The Rhetoric and Conceptualization of Enmity in Classical Athens

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0041431/00001

Material Information

Title: The Rhetoric and Conceptualization of Enmity in Classical Athens
Physical Description: 1 online resource (199 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Alwine, Andrew
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2010


Subjects / Keywords: ancient, andocides, anger, angry, antiphon, apollodorus, athens, attic, blood, century, classical, conceptualization, culture, demosthenes, enemies, enmity, feud, feuding, fourth, greece, harm, harming, hate, hatred, historical, history, ideology, isaeus, isocrates, lycurgus, lyisas, morality, non, orators, oratory, popular, rhetoric, rhetorical, social, society, values, violence, violent
Classics -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Classical Studies thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: This study examines the rhetorical use of enmity in Athenian legal oratory and the conceptualization of enmity in oratory, history, philosophy, and drama. Chapters 2 3 argue that the Attic orators construct narratives about their past hostile relationships with their opponents to support character and probability arguments. Many different strategies were available to Athenian litigants, depending on the particular features of their cases. A speaker in the court room had the flexibility to adapt his presentation of enmity to his own needs. Thus, the rhetorical use of enmity was elastic in its range of application and firmly tied to the whole of a litigant s argument. Since litigants frame their accounts of enmity to create probability arguments, they had to be in tune with what the jury would find a probable situation and response. We can therefore use these speeches to learn what types of behavior the jury would believe were characteristic of enemies (Chapters 4 5). Passages from other genres, including history, drama, and philosophy, can also be used as corroborating evidence to support conclusions drawn from the Attic orators. These sources yield a view of society in which Athenian men were frequently engaged in semi-formalized relationships of enmity. They also believed it their duty to harm their enemies; Athenians expected enemies to engage in insults, lawsuits, and political rivalries. However, aggressive violent behavior was, in the Athenian imagination, limited by democratic ideology and institutions. Previous discussions of enmity have posited competing codes, one agonistic and one restrained, but this dichotomy is rejected here. The Athenians consistently maintained that they were non-violent and gentle toward one another. Athens was thus a city with two seemingly contradictory aspects. Athenians conceptualized their society as feuding society, although relatively non-violent.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Andrew Alwine.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2010.
Local: Adviser: Wolpert, Andrew Oxman.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2010
System ID: UFE0041431:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0041431/00001

Material Information

Title: The Rhetoric and Conceptualization of Enmity in Classical Athens
Physical Description: 1 online resource (199 p.)
Language: english
Creator: Alwine, Andrew
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2010


Subjects / Keywords: ancient, andocides, anger, angry, antiphon, apollodorus, athens, attic, blood, century, classical, conceptualization, culture, demosthenes, enemies, enmity, feud, feuding, fourth, greece, harm, harming, hate, hatred, historical, history, ideology, isaeus, isocrates, lycurgus, lyisas, morality, non, orators, oratory, popular, rhetoric, rhetorical, social, society, values, violence, violent
Classics -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre: Classical Studies thesis, Ph.D.
bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: This study examines the rhetorical use of enmity in Athenian legal oratory and the conceptualization of enmity in oratory, history, philosophy, and drama. Chapters 2 3 argue that the Attic orators construct narratives about their past hostile relationships with their opponents to support character and probability arguments. Many different strategies were available to Athenian litigants, depending on the particular features of their cases. A speaker in the court room had the flexibility to adapt his presentation of enmity to his own needs. Thus, the rhetorical use of enmity was elastic in its range of application and firmly tied to the whole of a litigant s argument. Since litigants frame their accounts of enmity to create probability arguments, they had to be in tune with what the jury would find a probable situation and response. We can therefore use these speeches to learn what types of behavior the jury would believe were characteristic of enemies (Chapters 4 5). Passages from other genres, including history, drama, and philosophy, can also be used as corroborating evidence to support conclusions drawn from the Attic orators. These sources yield a view of society in which Athenian men were frequently engaged in semi-formalized relationships of enmity. They also believed it their duty to harm their enemies; Athenians expected enemies to engage in insults, lawsuits, and political rivalries. However, aggressive violent behavior was, in the Athenian imagination, limited by democratic ideology and institutions. Previous discussions of enmity have posited competing codes, one agonistic and one restrained, but this dichotomy is rejected here. The Athenians consistently maintained that they were non-violent and gentle toward one another. Athens was thus a city with two seemingly contradictory aspects. Athenians conceptualized their society as feuding society, although relatively non-violent.
General Note: In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note: Includes vita.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Statement of Responsibility: by Andrew Alwine.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2010.
Local: Adviser: Wolpert, Andrew Oxman.

Record Information

Source Institution: UFRGP
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: lcc - LD1780 2010
System ID: UFE0041431:00001

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2 2010 Andrew T. Alwine


3 Uxori dilectae


4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I must first of all thank my chairman, Andrew Wolpert. He helped me through this process at e very step and read more of my writing than anyone should be forced to read. He provided constructive criticism that compelled me to think and rethink my arguments. This study is much better for it. Konstantinos Kapparis was also a very helpful mentor He w as always encouraging and willing to meet with me to chat about all things Greek. Many of my conversations with him, both in person and through e mail, had great influence on my work for the better. I would also like to express my gratitude to Andrea Sterk and Robert Wagman for their support and their willingness to serve on my committee. In addition to the faculty members mentioned above, I wish to thank Mary Ann Eaverly, Timothy Johnson, Jim Marks, Victoria Pag n, and Gonda Van Steen. It would be difficul t to say how much time all of them sacrificed to help me be come a better scholar, teacher, and colleague. It is certainly difficult to exp ress how much I appreciate it. Among all of the wonderful graduate students at the University of Florida, I must espec ially thank Todd Bohlander and David Hoot, who were subjected to the experience of revising my work at various stages of incompletion. I would also like to thank Dustin Heinen, with whom along with Todd and David, I had many fruitful conversations. I owe more gratitude to my family than I can express in a mere fourth paragraph of a section of acknowledgements. First, I thank my wife, Megan Alwine, who did more to help me through graduate school than I ever could have asked My parents, David and Margaret A lwine, are the real heroes behind the scenes. Without their love and nurture, I could never have come this far. Finally, I want to thank my two children, Elizabeth and Charlotte. Even in my most stressful and tired moments, they could also restore to me a sense of humor.


5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 9 Athenian Law ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 12 Sources for Athenian Law ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 15 The Semantics of En mity ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 18 Enmity in Classical Athens ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 21 The Rhetoric and Conceptualization of Enmity in Classical Athens ................................ ..... 29 2 ENMITY IN PROSECUTION SPEECHES ................................ ................................ .......... 34 Argument from Probability ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 35 Affirming Enmity but Denying Culpability ................................ ................................ ........... 40 Establishing Motive for Assault ................................ ................................ ............................. 53 Matters of State ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 64 Enmity in Private Disputes ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 79 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 86 3 ENMITY IN DEFENSE SPEECHES ................................ ................................ .................... 89 Attacked by Enemies ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 91 Denying Motive for Assault ................................ ................................ ................................ 110 Attacked by Sycophants ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 115 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 123 4 MAKING ENEMIES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 125 The Prevalence of Enmity ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 127 The Causes of Enmity ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 130 Spreading Enmity ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 143 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 151 5 HARMING ENEMIES ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 153 A Formalized Relationship ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 154 Non v iolent Vengeance ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 158 The Limits of Harming Enemies ................................ ................................ .......................... 169 Conclusion ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 182


6 6 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 185 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 189 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 199


7 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Sc hool of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE RHETORIC AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ENMITY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS By Andrew T. Alwine May 2010 Chair: Andrew Wolpert Major: Classical Studies This study examine s the rhetorical use of enmity in Athenian legal oratory and the conceptualization of enmity in oratory, history, philosophy, and drama. Chapters 2 3 argue that the Attic orators construct narratives about their past h ostile relationships with their opponents to support character and probability arguments. Many different strategies were available to Athenian litigants, depending on the particular features of their cases. A speaker in the court room had the flexibility t o adapt his presentation of enmity to his own needs. T hus, t he rhetorical use of enmity was elastic in its range of application and firmly tied to argument Since litigants frame their accounts of enmity to create probability argu ments, they had to be in tune with what the jury would find a probable situation and response. W e can therefore use these speeches to learn what types of behavior the jury would believe were characteristic of enemies (Chapter s 4 5 ). Passages from other gen res, including history, drama, and philosophy can also be used as corroborating evidence to support conclusions drawn from the Attic orators. These sources yield a view of society in which Athenian men were frequently engaged in semi formalized relationsh ips of enmity They also believed it their duty to harm their enemies ; Athenians expected enemies to engage in insults, lawsuits, and political rivalries However,


8 aggressive violent behavior was, in the Athenian imagination, limited by democratic ideology and institutions. P and one restrained, but this dichotomy is rejected here The Athenians consistently maintained that they were non violent and gentle toward one another Athens was thus a city with two seemingly contradictory aspects. Athenians conceptualized their society as feuding society, although relatively non violent.


9 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The members of a society must find ways to mediate violen t disagreements if they intend to avoid anarchy 1 The Greeks were well aware of the need for peaceful and non violent methods of arbitration between quarreling people In The Works and Days, the ability of humans to effect dispute resolution ( established the following law for mankind, that fish and beasts and winged birds eat each oth er since justice is not in them, but he gave to mankind justice, which proves itself by far t 2 Aristotle argues in the Politics ) and therefore naturally forms communities and states (125 3a3 ). I ndividuals must subordinate their interests to justice, 3 J ust as man is the best of animals when perfected, he is the worst of all part of the polis 4 Failure to institute effective controls on conflicts between citizens could result in internal t urmoil, or worse, civil war ( stasis ). In his narrative of the revolt of Corcyra (3.70 85) Thucydides illustrates the potentially devastating effects of stasis 5 Envy drove men to seek revenge at all costs, ignoring the gods and overturning justice and the laws. Corcyra descended 1 Harris 2001, 157 200; Herman 2006, 72 8. 2 Hes. Op. 276 80 : Cf. Dem. 25.20; Xen. An 5.7.32. 3 polis Pol. 1253a25 6). Cf. Dem. 8.72. 4 Arist. Pol 1253a 31 3, 37: 5 On stasis see Ruschenbusch 1978; de Ste. Croix 1981; Cohen 1995, 25 33; Ober 1998 66 72; Raaflab 2009.


10 greater acts of vengeance, not adhering to justice or the interests of the state, but rather considering any given whim of a group of indiv iduals as t 6 Because all societies experience internal conflict, many states throughout history have established law courts and penal institutions to provide a formally sanctioned apparatus for resolving conflict. However, no t all methods of mediating societal tensions need be institutional In many areas of the world, elaborate codes of honor provide scope for feuding between individuals and groups but at the same time limit such conflicts through expectations about how feuds are to be carried out 7 Rather than functioning to effect resolution and reconciliation, the legal system is often incorporated into the overall feuding process. Enemies tend to take an instrumental view of the courts, using them for their own ends and retaliat ing against their opponents through lawsuits. 8 Although such societies are often characterized by a h igh level of violence, 9 disputes must still be carried out within certain parameters to be considered honorable and legitimate. 10 A fe uding culture will thus have a method of establishing boundaries for conflict which are reinforced by the community wheth er by informal norms and values, formal institutions or both in tandem. A human community with no rules, expressed or unexpressed, is no community at all, but rather a group of individuals pursuing personal self interest at all costs. 11 6 Thuc. 3.82.8 : 7 See, e.g., Peristiany 1965; Wilson 1988. 8 For this ideology at Athens see Cohen 1995, 87 118; Rhodes 1998. 9 Feuds perceived insults and slights and thus encourage violence. 10 On how a society can establish and adapt the rules of an honor game, see Cohen 1995, 15 24. 11 Christ (2006, 15 44) shows that ancient Athenians were very concerned about the potential danger residing in interest.


11 In Athens during the classical period the problems resulting from conflicts between citizens were acknowledge d and discussed Personal enmity was an issu e that authors in many different genres confronted, but none so explicitly and extensively as the Attic orators. Because the speeches composed for the jury courts directly addressed ongoing conflicts and openly discussed the relationships of enmity, they f orm the focus of this study of enmity in classical Athens. In the court room speakers portrayed themselves and their enemies in ways that allowed them to support character and probability arguments. Many different strategies were available to Athenian liti gants depending on the particular features of their cases. F or instance, a prosecutor in a case of physical assault would often assert that the defendant had been his enemy for many years to establish a credible motive for the crime. On the other hand, a p rosecutor in a case of special public importance may deny enmity with his opponent to prevent the jury from suspecting that he is attacking a personal enemy on trumped up charges. The flexibility in herent in the rhetoric of enmity allowed a litigant to cho ose from several different strategies and adapt his presentation of enmity to his own needs. Recognition of t permits an examination of how Athenians conceptualized the practice of enmity in their so ciety. Because these speeches may be used to learn what types of behavior many Athenian citizens would believe characteristic of enemies Employing this me thod, this study concludes that Athenians believed enmity to be widespread, an integral part of everyday life They also believed that a common practice if not the duty of every honorable male citizen However democratic ideology put limits on how far enemies could go in pursuing each other


12 and prohibited the use of violence to pursue a feud. The Athenians maintained consistently that they were a non violent and gentle people Athens was thus a city with two seemingly contradictory aspects I t was in many wa ys a feuding society but not a violent one. 12 Before a more detailed statement of theses and goals, a few remarks on the Athenian legal be off ered, followed by a discussion of the semantics of several key words pertinent to the ). After an overview of the e chapter will focus on the Athenian Law In Athens ordinary citizens performed the roles normally reserved for professional judges and lawyers in civil and common law systems so that Athenian law was directly connected to the values of the people and expressed popular beliefs and opinions (Dover 1974 5 6) Out of a citizen body of approximately 30,000, each year 6000 Athenians were selec ted by lot to become a pool of available jurors. C itizens from this pool were assigned, also by lot, to serve on the daily juries, which ranged in size from 201 to 2501 and judged all cases, from assault to illegal legislation, without guidance from judges or deliberation among the jurors The courts convened between 150 and 240 days each year, usually with four or more courts in operation each day ( Hansen 199 1, 178 224) The Athenians themselves apparently recognized how frequently they participated in the court system. Wasps dangerous addiction to jury duty. A character in the Clouds shows a map to Strepsiades and 12 21.


13 points to where Athens is located. I do see the jurors sitting 13 The study of Athenian law has the benefit of confronting us with a legal system very different from civil and common law institutions. Modern western thought is dominated by the influence of Roman law while Greek law did no t extensively influence European legal practice ( Todd 199 3, 3 4 ) more critical consideration of some of the most basic assumptions which are now taken for granted. For instance, Mont United States and other countries with constitutions built on the European model. Such a concept was totally foreign to Athens. Rather than divide the government into three separate spheres, executive, legislative, and judicial, the Athenians created political institutions with overlapping powers and responsibilities. 14 Neither did Athens have a massive body of legal literature preventing the ordinary citizen from understanding and participatin g in the legal process. 15 Athenians did not develop the doctrine of binding precedent or feel obliged to engage in intricate legal reasoning to work out the appropriate solution for every conceivable situation. Consequently, Athenians never produced a body of juristic literature which could produce authoritative interpretations as the 13 Ar. Nub 20 7 8 : 14 This is not to say that the Athenians did not attempt to balance the influence of the various governmental bodies. Rather, they did not conceive of government as divided into these three sphe res and separate their institutions ians had of 15 The Athenian legal system was designed to encourage amateurs to participate in the process and discourage professionalism (Sinclair 1988, 211 18; Todd 1993, 77 8). Even the well known public speakers ( ) did not have official legal status (Ober 1989, 104 18).


14 Romans did. 16 In contrast to Athenian practice, Roman law developed by gradual accretions which eventually yielded a body of literature on law and legal process so overwhelming that jurists under the Empire found it nearly impossible even to organize it. Even t he famous law code of Justinian has many inconsistencies and repetitions. The Athenians, however, did not burden their system with the requirement that jurors vote in accor dance with the verdicts of earlier cases or be students of an unwieldy body of legal literature. There was, therefore, little to prevent the average citizens from participating in the process. The Athenian system also did not make allowance for lawyers. 17 I n private procedures, which were called dikai (singular: ), the aggrieved party had to appear in court and deliver a speech on his own behalf 18 although it was possible to hire a professional speechwriter, called a logographer. 19 In public suits, however anyone who wished ( ho boulomenos ) was permitted to bring an action against another. These public suits were called graphai (singular: ). Many other exceptional procedures, which functioned essentially as graphai except for their preliminary phase, were also available. 20 Even in graphai and exceptional procedures, the person 16 The Athenians may have kept some records of judicial proceedings in the Metroon, but, as Sickinger (1999, 132) 17 Litigants could persuade someone to speak on their behalf at trial, a practice called but these ) offered a supplementary speech not a subst itute. The main prosecutor still delivered an oration, even if it was short. Further, were expected to be close friends or family. They often stressed their connections to the persons they were supporting to dispel suspicions that they had been h ired. See Dover 1968, 149 50; MacDowell 1978, 251; Todd 1993, 94 5; Christ 1998, 37; Kapparis 1999, 195; Rubinstein 2000. However, Rubinstein (2000, 128 47) points out that while in private speeches conform to this expectation, the pattern does n ot hold true for public prosecutions. Many advocates in graphai and exceptional procedures make no attempts to prove a connection with the main prosecutor. 18 If a non citizen, such as a woman or slave, was wronged, the male citizen who had authority over t he wronged party ( kurios a husband, father, owner, etc.) had to bring suit. 19 Of the ten Attic orators whose speeches are extant, three (Lysias, Isaeus, and Dinarchus) were metics (resident aliens) who had no citizen rights and therefore could not normal ly speak before a law court. These logographers participated in the system by writing speeches for delivery by Athenian citizens. Other orators also engaged 8; Lavency 1964 ; Edwards 2000; Gagarin 2002, 2 4; Todd 2007, 3. 20 Todd (1993, 112 21) has produced a useful, though not exhaustive, study of these procedures.


15 who brought the suit had to deliver a speech at the trial; he could not simply hire a professional to speak for him. Although technically any citizen could lodge a public suit, in practice probably only a person with a close connection to the offense would be willing to run the risk of a public prosecution ( Christ 1998a: 119 33 ) 21 with the result that litigation at Athens remained an intensely personal and confrontational affair. So urces for Athenian Law Like the legal system itself, the sources for Athenian law differ markedly from the sources for other societies. The proceedings of trials were not formally recorded Because m agistrates did not write notes or commentaries as for in stance, Roman jurists did legal handbooks have not been transmitted. 22 T he texts of only a minority of the laws have been preserved in inscriptions and written document s. The legal system was not embodied in a set of codified rules but was constituted and reconstituted by the everyday practices of jurors and litigants. 23 Customs and norms were passed down informally as jurors and litigants both learned about the system from what was happening in the courts and contributed to the process in their own ways. Therefore, the actual trials, rather than mere descriptions of laws and procedures, are of paramount importance for shedding light on the functioning of t he Athenian system. Fortunately the bulk of the information on legal practices comes from speeches compo sed for delivery in the law courts. The forensic speeches in t he corpus of the Attic orators, slightly fewer than one hundred orations composed between approximat ely 420 and 320 B.C., represent our most important source for 21 If a prosecutor in a public suit failed to obtain one fifth of the votes, he would be fined one thousand drach mas and be prohibited from bringing the same type of case in the future. 22 The only texts from classical Athens even resembling a legal handbook would be critical works on oratory, such On the Sophists Rhetoric to Alexander and Rhetoric Whether or not many other handbooks existed is a matter of debate (see Schiappa 1999, 4 6, 45 7). 23 After the restoration of democracy in 403, prosecutors were required to bring others to trial under an existing law, but the definiti ons of offenses were often vague and left open to interpretation. Laws typically focused on procedural guidelines, leaving the offenses themselves undefined (Ruschenbusch 1957; Cohen 1995, 152).


16 Athenian law. 24 These speeches oc cupy a special position not only because of the number of them that survive but also because they were intended for an audience of ordinary Athenian citizens. The elite bias of most other ancient sources does not control how the orators present their cases since speakers must appeal to the ideology of the masses in order to win their cases. 25 Thus we can draw conclusions about the working of Athenian law and the ideology of Athenian citizens from a careful analysis of how litigants present their cases and at tempt to sway the jury. 26 The study of rhetorical methods is therefore of prime importance for this discipline. 27 Although a sufficient number of speeches survive to allow a meaningful investigation into the working of the Athenian law courts, certain limita tions in the nature of the evidence hinder a diachronic study. First, the extant speeches are not evenly distributed over the period (c. 420 B.C. 322 B.C.); they occur in clusters Antiphon, Andocides, Isocrates, and Lysias all composed their speeches be fore c. 380 B.C. The bulk of the remaining speeches by Demosthenes, Aeschines, Apollodorus, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Dinarchus and Demades occur in the last two decades of the period. The possibly exceptional nature of the speeches that are preserved presents a further complication. Many of the transmitted orations may owe their survival through the hazards of textual transmission at least in part to their peculiar and interesting features If this is the case 24 These speeches cover a wide range of procedures (various di kai and graphai and also many exceptional procedures: diadikasia, ). 25 See Ober 1989. Todd (1990a) shows how invoking a set of ideas that alienates the jury could be detrimental to a case. 26 Studies that have used the rhetoric of court speeches to draw conclusions about Athenian ideology include Dover 1974; Ober 1989; Cohen 1991; 1995; Christ 1998a; Johnstone 1999; Allen 2000a; Herman 2006; McHardy 2008; Worman 2008. 27 Of course, the u se of these speeches is not without its own set of problems. The Attic orators are notorious for distorting the truth when it serves their interests. Todd (1990b) outlines several of these difficulties.


17 then many speeches do not necessarily provide an a ccurate representation of typical cases and disputes Third, many orators seem to have specialize d in certain types of case s. Therefore, what may appear as differences in the presentation of traditionally used motifs over time may be more accurately attrib uted to differences in procedure. Demosthenes, whose corpus contains speeches of nearly every variety, is the exception, but other orators have identifiable patterns in the types ll of which concern trials for homicide. The only other speech composed for homicide trials was composed by Lysias (1). 28 Isaeus composed many of his speeches for inheritance cases and consequently the diadikasia which is the procedure used in six of his s peeches (1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10), while only three diadikasiai or two orators provide examples of a certain procedure. All dikai emporikai occur in 5, 56) 29 Likewise, Lysias composed all extant dokimasia speeches (16, 24, 25, 26, 31 ) except one (Aeschin. 1). 30 In view of these limitations a synchronic approach is the most logical way to evaluate the sources. It is possible to treat the period from c. 420 B.C to 322 B.C. as a unit since the 28 Lysias 12 and 13 also bring a charge of homicide, but do not employ the standard procedure for homicide ( dikai phonou ). 29 All but one of these cases are actually paragraphai (barring actions) resulting from a (Dem. 32 5). On these speeches see Lanni 2006, 149 74. 30 Aeschines 1 is, further, a different type of dokimasia ( for which see Lipsius 1905 15, 278 2; Harrison ii. 1968 71, 204 5; MacDowell 1978, 174; Todd 1993, 116; MacDowell 2005; Gagliardi 2005). The was designed to provide a vetting process for men who spoke in the Assembly and attempted to influence the policy of the state. Unlike other dokimasiai this procedure had to be initiated by a volunteer prosecutor, who had to prove the defendant guilty of misconduct severe enough to prohibit him from continuing to give advice in the Assembly. Regular dokimasiai were required entry examinations for each incoming magistrate after he was selected for the post. For the dokimasia procedure, see Lipsius 1905 15, 270 8; Harrison ii. 1968 71, 200 3; MacDowell 1978, 167 9; Adeleye 1983; Hunter 1994, 106 8; Todd 1993, 115 16.


1 8 constitution remained essentially constant except for minor changes. 31 In the analysis that follows speeches from this time frame will be adduced as evidence for the rhetorical use of enmity in the Athenian court room (Cha pters 2 3). However, three speeches by Antiphon (1, 5, 6) that fall outside of this period will also be cited. 32 This analysis will demonstrate that the rhetorical use of enmity in Antiphon follows the patterns established from other speeches 33 The Semantic s of Enmity Before this study proceeds, s everal key terms merit a brief discussion The English word echthra ( ). Importantly, the English word shares echthra ther than a dispute between states or larger groups. This is not, however, the case with the related Greek noun echthros ( ) and its typical English counterpart both to opponents of an individual and o pponents of a state, Greek has two words that distinguish these concepts. An e chthros is a polemios ( ) is an enemy of the state. 34 For example, Demosthenes would have considered Aeschines, a rival Athenian orato r, his echthros while Philip, the king of a state at war with Athens, was a polemios A passage from Lysias illustrates the differences in the semantic fields of these two words: Since I am seeking vengeance on Alcibiades, who is my enemy ( echthros ), 31 For justification of viewing this period synchronically, see, e.g., Ober 1989, 36 8; Hunter 1994, 6 7; Christ 1998, 6. Hansen (1989a, 1989b) has argued vigorously against scholar s who include the Periclean democracy in such an analysis, but allows that fourth century Athens may be examined synchronically. 32 These speeches were composed shortly before the constitutional change of 403. 33 Although important changes occurred in 403, the rhetorical use of enmity would not have been much affected since, as argued below, it was based on probability arguments, which were well known throughout the Greek world, and enmity, a long standing way of structuring society. Thus, it is not surprisi ng that Antiphon employs enmity in ways very similar to fourth century orators. 34 Latin maintains a similar distinction between inimicus and hostis From the former are derived the English words


19 you should have the same opinion and vote as when you though t that you were about to be in danger because of your enemies ( polemioi ). 35 T he speaker refers to his own personal enemy as an echthros while he alludes to the foreign enemies of Athens by using the word polemios (cf. Lys. 4.13, 22.14 15). This study will be concerned primarily with words of the root echthr rather than polem since it addresses personal enemies within the Athenian state rather than external threats. 36 Enmity must be distinguished from anger ( ), hatred ( misos ), and other such terms. 37 These describe emotions simpliciter while echthra rather signifies a type of relationship. Enmity at Athens could be quite formal, entailing clear expectations for how the echthroi involved in the relationship should act toward each other (see Chapter 5) As a practical matter, however, when an ancient source speaks of negative emotions directed at another person, it may be assumed that a relationship of enmity exists For instance, if an orator claims that he h as hated his opponent for many years and now wants to see him punished, he is undoubtedly describing a long standing relationship of enmity between the two. 38 As a matter of course enemies hated and were angry with each other. 39 35 Lys. 15:12: 36 Although this distinction between echthros and polemios generally holds true, some semantic o verlap occurs. Words of the root polem are ocassionally employed to refer to a private dispute, typically emphasizing the intense nature of the conflict (for instance, Dem. 21.29; cf. Arist. Pol 1322a). See Blundell 1989, 39; Phillips 2008, 15. 37 On the emotions, see Konstan 2006, a systematic treatment of the vocabulary of the emotions in ancient Greek. Rhetoric as a basic framework, but is careful to include many other sour envy, Harris 2001, which focuses specifically on anger in the ancient worl d, and Allen 2000a, which addresses anger in classical Athens. 38 Aristotle ( Rh 1378a30) connects anger ( ) with the desire for punishment ( ). Both were natural to enemies. 39 Echthra is similar to its counterpart, philia ( ; or the articular infinitive form, ). Debate continues as to whether philia was primarily formal or affectational (see, e.g., Konstan 1997; Peachin 2001), but it seems that


20 Several English words also de serve consideration since they will appear frequently in the following pages. The first (1995) that of blood feuds, which often entail repeated acts of merely enduring long term relationship of conflict following a retaliato ry logic ( Cohen 1995, 20 ), which is the force that it will have in this study 40 F will refer to long standing enmities without connoting specific acts of violence. 41 Violence, perhaps the most difficult of all of these terms, will also figure prominently in this study becoming especially important in Chapter 5 42 No attempt will be made to define the the definition will vary from individual to individual and sit uation to situation H owever, when violence is spoken of here, it will be in reference to aggressive attempts by a person or persons to do physical harm to another. This definition does not form a monolithic category since the seriousness of violent behavior can philia like echthra could denote both a formal relationship and strong emotional content. Aristotle makes the philos 1381a). Philia like echthra encompasses both relationship and emotion. 40 extreme acts of violence. A s the court systems became stronger by virtue of the expansion of state bureaucracy, Corsicans channeled their aggressive actions through the legal system, using lawsuits to pursue personal vendettas. Harris (2005, 133 4) objects that Cohen speaks of feudi exclusively for long standing disputes between groups of people. However, any feud between two Athenian men would typically include their oikoi and possibily also their friends and relatives (see Chap so that it does not seem an inappropriate term to employ for Athenian male citizens. 41 42 The semantic ranges of two words in Greek, bia ( ) and hybris ( ), overlap with the English word, Bia is perhaps the closest parallel, as it typically denotes the use of physical force against another. Hybris can include virtually any type of insulting act, which can often be violent beh avior. Thus the overlap between the meanings of Greek hybris hybris ) would not be ve study of hybris in Athenian literature.


21 range from a pu nch to murder. Such distinctions will be made in Chapter 4, the only chapter concerned specifically with this issue. 43 Enmity in Classical Athens Just as the institutional arrangement of the Athenian law courts seems strange to the modern observer in many respects the methods by which litigants present their arguments have struck many students of Athenian law as perplexing. 44 One issue that many scholars have commented on is the extent to which litigants describe their relationships with their opponents. Spe akers alternatively flaunt, disguise, or deny histories of hostility with their adversaries Although the rhetorical strategies vary, many of the extant speeches contain explicit accounts of the presence or absence of long standing relationship s of enmity, usually between the two litigants involved in the dispute. It would seem that the jury expected an explanation of the relationships. 45 The adversarial nature of Athen ian litigation provided a fertile ground for producing inimical relationships. 46 Athens had no police force or state prosecutors; all trials involved two 43 Chapters 2 3 address the rhetorical use of enmity for character and probability arguments and therefore mention violence only as it happens to apply to starting or continuing a relationship of enmity. 44 The app charis ) from the jury in recompense for services rendered to the state and the practice of torturing slaves to obtain information ( basanos ) are among the chief offenders. The debate over both continues. On char is see Davies 1981, 92 105; Ober 1989, 226 30; Johnstone 1999, 93 109; Rubinstein 2000, 212 33. On basanos see Thr 1996; Hunter 1994, 70 95; Gagarin 1996; Mirhady 1996; Thr 1996. Other seemingly irrelevant material contained in the speeches has prompte d Lanni (2006, 42 64) to list several rhetorical strategies which would be considered irrelevant in modern courts but were acceptable in the Athenian system. 45 Speakers commonly cite their feuds with their opponents as their motivation for appearing in cou rt. See Hunter 199 4, 127; Cohen 199 5, 70 86, 101 15; Christ 1998a: 154 9; Rhodes 199 8, 154 60; Kurihara 2003. 46 8. Todd notes that modern legal scholars divide the institutional methods fo r administering justice into two types, adversarial and inquisitorial. In the former, piece battle, while in the latter the judge interrogates witnesses himself and gene rally attempts to find out the truth on his own. On this model classical Athens falls at the extreme end of the adversarial type of system.


22 individuals pitted directly against each other in a contest which would have one winner and one loser. 47 The jury simply picked whomever they believed had the better case with no investigation before or deliberation after the speeches. Opponents frequently employed ad hominem attacks, along with every other argument at their disposal since no formal rules co nstrained how they presented their cases. Further, in the absence of a state apparatus for imposing the decisions on unsuccessful litigants, the winner of the lawsuit himself had to ensure that the dictates of the court were carried out although t h e loser of the case did not always comply willingly 48 The Athenians therefore created a procedure for coercing non compliant losers, the suit of ejectment ( ), which, if the prosecutor was successful, authorized him to take the awarded amount by force and entailed a fine of equal amount to the original verdict that went to the state treasury. Notably, even a favorable verdict in a suit of ejectment did not call upon state officials to settle the dispute but simply gave legal sanction to the indiv idual to seize property equal to the amount that he was owed. 49 The lack of public law enforcement encouraged private initiative and even sometimes man committi ng adultery with his wife could kill the adulterer with impunity (Lys. 1.30; Dem. 23.53). If a man was robbed under certain conditions, such as during the night, he was allowed to 47 ag ne had to lose. Enmity would result no less from litigation by committee than from individual driven prosecutions. 48 E.g., Isae. 3.62, 5.22; Dem. 21.81, 30, 31, 34.54, 37.19. See Lipsius 1905 15, 664 74; Harrison i. 1968 71, 217 220; MacDowell 1978, 153 4. 49 Roman law is actually similar on this point, at least during the Republic. The execution of the judgment was left up to the individual. By the imperial period, however, the praetor carried out duties which had previously been left to individual citizens Romans.


23 kakourgos ) without legal repercussions. The Athenian e mphasis on the sanctity of the household ( oikos ) prompted the state to leave much room for immediate self help against those who violate d homes or burst in on (Christ 1998b) Thus many i ndividuals were in constant and direct frictio n 50 Enmity was a force in Athenian society that had wide reaching implications on the everyday practice of government and the structuring of interpersonal relationships. The norms and values underlying the practice of enmity inevitably undergirded the way litigants portrayed their hostile relationships with each other. Over the past two decades, scholars have drawn very different conclusions about both the rhetorical and ideological aspects of enmity. Cohen (1995) argues that Athenian juries showed approval for prosecutors who presented themselves as taking vengeance on their enemies. Athens was, for Cohen, a feuding society in which litigants frequently appealed to a strong societal notion of honor and presented their actions as conforming to the rules of a n honor game. (82). Against Cohen, Herman points to speeches in which prosecutors deny that enmity prompted them to lodge their suit and downplay their personal incentives for revenge. 51 He argues that l i tigants present themselves as moderate, restrained, and prone to under react to the wrongs of their arrogant, insulting opponents. The ability to make a convincing display of such behavior tied in directly to the outcome of the cases O thers have attempted to find a compromise position between the two extremes of the claims of Cohen and Herman. Christ (1998a 191 ) w hile there is surely a gap between collective ideals of cooperation articulated in the 50 Hunter 1994, 149; Cohen 1995, 87 142; Rhodes 199 8, 148 52. 51 Herman 1993 ; 1994 ; 1995 ; 1998; 2000 ; 2006 ; 2007


24 courts and individual behavior outside of them, the courts and the peaceful values institutionalized within them in all likelihood had real and salutary effects on disputing behavior ( 2000a 127 ) asserts that Cohen and Herman respectively emph asize only one of two values at work. Males should pursue their enemies in anger, as Cohen points out, 52 Roisman (200 3, 137 8 ) also maintains that the two codes e xisted alongside each other. Others have included themselves in the debate, arriving at similar conclusions, though dis agreeing on which part of the arguments of Cohen and Herman are sound and which are to be rejected. 53 Although these scholars take a varie ty of different views on the relative merits of the models of Cohen and Herman, great influence on how most scholars present their claims Cohen (1995 191 2 ) argues that jurors did not vote on a which could include judgments about what was in the state s and whether the litigants had acted in conformity with the normative expectations of the jurors. According to Cohen (1995, 87 classical Athens. He argues that j urors did not attempt to cast their votes in strict accordance with the facts of the case but rather considered, a mong other things, the relative social standing of the litigants and their usefulness to the state. 54 Accordingly, Cohen (1995, 77) asserts that litigants 52 citizen anger the predominant motive force in the legal process, favors 53 Harris 1997, 366; Schofield 1998, 39; Fisher 1998, 80 6; Harris 2001, 183 4; Harris 2005; Christ 2005 143; Lanni 2006, 25 31; McHardy 2008, 94 9. 54


25 often believed that they could win their case based on who they were rather than what they had or had not done. Following such an approach, m any scholars have represented the Attic orators as deploying the rhetoric of enmity to win favor with the jury by demonstrating that they have the proper motives for litigating and that they have conducted themselves in accordance with communal norms. Even Herman (2007), diametrically opposed to Cohen in most respects, had the majority of Athenian law court speakers attempted to swing the dikasts in their favor by swaggeri ng round demanding respect and breathing vengeance, I would have concluded that Athens should indeed be grouped together with feuding, primitive or Mediterranean societies. Herman (2006, 200) is in essential agreement with Cohen that enmity in the Attic orators functions as an appeal to the jury to render the more non feuding characteristics a litigant managed to display, the better his chances of winning became 55 Allen (2000a, 151 67) follows a similar method She argues that prosecutors must prove think that they are worthy of prosecuting. Here again enmity would serve as an argument that legitimizes the prosecution without reference to the truth or falsehood of the claims. Phillips echthros in order to 55 Speaking of Demosthenes 21 ( Against Meidias ), Herman (2006, 1 of a social judgment on the relative merits of the behavior of the two litigants. Christ (1998a, 163) follows the same litigants know that to win their suits, they must reconcile their participation in litigation with social ideals of cooperative behavior


26 justify his prosecution, and he invites the jury to view the defendant likewise and, by implication, 56 It is true that Athenians viewed using the courts as a valid method of taking revenge, but, Allen, Phillips, and others would see the motive of revenge as legitimizing the prosecution i tself, calling for a conviction by the jury. By this line of reasoning an affirmation or denial of enmity constitutes an argument on its own merits: if litigants are able to demonstrate that they have conformed to Athenian social norms in their pursuit or non pursuit of a hostile relationship then the jury should be more inclined to vote for them. Thus many scholars assume that prosecutors and defendants affirm or deny enmity with their opponents in or der to gain favor with the jury without reference to cla ims about the facts of the case. 57 T he rhetorical uses of enmity would then serve primarily to prosecutor affirms or denies preexisting hostility with his opponent, he a ttempts to make the jury believe that he has the right motivation for bringing suit regardless of the facts of the case A count of the number of litigants who affirm enmity as their motivation for prosecuting and who deny it should therefore provide infor mation on Athenian ideology of the practice of enmity. This presupposition, however, is quite problematic. Such an approach assu mes a monolithic use of enmity T he motivations would constitute the most important concern for litigants in const ructing their narratives of enmity. Were this true, certain commonalities in rhetorical strategies might be expected to occur For example, i f prosecutors 56 See pp. 52 57 This is not to say that scholars always treat enmity as an extra legal argument. However, t hey tend to overlook its use to establish probability and emphasize its function as an extra legal argument. For instance, Harris (2001) cites Demosthenes 54 as an example of a speaker who believes that he should not attempt to seek revenge. He concludes t take into account the fact that Ariston portrays himself as restrained not necessarily because it was the morally to make it seem likely that he did not provoke Conon (see below, pp. 58 2006, 69) comment, appealing to courts rather than relying on individual ven geance is


27 deemed it i n their interests to present themselves as feuding with their opponents in order to stave off accusations of sycophancy and to prove that they were legitimately angry with their opponents, 58 then prosecution speeches could be expected to assert long standing enmity between the litigants consistently while defense speeches would deny enmity to un dercut the Likewise, if litigants thought it necessary to present as many non feuding characteristics as possible, prosecutors would deny enmity as a motivation for bringing suit while defendants would accuse their opponents of prosec uting out of hatred and malice. However, the evidence does not fit either formula. A simple recipe of this sort that explains the use of enmity in the Attic orators in terms of legitimizing or delegitimizing the court action does not exist. Some prosecutor s affirm enmity some deny it and some ignore it all together. 59 Similarly, some defendants affirm enmity, some deny it and some ignore it 60 B iases of the available sources present another difficulty. Two divergent tendencies of the corpus of the Attic o rators have lent credence to nearly every position on the spectrum between the view s of Athenian society as essentially feuding or non feuding On the one hand the extant speeches concern only cases that actually came to trial and were not able to be reso lved in the preliminary arbitration phase of litigation as many cases would have been The corpus of Attic 58 Such as in the arguments of Cohen 1995, Christ 1998a, and Allen 2000a. 59 Affirm: Lys. 12, 13, 14, 32; Isoc. 17, 21; Isae. 5; Dem. 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 39, 40, 47, 48, 54; [Dem.] 45, 49, 50, 53, 58, 59; Aeschin. 1, 3. Deny: Lys. 22, 27, Dem. 20, 23, 41; Din. 1; Lycurg. 1 Ignore: Lys. 28, 29, 30; Isae. 3, 6; Dem. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 44, 56; [Dem.] 46; Hyp. 1, 4, 5; Din. 2, 3. 60 Affirm: Andoc. 1; Lys. 3, 9, 16, 19, 21, 23; Isoc. 16; Dem. 18, 55, 5 7; Aeschin. 2; Hyp. 3 Deny: Antiph. 5, 6; Lys. 1, 4, 7, 24, 25 Ignore: Lys. 18; [Lys] 20; Isae. 2, 11; Dem. 29; [Dem.] 52; Hyp. 2 The issue is still more complex. In many speeches it is unclear whether the speaker ignores enmity or implicitly denies it by refusing to mention it in his narrative. Other speeches are incomplete or are supplementary speeches ( ); references to enmity could have occurred in a missing speeches or portion of a speech. A further complication is the by which a defendant could sue his prosecutor for bringing suit illegally. The roles were then reversed, the origi nal defendant becoming the prosecutor and the original prosecutor becoming the defendant. These speeches (Lys. 23; Isoc. 18; Dem. 32 8) have not been categorized because there are not enough references to enmity in them to determine how enmity functions in these cases.


28 orators represents only the most virulent disagreements and can be expected to record the fiercest hostilities. Cohen can draw upon stories narrated On the other hand all litigants are constrained by t he legal setting of their cases Invocations of an ideal of non violent restraint and adher ence to a civic code of submitting to the will of the state are to be expected in such a body of literature. Herman (1994, 117) self control to violent societies of pre industrial Europe Awareness that both of these tendencies are present has no doubt led to the many statements of compromise positions between Cohen and Herman although it is quest ionable how are for investigating the rhetoric and ideological dimensions of enmity in classical Athens The room between two such divergent positions is too great for simple concessions to both sides to have much to offer. Even if one uses the language of two competi question of how Athenians employed and appealed to different modes of behavior, how frequently they did so, and what underlying principles characterized their decisions. Cohen a nd Herman have positioned their models concerning the working of enmity and the violence of society at opposites ends, but there lies an entire range between the two. Perhaps because of the unsatisfactory nature of these compromise positions, the debate be tween the extremes still continues apace, a critical heated response to Christ 61 61 Christ 2007; Herman 2007. See also the paper by Harris (2005) and the response by Christ (2005).


29 The Rhetoric and Conceptualization of Enmity in Classical Athens This study will attempt to offer a fresh perspect ive on the rhetorical use of enmity in the Attic orators, which will influence how an analysis of the broader social dynamics of enmity may proceed (see below). Speakers employ rhetorical strategies involving enmity in ways that are closely related to thei r overall arguments about the truth or falsehood of their respective versions of events. Enmity is not, as many have tre ated it, an extra legal concern but rather functions to create character and probability arguments about the case. As litigants crafted their speeches, the desire to bring about a favorable verdict determined how they presented their arguments. Speechwriters were compelled to meet the specific expectations of the legal setting and to subordinate al l other considerations to their attempts t o win their case. 62 A good example of this is Lysias 1 ( On the Murder of Eratosthenes ), in which the speaker, Euphiletus, portray s himself as nave and even wimp y 63 Euphiletus has been charged with the murder of Eratosthenes He admits that he killed Eratos thenes after he caught him having intercourse with his wife in his own home but argues that he did not attack Eratosthenes out of some private animosity ( 44 6 ) Rather he was performing a civic duty in removing a violator of the laws ( 47; cf. 26 ). If he h ad presented himself as a shrewd and cunning pursuer of vendettas, the jury might doubt his claim that he did not premeditate the murder of Eratosthenes. Thus Euphiletus emphasizes his own almost unbelievable credulity and obtuseness. Near the beginning of his speech he outlines ironically how much trust he had in his wife and he r positive qualities as a house keeper (6 7, 10). Euphiletus even relates that he slept through one of 62 Johnstone (1999, 1 8) points out that litigation resulted from a decision to transform the dispute into a trial set before a jury sanctioned by the state. This movement from private sphere into the court room has important consequences for how the parties involved deploy their strategies. 63 Herman 1993, 416 17; Carey 1994 a: 40 1; Wolpert 2001, 418 20. Cf. Porter 1997, who argues that Lysias 1 h as


30 11 14), a detail that an Athenian male citizen would no doubt happily omit in a setting other than the court room. This story has another heavily ironic and dreadful detail. has the nerve to chastise Euphiletus for trying to get her out of the room so that he can sleep with a slave girl (12). Overall, Euphiletus paints a fairly negative portrait of himself although it supports the key claims of his argument ( Usher 1965, 101 5 ) 64 The Attic orators desire first and for emost to win the dispute at hand. They make use of the rhetoric of enmity accordingly. Litigants shape the way they present their relationships with their opponents to support their claims about the facts of case and to undermine the claims of their rivals The extant speeches employ various strategies, but the primary purpose of narratives of enmity is for probability or character arguments. For instance, a prosecutor in a case entailing monetary reward sometimes claims that the defendant has long been his enemy to provide a motive for his prosecution other than desire for pecuniary gain. This preempts the defendant from accusing him of bringing trumped up charges out of mere greed (e.g., [Dem.] 53, 59). Similarly, a defendant often affirms enmity to paint the prosecutor as maliciously bringing a false charge in pursuit of a vendetta (Lys. 9; And oc 1; Isoc. 16; Dem. 18; Dem. 57). These are just a few brief examples, but the rhetoric of enmity can function in much more complex ways. Chapters 2 3 investigate the methods by which prosecutors and defendants present hostile relationships with opposing litigants in order to support the claims of their cases The exigencies of the case determine whether a litigant chooses to affirm, deny, or obfuscate enmity. The r hetoric of enmity is grounded in the confines of the legal sphere. 64 admit some venial blemishes so as to add verisimilitude to their na rratives. See, e.g., Lysias 7.12, where the speaker admits to a negative description of his character to make a probability argument.


31 The conclusions of Chapters 2 3 challenge the methodology employed by many scholars who assum e that jurors did not limit themselves to the facts of the case but rather considered the ity of th (199 5, 191 2) has stated it. The Attic orators employ different strategies in their presentation of hatred and enmity not to justify themselves so that the jury will vote for them because of their status in society and reg a rdless of the facts of the case but rather to support their overall argument and the truth of their own version and interpretation of events. The rhetoric of enmity is not governed by need to find extra legal justification but rather addresse s legal concerns directly Therefore, appeals to the number of times that litigants admit or deny enmity will not be Fortunately, it is not necessary to determi ne all the reasons that drive each individual speaker to truth of that situation. E ven if they did not narrate events as they truly happened, speakers in the c ourt room attempted to make their narrative believable by creating a facsimile of truth that the jurors would be willing to accept The rhetorical use of enmity for probability arguments would be ineffective if stories about their enemies did no t resonate with what the jury believed probable. Thus a reconstruction of the way Athenians conceptualized the practice of enmity is possible without consideration of the truth or falsehood of individual stories. We may instead look at what the jury would find believable and compelling. Consequently, w hile the statements about enmity have often been analyzed as if they were prescriptive, this dissertation will treat them simply as descriptive. For instance, many have cited that he has long been an enemy of his opponent or a


32 the jurors thought was objectively the right way or the best way to act in a given situation. This view portraying themselves as conforming to societal norms in their use of the law courts This method, however, yields mutually contradicting results. I f these same pa ssages are treated rather as descriptions of events that are intended to support an argument then the focus shifts from what the jurors would have thought morally correct to what they would have thought probable. Analysis can then proceed along these lines incorporating stories from multiple speeches to discover what Athenians thought was a probable representation of how people acted even if they did not necessarily approve of such behavior. Chapter s 4 5 employ this method to draw conclusions about Athenia n beliefs on three key issues, that is, (1) how prevalent relationships of hostility were, (2) how citizens typically reacted to wrongs and pursued their enemies, and (3) how the state and social structures at Athens intervened to limit violence and feudin g. Ancient Athenian literature presents a relatively cogent picture in which relationships of enmity were a part of everyday life. Nearly every citizen could expect to have identifiable groups of friends and enemies. This resulted naturally from the vast a rray of ways to make enemies and to pass the relationship of enmity on to other people, which Chapter 5 addresses the possible responses to enemies. Retal i ation and vengeance formed a key part of the ethic of enmity. Athenians expected an individual who was wrong ed to seek redress whether in the courts or by informal means. Rarely was the right to seek vengeance questioned although democratic ideology did insist that retaliation on oth er citizens not be sought through violence Violent acts were limited, in the Athenian mind, by democratic institutions and the social cohesion of the demos


33 The Athenian belief in the sacrosanctity of the citizen body put severe limits on h ow far enemies could go in physically assaulting each other; violence was not condoned. Athenians thus envisioned themselves as participating in a society that combined elements both of a feuding mentality and of a non violent approach to the pursuit of en mity. Enmity and vengeance functioned within much more limited confines than the violent feuding societies of the Mediterranean discussed by Cohen (1995) Ye t Athenian males were not willing to give up their claims to honor or to insist on a non retaliatio (2006) insists. The ethic of harming enemies was seldom questioned, but neither was the prohibition on the use of physical force against other citizens. The Athenians conceptualized their society as ociety, but relatively non violent


34 CHAPTER 2 ENMITY IN PROSECUTION SPEECHES prosecutors mold their rhetorical use of enmity to fit the particular features of their cases, such as the procedure, the type of offense, and the history of the dispute. Although patterns exist, there is no single criterion by which one may predict whether a prosecutor will affirm or deny enmity. The details unique to the case at hand influence how a litigant portrays his relationship with his opponent. The second goal is to show that litigants do not treat their presentation of enmity as an end in itself, justifying their cases objectively, but rather as a means by which they can construct arguments about the case. In other words, speakers do not believe that the mere assertion or denial of a hostile relationship with their opponent can win favor simply by meeting the jury main assertions about the facts of the case, serving to support probability and character arguments. For instance, a prosecutor may deny enmity with the defendant so that he does not appear to be maliciously prosecuting a personal enemy on trumped up charges. On the other hand, a prosecutor may admit that his hatred for the defendant prompted him to bring suit in order to preempt the allegation that he has no personal stake in the case and therefore is using the courts for monetary gain. Yet another litigant may include a narrative of enmity so that he can describe specific incidents in an ongoing hostile relationship and thereby construct a character argument, portraying his opponent as a liar, sycophant, or monstrous villain. In all of these situat rhetorical use of enmity by defining the eikos differen t types of rhetorical techniques, including construction of character, can function as


35 implicit arguments from probability. The next four sections demonstrate how litigants employ affirmations, denials, and narratives of enmity in ways that fit within the broad definition of arguments from probability. They also elucidate possible strategies for presenting those shows how many prosecutors attempt a balancing act in their presentations of hostile relation ships both affirming enmity and denying responsibility for it. This strategy allows speakers to develop character arguments about both prosecutors usually employ the s trategy described in the previous section in order to establish a argues that litigants who brought a suit with special public interest tended to avoid the issue of enmity, either admittin g prosecutors usually affirm enmity but limit their narratives to the dispute at hand. In all of these sections one unifying theme will be continually highlighted: the use of enmity for character and probability arguments. While the techniques vary, prosecutors consistently interweave the issue of enmity with their main contentions about the facts of the case. The rhetoric of enmity serves as a vehicle through which a speaker may make character arguments and probability arguments which inform on the truth or falsehood of the respective Argument from Probability The eikos argument is a prominent feature of the extant Athenian law court sp eeches and is of special importan ce for the present study. 1 In the Rhetoric ( eikos usually, not absolutely, as some define it, but in regard to things 1 Gagarin (2007) shows that rational argument was important even in early Greek rhetoric (see also Carawan 1998, 21 8).


36 2 Aristotle reg ards the probability argu ment as essentially a syllogism 3 These arguments can be gleaned from those things th at either occur usually or are thought to occur usually are 4 prem that Demosthenes is the previous example the major and unstated premise in this syllogism is a m atter of personal opinion (thus ot support each other. 5 The Rhetoric to Alexander attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus, ties the argument from probability more closely to Probability, therefore, is that of which, when it is spoken, the listeners have examples in their minds. I say, for instance, that if anyone should assert that he wants his country to be great and his friends to do well and his enemies to 2 Arist. Rh 1 357a34 6 : 3 Goebel 1989, 42; Schmitz 2000, 49 50. 4 Arist. Rh 1402b14 16: has the element of uncertainty and therefore of probability, because it is based on what usually happens or is perceived to happen (Kennedy 1963, 97 simply describing the process of combining two statements to form a conclusion through deductive reasoning. 5 50. Kennedy (1963, 96 8) provides a helpful explanation of both syllogism and enthymeme and the difference between the two.


37 encounter misfortune and other similar thing s, overall these things will seem likely. For each of the listeners understands that he himself has these sorts of desires in regard to these and similar matters. Therefore, in our speeches we must always try to discover whether we will find our audience in sympathy with what we are saying. For it is probable that they will believe these things. 6 Anaximenes notes that a speaker must be in tune with the expectations and assumptions of his audience in order to make an effective argument from probability. The A ttic orators make extensive use of this type of reasoning, as a simple search for the word eikos mere word study to include arguments that do not include mention of the premi ses. For instance, Carey (1994a: 39 42) has noted how several speeches of Lysias (1, 3, 7, 16) employ a character to portray themselves in such a way that the j ury will not believe that they have acted in the speeches (prooemium, narration, proofs, and epilogue) are useful for analysis of a speech but not for descriptio n of its purpose since in this case, the narrative section actually functions in many 7 Therefore, character arguments, although they appear in the t sets of premises. This category of unstated or implied arguments from probability can also include background information on the trial. A speaker may narrate the history of the dispute to make claims about the truth of his own case or the falsehood of hi 6 [Arist.] Rh Al. 1428a23 34: 7 Lys 19). See also Scafuro 1997, 56 66.


38 recorded several examples of this strategy in the work of Demosthenes. In Against Timocrates (Dem. 24) the speaker, Diodorus, who evidently commissioned Demosthenes to write this speech for him, includes a lengthy narrative section on the former deeds of Timocrates (14 31) in order to prepare the way for his accusation (Pearson 1981, 66 7). Diodorus is prosecuting Timocrates by for proposing a law that would allow a state debtor to remain free unti l the ninth prytany of the year provided that he offered sureties for his obligation. 8 Diodorus claims that Timocrates has disregarded the principles of the Athenian le gal system and has attempted to 8). In the narrative portion of the speech Diodorus emphasizes how Timocrates had already become accustomed to ignoring the laws and justice. He allegedly sold his services as a proposer of legislation and then drafted a law that manifestly contradicted another law which he had previously proposed himself (41 oligar chic and anti introducing a law that is contrary to the democracy and the interests of ordinary citizens. Diodorus has conditioned the jury to accept his assertion that Timocrates and An drotion designed the legislation to allow their associates to retain their illegally gotten gains. While Against Timocrates shows how narration of the broader background of a dispute can Against Pantaenetus (Dem. 37) provides an example of how character evidence can inform on an implied argument of probability The speaker, Nicobulus, has lodged a a barring action which would invalidate the original prosecution by 8 A was a procedure for prosecuting an Athenian citizen who had proposed a law or decree that was illegal ( paranomos ), that is, contrary to the existing laws. Because it was a any citizen could bring this suit. Several extant speeches use this procedure (Dem. 18, 20, 22, 23, 24; Aeschin. 3; Hyp. 1, 2). See Lipsius 1905 15, 383 96; Hansen 1974; MacDowell 1978, 50 2.


39 Pantaenetus. 9 This speech contains a complex and confu sing narrative, but only one aspect of it how Pantaenetus gathered a gang of thugs to intimidate people, employing reprehensible methods for obtaining illegal ver dicts in various lawsuits. The speaker accuses Pantaenetu s of sycophancy multiple times and supports the accusation by listing his dishonest prosecutions. 10 11 Demosthenes engages in character assassination against Pantaenetus not merely t o induce the jurors to hate him but to convince them that it is likely that his prosecution of t he speaker is the latest in a long series of vexatious lawsuits. 12 The Rhetoric to Alexander makes this connection between character evidence and opponents themselv 13 defendants, because they are the ones on trial, often must make arguments based on their own leas must especially show that neither they nor any of their friends have ever done any of the things 9 If a citizen believed that he was ind icted illegally, he could bring a against his prosecutor. The litigants would then switch roles, the defendant now prosecuting the original prosecutor for an unlawful prosecution. If the man who was originally the defendant won the tr ial, then the first lawsuit was voided. See Lipsius 1905 15, 846 58; Harrison ii. 1968 71, 106 24; MacDowell 1978, 214 17, 219. 10 Dem. 37.2, 3, 8, 13, 17, 18, 24, 35, 41, 45, 49, 52, 53. 11 Dem. 37.48: 12 Another example is Demosthenes 36 ( For Phormio 49). 13 [Arist.] Rh. Al. 1428b13:


40 of which they are 14 Such arguments from probability, whether based on character, the broader background, or an explic itly formulated eikos statement, are integral to speeches that contain references to enmity between litigants. The following sections will demonstrate that prosecutors frequently employ enmity to make character and probability arguments about their cases. Affirming Enmity but Denying Culpability enmity. A prosecutor who employs this tactic often asserts that he has known his opponent for a long period of time and has gaine d firsthand knowledge about his despicable behavior. Such a narrative provides a forum for the speaker to show that the defendant has already committed many offenses and therefore would have been acting in a manner consistent with his character if he had c ommitted the offense of which he is accused. In this way the character assassination, which is grounded in a narrative of enmity, supports an argument from probability about the charges. Yet a prosecutor had to recognize that his narrative of enmity, the v ery device that provided an opportunity for character assassination, could also undercut his argument when not handled in the proper fashion. If the speaker focused on his own role in pursuing a feud, he could l behavior by admitting that he had done his part in provoking him. An effective character argument must portray the opponent as aggressive, attacking when unprovoked, and excessive in his pursuit of innocent people. There must be no mitigating factors to excuse his behavior. Therefore, prosecutors who affirm enmity with their opponents to engage in character assassination must stop short of admitting that they themselves 14 [Arist.] Rh. Al. 1428b23 6:


41 have been engaging actively in the feud. A balancing act becomes necessary: the speaker must show that enmity exists, but also that he himself neither started it nor pursued it. If this balance could be maintained a narrative of enmity provided an effective way to Rh. Al. 1428b). Demosthenes employs this tactic against Aristogiton, freely admitting that he and Aristogiton had a long history of animosity but omitting any reference to his own pursuit of the feud. Accor ding to Demosthenes, the members of the Assembly forced him to be one of the prosecutors in this trial although Demosthenes was hesitant to participate (25.13). While enmity was not his reason for prosecuting, Demosthenes does not shrink from using the his tory of his relationship with Aristogiton to attack his character (36 9). 15 He includes a narrative of enmity to show that Aristogiton has abused the legal system many times, as he allegedly will at tempt to do in the present case. I know well that this man will avoid the true and just method of making a defense and will digress by abusing, slandering, and threatening to prosecute, to make an arrest, to deliver to prison. But all of these things, if you keep your focus correctly, will not help him. For which of these strategies has not been exposed many times before? 16 Demosthenes expects Aristogiton to employ diversionary tactics to distract the jury from the real hav e lodged graphai against me seven times since you hired yourself out to those who were 15 Typically affirmations of enmity come in the prooemium of a speech since assertions about motivation were expected at the outset (see below). In Demosthenes 25, however, the admission of enmity with Aristogiton does not occur until almost halfway t hrough the oration. This is an indication that the narrative of hostility is not intended to 16 Dem. 25.36:


42 supporting Philip at that time, and you have accused me at my euthynai 17 Supposedly the jury found that Aristogiton was lying on each occasion and convicted him o f sycophancy (37). unscrupulous behavior and provides the foundation for an implicit argument from probability allegation is that Aristogiton failed to pay a fine and is a state debtor. 18 If Demosthenes can demonstrate that Aristogiton has acted as a dishonest and sycophantic attacker on multiple previous occasions, the jury will be more ready to believe that Arist ogiton incurred a fine during one of his vexatious lawsuits, refused to pay it and now illegally exercises the rights of a citizen (4). 19 support arguments about the spea enmity to this end must perform the same balancing act although for slightly different reasons. He affirms enmity to defend himself against the charge of having no personal stake in the legal ac tion since he might therefore appear to be acting out of lust for money or other ignoble reasons. Because Athenians believed that certain citizens brought false charges to blackmail others, prosecutors naturally desire to preempt this allegation, which wou ld constitute a damaging blow to their credibility. At the same time, prosecutors do not overemphasize their personal hatred for their enemies since this could leave them open to the charge of attacking their 17 Dem. 25. 37: 18 The procedure was endeixis which was very similar to since in both types of case the prosecutor could arr est the accused. In endeixis the plaintiff would apparently lodge a charge with the magistrate and thereafter have the option of making an arrest himself, whereas in the plaintiff would arrest the accused first. See Lipsius 1905 15, 317 37; Harriso n ii. 1968 71, 221 31; MacDowell 1978, 75. 19 5). The character assassination preempts any attempt by Aristogiton to establish his own good char acter and argue that he is not the sort of person that would commit such crimes.


43 rivals out of malice and envy. Jurors were awar e that personal animosities could lead to trumped up charges and excessive litigation. The strategy of affirming enmity and denying culpability could therefore allow a prosecutor both to portray his opponent in a negative light and to demonstrate his own m otivation for bringing the suit. For instance, the main prosecutor of Against Neaera Theomnestus, includes a narrative of enmity that portrays his opponent as malicious attacker and at the same time defends his motives for prosecuting ([Dem.] 59.1 10). Th eomnestus shows that his opponent, Stephanus, has a history of harassing him and his brother in law, Apollodorus, who speaks as a s y 20 This rhetorical strategy fits the needs of this particular type of case, a that awarded one third of the proceeds of the trial to the successful volunteer prosecutor. 21 Because monetary reward s were thought to encourage expense, 22 the plaintif f in such a suit often finds it expedient to dispel suspicion by denying that such base motivations are at the core of his prosecution. On the other hand, a is a public procedure so a simple declaration of private enmity as the primary reason for the suit would not prove salutary either. Because private enemies are likely to trump up charges in order to harm 20 Although the main actors in this lawsuit are ostensibly Theomnestus, the prosecutor, and Neaera, the defendant, neither is the most important personality involved. The case is part of a larger feud between Apollodorus and primarily serves to introduce his father in law Apollodorus, who delivers the bulk of the argumen t as a Theomnestus narrates two previous actions brought by Stephanus against Apollodorus in his short speech (3 10) while Apollodorus states several times that he is the de facto prosecutor (121, 124, 125, 126). See Carey 1992, 4 5; Kapparis 19 99, 29 31. 21 Theomnestus is prosecuting Neaera, a prostitute who has reached mature years. He and Apollodorus aim to prove that Neaera is not a citizen but has been cohabitating with Stephanus and claiming they are lawfully married with legitimate offspri ng. The plaintiff, Theomnestus, and his Apollodorus must show both that Neaera and Stephanus have been acting as if they are lawfully married and that the marriage is in fact illegal. If they are successful, Neaera will be sold into slavery, while her hus band will be forced to pay a fine of one thousand drachmas (16). As a reward for bringing suit as a volunteer, the prosecutor is entitled to one third of the proceeds from the sale of Neaera (Carey 1992, 8 12; Kapparis 1999, 31 43). 22 The Athenians institu ted a penalty designed to prevent such abuse of this procedure. See p. 15 n. 21


44 their opponents, the jury may be wary of a sp eaker who presents himself as relentlessly pursuing a vendetta. 23 The prosecutor must achieve a balanc e between these two dangerous extremes. motives functioning almost as an apology f or the court action. The first section provides a template for how Theomnestus will present the history of animosity be There were many things that prompted me to indict Neaera with this and to come before you. For we, my father in law, my sister, my wife, and myself, have been severely wronged by Stephanus and have come into extreme danger because of him. Therefore, I will carry out this trial not as the one who started it but as on e who is taking revenge. He started the relationship of enmity although he never suffered any ill from us either in word or deed. I want to explain to you first what we have suffered from him so that you might more readily pardon me because I am acting in self defense, and then how we came into extreme danger of exile and disfranchisement. 24 In this preamble the two themes of affirming enmity but denying responsibility for it are immediately visible. Although Theomnestus admits hostility toward Stephanus, he argues that the blame is not his since Stephanus started it ( ). 25 Stephanus also has persistently aggravated the feud as Theomnestus will show in the narrative section of his speech (2 10). Theomnestus asserts that he i s prosecuting Stephanus for personal grievances for which he echthra ) to describe their relationship although he is bringing a public suit in which the jury typically would believe that 23 Cf. Dem. 23.1, 190; Lycurg. 1.6, where the legitimacy of private enmity is denied. In public suits, defendants can attack the motivations of the prosecutor by claiming that enmity is the driving force and that their opponents are maliciously attacking them on trumped up charges (see Chapter 3). 24 [Dem.] 59.1: 25 This phrase was probab ly a proverbial expression in iambic trimeter (Kapparis 1999, 168).


45 their inter ests were at stake. 26 Theomnestus demonstrates the length and intensity of the hostility have exacerbated the hostile relationship. At the same time, Theomnestus carefully presents Stephanus as the aggressor on each occasion. First, Stephanus brought a malicious against Apollodorus for proposing a decree concerning th e appropriation of public funds although Apollodorus was supposedly acting with th 27 All the that he [Apollodorus] suffe 28 Stephanus succeeded in deceiving the jurors in his indictment of Apollodorus for an illegal decree ( ) and gained a conviction by producing witnesses who gave false testimony and speaking about irrelevant matters. 29 Apollodorus and his associates were willing to over look this malicious prosecution but s to make concessions on the assessment of the penalty (6). Stephanus attempted to impose a severe penalty that would effectively disfranchise Apollodorus and his family (7 8). After failing to achieve this goal, Stephanus accused him of homicide and made a proclamation at the Palladion, hoping to have Apollodorus expelled from 26 ) citizens. This regulation was intended to prevent foreigners from simulating a lawful marr iage between Athenians and smuggling illegitimate offspring into the ranks of the citizens (Kapparis 1999, 203 6). This therefore concerned a public matter, the preservation of a citizen body that was descended from autochthonous ancestors. 27 [Dem .] 59.4: 28 [Dem.] 59.5: 29 [Dem.] 59.5:


46 Attica (9). 30 The charge was groundless, Theomnestus asserts since it later became evident that s. He had even dared to perjure himself by calling down an oath which invoked destruction on himself and his family, swearing to something he knew to be false (10). em phasizes the restraint that he and Apollodorus exhibited (12). He was not the aggressor ( 1) Stephanus started the whole affair although he had received no injury from Theomnestus or his family (1). Theomnestus appears to have been quite reluctant to involve himself in the quarrel since he requir ed prodding from friends and family before he made the decision to seek revenge: Everybody came up to me privately and exhorted me to take vengeance for the things I had suffered because of him. They also reproached me for being the most unmanly of men if, although I was very close to these people, I did not exact justice for my sister, father in law, nieces, and my own wife. 31 provocation of the feud 15). Neither Theomnestus nor his family bears responsibility for how hostilit ies ha ve escalated. The blame may be laid squarely on Stephanus and his friends. The character evidence developed in this narrative informs directly on the prosecut credibility as accusers. By presenting his relationship with Stephanus in this way, Theomnestus 30 Someone who made an accusation of murder would make a proclamation that banned the suspected murderer from entering the agora and other holy places important to the city. This prevented possible miasma (religious pollution) from staining the city ( IG I 3 104. 20 3; [Dem.] 43.57). See MacDowell 1963, 17, 23 5; Parker 1983; Carawan 1998, 17 20; Gagarin 2002, 109 12; Phillips 2008, 62. 31 [Dem.] 59.12: < >


47 lust for the one third reward but rather from Theomnestus Stephanus for his bad behavior. However, because he affirms his hatred for the defendants, the speaker must also guard against the suspicion that he is maliciously harassing Stephanus and his family to settle a private score in pursuit of a feud. 32 Theomnestus counters this problem by in responding to his injuries. His implicit argument from probability then suggests that if he was willing to ove rlook many offenses in the past, he is unlikely to bring a prosecution on a trumped up charge at the present. The story of the background of the dispute also serves as a forum for providing evidence Stephanus deceived the jury by produ cing false witnesses (5). Later he brought a false char ge against Apollodorus ( 9) and was caught doing so. He also lied under oath ( 10). Theomnestus, on the other hand, has been reserved throughout the affair and now asks the jury to vote according to the truth of his charge ( 15). Theomnestus may be trusted, but Stephanus has proved himself an unscrupulous liar on many occasions. credibility of the opposing parties and thus creates probability arguments about the facts of the case. Theomnestus, like any other litigant, desires first and foremost to convince the jury that his case represents the correct version and interpretation o f events. He crafts a narrative of enmity 32 15). That he is attacking a seemingly harmless old woman could lead the jurors to the conclusion that Apollodorus is pursuing a vendett a over a trivial affair. The restraint that Theomnestus attributes to Apollodorus helps to combat this problem.


48 that will make his charge seem more likely to be true. Theomnestus affirms enmity to deny sycophantic motivations while he also guards against the charge of malicious prosecution based exclusively on personal satis faction. At the same time Theomnestus engages in character assassination against Stephanus, painting him as a consummate liar, while he asserts that his own claims are based on the true facts. Against Neaera provides an example of the importance of recogn iz ing the structure of arguments based on narratives of enmity to avoid drawing conclusions that do not take into account the rhetorical purposes of the speech. Herman (2006) cites this oration as an example of this cas to being wronged. Theomnestus does not represent Apollodorus and himself as restrained because that is how all Athenians would expect him to act but rather because this character attempts to downplay personal vengeance in this speech fail to take into account how they reinforce the character portrayal of Stephanus within the overall argument. This passage cannot as the only acceptable way to respond t portrayal of Stephanus as a hybristic and unprovoked attacker. 33 33 Against Timocrates ) and Lysias 14 ( Against Alcibiades ) in the same passage (2006, 191 3) is similarly pro blematic. Both speakers portray themselves as exercising restraint and paint


49 When a prosecutor employs enmity to attack his o motivations for bringing the suit, he makes a legal argument about key issues in the trial. Athenian jurors were not opposed to the use of background information and character evidence because they believed that if a p erson had acted in a certain way in the past, he was likely to act in the same way in the future. When Apollodorus prosecuted the brothers Nicostratus and Arethusius, he included a lengthy narrative of their dishonest and spiteful behavior in order to atta ck their credibility as speakers and to support the reliability of his own version of the facts ([Dem.] 53.4 18). 34 Apollodorus asserts that he and Nicostratus are enemies but is also careful to point out that Nicostratus has consistently been the aggressor Apollodorus composed Against Nicostratus like Against Neaera for a procedure that entailed a monetary reward to the successful prosecutor. 35 Therefore, he starts his speech by addressing the possible suspicion that he is seeking profit by his court acti on: Let the seriousness of the and the fact that I myself have brought the prosecution prove to you that I have lodged this not because I am acting as a sycophant but because I have been wronged and treated outrageously by these men and think that I should take venge ance. 36 their opponents as shameless and malicious people who would likely commit the offenses of which they are accused. The speakers are not asserting categorically that it was illegiti rhetorical strategies of Demosthenes 24 and Lysias 14, see 37 8, 69 n. 88). 34 Although Apollodorus actually prosecutes Arethusius, the brother of Nicostratus, one can see from the narrative section of the speech that this court case is part of a larger dispute between Apollodorus and Nicostratus, into which other parties and family members have been drawn. 35 The procedure was an ) of items is entitled to one third of the proceeds from the sale of the property by the poletai belong to Arethusius and not, as the defense claims, to Nicostratus, his brother. 36 [Dem.] 53.1:


50 In a string of four causal participles, Apollodorus asserts both the grounds for the prosecution and the impetus behind it. His motivation is not maliciousness or greed but rather revenge, based on wrongs and insults that he has suffered at the hand s of the defendant. Apollodorus ties his motivation for prosecuting to the reality of the offenses committed. 37 His desire for revenge demonstrates that his charges are true since there must be a real offense that has caused him to seek vengeance. The jury may know, Apollodorus argues, that he is not falsifying charges because he has brought the suit himself rather than enlisting another person to prosecute for him. He risks a fine of one thousand drachmas in a suit over slaves valued at only two and a half minae, one forth as much, 38 and hazards being barred from acting as a volunteer prosecutor in the future (1 2). His appearance in court over such a measly sum at great personal risk proves both that his motivation for revenge is legitimate and that he has b een wronged. I lodged the because I considered it the most terrible thing in human affairs to be wronged myself but to put forward the name of another on my own behalf, although I was the one who was wronged and because I think that this would be proof for my opponents that I am lying whenever I talk to you about my enmity (for another would not have lodged the if I myself had been wronged). 39 Ni costratus and his associates and about their criminal behavior. If he had not appeared as the 37 The syntax of the senten ce reflects this. The first participle ( ) is without an accompanying explanation real offenses ( ). Sycophantic charges are naturally baseless while those who have suffered some wrong the jury, the wrongs I have suffered at their hands for which I lodged th e 19). 38 One mina is equivalent to one hundred drachmas. Thus, two and a half minae amounts to two hundred fifty drachmas. 39 [Dem.] 53.2:


51 prosecutor, the jury would know that he has no personal stake in the matter and is quite possibly lying ( ) since he would be running no risk in the tri al. Apollodorus explains his actions here, showing that behind them lies a basis in fact. Motivation is an important concern wrongdoing. While Apollodorus asserts that his enmity with Nicostratus led him to prosecute, he is also aware that excessive emphasis on his hostility towards the defendant could leave him open to the cha rge of prosecuting him out of sheer spite, fabricating a charge in an attempt to harm his adversary. 40 To preempt such an allegation, he shows that Nicostratus was at fault for starting ovoked and outrageous abuses. 41 him, stole his furniture, and vandalized his property (14 16). He attempted to trick Apollodorus into beating an Athenian citizen so that he could be prosecuted for hybris and, finally, ambushed 40 Lysias 23 ( Against Pancleon ) attempts to avoid a similar charge: wanted to commit outrage against someone rather than to be getting justice for the wrongs I suf 5). The speaker admits enmity with the defendant, but emphasizes that his desire to take vengeance is based on actual wrongs that deserve punishment, not trum ped up charges. 41 Since Apollodorus had been on the friendliest of terms with Niocstratus, his behavior appears that much worse. Apparently Apollodorus was accustomed to trust Nicostratus with his personal affairs (4 5). He includes the apparently irreleva nt comment that he had given two slaves to Nicostratus as a gift (6). He provided a loan of three hundred drachmas to free Nicostratus from slavery in Aegina (6 7), which he later forgave in full (8 9), even providing an additional sum to pay for Nicostrat 11). Nicostratus considered him a better friend that his to me for what I did for him, he immediately plotted against me to rob me of the money and to bring me into enmity 13).


52 him on the road between Piraeus and Athens (16 17). Apollodorus, on the other hand, retaliated only rarely and, when he did, he sought redress through the courts (15, 18). 42 This account, if the jury fi nds it credible, removes suspicions that Apollodorus has attacked the family of Nicostratus with false allegations to settle a score. If he has put up with so many wrongs, it does not seem likely that he would be making up such a minor charge as one concer ning slaves worth two and a half minae. Likewise if Nicostratus, Arethusius, and their associates have committed so many crimes with no thought to the interests of other citizens or the state, the jury may find it probable that he would collude in deceivin g the state as implicitly supports the veracity of the charges. 43 that Apollodo rus uses to qualify Nicostratus as a sycophant, while portraying himself as Cohen, a litigant who demonstrates that his motivation for prosecuting is a good one is making character. Against Nicostratus purportedly suppo maintained here, however, that Apollodorus does not advance character arguments about who 42 The story of how Apollodorus and Nicostratus became enemies after previously being friends mirro rs a fragmentary passage from Lysias ( P. Oxy. 1606 Fr. 6 col. iv). This speaker argues that he was previously a friend to the defendant, in order to make it seem more likely that he actually did loan money to him, which is the point at dispute. Like Apollo dorus in [Demosthenes] 59, Lysias uses a past friendship with the opponent to establish a claim of probability while admitting that the two litigants have now come to enmity. 43 Cf. Demosthenes 24 ( Against Timocrates ), in which the speaker, Diodorus, predic ts that the jury will want to narrative details how Timocrates has repeatedly attacked him with no provocation (6 10).


53 t rather to support an argument from probability about who is telling the truth about the offense on trial. It is not character evidence per se that is vital to the case but narrative does in fact give him legitimacy, but this legitimacy arises from the probability argument about who is more likely to lie, not from his character in itself. 44 Establishing Motive for Assault While many prosecutors attempt the balanci ng act of affirming enmity and denying culpability for starting or continuing it, a litigant who accused his opponent of assault was especially likely to employ this rhetorical strategy. This follows logically from the nature of the charge; an assault on o believable that the defendant assaulted him, the prosecutor must provide a motive for the attack. On the other hand, he must also avoid portraying himself as aggressive and vindictiv e so that he does not provide the defendant with an opportunity to argue that they were equally at fault and that they traded blow for blow. The prosecutor must affirm enmity to provide a rationale for his prove that his opponent was the one responsible for escalating hostilities. All prosecutors who allege physical assault against their own persons affirm enmity with their opponents (Dem. 21, 54). 45 In his famous oration, Against Meidias Demosthenes shapes his 44 A similar problem occur second section of Against Nicostratus on does not on its own merits justify his prosecution so that the jury feels obliged to vote for him because his qualities as a person, but rather provides an implicit argument from probability that he is telling the truth. 45 Several speeches allege murder an offense that certainly qualifies as physical assault but also changes the rhetorical situation. Speakers who prosecute for murder do not necessarily address the issue of enmity between themselves and their opponents since this does not inform on motiv e. Rather, a prosecutor in a homicide trial will show that enmity existed between the defendant and the deceased to provide a motive for the murder. For instance, the speaker of Antiphon 1 claims that his stepmother intentionally murdered his father, claim ing that she had been


54 claim that Meidias punched him with the intent of inflicting shame and dishonor ( hybris ) in a public venue. 46 At the same time, he desires to appear nei ther to lack a personal stake in the prosecution nor to be motivated solely by enmity. Therefore, he asserts that he and Meidias had been enemies for a long time but also carefully points out that Meidias, not he, has been the aggressor. 47 Demosthenes fully admits his longstanding enmity with Meidias and narrates it at length. The audience learns that two years previously Meidias had hatched a plot to thwart vindictive so that the jury will accept that she poisoned her spouse. On the other hand, Lysias prosecutes Eratosthenes fo r murder (Lys. 12) but includes contains no such affirmation of enmity between the Eratosthenes and 23). This trial may be treated as exceptional since it concerns an offense committed by a former member of the Thirty. Lysias wants to go beyond simply showing that Eratosthenes was guilty of murder and prove that he was utterly reckless and out of control. This may also be the case for Lysias 13, which also concerns another murder committed during the rule of the Thirty. However, the speaker may be affirming enmity between the deceased Dionysodorus and the alleged murderer Agorat 46). Isocrates 20 ( Against Lochites ) does not include explicit affirmation of enmity with the opponent, but it is fragmentary and so does not necessarily shed light on the pattern. 46 The expl icit language of hybris in Demosthenes 21 led some scholars to conclude that it was a Currently, there is a growing scholarly consensus that the procedure was actually a two stage type of litigation called although Harris (2008, 79 81) maintains that the preliminary trial at the Assembly was a but that Demosthenes 21 was written for a lodged two years later. The only evidence for the comes from this prosecution of Meidias and the examples of other prob olai that Demosthenes enumerates in sections 175 80. An Athenian citizen had the right to notify the prytaneis (the members of the Council responsible for arranging the meetings) that he intended to accuse someone of committing an injustice concerning a fe stival ( ). The prytaneis then placed the action on the agenda of the Assembly for the first day after the festival. In the first stage of the procedure the prosecutor and the defendant each gave a speech before the Assembly. The Assembly in turn voted for or against the defendant although this vote was strictly prejudicial. It was up to the prosecutor to bring the suit to trial in the dicastic court. Presumably, the second stage of the resembled a trial. As Demosthenes reports, he already obtained a favorable verdict from the Assembly; he composed Against Meidias for the second phase of the procedure, the jury court trial. The best discussion of the available can be found in MacDowell 2002, 13 17. See also Harris 1989, 1 30 31; 1992, 73 4; Rowe 1994. 47 It has been debated whether or not this speech was actually delivered. Aeschines says that Demosthenes dropped the suit in return for thirty minae (3.52). On the basis of this statement, many scholars, noting inconsistencies and defects in its style, argued that the speech is incomplete and was never delivered. Others, however, have cast doubt 118 21) discusses t he history of scholarship on this problem, as does MacDowell (2002, 24 5). MacDowell (2002, 26 not delivered in the form that has been transmi tted. Thus, the extant oration may represent a draft of the speech, which may or may not have been delivered.


55 (14 18). 48 He opposed the release of horus members from their military duty and attempted to destroy the sacred competition and then tried to buy off the archon (the state official responsible fo r organizing the Dionysia). 49 He finally abandoned intrigue and adopted more forceful methods, sabotaging the props for the production. Yet the history of hatred between these two goes farther back than that. The feud originated when Meidias incited Thrasy antidosis (77 82). 50 Although Demosthenes won a conviction for slander against him, Meidias ejectment ( ). Me idias later responded by hiring a known sycophant, Euctemon, to prosecute Demosthenes for desertion from the army (102 3), voicing abroad that he had murdered a certain Aristarchus (104 10), and attacking him viciously at his dokimasia (111). Meidias desir es to harm Demosthenes at all costs, caring nothing for the validity of his claims: 48 The alleged offense occurred at the Dionysia in the spring of 348 B.C., while the trial took place in 347/6. 49 Athens had nine archons The arch on basileus trials for homicide. The eponymous archon was responsible for overseeing various social matters, including the festivals mentioned above. The polemarch originally a leader in the Athenian army, was in charge of resident aliens (metics) and other foreigners. The remaining six archons were called thesmothetai rs of law, such as cases of See Lipsius 1905 15, 339 451; Harrison ii. 1968 71, 7 17; MacDowell 1978, 24 7. 50 An antidosis was a procedure whereby a wealthy Athenian citizen could avoid performing a liturgy, which was an expensive task. If someone who had been assigned a liturgy believed that there was another Athenian who had more wealth and had not been given a liturgy to perform, he could challenge that person to an antidosis The challenged individual could then choose between taking on the liturgy himself or exchanging property between with his challenger. Demosthenes was involved in an antidosis during the prosecution of his guardians for mismanagement of the estate which his father had left to him. On antidosis see Harrison ii. 196 8 71, 236 8; MacDowell 1978, 162 4; Gabrielsen 1987; MacDowell 2002, 1 2; Christ 1990; Christ 2006, 159 60, 197 8.


56 51 Meidias, Demosthenes asserts, is out of control. The rheto rical use of enmity in the Against Meidias follows the pattern found in other thus to develop a character portrait. Meidias has proved on multiple occasions throughout his life that he is the sort of person who would assault an enemy at any opportunity and would attempt to on of the dispute, if accepted, leaves the audience sympathetic to the idea that Meidias would have attacked Demosthenes with hubristic intent and in total disregard of the laws and justice even while Demosthenes was acting in his official capacity as chor us supports an implicit argument about the probability that Meidias would commit the crime in question. Because Demosthenes employs a narrative of enmity to make arguments about the facts of the case there is no need to posit an extra legal function for his rhetoric. In other words, he does not attempt to convince the jury to vote for him based on the social dynamics of the feud. Rather, Demosthenes narrates his feud with Meidias in a way that works within the overall structure of Other scholars, however, have cited Against Meidias as evidence for precisely such extra legal appeals to legitimacy. Cohen and Herman, although their conclusions are diametrically opposed, sympathetic to him because of who he is without reference to the truth of claims. Cohen (1995 51 Dem. 21.114:


57 92 persons to prevail Herman (2006 169 ) argues that Demosthenes quotes the violen t stories of Euthynus values of Athenians norms of behavior constitutes a valid r eason to ask the jurors for a favorable vote beyond the factual questions of the dispute. Such an idea is unwarranted, however, because Demosthenes uses the rhetoric of enmity to make probability and character arguments rather than merely to demonstrate hi s objective moral hybris against him. In anticipation of an argument Meidias will allegedly make, Demosthenes atte mpts to dispel suspicions that he is prosecuting 52 To counter this argument, D emosthenes asserts that the grounds for the charge are not personal 35), 53 34). 54 Demosthenes continually emphasizes that Me idias has committed many wrongs, stressing that these acts (not an evaluation of the two 52 Dem. 21.29: 53 Cf. Dem. 47.41 for the argument that an act against a public official constitutes a crime against the state. 54 ould have initiated a private case follows a similar vein (25 28). Demosthenes emphasizes throughout the speech that Meidias has committed an offense against someone acting in the capacity of a public servant, not against a private individual. Meidias is t he one who ignores the common good and pursues private vendettas (61).


58 ow that Meidias here has committed outrage not only against me but also against you and the laws and everybody else, 55 Likewise, when Demosthenes anticipates that Meidias will ask why all the people he supposedly wronged have n ot come forward (141), Demosthenes retorts to not done any of the things of which I have accused him, if he is able. And if he is not able, he ought all th 56 The deeds of Meidias are on trial, not the relative social standing of the two disputants. While in Against Meidias Demosthenes emphasized his enmity with Meidias to an extent unique among the Attic orators, in another speech that concerned an offense against the body he took a different strategy, deemphasizing the enmity between prosecutor and defendant. In Against Conon the speaker, Ariston, must of course admit enmity with the defendant because of the nature of the accusation, t hat Conon beat Ariston almost to death. If he had denied that there was any hostility between himself and Conon, Ariston would have seriously undercut the most obvious motive for the crime. Nevertheless, Ariston goes beyond the typical motif of portraying his opponent as the aggressor and paints himself as an entirely passive victim. Ariston does not provide the wealth of background information that Demosthenes does in Against Meidias nor ut he still he succeeds in portraying his opponent as an utterly hubristic and despicable bully who attacked an innocent 55 Dem. 21.7: 56 Dem. 21.142:


59 of outrageous conduct that has fascinated many readers throughout the years with its shocking details. 57 ( echthra Dem. 54.3), he mentions only two specific incidents and very much downplays his own sided. The event that precipitated the offense on trial occurred while Ariston was on military duty at Panactum where he had the misfortune of finding himself stationed in a were in the habit of drinking each day immediately after breakfast and spending their spare time harassing other citizens. They began pestering Ariston and his comrades, eventually driving them to make a co out for abuse, nor did he alone protest their conduct. He narrates the incident from the perspective of his group of messmates ( 4) and makes frequent use of first personal plural constructions ( 3; 3; 3; 4; 4; 4). He likewise stresses that they complained to the general en masse: us messmates related the affair to the general together, not I alone apart from the 58 Ariston avoids portraying the incident as the genesis of a private feud between Conon and himself but rather asserts that Conon and his friends committed offense s against the entire army. This could hardly be called the beginning of a real relationship of enmity since Ariston, who was simply one of many who complained about Conon and his friends, resolved to ignore the whole business once they left the camp (6). O ) 57 Dionysius of Halicarnassus ( Dem 13) cites Against Conon e of the most frequently read and discussed orations of Demosthenes. 58 Dem. 54.4:


60 forget the whole affair. Rather than treating this incident as the beginning of a bona fide hostile relationship, A riston simply uses it to set the background for the heinous act of hybris that he intends to relate. 59 believable. 60 The second incident that Ariston recounts includes the specific offe nse that is on trial. After they get back to Athens from military duty, Conon and his friends assault Ariston while he is out on a stroll, pin down his companion Phanostratus, and beat Ariston mercilessly. They strip him of his cloak, push him down into th e mud, and punch him. As a final insult, Conon imitates the sound of a victorious fighting cock and beats his elbows against his sides like wings (7 9). Throughout the narrative Ariston portrays himself as completely passive. He does not even mention that he or Phan ostratus offered any resistance. Phanostratus and held him down. Conon here and his son and the son of Andromenes fell upon me and first took off my cloak, and then, after they tripped me and threw me into the mud, they jumped on me and beat me outrageously so that they split my lip and made my eyes swell shut. 61 All of the verbal forms in this passage are active, with Conon, his son, and the son of Andromenes as subjects and Ariston as the object. In recapping the same events later in the 59 That Conon would allow his sons to commit such terrible crimes reflects poorly o 6). 60 Pearson (1981, 6 family went back to the incident at the camp and that Conon had exacted legitimate retaliation for a previous wrong. For this reason, Ariston emphasizes that the complaints to the generals were not his doing. 61 Dem. 54.8:


61 62 Ariston denies that he provoked Conon in any way and omits reference even to an attempt at self defense. 63 Because Ariston accuses Conon of a violent crime against the body of a citizen, he finds it 64 Whereas prosecutors commonly inform their audiences of the ways in which th ey have retaliated, Ariston strives to omit anything that could implicate him as a participant in a long standing feud. Rather, against Conon and others like him It is unusual for a prosecutor in a private case to call explicitly for the jury to be angry at the defendant, 65 but Ariston can make this request for a couple of reasons. First, the extremely abusive behavior of Conon and his friends and their assault on the body of an Athenian citizen make this crime virtually a public concern, as Ariston argues at the close of his speech (42 3). Second, Ariston asserts that the case itself is essentially a public suit since he could have prosecuted Conon by or a but chose a 62 Dem. 54.41: 63 Gagarin (2005, 366) posits that Ariston probably did defend himself and so is likely to be distorting the facts to appear restrained. 64 This close focus on the acts of the opponent is consistent with a technique described in the Rhetoric to Alexander : magnify good and bad actions, if you can show that the he acted with forethought, showing that he had thought about his actions long before, that he plotted them often, that he did them for a long period of time, that no one else before him had attempted s 1426a b). 65 Ru binstein 2004. Litigants were hesitant to assert that the jury had a moral injunction to be angry at the defendant unless the defendant had directly harmed the city itself. On anger in Athenian society, see also Harris 2001; Konstan 2006.


62 because of his youth (1). 66 The continued abusiveness of Conon and his friends detailed in therefore deserving of prosecution by them. 67 By showing how agonistic and violent Conon and his friends really are, Ariston conditions the jury to believe that he would commit such an outrageous crime. Ar iston even predicts that Conon will argue that such brutality is not an important matter and should be laughed off (13 23), a statement that no doubt is intended to seem despicable. 68 Ariston draws rt of person who would lie and present false witnesses. Do you think that those who break through walls and beat up people that happen to cross their path would hesitate to bear false witness on a tablet for each other, these men who have shared in such ex treme maliciousness, wickedness, shamelessness, and outrageous conduct ( hybris )? 69 d his friends are accustomed to beat people up and then lie for each other. would be inclined to take his side if he portrayed Conon as having attacked in the aggre ssive 66 Ariston preferr ed the private procedure for assault, 67 assassination against Conon is to the entire narrative. 68 Cohen (1 995, 119 30) argues that this anticipatory argument shows that Athenians accepted a certain amount of violence in society and thought it improper to go to court on such matters. However, Ariston is more likely to put n a sound argument. This cannot be used as evidence for what Conon would actually argue (see pp. 173 4). 69 Dem. 54.37:


63 is to emphasize the egregious nature of the crime so that the jury will be angry at Conon. Herman lieved that they [the jurors] would approve of a man who presented himself as frail and un cock cock like display of aggressive, upper 5). 70 The speaker does not emphasize his own passivity because he b elieves it the morally superior way of responding to restraint supports his character portrayal of Conon, which in turn supports an argument from probability about his main contention, that Conon committed hybris against h im. 71 find the whole affair outrageous and will have no sympathy for Conon. One cannot conclude that because Conon is a ghastly character in this narrative, no Athenian woul d have approved of aggressive and even violent behavior in pursuit of honor. Ariston has calculated his depiction of the whole incident to induce the jury to believe that the crime actually took place and that it was an egregious offense. The speaker does not address how one should react when wronged as a general rule of conduct. 72 The pattern evident in speeches delivered for charges of assault on the body demonstrates that the content and particular details of a trial can be more important in determining i ts rhetorical strategies than procedure alone. Although Against Meidias is a public suit and Against 70 Cf. Harris (2005) who cites 71 72 Herman (2006, 157 8) analyzes this speech along muc h the same lines in another place in his book. He asserts quite reasonably that Ariston draws out a dichotomy between his own actions and those of Conon in order to make oblematic is that he regards this speech as indicative of a broad theme in Athenian society whereby citizens were expected to under react to offenses. Ariston, however, does not speak to general trends; his depiction of himself as passive meets the legal n


64 Conon a private one, they both prosecute a similar sort of offense and employ enmity to develop rhetorical needs are determined by the exigencies of the case rather than simply procedure. Matters of State In many cases of a special public concern prosecutors avoid the issue of enmity as much as possible so as to avoid the appearance of bringing a pub lic suit for purely personal reasons. Some trials were so directly connected to the interests of the state that a focus on private motivation would probably not reflect favorably on the prosecutor. For instance, any court case that concerned the oligarchic regime of the Thirty inevitably involved the emotions of the entire 73 Likewise, Athenians viewed dokimasiai for public orators, suits for military dereliction, an d as intimately tied to public policy, the security of the state, and the system of law, respectively. A prosecutor who employed one of these procedures would be unwise to focus on his own relationship to the defendant while he accuses him of a crime against the state. In these trials prosecutors could choose from two strategies. Some speakers admit previous hostility with their opponents but only cursorily. After asserting enmity with the defendants, they then focus on matters of public con cern, leaving private animosities far behind. Discussion of enmity in these cases occurs only briefly, usually in the first part of the speech ( prooemium ), and then does not greatly factor into the rest of the argument. Other speaks deny enmity altogether to preempt any allegation of personal involvement. They eschew personal motivation for the lawsuit and free themselves to concentrate on the merits of their accusations. Their disinterested 73 evident in many of the preserved speeches (Wolpert 2002).


65 stance supports a probability argument that their claims are credi ble since they have no reason to lie. In some situations a denial of enmity would have been impossible. When Lysias accused Eratosthenes of murdering his own brother (Lys. 12), he could not credibly deny private motivation for bringing the suit. Such a hei have failed to elicit hostility from him. Because Eratosthenes was a member of the Thirty at the time of the alleged crime, however, it would have been disingenuous for Lysias to portray his suit as merely a private affair. Athenians viewed the Thirty as public enemies who became the body therefore had an interest in how the Thirty were remembered and depicted (W olpert 2002, 120 9). Consequently, after affirming his hatred for the defendant, Lysias quickly shifts the all have many reasons to be angry on personal and p 74 He maintains this focus on the public dimension of the trial for the rest of the oration. 75 Lysias 13 ( Against Agoratus ) is similar to Lysias 12 in that both speakers accuse a 76 Thi s prosecutor accuses a man in law, to his enemies among the Thirty. Allegedly, Dionysodorus identified Agoratus as his murderer before he died 74 Lys. 12.2: 75 prosecutors justify their lawsuits by revealing preexisting below). 76 The speaker of Lysias 13, however, uses a different procedure. He insti tuted a summary arrest ( ), by which the plaintiff led the accused before the Eleven, who were in charge of the state prison, and subsequently took him to trial before a jury. was an exceptional procedure because its initiation different from graphai and dikai Exce pt for the initiation period the trial would presumably have proceeded like a


66 (40 1). Since the speaker accuses Agoratu s of being responsible for the murder of his kinsman, took place under the brief rule of the Thirty and therefore have special significance for the interests of th e state. 77 The speaker attempts to integrate his own desire for revenge into the 78 He asserts that Agoratus caused damage both to himself and to the whole city in this one act (2). For this reason retribution by both groups is 79 After the prooemium the public dimension of the case clearly dominates while private enmity is marginalized. 80 Prosecutors who adopt this strategy often employ enmity merely to create arguments about enmity can function to dispel fears that they have no personal stake and are out for financial gain while the lack of sustained focus on enmity implicitly rejects the suspicion that they are motivated solely by pursuit of an enemy. For instance, Aeschines in Against Timarchus must 77 1). 78 Lys. 13.1: 79 Lys. 13.3: < > Cf. 92. 80 At the end of the oration the speaker fuses his own claims for vengeance for Dionysodorus with the men of the ( < > 92). The speaker alludes to the story he has already told about Dionysodorus imploring his family members for vengeance (41 2) and applies it to all those who died under the rule of the Thirty.


67 Timarchus and Demosthenes over the negotiations with Philip (Kurihara 2003, 472 ), 81 but he conspicuously avoids making his private affairs an i mportant concern in the trial. 82 Aeschines asserts that his opponents are his enemies but also strongly maintains that his prosecution benefits the state. Men of Athens, I have never indicted any citizen or caused anyone grief at their euthynai ; rather, I b elieve that I have shown myself levelheaded in all of these respects. But when I saw that the city was being greatly harmed by Timarchus here as he spoke to the Assembly contrary to the laws, and I was maliciously attacked myself as a private citizen I w ill demonstrate how in the rest of my speech I decided that it would be one of the most shameful things not to help the whole city, the laws, you, and myself. Because I knew that he was guilty of the things which you heard just a little while ago when th e scribe was reading the charges, I have brought this dokimasia against him. And thus it seems, men of Athens, that the customary sayings about public cases are not false since private enmities often correct public matters. 83 Aeschines boldly states that he prosecution of him. 84 At the same time, he carefully ties his own interests to those of the state. 81 This court action has been calculated to prevent Timarchus from bringing his own prosecution against Aeschines. Follow ing his role in the second embassy to Philip of Macedonia in 346, Aeschines had to undergo a customary exit examination ( euthynai colleagues and an opponent of Aeschi Aeschines countered with a (the present trial) and was evidently successful since Demosthenes mentions in a later speech that Timarchus was disfranchised (19 .283 6). 82 Aeschines says very little about the history of the political wrangling between himself, Timarchus, and 83 Aeschin. 1.1 2: ( ) 84 Even this admission ( ) has been carefully tied to public advantage. Aeschines labels Timarchus a sycophant, and therefore a public menace.


68 that he is 85 etween his motivation is subservient to the interests of the state. Even though he is indicting a private enemy, Aeschines attempts to make his own reasons for prose cuting appear secondary to the cause of justice. Aeschines emphasizes the public aspect of his trial to create a character argument about his own motivations. Aeschines portrays himself as a civic minded citizen concerned for the interests of the state, wh ich happen to coincide with his own interests in this case. Although he admits enmity, he does not stress it as the motivation for the lawsuit but rather emphasizes that he is not the type of person to pursue a private vendetta or trump up charges. 86 Aeschi nes does of himself but rather attempts to make an argument of probability about his case. Aeschines asserts emphatically that he has brought suit because his charge his true; he knows that Timarchus is guilty (cf. Lycurg. 1.5). Although the integration of private and public concerns is naturally more prominent in speeches composed for public procedures, a speaker in at least one private suit ([Demosthenes] 50) makes the same sort of claim. This particular case certainly has a public dimension to it since 85 Aeschines accuses Timarchus of prostituting himself while he was a youth and squandering his inheritance, two offenses which would disqu alify him from participating in the democracy as an Athenian citizen. 86 Men of Athens, I have never indicted any citizen or caused anyone grief at their euthynai ; rather, I believe that I have sho wn myself levelheaded in all of these respects ( ).


69 it concerns the office of trierarchy. 87 The speaker claims that the trial is not really between himself and Polycles but rather concerns the whole city ( 1). The prosecutor 88 In the following narrative the speaker emphasizes the public aspect of the trial and only recounts his hostile relationship with the defendant insofar as he must give details of the history of the dispute. Other speeches that concern matters of interest to the state include Lysias 14 (a suit for military dereliction) 89 and Demosthenes 22 and 24 ( ). 90 All of these speakers adopt the same strategy of attempting to deemphasize enmity as much as possible while still admitting it. This strategy provides two benefits for the prosecutor. First, he can affirm enmity in order to counter the claim that he is pursuing monetary gain or some other end. Second, he can 87 The trierarchy was a type of special duty pp. 139 40. 88 [Dem.] 50.1: 89 T he speaker of Lysias 14 ( Against Alcibiades ) asserts at the outset of his speech that his private enmity is compatible with the public concern of the charge. The jury needs to hear no excuse for why the speaker lodged the prosecution against Alcibiades since someone happens not to have been wronged by him, it is no less fitting to consider him an enemy for the other 1). The speaker later claims that the jury would be justified in considering Alcib 40). 90 Diodorus, the speaker of Demosthenes 24 ( Against Timocrates ), describes how Timocrates attacked him on several separate occasions (6 10), but is careful to assimilate his own grievances to those of the 6). D against the public (8). The focus then shifts from the brief narrative of enmity (6 10) to concentrate on the legal issues at stake for the rest of the speec h. Cf. Demosthenes 22 ( Against Androtion ) another speech for a which is similar in strategy to Demosthenes 24 although from the perspective of a The speaker the same Diodorus that delivered the Against Timocrates affirms the relationship of enmity between the prosecutor and defendant, bu t integrates the private and public elements of his plea men of the jury, because Euctemon [the prosecutor] has been wronged by Androtion he thinks it right to help the city and himself at the same time 1). At the beginning of the speech Diodorus includes a list of the prosecutions that Androtion has attempted against him (1 3), but then moves on to concentrate on the public welfare for the remainder of the sp eech.


70 also integrate his private interest with concern for the public good so that he avoids the charge of malicious litigation based on a private grievance. This rhetorical use of enmity therefore that he is telling the truth. An alternative way to address the tension between public interest and private motivation was to deny enmity altogether or obscure whether or not enmity existed. Litigants employ such strategies to preempt suspicions of excessive pursuit of personal interest and to provide an ly highlight their own sense of civic duty, portraying themselves as having the best interests of the state at heart and attempting to purge the city of a malefactor. 91 stance protects them from being accused of pursuing an ene my maliciously. Lycurgus employs this tactic in his prosecution of Leocrates on a rather nebulous charge of treason. 92 He denies enmity with Leocrates and focuses on the truth of his accusations. He prays to the gods that if Leocrates is guilty, he would be duly convicted and that, if Leocrates is innocent, he would be acquitted (1 2). Lycurgus presents himself as having only the guilt or innocence of the defendant in mind; no ulterior motives are allowed: Men of Athens, I brought this eisangelia because I k now that Leocrates has fled from the trials of the fatherland, has forsaken his own citizens, has entirely disregarded your power, and is guilty of the things that have been charged. I did not undertake this trial because of any personal enmity or contenti ousness or anything else but because I thought it shameful to watch this man enter the marketplace and 91 Probably for these reasons, most prosecutors who deny enmity initiated public suits (Lys. 22, 26, 31; Aeschin. 3; Dem. 19, 20, 21, 23; Lycurg. 1) The inverse conclusion, that public prosecutors tend to deny enmity, is not accurate (see pp. 76 9). 92 Phillip of Macedonia in the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. Leocrates, an Athenian citizen, allegedly fled the city with his family and as many of his possession as he could carry with him, sailed to Rhodes, and later went to Megara (17 21). For reasons that are unclear, he returned to Athens and soon found himself under prosecution by Lycurgus in 330 B.C. Lycurgus is apparently unable to point out a specific law that Leocrates has violated and instead attacks him on general grounds of cowardice and disloyalty to Athens.


71 share in public sacrifices while he has become an affront to both the fatherland and all of you. 93 He has not prosecuted because of enmity but rather beca use the offense actually occurred. 94 The legal action is grounded in fact, Lycurgus argues, not in the personal aims of the prosecutor. 95 Lycurgus expands on this argument to draw general principles: For it is the duty of a just citizen not to bring to publ ic trials people who have done no wrong against the city because of personal enmities but to deem that those who and that their public offenses offer public reasons for a quarr el with them. 96 Once again Lycurgus focuses on truth of the accusation as the most important criteria for bringing trial. The truly civic minded public servant will not attack personal enemies on frivolous charges but will rather view those who harm the cit y as harming himself. 97 93 Lycurg. 1.5: Cf. Lys. 14.22. 94 This section i s composed of only one sentence with a main verb ( ) and three circumstantial participles ( ), which explain why Lycurgus has brought his suit. He knows ( ) that Leocrates has committed the crime in question and he be lieves ( ) that it would be terrible to allow such a malefactor to walk the streets of Athens. On the other hand, he is not attacking Leocrates out of hatred or ambition ( ). 95 Compare the denial of enmity in Lysias 31, which als accusation against Philon here, not at all because I am pursuing some private enmity, nor because I rely on my experience and skill at speaking before you, but rather trusting in the multitude of his offenses and thinking it right 2). 96 Lyc urg. 1.6: 97 Cf. Lysias 27 ( Against Epicrates ), where the speaker also denies enmity to make it seem probable that he cares would have found it contrary to his interests to claim personal enmity as the reason for his prosecution. Therefore, he denies enmity and asserts that those who prosecute their enemies in disregard for the facts subvert the justice system (8). The speaker, 8). See spiritedness.


72 By denying that Leocrates is his enemy, Lycurgus defends himself against the charge of prosecuting maliciously for personal grievances. On the other hand, he leaves himself open to the accusation that he has lodged the suit as a vexa tious and litigious busybody. Lycurgus addresses this issue, arguing that there is a place for disinterested public prosecutors in the Athenian legal system (3 4). If the laws are to have coercive force, someone must be willing to bring wrongdoers to acco unt and give the jury the opportunity to punish them. It is not fair to classify as interferers all people who benefit the state as Lycurgus himself does (5 6). Several factors made denial of enmity the preferable strategy for Lycurgus. First, Lycurgus cha rges Leocrates with desertion and thus places patriotism at the very center of the case. If Lycurgus had voiced strong personal motivations, he would have been out of tune with his emphasis on civic interests throughout the speech. Second, an assertion of enmity would not leave much room for Lycurgus to emphasize his restraint and moderation since Leocrates had been out of Athens for eight years and only recently returned. If Lycurgus had claimed to be an enemy of Leocrates, he would appear malevolent and q uick to prosecute since he waited until the as de facto leader of the state may have made his appeals to patriotism and loyalty to the state especially plausible i 326 B.C. and so had built up a considerable amount of prestige with the people. His high profile resulting from his benefactions to th e state lent credibility to his claim of prosecuting out of devotion to the good of the state. Herman (2006, 276 7) cites the denial of enmity of Lycurgus 1 to cap his argument for Athenian intolerance of the use of the courts for private vengeance. He exp lains that law court speeches always apologize for suing enemies. However, Herman does not take into account the


73 patriotism may well have fallen flat had he att empted to make the trial appear to be a private conflict between himself and Leocrates so that denial of enmity may have been the only route possible for him. Against Leocrates does not provide evidence for a non feuding ethic in Athenian society in the wa y that Herman uses the speech. Lycurgus does not deny enmity because Athenians would have agreed that prosecuting enemies was a bad practice but rather because the particular needs of his case require it. Lycurgus employs this strategy to assert his credib ility as a speaker and to create an implicit probability argument about the claims of his case. While Herman argues that Lycurgus 1 epitomizes the Athenian non feuding ethic, Allen (2000b) asserts that the speech is an anomaly in the corpus of Attic orator s. She rightly stresses 98 i f we leave aside cases of official scrutiny ( dokimasia ) and cases dealing with publi c finance or political bribery we find only two extant speeches where a disinterested prosecutor decided on his own lights to prosecute a case in which he was not personally involved: this case of Lycurgus and Lysias' Against the Grain Dealers However, it is not clear why the dokimasiai should be excepted, nor why Allen does not mention Lysias 27 and Demosthenes 23 (see below). Denials of enmity may be less common in the extant speeches, but they should not be dismissed as if they are simply abnormal. These speeches make use of enmity in the same ways as other 98 In the extant speeches prosecutors affirm enmity more often than they deny it ( 25 to 7 ), but the dispar ity is not strong enough to marginalize the denials of enmity, especially given the limited number of speeches that remain and advances in her book (2000a), that prosecutors must prove that they are angry in order to punish their opponents Lycurg. 1 and Lys. 22 in Allen 2000a ,156 60.


74 speeches, that is, for probability and character arguments. The details of the case simply call for different strategies. In addition to establishing his patriotic credentials, a denial of enmity can also help a speaker address other exigencies of his case. For instance, the speaker of Demosthenes 23 ( Against Aristocrates ) denies enmity because of his heavy emphasis on the deliberative aspect of the trial. Euthycles, the speaker, prosecutes a man named Aristocrates by for proposing a decree which would have granted inviolability of the body to a celebrated ian foreign policy, namely, the issue of whether or not the state should continue availing itself of 99 Euthcyles casts himself in the role of the ideal volunteer prosecutor who eschews private motivation and takes only the civic intere st to heart. Men of Athens, let none of you believe that I have come to accuse Aristocrates here for any personal enmity, nor that I have witnessed some trifling mistake and am eagerly entering into a quarrel. Rather, if my considered opinion is correct, m y entire goal in this matter is that you hold the Chersonese securely and not be led astray and robbed of it again. 100 Euthycles denies enmity because he wants the jury to believe that he has formulated the most advantageous plan for Athenian foreign policy in the Chersonese and is not simply attacking Aristocrates. He therefore shifts the focus from his relationship with the defendant to the law 99 it contradicts other Athenian laws, (2) the inexpedient effects of continuing alliance with Charidemus, and (3) worthiness to receive such benefits. Papillon (1998a, 14 18) notes that Demosthenes 23 contains illegality of the decree (forensic), its inexpedience to the state matically. 100 Dem. 23.1:


75 the appearance o giving advice on public policy. predicts that certain persons will argue that he did not object when other orators passed decrees explanation for the present prosecution must be purely private motivation (187 9). Euthycles responds that he never desired to begrudge others (in this case, Charidemus) awards of honor but one proposed by Aristocrates (188 9). He falls back on the theme of patriotism once again. I believe that to speak against honors which that man could receive without being likely to harm the city severely is the act of one who has a private grievance or who behaves like a sycophant but to oppose the matters in which he prepared a great harm to the city is the act of a good and patriotic man. For these reasons I am speaking now although I said nothing previously. 101 Euthycles denies enmity to help him preemp t possible objections to his motivation for prosecuting. Speeches that admit enmity cursorily or deny it altogether typically put a twist on the issue of the enmity by asserting that the only enmity is actually between the defendant and the state. 102 An exam ple of this is Lysias 22 ( Against the Retailers of Grain ) in which the speaker accuses several metics of profiteering through the grain trade. He asserts that they have interests that are use it brings opportunity for 101 Dem. 23.190: 102 Lys. 12.2, 13.1, 14.40, 31.11; Aeschin. 1.2; Lycurg. 1.6 ; Dem. 24.1 2, 8.


76 103 The speaker highlights his own patriotic moti vations, denying that any personal motivation is behind his prosecution. 104 The defendants appear to be at odds with the interests of the city while the speaker has left his own personal concerns far behind. 105 It is clear by now that prosecutors had multiple options for how to present enmity with their opponents. Although the type of procedure (public or private) chosen by the prosecutor can influence his choices on how to present his relationships with his opponent and how to employ rhetorical devices, 106 it do es not necessarily determine how a litigant will employ enmity. Litigants had flexibility to shape their presentation of enmity according to their specific needs. Nevertheless, some attempts to find a direct connection between procedure and the use of enm ity for motivation. For instance, Kurihara (2003, 466) has argued that Athenians had the normative expectation that public suits should not be motivated by private enmity. 107 He asserts 103 Lys. 22.14 15: 104 Apparently, the speaker had already been accused of a conflict of interest when this case had been before the Council, of which the speaker was a member. He spends the first sections of his speech explaining that he prosecuted the grain dealers to counter the accusation that he had tried to protect them when the Council was deliberating over their crimes. Evidently, becau se he had suggested that the Council hand them over to be tried in court rather than give them to the Eleven for summary execution, several people accused him of complicity in the 4). 105 [Lysias] 6 is another candidate for such a denial of enmity in a public case. Since the speech was delivered by a ning the agreements, if Andocides pays the penalty for ( 41). The speaker asserts that Andocides is under prosecution for committing actual acts of wrongdoing and is not being attacked for private motives on trumped up charges. This is, in fact one of the very arguments that Andocides would make (1.1, 4). 106 particular procedure imposed limitations on the rhetorical strategy of the speakers use different strategies depending on whether the court action is public or private. 107 Christ (1998a: 157 9) comes to similar conclusions, though he only mentions two speeches (Lycurg. 1, Dem. 23) and does not attempt a thoroughgoing analysis. Cf. Rubinstein 2000, 180.


77 that public prosecutors normally deny enmity as a motivation although he notes several exceptions throughout the article. Lysias 12 ( Against Eratosthenes ), Lysias 13 ( Against Agoratus ), Lysias 14 ( Against Alcibiades I ), and Lysias 15 ( Against Alcibiades II ) admit private enmity with their defendants and tie this motivation t o their desire to benefit the city (468). 108 Kurihara (2003) argues that in the case of Lysias 14 and 15, the speakers took advantage of Because in Demosthenes 22 ( Against Androtion ), another exception to the rule, the speaker is again a Kurihara can put this oration in the same category. 109 This speech is related to a later lawsuit, Demosthenes 24 ( Against Timocrates ), 110 in which Diodotus, the speaker of the Against Androtion prosecutes Timocrates, an associate of the same Androtion who was the defendant in the former case. 111 Kurihara explains that Diodotus, although n ow the chief prosecutor and not a admits enmity in the Against Timocrates because as a result of the previous prosecution, it is now too obvious to deny. Similarly, Aeschines in Against Timarchus cannot deny the manifest rivalry between himself and Demosthenes with any degree of plausibility (470 2). 108 The procedure of Lysias 12 is not known for sure, but was probably a euthynai Lysias 13 was an The procedures of the related speeches, Lysias 14 and 15, are uncertain, although they we re certainly public since they concerned dereliction of military duty. 109 However, in the first section the speaker affirms that the original prosecutor was also at enmity with the defendant. 110 same two, Diodotus and Euctemon, impeached Timotheus in a public suit for the proposal of an illegal decree ( ). According to Diodotus, Timotheus was bribed to Against T imotheus ([Dem.] 49), was probably written by Apollodorus, is a private suit, and has nothing to do with the characters of Demosthenes 22. 111 Both Demosthenes 22 and 24 are speeches for a


78 Three speeches by Apollodorus ([Dem.] 53, 58, 59) 112 are further exceptions since they all contain very explicit affirmations of enmity with the defendants. 113 Kurihara notes that these orations were delivered by private citizens and pos its that the normative rule that discouraged prosecutors from bringing up their personal relations with the enemy applied less decisively to such private citizens. Finally, Kurihara discusses Demosthenes 21 ( Against Meidias ) and two previously mentioned sp eeches of Lysias (12 and 13). All of these share the characteristic that the injuries to the litigants were injuries that would arouse anger both in the victims and in the public. According to Kurihara, this blending of public and private anger makes the a dmission of enmity possible (473 6). The categories proposed in this article are not very clearly defined. By this reasoning public speakers who were very well known to the public could admit enmity because it was obvious (Dem. 24, Aeschin. 1) while privat e speakers who were unknown were also free to admit enmity ([Dem.] 53, 58, 59). Purportedly, could take advantage of their position to admit enmity, but in the only extant set of paired speeches for a public prosecution, it is the prosecutor hims elf, not the who admits enmity with the defendant ([Dem.] 59). Further, Kurihara discusses how the particular situations of different cases affected whether or not a prosecutor could affirm enmity with an opponent, thereby supporting the positio n that many more factors than procedure went into the decision making process. In any case, a dominant pattern in the extant orations apparently does not exist. Of the nineteen public prosecution speeches with references to enmity that Kurihara (2003, 466 n.11) cites at the 112 [ Demosthenes] 53 is an [Demosthenes] 58 an endeixis and [Demosthenes] 59 a prohibitting marriage between foreigners and Athenian citizens. 113 Although most of the text of [Demosthenes] 59 is a by Apollodorus, the affirmation of enmity actually comes from the main prosecutor, Theomnestus. Contrary to the idea that are more free to admit enmity, Apollodorus, the does not focus on enmity nearly as explicitly as does Theomnestus.


79 beginning of the article (Lys. 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 26, 31; Aeschin. 1, 3; Dem. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 53, 58, 59 ; Lycurg. 1), 114 ten of them have turned out not to follow the pattern (Lys. 12, 13, 14, 15; Aeschin. 1; Dem. 22, 24, 53, 58, 59 ). In fact litigants make the decision to affirm or deny enmity based on a variety of factors that are particular to their cases, with the result that a division between speeches intended for public and private procedures is too schematic and does not ac count for the multiplicity of exigencies that influence rhetorical strategies. Enmity in Private Disputes Speakers in private disputes are slightly more uniform in their use of enmity than those in cases that address public issues. These prosecutors usuall y affirm and almost never deny that those whom they are prosecuting are their enemies. This follows naturally from the facts of the case. A private suit presupposes a hostile relationship which has come to court since the two litigants are the antagonists in the dispute. Still, litigants had the flexibility to attempt different strategies and present their relationships in different ways. At least one prosecutor in a private suit denies enmity (Dem. 41, see below) and others vary their techniques according to what they attempt to prove (e.g., Lys. 23; Dem. 39, 47). Many private prosecutors simply omit the issue all together. 115 Although these speakers typically affirm enmity, in most cases, especially those that concern money, property, or kinsmen, plaintiffs conspicuously confine their narratives to the dispute in question, avoiding details about their relationship before the altercation that precipitated the trial. 116 When money or property is at issue, a prosecutor will of course not want to employ a long narr ative of enmity to prove that he is not out for monetary gain (as, for 114 Kurihara 2003, 466 n. 11. 115 Isae. 3, 6; Dem. 27, 28, 30, 31, 44, 56; [Dem.] 46; Hyp. 5. 116 Lys. 32; Isocr. 17, 21; Isae. 5; Dem. 40, 48; [Dem.] 49, 50.


80 instance, many public prosecutors do) since this is precisely what he is after. Rather, the litigant will prefer to concentrate on proving that the money or property in question belongs to him. In the case of litigation with kinsmen, a prosecutor would be reticent to admit longstanding hatred for family members because this would reflect badly on his character (Christ 1998a, 167 73). In addition to these factors, litigants in private sui ts simply had less time to deliver their speeches than public prosecutors. This fact alone may have discouraged lengthy narrative digressions on the history of hostile relationships. Like the speeches previously discussed, private orations employ enmity to create probability arguments about their cases. Isocrates 17 ( Trapeziticus ), a private case concerning money, provides an example of how a prosecutor can develop probability arguments from a narrative of enmity with a scope limited to the dispute in quest ion. The speaker, a young man from the Bosporus (modern day Crimea), accuses his banker, Pasion, of defrauding him. 117 Pasion made pretenses to goodwill in offering to help deceive the king of Bosporus, a local ruler s in fact plotting against him (8). The speaker emphasizes that Pasion was deliberately trying to deceive him throughout the whole affair (8 9). After the danger from the king of Bosporus had passed, Pasion kept the money and hid his slave Cittus, who had witnessed the transaction, in order to prevent the speaker from gaining access to him. Later, Pasion deceived the speaker by telling him that he would return the money after they had sailed to the Black Sea together and appeared before Satyrus, the ruler o f Bosporus, to reach a settlement (18 22). In the meantime, however, Pasion had the contract of agreement altered so that he was released of all obligations. He accordingly reneged on his promise and refused to sail 117 Pasion (d. 370/69) was the most famous banker of classical Athens and also the father of Apollodorus, the orator. Trapeziticus ) derives from Pa Bogaert 1968; Trevett 1992, 1 11, 155 65.


81 to the Black Sea (23). This conflict has evidently been going on for some time although the speaker only begins narrating from the point at which the dispute that has come to trial originated. 118 Lest he appear the aggressor in this quarrel, the speaker carefully presents Pasion as plotting agains t and maliciously betraying him although he had done nothing to provoke such treatment. Pasion made his schemes from the beginning (8, 9), spirited away the slave Cittus (10 12), deceitfully promised that he would return the money (18), and finally betraye d him on the voyage to the Black Sea (23). The speaker, however, acted with considerable restraint and even naivet. 119 He believed at first that Pasion intended to help him in his dire circumstances out of goodwill ( 8). Even after he had been c heated several times, the speaker was 120 The speaker even implies that he induced his friend to dr op a lawsuit after Pasion begged him to do so (21 22). personal involvement. Because this trial concerns a sum of money, the jury will naturally be suspicious of the plaint prosecutors to attempt to defraud others, especially rich bankers like Pasion. Since the speaker would like to avoid the charge of sycophancy, he finds it salutary to place special empha sis on his personal involvement and to portray his hatred for the defendant as an important part of his 118 Menexenus sued Pasion, demanding the surrender of the sla ve Cittus (21). 119 This speech could be another example of a litigant who paints an unflattering portrait of himself, subordinating his esteem in the eyes of the jury to his desire to support his claims and to win the trial. See pp. 29 30. 120 Isoc. 17.18:


82 reason for prosecuting. This prepares the way for the argument near the end of the speech against the presumption that the speaker is acting as a sycoph ant (46, 56). The narrative of the hostility between Pasion and the speaker also provides a version of events that serves as the basis for another probability argument. The speaker can now conclude that the facts of the case make it unlikely that he would pursue a false charge: Is it more likely that I while I was in such straights would make an unjust charge, or that Pasion, because of the magnitude of my misfortunes and the amount of money, would be spurred on to rob me? Who ever reached such a degree of sycophancy that while he was in physical danger himself he would plot against the possessions of another? 121 This explicitly developed probability argument occurs late in the speech and relies on the character portrait of the two parties already developed in the narrative portion. The jury is now conditioned to accept that the speaker typically exercises restraint and at the time of the dispute was already preoccupied with other problems, while Pasion is aggressive and ready to make enemies for his own person al profit. If the speaker had not impressed upon his listeners this enmity is the indispensible foundation for this argument from probability. Isaeus 5 ( On the Estate of Dicaeogenes ) also contains a narrative of a hostile relationship that is limited to description of the altercation that is on trial. The history of the case is complex and will not be explained here except in its barest details. The entire dispu te revolves around the posthumous heir to one third of the estate Dicaeogenes III later produced another will that made 121 Isoc. 17.46:


83 him heir to the entire estate. Ten years later, the sons of the four daughters of Dicaeogenes II had reached a more mature age and decided to dispute the will. Isaeus 5 was composed for those grandson s of Dicaeogenes II, who attempted to reclaim their portion of the estate from Dicaeogenes III. 122 The speaker begins his narrative with the genealogy of the family (5) and proceeds quickly He details how Dicaeogenes III treated his family members with hybris (11) but confines his description to the history of the dispute at hand. The narrative of enmity is in fact integrated into the entire narrative of the dispute. As the speaker explains t he history of the case, he takes every opportunity to point out how Dicaeogenes III has treated his kinsmen like enemies. This theme works well with the rhetorical purposes of the speech since the speaker wants the jury to believe that Dicaeogenes III is t he sort of person who would forge a will in an attempt to defraud his family. The narrative of enmity, which details his evil character, supports this proposition. Although it is common for a private prosecutor to confine his description of a relationship of hatred with his opponent to the events on trial, such a plaintiff will include the wider context when it suits his purposes. For instance, in Demosthenes 39 ( Against Boeotus ) a long history of case. The speaker, Mantitheus, is prosecuting another man for using his name and patronymic. In order to make Boeotus (as the speaker claims his opponent is named) appear to be the sort of malicious rogue who would attempt the ancient equivalent of identit y theft, 123 Mantitheus expands his narrative of enmity to 122 Technically, Isaeus 5 is a prosecution speech not against Dicaeogenes III, but against Leochares, who had agreed to be the surety for Dic estate, but found that after more than twenty years had elapsed, much of the property had been sold or mortgaged. T hey sued Leochares to reclaim an e quivalent amount. 123 Mantitheus asserts that Boeotus has already given him reason to be ashamed by his posing (19).


84 more than once for sums of money (25), thus proving himself a sycophant (26). Mantitheus asks Boeotus to stop bringing sycophantic prosecutions against him ( 34) and treating him as an enemy ( 36). Mantitheus narrates the broader background of their relationship of enmity because he must prove that Boeotus has been acting like his enemy. 124 A prosecutor i n a private suit may also deny enmity if it supports his case. The plaintiff in Demosthenes 41 ( Against Spudias ) carefully avoids portraying himself as a long standing enemy of the defendant. He begins by protecting himself from the potentially damaging ch arge of have forced the issue to trial. The speaker asserts that because he and Spudias are related, they have many common friends who would happily arbitr ate the dispute so that they all might avoid the embarrassing situation of brother in laws appearing as opposing litigants in the court room. Yet Spudias disdained even to discuss the matter and refused to submit to arbitration (1 2). The speaker anticipat es that Spudias will attempt to portray the whole affair as a malicious the jury, first of all I do not think that a defense of this sort is just, nor that it is fitting for someone, when he is clearly convicted of a crime, to change the charges and to make accusations 124 Another example is Demosthenes 47 ( Against Evergus ), in which the speaker, Stephanus, employs a narrative of enmity which includes incident s not strictly related to altercation immediately preceding the trial. Because he prosecuted Evergus with a (a prosecution for bearing false witness against him in a previous trial), Stephanus finds it salutary to provide a motivation for Evergus to have desired that Stephanus be convicted fraudulently. Likewise, the speaker of Lysias 23 ( Against Pancleon ) explains that he was at enmity with the defendant for a long time and did detective work to find out about him (2 11). The speaker m ust show how he found out that Pancleon was in fact a non citizen and why he would have gone to such lengths to get the whole story.


85 125 The speaker avoids the issue of enmity and focuses on the charges themselves. The speaker denies enmity probably beca use he wants to avoid seeming malicious in prosecuting for an apparently minor sum of money. 126 However, this rhetorical strategy also two litigants, this would und ermine the claim that they had many common friends to whom they could appeal without difficulty. While a hostile relationship could divide people into blocs with supporters and antagonists, two relatives who had not formerly quarreled should have been able to find common friends to whom they could submit their dispute. 127 The speaker must deny enmity in order to argue that Spudias has been vexatious in refusing to settle this matter out of court and thus to repudiate the assumption that the prosecution is a p roduct of personal antagonism. 128 Additionally, the absence of enmity between these two litigants supports a probability argument about the papers left by the wife of Polyeuctus which stated that Spudias owed twenty minae to the estate. The speaker claims th at Spudias was present when they recognized the seal on the papers as authentic, opened the seal, and later resealed them. Spudias himself therefore Spudias s hou ld have stated it at that time. 125 Dem. 41.13: 126 However, once the plaintiff establishes that enmity is not the mot ivating factor, t he relative unimportance of the money at issue may also provide a built in defense against the accusation of sycophancy. Those who attempt to make financial gains by their prosecutions would typically bring others to trial for large sums o f money, so that it 127 See Chapter 4 on the tendency of Athenians to share friends and enemies. 128 The speaker harps on the theme of Spudias refusing reaso nable arbitration ( 1 2, 7, 10, 11, 14 15, 29 30 ).


86 All of us are accustomed not to keep silent about charges that are neither true nor just but rather to dispute them immediately. If they do not do this but contest them later, they seem to be wicked men and sycophants. 129 T he speaker asserts that if Spudias had a real grievance, he would have said so right there. That would expect that hostility would have resulted had Spudias object ed to the will long ago. Thus never disputed the documents in question. Prosecutors in private suits will use whatever rhetorical strategy is available to them tha t will help them make arguments about their cases. Most plaintiffs affirm enmity and limit the scope of their narratives to the dispute in question, but a few found it beneficial to approach the issue from a different angle, such as denying enmity or expan ding the narrative to demonstrate the wider context. One thing remains constant, however. Enmity functions in a way that assertions about the truth of the charge s. Conclusion The reasons that prosecutors portray enmity as they do are discoverable and are tied to the exigencies of the individual cases and the strategies that speakers wish to employ. Prosecutors typically affirm or deny a longstanding hostile relati onship with their opponents in order to to create other arguments from probability. Therefore, the rhetorical use of enmity does not constitute a claim to about the truth of their version of the facts. 129 Dem. 41.23:


87 decisions on whether to affirm or deny e nmity and, if they affirm it, how to portray it. These patterns are useful for showing how considerations such as procedure, the nature of the offense, defenda nt. However, the patterns are not rigid and consistent enough to make it easy to predict exactly which strategy a prosecutor will choose. Yet it is clear that prosecutors use enmity in many different ways and tie it into their arguments about the case. Enm ity is not an example of to win over the jury without reference to the facts of the case. On the contrary, the function of enmity in these orations is grounded in the legal arguments about This conclusion creates problems for scholars who use affirmations and denials of enmity in the Attic orators to come to conclusions about the dominant norms of Athenian society. For instance, Herman (2007) states, had the majority of Athenian law court speakers attempted to swing the dikasts in their favor by swaggering round demanding respect and breathing vengeance, I would have concluded that Athens should indeed be grouped together with feuding, primi tive or Mediterranean societies. not. 130 They affirm or deny enmity based on how they plan to make i mplicit arguments of probability about the facts of the case. Thus Athenian society cannot be classified as either feuding or non feuding based on whether prosecutors more often admit or deny hatred for their 130 The simple fact that some prosecutors affirm enmity while others deny also calls this interpretative method into question. The motif of restraint in the face of an oppressive enemy does recur in the extant orations, but this is a result of the le gal setting. If an offense is on trial, it presupposes that no retribution for the crime has taken place. repugnant and to make it seem le ss likely that they are bringing a frivolous suit, as this is not a characteristic action of one who exercises restraint in regard to his enemies.


88 opponents. The reasons for how prosecutors port ray enmity are complex and tied to the details of the case; they do not simply reflect a standardized code. 131 131 l for


89 CHAPTER 3 ENMITY IN DEFENSE SP EECHES In many ways a defendant has more limited options for affirming or denying enmity than a prosecutor since th e latter chooses the procedure for the court action and speaks first at the trial. The prosecutor sets the tone for the entire debate and forces the defendant to address the arguments presented in his speech. 1 The defendant is left with the task of attacki ng the supports his own position or reject entirely the notion that there is a story worth telling. 2 In either casethe defendant must respond to the prosecutor. In accordance with this general principle, defendants employ the rhetoric of enmity in ways that correspond to its use in prosecution speeches. Affirmations and d enials of long standing relationships of hostility typically function, either explicitly or implicitly, as part of a probability argument. This frequently takes the form of character argument both about the defendants themselves and their opponents. While prosecutors often narrate their feuds with defendants in order to condition the jury to believe that such people are likely to commit the crimes of which they are accused, a defendant will use enmity to attack the credibility of his opponent and imply that he is not worthy of trust. By accusing him of pursuing a longstanding hostility the defendant can engender suspicion in the jury that the prosecutor is likely to bring 1 Some defendants actually complain that the prosecutor has an advantage in speaking first (e.g., Andoc. 1.6; Lys. 7.3). 2 Johnstone (1999, 54 argues that the story is a complete fabrication or does not contain an of fense worthy of appearing before the jury courts.


90 trumped up charges. Likewise, if the defendant can demonstrate that his opponent has al ready brought suit on false grounds and been caught doing so, he can cast doubt on his credibility. As noted in the previous chapter, prosecutors frequently attempt to avoid two extremes, attempting to find a middle ground between appearing totally disinte rested and excessively motivated by private hatred. The former will leave them open to suspicions of sycophancy, while the latter might cause them to come under suspicion of prosecuting a trumped up charge out of belligerent antagonism. A defendant will na turally attempt to push his opponent towards one or the other of the extremes. He may deny enmity with the prosecutor and thus portray him as a sycophant, or he may affirm enmity and depict the prosecutor as a malicious attacker driven by envy and spite. N o matter which way they choose to present their opponents, defendants consistently use the rhetoric of enmity to undercut the credibility of the opposition and to lend authority to their own claims. These strategies therefore are intended to convince the j ury of the truth or falsehood of competing versions of events. shown to employ affirmations of enmity with their prosecutors so that they may depict them as malicio us attackers who have produced trumped up charges in disregard of the truth. The next concerning an alleged physical attack against another. These litigants deny en mity with their opponent or, if it is a homicide trial, with the deceased man in order to deny that they had any defendant could deny that his opponent was an enemy and portray him as a sycophant who prosecutors innocent people maliciously. Throughout this chapter, as in Chapter 2, attention will


91 be drawn continually to how litigants consistently employ enmity to make arguments from probability about the facts of the case. Attacked by Enemies Most of the extant defense speeches that address the issue of enmity affirm it. Speakers in these cases typically narrate their hostile relationships to emphasize the malice and spitefulness of those who have prosecuted them. Chap ter 2 demonstrated that prosecutors often affirm enmity to prove that they have a personal stake in the case although they are careful to avoid portraying themselves as excessively eager litigants. Naturally, then, a defendant who affirms enmity will push his opponent toward the extreme claiming that he has been motivated entirely by desire for reliability as a speaker since he may well be distorting the facts t o obtain his own ends. In suits that directly concern the interests of the city, defendants frequently assert a longstanding hostile relationship with their opponent. The previous chapter pointed out that plaintiffs tend to downplay personal enmity when pr osecuting for offenses with a special public dimension such as any offense that occurred during the oligarchic regime of the Thirty dokimasiai for public speakers, suits for military dereliction, and (Chapter 2, ome public cases prosecutors even deny enmity altogether to avoid the appearance of being motivated primarily by private considerations when the offense on trial is one of special public importance (Lys. 22, 27; Dem. 23; Lycurg. 1). On the other hand, defe ndants in such cases affirm enmity and focus on it, attempting to show that their prosecutors are attacking them out of dishonest motivations and are bringing false charges. An example of this is Lysias 9 ( For the Soldier ), in which an Athenian hoplite def ends himself against a charge


92 of slandering several generals, an offense punishable at Athens by a fine ( ). 3 To attack the attacking him maliciously out of envy and spite despite the public nature of the trial, which concerned the proper conduct for soldiers in the Athenian army, an important concern for the In the prooemium the speaker depicts the generals as prompted to lodge the suit be cause of 4 The speaker asserts that they attac 5 After a short narrative detailing how the speaker did not commit any crime (4 7), he states that the clerks of the treasury ( tamiai ) declared him innocent (7). These clerks allegedly recognized the true rea 6 Thus, the speaker charges the generals with pursuing personal grievances and making accusations which have no basis in fact. After descr ibing the events that led to trial (4 7) and making an argument about the specifics of the law in question (8 12), 7 for the way they have treated him (13 18). He emphasizes both that they had no good reason for 3 The procedure that the generals employed is (see p. 49 n. 34), whereby they listed certain of the 4 Lys. 9.1: ; Lys. 9.2: ; Lys. 9.3: 5 Lys. 9.2: The speaker points out that the generals should not slander his character but actually prove that he had done wrong. The trial, he contends, is about a charge for an offense ( 3), not about his manner of living ( ). 6 Lys. 9.7: 7 The defendant argues that the generals had unfairly called him up for military duty and that he had never spoken ill of the generals in a venue prohibited by law.


93 with a man named Sostratus started the enmity presumably because Sostratus and the generals were already at odds. However, the defendant had given the g enerals no reason to hate him since 8 The odium related they were strengthene 9 In spite of the oath that the generals had sworn not to enlist men who had already served in the army, they perjured themselves and enlisted the defendant, knowing that he had already performed his duty (15). Indeed, the speaker asserts that integrity and truthfulness were the farthest things from 10 Harris (2005: 127) ved in public office (Lys. 9.14). Yet, the study of the rhetorical purposes of enmity offered above demonstrates the problems with this type of analysis. The speaker does not necessarily deny the legitimacy of the motto of helping friends and harm enemies (cf. 20; see below), but rather presents himself as moderate and restrained in order to make his prosecutors appear malicious. Lysias composed the statement at section 14 as part of an implicit character argument and not as 8 Lys. 9.14: 9 Lys. 9.15: 10 Lys. 9.16:


94 a commentary on contemporary mor als. 11 This character evidence about the generals supports the proposition that they would bring totally frivolous charges against an enemy. The speaker details how their unjust anger urged them to attack him without cause and thereby attempts to make it se em improbable that their accusation can be trusted. The narrative concludes with an 12 The generals are pursuing a private vendetta with an unreasonable prosecution of an innocent non feuding individual. It is clear from this speech that a simple affirmation of enmity by a prosecutor will not in itself lend credence to a prosecution since defendants can affirm enmity just as prosecutors. The can admit that his opponents have attacked him because of their desire for vengeance: t he injustice of these men caused m e only moderate annoyance since I consider it an established rule that one harm s one's enemies and helps one's friends 13 However, this does not make the prosecution legitimate because, as the speaker has pointed out, the charges are false. The truth of th issue as central to the trial: do not look on while those who have done nothing wrong fall into 14 Whether t he generals are legitimately angry or not is important only insofar as it supports an argument about the truth of the charges. 11 side, as an extra legal appeal for favor. 12 Lys. 9.18: 13 Lys. 9.20: 14 Lys. 9.22:


95 If a defendant found himself accused of impiety, he could employ the same tactic of highlighting the private motivations of his o pponents since the Athenian state considered religion an important matter of oversight. In On the Mysteries Andocides, who was accused of religious impiety, focuses on the private motivations of his enemies in order to contrast them with the public issues 15 He asserts that his ossible, 16 1.6) and have many ulterior motives. One of his accusers, Callias, attacks Andocides so that he could get an heiress whom Andocides had already claimed (118 23). The rest of the prosecutors, Andoci des alleges, became his enemies because he outbid them on a tax collection job auctioned off by the state (133 6). 17 Andocides attempts to establish private motivations for each of the prosecutors involved in the trial. He 15 The prosecution charged that Andocides had been one of those wealthy aristocrats who had celebrated the Eleusinian Mysteries in their private homes in 415, thereby mocking one of the most rever ed religious festivals in Athens. If he were guilty of such an offense, Andocides would have been barred from celebrating these rites ever again. The prosecutors maintain that Andocides, after committing sacrilege in the manner alleged, had then participat ed in the Eleusinian Mysteries illegally. The trial took place shortly following the restoration of the democracy, in either 399 or 400. 16 Andoc. 1.1: . The speaker of Lysias 19 ( On the Property of Aristophanes ) makes a similar accusation about 2). This defense fits into the same pattern, since it is a public procedure ( ) with a very public concern: the defendant in this trial is the heir to Aristophanes, whose property had been confiscated following his execution by the Athenian state. The prosecutor evidently charged that several of speaker of Lysias 19 accuses his enemies of attacking him on false grounds (11). 17 Because the Athens always had a very limited government, private citizens had to perform many of the official duties of state. Thus, the right to collec t taxes was regularly auctioned off to the highest bidder. The individual who won the auction would have to pay the state a determined sum and could keep anything above that sum as profit. Andocides explains that several men (including his prosecutors) had formed a cartel to keep bidding artificially low until he outbid them and broke their monopoly on the process.


96 denies the legitimacy of the charg e and accuses the plaintiffs of maliciously attacking him for their own ends. Rarely among the extant orations, one of the counterparts to Andocides 1 has survived, a prosecution speech in the corpus of Lysias ([Lys.] 6). 18 This affords an opportunity to c ompare the rhetorical strategies of the two sides of the litigation. While Andocides 1 makes the private motivation of the prosecutors a focus, the speaker of [Lysias] 6 ( Against Andocides ) virtually ignores the question of motivation. Instead, this oratio n highlights the negative effects that such impiety can have on the city and the necessity of purging the city from such evil. The focus is entirely on public concerns in [Lysias] 6 as it should be in a trial of so much interest to the state. Because the p rosecutors would be obliged to maintain such an emphasis on public affairs, Andocides attempts to subvert them with his focus on their private motivations. Because a volunteer prosecutor in public suits had to present himself as pursuing the nterests in his court action, he would always be vulnerable if the defendant could demonstrate that private enmity was his sole motive for prosecuting. In his famous speech On the Crown prosecuting him. Public interest in the proceedings of the trial would have been assured by the procedure ( ) and the well known competition between Demosthenes and Aeschines for political 18 Darkow (1917, 28 34) provides a history of the debate over the authenticity of this speech up to her own time. Rubinstein (2000, 141) and Todd (2007, 403 8) offer more recent discussions. Dover (1968, 82 3) accepts the authenticity of the speech. MacDowell (1962, 14 15) believes that the speech was not written by Lysias, but rather speech raises issues that are addressed by Andocides in his speech. Therefore, even if the extant speech was a The speech, whether or not it was composed by Lyisas or actually delivered, is treated here as though it was composed for the law courts of the fourth century, since there does not seem to be any reason to doubt this (Todd 2007, 407 8). Rubinstein (2000, 140 at section 42 is not as untypical for as many scholars had supposed.


97 leadership, but another aspect of the trial added a further dimension to its public nature. 19 Much of the speech (and the extant prosecution speech, Aeschines 3) centers on a debate over how defeat at the battle of Ch aeronea in 338. 20 Demosthenes and Aeschines dispute whether devotion to freedom for the Greeks. Thus, among the issues at stake was how the Athenians desired to r emember their past, whether they would believe that they had suffered the results of a failed and misguided policy, or that they had been defeated gloriously in continuing their centuries old commitment to freedom (Yunis 2000 2001). In accordance with the connection to civic issues, Demosthenes emphasizes the public dimension of the suit and at the secutor who brings suit on behalf of the public good. Demosthenes asserts that although Aeschines professes to prosecute injustices to the state, his actual goal is to abuse his enemy ( 12) and disfranchise Ctesiphon out of spite and envy ( 13). He inappropriately attempts to disfranchise Ctesiphon and 19 Although Aeschines actually Ctesiphon for proposing that Demosthenes receive an honorary crown for his service to the state, the real competition was between Demosthenes and Aeschines. Aeschines argues that the de cree is illegal for two reasons. First, a law stated that a public official must undergo his euthynai before receiving such an honor, but Demosthenes had not yet undergone his euthynai for being teichopoios (Aeschin. 3.9 31). Second, the decree included the provision that the award be announced in the theatre of Dionysius, in contravention of another law which stipulated that such awards only be announced in the Assembly and the Council (Aeschin. 3.32 48). Regarding the first issue, Demosthenes was indeed a public official who had not undergone his euthynai but the crown was proposed for a previous office that he had held several years ago. Harris (1994, 141 8) argues that Demosthenes was technically correct that the law state d that he must undergo his euthynai decree by citing a law that authorized announcing such honors in the theatre of Dionysius if the Assembly voted for it (Dem. 18.120 1). 20 The trial took place in 330 B.C.


98 he sets at 21 Aeschines initiated the entire process of to bring a for envy but not for 22 Demosthenes implies that Aeschines is guilty of malicious slander, stating the difference between slander and accusation: an accusation concerns unjust actions for which there are lawful punishments, but slander concerns 23 Aeschines, acting like a typical echthros is simply trying to attack Demosthenes and to slander him, not to bring a legitimate charge. 24 As Demosthenes develops his character assassination, he asserts that in many other instances Aeschines has used his rhetorical skill only for private ends and never to help the state presented themselves on behalf of the collective interests to reinforce his own hatred or enmity 21 Dem. 18.15: 22 Dem. 18.121: 23 Dem. 18.123: 24 Demosthenes ass their credibility. He asserts that Aeschines had done the same thing to him when he prosecuted Aeschines for his I brought this charge against you because of private enmity, while 283). Harris to prosecute out of enmity. Jurors were suspicious about a prosecutor who was actuated by enmity because of the possibility that he might be lying, not because enmity in itself was illegitim ate.


99 or anything of that sor 25 Aeschines has never brought suit against Demosthenes for a real offense (279) but has fabricated an accusation out of his own personal enmity and spitefulness ( 279). 26 Cohen (1995) cites this passage (Demosthenes 18.278 9) as evidence for an honor game that is being played out between Demosthenes and Aeschines in the courts and asserts that it can e is not necessary to infer that statements such as at Demosthenes 18.278 9 are intended primarily to speak to the relative social standing of the litigants wh functions as a part of the structure of his overall argument for the justice of his opinion. In this speech as in several others, the rhetorical use of enmity is more directly tied to the legal arguments at stake than Cohen allows. Defendants in private suits can employ the rhetoric of enmity in much the same fashion as defendants in public suits to cast doubt upon the motivation of their accusers and the truth of the charges. Demosthenes 57 ( Against Eubulides ) contains one of the most explicit affirmations of enmity by a defendant. The speaker includes a great amount of detail on his relationship with 25 Dem. 18.278: 26 Aeschines made a very similar accusation against Demosthenes in a trial thirteen years earlier (343 B.C.), when proceeded without being elected, while, although you were an enemy, you have never yet wished to impeach me for misconduct 2.139). Aeschines asserts that Demosthenes never prosecuted him when he had a chance to make a real accusation, but wai ted to attack Aeschines out of enmity and spite.

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100 The strategy of the speaker pe rhaps results naturally from the procedure, an ephesis engineered by Eubulides. 27 To make his charge seem credible, the speaker needs to provide the ju ry with a convincing explanation of why a fellow demesman desired to attack him and was able to effect his expulsion from the privileges of citizenship. entire speec h, is carefully and gradually developed. He begins by claiming that Eubulides brought a false charge against him (1) and that he is a victim of political rivalry (2). The narrative section of the speech is introduced with an explicit affirmation of enmity: 28 The speaker claims that Eubulides is attacking him because he previously gave testimony for a friend named Lacedaemonius in a case in which Eubulides was pr machinations and shows how far Eubulides was willing to go in pursuit of retaliation (9 13). Eubulides arranged the deme meeting s pecifically to disfranchise the speaker because of his private vendetta against him ( 9). He purposefully delayed the vote on citizenship until it was late at night and only the people that he had br ibed to vote against the speaker were in attendance (10). Once the hearing was called to order, Eubulides wasted no time; he commenced haranguing the defendant and demanding his expulsion from the roles of citizens (11). He passed out the voting stones ( ps ) immediately and without debate, ignoring the protests of the speaker and not allowing him to defend himself 27 In the only other extant ephesis Isaeus 12 ( On Behalf of Euphiletus ), the speaker also accuses his prosecutors of acting out of enmity (8). On ephesis see Harrison ii. 1968 71, 190 2; Just 1965. 28 Dem. 57 .5:

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101 before the voters. When the votes were counted, they totaled more than sixty although only thirty people were present (13)! Late in the speec h the audience discovers that the animosity had begun long before this particular deme hearing. Eubulides has been an enemy for a long time (49), inheriting the hostile relationship from the previous generation ( 61). The speake r asserts that before this trial Eubulides attacked him in many other ways. He stole from a temple a shield that the speaker had dedicated to Athena and then chiseled away the text of a decree that had gang attempted an assault on his personal 29 If the jurors accept this narrative as t ruthful, they will begin to believe that Eubulides is capable of doing almost anything to pursue his vendetta against the speaker. However, this emphasis is not intended simply to encourage the jury to form a negative social judgment between the two partie s and to vote against Eubulides. The speaker does not totally suppress his 30 He does not make an unambiguous dicho way as to become involved in quarrels. 31 Rather, the burden of the narrative of enmity in this speech is to make a compelling case that Eubulides has gone too far and, most importantly, has falsified facts in order to expel his opponent from the ranks of citizens. The speaker presents 29 Dem. 57.65: > 30 Dem. 57.63: 31 Of course, the speaker does not unduly emphasize his own propensity for feuding, since he wants to avoid

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102 Eubulides as malicious in order to undercut his claims. He makes it clear in his introductory sentence that he desires to demonstrate to unjustly and improperly, I will speak truly and fairly and attempt to show that I have a right to citizenship and have 32 The narrative of enmity that follows He has attacked unjustly and selfishly (5), simply pursuing a political rivalry (7). Such prosecutions motivated by spite are the very reason that this procedure of appeal was instituted: envy and enmity and other pretexts, you made this pla ce in your presence a refuge for those who have been wronged 33 The speaker asserts that he is making use of the appeal to the jury courts to protect himself from baseless charges brought by an enemy who is out of control. Eubulides is not only described a s an enemy, but also labeled a sycophant (32). The lost receiving not even one fifth of the votes (8). 34 The key mark of a sycophant for this speaker is that he br 35 Eubulides has a history of such actions. He and his friends have charged certain men money to be registered as citizen s (59) and have 32 Dem. 57.1: 33 Dem. 57.6: 34 one fifth of the votes cast in a p ublic suit and therefore incurred the normal statutory penalties, might make him 35 Dem. 57.34:

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103 similarly prosecuted or accepted bribes not to prosecute other innocent people (60). The speaker uth if he had knowledge of something, the 36 The defining characteristic of a sycophant, that he pursues groundless charges, can also be applied to an enemy who prosecutes mal iciously. The narrative of enmity in this speech also provides an opportunity for an explicit probability argument to be developed. The speaker emphasizes that he has served in his deme for many years during which Eubulides never brought suit against him f or not impersonating a citizen. If Eubulides had believed that the speaker was not a citizen, then he would not have al lowed him to hold public office. For surely he would not have allowed a foreigner and metic, as Eubulides now says I am, to hold office o since he is an old enemy of mine, have waited for this opportunity which no one could have foreseen, if he had had knowledge of something of like this. 37 Indeed, although Eubulides had been in the business of getting the names of citizens stricken r, he never attacked his status. It is quite unlikely that that would leave any [on the deme list] who were not A thenian citizens when they had knowingly expelled even men who were citizens whom the jury court restored. And although he was then an enemy of my father, he 36 Dem. 57.49: 37 Dem. 57.48:

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104 not only failed to make an accusation against him but never even cast a vote that he was not an At henian citizen. 38 earlier occasion. If there were even a grain of truth in the accusations against him, the speaker asserts, Eubulides would surely have taken advan tage of the situation to harm his enemy long ago. Interestingly, the speaker of Demosthenes 57 makes an argument that is similar to what Euthycles in Demosthenes 23 anticipates the defendant in his trial will make. Euthycles argues that private enmity did not motivate him to bring the prosecution because he wants to focus on his concern for public policy in bringing the against Aristocrates. In anticipation that someone might raise the objection that he should have prosecuted Aristocrates long ago when he was passing other decrees that honored Charidemus (23.187), Euthycles responds that he has made it a policy to prosecute people for illegal decrees only if they are 9). If Euthycles had admitted that he had An Athenian who had knowledge that his enemy was proposing a decree that did not benefit the state would be expected to be eager to attack his adversary and to help the state at the same time. response to the anticipated argument that he should have prosecuted Euthycles long ago. 39 This type of probability argument Lys. 19.60; Dem. 18.124, 251; 25.38; 55.4 5). 38 Dem. 57.61: Cf. 62. 39 See also the discussion of this speech at pp. 74 5.

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105 presupposes that the parties are angry with each other. Therefore, defendants often find it beneficial to admit private motivation and to emphasize that thei r opponents have pursued a feud to the point of ignoring the truth. The speaker of Isocrates 16 ( On the Team of Horses ), Alcibiades the Younger, asserts that his opponents were long time enemies of his father and his family and have lodged malicious and gr oundless accusations. Alcibiades complains that sycophants attack him frequently (1) no doubt because of the many enemies that his charismatic but divisive father had made. 40 their vendettas wit hybris that they 41 Alcibiades accuses his opponents of prosecuting maliciously (48) and ignoring the distinct ion between private and 42 More personally, Alcibiades e xpresses indignation that the prosecutor, Tisias, has become so reckless as to try to bring back up old grudges ( 43). 43 40 The speaker was the son of the famous Alcib iades whose exploits during the Peloponnesian War became well father dominates his argumentation. 41 Isoc. 16.10: 42 Isoc. 16.2: ; Isoc. 16.3: 43 Tisias, the brother in law of Alcibiades the Elder (43), prosecutes the younger Alcibiades because his father had allegedly stolen a team of horses which passed upon his death to the Alcibiades of thi s speech. Tisias attempts to reclaim these horses under the pretext that they were wrongfully taken from him, while the speaker argues that his father obtained them legally. The preserved speech is a large fragment, which begins about half way through the original oration, presumably after the narrative portion.

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106 The speaker emphasizes that it is unacceptable for personal enemies to bring public charges without regard for trut 44 This statement is an interesting parallel to the passage in Demosthenes 21 ( Against Meidias ) where Demosthenes anticipates that Meidias will make this same argument: ; do not destroy me for 45 counter it by denying that personal enmity is at issue ( 21.31 35 ; see pp. 53 8) In Isocrates this same claim that Demosthenes believes Meidias will make. Alcibiades attempts to portray his opponents as privately motivated by a feuding ethos with no thought to the truth of their claims. 46 As Alcibiades castigates his opponents for their strictly personal motivation, he emphasizes that they have neglected to develop arguments about their actual accusations: ing my father than giving information about their sworn 47 These prosecutors have become so focused on attacking the reputation of Alcibiades the Elder that they neglect to address their own grounds for prosecution. They have become so blinded and 2). The speaker, on the other hand, speaks only about that which actually happened ( 44 Isoc. 16.45: 45 Dem. 21.29: Interestingly, having denied the 213; cf. 220). 46 Compare the plea of the speaker of Lysias 19 ( On the Property of Aristophanes watch us be a 64). This statement is the climax of the speech. Like the speaker of Isocrates 16, this defendant attempts to portray his enemies as maliciously attacking hi m on false charges (2). 47 Isoc. 16.2:

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107 10), believing that the actual facts support his case and should win pity for him because of the groundless attacks of his adversaries (48). 48 Alcibiades uses his enmity with his opponents to point to the falsehood of their charges. The speaker in another private suit (Demosthenes 55, Against Callicles ) affirms enmity but employs his narrative somewhat differently from most other defendants. The hostile relationship sycophancy rather than to emphasize his aggressive feuding behavior. This emphasis on the er than his emotional involvement probably results from the nature of the procedure, a suit for damages ( ), since a prosecutor who brings a trial to obtain a sum of money is an easy target for the accusation of sycophancy. Accordingly, the speak unwarranted use of the courts. 49 The speaker narrates several incidents outside of the scope of the trial at hand. Because nd, he brought malicious accusations against him, bribing his cousin to initiate proceedings (1). Unsuccessful in this attempt, Callicles later obtained two verdicts against the speaker in cases which were decided by default; that is, the speaker was ruled against in absentia (1 2). This short history that the speaker presents in the prooemium it argument from probability that the same sort of malicious behavior is behind the current prosecution. 48 Isoc. 16:48: 49 The speaker constantly underscores his belief that he is being attacked by sycophants (1, 2, 7, 9, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 33, 35).

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108 actions more explicitly later in the speech. Do not be surprised dared to make false accusations. For previously when he persuaded his cousin to lay claim to my land, he produced fraudulent contracts. Also, now he himself has obtained a verdict by default again st me in another such case by indicting Callarus, one of my slaves. For they have devised this trick on top of all their other troublemaking. 50 to believe t hat he is currently engaged in a sycophantic legal action. The narrative of the feud therefore supports an argument from probability about the present charges against him. Although the speeches discussed so far would have been delivered before a jury court the use of the rhetoric of enmity for probability is not confined to this setting. Lysias 7 ( On the Olive Stump ), which was composed for delivery before the Areopagus Council, employs enmity in a way parallel dicastic court speeches. This defendant has b een accused of destroying the stump of an olive tree on his property, a capital offense in fourth century Athens. 51 An accusation of such a crime came before the Areopagus, which was also commissioned to send out inspectors who checked on the various moriai throughout the city. 52 Although the tree in this instance was the state. 53 50 Dem. 55.31: 51 It was illegal to cut down a sacred olive tree ( moria ) or violat e its enclosure ( ) (Arist Ath. Pol. 60.2) 52 The Areopagus, composed of archons (see above, p. 55, n. 48) who had completed their term and successfully passed their exit exams ( euthynai ) was primarily a homicide court, although it also had jurisdiction over some religious matters, such as the sacred olives. See Smith 1927; MacDowell 1978, 135; Carey 1989, 114 15; Wallace 1989, 106 12; Hansen 1991, 288 95. 53 For details about the sacred 15.

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109 h 54 The prosecutor, Nicomachus, is portrayed as a sycophant who attempted to extract a bribe from the speaker in return for dropping the suit (20). The delay of four years between the supposed off ense and this prosecution is, the speaker argues, an especially good indicator of the frivolous nature of this litigation. Nicomachus ought to have brought suit immediately after the alleged offense if the charge were based in fact (20, 42). Nicomachus cle arly cares nothing for whether or not an myself against the charges by which this man has come here in his plot against me although I am learning of these charges at th e same time as you, who will pass judgment concerning exile and 55 that the defendant is totally unprepared to make a defense until he hears the wild allegations of his opponent. 56 Surprisingly, however, the speaker at one point actually denies that Nicomachus is an 57 The speaker asserts that if Nicomachus had been hostile to him for many years, he certainly would have brought suit for this offense long ago (cf. Isae. 8.25 frivolously out of a desire for monetary gain. T his defendant, however, puts an interesting twist 54 Lys. 7.1: 55 Lys. 7.3: 56 Since pub arguments (Carey 1989, 120 1). For a similar complaint by a defendant, see Isoc. 18.7. 57 Lys. 7.20:

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110 on his rhetorical use of enmity. Although he denies that Nicomachus is a personal enemy, he also that Nicomachu 58 This further d to point out someone who had done wrong, but because he expected to received money from 59 Thus, the speaker of Lysias 7 in fact both affirms and denies enmity. He denies that Nicomachus is a personal enemy but asserts that he has been sent against hi m by his enemies, who are working behind the scenes. Both the affirmation and denial of enmity are calculated to a prosecutor seeking financial gain, then he sho uld find no credibility among the jury. Likewise, themselves (cf. [Dem.] 53.2). Ly sias has carefully crafted the narrative of enmity in this speech Denying Motive for Assault The previous chapter pointed out that prosecutors who alleged physical attacks affirmed enmity with th eir opponents to establish motive for the crime. As a natural corollary to this phenomenon, defendants in assault cases typically deny enmity. The speaker of Lysias 4, who is 58 Lys. 7.39: > < > 59 Lys. 7.39: Carey (1989) has a speakers also allege against their opponents that they are motivated by indicat es that this was only acceptable if it was accompanied by a desire to see justice done; to prosecute an enemy on a trumped up charge was not

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111 on trial for premeditated wounding ( trauma ek pronoias ), does just that in a spee ch that would have been delivered before the Areopagus. 60 This oration is fragmentary, but what survives is revealing. The speaker asserts that he had reconciled with his opponent (1 4), offering proofs as confirmation: the prosecutor had restored some goods that were disputed under an antidosis (1) 4). Although the loss of the first part of the speech makes it difficult to assess exactly how enmity functions, this denial o he had no motive to attempt murder (19). Lysias 4 would therefore be an appropriate parallel to the two prosecution speeches discussed previously (Demosthenes 21, 54) in which the spe akers affirm enmity in suits concerning assault to provide motivation for the heinous acts of which they accuse their opponents. 61 The speaker in this case denies that a relationship of enmity existed between himself and his opponent and rather asserts that they were friends since they had reconciled. He can then argue from probability that he had no reason to attempt the crime of which he is accused. Defendants in trials for homicide also deny enmity to create probability arguments. 62 Euphiletus, the speaker of On the Murder of Eratosthenes is careful to avoid admitting that he 60 Like Lysias 7, the rhetorical use of enmity is similar to other court speeches although the trial did not take place in a dicastic court. 61 Lysias 3 ( Against Simon ) is sim ilar in its rhetorical purposes although slightly different in technique. The speaker prov ides a narrative of the history of enmity between himself and the prosecutor, but limits it to a single chain of events having to do with a male prostitute. Yet, the speaker is careful to present himself as moderate and restrained, while Simon appears as a n antagonistic bully. Again, this rhetoric is calculated to speak to a probability argument about the accusation. The speaker wants it to appear more probable that Simon would bring malicious litigation than that he himself would actually attack Simon with intent to kill. 62 man, rather than between prosecutor and defendant. See p. 53 4 n. 44.

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112 and Eratosthenes, the deceased man, knew each other 63 although he admits that he killed him. Euphiletus argues that the homicide was justified by the law that allows a husband to kill an adulterer if he catches him in the act, but, evidently, he does not want the jurors to think that he lured Eratosthenes into a trap to kill him as an enemy. 64 To preempt accusations that he contrived the whole affair to seek private vengeance on an enemy Euphiletus argues that he had no reason at all to hate Eratosthenes or want to see him dead. He pointedly denies enmity with Eratosthenes enmity had ever exi sted between me and Eratosthenes until this point. For you will find that 65 Euphiletus immediately uses this denial of enmity to make an explicit argument from probability. He assumes that the jury will want to know whether or not Eratosthen es and he had acted with hostility toward each other with since enemies are more likel y to entrap and kill each other. For he did not lodge a against me as a sycophant, nor did he try to get me exiled from the city, nor did he lodge any private suits against me, nor did he have knowledge of any wrong that I was afraid would be revealed and so attempt to kill him, nor, if I should accompli sh this, did I hope to gain money from it. For on the basis of these sorts of things some people plot death for each other. 66 63 Todd (1998, 165) points out that some incidental rem arks point to the conclusion that Euphiletus and Eratosthenes were members of the same deme, although Euphiletus carefully disguises this fact. 64 The case would have taken place at the Delphinium, which conducted trials in which the defendant on a charge o f homicide claimed that the murder was justifiable. This court was staffed by the ephetai, a body of fifty one jurors chosen by lot. The ephetai oversaw trials at the Delphinium in cases of alleged justifiable homicide and at the Palladion for unintentiona l homicide. Whether the ephetai were chosen from the members of the Areopagus or the citizen body at large is unclear. See MacDowell 1963, 48 57; Gagarin 1981, 134 6; Carawan 1998, 8 15. 65 Lys. 1.43 4: 66 Lys. 1.44:

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113 In order to maintain that his act of homicide was justifiable and not based on a premeditated plan to punish an enemy, Euphiletus d enies that he was feuding with Eratosthenes. The speaker in fact has no ulterior motive of which the jury may be suspicious. In the first part of his discussion of enmity, Euphiletus employs a negative probability argument, that is, one that is designed to disprove a proposition rather than to prove it. The plot to murder each other. The conclusion is that Euphiletus did not plot to murder Eratosthenes. Euphiletus t hen uses his stated premise, that he is not an enemy of Euphiletus, to construct a positive probability argument designed to provide a compelling account for how the murder actually happened. If Euphiletus had never met Eratosthenes before, then he must ha ve had another very strong reason for killing him. This reason is, Euphiletus argues, the act of adultery to gain by running such a risk unless I had been wro 67 version of events. of Lysias 1 as an important component in his argument for his model of Athenian society. Herman (2006, 175 violent, non retaliatory code of behavior. For Herman, Euphiletus presents himself as a detached executor of civic justice because the jury would sympathize with this kind of behavior and find it acceptable. However, for Eratosthenes 67 Lys. 1.45:

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114 actually arise from the legal consideration of denying an ulterior motive for murder. Euphiletus presents himself as dispassionate not because he believes the jury will find this a satisfactory way for him to behave, but rather because he believes it will help him counter the accusations of the prosecution and show that he did not entrap Eratosthenes in order to kill him. One need not suppose, as Herman does, that the jury members would not endorse a crime of passion in a case in which the key details of Lysias 1 were different. On the other hand Allen (2000a, 126 7 ) argues that the jury would have sympathized with Euphiletus if he had portrayed the whole affair as a crime of passion. According to Allen he did not kill Eratosthenes in a moment of anger ). suffers from the same problem of unstated S he assumes that Euphiletus port rays his relationship with Eratosthenes in a way that will win him favor with the jury because he has behaved in accordance with social norms. H owever, Euphiletus emphasizes his own dispassionate attitude because of his leg al argument about motive. His den ial of enmity is linked to his probability argument about the nature of the homicide, not the expectation of a social judgment about his behavior. 68 Like On the Murder of Eratosthenes Antiphon 5 ( On the Murder of Herodes ) is a defense speech for a homicide trial although the prosecution has chosen the procedure rather than bringing the defendant before the court of the Areopagus with a 69 Following the same pattern as other litigants in cases of physical assault, the speaker, Euxitheus, m akes it 68 In fact, Euphiletus does not portray himself in a wholly positive light (see pp. 29 30). I f his social standing with 69 The speaker in fact complains that the prosecutors have used the wrong procedure in preferring to di phonou (9).

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115 very clear that the victim, Herodes, was not an enemy. He further argues that because no enmity existed between the two, the prosecution cannot co njure up a motive for the crime. Why indeed did I murder Herodes? There was no enmity between me and h im. They dare to claim that I killed the man as a favor. And who ever performed this act to do a favor to another? I am sure that no one has. Rather, the one who intends to do this must be extremely hostile and his premeditation necessarily becomes very ob vious. But there was no enmity between me and Herodes. 70 further comment. Euxitheus asserts that only the bitterest of enemies attempt to murder each other and that he and Herodes had no such hostility between them. If both of these premises are true, then the conclusion, that Euxitheus is not guilty, follows logically. The speaker of Antiphon h a motive for the murder. 71 Attacked by Sycophants In cases other than trials for physical assault, it is much more common for defendants to affirm enmity, 72 but a few defendants deny it. 73 These speeches, however, are quite exceptional in details of their c ases. Only in special circumstances did defendants find denial of enmity the preferable strategy. A defendant who rejects enmity as the motivation for the prosecution affords 70 Antiph. 5.57: 71 Cf. Antiphon 6 ( On the Chorus Boy ), in which the speaker, on trial for murdering one of the boys of his chorus, den ies that he made any enemies in raising his chorus (11). In this way, the speech follows the established pattern The speaker concentrates o n his relationship with his prosecutors rather than with the deceased. He accuses them of acting him maliciously (7) and asserts that the whole case is a piece of strategic litigation (34 6). Men whom the speaker intended to prosecute for embezzlement pers uaded the relatives of the deceased boy to lodge a suit against the speaker and prevent him from bringing his case against them to trial. 72 And oc 1 ; Lys. 3, 9 16, 19 21 23; Isoc. 16 ; Dem. 18 55; 57; Aesch in 2 ; Hyp. 3 73 Lys. 24, 25. Lysias 7 may be t reated both as affirming and denying enmity (discussed above).

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116 himself an opportunity to paint his opponent as motivated by ignoble reasons and thus accuse him of sycophancy. As in the other defense orations, these speakers use the absence of enmity rhetorically to emphasize to the jury that their opponent is a liar and has brought trumped up charges. Once again enmity functions to create probabil ity and character arguments about the case. Lysias 24 ( For the Invalid ), in which the speaker denies enmity and portrays the prosecutor as a sycophant, has several interesting features, including the procedure, a dokimasia for persons who received a govern ment pension. 74 Any disabled citizen who accepted pay from the state had to undergo this scrutiny exam ( dokimasia ) at which any citizen could accuse him of defrauding the city and obtaining his pension illegally. The nature of the procedure indicates that t his speech would have been delivered by a relatively poor person and therefore represents the only speech 75 Because many have found it difficult to believe that a person living off payments f rom the state would be able to afford a demonstrated in the following analysis. 76 74 Another unusual feature of this speech is humor. When this allegedly disabled and poor man accuses his opponents of attacking him out of envy for his manner of life and lust for money (see be low), a humorous effect may be intended. The author of the speech may be manipulating the rhetorical topoi of enemies and sycophants to jeer at his opponents. 75 This conclusion, however, depends on the assumption that the speaker is telling the truth when he states that he is not too wealthy to be drawing a government pension. 76 Darkow (1917, 73 commentary on the speech, Roussel (1966) argues against its authen ticity; Wood (1983) concurs. However, Dover (1968, 189), Winter (1973), Edwards and Usher (1985, 263), Carey (1990, 50 1, n. 19), and Dillon (1995) accept the speech as genuine.

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117 The speaker asserts that he is not confrontational, denying enmity to emphasize the disparity in character between the two litigants. He claims that t he prosecutor brings a false myself have lived a life worthy of praise rather than envy up to this day: for I think that this man has brought this trial again 77 The speaker accuses his opponent of bringing suit out of envy ( phthonos ) and denies that enmity ( echthra ) plays a role: a s his enemy, he is lying. For because of his wickedness I have never treated him as friend or 78 The speaker denies enmity with the prosecutor in order to separate himself as much as 79 The defendant in this case even go es so far as to thank the prosecutor for bringing the case since it gives him an opportunity to demonstrate his good habits give an account of my life although p 80 The contrast between prosecutor and defendant is highlighted throughout. It would have been odd for a poor man who was rec eiving state pay to be engaged in quarrels 77 Lys. 24.1: 78 Lys. 24.2: The prosecutor is motivated not by enmity, but envy: Indeed, Council, this man is clearly acting on envy because, although I have to endure such a misforturen, I am a better citizen 3 ). 79 The speaker portrays the prosecutor as driven ( 1; 2 ) ( 1; 2 ) wickedness ( 13 ), to increase the probability that he is lying ( ) 80 Lys. 24.1: The speaker of Lysias 16 ( For Manitheus ) dokimasia to demonstrate how well he has behaved (1 3). Unlike the speaker of Lysias 24, Manitheus affirms enmity with his prosecutor, but, like the speaker of Lysias 24, concurrently accuses the opposition of envy and malice.

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118 action. He does this by attempting to paint him as a lying sycophant. 81 The speaker repeatedly credibility, emphasizing that he is a known liar and is bringing a false accusation. Because this is a dokimasia tance of public man who has the leisure and resources to engage in hosti le relationships and pursue them in the courts would certainly not appear to be destitute and in need of the financial assistance from the city. If he has the ability to be in a feud with other citizens, surely he would have the ability to support himself. 82 He asserts that he does not us e state pay to pursue quarrels. Why should I receive such treatment from you? Because previously somebody came to trial on my account and lost their possessions? But no one would be able to demonstrate that. Or because I am a busybody, reckless and fond of quarreling? But I do not use my means of living for those sorts of things. 83 81 Lys. 24.1: ; Lys. 24.2: ; Lys. 24.25: 82 Lys. 24.7: 83 Lys. 24.24: < >

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119 Now that he has established that the prosecutor cannot claim to be in a legitimate hostile relationship with him, the speaker is free to portray himself as a poor man who needs his pension, under attack by a malicious prosecutor who does not hesitate to tell lies. 84 In his discussion of this speech, Cohen (1995, 82 3) elucidates the antithesis between enmity ( echthra ) and envy ( phthonos ). 85 revenge here as legitimate motivations for litigation, whereas envy implies th as a reason to question the credibility o litigant can either affirm enmity or deny enmity depending on the case. He even comes close to clearly how he sees these arguments as functioning. He admits the aspect of probability iterates his thesis that a revenge reflect the normative expectations which Lysias anticipated the judges to bring to bear in wever, if enmity functions to support character and probability arguments, there is no reason to posit such an extra legal use of enmity to speak to Rather different speakers make use of enmity in very diverse ways specifical ly because they tie it to the claims of their cases. The speaker of Lysias 24 does not 84 The speaker of Lysias 16 ( For Mantitheus ) a lso denies involvement in court cases and such feuding activities (12). Someone on trial for a dokimasia or euthynai would naturally not want to appear quarrelsome, since excessive pursuit of private enemies could mar service to the public. 85 Phthonos is t he only emotion that Aristotle treats as wholly negative (Konstan 2006, 112 13). It is mere petty

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120 deny enmity to win points in pursuit of some sort of honor game but rather to make argume nts about the details of the case. On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy (Ly sias 25), probably composed for a type of dokimasia undercut their credibility. The defendant is evidently wealthy (12 13) and has been charged with staying in Athens during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants and therefore colluding in some way with the regime. The speaker counterattacks by calling the credibility of the prosecution into question with his assertion that his opponents are sycophants who have become rich by maliciou sly enmity. Not only i s the topic of the trial directly related to the regime of the Thirty, but the speech was composed shortly after their overthrow of their regime, probably around 400 (Murphy 1992, 546). In view of the political climate, the speaker appeals to larger issues about public welfare. Murphy (1992) even calls Lysias 25 individual (1992, 555 8). He further accuses his opponents of helping create the factionalism that led to civil war assert ing prosecuting the elites for monetary ends (Wolpert 2002, 123) The public focus in the speech therefore makes it expedient fo r the speaker to eschew private concerns and, especially, an affirmation of private enmity.

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121 The speaker does not include an explicit denial of enmity, but he conspicuously ignores the issue throughout, at the same time emphasizing that his prosecutors have no personal interest in his affairs but are busybodies. I wonder at my accusers, who care nothing for their own affairs and interest themselves in the affairs of others. Although they know those who have done nothing wrong and those who have committed man y crimes, they are trying to make a profit and persuade you to have this opinion about all of us. 86 These men do not care at all about the factuality of the offenses of which they accuse people although they know very well who has done wrong and who has not They are acting only for money. The speaker emphasizes that they have obtained wealth through their unscrupulous Demophantes, and Cleisthenes profited privately b wealthy out of their poor status and have never undergone the submission of accounts ( euthynai ) although they have held ma 87 These accusations prepare the way for the engaged in frivolous prosecutions, they will be more disposed to accept that the charges against the speaker are false. The speaker emphasizes his own moderation during the time of the Thirty to undercut any claim by the prosecutors that he is their enemy. He claims that he did not take part in the 86 Lys. 25.1: 87 Lys. 25.3: ; Lys. 25.25: ; Lys. 25:29: ; Lys. 25.30: The people listed in section the text to change the names, but this is irrelevant to the present argument. It is clear from the context of the previous sentence that this list (whatever the names included) is intended to name the prosecutors in the case.

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122 oligarchy, nor did he favor his friends or harm his enemies when he had opportunity (15). He did 88 nor did he get an arbitration verdict against another (16). He did not enrich himself at the expense of others (16) nor commit any crimes although the regime o f the Thirty provided the perfect opportunity to get away with wrongdoing erly on you 89 These arguments would have been less believable if the speaker had not denied enmity. Had he acknowledged that he made enemies during the regime of the Thirty, he would have put himself under suspicion of misconduct under Throughout the speech the defendant ignores the issue of enmity and concentrates on the intended simply to make the jury vote against the m because of who they are, but rather to make it seem more likely that they are lying in the present case and that the speaker is innocent. The sycophants. Fo 90 This statement connects their past history to the falsehood of the present charges. These prosecutors are harassing the speaker with no basis in fact. Therefore, I think that it is a strong arg ument that if my accusers had been able to convict me of doing some private injustice they would not have accused me of the 88 ) is. Possibly it was a list of Athenian c itizens in 404 B.C. (cf. Isoc. 18.16; 21.2). However, Xenophon ( Hell 2.3.18, 51 52; 2.4.1) and Aristotle ( Ath. Pol. 36.2) mention another ka talogos the three thousand citizens enfranchised under the Thirty (Edwards and Usher 1985, 273). 89 Lys. 25.17: 90 Lys. 25.3:

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123 crimes of the Thirty. They also would not believe that they have to slander others for things that the Thirty did, but that they had to convict those who had actually done injustice. 91 The speaker emphasizes this character argument at the end of the speech. If he has convinced the jury that his opponents are unscrupulous prosecutors, he can now make a strong argument that they are likel y to be lying on this charge. These sorts of people, the defendant claims, are 92 In this way they make the ci ty a place where as these men want it to, and it is not those who have wronged your people who pay the penalty, but those who do not give up their own posses 93 The speaker wants the jury to believe that his opponents habitually engaged in false accusations so that the jurors will be skeptical about the charge against him. Conclusion Certain patterns are detectable in the rhetorical use of enmity in defen se speeches as in prosecution speeches. Defendants are much more likely to affirm enmity than to deny it. 94 Defendants in trials for homicide invariably deny enmity with the victim since they do not want to provide their opposition with reasonable grounds f or a motive for the alleged murder. Other than suits for physical assault, denials of enmity only occur in cases that are exceptional in 91 Lys. 25.5: 92 Lys. 25.31: 93 Lys. 25.32: 94 However, a significant number of speeches ignores the issue altogether ( Lys. 18 ; [Lys.] 20 ; Isae 2, 11 ; Dem. 29 ; [Dem.] 52 ; Hyp. 2 ).

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124 nature. Because Lysias 25 has a direct connection to the Athenian civil war the speaker denies that he antagonized the prosecutor during that the regime of the Thirty. He desires to avoid the one of the most exceptional speeches of the entire corpus of the Attic orators. The l itigant is a poor invalid who must deny that he is wealthy enough to be involved in a feud with prosecutor. 95 Whether a defendant chooses to affirm or deny enmity, one thing remains constant: the rhetorical use of hostile relationships for probability and character arguments. Defendants who affirm enmity typically do so to paint their opponents as malicious attackers prosecuting their enemies in pursuit of a vendetta and without regard to the facts of the case. Defendants who deny enmity either undercut the opponents of acting as sycophants trumping up charges that are untrue. In all of these cases, a defendant employs enmity rhetorically in a way that integrates with his overall argument s and supports his claims about the facts of the case. 95 Further, Lysias 24 may not be authentic (see p. 116 n. 76).

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125 CHAPTER 4 MAKING ENEMIES The Attic orators are valuable sources not only for how Athenians employed and manipulated the issue of enmity in the court rooms but also for how they conceptualized the worki ng of enmity in society. Chapters 2 3 investigated the rhetorical use of enmity to create 4 5 examine how enmity is depicted in the orators and other Attic so urces and what this tells us about Athenian attitudes toward enmity in their society. Whereas the foregoing analysis investigated the methods by which litigants used enmity for their own purposes, these chapters examine what Athenians assumed about enmity another. The preceding rhetorical analysis h as laid the groundwork for such an investigation. Because Athenian litigants introduced the issue enmity for the rhetorical purposes of constructing arguments from character and probability, their narratives provide a picture of how Athenians thought that enmities were likely to arise and to be carried out. A speaker would construct his accounts of a hostile relationship in such a way as to make his version of events appear to be the most plausible of the ones offered. A litigant must therefore ensure that his narrative will fit the jury even if he embellishes the truth or fabricates a narrative. The Attic orators are famous for distorting the facts, but, a matter of great concern. Even if all extant speeches exaggerate or distort the events they describe they still provide evidence for what an Athenian jury would have been ready to accept as plausible (Dover 1974, 13 14)

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126 P atterns of behavior depicted re peatedly i how Athenian citizens presumed that feuds were likely to happen (although not necessarily how they should happen) 1 When several different litigants describe similar sets of circumstances, they are often taking adva ntage of a common scenario which entailed certain typical responses and consequences. For example, because the sources frequently depict disputes over inheritance and money as causing a rift between different kinship groups within the family, one may concl ude that Athenians viewed this as a likely scenario in which enmity could occur. Such repeated patterns will reveal many different aspects of the conceptualization of enmity in classical Athens. Because the scope of the study has broadened to include quest ions about Athenian ideology in general, it will now incorporate sources beyond Attic oratory. The following analysis will draw on classical Athenian texts of different genres, including history, drama, and philosophy. A study of how Athenians in general c onceptualized the working of enmity must take into account as much of the source material as possible. While the Attic orators, due to their explicit focus on disputes, provide much of the material for this topic, other sources enhance the portrait of soci ety drawn from the law court speeches. This corroboration from ancient authors of diverse genres provides a necessary corrective, mitigating the biases of one particular type of source This chapter will show that n umerous cl assical Athenian sources assume enmity to be extremely common. The Athenians believed that it was natural for an individual to divide up his acquainta that Athenian accepted enemies as a common part of li 1 Of course, the extant speeches will mirror the values of the society in which they were delivered so that inevitable. Yet the primary aim of the orators is not to convince the jurors that they are pursuing a feud within acceptable bounds, but rather to prove that a punishable offense has occurred.

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127 by which an Athenian could make an enemy. Whether in alcohol related incidents, sexual rivalry, criticism and gossip, fa mily quarrels, monetary disputes, conflict in the performance of public duties, disagreement over public policy, or a host of other reasons, a citizen could come into a hostile relationship with relative ease. The tendency in Athens to divide up society in to networks of family and friends facilitated the spread of enmity from a dispute between two individuals to one including a vast network of people. One lawsuit or act of slander could draw a great many third parties into a single dispute, giving rise to m any other related quarrels. The citizens of classical Athens were aware of a multitude of scenarios in which conflict could ignite and therefore saw enemies as simply a fact of life. The Prevalence of Enmity E nemies are a ubiquitous concern in all genres o f Athenian literature, including oratory, history, drama, and philosophy. Demosthenes in Against Meidias assume s that the members of his audience all have enemies, arguing from analogy that none of the jurors would want to allow one of his enemies to do to him what Meidias has done to Demosthenes: erhaps Meidias hates me, but someone else hates each one of you. Would you agree, then, that everyone who hates someone else should have authority to do the things that Meidias has done to me? I do 2 Demosthenes bases his appeal to the jury on the belief that Athenian citizens would Charmides Plato implies that by the time they were learning to read and writ e, Athenian boys 2 Dem. 21.220: Elsewhere in the speech Demosthenes emphasizes the disgust who quarreled with each other (62 62), but not pursued them to t he point that Meidias has. Although he argues that Meidias has carried his hatred too far, Demosthenes still assumes that enmity is quite common.

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128 would be able to identify certain persons as their enemies, probably as a result of enmity passed down from their father s or other members of their households In the context of his dispute with the interlocutors of the dialogue over the d ) a ) Socrates asks the youth Charmides, o you think that the scribe [who educated you] read and wrote only his own name and taught you boys to do so, or did you pract ice writing the names of your enemies no less than your own names and your 3 Socrates takes for granted that Charmides knew people whom he could identify as enemies even when he was just learning the alphabet. 4 Memora bilia expects all Athenian men to experience a 5 needs the same skills that a general of the army develops, namely, to b Nicomachus, objects to the comparison of heads of a household ( ) and generals, bad a nd reward the good, etc.] are common to both [heads of households and generals], but 6 Nicomachus agrees emphatically ( ). 3 Pl. Chrm 161d: 4 Athenians were not unaccustomed to think of youths as obtaining or inheriting enemies at an early age. The speaker of Isaeus 5 ( On the Estate of Dicaeogenes ) accuse s Dicaeogenes of betraying young orphans while he was 10). The speaker of Lysias 32 ( Against Dicaeogenes ) posits that the orphans for whom he is speaking as an advoc ate may have an 22). 5 Xen. Mem 3.4.6: 6 Xen. Mem 3.4.10:

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129 Ancient Greeks do not seem to have found it difficult to divide up their acquaintances into friends and enemies. 7 A Greek was expected to help those he considered friends and to harm those he considered enemies. This dichotomy was a key part of the structuring of social rel ationships and often had widespread implications since in the absence of a clear distinction between different spheres of activity, a private dispute between two individuals would generally expand to include all spheres of life in which they interacted. Pu blic speakers who differed on law courts (Mitchell and Rhodes 1996, 21 9). The speaker of Lysias 14 ( Against Alcibiades ) pardon men of this sort? Is it because they have been unfortunate in their public life but have otherwise lived orderly and moderate lives? Have not 8 The prosecutor attacks hi s opponents not only for their public policies but for their character since he believes with his policy and did not always make fine distinctions between the public and private spheres T he following two sections will enumerate some of the many ways by which Athenians could make enemies, exploring how Athenians conceived of the causes of enmity and the reasons for its spread among networked groups of friends and enemies The evidence supports the proposition already stated, that enmity was a fact of everyday life and was a prominent part The great diversi ty of methods by which enmity c ould begin and spread assured that very few citizen s would be left unaffected. 7 Dover 1974, 181; Blundell 1989, 39 49; Phillips 2008, 15 21. 8 Lys. 14.41:

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130 The Causes of Enmity Enmity often ensued from conflicts in both the private and public arena s D rinking parties court cases, struggles for political advancement and many other activities could pit two citizens against each other, with the result that each stood This section relationships of enmity in ord er to illustrate how many different avenues for making an enemy existed. The Athenians assumed that enmity could result from activities in nearly every aspect of life and was correspondingly a widespread phenomenon. D rinking parties, sexual rivalry, and ga mes were especially marked out as activities that irrational acts. Demosthenes uses the example of a public official who started a scuffle with another citizen as a typical case of such behavior for the man who struck the thesmothete has three excuses: drunkenness, love, and ignorance on account of the fact that the deed was done in darkness at night. 9 Demosthenes implies that such acts committed under the influ ence of drink or love were relatively common. Lysias 3 ( Against Simon ) centers on the conflict over the affections of a Plataean boy The narrative chronicles several altercations between himself and Simon, including a melee in which got their heads cracked 10 The speaker asserts that scuffles over these issues were widespread and unworthy of the severe penalty for which he has been put on trial He believes it incredible ( ) that the courts would exile 9 Dem. 21.38: 10 Lys. 3.18:

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131 over boys or slander or a hetaera 11 12 uarrels resulting in enmity had a famous precedent in the story of Harmodius and Aristogiton who overthrew the Pisitratid tyranny at Athens in 508/7 B.C According to Thucydides (6.54 9), Aristogiton formed his plot against the tyrant Hippias after the ty 13 In the case of adultery, Athenians appeared especially willing to go to extreme lengths to ), he could kill him with impunity (Dem. 23.53). 14 In Lysias 1 ( On the Murder of Eratosthenes ) Euphiletus claims that he executed Eratosthenes in accordance with the laws because he had caught him in bed with his wife. Although the enmity between Euphiletus and Eratosthenes had been short lived, 15 16 Andromache illustrates the belief that someone who took more than one 17 Hostilities would frequently result from such rivalry. 11 Lys. 3.43: 12 Lys. 3.42: Other disputes over prostitutes which resulted in violence or enmity are Ag ainst Neaera ([Dem.] 59.30 On the Estate of Pyrrhus (3.13). 13 Love affairs could also lead to family squabbles. In Demosthenes 39 ( Against Boeotus I ) the speaker asserts that sons as legitimate, thus causing a tangle of legal problems for his legitimate son, the speaker himself (see esp. 40). 14 On this law of justifiable homicide, see MacDowell 1963, 72; Gagarin 1981, 114; Carawan 1998, 92 4. 15 Only re latives could bring suit i n a prosecution for homicide by the See MacDowell 1963, 17; Gagarin 1981, 55 7; Carawan 1998, 1. 16 176). If they had been enemies pr eviously, Eratosthenes may have intended to do Euphiletus dishonor by cuckolding him. 17 Eur. Andr 467:

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132 This is further illustrated by litigants who deny that they were involved in drinking parties or love affairs with their opponents to preempt suspicions of enmity. Euphiletus must deny that he was involved in a drunken brawl ( Lys. 1.45) with Eratosthenes in order to deny that enmity existed between them (Cohen 1995, 71 2). 18 The speaker of D emosthenes 47 ( Against Evergus ) proves that he has no ulterior motives by rejecting the common causes of enmity: h him over some advantage he had gained 19 Another litigant draws a contrast between himself and his opponents, asserting that he has never given anyone a reason to become his enemy while his oppo 20 The speaker implies that those types of people are more likely to quarrel with others than restrained and moderate men like himself. Aristotle asserts that men who are drunk are more likely than those who are sober to commit hubris ( Pol. 1274b). A similar assumption that drunkenness often leads to quarrels may Ecclesiazusae instituting a form of government simil ar to communism in Athens on the grounds that common commit outrage 21 18 Euphiletus, unlike the other litigants cited, mentions only drinking parties and omits reference to sexual rivalry, p affair with his wife. 19 Dem. 47.19: 20 Lys. 16.11: 21 Ar. Eccl 663 4:

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133 Athenians w ere quick to link activities involving irrational impulses, such as drinking and love, to quarrelsome behavior. Citizens who came into conflict often reinforced their hostile relationships through mutual criticism and gossip. In one of his philosophical wo rks Isocrates asserts that while praise for another can begin a friendship censure can just as easily cause enmity (1.33). Even the failure to return a friendly gre eting could be interpreted as an insult, causing ill will and turning a friend into an enem y (Xen. Mem. 3.13.1 ; cf. Arist. Rh. 1379a ). Aristotle asserts that friends will likely be those who are not critical ( Rh 1381b) or apt to slander others ( ). Such behavior could easily terminate a friendship. For instance, the speaker of Lysias 8 ( Against the Members of a Sunousia) alleges that his opponents had acted as if they were his friends but were in fact slandering him behind his back (1 2). The friendship has now turned into enmity (14, 18). 22 Isaeus 1 ( On the Estate of Cleonymus ) includes a similar story about two individuals who became enemies after having an intense argument : were former ly friends and had no pretext for such behavior they came into enmity with each other after an exchange of words for no apparent reason 23 Such insults figure prominently in the plots of tragic plays. The title character of Sop Ajax unwisely refuses the goddess rring her enmity and wrath (770 7 ). Athena then gets revenge for this slight by humiliating Ajax and eventually driving him to suicide. 24 22 Lysias 8 was clearly not intended for a dikastic court, and may not have been composed for a trial before any official body in Athens. It is more likely an address to the private club ( sunousia ) of which the s peaker was a member. 23 Isae. 1.9: 24 7.

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134 Many contentious issues could arise from within the household, especially over inheritance and the practice of guardianship. 25 The extant orations on matters of inheritance, which are notoriously complex, 26 demonstrate that intricate and often convoluted interpretations of the relevant laws, along with elaborate claims about the circumstances surrounding a will, could cause considerable strife among family members (Isae. 1.22, 3.73). For instance, the speaker of Demosthenes 44 ( Against Leochares ades on the grounds that he is the adopted son of the adopted son of Archiades. An adopted member of the family should not be allowed, he argues, to adopt another person into the family (63). In Isaeus 1 ( On the Estate of Cleonymus ) the speaker argues that the will made by the now deceased Cleonymus disinherited him and his siblings because of the enmity between Cleonymus and their guardian, Deinias. After hostilities between the two had cooled, Cleonymus intended to make a new will but was prevented from d oing so by family members with a vested interest in the old will. The speaker asserts that the old will, which disinherited him and his siblings, should be ignored. He reasons that he and his siblings are nearer in relationship and that Cleonymus was never in a quarrel with them. Cleonymus, therefore, had no reason to wish them to be dispossessed (17). Thus he attempts to undermine the actual document, even boldly asserting, (as you typically do) for those who dispute based on their family relationship rather than those who 25 The most fertile source for the first of these is the corpus of Isaeus, who seems to have specialized in inheritance law. 26 Harrison (1968 gave play to litigation and the skill of t 1905 15 the te stator.

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135 27 A law that invalidated a will made under the influence of insanity, old age, drugs, or a woman provided further complications to testamentary issues (Isae. 2.1, 19; Dem. 48.56; [Dem.] 46.14). A claimant could easily dispute the status of an inheritance by alleging that the testator had been manipulated. Even when claimants did not dispute the status of the will, questions could ari se over who actually possessed the money and whether they had it rightfully. As two daughters of a deceased man contest his will in Demosthenes 41 ( Against Spudias ), one of their husbands maintains that another son in law already owed twenty minae to the e state of the deceased that he should repay. The speaker of Lysias 19 ( On the Property of Aristophanes ) has been brought to trial for possessing wealth inherited from Aristophanes that belongs to the state. He argues that Aristophanes was not as wealthy as supposed and that the amount of money requested by the prosecutors simply does not exist (24 7). Such disputes could fuel relationships of enmity that continued well beyond the original issue. In On the Mysteries Andocides accuses his prosecutor, Callias, of attacking him because of a previous quarrel over the marriage of an heiress (1.117 23). This story indicates that disputes over inheritance issues provided opportunities for lasting hostile relationships to develop. 28 The practice of guardianship could a lso be a source of strife between family members and close friends. In addition to the famous case of Demosthenes (Dem. 27 31), seven lawsuits involving disputes over guardians survive (Dem. 36; 38; [Dem.] 45; Isaeus 1; 5; 7; 11). Thus twelve out of the ap proximately one hundred extant forensic orations concern this issue directly (see also the reference to another guardianship case at Lys. 10.5). The speaker in a Lysianic 27 Isae. 1.41: 28 Thompson (1981) argues that Athenians frequently made wills. Therefore, these disputes could have been quite widespread and not limited simply to exceptional cases.

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136 is not enough, men of the jury, that guardians receive so many troubles because of their guardianship; many, after they have preserved the possession of their friends, are also maliciously prosecuted 29 As in testamentary law, the potential for abuse was high. The absence of strict records and the latitude given to guardians to manage the money as they saw fit made it difficult to prove or disprove misconduct in the administration of the property. Disputes over money and property were not lim ited to relatives and friends. Court cases between even relative strangers could make business associates into enemies. Pasion, the most famous banker in Athens, was involved in several such court cases. 30 A fragmentary speech in the Lysianic corpus shows t hat even a casual loan could turn two friends against each other: 31 A story from Isaeus 5 ( On the Estate of Dicaeogenes ) confirms that lending and borrowing could turn a friend from boyhood and from whom he stole money that he had borrowed; he is now his 32 to find his explanation for the end of a friendship plausible. The many other extant private suits concerning money or property would also presumably have ended in enmity between the opposing litigants. Litigation for profit was not confined to banking an d contract disputes. Athenian literature frequently expresses concerns over unscrupulous citizens who extorted money from others by 29 Lys. Fr. 43 Thalheim: 30 Isoc. 17; Dem. 36; [Dem.] 49.6 32; 52.12 15. On Pasion, see p. 80 n. 116. 31 P. Oxy. 1606 Fr. 6 col. iv: 32 Isae. 5.40:

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137 accusations of such sycophancy: Who does not know how many troubles you have not ceased to cause not only by bringing sycophantic private suits, no less weighty than the present trial, but also by bringing sycophantic public suits and never following through with the trial? Did you not accuse Timarchus? Or Callipus, who is now in Sicily? Or again Menon? Or Autocles? Or Timotheus? Or many others? 33 Demosthenes may well be exaggerating, but he is employing a character type that was well known to Athenians. Whether or not these blackmailers were a legitimate public menace, Athenian literature certainly envisions them as such. 34 Because Athenians did not separate their lives into public and private spheres, quarrels over public matters could lead to enmity. Deliberation over foreign policy in t he Assembly personal dimension. 35 These power blocs may have focused on a specific issue of policy as did the groups led by Demosthenes and Aeschines in th e middle of the fourth century, but they inevitably entailed private vendettas that were played out in the courts and elsewhere. Any Athenian could make an enemy by speaking in the Assembly since he was bound to disagree with other policy makers who often viewed their honor and status as linked to their influence on 33 Dem. 36.53: < > 34 E.g., Lys. 19.51, 25.3, 27.2; Isoc. 21.15; Dem. 25.46 7; Aeschin. 3.212. Although many scholars have argued that pe cuniary motives defined a sycophant, others have posited that a sycophant was primarily a vexatious litigant rather than necessarily one seeking dishonest gain (see MacDowell 1978, 62 66; Osborne 1990; Harvey 1990; Todd 1993, 92 4; Christ 1998a: 48 71; All en 2000a, 156 67; Rubinstein 2000, 199 213). However, the argument presented here rests only on the supposition that Athenians were concerned about people who used the courts for profit and not 35 Although the communis opinio for many years has held that these political battles in the Assembly and courts were the preserve of the super rich, Rubinstein (2000, 91, 111) has effectively challenged this view. She argues that allowed citizens of moderate means to attach themselves to important public figures and work their way to prominence.

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138 36 The prooemium to Andocides 4 ( Against Alcibiades ) connects political activity with the acquisition of personal enemies: I am not experiencing for the first time how danger ous it is to get involved with the affairs of the city. Rather I regarded it as an arduous task even in the past, before I concerned myself with public business. But I think it the duty of the good citizen to be willing to face danger on behalf of the mass es and not to keep silent about public problems for fear of coming upon private enmities. 37 17), addressed to the Assembly, illustrate how itical stances and private lives but rather attacks them indiscriminately with ad hominem arguments. He asserts that the state ought to execute publicly his political opponents who wanted to make peace with Philip ( 10.63). 38 He implie s that invectives between political adversaries were 39 Even in private life insults and slander could inflict dishonor; in front of the Assembly, such criticism wil l have created deep divisions between citizens. 40 These political leaders could take an attack on their public record or policies as the beginning of enmity. The orators often pursued their political opponents in the courts (e.g., Dem. 19; Aeschin. 1, 3), e xacerbating hostilities. Such prosecutions resulting from public matters could make enemies. In On the Dishonest Embassy Demosthenes asserts that the Phocians, who em 36 On the perceived difference between the ordinary citizen and the political expert, see Ober 1989, 104 27. 37 Andoc. 4.1: 38 On apotympanismos see Allen 2000a, 232 3. 39 Dem. 4.44, 40 Deliberative debates that resulted in personal attacks were not limited to the Assembly. The speaker of Lysias 22 ( Against the Reta ilers of Grain ), a member of the Council, asserts that when he spoke against summary execution for traders of grain who had engaged in illegal business practices, he was immediately accused of favoritism (2 3).

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139 41 A fragment from 42 Those who came into con flict in the public arena often cemented a private relationship of enmity through the courts. Memorabilia a successful politician could expect to make many enemies among his fellow citizens and therefore had to develop the skills ne cessary to master his rivals. Socrates asks Aristippus about the education of two hypothetical youths, one who will be educated to be a strong leader and another who will be taught not to attempt leadership. As Socrates and Aristippus discuss the various s kills in which each boy should be trained, Socrates 43 The answer to stion was evidently quite obvious since this issue is not debated in the rest of the dialogue. Xenophon assumes that his audience will find it plausible that those who exercise leadership will make enemies as a matter of course. Liturgies provided addition al avenues for making enemies by virtue of their intensely competitive nature. 44 The richest men in Athens were selected to perform certain duties such as producing a dramatic play at a festival, supporting an athletic team, or equipping and 41 Dem. 19.80: 42 Din. Fr. 87.126 Sauppe: 43 Xen. Mem 2.1.3: ; ; 44 Whitehead 1983; Veyne 1990, 77 8. Davies (1981, 91 7) and Ober (1989, 231 3) assert that the wealthy performed liturgies so that they could ask for gratitude ( charis ) from the jury if they were to become entangled in a court case. Johnstone (1999, 93 108) takes a slightly different approach, pointing out that elite litigants cited the liturgies they had performed to establish their character before the jury. Regardless of the exact motives behin d establish their standing and to gain honor among the citizen body. On liturgies, see also Christ 1990; Hansen 1991, 110 12.

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140 commanding a wa rship for the fleet. This institution allowed wealthy citizens to gain status and reputation in the city by performing their duties well. While most rival wealthy citizens were already engaged in a continuous battle for status in the community, liturgy per formers were often pitted against each other in more direct ways (for instance, competing against each other with rival choruses at the same festival). In a society with agonistic values, the competitive atmosphere surrounding performance of liturgies made for a natural arena of conflict. An anticipatory argument in Antiphon 6 ( On the Chorus Boy ) implies that the jury might assume that a chorus producer would make enemies during his recruitment of chorus boys and the chorus as best as I was able, not causing anyone 45 The speaker must deny that he made enemies while discharging his duties in order to assert that he had no motive for the murde producers must develop the skills to overcome their enemies, thus assuming that enmity results naturally from the competitive arena of liturgy performance ( Mem 3.4). Socrates argue s that chorus producers are comparable to generals since both will inevitably acquire enemies and must be able to defeat them (3.4.10). This dialogue between Socrates and Nicomachus operates under the premise that elite liturgy performers have echthroi jus t as generals have polemioi 46 Trierarchies occasioned no less strife than chorus productions. Because they could be quite lucrative, citizens sometimes competed for them. The powerful and wealthy might promise trierarchies to their associates or dependants as a reward or token of friendship (Lys. 28.4, 29.3). Conversely, influential citizens might force unprofitable trierarchies on their enemies to punish 45 Antiph. 6.11: 46 Public service in general could function as a competion for honor among elite citizens. See Davies 1981, 26; Whitehead 1983; 1993; Sinclair 1988, 188 90; Gabrielsen 1994, 48 9; Wilson 2000, 144 97; Christ 2006, 171 2.

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141 Knights become a 47 Several speeches of the Demosthenic corpus (44, 50, 51; cf. Lys. 21.8) have a direct connection to trierarchic service and disputes arising from it. Demosthenes 44 and 50 in particular illustrate how the exchange of these warships from one captain to another could end in hostilities, especially if a dispute arose In Lysias 21 ( On a Charge of Accepting Bribes ) the speaker mentions another type of dispute over warships. Several ge nerals verbally abused each other in a battle over who would get to go aboard the best equipped of the triremes (8). 48 Public magistrates could make enemies simply in the performance of their duties. The speaker of Demosthenes 57 ( Against Eubulides ) admits that he quarreled with several people while he served as the leader of his deme, apparently considering such behavior normal. In Against Meidias had a verbal battle over the allotment of flute players. Both the archon and the members of the tribe gave speeches in which they abused each other and engaged in mutual accusations. 49 Aristotle similarly assumes that magistrates became involved in enmity in the natural course of their duties. H e suggests that the officials who impose penalties be different from those who 47 Ar. Eq 912 14: Some trierarchs even hired substitutes (Gabrielsen 1994, 95 102). 48 The ant idosis procedure may also have increased the potential for strife in the performance of liturgies. A wealthy Athenian who was assigned a liturgy could challenge someone else either to do the liturgy himself or to submit to an exchange of property (see p. 5 antidosis 82). The trials of Lysias 4 ( On a Premeditated Wounding ) and Demosthenes 42 ( Against Pha enippus ) likewise resulted from an antidosis (1). Although enmity may have arisen from such procedures, it seems probable that the person who proposed the antidosis would challenge one of his enemies rather than a friend or someone he did not know. A ntidosis may have presupposed rather than created enmity. 49 Dem. 21.13:

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142 exact the penalties because if the same people were responsible for both they would become Pol. 1322a; cf. Plat. Resp 343e). 50 One former official reportedly avoided the courts because of the enemies he had made having suffered a wrong from him in some other public capacity, would appear against him 51 An influential aristocrat named Polystratus feared reprisal from those who were dissatisfied with the administration of his office. When asked to come up with a list of the 5000 men to control the new government, he actually wrote down 9000 names becau se he believed that he could make enemies by excluding citizens who desired to be on the roll ([Lys.] 20.13). 52 Arbitrators could acquire new enemies by stepping into the middle of a dispute. 53 Demosthenes asserts that Meidias became angry with Straton, who, as a public arbitrator, had (21.87). Private arbitrators also risked angering one of the two parties if they attempted to participate in the resolution process. The sp eaker of Isaeus 2 ( On the Estate of Menecles ) relates that mutual friends refused to arbitrate between his opponent and himself because they did not wish to take the chance of making an enemy of either party (30). Arbitrators risked expanding a dispute rat her than resolving it. 50 The danger that Aristotle feared seems to have been present in the Athenian process of tax collection. Because the tax collectors paid the state a fixed sum and kept the overages for themselves, they profited directly from their activities. It is no surprise that the Attic orators make several references to tax collectors making enemies (Andoc. 1. 133 6 ; Lys. 22.8; Dem. 22.63). 51 Dem 39.3: 52 This occurred in 411 B.C., when the first oligarchic rebellion during the Peloponnesian War took place. This s hort 70, 97). 53 On the practice of private arbitration at Athens, see Lipsius 1905 15, 222 6; Harrison ii. 1968 71, 64 6; MacDowell 1978, 203 6; Hunter 1994, 55 67.

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143 The Athenian sources provide a portrait of society in which enmity could result from private spheres and within the household and outs ide of it. Athenians conceived of enmity as a pervading force in society, able to arise in a multitude of situations. The casual admissions of enmity by Athenian citizens are not at all unusual in view of their acceptance of the prevalence of enmity in the city. Spreading Enmity Once started, a relationship of enmity naturally expanded to include many more individuals than the two originally involved in the conflict. Hostilities were usually passed on through affinity groups, including members of the househ old and friends. Because Athenians tended to group themselves into identifiable social networks, a newly formed relationship of enmity could cause a chain reaction among such groups with far ranging consequences. 54 The first level to which enmity expanded w as the household ( oikos ). When the heads of their respective oikoi became enemies, all members of their households were drawn into the relationship of hostility. 55 For instance, Athenians believed that enmity was passed down from father to son. Defendants s ometimes complain that they are on trial because their opponents wish to continue a feud inherited from the previous generation (Dem. 57.61; Isoc. 16.2 3). Likewise, a prosecutor may assert that the origin of his hatred for his opponent came from their fat relationship. The speaker of Lysias 14 ( Against Alcibiades ) cavalierly admits that he is 54 Blundell (1989, 47) summarizes th philos we are expected ipso facto to share in and transitional categories, but the model generally holds true. 55 Litigants could also present their family to the jury to gain sympathy, appealing to the effects of collective punishment (Hall 1995; Rubins tein 2000, 154 6).

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144 there was a conflict between our fathers and because now I have suffered wrongs at his 56 Apollodorus ties his reasons for prosecuting to his desire for vengeance for his father even more explicitly in Against Theocrines whom I am obeying in doing all that I have done, expressed to all his relatives extreme displeasure at the idea that I might omit an opportunity in 57 Enmity could also be passed down simply through unsettled accounts or other lawsuits that the son was obliged to carry through after his father had died or for which he was compelled to stand trial. 58 duty to exact 59 According to the speaker of Lysias 13 ( Against Agoratus ), on his death bed Dionysodorus requested vengeance from all of his family members, including his unborn son (42 3). This child would presumably be taught that his eventually duty was to avenge his father (cf. Isae. 9.17 20). 60 Antigone a father rebukes his son for failing to support him against his rivals. The father, Creon, appeals to what he considers the natural way for family relationships to 56 Lys. 14.2: . Cf. Dem. 20.144. 57 [Dem.] 58.2: 58 Lys. 17.1 3; 19.1; Fr. 20.16 Thalheim; Dem. 36.20; 38.6; 47.32; 49.1; [Dem.] 52. 59 This ethic was represented in and reinforced by Athenian law, which prohibi ted anyone but a relative of the deceased to bring suit for murder. 60 Enemies acquired at a young age may not have been uncommon, see pp. 127 8.

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145 house, so that they might repay their f 61 Jason addresses his children Medea 62 Household solidarity prescribed that family members share the hatreds of the head of the house and, if necessary, take vengeance on his behalf. Aristotle considers this principle so obvious that it was banal and exceedingly commonplace. As ) he cites the 63 The son, if left alive, would be expected to seek vengeance for his father. The connection between father and son seems to have been a pa rticularly important one, but a relationship of enmity had the potential to draw in any number of relatives. In Lysias 13 ( Against Agoratus ) Dionysodorus asks for vengeance not only from his unborn son but also from his brother, brother in law, and all his friends (42 3). His brother in law or cousin is in fact the 64 It was not uncommon for citizens to enter into a dispute by speaking on behalf of their relatives in c ourt (e.g., Lys. 32; Dem. 30; cf. [Lys] 20.11). 65 Kinsmen were expected to be willing to support each other, as evidenced by Demosthenes 19 ( On the Dishonest Embassy ), in which 61 Soph. Ant 641 3: 62 Eur. Med 920 1: Cf. Supp 544 6; Heracl 1000 3. 63 Arist. Rh 1395a: Cf. Lys. 12.36; 14.30. 64 The speaker 41). 65 [Lysias] 20 is a is possible that t he transmitted text is actually two speeches. See Rubinstein 2000, 153 4.)

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146 Demosthenes finds it incredible that Eubulus would not help his relative when h e was on trial (290). On the Dishonest Embassy Demosthenes anticipates that not spare them from his abuse, insulting their occupations as clerks ( mouthed and 238). Aeschines employed similar tactics on Demosthenes several years later, denigrating his speech against Ctesiphon (3.171 2). Aeschines reveals that he is creating enemies by Aeschines asserts, of Scythi 172). 66 relatives Aeschines expands the feud. When one citizen took another to court, the opportunity for enmity to expand increased dramatically since friends and family would often play supporting ro les as co speakers ( ) or witnesses. 67 Rubinstein (2000, 24 75) has shown that trials at Athens were much more than between two individuals, but were team based affairs. 68 The speaker of Isaeus 6 ( On the Estate of Philoctemon ) believes that ap pearing as an advocate is a relatively minor 66 16) has illustrated how female relatives were especially susceptible t was nearly impossible to refute. See also Henderson 1987. 67 On the practice of see p. 14, n. 17. 68 Rubinstein (2000, 158) notes that even hostile sources do not condemn relatives who support each othe r as

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147 because I considered these men friends and helped them out, but now I did not attempt to speak for them so that y 69 Likewise, the speaker of Isocrates 21 ( Against Euthynus ) sees his friendship with the prosecutor as a sufficient excuse for appearing before the jury on his behalf (1). 70 The prac tice of which was quite common, thus enlarged the conflict from two individuals to two opposing teams of friends and family members (Rubinstein 2000, 13 23). 71 When they did not speak in support of friends and family, citizens could serve as witn known and trusted associates. 72 The loss of a friend could be equated with the loss of potential advocates or witnesses in future court cases. 73 Some speakers even assume that friends and 74 Apollodorus accuses his 69 Isae. 6.2: 70 Cf. Lys. 5.1, 21.1 7, 27.12; Isae. 1.7, 4.1, 7.10; Dem. 20.1, 36.1; Lycurg. 1.138. In Isocrates 21 the speaker can envision people abusing the alliance of friendship in order to attack others, using friends to bring spurious lawsuits in collaboration (8). Fisher (1999, 56 9) ), of villains. 71 Approximately one third of the extant speeches belong to a (Rubinstein 2000, 58 9): Lys. 5, 13, 14, 15, 27, 32; [Lys.] 6, 20; Isoc. 21; Isae. 2, 4, 6, 12; Dem. 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 29, 34, 36, 43, 44; [Dem.] 59; Hyp. 1, 3, 4; Din. 1, 2, 3. 72 Lys. 15.5; Isae. 3.19 22; 5.8; 9.25; 12.1, 4; Dem. 29.23 4; 37.48; [Dem.] 52.17; Aeschin. 1.57. A litigant could support him (Isae. 1.2). On the function of witnesses in Athenian law, see Humphreys 1985; Todd 1990c; Carey 1994c; 1995; Hall 1995; Rubinstein 2000, 13 4. 73 friendship with you, since by the God I do not know what loss I will suffer by not associating with you; I gained nothing when I did. When I have some trouble, will I need someone who ;, Lys. 8.18). The speaker assumes that friendship nat urally entails the benefit of having people ready to assist as advocates and witnesses should a trial arise. 74 for him (Isae. 2.33).

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148 bringing his friends and family forward to bear fal 75 Many Athenians considered it the duty of close associates to support each other in such circumstances. 76 Advocates and witnesses widened the scope for new relationships of enmity since a litigant believed that everyone on his oppone speakers during the trial (Rubinstein 2000, 160 they 77 ). 78 Those who were attacked in this fashion could be expected to carry a grudge. If an Athe nian asked someone to appear as an advocate on his behalf, he was asking that person to risk enmity with the opposing litigant. Thus Apollodorus complains in Against Theocrines that no one will speak for him out of fear of making an enemy of Theocrines ([D em.] 58.59). Witnesses also risked new hostile relationships. An unsuccessful litigant could use his ) to have the original verdict nullified. 79 75 [Dem. ] 52.17: Cf. Isae. 12.4. 76 Much debate has centered on the legal purposes of witnesses since Humphreys (1985) argued that witnesses were not expected to be impartial, but rather to support one of the two litigants. See also Todd 1990c; Carey 1994b; Mirhady 2002 ; Rubinstein 2005 ; Thr 2005 ; Gagarin 2007. 77 Lycurg. 1.138: Cf. Ly s. 14.22. 78 12 ( Against Eratosthenes Theramenes by attack ing Theramenes in a long digression (50 79; cf. Lys. 26.21; Dem. 21.205 8). The speaker of Lysias 14 ( Against Alcibiades ) categorizes his opponent and all his associates as collaborating wrongdoers (45). 79 On the see Harrison ii. 1968 71, 156 7; MacDowell 1978, 244 5. The diamatyria could also cause problems for witnesses. This procedure consisted of a formal declaration of a fact by a witness who was

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149 friends or family since these were the people who typically served as witnesses. 80 However, a witnesses simply by insulting them in his speech. In Against Demosthenes Dinarchus attacks the opposing witnesses, warning the jury that anyone who would enemies of the 81 Such insulting language would have led to the 82 Extant curse tablets confirm that Athenian litigants took it personally when people appeared against them in court litigants ( syndikoi ) in their imprecations. 83 Wnsch Def. tab. 39 i s representative of the pattern. Ariphrades, Cleophon, Archedamus, Polyxenus, Anticrates, Antiphanes, Zacorus, Antichares, Satu ra, Mika, Simon, the mother of Satira, Theodora Antamis, Eucoline, Ameinias, and all of their fellow litigants ( syndikoi ) and friends. 84 Five more tablets curse 85 Wnsch Def. tab. 38 p rovides an illustrative example. Philippides, Euthycritus, Cleagorus, Mentimus, and everybody else, whoever spoke as advocates ( ) for them. 86 presumed to have intimate knowledge of the point at issue. If a litigant objected, he would have to bring a against this key witness (Lipsius 1905 15, 854 6; MacDowell 1978, 212 14). 80 Lys. 10.12, 22, 24 25; Isae. 3.3 4; 5.12 13; Dem. 29; 47; [Dem.] 45; 53.15. 81 Din. 1.112: ; Din. 1.113: 82 The speaker of Against Eubulides shows that a litigant could consider any witness who appeared against him an enemy. He complains that Eubulides attacked him in a deme meeting and caused his disfranchiseme nt because of the role he had played as witness in a previous trial against Eubulides (Dem. 57.8). 83 Wnsch Def. tab. 39, 66, 81, 88, 103, 106, 129; Audollent Def. tab. 62, 63. The word syndikos was often used interchangeably with (Rubinstein 200 0, 42 5). 84 Wnsch Def. tab. 39: / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 85 : Wnsch Def. tab. 38, 63, 65, 95; Audollent Def. tab. 60. Witnesses: Wnsch Def. tab. 65, 68; Audollent Def. tab. 63.

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150 The common formulae on these t 87 The expectation that friends would share the same friends and enemies meant that Athenians tended to be drawn into the conflicts of their close associates. Aristotle states that people who become friends will likely be those who have the same friends and who are hated by the same people. 88 Isocrates advises Demonicus against making friends that are not true f riends, that is, friends who will not be willing to take the risk of sharing enemies (1.30). A true friend might be expected to help out his associates by attacking their enemies. Thus the speaker of Lysias 26 ( Against Evander ) must deny that he is prosecu ting Evander to oblige his friend, Leodamas (15; cf. Xen. Mem 2.9). Because friends were expected to share enemies, Athenians Memorabilia Socrates warns against finding ) person who will 89 These sources suggest that Athenians tended to lines of friendship and enmity. 90 86 Wnsch Def. tab. 38: / / / / / 87 These curse tablets can all be dated to the fourth century Attica (Faraone 1991). 88 Arist. Rh 1381a: Aristotle asserts that, generally speaking, friends Rh 1381a). Compare Lysias 16.11, where the speaker argues that the types of people who enjoy drinking and gambling do not associate with him. A litigant can draw a contrast between his own behavior and those of other people to show that they could not be friends. 89 Xen. Mem 2.6.4: 90 Some might even ask that their friends take vengeance on their behalf. The dying injunction of Dionysodorus was for his friends to take vengeance for his family ( Lys. 13.94; cf. Lys. 18.10). The speaker of Lysias 15 ( Against Alcibiades II ) argues that the generals were not supporters of Alcibiades, asserting that if they had been his friends, they would have fined the commander ( phylarchos ) who expelled him from the cavalry (5).

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151 Conclusion The Attic sources picture a society whose members were constantly engaging in activities that promoted conflict and enmity. In the private sphere relationships of enmity often resulted from drinking parties, games, sexual rivalry, gossi p and criticism, and slander. Within the household the practice of guardianship and disputes over adoption and inheritance could cause strife between family members. Disagreement over money and property could potentially turn acquaintances, friends, or eve n kinsmen against each other, especially when such disputes resulted in litigation. Citizens who participated in the public matters of the city encountered many more situations in which hostile relationships were created. Policy makers and politicians were in constant friction with each other, as were liturgy performers. Magistrates had to make decisions typically confine their disagreement to a certain sphere of their lives, but rather sought to retaliate for perceived wrongs. Personal feuds could result from nearly any disagreement or conflict between citizens. groups. The family was viewed as a unit so that, when two persons from different households became enemies, their entire families were at odds. Hostilities spread naturally to other family members and even friends, especially if either of the parties resorted to litig ation since the courts offered many new opportunities to bring in third parties as advocates or witnesses and to insult Therefore, it is not surprising that Athenian sources accepted enmity as a common practice which tou ched the lives of nearly all citizens. However, the Athenians also recognized that the prevalence of enmity encouraged fragmentation among the citizen body and therefore created

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152 dangerous problems for society at large. The question of how such groups of fr iends and enemies should treat each other and how democratic institutions should regulate their actions is the subject of the next chapter.

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153 CHAPTER 5 HARMING ENEMIES Because Athenians believed that enmity was a widespread phenomenon among the citizens of t heir city, they had to confront the issue of how enemies would act toward each other. What did they believe was typical behavior for those who became involved in relationships of enmity? The sources provide evidence for a widespread expectation that those who participated in hostile relationships would attempt to harm their enemies whenever possible The classic Greek motto to be vigilant for opportunities to do injury to their rivals. Ath enians accomplished this in a number of ways, including most conspicuously slander, lawsuits, abuse of influence in government, and vandalism. 1 The Athenian ideology of harming enemies was grounded in their conception of enmity as a formalized practice. Wh ereas many people in modern cultures would consider the criteria for being a personal enemy merely emotional, enmity in Athens entailed expectations of the enmit y did not act in a way consistent with Athenian conceptualization of the practice, then the legitimacy of the relationship was called into question. However, while the injunction to harm laced on the pursuit of a rival, especially when that pursuit became violent. Although it was considered natural for enemies to pursue each other by various non violent methods, Athenians viewed violent responses as contrary to democratic egalitarian ideol ogy, which prohibited such assaults on a 1 Many of the ways by which Athenians ma de enemies (see Chapter 4) were always the ways by which they pursued them. This follows logically, since enmity would be started by one person harming another and would be continued in just the same way. The chief difference between making enemies and pur suing enemies was that the former activity was usually unintentional.

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154 the harmony of the citizenry, were believed to prevent the escalation of a feud to the point of bloodshed. The source s yield a view of society with seemingly contradictory aspects. Athenian males were frequently engaged in formalized relationships of enmity and believed it their duty to harm their enemies. Athenians expected enemies to engage in insults, lawsuits, and po litical rivalries, but aggressive, violent behavior was limited by democratic ideology and institutions. In the Athenian mind enmity was both widespread and relatively non violent. A Formalized Relationship Enmity meant more than dislike and avoidance of a certain person; it was a formalized relationship that required participants to act in certain ways toward each other. 2 Enmity, like friendship, was supposed to be mutual and to be accompanied by the exchange of actions. 3 A relationship of enmity was there fore the inverse of a relationship of charis by which Athenians exchanged favors in an endless series of debts and repayments (cf. Plat. Resp 331e). 4 Like friends, enemies owed each other certain things. As Aristotle asserts, Athenian men are to do whate ver helps their friends and whatever harms their enemies. 5 Aristotle defines friendship as a desire for the benefit of the friend ( Rh 1380b 1381a) while also asserting that whatever does not 1362b). To adh ere to this ideology an Athenian had to know who his enemies were and to act in accordance with the expectations. 2 Cohen 1995, 70 2; Phillips 2008, 15 21. 3 On this dynamic of friendship, see Konstan 2006, 169 84, esp. 173 7. 4 See Ober 1989, 226 30; Harrison 2003; Konstan 2006, 156 68. 5 Arist. Rh 1363a:

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155 official status granted to relationships of enmity. 6 Enemies coul d reconcile by a ceremony attended by friends and witnesses, often as part of private arbitration. The speaker of Antiphon 6 ( On the Chorus Boy ) describes the end of his enmity with Philocrates as occurring at an identifiable time and place. I listened to Dipoleia festival before witnesses who reconciled us near the temple of Athena. And after this they spent time with me and conversed with me at festivals, in the marketplace, in my house and the irs, and everywhere else. Finally, by Zeus and the gods, this Philocrates himself was talking with me in the Council chamber before the Council while he was standing with me on the platform, addressing me by name, as I did him. 7 Antiphon assumes that such an agreement could put an abrupt end to one type of relationship and just as suddenly start another. The speaker and his enemy immediately stopped harming each other and began spending time together, even supporting each other in public events. A ceremony and exchanging of oaths has decisively changed their relationship. This process of reconciliation was recognized as legally enforceable (Dem. 37.16 20; 38.1, 5 6; 48.2; cf. Isae. 2.38 9). Several court speeches use reconciliation agreements to make legal a rguments. The speaker of Lysias 4 ( On a Premeditated Wounding ) assumes that he will defeat 5). He laments that his opponent was not on the board of judges for t he Dionysia to vote for his tribe since it would prove that they had been reconciled (3 4). Athenians expected that after such 6 On arbitration and reconciliation, see Scafuro 1997, 117 41. 7 Antiph. 6.39:

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156 ceremonies the parties would abide by their agreement, 8 which often included the specific requirement that the two former enemies now treat each other as friends. A reconciliation in Against Neaera 9 Likewise, the speaker of Hyperides 3 ( Against Athenogenes ) states that the per 10 In these cases, when an enmity was ended, a new relationship of friendship was assumed. Little middle ground between friendship and enmity existed. Both were forma lized categories of relationships into one of which Athenians attempted to fit all of their acquaintances. 11 A relationship of enmity entailed certain expectations that went beyond mere emotional content and required that enemies actively pursue each other. The evidence for this ethic of 12 deserving the name of enmity, and a man who spo Bacchae hand over the head of 13 The motto of helping friends and harming enemies 8 Of course the parties often did not abide by their agreement, as the speeches delivered in court demonstrate. 9 [Dem.] 59.71: 10 Hyp. 3.5: Cf. Isae. 2.32. 11 See also the other references to reconciliation in Attic oratory: Isoc. 17.19 20; 18.7, 14; Isae. 5.32, 7.44; Lys. 7.40; 27.15; Dem. 21.119, 121; 40.46; [D em.] 52.21; 59.47, 48, 53, 70. 12 See especially Dover 1974, 181 4; Blundell 1989, 26 59. 13 Eur. Bacch. 877 80: Athenians considered an allegation that someon

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157 friends, it is clear that you also will appear honorable by taking vengeance on your enemies 14 Gorgias even when Socrates proposes that one should not retaliate against enemies, he r penalty, then they suffer a much worse fate because their souls rather than their bodies is harmed (480E 481B). 15 In the Memorabilia quoted in Chapter 4 (p. 128) Socrates convinced Nicomachus that Athenians who act as leaders in al most any capacity are similar to generals in it not 16 Enemies, once acquired, must be overcome. 17 The point of comparison between generals and private citizens in this Memorabilia passage also shows how personal enemies ( echthroi ) could even be compared to enemies of the state ( polemioi ). The speaker of Lysias 4 ( On a Premeditated Wounding ) asserts that echthroi could even b e more dangerous. While polemioi are willing to receive a ransom and return serious insult. Several litigants accuse their opponents of helping their enemies and harming their friends (Lys. 15.10; [Lys.] 6.7; cf. Lys. 8.1 6, 12.66 7). 14 Lys. 14.19: On the nuance of beltious in this passage, see Rubinstein 2000 159 15 Meno in which helping friends and harming enemies is said to be a v irtue (71E). Plato has an extended discussion of this common motto in Book I of the Republic starting with a citation of Simonides, who claimed that justice consisted of giving everyone what he was owed. Polemarchus points out that what is owed to enemies is 332b). 16 Xen. Mem 3.4.10: 17 tends toward being descriptive. However, which concerns what Athenians believed and expected enemies to do, rather than what they thought was the right thing to do.

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158 18 The idea of echthroi 19 The many references to a delay of several years between an alleged offense and its trial indicate that enemies were willing to hold a grudge for a very long time, watching for an opportunity to attack their opponent. 20 Pleasure often accompanied vengeance on an enemy. 21 A Homeric proverb expresses this 22 Heraclidae states that an 23 The title Hiero 24 Enemies were thought not only to desire to punish their opponents but also to experience great sati sfaction in the act of vengeance. Non v iolent Vengeance While many avenues were open to someone who wished to do harm to another, Athenians strongly associated slander and insult with the characteristic behavior of enemies. The speaker of 18 Lys. 4.13: 19 [Lys.] 6.31: 20 Lys. 3.39, 7.42, 13.83 4, 18.19; Dem. 18.13, 32.23, 3 6.2, 37.2, 38.6, 41.23; [Dem.] 52.2. 21 Blundell 1989, 27 8; Konstan 2006, 109. 22 Il 18.108 10: Quoted at Arist. Rh 13 78b; cf Thuc. 7.68.1. 23 Eur. Heracl 939 40: Cf Ajax 79). In the Antigone Creon asserts that the man who has children that will not be a help to him in his old age 647). 24 Xen. Hier 1.34: Cf. Mem 2.1.19.

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159 Lysias 19 ( On the Property of Aristophanes 25 Thi s implies that enemies would insult each other given the slightest pretext. Enemies would, as Apollodorus 26 Demosthenes concurs, asserting that enemies naturally engage in abusive speech aga inst each other. 27 For instance, Meidias allegedly engaged in a campaign of defamation against Demosthenes by wandering around the agora and asserting to whomever he came across that Demosthenes was a murderer (Dem. 21.104). Demosthenes later accused Aeschi nes of similar behavior (19.209 10). 28 Isocrates reproaches poets and mythographers for saying things about the gods that are 29 Isocrates uses this as an extreme example, implying t hat enemies will say almost anything to insult each other. Two passages from Greek tragedy similarly suggest that enemies will take the opportunity to slander Suppliant Women Theseus deliberates on wh ether he should give aid to the widows from Argos, worrying about what his enemies will say if he fails to help (343). Megara in the Heracles 286). According to Aristotle, insults feed and sustain hostile relationships. He includes ) let anger be the desire for revenge 25 Lys. 19.60: 26 [Dem.] 58.40: 27 Dem. 18.123 : 28 Attic orators make many references to enemies insulting each other (Andoc. 1.4, 54; 4.2; Lys. 9.1 3; 14.25 8, 41 2; 16.11; 19.2 6; 21.17; [Lys.] 20.11, 30; Isae. 5.39; 8.40 2; 12.12, Aeschin. 2.182). 29 Iso c. 11.38:

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160 accompanied by pain on account of a perceived bel ittlement against either the man himself or one of his dependants whom it is not fitting to belittle. 30 ( ful treatment ( outrage ). The list demonstrates that what Aristotle means by hybris 31 Like other Athenian sources he assumes insult as the prime motivator behind anger and enmity. 32 An Athenian citizen could lodge a court case against his enemy to gain a public venue for disparaging him. The speaker of On the Chorus Boy complains that his ac cusers make pretenses 33 Demosthenes claims that Meidias hired someone to prosecute him for desertion from the army ( 34 In Lysias 10 ( Against Theomnestus ) the speaker prose cutes Theomnestus for accusing him of killing his own father, a form of verbal abuse 30 Arist. Rh 13 7 8 a 30 2: < > 31 Arist. Rh 1379a30 2: 32 1378b32) by e were many types of insulting behavior. 33 Antiph. 6.7: 34 Dem. 21.103:

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161 prohibited by law. 35 Yet the speaker alludes repeatedly to a charge against Theomnestus for leaving his shield behind in battle, another illegal insult (3, 5, 9, 12, 21, 22 25). Although he put Theomnestus on trial for slander, he does not refrain from slander himself. 36 Enemies could gain new opportunities to insult each other by appearing in court in supporting roles as advocates ( ) or witnesses whether or not they had any direct connection with the events or parties of the trial (Xen. Mem 2.9.5). The sources evoke a his behalf. 37 The Rhetoric to Alexander asserts that men who bear witness against one of their enemies will come under suspicion for false witness since they may well be acting from motivations of revenge (1431b). Some Athenians may have avoided the courts because they knew that their enemies would appear against them, as did the father of the speaker of Against Boeotus I (Dem. 39.3). 38 speak for him, he could come under suspicion of having an exceeding ly weak case. The speaker of Lysias 7 ( On the Olive Stump ( 19) to appear as witnesses proves that his accusation is false. 39 Personal enemies could stand in as advocates as well (Lys. 13.3, 29.1), but even if they did not take a visible role in the 35 Lysias 10 is a Anyone who believed that he had been insulted in a way prohibited by law could bring legal action for slander (Lipsius 1905 15, 646 51; MacDowell 1978, 126 9; Todd 1993, 268 9). A separate law also governed insul ting magistrates (Lys. 9.6 10; Dem. 21.32 3). It may have been possible to prosecute someone for slander under the law for hybris (MacDowell 1978, 129 32). 36 Theomnestus had been accused of throwing away his shield in a previous suit, to which the speaker continually alludes. While the speaker of Lysias 10 served as a witness in that suit against him, Theomnestus allegedly slandered him with the insult for which he is now on trial. 37 Rubinstein (2000, 91 111) also notes that stood to benefit by a successful court action in terms of prestige. This provided another incentive for enemies to appear against each other in court. 38 The speaker of Lysias 23 ( Against Pancleon ) produces as witnesses men who claim to have gained a conviction against Pancleon in court before the Polemarch (4) and another man who claims that Pancleon is his slave (7 8). 39 Lys. 7.19: Cf. Andoc. 1.8; Dem. 40.58; [Dem.] 58.4; Lycurg. 1.19.

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162 trial, they could undercut their rivals in more inconspicuous ways. Nicostratus allegedly sabotaged Apollodorus by telling the men whom Apollodorus was prosecuting how he would argue his case ([Dem .] 53.14). Others used similar tactics, providing damning information to 40 Slander may have been a common way to attack enemies, but prosecuting them directly seems to have been more satisfying. Athenians favored legal action becau se they viewed victory in the courts as a legitimate form of revenge. 41 42 Apollodorus begins Against Nicostratus by stating his desire for revenge ( ) although the case only indirectly related to the original grievance between them conduct this present trial not as the one who started things but as one 43 The speaker of Lysias 13 ( Against Agoratus ), having allegedly received from his dying brother in law instructions to take vengeance on Agoratus for murder, believes his prosecution fulfills it just and right that I and all of you take vengeance on 44 The speaker of Lysias 10 ( Against Theomnestus ) criticizes his opponent for avenging himself ( ) by means of the law but then denying the 40 masters (Lys. 5.5, 7.16) 41 ce made his prosecution legitimate. The had occurred (Chapter 2). 42 Dem. 23.56: 43 [Dem.] 59.1: 44 Lys. 13.3: < >

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163 45 These speeches evidence general agreement that retribution by lawsu it was a normal way of continuing enmity (see also Lys. 7.20; Isae. 1.7; [Dem.] 58.2). The shame attendant on a loss in court made the legal option all the more attractive to feuding individuals. The speaker of Lysias 27 ( Against Epicrates ) warns the jury against letting from those who do wrong, as though they were concerned about the disgrace rather than the 46 This passage implies that an unfavorable ver dict imparted both loss ( ) and shame ( oneidos 47 Defeat before a large jury of fellow citizens dealt a blow to the st atus and honor of the loser. The legal system offered enemies the opportunity to score a public victory over their opponents. 48 Evidence from both the orators and other sources confirms that enemies often engaged in mutual prosecutions. 49 So strong was the c orrelation between enmity and court cases that if someone failed to prosecute when his enemy had done something controversial, the legitimacy of the claim to enmity could be called into question. 50 In Against Theocrines Apollodorus asserts that his opponent 45 Lys. 10.13: Cf. 3. 46 Lys. 27.16: 47 Lys. 27.16: 48 Cohen 1995, 89 90; Johnstone 1999, 6 7. 49 Christ (1998a: 154 6) illustrates this point well. See also Dover 1974, 182; Cohen 1995, 101 15; Rhodes 1998. 50 See for example Isaeus 5.33, where enemies and legal opponents are put in close juxtaposition:

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164 He argues that because none of them have ever brought suit against Demosthenes, they are lying when they claim to be political opponents ([Dem.] 58.39 44; cf. Antiph. 6.9; Isae 7.11; Dem. 25.38; Aeschin. 2.139). Enemies could attack each other both by bringing legal actions and by speaking against each other at entry or exit examinations for office ( dokimasia and euthynai ). The speaker of Demosthenes 25 ( Against Aristogiton ) a ccuses his opponent of indicting him seven times and accusing him at his euthynai twice (37). 51 The same speaker asserts that whenever the issue of debt to the state treasury of the city arises, everybody cites the name of his own personal enemy and accuses him of being a debtor (91). Such behavior was characteristic of enemies (Lys. 27.8; Isae. 4.30). Other sources often assume that the law courts were a prime locus for carrying on a feud. The Athenian fondness for litigation was legendary, finding frequent reference in comedy. In Knights Cleon and the Sausage Seller get into a tiff, threat ening each other with lawsuits. Cleon : You will stand trial for four lawsuits, each for one hundred talents. 52 Sausage Seller : You will stand trial for twenty lawsuits for military dereliction and more than one thousand for theft. Cleon : I maintain that you were born from parents who committed sacrilege against Athena. Sausage Seller : I maintain that your father was a mere satellite. 53 In the Wasps Philocleon su ggests that Athenians love the legal system so much that one day they will find a way judge cases in their own houses (799 804). Euelpides in the Birds 51 Cf. Lys. 16.1, 24.1; Dem. 18.249, 21.84, 47.6 10. 52 One hundred talents was an exorbitant amount of money. 53 Ar. Eq 442 7: /

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165 54 The anonymous author of the Athenian Constitution complains that his fellow citizens engaged in more lawsuits than any other Greeks (Xen. [ Ath. p ol. ] 3.2). According to Thucydides even Pericles commented on the philodikos 1.77.2). 55 Cohen (1995, 87 118) illustrates well the capacity for a single lawsuit to function as part of a much longer and wider feud. 56 ( ). 57 Sometimes a powerful person or group of peopl e would hire a third party to attack an enemy. The speaker of Lysias 7 ( On the Olive Stump ) asserts that his enemies hired Nicomachus to prosecute him (39 40). A more famous instance is the case of Timarchus, who prosecution (Aeschin. 1). Demosthenes in turn accused Aeschines of sending hired attackers against him while failing ever to prosecute Demosthenes himself (Dem. 18.249 51). Demosthenes had previously accused Meidias of similar tactics. M eidias supposedly hired Euctemon to prosecute Demosthenes, then paid the relatives of a deceased man to put Demosthenes on trial for murder (Dem. 21.103 4). Apollodorus evidently assumes that hiring another to prosecute on his behalf would be not be outsid e of the norm for a well off Athenian: 54 Ar. Av 40 1: 55 For the term philodikos in classical Athenia n literature, see Lys. 10.2; Dem. 40.32; 56.14; Arist. Rh 1373a, 1400a. The same sentiment is expressed about Athenians at Isaeus 4.30. 56 Rhodes (1998) points this out as well, but without reference to the comparative anthropology method that Cohen uses. 57 Gorg. Pal.27 ; [ Lys. ] 6.42 ; Isoc. 12.22; Aeschin.1.178 ; Arist. Top 102a, 103b, 132a, 133a, 135a, 140b, 155a. If own welfare. According to th e Rhetoric 1372b), since they are easy ).

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166 58 The many other references to third party prosecutors show that the practice was not uncommon. 59 Citizens could a lso use their influence in politics to attack their enemies. Anyone who rose to even a modicum of political influence was expected to use his position to harm those who opposed him. Therefore, litigants who desire to portray themselves as moderate and rest rained must specifically deny that they used their public office as a means for helping friends and harming enemies. The speaker of Lysias 9 ( For the Soldier d not take vengeance on an enemy or 60 The speaker of Lysias 25 ( On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy one, nor did I take vengeance on an e 61 These passages imply that it was more common for those in authority to play favorites, punishing their enemies and rewarding their friends. 62 The speaker of Lysias 18 ( ) 58 [Dem.] 53.2: Cf. Lysias 13 ( Against Agoratus 18) that they had to associate with Agorat us. 59 Antiph. 5.33, 6.34 6; Andoc. 2.4; Isae. 8.3, 9.24; Isoc. 16.7; Dem. 24.14, 39.2; [Dem.] 53.14, 59.10; Aeschin. 2.154; Xen. Mem 2.9.5. 60 Lys. 9:14: The s 20). 61 Lys. 25.15: 62 See also Lys. 9; 15.5. The speaker of Lysias 15 ( Against Alcibiades II ) argues that the generals clearly were not friends of Alcibiades, or they would have fined the commander ( phylarchos ) who expelled him from the cavalry (5). enemies.

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167 denies t hat his father failed to join an oligarchic regime because of private enmity as if that would be a normal reason to be excluded from certain privileges (5; cf. Lys. 25.12). 63 Extra legal options for harming enemies, including destruction of property and va ndalism, were also available. 64 Demosthenes accuses Meidias of obstructing his performance of a liturgy Dem. 57.64). Another litigant asserts that his opponent ca me onto his property, dug up and uprooted ( ) more than a thousand olive trees, and sold them (Dem. 43.69). In Against Nicostratus Apollodorus accused his opponent, Nicostratus, of breaking into his house, stealing his furniture, a nd destroying many of his vines and fruit grafts ([Dem.] 53.15). Such vandalism appears not to have been uncommon since Apollodorus shows concern for the same issue in another speech. He asserts that those who have enemies who desire to harm them can take several precautions, including staying in their houses to keep watch over their possessions ([Dem.] 58.65). Many tactics that Athenians employed to harm their enemies may have left no trace in extant literature, but some incidental references provide an i dea of the multitude of possibilities. judges (Dem. 21.5 6), stole important documents (Dem. 33.18), rescinded marriage alliances (Dem. 41.4), and cut quarreling family members out of wills (Isae. 1.3). An anecdote from Demosthenes 47 ( Against Evergus ) illustrates the point that enemies had many options for pursuing each other. The speaker accuses his opponent of murdering one of his elderly household slaves, who h ad no relatives and therefore could not be avenged by a homicide trial. 63 Additionally, the many ways to make enemies in p ublic office (pp. 141 2) could function as avenues for harming enemies. 64 y credible that some Athenians sought to avenge themselves on each other in a variety of creative ways within and outside of the legal proce

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168 When consulted, the Interpreters ( ) advised the speaker not to attempt a court case on 70). This advice presupposes that there were many different ways to get back at a foe (cf. Andoc. 1.1). The many possibilities for harming enemies call into question the tacit assumption of some scholars that feuding manifests itself either in violence or in court actions. For instance, Phillips 65 Certainly the Athenians made use of the courts to pursue private vendettas, but many other avenues for private revenge also lay open. The many legal orations that result from preexisting feuds survive while hostile relation ships that continued outside of the court system would never have produced such extensive documentation. blood feuding is transferred directly to the courts. The At henians, however, were able to envisage a much wider spectrum of possibilities for pursuing enmity. 66 problematic. He argues that litigants who portray themselves as n on violent appeal to a dominant code of behavior dictating restrained and unemotional responses to wrongdoing. 67 However, these speeches do not prove that Athenians believed it necessary for citizens to give up their 65 66 McHardy (2008) shows that ancient Athenians were often confronted with multiple opti ons for taking revenge on their foes. They did not always respond according to a well defined code of conduct, but rather made rational decisions about how far they would be able to pursue vengeance. 67 On Lysias 1 and Demosthenes 54, see Herman 2006, 156 9 174 83.

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169 claims to honor or to cease attempting t o harm their enemies all together. As Fisher (1998) states, self restraint and recourse to appropriate legal procedures constitute a u r and revenge is a fundamental error When a speaker e behavior and to make it seem more likely that he has done nothing to provoke him. Restraint serves a rhetorical purpose; the speaker does not mean to argue that one shoul d never retaliate. moment, but it does not follow that vengeance would not be sought through other means. The Limits of Harming Enemies Athenians may have exp ected enemies to attempt to harm each other in a great variety of ways, but they also expected them to observe certain limitations. Standards for acceptable behavior had to be established because feuding, if left unchecked, could threaten the cohesiveness of the state. A society with enemies pursuing each other at all costs could easily devolve into stasis (civil war), which was something Greeks always feared (see pp. 9 10). Athenians were not willing to allow citizens to pursue their enemies at the expense welfare. that such hostile relationships not introduce w idespread civil conflict is evident in the sources. 68 Litigants consistently avoid portraying their dispute as merely a private affair, attempting rather to represent their opponents as so corrupt in character that they deserve the enmity of the city. If 68 Dover ( 1974, 82 ) captures this tension both competing individuals and members of social groups; we are impelled both to assert ourselves against others and

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170 a prosecutor can convince the jury that his opponent is unworthy of citizenship and has actually taken himself outside of the social compact by his own defiantly anti democratic behavior, then punishment becomes unproblematic. The defendant no longer must be treated as a full fledged citizen. The tension is resolved because the dispute has changed into a public issue between the state and an unruly citizen rather than a private one between two enemies. lawsuits with a special public interest in which the prosecutors attempt to subsume their affirmation of enmity into a larger 69 Many other cases also contain such a focus. Ariston in Demost henes 54 ( Against Conon ) portrays Conon as so against Conon, asserting that it is not in their best interests to permit such behavior (42 3). In Against Neaera Apo wrongful behavior prevented the jury from viewing the lawsuit as a simple feud between two cit izens and allowed them to maintain their belief that true Athenians citizens could still live together. Speakers often asserted in court that their opponents were not true citizens to mitigate and their own private ends. 70 Enmity also threatened some basic ideological tenets of the democracy, namely equality ( isonomia ) and freedom ( ). Because all Athenians were afforded protection under the laws of Athens, the use of violence against fellow citizens was prohibited. The decree of 69 Lys. 12, 13, 14; Aeschin. 1; Dem. 22, 24, 50. Cf. the prosecution speeches that deny enmity altogether in similar situations (Lys. 22, 27; Dem. 23; Lycur. 1) and the defense speeches that attempt to portray their opponents as violating the norm and prosecuting public charges out of merely private motivations (Andoc. 1; Lys. 9, 19; Dem. 18). 70 For this reason many speakers emphasize that the real relationship of enmity is between their opponent and the state (see pp. 75 6).

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171 Scamandrius secured for all Athenian citizens the sacrosanctity of their person (Andoc. 1.43). 71 It was the hallmark of slavery to be liable for punishment on the body while free citizens were exempted from being physically harmed (Dem. 22.54 55, 24.166 7). The Athenian belief that the citizen body was sacrosanct meant that acceptable behavior for ene mies would be limited to acts that did not entail physical violence. 72 Caution is needed on the topic of violence since often only the extreme examples of violent behavior have been recorded. Only the most virulent disputes would have made it to court. Dram a likewise must be used with discretion since it is often characterized by embellishment and exaggeration intended to produce shock in the audience. 73 The dramatic form further allows its author to present a variety of moral viewpoints without committing to one (Blundell 1989, 10). However, the evidence suggests a rather cogent picture: Athenians recognized violence as a problem and took steps to curb its effect on society. Violent acts, especially in extreme forms, such as those characteristic of blood feud ing societies, were not sanctioned by the Athenian people. The closest the Athenians came to allowing violent behavior among the citizen body was in granting a certain degree of indulgence to minor aggressive acts inspired by irrational impulses. These wer e connected with specific activities such as drinking, love rivalries, and competitions for honor ( philotimia ), which could cause a person to act foolishly for a short 71 See MacDowell 1962, 92 scussion of the hybris by law. 72 Of the threats to state interest posed by personal enemies, the first listed was pragmatic (avoiding stasis ) while the second is ideological (preserving equality, freedom, and the sacrosanctity of the citizen body). However, the two may be very closely linked. Equality and freedom could also be thought to prevent stasis just as violence would threaten it. 73 Cyclops that I have seen things 375 6). This character shows that there was a gap between the s tories of myth, with which tragedy was concerned, and the reality at Athens. See also Dover 1974, 17 18.

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172 period of time. In a love competition over a Plataean boy, the speaker of Lysias 3 ( Agai nst Simon 18). Scuffles such as this do not appear entirely unusual. In the Politics novelty since it punished drunken offenders more ha rshly than sober ones in order to curb such violence (1274b), thereby implying that the opposite type of law (that is, treating drunken offenders more leniently) was the standard in Greek cities. In Against Meidias Demosthenes describes how a certain perso n punched a thesmothete in a drunken quarrel over a prostitute and how another man, named Polyzelus, struck a judge in a similar dispute over a flute girl (21.36). 74 He asserts that both men deserve some measure of pardon since the former had the excuses of drunkenness and love ( 38) and the latter also was acting irrationally ( ), intending no insult ( ) since he was not an enemy ( ). Later in the speech Demosthenes mentions another case of limited vio lence. In a competition over choruses Alcibiades struck a man named Taureas on the face (147). 75 The agonistic nature of liturgy production offered some excuse for In these three episodes Demosthenes does not c ondone violent behavior, but he does cite drunkenness, love, and competitiveness as mitigating factors in assessing the severity of a hostile act. In contrast to these relatively minor offenses, was a deliberate and premeditated attempt to dishonor Demosthenes. Against Meidias indicates that crimes of passion, which had an irrational element, were allowed more leniency than deliberate hybris 74 This passage is discussed in Chapter 4 (pp. 130) to show how these activities (drinking, sexual rivalry, and competitions) could begin a relationship of enmity. 75 The same story is told by Andocides (4.20), who uses it as an example of the sort of behavior that Athenians condemned. The spectators are said to have hated Alcibiades and refused to listen to his chorus.

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173 Yet Athenian indulgence for violence committed under t he influence of alcohol, love, or competitiveness was not unequivocal. Several litigants condemn such behavior. 76 Although Athenians did not endorse violent b ehavior as a general rule. Gagarin (2005, 375) has demonstrated that while acts of violence are described in the extant orations many times, they are never regarded as legitimate. 77 If a speaker narrates a violent encounter, he always tries to reduce his ow n participation to a minimum (Gagarin 2005, 371). The only claims that such behavior is common and acceptable come from arguments that litigants attribute to their opponents. The speaker of Demosthenes 54 ( Against Conon ) predicts that Conon will attempt to make light of his hybristic violence by pointing out that members of aristocratic clubs commonly engaged in fighting. He will allegedly assert that the whole affair should be disregarded as an unremarkable example of young men getting into scuffles (13 14 ). Although Cohen and others have pointed to this passage as evidence that such violence was accepted in Athenian society, 78 the opposite conclusion is more warranted. It is unlikely that Ariston desired to put a strong argument into the mouth of his oppone nt. 79 He introduces his anticipatory argument by 80 Ariston responds to his own question by positing that Conon will make the audacious and outrageous claim that the jury should simply ignore the act of violence. He does not believe that the jurors 76 Lys. 3.6; Dem. 54.4 5, 7 9; Aesch in. 1.58 9. 77 Gagarin contrasts the non violent public discourse with the Homeric ethic that dominated Athenian society before the late fifth century. 78 Cohen 1995, 119 30; Roisman 2005, 73; McHardy 2008, 99; Phillips 2008, 19. 79 80 Dem. 54.13:

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174 Ithyphal loi and 81 but incendiary. Therefore, we need not assume that the a rgument that Ariston attributes to Conon was what Conon actually intended to say. There are alternative ways to make sense of the evidence. Conon may have intended to make a much more reasonable claim similar to the defense that the speakers of Lysias 3 an indicate that he could be exaggerating an argument that Conon actually put forth. Conon will allegedly assert that the speaker and his brothers were drunkards and hybristai (14). Arist on drunk or committing hybris 82 reflect a fear that Conon will claim that everybody involved was drun k and acting irrationally so that the penalty is too heavy to fit the crime. Conon would then be claiming drunkenness merely as a mitigating rather than a legitimizing factor in the dispute. He would not need to assert that he and his aristocratic friends should be able to perpetrate acts of hybris with impunity. Such an argument would be similar to the defenses made in Lysias 3 ( Against Simon ) and 4 ( On a Premeditated Wounding ). Neither litigant attempts to justify an act of violence but rather argues that the excessive penalty proposed by his prosecutor is out of all proportion with an expected characteristic of hostile relationships in Athens does not take into ac count this aspect 81 Dem. 54.20: 82 Dem. 54.16:

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175 83 The speaker of Lysias 3 asserts, laws did not consider that exile from their homeland was a worthy penalty for those who happened to get into a scuffle and crack each o 84 When the speaker of Lysias 4 expresses irritation at being on trial simply because of a girl who is a prostitute and a slave (19), he is not excusing violent behavior but attempting to downplay the severity of the offense. He asserts that h is opponent exaggerated the whole affair, labeling a black eye a premeditated attempt at murder (9). The penalty of exile is excessive, the speaker argues, even if he were guilty of being involved in a drunken brawl. 85 Lysias 1 ( On the Murder of Eratosthene s ) is the only extant oration in which the speaker admits committing an act of violence without equivocation. Nevertheless, this speech confirms that violence was normally viewed as illegitimate. If Athenians had accepted homicide as an authorized response to a variety of situations, Euphiletus could have asserted that he was at enmity with Eratosthenes and that when he caught him on top of his wife, he killed him in hot ce toward acts committed in the heat of the moment than cold and calculated ones (Allen 2000a, 153 Eratosthenes is highly suspect. They were probably members of the same tr ibe and possibly of the same deme. 86 83 Cohen 1995, 131 7; Phillips 2008, 23. 84 Lys. 3.42: In any case, the speaker asserts that he is 4). 85 This passage supports the idea that violence could result from rivalry and intoxication, contests, insults, and fight over courtesans, but not that they were perpetrated with impun ity. 86

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176 suggests, we might expect Euphiletus to have chosen a defense that corresponded with such values. As it is, Euphiletus must represent himself as a c uckold and a bit of a buffoon to maintain that he was not driven by wrath and personal vengeance when he executed Eratosthenes in accordance with the laws (see pp. 29 30). He maintains that he acted as a dispassionate executor of public punishment to preve nt the jury from viewing his act as a violent display of private vengeance. 87 Another passage often cited as an example of Athenian approval of violent responses to enemies is the story of Evaeon narrated in Demosthenes 21 ( Against Meidias ). However, as in the cases of the speeches examined above, close attention to the rhetorical purpose of this passage casts doubt upon such a conclusion. Evaeon supposedly killed someone for punching him at a drinking party. Demosthenes implies that he himself has acted mor e acceptably by 88 With this statement t rather to illustrate how behavior because it supports his argument that hybris even when manifested in an act that causes only minor physical harm, is an incre dibly serious offense. The Evaeon episode is not an 87 Herman (2006, 175 83) shows that Euphiletus suppresses the issue of honor throughout the speech in order to be seen as a citizen who perform ed what justice required without personal prejudice However, he goes too far in this direction. Harris (1997) rightfully critique s s that Euphiletus was not categorically denying the right to revenge, but in hi s own situation felt that it was advantageous to make himself the agent of public justice (cf. Fisher 1998, 80 2) 88 Dem. 21.74: Herman (2006, 169 70) argues that Demosthen es is providing an example of what not to do in response to an injury. However, this would only prove that murder was an unacceptable response (see Dem. 21.75), not that someone in such a situation was always expected to resort to the courts.

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177 a fortiori argument. Consider among yourselves how much more reason I had to angry when I suffered hands than Evaeon when he killed Boeotus. For he was struck by an outraged ( ) in front of many people, both foreigners and citizens, by an enemy who did this early in the morning while he was sober, not prompted by the influence of alcohol but by hybris 89 s acceptable to punish someone who committed such an act of hybris by killing him immediately, surely the present jurors should be willing merely to vote down such an offender. 90 A further point merits consideration. The man who punched Evaeon had committed an offense that constituted a breach of Athenian law. Demosthenes makes it clear that he has introduced this story as an example of an act of hybris (72), which was prosecutable by a help. 91 According to Demosthenes, Evaeon did not commit an act of random violence but responded to a criminal offense on his own initiative. Evaeon lost the trial because in his reprisal he had gone further than the law allowed (75). He would have been much better off had he taken the route that hybris and act without restraint in the moment of anger but rather should bring them before you since you confirm and guard the 89 Dem. 21.73 4: 90 Compare the implicit a fortiori argument in Lysias 12 ( Against Eratosthenes ). He asserts that Eratosthenes put 23). Lysias had had a private pretext. Rather, he denies that Eratosthenes had this motivation to ma ke his action appear all the more heinous. 91

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178 safeguards granted by the 92 Although Demosthenes has sympathy for those who help themselves when they are harmed by wrongdoing (74), recourse to the courts is the best way to stay within the bounds of the law. One could object that court cases such as Demo sthenes 21, Demosthenes 54, Lysias 3, and Lysias 4 concern violent acts and therefore prove that violence must happened in Athens. In Demosthenes who resorted to litigatio n, there was a Conon or Meidias who preferred to settle shed very much light on how typical such abuse was since the sources probably record only the worst feu ds. Nevertheless, Cohen (1995, 137 speech Against Tisias (frr. 75, 76 Thalheim) as evidence that violence was commonplace at Athens. Phillips asserts that the narrative, which details how verbal abuse end ed in physical echthra from verbal against justice, or he would not have put the defendant o n trial for it. The survival of this speech may in fact suggest the reverse of what Cohen and Phillips argue, that such acts were so exceptional that they were marked out as interesting stories to be preserved for posterity. Athenians expected that aggress ive violent behavior would be checked by democratic institutions and practices. According to Demosthenes 54 ( Against Conon ) the legal system prevented enemies from resortin g to violence to solve disputes. It is said that these [lawsuits of defamation] exis t so that those who are engaged in abuse may not be led on to beat each other. Again, there are suits for battery; and I hear that these exist so that no one, when he finds himself at a disadvantage, may 92 Dem. 21.76:

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179 defend himself with a stone or something else of thi s sort but will wait for justice from the law. Again there are lawsuits for wounding so that murders do not result when men are wounded. The most insignificant of these, defamation, has, I believe, been dealt with because of the final and most terrible of these, so that murder may not ensue, and that men not be led on little by little from defamation to blows, and from blows to wounding, and from wounding to death, but so that rather justice for each of the things be obtained through the laws. 93 Ariston sugg offenses are able to stop escalation that could end in violence. The passage is representative of the Athenian belief that violence could be and should be prevented by recour se to the courts. Phillips (2008) comes to an entirely different conclusion regarding this passage. He argues est of the speech makes clear, Ariston expects Athenians to beat and wound each other. 94 ( Against Lochite s ), which similarly depicts the body of laws as designed to prevent violence. The speaker asserts that the lawgivers created a procedure for slander in order to prevent people from eventually coming to blows, because they were especially concerned about th e bodies of citizens ( 2). Both of these passages providence evidence for Athenian distaste for violence and belief that the laws could limit it. The Athenians celebrated their conviction that the legal system tended t o provide a check Suppliant Women strikes at the core of a theme 93 Dem. 54.17 19: 94 The most that could be argued from this passage is that violence a cts must not have been totally unheard of in Athens for Ariston even to mention escalation as a plausible scenario. This is undoubtedly true, but Ariston does not imply that violence was overlooked or a part of normal life.

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180 95 The Oresteia dramatizes this conflict between blood feud and justice in the person of Orestes. In the Eumenides t he Athenian court of the Areopagus breaks the cycle of feuding and bloodshed brought on by the curse of Atreus and restores harmony. Isocrates expresses a similar sentiment in the Panathena icus 4.40) came to the homicide courts at Athens. Athenians believed that their laws, homicide laws in particular, put limitations on violen ce (Phillips 2008, 56 7). Even if the courts did not always put an end to a conflict, they could at least provide a new outlet for continuing enmity. 96 Demosthenes asserts that the legal system, with its multiple procedures for similar offences, is designed to provide avenues for all citizens to obtain redress (22.26 7). This procedural flexibility allowed Athenian citizens to pursue their enemies in front of a jury rather than by physical confrontation. The use of the courts to continue relationships of enm ity could diffuse violence by channeling it through a state run, non violent apparatus. The agonistic Athenian may well have preferred a public and humiliating victory over an opponent in the courts to a private triumph which involved the risks of fighting Consequently, the courts would remain a very attractive option to honor seeking citizens (McHardy 2008, 99). The active participation of bystanders in stopping fights also provided an important check on violent behavior (Hunter 1994, 138 9). In Lysias 3 ( Against Simon ) a crowd ( 16) gathers to help a Plataean boy who is being assaulted by Simon. 95 Eur. Supp 614: 96 Cohen 1995, 87 118; cf. Rhodes 1998. Cohen points out that trials often exacerbate hostile relationships and could thereby increase the probability for violence to occur. The first point is well made, but it does not necessarily follow that violence increased in direct proportion to how much people hated each other. The courts would remain a viable option for pursuing an enemy even among those who were in extremely acrimonious conflict, such as Demosthenes and Aeschines.

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181 Apollodorus states that a group of passersby ( ) helped him by preventing Nicostratus and his friends from pushing him into a quarry ([Dem.] 53.17). Another crowd of citizens stops a violent attack in Isocrates 18 ( Against Callimachus 6). The speaker of Demosthenes 47 ( Against Evergus and Mnesibulus ) tells how his neighbors saw that his house was being invaded and so rushed to the rescue (60 1). To Athenians this normalizing force was setting up a contrast between his actions as he looks on and encourages his sons to continue beating Ariston, and the appropriate response of bystanders, who were expected to help the afflicted (Dem. 54.25). In another speech Demosthenes asserts that if imprisoned criminals got loose all of the jury members would run to help (Dem. 24.208). Bystand er help seems to have been a part of civic ideology (cf. Lys. 7.18). The absence in Athens of the blood feuding ethic found in other societies is confirmed by the fact that Athenians did not carry weapons, as Herman (1994, 99 105) has pointed out. Thucydid es asserts that the Athenians were the first among the Greeks to give up the practice of Pol Gorgias Socrate s mentions carrying a dagger into the marketplace as if the concept were a novelty (469D). Socrates asserts that he would have the power of a tyrant to kill whomever he wanted, thus assuming that no one else would have a weapon. This scenario proposed by S seizing power (Hdt. 1.59.3 5). Pisitratus secured a group of bodyguards armed with clubs and took control of the acropolis. The Athenians were apparently unable to resist this small force and t herefore must not have been armed themselves. Andocides 1 ( On the Mysteries ) provides an exception that proves the rule. According to Andocides the citizen body was so fearful after the

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182 mutilation of the Herms that many took to carrying arms for a period o f time (45; cf. 66). In his list of the measures that people can take to avoid being wronged by their enemies, Apollodorus mentions guarding household effects, staying at home at night, and taking preparations against plots ([Dem.] 58.65); he does not incl ude carrying a weapon for self defense. 97 Athenians did not carry weapons because they did not view their society as violent. They encouraged citizens to intervene when a quarrel began to escalate and expected the legal system to help limit bloodshed. Overa ll, the respect for the sacrosanctity of the body of the citizen prevented the Athenians from condoning violent behavior as normal and acceptable. 98 Conclusion Chapter 4 concluded that in the Athenian conceptualization of their society, enmity was quite pre Athenians believed that citizens would invariably attempt to harm their enemies. Enmity was more than an emotional response to people whom one disliked; it was a formalized relationship that entailed certain expectations. Just as friends were supposed to demonstrate their friendship by acts of kindness in an endless series of gift exchanges, enemies were expected to trade acts of hostility. The practice of reconciliation by which enmity was formally ended and a friendship formally begun shows that the Athenians allowed for little middle ground between these two relationships. Of course the average Athenian would have many people whom he knew only incidentally and did not cons ider a friend or an enemy. But, presumably, as an Athenian became better acquainted with another person, he would eventually find a way to place him in one of one 97 Fisher (1998) asserts that the lack of siderophoria 7). 98 Ober (2005, 92 127) argues that some rights of citizens were gradually extended to other members of society, including women and sla since the same stigma does not seem to have applied to violence against slaves and prostitutes (see, e.g., [Dem.] 53.16).

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183 of the known categories whether as a friend or as an enemy. Enmity was a socially constructed relationship that involved the expectation that those involved in such a relationship would attempt to harm each other. Enemies attempted to harm each other in a number of ways. One of the most important of these was a constant verbal battle of insults an d slander. In nearly every genre of ancient literature enemies are depicted as engaging in a constant verbal battle as they compete for status and honor. Feuding individuals would also take advantage of the court system to attack each other whether by pros witnesses. Many other options for enemies to pursue each other, both legal and illegal, were also available. Athenians did not lack for ways to carry on a relationship of enmity. The e thic of making and harming enemies was not without problems for democratic ideology. Athenians were reticent to sanction the use of the courts for the aggravation of purely private quarrels since this threatened democratic values and could even lead to sta sis Therefore litigants often argued that their opponents had committed such terrible acts that they could no longer be considered citizens. These speakers attempt to mesh their private motivation with the best interests by passing a verdict against their opponents. The Athenians thus avoided the necessity of admitting that two good citizens could be enemies. 99 Athens also did not provide scope for enmity to escalate into acts of violence. Although some viole nce undoubtedly occurred, Athenians viewed it as abnormal and illegitimate. Attacks on the body of the citizen were considered egregious and were therefore limited. Enemies may 99 Socrates attempts to solve this problem b y asserting that just citizens should only be at enmity with unjust citizens ( Resp. 334d 335a). As a theoretical ideal this may have worked, but in practice probably every individual would consider himself just and his rivals unjust.

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184 have been expected to attempt to harm their enemies in a variety of ways, but t hey were also required to stay within the parameters set by society, which included a prohibition on violence, especially in extreme forms. Athens did not endorse blood feuding behavior. But neither did it infringe heavily on the rights of the individual m ale citizen to harm his enemies so long as he did not cross the boundaries established by the state.

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185 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION This study has investigated how Athenians discussed and conceived of enmity among the citizen body. The first part (Chapters 2 3) exam ined how the Attic orators employ enmity in their speeches. Litigants had different strategies available to them and could shape their presentation of their relationships with their opponents to their own needs. Enmity is most often used as a vehicle for c version of events although the exact details of how a litigant employs enmity will vary from case to case. In light of these insights into the rhetorical use of enmity, a new way of evalu ating the sources is possible. The second part of this study (Chapters 4 5) employed a methodology that took into account the rhetorical aspect of enmity illustrated in the first part (Chapters 2 3) and also brought in evidence from genres other than the A ttic orators. The ensuing examination concluded that for the Athenians relationships of enmity were a part of everyday life. Nearly every citizen could expect to have identifiable groups of friends and enemies bound by formalized relationships. Enemies wer e expected to harm each other and had at their disposal a variety of options for doing so. However, they were required to stop short of physical violence. Because the body of the Athenian citizen was inviolable, clear limitations were established for enemi es who might be tempted to attack each other by violent means. In the Athenian mind democratic institutions such as the courts functioned to limit violence. Although Athenians did not reject the legitimacy d that it had to be carried out in ways that did not threaten the social compact of the state.

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186 This study illustrates how a close analysis of rhetorical topoi and legal arguments is instrumental to understanding the nature of Athenian society Chapters 2 3 demonstrated that enmity is grounded in the legal sphere and is linked to rational arguments about the facts of the case. Scholars had often assumed that when litigants invoked enmity they portrayed themselves as outstanding models of how Athenians believ ed citizens should act and their opponents as the antithesis, but the reality is much more complex. The rhetorical strategies for presenting hostile relationships to the jury are more flexible than previously supposed. Litigants employ a variety of differe nt methods for introducing their relationships with their opponents and shape their rhetoric according to their needs. This observation causes problems for one of the common methods of evaluating the sources. Many scholars have tacticly accepted the premis e that litigants invoke their relationships with their opponents to win over the jurors, who intended to make a social judgment between the employ enmity to create probability arguments about the facts of the case, not necessarily to present themselves as exemplars of the correct responses to enemies. One cannot cite speakers who portray themselves as retaliating on enemies as examples of a feuding ethic just as one cannot cite speakers who portray themselves as passively suffering wrongs as examples of a non feuding ethic. These presentations of enmity are designed not to provide moral commentary but to develop arguments about the case based on the character of the disputants. The observation that speakers employ enmity primarily for probability allows for a more reliable method of evaluating the sources. An approach that focuses on narratives of enmity can discover what the jury believed was likely to happen in the course of a relationship of enmity. To create arguments from probability, litigants had to be sensitive to what the jurors would be ready

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187 to believe. Narratives of enmity would therefore reflect the types of behavior that Athenians believe d were cha racteristic of enemies This method has been employed in Chapters 4 5 to arrive at a fresh perspective on enmity in ancient Athens. This study rejects the dichotomy between two competing codes of behavior. Athens cannot be plotted at some point on a spect reality is much more complex. The issues of the prevalence of enmity, the causes and spread of enmity, the characteristic behav ior of enemies, and the social and legal limits on vengeance merit separate consideration to make possible a fuller and more nuanced picture of the Athenian worldview. Athenians could simultaneously believe that enmity was a prevalent phenomenon in the cit y, that enemies would constantly attempt to harm each other, and that enemies would be prevented from using violence by democratic institutions and practices. Perhaps one of these s the ideology of incongruous. This examination of the Athenian sources calls for a reorientation of the debate about enmity. Closer attention to the nuances of the rhetoric of enmity yields a more reliable methodology by which to evaluate the source material. Further, the idea of two competing codes of behavior should be abandoned as it is too schematic to account for the multifaceted nature of the Athenian conce ptualization of enmity. This study has offered alternatives to this problem by examination of the patterns that reveal how Athenians envisaged the practice of enmity in their society.

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188 The way that Athenians approached the topic of enmity illustrates that Athens was a complex society with its own distinctive features. Enemies were allowed to pursue each other and to fight for honor, but state regulations and the socia l expectations of the citizen body put strong restraints on acceptable behavior. Thus classical Athens does not fit into the models of feuding or non feuding societies since it lacked the characteristic violence of the former and the prohibition on feuding of the latter. Athens possessed an individuality of its own.

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189 LIST OF REFERENCES Adeleye, G abriel Dokimasia GRBS 24 : 295 306 Allen, D anielle S. 2000 a The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000 b CA 19 : 5 33. Arnaoutoglou, Ilias AncSoc 25 : 5 17. Audollent, A uguste 1904. Defix ionum Tabellae Paris : Alberti Fontemoing Balot R yan K. 2001. Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens Princeton : Princeton University Press Biscardi A rnaldo La G nome D ikaiotate et l' I nterpr tation des L ois dans la Gr ce A ncienne RIDA 17:219 32. Bleicken, Jochen. 1988. Die Athenische Demokratie Paderborn: Wolfgang Schuller. Blomquist, J erker Hippolytus Hermes 110 : 398 414 Blundell, M ary W 1989. Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: a Study in So phocles and Greek Ethics Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Bogaert R aymond 196 8. Banques et B anquiers dans les C its G recques Leiden : A.W. Sijthoff Carawan, E dwin 1998. Rhetoric and the Law of Draco Oxford : Clarendon Press Carey, C hristopher 1989. Lysias: Selected Speeches Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. G&R 37 : 44 51. 1992. Apollodoros against Neaira: (Demosthenes) 59 Warminster: Aris & Phillips 1994 a Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action ed. I an Worthington, 26 45 London : Routledge 1994 b G&R 41 : 172 86 BICS 39:95 106. Exosmosia CQ 45:114 19. Christ, M atthew R. 1990 Liturgy Avoidance and Antidosis in Classical Athens TAPA 120 : 147 69.

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190 1998 a The Litigious Athenian Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press AJP 119 : 521 45. 2006. The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 2007. Review of Herman 2006. Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2007.07.37: http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2007/2007 07 37.html Cohen, D avid Seclusion, S eparation, and the S tatus of W omen in C lassical Athens G&R 36 : 3 15. 1991. Law, Sexuality, and Society: Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens Cambridge : Cam bridge University Press 1995. Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens Cambridge : Cambridge University Press Darkow, A ngela C. 1917. The Spurious Speeches in the Lysianic Corpus Bryn Mawr : Lord Baltimore Press Davies, J ohn K. 1981. Wea lth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens New York : Arno Press Dillon, M atthew AncSoc 26 : 27 57. Dover, K enneth J. 1968. Lysias and the Corpus Lysi acum Berkeley : University of California Press 1974. Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle Berkeley: University of California Press. Edwards, M ichael J. 2000. Antiphon and the B eginnings of Athenian L iterary O ratory Rhetori ca 18 : 227 243 Edwards, M ichael J and Stephen Usher. 1985. Antiophon and Lysias Warminster : Aris & Phillips Epstein, D avid F. 1987. Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218 43 B.C. London : Croom Helm Erbse, H atmut 19 5 6 Hermes 84 : 135 51. Fairchild, W illiam D. 1979. The Argument from Probability in Lysias. CB 55:49 54. Faraone, Christopher Magika Hiera: Ancient Greek Magic and Religion ed. Christopher A. Faraone and D irk Obbink, 3 32. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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191 Finley, M oses I. 1983. Politics in the Ancient World Cambridge : Cambridge University Press The L aw of H ubris In Nomos ed. P aul A. Cartledge, P aul M illett, and S tephen Todd 1 23 38. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 1992. Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece Waxminster : Aris and Phillips When Men were Men ed. L in Foxhall and J ohn Salmon, 68 97 London : Routledge 1999 Organized Crime in Antiquity ed. K eith Hopwood 53 96 London : Duckworth 2001. Aeschines : Against Timarchos Oxford : Cla rendon Press Frnkel, M ax A Hermes 13 : 452 66 Furley, W illiam D. 1996. Andokides and the Herms: A Study of Crisis in F ifth century Athenian Religion London : Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, Unive rsity of London Gabrielsen, V incent The A ntidosis P rocedure in C lassical Athens C &M 38 : 7 38. 1994. Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press Gagarin, M ichael. 1981. Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law New Haven : Yale University Press The T orture of S laves in Athenian L aw CP 91 : 1 18 2002. Antiphon the Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists Austin : University of Texas Press V iolence dans les P laidoyers A La V iolence dans les M ondes G rec et R omain ed. Jean Marie Bertrand, 365 76. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne 200 7 Rational A rgument in E arly Athenian O ratory Logos : R ational A rgument in C lassical R hetoric ed. J onathan Powell, 9 18 London : Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London Gagliardi, L orenzo Dokimasia of Orators. A Response to Douglas M Symposion 2001 : Vortrge zur G riechischen und H ellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte ed R obert W. Wallace and M ichael Gagarin 89 98. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Gallant, T homas W. 1991. Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece: Reconstru cting the Rural Domestic Economy Stanford: Stanford University Press

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199 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Andrew Alwine was born in Sewanee, Tennessee, in 1982. In 2001 he graduated from Temple High School in Temple, Texas. He graduated from Baylor University in 2004 with a Bachelor of Arts in history and classics. He receive d his Master of Arts (2006) and his Doctor of Philosophy (2010) in classical studies from the University of Florida.