation focuses on the process of community reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal, Costa Rica, which was resettled in 1977 as a consequence of the Arenal Hydroelectric Project. Considered to


21 be one of the few short term success stories of invol untary resettlement (Scudder 2005), an analysis of the long term outcomes of this project promises to be helpful in enhancing our understanding of resettlement practice and theory. After a brief description of the research setting (a more thorough discussi on is presented in Chapter 3), this chapter will present an overview of the debates surrounding large dams and involuntary resettlement. Research Setting The Arenal Hydroelectric Project was first conceived by the Costa Rican Institute of E lectricity ( Ins tituto Costarricense de Electricidad or ICE) in the late 195 0s as a way , funded through a combination of domestic investment and a loan from the Inter American Development Ban k (IDB) , consists of a 65 meter dam, an 88 km 2 reservoir, 6700 meters of conduction tunnels, and a machine house with three power generating units (Partridge 1993). Several predominantly agricultural communities totaling approximately 2500 people were disp laced by the new reservoir. ormed in 1974 by an interdisciplinary team of professionals, was charged with creating a viable resettlement plan for the displaced communities . This included investigating potential sites for the two new resettlement areas Nuevo Arenal (New Arenal) and Nuevo Tronadora (New Tronadora) and creating a process through which displaced residents would be compensated for the loss of their property and provided with new homes and land in the newly constru cted communities . By 1977, the community of Nuevo Arenal was occupied by the displaced families and had a population of approximately 1500 people in 325 households. Follow up studies conducted by University of Costa Rica student Marta Obando in 1979


22 (Oband o 1981) and anthropologist William L. Partridge for the IDB in 1983 (Partridge 1983) revealed that, after some initial difficulty, the resettled communities had achieved some level of stability and success. A majority of residents in both communities were original resettlers, with only a small percentage of the communities composed of immigrants. Additionally, agricultural and livestock production had intensified; households were investing surplus income in additional farmland, outbuildings, and vehicles; l ocal organizations were being formed to meet community needs; and local business owners reported significant increases in their permanent inventory (Partridge 1993). Since the early 1980s, however, no further evaluation of the long term success of the rese ttlement project has been conducted . Currently, Nuevo Arenal has a population of approximately 2100 people in 600 households. Major livelihood activities include dairy production; cattle ranching; commerce and services ; and an increasing focus on supportin g the booming residential tourism industry, which is causing an influx of foreign land buyers and Costa Ricans seeking employment opportunities. Dams, Development, and Involuntary Resettlement Dams and Displacement in the Context of Global Development Betw een 1950 and 2005, approximately 40,000 large dams 1 were constructed in over 140 countries (ICOLD 1998). This number represents almost an order of magnitude increase from the 5,000 dams in existence in 1949, three quarters of which were located in industri alized countries (ICOLD 199 8). As of 2000, the year in which the 1 A la rge dam is defined as being 15 m or greater in height or having a storage capacity of at least 3,000,000 m 3 ( http://www.icold ) .


23 Development: A New Framework for Decision under construction, most in developing co untries (WCD 2000). The location of these new dams becomes important when one takes into account that the negative impacts of such projects are now largely borne by the populations most vulnerable, by virtue of their relative material poverty and natural r esource based livelihood strategies, to major landscape changes and environmental degradation. The explosion of dam construction during the second half of the 20 th century was driven by the emergence of the post W orld War II model of development. Though dissertation is the suite of economic policies and practices aimed at promoting public and private economic growth, ultimately for the purposes of reducing poverty (Penz et al. 2011). 2 Over time, as economic growth alone was not shown to significantly reduce poverty or distributional inequities, the goal of development has shifted to poverty reduction itself, generally attempted through the increased integration of people into th e state and market (Penz et al. 2011, Oliver Smith 2010a). F rom 1945 through the 1970s, approaches to development were governed by the idea that economic 2 A more critical view of development, influenced by the work of Michel Foucault and employed by post structuralist sc holars like Arturo Escobar (1995) and Wolfgang Sachs (1992), argues that development is for the imposition of hegemonic Western ideologies (promoted by the state and development development discourse is so powerful that it has been assumed by the nations it targets, who accept 1995:6).


24 and human well being gap s between the First and Third Worlds through modernization (Ferguson 1999, McMichael 2000). This development model emphasized large scale, techno managerial interventions that relied upon the intensive exploitation of natural resources, f inanced by loans from new mu ltilateral lending institutions created under th e Bretton Woods Agreement. 3 Thus, economic growth was to be achieved through the implementation of First World sci entific and technical knowledge, including the construction of infrastructural mega projects s uch as dams, roads, and irrigation schemes; intensification of production; and the expansion of international trade (Edelman and Haugerud 2005, Escobar 1995, Oliver Smith 2010a). This form of development not only provided a market for First World technolog ies but also created a system in which First World top down, technology centric models became the accepted means through which development would take place. Development interventions were not only accepted by developing nations but were viewed as the logic :6 ). 4 The significant environmental and social costs of these projects were (and continue to be) externalized, as the goal of economic development reigned supreme. As Oliver Smith (2010a:8) argues economics is seen to contain its own internal morality in terms of benefits outweighing 3 The 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement was created to govern the comm ercial and financial relationships on capital movements . The A greement established the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Recon struction and Development (now part of the World Bank Group) (Edelman and Haugerud 2005). 4 For more detail about this line of reasoning, see footnote #2, above.


25 After almost four decades, the failure of the development industry to achieve its goal of eliminat ing poverty, combined with the international debt crisis of the early 1980s, opened a space for a new strain of development interventions framed by neoliberal economic theories. Driven by a process of economic, political, and cultural globalization, curren t development strategies emphasize a diminished role for the state and the promotion of market mechanisms for stimulating economic growth and increased integration into the global economy (McMichael 2000, Penz 2011). This new form of development has displa ced national planning, transforming the state from a (Penz 2011:31) . The effect of this new development orthodoxy on vulnerable populations has been severe. The ec onomic liberalization policies, structural adjustment, and stabilization programs that are part and parcel of the neoliberal development model have exacerbated the displacement of communities by facilitating investment in displacement inducing activities a nd exposing local producers to competition from the global market and subsidized agricultural products from wealthy countries (Oxfam 2002 cited in Vandergeest et al. 2007:7). Furthermore, austerity measures and the consequent reduction in the role of the s tate have been linked to the breakdown of many of the protections and social services on which the citizens of developing nations depend for their well being (Edelman and Haugerud 2005). One relevant implication of this process is that weake ned state insti tutions are less equipped (and perhaps even less willing, due to their own political economic alliances) to effectively mitigate the negative social repercussions of large development projects, thus leaving affected


26 populations even more vulnerable to the changes induced by mega development (Patkar 2009:xiv) . Much like its predecessors, then, the contemporary development model often magnifies poverty and inequality , rather than resolving these issues . Throughout the various phases of the post WWII developm ent era, i ncreasing has consistently been seen as the key to economic growth and the improvement in living standards for the entire populace (Oliver Smith 2010a). Under this paradigm, harnessing rivers for energy production , irrigation schemes , and navigation constitutes the most efficient exploitation of the economic potential of th is natural resource. In promoting or enabling this type of resource use , governments, developers, and financ i ers mak e a judgment that local populations are not using rivers and river basins (or other natural resources) in a satisfactorily productive manner and can thus justify commandeering them, ostensibly for the betterment of the larger society. The fact that these d evelopment projects may displace local populations is often seen as an unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence of the march of progress. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the t good for the greatest nu is engaged time after time to justify mega development projects. This ethical position gives rise to one of implemented to improve the quality of life of the majority a re the same projects that have displaced tens of millions of people, causing widespread human suffering. As development as an actual process [is the paradox] with which we are con fronted when


27 The negative impacts that have been suffered by millions of people in the name of development have generated new discussions among academics and activists about what kind of development is both worthwhile and ethical, and what kinds of decision making processes are necessary in order to arrive at the answer to that question (Penz et al. 2011). These discussions are not simple, however, as critics of mega development must contend with powerful institutions, int erests, and hegemonic ideas about development in their pursuit of justice (Khagram 2004). The theme of development ethics will be revisited later in this chapter and in the conclusion of this dissertation. Despite the vast investment of money and manpower in development projects over various decades, critics argue that many development interventions have failed to meet their stated goal of poverty reduction. A number of impo rtant studies have demonstrated that this failure can be at least partially attribut ed to the fact that development institutions frame their target populations in certain ways in order to justify their own ment their standardized development packages, including infrastructural expansion and agricultural image of an isolated subsistence economy in need of modernization. I n doing so, not only do development institutions miss (or ignore) the real problems and potential solutions in a given area, but they also oversimplify the functioning of natural and social processes to the point that the images constructed of these system s are no longer realistic (Josephson 2002, Scott 1998). It is no surprise, then, that many of t he projects


28 designed under these self serving constructions of reality have been unsuccessful. Seen through this lens of over simplification, large dams become e ngineered systems with easily foreseeable outcomes , and the resettlement of communities displaced by these projects becomes simply both unpredictable and difficult to manipulate , leading to unforeseen and often tragic consequences . Within the development industry , the rationale for constructing dams has been easily adapted to fit the goals of the discourse du jour . In the initial dec ades of the global development era , dams were seen as tools for modernizing . Under the c urrent neoliberal economic paradigm, they are promoted as a means for the intensive exploitation of national resources in order to allow nations to position themselves i n the international market according to their competitive advantage. Furthermore, in response to concerns about climate change, large dams are increasingly (and incorrectly) viewed as sources of clean, carbon neutral energy (Anderson 2012, Fearnside and P ueyo 2012). Mega development, however, is also a game in which ther e are clear winners and losers: (Khagram 2004 : 4). The fact that the costs of development have largely been borne by the poor, while the benefits have been enjoyed by the rich is a reflection of unbalanced power relations among the various sectors of society (Bryant and Bailey 1997, Johnston 1995). It is through this lens that the current era of large dam construction and its accompanying human impacts can be viewed.


29 The Social Consequences of Large Dams Large dams are seen by many as a flawed but necessary development option (Scudder 2005). They provide i mportant social and economic services, including irrigation, hydropower, urban water supply, flood management, navigation, and recreation and tourism (Scudder 2005). D ams provide water to 30 268 million hectares of irrigated agricultural lands and generate electricity supply (WCD 2000). Globally, 12% of large dams are designated for urban water supply (WCD 2000). Nevertheless, it is estimated that one billion people still lack access to an adequate supply of water and two billion people lack a stable source of electricity (Khagram 2004); these numbers are destined to increase as the global population grows. Large dams offer an attractive solution to these dilemmas. Dams are also powerful at a symbolic level. They are signs of industrialization and modernity (Oliver Smith 2010 a , Scudder 2005), and of the entry of former colonies : 1). Dams represent ; to manipul ate a resource in whose absence or excess living beings cannot survive ; and to simultaneously transform physical, social , political landscape s (Worster 1985). Khagram (2004:4) other development initiative, big dams have symbol ized the progress of humanity from a life controlled by nature and tradition to one in which nature is ruled by technology, and tradition supplanted by science . national imaginary and many projects are pushed through by the highest ranks of a (Scudder 2005).


30 Despite the myriad benefits provided by large dams, however, this particular form of mega development has left in its wake a legacy of disastrous environmental and social consequences. Environmental issues include river fragmentation, ecosystem degradation, sedimentation, salinization, coastal erosion, damage to fisheries, water weed proliferation, river channeliz ation, and greenhouse gas production in reservoirs (Blackwelder and Carlson 198 6, Fearnside and Pueyo 2012 , WCD 2000). The severity and extent of the environmental damage caused by dams is still under study, as is the ability of natural systems to recover once large dams have exhausted their life expectancy and are decommissioned (Grant 2001, Stanley and Doyle 2003) . The social consequences of large dams are perhaps even more sobering. L arge dams have physically displaced at least 80 90 million people wor ldwide (Cernea 201 0), not to mention the broader physical and livelihood displacement that occurs both upstream and downstream of dams in the years after their construction (Scudder 2005). 5 It has been estimated that dams displace around four million peop le per year (Cernea 1997). Impacts to individuals and communities occur before, during, and after construction, at each phase radically altering the social and environmental contexts in which dam affected peoples negotiate their livelihoods. Before constru ction even begins, rumors about a project start to circulate. Faced with the likelihood of displacement but knowing little, if anything, about the timeline or process, local people live with the stress of uncertainty and in disbelief that such an event cou ld actually happen to them (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010, Scudder 5 It is estimated that large dams have negatively affected at least 472 million downstream re sidents (Richter 2010).


31 1973). Impoverishment also begins during this phase a s government and private investment cease. R esidents stop maintaining their homes in the event that they will lose everything during r elocation, spatial mobility is reduced in order to maintain a physical presence to assure resettlement compensation, and social systems like store credit and landlord renter relationships break down under the uncertainty of future events (Bartolom e 1984, M cCully 2001). During the construction phase of a dam, a flood of workers and equipment, along with the infrastructure necessary to support both, arrive to the area. While this may create a temporary glut of construction and service jobs, the influx of new comers also disrupts local social systems and has been correlated with an increase in health problems, including sexually transmitted diseases and malaria (Kedia 2010, WCD 2000). Traditional livelihoods, economic systems, and land use are disrupted as the construction project dominates the landscape. It is also during this time that communities in the future reservoir zone begin the stressful process of planning for their imminent relocation and negotiating compensation, assuming that they have not made the decision to resist displacement (a decision that brings with it an entirely new set of stresses and risks). 6 After construction is completed, populations both downstream and upstream of the dam face dramatically new social and environmental contexts. Downstream, communities must make livelihood adjustments due to alterations in their social and natural environments, including human population movements and changes in fisheries, 6 See Dwivedi 1997 for an excellent discussion of the decision making process involved in the choice to resist displacement.


32 species composition, stream flows, water quality, natural flood regimes, an d estuarine and marine ecosystems (Scudder 2005, Tsikata 2006, WCD 2000). This adjustment can also take the form of migration from the area, a form of indirect displacement that Penz by e direct for Meanwhile, upstream populations are faced with the Herculean task of reconstructing their personal and communal lives in an entirely new place. In fact, it is the displacement and resettlement of upstream communiti es that has former senior sociologist at the World Bank, orced population displacement caused by dam construction is the single most serious counter dev Compensation for displacement, if available at all , ranges from cash buyouts to facilitated relocation, neither of which has been particularly successful in restoring or improvi ng livelihoods, and thus preventing impoverishment, among displacees (Cernea and Mathur 2008). 7 Cernea (2008:8 9) argues that this is because the principle of displaced: thi s is only a restitution of what was taken away (very often, an incomplete Cash based compensation is widely accepted as the lesser prefe rred option, particularly in rural areas with agricultural economies, because it often leads to the wholesale dismantling of communities as individuals are forced to seek 7 Fernandes (2004) notes that most people displaced by development projects in India have not been offer ed any form of compensation.


33 available land elsewhere. Furthermore, the payments are often not sufficient to repla ce expropriated lands (Avinash 1997 , Cernea 1990, McCully 2001). On the other hand, land for land compensation in the form of facilitated relocation, while preferred in terms of preserving community integrity, has tended to result in increasing levels of p overty and decreasing levels of well being and social cohesion (cf. Acselrad and da Silva 2000, Hamilton 1993, Rapp 2000, Robinson 2000). According to Thayer comparative survey of 50 cases of dam induced resettlement since 1936, in only five case s were living standards restored post development, and in only three cases were living standards improved (Scudder 2005:61). One reason for the abysmal track record of development forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR) is its inherent complexity moving people from one place to another simultaneously involves social, cultural, economic, and political issues (de Wet 2006). Oliver Smith (2002:10) calls resettlement that it affects all aspects of individual and c ommunity life. DFDR results in the loss of material assets like homes, land, businesses, subsistence resources (including common property resources), and cultural sites. It also causes the loss of non material assets like social ties and networks, leadersh ip and political structure, cultural and group identi ty, and world view (Asian Development Bank 1998 cited in Downing and Garcia Downing 2010:226; Oliver Smith 2010a). Involuntary resettlement is distinguished in intensity from other circumstances characte rized by rapid change (e.g., voluntary relocation for employment opportunities or what Downing and Garcia Downing (2010 :229 First, all of its impacts occur simultaneously (de Wet 20 06, Downing and Garcia -


34 Downing 2010). Second, the simultaneous impacts affect the entire population (Scudder 2005), albeit differentially based on gender, age, health, socioeconomic status, etc. (Cernea 1997, Dwivedi 1997). Finally, the impacts are imposed upon the affected Smith 2005a:191, 2010b). The sudden, complete, and uncontrollable disruption of the routine that makes life predictable a nd decipherable leaves resettled communities in a state of shock from which it is difficult to recover (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010). The material and e conomic i mpacts of r esettlement The material impoverishment associated with DFDR results from the lo ss of assets, loss of access to the means of production, and unsatisfactory options for replacement. Displacees lose physical assets like homes, businesses, and community infrastructure (churches, schools, health clinics, etc.). While resettlement programs generally prioritize the restoration of these assets, planning, budgeting, and institutional problems have been known to cause significant delays and negatively affect the quality of resettlement efforts (Hamilton 1993, Robinson 1991, Scudder 1973). Mate rial losses are exacerbated by economic losses from displacement, including diminishing livelihood and income options due to the loss of jobs , loss of access to landholdings and common property resources ( e.g., forests, grazing or agricultural lands, fishe ries, etc.), and changes in the control of productive resources (McCully 2001, WCD 2000). Increased indebtedness is also a common outcome of resettlement, as people are shifted from subsistence to market economies (McCully 2001). For the purposes of agricu lture, non riparian replacement land is likely to be less fertile than river basin land, thus diminishing productivity in the resettlement zone. It is


35 also often difficult for resettlement agencies to secure sufficient replacement land to make agricultural economies viable (McCully 2001). Furthermore, in some cases, the areas that are available for resettlement projects are already inhabited, leading to even more competition for livelihood resources (Bartolome et al. 2000, Scudder 2005). W hile material and economic losses affect all displacees, women tend to be worse off than men after resettlement. This occurs for a variety of reasons. I n many societies, women tend to make greater use o f common property areas for collecting water , fuelwood , and plants than do men. They therefore experience the loss of these assets more acutely (McCully 2001). Additionally, existing resettlement policy and related guidelines do not seriously take gender i Involuntary Resettlement makes no reference to gender and mentions women only once (Clark 2009). In implementing resettlement programs, resettlers are generally assumed to be male (Mehta 2009a ), and land titles are often placed in the name of the male head of household (Clark 2009). Payments are also usually made to the male heads of household with the expectation that benefits will be transferred to all members of the household (Mehta 2009 b ), Finally, c ompensation packages are generally offered at the household, not individual level, and thus do not necessarily lihoods (Clark 2009). Despite the known risks of material and economic impoverishment that stem from resettlement , resettlement agencies tend to believe their responsibilities end upon the completion of the resettlement action plan or construction phase o f the project


36 (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010). This leaves resettlers without institutional assistance at precisely the point at which they are most vulnerable immediately after resettlement. The rebuilding of local livelihood systems that may serve to m itigate impoverishment requires time and more resources than agencies generally have at their disposal. While adequate compensation for losses is a key step in the resettlement process, it is not sufficient to meet the policy goal of enabling resettlers to reestablish and improve their livelihoods (Cernea 2003 , 2008 ) . 8 A more comprehensive approach to resettlement resettlement with development is a longer term option that may aid the reestablishment of viable livelihoods among resettled populations. Thi s process begins with adequate mechanisms to ensure the participation of all affected groups in the planning and implementation of resettlement and development programs, and the establishment of a competent body in each region or country that can provide i ndependent monitoring and evaluation of the resettlement process (Bartolome et al. 2000). This would ensure that resettlement programs are meeting the basic needs of the affected populations. Scudder (2005 , c hapter 4) also argues that current best practice s involve concrete economic development opportunities, such as including resettlers as shareholders and co managers of resettlement funds and joint business ventures, extending irrigation benefits to resettlers (for dams that have an irrigation component), encouraging diverse rain fed agricultural systems, making better use of reservoir draw down zones and fisheries, and providing job training. Many of these 8 44).


37 efforts are relatively new, however, and their potential for success is still being evaluated. The i mportance of material reconstruction after involuntary resettlement cannot be understated. As Oliver Smith (2005b) argues, material reconstruction and community empowe rs the process of social reconstruction. Similarly, economic reconstruction (i.e., Smith 2005b:53). The non m aterial impacts of r esettlement The majority of resettlement scholarship and practice has focused on the material impoverishment associated with DFDR, leading to important advances in addressing material reconstruction by way of compensating for losses, r estoring livelihoods, and sharing project benefits. Less studied (or perhaps studiously avoided, at least by project developers) but equally important are the non material and non economic effects of involuntary resettlement. These include impacts to reset cultural systems and physical and psychological well being. Downing and Garcia Downing characterize the non material impacts of s ocio 225). They describe the process of involuntary displacem ent as one that transforms routine culture into dissonant culture. Routine culture is the set of the constructs and rules that allow a particular group of people to answer fundamental questions about themselves, such as ( Downing and Garcia Downing 2010: 228). The constructs that provide the answers to


38 these questions are embedded in places, s ymbols, language, resources, and kinship categories, and the answers themselves provide individuals and communities with a routine that is predictable, though not static. es meaningful until it can be placed in a context of habits of feeling, principles of conduct, attachments, purposes, conceptions new experiences depends on their ability to place those experiences within a familiar construction of reality (Marris 1974). Involuntary displacement and resettlement profoundly disrupts these structures of interpretation. It destabilizes routine culture and creates a dissonant culture characte psycho socio Downing and Garcia Downing 2010: 230). the affective bond to a location produced through so cial activity leading to a fundamental crisis of individual and collective identity (Low and Altman 1992, Turton 2005) . Routines fall apart ; life becomes unpredictable and, in a sense, loses its meaning . Eventually , be cause the cultural dissonance becomes intolerable, a new routine culture emerges, sometimes similar to and sometimes different from the original routine culture. Marris (1974:35) expression of a prof ound conflict between contradictory impulses to consolidate all that is still valuable and important in the past . . . and at the same time, to re establish a dissonan t culture to a new routine culture involves the restoration of continuity by linking


39 the past to the present and reinterpreting the structures of purpose and attachment that make life predictable and intelligible. According to Downing and Garcia Downing, t he goal of resettlement projects should be to minimize the disruption of routine culture to the greatest extent possible, and to facilitate the emergence of a new routine culture. And Marris (1974:61 62) argues that the more adaptable the new location is t o the previous way of life, including prior patterns of social interaction, the easier it will be for resettlers to make sense of their new environment because it will not require a radical revision of their constructions of reality. Scudder takes a simi lar approach to the non material impacts of involuntary resettlement , characterizing them composed of three categories: physiological, psychological, and socio cultural. Physiological stress refers to the health conse quences of resettlement, including increased morbidity and mortality from exposure to new diseases; malnutrition; inadequate or contaminated food and water supplies; the spread of disease due to increases in population density; and exposure to water borne illnesses like malaria (and other mosquito borne diseases), schistosomiasis, and gastroenteritis (Kedia 2010, McCully 2001:80, Scudder 2005b:24). Psychological stress involves grieving for a lost home, including the culturally relevant artifacts and symbo ls embedded therein for example, burial grounds or landscape features with cultural significance (Scudder 2005). As previously mentioned, p between space, time, kin, commu nity, cosmology, and tradition that aid in the formation of individual and collective identity (Oliver Smith 2005b:48). Psychological stress also involves anxiety over the future, as normal routines are disrupted and future routines


40 are still unknown (Scud der 2005). Kedia (2010) report ed higher levels of depression displaced people. This depression was manifested in sleep problems and feelings of guilt, worry, and hopelessness. Socio cult ural stress is caused by the fact that resettlement threatens a livelihood strategies systems that once provided a sense of individual and community identity. This process i s often made more difficult by conflicts with host communities, who may be opposed to sharing land and resources with new arrivals. Resettlers may also lose practices that affirm cultural identity, such as rituals, customs, or histories that are place or c ontext specific (Oliver Smith 2010a, Scudder 2005). Finally, at a time when strong leadership and community cohesiveness is critical, resettlement may cause breakdowns in traditional leadership and political structures. Leaders who attempt to make the best of resettlement by negotiating for better compensation or project benefits may be seen as siding with the developers and thus lose the trust of their constituents (Scudder 2005). On the other hand, leaders who are opposed to resettlement but who are unabl e to prevent it are seen as powerless, unable to protect powerlessness extends not only to leaders, but also to the community as a whole. As Oliver ement is one of the most acute expressions of (2002:2). Scudder (1973) argues that this feeling can limit the adaptive capacity of


41 resettlers for a significant period of time , further exacerbating the material impoverishment associated with resettlement. Downing and Garcia material physical, emotio nal, and socio cultural well being. Following this line of reasoning, Penz et al. (2011) argue that approach is also a useful tool for importance such as the ability to obtain adequate nutrition, to avoid premature mortality and excessive morbidity, to become educated, and to take part in public life without shame being . The capability, or the freedom, to achieve the functionings that are valuable to a person or group of people constitutes their ability to live well (i.e., to have well being) (Sen 1992). In both material and non material senses, resettlement can undermine or create obstacles to this capability and th being . The capability approach, then, allows for the evaluation of the impacts of resettlement to extend beyond physical or economic indicators, and more broadly encompass the full impact of resettlement on individuals, families, and communities (Penz et al. 2011:175). As previously stated, the non material impacts of DFDR have been understudied, principally because they are difficult to quantify and even more difficult to resolve. In response, Downing and Garcia Downing (2010) off er some suggestions, including adding psycho socio cultural objectives to resettlement policies and plans and providing opportunities for displacees to participate in resettlement planning in order to give them some sense of control over the process. Addit ionally, the reconstitution of


42 individual and community identity and well being may be aided by effective material reconstruction. Oliver resettlement projects is a system in which people can materiall y sustain themselves Dams and Decision Making: Cost Benefit Analysis, Commensuration, and the Ethics of Development The sense of powerlessness experienced by people who face involuntar y resettlement is not unjustified. In many ways, displacees are at the mercy of political systems that exert their power by moving people and things around the landscape in the name of the common good (de Wet 2010, Oliver Smith 2010a). In doing so, the sta te push for development (Ramanathan 2006). Displacees decision making that privileges economics over so cial issues in determining whether dam projects should proceed. This decision making framework tends to emphasize how a project will benefit the broader society and minimizes (or externalizes) the tangible and intangible costs of displacing local communiti es. Thus, despite the grave social and environmental consequences of building large dams, these projects continue to proliferate in the name of economic progress. The utilitarian notion of doing the greatest good for the greatest number is the dominant nor mative ethical position employed in decision making about large dam projects (Penz et al. 2011) benefits are each added up. If the sum of the benefits is greater than the sum of the


43 costs, the project is considered to be a justifiable endeavor. CBA is promoted as an objective, technical, democratic, and apolitical decision making tool (The Corner House 1999). Despit e its image as an efficient and scientific method for making decisions, however, CBA is plagued by a number of important problems. First, because the goal of CBA is to minimize costs and maximize benefits, CBAs for large dams tend to inflate benefits and u nderestimate costs. Included in this underestimation is frequently a massive undercounting of the total number of people to be resettled and the costs that resettlement entails (McCully 2001). For example, Cernea (1990) recounts that the feasibility study found that almost half of the active projects expected to displace at least 200 people did not inclu de resettlement plans ( World Bank 1996: 129). Second, CBA does not deal with the distribution of costs and benefits. In other words, who pays the cost and who reaps the benefits of development projects? In the case of large dams, those who suffer the great est costs are rarely those who stand to benefit from the project, and those who lose the most are usually from the poorest and most marginalized sectors of society (McCully 2001). In forcing people from their homes and demanding that they reinvent their li velihoods elsewhere, usually without adequate compensation, displacement demands a disproportionate contribution to development requires an equitable allocation of the burden of development (Penz et al. 2011). CBA does not adequately address this dilemma.


44 measured using the same numeric yardstick. To allow for this, all costs and benefits mu st undergo a process of commensuration, in which their value is transformed from their normal unit of measurement in to a single standard unit usually a price in monetary terms (Espeland 1998). As David Pearce (quoted in Adams 1996:1) puts it, However , many of the costs and benefits associated with dam projects (e.g., aesthetics, ecosystem health, quality of life, health risks, etc.) are not market items and thus do not have a generally accepted price or other quantifia ble unit of measurement. To deal with this problem, economists have developed methods to assess the value of intangibles. Known as contingent valuation, affected people are asked how much they would be willing to pay (WTP) to prevent losses or willing to a ccept (WTA) as compensation for losses (Oliver Smith 2002). While both questions force the artificial valuation of non market items, economists generally ability to pa y (Adams 1996). In practice, neither method provides particularly meaningful answers (Adams 1996). 9 Nevertheless, the resulting values continue to be used in CBA. things that simply or experiences believed to have an intrinsic worth that cannot be expressed in terms of any other type of value (Espeland 1998). The se include lives, friendships, or the 9 An alternative method, proposed by Penz et al. (2011:72), suggests treating resettlement as voluntary and asks how much the resettler would need in order to not feel worse off. Of course, relying on voluntary resettlement carries its own set of limitations, including the risk of resettlers making exorbitant demands and thus single handedly vetoing beneficial development projects (Penz 2011:73).


45 symbolic or sacre d meaning tied to land or landscapes. Incommensurables are often culturally specific and play an important role in defining identity and relationships. To put a price on these items is morally offensive; most people faced with having to do so will refuse. Arizona is illustrative of this point. When faced with being forced from their ancestral lands, a Yavapai teenager said , ( Espeland 1 998:183). At the same time, the refusal to allow for commensuration defies nal . An obvious stalemate ensues. Ultimately, CBA cannot deal with situations characterized by plural values . T hough each value system may have its own internal logic, only the form of rationality that facilitates commensuration is considered to be useful (Lohmann 1997). The problems inherent in CBA lead to an important point, one that is particularly relevant in the debate over large dams. Alt hough CBA it cannot in fact lead a society with pluralistic values to a valid conclusion about whether a given develo project can be both. Therein lies the dilemma surrounding large dams. Development human well being frustratingly complicated. food, and shelter, thus addressing one of the overarching goals of development practic e. The right to development has long been established in international human


46 rights law, most notably through the United Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development. At the same time, the people displ aced by mega development projects face almost certain impoverishment , thus undermining their human rights as described in the same documents. 10 Article 2 of the Declaration on the Right to Development states: States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of t he benefits resulting therefrom. (United Nations, General Assembly 1986) Article 8 states: States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization o f the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of o pportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income . (United Nations, General Assembly 1986) Despite the distributive approach to development called for in these a rticles, however, most development projects have been conceived in terms of economic returns rather than emphasizing participation, equity, and universal well being (Oliver Smith 2010a). In the pursuit of well being for the entire population, t hose that ar e harmed by development do not have fewer rights than those that are helped, or vice versa. 10 Other key international human rights laws and guidance that explicitly defend the rights of people threatened by displacement include the 1989 International Labor Organization Convention No. 169, which affirms the right of indigenous peoples not to be removed from their lands without free and informed consent; the 1997 UN Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on Development Based Displac ement, which allows for forced evictions only in exceptional circumstances and gives displacees the right to all relevant information, the right to propose alternatives, the right to full participation and consultation throughout the process, and the right to arbitration by an independent body in the event that agreement cannot be reached; and the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which calls for avoiding or minimizing displacement; participation of displacees in their relocation; and spe cial protections for indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists, and other groups with special attachments to their lands.


47 Nevertheless, in the traditional conceptualization of the large dams debate , both of these parties cannot win. De Wet (2010) argues that the criteria available to m ake the necessary choices are unsatisfactory. It is impossible to consistently apply ethical standards (i.e., standards based on human rights) because the granting of rights to some implies the denial of rights to others. Similarly, it is impossible to con sistently apply the principles of utilitarianism because of the aforementioned limitations of cost benefit analysis. The development ethics framework proposed by Penz et al. (2011) may provide a path out of this stalemate. The central principle of this ri ghts based approach is that development is a worthy social goal only if it satisfies seven core values, including human well being and security, equity, empowerment (through participation), cultural freedom, human rights, environmental sustainability, and integrity regarding corruption (Penz et al. 2011:11). Under this framework, economic growth is not a suitable development goal in the absence of the seven core values. The development ethics approach requires that proposals for development projects undergo public deliberation, where the need for the projects is justified on more than economic grounds and accepted by those whom the project will negatively affect. However, as opposed to the strict application of ethical standards, leading to the stalemate tha t de Wet predicts (i.e., any harm to anyone is unacceptable), the development ethics framework proposed by Penz et al. suggests that imposing sacrifices on some for the greater good of national development may be acceptable as long as those sacrifices are allocated equitably, rather than arbitrarily. In other words, this approach leaves room for forced displacement in cases where it can be shown to be necessary through fair public


48 deliberation. Importantly, however, forced displacement is only acceptable if the following rights of displacees are protected: 1) to be free from losses resulting from displacement, 2) to share equitably in benefits of the development, 3) not to be forcibly displaced except for development that can be demonstrated (in fair public deliberation) to meet the standards of responsible development; and 4) to be empowered sufficiently to obtain equitable outcomes (Penz et al. 2011:153 154). Another key feature of the ethics framework is the idea that involuntary resettlement may be avoide d entirely if the compensation offered is high enough that affected people see voluntary relocation as an opportunity to improving their well being (Penz et al. 2011). However, if a strong ancestral attachment to the land precludes moving (as in the case o f indigenous peoples), relocating the dam should be considered (Goodland 2010). This proposal for an ethics based approach to development may encourage a new approach to development planning in the future. Traditionally, however, the utilitarian approach embodied by CBA has been favored , as evidenced by the continued approval of mega development projects that generate economic returns (at least in theory) but also inflict significant harm on displacees . Furthermore, given the complexities of employing an ethics based approach, not the least of which is gaining the support of mega development advocates, such as project financiers and national governments, CBA is likely to continue to dominate in development decision making. Under the status quo, then, devel opment that causes human displacement and resettlement is likely unavoidable . This fact underscores the need for strong resettlement policy, the topic of the following section .


49 Resettlement Policy: Advances and Limitations Resettlement policy began to rec eive increased attention in the 1970s. The push for policy improvement was encouraged by two parallel activities. The first was a research focus on resettlement that had begun in the 1950s, which revealed that almost without exception involuntary resettlem ent led to material impoverishment and heightened individual and collective stress among displaced populations (c.f. Chambers 1969, Colson 1971, Guggenheim and Cernea 1993, Hansen and Oliver Smith 1982, Scudder 1973). This research was particularly common in countries in which large infrastructure projects were being funded by national, international, and multilateral sources, as those funding entities encouraged the production of feasibility studies and project evaluations (Oliver Smith 2005a). In addition , non governmental organizations (NGOs) that worked with displaced peoples had also become interested in documenting the effects of DFDR (Oliver Smith 2005a). Widely accepted as a violation of basic human rights, the overwhelmingly negative outcomes of pla nned resettlement encouraged important efforts to strengthen resettlement policy at both the international and domestic levels. The second activity was the increasingly frequent phenomenon of resistance to displacement . Driven by the rise of environmentali sm in the 1970s; the overthrow of authoritarian regimes; improvements in communication technologies; and the global spread of norms and principles regarding the environment, human rights, and indigenous peoples, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new, powerful, and increasingly interconnected transnational civil society (Khagram 2004, McCully 2001). By the late 1980s, virtually every proposal for a large dam was met with opposition, both from directly affected people and grassroots groups and from their


50 national and international allies. At its core, the opposition to large dams was rooted in a critique of dominant development models that emphasize large scale interventions at the expense of local people and the environment (Khagram 2004, Olive r Smith 2010b). T hese resistance movements made the plight of displaced peoples visible on the international stage and brought attention to the failings of resettlement policies and practices (Oliver Smith 2005a). Th is combination of research and activism was critical to illuminating the failings of resettlement and encouraging improvements in the policy arena. Spearheading this process was the World Bank, which became interested in policy improvements in the 1970s and produced the first resettlement guide lines in 1980 (Cernea 2003, Scudder 2005). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Asian Development Bank, and the Inter American Development Bank soon followed with similar guidelines (Oliver Smith 2010a). The first iteration of the se resettlement guidelines, however, was not particularly strong. Specifically, they required only the restoration of living standards of resettled people, rather than the improvement of living y goal was stren ll involuntary resettlement operations should be simply restoring living standards was still in place (World Bank 1986 cited in Cernea Involuntary Resettlement, was produced in 1990 and called for minimizing resettlement where possible, community participation in resettlement planning and implementatio n, the development of a resettlement plan prior to resettlement, improving or restoring


51 living standards, compensation for lost assets, and resettlement with development including benefits sharing with resettlers ( Koenig 2002 , Oliver Smith 2010a, Scudder 2 005 wording, the option of restoring, not improving, living standards still remained. OD 4.30 ch required that displacees demonstrate legal title to receive compensation for their land and focused only on the direct economic and social impacts of resettlement while ignoring cultural and psychological damages (Scudder 2005). 11 D espite their limitati ons , the standard by which to evaluate other institutional guidelines and projects, though the extent to which the increasing number of projects funded by the private sector will be held to these sta nd ards remains closely watched (Koenig 2002, Scudder 2005). 12 The Bank (along with other funders) has also begun financing resettlement separately from construction costs, a significant shift from the former system in which resettlement funding and implementa tion were seen as the obligation of borrower nations (Scudder 2005). It has also encouraged the development and implementation of resettlement legislation at the national level, involving large rese ttlement operations unless the government concerned adopts 11 OP/BP 4.12 was most recently modified in 2011 to require (a) the establishment of an escrow account before proceeding w ith the taking of land and related assets in the event that an affected person rejects an offer of compensation that has been made in accordance with an improved resettlement plan and (b) that the costs for grievance procedures be included in the total pro ject cost. 12 projects [financial institutions] finance are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management pract , www.equator ). The Principles are based on the International Finance Co r September 9 , 201 3 , 7 8 financial institutions had a dopted the Principles.


52 (World Bank 1996:183). This proclamation, in tandem with domestic tensions and conflicts regarding resettlement, h as spurred the development of national policies in Braz il, Colombia, Mexico, China, India, and perhaps other countries as well (Oliver Smith 2005a, Penz et al. 2011, Scudder 2005). Adequate resettlement policies, however, mean very little if they are not c onsistently and rigorou sly implemented. Whether successful implem entation is actually possible remains a matter of considerable debate. In fact, the limitations to implementing resettlement policy often seem to outweigh the effort that has gone in to desig ning the policies themselves, as evidenced by the paucity of successful resettlement efforts. These limitations fall into two broad categories: administrative and economic. The principal administrative factor that limits the successful implementation of r esettlement policies is the lack of institutional capacity to carry out the work. Large infrastructure projects tend to be called for and designed by agencies that are charged with infrastructure installation . These agencies typically have few, if any, soc ial or environmental scientists on staff (Ericksen 1999, Koenig 2002). Th e result is an engineering bias in the project design phase , to the detriment of addressing social variables (Cernea 1990, Scudder 2005). The lack of agency staff with the skills and time necessary to carry out successful resettlement efforts results in poor planning and coordination , with the ultimate effect of reducing resettlement to relocation (i.e., getting people out of the way of t he project) (de Wet 2006 ). The lack of staff cap acity also leads to inadequate or non existent baseline and pre project surveys of the affected


53 populations . This results in an information vacuum regarding the number of people to be displaced, economic activities and income levels, livelihood strategies, resource use, and socio cultural features (Scudder 2005:280). In addition, incorporating resettlers into the resettlement planning and implementation process takes staff time and money that are frequently not budgeted for during the project design phase ( Scudder 2005). Finally, resettlement efforts can suffer if the institutions implementing the resettlement lack legitimacy, policy mandates, political will, or are governed by conflicting laws and regulations (Koenig 2002, Scudder 2005). Another administrat ive factor that limits the implementation of successful resettlement has to do with the project cycle. A long planning horizon of 10 20 years for many dam projects places communities within the future reservoir zone in the seemingly endless position of not wanting to make investments in their current context (e.g., businesses or infrastructure improvements) but simultaneously being unable to move forward in the new resettlement site. T h is limbo can cause living standards to drop even before resettlement (Sc udder 2005:279). Once funding is secured for a project, agency staff are under pressure to move forward with the project, often to the detriment of the time intensive process of involving resettlers in project planning and implementation (Scudder 2005). Fi nally, the notion that institutional responsibilities end once construction is complete leaves resettlers with little support post resettlement (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010). The paucity of medium term evaluations (five to ten years after the project i s completed) obscures the real difficulties faced by resettled populations, including the decline in living standards in the aftermath of resettlement (Scudder 2005). All too frequently, the failure of resettlers to thrive after resettlement is


54 attributed to their inability to take advantage of the opportunities offered them, rather than to problems with resettlement design and implementation (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010). Finally, the administrative limitations to implementing resettlement policy i nclude some basic flaws in how institutional obligations regarding resettlement are conceptualized at both the policy and administrative levels. Scudder (2005) argues that resettlement cannot be successfully implemented because the policy goal of simply re storing livelihoods almost always leaves resettlers worse off than before resettlement. The emphasis on restoration of living standards creates a focus on compensation, while a policy goal of improving living standards would encourage a focus on developmen t options and benefits shari ng. Nevertheless, restoration remains the preferred option from an institutional standpoint because it is less expensive and less time consuming (Scudder 2005:279 280). The economic limitations to implementing resettlement pol icy are closely linked to the administra tive issues. The most basic economic factor consist s of a lack of funding for resettlement. At times, this a budgeting issue, such as when resettlement is an afterthought of a proposed project and thus receives very little of the project budget, or when overruns in construction costs force a reallocation of budgeted funds (Scudder 1997). Budgetary problems are also created by the undercounting of the number of people a given project will displace and by an underestima tion of the funding necessary to adequately implement a longer term vision of resettlement as a development proje ct (Cernea 1990, de Wet 2006, McCully 2001 ). Additionally, the inability of contemporary economic valuation tools like cost benefit analysis to take into account all of the


55 counter development al impacts of DFDR also constitutes an economic limitation to those impacts it is able to capture (Cernea 1990). Along a somewhat differe nt line, overly optimistic estimates of the viability of economic activities post resettlement also limit the success of resettlement once it is completed (McCully 2001). Resettlement agencies are also often slow to allocate project assets to resettlers, t hus limiting their economic and livelihood options post resettlement (Scudder 2005). Ultimately, the problems associated with implementing resettlement projects call into question the entire practice of resettlement. O liver Smith asks c onstraints against engaging in actions for which the competence to achieve successful addressing the aforementioned institutional and economic limitations is all that is need potential explanations for the general failure of resettlement planning. The first, which he key problems confronting resettle ment are seen as . . . problems that can be dealt with through the reform of this approach indicates that the economic and institutional limitations discussed above are , in a sense, fixable. The inadequate inputs approach is generally accepted by project financiers and planners to explain the failings of resettlement. second T here is a complexity in resettlement, which arises from the interrelatedness of a range of factors of different orders: cultural, social,


56 environmental, economic, institution and political all of which are taking place in the context of imposed spatial change and of local 2006:190). This complexity renders some aspects of the resettlement process resistant to rational planning. In the end, de Wet argues, insisting on rational planning pr ocedures despite the complexities of resettlement increases the likelihood that resettlement will fail. Instead, he proposes a more comprehensive, participatory, and open ended approach to planning and decision making that deals with both the issues of ina dequate inputs and inherent complexities. A discussion of resettlement policy would be incomplete without expanding upon the issue of stakeholder participation, particularly given its central role in contemporary development discourse. The concept of parti cipation was derived from critiques of top down development models in the 1970s and 1980s, and is now ubiquitous in development plans and policies (Gardner and Lewis 1986). The rationale behind participation is that by giving local people a voice in the pl anning and implementation of development projects, they will form a vested interest in the success of those projects. The right to participate in decision making regarding development has since been established both in international human rights law and in the resettlement policies developed by financing institutions. The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, s, General Assembly 1986:Art


57 participate in planning and implementing resettlement pro 2). There is a considerable lack of clarity, however, about what participation actually means in the context of development planning and implementation. The debate centers on what purpose participation serves (or should serve) and, correspondingly, what type of participation is required to satisfy that purpose. On one side of the discussion are those who believe that participation should give individuals and communities a real voice (and real power) in decision making about the development planning that directly affects them. On the other side are those who see participation merely as a bureaucratic mechanism for achieving local support for projects that have already been decided upon in the traditional top down fashion (Oliver S mith 2010a, Penz et al. 2011). Because of the lack of clarity surrounding the definition of participation, and the difficulty to describe a broad spectrum of activitie s, from own initiatives to simply providing communities with information about a given project . Penz et al. (2011:113) argue that the internal resettlement policies used by development banks tend to fall on the less participatory end of this spectrum, with perspective is also illustrated by the Worl consultation indigenous peoples (World Bank 2005: Art. 20), rather than the international standard of consent stablished in International Labor Organization


58 Convention No. 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Labour Organization 1989; Goodland 2010; United Nations, General Assembly 2007:Art. 10). This semantic difference cl early demonstrates the distinct interpretations of participation held by indigenous peoples and development institutions (Oliver Smith 2010a). Furthermore, the Bank does not offer clear standards to demonstrate that even consultation has occurred (Goodland 2010). With regard to the decision making process surrounding large dams, the final Dams and Development : A New Framework for Decision Making , has been hailed as having the most comprehensive, systematic, and participatory approach to dam building to date (Goodland 2010). In addition to presenting a set of core values by which large dams should be evaluated (including participatory decision making, equity, efficiency, accountability and sustainability), the re port also identifies a sequence of decision points at which negotiated agreements among all stakeholders are required before moving to the next stage. These stages include: 1. Needs assessment: Stakeholders, including potential outstees, are identified, and a consultative forum is established in which the needs for water, power, and flood control are verified and development objectives for the region are set. 2. Selecting alternatives: Stakeholders participate in creating the inventory of options (including opt ions other than dams); assessing those options through social and environmental impact studies; and negotiating the outcomes that affect them, including compensation, mitigation, resettlement, development, and monitoring measures. 3. Project preparation: Leg ally enforceable contracts between the developer and entitlements as determined in the prior phase. No construction contracts can be granted until these commitments are in place. 4. P roject implementation and operation: Prior to licensing the dam for operation, all social and environmental commitments must be fulfilled.


59 By requiring negotiated agreements among project stakeholders at each stage, potential outstees are given a concret e role in the decision making process surrounding development in general, not just resettlement. The negotiation and arbitration process recommended by the report also converts the generic and declaratory rights established by human rights instruments such as the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, and the Rio Declaration of 1992 into specific and legally enforceable rights for all of the stakeholders in a development process (Penz et al. 2011). Upo n its release, the WCD report was critiqued on a number of fronts, including its lack of acknowledgement of power imbalances that can distort participatory processes and its treatment of all stakeholders as equals despite major differences in the magnitude of impacts the project may impose (e.g., some will lose their livelihoods if the dam is built while others may stand to gain only modest increases in well being). In implemented with moderate success. While it has not led to the creation of regulatory guidelines as anticipated, it has sparked new ideas and encouraged higher standards in a variety of sectors, including development institutions, private industry, and national gover nments (Moore et al. 2010). Of course, the recommendations in the WCD report have also encountered significant roadblocks. Perhaps the most prominent of these was Water Resour ces Sector Strategy than devising new mechanisms for stakeholder participation in the development process


60 (Goodlan d 2010, Penz et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the WCD report is still considered to be a landmark document in that it calls for a much more robust stakeholder participation than any other guidelines to date. As such, discussions about how to continue implementi ng its recommendations, with modifications based on current social and environmental trends, are continuing (Moore et al. 2010). Frameworks for Understanding the Effects of Development Forced Displacement and Resettlement In addition to informing resettl ement policy and practice, the past six decades of negative (and, more rarely, positive) experience s with development forced displacement and resettlement have also led to important advances in two complementary conceptual frameworks for understanding how resettlement plays out on the ground in the short and long terms. While these frameworks are not without fault, they do serve important analytical, predictive, and planning functions. 13 They also play an important role in allowing resettlement policy makers , financiers, agencies, researchers, and activists to speak a common language about resettlement. In doing so, these conceptual frameworks have led to improvements in the way resettlement is conceived, understood, and implemented. The first of these framew orks is the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model, developed in the 1990s by sociologist Michael Cernea during his tenure at the World Bank. The model was inspired by an increasing disciplinary interest in risk and vulnerability (Oliver Smith 2005). Given that impoverishment is the most 13 that does not capture local understandings of loss or risk, address the social and demographic diversity among resettled populations, or critique hegemonic development models that rationalize the displacement of vulnerable groups in the name of economic gr owth (Mehta 2009b).


61 widespread effect of involuntary resettlement, Cernea (2000) argues that detailing impoverishment risks in an organized fashion can lead to the development of safeguards for poverty prevention. Based in a defin model highlights both economic and social risks experienced by individuals and communities during displacement and reestablis hment. In situations of forced displacement, these risks often occur simultaneously, resulting in crisis. The model nea 1997:1572): Landlessness: commercial activities, and livelihood systems. Joblessness: Opportunities for wage employment are lost and creating new jobs is difficult. Homelessness: The loss of housing affects people on both a material and symbolic level. While new houses can be constructed symbolizes the destruction of their sense of place and cultural space. Marginalization: This consists of the loss of economic p ower, which is often accompanied by social and psychological marginalization due to a drop in social status or the sensation of increased vulnerability. Food insecurity: Temporary or chronic undernourishment can be a result of drops in crop availability a nd/or household income. Increased morbidity and mortality: Declining health is related to social and psychological stress, insecurity, and the outbreak of illnesses. Loss of access to common property: The loss of access to common property assets (typicall y not compensated) or social services is a common consequence of displacement. Social disarticulation: The loss of social capital occurs when communities are fragmented, kinship groups are dispersed, and social support systems and networks are dismantled .


62 Key to the IRR model is the potential for risk reversal (Cernea 2000). The capacity to identify the most salient risks means that a plan can be put in place to overcome the pattern of impoverishment. In addition to this predictive function, Cernea (200 0:21) identifies three other functions of the IRR model: diagnostic, problem resolution, and research. As such, the model is useful to a broad range of actors. processes and risks that occur during and immediate ly after resettlement. I t does not , however, deal as effectively with the longer term issues a community face s during the extensive process of reconstruction post resettlement. To understand this longitudinal process, the Scu dder Colson four stage model of involuntary resettlement is more appropriate. The model was developed through w ork conducted over several decades by Scudder and Colson (1979) among populations displaced by hydro developm ent in Zambia. It is based on the co ncept of multi dimensional stress experienced by resettlers as they pass through the process of displacement and resettlement. 14 In contrast to the IRR model, which focuses on the institutional and planning aspects of resettlement, the Scudder model emphasi zes the agency of resettlers in the reconstitution of a viable community. The model consists of four stages, the last two of which are critical to the evaluation of the long term s uccess of resettlement projects: 1) planning and recruitment, 2) adjustment and coping, 3) economic development and community 14 Like the IRR model, the Scudder Colson model has also been subject to critiques. One criticism is concerned with its level of generalization and focus on the similarities, rather than the differences, in how people react to involunt ary resettlement. As such, critics claim it does not deal with the wide range of dynamic coping strategies exhibited by the wide variety of communities that have been displaced (Weist 1994:20 cited in Scudder 2005:43).


63 formation, and 4) handing over and incorporation. The following description of the four stages is largely drawn from Scudder 2005:33 41. During the first stage of the Scudder the development project and subsequent resettlement effort is conceptualized. This can be a time of great uncertainty if information about the project is not readily available and rumors begin to circulate. Scudder emphasizes the importance of involving affected people early in the planning and decision making process (though, as discussed in the previous section, this does not often occur in any real sense). Participatory planning during this stage is encouraged with the idea that locally viabl e development opportunities will enable resettlers to become project beneficiaries. Participation in project planning is also assumed to reduce the stress associated with their imminent resettlement. th the initiation of physical removal to the new resettlement site and can last anywhere from two to ten (or more) years. During this stage, living standards of the majority of resettlers tend to drop due to the multidimensional stress of resettlement, the process of adaptation to the new location (e.g., clearing new fields, building homes, new economic activities, new neighbors), and increased expenses and indebtedness. Resettlers also tend to be risk averse for at least a year after resettlement. In many cases, they attempt to recreate the old patterns of life, including replicating former house types, using known crop varieties and agricultural techniques, and establishing residences composed of familiar social units. This conservative strategy is a copin g response to the stress and uncertainty of moving to an unfamiliar place, where they must adjust to an entirely new physical,


64 social, and political environment. In his eloquent analysis of the role of grief in processes of change, Marris (1974: 160) argue changes on ourselves or others, we need to allow some kind of moratorium on other business, so that people can give their minds to repairing the thread of continuity in their eat into the familiar is an integral component of their grieving process, which will eventually allow them to move forward in their new lives. resettlers begin to feel more secure in their new environment, which opens a space for 111). They become less risk averse and begin to take advantage of development opportunities, if available. Development o pportunities must be sustainable and accompanied by the appropriate infrastructure (e.g., roads and market access), however, or resettlers run the risk of becoming increasingly impoverished. Social stratification and wealth differentials also tend to incre ase during this stage, as does the diversity of economic activities and investments. Increases in household earnings lead to improvements to living arrangements and the purchase of consumer goods. There is also a psychological shift during this stage, wher ways, naming landscape features, and incorporating the resettlement area into cultural expressions like dances and songs. Final ly, the third stage is characterized by increased attention to community formation activities, such as the establishment of


65 municipal councils; improvements to schools and clinics; and the reemergence of religious activities. Both old and new political leaders may also begin to act as representatives for resettler interests with project and government authorities. The final stage of the Scudder anding o ver and incorporation occurs when the resettlement areas and populations are integrated into the broader political economy of a region or nation. This requires three conditions. First, project assets and management responsibilities must have been handed over to the appropriate local or national authorities , either during this stage or in earlier stages. Second, household production activities and community leadership are assumed by the second generation of resettlers , whose living standards must continue to improve at least in line with neighboring communities . Finally, community members (likely led by t he second generation ) develop the political and institutional strength to compete for Scudder 2005:40). The util ity of the Scudder Colson four stage model lies in its diachronic nature. If one accepts the premise that the measure of successful resettlement is in what happens over the course of multiple generations, a longitudinal model becomes essential to both rese arch and practice. Therefore, while this dissertation will employ both the IRR model and the Scudder Colson model to evaluate the outcomes of the Arenal resettlement project, it will rely most heavily on the latter to inform the analysis of the long term s uccess of the project. Chapter Conclusion Broadly stated, t he purpose of the research presented in this dissertation is to advance our understanding of the long term consequences of DFDR. Long term evaluations can provide important lessons in all cases of involuntary resettlement , but


66 they are particularly important for the very few projects deemed t o be successful in the short term . The Arenal case provides such an opportunity having been given a positive evaluation at the five year mark, at which point it was considered to have entered th e third stage of the Scudder Colson four stage framework ( Partridge 1983, Scudder 2005) . Following the Scudder Colson model of involuntary resettlement, the quantitative aspects of the research presented here focus heavily on second generation resettlers as a measure of the success of the Arenal resettlement project. At the same time, the qualitative aspects of this research consider the e xperiences of all resettlers, as those experiences are critical to understanding what has happened in Nuevo Arenal over the course of 33 years . The structure of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss the theoretical and methodological approaches to this research. In Chapter 3, I present a brief history of hydropower devel opment in Costa Rica and discuss the research setting in detail, including the process of resettling Arenal and the immediate aftermath of resettlement. Chapters 4 and 5 use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data to detail the processes of econ omic, material, and social reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal and to discuss local perceptions of the long term outcomes of resettlement. Chapter 6 relies on quantitative data to assess the impacts of resettlement on the second generation and the factors that Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of whether the resettlement of Arenal can be considered a long term success, what lessons can be taken from this project, the extent to which the Scudder Colson model holds true in this case, and in what other contexts findings from research on DFDR may be applied.


67 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES Research Problem The preceding discussion of the issues surrounding de velopment, large dams, and DFDR was intended to present a picture of the complexity of these topics, both in translate these theoretical and practical issues into an ana lysis of how a subject is experienced by people at the local level. In that spirit, the research presented in this dissertation examines the long term outcomes of displacement and resettlement in the community of Nuevo Arenal, Costa Rica, which was relocat ed as a consequence of the construction of the Arenal Hydroelectric Project in 1977. The Arenal resettlement project has been recognized internationally for its proactive and well conceived approach to the relocation of communities displaced by the creatio n of Lake Arenal. It remains one of the few resettlement projects in the world in which the standard of living was thought to have increased for a majority of the residents five years after relocation (Partridge 1983 , Scudder 2005 ). B ecause resettlement cr eates long term impacts, however, assessing the success of resettlement projects on the basis of information gathered only a few years post resettlement is premature (Scudder 2005). Given that no further information has emerged about the Arenal project sin ce 1983, t he year in which the last evaluation was completed for the Inter American Development Bank , it therefore represents an important opportunity to evaluate the long term outcomes of an arguably well implemented resettlement plan. While the Scudder Colson four stage model of involuntary resettlement describes how successful community reconstruction might progress over the course of at least two


68 generations of resettlers, resettlement projects generally have been unsuccessful in facilitating the progression of communities through these stages. Successful resettlement projects (i.e ., those that achieve the final stage) are scarce. In a 2005 survey of 50 large dam induced resettlement projects ca rried out between 1936 2002, Scudder identified only three cases in which the majority of resettlers experienced an improved standard of living post resettlement (Arenal is included in this category, though it had only reached the third stage at the time o f last data collection) and five in which the standard of living was restored for the majority. Only 18 resettled communities had entered the fourth stage of the model at the time of last data collection. Based on these findings, Scudder ( 2010 ) specificall y calls for a study of the Arenal case, arguing that systematic research on potential success stories is important to the advancement of resettlement policy and theory. The research presented in this dissertation responds to this suggestion by using the S cudder Colson model to analyze the long term outcomes of resettlement in Nuevo Arenal in the 3 3 years after relocation. The central question of my research is whether the Arenal resettlement project can be deemed a long term success (i.e., whether the comm unity has entered the fourth stage of the model) and to what extent long term resettlement outcomes are a product of the resettlement project planning rather than the result of exogenous factors. Isolating outcomes attributable to project planning from out comes attributable to extraneous processes is a challenge in longitudinal studies such as this one, but is nevertheless necessary in order to generate widely applicable conclusions. This research also asks whether the second generation of resettlers has


69 ha d access to sufficient opportunities and resources to allow them to survive and prosper, both materially and socially, in the new community , as this is a sign of successful community reconstruction. 1 esettlement The goal of an ethically sound resettlement project should be to facilitate the process of community recovery after the trauma of displacement. But exactly what is it that needs reconstruction, and how will we know when we get there? This is to say, an analysis of itself is defined. The way in which community is conceptualized sets the benchmark for assessing whether or not the goal of reconstruction has been reached. While community has been defined in various ways and in many contexts, the definition that will be employed here must be relevant to the specific characteristics of DFDR. To begin, a definition of community appropriate to involuntary resettlement must include a physical component because displacement and resettlement, by their very nature, involve moving people from one place to another. Thus, the conceptualization of community employed in this dissertation includes the idea that community is a physical space with discrete boundari es, however arbitrary those boundaries may seem based 1 For the purposes of this study, first generation resettlers are defined as individuals who were 18 years of age or older at the time of resettlement. Their status as adults entitled them to receive resettlement project benefits. Second generation resettlers are defined as individuals who were 17 years of age or younger at the time of resettlement, or who were born a fter resettlement to a parent who was a first generation resettler. Immigrants are Costa Ricans or other Central Americans who arrived in Nuevo Arenal at any time after resettlement (including those who arrived immediately after resettlement but who were n ot entitled to resettlement compensation because they were not residents of one of the displaced communities). Foreign expatriates are a special category of immigrants, generally from developed countries, who immigrated to Nuevo Arenal because of its natur al amenities or the opportunities generated therefrom.


70 of a community after resettlement therefore must include an element of material reconstruction and the recovery o f an attachment to place. Indeed, as discussed previously, it is the material aspect of resettlement, though not necessarily the affective dimension of place attachment, that has been prioritized by resettlement authorities to date (Downing and Garcia Down ing 2010, Oliver Smith 2005b). Beyond the physical, the concept of community also has a symbolic component, which is equally important in reconstruction after resettlement. Cohen (1985) characterizes community as a system of values, norms, and moral co des that give people something in common, and that distinguishes them from other groups. Drawing Smith (2005b:54) extends this idea by arguing that shared understandings, histories, and life practices allow people to identify themse lves as a communities into an environment of uncertainty, undermines their capac ity to defend their interests. Social reconstitution after resettlement therefore involves a process through which the community develops a new identity and recovers the capacity to work toward satisfying the material and social needs of individuals and th e population as a whole. Both Oliver Smith (2005b) and Marris (1974) note that the idea of community as a group that can act on its own behalf does not mean that communities are homogenous or without conflict, a characterization that critics of community s tudies have cautioned against (c.f. Agrawal and Gibson 1999). In fact, I would argue that the diversity of interests within a community may aid in the identification of a broader array of needs or desires, particularly in a post resettlement context.


71 In s Smith 2005b:47). It is this combination of elements the material and the symbolic that involuntary resettlement disrupts and that should be the measure of community reconstruction after relocation. Successful resettlement must therefore consist of two processes, both of which have long term implications. First, it must involve the reconstruction of the material (in both the economic and physic al senses) in a way that can be sustained over time. Second, it must facilitate (or at the very least not impede) the rebuilding of the social, again in a manner that allows for continuity over time in order to facilitate the evolution of Smith 2005b:53 54). The third and fourth phases of the Scudder respectively) explicitly draw upon these aspects of c ommunity reconstruction. material ways, such as through the construction of infrast ructure that serves local second generation of resettlers as a measure of the long term sustainability of the processes that occur during the prior phase. According to t he Scudder Colson model, the fourth stage is achieved if the resettled community exhibits three key characteristics. First, project assets (e.g., infrastructure) and management responsibilities must be in the hands of the appropriate local or national auth orities, signifying that the community has transcended the dependence on the resettlement agency that can exist early in the


72 resettlement process. The capacity of the community to act on its own behalf is instrumental here, and is a measure of its social r econstitution. Second, the second generation of resettlers must have assumed leadership of the community or be in the process of doing so, and they must have a standard of living at least as good as that of neighboring communities. Finally, the second gene ration must be able to compete for Scudder 2005:40). In sum, the quality of life of second generation resettlers, their presence in key positions within the social fabric of the community, and their ability to acce ss resources necessary for survival is the ultimate measure of the success of the long term process of material and social reconstruction after resettlement. As such, the effects of resettlement on the second generation will be highlighted throughout this dissertation. Research Objectives and Hypotheses The overa ll objective of this research was to evaluate the success of the Arenal resettlement project by determining whether the resettled community of Nuevo Arenal has entered the final stage of the Scudde r Colson four stage model. This assessment was accomplished through a mixed methods approach that integrated qualitative and quantitative methodologies and was organized according to three specific objectives. My first research objective was to understand the evolution of the community from the point of last data collection in 1983 through today. Specifically, I was interested in understanding the processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction tion of Nuevo Arenal within the broader political economy of the region and nation; and the quality of life in Nuevo Arenal compared to other neighboring communities. Somewhat peripherally, but still important to my analysis of the long term effects of res ettlement, I was also interested in


73 Arenale ños objectives were accomplished through conducting life and community history interviews, carrying out a livelihood survey, constructing pers onal social networks, and participant observation. My second research objective was to identify the social p ositions occupied by first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers , and other residents (including third generation resettlers and immi grants) in order to a) evaluate whether community leade rship has been passed on from one gener ation to the next and b) identify whether second generation resettlers have sufficient access to the resources necessary to sustain their livelihoods. This involv ed constructing a whole social network for the community to compare the structural positions occupied by first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and other residents . My final research objective was to identify whether a relationship exi sts between factors rel evant to community reconstruction after resettlement . Based on the premise that occupying a highly central position in the social network is both socially and materially advantageous to an individual, I was interested in explaining how such a position could be achieved, the importance (or lack thereof) of generational status, and what factors other than generational status might have explanatory power. Again, following the Scudder Col son model, if a resettled community is to be sustainable over time, access to various types of resources should be useful to all community residents, including second generation resettlers and immigrants. Addressing this objective involved combining data f rom a livelihood survey with the previously collected whole social network data to cr eate an


74 ordinal logistic regression model. It also involved constructing personal social networks for a sample of the population in order to evaluate the association betwe en whole network centrality and access to people and resources outside the boundaries of the community. While the focus of this objective is on the individual, rather than the community, the ultimate intention was to determine which features of life in Nue vo products of the original resettlement plan or the subsequent processes of material and social reconstruction. Based on these three research objectives and f ollowing t he Scudder Colson four stage model, if the resettlement of Nuevo Arenal was successful (i.e., if second generation resettlers have access to resources sufficient to sustain their livelihoods), the f ollowing outcomes were expected: Hypothesis 1: The process es of economic, material, and social reconstruction that began during the second and third stages of the Scudder Colson model will continue to be visible today, and will have expanded in scope. This points to the capacity of resettlers to be agents of thei r own process of recovery. Hypothesis 2: Nuevo Arenal will have become integrated into the broader political economy of the region and nation, as measured by economic, political, and social interactions with entities outside of the physical boundaries of t he community. Hypothesis 3: Residents of Nuevo Arenal will consider their quality of life to be at least on par with that of neighboring, un resettled, communities. This is an indication that the community was, at the very least, not permanently disadvanta ged by resettlement.


75 H ypothesis 4: Both first and second generation resettlers will occupy key structural positions within the social network of the community. These positions will be occupied by each group in numbers that are proportional to their ove rall population size. In other words, the post resettlement reconstruction process will have created viable opportunities for second generation resettlers to remain in the community, to assume important social roles at the community level, and to gain acce ss to the social and material resources necessary for survival. H ypothesis 5 : There will be no differences in measures of me an network centrality between first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and immigrants. In other words, members hip in one of these groups does not confer an advantage in becoming central to the network , signifying that leadership is not solely the purview of first generation resettlers or immigrants, who in some cases have been shown to be better educated, with mor e capital and experience (Scudder 2005) . Second generation resettlers will be on equal footing with all other residents, indicating that there have been sufficient opportunities to sustain their economic and social well being in the community over time. H y pothesis 6 : Variation in measures of n etwork centrality will be associated with the following variables: age, gender, level of education, kinship ties to other local households, employment status, diversity in sources of household income, home ownership, e ase of access to other community members and activities (i.e., home location), l and ownership, and participation in community or political organizations. In other words, features of the resettlement plan and the subsequent process of community reconstructi


76 centrality will not generation resettler. This indicates that second generation resettlers have an equivalent chance as any oth er resident category of becoming central in the social network, suggesting that the process of community reconstruction has not disadvantaged them relative to other residents. H ypothesis 7 : There will be a positive relationship between measures of network centrality and access to human and material resources external to the community. In other words, becoming central in the local social network will be correlated not only with access to resources within the community, but also with access to people and reso urces outside of the community. If this hypothesis holds true, it will provide additional support for the need to mitigate the risks of marginalization and social disarticulation often experienced after resettlement (Cernea 1997). Methods The research pr esented in this dissertation began in August 2006 with a preliminary visit to Nuevo Arenal, during which I secured support for the project from the Costa Rican equivalent of the city council, the Asociaci ó n de Desarrollo Integral de Nuevo Arenal (Developme nt Association of Nuevo Arenal) , and conducted unstructured interviews with first and second generation resettlers. In September 2006, I interviewed staff at the central offices of ICE in San Jose, some of whom were directly involved in the resettlement o f Nuevo Arenal, and obtained access to the original baseline studies and reports produced during the resettlement planning and implementation. I returned to Costa Rica in the summer of 2007, during which I reviewed the resettlement compensation files at IC study of Nuevo Arenal using records from the National Registry in San Jose. From


77 June December 2008, I lived in Nuevo Arenal, during which I conducted participant observation and honed my research s trategy. I began data collection in earnest in April 2009 and completed the research in August 2010. During this time, I focused on four principal methodologies, each of which corresponded directly to the research hypotheses: life and community history in terviews (H1 3), social network analysis (H4 5), a livelihood survey (H 6 ), and personal social network analysis ( H7 ). Each of these methods is discussed in detail below. Life and Community History Interviews Life history interviewing is a qualitative met hod for understanding changes in an broadly defined as encompassing both material goods and social processes. In particular, life history interviews provide insight into how personal relationships affect a larger scale opportunities and constraints (Bagchi et al. 1998). Given the longitudinal focus of this research, life history intervi ews were an appropriate method for understanding how the design of the Arenal resettlement project facilitated or f the Scudder four stage model. Data c ollection I conducted life history intervie ws from April August 2010 with a stratified random sample of the population. The sample was based on the results of the social network analysis (described below) and consisted of 20 individuals from each level of network centrality (high, med ium , and low) . This sampling strategy ensured that interviewees were diverse in terms of age, occupation, resident type (e.g., first generation resettlers,


78 second generation resettlers, other residents), socio economic status, and prominence in the community (i.e., netw ork centrality). In the end, 51 individuals were interviewed during this phase of the research (Table 2 1). The life history interview (Appendix A) focused on the trajectory of livelihood systems and social dynamics within the community over time. P artic ular attention was paid to eliciting responses on the following themes, which have been shown to be important in evaluating the long term success of other dam induced resettlement projects in rural agricultural areas (McDowell 2002, Scudder 2005): opportun ities and strat egies for income generation , diversification of household economy, access to land, production for external markets, access to formal and informal institutions, opportunities for education, dependence upon government programs or upon external agencies, and participation in community organizations or political groups . Because access to people in access to and exploitation of these resources among first ge neration resettlers, second generation resettlers , and other residents is critical to exploring variation in social position within the community. Ultimately, these interviews help ed me to identify which e lements of the resettlement plan were central to lo ng term success. Beyond the tangible, I was also interested in understanding the psychological depth of the resettlement experience. I therefore also focused on the following themes during the interviews : perceptions of the resettlement experience, percept ions of quality of life and standard of living relative to neighboring communities, perceptions of immigrants and the ability to compete with them for local resources, the ways in which e upheaval of


79 resettlement, and the ways in which the memories of the old community have been preserved and passed on to future generations. The interview protocol was semi structured. I followed the interview guide closely enough to ensure that each part icipant answered all of the questions, but also allowed each interview to flow naturally from one topic to the next. Interviews typically were 1 1.5 hours in duration, though some were as short as 30 minutes and some as long as four hours. After the interv iew was over, each participant was also asked to construct a personal social network (discussed below), which took an additional 45 90 minutes. Due to the time commitment involved in participating in the interview, I offered each participant the equivalent of US$10. Interviews were scheduled a few days in advance, at which time I clearly stated the expected duration and the compensation to be offered. Most interviews were conducted in the home of the interviewee and, with their permission, recorded for late r transcription. Data a nalysis The l ife history interviews in Spanish were transcribed by students from the University of Costa Rica in San Jos é and the National Autonomous University in Heredia. I transcribed the interviews in English. I then coded all o f the transcriptions based on recurring themes in MAXQDA (MAXQDA n.d.). These themes included personal economic and social information (e.g., work history, family, popular participation), community scale information (e.g., broad economic strategies and tre nds, community development efforts, resident relationships), and perceptions of resettlement planning and execution. Data from the life history interviews were used to address Hypotheses 1 3.


80 Social Network Analysis The purpose of the whole (or socio centr ic) social network analysis conducted for this research was twofold. First, I was interested in identifying the positions of second generation resettlers in the social fabric of the community. According to the Scudder Colson model, a successful ly resettled community is one in which the community has achieved enough stability to afford second generation resettlers the opportunity to assume the social and economic roles once filled by the original resettlers. As discussed above, the presence of second generat ion resettlers in these leadership positions can be seen as an outcome of successful material and social reconstruction after resettlement. straightforward (e.g., elected officials), a social networ k approach offers a more nuanced view of leadership in that it can aid in the identification of the extent to which second generation resettlers occupy strategic (e.g., highly visible, prestigious, etc.) positions in the community in comparison to other gr oups. Highly central individuals tend to be conduits for ideas and inform ation flows through a network , and have greater social influence (Bolland 1985). Second, also following the Scudder Colson model, I was interested in whether second generation resettl social capital, this line of reasoning asserts that a resources necessar y for survival and engage meaningfully with the world depends, in large part, on their access to various forms of assets, including produced, human, natural, cultural , and social capital (Bebbington 1999). Of these forms of capital, it has been argued that social capital is critical because it gives individuals access to other


81 actors in their pursuit of material resources and social and political power (Bebbington 1999). An expanded discussion of social capital can be found in Chapter 6, where the results o f the social network analysis are presented. While social capital has been operationalized in various ways (e.g., collective vs. individual, closed vs. open groups) (Lin 2001a), there is some consensus that a social network approach best captures its rela tional nature (Lin 2001b). Simply put, people who are better connected, as defined by their position in the structure of network exchanges, tend to do better (Burt 2000). The location of an individual in a network is therefore directly related to their soc ial capital , which in turn influences their access to various kinds of resources . In sum , social network analysis can aid in the identification of whether second generation resettlers, in comparison to other groups, occupy highly central positions in the social fabric of Nuevo Arenal , thus representing the transfer of leadership predicted by the Scudder Colson model . Their network position can also be an indicator of the extent to which they are able to access resources (i.e., whether they possess high levels of social capital). Ultimately, then, the network position of second generation resettlers is a measure of whether Nuevo Arenal h as been resilient over the long term to the social and material disruption created by involuntary dis placement and resettlement. Data c ollection Social network data collection occurred from April September 2009. Nine hundred and eighty four (984) individuals were interviewed for this component of my research.


82 Socio are, by definition, bounded social groups , and must therefore be physically or conceptually delimited. For this study, the physical boundary chosen was the geographic extent of the original resettlement area, (Figure 2 1) . Within this area, I began by creating a map of the study community based on a template used by the rural clinicians from the local health clinic . Each household was noted on the map and identified with a unique letter and number code. Once all households were identified, I trained four research assistants to assist in administering the survey. All research assistants were local women ranging from 18 to 37 years of age who were recommended to me by trusted key informants. They were all high s chool graduates. The research assistants participated in a three hour training during which they were given an introduction to social network analysis, practiced administering the survey to each other with my feedback, and were trained in the IRB protocol regarding informed consent. I then observed them in the field during their first attempt at administering the survey and again at various times throughout the survey administration process. The research assistants worked five days per week (Tuesday Saturda y) and in teams of two for the purposes of safety. Because of the physical rigors involved in administering the survey over a relatively extensive area during the dry (sunny) season, two research assistants resigned approximately halfway through the proces s; data collection was completed by the remaining two assistants and myself . The social network survey (Appendix B) , which was translated into Spanish with the help of a key informant and pre tested for clarity, consisted of demographic questions about the respondent (name, nickname, age, gender, occupation), resident


83 status (place of origin, length of residency in Nuevo Arenal), information about the household (number of residents over the age of 18), and four network generation questions. Each responde nt was asked to name five people in response to each of the following questions : 2 Which people do you think contribute the most to the development of Nuevo Arenal? Which people are the most economically successful? Which people are the most active in commu nity events? If there were a major natural disaster in this community, whom would you expect to take command of recovery efforts? To ensure that all key individuals in the community were included in the social networks generated by these questions, our g oal was to survey at least 70% of the adult population. At that response rate, it is safe to assume that other respondents included these key individuals in their responses even if the individuals themselves chose not to provide their own data or were othe rwise not surveyed (Kossinets 2006). Because a complete census of the community was not available at the start of the study, however, the total number of residents was unknown. To address this issue, during the first visit to a household the survey adminis tration team would record the number and names of all household residents over the age of 18. If the other residents were home at the time, they were surveyed immediately. If not, a note was made to return to the household to survey them at a later date. I recorded the occupants of each household on a master 2 Respondents were asked to name only people who lived within the physical boundary of the study area, which was described in detail using well known landmarks. While most respondents abided by this ru le, some did not. As a result, approximately 119 people were included in the social network who either lived just outside the boundary of the original resettlement area, but were accepted members of the community of Nuevo Arenal, or who no longer lived in Nuevo Arenal but were still considered important actors by some respondents. These individuals were retained in the analysis of the whole social network.


84 spreadsheet and map, thereby eventually arriving at a good estimate of the total number of adults in the social network (n=1430). Ultimately, we surveyed 69% of the residents through this iterative proc edure. One important concern during the collection of social network data is that multiple people can have the same first and last names. We addressed this issue by asking for a have nicknames that are commonly used, almost to the exclusion of their given names). During the survey administration, when a respondent named a person who shared a name with someone else, the respondent was asked to clarify his or her response by using the time of the survey administration but was noted during the data entry process, the original respondent was contacted again and asked to clarify their response. Data anal ysis Data from each of the four network elicitation questions were organized in asymmetric 1430x1430 adjacency matrices (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The matrices (or networks) were analyzed in UCINET v. 6.427 (Borgatti et al. 2002) and measures of in degree and betweenness centrality across three of the four matrices were generated for each person in the network. 3 To address Hypothesis 4, I cross classified individuals based on their overall centrality and their status as first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, or other category of community resident. A chi squared test was used to test for differences between observed and expected counts within each cross 3 lea dership in the same way as the other networks.


85 classified group based on the marginal totals. To address Hypotheses 5, I used Kruska l Wallis and Mann Whitney U tests to compare the median measures of in degree centrality among the groups of residents for each network , and c hi squared tests to test for differences between observed and expected values in betweenness centrality . A more de tailed description of this data analysis process can be found in Chapter 6. All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS (v. 22 ) for Mac OS X (IBM Corp. 2013). Livelihood Survey cial network can facilitate their access to key resources. In turn (or perhaps even as the capital, thus creating a type of positive feedback loop between resources an d social capital . Among the resources to which resettlers have access are a number that have been identified as especially important in facilitating the transition of resettled communities to the fourth stage of the Scudder Colson model of involuntary rese ttlement. These include sustainable and reliable income generating strategies, diverse household economies, access to human and material resources external to the community, access to formal and informal institutions, access to land (particularly for secon d generation resettlers and new immigrants who did not receive land during the original resettlement), production for external markets, participation in community organizations, political activism, decreased dependence upon government programs and policies or upon external agencies, reduce d need for temporary migration for wage labor, and educational opportunities (McDowell 2002, Scudder 2005). The livelihood survey component of my research used these factors as a starting point for a survey that attempted to reveal


86 network position and their access to some of the more easily quantifiable resources (t he less easily quantifiable factors were addressed through life hist ory interviews, discussed above) . My goal was to i dentify which features of life in Nuevo Arenal, including generational status, were most strongly associated with network position. This achieved two objectives. First, it allowed me to determine whether second generation resettlers were on equal footing w ith other residents in terms of their likelihood to occupy highly central positions when other variables were held constant, thus speaking to the focus on the success of second generation resettlers highlighted in the fourth stage of the Scudder Colson mod el of involuntary resettlement. Second, it helped me to identify which other factors were associated with network centrality and then attempt to link those factors to features of the original resettlement plan and the process of community recovery after re settlement . Data c ollection Livelihood surveys were administered from April August 2010. Two hundred and sixty three (263) individuals were interviewed for this component of the research. The survey (Appendix C) included the following variables, whose imp ortance to community reconstruction after resettlement was based in the resettlement literature and in my preliminary studies in Nuevo Arenal: age, gender, nationality, marital status, level of education, years of residence in Nuevo Arenal, kinship ties to other households, occupational history, sources of household income, self ranking of economic status relative to others in the community, home and property ownership, and participation in commu nity organizations. The survey was translated into Spanish wit h the help of a key informant and pre tested before widespread use.


87 For this phase of the research, I hired four local women as research assistants. Two had previously assisted in the completion of the social network survey, one was the sister of a former research assistant, and one was a native English speaker who assisted in the administration of the livelihood survey to foreign expatriates. Each research assistant participated in a training session, during which they were trained in the IRB protocol for obtaining informed consent and practiced administering the survey to each other. Survey participants were sampled based on the results of the whole social network analysis. The overall centrality measure calculated above resulted in a distribution of cent rality among adult community members as follows: 73 individuals of high overall centrality, 130 individuals of medium overall centrality, and 1227 individuals of low overall centrality. Individuals within each of these groups were placed in random order. I retained the first 25 30 individuals from each group for the life history interview phase of the research (discussed above) ; the remaining individuals were assigned to research assistants for survey administration. Each research assistant received an orde red list of approximately 100 individuals. They were instructed to follow the order of the list as closely as possible when seeking out survey participants. When we were unable to locate an individual after a minimum of three attempts, that individual was eliminated from the sample. In addition, some people declined to participate in the survey and some no longer resided in t he community. When the original sample lists were exhausted, more survey participants were added in ordered groups of 50. Ultimately, our survey strategy resulted in completed surveys with 39 individuals of high centrality, 68 individuals of medium centrality and 156 individuals of low centrality.


88 Data analysis Data from the livelihood survey were initially entered into an Excel spreads heet and later analyzed in SPSS (v. 20) for Mac OS X (IBM Corp. 2011) . Due to sample size constraints, the survey topics were reduced to a smaller subset of the most relevant variables for use in the statistical analysis (Table 2 2) . T o address Hypothesis 6, I created an ordinal logistic regression model that treated network centrality as the dependent variable and measures of natural, human, economic, and social resources as the independent variables. More details about data analysis are presented in Chapt er 6. Personal Social Network Analysis Whole network analysis is l imited , by design, to a bounded social group (in the case of this research , residents of the community of Nuevo Arenal). While much information about community structure and function can be gained from this type of analysis, it is also important to take into account the ways in which communities and their residents interact with broader regional, national, and international contexts. This is particularly relevant in the case of resettled comm unities, which, through removal from their established contexts and relocation to an entirely new setting, are forced recreate and reinvent those relationships. Throughout this process, they face the risks of marginalization and social disarticulation (Cer nea 1997). Rebuilding a functional relationship with the outside world thus becomes a critical component in the process of community reconstruction. In fact, the Scudder Colson four stage model specifies that a requirement of the fourth stage is that succe ssfully resettled communities demonstrate integration into the broader political economy (Scudder 2005).


89 Personal social networks are one method of measuring this integration. Entirely acces s to people and material resources external to the community . Access to such resources can be usefu l personal pursuit of economic and social success , while simultaneously serving as bridges between the resettled community and the rest of th e world. community corresponds to their network position within the community can help to reveal exactly how important this integration is to community reconstruction post resettlement. Data c ollection Personal social networks were constructed for 47 of the 52 individuals who participated in the life history interview using EgoNet, a computer software designed specifically for this purpose (McCarty et al. 2012). I input t he data into a laptop computer in real time as I conducted the interview (Appendix D). Each respondent w as asked to name the 30 people ( or with whom they had interacted most recently (with in the past 6 12 months ), beginning with people who did no t live in Nuevo Arenal. The figure of 30 alters was chosen in order to reduce the respondent burden as much as possible while still maintaining the integrity of the network (after naming the alters, the respondent is asked to provide information about each alter and then asked to evaluate the relationship between each pair of alters; interviews can quickly become lengthy with the addition of just a few alters). Research has shown that structural measures of personal networks with 35 alters are similar to ne tworks with 45 alters, and it is likely that as few as 25 alters is adequate (McCarty et al. 2007). List ing the same number of


90 alters is also important because some structural measures are sensitive to network size (McCarty and Killworth 2007). After nami ng 30 alters, r espondents were asked questions about e ach alter, including: sex, age , location, relationship to the respondent, frequency of interaction, and type of interaction. They were then asked to establish ties between all alters by responding to th were collected on site with a laptop computer, a visualization of the immediately generated. T his graph w as then u network and how these patterns relate d I made note of these patterns and explanations as we discussed them. Data a nalysis Personal network data were collected and visualized in EgoN et . One use of personal network visualizations was to facilitate discussion during the semi structured interviews (McCarty et al. 2007). Personal network data were also analyzed for measures of network composition (e.g ., location of alters, type of relationships to the respondent). To address Hypothesis 7, I use d Kruskall Wallis (K W) tests to compare the distributions of alter location and alter type among the three sample groups (low, medium, and high centrality in th e combined whole social network). I also used K W tests to compare the distributions of alter location and type among the three resident categories (first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and others) in order to determine whether second generation resettlers were significantly different from other


91 resident categories with regard to personal network composition. More details about data analysis are presented in Chapter 6. Participant Observation and Other Reflections on Research Much of my research process in Nuevo Arenal was quantitative in nature or Bernard 2002 ). I attended soccer matches, community events, birthday parties, baby showers, and other social gath erings. I made lifelong friends, some of whom were resettlers and some of whom were newer arrivals to the community, both Costa Rican and expatriate. I rented an apartment from a local family, the matriarch of which was also Nuevo y ticket saleswoman. She became a good friend and key informant, and I spent many hours sitting at her downtown locale as she sold tickets. I have returned to Nuevo Arenal three times since completing my fieldwork, and each time these friendships have grow n stronger. As a field site, Nuevo Arenal was a truly lovely place. Surrounded by bright green rolling hills, with a view of Lake Arenal and the Arenal volcano, it is extremely aesthetically attractive. At 600 meters in altitude, it has a temperate climat e and often sports a pleasant breeze, a fact that has made Lake Arenal a prime international windsurfing destination and the location of a number of wind energy farms. Ticos are known for being good natured and welcoming, and that was exactly my experience . For my first few nights in Arenal, during my preliminary research, I stayed at a small hotel owned by a woman who would later become a close friend. Noting the look of panic on or Sunday afternoon coffee where I was met with much interest and an open discussion about my research. Most of those present were second generation resettlers, and they were more


92 than willing to talk about their experience. It was then that I knew this re search project would be meaningful both to me and to the community. Despite the rosy picture I have just painted, however, conducting research as a foreign woman in Latin America has its challenges. Most women my age in Nuevo Arenal had families and sp ent much of their time at home or conducting activities to fulfill the needs of their families. Making friends outside of my small core support group was therefore somewhat difficult. It was also not easy for me to spend time in places known for opening so cial doors, like bars, because they were male dominated spaces. I was extremely wary of male friendships in order to protect my reputation as a married woman and researcher. Most of my social interactions with Ticos, therefore, took place during planned ev ents like parties and community celebrations, rather than in more (e.g., I did spend a fair amount of time at the homes of my closest three female friends), but by and larg e, the social aspect of my research was one of the most challenging parts. A second challenge to conducting research in Nuevo Arenal was the presence of a large expatriate community. Beginning in the early 1990s and peaking in the mid 2000s, the area aroun d Lake Arenal has become extremely attractive to foreign retirees in search of a lower cost of living than in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Some founded businesses, but the majority were in Nuevo Arenal to simply relax and live out their retiremen t years. Many expats made only a cursory attempt to learn Spanish, the majority were not particularly engaged with the community, and as a group they tended to consort almost exclusively with each other. So, while Arenale ñ os had grown


93 accustomed to having foreign faces in their community, this also meant that I had to prove that I was a different kind of foreigner than they were used to. I did this by renting an apartment from a local family, living in the center of town, limiting my social interactions wit h expats, and making my purpose in the community clear. The fact that I spoke fluent Spanish was also a distinct advantage. My strategy worked. During my going away party at the end of my fieldwork, I was flattered when a well respected woman in the commun ity said that I was unlike the other foreigners in Arenal because it was clear that I was interested in the Tico way of life. I could not have asked for a better compliment. Finally, I would like to highlight a key strategic research decision, which was to hire local women as research assistants. These young women were from well known families in the community, and were individually liked and respected by community members. I strongly believe that my affiliation with them gave me credibility and made peop knowledge of the community was particularly important during the social network survey. As we were furiously working toward our goal of a 70% response rate, we eventually r esorted to sitting at a downtown restaurant and waiting for any of the missing residents to walk by. When my field assistants identified someone who had not completed the survey, I would then approach the person to request their participation. I am confide nt that we would not have met our goal without their insider knowledge. Their company and good humor also made my life in the field immensely more entertaining.


94 Table 2 1. Participants in life history interviews (sorted by network centrality, then by r esident type). Network Centrality Resident Type Age Gender Education Occupation and/or Primary Income High First generation resettler 70 M 6th grade Retirement pension, property rentals High First generation resettler 70 M 4th grade Beef cattle rancher High First generation resettler 68 M 6th grade Retail shop owner High First generation resettler 56 M 6th grade Personal loans High First generation resettler 51 M Master's degree Retirement p ension, farmer, property rentals High Second generation rese ttler 47 M 6th grade Mechanic, dairy farmer High Second generation resettler 47 M 8th grade Security guard High Second generation resettler 45 F Master's degree Teacher High Second generation resettler 44 M High school Retail business owner, property re ntals High Second generation resettler 43 M 9th grade Bar/restaurant owner, fishing tour provider High Second generation resettler 41 M 6th grade Public water utility employee High Costa Rican immigrant 61 F Normal school Retirement pension High Costa Rican immigrant 52 F High school Business owner High Costa Rican immigrant 50 M 4th grade Real estate sales, bed & breakfast employee High Costa Rican immigrant 49 M 6th grade Butcher shop owner High Costa Rican immigrant 43 M 4th grade Transportation s ervices High Costa Rican immigrant 43 M 6th grade Dairy farmer High Foreign expatriate 79 M Master's degree Retirement pension Medium First generation resettler 76 M 3rd grade Small supermarket owner Medium First generation resettler 71 F 6th grade Fa rm property rental Medium First generation resettler 66 F 3rd grade Retail shop owner Medium First generation resettler 64 M 6th grade Dairy farmer Medium First generation resettler 59 M 6th grade Plant nursery owner, agricultural wage laborer Medium F irst generation resettler 59 F Some college Retirement pension, property rentals Medium Second generation resettler 41 M High school Transit police Medium Second generation resettler 33 M 6th grade Dairy farmer, small motor repairs Medium Second generat ion resettler 28 M High school Hydropower plant operator (CNFL) Medium Third generation resettler 23 M 9th grade Supermarket employee Medium Costa Rican immigrant 60 M Master's degree Retirement pension Medium Costa Rican immigrant 46 M High school Cons truction company owner Medium Costa Rican immigrant 43 M None Agricultural wage laborer Medium Second generation immigrant 30 M College Civil engineer, beef cattle rancher Medium Foreign expatriate 73 F College Bed & breakfast owner Medium Foreign expa triate 66 M Some college Computer repair Medium Foreign expatriate 54 F Master's degree Retirement pension Medium Foreign expatriate 45 F Medical school Agricultural products, agrotourism Low First generation resettler 53 M 1st grade Construction worker Low First generation resettler 49 M 4th grade Dairy farmer


95 Table 2 1. Continued Network C entrality Resident Type Age Gender Education Occupation and/or Primary Income Low Second generation resettler 44 F 9th grade Homemaker Low Second generation rese ttler 40 F 10th grade Domestic worker, home based business owner Low Second generation resettler 39 F High school Domestic worker Low Second generation resettler 26 F College Student Low Second generation resettler 24 F 8th grade Unemployed Low Second generation resettler 22 F High school Unemployed Low Second generation resettler 21 F 9th grade Homemaker Low Third generation resettler 23 M High school Butcher shop employee Low Costa Rican immigrant 52 M 2nd grade Dairy farm laborer Low Costa Rican immigrant 50 F Secretarial school Homemaker Low Costa Rican immigrant 45 M 6th grade Construction worker Low Costa Rican immigrant 30 M College Construction company owner Low Foreign expatriate 53 M College Telecommuter/small business owner in USA


96 Ta ble 2 2. Description of variables used in the ordinal logistic regression model Variable Description of Data Type of variable Dependent or Independent Network centrality Rank according to in degree centrality in the whole social network (1=low, 2=me dium, 3=high) Ordinal Dependent Res ident status st generation resettler, 2 nd generation resettler, or other Categorical Independent Age data collection Interval Independent Gend er Gender of respondent Binary Independent Education Years of education completed by respondent. Primary: 1 6, Secondary: 7 11, University: 12 16, Graduate studies: 17 Interval Independent Kinship Respondent has adult relatives in at least one other ho usehold in the community. Binary Independent Employment status Employment status of r espondent: 1: self employed, 2: salaried or wage laborer , 3: not employed Categorical Independent Household economic diversity Number of sources of household income ot her than primary source of income of respondent Interval Independent Home ownership Respondent owns home in which they live Binary Independent Home location Primary residence is located in the urban core Binary Independent Number of properties Numbe r of properties respondent owns other than the home in which they live Interval Independent Years of participation Total number of years respondent has participated in community organizations , summed across each organization Interval Independent


97 Fig ure 2 1. Map of study area. Households are represented by crosses. The dense cluster at the center is the urban core of Nuevo Arenal; the households extending outward from the core in three branches (one toward the west and two toward the east) were origi nally larger farm plots. The two households on the far right are not within the study area but had residents with whom I conducted a life history interview during the final phase of this research.


98 CHAPTER 3 DISMANTLING COMMUNIT Y A Brief History of Cost a Rican Hydro power Development and Energy Governance Hydropower has been a pri ncipal source of energy for Costa Rica since the late 19 th century . It c urrently provides 65 % of electricity produced in the country , though this proportion was higher before the electricity sector was diversified to include wind and geothermal energy ( ICE 2012 ). It is estimated that 98% of the population has access to electricity, in no small part due standing commitment to hydro power development (Anderson e t al. 2006). was inaugurated in n opened in New York City , and provided incandescent street lighting for downtown San José (ICE n.d.c ). Between 1884 and 1928, a small number of privately owned power companies were responsible for ongoing hydro development in the Central Valley , each oper at ing under a concession granted by the central government (Rodriguez 2000). In 1928, the American Foreign Power Company (AFPC), a subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share Company, acquired a majority of shares in the three principal energy companies of the time (ICE n.d.c ). 1 , 2 In doing so, t he AFPC established a foreign 1 The Electric Bond and Share Company is a U.S. company founded by General Electric in 1905 and acquired by Raytheon in 1993. 2 The three energy companies were the Costa Rica Electric Light and Traction Comp any, the Compañía Nacional de Electricidad ( National Electricity Company), and the Compañía Nacional Hidroeléctrica ( National Hydroelectric Company ).


99 regulated by the National Electricity Service ( Sistema Nacional de Electricidad or SNE), which was crea ted in 1928 in response to concerns about electricity privatization (Rodriguez 2000). 3 In 1941, based on the recommendation of Julius Krugg, an American engineer with the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority, the three companies owned by the AFPC were consolida ted for regulatory purposes into the National Power and Light Company ( Compa ñ ia Nacional de Fuerza y Luz or CNFL) (Rodriguez 2000) . 4 Throughout this period , however, the AFPC/CNFL did not mak e any additions to the energy infrastructure of Costa Rica, leadi ng to serious energy shortages throughout the country and paralyzing its economic development (La Republica 1958, Rodriguez 2000). citizens from the municipality of Heredia (also located in the Central Valley) founded the Association for the Defense of the Electricity Consumer (Asociación para la Defensa del Consumidor Eléctrico ). Members of this a ssociation soon contributed to the first local attempt to regain energy sovereignty, the construction of the Carrillos de Poás Hydroelectric Plant. The success of this effort demonstrated that the country had both the technical and the financial capacity to address its own energy needs (ICE n.d.c ). In the words of Jorge Manuel Dengo Obreg on, the project engineer and future president of the Costa Rican Institute of E lectricity ( Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad or ICE): 3 The SNE became the Public Services Regulatory Authority (ARESEP) in 1996, at which time it also assumed responsibility for telecommunications, public transportation, and municipal waste management (Rodriguez 2000). 4 T he CNFL was nationalized in 1968 but motivated by a request for assistance from Costa Rican President Rafael Angel Calder ó n to U.S. (Rodriguez 2000).

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100 Esta planta de Heredia significó cuatro cosas . . . . Q uitar la idea que había metido la compañía eléctrica [CNFL] d e que sólo ellos podían construir una planta e léctrica. . . . N os permitió a los ingenieros jóvenes tener la experiencia de hacer un proyecto grande. . . . L a experiencia mía en or ganización y financiamiento. . . . Y me permitió ponerme a estudiar en qué c onsistía el problema eléctrica de Costa Rica. (Rodriguez 2003:237 238) The Here dia plant meant four things. . . . I t got rid of the idea fostered by the electricity company [CNFL] that only they were capable of bu ilding an electricity plant. . . . I t allow ed us young engineers to have the experience of building a large project. . . . I t gave me experience in organization and financing. . . . A nd it gave me the chance to study the basic problem of electricity in Costa Rica. Following the success of the Carri llos de Po á s plant, in 1948 a group of civil and the support of the Board, the proposa l was presented to the president of Costa Rica, José Figueres. This process ultimately resulted in the founding of ICE in 1949 via Law #449, which read, in part: Créase el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad . . . al cual se encomienda el desarrollo ra cional de las fuentes productoras de energía física que la Nación posee, en especial los recursos hidráulicos . La responsabilidad fundamental del Instituto, ante los costarricenses será encauzar el aprovechamiento de la energía hidroeléctrica con el fin de fortalecer la economía nacional y promover el mayor bienestar del pueblo de Costa Rica. (FAOLEX n.d.) The Costa Rican Electricity Institute is hereby created . . . it is entrusted with the rational development of the sources of physical energy possessed by the Nation, especially water resources. The primary responsibility of the Institute to the citizens of Costa Rica will be to channel the use of hydroelectric power in order to strengthen the national economy and promote the greater welfare of the people of Costa Rica .

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10 1 While the CNFL and ICE co existed until 1967, ICE was viewed as the key to regaining 5 day ci vil war, which was sparked by accusations of electoral fraud committed by the party of the sitting president, Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia. While the Costa Rican over social reforms and introduce new initiatives to enhance public education, universal suffrage, and basic social infrastructure (Alvarenga 2005). In this context, the cr eation of a nationalized electricity company as a keystone institution of the welfare state was viewed as an appropriate measure (Guillen 2009). Conceptually, ICE was modeled after iewed as an electricity company with a broadly defined rural development mission (O. Solis, pers. comm.). Under the leadership of Jorge Manuel Dengo, ICE immediately took on the task obal development industry in the post WWII era, increased energy production was seen as a path to economic development and human well being, and ICE took its role as a development agency seriously. The first hydroelectric plant constructed by ICE, La Garit Following La Garita, the Rio Macho Hydroelectric Plant opened in 1963, Cach í in 1966, 5 In 1968, ICE became a majority shareholder of the CNFL, thus ending a 40 year private monopo ly on the distribution of electricity in the Central Valley (Rodriguez 2000).

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102 Arenal in 1978, Miguel Pablo Dengo in 1982, Alberto Echandi in 1990, Sandillal in 1992, Toro I in 1995, Toro II in 1996; Angostura in 2000, Pe ñ as Blancas in 2002, and Cariblanco in 2007 (ICE n.d.b, n.d.c). Of these 12 plants, eight necessitated the construction of large dams (Laurencio 2005). In addition to these major plants, ICE also acqui red four smaller plants upon its establishment the three Sistema Miller Hydroelectric Plants, which began operating between 1938 and 1956, and the Cacao Hydroelectric Plant, which began operating in 1928 (ICE n.d.c). Further public and private hydropower d evelopment has also resulted in the construction of numerous smaller dams throughout the country (Figure 3 1). 6 The Symbolism of ICE From its inception, ICE was an extremely visible public agency that contributed in concrete ways to improving the welfare o f Costa Rican citizens. As a result of its success in addressing national priorities, the institution has acquired an important symbolic value in Costa Rica. house anthropologist and director of its Office of Historical and Technological Patrimon y, Jos é Luis Amador, offers a number of explanations as to why ICE is so beloved by the Costa Rican populace (Amador 2000:2 5). These include its: controlled electricity monopo ly foundation in local efforts to demonstrate technological capabilities and regain local control of energy provisioning 6 From 1949 until the 1990s, hydropower development was conducted exclusively by ICE. From the 1990s onward, stimulated by neoliberal economic reforms, energy privatization began to play a more predominant role in electricity provision, though ICE has retained its monopoly on energy distribution (Anderson 2002).

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103 commitment to using Costa Ricans to design and carry out its public works, leading to a sense of technological sovereignty role in creating the basic conditions necessary for industrialization and capitalist development, which ultimately transformed the daily life and culture of Costa Ricans in even the most re mote corners of the country image as a company committed to the well being of Costa Ricans and its willingness to pitch in during times of national crisis, such as during natural disasters institutional culture, which reinforces the idea that ICE employe es are part of a historic mission in service of the Costa Rican public energy provisioning, its success in satisfying a tangible need of the population, and its role in building monumental structures that symbolize the capacity of Costa Ricans to achieve their goals has contributed to its image as a driver of progress and social transformation. ICE has therefore been associated with: Innovation, state of the art technology, moder nization, economic solvency, success, nationalism, training, knowledge, ability to get the job done, machinery, teamwork, publications, power, Costa Rican technical and labor abilities, technological sovereignty, social solidarity, democratization of servi ces, popular welfare, humanitarianism, and community solidarity. (Amador 2000:1) ICE is viewed by the Costa Rican public as their institution, created through the sacrifice of generations of their predecessors, and they have demonstrated this sense of own ership by leaping to its defense when private interests have threatened the institution in recent years (Alvarenga 2005). Interestingly, it is not only the image of the institution that has reached somewhat mythical proportions in Costa Rica, but also the workers themselves. In the absence of soldiers (Costa Rica abolished its army after the 1948 civil war), el tunelero y el técnico (the tunneler and the technician) became the new national heroes. Upon completion of

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104 the expansion of the Rio Macho Hydroelect ric Plant in 1974, President José Figueres, Solo en términos poéticos se puede hablar de esta obra . . . . Es una victoria del hombre sobre las rocas, el agua y las inclemencias del tiempo. Esto son héroes . . . . Los trabajadores del túnel de Tapantí se merecen un monumento [One can only speak in poetic terms about this work. . . . It is a victory of man over rock, water, and inclement weather. They are heroes. . . . The Tapant í tunnel workers deserve a monument.] (La Nación 1974, La Republica 1974, quoted in Amador 2000:4). success but also founded the Office of Civil Defense (the precursor to the National Emergency from 1986 1990 during the first Oscar Arias administration (Vargas 2012). T he obituaries and opinion pieces published after his death in January 2012 were nothing short of reverent. Frank McNeil, former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, wrote: I think Costa Rican historians will in time conclude that he was the third founding fathe r, ranking just behind Dr. Calderón and Don Pepe [José Figueres] in the making of Costa Rican democracy. I say this not so much because of his extraordinary résumé, but because . . . it is impossible to imagine the Costa Rica of today had it not been for t he life and works of Jorge Manuel Dengo. And because he embodied to the nth degree the old Costa Rican ideal of education, hard work and unselfish service, coupled with a sophisticated appreciation of technology, international affairs and what we now call globalization. (McNeil 2012) At times, the discourse surrounding ICE almost seems too good to be true, and in some ways it is. Conflicts have been glossed over in favor of presenting a coherent development in Costa Rica. For example, citizen protests in Cartago, Alajuela, and Puntarenas (regions outside of San

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105 Jos é ) during the 1950s and 1960s were spurred by the threat of electricity cost increases; these movements opposed centralization and advo cated for local control over public services (Alvarenga 2005). Likewise, in 1983 citizens protested increases in of unfair billing practices (Alvarenga 2005). In recen t years, social movements opposing the construction of large dams have also emerged (Barrantes 2005). Nevertheless, the image of ICE as an engine of progress with a strong commitment to social welfare dominates m any discussions surrounding the institution. This largely positive relationship between citizens and the state, rooted in a long history of Costa Rican democratic ideals and governmental accountability (what toward the institution stand in contrast to the more contentious dynamics surrounding hydropower development in other Latin American countries like Mexico and Brazil (Robinson 2000, Rothman and Oliver 1999). Ultimate likely one of the reasons it was able to develop the Arenal Hydroelectric Project with little resistance from the future displacees or the broader Costa Rican society, and its internal set of values surrounding rural dev elopment translated to the unique way in which the resettlement of the affected communities was carried out. The Arenal Hydroelectric Project The Arenal Basin is located in the Canton of Tilar á n in the humid tropical highlands of the province of Guanacas te (Figure 3 1). It is just east of the continental divide between the Tilar á n and Guanacaste mountain ranges (ICE 1978) and drains an area of approximately 500 km 2 (Obando 1981).

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106 The idea of damming the Arenal River for hydropower occurred to Jorge Manuel Dengo in 1948, even before ICE was founded (Rodriguez 2003). It was not until over a decade later, however, that the project began to move from dream to reality. ICE began seriously studying the potential for a dam on the Arenal River in 1959 (ICE 1978). Funding for the project was secured from the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) in 1974. The original loan totaled $50.5 million, while the estimated project total was $91 million. Of this total, $4 million was budgeted for resettlement: $2.87 million f or land acquisition and $1.25 million for the construction costs, indemnification for lost properties, community development programs, and administrative and management costs (Partridge 1993). However, as is typical of large hydropower projects, cost overr uns due to difficulties during the excavation and construction of the conduction tunnels brought the final project cost to $179 million (IDB 1998, Partridge 1993). Ultimately, $16 million was allocated to the resettlement activities as a direct cost of con struction, to be paid by ICE as specified in the loan contract (IDB 1998, Partridge 1993). This amounts to a total cost of resettlement of $6540/person. A resettlement action plan, detailing the resettlement preparations, mechanisms for public participatio n, plans for the new settlement sites, and broad community and economic goals for the new sites was submitted to the IDB as part of the loan documents (Partridge 1993). During the resettlement process, the IDB Sectoral Specialist in Costa Rica submitted a month intervals, covering the progress of the resettlement program (Partridge 1983). Disbursement of the loan funds was contingent upon satisfactory reports (Partridge 1983).

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107 T he Arenal site was attractive to the ICE engineers because of its reservoir capacity. The storage capacity provided by the reservoir, the largest in Costa Rica, would mean that electricity generation could continue during the dry season, thus reducing the in Obando 1981:6). In addition, the diversion of waters across the continental divide dr op required for electricity generation, would allow for the irrigation of agricultural land less critical, though still important, rationale for the project had to do wit h the emerging tourism market in the country. New tourism developments were slated for Guanacaste, including the Culebra Bay Tourism Project on the coast and the Llano Grande 7 Planned road netw ork expansions throughout the country, including a highway around the new reservoir, would connect the coast to the inland and place the Arenal region on the pathway between the new Guanacaste tourism projects and the San Carlos and southern Caribbean regi ons. In addition, the new highway was predicted to facilitate the exploitation of local touristic attractions, including the Arenal Volcano, Lake Cote, the Venado Caves, and the Arenal reservoir itself (ICE 1978). Construction of the Arenal Hydroelectric Project began in 1974 and was completed in 1978. Figures 3 2 through 3 6 illustrate some of the construction process. 7 Llano Grande Inte rnational Airport in Liberia (now the Daniel Oduber Quirós International Airport) is currently used by ten international airlines and received 199,000 tourists in the first six months of 2012 alone (Arce 2012).

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108 The finished project consisted of a 65 meter dam, an 88 km 2 reservoir, 6700 meters of conduction tunnels, a machine house with three power generating units, and two new communities for people displaced by the reservoir (Figure 3 7) (Partridge 1993) . Two additional power stations, Miguel Dengo and Sandillal, were added to the complex in subsequent years. T o generate electricity , water from La ke Arenal, located at 546 meters above sea level, enters an intake tunnel, flows west across the continental divide, and drops 210 meters to reach the Arenal power station, which has a generating capacity of 157 MW (Figure 3 8). There , the water accumulate s behind a 19 meter dam before it drops 234 meters to the Miguel Dengo (formerly Coribi cí ) power station, which has a capacity of 174 MW. Water then accumulates behind a third 45 meter dam before it drops the final 96 meters to the Sandillal power station, which has a capacity of 32 MW. All told, the ARCOSA (Arenal Corobic í Sandillal) system can generate 363 MW of generating capacity from all sources including fossil fuels, geothe rmal, biomass, and wind (ICE 2012). In 2010, the ARCOSA system provided 18.5% of the electricity consumed in the country (ICE 2012). Of course, when the project was first constructed it t does today. As noted above, in addition to its hydropower potential, the Arenal project was also considered to be critical for resolving agricultural water shortages in the dry Guanacaste region. In fact, the plan for the irrigation district had been l inked to the plan for the hydroelectric project since the 1950s (SENARA n.d.). Upon completion of the hydroelectric project in 1978, Costa Rica began construction on the Arenal Tempisque Irrigation District ( Distrito de Riego Arenal Tempisque ) , also financ ed by loans from the

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109 IDB. A new institution, the National Service for Groundwater, Irrigation, and Drainage ( Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas, Riego, y Avenamiento or SENARA), was created in 1983 to govern the project. Today, 773 small producers an d four private companies irrigate an area of 19,000 hectares with water from Lake Arenal (SENARA 2012). Plans for future expansion are also underway. Needless to say, the irrigation district fundamentally transformed the landscape of the Tempisque Basin. In sum, the ARCOSA complex, combined with the Arenal Tempisque irrigation district, was a massive undertaking for the Costa Rican state, its institutions, and their respective staffs. To this day, it is the only infrastructure project of its kind in the c ountry, and the institutions involved are rightfully proud of their accomplishments. Nevertheless, while there were certainly many beneficiaries of this project, mega development inevitably involves negative human impacts. In the current case, following wh at Zambrano Barrag á announce making, entire communities were sacrificed for the greater good without their consent, and their inhabitants were forced to reconstitute their lives in new locations. The rema inder of this dissertation will focus on this topic. Dismantling Community: The Resettlement of Arenal dam was the fact that a number of communities in the basin would be displa ced by the reservoir. These included the population centers of Arenal and Tronadora, and the smaller settlements of Ca ño Negro, Guadalajara, Mata de Caña, Naranjos Agrios, Piedras, Tronadora, and part of San Luis. The affected population total ed approximat ely 2 , 500 people in 300 households (ICE 1973, ICE 1978).

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110 Viejo Arenal The settlement of the Arenal region began in the late 19th century as part of the three phases: 1) colonization of tropical forests by migrants to create small farms, 2) consolidation of small holdings by large cattle ranches, and 3) depopulation once cattle ranches are established and less labor is required (Partridge 1993) . Following this pattern, t h e first families arrived to the Arenal basin from the Alajuela province in 1878, Central Valley. Between 1890 and 1927, migrants from the Central Valley continued to be attracted to the area by the availability of land, the development of small scale gold mining operations, and the establishment of foreign owned ranching operations (ICE 1973, Jimenez Castro 1956). In addition, growing demographic pressures and the concen tration of land in the hands of large coffee producers in the Central Valley encouraged migration to more peripheral areas of the country. It was toward the latter end of this period and into the 1960s that Arenal 8 and Tronadora became established as the l argest population centers in the Arenal basin, outside of the municipal capital of Tilarán. Arenal, in particular, served as an important bridge between Tilarán, which could be reached from the Pan American Highway via road, and the frontier areas toward t he north, which were only accessible by horseback (ICE 1973). By the 1960 1970 period, however, the region is considered to have entered the depopulation phase 8 (Old Arenal) is us ed to distinguish the original community of Arenal from the resettled community of Nuevo Arenal (New Arenal) . This nomenclature was employed by my research always be referred to as Nuevo Arenal.

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111 of the humid tropical cattle ranching complex. 9 Population loss was exacerbated by two natural d isasters that traumatized the local communities the surprise eruption of the Arenal Volcano after 450 years of dormancy in 1968 and a magnitude 6.5 earthquake in 1973 (ICE 1973, Partridge 1993). The major economic activity in the Arenal region at the time of resettlement was cattle ranching. The largest ranch in the area was the hacienda La Rosita, an American company held by the corporation Peter Eckrich and Sons, Inc. from Fort Wayne, Indiana. It owned 90% of the land around the Arenal lagoon that was to be inundated (Partridge 1983). La Rosita produced approximately 25,000 head/year of beef cattle for export, the demand for which had grown considerably during the 1950s and 1960s due to increased economic prosperity in the United States and the growth of t he fast food industry (Kutsche 1997). In addition to this large foreign owned ranch, there were also four or five large (over 350 hectare) Costa Rican owned ranches and several medium (35 350 hectare) ranches that also focused on cattle and dairy productio n. Ranching at this scale was dependent on wage labor (field laborers, cowboys, milkers, dredge operators, farm managers, etc.) and served as the major source of employment in the region. 10 The hacienda system also created a social hierarchy of patrons and workers, as well as distinct socio economic stratification. 9 It should be noted that the determination of depopulation was based on a comparison of the 1963 and 1973 national censuses. However, the 1973 census missed 35% of the population in the Arenal basin (ICE 1973). Popul ation figures should therefore be interpreted with caution. 10 Of a sample of 550 heads of household surveyed for the 1973 national census, 286 (52%) were wage laborers. Of these, 217 (76%) were peones (wage laborers on cattle ranches or agricultural farms ) (ICE 1973). Between wage labor and self employment, 94% of the economically active population was employed. In other words, the Arenal region was not an area that lacked employment opportunities (ICE 1973).

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112 Commercial and subsistence agriculture were present but limited in the region, generally conducted by small landholders on farms of 0.7 35 hectares. Some of the larger farms of this type also en gaged in cattle and dairy production, while crops like tomatoes, beans, corn, manioc, and coffee were largely limited to areas of 0.7 14 hectares (ICE 1973). These small farms were located on the southern side of the basin, near the settlements of Arenal a nd Tronadora (Figure 3 9). While farming activities may have necessitated occasional hired labor, the farms were typically family run. This was the population that perhaps stood to lose the most from resettlement, as they operated essentially at a subsiste nce level and had also developed strong affective bonds to their land. The community of Arenal supported this agricultural economy by serving as the commercial center of the valley. Agriculturalists and ranchers in scattered settlements throughout the basi n came to town on horseback to sell their products and restock on basic supplies. During my fieldwork, almost everyone who had lived in Viejo Arenal recounted stories of busy market weekends, during which horses lined the main streets and a festive atmosph ere infused the town. At the time of resettlement, the urban nucleus of Arenal had a population of 800 people in 126 households distributed over an area of 16 hectares. The population was a relatively young one; in the district of Tronadora, to which Arena l belonged, 47% were under 15 years of age and 43% were between the ages of 15 55. Most people had some primary education (75% over the age of six) but very few had progressed to secondary school (4%) or college (0.6%) (ICE 1973). The gender distribution w as relatively equal 53% male and 47% female (Obando 1981).

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113 Arenal was connected to the municipal capital of Tilar á n via a 20 km gravel road (Figure 3 10). Organized around a central plaza that was flanked by the Catholic church and a primary school, t he community also had a bank, rural credit organization, office of the National Production Council (a governmental agency responsible for promoting agricultural production for the domestic market); rural health center staffed periodically by visiting docto rs, and Rural Guard office (which also provided emergency telephone service) (Figure 3 11). Local businesses included a butcher, boardinghouse, pharmacy, vegetable market, cobbler, mechanic, tailor, slaughterhouse, gas station, and small sawmill. Arenal al so offered recreational opportunities, including a movie theater, various bars, a billiard room, dance halls, a restaurant, and other meeting spaces. Electricity was available to some through private parties; approximately 15 of the wealthier households an d businesses had generators and would distribute power to neighboring buildings. Otherwise, lighting was provided by candle or kerosene lantern. There was no central sewage homes had outhouses (60%) or septic systems (40%) but there was a running water sys tem maintained jointly by the municipality and the community (ICE 1973). Houses in the Arenal region were typically wood plank structures with wood socioeconomic status ( Figure 3 12). Approximately 81% of the 126 homes in the urban core of Arenal were considered to be in either good condition or regular condition (ICE 1973). 11 Most homes had a yard with a vegetable garden and fruit trees, which were of 11 In the Arenal region as a whole, 78% of home s were considered to be in good or regular condition (ICE 1973).

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114 considerable personal importance to the residents as they took pride in having a well groomed area around their homes (Obando 1981). During my fieldwork, older informants were consistently nostalgic about the highly fertile volcanic soil in the Arenal A survey of 550 households in the Arenal region from the 1973 census indicated that 55% percent of homes were owned by the resident family, most of whom were self employed cattle ranchers or farmers, agricultural wage laborers, female headed households, or people of retirement age. Twelve percent (12%) of homes were rented and 31% were borrowed either from relatives or employers (at least two thirds of the 31% fell into the latter category) (ICE 1973). In other words, though a majority of residents were homeowners, there also existed a significant proportion of residents who were not. Today, the residents of Viejo Arenal reflect on their former lives with considerable fondness. Th ey characterize the old community as a wholesome place with a strong sense of community pride due to its importance in the basin. While the influence of nostalgia what Oliver on these idealized accounts should not be overlooked, my sense is that most Arenaleños were extremely content with the pace and quality of life in Viejo Arenal. It was the center of employment and i nteraction. Its proximity to the Arenal River and the original Arenal Lagoon allowed for recreational hunting and fishing, and children spent their days outside playing soccer and otherwise cavorting with their friends. Despite the relatively

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115 short history of the community, then, residents had formed a strong attachment to place prior to resettlement. From Viejo Arenal to Nuevo Arenal While the Arenal project was not the first instance of dam induced displac e ment in Costa Rica, it was by far the largest. 12 Office of Resettlement during the project, staff members were acutely aware of the material, social, and psychological challenges of resettlement. 13 As representatives of and development institutions, they took their responsibility to implement a participatory and humanitarian resettlement plan seriously, and they worked slowly and methodically to earn the trust of the resettlers and approval from the broader public. In ad dition to lengthy discussions within the project team and later with the resettlers themselves about how to best implement the project, ICE staff also conducted site visits to other resettled communities, including those necessitated by the Tomine dam in C olombia, the Cerr ón Grande dam in El Salvador, and the Chicoasén dam in Mexico. There they were exposed to resettlement outcomes that they did not want to repeat (e.g., soldiers removing families by force in El Salvador and resettlement houses abandoned by resettlers in Colombia). Additionally, the year prior to becoming involved in the Arenal project, Brenes (a architect and urban planner by training) had participated in a special interdisciplinary course on development planning 12 In 1968, 30 families were displaced by the Cachí Hydroelectric Project in the provi n ce of Cartago. A citizen movement forced ICE to provide the affected people with replace ment land in 1971 , while a separate government agency financed the construction of new homes (Obando 1981:7). 13 Office of Architectural Design, who had been in charge of the re settlement planning to this point , an aerial photo specialist, two construction engineers, an agricultural engineer, and two agricultural technicians.

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116 in Rio de Janeiro in 1972, which treated rural development as a complex issue with both material and socio cultural dimensions. This holistic approach to rural urban planning (E. Brenes, pers. comm.). In s um, a combination of institutional ethics and political will, the project approach to the Arenal resettlement project. In determining how to approach the issue of displac ement in Arenal, ICE developed three opti ons: a) provide cash compensation and allow the affected households to relocate themselves, b) relocate the households to the nearby city of Tilarán, the largest population center in the immediate region, or c) rese ttle the affected populations into newly constructed communities (ICE 1978). To identify the best option, in July 1973 an Inter Institutional Task Force composed of the ICE Office of Architectural Design, The Institute of Municipal Development (IFAM), and students from the Department of Architecture of the University of Costa Rica conducted a preliminary survey of 164 families in the future reservoir zone. In August 1973, a second survey of 203 families was conducted by ICE, IFAM, and students from the Depa rtments of Anthropology and Architecture of the University of Costa Rica (ICE 1973). Based on the results of these studies and an analysis of regional data from the 1973 national census, it was determined that the displaced populations would best be served by being resettled into new communities. This was both the preference of the displacees, who wanted to remain in the same general area and retain their independence from Tilarán, and of ICE itself, which viewed the replacement and improvement of the indiv idual and communal resources the communities were being forced to leave behind as its ethical

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117 obligation (ICE 1978). In addition, ICE viewed the challenge of designing planned rural communities with sufficient opportunities to slow the growing pace of rura l to urban migration as an exciting opportunity (ICE 1978). Once the course of action was decided upon, the resettlement activities proceeded in ten somewhat simultaneous phases: 1. Baseline Studies 2. Information Campaign and Meetings with Affected Families 3. Ne w Settlement Site Selection 4. Land Acquisition 5. Urban and Architectural Planning 6. Financial Mechanism for Restitution of Property 7. Construction of the New Settlements 8. Community Development 9. Agricultural Development 10. Inaugurating the New Communities Unless other report, Relocation of the Tronadora Arenal Populations, of the Arenal project. Phase 1: Baseline studies In addition to the ethnographic surveys, published i Development in the Arenal Lagoon Area: Relocation of Populatio gave ICE a preliminary picture of the social and economic context in the Arenal basin, and of the needs and desires of the affected populations. Two findings from these studies deserve special mention. One was that the main population c enters of Arenal and Tronadora were characterized by distinct development trajectories and economic activities. While Arenal was a bustling commercial hub and

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118 home to many of the families who owned small and mid sized ranches, Tronadora was a smaller town composed of agriculturalists. It was therefore preferable to create two separate resettlement communities, rather than attempt to combine the populations into resettl ement, but it also served to minimize the inter group conflict that has been recorded in other cases of resettlement (c.f. Mahapatra and Mahapatra 2000, Wolde Selassie Abutte 2000). The second important finding was that the large scale ranchers and wealthy commercial families of Arenal and Tronadora did not intend to participate in the resettlement, but instead planned to move to ranches or other land they owned elsewhere. They also did not intend to take their workers with them, as they already had employe es on the other ranches. Ultimately, this meant that the primary source of employment and capital in the area would disappear upon resettlement and the population to be resettled would consist of small landowners, business owners, and landless families. Th e resettlement plan therefore needed to facilitate the development of new small scale economic activities, such as commercial dairy farming and agricultural production (ICE 1973). Importantly, the findings from these studies were made publicly available, thereby opening the planning process to public scrutiny. According to Partridge (1993), this had several positive effects. First, other governmental institutions became aware of how the project might affect them. Second, the affected families had access to information about the project and could seek changes where necessary. Third, there

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119 thereby lessening the potential for corruption. Finally, the general availability of i nformation about the project served to reduce tension and panic among the affected populations. Phase 2: Information c ampaign and contact with affected f amilies During the ethnographic survey conducted in 1973, it was revealed that despite newspaper arti cles and radio broadcasts about the project since 1970, there was a significant lack of knowledge among the affected population about the hydroelectric project, its purpose, and its impact on them (ICE 1973). This was particularly the case among the smalle r landholders, wage laborers, local business owners and artisans, and those without steady employment in other words, those of lower socioeconomic status who were the most vulnerable to livelihood disruptions (ICE 1973). In addition to lacking general info rmation about the project, residents were also missing information about the procedure for indemnification and therefore could not estimate how negatively they would be affected (ICE 1973). To address this lack of knowledge, the Task Force created a pamphl et with responses to the 38 most frequently asked questions. These was distributed i n Arenal and Tronadora in August 1973 during meetings in which ICE staff discussed the role of ICE, the history of electricity development in Costa Rica, the hydroelectric project, and the need for a resettlement plan. Partridge (1993) points out that duri ng these meetings, ICE did not present an ad hoc resettlement plan, but rather assured the affected population that the plan would be designed in consultation with the affected communities. It should also be noted, however, that these meetings were designe d to provide information about a project that was already decided upon, rather

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120 than serving as a venue for the affected communities to participate in decision making about the project and the need for resettlement. sharing efforts , when machinery, workers, and infrastructure began arriving to the area in 1974, the local population reacted with fear. It was at that point that the affected communities realized the project was actually going to proceed and that their personal futures were unclear. Scudder (2005:33) notes that Colson four and Tronadora, composed mainly of wealthy ra nchers and their employees. Within the committees, however, there were two competing ideologies. One group, primarily composed of the wealthy cattle ranchers, threatened to shut down the project. The other group, composed of poorer laborer families, saw th e opportunity to use community mobilization as a means to improve the conditions of resettlement. Eventually, it became clear that the ranchers were primarily interested in increasing the price of restitution for their lands and were not concerned with the components of resettlement that affected their employees (e.g., schools, houses, potable water, etc.). The ranchers thus lost credibility as community leaders. The defense committees, however, were retained as the main vehicle for interaction between the communities and ICE because the committees represented both the small scale farmers and landless laborers who would remain in the area after resettlement (Partridge 1993). Another important response to the fears expressed by the affected populations was th formed Office of Resettlement. These staff members were tasked with providing

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121 information about the project at the individual, group, and community levels; maintaining one on one co ntact with each affected family to assess their socioeconomic conditions and future needs; and offering incentives and assistance for community organizing and development. ICE emphasized the independence of these staff members with regard to the institutio nal agenda; they were given the latitude to carry out their duties according to the ethics of their profession rather than according to the priorities of the institution. This was intended to generate trust in the institution, its staff, and the resettleme nt process. Phase 3: New s ettlem ent site s election The baseline censuses and ethnographic surveys had revealed that the preference of Arenale ñ os was to be relocated to the north side of the reservoir in order to maintain their strategic position as a comm ercial center for that region. Residents of Tronadora, on the other hand, wished to remain on the south side of the reservoir, near their current location. According to my own interviews, Arenaleños also had three other motives for relocating to the opposi te side of the reservoir. First, in obtaining some physical distance from Tronadora, Arenal would cease to belong to the district of Tronadora and would become its own district within the municipality of Tilar án. This would mitigate the sense of competitio n between the two communities, spurred by the fact that Arenal was politically subordinate to Tronadora even though it was larger and more economically important. It would also gain the right to have representation in the municipal government. In fact, Are nal had twice petitioned to become its own district, once in 1953 and once in 1970, but had been denied both times (Obando 1981). Second, the resettlement site options along the northwestern edge of the new reservoir would provide easier access to the Guat uso region (an adjacent basin to the north of

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122 Arenal), whose agricultural potential had recently been discovered and where some residents of Viejo Arenal had acquired inexpensive land. Finally, the resettlers wanted to gain some distance from the Arenal Vo lcano, whose sudden eruption in 1968 had traumatized the community. process of selecting the new resettlement sites. First, it identified potential resettlement sites according to t he topography of the region. Seven sites were proposed for Nuevo Arenal and three were proposed for Nuevo Tronadora (Figure 3 13). Second, site representative from the comm unity defense committee. Third, each site was evaluated based on series of variables, including distance from urban centers, existing or planned road systems, area available for growth and expansion, administrative unit, distance from the future reservoir, distance from the Arenal Volcano, physical and climatological characteristics, and the ease of providing basic services (e.g., water, electricity, telephone). Fourth, the site evaluations were presented to each community, along with options for the design of the new settlements (urban town, dispersed farms, or a combination of an urban core surrounded by farms) (Figure 3 14). After much negotiation and debate, the new resettlement sites and designs were determined by popular vote (Figure 3 15). La Naci ó n, a national newspaper, described voting day: Lo hacen ante el inevitable hecho de que dentro de 15 meses, Arenal quedará bajo 15 metros de agua una vez que se construya la represa en el río del mismo nombre. Un domingo en un pueblo, todos sabemos que se con vierte en el único día en que se reúnen sus habitantes de hacer todo tipo de comentarios, pero el tema único de jóvenes y viejos ayer en Arenal, fue sobre la decisión que estaban tomando. Las ventajas y desventajas de cada alternativa se discutían en medio de un ambiente de tristeza. Finalmente, a las cuatro de la tarde, so obtuvo el resultado del plebiscito,

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123 en el que 292 personas votaron por la alternativa de Santa María y 105 demostraron su deseo de que la nueva población se asentara en Sangregado a unos dos kilómetros del actual centro urbano que será sepultado por las aguas en pocos meses . (La Nación 1974, cited in Obando 1981:50) They do it faced with the inevitable fact that within 15 months, Arenal will be under 15 meters of water once the dam is bu ilt on the river of the same name. On a Sunday in any town, everyone knows that it is the only day on which its residents gather to comment on all types of issues, but the only theme among young and old yesterday in Arenal was about the decision that they were making. The advantages and disadvantages of each alternative were discussed in the middle of a sad atmosphere. Finally, at 292 people voted for the Santa Maria option and 105 demonstrated their desire that the new town should settle in Sangregado, two kilometers from where the current urban center will be buried by the waters in a few months. Thus by a majority vote, the location of Santa Maria, located on the northwest shore of the lake, was selected for Nuevo Arenal (Figure 3 13). 14 Both Arenal and Tronadora also selected the mixed urban/farm layout, likely because it was the most similar to their current situation and would thus create some sense of continuity between their old and new lives (Marris 1974). Phase 4: Land a cquisition Upon selection of the resettlement sites, ICE began the process of indemnifying the properties that were to be flooded and purchasing the land for the new communities. The indemnification process c onsisted of a) a survey of the property, b) approval of the 14 There is some debate among Arenale ños as to whether ICE constructed the community at the location selec ted through the popular vote. Some residents contend that they voted for the location of Santa Maria, but that the community was actually constructed at Dos Bocas. While in close proximity to each other (i.e., within easy walking distance), these sites hav e distinctly different soil types, Santa Maria being much better suited for agriculture. As will be described in Chapter 4, Santa Maria was taken over by squatters in the early 2000s and is the only area of Nuevo Arenal that is currently used for agricultu ral purposes.

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124 department, who then delivered it to the Fiscal Administration Tribunal, d) inspection of the land by an evaluation exp ert sent by the Tribunal and a determination of the price to be paid, e) payment for the purchase price made by ICE. In cases of disagreement, both the landowner and ICE were entitled to seek legal remedy according to laws governing expropriation. This pha se was characterized by marked tension between ICE and the landholders, particularly in Arenal. Some local landholders were understandably upset by the impending loss of their homes and communities, while others, namely large landholders who were not perma nent residents of the region, took advantage of the highly charged atmosphere to create unrest in order to increase the price they were to be paid for their land. Encouraged by these landholders, the defense committee threatened to mount a fight against th e institution. As recounted to me by Eduardo construction was to begin in Nuevo Arenal, a group of cattle ranchers met in Viejo Arenal and threatened to block the inaugurati on ceremony. The next morning, buses lined up in the central plaza to transport Arenale ñ os to the new site for the ceremony but hours passed before anyone was brave enough to defy the social pressure created by the ranchers and enter the buses. Finally, on e woman boarded, which inspired other villagers to board as well. Upon arriving at the new resettlement site, however, ICE staff learned that the Catholic Church in Tilar á n was refusing to participate in the ceremony, stating that it could not officiate a chief of the Arenal hydroelectric project, Carlos Corrales, gave a short speech and led

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125 Ultimately, the conflict with the ranchers was resolved through their efforts to modify the law of expropriations (Law 5869) to allow them to accept payment based on the estimated value of their properties without actually agreeing to the value. This enabled them to continue to pursue higher valuation of their lands through legal venues without impeding the progress of the resettlement efforts. ICE also diffused the tension by ceasing the use of the defense committees as a medium of communication with the communities, and began a proce ss of one on one negotiation with each affected family. Phase 5: Urban and architectural p lanning The new settlements were planned between January and June 1975. The planning process was informed by the previous ethnographic studies of the old communities and, more importantly, by the opinions of the affected populations. Only when the communities approved the plans did ICE act upon them. The characteristics of the communities were to be as follows: The communities would consist of an urban core surrounded by farm plots. The urban core would have defined commercial and residential areas. Urban lots would be between 700 and 1300 m2 in size, large enough for chicken coops and vegetable and flower gardens, with the idea being to preserve the rural character of the community. Farm plots would range from 2 5 hectares in Nuevo Tronadora and from 2 10 hectares in Nuevo Arenal. Smaller plots would be located closer to the urban core, while larger plots would be on the outskirts of the resettlement area. Larger plot s in Nuevo Arenal reflected the larger holdings in Viejo Arenal due to the predominance of cattle ranching. Sixty five plots would be set aside for the next generation, to be purchased from ICE. At one point, the resettlers were taken to the community of Z arcero, which has similar environmental conditions and is dominated by small landholdings. This visit made clear that technical assistance would be needed in Nuevo Arenal to teach farmers how to grow commercial crops or intensify their livestock production systems. Each new settlement would have the same commercial and public services that had existed in the old settlement. In addition, extra spaces were left for new future services.

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126 The traditional plaza church school complex would be retained as the cent er of the new settlements. Parks and gardens would be created around the church in order to dissuade residents from using the main plaza (soccer field) as a park. In addition, the school would have an agricultural plot where students would receive training in agricultural production. The new settlements would have running water, septic tanks, electricity, gravel roads, street gutters, sidewalks, green spaces, and public lighting. The architecture was to be purposefully simple, reflecting the rural character of the towns. Eighteen different models of homes were to be available for each family to choose from. Each had a living room, dining room, kitchen, laundry area, bathroom, 2 5 bedrooms, and an optional carport. The homes would be built from concrete block (based on the expressed preference of the resettlers) and would have cement floors. Internal divisions were to be created from wood to permit future adaptation. Roofs would be made of corrugated asbestos cement. Homes would be set back at varying dis tances from the sidewalks in order to avoid a monotonous line of houses. Phase 6: Financial mechanism for restitution of p roperty ICE characterized this phase of the resettlement process as one of the most important, as it was at this point that the futur e of each family in the new settlements would be determined. The negotiations were conducted individually between each objectives of the project to improve the standard o f living of the affected families ICE situation was made, including their current occupation, income, and size of landholding. stated desires for future occupation, size of house, and size of property in the new settlement. Finally, the two were reconciled and an agreement was reached regarding the appropriate size house and property based on current property, available family labor, their skills and other productive capacity, and their economic needs.

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127 To facilitate the acquisition of homes in the new settlements, five financing packages were offered to the residents of Arenal: 1. Those whose p roperty was appraised at or less than 47,000 colones (equivalent to US$5,484 at the 1975 exchange rate) would receive new replacement houses and farm plots free of charge. This sum corresponded to the value of a three bedroom house in Nuevo Arenal. 2. Tho se whose property was appraised at between 47,000 and 100,000 colones (US$5,484 $11,668) would be required to pay 50% of their indemnification toward the purchase of a new property. The remainder of the purchase price would be financed by ICE for a term of 20 years at 8% annual interest. 3. Those whose property was appraised at between 100,000 and 200,000 colones (US$11,668 $23,337) would be required to pay 50% of their indemnification toward the purchase of a new property. The remainder of the purchase price would be financed for a term of 10 years at 8% annual interest. 4. Those who did not own property in Arenal could purchase a property in Nuevo Arenal, financed for a term of 20 years at 8% annual interest. 5. Those whose property was appraised at more than 200,000 colones ($23,337) were given a cash payment only, which they could use to purchase a home or property in the community if they so chose. Repayment of loans could be made monthly or annually, depending on the annual payment in order to wait for income earned during the harvest season. In addition, ICE granted all recipients of the finance packages a one year grace period, the first payment not being due until the beginning of the following year, thus giving th e resettlers a period of two years before entering debt repayment. This was intended to give the resettlers sufficient time to implement their new production systems and begin earning an income. Families were preliminarily assigned to urban lots and farm plots within the new settlements with the help of community leaders who had knowledge of their social networks and locational needs. Each family was presented with this preliminary assignment and then allowed to make modifications as necessary. Eighty perc ent of the

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128 families accepted the properties to which they were assigned, while 20% made adjustments. During my fieldwork, research participants recalled a large scale map in the ICE office upon which the assignments were recorded. Families could see where their friends and families would live, who their new neighbors would be, and make adjustments accordingly. Importantly, this process addressed the need for maintaining continuity in social relationships emphasized by Marris (1974) and minimized the risk of social disarticulation highlighted by Cernea (1997). Families who paid for their homes or properties in full were prohibited from selling them for a period of five years, while families who participated in one of the credit based financing packages w ere prohibited from selling their homes or properties for a period of 10 years. These restrictions were intended to protect the resettled families from the temptation of abandoning their properties soon after resettlement without giving themselves the chan ce to get accustomed to their new situation. The restrictions were resources to replacing and improving the physical infrastructure of the old communities and did not w ant to see the new settlements overtaken by outsiders. It is likely that this Guatavita were unable to adapt to the design of the resettlement houses and eventually abandone d them. The houses were later acquired by outsiders as vacation properties. Commercial properties were dealt with in much the same way as personal properties. Business owners who were active in the old communities prior to January 1973 were entitled to e quivalent commercial properties in the new communities. Business owners who paid 50% of their indemnification toward the purchase of a new

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129 property would receive financing for the remainder of the purchase for a term of 10 years at 8% annual interest. Thos e who paid less than 50% would receive financing for a term of 10 years at 9% annual interest. Anyone who received financing for their commercial property was restricted from selling the property for a period of five years. Business owners were given the o pportunity to provide input on the design of their commercial properties during construction. Phase 7: Construction of the new s ettlements ICE began construction in Nuevo Tronadora in June 1975 and finished in December 1976. Construction began in Nuevo Ar enal in November 1975 and was completed in December 1977. Figures 3 16 through 3 18 illustrate the construction process. Rather than install pre fabricated houses of questionable quality, it was decided that building houses from scratch would allow for f lexibility in their design, create a source of employment, and provide construction experience for local workers. In conjunction with the National Learning Institute ( Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje ), a construction course was offered to 70 young men fro m Arenal and Tronadora. During the construction of the communities, 70 men were hired as laborers, thus providing on the job training in preparation for the future and instilling within them a sense of ownership of their new homes. In addition to creating feelings of ownership and attachment to their new community and providing the opportunity to gain new skills that could be used after resettlement, the use of local labor can also lower the level of dependency on outside resources during the resettlement p rocess (Oliver Smith 1991). During construction, each family served as the building inspector of their new home and a family representative was present for much of its construction. In addition,

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130 out of respect for the residents of the old communities, IC E dismantled the former buildings slowly rather than razing them all at once. Thus, materials like shutters, doors, windows, and wood panels could be salvaged and used in the new houses. Beyond the functional purpose of these materials, the presence of ite ms from the old community can also serve to sustain a connection with the past, thus allowing for the preservation of memory and group identity at a time when socio cultural systems are under severe stress (Oliver Smith 2005b, Rogers and Wang 2005). ICE largely followed through on the promises made during the planning process. The final community of Nuevo Arenal consisted of 149 farm plots, 199 urban lots and 325 houses. The urban area had water service, septic tanks, street gutters, electricity, gravel roads, public lighting, sidewalks, green spaces, and telephone service. Public services included the rural police, telegraph and postal service, Center of Nutrition (a governmental service that provides food, nutritional, and educational services to childr en under four years of age), mobile health unit, bank, elementary school, Catholic and Evangelical churches, and a cemetery. Recreational infrastructure included a soccer field, basketball court, and green spaces. The commercial zone of the community consi sted of 50 lots, 35 of which were occupied at the time of resettlement. Businesses included food and vegetable markets, butcher shops, dance halls, bars, small restaurants, stores, a boarding house, a hotel, a movie theater, a grocery cooperative , an auto mechanic, and carpentry and welding workshops. Phase 8: Community d evelopment resettlement from a holistic perspective. This meant that the institution was not only focused on constructing the necessary physical infrastructure, but also on reconstituting

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131 community promoters consistently engaged with the communities before, during, and after r esettlement. In fact, the community promoters demonstrated their commitment and confidence in the new communities by taking up residence there for three years after resettlement. During the period immediately before and after resettlement, ICE staff organ ized educational opportunities such as the construction training discussed above and additional courses in community development, leadership, family life, child psychology, home improvement, crafts, dressmaking, and baking. They also attempted to convey th e importance of addressing ongoing local issues through community organizations. In addition to resolving some of the immediate needs of the community, it was believed that these organizations would also give the residents a sense of ownership over their n ew home and presumably aid in the development of a new group identity. In fact, this Scudder Colson model of community reconstruction (Scudder 2005). Soon after resettlement, local organizations emerged that focused on the school, church, and community maintenance and aesthetics. In addition, committees were formed to organize the develo pment of sporting activities and agricultural efforts. Among the accomplishments of these groups was the purchase of the stained glass for the Catholic Church, desks for the school, and tables for the community center, and the planting of grass and gardens in public areas. While most of these groups dissolved soon after achieving their short

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132 together to achieve community goals remained, as illustrated by the rapid formation of a local Community Developm ent Association ( Asociaci ó n de Desarrollo Integral ) in 1978, which remains active to this day. 15 One tangible measure of the success of the efforts to develop a sense of community and an affective bond to the new site was the celebration of the first Cathol ic Mass in Nuevo Arenal in April 1977, six months before construction Phase 9: Agricultural d evelopment dedicated considerable effort to assisting with the development of subsistence and commercial agricultural systems. These programs took three forms: 1. Household production: ICE provided cuttings of traditional crops (maize, manioc, banana, and plantain) at the new settlements a nd encouraged resettlers to clear their land and plant crops as soon as the plots were allocated to them. In the first year after resettlement, these crops provided an important source of food to the resettled families. 2. Experimental plots: ICE maintain ed experimental agricultural plots in each community, where new varieties of crops were planted (e.g., potato, garlic, onion, pineapple, peppers, cabbage, lettuce, etc.) and where new planting techniques were demonstrated (e.g., fertilizers, pest control, etc.) (Figure 3 19). In addition, new varieties of coffee (e.g., Caturra, a variety of the Arabica plant that matures rapidly and does not require shade) and pasture grass were tested (e.g., King Grass (Pennisetum purpureum)). A financial accounting of the cost of production was carried out to determine which crops were economically viable. The intent of the experimental plots was not to force resettlers into new production systems, 15 The National Community Development Directorate ( Dirección Nacional de Desarrollo de la Comunidad or DINADECO) was established by the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly in 1967 via Law No. 3859, with the intention of supporting local communi ty development associations. The mission of the local associations was to work for the economic and social improvement of their communities, together working toward the achievement of national economic and social development goals. Between 1967 and 1978 (t he approximate time period of resettlement), 807 associations were established in Costa Rica, located associations. The community development associations are p art of a long tradition of institutionalized relationships between the State and local civil society that began in the mid 19 th century (Mondol Vel á squez 2009).

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133 3. Technical training: Agricultural educati on programs were implemented in the primary schools as a means of training the future generation of farmers. Courses included soil preparation, conservation, and fertility, and the establishment of ricultural plot and the harvests were used in the school kitchen. ICE technicians also provided a series of public lectures on horticulture and fruticulture and worked closely with farmers on their plots to implement new agricultural techniques. Phase 10: Inaugurating the new communities Residents of Nuevo Tronadora moved into their new homes in December 1976, while residents of Nuevo Arenal moved in December 1977. Each family was responsible for transferring their own belongings to the new communities. Re location was completed almost a year before the old communities were flooded (ICE 1978, Partridge 1993). A ceremony was held to inaugurate the new settlements, with a dedication by municipal officials from Tilar án and a religious procession in which a Cath olic priest from San José blessed each house and the public buildings. While ICE staff provided development assistance to the communities for three years after resettlement was completed, the inauguration marked the transfer of administrative responsibilit ies from first step in fulfilling the requirements of the final stage of the Scudder Colson model, though it occurred immediately after physical resettlement was com plete (concurrent community for various years after resettlement. The Immediate Aftermath of Resettlement ttlement aided in making the physical transfer from one community to another a relatively smooth process. Because construction on the new settlement was completed long before the reservoir was flooded, there was no sense of urgency in moving the resettlers out of the

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134 basin. Resettlement therefore occurred in bits and pieces over the course of a few months. This gradual transfer of residence was also partially due to the fact that resettlers were not given any assistance from ICE in transporting their posses sions from Viejo Arenal to Nuevo Arenal, so they were forced to rely on the few residents who had access to vehicles to move their goods in small batches. Construction materials taken from the dismantled houses in the old community were also transported pr ivately. In addition, even after the houses in Nuevo Arenal were completed and inhabited, the elementary school was still under construction, so school children were bused from Nuevo Arenal back to Viejo Arenal to attend classes. For a short time, then, th e two communities existed simultaneously, allowing for a more gradual process of adjustment and the maintenance of continuity between the communities, the importance of which has been emphasized by resettlement scholars (cf. Downing and Garcia Downing 2010 , Marris 1974). This process stands in stark contrast to other, more violent, accounts of forced displacement. Jing (1996), for example, describes the sudden and frightening eviction of Chinese villagers to make way for the Yanguo Gorge dam project in 1960 . Under cover of night, the militia literally dragged people from their beds and pulled down the columns of their houses with ropes; in a state of panic, villagers salvaged what they could, including the bones of their ancestors for later reburial (Jing 19 96:1 2). In comparison to stories like these, the resettlement of Arenal was extremely humane. Upon their arrival in Nuevo Arenal, however, resettlers report being taken aback by the aesthetic appearance of the new communities. While ICE had fulfilled its commitment of replacing and improving the physical infrastructure that had existed in Viejo Arenal, this was accomplished in the most spartan of fashions. Houses were

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135 painted in a plain and uniform color. 16 There was no ground cover, grass, or trees on priv ate or public properties. Roads in the urban core were muddy, composed of a sticky red clay soil. The highway connecting the community to the major population centers on either side of the new reservoir, Tilar á n and La Fortuna, was made of gravel that quic kly deteriorated during the rainy season. Though Nuevo Arenal was only a few miles from Viejo Arenal, the microclimate created by the mountain ranges that surrounded the basin resulted in considerably more precipitation than the resettlers were accustomed to. Invariably, when describing the early years in Nuevo Arenal, people would tell me it when the resettlement occurred: Male, 47: Lo que yo me acuerdo cuando llegamos a este pueblo es que era un pueblo que nosotros le llamábamos pueblo fantasma. Era un pueblo totalmente horrendo, feísimo. Las calles todas llenas de barro, no había pavimento, no habían aceras, llovía demasiado, como hasta el momento pero anteriormente era más lluvia y se veía más feo por por lo mismo, por las aceras, las calles y era algo bastante desagradable para los que vinimos para acá. Por eso mucha gente optó por vender baratísimo y se fueron para otros lados, ya, a hacia Tilarán, a otras otras zonas , mucha gente se fue de Arena . l . . . Porque cuando nosotros llegábamos nosotros le decíamos un pueblo fantasma. Aquí no había paso, no había camino como para Fortuna, nada de eso. What I remember when we arrived in this town is that it was a town that w e called a ghost town. It was a totally horrible, ugly town. The streets were filled with mud, there was no pavement, there were no sidewalks, it rained too much, like now but before there was more rain and it looked uglier because of that, because of the sidewalks, the streets, and it was something really disagreeable for those of us who came here. For that reason, a lot of people decided to sell their properties for a low price and they went somewhere else, toward Tilarán , to other areas, a lot of people left Arenal . . . . Because when we arrived, we called it a ghost town. Here 16 Resettlers I interviewed told me the houses were left unpainted. However, Eduardo Brenes, he ad of Resettlers could purchase other colors of exterior paint at their own expense if they so chose, which the construction workers would apply (E. Bre nes, pers. comm.).

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136 that. As the comment above indicates, the new community was also struggling economically. Though ICE had c arefully designed the resettlement project to promote agricultural development in the face of the departure of the major employers of the region (the large cattle ranches), these efforts were undermined by a number of important factors. The topography of t he resettlement site was mountainous, as opposed to the valley plains to which the resettlers were accustomed, and therefore more difficult to farm. The red clay based soils in the resettlement zone were not particularly fertile and had limited permeabilit y, a fact had been overlooked by ICE during the planning process because the agency had not done a basic assessment of the agricultural potential of the new area (Obando 1981, Partridge 1993). Furthermore, much of the limited fertile volcanic topsoil that did exist had been lost during the excavation process for the new settlement site (Obando 1981). Resettlers described the economy, this was a major oversight. To achieve the agricultural productivity found in the volcanic soils of the valley floor, farm ers were forced to use fertilizers, which created economic hardship. In addition, the extremely wet climate was too intense for seedlings to take root, which also affected agricultural productivity. Most resettlers also claim that the size of the farm plot s was not sufficient to support commercial agriculture or dairy production, particularly given the unanticipated problem of low soil fertility. Finally, the farm plots allocated to the resettlers by ICE were left in their original, forested condition.

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137 Much therefore consumed with clearing and preparing the plots for production, contributing to an even longer lag time between arrival in the new community and economic solvency. To mak e matters worse, the market access promised by road development during the project quickly declined as the condition of the gravel roads worsened over multiple rainy seasons. The route from Nuevo Arenal to Tilar á n was not paved until 1982, leaving Nuevo Ar enal somewhat isolated for the first five years post resettlement. In the other direction, the road between Nuevo Arenal and La Fortuna was partially paved in 1994 and completed in 2006. Today, road travel from Nuevo Arenal to either city takes approximate ly 30 45 minutes, whereas prior to paving the trip was on the order of 2 3 hours. This made it difficult to transport agricultural products to and from the community. intentioned efforts at creating a viable agricultural economy in Nuevo Arenal, including a concerted effort at introducing coffee as a cash crop shortly after resettlement (discussed in detail in the next chapter), the limitations were too great to overcome in the short term and without more external assistance such as access to agricultural credit. However, ICE itself had no means of providing credit to the resettlers, and their ability to obtain independent credit was limited by the absence of legal title to their land for various years post resettlement due to a d isagreement between ICE and the hacienda La Rosita, from which ICE had purchased the land for the new resettlement site (Obando 1981). Issues with agricultural production and road access also meant that businesses in the urban core suffered because the re simply was not enough money in circulation to

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138 sustain them. Though the site selection for Nuevo Arenal was strategic in the sense that it allowed the businesses to continue to supply rural communities on the north side of the lake, upon resettlement the community was cut off from communities on the south side of the lake. This meant that Nuevo Arenal was essentially an island. Many businesses that had thrived in Viejo Arenal due to its commercial centrality in the valley, like the hotel, cinema, and rest aurants, closed within a year or two after resettlement. Another important economic problem was the introduction of relatively large amounts of debt into almost every household upon resettlement. Eighty four percent of homes in the urban core and 89% of th e larger farm plots were purchased through based resettlement compensation structure (Obando 1981). In addition, access to electricity also generated an increase in the purchase of consumer goods like televisions (47%), refrigera tors (36%), and stoves (26%) (Obando 1981). Many households also purchased furniture for their new h omes (36%) and some centers (9%) (Obando 1981). Thus, not only were reset tled households in a position of having to make capital investments in their own production systems or businesses, but they were also expected to make payments to ICE on their home loans, repay the debt created by the purchase of consumer goods, and also e arn enough to sustain their families in an climate that did not offer many options for income. ICE had not anticipated these issues and therefore had not made arrangements for short term credit or food relief. The years immediately following resettlement w ere therefore marked by a critical economic situation that created an environment of uncertainty and ultimately resulted in

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139 an outflow of residents from the community. Two years after resettlement, Obando (1981:90) found that 5% of the heads of household s he interviewed wanted to abandon their properties due to their inability to pay their debts. Though I do not have data on the migration rate during this period, one trustworthy informant believed that there were approximately 50 60 unoccupied houses in the community during this exodus, which amounts to 15 18% of the total number of homes constructed by ICE. Those resettlers who could sell their homes for a much reduced price did so (reports are that houses were being sold for as low as 10,000 15,000 colones , or $1,166 $1,750), while others simply turned their homes and land over to ICE. While ICE had placed restrictions on restrictions either were not enforced or were worked around by creating private contracts between the buyer and seller. An interesting side effect of the out migration generated by the diffcult condtions is that it enabled the acquisition of property by the remaining resettlers and new immigrants. S ome resettlers who had access to savings or extra capital were able to purchase additional agricultural lands in Nuevo Arenal, thereby increasing the production capacity of their properties. Others chose to purchase additional business or residential prope rties in the urban core. The availability of property also attracted a small number of new immigrants, mostly from the surrounding rural communities, who had previously traveled to Viejo and Nuevo Arenal for commercial purposes. In fact, one of these immig rants told me that he believes the all of the original residents of the nearest settlement of Mata de Ca ña now live in Nuevo Arenal. Most were cattle

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140 ranchers who retained their lands for commercial purposes but preferred to live in town due to the service s provided by the urban center. 17 The difficult economic and physical conditions in Nuevo Arenal, paired with the emigration of residents, created what by all accounts was a depressing environment. Obando (1981) noted that in 1980, two years after resettlem ent, resettlers still had not developed feelings of attachment to the new community, continued to express regret about having to abandon their homes and livelihoods in Viejo Arenal, exhibited a general apathy, and tended to have limited social interactions . Illustrative of these sentiments, five of the 29 residents with whom I conducted life history interviews who were present at the time of resettlement independently referred to Nuevo Arenal as a Male, 43: Hay algo muy importante que tenemos que entender: cuando nosotros nos pasamos para acá esto era un pueblo fantasma. No había ninguna fuente de trabajo. La única fuente de trabajo que tenía era el ICE y el jefe de hogar que no trabajaba para el I CE estaba en problemas de sobrevivir, tenían que irse. Fue cuando hubo una migración de los pobladores para otros lugares. Vendían la propiedad que ellos tenían aquí y se trasladaban a otros lugares donde habían fuentes de trabajo. There is something ver y important that we have to understand: when we The only source of work that it had was ICE and the head of household who town. That was when there was a migration of people to other places. They sold the properties they had here and they moved to other places where there were sources of work. Male, 56: Los primeros a ñ os aqu í en Nuevo Arenal [ fueron ] muy difícil es , porque a quí usted iba a a buscar un limón para hacer un fresco y no había . O sea esto era un pueblo fantasma que llamábamos, muy duro. Pero en la dureza todas las finquitas que nos dieron eran charrales como le digo, 17 Mata de Ca ñ rather than a population center.

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141 había que chapiarlas, había que yerbicearla y c omenzar a hacharle y meterle el pasto. The first years here in Nuevo Arenal were very difficult, because here you would look for a lime to make juice . I n other words, And in the midst of the difficulty, all of the small farms they gave us were scrublands, you had to clear them, add herbicides, and start to seed them with pasture grass. Most accounts indicate that t his situation continued for a considerable length of tim e after resettlement . Here a respondent recounts moving from Tilarán to Nuevo Arenal in 1984 , seven years after resettlement , when her husband took over the local gas station : Female, 52: Lo poquito que me queda es que era como un pueblo fantasma. Si, esta ba todavía apenas en ese proceso de cambio, de ambientarse. Lo que si yo me acuerdo era que todo yo lo veía muy feo, que digamos que no estaban las casas con zona verdes . . . . Entonces yo siento por lo menos lo poco que me recuerde es que sí, era un puebl o donde apenas la gente esta tratando de, que se hace, como se sobrevive. Porque en el Viejo Arenal cada uno tenía ya su vida hecha, vida realizada, y venir aquí a empezar de cero como que le dan una casa, un lote, pero díay nada más, y ahora que? The li ttle that I remember is that it was like a ghost town. Yes, it was still just in the process of change, of adjusting to the environment. What I do landscaping . . . . So I feel that from what little I remember is that it was a town where the people were trying to figure out what to do, how to survive. Because in Viejo Arenal, each person had their life established, realized, and to come here and start from nothing, like they give them a ho use, a lot, but nothing more, and now what? This description is consistent with the responses from other residents with whom I conducted interviews. When asked how many years it took for the community to reach a level of comfort post resettlement, defined as the sense that survival was not a struggle and that they had reached some level of economic stability, most of my research participants responded that it took five to seven years to achieve basic stablity.

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142 Interestingly, this timing coincides with Part project for the IDB in 1983, which was based in large part on the temporary prosperity generated by the emergence of coffee production (discussed in further detail in Chapter 4). In the Scudder Colson four stage fr amework, the five to seven year post processes of economic development and community for mation will be the focus of the next two chapters. Using the IRR Model to Evaluate the Design of the Arenal Resettlement Project As disc ussed in Chapter 1, during his tenure at the World Bank , sociologist Michael Cernea developed a useful framework for p redicting, diagnosing, and mitigating the risks faced by forcibly resettled populations, particularly in the short term. The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model consists of eight risks or subprocesses that together can lead to impoverishmen t : landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property assets, and community disarticulation (Cernea 1997) . Before discussing the longer term process of community r econstruction after resettlement in the two next chapter s , I would first like to briefly assess the Arenal project according to the IRR framework. By using this framework to evaluate the design of the Arenal resettlement project, it is possible to identify which elements of the project design worked well to facilitate community reconstruction post resettlement and which did not.

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143 Landlessness The Arenal project directly addressed the risk of landlessness by making land based compensation an integral componen t of the process of indemnification. In addition to providing replacement lands for those resettlers who would lose their holdings to the reservoir, ICE also recognized the need to provide land for resettlers who were not property owners because the major sources of employment in the region would be lost. T he Arenal resettlement project was therefore designed with a combination of cash based and land based compensation. L and holders in Viejo Arenal were compensated with a payment for the assessed value of th eir holdings, which they could then apply toward purchas ing property in Nuevo Arenal. Landless residents were offered the option to purchase property in the new town under the same loan conditions as property owners. Through this system, the most vulnerabl e , including the landless, were taken into account . 18 Interestingly, this compensation structure created a situation in which those who had very little were more advantaged by resettlement than those who had more. Many landless residents who worked as wage laborers on the large cattle ranches, for example, became self employed property owners upon resettlement. Meanwhile, the owners of small to medium sized properties were not offered equivalently sized holdings in Nuevo Arenal (the maximum lot size was 10 hectares) nor did they have the capital to acquire land elsewhere. These residents thus lost significant economic and social power after resettlement. A similar outcome was recorded by Mahapatra and 18 Large landholders were an exception to the land based compensation structure; they were offered cash compensation only . This did not have a significant negative effect on their well being, however, as they either already owned land elsewhere in the country or could afford to purchase it upon becoming aware of the hydroelectric project.

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144 Mahapatra (2000:433) in their study of the resettlement a Ramial River project. Despite this negative outcome for mid sized landholders, however, overall the Arenal resettlement project created a more equal distribution of property ownership among those who remained in the area. This al so served to minimize the social stratification that had emerged in Viejo Arenal, where power and privilege were concentrated among the owners of the large ranches (Obando 1981). Joblessness During the process of resettlement planning, ICE was extremely c ognizant of the need to replace the opportunities for employment that had existed in Viejo Arenal and to create new opportunities to substitute those that would be lost by resettlement. A b ased compensation structure discussed above. Seventy percent of the new settlement site was set aside for the rural farm parcels (La Naci ó n 1975 cited in Obando 1981:73). By making smallholders out of those resettlers who had been engaged in agricultural p roduction in Viejo Arenal (or were interested in becoming so), it was expected that a new agricultural economy would emerge in the new location. To encourage the development of this new economy, ICE technicians providing cuttings of traditional crops, main tained experimental plots to test the viability of new crop varieties and planting techniques, provided public trainings on horticulture and fruticulture, worked with farmers to implement new agricultural techniques, and developed primary and secondary edu cational programs focused on agriculture in order to train the next development was to lead by example, rather than to force new ideas on an already disoriented population. In ef

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145 phase of resettlement would be characterized by the conservatism predicted by Marris (1974) and Scudder (2005), where old techniques would be relied upon and riskier new techniques would not be readily adopted. consisted of replacing the businesses that had existed in the urban core of Viejo Arenal. Business owners were compensated for the loss of their infrastructure a nd given the option to purchase new facilities in Nuevo Arenal under similar loan conditions that applied to land and home purchases (i.e., they were expected to apply up to 50% of their indemnification toward the new purchase and received financing from I CE for the remainder). Thus, upon resettlement, essentially all of the services that had existed in Viejo Arenal were recreated in Nuevo Arenal. In addition to the local customer base that consisted of the resettled population, these businesses were expect ed to serve the settlements along the northern side of the reservoir. concern immediately upon resettlement. The new smallholder properties did not require regular wage labor, so t he number of jobs available to resettlers who did not purchase farm plots was limited. This also meant that there were few sources of work for those property owners who did not have the capital or income to survive exclusively off of the production from th eir own farms. In the urban area, businesses suffered both from the uncertain local economic conditions and from the removal of the community from its central position in the valley to the periphery. There were especially few sources of employment for wome n, though this was not much different from the situation in Viejo Arenal (Obando 1981).

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146 Perhaps the most serious planning failure was the unanticipated difficulty of agricultural production. The combination of physical constraints, such as poor soil ferti lity, low permeability, and high levels of precipitation; infrastructural limitations, such as the difficulty of access to market centers and the lack of local facilities for collecting agricultural products like milk, beef, and staple crops; and financial constraints generated by lack of access to credit and few opportunities for income generation Furthermore, because ICE had placed so much emphasis on the agricultural component s of the plan, no alternative development projects were conceived or implemented. As a result of this economic uncertainty, Obando (1981:91) found that 66% of resettlers thought their economic situation had not improved after resettlement. Of these, 43% bl amed the lack of employment and 27% blamed the low soil quality, while the remaining 30% blamed the increased expenses incurred by resettlement. 19 Homelessness The risk of homelessness was mitigated by making the purchase of a home possible for every r esettled household. When compared to the rate of home ownership in Viejo Arenal (45%), it is clear that the resettlement project created more equal access to homes. Even two years after resettlement, every family but one was the owner of the house in which they lived (Obando 1981). The houses were also well constructed, culturally appropriate, built to the specifications of the new owners with their supervision, and designed to be easily modified to fit the needs of the family. While 35% 19 Twenty four per cent of resettlers thought their economic situation did improve after resettlement (primarily due to the acquisition of property) and 10% thought it stayed the same (Obando 1981:91).

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147 of the households m odified their kitchens to accommodate the use of a wood burning stove within two years after resettlement (ICE did not design the homes to have chimneys), overall the level of satisfaction with the homes was high. The transition from wooden structures with out electricity and indoor plumbing to concrete houses with modern facilities was universally applauded. In fact, Obando (1981) found that the houses were the aspect of the new settlement site that was most appreciated by the residents, and I encountered s imilar sentiments during my own research almost 30 years later. It should be noted, however, that the lack of legal title to the properties due to the disagreement between ICE and the former property owner (the hacienda La Rosita) caused considerable disco mfort among resettlers until it was resolved. In addition to limiting their access to credit, Obando (1981) argues that the lack of legal title delayed the development of their sense of ownership of the properties and their attachment to the new community. Marginalization T he risk of marginalization involves the loss of economic power. This can be accompanied by social and psychological marginalization due to a drop in social status or the sensation increased vulnerability. By this definition, Arenale ños ex perienced marginalization in various ways as a result of resettlement . The aforementioned transfer of the community from its central location in the valley to the periphery reduced its economic and social importance. This was exacerbated by the lack of all season roads to market centers, which severely limited Arenaleños ability to participate in the regional and national econom ies. The loss of economic status was felt by all resettlers, but especially by those whose livelihoods depended on the economic re lationships between the urban service providers and the rural farms. Arenale ños also felt more vulnerable

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148 after resettlement due to the lack of employment opportunities and their difficulties in generating enough income from their farms or businesses to su stain themselves. The social and psychological effects of this sense of vulnerability were manifested in apathy, nostalgia, low social interaction, and a lack of attachment to place (Obando 1981). On the other hand, one important change served to mitigat e the risk of political marginalization. Upon resettle ment , Arenal was granted the status of a district within the municipality of Tilar án. This enabled the community to elect a representative to the equivalent of the county commission, thus facilitating i ts political inclusion. Through its presence on the council, Arenale ños could directly advocate for the improvement of benefits and services for the community. These improvements will be discussed further in the following two chapters. Food Insecurity IC E attempted to mitigate the risk of food insecurity by focusing on land based compensation and reestablishing local economic activity via rural farming and urban services. Resettlers who were property owners were encouraged to prepare their lands for plant ing even before resettlement occurred (in some cases as early in 1976) in order to minimize the lag time between resettlement and agricultural production systems. However, the low soil fertility and relatively small parcel sizes limited the scale of agricu ltural production and most resettlers could not produce enough to sustain their families using traditional practices (Partridge 1993). Within the urban area, Obando (1981) reports that there were no gardens for household use, which was a significant shift from the urban gardening system in Viejo Arenal. In sum, the first years after resett lement were extremely difficult and many households were forced to incur debt in

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149 order to purchase food. During this time, ICE did not plan for or provide any emergency fo od relief (Partridge 1983). Increased Morbidity and Mortality The risk of increased morbidity and mortality is associated with unhealthy living conditions after resettlement, such as inadequate or contaminated water supplies and increased population densi ties, and with the advent of new diseases associated with the changed environment, such as malaria and schistosomiasis (McCully 2001, Scudder 2005b). In the Arenal project, these types of health problems were not a serious issue. Before resettlement occurr ed, the construction of housing and basic services was completed. The community had indoor plumbing and sanitation services. There were some reports of inadequate water supplies due to an engineering design flaw (Obando 1981), but this did not lead to life threatening shortages. I am not aware of any reports of increased rates of water borne illnesses. The population density of the urban core may have increased upon resettlement, but resettlers did not live in overcrowded conditions nor were they exposed to new diseases from an unfamiliar host population , as the settlement site was located in a relatively uninhabited area. Finally, while the establishment of a permanent health clinic was not part of the original project plan, one was opened in 1980 in what w as originally the local hotel, which closed soon after resettlement due to the lack of clients. It remains in the same location today. Loss of Access to Common Property Assets ICE designed the new settlement to include the same important common spaces tha t existed in the original community . This included parks, open spaces, and the ubiquitous Latin American soccer field. It also included assets important to the recovery of community identity and community building activities, such as churches, schools, and

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150 meeting spaces. With regard to the natural resource base, residents of the Arenal basin did use nearby forested areas for hunting and the rivers and lagoon for fishing as supplementary food source s prior to resettlement . Because the new settlement site wa s in an area with low host population density and located near the same forests and streams , these activities could continue after resettlement , thereby mitigating the loss of access to these assets. Social Disarticulation ICE dedicated significant atten tion to community development before, during, and after resettlement in order to mitigate the risk of social disarticulation. In addition to providing courses in community development and leadership, the resident ICE staff members also encouraged the devel opment of local organizations that would help the community adapt to its new location and address its future needs. One measure of the success of these efforts was the emergence of church, school, and sports committees shortly after resettlement and the es tablishment of a community development association that remains active today. At a material level, t he resettlement project included the replication of important community support infrastructure , such as churches and schools , which helped to sustain socia l support systems . In addition, because residents were allowed to choose the location of their homes, they were able to maintain proximity to the ir families and neighbors i f they wished to do so , thereby preserving continuity in localized social networks a nd support systems. Notably, as has been documented in other cases of resettlement (cf. Downing 1996), some residents also took advantage of the opportunity to distance themselves from undesirable neighbors, underlining the importance of choice in the reco nstruction of spatial patterns of residence . Finally, the

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151 conceptualization of the project as a land based effort promoted the resettlement of a largely intact community, thus mitigating the fragmentation that occurs when only cash compensation is offered and individual families must independently pursue the reestablishment of their livelihoods. Chapter Conclusion: Reflections on the Resettlement Planning Cernea (2008:2) notes that prior to the 1980s, resettlement was generally normlessness. . . . No policy. No rules. No regular plans. No institutional capacity. No competent social specialists involved in resettlement preparation and planning. Low accountability for decision makers initiating or approving internal ethic and political context that demanded that the resettlers be beneficiaries, rather than victims, of the development process. It was also influenced by the extensive project preparation, including external site visits, information gathering, and lengthy discussions about how to best carry out the project. From the initial stages of the Arenal resettlement planning, ICE had two explicit objectives. The first was to improve the standard of living of the affected populations. More often than not, resettlement programs Smith 2010b:3) due in part to the lack of political will to carry them out in an equitable and just living after resettlement was nothing short of remarkable. As discussed in Chapter 1, it suggest the goal of improving, not just restoring, the standard of living of the affected

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152 population post resettlem ent. The fact that ICE established such a high bar as its own standard for success in 1974 was extraordinarily advanced for its time and speaks to expanding its focus beyon d simple compensation (Scudder 2005). Undoubtedly, this ethic emerged from the early foundations of the institution, which, as discussed above, was conceived of as a broad reaching development agency rather than just a public utility. e was to develop an integrated resettlement project that established not only a suitable physical infrastructure but also the economic and social environment necessary to allow the resettled communities to achieve their own development goals (ICE 1978). Th of the resettlement project as a multi faceted and long term effort, which was also a forward thinking approach to the problem of resettlement. In contrast to the focus on material reconstruction th at has historically characterized most resettlement projects (Oliver Smith 2005b), the Arenal project was designed with the goal of establishing the basic social and economic systems that would sustain the community over time. For example, agricultural edu cation programs were offered to adults and children to prepare them for future livelihoods oriented around commercial agricultural production. Local laborers were hired during the construction of the settlements in order to provide on the job training that could potentially be useful in the future. The formation of voluntary associations and community development activities were also encouraged. After resettlement, ICE staff remained in the communities for three years to provide community development suppor t and technical expertise. At a material level, extra

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153 space in the settlements was set aside for future development and population growth. ICE staff carefully considered each of these aspects of the resettlement plan in order to achieve their goal of creat ing a community that would regain its capacity to function and remain operative over the long term. Two important strategies stand out throughout the resettlement planning and implementation process. First, ICE staff took the project preparation phase ser iously. Their planning was based on primary data collection, conducted over a multi year period by skilled professionals from a range of disciplines. This resulted in the production of high quality information about the affected population, eliminating the information vacuum typically encountered in resettlement efforts (Scudder 2005). As an institution, ICE invested in its own capacity to conduct resettlement by creating an Office of Resettlement that was dedicated exclusively to the project, thereby addre ssing one of the primary administrative limitations to successful resettlement (Koenig 2002). In addition, rather than allocating resettlement tasks to various public agencies or private contractors, the Office of Resettlement assumed full responsibility f or the project. This mitigated the risks of low accountability for poor outcomes and conflicting institutional priorities or policies, both of which have been significant challenges to other resettlement efforts (Koenig 2002, Scudder 2005). A resettlement action plan, rooted in the realities of the location, was ready when financing for the project was sought and the financial responsibility for resettlement was clearly assigned to the institution in the loan documents. Such attention to planning shortened the project cycle, creating a resettlement, and minimizing the drop in living standards prior to resettlement that has

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154 been associated with prolonged periods of uncertainty (Scu dder 2005). It also ensured that sufficient funds were designated for resettlement, thus addressing one of the key economic limitations to successful resettlement (Cernea 1990, Scudder 1997). Second, ICE prioritized resettler participation throughout t he resettlement process. Participation has been identified as fundamental to achieving positive post resettlement outcomes (Oliver Smith 1991). In the Arenal case, encouraging participation involved standard approaches such as information sharing and consu ltation with the affected population. It also relied on innovative approaches, such as involving resettlers in the design and construction of their homes and other community infrastructure, allowing resettlers to determine their own housing patterns, and s tationing permanent staff members in the communities before and after resettlement. This created something of a bottom up approach to resettlement, during which problems could be identified and resolved early, rather than a traditional top down approach th at may or may not be appropriate to the local context. In 1973, during the early stages resettlement project planning, ICE (1973:86) stated: Es nuestra premisa de trabajo que los pobladores rurales suelen resultar afectados en lugar de ser posibles benefic iarios en proyectos de desarrollo, porque en el pasado no ha sido costumbre hacerles participar en ellos . . . . También se pensaban a menudo que no hacia falta que participasen ni comprendiesen porque de todas maneras lo que pensaban hacer era algo que les beneficiaria a ellos o a sus descendientes. Es nuestra convicción de que cuanto mejor se comprenden los alcances de los proyectos, mejor puede la población derivar por su propia iniciativa otros beneficios y evitar perjuicios aparte de los que por su cuen ta sean previstos por los planificadores. Our working premise is that rural people tend to be affected rather than being possible beneficiaries of development projects, because in the past it has not been customary to let them participate . . . . It was a lso often thought that their participation or understanding was unnecessary because what was planned was something that would benefit them or their descendents.

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155 It is our conviction that the better they understand the scope of the projects, the better they can derive other benefits through their own initiative and avoid damages outside of those that can be anticipated by the planners. A public testament to the pride ICE took in the Arenal resettlement project wa s the creation of a set of three documentary m ovies about the resettlement process, funded by the Ministry of Culture and directed by Costa Rican filmmaker Carlos Freer. 20 These films are mentioned frequently both by Arenale ñ os and by ICE staff as an important part of the historical record . In these fi lms, the difficulties of resettlement are acknowledged, dedication to the resettlers being . This explicit treatment of the human consequence s of of resettlement stands in contrast to the where Chinese authorities school textbook that highlighted the technological achievement symbolized by the Yanguoxia dam while simultaneously era sing displacement from the public record. unfortunately the same cannot be said regarding its implementation. In fact, the economic difficulties encountered in the fir st few years post resettlement confirm de rational planning. While the Arenal project did serve to equalize the distribution of home and property ownership among the res ettled population, the project planners seriously underestimated the ease with which a new agricultural economy would take root, particularly in an area whose agricultural potential was never seriously evaluated. This 20 The films are entitled: Canto a Dos Pueblos (A Song to Two Towns), Cami no a Pueblo Nuevo (On the Road to the New Town), and Vivir en Pueblo Nuev o (Living in the New Town).

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156 became a critical issue upon resettlem ent and led to a number of years during which households had difficulty sustaining themselves in the new settlement. In her evaluation of the project in 1980, Obando (1981) argued that because of this hardship, ICE did not meet its goals of improving the s tandard of living of the resettled community and re establishing strong social and economic bases, at least in the short term. Of the 224 heads of household she surveyed, 44% believed that ICE had harmed the community by resettling it because it gave them poor quality lands, caused unemployment, and abandoned the community too quickly after resettlement. An additional 10% believed dió buenas casas pero endeudó a la gente [it gave nice houses but indebted the peo dió tierra mala pero un pueblo bonito [it gave poor quality lands but a pretty town] (Obando 1981:85). Only 37% thought that the community was benefitted by resettlement, stating that the project improved the community infrastructure, created mo re property owners, and created an aesthetically pleasing lake. These responses are illustrative of the somewhat unsettled relationship between Nuevo Arenal and ICE during the first years after resettlement. Because ICE was the singular face of the projec t and had been highly involved in the community for many years prior to and during resettlement, the resettlers developed the expectation that ICE would continue to resolve issues as they arose, including economic, infrastructural, and social concerns. In addition, ICE had emphasized the probability that collateral projects, such as the completion of a paved highway around the lake and the development of tourism projects in the area, would be carried out in order to gain local support for the project. The i nstitution, however, never intended to carry out these projects itself. Thus,

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157 the expectations that it had established were not fulfilled until many years later, which created a sentiment among resettlers of having been deceived by the institution (Obando 1981). During my own interviews, almost 30 years later, these feelings clearly remained. In addition, Arenale ñ os also expressed frustration that they had not received any financial benefits from hydropower production, such as reduced electricity rates or t he investment of energy profits back into the community, despite having made such a large sacrifice for the common good. For its part, ICE was unable or unwilling to engage indefinitely in resolving the eating a relationship of dependency between itself and the community (Obando 1981). This attitude is a softer version of the Downing (2010:240), which warns of the dange r of accepting that the resettlement resettlement action plan. In the Arenal case, while the action plan extended well beyond the construction phase of the project, ICE did not necessarily feel a sense of ongoing responsibility toward the community after fulfilling its pre determined goals. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the tension between Arenale ñ os and ICE did not create strong negative sentiments toward the resettlem ent project over the long term, but it does appear that feelings of distrust were created during the difficult first years in the community, feelings that perhaps continue today. In summary, the Arenal project design was successful in the short term at im proving the community infrastructure and equalizing the distribution of material assets. It was not as successful, however, at creating a viable economy in the new

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158 settlement site and did not provide enough short term assistance to struggling households, a fact that quickly led to other problems such as a decline in household increased levels of indebtedness, and difficulties in developing a sense of attachment to the new settlement site. Without discounting the seriousness of these challenges, however, it should once again be emphasized that, relative to other resettlement projects, the care and thoroughness with which ICE planned and implemented the Arenal project is uniq ue. 21 Thus, despite the failings of the project design, there were also many elements that facilitated the longer term process of community reconstruction that will be the focus of the next two chapters. 21 projects for the IDB. The Chixoy project is considered t o be an unqualified planning disaster, resulting in the massacre of hundreds of Mayan people by the Guatemalan government and the extreme impoverishment of those who survived the resettlement (Johnston 2005, Partridge 1983).

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159 Figure 3 1. Map of hydropower development in Co sta Rica (Ortiz 2008). The location of the research site is marked by a cross.

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160 Figure 3 2. The Arenal Basin before construction of the dam. The Arenal Volcano can be seen in the distance. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives) Figure 3 3. During constr uction, ICE established a camp at the foot of the dam. The tower toward the right of the photo is the only piece of this infrastructure that would remain once the reservoir was filled. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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161 Figure 3 4. ICE workers in one of the conduction tunnels. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives) Figure 3 5. The Arenal Basin as the reservoir began to fill. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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162 A B Figure 3 6. A view of the reservoir A) soon after construction of the dam and B) in 2012. The top of the tower from Figure 3 3 can be seen emerging from the water in both images. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives (left) and Richard Hamann (right))

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163 Figure 3 7. Schematic of the Arenal Hydroelectric Project. Water leaves Lake Arenal (located in th e upper right corner of the diagram) via an intake tunnel and drops 224 meters to the Arenal power plant. It then drops another 234 meters to the Miguel Dengo (formerly Corobi cí) power plant and another 96 meters to the Sandillal power plant (not pictured) . The striped towers are surge tanks, used to relieve excess water pressure. Following its use for hydropower generation, the water is distributed via canals to the Arenal Tempisque Irrigation District for agricultural use. (Image courtesy of ICE archives )

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164 Figure 3 8. The Arenal power station soon after construction. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives) Figure 3 9. Cattle ranches dominated the landscape outside of the population center of Viejo Arenal. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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165 Figure 3 10. A gravel road connected Viejo Arenal to Viejo Tronadora and Tilarán. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives) Figure 3 11. The Catholic church in Viejo Arenal. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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166 Figure 3 12. An example of houses in Viejo Arenal. Most were w ooden structures. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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167 Figure 3 13. Seven potential resettlement sites were proposed for Nuevo Arenal on the north side of the reservoir (sites 1 7). Three potential sites were proposed for Nuevo Tronadora on the south side of the reservoir (sites A C). The locations of the original communities are marked by black dots within the reservoir zone. Site 7 was ultimately selected for Nuevo Arenal. Site A was selected for Nuevo Tronadora. (ICE 1978).

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168 Figure 3 14. ICE staff pr esent the possible resettlement sites in Tronadora. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives) Figure 3 15. The locations of the new resettlement sites were selected by popular vote. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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169 Figure 3 16. Aerial view during the constr uction of Nuevo Arenal . (Photo courtesy of ICE archives) Figure 3 17. Homes in Nuevo Arenal were constructed of cement block with roofs of corrugated asbestos concrete. The future reservoir zone can be seen in the distance. (Photo courtesy of ICE arc hives)

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170 Figure 3 18. Construction of the Catholic church in Nuevo Arenal. The open space is the plaza/soccer field. The white building in distance is the elementary school. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives) Figure 3 19. An experimental agricultural plot in Nuevo Tronadora, maintained by the ICE agricultural experts. Similar plots were also planted in Nuevo Arenal (ICE 1978).

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171 C HAPTER 4 RECONSTRUCTING LIVELIHOODS: ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN NUEVO ARENAL Development forced displacement and resettlement is ( Oliver Smith 2002:10) . The process of recovery and reconstruction after involuntary resettlement must therefore entail the rebuilding of each of these sphere s. In Chapter 3, I reviewed the resettlement planning and implementation process both from the perspective of ICE, which served as the hydropower developer and resettlement agency, and from the perspective of the displacees. I also assessed the short term outcomes of the resettlement project, which revealed that in its first three years, the project was largely unsuccessful at facilitating economic recovery but had more success in other areas, namely replacing individual and community infrastructure and fac ilitating some level of social reconstitution. These first few years after resettlement roughly correspond to the second stage of the Scudder resettlers become familiar with their new environment. This st age typically entails a drop in their standard of living due to the multidimensional stress of resettlement, the process of adapting to the new location, and increased expenses and indebtedness (Scudder 2005). According to Obando (1981) and Arenale ñ descriptions, this characterization of post resettlement conditions indeed holds true in the case of Nuevo Arenal. Short term assessments, however, only tell a small part of the story. As conveyed by the long term design of the Scudder Colson model, the process of community recovery after resettlement can take decades. The true test of the success of a resettlement project lies in whether the processes of economic, material, and social

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172 reconstruction over time result in a viable community in which future generations of resettlers can carry out their lives. This long term process makes up the third and fourth In the economic development component of the third stage, it is predicted that resettlers will become less risk averse and begin to take advantages of available development opportunities. Economic activities begin to diversify, household wealth increases, and wealth differentials and social stratification also emerge. During the community formation component of Stage 3, resettlers should begin to engage in naming landscape features. There is also increa sed attention to the creation of community organizations, infrastructural improvements, and the reemergence of community building events such as religious activities and other celebrations. The fourth stage of the Scudder Colson model is marked by the inco rporation of the resettled community into the broader political economy of the region or nation. This occurs when project assets and management responsibilities have been handed over to the appropriate local or national authorities; the community and its m embers have developed the political and institutional strength to compete for their fair share of national resources; and household production activities and community leadership have been assumed by the second generation of resettlers, whose living standa rds continue to improve at least in line with neighboring communities. Over the course of the next two chapters, I will describe the multi decade process through which Arenaleños proc e eded through these stages , develop ing and/or

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173 reinforc ing the ir eco nomic, material , and social spheres to create a viable existence in the new community. These chapters address my first research objective of understanding the evoluti on of Nuevo Arenal from 1977 through today . Based on this research objective and following the predictions of the Scudder Colson model, I hypothesized that: 1. The processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction that began during second and third stages of the Scudder Colson model will continue to be visible today, and will have exp anded in scope. 2. Nuevo Arenal will have become integrated into the broader political economy of the region and nation, as measured by economic, political, and social interactions with entities outside of the physical boundaries of the community. 3. Resid ents of Nuevo Arenal will consider their quality of life to be at least on par with that of neighboring communities. The current chapter focuses on the evolution of economic strategies in Nuevo Arenal from 1977 to 2010. In Chapter 5, I will discuss the pr ocesses of material reconstruction (i.e., improvements to the built environment that serve to create a sense of place and reinforce community building) and social reconstitution. These chapters draw upon life history interviews, livelihood surveys, my obse rvations as a resident of Nuevo Arenal, and secondary data sources. It should be noted that while economic, material, and social themes are treated somewhat discretely in these chapters, they are far from being disconnected in reality. Rather than one type of reconstruction leading to the others in a linear fashion, the processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction form a dialectical relationship, each interplaying with, influencing, and reorienting the others. As Oliver Smith (2005b) argues, e conomic reconstruction enables resettlers to become actors rather than victims, which can catalyze the processes of material and social recovery.

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174 By the same token, material reconstruction supports, expresses, and confirms economic reconstruction and socia l reconstitution by providing physical spaces in which these processes can take place. Finally, social reconstitution enables the processes of economic and material reconstruction and reproduction over time by enhancing the potential for cooperation. Econo mic Development: 1977 2010 In undergoing forced resettlement, resettlers must deal with the loss of material assets , loss of access to the means of production , and changes in the relationships of production ( McCully 2001, WCD 2000 ). The combination of the se losses leads to material impoverishment in a majority of cases (Scudder 2005). Successful and rapid economic reconstruction is therefore one of the most critical aspects of resettlement. To say that the process of rebuilding the economy of Nuevo Arenal was one of reconstruction is actually something of a misnomer. In reality, the process was one of reinvention . The flooding of the large cattle ranches of the region and the ensuing loss of the patron population for decades meant that an entirely new livelihood system, set of economic relationships, and cultural identity had to be developed essentially from scratch. Landless wage laborers from the large cattle ranches became smallholders almost overnig ht, transforming both their relationships with each other and how they viewed themselves. Residents with medium sized holdings were dramatically downsized, effectively reducing their economic and social power. Meanwhile, local businesses that had thrived b economic realities of the new settlement area.

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175 As discussed in the previous chapter, ICE was well aware of these challenges and dedicated considerable attention to creati ng a foundation for the emergence of a new small scale agricultural economy. In addition to implementing a land based resettlement compensation structure, the institution also provided technical assistance to landholders, managed experimental plots for new agricultural techniques, organized educational programs, and encouraged mechanisms for cooperation among community members that might lead to community development efforts. Nevertheless, due to serious environmental, physical, and financial constraints, a gricultural activities in the region were plagued by difficulties and, as will be discussed in this chapter, were not ultimately successful in single handedly sustaining the community over the long term. Somewhat fortuitously, in the 1990s Costa Rica becam e a popular destination for international tourism, which breathed new life into a community that was otherwise in two phases, the first of which was centered on land base d livelihoods (some of which continue today) and the second of which decidedly was not. Phase 1: The Land Based Economy The period during which the economy in Nuevo Arenal was almost singularly dependent upon land based activities lasted from the time of resettlement in 1977 until the early 1990s. During this 15 year span, Arenale ñ os attempted to sustain what remained of the familiar livelihood systems prior to resettlement (i.e., dairy farming, beef cattle ranching, and small scale staple crop agriculture ). As predicted by the Scudder Colson model, the resettlers also became less risk averse over time and began to take advantage of development opportunities that provided a pathway into more experimental agricultural production (e.g., the introduction of ca sh crops for export).

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176 This innovation was also driven by necessity, as the community needed a more stable economic environment than was provided by staple crop production in order to survive over the long term. Each of these strategies is discussed in deta il below. D airy farming The large cattle ranches that dominated the Arenal basin prior to flooding had principally focused on the production of beef for export. There was also, however, a long standing tradition of dairy farming in the valley. In fact, a number of dairy farmers from Viejo Arenal and the surrounding area had contracts to supply milk to Dos Pinos, h this center unfortunately did not transfer to Nuevo Arenal after resettlement. The failure to re establish the collection center in the new site was a major oversight in the resettlement planning process, as it effectively cut farmers off from the region al and national dairy economy. Nevertheless, upon resettlement dairy production became one of the most important and stable economic activites in the new community and remains so to this day. In the first years after resettlement, only three residents, by virtue of being shareholders of Dos Pinos rather than suppliers, were able to continue their commercial relationship with the cooperative. Due to the small resettlement plot sizes, however, the necessary level of production was only sustainable if resettl ers had previously acquired larger properties elsewhere. For example, one first generation resettler and third generation dairy farmer I interviewed purchased a farm plot of 10 hectares in Nuevo Arenal, which he used for cows in active production. A previo usly purchased 35 hectare farm in Sangregado, located at some distance from Nuevo Arenal along the northern ridge of the basin, was used to raise calves to maturity, whereupon they were returned

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177 to the plot in Nuevo Arenal for milking. Drawing on knowledge gained through his family history of dairy farming, he was able to produce enough milk to guarantee an income of around $500 per month from Dos Pinos, which sustained him until he was able to sell both of his properties for increasingly large sums of mone y in the mid 1990s and purchase an inexpensive house and commercial property in the urban core. 1 Reflecting on his resettlement experience and the challenge of economic recovery, he said: [ICE] Nos hizo la casa, eso sí, ero cada persona ten ía que trabajar como los hombre s para hacer su finca o su parcela . El que no trabajó, malo. E sos son las perso nas que se fueron de aquí por miedo, o por no saber trabajar , o que la tierra es más mala aquí que [en Viejo Arenal]. . . . Para mí fue un privile gio haber comprado esa propiedad al ICE, pendejo si no la hubiera comprado. Para mí que hubiera sido si no hubiera comprado yo esa propiedad, un hombre sin estudio, sexto grado nada más? No me hubiera dado trabajo nadie. Solo vaya ordeñe vacas, vaya trabaj e como administrador de una finca, porque yo se mucho de finca, pero va seguir uno viejo en eso? wo rk. Those are the people who left here because of fear, or because of not knowing how to work, or because the land is worse here than it was [in Viejo Arenal]. . . . It was a privilege for me to have purchased that property from ICE, I would have been stup id not to. What would I have been had I not purchased that property, a man with out education, only sixth grade? No one would have given me work. Just go milk cows, go work as a farm administrator, because I know a lot about farms, but is an old man going t o continue doing that kind of work? Resettlers who engaged in dairy production but were not shareholders in Dos Pinos made homemade cheese to sell to local residents and small scale distributors. 1 The 10 hectare Nuevo Arenal property, which was purchased for 119,500 colones ($13,900 in 1977 prices), was sold in pieces to four different foreign purchasers between 1995 and 2000 for a total of 102 million colones (over $400,000 based on the average exchange rate from 1995 2000). The 35 hectare farm was sold in 1995 for 18 million colones (around $100,000 based on the average exchange rate in 1995). This resettler now lives off of his considerable savings and supplements his income with earnings from a commercial rental property an d by making private loans to fellow community members. His two adult sons do not work in agricultural occupations but rather have secured salaried employment in the commercial and public sectors.

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178 The most successful of these producers also found ways to ex pand the amount of land available to them. For example, another first generation resettler and third generation dairy farmer I interviewed originally purchased a 4.5 hectare farm plot in Nuevo Arenal and supplemented it by purchasing another 4.5 hectares f rom his brother, who owned the neighboring plot but did not plan to live in Nuevo Arenal. After selling 1.5 hectares to a Canadian buyer in the early 1990s for a very large sum money at the time (10 million colones or ~$70,000) and purchasing two hectares from a neighbor for a very small sum of money (160,000 colones or ~$1000), he was able to secure 9.5 contiguous hectares in Nuevo Arenal. He also used the earnings from land sales to acquire an additional 87 hectares some 10 km down the road that runs alo ng the north ridge of the basin in approximately 1990. Similar to the previous example, he uses the large farm to raise calves. When they are mature, the females are returned to the Nuevo Arenal property for milking, while the males are sold for beef. The milk is used to make unaged cheese, which is sold to the same line of distributors from Zarcero (a community halfway between Nuevo Arenal and San Jos é ) with whom his family had established a relationship while in Viejo Arenal. Currently, his son also works on the dairy farm as a salaried employee. During our interview, he attributed his business success to his prior experience with dairy farming and to having the opportunity to purchase a second farm plot from his brother in Nuevo Arenal. He claims that wit h only one parcel, he would not have been able to survive. Over time, with the acquisition of more land and cattle he has continued to increase his cheese production. These stories illustrate the more successful attempts at dairy production in Nuevo Arena l. However, there are relatively few people in the community who have

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179 been able to sustain themselves over time through this activity. And, as illustrated by both of these stories, the temptation to sell land at a large profit to incoming foreign expatriat es (and to a lesser extent wealthy nationals) has gradually diminished the role of dairy production in the region. During my fieldwork, I recorded occupation data for a total of 314 adults (approximately 25% of the adult population) through a combination of life history interviews and livelihood surveys (Figure 4 1). Of those, 68 people were not economically active by virtue of being homemakers (34), students (3), retired (22), unemployed (4), or living from income that was not generated through employment (5) (e.g., savings, inheritance, child support, family assistance, or state welfare). Of the remaining 246 economically active individuals, 16 people (6.5%) characterized dairy production as one of their primary sources of income (12 are the dairy owners; four are employees, two of whom are sons of the owners). However, only six of these (2.4%) were dedicated to dairy production to the exclusion of other personal sources of income. An additional four people (1.6%) reported that small scale dairy production on their properties was a secondary source of income. All told, 21 people (8.5%) in my sample earned some income from dairy production. An additional three survey respondents reported that someone in their household earned at least some income from dairy production. Figure 4 2 illustrates the distribution of the sampled Arenaleños among the major sources of employment in the community, broken down by resident type (i.e., first generation resettler s , second or third generation resettler s , immigrants and t heir chil dren, and foreign expatriates). Dairy production is clearly dominated by resettlers,

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180 both of the first generation as well as of the second and third generations. The few immigrants who are engaged in dairy production are long time residents of the basin who arrived in Nuevo Arenal shortly after resettlement. Despite the relatively small proportion of residents involved in dairy farming, it is considered to be one of the most stable economic activities in the region, likely because of its continuou s presence in the area even before resettlement and its dependability during the difficult years after resettlement. Dairy production today is somewhat limited by the lack of availability of buyers for raw milk neither of the two national dairy cooperative s has established a collection center in or near the community, despite various attempts over the years so most producers continue to make cheese on their farms to sell to larger distributors who make collection runs once or twice a week. Dairy production also continues to be limited by the small farm sizes near Nuevo Arenal, particularly for those people who have not been able to acquire more land. Finally, it does not provide a major source of wage employment in the region because most farms are small eno ugh to be maintained by the owners and their families. Beef cattle ranching Beef cattle ranching has also been a dependable income source for some Arenale ñ os since resettlement. In fact, at a symbolic level, cattle ranching is more emblematic of Guanacas because cattle ranching for profit requires extensive terrain, very little is conducted within the confines of Nuevo Arenal. While some Arenale ños raise a f ew head of cattle on small plots closer to town as a form of supplementary income, those who dedicate themselves exclusively to this occupation tend to have large properties elsewhere,

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181 many of which are outside of the Arenal basin. Cattle from these ranches are sold to slaughterhouses and meat dist ributors at regional auctions throughout Guanacaste. Interestingly, the most economically and politically powerful family in Nuevo Arenal has made its fortune through beef cattle ranching. Because of the scale of production, the four sons of this family wo rk as a unit, led by the patriarch. This first generation resettler used his resettlement compensation to finance the purchase of properties outside the basin, in addition to acquiring a house in Nuevo Arenal. His skill, work ethic, and shrewd businesses s ense have enabled him to acquire more land over time, resulting in ownership of a 350 hectare ranch with 450 head of cattle in a neighboring valley and a smaller property near the Arenal volcano. His four sons have followed his lead and have acquired prope rties throughout the region, including a number of commercial buildings in Nuevo Arenal. Altogether, the family manages 1500 head of cattle and is beginning to diversify into rice production. Like many ranchers in Nuevo Arenal, his personal identity and ha ppiness are deeply tied to his occupation: S i a mí me quitaran la ganadería seguro me moriría . . . . S i la ganadería se terminara , seguro que yo también tendría que terminarme también. . . . E l que es ganadero , diay , es ganadero y vive feliz con la ganader ía. If they took ranching away from me, I would surely die. . . . If ranching were to end, surely I would have to end as well. . . . He who is a rancher, well, he is a rancher and lives happily through ranching. As with dairy farming, the continuity of li velihood strategies before and after resettlement was critical in enabling this family, and others like them, to continue pursuing activities with which they were familiar, rather than being forced to reinvent themselves and their livelihoods in the new lo cooperatively to make large investments is also a significant advantage, as is the continuity of the business relationships they have maintained over time, beginning even

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182 before resettlement. These forms of continuity have psychological as well as material relevance. As Marris (1974) points out, the more adaptable a new location is to the previous way of life, the less energy resetters have to expend in revising their constructions of reality and the easier it is to mak e sense of the new environment and their lives within it. Despite the cultural importance of cattle ranching, however, only one or two other families in Nuevo Arenal have achieved a similar level of success as the example just discussed. For most Arenale ñ os, the production of beef cattle occurs at a very small scale, on the order of just a few animals. In some cases, the animals are used as a way to earn income from a property that is for sale while the owner awaits an interested buyer, but are not necess arily a long term livelihood strategy. Nevertheless, the proportion of the population engaged in this activity is significantly larger than that in dairy production. Of the 246 economically active people for whom I recorded occupation data, 15 (6.1%) repor ted that beef cattle ranching was one of their primary sources of income; for ten of these people (4.0%), it is their only personal source of income. All 15 people are the livestock owners (though some ranch on rented properties); none are wage laborers. E ighteen more people (7.3%) reported that beef cattle ranching was a secondary income source. All told, 33 people (13.4%) earn at least some income from beef cattle ranching. An additional seven respondents reported that someone in their household earned in come from cattle ranching; five of these were livestock owners, while two were wage laborers. In sum, much like dairy farming, cattle ranching is an important economic activity but does not provide a significant source of wage employment for Arenale ñ os who do not own the means of production.

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183 Figure 4 2 demonstrates that participation in cattle ranching has a greater rate of participation among immigrants than does dairy farming. Similar to the dairy sector, however, the immigrants who are engaged in cattle ranching tend to be long term residents of the Arenal basin who arrived in Nuevo Arenal shortly after resettlement. The exceptions are five people who arrived in Nuevo Arenal in the 1990s, all of whom are from areas in the Arenal basin known for dairy and cattle production . In other words, much like dairy farming, cattle ranching in Nuevo Arenal is a traditional activity that tends to be attractive and accessible to those with a very specific personal history. It should also be noted that neither activity after resettlement. That attention was dedicated almost exclusively to crop based agriculture, discussed next. Crop based a griculture Staple crops: While dairy farming and beef cattle ranching have proven to be somewhat sustainable economic activities over time in Nuevo Arenal, even if for just a small proportion of the population, the same cannot be said of crop vision of engendering a vibrant agricultural economy never took root in Nuevo Arenal at before, during, and after resettlement, seemingly to the exclusion of more traditional activities (at least for Arenale ñ os) like animal husbandry. To my knowledge, the only assistance regarding ranching or dairy farming that ICE provided to the resettlers was

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184 the provision of new varieties of pasture grass. 2 Meanwhile, t he majority of the traditional staple and new commercial crops. This tunnel vision was perhaps one of the In the year s after resettlement, many households planted traditional staples such as manioc, plantains, corn, and cilantro for their own subsistence use, a practice that continues today. The fact that the scale of production of these traditional crops never expanded to a commercial level, however, has a number of explanations. One first generation resettler attributed it to a cultural feature: Aquí lo que menos hay es agricultores. Aquí el agricultor no existe porque es como muy cultural. Usted ve la gente de Arena V iejo , donde la gente vivía mayormente de las lecherías . P orque eso casi que se lleva en la sang re porque no les gusta sembrar aunque sea granos básicos. Here, there are very few farmers . Here, the farmer he people from Viejo Arenal, where people lived staple crops . In other words, according to this informant, Arenale ñ iented around animal husbandry rather than agricultural production. While ICE staff may have expected that one would translate to the other, in reality it did not. An other explan ation for the low level of agricultural production in the resettled communit y is that the issues identified immediately after resettlement environmental 2 Nuevo Tronadora, written before the resettlement of Nuevo Arenal was fully implemented, only discusses the agricultural assistance undertaken in Nuevo Tronadora. It does, however, acknowledge that Arenale ñ os were more familiar with cattle ranching than wit h crop based agriculture and claims that that fact would be taken into account when developing appropriate agricultural programs in Nuevo Arenal. Again, to my knowledge, this assistance was limited to the testing of new varieties of pasture grass; none of my research participants mentioned other types of assistance offered by ICE.

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185 constraints (e.g., poor soil quality, broken terrain, heavy rainfall), small plot sizes, lack of access to credit, and difficulty of market access due to poor road conditions cont inued to be major barriers over time. One respondent who attempted to farm tomatoes and peppers in cooperation with her neighbor in the late 1980s recounted that by the time they paid for all of the necessary additives and transportation costs to the natio nal food distribution center in San José, they were lucky to earn pennies per crate. 3 In addition, fluctuations in the market price for agricultural products meant that profits were not predictable or guaranteed. Agriculturalists also had difficulty encou ntering a market for their products at the local level. In contrast to other communities in Guanacaste and throughout Costa Rica, neither Arenal nor nearby Tilar á feria del agricultor ). Even today, Nuevo Arena l also does not have such a market, which is remarkable given the ubiquity of ferias throughout Costa Rica. According to one to establish a store to sell vegetables grown in Nuevo Arenal in the early 1990s failed because of a lack of local interest: Y se intento hacer [una feria]. Cuando sembrábamos allá en Santa María, se encargó hacer una feria que por eso teníamos un local propio, pero no había el apoyo así, así que se decía que se iba a vender gran cantidad, entonces no . . . . Como tipo Cañas por ejemplo, Cañas y Liberia hay mayor influencia de la gente de la comunidad, de ir a compr ar el día que llega la feria. En cambio en Tilarán no tenía eso, y Arenal tampoco porque la gente no iba, nada mas. 3 The Central Nacional de Abastecimiento y Distribución de Alimentos or CENADA was founded in 1976 today.

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186 quant ity, so no. . . . Like Ca ñ as, for example, in Ca ñ as and Liberia there is more influence from the people of the community to make their purchases on the day the market is set up. On the other hand, Tilar á was that. Arenale ños national structural adjustment policies implemented after the 1980s debt crisis. In the mid to late 1980s, these policies led to the elimination of the rural grocery stores managed by the National Production Council (the Consejo Nacional de Producció n or CNP), a governmental agency responsible for promoting agricultural production for the domestic market. The newly denational ized Arenal CNP first joined with other CNPs to form a regional employee owned cooperative, which was eventually converted to a privately held chain in 1990. According to a first generation resettler who owns a pulperia (small food market) in Nuevo Arenal and who supplemented his income for 25 years after resettlement by using his small truck to distribute agricultural products from farms along the northern ridge of the Arenal basin to other regions of the country, the introduction of large supermarkets in the area further reduced the market for local products because the chains tended to buy from large distributors rather than local producers. While a few small family owned shops still exist today in Nuevo Arenal, they stock only small quantities of perisha ble goods. One of the most organized, albeit infamous, attempts to earn a living from staple crop agriculture in Nuevo Arenal occurred approximately 15 years after resettlement and involved considerable local drama. In the late 1980s, a number of resettle rs with small lots in the urban core received permission from ICE to plant staple crops on unoccupied ICE lands along the westernmost edge of town. After a number of years and considerable personal investment on the part of the resettlers, ICE reneged on t his

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187 arrangement, perhaps out of fear that the farmers would claim rights to the land. In response, the resettlers invaded a peninsula located just outside the urban core, known as Santa Maria, which was known to have the most fertile soils in the area but was owned by the national Costa Rican Tourism Institute ( Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or ICT). 4 The group claimed squatters rights to their new farm plots. After approximately n reform institution, the Institute of Agrarian Development ( Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario or IDA). Resettlers were granted legal title to their properties with a restriction on title transfers for a period of 15 years. 5 For the first few years in Santa Maria, the resettlers dedicated themselves almost Asociación de Agricultores de Santa María ) and opened the ill fated store to sell their products locally. The associat ion also distributed its products to other nearby communities. Despite the relative success of this effort, however, the scale of production was not large enough to sustain the households. As more employment opportunities emerged after the tourism boom in the mid 1990s, the number of active farmers began to diminish. Nevertheless, even today Santa Maria remains the only area in which one can observe staple crops being grown in Nuevo Arenal (Figure 4 3 ) , 4 As discussed in Chapter 3, many resettlers claim that Santa Maria was supposed to be the site of the urban core and that ICE changed the location without their consent. 5 This was an extremely uncommon form of land redistribution. Under normal c ircumstances, IDA purchases a large swath of land from a title holder and distributes it in small lots to families who can demonstrate extreme need (e.g., landless, low income households) and the intent to use it for agricultural purposes. There is one suc h settlement just a few kilometers from Nuevo Arenal that was established in 1992. The Santa Maria case was unique not only because the squatters illegally occupied the territory for so many years, but because many of them were Arenale ños who had homes in the urban core and thus

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188 though none of the ten households surveyed in 2010 (of 27 total households on the peninsula) reported agriculture as an income generating activity. Despite a smattering of moderately successful examples, staple crop agriculture in Nuevo Arenal has largely been a failed experiment. Faced with considerable bar riers to generating a livable income, many resettlers abandoned their efforts. Some sold their land and left the community, while others converted their farms to pasture and acquired a small herd of cattle in order to participate in the more stable dairy a nd beef markets. Those who continued to pursue farming only did so until better employment options came along. The scarcity of agriculturalists in the community was confirmed by my interview and survey data. During the course of my life history interviews , not a single respondent could name an Arenale ñ o who currently earns a living exclusively from agriculture. My survey results support this contention. Only four people (1.6%) of the 246 economically active individuals for whom I collected occupation data reported agriculture as one of their primary income sources. However, based on my ethnographic work, I know that these four people also have significant alternative income sources. One is a cattle rancher, another is a dairy rancher and property administra tor for absentee foreign owners, and a third is a furniture maker. The fourth is an elderly man who occasionally reported agriculture as a secondary source of income; of these, one is a full time security guard at the local primary school, the second is also a dairy farmer, the third has a substantial interest generating savings from a prior land sale, and the fourth lives from his retirement pension in addition to havi ng various other sources of income. All

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189 told, the eight people (3.2%) who reported agriculture as one of their sources of income likely did not earn much from it relative to their other activities. Five additional people reported agriculture as an activity to which they dedicate time, but from which they do not earn any income. Everyone I surveyed who was engaged in agriculture worked on his own property; no one reported being a wage laborer. Figure 4 2 illustrates the distribution of agricultural occupati ons among the resident types. Macadamia production, discussed below, is included in this category and employs three people: two immigrants and one foreign expatriate. When macadamia is eliminated, it becomes clear that staple crop agriculture is almost exc lusively carried out by first generation resettlers, all of whom have an extensive family history of said activity. The Scudder Colson model predicts that once resettlers have become accustomed to their new environment and have reached self sufficiency in the production of food staples, they will become less risk averse and be willing to engage in non traditional activities, such as the production of higher value cash crops. As will be discussed next, Arenale ñ os did indeed begin to engage in riskier agr icultural activities within a few years of resettlement, though this was not necessarily because they had reached a level of comfort and self sufficiency. Rather, given the poor outcomes in their attempts to produce sufficient staples for household consump tion, the barriers to expanding production to the commercial scale, and the absence of other employment opportunities, Arenale ños had few options but to begin experimenting with other types of agriculture. Since resettlement, there have been three such att empts, none of which was particularly successful in the long term but some of which served to sustain the

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190 community for various years. These included coffee, cardamom, and macadamia production. Coffee : project whether the institution considered promoting coffee production in Nuevo Arenal in their original agricultural development plan. My suspicion is that it did not, as neither the 1973 baseline studies nor the 1978 report on the resettlement process me ntion coffee. It is more likely that the difficult conditions immediately after resettlement prompted ICE staff to consider ways to promote the development of a cash crop that could sustain the community. In 1979, almost two years after resettlement, ICE and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cattle ( Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería or MAG) negotiated a coffee credit program with the National Bank of Costa Rica ( Banco Nacional de Costa Rica or BNCR ) . As discussed in Chapter 3, prior to this point, the re agricultural credit was limited by the fact that their property titles were tied up in the legal battle between ICE and the Hacienda La Rosita, which restricted their ability to use their properties as collateral for bank loans (Obando 1981). In light of this serious agricultural development; it had already demonstrated that a variety requiring no shade could be grown in the region (Partridge 1983). The c redit program provided loans ranging from 43,000 100,000 colones ($5,000 $11,600 at the 1979 exchange rate), financed at an interest rate of 8% per year with a three year grace period. After the third year, the interest rose to 12%. The money was to be use d to pay for seedlings, fertilizer, wage labor, and other necessities (Partridge 1983).

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191 The infusion of money into the struggling community was a boon after the two years of economic decline experienced after resettlement. Many resettlers who had purchase d rural farm parcels jumped at the opportunity to take out loans to grow coffee. One informant who had been heavily engaged in coffee production estimated that at the peak of production, there were 250 hectares of coffee planted by smallholders in the regi on. During my fieldwork, almost every landowner I interviewed mentioned planting coffee at one point or another. In early 1981, MAG helped the resettlers establish the Tilarán Coffee Cooperative (CoopeTila) and staffed it with its first manager. The coope rative was able to purchase an inexpensive piece of land from ICE about halfway between Tilar á n and Arenal, where they set up the coffee processing operation (Figure 4 4). It also placed coffee receiving stations in three locations closer to the farm parce ls, where it was more convenient for farmers to deposit their coffee berries. CoopeTila eventually was able to expand the production of coffee to areas outside of the Arenal basin, including Abangares, Upala, and Ca ñ as . According to an informant who served on the board of directors , the cooperative grew to include almost 700 members and, at its height, produced over 7.7 million kilograms of coffee per year, worth $1.5 million . The availability of agricultural credit was a turning point for Nuevo Arenal. It is widely recognized by the resettlers as the economic shift that helped bring the community back from the brink of failure. In fact, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the economic growth, material well being, and social stability that Partridge ob served in Nuevo Arenal during his evaluation for the IDB in 1983 was largely based on the infusion of coffee credit and earnings into the local economy. Some coffee farmers used

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192 their earnings to buy additional land and/or dairy cows, thereby diversifying their Resettlers who had suffered from food insecurity during the years immediately after resettlement were able to buy food from local merchants (Partridge 1983). In turn, this a llowed merchants to expand their inventories. Partridge found that the quantity of fixed and inventory capital invested by local merchants was 50% to 200% higher than in Viejo Arenal. He also counted 82 motorized vehicles in Nuevo Arenal in 1983 (28% of ho useholds), an increase of 19% since 1980 (Obando 1981). When he asked a sample of families to compare their situations with conditions in the old communities, they unanimously agreed that the present situation was better (Partridge 1983). In an illustrat ion of the interplay between economic and material reconstruction, the coffee period in Nuevo Arenal also stimulated broader improvements in the community. A health clinic was opened in 1980 in what was originally the local hotel, and the closure of the lo cal branch of the BNCR was avoided. CoopeTila, by virtue of its association with MAG and IDA, gained political power and was able to lobby the national government for improvements to local road, lighting, water, and telephone services. The cooperative also funded a scholarship program for low income high school students to facilitate their purchase of school supplies, uniforms, and the like. Despite a number of years of much needed prosperity, however, the success of coffee production in Nuevo Arenal was s hort lived and plagued by difficulties. The first set of these difficulties was financial. The capital necessary to begin production was high and indebted producers to the bank, thus adding to their existing debts to ICE and others. The bank debt was parti cularly problematic because the lag time between tree

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193 planting and tree maturity was one to two years, so no profits were made immediately. While a grace period of three years was given on the loans, interest continued to accumulate during this time. When the harvest finally began to generate a profit, much of it had to be used to pay back the bank loans and debts owed to the coffee cooperative for agricultural inputs. CoopeTila required producers to pay back the entirety of their debt before distributing a ny profit. The cooperative also spread out its payments to producers over the course of the year, making payments at the beginning, middle, and end of the harvest. This meant that coffee growers did not have a large infusion of capital at one time, usually earning just enough in the first two payments to pay the wages of their coffee harvesters. A former schoolteacher who planted two hectares of coffee and was one of the last to abandon production in 1996 described the financial difficulties: [L a cooperativ a tenía] un precio por fanega , entonces apenas le llegaba para pagar los cogedores y medio ayudarse con el combustible del carro . 6 . . . P orque lo del café era apenas para ir saliendo. Ya cuando era fin de año, cuando terminaba de vender ellos el café, ent onces ellos le iban dando a uno, o a veces se le daba tres tantos. Se reunían acá mismo en Arenal . . . ya daban el informe de que en tal mes iban a dar una tercera parte . . . . Los que teníamos el crédito allá, ellos lo rebajaban de una vez el crédito por que había que sacar los insumos, el café, digamos, el abono, todos los químicos que se utilizaba, entonces uno iba a la cooperativa, ellos se lo daban pero lo rebajaban de una vez de lo que correspondía. Lo que quedaba era para pagar a los trabajadores. [T he cooperative had] a price per fanega , so it was just barely enough to pay the harvesters and help yourself a little bit with fuel for the car. . . . Because growing coffee was just barely enough to come out ahead. At the end of the year, when they [the c ooperative] finished selling the coffee, they would give you a payment, sometimes the payment came in three parts. They would meet right here in Arenal. . . . They would tell you in which 6 A fanega is a traditional unit of measurement for coffee in Costa Rica. One fanega equals 258 kilograms of coffee berries and produces 46 kilograms of unroasted beans. A smaller unit of measurement, a cajuela , is 1/20 of a fanega .

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194 month they would give you the third part. . . . Those of use who had credit there, they would make you pay back the credit immediately, because you had to buy the inputs, the coffee, the fertilizer, all of the chemicals you used. So you would go to the cooperative, they would give you your payment but they would immediatel y take out what you owed them. What was left was for paying the harvesters. The second set of difficulties was environmental. Though ICE had attempted to identify a coffee variety that was suitable to the area, the best coffee regions in Costa Rica are located approximately 1500 meters above sea level. At 600 meters and with an extremely wet climate, Nuevo Arenal simply was simply not the right environment for coffee trees. In fact, a report commissioned by ICE from the Tropical Science Center in 1980 wa rned that the area surrounding Nuevo Arenal was not suitable for coffee because it was too steep, too wet, and had extremely shallow top soil (CCT 1980 cited in Obando 1981:75). Inexplicably, the findings of the report seem to have been ignored. The result of the environmental incompatibility is that coffee harvesting became almost a year round activity. In contrast to the prime coffee regions of the country where all of the berries ripen within a period of two to three months, in Nuevo Arenal, the berries would ripen for six months or more. This meant that the harvest was consistently small and spaced out over a long period of time, necessitating a greater investment in labor and transportation costs. Ultimately, this resulted in very little profit. The sam e schoolteacher quoted above described the burden of transporting workers to her farm plot for months on end before and after she reported for work: La gente, cuando empezó a sembrar el café, se entusiasmo pensando en los números que traían de afuera, diga mos, de Heredia y de todas esas partes, donde de verdad la gente hizo plata con café. Por eso, porque ellos en un mes cogen todo, toda la producción por decirle algo, un mes, dos meses. En cambio aquí no, aquí había que sostenerse casi todo el periodo de m edio año con el café, con el poquito de café que se iba cogiendo. Bonito hubiera sido que cuatro, seis semanas, que usted nada mas iba a las seis semanas y era lo que tenía que gastar en combustible y todo eso,

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195 mientras que eran todos los meses, y varios m eses, y tras el gasto que había que hacer para ir a dejar a la gente . When they started planting coffee, people got excited thinking about the numbers that came from outside, say, from Heredia and all of those areas, where people made real money from coff everything in one month, all of the production in one month, two months. a year, with the little bit of coffee that you picked. It would have been nice to have four, six weeks, where you only went for the six weeks and that was all you had to spend in gas and everything else. Meanwhile, here it was all of those months, various months, and also the cost of having to transport the workers. The final d ifficulty was social. Laborers were scarce in a community composed of smallholders who were occupied with working their own lands. As a second generation resettler whose father planted eight hectares of coffee told me: Era muy desordenado porque, diay, no se podía. Una zona pequeña de población todos cafetaleros no había mano de obra, entonces la urgencia era pasar casi hasta de noche cogiendo café las familias. Porque si la familia era numerosa era ventajoso para la recolección, pero si era poca había pro blemas. Y los que quedaban en el aire que no tenían cafetales andaban buscando el mejor postor que pagara para ir a coger . . . . Y a veces se daba la necesidad de que el cafetal estaba muy bueno y para que no se cayera se pagaba un poco más de la tarifa qu e estaba establecida al precio de la cajuela por ejemplo. families would spend almost until dark harvestin g coffee. If the family was big, it was advantageous for the harvest, but if it was small, there were highest bidder to work for. . . . And sometimes when the coffee plants were doing we ll and to prevent the berries from falling to the ground, it was necessary to pay workers more than the established price for a cajuela , for example. In addition, coffee production in the Arenal area was not part of the culture like it was in the centr al valley, where entire families were a source of labor during the harvest season. The former schoolteacher said:

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196 Aquí en aquella época era unos lluviones, entonces la mayor parte del café se perdía porque no había muchos cogedores, pues la gente del pueb lo no estaba como allá afuera que salen muchachos universitarios, muchachos del colegio a coger café. Aquí parecía ser una vergüenza, verdad, que los muchachos de séptimo ir a coger café. Here at that time it rained a lot, so a majority of the coffee was l ost because in other parts where kids from college and high school participate in the coffee harvest. Here, it seemed like it was embarrassing that kids from seventh grade would go pick coffee. These difficulties were also identified in the CCT report, which stated: En estas nuevas parcelas de café, se pueden apreciar algunas de las dificultades que se encontrarían si se promueven cambios de tenencia y uso de la tierra sobre tod o en campesinos antes jornaleros sin planificación previa de las fincas o supervisión del crédito ortogado. (CCT cited in Obando 1981:75) In these new coffee parcels, one can appreciate some of the difficulties that can be encountered when changes in land tenure and land use are promoted, especially in farmers who were once wage laborers, without prior planning or supervision of the conferred credit. Interestingly, two new categories of workers emerged during the harvest labor scarcity. First, women in the community proved to be an available source of labor. This was especially notable because employment opportunities for women were extremely limited at the time. Second, the 1980s coffee boom in Nuevo Arenal coincided with pal capital of Tilar á n became a temporary home to hundreds of Nicaraguan refugees, who were recruited for labor during the coffee harvest. At one point, Nuevo Arenale ño s even created a camp in the community bullring to house the Nicaraguan coffee workers. While a few of the Nicaraguan refugees remain in Nuevo Arenal today, many eventually migrated to the Central Valley. Despite the short term economic benefits that coffee production brought to Nuevo Arenal, the combination of the difficulties just discuss ed, declining prices on the

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197 global coffee market in the 1980s, and a coffee blight that decimated many of the trees ultimately caused most Arenale ñ os to raze their coffee plantations by 1990. Some people who were more dedicated to the cooperative and who h ad other sources of income, like the schoolteacher referenced above, were able to sustain their harvest for a few more years. Today, however, no coffee exists in Nuevo Arenal and the legacy of coffee is not exactly a positive one. As one respondent remarke d, mirroring the opinions eso arruinó a la gente porque el café no sirvió y las deudas si quedaron remained]. CoopeTila continued to function until 2005 b y relying on coffee production from areas outside of Nuevo Arenal, Ultimately, however, corruption at the managerial level caused it to go bankrupt. A first generation resettler who sat on the board of directors but resigned from the cooperative in 2001 de scribed its downfall: Lo que pasa es que la cooperativa comenzó a perder la visión social en la que se crían las empresas cooperativas . . . . Se fue haciendo muy grande y la capacidad gerencial y administrativa comenzó a tenderse con proyectos como la mac adamia, productos de exportación, el café y macadamia y los insumos agrícolas. Pero la directiva se cambia cada dos años, entonces no se le da continuidad a los proyectos. O llega gente muy ambiciosa, no tiene visión comunal sino que la visión de esas pers onas es mas bien como entrar a favorecerse a nivel personal. What happened is that the cooperative started to lose the social vision with which all cooperative enterprises are started. . . . It kept getting bigger and the management began to engage in pro jects like macadamia, export products, coffee, macadamia, and agricultural inputs. But the directors vision of those people was to benefit themselves personally.

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198 Today, the facilities still stand but they no longer process coffee. Most recently, a restaurant was established in one of the buildings in an attempt to attract passing tourists. It should be noted th at the story of coffee production in Nuevo Arenal illustrates why short term evaluations of development projects can be misleading. The perceived success of the Arenal resettlement project among resettlement scholars and practitioners was largely based on five years after resettlement. At that point, the economic landscape seemed quite positive, largely due to the new infusion of coffee capital, and the effects could be felt throughout the basin as other s mall farmers replicated Arenale ñ their agricultural production. Less than a decade later, however, most producers had razed their coffee plantations and the community had entered another period of economic downturn during which the resettlers once again reverted to dairy and beef cattle production to sustain themselves until the next opportunity emerged. Nevertheless, despite its short life span, coffee production served to boost the lution, and stimulated farmers in Nuevo Arenal and the surrounding areas to pursue non traditional livelihood activities. Cardamom : One of the non traditional and less successful agricultural experiments was the production of cardamom. This was an extre mely short lived effort that occurred in the late 1980s, just as the coffee production was fading. Cardamom agriculture was introduced by a group of Iranian investors who purchased a large farm just outside of Nuevo Arenal (the Iranian farm manager later e stablished a small shop and remains in

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199 attempted to incentivize additional production among local farmers. However, only a few Arenaleños were willing to take a risk on an almost unknown crop, and they were quickly disappointed by the lack of profitability. The same second generation resettler whose father had planted eight hectares of coffee described the problem: Y o siento que la gente más bien fue así como temerosa po rque eran cultivos que no eran tradicionales, verdad? Entonces ahí estaba el temor de un producto nuevo que no se sabía como iba a funcionar, y después los créditos en los bancos, no. Entonces por eso fue que no se le dio pelota, por así decirle. I feel th give it much attention. Though cardamom pr oduction was only a small blip in the economic evolution of Nuevo Arenal, I present it here as an example of some Arenale ñ with regard to livelihood strategies, as predicted by the Scudder Colson model. Macadamia: Though it i s not a locally driven endeavor, macadamia production has provided a much needed source of employment throughout the history of Nuevo Arenal. In the early 1980s, two large foreign corporations interested in the production of macadamia for export, the Hacie nda Rio Frio and Aloha Macadamia, established plantations along the northern ridgeline of the basin, outside of the resettlement area but just a few kilometers from the urban core. While this was not the first macadamia experiment in Costa Rica, it was the first of it kind in the Arenal area. The Hacienda Rio Frio hired an American Peace Corps volunteer from the Turrialba region (which was also

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200 experimenting with macadamia production) to manage the farm in 1983; she remains in Nuevo Arenal to this day, havi ng purchased a large share of the plantation. The macadamia plantations created much needed jobs for the resettlers during the late 1980s, at their height employing approximately 120 workers. Inspired by the success of the plantations, a few Arenale ños a ttempted to plant macadamia as well. However, the larg e up front investment and the lag time between planting and harvest prevented it from being a viable activity for many households . By the early 1990s, management issues at Aloha Macadamia caused it to close its doors. The Hacienda Rio Frio still remains, but over time has reduced its production to the point that only a few workers are needed, primarily during the harvest season. Of the 314 people from whom I collected occupation data, only three people (1%) reported macadamia production as a primary source of income; these were the plantation owner and two salaried employees. Nevertheless, the macadamia plantations sustained the community during a time when there were few other options for wage labor. Phase 2: The Service Based Economy As the previous discussion demonstrated, agricultural development in Nuevo Arenal has been characterized largely by failed experiments that did not result in long oods. Staple crop production was used to supplement household consumption, but did not prove to be a sufficient source of coffee producers helped the community transitio phase of the Scudder exceptions to these unsuccessful efforts were the traditional activities of dairy farming

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201 and beef cattle ranching, which have provided the most consistent source of income over time, and foreign owned macadamia plantations, which provided necessary jobs during the critical period after the failure of coffee product ion and continue to employ at least a few people today. It is, however, notable that neither animal husbandry nor though Nuevo Arenal underwent a process of innovative eco nomic development as predicted by the Scudder Colson model, it was still struggling to find its footing for almost 15 years after resettlement. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, the economic context began to change dramatically as Costa Rica secured i ts position in the global tourism market. The emergence of tourism in Costa Rica By the mid 20 th century, it was widely acknowledged that the land based economy (e.g., coffee, sugar, cacao, bananas, beef, etc.) from which Costa Rica had profited for cent uries had led to extensive land degradation (Hill 1990). By 1981, these The worrisome trend of forest loss led to, among other things, the establishment of the National Park Service in 1970 and the creation of 26 national parks and over 100 resource conservation was especially important in Costa Rica because its location between the nor thern and southern hemispheres creates extremely high levels of biodiversity. This fact had already made Costa Rica a prime location for academic and scientific tourism by the 1950s and 1960s, encouraged by such organizations as the Organization for Tropic al Studies and the Tropical Science Center (Hill 1990).

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202 In addition to a commitment to biodiversity conservation, the nation was also interested in furthering its own economic growth and reducing its high national debt. ket was seen as a way to balance these interests (Hill 1990). While Costa Rica had begun purposefully encouraging tourism as early as the 1930s, it was not until the 1980s that national policy began to seriously incentivize tourism development. 7 In the ear ly 1980s, the Latin American debt crisis caused a sharp devaluation of the Costa Rican currency, making it an affordable destination for international tourists (Raventos 2006). Inspired by this brief spike in tourism, the government created the Tourism Dev elopment Incentives Law ( Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo de Turismo No. 6990 ) in 1985, which granted tariff, property, and sales tax exemptions for hotels, air and sea transportation, car rental agencies, and travel agencies. In 1988, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute ( Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or ICT) launched an aggressive campaign to attract foreign investment in luxury resort facilities and other joint public private efforts (Hill 1990). At the same time, sm destination was buoyed when then president Oscar Arias received the 1987 Nobel Peace Price for his role in the Central American peace agreements of 1986 (Honey et al. 2010). Throughout the 1990s, the ICT ersity conservation by encouraging eco and nature 7 A national tourism board was created in 1931. It later became the Costa Rican Tourism Institute ( Instituto Costarricense de Turismo or ICT) in 1955.

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203 These stra tegies proved to be wildly successful. Between 1987 and 2012, the annual number of visitors to Costa Rica increased from 277,000 to 2.3 million (Hill 1990, $2.2 billion (4 .9% of the GDP) during the same period. These earnings far outpaced just under $780 million each in 2012. In 2012, Costa Rica ranked first in the Central American region in terms of numbers of tourists and tourism earnings, with a 26.4% and 30.2% market share, respectively (UNWTO 2012:10). In 2013, the country was ranked 47 th in the world (and 3 rd in Latin America, after Panama and Mexico) in terms of tourism competitiveness by the World Economic Form, whose ranking of the 140 participating countries is based on domestic regulatory frameworks; business environment and infrastructure; and human, cultural, and natural resources (Blanke and Chiesa 2013:xvi). In sum, through a co mbination of strategic policy decisions and aggressive marketing, Costa Rica has positioned itself as one of the leading tourism destinations in the world. In the process, it has developed an interesting mix of ecotourism, luxury/resort tourism, and reside ntial tourism. It is a combination of the first and last categories that is most relevant to economic development in Nuevo Arenal. Tourism in Nuevo Arenal Nuevo Arenal lies on what has become a major tourist transportation route that links the town of La F ortuna home to a multitude of nature based tourism attractions including the active Arenal Volcano original vision of the Arenal hydroelectric project and its collateral development projects included this i nfrastructural linkage, it was not until the 1990s that the road around Lake Arenal became well traveled. This lag time was in part due to the absence of a strong

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204 program s discussed above and in part due to the underdeveloped tourism economy in La Fortuna to that point. It was also due to the fact that the segment of road between La Fortuna and Nuevo Arenal was unpaved until 1994 (and remained partially unpaved until 2006) , making for an uncomfortable and long ride. Tourist travel along this route also expanded significantly after 2002, when major international carriers began flying into Daniel Oduber International Airport in Liberia, which brought even more tourists to nor thwestern Costa Rica. 8 This combination of market expansion and infrastructural improvements made the Lake Arenal region more accessible to tourists. In Nuevo Arenal, the expansion of the Costa Rican tourism market played out in two ways. The first was in stimulating infrastructural development that would attract traditional tourists (i.e., day or overnight visitors). The second, and most important, was the emergence of a strong residential tourist population (i.e., permanent expatriate residents or second homeowners). 9 Mirroring the experience of tourism development around the world, the effects of the new tourism economy were somewhat contradictory. On one hand, it created new sources of income and employment for Arenale ñ os after a 8 Delta Airlines was the first international carrier to s chedule regular flights into Liberia. It was encouraged to do so by a group of private tourism developers who established a $3 million trust fund to cover any potential financial loss if there was not enough tourist interest to make regular flights profita ble. The trust fund was never needed. Soon after, Continental Airlines and American Airlines began scheduled flights into Liberia; by 2009, the Liberia airport served over a dozen international carriers (Honey et al. 2010, Morales and Pratt 2008). 9 I use the term residential tourism with the caveat that many foreigners in Nuevo Arenal are permanent intention [is] to Watters 2009:6). Additionally, despite subtle differences

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205 multi year period of ec onomic decline upon the failure of the coffee sector. Economic revitalization was both necessary and welcomed. On the other hand, tourism (in particular, residential tourism) brought with it many of the negative effects documented in other areas that under go tourism development, including rising land values, increases in the cost of living, transformations in local identity due to a shift away from the land based economy, changing cultural norms, increased inequality, and increased vulnerability to the fluc tuations of the global economy (Cabezas 2008, Wilson 2008b). Oliver primary elements: land, pe Traditional tourism: Relatively speaking, traditional tourism plays a minor role in the economy of Nuevo Arenal. Given trends in other areas of Latin America exposed to tourism development (cf. Ross et al. 2007, Wilson 2008b), it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the infrastructural development intended to attract traditional tourists to Nuevo Arenal has been led by non Arenale ño s and foreigners. This includes a small bed and breakfast opened in 19 91 by an American couple on a former dairy farm, a second bed and breakfast built in the mid 1990s by a German couple at the other end of the same former dairy farm, and a 29 bedroom hotel constructed in 1993 by a Canadian developer on formerly agricultura l land in a different rural sector of town. In the urban center, an American real estate investor purchased a commercial space facing the central plaza in 1991 (in addition to other urban and rural investment properties), which he expanded to include a res taurant and 12 hotel rooms. More recently, an Israeli chef

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206 and an American developer opened more upscale bed & breakfasts in 2006 and 2007, respectively, on opposite ends of town. In addition to hotels, foreigners have also opened restaurants geared toward traditional tourists, including a German owned bakery and an Argentinean owned restaurant, each of which have meal contracts with private bus companies that transport large tour groups (Figure 4 5). In addition to providing construction jobs during the b uilding phase, these businesses have also become a source of service jobs for Arenale ñ os, who are employed as housekeepers, gardeners, cooks, bartenders, drivers, and security guards. In some cases, particularly in the larger hotels and restaurants, Arenal e ñ os have been employed at the managerial level, gaining valuable and transferable skills. However, the jobs provided by this sector have not been entirely reliable over time. The ownership of the hotels mentioned above has changed relatively frequently, i n all cases leading to closures, foreclosures, and re openings. Furthermore, the success of the tourism based businesses is highly dependent on the structure and strength of the international tourism market. The broader Lake Arenal region also benefited f rom the expansion of the Costa Rican tourism market. Today, there are no fewer than a dozen small to medium hotels and a handful of restaurants lining the 73 km of scenic lake highway between La Fortuna and Tilar á n, many of which are under foreign ownershi p. These businesses are very obviously oriented toward international tourists, as the promotional signs around the lake are almost exclusively in English. Businesses located closer to Nuevo Arenal provide a source of jobs for Arenale ño s, though limited pub lic transportation is a barrier to their accessibility. The most important of these is the Lake Coter Eco Lodge, founded

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207 in 1990 by a family from Tilar á n as pilot eco tourism project with an economic endowment from the World Bank. At its height, the Eco Lo dge directly employed up to 50 Arenale ños and indirectly supported many more. Since the mid 2000s, however, it has undergone various changes in ownership and the accompanying financial difficulties have f orced it to minimize its staff. While much of the larger scale development aimed at traditional tourism has been dominated by non locals , a small group of Arenale ñ os has also been able to engage in this market. Interestingly, developing the ability to take advantage of this new possibility for economic g rowth demanded that Arenale ño s fundamentally reorient the way they engaged with their surroundings. Whereas traditionally Arenale ñ of their community was largely social in nature for example, businesses and porches were oriented toward the st reet to be able to watch the goings on in town engaging in the tourism market necessitated the development of an appreciation for the aesthetic value of the landscape. In his study of residential tourism in Boquete, Panama, as native Boquete ñ os experience Boquete as a place to which their entire beings are fundamentally fused, residential tourists experience Boquete as a landscape Similarly, upon the advent of tourism in Nuevo Arenal, the natural environment that had previously served simply as a backdrop for community life quite quickly transformed into the basis for a new economy predicated not upon its use value but upon its aesthetic appeal. Perhaps the earlies t example of this transformation in perception is that of a first generation resettler and his wife who opened a soda (small restaurant) across from the

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208 central plaza in 1986, out of which he also ran a tailoring business (Figure 4 6). The base at that time was almost exclusively local, but the owner, in a chance encounter with a visiting travel agent, was soon advised to expand the back patio of the restaurant, which had a view of the lake, in order to attract tourists. This was a shift fro m his prior strategy of expanding toward the plaza so that their clients could watch soccer games: Yo siempre pensé que el frente era lo mejor entonces hice un salón para el frente. Una vez yo estaba cortando [tela] y pas ó un señor por la acera y fue que oyó y le llamó la atención. Y se volvió y se vino y me dice, mira este fue mi primer oficio, dice, en esto me fui a trabajar a Miami. Dice, y hoy tengo dos agencias de viajes. Entonces, me dice, ando buscando por aquí, viendo las posibilidades porque ahora está viniendo turismo aquí a Costa Rica. El asunto es que fuimos a ver por allá atrás y me dice, bueno pero vos tenes que construir par acá, atrás, porque de allá se ve el lago. La vista es el lago y todas las montañas de allá al otro lado y eso. Y, pues, yo no lo había pensado, la verdad, yo había pensado en el frente por la plaza y era lo que nos estaba dando más por los equipos de futbol, pero en eso comenzó a entrar el turismo y entonces también el asunto se fue haciendo más fuerte. I always thought th at the front side was the best so I created a dining room toward the front. One time I was cutting [fabric] and a man walked by on the sidewalk, and he heard the sound and it got his attention. He turned around and came toward me and said, look, this was m y first job, I went to Miami to looking at the possibilities because now tourism is coming to Costa Rica. The deal is that we went to look at the back of the building and he said, ok you have to build out here, out back, because you can see the lake from here. The view is the lake and all of the mountains on the other side. And, side by the plaza and that was what was giving us the most business because of the soccer matches, but then tourism started and it just kept getting stronger. By making his restaurant attractive to foreign tourists by providing a scenic vista, this first generation resettler was a ble to draw tour buses for lunch stops in the early stages of the tourism market. This strategy allowed the couple to successfully maintain the business until 2007, at which point they sold it in order to pursue other personal

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209 interests. The idea of Arenal e ñ os reorienting their worldview to incorporate different ways of valuing their surroundings is also important in the context of residential tourism, discussed below, in which mountainous terrain that had little agricultural worth suddenly acquired tremend ous aesthetic (and thus monetary) value because of the lake views it afforded. This type of reevaluation of local resources mirrors the experiences of tourism development in other areas (Cohen 1984, Swords and Mize 2008). Other successful examples of local efforts to secure a share of the traditional tourism market include a young Arenaleño who used the experience gained during his employ ment in various foreign owned restaurants to open a pizza restaurant on the main highway through town in 2007. His romant ic partnership with a Canadian woman has also given him insight into the tastes of foreign tourists, allowing him to expand his menu to be more attractive to them. His clientele is almost entirely foreign, many of whom are tourists with rental cars who are able to stop at will, unlike the tour buses that have established relationships with restaurants with larger capacities. Three households in Nuevo Arenal have also opened small hotels, all constructed between 2006 and cabinas tend to attract a clientele composed of Costa Rican business travelers and a small number of shoestring tourists (Figure 4 7). In addition to these examples of the ways in which at least a few Arenale ñ os have successfully engaged in the traditional touri sm market, there have also been some less successful efforts, which serve to highlight the rocky path to economic development through tourism that is sometimes obscured by its promoters. In 1995, community members and a Swiss hotel owner attempted to estab lish a Chamber of Tourism in Nuevo Arenal in order to create events and attractions for traditional tourists. The

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210 members went as far as to meet with the Chamber of Commerce of La Fortuna in order to develop joint projects that might funnel some of La Fort Arenal. Unfortunately, the Chamber of Tourism did not receive the necessary support Asociación de Desarrollo Integral ), n or from Arenaleños themselves and was therefore a short lived effort. During our interview, one of the founding members shared her suspicion that it was difficult for a community of campesinos (farmers) to shift their vision toward traditional tourism, given the nascent state of the sector in Costa Rica . Another notable, but ultimately unsuccessful, local effort was an ecotourism Association of Santa Maria ( Asociación de Mujeres de Santa María ), part of the same group that i llegally occupied the Santa Maria peninsula in order to gain access to agricultural land. After their attempts to earn a living from agriculture failed, and in the absence of other sources of employment in the community, the group of women decided to start a small business. Led by the coffee farming former schoolteacher Association were extremely savvy about accessing domestic and international support for their effort. Between 2000 and 2004, they were able t o secure 3 million colones (approximately $9000 at the 2000 ó n, an NGO that assists small businesses with sustainable development projects. With Fundecooperaci ó and the Municipality of Tilar á n to grant them a concession of six hectares of land along the main highway just outside of the urban core, upon which they could build the restaurant and trail system. Fundecooperaci ó n

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211 also helped the group access $10,000 fro m the United Nations Development Program. The trail system was constructed with the help of volunteers from Reto Juven í l, a Costa Rican NGO that connects international youth volunteers with rural development projects. The restaurant opened in 2004 and exp erienced some initial success. Within a span of two or three years, however, it became clear that the income generated from the project was not enough to sustain all 12 members of the Association. Their interest and ability to dedicate time to the enterpri se began to wane, which generated some internal conflict. The project also lacked strong marketing in printed and online tourist guides, and the number of passing tourists who might spontaneously stop to dine began to decline upon the advent of the global economic crisis in 2008. Today, the restaurant has been reduced to a barely functional level. The infrastructure remains however, and the remaining active member, the former schoolteacher, is hopeful about reinvigorating the business in the future. My obse rvations indicate that the experience of the failed Chamber of Tourism continues to hold true today local entrepreneurs, both Costa Rican and foreign, have not demonstrated much interest in developing activities that might attract self guided overnight tou rists (i.e., those who do not travel on more luxurious package tours). For example, in the urban core of Nuevo Arenal there are no providers of services like watercraft rentals, horseback or ATV circuits, or guided nature hikes, all of which are popular ac tivities in tourism oriented La Fortuna. Two residents of Nuevo Arenal, one American and one second generation resettler, offer lake fishing tours, but there is little to no local promotion of this activity. Tourists in the lake region interested in these

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212 activities are therefore limited to the larger hotels that organize tour packages with established providers. The odd tourist who stops in Nuevo Arenal en route to another epart quickly. For its part, in what was perhaps a planning oversight, ICE did not include the development of tourism infrastructure or capacity building for participation in the tourism economy in its original resettlement plan, which gave the community l ittle to build from. Though he may have been exaggerating slightly for effect, one second generation resettler put it thusly (in the process demonstrating some resentment about the resettlement project): Aquí no hay turismo. El turismo pasa nada más por ah í [motions toward the highway] sted vio los carros pasar , y si quieren entrar a tomarse un vaso de agua o a hacer una necesidad , tienen que pasar a la bomba y después de ahí se van. Aquí ellos no dejan ni un cinco en A renal. Todo el turismo va para L a Fortuna, ese fue el pueblo beneficado en este momento con el turismo. Con la reubicación de Arenal y el volcán y todo lo que se hizo, el pueblo beneficiado fue Fortuna de San Carlos, Arenal no, ni Arenal, ni Tilarán, ni Tronadora, nada de eso . . . . Si el ICE hubiera dicho bueno Arenal , le vamos a dar allá en Sangregado [an alternate resettlement site closer to Viejo Arenal] allá por la represa arriba don de están los hoteles, ahí sí. ¿P or qué? Porque la gente va a ver la represa, va a ver el volcán, las aguas termales , y todo lo que ha salido últimamente . E ntonces , sí, Arenal sí se hubiera beneficiado, pero diay los mandan para acá donde solo barro colorado . D ígame usted , que aquí llega un turista que le puedo yo decir a un turista? U sted misma que q ue ha estado en la comunidad, que le puedo mostrar yo a usted? Vamos a tal lado? ¿ Q ue que le puedo mostrar? and if th ey want to enter the town to drink a glass of water or use the bathroom, they have to pass by the gas station and from there they leave. Fortuna, that is the town that benefits from tou rism right now. With the resettlement of Arenal and the volcano and everything they did, the town that was benefitted was La Fortuna de San Carlos, not Arenal, not Arenal nor Tilar á n nor Tronadora, none of those. . . . If ICE had said, well Arenal, oing to relocate you in Sangregado [an alternate resettlement site closer to Viejo Arenal] by the dam up above where the hotels are, there,

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213 yes. Why? Because the people will see the dam, the volcano, the hot springs, and everything that has emerged recentl y. In that case, Arenal You tell me, a tourist arrives here and what can I tell them? You have been here in the community, what can I show you? Where should we go? What can I show you? In sum, since its inception, traditional tourism has created limited, though not insignificant, economic opportunities in Nuevo Arenal. Of the 246 economically active people for whom I collected occupation data, 12 (4.9%) reported traditional touris m as their primary source of income. Five of these are foreigners who have established small hotels and vacation rentals. The remaining seven are a mix of business owners (cabinas, transportation services, and a horse tour provider) and service workers (co oks, groundskeepers, etc.). Six people (2.4%) reported work in the tourism sector as a secondary source of income, three of whom are foreigners. In total, 18 people (7.3%) in my sample earned at least some income from traditional tourism. An additional thr ee people reported that someone in their household earned income from traditional tourism. The profits and employment generated from traditional tourism in Nuevo Arenal have been relatively small in comparison to popular tourist destinations like La Fortu na. In addition, foreign expatriates, rather than Arenale ño s, account for a significant proportion of the population that is generating an income from tourism (see Figure 4 2). Interestingly, however, the second most active segment of the population in tra ditional tourism related activities is second and third generation resettlers; meanwhile, first generation resettlers are all but absent from this sector. This is a noteworthy finding, as it represents a generational shift into occupations outside of the traditional land based economy, paralleling similar changes at the regional and national levels.

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214 Residential tourism: While traditional tourism has been a limited source of economic development in Nuevo Arenal, residential tourism is a different story ent irely. What Nuevo Arenal lacks in activities that might attract traditional tourists, it makes up for in an extremely pleasant climate, beautiful lake views, and access to the basic services that interest foreign retirees (e.g., bank, post office, grocery stores, pharmacy, restaurants and bars, relatively easy access to health care facilities, etc.). With few exceptions, residential tourists in Nuevo Arenal are retired professionals, many of them American baby boomers, whose retirement savings and pensions stretch further in Costa Rica than they would in the United States. Similar trends have been described elsewhere in Latin America, such as in Boquete, Panama (McWatters 2009) and Lake Chapala, Mexico progressive country, however, seems to make it even more appealing than other destinations. As one American expatriate who arrived in 2008 told me: We started looking at Costa Rica the day after we entered the first Gulf War. My son was in kindergarten and want another Vietnam where my son was going to die over foreign oil. We started looking at countries that were dedicated to peace. And we started reading and reading and we filled up a whole bookcase with books o n Costa Rica . Other countries too, but Costa Rica really dominated. But it took us until our so n graduated from college, so we started the time he was in kindergarten thinking about it and he graduated from college in May [2008]. The house went up for sale in June, we sold in July, and were here by September. We [also] kind of looked at Panama and Belize. Costa Rica dominated, huge. And it was really because of their whole peace. And everything we kept reading about their philosophy fit into our personal ph ilosophy. And that was before we realized it was beautiful and all the other things. It was really from a political, philosophical standpoint.

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215 A retired American educator, who had originally planned to retire with her husband on c coast but was later drawn to Nuevo Arenal in 2008, echoed this sentiment: t retirement and then when my [brother and sister in law] started talking about it, we got to thinking that we ought to d o something really different. And to make it affordable , because we were hoping to retire early, we were looking at outside the country. And once we heard about Costa Rica and did research, it sounded like it was much more progressive than a lot of Latin A merican countries . . . . W e had been looking all the way around the country and had found Arenal and felt like oh gosh, temperature wise and so many things, the lake and all , this is more where we think we want to be. Residential tourism began to emerge in Nuevo Arenal at approximately the same time as the traditional tourism projects. In 1991, a German developer from the Pacific who spoke English to help him acquire propert ies. He purchased a piece of agricultural land and created the first gated community in Nuevo Arenal, Las Flores, located five to ten minutes by car from the urban center. The development consists of more than 30 nearly identical Spanish style homes descen ding down immaculately landscaped hills toward the lake. Over the next ten years, three other gated communities were also created in the same area of town: two by another German developer who had also worked on the Pacific coast and one by a semi retired A merican real estate developer. Each of these is smaller in size than the first development, consisting of seven to 17 dwellings. The gated communities in Nuevo Arenal tend to attract second homeowners because they (in theory) afford an additional level of security, making them ideal for absentee landlords. Las Flores, for example, only has five or six full time residents. The unoccupied homes are frequently marketed as vacation rentals during the months that the owners are not present.

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216 While gated communit ies offer certain advantages, the vast majority of the full time (or mostly full time) residential tourists in Nuevo Arenal have chosen to live outside of them. Some have purchased a piece of land with the help of a local broker (Costa Rican or foreign) an d hired a contractor to build a custom home. Others have purchased ready built homes, generally designed by one the numerous foreign developers who have taken up residence in Nuevo Arenal in order to take advantage of the newly developing real estate marke t (Figure 4 8). More recently, expatriates have also been able to purchase homes built by the foreigners who came before them. These properties tend to be in the hilly rural sectors of Nuevo Arenal, which afford spectacular lake and volcano views. Though residential tourism began in the 1990s in Nuevo Arenal, it reached its peak in the mid 2000s during the United States housing bubble and before the economic downturn. According to the maintenance manager of the local water utility (which services an area slightly larger than the original resettlement site), between 1999 and 2010, the number of water clients increased from 400 to 970. 10 While some of this growth was locally driven, he believes that much of it was a product of the residential tourism boom. Ac cording to data from the local branch of the Costa Rican Social Security service, between 2005 and 2010, the number of houses in just two of the rural sectors of Nuevo Arenal that are most attractive to residential tourists increased by 67, from 208 to 275 (see Figures 4 9 and 4 10 for examples of the foreign driven 10 By law, water service in many rural areas of Costa Rica is provided by a local Administrative Association of Rural Aqueducts ( Asociación Administradora de Acueductos Rural es or ASADA). Nuevo Association (the Asociació n de Desarrollo Integral or ADI) was not appropriately managing the funds generated from water provision, leading to a decrease in the quality of service.

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217 development on the hills overlooking the urban core). During the same time period, the population of Nuevo Arenal grew from 2025 to 2183. Most of this growth occurred in the population of reside nts over the age of 60, which increased by 18%. In contrast, the population of residents from 0 59 grew by only 7%. Other statistics are also illustrative of the influx of residential tourists. According to the national censuses of 2000 and 2011, the popu lation of North Americans in the Arenal district (which also includes the neighboring small settlements of Sangregado, La Union, Aguacate, and Rio Piedras) almost tripled in just 10 years (Figure 4 11). Ninety percent of these new immigrants were from the United States. Additionally, between 2004 and 2007 , the county of Tilarán, of which the Lake Arenal region is a part , was the 6th largest recipient of foreign investment in real estate in the country , surpassed only by five Pacifi c coastal counties experie ncing extremely intensive development of both residential and resort tourism. During the 2004 2007 period, Tilar á n received approximately $50 million in foreign real estate investment (Rom á n Forastelli 2009). The Lake Arenal region has been promoted as a p rime retirement destination in International Living Magazine and on a number of smaller international retirement websites. It is particularly attractive to older expatriates who are put off by the heat, insects, and party atmosphere of the beach communitie s. I first visited Nuevo Arenal in 2006 during the height of the real estate market. I was left with an impression of a modern Wild West of sorts a town rife with land speculators, shady characters, raucous nightlife, and a feeling of boomtown prosperity . Some signs promoted local real estate brokers, while others were erected by the

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218 landholders themselves (Figure 4 12). It seemed that everyone wanted a piece of th e action and, indeed, most Arenale ñ os benefited in one way or another from the new economy. As one first generation resettler explained, a history of economic difficulties since resettlement had made Arenale ñ os eager to extract what they could from their l ands, despite the potential negative consequences: La pobreza metió mucho extranjero. Usted con una jarana, una jaranita en ese tiempo, póngamele de 150,000 pesos, y no puede pagarla y llega un extranjero y le dice le doy 500,000 pesos por esta casa , dia y , me quedan 350,000 pesos voy a darle viaje por allá hago algún ranchillo o la gasta y ya quedo sin nada. Eso es hacerse más pobre y ese es un cuidado que hay que tener mucho. Poverty created the space for a lot of foreigners. If you had a debt, a small de be left with nothing. have to be very careful about that. Some of the social consequences of this influx of foreign residents will be discussed in the next chapter; the significant economic consequences are what concern us here . From 1995 on, the economy of Nuevo Arenal was transformed. No longer a sleepy and struggling agricultural community, residential tourism brought with it heretofore unknown prosperity. As one first Aquí hay un antes y un después de lo que es de la llegada del extranjero Here, there is a before and an after the arrival of the foreigners ]. The impacts of the new economic landscape were various. The first major effect was that the price of land skyrocketed. What had previously been considered low value agricultural land in the hilly rural sectors of the community suddenly acquired value beyond imagination. As a long time resident of the basin who moved to Nuevo Arenal in 1997 described:

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219 Hace un tiempo atrás aquellas colinas que usted ve allá tenía su precio pero nadie pensaba que vale lo que vale en este momento, o sea estamos hablando de que hace doce años atrás. Ahí por el cruce de Guatuso [an intersection that leads to an elevated sector that is popular with foreig ners] para arriba todo eso era baratísimo, mas las propiedades nadie las quería porque Arenal era muy lluvioso y muy frío, entonces nadie quería vivir en Arenal. Entonces, diay, si usted tenía una propiedad usted decía nombres esto no vale nada. Y resulta que hace un tiempo para acá llegaron los gringos, los extranjeros, y a ellos sí les gustó y ellos pagaron, inclusive pagaron poco dinero por unas propiedades que en este momento valen un montón, veá. La gente no tenía idea lo que eso iba a valer. Some time ago, those hills that you see over there had their price but nobody thought that they would be worth what they are worth right now, [an intersection that leads to an elevated sector that is po pular with foreigners] and up, that was all very inexpensive, and nobody even wanted the properties because Arenal was really rainy and cold, so nobody wanted to anything. And then it turns out that between then and now, the gringos, the foreigners, arrived and they did like the properties and they paid. Some of them even paid very little for properties that right now are worth a lot. People had no idea what that land was going to be worth. Two examples serve to illustrate this growth in land values. The first generation resettler and dairy farmer discussed earlier in this chapter purchased his 10 hectare property ( with a house) from ICE in 1977 for the equivalent of $.14/m 2 . 11 He began selling his land in the mid 1990s for approximately $2/m 2 and made his final sale in 2000 at approximately $7.5/m 2 . In other words, in five years, the value had almost quadrupled and it continued to grow. Today, it is almost impossible to find lan d for under $10/m 2 . In another example, a long time resident of the basin whose mother had purchased a seven hectare farm plot from ICE upon resettlement for $.17/m 2 in 1977 sold the property in 2000 for $1.4/m 2 . He then proceeded to leverage that land sal e by 11 One hectare (approximately 2.5 acres) is equal to 10,000 m 2 .

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220 purchasing more properties and selling them at increasing profits, thereby becoming one of the most successful real estate transactors in Nuevo Arenal. Throughout the 2000s, land prices continued to soar. With each new sale, the next person in line w ould demand a higher price. During the height of the boom, some Arenale ñ os were asking for exorbitant sums, in some cases upwards of $30 40/m 2 , which would put the price of a hectare at $300,000 400,000 ($120,000 160,000 per acre). In some cases, these pro perties were in prime locations with lake and/or volcano views, but in many cases the price per meter was based upon the rumored sale price of another property rather than upon the particular (sometimes unattractive) attributes of the lot in question. As t $10 20/m 2 , which was still an order of magnitude increase from the $1 2/m 2 at the beginning of the residential tourism period. Nevertheless, relative to land prices in the United States and E urope, where most of the purchasers were coming from, this was a reasonable sum that new immigrants were willing to pay. The same upward trend applied to houses in the urban core. For example, the same first generation resettler just referenced bought his home in town for the equivalent of $13,500 in 1998. According to another informant, a friend who wanted to purchase a house in the same neighborhood saw prices rise by $10,000 each year thereafter. In another case, a Costa Rican immigrant bought a small u rban lot without a house in 2006 for the equivalent of $7,000; by 2010, it was valued at $40,000. At the peak of the market, the humble resettlement houses, originally worth $5,000 10,000 (or less during the difficult years just after resettlement), were s elling for upwards of $80,000. Today, according to the online real estate listings for Nuevo Arenal, the

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221 original ICE homes are listed for $50,000 $150,000, depending on their degree of updating. According to one Arenale ñ o who currently holds a position in the municipal government that takes him to various communities in the Lake Arenal region, the same house would sell for $20,000 $30,000 in locations that have not experienced a residential tourism boom. While many Arenaleños were able to profit from th e sudden abundance of willing foreign buyers, the re were also a number of economic drawbacks to the real estate boom. As has been noted in other studies of residential tourism (cf. Oliver Smith et al. 1989, van Noorloos 2011), many Arenaleños began to be p riced out of their own community . Those who sold land either had to immediately reinvest in new local property or risk being unable to afford land in the area even a year later as prices continued to skyrocket. Residents whose economic circumstance did not change because they did not have land to sell were suddenly faced with the reality of not being able to afford property in their own community without going into extreme debt. This is especially relevant to second and third generation resettlers and new immigrants attempting to make an independent life for themselves and their families. As a second generation resettler told me: Es una meta que todo el mundo lo quieren, si se casan o ya que sean mayores quieren tener un lote con una casa. Diay, aquí yo pi enso que para mucha gente es muy difícil, porque primero nadie quiere vender lo que tiene , y si la quisieran vender cobran para un extranjero, no para gente de aquí . P orque ahora a usted le cobran por metro, tanto vale diez mil, quince mil , o veinte mil pa ra un extranjero , y si usted no acepta viene un extranjero y lo compra. when they become an adult, they want to have a lot with a house. Well, I think that is really difficult for a lot of people here, because first, nobody wants to sell what they have, and if they did want to sell it, they charge what a foreigner would pay, not what people here would pay. Because now they charge you by the meter,

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222 this is worth ten thousand, fifteen thousand , or twenty t housand to a A first generation resettler expressed a similar concern about the price of properties: Aquí la única manera de que un Tico compre es una propiedad que esté financi ada con el banco y que esté en remate, que se la vaya a quitar el banco porque la persona no pueda pagarla por una deuda , o porque tenga problemas financieros extremos de quiebra que tenga que venderla. Pero de lo contrario , en una situación estable económ ica , tiene que tener uno mucho capital para adquirir en efectivo. Here, the only way that a Tico can buy is by financing a property that is in foreclosure through the bank, where the bank is going to take it back of another debt, or because they are going bankrupt and have to sell it. Other than that, in a stable economic situation, one has to have a lot of capital to buy a property in cash. Another first generation resettler perhaps put it most succintly when he said, A quí había gen aquí no se puede comprar, aquí solo pueden comprar los norteamericanos d that each of the Arenale ños quoted here, as long term residents of the community, actually do own their own homes and properties, all acquired before the real estate boom. However, the younger people I interviewed, many of whom still lived at home or had added on to their property in the future. In effect, reside ntial tourism created a new breed of socioeconomic inequality in the community as Arenale ñ os began to dem and prices for land that only foreigners could afford. To date, however, tourism development has not caused physical displacement of Arenale ñ os from their own community, in contrast to tourism experiences in other areas (cf. Bookman 2006, Cohen 1984, Wilso n 2008a). Van Noorloos (2011) recorded a similar outcome in her study of residential tourism on

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223 density and the maintenance of local ownership of at least a small parcel of land for personal residential use. The same explanation seems to hold true in Nuevo Arenal. Existing socioeconomic stratification among Arenale ñ os was also intensified by the new real estate market, as former farmers became extremely wealthy and demonstra ted their newfound prosperity through the purchase of consumer goods, home upgrades, and the like. To compensate for the high cost of land, families have begun to subdivide their existing lots in order to make space for their children. While this strategy is viable on the larger farm plots, there is an obvious spatial limit to this practice in the urban core. The Costa Rican government, through the Housing Mortgage Bank ( Banco Hipotecario de la Vivienda ) , also provides subsidies ( Bono Familiar de Vivienda ) to enable low income families to build a home or purchase a lot. However, the subsidy in 2013 was only 6.25 million colones (approximately $12,000), which is not sufficient to cover the cost of a lot or house in Nuevo Arenal. When asked about the existence for local property sales at more reasonable prices, some of respondents affirmed that properties could occasionally be purchased at reduced rates but most respondents denied that such a market exists. Another drawback of the re al estate boom stemmed from the issue of currency devaluation. M any Arenaleños who did not have an immedia te need for the funds earned from land sales put their earnings in the bank. As the Costa Rican colon

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224 continued to devalue over time, however, their s avings shrunk. 12 Ten million colones earned from a land sale in 1995 was only worth a third of that 15 years later. In the end, many Arenale ñ os had traded their land for profit, only to be left with no profit. A second generation resettler shared the story of an acquaintance who suffered this fate: Le voy a dar sólo un ejemplo. Hay un señor que le dicen Bejuco. Él era dueño de la parcela de donde está el hotel Joya Sureña. Esas eran más o menos seis, siete hectáreas, las propiedades más valiosas, Vino el aug e de turismo e inversionista, entonces se vende todo en cuatro millones, una suma en ese momento astronómica. Entonces se salva porque compra un lote ahí frente a la plaza de Mata de Caña como de cuatrocientos metros y construye una casita bonita y ya él d ice que con el resto de plata se va a quedar a vivir porque ya se pensiona. Y con el transcurso de los años se tuvo que poner a trabajar porque, diay, se le fue la plata . . . . En este momento el banco tiene tres mil metros con el hotel por quinientos mill ones, pero como un millón de dólares, fuera lo que vale el resto de la propiedad. Bejuco. He was the owner of the farm plot where the Joya Sure ñ a hotel is now. He had six or seven hectare s of the most valuable property. The tourism and investment boom comes, and he sells everything for four million colones, which was an astronomical sum at the time. So he saves himself because he buys a four hundred meter lot in front of the plaza of Mata de Ca ñ and live off the rest of the money. And as the years pass, he had to go back to work because the money was gone . . . . And now the bank is selling three thousand meters with the hotel for 500 million colones, a million dollars, not counting what the rest of the property is worth. Finally, as is typical in many communities that have experienced similar booms, some Arenale ños used their profits to purchase new cars and other luxury items, and in the end were left with no savings and no land, as forewarned by the first generation resettler quoted above. A long term resident of the community who immigrated in 1989 12 Between 1995 and 2010, the exchan ge rate of the Costa Rican colon went from an annual average of 179 colones per dollar to 519 colones per dollar.

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225 and founded a construction company in 1994 to take advantage of the real estate boom characterized this tendency as follows: Está bien que vendan pero si ya han asegurado otra casa u otro lugar. Pero vienen y se quedan con la plata por ahí y se la andan comiendo. Y nosotros los pobres yo siempre le digo a las personas que trabajan conmigo nosotros los pobres somos como chiquillos cuando salimos y vemos caramelos de todo pero no lo podemos comprar . E ntonces cuando uno está chiquitillo dice, cuando tenga plata me compro una bolsa de esos para comer. Los pobres lo primero que hacemos c uando tenemos plata es ir a comprar un carro aunque no sepamos ni manejar, es lo primero. Y a veces piensan en comprar un carro y no piensan en comprar una casa. place to live. But t hey come and have the money and they just use it all up. And we poor people I always say this to the people who work with me to buy myself a bag of that candy to eat. The first thing we poor people do when we have thing. And sometimes they think about buying a car and not buying a house. The second signif icant economic effect of the residential tourism boom was the creation of new employment opportunities. The first, and most obvious, was that of the ño s entered the real estate oc cupation because they had their own property to sell and were able to use that experience (and income) to engage in the purchasing and selling of other properties. In other cases, such as with the English speaking schoolteacher who partnered with the Germa n developer, foreign real estate brokers needed local expertise to identify available properties and facilitate the transactions, which also provided another entrée into the market. In both of these examples, the Arenale ños in question have become extremel y successful in their new occupation. Nevertheless, there are only a handful of people who have been able to approximate their success. Of the 246 economically active people for whom I collected occupation data, five (2.0%)

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226 reported real estate transaction s (i.e., facilitating transactions for others, buying and selling their own properties, or both) as a primary source of income; only two people reported it as their only source of income. Of these five, four are Costa Ricans, all of whom are long term resi dents of the community and one is foreign expatriate from Colombia who is married to an American developer. Twelve people (4.9%) reported real estate transactions as a secondary source of income. Of these 12, four are foreigners and eight are long term Cos ta Rican residents of Nuevo Arenal (Figure 4 2). In sum, 17 people in my sample (6.9%) reported earning at least some income from real estate transactions. 13 One additional person reported that a member of their household earns some income from this activit y. Interestingly, the overall frequency of participation in real estate activities is only slightly lower than those of the most important traditional activities in Nuevo Arenal, dairy farming (21 people) and beef cattle ranching (33 people), illustrating the shifting economic landscape of the community over time. However, unlike in traditional agricultural activities and traditional tourism, second and third generation resettlers represent a very small proportion of the population that generates income t his activity. Rather, foreigners and Costa Rican immigrants (albeit long term residents of Nuevo Arenal) dominate this sector. Four of the five foreigners began facilitating real estate transactions somewhat by chance, most having migrated to Nuevo Arenal in the 1990s in order to establish small hotels. At least five of the eight Costa Rican immigrants (and perhaps more) became active in real estate transactions after selling their own 13 It should be noted that while all of the people I interviewed or surveyed are independent brokers, there are also a number of real estate fi rms in Nuevo Arenal, including the major international franchise of Century 21. These firms tend to be owned by foreigners but create administrative jobs for Arenale ñ os.

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227 properties, many of which had been acquired soon after resettlement or w ere located in the host community prior to resettlement (in other words, in close proximity to but still outside the boundaries of Nuevo Arenal). Though I cannot confidently explain the absence of second generation resettlers from this activity, I can hypo thesize that given the meager income generated by agricultural activities, there was little incentive and perhaps limited economic ability for second generation resettlers to purchase farmland. This may have translated to a lack of access to the real estat e market when the boom began. Mirroring global trends (cf. Oliver Smith et al. 1989, Wilson 2008b), the employment opportunity that was perhaps the most accessible to the broader population of Arenale ñ os, including second generation resttlers, was the new abundance of construction jobs and affiliated opportunities (e.g., transportation of construction materials, equipment repair, carpentry/woodworking, etc.). These jobs first began to emerge during the development of the hotels and gated communities at the beginning of the tourism period, and later expanded as foreigners began to build independent homes. Interestingly, some of the first local contractors had gained their skills working for ICE during the construction of the dam and the resettlement communit ies, confirming the importance of the job training that occurred during the resettlement process. At the height of the construction boom, some local general contractors were employing up to 50 people per day to work on half a dozen simultaneous projects. E ven after the boom had slowed due to the global economic crisis in 2008, construction work continued to be an important source of employment, even if the workers were not employed full time. Of the 246 economically active

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228 individuals for whom I collected o ccupation data in 2010, 23 people (9.3%) reported construction work as one of their primary sources of income. Of these, 17 people reported it as their only source of income. Three people (1.2%) reported construction work as a secondary source of income. I n sum, 26 people (10.6%) reported earning at least some income from construction work. An additional 15 people reported that someone in their household earned at least some income from this activity. Furthermore, 27 people who did not currently earn income from construction work reported having worked in construction at some point between 1990 and 2010. Clearly, construction work has become an important part of Arenaleñ livelihood strategy, as the frequency of participation eclipses all other occupations discussed thus far. However, unless one is the owner of a construction company or associated service (six of the 23 people who reported construction work as their primary source income were owners), the jobs in the construction sector pay relatively poorl y, on the order of $2 3/hour. Thus, while many people are engaged in this sector, they tend to occupy the lower socioeconomic bracket of the community. As illustrated by Figure 4 2, immigrants to Nuevo Arenal fill construction jobs at almost twice the rate of second and third generation resettlers, and over five times the rate as first generation resettlers. These immigrants are in large part young men who are newer arrivals to the community, in contrast to the immigrants active in agriculture and real est ate, who are longer term residents of Nuevo Arenal. Again mirroring global tourism trends (cf. Cabezas 2008, Wilson 2008a, Oliver Smith et al. 1989), the residential tourism boom also created a new set of opportunities for employment as housekeepers, gard eners, nannies, and the like. Housekeepers are

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229 exclusively women and tend to work in various households throughout the week. Gardeners are exclusively men and usually work for only one or two households or on a team at larger developments and hotels or res taurants. Wages earned through this type of employment are similar to those earned in construction, approximately $2 3/hour. Of the 246 economically active people for whom I collected occupation data, 11 (4.5%) reported domestic service (housekeeping or ch ildcare) as their primary source of income, while one person (0.4%) reported domestic service as a secondary source of income. An additional eight households reported that someone in their household earned at least occasional income from domestic service. Seven people (2.9%) reported gardening or landscaping as their primary source of income, and one person (0.4%) reported it as a secondary source of income. An additional six people reported that someone their households earned at least some income from gar dening or landscaping. In sum, 20 people (8%) in my sample reported earning income from these service based activities. Figure 4 2 indicates that the proportion of second and third generation resettlers and immigrants who earn an income from domestic ser vice is roughly equal. As stated previously, all of the people who are employed in this activity are women, for whom there were limited employment opportunities prior to the emergence of the tourism sector. While I did not specifically study the impact of partners or spouses, and their ability to leave conflict ridden marriages (Cohen 1984, Wilson 2008 b). It is likely that these findings apply in Nuevo Arenal as well.

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230 Landscaping jobs, occupied by men, are relatively equally distributed among all resident categories (except foreign expatriates). The third major impact of the residential tourism boom was more indirect. The presence of a permanent group of residents with disposable incomes who tend to be business provided by tourists renting short term vacation homes au gmented the amount of money in circulation in the Nuevo Arenal. This has led to an increase in activity in the commercial sector. New restaurants and bars, grocery stores, specialty food shops, appliance and furniture stores, bakeries, hardware stores, ret ail shops, pharmacies, a bank, and rental apartments are just a few examples of the commercial expansion that has occurred since the mid 1990s (Figure 4 13). Figure 4 14 provides a breakdown of occupations in Nuevo Arenal for the people I surveyed or inter viewed whose employment did not fall into the major categories previously discussed and presented in Figure 4 2. Outside of the sizeable public sector (i.e., education, health care, banking, public utilities and agencies, and police), the largest primary i ncome generating activities are retail shops and restaurants/bars. In addition, the informal economy, defined as mobile businesses and income generating activities conducted from the home (e.g., sewing/tailoring, specialty food preparation, personal care, catalog sales, laundry, etc.) also employ a significant proportion of the population. Of course, not all of these businesses have been successful over the long term, but Arenale ños significant measure of economic reconstruction. It should also be noted that a majority of these businesses are owned and run by Costa Ricans, many of them first or second -

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231 generation resettlers or long term residents of Nuevo Arenal, rather than foreigner s and other recent immigrants. In fact, the two oldest retail shops in Nuevo Arenal are owned by first generation resettlers who worked in or owned similar businesses in Viejo Arenal. In effect, their relationships from the old community have facilitated t heir success in the new one. Scudder (2005) has highlighted the risk of immigrants with more resources and skills becoming economically dominant in resettled communities. This does not seem to be the case in Nuevo Arenal, likely because the foreign immigra nts are largely retired (with some exceptions) and Costa Rican immigrants have arrived in search of work rather than with preconceived business ideas and unique skills. In the end, despite its drawbacks, residential tourism in Nuevo Arenal has generated m uch needed jobs and at least a temporary sense of security. This was particularly welcomed at the beginning of the tourism boom, as for many years prior the based agricultural economy . In fact, when older resettlers and early immigrants were asked when they felt like the community had achieved a sense of economic stability, almost everyone identified tourism as the turning point. As one second generation resettler, who had characterize d Nuevo Arenal as a ghost town in the first years after resettlement, put it: [La inversión extranjera] fue lo mejor que hemos tenido nosotros, porque realmente si no hubiera llegado la inversión extranjera, qué sería del Arenal en este momento? Quizás no tuviera un buen banco, no tuviera los supermercados que tiene, no tuviera la clínica, muchas cosas que hay que tener en cuenta. Al llegar la inversión extranjera, empezó a haber más trabajo en construcción, en jardinería, que de guarda, muchas mujeres tra bajando de misceláneas en las casas. Eso fue lo bueno de la inversión extranjera. Empezó a haber más dinero en el pueblo y más trabajo, aparte que las tierras aumentaron de valor.

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232 [Foreign investment] was the best thing that we have had, because really if things should be kept in mind. Upon the arrival of the foreign investment, there began to be more work in construction, gardening, protection, many women working as housekeepers. That was the good that arrived with the foreign investment. There was more money in the community and more work, and the land increased in value. Conclusions About Economic Reconstru ction co mmunity were characterized by difficult environmental conditions, serious financial constraints, and unanticipated physical isolation, the combination of which undermined com of the Scudder Colson model, resettlers took one of two tacks. A significant proportion simply abandoned their properties and left the community. A larger number, however, r emained and attempted to eke out a living by engaging in familiar activities like dairy farming, cattle production, staple crop agriculture, and commerce and services. Obando (1981) argues that many of those who stayed in Nuevo Arenal experienced a drop in living standards, which was an undesirable outcome for the project planners but is a common occurrence in cases of involuntary resettlement. In fact, a drop in living standards is predicted in Stage 2 of the Scudder Colson model, a resettlers adjust to th eir new environment (Scudder 2005). The assertion that this drop occurred in Nuevo Arenal was corroborated by my interviews with resettlers and early immigrants, all of whom characterized the first years in the community as extremely challenging. A first -

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233 g eneration resettler commented that people in the region referred to Nuevo Arenal as pueblo triste After two years of difficulties, the introduction of the coffee credit program was an important turning point, albeit a shor t lived boost to the local economy that ultimately left many resettlers indebted and discouraged. Initially, however, the infusion of cash into transition into Stage 3 of the Scudder Arenal was characterized by the diversification of economic activities to include coffee and other cash crops (e.g., cardamom an d macadamia); investments in additional properties, property improvements, and consumer goods; the acquisition of additional livestock; expansion of the commercial sector, and eventually a transition for some resettlers into non farming activities. In effe ct, development in Nuevo Arenal followed a relatively standard rural development model once the immediate trauma of resettlement had passed. However, while the Scudder Colson model predicts that economic diversification will occur after self sufficiency in the production of food staples has been reached (i.e., resettlers become more willing to take risks once their basic needs have been met), the Arenal case demonstrates that economic diversification can actually be a response to the inability to achieve se lf sufficiency rather than an outcome of self sufficiency. In other words, Arenale ñ os had no choice but to engage in riskier, non traditional economic activities because they would otherwise have had to abandon their new properties and be left with nothing .

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234 Despite the eventual failure of coffee production in Nuevo Arenal, it is undeniable some features of this period were early harbingers of the transition to Stage 4 of the Scudder characterized by the integration of the new community into the broader political economy. For example, as a product of the coffee boom, Nuevo Arenal became an important econ omic influence in the region. Not only were Arenale ñ os providing a cash crop to the coffee cooperative that was then traded nationally and internationally, but other smallholders in the lake region followed their lead and began to diversify their own produ ction systems (Partridge 1983). This had a transformative effect on the regional economic landscape, which was once almost exclusively dominated by dairy and cattle production. During the coffee period, Partridge (1983:n.p.) described the countryside bet we fodder plots, sugar cane plots, corn and bean plots, orange groves, milk and cheese production units, and banana and plantain plots. Production has become The economic viability of these diversified production systems was aided by the provision of the gravel road that linked Nuevo Arenal and other formerly isolated hamlets to the regional center of Tilar án, which was a direct outcome of the resettlement p roject. The coffee cooperative was also able to encourage the expansion of coffee production beyond the Arenal basin into adjoining areas, thereby connecting Nuevo Arenal with the broader r egion, and successfully lobbied the national government for improvements to local infrastructure. Additionally, though they were not locally oriented development

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235 schemes, the foreign owned cardamom and macadamia plantations that emerged during this period also provided linkages between Nuevo Arenal and the national and international economies. Colson model was also catalyzed by the transfer of management responsibilities from ICE t o the appropriate national agencies at various points during the economic development period. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture, not ICE, was charged with assisting in the early phases of the coffee cooperative. Similarly, the Institute of Agrarian Development, rather than ICE, resolved the squatter land tenure dispute on the Santa Maria peninsula. In other ways, however, the transition between the third and fourth stages of the Scudder Colson model was not as linear. For example, once resettlers r ealized that they would not be able to generate enough profits to cover the expenses of coffee production a problem that was further exacerbated by fluctuations in the international coffee market the community once again entered an economic downturn. Had e xogenous factors not intervened, namely the emergence of a strong tourism economy in Costa Rica in the 1990s, it is very possible that Nuevo Arenal would have permanently reverted to the traditional activities of dairy and beef cattle production. This is n ot to say that such a traditional economic context would have precluded the achievement of some aspects of Stage 4 of the Scudder Colson model (for example, the handing over of project assets and management responsibilities would likely still have occurred as ICE minimized its local presence over time) but rather that economic

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236 different economic context could have negatively affected second ability ability to develop the political and institutional strength to advocate for its own needs. Both of these are required elements of Stage 4 of the Scudder Colson model. In the pre sence of the significant exogenous factor of the international tourism market, however, the economy of Nuevo Arenal entered a new trajectory that finalized the transition into the final stage of the Scudder Colson model. This new economic phase firmly secu global economies. As the Lake Arenal region became a popular residential tourism destination, Nuevo Arenal achieved special notoriety due to the basic services provided in the urban core , many of which were a direct result of the resettlement project. Though the provision of these services was not initially contemplated with tourism in mind, the important role they played in the evolution of the community speaks to the potential of includ ing basic services in resettlement plans in anticipation of their future utility. In fact, Williams et al. (2000) specifically note the importance of amenities and services to satisfying the needs of international retirement migrants, a conclusion also sup ported by McWatters (2009). The tourism economy in Nuevo Arenal created new economic opportunities for resettlers of all generations (including women, whose employment opportunities were heretofore limited) and newer immigrants alike. As discussed at vario us points throughout this chapter, second and third generation resettlers are present in almost every occupational category (Figures 4 2 and 4 14). Furthermore, while first generation resettlers are more predominant in traditional land based economic acti vities, second

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237 and third generation resettlers have shown themselves to be more likely to take advantage of the service oriented opportunities created by the new economic context (e.g., traditional tourism, construction, domestic service, urban commerce and services, etc.). This has allowed them to maintain a standard of living at least on par with that of neighboring communities, another characteristic of Stage 4 of the Scudder Colson model. 14 Without undermining the importance of these employment opport unities to the continued economic viability of Nuevo Arenal, it is nevertheless essential to point out that this new strain of employment does not necessarily offer an obvious pathway to economic affluence. As has been noted in other tourism studies (cf. C ohen 1984, Wilson 2008b), most of the jobs in the service sector pay relatively low wages (though perhaps more than agricultural jobs) and do not provide many opportunities for advancement. When combined with increases in the cost of living due to the infl ux of foreign expatriates with greater economic means, basic survival in Nuevo Arenal is a more costly enterprise than in other rural areas of Costa Rica. Younger residents of the community are therefore currently unable to acquire personal, agricultural, or commercial properties without significant family assistance or incurring large debts. 15 Ultimately, the process of selling off landholdings to foreigners in combination with the rise in new employment opportunities created by tourism has engendered an 14 A more detailed discussion of local perceptions of quality of life will be presente d in the next chapter. 15 At the same time, according to many of my research participants, younger generations do not seem to be particularly interested in engaging in land based livelihood activities that would necessitate property ownership, though there are some exceptions, particularly in families who have achieved economic success through these activities. Such is the case with the prosperous cattle ranching family discussed at the beginning of this chapter.

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238 im portant shift in the structure of the local economy. In effect, the residents of Nuevo Arenal have largely been transformed from smallholders back to wage laborers. As a first generation resettler insightfully stated, L a mayoría somos jornaleros. Volvimos al mismo patrón de vida que se traía en el viejo pueblo [The majority of us are wage laborers. We have returned to the same pattern of life that we had in the old community]. This trend is consistent with research findings in areas that have undergone sim ilar tourism development trajectories (cf. Oliver Smith et al. 1989, van Noorloos 2011). Figure 4 15 illustrates the magnitude of this new pattern. During the administration of my livelihood survey, each participant was asked to detail his or her employmen t history (to the best of their recollection) from the year of their arrival in Nuevo Arenal through 2010. These reported occupations were coded and graphed longitudinally. This exercise revealed that the service based economy currently generates three tim es the employment as the land based economy, which is an almost complete reversal of the economic pattern at the time of resettlement. According to this graph, the point at which service based jobs surpassed land based activities was in 1991, exactly at th e time when tourism began in Nuevo Arenal. Interestingly, the number of people that reported being engaged in land based activities has remained relatively consistent over time, even accounting for population growth, indicating that the growth in importanc e of the service sector has more to do with an increase in the available opportunities than a decrease in land based activities (Figure 4 16). Incidentally, the transformation from smallholders into wage laborers is exactly the opposite of the original int ention of the resettlement project.

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239 T he sustainability of this new pattern of employment is somewhat uncertain, Wh ile the Scudder Colson model treats integration int o the broader political economy as a positive measure of post resettlement reconstruction, the other side of this coin is that control; meanwhile the resource base upon which livelihoods traditionally depended is typically no longer available (Cabezas 2008, Cohen 1984, Oliver Smith et al.1989). For example, Nuevo Arenal suffered a significant economic downturn upon the advent of the global economic crisis in 2008. As in o ther popular tourism destinations in Costa Rica (cf. Honey et al. 2010), foreign investment in the real estate and construction sectors essentially ground to a halt between 2008 and 2010. In Nuevo Arenal, this crisis was further exacerbated by the sudden b ankruptcy of a national savings and credit cooperative, Coopemex, in February 2010, in which many Arenale ñ os and foreigners had invested their savings based on the promise of high interest rates. By the time I conducted my life history interviews in the fi rst half of 2010, the community was in relatively dire economic straights, which became a frequent theme of discussion during the interviews. Though the presence of a permanent expatriate population with stable incomes insulated the commercial sector of Nu evo Arenal from the fluctuations of the tourism market to a certain extent, the construction sector, which employed a significant number of people, did not have the same protections. While I do not have data regarding migration from the community during th is period, I can confirm anecdotally that a significant proportion of the socially and economically peripheral residents left the community between 2009 and 2010. This assertion is based on the fact that between

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240 conducting my social network survey in 2009 and my livelihood survey in 2010, we were participation in the livelihood survey because they had left the community. In contrast, personal rather than economic reasons. Given this vulnerability to external forces and the paucity of alternative livelihood activities, Arenale ños are somewhat unsure about what the future holds. When asked whether he believed Nuevo Arenal had finally reached a point of stability after the many years of hardship post resettlement, a first generation resettler said: Pues sí, mientras el turismo no se vaya el pueblo vive. Pero Arenal sin el turismo no t iene vida porque la gente vive mucho del turismo . . . . Es que en otras partes hay el mismo Cañas, San Ramón, la agricultura es la vida del pueblo, o Guatuso, en Guatuso hay mucha agricultura pero aquí no. e community will live. But in Ca ñas, San Ramó n, agriculture is what the town survives from, or in Guatuso, in Guatuso there is a lot of ag A second generation resettler expressed a more pessimistic vision of the future, which perhaps reflects the psychological effects of living through the various boom and bust cycles that have occurred throughout the commun El futuro de nosotros es el mismo que tenemos desde el principio. Ahorita va a ser hasta el fin. Que Arenal no va a tener un futuro nunca, nunca lo va a tener . . . . Vea los años que tenemos de tener esta comunidad nosotros y no vemos el fu turo en esta comunidad. Our future is the same one we have always had. From now until the end. Arenal will never have a future, never. . . . Look at all the years we have

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241 Interestingly, the solution propos ed by more than one Arenale ño to these dilemmas was not a reversion to or expansion of the land based or commercial sectors, but rather a desire for a greater diversity of opportunities for wage labor. More than once, my research participants proposed the establishment of maquiladora style factories or the like that would provide a steady source of employment. The passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2007 has facilitated the development of such an industry in other rural areas of Costa Ri ca, inspiring a similar vision for Nuevo Arenal in some of its inhabitants. A related concern about the future of the community and perhaps one that would be at least partially resolved by greater economic diversification is the scarcity of opportunitie s for young Arenale ños with post secondary education. The increasing affluence of Arenaleños o ver time and the expansion of options for post secondary studies in Costa Rica have prompted a significant number of second and third generation resettlers to pu rsue higher degrees. T he current service based economy in Nuevo Arenal , however, provides few opportunities for people with advanced training. Thus, many young people have chosen to leave the community in order to pursue better opportunities. While this in modern society, it does call into question the fate of future generations of resettlers in the community. As the daughter of a first generation resettler who was studying tourism at the Ca ñas camp us of the National Technical University and has since gone on to find work as a schoolteacher outside of the Arenal region stated: Antes no se veía que los jóvenes estudiaran; se dedicaban a la ganadería o a la construcción o limpiar casas. Pero ahora much os jóvenes estudian, entonces Arenal no es un lugar para un muchacho que está estudiando en este momento. Porque digamos, un muchacho que está estudiando

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242 ingeniería eléctrica, donde va a venir a trabajar en Arenal? No puede, no puede. Entonces yo digo que Arenal va a llegar a convertirse en un lugar de puros viejitos . . . . Ahora tenemos que estudiar; nadie se puede quedar sin estudiar, y Arenal no es un lugar para que un muchacho prospere. Para ver esa prosperidad tiene que salirse a otros lados, y es mas ni Tilarán, tiene que ser como San José, Liberia, o sea buscar trabajo en otros lados. Eso es lo que he pensado yo. construction or housekeeping. But now a lot of young people stu dy, so Because someone who is studying electrical engineering, where are they to become a place of just olde r poeple. . . . Nowdays, we have to study; no prosper. To obtain that prosperity, they have to leave, and not even just to Tilar á n. It has to be San Jos é , Liberia, in other words th ey have to look for This statement echoes the opinions of many of the young people with whom I conducted interviews. With few exceptions, most were biding their time until they could leave the community, followin g in the footsteps of many of their peers. Before concluding this chapter, I would like to highlight two features of the resettlement planning and implementation process that were essential to economic reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal. The first of these is based resettlement compensation scheme. In the short term, it allowed resettlers to maintain the continuity of traditional agricultural activities and eventually to take advantage of new development opportunities like cof fee production. Furthermore, as in many cases of resettlement, land based compensation also gave landless laborers from Viejo Arenal a pathway to property ownership that they would not have had in the old context, thus allowing for the emergence of new pat terns of production (Scudder 2005). In the long term, land ownership provided a significant number of families entree into emerging real estate markets, in some cases dramatically elevating their socioeconomic

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243 status. Overall, the use of resettlement land a t the local level has evolved hand in hand with the economic changes at the national scale. As a first generation resettler expressed, " A quí repartieron muchas parcelas , y muchos la han mantenido y otros la han vendido y otros sí han dado a los hijos. De a lgun a manera, la han sacado provecho " [Here they distributed a lot of land, and many have held on to it and others have sold it and others have given it to their children. In one way or another, they have benefitted from it]. continued presence in the community for a number of years after resettlement proved to be extremely valuable. By living and working in Nuevo Arenal on a daily basis, ICE staff were able to see first hand that the agricultural economy they had originally en visioned was not developing as expected. They were then able to adapt their approach by negotiating the coffee credit program with MAG and the BNCR, which was a critical turning point for the community. Had ICE been observing the reconstruction process fro m San Jos é, the outcome could have been much less satisfactory. This speaks to the need for project planners to conceptualize resettlement and post resettlement recovery as a hands on process, conducted in tandem with the resettlers themselves rather than from distant cities that are disconnected from the realities of life in the resettlement site. I began this chapter with three hypotheses relevant to economic reconstruction that would hold true if Nuevo Arenal had entered the fourth and final stage of th e Scudder the process of economic reconstruction that began during second and third stages of the Scudder Colson model would continue to be visible today, and would have

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244 expanded in scope. This hypothesis was upheld by my research. Early economic development took the form of diversification of the land based economy into specialty cash crops, with an accompanying expansion of the commercial sector. This diversification, in tandem w ith more traditional activities, largely supported the community until new opportunities emerged during the expansion of the traditional and residential tourism markets at the national scale. A healthy proportion of Arenale ñ os continue to be active in trad itional activities like dairy production and cattle ranching, though later generations have also become engaged in the newer service based economy. Thus, economic development continues as resettlers continue to adjust and take advantage of new opportunitie s. My second hypothesis was that Nuevo Arenal would have become integrated into the broader political economy of the region and nation. This hypothesis was also confirmed by the research. Economic integration actually started relatively early in the commu felt throughout the region and led to economic growth as far as Tilar á n (Partridge 1983). Incorporation was later solidified by the emergence of traditional and residential tour ism, which increased the integration of the Lake Arenal region, and Nuevo Arenal in particular, into the global tourism sector. Today, there is no doubt that the community is integrated into the broader political economy, though, as discussed above, this i ntegration is accompanied by a new set of risks and vulnerabilities. Beyond the economic dimension, the transfer of responsibility for resolving local issues from ICE to the appropriate national agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture and the Institute of Agrarian Development) is also an important signal of political economic integration.

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245 My third hypothesis was that residents of Nuevo Arenal would consider their quality of life to be at least on par with that of neighboring communities. The findings t hat address this hypothesis will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, where I discuss local perceptions of the long term outcomes of resettlement. For now, suffice it to say that my observations indicate that Nuevo Arenal has a greater diversity of em ployment opportunities than many of the neighboring communities who did not undergo resettlement. In addition, the infrastructural skeleton put in place by the resettlement project, which has been expanded upon over time, creates a level of access to basic goods and services that is unique in the area. The current chapter reviewed the trajectory of economic reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal in the three decades since resettlement, illustrating some aspects of the of the Scudder Colson model. As previously stated, however, post resettlement reconstruction also involves the from a previously unfamiliar space. The following chapte r will describe these processes in Nuevo Arenal, again drawing upon the framework of the Scudder Colson model.

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246 Figure 4 1. Distribution of residents for whom occupation data was collected (n=314). Twenty three percent were first generation resettlers (n= 71), 28% were second or third generation resettlers (n=89), 40% were immigrants from other areas of Costa Rica or Nicaragua (n=126), and 8% were residential tourists of foreign origin (n=26). This roughly corresponds to the distribution of the overall population surveyed during the social network portion of this research (n=1430), in which 17% were first generation resettlers (n=244), 29% were second or third generation resettlers (n=421), 37% were immigrants from other areas of Costa Rica or Nicaragu a (n=532), 12% were residential tourists (n=175), and 4% were of unknown origin (n=58).

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247 Figure 4 2. Frequency of participation in key occupations according to resident category and importance of activity to e activity was reported as a primary source of personal income, some income from the activity. While first generation resettlers continue to be economically active in many sectors, second and third generation resettlers also participate in every type of activity. First generation resettlers are particularly active in more traditional occupations (i.e., dairy farming, cattle ranching, and agriculture), while second and third generation resettlers are more evenly distributed throughout all occupational categories. Foreign expatriates are only active in traditional and residential tourism related occupations. Immigrants have a strong presence in all occupational categories. However, those immigrants who participate in more traditional activities and real estate are long standing residents of the community, many of whom immigrated shortly after resettlement. The categories of construction, domestic service, and landscaping, on the other hand, are dominated by newer arrivals to the community.

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248 Figure 4 3. An agricultural plot on the Santa Maria peninsula, which was in vaded by squatters in the early 1990s in order to access fertile agricultural land. The agency. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks) Figure 4 4. The Tilaran Coffee Cooperative, C oopetila, was established in 1981 to Gabriela Stocks)

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249 Figure 4 5. The German Bakery was established in 1995 by a German immigrant. It provides breakfast and lunch service to individual tourists and larger tour wife but now owned by a first generation resettler who is an artisan woodworker. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks) A B Figure 4 6. A) T he building on the left was a restaurant owned by a first generation resettler from 1986 2007. It is located across the street from the central plaza. While the owner originally thought the view of the soccer field would be more interesting to his customer s, he was advised to expand the back side of his space in order to take advantage of the lake view, which was more appealing to tourists. B) An approximate representation of the lake view from the commercial spaces across from the main plaza. (Photos court esy of Gabriela Stocks)

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250 Figure 4 7. The Cabinas Canfinera, owned by a pair of second generation resettlers, is courtesy of Gabriela Stocks) Figure 4 8. Paradise Investment Company was one of the major, and most disreputable, developers in Nuevo Arenal in the mid 2000s. The sign on the courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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251 A B Figure 4 9. Residential tourism development in Nuevo Arenal. A) This photo was taken from the intersection of the main highway around the lake (straight ahead) and the road that enters downtown Nuevo Arenal (to the left, not pictured). The homes lining the ridgeline in the distance are all owned by residential tourists, who are attracted by the lake and volcanic views offered at higher elevations. B) The view of Nuevo Arenal and Lake Arenal from the home of a residential tourist. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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252 Figure 4 10. An e xample of foreign expatriate construction. This home belongs to a pair of retired American schoolteachers. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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253 Figure 4 11. Birthplaces of the residents of the Arenal district who were born outside of Costa Rica accordin g to the 1984, 2000, and 2011 national censuses. Between 2000 and 2011, the North American population of the district almost tripled, reflecting the growth of residential tourism in the Lake Arenal region. Ninety percent (90%) of the North Americans presen t in 2011 were from the United States. Incidentally, 97% of the Central Americans present in 2011 were from Nicaragua. The total population of the district was 1751 in 1984, 2175 in 2000, and 2300 in 2011. (Source: INEC 1984, INEC 2000, INEC 2011)

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254 A B C D Figure 4 12. Examples of the real estate signage near Nuevo Arenal in the late 2000s. Most signs were in English in order to attract foreign buyers. Some signs promoted local real estate brokers (A), others promoted planned developments (B, C), and others were erected by individual landholders (D). (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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255 A B Figure 4 13. Examples of commercial spaces in Nuevo Arenal. A) Across from the central plaza. B) Downtown, just off the main highway. While many of the structures date to the original resettlement project, the businesses they house have changed over time. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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256 Figure 4 14. Distribution of other occupations in Nuevo Arenal according to resident category and importance o f activity to overall income. The public sector (education, health care, banking, public utilities, etc.) is the largest, and most reliable employer in the community. The service sector, including food service, retail shops, and services provided through t he informal economy are also major employers. Second and third generation resettlers can be identified in almost every type of economic activity.

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257 Figure 4 15. Proportion of residents engaged in land based, service based, and public sector activities f rom 1977 2010.

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258 Figure 4 16. Number of residents engaged in land based, service based, and public sector activities from 1977 2010.

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259 C HAPTER 5 RECONSTRUCTING COMMU NITY : MATERIAL AND SOCIA L RECOVERY IN NUEVO ARENAL In the previous chapter, I reviewed the long term process of economic reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal from 1977 2010. Economic recovery after the trauma of resettlement was an important aspect of rebuilding Arenale ñ ion through the final two stages of the Scudder Colson model. While economic viability is critical to the sustainability of resettled communities over the long term, however, community reconstruction after involuntary resettlement is not just an exercise i n economics. As Numerous resettlement scholars have pointed out that the risk of impoverishment after resettlement extends beyond the economic sphere and into the socio cultural realm (cf. Cernea 1997, Colson 1971, Downing 1996, Oliver Smith 2005b, Scudder specifically highlights the risks of marginalization and social disarticulation in resettled communities (Cernea 1997), while the Scudder Colson four stage model emphasizes the multidimensional stress resettlers experience during resettlement (Scudder 2005). Following these ideas, the current chapter addresses the processes of community reconstruction, both material and social, in Nuevo Arenal after resettlement that served to mitigate social impoverishment and disarticulation and create a functional community. Social disarticulation after resettlement stems in part from the disruption of what constructed spatial temporal order that allows people to answer basic questions about

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260 in location, timing, and purpose of certain religious celebrations (e.g., Easter) can serve a clear spatial, temporal, and moral orienting function for followers. Similarly, the spatial organization of homes and neighborhoods , and the regular social interactions that occur within them, can lend predictability and meaning to daily life. In this way, the spatial temporal order establishes parameters for socially acceptable (or expected) behaviors, values, priorities, and morals. In effect, it gives life meaning. The disruption of this order can render life meaningless, unpredictable, and unintelligible (Downing 1996, Marris 1974). Resettlement can also cause social disarticulation and impoverishment by fragmenting communities, k in groups, social support systems, leadership structures, and social networks. In other words, the social relationships that undergirded life in the old community are fundamentally transformed by resettlement. Reconstructing community therefore entails the ability to act on its own behalf to satisfy the needs of individuals and the population as a whole, both at a local level and within broader political, economic, and social contexts (Cohen 1985, Oliver Smith 2005b). To regain predictability and meaning, reestablish group and individual identity, Downing 2010) cted. At its core, reconstructing social geometry is the process of recreating the sense of place that was destroyed by resettlement. It is about making the new community feel like odifying, and

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261 expanding personal and community infrastructure. It can also include the restoration of rituals, customs, and even daily practices that affirmed social and cultural identity in the old location, linking the past to the present and helping res ettlers reinterpret the structures of purpose and attachment that make life meaningful (Marris 1974, Oliver Smith 2010a). Reestablishing an attachment to place helps forcibly displaced people regain a feeling of control over their lives, assists in the for mation of a new identity, and helps resettlers move beyond the trauma of resettlement. In other words, sense of place generate the broader sense of community and pride necessary to stimulate and support community development efforts (Manzo and Perkins 2006). Within the framework of the Scudder Colson four stage model, the process of commu During the community formation component of Stage 3, the model predicts that such as deco rating houses and naming landscape features. The model also predicts increased attention to infrastructural improvements, the creation of voluntary associations, and the reemergence of community building and community affirming events such as religious act ivities and other celebrations. Stage 4 is marked by the assumption of community management responsibilities by local actors (where appropriate), integration of the community into the broader political economy of the region or nation, and the development o f sufficient political and institutional strength to

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262 public institutions that is char acteristic of communities that have been forcibly resettled (Oliver Smith 1991). In other words, as resettlers successfully reconstruct their individual and collective lives in the new location, they acquire the capacity to assume responsibility for their community in all aspects economic, material, and social. A key measure of the success of the community development and incorporation stages is that second generation resettlers assume leadership positions within the community and that their living standard s continue to improve at least in line with neighboring communities. As in Chapter 4, the data presented here address my first research objective of understanding the process of community reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal from 1977 through today. This objecti ve was accompanied by three research hypotheses: 1. The processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction that began during second and third stages of the Scudder Colson model will continue to be visible today, and will have expanded in scope. 2. Nuevo Arenal will have become integrated into the broader political economy of the region and nation, as measured by economic, political, and social interactions with entities outside of the physical boundaries of the community. 3. Residents of Nuevo Are nal will consider their quality of life to be at least on par with that of neighboring communities. The current chapter is organized in three sections. In the first section, material reconstruction, I discuss the process through which Arenale ños transform ed the built environment of Nuevo Arenal into a place imbued with shared meaning and to which they feel attached. The second section of this chapter deals with social reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal, focusing on themes of group identity, community associati ons, community rituals, and the role of memory. The final section weaves economic,

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263 material, and social themes together to discuss Arenale ñ os perceptions of their quality of life in Nuevo Arenal and the long term costs and benefits of resettlement. From S pace to Place: Material Reconstruction After Resettlement The Significance of Place In Place and Placelessness , geographer E.C. Relph wr i o be human is to live in a world that is filled with signifi cant places: to be human is to have and to know you r functionally and existentially. At a functional level, they meet our needs as locations in which we conduct daily activities like working, sleeping, and relaxing. At an existential homesickness, places engender affective bonds and emotional responses in people, al and Altman 1992, Relph 1976). As reflections of the ways in which people organize themselves in response to other people and to their surroundings, places are also express ions of the culture and social structure the identity of a community and its residents (Oliver deep relationship with places is as necessary, and perhaps as unavoidable, as close relationships with peop le; without such relationships human existence, while possible, is Forced displacement fundamentally undermines the relationship between people and place. The prefix dis (OED Online 2013). Dis placement, then, is quite literally the separation of people from their place places to which they are attached and that play an important role in their

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264 individual and socio isorienting experience even under the best of circumstances (e.g., voluntary migration for employment or educational opportunities). In the case of d is placement by development, however, which totally and permanently transforms entire landscapes, the loss o f place is involuntary, sometimes sudden, and profoundly traumatic for the displaced. social geometry, creating high levels of psycho socio cultural stress (Downing and G arcia Downing 2010, Scudder 2005). This is not to say, however, as Appadurai (1996) and Malkki (1992) warn in their critiques of sedentarist notions of culture, that identity and place are so inextricably linked that removing people from their communities of origin inevitably implies the permanent loss of culture. Rather, while acknowledging that deeply held attachments to place do indeed form part of the foundation of individual and group identity, an anti sedentarist perspective grants displaced people t he agency to create a home wherever the current chapter. In development forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR), displacees are forcibly moved from a familiar physica l and social environment to an unfamiliar resettlement site. From the household scale to the community scale and beyond, this (Hirschon 2000, Hammond 2004). In other words, the social geometry of the new location is as yet unknown, which renders life temporarily unpredictable and unintelligible (Downing 1996).

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265 Displacement, however, is not just about the loss of place, but also about the struggle to make a new place in the worl d, where meaningful action and shared understanding is possible (Turton 2005). Thus, through a gradual process of em placement (as opposed to dis placement), resettled individuals and communities can hip [of belonging] between person (individual or collective) and place . . . through the interworking of place, identity, 83). During the process of em placement, previously significance for resettlers are transformed into socially constructed, meaningful, and value Altman 1992, Tuan 1974). In doing so, what is ultimately recovered is not just an individual and communal attachment to place, but also a m eaningful pattern of 3 Empla cement is not simply the natural outcome of increasing familiarity with a new locality (though length of residence, for example, has in fact been linked with place attachment (Manzo and Perkins 2006)). Rather, place is produced through social activity (Tur ton 2005). Key here is the idea of practice; places acquire meaning through regular work a sense of place, including conferring place names, demarcating boundaries, and situating houses and other elements of the built environment. Place making in the

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266 context of forced mi gration or resettlement is often characterized by efforts to repair or reestablish continuity with the past, including recreating features from the old community and transporting mementos and familiar objects to the new location (Mazumdar et al. 2000, Oliv er Smith 2005b, Turton 2005). In the Scudder Colson model, emplacement also involves modifying resettlement houses to suit family needs and improving community infrastructure (Scudder 2005). Ultimately, then, sense of rms of intentional activity . . . that yields particular As discussed previously, resettlement projects have traditionally underemphasized the social and psychological dimensions of the loss of place and th e process of attachment to a new place, preferring instead to focus on the economic dimensions of DFDR. In his discussion of the design of resettlement projects after ffect is the dimension of hu man experience where recovery projects either become relevant and meaningful for disaster affected populations, or they perpetuate the undesired socio environmental The same argument can easily be applied to DFDR; resettled communiti es are only viable over the long term if they come to feel like home to the resettlers. This includes, of course, the restoration of livelihood activities, but it also involves the material, symbolic, and affective dimensions of emplacement. Importantly, resettlement project design and implementation can either facilitate their social geometry. For example, Marris (1974:61 adaptable the new l ocation is to the previous way of life, including prior patterns of

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267 social interaction, the easier it will be for resettlers to make sense of their new organization and interaction, which translate into their daily lived experience in the new location in ways that can confer a sense of well or ill being. Oliver Smith (2005b:52) takes these as take a form (physically) that people can appropriate as their own, and add to and this line o f thought, in the following three sub sections I will discuss the material aspects of place making in Nuevo Arenal at three scales home, neighborhood, and community with an emphasis on the relationship between resettlement planning and the process of empla cement. Home to analyze the design of the Arenal resettlement project. There, I highlighted the land based resettlement compensation structure, which included making urban lots or rural farm parcels with houses available to resettlers via low interest loans. But, as Mahapatra (1990:155) notes, the risk of homelessness that accompanies resettlement ace, ñ Upon resettlement, every family in Nuevo Arenal effectively owned the house in which they lived, though, as discussed previously, titles were not officially granted for a number of years after resettlement due to a legal dispute between ICE and the

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268 hacienda La Rosita. According to Obando (1981), this caused some discomfort among resettlers and delayed attachment to the new community. Additionally, economic difficulties caused a significant level of emigration during the first few years after resettlement. Nevertheless, de facto homeownership did allow the resettlers who remained to assume responsibilit y for their properties and to adapt the houses and lots to suit the needs of the family, thereby beginning the process of emplacement. This stands in marked contrast to other examples of resettlement, in which tenuous tenure situations create an environmen t of uncertainty that works against the development of an attachment to the new place. Hirschon (2000), for example, notes that the lack of identity among resettlers th at was leveraged to extract additional benefits from the state, thus prolonging the period of dependency and inhibiting adaptation to the new resettlement site. In contrast, the relatively clear tenure structure in Nuevo Arenal allowed the resettlers to mo ve beyond the identity of victims and achieve independence from the resettlement authorities with regard to their material assets, particularly after legal title was in hand. Today, the rate of home ownership remains high. Of the 314 individuals who partic ipated in my livelihood survey and life history interviews, 253 (81%) reported either owning the home in which they lived or residing with the owner of the home. Another key feature of the process of emplacement at the home scale was the manner in which the resettlement houses were built. As noted in Chapter 3, during the construction phase of the project, ICE resettlement staff recruited and trained young resettlers in construction techniques and then hired them to work on the new settlement

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269 sites. In ad dition to instilling a sense of ownership, pride, and attachment to their new community and providing the opportunity to gain new skills that could be used after resettlement, the use of local labor has also been shown to lower the level of dependency on o utside resources during the resettlement process (Oliver Smith 1991). Oliver Smith (1991) identifies housing design and construction as a factor that can determine the success or failure of resettlement projects. In the Arenal case, the resettlement hous es themselves were designed to be an improvement on the old wooden houses in Viejo Arenal, thereby creating a sense of improved well being among resettlers. ICE staff also chose to build concrete houses from scratch in lieu of erecting inexpensive pre fabr icated houses. The structures remain in good condition today, despite more than 30 years of earthquakes and other tropical weather related events. While the houses were laid out in the traditional Costa Rican style (including a living room, dining room, ki tchen, laundry area, bathroom, and private bedrooms), they were also designed to be flexible to accommodate the needs of the residents by creating internal divisions from plywood in order to allow for adaptation once the houses were occupied. In addition, each family served as the inspector of their house as it was being built, which gave them some ability to modify it during the construction process (e.g., some resettlers had no use for a carport and instead preferred to enclose an additional bedroom). The high level of resettler participation in the design and construction of their houses aided in creating feelings of attachment, as each house reflected the particular needs of the family that was to occupy it. Over time, resettlers have continued to modify their houses, demonstrating a sense of proprietorship. For example, Obando (1981) noted that 35% of the households modified their kitchens to accommodate the use of a

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270 wood burning stove within two years after resettlement. Additionally, of the 106 individ uals who resided in an original resettlement house that I surveyed during my fieldwork (n=263 total individuals surveyed), 95 (90%) reported that their house had undergone some type of modification either through expansion or remodeling existing spaces. B eyond the physical house structure, residential lots in the urban core of Nuevo Arenal were designed to accommodate the same uses that had been important in Viejo Arenal, namely areas for family gardens and fruit trees. The resettlement lots were narrow bu t long, ranging from 600 to 1200 m 2 , and thus contained space toward the rear for horticulture or small animal husbandry. Property boundaries came to be marked by fences or shrubbery, signifying household control over the space. Today, the back yards of ma ny Arenale ños contain sheds or other small structures; gardens with fruit trees, herbs, and vegetables; and chicken coops and pigpens. Arenale ñ adapt their properties to accommodate traditional uses aided in maintaining a sense of continuity with the past, which allowed them to make sense of their new environment and begin to form an attachment to the new site (Marris 1974). Similarly, outside the urban center, resettlers cleared their rural farm plots to permit the agricultural uses discussed in Chapter 4, constructed outbuildings, demarcated their properties with emplacement in the new resettlement site. demonstrated by interior and back yard modifications, but were also demonstrated in

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271 publicly visible ways. While at the time of resettlement, the urban lots were l eft barren of trees and grass and the concrete houses were painted in a uniform neutral color (see Chapter 3, Figures 3 16 and 3 17), resettlers eventually began to landscape their front yards and repaint their homes in an effort to make their new environm ent comfortable and pleasing. This culture of placing value on home aesthetics has continued over time. When I first arrived in Nuevo Arenal in 2006, I was struck by the obvious pride residents took in the maintenance of their houses and yards (Figure 5 1) . Even families who were not able to afford exterior paint for their entire house would paint the just front side that was visible from the street. As a second Me encanta este pueblo, todo el mundo se preocupa como de tener s u jardincito bonito, su patiecito cuidado. Hasta las instituciones , usted ve y pasa por el colegio y la escuela y lo tienen cuidadito for. Even the public institutions, you w alk by the high school and the elementary school and visitors is another indicator of the process of emplacement in the sense that it is rroundings and of the effort to crate a pleasing environment in which to live. In discussing the importance of home, Relph (1976:39 40) writes: Home is the foundation of our identity as individuals and as members of a community. . . . Home is not just th e house you happen to live in, it is not something that can be anywhere, that can be exchanged, but an irreplaceable centre of significance. Home . . . is the point of departure from which we orient ourselves and take possession of the world. Similarly, M arris (1974) argues that the formation of a sense of place leads to the restoration of a meaningful pattern of relationships. Thus, Arenale ñ

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2 72 was key to reg aining a sense of belonging after resettlement, to forming a new identity in the new location, and to their ability to interact meaningfully with the rest of the world. This began with reconstructing their social geometry at the home scale, the site of sig nificant social interaction, but also extended to larger scales as well. Neighborhood Social disarticulation has been identified as one of the primary risks of resettlement (Cernea 1997). The fragmentation of social relationships is caused not only by the loss of friends and relatives who, for one reason or another, are not resettled into the same community, but also by architectural designs that impede prior patterns of social interaction. For example, Barrios (in press) and Oliver Smith (1991) lament the many examples of modernist urban resettlement designs characterized by culturally inappropriate architecture (e.g., high rise apartment buildings rather than single family dwellings), random property distributions that reorganize resettlers into unfamilia r spatial patterns, and aesthetically displeasing monotonous and uniform layouts, all of which can lead to the breakdown of relationships upon which the social geometry of a community is based. As Oliver he long term viability of a settlement and its potential to sustain further social development is as dependent on its arrangement in social space as it is on the cultural appropriatenes s of each individual dwelling or the safety of the terrain fied as a crucial issue in the success or failure of resettlement efforts. In the case of Nuevo Arenal, it is clear that ICE staff were sensitive to the effects of urban architecture on ss of emplacement at the neighborhood scale and beyond.

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273 In planning the new settlement, ICE staff attempted to maintain continuity between the old and new communities by recreating essentially the same type of residential layout in Nuevo Arenal that existe d in Viejo Arenal. Figures 5 2 and 5 3 are architectural maps of the urban cores of Viejo Arenal and Nuevo Arenal, respectively, created by ICE staff during the resettlement planning process. Though the figures are not identical, the similarities are notew orthy, including the distribution of residential neighborhoods into blocks and the irregular sizing of lots within those blocks to scale layout will be discussed in the next su b section). Maintaining familiar neighborhood social units was also recognized as a way to facilitate emplacement and adaptation to the new site. As noted previously, resettlers were given the final decision with regard to where they wanted to live in t he new community. This allowed families and friends to maintain their spatial proximity upon resettlement if they so desired. In fact, kin groups did tend to cluster together, particularly in the urban core where properties were smaller and neighbors close r at hand. Some of these spatial arrangements still exist today despite more than 30 years of immigration and emigration. For example, two of my field assistants were cousins and lived in a family complex on the street where I rented an apartment. The orig inal resettlement house was owned by an aunt and was occupied by herself, her spouse, and her elderly brother. She had subdivided the original lot to make room for two new houses occupied by her brother and sister, respectively, and their families. Her dau the family since the time of resettlement. Similarly, on the same block, another neighbor

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274 occupied her original resettlement house but had subdivided her lot to accommodate tw o new houses for her sons and their growing families. In this manner, Arenale ñ os have both maintained former patterns of social interaction outside the boundaries of the immediate household and created new spaces for engagement at the neighborhood scale. A nother notable feature of the resettlement design that facilitated emplacement was the lack of uniformity in its layout . Only four blocks in the urban core were of the modern square variety, and even those were not uniform in appearance. Otherwise, streets meander ed in curved lines, blocks and lots were irregularly shaped, and houses were set back at var ying distances from the street. Though the houses were neutrally painted by the resettlement agency, they each eventually acquired different colors based on 1 While these may seem like minor details, purposeful attention to the aesthetics of urban design combined with the efforts of resettlers to personalize their homes has resulted over time in heterogeneous neighborhoods wi th a pleasant, organic feeling (Figure 5 4). This stands in contrast to other case studies of resettlement, in which provisional (and sometimes permanent) housing takes the form of modular barracks (cf. Oliver Smith 1986) or other aesthetically displeasing layouts, thus perpetuating a refugee identity and inhibiting the formation of an affective bond with the new home, neighborhood, and community. 1 It should be noted that the lack of landsca ping and claims about the lack of exterior house paint was one allow resettlers to customize their homes and neighborhoods. In thinking about ways to i mprove resettlement planning, there is likely an agreeable middle ground.

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275 Careful attention to community and neighborhood layout in resettlement projects is also important because poor planning can reinforce patterns of social inequality among resettlers, thus impeding the formation of community solidarity and, arguably, place attachment (Oliver Smith 1990). For example, tiered systems of housing distribution and pricing can affect whic h resettlers have access to particular houses in particular locations (Oliver Smith 1990). In this sense, however, the Arenal resettlement project was not particularly at risk of perpetuating social inequalities. Most of the resettlers were essentially of the same socio economic status because the wealthier residents of the valley (the large ranchers) had left the area upon resettlement. over others (e.g., the landles s residents of Viejo Arenal had the same access to residential lots as property owners), and any resettler could choose to live anywhere a house was available. Thus, upon resettlement, neighborhoods did not seem to be stratified based on socio economic or other variables. Over time, of course, as people have come and gone, neighborhoods have acquired their own identities and thus attract a certain type of resident. This is particularly notable in neighborhoods that have become attractive to foreign expatria tes due to their lake views and/or access. There is gated communities in the rural zones that are almost exclusively occupied by foreigners. In order to understand these spa tial patterns, I collected GPS data for each household in the community. These data are displayed in Figure 5 5, which is a map of Nuevo Arenal divided into hexagons of 300 m. While some clustering by resident type is obvious (the large blue triangles alon g the northern edge, for example, represent the

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276 gated communities), it is also notable that overall, the housing distribution of Costa Ricans and expatriates is relatively mixed. Thus, while economic disparities exist among these populations, this has not yet played out in a significant way on the housing landscape. 2 Furthermore, within the Costa Rican community, my observations suggest that very little neighborhood stratification exists among Arenale ños . For example, the patriarch and matriarch of the weal thiest Costa Rican family in Nuevo Arenal live next door to a family of limited economic means; the sons of the family, also wealthy in their own rights, live in an economically mixed neighborhood in the center of town. While the appearance of their houses economic status, the locations do not. Emplacement in the new community has also taken the form of the emergence of new neighborhoods. In designing the resettlement project, ICE staff created room for expansion by leaving 65 residential lots available for future generations. These lots were located in clusters throughout the urban center and turned over to the Community Development Association ( Asociación de Desarrollo Integral ) for future allocation. Extra neighborhood spa ces have also been carved from existing parcels outside the urban center. Over time, these areas have been organically incorporated into the existing community. the neighbo rhood scale in Nuevo Arenal is that most neighborhoods, old and new alike, have been named. Most names are descriptive, such as Las Palmeras (The Palms) , a 2 For a more detailed discussion of the perception of spatial clustering among resident groups and the implications of this divide, see Matarrita Cascante and Stocks 2013:96 97, 99).

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277 neighborhood characterized by its high palm trees; El Congo (The Howler) , a neighborhood carved from a forested area that once contained howler monkeys, known colloquially as monos congos; and El Infiernillo (Little Hell), a neighborhood located in the lowest lying area of the urban center. Much like people, some neighborhoods have been given both formal names and (sometime vulgar) nicknames. Such were the cases with the neighborhood in which I lived, which was given a nickname that reflected its largely single female population, El Barrio de los Culos Solos (The Neighborhood of the Single Asses), and the newest neighborhood in town, Las Meonas (The Bedwetters). As of reference on the landscape (Relph 1976:17). Jacquetta Hawkes (1951:151) writes, Thus, the act of naming their neighborhoods was, in effect, Arenale ñ integrating the new place into their sociocultural landscape. Ultimately, through lived experience and practice recre ating former neighborhood social units, modifying existing neighborhoods and expanding into new Arenale ñ os have successfully transformed the generic neighborhoods they encountered upon resettlement into meaningful and individualized places. While much of the process of emplacement was dependent on the agency of the resettlers themselves, it was also facilitated by the pla nning and the affective dimensions of attachment to place. This same attention to detail applied to the community scale, discussed next.

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278 Community At the community scale, Oliver Smith (1991) identifies site selection, layout, and popular participation as k ey planning factors that contribute to the long term success or failure of resettlement efforts. These features can determine whether resettlers perceive the new community as a place in which life, both social and material, can be rebuilt in other words, w hether emplacement is possible. In the case of Nuevo Arenal, ICE planners paid careful attention to all three elements, albeit with more success with the last two than with the first. Despite some planning shortcomings, however, the strong roots Arenale ñ os have developed in the new community after the initial period of difficulty and abandonment are indicative of emplacement at the community scale. of and development of Smith 1991:16). For example, practical considerations like ease of land acquisition, accessibility, and topography are often used in decision making, rather than economic, ecological, and social factors that may make one sit e more viable than another (Oliver Smith 1991). To some extent, this contention holds true in the Nuevo Arenal case. During the resettlement planning process, ICE staff scouted seven possible sites for the new community and assessed them according to a set of variables, including distance from urban centers, existing or planned road systems, area available for growth and expansion, administrative unit, distance from the future reservoir, distance from the Arenal Volcano, physical and climatological characte ristics (e.g., water quality and availability, soil stability, temperature, wind direction and velocity, rainfall, humidity, elevation, etc.), and the ease of providing basic services (e.g., water, electricity, telephone). While this set of variables was p erhaps more comprehensive than in other resettlement projects, my review of the

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279 based and of poor quality. Furthermore, while distance from urban centers and transportation infrastructure were included in the assessment, the effects of the prolonged rainy season on marke t access and agricultural production were not fully taken into account. Important social variables were also not considered. For example, the hilly and muddy terrain on which Nuevo Arenal was ultimately sited proved to be a significant impediment to foot t ravel between homes and businesses, thus reducing the ease of social and economic interactions. Resettlers lament the loss of the flat terrain of Viejo Arenal to this day. Ultimately, the chosen site was the one with the largest acreage (i.e., land availab ility) that also achieved a balance between distance from the volcano and to the major urban center of Tilar á n, ease of installation of telephone and electricity services, and reasonable climatological conditions. Thus, despite the inclusion of a relativel y broad set of variables to inform the decision making process, it appears that the practical considerations were prioritized over a more in economic, and ecological potential. Where the Arenal project differs from other cases, however, is in the level of popular participation in the final site selection. As discussed in Chapter 3, the seven potential sites were presented to the community for a vote, in which the location of the current community was chosen. Therefo re, though the site selected was not ideal due to the conditions discussed above (and other constraints reviewed in the previous chapter), it can be argued that the resettlers were as much responsible for the decision

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280 as was the resettlement agency. In thi s sense, then, Arenale ños were in a position of making a home in the location of their choosing, a challenge they have met over time. Resettlement site selection also had another, more symbolic, dimension in Nuevo Arenal in the sense that the location chos en for the new community affected Arenale ños commercial center with some level of regional notoriety and an established system of livelihoods and socio economic relationships, Nuevo Ar enal was a peripheral village with a lower to middle class populace that struggled to regain its economic footing for years after resettlement. In effect, because of their increased physical, economic, and social marginalization, Arenale ñ os temporarily lo st a sense of who they were as a community. Regaining their group identity was only possible by regaining the sense of place, and thus sense of self, that they had lost. As Basso (1996:7) argues, place way of constructing social traditions and , in the process, personal and social identities central organizing principle on which life (in all its manifestations) 2004:119). Community layout is as important as site selection in facilitating or hindering attachment to place after resettlement. Oliver Smith (1991) notes that community designs that are not aesthetically appealing or that lack traditional ritual spaces have led to the outright abandonment and rejection o f resettlement sites. Similarly, Barrios (in press) discusses the inability of uniform, modern urban designs, which originated in 19 th century Western Europe as a tool for creating a disciplined and easily governed hallarse (to feel at ease) in Hondurans displaced by

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281 Hurricane Mitch, thereby constraining the development of an affective bond to the ir new community . In the Nuevo Arenal case, ICE mitigated the potential undesirable effects of modern and culturally inappropriate layouts in a number of ways, thereby creating a come to feel like home. First, continuity between Viejo Arenal and Nuevo Arenal was created by maintaining similar layo uts between the two communities (Figures 5 2 and 5 3). In particular, the church plaza school complex was retained as the core of the new community, echoing the basic layout of most Latin American towns. As discussed previously, continuity between old and new can help resettlers make sense of the new site by recreating features of the former social geometry (Marris 1974, Downing 1996). The built environment also helps preserve social memories and information about a serves as a mnemonic . . . reminding people of the behavior expected of them . . . who does (Rapoport 1982 :80 81). Thus, the preservation of this central triad created a familiar venue for important components of social l ife: worship, soccer, and education (Figure 5 6). This community core continues to be a key site of social interaction today. Catholic church services and other activities are regularly attended and generate a high level of popular participation in the for m of planning and fundraising committees. 3 , 4 Frequent 3 An Evangelical church, located a block from the main plaza, was also a component of the original resettlement plan. While attendance is high, it does not have the same level of cultural importance as does the Catholic Church in the traditionally C atholic country, and thus occupies a more peripheral space, both materially and symbolically. 4 Today, both the Catholic and Evangelical churches have a resident priest and pastor, respectively. This was not the case in Viejo Arenal or immediately upon r esettlement in Nuevo Arenal. Nevertheless, the

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282 soccer games and topes 5 (horse parades) in the central plaza draw large audiences, and the local Community Development Association has assumed responsibility for its maintenance and improvement, includi ng landscaping and maintaining park benches for viewers (Figure 5 7). Finally, in addition to the daily ritual surrounding school attendance, fundraising and other activities at the elementary and high schools generate more popular participation than any o ther entity in the community. 6 Also similar between the old and new communities was the existence of a commercial core, where daily business transactions could occur but which also served as a significant site of informal social interaction, surrounded by residential neighborhoods. Space for a cemetery was created on the outskirts of the new community as a replacement for the old cemetery that had been flooded by the reservoir. In this manner, the layout of the new community enabled the restoration of key c omponents of Arenale ñ geometry, thus facilitating their emplacement in the new community. Second, ICE took into account the need for other architectural features that made ds and staggered houses above, which stands in contrast to the modern urban architectural tradition of houses and streets in straight lines condemned by Barrios (in press) and others. Leisure spaces, such as a small park next to the main plaza, a basketbal l court, recreation of religious infrastructure upon resettlement allowed for the preservation of these socially and culturally valuable institutions despite the absence of a permanent figurehead. 5 The name tope comes from the word topar , to run into or encounter. A tope , therefore, is literally an tope is a key feature of the annual fiestas c í vicas (civic festival), discussed in further detail later in this chapter. 6 The role of community organizations and popular participation is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

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283 and soccer field, provided venues for relaxation and social interaction (Figure 5 8). Public lighting and sidewalks in most neighborhoods of the urban core also made positive contributions to the atmosphere of the new settlement. With the exceptio n of the basketball court, each of these features has been maintained and improved upon over time, demonstrating their importance to the community. Finally, the choice of community name was also a purposeful linkage between old and new in order to cataly ze the formation of place attachment. Rather than giving the resettlement site a completely new name, ICE staff retained the name of Arenal and Nuevo purpose of making the new com while simultaneously maintaining continuity with the past. Drawing from the work of K.I. Leonard, Mazumdar et al. (2000:328) note a similar purpose in their study of the ethnic enclave of Little Saigon in Westminster, California: p. 46), wh migrants to empower themselves in new contexts, a way of taking charge of t (Leonard, 1997, p. 46). Relph (1976:17) also highlights the importance of using former T o this point, this discussion of community scale emplacement has primarily focused on the ways in which Arenale ñ os have taken advantage of existing community infrastructure to recreate prior forms of social interaction in order to make the community feel l

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284 however, is the extent to which community infrastructure has been expanded upon through the efforts of Arenale ñ os themselves. According to the Scudder Colson model, infrastructural improvements are a sign of community formation (i.e., emplacement) in increasing level of independence from the resettlement agency. Upon resettlement, Nuevo Arenal was equipped wit h a number of modern amenities, including water, electricity, and telephone service; septic tanks; street gutters; gravel roads; public lighting; sidewalks; green spaces; offices of the rural police, telegraph, and postal services; Center of Nutrition; mob ile health unit; bank; elementary school; Catholic and Evangelical churches; cemetery; and soccer field and basketball court. In many ways, the infrastructure that had existed in Viejo Arenal had been replaced and expanded upon in Nuevo Arenal. Nevertheles s, additional needs were identified over time. transformation of a failed hotel into a permanently staffed health clinic in 1980, stimulated by the economic growth during the coffee boom (Figure 5 9). Following the clinic, a public gymnasium was constructed between 1983 and 1988, which today serves as a location for indoor soccer matches, cultural events, community meetings, and other activities (Figure 5 10 ) . Funding for the structure was obtained via a chance meeting of two prominent community members (one a first generation resettler and one an early immigrant from Tilar á n) and the national Minister of Public Works and fiesta cív ica (civic festival) in the distant

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285 provided additional funding. Also constructed between 1986 and 1990 by the Community Development Association was a bullring, a quintessential fe ature of northern Costa Rican towns where rodeos ( corridas de toros ) take place in conjunction fiestas cívicas and fiestas patronales (patronage festivals) (Figure 5 11 ). Significant infrastructural expansion was carried out dur ing the presidential administration of Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier (1990 1994), who happened to be a longtime personal friend of the prominent first generation resettler mentioned above. During this period, the roads in the urban core were paved; a new settlement on the the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) in order to attract more people to the area; and a community hall ( salon comunal ) was constructed next to t he bullring. The hall is used today for dances and other activities associated with the biannual fiestas , public meetings of the Community Development Association, and private events such as weddings, birthdays, and other celebrations ( Figure 5 11 ). Impro ongoing community driven effort. In particular, the addition of a high school that would preclude students from having to travel an hour by bus to Tilarán was a major achievement. Via a petition to the national Ministry of Education, ICE had made an initial attempt at establishing an agro technical high school in 1980, for which classes were held in the existing elementary school building. This was a short lived attempt, however, only lasting until 1983, after which the community lacked a high school for over a decade. The second attempt occurred in 1997, this time taking the form of an

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286 experimental bilingual high school. Classes were held at the community hall for a number of years unt il a new building was constructed. Funding for the new building (Figure 5 12) was secured during the presidential administration of Miguel Angel Rodriguez (1998 2002), during which the same prominent first generation resettler mentioned above served as the presidential delegate for the county of Tilar á n. 7 In addition, outside of the urban core, Partridge (1983) noted the establishment of an elementary school by a group of farmers; to my knowledge, it is still in operation today. The outcome of these efforts is clear. While the first generation resettlers I surveyed and interviewed (n = 71 ) had only completed an average of 5.0 years of public school ing, second generation resettlers (n = 74 ) had completed an average of 8.5 years of public school ing and third g eneration resettlers (n = 15 ) had completed an average of 9.7 years of public school ing . Interestingly, second and third generation women also tended to have completed more years of schooling (9.4 and 11.0 years, respectively) than second and third gener ation men (7.6 and 9.1 years, respectively). Eight second and third generation women had also completed college in addition to their public schooling, while only two men had done so. This discrepancy is likely due to the opportunity for males to be hired as manual or farm laborers, which takes them out of school earlier. With regard to the overall trend of increasing levels of education, Mahapatra and Mahapatra (2002:437) noted the same pattern in resettlers displaced by they attribute to the increasing value placed on 7 delegates were appointed from almost 100 count ies throughout Costa Rica and served as the eyes and ears of each administration. This was a particularly important position in rural areas because it served to attract public funds to isolated communities (Murillo 2010).

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287 education in the face of new economic opportunities and a decrease in the natural resource base. The same explanation could arguably be applied to the Arenal case, particularly given the shift from land bas ed to service based livelihoods that was discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, and without undermining the importance of access to educational facilities to increases in the average level of education in Nuevo Arenal, it should also be noted that the increase in average years of schooling region as a whole in recent decades (World Bank 2012). The most recent set of major infrastructural improvements occurred duri ng the second presidential administration of Oscar Arias Sanchez (2006 2010), during which an active second generation resettler served as the second presidential delegate in the á n. During this period, impr ovements were made to the local and regional road infrastructure, a communal kitchen was added to the original community hall, and a second community hall was constructed at a lakeside park that ICE had turned over to the Community Development Association in the early 1990s. In 2008 2009, the Community Development Association financed the construction of new office buildings for itself and the local water utility ( Figure 5 13 ). Currently, in response to the growing number of dual employed households in the community, a new child care center is being built on the site of the former basketball Red Nacional de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil ). In this section, I have attempted to demonstrate the proc ess of community scale emplacement via transformations to the built environment in Nuevo Arenal. Relph

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288 powerful one in which each reinforces the identity of the other, and in which the landscape is very much an expression of communally held beliefs and values and of Arenale ños to emplace themselves on the man made landscape in ways that spoke to their communal needs and values can be seen as an important step toward regaining the group identity and sense of place that had been lost by resettlement. Developing an attachment to the new community, of course, began with a number of good planning de cisions on the part of the resettlement agency. But it also has extended over the course of the last three decades as resettlers have contributed their time and energy, and have leveraged their political connections, to create a built environment that fulf ills effort represents successful community reconstruction in the sense that it demonstrates se projects relationship of dependency between resettIers and the resettlement agency, thus agenc[y] to combination of state investment and local integration into the political economy of the nation, due in no small par t to the political astuteness of some of its residents. Ultimately, then, despite an arguably poor site selection, Arenaleños have successfully worked to create a functional community in the new location.

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289 Conclusions about Material Reconstruction Resett lement projects, particularly those that stem from elective activities like mega development projects, tend to treat homes, neighborhoods, and communities as interchangeable. Infrastructure destroyed by the development project is simply rebuilt elsewhere, assuming the relevant authorities are so inclined. What this perspective does not take into account, however, is that loss of place is more than just the loss of material goods. What is physically destroyed by resettlement may be material, but the material world is a product of social activity, reflects social relationships and group identities, and engenders affective responses in people. Its loss cannot be easily compensated for, and certainly not without careful and conscientious planning that creates a way of life. approach was one that attempted to take into account the social and psychological dime nsions of recreating life in a new place. At each of the scales discussed in this section home, neighborhood, and community ICE staff made a conscious effort to recreate, and in some cases improve upon, key features from the old community. This replication of the familiar, in addition to other good decisions, facilitated the importantly, the participation of the resettlers in resettlement planning at all scales was a key f eature of the Arenal project. As Oliver Smith (1991:20 21) argues, when cultural as well as material problems, in which the victim population participates in both planning and implementation, the cha nces for success are enhanced . . . . The capacity of a

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290 community to develop itself . . . can be engendered or enhanced by just such As this section demonstrates, developing a sense of place in Nuevo Arenal also involved a purposeful process of emplacement driven by the resettlers themselves. Arenale ñ bonds to the new community. the new settlement into a home that has sustained the community for over three decades. Marris (1974), Downing (1996), and Oliver Smith (2005b) also remind us that material reconstruction is about m ore than just developing an attachment to a physical place it is also about reconstituting the relationships and forms of interaction that that place makes possible. Thus from the household level to the community level, the process of emplacement also crea ted places that allowed resettlers to rebuilt their social landscape. This process fits neatly within the evolution predicted by the Scudder Colson four characterized in part by incre infrastructural improvements, and, perhaps more importantly, by the development of is marked by the transfer of manage ment responsibilities to the community itself and the incorporation of the community into the broader political economy. The process of place making in Nuevo Arenal clearly fits these criteria. Not only did Arenale ños continue to modify the community over time to suit their needs, but they did so largely

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291 without the assistance of the resettlement agency by seeking out resources at local, regional, and national levels. While the discussion to this point has focused primarily on the material aspects of emp lacement, it is clear that material reconstruction and social reconstitution after and shapes our social relations. . . . Material reconstruction can support . . . exp ress . . . Smith 2005b:51). In the following section, therefore, my focus will shift to social reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal, which was another important facet of emplacement in the new community. Becoming Nuevo Arenaleño: Social Reconstitution After Resettlement As emphasized throughout this chapter, forced displacement destroys the material and economic assets, but also disrup ts the forms of social interaction that give tears apart the existing social fabric. . . . Life sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self organized mutual service are disrupted. This calls social disarticula tion, creates or intensifies many of the impoverishment risks identified in the IRR model. Social re articulation is therefore critical to a resettled to successfully survive resett brings together, at the group level, many of the processes addressed individually [in the

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292 that social reconstitution cannot be engineered through the type of administrative planning that characterizes resettlement projects. Oliver Smith (2005b:55) reminds us conceived In many ways, the material aspect of the Arenal project that was the focus of the previous section met this cha llenge. Resettlers were provided with a built environment that was a suitable venue in which to begin their own process of emplacement and social re articulation. Through making the new community feel like home at various scales, resettlers began to regain the sense of place that was lost by resettlement. And here sense of place is strong . . . it has also proven to be a useful variable for building, political act i Wright and Storr 2009:617). At the same time, the community engagement that is made possible when an attachment to place is developed can catalyze new forms of cooperation, community development, and identity format ion, which are key features of post resettlement reconstruction. Manzo and Perkins (2006:337) contend I values are indeed informed by places they deem significant, then it fol bonds with those places will impa ct their engagement in such places, whether it be to main tain or improve them, respond to changes within them, or simply to stay in that place . Thus, place attachment, community development, and social reconstitution go hand in hand.

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293 The Scudder Colson four stage model makes a number of predictions about the and the reemergence of commun ity building and community affirming events such as religious activities and other celebrations. This occurs in tandem with the practice of place f the community into the broader political economy of the region or nation. This is marked by, among other things, the assumption of community management responsibilities by local actors or the relevant national authorities, and the development of sufficie nt political and institutional strength to community has regained the capacity to self manage, which is an important measure of successful social re articulation. Fo llowing these ideas, the current section reviews the process of social reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal. I begin with a discussion of the ways in which Arenale ñ os were able to preserve and strengthen their group identity in the face of relocation. I then rev iew the growth of local voluntary associations and popular participation as a measure of resettler self sufficiency in managing the affairs of the new community. This is followed by a discussion of the reemergence of community activities that serve to affi rm and strengthen group identity. The section concludes with a discussion of the role of memory in social re articulation. Identity and Social Reconstitution That displacement and resettlement causes a crisis of identity has been widely documented (cf. Cha mlee Wright and Storr 2009, Hirschon 2000, Wolde Selassie

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294 patterns of livelihoods, social networks, leadership structures, traditions, histories, and geographies. This, in t urn, demands a reinterpretation of the basic constructs that make up routine culture, causing disorientation and high levels of stress among resettlers (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010). Two key factors that challenge group identity emerge repeatedly in c ase studies of resettlement. First, kin groups and other social networks are often fragmented when communities are not resettled together or all at the same time. This means that the cultural resources of the community are not available to aid in social re constitution at a Smith 2005b). Second, resettlement frequently thrusts resettlers (who themselves may originate from different locations) into the midst of host populations with whom they have little in comm on and who may not welcome their presence. Cohabitation with unfamiliar host populations threatens group identity through the loss of customary behaviors and traditions, and can cause conflict due to inter group tensions and increased competition for resou rces (cf. Hirschon 2000, Jing 1999, Mahapatra and Mahapatra 2000, Wolde Selassie Abutte 2000). The Arenal case is an exception to both resettlement planning problems. With regard to community integrity, the entire population was resettled into the same lo cation at essentially the same time (resettlers moved into their houses as they were completed over the course of a few months). As discussed previously, Arenale ñ os were also able to maintain kinship and social networks by choosing where in the new communi ty they would live. Preserving the integrity of the community as a whole and of its more localized sub networks undoubtedly aided in the process of social re articulation. When

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295 asked about relationships between community members today, a second generation resettler said, H ay muy pocos problemas entre vecinos, la gente del pueblo. E s que venimos del mismo lado, toda la vida de allá para acá. a ll o f our lives from there to here.] Kinship data collected via my livelihood survey supports the assertion that familial networks in particular have remained strong. Of 263 survey respondents, 198 (75%) reported kinship ties to at least one other househol d in the community. The specific breakdown is as follows (in all cases, reported kin did not live in the same household as the respondent): 131 (50%) reported one or more cousins 130 (49%) reported one or more siblings 91 (35%) reported one or more aunt s or uncles 76 (29%) reported one or more parents 72 (27%) reported one or more children 71 (27%) reported one or more nieces or nephews 31 (12%) reported one or more grandparents 26 (10%) reported one or more grandchildren or great grandchildren In addition to preserving local social networks, extra local networks were also maintained to a certain extent by the fact that the resettlement site was only 11 kilometers away from the original community. Host po pulation conflicts were also not an issue fo r a variety of reasons, namely because the land purchased for resettlement was originally part of a large cattle ranch and was thus uninhabited. The nearest population cluster, Mata de Ca ña, began approximately two kilometers from the urban core of Nuevo A renal and consisted of a few families dispersed on small farms along the northern ridge of the basin. Additionally, the resettler were ethnically and culturally similar to these nearby populations, most having originated from the Central Valley within a ge neration or two prior to

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296 resettlement. They were also in close contact with each other even prior to resettlement, as farmers from Mata de Caña were commercially and socially integrated with residents of V iejo Arenal. Finally, as opposed to other cases of resettlement in which resettlers pose a threat to limited resources, residents of Mata de Caña actually welcomed the resettlement project as it brought modern public services, schools, and commercial activity closer to their community. In fact, almost imme diately upon resettlement, residents of Mata de Caña began to take up residence in Nuevo Arenal and today the families are highly integrated through marriage, friendship, and business relationships. In a sense, the lack of conflict with the host population allowed for the emergence of a mutual identity over time, and today it is difficult to tell where one community ends and the next begins even on the landscape. In terms of both community integrity and host relationships, then, the Arenal case demonstrates the importance of these issues to the preservation of group identity after resettlement. That Arenal is an exception with regard to these issues, however, is not to say that Arenale ñ o identity was not at all challenged by resettlement. As discussed in the hub of the basin, and necessitated a reinvention of livelihood strategies. Th ese changes demanded the revision of how Arenale ños perceived themselves, their community, and its role in the broader regional context. This process of adjustment occurred slowly as they acclimated to life after resettlement and became emplaced in the new environment. At the same time as some aspects of Arenale ño identity were being challenged , however, resettlement created another, perhaps unexpected, outcome. In some senses,

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297 the crisis posed by resettlement actually solidified, rather than undermined, A renale ño group identity. As discussed in Chapter 3, the difficult years immediately after resettlement were marked by a significant level of emigration. In addition to affecting morale in the community, the population loss also challenged the integrity of social and kinship networks. To this day, one of the first topics of conversation that arises with regard to the experience of resettlement is the number of people who abandoned their homes and properties and left the community. Rather than becoming a sour ce of disempowerment, however, the effect of this outflow of residents was that those who remained in spite of the difficulties began to see themselves as survivors. As one first generation resettler put it, En ese tiempo mucha cosa no servía, no había tr abajo, mucha gente se fue. Quedamos los valientes . Another informant echoed this sentiment during a group interview of first generation reset tlers, emphasizing the role that Arenale ñ community : Nosotros pasamos par a acá algo durísimo . . . . Porque llegamos aquí y solo tierra de los tractores, de las construcciones. En ese tiempo llegamos aquí y no conseguíamos aquí, no había naranja, no conseguíamos un tomate, aquí no conseguíamos una botella de leche en ese tiempo . . . . Y o pienso que ahora es mejor todavía. Porque cuando nosotros llegamos en ese tiempo si era difícil el trabajo. Mas bien aquí se llego a pensar, se llego a decir que esto era un pueblo fantasma. Esto no iba a crecer, esto no iba a progresar. Y dichosamente porque Arenaleños son de buenas costumbres, hoy por hoy Arenal es otra cosa. S í, han salido avances por el esfuerzo de todos, porque cada uno de nosotros que estamos aquí [en esta reunión ] hemos puesto un poquito de esfuerzo para las bienes de la comunidad. Y hoy por hoy lo sentimos contentos de estar en Arenal . . . . Y hoy por hoy si podemos cantar victoria porque yo pienso que ya se pasó lo peor. Uno como Arenaleño, mis hijos nacieron todos en Arenal, se criaron en Arenal , y viven en Arenal. Y por eso es muy difícil de olvidarse uno de este pueblo.

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298 We went through difficult times when we moved here. . . . Because we got here and it was just dirt from the tractors, from the buildings. At that time, first got here, work was d ifficult. Rather, here we came to think of it, and to to progress. And thankfully because Arenale ñ os are good people, today Arenal is completely different. We have advanced becau se of the efforts of everyone, because every one of us here today [ at this meeting ] has put forth a little effort for the good of the community. And today we are happy to passed. As an Arenale ñ o, my children were born in Arenal, they were this town. As these comments indicate, the difficult process of emplacing themselves in the new community in effect became the basis for a new group identity. This strength of identity proved useful in galvanizing many aspects of community recovery in the years after resettlement. Before moving on to a discussion of other facets of social reconstitution, it would be rem iss to ignore the effects of residential tourism on Arenale ño identity. Community identity is not static; it can and should evolve over time in response to new inputs, and Nuevo Arenal is no exception. Increased integration with the global tourism economy has caused a reappraisal of some aspects of local identity that is arguably almost as significant as that caused by resettlement. Despite the changes in livelihood strategies necessitated by resettlement, both Viejo Arenal and Nuevo Arenal were rural commu nities rooted in an agricultural lifestyle; this identity was expressed both materially (e.g., land use patterns, modes of transportation, clothing choices) and symbolically (e.g., notions of campesino ness (hard work, love of the land, humility), celebrat ions of ranching culture). As discussed in Chapter 4, however, the advent of residential tourism in the mid 1990s transformed the

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299 local economy through an infusion of money from land sales and by creating opportunities for service based employment, includi ng construction work, domestic labor, and jobs in the hospitality sector. This transformation was compounded by other simultaneous effects of globalization, such as increased communications and transportation infrastructure, population movements, and inter national trade, which exposed the community to an even broader set of influences. Today, while many of the public expressions of local identity reflect the detail below), Nu Arenale ñ preserving its agricultural lifestyle; symbolic of this shift is the fact that young people are embarrassed to we ar the rubber boots of their campesino forefathers in public, preferring instead the latest fashions from San Jos é . The visibly higher standard of living of the residential tourist population has highlighted economic disparities in the community, leading t o increased levels of crime, aimed at foreigners and locals alike. Cultural and behavioral differences have also created an environment of uneasy, though not outwardly contentious, coexistence, in which Arenale ños accept the presence of foreigners (and the (necessary evil) but are also concerned about some of the less desirable effects of residential tourism. 8 For example, a common theme during my interviews is that Arenale ñ os attribute increased drug use and p rostitution in the community to the 8 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Arenaleños and residential tourists, see Matarrita Cascante and Stocks 2013.

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300 presence of foreigners. While this accusation is perhaps unfair given that these seem to be effects of globalization in many locations in Costa Rica and beyond, Arenale ñ os strongly associate the breakdown in traditional norms of behavior with the arrival of the foreign population. Thus, in some ways, it seems that the current multi cultural nature of the community is challenging some long standing aspects of Arenale ñ o identity. One first generation resettler characterized the recent transformation in these terms, Yo digo que en Arenal hay millonarios sin millones y ganaderos sin ganado. millionaires without millions and cattlem en without cattle.] Arenale ñ os are currently in the process of negotiating this transition, holding on to some elements of the old identity while making room for new forms of self perception. That being said, the fact that Arenale ñ os have been able to ada pt to the changing community dynamic by exhibiting the type of resilience one hopes will emerge in cases of forced resettlement is itself a sign of successful social reconstitution. It is also an illustration of the multi dimensional nature of identity. Wh ile changes in the social and economic structure of the community have led to transformations in some aspects of Arenale ño identity (e.g., from campesinos to service sector workers), the group identity that has formed the basis of the community since reset tlement has largely remained intact. Ultimately, despite the discomfort generated by the significant changes the community has undergone in recent years, Arena leñ os continue to feel attached to the place they have created. As a second generation resettler who was a small child at the time of resettlement expressed: Toda esa vieja generación de [Viejo] Arenal tiene la mentalidad de que somos diferentes a toda la zona, y cuando usted ve esa nueva generación .

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301 . . están en lo mismo. Por ejemplo , ellos tienen c omo tres años de organizar el tope, les toca a ellos. Entonces ellos venden el nombre de la E s que Y S Entonces esa e s la parte que es como una nueva generación que lo ve diferente pero en el fondo es igual, nada más que nosotros venimos de allá [Viejo Arenal] y ellos valoran el pueblo por todo lo que es ahora. The older generation from [Viejo] Arenal has the mentality that we are different from the whole area, and when you see this new generation . . . they are the same way. For example, they have organized the tope for the wherever they go a á Just that we come from there [Viejo Arenal] a nd they value the town for all that it is today. In other words, to be Arenale ñ o means something to the residents of the community. Importantly, this strong group identity has been both the driver and the outcome of other facets of social reconstitution, including the emergence of community organizations, discussed next. Voluntary Associations and Social Reconstitution In analyzing social reconstitution in the Beles Valley agricultural resettlement 1980s drought and famine, Wol de Selassie Abutte (2000:430) argues that P roviding the conditions necessary to facilitate rather than institutions is vital in the social re articulation of a disrupted com In the Beles Valley project, resettlers were recruited with false promises; resettled into distant areas with unfamiliar and unwelcoming host populations; and forced into a collectivized agricultural production system that undermined former social networks, hindered the development of self

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302 decision making entities. Social re articulation under this scenario, though eventually successful, took almost a decade. The Arenal project stands in stark contrast to this and other examples of ineptitude in resettlement planning. According to ICE publications, encouraging before resettlement. For example, as disc ussed in Chapter 3, rather than attempt to squelch the defense committee that formed in Viejo Arenal once the resettlement project became a reality, ICE staff interacted directly with the committee to negotiate the early terms of resettlement. Though ICE e ventually chose to negotiate the final terms formed local authority structure was symbolic of its support of local self reliance. Furthermore, during the construction of the new communities, ICE staff encouraged the development of local associations that could respond to the needs of the new community. To promote the emergence of these groups, ICE organized various activities, some held at the site of the new community as it was under construction, around the themes of community development and leadership (ICE 1978). As noted previously, these efforts were met with some success. Soon after resettlement, groups emerged that focused on the school, church, and community mainte nance and aesthetics. In addition, committees were formed to organize the development of sporting activities and agricultural efforts. While many of these groups dissolved after accomplishing their immediate goals, the idea of local organizing for the purp ose of community management remained.

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303 In the years since Nuevo Arenal was founded, the number of voluntary associations has steadily increased. In 1980, three years after resettlement, Obando (1981) recorded the existence of four organizations: the Commun ity Development Association ( Asociación de Desarrollo Integra l ), a health committee ( Comité de Salud ), a religious charity committee ( Comité de Caritas ( Asociación de Mujeres de Nuevo Arenal up v isit for the Inter American Development Bank, he recorded the addition of sports, Catholic church, and school committees. He also noted a high degree of participation in these groups, particularly in the school committee (Partridge 1983). Over time, even m ore associations have been created (and some disbanded); their number and diversity is impressive. During my fieldwork, survey participants (n = 263) reported membership in a ory. In addition to local organizations, survey participants also reported membership in seven political economic context and the strengthening of its ability to advocat e for the (49%) reported participating in at least one organization while 67 respondents (25%) reported participating in more than one organization. A list of organizatio ns and the level of participation can be found in Table 5 1. Here, I will highlight four of the most important organizations with regard to community development and social re articulation. Community Development Association ( Asociación de Desarrollo Integ ral ) One of the most important local organizations in terms of community management and development is the Community Development Association ( Asociación

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304 de Desarrollo Integral or ADI). As noted in Chapter 3, the Nuevo Arenal ADI is one of more than 3,000 ADIs that exist throughout Costa Rica. These groups, which began in were created to serve as a bridge between the state and local civil society (Mondol Vel á squez 2010). Their purpose has been to promote community development at the (Mondol Vel á squez 2009). The ADIs are thus highly integrated into the Costa Rican political economy, as they receive both funding and other types of development assistance from the state. The institutional mechanism for this support is the National Community Development Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Desarrollo de la Comunidad or DINADECO ), established in 19 67. The decentralized development model reflected by the ADIs has been particularly important in rural areas of Costa Rica, which have absorbed the population outflow from the Central Valley but are typically outside of has taken on increasing responsibility for community management and today is the principal governing body at the local level. As ICE slowly removed itself from community ma nagement responsibilities in the years after resettlement, it turned these tasks over to the ADI. Examples include the management of local water provision, the allocation of properties that were reserved for future generations after resettlement, and the o ngoing maintenance of local public infrastructure and green spaces. Many of the infrastructural improvements in the community that were discussed earlier in this chapter were initiated or facilitated through the ADI, including the gymnasium, bullring, comm unity hall, and

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305 community kitchen. In addition to receiving financing from the state for these projects, fiestas cívicas . Public elections for the board of directors take place every two years, d uring which candidates run on a group ticket. The board meets at least monthly, while public meetings in which projects are discussed and the budget is reviewed are required by law to take place on an annual basis. Because of its highly visible role, its and its control over the use and maintenance of public infrastructure, the ADI is also one of the most controversial groups in the community. Resentment toward the group is exacerbated by the fact that its leadership p ositions, particularly the presidency and vice presidency, tend to be passed around among the most well off and vocal members of the community who may have different priorities than less prosperous community members or who allegedly use their elected posit ion to their personal advantage. Arenale ñ os who are outside of this in crowd characterize the governing group as an argolla ongoing ill will between the sports committee a nd the ADI leadership over the use of the central plaza. The ADI leadership (many of whom are cattle ranchers) are accused of blocking access to the plaza for sporting events because they want to preserve its grass for topes . Another common complaint is th at the group (regardless of who is on the board of directors) is corrupt and that money raised during the fiestas , for example, On one hand, these accusations are quite serious and have the potential to undermine important community development efforts or negatively affect Arenale ñ

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306 interest in public participation. On the other hand, communities everywhere are characterized by heterogeneity and even conflict (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). In this sense, so me degree of discord is a positive indicator of social reconstitution. As Oliver Smith (2005b:61) points out in his study of social reconstitution in Yungay, Peru after it c ould attend to individual interests again, and the interplay of consensus and contention applicable to Nuevo Arenal as well. Outside of these issues, however, what is perh aps most relevant to post resettlement reconstruction is that the ADI has gained strength accessing resources for the purpose of community development. As such, it is an impor tant marker both of local self broader national context. Administrative Association of Rural Aqueducts ( Asociación Administradora de Acueductos Rurales ) Another significant outlet for popular particip ation has been the various iterations of the water utility in Nuevo Arenal. At the time of resettlement, ICE built and managed community, however, this responsibility was t urned over to the ADI, which formed a sub committee ( Comit é de Agua ) to deal with the administration and maintenance of the water system. Proceeds from water provision was collected and managed by the ADI. In the early 2000s, however, this system became p roblematic as the ADI was, by local accounts, mismanaging the funds and not using the earnings to satisfactorily maintain the water system. Water quality issues arose and national governmental

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307 entities became involved, including the Ministry of Health and the Aqueducts and Sewage Institute ( Instituto de Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados or AyA). At that point, it was decided that the water provision system would be better managed by an A sociación Administradora de Acueductos Rurales (ASADA). The se locally run organization s, regulated by national law, provide water in many rural areas of Costa Rica that are outside the reach of the centralized AyA system. The Nuevo Arenal ASADA has two paid employees (a maintenance man and an administrative assist ant) and is governed by a volunteer committee. It currently provides water to over 900 households, some of which are located outside the original resettlement area. I include the ASADA as an example of social reconstitution for two reasons. First, the transfer of responsibilities from ICE to a local entity (the ADI) for the management of w ater provision arose, it was not ICE that stepped in to resolve the issue but rather the corresponding national authorities. These steps are important markers of the achievement of the final stage of the Scudder Colson model, providing additional evidence of successful post resettlement reconstruction. School and church committees While much of the day to day management of community affairs takes place through the organizations discussed above, much of the organization of social affairs takes place via the public school and Catholic church. These physical places and the relationships they entail are important to the social life of the community and form a key provide a regular temporal framework under which community activities are carried out,

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308 while the places themselves provide the venue for social engagement and are visible the behavior expected . . . who does (Rapoport 1982 :80 81). As discussed previously, the importance of these locations to community life is demonstrated by their physical centrality in the community layout. The high level of public participation in the school committee that Partridge noted in his 1983 visit t o Nuevo Arenal has remained consistent in the decades since. In fact, when all of the various school committees and groups are aggregated, the level of participation is significantly higher that of any other local group. Of the 263 participants in my livel ihood survey, 49 (19%) reported having participated in at least one school committee at some time. This relatively high level of participation has two explanations. First, as a society, Costa Ricans place a high value on education. Upon the abolition of th e Costa Rican army in 1948, state resources were redirected into the educational and health care systems. Today, state and local authorities continue to invest significant public resources in maintaining the quality of its infrastructure and instruction. A strong public education system has therefore become a keystone of national identity, and as such engenders significant popular support throughout the country. Second, most adults in Nuevo Arenal have children, and these parents tend to become involved dur ing the years their children are in school. Membership in school committees is therefore one of the most accessible, and perhaps expected, forms of public participation. As previously mentioned, the committees are also an important site of social interacti on in the community, as the members work together to carry out activities throughout the year, fiestas c í vicas and fiestas patronales, developing strategies for the maintenan ce and

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309 improvement of school infrastructure, planning celebrations for graduation and other milestone occasions, and coordinating classroom activities. Religious activities represent the second most popular form of participation in the community. Nuev o Arenal has three churches, all of which are well attended. Two are original to the resettlement project the Catholic church on the central plaza and the Evangelical church two blocks from the plaza. The third is a Christian church located approximately t wo kilometers from the urban core on the highway to Tilar á n. Founded by a small group of American expatriates in the late 2000s, the Christian church holds weekly services in English and Spanish and hosts volunteer missionary groups. Of the 260 participant s in my livelihood survey, 38 (14%) reported involvement in at least one church related group. The vast majority of these (35 people) reported participation in the Catholic church committee, which is to be expected given the dominant role the Church plays in the predominantly Catholic Costa Rican society. Much like the school committees, participation in these religious committees provides a source of social interaction with like minded people. Unlike the school activities, which draw support and participat through the church committees tend to be limited to church goers and are thus less publicly visible. As demonstrated by these examples, voluntary associations in Nuevo Arenal pla y both functional and symbolic roles. At a functional level, they are mechanisms through which community management and its further development occurs. At a symbolic level, these organizations represent the rebuilding of capacity to self manage, the elimin ation of dependency on the resettlement agency, and, perhaps most

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310 importantly, the reconstitution of the social relationships that make life meaningful. These relationships are also rebuilt and expressed through activities that build and affirm a sense of community, discussed next. Rituals and Social Reconstitution In thinking about the relationship between ritual and social reconstitution, informative. Cohen (1985:50) confirms and strengthens social identity and pe the boundaries of a commun the community as a whole vis à vis as mediated by Involuntary displacement disrupts the symbolic expressions of community by boundaries is therefore important to social reconstitution after rese ttlement, as the resettlers begin to rebuild and reaffirm their group identity in the new location. This process is critical to being able to answer the basic questions that make up routine rcia Downing 2010: 228 ). One way in which boundaries are reasserted and community is recovered is through the reenactment of rituals, such as the celebration of secular and sacred holidays ( Oliver Smith 2005b). Boundary making can also take place through ev ents like fairs and fiestas, which demarcate the host community in relation to other communities (Cohen 1985).

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311 Rituals can also aid in the development a sense of place among resettled communities. As Relph (1976:32 uch ritual and custom and myth has the incidental if not deliberate effect of strengthening attachment to place by reaffirming not only the sanctity and unchanging significance of it, but also the enduring relationships between a people and their place. namese ethnic enclave of Little Saigon in Westminster, California, Mazumdar et al. (2000:327) noted that ritual events such as the Tet festival, which marks the beginning of the lunar calendar, allow to share and express their In Nuevo Arenal, the first significant symbolic expression of community recovery through ritual was the first Sunday Mass held in the new community. Notably, this Mass was carried out six month s prior to resettlement, while the church and homes were still under construction. The event was conceived and organized by the resettlers a sense of community ownersh ip through the activities described previously. The enactment of this important ritual served multiple purposes. By carrying out an event in the new church that would have occurred in the old church, resettlers were able to establish continuity between the old and new communities. This ritual recreated an the spatial temporal order that regulates social relationships (Downing 1996) in the new location. Additionally, the choice to hold the Mass as early as possible in the new community helped begin the psycho socio process of identity building in the new location and legitimized the new location as the site of key community affirming activities.

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312 Another ritual that was uninterrupted by resettlement was the celebration of th of each year. As in Viejo Arenal, the schools. A student marching band practices for the weeks leading up to the event, blanketing the urban core in the cacophony of drums. The day itself is celebrated with a parade around the central plaza, in which students carry Costa Rican flags to the beat of the marching band while adults line the sidewalks to cheer the m on (Figure 5 14 ) . The annual celebration of this event, even during the difficult years after resettlement, membership in broader Costa Rican society. An important ritual t hat was, in fact, interrupted by resettlement was the fiestas c í vicas . F iestas c í vicas are a significant socio cultural event in many Costa Rican communities, and the ability to host successful (i.e., well organized and well attended) fi estas is a point of pride and a way of measuring a fiestas , which were the largest in the valley and drew attendees from far outside the region. Upon resettlement, the fiest as were suspended for almost a decade, until the festival was regained. Interestingly, Viejo Arenal did not have a permanent bullring and instead erected a temporary struc ture in the central plaza each year. According to one informant, this was not an option in Nuevo Arenal due to the dire economic situation in made it difficult to attract fiestas civicas

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313 act of hosting the fiestas did exactly what Cohen asserts it marked the community as a group in relation to other groups. The fiestas which Arenale ñ os could publicly demonstrate their new group identity and the coherence of the new community. Today, the fiestas cí vicas in Nuevo Arenal are elaborate public celebrations. I ncidentally, they are also the ADIs largest fundraiser and make a significant contribution to the local economy by attracting out of town attendees. The fiestas typically take place over the course of a three day weekend in April or May and consist of a nu mber of connected events. They begin with a carnival and two nights of bull riding ( corrida s de toros ) and other rodeo entertainment, which take place in the bullring complex (Figure 5 15). The bulls for this event are contributed by the most prominent cat tle ranching family in Nuevo Arenal, which also provides bulls for fiestas throughout the country; the corridas are an opportunity for them to publicly display their breeding skills. The festivities continue into the night at a dance party held in the comm unity hall next door. Also on the first day of the fiestas , a mini tope is organized as a fundraiser for the preschool, in which the children ride stick horses from the school to the community hall, where the boy and girl with the most sponsors are crowned (Figure 5 16). On Sunday, the festivities culminate with a well attended tope . Participants consist of local riders and their personal invitees from communities where Arenale ñ os have personal or professional relationships. On the da y of the tope , the horses and their riders first gather in the central plaza, which is lined with tents displaying the logos of businesses who have sponsored the event (Figure 5 7 and

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314 Object 5 1). The streets surrounding the plaza fill with food stands and people, while music blares from nearby speakers. As much as spectators enjoy watching the horses and their riders, they also enjoy the social aspect of the event and begin to mill about the streets hours before the parade begins. As the horses leave the p laza and enter the street, each rider is introduced by an emcee. The riders command their horses to prance and perform tricks for the crowd, much to their delight (Figure 5 17 and Object 5 2). Other elements of the parade include a presentation of the pres chool royalty, marching bands, dance troupes, and VIP invitees (for example, in 2010 the special guest was Rodrigo Arias, the brother of then president Oscar Arias). All in all, the fiestas are relatively extravagant occasions that allow Arenale ños to affi rm their group identity and d isplay their community spirit to their out of town guests. While formal rituals like the ones just discussed are essential to affirming and strengthening community identity, particularly after the trauma of involuntary resett lement, informal customs can also be just as important. Two examples from Nuevo Arenal illustrate this idea. As discussed previously, one facet of individual and group identity in both Viejo and Nuevo Arenal is the strong tie residents feel to the ranching culture of northwestern Costa Rica. One way of publicly expressing this identity is through ca balgatas (cavalcades), which are somewhat spontaneous gatherings of local cowboys for the purpose of parading through town. These events sometimes occur for ente rtainment value, but usually are organized in the name of a particular cause. For example, the opening paragraph of this dissertation describes a cabalgata that was organized as a fundraiser for a friend who had suffered a serious accident. These informal events are symbolic of community re articulation on two levels.

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315 Smith 2005b:56) creates continuity with the past while simultaneously affirming contemporary group i dentity. In effect, the past and the present merge onto the same timeline, undisrupted by resettlement. Second, the public display of solidarity demonstrated by the fundraising cabalgatas willingness to take care of i ts own members in times of need. This idea also applies to the second example. When a disaster strikes a particular household in Nuevo Arenal, such as a death, house fire, or serious illness, it is customary for a self appointed group of community members to solicit donations from other households to assist the affected family. This informal system of social support is critical to households of low socio economic status who may not otherwise be able to recover after the incident. Again, this show of solidar ity symbolizes the social capital and sense of community and that Arenale ño s have rebuilt in the new location. Ultimately, Arenale ñ important expressions of social reconstitution after resettle ment. By continuing to carry out some of the rituals without interruption, such as Sunday Mass and the independence day celebration, a degree of continuity between the old and new communities was maintained. The later revival of the most important public d isplay of community identity, the fiestas c í vicas , not only allowed Arenaleños to connect their past with their present but also allowed them to demonstrate to themselves and to ime, the adaptation of these rituals to the new location helped the resettlers begin to develop a

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316 sense of community and a sense of place in the new town, thereby furthering the process of emplacement. Memory and Social Reconstitution As discussed in the previous section, the reestablishment of community rituals was an important aspect of social reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal. Rituals are powerful in part because of the sense of continuity they embody, which allows resettlers, in the midst of the challengi ng process of emplacement, to preserve their group identity and the structures of purpose that make life meaningful. Another common method of preserving connections to the past is through the evocation of memories of the old community. If, as scholars of p lace attachment suggest, identity is rooted in personal and collective place based histories, preserving those histories becomes important to recovery when communities experience totalizing losses like those that occur during involuntary displacement. Rit uals like the ones described above are themselves a form of memory preservation, but memories can take many other shapes. For example, physical mementos of the old community often make their way into new resettlement sites. In their study of environmental resettlement in Inner Mongolia, Rogers and Wang (2005) noted that families transported iron and wooden gates from their former homes to the new resettlement village in order to sustain a connection with their past. In addition, public memorials of resettle ment have been used to inscribe past events what Jing onto the contemporary landscape, serving as resettlement of Dachuan, China, where memorial t exts placed on newly erected temples -

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317 resettlement that emerged from these efforts re inforced the process of community recovery long after resettlement. Other expressions of social memory including oral and written histories, storytelling, shared discourse, and ritual commemoration of the old place, are also important means of helping peop the process of social reconstitution (Cole 1998:610). I present these examples not necessarily because they all apply to social recon stitution in Nuevo Arenal, but because they provide an impressive illustration of the diversity of ways in which resettled communities employ memory to cope with loss and recovery. I also present them as a point of contrast with the Arenal case, because wh at is perhaps most striking about Nuevo Arenal today is the almost total absence of Catholic church, which was painted in 2009 on the side of a public social hall at the (Figure 5 18), there exist no other visible reminders of the old community. This includes the construction materials resettlers took from their houses in Viejo Arenal before they were demolished, which have long since been replace d. In early 2008, before I began field work, the community celebrated the 30 th anniversary of its founding. To my knowledge, since that event there have been no other activities that have marked the departure from the old community, nor the arrival in the new one. When I asked a prominent second generation resettler why he thought No hay nada que conmemorar sobre la reubicación .

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318 newcomer to Nuevo Arenal could learn very little, if anything, about its history from surveying the built environment or even through participating in public events. The lack of explicit mechanisms for collective recollection in Nuevo Arenal, however, does not mean th identity. It simply means that the ways in which memory is transmitted are more subtle, taking place through daily practice versus conscious ritual. During my life history interviews, I asked participants how the memory of the old community is kept alive in the absence of material reminders. The responses of younger Arenale ños were of particular interest . Very few younger participants could recall instances of their parents or grandpar ents sharing memories of Viejo Arenal directly with them. Rather, they said, reminiscing takes place between older Arenale ñ os in the presence of, but not directly with, younger people. By being privy to these passively absorbed by younger generations, and they actually know more about Viejo Arenal than they might realize. The effectiveness of this method was accidentally demonstrated to me by one of my young field assistants (the step daughter of a first gener ation resettler) who, during the course of our survey administration, could tell me with remarkable accuracy which families in Nuevo Arenal had originated in Viejo Arenal and which had not. In other words, she was intimately familiar with the social landsc ape of the community, despite the lack of direct instruction. On the other hand, this knowledge did not seem to translate into affective ties to Viejo Arenal among those who had not experienced life there first hand. W ith the exception of two second gener ation resettlers in their early 20s, all participants who had

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319 been born after resettlement stated that they felt no connection at all to the old community and no sense of nostalgia for it. They could recount some aspects of life in Viejo Arenal (e.g., high agricultural productivity, recreational activities, the absence of public services like sewers and electricity, etc.) but they did so matter of factly, rather than with a sense of having lost something that was personally important to them. Interestingly, Dachuan, where nostalgia not only was transmitted to younger generations via oral histories but also fueled their own sense of having been wronged by resettlement despite the fact that the y had been born afterward. In the few instances that younger interview participants recalled that memories of Viejo Arenal were explicitly shared with them by older generations, the memories seemed to be employed for the purpose of moral teachings rather than for the transmission of historical information. For example, the twelve year old son of a second generation resettler wandered into our interview as it was concluding and recalled that his father told stories of life in Viejo Arenal to teach him about the importance of a good work ethic: a ellos les encantaba ir a la escuela porque cuando no estaban en l a escuela, estaban trabajando, porque dice él que ya uno, como a la edad mía a los doce años, ya tenía que ayudar a la familia. Obviamente que era diferente porque aquí uno se la tira de vagazo, y en ese tiempo ellos no se podía dar ese lujo, porque tenían que trabajar mucho. Mi papá trabajo mucho toda la vida, bueno por lo menos eso dice él [laughs]. that th were working, because he said that at my age, at 12 years old, they had to help the family. Obviously it was different because here you can be lazy,

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320 luxury, because they had to work a Similarly, another second generation resettler recalled that her mother shared stories about Viejo Arenal to remind her children to be tha nkful for what they have: Ella dice ahora uno aquí vive como un rey porque tiene todo. En aquel momento ellos no tenían, y tenían que ver cómo se la jugaba, que eran con luces y focos o candelas. Y ahora uno tiene su luz, tiene su tele, tiene su DVD, tie ne su radio, tiene lo que sea y allá no. Como dice ella, ustedes no se maltratan, ustedes no saben lo que es en realidad difícil y si la vemos difícil así con todo ahora, si no tuviéramos? Más que todo son las cosas que nosotros nos ponemos a hablar con el la y ella a veces que se pone a regañarnos porque nos dice es que ustedes vean que fácil que tienen todo y uno tenía que matarse. Pero si eso es lo más que hemos hablado sobre eso, del pueblo no mucho la verdad. She says here one lives like a king because they have everything. Back lights and flashlights and candles. And now we have light, we have television, we have DVD players, we have radios, we have whatever, but there they did everything we have? More than anything, those are the sorts of things that we talk about with her, and sometimes sh e scolds us because she says we about, in reality not much about the town itself. As both of these examples demonstrate, contrasting the difficulty of life in the old community wi th the ease of life in Nuevo Arenal was a means of communicating a particular value system. Thus, while the intention was not necessarily a history lesson, these memories did serve to maintain a certain continuity in terms of social norms and values. Befor e concluding this section, two other forms of memory preservation in Nuevo Arenal deserve brief mention. The first is a Facebook page established by the Community Development Association (ADI), where old photographs of Viejo Arenal are posted. These photos largely come from the personal collections of Arenale ñ os, but I

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321 was also able to contribute a significant number of photos from the ICE archives that I accessed during my visits to the headquarters in San José. While this is a relatively passive form of m emory sharing, the photos are immensely popular and generate considerable nostalgia each time a new one is posted. The second form is the occasional public screening of the three part documentary the Ministry of Culture made about the resettlement process. According to the younger Arenale ñ os I interviewed, the film has been shown to schoolchildren, though I am not sure with what frequency. In addition, a public viewing in the gymnasium was organized during the summer of 2006, just before I visited the commu nity for the first time. When the topic of memory arose during my interviews, participants almost invariably asked whether I had seen the film and were pleased that such a record of the old community existed. While the use of memory to aid in social recon stitution in Nuevo Arenal may not be as dramatic as in other cases of forced displacement, memory nevertheless plays an history that forms the basis for their understandi ng of who they are. Arenale ñ in Viejo Arenal is a key theme both in public conversation and in individual memory, particularly among those who lived there, even as young children. That Viejo Arenal cial landscape is confirmed by the act of painting a mural of the old church more than 30 years after resettlement to, as a second tener un recuerdo . . . que la gente se identifique como era Arenal Viejo . . so that people can see what Viejo Arenal was like.] This and other subtle reminders perhaps help Arenale ñ os remember who they are despite the significant changes the community has undergone.

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322 Conclusions about Social Reconstitution Oliver Smith (2005b: social reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal confirms this assertion in the sense that recovery began as a result of independent resettlement community, in which Arenale ñ os were resettled as a group, at the same time, and in familiar sub networks, maintained community integrity at various scales and reduced th emergence of voluntary associations to address local needs was an important aspect of resettlers assuming the management of their own community and lowering their dependency on the resettlem ent agency. Local self reliance was furthered by the extraction from the management responsibilities of the executed construction schedule allowed for the coexistence of the communities for some time, which helped resettlers gradually transition between communities and begin to rebuild elements of their social geometry in the new location (e.g., through rituals like Sunday Mass) even before resettlement. In the Arenal case, then, resettle ment planning seems to have facilitated, rather than impeded, social reconstitution. Much like the process of material reconstruction, the agency of the resettlers themselves was also an important aspect of social reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal. Through p articipation in voluntary associations, the reestablishment of formal and informal rituals, and creating continuity via memory, Arenale ños have reconstituted their social geometry, reestablished the boundaries of their community, and affirmed their group i dentity. In sum, they have recovered the features of life that were meaningful to

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323 them as a group and as individuals. An early immigrant to the community perhaps characterized the success of social reconstitution best when he told me: Todo se ha ido acomo dando y no ha sido porque nos han regalado, ha sido porque se ha luchado y ha habido muy buenos lideres aquí. Bien que mal, la unión hace la fuerza y eso es lo que tenemos aquí. given to us, it has been because we have fought for it and we have had good leaders. One way or another, unity creates strength and that is what we have here. social reconstruct ion discussed by Oliver this person referred is the series of infrastructural improvements that Arenale ñ os have been able to achieve for their community, many of which also enabled the restoration of other elemen ts of community life (e.g., the gymnasium in which soccer games and other events are held, the bullring in which the fiestas occur, and the high school that engenders significant popular participation). Ultimately, social recovery in the form of a strong g roup identity and the emergence of community organizations enabled the level of community development Arenale ños have been able to achieve. In turn, this community development has created a sense of pride and has strengthened their group identity. The pro cess of social reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal largely adheres to the predictions made by the Scudder Colson model. In Stage 3, community development and economic formation, the model anticipates the establishment of community organizations and the reemerge nce of community building and community affirming events such as religious activities and other celebrations. While the emergence of voluntary associations in Nuevo Arenal actually began simultaneously with resettlement

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324 (i.e., during Stage 2 of the model), the expansion in number and scope during the early events were uninterrupted by resettlement, while others, like the all important fiestas c í vicas , took longer to reest ablish due to economic difficulties in the community. In general, however, the reemergence of these activities was a marker of the type of community formation predicted by the model. the community into the broader political economy of the region or nation, assumption of community management responsibilities by local actors or the relevant national authorities, and the development of sufficient political and institutional strength to a stage was marked by the community management and community development carried out by voluntary associations like the ADI and the ASADA, as well as by the reclaimi ng fiestas cívicas . The outcome of the processes of social and material reconstitution in Nuevo Arenal is a community that engenders the affective bonds that are so elusive in cases of involuntary resettlement. Echoing the sentiments of many of the Arenale ñ os I interviewed, a first Yo prefiero comerme una banana con sal que irme de aquí community that has demonstrated its capacity to self management and that has become, largely through its own efforts, socially and economically integrated in the broader regional and national contexts. While these are important markers of community recove ry after resettlement, however, they are also relatively insular.

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325 Another measure of community recovery after resettlement, then, is how the standard of living in Nuevo Arenal compares to that of other communities in the region. This is the topic of the fi nal section of this chapter. Perceptions of Quality of Life in Nuevo Arenal The Scudder Colson four stage model identifies standard of living, particularly of the second generation of resettlers, as a measure of successful community reconstruction after resettlement. Specifically, the model predicts that living standards will continue to improve at least in line with neighboring communities . This indicates that over th e long term by resettlement. Following this idea, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the standard of living in Nuevo Arenal today in comparison to other communities within the county. The results presented here rely on data from my life history i noted that for the purposes of my interview, I used the phrase calidad de vida (quality of life) perceptions of both economic and social issues. I did this because I was interested in a more comprehensive range of responses than simply the economic measures that the When asked to compare the quality of life in Nuevo Arenal with that in neighboring communities that had not undergone resettlement, 32 (63%) of the interviewees believed that it was unequivocally better in Nuevo Arenal. An additional respondent believed it was better in terms of the availability of public infrastructure and services but about the same with regard to the economic dimension. Another respondent also believed that it was better in terms of services, but economically worse

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326 off than a nearby ranching community. A third believed that it was better in terms of services than neighboring communities, but about the same as the quality of life as in any small town in Costa Rica. Of these 35 respondents, ten were second and third generation resettlers. Ten participants (20%) believed that the qua lity of life was about the same in Nuevo Arenal as it was in neighboring communities. Of these, five were second generation resettlers. Only two participants (4%), one of whom was a second generation resettler, thought the quality of life was worse in Nuev o Arenal than in neighboring communities. Four participants did not respond to the question. In large part, the positive perception of quality of life can be attributed to the services available in the community. Respondents consistently mentioned the ban k (including the ATM machine), school, centralized water system, supermarkets, pharmacy, and health clinic as services that could not be found in neighboring communities, and which residents of those communities actually had to come to Nuevo Arenal to use. It is notable that many of these services are original to the resettlement project. Two respondents also mentioned the rate of homeownership and the quality of the resettlement houses as a marker of the better quality of life in Nuevo Arenal. In addition, a number of respondents commented that neighboring towns have not undergone the same intensity of infrastructural and economic expansion as Nuevo Arenal and thus are much the same as they have always been. Meanwhile, Nuevo Arenal, as detailed in the previ ous sections of this chapter, has continued to develop over the years, which is a point of pride for its residents. This applies as much to infrastructure and public services as it does to the availability of activities, for example restaurants, bars, and other forms of entertainment. Finally, the availability of jobs in the

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327 tourism and service sectors in Nuevo Arenal was also frequently cited as an important Interestingly, though it was not par t of my interview protocol, a number of respondents volunteered information about the other resettlement community, Nuevo Tronadora, which, though smaller in scale, was planned almost identically to Nuevo Arenal. Despite their similar origins, however, Nue vo Tronadora has not undergone the same level of infrastructural and economic development as has Nuevo Arenal. For example, when I visited the community in 2006, the commercial infrastructure essentially consisted of one small supermarket, a bakery, and a bar with a few attached hotel rooms. While one first generation resettler hinted that this lack of development was because of a character defect among Tronadorans (recall that Arenal and Tronadora have always had a healthy sense of competition), others bel ieved that proximity to Tilar án meant that Tronadorans were not as in need of local eco nomic growth and public services as was the more independent Nuevo Arenal. The comparison of Nuevo Arenal and Nuevo Tronadora is an interesting example of the significantly different trajectories two communities with similar origins can take. Respondent s who believed that the quality of life in Nuevo Arenal was about the same as in neighboring communities either did not feel they were familiar enough with other communities to make a comparison or believed that the lifestyle in all of the ties were about the same because they are all relatively small towns. While there was some acknowledgement of the convenience of the additional services

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328 available in Nuevo Arenal, respondents did not seem to believe that the lack of those services in neigh boring communities negatively affected the quality of life in those communities. Respondents who believed that the quality of life in Nuevo Arenal was worse than in neighboring communities were concerned with the difficulty of agricultural production in Nu evo Arenal and cited the better soil quality elsewhere in the region. One Nuevo Arenal. From an economic perspective, that Nuevo Arenal has a standard of living at lea st on par with other communities in the county, region, and nation is substantiated by national census data. According to the 2011 national census, the unemployment rate among job seekers in the district of Arenal (which includes some of the smaller neighb oring communities) was 1.3%. This is on par with the average unemployment rate in the six other districts in the county of Tilar án (average of 1.2%, range: 0.7% 1.7%) and lower than the unemployment rate in the province of Guanacaste (1.9%) and the country as whole (1.7%). The poverty rate in the Arenal district, as measured by the 9 This is lower than the average poverty rate in the six other districts in the county of Tilar á n (33.2%, range: 21.2% 47.2%), as well as in the province of Guanacaste (33.1%), and the nation as a whole (27.4%). In sum, the quality of life in Nuevo Arenal was perceived by most of the 51 residents I interviewed, 17 of whom were second or third generation resettlers, as 9 The basic needs index is composed of measures of quality of housing, access to basic services, education, health care, and buying power/consumer ca pacity. It has been used in Latin America since the 1980s, based on the recommendation of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

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329 equal to or better th an in neighboring communities. This perception is due in large part to the infrastructure created by the resettlement project, which, over time, established Nuevo Arenal as the purveyor of goods and services for a large segment of the northern Arenal basin . This serves as another marker that the community has completed the transition to the final stage of the Scudder Colson model. While current quality of life is a key marker of successful resettlement, however, it is also important to note that it should not be confounded with the community having actually been benefitted by resettlement. In other words, the largely positive outcome of the long and purposeful process of economic, material, and social reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal does not necessarily mean that the community is better off than it would have been in the absence of resettlement. The distinction may be subtle, but it is significant. In light of the fact that resettlement projects are currently being framed as opportunities for community develo pment in effect, as win win scenarios it is important that the findings from the Arenal case not be misunderstood. To speak to this point, therefore, I also asked interview participants whether they believed that Nuevo Arenal had benefitted from resettleme nt. 10 Twenty three respondents (52% of those asked) said that they believed Nuevo Arenal had benefitted from resettlement. Among these, eight were first generation resettlers, ten were second and third generation resettlers, four were early immigrants, and one was a more recent immigrant. The material benefits from resettlement, according to these respondents, included better quality houses, more public services, 10 While I also asked this question of seven foreign expatriates, only data from the 44 Costa Ri can participants are reported here.

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330 and increased access to education. Economic benefits included the conversion of landless reside nts into property owners upon resettlement and, eventually, diversified value. In the words of a first generation resettler who, incidentally, profited handsomely by selling h is resettlement lot to foreign buyers: El que diga que [el pueblo] no se benefició es un jetón, porque allá [en el Viejo Arenal] era muy bueno y todo, pero era un pueblo de solo casitas, muy pocas casitas de cemento. Este pueblo para mí es un pueblo modelo , todas la casitas de cemento bien hechitas, aquí no hay tugurios, que es muy feo en verdad en pueblos, ¿entonces que más queremos aquí en este pueblo? Pueblo limpio, lindo modelo, es un pueblo modelo porque es un pueblo hecho por ingenieros, cierto, enton ces para mí es un pueblo modelo, muy lindo. Son poquitos los pueblos que tenemos como este. Anybody who tells you this town did not benefit is a liar, because in Viejo Arenal it was nice and everything, but it was a town of just small houses, very few ce ment houses. To me, this town is a model town, all of the really ugly in some towns. So what more do we want from this town? A clean town, a model town, this is a model town because it engineers, right, so for me it is a model town, very pretty. There are few towns like this one. Fifteen respondents (34%) said that they believed Nuevo Arenal had not benefitted from resettlement or that the community would have been bet ter off had it not been relocated. This group was composed of six first generation resettlers, five second generation resettlers, and four early immigrants to the community. In large part, these respondents bemoaned the loss of the fertile valley soils, th e flat topography, and the commercial importance of the old community. A number of people pointed out that Viejo Arenal had a number of public services (e.g., an elementary school, bank, police station) in addition to the vibrant commercial sector, and tha t it is likely that after three decades those services would have expanded to include electricity, telephone, and water in sum, the types of services that were made available in Nuevo Arenal upon

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331 resettlement. For these respondents, the loss of the communi outweighed any material benefits brought by the resettlement project. 11 As a second generation resettler put it: E n la parte comercial y el bienestar de toda la gente [Viejo Arenal] hubiera sido mejor y productiva porque hubiera sido u n mercado más fuerte económicamente o sea no se hub iera perdido todo ese mercado. U na cosa es lo óptico, lo que usted ve ahora que el lago es muy lind o, que es lindo el pueblo pero eso se cambió por un potencial económico y de mercado que no se podía comp arar jamás, no le arrima pero esto no jamás. In terms of the commercial component and the well being of the people, [Viejo Arenal] would have been better and productive because it would at market. One thing is what is visible, what you see now that the lake is really pretty, that the town is pretty, but that was exchanged for an economic and market potential that you could never compare to, this would never even come close. Three respon dents (a second generation resettler, an early immigrant, and a more recent immigrant) were undecided about whether or not the community had benefitted from resettlement, presenting the same points in favor and against resettlement as discussed above. Thre e additional respondents did not feel that they could answer the question because they had not lived in Viejo Arenal. However, they all commented that they had heard that Viejo Arenal was a more favorable place to live because of better soil quality, flatt er topography, and more commercial activity. On the other hand, they said, they felt that residents were content to live in Nuevo Arenal today. 11 It should be noted that beef cattle production, the principal economic activity in the Arenal basin prior to resettlement, has lost popularity in Costa Rica in recent decades. Beef production declined at a rate of 0. 1% per year between 1980 and 2004, while the total cattle inventory (in number of heads) declined at a rate of 2.5% per year during the same period (Holmann et al. 2008). It is therefore likely that wage laborers in Viejo Arenal would have had to modify t heir economic strategies, either through diversification or migration, even in the absence of resettlement.

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332 In aggregating these results, I admit to some surprise about the findings. While I knew that Nuevo Arenale ñ o s were proud of and attached to their community, I had also spent many hours in interviews listening to nostalgic accounts of Viejo Arenal and complaints about the prolonged economic struggles in Nuevo Arenal. During a group interview, one first generation El ICE sacrificó un pueblo por el bien estar del país . E llos [el ICE] mismos decían, . expected to hear more criticism of the resettlement project, especially from first generation resettle rs who had experienced the transition first hand. However, a slightly higher percentage of the 14 first generation resettlers I interviewed actually thought the community had been benefitted by resettlement rather than harmed (57% vs. 43%, respectively). P erhaps understandably, given their different relationship to the loss of land based economy, this trend became even more prominent among the 17 second and third generation resettlers I interviewed, of whom 59% thought the community had been benefitted by resettlement while only 29% thought it had been harmed (the remaining 12% either could not decide or had no opinion). Ultimately, it appears that the quality of the resettlement project planning in combination with Arenale ñ to emplace themse lves in their new environment has resulted in a generally positive attitude toward the resettlement project over the long term, particularly in terms of its material dimension.

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333 Chapter Conclusion: Revisiting the Research Hypotheses This chapter began with three research hypotheses relevant to the processes of social and material reconstitution after resettlement. Should the Scudder Colson model hold true for the Arenal case, I hypothesized that the following outcomes would be expected: 1. The processes of material and social reconstruction that began during the second and third stages of the Scudder Colson model will continue to be visible today, and will have expanded in scope. 2. Nuevo Arenal will have become integrated into the broader political economy of the region and nation. 3. Residents of Nuevo Arenal will consider their quality of life to be at least on par with that of neighboring communities. T he evidence presented in the first two sections of this chapter confirms the first research hypothesis . Material reconstruction began with good resettlement planning on the part of the resettlement agency, which attempted to replicate familiar features of the old community in order to allow for the recovery of important elements of the ometry at the household, neighborhood, and community scales. This effort was complemented by Arenale ñ place in the new community by modifying their homes and properties, preserving neighborhood social networks a landscape, and maintaining and expanding upon community infrastructure that was important to the reconstitution of social life. This purposeful process of emplacement has continued throughout the three the emergence of a strong affective bond to the community among its residents. Social reconstitution, another dimension of emplacement, actually began earlier than predicted, initiating during the adjust ment and coping phase (Stage 2 of the

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334 Scudder Colson model). Initially, social recovery was expressed through the preservation of group identity, the emergence of voluntary associations during and immediately after resettlement, and the uninterrupted celeb ration of important rituals in the new community. As more associations formed and assumed increasingly comprehensive management of the community, dependency on the resettlement agency was eliminated and important elements of social life were rebuilt. Addit ionally, Arenale ños were able to reestablish the all important fiestas c í vicas in addition to other formal and informal rituals, thereby demonstrating the recovery of community identity and self sufficiency. This trajectory closely follows the process of c ommunity reconstruction predicted by the Scudder history and sto rytelling occurred throughout all of these stages, allowing resettlers to retain important elements of their group identity by connecting their past with their present. The second research hypothesis also emerged from the Scudder Colson model, which p broader political economy of the region and nation. In the Arenal case, evidence of this integ ration can be found in both the material and social dimensions of post resettlement reconstruction. While ICE was responsible for the initial construction of the community, the infrastructural expansion after that point was achieved without the help of the resettlement agency. Through seeking out resources at the local, regional, and national

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335 levels, and channeling those resources through strong local associations like the ADI, Arenale ñ nto a community that served their needs. The state resources harnessed by community improvements to the regional transportation infrastructure, thereby facilitating Nuevo A attraction for the foreign expatriate population, upon whose presence the local econ omy now heavily depends. Finally, with regard to quality of life in Nuevo Arenal, my results indicate that a majority of respondents believe that residents of Nuevo Arenal, including but not limited to second generation resettlers, have an equival ent or better quality of life than that in neighboring, unresettled communities. This is largely due to the infrastructure and services initiated by the resettlement project and expanded upon by the community over time. In addition, a small majority of my interviewees also believed that the community was benefitted, rather than harmed, by resettlement. Again, material conditions seemed economics was a primary theme among those who felt that the community had in fact been harmed by resettlement. These results illustrate the importance of the material dimension in resettlement planning, though it should be emphasized that this does not excuse poor planning with regard to ec onomic reconstruction. Ultimately, successful community reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal is in large part confirmed by each of the measures discussed above. According to the Scudder Colson

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336 model, however, one measure of successful post resettlement reconst ruction remains the position of second generation resettlers in the social fabric of the community. If the processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction have been successful, the model predicts that second generation resettlers will occupy key leadership positions prediction is based on the premise that successful community reconstruction has made it possible for multiple generations of Arenale ño s to create a life for themselves in the new community. The next chapter, therefore, uses social network analysis to quantitatively assess the social position occupied by second generation resettlers in the social fabric of the Nuevo Arenal.

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337 Table 5 1. Local, regi onal, and national organizations in which survey participants reported participating since becoming a resident of Nuevo Arenal. Organizations No. Participants Local organizations: Comité de la Iglesia (Catholic Church Committee) 35 Asociación de Desarr ollo Integral (Community Development Association) 30 Patronato de la Escuela (Elementary School Committee) 24 Comité del Centro de Educación y Nutrición (Education and Nutrition Center Committee) 21 Comité de Deportes (Sports Committee) 20 Junta de la Escuela (Elementary School Board) 17 Junta del Colegio (High School Board) 15 Comité de A gua/ASADA (Aqueduct Committee) 13 Adultos Mayores (Senior Citizens Group) 9 Asociación de Agricultores de Santa María (Santa Maria Farmer's Association) 5 Asociac ión de Padres del Colegio (High School Parent's Association) 4 Comité de Salud (Health Committee) 4 Asociación de Padres de la Escuela (Elementary School Parent's Association 3 Junta de la Escuela de San Antonio (San Antonio Elementary School Board) 3 Comité de Bandera Azul (Blue Flag Committee) 3 Comisión de Fiestas (Festival Commission) 3 Comité del Cementerio (Cemetary Committee) 3 Comité de Emergencias (Emergency Committee) 3 Comité de Policía (Police Committee) 3 Grupo Catecúmenos (Catholic Ch urch Catechumen Group) 3 Comité del Kinder Arenal (Kindergarten Committee) 2 Asociación de Mujeres de Nuevo Arenal (Nuevo Arenal Women's Association) 2 Comité de Caminos (Road Committee) 2 Comité de Jóvenes (Youth Committee) 2 Asociación Agricultores de Nuevo Arenal (Nuevo Arenal Farmer's Association) 2

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338 Table 5 1. Continued Organizations No. Participants Grupo de Eventos Culturales (Cultural Events Group) (informal) 2 Asociación de Mujeres de Santa María (Santa Maria Women's Association) 1 Alcohó licos Anónimos (Alcoholics Anonymous) 1 Comité Camino San Antonio (San Antonio Road Committee) 1 Guías & Scouts (Boy Scouts) 1 Comité del Gimnasio (Gymnasium Committee) 1 Banda de la Escuela (School Band) 1 Asociación de Vecinos de San Antonio (San An tonio Neighborhood Association) 1 Damas Voluntarias (Volunteer Ladies) 1 Comité de la Escuela Dominical de la Iglesia Cristiana (Christian Church Sunday School Committee) 1 Comité de Seguridad (Security Committee) 1 Comité de la Iglesia Cristiana (Chri stian Church Committee) 1 Feria de Agricultura del Colegio (High School Farmer's Market) 1 Comité de Reciclaje (Recycling Committee) 1 Coopetila (Coffee Cooperative) 1 Regional and national o rganizations : Participación Política Nacional (Participa tion in a national political party) 14 Municipalidad de Tilará n (Municipality of Tilarán) 4 Asociación Protectora Embalse Arenal ( Association for the Protection of the Arenal Reservoir) 1 Fundación para el Desarrollo del Área de Conservación Arenal (FUN DACA) (Foundation for the Development of the Arenal Conservation Area) 1 Asociación de Pequeños y Medianos Empresarios (Association of Small and Medium Businesses) 1 Comisión Nacional de Emergencias (National Emergency Commission) 1 Fuentes Verdes (Reg ional Environmental NGO) 1 Grupo Cá ritas ( Catholic service organization ) 1

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339 A B Figure 5 1. Examples of landscaping and home aesthetics in Nuevo Arenal. A) The front yard of an original resettlement home is demarcated by a fence and the front yard i s nicely manicured. B) Landscaped yards along the principal highway through town. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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340 Figure 5 2. Map of the urban core of Viejo Arenal, produced by ICE in 1974. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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341 Figure 5 3. Map o f the urban core of Nuevo Arenal, produced by ICE during the resettlement planning phase. (Photo courtesy of ICE archives)

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342 A B C D Figure 5 4. Neighborhoods in Nuevo Arenal. A) A view down one of the main streets in the urban core. B) A view down the main highway through town. C) A neighborhood near the plaza. D) The neighborhood in which I lived. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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343 Figure 5 5. Spatial distribution of households composed of residential tourists versus Costa Ricans (or other r esidents who are not residential tourists). Each hexagon represents a width of 300 meters. Icons are sized acc ording to the percentage of each population located within each hexagon.

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344 Figure 5 6. The central plaza/soccer field is flanked by the Catholi c Church and the Commercial spaces, not shown, line the road to the right. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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345 A B Figure 5 7. The central plaza is the site of signific ant social interaction. A) A crowd begins to form in anticipation of a tope , a cowboy gathering at which horses and their riders parade through town. Topes are usually held in conjunction with the biannual community fiestas and draw participants from commu nities throughout the region. B) Horses and their riders mingle on the plaza before the tope begins. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks) Figure 5 small park next to the centr al plaza. Since this photograph was taken, the park has been modified to include a play structure for children. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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346 Figure 5 9. A permanent health clinic was founded in 1980. The building was originally a hotel that cl osed down shortly after resettlement. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks) Figure 5 10. A community gymnasium was constructed in the mid 1980s. (Photo courtesy of Community Development Association of Arenal)

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347 Figure 5 11. A bullring, constructed i n the late 1980s, is an important feature of the community. A town hall ( salon comunal) was added in the early 1990s. The bright red roof on the near side of the hall houses a communal kitchen added in the late 2000s and used primarily during the fiestas . This complex is an fiestas , which attract attendees from neighboring communities. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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348 A B Figure 5 12. Educational infrastructure has been a focus of com munity development in Nuevo Arenal. A) The elementary school was built at the time of resettlement. B) The high school was added in the late 1990s. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks) Figure 5 13. Offices for the local water utility, the Administrati ve Association of Rural Aqueducts ( Asociación Administradora de Acueductos Rural es or ASADA), and the Community Development Association ( Asociaci ó n de Desarrollo Integral) were constructed in the late 2000s. (Photo courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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349 A B Figure 5 th , is celebrated with a parade organized by the public schools. A) Students march while carrying the national flag. B) A marching band provides additional entertainment. (Photo s courtesy of Gabriela Stocks) A B Figure 5 15. The annual fiestas c í vicas are a popular local event. A) The bull ring is also the site of a carnival. B) Local men await the release of the bull and his rider from the pen. (Photos courtesy of Gabriel a Stocks)

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350 A B Figure 5 16. The annual fiestas c í vicas include the children of the community. A) A mini tope , for which preschoolers ride stick horses, proceeds from the preschool to the community hall. B) The boy and girl with the most sponsors are fiestas . (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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351 A B C D Figure 5 17. The annual fiestas cívicas culminate with a tope . A) Riders wait in the plaza for the tope to begin. B) An Arenaleño shows off his priz e horse during the parade. C) The king and queen of the fiestas participate in the tope . D) Other entertainment includes musical bands and dance troupes. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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352 Figure 5 18. A mural of the church from Viejo Arenal was pai nted in 2009 on the side of the social hall at the lakeside park. This painting represents the only material tribute to the old community, and is located in an area of town that is not highly trafficked. (Photos courtesy of Gabriela Stocks)

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353 http://ufdc.uf Object 5 tope (.avi file, 89 MB) Object 5 2. Short video of tope (.avi file , 60 MB)

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354 CHAPTER 6 THE LONG TERM OUTCOMES OF RESETTLEMENT: SOCIAL NETWORKS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES foundations. As describ ed in the previous two chapters, recovery after a shock of this nature can take years in some cases decades depending on how well the resettlement project is designed and implemented, the agency of the resettlers themselves, and other exogenous factors. In light of the long term nature of the process of recovery after resettlement, the Scudder Colson four stage model around which this dissertation is oriented encompasses outcomes for at least two generations of resettlers. In particular, the fourth stage of emphasizes the well being of second generation resettlers as a key measure of community recovery. The final stage of the Scudder Colson model predicts that second generation resettlers will assume household pr oduction activities and community leadership, and that their standard of living will be at least on par with neighboring communities ( Scudder 2005). The second generational focus of the model is based on the idea that successful economic, material, and soc ial reconstruction creates the conditions necessary fo r future generations of resettlers t o remain in the new community and to assume the roles once filled by the original resettlers. Notably, a focus on the second generation also provides a long term pers pective on whether a community has overcom e many of the risk s Reconstruction model (Cernea 1997) . Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation addressed the longitudinal process of community reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal. In those chapters, I discussed two of the

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355 three themes relevant to assessing whether the community has transitioned into the final stage of the Scudder Colson model: the livelihood activities and quality of life of Arenale ñ os, including those of s econd generation resettlers. In the interest of assessing the remaining metric of Stage 4, the current chapter will begin by focusing on the social positions of second generation resettlers within the fabric of the community, with a special emphasis on the ir role in community leadership and their social capital. This analysis addresses my second research objective, which was to identify the social p ositions occupied by first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers , and other residents (includin g third generation resettlers and immigrants) in order to a) evaluate whether community leade rship has been passed on from one gener ation to the next and b) identify whether second generation resettlers have sufficient access to the resources necessary to sustain their livelihoods. For the purposes of this discussion, social position and social capital were measured by conducting a socio centric (or centrality were calculated . In addition to identifying the position of second generation resettlers within Nuevo central) network position might be achieved. If successful community reconstru ction is (defined here as high network centrality) in the community. In turn, high network

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356 positive feedback loop between access to resources and network position (or social capital). The notion that occupying a highly central position is a good measure of individual success will be further explored later in this chapter; at base, it is rooted in the idea that better connected individuals tend to do better socially, eco nomically, and politically (Burt 2000). A corollary goal of this portion of the study was to identify whether status as a first generation resettler, second generation resettler, or other resident category is associated with network positio n. When all other variables are held constant, if resident status as a second generation resettler is not negatively associated with network centrality, this would indicate that second generation resettlers are, at a minimum, not in a disadvantaged positio n relative to other community residents. Addressing this research objective involved constructing an ordinal logistic regression model using data f rom my livelihood survey and centrality measures from the whole social network analysis. It should be emphasi zed that this analysis does not intend to imply a causal relationship between access to resources and network position; rather, it explores the relationship of association between these variables. While the regression model addresses the relationship between access to resources within the boundaries of the community and individual success, it is also likely that there is a relationship between access to resources outside of the community and Colson model emphasizes integration with the broader political economy of the region and nation as a measure of integration into the broader context that was presented in Chapte rs 4 and 5, I was interested in measuring this integration at a personal level in order to determine whether

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35 7 there is a correlation between individual level integration and community level network centrality. Personal social network analysis (distinct from whole social network analysis) is a method of measuring this integration by reveal ing the extent and type of an individual external to the community. Access to pursuit of economic and social success, while simultaneously serving as bridges between the resettled community and the outside world . Taken together, the analyses of access to internal and external resources address my third and final research objective, which was to identify the factors rel evant to community reconstruction after resettlement that might be associated with he social network. F ollowing the Scudder Colson four stage model , these research objectives led to a serie s of hypotheses (H4 7). I f the resettlement of Nuevo Arenal was successful, the f ollowing outcomes are expected: 4. Both first and second generation resettlers will occupy key structural positions within the social network of the community. These positions w ill be occupied by each group in numbers that are proportional to their overall population size. In other words, the post resettlement reconstruction process will have created viable opportunities for second generation resettlers to remain in the community , to assume important social roles at the community level, and to gain access to the social and material resources necessary for survival. 5. There will be no differences in measures of mean network centrality between first generation resettlers, second g eneration resettlers, and immigrants. In other words, membership in one of these groups does not confer an advantage in becoming central to the network , signifying that leadership is not solely the purview of first generation resettlers or immigrants, who in some cases have been shown to be better educated, with more capital and experience (Scudder 2005) . Second generation resettlers will be on equal footing with all other residents, indicating that there have been sufficient opportunities to sustain their economic and social well being in the community over time. 6. Variation in measures of n etwork centrality will be associated with the following variables: age, gender, level of education, kinship ties to other local households, employment status, diversity in sources of household income, home ownership,

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358 ease of access to other community members and activities (i.e., home location), l and ownership, and participation in community or political organizations. In other words, features of the resettlement plan and t he subsequent process of Network centrality will not a second generation resettler. This indicates that second generation resettlers have an equivalent chance as any other resident category of becoming central in the social network, suggesting that the process of community reconstruction has not disadvantaged them relative to other residents. 7. There will be a positive relation ship between measures of network centrality and access to human and material resources external to the community. In other words, becoming central in the local social network will be correlated not only with access to resources within the community, but al so with access to people and resources outside of the community. If this hypothesis holds true, it will provide additional support for the need to mitigate the risks of marginalization and social disarticulation often experienced after resettlement (Cernea 1997). To address these objectives and hypotheses, the current chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section presents the results of the socio centric network analysis. The second section presents the results of the ordinal logistic regre ssion model and personal social network analysis. Before proceeding, it should be explicitly acknowledged that the current chapter focuses primarily on the scale of the individual, while the previous chapters have been more broadly focused on processes a t the community scale. Given that communities being, but is also relevant at the community level. Successful people are more likely to remain with in the community rather than search for better opportunities elsewhere. This population stability contributes to the long term economic and social sustainability of the community, which is one of the goals of post resettlement reconstruction. Furthermore, as will be discussed at various points throughout this chapter, the social capital possessed by well connected individuals in Nuevo Arenal is frequently engaged to access and attract resources for the betterment

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359 of the community as a whole. There is, there fore, a strong connection between successful individuals and successful communities. Socio Centric Network Analysis Social Network Analysis, Leadership, and Social Capital As just discussed, the Scudder Colson model partially defines successful post resett lement reconstruction in terms of the social positions of second generation resettlers. Specifically, the model predicts that in a successfully resettled community, the second generation will have assumed (or be in the process of assuming) the leadership p ositions once occupied by first generation resettlers, and that they will have access to the resources necessary to sustain their livelihoods. Based on these predictions, my use of socio centric network analysis (SNA) had a dual purpose. First, I was inter ested in identifying whether second generation resettlers did, in fact, occupy leadership positions in Nuevo Arenal. W have originally been conceptualized in a relatively straightforward sense (e.g., elected offici als), I believe that a social network appr oach offers a more nuanced perspective in that it can aid in the identification of whether second generation resettlers, in comparis on to other groups, occupy strategic (i.e., highly central) positions in the socia l fabric of the community. Highly central individuals tend to be conduits for ideas and inform ation flows through a network , and have greater social influence (Bolland 1985). The second purpose for the SNA was to identify whether second generation resettl ers have sufficient access to the resources necessary to sustain their economic, material, and social well being in the community. These resources are accessed . S ocial capital is thus imp ortant because it gives people access to other actors in their pursuit of various types

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360 of resources (i.e., produced, human, and natural capital) and social and political power (Bebbington 1999). Given the considerable discomfort the idea of social capital generates among anthropologists, however, this concept merits further exploration. The premise behind the notion of social capital is much the same as with other forms of capital: an investment with the expectation of returns in a marketplace, be it a p olitic al, labor, or community market (Lin 2001a, 2001b). The investment in the case of social capital is in social relations, which can help an actor gain access to key resources (Burt 1997, Lin 2000). It is important to note that by using the idea of soci al capital to inform my analysis, I do not mean to reduce social relationships to the purely instrumental. The concept of non economic forms of capital (i.e., human, natural, cultural, etc.) has been criticized for its tendency to be economistic to emphasi ze how the various forms of capital contribute to higher levels of production or command a market price (cf. Sen 1997). But, according to Bebbington (1999:2022), capitals can y to be well social capital) is not simply about the direct return on investment in ter ms of access to material resources, but also about developing meaningful relationships that allow for the pursuit of individual and collective well being (Bebbington 1999). Social capital has been operationalized in various ways since the concept first ca me into use in the early 20 th century (e.g., collective vs. individual, closed vs. open

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361 groups) (Lin 2001a). 1 Today, there is some consensus that a social network approach best captures its relational, political, and individual nature (de la Pe ñ a 2008, Lin 2001b). Individuals who are highly central in a social network can be important channels for information flow , can serve as bridges or brokers between social groups, and can coordinate group processes (Bavelas 1948, Cohn and Marriott 1958, Freeman 1979, S cott 2000). Simply put, people who are better connected, as defined by their position in the structure of network exchanges, tend to do better (Burt 2000). Not only do they have a greater co mpetitive advantage, but they also tend to have higher standing wi thin the group and are thus more frequently given the opportunity to make decisions in the name of the group, thereby generating more opportunities to promote their own self interest while also serving the collective interest ( Burt 2000, Lin 2001b). In eff ect, there is a bi directional relationship between network position and social capital as each serves to augment the other. The location of an individual in a social network is therefore directly related to their social capital. Some scholars ( cf. Lin 200 1a) have argued that network location gives an individual access to the resources embedded in other actors in the network; cf. Burt and Celotto 1992) have argued that network location is an asset in itself how close or how far an competitive advantage. In either case, network location is important. Two network measures, degree and betweenness centra lity, are particularly useful in a discussion of 1 The first recorded use of the concept of social capital dates to 1916 when LJ Hanifan, the West Virginia State Supervisor of Schools, discussed t he importance of social relationships to improving the well being of individuals and of living conditions in the community as a whole (Putnam 2000).

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362 social capital. Degree centrality is a measure of the number of other people to which an individual is directly connected. Individuals with a high degree centrality are in contact with many others, tend to be prestig ious and/or influential, and can be an important channel of information (Freeman 1979, Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Betweenness centrality is a measure of the extent to which an individual lies on the shortest path between other individuals. Individuals who are highly between central often serve as bridges or brokers between different social groups and can be coordinators of group processes (Cohn and Marriott 1958, Freeman 1979, Scott 2000). Ultimately, identifying the position of second generation resettler s within the social network of Nuevo Arenal can aid in an assessment of whether community long term. SNA allows us to measure both leadership and social capital among second generatio n resettlers relative to other groups in the community ; positive measures are a good indication that the community has been resilient over the long term to the disruption created by involuntary displacement and resettlement. Social Network Methods and Analysis The procedure for collecting whole social network data was described in detail in Chapter 2. To briefly review, my field assistants and I interviewed 984 individuals, which represented approximately 69% of the adult population. We aske d each individual to name five other people in response to four network elicitation questions, each focusing on different dimensions of leadership within Nuevo Arenal: contribution to community development, economic success, participation in local activiti es and events, and leadership in the event of a crisis. From these data, four asymmetric adjacency matrices (i.e., networks) were created. It should be noted that, while appropriate to the current

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363 study, this approach to social network generation only reve als the existence of a very basic relationship between the respondent and the people they name; it does not provide information about the quality of that relationship, nor about the power dynamics it may involve. Nevertheless, the results of this analysis are informative for the questions at hand. Two key structural measures of interest were calculated for each network. In degree centrality a directed form of degree centrality that reflects the number of times an individual was n amed by others in the commu nity was calculated using the asymmetrical (directed) matrices . Freeman betweenness centrality the extent to which was calculated using symmetrical (undirected) versions of the matrices (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Graphs of the network data were produced in Netdraw v. 2.123 (Borgatti 2002). To evaluate the fourth research hypothesis (H4 : both first and second generation resettlers will occupy key structural positions within the social network of the community in numbers that are proportional to their overall population size) , an overall calculate this measure , I used Spearman correlations to test for association between in deg ree and ( > 0.7, p = .01 in all cases) were large enough to justify the use of in degree centrality as the summary measure. Spearman correlations were then used to test for association of in degree measures across all four networks, networks . While in degree measures across all networks were significantly co rrelated (

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364 = .309 .572 , p = .01), the in degree measures for the Economic Success network were consistently less strongly correlated with the other networks ( .459, p = .01 for the Economic Success network compared to .572 , p = .01 for the other ne tworks ). Because this confirmed my suspicion that the Economic Success network did not measure leadership in the same way as the other s , I chose to eliminate that network from the overall centrality calculation. 2 To sum in degree centrality measures acro ss the three remaining networks and assign individuals to a category of low, medium, or high centrality, all individuals with an in degree centrality of 0 or 1 within a particular network were assigned score applied to a vast majority of individuals in each network. Individuals who had an in degree centrality of 2 or higher in a particular network were then divided into two percentile based groups: the 49 th percentile and below were assigned a score of th percentile and . Ultimately, within each network an individual could have a score of 1, 2, or 3. I ndividual scores were then summed across all three networks, resul ting in a total individual score ranging from 3 to 9. Finally, on their total scores (3 4 = low, 5 7 = medium, 8 9 = high). I then cross classified individuals based o n their overall centrality and their status as first generation resettlers, 2 The difference between the Economic Success network and the other networks is explained by the fact that foreign expatriates were frequently named in response to the economic success network elicitation question. However, my ethnographic research indicate was low and that their integration with the Costa Rican community was limited. While a comparison of the economic network with the other networks could be the focus a future analysis of the effects of resi dential tourism in the community, I chose to eliminate the economic network for the purposes of the current discussion.

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365 second generation resettlers, or other s . 3 A chi squared test was used to test for differences between observed and expected counts within each cross classified group based on the m arginal totals. To evaluate the fifth research hypothe sis (H5 : there will be no differences in measures of mean network centrality between first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and other residents), measures of in degree and betweenn ess centrality from the three independent networks ( Community Deve lopment, Participation, and Emergency Recovery) were used. I n order to determine whether non parametric tests for the comparison of medians would be applicable to these data, Kolmogorov Smir nov (K S) tests were used to compare the probability distributions of in degree and betweenness centrality for pairwise resident categories in each network. 4 The K S tests indicated that the probability distributions for in degree centrality were equivalen t across all resident categories for each network. Based on this finding, and in order to facilitate future mathematical calculations, all residents with an in degree centrality of 0 were eliminated from the analysis under the rationale that my research qu estion was most focused on those people who were at least margi nally active in the community (70 79% 3 other includes third generation resettlers, immigrants of Costa Rican origin, children of Costa Rican immig rants, immigrants of foreign origin , and individuals of unknown resident category. Third generation resettlers were not grouped with second generation resettlers because they tend to be young and have not yet had the opportunity to achieve leadership posit ions within the community. 4 I had originally planned to conduct one way ANOVA tests to compare mean in degree and betweenness centrality among the different groups of residents for each network. H owever, the distributions of both in degree and betweennes s centrality for all of the networks were heavily skewed to the right a large majority of residents had very low centrality measures because they were named by few (or no) people in response to the network generation questions. Parametric statistical tes ts assuming normality were ruled out by using by using Kolmogorov Smirnov (K S) tests of normality. I therefore had to explore the use of non parametric tests.

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366 of the population had an in degree centrality of 0 in each network). 5 I then used Kruskal Wallis and Mann Whitney U tests to compare the median measures of in degree centrality among the groups of residents for each network. With regard to betweenness centrality, the K S tests indicated that the probability distributions of the data were not equivalent across all resident categories for each network, which invalidated the use of non parametric tests. I therefore chose to employ categorical data analysis. Betweenness centrality measures from each network were divided into terciles of low, medium, and high centrality. In contrast to the previous analysis, indi viduals with a betweenness centrality of 0 were retained in the calculations for two reasons. First, given the nature of the betweenness measure, many fewer individuals had a betweenness centrality of 0. Second, a betweenness centrality of 0 indicates a mo re severe level of social isolation than does an in degree centrality of 0, which was important to reflect in this analysis. I then cross classified individuals based on their level of centrality and their resident category for each network. Chi squared te sts were used to test for differences between observed and expected values in betweenness centrality based on marginal totals across resident types. All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS (v. 22) for Mac OS X (IBM Corp. 2013 ). Social Network An alysis Results Overall network centrality At the time of study, I identified 1430 adults who composed the social network of Nuevo Arenal. Of these, 244 (17.1%) were first generation resettlers, while 333 (23.3%) 5 Because such a large proportion of the population had an in degree centrality of 0 in each ne two rk, the inclusion of these residents would have led to a median of 0 for each resident category, making a comparison of medians impossible.

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367 were second generation resettlers. The rema inder of the population (59.6%) consisted of third generati on resettlers (n=88), immigrants of domestic origin (n=426 ), children of domestic immigrants (n=88), imm igrants of foreign origin (n=193 ), and individuals of unknown resident category (n=58 ). Usin g the summary measure of in degree centrality described above, 14 first generation resettlers were identified as highly central in the overall social network, while 30 were moderately central. Twenty four second generation resettlers were identified as hig hly central in the overall social network, while 25 were moderately central. In sum, 5.7% of first generation resettlers and 7.2% of second generation resettlers were highly central in the social network. Only 4.1 % of all other residents were highly centra l ( Figures 6 1 and 6 2 ). A chi squared test indicated that the proportion of residents in leadership positions was significantly different than expected ( 2 (4, N =1430) = 9.106 , p =.0 59; Table 6 1 ). This is due to more than expected first and second genera tion resettlers in high ly central positions, more first generation resettlers in moderately central positions, and fewer than expected other resident categories in those positions. Median in degree and betweenness c entrality The network generation questi ons presented above resulted in three networks, 3 through 6 5). Upon elimination of individuals with an in degree centrality of 0 (i.e., individuals who were not named at all in response to the network generation questions), in degree centrality ranged from 1 613 (mean=11.67; median=2; interquartile range: Q 1 =1, Q 2 =2, Q 3 =5), 1 208 (mean=10.21; median=2; Q 1 =1, Q 2 =2, Q 3 =6.25), and 1 303 (mean=10.32; median=2 ; Q 1 =1, Q 2 =2, Q 3 =5) for the Community

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368 Development, Participation, and Emergency Recovery networks, respectively. Kruskal Wallis (K W) tests indicated that there were no statistically significant differences in the medians of in degree centrality between fi rst generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and all other residents for the Community Development and Emergency Recovery networks ( p =.611 and p =.448, respectively). The K W test for the Participation network indicated that there was strong sta tistical evidence for a difference in the median in degree centrality between at least two of the resident categories ( p =.014). Mann Whitney U tests were then conducted for each pair of resident categories, and indicated that there was no statistical evide nce for a difference in median in degree centrality between first and second generation resettlers ( p =.902) in the Participation network, but there was a statistically significant difference between second generation resettlers and other residents ( p =.026 ) and between first generation resettlers and other residents ( p =.019). To summarize, there was no difference in median in degree centrality among all groups for two of the networks (Community Development and Emergency Recovery) and among first and second generation resettlers for the third (Participation). Median in degree centrality was greater for first and second generation resettlers than for other residents in the Participation network. Chi squared tests indicated that there were statistically sig nificant differences between observed and expected values in betweenness centrality among first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and other residents for all three networks ( 2 (4, N =1430) = 15. 622 , p =.004 , 2 (4, N =143 0) = 38 .961, p =.000 , 2 (4, N =1430) = 22.106, p =.000 for the Community Development, Participation, and Emergency Recovery networks, respectively; Tables 6 2, 6 3, and 6 4). This is due to

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369 considerably more second generation resettlers in highly and moderately between central positions than expected, and considerably fewer than expected other resident categories in those positions for each network. Leadership and Social Capital Among Second Generation Resettlers The results of this social network analysis largely confirm the fourth and fifth research hypotheses. First, both first and second generation resettlers occupy key leadership positions within the social network, as evidenced by their high levels of overall centrality. In fact, they occupy these positions in numbers g reater than expected given their population sizes; this especially applies to second generation resettlers. That being said, other categories of residents, including domestic and foreign immigrants, also occupy highly and moderately central positions to so me extent, though in lower numbers than expected. This indicates that Nuevo Arenal is a dynamic community with the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Thirty three years after resettlement, the community provides leadership (and, by extension, oth er) opportunities for long term residents, their children, and newcomers. network, median levels of in degree centrality were equivalent for first generation resettlers, seco nd generation resettlers, and all other residents in each network. In other generation resettler does not confer an advantage to becoming degree central in the social netwo rk. This is a key finding, as it indicates that Nuevo Arenal has achieved enough stability to allow first generation resettlers to pass leadership to future generations and newcomers.

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370 The transfer of leadership does not, however, mean that first generatio n resettlers do not continue to occupy strategic positions within the social network. A comparison of the networks of highly in degree central actors illustrates this point (Figures 6 6 through 6 8). In both the Community Development and Emergency Recovery networks (Figures 6 6 and 6 7), the individual with the highest in degree centrality is a first generation resettler, Node 568. This individual, now in his mid 60s, is the prominent community member introduced in Chapter 5, whose strong ties to political infrastructural development projects in Nuevo Arenal. Of the 985 individuals surveyed, 613 of them named Node 568 in response to the Community Development network generation que stion. Also prominent in these networks is Node 13, who is the former school director and has served on the county commission for a number of years. These positions have facilitated his access to resources used for community development purposes. Notably, the Participation network (Figure 6 8) introduces an interesting variation. While Node 568 is still the most highly central first generation resettler, six second generation resettlers and three immigrants also emerge as important actors. Nodes 218 and 23 0 are siblings and members of the wealthiest cattle ranching family in the community. Node 334 is a local business owner and was the presidential delegate during the second Oscar Arias administration, a position that allowed him to channel state funds to l ocal and regional projects (also discussed in Chapter 5). Nodes 349, 710, and 931 are known for their efforts in coordinating youth sporting events, religious activities, and community festivals, respectively. Node 304 was an early immigrant to

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371 Nuevo Arena l who lived in the host community of Mata de Ca ñ a prior to the resettlement project, and is active in the sports committee. Nodes 185 and 286 are also long term residents of Nuevo Arenal, having arrived in 1986 and 1992, respectively. In addition to their other efforts, all seven individuals also consistently participate on the governing board of the community development association (ADI). Also notable in the Participation network is the increased presence of women in highly central positions, including so me second generation resettlers. In sum, the compositional differences among the Community Development, Emergency Recovery, and Participation networks suggest that first generation resettlers are considered to be authority figures based on past, and to som e extent future, scenarios, but that second generation resettlers and other residents are more involved in the day to day leadership of the community. The measures of betweenness centrality tell a slightly different story. Second generation resettlers are more between central than expected, while other residents are less between central than expected. As discussed above, betweenness is a measure of the extent to which an individual lies on the shortest path between other individuals. Highly between central individuals tend to serve as bridges or brokers among social groups. The fact that second generation resettlers outrank all other residents in betweenness centrality indicates that they are in a significantly strategic position in the community in terms o f being finding does not directly support the fifth research hypothesis, it is actually a positive indicator of community reconstruction. If one population group is going be favored with a strategi c position in the resettled community, preference would be given to those who

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372 have an established history and identity as Arenale ños , and who have the most to gain at an affective level from the forward progress of the community. The presence of second generation resettlers in leadership positions indicates that the Scudder Colson model holds true with regard to its predictions of the inter generational dynamic of post resettlement reconstruction. These findings provide additional evidence that Nuevo Ar enal has completed its transition to the final stage of the model. This network analysis also suggests that Nuevo Arenal has overcome the impoverishment risks predicted by the IRR model in the sense that the community has developed the capacity to fulfill the social, material, and economic needs of at least the second generation of resettlers, allowing them to remain in the community and assume responsibility for its management. The ability of second generation resettlers to access the material and social resources necessary to sustain a standard of living at least on par with their peers in other communities is also a key component of the fourth stage of the Scudder Colson model. As discussed above, proponents of a network approach to social capital argue being is dependent, at least in part, on their relationships to others in their social network (Burt 2000, Lin 2000). In this sense, network position is directly linked to opportunitie s for both material and non material advancement. Occupying a highly central position in a network confers a significant advantage in the pursuit or mobilization of social capital (Lin 2001a). High in inence or prestige within a community, while high betweenness centrality is a measure of a

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373 and Riddle 2005). The fact that second generation resettlers occupy positions of hig h in degree and betweenness centrality in the leadership network of Nuevo Arenal means not only that they are able to compete for their fair share of resources, but that they have the authority to make decisions on behalf of the community that may also ser ve their self interest (Lin 2001b). At a very tangible level, a considerable number of second generation resettlers make community development decisions, are highly visible within the community, and are looked to for leadership by fellow community members in the event of a crisis. By these measures, there is no doubt that they possess high levels of social capital. The resettlement of Nuevo Arenal occurred 33 years before the data for this study were collected. The handing over of leadership to future gener ations is therefore partially a product of time. Many first generation resettlers have passed away or left the community; others are aging and less active in community affairs. It is only natural that others would assume leadership in their place. What thi s social network analysis reveals about Nuevo Arenal, however, is that the new leaders are largely second generation resettlers. This is a positive indication that the evolution of the community post resettlement has provided sufficient opportunities for s econd generation resettlers to establish their livelihoods in the new place. It is also notable that immigrants do not disproportionately occupy highly central positions. In many cases of dam induced resettlement, immigrants tend to be better educated, wit h more capital and more experience than resettlers and thus restrict opportunities available to local people (Scudder 2005). This does not seem to be the case in Nuevo Arenal, at least in terms of social relationships and the advantages those relationships confer. That being said,

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374 whether or not these positive trends will continue in the future is uncertain. As discussed in Chapter 4, young Arenale ños are increasingly pursuing educational and professional opportunities in larger cities, as there are limited local employment opportunities outside of the economy generated by the residential tourism industry. If that continues to be the case, a shift in community composition, and therefore community leadership, is to be expected. This discussion of the implic ations of the socio centric network analysis of Nuevo access to various types of reso urces, including produced, human, and natural capital. Of particular interest in this dissertation are those resources that are related to the original resettlement project design and the process of community reconstruction after resettlement. The next sec tion therefore attempts to develop a statistical model for evaluating the association between network centrality and access to resources both internal and external to the community. Connecting Resource Access and Network Centrality Successful resettlement projects are those that provide the conditions necessary for multiple generations of resettlers to reestablish their lives and livelihoods in the new leave resettlers hom eless, landless, jobless, and socially disarticulated, among other risks (Cernea 1997). In contrast, well planned resettlement projects are those that attempt to mitigate these risks, though it is also notable that these efforts have been met with varying systems react to the resettlement process (de Wet 2006).

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375 Among the factors that have been identified as important to facilitating the reconstruction of resettled communities, and there by assisting their transition through the four stages of the Scudder Colson model, are many of the themes present in previous chapters of this dissertation. These include employment opportunities, access to land , access to housing, strong community organiz ations, networks of social support (including kin groups), educational opportunities , and access to human and material resources external to the community ( Cernea 1997, McDowell 2002, Scudder 2005). In sum, these resources comprise a set of economic, human , social, and natural assets (or forms of capital) that make life possible in the new location. Beginning with the quantifiable aspects of these factors and appending additional variables that my preliminary studies suggested may be relevant to an individu created a livelihood survey that included the following variables: age, gender, nationality, marital status, level of education, length of residence in Nuevo Aren al, kinship ties to other households, occupational history, sources o f household income, self ranking of economic status relative to others in the community, home and property ownership, and participation in commu nity organizations (Appendix C) . Data from this survey was used to construct an ordinal logistic regression mode l that calculates the position of high network centrality. In addition to this livelihood survey, which focused on resources within the boundaries of the community, I also used personal social network analysis to assess the relationship between network centrality and access to resources external to the community. Ultimately, t he purpose of this component of the research was to identify

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376 whether there are systematic fac tors that explain social network position in N uevo Ar enal, with the ultimate goal of connecting those factors to the design and implementation of the resettlement project and to the process of community recovery in the three decades since resettlement. In ternal Resources: Ordinal Logistic Regression Model Livelihood surveys were administered to a stratified random sample of 263 individuals from the three levels of overall network centrality: 39 individuals of high centrality, 68 individuals of medium cent rality , and 156 individuals of low centrality. Data from the livelihood survey were en tered into an Excel spreadsheet and used to produce descriptive statistics about the study population . While the livelihood survey addressed a broad range of topics, many of which have been discussed in previous chapters, these topics could not all be included in the regression analysis due to the constraints of sample size. The topics were therefore reduced to a smaller subset of the most relevant variables for use in the statistical analysis. When two variables were highly correlated or measured slightly different dimensions of the same concept, only one was retained for further analysis (e.g., property ownership was recorded in three ways: as a binary category, as the nu mber of properties owned, and as the total size of landholdings; only the number of properties was retained for further analysis). In addition, variables that preliminary analyses suggested were not useful in explaining network centrality were eliminated ( e.g., the Costa Rican cultural value of egalitarianism made the self ranking of economic status in comparison to other households relatively meaningless), as were multi category nominal variable s that introduced many additional de grees of freedom into the statistical model (e.g., nationality). Ultimately, 11 variables were retained for further analysis (Table 2 2). A summary of the data can be found in Table 6 5.

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377 To address the sixth research hypothesis (H6: v ariation in measures of network centrality will be associated with the following variables: age, gender, level of education, kinship ties to other local households, employment status, household economic diversity, home ownership, home location, l and ownership, and popular participation; network central ity will not be negatively associated with second generational status), the 11 variables were used to create an ordinal logistic regression model. This type of regression model is appropriate when there is a rank order associated wit h a categorical depende nt variable. In this network ordered ca tegories low, medium, and high which satisfies the requirements of the modeling procedure. Because the survey sample was heavily populated with individuals of low o verall centrality, I was concerned that those observations would bias the results of the regression model. I therefore experimented with both weighted and unweighted versions. The weighted version of the model treated the individual observations such that each centrality group was given equal representation for the purpose of fitting the model. The unweighted version used the original dataset. Ultimately, the regression coefficients for both models were similar in direction and magnitude. In addition, both models performed relatively well in terms of their ability to predict low and high centrality and were less accurate in their predictions of medium centrality. Based on these outcomes, only the results from the weighted regression analysis will be presente d here. All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS (v. 22) for Mac OS X (IBM Corp. 2013 ).

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378 Table 6 6 presents the results of the weighted ordinal logistic regression model. A chi squared test indicated that the predicted centrality values were signi ficantly different than would be expected from a random distribution of values ( 2 (4, N = 263 ) = 123 . 375 , p =0.000 ; Table 6 7). This is positive evidence of the predictive capacity (i.e., accuracy) of the model. In addition, a Spearman correlation indicated t hat predicted centrality values correlated relatively well with known centrality values, also indicating that the model performs satisfactorily ( =.637, p=.000). From Table 6 6 , it can be deduced that the variables with significant explanatory power were : home location, resident status, employment status, gender, home ownership, diversity in household economic strategies , age, education, p articip ation in community organizations , and landholdings . Not significant in this model was kinship. In ordinal logistic regression, the exponentiated beta coefficients (ExpB) for each regressor are interpreted as the proportional odds of moving from one categor y of the dependent variable to any higher category when all other independent variables are held constant. The regression coefficients in this model should therefore be interpreted as follows: Location : Individuals who live in the urban core were twice as likely to occupy a more highly central category as those who live in the peripheral areas of town. R esident status : Second generation resettlers were 2.5 times more likely to gene ration resettlers were 1.8 times less likely to occupy a more highly central E mployment status: Individuals who are self employed were twice as likely to occupy a more highly central social position than individuals who are unemployed. Salaried employees or wage laborers were 1.4 times less likely than unemployed individuals to occupy a more highly central social position.

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379 G ender: Women were three times less likely than men to occupy a more highly central category. H om e ownership: An individual who does not own their home was 2.5 times less likely to be in a more highly central category than those who do own their home. D iversity in household economic strategies: For every one unit increase in the number of household i ncome sources, the proportional odds of being in a more highly central social position increased by 1.43 times. A ge : For every one additional year of age, the proportional odds of being in a more highly central position increased by 1.024 times. E ducation : proportional odds of being in a more highly central position by 1.16 times. Popular participation: For every additional year of participation, the proportional odds of being in a more highly ce ntral position increased by 1.15 times. Property ownership: For every additional property owned (other than the primary residence), the proportional odds of being in a more highly central social position almost doubled (1.93 times more likely). The resul ts of the ordinal logistic regression model largely support the predictions made in Hypothesis 6. With the exception of kinship, all variables had significant due to the way in which the variable was aggregated (i.e., using a binary category rather than ordinal or interval level data). 6 Because a large majority of the sample (75%) reported having relatives in at least on other household, there is little variability in the category, thus reducing the explanatory power of the variable. Perhaps most relevant to the overall purpose of this study, resident status emerged as a variable with considerable explanatory power. All things being equal, 6 While the livelihood survey did ask respondents to report the number of adult relatives in other households in the community, I was concerned that these responses were only rough estimates. I therefore chose to create a binary categorical variable from these data. Future analyses could transform this binary variable into an ordinal variable (e.g., no relatives. 1 2 5, 25+), though there are computational tradeoffs in terms of the degrees of freedom additional categories introduce to the model.

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380 second generation resettlers were much more likely to be in more highly central positions than other residents. This supports the prediction made in Hypothesis 6 that network centrality would not be negatively associated with status as a second generation resettler. In fact, second g enerational status was positively associated with network centrality. While this finding confirms the results of the social network analysis, the process of statistical modeling goes one step further in that it holds other potentially explanatory factors c onstant (e.g., age, employment, etc.). This likelihood of high centrality among second generation resettlers is a measure of their high level of social capital and an extremely positive signal of community recovery, according to the framework of the Scudde r Colson model. If first generation resettlers had greater odds of being highly central than any other group, this would be evidence that there had not been sufficient opportunity for younger resettlers and newer immigrants to assume the roles filled by ol der generations . (composed mainly of foreign and domestic immigrants) were more likely to be highly central than second generation resettlers, this would have indicated that second generation resettlers were in a disadvantaged position relative to newer residents, who in some cases have been shown to be better educated, with more economic capital and experience (Scudder 2005) . The results of this analysis are therefore a positive finding regarding second resources necessary to sustain their lives and livelihoods in the new location. The results of the regression model also suggest that many of the features of life in Nuevo Arenal that a re associated with the resettlement project design or with the process of community recovery have longitudinal importance in terms of individual

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381 ownership and a central ized urban design that influences how easily accessible an individual is to other community members and vice versa, emerge in the model as significant factors associated with network centrality. Features of economic development, such as multiple property o wnership, independent employment opportunities, and diverse household economies, are also significant. Finally, the model suggests that elements of social reconstitution, such as access to secondary education and opportunities for popular participation, ar While all of these factors may not be directly linked to the resettlement project after three decades (e.g., non resettlers live in resettlement houses and resettlers live in newly constructed houses, landholdin gs have changed hands over time), at some level these resources exist because of the project design or because of the process of community reconstruction post resettlement . Also notable is that in many ways, the factors associated with network centrality i n Nuevo Arenal would likely be associated with network centrality in any community . The fact that Nuevo Arenal has, in effect, is an important measure of recovery after resettleme nt . Before concluding this section, the wide gender disparity in network centrality deserves mention. The regression model suggests that, all other things being equal, women are much less likely to occupy more highly central network positions. Culturally, this result makes sense, as rural Costa Rica continues to be largely patriarchal. Men tend to hold title to land and property and are generally more active than women in .

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382 The result also falls in line with the outcomes of decades of development practice that focused principally on male dominated economic activities to the exclusion of women, being (Clark 2009, Mehta 2009a, Robbi ns 2004). The Arenal resettlement project, implemented in the 1970s, focused primarily on land based economic activities carried out by men. As such, it was a product of its time and place with regard to gender issues. The results of the regression model s uggest that the long term outcomes of this approach continue to be relevant today, as indicated by the largely non central social positions occupied by women in Nuevo Arenal, who continue to lack access to the resources available to men. These results sugg est that an increased focus on integrating women into the social and economic life of resettled communities may serve to augment their social capital and access to resources. In fact, periods of significant social upheaval, such as those engendered by rese ttlement, may provide a critical opportunity to reorganize gender based structures of power and representation. This must be done with attention to culturally specific gender dynamics, however, as there is considerable evidence that blindly encouraging wom and economic participation can exacerbate household and community tensions, leading to unintended consequences such as domestic violence and public ridicule, among others (Podkul 2012, Robbins 2004). The association between the resources us ed in the regression model and network position can likely be explained by a number of factors. Stability in the material and economic dimensions of life may allow for the investment of personal time and energy in non material aspects like popular particip ation. In turn, increased participation gives actors access to other people (and their resources), potentially leading to

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383 additional improvements in their standard of living. Additionally, access to education may increase the material, economic, and social opportunities available to individuals, thus augmenting their social position. So can the diversification of economic strategies, make them less vulnerable to fluctuatio ns in the local or regional economy. Ultimately, achieving centrality in a social network is not just about being well known in a community, but also about what advantages that social position confers. This idea is especially relevant to the case of second generation resettlers, upon whose social and economic status the definition of successful resettlement is based. As discussed previously, people who are in central positions can control information, facilitate group processes, and broker interactions betw een groups in order to gain access to both tangible and intangible resources. A specifically a second generation highly central position in the social network can therefore facilitate their access to additional resources (e.g., la nd, employment) and allow them to engage those resources to augment their social position, thus creating the positive feedback loop between resources and social capital previously referenced . The complexity of social systems can create unexpected outcomes in cases of resettlement. That being said, the long history of failure in development induced resettlement projects has demonstrated that even relatively easily controllable elements like adequate housing, land tenure, and access to education have been ig nored, poorly implemented, or promised and then not followed through. A key outcome of the statistical modeling employed in this section, therefore, is the quantification of how

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384 important those, and other, features of community reconstruction are in influe ncing External Resources: Personal Social Networks The regression model discussed in the previous section was based on the association between network position and access to material, natural, and social resources within the boundaries of the community. An equally important facet of community recovery, however, is the level of integration between the community and broader social, economic, and political contexts (Scudder 2005). Resettle ment undermines the relationships between a community and external entities by destroying the physical and social context in which important interactions occur, leading to the the refore partially predicated on rebuilding a broad network of relationships with the outside world, as no community can survive in isolation. reintegration with the broader political ec onomic and social contexts. In this section, I narrow the focus of analysis to the individual level by measuring the types of relationships Arenale ños have with people outside the community and by evaluating the association between social network position and access to external resources via those relationships. This was achieved through constructing personal social networks for 47 people with whom I also conducted life history interviews. A detailed description of the procedure for collecting personal net work data can with whom they had had interacted within the past 6 12 months, beginning with people

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385 who did not live in Nuevo Arenal. 7 Respondents were then asked a ser ies of questions about each alter. Most relevant to this discussion were a) the location in which each alter lived (originally collected as open ended text and later recoded into three categories: within Nuevo Arenal, within the Lake Arenal region, outside the Lake Arenal region) and b) the type of interaction the respondent had with each alter (also originally collected as open ended text and recoded into two categories: personal or professional). Respondents were also asked to evaluate alter alter ties by identifying which alters knew each other even in the absence of the respondent. I used the software EgoNet on a laptop computer to collect these data. After the data collection etwork, which we used to discuss the patterns that emerged. To address the seventh research hypothesis (H7: t here will be a positive relationship between measures of network centrality and access to human and material reso urces external to the community), I first calculated the proportion of each use d Kruskall Wallis (K W) tests to compare the distributions of alter location and alter type among the three centrality groups (low (n=15), medium (n=17), and high (n=15) in the overall network). I also used K W tests to compare the distributions of alter location and type among the three resident categories (first generation resettlers (n=10), second generation resettlers (n=16), and others (n=21)) in order to determine whether 7 When respondents exhausted their recollection of contacts from outside of Nuevo Arenal, they were allowed to list other community members. Thirteen respondents used this option, naming anywhere from one to 25 alters who lived locally.

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386 second generation resettlers were significantly different from other resident categories with regard to personal network composition. Figure 6 9 presents a graph of the distributions of alter locatio n for each category of overall centrality. K W tests conducted for each pair of centrality categories indicated that there were no statistically significant differences in the distribution of alter locations between individuals of low and medium centrality . There was, however, strong statistical evidence of a difference in the distribution alter location between individuals of high centrality and those of low and medium centrality (Table 6 8). It can be discerned from Figure 6 9 that individuals with low an d medium overall network centrality tended to have more network alters outside of the Lake Arenal region, while individuals who alters within the Lake Arenal region. In o ther words, having more alters within the regional context, as opposed to the national or international contexts, was associated W tests also indicated that there was no difference in th e distribution of alter location based on an generation resettler, second generation resettler, or other resident ( p espectively). Figure 6 10 presents a graph of the distributions of alter type for each category of overall centrality. K W tests conducted for each pair of centrality categories indicated that there was strong statistical evidence of a significant differen ce in the distribution of alter type between individuals of low network centrality and individuals of medium or high network centrality (Table 6 9). Figure 6 10 reveals that people who occupy

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387 positions of low network centrality tended to have more personal and fewer professional alters than did people who occupy more highly central categories. In other words, having a network with a higher proportion of professional alters is associated with higher network centrality. Additional K W tests indicate that ther e was no difference in the generation resettler, second generation resettler, or other resident ( p Based on these find ings, I was also interested in further exploring the distribution of alter types versus alter location. A c hi squared test w as used to test for differences between observed and expected values in alter location based on marginal totals across alter locatio ns ( 2 (2 , N =1409 ) = 43 . 766 , p =0.000; Table 6 10) . This test revealed that the distribution is significantly different than expected. Within the Lake Arenal region, respondents named more professional alters and fewer personal alters than expected. Outside of the region, respondents named fewer professional alters and more weighted toward the professional alters among people who live nearby, but toward the personal side for pe ople who live far away. This pattern makes sense given that my observations suggest that a majority of the economic activities in Nuevo Arenal are carried out at the regional level while personal relationships tend to exist with family and friends who have moved away (usually to larger cities outside of the region) in search of better personal and professional opportunities. Graphs of the personal networks of four individuals of high and four individuals of low overall network centrality provide an info rmative visual demonstration of these

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388 findings. Figures 6 11 and 6 12 display the personal networks of first and second generation resettlers with high overall network centrality. The individual represented in Figure 6 11(A) is a local business owner and was the presidential delegate for the county of Tilar á n during the second Oscar Arias administration. His personal network is evenly divided between regional and extra regional alters; regional alters are both professional and personal while a majority of his extra regional alters are personal. The individual represented in Figure 6 11(B) is the former elementary school director and served on the country commission. His network consists of a large cluster of professional alters who are also involved in regi onal politics and volunteer activities, and a smaller cluster personal alters from the adjoining basin where he owns a small farm. The individual represented in Figure 6 12(A) is a local business owner, conducts fishing tours for tourists, and is extremely active in the organization of the fiestas c í vicas and the sports committee. In his network, professional regional contacts, many of whom are also involved in the tourism sector, account for half of the alters named while extra regional alters are largely personal. The individual represented in Figure 6 12(B) is the night guard of the local health clinic, a salesman in the informal economy, and is active in youth sporting events. His network consists almost entirely of regional alters, over half of whom are professional (many known through his job at the health clinic). Within the community, these four individuals are known for their high level of popular participation and for their ability to attract resources for the purposes of community development. On the other end of the spectrum, Figures 6 13 and 6 14 display the personal networks of first and second generation resettlers with low overall network centrality.

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389 The individual represented by Figure 6 13(A) is a dairy farmer who spends much of his time on his distant farm and feels very little affection for Nuevo Arenal. His network consists of three somewhat connected groups of friends and family; the groups are located in regional communities where he frequently spends time. The individual represented by Figure 6 13(B) is a manual laborer who was only active in school activities when his children were younger. Almost half of his network consists of local contacts, as he had difficulty naming alters from outside Nuevo Arenal. He has many more extra regiona l than regional alters; both groups are almost entirely personal. Both individuals represented by Figure 6 14 are female second generation resettlers and single mothers who have part time housekeeping jobs. The difference between these the networks of the previous six men is striking. Despite being whom are family members that live outside the region. In sum, what is notable in the four networks of in dividuals with low overall network centrality is the lower proportion of regional contacts (with the exception of Figure 6 13(A)) and the preponderance of personal, rather than professional, alters. The results of this personal network analysis support Hypothesis 7, which predicted a positive relationship between measures of network centrality and access to human and material reso urces external to the community. Particularly important is the finding that individuals of high network centrality tended to h ave more regional scale alters and, though their networks were still predominantly personal, had a large proportion of professional alters. While ties with family and friends outside of the community are obviously important, it is through professional rela tionships that

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390 integration with the broader political economy is realized. Having a large number of professional alters within close proximity of the community likely keeps highly central es and opportunities. This gives them to access resources that can be used for their own personal advantage and that might also be of use for the good of the community as a whole. A prime example is that of the fiestas c í vicas , discussed in Chapter 5, for which Arenale ñ os invite contacts from the lake region and beyond to Nuevo Arenal to participate in the tope and corrida de toros . These professional cum personal relationships are critical to the success of the fiestas and to the prestige of the community. People who are involved in organizing these celebrations are seen as leaders within Nuevo Arenal, which only adds to their already high level of social capital. Professional connections vo Arenal, thus supporting the local economy, and their capacity to access municipal and other funds for community development purposes. The fact that these important relationships are formed primarily at the regional scale, rather than at larger scales, s uggests that in future cases of resettlement, re integration within the regional economic, political, and social contexts should be prioritized. The results of this analysis also provide strong quantitative support for the contention made in prior chapte rs that Nuevo Arenal has successfully achieved integration with the broader political economy, which is one of the criteria delineated in the final stage of the Scudder Colson model of community recovery. The personal networks of Arenale ñ os demonstrate tha t this integration is enacted not just in general

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391 terms, but by individual community members with measurable personal and professional relationships with entities outside the community. Chapter Conclusion The quantitative methodologies employed in this ch apter are a departure from the largely qualitative data presented in previous chapters. Nevertheless, it is useful to attempt to operationalize some of the concepts employed in the final stage of the Scudder Colson model. Not only do these quantitative ana lyses offer new insights about the long term process of community recovery in the Arenal case, but they may also be able to inform resettlement planning in other communities faced with involuntary resettlement. Additionally, the analyses discussed in this chapter constitute a set of baseline data that can be used in future studies to compare long term outcomes in involuntarily resettled communities. The analyses discussed in this chapter addressed my final two research objectives. To review, following the predictions of the Scudder Colson model, I was interested in identify ing the social p ositions occupied by second generation resettlers in order to evaluate whether they had assumed community leade rship and whether they possessed the social capital necessar y to sustain their livelihoods. The socio centric network analysis confirmed that second generation resettlers occupy leadership positions at a higher rate than expected given their population size, and that they also disproportionately occupy strategic so cial positions, as measured by their in degree and betweenness centrality. These findings are evidence of the ability of second generation resettlers to sustain their lives and live lihoods in the new community, which corroborates the contention that Nuevo Arenal has transitioned into the final stage of the Scudder Colson model.

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392 I was also interested in exploring how a strategic (i.e., highly central) network position might be achieved, with a specific focus on access to resources both within and outside of the boundaries of the community that have been demonstrated to facilitate the process of community recovery after resettlement. Construction of an ordinal logistic regression model revealed that access to certain types of produced, human, and natural capi tal that formed part of the resettlement project design or that emerged during the process of community recovery have significant explanatory power. Perhaps more importantly, the model revealed that status as a second generation resettler was extremely adv antageous to achieving higher network centrality even when all other explanatory factors were held constant. This speaks to the strong social position of second generation resettlers, which is an important measure of community recovery. Finally, personal n etwork analysis confirmed the positive association of access to external resources, specifically professional contacts within the Lake Arenal region, and network centrality. This substantiates the findings of other studies of resettlement that identify the importance to community reconstruction of regional scale integration, which expands the immediate network of resources available to community members (Mahapatra and Mahapatra 2000, Wolde Selassie 2000). In sum, the findings of these analyses have importan t implications for the ways in which resettlement projects are conceptualized and implemented.

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393 Table 6 1. Crosstabulation of resident category and overall centrality based on in degree centrality summed across all networks. First and second generatio n resettlers occupy more highly and moderately central positions than expected ( 2 (4, N =1430) = 9.106 , p = 0.0 59 ). Overall Centrality Total Low Medium High 1 st generation Count 200 30 14 244 Expected Count 209.4 22.2 12.5 2 nd generati on Count 284 25 24 333 Expected Count 285.7 30.3 17 Other Count 743 75 35 853 Expected Count 731.9 77.5 43.5 Total 1227 130 73 1430 Table 6 2. Crosstabulation of resident category and betweenness centrality for the Community Development ne twork. Second generation resettlers occupy more highly and moderately central positions than expected ( 2 (4, N =1430) = 15. 622 , p =0.004 ). Community Development: Betweenness Centrality Low Medium High Total 1 st generation Count 96 71 77 244 Expected Count 98.8 63.8 81.4 2 nd generation Count 107 96 130 333 Expected Count 134.8 87.1 111.1 Other Count 376 207 270 853 Expected Count 345.4 223.1 284.5 Total 579 374 477 1430

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394 Table 6 3. Crosstabulation of resident category and betweenness c entrality for the Participation network. First and second generation resettlers occupy more highly central positions than expected. Second generation resettlers also occupy more moderately central positions than expected ( 2 (4, N =1430) = 38.961, p =0.000) . Participation: Betweenness Centrality Low Medium High Total 1 st generation Count 89 65 90 244 Expected Count 84.5 78.1 81.4 2 nd generation Count 71 137 125 333 Expected Count 115.3 106.7 111.1 Other Count 335 256 262 853 Expected Cou nt 295.3 273.2 284.5 Total 495 458 477 1430 Table 6 4. Crosstabulation of resident category and betweenness centrality for the Emergency Recovery network. Second generation resettlers occupy more highly and moderately central positions than expecte d ( 2 (4, N =1430) = 22.106, p =0.000). Emergency Recovery: Betweenness Centrality Low Medium High Total 1 st generation Count 95 71 78 244 Expected Count 95.9 66.7 81.4 2 nd generation Count 96 106 131 333 Expected Count 130.9 91.1 111.1 Othe r Count 371 214 268 853 Expected Count 335.2 233.2 284.5 Total 562 391 477 1430

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395 Table 6 5. Summary of data for ordinal logistic regression model N Marginal % Range Mean Std. Dev . Network centrality: Low 156 59% Medium 68 26% High 39 15% Home location: In urban core 149 57% Outside urban core 114 43% Resident status: First generation resettler 58 22% Second generation resettler 58 22% Other 147 56% Employment status: Self employed 81 31% Salaried/Wage 108 41% Unemployed 74 28% Gender: Female 108 41% Male 155 59% Kinship: No related households 65 25% 198 75% Homeowner: No 107 41% Yes 156 59% Household economic divers ity 0 5 1.03 1.01 Age 20 93 46.13 16.56 Education 0 17+ 8.22 4.37 Popular participation (years) 0 50 3.98 7.94 Landholder (# of properties) 0 5 0.39 0.86

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396 Table 6 6. Ordinal logistic regression model. Parameter Hypothesis Test 95% Wal d Confidence Interval for Exp(B) Wald Chi Square df Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper Threshold: Centrality=low 15.605 1 0 .000 34.996 5.997 204.221 Centrality=medium 33.451 1 0 .000 227.858 36.200 1434.240 Location=in urban core 5.964 1 0 .015 2.032 1.15 0 3.589 Location=outside urban core . . . 1 . . Resident status=first generation resettler 1.691 1 0 .193 0 .560 0 .233 1.342 Resident status=second generation resettler 5.468 1 0 .019 2.486 1.159 5.335 Resident status =other . . . 1 . . Employment status =self employed 3.613 1 0 .057 2.116 0 .977 4.584 Employment status =salaried or wage 0 .587 1 0 .444 0 .722 0 .313 1.662 Employment status =not employed . . . 1 . . Gender=female 11.163 1 0 .001 0 .334 0 .175 0 .635 Gender=male . . . 1 . . Kins hip=no related households 0 .674 1 0 .412 1.370 0 .646 2.908 Kinship=at least one related household . . . 1 . . Homeowner= no 9.121 1 0 .003 0 .394 0 .215 0 .721 Homeowner= yes . . . 1 . . Household economic diversity 6.728 1 0 .009 1.430 1.091 1.87 3 Age 3.521 1 0 .061 1.024 0 .999 1.049 Education 16.448 1 0 .000 1.157 1.078 1.242 Popular participation (years) 38.231 1 0 .000 1.147 1.098 1.198 Landholder (# of properties) 14.459 1 0 .000 1.928 1.375 2.704

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397 Table 6 7. Crosstabulation of obser ved and predicted centrality values from the ordinal logistic regression model. ( 2 (4, N = 263 ) = 123 . 375 , p =0.000). Predicted Centrality Low Medium High Total Low centrality Count 141 10 5 156 Expected Count 106.8 17.8 31.4 Medium centralit y Count 34 15 19 68 Expected Count 46.5 7.8 13.7 High centrality Count 5 5 29 39 Expected Count 26.7 4.4 7.9 Total 180 30 53 26 3 Table 6 8. Kruskall Wallis p values for pairwise comparisons o f overall centrality groups and alter location. Significant p Kruskall Wallis p values I n Nuevo Arenal In Lake Arenal r egion Outside Lake Arenal r egion Low vs medium centrality 0.592 0.173 0.691 Low vs high centrality 0.361 0.041* 0.078 Medium vs h igh centr ality 0.166 0.014* 0.070 Table 6 9. Kruskall Wallis p values for pairwise comparisons o f overall centrality groups and alter type. Significant p Median Percentage of A lters Profession al Personal Low vs medium centrality 0.005* 0.005* Low vs high centrality 0.001* 0.001* Medium vs h igh centrality 0.557 0.557

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398 Table 6 10. Crosstabulation of personal network alter locations and alter types ( 2 (2 , N =1409 ) = 43 . 766 , p =0.000). Alter Type Total Professional Personal In Nuevo Arenal Count 57 98 155 Expected Count 41.8 113.2 Lake Arenal region Count 181 343 524 Expected Count 141.3 382.7 Outside region Count 142 588 730 Expected Count 196.9 533.1 Total 38 0 1029 1409

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399 Figure 6 1. Proportion of first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and other residents in high, medium, and low centrality positions within the social network of Nuevo Arenal. Second generation resettlers occupy highly central positions in proportionally larger numbers than do first generation resettlers and other residents. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1st generation (n=244) 2nd generation (n=333) Other (n=853) Percentage of Total Resident Category Low centrality Medium centrality High centrality

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400 A B Figure 6 2. Whole social network of Nuevo Arenal aggregated from the three individual networks. First generation resettlers are represen ted in green, second generation resettlers in yellow, and all other residents in blue. Ties between individuals are represented by gray lines. A) Nodes are sized by overall centrality (low, medium, high). B) Nodes of high overall centrality only .

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401 A B Figure 6 3. generation resettlers are represented in green, second generation resettlers in yellow, and all ot her residents in blue. Ties between individuals are represented by gray lines. Nodes are sized by A) in degree centrality and B) betweenness centrality.

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402 A B Figure 6 4. people a generation resettlers are represented in green, second generation resettlers in yellow, and all other residents in blue. Ties between individuals are represented by gray lines. Nodes are sized by A) in degree centrality and B) betweenness centrality.

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403 A B Figure 6 5. were a major natural disaster in this community, whom would you expect to g eneration resettlers are represented in green, second generation resettlers in yellow, and all other residents in blue. Ties between individuals are represented by gray lines. Nodes are sized by A) in degree centrality and B) betweenness centrality.

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404 Fi gure 6 6. Community Development network of individuals with high in degree centrality (in First generation resettlers are represented in green, second generation resettlers in yellow, and all other residents in blue. Nodes are sized by in deg ree centrality and numbered by a unique network ID. Note the importance of Node 568, a first generation resettler with considerable political influence and a history of community development success.

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405 Figure 6 7. Emergency Recovery network of individua ls w ith high in degree centrality (in First generation resettlers are represented in green, second generation resettlers in yellow, and all other residents in blue. Nodes are sized by in degree centrality and numbered by a unique network ID. While Node 568 continues to be highly central in this network, both second generation resettlers and other residents also emerge as key actors.

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406 Figure 6 8. Participation network of individuals w ith high in degree centrality (in First generati on resettlers are represented in green, second generation resettlers in yellow, and all other residents in blue. Nodes are sized by in degree centrality and numbered by a unique network ID. Note that Node 568 loses centrality relative to second generation resettlers and other reside nts when compared with Figures 6 6 and 6 7.

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407 Figure 6 9. Distribution of personal network alter locations by level of centrality in the whole social network.

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408 Figure 6 10. Distribution of personal network alter types by lev el of centrality in the whole social network.

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409 A B Figure 6 11. Personal social networks of A) a second generation resettler and B) a first generation resettler. Both occupy positions of high centrality in the overall social network, in large part due to their political involvement. Alters within Nuevo Arenal are represented in gray, alters in the Lake Arenal region in blue, and alters outside the Lake Arenal region in red. Professional alters are represented by circles and personal contacts by triangl es.

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410 A B Figure 6 12. Personal social networks of A) a second generation resettler who is a local business owner and is active in community events and B) a second generation resettler who is a security guard and informal salesman, and is particularly ac tive in youth sporting events. Both occupy positions of high centrality in the overall social network. Alters within Nuevo Arenal are represented in gray, alters in the Lake Arenal region in blue, and alters outside the Lake Arenal region in red. Professio nal alters are represented by circles and personal contacts by triangles.

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411 A B Figure 6 13. Personal social networks of A) a first generation resettler who spends a majority of each week on his distant cattle ranch and B) a first generation resettler w ho is a construction worker and participates very infrequently in community activities. Both occupy positions of low centrality in the overall social network. Alters within Nuevo Arenal are represented in gray, alters in the Lake Arenal region in blue, and alters outside the Lake Arenal region in red. Professional alters are represented by circles and personal contacts by triangles.

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412 A B Figure 6 14. Personal social networks of A) a second generation resettler who is a single mother and works as a house keeper and B) a second generation resettler who is a single mother and infrequently works outside the home. Both occupy positions of low centrality in the overall social network. Alters within Nuevo Arenal are represented in gray, alters in the Lake Arenal region in blue, and alters outside the Lake Arenal region in red. Professional alters are represented by circles and personal contacts by triangles.

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413 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION The services provided by large dams have been responsible for measurable improvemen ts in the well being of citizens of the developed and developing worlds alike. Through the provision of water for human consumption and irrigation, energy access to basic needs , thus addressing one of the primary goals of contemporary development practice. Large dams are also important at a symbolic level, as concrete Smith 2010a, Worster 1985 , Khagram 2004). Nevertheless, as discussed throughout this dissertation, these large infrastructure projects have also been the cause of disastrous and fundamentally unjust human consequences. Dams displace approximately four million people per year, the vast majority of whom are impoverished by dislocation, not just in material terms but also psychologically, socially, and culturally (Cernea 1997, Downing and Garcia takes awa y from those it displaces is their moral map, the basis of their livelihood, and a rebuilding their livelihoods in an unfamiliar location while simultaneously coping with the multi dimensional stress associated with the breakup of social systems and kin groups, shifts in the relations of production, and the loss of their sense of place. In this new past securities have been removed, and vulnerability [is] suddenl y and externally imposed .

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414 The ethics of a development model that creates this high level of human suffering is the subject of considerable debate. On one hand, the development projects in question are responsible for measurable improv ements in the quality of life of millions of people. On the other hand, these same projects have displaced and impoverished at least 80 90 million people since the middle of the 20 th century (Cernea 2010). This contradiction highlights the tension between the goals of development and the realities of its implementation (Penz et al. 2011). Traditional approaches to decision making about the construction of large dams are not particularly useful to resolving this dilemma. Decision making guided by benefit analysis tends to externalize environmental and social costs in favor of economic growth. In addition to the technical issues surrounding the use of cost benefit analysis, which include problems associated with the process of contingent valuation for non market items and the regular inflation of benefits and underestimation of costs, the utilitarian notion of doing the greatest good for the greatest number upon which CBA is founded does not take into account issues of contributive justice. In other words, it does not question who pays the costs of development and who benefits, and it does not call for the burden of development to be allocated equally (Penz et al. 2011). The flawed decision making process lead s to the (Ramanathan 2006). Despite these valid criticisms of the negative consequences and decision making surrounding mega development, the future of large dam constru ction is a near certainty. Increasing demands for water and energy, particularly in the current unpredictable

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415 context of climate change, have recently led to increased funding for large dams (World Bank 2009). Human displacement and resettlement will almos t certainly accompany many of these projects. Improvement to resettlement policy and practice to mitigate the counter development consequences of large dam construction is therefore an urgent need. The research presented in this dissertation was conducted in an attempt to contribute to this discussion. In particular, by analyzing a case of resettlement that is dissertation will contribute to the body of knowledge on s uccessful involuntary resettlement. This research was primarily framed by the Scudder Colson model of community reconstruction after involuntary resettlement, which delineates a set of four stages through which resettled communities are predicted to pass as they recover from the trauma of resettlement if the resettlement process is appropriately planned and executed. A prior evaluation of the Arenal project conducted by William Partridge for the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) in 1983, five years aft er resettlement, determined that the community had entered the third stage of the model. The overall objective of this research was to evaluate the long term success of the Arenal resettlement project by determining whether the community of Nuevo Arenal ha s entered the final stage of the Scudder Colson model. This overarching objective was broken into three specific objectives. First, I wanted to understand the processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction undertaken since the time of last data collection in 1983. Second, I wanted to identify the social positions occupied by first generation resettlers, second generation resettlers, and other residents in order to

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416 determine a) whether community leadership has been assumed by the second generatio n of resettlers and b) whether second generation resettlers, in comparison to other groups, occupy positions in the social network that facilitate their access to various types of resources. This focus on the second generation emerged directly from the pre dictions made by the Scudder Colson model, which identifies the well being of second generation resettlers as a metric of successful long term community reconstruction. Finally, I was interested in identifying whether features of life in Nuevo Arenal that stemmed from the resettlement project design or that emerged from the process of community recovery after resettlement are associated with individual success (operationalized as high network centrality) in the community. These objectives led to seven resea rch hypotheses. If the resettlement of Nuevo Arenal was successful, the following outcomes were expected: 1. The processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction that began during the second and third stages of the Scudder Colson model will conti nue to be visible today, and will have expanded in scope. This points to the capacity of resettlers to be agents of their own process of recovery. 2. Nuevo Arenal will have become integrated into the broader political economy of the region and nation, as m easured by economic, political, and social interactions with entities outside of the physical boundaries of the community. 3. Residents of Nuevo Arenal will consider their quality of life to be at least on par with that of neighboring, un resettled, commun ities. This is an indication that the community was, at the very least, not permanently disadvantaged by resettlement. 4. Both first and second generation resettlers will occupy key structural positions within the social network of the community. These positions will be occupied by each group in numbers that are proportional to their overall population size. In other words, the post resettlement reconstruction process will have created viable opportunities for second generation resettlers to remain in t he community, to assume important social roles at the community level, and to gain access to the social and material resources necessary for survival.

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417 5. There will be no differences in measures of mean network centrality between first generation reset tlers, second generation resettlers, and immigrants. In other words, membership in one of these groups does not confer an advantage in becoming central to the network , signifying that leadership is not solely the purview of first generation resettlers or i mmigrants, who in some cases have been shown to be better educated, with more capital and experience (Scudder 2005) . Second generation resettlers will be on equal footing with all other residents, indicating that there have been sufficient opportunities to sustain their economic and social well being in the community over time. 6. Variation in measures of network centrality will associated with the following variables: age, gender, level of education, kinship ties to other local households, employment statu s, diversity in sources of household income, home ownership, ease of access to other community members and activities (i.e., home location), l and ownership, and participation in community or political organizations. In other words, features of the resettle ment plan and the subsequent process of position. Network centrality will not status as a second generation resettler. This indicates that second generation resettlers have an equivalent chance as any other resident category of becoming central in the social network, suggesting that the process of community reconstruction has not disadvantaged them relative to other residents. 7. There w ill be a positive relationship between measures of network centrality and access to human and material resources external to the community. In other words, becoming central in the local social network will be correlated not only with access to resources wi thin the community, but also with access to people and resources outside of the community. If this hypothesis holds true, it will provide additional support for the need to mitigate the risks of marginalization and social disarticulation often experienced after resettlement (Cernea 1997). Review of Previous Chapters Chapter 1 of this dissertation began by providing a thumbnail sketch of the resettlement project upon which the research was based. I then reviewed the debate over dams and displacement in the context of global development, the ethical and operational challenges surrounding decision making about large dams, and advances and limitations in resettlement policy and practice. The chapter concluded with a review of the two dominant models for unders tanding the impacts of development forced

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418 Reconstruction (IRR) model and the Scudder Colson four stage model of community reconstruction. While this dissertation employed both models throughout, it is principally oriented around the Scudder Colson model as it provides a multi generational perspective on community recovery. as the framework for iden tifying what the benchmark for successful community reconstruction after resettlement should be. I argued that for the purposes of research on involuntary resettlement, community should be seen as a physical space within which resettlers build a shared an identity and recover the capacity to work together to meet the needs of the community. In this definition, both the material and symbolic dimensions of community come into play. I then situated this definition within the third and fourth stages of the Scud der Colson model. Finally, I presented the research objectives, hypotheses, and methods employed in this research. Chapter 3 began with a brief history of hydropower development in Costa Rica, with a special focus on the role that the Arenal project plann er, the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity ( Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad economic growth and rural development as a keystone institution of the welfare state. internal ethic were critical to its ability scale human displacement. This discussion was followed by a detailed description of the process of project. I then described the immediate aftermath of resettlement, based on two short -

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419 term assessments of the project (Obando 1981; P artridge 1983, 1993) and my own interviews. I also assessed the resettlement planning process and short term outcomes to address all eight risks, joblessness, marginalizat ion, and food insecurity were significant problems immediately after resettlement. Chapter 3 closed with some planning and the participatory nature of the resettlement process, the first three to five years in the new community were extremely challenging for the resettlers, largely because of difficulties encountered in rebuilding a viable local economy. On the other ttlement created the foundation for material reconstruction and social reconstitution in the new community, which enabled resettlers to become the agents of their own process of community recovery. In Chapters 4 and 5, I addressed Hypotheses 1 3 by rev iewing the long term processes of economic, material, and social reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal. Chapter 4 dealt principally with economic recovery. I began with a description of the principal land based livelihood strategies, some of which were consistent with activities prior to resettlement (e.g., dairy and cattle ranching) and some of which were riskier new strategies designed to salvage the struggling local economy (e.g., coffee). There, I crop agriculture rather than on traditional activities like animal husbandry was a major oversight in the project planning, and led to a number of difficult years after resettlement. The introduction of agricultural credit to incentivize coffee production was a short term difficulties and facilitated its integration into the broader economic context, but coffee

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420 production was not successful in the long term due to an inadequate environment for coffee plantations. In fact, in the end, man y resettlers who engaged in coffee production were left worse off than before due to the large amount of debt they incurred. The second half of the chapter focused on the emergence of a new service based economy, the demand for which was created by the gro wing national tourism sector in the mid 1990s. In particular, residential tourism created a booming real estate market, in which a number of Arenal eños secured their fortunes , and led to new employment opportunities in the domestic labor and hospitality se ctors. While land based economic activities continue to be an important component of Arenale ñ cultural identity, this new service based economy is widely perceived to have been the ion and into the hub of activity it is today. The new economy, however, also has a darker side, as it has dramatically increased the cost of living in the community and created social tensions due to changing norms of behavior. By integrating the community into broader scale global such as economic recessions and fluctuations in the international tourism sector. While Chapter 4 focused on economic development, Chapter 5 addressed the important processes of material reconstruction and social reconstitution that allowed Arenale ñ os to turn the resettlement site into home and regain their sense of community. I began by discussing Arenale ñ e, neighborhood, participation throughout the resettlement process, helped create a sense of continuity between Viejo Arenal and Nuevo Arenal and gave community members a solid

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421 foundation from which to begin to rebuild their social geometry. Through appropriating, modifying, and expanding personal and communal infrastructure, largely without the assistance of the resettlement agency, the resettlers made the new community their that had been lost by resettlement. Chapter 5 also addressed the process of social reconstitution by focusing on the roles of group identity, popular participatio n, ritual, and memory. Group identity was largely preserved by maintaining the integrity of the community during resettlement. It was later strengthened through feelings of solidarity in overcoming the challenges of resettlement, the continual preservation of memories of the old community via oral histories and storytelling, and the recovery of important formal and informal rituals. As with material reconstruction, social reconstitution was aided by the preservation of continuity between the old and new com munities. Another metric of social reconstitution, the ability of the community to manage its own affairs and the elimination of dependency on the resettlement agency, is illustrated by the abundance of voluntary associations, in which the level of partici pation is relatively high. Similar to the process of material reconstruction, a series of good planning decisions on the part of the resettlement agency played an important role in facilitating, rather than hindering, social recovery. For example, ICE was cognizant of the importance of maintaining group and sub group integrity during resettlement, encouraged the organization of local associations, and provided trainings on leadership and community development. Chapter 5 concluded with a discussion of Arenal e ñ quality of life in Nuevo Arenal compared with neighboring communities and their reflections on whether the community had been benefitted by resettlement. In order of

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422 importance, access to urban services, community infrastructure, and employment opportunities were responsible for the generally positive perception residents had of their quality of life in the community. A small majority also believed the community had been benefitted, rather than harmed, by resettlement for similar reasons. Taken together, the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 support the predictions made in Hypotheses 1 3. Chapter 6 addressed Hypotheses 4 7 by quantifying some of the long term outcomes of resettlement. I began with a socio centric network analysis, used to identify the social positions of second generation resettlers within the social fabric of Nuevo Arenal. This was intended to measure whether leadership had been passed from first to second generation resettlers and whether second generation resettlers were in a position to access the resources necessary for survival (i.e., whether they had high levels of social capital). Both questions were positively affirmed by the research findings, confirming the predictions made in Hypotheses 4 and 5. In the secon d half of the chapter, I discussed the construction of an ordinal logistic regression model to of a strategic network position. Importantly, many features of life in Nue vo Arenal that are outcomes of the resettlement planning or the process of community recovery were demonstrated to have significant explanatory power. These include access to secondary education, employment opportunities, home and land ownership, and popul ar participation. Additionally, status as a second generation resettler was shown to be extremely advantageous to achieving high network centrality. These findings largely confirm the predictions made in Hypothesis 6. Finally, the importance of professiona l

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423 contacts at the regional scale to achieving a strategic network position was revealed through personal network analysis, thus supporting Hypothesis 7. I assert that these relationships are also important beyond the individual level, as they serve to stre ngthen the connection between Nuevo Arenal and the regional political economy. In sum, the analyses in this chapter support the notion that a combination of good resettlement planning and resettler agency have resulted in an environment that creates opport unities for individual and, by extension, community success. The Arenal Case: An Example of Successful Resettlement? The overarching question that framed this study was whether the resettlement of Nuevo Arenal can be considered a long term success. The path to answering this question was charted by applying the Scudder Colson four stage model of successful community reconstruction after involuntary resettlement. The first two stages of the ely address the short term issues associated with resettlement, though in poorly executed resettlement projects, the second stage can extend indefinitely. The third and fourth stages of the over and term process of community the capacity to manage all dimensions of individual and communal life in the new lo cation economic, material, and social. In recovering this capacity, the dependency on the resettlement agency that exists early in the resettlement process is eliminated, the community becomes incorporated into the broader political economy of the region a quality of life comparable to other communities in the region becomes possible for future

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424 generation of resettlers in the new location. In her analysis of refugee repatria tion, which bears a strong resemblance to other forms of resettlement, Hammond (2004:220) characterizes the goal of community reconstruction after repatriation as the recovery of with other term goal for community reconstruction presented in the Scudder Colson model. At the time of last data collection in 1983, the level of economic and community development in Nue vo Arenal signaled that it had entered the third stage of the model. The data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation confirm that finding and provide additional documentation of the continuing processes of economic development, community format ion, and the recovery of an attachment to place. The current study also provides strong evidence that Nuevo Arenal has entered the final stage of the model. As detailed in Chapters 4 and 5, community management responsibilities are fully in the hands of th e appropriate local, regional, and national authorities; the community has long been incorporated into the broader political economy of the region and nation (and beyond); the continuing process of community development demonstrates its capacity to advocat e for its interests and compete for its fair share of resources; and a majority of residents believe that Arenale ñ os have at least a comparable quality of life as their peers in neighboring communities. By these metrics, and despite its shortcomings, the r esettlement project can be deemed a long term success. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Arenale ñ os have developed a strong affective attachment to the new community. While they acknowledge that resettlement represented an enormous sacrifice on th eir part and are nostalgic for some

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425 aspects of the old community, they are also proud of the process of community recovery that they have undertaken and feel a strong sense of community spirit and identity. In addition to these benchmarks of successful resettlement, the Scudder Colson model also characterizes success in terms of the social positions of the second generation of resettlers. This is based on the idea that successful community recovery after resettlement will create the circumstances necessa ry for second generation resettlers to establish their lives in the new community and assume the social and economic roles once filled by the original resettlers. The analysis of the social positions of second generation resettlers presented in Chapter 6 c onfirms that second generation resettlers occupy leadership positions in numbers greater than expected given their population size. Furthermore, second generation resettlers are more in degree and between central than expected, indicating that they occupy strategic positions within the social fabric of the community and therefore are more likely to have access to information and resources. They are also more likely to achieve a highly central network position than any other group in the community and have e quivalent access as other residents to resources outside of the community. By these standards as well, then, the community can be considered to have entered the final stage of the Scudder Colson model. While the resettlement of Nuevo Arenal can be deeme d a long term success according to the predictions made by the Scudder Colson model, by other metrics the picture is slightly less clear. For example, during the first difficult years after resettlement, which were characterized by marginalization and a fa iling economy, the project did not meet the contemporary resettlement policy goal of restoration, much less

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426 improvement, of living standards. Nor did it incorporate other strategies akin to he loss of economic potential. As in many cases of resettlement, the project planners prioritized the restoration of material assets but did not deal as well with the economic dimensions of recovery. While some have persuasively argued that community recon struction is possible in the absence of economic recovery (cf. Hirschon 2000), I assert that in the context of rural development where income generating options are limited, the ability to reestablish at least subsistence level livelihood activities is cri tical. On the other hand, as the resettlers adjusted to life in the new community and new economic opportunities emerged, living standards did improve over time. Today, the quality of life in Nuevo Arenal is considered by many to be better than that in neighboring communities, and considered by a small majority to be better than they would have had in Viejo Arenal in the absence of resettlement, precisely because of the assets created by the resettlement project. Ultimately, the Arenal case is characteri zed by a somewhat unique combination of good planning, resettler agency, and good luck sensu Sen 1992) to achieve well being. In the vast majority of cases of involuntary resettlement, however, positive outcomes are not the norm (Scudder 2005). Seen through this lens, then, the question of whether the ends justify the means is unavoidable. How many years of trauma (if any) are excusable in the pursuit of potentially elusive positive long term outcomes? Wh ile obviously an unanswerable question, it is one I am left with as I near the end of this project.

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427 Principal Lessons Despite the somewhat ambivalent tone with which I concluded the previous section, the Arenal project remains an important case from whic h to draw lessons that can inform current resettlement policy and practice. To begin, this study demonstrates the extent to which good resettlement planning and implementation can lead to successful post resettlement outcomes. In the introductory chapter o f this dissertation, some of the administrative and budgetary challenges to successful resettlement were identified. Among these are a lack of institutional capacity to carry out the work, a long project timeline that creates a prolonged environment of unc ertainty for the resettlers, and a lack of funding for the resettlement component of development projects. In the Arenal case, the project developer, ICE, successfully addressed these challenges. ICE began by collecting primary baseline data in order to u nderstand the current situation and future needs of the population that was to be displaced. Once it had a sense of the problem, the institution enhanced its institutional capacity by creating an Office of Resettlement. The Office was staffed by an interdi sciplinary team of architects, engineers, technicians, and social workers, whose sole responsibility was to oversee the resettlement process. These staff members then worked closely with the resettlers to design a resettlement plan that was acceptable to t hem, giving them a voice in the selection of the future resettlement site, the layout of the community, and the design and location of their personal properties. This high degree of information sharing and consultation gave resettlers a sense of control ov er the process, which Downing and Garcia Downing (2010) argue helps mitigate the psycho socio cultural stress of resettlement. Participation also allows resettlers to develop a sense of ownership of the

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428 new settlement, which can catalyze the process of com munity recovery (Oliver Smith 1991). The resettlement timeline itself was relatively short. Though the Arenal hydroelectric project had been under consideration since the late 1950s, funding for the project was not secured until 1974. Because a resettleme nt action plan was ready at the community in 1973 and resettlement in 1977. This forestalled the gradual deterioration in living standards noted in other a cases of resettl ement as the lengthy period of uncertainty discourages continued investment in personal assets (cf. Bartolome 1984). Furthermore, the new community was ready to be occupied almost a year before the reservoir was flooded, allowing for a gradual transition b etween sites. In contrast to other cases of involuntary resettlement, in which project delays create last minute resettlement crises (Hamilton 1993), the planning measures in the Arenal case created as much of a sense of a controlled process as can be expe cted in these highly stressful situations. One important factor in the timely completion of the resettlement component of the project was the fact that ICE allocated considerable funding to it, 9% of the total project budget, thus avoiding the budgetary ch allenges encountered in other cases. of project authorities and governments to impleme nt a resettlement action plan that is responsible resettlement was rooted both in its long histo ry as a principle agent of rural

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429 dominated during the second half of the 20 th century. Though Scudder (2005) notes that political will alone is insufficient to ensure project su ccess, the reverse is also true the absence of political will almost guarantees project failure. Another challenge to successful resettlement is the idea that institutional responsibilities to the resettlers end after construction of the settlement is com plete, leaving resettlers without support at their most vulnerable moment (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010). In the Arenal case, though ICE strategically began to turn project assets and management responsibilities over to local and regional authorities al most immediately upon resettlement, the institution demonstrated its longer term investment in the community by hiring community promoters to live alongside the resettlers for a period of three years in the new settlement. The importance of the institution economic struggles of the community early on and adjust accordingly by helping to institute a new coffee production system. This capacity for flexibility and adaptation underlin es the fact that rural development is a hands on enterprise that cannot be conducted effectively from a distant capital. As I argued in Chapter 4, the short term economi c situation continued to deteriorate, as it likely would have in the absence of the infusion of capital from coffee production. The Arenal case also illustrates the importance of thoughtful resettlement planning to the process of material reconstruction. T hrough such actions as building houses according to a traditional format (and of better quality than those in the old

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430 community), allocating lots large enough for the recovery of activities like gardening and fruticulture, paying attention to the aesthetic s of urban design, and maintaining continuity of layout between the old and new communities, ICE created the blueprint of a community that Arenale ñ os were then able to appropriate and modify to suit their needs. Through the process of emplacing themselves in the new environment, Arenale ñ os began to reconstruct their social geometry and regain the senses of place and community that were lost by resettlement. Additionally, the strong material base created by the resettlement project allowed the resettlers to direct their energy to other pressing tasks upon resettlement, such as economic recovery and social reconstitution, rather than dealing with the issues of homelessness, landlessness, and health risks so prevalent in cases of forced resettlement (Cernea 199 7). In this sense, this study supports Oliver the reconstitution of individual and community identity. That being said, another important lesson from the Arenal project with regard t o material reconstruction is that the aesthetics of a new settlement are extremely three decades after resettlement, Arenale ñ os continue to reflect on how depressing the new community was with its muddy terrain, unpaved roads, and bare housing plots. While some may argue that a blank slate allows resettlers to take ownership of their properties by making their mark on them, I believe that an appropriate middle ground e possible while still giving resettlers the option to modify the appearance of their new

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431 properties as they deem necessary. The shock of abandoning the old community is dif ficult enough; an aesthetically displeasing new settlement only adds insult to injury. This study also demonstrates that good resettlement planning can help mitigate the social disarticulation that is frequently associated with resettlement and facilitat e the process of community recovery. In the Arenal case, maintaining community integrity by resettling the entire community together into an area with low host population density, as well as allowing for familiar social and kinship units to be maintained a t the household and neighborhood scales, helped resettlers preserve their sense of group identity. In turn, the preservation of group identity reduces the multi dimensional stress caused by resettlement (Scudder 2005). In addition, ICE staff encouraged and directly facilitated the development of voluntary associations to manage the affairs of the community, which catalyzed a sense of local self dependency on the resettlement agency. Finally, the establishment of Arenal a s an independent political unit at the municipal level allowed for political inclusion, thereby community development. In both the material and social dimensions of community recovery, the Arenal and new lives to the extent possible. Involuntary resettlement is profoundly disruptive, effecting a shift from routine culture (i.e., the set of the constructs and rules that provide a group of people with a routine that is predictable and meaningful) to dissonant culture (i.e., reordering of space, time, relationships, norms, and psycho socio cultural constructs D owning 2010:230)). The effect of this shift is that life

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432 becomes temporarily unintelligible (Downing and Garcia Downing 2010). Minimizing the disruption of routine culture can be achieved by ensuring that the new location is evious way of life, including prior patterns of social interaction (Marris 1974). Thus, the features of resettlement planning that prioritized material, social, and cultural continuity played an important role in Arenale ños make sense of their new environment. This is not to say that resettlement was not stressful and disruptive for Arenale ñ os; it was, as illustrated by their descriptions of the immediate aftermath of resettlement in Chapter 3, during which many residents simply abandoned the co mmunity. Nevertheless, continuity in certain features of the plaza school triad and the maintenance of localized social networks) arguably made for a smoother transition than has been documented in othe r cases of resettlement. attention to the material, social, and, perhaps most importantly, psychological and affective dimensions of resettlement, the latter two of which have larg ely been ignored ability to transition from victims into actors (Oliver Smith 2005b) . On one hand, the decision to implement a land based compensation structure was well conceived. In theory, it gave resettlers, many of whom were landless prior to resettlement, access to the means of production necessary to sustain their livelihoods. ICE also carefully considered the need to promote a new smallholder agricultural economy in the new settlement to compensate for the loss of the major source of employment in the region

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433 (the large cattle ranches). Furthermore, efforts were made to rebuild the commercial sector by replacing the urban infrastructure that was lost by resettlement. Despite this attempt at economic planning, however, ICE overlooked a number of critical factors, the combination of which created an extremely difficult econ omic situation in the new community. resettlement projects. First, McCully (2001) notes that it is often difficult for resettlement agencies to secure sufficient replacement land to make agricultural economies viable. This was true in the Arenal case. As discussed in Chapter 4, only resettlers who were able to access the capital necessary to purchase additional properties had any hope of generating enough income to support th eir families. In general, the small rural plot sizes in combination with the low soil fertility and difficult climate, made commercial scale agricultural production nearly impossible. Second, McCully (2001) also notes that estimates of the viability of pos t resettlement livelihood activities tend to be overly optimistic. This was also true in the Arenal case and led to a sort of tunnel vision among project planners, who were confident that the land based resettlement structure and their own technical assist ance would naturally lead to the establishment of a vibrant agricultural economy. This approach discounted or ignored other complicating cultural, structural, and political economic factors. In addition to these challenges, an additional planning problem w to the legal complications with their property titles. In this analysis, three key factors become apparent that, if addressed differently, may have helped to alleviate some of the eco nomic stress involved in the relocation

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434 project. First, agricultural credit should have been made available to the resettlers even before resettlement. If this was not possible through the traditional financial institutions, ICE could have redirected a per centage of the resettlement funds to this issue. Second, rather than focus almost exclusively on crop agriculture, ICE planners could have applied the same attention to continuity in the economic dimension that they did in the material and social dimension s. By taking advantage of Arenale ñ experience with animal husbandry, perhaps in combination with the promotion of new crop agriculture, a more diverse local economy could have emerged. A greater emphasis on animal husbandry would also have highlighted the need for larger resettlement properties. ICE could also have paid more attention to the need for economic diversification, perhaps even through initiating or encouraging the development of tourism infrastructure to accompany their predictio future touristic value. Finally, project planners seemed to have conceived of the new economy in isolation, without consideration for how it would integrate with the broader market structure. Access to markets was hindered not only by t he physical isolation of the community to due poor road conditions, but also by a lack of attention to creating (or preserving) relationships between the producers and potential consumers. For example, lk collection center to the new community severely limited market access for resettlers who attempted to engage in dairy production in the new community. Increased attention to this and other producer consumer linkages could have made a measurable differen ce in the difficult first years after resettlement. It may also have helped to mitigate the economic difficulties

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435 clients and low cash flow. The eventual emergence of coffee pr oduction and the establishment of the coffee cooperative were important steps in the right direction, with the caveat that coffee was an inappropriate product for the region and thus was only a temporary solution (and a problematic one at that). To concl ude the discussion of the lessons about economic recovery after resettlement that can be taken from this case, it should also be noted that exogenous 1990s, played a critical term economic viability. While the touristic potential of Lake Arenal was a predicted benefit of the hydroelectric project, ICE did not anticipate the eventual scale and international nature of tourism in the country and thus d id not concern itself with the development of tourism infrastructure. In a sense, the arrival of residential tourism in Nuevo Arenal was a lucky accident that would be difficult to purposefully replicate elsewhere. There were, however, some elements of the resettlement project planning that were important to the emergence of this new economic phase. First, the infrastructure that was initially developed by the resettlement agency and later expanded upon by the resettlers themselves was an attractive feature to residential tourists. These tourists were predominantly North American and European retirees who were interested in a similar standard of living as amenities they were looking for. Second, the land based compensation structure of the resettlement project gave Arenale ñ os an entrée into the new real estate economy through selling their land, sometimes for astronomical sums. The influx of cash into the local economy created a cascading effect of new commercial enterprises and

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436 infrastructural expansion. In sum, the ways in which Arenale ñ os have been able to take advantage of the new economic opportunities created by the tourism sector is an indication that the project contrib uted to, or at least did not hinder, their long term capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. This flexibility is a positive signal of successful community recovery after resettlement. Beyond the resettlement planning aspects, the Arenal case also dem onstrates the importance of resettler agency in community recovery. As Scudder (2005:32 33) well rly assisted in the process of community reconstruction in Nuevo Arenal, particularly in the material and social dimensions, the resettlers themselves were also important actors in their own recovery. Despite the difficulties of resettlement, Arenale s trong sense of identity and pride was retained, and it buoyed them during the difficult process of emplacing themselves in the new environment. Key actors, such as those residents with political connections or an interest in popular participation, were als o instrumental to the continued forward progress of the community. In the end, the Arenal case provides additional evidence that when poor resettlement planning does not hinder the process of community recovery, resettlers will quickly become actors rather than victims, enhancing the chances of successful resettlement. Last but not least, this study highlights the importance of long term evaluations. Five years after the resettlement of Nuevo Arenal, anthropologist William Partridge 1983 follow up assess ment for the IDB was overwhelmingly positive. In addition to recording positive indicators of social reconstitution, Partridge also found that

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437 agricultural and livestock production had intensified; households had surplus income that they were using to inve st in additional farmland, outbuildings, and vehicles; and local business owners reported significant increases in their permanent inventory. just two years after the co ffee cooperative was founded and when production was continuing to expand. Just a few years later, however, the coffee economy had crashed, resettlers had razed their fields, and the community entered into another multi year economic downturn. Conclusions about rural economic development after resettlement why Scudder (2005) notes that assessing the success of resettlement projects on the basis of information gathered only a few years post resettlement is premature . It is only through a long term perspective on the process of community recovery, such as that presented in this dissertation, that more accurate conclusions can be drawn. Before concluding this section on th e principal lessons that can be taken from the Arenal case, it important to acknowledge that the extremely progressive conceptualization and implementation of the Arenal resettlement project emerged from a relatively unique set of political and cultural ci internal ethic and sense of responsibility toward the resettlers. States less concerned with citizen welfare have historically tended to approach resettlement differently, with less consideration for the well being of p eople affected by development projects. The Arenal project was also relatively small, consisting of a displaced population of only in different socio cultural and pol itical contexts is therefore an obvious, but not

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438 insurmountable, challenge, assuming the political will to implement resettlement in an ethical manner is present. From Theory to Practice and Back to Theory: Testing the Scudder Colson Model In addition t o using the Scudder Colson model to evaluate the success of the Arenal project, this study also provides an opportunity to use the Arenal case to evaluate the validity of the model. In particular, the final two stages of the model are in need of field test ing, in part due to the lack of long term studies on DF DR and in part due to the paucity of successful resettlement projects. The findings from this study suggest that the model is largely accurate. As ary resettlement have remarkably similar histories and . . . people and the complex systems in which they are embedded erized initially by uncertainty among encourage local participation in the resettlement planning. The first two to three years after resettlement in Nuevo Arenal correspond w In these first years in the new settlement, resettlers underwent an intense process of adjustment to the new community, during which their living standards dropped and levels of debt increased as they attempted to e stablish new livelihood systems. This period was characterized by conservatism in economic production (e.g., the planting of traditional crops) and social systems (e.g., recreation of certain elements of the social geometry at the household, neighborhood, and community scales). The retreat into the familiar is an integral component of the grieving process, which at base is an attempt to

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439 more willing to engage in innovative and riskier economic strategies, such as coffee production, which ultimately was only a short economic difficulties but was nevertheless a turning point in its recovery process. This phase was also characterized by social and material reconstruction, including turning the community into a home, the restoration of important rituals like the fiestas c í vicas , and the founding of an increasing n umber of voluntary associations to manage case. Long term community recovery was characteri zed by the assumption of management responsibilities, the elimination of dependency upon the resettlement assumption of community leadership by the second generation (and other n ewer arrivals), and the achievement of a standard of living at least on par with other neighboring communities. Despite the surprisingly accurate predictions made by the model, however, the Arenal case also creates opportunities for its potential mod ification. First, this case demonstrates that good resettlement planning can actually create the conditions for community formation during Stage 2, much earlier than anticipated by the model. As tions for addressing community needs resulted in the establishment of various associations before and immediately after resettlement. The most enduring of these, the Community Development Association ( Asociaci ó n de Desarrollo Integral ), played a critical r ole in

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440 a sense of community ownership even before resettlement by engaging resettlers in the planning of the community and construction of their own homes resulted in the continuous celebration of important community rituals, including Sunday Mass and the annual independence day celebration. Finally, the decision to move the entire community at the same time to an area with low host population density facilitated the prese rvation of group identity. In sum, these examples suggest that the difficulties of the adjustment and coping stage (Stage 2) can be somewhat mitigated by good resettlement planning. Second, the Scudder Colson model suggests that the economic diversificati on Stage 3 are a product of having achieved self sufficiency in the production of food staples. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Arenal case indicates that inn ovation and economic diversification can actually be a response to the inability to achieve self sufficiency rather than the outcome of self sufficiency. In other words, the dire conditions that were created by the failure of staple crop agriculture forced Arenale ñ os to consider other non traditional options, despite the risks this entailed. Finally, Scudder (2005:43) has acknowledged that the linear nature of the model is problematic in the sense that community recovery does not necessarily proceed in an organized and predictable fashion. A resettled community can move forward and backward between stages, or exist in multiple stages simultaneously, as resettlers adjust to life in the new location. I found this critique to be true in the Arenal case as well . As noted above, the line between Stages 2 and 3 with regard to community

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441 implement a well conceived resettlement action plan. Perhaps more importantly, I frequently found it difficult to distinguish between Stages 3 and Stage 4 when analyzing the Arenal case. For example, many of the features of community formation that occurred during Stages 2 and 3, particularly with regard to the emergence of voluntary associations and community development, went hand in hand with the handing over of management responsibilities, a key feature of Stage 4. Similarly, some facets of economic development in Stage 3, such as the emergence of coffee production and the founding of the coff ee cooperative, were the means through which incorporation of the community into the broader context was achieved. Treating economic development and incorporation as separate stages in that example made little sense. In sum, while the distinctions between the first three stages of the model are relatively clear, it seems that many of the features of Stage 4 actually extend throughout Stages 2 and 3. While I understand the need for a model with discrete phases at a conceptual level, in reality much of what i s predicted by Stage 4 occurs somewhat simultaneously with the other stages as the community draws away from the resettlement agency and becomes self reliant in all aspects. Ultimately, it may be more appropriate to build some features of Stage 4, such as the handing over of project assets and institutional responsibility and the incorporation of the community into the broader political economy, into prior stages, while dedicating Stage 4 to the only feature that is truly particular to it the long term focu s on the well being of the second generation of resettlers.

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442 Research Implications In the Context of DFDR The research presented in this dissertation makes both theoretical and practical contributions to the study of DFDR . As just discussed, this research is theoretically significant in that it provided an opportunity to test the Scudder Colson four stage framework, which was developed as a tool for analyzing the process of successful community reconstruction as an outcome of well planned resettlement. In t he sense that the Arenal project was largely a planning success, understanding the ways in which the process of community recovery adheres to and deviates from the model is important to improving its utility. The proposed research is also methodologically important in that it represents a unique attempt to operationalize currently undefined concepts in the fourth stage of the model , thereby transforming the model from a purely theoretical construct into a useful evaluation tool. To my knowledge, the resear ch presented here is the first social network study of a community resettled due a large dam. 1 These data, in addition to the other analyses presented in Chapter 6, therefore establish an empirical baseline of post r esettlement community dynamics that can be used as basis of comparison in other long term evaluations. The applied significance of this research is even more important. As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, e xperts in the field of development see the construction of large dams as a flawed but necessary development option given the growing need for power, irrigation, and flood control in developing countries (Scudder 2005). In addition , 1 This claim was made by Thayer Scudder in 2010 (pers. comm.).

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443 an increasing focus on clim ate change has generated a growing interest in non c arbon based forms o f energy generation , including hydropower ( Anderson 2012, National Hydropower Association 2006). Though the characterization of hydropower as a clean energy solution is strongly contested ( Fearnside 2012, International Rivers Network 2006), it is a near ce rtainty that dams will continue to be built under this rationale. Specifically, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol emissions from other industrial so lateral development banks continue to finance these projects, new capital infusions from China, Brazil, Thailand, India and other middle income countries are also driving a new wave of dam building un der the promise of CDM funding (Imhof and Lanza 2010). Furthermore at the level of discourse, hydropower represents a sort of new morality. hydro dams were cast by their opponents as an immoral blight on the social and environmental landscape . . . in contemporary climate discourse dams are recast as the moral alternative to fossil fuel based electricity production. Given these trends, and in light of the millions of people displaced by these projects ea ch year, it is essential that resettlement efforts begin to achieve a greater level of success. Long term research, such as the study presented in this dissertation, is critical if policy makers and development agencies are to reverse the predominantly neg ative track record of involuntary resettlement outcomes . In Other Contexts Research on involuntary resettlement also has broad applicability outside of mega development projects. Hansen and Oliver Smith (1982), for example, were

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444 instrumental in pointing resettlement due to political upheaval, natural disasters, development projects, and other forms of planned change. Given these similarities, the lessons from long term studies on DFDR are use ful in a variety of other contexts. Currently, climate change is one of the most widely discussed drivers of human displacement. Environmental change in the form of sea level rise, desertification, and redicted to create tens of millions of environmental refugees in developing countries this century (UNU 2005) . Permanent climate change induced displacement, such as that experienced by small island states in the face of sea level rise, falls outside of th e UN Framework Convention on Climate is creating situations to which adjusting or adapting simply is not possible. In response, a new policy framework, Loss and Damage, has been proposed, which would provide compensation to affected nations, presumably in order to fund rehabilitation programs, including planned relocation. Oliver Smith (2013) points out that this compensation based strategy is problematic in that it igno res the socially constructed causes of vulnerability, preferring instead to focus on outcomes rather than drivers. Nevertheless, at the 19 th Conference of Parties in Warsaw in November 2013, an international mechanism for implementing the Loss and Damage f ramework was established. Ultimately, then, under the new challenges posed by climate change, not only will r esettlement programs play an important role in addressing the direct needs of displaced populations, but the lessons learned through studies of for ced resettlement

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445 about the failure of compensation to restore livelihoods among displaced populations will also find new applications (Oliver Smith 2013). The Future of DFDR In this concluding chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that there are importa nt lessons to be taken from the Arenal case as one of the few examples of competent resettlement planning and implementation. The findings of this dissertation own reco very if appropriate planning, adequate funding, and suitable development options are available. While there was clearly room for improvement in the Arenal case, particularly with regard to economic recovery, components of the planning process could neverth eless serve as a model for future instances of resettlement. That said, while some of the lessons may be timeless, the political, economic, policy, and social context in which the Arenal project was carried out is very different than that under which mega development projects operate today. A growing awareness about the impoverishing effects of DFDR in combination with the emergence of a vocal transnational civil society that questions the ethics and democratic nature of a development model that necessitate s displacement, demands increased transparency and accountability in decision making, and actively resists new development projects has created a considerably more complex landscape for development projects. The increasingly contested nature of DFDR has pr essured for a reconceptualization of the entire development process (Oliver Smith 2002). One component of this reconceived approach to development consists of the emergence of new frameworks for decision making. While these frameworks may vary in language and scope, they have in common a demand for the increased participation

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446 of those directly affected by development projects. The right to participate in decisions about development is clearly established in international human rights law (e.g., in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development) but the type and extent of this participation has been inconsistent in practice. In response, participation has been operationalized in the framework for decision making proposed by the World Commission on Dams in 2 000 (WCD 2000), which requires negotiated agreements between stakeholders at various stages of the development process, and the development ethics framework proposed by Penz et al. (2011), which is founded on principles of deliberative democracy, contribut ive justice (i.e., an equitable allocation of the burden of development), and empowerment. The fair implementation of these processes also demands increased attention to the power imbalances inherent in decision making about development, as well as a focus on capacity building among affected populations so they can participate on equal footing in resettlement negotiations (de Wet 2010). Penz et al. (2011) go as far as to suggest that non coercive negotiated agreements for compensation may eliminate the need for forced displacement entirely by making voluntary resettlement an attractive option to rural people. Another effect of the reconceptualization of development is the explicit atest excuse unjust outcomes for the outstees. In response, a more equitable approach to me project beneficiaries rather than victims (Scudder 2005:87). This begins with an

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447 increased focus on the participation of the affected communities in the resettlement planning process in order to capitalize on local knowledge, ideas, and desires that may facilitate community reconstruction after resettlement (de Wet 2010, Scudder 2005). It Scudder (2005 , c hapter 4) , for example, suggests such innovative strategies as joint business ven tures between project authorities and affected people (i.e., profit sharing), including resettlers as co project managers in the use of resettlement funds, extending irrigation benefits to resettlers (for dams that have an irrigation component), encouragin g diverse rain fed agricultural systems, making better use of reservoir draw down zones and fisheries, and providing job training. Cernea (2008:9 10) adds to this list equity sharing, locally redistributing taxes levied on project created new businesses, a nd offering preferential rates and fees to project affected people. Treating resettlement as a development opportunity is seen as the key to eliminating the impoverishment with which it has traditionally been a ssociated. Conceptually, this new approach shifts the focus of resettlement operations from the (Cernea 2000:50). Of 006) of the resettlement process will likely confound even the best conceived attempts. De Wet (2006:199) therefore also advocates for increased open endedness and flexibility in ective resettlement outcomes. In effect, de Wet is advocating for the application of the popular concept of adaptive management to resettlement operations.

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448 In sum, the goal of th ese more progressive approaches to development is to end, it comes down to a question of respect : respect for the people we presume to put will come when involuntary resettlement is no longer a concern. Until then, the lessons from long term research on DFDR, such as those gained through studies like the one presented in this dissertation, will continue to inform development policy and practice, and are therefore critical to human well being.

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449 APPENDIX A LIFE HISTORY INTERVIEW Part 1 Personal Info: What is your name? How old are you? Where were you born? Where did you grow up? How long have you lived in Nuevo Arenal? Did you ever live in Viejo Arenal? Family: Are you married? Do you have children? How old? Where do they live? What do they do? Do you have other siblings? Where? What do they do? Where do your parents live? Where are they from? Why did you/your family come to Nuevo Arenal? Livelihood: Education and Employment How many years of school did you complete? Did you have additional opportunities for education? What do you do for a living? What else have you done for work in your lifetime? When? Why did you stop doing that/start doing something else? Is that the only activity you engage in, or do you do additional jobs on the side? How dependable is the income you receive from your work? (How reliable?) How secure do you feel your work is? (How sustainable?) Do you depend on people/businesses/goods from outside the community in your work? If you needed to access people/businesses/goods from outside the community, could you? Do you feel that there are opportunities available to your children now t hat were not available to you? Or vice versa? How would you compare your financial situation to other households in the community: better, same , worse . Do you see any connection between what you have done for work throughout your lifetime and what has been going on in the rest of Costa Rica, the larger context? Land Tenure Did you receive land from ICE during the resettlement? Do you own the ho use you live in? Do you own the land your house is on? Do you (or have you ever owned) other land? Where? How much?

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450 How long have you owned that land? What do you do on that land? Where do you sell your products (if applicable) ? Has owning or selling that land affected your livelihood strategy/ way of life? If you do not own land, are you interested in owning it? Could you purchase land in this community if you wanted to? Dependence on government programs and policies or upon external agencies Are you inv olved in any government programs? Do you receive any government benefits? Have there been policies put in place by the government that have affected your work ? Do you receive help from any government agencies, tec hnicians , or extension agents ? Have you ev er received such benefits? Migration for wage labor Have you or your family members ever had to leave Nuevo Arenal to find work? If so, h ow often? If so, w hat did you do? Access to formal and informal institutions Upon whom do you depend when you are having difficult times, economically or occupationally ? Who ha ve you turned to in the past (e.g., government, family, friends, community organizations, etc.) ? Do you feel that you know (or would know) where to turn to for help when you need it? Particip ation Are you a member of any community organizations or groups? Do you ho ld an official position ? What do you do as part of those groups? activities? Are you active in local, re gional, or national politics? Part II Community Economy What is your opinion of the overall economic situation in Arenal now? Is it better, worse, or the same as in the past? Do you think it would be different had the community never been resettled? How? Do you feel that people in Arenal have a better, worse, or equal standard of living as the neighboring communities? What about quality of life? Do you like living in Nuevo Arenal? Why or why not ?

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451 Population What do you think the population changes that have occurred in Nuevo Arenal immigration, emmigation, the arrival of foreigners. How have immigration and emigration affected social and economic relationships within the community ? S ocial networks ? P artic ipation in cooperative projects? Do you think that new arrivals out compete locals for economic resources? Has in migration to the community forced some people to leave? How? Do you feel there is currently enough economic opportunity to keep people here? What about in the past? Have you seen cultural changes in the community since you began living here? Tourism What do you think about the tourism economy here? What do you think about the changes in the community due to tourism or the quantity of foreigners who have come here to buy property or start businesses? How do you feel the foreigners and locals interact? Is there a different interaction between Arenale ñ Arenal or b) foreigners? Part III Resettlement (if applicable) Describe to me your experience with resettlemen t. What was the resettlement experience like? Was it difficult to leave Viejo Arenal? Was it easy to get used to being here? Viejo Arenal (if applicable) What did your family do in Viejo Arenal? Parents, siblings, etc. How did it affect the community when the big ranchers for whom they worked left after the resettlement ? Did the community trust ICE during the resettlement ? What was the relationship like between people in Viejo Arenal and ICE? How did the community experience the relocation process? Was it easy or difficult? Were there conflicts? After Resettlement , Part 1 (if applicable) Describe the first years that you were here in N uevo A renal . How were they? How did people earn enough to survive? In the first years, did a lot of people leave or did th ey stay ? Did some come back after it got better here? Did ICE maintain any type of presence in Nuevo Arenal after the resettlement (with the exception of the social workers who worked the demonstration plots ) ?

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452 How many years passed before the community was stable again producing food, jobs appearing, people feeling settled? Before people could take advantage of opportunities or begin to think more creatively about their options? What was the economy based on after the first few years but before tourism? ( mid 1980s mid 1990s)? Do you like living here ? Is it better, worse, or the same as in V iejo A renal? Do you think the resettlement project did an adequate job of providing development opportunities after resettlement, or could it have done a better job? Did the experimental plots planted by ICE work to increase agricultural production in this area after resettlement? After Resettlement , Part 2 (if applicable) Has the population of Arenal been stable over time? If so, why? If not, what has driven immigration and emigration? If people have emigrated, where have they gone and why? Have you seen changes in the community since the relocation, for example in community events? Have ther e been cultural changes in the community? Do you think that what you see in Arenal today is a result of the development that came with ICE, with the dam? Are there still people that earn a living from agriculture here? In general, do you feel that you hav e benefited from the dam? Has the community benefitted? Do you think that others in the community feel the same way? What does it mean to be Arenale ño ? How has that identity been maintained despite the upheaval of resettlement? How have the memories of Vi ejo Arenal been preserved and passed on to future generations?

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454 APPENDIX C LIVELIHOOD SURVEY Nombre de la encuestadora: ___________________________________ Fecha: ___________________ Ubicac ión y No. Casa : ____________________________ Buenos días. Yo me llamo ___ _____ y estoy asistiendo en la administración de una encuesta organizada por Gabriela Stocks, antropóloga de la Un iversidad de Florida de los Estados Unidos . Gabriela lleva a cabo u na investigación en Nuevo Arenal para su tesis de doctorado. El tema de su investigación es la evolución de Nuevo Arenal después de la reubicación de la com unidad por el Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Arenal. Esta encuesta es una parte esencial de su investigació n. Tom a un máximo de 30 minutos y l a información que usted nos brinde es totalmente confidencial. M e gustaría saber si usted desea participar. DATOS PERSONALES 1. Nombre: _______________________________________________ 2. Edad: _____________ 3. Sexo: M F 4 . Nacionalidad: ______________________________ 5 . Estado civil: Soltero/a Casado/a Unión Libre Viudo/a 6 . Nivel de educación: Primaria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Secundaria: 1 2 3 4 5 Bachillerato Estudio técnico: 1 2 3 4 5 En:_________________________ Universidad: 1 2 3 4 5 Graduado/a Posgrado : En: ______________________ Otro: ______________________________________ 7. Cuantos a ños en total tiene usted de vivir en Nuevo Arenal ? _________________

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455 8. Ha vivido en otro lugar por algún tiempo? Si No Lugar Duración En cuales años ? ________________________ ___ _____________ ____________ ________________________ ________________ ____________ ________________________ ________________ ____________ ________________________ ________________ ____________ HOGAR : Las siguientes preguntas son sobre su familia y sus parientes que viven en Nuevo Arenal. Esta información ayudar á a la investigadora a entender las conexiones familiares que existen en Nuevo Arenal. 1. Cuantas personas actualmente viven en su casa? ___________ Quienes son? Nombre Edad Relación ______________________ ______________ _______________ ______________________ ______________ _______________ ______________________ ____________ __ _______________ ______________________ ______________ _______________ ______________________ ______________ _______________ ______________________ ______________ _______________ _______ _______________ ______________ _______________ ______________________ ______________ _______________ ______________________ ______________ _______________ 2. Usted tiene más famili ares en Nuevo Arenal qu e no viven con usted ? Si No Padres Cuantos? ___________ Hermano/as Cuantos? ___________ Hijo/as Cuantos? ___________ Tío/as Cuantos? ___________ Primo /as Cuantos? ___________ Abuelo/as Cuantos? ___________ ECONOMIA : Las siguientes preguntas son sobre su ocupación. Estas preguntas ayudar á n a la investigadora a entender las diferentes oportunidades que han surgido en Nuevo Arenal y en Costa Rica en general. 1. Historia de trabajo Descripción Duración A ño s Ubicación Trabajo #1 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________ Trabajo #2 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________ Trabajo #3 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________

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456 Trabajo #4 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________ Trabajo #5 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________ Trabajo #6 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________ Trabajo #7 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________ Trabajo #8 ______________________ ________ _____ _ ___ ____________ 2. Cual es su mayor fuente d e ingresos en este momento? _______________________________ ________________ ______________________________________________________________ 3. Cuales otras fuentes de ingresos tiene usted ? ____________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________ ___________ 4 . Cuales fuentes de ingresos tiene las otras personas que viven en su casa? Nombre Tipo de T rabajo ______________________ _______________________ ______________________ _______________________ ______________________ __________________ _____ ______________________ _______________________ ______________________ _______________________ ______________________ _______________________ ______________________ _______________________ ______________________ _______________________ 5 . En una esc ala de 1 nivel económic o de su casa en comparación con las otras casas/familias en Nuev o Arenal? Escoja un numero entre 1 y 5. Peor que la mayoría 1 2 3 4 5 Mejor que la mayoría

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457 PROPIEDADES : Las siguientes preguntas son sobre sus propiedades. Esta información ayudará a la investigadora a entender que pasó en el largo plazo co n las propiedades distribuidas por el ICE durante la reubicación, y la distribución actual de propiedades en Nuevo Arenal. 1 . Usted es el dueño de esta casa? Si No ( Si es una parcela, de que tamaño es la p arcela? _________ hectáreas o ____ _____manzanas) 2 a . Si usted SI es el dueño, como adquirió est a casa : Del ICE durante la reubicación Comprada de un tico Comprada de un e xtranjero Regalada /herencia Construida (con propia plata, de préstamo, etc.) Casa del bono Otro ________________________________ 2 b . Si usted NO es el dueño, quién es? ____________________________________ El dueño también vive en la casa? Si No 3. Esta casa es una casa del ICE? Si No 4. Si es una casa del ICE, usted o el d ueñ o anterior ha hecho mejoras? Si No De que tipo ? ___________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ 5 . Usted es el dueño de otras propiedades? Si No Ubicación Tamaño A ño Adq. Fuente Casa? (Si/No/ C onst.) ___________ _____ ha _________ Comprada Regalada/herencia IDA Otro ____________ _______ ___________ _____ ha _________ Comprada Regalada/herencia IDA Otro ____________ _______ ___________ _____ ha _________ Comprada Regalada/herencia IDA Otro ____________ _______ ___________ _____ ha _________ Comprada Regalada/herencia IDA Otro ____________ _______ ___________ _____ ha _________ Comprada Regalada/herencia IDA Otro ____________ _______ ___________ _____ ha _________ Comprada Regalada/herencia IDA Otro ____________ _______ ___________ _____ ha _________ Comprada Regalada/herencia IDA Otro ____________ _______

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458 PARTICIPACION : Las siguientes preguntas son sobre su participación en las organ izaciones que existen en Nuevo Arenal. Esta información ayudara a la investigadora a entender su participación en la toma de decisiones en la comunidad. 1. En cuales de las siguientes organizaciones en Nuevo Arenal ha participado o h a tenido un puesto? Puesto Duración Años Asociación de Desarrollo de Nuevo Arenal _____________ ________ ______ Patronato de la escuela _____________ ________ ______ Junta de la escuela _____________ ________ ______ Junta del colegio __________ ___ ________ ______ Comité del CEN _____________ ________ ______ Asociación de mujeres de Nuevo Arenal _____________ ________ ______ Asociación de mujeres de Santa María _____________ ________ ______ Asociación de agricultores de Santa Ma ría _____________ ________ ______ Comité de la iglesia _____________ ________ ______ Comité de deportes _____________ ________ ______ Municipalidad de Tilará n _____________ ________ ______ P artido político _____________ ________ __ ____ Otra __________________________ _____________ ________ ______ Otra __________________________ _____________ ________ ______ Otra __________________________ _____________ ________ ______

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459 APPENDIX D PERSONAL NETWORK INTERVIEW Alter Promp t 1. Por favor, nombre 30 personas con quien usted se haya relacionado recientemente, empezando con personas que no viven en Nuevo Arenal. Alter Information 2. De que sexo es esta persona? Hombre Mujer 3. Cuantos años tiene esta persona? 0 17 18 25 26 35 36 45 46 55 56 65 66 75 76+ 4. Vive esta persona en Nueveo Arenal? IF yes, proceed to Question 7 . IF no, proceed to Question 5 . 5. Donde vive esta persona? Nuevo Arenal Mata de Caña La Union La Fortuna El Aguacate Rio Piedras Tronadora Otra comunidad por el Lago Arenal Tilaran Cañas Liberia Provincia de Alajuela Provincia de Cartago Provincia de Guanacaste Provincia de Heredia Provincia de Limon Provincia de Puntarenas Provincia de San Jose En otro pais Otro No sabe

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460 6 . IF , donde? 7. Como conoce usted esta persona? Amigo/a Familia Conocido/a Otro 8 . IF 9. Con que frecuencia se relaciona usted con esta persona? Cada día Cada semana Cada mes Cada seis meses Cada año Otro No sabe 11. IF que frecuencia? 12. Para que propósito(s) se relaciona usted con esta persona? Alter Pair 13. Seria probable que estas dos personas tuvieran una relación entre ellas independiente de usted? Muy probable (Hay una relación confirmada) Mas o menos probabl e (Es probable que haya una relación) No probable (No es probable que haya una relación)

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481 BIOGRAPHICAL SKET CH Gabriela Stocks earned a B.A. with honors in anthropology from the University of Chicago in 1998. Before beginning her graduate studies, she worked for a number of years at a non profit organization dedicated to river conservation in Portland, OR. Stock s earned an M.A. in anthropology from the University of Florida in 2007, the research for which focused on local systems of watershed management in the Bolivian Amazon. She received her Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Florida in 2014.