The Politics of Indigenous Nationalism

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The Politics of Indigenous Nationalism The Case of Bolivia
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Latin American Studies
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Thurner, Mark W
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Williams, Philip J
Deere, Carmen
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Latin American culture ( jstor )
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Nationalism ( jstor )
Peasant class ( jstor )
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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts THE POLITICS OF INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF BOLIVIA By Aaron G. Victoria May 2011 Chair: Mark Thurner Major: Latin American Studies This project analyzes recent shifts in the methodologies of studies of the politics of subaltern groups in the Andean region, and more specifically Bolivia. Since the 1950s, the political studies that focus on Andean communities have transformed their perspective to coincide with shifting intellectual and political notions. This project identifies a number of factors that indicate shifting methodologies. Furthermore, this project analyzes current changes that are occurring within the realm of the political system in Bolivia. These changes are used to suggest an academic shift away from essentializing notions like ?indigenous politics? and back towards political culture studies. The case of Bolivia is used to support an academic shift back toward political culture studies by focusing on the growth of ?indigenous? nationalism. The emergence and ultimate success of nationalist ?indigenous? political groups in Bolivia have helped to reshape the public image of the ?indigenous? and influence academic approaches to studying these groups. However, recent shifts in the Bolivian political power structure have indicated that political groups may be moving away from nationalist ?indigenous? discourse and towards micro-level community based politics. This project suggests future studies to account for these shifts by conducting research on political culture at the community level. ( en )
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2011 Aaron G. Victoria 2


To all of those who supported me along the way 3


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the Cent er for Latin American studies for opening their doors to me and providing me with the tools to properly conduct this research. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Mark Thurner, Dr. Philip Williams, and Dr. Carmen Diana Deere, for the countless hours of support and assistance that they so gener ously provided to me over the course of this project. I would also like to thank the wonderful staff at the Latin American Collection of the George A. Smathers Library for never turning out th e lights on those late evenings. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Caleb Finegan at Indiana University of Pennsylvania for opening my eyes to the beautiful world that is Latin American Studies. 4


TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 5 LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... 7 LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 8 LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................. 9 ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. 11 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 13 2 FROM PEASANT STUDIES TO INDIGENOUS POLITICS ............................................. 17 The Study of Peasant Politics in Latin America .................................................................... 17 Peasant and Indigenous Politics in Bolivia ........................................................................... 21 The Invention of Indigenous Politics ................................................................................. 28 Indigenous Politics and Bolivianist Scholarship ............................................................... 30 Is Indigenous Politics a Unique Form of Politics? ............................................................ 33 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... ......... 34 3 THE INVENTION OF I NDIGENOUS NATIONALISM .................................................... 36 Inventing the National Indigenous We .............................................................................. 43 Cultural Unity of a National We ........................................................................................ 44 Rewriting History ............................................................................................................. ..... 47 Remembering Utopia ............................................................................................................ 52 Constructing a Political Base ................................................................................................ 55 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... ......... 57 4 HISTORICIZING NATIONAL INDIGENOUS POLITICS ............................................. 60 Setbacks to Early Political Success for th e Candidates of National Indigeneity .................. 63 National Indigeneity and the Re-Con quest of Bolivian Politics ........................................... 68 A New Era for National Indigeneity ..................................................................................... 74 5 INVESTIGATING INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE .............................................................. 83 Two Indigenous Bolivias? ..................................................................................................... 86 5


Public Demonstration ............................................................................................................ 93 Support for Military Contro l of the Government .................................................................. 94 Principles of Democracy ....................................................................................................... 96 Associational Autonomy ..................................................................................................... 102 Inclusive Citizenship ......................................................................................................... .. 105 Summary ....................................................................................................................... ...... 107 6 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 116 APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES .................... 123 LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 124 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...................................................................................................... 132 6


LIST OF TABLES Table Page 4-1 Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabaja dores Campesinos de Bolivia pyramid structure 108 4-2 Descriptive statistics of independent variables .................................................................... 109 4-3 Public demonstration (OLS regression coefficient) ............................................................ 110 4-4 Individual variables fo r support for military control ........................................................... 110 4-5 Support for military control (OLS regression coefficient) .................................................. 111 4-6 Acceptance of an unsupported president (OLS regression coefficient) .............................. 111 4-7 Dahl's key political institutions and their operational definitions ....................................... 112 4-8 Support of freedom of association/assembly (OLS regression coefficient) ........................ 112 4-9 Support of outside points of view (OLS regression coefficient) ......................................... 113 4-10 Population distribution by depa rtment by linguistic affiliation ......................................... 113 4-11 Population distribution by muni cipality by linguistic affiliation ....................................... 114 4-12 Legitimate party system (OLS regression coefficient) ...................................................... 114 4-13 Support of Political Partie s (OLS Regression Coefficient) ............................................... 115 7


LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 3-1 1979 Bolivian presidential election ballot ............................................................................. 80 3-2 Close-up of the 1979 Bolivian presidential election ballot ................................................... 80 3-3 Evo Morales (far right) donni ng a traditional Unku and Chucu............................................ 81 3-4 View of the Mallkus and flags of the 2002 presidentia l inauguration ................................... 82 8


LIST OF ACRONYMS ADN Accin Democrtico Nacionalista CESC Coordinador tnico de Santa Cruz CIDOB Confederacin Indge na del Oriente Boliviano CIRABO Central Indgena de la Regin Amaznica de Bolivia CONAMAQ Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu COMCIPO Comit Cvico de Potisinista CPIB Central de los Pueblos Indgenas de Beni CSUTCB Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia FNMB-BS Federacin Nacional de Mu jeres de BoliviaBertolina Sisa FRI Frente Revolucionario de la Izquierda FULKA Frente nico de Liberacin Katarista LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project LPP Ley de Participacin Popular MAS Movimiento Al Socialismo MIP Movimiento Indgena de Pachakutik MITKA Movimiento Indio de Tupak Katari MNR Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario MRTK Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupak Katari MRTKL Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupak Katari Liberacin MUJA Movimiento Universidad de Julien Apaza NFR Nueva Fuerza Republicana PIB Partido Indio de Bolivia 9


WGIP World Group on Indigenous Populations 10


Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts THE POLITICS OF INDIGENOUS NATIO NALISM: THE CASE OF BOLIVIA By Aaron G. Victoria May 2011 Chair: Mark Thurner Major: Latin American Studies This project analyzes recent shifts in the methodologies of studies of the politics of subaltern groups in the Andean region, and mo re specifically Bolivia. Since the 1950s, the political studies that focus on Andean commun ities have transformed their perspective to coincide with shifting intellectual and political notions. This project identifies a number of factors that indicate shifting methodologies. Furthe rmore, this project analyzes current changes that are occurring within the real m of the political system in Boliv ia. These changes are used to suggest an academic shift away from essentiali zing notions like indigenous politics and back towards more detailed studies of political culture. The case of Bolivia is used to support an acad emic shift back toward political culture studies by focusing on the growth of indigenous nationalism and its role in shaping the political perspectives of part icular population sub-groups. The emergence and ultimate success of nationalist indigenous politic al groups in Bolivia have helped to reshape the public image of the indigenous and influence a cademic approaches to studying these groups. However, recent shifts in the Bolivian political power structure have indi cated that political groups may be moving away from nationalist i ndigenous discourse and toward s micro-level community based 11


politics. This project suggests future studies to account for these shifts by conducting research on political culture at the community level. 12


CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Since the 1980s Latin Americanist scholars have written extensively on the politics of subaltern groups on the margins of national societies. At the same time, scholarly interest in nationalism has boomed, in part in response to the seminal work of Benedict Anderson.1 Much of this work has been concerne d not only with class struggle but with what has come to be known as identity politics and, in a somewhat different critical vein, political culture. According to the anthropologist Charles Hale, Jr., identity politics refers to the actions and discourses of a group that come from a particul ar social and cultural location within a given national society. The location of the group derives from a collective social memory as well as a distinct place in society. One goal of such groups is to challenge state policies that seek to suppress or erase the identity they imagine for themselves.2 Approaches to political culture and practice have been more diverse than simple identity politics, of ten blending Marxist or Post-Marxist concerns with those of postcolonial and cultural studies.3 In the Latin American field, anthropologist Eric Wolf raised critical questions about peasant politics in the 1960s, and historian Steve Stern extended Wolfs view in a historical and theoretical review of A ndean peasant politics in 1987.4 Subsequently, anthropologist Orin Starn raised critical questions a bout Andean studies or Andeanism as a form of Orientalism. 1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso, 1983); Mark Thurner, Peruvian Geneologies of History and Nation, in After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas ed. Mark Thurner and Andrs Guerrero (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003b); Florencia E. Mallon, The Pr omise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies : Perspectives from Latin American History, The American Historical Review 99:5 (1994). 2 Charles R. Hale, Cultural Politics of Identity in Latin America, Annual Review of Anthropology 26 (1997), 568. 3Jacobsen and Aljovn de Losada 2005, 58-67; Mark Th urner, After Spanish Rule : Writing Another After, in After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas, ed. Mark Thurner and Andrs Guerrero (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 12-47. 4 Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1969); Steve Stern, Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). 13


This study builds on these seminal critiques with an examination of the emergence of the discourse and practice of indigenous politics in contemporary Bolivia. While I refer to political culture throughout this project, I am not using the political science behavioral concep t of political culture that orient s a specific group, or culture, within the larger scheme of politics by identifying a dist inct and static form of political practices. Instead, I use political culture as it has been approached by hist orians and anthropologists. In these cases political cultures are attributed to political actions that have been formed by a combination of interactions with power structures. As a resu lt, individuals and groups shape their political demands, actions and discourses based on the community that they find themselves to be a representative. From this perspective political cultures are not static in nature, rather they can change as individuals an d groups relations with power structures change over time.5 Specifically, Nils Jacobsen and Cristbal Aljovn de Losada define political culture as a perspective on processes of change and continuity by any human polity or its component parts which privileges symbols, disc ourses, rituals, customs, norms, values, and attitudes of individuals or groups for unders tanding the construction, consolidation, and dismantling of power conste llations and institutions.6 While many factors shape political cultures, the historical and anthr opological approaches have paid significant attention to cultural perspectives and how they have shaped political actions throughout history. In this project, it is my intention to speak of political culture as a way of addressing these cultural elements. 5 Larissa Adler Lomnitz and Ana Melnick, Chiles Political Culture and Parties: An Anthropological Explanation (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 2; Alan Knight, Is Political Culture Good to Think?, in Political Cultures in the Andes 1750-1950, ed. Nils Jacobsen and Cristbal Aljovn de Losada (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 26. 6 Nils Jacobsen and Cristbal Aljovn de Losada, How Interests and Values Seldom Come Alone: The Utility of a Pragmatic Perspective on Political Culture, in Political Cultures in the Andes 1750-1950, ed. Nils Jacobsen and Cristbal Aljovn de Losada (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 58. 14


The differentiation between the political science and histor ical/anthropological definitions of political culture is important to note for this project. If we were to use political culture as it is commonly defined by political sc ientists, we would be using essentialist notions when discussing the political practices of Qu echua and Aymara language communities because to be Aymara or to be Quechua would be th e key to understanding an individuals political culture. However, by using the historical/anthrop ological definition of p olitical culture, we save ourselves from essentializ ing criticisms because from a cultural perspective Quechua and Aymara interactions with power structures throughout history ha ve shaped the way that they currently conduct political practi ces. In this case, being A ymara or Quechua does not necessarily define an individual s political culture, but it does li nk them to a particular history that has been used to form the way that they part icipate in politics; a subj ect that is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. This political culture is not ingrained, but formed by particular histories and interactions. The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. First, I trace the history of Latin Americanist studies of subaltern groups and the emergence of the concept of indigenous politics in Andean Studies. I criticize identity politics scholarship and argue for a critical return to political culture approaches. Second, I examine the excep tionalist discourse of i ndigenous politics in Bolivia and argue that it actually constitute s a typical form of cultural nationalism. Chapter 2 reviews the recent history of Latin American and Andean studies of the politics of subaltern groups, most notably peasants and Indians and natives. Chapter 3 reviews the recent historiography of pre-col onial, colonial, and republican po litics in what is today the territory claimed by the na tional state named Bolivia. Chapter 4 examines the recent history of the discourse and practice of indigeneity in the national politics of Bolivia. Chapter 5 presents 15


16 quantitative data on the political tendencies of Bolivias Quechua and Aymara speakers. In the conclusion I suggest some promising avenues of inquiry on the political culture of indigenous nationalism.


CHAPTER 2 FROM PEASANT STUDIES TO INDIGENOUS POLITICS Since the 1950s, the politics of subordinate groups have been studi ed primarily under the rubrics first of peasant politic s, then Andean peasant politi cs, and finally indigenous politics. These terms or rubric s reveal a history of thought a nd action that allows us to contextualize the emergence of indigenous politi cs in Bolivia. Therefor e, by contextualizing the emergence of indigenous politics in Boli via we can also hypothesize about the possible trajectories of future research projects on the subject of political culture in Bolivia. The Study of Peasant Politics in Latin America During the period between the late 1950s and the early 1990s scholarly interest in peasant politics in Latin America grew substa ntially. The scholars of this period ultimately took a class perspective that em phasized peasant responses to ha rdship and moral economy in agrarian communities. The importance of a classand location-based term such as peasant (or petty commodity producer, in some cases) held considerable weight in Latin America where economic and social inequalities between city and countryside were marked, and where programs and policies of agrarian reform were implemented on a large scale.1 In his 1955 article Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion anthropologist Eric Wolf identified Latin Americas peasants as being bound by three characteristics. According to Wolf, peasants are defined as individu als who are primarily agricultural producers, retain effective contro l of their landholdings, and favor subsistence 1 Carmen Diana Deere, The Peasantry in Political Economy: Trends of the 1980s, (Amherst, MA: International Studies Program, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1987), 26-28; Alain de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 14. 17


production over reinvestment.2 These characteristics were used to establish who falls under the category of peasant. In his classic study Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century Wolf analyzed the most significant peasant rebellions of the century, with two chapters notably devoted to the Latin American cases of Mexico and Cuba. Here, Wolf presents the peasant movements as cultural encounter s between the capitalist cent er, the metropolis, and the precapitalist or non-capitalist periphery. These enc ounters culminate in revolutions as peasants resist the social changes that are brought about by the capitalist model.3 Following the influential work of the Britis h Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, many Latin Americanist scholars during this period portrayed the peasant as a reactionary group that did not act in national politics unless provoked by outside forces.4 This concept, also known as the parochial reactor thesis, stems from the id ea that peasant interaction with the capitalist system resulted in a stratification of the peasant class. In this respect, terms such as bourgeois farmers, middle peasants and proletarianized paupers emerge to identify the different sectors of the peasant class. According to histor ian Steve Stern, the parochial reactor concept is rooted in the idea that inter-cla ss stratification forces peasant gr oups to clash with one another and look inward towards local issues and debates, therefore limiting their political horizons. As a result, it is the task of outside forces to organize peasant interest and channel it into national level politics. Stern explains that these forces can appear in a number of forms, including the leadership and influence of urban groups, rural-to -urban migrants, and intellectuals allied with 2 Wolf defines effective control as land that is generally insured through direct ownership, through undisputed squatter rights, or through customary arrangements governing the rental and use of the land.Eric Wolf, Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion, American Anthropologist 57:3 (1955), 453. 3 Wolf 1969, 278. 4 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Praeger, 1963). 18


the peasants.5 Playing by the rules of the parochial reactor thesis, peasant involvement in national level politics occurs onl y in reaction to changes that are implanted by these outside forces. As late as 1975, some influential scholars were still depicting peas ant groups in Latin America as isolated groups sitting on the ma rgins of society. In a 1974 study, Charles Wagley perpetuates this peasant stigma by arguing th at the peasant groups of Latin America are located in proximity to the t ribal Indian on a social spectrum that ranged from the most isolated, backwards sub-cultures (tribal Indi an) to the most accessible, progressive subcultures (white metropolitan).6 Wagley defended his positi on on the peasant class by arguing that peasants and the Indian were agricu lturalists that used many of the same tools and techniques, and depended on subsistence farming, noti ng that they showed little or no interest in politics, and then only when influenced by outsiders.7 By the 1980s, this isolated and limited view of the peasant and his politics came under attack. Historian Steve Sterns historical and theore tical critique of the parochial reactor thesis was fundamental for the subfield of Andean Studies. Here, Stern is critical of the methodologies used to construct the parochial reactor thesis arguing that scholars of this approach use isolated cases and historical references to generalize pe asant political behavior and consciousness. Stern proposes that scholars rethink th is paradigm by expanding their scope of peasant studies and utilizing a number of methodological suggestions Sterns suggestions in clude the role of peasants as continuous initiators in political relations, the selection of appropriate time frames as 5Stern 1987, 6. 6 Charles Wagley, L.J. Bartolome, and E.E. Gorostioga, Estudios sobre el campesinado latinoamericano: la perspectiva de la antropologa social (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Perife ria, 1974); Andrew Pearse, The Latin American Peasant (London: Cass, 1975). 7 Wagley 1974, 32. 19


units of analysis in the study of rebellion, the diversity of peas ant consciousness and political horizons, and the significan ce of ethnic factors in explaining peasant consciousness and revolt. Sterns broad approach reconstruc ts peasant political behavior and consciousness as being more complex than it appeared under the parochial react or thesis. In this light peasant groups occupy a wide range of political horizons as they are continually engaged in their political worlds. This approach opens the door to a number of new avenues for studying peasant political behavior and consciousness; including a synthesi s of ethnic and class based factors.8 In a similar vein as Stern, anth ropologist Orin Starn is criti cal of studies that generalize peasant behavior and consciousne ss through static cultural depict ions in a phenomenon that he refers to as Andeanism; an Andean twist on Edward Saids Orientalism.9 According to Starn, Andeanism is a representation that portrays contemporary highland peasants as outside the flow of modern history. El aborating further, it dichotomizes between Occidental, coastal, urban and mestizo and the non-Wester n, highland, rural and indigenous.10 In this case, Starn argues that scholars of this current present gene ralized depictions of A ndean culture that are formulated from unique, isolated cases. Base d on Starns argument, it is apparent that Andeanism falls victim to the same trappings as the parochial reactor thesis. While examples of traditional Andean commun ities exist, there is an array of cases that depict highland communities covering a complete ra nge of interaction with non-hi ghland systems. Starn suggests that scholars of the Andean field should consider the complex system of interaction when analyzing significant historical events. 8 Stern 1987, 6-9. 9 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 10 Orin Starn, Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and the War in Peru, Cultural Anthropology 6:1 (1991): 64. 20


Peasant and Indigenous Politics in Bolivia In the Bolivian scholarship, global trends c oupled with local events shaped political discourse and academic studies on peasant politics In a typically paternalistic fashion, the Creole-led 1952 Movimiento Nacional Revolucio nario (MNR) Revolution helped to usher the peasant into Bolivias political arena. Prio r to the 1952 Revolution, pol itical elites used the term Indian to establish a ba rrier between white, land owning citizens with full rights and nonwhite individuals excluded from the benefits a nd decision making processes of the state. During this period, Indian was used as an exclusionary term and ensu red that non-white individuals remained in a lower social stratum than Cr eole and mestizo compatriots. After the 1952 Revolution, the use of the term Indian change d as the Bolivian government implemented a revolution from above that sought to reclassify Indians as campesinos and Indian communities as peasant unions, or sindicatos. In doing so, the registered communities were to drop their colonial ethnic identity as Indians and assume the modern, class-based, national identity of peasants. One of the underlying pu rposes of this modernization project was to solve Bolivias Indian problem by simply removing the Indi an from the equation, reinventing him as a union member or sindicalista .11 The new legal status of Indians as campesinos and Indian communities as sindicatos remained until the newly drafted Bolivian constitution of 2009, which purported to reclaim the cultural roots of the indigenous or native. Despite the legal recognition of the peas ant by the Bolivian state in the 1950s, a number of social movements appeared in the And ean region in the 1960s and 70s that challenged that label, including the Federacin de Cent ros Shuar (Ecuador, 1964), Ecuador Runakunapak 11 Xavier Alb, From MNRistas to Kataristas to Katari, in Resistance, Rebellion, and Conciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 379. 21


Rikcharimuy (Ecuador, 1972), and Consejo Regi onal Indgena del Vaups (Colombia, 1974).12 By the 1970s a number of Indian and/or indi genous movements also appeared in Bolivia, including the Partido Indio de Bolivia (1967), the Kataristas (1968), the Indigenistas (1970), Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (1979), and the Confederacin Indgena del Oriente Boliviano (1 982), all of whom made demands that relied heavily on an indigenist la nguage and ethnic platform.13 Notably, however, many of these groups did not refrain from calling themselves peasants or campesinos. The doctrines of these movements, such as the Manifiesto del Par tido Indio de Bolivia (1970), the Kataristas Tiahuan aco Manifesto (July 1973) or th e Tsis Poltica of the CSUTCB (June 1983), opened the doors for Bolivianist scho lars to pursue new methods of study which combined class analysis with cultural or identity politics. In the political sphere, these movements created symbols and resurrected traditio nal heroes that made it possible to imagine peasant Bolivia as an oppressed but unified indigenous homeland. During the 1970s the perspective of scholar s on Bolivian peasant politics was very similar to that of the rest of Latin America. During the 1980s, however, the trend of analyzing Bolivias peasant class was transformed. In his 1980 study, Gregorio Iriarte argued that the most important aspects of peasant politics had been ignored by previous studies. Iriarte sheds new light on this history by focusing on the be hind-the-scenes organizi ng of Bolivias first 12 Silvia Mara Hirsch. The Emergence of Political Or ganizations among the Guaran Indians of Bolivia and Argentina, in Contemporary Indigenous Movements in Latin America edited by Erick Detlef Langer and Elena Muoz (Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 2003), 85. 13 Robert J. Andolina, Between Local Authenticity and Global Accountability: The Ayllu Movements in Contemporary Bolivia, in Beyond the Lost Decade: Indigenous Moveme nts, Development, and Democracy in Latin America edited by Jos Antonio Lucero (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2003), 124. 22


peasant unions.14 He argued that the peasant cla ss was not reactionary. In another, ethnohistorical vein, British anthropologist Tris tan Platt argued that Andean communities or Ayllus had developed a political and tributary pac t with the colonial st ate, and that in the republican period those communities had successfully resisted the enlightened liberalism of republican elites.15 Platts study suggested th at Andean communities we re forceful political actors in Bolivian history, in part because they had defended ethnic or Indian rights of colonial origin, and in part because they had defended traditional Andean patterns of transhumance which were at odds with the libe ral regime of private property and individual citizenship which Platt called a form of ethnocide. In anot her ethnohistorical study, Roger Rasnake focused on the social and politic al roles of Indian authorities or kurakas .16 Rasnake argued that a rich Andean political culture had su rvived in the rural areas of Bolivia. In yet another ethnohistorical study, in this case informed by Marxis t social history, Brooke Larson examined Andean life in Cochabamba during th e colonial and republi can periods. In this examination she explains how Andeans actively c hose to fully assimilate to some European elements while also choosing to fuse other elemen ts with pre-existing Andean traditions. For the cases in which Andeans assimilated, Larson prov ides examples of how groups in Cochabamba utilized the colonial legal sy stem to their own advantage. Larson depicts the colonial and republican eras as periods of gr adual adaptation and resistance as opposed to absolute conquest 14 Gregorio Iriarte, Sindicalismo campesino: Ayer, hoy, y maana (La Paz: Centro de Investigacin y Promocin del Campesino, 1980) ,15. 15 Tristan Platt, Estado Bolivian y Allyu Andino: Tierra y Tributo en el Norte de Potos, (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982). 16 Roger Rasnake, Domination and Cultural Resistance: Authority and Power Among an Andean People (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). 23


and domination. Furthermore, she describes partic ular groups of Andeans as effective political actors that were fully conscious of their political capabilities.17 In the late 1980s and early 1990s Bolivian scholars continued to push the field of peasant politics toward cultural critiques of Boliv ias Creole nationalism and neoliberalism. In their 1990 study, Xavier Alb and Josep M. Barnadas argue that the And ean peasant was the central force in the making of Bolivian history.18 Furthermore, the Andean peasant was able to play a significant rule in politic s by having direct interactions with political elites and policy makers. In a 1987 compilation that includes some of th is Bolivian work, Steve Stern argues for a more historical approach to p easant politics. In this introduction, which we have already cited above, Stern emphasizes the role that the Cold Wa r played in stimulating interest in peasant politics in the United States, England, and France. Wolfs work is a prime example of this trend, as was the early work of James C. Sc ott on Southeast Asian peasant politics.19 Furthermore, he acknowledges that, since the 1960s, the field of p easant politics had grown into a stable and self sufficient field of researc h. Stern noted that stability in th e field indicated that there would be methodological diversification which in turn would resolve th e troubles of past peasant studies in the Andean region. Prim arily, he finds it difficult to ignore the role that indigenous, ethnic, and racial issues play in Andean poli tical life. What is more, he argues that, since peasant is an ethnically blind term, it is di fficult to apply it to an Andean region where 17 Brooke Larson, Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1550-1900 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988). 18 Xavier Alb and Josep M. Barnadas, La cara india y campesina de nuestra historia (La Paz: UNITAS, 1990), 258. 19 Wolf 1969; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale Univ ersity Press, 1985). 24


ethnicity plays such a significant role. Stern accounts for these troubles by introducing some theoretical suggestions for st udying the peasant. Included in these suggestions is a new historical perspective that r ecognizes ethnicity as a key co mponent in the study of Andean peasants, and the need to study the politics of such groups over time, not merely focusing on events like rebellions or protests.20 It is noteworthy that the title of Sterns compilation utilizes the ethnogeographical, class inflected term of Andean Peasant, favored by many anthropologists. The scholars th at follow Sterns theoretical su ggestions utilize both the terms Andean Peasant and Indian Peasant as a way of continuing the pea sant studies tradition while also accounting for the str ong ethnic colonial or neocolonial dimensions of Andean life. In some cases this combination of class based or Marxist and ethnic approaches to peasants produced such concepts as class culture.21 By the 1990s, terms, such as Andean peasant and Indian peasant, come into common usage as scholars investigate more detailed dyna mics of the once singula r peasant class. By placing geographical or ethnic boun daries on the peasant class, scholars of this period recognized the diversity and complexity of politics in the Andes. Following Sterns suggestions, 20 Stern 1987, 15. 21 Orin Starn et al, Rethinking the Politics of Anthropology : The Case of the Andes [and Comments and Reply], Current Anthropology 35:1 (1994), 13-38; .Although Stern called for a shift in perspective, from a purely class based to a mixed class cultural perspective, works that introduce this method had already been published by scholars at Latin American institutions. In a 1981 study Guillermo Bonfil Batalla adds to the academic discussion of identity politics by publishing a compilation of the manifestos of the various ethnic movements that emerged throughout Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Although he emphasi zes the role of the ethnic movements of the 1960s and 1970s, he argues that, as a social class, the Indian is a vital part of the peasant movement. Bonfil Batalla reinforces this argument by explaining that the India n of Latin America qualifies as peasant based on Eric Wolfs original standards. This publi cation is important to the transition of identity politics for a couple of reasons. First, he explains how the Indian movements of the time period can also be recognized as being peasant movements. In both of these cases, the native Andean groups sit on the margins of both ethnic and class based models. To identify this group he uses the Indio Campesino which utilizes both the ethnic and class based labels, or class culture. Second, Bonfil Batalla argues that the various ethnic movements that emerged in Latin America share a number of similarities. According to Bonfil Batalla this is most recognizable in the official publications of the most prevalent ethnic and peasant political groups. The publications that emerge from separate places follow very similar outlines and they follow a very similar set of demands, such as the recupe ration of history, cultural recognition, and equal state rights. Most important of these similarities is that they all place nuestro against lo otro. 25


one way that historians and anth ropologists investigated this diversity and complexity was by reconceptualizing the recent hi story of peasant politics alon g ethnographic lines, as Mark Thurner explains.22 In an ethnographical history of the hacienda system in the Ecuadorian highlands Thurner examines the intricate system of relationships that existed between the hacienda peasants and the landlord or patron Thurner criticized the o pen triangle theory of the Andean hacienda system which depicted peasants as being completely dominated and isolated by the landlord. By examining the et hnographic complexity of Andean peasant relationships within the hacienda system, Thurner is able to te ase out the cultural politics of symbolic exchange and everyday resist ance that shaped class and culture.23 Extending the ethnographic history approach to Peru, Thurner disabused a previous history that had inscribed Pe rus Indians or natives as pre-political peasants.24 To do so, he analyzes colonial and postcol onial peasant-state re lations. Thurner breaks with all scholar labels and, in a linguistic turn, traces the politic al discourse and practice of Andean peasants as engaged republicans and Peruvians. ly Another way that scholars of this period inve stigated the various aspects of the Andean peasant experience was by investigating the in ternal conflicts of cl ass and culture that commonly exist among peasant organizations. In one case, Juliana Strobele-Gregor argues that Andean peasants are torn between traditional no rms of community and ethnicity and the hard 22 Mark Thurner, Peasant Politics and Andean Hacienda s in the Transition to Capitalism: An Ethnographic History, Latin American Research Review 28:3 (1993), 42. 23 Thurner 1993, 66. 24 Mark Thurner, Republicanos and La Communidad de Peruanos: Unimagined Political Communities in Postcolonial Andean Peru, Journal of Latin American Studies 27:2 (1995), 318. 26


ideological class line of offi cial peasant organizations. 25 This conflict in discourse and practice places great strain on Bolivias peasant organizations, she argues, as highland Andean peasants feel the need to choose between s upporting a strictly indigenous movement or remaining within the ranks of the peasant organization. Strobele-Gre gor deals with this conflict by explaining that Bolivia s peasant organizations adopt ed a unified structure that combined the peasant union model with the tr aditional Andean patterns of organization. In another important study, anthropol ogist Thomas Abercrombie develops a sophisticated, intercultural approa ch to the cultural politics of et hnicity in colonial Alto Peru and postcolonial Bolivia. Abercrombie examines the ways in which carnival pageants serve as a stage for forming the public image of particular cultures, cultural interactions, and histories. In the case of Oruros Carnival, Abercrombie e xplains that over the last two decades the departments indigenous communities have be en using the pageant to present authentic original shows of rural culture and demonstrate pride in their cultural traditions. According to Abercrombie, there are numerous motivations behind these shows. Firs t, these rural groups desire to disabuse previous images of rura l cultural that have been displayed by nonindigenous elites throughout previous generations of Carnival. Second, they use the parade as a political mechanism to be recognized as au thentic rural base communities. Abercrombie argues that this type of recognition could pay dividends when these groups petition for development money and hope for a more direct form of representati on in national politics.26 In Abercrombies portrayal of the cultural drama, indigenous rural culture is presented as being 25 Juliana Strobele-Gregor, Culture and Politics of the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia: Autonomous Forms of Modernity in the Andes, Latin American Perspectives 23:2 (1996), 83. 26 Thomas Abercrombie, Mothers and Mistresses of th e Urban Public Sphere: Post colonial Predicament and National Imaginary in Oruros Carnival, in After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas, ed. Mark Thurner and Andrs Guerrero (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003), 209. 27


complex as opposed to singular, as the Carniv al pageant would indicate. Furthermore, indigenous rural groups are ac tively participating in cultural politics by using the image of their traditions as a means of registeri ng their authenticity. The Invention of Indigenous Politics While the sophisticated scholarship on Andean peasant politics s ought to diversify and extend the fields of peasant pol itics and subaltern studies, th e fall of the Berlin Wall and the Quincentennial of 1992 helped bring about the resurgence of the concept and discourse of indigenous politics. In part as a consequence of these events, some scholars shifted from postMarxist studies of political culture (i.e., And ean peasant politics) to indigenous identity politics.27 During this period there is a re-invention of Indian or indigenous groups in Latin America and beyond. No longer were these groups seen as parochial reactors to oppressive governments, but instead as highl y organized and influential or ganizations fueled by radical nativist rhetoric and growing in power and visibility, and with the ability to change or overthrow the governments that ruled over them. In a 1994 study, Donna Lee Van Cott identified th ree key factors that cleared the way for ethnic or Indian and indigenous movements to emerge on the national and international political stage, ultimately influencing a scholarly shift towards an ethnic identity politics perspective.28 The three factors she identified were (1) th e transition to democratic rule in Latin America, (2) the fact that indigenous groups pa rticipated in the democratic movement, and so were obligated to participate in the electoral pr ocess, and (3) the fall of the Soviet Bloc, which 27 Donna Lee Van Cott, Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994); Hale 1997. 28 By ethnic movements I am referring to particular soci al movements that establish indigenous as an ethnic category and use this indigenous ethnicity to form their demands and political practice. While the sign indigenous is dubious as an ethni c category, social movements and the studies that focus on them conventionally use the term ethnicity to refer to indigeneity. 28


led to the decline of Latin American Marxism.29 Van Cotts scheme is problematic, and clearly does not apply to Peru, but in the cases of Ecua dor and Bolivia makes some sense. She ignores, however, the strong activism of indigenous leaders in world forums, or that the United Nations declared the year of 1992 as an indigenous ye ar, or that Rigoberto Menchu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992.30 In another vein, anthropologists Greg Ur ban and Joel Sherzer help to introduce a discourse approach to identity politics on th e eve of the quincente nnial in their 1991 book on ethnic movements and the nation state in Latin Ameri ca. The priority of their work is to reorient the global perspective so that indigenous groups are no longer studied as an isolated other.31 Such an approach, of course, was always central to the anthropological and historical study of peasant politics. The authors compile a number of essays that deal with indigenous groups throughout Latin America and the ways in which they deal with their place in a nation-state. This process de-colonialized the indi genous groups by explaining how they interact with their nation as opposed to how they remain isolated, but again this was nothing new when seen in relation to the history of rese arch on peasant politics and et hnicity (e.g., Wolf and Stern). Michael Brown, for example, looks to familiarize the indigenous political leaders of Brazils Amazonian region by investigating their purpose in portraying dis tinct tribal ethnicity. Brown argues that these groups use their ethnicity as a discursive tool to achieve political success. Although it is tempting to see the indige nous identity politics scholarship as reinventing the wheel, there is a distinct differe nce between the scholars of peasant or Andean 29 Van Cott 1994, 10. 30 Initially, this was supposed to be a month long honor, but as members of the council of the United Nations felt that one month was not long enough they decided to dedicate an entire year to this cause. Van Cott 1994, 8. 31 Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, NationStates and Indians in Latin America, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 2. 29


peasant politics and the scholar s of the newly emergent fiel d and discourse of indigenous identity politics. In a 1996 study, Michael Kear ney exemplifies this phenomenon as he argues that the term peasant is outdated and that new post-peasant perspectives should be recognized. He argues that the standards that scholars such as Wolf used to identify peasant groups be reevaluated. Although Kearney argues that peasant needs to be more complexly structured he ignores much of the critical scholarship of the 1990s. 32 Kearney argues that one of the many identities coming out of the pos t peasant era is the indigenous although scholars such as Thurner have demonstrated that the political us e of the indigenous label is at least 200 years old in the Andes.33 Indigenous Politics and Bolivianist Scholarship Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson link th e reemergence of indigenous politics in Bolivia to the 1970s birth of the fi rst major ethnic movements, the Kataristas and Indigenistas. These movements condemned the non-indi genous political elites for using mestizaje as a national revolutionary ideology while also focu sing on colonialism and the Indian question. 34 The ethnic movements of this period called fo r the union of native Andean groups to fight against their exploiters. Hylton and Thomson cr edit the ethnic consciousness of these early ethnic movements with laying the framework for the type of political activity that became typical in the 1990s. In this case, indigenous politics was defined by the demand for a constitutional assembly in which native Andean groups seek to achieve proper forms of political 32 Michael Kearney, Reconceptualizing the Peasantry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 6. 33 Kearney 1996, 117; Mark Thurner, From Two Republic to One Divided: Contradiction of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1997), 28. 34 Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson The Chequered Rainbow, New Left Review 35 (2005): 46. 30


representation, expand the domain of comm unal autonomy, and defend local autonomy.35 While Hylton and Thomson characterize indigenous polit ics today as being focused on these key concepts and demands, they argue that the characteristics of these politics were actually crystallized during the late 18th century. In a second study, Nancy Grey Postero explains that indigenous politics is a combination of methods of resistance develope d during the colonial period and political knowledge gained during native Andean struggles with the Bolivian government in the 19th and 20th centuries.36 Also, Postero acknowledges that the term indigenous politics began to ci rculate as a result of the Ley de Participacion Popular (LPP), which enabled native Andean groups to use form al political avenues to make demands for change. Postero identifies indigenous politics as reaching beyond demanding basic rights and into rethinking and reshaping the cultural meaning of social relations in Bolivia.37 In a third study, Robert Al bro defines indigenous politic s as the ways in which indigenous groups frame their demands. These demands are particularly familiar to the native Andean sectors of the populati on. He argues that indigenous pol itical leaders, such as Evo Morales, translate standard politi cal rhetoric into an ethnically fuelled agenda. These political leaders achieve this by stressing the preservation of cultural heritage while pushing broad based social enfranchisement. Furthermore, Albro expl ains that indigenous political leaders adopt methods that connect cultural hi story to the need to gain politi cal support. These tactics include protests, hunger strikes, and mass marches which strengthen these groups imagined ties to long 35 Hylton and Thomson 2005, 45. 36 Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 1. 37 Postero 2007, 6. 31


standing historical conflicts.38 In summary, these three studies id entify indigenous politics as the ways in which native Andean groups claim certain sets of demands, reshape the cultural meaning of social relations, and use cultura l history to gain political support. In one recent Bolivian study, Ricardo Peara nda compiles a list of demands that commonly accompany contemporary ethnic moveme nts. Pearanda argues that ethnic movements are able to present a political platform that relates to many of the displaced Andean groups by sticking to particular demands that ha ve a cultural resonan ce. Included in these demands are discourses for land and autonomy.39 In a second case, Esteban Ticona Alejo speaks directly of the political ideologies of native Andean leaders and how certain aspects of their life experience, such as mining and an urban lifestyle, contribute to these ideologies. Ticona Alejo explai ns that the ideologies of early ethnic leaders, such as Paulino Quispe, Antonio Alvarez Mamani, and Jenaro Flores, were forged by their direct interactions with the inequalities of the Bolivian st ate. As workers in mines and on haciendas, these types of leaders became motivat ed by the desire to ha ve the needs of their fellow workers heard and their demands met.40 While their political ideo logies were forged by their experience with the Bolivian social system, these ethnic leaders lear ned political discourse and practice through interact ion with the urban center, or othe r native Andean political leaders who had migrated to the urban center. Jenaro Flores, for example adopted much of his 38 Robert Albro, The Indigenous in the Plural in Bolivian Oppositional Politics, Bulletin of Latin American Research 24 (2005): 10. 39 Ricardo Pearanda, La Movilizacin Ind gena y los Lmites de la Participacin en la Poltica Colombiana, in Participacin Poltica, Democracia y Movimientos Indgenas en los Andes, ed. Jorge Len Trujillo and Seminario Regional "Participacin Poltica, Democracia y Movimientos Indgenas en los Andes" (La Paz, Bolivia: Fundacin PIEB, 2005), 80 40 Esteban Ticona Alejo, Organizacin y Liderazgo Aymara: La Experiencia Indgena en la Poltica Boliviana, 1979-1996 (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad de la Cordillera, 2000), 36. 32


knowledge about political discourse and pract ice through personal inte raction with Raimundo Tambo, who had received formal education at the Universidad de Villarroel in La Paz. In a third, Peruvian study, Rodrigo Montoya Rojas indentifies characteristics of modern native Andean groups that focus on cultural history. He explains that the prin cipals of reciprocity and solidarity are pillars to the indigenous a pproach to politics. Furthermore, Montoya provides a list of key elements that shape the nati ve Andean political participation of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. These key elements included the preservation of language, culture, identity, and spirituality, as well as the establishment of self governance and collective community rights. 41 While Montoya explains that na tive Andean groups apply certain techniques to gaining political influence, he argu es that their techniques are not unique to the native Andean populations of the A ndean Region. He argues that th ese attributes have been key elements of political struggles around the world. To better expre ss this concept, Montoya links the defense of language, culture, and identity to ideas that were motiv ating factors during the French Revolution of 1789.42 Although Montoya argues that na tive Andean political practices are nothing unique to the realm of politics, he does identify a number a trends that characterize the political culture of these groups. Is Indigenous Politics a Unique Form of Politics? The Andean examples of indigenous politic s appear to pertain to making certain demands, reshaping the cultural mean ing of social relations in the nation, and appealing to an idealized cultural history and native cultural traits to gain political support. However, as Montoya argues, these techniques are not unique to the realm of indigenous politics in the 41 Rodrigo Montoya Rojas, Voces de la Tierra: Reflexiones Sobre Movimientos Polticos Indgenas en Bolivia, Ecuador, Mxico, y Peru, (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la UNMSM, 2008), 364. 42 Montoya 2008, 366. 33


Andes. If the term, then, does not refer to an ethnically unique form of politics, what is its purpose? Does being indigenous indicate that individuals adhere to a particular form of political behavior, or does a particular form of political behavior indicate that an individual is indigenous? The answer is clearly no in both cases. The indigeneity phenomenon in politics is actually similar to the parochial reactor thesis and the Andeanism charge that Steve Stern and Orin Starn forwarded in earlier d ecades. Unique cases that are made politically visible now set the standard for generalizations or essentialisms of how indigenous groups participate in politics; a.k.a. indigenous politics. Although recent studies attempt to characte rize indigenous politics in Bolivia, many scholars fail to explain why politics conducted by the indigenous s ectors of the population should be considered indigenous, or what distinguishes indige nous politics from politics in general. Is there some characte ristic approach to politics that may be called indigenous and that is distinct from Bolivian political practice in general, or from political practice at large? If so, what are the distinctions, and how did they come to be? Albro and Montoya believe that a characteristic approach does not exist. They ar gue that the indigenous style of politics, which stresses demands and utilizes tactics, has been typical of social and national movements in other parts of the world, and at other points in time. In short, indigenous politic s appears not to be indigenous to any place in particular. This does not mean that people who call themselves indigenous do not have a particul ar political history in coloni al Alto Peru and postcolonial Bolivia, however. Conclusion In this chapter I have reviewed the recent scholarship on th e politics of s ubaltern groups by analyzing the shift from peasant politics to indigenous politics. Throughout the 50 years 34


35 or so covered, studies of th e politics of subaltern groups have continued to diversify methodologically as both intellectual and political factors exert effects on the field. Here I have noted the important influences of the critique s of, Steve Stern and Or in Starn vis--vis the peasant studies tradition. Stern cr iticized the parochial reactor thesis that contributed to the once dominant view that peasants were provincial and at best p re-political reacto rs to outside forces of change. Within his critique, Stern argued that new studies should acknowledge the importance of historical and ethnic factors among Andean peasan t populations. In the second case, Starn criticized scholarly works that fell victim to what he called Andeanism, which portrayed native Andean groups in a static manner that placed them outside the flow of modern political history. In both of these cases, Stern and Starn were critical of the isolated and unique experiences that generalized indigenous political behavior and consciousn ess. Their criticisms ultimately suggested a diversification of the fi eld of peasant politics, toward historical approaches to political culture. Currently, Andean scholarship is faced with another critical moment in the history of studies of subaltern politics. Recent changes, for example, within Bolivian national politics highlight the internal differentiation that ex ists within the indig enous and peasant and Andean/Indian peasant groups and their discours es. For this reason, it is important to back away from essentializing terms that classify di verse groups and historically comparable practices under exotic labels such as indigenous politics.


CHAPTER 3 THE INVENTION OF INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM Most studies by political scientists tend to ar gue that modern ethnic movements, such as the Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabajador es Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) and Confederacin Indgena del Orient e Boliviano (CIDOB), have only recently become politically active, and that indigen ous politics were forged in response to late 20th century events, beginning with the 1952 Movimiento Naci onal Revolucionario (MNR) revolution.1 These political science studies, however generally ignore that historia ns have traced the contemporary political culture of Andean communities to th e late colonial period. Clearly, the recent emergence of indigenous politics responds to globa l shifts in political and scientific discourse. Nevertheless, the tactics employed by the contem porary movements in Bolivia are not new to the Andes, and at the same time they are not uni que to the Andes. The ways in which the contemporary movements push sets of demands, reshape the cultural meaning of social relations and political representation, and de ploy an idealized cultural histor y to gain political support are deeply rooted in Andean history, but this hist ory is not divorced from wider trends in world history. In this chapter I hist oricize the emergence of indigenous politics and argue that recent political practice and discourse in Bolivia may be understood as an Ande an variant of cultural nationalism. As noted in Chapter 2, anthropologist and ethnohistorian Tristan Platt established in Estado Boliviano y Ayllu Andino that native Andean groups in Alto Peru and Bolivia have long shaped the contours and limits of the administrativ e politics of the colonial and national state, 1 Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 152. 36


and other historians and anthropologists have confirmed and extended his arguments.2 Platt demonstrated, for example, that Ayllus resist ed the enlightened liber al reclassification of Indians as citizens throughout the Republican pe riod. Creole elites ha d sought to dismantle the Bolivian Indian communities, or Ayllus, and thus oblige them to participate as propertied citizens in the capitalist economy and society of the Bolivian Republic. The liberal state attempted to abolish the old colonial practices of tribute and communal land tenure, but these measures were successfully resisted.3 By transforming the nativ e Andean populations into citizens, the Creole elites would solve the Ind ian problem by getting rid of the term Indian altogether. Such a reform, Platt noted, was quite similar to those carried out by the MNR in the 1950s, and also those which, later in the twentieth century, were proposed by neoliberal Creole regimes. Those reforms would meet similar ends. In his ethnohistorical study, Roger Rasnake ex plains that in the waning years of the colonial period the process of political pa rticipation among the native Andean communities began to change as the colonial power structure broke down.4 It broke down in part because the colonial political structure of Andean society, whose lynchpin was the hereditary chief, or kuraka was destroyed.5 This destruction was brought about both by Bourbon reforms and by 2 Platt 1982, 37; Stern 1987, 35; Marta Irurozqui, The Sound of the Pututos: Politicization and Indigenous Rebellions in Bolivia: 1826-1921, Journal of Latin American Studies 32 (2000): 86;Rasnake 1987, 97; Sinclair Thomson, We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 64. Brooke Larson, Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 145. 3 Tristan Platt, The Andean Experience in Bolivian Liberalism, 1825-1900: Roots of Rebellion in the 19th Century, Chayanta (Potos), in Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison: Univers ity of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 280. 4 Rasnake 1987, 121. 5 The terms mallku, kuraka, and cacique were all used to denote traditional community leaders of pre-Colombian groups at this point in time. However, their use is dependent on the group applying the term. Typically, mallku is used by Aymara speaking communities, kuraka is used by Quechua speaking communities, and cacique is a term 37


Andean protest against abusive kurakas. The breakdown of the role of the kuraka brought native Andean communities in more dire ct contact with the colonial authorities. As we shall see, historian Sinclair Thomson will later argue that this late colonial restructuring of the relationship between Andean peasants and the colonial stat e amounted to a revolutionary democratization of Andean politics with fa r-reaching consequences. According to Rasnake, prior to the arrival of the Spanish the kuraka was a hereditary position that mediated the relationships betw een living individuals and the world of the ancestors.6 The kuraka had two significant duties that enabled them to keep the two worlds connected. First, they were a representative of the community during ritual and ceremony. Through this function, members of the community entrusted the kuraka with the task of representing their best interest s in making offerings to the anci ent ancestors, which were usually embalmed and placed in sacred caves or on mounta intops. In doing so, they would remain in the good graces with the mountain gods who oversaw productive activities in the communities. In effect, the kuraka was a representative or me dium of the sacred world of the ancestors. Due to their hereditary connection to the ancients, kurakas were entrusted with maintaining the living world.7 In fact, the term kuraka in Quechua may be translated as he who has the voice for all.8 Soon after the Spanish arrival in the Andes the position of the kuraka began to change. The kuraka was in some case still the intermediary between the living world and the world of the that was brought to the Andes by way of the Caribbean by the Spanish. For purposes of simplicity, I will refer to these community leaders as kuraka. 6 Susan E. Ramrez, Don Melchior Caruarayco: A Kuraka of Cajamar ca in Sixteenth-Century Peru, in the Human Tradition in Colonial Latin America, ed. Kenneth J. Adrien (Wilmongton, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), 22 7 Karen Spalding, De Indio a Campesino: Cambios en la estructura social del Per Colonial (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974), 35 8 Diego Gonzlez Holgun and Ral Porras Barrenechea, Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Per llamada a quichua o del Inca (Lima, Per : Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1989), pg 55. 38


ancient ancestors, but in addition he mediated relations between Andean communities and the colonial magistrates and inspectors. Although in some cases the kurakas had also done this under Inca rule, the colonial regime of divide and rule actually increase d the importance of the kurakas since they were indispensable to the local f unctioning of the colonial regime of tribute and draft labor. Thus, the colonial regime of indirect rule relied heavily on the kurakas. Not only could, ayllu members post complaints and pursue policy changes through their kuraka but it was the duty of the kuraka to mediate tribute collection and mita (labor draft) requirements.9 The kurakas of course could and did abus e their position as tribute and mita administrators. They sometimes met Spanish de mands for Indian goods by selling off locally produced items that were in high demand. In theor y, the profits collected from the sale of Indian tribute goods would be used to alle viate some of the pres sures of the required tribute. In reality, however, in some cases profits were used for the kurakas personal gain.10 As the colonial period wore on, a combination of miscegenation and coloni al structural adjustments changed the face of the kuraka as they became increasingly of mixe d descent. Also, as early as the 17th century the Spanish stopped recognizing Andean succession practices as magistrates hand-picked chiefs to mediate between them and the ayllus. Accordin g to historian Susan Ra mrez, the old-style kurakas were slowly replaced often by hand-picked cronies of local Spanish overlords who had no traditional claim to community leadership.11 By the late 18th century kurakas were outwardly abusing their powers a nd adding their own demands to t hose of the colonial regime. The combination of the lack of traditional blood ties and exploitative tendencies resulted in a 9 Rasnake 1987, 263. 10 Spalding 1974, pg 55 11 Ramrez 2002, 23 39


stark decline in legitimacy for the kuraka in the eyes of ayllu members.12 As a result of kuraka illegitimacy, ayllus could no longer rely on them to parlay local demands to the colonial administrators. Instead, commone r ayllu officials, or elected alcaldes sometimes called varayoc, began taking matters into their own hands. Sinclair Thomson examines this aspect of native Andean political participation by explaining that the transformation of the kurakas identity removed the apex of the colonial Indian/Spanish political structur e, thus opening up a more demo cratic and horizontal political practice vis--vis the state. Without the kuraka in place, the members of the ayllus no longer lobbied to the kuraka for change, but directly with the coloni al authorities. In this manner, native Andean communities were often able to orga nize and push their demands upon the colonial functionaries. According to Thomson, when communities were faced with an abusive or ineffective kuraka they confronted the col onial order to oust him and install a more responsive, democratic structure of rule. As a result of the weakened state of the traditional structures of the colonial regime and the local democratization of Andean politics, co mmunities often succeeded in achieving their demands. Thomson, following St ern, refers to this period as the Age of Insurgency because it is characterized by direct confrontations between Andean communities, which were growing in strengt h, and colonial officials, who were losing their grips on power. Furthermore, these confrontations provided these communities with valuable experience in political dealings with the state.13 12 Ward Stavig, Eugenio Sinanyuca: Militant, Non-Revolu tionary Kuraka, and Community Defender, in the Human Tradition in Colonial Latin America ed. Kenneth J. Adrien (Wilmongton, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), 247 13 Sinclair Thomson, We Alone Will Rule: Recovering the Range of Anti-Colonial Projects Among Andean peasants (La Paz 1740s-1781), Colonial Latin American Review 8 (1999): 278. 40


Prior to Platts 1982 research, Bolivian schol ars were inclined to assume that native Andean groups only participated politically in passing moments of violent protest. While rebellion was an important tool in the political toolbox of colonial and postcolonial Andean communities (the Tupac and Tomas Katari rebell ions of 1781-83 and the Chayanta rebellion of 1882 are significant examples), following his adviso r Steve Sterns research agenda (discussed in Chapter 2) Thomson demonstrates that protest was not just a spontaneous action but instead a weapon used to threaten and persuade ruling elites to accept Andean demands. According to Thomson, once demands were met, the uprising was disassembled.14 In short, the historical studi es of Thomson, Rasnake, Platt, and others help to identify the characteristics of Andean politics vis--vis the state. These coincide with the characteristics identified by Stefan Varese for contemporary ethnic movements, and confirm the notion that Andean groups have established a political style that has its roots in th e late colonial period.15 This historical political practice or culture, however, does not make indigenous politics distinct or unique. Peruvian anthropologist Rodri go Montoya has classified indig enous politics as a set of demands that has been of continua l importance over the last 500 years.16 According to Montoya, these demands include the preservation of language and culture, the assertion of local economic autonomy, and the respect of community or Indi an rights. Such demands are of colonial origin, but in the late colonial and postcolonial eras they have become increasingly democratic and national in flavor as the sc ope of demands has led to the creation of a national indigenous 14 Thomson 2002, 144. 15 Stefan Varese, The Ethnopolitics of Indian Resistance in Latin America, Latin American Perspectives 23:2 (1996), 68. 16 Montoya 2008. 41


we that is in some ways reminiscent of Benedict Andersons concept of imagined community.17 In Bolivia, the rise of indigenous politics as a field of study follo ws the resurgence of identity politics in the public sphere of the nation. The indigenous movements have helped to change the public perspective by pushing a nation alist rhetoric that re presents heterogeneous groups as a unified imagined community of n atives. The scholars of Bolivian indigenous politics have a tendency to perceive this inve nted identity as something real and organic. Although the first ethnic movements laid out nati onal demands as early as the 1970s, it was not until President elect Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada named the self proclaimed member of the Aymara community Victor-Hugo Crdenas as hi s Vice President in 1993 that these groups achieved major political success at the national level. After this period, their influence in the national realm of political discou rse continued to expand, coming to a head with the presidential election of the first president with roots in na tive Andean communities, Juan Evo Morales Ayma, in 2006. Once Morales assumed the presidency in an invented indigenous r itual or coronation at the pre-Inca ruins of Tiawanaku on the shores of Lake Titicaca, it was clear that the indigenous we had attained sufficient politic al acceptance to serve as a po werful symbolic frame for an authentic form of nationalism that would n ationalize Bolivias resources and society.18 The growth of the indigenous national project in Bolivia can be divided in two phases, starting with the publicati on of the first ethnic manifestos in 1970 and ending with the drafting of the new Bolivian constitution in 2009. The first phase focuses on the growth of the imagined indigenous nation from 1969-1993. The second phase is the re-conquest of political power that occurred between the years of 1993-2006. 17 Anderson 1983, 84. 18 Tiwanaku rindi honores al presidente electo Evo Morales, El Diario January 22, 2006. 42


Inventing the National Indigenous We The first Bolivian groups to publish new pl ans for indigenous political participation appeared during the period between the late 1960s and early 1980s. During this period, three major publications emerged that expressed a new na tivist Andean political awareness. First, the Partido Indio de Bolivia, led by Fausto Reinaga, appeared as a purely Indian movement that was forged by centuries of oppression and e xploitation by leaders of the western world.19 Reinaga expressed his ideals and demands by pub lishing the Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia in 1970. By 1973, a second ethnic movement emerged under the name Kataristas. This movement was constructed by a group of rura l Aymara youths hailing from the province of Aroma, the former Aymara community of Sica-Sica. During the 1960s, these youths moved to La Paz to receive formal education in the Vill arroel secondary school. While at the Universidad de Villarroel, they helped to organize a student organization under the name of the Movimiento Universidad de Julien Apasa (MUJA). Fuelled by the struggles of city life and the literature of Fausto Reinaga, MUJAs main proponent, Raimundo Ta mbo, ventured back to the rural areas to educate Andean communities about their new, pro-indigenous political movement. During this mission, Tambo connected with Jenaro Flores, a rural community leader, to organize a formal movement by the name of the Kataristas 20 The scope of their mission is encapsulated in their Manifiesto de Tiahuanco which the group first drafted in 1973. Later, during the latter half of the 1970s, a third stream of ethnic movement appeared in the form of the CSUTCB, a national labor union. The CSUTCB functioned primarily as a peasant union, but they were ope nly partial to the demands and needs of its native Andean members. Because the CSUTCB was officially a national union, they functioned more formally 19 Fausto Reinaga, Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia (La Paz, Bolivia: Ediciones PIB, 1970), 11. 20 Alb 1987, 391. 43


than the PIB and the Kataristas as leaders were democratically elected instead of being self appointed. By 1978, many of the prominent figureheads from other purely ethnic movements held influential positions in the CSUTCB; most notable is Jenaro Flores position as Secretary General from 1978-1987.21 Although the CSUTCB is officially a labor union, it is difficult to ignore ethnic motivations that are hidden under a cloak of labor issues. This concept is exemplified in their official 1983 publication titled Tesis Politica de la CSUTCB. While all three of these documents appear at different times from different movements, the methods used to present their political de mands generally follow the same pattern. Most importantly, these three publications demonstr ate how ethnic movements used the various powers of the written word to spark a national cultural revival. To do so, they erected four pillars for building indigenous nationalism, or Bolivian indigeneity. The nationalist indigeneity that emerged from these documents introduced a new native Andean identity that was openly nationalist. First, the documents claim a broad national unity of i ndigenous culture. Second, they re-write history from this unified, native A ndean but always in reality thoroughly Bolivian perspective. Third, they imagine a utopian societ y in national ways, harking back to an ideal image of a lost past as the origin myth of the nation, much like cultu ral nationalisms around the world since the 18th century. Cultural Unity of a National We The first technique that is used to build na tional indigeneity in Boliv ia is a discourse of cultural unity. In this case, the early ethnic movements utilized terminology that grouped the various Andean groups of Bolivia into one dist inct nation opposed to one common enemy. They achieve this by addressing their audience as a fa miliar group with common histories, traditions, and ancestors. This method re-imagines diverse and disparate communities as a single national 21 Yashar 2005, 178. 44


group under the authenticating iden tity of indigenous. Throughout the publication they use a genealogical we, us, and our to refer to their target audience. This technique was first introduced to indigenous doctrine by the PIB in 1970. After providing an extensive historical section, Fausto Reinaga links the contemporary And ean groups to those that suffered in the past by stating: We have resisted all of this infernal torture; we have carried all of this suffering for four long centuries, and we have not disappeared. And it is not only that we have not disappeared, but that-and this is th e largest-we have persisted in our fight for liberation. And we have not been c onquered because we are a thousand year old culture and race. Because we are a town, like the Andes, fatally strong. Because we are, finally, a Nation amassed by the Inkas. Here, Reinaga is able to place a divide between the Indian culture that has been oppressed and los blancos that have exploited this culture. Furthermore, by using we, and our, Reinaga is placing the interests of the PIB on the side of the oppressed Indian. Al so, he connects a large pool of disparate native Andean communities by linking them to one common ancestor, the Inca. In doing so, Reinaga is able to portray the new Indian identity as a thousand year old culture with a fluid line of ancestry. Notably, this discou rse is strikingly similar to the Creole discourses of independence upon which the nation of Bolivia was founded in the 1820s. Similar to Reinaga, the Kataristas use a discourse of cultural unity to corral their target audience and make clear for wh om they are speaking. In the Katarista Manifiesto de Tiahuanaco they erect this pillar by explaining that: Inca Yupanqui told the Spaniards A people who oppress another people cannot be free. We, the Qhechwa and Aymara pe asants and other indigenous peoples of the country say the same. We feel ec onomically exploited and culturally and politically oppressed. There has been no integration of cultures in Bolivia; it has been a question of impositionWe are foreigners in our own country.22 In this manner, the Kataristas refer to the various Andean groups of Bolivia as we. In doing so, the writers of this document are able to persona lly link themselves to th e communities that they 22 Javier Hurtado, El Katarismo (La Paz, Bolivia: HISBOL, 1986), 303. 45


address. This cultural connectivity enables the Kataristas to legitimize their ability to make broad demands for every person that claims roots to ancient Andean communities. Furthermore, they connect communities to ancient, reputable cultures by using a quote from Inca Yupanqui to buttress their argument. Ten years later, the CSUTCB also borrows fr om Reinagas technique and re-establishes the social divide by clearly depicting the vari ous Andean groups as a singular, oppressed class and non-indigenous ruling groups as the oppressor cl ass. In the opening statement of the Tesis de la CSUTCB they narrow their scope by stating that their message is to the peasants of the nine departments, to the brothers of the or iginal nations and cultures of our country. The Aymara, Quechuaand others, we are the legitimate owners of this land.23 These statements establish for whom their plan of actions represents and seeks to benefit. Also, by using the terms us, we, and our the CSTUCB is able to speak for all the Andean communities by establishing their legitimacy as a member (or a representative at least) of these groups. Beyond establishing their representative base, the CSUTCB also created a clear cut enemy in the nonindigenous class. They explain that during the colonial period the enemy was the Spanish Crown and its representatives. Skipping through Bolivias history they stre ss that a similar oppressor existed during each epoch. First, the Republican period brought an enemy in the Creole oligarchy. Second, the early 20th century introduced an enem y in the pse udoleftists who disguise themselves with populist language to ga in the ability to repr esent the majority and maintain their privileges. Lastly, the current period brings an enemy in the capitalist exploiters, and the state which channels neocolonial and imperialist interests through multiple mechanisms of domination. Through these descriptions, the CSUTCB plants the idea that, even 23 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, Oprimidos pero no Vencidos: Luchas del Campesino Aymara y Qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980 (La Paz: HISBOL; CSUTCB, 1984), 185-188. 46


though the name of the enemy has changed over time, the face of this enemy has remained unchanged since the colonial peri od. Furthermore, they connect themselves to the Andean groups by using we, us, and our to refer to these groups. The method that these ethnic movements use to create unified interest groups out of diverse Andean communities borrows from what Jrgen Habermas refers to as the public spheres political function. According to Ha bermas, the voting population consists of two groups; a small minority that is pol itically active and awar e and a large majority that is inactive and unaware of the workings of the political game. The small minority typically uses public interest to attract the support of the large majori ty. To properly do so, they create a community in which inactive voters feel connect ed or part-of. The easiest wa y to connect inactive voters to a certain political community is to use cultural attr actions that link them to particular experiences that occurred in the distant past or over generations.24 Due to the fact that individuals memory of the past is often clouded and vague, these groups are able to manipulate the dist ant past to fit their political agenda. This technique is applied by each of the aforem entioned ethnic movements as they connect their target audience to the In ca, Aymara, Quechua, Guar an, and other Andean groups of the past. In doing so, they are using the public domain to attract supporters from the reserves of inactive a nd unaware voters. Rewriting History The second technique that the first nati onal indigenous movements used to build indigeneity is the rewriting of hi story as a heroic struggle of unity and resistance. In this case, these early movements used elements of history to shift the attention of the public to the long standing struggle of the indigenous people. To do so, they emphasize a previously 24 Jrgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1962), 214. 47


unrecognized struggle and resu rrect past cultural heroes to evoke a national spirit of resistance. Ultimately, each of the publicati ons that emerged during this period sought to disabuse the Bolivian history that was told from the perspective of the Creole ruling class so that their current demands would have historical relevance. This rewriting of history for the purposes of national unity is of course a universal trait of all cultural nationalis ms, as Benedict Anderson makes clear.25 Historians build nationalism by rewriting historical narratives in a way that explains the interests of diverse and conflicti ng groups as the continuation of the struggles of their ancestors which began more than 500 years earlier.26 Also, by re-writing histor y as a national saga of resistance, these leaders are able to revitalize cultural heroes from previous eras of struggle, in particular the Kataris of the 1780s. The connection to the struggles of past cultural heroes helps to imagine their current interests as concepts that are linked to the struggles of recognizable and revered cultural figures. By rewrit ing histories and resu rrecting heroes, these leaders are able to use the idea of indigeneity as a way to conjure up nationalism. From this perspective, to be Indian in Bolivia is to support these leaders and their national demands. It is not out of the ordinary to hear references to these revised national histories a nd resurrected cultural heroes in the speeches and rhetoric of ethnic movements. Fuasto Reinaga, first, dedicates more than half of the Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia to re-writing the history of Bolivia, starti ng with the reign of the Inca. Here, his primary intention is to tell the story of Bolivia from th e perspective of the India n whose glory had been omitted from the national history and hidden by the oppressive western civilization. Notably Creole narratives of Bolivian history did and do the same vis-a-vis narratives of Spanish 25 Anderson 1983, 37. 26 Jose Lucero, Barricades and Articulations: Compar ing Ecuadorian and Bolivian Indigenous Politics in Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador, ed. Mark Becker and A. Kim Clar k (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 215. 48


imperialism. Reinagas new Bolivian history focuses on the Andean groups that fought to salvage their culture and commun ities. During the colonial period, he focuses on the groups that succeeded in fending off Spanish exploitation. Groups such as the Indians of Arequipa that proclaimed Casimiro Inka as their king and of th e Indians of La Paz that gathered to claim Death to the King of Spain, hi ghlight strong points for And ean groups during the colonial period.27 Reinaga continues through the War of Independence, Republican period, and 1952 agrarian reforms following the same trend of highlighting valiant attempts to defend their culture. This technique re-imagines the modern Indian class as a strong, resilient class instead of an oppressed, marginalized class. Reinaga also uses history to resurrect cultural heroes that symbolize the 500 years struggle of the Andean groups in Bolivia. Sca ttered throughout the Manif iesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia are endless references to past cultural heroes. Distant heroes, such as Juan Blez de Crdoba, Toms Katari, Tupac Amaru, Tupac Katari, and Bertolina Sisa are used to symbolize one common struggle that spans gene rations and persists into the m odern era. Reinaga is able to connect their current struggle to those of the distant past by connecting the current ethnic movement to these heroes. This technique is best exemplified on the final page of the manifesto. Instead of signing his name, Fausto Reinaga signs Rupaj Katari; a name that Reinaga assumed at the end of the 1960s. By signing this name, Reinaga is claiming himself to be a direct descendent of Tupac Katari, thus strengthening his legitimacy to lead his campaign of re-conquest. While Reinaga dedicated a considerable amount of space to re-writing the history of Bolivia, the Kataristas utilize similar tactics in a mu ch more efficient manner. The Kataristas reestablished distinct so cial divisions between the indige nous and non-indigenous classes by rewriting the history of Bolivia from a nativ e Andean perspective. Unlike Reinaga, the Katarista 27 Reinaga 1970, 32. 49


historical perspective focuses on the constant expl oitation of the native A ndean groups. This is in opposition to the national history that focuses on progress. They state: During colonial times our cult ure was neither respected nor acknowledgedIndependence, in spired by liberal principa ls, did not liberate the Indians; rather, the Indians were treated as a passive element useful only as cannon fodderTwo important laws promis ing freedom were passed after the Revolution of 9 April [1952]Sadly th ese laws did not live up to the expectations because they were designed on the basis of excessively individualistic principals.28 Statements such as these deploy an essentiali zed anti-Occidental hist ory to deepen the long standing colonial dichotomy and pits one, nonindigenous or Creole Bolivia against the indigenous Bolivia. According to the Kataristas the Spanish and Creole elite have failed to provide the native Andean groups with any true progress. While independence was achieved and steps were taken towards progress for Bolivia, the indigenous nation remained in the same position as it was at the time of the conquest. These words are used to bring this history into the spotlight and bolster nationalism among the indigenous class as it is defined by the Kataristas Nationalism is further bolstered as the Kataristas resurrect cultural heroes and place their motivations in a national historical context. Within their manifesto the Kataristas state that, liberation as embodied in Tpac Kataris struggl e for Indian freedom remains shackled. Indian policy briefly raised the hopes amon g the peasant masses but the life of Indians continues to be degraded by shame, exploitation, and contempt. La ter, they also state that there must be a revolution, one which holds up once again the ba nners and ideals of Tpac Katari, Bertolina Sisa, and Willka Zrate. The starting point of the revolution should be our people.29 Here, the Kataristas are legitimizing their political intentions by linking them to the struggles of cultural ancestors. The ideas of the Kataristas appear to be synonymous with the ideals of the cultural 28 Hurtado 1986, 304. 29 Hurtado 1986, 307. 50


revolutionaries that existed during the Colonial and Republican eras and by identifying with these cultural revolutiona ries, individuals should also identify with the Katarista agenda. The later publication of th e CSUTCB also looks to re -writing history to create nationalism. They desire to develop their own hist ory while tossing the lies of the official history to the side.30 To do this, the CSUTCB provides an exte nsive summary of Bolivian and colonial history that places Indians on the receiving end of continued exploitati on, mistreatment, and misrepresentation. By doing this th e CSUTCB is able to depict the ro le of the Indian in history as one that needs to be disabused. The CSUTCB also dedicates a considerable amount of thought to resurrecting cultural heroes who, according to the CSUTCB, are the true liberators of the colonial period.31 Once again, the names of past leaders, such as Juli en Apaza, Bertolina Sisa, Gregoria Apaza, Tupak Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, and Pablo Willka Zrate ar e used to connect the current political push for control to the 500 years str uggle of all native Andean peopl es. In doing so, the CSUTCB is able to imagine themselves as representing the in terests of past peoples and continuing the fight that was started by thei r colonial ancestors. These techniques applied by ethnic movements rely heavily on manipulating the memory of the target audience to re-imagine native A ndean identity and build indigenous nationalism. These tactics are ultimately used to win the support of an ethnical ly charged political agenda. In each of these examples, history wa s re-written to stir up strong emotions and connect the target audience to the interests of the movements. For the PIB, the emotion was pride. For the Kataristas and the CSUTCB it was anger, resent, and hope. Either way, true history is being used to construct a new politic al community and disguise polit ical interests. As Benedict 30 Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 188. 31 Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 190. 51


Anderson rightfully argues, re-writing history al lows social movements to speak for distant groups whose struggles and intere sts are in no way connected to those of the modern era. However, by re-writing history and speaking for past cultural heroes these movements are able to create a connection between the two eras of struggle.32 In doing so, nationalism is constructed by making it seem as if past generations of revolutionaries paved the way for the current movements to succeed. In this way, by supporting the ethnic movements, native Andean communities were supporting their ancestors, and vice versa. Remembering Utopia The third technique that is used to build an indigenous politi cal community is the reference to past utopias. Each of the movements discussed refer back to a utopian society that pre-dates Spanish arrival. At the heart of this utopia lies a glorious past that existed free of corruption and deception; a time when all groups were able to exist free of tyranny. The ability to conjure a historical image of a utopian society allows these groups to motivate native Andean groups to regain the once great culture that was lost by retaking control of the Bolivian government. As Thurner explains for the case of Per u, such narratives of past glory are typical of Creole nationalist narratives in postcolonial Latin America and beyond.33 Fausto Reinaga builds an image of a utopian society in his Manifiesto del Partido Indi o de Bolivia as he speaks of pre-American cultures that ex isted free from European corrup tion. He does this by explaining that, the man of Inca society has a clear conscien ce of his dignity. He does not lie, he does not rob, and he does not exploit his fellow man. Th e Inca man works; and works happilyIn the Inca kingdom there is no hunger The land is a common good, everyone works it, and 32 Anderson 1983, 198. 33 Thurner 1997, 164. 52


Pachamama provides generously to all.34 These statements depict the pre-Spanish world as a perfect model that provides equally for its entire community. With the arri val of the Spanish also came a disruption to this utopian model. Accordin g to Reinaga, destructive tendencies, such as exploitation, syphilis, and leprosy, were in troduced to their society by the Spanish. The concept of utopia was also utilized by the CSUTCB as they also depicted preSpanish society as being free from hardship. The following statement expresses the manner in which they feel that the ancient indigenous soci eties were free from the corruption of modern Bolivian society: Before the arrival of the Spanish we were communal villages. In our land we were not familiar with hunger, robbery, and lies. In the Andean zone, our ayllus, markas, and suyus were a base of gra nd civilization in which the autonomy and the diversity of our forms of organization and work were respectedAll of this development was violently interrupted with the invasion of Spain in 1492.35 This passage clearly expresses how utopian societ y can be shaped to meet the needs of current movements and organizations. As previous studie s have indicated, pre-Spanish Andean society was not void of personal struggle.36 Both of these groups make references to an Inca society that existed free from hardship and exploitation. If we recall correctly, the Inca were an imperia listic culture who also conquered and exploited the various cultures of the Andes. However, true hist ory, if there ever is one, is not of importance here. What is important is the fact that gr oups, such as the PIB and the CSUTCB, imagine pre-Spanish society as utopian. The purpose of this utopian imagination is to garner support from the native Andean communities and to evoke nationalism. 34 Reinaga 1970, 24. 35 Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 189. 36 John Murra, Cloth and Its Function in the Inca State, American Anthropologist 64:4 (1962): 710-728.; John Rowe, Inca Policies and Institutions Relating to the Cultural Unification of the Empire, in The Inca and Aztec States, 14001800: Anthropology and History eds. George Allen Collier, Renato Rosaldo, and John D. Wirth, 93118 (Ney York: Academic Press, 1982).; Michael A. Malpass, Daily Life in the Inca Empire (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996). 53


Nevertheless, this technique is nothing new to politics. In the original construction of utopia, Sir Thomas More presents Utopia as a country that is th e exact mirror of England at his time of writing (1556). All the problems that existed in England were unknown in Utopia.37 In this way, More was able to present an example of what the world could be like if their problems were fixed. Furthermore, he was able to discre tely criticize the Eng lish monarchy by disguising his criticisms as a historical narrative. While More introduced the case of Utopia, historian Alberto Flores Galindo argues that the Andean Utopia functions in a different manner than Mores. In Flores examination of the Andean Ut opia he explains that it has a long history that serves to meet the needs of a variety of groups. On one hand, during the early colonial period for the millenarianists, for all those rejected from the old world, America appeared as a place where they would be able to execute their dreams.38 For Europeans coming to the New World the Andean Utopia was a mechanism to build a new identity. On the other hand, for native Andean groups the Andean Utopia was used as a mechanism to conserve their identity. Flores argues that this was especially tr ue in the Andean regions becaus e revolt and rebellion had been frequent, but the peasants had never entered into the capital and held posse ssion of the palace of the government.39 These groups coped with the struggles of the colonial system by enacting histories and traditions that preserved their identit y. In both of these cases individuals perception of the Andean Utopia had been influenced by pe riods of crisis as thei r memories interpreted their situation to fit their needs. 37 Reverand M. Kaufmann, Utopias; or, Schemes of Social Improvement (London: C. Kegan Paul and Co., 1879), 6. 38 Alberto Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca: Identidad y Utopia en los Andes (La Habana, Cuba: Casa de las Amricas, 1986), 33. 39 Flores Galindo 1986, 15. 54


In collaboration with Flores, historian Manuel Burga explains how native Andean communities used a synthesis of history and cr eation myths to build the Andean Utopia.40 Throughout Burgas examination of 16th and 17th century utopia he discusses a number of stories of Inca creation that reposition native Andean co mmunities within the colonial structure. From the perspective of these stories, the hardship faced by native Andean communities during the colonial period is a small part of a larger story that ends with the resurrection of the Inca as supreme ruler. In this case, the colonial tragedy is a self fulfilling proph ecy in the eyes of the native Andean communities. The movements of the 1970s refer to past utop ian societies in ways that are similar to each of these examples. First, as a way of crit iquing their current government they explain that, what did not exist in pre-Spanish society was everything that these movements were arguing against in the 1970s and 1980s; no exploitation, no hunger, no lies, no private property. These aspects all relate to the demands placed by the et hnic movements. Ultimate ly, these descriptions of utopia use pre-Spanish society as a picture of what Bolivia c ould look like if their demands were all met. Second, these manifestos culminate in depicting the return of the Inca to power. In this way these groups are continuing the myths that circulated during the colonial period. Constructing a Political Base By erecting the previous three pillars (cultura l unity in a national we, rewriting history, and remembering/reviving a past utopia) the ma jor Indian and indigenous movements of the 1970s and 1980s imagined a single, genealogical indigenous nation that was on a 500 year journey to achieve liberation from their oppres sors. These three pillars evoked indigenous nationalism and legitimized the demands of the movements themselves by linking them to the 40 Manuel Burga, Nacimiento de una utopia: Muerte y Resurreccin de los Incas (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1988). 55


colonial struggle. From this perspective, it ap peared as if these et hnic movements were only reiterating the demands of their ancestors in wh at Anderson refers to as reverse ventriloquism.41 They speak for past generations and portray their present struggl e as a continua tion of cultural struggles dating back 500 years. Furthermore, th ey express concern about losing their culture and their connection to past generati ons. Only by salvaging what is le ft, and regaining what was lost, can these groups save their culture. In this way, th ey are able to classify all Andean communities with distant cultural connections as one commo n group. The pillars to constructing nationalism allowed each of the ethnic movements of the 1970s and 1980s to combine sentiments of the aforementioned tactics to present a clear cut li st of demands that could only be achieved by native Andean self-rule. First, Fausto Reinaga used this nationalism to state that: This land is our landThis country is our country. Yesterday we fought Spain, today we fight against the imperial ya nkee. We fight for the liberation of BoliviaBecause in this Bolivia is our life, our land, our houses, and our family. In this Bolivia are our ancestors and our childrenPower or death!42 Second, the Kataristas used this nationalism to argue fo r economic restruct uring that would allow hard working peasants to benefit, educ ational restructuring that would permit academic programs to be available in loca l languages and culturally significant curriculums, and political restructuring that would allow for the indi genous class to fully represent themselves.43 Third, the CSUTCB stressed their desire to cr eate a new form of representation that is constructed on the part of the new awakened campesino They stress the importance of constructing a union that 41 Anderson 1983, 198 42 Reinaga 1970, 64 43 Hurtado 1986, 305. 56


acknowledges the importance of their culture and languages, follows community democracy, and exists free from all forms of capitalist exploitation and colonial oppression.44 Conclusion In brief summary, the doctrine of the first ethnic movements imagined the diverse native Andean groups as one nation against a long reigni ng exploiter. This re-imagined vision of the native Andean groups reshaped the public perspective of Indians and their role in Bolivian society. Ultimately, the leaders of these organi zations were conducting po litics of their own by creating politically active populations out of prev iously politically inactiv e (or politically active but disorganized) populati ons. In these cases, these ethnic organizations that relied on ethnic jargon would build images of what the indigenous past was like, bu t in many cases these images are products of new social situations and relationships, as Joanne Rappaport explains.45 They accomplished this by re-writing history to emphasize the native Andean struggle, resurrecting past heroes, and by laying out the demands of the native Andean group. Furthermore, these ethnic organizations streng thened the public image of the indigenous by plunging indigeneity into the public spotlight. By drilling the imagined indigenous heritage into the public, these groups c ould solidify the new image of the native Andean communities. They accomplished this by publically displaying th eir indigenous heritage in everything from public festivals to political debates. This con cept of using the public arena to build national identity is a concept that is brought to light by Thomas Abercrom bie. According to Abercrombie, identity of a particular group is strengthened by the general pu blics perception of that group.46 44 Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 200. 45 Joanne Rappaport, The Politics of Memory: Native historical Interpretation in the Colombian Andes (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 198. 46 Abercrombie 2003, 178. 57


In this case, when the genera l public sees indige nous groups during festivals and ceremonies, they believe that they are seei ng history right there in front of them; indigenous groups acting the way that they had prior to the European invasion. In this way, indigeneity becomes something real, something tangible. The role of indigeneity in shaping public perspective is the subject of the next chapter. While this project sugges ts that the ethnic movements of the 1970s re-imagined an Andean variant of indigenous nationalism, there is a discussion, particularly in the field of political science that would link these discour ses to the global indigenous movement. This discussion recognizes global indigenism as the di scourse and movement aimed at advancing the rights and status of indigenous peoples at a global level.47 Furthermore, the global reach of the indigenous movement is understood as being es tablished during the 1960s under the tutelage of supranational political organiza tions, such as the United Nations. The primary goal of the global indigenous movement is to write new norms of indigenous rights into international law.48 According to Erica-Irene Daes, the movement stresses the rec ognition of a number of demands, but the central tenant and main symbol of the global indigenous movement is selfdetermination.49 In the case of Bolivia, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) has been act ively involved with the Bolivian government since its formation in 1982. While it is tempting to argue that the discourses presented by the indigenous movements in Bolivia have only recently been developed an d have been influenced by the global indigenous 47 Franke Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics; Since Time Immemorial (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1993), 199; Alison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 19. 48 Rhiannon Morgan, On Political Institutions and Social Movement Dynamics: The Case of the United Nations and the Global Indigenous Movement, International Political Science Review 28:3 (2007): 276. 49 Erice-Irene Daes, Protection of the Worlds Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, in Human Rights: Concept and Standard ed. Janusz Symonides (Ashgate: UNESCO Publishing, 2000), 303. 58


59 movement and its intern ational goals, it is important to unde rstand that discourses for indigenous rights, or derechos indge nas, date back to the 18th century in the Andes.50 In this way, the discourse of the indigenous moveme nt in Boliviaand to a larger degree the Andesis linked to a complicated history of community/state or community/colonial regime relationships. Embedded in these relationships are simila r colonial discourses that revita lized pre-Colombian cultures and used their social relevance to push political rhetoric. 50 Thurner 1997, 138; Thomson 2002, 140-179.


CHAPTER 4 HISTORICIZING NATIONAL INDIGENOUS POLITICS The way that indigenous movements imagined the nation in the early 1970s ultimately reshaped the political game for decades to co me. Even though Andean communities were active in politics prior to the 1970s, doc uments such as the Manifiesto de Tiahuancu attracted many of them to the national scene and high organize d politics. After the publication of the doctrine of the 1970s, ethnic parties, movements, and can didates appeared on the presidential ballots more frequently. The presidential elections of 1979 hosted four candidates from indigenous parties; two as presidential can didates and two as running mates. The Frente Revolucionario de la Izquierda (FRI) selected campesino leader Casiano Amurrio as their presidential candidate with Domitila de Chungora, a female movement leader from the mining dist rict of Catavi, as his running mate. Also, the Movimiento Indio de Tupa k Katari (MITKA) selected ex-miner Luciano Topia Quisbert and native Andean academic Is idoro Capa Coyo as the presidential and vice presidential candidates, respectively. While FRI eventually pu lled out of the election, MITKA successfully completed the elections a nd received 2% of the national vote.1 Later, Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupak Katari (M RTK) president, Jenero Flores, campaigned as Juan Lechins vice president in 1980 and again as presidential candidate for th e Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupak Katari Liberacin (MRTKL) with the Ay mara speaking Victor-Hugo Crdenas as his running mate in 1985; also appearing in the 1985 election was Macabeo Chile of the MRTK.2 Together, the two candidates tal lied 3% of the national vote. Again in 1989, both Flores and Crdenas participated in the presidential elections but this time as leaders of separate parties, 1 Bolivia: Wheat and Chaff, Latin American Weekly Report V7 N22 (1978): 173. 2 Elections Still Look Dodgy, Latin American Regional Report: Andean Group 05 (1985): 3. 60


Frente nico de Liberacin Katari sta (FULKA) and MRTKL respectively.3 In this election both candidates received a combined 2.5% of the national vote.4 Although the indigenous candidates of the 1979, 1985, and 1989 elections failed to capture significant percentages of the national vote, their consis tent participation in national politics after 1979 is a clear indica tion that the methods of the et hnic movement had reshaped the political game in Bolivia. By 1978, these organiza tions brought ethnically fuelled demands into the national spotlight and used indigeneity to rais e nativist Andean political awareness. In doing so, they forced presidential candidates to focu s on gaining the support of the indigenous vote. According to the Latin American Weekly Revi ew of 1978, the campaigning parties cannot even cede a modicum of control over the campesinos and still hope to win elections. Again in 1985, the political influence was recognized in th e Latin American Regi onal Report when they explained that the latest electoral process in Bolivia has highlighted a development which most outside observers have not yet fu lly noted: the rise of the aborig inal based peasant movement. These exclamations, although wildly outdated, i ndicate that, even though the these candidates were not winning elections at the national level, they were slowly chipping away at the power of the long standing major political parties, such as the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) and the Accin Democrtico Nationalista ( ADN). They were doing this by influencing larger proportions of the native Andean demographic to particip ate in national politics, thus causing the opposing candidates to cate r to the native Andean vote. The new method of using national indigeneity as a political force is better understood by analyzing the ballots of the 1979 presidential election. The ballots of this election were the first to incorporate the elec toral law of 1965, which f acilitated the el ectoral process by utilizing 3 Foro Debate : Elecciones Nacionales 1989 (La Paz, Bolivia: Asociacin de Periodistas de La Paz, 1989). 15, 65 4 Salvador Romero Ballivin, Geografa electoral de Bolivia (La, Paz: Bolivia: N.L.E. Caraspas, 1998), 217. 61


multicolor, multi-symbol ballots. Furthermore, the law allotted each candidate equal space to provide their candidate picture, party a ffiliation, party symbol, and party color.5 At first glance of the 1979 ballot the use of indi geneity to separate Luciano T opia Quisbert and MITKA from the rest of the field is obvious [Figures 3-1 and 32]. First, Quisbert is depicted in the candida photo wearing a highland style w oven poncho accompanied with a traditional Andean knitted hat, or lluchu. The rest of the candidates ar e pictured in a very traditional western style wearing suits either with or wit hout a tie. This characteristic pl ays on Fausto Reinagas original declaration for Indian groups to wage a pol itical war against their western oppressors. Obviously, this war spilled over into the realm of fashion by ditching the tr aditional garb of the western politician. Second, the MITKA party symbol displays the image of a tradition Indian, also dressed in a highland style poncho and lluchu. Beyond his attire, the I ndian is shown with his hands in the air with broken chains dang ling from each wrist; a gesture symbolizing liberation. te 6 In this case, Quisbert is using the space offered to him to place as many connections to the imagined indigenous community as possi ble. Furthermore, Quisbert is the only candidate whose social connection can be recogn ized at first glance. Even though the lack of literate native Andean voters may have influenced such a distinct party symbol, its ability to evoke emotion and tell a story is impressive. Although other candidates u tilize the party symbol option to insert a symbol meaningful to thei r party, only MITKA uses it to include an ethnic symbol. In this case, it is clear that Quisbert and MITKA are portraying the idealized native Andean tradition by ditching the western suit of the opposition and donning the garb of their ancestors. 5 Omar Chvez Zamorano, La Autonoma Electoral: Histora Poltic a e Institucional del Sistema Electoral Boliviano (1825-2006) (La Paz, Bolivia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007), 461. 6 Ral Rivedeneira Prada, La Guerra de los Insultos: la Propaganda Poltica en Bolivia, 1979 (La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Difusin, 1980), 62 62


Aside from using ballots, the use of indige neity as a political tool also appears in movement name selection. After the emergen ce of Reinagas PIB, a number of ethnic movements appear with names that link their poli tical struggle to the colo nial struggle of the distant past. Groups, such as the Kataristas MRTK, MRTKL, FULKA, Movimiento Universitario de Julien Apaza (MUJA), MITKA, Movimiento Indgena de Pachakutik (MIP), and Federacin Nacional de Mujeres de Bolivia-Bertolina Sisa (FNMB-BS), all look to cultural heroes of the past to legitim ize their movements as being indigenous movements. In these ways, during the 1970s and 1980s, indi geneity was used as a politic al tool to push the demands of the marginalized populations. However, wh ile documents, such as the Manifiesto de Tiahuanaco, created an imagined indigenous political community, the success of native Andean groups in the political realm was limited by a two challenges; a lack of open political space and poor voter turnout. Once they were able to overcome these challenges, they achieved greater success in the polls. Setbacks to Early Political Success for the Candidates of National Indigeneity The first factor that stalled the political su ccess of ethnic movements was the closing of political space that occurred under the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer in the 1970s. Even though two pro-indigenous publications had surfaced by 1973, a candidate from this current of thought does not appear on the presiden tial ballot until 1979 with Luciano Topia Quisbert. Between 1973 and 1979 President Hugo Banzer closed political space by placing a ban on all trade unions and student unions.7 Since the majority of native Andean interest was consolidated in unions, Banzers ban stymied the indigenous rise to po litical power. However, af ter the removal of the ban, political space opened, and continued to open, for native Andean groups throughout the 7 Bolivia: Wheat and Chaff 1978, 173. 63


1980s and 1990s. Much of this is due to a push for democracy promoted by a number of presidential strongmen as early as 1979; oddly enough Banzer a nd Victor Paz Esternssoro in particular. An important factor in the push for democracy was the desire to extend political participation to all social a nd political sectors of Bolivia.8 The results of the extension of political participation first appear with the in troduction of the multicolor, multi-symbol ballot that was used in the 1979 presid ential elections, which was disc ussed in the previous section. While the Bolivian government drafted the law to use this ballot in 1965, military dictatorships of the late 1960s and 1970s had su spended its use until 1979. With this ballot, illiterate voters and voters with limited knowledge of party aff iliation or party agenda could cast their vote simply by recognizing their candi dates photo or party symbol.9 Also, the extension o participation provided smaller parties and movement s a greater opportunity to participate directly in national elections. After 1979, candidates of the indigenous curren t of thought appear regularly on the presidential ballot s either as presidential candidate s or as the running mate of a presidential candidate. f political A second factor that stalled the growth of indigenous political suc cess was the lack of voter turnout. According to the Bo livian Institute of St atistics, as late as 1992 49.73% of the rural population failed to present the proper voter iden tification card at the polls. This pales in comparison to the 26.35% of the ur ban population of the same grouping.10 However, even as it is common to assume that every rural Bolivian is indigenous, this is not the case. Therefore, some real information needs to be teased out of this statistic. This is done by cross referencing 8 Focus on the Katarista Movement, Latin American Regional Report: Andean Group 07 (1985): 5. 9 Rivadeneira Prada 1980, 59. 10 Instituto Nacional de Estadstica (Bolivia), Estadsticas Electorales (La Paz, Repblica de Bolivia: Minsterio de Planeamiento y Coordinacin, Instituto Nacional de Estadstica, 1993), 36-43. 64


rural/urban inhabitants with a variable that determines ethnicity. According to a 1998 geographical survey conducted by the Latin Amer ican Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 71.94% of Bolivians who speak a native Andean language, or auto identify as indigenous, reside in a rural area of 2,000 inhabitants or less. This differs from the 30.58% of non-indigenous, Spanish speaking Bolivians that live in rura l regions of 2,000 inhabitants or less.11 Since the rural communities have traditionally been the focal point of the ethnic movements, these numbers are indicators of the amount of possible supporters that were not able to vote in previous elections, although we are not able to pin down an exact st atistic. In the elections that followed, voter participation steadily raised a llowing candidates of the indigenous current to achieve greater political success. By 2006, nearly 91.6% of Bolivia ns who auto-identify as indigenous voted in the presidential elections. This is up from the 64.6% that voted in the 2002 elections. Furthermore, 91.9% of respondents living in a rural region of 2,000 i nhabitants or less voted in these elections. This statistic is up from th e 65.7% that voted in the 2002 elections. Oddly enough, 2006 is the same year that the ethnic move ments achieved their great est political success by winning the national election, but this event will be discussed later in the chapter. By 1994, the challenges to political success had been reduced and, as a result, the performance of ethnic parties and movements cha nged drastically. The first of these changes is indicated by Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada and the MNRs nomination of the first vice president to claim native Andean roots, Victor-Hugo Crden as. According to Salvador Romero Ballivin, Crdenas nomination was the first time that th is current [Katarismo] had the opportunity to directly make its mark on public politics.12 For the first time since their emergence in the late 11 Latin American Public Opinion Project, Bolivia, 2006, Vanderbilt University and USAID: Del Pueblo de los Estados Unidos de Amrica, 2006. 12 Romero Ballivin 1998, 203. 65


1960s, nativist Andean interest was in the nation al spotlight for everyone to experience. This period in Bolivian politics is important for studying indigeneity for a number of reasons. First, Sanchez de Losada was the first candida te from a major political party to select a running mate from the indigenous current of thought.13In previous elections, candidates from the ethnic movements had been nominated by trad itional parties, such as FRI, but never by a party with the power and reputation of the MNR. Sanchez de Losadas selection reveals a lot about the importance of obtaining the votes from the native Andean class. If a presidential candidate wants to harness the vote of a marginal ized sector of the population, what better way to do it than to select a respected member of their community? It is also important to keep in mind that this election also occurred in close pr oximity with the quincentennial of the European Conquest. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the gl obal perspective at th is time was focused on reconciling for the atrocities brought upon nativ e Andean communities during the colonial period. They reconciled with this issue by promoting and celebrating native Andean culture. It is only fitting that this is also th e same election year that Bolivias most powerful political party, who had been under much criticism after the 1980 s, decided to select its vice presidential candidate from the same ethnic pool that was in th e global spotlight. This action is politics at its finest. Sanchez de Losadas larger than expected success in the 1993 election was due in no small measure to his decision to choose a na tive Andean politician as his running mate. According to the Latin American Regional Report this attracted the votes of members of the increasingly assertive indigenous organizations and many campesinos.14 13 Juan Lechin selected Jenero Flores as his running mate in the fraud-ridden 1980 elections. However, Lechins party was much smaller in size as the traditional parties of the MNR and ADN. 14 Good Start with Indians, Latin American Regional Report: Andean Group 07 (1993): 6. 66


Second, the native Andean cultura l revival that began some 20 years prior was in full bloom and Crdenas victory symbolized this. Th e victory celebration quickly turned into a cultural event that played on as many aspects of indigeneity as possible. Given that Crdenas was given access to the largest public stage in Bolivia, it is not odd that he us ed it to strengthen the public perception of indigenous culture. S oon after the victory, roughly 7,000 native Andean citizens attended a celebration at a La Paz stadium in what was considered to be an unprecedented event. At this event Crdenas was presented with traditional ceremonial staffs ( vara ) from a number of native Andean communities. To receive a vara is of the highest honor in the Andean perspective because it signifies the highest position in traditional Andean ayllus and has ties to deities of Andean cosmologies.15 The delivery of varas to Crdenas symbolizes the social role of Crdenas in the eyes of the native Andean community as they mark him as their official leader. To strengthen the cultural im portance of this event, Nobel peace prize winner Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan Indian, delive red the opening speech for the ceremony. This action depicts the indigenous struggle as one that transcends na tional borders and is connected by a singular cultural bond that places one margin alized culture against the other dominant one. However, the use of indigeneity during Crd enas victory goes beyond the victory celebration. During his inauguration, Crdenas delivered hi s vice presidential address to the Bolivian Congress in Spanish, Aymara, Quechua, and Guar an. This action not only raises general awareness of the native Andean la nguages, but also depicts Crden as as a leader that recognizes the various Andean communities and who w ill fight for the rights of these groups.16 In these ways Crdenas represented a victory for the entire indigenous comm unity as it had been 15 Michael Moseley, The Incas and their Ancestors: the Archeology of Peru (London: Thames and Hudson, 2001), 67. 16 Good Start with Indians 1993, 6. 67


imagined 23 years earlier. The important variab le of this victory was not Crdenas, as many would believe. The important variable was the fa ct that the indigenous current of thought had finally achieved a significant victory. The candidate could have been anybody, as long as they openly represented the native Andean communities. After 1993, capturing the native Andean vote con tinued to be at the top of the political agenda during campaign periods. In 2002, two candida tes of the indigenous movement appeared on the presidential ballot and, for the first time as parties independent of larger parties, they claimed a significant percentage of the nationa l vote. Evo Morales of the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) and Felipe Mallku Qu ispe (MIP) received 20.94% and 6.09% of the national vote, respectively.17 Looking back, the years from 1970-1993 can be ma rked as the rise of nativist Andean political awareness. The indigenous political community was first imagined by the ethnic movements of the 1970s and fully blossomed with the nomination of Victor-Hugo Crdenas as vice president in 1993. What occurred between 1993 and 2009 is an onslaught of indigeneity in the political arena. While the methods of nativ ist Andean political pa rticipation remained unchanged, the growth of their political efficacy finally reached a level that fostered major political successes. National Indigeneity and the Re-Conquest of Bolivian Politics If 1993 marks the arrival of th e imagined indigenous nation in national politics, the period after marks their gradua l re-conquest of the Bolivian government. During Crdenas term as vice president, a number of laws that rec ognized long standing demands for solidarity were 17 Chvez Zamorano 2007, 615. 68


put into effect.18 Most recognizable is the Ley de Participacion Popular which was signed in 1994. Through the LPP the structure of the Bolivian government faced a number of significant changes. First, it expanded the ju risdiction of the munici pal government to in clude the rural areas surrounding the direct urban distri ct of the municipality. Seco nd, through the inclusion of the rural regions, the citizens living within the rural areas were permitted to vote in the municipal elections, as well as, run for municipal offi ce. Finally, the LPP decentralized government spending by allowing financial resources to be allocated by the municipal governments.19 The restructured government spending brought new d ecision making power down to the local level. As a result of the LPP, new political space wa s offered to the native Andean populations in Bolivia. Since the emergence of the ethnic move ments of the 1970s, the LPP marked the second opening of political space for native Andean comm unities; the removal of Banzers ban on trade unions and students unions being the first. Although th e actual ability of these populations to access this space is debated, it is clear that the LP P led to a major increase in the formal political participation of such populations and ultimately increased the succe ss of later candidates of the indigenous current.20 Prior to the passing of this law, ethnic organizations, such as the Confederacin Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) and the MRTKL needed to find support in larger mixed or ganizations that had the power to formally access political space; Victor-Hugo Crdenas and the MNR is one example.21 18 While these laws were passed under the same administra tion that employed Crdenas, I do not intend to make it seem as if Crdenas was the sole body behind their ratification. During the passing of the Ley de Participacion Popular, Crdenas was actually more of a backgr ound player than a driving force. 19 Carmen Medeiros, Civilizing the Popular: The Law of Po pular Participation and the Design of a New Society in 1990s Bolivia, Critique of Anthropology 21 (2001): 11. 20 Peter DeShazo and Center for Strategic an d International Studies America Program, Outlook for Indigenous Politics in the Andean Region; a Report of the CSIS Americas Program (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2009), 6. 21 Postero 2007, 145. 69


While the vice presidency of Crdenas i ndicates the start of national indigenous political success, the following elections reveal the gradual takeover of the Bolivian government. In 2002, two candidates that claim to have root s in native Andean communities appear on the presidential ballots; Evo Morales, head of the coca growers union and candidate for MAS, and Felipe Mallku Quispe, former general secret ary of the CSUTCB and candidate for MIP. For the first time in electoral hist ory, candidates of the indigenous current, independent of nonindigenous party affiliation, rece ived a significant percentage of the national vote; Morales receiving 20.94% and Quispe 6.09%.22 Although neither party won the election, Morales and Quispe reached a number of benchmarks for ethn ic political parties. Fi rst, Morales captured more votes than any previous candidate of native Andean heritage, placing 2nd. Second, MAS was able to secure 8 of the 27 seats in the Sena te and 27 of 130 seats in Congress; MIP secured 6 seats in congress.23 Third, Morales won the majority vote in 4 of the 9 departments; La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Potosi. The results of the 2002 election revealed the growing power of the indigenous vote with 42.6% of native Andean voters voting for either Morales or Quispe. During these elections Morales and Quispe util ized many of the tactics previously used by ethnic movements to build indigenous nati onalism and shape the public perception of indigenous culture. Even though native Andean cultu re in Bolivia is extremely diverse, these candidates preached a platform that encomp assed all groups. During speeches, Bolivian President Evo Morales would often appear dressed in tr aditional outfits of native Andean culture while sporting coca leaf necklaces. This tactic is simply a means of emphasizing his native Andean roots. Furthermore, thes e candidates glorify cultural artifacts that the original ethnic 22 Chvez Zamorano 2007, 615. 23 Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia, Acta de Cm puto Nacional Elecciones Generales y Referendos 2009, 70


movements established as indigenous cultural symbols, such as the wiphala and native languages. These cultural artifacts establish th eir legitimacy among native Andean voters. What is more, they make references to traditional A ndean concepts of spirituality by recognizing the distinctly traditional deities such as Pachakuti and Pachamama.24 Once again, these are examples of how presidential candidates are able to mask political issues as cultural references. By presenting an ethnically fuelled campaign, candidates, such as Morales, are able to evoke indigenous nationalism and use indigeneity to capture political support. These techniques are further exemplified by Morales as he states that in my community [we] lived in solidarity. In my community there was no privat e property. In my comm unity one lived in a fashion together with the familyIn my community, we did not know about money, but we lived well.25 There is obviously more to this statement than is actually stated. Deeper analysis of this statement reveals that it is eerily reminiscent of passages in th e first publications of ethnic movements in the 1970s. In a short period of time, Morales is able to utilize a number of the same techniques as the Parti do Indio de Bolivia (PIB), Kataristas, and Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Boliv ia (CSUTCB). First, Morales uses cultural connectivity by referring, repeatedly, to my co mmunity. This technique gives the statement a personal feel by physically placing Morales in the context of the examples. Next, he relates the indigenous lifestyle to the way th at things should be; a utopia in a sense. In this manner, he imagines indigenous life as everything that is right in life and the capitalist lifestyle as everything that is wrong with the world. Lastly, he presents a political base that communicates a political agenda in cultural terms. The nativ e Andean populations can relate with Morales demands by simply being members of native Andean communities and sharing similar 24 Albro 2005, 11. 25 Lucero 2007, 215. 71


experiences. By stressing these aspects, candida tes of the indigenous current are able to imagine the modern indigenous po litical agenda as being linked to a five century old struggle of native Andean culture against the exploiters. Th e methods that are used to accomplish this are very similar to the methods used by the ethnic movements of the 1970s as they laid the groundwork for the imagined indigenous nation. Again in 2005, Morales and Quispe particip ated in the presidential election gaining 53.74% and 2.09% of the national vote, respectively.26 Furthermore, MAS secured 12 seats in the Senate and 72 seats in Congress. The succe ss of the 2005 presidenti al election marked a number of key accomplishments for the native And ean communities of Bolivia. First, for the first time in their history a candidate with cultural tie s to native Andean communities was elected as president. Second, the overwhelming electoral su ccess of MAS gave them majority control of Congress and slightly less than majority control of the Senate. Third, the results of the election represented the demise of the traditional elite political parties; MNR, MIR, ADN, and NFR. Furthermore, the persistently powerful MNR was al most dissolved of power, clinging to 7 seats in Congress and 1 seat in the Senate. For the fi rst time in Bolivian hist ory an ethnic movement gained majority control of the d ecision making process in Bolivia. The role of indigeneity in these elections is best demonstrated by th e celebration that took place during Morales inauguration on January 21, 2006. For this event, Morales pulled out all of the stops. First, he held his inaugural speech on the steps of the Pyramid of Akapona at the sacred site of Tiwanaku. The decision to hold th e ceremony at the most publically sacred of sites for the indigenous nation -as it had been imag inedsymbolizes the completion of a journey that had been started during the colonial period by distant groups of native Andean communities. Morales stresses this achievement by stati ng that today starts a new era for the pueblos 26 Chvez Zamorano 2007, 627. 72


originarios for the world. A new era for everyone fr om Tiwanaku, Bolivia convinced that only with the force of the town and the unity of the to wn could we put an end to the colonial state and neoliberal model.27 Morales further demonstrated his indigeneity by donning a red traditional highland tunic (unku ) with horizontal stripes and the trad itional four pointed knitted cap ( chucu ) [Figure 3-3]. Similar to the inauguration of Crd enas, community leaders presented Morales with multiple vara proclaiming him the maximum authority in Bolivia and Latin America. The ceremony commenced with the sounding of traditional Andean ceremonial horns ( pututus ) as Morales offered incense and alcohol to their traditional deity Pachamama (Mother Earth). The public arena was further used to display indigeneity as 30 mallkus surrounded Morales at the foot of the Pyramid of Akapona. Each of the 30 mallkus carried two flags, their community flag and the wiphala [Figure 4-4]. The entire ina ugural ceremony encapsulated the traditions of the indigenous nation that had been imagined 36 years prior. Judging by the events of the inauguration, it is clear that the imagined nati onalism established by the ethnic movements of the 1970s had finally grown enough to regain control of the Bolivian government. The events that took place on that January morning played out exactly as the first movements planned. Political demands had been embedded in cultural preservation a nd the continuation of the colonial struggle. If the victory of Victor-Hugo Crdenas mark ed the start of the re-conquest of Bolivian politics, the ratification of the Bolivian constitution in 2009 symbo lizes its end. By analyzing the 2009 constitution it is clear that many of the orig inal demands of the first ethnic movements had been realized. This is best e xpressed in the preamble stating th at the new constitution leaves behind the colonial, republican, and neoliberal state. The first chapter further denotes a number of changes that relate to the long standing cultural struggles. First, the official language of the 27Comienza nueva era para pueblos originarios, El diario January 22, 2006, Primera pgina. 73


state is changed to include all the languages of the native Andean nations.28 Second, the official capital has been placed solely in Sucre. Pr eviously, the Bolivian st ate capital held its constitutional seat in Sucre and its governmental seat in La Paz.29 The history of this situation was typically viewed by native Andean communitie s as another symbol of European dominance of the native Andean people. The elite class was once again demonstratin g their power over the native Andean people by taking so le authority out of Sucre, th e long standing capital of the native Andean groups, and splitting it between Sucre and La Paz. The reversal of this policy symbolizes the removal of another reminder of colonial style do minance. Third, the wiphala is added as the national flag, along with th e red, yellow, and green tricolor flag.30 These changes that occur within the first chapter of the new constitution symbolize the removal of the oppressive, exclusionary role of previous non-indigenous gover nments. Furthermore, these amendments denote the end of the indige nous re-conquest of the Bolivian government. A New Era for National Indigeneity After the Morales administration ratified th e new constitution, the demands of the ethnic movements of the 1970s had been realized and ma jority control of decision making power had been restored to the native Andean communitie s. During this period, indigeneity or simply ethnic politicswas thru st into national politics by candida tes claiming roots to an indigenous community; an indigenous community imagined by the social movements of the 1970s. Oddly enough, this period also marked the hey day of the stream of identity politics known as indigenous politics. In many ways internal changes that were brought about by ethnic movements helped to change the way that scholars viewed native Andean communities and their 28 Bolivian Constitution, 2009 : Chap. 1 Art. 4 Sec. 1. 29 Bolivian Constitution, 2009: Chap. 1 Art. 6, Sec. 1. 30 Bolivian Constitution, 2009: Chap. 1 Art. 6 Sec. 2. 74


role in Bolivian politics. This was primarily ach ieved by a transformation of the public image of indigenous identity. These groups took obscure histories, heroes, and cultural symbols and reinvented them as being distin ct parts of an indigenous nati on. By the early 1990s, indigenous identity in Bolivia was promoted as a singular culture made up of many parts, but also having deep roots in one non-western heritage. The st udies that emerge between 1993 and 2009 focus on key points that were used to bu ild this indigenous nationalism twenty years prior; such as a 500 year struggle, the use of protes t, and the demands for autonomy. During this period, studies of indigenous po litics did properly analyze the primary political battle that was taking place in Bolivia. This battle pitted the various native Andean communities against western oppressors; or more simply one against the other. However, as Steve Stern argued about peasant po litics in the 1980s, the field of indigenous politics is at an important point of transition. While indigenou s politics has an appropriate place in Bolivian politics between 1993 and 2009, recent changes have reshaped the politi cal scene in Bolivia which suggest that a new perspective to studyi ng native Andean groups may emerge. Ultimately, changes in the structure of the indigenous political movement hi nt towards a possible point of transition for this particular field. After the Morales administration passed the 2009 constitution the power of indigeneity as a tool to gain political power began to fi zzle out. The theory behind this phenomenon comes from a question that follows the triumph of any social movement in a ny place at any period of time. How does a movement, which is predicated upon struggle and the need to influence change, survive once it achi eves absolute power? The answer to this question is illustrated in the political campaign of the 2009 Bolivian presidential elections. Of the ei ght active candidates, five of th em claim roots in what could 75


traditionally be labeled as indigenous groups; Evo Morales (MAS), Rene Joaquino (Alianza Social), Roman Loayza (Gente), Rime Choquehua nca (Bolivia Social Democrtica), and Alejo Vliz (Pueblos por la Libertad y Soberana). For the first time in recent electoral history indigeneity alone would not garner votes. Furthermore, the po wer of indigeneity as a political tool broke down as candidates cr iticized one another for being hist rionic about their heritage. In a newspaper interview, Alejo Vliz is openly critical of the ways in which native Andean political leaders, particularly Morales, milk indigeneity to gain political ground. In the article, Vliz states that [Morales] wants to return our people to something that existed 600 years ago, but he is trying to relive something id ealized that never existed.31 This statement says a lot about how the power of indigeneity has changed since 2009. By dressing the part, rewr iting histories, and resurrecting past heroes, candi dates are putting on a show th at makes it seem as if the indigenous community is something real and not imagined. However, Vliz cracks the system as he realizes that it is simply a tool that is imagined and used to raise attention and garner political support. Although Morales won the 2009 presidential election, and MAS further consolidated their control over Congress and the Senate, indige neity had less influence on his victory than on previous elections. What ultimately gave Morales the advantage was his ability to garner support from the non-indigenous sectors if the population. This is distinctly different than past elections that hosted non-indigenous candi dates who gained an advantage by attracting support from the native Andean sectors of the population. These changes in Bolivias political ma keup illustrate the complexities of studying political participation, or political culture, under generalized terms, such as ethnicity. Whereas, in many cases, ethnicity is used to differe ntiate between indigenous and non-indigenous 31 John Enders, The Bolivian Pr esidents Surprising Critics, San Francisco Chronicle, July 26, 2009, 2. 76


political interests, a si ngle indigenous class ag ainst a non-indigenous oppre ssor is falling out of the spotlight in Bolivian politics today. The comm on enemy that was defined in the first ethnic manifestos has been defeated; or at least te mporarily removed. With the once common enemy out of the picture indigenous ethn icity as a demarcation of intere st breaks down as individual linguistic groups now politick over political issues. This is best illustrated by an example coming out of Potos, one of Bolivias traditional native Andean departments. Beginning on July 28, 2010, the Comit Cvico de Poto sinista (COMCIPO), a Potos-b ased social movement led by Celestino Condori, organized a road block that prohibited all traffic from entering or leaving the city for more than 15 days. COMCIPO organize d the demonstration to show their discontent with the Bolivian government for failing to solve priority problems within the city of Potos.32 During the roadblock, Condori met with a number of government officials, including President Morales, where he laid out the demands of the movement. Similar to the manifestos of the 1970s, COMCIPO presented these demands in a formal lett er written to the government. Included in the demands were the need to settle a territory disp ute between the ayllus of Coroma (Department of Potos) and Quillacas (Department of Oruro), the n eed to solve efficacy issues with the elected local officials, and the need to resolve a number of labor issues.33 The breakdown of the imagined indige nous community of Bolivia is further demonstrated by Andean communities that are em erging with the goal of prying decision making power away from MAS at the m icro local level. According to the Latin American Regional Report, native Andean groups that once supported Morales and MAS, such as Confederacin Indgena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB) and the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), are currently at odds w ith the ruling party ove r unfulfilled promises. 32 Ayllus de Potos Macha Proponen para Dialogar, Los Tiempos, August 13, 2010, Actualidad. 33 Carta de Comit Cvico de Potosinista al Gobierno, El Potos, August 1, 2010. 77


Aside from Morales inability to follow through on campaign promises to native Andean communities, CIDOB and CONAMAQ are also disheartened by Morales attempt to deruralize MAS by supporting urban middle class candidates over nati ve Andean candidates from the rural regions. As a result of these inefficiencies, micro local native Andean political groups have been able to win local elections in municipalities that have tradit ionally been strongholds for Morales and MAS, such as Achacachi and Plan Tres Mil.34 These conflicts mark changes in the shape of the native Andean political sector as indi vidual groups feel left out from Morales policy making and seek better local representation. While these ayllus could work together to face th reats at a level larger than their internal differences, they continue to dispute among one another after that larger th reat is removed. This social structure is best described as a collapsible social system. This means that these individual ayllus will organize to whatever level is needed to so lve the most serious problem of the time period. Once that problem is removed, the social system collapses to deal with the less serious conflicts. In the past, these communities ha d organized at the highest level to deal with problems of a completely foreign nature, a Euro pean dominant class. Now that this dominant class has been removed, the social system will collapse to focus on the next level of problems. This is a topic that I will discuss to a mu ch further extent in the following chapter. Recently, issues, such as territory and na tional resource development, have replaced previous struggles to remove th e colonial, republican, and neoliber al regimes. The changes in the political perspective and organization of social groups in Bolivia raise im portant questions about where the study of indigenous politics should pr ogress next. How should indigenous politics, and other types of identity poli tics that focus on native Andean gr oups, adjust to properly capture the internal differentiation that exists among the individual communities? Traditionally, 34Indigenous Frustrations with Morales Laid Bare, Latin American Regional Report: Andean Group 08 (2010). 78


indigenous politics, peasant politics, and Andean/India n peasant politics study one marginalized group against a dominant other. One wa y to capture the internal differentiation that exists within these groups is to narrow the scope of study and focus on individual communities that exist within the previously singular peas ant, indigenous, or Andean/Indian peasant classes. While there are many possibilities to na rrowing the scope of study, one possibility is to analyze variables of political culture for the vari ous linguistic groups that are actively involved in national politics. 79


Figure 3-1. 1979 Bolivian pres idential election ballot Source: Ral Rivedeneira Prada, La Guerra de los Insultos: la Propaganda Poltica en Bolivia, 1979 (La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Difusin, 1980), 62. Figure 3-2. Close-up of the 1979 Bo livian presidentia l election ballot Source: Ral Rivedeneira Prada, La Guerra de los Insultos: la Propaganda Poltica en Bolivia, 1979 (La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Difusin, 1980), 62. 80


Figure 3-3. Evo Morales (far right) donning a traditional Unku and Chucu Source: Bolivia: Evo Morales vs. the Workers and Oppressed, The Internationalist, accessed on August 06, 2010, boliviamoralesvsworkers0709.html 81


Figure 3-4. View of the Ma llkus and flags of the 2002 presidential inauguration Source: Tiwanaku rindi honores al presidente electo Evo Morales, El Diario January 22, 2006, accessed August 06, 2010, 82


CHAPTER 5 INVESTIGATING INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE The 2009 presidential elections in Bolivia affi rmed significant changes in the ways that political groups deployed the disc ourse of indigeneity to consolidate national power. For this election, more than 50% of the re gistered candidates self identified as members of indigenous groups. The easy winner, Evo Morales, achieved victory by securing the votes of the mestizo and white sectors of the population. What is more, several candidates from the indigenous current narrowed their message to gain the support of specified Andean communities. This more selective approach differs from the discourse an d strategy of previous elections where candidates such as Morales and Quispe deployed indigeneit y to unite native communities into one or two blocks or movements. While the focus of th e 2009 candidates became more community-oriented, the 2009 elections also marked the removal from power of the traditiona l ruling parties of the Creole and Mestizo classes. The traditional poli tical powerhouses, such as the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MNR) and Accin Democrtico Nacionalista (AND), no longer hold seats in Congress or the Senate, as movement-based poli tics has come to rule the national scene and government. Furthermore, the 2009 municipal electio ns witnessed the emergence of local groups that managed to wrestle decision making power away from the ruling party (Movimiento Al Socialismo) in municipalities that had form erly supported Morales and MAS. This phenomenon marks the end perhaps of the long standing oppositio nal tactics that have tended to define the indigenous nation in the past vis--vis Western or Cr eole politics and society. Another key change is the Morales admini strations approach to natural resource development. Currently, political issues regarding natural reso urce development are creating inter-community debates and have prompted nati ve groups to organize along community rather than indigenous nationalist lines. This phenom enon is best represented in the debate over 83


Bolivias new lithium market. Lithium is used to power the batteries of a number of technology era toys, including iPods, cell phones, laptops, and electric cars. A recent boom in these markets means that new attention has been brought to countries that have ample lithium reserves. According to William Tahil, research director fo r Meridian International Research, 40.3% of the worlds lithium reserves (or 5.4 m illion tons) are located in Bolivia.1 On one hand, Bolivia can capitalize economically on the bene fits of lithium by exploiting its resources. On the other hand, improper lithium development programs can ha ve adverse effects on the delicate surrounding environments and the people that inhabit them.2 Once again, Bolivia is at the center of global natural resource attention and th e national debate over lithium exploitation is dividing native groups along community lines. The new Bolivian Constitution declares that a ll natural resources belong to the nation and that the industrialization of a ny natural resource must respect and protect the environment and the rights of local communities.3 Although many native groups want lithium development to be solely in the hands of the state, the Evo Morales government has proposed a mixed market approach that could attract much needed capital to fund lithium development. To keep Bolivian critics of foreign investors at bay, Morales is emphasizing the power of the new Constitution and claiming that any contract with a foreign invest or will include social welfare conditions. Under these conditions the contracted company will be required to dedicate an agreed upon sum annually to the development of social progr ams, such as the building of schools and 1 William Tahil, The Trouble with Lithium: Implications of Future PHEV Production for Lithium Demand (Meridian International Research, 2006), 2. 2 For a detailed examination of the effects of Lithium Mining see: Hollender, Rebecca and Jim Schultz. 2010. Bolivia and Its Lithium: Can the Gold of the 21st Century Help Lift a Nation Out of Poverty? Cochabamba, Bolivia: The Democracy Center. 3 Bolivian Constitution 2009: Chap. 3 Art. 319 Sect. 1. 84


infrastructure. Through these measures, the Morale s administration hopes to ensure that lithium mining will help to improve the conditi ons of life in local communities. However, many native groups are weary of thes e kinds of promises and negotiations with foreign firms. The manifestos of the 1970s, for example, expressed the sentiment that the movements already felt let down by governments th at promised social benefits in return for exploitation. This time around many communities appear to be less willing to fall into the same trap. According to Raquel Gutirrez of The Guardian the indigenous populat ions of Bolivias western areasappear to disagr ee with the policy. The social movements that brought Morales to power have mobilized over recent months ar ound the demands for local development. In the minds of many Bolivians, the most important thing is that local communities decide on the uses of resources in th eir own territory.4 In the past, natural resource issues would have been cited as another attempt by the oppressor Creole cl ass to exploit the i ndigenous population and consolidate its political intere sts. In his 2003 presidential sp eech, Evo Morales proclaimed: We know that there are two Bolivias; One Boliviawho always makes promises and signs agreements they never fulfill, and the other Bolivia which is always tricked, subjugated, humiliated, and exploi ted. I denounce before the Bolivian people that this is a cultural confrontation: the culture of death against us, the indigenous peoples.5 Today, the mobilization of inte rests is occurring along community lines that cannot be defined by the broad us versus them ethno-nationalis t categories of the old indigenist rhetoric. There are no longer two Bolivias. However, there may be at least two indigenous Bolivias that in turn are fragmented in a myriad of lo cal communities with distin ct political tendencies. 4 Raquel Gutirrez, A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1800-1952 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 5 Evo Morales, Bolivia, the Power of the People (Presented at the En Defensa de la Humanidad conference, Mexico City, Mexico, 2003). 85


Two Indigenous Bolivias? Jose Lucero acknowledges that one of the current weaknesses in much of the existing literature and contemporary discourse on Bolivian politics is the tendency to speak of the Indian movement as a unitary actor, overlooki ng its organizational and ideological diversity.6 This tendency is in part a consequence of the f act, noted by Postero, that while the historical hostility between individual groups was an ini tial obstacle to organizing, one central issue organized them: the need to defend a nd control their land from outsiders.7 The first major political push of Andean groups came during the sindicato land and labor reform implemented by the Bolivian state following the 1952 MNR Revolution. The underlying purpose of the sindicato project was to solve Bolivia s Indian problem by simply removing the Indian from the equation and making him into a national campesino with land. The movements that emerged at this time were organized by Aymara speaki ng leaders from highland communities who viewed the sindicato project as a threat to thei r identity. To counteract the project, these leaders began preaching an ethnic or ethno-nationalist agenda that recognized the political and social needs of Andean peoples.8 The first wave of Bolivian ethnic movements, the Kataristas and Indigenistas was spawned in the Aymara speaking district s of Pacajes and Aroma by Aymara university students. These districts were hotspots for m ovement growth because they had remained culturally strong and organized over time by resisti ng earlier transformative moves by the Bolivian government in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This is a much different history from 6 Jose Lucero, Arts of Unification: Political Representa tion and Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Ecuador (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2002), 8. 7 Postero 2007, 195. 8 Xavier Alb 1987; Postero 2007. 86


that of their Quechua speaking counterparts wh ose communities were, in contrast, weakened by the peasant transforma tion of the MNRistas.9 Notably, the leaders of the Kataristas promoted native rights under the more formal class organization of the Confederacin Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB, according to Deborah Van Cott, has been the largest organization in Bolivia uniting Andean peasant groups from all nine of the departments in Bolivia.10 The CSUTCB united the various groups by organizing the different ayllus of these communities into larger groups, called sub-centrals. The sub-centr als were then organize d into centrals, which were part of the largest section of the movement, the federation.11 Essentially, the organizational structure of the CSUTCB resembles a pyramid; with the base being formed by the ayllus and the apex representing the top officials of the movement. The CSUTCB structure is illustrated in Table 4-1. Through the use of a pyramid structure, the CSUTCB was able to shed the differences that set them apart as communities and channe l their demands to preach a primarily ethnic agenda under a national, class umbrella. It is for this reason that the Andean peasant communities of the CSUTCB were discussed as uniform indigenous and not as a union of Andean communities with varying attitudes and demands. While the CSUTCB formed in the highla nds of Bolivia, a second organization, the Confederacin Indgena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), assembled along explicit indigenous 9 Yashar 2005, 168. 10 Although the CSUTCB was technically c onsidered a peasant union, due to the sindicato project of the 1950s and 1960s, the term peasant typically identified highland Indian groups in Bolivia. Although the goals and political approaches of these first movements are important to the history of indigenous movements, they are not relevant to the focus of this section. What is relevant is that the agendas of these organizations were established, first, by Aymara intellectuals and that they were first formal organizations to outwardly seek political gains on the basis of being Indian. Van Cott 1994, 53. 11 Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America; the Evolution of Ethnic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 58. 87


lines in the lowlands. Forming in 1982, CIDOB firs t consolidated the interests of communities of Guaran, Ayoreo, Chiquitanos, and Guarayos. Si milar to their highla nd counterparts, CIDOB consolidated local ayllus into 34 sub-regional groups, which were then organized into 4 major regional organizations: the Centra l Indgena de la Regin Amoz nica de Bolivia (CIRABO), the Central de Pueblos Indgenas de Beni (CPIB), th e Consejo Yuqui, and the Coordinador tnico de Santa Cruz (CESC). Finally, these four organizations represented the major functioning parts of CIDOB.12 Much like the CSUTCB, CIDOB was able to shed the differences that set them apart as communities in order to establ ish a list of demands that best represented the movement as a whole. CIDOBs goals are to strengthen its re presentatives and to fight for the effective incorporation of indigenous groups in national political, economi c, and social decision making.13 In a recent study Mitchell Seligson uses surv ey data to study the differing political cultures among the standard demarcations of blanco, negro, indigena, mestizo, and cholo.14 Seligson provides data on the sub-categorie s that recognize partic ular native Andean communities, but he only goes so far as to provide basic demographic statistics, such as the percentage of individuals who identify with each group.15 This section raises questions about where indigenous politics is to advance next by using Seligsons Latin American Public Opinion Project (2006) survey da ta to identify differences in various indicators of political participation of Bolivias two most prominent linguistic groups, the Quechua and Aymara. Of 12 Van Cott 2005, 61. 13 Confederacin Indgena del Oriente Boliviano 2009, 14 Mitchell A. Seligson, La Cultura Poltica de la Democracia en Bolivia: 2000 (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad Catlica Boliviana, 2001); Mitchell A. Seligson, Auditora de la Democracia: Bolivia, 2002 (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad Catlica Boliviana, 2003). 15 Mitchell A. Seligson, Auditora de la Democracia: Bolivia, 2006 (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad Catlica Boliviana, 2006), 15. 88


the respondents that auto-iden tify as indigenous, 84.7% of them further identify as either Quechua or Aymara, with corresponding estimates of 2,298,980 and 1,549,320 in the total national population, respectively.16 Due to the low representation of Bolivias other linguistic groups within the survey, further research needs to be conducted to extend the results to the national level. In this section I utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression analyses to properly conduct statistical analyses on the political pa rticipation of Aymaraand Quechuaspeaking respondents. This statistical te st allows for the effects of Aymara and Quechua language affiliation on target dependent variables to be isolated as a number of controls are set. The controls that I will be using for the regression an alyses indicate other individual characteristics that may have an effect on concepts of political participation. The basic explanatory variables include: age, gender, urban/rural place of reside nce, and socio-economic status. Furthermore, I introduce a number of non-demogr aphic controls that also aff ect an individuals concept of political participation. First, e ducation is controlled for with the understanding that increased levels of education may affect the way that an individual thinks about politics. Second, individual interest in politics is used as an independent variable with the understanding that, the higher an individuals interest in politics the more likely they are to participate in politics. Third, crime victimization is used to account for the fact that individuals who have been a victim of a crime take significantly different approaches to politics than those who have not been victims.17 Fourth, religious regularity is controlled for w ith the understanding that religious affiliation and dedication may alter an individuals perception of politics. In total, the left side is as follows: 16 Van Cott 2005, 50. 17 Charles H. Wood, Alin M. Ceobanu, and Ludmila Ribeiro, Crime Victimization and Support for Democracy in Latin America, 2001-2006 (University of Florida, Unpublished manuscript, 2008). 89


age, gender, urban/rural place of residence, socio-economic status, educat ion, political interest, crime victimization, and religious regularity.18 The descriptive for thes e independent variables are listed in Table 4-2. The method of isolating respondents lingui stic background borrows from methods used in a 2004 study conducted by Xavier Alb and Victor Quispe. They construct a more complex method for determining an individuals affilia tion with native Andean communities. While studying trends in survey data they discovere d that community connection could be more accurately determined by combining survey questi ons regarding auto-identification with those regarding language affiliation. To do so, Alb and Quispe construct an index using four primary variables that reflect an individuals a ffiliation with native Andean communities: 1. Do you consider yourself part of a pueblo originario, if so, which? 2. What was the first language that you learned as a child? 3. Which language do you speak the most as of now? 4. Where were you born? The index, which they titled the ndice combinado etnicidad, ranges from 1 to 4 based on respondents answers to these questions.19 Aymara and Quechua language groups are proper ly isolated in this section by utilizing a number of variables that indi cate linguistic group affiliation. The LAPOP survey (2006) asks respondents 4 questions that determine comm unity affiliation and language use. These 4 questions are used to indirectly determine their appropriate linguistic background. First, they ask: Which of the following pueblos originarios do you consider yourself a member? This variable 18 While there are many ways to construct a socio-economic status variable, I use the index provided by LAPOP which uses levels of annual income as the primary indicat ors. The descriptive for the socio-economic status index are listed in Table 4-2. 19 Xavier Alb and Victor Quispe, Quines Son Indgenas en los Gobiernos Municipales (La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores, 2004), 61. 90


allows respondents to auto-identify as a num ber of native Andean communities, including Aymara and Quechua. Second, they ask: What is the first language that you spoke as a child? Third, they ask: Which language did you speak the most in your house as a child? These two questions get at the heart of th e respondents cultural background by figuring how deeply they are entrenched in the Aymara of Quechua language communities. Fourth, they ask: What was the language of the interview? This variable is a solid indicator of specific language affiliation because it determines which language the respondent is most comfortable speaking. Furthermore, if a respondent chooses to take the interview in Aymara or Quechua, their commitment to that specific community can be assumed to be high. For this analysis, I combine these 4 variables into an index that represents levels of Aymara and Quechua linguistic groups, or scale of linguistic affiliation. For each vari able, a positive answer is one that registers a respondent as either of the Aymara community or the Quechua community. Furthermore, 4 grades of language affiliation exist for each grou p; Aymara I/Quechua I for the respondents that answered positively for 1 variable, Aymara II/Quechua II for those who answered positively for 2 variables, Aymara III/Quechua III for those who answered positively for 3 variables, and Aymara IV/Quechua IV for those who an swered positively for all 4 variables. When we analyze Quechua and Aymara linguistic affiliation it is important to use indices as opposed to singular identifiers of ethnicity b ecause variables of simple auto-identification fall under significant scrutiny. This scrutiny focuses on two particular social phenomena. First, in some cases indigenous respondents will auto -identify as mestizo. Second, mestizo, or respondents that are not fully indigenous, will auto-identify as indigenous. In both cases, respondents use the vagueness of the ethnicity question to place themselves in other ethnic or community groups. The ability to change social categories in si ngle phrase enables respondents 91


to deal with social issues that are linked to th eir true identity, whether they are ashamed of their ethnicity or feel it to be to their advantage to be categorized under different identifiers. The indices constructed by Alb and Quis pe and used in this chapter at tempt to minimize the issues of auto-identification by searching for community attachments in a more indirect manner. While these indices are vital for iden tifying respondents of Quechua a nd Aymara language affiliation, it is troublesome to compare the e ffects of two indices on a depende nt variable th rough regression or other types of analyses. As a result, the ro le of the Quechua and Aymara indices in the regression analyses and the discussions that follow will indicate differences in the sign, significance, and size of the Quechua/Aymara coefficients and not exact quantitative variances. Before moving ahead, it is important to provide one caveat: moments of aggressive political action have existed and still exist for both Quechua a nd Aymara linguistic groups. For the Quechua, the hacienda occupations of th e early 1950s and the Water Wars of 2000 are good examples of their ability to use aggressive political tactics. For the Aymara, recent examples include the La Paz farmers un ion protests in 2000 and the Ga s Wars of 2003. In the discussion that follows it is not my intention to portray Qu echua groups as never using aggressive political tactics, but to provide data to support historical references that suggest that Aymara groups have adopted a more aggressive poli tical culture throughout the long duration of history. With this being said, the following analyses highlight key differences in the political cultures of Quechua and Aymara respondents. 92


Public Demonstration As one scholar has noted, the Quechua l ong enjoyed a reputation of being much more [politically] open and flexible than the hostile and recalcitrant highland Aymara.20 The largest rebellions of the 20th and early 21st centuries have been histor ically instigated by Aymara speaking groups, only later to be joined by the mo re reluctant Quechua groups. For example, in September of 2000, Aymara farmers unions we re able to organize and shut down ground transportation within the city of La Paz for roughly three we eks. Also, most famously, during the Gas Wars of 2003, Aymara groups wa ged violent conflict over the privatization of gas in La Paz.21 Even the most famous rebellions of the distant past have been organized by Aymara leaders whose names still ring loud among modern ethnic social movements. Both Tupak Katari, and later Pablo Zrate Willka, proclaimed their Ay mara roots as they led their rebellions in 1781 and 1898, respectively.22 Although these rebellions suggest that Aymara groups may organize protests more frequently than Quechua groups, is there an actual difference in their general populations measurable willingness to engage in acts of protest? The answer to this question can be found by analyzing the LAPOP survey data for Bolivia (2006). Within this surv ey, LAPOP provides a variable that asks how often respondents participate in public demonstrations. The results for the effects of Aymara and Quechua language affiliation on respondents frequency to participate in public demonstrations are illustrated in Table 4-3. Model 1 of Table 4-3 ill ustrates the effect of Aymara or Quechua language affiliation 20 William Carter, La comunidad Aymara: un mini-estado en conflicto, in Races de Amrica: el mundo Aymara, ed. Xavier Alb (Madrid: A lianza Editorial, 1988), 241. 21 Bret Gustafson, Paradoxes of Liberal Indigenism: Indigenous Movements, State Processes, and Intercultural Reform in Bolivia, in The Politics of Ethnicity: Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States ed. David Maybury Lewis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Un iversity Press, 2009), 284; 22 Jos Teijeiro, La rebelin permanente: Crisis de identidad y persistencia tnico-cultural aymara en Bolivia (La Paz: PIEB, 2007), 111 and 153. 93


independently on the frequency of public demonstr ation, while Models 2-9 illustrate this trend net of the set controls.23 As displayed in Table 4-3, the size of the coefficients suggest that being more strongly identified as Aymara (1.869) will have a greate r impact on an individuals willingness to participate in public demonstration than being more strongly identified as Quechua (0.235). Also, the variance indicated by Ay mara respondents is statistically significant at 0.005 or less (s.e.= 0.002). Afte r introducing the explanatory variables, Aymara and Quechua language affiliation explai ns 75.8% of the variance (R2) in the frequency of public demonstration. With these statistics in hand, we may ente rtain the hypothesis that Aymara respondents are more likely to engage in protest than Quechua respondents. While the aforementioned historical events indicate that public protests are more freque ntly organized by Aymara groups, these survey results indicate th is trend among the general populations of these groups. However, public protest is only one aspect of political cult ure that may in part explain the differences in these two indigenous groups. Support for Military Control of the Government The following section will analyze the will ingness of Quechua and Aymara groups to tolerate governments under certain circumstances. It examines the circumstances that may lead members of each language group to support a m ilitary takeover of the government. While military takeover has many faces, the variables used to test these data do not specify the exact nature of military control of the government. In th is case, more detailed research needs to be conducted on this subject. 23 This will be the trend with the regression analyses that follows. 94


Within the LAPOP survey of Bolivia ( 2006), respondents were asked a number of questions that pertained to th eir willingness to accept rule from inefficient governments. The questions are gauged in a way that present a number of circumstances to the respondent and asks whether or not they would support military takeov er of the government under each circumstance. If the Quechua and Aymara groups tolerance of governments does vary, this variable should indicate this variance. An index which illustrate s the aggregate variance of each circumstance is utilized to properly gauge the Quechua and Ayma ra trends regarding th eir support for military takeover of the government (Table 4-4). As disp layed in Table 4-5, the coefficients of the regression analysis suggest that being more strongly identified as Aymara (1.052) may be related to a lower tolerance for inefficient government s and a higher level of support of a military takeover than their Quechua counterparts (-0.008 ). Of the two language groups only Aymara linguistic affiliation is statistically significant (s.e.= 0.1). Fu rthermore, Aymara and Quechua language affiliation explai ns 90.3% of the variance (R2) in support for military takeover. It is also important to note that age and level of education have a st atistically significant impact on a respondents willingness to support a m ilitary takeover of the government. The results of the comparisons indicate th at there are significant differences in the perception of Quechua and Aymara speaking resp ondents in regards to military overthrow of inefficient governments. This comparison indica tes that, in general, Aymara groups show a higher tendency to reject their governments, in any case, than Quechua groups. Furthermore, when a government is viewed as inefficient, Ay mara groups may step outside of the democratic boundaries and physically replace the government. Although the previous test suggests that bei ng more strongly identified as Aymara may have a greater impact on what is judged to be an inefficient government, we still must indicate 95


whether or not they are less willing to recognize a government that they do not support. A second variable in the LAPOP survey for Bolivia (2006) gets to the heart of th is hypothesis by asking respondents whether or not they would support an elected official that had not received their support. On one hand, the size of the coefficient for this variable indicate that being more strongly identified as Aymara (-0.748) has a st atistically significant (s.e.= 0.039), negative impact on a respondents willingness to accept an unsupported elected official. On the other hand, the size of the coefficient for Quechua (-0.027) respondents is relatively small and statistically insignificant (s.e.= 0.937) .The results of this analysis are listed in Table 4-6. Also, a respondents level of interest in politics has a statistically signi ficant impact on their willingness to accept an unsupported elected official. This te st is significant b ecause it supports the hypothesis stating that Ayma ra groups are more likely to resist governments that are not viewed as legitimate in their eyes. Principles of Democracy While the previous two indicators of political cultures help to expl ain the differing roles of Quechua and Aymara speaking groups, a comp arative study of their perception of key principles of democracy can be used to provide insight into the future of democracy in Bolivia. The variables that are used to analyze principles of democracy derive fr om 5 of Robert Dahls vital political institutions fo r modern democracy. According to Dahl, these 5 political institutions (elected official s, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and inclus ive citizenship) are the first institutions that should be installed by democratic governments.24 Fortunately, the LAPOP survey for Bolivia (2006) 24 Robet Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 85. 96


provides variables that operationalize each of Dahl s 5 key principles of democracy. A full list of the key pillars of democracy and their operational definitions is listed in Table 4-7. Support of Elected Officials The first variable of analysis is the ins titution of supporting elected officials. According to Dahl, the institution of elected officials is vital to democracy because it allows for the demands of large scal e populations to be represented by an elected official that is trusted by their representative population base.25 In this vein, the institution of elected officials simplifies the decision making process by consolidating the intere sts of large populations into a set number of elected officials. For this study, the LAPOP survey provides a question that asks whether or not respondents would support an elected official that did not receive th eir vote. This variable works best as an operational definition of this partic ular principle of democracy because it expresses respondents trust in the represen tative system to express and achieve their personal demands. The results of the regression analysis for this variable have already been presented in the section regarding Military Takeover, but they are applicable to this principle as well. If we recall correctly, the coefficient for strength of Aymara identification has a statistically significant, negative impact on a respondents willingness to support an elected official that did not receive their vote while the coefficient for strength of Quechua identification is relatively small and statistically insignificant (Table 4-6). The results of this compar ison, coupled with voting trends from the 2005 election, point toward possible trends in the futu re for democracy in Bolivia. According to the LAPOP survey, in the 2005 pres idential election 84% of Aymara respondents voted for Evo Morales, with no other candidate receiving more than 8% of the Aymara vote. 25 Dahl 1998, 93. 97


Currently, President Morales, who claims to have both Aymara and Quechua roots, has a stronghold on the presidential seat. The fact that Morales is able to garner such a large percen tage of Aymara votes, as well as votes from native Andean populations in general, may present future opposition with some major obstacles. If Aymara language affiliation has a negative impact on a respondents decision to support an elected official th at did not receive their vote and the majority of Aymara voters support a native Andean candidate wi th Aymara roots, it is possibl e they would outwardly refuse to recognize the election of a candidate that is not of native Andean decent, or more specifically a non-Aymara candidate. Furthermore this concept is supported by the fact that, statistically, being more strongly identified as Aymara has a greater impact on a respondents willingness to support a military takeover of an inefficient government. Freedom of Expression The second variable of analys is is the instituti on of supporting the freedom of expression. According to Dahl, freedom of expression means that individuals are able to openly oppose the ruling government without the fear of punishment This definition primarily applies to the formulation of opposition groups.26 The freedom of expression is an important component of democracy because it permits citizens to participat e equally in the political game. Furthermore, it allows for the organization of opposition groups that help to check the legitimacy of the ruling party. The operational definition of this principle within the LAPOP survey consists of a variable that asks respondents whether or not they would support a law that prohibits the organization of opposition groups. This variable properly reflects th is principle because it estimates respondents 26 Dahl 1998, 97. 98


perception of opposition groups and their ability and right to democratically challenge the existing government. The coefficient of the regression analysis for respondents perception of freedom of expression, in Dahls sense, suggests that bei ng more strongly tied to the Aymara (0.783) will have a greater impact on a respondents wil lingness to support a law that prohibits the organization of opposition groups than being more strongly identified as Quechua (0.489). On a scale of 1-5, the difference in the coefficients for Quechua and Aymara language affiliation is relatively small. However, if we consider the fact that the coefficient for Quechua language affiliation is not statistically significant, the relati ve variance within this analysis increase (Table 4-8). Also, gender and crime victimization ha ve a statistically significant impact on this dependent variable. After general analysis of these data, it is clear that both Aymara and Quechua language affiliation have a negative impact on a respondents willingness to support a law that prohibits the organization of opposition groups than thos e who identify with neither language groups. These data go against the general hypothesis that states that Aymara language affiliation will be less democratic in their perception of key principles of democracy than Quechua respondents. Although Aymara and Quechua groups are generally on the side of the ruling party at the time of this survey, they had been on the side of the opposition groups prior to the 2006 victory of Morales and MAS. Since the emergence of the first ethnic political groups in the 1970s these communities had been active members of the opposition who were working to pry power out of the hands of the omnipotent political elite. Th rough their experience as opposition groups they understand the importance of these groups in influe ncing positive change in the political system. Furthermore, if we consider changes that are occurring in Bolivian pol itics today, Aymara and 99

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Quechua respondents may still consider themselv es as part of the opposition as they are attempting to restrict the overall power of th e ruling party (MAS). However, more current research needs to be conducted to properly support this statement. Alternative Forms of Information The third variable of analysis is the in stitution of permitting alternative forms of information. According to Dahl, alternative forms of information are defined as information and opinion that come from media sources that are not controlled by the ruling party.27 This principle is important to democracy as a form of gove rnance because it provides citizens access to alternative ideologies an d clears them of the feeling that their government is hiding them from something better. In the eyes of John Stuart Mill, the freedom of opinion and information has two possible consequences. First, if the opinion is correct, the government benefits by being provided guidelines to change their inefficien cies. Second, if the opinion is incorrect, the opinions of the ruling government are given gr eater legitimacy. The government can choose to either accept or deny outside opinions. However, according to Mill, denying these opinions is detrimental to true progress because few new pers pectives are able to work their way into the system.28 It is important for citizens to access altern ative forms of information if a government desires to continue to change in unison with their population. Without free flowing information, political concepts will become stale and ine fficient. The LAPOP survey allows for proper analysis of this principle by providing a variab le that asks respondents whether many points of view should exist or if only one should be corr ect. This variable will serve as the operational 27 Dahl 1998, 97. 28 Achal Mehra, Free Flow of Information: A New Paradigm (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 8. 100

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definition of this principle of democracy because it is the most appropria te variable to gauge respondents opinion of outside information. In this case, both linguistic group indices ar e significantly relate d to respondents perspective of alternativ e sources of information. However, the sign of the coefficient suggests that being strongly connected to the Aymara language community has a positive impact on a respondents decision to reject information from outside sources. This differs from the Quechua coefficient that indicates a negative correlati on. Also, the size of the coefficients for both linguistic group indices hints at the relative variance between Aymara language affiliation (1.535), Quechua language affiliation (-1.892), and th e dependent variable. Considering that the dependent variable is measured on a scale of 1-7, the range of the coefficients for the linguistic group indices appears to be signifi cantly and relatively large (3.427). These data are illustrated in Model 9 of Table 4-9. How relevant are these data for identifying trends in polit ical culture? According to LAPOP survey, the population distribution of Aymara respondents is consolidated in the department of La Paz with 78.5% of their total po pulation. This statistic di ffers greatly from the population distribution of Quechua respondents whose most densel y populated department is Cochabamba with only 36.7% of their population (Table 4-10). Furthermore, 50.1% of Aymara respondents reside in the munici palities of La Paz or El Alto while only the municipality of Cochabamba holds more than 10% of the Qu echua population (10.7%). These statistics are illustrated in Table 4-11. According to these statis tics, the physical consolidation of the Aymara populations hints toward a more exclusive flow of opinions. The condensed form of the Aymara populations makes it easier for thes e groups to refuse outside opini on as they can easily transmit information and opinions among themselves a nd develop and sustain a discourse on their 101

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communities and issues. As for the Quechua communities, the diverse spread of their populations illustrates their willingness to navigate the political culture of the ruling classes. Associational Autonomy The fourth variable of analysis is the institution of associ ational autonomy. This variable relates to individuals ri ght to form and seek membership in political parties and organizations. The institution of associational autonomy goes hand in hand with elected representatives. If a country is large enough to require elected representatives then it is inevitable that individuals with similar interests form politic al parties and organizations. Furthermore, as Dahl explains, political parties and organizations are also breeding grounds for civic education and enlightenment. Individuals are able to share ideas and interests a bout politics by participating in independent associations.29 This ultimately makes the institution of associat ional autonomy crucial to the development of a countrys pol itically active populat ion. The LAPOP survey properly analyzes Aymara and Quechua perceptions of this institution by providing two variables that operationalize associational autonomy. First, the LAPOP su rvey asks respondents whether they feel that political parties ar e necessary to represent the interest s of the people or if they feel that they are unnecessary in the po litical system. This variable leaves a little bit of room for interpretation. Although the question directly asks about political parties, the lack of additional options and further questioning, such as their opinion of civic groups a nd social movements, leads one to believe that political parties covers all types of recognized political groups. In this case, the institution of associational autonomy is supported by an answer in favor of political parties. The second question that will be used to analyze this principle reaches deeper into the opinions of the respondents. Here, the LAPOP surv ey asks respondents if they felt that their 29 Dahl 1998, 98. 102

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interests were best represented by political pa rties or by civic groups. While the previous question provides information about the party system as a whole, this question isolates the type of political group that the respondent feels is most legitimate. The coefficient for the first question, the im portance of political pa rties, suggests that being more strongly identified as Aymara (0.608) will have a greater im pact than being more strongly identified as Quechua (0.152). These data are displayed in Table 4-12. While both Aymara and Quechua language affiliation have a positive correlation with respondents view of political parties, only Aymara language affiliation is statistically significant (0.097). In this case, Aymara and Quechua language affiliation explains 76.2% of the total variance for this variable. Also, it is important to note that the Urban/Rural independent va riable is also statistically significant in this regression analysis. These da ta indicate that both language groups understand the importance of a party system in a represen tative democracy and s upport the continuation of this system. Throughout history, th ese groups have been able to achieve political success by utilizing political parties and or ganizations to build a solid polit ical base. During the 1980s and early 1990s, native Andean groups looked to the large scale political parties, such as the MNR and FRI, to give them legitimacy in the poli tical game. Although this question investigates whether or not these groups place importance in a party system, the following question analyzes which type of political group is best to represent their interests. The coefficient for the second question, prefer ence of political par ties or civic groups, reveals that being more strongly connected to the Quechua language community (-0.401) will have a greater impact on a respondents decision to support political pa rties over civic groups than being more strongly connected to the Ay mara language community (-0.071). In this case, the coefficients for the language community indice s reveal that being more strongly identified as 103

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Aymara is not statistically significant and relativ ely small, while being more strongly identified as Quechua is statistically significant (0.075) and relatively large. This suggests that Aymara respondents are not more willing to place their confidence in political parties more than civic groups. However, over the last 40 years Aymara po litical groups have op enly criticized nonindigenous political parties for not properly representing the in terests of the native Andean groups that they supposedly supported. The role of political parties in the last 40 years of Bolivian political history helps to explain these perceptions of po litical parties and civic groups. Historically, Bolivian political parties, such as the MNR, have played a major role in consolidating the interest s of a number of Andean groups and organizations in order to increase their support base.30 Recently, these traditional types of political parties are losing ground as more modern, leader oriented parties are becoming the norm; Morales MAS party is a good example. An example of the way in which this power is shifting is the fact that, in 2002, the MNR held 30% of the seats in th e National Congress, while MAS he ld 22% of the seats. As of the recent 2009 election, the MNR is non-existent in the Nationa l Congress, while MAS holds a majority (66%) of the seats.31 Furthermore, of the current polit ical parties represented in the Bolivian National Congress, only MAS held seats during the 2002 term and only MAS and Frente de Unidad Nacional (UN) held seats during the 2005 term. These modern political parties have become more of a one man show as politi cal parties are in a constant state of flux as political leaders emerge and subside in the po litical game. According to Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, major political parties must rema in stable and consistent with their views over 30 Alb 1987, 382. 31 These statistics were listed on the website for the National Congress of Bolivia at 104

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time in order for the party system to become institutionalized.32 Currently, in Bolivia, this does not seem to be the case as political party volatility is extremely high. The fact that Aymara language affiliation indicates no statistically significant preference for political parties corresponds with their opinions as expres sed in the Aymara-led ethnic movements of the 20th century. The Katarista Manifiesto de Tiahuanacu openly expressed dissatisfaction with political partie s, stating that no political party has ever represented the true interests or been inspired by the cultural values [o f the indigenous people]. Furthermore, in the introduction to the manifesto, the Kataristas express their understa nding that as we approach the pre-election peri od professional politicians will approach the [indigenous] once again to obtain their votes and again they will use fraud and make false promises.33 Although this document appears to express the desires of both Quechua and Ay mara speakers, it was drafted by Aymara intellectuals of the Puma Aymara Defense Un ion out of La Paz. Although the differing perspectives of political parties support historical trends, such as those of the Manifiesto de Tiahuanacu, what do they reveal about the future of democracy in Bolivia? If Aymara groups are less likely to have confidence in political parties, could there be an even greater increase in polit ical party volatility? For now, it seems that Morales MAS party has made its place in Bolivia, but will it remain so after Morales is out of office? Inclusive Citizenship The fifth variable of analysis is the instituti on of inclusive citizenship. According to Dahl, inclusive citizenship is defined as a democratic system that provides all adults permanently residing within a countrys borders with the same rights. This includes access to the previous 32 Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Skully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Un iversity Press, 1995), 3. 33 Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 169-177. 105

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four democratic institutions and, among others, the right to particip ate in free, fair and frequent elections and the right to run for political office.34 It is commonly understood that inclusive citizenship helps to deepen democracy because it en courages all citizens to involve themselves in the political game and also provide s them with the feeling that th ey are receiving the same basic benefits from their government as every other citizen. In regards to this specific study, the amount of importance that an individual places on inclusive citizenship symbolizes the how inclusive they believe their government should be. In other words, who should be protected under the current system? On one hand, we could hypothesize that both Aymara and Quechua groups would be more likely to support inclusive citizenship be cause of their long hi stories with fighting exclusion from politics. Also, it has been the resu lt of the movement to extend voting rights to all citizens under the Ley de Participacin Popular (LPP) that has provided native Andean groups the voter bases to achieve success. On the other hand, we could utilize previous data to hypothesize that Aymara groups may be less in favor of inclusive citizenship because of their unwillingness to accept rule from outside groups. This characteristic indicates that Aymara groups are more exclusionary in their policies toward outside groups In this vein, it may be so that they are also exclusionary in their vi ew of non-indigenous, or non-Aymara citizens. Furthermore, we could also hypothesize that Quechua groups would be more in favor of inclusive citizenship because of their willingness to accept outside rule and also their history of assimilating to the ruling class. These characterist ics indicate that Quechua groups would also be more inclusionary in their vi ew of non-indigenous, or nonQuechua, citizens. Unfortunately, LAPOPs survey for Bolivia (2006) lacks the proper variables to operationalize this principle of 34 Dahl 1998, 99. 106

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democracy. Here, there is a dearth of information on this subject for Aymara and Quechua speaking groups, and more resear ch needs to be conducted. Summary These survey data point to important diffe rences between Aymara and Quechua speakers in Bolivia. For many Bolivians, these differences in Quechua and Aymara political culture are well known by the general population. In a personal conversation with Dr Martn Mendoza, a Bolivian born political scientist, he could not help but smile wh en I presented him with these data. His humor towards my work stems from th e fact that I had compiled all these complex formulas to come up with information that is well-known to any cab driver in La Paz.35 This colloquial knowledge and sentim ent suggests that the unitary discourse of indigenous nationalism is widely suspect in Bolivia. While these data indicate possi ble differences in the political cultures of Quechua and Aymara linguis tic groups, they do not necessarily mean that, popular beliefs notwithstanding, ther e are not two indigenous Bolivias. Nevertheless, the survey data raise more questions about the internal differentiation of the na tional indigenous and peasant identities of the past. 35 Martn Mendoza, interview by author (October 29, 2010). 107

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Sub-Centrals Ayllus Centrals CSUT CB Officials Table 4-1. Confederacin Sindica l nica de Trabajado r es Cam p esinos de Bolivia pyram id structure 108

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Table 4-2. Descriptive statisti cs of independent variables Variable N Range Mean % Standard Deviation Quechua (index)1 242 0-4 2.13 0.69 Quechua Language Group 582 Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)2 37.46 0.48 Quechua as a Mother Tongue 583 Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)2 27.43 0.45 Quechua as Most Frequently Spoken Language 579 Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)2 20.69 40.66 Quechua as the Interview Language 583 Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)2 3.27 0.18 Aymara (index)1 266 0-4 1.99 0.58 Aymara Language Group 582 Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)2 43.78 0.50 Aymara as a Mother Tongue 583 Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)2 28.01 0.45 Aymara as Most Frequently Spoken Language 579 Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)2 19.27 0.39 Aymara as the Interview Language 583 Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)2 1.17 0.11 Age (in years) 583 18-80 38.27 16.16 Gender 583 Dummy Variable (male=ref)2 53.45 0.50 Urban/Rural 583 Dummy Variable (rural=ref)2 51.49 0.50 Education (in years) 583 0-24* 7.53 5.27 Interest in Politics 571 1-4** 2.00 0.93 Crime Victimization 576 Dummy Variable (no=ref) 15.27 0.36 Religious Regularity (days of worship per month) 532 0-31 2.65 2.61 Socio-Economic Status (annual income in Bolivianos) 473 0-8*** 2.63 1.18 Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Bolivia 2006 1 For the Variables within the Quechua/Aymara Language Indices; 0= ref; 1= an answer in favor of the corresponding language affiliation 2Ref= reference category; coded as 0 *0=no education; 1-5= basic; 6-8= intermediate; 9-12=medium; 13-18=college; 18-24= post graduate **1=none; 2= a little; 3=some; 4= a lot ***0=no income; 1= less than 250; 2=between 251-500;3= between 501-1000; 4=between 1001-2000; 5=between 2001-5000; 6= between 5001-10,000; 7= 10,001-20,000; 8= more than 20,000 109

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Table 4-3. Public demonstration (OLS regression coefficient) Independent Variables M1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 Constant 0.353 0.375 -0.435 -0.720 -2.354 -3.482** -3.627** -4.290** -3.812** Quechua 0.224 0.224 0.315 0.290 0.456 0.333 0.346 0.283 0.235 Aymara 0.887* 0.885* 1.092** 1.072** 1.272** 1.723*** 1.778*** 1.855*** 1.869*** Age 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.021 Gender 0.723* 0.738* 0.761** 0.884** 0.911** 1.067** 0.950** Urban/Rural 0.395 0.524 1.127** 1.106** 1.446** 2.021** Education 0.068* 0.11 0.011 0.024 0.108 Interest in Politics 0.375* 0.396* 0.446 0.277 Crime Victimization -0.681 -0.834 -1.204 Religious Regularity 0.045 0.068 Socio-Economic Status -0.465 R2 0.128 0.128 0.257 0.288 0.384 0.717 0.725 0.726 0.758 N= 592 Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006. *Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less **Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less *** Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less Table 4-4. Individual variables for support fo r military control Variable Question JC1 If faced with high rates of unemployment JC10 If faced with high crime rates JC13 If faced with high rates of corruption JC11 If faced with high ra tes of social disorder JC7 If parties of the extreme le ft win the presidential election JC8 If parties of the extreme ri ght win the presidential election JC17 If transnational corporations take advantage of the country Cronbachs Alpha: 0.853 110

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Table 4-5. Support for military cont rol (OLS regression coefficient) Independent Variables M1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 Constant -0.959 2.087 1.162 0.190 6.618** 5.172** 5.172** 7.441* 7.217** Quechua 1.683* 1.276 1.304 1.134 1.064* 1.127** 1.127** -0.026 -0.008 Aymara 1.556 1.250 1.673 1.863* 1.352* 1.010 1.010 1.028 1.052* Age -0.54** -0.057** -0.055** -0.107*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.108*** -0.109*** Gender 0.950 1.270 0.901 0.690 0.690 1.372** 1.467* Urban/Rural 0.908 -0.343 0.111 0.111 0.416 -0.230 Education -0.263*** -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.283*** -0.316** Interest in Politics 0.579* 0.579* 0.355 0.403 Crime Victimization 0.00 0.00 0.00 Religious Regularity -0.463* -0.488 Socio-Economic Status 0.180 R2 0.179 0.374 0.429 0.458 0.809 0.849 0.849 0.902 0.903 N= 592 Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006. *Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less **Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less *** Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less Table 4-6. Acceptance of an unsupported pr esident (OLS regression coefficient) Independent Variables M1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 Constant 3.868*** 3.341*** 3.258*** 3.000*** 2.161** 1.948** 2.005** 2.376*** 2.924*** Quechua -0.107 -0.165 -0.145 -0.176 0.006 0.159 0.220 0.036 -0.027 Aymara -0.606** -0.661** -0.649** -0.608** -0.584** -0.659** -0.597* -0.651** -0.748** Age -0.018** -0.018** 0.018** 0.022** 0.019** 0.015* 0.015* 0.012 Gender 0.078 0.060 -0.023 -0.068 0.034 0.051 -0.002 Urban/Rural 0.373 0.383 0.309 0.258 0.297 0.222 Education 0.049* 0.027 0.011 0.001 -0.001 Interest in Politics 0.270** 0.268** 0.285** 0.309** Crime Victimization 0.600* 0.757** 0.682* Religious Regularity -0.072 -0.084 Socio-Economic Status -0.053 R2 0.046 0.111 0.112 0.134 0.174 0.171 0.201 0.223 0.198 N= 592 Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006. *Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less **Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less *** Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less 111

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Table 4-7. Dahl's key political institu tions and their operational definitions Democratic Principle Operational Definition Elected Officials Importance that an official takes office even though you did not vote for them Freedom of Expression Would you support a law that prohibits the organization of the opposition? Alternative Sources of Information Although Many Opinions Exist, Only one is Probably Correct Associational Autonomy Are we better with or without a party system? Would you rather support a political party of a civic group? Inclusive Citizenship Only People With an Education should Vote Source: Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); 85. Table 4-8. Support of freedom of associatio n/assembly (OLS regression coefficient) Independent Variables M1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 Constant 3.425*** 3.214** 2.460** 2.550** 4.028** 4.071** 3.352** 3.938** 3.591** Quechua 0.469 0.483 0.539 0.560 0.442 0.298 0.368 0.454 0.489 Aymara 0.259 0.290 0.479 0.478 0.300 0.603 0.879* 0.793* 0.783* Age 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 Gender 0.958** 0.945** 0.322** 1.172** 1.302*** 1.064** 1.148** Urban/Rural -0.140 0.381 -0.171 -0.282 -0.392 -0.809 Education 0.034* -0.055 -0.054 -0.040 -0.100 Interest in Politics -0 .186 -0.078 -0 .250 -0.127 Crime Victimization -3.433** -2.746** -2.477* Religious Regularity -0.109 -0.126 Socio-Economic Status 0.337 R2 0.048 0.053 0.325 0.330 0.434 0.458 0.686 0.719 0.741 N= 592 Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006. *Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less **Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less *** Statistical Signifi cance of 0.005 or less 112

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Table 4-9. Support of outside points of view (OLS regression coefficient) Independent Variables M1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 Constant 2.295 3.393* 3.148* 4.242** 5.700** 4.183* 4.474* 5.275* 5.490 Quechua 1.915** 1.790** 1.525** 1.904** 2.069** 1.780** 1.817** 1.743** 1.892* Aymara -0.399 -0.556 -0.368 -0.698 -0.818 -1.484** -1.558* -1.564* -1.535* Age -0.019 -0.023 -0.026* -0.038* -0.024 -0.026 -0.029 -0.033 Gender 0.810 0.377 0.137 0.222 0.138 0.072 0.065 Urban/Rural -1.142* -1.463* -0.870 -0.889 -0.957 -1.502 Education -0.066 -0.067 -0.071 -0.078 -0.155 Interest in Politics 0.741* 0.698* 0.569 0.570 Crime Victimization 0.814 1.363 1.972 Religious Regularity -0.114 -0.182 Socio-Economic Status 0.348 R2 0.459 0.515 0.574 0.677 0.705 0.801 0.808 0.814 0.818 N= 592 Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006. *Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less **Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less *** Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less Table 4-10. Population distribution by department by linguistic affiliation 90 Tarija Pando Potosi Chuquisaca Oruro Cochabamba Santa Cruz La Paz 80 70 60 50 Quechua A ymara 40 Percentage30 20 10 0 Beni Department113

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Table 4-11. Population dist ribution by municipality by linguistic affiliation A iquile Tomave 30 25 20 05 1 0 15 Tacopaya Vacas Potosi Sucre Oruro Quillacollo A ymara Quechua CochabambaMunicipality Monetro La Paz Coro Coro Santa Cruz El Alto Quime Viacha Puerto Carabuco 35 Percentage Table 4-12. Legitimate party system (OLS regression coefficient) Independent Variables M1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 Constant -0.422 -0.746 -0.610 -0.536 -0.106 -0.146 -0.374 0.997 -0.761 Quechua 0.168 0.166 0.156 0.168 0.143 0.153 0.170 0.122 0.152 Aymara 0.580** 0.657** 0.630** 0.622* 0.564* 0.507 0.646 0.668* 0.608* Age 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 Gender -0.151 -0.155 -0.175 -0.204 -0.147 -0.296 -0.266 Urban/Rural -0.075 -0.132 -0.138 -0.184 -0.755** 0.973** Education -0.016 -0.011 -0.010 -0.031 -0.067 Interest in Politics 0.001 0.012 -0 .155 -0.057 Crime Victimization -1.036 -0.640 0.473 Religious Regularity -0.143 -0.145 Socio-Economic Status 0.199 R2 0.176 0.212 0.234 0.238 0.260 0.228 0.299 0.740 0.762 N= 592 Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006. *Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less **Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less *** Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less 114

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115 Table 4-13. Support of Political Par ties (OLS Regression Coefficient) Independent Variables M1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 Constant 1.213* 1.156* 1.143* 1.212* 1.195* 1.279* 1.319* 1.471* 1.464* Quechua -0.292 -0.299 -0.298 -0.281 -0.277 -0.291 -0.277 -0.384* -0.401* Aymara -0.026 -0.036 -0.033 -0.052 -0.052 -0.008 0.007 -0.018 -0.071 Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 Gender 0.018 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.035 0.059 0.094 Urban/Rural -0.089 -0.089 -0.095 -0.114 -0.102 -0.021 Education 0.001 0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.006 Interest in Politics -0 .068 -0.074 -0 .061 -0.058 Crime Victimization 0.131 0.188 0.155 Religious Regularity -0.027 -0.028 Socio-Economic Status -0.044 R2 0.085 0.093 0.093 0.103 0.104 0.123 0.135 0.184 0.186 N= 592 Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006. *Statistical Significance of 0.01 or less **Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less *** Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less

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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS This study has traced trends in the recent sc holarship on the politics of subaltern groups in the Andean region, and more specifically Boli via. Following Stern a nd Starn, I have argued against essentializi ng notions such as parochial actors and indigenous politics and advocated instead a return to studies of political culture. The recent scholar ship on indigenous politics in Bolivia has followed both larger trends in scholarsh ip and local political factors. I argue that this scholarship and the politics it represents amounts to an Andean variant of cultural nationalism. Over the last 40 years or so, Andean politic al groups in Bolivia have constructed an indigenous political community by circulating a nationalist disc ourse that imagines diverse communities as a unified cultural nation in a pol itical battle against non-indigenous Creole exploiters. Ultimately, the growth of the indige nous ethnic movement played a significant role in influencing scholars to conduct studies of cultural or identity politics. When this period of Andean nationalist politics passes differing methods will emerge. The evidence that previous generations of scholarship have diversified to better suit ever changing intellectual and political factors makes it clear that the current scholarsh ip will continue to diversify once Bolivias indigenous nationalist period has passed. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, where I hi storicized national indigenous politics in Bolivia since 1970, the manifestos of the Partido Indio de Bolivia (PIB), the Kataristas and the Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) indicate a shift in political factors as these groups used nationalist discourse to construct an indigenous political community. They accomplished this by unifying diverse Andean communities as a cultural we, rewriting histories to support nationalist not ions, and using the idea of an Andean utopia as a mechanism to insert their cultura l identity into the public sphere. Through this 116

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process, these groups were able to establish a cultural nation and ultim ately introduce political arguments that were presented as demands to preserve the indigenous nation. During the period from 1970-1993 national indigenous identity was in the early stages of construction and the electoral success of the cultural movement in Bolivia was limited. Although indigenous political can didates appear on the nationa l electoral ballots in 1979, 1980, 1985, and 1989 these candidates never received more than 3% of the national vote combined. While the electoral success of the cultural movements was limited, the influence of indigenous cultural identity is evident in the scholarship on Bolivian peasant politics during this period. Throughout the 1980s schol ars such as Iriarte, Platt, Rasnake, Larson, and Stern (to name a few) worked to re-conceptualize the role of the peasant in Bolivian political society. Ultimately, these studies stepped away from the parochial reactor theory and examined peasants by mixing class and cultural studies and discussing how Andean groups worked within the Bolivian political system. No longe r were peasant and indigenous groups reactionary. This study recognizes the arguments of Stern (1987) and Starn (1991) as being key indicators of this academic shift toward th e cultural analysis of peasant politics. The political success of the nationalist indig enous movement grew significantly after Victor-Hugo Crdenas was nominated as Vice Pr esident in the 1993 natio nal elections. In the elections that followed the political success of candidates from the nationalist indigenous movements grew substantially. This trend is indicated by followi ng the presidential campaigns of Evo Morales, who received 20.94% of the na tional vote in 2002, 53.74% in 2005, and 64.22% in 2009. During the period between 1993 and 2009 the nationalist indigenous movement had open access to the national spotlight Through the public sphere they were able to reshape the public image of the indigenous nation by flaunting their newly re vived cultural heritage during 117

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public ceremonies, such as political inaugura tions. These politics of public performance are analyzed by anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie, who demonstrates that they function as a postcolonial public arena for building Bolivian national identity.1 Shifts in the academic approaches to studyi ng the politics of subaltern groups in the Andean region are related to shifts in politic al discourse. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the scholarly shift towards an ethnic identity politic s perspective in the early 1990s was influenced by a the transition to democratic rule in Latin Amer ica, the fall of the Soviet Bloc, the proximity of the quincentennial of the Span ish conquest, and the growth of the political participation of self-identified indigeno us groups. Within Bolivian politics, nationalist indigenous discourse helped to increase the political participat ion of Bolivias indigenous groups. For the scholarship of this region, studi es of indigenous politics focuse d on characterizing the political participation of the growing i ndigenous cultural identity. However, recent shifts in the Bolivian political system have indicated changes in the effectiveness of indigeneity as a political tool. First, for the 2009 presidential elections Evo Morales secured his victory by capturing the votes of the mestizo and white sectors of the population. This differed from the approaches of the indigenous candida tes in the elections between 1979 and 2005 who gained an advantage by using indigeneity-as described in Chapter 4to capture the votes of th e indigenous political communit y. Morales change in methods indicates that he found it to be to his advantage to obtain suppor t from sectors of the population that were traditionally non-indigenous. Sec ond, the overwhelming percentage of indigenous presidential candidates on the 2009 ballot reduced the effectiven ess of nationalist indigenous discourse. For these elections pr esidential candidates narrowed thei r message to gain the support of specified Andean communities. Third, the resu lts of the 2009 presidential elections marked 1 Abercrombie 2003, 176. 118

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the removal of the traditional ruling parties of the Creole and mestizo classes (Accin Democrtico Nacionalista and Movimiento Naciona l Revolucionario). This shift in political power also symbolizes the removal the common colonial, Republican, and neoliberal enemy of the nationalist indigenous movements that tied the diverse Andean communities together, as discussed in Chapter 4. Fourth, the results of the 2009 municipal el ections revealed the emergence of micro-level politics as community based leaders now atte mpt to wrench power out of the hands of Morales and Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) at the municipal level. This trend steps away from the us versus them ethno-nationalist rhetoric and focuses more on individual differences that exis t within the indigenous nation at the community level. While recent studies of indigenous politics have played on nationalis t characteristics, I suggest that these changi ng factors in the Bolivian political system indicate an academic shift away from essentializing notions like indigenou s politics and back towards political culture studies. In this case, the political cu lture approach falls in line with the historical/anthropological defini tion of political culture that focuses on various interactions with power structures and how th ey shape an individuals or a groups approach to politics. Political culture from this perspective moves aw ay from political science approaches that have characterized political practice to be ingrained in an individual s identity and towards a more open approach that recognizes th e changing nature and complexity of political participation. The analyses conducted in Chapter 5 illuminate the importance of re turning to political culture studies by pointing to important di fferences that exist between two linguistic communities: Quechua and Aymara speakers in Bolivia. From the historical/anthropological perspective of political culture we can attribute variances in each groups approach to politics to a number of variables, includ ing differing relationships with power structures over time. The 119

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effects of these differing variables are recognized in the analyses that indicate notable differences in the political tendencies of Quechua and Aymara linguistic groups. Aymara respondents willingness to participate in public protest a nd support a military takeover of an inefficient government suggests that the Aymara linguisti c community may have a more aggressive approach to political participation than does the Quechua linguistic community. Also, Aymara respondents are more likely to disregard Dahls principles of de mocracy, which suggests that the Aymara linguistic community may be less recepti ve to non-Aymara candidates, information, and discourse than the Quechua linguistic community. This study has attempted to contribute to the subfield of Andean Studies within the field of Latin American Studies by approaching i ndigenous politics as a form of cultural nationalism.. As was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, since 1970 ethnic movements such as the PIB, the Kataristas, and the CSUTCB managed to construct an indigenous political community out of diverse Andean communities. Although their political success was limited in the 1970s and 1980s, they were able to reshape the political game and enable future candidates to use the discourse of indigeneity as a tool to achieve el ectoral success. What is more, they were able to reshape the public image of the Indi an in Bolivian politics from a group that was isolated and reactionary to a group that is influential and po litically active. By 2006, they achieved their greatest success as Evo Morales and MAS won the presid ential election only to later gain majority control of the national decision making power in 2010. Currently, the emergence of micro level politics symbolizes th e breakdown of the national pyramid structure of the ethnic movements. This trajectory of emergence, political vict ory, and breakdown may represent a full cycle for the indigenous social movement as a nationalist phenomenon. The Bolivian case of indigenous nationalism is th e first case where the indigenous political 120

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movement democratically earned majority contro l of their respective gove rnment in the Andean Region. The Bolivian case also provides us with a first glimpse of what exists after an indigenous movement completes their year struggle in Latin Amer ica. For these reasons, it is important to study this social movement cycle to better understand the varieties of Latin American nationalism and their relative efficacy as a cultural instrument in el ectoral politics. Lastly, the discussion in Chap ter 5 points to another intrigui ng social question that exists at a level deeper than indigenous national identity in Bolivia. Is it possi ble that there are two indigenous Bolivias? On the level of popular discourse it certainly seems so. Although the tests indicate possible differences in the political culture of Quechua and Aymara linguistic communities, these do not necessarily mean that there are two indigenous Bolivias. It appears that Aymara speaking respondents are more likel y to resist rule from outside groups and Quechua speaking respondents are more likely to acquiesce and assimilate to the culture of the ruling class. However, it is also possible that a particular pol itical culture exists beyond the linguistic or textual community. It would be important to analyze, for example, the content of political discourse in the two languages. Over time, experiences with colonial, republican, and neoliberal policies could have formed two poles of the same political culture within Andean communities. One polar tendency is resistant and hostile to policy coming from outside of their immediate social group and more likely to succu mb to nationalist discourse. The other polar tendency is more acquiescent a nd willing to accept policy coming from groups outside of their social group. These polar tendenc ies were noted by Stern in 1987.2 Nevertheless, if we acknowledge the critiques of Stern and Starn, we must also understa nd that it is likely that the political cultures of native Andean communities ar e more complex than a simple dichotomy of resistance versus accommodation. In this rega rd, the various Andean communities could occupy 2 Stern 1987, 10. 121

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the complete range of political practices. For this reason, it is important to continue these studies of political practices and culture as a means to obtain a more satisfying set of examples. This project provides one avenue for conduc ting this research and opens the door to future projects within the fiel d of Andean studies. However, it is important to conduct more detailed studies of the political cultures of Andean communities in Bolivia by reaching beyond Quechua and Aymara linguistic communities. Will more complex studies reveal trends towards the poles defined by the Quechua and Aymara res pondents in our sample? For now, this project provides insight into this questi on by analyzing the political cu ltures of Bolivias two largest linguistic communities. But, most importantly, this project points to changes that are occurring within the politics of indigenous nationalism and urges for a sh ift back towards studies of political cultures. 122

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APPENDIX DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Variable Code Name1 N Range Mean % Standard Deviatio n Public Demonstration Prot1 583 1-3* 1.77 0.92 Support for Military Control (index) MilCon 460 0-7 2.19 2.28 High rates of unemployment JC1 523 Dummy variable (no=ref)2 27.06 0.44 High crime rates JC10 523 Dummy variable (no=ref)2 41.33 0.49 High rates of corruption JC13 525 Dummy variable (no=ref)2 44.24 0.50 High rates of social disorder JC11 511 Dummy variable (no=ref)2 43.07 0.50 Parties of the extreme left win the presidential election JC7 496 Dummy variable (no=ref)2 14.56 0.35 Parties of the extreme right win the presidential election JC8 491 Dummy variable (no=ref)2 13.34 0.34 Transnational corporations take advantage of the country JC17 516 Dummy variable (no=ref)2 44.12 0.50 Support of Elected Officials Leg1 533 1-4** 3.06 1.02 Support of Freedom of Association/Assembly D33 514 1-5*** 3.76 1.15 Support of Alternative Forms of Information Dog1 465 1-3**** 1.87 0.86 Support of a Legitimate Party System JC20 535 Dummy variable (without parties=ref)2 57.39 0.49 Support of Political Parties BOLVB8 568 Dummy Variable (political parties=ref)2 47.20 0.49 Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Bolivia 2006 1 The code name provided for each variable within the LAPOP data set for Bolivia 2006. 2 ref= reference category; labeled as 0 *1=never; 2=rarely; 3=often **1=not important; 2=a little important; 3=important; 4=very important ***This variable is coded as a scale with 1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree ****1= strongly agree; 2=indifferent; 3=strongly disagree 123

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132 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Aaron Gabriel Victoria was born in Jeannette, Pennsylvania to his mother, Elaine Holas. Growing up in Adamsburg, Pennsylvania, he graduated from Hempfield Area Senior High School in 2002. As an undergraduate student, he attended Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP) where he graduated Phi Alpha Theta and ma gna cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts in history and minor concentrations in Latin American studie s and economics. While attending IUP, he was introduced to the field of Latin Am erican Studies and was drawn to the complexity of its histories. He decided to pursue a Master of Arts in Latin American studies with a thematic concentration in Andean Studies. During his time as a graduate stude nt, he worked as a Distance Volunteer for the Democracy Center where he he lped conduct research fo r their special report on Bolivia and Its Lithium: Can the Gold of the 21st Century Help Lift a Nation Out of Poverty, written by Rebecca Hollender and Jim Schultz. He hopes to pursue a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology as well as a career in academia.