1 CAN LOCAL COMMUNITIES PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY? GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF WILDLIFE IN LOGGING CONCESSION ADJACENT TO NATIONAL PARK IN REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO By GERMAIN A. MAVAH A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOO L OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2011
2 2011 Germain A. Mavah
3 To The students in the School of Natural Resources and Environment, and the Dep artment o f G eography, as well as local people in rural areas across the world
4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my mother and father for their support throughout my childhood and my educational career. I owe a debt of gratitude to many people who have contributed to this study directly or indirectly. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all of them. I give special thanks to my advisor, Dr. Brian Child, who encouraged my understanding of principles of community based natural resource management (CBRNM) as well as the development of my research instruments. I also would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Mickie Swisher, who encouraged my understanding of research design and methods, the development of my research instruments as we ll as statistical analysis and Dr Eric Keys for his contributions to the development of my research instruments. I also would like to thank Dr James Colee for help with my statistical analysis. This study would not have been possible without the active su pport and cooperation of many institutions and individuals. I would like to thank these institutions : Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS Beinecke African Scholarships), Dexter Fellow in Tropical Conservation Biology, Center for Latin American Studies (Trop ical Conservation and Development), Center for African studies, English Language Institute and University of Florida who funded this study in various ways. There are also many individuals who help ed in various ways towards the present study and they deserv e my sincere thanks, they are: John Poulsen, Connie Clark, Paul Telfer, Jerome Mokoko, Brian Curran, Paul and Sara Elkan, Richard Malonga, Shylock Muyengwa V alentina Komaniecka, Lia Brenneman, Taraneh Darabi, Sanford Porter, and Don Thomas. I wish to than k my wife Eleonore Koubangou who has accepted several sacrifices for our better future. Last but not the least; I am deeply indebted to the NGOs, government officers and villa gers of Attention and Zoulabout who participated with enthusiasm in this study.
5 TABLE OF CONTENTS P age ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 7 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 9 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 10 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 13 Problem Statement ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 13 Research Question ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 17 Definitions of Terms Used ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 17 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 20 Theory of Collective Action and Common Pool Resources ................................ ................... 21 The Theory of Collective Action ................................ ................................ ..................... 21 Common Pool Resources ................................ ................................ ................................ 24 Empowerment Theory ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 25 Theoretical Framework ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 28 Objectives ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 29 Hypotheses ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 29 Evolution of Congolese Legal Framework Related to Natural Resources Managemen t ....... 30 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA ................................ ................................ ............. 35 Location ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 35 Relief, Hydr ology, climate, vegetation, fauna and soils ................................ ......................... 35 Demography ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 36 Traditional framework and socio economic activities ................................ ........................... 37 History of Logging in Forest Concession of Ngomb ................................ ............................ 37 Infrastructure ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 38 Odzal a Kokoua National Park ................................ ................................ ................................ 38 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ................................ ................................ .. 40 Site Selection ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 40 Research Design ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 40 Sample Selection ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 43 Validity and Explanatory Power ................................ ................................ ............................. 46 Instrumentation ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 47
6 Questionnaire ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 47 Validity and reliability ................................ ................................ ............................. 48 Social trust and social cohesion index ................................ ................................ ...... 49 Attitudes of local people towards formal laws ................................ ................................ 49 Focus Group Questionnaire ................................ ................................ ............................. 51 Bushmeat Questionnaire ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 51 Data Analysis ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 52 Qua litative Data ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 52 Quantitative Data ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 52 Hypothesis 1 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 53 Hypothesis 2 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 54 Hypothesis 3 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 55 Test of Normality ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 55 5 RESULTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 63 Hypothesis 1 ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 63 Hypothesis 2 ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 66 Hypothesis 3 ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 71 6 DISCUSSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 86 The nature of Wildlife Laws and Regulatory Controls ................................ .......................... 86 Categorization of Causes and Consequences of Wildlife Extinction and Local ................................ ................................ ........ 89 The Sustainability of Wildlife and Livelihoods that Depend on it ................................ ......... 92 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMM E NDATIONS ................................ ................................ 96 APPENDIX A DETAILED RESULTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 101 B IRB NOTICES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 104 C INSTRUMENTATION ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 106 D ................................ ................................ .......................... 112 LIST OF RE FERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 121 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 128
7 LIST OF TABLES Table page 2 1 Selected legal reg ulations related to land tenure and natural resources use in Congo (i.e. wildlife) ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 33 4 1 Dimensions of importance of wildlife, contribution of hunting to income, bushmeat harvest, m embership and group interactions, participation and motivation in collective activities, motivation in communal activities and applied measurements ........ 57 4 2 Dimensions of Knowledge of causes and consequen ces of wildlife extinction, k nowledge of formal laws, k nowledge of pasted norms and applied measurements ........ 58 4 3 Dimensions of social trust, social cohesion and applied measurements ............................ 59 4 4 Dimensions of attitudes towards formal laws and applied measurements ........................ 60 4 5 Item Total Statistics of dimensions of local people atti tudes towards formal laws, Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ......................... 60 4 6 Shapiro (N=71), Ngom b Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ........... 61 4 7 Shapiro (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ........... 62 5 1 Mean scores of cumulated variables (details in appendix A 1), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................... 73 5 2 Attitudes of local people towards hunting regulations (formal laws), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................... 74 5 3 Distribution of frequencies and scale score of different main threats to wildlife (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ........... 75 5 4 Distribution of frequencies a nd scale score of different main consequences to wildlife management (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 76 5 5 Distribution of frequencies of different c ategories of main solutions to wildlife management (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 77 5 6 Distribution of frequencies and scale score of different cat egories of main obstacles to wildlife management (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 78
8 5 7 ssment (N=71), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ......................... 79 5 8 how likely is it that people will cooperate to solve the problem in any ?, Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ 80 5 9 Level of social trust (N=71), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 81 5 10 Level of social cohesion (N=71), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 82 5 11 Mann Whitney U test for all variables, Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ 83 5 12 Mean scores of variables and Mann Whitney U test for level of significance among ethnic groups (N=71), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 84 5 13 Bushmeat records during the bushmeat survey in Zolabout (northern Republic of Congo) by month between January and June 2010 ................................ ........................... 85 6 1 Comparison of actual harvest rate in Zolabout in 2010 and sustainable harvest rates across Congo basin ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 95
9 LIST OF FIGURES Figure P age 2 1 Theoretical framework of collective action and empowerment ................................ ........ 32 2 2 Conceptual framework of land tenure and natural res ource (i.e. wildlife) regulations evolution in Republic of Congo ................................ ................................ ......................... 34 3 1 Location of Congo in Africa, location of northern Congo in Congo, location of the study area in northern Congo, location of national parks in northern Congo and location of logging concessions in northern Congo ................................ ........................... 39 5 1 Scale score of major threats to wildlife (details Table 5 3) (N=48) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................... 76 5 2 Scale score of different main consequences to wildlife extinction (details Table 5 4) (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Bra zzaville), 2010 ........... 77 5 3 Scale score of different main solutions to wildlife management (details Table 5 5) (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ........... 78 5 4 Scale score of different main obstacles to wildlife management (details Table 5 6) (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ........... 79 5 5 Distribution of ethnic groups by type of association (N=71), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 ................................ ................... 80 5 6 Comparison of importance of wildlife and contribution of hunting as source of income between Bantu and autochthonous people in north of Congo (2010) ................... 84
10 Abstract of Thesis P resented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science CAN LOCAL COMMUNITIES PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY? GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF WILDLIFE IN LOGGING CONCESSION ADJACENT TO NATIONAL PARK IN REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO By Germain A. Mavah May 2011 Chair: Brian Child Major: Interdisciplinary Ecology In Republic of Congo, conservation landscapes include protected areas and adjacent logging concessions where local people live. We tested the hypotheses that p olitical, economic, and in conducted five focus groups in the northern Congo. I framed the issue of collecti ve empowerment in relation to the use of common pool resources (i.e. wildlife) by local people and investigated the complex factors affecting the use of wildlife, including k nowledge of formal laws, a ttitudes towards these laws, k nowledge of traditional s ystems of wildlife use, causes and consequences of wildlife loss strength of associational life and social capital. We found that wildlife was extremely important to local livelihoods proving the majority of protein and one of the top two sources of incom e depending on ethnicity. People had a good understanding of the causes and consequences of wildlife depletion, but little understanding or exposure to solutions such as CBNRM and property rights based solutions They did not have the capacity to aspire to ownership primary threat to wildlife People were concerned that wildlife and therefore their livelihoods
11 might not be sustainable, and our off take records confirmed that bushmeat harvests wer e likely not sustainable a situation likely to get worse given the lack of alternative source of protein and income. of ownership of rights over forest resources by forest communities, despite these resources being exclude other users from harvesting it although hunting is their second most important source of income and f ood. Local people recognize the enormity of the problem, but are not taking action to resolve it because this responsibility legally lies with central government. A combination of factors drive increasing bushmeat harvest, including increasing demand for bushmeat driven by population growth and an emerging money economy, technological changes (guns, wire snares) and regulations leading to a de facto open access situation (tragedy of the commons). T he forests of the north Congo will be progressively expose d to the loss of wildlife and local livelihoods will become increasingly vulnerable u nless action is taken. Local people are concerned about the sustainability of wildlife because this will affect their future livelihoods (i.e. food and income). To autoch thonous people wildlife is important for economic and cultural reasons, whereas Bantu are influenced more by the economic factors A poor understanding of these dynamics led to the design of inappropriate wildlife regulations that were unenforceable, und ermined traditional system of wildlife management, and increase d pressure on wildlife and local livelihoods Consequently villagers neither understand, legitimate nor enforce them Our conclusion is that the future of wildlife and forest livelihoods will local people in managing and benefiting from wildlife. This study contributes to our
12 understanding of how to design wildlife management and conservation strategi es I mportant institutional issues include adequate monitoring, communication the implementation of appropriate regulations regarding wildlife conservation and management and, above all, building on traditional management systems through genuine devolutio n for rights and responsibilities
13 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Problem S tatement The Congo Basin in Central Africa is the second largest forest area in the world after the Amazon Basin, with a large variety of resources on which local communities have long r elied for food, exchange, and socio economic purposes (WWF, 2006; Poulsen et al., 2007; 2009; Cowlishaw et al., 2007). In the Republic of Congo, conservation landscapes include protected areas and the adjacent forests and logging concessions where local p eople live. However, with the expansion of logging concessions, roads and in migration into once remote forests, use patterns are changing rapidly. This affects the sustainability of wildlife and hunting patterns on which people have long depended and loca l livelihood patterns. To design more effective interventions for conservation and development, we need to understand how these important changes are leading to the over exploitation of game species and how the interactions between traditional mechanism o f access, exclusion and the local control of hunting, and modern (usually centralizing) regulations or institutions In the past, customary rules defined access rights and the modalities of use for primary livelihood resources such as agriculture or hunting (Bahuchet, 1992). Bushmeat harvesting was sustainable as non materialistic beliefs and cultural traditions of local communities combined with their ability to control access to their forests and relatively low densities of people and demands on bushmeat. At that time, the economic cost of excluding external users was low because rudimentary harvesting technologies, isolation of rural areas, low population densities, and weak prices and markets reduced the demand for bushmeat, in circumstances very similar to that Stroup and Baden (1983) described for early North America. However, local mechanisms of control were weakened by the centralizing policies of the colonial and post colonial state. With
14 (Murphree 1990) an open a ccess tragedy of the commons type situation was created laws. Thus, the abolition of customary rights by the Law n o 52/83 of April 21, 1983 concerning public lan likely weakened traditional mechanisms for excluding outside users and led to potential changes in patterns of use of natural resources such as wildlife. These land reform laws did not recognize that land belonged to t he people who lived on it as established by the previous laws. However, informally, rural people still thought that they were the owners of land because that was the legacy of their ancestors. Consequently, these reforms have contributed to the loss of anc estral land and led to the loss of many aspects of recompensing the forest owner after hunting in his zone ) In addition, 60% of area is covered by forest hab itats. Among these forests, about 43% are classified into forest concessions for timber production, often forming buffer zones for protected areas (11%) (WRI and MEF, 2006). Yet, i n Republic of Congo, 80% of land is state property. The rights of local peo ple living in these areas are limited to authorized users. The local communities in this part of the Congo Basin are exposed increasingly to the changes in legal policies related to natural resources and increase d logging activities such as roads, hunting, markets, and human immigration. These political, economic and technological changes have dramatically affected use patterns of natural resources over the past three decades. The introduction of new hunting technologies (e.g. firearms) coincided with the introduction of logging concessions, and a growth in human populations, markets and road improvements. In order to reduce threats to wildlife and
15 encourage sustainable management practices in logging concession s adjacent to the Odzala Kokoua National Park, a collaborative effort was introduced by the Ministry of Forest Economy, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and the forest company ( Industry forestire de Ouesso) (IFO, 2007) in February 2005. Although local communities have been involved in the process o f zoning of traditional territories, we are concerned that their participation in conservation innovations remains passive and this study explores attitude s about participation in conservation For instance, factors such as alienation by modern institution s, loss of local control, and low level of genuine local participation in control mechanisms or cultural issues may prevent local communities from participating effectively. This study will also focus on the neglected topic of institutional history, intera ctions and their limitations. Ostrom (2000) states that the ability of local communities to develop a more effective regime over time is affected by whether their rights of exclusion and organization are recognized and legitimated by national or local gove rnment. Yet community participation is the foundation of effective community engagement, and needs to enable communities to regain control over natural resources, strengthen their decision making capabilities, and advance their involvement in project activ ities and improving their economic welfare ( Child, 1995; 2006; Wainwright and Wehrmeyer, 1998; Barrow et al ., 2000). The centralization of control of natural resources by the colonial state is retrospectively blamed for the disappearance of indigenous syst ems of management. For example, Ostrom (2000) postulates that stronger national regulations may backfire (for conservation) by weakening local norms and mechanisms of exclusion, while the weakening or disappearance of long standing local or community bas ed fisheries in South East Asia is attributed to a much strong er management role by central government (Pomeroy 1995) The purpose of this study is ronger government regulations for
16 natural resource management, and weakening local systems of control in longstanding communities around protected areas in Congo, and the implications of these relationships for wildlife conservation and human livelihoods. This study uses as its case study (and means of influence) an emerging forest conservation approach that is being developed widely in the Republic of Congo since the implementation of forest Code in 2000, and which was expected to integrate conservation, timber production and development objectives for local people (MEF, 2000). This study also aims to understand factors that are constraining the collaborative action that local communities require to promote sustainable wildlife management. We seek to und erstand if local people recognize ecological degradation in the form of unsustainable bushmeat hunting (Hur, 2006), and if they do, whether their failure to respond to this problem stems from endogenous factors such as ignorance of solutions or an inabilit y to work together, or endogenous factors such as disempowerment. The sustainability of wildlife is important in its own right. Its importance in local livelihoods and livelihood vulnerability is something we want to quantify. Further, we expect to find that these relationships are complicated by factors such as the level of social capital, ethnicity, and institutional arrangements. In particular, we seek to understand the constraints and opportunities for local collective action and empowerment through c ommunity based organizations, as both a conservation and livelihood strategy. We hope that this research will inform the evolution of formal and informal institutions to improve wildlife and forest conservation, ecosystem services and the sustainability of local livelihoods and culture. This is pygmies resources to support their livelihoods.
17 Research Q uestion Conservation agencies are concerned about low levels of partici pation of local people in wildlife management strategies in the periphery of Odzala Kokoua National park. The objective of this research is to understand if these observations are accurate and to understand what factors potentially hinder participation. T o explore perspective and reveal possible obstacles related to this problem, our research questions are: 1. How do factors such as traditional institutions, formal institutions, access to resources, and harvest technologies interact to affect the sustainabil ity of wildlife and rural livelihoods? 2. Is there scope (including economic opportunities and social capital) to strengthen participation collective action to address emerging problems? Definitions of Terms U sed Some terms have very clear, universally accep ted definitions. However, there is considerable debate over the meaning others. We sought to delimit these terms in our context. Governance: This term is related to c ommunity based natural resource management (CBNRM) which is strongly associated with bui lding social capital, responsibility and self determination, and the organizational capacity of local landholders. Organizing and strengthening people lays the foundation from which they can participate and be heard ( Child and Lyman, 2005. p.6). Sustainab ility: includes economic growth together with protection of the quality of the environment, e ach reinforcing the other (The World Commission on Environment and Development ). In this study, the term sustainability of wildlife is used to illustrate that wildlife must not be overexploited today in order to cause environmental damage and its loss for the future generations.
18 Bushmeat: Africa to refer to wild meat that is hunted in contrast to domestic meat that is reared for consumption (Milner Gulland et al., 2003). Collective empo werment: This term refers to process by which individuals join together to break their solitude and silence, help one another, learn together, and develop skills for collective action (Hur, 2006). Collective action: It is action by more than one person dir ected towards the achievement of a common goal or the satisfaction of a common interest (that is, a goal or interest that cannot be obtained by an individual acting on his own) (Wade, 1987). Ethnic group: The term ethnic group is generally understood in a nthropological literature to designate a population which is largely biologically self perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms, makes up a field of communication and interaction, has a membership which id entifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order (Barth, 1969). In this study, we use this term to designate autochthonous people and Bantu living in the same terri tory. Autochthonous peoples: Autochthonous people also called tribal, aboriginal or indigenous people, national minorities or first peoples (Toledo, 2001). In this study, I used the term autochthonous people to indicate the ethnic group pygmy because the u se of this term has a pejorative meaning. In the study area, they are the descendants of the original inhabitants of this territory by contrast to their neighbors Bantu. Common pool resource: Ostrom (1990) used the term "common pool resources" to denote na tural resources used by many individuals in common, such as fisheries, groundwater
19 basins and irrigation systems. We use this term to indicate wildlife that is owned by no one in Congo, therefore it is a public good. s dilemma game is conceptualized as a no cooperative game in which all players possess complete information (Ostrom, 1990:4). In this study, we use this term to express the outcome from rules imposed by government which will lead to no one will cooperate a t the level of local community (traditional villages).
20 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW In 1983, the Congo Land Tenure Law declared that forest and its resources are owned by the government. This created the situation in which wildlife came to be viewed as a p ublic good, owned by no one. Likely, the lack of resources for government to enforce these new rules and the absence of effective applicable mechanism s at the village level have led to open access to forest resources, especially wildlife. Its use in this c (Hardin, 1968). In addition, wildlife requires large blocks of contiguous land but the needs of wildlife are not seen as legitimate largely because of the intangible nature of its products; in this context wil dlife is an illustration of common property resources. This study address es the question of why people living in rural areas (traditional villages) are not interested in the strategies of wildlife management in the forest of their territories Consequentl y, if wildlife is harvested faster than it is produced, it will not be sustained. Therefore, it needs to be protected in order to allow for its continuous use. The use of wildlife in Republic of Congo is an illustration of common pool resources. Ostrom (1 990) argued that the term common pool resources refers to a natural or man made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from its use. In this framework, the use of wildlife is subject of several issues related to organizational structures, institutions and local capacity to respond to them. To explore this problem, I first examine the evolution of conventional theory of collective action and the empowerment in terms of theoret ical perspectives. Second, I review and discuss the theoretical framework of collective empowerment which is the common construct to both theories and can affect local capacity for collective action, which is central to this research. Then,
21 we examine the evolution of Congolese public land regulations which can be a hindrance to local capacity to respond to wildlife management strategies. Theory of Collective Action and Common P ool R esources The Theory of Collective A ction D istinguish ing between two types of collective action and explaining the how success in providing goods depend s on the type of good is a major task of social scientists. Previous scholars have been interested in this question in order find a set of criteria for predicting the optimum per formance of market institutions and their failure. To this end, the theory of public expenditure suggest s that there two categories of goods private consumption goods and collective consumption goods. He argued that private utilization goods could be dist ributed sense that each individual's consumption of such a good led to no subtraction from any other However, Musgrave (1959) disagreed partially with Samuelson and argued that public expenditures is a narrow term because Samuelson did not take into account the social opportunity cost of social goods. Therefore, the (Musgrave, 1959:787). Thus, this theory suggested that the exclusion principle can be used by itself to divide the world into private and public goods. Following these scholars, Olson, in order to bu The Logic of referred to that groups tend to act in support of t heir group interests is supposed to follow logically from this widely accepted premise of rational, self interested behavior. In other words, if the members of
22 some group have a common interest or objective, and if they would all be better off if that obje ctive were achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self From this, Olson made very convincing arguments about the dif ficulties in organizing people. However, in order to define an attribute for collective action, he used the term public goods as a co nstruct of collective action and classified them into exclusive and inclusive public goods (Olson, 1965). From this theory we can learn that individuals are led to act in a self interested manner that interferes with any desire to work toward a collective good. This context reveals that the more members there are in an inclusive group, the more individuals there are who may be willing to share the costs of providing a good of general benefit to all. To summarize, the collective action problem emerges in group settings where all individuals can materially profit by not c ontributing to the group (Olson, 1965). This illustrates situation free riders. L egislation that requires union membership is a common way to deal with free riders. This also refers to the defined by Hardin (1968). He pointed out that in the case of the freedom of the commons each user is pu rsuing his own best interest without limit. He concluded that According to these scholars, the conventional theory of collective action assumes that all individuals maximize short term material benefits to self i n all contexts (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968) Based on the work of the previous scholars and many others, Ostrom (1990) has developed a framework in the context of natural resources entitled She argued t collective action problems, prisoner dilemmas, open access resources or even common property
23 resources, the observer frequently wishes to invoke an image of helpless individuals caught in an inex Bray (2008) argued that t he behavioral approach to collective action begins with an evolutionary argument which states that human beings have evolved the capacity to learn cooperation norms and social regulations which have enhanced the success of groups. Yet, he emphasized that c ollective action theory seeks to understand how groups of individuals are able to cooperate to overcome social dilemmas, assuming that being a self interested, short term maximize r is the default position. However, Willer (2009) argued that, when all individuals withhold contribution, collective action fails and all are worse off. If all individuals act in their own material self interest in these situations it would seem impossible for any public goods to be produced. Wade (1987: 97) argued that common goal or the satisfaction of a common interest (that is, a goal or interest th at cannot be collective action is an alternative solution to privatization or state in the context of governing the commons. Nonetheless he was not totally in agreement with several theories of collective action such as the prisoners' dilemma of Olson, Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' and Olson's logic of collective action, because they showed s uch pessimism in their conclusions about collective action. Finally, collective action might be th e formulation of a rule of restrained access to a common pool resource and observance of that rule, and the public good might be the result in situation of sustainable exploitation. I will adhere to this definition in the following discussion on the concep t of common pool resources.
24 Common Pool R esources Similar to the term used in economics, common pool resources are components of public goods (Wade, 1987). The essential property of public goods is that many can use them at the same time because exclusion is difficult. The use of this resource is related to common property because the rights to exploit this resource are held by people in common with others (Wade, 1987). However, there are two types of public goods, those whose yield is infinite such as th e weather and those whose yields are finite, where the faster they are used the less that remains for others (such as wildlife in our case). Ostrom (1990) used the term "common pool resources" to denote natural resources used by many individuals in com mon, such as fisheries, groundwater basins, and irrigation systems. Such resources have long been subject to overexploitation and misuse by individuals acting in their own best interests. Common pool resources are therefore subject to congestion, depletion or degradation from use which is pushed beyond the limits of sustainable yields (Blomquist and Ostrom, 1985; Randall, 1983). The lack of exclusion from the resource thus creates an incentive for a rate of aggregate use which exceeds the physical or biolo gical renewal of the resource (Ostrom, 1985B). Far reaching proposals for institutional change in the management of common pool resources have been justified by this kind of argument (Ostrom, 1985A; Runge, 1986). Based on this reasoning, two schools of th oughts have emerged T he first school advises the establishment of full private property rights over the commons as a necessary condition for avoiding such a tragedy (Demsetz, 1967; North and Thomas, 1977; Johnson 1972; Picardi and Siefert, 1976) T he sec ond school pointed out that only the allocation of full authority to regulate the commons to the state can succeed (Ophuls, 1973; Ehrenfeld, 1972; Carruthers and Stoner, 1981; and Hardin, 1968). From both perspectives the challenging question is how to de sign optimum rules that bring agreement between decision
25 cooperative game in which all players possess complete inform in the sense that the player is better off choosing this strategy to detect no matter what the other social dilemma assumes that all individuals maximize short term materiel benefits to self in all contexts (Hardin, 1968 and Ostrom, 1990). In the context of social dilemma where free riding is the dominant game theoretical strategy, the prediction is that n o one would contribute to gain collective benefits (Ostrom, 2000; Comm. Pers.). In our case, we assume that the institutional arrangement towards wildlife use is one of the factors related to the poor participation of local people to wildlife management. Moreover, Ostrom (2000) emphasizes that the ability of local communities to develop a more effective regime over time is affected by whether their rights of exclusion and organization are recognized and legitimated by national or local government. She pos tulates that stronger national regulations may backfire (for conservation) by weakening local norms and mechanisms of exclusion. Considering both the organizational structures and common pool resources understanding of social scientists, this study consid ers that political, social and economic factors interact to context of wildlife management. Furthermore, the capacity of local people is a function of social chang e arising from their organizational structures which is related to the collective empowerment subset of empowerment theory that I will be discussing in the following section. Empowerment T heory Empowerment is central to understanding the degree to which p eople are connected to their community. It is a transition from a passive observance to active participation and control.
26 Empowerment generally refers to the process of enabling and enriching an individual or a group of individuals with the means necessary for a constructive, better informed and more beneficial undertaking. For instance, community empowerment is a collective social process of creating a community, achieving better control over the environment, and decision making in which groups, organizati ons or communities participate. Robbins et al. (1998, p.91) argued that control over their own lives. In doing so, they gain the ability to achieve their highest personal The conceptual development of empowerment has gained increasing attention in the context of human behavior, especially in the field of social change. There is a d ifference between empowerment and power in t he context of community organizations. Speer and Hughey ( 1995:732) assumed that empowerment is the manifestation of social power at individual, organizational, and community levels of analysis. In addition they argued that community e mpowerment can only be realized through organization However, Zimmerman ( 1990, 1997) mentioned two levels of empowerment, individual and organizational. He argued that empowerment at individual level refers to participatory behavior, motivations to exert control, and feelings of efficacy and control, while at organizational level, empowerment includes processes and structures that enhance member participation and improve organizational effectiveness for goal achievement (organizational structures). He emphasized that at the co mmunity level of analysis, empowerment may refer to collective action to improve the quality of life in a community and the connections among community organizations and agencies. In this context, empowered communities comprise empowered organizations and include opportunities for people participation in community decision making and other issues in their
27 community. Perkins and Zimmer man (1995) recognized that there are multiple definitions of empowerment and every researcher should make his particular def inition as clear as possible. process centered in the local community, involving mutual respect, critical reflection, caring, and group participation, through whic h people lacking an equal share of valued resources gain greater access to and control over those resources or simply process by which people gain control over their lives, democratic participation in the life of their community and a critical understandin g of their environment (p570). In his analysis of empowerment theory, Zimmerman (1997) defined three aspects of empowerment empowerment values processes, and prof essionals and clients work together. Empowering processes are the mechanisms through which people, organizations, and communities gain mastery and control over issues that concern them, develop a critical awareness of their environment, and participate in dec isions that affect their lives. The outcome dimension concerns consequences of empowering processes as well as ( Zimmerman, 1997 : 6 7). Additionally, o ther scholars such as Laverack and Wallerstein (2001) by arguing about community empowerment pose a number of salient questions. These questions include the following: 1. Who is the community in a program context? 2. What factors influence community empowerment? 3. Is empowerment a process or a outcome? 4. How can we build capacity as a part o f program approach? 5. How can we promote empowerment beyond attempt to measure it? 6. Overall, the content of these questions include the sense of empowerment. Hur (2006:524) in his stud y on t heoretical synthesis o
28 empowerment is conceived as the idea of power, because empowerment is closely related to or example in the field of education, empowerment was perceived as a means of liberating oppressed people. Hur (2006) conceived that empowerment arise at several scales, sociological, psychological, economic and political. It also happens at the individual, organizational a nd community levels. Finally, empowerment includes social process (relation to others) and an outcome (capability to be improved and estimated. However, empowerment is not a panacea for all individual and ndividualistic and conflict oriented, resulting in 58). Based on this literature, empowerment in our context can be identified as an outcome at the level of organiza tional of the local and community in ways we need to understand through a clear theoretical framework. Theoretical F ramework The use of the evolution of conventional theory of collective action and the theory of empowerment can help me to examine factors t hat undermine local people capacity to manage the use of public good wildlife in our context. These two theories are appropriate for addressing collective action issues because they are related to community empowerment and the use of common resource (i. e. wildlife). Based on the work of Ostrom (2000), Speer and Hughey ( 1995); Zimmerman and Warschausky (1998); and Hur, 2006) the theory of collective action and the empowerment theory have common pool resource and collective empowerment as constructs. Thes e constructs can have as indicators organizational structures and the yields of common pool resources. These indicators can be measured through variables such as knowledge of formal and informal laws, associational membership and interactions between assoc iations, participation and
29 motivation to collective action, social trust and cohesion, the harvest rate of wildlife (our common pool resource) and causes and consequences of its extinction. All these variables can affect local capacity in wildlife manageme nt. I use the literature focusing on collective action and empowerment theory research to explore community empowerment, common pool resource and capacity of local people for collective action (Figure 2 1). However, a poor understanding exists on whether high ly centralized regulations of common pool resources are obstructive or beneficial to collective action, especially in relation to community based conservation. In our context, this methodological design for the analysis of community empowerment leads u s to understand empowerment as an outcome at the organizational and community level. I focus on the organizational and community level of analysis because it is a found ation for community building. Objectives There are two objectives for this research: 1. To investigate how changes in formal and informal institutions have influenced participation of local communities to the protection and use of wildlife and; 2. To determine trends in the availability and use of wildlife, and how this affects the livelihoods of l ocal communities. Hypotheses Based on this conceptual model I will test three general hypotheses. 1. Our first hypothesis reflects (Ostrom 2000) collective action is the imposition of unitary centralized controls (l ike forest resource regulations). These undermine the capacity of local mechanisms to control access to resources like wildlife. Speci fic ally, I expected that there is a relationship between attitudes of local people towards wildlife regulations and their knowledge and participation in law enforcement. 2. The ability of local people to respond to threats to wildlife and livelihoods through collective action is undermined by; 1) failure to recognize these threats, 2) lack of knowledge of what to do and 3 ) weak social cohesion and trust.
30 3. Wildlife is significant to livelihoods of local people depending on their ethnicity; however, its long term availability becomes questionable with regard to the current harvest rate. Therefore, there is a relationship between t he importance of wildlife as view ed by local people and the contribution of hunting to house hold income. Evolution of Congolese L egal F ramework Related to Natural Resources M anagement Local people have long managed and used forests for their own livelihood in a particular context. Since the central government took over forest management from the people, however, local communities have suffered and forest management has failed. This study aims to examine forest resources such as wildlife. I assume that a poor understanding of institutional arrangements among the local users may be one of the central factors. In the past (1958), Congo was known as Middle Congo territory (French Equatorial Africa) and then the Republic of Congo after independence in 1960. From that time until 1983, customary rights on forest resources were not abolished. Therefore, the tenure land law of June ime of this current regulation become effective, have rights on land, in relation to local customs, they have faculty to recognize the existence and the extend of these rights by application of the followed processes which replace those of previous regulat ions specially the degree of February 10, 1938. These communities or individuals must not lose their rights, if it is not about public use purpose and have owner ship of a given area and hav e the right to exclude outsiders for the use of any resource on their territory. For hunting for example, users ask for permission from the owner before hunt ing After hunting, the hunter was obligated to recompense the landowner. This traditional norm was well respected. The law n o .52/83 of April 21, 1983 concerning the Congo, in its article 1 belongs to the
31 abolished all previous rights including The results of these institutional arrangements resulted in the a bolition of customary rights defined in the public land law of 1958. As a result landowners have lost exclusion right s because land and its resources become government property. In the case of wildlife, law n o .48/83 of April 21, 1983, defin ed the conditions of exploiting and conserving wildlife. Article 32 of the law rec n other words, commercial hunting is illegal. Consequently, these new l aws lack enforcement capacity and local legitimacy and have undermined traditional controls (i.e. exclusion), and open access has led to an increase in outsider populations and harvests Subsequently, the increase of harvest leads to increase d pressure on wildlife. O ther problems have been exacerbated, such as land tenure, biodiversity loss, and cultural degradation. Although, the intention of wildlife regulations was to prevent the exp loitation of vulnerable or important species, this objective may be questionable in relation to the effective developing world, resource constraints greatly l imit the ability of governments to implement conservation legislation. They emphasized that laws are often implemented with little or no enforcement to back them up, requiring an implicit assumption that resource users will voluntarily modify their behavio (p.2631). This statement describes the problem in Congo T he average citizen does not consider these laws legitimate and there is a lack of mechanisms to apply this law at the local level. The evidence against this defective e nforcement of regulations is demonstrated by the rate of off take of partially protected species such Potamochoerus porcus hunting during the night, hunting all year around, etcetera. One of the objectives of this study is therefore to determine the effec ts of highly centralized regulations
32 regulations in terms of land tenure laws and wildlife laws (Table 2 1). Also, I have established a conceptual framework of the evolution of regulations and their tangible consequences in relation to wildlife exploitation (Figure 2 2). Figure 2 1 Theoretical framework of collective action and empowerment
33 Table 2 1 Selected legal regulations related to land tenure and natural resources use in Congo (i.e. wildlife) Legal texts concerning land tenure and forest resources use (wildlife) Legal land tenure texts Decision n o 75/19582004 of June 19, 1958 concerning p ublic land Law n o 52/83 of April 21, 1983 concerning public land law Republic of the Congo Law n o 09/2004 of March 26, 2004 concerning the State domain code Law n o 10/2004 of March 26, 2004 fixing applicable general principles to Land tenure a nd state lands Law n o 11/2004 of March 26, 2004 concerning expropriation process for public use Legal natural resources selected regulations (Wildlife exploitation) Law n o 48/83 of April 21, 1983 defining the conditions of exploiting and conservation o f wildlife Law n o 49/83 of April 21, 1983 fixing the various taxes envisaged by law 48/83 Law n o 003/91 of April 23, 1991 on the protection of environment Law n o 16/2000 of November 20, 2000 establishing the forest code Decree n o 879/85of 6 July 1985 beari ng application of law 48/83 of 21april 1983 defining the conditions of the conservation and the exploitation of wild fauna Decree n o 437/2002of December 31, 2002, creating guidelines for management and use of forests Decree n o 3772/MAEF/DERFN of 12 August 19 72 determining the open and closed seasons for hunting Decree n o 3863/MAEF/SGEF/DCPP of May 18, 1983 listing completely protected or partially protected species as envisaged by law n o 48/83 from April 21, 1983 which defines the conditions of conservation and restrictions on the exploitation of wildlife Decree n o 0103 of January 30 1984 addressing the provisions relating to the exploitation of products from wild fauna and flora Law n o 37/08 of November 28, 2008 concerning wildlife and protected areas (not applie d yet because of the absence of decree).
34 Figure 2 2 Conceptual framework of l and tenure and natural resource (i.e. wildlife) regulations evolution in Republic of Congo
35 CHAPTER 3 DESCRIPT ION OF THE STUDY ARE A Location Located in Central Africa and on the equator, Republic of Congo covers a surface area of 342,000 km 2 The study area, located in northern Congo is bordered by Gabon at the West of OKNP, Cameroon, and Central African Republic (CAR) (Figure 3 1). Settlements include one logging town, one regional city and several small traditional villages. The study was conducted in two traditional villages, named Attention and Zolabout (Figure 3 1). Since socio political institutions are under central government influence in these villages, variation in the informal social organization of the community with regard to the control of resources may exist To examine the influence of these variations and how local communities deal with them is the objective of this study. S ome measures of joint collaborative resource management activities have been formulated, but they may not be effective because of the origin of the concepts embodied in them (top down or bottom up approaches). This is important to determine whether people are at least organized to some extent concerning the management of their resources, although there are likely some hindrances. Relief, Hydrology, climate, vegetation and fauna and soils The elevation in the area varies between 30 0 800 m above sea level ( Maisels, 1996). The main river in this area is Sangha River. The hydrographic is mainly made up of three principal river watersheds: the Sangha River, Mambili and Lengou. The watersheds of these rivers are culation and as a source of food in their fish resources. In general the climate of the study area is an equatorial climate with two dry seasons and two wet seasons, astride the northern and southern hemispheres' climatic regimes. This is modified by the e scarpment to the west which creates up currents of air coming from the west,
36 which then falls as orographic precipitation on the western border of the Mambili watershed. This leads to a generally wetter climate to the northwest than in the southeast, which is reflected in the vegetation. Its characteristics are moderately high temperatures (23 25C ), low annual temperature range (1 2C), low daily temperature range more than 10C, high rainfall falling bimodally more than 1500mm and the mean annual humidit y is around 80 % (Hecketsweiler et al. 1991). Congolese vegetation is comprised mostly of forests and savannah grasslands. Forest zones cover nearly 60% of the national territory (20 million hectares). In the study area, vegetation is exclusively forests that contain redwoods with high value such as Sipo ( Entandrophragma utile Sapelli (Entandrophragma cylindricum), and Wenge (Millettia laurentii). Asides theses wood species, there are some light hardwoods such as Ayous ( Triplochiton scleroxylon) and Limba (Terminalia superb). The northern Congo is known for its richness in species, especially mammals, such as forest elephants ( Loxodonta africana cyclotis) lowland gorilla ( Gorilla g. gorilla ), chimpanzee ( Pan troglodytes ), and many other endangered species ( Maisels, 1996). Their ecological range is quite broad, extending from the wet dense forest up to gallery forests. In the northern Congo, there are various types of soils, but mainly hydromorphic ground under flooded forests in the Congolese watershed and ferralitic soils in the remainder of the territory. In our study area is around Ouesso, and Kokoua, soils are on granito gneiss (Maisels, 1996). Demography The p opulation of the study area include s two ethnic groups Approximately 70% are Bantu and 30% au tochthonous people ) The two groups have co existed for many centuries. Each group comprises several sub ethnicities. The estimate of this population is about
37 14000 inhabitants. Approximately 57% of populations live in the logging town, while 43 % reside in traditional villages. The population density is about 0.8 inhabitant/km 2 (IFO, 2007). Traditional Framework and Socio economic A ctivities In the study area, daily activities consist of farming, hunting, fish ing and logging, among others. Howev er, logging is the predominant form of land use for this otherwise largely undisturbed natural region (Laporte, 2002). The Forest Industry of Ouesso (IFO) is the logging concession operating in the study area. Belief regime s in the study area are based on myths, legends, reli gion and witchcraft. This strongly influences Bantu and autochthonous people lifestyle s and determines their daily behaviors. Traditional rights on natural resources are not taken into account by modern law when it comes to determin ing equitable accesses to the natural resources (Ministry of Forestry Economic, 2005). In the traditional design, common law draws its base from lineage. In the past, access to the natural resources was followed by several formalities as they were clan ter ritories. For instance, for hunting you should ask for permission from the landowner. Once approved, the hunter has the duty to respect the rights which guarantee his access to these resources such as giving a part of harvest to the landowner. These right s of access to the resources are based on the system of land tenure and the rights of descendents who have inherited land from their ancestors who were the first occupant. This dualistic character of the Congolese society in regards to land requires that o ne take into account the traditional tribal rights that are a product of both common laws and colonial legislation (Ministry of Forestry Economy, 2005). History of L ogging in F orest C oncession of Ngomb In general, Congolese forest is divided into several units named forest management units (FMU). Its allocation to logging companies is attributed either through an industrial processing
38 agreement ( a management and processing agreement permis special objectives:; Timber exploitation, timber processing through sawmill timber transport and commercialization (shipping of wood from production site to consumers in Europe and Asia). Any logging company interested in any of these FMUs must create a management plan for its activities and pursue a certification process in order to reduce the impact of its activities on biodiversity. The forest concession located in the study area is called Ngomb. It was allocated to the company Forest Industry of Ouesso in 1999 (IFO, 2007). It is the second largest logging companies in northern Congo with a size of 1,159,643ha. IFO has an asset base of $ 1,877,934 (800,000,000FCFA) (IFO, 2007). IFO has 900 employees. Today, IFO has a management plan and has been approved most important actors for regional development because it is the single provider of employ ment besides others logging companies. Infrastructure In the study area there are two means of transportation, the national road linking Brazzaville to Ouesso, the regional city and the 3 rd national road connecting Ouesso to Semb (a district city) in North W est of the study area. Odzala Kokoua National Park Odzala Kokoua national park (OKNP) is the largest Park in Congo with around 1,360.000 ha. It is located at the west of Ngomb forest concession. OKNP was created in 1935 but was not managed until 1992 (SG S, 2008). Its habitat includes a mosaic of forest savannas of very rich and diversified fauna. Its wildlife diversity includes e lephants, g orillas (3.7 individuals/km 2 ), chimpanzees (0.4 individual/km 2 ), buffalo and others mammals. Since 1990, a
39 partnersh ip with the European Union has been developed within the framework of the program on the use and the rational management of the forest ecosystems of Central Africa (ECOFAC). The implementation of this program has made it possible to improve the level of kn owledge of the natural resources of this park. Tourist activities have been introduced to the park and there is some basic infrastructure available to accommodate limited tourists (Ministry of Forestry Economy, 2005). T he initial structure of this program d id not include a management plan b ut in 2010 a management plan was created with plans to implement it between 2010 and 2014. The budget estimate for this management plan is about 1.5 to 1.8 billon of Congolese Francs ($ 3,409,091) (OKNP, 2010). This estim ate is based on $220 234/km 2 following the estimates of protected areas of $50 300/km 2 (Baldus, 2008), and $250/km 2 (Ervin, 2003). Figure 3 1. Location of Congo in Africa, location of northern Congo in Congo, location of the st udy area in northern Congo, location of national parks in northern Congo and location of logging concessions in northern Congo
40 CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY Site Selection We conducted this research in the Sangha region in the northern Congo. There are several reasons that this area was an appropriate research site. We chose this site because many logging companies in Sangha are incorporating forest management plans to reduce negative associated effects of their extractive activities on biodive rsity. Local or rural people must be involved in these strategies because the forest surround s them and they use it for their livelihoods. Additionally, today, wildlife is endangered because of the political, economic and social change s that have accompani ed changes in regulation s development strategies, immigration for job seekers economic opportunities, and the lack of alternative sources of income and protein in this area. This region is now one of the most endangered wildlife regions in Congo because it is remote from big cities and because of the growth of logging activities in Congo. Logging activities are the central source of income in the regional econom y and wildlife is one of the central sources of income and food for local residents. The impor tance of logging to the national economy and the more recent recognition of the need to protect natural areas encourage both governmental and private companies to develop forest management plans. However, local people seem to be an underrepresented group i n these processes because of their empowerment to participat e in these strategies. Research Design We used a of analysis about which we collect information. The unit that we se It includes holistic and embedded units of analysis. The case study design is sometimes called
41 retrospective because it explores the past. In this case, we worked backwards to figure out what potential factors can influence lo cal people behavior. This kind of study involves potential shortcomings regarding the loss evidence by recalling the past (de Vaus, 2001). Nevertheless, de Vaus (2001) and Yin (1994) argue that in this situation, the use of multiple sources of evidence c an reduce error and bias. Our case study was an exploratory study which allowed us to detect factors that influence local participation ( Benbasat et al., 1987). We analyzed attitudes through questionnaires and focus groups. We scored each factor and compa red the sample means for the two ethnic groups Bantu and autochthonous people and three types of actors local people, NGOs and Officers which come from the same population s We explored the correlation between the importance of wildlife and the importa nce of hunting as a source of income, m embership and participation and motivation for collective activities, and level s of s ocial trust and s ocial cohesion and knowledge and participation in formal laws and attitudes of local people towards hunting regulat ions in the same population s We included documented evidence of regulations in relation to land tenure and wildlife regulations and opinion s The theoretical population for this study was rural residents or local people living in the Ngomb logging conce ssion adjacent to Odzala Kokoua National Park in Congo. The theoretical population included all adults in households of both ethnic groups (Bantu and autochthonous people) living in the villages located in this logging concession who can potentially partic ipate in the management of their forest resources in Congo. Our theoretical population is homogenous with regard to the following characteristics: location, historic conditions traditional customs, formal laws, structure, practices, socio economic activit ies, strengths and weaknesses.
42 The accessible population for our study is residents living in two villages named Attention and Zolabout located in the Ngomb logging concession in northern Congo. In these villages, there are households composed of two ethn ic groups Bantu and autochthonous people. We choose two cases (two villages) because a single case is less compelling than two or multiples cases (de Vaus, 2001). Unfortunately, limited resources did not allow us to include more than two cases to increase the sources of evidence available Our accessible population adequately reflects the theoretical population because all of these populations live in villages located in logging concession. There are two ethnic groups in the logging concession and they use using forest resources for their livelihoods. They are dealing with the issues of how they can sustain the use of their wildlife and be involve d effectively in the new partnership that is developing as other users of forest resources move into the area (l ogging companies, immigrant s, and conservation agencies). We explored the factors that management The empirical problem is that collaboration by local people is weak, and we therefore worked back wards to reconstruct the historical reasons for this, triangulating between several methodologies (Jick, 1979; Yin, 1994). We took into account both ethnicities in our sampling because of different livelihood strategies and because autochthonous people of ten speak openly only in separate focus groups. W e choose a case study design because our topic is local community collaborative actions. Tellis (1997) argue s that, the effects of community based prevention programs have been widely investigated using the case study design. He argues that the case study design bring s out the details from the viewpoint of the participants by using multiple sources of data. According to him, a case study is a multi perspective analysis. In this context, the involvement of
43 loc al community members and others provides for multi perspective analysis. I n our case, the views of people within and out side the community (like the different conservation organizations) who interact with the local communities will be considered in order t o increase sources of evidence. T he best way to use a case study design would be to compar e two groups that differ in outcome; for example one group with effective participation and the other with poor participation in homogenous population. Unfortunately, two groups for to this topic participation in order to make comparison s (Yin, 2003). For this reason, our case design is descriptive although the use of triangulation helps to overcome limitations. I t is also retrospective because we have to ask participants to recall evidence from the past We chose two villages because we wanted increase source s of evidence. Sample Selection Sample selection was judgme ntal and purposive. These two villages were selected because of their accessibility, and their similar park and logging configurations, socio economic characteristics, ethnicity, remoteness from urban areas, and dependence on forest resources. We expected these characteristics to affect our outcome, and have chosen a non random, purposive sampling approach to assess their impacts as suggested Turnbull and Moustakatos (1996). W e established the following criteria f or screening to select the two village s: T he villages had to have a high level of dependence on the forest and its resources since this study is about participation in the management of wildlife The villages should have both ethnic groups in order to permit the analysis of variations among this h eterogeneous community, Bantu and autochthonous people. The villages should be rural to reduce the influence of urbanization on local knowledge in forest activities and social norms. This was important in order to get to know the traditional way the local people use and manage their forests.
44 The v illages should have socio political institutions that influence the social organization of the community in order to determine the influence of these various institutions on the livelihoods or way of living of dif ferent ethnic groups. The villages should be accessible for this study. The villages should have more than 500 people in order to have enough households to survey if there were some non respondents and mortalit y during data collection. Based on these crit eria, we identified villages suitable for the study. Although a probability sample is sometimes ideal, it is often impossible to use probability sampling under real research conditions (Bernard, 2000). Our sampling did not involve random selection nor were villages selected with equal probability However, o ur priority is based on the villages that are ideal for our study with regard to key factors under study T o select respondents (household heads and keys informants), we used a volunteer sample. This al lowed reaching a wide variety of participants and made sampling easier This non probability sample provided a way to increase the potential of covering the range of issues, phenomena, and types of individuals that are of interest (Turnbull, and Moustakato s, 1996). These are not haphazard samples because systematic procedures are employed, which make use of currently held information and expectations about the important dimensions of a research problem. Although this technique was useful to cover ma n y peopl e, we were conscious that the type of participants who volunteer may not be representative of the target population for a number of reasons. For example, they may be more obedient, more motivated to take part in studies and so on. In order to minimize non response bias, we eliminated all non responses possible. A low response rate is related to non responses in the form of in valid responses from the respondents (Henry, 1990). He argues that non response can occur when the respondent refuses to answer a part icular question or refuse to participate in the survey, or when the respondent cannot be contacted. In fact, non response is a non sampling bias. For this reason, we screen ed and people
45 who did not want to participate were eliminated. The use of multiple m ethods of contacting sample members questionnaire, focus group, interviews, participatory observation, in depth interviews help ed me to mitigate the effect of non responses. The use of several methods can help minimize respondent refusals and is one way to reduce non response (Henry, 1990). It is the same in the case of mortality dropout or the loss of respondents. They will not impact our sample (de Vaus, 2001) because a were removed from t he sample. De Vaus (2001) state s that in the case study, the sample is always judgmental or purposive rather than statistically representative. Case studies depend on more theoretical generalization and less on statistical generalization. O ur sample cover ed about 37% of 190 households that composed the two villages. The estimate d number of households in both villages is about 190 households. However, in the logging concession, the average number of people per households is about five to six people (WCS Con go program, unpublished data). Our sample had 71 households, 48 key informants and five focus groups. Tellis (1997) argues that case study research is not sampling based research. Nonetheless, the selection of cases has to be done to maximize what can be learned in the time frame available for the study. He also emphasizes the importance of a case study for its multi perspective analysis of the actors chosen for the study and of other parties who interact with the actors. This aspect is a significant attri bute of case studies, thereby making the powerless and voiceless participants in the research. The case study method helped to understand as much as possible about the research participants and their activities. We used multiples methods as source of infor mation in order to reduc e bias due to non response (non sampling bias).
46 Validity and E xplan atory P ower Yin (2003) states that, the possibility for triangulation in case studies can help to confirm validity. In term s of internal validity, the use of multip le sources of data is a best practice for removing threats to internal validity The purpose of any study should therefore establish the parameters applicable to the research. In t his case study we used the recommended approaches of used multiple methods a nd sampl e screening. The purpose of case study is not statistical generalization but theoretical generalization. However, in terms external validity, we are aware of the potential limitations of our design. Although w e are confident of our conclusions, we are also cautious regarding the degree to which we can extend these conclusions to other conditions or areas As Yin (2003) points out, in the case study generalization is not automatic but needs to be test ed to replicat e findings before generalizing Thi s calls for special caution in order to reduce errors in generalization due to the limitations stated above. The key weaknesses of this study is at statistical level were the lack of a random sample limits statistical generalization, despite the use of se veral sources of data. In addition, the lack of differences in the unit of analysis may reduce its explanatory power because of the absence of replication logic (de Vaus, 2001; Yin, 2003). On the other hand, theoretical generalization is increased because of the use of several source s of evidence. E xplanat ory power is the capacity of a theory to identify and anticipate the outcome in order to eliminate other explanations and therefore increase internal validity. This allows the researcher to discern betwe en assumptions derived from the sample and the ability to generalize ( Steckler and McLeroy, 2008). In this case, the use of several methods, screening and matching can demonstrate causality because several relationships between variables can be explored T he case study design can help us to understand as much as possible about the research participants
47 and their activities and what influence s their activities. Many linkages will be explored. Therefore, this study may demonstrate causal linkages betw een poor participation by local people in collaborative actions. The use of two cases, several methods, screening, and matching all strengthen the ability to identify causal relationships associated with the degree of local participation in collaborative actions. Instrumentation Data were collected at t he level of households heads (N =71) including both ethnic groups (Bantu and autochthonous people) and key informants including local people, natio nal NGOs and officers (N =48) and focus groups (N =5) First, we develop ed a questionnaire to measure the importance of wildlife, the contribution of hunting to household income, associational life, participation and motivation for communal activities, knowledge of and participation in formal laws, recognition of causes and co nsequences of wildlife extinction and knowledge of traditional norms. Second, we developed an index to measure level of social trust and social cohesion and an index to measure attitudes of local people towards formal laws. We scored each item and then cre ated a summative score for each variable. Measurement of the dimensions of each variable produced data with different levels of measurement (interval, ordinal, and nominal). Questionnaire The questionnaire was developed to include the following factors: 1. Importance of wildlife for household; 2. Contribution of hunting to household income; 3. Associational life 4. Participation and motivation in communal activities; 5. Knowledge of and participation in enforcement of formal laws; 6. Attitudes towards wildlife regulat ions; 7. Recognition of main threats to wildlife ; 8. Recognition of potential consequences of wildlife extinction, 9. Recognition of potential obstacles ;
48 10. Recognition of potential solutions; 11. Knowledge of traditional norms; 12. Social trust ; and 13. S ocial cohesion I de veloped a questionnaire to measure these dimensions, all of which are presented in Table 4 1, Table 4 2 and Table 4 items on the questionnaire. Validity and R eliability In order to have a vali d instrument the questionnaire was tested. Bryman (2008) states that testing the questionnaire enables the researcher to have a greater sense of confidence, to make sure that everyone is answering in the same way, to ensure that respondents are comfortable and to make sure questions are not unclear. Validity addresses the amount of systematic error contained in the measure (Norland Tilburg, 1990). Massof and Rubin (2001) state that validity is a statement of confidence that the instrument accurately measure s what it intends to measure. I checked for content validity by administrating the instrument, first with colleagues in order to get their reactions to the questions to determine if questions were confus ing or inappropriate. This first exercise allowed me to improve questions by rewriting or removing unclear items. This questionnaire was test retested for its reliability. Reliability is concerned with the administration (test retest reliability) or the consistenc y of instrument scores across conditions of administration (e.g., effects of environment, person administering the instrument, or mode of instrument administration) (Massof and Rubin, 2001). The instrument was given to several individuals ranging from grad uate colleagues and instructors to practitioners. There were some questions that after testing with more individuals, we discovered to be unclear, and therefore removed. Because of the
49 diversity of tes te d respondents, I was able to ensure that there was le ss potential for homogeneity of answers due to overlap of disciplines. After testing for reliability, we came up with our final instrument (Appendix C 1 and Appendix C 2 ). Social trust and social cohesion index The index used to measure social trust and s ocial cohesion was adapted from Grootaert (2004), Van der Veld (2007) and Cadavieco (2009) (Appendix C 1 ). Each statement or item was rated on a scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) (Table 4 trust and cohesion score c social trust and 12 statements in the social cohesion index, each of which included multiple items to increase the reliability of the score (DeVellis, 2003; Carrington, 2007). The variable score consisted of summing the mean score on each item for each respondent by dimension (Black and Earnest, 2009). Attitudes of local people towards formal laws To investigate local people feelings about formal laws, I develop ed a L ikert type scale (Appen dix C 2 ). Each item was scored on a five point scalar response format: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, and (5) strongly agree (Black and Earnest, 2009). As suggested by Martineau and Hannum (2004), the Likert type scale items w ere used to measure the extent of participant agreement (Table 4 4). The instrument was checked for its validity by a panel of experts that included colleagues, faculty members, and practitioners. The instrument was tested in the field with similar respo ndents and different type s of respondents (Bantu, autochthonous people, men, women). All unclear questions were removed and I came up with 51 items. In addition, I tested reliability of instrument by using Cronbach's alpha to determine the internal consist ency or
50 average correlation of items in the to estimate its reliability. Martineau and Hannum (2004) mention that reliability is the consistency of an assessment while validity refers to the accuracy of an assessment. They argue that the appropriate reliab ility level depends on the situation. R eliability is usually reported on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, with estimate s closer to 1 being preferred. The instrument was administered to 26 people including 16 Bantu, 10 autochthonous people, 10 women and 16 men. I also tested for discriminatory power, the ability of the instrument to distinguish among respondents. Field (2005) states that discrimination or discriminatory power simply means that people with different scores on a variable should differ with regard to the construct of interest. The following codes were used to enter the data for each respondent, if the respondent 1. 2. If 3. 4. If 5 I computed Cronbach's alpha using SPSS for all fifty four items. It is very important to know whether the same set of items would elicit the same r esponses if the same questions are recast and re administered to the same respondents. Variables derived from test instruments are declared to be reliable only when they provide stable and reliable responses over a repeated administration of the test. Nunn ally (1978, p. 245) and Devellis (2003, p. 136) recommend that instruments used in basic research have reliability scores of about 0.70 or better. Field ( 2005) points out that any items having a correlation less than 0.3 should be excluded. Therefore, I deleted all items with item total correlations of less than 0.4 in order to be 0.7 The resulting output from the test is given in the Table 4 5.
51 Focus G roup Q uestionnaire The purpose of this focus group was to gain a deeper understanding of the feelings and perceptions of local people about wildlife regulations when they are in a group environment. For the purpose of enhancing academic rigor thorough triangulation, the focus group is used in addition to a self comple tion questionnaire (Barbour, 2001). The q uestionnaire provided some evidence about individual perceptions collected in household survey (Appendix C 3 ). It was developed to include all factors which I need to evaluate interactions among participants; import ance of wildlife, contribution of hunting in village income, participation in formal laws enforcement, attitudes towards, participation and motivation in communal activities, causes and consequences of wildlife extinction. The i nstrument was tested and re tested for its validity and reliability. In order to have an objective measure of the prevalence of an attitude between and within local people, the focus group data analysis included analysis of findings as the most important themes, the most significant quotes and any unexpected findings. Bushmeat Q uestionnaire I used bushmeat data from a study conducted in logging concession by the project of ecosystems management adjacent to Odzala Kokoua national (PROGEP/PNOK) in the small village named Zolabout. Th e purpose of this study was to assess the pressure on wildlife in order to compare the harvest rate in traditional settings and in a logging town. However, I used these data in order to establish whether the harvest rate was sustainable. Thus, data were co llected by monitoring bushmeat supply in village for ten randomly selected days each month from J anuary 2010 to J une 2010. There was a research assistant in the village in the morning when most of the hunters return from the forest before bushmeat had been sold. He observed the principal trails entering in village. He record ed the species of animal, condition (fresh or smoked or whole or
52 part), means of capture (gun, cable trap or dogs), and ethnicity of the hunter ( A ppendix C 4 ). For a subset of these obse rvations carcasses were weighed. I converted the number of observations to biomass because it allowed us to account for observations of partial animals (e.g., hind quarters of a duiker) (Poulsen et al., 2009). I used average weights to estimate the total b iomass of duikers for the purpose of sus tainable harvest rate analysis. Data A nalysis I used multiple methods, qualitative and quantitative. Therefore, qualitative methods were focus groups and provided qualitative data, and quantitative methods were quest ionnaires to households and key informants, provided quantitative data. Qualitative D ata I used focus groups to collect qualitative data in order to support quantitative data from questionnaires. Rabiee (2004) argues that like one to one interviews, the results of focus group interviews can be presented in uncomplicated ways using lay terminology supported by quotations from the participants. In addition, Krueger (1994) suggests that focus group data analysis can rang e from the mere accumulation of raw da ta to the interpretation of data (descriptive statements and interpretation). Therefore, I use d descriptive statements to identify findings as most important themes, the most noteworthy quotes and any unexpected findings. For example, during the focus gro up, I collect ed the most repeated sentences such as f we orest is for no one Quantitative D ata I collected quantitative data from household surveys, hunting, including ethnic groups (Bantu and autochthonous people ) and key informants including, local people, national NGOs
53 and government officers. We used statistical tests to examine difference s between groups of respondents in the same sample and correlation s between variables in the same sample. I compared differenc es between ethnic groups and key informants. This allowed me to analy ze the relation ships between them and make comparison s The quantitative data were analyzed using the following procedures. 1. We scored variables (i.e. m ost important (5), second most impo rtant(4), third most important (3), fourth most important (2) and fifth most important (1) ; 2. We used SPSS to determine means scores for each variable ; 3. We determine d the normality of each variable with the Shapiro Wilks test (p>0.05); 4. We reported frequenc ies ; 5. We us ed parametric and non parametric statistic al test s to assess if there was a significant difference s between groups related to the variable and the correlation between variables based on mean sc ores. Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis I reflects (Ostrom 2000) observation that an important threat to local collective action is the imposition of unitary centralized controls (like forest resource regulations). These undermine the capacity of local mechanisms to control access to resources like wildlife. Specially, I expected that there is a relationship between attitudes of local people towards wildlife regulations and their knowledge and participation in law enforcement. To measure this we compared the means scores of three variables between group s of respondents (local people, NGOs and Officers): 1) knowledge of formal laws and participation in its enforcement, 2) attitudes towards formal regulations, and 3) knowledge of informal norms. These factors were scored using the rubric in T able 4 2. I ran Spearman's rank correlation to test the correlation s between attitudes, knowledge and participation in formal law enforcement.
54 Hypothesis 2 The ability of local people to respond to threats to wildlife and livelihoods through collective action is undermined by 1) failu re to recognize these threats, 2) lack of knowledge of what to do and 3 ) weak social cohesion and trust. This hypothesis was assessed through the variables of k nowledge of threats to wildlife, consequences of its extinction, potential solutions, and obs tacles to wildlife management by local people. I developed categorical responses for each of these variables and the respondent was asked to identify three of them in terms of most important, second most important and third most important. I analyzed frequ encies of categorical response response to each variable. In order, to apply statistical test s to assess if there was a significance difference between group in appreciation of threats to wildlife, consequences of its extinction, solutions to mitigate threats and obstacles to their implementation, factors were scored as most important, second most important and third most important. I assumed that these categories represent similar and contrasting responses between groups of respon dents (local people, NGOs and government officers). The analysis of these variables was to see if local people have recognized these themes as well as NGOs and government officers (Table 4 2). To determine the major themes related to each variable, I analy zed frequencies of each category and compare d groups of respondents. Themes related to each variable provide insight in collective action regarding management of wildlife. The differenc es in responses between groups of respondents provide insight s about the level of recognition of threats by local people consequences, solutions and obstacles to wildlife conservation.
55 In addition I scaled attitudes of local people towards the variables of social trust and social cohesion (Table 4 3). I analyzed the mean scores for differences between groups. Hypothesis 3 Wildlife is significant to local livelihoods of local people depending on their ethnicity H owever, its long term availability becom es questionable with regard to the current harvest rate s Data about sustainability of wildlife were measured by variables of importance of wildlife for household, i mportance of hunting as source of income and the analysis of actual harvest rate. Importa nce of wildlife for household was analy zed by comparing mean scores of the importance of wildlife on scale of 1 to 5 with ve ry little (1), a little (2), some (3), a lot of (4) and a great deal (5). The importance of hunting as source of income was also ana lysis on the scale of 1 to 5 with most import important (5), second most important (4), third most important (3), fourth most important (2) and fifth most important (1) (Table 4 1). Finally, to measure actual harvest we first determined first the hunting zone size and then determine d the biomass and the number of carcasses by using average weight for Duikers the most hunted species in the study area (over two third s of total hunted biomass). The actual harvest rate is the ratio between the number of anim als hunted or corresponding biomass and the size of hunting zone. Finally, the actual harvest rates of this study were compared to the sustainable harvest rates across Congo basin f o und in the literature. I also examined the correlation between the importa nce of wildlife and the importance of hunting to determine if there was a relationship between these two variables. Test of Normality I tested if variables were normally distributed using the Shapiro Wilks test. For both Bantu and autochthonous people I co
56 survey were not normally distributed (p<0.05), the importance of wildlife for the household, the importance of hunting as a source of income, association membership and group interaction, participa tion and motivation for collective action, social trust, and social cohesion (Table 4 6). Similarly, in the key informant survey of local people, NGOs and government officers the following variables were not normally distributed: K nowledge of causes, con sequence of wildlife extinction, knowledge of obstacles, knowledge of potential solutions and knowledge of past laws (p<0.05) (Table 4 7). However, the variable of attitudes towards wildlife laws was normally distributed (p > 0.05). The variable of knowle dge and participation in formal law enforcement was not normally distributed for the two groups (local people and government officers) (p<0.05). I performed both log and square root transformations on this variable, but normality was not achieved. Therefor e, I concluded that this variable was not normally distributed. Where distribution was normal I was able to use one way ANOVA to test for differences between more than two groups, and if non normal I need to rely on non parametric tests line the Mann Whit ney U test for two group comparison s (Bantu and autochthonous people) and the Kruskal Wallis test for three groups (local people, NGOs and government officers).
57 Table 4 1 Dimensions of importance of wildlife, contribution of hunt ing to income, bushmeat harvest, m embership and group interactions, participation and motivation in collective activities motivation in communal activities and applied measurements Variables Measure in Questionnaire Level of Measurement (Quantitative) H ow important is wildlife for your household Level of importance Scale 1 5: Very little, a little, some, a lot of and a great deal Dimension of hunting as source of income Level of contribution in household income Scale 1 5: fifth most important, fourth m ost important, third most important, second most important, first most important. Bushmeat harvest Number of carcasses and biomass Actual harvest rate for most hunted species which are duikers Membership and group interactions To be a member of any gr oup of any group in the village Identification as a member of any group Scale 1 2: No(1), Yes(2) Interact with groups around the villages Level of agreement Scale 1 3: No(1), Yes occasionally(2), Yes frequently(3) Participation and motivation in collec tive activities Level of agreement on participation How people will cooperate to solve the problem Scale 1 2: No, Yes Scale 1 5: Very unlikely, Somewhat unlikely Neither likely Somewhat likely Very likely
58 Table 4 2 Dimensi ons of Knowledge of causes and consequences of wildlife extinction, k nowledge of formal laws k nowledge of pasted norms and applied measurements Variables Measure in Questionnaire (categories of responses) Level of Measurement (Quantitative) Central thre ats to wildlife Population growth Lack of law enforcement Open access Lack of alternative source of income Lack of alternative source of protein Proliferation of guns Development of Roads Scale 1 3: Most important(3), second most important(2), t hird most important(1) Potential solutions Solution must come from Government Population should organize Arrangement of local exclusion rights Wildlife cannot finish Nothing to do Potential obstacles Government is far from village We don't have power Lack of local organization Lack of knowledge Main consequences Loss of income from hunting Reduce of source of animal proteins Culture loss Children will not know wildlife Change of forest structure Increase of rural poverty Autochthonous people will neglect forest Knowledge of formal laws Formal law applied to the control wildlife Knowledge of laws Scale 1 3: I don't know, The state law, and law 48/1983, Reporting poaching incident to the local authorities Participation to law e nforcement Scale 1 5: Never, rarely, sometimes, usually, and always Knowledge of past norms in relation to wildlife use Informal rules related to the use of wildlife in the past Scale 1 Ask for permission to fo rest proprietor
59 Table 4 3 Dimensions of social trust social cohesion and applied measurements Variables Measure in Questionnaire Level of Measurement (Quantitative) Social trust Interactions among people Self interested Peo ple help one another Scale 1 5: Very few, A few, About half, Many, Many more Would do you say that most people can be trust or that Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if you got a chance Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking out for themselves? Social cohesion Relationship that brings people together in community Scale 1 5: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Ag ree and Strongly agree In this village people work together I enjoy working together with other people People help each other When I need help, I turn to other people People share common beliefs I learn about services through other pe ople People feel that they can make a difference by working together When I get sick, I turn to other people for help When I seek help I usually do so with other people I seek advice from other people When people have a plan they stic k to it People are willing to work collectively
60 Table 4 4 Dimensions of attitudes towards formal laws and applied measurements Items Attitudes towards formal laws Measure in Questionnaire Level of Measurement (Quantitative ) 05 Decision on wildlife is made far from its habitat Level of agreement Scale 1 5: Strongly agree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly disagree 10 Wildlife laws don't have taken into account local realities 12 Abolition of customary law is one of the causes of pressure on wildlife 24 Hunting is difficult to control by customary law 29 Local control of wildlife is possible 30 New government laws are undermining the ability of local people to control access to wildlife 31 Involvement of local people in wildlife management was interrupted with abolition of customary law 35 Local people can implement hunting regulations 44 Hunting can be controlled by local people Table 4 5 Item Total Stati stics of dimens ions of local people attitudes towards formal laws, Ngomb F orest Management U nit, N orthern Congo (Brazzaville) 2010 Cronbach's Alpha= 0.726; Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items = 0.719, N of Items = 51 Items Scale Mean if Item Deleted Scale Var iance if Item Deleted Corrected Item Total Correlation Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted Item05 167.52 218.677 0.41 0.713 Item10 168.08 213.993 0.533 0.706 Item12 167.92 215.327 0.431 0.71 Item 24 167.8 216.5 0.436 0.711 Item 29 167.8 212.833 0.562 0. 705 Item 30 168.2 215.833 0.496 0.709 Item 31 168.16 207.89 0.706 0.698 Item 35 167.36 212.24 0.64 0.703 Item 44 167.72 215.293 0.555 0.707
61 Table 4 6 Shapiro Wilks test of normal distribution for all variables survey (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Variables Bantu Autochthonous people W P W P Conclusion Of normality Important of wildlife for household 0.905 0.002 0.841 0.001 Not normal Hunting as source of income 0.792 0.0001 0.666 0.0001 Not normal Association membership and group interaction 0.767 0.0001 0.678 0.0001 Not normal Participation and motivation to communal activities 0.645 0.0001 0.845 0.001 Not normal Social trust 0.908 0.003 0.928 0.048 Not norma l Social cohesion 0.656 0.0001 0.702 0.0001 Not normal
62 Table 4 7 Shapiro Wilks test of normal distribution for all variables (N=48) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Va riables Local people NGOs Officers Conclusion W P W P W P Of normality 1.Knowledge of threats Population growth 0.442 0.0001 0.633 0.0001 0.566 0.0001 Not normal Lack of law enforcement 0.586 0.0001 0.696 0.0001 0.72 0.004 Not normal Open acc ess 0.785 0.0001 0.558 0.0001 0.779 0.017 Not normal Proliferation of guns 0.819 0.0001 0.311 0.0001 Not normal Lack of alternative source of income 0.645 0.0001 0.757 0.002 0.847 0.088 Not normal Lack of alternative source of animal proteins 0.193 0.0001 0.706 0.001 0.601 0.0001 Not normal development of roads 0.458 0.0001 Not normal 2. Potential solutions Solution must come from government 0.779 0.0001 0.826 0.014 0.566 0.0001 Not normal Population should be or ganize 0.74 0.0001 0.816 0.011 0.804 0.032 Not normal Arrangements of local exclusion rights 0.71 0.0001 0.81 0.009 0.835 0.067 Not normal There is nothing to do 0.494 0.0001 Not normal Wildlife cannot finish 0.294 0.0001 Not norma l 3.Obstacles to local i nvolvement Government is far from rural area 0.401 0.0001 0.705 0.001 0.729 0.005 Not normal lack of power 0.427 0.001 0.715 0.001 0.418 0.0001 Not normal Lack of local organization 0.706 0.0001 0.763 0.003 0.858 0 .114 Not normal Lack of knowledge 0.311 0.0001 0.418 0.0001 Not normal 4.consequences of wildlife extinction Reduce of source of income 0.765 0.0001 0.684 0.0001 0.781 0.018 Not normal Reduce of source animal proteins 0.726 0.0001 0.662 0.0001 0.693 0.002 Not normal Culture loss 0.341 0.0001 0.696 0.001 0.607 0.0001 Not normal Children will not know wildlife 0.844 0.001 0.687 0.0001 0.772 0.014 Not normal Change of forest structure 0.193 0.0001 0.807 0.008 0.798 0.027 Not normal In crease of rural poverty 0.193 0.0001 0.599 0.0001 0.566 0.0001 Not normal Autochthonous people will neglect forest 0.427 0.0001 0.446 0.0001 0.566 0.0001 Not normal 6. Knowledge and participation in formal laws enforcement 0.758 0.0001 0.939 0.440 0.766 0.012 Not normal 7.Attitudes towards formal laws 0.945 0.162 0.930 0.342 0.899 0.282 Normal 8. Knowledge of past laws 0.614 0.0001 0.787 0.005 0.809 0.036 Not normal
63 CHAPTER 5 RESULTS This study has investigated factors that influence the parti cipation of local people in wildlife management and conservation, specifically bushmeat hunting by local communities in the Republic of Congo. Hunting is affected by many factors, the most important of which includes the value of wildlife for local people including its contribution to their income and diet, their recognition of threats to its sustainable use and knowledge about potential solutions, and o bstacles that prevent local people managing wildlife sustainably such as external regulations and local disempowerment formal and informal wildlife regulations, the capacity for associational life and group interactions, and factors that affect participation in collective action, including l evels of social trust and cohesion in the community. Therefore I wi ll: 1. Describe these variables using descriptive statistics such as means and frequencies; 2. Analyze whether there are the significance difference in responses between Bantu and autochthonous people and between local people, NGOs staff and government officia ls; 3. Examine the correlations between some variables, for example between social trust and association membership; 4. Analyze the sustainability of wildlife by comparing the harvest rate of wildlife recorded in the study area to sustainable rates reported in the literature. Hypothesis 1 H1 reflects (Ostrom 2000) is the imposition of unitary centralized controls (like forest resource regulations). These undermine the capacity of traditional local mech anisms for controlling access to and use of resources like wildlife. Specially, I want to test if negative attitudes of local people towards wildlife regulations reduce their participation in law enforcement. To measure this, we compare d means between grou p s of respondents (local people, NGOs and Officers) for three combinations of variables: (1) knowledge of formal laws and
64 participation in its enforcement, (2) knowledge of informal norms for wildlife management, and (3) attitudes towards formal regulation s (Table 5 1). about them) than NGOs and government officers (83% and 100 %), but slightly higher levels of knowledge about informal norms with 63% of respondents saying t hat outsiders had to seek permission from the community in the past compared to 46 % and 50% for NGOs and officers ( Appendix A 1). Local people reported that they never reported poaching activities to offici als (100%) ( A ppendix A 1). All three groups had n egative attitudes towards wildlife regulations (Table 5 1 and Table 5 2). Detailed results (Table 5 2) showed that local people thought laws about wildlife were made far away (74% agreed or strongly agreed), and did not take local realities into account ( 85% = agree or strongly agree). They agreed that the abolition of local laws was increasing pressure on wildlife (77%) and did not take local realities into account (85%), had reduced the involvement of local people in wildlife management (70%) and had un dermined the ability of local people to control access to bushmeat (74%). While they thought local control of wildlife might be difficult under current institutional conditions (55.6%) they also agreed that local control was workable (67%) and that local people could implement hunting regulations (67%) and control hunting (74%). NGOs agreed that wildlife laws were distanced from local reality, but were less certain that central laws had undermined local responsibility, yet agreed that local people could co ntrol hunting and bushmeat harvest The responses of government officials were bi modal: some officers took the position that central laws had undermined local controls but others disagreed. However, even government officials believed that local communit ies could control hunting.
65 When we combine five point scal ar measuring similar variables (Table 5 1), we find that local people neither understand nor participate in formal law enforcement (score = 1.31) co mpared to NGOs and officials (scores = 2.77, 3.31). However, their understanding of traditional systems is slightly better (score = 2.26 versus 1.77 for NGOs, 2.13 for officials). All three groups had negative attitudes about the efficacy of current wildl We then tested to see if the differences between local people, NGOs and officials were significant. The Kruskal Wallis H test used for non normally distributed variables showed th at: 1 There was a significance difference between local people, NGOs and officers in regards to the knowledge and participation in formal law enforcement (Chi square = 33.571, degree of freedom = 2, p= 0.0001) ; and 2 There was n o significance difference betw een local residents, NGOs and government officers regarding their knowledge of past informal rules (Chi square = 1.626, degree of freedom equals 2, p= 0.443). A ttitudes towards wildlife regulations were normally distributed, so we used a one way ANNOVA t es t for differences between groups. T here was no statistically significant difference between local people, NGOs and government officers regarding their attitudes towards wildlife regulations ( p= 0.330, df=2). To understand if lack of participation in law enforcement (i.e. understanding of formal laws and reporting poaching activities (Table 5 1) was related to negative attitudes towards wildlife regulations (comb ining all eight variables from T able 5 2 ) we ran a Spearman's rank correlation of the combine d scores for each individual (N=48). This suggested that there was no significant correlation between these two variables ( r = 0.152, p = 0.302 ) (a Spearman correlation is used when one or both of the variables are not assumed to be normally distributed). These data are enriched by focus groups and participant observation. A regular response
66 r in the forest, he would say the wildlife was not owned by them but by everyone, and that they had no powers to control access to the forest by others. A n unsolici ted comment was that people said that is was risky to support law enforcement in the current context because of the risk to witnesses and the lack of protection of witnesses. Local people are also worried that if they report a poaching event, they will be driven to the jail as a witness with the poacher. When we asked local people to give an example to illustrate the non enforcement of wildlife regulation, they stated that they used illegal hunting methods like snares, hunted protected species like forest hog, buffalo, red duiker for which permits are required, and hunt ed all the year without following hunting season s People noted that hunting regulations were seldom supported by the actions of government officials, such as monitoring of permits. Most peo ple agreed that if w ildlife regulations were cut back greatly to empower local people, they could manage wildlife better. Hypothesis 2 Our second hypothesis was that the ability of local people to respond to threats to wildlife and consequently to their li velihoods through collective action is undermined by: 1. Failure to recognize threats to the sustainability of hunting (Table 5 3); 2. Failure to recognize the consequences of the loss of wildlife to livelihoods, culture and conservation (Table 5 4); 3. Lack of kn owledge of how to respond to threats to wildlife sustainability (Table 5 5); 4. Obstacles to the evolution of local solutions for sustainable wildlife management (Table 5 6); 5. Membership life and participation in communal activities (Table 5 7, and Table 5 8 ); 6. And whether weak social cohesion and trust (Table 5 9 and T able 5 10) would prevent local solutions from emerging
67 Threats to S ustainability Threats to sustainability are summarized in Table 5 3 which reports how frequently threats were listed as mos t important, second and third most important. To assist analysis, we provide a total score which sums frequency multiplied by ranking scores (i.e.3, 2, 1 respectively), and a weighted mean score (methods). Local people, NGOs and officials all suggested t hat the primary threat to wildlife was selling bush meat for money because of the lack of alternative sources of income. Local people ranked the next most important threats as, the proliferatio n of guns, the fact that anyone could hunt in the forest witho ut permission (i.e. open access) (Figure 5 1), and weak law enforcement. Detailed results (Table 5 3) showed that local people thought that the lack of alternative source s of income is the most important cause of pressure to wildlife (70% ranked 1 st ) with the proliferation of guns (49% ranked 1st or 2 nd ) as second most important threat to wildlife. NGOs also identified weak law enforcement and open access as problematic, but they also mentioned demographic factors including population growth and local cons umption of meat. NGOs argued that reselling bushmeat for income is the main threats to wildlife (42%) followed by lack of law enforcement, open access and population growth (17 % for each). Government officials also claimed that the main threat to wildli fe was bushmeat sales because of the lack of alternative source s of income (57% ranked 1 st or 2 nd ), followed by open access and weak law enforcement. Consequences of loss of wildlife 2, det ailed results in Table 5 4) was a reduction in sources of animal protein (ranking: 1 st = 52%, 2 nd = 30%) followed by decreased income opportunities (1 st =37%, 2 nd =48%). NGOs and Government
68 officers were most concerned about loss of sources of income and wildlife (Table 5 4). NGOs argued that the main consequences of wildlife extinction will be the decrease in sources of income at first (36%) then wildlife will be unknown by the next generation (58%). However, governmental of ficers worried about the decrease d source s of income at 29% and wildlife will be also unknown in the future (56.2% ranked 1 st or 2nd ). Knowledge of how to respond to threats to wildlife To manage the threats to wildlife, almost all respondents agreed that potential solutions (Figure 5 3). Detailed results for local people, NGOs and government officers were 48% and 44%), 50% and 33%, and 75% and 67% respectively (T able 5 5). Obstacles to local collective action towards threats to wildlife When asked about the main obstacles to taking corrective action (Table 5 6, Figure 5 4), local people pointed out that they currently lack local organizational capacity to manage wildlife (94% ranked this top), and lack the authority (power) to do so (57% ranked this second). However, NGOs focused on the lack of power (57% Ranking 1 st = 57%, 2nd = 40%), followed by lack of local organization (1 st =27%, 2 nd = 40%). The primary const raint identified by government officers is that government is too far away to support local people (1 st =60%, 2 nd =25%) and the lack of local organization (1 st =20%, 2 nd =75%). I used non parametric Chi square test of the scal ar score data to assess difference s between gr oups of respondents ( Appendix A 2). It indicated that difference between groups of respondents for the four variables listed in T able s 5 3, 5 4, 5 5, and 5 6 were statistic ally significant (p<0.05) (A ppendix A 2).
69 Associational membership and p articipation in communal activities To further test hypothesis 2, I assessed associational membership and participation in collective actions of villagers. Most people of both Bantu (83.3%) and autochthonous people (79.3%) was a member of at least one asso ciation in the village (Table 5 7, Figure 5 5). In addition, the Bantu ethnic group (35.7%) indicated that their associations interacted with similar associations in other villages, significantly more ( p=0.016 ) tha n for the more isolated autochthonous peo ple where only 10.3% of groups worked with another village. We recorded the field of action of the 12 associations where villagers were members. They were classified in two categories (1) cultural organizations devoted to social and cultural events such as dance, death or illness among members ( Beka, Endzegui, Ekorombe, Endzengouma, Azimba, and Bouma) and ( 2) economic associations including agricultural associations ( Congo San, IFO cooperative, Averez cooperative, and Azac cooperative, and mining associat ion. Besides this there are also church groups. Cultural organizations are informal help and have long originated from within the community and are sometime inte rconnected with other villages. These include cultural systems where fellow members help to feed a family that is mourning a death and are culturally restricted from leaving the household to hunt or collect food or water for several weeks, and events wher e people come together including from other villages on anniversaries of important occasions like deaths. Economic groups are a modern idea and have been created by external agency through top down intervention by government officers and NGOs. These assoc iations are village based and do not interact with others villages. Many of these economic associations emerged from the cooperative movement, but they invariably have no effective activities.
70 In addition, findings showed high scores for variable s related to participation and motivation (Table 5 8). The mean scores of ethnic group Bantu were greater than those of autochthonous people and the p value was nearly 0.05 (0.07) (Table 5 11). Social trust and cohesion We used three items to measure social trust ( Table 5 9). There is generally a high level of social trust among both Bantu (73.8% agree or strongly agree) and autochthonous people (79.3%) agree or strong agree. Bantu disagree that people take advantage of others (69.1%) and that people are selfish an d look after themselves (59.6%). Autochthonous people are slightly less trusting, with only half (51.7 % ) disagreeing on these matters. These differences are statistically significant at p <0.10 (Table 5 11). We asked people 12 questions relating to social cohesion (Table 5 10). Social cohesion was high in both Bantu and a utochthonous people (85% and 89% respectively). The main scores of social trust were high as well as for social cohesion at the village level on the scale of 1 to 5. However, among ethni c groups, a utochthonous people showed higher mean scores for social trust (3.00) than Bantu (2.90). L evel of social cohesion was also theoretically different between the two groups Bantu (3. 78) and autochthonous people (3.74 ) (Table 5 10 ). During this stu dy when asked if most people can be trusted, Bantu respondent s as well autochthonous people nearly agreed. The Mann Whitney U test was used to confirm if there was a difference between groups of respondents for the scal ar score for variables of membership life and participation to communal activities, social trust, and social cohesion. Findings showed that there was no difference between groups for both variables (p>0.05) (Table 5 11).
71 However, for scal ar score s for the variables of social trust and social cohesion, at the 95% of confidence interval the difference between groups of respondents, indicated no significant difference between groups of respondents for both variables ( autochthonous people and Bantu) (Table 5 11). Hypothesis 3 Wildlife is signific ant to local livelihoods of local people depending on their ethnicity but its long term availability becomes questionable with regard to the current harvest rate. Therefore, there is a relationship between the importance of wildlife to local people and th e contribution of hunting to house hold income. The mean variable scores of the importance of wildlife and the level of contribution of hunting in household income were computed by using SPSS. Overall, for both variables, importance of wildlife for househ old and the contribution of hunting to households income, the scores which are respectively, 3.46 and 4.06 are greater than the median score on the scale of 1 to 5. However, analysis of the trends separately between Bantu and autochthonous people, showed t hat the scores for both variables are greater for autochthonous people ( 3.83; 4.59) than Bantu ( 3.21; 3.69) (Table 5 12). Because these two variables were not normally distributed, the Mann Whitney U test was used to determine if the autochthonous people differ from Bantu with regards to the importance 95 % confidence interval the p value is 0.014 for the importance of wildlife and 0.001 for hunting as source There was a significant difference between autochthonous people and Bantu ( p<0.05 ) for both variables (Table 5 11). In addition, a Spearman's rank correlation was run to determine the relationship between the importance of hunting for household s and hunting as a source of income. The result showed
72 a strong, positive correlation between the importance of wildlife and hunting as a source of income, which was statistically significant ( r = 0.512, n = 71, P =0. 001) (Figure 5 6). Final ly, more details about frequencies in variables about the importance of wildlife compared to other sources of income are summarized in A ppendi ces A 3 and A 4 F rom these findings we concluded that hunting is one of the central mean s of livelihood in rural areas. Using qualitative data, i n the focus groups in the villages and small workshop at regional level, villagers, officials and NGOs acknowledged that hunting is an important means of livelihood for people living in forest areas. Poulsen et al (2007 ; 20 09) mentioned that in the Northern Congo, wildlife is one of the main sources of food; demand for it cannot change without alternative source of meat. Overall, the majority are seriously concerned about the sustainability of wildlife even though very few p Due to the importance of wildlife in rural area, the pressure of hunting on forest mammals was studied in the village of Zolabout of about 500 inhabitants in the Sangha region in northern Congo. Harvests were assessed from carcass counts in the village. A total of 609 carcasses of 21species were recorded in the village in 60 days between January and June 2010. This represents a biomass of harvested mammals of 4441.20 kg ( 74.02kg/day) ( Table 5 13) T he annual harvest is about 27,017 kg. Of this, duikers including Cephalophus monticola, Cephalophus callipygus, Cephalophus dorsalis and Cephalophus nigrifons, Cephalophus leucogaster and Cephalophus sylvicultor w ere major prey harvested in the village studied T hey represent about 77% of total biomass recorded (394 carcasses for 3424 kg of biomass). In 60 days of data collection during the six months we recorded an average of 57.07kg/day of duikers. This correspon ds to an annual harvest of 20829.33 kg of duikers. In a
73 study of zoning in north Congo, data showed that the village zone varied between 8 and 35 km representing an average distance which hunters can walk of about 22 km (unpublished WCS report on zoning) Therefore t he estimate of the hunting zone of Zolabout is about 1519.8 km 2 In addition, five partial ly protected species; Potamochoerus porcus, Cephalophus dorsalis, Tragelaphus spekei Cephalophus sylvicultor and Hyemoschus aquaticus have been record ed. Since 1983, according to Congolese wildlife law, the hunting of these species must be done after paying for a hunting permit. Although not systematically collected, hunting records show that one bird species has been recorded (0.2% of all observations) These bush meat data were also recorded under several categories of records such as : 1) hunters were classed according to their ethnic group origin (Bantu and autochthonous people), 2) t hree principal hunting techniques have been used by hunters (snares, guns and dogs), and 3) two kinds of state carcasses were observed (smoked and fresh) (Table 5 13). Table 5 1 Mean scores of cumulated variables (details in appendix A 1) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Braz zaville), 2010 Variables Mean scores Local people (n=27) NGOs (n=13) Officers (n=8) Sum (N=48) Knowledge and participation in formal law enforcement ( A ppendix A 1) 1.31 2.77 3.31 2.04 Knowledge of past informal regulations ( A ppendix A 1) 2.26 1.77 2 .13 2.10 Attitude s towards wildlife regulation (T able 5 2) 3.71 3.51 3.52 3.62
74 Table 5 2 Attitudes of local people towards hunting regulations (formal laws), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Statements Local people n (%) NGOs n (%) Officers n (%) Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree Decision on wildlife i s made far from its habitat 0 2 (7.4) 5 (18.5) 20 (74.1) 0 1 (7.7) 0 0 5 (38.5) 7 (53.8) 2 (25) 0 0 3 (37.5) 3 (37.5) Wildlife laws don't taken into account local realities 1( 3.7) 1 (3.7) 2 (7.4) 18 (66.7) 5 (18.5) 4 (30.8) 1 (7.7) 0 8 (61.5) 0 2 (25) 0 0 2 (25) 4 (50) Abolition of customary law is one of the causes of pressure on bushmeat 1 (3.7) 1 (3.7) 4 (14.8) 17 (63) 4 (14.8) 0 5 (38.5) 2 (15.4) 3 (23.1) 3 (23.1) 3 (37.5) 0 1 (12.5) 3 (37.5) 1 (12.5) Hunting is difficult to control by customary law 0 4 (14.8) 8 (29.6) 14 (51.9) 1 (3.7) 1 (7.7) 6 (46.2) 1 (7.7) 4 (30.8) 1 (7.7) 1 (12.5) 2 (25) 0 4 (50) 1 (12.5) Local control of wildlife is possible 1 (3.7) 2 (7.4) 6 (22.2) 18 (66.7) 0 1 (7.7) 2 (15.4) 1 (7.7) 8 (61.5) 1 (7.7) 0 1 (12.5) 0 5 (62.5) 2 (25) New government laws are undermining the ability of local people to control access to bushmeat 0 1 (3.7) 6 (22.2) 19 (70.4) 1 (3.7) 1 (7.7) 6 (46.2) 2 (15.4) 4 (30.8) 0 2 (25) 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5) 2 (25) 2 (25) Involvement of local people in wildlife m anagement was interrupted with abolition of customary law 0 1 (3.7) 7 (25.9) 16 (59.3) 3 (11.1) 0 2 (15.4) 4 (30.8) 7 (53.8) 0 2 (25) 0 0 5 (62.5) 1 (12.5) Local people can implement hunting regulations 1 (3.7) 1 (3.7) 7 (25.9) 16 (59.3) 2 (7.4) 0 2 (15.4 ) 0 8 (61.5) 3 (23.1) 0 0 1 (12.5) 5 (62.5) 2 (25) Hunting can be controlled by local people 0 1 (3.7) 6 (22.2) 19 (70.4) 1 (3.7) 0 1 (7.7) 0 10 (76.9) 2 (15.4) 1 (12.5) 0 2 (25) 2 (25) 3 (37.5) Total respondents 27 13 8
75 Table 5 3 Distribution of frequencies and scale score of different main t h reats to wildlife (N=48) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Groups of respondents Categories of responses Most important Freq (%) 2nd mos t important Freq (%) 3rd most important Freq (%) Total Score Weighted Mean scores Population growth 1(3.8) 2(8.30 1(5.6) 8 0.3 Lack of law enforcement 3(11.5) 3(12.5) 1(5.6) 16 0.6 Open access 0 9(37.5) 8(47.06) 26 1 Local Lack of alternative sourc e of income 18(69.2) 1(4.2) 3(16.7) 59 2.2 Lack of alternative source of protein 0 1(4.2) 0 2 0.1 Proliferation of guns 4(15.4) 8(33.3) 4(22.2) 32 1.2 Development of Roads 0 0 0 0 0 N 26 24 17 Population growth 2(16.7) 1(8.3) 1(14.3) 9 0.7 L ack of law enforcement 2(16.7) 1(8.3) 2(28.6) 10 0.8 Open access 2(16.7) 1(8.3) 0 8 0.6 NGO Lack of alternative source of income 5(41.7) 6(50) 0 27 2.1 Lack of alternative source of protein 0 2(16.7) 3(42.9) 7 0.5 Proliferation of guns 1(8.3) 0 0 3 0.2 Development of Roads 0 1(8.3) 1(14.3) 3 0.2 N 12 12 7 Population growth 2(28.6) 0 0 6 0.8 Lack of law enforcement 1(14.3) 2(28.6) 0 7 0.9 Officers Open access 1(14.3) 3(42.9) 0 9 1.1 Lack of alternative source of income 3(42.9) 1(14.3) 2( 66.7) 13 1.6 Lack of alternative source of protein 0 1(14.3) 1(14.3) 3 0.4 Proliferation of guns 0 0 0 0 0 Development of Roads 0 0 0 0 0 N 7 7 3
76 Figure 5 1 Scale score of major threats to wildlife (details Table 5 3) (N=48) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Table 5 4 Distribution of frequencies and scale score of different main consequences to wildlife management (N=48), Ngomb Forest Managem ent Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Groups of respondents Categories of responses Most important Freq (%) 2nd most important Freq (%) 3rd most important Freq (%) Score Weighted Mean scores Loss of income from hunting 10(37.0) 13(48.1) 1(4.8) 57 2.11 Reduce of source of animal proteins 14(51.9) 8(29.6) 1(4.8) 59 2.19 Culture loss 1(3.7) 0 2(9.5) 5 0.19 Children will not know wildlife 1(3.7) 5(18.5) 13(61.9) 26 0.96 Local Change of forest structure 1(3.7) 0 0 3 0.11 Increase of rural pove rty 0 1(3.7) 0 2 0.07 Autochthonous people will neglect forest 0 0 4(19.0) 4 0.15 N 27 27 21 Loss of income from hunting 5(35.7) 1(8.3) 0 17 1.31 Reduce of source of animal proteins 4(28.6) 1(8.3) 0 14 1.08 Culture loss 2(14.3) 1(8.3) 2(18.2) 10 0.77 NGO Children will not know wildlife 0 7(58.3) 1(9.1) 15 1.15 Change of forest structure 2(14.3) 2(16.7) 3(27.3) 13 1.00 Increase of rural poverty 1(7.1) 0 3(27.3) 6 0.46 Autochthonous people will neglect forest 0 0 2(18.2) 2 0.15 N 14 12 1 1 Loss of income from hunting 2(28.6) 1(14.3) 1(14.3) 9 1.13 Reduce of source of animal proteins 0 2(28.6) 1(14.3) 5 0.63 Culture loss 1(14.3) 1(14.3) 0 5 0.63 Officers Children will not know wildlife 2(28.6) 2(28.6) 0 10 1.25 Change of forest structure 0 1(14.3) 3(42.9) 5 0.63 Increase of rural poverty 0 0 2(28.6) 2 0.25 Autochthonous people will neglect forest 2(28.6) 0 0 6 0.75 N 7 7 7
77 Figure 5 2 Scale score of different main consequences to wildlife extinction (details Table 5 4) (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Table 5 5 Distribution of frequencies of different categories of main solutions to wild life management (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Groups Resp. Categories of responses Most Important Freq (%) 2nd most Important Freq (%) 3rd most Important Freq (%) Score Weighted Mean Scores Solution must come f rom Government 12(44.4) 4(17.4) 4(28.6) 48 1.78 Population must organize 13(48.1) 10(43.5) 1(7.1) 60 2.22 Local Arrangement of local exclusion rights 0 4(17.4) 7(58.3) 15 0.56 Wildlife cannot finish 0 2(8.7) 0 4 0.15 Nothing to do 2(7.4) 3(13) 0 12 0.44 N 27 23 12 139 Solution must come from Government 4(33.3) 5(50) 1(11.1) 23 1.77 Population must organize 6(50) 4(40) 2(22.2) 28 2.15 NGO Arrangement of local exclusion rights 2(16.7) 1(10) 5(62.5) 13 1 Wildlife cannot finish 0 0 0 0 0 Noth ing to do 0 0 0 0 0 N 12 10 8 64 Solution must come from Government 6(75) 0 0 18 2.25 Population should organize 2(25) 4(66.7) 0 14 1.75 Officers Arrangement of local exclusion rights 0 2(33.3) 3(60) 7 0.88 Wildlife cannot finish 0 0 0 0 0 Noth ing to do 0 0 0 0 0 N 8 6 5
78 Figure 5 3 Scale score of different main solutions to wildlife management (details Table 5 5) (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Table 5 6 Distribution of frequencies and scale score of different categories of main obstacles to wildlife management (N=48), Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Groups of respondents Categories of response s Most important 2 nd most important 3 rd most important Scores Weighted mean score Government is far from village 1(6.3) 0 3(60) 6 0.22 Local Lack of power 0 4(57.1) 0 8 0.30 Lack of local organization 15(93.8) 3(42.9) 2(40) 53 1.96 Lack o f knowledge 0 0 0 0 0 N 16 7 5 67 Government is far from village 1(14.3) 1(20) 3(50) 8 0.62 NGO Lack of power 4(57.1) 2(40) 0 16 1.23 Lack of local organization 2(28.6) 2(40) 2(33.3) 12 0.92 Lack of knowledge 0 0 1(16.7) 1 0.08 N 7 5 6 37 Government is far from village 3(60) 1(25) 0 11 1.38 Officers Lack of power 1(20) 0 0 3 0.38 Lack of local organization 1(20) 3(75) 1(50) 10 1.25 Lack of knowledge 0 0 1(50) 1 0.13 N 5 4 2
79 Figure 5 4 Sca le score of different main obstacles to wildlife management (details Table 5 6 ) (N=48) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Table 5 7 assessment (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Variable (2 items) Bantu (n=42) Autochthonous people (n=29) Sum(N) p value Yes No Yes No Are you member of any group in the village 35(83.3) 7(16.7) 23(79.3) 6(20.7) 0.669 Does this group work with or interact with groups around the village 15(35.7) 27(64.3) 3(10.3) 26(89.7) 0.016 Scale sore variable 1.77 1.50 1.66 0.059
80 Figure 5 5 Distribution of ethnic groups by type of association (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Table 5 8 how likely is it that people will cooperate to solve the problem in any communal acti ? Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Variable (2 items) Bantu(n=42) Frequencies (%) Autochthonous people (n=29) Frequencies (%) Total (N=71) 1.Cooperate to solve communal activity Very likely 16(38.1) 7(24.1) 23(3 2.4) Somewhat likely 23(54.8) 19(65.5) 42(59.2) Neither likely 1(2.4) 2(6.9) 3(4.2) Somewhat unlikely 1(2.4) 1(3.4) 2(2.8) Very unlikely 0 0 0 Missing 1(2.4) 0 1(1.4) 2.Participate in any communal activity 42(100 yes) 26(89.7)(yes) 3(10.3)(no) Score 3.11 2.98 3.06
81 Table 5 9 Level of social trust (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Bantu Autochthonous people Statements Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree St rong ly Agree Scale score Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree Scale score Sum (N=71) Can most people be trust 3 (7.1) 8 (19) 0 31 (73.8) 0 3.4 1 (3.4) 5 (17.2) 0 23 (79.3) 0 3.55 3.46 Most people would try to take advantage of others 1 (2.4) 28 (66.7) 0 12 (28.6) 1 (2.4) 2.62 2 (6.9) 13 (44.8) 0 11 (37.9) 3 (10.3) 3.00 2.77 People are looking for themselves 7 (16.7) 18 (42.9) 1 (2.4) 13 (31) 3 (7.1) 2.69 5 (17.2) 10 (34.5) 1 (3.4) 11 (37.9) 2 (6.9) 2..83 2.75 Total 42 2.9 29 3.13 3.00
82 Table 5 10 Level of social cohesion (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Bantu (n=42) Autochthonous people(n=29) Statements Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree Score Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strong. Agree Score Sum (N) In this village people work together 6 (14.3) 3 (7.1) 0 32 (76.2) 1 (2.4) 3.45 1 (3.4) 4 (13.8) 0 24 (82.8) 0 3.62 3.52 I enjoy working together with other p eople 0 2 (4.8) 0 39 (92.9) 1 (2.4) 3.93 0 0 1(3.4) 24 (82.8) 4 (13.8) 4.10 4.00 People help each other 4 (9.5) 6 (14.3) 0 31 (73.8) 1 (2.4) 3.45 1 (3.4) 6 (20.7) 0 22 (75.9) 0 3.48 3.46 When I need help, I turn to other people 2 (4.8) 4 (9.5) 0 35 (83.3 ) 1 (2.4) 3.69 3 (10.3) 2 (6.9) 0 24 (82.8) 0 3.55 3.63 People share common beliefs 1 (2.4) 0 0 41 (97.6) 0 3.93 3 (10.3) 2 (6.9) 0 24 (82.8) 0 3.55 3.77 I learn about services through other people 1 (2.4) 1(2.4) 0 40 (95.2) 0 3.88 1 (3.4) 3 (10.3) 0 25 (86.2) 0 3.69 3.80 People feel that they can make a difference by working together 2 (4.8) 2(4.8) 1 (2.4) 36 (85.7) 1 (2.4) 3.76 1 (3.4) 0 0 28 (96.6) 0 3.90 3.82 When I get sick, I turn to other people for help 2 (4.8) 3(7.1) 0 36 (85.7) 1 (2.4) 3.74 2 (6.9) 3 (10.3) 0 23 (79.3) 1 (3.4) 3.62 3.69 When I seek help I usually do so with other people 1 (2.4) 2(4.8) 0 39 (92.9) 0 3.83 2 (6.9) 1 (3.4) 0 25 (86.2) 1 (3.4) 3.76 3.80 I seek advice from other people 0 0 0 41 (97.6) 1 (2.4) 4.02 0 0 1 (3.4) 28 (96.6) 0 3.97 4.00 When people have a plan they stick to it 3 (7.1) 0 3 (7.1) 35 (83.3) 1 (2.4) 3.74 1 (3.4) 2 (6.9) 1 (3.4) 25 (86.2) 0 3.72 3.73 People are willing to work collectively 2 (4.8) 0 0 38 (90.5) 2 (4.8) 3.90 0 1 (3.4) 0 28 (96.6) 0 3.93 3.9 2 Level of social cohesion 3.78 3.74 3.76
83 Table 5 11 Mann Whitney U test for all variables Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Variables Ethnic groups N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks U Z p level Hunting as source of income Autochthonous people 29 45.03 1306.00 347.00 3.292 0.001 Bantu 42 29.76 1250.00 N 71 Importance of wildlife for household Autochthonous people 29 42.88 1243.50 409.50 2.453 0.014 Bantu 42 31.25 1312.50 N 71 Social trust Autochthonous people 29 40.69 1180.00 473.00 1.648 0.099 Bantu 42 32.76 1376.00 N 71 Social cohesion Autochthonous people 29 35.67 1034.50 599.50 0 0.121 0.904 Bantu 42 36.23 1521.50 N 71 Participation and motivation for collective action Autochthonous people 29 31.28 907.00 472.00 1.779 0.075 Bantu 42 39.26 1649.00 N 71 Association membership and interactions Autochthonous people 29 31.02 899.50 464.50 1.891 0.059 Bantu 42 39.44 1656.50 N 71
84 Table 5 12 Mean scores of variables and Mann Whitney U test for level of significance among ethnic groups (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 V ariables Autochthonous people Bantu N U Z P level 1.How important is wildlife for your household 3.83 3.21 3.46 347.000 3.29 0.001 2.Hunting as source of income 4.59 3.69 4.06 409.500 2.453 0.014 Figure 5 6 Comparison of importance of wildlife and contribution of hunting as source of income between Bantu and autochthonous people in north of Congo (2010) Using Mann Whitney U test (variables not normally distributed), at 95 % confidence interval of t he difference, there was a significant difference between Bantu and autochthonous people in regards to the importance of wildlife and hunting as source of income(p<0.05 for both variables) (Table 5.4.1). However, using, a Spearman's rank correlation, the r esult showed a strong, positive correlation between the importance of wildlife and the hunting as source of income, which was statistically signific ant ( r = 0.512, n = 71, P =0. 001).
85 Table 5 13 Bushmeat records during the bushmeat survey in Zolabout (northern Republic of Congo) by month between January and June 2010 Species No carcasses Average weight Total Biomass State of carcass Hunting techniques Hunter's ethnic groups Fresh carcasses Smoked carcasses Snares Guns Dogs Bantu Autochthonous people Cephalophus sylvicultor 6 60 360 2 4 5 1 0 5 1 Cephalophus dorsalis 20 19 380 12 8 13 7 0 8 12 Cephalophus monticola 296 5 1480 175 121 132 164 0 119 177 Cephalophus nigrifons 5 13 65 0 5 2 3 0 2 3 Cephalophus leucogast er 1 17 17 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 Cephalophus callipygus 66 17 1122 14 52 28 38 0 22 44 Herpestes paludinosis 1 3 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 Genetta tigrina 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 Viverra civetta 1 6.25 6.25 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 Cercopithecus cephus 32 4 128 30 2 2 30 0 15 17 Man is tricuspis 9 2.67 24.03 9 0 1 8 0 0 9 Guttera plumifera 1 1.25 1.25 1 0 1 0 0 1 Cercopithecus nictitans 22 4.66 102.52 20 2 0 22 0 8 14 Cricetomys gambianus 2 1.13 2.26 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 Monkey spp 42 4 168 41 1 1 42 0 17 25 Cercopithecus pogonias 24 4 96 24 0 0 24 0 8 16 Nandinia binotata 9 3.36 30.24 7 2 1 8 0 2 7 Hyemoschus aquaticus 4 5 20 0 4 2 2 0 1 3 Tragelaphus spekei 2 60 120 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 Lophocebus albigena 5 4.13 20.65 3 2 1 4 0 1 4 Atherurus africanus 58 3.5 203 31 27 12 45 1 23 35 Po tamochoerus porcus 2 45 90 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 Total 609 4441.20 374 (61.41) 235 (38.58) 204 (33.49) 404 (66.33) 1 (0.16) 234 (38.42) 375 (61.57)
86 CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION government lacks the capacity to enforce them and they are inhibiting communities from taking action to sustain their own wildlife based livelihoods. In addition, communities have demonstrated capacity for local collective action in other fields of their lives (albeit with a negative experience in economic collective action through the failed cooperatives movement), have the motivation to conserve wildlife, and are therefore well placed to participate in a strategy of devolved wildlife conservation such as community based wildlife management. They have a deep understanding about causes of wildlife depletion and are worried about its consequences to questions about whether the current harvest levels are sustainable. The nature of W ildlife L aws and R egulatory C ontrols forest resources by forest communities despite these re sources being central to their livelihoods. De jure, local people do not have the rights to manage wildlife or exclude other users from harvesting it although hunting is the most important sources of livelihood for autochthonous people and the second most important source of income and food for Bantu. Ostrom (2000) points out that t he capability of local users to develop more effective collective active regimes ov er time is affected by whether their right s to organize is recognized by a national or local government standing common pool resource regimes (Ostrom, 1990) According to public land law N o 75/58 of June 19, 1 958, two years before Independence, local people had customary rights to land and the wild resources on that land. However,
87 following the Marxist Leninist period ( all for people, just for the people ) and one party rule in 1969 1970, the new public land law 52/83 of April 21 st 1983, abolished traditional rights to land. Additionally, law 48/83 of April 21, 1983 concerning wildlife use clarified that local people are authorized users of wildlife for subsistence purposes and commercial hunting is illegal. If a property right is defined as a bundle of rights including access (i.e. right to enter an area), withdrawal (i.e. right to obtain products of a resource), management, exclusion and alienation (Schlarger and Ostrom 1992) local community rights were limited to access and subsistence are likely the starting point for a loss by local people of power over their land and resources, and increasing disconnection from it. Hanna et al. (1996) state that property rights allow people to connect with their environment, and that the way institutions are designed strongly influences the interaction between people and natural environment. This is reflected in our results, where people recognize that the sustainability of the wildlife resources is threatened, but abrogate the responsibility for solving t hese problems to government where the de jure power and responsibility lies. By contrast, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) argue that communities who have rights of management and authority to determine how, when, and where harvesting from a resource may occur tend to develop responsible practices and mechanisms of collective action. An operational problem was that when customary rights were abolished by this new law, there was no mechanism designed to apply the new laws at the village level. It is likely that the lack of resources prevented the government from implementing optimal law enforcement practices, while our data also show that communities are not reporting infractions presumably
88 because the law lacks social legitimacy at their level. This is an exam ple of the s exceeding its grasp (Murphree, 1994) Our findings show that government is unable to fulfill its leg al responsibilities, yet these have undermined local traditional mechanisms of exclusion, resulting in de facto open access been hunted using illegal hunting m ethods (i.e. wire snares), and about 50% of carcasses were smoked in forest camps which is also de jure illegal. Congolese regulations ban the use of snares, and both hunting during the night and establishing hunting camps in the forest are illegal. In ad not sought which is a legal requirement. These illustrations confirm that formal regulations are not enforced at the local level, so that the net effect of centraliz ed regulations is counterproductive and increases pressure on fauna resources. When we asked local people if they and law is reasonable. Similarly, our findings management, they have a negative view towards wildlife regulations (Table 5 2). This is a normal human response. Bagherian et al. (2009) indicate that those people who participate in activity are more likely to have a positive attitude toward it. Even though wildlife is one of the major sources of income for local people, because it remains under central control, people are using it unsustainably and are not taking action to reverse this even thou gh they mostly agree that action is necessary. The current system is ecologically unsustainable and economically unproductive (uncontrolled bushmeat production is a low value use), yet can conceptually be transformed. This depends on a change in governanc e that both unleashes the economic potential of wildlife and builds local proprietorship for it (Chil d, 2004) In the context of
89 governance, local people can be involved effectively in natural resource management if they see resources such as wildlife as a net asset (Halstead, 2003). These results confirm our hypothesis that centralized control of wildl ife has reduced the capacity of local mechanisms to control access to wildlife. Statistically we had expected to find 2) would be correlated to their knowledge of formal laws (Table 5 1 and Appendix A 1 ) and their reporti ng of poaching activities ( Table 5 1 and A ppendix A 1 ). However, no one reported poaching activities regardless of their attitudes, which were largely negative. By contrast, NGO staff and government officers were more like ly to report poaching if they had higher levels of knowledge about wildlife laws. Local people had stronger negative attitudes toward wildlife regulations than NGOs and officials (Table 5 2). Categorization of C auses and Consequences of W ildlife E xtincti on and Local C C apacity in C ollective A ction Our findings showed that local people are quite able to categorize threats and consequences of wildlife extirpation, and suggested that their understanding of these complex threats may be more complex and sophisticated than NGOs or officials. However, while they believe that they can manage wildlife and have done so in the past, and understand the problems posed to wildlife by an open access property regime, they did not demonstrate that they understoo d how to resolve the current problems with a CBNRM type property rights based solution. They have had no exposure to solutions that to some may appear a radical departure from current centralized conservation practice (Hulme and Murphree 2001) so in the words of uring the h ousehold interview people often mentioned the lack of alternative sources of income and open access to forest
90 resources as the main threats to wildlife. They pointed out that solutions must come from governm ent, but also that the community must be organized It appears that people feel that they need to organize to resolve bushmeat problems, yet are unsure about how or what to do (Table 5 5 ). that although they were highly cooperative on social issues this capacity did not extend to productive activities where the experiences with the cooperative movement s was generally negative (Table 5 6 ). Overall, local people were accustomed to believing that government was the only actor who can bring change to the management of their natural resources. Our assessment of community strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of collective action, showed high levels of trust and social cohesion in soci al functions, with high levels of participation in social assistance associations and a generally positive opinion of each other regarding trustworthiness and the ability to work together (Table 5 5, Table 5 6, Table 5 7 and Table 5 8). As noted, one excep tion was economic cooperation, where social trust and cohesion were low. This discrepancy can be explained by the long history of social cooperation within communities that historically have been far removed from the global economy, and the bungled impleme ntation of cooperatives by Congo emerging as an independent nation state during the Cold War and establishing cooperatives as much out of ideology as economic practicality. The strong social cohesion and cooperation that we found is not surprising because it reflects the typical social organization of hunter gathering communities. Woodburn (1982) states that these societies are egalitarian societies in which equalities of power, prestige or rank are not merely sought but are, with certain limited exceptio ns, genuinely realized. During our informal mee tings, many people interviewed yourself that are good, your friends may be jealous with you and it is seen in poor form to boast
91 alous of economic stratification, and this behavior may undermine collective action relating to productive activities. Woodburn (1982) emphasizes that the social organization of these societies have the following basic characteristic s: 1 S ocial grouping s ar e flexible and constantly changing in composition ; 2 I ndividuals have a choice of whom they associate with in residence, in the food search, in trade and exchange, in ritual contexts ; 3 P eople are not dependant on specific other people for access to basic req uirements ; 4 R elations between people, whether relations of kinship or other relationships, stress sharing and mutuality We need to understand local grassroots mechanisms to implement appropriate conservation and/or development strategies in rural areas, e specially for productive activities. For example, collective action needs to include mechanisms for dealing with shirking. For Bateke Plateaux there are sharing labor groups of women calle d Eboula crop planting to their harvest. This is a way to make sure each individual in the group is workin g agricultural cooperative s which often failed because people were grouping without taking into account issues of social organization like sharing and shirking. Our study record s 12 associations in the study area. Half of these (i.e. Beka, Endzegui, Ekorombe, Endzengouma, Azimba, and Bouma) are cultural associations, including dance meeting s, social assistance for death events and illness among members and traditional practices like initiation These associations have emerged locally ( b ottom up) and many of them have exist ed for generations. However, we also recorded agricultural and economic cooperative s, but the idea for these and their creation was top down and all productive associations are recent creat ions This category includes Congo San IFO cooperative Averez cooperative
92 Azac cooperative and Mining cooperative ) The future of productive associations is unclear, but they are generally perceived to be in effect ive and autochthonous people think that they will not live longer Bantu think that they need further external support to make them effective. Our results do not support hypothesis 2 which states that the ability of local people to respond to thre ats to wildlife and livelihoods through coll ective action is undermined by; 1) f ailure to recognize these threats 2) l ack of knowledge of what to do and 3) w eak social cohesion and trust. People know that wildlife is threatened, and through this so are t heir livelihoods. They have some ideas of what to do to sustain wildlife, and often brought up this problem of open access property regimes, but the authority to act has been taken away from them. They have strong social cohesion and trust, but this does not extend to productive activities presumably because of the inept and top down implementation of cooperatives Our judgment is that local people have both the incentive to conserve wildlife, and the social capital on which to base collective action sol utions, but implementing CBNRM effectively would (1) need to clearly devolve authority to them and (2) apply considerable care to the design of local wildlife management institutions to avoid the problems associated with agricultural cooperatives. T he S ust ainability of W ildlife and L ivelihoods that D epend on it The use of wildlife is positioned at two levels its value for local people and the contribution of wildlife to biodiversity. In Zolabouth, a village of about 500 inhabitants in northern Congo inclu ding Bantu and autochthonous people over two and half tons of animals were harvested from 609 carcasses in 60 days of recording This translates to a monthly yield of at least 740 kg of bush meat, or about 1.5 kg/person. Our records are a minimum producti on because we assume that the monitor was not able to record every single carcass as hunters
93 returned at different times and used different path s a nd also not all carcasses are found in a market Auzel and Wilkie (2000) reported that 36% of animals hunted in Ndoki 1 were not sold in markets. Our results confirm that hunting is the most ( autochthonous people ) or second most (Bantu) important source of livelihoods for f orest people ( Poulsen et al 2007; 2009). It is important for food and is a primary sour ce of income for local people. In the past all bushmeat was consumed locally, but people now report that they are selling the majority of their harvest to the big cities which are remote from villages. With few alternative sources of animal protein and so urces of income p ressure on wildlife is not surprising, including in remote areas such as Zolabout. In tropical rainforest areas, wildlife is found close to local people and livestock production is not reliable and seldom practiced Forest people face a serious problem: Hunting is a major and long standing source of livelihood the sustainability of which is threatened, yet they have no authority to resolve this problem. the sustainability of hunting (Table 5 4) are supported by harvest data (Table 5 13). Duikers ( Cephalophinae spp) are the most commonly hunted forest wildlife ( Wilkie and Carpenter, 1999 ). In the study area, the three most important species yield of about 12 kg/km 2 This is higher than offtake rates recorded by Noss (1998) in Dzanga Sangha (Central African Republic), Muchaal & Gandjui (1999) in Dja (Cameroon) and Fa et al. (1995) in Equatorial Guinea (Table 6 1) for Cephalophus monticola and Cephalophus callypigus However, for the Cephalophus dorsallis our actual harvest rate seemed to be higher than others across Congo basin. harvest will continue to be sustainable or not over the long term because both population density
94 an d harvests are dynamic through time because production varies with population density (through density Local people are concerned about the sustainability of wildlife for economic (i.e. food and income) and for non economic reasons, an d l ocal people are concerned that their children However, the interest of Bantu people in wildlife is more strongly related to money than autochthonous people. Bantu who made more money from wildlife thought it was more importan t, but autochthonous people valued wildlife regardless of its financial value (Figure 5 6) However, they are not responding to what they see as an important threat to their future because they believe the responsibility for acting lies with the Government who, de jure, are the owner and manager of wildlife and forest resources. Several factors probably contribute to the pressure on wildlife in the study area : 1) the lack of local mechanism s to control offtake or quotas, 2 ) open access to forest resources including hunting 3) new technologies that lower the cost of harvesting wildlife (i.e. guns and wire snares) 4) the lack of alternative sources of income and protein in the village and in Ouesso (regional capital), 5 ) the lack of alternative sources of protein in logging towns and 6) the increasing demand for meat Local people have lived sustainably with wildlife for generations and Wilkie and Carpenter (1999) state that bushmeat consumption by low density populations living in the forest may be susta inable at present. However, this is no longer the case. Higher demand for bushmeat is coupled with low harvesting costs (technology). This is a problem because local property rights (i.e. the traditional mechanisms of rationing and exclusion) have been w eakened at a time when they should be strengthened to maximize the benefits from hunting to the people on whose land it lives and provide the incentives and mechanis ms for managing it sustainably.
95 Overall, our results have confirmed that wildlife is signif icant to local livelihoods yet offtake level s are probably not sustainable In the absence of institutional solutions, it is inevitable that the problem will worsen. Local people have few alternative source s of protein and income. The demand for bushmea t is increas ing as human populations in both the capital region and logging camps and towns expand, and as roads improve. U nless action is taken to reduce the demand for bushmeat, or the supply of it the forests of north ern Congo will be progressively exp osed. Wildlife will be deplete d or extirpated, increasing the vulnerability of local livelihoods. The increased demand for bushmeat is not resulting in an increased supply, a situation which economists classify as a market or a policy failure. The combina tion of (1) high price and (2) open access is invariably disastrous for wildlife. The massive recovery of wildlife in southern Africa, however, follows the enactment of radical policy changes that directly address this market failure. State ownership (wh ich our data suggest is unenforceable and results in de facto open access) was replaced with local proprietorship. Importantly, this transformed the high demand and price for wildlife into a positive rather than a negative factor for conservation. Tabl e 6 1 Comparison of a ctual harvest rate in Zolabout in 2010 and sustainable harvest rates across Congo basin Our study North Congo (2010) Comparable data Sustainable Comparable Species Density of duikers Actual harvest (Kg/ km2) Actual harvest (Ind/km2) Density of duikers Sustainable harvest rate (Kg/km2) Sustainable harvest rate(Ind./km2) Cephalophus monticola 5.92 1.18 10.5 14.9* 1.850 5.26*** 0.24 0.35* No 3.16 4.10** 0.492 0.645** 22.6*** 0.37 1.0 5*** Cephalophus callypigus 4.49 0.26 0.6 1.5* 0.01 0.02* No Cephalophus dorsalis 1.52 0.1 0.3 0.6* 4.91*** 0.003 0.01* Yes? 3.8*** 0.25*** *Noss (1998), Dzanga Sangha Central African Republic **Muchaal & Gandjui (1999), Dja, Cameroon ***Fa et al. (1995), Equatorial Guinea
96 CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND REC OMM E NDATIONS This study offers insight into factors that potential ly hinder the emergence of local capacity to participate effectively in the collaborative management of wildlife or conse rvation This study was conducted in a context where regulations were highly centralized and suggests factors that are essential to consider when designing strategies for shifting policies to involve rural communities in community based wildlife management In this context, it is clear that people need group empowerment and institutional development befor e they can properly (Hur, 2006, p .527) and further we recognize that participation is likely to be contingent on the devolution of rights an d benef its. the enforcement of modern wildlife laws enforcement and that their traditional rules have been undermined by new centralized regulations related to the land tenure and its resources e specially wildlife use at the village level. Bagherian et al. (2009) indicate that people with positive attitudes toward an activity will be more likely to participate in it. participat e in enforcing wildlife regulations illegal hunting techniques (snares) quite openly as they do for partially protected species that they hunt without permits although permits are formally required Modern land and wildlife regulations also u ndermine local ability to control access to hunting, because local people have a good understanding of their traditional ( informal ) rules or wildlife regulations, but cannot implement them because wildlife was nationalized directly and indirectly (i.e. is no one ) and this has undermined customary rights since the early 1960s. Most people think that wildlife regulations need absence of ownership o f rights over forest resources by forest communities, despite these
97 wildlife or exclude other users for harvesting it although hunting is their second most important source of income and food. The central idea developed in the literature review is that t he capability of local users of a given resource to develop successful management over time is affected by whether they viewed it as an asset and whether t hey had some form of proprietorship over it If it is not valuable, or if people have no rights to it, people are highly unlikely to cooperate in its management To reverse the current tragedy, therefore, new economic and/or institutional arrangements are necessary to increase the value of wildlife and ensure that this value accrues to local people who have the rights to exclude others from them. Transforming wildlife institutions will require a technical understanding of the nature of the resource in ques tion in relation to property rights ( Wade, 1987, p.96) a pragmatic political understanding of what is possible and what changes will be resisted, and the ability to encourage stakeholders to solve what is emerging s a critical problem in which all stakeho lders are losing. Our second set of results knowledge of threats to wildlife, potential solutions, obstacles to implementing solutions consequences of wildlife loss and local that local people had a clear categorization of threats, obstacles and consequences of wildlife loss They recognized major threats to wildlife such as proliferation of guns, weak property rights, and lack of livelihood alternatives. They believe the respo nsibility for resolving threats to wildlife lay with the Government who, de jure, are the owner and manager and were, c onsequently not acting to solve th ese problem s themselves. High levels of cooperation trust and communal activity suggests local people are well placed to participate in devolved community based wildlife management, but this must be
98 carefully designed to avoid the institutional problems associated with failed agricultural cooperatives. Willer (2007) argued that because of the tension betw een individual and collective interests, collective action represents a social dilemma where what is rational in the narrow economic sense at the individual leve l may be irrational for the group. However, for fugitive wildlife that lives in low densities in forests, collective action may well benefit both individual and the group. O ur and previous findings (Poulsen et al., 2007; 2009) showed that wildlife is one of the However, the actual rate of harvest of the most hunted species such as duikers were probably un sustainable, a situation that is getting worse Local populations are concerned about this problem because it will affect their future livelihoods (i.e. food and income). Robinson and R edford (1994, p.249) pointed out that forests. However, the resource can easily be overexploited and game species can be locally so cial and economic development population growth, increase d forest extractive activities ( including job seekers and new economic opportunities), and new roads the forests of the north Congo are going to be exposed to increas ing demand for animal proteins. In addition, resolving these challenges at the local level the issue is unlikely while local people still believe that the responsibility for acting lies with the Government. Rowcliffe et al. (2004) argued that people will not comply with laws for the p rotection of some species of large mammal without enforcement. However, laws will remain on paper if they are not supported by enforcement capacity and/or local legitimacy and understanding. Current laws no longer reflect realities on the ground. Our rese arch suggests that Congo needs a new legal and institutional approach to the serious problem of unsustainable hunting and livelihoods
99 that need to be supported by capacity building, skills training, and other empowerment initiatives into rural development programs P ositive outcomes depend on sound (devolutionary) policy and leadership at macro level, capacity building and facilitation at meso level, and effective governance and management at micro level which, if not designed carefully, holds within it th e dangers of elite capture. To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past strategies related to community based natural management should be sustained by adequate theoretical framing that includes economics, governance, empowerment, monitoring and adaptive management It is important that practitioners communicat e with local users to understand why the current legal to resolve current problems by combining th e best of traditional practice and modern institutions. We propose a robust decentralization strategy that combin es effective institutions and the development of local management capacity at the local level coupled with technical support and oversight fro m a strong central level level and, counter intuitively, officials are likely to became more important and influential if, by devolving power, they create effective management at the local leve l This study explored factors that likely contribute to the poor local capacity in a collaborative management of their surrounding natural resources such as wildlife. This resource provides many benefits to the local community, including sustenance, cult ural significance as well as recreational, and tourism opportunities. Our findings will help us to find the best path to get local people involve in the collaborative management through communities based organizations. We are therefore confident that our r esearch will contribute to effective management of the area by the relevant agencies. I also expect that this study will enhance the ability of local communities and authorities to make informed decisions about wildlife use and its economic and ecological implications conservation With these findings, the government will
100 mitigate its deficiency by involving communities in the coming decentralization policies and set Ostrom, 2000 ). Over past decades, management strategies and policies related to rural development and natural resources focused on local involvement, but in reality most of these strategies remain on paper and did not succe ed on the ground, and never reconciled moder n regulations and traditional norms. Thus, local people have an ambiguous view of participation and action so natural resource s such as wildlife are being rapidly depleted. The theoretical framework for this study includes collective action theory and emp owerment theory, and we explore d how factors such as legislation, livelihoods, traditions and social capital influence local management of wildlife. This study accepts that many factors affect outcomes in a complex social ecological environment, and we the refore used mixed methods and triangulation to understand causality. We adopted some items developed by previous studies and we developed others to build our instrument and used a combination of participant observation, focus groups and statistical tests to validate and cross check our findings. Some of our limitations included the need to translate out instrument from English to French to Lingala (national language) and back again. The complexity of the issues involved encouraged us to choose an explorat ory case study approach rather that a formal comparison with a control group, especially as we could not pre define two units that differ in ways we wanted to compare (Yin, 2003). For logistical reasons we used a purposive rather than a random sample, wh ile a large sample size would have strengthened the statistical generaliza bility of our results. Nonetheless, the statistical description tends to be supported both by the theory and our understanding derived from focus groups, other triangulating data an d eight years spend living with these people.
101 APPENDIX A DETAILED RESULTS A 1 Distribution of respondents to the knowledge of formal law, local participation to its enforcement, how past informal law was applied and its punishment for denying (N=48) N gomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Questions Local n (%) NGOs n (%) Officers n (%)) Fo rmal law applied to the control of wildlife State law 13(46.4) 5(41.7) 8(100) Law voted in 1983 2(7.1) 5(41.7) I don't know 13(4 6.4) 2(16.7) Re porting poaching activities Never 27(100) 1(7.7) 0 Rarely 0 2(15.4) 0 Sometimes 0 5(38.5) 2(25) Usually 0 1(7.7) 0 Always 0 3(23.1) 6(75) Missing data 0 1(7.7) 0 Outside use of wildlife rules in the past Ask for permission to landowner 17(63) 6(46.2) 4(50) landholders had regulations 0 1(7.7) 2(25) I don't know 10(37) 3(23.1) 1(12.5) Missing data 0 3(23.1) 1(12.5)
102 A 2 Non parametric Chi square test of cumulated variables Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (B razzaville), 2010 Variables (factors) Local people (n=27) NGOs (n=13) Officers (n=8) Sum (N= 48) Ch2 df P value Main threats Population growth 0.3 0.69 0.75 0.48 75.5 3 0.0001 Lack of law enforcement 0.59 0.77 0.88 0.69 49.5 3 0.0001 Open acces s 0.96 0.62 1.13 0.9 20.167 3 0.0001 Proliferation of guns 1.19 0.23 0 0.73 40.833 3 0.0001 Lack of alternative source of income 2.19 2.08 1.63 2.06 22.5 3 0.0001 Lack of alternative source of protein 0.07 0.54 0.38 0.25 54 2 0.0001 Development of Road s 0 0.23 0 0.06 84.375 2 0.0001 Main solutions Solution must come from Government 1.78 1.77 2.25 1.85 13.167 3 0.004 Population must organize 2.22 2.15 1.75 2.13 19.5 3 0.0001 Nothing to do 0.26 0 0 0.15 68.375 2 0.0001 Wildlife cannot finish 0 .07 0 0 0.04 40.333 1 0.0001 Arrangement of local exclusion rights 0.56 1 0.88 0.73 23.167 3 0.0001 Main obstacles Government is far from village 0.22 0.615385 1.375 0.52 59.5 3 0.0001 Lack of power 0.3 1.230769 0.375 0.56 41.375 2 0.0001 Lack of local organization 1.96 0.923077 1.25 1.56 10.5 3 0.0001 Lack of knowledge 0 0.076923 0.375 0.08 84.375 2 0.0015 Main consequences Loss of income from hunting 2.11 1.31 1.13 1.73 11.5 3 0.009 Reduce of source of animal proteins 2.19 1.08 0.63 1.63 13.5 3 0.004 Culture loss 0.19 0.77 0.63 0.42 75.333 3 0.0001 Children will not know wildlife 0.96 1.15 1.25 1.06 9.5 3 0.023 Change of forest structure 0.11 1 0.63 0.44 64.5 3 0.0001 Increase of rural poverty 0.07 0.46 0.25 0.21 94.333 3 0.0001 Autochthonous people will neglect forest 0.15 0.15 0.75 0.25 54.5 2 0.0001
103 A 3 (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Perception Autochth onous people Bantu Frequency % Frequency % Very little 0 0 4 9.5 A little 2 6.9 5 11.9 some 6 20.7 16 38.1 A lot of 16 55.2 12 28.6 A great deal 5 17.2 5 11.9 Total 29 100 42 100 A 4 (N=71) Ngomb Forest Management Unit, Northern Congo (Brazzaville), 2010 Ethnic groups Source of income Most important 2nd most important 3rd 5 th most import Bantu Farm 24(57.1%) 6(15.4) 4(9.1) NTFP 0 0 5(11.4) Hunting 12(28.6%) 18(46.2) 9(20.5) Livestock 0 2(5.1) 5(11.4) Fishery 0 6(15.4) 12(27.3) Witchcraft 0 1(2.6) 5(11.4) Job 3(7.1%) 2(5.1) 0 Mining 1(2.4%) 0 1(2.3) Commerce 1(2.4%) 3(7.7) 0 Others 1(2.4%) 1(2.6) 3(6.8) N 42 39 44 Autochthonous peopl e Farm 8(27.6%) 11(39.3) 7(17.1) NTFP 0 3(10.7) 10(24.4) Hunting 18(62.1%) 9(32.1) 2(4.9) Livestock 0 0 1(2.4) Fishery 1(3.4%) 4 (14.3) 16(39) Witchcraft 0 0 1(2.4) Job 0 0 0 Mining 2(6.9%) 1(3.6) 3(7.3) Commerce 0 0 0 Others 0 0 1 (2.4) N 29 28 41
104 APPENDIX B IRB NOTICES
106 APPENDIX C INSTRUMENTATION C 1 Household questionnaire Village: .................................Date: .......... .. Household n o Investigator: ........... .... ....................... ..... Identity: ......... ..... ................ .. ... 1) How many individuals do you have i 2) What are the sources of incomes for your household? Please r ate 1 = most important, 2 = second most important and so on. NTFPs Specify) .. Fishery ... 3) Why do you use gun? 4) How important is wildlife for your household ? 1. Very l 5) Level of social trust (social mistrust, helpfulness) (very few=1, Many more= 5) Items Very few A few About half Many Many more Would do you say that most people can be t rust Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if you got a chance Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking out for themselves?
107 6) Social cohesion in the community S tatements Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree In this village people work together I enjoy working together with other people People help each other When I need help, I turn to other people People share common b eliefs I learn about services through other people People feel that they can make a difference by working together When I get sick, I turn to other people for help When I seek help I usually do so with other people I seek ad vice from other people When people have a plan they stick to it People are willing to work collectively 7) Are you member of any group of any 8) Which one is the most important for your household? Nam 9) Does this group work with or interact with groups around the village? 10) Do you have someone to whom you could borrow money and who would be willing and able to provide you this money? 11 ) In the past 12 months did you or any member of your household participate in any communal activities, in which people come together to do some wo rk for the benefit of the community? 1. No 12) If there was a water supply problem in this community, how likely is it that people will cooperate to solve the problem?
108 C 2 Key informants questionnaire Key informant N o 1) C ategorization of c auses and consequences of bushmeat extinction on household livelihood Rank the three most important threats to bushmeat and livelihoods based on it ? What do you do? Are you doing this? If you are not taking this action, why not? 1. Population growth 2. Outsiders 3. Law not enforced 4. Technology 5. Uncontrolled access to forest lack of alternative source of income 6. Road 7. Poverty/ time 8. Lack of local mechanism to act 1. Government should solve this problem 2. Local people must be organized in committee 3. Nothing to do 4. Wildlife cannot finish 5. We need rights to exclude people 6. To renew our customary law 1. Government is far from he re 2. talk to the government. 3. committee. 4. People are not cooperative. 5. 2) Rank the three most important threats to bushmeat and livelihoods based on it ? 3) What do you do ? 4) Are you doing this? If you are not taking this action, why not? 5) In which way the extinction of wildlife can affect your livelihood? Red uce of sources of income, Reduce of source of food, Culture loss, Children will not know wildlife, change of forest structure, Increase of rural poverty, no autochthonous people will interested by forest. Please, rank three most important threats 6) What formal law is applied to the control of wildlife do you know? Law 48 1 7) How formal laws applying to control wildlife are implemen ted (by whom )? Fo Vehicle s are cont Jail at
109 8) Do you have any informal rule related to the use of wildlife in the past? Before to go in the forest you have to contact chief of propr We have the landholder have they 9) How often do y ou report poaching incident to the local authorities 10) Which of these statements come closest to your view? The wildlif 11) Attitudes toward in wildlife management Items Attitudes towards formal laws Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 05 Decision on wildlife is made far from its habitat 10 Wildlife laws don't have taken into account local realities 12 Abolition of customary law is one of the causes of press ure on wildlife 24 Hunting is difficult to control by customary law 29 Local control of wildlife is possible 30 New government laws are undermining the ability of local people to control access to wildlife 31 Involvement of local pe ople in wildlife management was interrupted with abolition of customary law 35 Local people can implement hunting regulations 44 Hunting can be controlled by local people
110 C 3 Focus group questionnaire 1) What are your principle activitie s in the village? For men, for women? 2) What is the most important hindrance in community projects in your village? Why? How do you can overcome it? 3) What types of associations do you have in your community? 4) Do you any informal rules or regulations of access to your forest? If so, how strong are they comparing to formal? 5) What factor influence the most pressure on wildlife in your village? 6) Please sort your most important hunting mo t ivations T 7) What can we do to use wildlife for long term?...................... ..................... ....................... .......... 8) 9) What do you know about wildlife? Measures of con ... 10) Wh at are the consequences of wildlife extinction? What actions should you take?........................................ ....... ................................................ ........... Why are you not taking these actions?
111 C 4 Bushmeat questionnaire Specie (local na me) Sex (M/F) Form (partial/total) State (Fresh/smoked ) Age Weigth (kg) Price Hunting technique Hunter ethnicity
112 APPENDIX D ON
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128 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Germain A. Mavah was born and raised in Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). He graduated in rural development as Engineer in rural development from Rural Development Institute of University of Congo in 1993. This study program combined courses of agronomy, ecology and rural development. It was completed by internships at each level of training. These courses included perspectives of natural and social sciences. Through these studies he became interested in the c omplexity of conservation issues in developing countries where local livelihoods are tightly linked to natural resource management. After graduation, Germain worked first for the Congolese Association for United Nations as a community development volunteer for two years. Second, he worked for the Africa Development Foundation (ADF) as a technical assistant for one year. Third, he worked for the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ PROECO) as a consultant working to protect and con serve forest ecosystems. S in ce June 2001, he has been working as a socio economic researcher for the Wildlife Conservation Society PROGEPP (Project of Ecosystem management in the buffer zone adjacent to the Nouabal Ndoki National Park) in the Republic of Congo. His primary responsib ilities as head researcher for PROGEPP have included village censuses, studies to examine patterns of resource use by local populations, bushmeat studies, developing hunting zones with local people using Geographical Information System (GIS), and the creat ion of resource management committees in local villages. The successes of PROGEPP have strengthened his desire to help develop sustainable management systems and to conduct the solution based research required to address problems linked to conservation an d development in the Congo basin. This experience inspired the questions he investigate d He received his Master of Science degree from the University of Florida in spring 2011.