Citation
Rebeginnings

Material Information

Title:
Rebeginnings Agricultural Intervention and the Crafting of State and Status in Eastern Madagascar
Creator:
Kiel,Michelle Lea
Place of Publication:
[Gainesville, Fla.]
Florida
Publisher:
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Language:
english
Physical Description:
1 online resource (447 p.)

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Doctorate ( Ph.D.)
Degree Grantor:
University of Florida
Degree Disciplines:
Anthropology
Committee Chair:
Chalfin, Brenda H
Committee Members:
Stoilkova, Maria Milkova
Emihovich, Catherine A
Goldman, Abraham C
Graduation Date:
8/6/2011

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Agricultural development ( jstor )
Agricultural land ( jstor )
Agriculture ( jstor )
Canals ( jstor )
Collaboration ( jstor )
College students ( jstor )
Farmers ( jstor )
Peasant class ( jstor )
Political power ( jstor )
Villages ( jstor )
Anthropology -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
agriculture -- anthropology -- development -- madagascar -- politics
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
Anthropology thesis, Ph.D.

Notes

Abstract:
"Development," as the improvement of the quality of individual lives, has been a mainstay of international relations since at least the post WWII era. While material improvements have taken place in key areas, "development" remains elusive for much of the world?s population. Rural farming, a main vector of "development" intervention, is one of the least satisfactory performers in improving the standard of living in rural communities. Avoiding the question of why development fails and how it might be fixed, this project asks how development interventions continue in the face of failure. Based on fieldwork among two agricultural development projects that target rural populations in Madagascar, I suggest that development remains salient despite its failures through a process of rebeginning that 1) offers bureaucrats, administrators, technicians, and farmers the chance to transform their lives, even if not in the way intended, and 2) offers a way for projects to obscure project missteps and failures, transforming them into rationalizations for further development intervention, or erasing them altogether. ( en )
General Note:
In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note:
Includes vita.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description:
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description:
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2011.
Local:
Adviser: Chalfin, Brenda H.
Electronic Access:
RESTRICTED TO UF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE UNTIL 2013-08-31
Statement of Responsibility:
by Michelle Lea Kiel.

Record Information

Source Institution:
UFRGP
Rights Management:
Copyright Kiel,Michelle Lea. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Embargo Date:
8/31/2013
Classification:
LD1780 2011 ( lcc )

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1 REBEGINNINGS: AGRICULTURAL INTERVENTION AND THE CRAFTING OF ST ATE AND S TATUS IN EASTERN MADAGASCAR By MICHELLE LEA KIEL A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2011

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2 2011 Michelle Lea Kiel

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3 To my g randfather

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4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research would not have been possible without a Dissertation Improvement Grant fro m the Wenner Gren Foundation and the support of an Alumni Fellowship from the University of Florida. I owe a debt of gratitude to all those individuals in Madagascar that participated in my research, allowing me access to their daily lives and their organizati ons. I must thank in particular the families of students at the Campus Ambanivohitra in Ilaka Est, Niarovana Caroline, and Ranomafana Est and the villagers of Andakolosy. This work would not have been possible without the support of a number of government of reality in their communities. While my treatment of organizations in Atsinanana is critical, I have no doubts in the beliefs and aspiration of administrators and bureaucrats to see th e island improve. I hope that my critiques help open up discussions of the trajectories this improvement might take. I also want to thank my research assistants, who suffered through my fumbling and, I think, grew with me through the research process. I look forward to working together again. The development community at large offered a great deal of support, particularly as we began to grapple with the 2009 political cri sis that forced many project and plans into hiatus. The stress and cabin fever wo uld have been unbearable but for the company and discussion of friends like An Bollen, Abel Tely, Fabiana Ilescas, and too many others to name. T his work would not have been possible without the patience encouragement and intellectual guidance of my chair, Brenda Chalfin, who has continuously support ed me in a process of story telling that has been uncomfortable as all dissertations

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5 should be and at times, painful. Her keen understandings of power have been an inspiration and a useful benchm ark to my understandings of what development means and what it does in Madagascar. A dditionally the guidance of my committee members has been central. Thanks are due to : Catherine Emihovich, who urged me to attend to the advocacy roles that anthropologi sts encounter in the field ; Abe Goldman, who encouraged me to focus on the farmers ; and Maria Stoilk ova, who reminded me to begin on the ground with the individuals within the study, and work up from there. Finally, this work would not have been possible without the support of my parents, Willi am and Wanda, my husband Christian, and our two dogs, Cooper and Jasper My family has been patient with my prolonged absences during fieldwork to Madagascar and during the writing process T hey have been integral in keeping me grounded and thoughtful Works such as this are he avily invested in the lives of real people and as such pose a number of ethical quandries I have tried to balance the need to shield my informants with th e need to lay bare one vantage o f the politics of development. T hroughout, I used power dynamics and my perception of them to dictate the coun tours of what should and should not be revealed. This work is, as I believe all anthropology should be, subjective and organic S ome informants or scholars may d isagree with my description of events or my analysis of them and I welcome their critique I take full responsib i l ity for any inaccuracies, omissions, or errors contained in this text.

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6 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 6 LIST OF TABLES ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 11 LIST OF FIGURES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 12 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ ................................ ........................... 16 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 18 1 REB EGINNING MALAGASY DEVELOPMENT ................................ ...................... 19 The Beginning of the End ................................ ................................ ....................... 19 Rebeginning as a Phenomenon of State led Development in Madagascar ............ 21 Development as an Object of Analysis ................................ ............................. 28 ................................ ................................ ........... 32 Establishing Madagascar as a Space of Development ................................ ........... 36 A Development Baseline ................................ ................................ .................. 37 Locating Development in Individualized B odies ................................ ............... 43 Malnourished Bodies to Inadequate Farms ................................ ...................... 46 Inadequate Farm to Endangered Forest ................................ .......................... 48 International Aid since Independence ................................ .............................. 50 Situating Regional Development in Atsinanana ................................ ................ 53 Engaging Dev elopment: Politics and Uncomfortable Ethnographic Encounters ..... 55 Chapter Layout ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 64 2 HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS: AGRICULTURAL DEVELOP MENT AND THE REBEGINNINGS OF THE MALAGASY STATE ................................ ..................... 69 Starting Over: Development and the Malagasy State ................................ ............. 69 Pre Colonial Madagascar ................................ ................................ ....................... 71 The Betsimisaraka Confederation / Kingdom, 1712 1750 ................................ 72 Imerina and the Rise of the Kingdom of Madagascar ................................ ....... 74 French Imaginings of Hegemony and Indolence ................................ ........ 83 Discourses of oppression ................................ ................................ ........... 83 Craft ing Indolence ................................ ................................ ...................... 84 Colonial Power in Madagascar ................................ ................................ ............... 85 Establishing Colonial Authority ................................ ................................ ......... 86 New Colonial Orders and the Patterns of Power ................................ .............. 87 Colonial Networks of Expertise ................................ ................................ ......... 94 New Knowledge and Old Nar ratives ................................ ............................... 101 Madagascar Since 1960 ................................ ................................ ....................... 103

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7 The First Republic, 1960 1972 ................................ ................................ ....... 103 The First Transition, 1972 1975 ................................ ................................ ..... 106 The Second Republic, 1975 1993 ................................ ................................ .. 107 The End of Socialism ................................ ................................ ..................... 110 The Third Republic, 1993 1996 ................................ ................................ ...... 111 The Impeachment of Zafy Albert, 1996 ................................ .......................... 112 The Third Rep ublic, 1997 2001 ................................ ................................ ...... 112 The Fourth Crisis 2001 2002 ................................ ................................ .......... 113 The Third Republic, 2002 2009 ................................ ................................ ...... 113 Malagasy Development at the Intersection of Power and Peasantry .................... 119 3 STARTING OVER: POWER AND THE PEASANTRY AT THE CAMPUS AMBANIVOHITRA ................................ ................................ ................................ 123 Imagining Development and Its Futures ................................ ............................... 123 Development Partnership: the Campus Ambanivohitra in Brief ............................ 123 .......................... 129 Constructing the Need for Change: The Malagasy Peasant as Moral Object 130 Imagining the model farmer ................................ ................................ ..... 131 Discourses of destruction ................................ ................................ ......... 133 Remembering Peasantry Past ................................ ................................ ........ 135 Peasant Populism ................................ ................................ .......................... 137 Candidacy: Ideals and Functional Realities ................................ .................... 140 Constru cting Entrepreneurs and Experts ................................ ....................... 144 Networks of Expertise ................................ ................................ .................... 149 Legitimate Actors: States and Agents at the Campus Ambanivohitra ................... 153 Improving the State of the State ................................ ................................ ..... 154 Alternate States: French Decentralized Cooperation and the Campus Ambanivohitra ................................ ................................ ............................. 164 Governing bodies in close encounter ................................ ....................... 165 Decentralized moralities ................................ ................................ ........... 168 Moralities of knowledge and exchange ................................ .................... 169 Bureaucratic cosmopolitanism ................................ ................................ 172 Connection and the political and economic reproductio n of the state ...... 173 Careers of Connection: Development and Power ................................ .......... 174 Developmental benefits: the generation of lifestyle and labo r .................. 175 Contingent mobilities: the politics of development and education at the Campus Ambanivohitra ................................ ................................ ........ 178 Webs of Development ................................ ................................ .............. 182 Conclusions ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 183 4 DURABLE INSTABILITY: NAVIGATING NETWORKS AND REBEGINNING AT THE CAMPUS AMBANIVOHITRA ................................ ................................ ........ 188 Connection and Conflict at the Campus Ambanivohitra ................................ ........ 188 Part 1: Knowledge, Labor, and the Politics of International Exchange .................. 190 The Powers of Knowledge ................................ ................................ .............. 192

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8 The Necessity of Connection ................................ ................................ .......... 193 Navigating French Network s of Exchange ................................ ...................... 199 Part 2: Relocating the Campus Ambanivohitra ................................ ..................... 212 Laboring In and On the Network ................................ ................................ ..... 212 Re inhabiting Historical Spaces ................................ ................................ ...... 219 Tenure and Territory ................................ ................................ ....................... 227 Part 3: Disappearing Money, Ri sk, and the Vagaries of Debt ............................... 234 Audit: Discovering Worst Practices / Generating Best Ones .......................... 234 Micro Credit and New Opportunitie s for Capture ................................ ............ 236 Vitrines and the New Possibilities of Old Subjectivities ................................ .. 244 Conclusions ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 247 5 RENEWAL: PROFESSIONAL POTENTIAL AND THE PERFECTED STATE AT THE CAMPUS FANANTENANA / VILLAGE MAP ................................ ................ 251 Power and the Re Creations of Agricultural Intervention ................................ ...... 251 Competition, Cooptation and State Engagement at the Campus Fanantenana .... 253 Shifting Positions: Rebeginning the Campus Ambanivoh itra .......................... 254 Representing and Rebeginning the Campus Fanantenana Village MAP ....... 262 Creating empty ahistorical space and limitless pote ntial .......................... 263 Inviting State Connection ................................ ................................ ......... 267 Auspicious (re)beginnings: the Village MAP ................................ ............ 270 (Re)Presenting the Village MAP ................................ .............................. 274 Limitless Potentials: Dreaming Big at the Village MAP ............................ 280 Alternate (I deal) States: Sherritt and (another) Model Village ........................ 2 83 Representing the State and Reproducing Status: Bureaucrats, Politicians and Technicians (and an Anthropologist) at the Village MAP ................................ ... 286 Bureau Rgional de la Prsidence ................................ ................................ 289 Region of Atsinanana ................................ ................................ ..................... 294 Comm une ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 296 Fokontany ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 296 Direction Regional du Development Rural ................................ ...................... 299 Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux ................................ .......... 301 Office National de Nutrition ................................ ................................ ............. 302 The Anthropologist: Optical Illusion and Illus ory Advocate ............................. 303 Shadow Presences ................................ ................................ ........................ 306 Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra ................................ ................................ ....................... 306 Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave ................................ ............... 307 Madagasikara ................................ ................................ ....................... 308 Croix Rouge ................................ ................................ ............................. 308 Embedded in History: Andakolosy Peasants Outside of Official Narratives .......... 309 Conclusions ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 313 6 KNOWLEDGE AND THE OPTICS OF STATE POWER AT THE VILLAGE MAP 318

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9 Part 1: The Powers of Time, Labor, and Land ................................ ...................... 319 Waiting Games ................................ ................................ ............................... 319 Losing Land ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 321 Laboring for the State ................................ ................................ ..................... 324 Association and rationalized labor ................................ ........................... 325 Development Wages ................................ ................................ ................ 327 Sta te Gifts ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 328 Presidential Expectations ................................ ................................ ............... 330 Disappearance and Risk at the Village MAP ................................ .................. 332 Part 2: Hierarchies of Knowledge at the Village MAP ................................ ........... 334 The Pastor and the Tomato ................................ ................................ ............ 334 Disappearing Seed lings and Vazaha Technicians ................................ ......... 342 A Tale of Two Canals ................................ ................................ ..................... 346 Part 3: The Impossibilities of Addressing Failure ................................ .................. 355 Growing Concern ................................ ................................ ........................... 355 Resituating Power in Crisis ................................ ................................ ............. 358 New Beginnings and the End ................................ ................................ ......... 362 Conclusions ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 364 7 DEVELOPMENT AND THE CONTINUING REBEGINNING OF THE STATE ...... 368 The End of the Beginning ................................ ................................ ..................... 368 And It All Came Crashing Down ................................ ................................ ........... 368 A Troubled State ................................ ................................ ............................ 369 Living Crisis ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 372 Black Saturday ................................ ................................ ............................... 373 And Then It Was (Sort of) Over ................................ ................................ ...... 374 The Costs (and Benefits) of Crisis ................................ ................................ .. 376 Cultivating the Network: The Campus Fanantenana and the Campus Ambanivohitra ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 378 Returning to Rebeginnings ................................ ................................ ................... 380 The Paradox of the Past in Development ................................ ....................... 382 Rebeginning and De ................................ ..................... 386 Imagining the peasant ................................ ................................ .............. 388 ................................ ............. 392 Rebeginning and State Power ................................ ................................ ........ 396 Rebeginning Geopolitical Relations ................................ ................................ 398 Rebeginnings and the Anthr opology of Development ................................ ........... 399 APPENDIX A D D I TI ON AL F I GUR E S ................................ ................................ .............................. 401 Introduction ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 401 General Economic Indicators ................................ ................................ ................ 401 Employment Indcators ................................ ................................ .......................... 404 Exports ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 405

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10 Imports ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 407 Demographic Indicators ................................ ................................ ........................ 409 Agricultural Indicators ................................ ................................ ........................... 413 Educational Indicators ................................ ................................ ........................... 414 Malagasy Currency ................................ ................................ ............................... 417 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ............................. 419 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ .......................... 447

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11 LIST OF TABLES Table page 3 1 Campus Ambanivohitra entrance exam subjects, 2008. ................................ ... 143 3 2 Courses offered at the Campus Ambanivohitra years 1 and 2. ....................... 146

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12 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1 1 Pub lic institutional networks of the Campus Ambanivohitra and Campus Fanantenana ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 27 1 2 Madagascar Human Develo pment Index Scores, 1985 2010. .......................... 39 1 3 Malagasy Gross National Income, 1980 2010. ................................ ................... 41 1 4 Malagasy malnutrition, 1992 2004.. ................................ ................................ .... 44 1 5 Malagasy s orghum p roduction, 1960 2008.. ................................ ...................... 47 1 6 Sorghum as part of the Malagasy food supply, 1960 2008.. .............................. 48 1 7 Malagasy forest degradation, 199 0 2008. ................................ .......................... 49 1 8 Bilate ral aid by c ountry, 1960 2010. ................................ ................................ ... 51 1 9 Development a id from U nited nations a gencies, 1960 2008.. ............................ 53 2 1 Signs of d evelopment. ................................ ................................ ..................... 117 3 1 Campus Ambanivohitra partnership structure, 2004 2009. .............................. 125 3 2 2000 Ariary note featuring highland irrigated rice fields. ................................ ... 132 3 3 Ravenala and Baobab pictured on Malagasy currency. ................................ ... 134 3 4 Campus Ambanivohitra ganizational linkages. ............................ 151 3 5 Campus Ambanivohitra government relationships, 2004 2010.. ...................... 156 3 6 Decaying gas and air pumps at Niarovana Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra site .................... 164 3 7 2010. ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 167 4 1 Directionalit y of knowledge based exchange. ................................ ................. 191 4 2 Aerial map of Campus Ambanivohitra site at Ivoloina. ................................ ..... 220 4 3 Campus Ambanivohitra site, r uins of the Institut Franais du Caf du Cacao et autres Plantes Stimulante s and the remaining FOFIFA offices ................... 225

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13 4 4 Aerial map showing locations of Campus Ambanivohitra main training site an d SRI training site in 2011. ................................ ................................ ............ 230 5 1 Status Shifts and Institutional Change at the Campus Ambanivohitra 2006 2008.. ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 25 9 5 2 Pho tos included in Campus Fanantenana Description ................................ ..... 264 5 3 Rui ns overlooking Andakolosy. ................................ ................................ ......... 268 5 4 Village MAP infr astructural constru ction and final product. .............................. 278 5 5 Aerial map showing the area surrounding the Village MAP. ............................. 279 5 6 Andakolosy Primary School. ................................ ................................ ............. 281 5 7 Andakolosy n etwork connections, 2008 2009 ................................ .................. 288 5 8 The Presidential Palace in Tamatave. ................................ .............................. 290 5 9 ................................ ............................... 298 5 10 Sign along the highway signaling the O ffice N ational de N utrition project in Andakolosy. ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 303 5 11 FOFIFA and IFAC buildings in 2008 ................................ ................................ 310 6 1 Villager c reating p lace bandes in the p roduce f ields at Andakolosy ................. 338 6 2 Unused ppinire tables flooded after a cyclone. ................................ ............. 343 6 3 Village MAP produce garden. ................................ ................................ .......... 344 6 4 Produce g arden in A ndakolosy February and March 2009. ............................. 345 6 5 The Fokontany President taking a cucumber as a gift March 2009.. ............... 346 6 6 Barra ge under construction.. ................................ ................................ ............ 347 6 7 Reservoir after a heavy rain, December 2009. ................................ ................. 348 6 8 ONN canal, December 2009. ................................ ................................ ............ 349 6 9 Aerial m ................................ .... 349 6 10 Second ONN Canal February 2009 ................................ ................................ 352 6 11 O vergrown canal Febr uary 2009 ................................ ................................ ..... 352

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14 7 1 Rebeginning as a p rocess of d evelopment. ................................ ...................... 381 A 1 Malagasy per capita Gross National Income since Independence. .................. 401 A 2 Malagasy Gross Domestic Product since Independence. ................................ 402 A 3 Malagasy annual percentage growth in Gross Domestic Product. ................... 402 A 4 GDP in comparative perspective. ............................... 403 A 5 Employment by sector in comparative perspective, 2005. ................................ 404 A 6 Malagasy e xports by p roduct, 1970 2005. ................................ ........................ 405 A 7 Malagasy merchandise exports by region, 1960 2010. ................................ .... 405 A 8 Malagasy exports by nation, 2005 2009. ................................ .......................... 406 A 9 Malagasy merch andise exports by region, 2009. ................................ ............. 406 A 10 Malagasy imports by product, 1970 2005. ................................ ........................ 407 A 11 Malagasy merchandise imports by region 1960 2010. ................................ .... 407 A 12 Malagasy imports by country, top 1 0 trading partners, 2005 2009. ................. 408 A 13 Malagasy merchandise imports by region, 2009. ................................ ............. 408 A 14 Malagasy population growth rates since 1960. ................................ ................. 409 A 15 Mortality rates among children under 5 in comparat ive perspective. ................ 410 A 16 Rural population as a perentage of total population in comparative perspective. ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 411 A 17 Rural populat ion growth rates in Madagascar in comparative perspective. ...... 411 A 18 Urban population as a percentage of total population in comparative perspective. ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 412 A 19 Urban population growth rate in Madagascar in comparative perspective. ...... 412 A 20 Malagasy crop production in tons, 1961 2007. ................................ ................. 413 A 21 Literacy rates in comparative perspective. ................................ ....................... 414 A 22 Primary school completion rates in comparative perspective, 2008. ................ 414 A 23 Secondary school completion rates in comparative perspective, 2008. ........... 415

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15 A 24 Malagasy poverty by region, 2007. ................................ ................................ ... 416 A 25 100 Ariary n ote ................................ ................................ ................................ 417 A 26 200 Ariary n ote ................................ ................................ ................................ 417 A 27 500 Ariary note ................................ ................................ ................................ 417 A 28 1000 Ariary note ................................ ................................ ............................... 418 A 29 2000 Ariary note ................................ ................................ ............................... 418 A 30 5000 Ariary note ................................ ................................ ............................... 418

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16 LIST OF ABBREVIATION S ANGAP Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protges BRP Bureau Rgional de La Prsidence CIRAD Centre de coopration internationale en recherche agronomique pour le dveloppement CNEP Comptoir National CTHT Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave DRDR Direction rgionale du dveloppement rural (Regional Directorate of Rural Development) EASTA cole d'Application des Sciences et Techniques Agricole (Applied School for Agricultural Scien ce and Technology) FJKM Fiangonan'i Jesoa Kristy eto Madagasikara (Church of Jesus Christ of Madagascar) FOFIFA Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra (National Center for Applied Research on Rural Development) GRENE Gestio IFAC Institut Franais de Recherches Fruitires outre mer et des Agrumes Coloniales IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFCC Institut Franais du Caf du Cacao et autres Plantes Stimulante s IMVAVET Institut Malgache de Vaccins Vtrinaires INSTAT Institut National de la Statistique (National Statistical Institute) IRAM Institut de Recherches Agronomiques de Madagascar LAMP Leadership and Management Program LAMSAD Laboratoire de modlisati on statistique et analyse des donnes (Statistical Modeling and Data Analysis Lab) MAEP Ministre levage et de Pche (Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing)

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17 MAP Madagascar Action Plan MCA Millennial Challenge Account MDG Mil lennial Development Goals MENRS Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research NLIM National Leadership Institute of Madagascar ONN Office National de la Nutrition (National Office of Nutrition) ORSC Office de la recherche scientifique et colonial (Colonial Office of Scientific Research) ORSOM mer (Overseas Office of Scientific Research) ORSTOM mer (Overseas Office of Scientific and Technical Resear ch) PPRR Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux (Program for the Promotion of Rural Revenue) PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSDR P rojet de Soutien au Dveloppement Rural (Support Program for the Rural Development) SAF/FJKM Madagasikara ( Development Organization, Church of Jesus Christ of Madagascar) SECALINE Surveillance et ducation des coles et des communauts en ( State Organization for Monit oring and Educating Cchools and Communities in Matters of Food and Nutrition ) SMOTIG (Labor Service for Public Works) SRI S ystme de Riziculture Intensive ( System of Intensive Riziculture) UNDP United Nation s Development Program

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18 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy REBEGINNINGS: AGRICULTURAL I NTERVENTION AND THE CRAFTING OF STATE AND STATUS IN EASTERN MADAGASCAR By Michelle Lea Kiel August 2011 Chair: Brenda H. Chalfin Major: Anthropology Development improvement of the quality of individual lives, has been a mainstay of internation al relations since at least the post WWII era. While material improvements have taken place in key areas, Rural farming, a main is one of the least sa tisfactory performers in improving the standard of living in rural communities Avoiding the question of why d evelopment fails and how it might be fixed, th is project asks how development interventions continue in the face of failure Based on fieldwork among two agricultural development projects that target rural populations in Madagascar I suggest that development remains salient despite its failures through a process of rebeginning that 1) offers bureaucrats, administrators, technicians, and farmers t he chance to transform their lives, even if not in the way intended, and 2) offers a way for projects to obscure project missteps and failures transforming them into rationalizations for further development intervention, or erasing them altogether

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19 CHAP TER 1 REBEGINNING MALAGASY DEVELOPMENT The Beginning of the End It was 6:50 in the morning on the eve of my departure from Madagascar when I called the Minister of Decentralization to inform him that my university had asked me to leave the country. The U n ited States Department of State issued a travel warning two days earlier, initiating the departure of non essential personnel, and warning those who stayed behind that the embassy itself may close unexpectedly. I had been in Madagascar for 9 months conduc ting research on two rural development programs in the eastern region of Atsinanana. Malagasy politics were ever present in the projects I studied, but as the Malagasy winter of 2008 dissipated, the situation in the capital turned critical. The mayor of A ntananarivo, a young DJ nicknamed TGV after the French bullet train, had begun to gather support among the former leaders of the country. opposition to Marc Ravalomana na since he became president in 2002. 1 As the opposition honed its rhetoric to exploit the contours of popular discontent, President Rav a olicies came increasingly under fire. By March the nation was worn down by four months of crisis. In the capital the situation was tense and violence was an almost daily occurrence. In coastal regions like Atsinanana the tension was palpable. Rumors circulated about plans of ethnic 1 isis, when he was the mayor of Antananarivo and ran against former President Didier Ratsiraka, declared himself the outright winner of

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20 violence, shipments of arms provided to the opposition by China, and the use of South African mercenaries by the ruling regime. The Minister of Decentralization had only been in the job for a few weeks when the violence began in earnest. He was the creator of the Campus Fanantenana (litera lly Campus of Hope) and had asked me to expand my research on rural development to include it. By mid February his whereabouts were a secret closely guarded by his staff. With politicians and functionaries distracted by the crisis, the Campus Fanantenana (by now renamed the Village MAP ) was thrust into a hiatus at the same moment that the interventions it had introduced threatened to throw the target population into a food crisis. Meetings to address the problem were postponed due to fears of attack at lo cal government offices. To make matters worse, most of the individuals with the political power to address the situation were, like the M inister, unavailable. When I spoke to him that morning, the Minister told me he was cornered in the capital of Antanan arivo, trying to find a way to get his wife and children out of the country. In a few days, Andry Rajoelina would name himself the president of the Haute Autorit Transitionnelle ( High Transitional Authority HAT) Ravalomanana would be forced to resign at gunpoint. 2 staff and I presented him with a corpulent goose as he spoke proudly of how his senate colleagues had dubbed him Obama. Two years earlier he was an economi cs professor, university administrator, and the Research Director of a new farmer training 2 According to President R avalomanana, the US Ambassador, and a pro Ravalomanana demonstration on the Island of Reunion held a week after Rajoelina declared himself president.

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21 program in eastern Madagascar, named the Campus Ambanivohitra ( Country Campus, the initial subject of my research). Now, his political future was bleak, as was tha t of his wife, a member of the Malagasy parliament. Both had been visible and vocal supporters of the President. They had invested themselves in his development initiatives, tying their futures to his fate. In short, they had like many Malagasy in pow er staked their political careers on their discontent of a citizenry that either saw little effect in their lives, or imagined the nation, and their birthright, turned over t o commercial interests that profited the president and his advocates. Now their allegiance to Ravalomanana could very nearly cost them their lives. responded shakily He was alluding to the danger of being targeted by the opposition, but also the possibility that the gendarmes sent to protect him might turn against him at any moment. In a way that echoes the fates of the loyal cadres of previous pre sidents, political survival under a new political regime in Madagascar would mean a necessary reinvention, a rebeginning either in Madagascar or outside; a shift in allegiances and networks, hopes and aspirations. Rebeginning would mean survival in both p olitical and material ways. Rebeginning as a Phenomenon of State led Development in Madagascar The story of the 2009 coup and its effects on individuals and groups involved i n Malagasy development offers a point of entry into the theme of rebeginning t hat drives this text. Simply put, rebeginning is a way to conceptualize change that gives credence

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22 to the creation of new things concepts, strategies, and relations that are never quite new, but rather reconstructed, reoriented and redeployed. Rebegi nnings are neither radical disjuncture nor gradual change; they are punctuations for survival that are key in constantly being made according to the shifting desires and capa bilities of states, development agents, international donors, and target populations. Rebeginnings are political in every sense of the word they are centered in power and the struggles over it and its attendant social and material advantages. What r esults is a development industry that is in a constant process of erasure and rebeginning in an e ffort to ensure survival. These rebeginnings and the contextual and cultur al factors which accompany them are the focus of this analysis. This study concen trates on the development industry in Madagascar, specifically two state led rural development projects that aimed to transform farmers and their communities: the Campus Ambanivohitra and the Campus Fanantenana 3 The projects were closely linked to the po litical fortunes of their directors, the policy plans of the Malagasy state, and the priorities of international organizations and agents, like the Goals and the Decentra lized Cooperation priorities of regional aid partners like Haute and Basse Normandie in France. Led by an economist and a mathematician from the University of Toamasina both relied on practical training to dis seminate agricultural knowledge and utilized the same pool of expert technicians and government partners. 3 The names of selected organizations have been altered to protect their anonymity. All proper names us ed within this work are pseudonyms. Exact dates have been omitted to offer individuals involved another layer of anonymity.

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23 They also both experienced a number of rebeginnings throughout their tenure that obscured, shift ed, or otherwise redefined their previous incarnations at the same time that they renewed their po ssibilities. Processes of rebeginning cleared away the debris of previous power relations and ensured the continuation of multiple circulations of land and labor, knowledge and status, and material and ideology that attend ed Ultimately, re beginnings act ed to preserve power at the same time that they smooth ed out its disruptions 4 Within this framework, rebeginnings are de eply connected to the reproduction and redistribution of the political, economic, and epistemological power and status o f a diverse group of actors that includes: developme nt brokers, agents, targets, funders, bure aucrats, and politicians Among these divisions run supplementary contours of differentiation expert/non expert, urban / rural, bureaucratic / political and nort h/ south The coalescence of m ultiple agents and agencies renders development an important space for understanding ways that layered organizational and individual interests articulate within the development industry F ocusing on the intersections where t he borders of status and sovereignty are patrolled I ask : How do multiple organizational and individual agencies and structures interact as they mediate the flows of social, economic, and political capital within the networks of development? How are thes e relations sustained? How do they suppress, reinforce or otherwise transform the 4 As an example: The name of the Malagasy ministry concerned with rural agriculture has changed several times since the island gain ed independence in 1960. Lined up, these names reflect political movements that were varied: the desire to appease the opposition, the move to distinguish one administration from others, a signal of a willingness to embrace neo liberal reforms, or the des ire to expand the bureaucratic apparatus and the ability to create offices (as Rajoelina has done since 2010). These movements are deeply political and have, over time, the effect of expanding state power by a series of extensions and retractions that kee

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24 contours of inequality on the island? What does it mean when they fall apart? What are the implications for a Malagasy state that continues to start over in new hands? Th e Campus Ambanivohitra created in 2005, was championed by the then president of the University of Toamasina. The project was originally meant to transform university students and rural farmers into experts of development knowledge specifically through practices and market phenomenon. Over time, the project dropped its efforts to create a cadre of university experts, focusing solely on training rural farmers and facilitating their entry throug into agricultural markets. Later the project became concerned with creating showcase farms in rural areas that assured the Campus a stake in future harvests and gave participant farmers the opportunity to direct the labor of other s in their communities. The transformation of project objectives was echoed in the spatial shifts of the campus, which moved between several villages from its 2004 inception to its 2009 reality. The Campus Fanantenana was a similar project initiated by the former researc h director of the Campus Ambanivohitra who would later become the Minister of who were conceived of as the poorest and most destitute of rural individuals. The link to political power meant, however, that the project soon came to be re envisioned. Its target population shifted from a large group of individuals from disparate areas (like the Campus Amba nivohitra ) to an extant group of villagers living on land held by the state. The name changed from Campus

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25 Fanantenana to Village MAP This new designation came from the acronym of the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP). The M adagascar A ction P lan (MAP) was k Bank mediated Poverty Reduction Strategy, and was one of the state objectives that Millennium Challenge Account. As state power entered the pr oject, it transformed into also revealed the content of state ideas of model inter vention and strategies in the face of contextual changes and project failures all while contributing to the reproduction and reorientation of status among the projects agents and targets Like the Campus Ambanivohitra the alterations and reinventions o f the p roject reflected struggles over power and resources among farmers, administrators, politicians and partners. These various rebeginnings reflected contextual shifts in state and international conceptions of development, the material constraints of t he programs, and the friction that emerged between the agents implicated in the project as they struggled over access to the resources it set loose. Political, social, and economic capital flowed through the personal, governmental, and organizational netw orks that the project opened. The way agents state and non state, urban and rural, high and low status sought to access, cut off, or divert these resources came to shape the way the project hrough agents and agencies whose presence offered important potentials to reproduce state power to offer, as it were, a rebeginning of the state These uses, and the disruptions they

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26 stant reinvention. occurs as a site for the production and reproduction of political and economic power. T his is in part its goal. Development moves money, people and things in ways that move power. Foremost among this is state power. The state writ large as a surprisingly durable form of political organization complicated but not destroyed by increasing mobility (Chalfin 2006) present s itself in the projects efforts to render rural farmers governable and s elf governing alongside the subjection of expert and non expert state agents to similar efforts to proliferate self management through audit and evaluation. Writ small as in individual nation states the projects speak to state efforts to craft national identity, to extend i ts territorial scope, and to craft legitimacy at multiple levels In both cases materiality resides much less in institutions than in the reworking of processes and relations of power so as to create Tr o uillot 2001: 127). This does not negate institutional relations, but shifts focus to the ways similar processes inhere across the multiple institutions implicated in state based development. The Campus Ambanivohitra and the Campus Fanantenana represen t two institutional di stances from the state one dilut ed through partnerships and positioned outside the core of Malagasy state power (t wo levels below the Ministry of Education with the backing of multiple national and international institutions ); the o ther intimately linked with the state through a parallel chain of power that political leaders hip ( specifically, the Bureau Rgionale de la Prsidence Regional Office of the

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27 Figure 1 1. Public i nstitutional n etwor ks of the Campus Ambanivohitra and Campus Fanantenana Gray borders and lines indicate partnership that were secondary or disappeared over time.

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28 Presidency, see Figure 1 1). At the same time, the two programs are closely connected to each other and, in a way, mutually constituted. This mutual constitution is related to the networks that development opens for the for whom certain networks are opened efforts to imp rove the lives of rural individuals facilitate the flow of capital along networked lines. Far from being wholly predetermined or wide open, networks emerge along multiple lines and network flows are captured by a variety of expert and non expert, state an d non state agents. These include various agents and individuals who fill overlapping roles Development agents mediate relations between development agencies and the target population and mediate knowledge and state power (in this case the instructors a nd technicians employed at each project). Development brokers, those that sit between institutions and target case, the administrators of the projects), f acilitate the m ovement of resources, providing the evaluative and budgetary justification and crafting stories of development that (if they are successful) loosen development funds. Additionally included are rural politicians, business interests, and, of course, the des Development as an Object of Analysis focus of anthropology, where it tracks to anthropological concerns with social change and global inequality (Barth 1967; Trouillot 2003; Escobar 1 991) Most influential has been a set of work, embodied in the scholarship of Escobar (1988; 1995) and Ferguson (1990), that examine s the discourses of development as they a re mobilized and deployed a t the relatively abstract levels above the state or wit hin it. This work has viewed development as a space for

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29 the exercise and assurance of hegemonic power, particularly the hegemonic power of western capitalist (and formerly colonial) powers and the state A second strain, largely built against this first, is concerned with paying attention to the micro level interactions that development facilitates. Here, micro level power drives development s continuation and is reproduced and expanded through the processes undertaken within development interventions. The research presented in this thesis is an attempt to reconci l e these two view points seeing development as at once about capitalist hegemony the continuing creation of the metropole as an economic, political, and epistemological center, the reproduc ti on of the state, and the capture and distribution of political, economic and social resources among the individual parties involved In viewing development as a space where resources are set loose along various networked pathways and situating my study a long the clustered connections that constitute individual development projects, I am purposefully avoiding certain questions works or does no t work, or what we can do to fix it R ather I seek to understand how development is propelled forward and put to work across global networks of power that stretch from local governments to nation states, to INGOs and beyond Anyone looking for answers to global poverty or new formulas for developmental success will not find what they are looking for in these pages. Instead they will find a detailed sketch of the politics of development a politics I think is necessary to answering these more practical qu e ries. It is this politic s th s most stringent critques of the ideologies and practices of development, an d it is this critical anthropology that I situate my research within.

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30 of t colonial system. Scholars examining these relations view development as intimately tie d to the economies of colonialism and, particularly, to the efforts of colonial powers to quell resistance and retain power over their colonies (Cooper 2002, 2005; Cooper and Packard 1997; Mitchell 2002; Moore 1999). In this perspective development is in tegral to the vis the non West. In the same way that the pre colonial Europeans decried the savage mind and missionaries sought to save the heathen based on the idea that they lacked something, be it intellect, god, or civilization (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997) colonial administrators and post WWII These works call attention to the very important role that power plays in development, and call attention t set of material relationships, activities and powers that renders power 7). Th ese power dynamic s are masked by the supposedly apolitical and scientific nature of development (Packard in Cooper and Packard 1997). Ferguson (1990) describes the way development expertise and scientific objectivity act to obscure the expansion of bur eaucratic and state power. In this way development discourse enables also Bose in Cooper and Pa ckard 1997). A nthropologists were crucial in crafting this distinctio n and their work fed into a teleological narrative of progress that saw the west

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31 as the high point of cultural and technological evolution (Ferguson in Cooper and Packard 1997; Ferguson 1999; Moore and Vaughan 1994). These perspectiv es have been criticized for : overly focusing on / deconstructing development discourse ; p romoting an idea of a monolithic development or a monolithic state ; envisioning the state in too limited a role ; rendering colonialism a caricature while erasing the agency of individual actors ; and, overall, incoherences, uncertainty and contradictions structurally inscribed in development institutions ( Sardan 2005 : 5; Green 2003; Lewis and Moss 2006 ; Mosse 2005 ; Blundo 2006 ) In the place of these issues, this group of scholars have sought to redirect the gaze of anthropology through development drawing it away from discourse, the state, and colonialism and focusing on the actors that mediate s relations and relationships between local power and developme (including decentralization; Sardan 2005: 14). Like Sardan (2005), I find the shift in focus compelling. I agree that the state needs to be seen he creation of that agency should be a focus of analysis, and that we should realign our sights on the space b etween the state and global regimes of power on the one hand, an d the targets of development, on the other. Unlike Sardan (2005), I do n o t believe i rationalize s and legitimizes power but it does not ex targets. These are the actors that replicate and reiterate narratives of development

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32 must be drawn into the analysis. Mo reover, the power that enables and is enabled by these development discourses remains important at multiple scales The se levels, I would suggest, are mutually constitutive, and therefore necessary to understanding what development does and for whom T o ignore these realities or to assume that the intellectual work is done the field harvested, to put it pastorally is akin to throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. The approach I take here attempts to avoid these pitfalls while bringing the se objects of analysis together. Rebeginnings offer me a loose frame in which to imagine how these multiple processes the producti on and reproduction of state and geopolitical power, and more micro level brokerage articulate as multiple actors nego tiate the flow of social and economic capital through the networks opened by development. Development Rebeginnings speak to the lifestyles that development makes possible, not only for its targets, but also for its agents. Petrol vouchers fo r university administrators, cars for development projects, computers, cash, land, labor they are all up for grabs with in development, propelled through the network with the potential be translated into state and individual power. These flows are neithe r openly accessible nor regularly available, It i s tempting to see these flows, and the ways they are directed as corruption or what Sardan (2005) and others characterize as the rent of develo pment brokers (Lewis and Moss 2006; Moss 2005) I find this analytic problematic as it so easily slip s into

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33 familiar narratives of Africa as ungovernable, 5 that reify the very power differentials that Escobar (correctly) indi cts 6 Green (2000 ) a rtfully a voids the economic, political, and g people to depend on access to the kinds of development goods associated with localized interventions as an essential means of by 68 69 ). While I find forcing people err towards overstatement, this concep t begins to get us away from the problems of I suggest that it would be more fruitful and less dangerous to understan d these relationships as more There are winners a nd losers to be sure and flux That is to say, these relations are complex and a single actor might slip between status positions multiple times within ongoing struggles over development in it s discursive and material forms. It is akin to what Chalfin (2008) of subject positions and a spectrum of agencies In Madagascar, struggles ensued over the types of subjects that would be produced by the pro grams I studied. While participants general objectives the way that rural participants articulated and attempted to enact 5 Scholars engaging in these terminologies are quick to point out the slippage, but continue to engage the terminology (e.g. Sardan 2005: 76). Chalfin (2008) does an excellent job of analyzing similar proc esses without reinforcing these concepts, centering her analysis on the fluidity and multiplicity of encounters between citizen sovereigns and sovereign citizens in Ghanian Customs. 6 The option opposite avoiding these terms is popularizing them so that d iscourses of corruption about western nations, the supposed seat of good governance, are taken seriously rather than marginalized as outliers that legitimize the status quo.

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34 these benefits often fell outside of the projects purview and expectations Participant farmers and project directors disagreed over the relative mobility that should inhere in rural agricultural production, the level and types of technology that were worth including in the curriculum, and the types of agricultural practices that made sense for local pop ulations. These disagreements resulted in part, in the repeated reorientation of project goals and the more material results of project practices that follow ed and precede d them. The projects were in a constant state of tinkering that rendered them alwa ys new, always in the present. In their most attenuated forms, these changes are dramatic. Yet they rarely show up in official project narratives and when they do they k of evaluation within development. The projects themselves, then, are in an almost constant state of rebeginning. Rebeginning refers to two movements at once each filled with different components and suspended in different relations, but at the sam e ti me linked. F irst is the allure of development which speaks to the transformations that are promised and potentially occur through development. Rebeginnings are thus about the agents and actors involved in development as individuals re crafting, reb rand ing, and re envisioning themselves, often in ways that signal and emerge from their situation within the network. These are b olstered by the circulation of multiple forms of capital that is facilitated by the networks of development. Struggles over the movement of this capital over who gets it and who does n o t help ed to shape the ways the projects evolve d forcing micro (and sometimes macro )

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35 adjustments to the objectives that the projects would pursue These objectives we re erased as project docum ents d eployed a ( Lewis 2009) that envision ed the project as always in the now and obscured the struggles and negotiations engendered by development These changes constitute a second rebeginning the institutional and discursive rebe ginning that takes place through development. F ailures were edited out of official documents dropped from contracts, or sidelined to lessons learned or peasant caricatures that envision ed problems as a lack (Shore and Wright 2000) and d the value of the project going forward (Cooper and Packard 1997) T echniques of evaluation and audit facilitate d these moves acting as the productive force behind the network s opened by development (see Strathern 200 0, Elyachar 2005, 2006, Castles 1996). What appeared were projects in a constant state of rebeginning. Deeply embedded in the theatrics of state legitimacy, rebeginning s illustrate the will to develop (see Li 2007) in an area in which most rural farmers, as well as elite age nts, are abandoned by the state. Development projects are key in the erasure of these failures of its citizens. Furthermore, the networks opened through development projects create new pathways for state power facilitating its general reach and reinforcing the power it already commands. Put another way, development is about rebeginning the state. This work is, then, a rebeginning of the F and highly apolitical to piggy back on its earlier forms (cannibalizing them), while

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36 deploying a narrative that excoria tes their effectiveness. In the process, the state institutional reach is electrified even if for a moment and ultimately extended. The social is not dead it is reanimated in ways that echo and resituate understandings of the productive power of absent states (Chalfin 2010, Masquelier 2001) Establishing Madagascar as a Space of Development To be labeled a country in need of development to inhabit the space needed to become subject to the processes I outline relies upon a positioning structur ed by scientific approaches to understanding poverty. Countries are subjected to techniques of audit that help to place them in a system of rankings marking out a status and creating groups distinguished by a number of predetermined categories These cat egories are created in the space between governmental agencies in the concerned country and international and extra national governance structures at organizations like These larger organizations sponsor, collect, and combine data culled from the national level in an effort to aid in economic development and good governance ( FAOSTAT 2011, World Bank 2011). The numbers themselves go far in determining who deserves and gets deve lopment. 7 These statistical practices which disaggregate and re aggregate multiplex phenome non into cells on a spreadsheet are a central facet of the development machinery. They illustrat e with cold and seemingly apolitical precision the real ne eds for development and legitimize intervention while affecting an erasure of the past 7 These practices of ranking are ubiquoutous and constitute a particularly neo liberal form of important not so much by what they indicate about on the ground realities, but by how they act to order practice.

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37 that takes history out of the equation 8 They take place at the highest echelons of government, but also at the level of individual NGOs where audits serve similar fun ctions of garnering aid and tightening the focus of projects The se practices also play an important role in how anthropologists perform ethnographic fieldwork and stake claims on knowledge and translatability in short, how we make our work speak to a b igger picture and accessible to a larger audience The statistics that make up development, then, are a part of an audit culture (Strathern 2000, Shore and Wright 1999 Power 2003 ) that is both new and neo liberal and as the following chapters suggest old and ordin ary. They build upon earlier mobilizations of knowledge to individualize and totalize the human subject (see Hacking 1990) T hey also take the se further multiplying the responsibility of the individual to be an evaluating entrepreneur of the self or allowing evaluation to open up new/old potentials for state power The following section keeps these observations in mind, p larger narratives and knowledge practices of development and as a central starting point to my own ethnographic treatment of Malagasy development within two projects that aim to address the large part, produced through the creation and circulation of statistics A De velopment Bas eline In 200 5 Human Development Index (HDI) sandwiched between Nepal and Papua New Guinea near the bottom of a group of countries 8 Statistics mask oth er realities as well, including cultural struggles and state power (Stoilkova 2005; Hacking 1990; Ferguson 1990).

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38 classified as having obtained medium human development (UNDP 2007). The HDI is compiled from statist ical sources at the U nited Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 9 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ( UNESCO ) Institute of Statistic s, 10 the World Bank, the I nternational M onetary Fund (IM F ) and Barro and Lee (2010) 11 The HDI itself ru ns on a scale from 0 to 1, and is subdivided into quarters the upper 25% (closest to 1 ) are classed as Very High Human Development, the 50 75% as High Human Development, 25 50% as Medium Human Development and the lowest percentile of 0 25% is ranked as Low Human Development The numerical ranking stands for little Madagascar ha s shifted between 115 th and 153 rd in the 20 years since the index was devis ed by Amar t ya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq (UNDP 2010). O riginally an agg regate measure of statistics on life expectancy educational opportunity, and income t he HDI has been adjusted and updated every year (UNDP 2010: 7). Every iteration of the HDI equation s hifts both the prospects of consistently ranked on the lowest level of development, except in 2005 (Figure 1.1). Subsequent recalculations have had the effect of smoothing out fluctuatio ns in the measurement. In so doing, they tend to advocate an ever increasing ideal and, more importantly, temper larger local shifts in the statistics reported. 9 generated from their individual census. 10 UNESCOs statistics come from the survey responses of national authorities (UNESCO 2011) 11 Barro and Lee (2010) compiled statistics on education from UNESCO and the UN Demographic Yearbook, who each get their sources from surveys and the evaluating work of member states.

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39 Figure 1 2. Madagascar Human Development Index Scores 1985 2010. Original HDI represents HDI values closest to the time of report publication. Solid lines are trends projected backwards under new formula e 12 The point here is neither to negate these statistics, nor critique them in the hopes of a better equation. 13 I mean neither to invalidate these methods nor question their ability to represent, in particular ways, lived reality. Rather, I am attempting a sort of methodological relativism that accepts and hopefully renders more productive the slippery relationship between the tools and th e objects of analysis (see Holmes and Marcus 2005). I aim to draw attention to the numbers that exist at the apex of the 12 Inequality was added to equation n 2010, creating a sister index, dubbed the IHDI. The creation of the IHDI bumped Madagascar down almost 30% to 0.308 from 0.435. The trend line shown here for 2010 represents the HDI before the introduc tion of inequality. The drop here is unrelated to the introduction of inequality. 13 This is best left to economists. Some notable critiques are Sagar and Najam (1998), Morse (2003), and McGillivray (1991). 0.325 0.375 0.425 0.475 0.525 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Original HDI 2000 HDI Trends 2001 HDI Trends 2002 HDI Trends 2005 HDI Trends 2006 HDI Trends 2007/8 HDI Trends 2009 HDI Trends 2010 HDI Trends

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40 development industry, which provide the legitimizing thrust behind developmentalist interventions and th eir evolution through time an d the very similar process e s of development on the ground, which make up the bulk of this thesis. Namely I seek to highlight the processes of smoothing out irregularity by projecting the present backwards that accompany practices of representation and kn owledge making in global and local c onstructions of development and its targets. Development statistics go on to live in the grand developmentalist plans of individual states in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and in Madagascar, the Madagascar Ac tion Plan (Madagascar 2006: 8). These, and other statistical measures, become the impetus and legitimization of international and state intervention rising cts a number Th is ranking and the numbers behind it reflects a lif e expectancy that has increased by some twenty years from 40 to 60, since 196 0 (World Bank 201 1 ) Mortality rates have also dropped substantially, falling from 21.7% to 7.9% between 1975 and 2010 (US Census Bureau 2011). 14 The m ortality rate has remained well above those of more developed economies such as the United States and Fr ance (see Figure A 15 in the Appendix) Advances in education are less visible ; both literacy rates and average time in school remain flat at 70% and just over 5 years (World Bank 201 1 UNDP 201 1 ). 15 Educational attendance falls off as students get older, with a little over seventy percent of youth attending primary school, then 30 percent attending secondary 14 The US Census Bureau obtains its information m ainly from the Malagasy state statistics organization INSTAT in partnership with an US consulting group, ORC Macro (ICF Macro since its 2009 acquisition by 15 World Bank estimate s of literacy only contain the years 2000 and 2008, both from UNESCOs Statistics.

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41 school. Whil e primary education is high, the number of students matriculating drops precipitously as educational level advances. Figure 1 3 Mal agasy G ross N ational I ncome 1980 2010. In current USD. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, 2011. Income remains low with most Malagasy living on just over a dollar a day and meeting, under some estimates, 16 the poverty threshold of $1.25 pe r day (UNDP 2011: 6, World Bank 2011). and over 80% of Malagasy make a living in agriculture R ecent years have seen an increase in the industrial manufacturing and service sectors. In addition, the percentage of agricultural exports has dropped substantially (from 75% to around 30%) while industrial and manufacturing exports have increased (World Bank 2011 ; see Figure A 6 in the Appendix ) High Income countries have been the prime market for Malagasy goods, 16 stimates that put income some 600 dollars a year higher than the World Bank Atlas GNI estimates. I am using World Bank Atlas measurements here for two reasons: 1) this method tends to correct for currency fluctuations, and 2) it is the method used by the World Bank to allocate development aid. For this illustration rendered with PPP at current rates of USD and 2008 USD value, see the Appendix. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

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42 with these nations receiving between 70 and 80% of the entirety of Malagasy exports over the last half century (World Bank 2011 ; for more detailed statistics see Table A 8 and A 9 in the Appendix ). While hig h er income countries have constituted the bulk of the market for Malagasy goods, Madagascar has decreased its dependency on manufactured goods from high income countries Madagascar has reached import parity between high income and developing economies largely through fostering imports from East Asia an d the Pacific and to a lesser degree, Africa and the Middle East. Most imports have been and remain manufactured goods from elsewhere; though food imports have increased slightly over the past thirty years ( see Figure A 10 in the Appendix ). While these n umbers seem distant from the realities of two rural development projects the projects. The truth claims these numbers have are bolstered by their constant adjustment; it is not so much the atomi zing nature of audit that performs this power, but its replication. Their reiterating existence legitimizes the continuation of intervention at the apex of the international development industry. Additionally, and more pressingly for rural Malagasy the iterative reality created through statistics legitimates the continued intervention of organizations that sit structurally below the level of international governing bodies (the UN) and development organizations (the World Bank). The state and other form s and levels of governance (local NGOs) are legitimized in their continued intervention in ways that support and ssertion that statistics are

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43 molded to fit prepackaged narratives of development. These numbers and others like them help to define the paths th at development interventions take inscribing the terms of governance onto individual subjects (both rural farmers and development agents), establish ing the centrality of agriculture and thus legitimizing agriculture as a realm of intervention, and perpetuat ing a system of resource validation and to an extent, internationally mediated feti s hization Locatin g Development in Individualized Bodies In the atomization of everyday reality into a controllable sp ace to think central unit of measurement Individualized and collectivized into statistics on life expectancy in calcu lations such as the H uman D evelopment Index the laboring, reproducing, and consuming individual is the key concern While Malagasy numbers are s c arce, 17 they illustrate rates of malnutrition through measurements of height and weight that rival other impov erished nations and illustrate a stagnation in which the situation does n o t appear to get any better Madagascar malnutrition rates hover around 55% when measured by height and 35% when measured by weight. Issues of malnutrition are key in understandin g the development industry in Madagascar, where neoliberal concerns with creating the entrepreneur of the self are often accompanied by state concerns over what can and what must be ingested that are in turn linked to economic indicators. Initially, they link directly with issues of population. 17 The World Bank 2011 WDI only carries numbers for 1992, 1997, and 2004. The Institut National de la Statistique (National Statistical Institute, INSTAT) carries figures for 1993, 1997, and 1999.

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44 Figure 1 4. Malagasy m alnutrition, 1992 2004. As a percentage of children under 5 years. Population increase is considered a major developmental issue facing Madagascar From 1961 to 2008 the population has inc reased by some 14. 5 million people, from 5.1 million to 19.6 million ( World Bank 2011). Most recent statistics peg annual population growth as 2.65 % (in 1990), be low its peak of 3.07 % in 1995, and its low est rate of 2.3 6 % in 1960 (see Figure A 14 in the Appendix). Concerns over population growth, and its relation to resources, remain a central impetus behind development projects, many of which are anchored in concerns over human bodies. Nestled within the image of the body are patterned movements that ar e ubiquitous yet only subtly present in larger conversations about development. p opulation is increasingly urban. Whereas only a little over 10% of the population resided in urban areas in the immediate post independence era, 28% are current ly residing in urban areas (World Bank 2011) Conversly, the rural population has fallen from almost 90% of the population to 70% (World Bank 2011; see Figures A 16 to A 19 in the Appendix) Overall, this has meant a wider swath of the rural population i s 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 World Bank Height for Age World Bank Weight for Age

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45 increasingly expected to create the agricultural goods needed to supply urban and international markets. In other words, the interests of development interventions are in part reflective of interests in creating laboring bodies that can supply a growing market. Bodies brought into proximity and the propensity for these bodies to create newer versions of themselves lead to concerns with reproduction and health that circle back to agriculture in interesting ways. lation issues spur new (and not so new) governmental forays into the liv es of individuals as the nation and the governing proxi es of the development apparatus seek to meet the desires of international aid agencies and local populations, and craft legit imacy among their population. Concerns over what is put into the Malagasy body, namely food and water, has meant a proliferation of development work by groups like the Office National de la Nutrition (ONN), Care International, Croix Rouge Madagascar, and others that are setting up networks and short term projects across the island that seek to provide clean water and nutritional aid for rural Malagasy families. These and accompanying reforms seek to gain purchase on bodily practices, going beyond the maln ourished bodies of children into issues of reproduction and hygiene ( Foucault 2003 ; Foucault et al 1988). Concern with the nutrition of Malagasy body as with concer n surrounding other bolsters developmentalist interest in food production. In the cases discussed here, this interest opens pathways for individuals development entrepreneurs who gain access to symbolic and material capital through their positioning within projects. The main cure to malnutrition is the creation of correct farming practices and correct knowledge among farmers. These practices are particularly centered on riziculture, the island s main staple and this along with the

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46 idea of creating a farmer as an expert entrepreneur structures developmental interventions O rganizations that address issue s of malnutrition often address issues of agriculture as well, and many offer wages to rural Malagasy for farm improvements like canals and dykes. Individual bodies become the basis for agricultural interven tion and Malnourished Bodies to Inadequate Farm s The ranking of bodies through standardized measurements of size and the linkage of these to agricultural practice feed anxiety over the ability to attain, or re attain individual self sufficiency The key entry point of the global economy in agricultural interventions in Madagascar is the of a prosperous past and the emergence of an import/export imbalance Most international agency Madagascar had been a net exporter of rice in the 1960s, 18 The Food and Agricultural Association (FAO) of the UN is the main interlocutor of agricultural statistics. With numbers provided by Malagasy state agencies, the FAO compiles data on indicators of agricultural development, beginning with measurements of production and land usage. They also carry statistics on the fertilizer and pest icide markets and consumption rates disaggregating World Bank data (which tends to be more general) into the products main chemical compositions and fostering, through these numbers, the growth of agro industrial markets They also include statistics on t he nutritional value of foods and their intake. 18 Another version

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47 These numbers have very real effects on individual development programs which often strive to adopt for material or ideological reasons, the crops international development experts choose to advocate ev en when these may not coincide neatly with local practices. For example, 2008 saw an increase in interest in Sorghum a crop well suited for arid regions. Organizations like the FAO and Care International were involved in pushing sorghum in certain area s of Madagascar and the government procured a number of seeds to use in the islands arid regions The narrative pushing the crop was one of loss backed up by the numbers, but the innovation entered projects in tropical climates such as Atsinanana in way s that revealed the power that mobile knowledge knowledge that ha s made a global and virtual circuit to the metropole and back again has over less mobile (and yet still arguably global) local knowledge. 19 Figure 1 5 Malagasy s orghum p roduction, 19 60 2008 Source : FAOSTAT 2011 19 I gesture here to the fact that for man y of the Malagasy involved in the project, earlier instances of the circulation of these same types of knowledge are now old hat their knowledge is more a recently 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

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48 Figure 1 6 Sorghum as p art of the Malagasy food s upply, 1960 2008 As kila calories per capita per day. Source: FAOSTAT 2011 This feedback from nationally created, globally mediated, statistics feeds understandings an d practices of development These trickle down into unrelated projects and define the discourses of development in Madagascar. Rural Malagasy lives are circumscribed by these concerns, which come on one side from concerns with the health of individual Ma lagasy and, on the other, through a vast conservationist industry that reiterates familiar narratives of a lost past. Inadequate Farm to Endangered Forest Madagascar cannot be mentioned without a nod to the island s unique flora and fauna. Almost every pu blication mentions the isolation that led to the island s singularity, a notion in contrast with human history of interconnection (see Raison Jourde and Randrianja 2002) The island is home to a population of 80% endemic species of flora and fauna, found nowhere else on earth. And while scholars debate the necessity of ecological considerations in the HDI, conservation. 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

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49 International agencies are key t o disseminating information on the destruction of Malagasy natural resources, chief among them the dwindling patches of forest across the island. While the FAO carries important statistics on the amount of forestry products that are produced by the countr y, the much more disseminated statistics are those of forest disappearance. The causal chain links deforestation to rural farmers directly through the land management practice of tavy or shifting agriculture that relies on fire to clear agricultural fie lds. The practice is still widespread across much of Madagascar, though its detrimental effec ts are in question (Kull 2004 ; Jarosz 1993 ), as are the rates of forest cover that have been projected backwards since colonialism. As a result of international interest and funding for conservation and the eradication of tavy practices, conservation has become a mainstay of interventions into agricultural practices in rural Madagascar. The inclusion of conservation as impetus and goal of development is more atte nuated in easter n Madagascar, where most current stands of primary forest remain. Figure 1 7. Malagasy f orest d egradation 1990 2008. As a percentage of land area forested. Source: FAOSTAT 2011 21.8 22 22.2 22.4 22.6 22.8 23 23.2 23.4 23.6 23.8 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

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50 Conservation and the specter of the forest loom lar ge in the development programs I worked with. This occurred not because individuals were practicing tavy (though they did) or because they were destroying extant forests (which they did n o t), but because the narrative of destruction and the return to a st atus quo anterior (a forested Madagascar) could be made to align easily with existing (and aspired) contours of inequality between urban/rural, elite/non elite, and good/bad. Statistics on land loss were easily put to work in these processes, and easily put to work as a contrast to the failures of projects themselves. International Aid since Independence Development aid has entered Madagascar from a number of different sources over the years. Unfortunately, the World Bank and Organization for Economic Co operation and Development (O ECD) do not give statistics on S oviet aid during the 1993) Figure 1 8 illustrates the five top donors over the past half century. The biggest single country donors are France and the United St ates, followed by Japan. The notable dips in aid coincide, in most cases, with shifts in political leadership that tended to restructure the island s relations with foreign donors, either through risk aversion, or improved relations. Notable peaks often occur after presidential elections or, as in 1999, drop during periods of crisis.

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51 Figure 1 8. Bilateral a id by c ountry 1960 2010. Source: World Bank 2011 Foreign aid is impor tant to Madagascar, making up an average of 13 % of the he period 1998 200 8 (World Bank 20 11) Approximately 2 0% of ame from France in 2008. The issue of who gives aid is significant. While donor involvement varies across Africa, 20 the particular relations of aid in Madagascar reflect the co ntinuing relationship of the country with its former colonizer. France holds the space at the top of the donor apex, supporting development on the island to the tune of almost 500 Million USD in 2003. Shifts often reflect the way leaders of the receiving country have used donors, and outside interests, strategically to further their personal and political desires. The same can be said of donor countries, wh o play out long standing rivalries in Madagascar public and private realms (see Chapter 2) 20 For example, levels given to former colonies do not seem to show a strict correlation with funds from the former colonizer. In addition, where these funds are made available through former colonizing powers, there is no simple correlation between former colonization and level of involvemen t. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Millions USD European Commission European Union Countries, Excluding France France Japan United States

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52 These strategies are not altogether different from earlier global relations of commerce, and are evident in the continuing trade relationship between Madagascar and France where France represents the island s biggest export marke t. Conversely, France is in th e third space after Thailand and China import market Moreover, the reality of donor aid across Africa, though variable, is still remarkably similar, with many of the same players donating to the same African nations an d the same trends seen across multiple countries 21 In addition to aid by individual countries, Madagascar benefits from directed aid from a series of subsidiary organizations of the United Nations. These organizations help to fund va rious development programs that flow into the local projects administered by a community of development experts and technicians The programs and organizations sponsored by individual nations and UN organizations enter directly into projects like the Village MAP, which uti lizes the clout of the state to harness the developmental productions these organizations perform. This form of international aid also flows indirectly into projects such as the Campus Ambanivohitra which take advantage of a the pairing of an economicall y undependable bureaucracy and the intellectual capital created by a proliferation of development expertise to enact its own technicians and leader s middle class development, and to a lesser extent that of rural farmers. 21 This is an important point because it illustrates the existence of a network of aid that circuits through Africa and is suggestive of the types of connections that might emerge at more localized levels.

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53 Figure 1 9. Development a id from U nited N gencies 1960 2008. Source: World Bank 2011 22 Situating Regional Development in Atsinanana The statistic s that feed the devel opment industry are aggregated in ways that disappear regional difference. This does not occur because of a ny overt desire to negate in country differences though it privileges the nation state as the level and unit of development but rather to keep statistics wieldy and actionable, and to fit them into a global political system still dominated by the natio n state But much falls out of national statistics, particularly in terms of ethno regional inequality and uneven development. In order to understand the micro level interactions of development agents 22 International Fund for Agricutlural Developmen t (IFAD); Jount United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); United Nations Develompent Program (UNDP); United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); (UNICEF); (UNRWA ); United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTA); United Nations World Food Program (WFP) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Millions USD IFAD UNAIDS UNDP UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UNRWA UNTA WFP

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54 and development targets in Atsinanana, it i s necessar y to come down another notch in the vertical hierarchy. The Institut National de la Statistique (INSTAT) the government s statistical office tied to the Malagasy Ministre conomie des Finances et du Budget 23 (INSTAT 2004), provides much of the info rmation used at the level of the World Bank. Locally, and with the financial and logistical backing of organizations such as the World Bank and USAID, INSTAT carries out surveys and compil es data that is deeply involved in legitimizing state action and in ternational intervention. The knowledge they generate is fraught with potential as it coincide s with and lend s credence to conceptions of regional and ethnic inequality, even while it eschew s mention of any markers outside of geography. Of the rural pop ulations of each reg ion of Madagascar, the eastern r egion of Atsinanana situated on the east coast, is the poorest with 86% of rural individuals living under the poverty line (INSTAT 2004) In the region s urban areas, by contrast, 45% of indivi duals are living below the poverty line. This statistical reality adds impetus to development efforts in the region. But in many ways it i s what the statistics do not reveal that helps to structure the pathways of development in the area namely the pol itical importance of the region as a locus of political opposition in the nation. The key to understanding the region s urban/rural discrepancy is the fact that it is home to the island s largest east coast city and main port It has also been a political ly privileged region located in president, Didier 23 The ministry has since changed its name twice, to the (in 2008) to the ie (in 2009; Hanitriniony 2009, MEI 2011, INSTAT 2011)

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55 Ratsiraka, it was the prime locus of governmental opposition during the crisis that atile regions The region of Atsinanana has a population of over a million inhabitants. Where the national average of ind ividuals working in agriculture is 83%, the figure is 96% for Atsinanana. As the Malagasy state, under its first (and now second) M erina president, trie s to quell concerns over ethnoregional inequality, Atsinanana remain s a central theater for the performance of legitimacy. If stati sti cs aid in the creation of the anti politics machine (Ferguson 1990), naturalize the political (Mitch ell 1988, 2002; Mitchell in Crush 1995), and render populations legible and thus controllable (Rose 1996), they also necessitate the proliferation of expert statuses that wield this power without appearing powerful. My research is, in part, an attempt to understand how these different forms of power are Engaging Development: Politics and Uncomfortable Ethnographic Encounter s T he research presented here is based on multi sited and multi scala r ethnographic research on two agricultural development programs in eastern Madagascar. Over nine months from 2008 to 2009 I conducted research in the port city of Tamatave and in smaller cities and villages across Atsinanana. I conducted interviews and participant observation among various groups including: politicians, government officials, project administrators, technicians, farmers and development project Within Atsinanana, my research focused on two rural development projects The first was the Campus Ambanivohitra which began in 2004 as the pet project of the then p resident of the University of Toamasina. The second was t he Campus Fanantenana which began in 2008 as the pet project of the senat or of Atsinanana. The projects we re

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56 similar to others in the region and rel ied on state and international p artners to provide support for interventions that attempt ed to transform the lives of rural farmers through education. While my research was originally centered on the Campus Ambaniv ohitra I was given the opportunity to study the Campus Fanantenana in August of 2008. The senator of the region who in 2005 was the Research Director of the Campus Ambanivohitra and the V ice P resident for Financial Affairs at the University of Toamasin a broke with the former university president who directed the Campus Ambanivohitra and went into state politics. He proposed that I study the Campus Fanantenana Campus Ambanivohitra had failed to address the concerns of the rural poor. The tension between the two projects was evident in the way their respective directors framed them, and in the competitions that ensued over the rural sites that the projects would rely on In part be cause of the tension and in part because of a curiosity about their respective shifts in positions of power, I chose to expand my study to incorporate this new program. Shortly thereafter, the Campus Fanantenana was appropriated into presidential politic s, thrusting the village into the national spotlight and implicating it in state propaganda and new levels of state intervention. In this way, the political positioning of th e men behind these two projects offered me the opportunity to observe two interve ntions with variable geographical scope, political status, and access to international and national development organizations as they were themselves locked

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57 in a process of transformation tha t I later came to understand through a process I have called rebeginning Research focused on the array of actors involved in rural agricultural development within Atsinanana. The formal parameters of the study included populations involved in the two programs I studied, including participant farmers, non partic ipant farmers, project administrators, project staff, and the representatives of the partner organizations that underwrote the projects. Over a hundred individuals were formally interviewed. In addition, participant observation was conducted among all gr oups and included a variety of activities: agricultural labor, ancestral ceremonies, sensibilisation or consciousness raising meetings with the local community, press events promoting the projects or Malagasy development in general, project training, and m eetings to discuss curriculum, methods of evaluation, project problems, etc. In addition, I gathered textual data on these and other development programs in Atsinanana, including the neighboring Sherritt mining project and its social programs, and tracked issues related to development in the realms of politics, agriculture, and education in the local news. The populations I chose to study reflected a concern with understanding development elites and the subjects of development in interaction with each ot her. This diverges from classic al, village based anthropology in rural areas, which tend s to reinforce notions of culture as a bounded and discrete entity in a way that erases the very real and deep interconnections between rural/urban, educated/uneducate d, and focusing on elite cultures (Nader 1972, Forsythe 1999) Working with these groups

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58 present s a number of dilemma s such as the state or development. Despite the struggles involved, the classical village study, with its iconic status in ethnographic writing, is a domain in which the experiences of fieldwork are widely known and discussed. Through the proliferation nal narratives of culture shock the rite of passage for anthropologists ( Clifford and Marcus 1986 ; Ferguson and Gupta 1997 Rabinow 2007 ). At the same time, the rural f ieldwork encounter reproduces the differential between anthropologists (as scholars and scien tists) and their subjects. These differentials can be seen in the alienation of the ethnographic subject from the products of ethnography where rural subjects often lack the ability to access or speak back against the representations proffered in ethnog raphic texts. This alienation of ethnographic subject in classical ethnography creates a dilemma for anthropologists who see their authority strengthened and are thus implicated in the erasure of the voices of su balterns. This dynamic has spurr ed the creat ion of critical ethnography as a way of attenuating the power inherent in the scientific authority of of ethnography that gives shape to sympathy with some subordinated, often silenced, 5 : 249). I nstead of simply speaking about ethnographic subjects, anthropologists also attempt often self consciously to speak for them ( Scheper Hughes 1995; Hale 2006)

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59 Politically, t he gulf between ethn ographic subject and ethnography can offer a measure of anonymity for rural subjects whose lives are laid bare before an audience of academics and foreign students. One rural village in Atsinanana may seem interchangeable with another, and those attemptin g to exploit th e knowledge contained in ethnography for political purposes might find it difficult to locate and identify such a small scale community. In this way, rural ethnography frees anthropologists to speak about and for individuals with some prote ction against the our ethnographic subjects becoming political targets for those individual s who read our texts. The attraction of the advocacy role of anthropology was present in Madagascar, where the failures of the projects I studied to fulfill their o bjectives or visibly improve the lives of participants pulled my alliances towards the rural populations I had worked with, and rendered me at times overly critical of the projects I studied and their staff. I became an (often ineffective) advocate for ru ral populations. This was a situation that rural farmers encouraged because I was present and because I was foreign, a factor that led them to believe I was someone who project director s and politicians would listen to. I accepted this role as the 2009 political crisis drew governmental attention away from the Campus Fanantenana The failures of the project resulted in a community on the verge of a localized famine. Villagers participating in the project attemp ted a number of channels before ask ing if I could intervene to get the government to provide food aid. I found out about government rice stores being held in Tamatave (presumably to sell cheap when the crisis caused the inevi table inflation of food prices) I persuaded the acting director of the project to convince the Chef de Rgion to set aside some few

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60 bags for the community. They called me and informed me of when they would be going out to deliver the aid, but when they arrived they had no rice. Instead they came with a new plan for wage la bor in the area (something that in a climate of crisis seemed dubious who would pay the wages with the government indisposed? More importantly, when? ). In this instance, the local population perceptions about the power of my status proved wrong. Whil e I could get the state to show up, to change some small practices, I could no more get them to make good on their promises than the local po litical leadership Part of the position I inhabited accrued from my role as an anthropologist examining urban and elite, as well as rural and non elite cultures. Up or turning the ethnographic lens on elite cultures troubles the relations of power inherent in the relationship of the anthropologist and their object of study. Where rural ethnography may a fford some measure of protection for ethnographic subjects, ethnographies of elites, particularly in the developing world, create new layers of danger. There are only a limited number of development experts in Madagascar, many of whom are accustomed to wo rking with one another and all of whom inhabit a deeply precarious place where employment is sparse, competition is high, contracts can end, and grants can disappear Descriptions that attend to cultural patterns among these groups lay bare their identit ies and necessitate extra layers of protection E ven in the face of pseudonyms and composites, it would be possible for individuals to deduce the elite agents that I studied. The potential erasure of the alienation of ethnographic subject from ethnograph ic product that exists among more literate and mobile elite cultures increases the possibility that individuals involved with the study might face

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61 negative political and economic consequences for their participation For this reason, I have altered or omi tted the names of my informants and omitted the specific dates of interviews. In addition to these pressing security problems, anthropologists are pulled into the paradoxical situation of attempting to craft ethnographic authority over individuals who ar e very much like themselves. This is particularly true among anthropologists who study issues such as development and science. These close working relations induce a sort of seduction in which the anthropologist may slip out of participant observation in to 5 : 250) a dynamic that holds the potential to mystify the ethnographic subject and render the anthropologist complicit in the reproduction of the cultural patterns that she/he wishes to study. Among state agents, my American ness lent me an air of importance that placed me in the background and, at times, at the center of propaganda efforts and the efforts of elite individuals to advance their political and economic interests. The senator behi nd the Campus Fanantenana saw me as an important ally and invited me to community events in Tamatave More important than this, I acted as a signal to President Ravalomanana was already quite deft at dealing with French development partners). I was offered an office in the oceanfront Presidential Palace in Tamatave ( an overture I respectfully declined), and was told that this was a privilege given because I was American. My privileged and fraught position, rather than reflecting any expert status I held,

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62 linkages and allowed t he senator to differentiate himself from his colleagues 24 The senator also asked that I ap pear periodically on local and national news pieces to talk about the project. I acquiesced to what I consider ed to be a routine negotiation of fieldwork I committed to performing this role honestly and without adding credence to the denigrations of rur al populations common among development experts or letting slip frustrations with what I sometimes viewed as the criminal indifference of development technicians. My acquiescence allowed the senator to access an Anglophone face and voice that could be de ployed to mean almost anything for a vast swath of the Malagasy population who did not speak English. It also offered an Anglophone voice that could act as a legitimizing force for the state This legitimizing function was particularly effective among an expatriate population that included development experts from organizations such as the World Bank and those associated with the burgeoning extractive industries in Tamatave, both of which might pave the way for new forms of funding and partnership As t he political crisis turned serious in January 2009, I began to wonder if I had not been too quick to comply with government in a region known as the center of political opposition (the 2008 9 crisis excluded) m ight not have been worth it. Yet part of anthropological work is learning how to navigate the political alliances necessary t o conduct fieldwork. That means not 24 President Ravalomanana had a long history of privileging Anglophone interests over the interests of the former colonial power. This was in part a response for French support of Ratsiraka during the crisis of 2002, and culminated in the expulsion of the French Ambassador in 2008 and French support for

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63 supporting, but interacting with and gaining some understanding of diverse individuals in div erse positions of power, even where one may disagree with their policy and practice. In the end, I believe the precarious, and sometimes foolhardy, positions I allowed myself to inhabit, strengthened the material I was able to gather, rather than detracti ng from it. These sorts of relationships and the dilemmas they introduced also pulled me into an uncomfortable interstice. I found myself wanting a say in the projects to argue, The teleological narrative of progressive deve lopment pulled at me, as did an oddly sincere faith that tinkering could somehow fulfill the promise s of development or at least temper the more difficult realities that these projects seemed to create I f elt the urge to proscribe the activities of the technicians of development; to urge them to participate in frequent dialogue (the operative word being dialogue) w ith local communities, visit p eople in their homes, discuss their desires, attend to issues of mistrust and try to avoid them. Were I to cross into the realm of pure participation, my driving concern would be to make development projects sustainable not just in ecological terms, but in political and economic ones. These struggles are not something to be laid aside within ethnographic research. Rather, the tensions of the ethnography and the expert (with the power that implies) help to reveal how development articulates with the relationshi ps of power between bu reaucrats expert s and local populations. For this reason, I strive to construct an ethnography that is honest not just about the development projects that I studied, but about my various roles in them.

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64 Chapter Layout This work is compose d of seven chapt ers that span the history and, in part, the present reality of development in Madagascar Chapter 2 outlines the connection and relations between state, international, and local agents across time in agricultural development. Beginning with the pre colon ial Malagasy states, it traces the implication of these multiple stakeholders in the evolution of policies that center state power in its ability to control land and labor in rural areas. It then turns to the colonial period, emphasizing the continuities and disjunctures that colonialism wrought and the increasing importance of the island in creating the agricultural expertise of the metropole. The chapter closes by discussing the post independence period highlighting the continual interplay of agricultu ral development and politics as they are refracted through subsequent governmental regimes that attempt to make agricultural policy their own The next two chapters center on the Campus Ambanivohitra the rural agricultural project that self consciously bi lled itself as space for the creation and dissemination of agricultural and market expertise. Chapter 3 explores the ways that the project created a space for intervention through a reliance on accepted narratives of rural agriculture on the eastern coast that both vilify and idealize rural farmers, redeploying ideas of difference (between highland and coastal, northern and southern) that closely trace the contours of inequality on the island. From h ere, the chapter looks at what is at stake in these repr esentations, understanding them as being simultaneously implicated in the construction and structuring of French governmental morality Malagasy state power, and the elite status of the bureaucrats, agents and brokers of development. Overall, the

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65 chapter is about the rebeginnings that the Campus offered these various agents through the economic, political, and social capital it set into circulation. C hapter 4 continues the examination of the Campus Ambanivohitra project, but turns to the way the project it self was rebegun. Three instances of the projects evolution are examined. The first centers on an original goal, shelved after its first run, to create development experts through an educational exchange between the University of Toamas ina and a French a gricultural engineering university. The exchange resulted in the disappearance of 5 of the 6 Malagasy exchange students into France and the short lived, the partnershi p strengthened the bond between the Campus Haute Normandie, helping to pave the way for his ascension to the office of Senator The second instance of rebeginning consist ed of the near constant geographical relocation of the Campus along lines structured by changes in administrative structure, anticipation of future development partnerships, and rural resistance. The third instance is concerned with the adopt ion, failure, and reorientation of development objectives, particularly the introduction, failure, and abandonment of a micro credit component and the subsequent adoption of new contractual relations between participant farmers, the Campus, and rural commu nities. The failure of micro credit inserted the Campus as a mediator of debt, allowing them greater access to rural agricultural labor in ways that could be turned through the redefinition of project strategy to enhance individual agents social and economic status. Each transformation represented a negotiation with material and political pressures and

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66 underscore d the ways rebeginning works as a strategy for project sustenance (and the continuation of the networked flows of social, economi c, and political capital) in the face of these pressures. Chapters 5 and 6 move to the Campus Fanantenana presented as a partial re creation of the Campus Ambanivohitra which is forced to begin again as it is appropriated by the state as a model Malagasy village. Chapter 5 parallels Chapter 3 in investigating the narratives about development that the project advances and the benefits that can potentially accrue to those individuals brought into it At the same time, the shifted structural alliances of t his new project, and its close alliance with the state, make it an important contrast to the Campus Ambanivohitra The project (highly visible) power of the state behind it (the project was directly administered by the Bureau Regionale de la Presidence BRP) Like the Campus Ambanivohitra participant farmers are recreated and recast within a narrative that highlights their (traditional) deficiencies T he histories of participants confound these assumptions belying t forgotten peasant masses In reality, these agents represent a long history of agricultural knowledge and power most land owners being retired or contemporary state agents in the ex pert organizations sid elined by recent neoliberal ref orms. These individuals complicate development narratives about the peasantry and speak to the force of development to bend individuals to its predetermined will rather than being bent to the will of individuals. Yet develo bureaucrats and politicians levered the project and the narrative it could promote to increase their status. Development emerges here as an important actor in the storie s

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67 the state tells about itself and state agents become intimate producers of state theater as they pursue their own futures through development. T he Campus Fanantenana was also subject to the same processes of rebeginning that characterized the Campus Ambanivohitra Chapter 6 examines these rebe ginnings as conflicts and competitions over the political, economic, and social capital set loose by the project Structured separately and certainly m ore overtly political and less economical than the Campus Ambanivohitra the Campus Fanantenana underwe nt a number of rebeginnings as its main interlocutors moved up in political and bureaucra tic hierarchies, disappeared from the project, or sought to direct the project in ways that c ould illustrate the success of expertise (but not its failure). The proj ect was shaken up multiple times as administrators disappeared up the political ladder and into the political morass that characterized the 2008 2009 crisis. S everal v entures failed, c ausing rural participants to lo se valuable labor and threatening their food security These failures ushered in more intimate relations between rural individuals and the state Chapter 7 returns to the coup that opened this story an event that shifts in focus throughout the text in the same way that the political focus s hifts as we travel between rural and urban and back again. Tracing out some of the events that led up to the 2009 coup that forced the nation into crisis particularly the relationship between the public face of development on the island and its manipulat ion for political gain (for example the prospective Daewoo land acquisition and the Sherritt nickel and cobalt mine both of against which the Campus Fanantenana could be (but never would be) a potent symbol. T he chapter then outlines some of the ways that Rajoelina has rebegun the state since

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68 taking office constantly reinventing his inner circle, disbanding and reorganizing ministries, generally restructuring the st a te in ways that benefit France ( who many their geopolitical influence on the island ) The chapter then turns back to the central process and premise of this work: that 1) d evel opment is best understood as a promise of rebeginning made to institutions and individuals through the very real political, economic, and social capital that flow through ; 2) t hese flows spur competition, making development a si te of confrontation and contestation; 3) i t is precisely within these points of conflict that the boundaries of diversely and variably weighted individual, expert, and state power are constructed ; and 4) t hat these conflicts are subsequently smoothed out b y the sorts of rebeginnings made possible by teleological notions of progress and neoliberal notions of governance ; which are then 5) put back to work in the rebeginnings of individuals and institutions (see no. 1)

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69 CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL CONNECTIO NS: A GRICULTURAL DEVELOPM ENT AND THE REBEGINNINGS OF THE MALAGASY STATE Starting Over: Development and the Malagasy State Using Malagasy h is chapter explores the ways that state governance has displayed patterns of rebeginning o ver time Here, incremental changes stitch ed new forms of power o nto old ones and were constituted sometimes in opposition, sometimes in (at least discursive) alignment to earlier power formations. These moves were never wholesale Rather they partition practices in a way that signals the continuous process es of hybridization that characterize political institutions in connection ( Pieterse 1995, Canclini 2000) 25 Thus, the structures of earlier formations, such as the or local governing bodies, utilized by the pre colonial Kingdom of Imerina, were continued (in modified form) under the French colonial regime and re independence leaders These rebeginnings offered a way for policy makers to build on the governing structures that existed temporally or geographically separate from, if adjacent to, the center of power in question while simultaneously distancing themselves from the politics of earlier regimes, or constructing their governing pow er against previous now cast as hegemonic orders ed throughout this history, its contents emptied and refilled according to the context. Early missionary accounts are replete descriptions of and how these could be that act 25 Rebeginnings are, in a way, a supplement to notions of hybridity that gives some space to understandings of why and how cha nges wrought by connection are assimilated and normalized.

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70 simultaneously as technologies of power and technologies of self ( Foucault et al 1988) In many areas missionaries worked with local authori ties to create these systems, with Protestant missionaries from the London Missionary Society (LMS) implicated in expansion of practical state education in the highland Kingdom of Imerina in the 1820s, and Jesuit missionaries on the coasts establish ing the ir own institutional systems Throughout, missionary understandings of local populations were levered into a need island would continu e through the colonial period. The colonial state would become, under pressure from colonizing populations, a main agent in the creation of expertise, the colonies. These efforts initiated a network of epi stemological power that remains in altered and almost skeletal form today As African states began to agitate for independence after WWII, development was given new life as an argument against colonial powe r in Madagascar (Cooper 2002, Cooper and Packard 1997) Malagasy nationalists took up development as an object necessitating autonomy; an object unattainable under the colonial system. In this way, development played a key role in the emergence of a nati onalist discourse, and the creation of post WWII forms of Malagasy identity. Even so, the forms of subjectivit y engendered by these new calls the types of Malagasy subject imagined were often layered over these earlier (colonial) discourses of develop ment. More recently, post independence leaders have made narratives of dev elopment central to the contemporary legitimacy of the state. Political crises, which have

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71 occurred regularly, are often driven by development al concerns that focus on asymmetries of power even while the practices of subsequent regimes have left these asymmetries largely intact The final section of this chapter traces these enduring assymetires Pre Colonial Madagascar Understanding the issues that face the contemporary Malagasy state requires some understanding of the island s pre colonial political history. The human history of Madagascar begins early in the current era, with populations from Africa and Indonesia, as well as the Middle East, arri ving on the coasts in a steady stream from approximately 400 C.E (Randr ianja and Ellis 2009, Cole 2001 ). While some came for trade, others made a life for themselves on the island, settling along the coasts and waterways and eventually moving inland Over time, these populations created kingdoms that, variously, cooperated, co opted, and conflicted with one another. These political groupings became the basis on which the multiple ethnic groups that make up the current Malagasy nation state were formed Two of these polities are particularly important for understanding the contemporary political and developmental realities of eastern Madagascar. The first i s the Betsimisaraka Kingdom / Confederation ( Randrianja and Ellis 2009, Cole 2001) 26 The creati on of a mtisse polity on which the eastern 26 among historians and anthropologists (see Cole 2001, Randrianja and Ellis 2009, Rakotondrabe 1993). Clearly the designation has political implications. To claim it as a kingdom is to assume centralization, project a longevity of centralized leadership that never really existed, and negate claims to Betsimisaraka exceptionalism. To claim it as a confederacy is to give it more egalitarianism than it, in fact, displayed, but does offer a potent political symbolism that offers a response that accepts, perhaps wrongheadedly, difference as a starting point. I am pulled both ways here, and so have lef t both, with the understanding that both understandings play a part in how Malagasy individuals today understand their place within the Malagasy state and its potential futures.

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72 ethnicity of Betsimisaraka was formed. Despite its temporal disconnection from the Kingdom of Imerina, the Betsimisaraka remains a salient political imagining that continu es to be deployed as an alternative reality to contemporary social inequality and the increasing centralization of state power The second is the highland Kingdom of Madagascar / Imerina (Randrianja and Ellis 2009) 27 Geographically based in the central highlands surrounding the capital city of Antananarivo, the kingdom constitutes a potent symbol of the Malagasy nation past and present It is also considered, among coastal ethnicities to be the base on which e thno regional inequality is rooted or am ong highland ethnicities, to be a baseless While the reality is debatable, the perception is palpable, particularly in times of crisis. Imerina, whether it i s viewed as a hegemonic force or continues to cast a shadow over Malagasy politics. The Betsimisaraka Confederation / Kingdom, 1712 1750 On the eastern coast the seventeenth century saw the continuation of the trade and concomitant pir acy that had helped to populate the island. Coastal p opulations profited from the slave trade and the weaponry it made available. International trade fueled regional conflict and contributed to the consolidation of power in Kingdoms along the Malagasy co ast s One such Kingdom was the north western Sakalava Kingdom of 27 However, a number of English language publications, particularly those written by anthropologists have labeled it the Kingdom of Imerina. The moniker had the effect of differentiating it from other kingdoms, such as the Sakalava, that coexisted with the highland Kingdom and emphasized, to an extent, thet the kingdoms powers were historical usage and tends towards the equation of the Kingdom with a certain e thnicity. This latter issue tends to ignore the islands very real history of migration. Both monikers leave something to be desired. I use both throughout to denote both the Kingdom and its regional base, to differentiate it from its neighbors, and to a id readers in understanding how salient their power was.

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73 Boina that would come to rule over much of the island northern regions The Sakalava had begun to move inland, exert ing power over the highland kingdoms through tribute. The King of Boina in the early 18 th politics of incorporating advisors and adopting military innovations from European pirates. His engagement in global commerce and the relationships he fostered spurred the creation of a number o f smaller kingdoms led by pirates on the eastern coast. These, in turn, created a dynasty of zanamalata or, children of the mulattoes (Ellis 2007, 447). It was among this group that the son of an English pirate and a Malagasy princess, Ratsimilaho, was b orn. Ratsimilaho would become an advisor to King Toakafo, before returning to the eastern coast in the early 18th century At the time tensions among the eastern clans were beginning to surface with southern ancestries concerned about the monopolization of trading ports by northern ancestries. Eventually, the southern ancestries attacked under the leadership of a man called Ramano. In response, Ratsimilaho created a coalition with northern and southern ancestries to form a federation against southern e ncroachment. Eventually, Ratsimilaho made a pact with leader of another southern ancestry and defeated Ramano. The polity he created in part a rebeginning of the Sakalava kingdom called a kingdom by some and a confederation by others, lasted from 171 2 : 38 ; see also Deschamps 196 5 ). The polity lasted less than 40 years, but the designation of the Betsimisaraka remained, and became the moniker for a large swath of ind ividuals across the eastern coast. The designation, and the historical memory of Betsimisaraka has had lasting

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74 effects on the island s poli tics. On the eve of colonization the ethnic designation would come to signify the brutality of the Imerina kingdo m in French eyes. During colonialism, politiques des races and subsumed under the l abel ctier (coastal) again set against a n oppressive an d hegemonic Imerina. After independence, the Betsimisaraka wo uld take up both these mantels, becoming the ethnic origin of President Didier Ratsiraka, who crafted hims elf, in part, as the leader of the ctier while ideas of Betsimisaraka as political formation fed notions of helped to construct the imagined futures of governance in Madagascar (Rakotondrabe 1993). Imerina and the Rise of the Kingdom of Madagascar The Imerina k ingdom emerged on the highland plateau in the latter part of the 15th century ( Deschamps 1965; Ki Zerbo and Niane 1997, Raz afintsalama in Raison Jourde 1983). Like the other kingdoms it thrived through interconnection. Imerina r ulers adopted technological, governmental, and cultural practices from nearby rulers as well as empires of global scope and solidif ied th eir position with these other powers through both amity and enmity. Over time, and at intervals, the kingdom expanded both the form and territorial scope of its power. The Merina Kingdom is important to contemporary understandings of Malagasy ethnicity and politics, and its political ascension is often seen as the root of contemporary manifestations of inequality. Much of this perceived inequality is linked to the extension of governing institutions, and its subsequent entry into the governanc e of land, labor, and knowledge. Built atop the territory of the part mythical / part real vazimba kingdom successive Merina monarchs consolidated a kingdom that would come to conquer most of the island by the time of colonial conquest (Berg 1977;

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75 Randri anja and Ellis 2009) The most notable among these are credited with the introduction of a number of advances to agriculture and its governance. These included the introduction of ironinto the construction of spears, axes, and hoes 28 ( Andriamanelo, r. 1 540 1575), the transformation of highland marshland into irrigated rice fields (Andrianjaka r. 1610 1630), and the construction of dykes and canals throughout the kingdom ( Andriamasinavalona r. 1675 1710; Brown 2000; Kent 1970 ; Deschamps 1 965, Koerner 1999 ) Subsequent leaders split the territory before, over a half century later, the famed Andrianampoinimerina ( r. 1787 1810 ) would reconnect it He accomplished this by using the slave t rade 29 as a source for investment in foreign weapons (Randria n ja and Ell is 2009). He turned this weaponry into a consolidation of the surrounding kingdoms of Imerina by 1790, and the subsequent annexation of non Merina kingdoms through threat of military destruction Those he could not conquer, he opened diplomatic relations with, making agreements and inviting their advisors and scholars to the seat of governance in Imerina to improve the kingdom. 30 In the agrarian realm Andrianampoinimerina expanded the highland focus on intensive rizicult ure through irrigation projects, enabling dual season rice production. These state projects were facilitated by fanompoana an established labor relation that 28 Randrianja and Ellis 2009). 29 Slavery relied on captives taken through local conflicts, accu sed of witchcraft, or otherwise on the wrong side of the power equation (Randrianja and Ellis 2009). 30 Most notably, Andrianampoinimerina exchanged gifts with the Kingdom of Sakalava in the northwest in the hope of negotiating some sort of recognition of h is authority (Deschamps 1965: 123). He also took advantage of the intellectual capital of neighboring kingdoms, bringing Anakara scholars from the southeastern Kingdom of Antemoro (Antaimoro) to share their knowledge of Arabic script in Imerina (Deschamps 1965, Kent 1969; Kus and Raharijaona 2000, 2008).

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76 obliged lower status and rank Merina (and later others) into unremunerated labor for those above them (Campbell 2005: 64) Andr ianampoinimerina expanded and formalized these obligations, establishing a system wherein local village councils, or would transmit royal decrees extracting labor for public works to the tune of 24 days of labor per year, mainly in the domain of agriculture. These formal obligations, and the canals and dykes they created, had a profound effect on the peasantry, arresting their mobility and facilitating their subjection to t axes and new forms of corve labor ( Deschamps 1965: 126; Randrianja and Ellis 2009:118). In 1810, Andrianampoinimerina died, naming his son Radama I (r. 1810 1828) as gesturing toward the powerful link between riziculture and political power (Deschamps 196 5: 127). By now the French had already made progress on the coasts, setting up governing bodies alongside the missionary presence of the French Jesuits The British, meanwhile, had established a colony on the nearby island of Mauritius. Radama exploited tensions and competition between Britain and France to convince the British to provide arms and support to the Kingdom In 1817, he signed a treaty with Governor Farquhar in which the British would supply arms to the Kingdom in excha nge for the abolition of the (foreign) slave tra de (Deschamps 1965). Radama I took full advantage of foreign expertise in ways that echoed the geopolitical strategies of his predecessors, creating a large cad r e of E uropean advisors. Their counsel and wha t infrastructure they had established on the island was put to 31 of fanompoana labor 31 Under Radama I, the army became a realm of permanent fanompoana as opposed to civilian fanompoana.

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77 obligations through institutions such as the army and schools in the early 1920s (Koerner 1999, Campbell 2005). W hile schools were mainly focused on literacy and mathematics, many had practical aspects, instructing students on tangibly productive capability such as carpentry (Koerner 1999). Radama I also instituted a sort of industrial fanompoana that staff ed the facto ries and factory farms led by Europeans and Merina throughout the, by now largely e xpanded, kingdom (Campbell 2005 ). These expansions of state power, and the concomitant creation of state infrastructure, was a source of conflict in regions such as At sinanana, where the influx of Merina or foreign missionary teachers was seen as an effort by the Merina to exert control over independent local populations or to turn non Merina children into Merina. King Radama died in 1828 and was succeeded, with the a id of a coup, by Queen Ranavalona I (r. 1828 1861; Deschamps 1965: 164; Randrianja and Ellis 2009). Ranavalona I was subject to new pressures from within, and her rule marked, in large part, the end of an independent monarchy (Randrianja and Ellis 2009). power rested on the wills of military leaders and traders. setting about suppressing and, in part, erasing the changes wrought by Radama She cut ties with the European merchants and technicians that had been welcomed by Radama and closed the 23 state schools he initiated (Koerner 1999). She reacted violently against the incursion of Christianity into the highlands, killing some hundred thousand converts and reportedly burying believers alive, drowning them in boiling water, or driving them off cliffs (Colin and Suau 1895). Despite her isolationist tendencies

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78 Ranavalona I accepted some foreigners 32 into her council and kept the lines of communica tion with European power s open 33 Ranavalona I famed brutality offered French missionaries and imperialists an entry point to greater control over the island and they set about exploit ing the fears of Merina elites and the leaders of neighboring kingdoms. The French governmen t negotiate d with nobles and royalty that fled or were exiled outside of the territory of Imerina establishing a protectorate among these in 1839 (Deschamps 1965: 171). In 1841, the Kingdom of Bemihisatra Sakalava in the north western region of the islan d submitted to french protection (Sharp 200 2: 31). s son, Rakoto, was venturing into territorial politics. In 1855, he signed a deal to hand over a substantial land concession to a group of French exchange for political support (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 129). The attempt garnered him ill will among the ruling class that stood behind the monarch and ignited anti European sentiment. In 1861 Queen Ranavalon a I died, leaving the throne to her son Rakoto, who took the name Radama II ( r. 1861 1863; Sharp 200 2 ). Radama the polar opposite of his as the name suggests, Radama II south to in part, return, reclaim, and recast a status quo anterior while adopting what was surely a 32 Most notably, the Frenchman Jean Laborde, who was shipwrecked, enslaved, and subsequently pressed int Randrianja and Ellis 2009). Laborde was responsible not only for arms. His work in the capital he fashion of the earlier English missionaries. Laborde opened a sugar refinement factory, a rum factory, an experimental field for tropical plants, and an agricultural training center (Deschamps 1965). 33 he England to halt the international slave trade from Madagascar, and offering her willingness to engage in fair trade with France and England (Resident 1847: 68)

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79 naively open policy towards his enemies He refused to pursue or punish the Merina nobles who opposed his ascension to the throne, freed the Christian converts imprisoned by his mother, welcomed back B ritish and French missionaries, and renounced slave raids and co nquests of neighboring kingdoms His reign abolished fanompoana and customs taxes authorizing, to become his own salesman; to dispose of his goods on his o Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 129) a prescient Around the same time, Radama II sovereignty, sign ing treaties with France and England allowin g them the right to buy land assur ing their freedom of movement and religion, and the right to be tried by their own consuls rather than by Merina authorities (Deschamps 1965) Ra da ma integrity of the kingdom and engender ed opp osition from his opponents. H e was killed in 1863 just two years after being named king by his councilor, Raharo (Deschamps 1965: 176). F rom his assassination until the advent of colonialism in 1896, the monarchy incr easingly shifted towards oligarchy built upon a cadre of ambitious nobles who competed to control the kingdom. When his first wife Rasoherina (r. 1863 1868) took the throne, she could no longer make decisions without consul ting the nobles under her. Subsequently, t reaties with Britain and France were Radama II. Rainilaiarivony, his s uccessor as prime minister in 1864 (Deschamps 1965: 179).

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80 Rainilaiarivony married Rasoherina and the two sought to repair the now worn relations between the Kingdom of Imerina and the British In 1865 they signed a new treaty with England, again assur ing the abolition of the slave trade and foreign property rights on the island. 34 The Kingdom signed a similar treaty with the United States in 1867 and the French in 1868. Rainilaiarivony remained in his post until a plot to kill the Queen was carried ou t by his brother and rival, Raharo. Rainilaia r ivony then orchestrated the ascension of another of Radama (r. 1868 1883) and married her (Deschamps 1965) The couple converted to Protestantism, a move that reflect ed their own histories of missionary contact (and education) and the strength of the LMS in the highlands, as well as a conscious move against French and catholic interests (Deschamps 1965: 181). After their conversion Rainilaiarivony and Queen Ranavalona II embarked on a values. They also extended the scope of Merina power, sending former soldiers into rural areas as administrators, establishing governors across the islan d, and relying on governing councils, or in villages to provide the fanompoana 35 that constituted both a continuation of former state policy and a replacement fo r now firmly abolished slave labor (Allen 1995: 25; Deschamps 1965 ; Campbell 2005 ). 34 These treaties are open to some interpretation, though they effectively represented the pro tection affairs. As far as land usage, they allowed 90 year leases, but not foreign land ownership, a situation that continues to this day (see Oliver 18 1998 for discussion of misunderstandings and questionable translations of these treaties at the time of their initiation). 35 Fanompoana was firmly established from about the 16 th century and was key in public works projects such as irrigation dykes (Campbell 1988).

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81 Concomitant with this expansion of state power, the Imerina Kingdom codified its governing regulations, publishing the Code of 305 Articles in 1881. These re formalized Malagasy living outs ide of the capital, ranging from compulsory schooling to currency regulation (Parker 1883). T and established policies, some already codified since Andrianampoinimerina, to control ac cess to forest resources (Kull 2004). They also began a process in which the kingdom attempted to gain further purchase on the mobility of populations, and their relationships with the land. Cole (2001) details the ones that are centrally important to th e relatively forested eastern coastal regions : Article 104: They [Betsimisaraka] 36 cannot build houses in the forest without the authorization of the government. If people erect, for the purpose of inhabitation, houses in the forest, they will be punished with a fine of 10 cattle and 10 piast er s and their houses will be destroyed and they must also pay an indemnity of one cow and one piaster for each tree cut. Article 105: It is forbidden to clear the forest by means of fire with the intention of planting fields of rice, corn, or other crops. Those areas already cleared may be cultivated, but if people clear new land with fire or extend those clearings already in existence they will be mis au fers [put in chains, i.e., imprisoned] for five years. Article 106: Those trees located next to the ocean can not be cut or damaged unless it is under the express orders of the government. Whoever damages the forest will be punished with a fine of 10 cattle and 10 piastres, and if they cannot pay will be put in priso n until they work o ff the fine. [Cole 2001: 42, citing Esoavelomandroso 1979: 83] Tavy or the practice of burning land for shifting agric ulture is described in Article 105. Its codification formalizes already extant discourses of state control over fore st 36 The law was written generally, though the fact that most of the remaining forest remained, at the time, along the eastern coast, making the laws most pertinent to this are a. The bracketed designation here is

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82 resources and ushers in linkages of tavy with deforestation on the island, a linkage that remains central to co ntemporary development schemes. monarchy and tried in earnest to la y claim on Madagascar as a colonial possession. The y attacked Merina posts on estern and e astern coasts 37 (specifically the cities of Tamatave and Majunga) and delivered an ultimatum to Rainilaiarivony in 1883 just as Ranavalona II was dying. Rainilaiarivony again married the successor to the throne, who was r enamed Ranavalona III (r. 1883 1897; Deschamps 1965: 186). Throughout this two hundred year period the highland Kingdom of Madagascar expanded its territory and extended its sway over ru ral subjects, staking a claim on the land, and trying to pin it down, for government control of individuals and resources. The codes were just one example of this. Irrigation and dykes likewise brough t rural subjects under new forms of state power. Fano mpoana obligations set rural and urban labor in the hands of a centralized power structure, and the extension of stretched this relation into a vertical power grid and expanded the potential for the surveillance and control of subjects This same period saw the Kingdom of Madagascar formed into a lever with which the French could excuse their intervention in the island s politics and stake a claim on its economic potential. The portrait that emerged of Imerina and its relations with the coast imagining of France as a just and right nation. This nest of geopolitical power would 37 Particularly the port cities of Tamatave and Majunga.

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83 remain impo rtant for local politics, particularly recently, when anglophone and francophone interests vie for, and get caught up in, power on the island. French Imaginings of Hegemony and Indolence The attendant discourses of French colonialism in Madagascar relied o n several constructions. Th e most important were centered on the specter of Merina hegemony and the idea of the indolent and unproductive Malagasy This section briefly outlines these two discourses, which are twisted into the tapestry of modern Malagasy politics. Discourses of o ppress ion Imerina kingdom carrying out a practice of dehumanization that would carry French interests in the island s material and human resour ces forward : syndicate of families united to exploit the larger populace. Barbaric princes already guilty of human sacrifice and horrors that it is impossible for me to describe here. A kingdom recognized as the master of an island of which it paid by its citizens. Here rape, there robbery, elsewhere piracy. Everywhere the eans in Randrianja 2004: 84]. Colonialism was beginning to be constructed as an anti hegemonic act, not to civilize but to protect the Malagasy from the worst natures of their inhabitants, specifically those inhabitants of the highlands Madagascar In 1895, speaking of the Merina / Protestant schools established on the eastern coast s the Catholic missionaries highlighted what they viewed as some of the cruelties of Merina rule: The Betsimisaraka people, in the countryside, die of hunger and misery. Two calamities are in the midst of being achieved, which are the militarism

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84 and, a strange thing, the protestant schools. All eligible youth even children of 14 or 15 years are taken from the villages and brought to the centers, where Hova 38 officers instruct them. Condemned to idleness, forced to feed themselves, house themselves, clothe themselves, conscripts are forced to borrow. Their officers pressure them to borrow clothes and rice at huge interest, at exorbitant interest. The future harvests of the old parents are also mortgaged in advance. [Colin and Suau 1895: 304] Their perceptions were colored both by their rivalry with the protestants, who dominated in the highlands, and their convictions of th e superiority of the French system and the equality it offered Ironically, many of the practices the missionaries critiqued would later be revisited upon the Malagasy by the French. Crafting Indolence If the image of a violent and hegemonic kingdom cal led forth a French government that was equitable and peaceful, it was accompanied by an (incongruent) image of local indolence and irrational land usage. the island, stating: The case which is particular to Madagascar, where a population of only a million inhabitants occupy land that could sustain forty million, leaving the rest of the land in an uncultivated state so that they can live there without work. [188 4 : xij] The assertion rallied popular E uropean discourses rooted in th e work s of European thinkers like the Swi Law of Nations from 1758: It is a popular question, to which the discovery of the new world has principally given place. One asks if a nation can legitimat ely occupy some part of a vast country, in which one finds nothing but errant people, incapable, by their small number, to live everywhere. These peoples cannot give themselves more land than what they need and on which they are not living or cultivating. Their vague habitation in these immense regions cannot pass for a true and legitimate possession and the peoples of Europe, already overpopulated in their realm, finding terrain for which the 38 Hova is another word for Merina, but carries the connotation of commoner.

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85 savages have no particular need and do not currently use or ma intain, could legitimately occupy and establish c 18 84: xij xiij]. This viewpoint of fered a framework that coupled with the discourse of Imerina hegemony outlined above, could be used to rationalize the expansion of French inv olvement from protectorate to colony. M orality hangs heavily here; a lack of cultivation beyond personal subsistence gestured towards a lack of proper morality and a misunderstanding of the world. Private property, in this equation is a relationship bet ween person and thing that requires const ant supervision and nourishment T he relations created between missionaries and local populations, the longstanding state interest in controlling the cultivation of rice in the highlands, the role and multiple fail ures of earlier attempts to penetrate the island, and the missionary outposts aimed at both were deconstructed, debased and sometimes recast in order to legitimize the colonial endeavor. Colonial Power in Madagasca r By 1890, narratives of Meri na disorder abounded and missio naries beg a n to call for French intervention. While these narratives helped to legitimize intervention, an accompanying series of fisca l traps solidified French political relevance in the area. The period was characte rized by methods of power that parallel the syndicates of organized crime ( see Tilly 1985) the French offered protection. The Malagasy owed an indemnity for th is p rotection This thinly veiled extortion saddled the k ingdom with a debt of 10 million francs (~ 2 million USD). The Imerina leadership initially attempted to create a national bank from which it could secure a loan to repay the indemnity with the help of the British on the basis of future customs income. The Fren ch, however, insisted that the Kingdom borrow only from French

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86 institutions, forcing it to borrow from the (CNEP) at seven per cent interest (Campbell 1988 b : 2 8 3 4 ). Establishing Colonial Authority This loan guarantee deprived the Malagasy state of tax revenue and forced the Kingdom to grant Europeans concessions for mineral and timber exploitation (Boahen 1985). Even with these concessions, the Kingdom was unable to meet its financial obligations to the CNEP and subs equently extracted more labor and taxes from the populace to recover the deficit. The c ustoms income on which it depended, was often lost to local and state corruption, or to the lack of customs taxes at the western ports, which remained indepen dent from Imerina (Campbell 1988 a : 287). This dynamic of debt, and the extension of political authority to cover that debt, fed into the already present concerns of non Merina Malagasy over It also fed directly into French narra tives of Imerina governance as defective, pass, absolutist, and tyrannical By 1887, the CNEP moved to take over the customs offices themselves, expanding their control over international trade. This instance signals the centrality of trade through custo ms and in the creation and expansion of state power. In Madagascar, as on the African continent, control over trade translated into the expansion of the governmental and fiscal capabilities of the state and was a key component of colonial power (see Cha lf in 2010). For Madagascar, the border remains an important space for state formation, as well as the formation of non state and extra state forms of governance ( see also Chalfin 2010, Roitman 2005). It is precisely this centrality that makes the Region of Atsinanana (and formerl y the Province of Toamasina) an important site for the reinvention and extension of systems of governance with a decidedly geopolitical and moral twist. Local interest in

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87 development means more than simply development, and the cons iderations of choosing Atsinanana are not disconnected from this reality. When the Kingdom of Imerina rejected French overtures to expand their control, France declared war on the Merina, sending in troops and taking control of Antananarivo in September of 1895 (Boahen 1985). Occupying the capital, however, against the introduction of Christianity and the presumed disappearance of Malagasy culture that came to be known as the Menalamba 39 This movement is often iden tified by scholars as the emergence of nationalism on the island (Ellis 1985). The Menalamba revolts lasted until 1898 and sought to restore a mythic Malagasy past before French and Christian encroachment. While Merina nobles, or andriana took up leadership roles within the movement, both the peasantry and nobility were involved and claimed they acted under the order of Queen Ranavalona III (Clayton 1993). New Colonial Orders and the Patterns of Power The M enalamba ended in 1896, when the French sent Colonel Joseph Simon Gallieni to take over the new and French concerns with Merina hegemony. One of his first acts was to rework the monarchy, killing off those who might be a threat He establish ed in their stead rulers that he imagined would be more amenable to French concerns. Changing course from previous relations between France and the Kingdom which at least sought to utilize the nobles, Gallieni ex iled the Merina royal family in 1897 and annulled the privileges of the aristocracy (Boahen 1985; Clayton 1993). Adding insult to injury, he had his men open 39 Translated as the Red Shawls.

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88 and desecrate the royal tombs an act that visibly sought to break territorial and historical li nkages. The strategies of conquering the Malagasy were not simply or consistently destructive. Gallieni attempted to harness the power of royal linkage, reinvent ing the Merina Festival of the Royal Bath, or Fandroana as Bastille Day by incorporating el ements of the celebration into Bastille D ay festivities on the island (Clayton 1993; Sharp 200 2 ). Gallieni also established a politique s des races based on French colonial policies in the Sudan and Indochina, which divided the island into ethnic groups an d assigned them to territories (Boahen 1985; Clayton 1993). It was an attempt, for Gallieni, to reinstall and rework his experiences elsewhere in the empire while simultaneously exploiting the politics of difference that was linked to competition and conf rontation between different kingdoms. Like the policies set forth by Andrianampoinimerina a century beforehand, this policy allowed the (French) state to control the mobility of the Malagasy people and thus their labor and their commerce. The focus of t his arrest on mobility, however, was the Merina. Control over their movement, for the French, was at once an act of vengeance in retaliation for Merina resistance and a containment policy against further troubles. Under this policy, Gallieni forced Merin a administrators stationed in coastal areas back to the highlands and appointed local chiefs to replace them (Clayton 1993: 98). In so doing, he also provided a gesture of good faith to the non Merina peoples that had the Kingdom of Imerina. policies, however, did not represent a break with the power structures instituted by the highland monarchy. Rather, he layered French structures atop

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89 Malagasy forms, transforming the content of both in the process. A t the local level, Gallieni extended the form of local counseling bodies that had been formalized by the Merina monarchy in their territories to the entire island (Boahen 1985). He also utilized and extended the fanompoana or forced labor tha t the required 50 days a year of labor from Malagasy males between the ages and 16 and 60 (114). The fanompoana, By 1901, Gallieni was complaining that both colonists and Malagasy had found a way to game the system and avoid the labor obligations he imposed Gallieni explained his frustrations to the Chief of the Africa section at the Union Coloniale a gro up funded by French businesses : You immediately see the consequence of this abuse. The natives, instead of becoming used to work, stay idle, happy to pay a modest sum to unscrupulous employers. As for the European colonists, the consequences are even worse conce rning serious colonization, the only type I must work to encourage. These individuals do nothing, and having brought no resources with them, limit them selves to living off of this for m of rent which is paid to them by the natives [Gallieni 1928: 68] This idleness, both of Malagasy and of colonists, has detrimental effects on what Gallieni Th e drive to economic productivity was a key principle in the objectives of the Union Colonial who in 1897 defined their goals as: To find all means necessary to assure development, prosperity, and the defence [sic] of the diverse branches of agriculture, commerce, and industry in our colonies. To unite all organizations and societies with these intere sts in common.

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90 To examine and present all economic or legislative measures deemed necessary to the public powers and to disseminate them by publicity in newspapers, etc. [Pe rsell 1974: 177] The Union allied itself with the Chambers of Commerce in the colon y and metropole to policy dedicated to the development of a colon establishment of railroads and a drastic alteration of the colonial tariff st Agriculture was key, and the Union focused their attention on providing training for colon ist task was finished, commerce could be established. In Madaga scar, Gallieni dutifully reported his issues with prestation or fanompoana t engendered. Gallieni sought to institute a wage labor system in which Malagasy workers who would then pay back in to the system through raised taxes and through the spending of these wages with French merchants, thus providing both the labor and a market for the colony ( Gallieni 1928: 70). The Union Coloniale was concerned about government expenditures and only parti ally able to influence th e direction of government funds and sought to continue the fanompoana Gallieni would later critique the Union colonial cause in order to support even pri vate interests, which really have nothing in (81 82). Gallieni was partially successful in arguing that only a tax would spur the Malagasy to work. He argued, in the morality of their work, saying:

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91 We have erased the forced labor and all the other subjugations through which our Malagasy were submitted under the former government, but, in doing this, I dec lared loudly and to the minister, and to the native protection organizations, and to all those who protested, complained, or asked me for them to productive work, they will all r eturn to their laziness and habitual resources for food, a little rice each day, a bad lamba [ piece of cloth ] to cover themselves. [Gallieni 1928: 133] In reality, forced labor was not so m uch erased as reorganized under new Office Central du Travail in 1900 to recruit natives to work on colonial projects (Boahen 1985: 114). In 1926 the (SMOTIG Manual Labor Service for Public Works was initiated. This office organized labor on colonial construction, requiring Malagasy men who were conscripted but not pressed into military service to serve for two to three years of manua l labor (Boahen 1985). Education was pressed into the service of these labor and material needs, and practical education, as in the Kingdom of Imerina, proliferated. In 1902 Gallieni spoke optimistically of the goals he hoped to accomplish by 1906, incl uding a railroad, a road network, an agricultural service, and successful plantations on the eastern coast into the everyday lives of Malagasy people, extracting labor and resources, while at the same time carrying out the discursive work of making colonialism rational and right. Alongside the desire for labor and resources came the construction of the Malagasy as indolent, the French as industrious and good governors, the Merina as obstinate the land as empty, etc. examining. In 1899, in a letter to the Secretary General of the Union Gallieni defends

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92 himself against claims of French brutality and explains the situation in Madagascar as he sees it: Here, it was necessary to franciser the island, which was English and hova 40 and, for this it was necessary that the governor general, successor of the queen, received in the beginning, the same hon ors as her. My modesty if it had been otherwise, would have been exploited by the hostile principal building of the English to make public buildings under our flag, advantages for goal. [Gallieni 1928: 54] illustrates the paradoxical relationship colonialism wrought. The French sought to b e both the replacement of and the answer to Merina hegemony and expected loyalty from the Merina, those that had been conquered by the Kingdom of Imerina, and those that had remained independent up until the French annexed the island in 1885 and establishe d the colony in 1896. The relationship between the French and the Merina remained fraught, and in 1901, in a letter to the director of Gallieni expressed his vision for Madagascar is not a settler colony, an d its economic, agricultural, mining, and industrial future (forests, distilleries, dcotiqueries, etc.) are found in the coastal and intermediary areas (5 to 600 meters in altitude), to the economic capital or the economic capitals of the island, since Tamatave, Majunga and Diego each have well determined fields of action, will sooner or later move towards the coasts. Naturally, Tananarive will always stay the military capital and a represented [87]. 40 Hova is the name the French often used for t he Merina and denoted commoners within the kingdom (Randrianja and Ellis 2009).

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93 Gallieni here lays out a vision that reiterates the goals of the Union but also reflects the views of the metropole vis vis their former adversary. The sentiment was reflected i n policy with the colonial government attempting to set up schools and reorient the administrative centers away from the highlands Yet the preexisting infrastructure meant that in tellectual core (Koerner 1999; Randrianja and Ellis 2009). coupled with the intermittent flow of funds from the metropole, meant that in reality what Gallieni was able to accomplish during this early period of col onization imagined in the British colonies (Lugard and Perham 1965). Relying on local leaders and partially appropriating local structures allowed Gallieni to keep the colony afloat. Throughout the colonial p eriod, French administrators oscillated between forms of direct and indirect rule and between policies of assimilation and distinction. These chronic shifts resulted from decisions made in the metropole and practical complications in the colonies. They a lso accompanied changes in personnel as the government traded administrators among its colonies in Africa and Asia. The infrastructure of Madagascar improved in fits and starts. Gallieni initiated a series of roads to link the central highlands to the mai n inland cities and coastal ports. Later governors, using the modified colonial version of fanompoana corve a policy that indexed fanompoana as well as the labor policies of other colonies to continue this work. This infrastructural effort was given impetus by World War s I and II, and postwar plans centered on creating, improving or repairing the infrastructure meant to service the economic needs of the colony (Thompson and Adloff 1965).

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94 The Malagasy colony continued with the taxation po licies suggested by Gallieni and thereby created what Randrianja and Elli s (2009: 161) describe as a vic ious circle. Here the colonial government sought revenue to pay for its own administration. To gain this revenue they imposed taxes on a number of pop ulations that were only partially linked into the market economy. Extracting resources from these populations decreased their ability to buy imported goods, which then decreased the revenue of the state, which led in turn to an increase on pressure to gai n state revenue through taxes. The colonial power, rather than creating the producers and consumers imagined by the Union Coloniale created a bureaucracy that absorbed some 80% of state revenue by 1955 (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 162). Meanwhile, the p opulation continued to grow, putting ever more pressure on the colonial administrat ion and the already over taxed state revenue system. Colonial Networks of Expertise During this period, and particularly through the developmentalist policies of the metropo le, Madagascar was pulled tightly into French networks of expertise. While the Kingdom of Imerina was establishing its power base in the highlands, France folded scientific expertise into the work of Empire, partnering with agricultural and medical associ ations in France and in the count s new colonies (McClellan and Regourd 2000). By the time Gallieni was brought in to quell resistance, explorers and doctors working on the island had already been influencing knowledge about the tropics in the metropole These scientific endeavors were formalized and explicitly linked to the governing powers of the colonial regime at the same time that Gallieni took control of the island. The y also reflect the emergence of interest in improving the lives of people tho ugh it should be no surprise that the people whose lives they intended to improve

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95 were French colonists and French in the exterior, especially the island of Reunion. It was in this way that the colony supported the creation of the metropole ( see also Coma roff and Comaroff 1997). F orays into the economic improvement of the metropole and its subsidiaries relied on the same themes that shape development today and had, to an extent, shaped it in the past: the individual farm, and the forest. In 1897, Gallie Institut Bactriologique to address smallpox; in 1900, this expanded in to the Institut Pasteur de Tananarive to incorporate local concerns about rabies. This organization gained a partnership agreement with the Institute P asteur de Paris in 1927, and it was given its current moniker, the Institut Pasteur de Madagascar ( Institut Pasteur de Madagascar 2009 ). 41 Medical technologies were a practical necessity in Madagascar and were a key support in the development goals of the colony, which required a healthy workforce, whether French or Malagasy Making that workforce effective, however, fell to a series of organizations that embraced scientific approaches to agriculture. These colonial endeavors followed on previous efforts namely the installment of a French agricultural official in Anta nanarivo since 1885 (Thompson and Adloff 1965:342). The following years saw the prolife ration of experimental stations at sites that would later become layered zones of development (includi ng the contemporary sites of the Campus Ambanivohitra and Campus Fanantenana ). From the early Union s goals were seen as intimately tied to the ability linked with the institution of research centers on the island. In France, the Mus e 41 Other sources identify the date of inception to 1902 (Sabri 1996).

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96 (Museum of Natural History) took the lead in coordinating colonial research, establishing a colonial agronomic training center for colonial agents at Nogent sur Marne in 1899 (Bonneuil and Petitjean 1996: 115). By 1901 colonial laboratories were being set up, concer ned mainly with fishing and agriculture. By 1905, the eastern coast of Madagascar had set up one such center on the river Ivoloi na, some 14 kilometers north of Tamatave, where agricultural specialists experimented with an impressive number of plant species (Madagascar 190 5: 669 ). This site would, a century later, continue to be an oft recreated zone of development. These researc h outposts remained highly specified to their colonial context in Madagascar until French scholars, seeking to reassert the epistemological linkage between the metropole and the periphery, developed the Acadmie des sciences colonial in 1922 and the Associ ation colonies sciences in 1926 (Bonneuil and Petitjean 1996: 115). These organizations, constituting a lobby for colonial science as well as a mode of knowledge dissemination, began a process of atomization within the realm of colonial science This pro cess so ught to divide academic labors between the colonies and subsequently encouraged their dependence on the metropole, rather than their independence in the periphery. The y ec of the colonies and e mphasized the power of technology and expertise to provide moral legitimacy to the colonial endeavor. These efforts were often piecemeal, linked to the colonial government but not organized under any centralized office of the government. This situation co nstituted a problem for the French government. In 1937 Marius Moutet, Minister of the Colonies in France, stated that

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97 colonization, an Sabri 1996: 224). By 1944, the French government created the Office de la recherche scientifique et colonial (ORSC Office of Scientific and Colon ial Research ) to reorganize colonial science and began deploying research teams to the colonies (Sabri 1996). To pay for these efforts, the French government established the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Dveloppement Economique et Social in 1946 ( FIDE S, Investment Funds for Social and Economic Development; Clauzel 2003:187). Like the ind s inception, development was to be achieved through interest bearing borrowed funds, secured against future state revenues. Unlike ear lier efforts, which were often highly localized, the reorganization of colonial expertise through the ORSC was focused on creating and accumulating the knowledge necessary to create the colony as a self sustaining, metropole supporting, entity. In 1949, t he colonial administration renamed the ORSC the Office de la Recherche Scientifi que Outre mer (ORSOM Overseas Office of Scientific Research ; Sabri 1996), and in 1953, the organization was again renamed. In this latest incarnation, it was the Office de mer (ORSTOM, Overseas Office of Scientific and Technical Research), a moniker that illustrated an emphasis on the application of scientific research in the colonies (Sabri 1996). 42 Following this logic resea rch stations were set up across Madagascar with stated foci on agricultural, energy, and mineral production and exploitation. I n this way, and in 42 In 1982, ORSTOM was renamed the Institut francais de recherche scientifique pour le dveloppement en coo pration though the early acronym, ORSTOM, was retained. In 1998, the organization was again renamed, this time as the Institut de Rechereche pour le Developpement (IRD).

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98 partial response to growing colonial concerns about self determination in both politics and development that followed WWII, France restructured colonial experimental stations, giving them new names and new legitimacy as expert organizations. Three of these organizations were based in Atsinanana: the Institut des Frui ts et Agrumes Coloniales (IFAC), the Institut de Recherches Agronomiques de Madagascar (IRAM ) and the Institut Franais du Cafe, du Cacao et autres Plantes Stimulantes (IFCC) IFAC was created in 1942. In Madagascar, IFAC set up research stations in Ivoloina, north of the city of Tamatave and near Majunga. In 1966, the IFAC station in Ivoloina employed 92 employees, with 2 being researchers and the rest technicians and staff. In addition, the site boasted a small lab and over 600 acres of experimental land (UNESCO 19 64: 141 ). The program trained farmers to become agricultural technicians, many coming from the capital of Antananarivo, or training for a future in France. 43 IRAM was directed by the Institut de Recherches Agronomiques Tropicales et des Cultures Vivrire s (IRAT Institute of Tropical Agronomy and Food Crops ), based in Paris, and fell under the administration of the Malagasy Ministry of Agriculture and Peasantry (before this Ministry was renamed and restructured). IRAM consisted of three agricultural rese arch stations, one near the capital of Antananarivo, one in the Lac Alaotra region of Toamasina Province, and one that specialized in vanilla at Antalaha in the northeastern province of Antsiranana. In addition, IRAM ran experimental units in each of the six provinces of Madagascar, including one site at Ivoloina, adjacent to the 43 IFAC became the Institut de recherches sur les fruits et agrumes (IRFA) in 1975, and remained under this moniker until 1984, when it was folded into the creation of the Centre Internationale de la Recherche Agronomique pour la Developpement ( www.cirad.fr 2010).

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99 IFAC. At Ivoloina, IRAM and IFAC offered employment to a large portion of the community and continues to be a shadowy presence for the communities there. While as concerned with pedology, plant genetic s, entomology and chemistry, IRAM was involved in rice, cacao, sugar cane and produce cultivation In total, these laboratories and experimental stations employed some 31 res earchers and technicians by 1964 and a number of other local individuals who performed maintenance duties (UNESCO 1964). 44 The IFCC was originally called the Service caf, Cacao, The de l'Orstom ( Service of Coffee, Cocoa, and Tea, www.cirad.fr 2010). It was renamed in 1942, and by the mid sixti es the IFCC employed over three hundred and fifty individuals spread over the Niarovana Caroline in the region of Atsinanana, and its substations at Kianjavato, in the southeastern province of Fianarantsoa and Ambanja in the northeastern province of Antsiranana (UNESCO 1964: 138). Of these three were employed as researchers and 10 as technicians. The site also boasted a research library, with some 350 books, almost 7000 square feet of lab space, and approximately 2500 acres of experimental fields (138) IFCC was the largest agricultural research station in Madagascar, employing more individuals and controlling more land than any other of the period. The main site at Niarovana Caroline, some seven kilometers south of the cit y of number of buildings, a large warehouse main offices and several other buildings that 44 When IRAM left the area in 1974, FOFI FA took possession of many of their buildings and land. Some of this land was then transferred to the Ministry of Water and Forests. Currently, FOFIFA holds a number of buildings and rice fields at the entrance of the park, and the Ministery of Water and Forests owns the land, while the NGO Madagascar Fauna Group, based in the US, administers a lemur park on the site.

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100 provided housing and work space for staff. The station was remembered fond ly by current residents of Niarovana and Ilaka, who described it as a premier source of wage labor and community pride. Though the institute was concerned with all stimulants, the Niarovana site was dedicated to coffee, as had been the colonial concession and exporting facility on which it was built, and which it had, in many ways rebegun. In establishing these research centers ORSTOM began to stake a claim on the transformation of rural li velihoods in the French colonies. This was a shift fr om earlier colonial efforts, which sought taxes to prod rural individuals into labor; ORSTOM began to implicate knowledge as a source of transformation. Thus the first director of ORSTOM, Raul Combes, speaking in 1951, stated: Human life in tropical regions is thr eatened by multiple and terrible enemies that are the agents of diverse maladies: direct enemies of man, enemies of his livestock, enemies of the plants 45 from which he takes his subsistence. Their deleterious actions linked to the poverty of the soil, suc h as deforestation, brush fires, the depletion, by often deplorable traditional aid of the engineer and the scientist which can conquer new ground or inventory other resources, ov erpopulation will soon bring a generalized people, to make them able to better care for themselves, better feed themselves and to work under better conditio ns [Combes, quoted in S abri 1996 : 226] In Madagascar, this meant a focus, already well entrenched in Imerina by the mid 19 th century, on the agricultural practices of individuals. Science and technical knowledge became one basis around which the colonial state built its gover ning apparatus, and and the promotion of wage labor on large export generating plantations, became an 45 Ironically it was French colonial officers, on the opposite side of the island, who introduced the yed prickly pear cactus at the beginning of the 20 th century (Kaufmann 2001).

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101 entry point through which governing bodies could extend thei r control over rural Malagasy New Knowledge and Old Narratives Colonial research stations created exper tise that could be at least theoretically put to work in creating colonies that could subsidize the metropole. In so doing, knowledge was implica ted in the excerise of power over land and labor pursued by the French colonial regime. Tavy and deforestation, the objects of anxieties already associated with hegemonic power, were recast under expert knowledge, and thus appropriated and recast in the l arger web of colonial power. The rationale behind the power of the sovereign over the forest shifted, and expert knowledge became the main rationalizing thrust of colonial agricultural authority T avy or the practice of slash and burn agriculture, becam e one locus through which scientific knowledge linked up with the hegemonic motives of the colonial state. T avy Articles. The colonial government, at its inception, practiced a level of tolerance for the practice, and at times admitted the benefits of field tavy (rather than forest; Kull 2004). As French colonization expanded and took root, accounts increasingly wove narrative s in which tavy was responsible for low rice yiel ds in the colonies and general deforestation ( see Madagascar 1905). Colonial science, with its focus on tropical soil science, or pedology, lent credence to these claims and a universal ban on tavy was instituted in 1913 (Feller et al. 2008; Jarosz 1993). Researchers working at sites across Madagascar enumerated the risks of tavy 7: 5).

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102 These narrative s ignored the role of other colonial and native practices that contributed to deforestation on the island, including logging, cattle ranching, fuelwood gathering, mining, and other forms of colonial development (Jarosz 1993: 374). Scholars working on deforestation, or in the soil sciences, fed narratives that rationalize d colonial policies focused on creating a sedentary and thus more controllable workforce. This workforce could be readily available to provide labor for colonial endeavors through corv e labor patterned on Imerina fanompoana or through wage labor at French colonial plantations, where the ability to increase productivity and thus exports were informed by the work carried out in rural research stations and dependent on Malagasy labor. Both endeavors helped to provide the colonial state with revenue, and the continuing practice of tavy after the 1913 ban w as seen by the government as a method of tax evasion. For the Malagasy on the other hand, the bann ing of tavy was interpreted as a denigration of historical practices, and being forced into wage labor akin to slavery tavy within this schema, could be recast as resistance to state power (Jarosz 1993). The debates over tavy are particularly salient in eastern Madagascar, where current development practice is built through narratives of rural indolence and destructiveness that are rooted in the narratives colonial and pre colonial periods at the same time as the locate their genesis in the apolitical pursuit of value less knowledge The se debates echo the concerns of colonial science in other areas, particularly in Asia, where similar discourses circulated about the relationship of forest dwellers to the land (Bruneau 2005). This is not to say that t what it map seamlessly onto these earlier

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103 discursive forms. Rather, current developm ent discourse re creates its predecessors in piecemeal fashion, creating a bricolage which incorporates both a linkage with former practices even while affecting a discursive erasure of these same practices This simultaneous action is key in understanding the concept of rebeginnings. Madagascar Since 1960 Since gaining independence fro m the French in 1960 the Malagasy nation has gone through some seven leaders and, currently, six constitutions. This section outlines the political changes that the island has been through, and the various rebeginnings of the state they have ushered in. Of particular interest are the ways that government relied upon rural populations as important rhetorical cues, even while policies have more often than not detrimentally a ffected these populations particularly policies that have depressed rural crop p rices in order to keep urban areas appeased Throughout, politicians have re deployed the strategies and plans of their predecessors, even while loudly declaring their political distinction. The se policy rebeginnings were sometimes successfully appropria ted, morphing to legacies associated with one politician or another, and concomitantly breaking and exploiting their connections to past regimes of power M algachisation (for Ratsiraka) and the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP, for Ravalomanana) represented co ntinuations with earlier policies and political ideas while they could be rebegun and re cast as the ideological property of their proponents. The First Republic, 1960 1972 The first Malagasy Republic was initiated in 1960. L ike other nations in Afric a, Madagascar inherited the administrative structures of the Fren ch colonial state and, like some, chose association rather than complete independence France retained a

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104 presence in Madagascar through the pro French policies of its first president, Philib ert Tsiranana (1960 1972; Cooper 2002, Sharp 2002). A Tsimihety ctier 46 from western like those that were to follow contained a large number of highland Merina elites (Brown 2000) 47 In addition, the First Republic, as it was known, retained a number of French expatriates in important positions such as University pro fessors and administrators (Covell 1987 ; Sharp 2002 ) t policies were heavily invested in the agricultural sector Investing in agricultural inputs and rural infrastructure and services, he fund ed a few large irrigation schemes, and continued agricultural extension services from the colonial period Tsirana na also intervened in the market in ways reminiscent of French policy (Barrett 1994). His p olicies tended, overall, to favor the richest agricultural smallholders (Pryor 1990). In this vein, the agricultural Research and Development infrastructure that w as set in place under the colonial regime r emained. In Atsinanana, the three international research stations IFAC, IFCC, and IRAM funded by ORSTOM and the Malagasy government, continued to exist and generate (mainly French) agricultural expertise. Def orestation continued to constitute a main concern of the state, and in 1962, Tsiranana decreed that : all men had to plant 100 seedlings a year or suffer a tax (Tyson in Raik 2007:7). This string of legislation reinforced the state as the only legitimate 46 Tsimihity is his ethnicity and c tier is the generic name for the collectivity of ethnic groups that make up the coastal population. Both are problematic: c tier is also a h eavily laden term related to colonial strategies that used concerns over highland hegemony to gain traction on the island. Ethnicity, on the other hand, is neither primordial nor universally binding. 47 This situation was the result of institutional and structural inequality that followed the uneven infrastructural and administrative development that preceded colonialism on the one hand, and was further entrenched by its desires to colonize on the cheap.

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105 manager of forest resources in Madagascar, and contributed to a repressive relationship between the forest service and local people (Montagne 2004) [Raik 2007: 7]. In April 1971, conflicts over forest and farm came to a head and fire emerged as a sort of protest and defiance of state power in southern Madagascar and not for the first time. Anne Marie Goguel, a French schoolteacher during the protests described the For the peasant world the legal means of expression were pr forbidden by the (Goguel 2006: 323) The fires followed on the heels of harsh tax collection and culminated in a group of peasants overta king administration buildings in the region (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 184, Sharp 2002: 35). The government reacted swiftly and violently, killing up to 1000 protestors to put down the revolt. The peasant movement was followed by student movements in urb an centers and, mainly, in the capital. The two protests were not wholly separate, and this was not the M any of the students who were active during this period would later take up important posts as advocates and entrepreneurs of development. lead the state, which by now looked to many Malagasy to be a continuation of French colonialism unde r the auspices of independence In aligning himself tightly with the politics of the past, Tsiranana sealed his fate. With the rise in protests in the early 70s he was forced out of power.

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106 The First Transition, 1972 1975 In 1972, the First Republic fell and a transitional period was initiated. General Gabriel Rama na ntsoa took over the country with a mandate to restore stability. He aboli Council, a body of advisors which was compo sed of future presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 191). The Ramanantsoa government transformed some agricultural structures during its short stint in power Paramount was a slight shift in state intervention that refo cus ed intervention on poorer individuals ( Pryor 1990 : 31) However, conflict within the army forced him to dissolve his administration, handing it over to Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava an officer that had been among those who repressed the 1971 rebellio n (Rabenirainy 2002; Randrianja and Ellis 2009). committees called fokonolona originally perpetuated by the Imerina administrations, in a decentralized power structure (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 192). The resurrection of this administrative unit was accompanied by developmentalist rhetoric that emphasized that development should be led by the Malagasy a gesture towards the politics of the previous regime These pol icies, while striking a developmentalist tone, worried rural leaders who saw the efforts to instate fokonolona as a threat to their power ( Rabenirainy 2002: 87). The French experimental stations around the island were given over to a new government organi zation, the Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra ( FOFIFA, National Center for Applied Rural Research) C reated in 1974 under an act to nationalize the agricultural research stations peppered across

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107 the island FOFIFA inh erited the concessions and stations of IFAC, IRAM, and the IFCC in Atsinanana (FOFIFA 2010). Malagasy agricultural research and its outreach and extension components would start over under a new name, rebeginning as exactly the Malagasy cente Ratsimandrava was assassinated in 1975 and while his assassination could be directorate was set up to run the country in the immediate aftermath. While brief, the legacy of this governing body was one of balance based on, first, branch of military, and second, regional origin. The body also brought back political players from (Rabenirainy 2002). The Second Republic, 1975 1993 After four months the military handed po wer over to Didier Ratsiraka (1975 1993, 1997 2001) who enacted a set of reforms meant to cleanse civil service and private sector posi tions of remaining French expatriates (Sharp 2002). This reform, known as malgachisation (Mamdani 1996) and continued policy scheme s t hat had been proposed during the period of transition Concomitant with this move, and again like nations on the African continent, Ratsiraka initiated a socialized form of government, breaking ties (at least rhetorically) 48 with the former colonial power and fomenting linkages with socialist states like the USSR (Cooper 2002; Gow 1997) 48 As in the case of Tanzania Cooper (2002) descri bes, Madagascar continued to receive western aid during this period (Gow 1997).

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108 Socialism and malgachisation combined to create distinct form of isolationism that, while not complete, was pervasive. Malgachisation involved not only removing expatriates but also instit uting Malagasy as the language of instruction in primary and secondary schooling (Covell 1987; Sharp 2002). University education, however, remained in French. This move benefited urban and Merina populations who had had a longer history with, and more in stitutionalization of, the French language. Like bifurcated state in Africa with rural subjects and urban citizens, this reform further entrenched the rural/urban divide. I t also reinforced a tradition of highland/M erina dominance that began well before colonialism. The effects of the socialist period on agriculture and rural populations were significant ers in collection, transport, processing, storage, distribution, and retail sale of staple Farms over 250 acres (just over 100 h e ctares) were nationalized and the state conscripted private land in the region of Mana n jary, on the southern border of Atsinanana. Here, the government redistributed privately held land among almost 1700 families, allotting ten acres to each and groupin g them in cooperatives (Mukonoweshuro 1990: 378). The research institutions now headed by FOFIFA continued, but their funding began to wane, forcing a decrease in the local jobs they created in their rural posts. ended towards a rhetorical celebration of the peasant but rarely translated into any real gains for this population. The embrace of

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109 radical equality and (rural) socialism was never as real as it seemed in rhetoric I nvestments in industry spurred by nati tended to outstrip rural improvements ( Pry or 1990: 31). privileging richer farmers, and cutting programs that would give the poor access to capital and infrastructure (Pryor 1990). T h e divide between rural and urban was also strengthened, as policies tended to cater to governmental desires to control a burgeoning urban population by controlling the prices of food. Development would become linked, in purpose, with grand statistics of population growth outstripping agricultural production. A s ystem would emerge in which rural populations were encouraged to go beyond subsistence in order to provide for the urban populations at the sam e time that their desires to improve their lives would pull them toward s urban areas. Like others, rural farmers would relish the opportunity to start over, but it and those that would fo llow it, set on keeping rural farmers in place. I nternationally socialist regime translated into closer relations between Madagascar and Soviet Bloc countries like Russia and North Korea (Covell 1987, Gow 1997, Mukonoweshuro 1990) This align ment created a generation of individuals trained in Soviet Bloc countries, many in economics and agronomy, who currently make up part of the cadre of development leaders within state development organizations. These relations failed to trans late into tang ible development and relations with France remained central despite rhetorical distancing 49 49 Statistics on bilateral aid from the World Bank show no reduction in French aid during this time. Rather, French aid actually saw significant upswings in aid and continued t o outstrip aid from other

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110 International relations entered into local politics and were folded into the rhetorical performances of the state. Relations with South Africa, which had existed during period. By 1977, the policies enacted had begun erode government began to accuse South Africa of plotting with factions inside the country. The regime began a trend of creating rumors of non Malagasy communities wreaking exploiting by now well worn discourses of difference an d authenticity that accompanied nationalism and independence. The End of Socialism 1980, the nation was forced to accept the structural adjustment plans of the Internatio nal Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Randrianja and Ellis 2009). The possibility of a new path through structural adjustment rebeginning through the ab andonment of socialist rhetoric helped legitimize his bid for re election el ection in 2002. By 1986, the GNI of individual Malagasy had decreased further, and the fissures between espousals of socialism and the realities of the devalued Malagasy franc were becoming clear. Adjustments to agricultural markets caused Ratsiraka to l ose his urban base, which had been cultivated through policies that worsened the situation of individual Malagasy farmers by keeping the cost of foodstuffs artificially low Protests followed by violent reprisals became more commonplace in the capital (Go w 1997; Randrianja and Ellis 2009). nations such as Japan, the United States, and other European countries. In addition, aid from UN agencies seems as though it was unimpeded through this period (World Bank 2011).

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111 Structural adjustment resulted in a slight uptick in GNI during the 1980s though it would drop again in 1991. At this time, it hit its l owest point since a peak in 1981 at almost 500 USD per capita (World Bank 2011 ). the apparent failures of structural adjustment, continued to foment opposition. By the early 1990s he was on the verge of loosing his position as head of state. The Third Republic, 1993 1996 In 1991, Zafy Albert a n opposition leader who had served with Ratsiraka under General Ramanantsoa in the early 70s took advantage of the growing crisis around Ratsiraka, and set up an oppositional government with a coalition of 16 parties that he called the Haute Autorit 50 e ventually driving Ratsiraka to bargain (Randrianja and Ellis 2009, Marcus 2004) and the church. The Fiombonan'ny Fiangonana Kristianina eto Madagasikara (FFKM Fellowship of Christian Ch urches of Madagascar ), a conglomeration of the countries four major churches, 51 became a major political force after 1991. Through this positioning, Zafy was able to run in an election against Ratsiraka in 1993, gaining a majority under the banner of the Un ion Nationale pour le Dmocratie et le Dveloppement (UNDD, R andrianja and Ellis 2009: 280). further strip money from r esearch organizations like FOFIFA; r ecords of spending from 1991 1996 show a decline in funding of almost 57% duri ng this period (Beye 2001 ). Policies of malgachisation were abandoned, and technicians from the exterior were brought in 50 Rajoelina would name his government something sim ilar the Haute Autorit de la Transition in 2009. 51 This includes the Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, the Anglican Church, and the Church of Christ (FJKM).

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112 The Impeachment of Zafy Albert, 1996 Zafy presided over only modest growth but he acc epted economic liberalism whole heartedly. This trend spurred social changes, themselves infused with an ideology of individualism. Issues of corruption and the lack of fiscal discipline in the Zafy government led to the suspension of d onor programs from the World Bank and IMF (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 204). These moves accompanied the almost complete disappearance of real functionality at FOFIFA sites. In 1996, as he attempted to organize a constitutional referendum tha t would strengthen presidential powers, Zafy was impeached by the parliament. Zafy Albert would stand for reelection in 2001, setting himself as an opposition leader (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 280). He also emerge d again in 2009 during the crisis that o ust ed President Marc Ravalomanana where he played the role of political adult his impeachment recast as a rare instance of a Malagasy leader willingly giv ing up control of the state The Third Republic 1997 2001 eturned from French exile to stand in the upcoming election. Ratsiraka returned to power and renewed his commitment to liberalism. The economy began to improve and aid flows increased. New programs for development were created that fused different aspec ts of the development goal. Among these was Surveillance et ducation des coles et des communauts en matire largie (SECALINE/SEECALINE, the S tate O rganization for Monitoring and Educating S chools and C ommunities in Matte rs of F ood and N utrition (Galibert 2009 : 59).

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113 T he Fourth Crisis 2001 2002 itical situation seemed to stabilize ahead of the elections in 2001. However, the first round of voting was met with Antananarivo Mayor Marc Ravalomanana asserti ng a clear victor and declar ing himself the outright winner of the Pre sidency. Ratsiraka opposed his attempt to claim the office, and set up a rival capital in Toamasina province After a prolonged crisis in which Ratsiraka attempted to choke off the hig hlands and capital where Ravalomanana and his supporters were centered, Ravalomanana gained the recognition of various western powers and the legitimacy to keep the office (Randrianja 2003) The Third Republic 2002 2009 ascension to power w as crafted in ways that spoke to powerful sets of individuals interior and exterior to the island and against the vision of Madagascar tied to his predecessor image as the consummate self made man lete neoliberal reforms which had themselves b eg u n amid massive protests against government corruption (Sharp 2002) His regime declar ed itself new, different, and disconnected from earlier leadership. His P overty R eduction S trategy P aper (PRSP) a rew ritten version of the paper Ratsiraka wrote for the World Bank highlights 52 poverty reduction strategies since the crisis eschewing ties with the former colonizer in favor of ties t o Anglophone allies an action that signaled his feelings for France in the now while inviting images of the geopolitical strategies of pre colonial (Merina) Kingdom of Madagascar. 52 Redemarrer

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114 ge in the exterior BBC articles praise him as a perfect rags to riches story (Donovan 2002). Educated in Madagascar, then in Sweden, he eschewed further education and: started producing home made yogurt which he sold on the streets of Antananarivo off assisted by the Protestant Church [ Fiangonan'i Jesoa Kristy eto Madagasikara FJKM] of which today he is the vice president, Mr. Ravalomanana managed to secure a loan from the World Bank to purchase his first factory. [Donovan 2002] This story so perfectly fitted to neoliberal narratives, would be deployed at the international level a sort of proof that development directives worked that merit brought people to the top. At the same tim e, Ravalomana biography could be cast as a sort of modern day embodiment of the protestant ethic He turned his World Bank loan into the dairy company Tiko which had become the largest corporation in Madagascar by 2001 (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005) A fter being elected mayor of Antananarivo in 1999, Ravalomanana created the party at the time consisted of soda products that rivaled Coca Cola Fanta, and of course, dairy products like milk, oil, and, of course, yogurt). Tiko posters adorned shops all over the island (in rural and urban areas) gesturing towards a state/corporate entanglement that would be echo ed policies (Marcus 2010) This en tanglement nationalization of industry under socialism here the state would be folded into Th e increasingly cozy relationship between Tiko and the state became a major source of critique ahead of the 2008 2009 crisis

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115 During his first few years in office Ravalomanana proved exceedingly successful at marketing the state to international governing bodies. The country was awarded the honor of being t he first recipients of the Mille nnial Challenge Account in 2005 (worth 110 million USD, Millennium Challenge Corporation and USAID 2007 ). 53 By 200 8, Ravalomanana had been through a second contentious election which pitted him a number of other oppos ition candidates with weak support. Coming out victorious, he continued to weave the state together with corporate interest s By 2008, critique was a major preoccupation in the country and a number of These spurr e d anti democratic practices as the state tried to quell the loudest voices of the opposition the vocal Mayor of Tamatave, was arrested for embezzlement after the 2006 presidential election ( Ploch 2009, Madigasikara Soa 2007). T hese p ractices spurred rumors that ceded Ravalomanana magical and menacing powers marking the sovereign as supernatural In Toamasina province, where over 53 % of voters cast their ballots for former President Ratsiraka in 2001 ( and only 36% for Ravalomanana; M arcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005 ) rumors circulated about and sometimes supernatural capabilities. When former members of his government resigned over their opposition to his policies, and then inexplicably died, coastal university students circulated stories of poisoning. 53 Mill ennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funds are awarded based on statistical indicators on the economic, political and social climate as measured by organizations such as Freedom House, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Heritage Foundation, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and some smaller research organizations like the Center for International Earth Science Information Network at C olumbia and Yale Universities (Millenium Challenge Corporation 2011).

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116 M embers of government saw their lives at risk as well. Permanent staff at the presidential palace sniffed out threats of organization against the president arresting and interrogating dissidents who circulated tracts ag ainst Ravalomanana At the Bureau Rgionale de la Prsidence (BRP) in Tamatave, a man known simply as the personnel when they travelled across the island. When an l expert, a consultant to the president, died unexpectedly in 2008, poison was the first explanation embraced by Development became a central space around which political opposition and support was built. Like those before him, Ravalomanana set up visible reminders of his policies of development ( see Evers and Spindler 199 5 for reference to earlier usage of these tactics as demonstrations of the will to development ) R oad signs in Madagascar attest a multitude of de velopment p rojects, some which still exist and others which have long since d isappeared. E ach carried the current state mo tto 54 in Malagasy : Madagasikara: Tanindrazana Fahafahana Fandrosoana (Republic of Madagascar: Homeland Freedom Pr ogress). The rest wa s in French Many of these signs marked the new constru ction of schools and hospitals that were, at best, sporadically staffed 54 The state motto has changed as each new leader has sought to solidify their position and differentiated their government from those that had come before. Since a referendum in late 2 010, changing the total Tanindrazana Progress, Article 4, Madagascar 2010).

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117 Figure 2 1. Signs of d evelopment. Signs along the coastal highway alerting travelers, in French, to projects carried out in southern Atsinanana. The photo on the left refers to school construction project finished in 2007; the one on the right refers to a Catholic Relief Services projects that had finished around the same time. August 2008. These quite many of which were squarely focused on Tamatave. A new mine was being opened in eastern Madagascar with a pipeline for nickel and cobalt running from the interior of the island to the por t city of Tamatave Here a refinery would prepare them for exportation. The mine generated an economic boom in Toamasina, which saw an influx of workers from Europe, the Philippines, Canada, South Korea, and South Africa. The Sherritt mine and refinery translated into drastic shifts in Tamatave, which would experience a roar of new construction and an explosion in property values The mine was central in negative, as well as positive, Malagasy in Tamatave who were shut out o f direct employment with the mines complained about the low wages the mines offered and the lack of opportunity it provided for locals (many employees were shipped in from the highlands or from the

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118 Philippines). As the political opposition became more voc al in late 2008 and 2009, the proclivities and his desires to sell off the island to his own profit. It was joined by another deal President Ravalomanana was pursuing. Under an agree ment made with the South Korean firm Daewoo which had some subsidiary stake in the Sherritt Ambatovy Nickel and Cobalt Mine Madagascar was preparing to lease some 1.3 million hectares (approximately 44% of the countries arable land based on FAO estima tes ; FAO Stat 2010) to the firm s subsidiary Madagascar Futures Enterprise (Madagascar Tribun e 2009 Park 2008 ). The deal called Madagascar into South Korean food security issues and emerg ent (yet familiar) trends in which more developed countries seek to control land and stake a claim on resources in the south (e.g. in Mali, Ethiopia, and Ghana; Robertson and Pinstrup Andersen 2010; Cutola et al 2009 ) As a Daewoo representative explained to the Financial Times in 2008, "it is totally undeveloped land w hich has been left untouched. And we will provide jobs for ( Jong a, Oliver and Burgis 2008 ). Global flows of information circulated rumors that Daewoo would pay nothing for the lease, turning it into an i ssue of colonial power and fueling the opposition to Ravalomanana ( Jong a, Oliver and Burgis 2008 Madagascar Tribun e 2009 Ryall and Pflanz 2009 Courrier International 2008 ). In 2008 and 2009, embossed leather Daewoo datebooks circulated among Atsinanan a bureaucrats, lending credence to the idea that Ravalomanana was i n process of selling Malagasy land to the highest bidder. Had the deal gone through, it would have represented a massive ceding of land to

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119 foreign interests and ushered in new layers of go vernance on a scale much larger than that undertaken by the mining industry. These two massive projects one existing more as potential than reality constituted a backdrop for the rural agricultural projects I studied In many ways, these projects we re constitute d against these other, less savory, forms of development. They could be made to speak to a populism that legitimized governance in ways that could to At the same time, these corporate entries have reflected and, in ways, re entrenched the past. Concessions have followed upon debt in ways that seem all to familiar. Malagasy Development at the Intersection of Power and Peasantry an increasing intimacy between centralized forms of power (the state) and citizens. In large part, the focus of this power was pointed towards the rural peasantry a group far mo re complex than its construction within political discourse. Over the past 200 years, Madagascar has seen a number of distinct states that have re created and re structured power in ways that have drawn upon and been built against (sometimes sim ultaneousl y) their predecessors. This re creation and re structuring constitutes one sort of state rebeginning and highlights the important ways that rebeginning ushers increasingly close relationships between sovereign and citizen. From the adoption of Sakalava po litical forms in the Betsimisaraka Confederation/Kingdom to the creation of (missionary mediated) state schools during noted elsewhere ( Hobsbawm

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120 and Ranger 1983), these rebeginnings relied on things that came before them. They also wove in new ideas and purposes, creating hybridized versions that are always under construction ( Comaroff and Comaroff 1997 ). The gove rning policies, practices, and mythologies of these early kingdoms the idea of the forest as the property of the sovereign, the idea of the Malagasy confederacy, the structures of forced labor continued to live on and were woven into the governing form s that followed the advent of colonialism. Colonial power recreated and reworked Malagasy governance, appropriating and recreating earlier practices of governance even while it relied on these precursors as a useful foil to its power. French colonial leade rs exploited concerns over Merina hegemony, casting the Kingdom of Madagascar as hegemonic, violent and oppressive. At the same time fanompoana or the labor obligation to the monarch that defined the subject / sovereign relationship was reworked as corv ee and the Festival of the Royal Bath was reinvented as Bastille Day. These destructive moves sought to break the symbols of the monarchy even as they engaged i n a redefinition of the population namely the peasantry that rationalized new forms of cont rol over laboring rural and urban bodies. These moves of practical appropriation and discursive abandonement simultaneous and seemingly contradictory are a key facet of the process I call rebeginnings. At the same time, the colony constitute d a fiel d in which the metropole and the empire could be re fashioned and re worked. Madagascar was a si te for the application of already instituted colonial policy from Indonesia and Africa, even while it was a place for experimentation into the creation of idea l laboring bodies in the colony and the

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121 metropole among the Malagasy and the French. Forced labor and taxes intermingled as leaders like Gallieini sought to discipline the unruly and indolent. The colony, as other scholars have noted (see Comaroff an d Comaro ff 1997), constituted a prime space of political experimention for the metropole. Knowledge and particularly foreign knowledge played an important role in each of these periods. From the reliance on the L ondon M issionary S ociety for the design of early state sponsored education to the creation of a network of expert agricultural outposts designed to help the colonies create value, expertise has been key to the expansion of state power. These alliances of power and knowledge helped to creat e th e underlying structures that guide the contemporary trajectories of Malagasy agricultural development. They constitute one form of what I call shadow presences In this case the shadow presence i s temporal 55 represented by the insti tutional detritus that signals the failed promises of a better future and that haunt the contemporary development projects I studied. This layeri ng is not new. Chalfin ( 2010 ) describes similar circumstances at the Ghanaina border where customs, rather than agricultural develo tangible record of agends that have been officially abandoned or replaced yet continue Li 2007) Th is presence is no small thing. Colonial and post colonial research stations are now the homes of development s targets, who pass by and inhabit structures that speak to a better past a past that promised a better future. 55 In this work I recognize two types of shadow presence, the temporal (and thus historical) and the physical or geographical, represented by adjacent and parallel development projects and partners (discussed further in the chapters that follow).

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122 Post colonial governance ha s re appropriated these spaces, returning the powers of knowledge creation partially to the Malagasy. At the same time, however, the hierarchy of knowledge has persisted and, in some ways, deepened. The residents of the areas surrounding these resear ch stations often technicians and agricultural in narratives that are eerily familiar. This redefinition of the peasant ratio entrenches the power of (mainly western and highland) techno scientific power. Subsequent Malagasy presidents have helped this process along, even while their policies claim a (rhetorical) break with the past. Thus recent leaders, like Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana (and now Rajoelina) have crafted their power through a careful combi nation of international prowess setting them in the midst of important geopolitical competitions in historically familiar ways In addition and in service to these international alliances (that are political an d economic), leaders have simultaneous ly demonized and celebrated the peasantry in the name of ecological con servation and rural development What these leaders are e ngaged in is a complex and dangerous dance that courts internal and external legitimacy in a way that holds asy m metries of power stable. This effort to stabilize asymmetry provides the impetus to the phenomenon of rebeginnings.

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123 CHAPTER 3 STARTING OV ER: POWER AND THE PE ASANTRY AT THE CAMPUS AMBANIVOHITRA Imagining Development and Its Futures It is through representation that development makes its promises of transformation and, in some ways, fulfills them. This chapter explores the repre sentation s of the Campus Ambanivohitra a project focused on rural agriculture and peasant training in eastern Madagascar First, it illustrat es how development narratives and foci reflect and reproduce specific ima ginings of the peasant. Second, it looks at how thes e narratives are crafted and re crafted to appeal to develo pment partners and stakeholders Third, it highlights how narratives of development affect the erasure of the lived world of while legitimizing state governing bodies in Madagascar and abroad. The chapter then turns to what project representations do not often represent: the partners, administrators and staff members who run projects and whose imaginings and understandings of the peasantry along with their desires for better futures structure the representation as well as the ultimate goals of the project I argue that the representative work engaged in by development expert s and administrators hold s the potential to offer distinct forms of social mobility and legitimacy that are supp lementary to, and intertwined with, the power of the Malagasy state. Development Partnership: the Campus Ambanivohitra in Brief The Campus Ambanivohitra emerged out of the collaboration of a group of elite professors and administrators at the University of Toamasina in 2004. The brainchild of the University President, it was written with an eye to the international poli cies that were topical in Madagascar at the time, including: the UN Millennial Development Goals

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124 (MDG), and the educational reform known as License Maitrise Doctorat (LMD) 56 implemented by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research Originally, the Campus Ambanivohitra had four main components. First, it would train rural farmers in agricultural and market techniques in order t o increase their production and entrepreneurial cap abilities. Second, it would transform them into local leaders who c ould set an example and create farmi ng organizations that help to spread this knowledge and, through it, raise the standard of living in their rural communities After their training, students would (theoretically) be eligible to receive the equivalent of a Licence (bachelor s degree) or Masters. Third, it would create a cadre of development experts out of university students trained, in part, by farmers, through the project. Fourth the campus would help to craft a system of rural monitoring and evaluation that would add to knowledge on rural Malagasy communities. These objectives would be met through a reliance on established support an d logistical aid th at structured the paths the Campus could take. T he relations that sustained the Campus Ambanivohitra were fluid and forced to movement by frictions that emerged as different groups competed over the resources it set loose most of which are discussed in the next chapter This chapter explores the way the Campus and its partners crafted legitimizing narratives that held the power to unlock 56 This system follows the French and European Union shift to the LMD, a system that arose out of comp etition with United States higher education and the desire to facilitate international mobility for skilled workers. The LMD has stalled in Madagascar, where students and professors saw it as a method of further alienation. Specifically, students espouse d beliefs that the LMD would render earlier degrees obsolete, and professors were concerned about the suite of neoliberal reforms that would accompany the degree change and that would negate their positions as functionaries and the job security it offered in favor of contractual teaching positions (Kiel 2006). The reform was also depicted as a way to funnel money into the center and defund the regional university a position easily translated into already available narratives of highland domination and pref erential treatment and coastal indolence and resistance to

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125 development resources. These resources would, in turn, be put to work in the reproduction of the m ultilayered contours of inequality specifically those that inhere between expert and non expert, urban and rural, elite and non elite Figure 3 1. Campus Ambanivohitra partnership s tructure 2004 2009. wa s th e University of Toamasina As university administrators, the project full support to the project gaining access to university infrastructure professors, etc In addition and at another level t he Camp us Ambanivohitra established partnerships with governing bodies in the three regions of Toamasina Province: Alaotra Mangoro, Analanjirofo, and Atsinanana. The regions would, in the original plan, host the project in

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126 turn, and Analanjirofo was chosen for t he experimental first run State restructuring specifically the abolition of provincial governance, would push the Campus to tighten its regional focus in 2006, reorienting itself to the region of Atsi n anana the region that housed both the University a nd the urban center of Tamatave. Outside of these state bodies the Campus partnered with the local Chamber of Commerce This partnership was dissolved when President Ravalo manana decreed that Agriculture would no longer be a part of the Chambre de Comme Artisanat Toamasina rendering i t the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Crafts (changing the acronym from CCIAAT to CCIAT) To a lesser extent, the Campus was aligned with a number of government organizations that could offer material and logistical support. These were ministerial, falling like the university under the Ministre de l'Education Nationale et de la Recherche Scientifique (Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research, MENRS) and the Minis (Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and Fishing, MAEP ) The MENRS, which directed scientific research on the island, was the government administrator of the (mainly French) agricultural research stations that wer e held by the Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra (National Center for Applied Rural Research, FOFIFA) FOFIFA held property rights over the land the Campus used and their researchers often moonlighted with the project Othe r MENRS research organizations, like the Institut Malgache de Vaccins Vtrinaires ( Malagasy I nstitute of Veterinary Vaccines, IMVAVET) provided materials and teaching assistance. The MAEP, on the other hand, w as linked to the project through its small sc ale informal partnerships with its regional technical support

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127 offices the Direction Rgionale de Dveloppement R urale ( Regional Directorate of Rural Development ) and a number of small scale, internationally supported, rural projects Other relationships were more temporary. The participation of the Fiangonan'i Jesoa Kristy eto Madagasikara (Church of Je sus Christ in Madagascar, FJKM) the largest Malagasy protestant church and the church of President Mark Ravalomanana 57 only lasted one year. The churc h helped to identify and host students for the trial campus at Maromitety, Analanjirofo. After one cohort went through training th e re t hese functions moved to rural mayors, formalizing the Campus linkage with the state. A second partner was the local m icro credit agency of Ombona Tahiry Ifampisamborana Vola (OTIV, Savings and Loan Society). This group would come on as a private partner, making micro credit loans available to participant farmers who could display a mastery of self audit market knowledg e, and managerialism A second set of partners were non local and mainly based in France. The most important here wa s the Region of Haute Normandie, which has been the main foreign backer of the project since its inception Other regional partners li ke the Region of Rhone Alps, which funds a number of other Atsinanana initiatives passed on the project Beyond the region, the small cole Suprieure d'Ingnieurs et de Techniciens Pour l'Agriculture (ESITPA) 58 and its Laboratoire de modlisation statist ique et analyse 57 Ravalomanana was very open about his faith, attending prayer breakfasts at the White House and once declaring that Madagascar should be a theocracy, a view that his opponents have ta ken up since 2005, and was bantied about in 2009 (Hogg 2007, BBC News 2009) 58 ESITPA has under 500 students total. Tightly linked to agribusiness interests, ESITPA boasts a staff composed of 25 research professors and 250 agricultural professionals (ESIT PA 2010: 36).

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128 des donnes ( S tatistical M odeling and Data Analysis Lab, LAMSAD) would act as a partner in data gathering and analysis and host a number of Malagasy students in 2007. The relationshi p between the two soured after the exchange, though they re main continuing partnership with the University of Toamasina During the hiatus, the (Cooperation and Cultural Action Service, SCAC) a subsection of the French Embassy helped to fund follow up evaluations in 2006 and 2007, supplementing and then supplan ting the funding role of ESITPA The University of Rouen had a previous relationship wi th the University of Toamasina. I t continues this partner s hip through ongoing exc hanges These exchanges send French students to Madagascar for i nternships m any of which connect to the Campus Ambanivohitra and help to generate statistics about rural livelihoods in eastern Madagascar In addition, the project relied on informal a ssociations with a number of agricultural and development organizations outside of the project. Thus they pulled teachers from organizations like FOFIFA IMVAVET and the University of Toamasina but also local development agencies like the region of Atsin Direction rgionale du dveloppement rural (Regional Directorate of Rural Development, DRDR), the Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave (Technical Horticultural Center of Tamatave, CTHT) funded, in part, by the European Union, and falling under the (MAEP) and the Maison du Petit levage (Small Animal Farming Firm, MPE) made possible by the Malagasy government and Cooperation Franaise and a number of others (see Table 3 2 for more details).

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129 At another level, and often unofficially, the Campus relied on a variety of associations with rural government representatives and stakeholders Relationships were pursued with rural mayors, who were invited to sensibilisation (informational sessions) about the campus, and tasked with encouraging their community members to participate. The geographical location of the Campus did not solely rely on the provision of former agricultural research stations by FOFIFA, but also on agreements with municipal governm ents rural businessmen, and rural farmers. Rural mayors mediated these relations, making them central to the continuation These varied p artnership s provid e the resources and support the project needs to carry out its educational mission. The y a re equally important in the creation and proliferation of the official representations of the Campus Ambanivohitra that are dispersed through the internet and across the globe. These representations persist despite the changing nature of partnerships and continue to play a role in the legitimizing narratives of thos e who deploy them. They speak to how the project envisions its primary stake holders, but, also, how it presents main project protagonists in a way that facilitates the opening of resour ce flows across the nodes of this institutional network array, facilitating the legitimization of state, international, and individual forms of power spurring conflict and contestations, and ultimately ushering in, cutting off, or otherwise transforming a ccess to economic and political power Development s Objects: Defining and Redefining the Peasantry All efforts to improve the human condition coalesce, like research projects, around a central problem to be solved an issue or group that can be made to fit into a defined target space and potentially rendered manageable (Escobar 1988, Ferguson 1990, Rose 1999 Scott 1998, Kothari 2005) For the Campus Ambanivohitra rural farmers

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130 would constitute the main target of intervention, and thus became the subje ct of both knowledge making in terms of the creation of new forms of rural evaluation and monitoring and the application of knowledge But in order to approach this population, the Campus needed to hone its understandings and define the contours of th e population, first for the funding agencies and logistical partners who would back the program, and second, for the rural politicians who would be key in assuring and choosing local participants. This section explores the multiple construction s of the pea sant and the hierarchical relations they exploit reproduce, and potentially create Narrative representations of farmers that are created through project documents are not neat. R ather they are constantly shifting and often contradictory as they navigat e different spatial and temporal settings subject to variable fields of power They represent not only the production and reproduction of ideas of the peasantry (a discursive rebeginning ) but that reflect a negotiation of local and global hierarchies of power (see Lewis 2006; Mosse 2005; Sardan 2005; Ferguson 1999, 1990 ) Constructing the Need for Change : The Malagasy Peasant as Moral Object The Campus Ambanivohitra was centered on serve as a model for their neighbors As such, it relied on a narrative creation of the peasantry that could be achieved through discussions and project documents. T he contents of good farming were closely related to and dependent upon a numbe r of discursive divisions between center and periphery at two interconnected levels the local divisions between high land (Merina) and ctier (coasta l) and the global divisions

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131 The latter including not only the celebration of which in Mad agascar are closely intertwined, and part o f a long history of development discourse on the island. Imagining the model farmer I first heard about the Campus Ambanivohitra in 2005 At the time, the then vice president of the University of Toamasina an esteemed, French trained historian of highla nd ethnicity described it as a way to get the local populations away from the paresseux (lazy) agricultural habits. It was to be a place where technology would be brought to bear on these practices, transforming the target popu lations into agricultural entrepreneurs ceremony in 2005, he used a rhetorical question to explain the Campus goals, asking that immediately cast value on agricultural practices and reinforced the hierarchy of the industrious and productive highland Malagas y namely the Merina ethnicity, and indolent and destructive coastal populations. The rhetorical question tapped (and reinforced) local hierarchies of highland / coastal inequality. But it also made a forceful gesture t o a number of other hierarchies, fra These divisions were not confined to the project, but have lon g histories that connect to popular understandings and perceptions of pre colonial Merina state

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132 centralization as constructed atop highland agricultural practices and contemporary inequalities constructed atop pre colonial Merina hegemony. The linkage of Merina agricultural and the Malagasy state is strikingly presented on the 2000 Ariary note, the only paper cu rrency to depict a farming scene, and one that proudly displays the housing and agricultural styles of the Malagasy highlands (see Figure 3 2 ). 59 Figure 3 2 2000 Ariary n ote featuring highland irrigated rice fields. Not all depictions of the project relied on the juxtaposition of highland and coastal practices. Others relied solely on ideas of rural monoculture, a reality that, where it existed, was tied to the focus on cash cropping that characterized the colonial period. production : Degradation in terms of exchange and food security has completely disoriented th e Malagasy farmer. And we must emphasize that we cannot speak of conservation until this issue is resolved. In effect, the monoculture 59 The ariary is itself new (and old). I t s status as Malagasy currency is due to Ma rc Ravalomanana and h is desires to sever ties with France that the Malagasy franc (fmg) signified while simultan eously drawing connection to th e pre colonia l Malagasy past T his c urrency denomination thought to follow the Arabic designation for the Spanish real itself following the earli er Arabic r yal ( Kus and Raharijaona 2008 : 152).

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133 which is the traditional technique of Malagasy agriculture is no longer cost effective The ass ertion focuses on the idea of the risk accrued through monoculture, but calls forth common discourses of Malagasy environmental degradation. Discourses of destruction persisted through 2009, with the Director of the Campus centering both entry into the market economy and the eradication of tavy as the main goals of the Campus. He suggested the importance of the market, and of production, while redeploying and reproducing, ideas of value laden agricultural difference between the highlands and the eastern coast. Using an example I often heard in Tamatave, he told me to look at the market. The sellers and the food came from the highlands, while the land on the coast went to waste, with its inhabitants barely able to s ustain themselves and ruining what resources they had through tavy When I countered that the land on the eastern coast was visibly less denuded than the highlands he set as the example, with far less incidence of visible erosion, he responded that the la ndscape of the coast was itself the product of tavy gesturing towards stands of r avinala ( ravenala madagascariensis ) along the Atsinanana landscape. Ravinala related to the banana t ree but often considered a palm is endemic to the eastern coast of M adagascar. It occupies a special and paradoxical place in Madagascar culture, politics, and development that bears some exploration. As the Campus director insisted, it is a product of tavy its seeds aided by the actions of brush fires (Feeley Harnik 20 01). As such, its prol iferation across the coasts is visible proof of the agric ulture

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134 A t the same time the plant constitutes a central symbol of the Malagasy nation, pictured on its currency and, in modified fo rm, on the national seal It is akin to what Kaplan (in those symbolic items that are imbued with the weight of state power. As a nationalist symbol, it keeps company with other endemic and memorable flora and fauna like the baobab and the lemur that act to link nature and nation in the Malagasy imaginary, and reinforce a global imaginary of Madagascar as a unique ecology under threat from human hands. Figure 3 3 Ravenala and Baobab pictured on Malagasy currency. 60 The Ravenala is on the 100 Arirary note, the Baobab on the 2000 Ariary note. On the eastern coast of Madagascar, the Ravenala tree is a central social actor, intimately related to the lives and practices of the rural farmers in Atsina nana Here the leaves are used to construct durable, and easily replaceable, roofs and flooring for houses. It is, then, a paradoxical plant symbolizing environmental destruction, the unique ecology of an island perceived to be desperately in need of con servation, the construction of a Malagasy national imaginary that links nature and nation and a central natural resource in the lives of rural Malagasy in eastern Madagascar 60 Malagasy currency is well worth examining at length as it strives to represent the whole of the islands and its various economic activities and development goals. Images of Malagasy currency are reproduced in the appendix.

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135 The effects of discourses of destruction were wide ranging, and when I questione d farmers in 2008 and 2009 about global issues such as climate change, they identified the practice of tavy as the culprit. The mastery of the tavy discourse was an import ant component of the project. S tudent s in 2008 were given an entrance exam that ask ed, among other things, that students name two of the detrimental effects of tavy The project itself relied on tavy throughout its tenure, using it as a main pillar of its self representation from inception to the present sensibilisation (i nformational session) lauded the environmental aspects of the project: agriculture, for example the tavy which destroys the environment, rather during the training we teach them h ow to use mineral and organic fertilizer they are trained so that the soil will always be fertile. The statement echoes research narratives that have existed since colonial times that link fire to erosion and soil quality depletion, b ut ignores interes ting contemporary research that suggests that erosion and the movement of fertile soil are one part of an array of agricultural strategies used on the island (Kull 2004: 73 74 ; Jarosz 1993). Remembering Peasantry Past Representations of the eastern Malagas y peasant were not wholly negative. The original plan centered on an idea of exchange that envisioned knowledge travelling in two directions at once Specifically, the project would allow rural farmers to the benefit of U niversity of Toamasina students who would be trained through the program. The objective relied on a valorization of local (rather than highland) knowledge, and though it never fully materialized in the project s practice, and eventually f ell out of the project s official documentation much of which was written in French and destined primarily for the

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136 eyes of partner organizations it continued as a main theme in the program s verbal self representations to the local government officials who helped to choose the students tradition tive to problems of poverty was contained in a documen t generat ed by the c ampus in 2005. A mathematician and at the time the University e President for Fiscal Affairs, he f ramed the Campus as an opportunity to return to a status quo anterior, when communal labor, institutionalized in practices of tambiro and vanin tanana was widespread in rural communities ( Internal Document 2005 ). 61 Tambiro and vanin tanana are highly organized and labor intensive practices in which over 100 individuals work up to six hectares of rice fields per day and are provided with food, particularly zebu, rice, and farming tools b y the landowner. As t he Camp wrote in a program synopsis : In our days, the tambiro is more and more rare in the villages. Acco rding to the peasants, it is no longer financially viable because of the price of zebu bu currently [2005] costs 600 000 Ar or 250 Euros ) Certain villages try to replace the ro [zebu meat] motivation [ Internal Document c. 2005] The decline in communal labor was tied back to environmental degradation, li n king to discourses generated by the island s past agricultural research institutes previously housed on the same physical locations of the Campus Ambanivohitra that linked tavy to the decline in productivity o ver time In reality, the causes of the progressive disappearance of tambiro are : the weakness of rice 61 Tambiro, in Malagasy anthropology, is often associated with the Sakalava ethnicity inhabiting the northwestern section of the island (Jaovelo Dzao 1996).

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137 productivity (less than 1 ton per hectare) and traditional cultural practices, the consequence of a l ack o f training and s Internal Do cument 2005). Culture has, in this sense, wrought the destruction of culture a rhetorical move that allows the simultaneous valorization and demonization of rural agricultural practices. This, in turn, rationalizes the spread of supervision and monitoring techniques through agricul tural trainers and experts, who are suspended in a hierarchy that places them above rural farmers. This initial inclusion of cultural valorization would feed into representations of the Campus elsewhere as a palliative to cultural loss, the related idea of cultural infiltration, and concerns over elite/lowland status. The Campus would be framed as a celebration engageme nt of a type of peasant populism reflected the ways that project administrators as elite actors at the University of Toamasina envisioned their own role in Malagasy development as well as that of the rural peasantry. These expressions of the complex n ature of traditional practices embrac e populist development models that were often echoed in state discourse (Sardan 2005, Cooper and Packard 1997) T he idea of populism helped to shield the ways that practices within the Campus reproduced preceding power relations (by relying on local networks of political power) and increased the visibility and legitimacy of state power Peasant Populism The valorization of the peasantry was integral to the project s public relations ; newspaper articles spoke glowingly of how the project invited the participation of farmers as equals. ran a story on the project in 2005, highlighting its novelty and gesturing towards its potential to trouble accepted educational hierarchies:

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138 Some real farmers on the faculty! On this year the University of Toamasina has some in its ranks thanks to the Campus Ambanivohitra located in Ambonivato fokontany of the rural Ivoloin a district. [ Saholiarisoa 2005 ] This piece marked the inauguration of the Campus Ambanivohitra attended by notables such as the Malagasy Minister of Education. These discourses travelled into public relations documents, where the Campus was represented as a way to collapse social distinctions betw een the educated elite and rural Malagasy farmers. C onsciousness raising efforts of the Campus focused on this same form of exchange, and sought to centralize the Campus Ambanivohitra as being the only project truly of and for the Malagasy farmers of rura l Atsinanana. As such, it relied on the same ideas of cultural loss and infiltration that drove the projects initial representations In 2008 sensibilisation meetings held by the Campus were performed to reinforce and extend the project s relations wit h the rural community rhetorically breaking the hierarchies of knowledge that inhere in these educational practices (Rossi 2006) Carried out in the meeting rooms and staff offices of regional and commune capitals, these programs involved the presentatio n of projects to rural mayors who would in turn, at least theoretically, repeat the presentation in their own communities. At one such meeting, held in the Brickaville municipal center the largest venue of the three districts we visited for the 2008 trip project administrators sat down at a long table facing f ive rural mayors and one assistant mayor Here, training rural farmers was envisioned as a way to collapse, in part, the difference that inhered between development agencies and their stakeholders : experts who can be in the commune? Why, because normally, the

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139 technicians who work here in your communes, they come from elsewhere. Even the people who work for with PSDR, PPRR, for whatever development, they come from the exterior of your communes. The reality is that they students to be trained in agricu ltural and husbandry techniques, that presumes that you want to change. If the training objectives are achieved, I communes, they can do it themselves The Director s words singled out two of the larger development organizations that work in the region the Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux ( Program for the Promotion of Rural Revenue, PPRR), a program funded by the Malagasy government and the International Fund for Agricultural Development and meant to aid farmers in coordinating their efforts with product distributors, exporters, and access micro credit and the Projet de Soutien au Dveloppement Rural (PSDR), a project funded by the World Bank which helps to support regional o rganizations such as the DRDR. The idea of development from below, in this instance, is also infused with a healthy dose of competition between development organizations. This competition was more attenuated at these meetings, as the Director sought to d ispel rumors about the Campus Fanantenana the rival farmer training program that was emerging under the leadership of the Campus Ambanivohitra (former) Research Director in 2008 (see chapters 5 and 6). In addition, the Campus chose this opportunity t o draw an important distinction between itself and its main competitors, with the technical director telling rural mayors, Campus Ambanivohitra bureau o be leaders of another area and given new forms of power over their neighbors The next sentence confirmed this

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140 who are going to manage the people from their area Narratives that promised to democratize development and development expertise by putting it into the hands of rural farmers ignored t hree important facets of the Campus First, the project s structure was such that participants were selected ba sed on their relation to local political leaders themselves dependent upon their own regularly hired to teach Campus courses a fact which strengthened the reach of the state and supported its power among the elite by providing a source of supplementary income within a context of unsure institutions. Third, the project s initial incarnation, obscured here, was based on the very creation of development expertise at two le vels: among the rural, on the one hand, and among university students and campus in order to ( Internal Document 2008). The linkage eventually fe ll away, with this aspect of the project decoupled from its main activities and resituated under the Presidential Office in Toamasina (See Chapter 5 for a more detailed account of the politics behind the switch). Candidacy : Ideals and Functional Realities Participating peasants were not expected to display the characteristics described above. Rather, to participate in the project, they needed to be already exceptional Initially, rural mayors were asked to choose farmers from their communes who were r emarkable highly motivated and met the following criteria: Baccalaurat [secondary degree] preferred), ready to leave their village for at least two months, passion for the land, ownership of agricultural land (at least 300 ar es riziculture [3 hectares]),

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141 agreement to furnish travel expenses to get to the Campus Ambanivohitra readiness to apply new agricultural technologies, and agreement to participate in a rural organization and to transmit the acquired knowledge [ Internal D ocument 2005 ] These requirements are revealing of the way project administrators represented their ideal students: rural, docile, dynami c and social success was predicated on peasant mobility (in order to attend classes) peasant status (ability at some future point to manage others), and mo st importantly, access to no small amount of land. These requirements together ensured that participants would be relatively well off. In reality, however, these requirements w ere not often met. Of the students I interviewed ( approximately a quarter of the students accepted and half of those that matriculated) only 10 had advanced past primary education ( roughly 1/4) and of those, only four had made it to the Malagasy equival ent of high school. It would be difficult, in an area where educational participation drops off precipitously after primary school ( World Bank 200 2 ) for a project such as the Campus Ambanivohitra to locate suitable candidates who held a high school diplo ma and remained in rural areas. Advancing in educational level requires leaving rural areas, as very few can offer education past primary school. Of those that had some secondary education, only two travel led to attend secondary school often at distance s in excess of 50 miles. The rest came from towns that offered both primary and secondary education. Rural mayors, then, had some flexibility in who they could choose to put up for consideration. Each year, after their ann ual invitations to sensibilisation sessions in the district capitals, they were expected to do the same in their communities. However, the power and prestige associated with development projects, along with the promises of

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142 materials and access to financia l expertise made by project administrators during their informational meetings (things like farming implements, access to agricultural machinery, and micro credit, the latter discussed further in c hapter 4), meant that most often the m ayors offered the opp or tunity to specific individuals before communicating it publicly Chosen participants were often the children, in laws or close friends or colleagues of local mayors and other politicians Thus in 2008 both the mayor of Ranomafana Est and the mayor of Befotaka sent their sons to the Campus. In addition the secretary of the Niarovana Caroline office, though much older than the typical student or the age limit suggested, attended the program in 2007 along with a number of other local no tables. It was a point of pride for participant farmers to be chosen Those I spoke with explained how they were chosen and why often mentioning their exceptionalism in their home area and their willingness to try new things. But these were not the o nly qualities that the Campus desired to see in potential candidates. In 2008, the Campus began administering exams to potential students. Linked in part to the project s efforts to legitimize its program in the eyes of local and international partners like the University of Toamasina and the Region of Haute Normandie, both relationships which had been strained in the previous years the project added an exam to the application process. Students were expected to travel to the district capital to take p art in these written tests a requirement that again speaks to the mobility that was expected of participants. Subsequent relocations would, for the most part, be reimbursed by the Campus, but this first trip illustrated an investment on the part of pros pective students.

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143 The exam consisted of three written sections and one oral section. The first written section was on mathematics, and asked students to answer six questions based on addition, subtraction, multiplication, and ratios. It was an important section in its ability to gauge students abilities to work with numbers a central practice for the entrepreneurial accounting the project would require of them. The second written section was on general knowledge and asked students to answer questions in subject areas of history, geography, civics and French Th e difficulty of these questions depended on connection To answer the questions correctly, students would have to be connected through public education, but also through other media both rad io and print, through physical mobility and through civic participation All of these pieces of info r mation would be more available to those who interacted often with government agents and agencies, and to those who travelled extensively throughout their region Table 3 1 Campus Ambanivohitra e ntrance e xam s ubjects 2008. History Geography Civics Identify former Malagasy Presidents Identify the ethnic identity of the Pirate King Rasimilao [aka Ratsimilaho] Identify the number of communes in th e district Identify the furthest commune from their home in the district and how many kilometers separate them Name the three districts of Atsinanana Name the districts they would pass on their way to Tamatave Identify the legal voting age Identify the meaning of the acronym MAP Identify the events of April 4, 2 007 62 Identify the number of regions in Madagascar Identify the number of regions in Toamasina Name two regions in Toamasina Identify w hether or not HIV/AIDS is contagious Identify what t he BCG vaccine protects against 63 Name two detrimental effects of burning b r ush 62 This was the passage date of the constitutional referendum that abolished the autonomous provinces. 63 Tuburculo sis.

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144 The final sections of the exam were meant to measure the capabilities in French requesting that students listen to a French dict ation and then respond, in French, to a series of questions about it. The final section of the exam was oral, asking prospective students to des cribe their experiences, motivation, expectations, and anything else they would like to discuss. Administrator s would judge these responses, deeming students as serious or not serious, and treating their applications accordingly. The exams though the results on the general questions were not kept on recor d. Rather, the most important section was the oral one would make it into some campus documents. The exam acted as an evaluation that could neficiaries, even while the C onstructing E ntrepreneurs and Experts The Campus Ambanivohitra sought to educate Malagasy university students as technicians, capable of bo th observing rural practices and formulating development plans to address their cultural and economic needs. S tudents for their part, looked forward to reaping the benefits of the knowledge that the Campus promised to deliver, though it was not always ne w knowledge. Many were chosen precisely because they were already considered skilled farmers. Others had previously pursued training programs with little result. What the Campus did offer was knowledge with certification, and a mastery of expert techniq ues that promised to open the door to social mobility and new forms of rural affluence. The project promised to turn participants into entrepreneurs of the self (Rose 1999) and experts of the market. As the Campus put it:

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145 the international market is b ased above all on the law of supply and demand, the solution is to adapt oneself to policulture, which means to cultivate parallel products, stock and / or process them, and, finally, sell them at the most opportune time [ Internal Document 2007] Coursework was meant to enable self monitored flexible labor (Ong 1991, 1999 b ) where individual farmers were expected to follow market trends and have the expertise necessary to switch quickly between several agricultural activities. The curriculum at the Campus reflected this interest in a diversified entrepreneurial expertise Technicians and professors were brought in to teach a number of different modules. In their first term, students were given a baseline of knowledge on diverse forms of rural cultivation In the second term, students would build on this knowledge, revisiting the same agricultural themes but adding a significant amount of managerialism or a focus on agriculture as business that anticipated the power of participant farmers over the labor o f others and echoed the practices of the Campus Ambanivohitra administration and the wider administrative practices of development (Kothari 2005). This managerialism was fed by the expectation that individuals become leaders in the fikambanana or associ ations, they were expected to create after techniques Fikambanana would act to spread participants technical knowledge, pulling them into ( deeper ) hierarchical relations with their neighbors while at the same time pulling those same ne i g hbors into connection with new, old, and somewhat diffused, forms of state and international power. Through participants Paysan leader the networked reach of state and non state development experts would be stretch ed downward and outward into rural areas that the state rarely ventured Paysan leader

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146 (see Sardan and Bierschenk 1993) and gained new life within the Campus Ambanivohitra which set up a sort of leadership pyr amid that set its administration as Table 3 2 Courses o ffered at the Campus Ambanivohitra y ears 1 and 2. Year 1 Year 2 Subject Hours Subject Intensive and Improved Riziculture 100 Mastering Information Technology Vegetable Protection 10 Development and Optimization of Knowledge Creation and Management of Nurseries 15 Functioning and Organization of Agricultural Exploitation Market Farming 20 Diversification and Drivers of Market Crops Aromatics and E ssential Oils 10 Social Management of Water Large Animal Husbandry 30 Agricultural Machines: Mechanics and Tools Role of Animal Husbandry in Agricultural Exploitation 4 Financial Management and Accounting in Agricultural Enterprises Aviculture 60 Financ ial Systems of Rural and Agricultural Milieus Apiculture 10 Area Organization and Contracts Pisiculture and Rizipisiculture 20 Professional Agricultural Organizations Dynamics and Management of Soils to Scale 30 Editing Micro Credit and Finance Applicat ions Using Chemical Fertilizer 10 Techniques of Vegetable Propagation 10 Life and Land Sciences 10 French Communication 50 Rural Socio Economy 60 Introduction to Technology 25 Microfinance Projects 28 With the weight of these responsibiliti es, f armers were expected to be disciplined subjects, and cohorts of farmers would first experience the campus as a strict organization of their labor. The students were divided into groups of six, and one group would tend to a number of diverse activitie s that surrounded the upkeep of the campus, taking care of project livestock and provisions while their fellow students were in class or working experimental fields The day was divided into six, with individuals expected to participate in courses and wor k from 6 am to 6 pm with an hour for lunch. When the scheduled day was over, they were expected to continue to work in groups and subgroups perfecting micro credit projects or meeting informally.

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147 The disciplining of time at the campus would only be rei terated by expectations of temporal discipline at home. Students, who after s everal weeks of study would return to their homes to engage in practical application, were expected to adhere to strict schedules that would be evaluated by Campus a dministrators Success relied on the management of the time and labor intensive practices so closely linked to modern agriculture and, more generally, to techniques of governance whose genesis was in classical liberal governance ( Thompson 1967, Jarosz 1994 Munn 1992, Rose 1999 ). Both the curriculum and the schedule encouraged self evaluation and self discipline, proliferating, among rural agriculturalists, a culture of audit and evaluation (Strathern 2000) that was mirrored by the projects own methods of stock takin g and self evaluation. T he mastery of techniques of self evaluation culminated in the completion of a series of micro credit p roposals that would be presented to the savings and loan organization, OTIV. The Campus Ambanivohitra ourse on micro credit, and set up a template for participant farmers. Micro credit applicants copied the parameters into their notebooks, filling them out and returning them to the project where they would be digitized. The project would then deliver t he se to their partner, OTIV though loans were not guaranteed. OTIV loans required that students open themselves up personally and p rofessionally fields to declare their marital status, fill in their national identity card number and list their economic and social activities. The applications would advance much like a research p roposal with a justification for the project, then general and specific objectives Documents then turned

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148 to accounting tables that invited participants to be actuaries, estimating gains (such as eggs and milk) and losses due to death, consumption, and sale; t hen the cost of materials, medications, seeds, animals, etc. The documents moved on to issues of time management, having indiv idual farmers divide the project into phases, with detailed descriptions of the work to be done during each period. Finally, micro pro ject proposals offered prediction s on other labor needed, offering funds that would facilitate participant manag ement over others. These accounting tables could display understandings of market and risk, but demonstrated, above all, an ability to account for these understandings to translate them into auditing tables and to then translate those fields rather th an agricultural ones into money. Audit, as a mechanism of managing Campus Ambanivohitra the governing role of audit was doubled: the project rendered participant farmers as auditors of the self at the same time that it subjected them to layers of audit from OTIV and the Campus Ambanivohitra The project never delivered on all of its micro cred it promises and the audit practices it encouraged came to threaten a number of participants, who were exposed to some of the more threatening aspects of audit (see Chapter 4). Four years after the project was con c eived, discussion of conferring advanced de grees of License and Masters were shelved. In 2008, only two out of three stages of training had been completed, though two promotions had matriculated (with a rate of retention of approximately 60%). The problems that precipitated this shift illustrate tugs

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149 time, the project was subject to frozen funds originating with partners, or a disappearance of students into wage labor opportunities that cr oss scheduling such a s the litchi and clove harvests ( Activits 2008: 2). In addition, the Campus opening and closing ceremonies were planned around the availability of local dignitaries, such as the Minister of Education, whose unavailability del ayed the graduation of the Stage 2 cohort by a few months at the end of 2008. The se degrees derided by University personnel as a devaluation of university d iplomas were replaced by certificates that would offer students the cultural capital that shou ld accrue with matriculations. Like micro credit loans, these certificates promised to open up new opportunities for students. As one student summed up the These offered them legitimacy in the eyes of the state, a situation that would help to put them into rural leadership roles. The contours of participation and training offered at the campus highlight the impo r tance of connection Embracing and correctly wielding methods rooted in the practices of accounting and managerialism would open new doors of connection These would, in turn, offer new forms of acces s to labor, material resources and cultural capital. Networks of Expertise Connections, of course, emerged out of the practices of the Campus itself Farmer s attendance opened up new personal and geographical connections that could be translated into social mobility by students. As one student said, when asked what Campus Ambanivohitra a lot

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150 of people, but now we know people in high places, we know many students, many In c oming to the campus, participant farmers encountered other participants from a number of other rural areas. More than simple friendships, making connections within the cohort held the potential to increase mobility in very real ways. The political connec tivity that characterized students put them into a web of rural connection strengthening the web of power that led to the family and friends of local politicians and notables (and, at the same time, the state). In addition, s tudents many of whom carri ed cell phones took the numbers of their fellow students, creating a geographic network of individuals that could offer hospitality and market connections. Students could tap this network to discuss the project, meet up as they travelled to and from the campus, and later, to warn each other of the very real audits OTIV had begun to carry o u t in late 2008 In addition to their fellow students, the project brought them into contact with a large number of instructors tied to many of the biggest agricult ural development bodies, both governmental and non governmental, in Madagascar. During its first year the Campus employed some 10 12 instructors from: the University of Toamasina, including its prog ram (Natural Resource and Environmental Management, GRENE); the cole d'Application des Sciences et Techniques Agricole (School for the Application of Agricultural Science and Technology EASTA) located just north of Toamasina; FOFIFA; Agronomes et Vtrina ires Sans Frontiers (AVSF); the Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave (CTHT); the Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux (PPRR), the Madagascar

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151 Fauna Group, which runs the national park north of Tamatave, the DRDR, Care International, the NGO Tany sy Fampandrosoana (ONG TAFA, literally Land and Development NGO), and the Centre International de Dveloppement Rurale (CIDR). The network participants were connected to via instructors is illustrated in Figure 3 4 Figure 3 4 Campus Ambanivohitra i nstr o rganizational l inkages. B old boxes contain the organization represented within the Campus Ambanivohitra s instructional s taff. Vertical relations coalesce with the Malagasy state, while horizontal relation s represent outside funding and governme ntal agencies.

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152 From any measure, the project expanded individual participants interaction s with the state through varied bodies Many of these linked directly with the state through the inistries assuring a likewise linkage to the centrali zed power of the state. Not so much anti political (Ferguson 1990), the program flaunted its connection or tried to. T o be in the networks of the Campus Ambanivohitra was to be connected to political power a situation that could lead to more and bett er economic and political benefits (Crush 1995). T hese connections held the potential to aid students in accessing resources, and some who no longer wanted to attend the Campus Ambanivohitra used them to locate other programs they might pursue. High rates of attrition among teachers a reality that, according to the few former instructors I interviewed, spoke to dissatisfaction, logistical constraints linked to their primary positions and project curricula meant that students interacted with new individuals each year spreading their networks further While largely unintended, project flux coupled with expectations of farmer mobility, meant that the state could extend its reach further in terms of legitimacy and governance without a concomit ant invest ment in infrastructure. At the Campus Ambanivohitra the project translated into political and economic benefit for certain stakeholders through practices that were explicitly and implicitly present in project design. The fact that many students were already related to or had been chosen by rural politicians meant that the system was essentially closed to the opposition. In relying on these local politicians, t he project lent itself to a subtle one party structure that bristled next to administr to make bureaucrats.

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153 Legitimate A ctors : States and Agents at the Campus Ambanivohitra Development, as a general idea, has been largely criticized for spreading and supplementing bureaucratic power and legitimizi ng the state, all while sit ting under a cloak of rational, apolitical intervention (Ferguson 1990, Scott 1998) The Campus Ambanivohitra as discussed here, hints at its abilities to fill these roles superbly. There is no question that the Campus Ambaniv ohitra acted as a way to extend state power at the level of the peasantry. But state power relied upon more than this level for legitimacy. T o accomplish these feats of representation and administration, the state rel ied on the provision of prestige and material resources that the project could make possible. And to do this, the state needed to partner with a number of different agents of development beyond the peasantry each embroiled in its own efforts to craft personal and institutional reach and l egitimacy Each of these groups has, in turn, brought their own desires and concerns to the project. This section explores the ways that these organizations used the Campus to craft images of the good state, the good development agent and the good post co lon ial power. These representations link to realms of power that are outside of, but interconnect with, the state opening doors to new access to and control over social political and economic resources T hrough development the state gain s access to l egitimizing narrative s that engage the peasant as a symbol of the Malagasy nation and that function among elite Malagasy and international agents as well as peasant s The state, through the project, also access es a network that supplant s c (Foucault 1991) The project generated knowledge about rural subjects through surveys and evaluations that

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154 render ed messy realities into manageable figur es. These followed a circuit with raw data generate d by the project, processed by French partners, and returned as statistical evidence in the state s effo r ts to court material and logistical support from local and global partners. International powers re iterate state and project narratives of developme nt, shifting foci in ways that speak to these institutions and governments own economic and political concerns In practical terms, intern ational institutions and foreign governments use development t o craft their own legitimacy as moral nations to stak e claims on the control of scientific knowledge, and to leverage development roles into economic currency by embracing a support role for the Malagasy government. Individual agents, finally, seek and sometimes f i nd paths that c an sustain or improve t heir personal status by offering them access to new levels of social, political, and economic mobility These w ea ve in to and out of the state stop ping and start ing through the linkages that development projects increasingly rely on and in ways that far exceed the possibilities afforded rural farmers engaged in the project. What results is a nexus where agents and institutions come together, each move they make supporting the others in ways that are incomplete, yet effective. Improving the State of the State This paper has already outlined the effects of participant recruitment on the political makeup of the student body and the expansion, thereby, of state reach. But the further implications of these moves are worth exploring. This section analyzes th ese political and administrative connections further, linking them back to the reproduction of state power

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155 In 2004, when the Campus was conceived, there were severa l state bodies connected to it. Some were quintessential: the regional and municipal gover nments and ministry level offices whose participation and support were necessary Others were slightly removed ; another rung down in the organizational hierarchy Org anizations like FOFIFA and DRDR which were public, but sat at sub ministerial levels a nd could thus act as relatively innocuous and apolitical development entities found new paths to reach the public through the Campus curriculum. Another level of sub state agencies were a set of p organizations that were run as businesses: the Chambre of Commerce, PPRR, CTHT fit this classification. Taking these groups as an arena of exploration, this section ex amines the ways the p roject reinforced the power of the state outside of rural agriculture The Campus Ambanivohitra like development elsewhere functioned as a support to state power and legitimacy in a number of ways (Ferguson 1990, Kothari 2005, Elyachar 2005) Malagasy policy objectives and governing bodies made it a central space wide national and international audience. Second, partnerships with foreign entities were closely guarded and strategically deployed in ways that both obscured and reinforced state power. Third, the access to m aterial and symbolic resources that the project facilitated enabled state agents to strengthen personal, political, and expert networks that could supplement the support provided by increasingly weakened public agencies The Campus Ambanivohitra provided a central space in which political agents and institutions could craft a public narrative about the st (Li 2007).

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156 Following the trajectories set by the 2006 abolition of the autonomous provinces the Campus Ambanivohitra with the state flowed through a number of agents, each linking them back to the state Figure 3 5. Campus Ambanivohitra g overnment r elationships, 2004 2010. Black borders signal the direct partners of the project. Gray borders signify indirect relat ions. Under the new regional system, the President would name the Chef de Rgion through the Ministry of Decentralization, for each of the 22 regions (Marcus 2010). The administrative level below the district would lose administrative importance, and the commune rurale and fokontany would be elevated. Commune rural mayors, under this plan, would be elected directly, while chef fokontany the lowest level of official

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157 governance would be appointed by the Chef de Rgion In state rhetoric, commune r urale mayors and chef fokontany were tasked with doing 80% development, 20% administration (Marcus 2010: 124). These expectations made development participation in projects like the Campus important to the political futures of individual leaders from abov e (at the level of the state) and from below (at the level of their own citizens). For higher status individuals in the government chain like Ministers and Chefs de Region project events offered a way to reach both rural farmers and the more elite and ur ban development agents and individual citizens. Glowing newspaper articles printed statements from high level appointees on the promise of the Campus and its alignment to state policies. The Campus actively engaged in these linkages, postponing graduatio n ceremonies in 2008 because the Minister of Education could not attend on the scheduled day and budgeting reimbursements for journalist travel costs. At a more general level, the Campus Ambanivohitra got the state s polic y other state agents and international organizations and to a lesser extent, by other Malagasy Development went on display at conferences like World Nutrition Day in Foulepointe, just north of Tamatave. Here development projects like the Campus Ambanivohitra set up display booths as a caravan of dignitaries in keyless entry 4x4s sped up the coastal highway Once these dignitaries arrived they were entertained by dances put on by local students on the importance of hand washing and speeches by politicians, b efore walking a perimeter constructed of development booths. Here, state and international agents could visualize development

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158 through a spectrum of projects that illustrated the political will of the nation to develop ( as well as the relative prosperity o f different projects ). The display of development its spectacle also created an image of development that could then be disseminated through local televisions, reaching the urban areas where the citizens could the the social realm and particularly, to the rural peasant who was both iconic and maligned in Malagasy developmental and nationalist narratives. These public performances of development were supplemented by the administrative roles the region was assigned in contracts with the Campus Ambanivohitra obligations, according to the Campus Ambanivohitra and existing administrative institutions, as well as the partners mong the rural community efine the policy for the execution of the training project reside over the pilot committee Convention de Col laboration 2006 ). In other words, their power within the project was substantial and pointed. The region emerged here as a key player mediating powerful relations with project donors. In a nation characterized by the disappearance of the state embodie d in newly built yet often unmanned s c hools and hospitals the Campus Ambanivohitra offered another port of entry into donor relations for the state Through this role the region had an o pportunity for increased state visibility while at the same time obs curing the role behind less tightly state connected entities Partners would serve a role as visible foreign and thus objective support.

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159 The region put th is support on display in the new (Regional Palace) He re notices of development programs with jobs for technicians littered the cork boards outside the entrance These notices were mirrored in the familiar Madagasikara recruitment ads that searched out labor to work on newly (internationally) funded development projects. On the second floor of bright n ew construction the inside wall used by University of Toamasina students working as interns at the region, was dedicated to development and specifically Madagascar Action Plan. The room also served as the joint office of the French representative of Haute and Bas se N ormandie, and the Regional Development Councilor This connection was documented in the media, illustrating the types of representation generated by development relationships and the centrality of developments networks : It s the beneficiary of the results of effective cooperation between the Region of Atsinanana and that of Rhone Alpes in France. This large spacious room can receive seminars and working meetings organized by the Region, but equally those of the MAP commissions, if one understands t he planning: big screen, round table, internet access and the ability to consult electronic as well as printed documents (seating up a network of MAP commissions in the districts and with the exterior through various links on the Atsinanana website). [Mada gascar Tribun e December 7, 2007] Here, meetings about the region s role in development would be carried out between the respective corners of Haute Normandie and Atsinanana as mediator even while the presence of the Fre nch repre sentative legitimized the idea

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160 This reality of state mediation was very present in the Campus Ambanivohitra Project administrators were more often engaged in face to face relations with the Haute Normandie representative who acted as a gatekeeper for French funds than with the regional leaders. Yet each interaction with funders was carried out under the mountainous walls of the Maison MAP and Campus administrators were constantly reminded of their presence and their sy mbolic power over funding partners The Campus facilitated the circulation of m aterial resources that were important to the continuing legitimation of state power P roject administration embarked, then, on a relationship with the region that, when put tog ether, could create material revenue for the state and political capital for the region Often these joint efforts would follow the contours of individual s previous connections. Thus when the Campus submitted a proposal to renovate a number of buildings at their third training site at Niarovana Caroline, informants explained that it was the Chef de Rgion who had family in the area that wanted the Campus housed there. In joining the network and pledging its support, the region and its Malagasy count erparts at the University of Toamasina and the Chamber of Commerce gained access to a vast array of development monies ( and minimized their necessary contribution ) The jobs these funds created for university students and technicians a fforded politica l leadership resources that could be put to work in solidifying their base. The Campus Ambanivohitra project was also closely related to a number of p ublic institutions that answer to Ministries but do not ostensibly engage in territorial administrat ion. As discussed above, participant farmers were trained largely by technicians from public institutions who were paid a small salary, travel costs, and per

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161 diem for periodic instruction in Campus modules. 64 These organizations were expanded through the project and the additional support they received supplemented their positions as often underpaid functionaries. Like participating farmers these functionaries were networked into and through the Campus. The central partner of the project, the Univer sity of Toamasina, and several secondary partners, FOFIFA, DRDR, etc., sit below Ministries and Regions. Participation offered these technicians ways to supplement uncertain public incomes that linked t hem back to the power of the state even while it dir ected them to income at lower levels of the hierarchy. The project, in this way, became involved in the production of regimes of flexible labor among state technicians a situation that allowed the rationalized austerity of organizations like FOFIFA and t he University of Toamasina while simultaneously supporting the i nstitutional reach of the state. In addition, the project offered a market for the products of state expertise. According to their contract with the project, FOFIFA, the heir to the French development organization ORSTOM, now funded by the Malagasy contemporary successor, the Centre de coopration internationale en recherche agronomique pour le dveloppement (Center of International Coop eration in Agronomic Research for De and animal production (fertilization techniques, improved seeds, techniques for the ( I nternal Document 2006). This addition rendered the Campus an institution that could propagate the fruits 64 For a section, a technician could earn roughly three dollars an hour, plus the cost of transportation and a daily allowance consisting of about 1 USD per day. Travel costs in 2008 were reimbursed at a range of between 5 and 26 dollars per trip de pending on the point of origin.

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162 of internationally (CIRAD) mediated resear ch. This provision enabled the state to get research into new realms. The practice replicated other practices of seed redistribution emb arked on by FOFIFA elsewhere (La Gazette August 13, 2010). It also helped to create a market for FOFIFA / CIRAD produced seeds, a plan that was linked to state rationalization of seed s and planting materials of improved crop varieties, animal breeds and vaccines, a move the FAO labeled a n 2002 (FAO 2002) Like farmers, research organizations were expected to submit to market rationalization. FOFIFA stretched into relationships of land tenure among the population living near the Campus site : Concerning the land, FOFIFA undertakes to ensure to the University the use and development of the land surrounding the training center, favorable land for the irrigated rice paddy, and/or pluvial without compromising its research projects. [ Internal Document 2006] This land agreement would later prove problematic, with local communities contest ing and then reclaiming the land in question at Niarovana Caroline and a rival project the Campus Fanantenana staking a claim at the project s sometime c ampus at Ivoloina just north of Tamatave (see Chapter s 4 and 5 ) FOFIFA split the site at Niarovan a Caroline with the Toamasina Chamber of Commerce ( CCIAT ) negotiating with both for usage rights to buildings and to the small staff (2 guardians) that were kept there before Presidential restructuring forced Here the project acted to reinvigorate

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163 (see chapter 2). rel ationship to local land three sites from 2004 2009 meant that the state was silently present in the everyday workings of these sites. The Campus inhabited, quite literally, the shell of these earlier forms creating st udent dormitories, professors quarters, and classrooms inside buildings that had been given over to a number of different development entities undertaking short term projects since FOFIFA ceased using them This inhabitation of previous sites of developm ent previous signals of a working state and a working economy are present across Africa, as new programs take up the symbolic and physical space of their predecessors (see Chalfin 2010). But they also exist beyond Africa, in places like Indonesia (Li 2007) or Brazil (Caldeira and Holston 2006). Perhaps the most striking American example of this is the city of Detroit where images of a past prosperity and futures denied have become something of a cottage industry (see for example the glossy photos feat ured in Lost Detroit ). In Madagascar, th ese sites part of a group of geographical and temporal shadow presences st an d testament to the contemporary paucity of state funds for development intervention, with FOFIFA sites almost entirely g iven over to local communities, and formerly substantial research sites falling into disrepair. FOFIFA members interviewed in Tamatave bemoaned the lack of funding, stating that really the work of the Campus Ambanivohitra should be theirs, and that they h ad been instead relegated to research rather than outreach (see c hapter 3).

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164 Figure 3 6 Decaying g as and a ir p umps at Niarovana Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra s ite The Campus in inhabiting these sites tapped local memories of better days and an agricultural r esearch and development apparatus that worked. Interest gained them several students from the local communities, including two children of a former IFCC technician Yet the failure of the Campus to adequately deliver a set of promised and tangible benefi ts to local s in terms of wage employment, increased trade, and improved infrastructure threatened the projects claim to legitimacy and revealed asymmetries of the way s th e Campus FOFIFA, and the local municipal government inhabited their respective sp aces of state power ( see c hapter 4) Alternate States: French Decentralized Cooperation and the Campus Ambanivohitra The Campus Ambanivohitra did not solely propel the Malagasy state forward it fed French intervention into their former colony. French relations of decentralized cooperation brought the F rench state into physically and symbolically governance and university affairs in Madagascar. This insertion facilitated French representations of the moral Fre nch state, widening legitimacy through iterations of hum anitarianism that pop up in glossy magazines that highlight work in Madagascar. R elationships

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165 of development sustain and create patterns of knowledge production that center epistemological power in the metropole, even while narra tives of scientific development prom ise to collapse asymmetries of power. N arratives of French m orality that emerged through French development assistance linked to larger interests in furthering France s not i nsubstantial investments on the island Gove rning b odies in c lose e ncounter French policies of decentralized cooperation embrace lateral support through interregional partnership. These alliances occur as a sort of international mentorship, in which established the role of the Region as overseer and allow the Atsinanana Region to position itself gradually as project French volunteers working within the framework of decentralized cooperation produced and facilitated the spread of a set of evaluative and rep resentational practices that were a part of efforts to (CPMR 2010: 2). These north south regional alliances are nested within other administrative relations that establ ish and sustain linkages between the Region of Atsinanana, the Region of Haute Normandie the Region of Basse Normandie France, the European Union (EU) and its constituent territorial units Thus Atsinanana as a region partnered with Haute Normandie, B asse Normandie, and Rhone Alps comes in contact with three governing bodies at once In each of these relationships, the Malagasy state is pulled into a mixture of power wherein French support and French evaluation go together In addition, decentralize d cooperation allowed the French another connection through appointed Chefs de Region to a President with a strong and public tendency to prefer anglophone cooperation.

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166 French region s are fairly new governance bodies, emergi ng out of laws beginning i n the early eighties that increased the decision making power to these lower level political units (Cole 2006 Balme and Bonnet 1995 ). Dece n tralization in France was en Cole 2006: 32). This capacit y building occurs through lateral attachments with other regions and through associations created to represent their interests. The Region of Haute Normandie, for e xample, holds relationships of cooperation within France and among different regions in EU member states (e.g. England, Germany, and Poland ; Haute Nor mandie 2011 ). 65 These new administrative units formed associations that link ed them to regions in other Eu ropean countries and into common interest association s like the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR) formed in 2010. Associations like the CPMR create new iterations of decentralized cooperation folding north/south cooperation int o geographically based interregional alliances that constitute interest block s within supranational governance organizations like the EU In so doing, cooperation becomes integral to the reproduction and redirection of relations of governance that coexist at the same time that they help to define moralities of rule. Atsinanana here, becomes integral to the legitimation and reproduction of various scales and spaces of governance outside of the island. 65 The region received 600 million euros worth of EU funding between 2007 and 2010.

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167 Figure 3 7. rench Governing Structures, 2006 2010. Decentralized cooperation has been de rigueur in francophone development for at lea st twenty years, becoming a conditionality for aid in the mid nineties ( Sardan 1998, Bierschenk and Sardan 2003) and is based in a s et of narratives that suggest decentralization as a panacea for democratization and development. Yet in very real ways, decentralization opens up new pathways for the simultaneous diffusion and centralization of power. Decentralization has the effect of layering governance rather than devolving it in effect rebeginning and redirecting power along often parallel pathways.

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168 Decentralized m oralities Cooper ation was folded into narrative representations of the state produced by the Region of Haute Normandie the only French region that ended up supporting the Campus. Haute Normandie frame s d countries by allowing them access to development, while respecting their autonomy, their lif Normandie 2011). Alongside stirring photos of Malagasy children, Haute describes its numerous development programs. These representations are replicated out and iterated in glossy magazines like Ma Region or downloadable reports on the economic impact of solidarit international In Madagascar, the region of Haute Normandie mentions five areas of support. The first consists of micro projects strictly open to organizations based in Haute Normandie and prioritized decentralized cooperation partners in Wilaya de Bejaia in Algeria and the region of Atsinanana. The program requires that applicants assure three years of operation and that all decisions be made through Haute Normandie headquarters (Hau te Normandie 20 10 ). The second is in economic development and achieved through accepting agents of the CCIAAT into France for training in the Region s administrative offices. The third area is higher education, with the project emphasizing partnerships b etween the University of Rouen and the ESITPA with the University of Toamasina and the exchange they facilitated. Fourth was forestry, which funded the ( Social and Cultural Center of Tamatav e and the Forestry Hub of Envermeu a coastal commune in Haute Normandie). Finally, was the Campus Ambanivohitra a

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169 partnership whose Haute Normandie description was a familiar iteration of official project descriptions (Haute Normandie 2010 ) 66 Since 2 005, Haute Normandie has funded the establishment of the campus, a 2007 Post and simple agricultural kits for students a form of gift giving that backs up power (Li 2007; Mbem be 2001) as they matriculate through the project. In 2007, Haute Normandie began to fund student tr aining ( taken over from the University ) the cost of student nutrition ( taken over from the Chamber of Commerce ) and some of the cost of Campus Ambanivohit ra micro projects which were meant to introduce students to micro credit. Moralities of k nowledge and e xchange Issues of knowledge were of particular importance in the region s representation of its international solidarity. Partnerships were valued with in regional narratives for the knowledge exchanges they made possible. These exchanges aligned with the contours of power in a way that secured the continuing at least geographical situation of scientific knowledge in the metropole (Weingart 2006) M adagascar would act as a training ground for French students a place that rounded out their moral and accounting (and a ccountable) as well as their academic education (Stoler 1995; Strathern 2000; Harper 2000 ). These agents however minor a role their knowledge creation played in the on the ground experiences of the Campus p articipant farmers acted as important interlocutors for the moral and hierarchical positioning of development agents (in directing the labor of participant farmers) and the incul cation of 66 A couple of the descriptions from early documents have been reiterated multiple times, almost verbatim, across partner generated descript ions.

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170 specific mo ralities of the laboring body on the proj e These contours of exchange s are not new, but re structured culled from the networks that they are layered over. In this case, the layering involved the covering over of FO interventions with the Campus Ambanivohitra these past interventions, in turn, c over ed over their colonial and postcolonial predecessors T his dynamic is neither relegated to Madagascar nor wholesale, but widespread and p artial (Chalfin 2010; Li 2007). It is emblematic of the colonial endeavor and indicative of the continuance in altered form of the mutual constitution of north and south (Cooper and Stoler 1997; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997 ). Institutional partnerships were key in crafting the mobility of French students in ways that reinforced the moral legitimacy of France through the production (and reproduction) of a young, knowledge mediating, moral citizenry For the University of Rouen which was partnered with the University of Toamasina this often translated into an exchange of business students who would be set up as interns in Malagasy offices and then return home to write short analyses which would, in turn, garner them the equivalent of M.B.A.s. ESITPA s tudents, on the other hand, have written a series of agronomy papers based on litchi market, essential oil feasibility and most recently ginger feasibility (Haute Normandie 2011 ) All of these students are feat ured in media that highlight the cooperation in Madagascar, and the moral behavior of French students in Madagascar (Resoesitpa 2006) Programs facilitated the gathering of data in Madagascar, submitting rural Atsinanana to the techniques of audit that t ranslate into FAO data and then circulate

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171 back into development project design. 67 The Campus Ambanivohitra was predicated on large scale studies carried out by university students whose salaries w ere paid by the Region of Haute Normandie. Data gathering a interviews conducted with trained farmers, complete a precise database on the peasan ( Internal Document 2010 ). Once data was gathered, however, it would be transferred to the Fren ch Laboratoire de modlisation statistique et analyse des donnes (Statistical Modeling and Data Analysis Lab, LAMSAD ) lab at ESITPA. According to ESITPA s contract with the Campus Ambanivohitra : ESI Internal Document 2006: 3). To underscore the importance of this aspect of the study, the agreement state d that if the results d id not arrive, ESITPA would refuse to release the final 25% of financial support. Through this relationship, ESITPA essentially took control of data gathered in the field, presumably to be used in future studies, and would theoretically provide analysis for the Campus, though as of 2008, most of the staff claimed to never have seen the results. Between 2008 and 2010, taking documentation 68 This occurred, mainly, because the only educational exchange that the project undertook wherein it would welcome Malagasy students with 6 going to Fr anc e to study agronomy ended in 67 The most recent group of ESITPA students to work gathering information of the Campus used FAO questionnaires as a guideline. 68 subsection of the F rench Embassy, helped to fund some of the follow up evaluations in 2006 and 2007, supplementing and then supplanting the funding role of ESITPA.

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172 project. The others disappeared into France (see Chapter 4). The ESITPA, despite this pulling awa y, remains a present agent in/of the Campus Ambanivohitra on obs olete web pages and, at times, i n the official publications of the Campus Ambanivohitra Trapped in a cyber limbo the ESITPA site still hosts pages from 200 5 on the Campus Ambanivohitra and its relation to the LAMSAD laboratory. The relationship is frozen in time as a representative of north/south relations that testify to the universities moral engagement and its efforts to create moral (French) citizens through knowledge generation in the global south. Thus, on a page reinvented from project documents, the Campus Ambanivohitra describes its appeal to ESITPA: Tamatave a tool for sustainable development, while teaching Malagasy the most advanced technologies, to produce more while protecting the Knowledge is centered in the metropole The practices that French region s depict as epistemological largesse reenact the same hierarchies of knowl edge and expertise and re center the metropole while legitimizing governance at home by reference to aid in the postcolony that also traces out the co ntours of responsible French citizenship Bureaucratic c osmopolitanism In addition to the relations of ag ronomic knowledge production, decentralized cooperation offered France trajectories for French citizens interested in serving both Alps representative) or well meaning global citizens (li ke the Representative of Haute and Basse Normandie) were pulled into Malagasy development by the volunteer organizations run through the French state and the Volontariat de solidarit

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173 international ves, or with regions, for periods of up to two years. French volunteers often described the program though in reality, while Peace Corps volunteers are shunted to rural villages to learn the language in their first year, French volunteers arrived in positions of power despite their youth and relative in experience The representative of Haute and Basse Normandie, for example, was on his second year of volunteering (his first had been in Niger) and working to, as he described it to me, make sure that the Campus Ambanivohitra wrote proposals, budgets, etc. in ways that would work for the Region. His main task at the Regiona l Palace, then, was powerful, managerial and centered on works of translation (Lewis and Moss 2006; Sardan 2 005) This situation put him in the middle of conflicts within the administrative hierarchy of the Campus Ambanivohitra bailleur de fonds that could address grievances and force change. Connection and the p olitical a nd economic r eproduction of the s tate dis connected from Normandie makes clear on its website that at least one part of its goal in partnership is linked to ports and the market connections three ports of Le Havre, Rouen and Tamatave (80% of maritime traffic betwe en France (Haute Normandie 2011). With the la rgest port in Madagascar, Toamasina is a central gateway for goods coming into and going out of the nation. The balance of t rade with France i s substantial and regional cooperation agreements while not directly touching on these concerns connect to Fr ench interest on the island for more than humanitarian ism or the production of symbolic capital. Development then,

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174 acts as one of many sites where control and influence over border areas and the concomitant reproduction of state and global power are n egotiated (see Chalfin 2011). Campus Ambanivohitra through intermediaries at the regional level was engaged in its own state reproduction in terms that are at once economic and ideological. The Campus Ambanivohitra li ke other projects sponsored through decentralized cooperation acted to legitimize French state power in both France and Madagascar. At another level, it acted as a support of the region s place in both the French state and the European Union through whi ch European regions connect to each other. It also drew the contours of French citizenship around a mastery of managerialism and, at the same time, helped to reproduce asymmetries of epistemological power. Careers of Connection: Development and Power Th e state does not exist in a vacuum and a number of scholars have critiqued that fail to shift focus to the agents and brokers who mediate development interventions and monies (Sardan 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2005; Mosse 2005; Green 2003) The point is a useful one, and one to which we should add the idea that bureaucrats are much more complex than simple state agents an idea that is at once tied to efforts to dislodge sch olarly presumptions of a monolithic state and account for the circulation and interconnection of personal and bureaucratic power (Chalfin 2008, Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol 1985 ; Herzfeld 1992 ) The Campus Ambanivohitra offers a way of understanding th ese two points taking a look at the ways that the Ca mpus (and the state) intersect with the political and economic interests and trajectories of individual agents apart from the rural farmers targeted by the project

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175 Four main groups of individuals made up the Campus: Instructors and Technicians, Administrators, University Students, and French citizens abroad. In varying degrees, the Campus offered each group new forms of connection and relative affluence It enabled development lifestyles characteriz ed by physical and virtual mobility and access to technology, but also access to land and labor. The project also enabled social mobility through the networks it propagated through its curriculum and dependence on other development bodies. Finally, the p roject enabled political mobility through its reliance on state administrative structures. and their academic passions. In addition to the representations of the peasantry mobilized through these constructions are imaginings of self worth and expert morality. The project was created as a way to escape academic ivory towers a place where the conomy Ph.D. and ath Ph.D. could be brough t to bear on real life problems. F aith in science and economy as palliatives to rural poverty were sincere and heartfelt E xpertise was the defining characteristic of Campus staff in their relations with rural farmers. Hierarchies built of presumed asym metries of knowledge travelled with them development was, for them, existential. Developmental benefits: the generation of lifestyle and labor But alongside the narratives people created about who they were lay the very real material and political relat ions that the project made possible. Partnerships engaged in by the University of Toamasina and the Campus Ambanivohitra made things move. Project budget proposals called for office furniture mattresses, dressers, desks, tables, chairs, refrigerators na tural gas, computers, books and articles on tropical agriculture,

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176 as well as plows, harrows, cultivators, weeders, seeders, spades, watering cans, sickles, sprayers, and nursery equipment ( Internal Document 2006). P roposals only represented imagined pote ntials and in reality the project would only get some of these items. The project received computers funds to pay for phone and inter net credit, petrol, mattresses, the kits agricoles that accompanied matriculation ceremonies (usually Campus T Shirts, hoe s, and rotary tillers) and indemnities for participant farmers and rural mayors who sensibilisation meetings It also funded six students to go to France to study at ESITPA, the cost of large scale surveys, an d the cost of the creation of the budgets, follow up evaluations and a variety of other internal documents that were necessary to sustain the project administratively. The funding for these aspects of the project travelled downward, enabling project leade rs to inhabit certain lifestyles and produce and expand personal political networks that grew knotted, flowing in and out of state power (see Sardan 2005) O n the rece iving end of these financial flows, administrators and staff were sustained in a world th at seemed wholly apart from the students they meant to address. Younger administrators rode to work on scooters, sported dual cell phones (one for each of the top two carriers), and went to lunch at restaurants for meals that cost more than the average Ma lagasy would make in a day. To be clear, for many administrators this was not richesse. Rather it was respectable and middle class though more so in urban than in rural areas where CP staff could easily surpass most elite entrepreneurs

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177 Higher lev el administrators, on the other hand, gained somewhat more from the project. The University of Toamasina provided a car and periodically a driver, for the Funding as a complement to his un iversity salary was being put into a massive three story home he had begun to build just before the Campus project began. His ability to command Campus r esources made him especially important in rural regions where he commanded a bed at the homes of rural mayors and other state agents. His history in the area, particularly his family connections, were further cultivated in this post, and he patronized restaurants near the Campus site owned by members of his extended family and hired family members in to the project. His reputation as a scholar earned him respect in these rural arenas, as did his former post, and rural villagers as well as the Campus Ambanivohitra staff continued to call him lost that post. At the Campus sit e he demanded increased attention from the local cook he ha d hired for the project, having her walk over a kilometer carrying food to him. He controlled electricity at the Campus s ite (only turned on periodically) took the best bedroom at the teachers dormitory (others would sleep in a bathroom, an office, or, another bedroom whose wooden floor sank under the weight of each footstep). It was a position that contrasted greatly with his relations with Haute Normandie, where he would be made to wait for responses and project funds as they were almost incessantly tied up, not yet released, or otherwise unavailable. Audit here emerges as part of the practice of power as the partners, in wielding the ability to hold out funds, could direct proje ct labor towards specific ends.

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178 In addition to the rural networks engendered by the Campus and the enactments of middle and upper class Malagasy the project enabled the spread of the urban and international networks of the educated elite. It was thus a lso a player in both the creation of the elite, and the creation of a highly differentiated sort of elite culture or more specifically, a culture of expertise (Mitchell 2002; Meyer 1997 ; Strathern 2000 ; Rose 1996 ) Access to funds for sending Malagasy s tudents to France was important in facilitating the cooperation and further support of the Region of Atsinanana, and linked the Director of the Campus into a higher level governmental body. Funds for university students were spread among underemployed stu dents and facilitated thei r future mobility as they were s participating and non participating farmers. The project also provisioned jobs for underemployed technicians and instructors trained by other Malagasy programs. The ability to control these provisions translated into a vast political support network that was personal as well as state based. Contingent m obilities: the p olitics of d evelopment and education at the Campus Ambanivohitra The Directo r s connection to political and state power were well entrenched b efore hi s stint as university president U niversity students suggested that he had been brough t from the University of Antananarivo to the University of Toamasina precisely because of his l inkage to state power. According to this assertion, it was his Betsimisaraka ethnic identity, and his tenure in Antananarivo, that made him an ideal candidate to replace the university Rector. The Rector was active in the national Assembly for the Andry sy Riana Enti Manavotra an'i Madagasikara (AREMA, Association for a Malagasy Renaissance) party and a vocal supporter of former

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179 President Didier Ratsiraka, who contested the 2001 election results and effectively split the island during a prolonged politica l crisis. In 2002, the rectorate was transformed into a university presidency, and the future Director of the Campus Ambanivohitra won its first election. As university president, he travelled widely across the island, attending conferences and minister ial level meetings. The Campus, would, in part, grow out of the networks and relations he created during this time. His close cadre of administrators in the university presidency would come with him to the Campus Ambanivohitra taking up leading roles in its administration ; his former Administrator and beginning and his former Vice President for Fiscal Affairs at the university, who acted as the main contact for relations w ith French universities took up the top administrative positions at the Campus Ambanivohitra Other administrators came from other university development and accounting programs family Instructors were culled from the v arious development organizations around the island Local staff like the Niarovana campus cook were politically connected (her husband was the secretary to the Commune Mayor ) or inherited from earlier projects Guardian whose father had worked for FOFIFA and who continued to work for the state for unsure pay) and were thus a key, if unspoken, link in the director s ability to keep the project in place through the legitimacy of, however small, job creation These connec tions made the staff fiercely loyal (for a time) but also rendered the Director an individual who could direct redistribution in ways that could extend his

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180 personal political power. This was important, because the structure of the Campus put it in charge of land and labor in ways that could (and did) spur controversy and required the participation and approval of local politicians. These strategies helped to keep the Campus going through the rising tensions and abject failures that would come to charact erize it s efforts over the first few years of operation (see Chapter 4) The production and reproduction of p ersonal power (in addition to state power) would also act as a palliative that would keep the Campus together and legitimate while its temporary rival, the Campus Fanantenana (openly and boisterously coup Campus Ambanivohitra worked (for him) mainly as a way to extend h is status into local areas, continue relations with foreign funders, and produce the evaluative products needed to sustain the system while improving his situation in material and symbolic ways So strong were his connections and his confidence of them that he once demanded that a local development project director provide training for his students on one was obliged to allow it The move illustrated just how deftly he could use his political weight to command the la The main interlocutor for foreign relations before Haute Normandie sent their representative, was the Campus Research D irector. Capitalizing on a position he had crafted as director of student exchanges with France while in the U niversity of Toamasina administration, he turned the rural access the Campus afforded into political success. University students at the time suggested that the then President of the

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181 University had been grooming his second to take over for him during the next university administration. Later, however, he changed his mind deciding he would indeed run. They both ran and lost to a third candidate. In 2008 the Research Director was elected Senator of Atsinanana, a position no doubt helped b y the Campus close relations with rural commune m ayors who under the reigning governing system of the moment, selected regional Senators In early 2009 he was named Minister of Decentralization. Figure 3 6 illustrates the ways that the two translated the connections made possible by the Campus Ambanivohitra Figure 3 8 Political m obility of p roject l eaders 2005 2009.

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182 While the Campus Ambanivohitra ed downwards to the level of com mune rural mayors, it did not necessarily con tract Whereas he was previously part of a network of powerful university presidents meeting with ministerial level functionaries on a regular basis, the Campus gave him a more localized network that consisted of functionaries a t regional, district, and commune levels. He built upon the one s he was already familiar with, and cultivated others. These networks of political power facilitated by the movement of resources through the campus were supplemented by other networks that promised increased economic mobility. While instructors offered students important networks, technicians and instructors were afforded a less attenuated exposure. In brief encounters as one module ended and another began through interaction with the Cam pus participants and administration itself, the Campus offered a network through which to find new jobs. Webs of Development campus and longstanding d evelopment careers. For i nstructors, working at large state development organizations with little room for advancement, the Campus Ambanivohitra became one network through which to search out new economic opportunities even as it was itself an opportunity to access supplement al income. Administrators had h istories with major state agencies like the National Parks Association, Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protges (National Association for Protected Area Management, ANGAP) department o f Gestion des Ressources (Natural Resource and Environmental Management, GRENE) and a short term IRD / ORSTOM research project. The two members of the administrative staff who did leave the project went on to work for th

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183 sustainable organization for what one described as more money, satisfaction, and security Conclusion s The Campus Ambanivohitra emerged through relationships with a multitude of Malagasy and French partners, most of which were governmental. These partnerships helped to shape the trajectory of the projects interventions as it strove to meet the developmentalist goals of Madagascar and France promise consisted of a personal rebeginning that would transform rural farmers into ideal agricultural entrepreneurs who could flex with the market. At the same time and in order to reach this goal the project reinvented the peasantry to appeal to the donors agents and participants whose support it relied on Consequen t to this developmentalist objective, the project affected a number of other rebeginnings, including a re working of state and international relations, and individual status positions. The rebeginning of the peasantry at the Campus Ambanivohitra consisted of a construction of change as a necessity. In order to create ideal agricultural entrepreneurs, the project set about constructing the peasant as a series of deficiencies. In this construction, coastal peasants were pitted against those in the central p eriphery who were viewed as agricultural entrepreneurs par excellence The project relied upon and reinforced already existing hierarchies between center and namely tavy a bane on the conservationist efforts so socially desirable among international development organizations. The assertion of peasant destruction pushed to the fore in

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184 project docu ments and discussions, and stood uneasily next to assertions of Merina productivity, which themselves involved the destruction of large swathes of forest. Yet the construction of the coastal peasant at the Campus Ambanivohitra was not exclusively negativ e. T he project relied on narratives of loss to call participants and communities into the project, presenting it to rural mayors as a path to return to a prior state. In so doing, it pitted modern labor practices against the communal labor practice of ta mbiro In addition, the project held out agricultural training as an alternative to the epistemic hegemony of outsiders like the technicians employed by the state and contracted by the project. These four images of the peasant, while contradictory, were f used together within the project in ways that ensured the financial and physical participation of partners, participants and communities. These images of destructive, communal, and traditional peasants were far from the realities of the actual participant s in the project, who came largely from politically well connected families. Participant screening, rather, relied on the ability to i nhabit certain status positions vis a vis the state, to move, to command the labor of others, and to know the correct ans wers to questions mediated by state and international developmental interests. Once chosen, participants would be (ideally) molded into ideal agricultural entrepreneurs, with the ability to move deftly alongside shifts in the market. The curriculum soug ht to instill the value of evaluation. It sought to turn rural farmers into experts in their own right, teaching them to subject themselves to the sorts of the project to e xact these methods on others. The project, then, sought to instill the

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185 value of audit so ubiquitous in current ideas of good governance and neoliberalism (see Shore and Wright 1999; Strathern 2000; Rose 1999). Wh ile many of its goals to increase the prod uctivity and profitability of rural agriculture appeared to fail, the Campus Ambanivohitra offered transformative paths for rural individuals through the networks it offered access to. Participants in the project gained access to key governmental and inte rnational agencies and agents through the training. In the main, this access expanded the interactions of rural participants with the Malagasy state. It also tightened their extant political connections, elevating their place in rural communities. The tr ansformative capabilities of development were not confined to the participant farmers that enrolled in the Campus Ambanivohitra The states (Madagascar and France) involved in the project found in it a way to reinvigorate their legitimacy. In addition, d evelopment agents found their fortunes sustained and expanded through the p roject, which offered income, employment and mobility to underemployed Malagasy bureaucrats. In the Campus Ambanivohitra the Malagasy state found a space to craft legitimacy to development to rural and urban inhabitants and took over a number of functions that normally would be carried out by directly connected state agencies (rather than the ind irect linkages of the Campus Ambanivohitra). At a more general level, the project signaled this will to development to outside agents and governments, where it could be put to work in securing further development and private investment. Less apparent,

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186 ho wever, are the ways that the project crafted legitimacy by its provision of additional income to underemployed state functionaries. The project also helped to extend Malagasy state power in ways that were subsidized by outsiders. The region of Haute Norma ndie funded surveys and farmer evaluations that would then be fed back into the state and then funneled into as land and micro credit brought rural commune mayors more intimately into state plans, assuring their legitimacy in the eyes of the pres ident, but also increasing their assurance of community compliance with state directives. Both of these actions spread state power out, letting it reach just a bit deeper into t he lives of rural and seemingly disconnected Malagasy. For international agents and agencies, the Campus Ambanivohitra and ot her similar projects were key to the presentation of a moral state. This was particularly true in France, where well built website s boast the humanitarian concerns of the region of Haute Normandie. These partnerships also reinforce asymmetries of knowledge, allowing French purchase on the ways knowledge moves and to what purposes it is put. For individual agents, the Campus Ambanivo hitra was a place where individual aspirations could begin to unfold or unravel. The project offered precious employment to the under employed functionaries of the University of Toamasina and other state agencies. Entry into the network also meant acce ss to material, political, and social capital in ways that had very real effects the construction of a three story house, the almost meteoric ascension of a public figure, and the provision of employment to family.

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187 Development matters in very important ways ; it affects transformation in very important ways. Yet the transformations affected do not often align with the stated objectives and goals of the project. These obscured transformations, these rebeginnings so tightly linked to the flow of politi cal, economic, and social capital do not go uncontested. It is precisely the contestation of personal and political transformation the contestation of the process of rebeginnings first movement that force s the transfor mation of development. The next chapter explores this second movement of rebeginning, exploring how conflict and contestation have propelled the project forward, threatened to cut off the flow of resources, and ultimately forced the Campus Ambanivohitra t o start itself over.

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188 CHAPTER 4 DURABLE INSTABILITY: NAVIGATING NETWORKS AND REBEGINNING AT THE CAMPUS AMBANIVOHITRA Connection and Con flict at the Campus Ambanivohitra The opportunit y and legitimacy offered by the Campus Ambanivohitra to the par ties involved made it centrally important to its main age nts in Madagascar and France Consequently, throughout the project s short tenure the articulations of these variable desires have pushed its transformation Sitting behind its public face and its multiple potentials, the inner workings of the project transformed its exterior shifting the project from one objective to another in ways that were barely visible to the outside These transformations what I characterize as the project s rebeginnings wor ked. They function ed in way s that propelled the campus forward, affecting the erasure of the f ailures and missteps of its immediate past and assu ring the continual flow of project resources The network connections that the project sutu red together changed (or did not ) according to the shifting strategies of its stakeholders as they navigated and negotiated the social, political, and economic assets available Administrators cultivated certain c onnections, used them to stren g then others and then jettisoned them. International representa tives sussed out questionable practices and levered these into extended control over the program, including creating a position for the French volunteer program so important in crafting the image of the savy moral French citizen abroad Participant farmers received micro credit, and then disappeared with the funds Villagers surrounding the project offered rizicultur al land with expectations of the infrastructural improvement and concomitant wage labor opportunities it promised, then took it back after these failed to materialize. Put another way, the capital flows

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189 facilitated by the project we re uneven and unevenly accessible ; they reflect ed power differentials between different status expert / brok er / community but also among them. They reflect how these uneven flows are contested and redirected as individuals try to maintain and/ or advance their status. These struggles ultimately shift ed the network in ways that are structured and enabled by c ontemporary modalities of governance specifically accounting and law, and development s past s those shadow presences that stand testament to the future that never was These networks in turn enable individuals and groups to tap labor in ways that are d eeply intertwined with the state. In this chapter I track three stories of partnership and connection that went awry in ways that reflect multi scalar and multi sited struggle s over various forms of capital. The first centers on the short stint the Camp us served as a space for the creation of elite development expertise through University student exchanges with ESITPA Con cerns over disappearing funds coincided with mobile and disappearing bodies as litical tool tha t could gain the support of local government leaders. The second is the physical relocation several times over the course of a few years W r itten vaguely into the project s objectives, the shifts reflected continuing struggles o ver land and resources within the project that reflect the structured agency of the communities it relied on for support as well as its competition with similar programs The third story is the projects micro credit component Micro credit opened financ ial flows, but never fully, and eventually had to be abandoned. They would be replaced by vitrines or showcase farms, that would

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190 generate new extensions of power over land, labor, and finances for participant farmers as well as for the project itself. Part 1: Knowledge, Labor, and the Po litics of International Exchange In 2006, the Campus Ambanivohitra opened a partnership with the French agricultural university ESITPA that was adjacent structurally and linked ideologically with existing partnership s between the University of Toamasina and the University of Rouen, and between the Region of Haute Normandie a nd the R egion of Atsinanana (Figure 4 1) This partnership facilitated the exchange of six students from the University of Toamasina to the ESITP A campus in Val de Reuil, just south of the city of Rouen In exchange, the ESITPA would send two agronomy students t o help teach participant farmers at the Campus Ambanivohitra A ccording to the project, Malagasy tural and business techniques and constitute a would be exchanged with two French agronomic agricultural models in Madagasca r (Internal Document 2005) Project documents described the university students to be sent to France as September 7, 2006). They would, thus, be transformed into exper t subjects capable of transforming others in turn and with the promise of transforming Madagascar through their development expertise. They would in the process be come individuals who could control labor, in a way that was imperfectly parallel to th e Cam p us plans for its Paysan leader The way the exchange unfolded, while certainly affecting a number of transformations, did not accord with the After the completion

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191 of the exchange, fiv e of the seven Malagasy working at ESITPA disappeared staying and creating lives in France, only one of which was related to agriculture. The partnership with the Campus Ambanivohitra transformed leaving the two institutions only loosely connected th rough the University of Toamasina. With this re structuring of partnership, the nature of exchange shifted, heralding the disappearance of the Campus Ambanivohitra and reorienting t he trajectories that knowledge would travel within the program Figure 4 1. Directionality of knowledge b ased e xchange Gray lines represent the political and administrative relationships that stand behind these exchanges. The following sections expl ore the ostensible failure of this partnership examining how the network connections mad e possible through partnership we re put to work in the reproduction of varied and sometimes contr adictory inequalities and how politics and power wer e imp licated in c hoices about who could access expertise, and sometimes

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192 more importantly the exterior. Struggles over the social, economic and symbolic capital o pened by these partnerships forced the closure of this formal relationship, but, interestingly, expertise a nd power continued to travel along the network pathways of exchange that were opened in the original partnership though now diverted through the University itself, signaling the effects of the political fortunes of the CP Director At the Senator), who accompanied Malagasy students to ESITPA and took a Post Doc there signaling his mastery of the network. The Powers of Knowledge The relationships that ESITPA entered into wer e forma lized with the Campus Ambanivohitra around two goals. The first, discussed in the previous chapter, was the creation of a rural observato ry, or a monitoring system, for the region of Atsinanana. The second was the aforementioned exchange of six Ma lagasy students and two French students who would teach modules during the Campus Ambanivohitra s second year The plan promised transformation ostensibly giving Malagasy students the chance to access the transformative powers of knowledge and then brin g them back to affect a similar transform ation on rural farmers. At the same time, volunteer French agronomists would set to work transforming rural farmers into flexible agricultural experts The Malagasy university students held the potential to become Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999) These plans, however, did not quite follow the paths that were set out for them, and both sides of the exchange would be transformed in ways that ran cou nter to the stated goals of the program. At the same time, these relatio n ships would usher in new

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193 relations of labor and new international connections that carried their own, supplemental, value. By 2009, the French agronomists had moved on working with other decentral ized cooperation projects in Toamasina Together they reflected a theme of exchange that situated knowledge and epistemological power in western institutions and western experience Madagascar in this equation, could collect data but not analyze it, and knowledge would be put into the hands of a series of French trained statisticians and agronomists who would control its analytic manipulation The one student who returned and took the post of Technical Director in 2008, 69 implicated th e se exchanges in local politics, drawing attention to the connections behind choices. Originally trained as a historian he was pulled in to environmental science by its superior funding and post graduate prospects 70 While history and social sciences rese arch went underfunded, students in environmental science could expect at least some support preceding their likely incorporation into a development industry providing a comfortable and comparatively stable urban lifestyle. The Necessity of Connecti on The Campus Ambanivohitra his place in France through his ability to navigate educational networks to political and economic advantage. It was through connection that he got his name on the roster of students sent to ESITPA, despite the fact that he had never worked with the Campus 69 The first Technical Director left over a disagreement with the Director, and when on to work at an American o wned Bamboo flooring manufacturer, linking rural bamboo suppliers with the offices headquarters in Tamatave. 70 In 2008, he continued to harbor the desire for a Ph.D. in history, but at the age of forty his advisor told me that he was too old for anyone to support him.

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194 Ambanivohitra This section traces the importance of connection for the Malagasy students that attended ESITPA, and how these connections held the potential to feed benefi ts back to the Campus Ambanivohitra Elijah completed a master s degree in Environmental Science with the support of the National Parks Association, Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protges (ANGAP) Later he would take a position as an accountant in one of the University of administrative offices before being chosen to go to ESITPA under the auspices of the Campus Ambanivohitra in 2007 His story illustrates a political flexibility and network mastery that enabled him the op portunity to affect rebeginnings in status and self well before he went to the exterior. Yet his attempts to replicate these successes proved problematic in the exterior, where his attempts to master the networks of the ESITPA threatened the development n etworks carefully cultivated by the Campus Ambanivohitra During his early studies, Elijah aligned himself to a number of powerful interlocutors in the university administration. Befriending the R ector 71 Elijah took a position in one of rojects a college radio station The Rector made a name for himself as a partisan during the 2002 crisis that broke the island in two and threatened to throw the country i nto ethnic violence. Once the R ector had been replaced with the new University Pre sident, Elijah saw his opportunities obstructed The U niversity P rallied against Elijah identifying him R no longer had traction With the 71 that constituted a rebeginning of the system under Ravalomanana.

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195 help of U niversity pr ofessors just below the newly formed University Presidency he was put forward as a candidate for the Campus Ambanivohitra in 2006. He explained that the students who were chosen were sent because of their connections to Campus partners in Madagascar. Elijah described the circumstances surrounding their selection, beginning with the advantages partners had in naming students to be sent to ESITPA: The Campus Ambanivohitra was the University, the Region, and the Chamber of Commerce. So, generally speakin of Tamatave, two from the Region, two from the Chambre de Commerce You know? You understand? B ut the region took the 4 [places] to the detriment of the Chamb er of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce was angry from that day until now, because it should have had two students. You see you understand it? The region, the Chamber of Commerce, the University 2, 2, 2 the ways institutional networks acted as circuits for the flow of political and economic advantage and how these flows c ould b e manipulated in ways that threaten ed some linkages while strengthening or opening others. Elijah signaled the further distribution of access to mobility and the powerful networks offered by the exchange program and its more clientelistic and affinal facets: So there were 6 of us. 2 that were chosen by the university me, and the other was Benjamin, he was from Tulear. We were chosen by the Director [the then University President] we were a bit like his body guards [laughter] 72 He was the DDR [Director of Regional Development] for th e Region of Atsinanana. So he had chosen his family members to go to France an opportunity you 72 Dynatech was the company that initiated the nickel and cobalt mine and refinery in the Region of Atsinanana. The company that currently runs it is Sherritt (see Chapter 3).

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196 France. 73 Martin, and then daughter of his internship manager, Jean, it was Jean. He had a Malagasy girlfriend, but he abandoned her and married a Frenchwoma n. 74 Overall, this narrative r eflect s the political contestations that emerge d within the networked relations of the Campus partnership s but al s o echo narratives that travel counter discourses and dangerous practices that threatened to expose and under mine network ed partnerships That the opportunity to go the exterior was political that one did not get the chance to go without having already served the political interests of the President of the University, or without being connected was a common complaint among graduate students who struggled to finish their studies at the University of Toamasina. They suggested that those who made it to the exterior were those who willingly informed on the political activities of numerous factions on campus. It is true that the university campus was regularly a site for political conflict, with students staging protests alternately against the administration the result of a weak state and rumors of impending violence and real though mainly m inor skirmishes between student groups. Student protests can be in terpreted as deconstructions of the state that have significance beyond their stated purposes (be they tuition, stipends, etc. ; 73 While the economic and political reasoning behind this need not be explained, it is worth mentioning that the son of one of the highest ranking pro fessors at the University of Tamatave made more in a month than his father working part time at a supermarket in France. 74 This relationship is an inverse of the norm of Malagasy women in Madagascar seeking out vazaha men who become lovers and sometimes hu sbands. While these relations are key in the circulation of the material and cultural resources (Cole 2010; see also the case of Brazil in Goldstein 2003), they are structured by gender and socio economic status. While often impoverished Malagasy women s eek out relationships with vazaha, young rural men struggle to seek out similar relations. On the other hand, Malagasy men who are successful in establishing relationships with vazaha women are most often from the highest echelons of the elite Malagasy so cial status.

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197 1996; Fokwang 2009). The rumors of exterior trips as true or not were bolstered by the fact that many students sent to the exterior did not return. and explor[e] other epistemologi cal and political possibilities provide sites for exploring ( Briggs 200 4 : 182 ; Kroeger 2003 ). In an arena where the exterior holds material and political benefits, as well as s ymbolic and cultural ones (see Cole 2010) the abilit y to form connections and turn those connections into benefits had important effects on the legitimacy of the University administration, and by extension, the state. At the same time, and as the circulation of these rumors attest, these trips could act as potent examples of the corruption and favoritism of the administration, and thus the state. In our interviews, Elijah interspersed stories of the allure of France with anecdotes of jealousy and racism. Like most Malagasy he knew the opportunity was once in a lifetime. The allure of the exterior is, of course, very real. At roughly .2 % GDP (UNDP 2007) remittances do not seem like a lot but they touch many people through a number of social networks and emerge as part of the fabric of urban and rural lifestyles. Stories of connection circulated, calling attention to the value of the exterior in creating lives at home as well as the ironies that attend the global economy. It is not uncommon to encounter cattle sacrifices funded from the exterior (see Cole 2010) ; be pointed out the newly buil t homes of people living abroad, often performing labor below their status but earning well beyond what they might in their field in Madagascar and exposing one of the many ironies that attend the heterogeneous con nections of globalization.

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198 There were app roximately 150 ,000 Malagasy living in the exterior in 2006 ( Ratha and X u 2007). In 2008, the World Bank reported that 36 percent of college educated Malagasy were emigrating out of the country ( Ratha and X u 2008: 42). In 2005, college educated Malagasy made up 9.1% of all unemployed Malagasy much better odds than individuals with only primary (~44% of the total unemployment), or secondary (~24%) education (World Bank 2011) In part then, partnership was facilita ting the much a factor that then feeds back into the Malagasy community, spurring the creation of further political networks as well as rationalizing the trajectories of further relations In 2006, at the same time that the Campus Ambanivohitra was formalizing relations with ESITPA the project submitted a proposal to the region for the renovation of t he Campus Site of Niarovana Caroline The proposal relied on a number of resources that only the region of Atsinana na could provide, specifically the construction of work on building roads, building working toilets, new kitchens, new dormitories, and new administrative offices on sprawling site. The choice of this site was knotted together with the regional a dministration in Atsinanana, and the geographical positioning of the Campus which informants suggested were closely tied with affinal linkages to the village Niarovana Caroline, I was told, was chosen specifically because it was the Chef de Rgion on of origin, and could thus constitute a way to introduce money into the local economy by providing jobs to people working on the project. The plan lent credence to the assur ances the project made to the Niarovana Caroline Mayor as the project moved to g ain land usage rights a situation complicated by a reassertion of rights by resident farmers in 2008

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199 Partnerships offer a new twist on understandings of the intellectual exodus of the global south linking it to the formal and informal networks of devel opment that precede and facil itate mobility and its role in local political processes. Put another way, the Malagasy d iaspora is built, in part, from processes and efforts to build and sustain powerful networks of development This is in line with if a slight inversion of contemporary understandings of diaspora, and their continuing role in development at home (Mohan 2008; Mohan and Zack Williams 2002). As a strategy, t hese relations were carefully tended. This was made clear to me in 2005, when th e then Campus Ambanivohitra Research Director confided his troubles with another university exchange in which several French students from the University of Rouen had skipped the country prematurely The situation creat ed a flurry of activity and concern over the potential of a break in the partnership and made starkly clear where the power was choices threatened the ESITPA partnership in ways that gesture to the slippery realities of cooperation and network relations. Navigating Fren ch Networks of Exchange Success in the ESITPA exchange program meant following the rules and laying low. Over the course of four months of study that paralleled the pedagogical organization of the Campus Ambanivohitra (theoretical instruction followed by practical application ), students spent time in classes at the Val de Reuil campus before being ic as he attempted to navigate them on his own, strategizing for better deals and better situations in a way that bristled the Campus Ambanivohitra and the ESITPA In a context of increasingly anxiety ridden politics leading up to the 2007 French presiden tial

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200 election 75 his actions t hreatened to break the partnership altogether by exposing an intentionality that ran counter to the stated goals of exchange. theoretical instruction was little different from his education in Madagascar. What was striking, for him, was the way that the Campus Ambanivohitra populist rhetoric cast the students as uninformed (and disconnected) and obscured their previous experien c e s : They didn't like to speak with us "they're from the bush." Because eve n the name of the project that brought us there was Campus Ambanivohitra ." You see that it hangs in your memory. So they thought we were "peasants." "Those are the peasants." And when you ask the professor a question that's very pertinent, they do n't like that. The students you know the French when they see someone who is black like this it s They come from the bush. They're racist. The education was, according to Elijah, little different from the education offered in Madagascar, and th e material was something he was familiar with from his earlier studies in Madagascar: rural communication, a bi t of land improvement. In fact, it was a bit of everything connected to agriculture. But all the agronomy, we did that since the first year. 1st year, doing agronomy. And in fifth year, because we were in fifth year, in the fifth year to have the engin eering degree we started, we did design issues of international commerce, and of international agriculture W hat's risk ? W hy can't poor countries export their products ? T here are customs barriers; there are all the custom tariffs. We studied that. B ut it wasn't anything new for me, because we had studied that in history. It wasn't new but they thought that it was new for us, and that we couldn't understand it. The Campus Ambanivohitra in Madagascar a term that called up images of farmers sharin g traditional knowl edge in rural settings, was packaged nicely for foreign and 75 This occuried during the advancement of far right anti immigrant candidate Jean Marie le Pen to the second round of the French presidential elections.

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201 It called up on roughly the same image ry in France an d affect ed an erasure of the social and political status that University of Toamasina students ha d gained through their advanced degrees and socio economic positions in Madagascar. The potential trade off wa s worth it time in the exterior could translate into high status and (relatively) high salaries. According to Elijah, the students who were c hosen to go to ESITPA were never meant to return. He explained excluding himself from the group : T hey told me that it was a way to leave to go to France. So from the beginning, have told me t have family in France to help them after no one called us back, because There wasn't any of that. But, I came back anyway. In this view, students would be tasked with sending remittances back to Madagascar that could support the extended family, and would likely spur diffuse forms of development such as funding family b usinesses, political ambitions, etc and build up networks of support for themselves or their families. These remittances began well before students were released from their educational obligations, and Elijah told stories of how students organized and communicated wage labor opportunities during both the theoretical and practical components of their education. Practical components at ESITPA fed into their organizational structure and their status as the only school run through the Assemble Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture (Permanent Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture APCA ), the French professional farmers organization 76 The ESITPA actively reinforced linkages with 76 receded and

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202 professional farm ers in France both through the incorporation of 270 agricultura l professionals as teachers, and the labor/knowledge exchange facilitated by the This hybrid model of education meant that Malagasy studying through the exchange were immediately submerged in labor/knowledge networks enabl ing them a relatively direct path to wage labor in Rouen. D uring two months of study, students were expected to access the network via the contacts that the ESITPA opened for them through professional agricultural conferences and its own, smaller, organ izational network of agricultural research and professional staff Students would network and gain access to short term internships at problems at ESITPA originated. Elijah located two possible i nternship managers at a conference in late 2006. His first choice did n o t respond to the call, and the ESITPA director Elijah worked with left a message before calling ESITPA established a contract with the second choice. After a few days, Elijah received a call from his first choice, saying he was ready to pick him up. Elijah eager to please, agreed and left the ESITPA with the farmer and his wife in their car His fellow students observed this. According to Elijah the other M alagasy ESITPA students were already a ngry at him. Earlier that year he met a fellow Malagasy in a bar and the two became fast roles at a series of French agricultural asso ciations (Actu Environnement 2009).

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203 friends. offered him a car as he and his family upgraded This sign of mobility 77 (Trumper and Tomis 2009) became an initial impetus for jealousy: the jealousy. I had a car... I started to be disliked as soon as I had a car longer thinking about the internship. You see he's already got a car. He wants to stay here. He's not..." The car spoke to a potential mobility that could breed stasis an object that by enabling te its labor, and thus its settlement. sparked reports to ESITPA administrators that he did n o t plan on leaving France. contract ed) internship manager showed up at the Campus to pick him up sparked more controversy again surrounding the projected mobility of the car : He picked me up in a nice car the other Malagasy they were still there, they didn't move. They saw me like tha t that I had left with a man with a nice car. I started to do my internship. They hadn't started yet, they were staying there. And on Monday, you see, it was Thursday. Thursday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday... So on Monday, the director asked the student s, "Where is Elijah?" "We haven't seen him. [And they answered] We saw him leave with a man and a woman in a nice car." The situation created issues with the contract Elijah had already signed with the second farmer Elijah asserted that this was a st atus issue, telling me that the second farmer was an important contributor to the ESITPA and an active member of French agricultural associations. 77 The car remained unused for the duration of his stay because he lacked insurance and so he left it in the ESITPA parking lot, a situation that points to the important, and almost magical powers of papers and contracts (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Meyer and Pels 2003).

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204 The ESITPA administrat ion threatened Elijah with the loss of his validation if he did not return immediatel y. He explained this to his internship manager (the first farmer), and the two w en t to meet with the internship director at the ESITPA. The farmer, in a bid to illustrate his investment in this Malagasy student, mentioned a desire to hire him setting of f anger at the college : Malagasy They didn't like that word. "No we don't accept that. Because, he's going to go back to be a trainer for a project, bu t he shouldn't stay here." That was it Framed in terms of racism and je reveals a desire for right practices, an investment in contracts and controls that formalized the networ k and kept its directionality at least on the surface, in check (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 2009) ESITPA leaders accepted the idea of negotiat ing with the farmer to draw up a second contract (allowing Elij ah to return to the same farm) but Elijah int ervened offering, and then insisting, that he honor the initial contract (with the second farmer) The move represented a will to acquiesce to the power of the institutional nodes in the Campus Ambanivohitra From anot her vantage, it was a second or third effort to stake a claim on and some agency within ESITPAs agricultural network that doubly threatened highly formalized relations. H e accused ESITPA official s of sabotaging him by telling stories that would eventually disintegrate t his internship and he thought, e ncourage d his second internship manager to work him like After some weeks with the second manager, Elijah was called back to the

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205 ESITPA to deal with a second controversy that called into question the directionality of the financial flows the Campus network set loose. Stories circulating a bout the partnership suggested that t he students that went to the ESITPA were drawn into convoluted fi nancial flow s that kept money tied up, at best, and embezzled, at worst. Money for the airfare and stipend, a part of the exchange agreement that would be paid by the Region of Haute Normandie, was said to have vanished into Madagascar, being he ld somewhere at the University of Toamasina. In response, students in France began borrow ing money from an ESITPA administrator incurring a not insubstantial debt that pushed students to seek further employment outside of the stipend they received with their training In this conceptualization of the Campus which was itself a sign of friction over the capture of social, political and economic capital the disappearance of exchange funds was related to the disappearance of students at the end of the project In essence, the money sent to the University for the project some 8,000 10,000 was suspected to have been embezzled or diverted into the University administration. This was suspected to be the norm, with University and state politics deman ding the provision of gifts for political support, and possibilities of continued linkages and the desires of silence making escape into the exterior all the more important. The program was described as a one way trip The disappearance of funds forced E lijah into credit and he borrowed money from ESITPA staff to stay afloat at the beginning of his trip. After he had gone to the second internship, he was called back to ESITPA to return the loan. The trip kept Elijah away from his internship for several hours too long, and upon his return he was

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206 understanding these events were related to stories that the program directors circulated about him which themselves tacked back to the situation w ith the car He relayed his conversation with his internship manager : "I know your story, eh. I know what's happened. You you're not serious, serious." "Excuse me, sir..." I don't want you're explanation. You're I heard that you're someone who lies." to cry. But I was flushed, because I was so shocked, because I had done nothing I didn't do anything. H e returned to ESITPA where he was threatened with expulsion : the second internship. You have to return to Madagascar right now. Tomorrow morning. You mus t go back. I'm going to do everything I can so that you return to Madagascar. I'm going to use all of my power at the school. Tomorrow, I'm going to the [ESITPA] Director. You must return to Madagascar, because you're someone who's not serious." Maki ng the exchange more memorable for Elijah, this administrator began to catalogue a list of misdeeds from Madagascar misdeeds that could have, according to Elijah, only been Here, a second set of rumors emerged a longside questions of disappearing money. The circulation of this talk was meant it seems, to set the network aright to police it in a way that protected it from fissures Elijah sometimes unwittingly, sometimes intentionally created in his efforts t o harness it. If the ESITPA and the internship manager succeeded in jettisoning Elijah as a problem student, the partnership could emerge renewed and legitimized

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207 Elijah tried to rally support from the Campus Ambanivohitra Research Director to no avail W orking on a Post Doc at ESITPA at the time, the Research Director would back whate ver decision ESITPA came to. Elijah developed a ruse a strategy to continue that relied on personal relationships he had built through the ESITPA network He called two people a friend and another farmer he ha d met at the agricultural conference ahead of the internships He had the farmer agree to let him complet e his ( third ) internship at his farm. He had the friend agree to intercept a phone call from hi s university just in c ase stories of his flighty and unserious nature continued. He then went and spoke to the superior of the administrator who threatened him with expulsion, insisting that he would finish the internship: "You have an internship?" "I h ave an internship." "No, no you don't have an internship." "I have an internship." "You're going to return [to Madagascar] ." "No, I have an internship." "You're going to return." "No I don't want to return. Excuse me, but I don't want to return I want to finish everything, because returned I wouldn't have... Madagascar at 11 000 km from France. I don't want to return, not without having something in hand. Determined not to lose the benefits of time in the exterior, h e gave the administrator the number of his friend, having her confirm the details of the internship. The plan worked, French / French it's ok. If it was me and a F rench [person] it's made and Elijah busied himself building fences and taking care of chickens at yet another farm The moment at which

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208 nsight into the informal practices that are deployed and reproduced within the system as individuals struggle to draw on the resources set loose by the network s T hese practices are not new or disconnected, but old and intimately connected to the ways that network connections work. Elijah finished this third internship, and coupling it with odd jobs saved enough to buy a ticket back to Madagascar. Back home he found himself out of work and in debt. He was not immediately brought into the Campus Ambanivohitra Rather, he was re cast as a trou ble maker and cut off from the Director of the Project : And what did the Campus Ambanivohitra had problems with ESITPA because of the problems with Elijah It was several months later before he would get a job at the Campus Ambanivohitra the position at the time held by the Director s nephew, an environmental sciences major from Tana. Instead, he came home to a layoff notice in October 2007 he had stopped receiving pay in August. He was hire d b y the Campus Ambanivohitra in February and was by then in so much debt debt directly drawn from his account that he would not touch a paycheck until July of 2009. Elijah kept himself afloat the same way he ha d sent himself home from France sear ching out multiple methods to supplement his income many related to networks he came in contact with through the Campus Ambanivohitra and through the exploding Tamatavien economy, linked to the mine and refinery project being implemented there. The Camp us Ambanivohitra like other developmentalist endeavors, was precarious. World Bank and EU projects offered short term expert employment, while at the

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209 Campus Ambanivohitra finances were doubly blocked in France and then in Madagascar. Elijah, like the ex pert teaching staff at the Campus Ambanivohitra sought to maximize the value of his expertise by finding short term, expert, piece work on the side. While Elijah returned to Madagascar o ther students remained behind Later, they would make up, in part, the Director, who returned to France after the coup Here he found a research position among the partnerships he had cultivated as a Malagasy development expert and politician. s narrative loca ted his troubles in a number of arenas, but the scenarios he describes are at base about conflicts over the network. T he institutional and personal networks opened by the nested and knotted partnerships of the Campus Ambanivohitra bec a me the site of flows of social and economic capital along network linkages (Cooper and Packard 1997) These flows were caught up in the relative importance of different relationships, accepted directionalities and mobile objects and Elijah was in many ways in trouble for his attempts to shift the trajectories of these flows H e attempted to craft his own partnerships courting preference with different parties, and in the process violat ed the regulatory systems that these relations rely on the contracts that formali zed legal controls that allow certain informal relations but not all (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009) E ventually Elijah was brought back into compliance by threat s to take away his access to a degree a piece of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1996) that is ke y to development networks

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210 In addition to the regulatory systems that patrolled formal partnership and were embodied by ESITPA a nd Campus Ambanivohitra administrators were the judgments of cohort, admonishing the visible networks he was creating In a sense, his open sociality his assertion of power in the social field threatened to bring attention to his fellow students on the one hand, and disrupt the partnership, on the other. the reigning in and restruct uring of the Campus Ambanivohitra ESITPA would shift its partnership up to the University of Toamasina, a move that accompanied the Campus Ambanivohitra of the U niversity P residency. Thus French exchange stude nts would come under the aegis of the university, with no direct funding relationship to the Campus Ambanivohitra The two agronomists it sent to work with the Campus Ambanivohitra would take jobs at other internationally funded development organizations. With the relocation of the center of partnership to the University of Toamasina, the ESITPA continued to send students to Madagascar, but not to receive them. In the process, the contours of epistemological power of who could access it and w ho could not were redrawn along lines that privileged the containment of (agricultural) epistemological power in French bodies and French bodies of knowledge. These were characterized by the creation of knowledge and credentials for a series of Frenc h st udents in Madagascar. The knowledge these students generate are proudly displayed on the region of Haute At the same time, the component of the partnership concerned with the creation of Malagasy experts at ESITPA disappeared, and exc

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211 Malagasy bureaucrats from the r egional government and the Bureau Rgionale de La Prsidence This shift has mean t a more direct and overt linkage between Haute Norm and centralized Malagasy state power, particularly given the linkage between regional bureaucrats and the office of the Presidency These exchanges travelled with the Research Director, and remained a part of his p u rvie w a fter he began his political ascension. Eventually, the relations he mastered and wove into his career would offer him shelter a job at the University of Rouen after the coup. The ESITPA partnership was implicated in a rebeginning that reverberated in to other nodes of the network T he Campus Ambanivohitra reoriented project goals to largely abandon plans to create young development expertise. ESITPA initiated a higher level partnership with the University administration, adding new dimensions of powe r (in the administration of the new University President). Meanwhile, the Research Director siphons the benefits of exchange upward into the state itself. The net effect of these t ransformations in partnership was a tightening state connection in two way s. F irst, in relocating the expert functions of the partnership into arenas of good governance and leadership, the new exchange electrified state linkages directly, rather than travelling, as they did with the Campus Ambanivohitra through affinal linkage s to the state. Second, and at an international level that belies the multiplicity of governance and affinal structures packed into t hese partnerships, government to government relations of audit and control were given new nodes of interaction between Fra nce and Madagascar.

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212 Part 2: Relocating the Campus Ambanivohitra Like many other state related development programs, the Campus, was relegated Malagasy reincarnation, FOFIFA The decision to locate in one area or another, however, was not simply linked to state networks of land ownership. Rather, the Campus was often pushed off and onto land by shifts in political power and forms of resistance that occurred both at the regi onal and the local level. Between its conception in 2004 and the end of my research in 2009, the Campus had shifted its location some four times. This section outlines the se relocations and examin e s how struggles over social, economic and political resou rces forced geographical rebeginnings and opened up new spaces for thinking and legitimizing the project It illustrates how these types of struggles reflect, reproduce, and reorient inequalities between and among urban and rural, elite and non e lite, and center and periphery. Laboring In and On the Network The Campus Ambanivohitra pilot was originally located in Analanjirofo, in the village of Maromitety, s ome 140 Km north Tamatave. According to the Technical Director who worked with the Campus at the time the site was chosen because of a In this way, it followed the tactics of colonial and state policies that redefined and laid claim to land These policies, seen elsewhere and se emingly continuous laid bare the powers of the state and the politics of land ownership (Mitchell 1988, 2002; Li 1999; 2007) Land u sage was redirected. P articipant farmers were put into the position of laboring bodies in service to the market and thereb y, the desires of their urban and metropolitan

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213 counterparts. The failures and resistances that emerged over land reflected struggles over this arrangement within the network of partnerships that the project built up FOFIFA was a partner i n this endeavor, but relative to later sites, the region had little colonial presence. At Maromitety, and at the project s second site in Ivoloina, project documents described the situation: Initiating the first practicum: 38 farmers were chosen from 81 volunteers from the village associations of Analanjirofo. They served as a locally financed pathway test. The training began on two sites separated by 120 k m (Maromitety, Ivoloina). At Maromitety (11 July to 16 August). The principal activity was the practice of short season riziculture, SR I SRA [ systme de riziculture intensive intensive rizicultural system, s ystme de riziculture amlior improved rizicultural system] on the large field of FOFIFA ( Malagasy CIRAD) and this, under the backing of the technicians of th e Ministry of Agriculture. The students were housed in the guest rooms of the village, they were motivated, but the rice produced, called vary tambatra (communal rice) was given after seed repayment, toward the second week of the month of December 2004 [ si c ] The harvest was gathered in the presence of Monsieur the Minister of National Education and Scientific research. [ Internal Document 2006: 7] The visibility of this first ha rvest, with the presence of the Minister 78 is worth noting In reality, the h arvest would beco me a main problem for the Campus Ambanivohitra and its students. The above description, which was constructed for the consumption of (French) foreign donors and thus a marketing tool for the Campus, obscures the realities of this pathway test as they were experienced by staff and farmers. The T echnical D irector responsible for setting the curriculum and ensuring it functioned smooth ly, lived at the site of the Campus during its periods at Maromitety and Ivoloina. In his descripti on but not in project documents of the 38 farmers 78 This presence was key in the representation of the Campus to the state, international organizations, and other development agents, reminding us of the importance of legitimacy work across the horizontal as well as vertical nodes of the network.

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214 accepted in the training and mentioned in project documents only 27 matriculated. This first group was chosen, primarily, from protestant church, the Fiangonan'i Je soa Kristy eto Madagasikara (Church of Jesus Christ of Madagascar, FJKM ), which acted as a powerful shadow presence in this first networked iteration of the campus. The first group came from as far away as Ivoloina in the region of Atsinanana, though mos t others came from Maromitety and the northern part of the then autonomous province of Toamasina. The Campus Ambanivohitra negotiated land usage with the mayor of the local commune rurale and infrastructural support with the cole Primaire Publique (Publi c Primary School, EPP) using their buildings to instruct the Campus Ambanivohitra students. Funds from Haute Normandie were used to prepare the rizicultural fields and repair the canal that served them, while staff salaries were paid by the University of Toamasina. Utilizing the FJKM the central association of the protestant church es on the island, and the church of President Marc Ravalomanana tapped the extant networks of the Director of the Campus Ambanivohitra and signaled the layering of religiou s, developmental, and government structures T he Director of the Campus Ambanivohitra played a leadership role in the FJKM. In assigning the religious association the responsibility of selecting students for the C ampus he was aligning it to his own soci al network, but also to the power and prestige of a state that very explicitly linked religion and governance The adhesion to these points in the network could be dangerous, but could also serve as the point of access to another powerful network 79 79 Risk is an important issue here as the profitability of the project is contingent on a number of uncertain allegiances and funding, and learning how to hedge to build multiple allegiances at once was an impor tant characteristic of development brokers and administrators (an incorporation of risk that echoes that of Ghanaian farmers highlighted by Chalfin 2000). This stands as an uncomfortable parallel to the

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215 Two ma with the Technical Director at the Maromitety cole Primaire Publique (EPP) T ogether they managed the Campus Ambanivohitra going back and forth to Tamatave during 3 months of training. One of th es e assistants later went on to study at ESITPA and disappeared into France Their location was adjacent to the rizicultural fields where they would practice SRI, a system created by a French Jesuit Priest / Agronomy Professor / Farmer in Madagascar and no w reportedly used in so me 50 countries ( Hubert 2006 SRI Rice 2011) The initial campus was characterized by lack. The Technical Director and areas where infrastructu re is low. T he project pilot was close to disastrous: So, there was almost nothing. There was nothing but a round table. At the university, the project furnished the mattresses for the students, and for us. We were all together in the large classroom. So, it was really problematic. We all fell ill because of that. There T threatened not only farmers abil i bility to continu e in the community. The situation creat ed problems for the lo cal director of the EPP who acted as a mediator of the network connection to the state, responsible for their usage of the building : Luckily, when we were there it was in the month of it was vacation, so the EPP was free, but we had to leave at the beginning of Septemb er, because it was the beginning of the new semester. So that caused a bit of lucrative potentials of risk that the project sought to instill in the market sensibilities of participant farmers, and the very material risks that they exposed them to through the training (see below).

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216 very good for the Director of the EPP, there was a bit of uncleanliness as well So we were very disa ppointed. For us, to manage some 30 people, we tried. So that was the problem. The reliance on the buildings of the EPP, and the destruction that occurred there, was one arena in which relations with the local community began to deteriorate. Another problem, which would recur at every site the Campus entered, was related to disputes over agricultural land. At Maromitety, this was evidenced in tensions over student origin s : T This theme of land being given away only faint here was recurrent in the communities where the Campus located where concerns over outsiders coming in drew the ire of resident farmers It was of particular concern land usage rights were already circumscribed by the state through FOFIFA. In Madagascar, where land is the central link to the past ( see Bloch 1971; Sharp 2002; Cole 2001 ) as well as an important agricultural resource, the entry of the Campus and the state into lan d usage rights was particularly pointed. Disputes over land would become a main impetus behind the Campus multiple relocations, though these issues only rarely appeared in official project narratives Rather, project narratives re c ast mobility as stren gth and banked on mobility as a support to the replicative powers of agricultural training and market rationality At the same time, these movements generated additional strain s on farmers.

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217 For pa rticipant farmers, it was the loss of lab or through participation that proved most problematic: W e had kept the farmers for two months, or three months. We started the month of July, August, So they were obliged to stay with us, even while they were either the father of the family or the mother of the family, so they missed the arvest to them. So that, that poses a lot of problems with the student farmers responsible in their families, their obliged to stay, following the The issue of who claimed ownership of the harvests produced by the practices of the Campus Ambanivohitra recurred at every location it chose. In this initial incarnation of the Campus, harve sts would be put back into the administration : Ordinarily, in the contract p lanned for the 2 nd practicum at Ivoloina, in part for the Ivoloina canteen, in part. So we said, to share, to distribute with them [the farmers at the 2 nd but a small bit of land there were lots of problems, because we did the SRI, the system de riziculture intensif t do a good job with the weeding, That we had a lot of problems with the farmers because they asked all r families. So, while the general idea at the beginning was to struggle against this poverty, it was the contrary. We really had a moral debt to the farmers. And we had 80 At Maromitety, then, the lack of resources created serious problems for farmers, who had lost time and labor at their home farms an d now had no harvest to return to or with They had suffered a net loss through their participation in the project: 80 Note again the appearance of contracts as mediating if sometimes ineffective forces in the resourc e flows of the network.

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218 It was them that paid for their own food, who brou ght their rice, bought their bouillon and all that, so i people who must work today in order to have food tomorrow... But then T h e accusations, by staff and participants alike, that the project generated rather than alleviated poverty would, like land and labor issues, follow the Campus through its various s ites, calling into question the directionality of the financial flows the Ca mpus freed and illustrating quite poignantly the struggles generated by the network form The situation of funds at the Campus, tight enough to force students further into debt, related to another issue of money, similar to the disappearing funds from the Malagasy fares to the University of ESITPA : was the founder [of the Campus Ambanivohitra ] with the University of Haute Normandie, but its necessary [despite the lack of funds] So, now that was posing a lot of problems, the result after when we were doing the 2 nd Practicum, there was around 10%, towards 20%, who no longer wanted to go to Ivoloina. So we went down to 18, there were only the 18 out of the 27 who came to Ivo loina. This second agricultural site was at Ivoloina, the large river that flows into the Indian Ocean some 7 kilometers north of the city of Tamatave. Here, on land once again owned by FOFIFA and adjacent to a national park administered by the Minist ry of Water and For ests and Madagascar Fauna Group the Campus guided students through a second level of study. Unlike Maromitety, where there was little infrastructure available for student use, either as dormitories or as classrooms, the partnership w ith FOFIFA allowed the Campus access to a number o f largely abandoned buildings that had played earlier roles in the development.

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219 Re inhabiting Historical Spaces The Campus Ambanivohitra territories it inhabited and the program drew power from this association. In reanimating parts of these seemingly dead spaces of development, the project reasserted state presence, even while its administration was crafted as simultaneously state and non state an expert industry in the service of rationalized self management instead of technologies of power. This is an important distinction and speaks to the ways that techno politics or the power laden nature of an atomized technical expertise (Mitchell 2002) ar e now being papered over with new sorts of individualized managerialism ( Shore and Wright 1999) that require more flexible forms of expertise North of Tamatave, the Ivoloina River crosses the highway marking a developmental intersection flanked by four d ifferent projects. To the south, was the cole d'Application des Sciences et Techniques Agricole (Applied School for Agricultural Science and Technology, EASTA ) a project simi lar to the Campus Ambanivohitra but more established and with more resources To the west was the Ivoloina Zoological Park a protected area belonging to the Ministry of Forests and Administered by the US based Madagascar Fauna Group, which offered trai ning in sustainable agriculture. T o the north was the site of the Campus Fanant enana / Village MAP, initiated by the Campus Ambanivohitra Research Director. And, of course, the Campus Ambanivohitra located in some old buildings on the road to the park. Ivoloina is marked by a number of other industries, closely linked to t he construction and real estate boom that the Sherritt project created and the areas direct access to good roads At the river, sand was collected and loaded on trucks bound for

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220 Tamatave. On the way to the Parc Ivoloina a village was dedicated to breaki ng up rocks for the quarry that sat adjacent to the protected forest. Elsewhere in the villages surrounding the river, entrepreneurs ran nurseries or poured concrete blocks destined for the city. These contemporary ties to economic development (producti ve and extractive) were layered on the remnants of past developments. During and after the colonial period, the Ivoloina site was a main arena for the creation of knowledge of and about tropical agriculture. The larger site, including the northern side o f the river, had been a research station for colonial science specializing in fruit trees. Before that, the area was purportedly used as a research and training center for colonial farmers. The area can be characterized as a temporally and geographically thick site of development. Figure 4 2 Aerial m ap of Campus Ambanivohitra s ite at Ivoloina.

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221 Staff descriptions of the site and the curriculum it hosted differ widely from the official p roject documents that repackaged these experiences for foreign dono rs in 2006: At Ivoloina (16 August to 12 September). Theory and Practical Courses under the modules: pisiculture, micro project conception and management, water problems, environment, information technology, F rench, apiculture [raising bees for honey], le adership. [ Internal Document 2006: 7 8] According to the Campus Ambanivohitra D irector, the primary building used during the Campus initial location at Ivoloina was the one that formerly housed the main FOFIFA office. Beyond this smal l village, where some 4 or 5 families were living, was the Ivoloina Park. 81 The former technical director described the continuing problems of the Campus Ambanivohitra at the site : So it was still the same thing at Ivoloina. Except that we paid the we gave It [micro finance, market farming, and animal husbandry] was in the plan. It was really in the plan. If we read the plan for the Campus Ambanivohitra really impeccable. But in practice there were many modules that we above all the SRI, we did a little pisiculture, just a little training, the We finished a lot of farming modules, but not the was a problem of teachers; farmers, the stud sorts of disputes every day I had a hard time managing all that. I mediated between the [student farmers and the administration]. So always some confrontation with the U niversity which mana ged the Campus 81 Parc Ivoloina runs its own training program, offering many of the same modules as the Campus Ambanivohitra and running into, according to its director, many of the same problems of non compliance that the Campus was concerned with

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222 University and the Campus Ambanivohitra after the Presidency in 2006 Like the Maromitety site, t at Ivoloina continued to be closely linked to the politics of land tenure: Ivoloina we planted nothing, we just had theoretical training we planted nothing. There was the land of FOFIFA, the rice f ields of FOFIFA, but the rice fields were already occup ied by the local farmers. That was the big problem at Ivoloina. The greater part of the land at Ivoloina is still a part of FOFIFA for the Minister of Agriculture. But it was the terrain that was al ready occupied by local peasants for 30 years. Now the Director of FOFIFA gave us even though there were already people using it. So never had the possibility to have even a portion of the la nd at Ivoloina to do again gestured to struggles over resources within the network By 2008, the Campus A mbanivohitra had re located to the southern commune rurale of Niarovana Caroline. This site, on the countries east coastal highway, was its third home and followed, in part, from the 2006 dissolution of the provincial system that broke the Province of Toama sina into three regions: Mangoro Alaotra Analanjirofo and Atsinanana. This political and administrative change effectively restructured state led development initiatives in the area, which were based, for practical reasons, in the provincial capital of T amatave With President Marc policy of decentralization, rural development organizations were forced to reconstruct their efforts along these new administrative lines. In effect, this meant that they would move closer to their Tamatavien c enter and refocus their efforts to prioritize the region of Atsinanana. Moreover, the dissolution of the provinces shifted the governing structures, so that now

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223 the Campus needed to deal squarely with the Chef de Rgion who was appointed by the President and the Commune rurale Mayors, elected directly but overwhelmingly Tamatave was an important site for the performance of legitimacy through development. It was the strongest regional locus of political opposition to Ra v a lomanana and a leading economic force in the country home to the largest port and the Sherritt nickel and cobalt refinery. T he break up of the provinces also meant a breakup of the large r (coastal) political bloc s that opposed the president their diminution into s maller, more controllable units and an increasing emphasis on public efforts to demonstrate the will to development in all its guises within the most problematic and profi table of these smaller units. T hese efforts could also eas ily be made to fit into international trends and desires for decentralization but ran counter to the findings that decentralization weakens the state (Geshiere 2009) Rather, it appears that Malagasy decentralization offered the state a venue in which t o perform development and good governa nce for international audiences, and in so doing opened new pathways of development at the same time that it reconnected state power. The Campus Ambanivohitra to Niarovana Caroline coincided with two poli tical movements. The first was the appointment of a new Chef de Rgion in Atsinanana, one whose tanindrazana or ancestral homeland, was in Ilaka Est and who had already established a project of improving the infrastructure in the area. The second was the President of the University o niversity election, an d the subsequent diminution of U niversity support. The movement of the C ampus to Niarovana Carolina was thus indicative of a mutual relationship wherein the Campus

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224 would ben efit from any infrastructural improvements that occurred and the region could better argue for the allocation of resources based on the presence of a rural dev elopment project in the area. 82 Niarovana Caroline was no stranger to development interventions. During the early 1900s it was a colonial coffee plantation implicated in pulling the local Malagasy farmers into wage labor on plantations owned and operated by French expatriates. Later, the colonial government would stake a claim on the land, a move that signaled their own legitimacy to expatriate plantation owners and French scientists who lobbied the government to create research institutes in the colonies ( Petitjean and Waast 1996). This research was celebrate d as knowledge production with the potenti al to spur the success colonial agricultural endeavors and culminated in the creation of the Institut Franais du cafe, du cacao et autre s plantes stimulantes (IFCC ; see Figure 4 3 for a view of the ruins of IFCC that make up and sit adjacent to the Campu s Ambanivohitra ). By the time Madagascar gained its independence in 1960, the Niarovana Caroline IFCC was hailed as one of two top coffee research centers in Africa, the other being in Malagasy scientists and funds until the Malagasy state expelled the European expatriate population and annulled cooperation during the implementation of malgachisation and seventies. At this point the land w as transferred to FOFIFA, the National Center for Applied Research and Rural 82 All of this, of course, closely tied to the exchange program that sent six students to Madagascar in the same year.

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225 83 Figure 4 3. Campus Ambanivohitra s ite, ruins of the Institut Franais du Caf du Cacao et autres Plantes Stimulante s (IFCC) and remaining FOFIFA o ffice s office still functioning (with monthly visits from the director), the most striking feature at the s ite are the remnants of the coffee plantation that once stood there. From time to time, the buildings of the Campus Ambanivohitra were negotiat ed the usage of land and buildings in the area, refurbishing two for their use at 83 This waning interest coincided with the flood of coffee on the global market and the implementation of trade agreements that lowered t he revenue available from coffee exports.

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226 the turn of the 21 st century. By 2006, these programs had disappeared, and the buildings transferred to the Chamber of Commerce, though the land, as always, remained under t he ownership of the state through FOFIFA. Niarovana Caroline offered a potential space to rebegin the project, and to an extent, the movement of the Campus to this site of development was met by an increase in resources due in large part to the projects state connections: We tried to catch up at Vatomandry [ Niarovana Caroline] but that was really a new group. At that time the region of Atsinanana joined, and the the beds, the mat tresses, electricity, a little bit of everything. They had the here was financing for food, and it was well paid. The Campus, however, ran up against memories of the LDS, FOFIFA, and the IFCC. In order to gain access to the site from the Mayor of Niarovana Caroline, the project had promised vast infrastructural improvements, which in turn, would have provided employment opportunities for villagers. These opportunities recalled the areas former prosperity, raising expectations eve n furthe r. But most never materialized, feeding into questions about the appropriation of land and resources at the site. In other words, the failure of the Campus to deliver on a status quo anterior represented in the shadow presence of FOFIFA and the IFCC became (further) impetus for local disputes over the resources of the network between on the one hand, Niarovana Caroline residents and the Campus, and on the other, Niarovana Caroline participant farmers and the Campus. At the same time, the networks of state power were extended if only temporarily through the projects reanimation of previous spaces of (state mediated) development.

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227 Tenure and Territory The use of state owned lands is prob lematic in a number of respects and became a central issue for the Campus Ambanivohitra in 2008 and 2009 Many of the Niarovana villagers have some history with the research stations located in the area, whether FOFIFA or the IFCC before them. W specifically the state, local f armers retain usage rights a situation that was trac ed to its stint as a colonial plantation, when the land was split between upland coffee and lowland riziculture In 2007, the commune rurale of Niarovana Caroline agreed, with FOFIFA who had engaged in a contract with the Campus Ambanivohitra that the Campus could use the land. Yet over the course of the year, a number of incidents contributed to a third and fou rth relocation of the campus. The first incident involved the harvest from the first semest er of classes at the Niarovana Campus, and repeated a similar incident that occurred at the first Campus Ambanivohitra location in Maromitety. As a part of their training students were engaged on the rizicultural fields that were housed on the FOFIFA parc el. Several came from the local area; others ha d travelled from further afield meaning their labor was lost to their own farm s Once the semester had finished and the harvest had been gathered, participant farmers were given a portion, as was the Campus Ambanivohitra However, the division of the harvest worried several of the participant farmers I spoke with. Rather than dividing the harvest in the fields, they were first moved to a stockroom, where they were measured and divided by the Campus Ambanivohi tra staff. The opaque nature of this division wherein the Campus Ambanivohitra and the farmers would split the harvest equally led to suspicions that the distribution was far from equal (and thus contrary to informal and formal promises of the Campus A mbanivohitra As it was

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228 s trespass on acce pted norms of communal labor and compensation Exacerbating these concerns, rumors cir culated in Niarovana after residents who had been to Tamatave and seen the home of the project director reported on his (relatively) grandiose lifestyle Indeed, his home, begun some five years earlier, when he was still the University President was enormous At thr ee stories each of at least 10 00 square feet, it was massive even by American standards, and was still unfinished as of 2009. As this information circulated spurred, according to the Campus administration, the Niarovana community became suspicious that the dir ector was exploiting the local population for personal gain. Campus staff told me later that they planned to fire the cook who allegedly circulated this story (because she ). Despite these counter accusations, the cook was an important part of the original plan, her husband a Deputy to the Niarovana Caroline M ayor who was continuing rights to the land For local participants, who were closely linked to the rural commune mayor, the situation was becoming more and mor e volatile. One project participant, who also worked as an assistant to the Mayor of the Niarovana Commune Rurale, described the situation to me in 2008: Right now the people of Niarovana no longer want to leave the land [to the People think it was me, as an advisor, who sold the land to the Campus Ambanivohitra that gave the land to the Campus Ambanivohitra We received the o rder from the region to put the campus here. We accepted the proposal after a town meeting. Now people are telling me that I am guilty of having sold this land to the Campus Ambanivohitra Some even threatened me.

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229 By the second semester held at the Niarov ana site, the majority of fields had been returned to the local population, and the Campus activities were relegated to the area immediately surrounding the two buildings ( previously refurbished by the CRS and LDI) that the campus used as a dormitory and a classroom. To address the loss of the Niarovana land to what project documents called icultural activities to Ambalamangahazo a town seven kilometers down the road in During periods of rizicultural tra ining, students would walk every morning from Niarovana to Ambalamangahazo and then return in the evening to their dorms at Niarovana Caroline. In order to ensure that the land continued to be cared for during periods when there were no students at the C ampus Ambanivohitra the Director turn ed the fields into a vitrine or model, for the community of Ambalamangahazo (for geographical relation to the Niarovona Caroline site, see Figure 4 4) Local farmers were hired to tend the fields and the project hir ed a Technician to lead the project. The landowner, a local businessman, was provided a contract in which he, and the workers he helped the project to hire, would share the harvest with the Campus Ambanivohitra This innovation as it would come to appe ar in project documents meant that participating farmers attending the Campus Ambanivohitra would have more time to labor on their own fields while simultaneously losing any claim on the products of their labor during their training. It was a precursor to one of the larger strategic transformations that the Campus undertook.

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230 Figure 4 4. Aerial map showing locations of Campus Ambanivohitra main training site and SRI training site in 2011. In 2008, the Campus Ambanivohitra students and then local farmer s set up a number of fields under the direction of the Campus Technician, each illustrating different methods of riziculture in order to illustrate to farmers the utility of modern systems. Ambalamangahazo farmers were tasked with over watering some fiel ds, under watering others, planting in rows in some areas, broadcasting seeds in others. While the experiment was meant to illustrate the power of intensive agriculture and inculcate a sort of democratized scientific expertise it was labor intensive and seemed to serve more to prove to farmers who considered their work as akin to wage labor more than an experiment the utility of continuing their own less labor intensive, practices in their own fields.

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231 The issue of wages, or the futility of non wage l abor in the minds of Ambalamangahazo farmers, constituted a serious problem for the Campus D irector. In 2008, he formulate d a plan to increase the capacity of local rice fields by creating a new canal into the valley. The canal would enable farmers to us e intensified rizicultural practices (namely SRI) and thus increase their rice yields. He tried in vain to convince local farmers to volunteer their labor for the project. They insisted on being paid. As he explained it to me, this was due to their pa st experiences with other not fact that increases in productivity on the farm would increase the revenue of the Campus Ambanivohitra who would take (at least) a third of the harvest Canals offer a central locus for state and other forms of power requiring, as they do, h igh leve l s of organization, cooperation, and sheer force (Kelly 1983; Hunt 1988). Yet the conflict over being paid for canals was also a negotiation of where the ended and the individual began within a newly neoliberal state (Rose 1999) Farmers at Amba lamangahazo would be paid for their work on experimental fields through an agreement with the businessman who owned the land who would in turn receive a greater proportion of the harvest For the Campus Director, a main purpose of the Campus was to give farmers the knowledge to create their own farms. Labor regimes were a part of this knowledge a part of teaching the Malagasy to help themselves.

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232 In reality, however, the vitrine at Ambalamangahazo would set the Director as one part of a hierarchical st ructure where labor would be controlled by others. Farmers, who undertaken by groups like CARE and the state based Office Nationale de la Nutrition (ONN, National Office of Nutrition), saw the Campus as a space wherein they could supplement their subsistence farming practices which did not necessarily mean that they would implement SRI in their homes When I spoke to Ambalamangahazo farmers, they complained about the amo unt of labor involved but often said they would try the training nevertheless Some told me blankly that they would not. Wage labor was less risky in very practical ways. Instead be destroyed by cyclones, etc. less labor intensive practices freed up villagers Wage labor, then, acted as a supplement to farming that reflected the flexible strategies that often keep rural livelihoods afloat. Wages represented a liberal desire in a neoliberal world that attempted to stake a claim on a future denied a future anterior closely linked to late colonialism and early independence (see Rose 1999) One parent of participants at the Campus complained bitterly of the way that the project treated students (complaints voiced elsewhere about the lack of food, the loss of labor, etc. ). He then turned to the period when the site had housed IFCC a time when sickness meant medical care, where nurses existed on site and if you were too sick for that, they took you directly to the hospital in the city His memories spoke to a provision of the social and a powerful proletariat within former

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233 pockets of development and expertise that for a fleeting mome nt offered a vision of a pro sperous future By 2009, the Campus had let the Ambalamangahazo technician go and moved back to Ivoloina where they continued to have land usage issues, this time mainly coming from the Former Campus Ambanivohitra Research Director at the time Senator o f the Region of Atsinanana His rival project, the Campus Fanantenana ( later renamed the Village MAP ) had staked a claim on prime real estate at Ivoloina, where they planned on creating many of the same sorts of training a s the Campus Ambanivohitra This understandably, raised the ire of Campus administrators, who began to pump me for information on what was happening at the site. Despite these, and other, land usage issues, the Director was determined to return the site to Ivoloina. When I spoke to h im about the issue, he said it was necessary because instructors did not want to go to rural campus at Niarovana They would, howver, come to the campus at Ivoloina, which was just a short distance north of the city of Tamatave. The movements of the Campu s signaled the multiple competitions that the project hosted as local communities who had been sold promises of local development through extensive renovation jobs, road works, etc. reasserted their claims on the land surrounding the site after a numbe losing end in agricultural training. The movement of the Campus was not solely about contests over land, but rather, the broken promises of w hat the Campus would do for participant farmers and the communities surro unding its sites. were about the struggles and negotiations that occur within development networks over

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234 the resources it sets loose. Movement acted to diminish previous missteps and mistakes at the Campus, enabling it to move on to new populations who wanted that accompanied its implantation in rural communities. Part 3: Disappearing Money, Risk and the Vagaries of Debt As the Camp us shifted its site southward to Niarovana Caroline, a number of related financial issues began to surface. These linked back to the personal and political goals of its leadership and the ways that these goals articulated with t he ideals of project partne r s. Some, such as the disappearance of the funds for the university students sent to France, and the appropriation of harvests, have already been touched on. This section consists of two stories centered on the ways that the money moved through the Campu s. The first deals with the events leading up to the re signation of the echnical D irector events which offer no closure on the occurrences of the Campus, but are suggestive of the ways that audit documents, seen as a positive accounting o f money, can act to shield the ways that money moves. The second explores the emergence of the OTIV problem, a situation in which the prospect of micro finance swiftly shifted to a reality of risk and debt for project participants. Audit: Discovering Wors t Practices / Generating Best Ones In 2006, the technical director of the Campus Ambanivohitra resigned. During an interview in 2009 he initially identified the reason as his new family and the lack of a good wage, but later explained it through another e vent In early 2007 the Technical Director said that he had received a visit from a French man. The individual arrived in the Campus Ambanivohitra office and ask ed how much money he was earnin g According to University partnership documents at the time, the University of Toamasina

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235 was responsible for his salary, and he was surprised that a foreigner was coming to ask him this question: Campus Ambanivohitra I received nothing but the salary o f a university trainee. He said, "How is that?" And I was surprised. I returned the question, "Do you know something? Should I be getting other money apart from the money coming from the university, as a university trainee?" He had some papers he was filling out... and after he was really surprised. "How is this it's not normal," and "I want to see the director." He said, "This worries me a lot the Campus Ambanivohitra ave that furnishes Campus Ambanivohitra ?" The Frenchman, presumably a representative performing an audit for the region of Haute Normandie, never returned. Later, however, the Director came to his ne phew: A fter the semester, the director brough t me the Budget Justification, he convinced me, he tried to convince me to sign the paper. The Technical Director asked why he would need to sign a paper saying he had received money that he had not, he said, received: He said, no, "Don't worry, coming, you should receive around 4 500 000 Franc a month." and all of the sudden, after two weeks, there was a sort of receipt... that I should sign. And it was marked thereon, 39 500 000 Ariary, no FMG [3,950 US D]. I would have to sign as though I had already received this money. And I did the calculation, this 39 500 000 divided by nine, that give's about 4 500 000 francs [450 USD] per month. But I was never paid. I looked at it like this, I saw the 39 500 000 fmg. "What is this?" "No that it's marked as your salary." And I said, "What is this?" They were, well I have all the respect in the world for him, as president of the university. H e was my uncle as well. And I said, "Listen M onsieur [the Director], I'm not going to sign. I'm going to think about it. I don't know what this is." I left and when I returned it was with a letter of resignation.

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236 Because I was really paid 1 100 000 FMG [110 USD], I had married my wife, and with the newborn I r ented a house at 650 000 francs, there was almost nothing for me. I had a debt like this The Technical Director had no employment contract with the Campus Ambanivohitra so 00 000 FMG [450 USD per month] Again, the contract emerges as the mediator of these relations, one that can assure as well as deny ri ghts (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006 ). The story, one memory from a disgruntled employee is telling on a number of levels. Central he re is not corruption but the complementary modalities of governance of law and accounting ( Comaroff and Comaroff 2006 ; Strathern 2000 ; Rose 1999 ) In this story, accounting and audit emerge first the receipt becoming a necessary precursor to balancing the books. The visit of the mysterious and inquisitive Frenchman was a potent symbol of the surveillance and governance functions of the French regional partner. The visit preceded, by a year, the arrival of the French volunteer who managed the project. An embodiment of supervision the lack of which Malagasy technicians identified as the key cause for island s continuing poverty making s budgets balanced, that their language reflected what the partners wanted to hear, and spoke in a way that would hold the connection together. The French volunteer also ushered new labor relations, as the Campus administration would become subject in some ways a situation that mirrored administr ators relations with the Campus Ambanivohitra participant farmers. Micro Credit and New Opportunities for Capture While money appeared to disappear at the level of the administration, 2007 saw it appearing in the hands of farmers, through Campus Ambaniv ohitra mediated micro

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237 finance pro jects. In 2006, the Campus negotiated an agreement with the Malagasy savings and loan outfit, OTIV, to fund the micro projects that had been planned since its inception, but had not yet been put into action. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Campus Ambanivohitra expert entrepreneurs that could flex with the market and display a mastery of techniques of evaluation and audit. The proposals were a key module in the Campus curriculum and were subject to mediation (and translation) by Campus staff before being sent on to OTIV. Here, OTIV would decide, based on complex calculations of risk, subjective evaluations of merit, and assessments about the mastery of the expertise needed to manage money and people. Students that passed OTIV evaluation would gain access to both capital and labor earning small loans to help them pay for these entrepreneurial inputs The loan contract, as the Campus originally desi gned it, would begin with a 25% loan provision by the University of Toamasina and the Campus Ambanivohitra Then : The OTIV Union will distribute this fund among the local OTIVs [in the more established cities in the region] according to the number of camp usard borrowers and credit needs The rate of interest depends upon the duration of credit. The project spelled out the responsibilities of participant farmers: 12 Months after the release of the first amount of credit, the campusard must reimburse OTIV an d the Campus Ambanivohitra and be able to build his own savings. At this time, the Campus Ambanivohitra is no longer responsible for the said account. The agreement would require that participant farmers be brought into two contractual relationships. The first would be with OTIV, the second with the Campus Ambanivohitra The total credit made available would amount to approximately 225

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238 USD. The Campus would have direct control over these funds according to the contract through follow up evaluation a participants Both could spring evaluations on the projects. Both shared the risk (50/50) if the projects failed. Micro credit is a popular contemporary modality of development and one particularly attached to neoliberal power (Brigg 2006). Not necessarily a new phenomenon, the formalized microcredit within the development industry emerged from Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Fernando 2006) OTIV within this institutional genealogy is a distant, multiply disconnected, spinoff It is suspended in a network that overlaps that of the Campus Ambanivohitra becoming another way that this small program is linked back to the Wo rld Bank, UNPD, USAID, the Millennial Challenge Account the Agence Franaise de Dveloppement and the Canadian Dveloppement International Desjardins (DID; Madamicrofinance 2011 ) As an agency brought into the Campus Ambanivohitra network of develop ment one of many it is connected to OTIV constituted another interested node. At the Campus Ambanivohitra t he project brought participant farmers into the governmental purview of (at least) two institutions at once subject to their practices of gov ernance in ways that speak to the layering (and uneven distribution) of sovereignty and states power ( Hansen and Stepputat 2006 ; Ong 2006; Ferguson and Gupta 2002 ) The campus worked hard to ensure the success of their candidates with OTIV, providing the their individual projects. The templates themselves mirrored the projects own grant

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239 proposals and partnership agreements, employing the same language, charts, and logics of the Ca mpus Ambanivohitra The Campus administration was likewise subject to a variety of different gazes that of the Malagasy government, the French government, the University. There are interesting symmetries in the divisions that emerge in the relations th at surround the Campus Ambanivohitra at one level, and its projected beneficiaries at the other. Micro credit was a main selling point for the Campus in 2006, and stories of its success circulated in way s that were specifically linked to the project s R esearch Director. In 2007, Madagascar Tribune ran a story on the opening of President Bureau Rgionale de la Prsidence (BRP) that would watch over the President s developmentalist interest in the region in a relationship of hierarchical co operation The article praised the developmentalist efforts of the new Coordinator, stating: [as a University administrator in the Office of the University Presidency ] he catalyzed the conclus ion of regional cooperation agreements between the Region of A tsinanana and two French regions, Haute and Basse Normandie To cite just a few of the benefits of this cooperation, recall the establishment of the agricultural reference site at Niarovana Caroline ( Campus Ambanivohitra ), the financing of training module s, and the financing of a mutual fund destined for the campusards with some other partners, which are the University of Toamasina, the OTIV network, the Region of Atsinanana and the Chamber of Commerce. To date, 23 c ampusards have already benefited from t he aforementioned funds. Atsinanana is also indebted to the cooperation agreement for the computer equipment of the Maison MAP. [ Madagascar Tribune 2007 b ] This piece is indicative of how the ability to work institutional connections could be translated i nto representations that support the extension of these connections regardless of ostensible success or failure The OTIV connection was one among many that the Campus Ambanivohitra research director tapped to generate his political

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240 success. At the low er end of the network, the OTIV connection made similar transformative promises to the farmers participating in the project B y 2008 it had become a major problem, appearing in project documents as an obstacle to student retention and project continuation: improve the relationship with micro credit, which constitutes a blockage to the individual applications and which drives the demoralization of our students (of 45 applications for financing, o nly 16 were granted, using 1600000 Ar [800 USD] of the 5000000 Ar [2500 USD] put aside for this endeavor) [ Internal Document 2008]. OTIV was run as a for profit business, and even holding money, however small the amount, under contracts such as these ea rns interest (see Elyachar 2005). A mong the 35 % 84 those who received initial loan installments in 2007, only one had successfully retrieved additional installments He utilized all the funds from the account and reimbursed the program fully by the end of 2008. That student was talked about quite a bit, affecting a sort of economic magic by taking some few chickens and turning them into two hundred within a year. It is important to note the importance of this magic, because it is a magic central to ideas o f development. The idea of exponential increase permeates imaginings of development. This one farmer out of 43 to succeed so completely at becoming an agricultural expert became a symbol of the promise of exponential growth It could, and was, used to re store faith in the powers of the project among the farmers and partners 84 Instead of the 23 (51%) that the Madagascar Tribune identified as receiving credit (December 17, 2007).

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241 governance and and v ). Most other participants did not fare well in the micro credit scheme and by the end of 2008, stories of the Campus Ambanivohitra and OTIV were circulating among former Campus Ambanivohitra par tners, like the Chamber of Commerce, who had bowed out of the project after 2008. 85 I was told that student s had come there complaining that they had been told the money would be theirs, and that now OTIV was sending people after them and threatening them with legal action a situation that My experiences illustrated the depth of these concerns, as one student hid from me, telling his uncle he was afraid that I ha d espite the fact I was assured by the project h e had never borrowed any money. Micro credit, far from a mode of empowerm ent (Elyachar 2005) emerges here as an oppressive (economic) power that stretches through the network and that appears to link back in interesting ways to power attest to the continuing reliance of Campus Ambanivohitra farmers on the networks they crafted there to move information such as the appearance of micro credit control 86 Campu s administrators laid the blame for the OTIV problem on the former Research Director, who was by then the Senator of the Region of Atsinanana. They asserted that he had told students they would n o t have to pay back the money ; that it 85 responsibilitie s. 86 It also brings up interesting points about the governmental particularly accounting work that anthropologists engage in when they travel with questionaires asking intimate questions. I was very much omfortable when confronted with the fear these practices instill in others.

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242 would be theirs so th at they could go and apply what they had learned at the Campus. The Director said that the region of Haute Normandie had originally proposed this, but that he had insisted that the money be given in loans so that Campus participants would learn how loan s worked and would have to work for their money. Work may have been the operative word. The OTIV project gave the Campus new access to and power over the labor of their participants, a reality that fed into the plan that succeeded micro credit. By the end of 2008, the Campus was combining their sensibilisation with rural mayors with quick meetings at the local OTIV offices in order to try to negotiate payment plans or debt forgiveness and visits to houses to try to find the ones who had not r epaid the money. Mos t were missing one had disappeared from her home in Mahanoro to the, relatively, big city of Tamatave 87 where she ha d started living with her sister. The Director was sure that most had spent the money already, buying VCD (video disc ) players and other items that they otherwise would not have been able to afford. credit component, echoed the mobility of its early exchange with the ESITPA. While it was obvious tha t some participant farmers had taken the initial loan payment, using it to relocate or pursue other endeavors, sometimes not related to farming, others had attempted to complete their projects, finding that OTIV was not so forgiving of the risks involved i n farming. In 2007, a student from Niarovana Caroline lost his rice crops to flooding caused by a cyclone, an unfortunately common risk on 87 By way of example, Tamatave was the big city in Atsinanana from vantage of the countryside of Atsinanana. For a World Bank consultant I knew in Antananarivo, Tamatave was jokin gly referred to as

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243 him: Before they ha d promised to give 280000 Ar, but the money was frozen at OTIV. As soon as this last saw that we would have a bad harvest, they Normally, half the money was for the preparation (clearing, cultivation). It was agreed upon that the rest wo uld be given after the harvest. As soon as OTIV saw that we were going to have a bad harvest, they froze the remainder. Again the issue of lost labor returned: othing else we can do to earn money. And then they freeze the funds that would relieve o u r familial responsibilities. With zero to start and after 4 months of training, hard. The most effective thing for us is if as soon as OTIV sees that we have a bad harvest despite everything, they should give us the remainder of the money. The disjuncture surrounding micro finance is closely related to ideas of labor and its value. The money, despite its denomination as a loan, was utilized and thought of by s tudents as payment for services rendered. Having already suspected that their harvests were being pillaged by the Campus Director, knowing that through their involvement in the Campus they were losing labor at home, the micro credit projects became one wa y that the Campus could pay off. This was particularly true in situations s meant that a loss meant more allowed local f armers to save their labor for more lucrative ventures. As elsewhere, micro credit served as an extension of coercive power that can be turned to advantage by savvy purveyors of the network (Elyachar 2002, 2005 ). Elyachar (2005) suggests that microcredit

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244 and lender. According to Roitm rents for redistribution in the national economy and for the management of internal conflict (212). Debt, then, is an important and generative aspect of the network, and at the Campus Ambanivohitra is sues of unpaid debt were followed closely by new and deeper relations of power and labor between the project and its participants Vitrines and the New Possibilities of Old Subjectivities The financial problems precipitated by the lack of donor funds and t he creation of new debt that the Campus had to take some responsibility for, fed new life into the p aysan leader Campus Ambanivohitra plan, and the creation of vitrine or showcase farms. The idea of experimental fields like those at Ambalamangahazo was shelved, as a new and far more (potentially) profitable engagement emerged. The Campus began to negotiate the use of fields for their students, offering a portion of the harvest to the landowner in exchange for the use of the land, a portion to the Paysan leader a portion to the local peasants the p aysan leader s would engage on their new fields, and finally a portio n to the Campus Ambanivohitra itself. The idea of the vitrine was not new in 2008. It had been a part of what was expe cted of Paysan leader s who had matriculated through the program. Students would go home to their own farms, and use them to demonstrate the utility of modern example, I d o agriculture, husbandry, like that everyone sees it. The vitrine becomes a In other words, the Campus Ambanivohitra would not be involved.

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245 By late 2008, the vitrine had taken new form. In August, the Campus, after some weeks of coordination with the rural commune mayor in Ranomafana Est, came with a contract to be signed between a rural landowner, the Campus, and the paysan leader The contract stipulated that the landowner, the Campus Ambanivohitra and the paysan leader would each receive a third of the harvest from the vitrine. The paysan leader would in turn, pay others to work the land. The vitrine project, in addition to providing agricultural training, would help far mers negotiate land and labor in their rural communities. The rationale presented was that project administrators were not satisfied with the project and that they firmly believed that development agents should come from within the commune, not from foreig ners. The local cadre of students that the Campus Ambanivohitra had created would become these development agents, embracing a role as farm supervisors and overseeing the labor of their neighbors. The project would, ideally, replicate success exponential ly. The Campus would retain the rights to a portion of the harvest, the remainder being split between the supervising farmer, the land owner and, the laborers. At the meetings, the vitrines were presented as a development from within the Campus itself. Later, the French coordinator for the Regions of Haute and Basse Normandie would tell me that no, in fact, it was the Senator of Atsinanana and the Regions that had pus hed for this new plan, not the D irector. In Ranomafana Est the vitrine would be led b y the son of the Commune rurale Mayor, who at the time was already working on his own plot of land. We went to the signing of the contract as a group, but despite earlier indications to the contrary, the rural family involved declined the contract. After hearing the work involved, the building

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246 of a dam and a canal, they had asked about salaries, stating that they would n o t be able to do the work without it. The Campus stated that they would handle all of that, and if they needed to hire someone they would situation, they decided to pass and their representative the Fokontany President who accompanied them and at one point stated If me in town, his deputy was dispatched to search out another potential landowner, and he returned a few hours later with a signed five year contract in hand. This innovation in the project, recast as a stage in its evolution, offered the Campus Ambanivohi tra Director the opportunity to insert himself into the new network relations fostered by the project. By facilitating the negotiation of land usage for the vitrine project, the Campus Ambanivohitra was cast as mediator in the relations of local patrons (former students) and local clients (the peasants hired by former students). Th e role of facilitator wa s complicated by the ways the Campu s set itself above its students supervisors for the supervisors of rural agricultural practice and staked claim o n a part of the proceeds from the vitrines While the original project had focused on creating p aysan leader s who would then act as examples through their own lands and through the creation of local farming organizations, the Campus began to engage in pr actices of leasing lands for participating farmers In this way, the students would gain access to more land, and in negotiations and its continuing role in mediating agricultural exp ertise, would gain access to multiple revenue streams, as each contract allocated a portion of the harvest to the Campus

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247 p aysan leader began as a project of knowledge hybridity and dif fusion, became one in which the price of knowledge was labor and rewards were debt. Conclusion s The Campus Ambanivohitra in 2008 was not unrecognizable from its 2004 version. Rather, this new version was shifted slightly the product of adjustments to th e plan like the ones I have described above: the erasure of the ESITPA partnership, the relocations of the campus site, the shift from micro credit to vitrines Each of these adjustments each expected and unexpected shift in scope, locale, and focus co nstituted a response to expected and unexpected political changes, local c onflicts, and practical problems. These moments of struggle what from one vantage appear as f ailures, from another, opportunities represent struggles over the flows of social, p olitical and economic capital through the network The Campus rebeginnings least partially, the conflicts involved and keep networked flows active. T he education al exchange between the Campus Ambanivohitra and the French University ESITPA what was (rhetorically) meant to be a simple exchange resulted in the disappearance of five Malagasy students into France. T he political connections of chosen students bolstered suspicions that they were meant to stay and signaled the importance of institutional networks for the (often uneven) distribution of the political and economic advantage that often resul ts from time in the exterior, and further entrenches epistemic asymettries between North and South. Yet the navigation of these networks is neither wide open, nor fully closed. The experience s of the only exchange student who did not

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248 clandestine ly immigr at e to France reveal several of the perils of the network that accompany the many opportunities it offers. A second instance of rebeginning at the Campus Ambanivohitra is seen through its multiple territorial shifts. Related to large scale governmental ch anges, like the abolition of the provincial system, as well as small scale resistance, like the reclamation of agricultural land by the residents of Niarovona Caroline, the Campus resituation on the Malagasy landscape signaled struggles over how political economic and social resources would be distributed. The projects geographic movements also reflected attempts to negotiate the network; the move to Niarovona Caroline linked to the political chef de region and the move to Ivo loina a partial response to that individual s loss of the position in addition to local resistance. The biggest driver in these transformations was the failure of the project to deliver on the promises it made to local communities. But the geographic rep ositioning of the Campus also speaks to the ways current developmentalist programs are structured by the programs of the past. The site was layered atop and drew rhetorical power from its predecessors, even while the pol itical rhetoric surrounding it esch ewed these earlier incarnations of development. Finally, the disappearance of money, both within the project and between participant farmers and its micro credit partner, OTIV, pushed the Campus to embrace new plans and objectives. Techniques of audit and evaluation are here explored not as the artifacts of good governance they are so often depicted as, but as tools that can be put to work in negotiating the flows of political, economic and social capital. As these audit artifacts came under question as bo oks were revealed imbalanced the governance and oversight functions of partner organizations tightened over the project

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249 in ways that mirrored the Campus relationship with its participant farmers. Later, the theme of disappearing money reemerged, t his time between OTIV and participant farmers. This conflict over economic and material resources ushered in new relations of power as Campus administrators stepped forward, claiming more direct access through rural vitrine farms to the l abor of participa nt farmers and, via them, access to larger swathes of the rural community. In each of these instances a djustments, or rebeginnings, opened up a productive space that allowed the project to distance itself from areas of struggle (be they physical or finan cial) while simultaneously building on those missteps Failure, in this schema, becomes an impetus to rebeginning, and rebeginning acts as a strategy of institutional and political survival. The multiple and variable factors which led from the to the vi trines the play of different agencies within the programs local incarnations, the role of local resistance, the other p otential endings never appear in official, and necessarily apolitical documentation Rather, what appears is a narra tive wherein p aysan leader rather than leaders of fikambanana (associations), where the ESITPA partnership was always about analysis instead of exchange, where the villagers of Niarovana Caroline were squ atters, not rights holders, and where micro credit losses constituted important lessons learned In looking at the Campus from the perspective of its rebeginnings, knowledge, land, and labor emerge as central to the networked relations it crafted. Acces s to the control side of this equation that is, being in control of knowledge, land, or labor was structured by and reproductive of multiple variations of inequality that set the French metropole at one end with control over knowledge, the paysan leade rs on the other with

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250 (potential) control over land and labor, and the Campus Ambanivohitra in the middle with some level of control over all three.

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251 CHAPTER 5 RENEWAL: PROFESSIONAL POTENTI AL AND THE PERFECTED STATE AT THE CAMPUS FANANTENANA / VILLAGE MAP Power and the Re Creation s of Agricultural Intervention In 2008 a new developm ent project was initiated in the region of Atsinanana The former R esearch D irector of the Campus Ambanivohitra told me about the Campus Fanantenana shortly before I arrived to conduct fieldwork in 2008. He described it as a project th an assertion that impl ied a moral deficit in the Campus Ambanivohitra The name constituted Campus Ambanivohitra and it would come to represent, for staff at the Campus Ambanivohitra a stra tegic existence. 88 At our first meeting, the Senator showed me a set of Campus Fanantenana t shirts that he had pri nted These mimicked similar shirts worn by Campus Ambanivohitra students and served as a visible marker of students. They also increased the visibility of that project, accompany ing students in their mobility in ways that rendered them walking billboards r epresent ing the goals and actions of rural improvement The shirts office in the Bureau Rgionale de la Prsidence (BRP) They were likely still there when the cris is closed the presidential palace in early 2009 The change to the Village MAP its first, and most telling, transformation made them redundant before they could be delivered. 88 It would, in fact, constitute a second existential threat for the Campus Ambanivohitra, the first based within the University administration and felt through the diminution of funds for the project discussed earlier.

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252 The Campus Fanantenana represents, in many ways an inversion o f the Campus Ambanivohitra or perhaps, more correctly, a new version, rew oun d back to the moment at which it showed the most promise, the moment when the most political and material support stood behind its leaders, and then scaling this support up expon entially. W hile this support meant that the promise th e pro ject held was initially greater that its importance and vi sibility were vastl y increased its fate was exponentially worse than that of the Campus Ambanivohitra which despite its failures an d deleterious effects continues to function. The Campus Fanantenana whose participant farmers were complaining by the end of 2008 that the project had ruined their food security, was extinguished where it stood It would become one more layer of ultima development sitting on FOFIFA land in Atsinanana This chapter explores how the Campus Fanantenana shifted from a very personal and rival project built as a replication of and reaction against the Campus Ambanivohitra to one of many develop ment efforts with the potential to solidify the role s of rising star s on the Malagasy political scene a project that a variety of aspiring bureaucrats and technicians c ould attach themselves to and curry political favor through The first se ction of this chapter deals with how the Campus emerged, exploring 1) the project s status as a rebeginning of the Campus Ambanivohitra and its related suspension in i nterpersonal and university politics and 2) tightening connection to the M alagasy the cooptation and re casting of the Campus Fanantenana as the Village MAP These t ales of rebeginning illu strate the way that the personal relationships behind political power at multi to

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253 various levels of elite and non elite stakeholders. The second section explores institutional and individual stakeholders who became involved as the project took shape : the p easants, the bureaucrats, and the technicians who imagined (and sometimes found) a place within the project from which to rebegin (in part) their lives, political careers, economic prospects and more This section begins to untangle how possibilities for rebeginning at a personal level and the closely related individual desires for the resources set loose through the networks of development generate erasures and redefinitions at other nodes in the network, and suggests the continuing importance of the shadow presences the precursor project, the adjacent intervention Malagasy development. As always, the specters of power and inequality stand in the background as development histories and expert identities are sub merged or elevated. Competition Cooptation and State Engagement at the Campus Fanantenana The Campus Fanantenana was initiated in the village of Andakolosy just to the north of the river Ivoloina some seven kilometers from port city of T amatave. S ituated on FOFIFA land across the river from the Campus Ambanivohitra (sometime ) training site, the Campus Fanantenana emerged as a geographic and financial competitor to the Campus Ambanivohitra This positioning reflected a growing personal and political rivalry between the Campus Ambanivohitra (by 2008 the Senator of the region of Atsinanana) and its Director (by 2008 the former President of the University of Toamasina). T he Campus Fanantenana would come to play a bigge r and a smaller role than the Campus Ambanivohitra W here the Campus Ambanivohitra was closely related to its founder s ties to the University of Toamasina and the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research

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254 the Campus Fanantenana was closely related to its main proponent s ties to the highest levels of Malagasy state power embodied in the Bureau Rgionale de la Prsidence (BRP) from which he launched the project Th ese relations meant that the Campus Fanantenana was more visible than the Cam pus Ambanivohitra and more able to command resources from a number of different state agencies. Yet its reach would quickly contract from the entire region of Atsinanana to the single village of Andakolosy. The project took on a life of its own as the pa rtnerships and power relations that initiated it ushered in new actors with new agendas that would in their interaction reduce the project to a shell whose shiny exterior could be deployed as a project ion of ideal vision of itself to its ci tizens. These rebeginnings would usher in a representation that could play powerful roles in the potential of individual bureaucrats and politicians for as an area of int ervention, even while the agency of these actors to determine their own futures would be set firmly in the background. Shifting Positions: Rebeginning the Campus Ambanivohitra The emergence of the Campus Fanantenana as a partial rival to the Campus Ambani vohitra was explained in interviews and informal conversations with administrato rs at the Campus Ambanivohitra and staff at the University of Toamasina That something had transpired between the Campus Ambanivohitra Director and his former second was clea r in the probing questions the Director began to ask me as the Campus Fanantenana took shape. This rivalry belied the Campus Fanantenana status as an institutional rebeginning where the objectives of the Campus Ambanivohitra were re written by its former second.

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2 55 After my visits to the proposed site of the Campus Fanantenana the Campus Ambanivohitra Director quiz zed me about their plan. I demurred giving the general precepts behind the Campus Fanantenana as I understood them, but holding back informati on that I thought would render me an operational mole reporting on the supposed secrets of The precepts behind the project were at the time, a rough replication of the Campus Ambanivohitra engagements centered on cre ating farmer s who could be experts of field and market with the addition of infrastructural capacity building. Each was met with claims by the Campus Ambanivohitra Director that it simply would not work and question s about the c market principles. The Campus Fanantenana had already begun to make the rounds among rural populations. Media reports sketched a small model village where farmers from around the region would come to be trained. The houses that the project was constr ucting reimagined the lone and mobile peasant, inviting the farmer as family, rather than as individual, and reformulating the troublesome labor equation that plagued the practices of the Campus Ambanivohitra This image would never be realized as such, b ut its existence as a shimmering reflection of the Campus Ambanivohitra was clear. Commune rurale mayors duly sensibilized by the media, began to ask about the project as we carried out the Campus Ambanivohitra sensibilisation meetings in the district capitals in late 2008 T he Campus Ambanivohitra Director defended his project, claim ing that this other project they were hearing of was somet hing else altogether and calling on the prior relationship between the Campus Ambanivohitra and rural commune may ors as cause for their continued collaboration He was correct that the project was

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256 quite different, though at the time w ith the Campus Fanantenana existing as little more than an idea and a series of potential structu re s in the mud he had no way of k nowing this. In calling out these imagined differences, the Campus Ambanivohitra Director critiqued a set of i deas about the Campus Fanantenana ; ideas that circulated among the representatives of the Region s of Atsinanana and Hau te Normandie with whom h e worked and on the local news channels In very real ways, the Campus Fanantenana offered a potential drain on the resources that the Campus Ambanivohitra tapped particularly in its visible usage of the main partners of the Campus Ambanivohitra A s th e project began to churn out its self representations in newspapers and on television, the image it projected which often centered on the most important supporters of the Campus Ambanivohitra : the Atsinanana Chef de Rgion and the young representative of Haute Normandie served as a political and economic threat This threat tapped the rivalry that was initiated when the Senator and Campus Ambanivohitra Director ran against each other for the University Presidency in 2006. Whatever the intentionality o f this gesture, the tensions it raised at the Campus Ambanivohitra were palpable As discussed earlier the Campus Ambanivohitra D irector was the former President of t he University of Toamasina, and his loss of the University presidency spelled his loss of a number of university supports for a project that was tightl y linked to his status in rural and urban areas How he lost the presidency was a story tied up in his relationship with the future S enator. In 2005, the University President had just broken ground on the newly founded Campus Ambanivohitra His presidential term was almost up and he was grooming his successor, culled from the loy al staff that accompanied him

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257 from the University administration to the Campus Ambanivohitra According to admini strators and former university students, the Research Director As the election neared, the Director reneged on the arrange ment, deciding to stand for the University presidency anyway Meanwhile, his Campus Ambanivohit ra second refused to step away from the election. And so an economist and a mathematician both working in the economics department both spearheading the Campus Ambanivohitra both already members of the University administration would run against eac h other and another economics professor on the university faculty. A former member of the university administration described the race as two Betsimisaraka using their ethnicity as a wedge to win support, while a third non Betsimisaraka economist managed victory by avoiding a similar instrumentalization of ethnicity This characterization by an elite (and Merina) faculty member reflected the political power that continues to link to ethnic identity and, on the flipside, an intellectualization and red uction of ethno regional issues to anachronistic emblems of defined as the use of ethnic identity for political purposes The politicization of ethnicity was of ten narratively deployed by highland ers to depict coastal populations These nar ratives are powerful counterweights to accusations of ethnic inequality that emerge across the island but serve equally well in obscuring and ignoring the structural realities that feed these suspicions in Madagascar 89 89 Thes e structural inequalities are not often politically viable objects of study in Madagascar, where ethnicity has been thoroughly deconstructed (Raison Jourde and Randrianja 2002, Randrianja 2004). without recourse to ethnicity, the regional contours of the islands inequality that siphons most gains towa rds the highland center. The realities and results of structural inequality were starkly visible in the buses that brought skilled labor from highland Madagascar to the Sherritt Ambatovy project and the

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258 Ethnoregional politics, rising here, was complicated by students at the Campus Ambanivohitra experts, or the positionality, somewhat ironically, of both of these Betsimisaraka as supporters of the (first Merina) President and his policies But these two associations the first with ethnicity, the second with a centralized power base that was, like it or not, situated squarely in the highlands sat easily beside one another. Ethnicity and its (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009: 143) carrying the propensity to foment difference as well as violence nested in fields of power that permeate the development industry. By 2008, the particular and personal rivalry between the Senator an d the Campus Ambanivohitra Director was a main concern for the Campus Ambanivohitra A dministrators accused the Senator of tryin g to sabotage the project by staking claim s on lands they had planned on using and draining their resources T hey implicated t he s politics into the problems of micro credit at the Campus Ambanivohitra stating that the Senator had promised participant farmers micro loans with no repayment. the Reg ion of Haute Campus Ambanivohitra creating a situation in which, as the young Haute Normandie representative put it, he pulled the strings at the Campus Ambanivohitra suggesting courses of action to the Region of Haute N ormandie and the Region of Atsinanana abundance of highlanders in the upper (and lower) ec helons of entrepreneurship in Tamatave, or even, to a lesser extent, in small towns like Niarovana Caroline. Even more stark were the wide disparities between Malagasy and non Malagasy both the long term resident populations from India and the Middle Ea st, China, the new skilled labor being brought in from the Philippines, and the French, Canadian, and American elites that came to settle in maincured compounds at the Sherritt refinery site and the beachside mansions and mid level condos and apartments th at were spread across the northern border of the city in 2008 and 2009.

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259 Figure 5 1. Status Shifts and Institutional Change at the Campus Ambanivohitra 2006 2008 Gray connectors depict relations of influence inside and outside of the project. Gray boxes indicate institutional rela tionships that have disappeared or dissipated over time.

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260 Status positions had changed radically (see Figure 5 1), flipped on their heads through newly emergent relations which were neither wholly determined nor wide open. The Campus Ambanivohitra Director lost an important connection in the University Presidency the Senator strengthened his connections with French agencies, taking a different stance to them from the one he had held as interlocutor to student exchange in Madagascar, and later, as a Post D Normandie became more important to the Campus Ambanivohitra as other partnerships faded. In another world, things could have turned out differently. The Senator could have become University President and stopp ed there or held off until later. He could have stepped aside and remained at the Campus Ambanivohitra as a Research Director. Yet past connections helped to set future trajectories, and the Put another way and key to anthropological understandings of development, in particula r (see Caldeira and Holston 2005 ), and of society, in general (see Foucaul t 1977, Rose 1999, etc.) the rebeginning of the Campus Ambanivohitra in the Campus Fana ntenana was a contingent development. It was reliant on a set of emergent realities and relations that were planned and unplanned. The Campus Fanantenana emerged as a reconstitution of a set of practices and desires of development that had slipped away f with the Campus Ambanivohitra Director Rebeginnings offer a way to understand how these contingencies are put to order in what can be described as a tactic of sustainability that is equally applic able to the networks, institutions, and individuals implicated in development.

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261 With its TV spots and massive state support the Campus Fanantenana clearly appeared to pick up where the Campus Ambanivohitra left off. Its image mimicked closely a set of l ocal enhancements the Campus Ambanivohitra proposed for Niarovana Caroline in 2006 renovated buildings, roads, and the creation of new infrastructure. It copied the very practices that the Campus Ambanivohitra based its legitimacy on with the addition o f the state based clout to achieve actual results. The Normandie and the Chef de Rgion for media appearances that acted as a sort of nationwide sensibilisation a widely visible theater of state legitimacy, as it were was easily translatable into a threat to the Campus Ambanivohitra relations. At the same time, the Campus Fanantenana was rendered a new and different version of the Campus Ambanivohitra mistakes even while it relied on old and familiar connections and alliances. The skills t hat t he Senator showed in becoming a successful politician tightly linked to the networks opened by the Campu s Ambanivohitra as well as his own past raised the ire of employees in the stifling office of the Campus Ambanivohitra His new found political power was tempered by claims that sought to place responsibility for the Campus Ambanivohitra objectives. The OTIV problem re emerged as a promise that the Senator had made to students in sensibilisation sessions a political tool that was effective in getting him where he was. For the Campus Ambanivohitra these assertions a bsolve d the project of responsibility for its role in these former (and former s) mistakes which could th en be cast as relics of past failures, rather than an indictment of contemporary practices

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262 Whether the Senator was driven by a d esire to destroy the Campus Ambanivohitra is less relevant here than the role that suspicion could play in the Campus Ambanivohitra its hold on to the resources made available through the development industry D evelopment acts here as a space in which the political, economic, and social benefits of development are negotiated by within and between a number of heterogeneous interest groups (Bierschenk et al 1991) Rebeginnings are one way that this messy reali ty of competition is molded into order The Campus Fanantenana would later fall prey to political machinations from above as the network that it relied on set it in the sites of a state in need of a visible representation of its commitment to rural devel opment. In a context of increasing visible dis connect between the rich and the poor in Tamatav e a realm where entrepreneurial pro wess was an incomplete solution and increasing disaffection for the development policies that were seen to ma k e this reali ty possible (embodied by the employment practices of the Sherritt Mine and Refinery as well as the proposed Daewoo land acquisition) made the Campus Fanantenana an important site for the rebeginning (and legitimation) of state power under the Ravalomanana regime. Representing and Rebeginning the Campus Fanantenana Village MAP The Campus Fanantenana was unquestionably about state power. It grew out of the political positioning of the Senator of A tsinanana and in so doing became subsumed to the increasing p olitical importance i t afforded him connection to the state as it is pulled taught, transforming the Campus Fanantenana into the Village MAP Examining first the representations through which the project renders invis ible the histories of the popula tion s it is meant to address creating for development and then to the ways the project turns to

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263 legitimacy and rebeginning a second time Creating empty ahistorical space and limitless potential Rebeginning means erasure. Like the nation state, development relies on processes of remembering and reme mbering to forget (Anderson 1983 ) or, put another way, proces ses of representation that highlight certain realities while erasing others Project documents, as in the case of the Campus Ambanivohitra eschew sometimes drastic changes: evaluations render the failures of the project into lessons learned, partnerships end, even while their detritus lives on, and sometimes circle back around, the peasant becomes a construction that is idealized at the same time that it is demonized, and the history of development is disappeared. As the Campus Fanantenana emerged, these rebeginnings of space and peoples w ere an instance of remembering to forget entrenched in project documentation. March of 2008. The site of Andakolosy was chosen, and the first official document 90 discussed the s ite in some detail. Constituted of an unexploited terrain, made up of an area of 91 hectares in a ferti le basin along the River Ivoloina, the site represents an agricultural Malagasy State, administer ed by FOFIFA, that the DRDR has improved for the benefit of the rural poor in the Campus Fanantenana Project. [ Internal Document 2008: 3 ]. This textual representation of land left unexploited was accompanied by photos that depict the rice fields and cat tle that belong to the people living in Andakolosy. 91 Like the 90 This was the first of only a few project created documents that I was given access to. I was told later quite far enough to generate the paper trail that typifies contemporary development projects the evaluations and re evaluations, the project reports, etc. As will become clear, the worsening political situation precluded the circulation of the projects internal representations, even while the project itself was widely disseminated through the Malagasy state and non state media.

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264 Campus Ambanivohitra which would eventually characterize the people of Niarovana Caroline as squatter s, the Campus Fanantenana figuratively cleared the land, even while displaying its continue d usage. The imagery reminds us that the political importance of land as more than an agricultural tool of development as a way to render people governable a primarily political resource (236) in the 1980s and Mitc of state coercion in Egypt in the 1880s land here emerges as a way that state representations of empty land slip into state relations over not the land but what is done on it It also illustrat es a patterning of development that layers on top quite literally of land inherited from colonial (and sometimes precolonial) expansions of state coercion to land tenure. Figure 5 2. Photos included in Campus Fanantenana Description With history and inhabitants figuratively wiped away, the land becomes an arena of limitless (yet structured) potential. At the Campus Fanantenana this meant a space favorable to live Internal Document 2008: 3) T hese subjects would never be 91 At least one of the photos reproduced in Figure 5 1 was taken froma moving car a poingnant reminder of the insularity of dev elopment elites viz a viz the local population in Andakolosy.

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265 taught at the Campus, as it was twisted to fit desires emanating from higher levels of the state These representations offer an empty arena of limitless potential but the site itself was shot through with remnants and memories of power Like Niarovana Caroline, the particularly pointed regardless of the government. Andakolosy lays atop a vast colonial and post colonial infrastructure most recently administered by FOFIFA (1974 Present), and before by the Institut Franais de recherches fruitires outre mer et des agrumes coloniales (IFAC, 1942 1975), which was itself laid atop what local elders described as an early colonial agricultural training center established as a at the advent of colonialism (Madagascar 1905). Farmers in Andakolosy like those that lived at Niarovana Caroline described their linkage to the land as precarious FOFIFA had the power to recall their rice fields or even their homes A public improvement on the socialist agrarian projects of (that now look more like a nationalized precursor of the potential Daewoo project that would, theoretically, put some 1.3 million hectares in foreign hands political legitimacy by relegating the directionality of state power onto areas already subject to it (an ironic move next to the potential of Daewoo) These narratives a ddressed a group of development experts and urban citizens that could be reached through the diffusion of the development message in project documents, newspaper accounts and television repor ts. They spoke to urban Malagasy and elite rural Malagasy in a way that was both historically disconnected and seemingly

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266 ideologically neut ral It mattered little what reality stood behind these representations most Malagasy would not remember what And akolosy meant as a space of colonial and post colonial agricultural intervention, fewer would ever venture into the village despite its location on a popular thoroughfare and just 7 kilometers from the city of Tamatave. In so many ways, this history did n ot matter in the midst of the important work of state image making. Like the Campus Ambanivohitra the decoupling of individual beneficiaries and territorial spaces from their historical moorings would prove a tactic of development. Ahist o r y, long decr ied as one of the most egregious missteps of the development industry (see Sardan 2005, Lewis 200 9 ), remains a mainstay of a governmentalist development that seeks to render messy realities into technical problems that can be addressed with technical solut ions (Ferguson 1990, Li 200 7 Foucault et al 1991). Yet on these former sites of development, the detritus of failed development, and desires for a future anterior, also bolstered development as they co nstituted shadow presences whose traces held the p ower to call up negative and positive memories of the state for the villagers called into the project Li (2007 ) looking at a similar situation of the encounters of farmers and development though this time with forestry conservation directly 92 identif ies the importance of history and historical devel liv e that affected the ways individuals expressed their agency ( 228 ; see also Walley 2 004 ). In Madagascar these shadow 92 In Malagasy scholarship, this issue has been masterfully taken up by Christian Kull (2004), who examines the issue of deforestation, and Janice Harper (2002) whose medical ethnography document s the lives (and unfortunately frequent deaths) of Malagasy on the borders of conservation.

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267 presences which were stark at both Niarovana Caroline and Andakolosy stood as silent promises and threats of rebeginning : the promise of a status quo anterior where state funds made things that functioned and the threat territory Rebeginnings emerge here as a sor t of manufactured consent, drap ed in shadow and rife with possibility. Inviting State Connection The representational blank slate created in project documents, was accompanied by representational work meant to court the state. This is an important point that is true of both the Campus Ambanivohitra and the Campus Fanantenana s tate support is n o t assured, but must be actively courted and therefore development s representation must effectively invite the state into participation, even when the state is the sole backer. Coming directly out of the BRP, the Campus Fanantenana invitation of the state was more pronounced than that of the Campus Ambanivohitra While the Campus Amban ivohitra courted mayors, ministers, and chefs de region, the Campus Fanantenana went straight to the top. The first articulation of the Campus signal ed its intimate relations with the state beyond Toamasina These render the state highly personal and are as darkly comical as they are tragic I nitial p roject documents include a photo of one of the old colonial buildings and a description of a hill over looking the Campus Fanantenana giving a view of the ocean. The summit could house a lovely Pres ( Internal Document 2008: 5 ). The project as a whole would be supervised by the First Lady, who is listed as its sponsor It is unclear whether this recourse to hearth and home was an appeal based on stereotypical understandings of gender an assertion of the literal and figurative power of the sovereign, or both The imagery called forth the

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268 President and the First Lady, perhaps relaxing on the veranda while villa gers toil in the fields below was unselfconscious yet pointed. It simu ltaneously recalled popular understandings of the colonial hegemony of the Merina and the French and seemed to offer that power back to the head of state and through him to the state in general. Figure 5 3 Ruins overlooking Andakolosy P ossibly the hill mentioned as a site for the Presidential Chalet. State connections ran across several other less insidious lines Here the business of management and the division of responsibility were key. In this earliest incarnation, t wo elected deputies (rou ghly the equivalent of congressional representatives in the US) from the district of Toamasina II (the rural district that surrounded the city of Tamatave which had its own, urban administrative district ) would be responsible for choosing proper candidate s to integrate into the project, and

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269 D irection Rgionale de Dveloppement R urale (DRDR) would handle preparation of agricultural materials and interface with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Project depicted here was remarkably thin on defining the para met ers of the target population some 70 to 80 families who were to be housed in the building s the project expected to rehabilitate and construct. Initially, individuals would be chosen from Toamasina II by r ural c ommune m ayors within the district These individuals were to represent the poorest among commune rurale constituencies a characteristic that would prove durable and problematic in the representations Their duties, efficiency and Internal Document 2008: 6 ) Training would occur mainly in the areas of market and poultry farming (6). The Campus would direct the flow of production towards the local market and the new Sherritt nickel and cobalt mine and refinery (6). These plans represented its ideological foundation a hybrid body built from above and below that promised peasant transformation that echoed both the Campus Ambanivohitra and the World Bank. Like the Campus Ambanivohitra the Campus Fanant enana sought to (at least theoretically) change rural individuals to their core In reality, its goals exist as doubles. As it was taken by the state, the Campus Fanantenana twice. It was refracted once through the prism of the Campus Ambanivohitra which extended self governance in service of the state in an effort to increase personal political power, and a second time as a sort of homage to state desire. In other words, the stat e enters the project at two ang l e s one twice removed and from the bottom, the second intimately connected and from the top (see Figure 5 1 5 7 ).

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270 Auspicious ( r e )b eginnings : the Village MAP By October 2008 some seven months after the submission of the initial project description the Campus Fan antenana (re) emerged rebranded. While still associated with the First Lady in local consciousness, 93 it had now been fully adopted under the Millennial Challenge Account approved plan for Madagascar the Madagascar Action Pla n and christened the Village MAP The project began to make its first national level p ublic a ppearances with staff from the Bureau Regional de la Prsidence (BRP) in Tamatave bringing reporters from the state television station to f ilm long informationa l pieces and interview the elite governmental officials and others about the project Ideas to rehabilitate the old FOFIFA buildings including the Presidential Chalet were scrapped. Likewise plan s to bring the most in need villagers from the distri ct dissipated as they came up against the non emptiness of the land that was chosen. T he local inhabitants of Andakolosy, several of whom were living in the buildin gs protested the idea of bringing in new individuals a nd giving them land and buildings that, while belonging to the state, they considered to be theirs Initial political opposition to the reclaiming of inhabited buildings near rizicultural fields was turned to advantage as the state moved the proposed mode l village site closer to the Ivoloina B ridge Here the project could be easily seen from the road by foreign development experts, state politicians, and the like as they travelled the 93 This association was deeply embedded in the consciousness of elite Malagasy and expats in ns about problems at the project, they told me I must alert the First Lady. At the level of project implementation, however, this project document would be the only one to mention her. To my knowledge, she never visited or physically interacted with the also to the ways the project was put to use among the local elite, many of whom seemed to know the projects links to the Presidency.

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271 sole north south corridor on the Eastern side of the island. Obstacles created by the Andakolosy community morphed into a high degree of visibility that could be easily translated into legitimacy and directed at the highly mobile urban and expatriate elite. The Village MAP in its existence as the physical incarnation of the policy components of the Madagascar Action Plan, ideal presence and its ideal ( peasant ) citizen. Andakolosy would constitute a pilot for this image. As one newspaper explained : These villages will feature all of the infrastr ucture necessary for their development and vitality, namely clinics, water sources, electricity from solar power, shower and toilet for each home, school, targeted aid for agriculture and animal husbandry, army posts for security, leadership village should be composed of a maximum of 150 homes and may lie far from national highways or provincial interests. After an as yet undetermined lapse of time, the village will become a model for the neighboring localities and the experience will be sha red with other villages. [ Rahaga 2008 ] 94 The idea was to expand this ideal across the island in stages. In the first phase, the state would create two model villages in each district Later the government would build upon that base and end with two in e ach commune rurale The system contained an aesthetic symmetry that gestured towards development and the governance that accompanies it as objects with the potential to increase exponentially. The ideas of creating visible examples of the model village and spreading success, almost pathologically, to others constitute specific modalities of contemporary approaches to development. For the Village MAP it bears repeating that the projects main goal was to : 94 This article concluded rather scathingly, stat communiqu relative to this training, is far from responding to the lived realties of the populations and the (Rahaga 2008).

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272 engaging the villagers and cultivating, among them, a true feeling of requires mor most. [ Hery 2008 ] In essence, the Village MAP offered a scaled up version of the ideas expressed in the Paysan leader and the vitrine of the Campus Ambanivohitra to an entire (at least theo retically) village system that could lead by example. T he Village MAP blew out the scope of development through the vitrine from the region to the nation. The ideal of the model village is a familiar one, redeployed here, but already a mainstay of earlie r state interventions like those Mitchell (2002) describes in Egypt, Caldeira and Holston (2005) explore in the modernist planning of Brasilia or Scott (1998) depicts as high modernist and statist intervention T he idea of also tapped World B ank interest in the The Village MAP was unveiled during a 2008 workshop with village leaders at the National Leadership Institute of Madagascar (NLIM) The NLIM was created by President Ravalomanana in 2006 as a part of the MAP Leadership and Management Program (LAMP) and funded through partnerships with a number of international organizations and consulting agencies as well as the US government ( Hery 2008 ; Heidenhof et al. 200 7, OMB Watch 2011). Leadership is understood, at th e level of international development assistance, as a supplement and catalyst to the power of expertise: technical reforms in a va riety of settings. Reinforcing leadership capacity is important because leaders play a critical role in prioritizing, leveraging, modeling and implementing reforms, and because they need new skills as their roles and responsibilities change as a result of reforms. [Heidenhof et al. 2007 : 1 ]

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273 Leadership represented a new fetish of the World Bank and a new component of its celebration of Mad agascar as an ideal case and of Marc Ravalomanana as an ideal leader. crisis. Emerging from crisis and riddled with systemic and institutional barriers to develop ment, amply manifest in all of its systems, structures, and in behaviors and perceptions at the individual level, Madagascar made significant progress through committed leadership and attention to systemic, underlying dysfunctions. It is the story of how delivery of customized support to those in power who are willing to make a difference can unleash capacity [Heidenhof et al. 2007 : 1 ] Leadership emerges here as a complement to the emphasis on partnership that both the Campus Ambanivohitra and Campus Fanan tenana exemplify, and which has been identified as a key modality of global inequality (see Gould in Moss and Lewis 2005: 61). More than just a complement, leadership constitutes the leading edge of new development techniques and a replacement for capacit y building (through partnership) and technical expertise, both of which are depicted in LAMP documents as failures (Heidenhof et al. 2007: 1). In Madagascar leadership was a key facet of state training for rural administrators like commune rurale mayors, development coordinators, and others that were supplemented by the mobility of elite western (and ivy league American) experts on leadership who travelled in state entourages with BRP employees acting as translators from Malagasy and French to English M imicking, in a way, the transformation of farmers at the Campus Ambanivohitra into flexible experts of the market and field, elite bureaucratic and political agents across hierarchical spaces would be train

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274 al. 2007: 1). In 2007, leadership was hailed as a success energized the [national] leadership and helped it devise and commit to a development oriented vi sion The program gave the state another pathway into rural areas, energizing governmental connections and extending the reach of the state Participants in the leadership program would travel to district capitals like Brickaville an d conduct not sensibilisation but workshops. These networks gave bureaucrats access to benefits in excess of those available at (relatively) small time projects such as the Campus Ambanivohitra but mirroring them at a different scale. By 2008, the elec trification of th ese networks by this and similar projects that existed down to the level of the Fokontany were a central preoccupation. Yet they could not stem the popularity of negative sentiment, particularly in Atsinanana, where the population was set squarely against President Ravalomanana. 95 (Re) P resenting the Village MAP As the Village MAP was co opted into the highest reaches of state power, local authorities began to engage personally with the villagers meant to benefit from the project. The Villa ge MAP began with a series of consciousness raising meetings that took place by the one room cafe that sat just off the main road Past t he old guard house that marked the turn off to Andakolosy and the FOFIFA ruins, it s tood within sight 95 In December 2008, the main guru for conducting workshops in Atsinanana, died suddenly at a resort in a secluded area in north eastern that the President sent his Minister of Health to collect the body and perform an autopsy before releasing it to the United States. The couple who ran the resort told European expats in Tamatave that it was natural causes, but that it had happened sudden ly. The rumors underscored the state and its international of the country.

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275 of the new Villa ge MAP houses Power and particularly state power sat heavily on the site In sensibilisation with Andakolosy residents held in August of 2008 local bureaucrats p ressed the import of the project, offering it as a reciprocal process of transformatio n : You know that there is a plan from the president of the republic which is that all who want to live there must beautify them with the aid of agriculture carried out according to the standards and techniques recommended for this land. agricultural formation in this place. For everyone who wants to cultivate, for terests. So, as you see, there are buildings that are being built here. The poorest people will live in them. We wi ll train them in agricultural techniques. [ Sensibilisation 2008] At the time, concerns over an influx of newcomers were salient. Andakol osy as a city was ultimately the property of FOFIFA and residents we re concerned about the possibility that the state could at any time rid them of their usage rights a situation that could potentially take away their livelihood and their homes T he tenuous relationship was complicated by their tenure which derived mainly from their parents former service as low to mid level FOFIFA employees. Loudly voiced concerns drew quick responses: to an agreement. Sensibilisation 2008). The success of the project was predicated, according to the bureaucrats and functionaries involved, on the actions of the farmers who would make up its target

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276 Sensibilisation 2008). The imagery of the gift, and the implied recip rocity of the work of maintenance expected, sets up a division between project administrators and technicians, on the one hand, and project beneficiaries, on the other. This division is filled with power, as the gift reflects the absolute authority of the state that is part of the circular nature of sovereignty (Li 2009: 12; Foucault 1991: 95). Here, the gift can be seen twisted into the legitimation of the governance, discipline, and sovereignty (Li 200 7 : 12) that were brought to bear on villagers in the extremely statist space of the Village MAP. (2001) description of the regulation of power and inequality of the postcolonial African state was about legitimizing and entrenching state power. Consciousness raising meetings set t he parameters of these divisions, identifying the experts and bureaucrats who would occupy the spaces of power above the local peasants, and the populations that their labor would serve A second sensibilisation was performed for Andakolosy in October of 2008, reasserting through reiteration the hierarchy of development : You will work with technicians, with representatives from the Ministry of guide you in following modern agricultural techniques. There will also be others who will share their knowledge with you. We, as representatives o f the Region, and working with these technicians, everyone who lives and farms here and increases their production and has a good harvest will receive some aid or financing. For the resid ents of Toamasina, there is a huge and as yet unmet demand for that. [market farming ; Sensibilisation 2008] This division was common to agricultural development initiati ves in Madagascar recalling the images of the disconnected epicted in the C ampus

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277 Ambanivohitra Like projects elsewhere on the continent (Ferguson 1990, Mitchell 2002), and further afield (Li 2007), the se depictions b o r e little resemblance to the lived experiences of project participants The complex histories with and relation s of Andakolosy villagers to the state and statist development are explored below. As the p roject began the government e mbark ed on a visual campaign to illustr ate its ideal presence and peasant. Twenty homes were built, at a size of about f ifteen by twe nty feet. Perfectly matched they contained enough space for two families and were at least twice the size of the homes inhabited by participants in Andakolosy The houses were constructed out of locally made and available materials, but situated on larg e concrete slabs which were poured around the main vertical supports. The walls were made of the flattened and woven trunk of ravinala and the roof consisted of the ravinala fronds commonly used in eastern Madagascar. It was an impressive display, partic social mitigation group at the Sherritt nickel and cobalt operation. Village MAP houses were situated in a barracks arrangement (see Figure 5 4) lin ing both sides of two small roads. Each set of two homes would share a detached bathroom and shower that were connected to a large sewage system. One common area was built with washbasins and faucets so that individuals could attend to household cleaning together. The fauce ts themselves were cemented into the washbasins to discourage theft. 96 These plumbing systems were attached to an industrial grade sewage tank, buried by a local company, and a series of cisterns placed 96 The theft of plumbing supplies was a common occurrence in these types of projects, and an earlier effort by the Red Cross to provide the Andakolosy primary school with clean water had ended in the disappearance of the majority of the spigots.

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278 high on a hill above the village. Administrators hop ed to build a common kitchen in the middle of the model. Figure 5 4 Village MAP infrastructural construction (left) and final product (right). At the main entry Village MAP was erected after the buildings were completed, but we ll before the villagers would be allowed to move in. The houses were landscaped, and a guardian was hired to live in one of the homes until the village was inhabitable. As local farmers were brought into the project, individuals were assigned house numbe rs, but not given the keys These individuals, along with other participants, were tasked with landscaping the site. By November of 2008, though empty of life aside from the guardian and his girlfriend, the site was clean and green. The image, visible f r om a relatively busy portion of the coastal highway constituted an impressive testament to the power of the state to create an ideal and ordered Madagascar.

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279 Figure 5 5. Aerial map s howing the area s urrounding the Village MAP. ded beyond the infrastructure of the housing site. A (see Figure 5 5 ) The canal would ( theoretically ) allow local farmers to control the flow of water and implemen t the systme de riziculture intensive (SRI) at the site. A tractor and motorized tiller would also be available (at times) at the site, aiding local villagers in preparing land for the new crops that the project planned to introduce. In addition, local state agencies would provide seeds and plants for local farmers. These items represented in words, then in (literally) concrete became the base of the imagined ideal state. In this state space, multiple disaggregated state institutions would reaggre gate on a single site. Together and with the participation of the local community they would weave state based development and present the state to its

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280 citizens (urban and rural, public and private) and back to itself. But these were the things that would be accomplished. Other things would only be imagined. Limitless Potential s: Dreaming Big at the Village MAP A s should be clear from the case of the Campus Ambanivohitra the represent ations of development rarely jive with the plans of development. Rather they circle back, conveniently forgetting what does not work. The Village MAP was destined to failure, but it was full of hope and as the situation of the nation deteriorated so did the he nation came under threat meant that a number of additional hopes and dreams technicians and bureaucrats deepest desires to create that perfect image of the state vanished. But the promises that they made remain, shadows of a possible future taken a way They constitute an order of what I call shadow presences. While FOFIFA constitutes a shadow presence built through memories that call up the failure of a future a nterior to arrive (a prosperous, proletarian, and autochthonous expertise built on top of the foreign foundations of the IFAC, IFCC, and IRAM ) the lost futures of these ideas will officially disappear while they become, unofficially, bit players in the plans, expectations, and imaginaries of project stakeholders potentials unrealized, piec es cast off and then reclaimed and formed into the bricolage ( Levi Strauss 1966) of development as they work to construct an image of the perfect state Put another way, these potentials had no institutional weight. They were, in the main, bureaucratic imaginings o f the perfect state generated for the consumption of other experts. Some were necessitated by the way the project had been structured. For example, administrators hoped to get electricity to the site. Electricity was necessitated mainly by the fact that the plumbing system that was set up

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281 would require some form of power and a pump to move water into the cisterns, where gravity would provide water pressure for the wash basins and showers. 97 Administrators toyed with several ideas at the time originally hoping to secure solar panels, which are like plumbing fixtures often stolen, then providing a generator that the community would have to supply with petrol, to finally attempting to convince Jirama the Malagasy power company, to extend its service area across the river Ivoloina. Other potential programs included: the creation of a nursery school for local children, the rehabilitation of a well near the site of the water reservoir, the amelioration s, particularly the ruins that made up over half of the school grounds, and one of which (in t he center background of Figure 5 6 ) was still being used, the repair of the Red Cross water system that had been established there a year or so earlier and the c reation of a school lunch program. Figure 5 6 Andakolosy Primary School 97 Later, electricity would be the prime solution to a problem technicians en countered with moving water through the canal from the reservoir that the partner agency, Office National de Nutrition (ONN), had installed.

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282 The plan however, proved impractical against the missteps and mistakes of administrators, local suspicion and resistance, and the burgeoning Malagasy political crisis and its imme diate effects. The specific ways in which failure was produced on the Campus, and the ways the project was rebegun from the inside as it grappled with a number of crises, will be taken up in the next chapter. At stake in the hopes that bureaucrats, techn icians, and rural individuals inves ted in the Village MAP are the ideals the individuals at the center of the project held for the Malagasy state and its rural citizens. The ideal state, as constructed here, is one which takes on a highly social hue. O n the surface, th e well as an infrastructure that can provide citizens with agricultural canals, clean water, nutritional aid, etc. This idea fulfills a taken for granted image of what the state envisions as the improvement of rural livelihoods and relies upon the statistical methods and expertise that help to define development It requires the positioning of the state and its agents both bureaucrats and technicians as intermediaries in the lives of rural individuals. More specifically, the state, through individuals with their own motivations and aspirations, places itself between the village and the wider economy This is particularly true in relation to the market needs of urban p opulations which are clearly envisioned as a palliative to rural poverty. As a number of scholars have noted, the social is not the purview of the state alone and the ascension of neoliberal ideology has resulted in what some have called 1999 ), which sees this aspect of legitimacy crafting in governance devolving onto other structures. For Ferguson (2005 ) and Ong (2006) the

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283 NGO has t aken up this role in some areas while corporate bodies have begun to provide it in others resulting in forms of overlapping and graduated sovereignty that both enhance and mitigate state power While western nations continue to grapple with and the lack thereof remain preeminent across the board. The state does not cannibalize the social as much as it manufactures it building up schools and hospitals for which it is visibly responsible, but which remain under staffed and under operated. Alternate (I deal) States: Sherritt and (another) Model Village While Village MAP administrators imagined a role for Sherritt in their project facilitated by its need for government support in Atsinanana and in the capital Sherritt was itself engaged in very simila r practices of crafting the ideal state and the ideal social within it. The inclusion of corporate social responsibility has become a key way in which extractive industries, which rely on t he interruption of land tenure craft their legitimacy (see Kapelu s 2002, Frynas 2005, Jenkins 2004) The folding in of the social into the corporate accompanies its disappearance in other realms (Rose 199 9 ) and results in uneven development, either through the relegation of space and territory into that which sovereignty and zones of development ( Ong 1999b ). The Village MAP (and to a lesser extent, t he Campus Ambanivohitra through the social h oping to capitalize on the market for agricultural good s the project would create. I t was an expectation of what I would term the market social that is a

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284 corporate responsibility to engage local markets that would not be realized in any formal way 98 When Sherritt (formerly Dynatech) constructed their massive nickel and cobalt refinery within Tamatave, they displaced roughly 1000 people. To deal with the displacement, Sherritt formed its own social mitigation group, headed by a Malagasy archaeologis t An anti developmentalist scholar, who once berated me for being overly idealistic, began his career with Sherritt by overseeing cultural resource management for the pipeline that ran from the mine, in the interior of the island, to the refinery in Tama tave. The social arm of the project offered displaced populations new, expertly planned, villages that mirrored (in a funhouse sort of way) those created at the Village MAP. The group hired architects to design two room homes for resettled populations. The houses had wooden frames and siding, with metal roofs, different from the at colonial IFAC and IFCC and postcolonial FOFIFA sites. The project created severa l school and medical center, paying the salaries of the employees at each. The administration of the area was put under the control of a consultancy called The Social Grou p, and overseen by an Oxford educated Peruvian whose father was a career diplomat at the U nited N ations The project tried, like the Village MAP and Campus Ambanivohitra to train locals Initially toying with the ide a of hiring state based, 98 Sherrit had a subsidiary from the capital that provided cafeteria services, and no one in their social services offices were interested in partnering with local farmers or had heard from either project.

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285 internationally funded organizations like the Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux they decided this was too expensive and they would handle it in house, hiring agricultural technicians individually to work with displaced fa rmers. They built an experimental field just next to a clinic they had constructed a clinic with the familiar paint scheme of cream and red used at government offices and newly built schools like the Andakolosy EPP. The products of this training were expected as at the Village MAP and the Campus Ambanivohitra to be sold to both the cafeteria operation at Sherritt and t he urban population of Tamatave. Local farmers, project staff complained, were uninterested in adopting these practices and severa l families moved clandestinely back to the land now controlled by the refinery Sherritt in this endeavor, were embroiled in a legitimacy game that fed into their relations with both the population they displaced, and the state that was enabling them to mine a very valuable resource with a largely foreign labor pool. They acted as a proxy for the state, not replacing them, but bolstering their power in an area characterized by its negative relations with the state and its leadership And a proxy they were the young Peruvian expert came to mediate disputes with the teachers at the local EPP whose salaries Sherritt paid, but who often passively resisted the project by leaving their posts in the middle of the day. She worked with village leaders to media te violent crimes (there was a murder in late 2008) and had young Malagasy social scientists living among the villagers and keeping detailed statistics on the entire population.

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286 The ideal state and the vision of the social refracted through development fin d their apex in the Village MAP but this distorted reflection is somewhat more poignantly evident in mitigation practices. Both reflect more than the desires of the state and its agents. They are carefully crafted ideal s (and models) that are project ed to audiences spanning national and economic borders. In this sense, th e Village MAP and the Sherritt resettlement are refraction s and performance s carried out for a set of consumers that are overwhelmingly urban and elite These consumers cons titute the central audience of the project, and hold different positions in a hierarchy that is illustrated by the differing emphases placed on issues as divergent as getting the program on the Malagasy airwaves or addressing local grievances. On th e groun d, this meant that sovereignty funneled through a variety of institutions was more attenuated in these spaces than in others Because Sherritt paid for the administration and care of their town, but did it through state educational institutions, the r esettlement scheme emerged as strong state space much stronger than the Village MAP, though roughly equal in its goals. The situation fits notions of graduated sovereignty where citizens are subjected to different rights and obligations ( Ong 1999b ) but also exposes these sites as spaces of conflict and contestation a reality that was true at Sherritt and the Village MAP. This conflict was not relegated to and betw Representing the State and Reproducing Status : Bureaucrats, Politicians and Technicians (and an Anthropologist) at the Village MAP This section explores the organizations and individuals that made up t he Village and who constitute, overall, the producers and consumers of the project. But state

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287 legitimacy does not exist outside of personal and professional desire In examining the villagers that did and did n o t participate in the program, the organizat ions and technicians that constituted the leading edge of the project, and the bureaucrats who administered it I illustrate the ways that their s earch for personal and professional rebeginnings and their own imaginings of the ideal state and the interac tion of the multiple and sometimes conflicting ambitions these entailed brought them into the orbit of the project and structured their effects on it. The Village MAP that emerg es from the representations is intimately tied to the imagini ngs of these agents, their perceptions of each other and their ideal vision of the Malagasy state. The organizations brought into the institutional network array of the Village MAP were diverse, and included the Bureau Rgionale de la Prsidence (BRP), th e Direction rgionale du dveloppement rural (DRDR), the Office National de la Nutrition (ONN), and the Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux (PPRR ; see Figure 5 7 ) For reasons that will become clear, I include myself as the anthropologist in th is list. Each individual and organization had a st ake in making the project work, or appear to work. Each organization could use the Village as a high profile example, one that could be at a later date, included in its literature those glossy material s that get handed out in spaces like the World Nutrition Day conference described in the last chapter becoming part of their self presentations. Individuals could see their moral and expert value through the project and it was imagined as a culmination of their desires to create an ideal world.

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288 Figure 5 7. Andakolosy network c onnections, 2008 2009. Bold black outlines denote formal and active connections, black denotes tacit relationships, and gray denotes a shadow presence. Black lines denote dura ble relations, while gray lines represent relations that have changed over time and broken gray lines denote a funding relationship.

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289 In addition to these se lf representations, the project offered paths through which individuals could become more relevant upping their political status, and their own position in the nodes of the network that constituted the state In fact, it was in part the success of the creation and dissemination of a certain image of the Village the ability of individu al agents to cr aft and present state that shook up and rebegan the Village under new leadership and contributed to its myriad logistical and technical problems Bureau Rgional de la Prsidence The Bureau Rgional de la P rsidence (BRP; Regional Office of the P residency ) housed in a grand bright white beach side mansion whose top floor constituted the the Senator for the Region of Atsin anana, who at the time was also holding the title of Coordinator of the BRP. The second was the Office of the Director of Development Support for the BRP. Both were grand offices with plush couches and windows looking out on the front garden and the beac h beyond. These two individuals constituted, for a time, the pinnacle of power above the Village MAP, and their well appointed offices stand in stark contrast to the former bathroom that housed the Campus Ambanivohitra or the well appointed, though oft f looded, offices of the French representative of the Region of Haute Normandie at the regional governmental palace. With full time military guards, tall wrought iron gates and a huge wall, the building was an imposing and sparse statement of presidential p ower. worked out of another office, marked him as the Presiden but also someone

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290 well connected with the most supreme power in a nation where power was becoming m ore and more centralized under the office of the President. Figure 5 8 The Presidential Palace in Tamatave. The avenue in the foreground was in the process of being repaved. Construction was initiated at the BRP. Where the Director of the Campus A mbanivohitra was relegated to the rare use of an old Citron prone to jettison parts of its chassis during sensibilisation trips a car provided by the university for the project several years earlier the highest level administrators of the Village MAP travelled in government provided 4x4s with leather seats and keyless entry and drove to the site, some 7 kilometers away, in caravans of 2 4 vehicles. These were the same vehicles that drove, lights on and horns blaring, in presidential caravans to events addressing Global Food Insufficiency, where Ministers ( in holes pre dug by local labor) for the press. These caravans were a (relatively) small part of the theatrics of st ate and sovereign that anthropologists have identified as a key

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291 locus of power (Balandier 1980). A s Herzfield ( 2001) notes, caravans act to reinforce the gulf between g overned and governors In trips to the Village MAP, this power was only sometimes apparent sometimes technicians came alone, some cars (and status positions) were better than others. But it is the larger caravan s the chain 15 cars deep with blaring h while chauffe u rs speed along that sent state power snaking up the coast. 99 These went to ceremonies and activities that the president never attended but where he was always expected. The line of government cars lent mystery to the President but also belied his paranoia. Jourde (2005) argues that t he presidential tour is key to the maintenance of a uthoritarianism In the case of Madagascar, it seems, absence is an equally potent symbol. In many ways, the BRP represe shadow presence in the region. But the BRP whose top floor stood empty awaiting the return of the President and First Lady acted as a space in which things got done, the image it projected making it more attractive to citizens and others who saw it as the pinnacle of state pow er. The outer office was often full of individuals from Tamatave and beyond, politicians and lower level bureaucrats, people seeking aid and redress from the Senator, and students he worked with at the Univers ity, looking for further guidance in their studies. It was, then, a space, and indeed the most prestigious space, from which he could fulfill his multiple duties: Senator, Coordinator of the BRP, and Professor at the University of Toamasina Like the te chnicians that took on multiple overlapping 99 The caravans also drew directly on and visibly reinforced the inequalities between urban and rural and between the bureaucratic elite and everyone else. The blari ng horns underscored who had the responsibility to get out of the way.

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292 roles that supplemented their stability and enhanced their economic potentials the Senator engage d in multiple forms of labor, weaving them together so that each flowed into the other. To give one concrete ex official enhanced his political relationship with the region of Haute Normandie. This, in turn, enhanced his power over the Campus Ambanivohitra and his status as Coordinator of the BRP, which enabled the existence of the Campus Fanantenana This is flexible labor as enhancement a rea lity that is open to few. But it is also a layering of labor rather than flexible labor seen consecutively. These labor practices which are in reality about political economy (r ather than politics or economy) represent a sort of flexible expert in the person of the Senator. When the Village MAP was begun when the houses were being constructed and it was still considered the Campus Fanantenana the Senator was a frequent visi tor, accompanying the Chef de Rgion and others, and calling in the Haute Normandie adagascar B roadcasting S ervice (MBS) At the time, the Senator had hoped that Haute Normand ie would help fund the project, but as the it gained the more explicit political support of the state and became more closely tied to the MAP, this became unnecessary. The optics of having foreigners involved, however, was preferable to the project being wholly Malagasy associated, and so our presence served a legitimizing function (Ferguson 1990) that grew and was transformed as it was pulled towards the as his political power increased and as the political crisis more fully emerged By the time Andakolosy

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293 farmers were participating in training, he had stopped visiting the site leaving it to the BRPs Director of Development Support. A student at the University of Toama sina, the Director had worked at Care International. Her interests moved the aspirations of the Village MAP toward s issues of family and education and she was key in the emergence of the (never materialized) goals of creating community childcare and a sch ool lunch program. Pursuing a Masters in Development, she conducted a handful of focus groups with community women, asking about their nutritio n and family planning practices. I accompanied her on these additional rituals of state power. Having the shop owner gather chairs under the shad e of a small shed, the BRP Development Director settled into asking young women to talk about health and childcare. She recorded the number of children their ages and their previous medical care. She then a sked about their food, leaning in to me to express concern over a little girl, whose hair was a bright sun worn red, explaining the linkage between the girls hair and malnutrition. When the young women pushed forward the skin on their arms to reveal Norpl ant contraceptive devices, she expressed surprise This encounter with bodies already aligned to the potential intervention of the state signaled the gulf between the image of development s targets and the realities projects so structured by political and state power encountered in practice The Development director, accused of some slight witchcraft by lower level BRP staff, was an ambitious woman and as the crisis unrolled she pressed herself closer to the seat of power. By January of 2009, she had la rgely disappeared from the proj ect. It was duly turned over to one of its other administrative partners, the Region of Atsinanana.

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294 Region of Atsinanana In the r egion of Atsinanana, the project was initially linked to the (presidentially appointed) chef d e r gion who played a role similar to that of the Senator as spokesperson for the project. Eventually, and as administrative support at the BRP began to dissipate, the project came under the leadership of the Regional Director of Economic Affairs and Pro jects a sub level bureaucrat for the project The DAEP, as he was called, had a grand office in a building boulevard that formerly held the offices of the province of Toamasina. As the provincial governing structure was dismantled and the new regional palace was built near the outskirts of t own, the building began to handle overflow. The front of the building was impressive, painted in the familiar cream and red The back of the building, on the other hand, was a deep weathered gray with accents of green moss. The roads led to the back on each side were so prone to flooding in the rainy season as to be impassible without a 4x4. The paint job signaled the importance of state visibility, the roads signaled the reality of decay. Com held against the offices of other government and development officials in Tamatave, it was well appointed primed for important meetings with a leather sofa and chair. The desk was littered with trinkets of economic development those small gifts that accompany the entry of large corporations into the area: a leather bound date book with calendar. The se small ornaments mirrored, and surpassed, the gifts that the French region of Haute Normandie provided their volunteer in Tamatave, who would close

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295 images circulation i s one part in the legitimacy games that go into governance and development, each gift a reminder of what the organization represented is doing for you in ways that touch your life and remain far removed from it. Like the gifts of the sovereign (Mbembe 200 1), the trinkets of development are key to the sustenance of power in ways that are important to both sides of the reciprocal relationship. The DAEP was no stranger to development initiatives, coming to work for the government after time spent heading up a non governmental organization called Tamokoreka (Brotherhood). His father had been the Chef de Zone de l in the south eastern city of Mahanoro and had spent two lengthy sojourns in France for training. As this suggests, his family was he avily involved in service, with one cousin running a military infirmary in Antsirabe and a sister organizing for President Tiako'i Madagasikara (TIM) party. His role in development, and his public service was, for him, more closely link ed to his religion than to his politics. The DAEP put great store in the Anglican Church he was involved in, and crafted his role as DAEP as one of religious duty. Religion was a common theme within the project inviting linkages of religion and develop ment as well as religion and bureaucratic power. The DAEPs self presentations were rife with themes of development as religious duty and moral obligation. His religion was one of many trait s he shared w ith the other technicians involved in the project. They also shared education abroad and the title of economist. The DAEP had attended private religious schools in Mahanoro before moving to public schools in Tamatave, then attending the University of Antananarivo and the Academy of Economic Science in Buc harest, Romania, before returning to Madagascar. Like many other

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296 development agents, his foreign training followed the trajectories of Cold War era politics in a time when the Malagasy nation was embracing socialism (1975 1992) under President Didier Rats iraka. Commune The Village MAP s operation also invited the involvement of lower level politicians. At the level beneath the BRP, the Senators, and the District Deputies, the project fell under the purview of the commune mayor. The mayo t was subtle he often sent an Assistant to represent him at consciousness raising meetings, but was not involved in the day to day operations of the project. For Andakolosy villagers, however, it was the commune mayor, after the President de Fokontany who was the best placed intermediary as the project began to fail and threaten their livelihoods, a situation discussed in the next chapter. Fokontany One of the most present individuals in the Village MAP was the President of the Fokontany of which it was a part. A relatively young politician, he had been born in the area and his family continued to live there. His father had been a FOFIFA chauffe ur before becoming a FOFIFA technician. This occupational link assured his family the right to farm the land and live in the remnants of FOFIFA buildings L ike many other families who farmers in the f okontany inhabited a world of questionable tenure where they consider ed themselves to be farming on borr owed time. idealized neoliberal (Rose 1999), the Fokontany President was engaged in a number of economic activities. His most lucrative activity was a nursery enterpris e (see

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297 Figure 5 9) Like his fathe r he worked for FOFIFA, acting as security for the parts of the site they were still involved in, including an experimental nursery adjacent to his home in a colonial era garage at the abandoned FOFIFA administrative off ices. He was one of only a handful of locals employed by FOFIFA in 2008 9. The Fokontany President ran two nurseries, one near his home, and another to the north along the highway, just past the turn off for Andakolosy and the Village MAP The plants h e grew here were destined for Tamatave, where he had a contract with a British owned landscaping office The landscaping business was carrying out the beautification and maintenance on the grounds of the Sherritt nickel and cobalt refinery, a massive comp lex with elite and menial barracks for expatriate and Malagasy employees respectively 100 In addition, the Fokontany President was involved in manufacturing cement blocks, again destined for Tamatave to be sold in the burgeoning (because of Sherritt and the industries it spurred) construction business. Finally, he was involved in intensive riziculture, identical to that which the project hoped to facilitate with their ill fated canal. These multiple, overlapping sets of practices set the Fokontany President as an ideal flexible expert in the pattern advanced by the Campus Ambanivohitra His activities were not all agricultural but he could turn economic activity on a dime following market shifts deftly Like the Senator, he could also turn the overlapping nature of his practices to entrepreneurial benefit, using contacts in one realm ( like his landscaping supply contract with Sherritt ) to foster connections in others (like construction). 100 As the economic crisis began to hit the Canada and the United States in the summer of 2008, Sherritt

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298 Figure 5 9 ts here were sold to the Mine in Tamatave. In addition to his private interests, the Fokontany President carried out the duties of his bureaucratic office. Officially, he presided over paperwork, providing death, birth and marriage certificates to locals. These duties, which were supposed to generate revenue for the local government, were rarely called upon as local individuals were rarely willing or able to pay the fees necessary to subject themselves to the power of the state. More often than not, his official duties were concerned with attending local ceremonies and adjudicating local disputes. He could also, and perhaps most importantly for his success, call on the labor of the villagers for public works he deemed necessary. In turn, his entreprene urial success supported the local economy providing temporary jobs to villagers whose positions would prove more precarious as the project went on.

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299 The Fokontany reservoir where the Village MAP canal was built, participated in the Village MAP project, one putting her name in to acquire one of the new houses, though most planned to stay where they were often living in the buildings that formerly housed FOFIFA technicians. brother, like him, held a political position as the Chef de Village of Andakolosy. This position gave him some power over land, but did not translate into a central role in the Village MAP As the project plans began to deteriorate in the face of Madag crisis, the Fokontany President became increasingly important. Village MAP participants, including his siblings, approached him to petition his superiors to address the problems initiated by the program As these problems progressed, he ran point between the villagers and the state. Direction Regional du Development Rural The most senior official at the Village MAP was a technician from the Direction Regional du Development Rural ( DRDR ) the local organization tasked with implementi ng the agricultural priorities of the Ministry of Agriculture. He was the Chief of Regional Service for Agricultural Mobilization and Producer Organization Support. In other words, his role in other areas was to aid in the creation of peasant organizatio ns and offer training in modern agricultural techniques. The Chef de Service attended public school in Madagascar, but was trained as an agronomist at the Bryansk Agricultural Institute in the USSR. Like the DAEP, his education coincided with the Malagasy It was his uncle, an accountant for the Ankoton'ny Kongresy ny Fahaleovantena Malagasy (AKFM, Congress Party for Malagasy Independence) party, that arranged this

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300 technician's and other students' educational exch ange with the Soviet Union The AKFM is considered the national communist party, and constituted the original post Ratsimbaharison 2005). When Ratsiraka came to power in 1972, the A KFM joined other socialist parties supporting him to form Front National pour la Defense de la Revolution (FNDR). Upon his return from Bryansk in 1981 the Chef de Service began working as a functionary, first for the Ministry of Agriculture in Fenerive Est north of Tamatave, then in Mahajunga, on the western coast, and finally back in Tamatave, where he had grown up. His interest in agriculture was a familial one his parents were farmers in the region of Analanjirofo, north of Toamasina, growing a numbe r of different items including: rice, coffee, clover, bananas, manioc and raising poultry and cattle. As mentioned earlier, hi s cousin an economist had also gone into the development sector, and while the Chef de Service had taught one workshop at the Campus Ambanivohitra he questioned the validity of their tactics and suggested that the project was not carried out correctly. At the Village MAP the Chef de Service had the opportunity to direct agricultural training and coordinate among three knowledge bases: the DRDR, which he represented, the PPRR, represented by another technician, and the FJKM, represented by the Pastor. The Chef de Service took responsibility for instructing villagers in intensive rice cultivation, sorghum (which would be a new cr op for the villagers), and maize. The PPRR and FJKM were tasked with instructing the villagers in market or produce farming, a facet of the training that was closely linked with the BRPs

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301 expectations and assessment of the burgeoning expatriate market spur red by the Sherritt Ambatovy project. The Chef de Service was also responsible for organizing the usage of regional resources such as the five ford tractors delivered to the Tamatave DRDR to divvy out among the five districts of Atsinanana, or a rotary ti ller that was used, once, to clear land at Andakolosy. In dictating the type of agriculture that the Village MAP would engage in, the Chef de Service called on the experiences and priorities of the DRDR as a whole. His reliance on these priorities led him to favor certain crops over others, even insisting that villagers clear land already planted with crops in order to grow new crops, for which he would provide the seeds. Villagers' ability to continue in the project, and their ability to in future in habit the houses that the project built for them, were predicated on their willingness to succumb to a hierarchy of agricultural expertise that he was organizationally at the top of. The failures that ensued, and which are discussed in the following c hapter, emerged not through his intentionality, but through his trust in his and Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux The PPRR was brought into the project early on, and tasked with im proving the people. In particular, PPRR was responsible for repairing the road that ran along the site, the creation of water pumps around near village fields that could provide water for agriculture, the construction of sheds to serve as points of sale and temporary storage for goods grown at the site. Materially, PPRR was expected to provide material inputs at the site, particularly items like seeds, fertilizer, and agricultural machinery. After the

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302 project had become viable, PPRR was expected to aid local farmers by facilitating the transport and sale of their products. In reality, PPRR had very little involvement in the project. Like ONN, they sent technicia ns to mark potential pathways. Initially they were also called on to instruct Andakolosy farmers in market agriculture, but after a slight competition between the pastor representing the FJKM and PPRR, their technician dropped out of this aspect of the pr oject. As the political crisis began to unfold, their participation, like that of many of the organizations and individuals involved began to wane. Office National de Nutrition Village MAP was limited in the start up phase o f the project to the amelioration of land, particularly as this supported the institution of Prevention et Scurisation Nutritionnelle initiative whose main goal was the impr ovement of local infrastructure (the placard announcing their work is shown in Figure 5 10) At the Village MAP two to three technicians led work on a new irrigation canal being built at the furthest reaches of the village. These individuals, armed with handheld G lobal P ositioning devices mapped the canal s route, running it from the internal boundaries Andakolosy, to the site of the Village MAP theoretically irrigating all of the lands in between. provided locals who volunteered to work on the canal with Ar 1500 a day (around .75 USD). The irrigation canal was being built at the same time that the houses within the Village were taking shape. Local individuals, including those from Andakolosy and those from neighboring villages, found a measure of wage labor with the project that

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303 allowed them the opportunity to work close to home. Hierarchies of knowledge emerged as local individuals working on the canal anticipated probl ems technicians did the next chapter) of the failure s of communication across social and epistemological hierarchies. Figure 5 10 Sign along the highway signaling the O ffice N ational de N utrition p roject in Andakolosy. The Anthropologist: Optical Illusion and Illusory Advocate It is discomforting but necessary to include myself here. Anthropologists exist in a constant state of unease as they deal with their subjects. As perhaps too many have po inted out, we are a fixture in our projects and cannot escape our subjectivity in either observing or relaying our observations. But all of that is by now wel l worn.

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304 What I want to draw out in discussing my role in the project is the fact that I was cal led in with purpose a strategic node in the network Initially the Senator pulled me into the proje ct, inviting me out to the site along with the French volunteer from Haute Normandie. We were responsible for nothing during these meetings, but provided a background of vazaha power that backed up and legitimized the action as coming or at least being supported reflection of what Ferguson (1994) describes as the importance of foreign bodies wi thin development as a mask for the political nature of NGOs. To an extent, then, I acted as a legitimizing form that illustrated the involvement of foreign expertise. As the project grew, so did my role in it. I got used to being in the background an e xtra in the theater of the state. I was a willing participant, subjecting myself to being used by the state in exchange for access to these performances. Later, I was called on to perform speaking roles sitting with deputies on a couch in the president ial palace, Malagasy Jim Carrey was just here and he spoke Malagasy on TV. It was great so you should say something in Malagasy est When the Ravalomanana MBS station came by to film the Village MAP I was asked to do the bulk of the speaking. I was cognizant of my role as a propaganda piece a project and how hard the villagers had worked thus far. In this piece I spoke only in on a

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305 translati on until the Senator informed us that it was not necessary they would air the piece without it Visibility emerged here as a prime objective of the project. As time went on, the Senator revealed more of why I was important to him. He told me that h e had spoken to the President about me. According to the Senator, the President said that he should get me to come and work at the BRP; I was given permission to set up an office there. The exchange was followed by a quip by the President about never let ting the French work there they could only work in the aforementioned Regional Palace but as I was American, I could have an office in the BRP. And finally as an American, the Senator must put me on TV. fforts to curry favor with the President, ench (this was shortly after he ha d spent several months ignoring the French Ambassador, eventually forcing him to leave the coun try). Not much more than a blip on the radars of their lives, the small attention I did garner, and the way I inhabited this role, meant that I was tightly linked to the project. When, in Novem and the political crisis wh ich precluded the assignment of attention to these problems had initiated a small scale food crisis, I was called on by the community to intervene. I was a last ditch effort, after the proper channels up to the commune rurale mayor had been approached. My intervention was the flipside of my compliance with being used to achieve a certain sort of political optics, but as discussed in Chapter 1 my capabilities as an advocate did n o t measure up to the situation. After following the hierarchical chain from the commune back to the BRP, and relying on an emphasis on the political optics of a

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306 development project creating hunger, my efforts garnered promises but no action. The aid I sought was strategically given over to functionaries working for the r egional government in Tamatave, while the farmers were subjected to a long and self Shadow Presences A few other org experience with development. These sat alongside the project, visible reminders th at Andakolosy villagers were not the image created for them of the desperately poor and disconnected. Rather, the villagers had experienced a layering of development interventions that began with their own families but continued in their frequent contact with additional organizations working to better the area. The site continued to constitute an experimental site, an area in which to do and show, for several organizations. This a representation to the inside and the outside. Organizations used their demonstrations as a way to with the target being the local population and to illustrate successes to the organizations on the other side of them. Thus the Red Cross periodically brought international administrators and Directors to see the wate r cistern they installed in Andakolosy, despite its operational difficulties. Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra ( FOFIFA ; The National Center for A pplied Research on Rural Development) had been in the area since 1972. Prior to their taking over the land at Andakolosy the areas fell under French scientific partnerships and organizations such as the Institut Franais de

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307 recherches fruitires outre me r et des agrumes coloniales (IFAC) and Institut de (IRAM). IFAC, according to locals, specialized in bananas, corn and fruit trees, while IRAM focused on rice, cocoa, sugar cane, and produce. In 1972, with the ascension of Didier Ratsiraka during his first term, IFAC and IRAM, and their technicians and administrators, were forced out of the country. The land concessions that were there then went to FOFIFA, who continued to run them until the mid 90s when a shrinking state budget caused layoffs and, eventually, the land was turned over to locals, many of whom were the descendants of former employees of the organization. B y 2008 9, FOFIFA had employed only a handful of part time employees, two loc al employees and four technicians who checked in from time to time on the organization that preceded it, constitute the temporal background of the stage on which the Village MAP was set. Shrouded in darkness in the official narrative of the project, and of how its elite protagonists imagined themselves, the contours of this past remained well known to Villagers, and shaped their approach to the project itself. The temporal aspect of FOFIFA existed adjacent to its very real continued existence as the true proprietor of the land. This situation left Andakolosy villagers in a precario us relationship with their land they relied on for survival At the same time, FOFIFA played a similar intermediary role between the new organizations taking over the functions it could no longer handle. Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave The Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave (CTHT ; Horticultural Technical Center of Tamatave ), an organization c reated in 2001, funded by the European Union,

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308 and falling under the administrative control of the Ministry of Agriculture, was a semi permanent fixture in Andakolosy. The program, though not directly involved in the Village MAP continued the work previou sly done by IFAC, specializing in fruit bearing trees. In Andakolosy, they had a small field with a number of different fruit trees, each labeled with their type. The field sat alongside the road, and just across the street from what served as the Villag e MAP s produce fields. Initially, this was the extent of their involvement. Later, as groups like PPRR pulled away from the training aspects of the project and as it devolved into crisis CTHT was invited to participate, though the political crisis pr ecluded this eventuality. The ( SAF/FJKM ; Development Organization, Church of Jesus Christ of Madagascar) is the develo pment arm of the FJKM. The FJKM was closely associated with President Andakolosy villagers, would be a prime agent in the Village MAP. SAF/FJKM was, however, not officially or formally involved in the project. Rather, it entered through a Pastor, individually. Croix Rouge Finally, groups like the Croix Rouge Madagascar and Croix Rouge Fra nce were involved in public awareness campaigns and plumbing systems at the EPP, providing five water spigots for students and a large cistern and pump in 2005. The group visited once while I was at the EPP, bringing with them French representatives and b ureaucrats to see the site. Other than the few signs around the campus admonishing

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309 the visitors to wash their hands, they were rarely present. By the time the Village MAP was underway, many of the waterworks created by the program were in partial disrepai r. Embedded in History: Andakolosy Peasants Outside of Official Narratives The creation of the target population, or the beneficiaries of development, is a key component in the creation and sustenance of development industry. The assertion of a certain ty pe of historical and economic reality for the peasantry is at odds with the lived reality of individuals in Andakolosy. At the Village MAP beneficiaries were imagined as a set of highly impoverished individuals, in line with the original goal of the Camp us Fanantenana As villager protest forced the project to address local individuals, rather than individuals from other communities, administrators continued under the same cted as simple, poor, and unconnected to the state by the elite involved in the project, had a much more complex reality. The project, as it evolved, came to encompass almost the entirety of the village of Andakolosy Situated about a kilometer west of th e eastern coastal highway, the main area of the village is situated on a rise at the end of a narrow and eroded road. The rise overlooks an expanse of rice fields that are tended by individuals from the small village and those larger ones that surround it The city, according to villagers, was constituted out of the presence of practical agricultural research and training. The Fokontany era, described the There were vazaha living here before. They built these houses. When the buildings were finished, the employees of FOFIFA used them. They had electricity before. Over there on the hill, there was a clock. You know why

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310 t Andakolosy because at 7 The name is a conjunction of any (at) and lakolosy (bell). By 2008, the bell no longer functioned, and most of the buildings were falling apart prime candi dates for renovation by a state trying to impress its capacity on its population. The memories of what had been were ever present shells of buildings spread across the landscape, many visible in the prime real estate at the tops of hills. The creation of regimented time through agricultural development, despite bureaucratic imaginings of a space filled with a one of regimented modernity that was characterized more by an ideal of wage labor for local communities than the entrepreneur of the self. Figure 5 1 1 FOFIFA and IFAC b uildings in 2008. F OFIFA had stopped running this office in the 90s, the other was abandoned in the 70s. Despite the FOFIFA layoffs in the mi d 90s, many of the employees that had worked at the IFAC and IRAM stations, then at FOFIFA, remained, and a couple continued to hold posts with FOFIFA. Notable among these were two supervisors and nine technicians, with specialties including: coffee, rice manioc, litchis bananas, and jackfruit. These were the most successful farmers in the area, and tended to live in bigger houses. Among them were the father of the Fokontany President, the Chef de

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311 Village, and another farmer who I was directed to when I asked the local seer who he considered to be excellent at cultivation. Most of these had worked their way up through the organization, starting as guardians and chauffeurs initially. Four others worked as watchmen before they were forced to leave their jobs. employees to farm, and as the workers were let go, the land was given over to them in place of a pension in 1996. According to one of the daughters of a Chef who continued to w ork for FOFIFA, doing follow up evaluations on newly trained technicians, FOFIFA gave employees a choice, the land or a cash settlement. Those who took cash had to leave, the rest could stay. Her father had worked first as a day laborer, then a driver, before making chef, and as part of his deal with FOFIFA, when the site closed he was able to keep his family in the FOFIFA technician housing near the present day dam and canal. With the seasonal onslaught of the cyclones, the housing had fallen into disr epair and the livable space being reduced. Gaining residency and farming rights was a legal issue, and an agreement with FOFIFA had to be made to gain access to land use rights. One elderly resident who was the common law wife of a retired, and by 2009 deceased, FOFIFA employee had to wage a legal battle to get the right to continue living on the land. One hundred thousand Ariary later (~50.00 USD) later, she had assured the right to the land for herself and her children The land of these former work ers was divided among their children, who in large part, they had taught what farming techniques they had learned with FOFIFA. Overtime, FOFIFA parents separated it among their children, so that the father of the

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312 Fokontany President shared his plots amon g his five children in Andakolosy, while his eldest son, the President, used FOFIFA land on the other side of the river. Land that was not distributed among family members was often rented out to other villagers. The practice generated income for the fam ilies living there, who earned around 20 000 Ariary a year for access to the land. Other land nearby, but no longer under the control of FOFIFA was available as well, and through another former FOFIFA employee, who used his retirement settlement to buy FO FIFA out of some of their land. Thirteen of the 45 (~28%) local individuals chosen to participate in the Village MAP were related to these former and present FOFIFA employees. One was the Chef de Village, and the rest were the children of his former col leagues. Three of these came from the family of the President of the Fokontany, and one was the daughter of the Chef de Village. The knowledge base that these individuals had was supplemented by a younger generation of villagers who, like the President F in law, had either been trained as technicians or had followed some other training through fishing organizations, micro credit banks, and the primary school curricula. Most of the participants had only attended school up to primary, and just a few had had no schooling or had gone on to secondary school. Yet practical education prevailed. The agricultural practices of Andakolosy villagers reflected the agricultural fields, these centered on rice, manioc, maize, sweet potato, but also included bananas, citrus, cherries, coconut, cinnamon, litchis and papaya. Elsewhere they were centered on cattle and poultry. In short, these peasants were not

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313 concerned with their development. Rather, they had experie nce and a particular experience of the state that invited them into the project as well as instilled fear of the project. They were reluctant and exuberant students anticipating the promises made while, it seemed to me, preparing for their potential f ailure. Conclusion s The Campus Fanentenana emerged out of the strained relationships among the two leading administrators of the Campus Ambanivohitra As such, it represents an iteration of that campus, and a self conscious (at least at first) compet itor. The project was also made possible by the Campus Ambanivohitra Research Directors translation of his work in de velopment into political capital But this deftness also pulled him away from the project, as the state became more and more direc tly inv olved and his role was filled by other bureaucrats and state technicians. real) powers to propel individuals up the political ladder and its importance as proof of their fealty and professional value made it a prime space for the performance of development and state legitimacy. As the Senator s political profile rose, it was transformed into the Village MAP and linked directly with President Ravalomanana and the Malagasy First Lady. The Village MAP was crafted in ways t hat followed, in part, the patterns of the Campus Paysan. It was predicated on the construction of an empty and underdeveloped countryside and an impoverished population that lacked the agricultural and market knowledge necessary to advance economically. This initial re construction of the local peasantry met wit h immediate resistance and the project was forced to reconsider its target population shifting from a plan that involved bringing students to

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314 Andakolosy from around the region to one that would develop the peasants who lived there. This shift belied the fictionalized image of the peasant promoted in developmental narrati ves, as it refocused its efforts on a population built of retired functionaries and their families and neighbors The project s elf consiously cou rted state power, using images of Presidential leaders. The project also offered local politicians pathways to extend their power base, giving them the right to choose (in the projects initial incarnation) the beneficiaries of development. These instances serve as important reminders that state support is not assured even within projects in which the state is the primary sponsor. Even as the project ac ted as a visible example of the legitimacy of a set of to develop (see Li 2007) to international agents and agencies. The projects situation just next to the main north south thoroughfare ensured foreign dignitaries would see its clean lines a symbol of modern hygiene and business acumen set to the tune of a policy goals, in minia ture a model that could be (theoretically) scaled up to the nation as a whole through reiteration. With all of these lofty goals and the power of the state backing it up, the Village MAP evolved into a space for the creation by politicians, bureaucra ts, and technicians alike of the ideal Malagasy state. Individuals imagined a village on which others would be based, where families had plumbing and electricity. Where their houses, mimicking the modernist ideal (Scott 1998) sat along nicely manicured streets

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315 mimicking each other and erasing socio economic difference. Peasants here would, like those matriculated through the Campus Ambanivohitra learn to be flexible experts of the self empowered by techno scientific knowledge from governmental and religious organizations to shift with the market, answering urban agricultural needs and assuring the nations food sovereignty. The machinations of the Village MAP are not solely related to those of the Campus Ambanivohitra Rather its stories, and to an extent its results, mimic other programs that aim to raise Malagasy standards of living on a village wide level. The project was eerily similar to the relocation programs of the nearby Sherritt nickel and cobalt mine and refinery which itself built M alagasy model villages. This resettlement mediated by private and extractive enterprises was arguably much more problematic than the Village MAP. It was certainly more expansive Yet the projects share a sharp focus on crafting legitimacy through re presentation present an image of the ideal state and carve out a space of attenuated state power. In addition, and like the Campus Ambanivohitra that presaged it, the Village MAP created bureaucratic and political careers and held the potential to brin g greater state interest and funds to a variety of governing bodies and agencies concerned with development. These included the Bureau Regionale de la Presidence (BRP), the Region of Atsinanana, the local Commune Rurale and Fokontany and rural developmen t agencies like the Direction rgionale du dveloppement rural (DRDR), and Programme de Promotion des Revenues Ruraux (PRPR). Even the anthropologist studying the project and here I speak of myself is implicated in an exchange with the potential to cr eate career advantages and with the potential for further power and

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316 influence (despite whether these are desired or materialize). My dissappointments in my own failures to affect some change within the program were certainly mirrored by other embroiled ag ents who felt themselves stymied pawns of a system that benefited those above them. In addition to these interested agencies and agents were a myriad of temporal and geographical shadow presences These sat as comparative reminders of the failed promi ses of the past, and of the struggles of the present, where these agencies were direct competitors in the development market. Agencies like the Foibe Fikarohana ampiharina amin'ny Fampandrosoana ny eny Ambanivohitra (FOFIFA, National Center for Applied Re search on Rural Development) had been a source of employment for several villagers, whose families now make up the core of village residents. Contemporary shadow presences belied the layered nature of development, as the site itself was centered on a numb er of post FOFIFA interventions into rural life. These shadow presences offer important counters to the assertion of untouched and un developed rurality as the central space for development, highlighting the privileging of capabilities over its material results. scientific knowledge is rendered mythological next to the more complex rea li ties of Andakolosy villagers. The village itself was once c reated as a sort of model of modern labor with rows of barracks near the fields to house technicians. It sat, in the present and the recent past, as a space of unsure tenure in ways that echo but are slightly different from those of Niarovona Caroline. Ironically, it was memories of these earlier

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317 experiences that both invited them into the project with the allure of development and warned them away with the threat of land loss. In the next chapter, I explore how this edifice begins to lose integrity fac ed with a number of factors including the inability of the state to live up to the picture it has painted of itself. Against the backdrop of a growing political crisis, the Village MAP is bungled. The political crisis, however, is not the cause. Rather, the need to enact hierarchies of knowledge and to buttress their stability acts as the primary cause of the projects failure. It is here in the projects over connection to the attempts of the state and individuals to rebegin themselv es that the project' s failures are ushered in

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318 CHAPTER 6 KNOWLEDGE AND THE OPTICS OF STATE POWER AT THE VILLAGE MAP The Campus Fanantenana / Village MAP was forced to start ove r, to ask individuals to begin anew as the project s failures became apparent. Before the project e ven began, local farmers of land ideal for farmer training muscled their way into the project. They agitated against the idea of bringing in other farmers and in this way forced the Campus to redirect its efforts in their direction. But resistance was accompanied by fear, skepticism, and a real desire to have a better life, all helped along by the attempts of individuals to increase their own standing vis vis state power. In what follo ws, I explore the ways that individual desire, fear and skepticism all centered on the ways resources were set loose through the project converged in the unfolding of the Campus Fanantenana / Village MAP project, creating small scale disasters that stole away the livelihoods of individuals in the name of development. This chapter is, to an extent, a voyeuristic exploration of disastrous development. But the story it tells is all too common, and one that illustrates the complicity of multiple and diverse rebeginnings. The chapter offers a view of three areas of contested ground and catastrophe other and with the larger state. The first is a general contestation over land and labor in an area in which individual tenure was tenuous, but individual feelings of attachment and rights to the land were strong. The second section explores the contestation of knowledge at the campus as hierarchies of knowledge were created and enacted, in the process taking powers over labor and

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319 knowledge away from some actors and giving it to others. The third section explores how the backdrop of crisis called forth narratives of indolence and intransigence, esch ewing the failure of technocratic elites as an option and rebeginning the project under a new guise that twisted the causes of its earlier problems out of view Part 1 : The Powers of Time, Labor, and Land T he Village MAP was about creating the ideal sta te through the provision of a set of services that entered intimately into the lives of participant farmers, demanding they accept changes to their agricultural practices, shift their village (and leave behind any non participants) and thus their spatial r elationships to the land and to each other, and subject themselves to new forms of visibility and state intervention. Using the coercive power of land specifically the threat of the loss of land the state staked a claim on time and labor. In addition, the state levered its development capabilit ies to generate wage labor for the v illage, bringing them (back) into employment relations with the state, and essentially generating legitimacy through the provision of employment as well as social s ervices. Waiting Game s The relationships between technicians and farmers were hierarchical from the beginning and reflected the privileging of the urban, the expert, and the educated. The borders of hierarchy were patrolled by expressions of temporal p ower The project demanded time of participants for training and labor. In addition, t echnicians rarely arrived on time to conduct training, often leaving the farmers to wait at the entrance to the Village MAP or by the coffee shop run by one of its stud ents. The training, when technicians did show up, was often begun an hour later than scheduled, and about half the time the villagers would leave to tend their fields after an hour and a half of waiting

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320 Abandoning this waiting game would later feed into the reconstruction of participants as indolent and reticent to learn affecting a sanction on resistance to the bureaucratic and expert control of time Time is a key concept for understanding bureaucracy, particularly among the expert technicians who br idge the state s relations within spaces of development like power to control time to make people wait key in expressions of state power (165). A large part of thi s power resides in how time tran slates into lost labor and lost production. Temporal power is thus a key indicator of social hierarchy and elite status wi thin development (see Green 2000 ) But t ime was not the only space in which hierarchy was crafted, n one present. Development at the Village MAP offered those with elite status at different levels the opportunity to control not only the time, but also the labor and resource utilization of in development reproduces inequality, land and labor are the primary material realms in which this takes place. The construction of status is not as straightforward as dichotomi es of the state versus the people, or the educated elite versus the peasant would suggest. Rather, a number of different actors involved in development, from position with in the development framework. Part of this jockeying involves the legitimization of the state, but this is an implicit, not explicit, goal of the individuals involved, who rely on state legitimacy to ensure their own futures. These machinations

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321 involve m ultiple contestations and negotiations that while failing to overturn completely the inequalities that are re instantiated through the project, do disrupt them. Losing Land Concerns over land and labor drove the way individuals related to the project from its inception. Project administrators shifted the focus of the project well before technicians began working with the local community. But new suspicions arose, egged on by the tactics of local politicians, about the risks of this developmental endeavor. As it became more important for politicians like the Fokontany President who like the farmers brought into the program farmed FOFIFA land, and li ke other members of his family, lived in former FOFIFA buildings to make this effort work, it also became more dangerous in the eyes of participating farmers. As one Andakolosy farmer stated: The [Fokontany] ant to work for free. Life is really difficult, you know. We want to leave the land, so we joined [the p roject]. from another village and built a house next to the river with the permission of the village head Unlike the residents who lived in the center of Andakolosy, she was not the descendant of a FOFIFA employee. She was allowed to use land for her home and to farm rice paddy in a small plot next to the river because of the intervention of local individuals who did have a right to the land based on their familial ties. Though she worked with the program, she did n o t consider herself solely a farmer and made most of her money, instead, through diving for sand in the middle of the Ivoloina River and contracting herself out as a day laborer on th e plots held by her

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322 neigh bors. She was engaged, like others, in a different type of flexible production a type uniquely suited to unsure economic situations but also increasingly valued by neoliberalism ( Ong 1999b ; Rose 1999 ). A main concern for villagers centered on how th e project would a ffect their already accomplished labor namely the fields they had prepared and planted before the project began. These concerns often took center stage when administrators allowed questions after informational sessions on the project. On e of these exchanges, between the technician from DRDR and a participant at a sensibilisation in August of 2008 highlights the middle ground technicians sought to strike, but also foreshadows the food crisis that would follow the project s agricultural int erventions: rice just sprouting. Do we wait for the seeds or can we cultivate these nurseries? DRDR Technician: Do you usually cultivate rice here every year? P4: Yes. DRDR Technici an: P4: Hmm. DRDR Technician: You can do it, ok. For those who left seeds in the soil, our instructions. We should have a harvest two times in the coming year, if you follow the [ Sensibilisation 2008] Villager: I have another question. manioc. Can we do that or do we need to wait for your training? BRP Coordinator: Regarding the fields of manioc, we should arrange that but, on the one hand is education and on the other is development. In this case,

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323 Manioc would become a central point of contention for Andakolosy villagers. For farmers, manioc was an important market crop, and most mentioned it second after rice when asked about what they grew. Economically villagers highlighted the importance of manioc as a source of revenue before the harvest as well as extra holiday income: You know last year, the same time period, we already had a good manioc harvest. We sold all that next to the highway. With the mo ney we bought Tamatave, we earn 10 000 Transforming the ways that individuals farmed had serious social and implications for families, who earned the type of profit from the venture to get them through the New Year. This desire to order rural socie ty disrupted the already existing order. The technicians heading up the project, in their faith in their own abilities, had essentially that all the land here should be ed the methods of technicians, and tried to offer other possibilities that would not force them to uproot and reorganize their land use practices. During a focus group after the training began to generate problems, An dakolosy villagers described how the project came to destroy their manioc fields: Research Assistant: They took it all? Villager 1: Yes, with the tiller. At the time that they were taking the manioc, we said that, rather than destroy the manioc fields, we were ready to clear bizarre, this technician telling us to pull up the fields of manioc. They said Villager 2: There are weeds now growing on the land where we grew manioc before.

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324 The disappearance of the manioc, and its replacement with a vast field of weeds was was successfully pushing in o ther regions. According to the lead technician from DRDR, the seeds were already in Madagascar, but had not yet arrived in Atsinanana. At the time, sorghum was being pushed by glob al development institutions like the United Nations Food a nd Agriculture Or ganization (FAO 2008, 2011) and Care International (Care 2011) for the arid and semi south. As it travelled this circuit, it necessarily came into contact with governmental organizations like the age, et de Pche ( MAEP) and its more localized bodies, like the DRDR where the idea of sorghum, and its seeds were said to be redistributed amongst these programs. It appears that sorghum became a main goal of the Village MAP administration for a few rea sons. First, it was en vogue and thus lacked the uninteresting patina of man practical level, sorghum was available, largely due to the interest of development agencies like the FAO and Care International and evidenced by the uptick in sorghum consumption during the period ( see Figure 1 6) Sorghum and international interests in sorghum helped to structure the way the project stake d claim on the land and labor of Laboring for the State The project extended state control into labor in two important ways. First, participant farmers were expected to form laboring groups, structured by state ideal of rationali zed management. This situation gave individuals the opportunity to control the labor of others, complicating the relationships of individual villagers. Second, participant

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325 farmers and non participant residents of the villages adjacent to Andakolosy were called into the wage labor provided by the public works component of the project, offering them new opportunities to suppleme nt their other livelihood activ ities. Association and rationalized labor Project administrators had very specific ideas of the wa ys that labor should be rationalized and arranged, and sought to transform them into realities at the Village MAP. Part of this rationalization was the creation of farm fields as efficient work spaces where agriculture would be divided across space and by type: All the growers [fields] of manioc will be located in the same area and the Sensibilisation August 2008] Being professional and modern would mean a fundamental change in how, and if, local crops like manioc would be grown. These changes would reflect a rationalized style preferred by high modernism (Sc ott 1998) The consolidation of crops in space would facilitate efficient group work. It would also enable visible space for associational competition where each group could view and (expertly) judge the work of their peers (see Li 2007). The effort s to professionalize agriculture by controlling where and what villagers would plant disrupted normal agricultural orders, forcing villagers to wait for instructions and inputs from technicians and administrators before planting. Where normally the villag ers would plant corn and manioc before sowing the rice fields, they now waited on both. Where normally they would have relied on their previous harvests to provide the technicians Agricultural time, though ideally regimented in both colonial and post

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326 colonial settings (see Jarosz 1994) clashed with time as status, with waiting games that were interlinked with the high status afforded bureaucrat s and technician s (Green 2003) Far m ing associations were created, but diverged from the suggestions of technicians. Instead, the villagers chose to work with those that lived near them or were family (and these were often the same) Thus one group was centered on a core group that consist ed of the sisters of the President of the Fokontany and the Chef de Village These groups would work together on the produce plots overseen by the Preacher from SAF/FJKM, as well as a corn field, overseen by PPRR, and sorghum and SRI overseen by DRDR. I n January 2009, the DRDR technician came with a bureaucrat to discuss, ostensibly, the formation of these groups. The meeting came at a time when the locals used the o pportunity to voice their concerns over how the project was progressing, a subject that will be revisited at the end of this chapter. After arriving, a bureaucrat from the Regional Government opened the meeting: Everyone should feel responsible for what important for us is to see someone who is responsible for each group. You h person should feel responsible. The philosophy is that everyone participates in all that should b everything we decide here, that way everyone will have a copy. The admonitions to responsibility and to take notes were laden with power suggesting The farmers had worked in groups for almost five months by this time. The precarious positions of technocrats and the

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327 high competition of the development industry reinforced this gulf, rendering failure a non option and thus structuring the ways villag ers could emerge in the project. In addition to restructuring agricultural habits and encouraging competitive sensibilities, the relations ushered by the groups and group leaders created new space for villagers to produce and reproduce their status vis vis their neighbors. One leader demanded that each member provide him with 800 Ar (about 0.40 USD). The group president [of the Fokontany] says that we have to leave thi s place, better that we leave than do something l s a central and effective strategy of resisting power, but this power need not be as centralized or as grandiose as the state (Sardan 2005) In this case, intervention ushered new power relations (and old ones) at the level of the village, a situation that spurred discomfort as well as the project failure as individuals within the network struggled over the resources it made available Development Wages The project began to hire locals to clear land in October of 2008, hoping to have training start immediately and individuals planting produce by the end of the month. Labor during the project was both paid and unpaid, with participant farmers and locals from neighboring villages paid around 1500 Ar (~0.75 USD) a day for clearing fields and fated canal and participants working for free on the fields after the initial clearing Paid labor was unproblematic for locals, many of whom had been pr eviously or were periodically engaged in labor for i ndustries that passed through (e.g. temporary positions with the road works organization Socit Sino Malgache de Travaux Publics (China Malagasy Society for Public Works)) or working piecemeal collectin g sand from

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328 the river or breaking rocks at the quarry In addition, it was common practice to earn wages, in cash or kind, for work on neighbors and friends plots, as well as with the President Fokontany, who, after losing his contract to provide plants f or landscaping at the Sherritt Nickel and Cobalt Refiner y the landscaping company itself had lost the job because of the 2008 economic crisis hired participant farmers to manufacture cinder blocks at his (second) compound north of the Village MAP 101 The introduction of the public works components in Andakolosy were key to the continuing legitimacy of the project, and became one way that the project supplemented the unpaid labor it forced from its participants. The two forms of labor sat uncomfortably ne xt to each other calling up memories of more extensive public works and the wage infras tructure as well as the history of forced colonial labor, and the unremunerated labor of the pre colonial period, a situation identified elsewhere in Africa (Sardan 2005) State Gifts Land and labor relations were not just centered on questions of tenure and agricultural practices. The lovely houses with the cement floors that made up the visible Village MAP along w ith the (non working) plumbing remained vacant until well after Marc Ravalomanana was deposed and the young TGV ascended to power. Initially, BRP administrators told me the houses could not be inhabited until they finished the plumbing (which did n o t run to the houses but to the exterior toilets, showers, and wash basins scattered am ong them) Then, we would have to wait until the village had electricity. Finally, the administrator representing the BRP stated blankly that the 101 Vill agers were also responsible for unpaid community works organized by the Fokontany President.

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329 villagers must have a good h arvest, and then they would turn over the keys, and at no time before then. The homes, it seemed, would constitute a reward for successful participation, but unsuccessful participation would receive nothing. The houses that would constitute symbols of state concern for rural populations were viewed by the Andakolosy villages either as an exchange for participation or for some who chose not to live in them a threatening prospect of a life lived in potential debt to the state. The more the project c reated hardships for the village through missteps, mistakes, and unforeseen political problems the more the villagers assigned to the houses felt they deserved them. By November of 2008, the cyclone season was nearing. Andakolosy villagers their l abor locked up in training and knowing they were already assigned homes in the model village left off the important work of repair. The ability to get into the houses took on added i mportance: ready to live there; do. You know that during the cyclone [a couple of weeks prior to this interview] our pr esident gave us the keys. The next day, as soon as the cyclone was gone, they said we had to return the keys. So everybody went would only stay in the houses during the cyclone. Af ter, he said to clean the house. People wanted since another c yclone was coming the next week they wanted to stay in the houses for a while That way we could clean every day. Again the optics of state power loom large, as the houses were held in r eserve in an attempt to hold on to a theatrical performance of legitimacy that would take place when crops were harvested and infrastructure was built. Power itself was relayed through a web of individuals who sat in hierarchical relation to each other wi thin the network (Rose 1999) It was this web of relations that the Fokontany President referenced when he

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330 later said that he did not have the right to tell them they could stay in the houses, they would have to wait for the technicians. The houses were f inished in September, but Presidential Expectations The main impetus in the work of the BRP, the DRDR, the ONN, and the other state institutions implicated in the Village MAP was the pleasure of the President. This meant that the definition of project success was tightly linked with the ability of local farmers to play appropriate roles in the optics of state power and legitimacy. The fields needed to be placed near the road to ensure their visibility to Malagasy and international elites The houses could not be released to locals because as was rumored almost every week between November and January the President was coming. The rumors were constan t and excited the D irector of the Campus Ambanivohitra as well as the Technicians involved in the much more state centric Village MAP Villagers were well aware of this, and the Chef du Village an older villager participating in the project, responded to my assistants sugg estions that they woul Rumor here takes a n ew turn, as it spurs people to action rumors, and the specter of the President, functioned as impetus to more and harder labor among rural villagers, even while the growing crisis pulled the relevant bureaucrats away from the project. The expectations of Presidential visits coincided with the imagery of the house as gift the ultimate of what development projects have to offer and clearly outstripping the

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331 kits agricoles provided at the Campus Ambanivohitra The ceremony was timed to coincide ( in an id eal world) with Christmas. It offered the allure of an image of a state, In a nation beleaguered President once suggested the values of theocracy (Hogg 2007), the imagery of the Christmas gift held the power to reinforce the alignment of his rule with Christian belief and moral order. The conditionality of the gift sought to bring rural Malagasy who were in fact not so far from the state into relations of power backed by the legitimacy of the church, the state, and science (see Ong 1999a ). At the alerted me to se veral impending Presidential minutes ahead of the weight of his presence was partially echoed by the power laden temporal practices of lower level technicians and bureaucrats. These powers represent the flipside of the powers of pr esidential visibility (see Jourde 2005). Invisib ility and expectations the secrecy of presidential locality acted to reinforce the fiction of the s tate and thereby its power (Ar e t xaga 2003). This was particularly true among state bureaucrats, who rem inded lower level staff at the BRP palace how important it was that the grounds were swept clear and the white paint on the balu strades was gleaming pointing out spots and exclaiming The day of Presid initial rumored visit to the Village MAP he never arrived, instead sending a Minister in his place. The Minister never stopped at the site, simply passing by in a motorcade on his way to the celebration of National Nutrition Day in Fou lepointe, some 40 miles north of Tamatave. On the second of his

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332 rumored arrivals, I got to the village around 9am. Several of the women were near the Village MAP site, donning their best dresses and hats. They had been told the President would be there early, around 7am. After we saw the presidential jet overhead a jet that was getting Ravalomanana skewered by TGV in the press we milled about expecting a visit. After a while, the crowd dispersed and I walked to the village and did interviews. When I finished, I rode my scooter back to Tamatave, and found out on the way that the President had come and given an address at Lyce Jacques Rabemananjara leaving immediately thereafter. By his third rumored arrival, no one bothered. The theatrics of st ate legitimacy through the gift and the performance of expertise through the creation of a complete and productive village and peasantry were objects whose directionality had very little to do with the peasants themselves, but with the projection o f a vision of development for middle class elites It is important to note that the legitimacy work that the project did was projected at a certain set of urban, educated, and mobile individuals. Th e recognition of this tightly honed form of le gitimacy f ollows on the insights of anthropologists like Sardan (2005), Mosse (2005), Lewis and Mosse (2006) and Green (2003), which highlight the space of development inhabited by its brokers and Ong (1999b) and Ferguson (2005) which call attention to the ef fects of this space on state sovereignty and new configurations of citizenship. Disappearance and Risk at the Village MAP Local farmers worked with technicians until late January when the politicians, BRP administrators, and even the local technicians no longer v isited the village. When Ravalomanana was forced to resign in mid March, they still had not been given access

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333 to the houses. During the political crisis, the state retracted from rural areas as it contracted on urban areas, disappearing in ways that di srupted development. The coup had the effect of freeing the Campusards from state control over their land and labor, but the state s retraction also ushered new potentials The President Fokontany an astute entrepreneur always ready for profitable opport unities, proposed that the houses be rented out to school teachers at the local EPP or other individuals in the village or passing through for 15,000 20,000 Ar a day each (~7.50 10.00 USD) The proposal would have rebegun the project creating a sort o f hotel built on The villagers were not interested they organized a meeting with the Fokontany President and refused the arrangement. The president responded by stating, according The disappearance of the state set loose the resources of the project, opening them up for capture in ways that bypassed certain forms of political and bureaucratic status. In the end, most of the Andakolosy villagers involved in the project moved into the houses of the Village MAP Their position, however, remains precarious While t heir land tenure was far more assured than that of farmers at the Campus Ambanivohitra Niarovana Caroline Andakolosy villager s would now be subject to the whims of a state twice removed from the one that had assured them usage rights. FOFIFA can come at any time to reclaim the land or the houses, primarily because they never entered into a contract with the local farmers who wo uld live in them. 2000). More than simply economic risk, risk in the context of the Village MAP was

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334 a bout the potential loss of time, land, and labor. Most farmers had ideas of h ow the project would end, though they always began by telling me that they hoped it would work. The project was interpreted as a set of potential futures, some bad like the idea others good like the promise of more p ro duction, money and infrastructure Participants were n o t nave about the propensity of the project to create hardships for them, but given the approach taken b y local politicians, and their relationship to the land, they saw little choice. Some managed risk by refusing to live in the houses the Village MAP constructed others by abandoning their studies to search out wage labor. All experienced a sort of struc tured risk that emerged out of their relations with bureaucratic and expert power. Part 2: Hierarchies of Knowledge at the Village MAP Knowledge became a locus of power at the Village MAP and hierarchies of knowledge were key to the ways that bureaucrats a nd technicians defined their position within the project. Knowledge was also central to the way that the elite initially constructed and then re imagined the peasant, and then re imagined this as the cracks in the artifice of their knowledge began to open up. Knowledge, because it was so important in the ways that individuals positioned themselves within the project, became an object of competition for technicians. The Pastor and the Tomato In late 2008, as the produce project was beginning to present it self as problematic, one of the older men participating in the project told me a story about their early meetings with the Pastor. He had come to train them and brought with him an unbelievably large tomato. The Pastor said that this tomato represented t he size they

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335 could expect to create after their training. The farmer told me that he expected the pastor to cut up the tomato and distribute the seeds among the farmers at the meeting He was surprised when the Pastor took the tomato with him after the t raining was finished, and insisted instead that the farmers await the seedlings he would bring to the site. The episode, small by itself, added to the problems already being created within the project. The tomato sealed the hierarchy of knowl edge betwee n the Pastor and SAF/ FJKM on the one hand, and the Andakolosy villagers on the other In technicians imaginings g were used to. Rather than utilizing experiential knowledge, base d on observing the best fruits, then seed selection and sharing m assive tomatoes could n o t be created in this way. T he story of the massive tomato wa s indicative of the accepted hierarchy of knowledge between deve lopment agents and their target populations. In effect, the insistence on taking the act of seed selection and breeding out of the hands of local farmers is also an insistence that this act be placed in the hands of local technicians and multinational cor porations. The value placed on the peasants starting new plants The diagnosis of the socio cultural environment of peasants in regards to seeds has concluded that the peasants consider seeds as gifts of nature destined to assure the continuation of life, and to maintain social cohesion. They are an object of exchange between neighbors, with interesting variety tion of t he economic context, improved seeds constitute a necessary production factor for increased productivity; but the accessibility of farmers to these seeds is so limited because their buying power is so wea k. To fully express their potential, their use shoul d be accompanied by an adapted technology packet (chemical fertilizer, pesticides, adequate cultural techniques), which

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336 on site. [ MAEP 2009 : 36] The peasant farmer as an individu al in need of being separated from agricultural knowledge at the same time that they are instilled with new knowledge is one that resonates in development at large. Here genetically modified seeds promote the cleavage of farmers from their own knowledge o n selective breeding and a disruption of their social relations while simultaneously inviting survival based on consumerism and the knowledge base that goes with it modern agriculture (Ziegenhorn 2000 ; Cooper and Packard 1997 ) F ar from using the seeds from the tomato, and far from relying on (local) social Village MAP would provide farmers with seeds from the French seed technology firm, Techn isem. Technisem specializes in creating seeds that can hold up to the heat and humidity of tropical climates (T echnisem 2010 ). In a call for interns at the French Ecole Suprieure de Commerce et de Management (ESCEM), the company offers a brief descripti on: Technisem is a family business, created in 1985, which produces and distributes vegetable seeds adapted to tropical countries. We work mainly in Africa, where we currently have subsidiaries in a dozen countries. No. 1: Technisem is the leader in pr oduce seeds on the African market today. The priority of Technisem: accessibility to quality seeds for the peasants of tropical climates at costs adapted to their buying power. [ ESCEM 2010] The projects main partner is Tropicasem in Senegal, which bills company for the tropical zone, having initiated activities in Africa since 1985. It i s the [ T ropicasemsenegal 2010], but does not mention Techn isem a play on its own need

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337 to craft legitimacy by avoiding to close a connection with France In addition there are Faso (Nankosem), Cameroon (Semagri), Benin (Benin Semences), Ghana (Agriseed) Mali (Tropicasem), Niger (Sahelia SEM), Morocco (Semaroc), Kenya (Savannah Seed), the Congo (Agrisem RDC), and of course, Madagascar (Semana; T ropicasem S enegal 2010, see also Kuyek 2002). Technisem was a blip on the radar, but its tomatoes came to pla y a starring role in the imaginary that the Village MAP constructed an d pulled the Village MAP into another sort of institutional network array Technisem and the status it represented as foreign and superior knowledge c ame to play a silent role in te chnicians struggles o ver claims to knowledge and expertise. In August, the project had two technicians attempting to instruct the villagers in produce cultivation. The villagers, under the instruction of the SAF/FJKM technician and, later, with the help of a motorized tiller, had cleared a lar ge swath of land between the roa d to Andakolosy and the river Ivoloina. PPRR and SAF/FJKM came to train the farmers on two consecutive days. When I came out to do interviews one morning, I noticed that there were two different techniques being employed on the fie ld. The first was familiar I ha d seen it before in the produce plots at the Campus Ambanivohitra site. Rows were created parallel to the road then boxed in with sliced and flattened bamboo. These, the farmers told me, were the ones the PPRR had instructed them to make. In an adjacent plot, they had created raised rows that ran diagonal to the road and the river (see Photo 7 1). When I asked the villagers about it, they told me it seemed odd. One tec hnician told them to do it one way, the other another way. They took the issue to the DRDR

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338 technician who headed up the training re Figure 6 1 Villager c reating p lace bandes in the p roduce f ields at Andakolosy The project technicians met the following week to sort out the confusion. I was invited, and sat listening while the DRDR, PPRR, and SAF / FJKM technicians discussed the problem. While some parameters had been clear at the get go like the fact that DRDR would train the villagers in SRI and sorghum others were not. As they began to negotiate future instruction, the Pastor from SAF/FJKM made claims to his own knowledge and political connectivity. Initially he suggested that the project carry out two way at the Campus Ambanivohitra that he had learned in the U nited States. Th e idea of experimental fields recalled those prepared by the Campus Ambanivohitra at Ambalamangahazo They represented a theory based on the inher ent

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339 : that if you show peasants the results of good and bad farming together, they will and good. Farmers at Ambalamangahazo on the other hand, found themselves engaged in wage labor to build these convincing exemplars of the value of mode rn agricultural practices. They often saw them as a bizarrely wasteful use of time the act of repeating labor was a waste of labor. In reality, the results of this labor often bolstered this view, with participants seeing themselves poorer by virtue of their participation. The negotiation of knowledge and technique moved on, and the Preacher asserted once again the value of his knowledge, particularly its political import : [the Pr esidential Palace in Antananarivo]. The president has already seen in the 22 regions of Madagascar. Th succeeded, get do my technique on a lot of land, because the goal is the minimum land with The DRDR director broke in, telling him th at the villagers would n o t want to cultivate under two different techniques they, he said, had trouble get ting their head around it (more importantly, it is unlikely they could get their labor around it). The PPRR representative jumped to the side of th The session went on to discuss the diagonal place bandes that would constitute the planting rows for the produce. The technician from PPRR began to question whether his plan to do just a few rows of produce farming would be enough. The pastor responded, reasserting the superiority of his knowledge, framed around its provenance and newness:

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34 0 My technique is totally new; we must do it little b y little. They should master to bit demanding on that. The president also asked that we do that for him. I e [the market In references to his political connectivity and his expe riences in the exterior, he touched on the geopolitical contours of epistemic and state power. The relation he cultivated with the local peasants echoed, in reverse, the relationship he identifies here with his American professor they must work. But t he ability to claim the power of knowledge was not wholly dependent on geopolitical standing. The Pastor claimed the mantel of leading knowledge broker because of the results he claimed to be able to produce. An entire produce crop would need only 45 day s to grow and he would teach the local villagers to grow during the off season, allowing more room for profit on foodstuffs that would normally be unavailable. But the most impressive moment came when the massive tomato reemerged: PPRR Representative: Ho w many days is it for the tomato? Pastor: 45 days. 36 tomatoes will fill all the crates. One place bande one plate filled b y one tomato. DRDR Technician: One tomato? Past o r: Yes. Past or : In their country [gestures towards me] there are good seeds. After our exam, they gave me 45 varieties. I sent the others to Iavoloha. 4.2 kilograms for pet say [chinese cabbage], 5 kilos for cabbage during the off season.

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341 littl e. OGM [Genetically Modified true. Even vegetables and fruit. If you go to my house, less than 45 days, The supernatural powers of knowledge its m iraculous attributes merge with religious understandings as GM plants were appropriated into the religious understandings. These call forth the enactment of a rebirth of sorts, a transformation through development to salvation. Developmen t and religion invite a narrative slippage in Madagascar where conservationist imagery of destruction echo the imagery of the biblical fall. Western knowledge and technology are seen as a pathway to regain the state of grace. Again invitation to start ov er looms large. Yet these imaginings of development were not convincing in fact it was their very foreignness that created problems for Andakolosy villagers who, while finding an allure in the promises of market farming and new seeds, experienced the pr oject as a failure of knowledge more than anything else. But the salvation of seeds needed to be accompanied by the knowledge to use them and the ability to obtain a number of implements that would not necessarily be available to the farmers after the pro gram left, not the least of which was the seeds themselves. The use of store bought items for the produce fields such as: fertilizer for each place bande (~4000 Ariary per) 102 preference, 2 500 to 3 000 Ariary per packet) would invite the farmers into the local economy. Other inputs, like wheelbarrows, spades and garden hoes which were provided by organizations like PPRR and were distributed one per five individuals 102 With roughly 5 bandes per work group and 5 work groups, a total of 25 bandes at a cost of ~100 000 Ariary or ~50 USD, or a little over a dollar per person).

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342 relied on a continuing sociality, and the c ohesion of individual farmers in the groups they had formed. The continuity of the agricultural practices they engaged, then, relied upon itself predicated at generating revenue while succumbing to its control over their land tenure. Disappearing Seedlings and Vazaha 103 Technicians The miraculous changes promised by the project never materialized. The hierarchies of knowledge it created would, however, p rove quite durable through the life of the project. raising the produce seeds he provided. Initially, he asked PPRR to build a number of long tables just next to the row houses of t he Village MAP one for each group. The tables were to hold the seedlings, above the ground and safe from insects. According to the Pastor, the seedlings would be giving flowers by the third week. The villagers planted seeds in a number of small contain ers per the Pastor s suggestions, and left them on the tables in view of the highway and passersby from the neighboring villages. In less than a week they were gone. When I approached the Pastor, asking him what happened, he told me that the plants had e ither died of neglect or been stolen and he ha d been forced to take what was left back to his home. The farmers, on the other hand, told me that the many of the seeds refused to sprout and that the Pastor blamed their failure on the heat. The 103 Va zaha is the designation given to (mainly white) Euro American foreigners (see also Cole and Middleton 2001; Cole 2010). A circa 1888 Malagasy/French dictionary defines Vazaha as strangers, but erm was used to mock more often than not, a local population.

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343 ppinires were in this way plucked from the control of local agriculturalists and moved back to Tamatave where they would grow under the watchful eye of the Pastor Figure 6 2 Unused p pinire t ables flooded after a cyclone. The local road is visible to the righ t. When the ppinire disappeared, local farmers were at the mercy of the Pastor as to when they would receive the produce plants. Every week seemed to put the garden off a little more. They must have cleared and weeded the plot three times before they g ot the first batch of cucumbers and beans from the Pastor. It would be still longer before crops like squash would appear. The project began in August, and it was not until November that each group would have enough plants to fill their five designated p lace bandes and even then they would not all grow as expected. The arrival of plants meant more labor, with farmers traveling from the river to the plot at least three times a day to water the plots. As the costs in labor began to supplant the returns, farmers sought to better their situation, looking for other ways to

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344 Mitady vola Figure 6 3. Village MAP p roduce g arden. Cleared place bandes near gr owing up and being re cleared over a second photo shows a group of cleared place bandes with still overgrown place bandes behind it. November 2008 February 2009. Eventually, t he fields were neglected and group members began to drop off. As farmer strations of these technicians situation here. You know, nor mally, according to the plan, the produce Normally, everything would be growing right now. Husband of Participant 1: Normally, we should be picking pineapples right think that Participant 2: I f they had discussed this with us before, everything would be fine. You know, the period to do the pineapples here, between the month of April and the month of August. The technicians from Madagascar already know this. But these new ones differently Malagasy technicians? Malagasy to do here.

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345 Farmers flipped the geopolitical hierarchy invoked by technicians on its head, as serting that foreign expertise so central to the Pastors construction of expertise was in fact the central problem of the training they were receiving. Figure 6 4. Produce g arden in Andakolosy February and March 2009. Eventually more plants arrived, but the lateness of their arrival meant that very little were properly tended. Tired of repeating their labor for little return and desperate to generate income, many individuals left the project. Like the Campus Ambanivohitra technicians and directors were left with only one good example one worthwhile group of farmers out of five which became the ideal to which all others fell short. True to the ppinires were well sized. Yet size mattered little when the project had essentia l l y forced one small farming communit y to redirect their labor with only a partial return on investment

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346 Figure 6 5. The Fokontany President (center ) taking a cucumber as a gift March 2009. Still empty Place bandes are visible behind him. A Tale of Two Canals A central facet of the project, and one which the O ffice N ational de N utrition (ONN) was primarily responsible, was the creation of a damn and canal with which water would be carried to the whole basin Ideally, this project would enabl e farmers to practice two season inten sive riziculture on their fields. The barrage was set on the far side of the basin, past the primary school and the row of FOFIFA barracks that the project had initially wanted to renovate. The undertaking was massive for the village, though it paled in comparison to other public works initiated by the Malagasy state (like the rebuilding of the Ivoloina Bridge around 2007, or similar ONN canal projects in Antananarivo). ONN hired some 30 or so workers from Andakolosy and neighboring villages to complete the canal, paying them wages on the order of 1500 Ariary (0.75 USD) a day. The canal was a boon to the Andakolosy economy which boasted one small picerie and one gargote (a small, inexpensive, restaurant). Normally, both

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347 catered to a market created by the local primary school, but the canal generated revenue while it was underway. When the project was initiated, the canal was the jewel in its crown. On several occasions I accompanied BRP personnel there, where they checked in on its progress and invite d journalists to facilitate the circulation of narratives of state led development With land cleared and tamped down, a damn was constructed that would block water and divert it into the canal. A metal mechanism was installed so that villagers could sim ply lift open a trap door to release the water. Figure 6 6. Barrage (dam) under construction. Old reservoir and canal is on the right. September 2008. The work was still underway when I began conducting interviews with individuals from the neighbor ing villages. Many of these individuals, like those that lived in Andako losy itself, farmed the valley and were familiar with the area. Several came from the family of the local seer who made money fishing, farming, and catering to middle class clients f rom the city. When they returned from their work at the site, they would When Village MAP participants were selected and began to learn the SRI techniques t he canal was meant to facilitate they started to question the project. The

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348 canal was finished in October, but as local farmers and wage laborers foresaw, the water would n o t flow from the reservoir at the damn into the canal at least not enough so that water would flow to their fields. The scope of the problem was considerable Water could reach the fields closes t to the dam (the fields cultivated by the family of the Fokontany President), but those that were further out were either stuck with the sa me amount of water or drier than they had been before. Villagers began to question the project: What I think is which should circulate here in our tanimbary [rice fields] becomes blocked. Every thing to flood our fields. Good irrigation was necessary for SRI, meaning that though they learned SRI techniques they could n o t apply them. Eventually, they convinced the DRDR technician t o give them permission to plant the fields according to their prior techniques Figure 6 7. Reservoir after a heavy rain, December 2009.

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349 Figure 6 8. ONN c anal, December 2009. Figure 6 9. Aerial m ap of Andakolo s canal was meant to bring water beyond the area of the 2 nd ONN canal. The highly irrigated land near the dam is farmed by the family of the Fokontany President.

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350 The canal stretched from the reservoir pictured in Figure 6 9 tracking a path along the tree line from ONN Canal 1 to the intersection near ONN Canal 2 in Figure 6 9. The area has reverted to the previous reservoir and the old canal. Even with the mechanism blocking the reservoir open, the water could not travel this distance. When the canal pro blem first began to surface, technicians from ONN arrived in 4x4s with me, the Pastor, and the BRP Development Director They took GPS points, made drawings and notes and identified new projects they could work on, like wells and certain points throughout the village, even finding a colonial era well head they might be able to reuse in front of the old FOFIFA/IFAC barracks (the row of houses just below the dam and canal). They suggested, and later conversations with BRP staff and the senator would confirm the addition of a pump that could be used to move water from the reservoir into the canal, and (hopefully) to the desired fields. The pump, however, never arrived. I n one meeting I attended on the problems of the canal invited because by this time I w as acting as an unofficial go between, carrying messages and status repo rts from the village to the BRP technicians from ONN claimed the root of the problem was in the reticence and intractability of local farmers. The villagers were lazy, they told me, as we sat on leather couches in an office with 15 foot ceilings and windows open to an ocean view. I responded that that made no difference if the water would n o t run through the canal, and tried to frame my argument in terms I thought would be convincin g. I suggested that Villagers talked to each other and it would look badly to the President if the residents of Andakolosy were having problems because of the issue

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351 Afterwards, the BRP convened a meeting with the villagers. When representatives at ONN spoke at the meeting in early January 2009, the pump idea had been shelved, and the issue took on a new hue: We at ONN were responsible T he idea that a lack of rainwater was to blame reinf orced by the Fokontany President, who oscillated between identifying himself with the technicians and the villagers: depend on us but on God like drought, the lack of water. So even if we to have the will, because this training is in your interest. The DRDR technician echoed this sentiment, telling me that they would have to wait until the rainy season to plant SRI. They seemed odd statements considering the running joke that in eastern Madagascar there were only two seasons, rainy and rainier and SRI was supposed to be possible in both. In addition, two cyclones had hit the coast, bringing a large quantity of rain to the area since the canal was built. The fact that they seemed unwilling to accept was that the canal was n o t working properly. After this meeting, the ONN decided to abando n the canal altogether and instead clear a nother canal near the site where the first canal ended. Fed by a natural spring that stretched in two directions from either side of a local path, the canal had been created during the colonial era and utilized by IFAC and then FOFIFA This would become ONN Canal 2 (Figure 6 9 ). The canals that linked the original reservoir had, over the years, become quite narrow, so that the addition of space would improve the capabilities of local farmers to practice SRI. Yet the question remains why was the

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352 first spot chosen? Why did technicians want to start over rather than reusing what was already there? And why, when locals were often quite vocal about their understandings of the land both t o me and to technicians was it im possible for the se concerns to register ? Figure 6 10. Second ONN c anal February 2009 Figure 6 11. O vergrown canal February 2009 This canal is on the other side of the path from Figure 6 10, and head s in the direction of the reservoirs. This is approximately the state that the canal in Figure 6 10 was in before ONN p aid farmers to clear it.

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353 A few issues deserve attention here. First, the political opti cs of the new versus the old were devices to their assertion of the utility of the pump, the ONN tech nicians were deeply invested in the new. Politically, the rehabilitation of old forms was unnecessary. In the same way that the plans to renovate the old buildings set off from the road in the area were scrapped i n favor of building the new one s next to the highway with possibilities (never realized) of running water and electricity into the village, the infrastructure of the past precluded re inhabitation by vir tue of its existence in the past Secondly the y that could make them a part of a social edifice in which they were dependent upon the technicians as experts of development. Their knowledge of the land, either through personal or technical experience with the canals, was problematic for an edifice tha t, in addition to holding peasants within a certain social space at the bottom of the epistemological hierarchy, held technicians at the top. The canal and the admission of the culpability of failed knowledge were an existential threat to individuals and organizations that claimed a monopoly on correct knowledge. The failure of expert knowledge, however, also came to constitute what was perceived as an existential threat to villagers. As in the case of the forced destruction of the manioc fields or the w asted labor of the place bandes the failure of expert knowledge prompted the questioning of this knowledge and people s claims to it. The assertion that the Village MAP technicians were outsiders was echoed by another villager who worked as a PPRR techni cian, though not with the project. Married to the sister of the Fokontany President, he once asked me if after I was finished in

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354 Andakolosy, I could come to visit the peasants he knew and assess the reasons why He claimed to be the only one in the village, aside from his in laws, practicing intensive cultivation. His wife was among the three students from the Fokontany President participating in the Village MAP training. When appearanc es on site became infrequent, villagers asked him to help them continue what they were doing. In early 2009, he summed up the situation: They made an error with the sensibilisation Why? Because they did the sensibilisation without having done a study o r a preliminary discussion with the elders here the people who already know the situation. What I can say is that the canal and the other things normally before doing that, they should have had a discussion with the Tangalamenas 104 They studied all th at solely in their imaginations; they looked for the water and immediately added a dam. After making the barrage, everything was blocked no more water going downstream, the pressure is insufficient. Not only that, they drained the water. Tha from here that after having discovered the problem. The people here two years. If they had discussed this with the people before, we have this problem. Other villagers commented that the technicians never visited their homes (which was true) choosing instead to call people for large gatherings, such as the sensibilisation next to the hightway and the Village MAP site, or (once ) call them for focus groups in central areas like the local gargote apparatus even while development ideology asserts a desire to erase socio economic inequality. Developmen t is not simply about a neo colonial turn, as with Escobar (1995) or the expansion of bureaucratic and state power, as with Ferguson (1990) 104 Mainly, these are local elders who retain exclusive rights to communicate with the ancestors and often preside over ceremonies where the ancestors were invoked.

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355 though both are certainly a part of what goes on within the development industry. Nestled within these seemingly monolithic forms of power are the nodes of inequality that give them their strength the technicians and bureaucrats whose jobs depend on the salience and durability of their categories. Part 3 : The Impossibilities of Addressing Failure The control and r egimentation of land and labor, coupled with the creation and sustenance of epistemological hierarchies that buttressed social inequality created what villagers considered a dire food shortage. At the same time, a political crisis meant technicians and bu reaucrats were missing in action. December 2008 saw the boiling point of a crisis and competition that had been simmering since the winter of that year. It was in December that the President shut down Viva TV, the station owned by Andry after it aired a 45 minute interview with former President Didier Ratsiraka. The move was followed by widespread protests, and those responsible for the Campus Ambanivohitra were increasingly called to the capital by a President who was anxious to quit th e crisis. Growing Concern By December 2008, the issues the Village MAP were wearing on the villagers. Discussions came to center on the effects of the practices described above: Participant 1: e, given anything. If we have enough to eat, I think we could come here [to the fields] every day Participant 2: A lot of students have already left the project. Do you think

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356 Participant 2: We even want to finish all this because we want to g et out of Compared to the land where we do our training, your land here is very good. The y said that. Students spoke of the way they were made to divide their days three days to work with each of the three technicians, the rest to tend the crops on their own parcels. They spoke of how the PPRR technician got angry and quit the projet becaus e one of the students went to find something to eat during his training and never came back I heard elsewhere that the technician left because he did n o t see the point in having the same training done by th ree different organizations The list of griev ances that students took to technicians went nowhere, and they asked the Fokontany President to step in. His family being closely involved, he knew of the problems. He discussed the issues with bureaucrats and technicians alike : the ppinire the canal, the hunger the villagers had because of their wasted labor. The technicians, particularly PPRR said that it was not working, and suggested that they give the houses to the villagers and hire a technician to live with them. Still, nothing seemed to happe n. The Fokontany President suggested that they go above him politically, drafting a letter to the Mayor of the commune and asking for his intervention. at the BRP office, and trying to track down the relevant staff. The worse the situation got, the more time I spent in government offices. The bureaucrats from the BRP had gone to Tana to deal with the rising political protests. I went to the DRDR representative, who told me that the real problem was that the peasants were parasseux (lazy) and did not want to work Then I went to the DAEP at the regional

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357 offices and apprised him of the situation. He was receptive to the problem, telling me that he would see what he could do When the BRP Director for the Project finally returned from Antananarivo, we set up a meeting to discuss the canal with ONN. The horticultural group CTHT was invited as well, though as the representative said, he was not Ca nal, and I was told flatly and again that the problem was that people were lazy. The meeting concluded by turning to expanding the program doubling down on development and including the training CTHT could offer. I went back to the DAEP, setting up another meeting with all of the technicians and meeting room I was met by regional bureaucrats, who were in the mid dle of filing past the armed soldiers guarding the bu ilding, saying they ha d cancelled the meeting due to the threat of protests. Later, a friend told me she ha d been to the local police precinct to handle some business and had seen a truck full of rice under guard there. I went back to the DAEP, asking if at least the project could convince the government agency in charge of them to let five 50 kilo bags go. We waited for his 4x4 and chauffer to arrive to take us to city e about the possibility We were told the rice belonged to the region, not the city, so we should ask there. The DAEP worked for the Region, but could n o t make that demand, and I was instructed to return to the BRP to see if they could secure the release of the food aid. They said they woul d see about it and that they woul d meet with the farmers to explain the situation shortly.

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358 Resituating Power in Crisis The morning before the meeting, I exchanged texts with the BRP Development Director who was now in charge of the project (the Senator was almost permanently in Tana by now ): 01/07/2009, 7:08 am MLK Andakolosy the food aid? sacks of white rice just for tod ay. Go DAEP will be with you. I went to Andakolosy and waited with the Villagers at the entrance to the Village MAP The technicians and bureaucrats arrived at 9. They had no rice. The Fokontany President opened the meeting, stating that they had gathered to d y sfunctions the cistern meant to serve the village and the lack of a generator to move water to it, the and the food shortage that was result ing After this opening, technicians took turns speaking and giving their explanations of what had happened. The Pa stor spoke first, suggesting that the training was too much for the farmers to learn quickly, and that putting a water pump near the site of the fields would help preserve their labor. At the same time, he said he would help the groups that had not had go od results to catch up with the ones who had. Next the representative from DRDR spoke, changing hi s tune 180 degrees from what he ha d said to me just a week privat e meeting, he highlighted their inability to do the work required given the material

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359 con straints of a lack of water, and a lack of seeds. Next the representative from ONN spoke, blaming the problems at the canal on the lack of rain, and offering that the ONN would find other public works jobs that would help the locals to address this problem, He asked for time to get through the bureaucratic process of beginning this project. In effect, the ONN proposal to deal with the Village MAP problems would kill two birds with one stone: public works would constitute a way for the ONN to provide aid to the village, and the bungled ONN canal created need for public works. The CTHT representative who had been at the meeting at the Presidential Palace in Tamatave spoke next. He explained what they were doing on their experimental field across from the place bandes He stated that while they were not yet finished with their expe riments, they would be willing to train the villagers in nursery practices that could grow the tree s faster. The Fokontany President an accomplished ppiniriste broke in, making it clear where CTHT would stand with the local community: To tell the t ruth, I was a bit surprised to see your ppinires I want to thank ho reap the rewards. His words gestured towards his own power in the situation, and a little to his concern that he was not apprised of the addition of another group, less so than one that might stake a claim on the benefits the project might produce. Th e final speaker was the individual who had built the houses. An entrepreneur and a n advisor to the Chef de Rgion he suggested that the houses be turned over to the villagers, citing the expense of posting a guardian at the site and of having to replace the locks every time that some bit of mischief happened there. He also stated

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360 he would be making furniture for each home a bed, a table, and some chairs. He offered to hire local villagers, mainly from the program, as laborers to finish whatever else n eeded to be completed on the project. These ideas were not components of the original plan, but seemed rather another instance of doubling down on development. But it was when he took up speaking as an advisor, rather than an entrepreneur, that served as a reminder of what being a model meant to the village, mentioning the import of the programs optics if, as the Regional Chief had told him, the First Lady were to visit. groups though the entire project rewound to day one: Hello everyone. I want to give my thanks to all our collaborators. The question we should ask ourselves is how are we going to have a good Andakolosy Village MAP is a bit special. In the 22 regions of Madagascar there is the Village MAP but the one in Andakolosy is very different. Why? Because in a very small amo unt of time you already have many trainers, technicians, and directors in this zone. He went on to engage in a side conversation, trying to get the President of the F okontany to tell him exactly how many people resided in Andakolosy and the neighboring v illages, his own unfamiliarity wit h the project beginning to show: What I was saying, a little special, the Village MAP of Andakolosy. We expect your willingness. Normally, we should start work, we work, we problems. Take the region of there, they work very well because they think the place was chosen there for the Village MAP The Village MAP gifts; you need to get that out of your thoughts. The Village MAP ourselves. Is the SRI going to work for you? Bananas? The subsistence foodstuffs [sorghum and maize]? Are you ready to do it, yes or no? We this continues.

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361 hard numbers of what they could produce per hectare of rice, sorghum, maize and then pulled the Fokontany president aside to tell him that they he should see to it that they leaders to ignore the farmers who were not present, declar Village MAP s. In this other Village MAP s, there is nothing bu t you you have houses, water The meeting, as striking as it is on a number of levels, constituted a stage on which the idea of the good farmer, and the good peasant was being remade. It represents a negotiation among these elite actors, themselves suspended in a hierarchy address problems, but to allow their open discussion and then their burial. It was a moment t hat taught the anthropologist where she stood as intermediary advocate between a group of villagers and the state, and the villagers where they stood. It tasked the Fokontany President with disciplining his subjects, despite his attempts to negotiate his own space of control. It threw the impossibility of sympathy (whether sincere or insincere) in the face of the DRDR director s statements. The solutions, where they th at could only be achieved through self surveillance within groups for each culture they attempted. Peasant grievances and the failures of the project were shoehorned and

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362 New Beginnings and the End The participants in the Village had been, by now, working for four months with no return on the labor investment they had made. The day after this meeting, they had a meeting with a new regional representative and the DRDR representative. She reminded t hem of a conversation they had had before. She had asked the villagers whether they knew asan tanana or how to do crafts: it? If I ask this question, a few months, and we it? No sex distinction: male or female, no problem because I can find someone to teach you. For example: basket weaver. The objective is to replace the goods so ld next to the road, like at Ivoloina, also to have something original. still have work that earns you an income. Students responded quickly to the assumption that they had tim e to weave baskets. The Chef de Village s poke first, stating that their problem was that they were already woman began to ask about the crafts, and then another ha d already gone through similar training called the had not been bam boo and raffia growing in Andakolosy for a long time. The training was fine if you lived where bamboo and raffia grew, she explained, but there had n o t been any there for a long time. Then another, ng tailoring, questioned whether the crafts they taught would cost too much after. Later the Chef de Village, who had worked at FOFIFA before, expressed anger about the first meeting held to address the Village MAP problems:

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363 I was really angry at the mee ting last Tuesday. The technician said he know how to grow produce with our traditional techniques. If we had done that with our traditional techniques, certain that we woul d have had a know th is already being harvested. Us peasants, if we do something, we just want sorghum now. Why did they order us to pull up all that [manioc]? What I think is that they want to kill us, not make our lives better. And further: We are deceived by these technicians. The problem is that they said we should destroy ou the land that is already full and exploit the empty land. They said that it was necessary to destroy it all because Ravalomanana was coming. We ar e not happy. Afterwards, it became clear that the flurry of activity precipitated by the diverse efforts of technicians, the president Fokontany, the DAEP and myself were for naught. The villagers took it upon themselves to reorganize into a new farming g roup, and approached the young brother in law of the President Fokontany to help them continue their training. They pooled money to get seeds to supplement what they had left, and planned to replant manioc and corn. The five sacks of rice (50 kilos each) earned the same fate as the rest of the truckload. It was finally released and taken to the Regional government offices where it was distributed among the functionaries there. Each received a half a bag of rice (25 kilos) and a quart of cooking oil. A g ift from the government meant to see them through a time of crisis that reflected the priorities of a state in crisis and perhaps the more

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364 durable purposes of development in the creation and sustenance of the expert and bureaucratic classes. Conclusions T he Village MAP brought together a diverse group of self interest parties ranging fr om national level politicians to local villagers. As the project began to generate and distribute resources, conflicts emerged over land and labor and over how diverse form s of knowledge would be put to use As these potential spaces of collaboration a nd negotiatio n emerged, they quickly fell subject to familiar asymmetries of power. Power over time, labor, and land became central areas of conflict at the model village. Villagers played constant waiting games with project personnel and important (and not so important) interlocutors between the project and the various levels of state ti me and labor. The state also turned development projects into projects that could employ local workers, doubling the linkage s between the target population and the state. The agricultural training itself brought the state and Andakolosy villagers into cl ose encounter Through the rationalization of peasant practices, the state staked a claim on intimate agricultural practices, and forced new forms of association while attempting to break others. Conflicts over land, labor and time were accompanied by d isagreements over the relative value of different forms of knowledge that were precipitated in part by the construction of the peasant as an individual impoverished by ignorance and indolence. Project technicians jockeyed for position, negotiating the val ue of their respective knowledge bases and, in the process, adopting experimental practices that engaged peasant labor in ways that threatened their ability to survive. Knowledge itself was

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365 closely guarded, and the incident with the massive tomato bears t his out. Being knowledgeable was a status that aligned with urban and educated, but also connected to the contemporary Malagasy state. This knowledge was in direct conflict with the knowledge of villagers, itself based in the experiences and expertise of previous political regimes. In 1997, Victoria Bernal, looking at colonial development in the Sudan, ainly matters, as does ignorance, but power inheres in the ability to order knowledge and thus lay claim to expert status Yet expert status does not guarantee success and several of the main public works projects initiated by the Village MAP failed at least one to disastrous effect. Villagers foresaw, based on their experiential and technical knowledge, the spectacular failure of this component and tried to warn development agents and technicians, to no avail Conflicts over techno scientific knowle dge and the control of land, labor and time helped to create a food crisis that threatened many villagers who had participated in the E fforts to rectify these issues were rebuffed with familiar discourses of peasant ignora nce and indolence. The situation was worsened by the constant shifts in local power because of the burgeoning political crisis unfolding in the capital and, to a lesser exte nt, in the largest cities. The handling of the crisis, or lack thereof, laid bare the asymmetries of power within development and signaled the often disheartening proclivities of the state to value performance over results. For the state, the Village MAP would, and to an extent did, constitute a central example of its legi timacy. It had the potential, had it been undertaken earlier, to balance

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366 taking land and revenue from farmers an accusation whose genesis came in the form of the Daewoo land deal and the dispossession of thousands of farmers through the Sherritt Nickel and Cobalt Mine. The project mattered or it could have mattered. By February and March of 2009, Andakolosy villagers were matter of fact about their In the end, and somewhat counterintuitive ly the project succeeded in transforming the lives of everyone involved. As meetings were taking place to address pr oblems at the Campus, the Senator was being named Ministe r of Decentralized Cooperation a winner, no doubt in the President s last effort to restructure his cabinet and gain some time with the supporters of the opposition. Of course, he would end up in exile in France, working as a mathematician at the University of Rouen and attempting to perfect development ahead of his ( inevitable ) return. His second in command was climbing the bureaucratic ladder before the coup, setting herself up as a central act or in Antananarivo before being tossed aside in the restructuring of the government. The Action Plan, were inevitably as the state starts over and attempts to prove that it h as moved on from the failed politics of the past demoted or chased out of office. The se agents transformed twice by development the development that propped the state up and the rhetoric of development that would tear it down. At the local level, to o, individuals were transformed. The Fokontany President, for a moment, gained more political power and more control over land and labor through

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367 his championing of the project. He would remain the President Fokontany past the mid March coup, continuing t o translate his admittedly substantial entrepreneurial skills into profit. The villagers of Andakolosy, despite their differences, may have had the last laugh. In the end, they got their houses, telling the Fokontany President that renting them out was dissipated. The land they ha d been cultivating was carried in common by the association they had created in February. There were disputes, and many of the students who had the he reditary right to farm the Andakolosy land left the group. As of April 2009, they planned to continue working with PPRR, the only organization that did n o t stay long enough to ruin their relations with the local population. The canal problem was solved, but it is unsure whether the site itself ever got real plumbing.

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368 CHAPTER 7 DEVELOPMENT AND THE CONTINUING REBEGINNI NG OF THE STATE The End of the Beginning This chapter return s to the subject of the 2008 2009 tat that opened this thesis and the political crisis that caused it, and continues until now The ultimate rebeginning or more correctly a perpetual state of heightened rebeginning end, another to b egin again under new governmental leadership. Th is chapter offer s the opportunity to in a highly self conscious way take stock, evaluate lessons learned, and draw some conclusions about what rebeginning means for anthropological understandings of the complex political economy of the development industry in Madagascar and beyond. It is a place to ask questions about where this study go es and what it mean s for the more practical concerns of development: the very real poverty that exists suspended in the relations of development described here, and the implications for concerned scholars. And It All Came Crashing Down D evelopment plays a role in relations much larger than the hierarchies that inhere between the Malagasy elite and the Malagasy peasantry, n either of which have clear geographic or temporal was a key player tropes of good and bad development and popular ideas of who should benefit from development and what this development should look like, he began to disrupt the official narrative s that projects like the Campus Fanantenana and Campus Ambanivohitra were

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369 integral in constructing. At the same time, and in very real w R volution Orange sappear, while allowing others to gain a better foothold. In other words, the crisis halted many types of development aid, while the change in governmen t opened new trajectorie s for development What occurred as things f e ll apart was a massive shift in the contents of the development network T he winners and losers changed while the institutional relations remained albeit in altered form. The ultimate effect of this rebeginning is a new extension of the state and the entry of new agents into the networ ks of development while other agents disappear (in)completely are cast into the realm of shadow presences (like the Campus Fanantenana ) or are able, by virtue of their status slightly removed from the state, to survive and overcome a political death that seem s eminent for the pet projects of political power (like the Campus Ambanivohitra which still operates today). A Troubled State Political dissidence has been attenua ted in Madagascar since the 2006 presidential election. After winning a second term, Ravalomanana famously had the mayor of Tamatave, the nephew of former President Didier Ratsiraka and his 2006 opponent, Roland Ratsiraka arrested for corruption ( Ploch 2 009, Madigasikara Soa 2007). Dissident voices like Father Sylvain Urfer, who made a habit of speaking out against inequality on the island were expelled in May of 2007 (Madagascar Tribune 2007 a ). T hese acts laid bare the politics of state power and wer e especially salient in coastal regions, w here the population was mainly C atholic, and where, despite his

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370 faults, Roland Ratsiraka and his uncle, the former President, were regarded as (relatively) important and popular political leaders By the time I a rrived to carry out research in 2008, the Mayor of Antananarivo, a ( Train Grande Vitesse ) was already butting heads with his predecesssor former Mayor of Antananarivo (now President) Raval omanana. After some skirmishes over state funds their relationship deteriorated. TGV began to us e the media resources at his disposal (he owned a television and radion station called Viva ) to lambast the President, accusing him of personal profiteering and selling the Malagasy peoples ancestral lands out from under them ( referring to the Sherritt and Daewoo deals; Larquier 2009) Critiquing development and accusing the Ravalomanana of being a dictator proved to be a winning strate gy Accusations that Ravalomanana was a dictator were old hat by 2008. But the international community would n o t begin to interrogate his leadership until well after the In an environment where dissidents did no t last long, Rajoelina emerged as a single voice that could speak for what was, up until late 2008, a disorganized and ineffective opp osition. He was deliberately provocative, using Viva TV and radio to speak out against the president. Yet not so different from Ravalomanana. Like the President, he was a self made man and a Merina who translated his professional success into the public realm. He was elected to the high profile position of Mayor of the capital of

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371 Antananarivo in 2007. As calls for reform, more open and democratic government, and new elections were articulated the parallels with the 2001 2 crisis that br ought Ravalomanana to power were palpable: There was a sense of dj vu about it all... young entrepreneur, wealthy, handsome and popular, mayor of the capital city. A massive crowd crammed into the Place du 13 Mai. Protests and an immense sense of hope f or real democracy. Peaceful demonstrations and a march on the presidential palace and other symbolic seats of power. [Raharimanana 2009] The crisis would prove durable, and while Rajoelina did not offer the type of leadership that won many to his side (see Le Monde 2009), he proved to be the only political leader still in office willing to take on Ravalomanana. He also seemed, at the outset, capable of bringing former leaders who were key to the opposition together around the goal of ousting Ravalomana na. Reaching out to previous presidents like Didier Ratsiraka and Zafy Albert and former Ravalomanana opponents like Roland Ratsiraka, Rajoelina became the center of what seemed in parts of the island to be a social movement R volution Orange he ca lled it Zafy and Roland Ratsiraka would both come to Tamatave to lead protests In calling on these leaders, and at the time, collaborating with them, Rajoelina promised a new state and a renewed state. Like the powerful shadow presences of FOFIFA with in development, thes e representative leaders sat as emblems of futures that could have been if Roland Ratsiraka had won, if Didier Ratsiraka had succeeded the 2002 standoff, if Zafy had not been impeached. In late 2008, Rajoelina did something particular ly provocative. He hosted a 45 minute interview with former President Ratsiraka on Viva TV. response was swift. He closed down Viva TV in December 2008, sparking widespread

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372 protests (Rakotoarison 2009) In early 2009, Ravalomanana shut d VIVA Radio prompting retaliation and the burning of state TV, the Madagascar Broadcasting Service ( MBS ) offices Efforts to silence the opposition only led to more protest s, and by late January, demonstrati ons were commonplace. Living Crisis In Tamatave, the crisis captured everyone. Rumors flew mainly positing the massacre of Merina by cotier and the robbery of vazaha in Atsinanana The state department sent out a young diplomat to interview A mericans and political notables in an attempt to guage the pro bability that the violence would turn ethnic T he prospect loomed over the Merina in town, who still remembered the sporadic ethnic violence that characterized the 2001 2 crisis and that would rise, on occasion, in spurts that signal led the political economy of violence. part icularly the Tiko subsidiary Magro, whose warehouses and markets were looted and burned. So me Malagasy took advantage, buying up this limited supply of good s at drastically reduced prices. E xpatriates and de velopment staff were for all intents and purposes, locked down We closed up our houses at 7 pm, sitting in the stifling heat and on on e particularly bad night listening to the looters carry goods past the garden wall. Days were punctuated by flurries of text messages relaying information gleaned from Sobika.com, a news site that scrolled constantly updating posts on the situation in A ntananarivo Protes ts were planned in Tamatave. Some culminated in the boom of tear gas cannisters. Others did n o t. Thunderstorms took on new significance as people kept sheltered in their homes recalling the crack of breaking barracades that echoed

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373 around the city on the day Magro was burned Shots rang out as store owners paid the military for protection in cash and cigarettes. The city was revealed as a bowl that carried sound remarkably, and eerily, well. And then it was quie t a silence brimming with dark anticipation. Black Saturday On Frida y February 6, 2009 I received a message from the US Embassy that echoed the periodic updates being sent out to Embassy. There will be a rally at Plac e 13 Mai Feb The place du 13 Mai is a premier location for the contestation central gathering space in 19 72, 1991, and 2002 (Raison Jourde 2002) A couple of thousand protestors showed up at the Presidential Palac e in Antananarivo to demand ouster. Guards and police opened fire, killing 26 and wound ing some 300 more ( TopMada 2009). A journalist wrote a piece published in All Africa shortly after : brief negotiations, and then the massacre. (Raharimanana 2009). One Malagasy newspaper carried a political cartoon consi sting of an inky black Saturday Sa turday February 7, was the height of the violence but was certainly not the only violence. In Tamatave rumors circulated that 20 had been killed, or 6, or more the numbers never emerged clearly. These narratives of violence circulated adding fuel to the fire against Ravalomanana and Rajoelina alike. They also added to the exhaustion of anticipation as uninterested Malagasy hoped for an unlikely return to stability and normalcy.

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374 And Then It Was (Sort of) Over On the tenth of March, after several months of crisis at oscillating levels and an unknown number of deaths the army gave its two protagonists a 72 hour ultimatum ( Agence France Presse 2009; Reuters 2009 a ) I went to the B ureau R egionale de la P residence (BRP) They had already started loc arrived, the soldier in charge of security was talking with the Chief of Police outside the main gate. I told him I had heard the military might be taking over. He smiled as he The ultimatum came and went the General who declared it was removed from power and replaced by a Rajoelina supporter who took control of the government and then immediately handed it over to TGV who declared himself the President of the Haute Autorite de Transition (HAT) Setting store in the stabilizing powers of governing 2010) and the lack of an effective opposition, scholars were taken aback by the suddenness of the fall. On the isla nd, citizens and expatriates were surprised, concerned, and sometimes hopeful. Individuals who had been tied closely to Ravalomanana were scared. In the two years that have followed the crisis, the state has e ngaged in a constant process of rebeginning and reshuffling In December 2009, f ormer heads of state like Zafy Albert who rallied protesters in support of the ouster of Ravalomanana, and Didier Ratsiraka, who was key in spurring the crisis through his VIVA TV interview, would find themselves banne d from the country ( Midi Mad a gasikara 2009) Banned as well was the Rector who preceded the Campus Ambanivohitra Director as leader of the University of Toamasina He had been named Prime Minister by the HAT in October

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375 2009 as a part of ongoing power sha ring negotiations ( he was the choice of Didier Ratsiraka, M idi Madagasikara 2009, Reuters 2009 b ) Commune rurale mayors and chefs de region were unceremoniously dismissed (A gence France P resse September 21, 20 10 ). New Ministries were created notably th e trifurcation of the Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and Fishing ( Madagascar 2009 ) that allowed Rajoelina the power to extend his own networks and solidify his power base, while partially dismantling and partially reinhabiting the same structures tha t had served In the foreground, the Rajoelina regime has continued to make and break agreements for a power sharing government and elections. The constitution was reformed in late 2010 to enable Rajoelina to claim an indefinite m andate (World Bank 2011 a ) Two projected electio n dates have come and gone. Intergovernmental bodies like the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have while the World Bank has discussed him only sident (World Bank 2011 a ) I nside the country, the situatio regime dissidents are arrest ed, rivals exiled, and the inner circle is enriched and constantly reshuffled. For people not connected too closely to the old regime or otherwise disconnected from the new one, the new order so much like the old order fails to address their concerns. The lack of legitimacy has re mained a major problem and has worn on the public consciousness. Malagasy in Atsinanana describe an increasingly desperate situation express hopelessness about a promised future that they might never see. At

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376 this point, Ravalomananana would be considered a n improvement albeit slight An editorial in early 2011 expressed a similar sense of despair: Egyptians are lucky to have leaders who really think about their country. Here, the elections are postponed indefinitely, and those that really think at the helm of the state, is clearly wrapped up with continuing development and ha s very real effects on the ground For an opportunity policy and institutional changes pushed them in ne w dire ctions, forcing them to abandon old projects and embark on new ones. Those closest to the former regime would see their fortunes reversed as they were forced into exile or out of their posts. The TIKO group would disperse, split up for all intents and purposes. The se piec es of the corporate body sit as remnants, waiting to be reanimated when (and if) Ravalomanana returns Less connected Malagasy would see change mainly in the transformation of acronyms and the entry of new and adjacent bureaucraci es of expertise as well as governance. T he Costs (and B enefits) of Crisis When the crisis began in earnest complete with the requisite political violence the World Bank suspended its operations. USAID evacuated its staff. The Millennial Challenge Acc ount monies were re s cinded. In partial parallel to the disappearance of the Village MAPs main administrative directors while they struggled to keep order in the region foreign (and particularly Anglophone ) development expertise disappeared France staye d, continuing its programs of decentralized cooperation, keeping its volunteers in place and fueling suspicions that the French had orchestrated the coup

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377 Rajoelina has actively cultivated geopolitical relations that set him apart from his predecessor, bu t call into question his continuing anti neo colonial rheotoric. Opposition, in this schema, is always foreign born backed by the same interests I ha ve described here, and illustrating the prevalence of what Holmes and Marcus (2005) describe as para ethn ography, with ethnographic practices diffused and put to myriad purposes. summed up in his response s to Daewoo and Sherritt tap critical engagements with and understandings of the net work that take up and use the same practices of ethnography engaged in this work and prevalent across the development industry ( see Geschiere 2009; Li 2007 ; Ferguson 1990 ) Yet autocthony in word does not equal autocthony in deed, and while Rajoelina claim s that his electoral successes (consisting in the main of his constitutional referendum which won 74% support with 52% participation; H aute C ourt C onstitutionel 2010) 105 w ere a reprisal of fore gn intervention, the reality is one of continuous connection pa rticularly to the power of the former colonizer The rebeginning of the Malagasy state fed into the rebeginning of the contours of geopolitical relations and a realignment of the flows that run through these relations giving the French (and others) adv antage Since Rajoelina declared himself president of the HAT in 2009, the World Bank reentered the country (World Bank 2011b), foreign investments have grown spurring This money lik e previous development investment will do more than just build hospitals. It will build 105 During the referendum there was an attempted coup by a group led by a former Rajoelina supporter (BBC 2010)

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378 legitimizing networks that will further entrench Rajoelina, until eventually his position is successfully challenged. These interventions, I would venture, will layer over the projects of previous regimes in a process of rebeginning that draws power and d predecessors. This process will grow the state, pushing it deeper into the lives of rural Malagasy even while this extension of pow er and control is masked by development and the politics of individual leaders. Cultivating the Network: T he Campus Fanantenana and the Campus Ambanivohitra Neither the Campus Ambanivohitra nor the Campus Fanantenana are isolated objects of development. I nstead they are outgrowths of a series of networks that come, overwhelmingly, from on high (at the level of state and international policy) and act most stringently on the ground The two projects are structural ly adjacent and ideologically similar, illus trating two competing nodes in development s oversized networks that act as receiving points for the resources set loose by development aid The Campus Ambanivohitra and the Campus Fanantenana crafted, through their networks, techniques of capture that i mplicated every actor, from international partner to project target, in their own rebeginnings offering multiple potentials for transformation that legitimized the differential distribution of power and capital within the project. Both projects were abl e to transform labor into resources within the network for the Campus Ambanivohitra this capital was mainly economic, in the Campus Fanantenana it was mainly political In Madagascar, the crux of the development matter is centered on land, labor and kn owledge. The main difference between the two projects examined here is how their positioning within structures of international and state power shifted the projects

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379 relationship with land, labor and knowledge and how these key resources were struggled ove r and translated into other forms of capital. At the Campus Ambanivohitra provide financial support that would feed back into the project. The Campus Fanantenana on t he other hand, generated political capital and state legitimacy. In other words, the Campus Ambanivohitra relied heavily on the ability to harness and manage labor in ways that produced physically marketable goods (through harvest) whereas the Campus Fana ntenana worked mainly to harness and manage labor in ways that produced visually marketable images of the ideal state It should be clear that these were general trends in overlapping and dynamic strategies of reso urce capture: both projects were awash in resource flows and both were characterized by the struggles that accompanied these. New configurations of development are never quite as new as they make network arrays. The Malagasy case s examined here while small and seemingly anecdotal, are built out of the same highly mobile ideas and ideals that inform development across geographic and temporal space 106 These projects speak not only to Malagasy concerns whose twi sts are seen in the ascension of certain images of the peasant over others, or certain forms of expertise over others but also to pr ojects across Africa and beyond, highlighting one of t he process es that enables the durability of development in the face of failure. 106 Model villages are old ideas (see Mitchell 2002), as are pay san leaders (Sardan and Bierschenk 1993).

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380 Returning to Rebeginning s Rebeginnings are a loose frame set around highly complex phenomenon. Theory requires s implification in that way it does much the same work as statistics: it disaggregates and reagregates data, or in this case, actio ns. The idea of rebeginnings, however, is also a very personal understanding of the phenomenon of development and may trouble the subjective viewpoint of another who prefers to view development from another vantage. As such, the process I outline here is not an endpoint, nor a final conclusion, but rather the outline of processes of development seen from a specific vantage and focused on the networked flows of political, economic and social capital. In other words, I do not propose to have discovered th e final key to our social reality, only to have outlined a process that to me seems ubiquitous in development, and to an extent outside of it. As I have outlined the idea in this work rebeginnings signal a double transformation. On the one hand, re beginning represents the the siren call of development, on the other, the effort to keep this potential open amidst struggles among diverse interested parties. Put another way, development is best understood as a promise of rebeginning made to institution s and individuals through the very real T hese flows spur competition, making development a site of confrontation and contestation It is precisely within these points of co nflict that the boundaries of diversely and variably weighted individual, expert, a nd state power are constructed. T hese conflicts are subsequently smoothed out by the sorts of rebeginnings made possible by teleological notions of progress and neoliberal notions of governance; which are then put back to work in the rebeginnings o f individuals and institutions

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381 F igure 7 1. Rebeginning as a p rocess of d evelopment The process can be (crudely) illustrated as a cycle that circles back on itself (see Figure 7 1). In the first instance, individuals and agencies are invited in with the promise of transformation This promise of transformation is existential to the idea of development development is transformation. The second instance of rebeginning the e ntry into a network, the struggles over resources, the eventual reinvention of institutions seems ubi quitous among states and corporations whether they make transformative promises or not Imagine for instance the way a state reinvents itself with each new leader, the way corporations jettison subsidiaries when they become troublesome, redefining their very nature (think Monsanto), or the way they are broken up only to re configure and eventually re animate (think Bell, Cingular, ATT).

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382 Rebeginnings help us remember to forget (Anderson 1983), they help us survive the past and think the future in ways that keep power largely untroubled. They are a revolution in place. T he Paradox of the Past in Development In order to gain traction, the idea o f development relies upon well worn teleological notions of progress that depend on an imagined past characterized by a lack of development. This notion of development has replaced older understandings that took development as one facet of a circular proc ess of growth and decay mirroring the human life cycle (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Development is, then, centrally concerned with an imagined future. In contemporary views of development, which continue, for all intents and purposes, to be largely modernis viewpoint there is an idea of a finish line a point at whic h development is no longer necessary, an idea made possible, in large part, by the decoupling of ideas of decay from development (see Cowen and Shenton 1996, Ferguson 1999). Another facet of the unilineal notion of development and its imagined futures is the Here the idea of development and the individual projects the idea engenders are always re situated in the present each iteration is the project in the now the past is obscured. Thi s from the small scale local projects where the documents written today quickly supplant the objectives crafted yesterday, to the well appointed halls of development agenci es where previous incarnations of policy are reformulated into lessons learned, incorporated into

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383 new policies, and then chucked into obsolescence (see Lewis 2009, Scott 1998). The negation of the past in project documents propels the present backward t objectives now have always been the project s objectives. The consequences of past failures are disappeared behind this presentist perspective the current situation does not have a history; it just is. In this way, the past is simultaneous ly erased and re written as the present. Yet despite these conceptual moves, real and imagined pasts remain the 95). On the one hand, the intricacy and complexity of thi s history is obscured and (Scott 1998: 6). Perhaps most striking is the obfuscation o f the role of earlier developmentalist policies in the creation of the predicaments that contemporary policies hope to address (see Ferguson 1999, Cowen and Shenton 1996); and certainly the obfuscation of the failures of the past are a necessary component of development s self sustainability. On the other hand, the past remains an ever present and necessary factor in the imagined futures that development proffers. In the accepted discourse on Malagasy development, the past emerges as a necessary component not for its lack of development but as development lost. Thus a number of World Bank documents advise readers of the shift from the status of a net exporter of rice in the period following independence to a net importer since 1980 ( FAO 2000; W orld Bank 2001 ) or the continuing decline in rice production p er capita since that time (Minti n and Dorosh

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384 2006). Thus while the past may be reduced to a sentence or lines on a graph showing, for example, agricultural output over time it remains a nec essary, though truncated component of official development. This past, however, is more insidious than these one line additions of t emporal longevity suggest. W hat remains important key even to the sustainability of developmentalist ideology i s the silent, yet heavy, presence of development s past. For all the ahistory and obfuscation involved in contemporary development, the development industry relies heavily on the material and ideological residue of recalls its earlier incarnations through what I have called its shadow presences : 107 crops that worked in the global marketplace; systems, networks and institutions of expertise that offered visibility to development a nd an active role for local and expatriate agents; and state and international institutions that appeared to answer the capitalist desires of those whose lives they touched. In Madagascar, as in much of the postcolony (see Li 200 7 Chalfin 2010 ; Walley 2 004 ), material infrastructure, intertwined as it is with the ideologies of local, state, and international actors, are reused, re inhabited, rehabilitated, or left to sit, decaying, alongside the newer structures that represent the interests of new regimes The projects I studied located themselves on government land inherited from earlier colonial, and then post colonial developmentalist efforts. They trained farmers next to buildings falling down from neglect buildings that had once trained farmers or housed 107 This concept builds on the insights and observations of Chalfin (2010) and Li (2007), and reworks the for mal economy.

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385 technicians. They proposed rehabilitation schemes that layered atop their precursors schemes and sometimes abandoned these, building anew somewhere close by, but also more visible. is a something that was not there it is structured by the past, its very place (both geographically and ideologically) is tied to that past. and the past is precar ious. The same ideas that build up the infrastructure on which development projects depend the elements reused by the development industry and that foster new imaginings of a future anterior, a future full of what should have been are themselves built on ground soiled by a pre colonial, colonial, and post colonial past of slavery, forced labor, land disputes, state power and inequality. This precarious relationship and its necessity foster the rebeginnings that development consta ntly engage s in. Rebeginnings, visible in the mundane and seemingly slight changes in project objectives, locales, and priorities the tangible aspects of this analysis are constituted through the coalescence of the more ideological and ephemeral rebegi nnings that development offers individuals and states. While development presents itself as about demonstration rendering visible the possibilities of farming through experimental fi elds, rendering visible certain missteps through follow up evaluations and stock taking procedures written into project goals they are also about disappearance and obfuscation. At the al particularities and political positionality of individual farmers and development agents alike. These agents

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386 are rendered invisible and then visible again in project documents that repackage them ctives, development disappears its larger mistakes, relegating them to the trash pile of obsolete plans that continue to exist at the margins as forgotten project documents and defunct websites that laud its earlier incarnations. For international agents, rebeginning offers a way to sustain international relations and craft legitimacy that obscures while re inscribing asymmetrical power relations between north and south. Development, in its self presentations, is ab out the promise of transformation. More often than not, transformation is presented as a formula built of marketable concepts of problem and solution. This equation, implying an inverse symmetry of lack and gain (lack + knowledge = development) must be c arefully crafted in a way that can call forth agents both above (the international and state agencies that support transformative knowledge of development). In this way, t he objects that represent lack must be represented multiple times to themselves (so that they are invited to subject themselves to the transformative power of knowledge) and to outsiders at both local, state and int ernational levels (so that they will support this endeavor ; see Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1995 to be plugged in to this equation, must be constructed. This construction is one of development s more visible effects peasants are tra nslated and re translated into development texts; they are engaged and promised a better future through the knowledge and practices of development. Thus development

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387 offers a downward funneled expertise that, in Madagascar, promises peasants the capability to be entrepreneurs of the self in a neoliberal world (Rose 1999). Less visible are the constructions and re constructions of development expertise itself, which is present in the mastery of the knowledge of how to create project documents, how to audit and evaluate project outputs, and how to define and craft the allegiance of both target populations and supporting agencies. Projects funnel academics and scientists into the (sometimes profitable ) world of development allowing them to turn expertise i nto entrepreneurship in a way that mirrors the transformative powers of development they promote for rural farmers. The flipside of this mobility is a rate of turnover that ensures the continual shifting of project desires. B oth cases were generative of a sort of knowledge labor that I am calling flexpertise The term has two meanings: one ideal and one real. First, flexpertise gestures towards the ideal of the expert entrepreneur that can anticipate and respond to market shifts deftly, flexing with the market, and shifting agricultural practices according to their reading and analysis of market phenomenon. This is the idea embodied in the Paysan leader and the wide ranging curricula at the Campus Ambanivohitra and the ideal village and economic project s of the Village MAP. This notion of the expert entrepreneur is part of a larger democratization of expertise that responds to critiques of development as unresponsive or tone deaf to indigenous knowledge and the speeding and tightening of global intercon nection. Second, flexpertise gestures towards the very real ways these projects facilitate the flexible labor of agricultural technicians that supplement the ir state and non state positions and precarious financial existences. 108 108 For both, these were positions that might change due to political shifts, or might go unpaid because of budgetary issues, which linked back to international donors and development aid.

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388 Imagining the peasant Desp unilineal history in Wes interventions which must construct the farmer, first as the object of intervention and then as an imagined outcome. The creation of target populations is a well studied facet of development interventions and it is the discrepancies between the construction of these individuals and their everyday reality that is held, in part, responsible for developmen Anthropologists analyzing the development industry have noted and critiqued the ways that its official discourses have crafted an idea of their target population. he global south in the post WWII era (21). He traces this to the translation of treatments of poverty much of which were partially re constructed from colonial administrative policies (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997) to the global south. In this viewpoin t, development replaces colonialism as a mode of control and governance. This shift was soon to b e independent colonies, and became a rallying cry and point of contention within new nations, who struggled over the content and control of the emerging development industry (Cooper and Packard 1997) So in addition to reflecting continuing relations of i

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389 concern for newly independent states. Ferguson (199 0 ) explores the disjuncture between the everyday realities a nd scholarly depictions of Lesotho migrant laborers who also farm and their construction in development texts as simple farmers. He illustrates the linkage of project failure to this disjuncture, but, more importantly illustrates the way that the usage of western models and the erasure of the everyday reality of Lesotho workers enabled the expansion and sustenance of state power. In a later work, Ferguson explores the temporal dimension of these constructions of poverty, identifying shifts in global devel opment policy from farming to industrial wage labor and back again (Ferguson 1999:241). er (37). the enemy of reason and progress P easants are assumed to be sensitive to processes of knowledge transmission that will render interventions and the cha nges to labor and land they precipitate and require a rationale (and often times the only) response to real and perceived needs and desires. The creation of the peasantry within development discourse is, however, not independent of the lived histories of development actors. Mosse (2005) illustrates the beneficiaries in one large scale project in I ndia. Like Ferguson (1990 ) he identifies the contextual realities t hat inform the identities of project participants, including the experiences of past forms of development.

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390 The construction of the peasant, then, must be seen as both local and global, carried out at the level of individual projects and with the involvem ent of brokers and mediators, and at the level of international policy and accepted contemporary views of what it means to exist as peasantry. The projects I examined wove together historical relations among regional ethnicities in as far as these can b e identified aiding in the further creation of ethnic divisions, and setting the central highland, or Merina, ethnicity above the coastal populations the projects wished to address. At the Campus Ambanivohitra c oas practices were depicted a s both traditional and destructive symbols of an indolent and unwilling populace even while they were imagined as corrupted by contemporary economies, and by the development industry itself. They were, thus, both disconnected and too connected. These were intertwined elsewhere (Appadurai 1996; Latour 1993; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997), as well as with contemporary concerns with conservation that are central to global imaginings of Madagascar as a world apart. In other words, the idea of the peasant is shot through with the desires of the state and international agencies for which they are, in part, packaged. At the core of all of this is a belief in the parallel rat ionality of local beneficiaries that imagines the infinite seductive capabilities of rational self interest. engage the d esires of the Malagasy themselves. Development must be inviting it Rossi (2006) asserts, a main facet of development work is the work of mediation that

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391 calls indivi duals into participation usually through sensitization. It offers, then, a promise of new beginnings to individuals whose current situation leaves them wanting. For project directors and funders, the ideal transformation that could occur would mine the innate entrepreneurial capacities of the individual, transforming peasants into entrepreneurs of the self. The peasant would be rendered a flexible expert, able to respond to complex market phenomenon with the easy adoption of new agricultural practices. This ideal sat uncomfortably next to the reality in which many rural farmers were already quite flexible layering economic activities in ways that stretched them beyond being simple farmers. This grounded flexibility was already intimately related to market shifts but remained largely unthinkable for technicians and bureaucrats whose work relied on a certain type of rural subject. For the Malagasy project participants and villagers, development opened up possibilities to tap into powerful social an d financial networks, solidifying their political positions, granting them access to capital through credit that could compensate the risk required in entrepreneurial endeavors, access to wage labor, mobility, etc. The imagined futures of project particip ants often tacked back to the future anteriors on each of which was itself dependent on those that came before it to define its objectives. Peasant interpretations, desires, and fears about their futures were closely tied to these layered histories, which constituted a store of understandings with which to approach the labor relations engendered by the projects. Initially, local farmers hoped for the ideal if attenuated, future similar to the one described for them by proj ect directors and established as a ghostly presence on the sites in which they studied. On the other hand, the very act of promising development

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392 and the exchanges for participation, and thus agricultural labor, that the projects provided spurred accusatio ns that too much participation specifically getting too involved in this exchange could and would trap participants into a relationship akin to slavery. Lack of adequate room and board at another project inspired similar suspicions. At the same tim e, failures of projects to adequately or fairly compensate participants for lost labor were met with suspicions that spurred accusations of forced labor. In so doing, rural farmers were redefining development agents at the same time that they sought to re align the futures they could and would imagine. Be ing and be those who have the skills to intervene and hold the expertise to direct the labor of others. The asymmetry of relations between development agents the brokers, mediators, and experts who drive the administration, provide the pedagogy, and translate development between donors and recipients withi n individual projects mirrors the asymmetry between global north and south, or more encounter each other, their supposed benefactors and their imagied beneficiaries. Within the field of actors involved in development are bureaucrats, functionaries, and businessmen, rural and urban, low level and high level political figures, agricultural technicians, etc. Individual agents tend to move between these arenas with i nd ividuals translating social capital in one field in to advancement in another, and often pursuing numerous political and economic activities at once. Thus many of the individuals engaged in development are also engaged in other ventures, such as restaurant s, small shops, etc. The practice of layering livelihood of having multiple

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393 enterprises is a practice of diversification that parallels the flexible practices of peasants. Each of these agents can lay claim to a certain form of expertise or the mas tery over certain aspects of knowledge, whether this be technoscientific, agricultural, managerial or bureaucratic that links into contemporary ideas of development. Expertise translates into the forms of power that allow individuals the abilities to pr escribe and proscribe the activities of others. In the development industry, this expertise solidifies alongside the creation of the non expert peasant described in the previous section. Expertise is also one facet of the promises that development agents offer to peasants in order to call them into participation but not always something that can or will be given. The failure of attempted transfers of expert knowledge are accompanied, and in some ways precipitated, by the intractability of expert status. development interventions since colonial governments first began using development as a salve for social unrest in the colonies and began replacing colonial civil servants with (Cooper 2005) 109 Since that time development experts have prolif erated constituting a mobile population whose mastery of certain forms of western knowledge and acceptable argumentation give them power. The highest echelons of development exp ertise the administrators and technicians that drive the development machi nery (Escobar 1995) That these individuals at the apex of development are able to for the most part rise to the top within the local development industry reflects practical concerns that in 109 assertion that credentialed university graduates

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394 turn refl ect contemporary epistemic asymmetries. This is particularly true where foreign education may facilitate a sort of network expertise in which the cultural and social capital imbued in accredited degrees or time in the exterior is supplemented by an array o f personal relations that can ensure the success of funding endeavors within a project. It also reflects another level in the already over constructed objectivity of experts foreign experts and expertise foster both the legitimacy of the state (Fergus on 1990) and protect it from accountability (Strathern 2000) This occurs, as Steiner Khamsi and Popkewitz (2004) note, in the utilization of foreign policy models which dis tance status, along with the erasure or subversion of cultural variables in the statistical measures they use, that allows development to become what Ferguson (1990) calls the anti politics machine. Much of the work carried out by development experts is concerned with the reduction of contemporary and historical realities into easily consumed bits and pieces that can then be subjected to generalized for mula for change that can be imported from anywhere. This reduction of complex problems into bits of easily quantifiable data is a staple of science and that has diffused out to become what Schofer, Ramirez, et al (2000) for granted component of the modern nation 110 Riles (2000) conceives of this sort of practice, and the networking that accompanies it, as an rathern (2000) suggests th at this dynamic is a part of 110 individuals, a contention that tends to leave as the ties of power that stand behind the ascension of certain types of knowledge over others.

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395 legitimacy and accountability in all walks of life (see also Harper in Strathern 2000) In this sense, the practices that constitute development expert ise constitute a form of magic, what Scott (1998) social and economic pr oblems (Ball 1998; Ferguson 1990; Tsing 2005) These aptitudes allow individuals entry into the international aid circuits on which Development experience translates into development expertise. The arena of expertise, made up of a diversity of roles and statuses from high level politician to mid level bureaucrat, from university professor and researcher to extension technician or proj ect administrator, stand as the networked web between funding providers and recipients. Money is funneled through the hands of states and individuals, who use it to entrench their own status over and above their colleagues in a situation that is at best p recarious. These agents are suspended in hierarchies of varying degrees of solidity. These are under constant threat as new agents attempt sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully to out maneuver their colleagues; translating development ac tivities into personal gain (see Bierschenk et al. 2000, Lewis and Mosse 2006). These strategies are necessary to the survival of individuals and projects that are vying for unstable positions and unstable funds. Thus while the hierarchy implies stasis, the opportunities for career mobility (as well as stagnation and backsliding) intrinsic to the work of development di srupt development hierarchies. Thus, for example, as the second in command for one project, the Campus Ambanivohitra became an important

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396 political figure in the region, he began to direct the projects movements from the outside through the new relations that the project offered with state and international development apparatus, at times directing funders from above much to the chagrin of his former superior. agents are both cause and consequence of personal rebeginnings that in turn feed transformations in project practices and discourses. At times these cha nges are driven by individuals, who find it expedient to distance themselves from the actions of those that came before them (Lewis 2009: 34). But as Ferguson and others have illustrated, the state and its modes of power are implicated, though not as mono lithic forces, but as actors in their own right, both strategically using power and being used strategically by powerful forces. Rebeginning and State Power As a number of scholars on development have noted, development constitutes an important element of and supplement to state power. Non governmental organizations state are dispersed among non state organizations (989). While this dynamic may be common in other areas, it is necessary to understand that the split between state and non state is not so clean cut. As stated in the previous section, bureaucrats, functionaries, and development agents often inhabit fluid positions they move between posts as functionaries, development leaders, private entrepreneurs, etc. In so doing they also move between private an d public domains.

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397 The state, then, should not be seen as ceding control to non governmental organizations, but rather of facilitating the layering of administrative, governance, and state legitimization among state and non state institutions and agents. These conglomerations may strengthen the power of the state as they allow the state to expand its institutional field of vision and control by contracting out governance functions while it simultaneously shrinks into a centralized hub to administer and mon itor these controls (Chalfin 2007, 2010; see also Ong in Hansen and Stepputat 2005) Elyachar ( 2002; 2005) suggests that the proliferation of governmentality among non state entities has allowed for the emergence development agencies are situated both inside and outside of the state. This arrangement allows states to utilize NGOs as tools for legitimacy and thereby strengthen their political position. What is at issue in Madagascar is the way that development allows the state to attach itself to and distance itself from the perceived successes and failures of earlier regimes. Thus developmentalist forms have the potential to legitimize state power, illustrating the will to improve the lives of its citizens (Li 2007) This happens in ways mediated by foreign agents but dependent on local understandings and memories of the state. s reanimated by development, and reanimated in specific nodes of impor tance nodes where development is the lost promise of a status quo anterior. It may be that more than simply structuring development, that sites of FOFIFA the rural homes of former technicians of the stat e are important sites for directed development among the more educated and elite rural populations of the state.

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398 At the same time, the failures of past Malagasy state forms, and the similarities of contemporary practices have the potential to spur local resistance and force projects to realign their objectives and redefine the relations states initiate through development. The legitimacy provided by development, then, is tenuous at best. It is also dependent on the real and constructed agents described in the previous section the abilities of exp erts and the participation of peasants, each of who utilize established f orms of development to their networked ends Rebeginning Geopolitical Relations As the state starts over, casting off and reusing the forms that came before it international relation s are renewed by development Scholars have noted the important role that international governments and non governmental organizations in development that inhered in c olonialism and the developmentalist relations that followed. Development aid and the development indus try, as Ferguson (1999) states : was laid on top of already existing geopolitical hierarchies; it neither created north south inequality nor undid it but instead provided a set of conceptual and organizational devices for managing it, legitimating it, and sometimes contest ing and negotiating its terms [248] In Madagascar, the failures of the state and of past development schemes have allowed the re inst antiation of developmentalist interest, and the entry of new agents into them. International interests remain a presence within development. Their involvement is, like that of all of developments agents, highly performative. Like individual agents, international groups and governmental bodies brand themselves as developmentalist and en gage in activities to this end. Contracts require

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399 their logos remain prominent, they par ticipate in training, and their names cross the lips of developments agents as they interface with each other. Entry into these arenas spins aid into a visibility that crosses public and private sectors, and urban and rural settings. Their involvement in the production of the social in Madagascar, and their presence and dissemination as a brand among the Malagasy through development, assures access to the important political and private interests. These can in turn influence way that state and private pr ivileges are divvied out. The ability to gain privilege through development then feeds back into the legitimacy of these international organizations, showing up on websites, in newsletters, etc. as testimony to the morality of the French nation state and o f French businesses and organizations. It is in these spaces that the ideal of development is packaged again. This final branded life, disconnected from its reality, projects the ideal images that the aid agency has of its self and re centers, and potent ially re aligns, reigning geopolitical hierarchies. It is in these ways that development offers international governments and agencies opportunities to begin international relationships again, affecting the discursive erasure of painful memories while con tinuing the relationships that characterized these periods of history. As with state power, the continuation of the symmetries of old and new global hierarchies. Rebeg innings and the Anthropology of Development Rebeginnings wo rk as a loose frame to understand the processes that sustain development despite its visible failures. These are what draw agents and institutions into the network. In the networked effort to ach ieve individual and institutional rebeginning, agents come into contact and conflict, resulting in institutional rebeginnings

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400 that work to keep flows of social, political, and economic capital flowing. Each of these adjustments to the plan, each expected and unexpected shift in scop e, locale, and focus constitutes a response to expected and unexpected political changes, local conflicts, and practical problems Within this framework, development emerges as an apparatus for the capture of land, labor and k nowledge that reproduces inequalities between north and south, urban and rural, and expert and non expert. This work is suggestive of several trajectories within th e anthropology of development. This may consist of a further investigation of the roles of shadow presences and particularly the contemporary lives of past forms of development. These developmental spaces could add depth to our understandings of how state power and legitimacy are spread and sustained A nother research area might focus on the flexible labor relations that are engendered by development, and understanding how individuals manage lives stretched across multiple livelihoods

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401 APPENDIX ADDITIONAL FIGURES Introduction This section includes additional graphs discussed in Chapter 1. All graphs are based on the World Bank s World Development Indicators, published in 2010, unless otherwise specified. General Economic Indicators Figure A 1. Malagasy p er c apita G ross National Income since Independence. 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Atlas Method Current International $, PPP 2008 USD, PPP

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402 Figure A 2. Malagasy Gross Dome stic Product since Independence. Fig ure A 3 Malagasy a nnual p ercentage g rowth in Gross Domestic Product 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Constant 2000 US$ Current US$ PPP Constant 2005 International $ PPP Current International $ -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

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403 Figure A er capita GDP in comparative perspective. Current International Dollar 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Afghanistan France Madagascar Malawi Mauritius United States

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404 E mployment Indcators Figure A 5. Empl oyment by sector in c omparative p erspective 2005 82% 3% 15% Madagascar Agriculture Industry Services 4% 24% 72% France 1% 21% 78% United States 14% 30% 56% Malaysia 10% 32% 58% Mauritius

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405 Exports Figure A 6 Malagasy e xports by p roduct, 1970 2005. Figure A 7 Malagasy m erchandise exports by r egion, 1960 2010. 0 20 40 60 80 100 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 Food Fuel Agricultural Raw Materials Manufactures Ores and Metals 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa High-income economies

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406 Figure A 8 Malagasy e xports by n ation, 2005 2009. Source: Madagascar INSTAT, 2011. Figure A 9 Malagasy m erchandise e xports by r egion, 2009. 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 2005 2005.5 2006 2006.5 2007 2007.5 2008 2008.5 2009 Billions Ariary France United States Germany China Italy United Kingdom Spain Mauritius Runion Other 7% 2% 0% 1% 2% 5% 83% East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa High-income economies

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407 Imports Figure A 10 Malagasy imports by p roduct, 1970 2005. Figure A 11 Malagasy merchandise imports by r egion 1960 2010. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 Food Fuel Agricultural Raw Materials Manufactures Ores and Metals 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa High-Income Economies

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408 Figure A 12 Malagasy i mports b y c ountry top 10 trading p artners 2005 2009 Source: Madagascar INSTAT 2010. Figure A 13 Malagasy m erchandise i mports by r egion, 2009. 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Billions Ariary China France Bahren Thailand South Africa India United States Mauritius Belgium Germany 42% 1% 2% 0% 6% 9% 40% East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa High-Income Economies

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409 Demographic Indicators Figure A 14. Malagasy p opulation g rowth r a tes s ince 1960 Figure A 15. Population growth r ate in c omparative p erspective 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Percentage Growth -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Botswana Burkina Faso Chad Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Cameroon Eritrea

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410 Figure A 14 Malagasy m ortality r ates Source: US Census Bureau 2011 Figure A 15 Mortality r ates among children u nder 5 in comparative p erspective 0 50 100 150 200 250 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births) Crude death rate (per 1,000 population) 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 1960 1975 2000 2009 Afghanistan France Madagascar Malawi Mauritius United States

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411 Figure A 16 Rural p o pulation as a p erentage of t otal p opulation in comp arative perspective Figure A 17 Rural population growth r ates in Madagascar in comparative perspective 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Percent of Total Populations Botswana Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Eritrea Madagascar -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Annual Growth Percentage Botswana Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Eritrea Madagascar

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412 Figure A 18 Urban p opulation as a p ercentage of total p opulation in comparative perspective Figure A 19 Urban p opulation g rowth r ate in Mad agascar in comparative perspective 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Percent of Total Population Botswana Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Eritrea Madagascar 0 5 10 15 20 25 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Annual Growth Percentage Botswana Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Eritrea Madagascar

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413 Agricultural Indicators Figure A 20 Malagasy crop p roduction in tons 1961 2007 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Millions of Tonnes Coffee, green Fruit, tropical fresh nes Taro (cocoyam) Mangoes, mangosteens, guavas Maize Potatoes Bananas Vegetables Sweet potatoes Sugar cane Cassava Rice, paddy

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414 Educational Indicators Figure A 21 Literacy r ates in c omparative p erspective Source: UNESCO 2011. Figure A 22 Primary scho ol c ompletion rates in c omparative p erspective 2008 92.45693 64.48090564 73.68997 87.8971 50 60 70 80 90 100 Malaysia Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Percentage of Literate Individuals Age 15 + 71.24424 57.91126 90.13782 95.4828 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Madagascar Malawi Mauritius United States % of Relevant Age Group Country

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415 Figure A 23 S econdary s chool c ompletion r ate s in comparative p erspective 2008 113.20076 30.05926 29.41488 87.5775 94.11309 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 France Madagascar Malawi Mauritius United States % of Relevant Age Group Country

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416 Figure A 24 Malagasy p overty by r egion, 2007. Source: Madagascar INSTAT, 2011. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Analamanga Vakinankaratra Itasy Bongolava Matsiatra Ambony Amoron'i Mania Vatovavy Fitovinany Ihorombe Atsimo Atsinanana Atsinanana Analanjirofo Alaotra Mangoro Boeny Sofia Betsiboka Melaky Atsimo Andrefana Androy Anosy Menabe Diana Sava Rural Urban

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417 Malagasy Currency Figure A 25. 100 Ariary n ote (~ 0.05 USD) Figure A 26. 200 Ariary n ote (~ 0.10 USD) Figure A 27. 500 Ariary n ote (~ 0.25 USD)

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418 Figure A 28. 1000 Ariary n ote (~ 0.50 USD) Figure A 29. 2000 Ariary n ote (~ 1.00 USD) Figure A 30. 5000 Ariary n ote (~ 2 .50 USD)

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447 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Michelle Lea Kiel earned her B achelor of Arts in African s tudies and a nthropology from Hendrix College. After a short break, she return ed to her studies and earned a Master of Arts in a nthropology at the University of Florida in 2007. During this time Michelle has also worked as a consultant on issues Native American sovereignty.