Politics at Its Demise

Material Information

Politics at Its Demise E. H. Carr, 1931-1939
Nishimura, Kuniyuki
Place of Publication:
[Gainesville, Fla.]
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (153 p.)

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Doctorate ( Ph.D.)
Degree Grantor:
University of Florida
Degree Disciplines:
Political Science
Committee Chair:
Oren, Ido
Committee Co-Chair:
Barkin, Jeffrey S.
Committee Members:
O'Neill, Daniel I.
Arfi, Badredine
Bergmann, Peter E.
Graduation Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Biography ( jstor )
Exile ( jstor )
Idealism ( jstor )
International politics ( jstor )
Liberalism ( jstor )
Philosophical realism ( jstor )
Rationality ( jstor )
Utopianism ( jstor )
Victorians ( jstor )
War ( jstor )
Political Science -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
carr, context, individualism, liberalism, modernism
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
Political Science thesis, Ph.D.


Despite the revived popularity of Carr in the recent scholarship of international studies, the existing inquiries into The Twenty Years' Crisis are still limited because of their lack of attentions to historical contexts. The present study aims at advancing our reassessment of this classical work by clarifying its connection to Carr's early biographical works: Dostoevsky, The Romantic Exiles, Karl Marx, and Michael Bakunin. Despite their seeming irrelevancy to international studies, these works vividly clarify one of Carr's deepest concerns in his early academic life: the European crisis. Given this concern, The Twenty Years' Crisis is not so much a polemic against interwar idealists as an attempt of political philosophy to tackle with the tension between man and society in the post-individualist age. Carr tried to transcend the deterministic force of history in the difficult era, when the Great War and the succeeding quagmires had demonstrated the possibility of human degeneration after the long reign of rational progressivism. Although his solution ended up a retreat to the old Victorian mode of thinking, the ambivalence of Carr suggests the difficulty of the question in political philosophy. The real value of The Twenty Years' Crisis resides not in its insights about specific issues but in its clear revelation of the difficulty of political studies in the post-Enlightenment era. The present study thus attempts to add a contribution to the recent revisions of the history of international studies. ( en )
General Note:
In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note:
Includes vita.
Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description:
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description:
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2009.
Adviser: Oren, Ido.
Co-adviser: Barkin, Jeffrey S.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Kuniyuki Nishimura.

Record Information

Source Institution:
Rights Management:
Copyright Nishimura, Kuniyuki. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
665066390 ( OCLC )
LD1780 2009 ( lcc )


This item has the following downloads:

Full Text




2009 Kuniyuki Nishimura 2


TABLE OF CONTENTS page ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................................................5 CHAP TER 1 PROLOGUE..................................................................................................................... ........6 Carr and International Studies ..................................................................................................6 Why Carr? .........................................................................................................................6 Why Carr Now? .................................................................................................................9 Why Biographies? ...........................................................................................................13 Approach .................................................................................................................................20 Structure ..................................................................................................................................25 2 THE QUESTION................................................................................................................. ...27 Dostoevsky as the Other .........................................................................................................27 Dostoevsky as Synthesizer .....................................................................................................29 Dostoevsky as Prophet ............................................................................................................34 The Dawn of an Age ...............................................................................................................37 3 WRONG ANSWERS.............................................................................................................40 The Romantic Tragedy ...........................................................................................................40 Herzen and the Difficulty of Love ...................................................................................41 Turn to the Radicals .........................................................................................................45 The Tragedy Reprised .............................................................................................................47 Bakunins Spectacular Life .............................................................................................47 The Rise of Individualism ...............................................................................................54 Against Romance ....................................................................................................................59 Marxs Unspectacular Life ..............................................................................................59 The Fall of Individualism ................................................................................................61 Beyond Failures ......................................................................................................................67 4 IN THE PRESENT CRISIS....................................................................................................70 Escape from Abstraction .........................................................................................................71 Economic Man Leaves ...........................................................................................................73 History Rages ..........................................................................................................................76 Civilization Recovers ..............................................................................................................82 Political Man Arrives ..............................................................................................................89 History against History ...........................................................................................................94 3


5 RELUCTANT RETREAT......................................................................................................97 Two Cultures ...........................................................................................................................99 Victorian Progressivism ..................................................................................................99 Modernist Decadence ....................................................................................................104 Divided Text .........................................................................................................................107 With Victorians ..............................................................................................................108 With Modernists ............................................................................................................112 The Heart of the Tear .....................................................................................................116 Being British .........................................................................................................................118 Saving England ..............................................................................................................119 Conquering Europe ........................................................................................................122 A Long Detour ......................................................................................................................126 6 EPILOGUE..................................................................................................................... ......131 LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................................................................................142 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................................153 4


5 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy POLITICS AT ITS DEMISE : E. H. CARR, 1931-1939 By Kuniyuki Nishimura May 2009 Chair: Ido Oren Cochair: J. Samuel Barkin Major: Political Science Despite the revived popularity of Carr in the recent scholarship of international studies, the existing inquiries into The Twenty Years Crisis are still limited because of their lack of attentions to historical contexts. The present study aims at advancing our reassessment of this classical work by clarifying its connection to Carrs early biographical works: Dostoevsky The Romantic Exiles Karl Marx, and Michael Bakunin Despite their seeming irrelevancy to international studies, these work s vividly clarify one of Carrs deepest concerns in his early academic life: the European crisis. Given this concern, The Twenty Years Crisis is not so much a polemic against interwar idealists as an attempt of political philo sophy to tackle with the tension between man and society in the post-individualist age. Carr tried to transcend the deterministic force of history in the difficult era, when the Great War and the succeeding quagmires had demonstrated the possibility of human degenerati on after the long reign of rational progressivism. Although his solution ended up a retr eat to the old Victorian mode of thinking, the ambivalence of Carr suggests the difficulty of the questi on in political philosophy. The real value of The Twenty Years Crisis resides not in its insights about specific issues but in its clear revelation of the difficulty of political studies in the post-Enlightenment era. The present study thus attempts to add a contribution to the recent revisions of the history of international studies.


CHAP TER 1 PROLOGUE Each individual person is bodily and menta lly independent. Yet the separation does not guarantee self-sufficiency. A communal form of life arises from demand. However, the original distinctness of each individual be comes endangered because of this communal form of life. Human independence is both the condition and the hindrance of politics. As the number of individuals increases, this inhere nt difficulty becomes aggrandized. Politics impinges its original aim through its development. The rise of interna tional politics, politics in the largest community on earth, demonstrates this paradox in a remarkable manner. International politics is the form of politics which reveals the limit of politics. What follows is a story about this strange invention. Carr and International Studies The present study is an inquiry into the history of the field of international studies. The specific focus is on the writings of Edward Hall ett Carr (1892-1982) and the primary subject is from which context his The Twenty Years Crisis (1939a) arose. The present work attempts to unravel the significance of th e connection between this m onumental work and the four biographies which Carr wrote before it: Dostoevsky (1931), The Romantic Exiles (1933), Karl Marx (1934), and Michael Bakunin (1937a). My objective is to reveal the philosophical foundation of his historical thi nking by grasping these five works as a consecutive effort to tackle with the European problems in the years between the two World Wars In this introductory chapter, I will discuss why it is important to st udy Carr, why scholars of international studies need to read biographies, and which approach is appropriate for the project of this present study. Why Carr? To understand the significance of Carr today, it is necessary to grasp the current status of the studies concerning his works. The recent revisions of Carr appeared most remarkably in the 6


field of internationa l studies. Carr is significant mainly because of his position in the history of this academic field. The typical narrative of the hist ory of international studies is the so-called Great Debates view. Despite the wide acceptance of this na rrative, scholars do not necessarily share the understanding neither about how many debates have occurred in the past nor about what the primary issue in each debate was. Yet, at least, one of the most popular stories unfolds as follows (see Schmidt 2002a). The First Debate occurred in the 1930s and 1940s between idealists (or utopians) and classical realists. The Second De bate was between behavioral positivists and classical realists in the 1960s. The Third Debate started in the 1980s and is ongoing. The main issue in this debate is not necessa rily clear, as the i nventor of the term already realized (Lapid 1989). It is variously identified as inter-paradig m conflicts: sometimes it signifies the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism; other times it points to the segreg ation of interpretive approaches from broadly positivist approaches. This narrative is helpful for grasping the ove rview of the development of the discipline. Yet its advantage accompanies a certain cost of excessive simplificati on. For instance, it is doubtful how positivism improved classical realism. The Great Debate narrative tells us that realism has become a more sophisticated theory through its exposure to positivist epistemologies. Yet leading classical realists such as Hans Mo rgenthau (1946; 1972) did not think of positivism as consistent with political re alism. Indeed, it is not sufficiently clear what it means to be scientific to begin with. The Great Debate narrative is not only silent about such issue but it also vindicates the legitimacy of the fields establishment through such a factually unsupported story. For example, many current forms of realism would prove to be theoretically flawed if realism were really 7


incom patible with positivism as Morgenthau clai med. Such issue is problematic especially when critical theorists have attacked the positivist assu mptions of these realisms in the last decades. Provided that disciplinary histor y tells us not only where the disc ipline came from but also in which direction it is moving, the revision of its origin has cr ucial importance for understanding both the limits and the possibili ties of the current scholarship (see Dryzek and Leonard 1988). The revision of the history of the discipline directly concerns the contemporary debate in the field. Carr occupies a unique place in the recent revisi onism. One of the reasons is that he has been among the most popular classical theorists both in the textbooks and the syllabi in graduate courses. He was also one of the earliest advocates of the realist view of international relations. The dichotomization of realism and idealism is supposed to have stemmed from his distinction between reality and utopia in his The Twenty Years Crisis (1939a). Morgenthaus Politics among Nations (1948a) later became a more popular liter ature partly because of its schematic and synoptic format. But The Twenty Years Crisis was published nine years earlier. Other eminent classical realis ts occasionally appear in academic discourses. Chronologically, Reinhold Niebuhr provided Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) before Carr presented The Twenty Years Crisis But Niebuhr has not, for any reasons, become as canonical a figure as Carr or Morgenthau in the history of international studi es. It is possible to make a similar statement about other classical theorists such as Arnold Wolfers and Nicholas Spykman. Another, but not scrutinized, uniqueness of Carr is that he was British. The Great Debate narrative is notably the story of international st udies in the United States. This point is worth stressing since both Carr and Morgenthau were non-Americans whereas they have been recognized as the pioneers of Amer ican international st udies. Morgenthau became popular as a 8


scholar of international relations mostly after he immigrated to the United States. Carr basically rem ained in Britain. Indeed, many idealists in the Great Debate narrative, the antagonists of Carr, were also British. It is not a coincidence that early revisionist studies of Carr first came from the so-called English School of international stud ies in Britain. For example, Tim Dunne (1998: chap. 2) considers Carr as the origin of the Eng lish School. If the Great De bate narrative is more ideological than accurately historical, therefore, the problem is magnified in the case of Carr because of its ignorance of contexts. Insofar as Carr is recognized to have established the academic discipline of internati onal studies through his attack on idealism, the clarification of this issue can be crucial for those who believe th at Carrs realism is the origin of contemporary international studies. Why Carr Now? Therefore, to unravel Carrs thinking is si gnificant not only for understanding the history of the field but also for decidi ng the appropriate direction of its present and futu re scholarship. However, some might ask if we need another st udy of Carr. The discip line of international studies already saw many inquiri es into Carr and the First Debate in the last decades. To justify the present pr oject, therefore, it is necessary to clarify the flaws of the existing inquiries into Carr. I do not doubt that the r ecent revisions have remarkably advanced our understanding of Carr and thus the origin of the field. They provide more historically convincing views than the previous scholarship has achieve d. Yet the revisionists show their own ignorance of historical contexts. I have two rela ted points to make about this issue. To begin with, we do not yet have much histor ical studies of Carr. This statement might sound counterintuitive to those who are already familiar with the recent literatures. Yet the trajectory of the recent revi sionism suggests this fact. 9


W hat is important is that the current revisi onism is not a single unitary body of movement. It is rather an amalgam of several different a ttempts to replace the existing view of the fields history. As I already mentioned, its revision has strong implications for critical theorists who attempt to denaturalize the legitimacy of positivis t schools in the discipline. Yet the revisionist movement is not exclusively connected to anti-p ositivism. As the Third Debate involved various reactions to the slightly distin ct schools of thought such as positivism (a philosophy of science), political realism (a normative appr oach to politics), and structural realism (an empirical theory), the revision of the history came from, and brought about, different concerns. The debate between structural realists and th eir critics were multifacet ed as the target of criticism was a combination of different theories. In the first place, structural realism was a type of political realism in its assumptions of states ego-centrism and their specific interests in military power. Next, it was a type of positivism, if its creator denied it (Waltz 1990), in its interests in the generalization of social issues, theoretical parsimony, the analogy to market theories in economics. Last, the theory was a fo rm of structuralism by reducing every state to a unitary actor and presupposing that the international society is innately anarchic. These three points were deeply intermingled but were still separate as the di stinct components of the theory. Thus each criticism of structural realism concer ned each distinct issue. It seems that these distinct interests in classical th eories produced different revisions of different classical theorists with uneven distributions of labor. Some positivist scholars cons idered classical types of r ealism more nuanced by taking morality and domestic conditions of politics in to account (Jervis 1994; Rose 1998). They could still vindicate positivism if they were dissatisfie d with normative aspects of structural realism. By contrast, more critical schol ars praised classical realism as it was not tainted by positivist 10


scientism (Murray 1997). Both strands contributed to the rise of sc holarly interests in the history of the field. The connection betw een classical realism and stru ctural realism was dubious for both types of scholars. However, th e two strands attempted to revive classical realism in different ways for different purposes. Another example is the studies of Morgentha u. Generally, revisions of Morgenthau seem to share the fundamental interest in political realism. Attempts to uncover his intellectual connection to Nietzsche, Weber, Freud, and Schm itt in history are all dedicated to rediscover richly nuanced realism in hi s discourse (Barkawi 1998; Pich ler 1998; Hyusmans 1999; Frei 2001; Gismondi 2004; Rohde 2004; Sc huett 2007; Sheuerman 2008). In this regard, the primary interest resides in the thought of Morgenthau itself. The implication of his thought for the history of the field is secondary if not accidental. Studies of Carr share interests in realism as well. Yet they are more inclined toward the historical position of Carr. In fact, the main strand is rather interested in the antagonists of Carr and its primary focus often deviates from him. Briefly sketched, recent studies of Carr have developed as follows. A pioneering study is Ken Booths (1991) rereading of The Twenty Years Crisis Scholars have long grasped Carrs dualism between realism and utopianism as a ma neuver to defend the former by rejecting the latter. Carr has thus been recognized as a founde r of political realism in the current form of international studies. Booth uncovered the more ut opian aspects of Carr by almost turning the dichotomy upside down. The next monumental study was The Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis (Long and Wilson 1995). Given the insight of Booth, this co llection of essays cont ributed to remove the misunderstanding that those whom Carr called ut opians were starry-eyed idealists. While the 11


contributors had different views about various idealists, their disa greem ent itself pointed to the argument that there had been no single schoo l of utopianism in the interwar years. The succeeding works followed this line of argument. The Great Debate view is more clearly doubted. The revisionist works unanimously asked if there was actually the First Debate as a dominating movement in the field (Osi ander 1998; Schmidt 1998a; Wilson 1998; Ashworth 1999; Ashworth 2002; Schmidt 2002b; Thies 2002; Ashworth 2006). In this regard, scholars have e xpressed greater intere sts in those whom Carr is said to have criticized rather than Carr himself. More precisely, scholars expend larger efforts to delegitimize the narrative of the First Debate which Carr is said to have created than to rescue Carr from this myth. I am not presenting the bina ry that those who are interested in Morgenthau exclusively focus on political realism, on the one hand, and schol ars of Carr attempt to denaturalize the Great Debate view, on the other hand. All the works ci ted above provide both new interpretations of classical realism and the history of the field. Scholars have reasons to focus on the legitimacy of the Great Debate narrative in their investigation of Carr inasmuch as the narrative tells that Carr created the binary of realism and idealism. Thei r focus is even natural given the aforementioned point that Carr is the origin of the discipline. I am just suggesting the diversity of revisionism. Revisionist scholars commonly atte mpt to denaturalize the Great Debate view as well as gain fresh insights from classical theories. Yet they differ to which aspect they intend to spill the larger amount of ink. Such differe nce has led to the curious shortage of the historical studies of Carr despite the abundance of studies about the scholars surrounding him. The number of Carr studies is es pecially small when it comes to the specific inquiries into the text of The Twenty Years Crisis Some studies situate this m onumental work in historical context. Yet the objective of them is rather to clarify the influence of the book in the discipline, 12


not to closely interpret the text (W ilson 2000; Rich 2000). Jonathan Haslams (1999) biography is now an indispensable source to grasp the cour se of Carrs intellectual development. Yet the work is not meant to provide clos e reading of his texts one by one. Charles Joness (1998) study gives us a fresh insight about Carrs relativistic notion of scientific inquiry. Joness attempt to compare Carr and Mannheim, however, is more theoretical if not a-historical at all. It is easy to observe a similar character in Sen Molloys (2003) study of the dialectical structure in The Twenty Years Crisis Other existing works are oriented toward our current problems in politics. These studies ar e more interested in picking out some useful insights from Carr than situating him in hist ory (Linklater 1997; Go ldfischer 2002; Chong 2007). Although these theoretical arguments provide some unique insights for reading his text, they are too selective to uncover the f undamental project of Carr. Jones study is almost a single exception, therefore, if it is recognized as a historical one. Compared with the vastness of literatures on interwar idealism, the thoroughly historical inquiries into the text of The Twenty Years Crisis are strangely scarce. If interwar idealism has widely been exposed to historical revision, its co unterpart deserves for an equally wide varieties of historical investigations. Why Biographies? My argument so far is meant to clarify why a nother historical study of Carr is necessary. It is still not clear why we need to focus on his biog raphies for the sake of this historical study. The issue concerns the lack of scholarly attentions to the fact that Carr is said to have been a pioneer of the discipline. This is probably another coun terintuitive statement. The issue concerns two interconnected points. 13


On the one hand, it is the retrospective creati on that Carr created th e discipline. Carr was the professor of internat ional studies at W ales. He discussed international relati ons. Yet he never claimed himself to have created the discipline. The point is not that scholars should t hus avoid considering Carr as a pioneer of international studies. Embracing the insight of Fou cault (1984), it is possible to claim that every origin is imaginary. Scholars might end up findi ng as many origins as the number of forgotten figures in history. If so, however, it is importan t to first think seriously of the fact that Carr has been considered a pioneer. It does not mean that scholars need to recognize Carr as the origin unconditionally. My point is that it is vital to begin with underst anding him whether other figures should be more appropriate as the founders or not. If every origin is a myth, scholars do not have the immediate reason to sweep the current authority from its power. One needs to know the presumptions about the orig in in order to reject it. It might be the existing criterion of evaluating Ca rr, not the discourse of Carr itsel f, which is problematic for the understanding of the origin of the field. It is possible to consider othe r strands of thought as pioneering for international studie s without concerning th e issue of criterion. It is even possible to broaden our eyes as such by directing our at tention to the unknown scholars. Yet it is not possible to claim such scholars are more pioneering than the current ones without understanding why the latter are considered as pioneering. The sufficient knowledge about the existing origin is necessary in order to differentiate this origin from other possible origins. It is impo ssible to compare two different things with two different criteria. However, the current revisionis ts sometimes make this mistake. For example, Lucian Ashworth (1999, 4) claims that the liberal internationalism of interwar idealists is more 14


appropriate ly the origin of the current internationa l studies than realism is. The reason is that the interwar liberal internationalism had gained cert ain solidarity as a discipline earlier than realism did since it was the heir of the ei ghteenth and nineteenth centuries id ea of international peace. In other words, Ashworth consider s liberal internationalism pioneering because it established a certain school of thought earlier th an realism did by manifesting its interests in th e idiosyncratic traits of international spheres. But what if Carr and other realists attempted to depart from such liberal internationalism? What if Ashworth underestimates the epochal meaning of the rupture between liberal internationalism a nd realism? It might be more historically accurate to consider that international studies started to take its cu rrent shape because realism removed the remnants of the Enlightenment project in liberal internationalism. Ashworth can claim that liberal internationalism is an origin of international studies. But he cannot say that liberal intern ationalism is more appropriately pioneering than realism without discussing by what criterion schol ars can consider realism as the origin. In fact, revisionists themselves disagree with each other about the criterion. When Brian Schmidt (1998b) claims that nineteenth century American political scientists were pioneering, he em phasizes the continuation of the interests in the analogy between domestic and international spheres instead of the uniqueness of the latter. Schmidts criterion is different from Ashwor ths since the latter focuses on the scholarly interests in the idiosyncratic char acters of the international field. If we try to denaturalize the current authority, we need to start from examining it from within. The aforementioned shortage of the study of Carr seems to have derived from this lack of clarity about the criterion. It is advisable to note that revisionists even share certain problematic presumptions with their pred ecessors, at least, unconscious ly. Current scholars almost unanimously contextualize Carr within his debate with interwar idealists However, it is doubtful 15


whether th e First Debate is th e most appropriate context for The Twenty Years Crisis Ashworth (2002, 38) notices that Carr did not refer to the contemporary works of Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern. Instead, Carr cites only the works which these idealists wrote before the Great War. Ashworths point is that Angells post-1918 works tackle with the irrational part of human mind more seriously and should thus be exempt fr om Carrs criticism of utopianism. But what if Carr was criticizing a mode of thought, rather than particular authors, as Ashworth (2002, 36) also realizes? And what if the mode of thought that Carr critici zed was the one represented only by early Angell, not by later Ange ll? In fact, Carr did not cri ticize any contemporary works of idealists in The Twenty Years Crisis if he denounced their earlier wo rks. It can be the case that Carr simply did not need to critici ze later Angell or other idealists. In fact, the logical conclusi on of revisionists argument suggests Carrs closeness to idealists in terms of his politic al orientation. On the one hand, revisionists praise Carr for his concern about utopian elements of politics despit e his criticism of utopianism. On the other hand, they criticize Carr for his misr epresentation of interwar idea lists who were concerned about issues of power and irrationality. The revisioni sts view suggests that both Carr and interwar idealists were all, if not evenly, eclectic betw een utopianism and realism, or liberalism and the criticism of it. It is strange that revisionist scholars emphasize the rupture between Carr and idealists whereas they admit the latters divers ity, in which Carr can safely find his place. To be fair, the newest revisionist studies seem more balanced. For example, Ashworth (2006) realizes that the terms realism and ideal ism did not signify two modes of thought in the interwar years. This historical finding suggest s that Carr might not have denounced idealists as utopian in the same way that later scholars did. Yet Ashworth (2006, 293-98) still recognizes Carr as the inventor of the dichotomy, which th ese later scholars adop ted. Ashworth (2006, 304) 16


repeats the f act that Carr ignored Angells work s after 1918. As such, Ashworth fails to grasp the historical awareness of Carr. I will argue that Ca rrs primary interest reside d in the trajectory of the European intellectual tradit ion. If interwar scholars did no t signify two modes of thought by realism and utopianism as Ashworth points out, it is possible that Carr did not even invent the theoretical binary through his usage of these terms. If Carr was mainly concerned about the particular modes of thought, he must have criticized American idealists to the same extent that he attacked British idealists. Yet Carr rarely referred to the so-called idealists in America. Such lack of reference was natural for Carr since, as he was explicit in The Twenty Years Crisis he considered their theories as root less as they detached from the or iginal context in Europe. There is not much textual and historical reason to consider that Carrs primary objective was to attack particular groups of scholars. Idealists might have attacked the target th ey did not need to. As Peter Wilson (2003, 200) suggests, one of the most extensive idealist criticisms of Carr by Le onard Woolf missed the nuanced relationship between utopianism and realism in The Twenty Years Crisis (also see Wilson 2000; Molloy 2003, 293-94). If interwar idealists had a more accurate understanding about Carr, they might not have mounted their cri ticism. If the First Debate was a myth, it might have been a myth partly created by idealists. Ca rrs ambiguity could have contributed to the denunciation of the idealis t approaches. Yet then, the real en emy of revisionists is the group of people who needed to pick up the realist elements from Carr as well as a particular discursive terrain where such interpretation of Carr was welcomed. As Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran (2005 ) persuasively discu ss, revisionists might have contributed to the creation of the myth. Indeed, revisionists take a double standard in this regard. On the one hand, they discuss that Ca rr did not establish a binary opposition between 17


realism and idealism but rather aspired their dialect ical synthesis. On the other hand, they try to rescue idealism given the binary opposition of Carr. If the primary concern of Carr was not interwar idealists, no debate could occur to begi n with. Revisionists are not clear whether they attempt to restore interwar ideali sm because they think it is in sightful or because its advocates were unfairly rejected. If the la tter is the reason, revisionists contradict themselves since they admit that Carr did not establish a dichotomy. If the former is the reason, revisionists lose the reason to set idealism against Carr. In short, existing works remain limited by conf ining Carr into a particular academic field. More specifically, most of them presuppose Carr as a scholar of international studies. To ask whether Carr was realist, idealist, or both is specific to the fiel d. The issue about the First Debate is also very specific to the field of interna tional studies, whether it ac tually happened or not. Significantly, such implicit contex tualization is not only parochial but is also a source of the myth of the First Debate. If Ca rr did not attempted to criticize interwar idealists, we can doubt whether his primary concern resi ded specifically in internationa l politics. His interests in the events in the international sphere might have been ephemeral of other more profound concerns. This is where the biographies have their significance. They suggest that Carr did not write specifically on international studies. The biogr aphy of Dostoevsky was not widely received by the contemporary generation but later became popular among literary scholars at least up to the 1980s. This fact shows certain dept h of Carrs immersion in the ex istential philosophy, which is potentially important for realism as it is a thought of survival. The Romantic Exiles the analysis of Herzen and Bakunin, is still so popular among current historians that its reprint paperback edition appeared in 2007. Especia lly when Carr has been considered a Marxist scholar, there is 18


no reason to ignore his Karl Marx It is rare to find citations of these books in scholarly investigations of Carr in the field of international studies. There are ev en historical reasons for the current scholars to pay attention to these biographies. When Carr presented his writings in the 1930s, academic professionalization and disciplinary border-making were less advanced than the present era. He was not even a professional scholar but a clerk at the British Foreign Office when he wrote first three biographies. It is also possible that Carr did not like an excessi ve professionalization personally as a graduate of Cambridge in the early twentieth century, where liberal education was preferred to expert knowledge (Soffer 1994, 5-6). Judging from the intellectual scope covered by The Twenty Years Crisis it is, indeed, somewhat strange to say that the book is for the specialists of international studies. As Jones (1998, 46-47) points out, so many ph ilosophical figures appear in the text that the book must be, despite its subti tle, counterintuitive for those who literary look for an introduction to the study of international relations. The existing literature about Carr, old or new, basically ignores his apparently nonpolitical works by not paying much attention to this fact. Yet such negligence cannot but be a strategic attempt as it is noth ing but a selective disregard of some inconvenient issues for incorporating eminent minds into the history of the discipline. Such maneuver has its own ramification as it ideologically lets the dominant view survive, however dubious its legitimacy is based on the available evidence. It is not easy to categorize Ca rr into the currently recognized form of an academic discipline. If someone asked: why do scholar s of international st udies need to care about biographies? I would rather ask in return: why is it possible to ignore them? It is, in fact strange that scholars have not discussed these texts just because their apparent disconnection with international studies. 19


As I already mentioned, recent researchers of Morg enthau have turned their eyes to his early writings of Nietzsche, Freud and Schmitt. Therefore, I have a legitimate reason to choose biographies as the context of The Twenty Years Crisis despite their seeming irrelevancy to international studies, for the sake of international studies. My focus is ultimately The Twenty Years Crisis because I started from the existing understandings within international studies and my primary interests in the significance of Carr in international studies. My discussion star ted from the deficits inside the field and then logically reached its outside to fix them. It is crucial to resituate Carr within the discursive terrain outside of international studies for understanding his position inside it. How persuasive my argument is depends, of course, on the following analyses. At this point, it is adequate to say th at the biographical studies enab led Carr to have clarified the question he tried to answer in The Twenty Years Crisis Carr also acquired his basic view of history through these early works. Once we unders tand Carrs particular notion of the western civilization and its process uncovered in his early biographical works, The Twenty Years Crisis appears not so much a mere polemic against in terwar idealism as an attempt to recover the possibility of human community in the declining tradition of political philosophy. The Twenty Years Crisis was not a prescription to the crisis of interwar years in particular but was a set of contemplation about the crisis of European thoughts about human life, which became most clearly visible in th e interwar years. Approach As I identified the problem of the existing work s with their lack of historical awareness, it should be now clear why we need to be concerned with contexts. My assumption is that Carrs early biographical works constitutes a context for The Twenty Years Crisis If so, however, how should we read these biographies themselves? 20


One possible way is to also contextualize them But this approach is not most appropriate for the pres ent study. If we need to show how fresh Carrs description of Dostoevsky was, contextualization would help diffe rentiate it from its predecessors Yet the primary task of this present work is to situate The Twenty Years Crisis within Carrs precedi ng discourses and then discuss Carrs consecutive project in the 1930s as a whole in wider intellectual contexts. The appropriate context for the former task and the one for the latter can be different. Our endeavor is not to reveal the change of British discourse on Dostoevsky or Herzen or Bakunin or Marx. Another related difficulty for the present st udy is that the texts are biographies. The biographical authors are not prohi bited from providing their own vi ews. To some extents, they might be encouraged to do so for the originality of their writings. Yet they are usually expected to detach from the figures of their study as much as possible so the readers can acquire credible information about such figures. For sure, we can not think about a univers ally and perennially objective biography. An objective de scription of a person in a pa rticular group of people in a particular era can be an ideological one in a different group of people in a different, or even the same, era. Nevertheless, the biography is differe nt from philosophical a nd theoretical texts in which authors are specifically expected to provide their own views about metaphysical and practical issues. The thinking of the author must be less clear in biography than in such texts. These concerns, for sure, do not prevent us from situating Carrs biographies in context. Yet these issues are sufficient for us to consider other text-oriented methods as a supplement. As a complementary way, therefore, I employ a narrativist approach (also see Chan 2003; Kratochwil 2006; Suganami 2008). In other words, I read Carrs biograph ical works as half novel and half history. 21


Novel and history are not clearly separate to begin with. As ge nres of discourse, they have the sam e root in the religious narratives about the mythologica l past in Christianity (see Butterfield 1981). They started to part their ways with some clarity in the eighteenth century when the secularization of the world progressed with the advance of capitalism and it became possible to think about their life not as a course predeter mined by God (see McKeon 2002). People started to plot their own lives and learne d their models from the novels. The appearance of the scientific field of history followed in the aftermath of French Revolution, which evoked peoples consciousness about the possibility of radical historical ch ange (see Cassirer 1950; Collingwood 1994). However, the difference between history and novel has never been totally clear up until today. Paul Ricoeur (1988, chap. 3) argues as follows: historical tr uth is fictional to the extent that, ultimately, historians cannot know what ha s actually occurred in th e past: fiction is not entirely a product of imagination si nce it tells us some kinds of hu man truth; history is read as tragedy in some times and as comedy in others; the fictional past is written as if there was such a period in our historical past. Ricoeur thus points out the importan ce of plot in both history and novel. The meaning of real lives, whether of individuals or collectives, Hayden White (1987, 173) concisely summarizes Ricoeurs argument, is the meaning of the plots, quasiplots, paraplots, or failed plots by which the events that those lives comprise are endowed with the aspect of stories having a dis cernible beginning, middle, and end. A meaningful life is one that aspires to the coherency of a story with a plot. Biography is a particularly uncl ear genre in terms of whether it belongs to history or novel. It is supposed to tell the life of individuals in the most empirically just ifiable manner. To that extent, it is closer to history if it concerns the truth(s) of the past. Yet biographers characterize 22


the life story of people as tragic or comedic to illustrate their personality, thought, and the time they lived. As actual lives of individuals have certain literary el ements, such effects necessarily accompany if the author did not intend to add th em. Any biographies will turn out to be rather imprecise without some literary elements. The biographical texts approach to novel in this respect. Biographers need to find what they think is the most appropriate plotting however modest the author tries their own personal impressi ons to be. Even if the chronology of events is out there, it is the biographer who finds their m eaningful connection as we ll as the best order of telling them. Indeed, plotting cannot be separate from the effort to write history. The issue is just remarkable in the case of biographical writings. To sum up, the manner of plotting reveals the assu mptions of the biographer. Note that plot analysis does not necessarily cont radict the historicist inclination which I manifested in my critique of the existing works on Carr. Biographers are not only constrai ned by historical truth but also by their own situations. How can we assu me the existence of totally objective truth in history? Historical trut h is, to a certain inevitable extent, the product of the present within the inescapable circle of hermeneutics. All we have is our memory of the past and our anticipation of the future. In the constant flow of time, the present exists only as an imaginative point. Reinhart Koselleck (2004) says that every present is the future of the pa st. Any attempts to distinguish history from the present would never be successf ul. A biographer needs to make a sufficiently persuasive argument to challenge the contemporane ously dominant view of the past. Plotting is not an arbitrary behavior but a practical action of the author within the existing discursive situation of the time. By the same token, plot analysis does not suggest that every bi ography is ideological. Generally speaking, the dichotomy of detachment and attachment is only conceptual. Their 23


difference is m ore quantitative than qualitative in practice. As above, any texts cannot be totally objective. Some Marxists and post-Marxists thus claim that every discourse is ideology (Ashcraft 1980; iek 1989). Yet the denial of objectivity does not automatic ally lead to the conclusion that every discourse is equally ideological. What is totally ideo logical expression? Can we ever make sense without appealing to the intersubjec tive understanding of facts? Private language is impossible. It is, in fact, self-contradictory that those who deny the possibility of complete objectivity characterize the world as completely ideological: they cannot conceptualize complete ideology without its counterpart. Every discourse might be ideol ogical. Yet some discourses are more objective, or intersubjectively universal, and others are more ideological, or intersubjectively local. This is the implica tion that the neologism intersubjectivity became significant in the contemporary humanities. Every discourse is somewhere between total objectivity and total relativity in its substance if it is thus ultimately relative in its form (see Bernstein 1983). Note, in this regard, that a plot analysis is not unfit for the oft-claimed neutrality of Carrs biographies. Nor my plot analysis means to deny such neutrality totally. I just seek to clarify the ineradicable elements of value within them. Such value should be both private and public given the hermeneutical circle of the meaningful human world. The analys is of plotting is thus not ahistorical approach to discourse but is more correctly an approach to history. In my reading of Carrs biographies, I will refer to critiques from his contemporary commentators. My objective is not to condemn Carr for his misunderstandi ng but to clarify his viewpoint. Carr might have been ab le to defend his view, if he attempted to do so, in a more convincing manner than his commentators att acked him. I introduce the contemporaneous critiques only to illuminate the points where Carrs discourse could have been contestable in his 24


tim e. I am interested not so much in the correctne ss of Carrs text as in the value behind it. I try to uncover such value to situate it in history for a more convincing inte rpretation of the text. Structure Now that I have discussed the scope, the objec tive, and the method of this present study, a summary sketch of its entire structure follows to conclude this introductory chapter. In the succeeding two chapters, I will discuss biographies of Carr: Dostoevsky in chapter two and The Romantic Exiles Karl Marx, and Michael Bakunin in chapter three. This separation is predicated on the following rational. As is intelligible just from their titles all biographies concern nineteenth century revolutionary movements which have particular connection to Russia. Dostoevsky is not only the first book of Carr but is also his first book-length writing in the 1930s. I will discuss that Carr found the primary question for his time in the writings of Dostoevsky. After failing to find the answer to it in Dostoevsky, Carr turned his eyes to other nineteenth century thinkers. Carrs writings in the 1930s were continuous because he was not satisfied with Dostoevskys solution to his own question in the interwar y ears. As the next chapter discu sses, however, he could not find the answer in other revolutionary th inkers either. In this context, The Twenty Years Crisis proves to be the place for Carr to have invented his own solution. Grasped as such, there is a direct linkage between Dostoevsky and The Twenty Years Crisis : the one is the question and the ot her the answer. On the other hand, The Romantic Exiles Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin primarily tell what Carr could not choose to solve the question. It does not mean that these three biographies are less significant. These works, indeed, reveal Carrs view of political strands such as individualism and collectivism: these two extremes, indeed, showed idiosyncratic tension in the nineteenth century (see Talmon 1960). They also contain his direct words about figures such as Hitler and Marx, who frequently appear in The 25


26 Twenty Years Crisis All four biographies play their own roles and I will spend as much space for the latter three biographies as I will do for Dostoevsky When it comes to comprehending the project of Carr co rrectly, however, Dostoevsky has more direct relevanc e as it unravels in what sense the project of Carr in the 1930s was con tinuous. The separation of the chapters two and three contributes to clarify this point. Chapter four starts dea ling with the text of The Twenty Years Crisis Given the insights from the biographies, it will become clear th at the primary question for Carr was human irrationality. It will turn out th at he actually approached this problem through the way that he learned from Dostoevsky, with the final step aside. Carr tries to grapple with human irrationality by believing in human rationality. Contrary to the recent discussions that the relationship between realism and utopianism is dialectical, the whole history of European civilization unfolds as a progress of utopian liber alism in the world of Carr. The potential problem of this thinking is that Carr returns to modern utopianism despite his criticism of it. Chapter five scrutinizes this si ngle point by situating Carr in the tension between Victorian culture of progress and the post-war culture of decline. I will use the axis between Darwin and Bergson (via Sorel) somewhat freely. The whole purpose is to clarify in what sense Carrs thinking is ambiguous and because of wh at presumptions. The dilemma of Carr will become clear once his roundabout approach to the British tradition of liberalism is revealed.


CHAP TER 2 THE QUESTION My primary thesis is that Dostoevsky The Romantic Exiles Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin constitute one of the vital contexts to understand what Carr tried to do in The Twenty Years Crisis The following two chapters discuss these four biographical works one by one. This chapter focuses on Dostoevsky and the succeeding chapter the other three. As Dostoevsky is a biography, the text contains deta iled descriptions of the life of the author. It is not necessary to follow them a ll. Our primary task is to understand Carr, not Dostoevsky. What was so unique about Dostoe vsky for Carr? How did Carr describe this uniqueness? These are the questions for unrave ling the presumptions behind Carrs texts. Carr finds that Dostoevsky, different from utilitarian liberals, had keen awareness of human irrationality and its social ramificat ion. Focusing on this awareness, Carr converts Dostoevskys lessons for Russia into the pr escription for Europe. To this extent, Dostoevsky is a preparatory study for Carr to provide his so lution for the European interwar crisis. Dostoevsky as the Other It is first necessary to understand how Carr pl otted Dostoevskys intellectual life, in order to find which part of the text is relevant to the present study Carr divides the intellectual trajectory of Dostoevsky into three stages: early phase, the years succeeding the exile, and later works. This view illuminates the rupture between early and later years of the author. While the early works have some connections with the late r works, the pursuit of parallels between the earlier and the later Dostoevsky is, as Carr (1931, 48) stat es, generally speaking, an unprofitable task. Years in Siberia marked a turning point. Captured as a thought criminal, Dostoevsky experienced extreme situations: repetitious long examinations by the commission; eight months 27


of solitary confinem ent; seventeen days of conti nuous walking to Siberia with the temperature of forty degrees below zero (Carr 1931, 55-58). Carr considers that Dostoe vsky first noticed the decisive influence of human irrationality from these experiences. Later works of Dostoevsky are a series of elaborations on this theme. Wh at norms can we defend given the fundamental irrationality of man? How can an irrational ma n go along with others without subverting their lives? Ethics and politics occupy a vital part of the works. In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky finally manages to synthesize human irrationality with a rational faith in God. This is not an abnormal narrative of Dostoevs kys life. Indeed, literar y scholars have often praised Carrs Dostoevsky for its objective and fact-based character (Muchnic 1939, 118). The text had been even one of the orthodox English biographies of Dostoevsky until around 1970s (see Wasiolek 1978, 92). It was not completely ne w to recognize Dostoevsky as psychologist in the early 1930s. As D. S. Mirsky (1931) stated in his preface to Carrs Dostoevsky it was already not polemical to delve into the subconscious part of Dostoevskys mind. Yet given the hermeneutical circle between in terpreters and texts, there are no totally objective facts. Whatever biogra phical sources were available, it was Carr who used it. The detached character of Carr meant that his desc ription was intersubjec tively correct. Also, Carr needed to decipher the novels of Dostoevsky. If Carr suggested the rupture between early and later works and characterized the latter as psycho logical, such evaluation is ultimately based on Carrs own interpretation. Some examples illustrate this point. For in stance, Carr is against Freud by emphasizing the discontinuity of Dostoevskys in tellectual life. Freud discussed the authors Oedipus complex already in 1929. Carr (1931, 37) re jects this view since it cont radicts his own view: if the psychological problems of Dostoevsky derived fr om his childhood, his intellectual life was very 28


continuous. On the other hand, Carr (1931, 102) has no problem recognizing Dostoevsky as a predecessor of Freud and Jung. In discussing A Raw Youth Carr (1931, 251, 258-59) even suggests the necessity of further sc holarly inquiries into this novel on the basis that it is the most psychologically oriented work of th e author. According to Mirsky (1931), Dostoevsky was the first thorough biography of Dostoevsky in English since the vital material s about the author had become available in the 1920s. Furthermore, the sp read of psychoanalytic ideas were slower in England in other countries (Hyne s 1968, 164). In the words of Carr s contemporary writers: The name of Sigmund Freud was first popularly hear d about 1920, though his methods were in repute during the war (Graves and H odge 1940[1994], 90-91). If Carr cons iders psychology as one of the decisive elements of Dostoevsky, Carrs interpretation is original on this point. Notably in this regard, Carr connects Do stoevskys psychology with Russianness. Carr (1931, 11) states that Dostoevsky was a Russian of the Russians. Yet Dostoevsky was not most Russian from the beginning. He became a Russian through his literary life. If Siberia was a turning point, the awareness of irrationality constituted a fundamental element of Russianness. To illuminate this point, Carr differentiates Dostoevsky from Europeans. While Dostoevsky himself maintained Russias distinctness from Eu rope, Carr uses his own examples to describe this distinctness. In other words, human irrationa lity is something external to Europe for Carr. Dostoevsky uncovers what Carr thinks is the prob lem of modern western civilization. The Russian character within the wri tings of Dostoevsky functions as a mirror to reflect the problems of Europe in Carrs discourses. Dostoevsky as Synthesizer The plot of Carrs text thus tells that he identified the fundamental uniqueness of Dostoevsky with the authors awaren ess of irrationality and tried to make this insight for his own European world. Our focus is, therefore, on the problems of human irrationality and how Carr 29


describ es it in his dichotomization between Russ ia and Europe. On the one hand, it is necessary to understand Dostoevskys solutions to human irrationality and the consequential ethicopolitical problems. On the other hand, it is neces sary to understand how and to what extent this interpretation of Dostoevsky is particularly Carrs In this section, the focu s is on the first issue. As Carr discusses the development of Dost oevskys thought by examining from one work to another, our discussion similarly follows this chronological order. The first important work in Dostoevskys later years is Memoirs from the House of the Dead This novel was Dostoevskys first attempt to convert the raw experience in Siberi a into a literary event. It was in the House of the Dead that Dostoevsky first learned to perceive the inadequacy not merely of human law, but of the ordinarily accepted code of moral values, and to ponder on the quest for a remoter truth beyond the frontiers of good and evil as ordinarily defined (Carr 1931, 70). The issue of good and evil reminds Carr of Nietzsche. In the succeeding paragraph, Carr (1931, 70) quotes a famous sentence from Beyond Good and Evil : He who strives with monsters must beware lest he himself become a monster; and when you look too long into an abyss, the abyss begins to look into you soul. Carr thus finds an ex istentialist connection between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. Both thinkers are aware of unconscious irrationality within human mind. Both thinkers also try to transcend this abyss in search for the authentic shape of the self. Dostoevsky, like Nietzsche, thus needs to criticiz e western liberalism. Carr illuminates this point by emphasizing the uniqueness of Dostoevsky to th e English readers. Dostoevsky first mounted his critique of Chernyshevsky in Notes from Underground Carr (1931, 119-20) calls this Russian figure a pupil of J. S. Mill and implies Dostoe vskys detachment from liberal utilitarianism: The age of optimism, of faith in a morality established by science and reason, has now long passed away. The irrational chaos of human natu re has become a platitude, and we no longer 30


require a subterranean philosopher to put out his t ongue at us in order to com pel belief in it. The Russian man separates himself from the economic man of mode rn utilitarianism. This separation from European utilitariani sm adds another dimension to the Russian character of Dostoevskys thinking: Christian orthodoxy. Carr describes Dostoevskys occupation by the gambling as if it was a manifestation of a religious belief. In The Gambler, an old lady named Antonida unhesitatingly bets a large amount of money against the mo st risky spot of the roulette. Her only purpose is to enjoy the en thusiasm of winning. Dostoevsky was short of money. But he, like Antonida, gambled for the sa ke of gambling. The principal, though often subconscious, impulse which drove Dostoevs ky to the gambling rooms, Carr (1931, 162-63) states, was not a reasoned calcu lation of financial profit, but a craving for strong emotions and abnormal excitements, perhaps even the longing, wh ich he often attributes to his characters, to plumb the depths of moral degradation. Dost oevskys absorption into the abyss somewhat paradoxically led to his belief in the transce ndental sublime: to re nounce roulette was to renounce the one remaining hope without which existence became morally impossible (Carr 1931, 165). This is the basic system of thought in Dostoevs ky, at least, in Carrs description. Ethics occupies the most important part. By using th e words of a contemporary Russian critic, Carr (1931, 188) argues that the major theme of Dostoe vskys later works is philosophy in action. Russians do not distinguish ethics from its prac tice since they are skep tical about abstract metaphysics. The Russian will accept no principl e and no convention until he has explored its very foundations, according to Carr (1931, 190), and if he finds that the first stone has not been well and truly laid he will reck lessly pull down the whole edifice about his ears. Principles are highly important but they need to be asserted in practice. This skeptical mind separates them 31


from English people: if we find in Dostoevskys novels people who murder for a principle, live on bread and water for a principle or commit suicide for a principle, Carr (1931, 190) emphasizes, we should remember that such type s are far less unfamiliar and fantastic to the Russian than to the English reader. Dostoevsky attempts to resolve the tension be tween human irrationality and rational faith through his last major novels. Crime and Punishment is exactly the story about the murder for a principle. Carr grasps Crime and Punishment as the introduction of the ethical question for Dostoevsky. Dostoevskys disconnection from his ear ly years is clear in this work. Poor Folk his first published novel, already concerned the same et hical issue. Yet the work was written under the influence of French romanticism represen ted by Rousseau (Carr 1931, 40-42). Romantic sentimentalism gives individuals a heroic character and negotiates the problem. It always ends with the self-assertion of the pr ide of such heroic individuals. Raskolinikov, the main character in Crime and Punishment is a heroic figure. But he is a neurotic hero. Raskolinikov murders an old landla dy for the sake of humanity. The killing of an avaricious person should be allowed for the welfar e of a larger number of people. Such exception in law is a rational vindication of human freedom. Raskolinikov thinks that he believes in this logic. Yet he is actually not as determined as he considers he is. His crime turns out to be a failure: when Raskolinikov kills the landlady in her house, he is unexpectedly shocked by his own murder; because of his shock, he does not re alize her sister coming home from outside; Raskolinikov ends up killing this sister and lose s his cause for humanity. Also, he is nearly arrested on the spot because of the same abse nt-mindedness. The story ends with his exile followed by his somewhat abrupt confession of the crime. The important character of 32


Raskolinikov is the weakness of rationality ones inability to control hi mself, which agitated Dostoevsky and which is taken up once more by Nietzsche (Carr 1931, 193) If Raskolinikov is a hero, he is not a romantic but a quasi-Nietzschean hero. Dostoevskys succeeding works flesh out the specifics of this peculiar heroism. The Idiot illuminates the passive character of Dostoevskys ethical ideal, given the question introduced by Raskolinikov. It is the ethics of suffering as he showed in his enthusiasm for gambling. The faith in suffering, according to Carr (1931, 209), is totally different from the western conception of a good man as one who performs good works. The Devils tackles the question from a different pers pective: politics. In Russia, literature and politics are never far apart (Carr 1931, 251) According to Carr (1931, 218), the ethical theory of Raskolinikov leads to nihili sm in private life. Carr (1931, 220) grasps The Devils as a criticism of nihilist revoluti onaries in the 1860s. To demonstrate how Dostoevsky was annoyed by such nihilistic thought since his years in Siberia, Carr (1931, 224) discusses that a character in the novel, Shatov, is a self-portrait of the author. With this character, The Devils confirms the connection between moral evil and political nihilism only to reso lve it through a rational faith: the work received the negative reactions from the outraged nihilists (Carr 1931, 226). The Brothers Karamazov finally specifies the place of religion in th is system of thought. Kirillov in The Devils already radicalized the problem of Raskolinikov. Kirillov commits suicide as a logical conclusion of becoming a superman: to be a superman, one has to overcome death; yet death can be overcome only through death sin ce any other experiences cannot substitute it. According to Carr (1931, 229), Krillov, the fanatic of logic, the rebel not only against morality, but against God, is the prototype of Ivan Karamazo v. Ivan represents the principle of evil. His counterpart of is Alyosha, who embraces the Christian ideal (Carr 1931, 286). Many 33


commentators before Carr has con sidered Ivan as the mirror of the creator and recognized Dostoevsky as skeptic. Carr (1931, 288) rejects this view and tries to vindicate the point that Dostoevskys faith was the product of reason rath er than intuition. Ivan denies any rational justification of the et hics of suffering. Dostoevsky accepts the validity of his argument. Yet Dostoevsky found Ivans search for the rational solution meaningless. The correctness of the abstract reasoning does not count. We have to acce pt Alyoshas answer: we have to love life to know its meaning (Carr 1931, 289). Dostoevsky fina lly reached his religious, romantic and masochistic faith (Carr 1931, 292). Dostoevsky as Prophet Dostoevsky appears as a synthesizer of rationalit y and irrationality in his last phase. What is important for the present study is to what extent this figure is Carrs creation. Many readers of Dostoevsky would not basically reject Carrs description and literary sc holars have actually given positive assessments of Dostoevsky for a long period. Yet it is still Carr who considered that the English would refuse to ask the ethical problem of Nietzschean su perman. It is Carr who emphasizes the western peoples unfamiliarity with the ethics of suffering. Carr described Shatov as a mirror image of Dostoevsky. Carr chose Alyosha, instead of Ivan, as the ideal of Dostoevsky. Carr even employs certain literary strategies to defend his view. Carr draws a parallel between Dostoevskys development into his la ter stage and the deepening of his Russian character. Carr (1931, 58) describes the scene of Dostoevskys exile as follows: behind them Europe and the past; in front, Asia and th e unknown future. The exile to Siberia was Dostoevskys exposure to the other. So the return from the House of the Dead is, by contrast, the return to European Russia (Carr 1931, 83). Th e exposure to non-European Russia nurtured the idiosyncratically Russian character of Dostoevsky. 34


Carr also d raws a parallel betw een the intellectual atmosphere in Russia before and after the exile. The debate between the Slavophil a nd the westerner was the primary concern of Russian intellectuals in the middle of the ninet eenth century. The Slavophil tried to make Russia more Russian without her homogenization with Eur ope. By contrast, the westerner sought a form of Russias Europeanization for her modern ization. The center of intellectual dominance transferred from the westerner to the Slavophil while Dostoevsky was in Siberia. By the same token, Dostoevsky transformed himself from a roma ntic European to an existentialist Russian. Scholars have documented this part of Russian history in a more or less similar way as Carr did (see, for instance, Neumann 1996, chap. 3). Importantly, however, Carr does not explain how the change of atmosphere influenced Dostoevs ky. This is natural since, as already discussed, the primary cause of Dostoevskys turn was his exile in Siberia in Carrs narrative. The rise of Slavophil only illuminates the timeliness of Dost oevsky. Carr (1931, 67) states: It might be too bold a paradox to maintain that, but for Siberia, Dostoevsky would neve r have developed his idealization of the Russian people; but the form of the cult bears the clear impress of these prison years. Carr merely assumes the parallel between the change of Russian intellectual atmosphere and Dostoevskys turn. It is as if both the world and the author were supposed to move ahead to a predetermined destination. As such, Carrs description dramatizes the point that Dostoevsky was ready to differentiate him from Europe when he entered his mature years. Remember that Carr even expended some efforts to reject Freud for emphasizing the discontinuity of Dostoevskys intellectual life. On the other hand, Dostoevsky left Europe only to return to it. His ideal resided in the Slavophilism in the so-called Pushkin speech, which was the final significant event in Dostoevskys intellectual life in Carrs assessm ent. Dostoevsky argued that Russians should 35


becom e super-European to be the teacher of Euro pe because the real Russian is a universal man (Carr 1931, 273). Carr interprets this Slavophilism as a thought of synthesis. Dostoevsky already made explicit his Hegelian inclinations in A Raw Youth (Carr 1931, 257-59). Carr (1931, 308) finds the same Hegelian idea in the speech: t he long-standing antipathy of Slavophil and westerner was to be resolved; by making hers elf most essentially Russian, Russian would become most completely European. Therefore, the Russian awareness of human irra tionality has a potential to help recreate Europe. Carrs manner of discussion is signifi cant regarding this point Carr always compares Dostoevsky with European authors. Juxtaposi ng Goethe and Dostoevsky Carr (1931, 99) states: Raskolinikov is the Russian Faust. Follo wing Dostoevskys own comparison between Don Quixote and his own The Idiot, Carr (1931, 208) adds King Lear for a further contrast. Carr makes such comparisons to clarify the Russian ch aracter of Dostoevsky. Yet, at a certain point, Carr starts to take advantage of Russia for the sa ke of Europe. Indeed, Carrs conclusion contains strong inclinations toward this direction. Naked, inchoate human nature has vanished from English literature, and perhaps from English li fe, since the Elizabethan age. And Carr (1931, 319) continues that it was only in a country so unorganised as Russia, and so untrammelled by rationalising convention, that th e nineteenth century could hope to recapture something of the starkness and the mobility of a more primitive epoc h in the evolution of civilisation. Russia is now the past of England if it is a recapture d past. Carr suddenly transmutes Dostoevskys synthesis into the power of Europe to renew itself. In this contex t, Carr (1931, 321) even reasserts the rationality of Dost oevskys religious faith and its successful synthesis with human irrationality. 36


As a natural corollary Carr discerns the west ern origins of Dostoevskys Russian character. On the one hand, the duality of mind is in its ge nesis, a literary concep tion of western origin (Carr 1931, 261). On the other hand, the faith of suff ering originates in romanticism. According to Carr (1931, 291), a typical romantic passage from Faust will suffice to show how many of Dostoevskys most characteristic and, according to modern judgment, most morbid ideas had been anticipated half a century earlier by the most representative of German poets. By discussing as such, however, Carr almost contra dicts himself since his starting point is the discontinuity between early romantic Dostoevs ky and later existentialist Dostoevsky. The experience in Siberia, originally the mark of the decisive rupture, turns to be an opportunity to reinvigorate romanticism. Carr (1931, 15) states early in the book: Of all the great Russian writers in the nineteenth century before Che khov, Dostoevsky alone is completely modern. Mirsky (1931) explains that Do stoevsky is modern only when modern includes Rousseau, Byron and Constant. Dostoevskys Slavophilism ends up w ith its reversal by Carr : Europe can be superEurope through its potentiality. The Dawn of an Age Dostoevsky converted his experi ence of human irrationality into a series of literary expressions. Carr learned the problem of the we stern world in this author. Originally, Carr emphasized the idiosyncratically Russian charac ter of Dostoevsky. The substance of this Russianness was the indifference between theory and practice as well as the awareness of human irrationality. However, it finally turned out th at Russia was just an ideal category for Carr to revitalize Europe. In Carrs story, Dostoevsky was a convenient focal point to clarify the importance of its function. Carr was orientalist in the original sense of the term by Edward Said (1994). If we follow the arguments of Iver Ne umann (1996; 1999), not only Carr but also many European intellectuals have long represented Russia in a similar way. We will return to this point 37


late r in chapter five after di scussing the connection between Dostoevsky and The Twenty Years Crisis What should be clear at this point is th at Carr made such linka ge possible through his particular reading of Dostoevsky discussed so far. Note that Carr was not satisfied with Do stoevskys solution. The modern world has accepted Dostoevskys premise, but denies his conclusion. By his religion, he belongs to the old order, by his psychology to the new (Carr 1931, 322). Dostoevsky was less praiseworthy for his answer than for his question. What was important for Carr was that Europe and Russia were not completely different. Carrs Russia was, ultimat ely, not the radically incommunicable Other but an other constitutive within the self. Russia, for Carr, did not signify a substantive nation but a conceptual mirror to see Europe from outside, or, actually, from inside. Europe and Russia could encounter since, by considering as such, Carr coul d draw a lesson for Europe from Russia. Said differently, it was sufficient for Carr if Russia co uld only give some lessons for Europe if not the ultimate solution. This interpretation does not conf lict with the usual evaluation that Carr was a detached scholar in his historical researches of Russia in later years (see, for example, Davies 2000, 91). What was remarkable about Carr is, perh aps, that he drew such view of Russia by using materials in a rela tively detached manner. If Dostoevsky was a prophet for Carrs cont emporary world, his pr ophetic insight resided in his awareness of the strength of human irra tionality as a motor to drive the world. Carr was dissatisfied with the utilitarian model of rational man. He found an alternative in Dostoevskys irrational characters. Rejecting Dostoevskys so lution, however, Carr was not yet sure how such irrational individuals could live together in a comm unity. He was still in n eed of another morality for the arising community. 38


Carr s works in the 1930s were an explorati on of this question. The question was old in its form as it concerned the relations hip between individual and societ y. Yet it was new in substance since the voluntarist model of man was discarded. Carr needed an alternate form of society for the new man. The fact that Dostoevsky, Her zen, Bakunin, and Marx were all critics of the western world in the nineteenth century gives a ce rtain continuity of Carrs consciousness of the problem in The Romantic Exiles Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin Now it is time to turn to these biographies. 39


CHAP TER 3 WRONG ANSWERS The previous chapter has clarified that human irrationality was the primary concern for Carr in Dostoevsky. The Romantic Exiled Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin all concern the same issue. Also similarly, Carr fails to obtain any satisfactory solutions thr ough the writing of these works. The present study demands an investiga tion of these biographical works because they reveal what was not enough for Carr. In addition, the three biographical works provide us some important resources for readi ng particular portions of The Twenty Years Crisis by unraveling his view of Marx, Bakunin, and others. The Romantic Tragedy Our starting point in this chapter is The Romantic Exiles by following the chronological order of publication. As already mentioned, Carr discussed, in Dostoevsky, the sea change of Russian intellectual climate in the middle of the nineteenth century. The focus of The Romantic Exiles is the generation intellectually prior to this change. It is in this last, and specifically Russian, efflorescence of Romanticismthe generati on of the thirties and fortieswhich is here represented in the person of th e Romantic Exiles (Carr 1933, 28). As a description of the lives of these exiles, the book is not as rewarding as Dostoevsky for the comprehension of Carrs own thought. The text of The Romantic Exiles does not contain as much interpretation of intellectual discourses as Dostoevsky had. Yet The Romantic Exiles is still significant as it clarifies a root of the que stion which Carr found in Dostoevsky. The plot of the text reveals its own unique significance in this regard. The Romantic Exiles is also important as it discusses the positions of Bakunin and Marx in Carrs view of history, which Carr discusses in his succeeding works. In order to hist orically demonstrate the continuity from Dostoevsky to The Twenty Years Crisis a consistent analysis of The Romantic Exiles is indispensable. 40


Herz en and the Difficulty of Love The plot of The Romantic Exiles is significant, in the first place, because it describes the life of a revolutionary, Alexander Herzen, as a tr agedy. Even the table of contents of the book suggests this fact: two family tragedies appear early in th e book and the penultimate chapter ends as the last tragedy. In the epilogue of the book, Carr (1933, 363) states: The story of the Romantic Exiles ends appropriately in tragedy andworse stillin tragedy tinged with futility. Why did Carr have to describe the story as appropriately a tragedy? A part of the tragedy is Herzens involvemen t in the crime of passion. Carr expends first one-fourth of the book to describe the triangular relationship among Alexander Herzen, Natalie Herzen, and George Herwegh (and, to some extent, his wife Emma). The stor y starts with a close friendship among the three but ends with their breakup. The friendship ends because of the development of love between Natalie and Herwegh. It brings the tragedy as it leads to Natalies death. It is sadly mistaken to consider Carr to have depicted this episode only for a literary effect, given the bulk of the ink he spilt for it. This is a symbolic anecdote which illustrates the fate of the romantic exiles. Carr (1933, 27, 63, 125, 167) repeatedly mentions the influence of George Sands secularized romanticism on the contemporar ies of Herzen and others. The undercurrent principle of their behavior is often compared and identified w ith that of Sand: nineteenthcentury Europe, and in particular feminine Europe, not only devoured her as a novelist, but worshipped her as a prophet (Carr 1933, 63). Th e cardinal doctrine of the philosophy of Sand was the virtuous nature of love. Carr continues: If virtue resides in the human emotions, the noblest of these emotions is unquestionably love; a nd to love must therefore be the supreme act of virtue. 41


The love af fair was one of the primary concerns of the romantic exile s in their theory and its practice. Carr depicts Natalie as the particularly Sandian fi gure. Natalies first love to Herwegh was philanthropic as the love was alwa ys as such for Sand. The mission on earth of romantic womanhood is, as one of George Sands he roes remarks, to console the unfortunate. Natalie, Carr (1933, 55) continues, felt that she a nd she alone could save Herweghsave from his own weakness and from the scorn of a dull disdai nful world (italics is original). Started as such, the early relationship among the three was an enactment of Sands philosophy. The triangular intimacy, according to Carr (1933, 56), seemed to these votaries of the romantic faith a realisation of the loftiest ideal of hu man friendship. The relationship was perfect. The three romantics only needed to learn the ritual to continue their intuitively merciful relationship as well the word to describe this harmony. They found their model in the newly published novel of, again, George Sand. The romantic exiles were the believers of Sand. They practiced her philosophy in their physical a nd psychological interactions. Yet this relationship was deemed to end tr agically. Carr recurrently foreshadows the collapse of the harmony. For example, he points out the imbalance of the relation of the three in only a page after describing it as perfect. Alex ander was uncomfortable with the way Herwegh addressed him as Landry and my twin, while Natalie and Herwegh was not. Natalie did not suspect any dangers in their intimacy, while Herwegh might since he was a westerner and he was familiar with the different conventions in the we stern civilization. The triangle was conditioned by a different set of postulates (Carr 1933, 57). Even the direct word tragic appears in the text for describing their fate (Carr 1933, 58, 86). The unhappy closure of the story was predetermi ned for romantics. In other words, Carr implies that romanticism was a philosophy whos e failure was foretold. Throughout the book, the 42


story of Herzen is characterized by his increasing disappointm ent of the European revolutionary thought of romanticism. He felt disappointment in Paris already from the beginning of his visit. The Paris in which Herzen found himself was not the Paris of his dreams, the Paris of revolution and of the rightness of man (C arr 1933, 33). He was let down by Paris, which nurtured the romanticism of Sand. Herzen would later find Paris a more comfortable place by discerning a clearer appearance of class consciousness in this industrialized city. However, Natalie would not (Carr 1933, 3839). After the revolution of 1848, moreover, Herzen himself would lose his promised land again. The reaction of Herzens feelings in the latter half of 1848 was far profounder and more fundamental than the disappointment which he had experienced when he first came to Paris in the precedi ng year (Carr 1933, 44-45). Carr then describes Herzen as a delayed revolutionary, as if to pred ict the sad ending of his adventure. He, Herzen, like Byron, had been born out of due time. He had found himself in disharmony not only, as he had once supposed, with his country, Russia, but, Carr (1933, 45) claims with his age, the bourgeois nineteenth century. He had been born too soonor too late. Carrs reference to a canonical English poet here is sugg estive. It is nuanced because He rzen would never be satisfied with England, where he moved after his total br eakup with Herwegh: Herzens impressions of England were, and remained, those of the disi nterested spectator (Carr 1933, 136). Herzen continued to miss his promised land in his entire life. It is in this disappointment and disillusionment that the Herzens were annoyed by the difficulty of passion. The declining story of He rzen, qua revolutionary, interweaves with the declining story of Herzen, qua romantic. Herzen would resume a tragic story after he relocated himself in England, this time with his old friend Nicholas Ogarev and th e wife of this friend Natalie. Herzen sought Natalie Ogarev for cons olation from his loss of the deceased Natalie. 43


Nicholas welcom ed Herzens affection for Natalie because he was a dedicated romantic, who was always concerned with the universal love (Carr 1933, 189). Th e story of the three leads to the physical relationship between Herzen and Na talie, and Nicholas condemnation of Herzen (Carr 1933, 199). Carr titles the chapter of this story, The Recurrent Triangle. The anguish of Herzen was that of romantics. T he romantic theory of the irresistibility of love is invoked by Herzen in his own defence, ju st as it had been invoked by the other actors in this drama (Carr 1933, 80). Natalie Herzens an guish between her husband and her lover was affected by this romantic theory. The romantic doctrine of the rights of husbands was strict and inexorable (Carr 1933, 98). Theref ore, Natalie needed to die as child and victim of the romantic age which she had never outgrown (Carr 1933, 116). The private story of the Herzens was a story about romantic Europe. Romanticism was a philosophy in action. The quarrel between Herzen and Herwegh afte r Natalies death became a polestar of European intellectuals as it was commented and documented by figures su ch as George Sand, Karl Marx, and Richard Wagner (Carr 1933, 120-21). It is noteworthy that, for Carr, the romanticism of the exiles was, even as it originated from Sand, at the same time Russian. Nowhere in Eu rope was her influence more potent and more intoxicating than in Russia (C arr 1933, 64). Herzen found, in his disillusionment in Europe, how Russian he was and tried to rediscover Russia which he had lost: Herzens growing distaste for Europe was conditioned and inflamed by a revived longing for his own land (Car 1933, 209). Carr discerns in the intricate l ove affairs of romantics the same love-hate complex which he found in Dostoevsky as the idiosyncratically Russ ian element. Carr (1933, 199) explicitly states that the love-hate complex of Nicholas Ogarev recalls the psychologica l probings of the earlier Romantics and anticipates the still profounder analyses of Dostoevsky. 44


Turn to the Radicals T o sum up, The Romantic Exiles is an inquiry into the root of the Russian awareness of human irrationality which Carr first detected in Dostoevsky. The romantics in the story are often caught by the tension between i ndividual passion and universal love. The tension between individual and society (or ones relation with others) recurs wh ile evoking our attention to the irrationality of individuals. As in Dostoevsky, th is Russian character has roots in romanticism. Indeed, the issue of love s uggests the substantive similarity between Dostoevsky and romanticists. The love is unintelligible unless one initiates it. Contemplation is not enough to know what love is. In this sense, the engagement in love points to th e romanticists departure from the preceding rationalists in the eighteent h century (see Taylor 1989, 380). Remember that Dostoevskys Alyosha suggested the necessity of loving life as the only way to know its meaning. The rational contemplation of Ivan does not work. Both Dostoevsky and The Romantic Exiles concern the transformation of Eur opean intellectual tradition if in different ways. By circling around this transition, the two wo rks focus on the same psychological duality of a Russian man. In this sense, it is natural that romanticism was predetermined to fail. Carr was not satisfied with Dostoevskys solution. It is thus understandable that The Romantic Exiles does not tell much about Carrs view of irrationality or his prospect for a new form of society. The work is, however, a necessary br idge to its sequel, Michael Bakunin Indeed, Carr suggests the future publication of a biography of Bakunin in his preface of The Romantic Exiles (Carr 1933, 8). At some points in the book, Bakunin appears as a contrast to Herzen in his political inclinations. In the 1840s, Herzen admired the enthusiasm of Bakunin as a romantic revolutionary (Carr 1933, 32). In the 1860s, they lived in differ ent worlds. Bakunin did not see the collapse of the revolution of 1848 and did not share the disillusionment that Herzen felt in Paris. Time had stood still for Bakunin for twelve years, while the world, turning on its axis, 45


had revolutionised the thoughts and opinions of his for mer associates (Carr 1933, 221). Carr finds in their difference a turning point of Ru ssian and European political thought. Herzen was once disappointed in democratic Europe and then gained a new faith in democracy by observing the regime of Alexander II in Russia. By contrast, Bakunin maintained his distrust in democracy. Carr considers Bakunin more Russian. Bakunin stood far nearer than Herzen to his own countrymen; and he shared to the full the instin ctive Russian distrust of democracy (Carr 1933, 225). Michael Bakunin will advance Carrs discussion of political community. Bakunin is also important because of his intellectual relation to Marx, who is the focus of another biographical work by Carr. The differ ence between Bakunin and Marx marks another turning point in what Carr cons iders the history of European political thought. Anarchism is Bakunins ultimate goal since it is the logical outcome of his subs cription to romanticism. Marx comes after the failure of this political idea Carr (1933, 226) argues: Human integrity could travel no further along that road. It only remained for Marx to initiate a ne w departure in political theory, and to overthrow, in the person of Ba kunin, the last and most consistent exponent of political Romanticism. In the epilogue of th e book, Carr (1933, 364) restates this point in a clearer and lengthy manner: The cause of revolution before Marx had b een idealistic and romantic.... Marx made it materialistic and scientific.... He brought to the theory of political revolution the same element of orderly inevitability which Darwin had introduced into biology. The Darwinian and the Marxian theories are strictly compar able in the ruthlessness with which they subordinate human nature and human happiness to the working of a scientific principle; and they have proved perhaps the most impor tant and the most influential products of Victorian science. These sentences are themselves interesting as they unravel Carrs view of history as well as the modern Victorian world, the world of his own childhood which disappeared because of the Great 46


W ar. We will turn to this issue in chapter five where we will discu ss Carrs relationship to Victorian utopianism. At this point, another signifi cant set of sentences should be quoted for this future investigation. Carr (1933, 364-65) continues toward the end of the book: It was indeed a new age which dawned when Karl Marx replaced Herzen and Bakunin as the most prominent figure in revolutionary Eu rope. ...the revolutionary movement, as the years progressed, took on more and more of the grim, dogmatic, matter of fact characteristics of the later Victorian age. In the person of that typical Victorian savant Karl Marx, it entered a phase whose vitality has not yet altogether exhausted itself. The sentences suggest the (dis )connection between romanticism and Marxism. To foreshadow the conclusion, the two schools of thought will turn out to repres ent political philosophies of individualism and collectivism respectively. In th e meantime, however, it is necessary to finish our investigation of the roma nticist side of the story. The Tragedy Reprised Our examination departs from chronology here. Karl Marx appeared three years before Michael Bakunin As Jonathan Haslam (1999, 43-56) argues, however, Carrs interest in Bakunin started with his writing of Dostoevsky Carr has finished a substantial amount of research at the publication of The Romantic Exiles On the contrary, Carr was orig inally disinterested in Marx before the publisher asked him to write Karl Marx (also see Carr 2000, xvii-xviii). Dostoevsky The Romantic Exiles and Michael Bakunin compose a trilogy of Carrs early study of Russian mind, or a counterforce to modern Europe. Michael Bakunin should thus be i nvestigated before Karl Marx. The actual text of the book verifies this hypothesis as my follo wing discussion shows. Bakunins Spectacular Life In Michael Bakunin Carr employs a similar literary strategy adopted in The Romantic Exiles The private life of Bakunin intersects with his intellectual life, especially in his early 47


years, although, unlike H erzen, at th e center of the story is not so much the passion of love as the devotion to rebellion. Since Mich ael Bakunin has won a place in hi story not as a great lover but as a great rebel, it is permissible to regard his first rebellion as a more important landmark in his career than his first love (C arr 1937a, 12). Carr characterize s young Bakunins conflict with his father as the first notable event in his life sinc e it unravels the innate re volutionary character of this future anarchist. Already in the early part of the book, it is possible find the phrases such as Michaels innate tendency to rebel, Michael, the born rebel and romantic, and his resilient nature (Carr 1937a, 14, 67, 88). As in the case of Herzen, Carrs story of Bakunin has a teleological moment. Bakunins quarrel with his father concerned the forced marriage of his sister Bakunin gave an objection to this marriage by advocating the importance of love Love is not controll able but is known only through a genuine practice of it. Born in the middle of the eighteenth century, Alexander, Michaels father, a rati onalist, did not understand the roma nticism of the 1830s. By describing the conflict as a conflict, not me rely of two generations, but of two centuries, Carr (1937a, 14) describes this episode as a sign of the arrival of the new era. In concluding this story, Carr (1937a, 17) states: the time was coming in Michaels life when every other author ity would in turn be judged, found wanting, and condemned to annihilation. After the family problem, the first intellectua l step to such annihilation comes from his exposure to romanticism. The romanticism in Russia derived from Ge rmany and thus had a strong idealist inclination. In other words, ro manticism implied an escape from reality. Carr points out that this philosophy designates a rupture between two generations in western intellectual history. The eighteenth century was a masculine age whose catchword was Reason. The motto of the new age was Love (Carr 1937a, 21). 48


But love wa s idiosyncratically idealistic fo r Bakunin, if his contemporary romanticists were more concerned about the tension betw een reality and idea. Because young Bakunin was idealistically romantic in love, Carr (1937a, 24) needs to insert the speculation that Bakunin was probably impotent in his later ye ars and had no sexual relations with women. While this is just Carrs speculation, he finds in it a reason to s ee Bakunin as innately re volutionary. Carr argues that Bakunins passion is directed toward politic al enthusiasm due to his disinterest in sexual love. His tumultuous passions, denied a sexual outlet, boiled over into every personal and political relationship of his life, and created that intense, bizar re, destructive personality which fascinated even where it repelled, and which left its mark on half nineteenth-century Europe (Carr 1937a, 24). Bakunin was destined to be a poli tical rebel even when he was not yet interested in politics. Carrs narrative is deterministic as he keeps talking about Bakunins nature. Naturally, therefore, Bakunin acquires the pol itical awareness in the succeeding steps of his intellectual development. Bakunins interests evolve from roman ticism to Kant to Fichte, to carry the idealist philosophy to the extreme subjec tivism. Carr (1937a, 39) anticipates the future of Bakunin: Michael, true child of the romantic age, cont inued throughout his life to shun the common bread of hard reality and to chew the sweetmeats a nd spices of his own fancy. On the other hand, however, Bakunin did not stick to Fichte. He n eeded to introduce real ity to his world. Carr discerns this opportunity in Bakuni ns intense quarrel with Belins ky about the latters love of Bakunins sister, a private affair again. At the first blow of hard reality, his ideal world had crumbled (Carr 1937a, 44). Other domestic affairs followed and Bakunin was led to realize that his external world was nothing but dream s and phrases, and that his inner life was poor and shallow (Carr 1937a, 59). 49


Bakunin then enters his Hegelian stage to find the reconciliation betw een reality and idea. Carr notes that Bakunin did not d eeply engage in Hegel. But Bakunin took from it what he wanted and adapted it to his ow n spiritual needs (Carr 1937a, 61) Hegel contributed to advance Bakunins romantic idealism rather than subverted it. In the intellectual development of Bakunin, his romantic premises were secured since they were innate to him. After the conflict with Belinsky about the interpretation of Hegel, Bakunin first finds his revolutionary awareness in the disciples of Hegel such as Schiller and David Strauss (Carr 1937a, 75). Bakunins final turn to politics was conc omitant with his farewell to philosophy, philosophy from Germany. Neo-Hegelian radicalis m was theory. French so cialism was practice. Philosophy could only negate the past. The future belonged to men of action (Carr 1937a, 11112). While this meant Bakunins detachment from his previous standpoint, it was a conversion from one form of romanticism to another. He subscribed to George Sa nds socialist type of romanticism after discarding the romanticism of German idealists. Now the intellectual center for Bakunin moved from Germany to France. Then Bakunin needed to visit France. Everyone interested in the theory or pr actice of revolution was bound sooner or later to come to Paris. It was the bugbear of the conservatives and th e Mecca of the malcontents. It was the proper element of such a spirit as Mi chael Bakunin (Carr 1937a, 125). Bakunins intellectual development is, as such, no t only linear but is al so predetermined in Carrs narrative. Since in so headstrong a character as Michael Bakunin temperament in the long run generally outweighs both tradition and reason, his ev entual conversion to the revolutionary cause may reasonably be regarded as a foregone conclu sion (Carr 1937a, 106). Importantly, Carr finds this trait of Bakunin some thing uniquely Russian. B ut the rapidity and completeness of the conversion exhibit symptoms typical both of the Russian aristocrat in 50


general and of Bakunin in particular (Carr 1937a 106). Russianness is linked with the rom antic and revolutionary tendency. Said otherwise, th e Russian character in Bakunin automatically led him to be a political rebel. As the early part of the book de scribes such an epical story of his intellectual development, the rest of the book has another te leological element. The text unfol ds as if the life of Bakunin was destined to his debate with Marx. The rest of this section analyzes this part of the text. It is one thing that the debate between Marx and Ba kunin was already well known among Carrs contemporaries. It is anot her thing that Carr anticipated it in the middle of his narration of the rebels life. After Bakunin transformed himsel f into a political rebel, Carr foreshadows his coming quarrel with Marx again and again. In 18 48, Marxs newspaper printed an article about the suspicion that Bakunin was a Russian gove rnment spy. Carr (1937 a, 164) notes: This episode served many years later as one of the counts in the charge of malice brought against Marx by Bakunin and his followers. Carr compares the two thinkers even where Marx was not physically involved. Bakunin, Carr (1937a, 184) states somewhat suddenly in comparing him with an editor of Czech newspaper, went far beyond the most extreme ambitions of the dogmatic and dictatorial Marx. It is easy to find further examples of both forms in other parts of the book (Carr 1937a, 235, 247, 265). In the latter part of the book, the plot is also notable in its manner and order of telling the episodes. After finishing the middle part as above, Carr situates the chapter on Marx and Bakunin before the epilogue. One-four th of the book is dedicated to this part, which sufficiently illustrates the importance of the debate in Bakunins life. This revolutionary figure was most productive in his intellectual output before his fight with Marx (Carr 1937a, 327). He was a leading figure in the revolutionary strand. Libera lists of 1840s, such as Herzen, already retreated 51


and could not comm unicate with the nihilistic generation of 1860s. Bakunin, who always welcomed anything new, was most vigorous among this inchoate genera tion, if his romantic spirit was not the same as nihilism (Carr 1937a, 334, 376). As aforementioned, the rumor of 1848, the one that Bakunin was a Russian spy, contributed to the doubt of this collaboration. Bakunins tentative ally with nihilist Nechaev aggrandized the suspicio n (Carr 1937a, 393). Therefore, Carr (1937a, 375) needed to insert the chapter on Ne chaev before talking about the actual fight between Marx and Bakunin: the story of the slowly widening rift between Bakunin and Marx must be suspended while a new character is brought upon the stage. Compared with such recurrent prescience of the duel, the description of the actual battle is strikingly short. Within Book V of Michael Bakunin which titled Bakunin and Marx, the fight of Marx versus Bakunin occurs only in the last chapter: Carr dedicates less than twenty pages for describing it. A contemporary reviewer of th e book already realiz ed this strange structure of Carrs story: Carr does not discuss in detail the controversy between Marx and Bakunin except in one short chapter, and even there does not attempt to analyse the fundamental issues (Buck 1938, 738). Yet this is not strange once we firmly grasp the aforementioned teleology in Carrs story. As Bakunin was destined to lose, th e detail of the conflict was not important. By the same token, it is natural that the post-debate scene is more dramatic. The young Russian revolutionaries of 1870s tried to bri ng Bakunin back to the public realm. But Bakunin was too old and too tired for the life of a po litical campaigner (Carr 1937a, 452). The conflict between Marx and Bakunin, which led to the breakup of the First International, is said to have been the beginning of the long antagonism between Marxists and anarchists. By contrast, Bakunins intellectual life ends here in Carrs na rrative. His name was still held in awe by his young compatriots; but his active sh are in the Russian revolutionary movement had come to an 52


end (Carr 1 937a, 456). Bakunins actual retire ment accompanies the scene where he sends a letter to the International for deactivating his membership. Carr (1937a, 460-61) even dramatizes this event: These letters written and dispatched, Bakunin had one further task to perform. He visited a tailor and replenished his wardrobe in a style appropriate to his new role as a respectable bourgeois. As a rebel failed in his pr oject, he needed to return to the old world which he was no longer able to reject. The peculiar structure of Carrs narrative in these last phases thus further illuminates its teleological character. Bakunins story needed to be tragic as Herzens was appropriately so. The story of Bakunin is the story of a Russian w ho was destined to enter the war with a German, only to be defeated. One of the main obstacl es for the mutual understanding of Marx and Bakunin was, indeed, their physical origins. Carrs literary strategies cannot be overlooked. Carr finds a se ed of the conflict already in their first encounter in Paris. In 1844, Marx already showed his intellectual talent and Bakunin admired it. Bakunins perfectly sincere admirati on for Marxs talents did not, however, include any affection for his person (Carr 1937a, 129). Th e conflict came from the difference of their personalities. For Bakunin, Marxs nature always remained some thing alien and repellent. Marx was hard, meticulous, and calculati ng. He practised a scientific socialism professedly based on pure thought; and for Bakunin nothing was good wh ich was not tinged with emotion (Carr 1937a, 129). Their conflict was natural. Indee d, their coming duel was arranged already when they were born. Carr (1937a, 129) continues: Bet ween the Russian aristo crat and the Jewish lawyers son there was not merely a clash of temperaments, but a lack of any common background of tradition and ideas ; and from the outset they neither understood nor liked each other. 53


Carr always uses these contrasts to disti nguish the two thinkers By quoting Bakunin s letter to George Herwegh, Carr ( 1937a, 146) states: The fundamen tal, temperamental antithesis between Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin, between the man of study and theory and the man of impulse and action, was thus early defined by Bakunin himself. When both Marx and Bakunin agreed with Proudhons view of revolution in 1848, it was temperamentally easier for Bakunin than for Marx to renounce representative institutions (Carr 1937a, 172). Bakunin was a holder of the queer illogical fascination while Ma rx was abnormally unimpressionable (Carr 1937a, 306). Even the breakup of the First International owes its cause to their diff erence of personality. Marx, who loved order and prec ision, had no use for the collaboration of anyone who did not offer unquestioning loyalty and obedience. Bakuni n, fundamentally undisciplined, might lead but could never follow (Carr 1937a, 307). The Rise of Individualism The fundamental difference in nature predeter mined the tragic course of Bakunins life. Note that Carrs schematic characterization of the two thinkers was somewhat notorious for his contemporary commentators. Carr s contrast of Marxism and Bakuninism, Samuel Bernstein (1939, 290) critiqued, sometimes bo rder on the superficial. Marx, he says was a man of study and theory, while Bakunin was one of impulse and action. Any biography of Marx, even the one by Mr. Carr himself, is sufficient to show that Marxs life is the perfect example of the unity of thought and action. Bernst eins (1939, 291) conclusion was that Carrs biography is a careless one. As for Bakunins character, Char les Buck (1938, 738) argues that Carr, perhaps unintentionally, makes Bakunin seem to be somewh at absurd. The teleological character of Bakunins life was Carrs creation as much as his duel with Marx was destined by this mythologized absurdity. 54


It is worth m entioning that Carrs characteri zation of Herzen is also questionable. Carr delineated Herzen, qua old democratic liberal, with Bakunin, qua new radi cal revolutionary, in the intellectual sphere of the 1860s. However, this view is acceptable only if we ignore the change of Herzens thought sinc e the 1840s. Herzen is described as if he no longer had as much ambition as Bekunin had in the 1860s: he helped Bakunin only financially. Contrary to this picture, however, it is more convincing to sa y, according to Karpovi ch (1939, 381-82), that Herzen was another main player as he shared with Bakunin the radical re volutionary spirits of the 1860s. Isaiah Berlin (1994, 82-113, 186-209), Ca rrs long antagonist, would later make a similar point. The heroic character of Carrs Bakunin is questionable. It can be the case that Carr was more accurate in interpreting the available sources than these commentators were. Yet the fact that these critiques all focus on Carrs charac terization of the thinkers, instead of his usage of materials, is enough to suggest that his interpretation was cont estable however empirical his study was. It is sufficient for this present wo rk that Carr implanted his own value into the thinkers he described. Importantly, it is based on such mythology that Carr illuminates the political and philosophical differences between Marx and Bakuni n. The two thinkers start to represent the two major schools of thought in the history of political philosophy. The rest of this section attempts to clarify this point. On the one hand, the difference of their philosophical orientations is more a stimulus of their mutual hatred than its result. As Bakunin converted from a student of German philosophy to a practical revolutionary, he dete sted the abstractness of German metaphysics in his mature years. Bakunins Slavophil thought also prepared his enm ity toward German. Marx, an internationalist, discerned a danger in Slavophil nationalism. 55


On the other hand, however the difference of their philosophies has its own significance. The following sentences are worth quoting at a s ubstantial length for illu minating Carrs view on this point. It is an incontrovertib le fact that Engels disliked the Slavs quite as heartily as Bakunin disliked the Germans, and that nave racial prejudice rather than any profound difference of principle was the dividing like between them. But the difference of principle nevertheless existed, and coloured the t hought of both. Bakunin clung fast to the romantic belief (he shed it only after the failure of the Polis h insurrection of 1863) that democracy and nationalism were twin forces expressing them selves in the same revolutionary impulse. Marx and Engels, being consistent materialis ts and believing in the social and economic character of revolution, could afford to regard nationalis m as a reactionary force. Bakunin, as a nationalist, supported Slav nationalism, t hough his principles failed to inspire him with any of the same enthusiasm for German nationa lism. Marx and Engels, as internationalists, condemned Slav nationalism, though th e corresponding phenomenon of German nationalism found them comparably tolerant. (Carr 1937a, 176) As a sentence in the quotation suggests, Bakunin later realizes that na tionalism and democracy do not necessarily come together: the will-o-th e-wisp of Slav nationalism was relegated to the background of his political ambitions (Carr 1937a, 286). Especially after hi s anarchist project in Italy in 1866, Bakunin transferred from the revolu tionary nationalism of his middle years to the revolutionary anarchism of his last period (Carr 1937a, 320). Ye t Marx continued to believe that Bakunin was a Slavophil, who tried to regenerate Europe through the revo lution in Russia (Carr 1937a, 368). The irreconcilable tension between Bakunin a nd Marx represented two major strands of political philosophies in the er a. Carr (1937a, 214) notes that the contemporaries of the two thinkers commonly realized the deep-seated mutual hatred of German and Slav. The encounter of Bakunin and Marx was a clash between Russian and German. At stake was the relationship between nationalism and democracy. 56


On the other hand, the competing schools sh ared their foundation: Hegel. Bakunin and Marx developed under m any of the same influences and subscribed to the same idea of thesisantithesis-synthesis (Carr 1937a, 434). It is true th at they parted their ways in their interpretation of Hegel. Marx relied on ma terialist Young Hegelians and em braced a collectivist view of politics. Bakunin owed his interp retation to the extreme idealism of Max Stirner, which was the logical conclusion of romanticism. Bakunin was, in theory, the most fanatical advocate of freedom, and the most complete individualist who ever lived (Carr 1937a, 435). The two thinkers disagreed with each othe r as to the role of the state. Marx anticipated the disappearance of the state but consid ered it a useful machine to reali ze the ideal society. For Bakunin, the revolution always needed to be the liberation from below. Yet, they basically agreed with each other in their intellectual orientation. Both Marxists and Bakuninists wanted a new social order. But they differed fundamentally over methods (Carr 1937a, 436). Carr (1937a, 365) notes that they were in agreement as to this point even in the height of their due l: The difference between Marx and the General Council on the one side and Bakunin and the commission on the other, was in the last resort one of tactics rather than of principle. The dichotomy between Russian Bakunin and European Marx interw eaves with the one between Russia and England/Europe introduced in Dostoevsky Carr finally argues that the two thinkers represent the two intellectual origins of his own contemporary political world. On the one hand, Marx, along with Bismarck, clearly demonstrated that there was no necessary connexion between them, the conception of democr acy and nationalism as allied forces making for political righteousness dominated the world far into the twentieth century, to be finally dissolved only in our own day by Signor Mussolin i and Herr Hitler (Carr 1937a, 139). The issue concerns the difference between Marx and Ba kunin: On the issue be tween nationalism and 57


internationalism history has not yet delivered its final judgment. Nor perhaps has it yet said its last word on the problem of the Slavs of Ce ntral Europe. Bakunin triumphed in 1918. But there are still people who share the opinion of Engels (Carr 1937a, 176-77). Remember the last sentences of The Romantic Exiles Carrs view was that Marx cam e after the romantic generation of Herzen and Bakunin. The same view is repeated in Michael Bakunin By characterizing the thoughts of the two romantics in the 1840s as na ve enthusiasms, Carr (1937a, 376) claims that the generation of the sixties had not yet discovered the scientific basis for a revolutionary creed provided by Marx. Despite the predetermined defeat of the roma ntics, however, Bakunin and Marx appear as two representative strands of political thought in th e early twentieth century. In the final chapter of the book, Carr speculates on their future. Marxists have some advantage since Marx left a clear form of doctrines while Bakunin left only speeches and occasional essays (Carr 1937a, 438). Nevertheless, Carr (1937a, 440) is even sympathetic to Bakunin as a vindicator of individualistic thought: it is scarcel y relevant to speak of his failu re to achieve, when the whole idea of achievement was alien to his character and purpose. It is as if Bakunins predetermined defeat was good and appropriate. Why does Carr appraise Bakunin as such? The intellectual situation might have had a certain affect. As a contemporary commentator of Michael Bakunin insisted, there was a renewed interest in anarchism in the 1930s in the Angl ophone intellectual world (Sheler 1938, 268). Even aside from this ambiguous mood, the text te lls us that Carr considered Bakunin as a representative figure of a major school of political philosophy: lib eral individualism. Bakunin is one of the completest embodiments in history of the spirit of libertythe liberty which excludes neither licence nor caprice, which tolerates no human institutions, which remains an unrealised 58


and unrealisable ideal, but which is alm ost universally felt to be an indi spensable part of the highest manifestations and aspirations of humanity (Carr 1937a, 440). Bakunin was still admirable in the 1930s as a vindicator of individuals. Against Romance So far, Carrs search for the origin of the Russian mentality has reac hed the point where it marked a turning point in Eur opean intellectual tradition. In Dostoevsky Carr found in the thinking of the Russian of Russians an al ternative form of subjectivity. By way of The Romantic Exiles his investigation of its origin revealed its clearer relation with politics in Michael Bakunin Both Bakunin and Marx rejected utilit arian individualism, as Dostoevsky did. However, these two thinkers represented types of individualism and collectivism respectively. As Carr found in them the two origins of the philoso phical currents in his own contemporary world, it has become clearer that he cons idered his era post-utilitarian. Still, the individualism of Bakunin was a failu re. Revolutionaries needed to wait Marx. Why was the arrival of science an improve ment? Did Carr end up em bracing Marx? It is necessary to examine these issues before turning to the interwar crisis. Marxs Unspectacular Life As Carr (2000, xvii) once assessed by himself, Karl Marx is not written as beautifully as The Romantic Exiles or Michael Bakunin Accordingly, Carrs Marx is not as dramatic as his Herzen or his Bakunin. Carr already describe d Marx as a dispassionate character in Michael Bakunin In Karl Marx Marx was a man who did not carry any profound affection for his parents to his mature life (Carr 1934, 9). He was a ma n whose first love was the only romantic experience in the entire course of life (Ca rr 1934, 9). Marx is the man of theory and generalization. Marx hoped the revolution to occur. His hope always accompanied his reason. 59


Marx is the outstanding exam ple in history of the truth, which is sometimes ignored or denied, that fanaticism is as easily compatible w ith intellect as with emotion (Carr 1934, 62). As the main character is not a man of roman tic passion, the life story of this figure is not dramatic in its plot. Karl Marx is not as literary a writing as The Romantic Exiles and Michael Bakunin were. Bakunin was destined to fight against Marx. Carr ( 1934, 224) states in Karl Marx that the force of their personalities, their amb itions, and the conflicting opinions which reflected the conflict of temperament, made them predesti ned rivals and the culm ination of the quarrel between them was the last important event in the lives of both. However, Bakunin appears almost exclusively within about thirty pages of the last chapter of this three hundred page book. The battle with Bakunists was not special for Ma rx, compared with his conflict with English trade unionists and French Proudhonists (Carr 1934, 190). After shortly describing all three issues as a single event, Carr re adily proceeds to talk about th e fate of Marxism in his own contemporary world. Carr plotted the story as such also because he considered Marx to have entered his mature stage very early. The dominant personality of Marx, capable of in spiring the strongest attachment as well as the stronge st repulsion, reached its full stat ure at a remarkably early stage of his career (Carr 1934, 18). Carr made a similar evaluation of Marxs practice of his theory. By 1848, Marx had now attained the summit of hi s powers and the zenith of his active career. He had just passed his thirtiet h birthday (Carr 1934, 60). Marx moved from France to England in the succeeding year. All he needed to do afterwards was to apply his already established thought to actual social situations. The mi gration to England, according to Carr (1934, 67), closed the chapter of adventure, and introduced a period of hardship, study, propaganda, and organization. His principal ideas had already taken shape when he came to London; and the 60


subsequent developm ent of them was in the nature of elaboration and app lication rather than of fresh thought. Given the lack of dramatic elements in the story, our focus is on how Carr interprets the thought of Marx rather than the plot of the text. Carr provides his evaluations of the thinker at the end of the first part (correctly as the interl ude between Marxs French years and his England years) and at the penultimate chapter of the book. The titles of the chapters are Marxism: the first phase and Marxism: the last phase. The rest of our analysis scrutinizes these two chapters as well as the final chapter, where Carr situ ates Marx in his own view of history. The Fall of Individualism Carr always gives Marx a modest eval uation. He states, for example, that Communist Manifesto was a brilliant writing. Yet it was brillian t as a rhetorical wr iting, whose strength lies in its confident and sweeping generalizations (Carr 1934, 52). Carr evaluates the core insight of Marxs sy stem of thought in the same manner. Marxs originality was his combination of Hegelian idealism and Feuerbachian materialism. French and English philosophies contributed to it. Marx did not share the roma ntic sentimentalism of French socialists, because of his innate character. There was nothi ng in Marxs ch aracter which predisposed him to the sentimental side of SaintSimonism and Fourierism, or encouraged him to believe in the perfectibility of human nature (Carr 1934, 71). Yet these so cialists taught Marx the conception of an opposed laboring class wai ting to be emancipated and their thought was a living, fighting organism (Carr 1934, 71). The English economists from Adam Smith onwards gave him a thought on economy and society. From these sources Marx extracted the theory, unfamiliar to German philosophers and unknow n in German political life, of labour as the source of wealth (Carr 1934, 72). Marx thus co mbined the German philosophy with the French political studies and the English economics. This combination brought him a unique theory: the 61


social class-struggle serves to resolve the antinomy between He gelian dialectic and Feuerachian m aterialism (Carr 1934, 73). As the history of cl ass-struggle is the story of every new society negating the previous one, it cons ists of a dialectical process. According to Carr, however, Marx did not so lve the antinomy in th e philosophical sense. He did not attempt to defend the legitimacy of tr ansposing the dialectical process from the plane of idealism to that of materialism; he simply assumed it (Carr 1934, 74). Philosophy slipped off from Marxs thought. He prioritizes action to me taphysics. Carr, by comparing this thought with Christian faith, concludes that Ma rxs theory is for his faith. Practically speaking, it is an admirable solution. Philosophica lly speakingand Marx professed to be a philosopher it is pure mumbo-jumbo. If it means anything, it means that you cannot be sure of your theory until you have tested it in practice; and Marxism, under the banner of unity of thought and action, ha s tended to degenerate into a species of opportunism whose philosophical basis can be nothing but pragmatism. (Carr 1934, 80) Marx, a philosopher, betrays his own task. Carr points out Marxs furthe r diversion from philosophy. Hegelian dialectics does not anticipate any destinations. It is an infinite process. By contrast, Marxs theory demands a clear goal: the notion of infinity is intellectually in tolerable to any save the mathematician and the philosopher; and Marx was no more than a distinguished dilettante in philosophy and mathematics (Carr 1934, 80). Carr recognizes a linkage between Marx and ut opian socialists. The Utopian socialists believed in progress, Carr (1934, 74) states, becau se they believed, like Rousseau, that man is essentially virtuous and that, once liberated from th e chains of the existing social order, he will advance through universal goodwill into a predestined state of perfection. But this was rank idealism. Since Marx attempted to transcend id ealism, he did not share the progressivism of 62


utopians. This rejection of idealism enabled him to introduce materialism into his theory. Yet, by assuming the end of history, Marx derived from them, and shared with th em, their conception of the primitive state from which man had proceeded and of the future state to which man would eventually attain (C arr 1934, 81). Marxs detachment fr om utopians ends up with his reattachment to them. On these essential points, Marx himself contributed nothing original, and was content to be the faithful disciple of the Ut opian socialists (Carr 1934 81). Marx went back to idealism, paradoxically, through his introduction of di alectical materialism. He established primitive communism in his imaginary past and hope d the world to return to it someday in the future (Carr 1934, 82). Two points are worthy of mention with rega rd to this assessment. One is that, by connecting Marx with utopian socialists, Carr detects a certain simila rity between Marx and Russian revolutionaries who have been disc ussed thus far. After discussing Marxs transformation of Hegelian dialect ics into the logic of class co nflicts, Carr (1934, 75) states: Hegel had shown that the path of progress was the path of conflictof a f light to the death from which new life was born. It was in this sense that Herzen the Russian called Hegelianism the algebra of revolution; and as such Marx used it. Marx does not disagree with Russians about their revolutionary interpretati on of Hegel, despite his hatred of Russians. Remember that Bakunin was idealist in his whole life despite hi s exposure to reality through Hegel. If Marx did not disagree with Russians about th e interpretation of Hegel, it is natural that he ended up an idealist in a significant respect. Carr also points out the roman tic origin of Marxis t dialectics in the succeeding paragraph. Marx imbibed from the Romantics his belief in the creative properties of hatred, and his biting scorn of the bourgeois and the p hilistine; and these romantic ingredients, incongruously 63


com pounded with the Hegelian conception of thesis and antithesis, produced the famous doctrine of class-hatred (Carr 1934, 75). On the other hand, the belief in a prehistoric primitive community was common in Marxs contemporary world. It was found in Russia: at the very moment when Marx was elaborat ing his theories, a certain Bar on Haxthausen, a German savant, was engaged in discovering traces of primitive communism in the contemporary Russian countryside (Carr 1934, 81-82). Marx and Russian revolutionaries we re intellectually interlinked with each other through their romanticism. Next, Carr considers that Marxs diversion from philosophy contradicts his scientific spirit. As I quoted earlier, Carr compares Ma rx with philosophers and mathematicians. Carr argues that Marxs faith in fi niteness was his diversion from philosophy. Carr uses the word scientific spirit in this context. Marxs interest in a finite end is surprising because it runs counter, not only to modern thought, but to the sceptical, scientific spirit wh ich is characteristic to Marxism (Carr 1934, 80). In The Romantic Exiles Carr characterized Marxs scientific orientation as Victorian. He now clarifies th e meaning of this combination as follows: Marx himself never admitted the possibility of a doubt. He believed in his creed with the same unquestioning fervour with which his E nglish contemporaries believed in certain religious or moral truths whic h have since been subjected to the same scepticism. Marx was a typical product of a generation which beli eved in itself and its works, and which found its main source of inspiration in a firm faith that the future is pre-ordained to be an improvement on the present. It was the sens e of inevitable success which gave Marx his overwhelming self-assurancethe famous se lf-assurance of the Victorian age which posterity has been so eager to mock. (Carr 1934, 78) Science and Victorianism signify slightly separa te issues. Science is th e product of skepticism. The primary component of Victorianism is its fa ith in progress. These two elements apparently contradict with each other. Yet, it is still possible to think about their coexistence unless we deny 64


the value-laden character of scient if ic theories. To translate, Marxs method was scientific in its interest in law while the substance of his thought was predicated on his faith. According to Carr (1934, 78), Marxs policy is the product of profound psychological insight. A renowned intellectual historian of Carrs time already argued that, even in the age of Enlightenment, the religious elements were never absent from rationalist natural philosophies (Becker 1932). Recent historians of science are even more emphatic on this point (for instance, Shapin 1994; Sutton 1995). Science and faith can coexist. Only the form of their linkage changed in the Victorian era. As such, moral faith occupies an important position in Marxs system of thought. However, the first phase of Marxism still lacked its foundati on. It can be discovered in the last phase of Marxism. The first phase of Marxism creat ed the system, the last provided its moral justification (Carr 1934, 83). The major part of the last forty pages of th e book is about the fate of Marx and Marxism. Carr put a special focus on Capital He considers that Marxs labor theory of value is basically flawed as it does not reflect the reality. It is rather a pure abstracti on (Carr 1934, 264). This does not mean that Marx is ranked low as a th inker in the western history of political thought. The logical correctness of thi nking is not related to its psyc hological starting point. Carr (1934, 264-65) employs the analogy of Christianity again: The Catholic Church has based its system on certain postulates which are refuted by human experience, but believed in by faith. On these postulates, a seri es of great thinkers... have founded a system of perfect logical cohere nce. The first step is full of flaws from which faith averts its eyes; th e rest is logically flawless. Psychologically, this incongruous juxtaposition of faith and logic has proved itself well adapted to the needs of a large proportion of humanity. Marx, an admirable practical psychologist, has unconsciously adopted the same technique. 65


Carr goes on to dem onstrate the perf ect continuity from the labor theo ry of value to the theory of surplus value. Since he criticized the former, he rejects the practi cal value of the latter for the same reason: the theory does not fit to reality. It is true that Marx devotes many eloquent and convincing chapters to prove that this was the ca se in nineteenth-century England; and the same opinion can reasonably be held to-day (Carr 1934, 269). Yet this does not guarantee the quality of his theory. Carr (1934, 269) continues: But these are moral judgments, and have nothing to do with the theory of surplus value propounded by Marx as an economic law. The importance of Marx resides in his clear documentation of workers miserable conditions in capitalist societies, however false and unsophisticated his theory was. Carr even claims that Capital is important not because many people have read it but because the book influenced so many people despite the number of its actual readers. Nobody, save a handful of specialists and enthusiasts, ha s read it through. Its power has lain, not in its contents, but in the fact of its existence (C arr 1934, 276-77). Marx is important as prophet, never as theorist. In fact, according to Carr, Capital is even more prophetic because of its flaws in theoretical discussions. Capital is a great book precisely because it is so constan tly false to its professed character as a treatise on political economy, and because the prophetic note of righteous indignation so persisten tly breaks in on the arid cour se of economic argument (Carr 1934, 277). On the other hand, the scientific part of Marxis m remained in its last phase. Starting from the fact that Marxs Critique of Political Economy was published in the same year as in Darwins Origin of Species, Carr (1934, 283) discusses the similarity between the two thi nkers as follows: Both provided a materialist basis for a concepti on of progress, both subordinated human nature and human happiness to the march of a scientific idea; and Marx soon detected a parallelism 66


between the survival of the fitte s t in nature and the class-struggle in society. Carr (1934, 28384) also points out that Marx sent a copy of Capital to Darwin, and Marx encouraged his disciples to emphasize the sim ilarity between the two. Carr (1934, 300) himself repeats this parallel in the final part of the book. Marxism established a strong position in the history of intellectua l thought through its combination of moral faith and scientific generaliza tion. Marx constituted a turning point in human thought, which declared th e beginning of the end of th e three-hundred-year period of history to which he gave the convenient, though not entirely appropriate label of bourgeois civilization (Carr 1934, 301). Even if Marx was the genius of de struction, not of construction and his view of the new world was even childish that revealed the amazing self-contradiction of his whole system, Marx has his own place in the nineteenth century intellectual thought (Carr 1934, 301). Marx is important because of his attemp t to provide the counterpart to individualism. Contrary to the liberal thinkers from Rousseau to Mill, Marx assigned only a minor role to individuals. Marx was the first important thinker for three centu ries who did not deign to pay even lip-service to the fetish of individual liberty. Carr (1934, 302) continues: And that is why, if the quality of Marxist doctrine is to be summ ed up in a single word, that word should be fanaticism. It is worth me ntioning that the subtitle of Karl Marx is A Study in Fanaticism. Beyond Failures Carr depicted Marx in a less sympathetic manner than he described the lives of Herzen and Bakunin. Yet Marx ended up a significant thinker in history because of his extraordinarily antiindividualist position in the west ern tradition of political thou ght. Especially when Marx had some similarity with Russian revolutionaries in terms of philosophical orientations, he appears as another representative figure in the post-utilitarian era. 67


Karl Marx thus further clarified Carr s view of history. The transition from Bakunin to Marx was not just a shift from romanticism to scientism. Science was rather a method. But science led Marx to a different conclusion bot h from Mills and Bakunins: collectivism. In Michael Bakunin it was still vague how Carr considered the competition between individualism and collectivism. In the end of Karl Marx Carrs characterization is clearer. In Capital Marx refers to the rgime of laissez-faire capitalism as the world of liberty, equality, property and Jeremy Bentham. It would be a fair parody to describe the world of the twentieth century as the world of mass-production, mass-dictat orship and Marx (Carr 1934, 302-3). Marx is clearly connected with totalitarian dictatorship. The analogy between utilitarianism and Marxism is interesting in this regard. Given that Carr was alre ady aware that he lived in the post-utilitarian world, the senten ces sound like the prescience of the future fall of Marxism. Indeed, Carr does announce it. Even if the near future produces an extens ion and an intensification of mass-rule, the inveterate tendency of man to individualiz e himself will ultimately reappear; and, unless all historical analogies are false, a new differentiation of the mass will lead to a new renaissance of humanism. Nobody will care to prophesy when and how this revolution will occur. But when it is consummated, the Marxist epoch of history will have come to an end. (Carr 1934, 303) Suggestive enough, this is the end of the book. Marxism, if not exactly the thought of Marx itself, seemed to be the terror in Carrs time. It is not only in the above sentences that Carr implies such view. I suggested at the beginning of my examination of Karl Marx that Carrs evaluation of Marx is often modest. After examining the whole book, it appears so modest that we do not ha ve much difficulty in finding more indirect criticisms than appraisals; or, we only find crit icisms disguised by ironically phrased appraisals. 68


Carr certainly exploited rhetor ical strategy to d enounce Marx. We already saw that a commentator of Michael Bakunin criticized Carrs view of Marx as a failed synthesizer of theory and practice. Carr, based on this view, presented Marx as a prophet in Karl Marx. Yet even a sympathetic commentator of Karl Marx cast doubt on Carrs statement that just a small number of people actually read Capital (Woodward 1934, 721). Carr could have overemphasized Marxs prophetic character to clarif y his unfortunate relevanc y to the interwar world. To summarize, our investigation of the four biographies have unfolded as follows. Carr found in Dostoevsky the question of irrationality as the fundamental problem to be solved for his contemporary Europe. Carr sought the origins of th e question first in Herzen, then his radical successor Bakunin, and finally reached his antagonist Marx. Pure individualism and its negation appeared as solutions. Yet Carr foun d neither of them as defensible. The competition between individualism and collectivism is not so much a dialectics between two philosophies of equal importance as a phase of exceptional cr isis to transcend. Two years after the publication of Michael Bakunin Carr literary called the in terwar era as crisis. It is time to turn to the book which has the word crisis in its title. 69


CHAP TER 4 IN THE PRESENT CRISIS Now that Carr finished introducing all his ques tions (from the fundamental irrationality of human to its political corollary) as well as so me possible erroneous an swers to them (religion, romanticism and totalitarianism), he needs to present his own solution. The Twenty Years Crisis attempts at this endeavor. Carr talks little about Russia and Russian thinkers in The Twenty Years Crisis This is not strange, however, since Russia was, as already discussed, just a functional category for Carr to reveal the contemporaneous threat to Europe. What Carr learned from his nineteenth century thinkers were not specific insights but the central problems in the intellectual sphere of his time. The first section clarifies Carrs historical awareness impregnate d within his binary between utopia and reality. Scholars have of ten recognized this funda mental framework of The Twenty Years Crisis as a theoretical generalization of particular schools of thought. Yet I will argue that the two ideal types also accord with th e distinct phases of history in Europe. Because of this historical form of th inking, it is necessary to read The Twenty Years Crisis in history and especially in its relation to the four biographies. The Twenty Years Crisis is an inquiry into history and thus shares its st arting point with his investig ation of nineteenth century revolutionaries. Once Carr starts criticizing utopi anism, it will turn out that his problem intersects with the critiques of utilitarian voluntarism by revolutiona ry thinkers. Realism comes as a nihilist assault against the economic man. As such, realism is the question that Carr needs to solve: the ramification of human irrationality in politic s. These are the topics of the succeeding two sections. 70


Carr needs to provide h is own way to surpa ss realism. The succeeding sections of the chapter focus on this aspect of Carrs system of thought. It will be clear that, despite his limited appraisal in his biography, Carr fo llows Dostoevskys way very closel y in its form of thinking. In fact, Carr ends up presenting his own rational be lief in man. Yet, by doing so, Carr also goes back to Victorian progressivism. Escape from Abstraction The objective of The Twenty Years Crisis is, according to Carr ( 1939a, ix-x), to specify the profound underlining cause of his contemporaneous crisis instead of discussing personal and immediate ones. The result is his dichotomy of u topia and reality, which was the original title of the book (Haslam 1999, 68; Cox 2001, xi). Scholars in the field of international studies have traditionally grasped this dichotomization as a herald of realism (Measheimer 2005). Recent revisionists rather emphasize the importanc e of utopianism in Carr (Booth 1991) or its complementary relation with realism (Jones 1998 ; Molloy 2003). The firs t interpretation cannot be sustained, given Carrs explic it critiques of realism in the chap ter on limits of realism. Yet the second interpretation is not wit hout shortcomings. Both interpre tations usually grasp utopianism and realism as mere theoretical categories. By providing two epigraphs from Francis Bacon, however, Carr announces, even before starting his disc ussion, that he is not interested in purely theoretical ideas. It is a signifi cant flaw to understand utopianism a nd realism as mere ideal types. Each of them signifies a specific phase of Eur opean history. For Carr, Randall Germain (2000, 325) suggests, knowledge about human affairs lose s its meaning unless it takes an historical form. This is the starting point for reading The Twenty Years Crisis and is thus needs further clarification. The book starts with the following sentence: The science of international politics is in its infancy (Carr 1939a, 3). Internat ional politics had been the concern only of 71


prof essionals until 1914. The Great War first po pularized it. People started to express their objections to it and such objections began to af fect political practice af ter the commencement of the war. It was the first symptom of the dema nd for the popularization of international politics and heralded the birth of a new science (Carr 1939a, 4). A particular ideal is necessary for developing science. Yet the study of internati onal relations has long failed to incorporate analytical elements, which contribute to verify th e legitimacy of this ideal. Adam Smiths theory of political economy was based on certain unveri fiable generalizations about economic man. Utopian socialists in the nineteen th century did not analyze the nature of class consciousness. A scientific mind appeared only after 19 31: this is realism (Carr 1939a, 8-13). In this narrative, both utopianism and realism are particular historical stages in modern history. Utopianism had been dominant for a long time and realism appeared only recently in the early 1930s. This historical awareness is clear wh en Carr discusses even most theoretical topics in the succeeding chapter. The seco nd chapter of the book deals with abstract issues such as free will and determinism, theory and practice, and ethics and politics. Yet, in discussing these issues, Carr (1939a, 16-19) quotes thinkers such as Sorel, Hegel, Marx, Jung and William James: all modern. The historical awareness of Carr comes into ye t sharper relief in the distinction between the intellectual and the bureaucrat. As an exemplif ication of theory-practice dichotomy, this issue is not as abstract as others. As a concrete categ ory, therefore, it has its history. While Carr (1939a, 20-21) refers to the last two hundred years of intellectual outlook and in tellectuals in modern times, all his examples are, again, modern figures such as well-known Woodrow Wilson, the intellectuals in pre-War Germany, and the in telligentsia analyzed by Lenin and Mannheim. 72


Contem porary intellectual historians had already provided a t ypical view of the Enlightenment which continued to be an orthodox one for the succeeding decades. Kant, after Rousseau, is the culminating point of the Enlig htenment according to this view (Lovejoy 1936; Cassirer 1951). Carr (1939a, 34-35), if superficially, shared this view and considered Rousseau and Kant as the predecessors of utopianism of Mi ll and Bentham. It is in this sense that Carr identified the intellectual with the left (Carr 1939a, 26). According to Stefan Collini (1993), these utilitarian thinkers contributed to create the cla ss called intellectual in ni neteenth century Britain. Carr calls them utopians. If the popularization of international politics enables an emancipation of people from elite intellectuals through scientific skepticism, it is a historical process in which these utilitarian intellectuals lose their authoritative status in society. What is noteworthy in this hi storical thinking is that Ca rr distinguishes utopianism and realism in general from their modern variants in particular. Whereas Carr (1939a, 83) finds origins of realism in Machiavelli, Hobbes and other thinkers in ear lier centuries, he maintains the distinction of modern realism from its predecessors in terms of its historical awareness. Modern realism would not manifest its political influenc e, as already mentioned, until 1930s. Similarly, Carr almost exclusively focuses on Victorian liberals in his most detailed critique of utopianism in chapter three. Carrs primary concern in The Twenty Years Crisis is modern utopianism and modern realism, not utopianism and realism in general. Economic Man Leaves As Carr assesses both phases of history crit ically, it is necessary to understand their advantages and disadvantages one by one. This is the task of the first half of the book. So our investigation needs to follow Carrs discussion clos ely. In this process, it will become clear how Carr considered human irrationality as the fundamental problem for his time. 73


What is the problem of modern utopianism ? According to Carr, its dominant mode of thinking took the contemporary shape in the thought of Jeremy Bentham. However, the utilitarianism started to get challenged already by the end of the nineteenth century (Carr 1939a, 31-36). The modern utopianism af ter the Great War was a strange revival of this dying thought and this revival occurred only accid entally. Modern utopianism regained its power partly because of the popular post-war symptom of seeking the restful place in the past. However, the more significant cause was the rise of the United States In this context, a Victorian thought became an abstract theory by deta ching from its original intellectual context in Britain. The liberal democracies scattered throughout the world by the peace settlement of 1919 were the product of abstract theory, struck no roots in the soil, and quickly sh riveled away (Carr 1939a, 37-38). The interwar crisis was a delayed reaction to modern utopianism. The arrival of realism was necessity in history as the belated reflexion of a century past beyond recall (Carr 1939a, 287). This understanding implies two points about the nature of modern utopianism. On the one hand, modern utopianism had certain attraction since it reappeared ev en after people shed sufficient doubts on its validity as a social theory On the other hand, it had a fundamental deficit since it had started to show its limits already in the nineteenth century before the actual death sentence was handed down to it in the interwar years. What is significant is that these two aspects coexisted in the nineteen th century. In other words, the comprehension of the success of modern utopianism is necessary for understanding its central flaw. Succinctly put, Carr identifies the primary success of modern utopianism with its ostensible achievement of the harmony between individual and society. Carr titles the first section of chapter four the utopi an synthesis, the synthesis between private and public interests. According to the utilitarian pe rspective, it is always good to achieve the greatest good of the 74


greatest number On the one hand, this doctrine vi ndicates the ethical cla im that to work for society is unconditionally good. On the other han d, this doctrine provides a reason for the selfinterested man to work for his society without sa crificing his own interest The pursuit of selfinterest and that of community-inter est are in union (Carr 1939a, 54-56). Carr finds the origin of this utilitarianism in Adam Smiths thought of the invisible hand. This thought was tenable as long as it contributed to the pros perity within nations as it presupposed a small society with small industries. When it was a pplied to international field, however, it turned out to be a theoretical jus tification of imperialis t expansionism. Modern utopianism vindicated nationalism through the an alogy between national and international: the division of labor can exist among, as it does with in, nations. Hegelian, Marxist, and Darwinian philosophies of conflict were potentially subversive to this doctrine. But th ey were neutralized to rather encourage its survival. As Smiths theory of nation was applied to the international sphere, the idea of the struggle for the fittest appeared as a social theory of international relations. The harmony of interests was establishe d through the sacrifice of unfit Africans and Asiatics (Carr 1939a, 64). As such, the success and the problem of modern utopianism reside in the same part of the doctrine: the rational economic model of man. Th e doctrine of the greatest good of the greatest number can logically imply the sacrifice of the group of people who are not counted as the greatest number. Contrary to the suggestion of recent revisionists (Wilson 1995, 6-7: Rich 2000, 205), in this sense, Carrs analysis is not a me re polemic against those whose ideas he did not share. Carr identifies the problem of modern ut opianism with its failure to solve the tension between individual and society. 75


The problem of modern utopianis m is its failure to achieve the goal of political philosophy A strict continuity from his early biographies to The Twenty Years Crisis is visible here. The problem of modern utopianism is the unreality of the idea that the act of a good rational man leads to a good society. Dostoe vsky, Herzen, Bakunin, and Marx al l rejected this rationalist model. The problem of utopianism is its lack of awareness about hum an irrationality. The primary question of Carr and that of his nineteenth century thinkers are identical. History Rages If so, however, it is legitimate to suppose that Carrs primary target was realism. Modern utopianism was ignorant of human irrationality. M odern realism made it visible. Then it is modern realist who is a skeptical nihilist. Carr needs to provide the way to overcome realism. The actual story of Carr certifies the correctness of this specu lation. The problem for Dostoevsky was to prevent irrational man from being nihilist in politics. In The Twenty Years Crisis the realist is such a nihilist by casting doubts on the rationality of man. Realism is the form of politics which unleashes the abyss into the world. To begin with, the interwar cris is is the arrival of realism. The title of the book seems to suggest that the crisis covers the whole interwar period. As Peter Wilson (1995, 7) suggests, however, this is not the case. He claims that the book is about the twelve or fifteen years of crisis when utopianism was influential from 1919 to 1930 or 1933. Wilson is right by discerning the two different phases of the interw ar period in Carrs discourse. Yet he is wrong by identifying the first phase as the period of crisis. Carr ( 1937b) already provided his periodization in International Relations since the Peace Treaties two years before The Twenty Years Crisis According to this text, the crisis starts from the economic disaster and Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931: the subtitle of part three of the book is The Period of Crisis: The Return of 76


Power Politics (1930-1933). This understanding is compatible with my argument so far. The Twenty Years Crisis is, I would say, either the nine or six years crisis. Therefore, a thorough knowledge about modern realism is necessary to understand Carrs solution to the problem of irrati onality. Scholars have us ually agreed that power and self-interest constitute primary attributes of realism (see Vasquez 1998). Yet a more important aspect of realism is its subscription to the de terministic law of history, at leas t, in Carrs system of thought. Power and self-interest are two of the variables in th is law. The rest of this section is dedicated to discussing this point. It should be advisable to clar ify why self-interest and power are not the most idiosyncratic elements of modern realism. As for self-interes t, it is sufficient to remember that modern utopianism started with its (appa rent) synthesis between the self and group-interests. Modern utopianism is based on the assumption of the self-i nterested man just as modern realism is. In this regard, modern realism did not reject the whole system of modern utopianism. It just suggested that the achievement of harmony in the political world is not an automatic process. The issue of power is slightly more co mplicated. By emphasizing the complementary relationship between morality a nd power in late r chapters of The Twenty Years Crisis Carr seems to have given much emphasis on power as th e primary element of realism. Such a view is possible only when we consider the dichotomy of utopianism and re alism to run parallel with the binary of morality and power. According to Carr, however, utopianism and realism each has its own view about the relationship between mora lity and power. They differ not because one represents morality and the other power. They di ffer in their conceptualization of morality and power: the antithesis of utopia and morality is rooted in a different conception of the relationship of politics and ethics (Carr 1939a, 28). In the realist world, power dominates 77


morality In this sense, however, what is more crucial about modern realism is the system where power is considered to dominate morality. The issue of power is only a part of it. A more fundamental problem is human irra tionality which scholars sometime call the human nature assumption (see Freyberg-Inan 2004). As we now know, it entails a uniquely nihilistic implication in politics. Yet in The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr prefers the term not nihilism but history to describe it. Behaviors of irrational i ndividuals go beyond their control, just as Raskolinikov could not smartly put his pr inciple into practice. Th is is the meaning of irrationality. The consequence of individuals be haviors acquires certai n autonomous effects. History advances as if it has its own driving force, which is so mething like, if not exactly the same as, what Hegel called Geist Indeed, Hegel is one of the pi oneering thinkers of political realism in the discourse of Carr (1939a, 84). As Andreas Osiander (1998, 418-21) emphasizes, one of the decisive differences between realism and utopianism resides in their philosophies of history. To clarify this point, it is worth delving into epistemol ogical differences between two schools of thought. Carrs distinct ion between utopianism and real ism relates to the one between idealism and realism in philosophy. As I already mentioned, representative thinkers of modern utopianism included many idealists in nineteenth century Britain. Carr (1939a, 14) identifies the critic of this strand with co mmonly called realism. Historic ally speaking, we can guess that this realism is philosophical realism since it ar ose in the early twentieth century partly as a reaction to idealist philosophies. To be sure, political utopianism and po litical realism do not neatly correspond to philosophical idealism and philosophi cal realism as is easily intelligible from the fact that Hegel is categorized into the realist camp in Carrs discourse. As we will discuss later, Carr is basically 78


eclectic as for epis temological issues. Yet cert ain relations are still observable in the text. According to Carr (1939a, 14), realism places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts on the analysis of their causes and consequences, in the field of thought, and tends to emphasise the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and these tendencies, in the field of acti on. Carr identified realism with th e historicist school of thought in Germany. Karl Popper (2002, 3) would later criti que historicism from a perspective of the philosophy of science by defining it as an appro ach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhythms or the patterns, the laws or the trends that u nderlie the evolution of history (original emphasis). Poppe r (2002, 46) mentions thinkers in cluding Marx as historicist. More historically, one of the historicists Ca rr referred in his text already proposed such view that political realism and realist-positivist philosophy are at once: Friedrich Meineckes (1936) Die Entstehung des Historismus Meinecke himself has been considered a pioneer of political realism in international studies. I have often said that what Morgenthau did was translate Meinecke from German to English, Ke nneth Waltz once stated, for example, and if you look at the index, you wont see Meinecke mentioned. I would translate some of Meinecke into the same words that Morgenthau used in Politics among Nations And then Morton Kaplan translated Morgenthau from English into whatever language it was that Kaplan was writing in. (Halliday and Rosenberg 1998, 386). No reference to Historismus appears in the text of The Twenty Years Crisis. But Carr (1939a, 112) cites, at le ast, Meineckes another major work, Die Idee der Staatsrson in der neueren Geschichte for which Historismus is the substantial companion (see Hofer 1957). Both works concern the rise of modern realist state. 79


Carr even directly refers to the works of ph ilosophical realists. Bert rand R ussell is one of the oft-cited figures in The Twenty Years Crisis. Many of the references are to the political commentaries of this philosopher but at least two of them conc ern his philosophical discussion. One of them is about the conjunction between words and things, which is the argument of philosophical realism. Carr (1939a, 41) makes this reference in his critique of utopianism. The other quotation is about the relationship between ethics and reality in the middle of the discussion about the relativist charac ter of realism. Russell here cons iders ethics to be more often a product of reality than otherw ise (Carr 1939a, 87). This is a manifestation of philosophical realism, as it points to the primacy of direct experiences over idealist metaphysical thinking in our acquisition of knowledge. In a similar vein, it is possible that Carr, as a reader of the wi de range of literature, learned philosophical realism through the novels of Henry James. As far as the text is concerned, Carr refers to the pragmatism of his brother. Carr (193 9a, 17, fn. 1) states that the dichotomy of utopia and reality, at least analogical ly, accords with William Jamess pairs of opposites such as rationalist-empiricist, intellectualist-sensationalist, and idealist-materialists. George Herbert Mead (1936, chap. 15), a contemporary commentato r, discussed in his lecture of the western tradition of philosophy that realism and pragmatism were two of the similar reactions to idealism. According to Mead (1936, 328), the fundamental point of philosophical realism is as follows. In the world of idealistic school the relations [of elements which constitute the world] were always the impressions of the realizing mind, so that relati ons were taken back to thought of the self. Relations are important in the re alist world as well but only inasmuch as they establish laws between causes and effects. Mead continues: T he realist, on the other hand, assumes the relations as simply there. We think th em; and if we think them, they must be there, 80


for we m ust be thinking something. The main inte rest of realism thus re sides in the process of analysis, of breaking up the object of knowledge into its various elements, with the isolation of the connection as well as of the things themselves. In the idealist world, the self relates it to the world through his own internal idea. Other people can be friends or foes depending on his recognition. As such, the substance of himself ch anges by becoming friend or foe of others. By contrast, each element is independe nt in the world of realism. It is only in this atomistic world where we can think of causes and effects as separate variables. If modern realism was scientific and analytical, it could not be so without em bracing philosophical rea lism at least partly. The word real in realism signifi es the attitude to see the worl d as it is. How can we imagine the world as an objective entity? What is the worl d as it is? Carr states th at modern realism is different from its precursors in that it embraces the idea of progress. If realism believes in the autonomy of history, the world as it is in this school of thought is the one that the law of history creates. This law does not lead the human world to a predetermined goal. As the law is beyond human subjectivity, however, it gives certain objec tivity to the shape of the world. Realism is realistic when it observes the (materially) real a nd (historically) inevitable clash of interests among nations that utopianism tries to disguise through its holistic view of the world (Carr 1939a, 77). In this regard, traditional scholars are right to have considered positivism as an element of realism if they have never scrutinized the issue in the original historical context (see Vasquez 1998). Because of the subscr iption to this phi losophy of science, however, the realist world is, as scholars have also frequently suggested, tragic (see Lebow 2003). The law of history impersonally (or scientifically) determines the course of the worlds development. Modern realism is a form of despair since it does not ad mit the power of individua ls to create their own 81


history However eagerly a rati onal man acts to achieve social harmony, history negates such efforts and constantly brings quagmires. Even if individuals are rational, their collective actions are irrational. It is the world of what Reinhold Niebuhr suggests by the tile of his book Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932). Carr (1939a, x) manifested his indebtedness to this work in the preface of The Twenty Years Crisis If the acts of man create irrational world, however, can we actually say that such man is rational? From a consequentialist point of view, it is more reasonable to consider that such man is irrational since his behavior results in irrational events. The world of modern realism is the society of irrational men. Note that the realist rejection of the economic man is a product not of abstract reasoning but of concrete historical experiences. In Carr s historical narrative, modern realism stemmed from European experiences of the Great War, the economic crisis of 1931, and the rise of totalitarian states. Reflecting on one set of experiences, namely t hose associated with the most devastating wars within the war-torn Euro centric context, as John Vasquez (1998, 202) evaluates the later prevalence of realism, it has generalized one set of tr aumatic experiences to all experience. Modern realism appeared as a form of skepticism against human rationality when incomprehensibly irrationa l events recurred. The rapid i ndustrialization made it difficult for individuals to grasp the shape of the soci ety they lived in. Conc omitantly, political and economic crises occurred one after another. It was natural for man to feel like losing the sense of independence and autonomy. History advanced in whichever direction he did not ever predict according to the cause-effect law of history. Peop le started to embrace nihilistic view of the world as a result: their actions would not affect where the world would go. Civilization Recovers What Carr needs to surpass in realism correctly turned out to be pessimistic nihilism in politics. How does Carr overcome this problem? Re visionists of Carr would say that it is through 82


the synthesis of realism and utopianism. If so, how ever, where can we situate this synthetic phase in Carrs history? As Carr provi ded his theoretical framework within his view of history, he also needed to situate his solution in it. In fact, the synthesis would not become a solution until we would be able to call it utopianism if different fr om its modern version. This section delves into this issue. Now that we have clarified the substa nce of modern utopianism and modern realism, it is time to grasp their relation as two phases of history. The problem is that it simultaneously points to two opposite directions. On the one hand, the relationship between realis m and utopianism is very asymmetrical. As realism comes from severe human experiences, it relates to the particular ly intersubjective mood of the time. Alternatively put, it concerns the realm of subconsci ous mind. In discussing the fall of modern utopianism in the late nineteen th century, Carr (1939a, 36) calls its critics psychologists: The belief in the sufficiency of reason to promote right conduct was challenged by psychologists. We already know that Carr co mmonly used the word psychologist to signify the thinkers of irrationality such as Dostoevsky Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx. At some points, indeed, Carr grasps the rise of modern realism in analogy with the discovery of unconsciousness (see Molloy, 2003: 284; Gismondi 2004, 437). As we have discussed in the previous section, modern realism is firmly connected with philosophical reactions to idealist metaphysics. In Carrs (1939a, 87) words, modern realism is relativist and pragmatist. As suc h, this thought itself originates from particular circumstances. This is the reason why Carr (1939a, 89-90) needs a discussion of how German philosophies gained and lost popularity in nineteenth century England because of her social and intellectual settings. At the end of this discussion, Carr (1939a, 91) states: The conditioning of thought is necessarily a subconscious process. 83


Modern realism appeared from the existing wo rld. Since modern utopianism dominated the world before the arrival of modern realism, the latter appears from the former as if the proletarian class consciousness arises from th e bourgeois world. By the same token, the problem of modern utopianism is its actual irrationality behind the proclaimed rationality of its principles. What matters is that these supposedly absolute a nd universal principles we re not principles at all, but the unconscious reflexions of nationa l policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time (Carr 1939a, 111). Just several pages earlier, Carr (1939a, 108) refers to Freuds interpretation of ancient im perialism to clarify how the nineteenth century idea of internationalism helped conceal the nationalist-imperialist inclinations in the practice of modern utopianism. Understood as such, modern realism is a s ubconscious irrational el ement within rational modern utopianism. As we already examined, the flaw of modern utopianism was destined to become clear once the world became internationa lized and no longer terr itorially expandable: the international community ca nnot be organised against Mars (Carr 1939a, 297). On the other hand, liberal utilitarianism created this deadlock by itself as it contributed to advance world capitalism through the application of its thought to the international sphere. Modern realism appears as a necessary part of the progress of modern utopianism. In other words, modern realism is an auto-critique of m odern utopianism. The relation of totalitarianism to the crisis is clearly one not of cause, but of effect. Totalitari anism is not the disease, but one of symptoms. Wherever the crisis rages, Carr (1939a, 288) claims, traces of this symptom can be found. Carr (1939a, 14) assesses the contemporary phase of the science of intern ational politics as the one where realism is the necessa ry corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as in other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism. 84


Modern uto pianism yields its counterpart because of the assumption that the rational economic man naturally establishes social harmony. The rise of m odern realism might be gradual. There are times when both realist a nd utopian ideas coexist, as in the late nineteenth century in Carrs discourse. Yet modern realism does not come up as a dominant body of ism before it manages to impregnate its doctrine in the mind of a sufficient number of people. Until then, the logic of realism even contribute s to the survival of modern ut opianism as it was the case of Darwin and Marx. Until around the early 1930s, modern utopianism was the totality of the world which was capable of neutralizing its critics as its own c onstitutive parts. By contrast, the whole world enters the realist phase once realism finds enough supporters. It is profoundly misleading to represent the stru ggle between satisfied and dissatisfied Powers as a struggle between morality on one side and power on the other. It is a clash in which, whatever the moral issue, pow er politics are equally predominant on both sides (Carr 1939a, 135). Every utopian thought is pr edicated on unverifiable assumpti ons. The issue is whether its model man can contribute to the interest of the whole. When he fails to do so, the issue is whether his egoism is still succe ssfully concealed or the scientific analysis already revealed it. The utopian world is alwa ys already the world of Realpolitik whereas the inhabi tants of it are not aware of it. The task of realism, as its auto-critique, is to make this fact explicit. As Carr (1939a, 111) states, as soon as the attempt is made to apply these supposedly abstract principles to a concrete political situation, they are revealed as the transparen t disguises of selfish vested interests (also see Elshtain 2008, 158). Utopianism and realism are, as such, two diff erent phases in the history of civilization. Utopianism usually dominates the world. Realism appears occasionally as its auto-critique from 85


within. Utopianism and realism are asymmetrical wh en they are understood as distinct stages in history. On the other hand, however, such asymmetry of the two paradoxical ly leads to their symmetrical relationship in theory. If realism is a constitutive part of utopianism, we cannot differentiate the two. Scholars are already aware that realism can be utopian. As Stefano Guzzini (1998, 22) points out, realism needs to criticize it self at the end of the day as it needs to be skeptical against itsel f if it is a consistent form of relativi st skepticism. R. B. J. Walker (1993, 22) argues that, since realism has long prevailed the discipline without being aware of its shortcoming, its dominant variant in the United Stat es is actually idealism which is lack of the skeptical mind. In a similar vein, Duncan Bell (2002) states that current forms of realism are ideology. Such understandings accord with Carrs interpretations of realist thinkers. Marx is a remarkable example (see Wilson 1995, 5). Darwinian evolutionism and Marxist dialectics contributed to the survival of modern utopian ism. Hitler employed the same evolutionism to overturn the order of modern utopianism. As he borrowed this strategy from an already failed philosophy, however, it was an outmoded ma neuver (Carr 1939a, 288). As Carr announced at the end of Karl Marx Hitler needed to fall so meday as utopians did. This understanding is a natural corollary of the aforementione d recognition that realism is a pragmatic theory. What is significant is that the same character can be discerned in modern utopianism as well. Scholars of international stud ies have not well discussed that utopianism can also be realism. Yet modern utopianism had its own skeptical character in its origin. Carr (1939a, 10) characterizes Adam Smiths th eory as a science of political economy and notes that this new science was based primarily on a negation of existing reality. According to Roy Porter 86


(2000, 87, 201-3), Sm ith was a critic of his contem porary world by adopting new types of natural philosophy. It is possible to make a similar poi nt about other forms of liberalism. As Raymond Geuss (2002, 322) suggests, the nineteenth cen tury liberalism was primarily a negative phenomenon. It was a set of attempts to reject the utopianism of the French revolutionaries without restoring the absolutist di ctatorship in the preceding century. There is no such thought which is perennially utopian or realist. Contexts determine the character of particular thoughts. Th is is the consequence of the fact that the relativism of realism has its place within the course of history. Since relativism rejects everything absolute, it completely reveals the relativity of utopianis m. Remember the discussion about ideology and objectivity in the introduction of this present study. My point wa s that we still need to think about the degree of objectivity if every discourse is ideologica l. Yet this means that every discourse is particular and relative, to different degrees. With the arrival of realism, it is still possible to think about a local tr uth but we cannot think about so mething universal and perennial. Utopianism loses its apparent absoluteness when its actual relativity is uncovered. If utopianism can claim its absoluteness, it is not because it is really absolute but realism is not yet influential enough to be a critic. Everything is relative in th e world of relativism, by definition. Realism just remains as a neutralized part of utopianism as long as it appears as a dominant body of thought. The coexistence of realist and utopian phases of civi lization is thus impossible insofar as realism is pragmatic and relativist. As realism is an auto-critique of utopianism, it might be said that we just call the relativist phase of utopianism as realism. Yet realism readily ceases to be relativisitic, as it dominat es the world: it turns to be absolute by itself. Realism cannot but be a tentative phase in the hi story of European civilization. Realism needs to be absolute to relativize 87


utopianism but thus it transforms itself into another utopianism. The beginning and the end of realism coincide. Realism can be not hing but an exception in history. If Carr tried to synthesize realism and utopi anism for solving the nihilism of modern realism, therefore, this synthetic phase needs to be another utopian pha se. It is true that, from part three of the book onward, Carr discusses the future of political community by taking both realist and utopian elements into account. As already di scussed, the coexistence of power and morality does not necessarily signify the synthesis of re alism and utopianism as two different schools of thought. But Carr simultaneously embraces the utopi an principles and the realist belief of mechanical change. Such synthesis leads to his most concrete suggestion: peaceful change. Carr (1939a, 284) explicitly states th at peaceful change needs a co mpromise between the utopian conception of a common feeling of right and the realist conception of a mechanical adjustment to a changed equilibrium of forces. From the discussion so far, however, it is wide of mark to consider that this suggestion points to the coexistence of realism and utopi anism as the two phases of civilization. What coexist in Carrs system of peaceful change ar e the elements of modern utopianism and modern realism, not the two different phases of civilizat ion. They cannot be utopianism and realism in general since no such school of thought exists without particular co ntexts. Peaceful change is a specific system of new utopianism (as a phase of civilization), consisting of the elements of modern utopianism and modern realism (as schools of thought). This new system, which is equipped with self-adjusting function via modern realism, should not be exposed to subversive criticisms. The system would otherwise collapse since the influence of rea list relativism does not know its limit. 88


Therefore, the new utopian phase needs to re place m odern realism with another absolute norm. In other words, the synthesis of mode rn utopianism and modern realism cannot be a solution to the problem of modern realism just because they incorporate both elements. It needs to acquire the intersubj ective understanding that such synthe tic phase represents the norm. Political Man Arrives The future phase of civilization needs be r ecognized as utopianism. How can it achieve such status then? Considering th at the end of modern realism is predetermined already in its arrival, the new civilization needs to appear from modern realism just as modern realism stemmed from modern utopianism. The most impo rtant issue for understandi ng Carrs solution to irrational nihilism is, therefore, what marks the end of modern realism. This section finally clarifies Carrs own answer to the epochal pr oblem in the western in tellectual tradition by discussing this issue. To foreshadow the conclusion, Carrs answer is similar to Dostoevskys: a rational belief. Yet Carrs belief is not passive, contrary to Dostoevskys. According to Carr (1939a, 116), realism collapses because it is clear that manki nd as a whole is not prepared to accept this rational test as a universally va lid basis of political judgment. The intolerable character of realism is just presupposed. Individuals ca nnot endure the command of history and need autonomy. On the other hand, Carrs belief is not religious To some extent, it is a logical conclusion. Carr is aware, through his reading of Dostoevsky, that irrationality is not the entirety of human mind. His concern is how to not unleash the abyss of human irrationality into the communal life. At stake is not to reject rationality but to ch ange the way of employing it. As modern realism designates the distrust in human rationality, its resolution is the rec overy of trust. Carrs belief in man is rational. 89


Carrs con cern of individuals is thus closely interlinked with his view of history. Carr (1939a, 7) recognized political science as a no rmative study of politics. Utopianism is a normal phase since it is based on the natural tendency of human beings whereas realism rejects such norms. Realism needs to be transcended in the development of science. Carr suggests this point at around the beginni ng of his inaugural lecture of the Wilson Chair in Wales in 1936 as well. By delinea ting Marx, Freud, and Ma lthus, Carr (1936, 846-47) admits that social inequalities, peoples psychology, and the growth of population have contributed to war. Yet he argues that they are not the primary causes with determinative effects. Otherwise, no Wilson Chair is necessary (Carr 1936, 847). The human world cannot be reduced to the law beyond individuals. Although Carr appreciated Dostoevsky and Freud for their psychological questions, he did not subscribe to their answers. One of the contemporary commentators of Dostoevsky suggested that Carr was perhaps too suspicious of Freud (Muchnic 1939, 119). The science of international politics cannot be reduced to psycho analysis since it needs to suggest the way that individuals overcome the relentless power of th e law of history through their own actions. The world is run by individuals if the force of history is tremendous. The responsibility for war and peace rests on every one of us (Carr 1936, 847). The substantive argument of the inaugural lecture is also significant in this regard as it deals with public opinion given the above awareness. Remember that the scien tific stage of international politics came only after people ceased to trust th e small groups of intellectuals. Carrs discussion about public opinion is linked with his understanding of history. To be sure, Carr is, after all, elitist. He is clear that elites need to enlighten the mass through their discourse (Carr 1936, 847). Given the elite career of Carr, a graduate of Cambridge 90


and a clerk at the Foreign Office, the creati on of the healthy public opinion might have appropriately been a part of his job. This e xplains the recognition of some revisionists that Crisis was propaganda. Carrs jobs at The Times can be understood as its pr actice (Jones 1998, chap. 5; Haslam 1999, 58-64; Jones 2000). Going back to The Twenty Years Crisis however, Carrs view of public opinion is ambivalent (also see Chong 2007). On the one hand, he points out that the form of power over opinion is not so different betw een totalitarian and democratic states (Carr 1939a, 170, 181). On the other hand, he suggests that it is not always possible to force people to subscribe to a particular opinion: When we set power over opinion side by side with military and economic power, we have none the less to remember that we are dealing no longer with purely material factors, but with the thoughts a nd feelings of human beings (C arr 1939a, 183). Individuals are at the center. Based on this understanding, Carr shows two lim its to propaganda. The first one is the existence of objective facts. Carr believes that individuals can discern truth from lies however susceptible they are to propaganda. The other is the inherent utopian ism of human nature, which limits the arbitrary use of power over opi nion even more effectively (Carr 1939a, 184). Carr then insists the potentiality of people to ho ld common ideas of value over national interests: international morality. The hallmark of his view of public opinion is the ut opian nature of man: individuals are rational and moral. Carr (1939a, 117) makes a similar statement in his criticism of Schopenhauers pessimism. According to Schopenhauer, individuals have nothi ng to do but to contemplate as long as history has its own law. Carr (1939a, 117) contests: Suc h a conclusion is plainl y repugnant to the most deep-seated belief of man about himself. That human affairs can be directed and modified by 91


hum an action and human thought is a postulate so fundamental that its rejection seems scarcely compatible with existence as a human being. Carr continues to vindicate the ability of individuals to create their own history in his prescrip tions to the new utopian era. Carr (1939a, 187, 195-96) needs to lament the lack of the discu ssion about individual mora lity in his series of argument about international morality. In his disc ussion of international law, Carr starts from asking why men obey the law. Carr (1939a, 221) considers that this question corresponds to the fundamental problem of political philosophy, why men allow themselves to be ruled. When modern individualism revealed itself to be imperialist and totalitarian in its practice, it was retaliated by (its own) totalitarianism thro ugh the auto-critique by modern realism. Yet, then, another form of individualism should appear and transcend this totalitarianism. The history of civilization is always driven by individual human agen cy. The scientific stage of international politics came only after its popular ization and the arrival of doubt against the small groups of intellectuals. Carr does not go back to the economic man mode l. Instead, Carr praises the ability of the new individual: political man. Ca rr starts his argument in part three of the book by referring to Aristotle for insisting the necessity of co mmunity (Carr 1939a, 123). Politics, or the way individuals live together, has been a condition of human from the ancient period. This fact became especially clear in the interwar years with the arrival of modern realism. The problem of old utopianism is its lack of political awareness. This point is most clear in his evaluation of Bakunin. In Michael Bakunin Carr described him as the most relentless defender of the individual in the history of political thought. Yet, in The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr criticizes his a-political character. The power that anarchists employ is onl y spontaneous and excessively individualistic. It can never lead s to a political life of individu als. Paradoxically, we cannot find 92


any autonomous individuals in Bakunin s anarchist system of thought. Both non-resistance and anarchism are counsels of despai r, which appear to find widesp read acceptance only where men feel hopeless of achieving anything by political action (Carr 1939a, 129). Carrs criticism of Karl Barths modern theol ogy also clarifies the same point. On the one hand, Barth claims the impossibility of eradicating political evils. On the other hand, he predicates his argument on the separation betwee n morality and politics. Yet, as such, his Christian view is very similar to modern realism in its understanding of th e nature of the political sphere: the doctrine that Christian morality ha s nothing to do with poli tics is vigorously upheld by the Nazi rgime. This view is basically differe nt from that of the realist who makes morality a function of politics. But, Carr states in the fiel d of politics it tends to become indistinguishable from realism (Carr 1939a, 129). It is true that Carr (1939a, 291-92) seeks establishing a harmony not between individuals or between classes but between nations. Yet this is not a vindication of the nation state as Carr (1939a, 269) can no longer find much meaning in such political community. As a product of modern utopian imperialism, the na tion state is rather the materializ ation of the limits of the state (also see Carr 1942, chap. 3; Jones 1998, 20). Liberal utilitarianism failed. Anarchist cannot be a substitute for the former. But Marxist collectiv ism needs to be overcome. The conflicts among people within national communities were transferre d to international community in the twentieth century (Carr 1939a, 291). The project of modern utopianism, which keep s people away from political evils, just tends to expose individuals to such evil s in a more unprepared manner. Carrs call for innately political individuals is an attempt to te ach their self-defense. Carr could not expose raw individuals to the power of international politics fo r the sake of individuals. Security and emancipation, as Ken 93


Booth (1991, 539) suggests in his discussion of Carr, are in fact two sides of the same coin. Carr was interested in re discoveri ng individuals as political agents in the age of international society. No one could be ignorant after experiencing the power of history. The central problem for Carr was that of political philosophy in the tw ilight of modern belief in liberal-individualrationalism. History against History The structure of thinking in The Twenty Years Crisis is strikingly similar to the one in Carrs Dostoevsky. After examining the roots of the question in Herzen, Bakunin, and Marx, Carr returned to Dostoevsky for its solution if not in substance but in form. Utilitarian economic man needs to be rejected for its naive view of hum an nature. Yet modern realism also needs to be rejected as it nihilistically denies all the possi bilities of political comm unity, which are vital for human life. Thus we need a rational be lief: Carr manifests his love of man. The crisis of Europe in the interwar year s stemmed from the gradual manifestation of human irrationality in the emerge nce of international politics. Rea lism, or the negation of human autonomy, is the problem to be solved. It is, only in this sense, understandable that some scholars have recognized Carrs system of thought as a call for emancipation (Booth 1991; Linklater 1997). Carrs fight against the cris is takes the form of the tension between man and nature. At stake is not the nature of animals, plants and so o n. It is the nature of man as an irrational entity. However, this is not the end of the story. Note that he recognized th is age-old problem as the duel between two different versions of history. In other words, he se t a progressive view of history against determining historicism. In his id iosyncratic discourse, the battle against nihilism was the one against history. When Carr won this battle through his belief in political man, he presented a progressive view of history. 94


What is significant is that th is progressivism is not a byproduct of Carrs system of thought but is actually its core. Carr describes why m odern realism needed to come up from modern utopianism. Yet he does not tell how people could achieve the suffic ient realist awareness or how widely the awareness should preva il to end the existing utopian er a. He just assumes that it naturally occurs in history. The same is true for the change from modern realism to a new utopianism. The rationality of man is the necessary condition. But it is not cl ear how people can successfully resist the law of history with their rationality. This mechanis m demands clear explanation especially when he started with the assumption that the contemporaneous crisis derived from human irrationality. As already discussed, it is logically correct to recove r rationality to tame the effect of its malicious part. Yet the solution needs the clarification of how. Furthermore, Carr does not talk about why a synthetic phase can be utopianism whereas modern realism cannot. To translate, he does not explain why nihilism is unacceptable. He just assumes the natural tendency of man to seek freedom and he considers it ethically good. Nor does he explain why new utopianism is not recogn ized as relativism in its relation to modern realism. If realism and utopianism are formally indistinguishable, Carr leaves his readers a certain doubt about the mechanism of the transformation of civilization. Indeed, the only element which logically asce rtains the progress of history is this inseparability of realism from utopianism. In other words, the changes of the phases of civilization are necessary since realism is an exception by definition. The fall of realism was determined from the very beginning when Carr established the dichotomy between utopianism and realism. Therefore, his analytical framework already prepared his answ er. Carrs solution is, 95


96 ultimately, not so much his belief in political man as his opposition of the progressive history against historicism. This is a problematic solution since, as we already know from our readings of biographies, progress was the hallmark of mode rn utopianism in Victorian Brita in. It is true that modern realism also embraced the idea of progress. Yet this is a corollary of the f act that modern realism is a version of modern utopianism. What is now problematic about Carrs solution is that he considers man to have the ability of creating the worl d but does not explain how. Carr seems to return to the natural harmony model of man and society. To complete our investigation, therefore, it is vital to understand how progressive Carrs view of history is. From the discussion so far, there is no doubt that Carr believes in the possibility of the human world to change. Howe ver, it is still not clear how and in which direction the world changes. Alt hough I have repeatedly used the word progress to designate the historical system of thought which Carr established in The Twenty Years Crisis we do not yet know how linear and teleological hi story would be in this system For sure, Carrs history of civilization unfolds as an auto-dev elopment of utopianism. Yet we ha ve clarified this point just in terms of the form of the history not of its substance. It is now clear that utopianism is the normal phase. Yet it is still unclear how each particular utopian phase differs from each other in its substance. A fuller evaluation of Carrs argument demands a further examination of his view of history.


CHAP TER 5 RELUCTANT RETREAT My analysis so far has characterized The Twenty Years Crisis as a struggle with the political ramifications of human irrationality. It turned out that while his apparent solution was the expression of the belief in rationality, th is solution was predicated on a particularly progressive view of history. Th is brings about a significant d oubt that Carr might have just retreated to modern utopianism The present chapter attempts to uncover the substance and implication of this progressivism for finishing our assessment of The Twenty Years Crisis As the problem of progressivism resides in the possibility that Carr might have returned to the old Victorian world despite his criticism, our starting point is its intellectual culture. More specifically, his progressivism needs to be exam ined in the context of the British history of science. The entire history of civilization, in Carrs discourse, unfolds as a development of the science of international politics. Therefore, the im plication of his view ne eds be discussed in the history of science. In this rega rd, it is necessary to pay special attention to the role of Charles Darwin. One of the reasons is that Carr refers to Darwin as a symbolically Victorian scientist of progress. Another reason is that Carrs unders tanding can conflict with a popular view that Darwin was a thinker of evolution, if evoluti on is recognized as different from progress by designating an irregular developm ent of species. Remember that Carr criticized the teleological moment of Marx as a betrayal of his own philosophy, at the sa me time juxtaposing him with Darwin as a Victorian thinker of progress. It is necessary, on the other hand, to situate Carr in the culture of his own time, which was remarkably distinct from the Victorian intellectual ferment. Indeed, it was in this culture that people started to consider Darwin more seriously as a thinker of evolu tion than a progressive scholar. The interwar culture had strong bent toward the typically twentieth century themes such 97


as discontinuity and uncertainty Still, this culture had certain ambivalent affinity with the intellectual mood of the preceding era. Between these two cultures, Carr shows his am bivalence in an idiosyncratic fashion. Until this point, my argument needs to be speculative in some crucial respects. One of the fundamental problems is that Carr does not directly talk a bout progress. To put differently, Carr is not a systematic thinker of progress. I already tried to clarify the syst em of Carrs thinking in the previous chapter by following his consistent flow of reasoning. In this chapte r, I will try to reveal the limits of this system by picking out the irre gular parts of it. All I can do is to excavate circumstantial evidence from the text as much as possible and relate it to the contemporaneous discourses. While I have the two cultures above as a theoretical framework, my argument needs to be unsystematic since Carr himself goes back and forth between them. The point is that we cannot uncover what is consiste nt behind this inconsistency w ithout experiencing his swinging by ourselves. Once we understand the generational tension above, we will attempt to find the place of Carrs ambivalence within the culture of ambivalence in his time. The text of The Twenty Years Crisis will turn out to be an attempt to solve the crisis not so much for Europe as for Britain. The theoretical eclecticism of his idea of progress and his ambiguity of political orientation finally interlink if in a problematic way. My flight from the issue of progress to politics from this point onwar d is not arbitrary but inevitable. The substances of the two cultures correspond to modern utopianism and modern realism respectively. It is not strange that the two cultures of time in histor y correspond to Carrs dichotomous concepts. On the one hand, Carr identified the difference of the two schools of thought with their distinct philosophies of history. On the other hand, Carr s theoretical concepts also described the historical stages of Europe. Carr embraced elemen ts of the thoughts of both stages for his new 98


utopianism To clarify his posit ion between the two cultural extremes means the simultaneous evaluation of the theoretical basi s of his progressivism and the implications of his practical prescriptions. The inquiry into history in this present chapter is comple tely continuous with the investigation about the tension of Carrs theory in the last chapter. By going deeper into this tension, I will try to identify Ca rrs ambiguity with his consis tently practical concern about British liberalism. Two Cultures The argument begins with grasping the basic hist orical context to situate Carr in terms of the idea of progress. I will juxtapose the progres sive culture of Victorian Britain and the antiprogressive movement of interwar modernism. This is a schematic delineation since our starting point is the possible internal c onflict of Carrs discourse. While Carr set modern realism against modern utopianism in terms of their conceptio ns of man and history, he ended up embracing certain notion of progress as a metaphysical idea. As Carr described history in a theoretical fashion by using the two ideal type s, utopianism and realism, the historical evaluation of his argument needs to be theoretical when we start our argument from his text. The conflict between progressivism and its antagonism is simultaneously theoretical and descriptive as to the history of Europe, as in the case of utopianism and realism in The Twenty Years Crisis Victorian Progressivism Our focus on the Victorian progressivism is Darwin. But it is not necessary to delve into his writings. It is doubtful whethe r Carr actually scrutinized Darwin and absorbed the insights of this biologist into the text of The Twenty Years Crisis Although Carr discusses Darwinism in Politics in a section of The Twenty Years Crisis he never cites actual words of Darwin. Any citations to the works of Darwin do not appear in the early biographi es either. Darwin is important for the present study as a foca l point to reveal the implication of The Twenty Years 99

PAGE 100

Crisis by clarifying the tension between progressivism and its antagonist in the era when the work was written. Aside from the details of biological discussions (see, for example, Coleman 1977), the revolutionary influence of Darwinian thinking ow ed its idea of change. In a broadly European context, the French Revolution ha d a significant effect on making people aware of the possibility that their society could change radically at a certain point in their daily lives (see Wagner 1965). As an example of its intellectua l influence, Hegelian philosophy of history, by which Carr is said to have been influenced (see Cox 2001), appeared partly as a reaction to the revolution (Ritter 1982). Chapters two and three of this present stud y already discussed that the romantic revolutionary thought of Herze n, Bakunin, and Marx stemmed fr om this ferment as well. Such a current also flowed into the Victor ian intellectual life. The Reform Act of 1832 radically transformed the electoral system and deprived the establishm ent of some of their privileged status in politics. The advancing indus trialization and th e resulting rise of the social status of individuals already incr eased the pressure for the reform in the early nineteenth century. However, this act revived the memory of the re volution as it gave a c oncrete shape to this pressure so the actual lives of people changed (Altick 1973, 91). In Britain, however, the Enlightenment belief in reason still flourished. This is the context where the utilitarian mode of thought from Bentham to Mill soon became influential (Altick 1973, 8). The early Victorian idea of progress ha d a connection to its form in the preceding century. British thinkers continued to consid er that the correct knowledge was vital for improving the human world, if they were aware of the limit of reason to the extent that they needed to discuss what the correct knowledge was. Notable about the Victorian faith in knowledge was, however, that these intellectuals ra ther went further back to Renaissance for its 100

PAGE 101

model. The empiricism of Francis Bacon was esp ecially popular as in the case of Mill (Houghton 1957, 2). The Victorian culture of science idealized the empirical search fo r truth in the age of scientific revolution. The writings of Darwin were widely discussed in the nineteenth century partly due to this culture. On the one hand, his style of research was empirical in a Baconian sense of the word especially in his early years. My first note-book was opened in July 1837. I worked on true Baconian principles, Darwin recollected, and w ithout any theory collected facts on a wholesale scale, more especially with respect to do mesticated productions, by printed enquiries, by conversation with skillful breeders and gardener s, and by extensive read ing (Barlow 1958, 119). On the other hand, he demonstrated the mechanism of change through this style of research. The Enlightenment belief resided in the power of know ledge to advance the human world in a better direction. If Victorian in tellectuals maintained th is belief even by going back to its origin, it was natural for them to have welcomed the progressive aspect of Darwinism. In this sense, Darwins thought was not comp letely new in the nineteenth century. Far from introducing the idea of evolution per se to a totally unprepared public or initiating the religious doubts which were to trouble so many minds in the years to come, Richard Altick (1973, 226) states, The Origins of Species was largely a brilliant synthesis of many specific ideas already current, with one or two cruc ial additions. John Burrow (1968, 19-21) also suggests that it is a-historical to emphasize the influence of Darwin too much since the preceding centuries prepared the nineteenth century evoluti onism. This point should not be confused with the denial of the revolutionary importance of Darwinism. Although their arguments suggest historians refrain from overempha sizing the uniqueness of Darwin, it does not deny the fact that Darwin was a remarkable thinker of evolution in Victorian Britain. It suffices for the present 101

PAGE 102

study to understand that Darwin was popular as a thinker of progr ess in the Victorian world and his progressivism was characteristic in the era. For this purpose, both Alticks and Burrows argument rather contributes to my argument as it suggests that Victorian Britain was an adequate circumstance for Darwin to present his evolutionism (also see Burrow 2000, 46). A remarkable aspect of Darwins thought is that it evoked debates not just in biology but also in wide intellectual fields. Darwinism brough t about heated debates concerning this existing intellectual ferment given this possibility of be ing accepted. This is the aspect of Darwin where his name has remained in history. Especially because he recogni zed the mechanism as a proce ss on the surface of the earth, not driven by any metaphysical entities, his argu ment evoked peoples attentions to its religious implication. If our ancestors were apes, why can we think of us as the center of the universe in the great chain of being? The appearance of Darw in was, as frequently said, revolutionary in a similar manner to the so-called scientific revolu tion in the early modern time. In the seventeenth century, Kepler relegated human beings from th e center of the universe by uncovering the solar system and thus endangered Christian concepti on of the Godly world order (see Koyr 1957). In this sense, Darwinism had a certain implication for the thinking about social order. It was, therefore, natural that social thinkers st arted to show their interests in it. What was remarkable was their almost exclusive focus on the progressive aspect of Darwin. As in the above words of Altick, Darwins achievement reside d in his idea of evolut ion if scholars disagree about the extent of its no bleness. It does not necessarily impl y progress but just an organic ability of movement. The idea of natural selection tells how species change but it suggests neither their progress nor whether they have a certain goal to head for. 102

PAGE 103

T o be sure, Darwin himself was not totally clear and even confusi ng about this issue. Darwin, for example, employed the insight of Malt hus principle of population: the growth of the population is faster than the sp eed that people can expand thei r production of food. Malthus cast a significant doubt on the Enlightenment progressi vism as his principle implied the possibility that the future of the human world would necessa rily be worse. The struggle is a condition of human beings. Darwin borrowed the notion of struggle from Malthus. As Gertrude Himmelfarb (1968, 162-63) points out, however, Darwins ap plication of Malthus, in effect, rather contributed to strengthening th e case of eighteenth century rationalists. Whereas Malthus considered the struggle as a condition of human beings which prevents their progress, Darwin grasped it as a sign of eternal progress. There is an inherent tension between progress and evolution in Darwins system of thought. What is significant is that Vict orian thinkers rarely took the late r seriously. The identification of Darwin with progressivism is a particularly Victoria n invention in this regard. Darwinism had become triumphant by the 1870s. But people were sc arcely concerned about the idea of natural selection. The metaphor of the struggle for exis tence, as Peter Bowler (2003, 179) states, was often applied in ways that do not correspond to the modern idea of natural selection. Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer were well know n in this regard. What they claimed was not a random advance of the society but a progressive improvement of the contemporary situation. Said otherwise, Darwin, whatever his own inte ntion was, became a tool for those who demanded the idea of progress to vindicate a certain social change. In fact, Darwin himself was rather critical of Spencer in hi s autobiography (Barlow 1958, 1089). Darwinism gave Social Darwinists an intellectual weapon to attack the Tory regime neve rtheless since they picked out from it just what they needed (Bowler 2003, 218). 103

PAGE 104

If Carr identified Darwin with a progressive Victorian thinke r, his understanding accords to this particularly nineteenth century interpreta tion. Yet Carr also discerned certain subversive elements of Darwin for modern utopianism as we ll. In this respect, it seems that Carr was aware of the evolutionary aspect of Darwin. Indeed, Darwin started to be understood as a thinker of irregular advancement of human bei ngs already in the interwar years. It is time to turn to this contemporary culture of Carr to cl arify the tension within him. Modernist Decadence The identification of Darwinism with the idea of progress was a particular rendering in the Victorian intellectual climate. Our contempor ary use of Darwinism focuses on the idea of selection which Victorian thinke rs rather ignored. This inte rpretation of Darwin implies irregularity and discontinuities in history sin ce it does not set the goal to reach: the selection occurs at random. Such understandin g already prevailed when Carr wrote The Twenty Years Crisis The so-called modern synthesis between the biology of Darwin and the genetics of Gregor Mendel occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. As Darwin was both biologist a nd social thinker in the Victor ian time, this change of the view about his thought occurred not exclusively in the small commun ity of natural scientists. It was part of a more general transformation of th e European mind which star ted around the turn of the century: modernism. The movement occurred most notably in literature but also in various fields from art to physical science and ma thematics (see Everdell 1997). Although it is both difficult and unproductive to give too much unity to the concept of modernism, Robert Wohl (2002, 604) discusses, the best way to approach modernism is through its project of negation. Modernism was a series of reactionary movements which occurred in every field of intellectual and cultural activities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It was natural that the notion of progress was especially problematic in this intellectual climat e. Stephen Kern (2003) 104

PAGE 105

called m odernism the culture of time and space. Darwinism, as a ca ll for the intellectual attentions to the irregular aspe cts of the human progress, belonge d to the series of modernist contemplations about the disc ontinuity and nonlinearity of time (but see Bowler 1994). To clarify the point, a further examination of the context is necessary. The modernist movement in Britain had become remarkable by the 1920s especially because of the Great War. Paul Fussells (1975) classic work has long told historians that post-WW I Europe was plagued by the doubt about the traditional value in every sphere of life (also s ee Leed 1979). After an inexpressible experience of the war, people started to consider that the world changed irreversibly. The war demonstrated that hum an species could actua lly descend (Bowler 2003, 277). Carrs contemporary world showed a remarkab le tension between pr ogress and its revision in this sense. This is all the more true wh en modernism was not the dominant school of thought. More recent works of historians te lls us a complicated intellectual ferment in the interwar period. On the one hand, the writers in the postwar er a still needed to use traditional words and metaphors to describe their experiences in the war (Hynes 1991; Winter 1995). On the other hand, the highbrow writers discussed by Fussell were not necessarily the most popular producers of the contemporaneous discourses. They were influe ntial in blazing the trail for the postmodern writings of the succeeding generations. But midd lebrow writers gained greater fame among ordinary citizens as they consci ously tried to recover traditional values in the pre-war world (Bracco 1993). Carr discussed the post-war reviva l of modern utopianism partly as a general inclination of man to seek a restful place in the familiar past. The anti-modernism pointed to this direction. As John Carey (1992) poi nts out, modernism represented, in a way, a form of the class related tension in the decades before and after the turn of the century. 105

PAGE 106

In this conn ection between intellectual and so cial issues in modernism, any idea of progress could not but entail certain political expression dependi ng on which strand it appealed for what respect. Notable about The Twenty Years Crisis is that it incorpor ates this tension. The conflict of Darwin in his own text as well as in Carrs story runs parall el to that between the Victorian culture and the interwar modernis m. Modern utopianism was rationalism and progressivism, for which progressive Darwin was its advocate. Modern realism was irrationalism and relativism, for which evolutionary Darwin was its supporter. Consid ering that these two different schools have their place in Carrs hist ory of civilization, it is reasonable to grasp the tension of its text, if any, as its constitu tive part, not the product of Carrs failure. Carrs social and intellectual standpoint s upports this reasoning since it is somewhat ambivalent. For example, Carr did not share th e experiences that his contemporary soldiers suffered in the battlefield since he did not go to the war. In this sense, he might not have shared the same feeling which many British modernists expressed. Although historians have extensively discussed the difference of the vi ews of soldiers and civilians, how ever, it was not necessary to experience the war to live in the interwar cu lture. As Janet Watson (2004) argues, there were different reactions to the war depending on the is sues at stake. The war was not so much the cause but a stimulus of the awar eness of uncertainty which modern ism represented in the clearest form. Carr realized such untraditional aspect of the world as we have extensively discussed in the previous chapters. The text of Carr, in this rega rd, had a direct connection with the movement of modernism, whether Carr was aware of it or not. The reason is that the reception of Dostoevsky was a notable part of English literary modernism (De Jonge 1 975; Kaye 1999). Carrs biography of Dostoevsky even marked the last phase of the fad of Russian cultures, which started from the late nineteenth century with the grad ual arrival of modernism (Muchnic 1939). 106

PAGE 107

The theoretical tension of m odern realism and modern utopianism has its connection to the historical conflict between the two cultures in Britain. Scholars have poi nted out the ambiguity of Carrs political orientati on (see Cox 1999). The same ambiguity appears in his notion of progress here. This is not strange since, as alr eady mentioned, the idea of progress could be a political issue in the early twen tieth century culture of modernis m. In fact, the epistemological ambiguity of Carr reveals its difficulty most clearly as to the idea of progress. Carr simultaneously subscribes to Victorian progressi vism and modernist anti-progressivism as well as liberalism and its criticism. To clarify this point, the next section discusses the tension of Carr by going back to the text of The Twenty Years Crisis Divided Text Now that we have theoretico-historical cont ext for Carrs progressivism, it is time to estimate the distance between Carr and Victorians a bout their notions of hi story. As the objective of this inquiry is to describe the ambiguity of Carr, this sectio n repeats a somewhat frustrating swinging between two different stra nds of history that I foresha dowed in the previous section. However, the crucial presumption of Carrs text will not be excavated without this absorption into ambiguity. As I will discuss in the following sections, Carr will ultimately subscribe to the set of Victorian ideas both in his epistemological a nd political orientations. Yet his retreat to this old world needs to be a reluctant one, given the hi storical circumstance of his time. The text of Carr rejects any immediate labeling of his intellectual standpoint. In this section, I will try to show the tension of Carr first by delving into the aspect he is closer to the Victorian side and second the aspect closer to the m odernist side. The point is not to reduce Carr into one of these two strands by estim ating to which Carr is more affiliated with. I will rather attempt to clarify Carrs distance from both sides. 107

PAGE 108

Wi th Victorians Although Carr does not clearly talk about what kind of progress he seeks, some pieces of circumstantial evidence help cl arify his view. The text of The Twenty Years Crisis points to the issue of progress even before the actual argumen t starts: Carr cites two epigraphs from Francis Bacons On the Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum The actual sentences are worth copying here (Carr 1939a): Philosophers make imaginary laws for imagin ary common-wealths, and their discourses are as the stars which give little light because they are so high. The roads to human power and to human knowle dge lie close together and are nearly the same; nevertheless, on account of the pernic ious and inveterate habit of dwelling on abstractions, it is safer to be gin and raise the sciences from these foundations which have relation to practice, and let the active part be as the seal which prints and determines the contemplative counterpart. Two epigraphs suggest the necessity of practical minds for theore tical contemplation. As such, the two quotations from Bacon foreshadow Carrs discussion of the science of international politics in the firs t pages of the book. This starting suggests a link between Carr and above mentione d Victorian intellectuals, at least, superficially. Remember that realism and utopianism signify two stages both of science and civilization because theory and practice are at one in Carrs system of thought. Carr does not choose between science and progress. More concretely, the connec tion between the two epigraphs of Bacon and the succeeding argument in the actual text demands us to turn our eyes to the history of science in order to situat e Carrs notion of progress in history. 108

PAGE 109

There is a further circumstanti al evidence supportive of Carr s link with Victorianism. Carr (1939a, 34) cites J. B. Burys The Idea of Progress early in his discussion. The quotation does not relate to the issue of progre ss but to the thought of Abb Sain t-Pierre, who is said to have been the first advocate of international organizati on for the peaceful world. Yet the fact that Carr read this book has a unique importance. Not onl y the book has been influential and is now a classic text on the history of pr ogress. But it is also the only wo rk on the idea of progress that appears in The Twenty Years Crisis except for more general works on the philosophy of history by Hegel, Croce, and others. In this monumental work, Bury (1920, 7) discerned the decisive intellectual rupture between the pe riod before and after the sixteenth century: the idea of progress appears only in the latter peri od. The two thinkers who marked th e turning point were Bodin and Bacon (Bury 1920, 36). The idea of progress became widely discussed in th e eighteenth century because of their pioneering efforts (Bury 1920, 128). As I already discussed in the previous chapte r, Carr emphasized the newness of the modern versions of realism and utopianism because of their subscription to the idea of progress. Indeed, Carrs view of history accords very closely wi th Burys since what Carr means modern is the same as the range of time in Burys story. Carr (1939a, 83) emphasizes the difference between realism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that in the eight eenth century, and then states that both utopianism and realism accepte d and incorporated in their philosophies the eighteenth century belief in progress. More sp ecifically, Carr (1939a, 3132) finds a disruption in history in the seventeenth century and finds a continuation from the Newtonian science to Bentham and Mill. Note that this Victorian view is not necessa rily a typical understa nding of the history of progress, at least, from the pr esent perspective. For example, Robert Nisbet (1980, x) evaluates 109

PAGE 110

Bury s book as a deeply flawed classic because it is dismissive of th e thoughts up until the late seventeenth century. Nisbets point is that an cient and medieval philo sophies have already prepared the foundational elements of the eighteenth century ideas of progress. It can be said, in this regard, that Carr already s howed a Victorian bias when he set his starting point in the modern era. I will come back to this point later when I will identify the embedded Britishness of Carrs text. In the meantime, it is sufficient to confirm just a potentially Victorian element of Carr in his text. The objective of the argument above is to find the first sign of Carrs inconsistencies. Given this sign, it is time to go deeper into the more substantive aspects of th e text to find the points which conflict with the Victoria n elements discussed so far. Carr did not completely subscribe to the Victorian ideal. Bringing back the scheme presented in the previous section, other textual evidence would rather suggest his detachment from it as in the case of his re lation with modernism. On the other hand, Carrs view of Darwin is Janus-faced: on the one hand, Darwin is a Victorian thinker of progress; on the other hand, Darwin is a (modernist) critic of Victorian progressivism. To discuss Carrs progressivism by setting Darw in as a focal point, therefore, it is significant to understand in which aspects Carr discerned the compatibil ity and incompatibility between Victorians and Darwinians. In this rega rd, it is important to understand what practical condition changes the view of Darwin in Carrs story. As already argued in the previous chapter, Carr discussed that Hegelian, Marxist, and Darwin ian ideas of struggle could be dangerous for the utilitarian school of thinki ng but it did not become a probl em because the international material conditions allowed Britain to keep e xpanding her territory. The philosophies of conflict were rather neutralized to s upport Victorian progressivism. What is significant about this 110

PAGE 111

understand ing is that Carr detected the limit of th e utopian negotiation in material conditions: the lack of space for further territorial expansion. This material ca use brings what Carr calls the rise of international politics and the arrival of realis m. On the one hand, modern realism appears in the extension of the history of m odern utopianism. The final cause of the crisis, the spread of the realist mind among people, is here specified w ith the material condition. Carr is much more materialist than idealist contrary to some of his words in the text. This point reveals Carrs ambivalence at the mo st philosophical level. As already discussed, political realists needed to be philosophical realist in the words of Carr. In this sense, there is an inherent tension in the project of Carr since he tries to pick up elements both from modern utopianism, which is more idealist in its philosophical orientation, and modern realism, which is otherwise. Carr thus needs to establish a certain hierarchical order betwee n idea and material in terms of their influence on the world. The above understanding of the la te nineteenth century history signifies that he prioritize matter to ideas, at least, as the drive of the world. In contradistinction to the aforementioned link between Carr and Victorians in terms of the way to describe the history, such materialist inclination strangely leads Carr closer to the evolutionist interpretation of Da rwin. In a way, it is possible to read the story of Carr as if the realism survived because it was fit for the circum stance. Yet a more careful analysis of Carrs story brings us back to the Victor ian aspect of Carrs Darwinism. I noted in the last section of the previous chapter that Carr does not explain how modern realism ac quires a sufficient number of its supporters. Without any explanation of this m echanism, Carrs story is teleological. What is strange is that the arrival of modern realism depends on the invisible power of history which enabled it, whereas such determining force of hi story is the idiosyncratic character of modern realism. To be sure, the idea of progress is implanted in modern utopianism. Yet it is realized 111

PAGE 112

through the behavior of rational m a n. If modern realism appeared in this process, it is a sign of utopian progress. This understanding does not conf lict with Darwinism. Darw in (1859[2006], 468) argued at one point in The Origins of Species : The key is mans power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man adds them up in cer tain directions useful to him. Carrs system of thought seems to have certain affinity with th is idea when he emphasizes the power of man to overcome the irrational force of history. What is significant, however, is that this understanding of Darwin is a Victorian one in my schematic delineation. I already mentioned that Darwin neutralized the dismal respect of Malthuss idea of struggle for the progressive notion of evolution. The aspect of Darwin, an advocate of mans ability to make evolution a progressive process, is exactly the point where Darwin rendered Malthus and ended up vindicating the Enlightenment idea of progress. According to Himmelfarb (1968, 420), the widely different views of Social Darwinists were at one only in th at they all sought the way out from the world of eternal struggle. As mankind adapted itself to the changing conditions of life, a new human nature would develop. We already know that mode rn realism is the phase of self-reflection for modern utopianism. Carrs progressivi sm is Victorian in this aspect. With Modernists It seems that the pragmatist understanding of hi story led Carr to be a confusing theorist. Lucian Ashworth (2006, 293) discusses that Carr was more idealist in his philosophical orientations. However, what is truly remarkable about Carr is his eclecticism. As above, Carr included Hegel and other idealist thinkers in th e realist camp despite political realisms certain affiliation with philosophical realism. Maybe, the problem is not particularly Carrs own. The dichotomy between materialism and idealism is not very helpful to grasp the tension within the nineteenth and twentieth century thoughts. Darwin was materialist but Social Darwinists were 112

PAGE 113

more idealis t. Some of the inte rwar Darwinists were materialis t and others were idealist. Carr was not the only person who showed confusion. Yet he is remarkable for his theoretical ambiguity. There are thus, as above, both idealis t and materialist moments in his story of the transformation of European civilization. So far, I have clarified the tension of Carr by examining the points where he is relatively closer to Victorian progressivism. Now it is ti me to the opposite aspects where Carr is more modernist. In this regard, it is no t only conceptually helpful but also historically accurate to start from introducing vitalist philosophe r Henri Bergson for a better contrast. It helps to further show the ambiguity of Carrs idea of progr ess at the epistemological level. Bergson (1911) made one of the most remark able achievements in the age of modernist evolutionism in his Creative Evolution Bergson vindicated progress but characterized it as an irregular process. His point was that the forces inside the organism of life attempt to resist material conditions. As history unfolds as a cu lmination of different reactions to different material circumstances, it is a non-linear pro cess if it is ultimately a progress (see Bowler 2003, 320-21). Carrs contemporary intellectuals recogni zed the significance of Bergson. In The Idea of Nature which was written during the 1930s and wa s published posthumously, R. G. Collingwood (1945, 136) described the historical uniqueness of Bergson as follo ws: This phase of thought, in which the idea of evolution was worked out as an essentially bi ological idea, may be conveniently regarded as culminating in the work of Bergson. Collingwood recognizes Bergson as a remarkably new heir of Darwin. As Bergs on succeeded the evolutionary aspect of Darwin, Mead (1936, 490-510) needed to emphasize how subve rsive the idea of Berg son could be against the whole project of rationalist science. 113

PAGE 114

There is no evidence that Carr read Ber gs on. Yet it is safe to suppose that Carr knew Bergson and touched his evolutionary thought at least indirectly through the Marxist works of George Sorel. By rejecting the utopian aspect of Marx, Sorel emphasized the internal power of man to change the situation. In Reflections on Violence Sorel (1915, 4-6) utilizes Bergson to advocate the necessity of creative resistance to the existing constraints. As Sorel rejected the utopian aspect of Marx, such re sistance leads to an irregularly advancing history. On the other hand, because of the same rejection of teleological moment, Sorel needs a certain myth to teach such a creative mind to people. Sorel (1915, 28-36) borrows the argument of Bergson for this point again. Carr cites Sorel several times in The Twenty Years Crisis One of the references is to Reflections on Violence (Carr 1939a, 10). Although at a differen t point where the exact citation is not shown to the reader, Carr (1939a, 115) refers to this argument about the usefulness of myth by mentioning the name of Sorel. If Carr was en thusiastic about teaching the masses a certain utopian myth to overcome the force of history, his method accords with Sorels and its philosophical basis is Bergsonian evolutionism which emphasizes the inner power of individuals. Importantly, however, this reference appears in the middle of his criticism about the impossibility of being a consistent realist. The evolutionism of Bergson-Sorel appeals more to the modernist-realist side of thinking. Yet Carr rather uses this evolutionism for its utopian implications of the necessity of norms. For a clarification of the tension in Carr, th e comparison with this evolutionist strand is worth continuing for some more while. Carrs whole system of progress presupposes the new utopian phase as the goal to reach. Carrs system of thought is not as irra tionalist or ex istentialist as to resist the existing order eternally and ev eryday anew. The objective of Carr is rather a 114

PAGE 115

rational m anagement of the world. In this re spect, Carr is more Social Darwinian than Bergsonian. However, Carr never asserts what the actual sh ape of the new utopian phase necessarily is because of the predetermined law of history if he discusses that such phase will come because human nature does not allow indivi duals to eternally tolerate the lack of autonomy. Carr seems to have denied predetermined plan of creation. In this respect, Carr is closer to Bergson than Victorian Darwinians. To understand this tension fully, it is necessary to pay attenti on to the structure of Carrs text. Note that The Twenty Years Crisis consists of the two mutually related but slightly different projects. In the first third of the book, the objectiv e of Carr is to present the mechanism of the transformation in civilization. Utopianism evolves itself through its transce ndence of realism. On the other hand, the latter part of the book discusses the substance of the new utopian phase given such mechanism. Different from the first half, however, Carr does not ta lk about the law-like mechanism of history. Instead, he offers his ow n prescription to achieve a brand new utopian phase. The first half points to the Victorian teleol ogy in form but the second half points to the vitalist lack of teleology in substance. In short, the whole argument can be rephrased as follows. On the one hand, Carr set an at least tentative goal to reach. He di d not go so far as to keep resisting against the establishment in a vitalist form, unlike Sorel or Bergson. On the other hand, Carr did not talk about any final goal as an integral part of his histor y of civilization. His idea of new ut opia can be grasped as a tool to pragmatically improve the current situation. In the final paragraph of the book, Carr (1939a, 307) states that his prescription too, is a utopia. But, he continues, it stands more directly in the line of recent advance than visions of a world federation or blue-prints of a more perfect League 115

PAGE 116

of Nations. Those elegant superstructures must wait until some progress has been made in digging the foundations. Carr attempts to create a new utopia but it does not seem that he considers it as the end of history. As far as th e substance of civilization is concerned, his history is not teleological if pr ogressive. Carr does not advocate the eter nal fight of man against history, like Sorel. Yet he does not specify the concrete goal such as the eradication of state, like Marx, or the complete end of the struggle for th e fittest, like Social Darwinists. The Heart of the Tear Carrs progressivism is, as suc h, totally eclectic from the theoretical perspective. I argued in the previous chapter that the relation between realism and utopianism is not dialectical when these categories signify the phases of civilization. Now that the logical conflicts between realism and utopianism (as schools of thought) are clear, hi s embracement of the elements of realism and utopianism in the new utopia is no t a product of the dialectical synt hesis either. It is rather a poorly integrated aggregation. By using his own words for Marx, Carrs system of thought is a pure mumbo-jumbo (Carr 1934, 80). He embraces both political liberalism and political realism, both philosophical ideal ism and philosophical realism, a nd both Victorian progressivism and modernist evolutionism. None of the binaries is synthesized into a higher level of intellectual product. It can be the case that Carr was simply not concerned about this kind of ambiguity since, he might have claimed, it matters only at the abstract metaphysical level. Theoretical discussions did not mean anything unless they offered speci fic insights about real ity. Carrs partial acceptance of Sorel might itself show his eclecticism in this regard. Sorel was an unsystematic thinker who tried to reconcile the structuralist system of Marx with the individualist one of Bergson (see Ton 1973). Or Marx was also an un systematic thinker as Carr himself noticed as above. 116

PAGE 117

The problem is, however that Carr tried to esta blish, not destroy, a sy stem even by setting a metaphysical idea of progress at its center. Theoretical eclecticism makes this system unsustainable at a certain level. It is time to go back to the ques tions I introduced at the end of the last chapter. If the realist force of history is problematic, indeed, we might be able to ask: why can people put up with being forced to prog ress? Carr proclaimed the fall of realism on the basis that people cannot tolerate the lack of autonomy. Bu t his progressive history is as deterministic as historicism because, we may sa y, it forces people to employ rationality and progress toward a certain better future. Yet what is better? It is to acquire the autonomy to resist the force of history. Why is it better? This is not a legitimate question since the word progress already implies a movement toward a furthe r good. Despite my argument above, therefore, Carrs teleology in form cannot be differentia ted from its substance when his spontaneous inconsistencies are placed within his system. In other words, it is necessary and adequate to consider Carrs history as completely teleological because of his eclecticism. Remember that The Twenty Years Crisis consists of the two slightly different projects. The fundamental problem is that the no rmative theory in the second half of the book is not an integral part of his whole mechanism of the movement of civilization in the first half. This is a problem since modern realism was flawed and thus supposed to collapse only according to this mechanistic law of history. The substance of his no rmative theory needs to be clear in his idea of progress and every normative disc ussion about individual issues needs to be based on it. In order to construct such system of thought, however, Carr needed to supply a reason why people cannot tolerate the lack of autonomy a nd why it is not good. As above, this was the axiom in his narrative. As such, Carr implicitly return ed to the ideal of ut opian and Enlightenment thinkers for whom human indivi dual freedom was unquestionably good. This is not strange if he 117

PAGE 118

vindicated the British tradition of liberalism by suggesting the continuity of modern utopianism. But it does not mean that he defended this tradition successfully through a logical argument. Naturally, the same question comes up again: wh y is it better to have freedom than to be determined by history? Carrs system is predicated on certain tautol ogy. Human freedom plays the role of natural right as the axiomatic cause to abide by. Carrs history needs to be progressive because of his liberal defense of positive individu alist freedom. Therefore, our final task needs to be the inquiry into the meaning of this axiomatic presupposition. Being British Our investigation of Carrs ambiguity ended up revealing his unverifiable moral orientations toward the British liberal tradi tion. As Carr was supposed to discuss European civilization in The Twenty Years Crisis the succeeding investigation should deal with Carrs positioning in Europe. This section attempts to clarify the meaning of his moral bias by uncovering his fundamentally British character in the intellectual and social settings of the time. Scholars of international studi es have suggested the cosmopo litanism of Carrs style of thinking (see Linklater 1997; Cox 2001). As far as his historical na rrative is concerned, however, Carrs discussion of European ci vilization always derives from a perspective of the English. As I already suggested in the previous chapter, modern utopianism, as a school of thought, was almost exclusively identified with Victorian utilitarian ism in the nineteenth century as well as its Scottish predecessors. Also, those who are familiar with Carrs Britain (1939b) might realize the striking similarity between the hi story of Britain in this work and the development of European civilization in The Twenty Years Crisis : both were published in the same year. If the civilization advances through a series of auto-critiques of utopianism, it can be said that Carr actually tried to vindicate the con tinuity of British intellectual tradition through his attempt to establish a new utopianism in Europe. In fact, Carr might have been talking from a 118

PAGE 119

V ictorian perspective already in his early biographies. Note in a dvance that this does not mean that there is no such connection as I es tablished between early biographies and The Twenty Years Crisis It rather suggests that Carrs thinking mi ght have been biased from the beginning. Saving England Historically speaking, the problem of irrationality did not nece ssarily come from outside of Europe. The problem was external more specific ally for England. According to a Noel Annans (1990, 10) recollection of the ear ly twentieth century, the mode rnist philosophy of irrationality has not received the wide acceptance in Britai n while it gained certain popularity in the continental world: The champions of irrationalism like the Dadaists did not much affect us and we were a little astonished in the sixties when at last, in very different forms, irrationality crossed the Channel. John Keegan (1998, 15 ) suggests that graduates of European universities shared certain knowledge about ancient and modern aut hors and constituted a single culture, but only by maintaining that such intellectuals were tiny mi nority. As Carr repeatedly emphasized in his book, the majority of English people were not yet well prepared for Dostoevsky in the 1930s. It might have been because they were unf amiliar with the world not outsid e of Europe but just beyond the Channel. The evolutionary idea of progress became popul ar in Victorian Britain because it made it possible for the thinkers to negot iate the conflict between British positivism and philosophies of history which mainly derived fr om German romanticist traditi on. The British idea of progress successfully rendered German Idealist philosoph y into an empiricist form. Burrow (1968, 272) states (by rephrasing Lovejoys statement about the eighteenth century biology): It would be almost equally apt to describe nineteenth-cen tury theories of social evolution as the temporalization of Natural Law. German philos ophies of history were used to vindicate the rationalist theories of ethics, from which Victorian thinkers invented their utilitarianism. The 119

PAGE 120

V ictorian idea of progress helped vindicate the British intellectual tradition by neutralizing the subversive effects of continental thoughts. Michael Freeden (1978, 6-8) would suggest that the definition of positivism here is too loose. By understanding positivism as a connecti on between ethics and science, Freeden (1978, 8) points out that the British Id ealists around the turn of the century transformed it into a more German shape of Weltanschauung. Yet this argument by Freeden itself suggests the fundamental continuity of liberal project in the late ni neteenth century Britai n. Freedens (1978, epilogue) point is that the combination of et hics and science in liberalism led to the project of social reform by the beginning of the Great War. He would not deny that the philosophies of Weltanshauung among British Idealists were yet the E nglish variants of German Idealism. While I have emphasized the link between Carr s thinking between the early biographies and The Twenty Years Crisis it did not mean that the latter de alt with the tension between Russia and Europe. The point was that Russia represented an irrationalist schoo l of thought and Europe a rationalist type. My own binary between Victor ianism and modernism is a specific historical manifestation of this distinction. The above history tells that these two cultures designate the intellectual conflict between Britain and Europe. In this sense, the tension between Russia and Europe in the early biographies is transformed into the one between Europe and Britain in (or, more appropriately, behind) the text of The Twenty Years Crisis It should be clear that thinkers of irrationality who appear in The Twenty Years Crisis are mostly European: Hegel, Marx, Freud, Spengler, Luka s, Croce and so on. Moreover, Carrs claim for the congruence of theory and practice was not necessarily Russian but very British either in the biographies or in The Twenty Years Crisis The words of Reba Soffer (1978, 1-2) are wo rth quoting at some length: 120

PAGE 121

The English never had to reply to the seem i ngly irresistible forces that overwhelmed Europen intellectuals. Prussian military might, virulent Austrian and French anti-Semitism, anarchistic Balkan and Italian nationalism, and a rising tolerance of vi olence as an antidote to frustrated reason oppressed European explan ations of social and economic, political, and psychological phenomena. Thinkers such as Weber, Freud, Durkheim, and Croce succumbed to a psychological malaise that acknowledged, reluctantl y, irrational forces underlying even the most rational behavior and institutions. While it can hardly be denied that the Europeans built more formidable theo retical structures than the English, their melancholy revelation of irrationality resu lted ineluctably in a deterministic and pessimistic social theory severed from social practice. British thinkers brought about a more practical form of social science by the time of the Great War to advocate what Freeden (1978) calls an ideology of social refo rm. It was already mentioned in the last chapter, at least in a pa ssing manner, that the word intellectual had its historical meaning in The Twenty Years Crisis. Etymologically, the Englis h word intellectual has started to commonly signify the figures who dedi cate themselves to the issues in culture and society after the Dreyfus Affair of 1898 (Allen 19 86). Yet, as Stefan Collini (1993) discusses, such figures existed already in the mid Victoria n period. In fact, Mill was a symbolic thinker as he introduced the socialist awareness to libera lism. Socialism here broadly means the concern about society. Such socialism widely spread by the 1880s, when Sir William Harcourt stated we are all socialist now (Freeden 1978, 25-32). Liberal intellectuals were responsible for improving the society. The advancement of industrialization contributed to the spread of professionalization in the British society (Perkin 2002). In the intell ectual field, it took a certa in form of reformism. The awareness grew toward the beginning of the war. According to the contemporary evaluation of Robert Graves and Alan Hodge (1940[1994], 200): Before the war the British educational system had been one of the clearest expres sions of the class-st ructure of society. The engineering liberalism survived even thr ough the years of the Great War and remained mostly intact in the university education (see So ffer 1994). Cambridge and Oxford played central 121

PAGE 122

roles by exp licitly aiming at nurturing elite inte llectuals who were supposed to lead the mass. Carr was in Cambridge in most of the first half of the 1910s. When he provi ded his elitist view of public opinion, he was like a typical graduate of Cambridge where the ancient form of liberal education was defended against the professionali sm of German university system. Carr learned classics both in the public school and Cambridge. Historical studies were considered primarily important for the intellect uals to lead the public. The British society was especially favorable fo r the reformist social theory in the 1930s. According to Graves and Hodge (1940[1994], 390), it was the time when engineers and scientists started to think that their insight might help reorganizing democracy: It began to be realized towards the end of the Thirties that a closer in tegration of community needs and feelings would make class-war unnecessary and even impossi ble. Carr lived in a similar intellectual circumstance where Victorian intellectuals at tempted to vindicate British liberalism from continental philosophies. Collini (2006) has rece ntly challenged the prevalent view that the twentieth century British society was lack of in tellectuals. His argument is a sequel to the above mentioned discussion about the nineteenth century intellectuals. As the most recent version of this project, Collini (2008, chap. 12), although a b it hesitatingly, discussed Carr as an intellectual in basically the same sense that he called Mill and others as intellectua l. We already know that Carr referred to Francis Bacon, not Dostoevsky, when he advocat ed the unity of theory and practice. Conquering Europe In this regard, it is possible to find Carrs bias in his earlier works. At least, two of Carrs early interpretations of nineteen th century thinkers il lustrate the same symptom: Dostoevsky and Marx. These two thinkers are especially important in this current context. One of them is the 122

PAGE 123

starting point of Carr for his enti re project in the 1930s. The other is strangely called Victorian German, who presented a theory of progress. I already mentioned in chapter two that Carrs reading of Dostoevsky had certain orientalist flavor. In his rendition of Russi a, Carr used Europe and England almost interchangeably. This fact necessarily implies th at England represents the substance of whole Europe since the latter is geograp hically larger. To put otherwise, the center of Eur ope is England. Carrs apparent Eurocentrism in Dostoevsky is, in this sense, actually the Anglo-centrism which depicts the countries in the European c ontinent as the peripheries of England. Historically, Britain had been in an exceptional status up until around the beginning of the twentieth century. It was partly because of its geographical position. Also, its imperial status relieved her of the demand to act ively learn cultural insi ghts from other countries. Until the early twentieth century, Britain ended up culturally and intellectually outmoded. According to the description of the interwar culture by Graves and H odge (1940[1994], 181), British avant-garde painting and criticism was always two or three steps behind French fashion, and British popular taste two or three steps behind the avant-garde painters and critics. In this context, the British vogue of Russianne ss in the early twentie th century was only a part of the increased interest s in European culture (Hynes 1968, 345). Besides, such interests were not directed toward Germany in the prewar years (Hynes 1968, 335). The reception of German insights was even delayed. It is possible that Carr, as a Britis h, found the argument of Marx, Freud, and Meinecke as something new in the same way as he read Dostoevsky. If Carr learned his basic view of hi story through his writing of Dostoevsky, it is natural that its bias remained in The Twenty Years Crisis 123

PAGE 124

Given this special ignorance of Germ an philo sophies by the interwar British, it is not surprising if Carr showed a simila rly distorted comprehension of Marx. It has been pointed out that Carr was Marxist. But in which respect was he Marxist? Carr considers The Twenty Years Crisis as a quasi-Marxist work by himself. In his autobiographical sketch: Ive always been more interested in Marxism as a method of re vealing the hidden spri ngs of thought and action, and debunking the logical and moralistic faade generally erected round them, than in the Marxist analysis of the dec line of capitalism (Carr 2000, xviii ). Based on this methodological interest, Carr (2000, xiii-xix) continues: I did during these years a lot of reading and thinking on Marxist lines. The result was The 20 Years Crisis which I first planned in 1936-37 and finished early in 1939not exactly a Marxist work, but strongly impregnated with Marxist ways of thinking, applied to international affairs. Carrs primary interest in Marx is methodol ogy. Accordingly, we do not see clear class conflicts in The Twenty Years Crisis However, Carrs Marxism is strange even when it comes to methodological aspects. As the fundamental proce ss of civilization is dr iven by utopianism, we actually do not see revolutionary moments contra ry to Marxist progressivism. As I already argued, Carrs system of thought is a type of evolutionism but it is a particularly Victorian version in its form. According to Himmelfarb ( 1968, 420-23), there is a logi cally irreconcilable difference between Darwinism and Marxism. It is a particular strand of so-called scientific socialists who considered them compatible. Such socialists were becoming more influential in interwar Britain (Macintyre 1980). In this circum stance, it was particularly British to interpret Marx as a quasi-Victorian. In fact, Sorel was one of the harshest critics of this scientific type of socialist. I have already discu ssed that Carr was in a more progr essive side as to how history proceeds, if not as to where it will reach. 124

PAGE 125

Indeed, sc ientific socialism was, if not excl usively, British in the sense that it helped mitigate the subversive moments of Marx for the liberal tradition of Br itain. Once the modernist impulses of Marx are grasped, it is easy to unde rstand why Carr needed to attempt this maneuver. Approached from the view point of individuals, Marxism is a theo ry of action. The historically radical part of this theory is its scope of emancipati ng the range of human actions from the realm of economy. In the words of Marshall Berman (1988, 98), Marx hoped to heal the wounds of modernity through a fuller and a deeper modernity. Modernity here means the world of tensions in industrializing societies. There is a wealthy community, on the one hand, while inner lives of individuals are locked away from it, on the other hand (Berman 1988, 43). Marxs solution was to deepen this tension so it reaches its culminating point to co llapse by itself. The problem of capitalism will be solved from its inside by the proletariats. There is a moment of existentialism in the t hought of Marx in this regard, if we understand existentialism as mans call for the emanci pation from the surrounding constraints. The instrumental rationality of the capitalis t economists bound people with the impersonally calculated rules of the system. Marx attempts to discard them. It is as though Marx, not unlike Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Hannah Arendt (1993, 25) suggests, tried desperately to think against the tradition while using its own conceptu al tools. Marxism is a subverting force toward metaphysical abstractness. As Arendt (1993, 39) al so argues, the very concept of dialectical movement as Hegel conceived it as a universal law, and as Marx accepted it, makes the terms idealism and materialism as philosophical sy stems meaningless (ita lics in original). Carr evaluated Marxs thought as an unsystemati c amalgam of ideas. If Arendt is right, however, the unsystematic structure of Marxism was natural since Marx tried to destroy the metaphysical system. It might seem that Carr understood this moment of Marx when he 125

PAGE 126

considered Marxism as a school of realism. Carrs theoretical system itself turned out to be a product of eclecticism like Marxs. Yet we alread y know that Carr returned to his metaphysical ideal of progress to incorporate its elements for his new system. Indeed, Carr must not have denounced Marx for his eclecticism if he himsel f sought to destroy the metaphysics. Carrs criticism of Marx itself suggests the deep concern about the c oherent system in the discourse of Carr. However explicitly Carr manifested his dislike of abstractness, he still aspired for a metaphysical idea of ethics. He might have wanted to deepen the modernity through modernity as Marx attempted to do. But his endeavor ende d up a less subversive a nd more unclear one. The man of action was revived only within the safely fenced tradition of utopianism. Carr was not so much a revolutionary as a bourgeoisie who happened to obtained Capital for some money. A Long Detour Our starting point was the possi ble tension about the progressi vism in Carrs system of thought. The investigation so far re vealed the coexistence of two di fferent cultures in Carrs text. His ambiguity in these two cultures suggested hi s eclectic bent in theo ry. Yet this eclecticism endangered his entire project of establishi ng a new model of civi lization. The goodness of progress was presupposed as an unverifiable axiom in this eclecticism. Cultural and intellectual contexts in history supported to identify Carr as an idiosyncratic ally British inte llectual in the interwar European settings. Given Carrs relativistic attitude to theoretica l concepts, it might be difficult to label him completely as Victorian despite his strong inclin ations to the possibili ty and goodness of human progress. Yet it might be less difficult to cal l him Edwardian, although he was slightly more optimistic than the label signifies. Samuel H ynes (1968, 348) describes the character of the Edwardian intellectual mind as follows: The do minant mood was rather a mixed one: nostalgia 126

PAGE 127

in those who looked backward, apprehension in those who looked toward the future. After Einstein, the British in the 1920s started to use the word relativity out of its original context in physics (Graves and Hodge 1940[1994], 86-87). The el egant skepticism started to become the sign of the sophisticated inte llectual mind (Houghton 1957, 180). Bury, from whom Carr learned the history of the idea of progress, represented such skeptical mind as well. Burys discussion ended with the suggestion that the idea of progress might be re lative as a doctrine. He asks: does not Progress itself suggest that its value as a doctrine is only relative, corresponding to a certain not very advanced stage of civilization; just as Providence, in its day, was an idea of relative value, corresponding to a stage somewhat less advanced? (Bury 1920, 352). The British started to acquire a skeptical attitude to their tr adition. Yet the Victorian period might have still been too close as the past to observe in a detach ed manner even for a person like Carr, who was well aware that th ere was the world outside of Br itain and whose objectivity in research has been praised by his contemporary inte llectuals. I do not beli eve that we are at a sufficient distance from the Victorian age, G. M. Young (1936[2002], 160) stated only three years before the appearance of The Twenty Years Crisis, to judge with perfect fairness its prevalent philosophy in a matter wh ere only the utmost vigilance can prevent our thought from being at once clouded and coloured with, often unconscious, emotion. To accept Youngs evaluation, The Twenty Years Crisis was not an abnormal work for the contemporaries who spent their youth mostly at around the tu rn of the century and entere d the intellectua lly productive stage of their life in the interwar period. Liberalism was at the center of Carrs thinking and his entire project in the 1930s concerned its revision. What is remarkable abou t Carr is that he employed rhetorical maneuver not to spread the realist doctrine but to vindi cate modern utopianism. For example, liberal 127

PAGE 128

utopian ism became rootless partly because Amer ica disconnected its idea from the British context. At stake is not necessarily the legitimacy of the British tradition but the detachment of utopianism from it. In this story, a logical possibility is saved that the authentic British liberalism can be revived if approached in an appropriate manner. Also remember that the skepticism against abstract metaphysics was a Russian trait in Dostoevsky. The same mind was implanted in realism in The Twenty Years Crisis It is possible to say that Carr is skeptic since he absorbed th is line of realism. As we already know, however, the doubt about metaphysics is also a characteristic element of British empiricism. The scientific mind of realism was not totally alien to the Englis h to begin with. By identifying skepticism with the realist mode of thinking, and thus an idea external to the British intellectual tradition, Carr provided a lip service to the aris ing European forms of thinking. It is not significant whether Carr was actually conscious of these points. What we need to concern is these possibilities that the text contains at least, implicitly. It is necessary to ask why The Twenty Years Crisis took a roundabout approach to disc uss the situation of the time. A historical form of thinking was an indirect appro ach to the crisis. A part of the reason might have been Carrs private inclinations to this mode of thought as well as the classic education he enjoyed in his youth. Yet if he wanted to use hi story as the exemplar of the necessity of both realist and utopian thoughts, it necessarily fa iled in its function not to tell how modern utopianism was flawed but to te ll how modern realism would nece ssarily collapse. The reason is simply that no one had yet seen the end of mode rn realism. If Carr needed history as mere empirical evidence, indeed, he might have been ab le to draw how utopian and realist phases have come one after another in the history of wester n civilization preceding the modern period. But he did not perform any investigation of this ki nd since his subject concerned something he 128

PAGE 129

considered n ew and idiosyncratic to his era. His concern was not primarily in the past but was in the present and the future. His discussion of how civilization proceeds thus needed to end with the prescription of how it would ad vance, indeed, in theory. In th is sense, Carr did not have an urgent reason to employ the historical form of thi nking that he adopted even if his interest was in the profound, not immediate, cause of the crisis. As such, the most remarkable use of history turned out to be its rhetorical function. He might have been able to focus on the political regime of the new era if he just needed to provide a prescription. Yet such a ttempt was also difficult since the left intellectuals did not have much choice. Different from Carrs description, the trad ition of liberalism was not a single line of the development of utilitarian voluntarism. As we discussed above, socialism was already a constitutive part of liberalism because of the advance of its ow n capitalist project. Liberalists could not stay at an idealist stage and need ed to ponder on the actual economic inequalities (Freeden 1978, 64). A part of the project of British Idealism was a further incorporation of socialist concerns about the class inequality fo r the achievement of more concrete forms of human rights. Yet such socialist liberalism was, as Ernest Barker (1915, 11) stated around the commencement of the Great War, rather a restoration of the Republic of Plato. It just reminded people of the fact that man was a social being. Freeden (1978, 27) states by discussing the late nineteenth century liberalism: the truth of socialism was in the perception that man was a social being. There had always been some socialis m since society come into being. And the consequence of the development of its line of socialist liberalism was the failure to prevent the war. Both classical and socialist types of libera lism already failed somehow when the war ended. Yet the former was worse sin ce its reapplication gradually showed the limit toward the 129

PAGE 130

130 commencement of another war, as Carr criticized it as a groundless. By contrast, socialist liberalism might still have left some space fo r improvement given the width of the range it covered as above. Interwar liberalis ts were forced a negative choice. Socialist forms of liberalism were less invalid. Or its advancement might have been the only (negative) option to revive the liberal project, which, anyway, contributed to th e progress of the world for more than a century. In fact, this form of libera lism might have been the only re asonable way to negotiate the malicious effects of the market economy especia lly when Carr considered the economic crisis of 1931 as the decisive point where history started to show its merciless force. Collectivism seemed to be a way of making life safer for everyone and less susceptible to the roulette wheel of the market (Annan 1990, 13). It may be possible to say that, whatever Carr in tended, it was part of the rhetoric of his text to describe the pre-war liberalism as the thoroughly classical type Socialist liberalism needed to be available as an option so its e nd needed to have been not announced yet. It is in this sense that the integrity was the vice for Carr (Haslam 1999) and he felt it his duty to tell a lie (Jones 1998). Carrs intellectual standpoint was radical but for a conservative purpose (Wilson 2001). The discourse about liberalism needed to be indirect. In return, his rhet orical approach itself points to his trust in liberalism. Given the eclectic character of the text, the rhetoric is the only tool to find consistency in it.

PAGE 131

CHAP TER 6 EPILOGUE The outline of the story was this. Carrs early works from Dostoevsky to The Twenty Years Crisis were a single series of str uggle with the epochal crisis in the Euro pean intellectual tradition. Carr first exposed himsel f to the problem of human irra tionality in his reading of Dostoevsky. This Russian author attempted to so lve its nihilistic ramifications in politics through a rational belief in God. The meaning of life can be known by suffering the everyday agonies. Carr rejected this answer as a solution to his own world. Yet he accepted the question by rendering it so it could have di rect relevance to the interwar era. Russia became a mirror of twentieth century Europe, or actually, England. Leaving Dostoevsky, Carr turned his eyes to other Russian figures such as Herzen and Bakunin as well as their antagoni st Marx. Early romanticists ended up being divided by the personal passion and the universal love. They could not establish the harmonious relation between them. Bakunins individualism did not provide the solution to this tension either since its implication was too atomistic as a politic al philosophy. By contrast, Marx was too antiindividualistic to give an appropriate status for the participants of politics. Carr realized that he could not rely on the histor ical figures to solve the problem of the present. Carr needed to find his own answer to the cris is in the interwar years. He could not be satisfied with the old utilitarian model for the sa me reason his nineteenth century thinkers could not. Yet he already learned that the problem is irrationality and its political ramifications. The voluntarist model of politics misestimated the power of the subconscious part of man. The crisis in the 1930s was the result of this ignorance. To resist the impersonal force, Carr needed to invent the model of political ma n. Everyone had to be prepared fo r the possible ir rationality of the collective act. 131

PAGE 132

By teaching people th e way of self-defen se, however, Carr ended up manifesting the modern utopian belief of human progress. The worl d advances in a better direction whenever this political man exploits his ability to the full extent. At bottom, it is not different from the model of economic man: a good mans good in tention brings society good. Carr was ambivalent in this aspect. On the one hand, he emphasized the uncertainty of the future by turning his eye to the power of human irrationality. On the other hand, he relied on the power of rational man to break the path to a better future by his own ability. This eclectic attitude was symptomatic in his system even at the ep istemological level. Ma terialism, philosophical realism, and philosophical idealism assert their legitimacy at different parts of the mechanism of history he described. Political realism and political liberalism coexist. A teleological idea of progress and the evolutionist claim of irregularity in history app ear one after the other. The only coherent core behind this amalgam was the ethi cal appeal to the liber al idea of individual freedom. As such, however, the ambiguity of the work was its constitutive element. Rhetoric integrated the text. It wa s a sign of sincerity in the culture of turmoil. The Twenty Years Crisis turned out to be an idiosyncratically British vindication of the freedom of individuals. What is the significance of this historical an ecdote to us living in a different era? Two primary insights are noteworthy fo r international studies. One of them is about the political standpoint of Carr and his time. At the end of th e last chapter, I mentioned the difficulty of liberalism in the early twentieth century. The war announced the failure of both traditional and socialist liberalisms. Some of Carrs favorite intellectuals in The Twenty Years Crisis share this difficulty. Harold Laski is a remarkable example. Carr (1939a, 115, 124, 226) cites the works of Laski several times in The Twenty Years Crisis and all the references are meant to support his 132

PAGE 133

own discussion. Since scholars have usually recognized Laski as a red professor not only in the interwar period but even beyond it, this fact apparently adds a circum stantial evidence for the scholarly observations which describe Carrs sy mpathy for totalitarianism as a corollary of his logic (Kaufman 1996, 322-23; Wilson 2000, 183; Fa lk 2002, 105). However, recent studies of Laski generally agree that he ha s been considered an advocate of communism just because of the dominant bias in the Cold War period. Revisionist s in the last two decades share the opinion that Laski was actually one of the most nuanced libe ral thinkers in the twentieth century (Kramnick and Sheerman 1993; Newman 1993; Lamb 2004). We already discussed that nineteenth century liberals gradually incorporated so cialist concerns into their thoughts. Laskis socialism was, in a crucial aspect, an extension of liberalism in the late ninet eenth century (see Freeden 1986, 295313). Laski was critical of liberalis m because of his liberal ideal. While not a British intellectual, Mannheim had a similar intellectual inclination. According to Charles Jones (1998), Carr and Mannheim shared the critical idea of positivist epistemology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is difficult to acc ept this argument without some reservations since it is now clear from the discussion in the previous chapters that Carrs theoretical orientation was more complex. Still, I think the two thinkers were closer in their political orientations. As an arguably critical theorist of the Frankfurt School, Mannheim was against the utilitarian understanding of politics. The criticism of instrumental rationality was needed since it bound individuals with their own reason. In th e industrialized societies, rationality was employed against the freedom of man. Mannheims criticism of the positivist epistemology was inseparable from his concern about human freedom in this respect. David Ketler and Volker Meja (1995, 17) assesses the political inclination of Mannheim as follows: His critiques of rationalism, ahistoricism, a nd individualism address substantive points of 133

PAGE 134

libe ral doctrine requiring adjustment, but the liberal elements constitute the structure and plan of his inquiry. Judged by his own indica tors, his style of thinking is predominantly liberal. Both Mannheim and Carr were concerned about the way of using reason, not its rejection. Carr (1939a, 21) criticizes Mannheims dismissive attitude toward the mass. Given that Mannheim advocated the classless character of intelligentsia, however he shared with Carr the awareness about the problem of class inequality. Although the two schola rs differed as to their methods, both aspired for the emancipation of individuals from the cons traints of old rationali sts irrationalities. It was not strange for liberalists to be critical of their classical ancestors in the age of crisis. In the introductory chapter, I referred to the possibility that Carr might have not needed to criticize the works of interwar idealists in th e 1930s. As in the last chapters, Carr used the dichotomy of utopianism and realism for historical and theoretical senses. He did not intend it to be a pejorative label. Given that Carr was primar ily interested in criticizing nineteenth century utilitarianism, it was not necessary for him to reject interwar idealists from the right start. It was not strange that Carr criticized only the earlier wo rks of idealists, not thei r later works. I do not denounce the achievement of the recent revisions about interwar idealists. They have excavated the long ignored social democratic concerns of the interwar theorists. Yet the insight of the revisionists should not be used to emphasize how Carr misunderstood these early theoreticians. It rather points to the widely recognized difficulty of liberalism, which Carr shared with them. This being said, the other relate d issue concerns the meaning of international studies in the western tradition of political st udies. It is crucial to obtain the above understanding about the intellectual situation in the inception of the modern international studies. Carr is significant in the history of international studies for his awareness of the significan ce of individuals in the age of its twilight. My argument started wi th the dissatisfaction with the la ck of historical awareness of 134

PAGE 135

the existing works. I discussed that it is necessa ry to go beyond the field of international studies for international studies. What I found through this expedition was Carrs concern about the problem of human irrationality in the western tradition of political philosophy. The appearance of international politics marked the twilight of this tradition. Mo re appropriately, the rise of international politics was considered to have cer tain relation with the twilight of the western intellectual tradition. The manifestations about the sense of the crisis were observable everywhere in among the contemporary intellec tual discourses in the post-Great War period (Koselleck 2006, 397). The end of a tradition was perceived by the era. Situated in this mood, The Twenty Years Crisis discussed politics at its demise. It is a different issue whether such understand ing is historically accurate from the present perspective. Yet this point brings a question worth pondering: what can we say about international politics after Carr ? At the very beginning of this study, I announced that international politics is the form of politic s which reveals the limit of politics. The story concludes by restating this issue. My final re mark starts from the comparison between Carr and Morgenthau. Both scholars have been recognized as the earliest theorists of the contemporary studies of international politics. Morgenthau is especially relevant for the present discussion, compared with other possible classical scholars since recent studies of his thought usually goes beyond the field of international studies and relate him with philosophers such as Nietzsche, Weber and Schmitt. I will not delve into Morgenthau deeply since this is not the place of examining his thought. My comparison is rather casua l. Yet it is sufficient to illuminate the implications of Carrs thinking for the i nnate problem of international politics. Carr and Morgenthau started from the same concern but ended up reaching different solutions. Robert Schuett (2007) recently di scussed how Morgenthau reused his early 135

PAGE 136

unpublished discussion of Freud in his Scientific Man versu s Power Politics Morgenthau borrowed from Freud the idea of ego instincts to discuss the world of struggle. Carr and Morgenthau both started from human irrationality and its ramifications in international politics. The discovery of irrationality led both Carr and Morgenthau to the rejection of the economic man of utilitarian liberalism. The wo rld could be the place of recurrent wars and quagmires if people continued to follow its idea l. Observing this danger, Morgenthau (1946, 202) advocated everyday solution of the problem by advo cating political ethics as the norm of doing (lesser) evil. In other words, Morgenthau tried to prevent the actualization of the potential crisis by attempting to solve the problems from within the new world of realism. When Carr discussed political man, it seemed th at he agreed with Morgenthau about the form of ethics in the new era. Yet Carr rather chose to believe in the ability of irrational men to appropriately employ their rational part of mind. His aim is to go beyond the world of realism to escape from the already actualized crisis. Morg enthau (1948b, 134) needed to criticize Carr as a believer of utopia, who could easily (re)turn to an idealist dictator. If Carr was interested in leading the mass to what he thought the right direction in order to ascertain his belief in human rationality, he was, indeed, quite a dictator as much as those nineteenth century intellectuals whom he criticized were. Morgenthaus argument sounds more plausible by accepting the evil as evil. He does not pretend that people can totally overcome such evil, contrary to utilita rian rationalists who believed they could. In the world of Morgenth au, an individual appears as a hero who relentlessly faces all the problems he has. He is almost a materialization of Nietzschean superman. As Christophe Frei (2001) suggests, Morgenthau was heavily influenced by Nietzsche indeed. 136

PAGE 137

However Carrs project was to transcend th is Nietzschean world. From a different view, Morgenthaus model is rather conservative as it is strangely similar to the rationalist model. When the utilitarian thinkers consider that the economic men automati cally achieve the harmony of interests, individuals do not have autonomy despite the assumpti on that the voluntary acts of the good man leads to the good of the whole society. Individuals are actually destined to behave in a certain predetermined way to increase weal th both in private and public spheres. By the same token, the hero of Morgenthau embraces the force of history as given. Morgenthaus pragmatic solution is a corollary of his persistent subscription to realism. According to Mead (1936, 359), philosophical realism and philosophical pragmatism lead to the same practical consequence due to their re jection of idealist teleol ogy: Progress is not toward a known goal. We cannot tell what the go al is toward which we are moving, and we do not test our movements or direct them according to any fixed goal that we can set up. What we do do, in the face of difficulties or problems, is to seek solutions. All problems for Morgenthaus hero are problems only inasmuch as he accepts the relentle ss law of history which limits the range of his possible behavior. Morgenth aus political animal is actually a slave of everyday bureaucratic duty. Unlike Nietzschean s uperman, he does not try to eternally transcend the existing value for higher value. Around the same time when both Carr and Morgen thau started to present their discussion, Arthur Lovejoy (1936) described th e history of the western thought as the change of the balance of the tension between this-world ly and other-worldly concerns. In this axis, both Morgenthau and Carr belong to the former side of the trad ition by focusing their at tention on the role of individuals in politics. Yet Morgenthau is relativel y more this-worldly when he criticizes Carrs utopianism. However, Morgenthaus extra this-wor ldly approach ends up with the subjugation of 137

PAGE 138

individuals to a transcendental power called history Carrs lim itedly this-worldly solution is more emancipative in this regard. The difference, we may say, is that Morgenthau stayed with the primitive stage of Raskolinikov and Carr embraced the teaching of Alyosha. Individuals, in the world of Carr, subscribe neither to the law of rationality nor to the law of history. True, they still live in these two laws. Yet they have au tonomy within these constitutive structures. It is not my intention to say that Carr was right and Morgenthau was wrong just because of this schematic delineation. As we already saw, the system of Carr was possible only when he gave an unconditional trust in the mercy of progress. Carrs belief in the ability of individual is naive and, we may say, unverifiable. Given that Ca rr ultimately went back to the old world if via a long detour, Morgenthau, a scholar with stronger inclinations to realism, was right by criticizing the possible ut opian dictatorship of Carrs model. As Jean Bethke Elshtain (2008, 157) suggests, Carrs ideal of inte rnational community might be dangerous and even silly. Furthermore, Morgenthaus pragmatism is anyway a thought of progress. We do not know where we can finally reach after the daily fights against evils. As far as we solve the problems, however, we move from the exis ting situation to another one if within the same horizon. The world is, at least, not static. It is progress wh erever the destination is. Ultimately, Carr versus Morgenthau is not progress versus non-progre ss but the conflict betw een two views of the advancement of the world. Indeed, Carr suggested that modern realism embraced the idea of progress. The issue was that th is idea of progress was something similar to the vitalist evolutionism which Carr embraced only partly. The world needs to be improved by the hands of individuals. Yet individuals no longer seem to have such power. If we try to teach th em their ability, they end up becoming a slave of history and cease to be autonom ous. If we try to set another field where people can be 138

PAGE 139

autonom ous, we cannot but make it groundless. The traditional solution to the relationship between individual and society is no longer available. Politics is th e art of life of individuals. Yet individuals cannot grasp their positio n in the vast field of interna tional society. They cannot tame the power of this society through election or ot her procedures whereas its ruling force spreads over the entire surface of the globe Politics is still the art of in dividuals but more in a negative way. The problem is linked with the chief concern in what Fred Dallmayr (1981) calls the postindividualist era, when the possessive form of subjectivity has been shaken first by Nietzsche and Freud, then by phenomenologists, and finally by critical theorists an d post-structuralists. Indeed, the possessive individualism has its root in the thought of John Locke, who was also the pioneering thinker of the modern British tradi tion of political philosophy whose decline Carr was primarily concerned about. Voluntarism ceased to be the option toward the beginning of the Great War. The human world moves in whichever di rection nevertheless. On the other hand, it is already counterintuitive to believe in the omnipotence of God who enable s the virtuous circle. But the world would become meaningless if we accepted the totally determining power of the structural force which does not have intimat e relation with the activ ity of individuals. International politics appears in the twilight of subjectivity. For sure, it is possible and even easy to find more sophisticated presentation of the same question in other twentieth century intellectuals. Carr was not the first ra te philosopher at all. Judging from the argument in the previous ch apter, his discussion was even terrible. Still, Carr is significant at least for the field international studies since he has been recognized as its pioneer for the ve ry text which he provided to ta ckle with the same question as more praiseworthy thinkers still discuss. Intern ational politics appeared as the epochal question 139

PAGE 140

of political p hilosophy first in his time and he recognized its significance. Carr uncovered the difficulty of politics in international politics. There is probably no definite answer to this qu estion so it is wide of the mark to attempt to achieve the immediate insight in the discourse of Carr. His primary significance is historical, and, in this regard, the problem is that the field of international studies has long been unaware of the fact that Carr grappled with such question. In the 1970s, Carr expressed to Stanley Hoffman (1977) his reluctance to have been recognized as a pioneer of inte rnational studies. He sure had a legitimate right to manifest such feeling. The Second Debate in the 1960s was just a strange revival of the school of thought which he already criticized in 1939. Both structuralism and behavioralism reduced the act of individuals to the law of the world beyond them. Worse still, Carrs enemies, realists, were now said to prev ail after equipped with such determining force. These self-claimed realists even suggested thei r intellectual connection with him. They even willingly eradicated the autonomy of individu als and thus the possi bility of politics. Methodologically, historical and rhetorical discourses started to be excluded from the discipline as illegitimate tools for academic discussions. Ca rr could have shared the feeling of the decline of political philosophy discussed by his contemporary critics of behavioralism. As indirect heirs to post-beha vioralists, recent critical theori sts might claim that they are aware of the problem. Intellectual historians have suggested the continu ity between modernists and post-modernists in terms of their concern ab out the various facets of indeterminacy of our social world (see Megill 1985; Berman 1988). Their approaches might indeed be better by grappling with it more directly and consciously. The introduction of the agent-structure problem is one of the clear evidence th at they know its significance in the contemporary problem of political philosophy. 140

PAGE 141

141 Yet even in this movement against structuralism in the field, it is rare that individuals are given the appropriate status as the active particip ants of politics. When linguistically oriented theoreticians claim the death of the author, indi viduals dissolves into the web of discourses. Roxanne Lynn Doty (1997) once criticized the lack of the attention to agents in the debate from a post-structuralist perspective. However, it doe s not seem that the discussion has remarkably advanced since then. In fact, cri tical theories might be closer to realism than usually considered given their subscription to skeptical mind as we ll as their appraisals of Nietzsche and other twentieth century thinkers (see Sterling-Folker and Shinko 2005). The fundamental problem of the field of in ternational studies is that it has moved backward by misunderstanding the problem which was correctly presented in its inception. It does not seem that the situation has been remark ably improved even in the current scholarship. The limit of politics in internati onal politics is still the enigma which does not have the space it deserves. In this sense, Carr still plays the pivotal role in the history of international studies.

PAGE 142

LIST OF REFERE NCES Allen, Peter. 1986. The Meanings of An Intell ectual: Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Usage. University of Toronto Quarterly 55 (Summer): 342-58. Altick, Richard. 1973. Victorian People and Ideas: A Companion for the Modern Reader of Victorian Literature New York: W. W. Norton. Annan, Noel. 1990. Our Age: English Intellectuals between the World WarsA Group Portrait New York: Random House. Arendt, Hannah. 1993. Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought New York: Penguin Books. Ashcraft, Richard. 1980. Political Theory and the Problem of Ideology. Journal of Politics 42 (August): 687-705. Ashworth, Lucian. 1999. Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition Aldershot: Ashgate. Ashworth, Lucian. 2002 Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations. International Relations 16 (April): 33-51. Ashworth, Lucian. 2006. Where Are the Ideali sts in Interwar International Relations? Review of International Studies 32 (July): 291-308. Barkawi, Tarak. 1998. Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic Studies. Review of International Studies 24 (December): 159-84. Barker, Ernest. 1915. Political Thought in England: From Herbert Spencer to the Present Day New York: Henry Holt. Barlow, Nora. (ed.) 1958. The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882 New York: W. W. Norton. Becker, Carl. 1932. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers New Haven: Yale University Press. Bell, Duncan. 2002. Anarchy, Power and Death: C ontemporary Political Realism as Ideology. Journal of Political Ideologies 7 (June): 221-39. Bergson, Henri. 1911. Creative Evolution New York: Henry Holt. Bernstein, Samuel. 1939. Review of Michael Bakunin Political Science Quarterly 54 (June): 289-91. Bernstein, Richard. 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 142

PAGE 143

Berlin, Isaiah. 1994. Russian Thinkers New York: Penguin Books. Berman, Marshall. 1988. All that Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity New York: Penguin Books. Booth, Ken. 1991. Security in Anarchy: Utopi an Realism in Theory and Practice. International Affairs 67 (July): 527-45. Bowler, Peter. 1994. Darwinism and Modernism: Genetics, Paleontology, and the Challenge to Progressionism. In Modernist Impulses in th e Human Sciences, 1870-1930 ed. Dorothy Ross. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 236-54. Bowler, Peter. 2003. Evolution: The History of an Idea Berkeley: University of California Press. Bracco, Rosa Maria. 1993. Merchants of Hope: British Middlebrow Writers and the First World War, 1919-1939 Oxford: Berg. Buck, Carl Darling. 1938. Review of Michael Bakunin International Affairs 17 (SeptemberOctober): 738-39. Burrow, John. 1968. Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burrow, John. 2000. The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914. New Haven: Yale University Press. Bury, J. B. 1920. The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth London: Macmillan. Butterfield, Herbert. 1981. The Origins of History New York: Basic Books. Carey, John. 1992. The Intellectuals and the Masses: Prid e and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939 London: Faber & Faber. Carr, E. H. 1931. Dostoevsky, 1821-1881: A New Biography. London: Alllen & Unwin. Carr, E. H. 1933. The Romantic Exiles: A Nineteenth-Century Portrait Gallery London: Victor Gollancz. Carr, E. H. 1934. Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism London: J. M. Dent & Sons. Carr, E. H. 1936. Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace. International Affairs 15 (November): 846-62. Carr, E. H. 1937a. Michael Bakunin London: Macmillan. Carr, E. H. 1937b. International Relations since the Peace Treaties London: Macmillan. 143

PAGE 144

Carr E. H. 1939a. The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Politics London: Macmillan. Carr, E. H. 1939b. Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Carr, E. H. 1942. Conditions of Peace London: Macmillan. Carr, E. H. 2000. An Autobiography. In E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal ed. Michael Cox, pp. xiii-xxii. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cassirer, Ernst. 1950. The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and History since Hegel New Haven: Yale University Press. Cassirer, Ernst. 1951. The Philosophy of Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chan, Stephen. 2003. A Problem for IR: How Shall We Narrate the Saga of the Bestial Man? Global Society 17 (October): 385-413. Chong, Alan. 2007. Lessons in International Co mmunication: Carr, Angell, and Lippmann on Human Nature, Public Op inion and Leadership. Review of International Studies 33 (October): 615-35. Coleman, William. 1977. Biology in the Nineteenth Centur y: Problems of Form, Function, and Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collingwood, R. G. 1945. The Idea of Nature Oxford: Clarendon Press. Collingwood, R. G. 1994. The Idea of History: With Lectures, 1926-1928 Oxford: Oxford University Press. Collini, Stefan. 1993. Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 18501930. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Collini, Stefan. 2006. Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain Oxford: Oxford University Press. Collini, Stefan. 2008. Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cox, Michael. 1999. Will the Real E. H. Carr Please Stand Up? International Affairs 75 (July): 643-53. Cox, Michael. 2001. Introduction. In The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Politics E. H. Carr. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, ix-lviii. Dallmayr, Fred. 1981. Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 144

PAGE 145

Darwin, Charles. 1859[2006]. On the Origins of Species by Means of Natu ral Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. In From So Simple a Beginning: The Four Great Books of Charles Darwin ed. Edward Wilson. New York: W. W. Norton, 449-760. Davies, R. W. 2000. Carrs Changing Views of the Soviet Union. In E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal ed. Michael Cox. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 91-108. De Jonge, Alex. 1975. Dostoevsky and the Age of Intensity New York: St. Martins. Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1997. Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory. European Journal of International Relations 3 (September): 365-92. Dryzek, John, and Stephen Leonard. 1988. Histo ry and Discipline in Political Science. American Political Science Review 82 (December): 1245-60. Dunne, Tim. 1998. Inventing International Society: A History of the English School Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2008. On Ne ver Reaching the Coast of Utopia. International Relations 22 (June): 147-72. Everdell, William. 1997. The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-Century Thought Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Falk, Richard. 2002. Shafts of Light: Hedley Bull and E. H. Carr on International Relations. International Journal of Human Rights 6 (Summer): 103-9. Foucault, Michel. 1984. Nietzsc he, Genealogy, History. In The Foucault Reader ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 76-100. Freeden, Michael. 1978. The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform Oxford: Clarendon Press. Freeden, Michael. 1986. Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought, 1914-1939 Oxford: Clarendon Press. Frei, Christoph. 2001. Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Freyberg-Inan, Annette. 2004. What Moves Man: The Realist Theo ry of International Relations and Its Judgment on Human Nature Albany: SUNY Press. Fussell, Paul. 1975. The Great War and Modern Memory Oxford: Oxford University Press. Germain, Randall. 2000. E. H. Carr and th e Historical Mode of Thought. In E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Michael Cox. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 322-36. 145

PAGE 146

Geuss, Raymond. 2002. Liberalism and Its Discontents. Political Theory 30 (June): 320-38. Gismondi, Mark. 2004. Tragedy, Realism, and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the Theories of Max Weber, E. H. Carr, Ha ns J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy & Statecraft 15 (September): 435-64. Goldfischer, David. 2002 E. H. Carr: A Historical Realist Approach for the Globalization Era. Review of International Studies 28 (October): 697-717. Graves, Robert, and Alan Hodge. 1940[1994]. The Long Week-End: A Social History of Great Britain, 1918-1939. New York: W. W. Norton. Guzzini, Stefano. 1998. Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold London: Routledge. Habermas, Jrgen. 1990. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures Cambridge: MIT Press. Halliday, Fred, and Justin Rosenberg. 1998. Interview with Ken Waltz. Review of International Studies 24 (July): 371-86. Haslam, Jonathan. 1999. Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982 London: Verso. Himmelfarb, Gertrude. 1968. Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution New York: W. W. Norton. Hofer, Walther. 1957. Einleitung des Herausgebers. In Die Idee der Staatsrson Friedrich Meinecke, pp. vii-xxx. Mnchen: R. Oldenbourg. Hoffmann, Stanley. 1977. An American Soci al Science: International Relations. Daedalus 106 (Summer): 41-60. Houghton, Walter. 1957. The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 New Haven: Yale University Press. Huysmans, Jef. 1999. Know Your Schmitt: A Godfather of Truth and the Spectre of Nazism. Review of International Studies 25 (April): 323-28. Hynes, Samuel. 1968. The Edwardian Turn of Mind Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hynes, Samuel. 1991. A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture New York: Atheneum. Jervis, Robert. 1994. Hans Morgenthau, Realism and the Scientific Study of International Politics. Social Research 61 (Winter): 853-76. Jones, Charles. 1998. E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 146

PAGE 147

Jones, Charles. 2000. An Active Danger: E. H. Carr at The Times 1940-46. In E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Michael Cox. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 68-87. Karpovich, Michael. 1939. Review of Michael Bakunin American Historical Review 44 (January): 380-82. Kaufman, Robert. 1996. E. H. Carr, Winston Churchill, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Us: The Case for Principled, Prudential, Democratic Realism. In Roots of Realism ed. Benjamin Frankel. London: Frank Cass, 314-53. Kaye, Peter. 1999. Dostoevsky and English Modernism, 1900-1930 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keegan, John. 1998. The First World War New York: Vintage Books. Kern, Stephen. 2003. The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918: With a New Preface Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kettler, David, and Volker Meja. 1995. Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Secret of These New Times New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Koselleck, Reinhart. 2004. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time New York: Columbia University Press. Koselleck, Reinhart. 2006. Crisis. Journal of the History of Ideas 67 (April): 357-400. Koyr, Alexandre. 1957. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. Kramnick, Isaac, and Barry Sheerman. 1993. Harold Laski: A Life on the Left New York: Allen Lane. Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2006. Histo ry, Action and Identity: Revisiting the Second Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory. European Journal of International Relations 12 (March): 5-29. Lamb, Peter. 2004. Harold Laski: Problems of Democracy, the Sovereign State, and International Society Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lapid, Yosef. 1989. The Third Debate: On the Pr ospects of Internationa l Theory in a PostPositivist Era. International Studies Quarterly 33 (September): 235-54. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2003. The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leed, Eric. 1979. No Mans Land: Combat and Identity in World War I Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 147

PAGE 148

Linklater Andrew. 1997. The Transformation of Political Community: E. H. Carr, Critical Theory and International Relations. Review of International Studies 23 (July): 321-38. Long, David, and Peter Wilson. (eds.) 1995. Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lovejoy, Arthur. 1936. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Macintyre, Stuart. 1980. A Proletarian Science: Ma rxism in Britain, 1917-1933 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McKeon, Michael. 2002. The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mead, George Herbert. 1936. Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mearsheimer, John. 2005. E. H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On. International Relations 19 (June): 139-52. Meinecke, Friedrich. 1936. Die Entstehung des Historismus Mnchen: R. Oldenbourg. Megill, Allan. 1985. Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida Berkeley: University of California Press. Mirsky, D. S. 1931. Preface. In Dostoevsky (1821-1881): A New Biography E. H. Carr. London: Alllen & Unwin, page numbers unavailable. Molloy, Sen. 2003. Dialectics and Transformation: Exploring the Internati onal Theory of E. H. Carr. International Journal of Po litics, Culture and Society 17 (Winter): 279-306. Morgenthau, Hans. 1946. Scientific Man versus Power Politics Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Morgenthau, Hans. 1948a. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace New York: Alfred Knopf. Morgenthau, Hans. 1948b. The Political Science of E. H. Carr. World Politics 1 (October): 127-34. Morgenthau, Hans. 1972. Science: Servant or Master? New York: Plume. Muchnic, Helen. 1939. Dostoevskys English Reputation, 1881-1936 New York: Octagon Books. Murray, Alastair. 1997. Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics Edinburgh: Keele University Press. Neumann, Iver. 1996. Russia and the Idea of Europe. London: Routledge. 148

PAGE 149

Neum ann, Iver. 1999. Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Newman, Harold. 1993. Harold Laski: A Political Biography Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1932. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics New York: Charles Scribners Sons. Nisbet, Robert. 1980. History of the Idea of Progress New York: Basic Books. Osiander, Andreas. 1998. Rereading Early Twentie th-Century IR Theory : Idealism Revisited. International Studies Quarterly 42 (September): 409-32. Perkin, Harold. 2002. The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880 London: Routledge. Pichler, Hans-Karl. 1998. The Godfathers of Truth: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthaus Theory of Power Politics. Review of International Studies 24 (April): 185200. Popper, Karl. 2002. The Poverty of Historicism London: Routledge. Porter, Roy. 2000. The Creation of the Modern World: The Untold Story of the British Enlightenment New York: W. W. Norton. Quirk, Joel, and Darshan Vigneswaran. 2005. The C onstruction of an Edifice: The Story of a First Great Debate. Review of International Studies 31 (January): 89-107. Rich, Paul. 2000. E. H. Carr and the Quest for Mora l Revolution in Internat ional Relations. In E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal ed. Michael Cox. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 198216. Ricoeur, Paul. 1988. Time and Narrative, vol. 3 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ritter, Joachim. 1982. Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right Cambridge: MIT Press. Rohde, Christoph. 2004. Hans J. Morgenthau und der weltpolitische Realismus Wiesbaden: VS. Rose, Gideon. 1998. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics 51 (October): 144-72. Said, Edward. 1994. Orientalism New York: Vintage Books. Scheler, Michael. 1938. Review of Michael Bakunin Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 199 (September): 268. Scheuerman, William. 2008. Realism and the Left: The Case of Hans J. Morgenthau. Review of International Studies 34 (January): 29-51. 149

PAGE 150

Schm idt, Brian. 1998a. Lessons from the Past: R eassessing the Interwar Di sciplinary History of International Relations. International Studies Quarterly 42 (September): 433-59. Schmidt, Brian. 1998b. The Political Discourse of Anar chy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations Albany: SUNY Press. Schmidt, Brian. 2002a. On the History and Hist oriography of International Relations. In Handbook of International Relations eds. Walter Carlesnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. London: Sage, 3-22. Schmidt, Brian. 2002b. Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of a Discipline: American International Relations, Pluralist Theory and the Myth of In terwar Idealism. International Relations 16 (April): 9-31. Schuett, Robert. 2007. Freudian Roots of Politic al Realism: The Importance of Sigmund Freud to Hans J. Morgenthaus Theory of International Power Politics. History of the Human Sciences 20 (November): 53-78. Shapin, Steven. 1994. A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Soffer, Reba. 1978. Ethics and Society in England: The R evolution in the Social Sciences, 18701914. Berkeley: University of California Press. Soffer, Reba. 1994. Discipline and Power: The University, Hi story, and the Making of an English Elite, 1870-1930 Stanford: Stanford University Press. Sorel, Georges. 1915. Reflections on Violence London: Allen & Unwin. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, and Rosemary Shi nko. 2005. Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33 (June): 63764. Suganami, Hidemi. 2008. Narrative Explanation and Inte rnational Relations: Back to Basics. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37 (December): 327-56. Sutton, Geoffrey. 1995. Science for a Polite Society: Gender, Culture, and the Demonstration of Enlightenment Boulder: Westview Press. Talmon, J. L. 1960. Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase London: Secker & Warburg. Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Ma king of the Modern Identity Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Thies, Cameron. 2002. Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate. European Journal of International Relations 8 (June): 147-85. 150

PAGE 151

T on, James Jay Hamil. 1973. Georges Sorel and th e Inconsistencies of a Bergsonian Marxism. Political Theory 1 (August): 329-40. Vasquez, John. 1998. The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wagner, Fritz. 1965. Der Historiker und die Weltgeschichte Mnchen: Karl Alber Freiburg. Walker, R. B. J. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waltz, Kenneth. 1990. Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. Journal of International Affairs 44 (Spring-Summer): 21-37. Wasiolek, Edward. 1978. Review of Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849 Comparative Literature 30 (Winter): 92-94. Watson, Janet. 2004. Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, Hayden. 1987. The Content of the Form: Narra tive Discourse and Historical Representation Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wilson, Peter. 1995. Introduction: The Twenty Year s Crisis and the Category of Idealism in International Relations. In Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed, eds. David Long and Peter Wilson. Oxfo rd: Oxford University Press, 1-24. Wilson, Peter. 1998. The Myth of the First Great Debate. Review of International Studies 24 (December): 1-16. Wilson, Peter. 2000. Carr and His Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty Years Crisis 193946. In E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal ed. Michael Cox. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 165-97. Wilson, Peter. 2001. Radicalism for a Conservativ e Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of E. H. Carr. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30 (January): 123-36. Wilson, Peter. 2003. The International Theory of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth-Century Idealism Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Winter, Jay. 1995. Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wohl, Robert. 2002. Heart of Darkness: Modernism and Its Historians. The Journal of Modern History 74 (September): 573-621. Woodward, E. L. 1934. Review of Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism International Affairs 13 (September-October): 721. 151

PAGE 152

152 Young, G. M. 1936[2002]. Portrait of an Age London: Phoenix Press. iek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology London: Verso.

PAGE 153

BIOGR APHICAL SKETCH Kuniyuki Nishimura was born in Japan. U pon graduating Kyoto University with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 2003 and a Master of Arts degree in political science in 2005, he moved to Gainesville, Florida to pursue his PhD in political science at the University of Florida. He completed his dissertation in 2009. 153