Citation
Do They Really Hate Us? The Limits of U.S. Public Diplomacy

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Title:
Do They Really Hate Us? The Limits of U.S. Public Diplomacy
Creator:
Shams, Hammaad R
Place of Publication:
[Gainesville, Fla.]
Florida
Publisher:
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Language:
english
Physical Description:
1 online resource (89 p.)

Thesis/Dissertation Information

Degree:
Master's ( M.A.M.C.)
Degree Grantor:
University of Florida
Degree Disciplines:
Mass Communication
Journalism and Communications
Committee Chair:
Leslie, Michael
Committee Members:
Molleda, Juan Carlos
Tripp, Bernell E.
Graduation Date:
8/11/2007

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Communism ( jstor )
Democracy ( jstor )
Depth interviews ( jstor )
Diplomacy ( jstor )
Hate ( jstor )
Muslims ( jstor )
Research methods ( jstor )
Terrorism ( jstor )
Terrorists ( jstor )
War ( jstor )
Journalism and Communications -- Dissertations, Academic -- UF
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
Mass Communication thesis, M.A.M.C.

Notes

Abstract:
After the tragic events of 9/11, the U.S. public searched for reasons for these horrific attacks. President George W. Bush and like-minded others reasoned that hatred for U.S. freedom by terrorists was the prime reason for the attack. Is it U.S. freedom or something else that is fomenting resentment toward the United States? To answer this question a study was conducted to survey opinions of Pakistani elites in the context of contemporary U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistani politics are complex, but there are three main ruling factions: the military, lay elites (politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics), and the clerics. Therefore, the opinions of military elites, modernizing elites, and religious elites were studied. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data. These interviews allowed the researcher to explore the perspectives and perceptions of these important stakeholders. The findings of this study contradict President Bush's assertion that freedoms enjoyed in the U.S. foment hatred. Rather, U.S. foreign policy was found to be the real reason for animosity toward the U.S. This study also analyzed why current U.S. public diplomacy has failed to achieve the desired results and how public policy can be modified to help assuage Pakistani ill feelings toward the U.S. ( en )
General Note:
In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.
General Note:
Includes vita.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description:
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page.
Source of Description:
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Thesis:
Thesis (M.A.M.C.)--University of Florida, 2007.
Local:
Adviser: Leslie, Michael.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Hammaad R Shams.

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UFRGP
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Copyright Shams, Hammaad R. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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pretending to be global policeman. "Being the sole superpower does not give it any rights to

enforce law of the jungle in the world. What all America requires to improve its image is total

shift in its current policies and tactics," he said.

One military believed that the United States could reduce the menace of terrorism by 75%, if it

could honestly resolve Middle East crises.

According to a retired brigadier general, the collateral damage resulting from conflicts all

over the world makes it difficult for the government of Pakistan to support U.S. policies. He said,

"In today's global world when real time pictures reach the living room, Muslims all over the

world and Pakistanis in specific saw the authorities at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib

inflamed their passions. As if it was not enough, Washington's support for Israel continued

unabated as before even after the massive bombings in Lebanon. It became morally impossible

to support U.S. policies in fighting terrorism."

The same retired brigadier general argued that it is American compassion, not American

aggression, that holds the key for a better U.S. image. He also declared the Bush doctrine--U.S.

has the right to invade any country that poses a threat to its security-as illegal. A Pakistani

general said that it is not desirable to use force to influence international events. It would rather

be more becoming if it uses its soft power of persuasion, financial help, and its strength of

culture, values and prestige. He believes that American pop culture and its style of government,

with freedom of speech, respect of the law, and equal rights, is the only viable weapon available

to America to defeat terrorism.

Military elites also stressed the need for genuine friendship between the two countries and

for help to improve the basic infrastructure in Pakistan. A retired three-star general said,

"Pakistanis don't like policy of 'stick and carrot.' They would only appreciate carrot without









LIST OF REFERENCES

Atkinson, Rick. "Nuclear Parts Sought by Pakistan." Washington Post. July 21, 1984, sec. A.

Auerbach, Stuart. "Pakistan Seeking U.S Guarantees in Formal Treat." The Washington Post.
January 18, 1980, sec. A.

Auerbach, Stuart. "Pakistan Ties Arms Aid to Economic Assistance." The Washington Post.
January 14, 1980, sec. A.

Babbie, Earl. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont: Thomson Higher Education, 2006.

Ballen, Kenneth. "The myth of Muslim support for terror," The Christian Science Monitor,
February 23, 2007. http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html. (last
accessed May 9, 2007)

BBC News. "Bin Laden lieutenant 'gave warnings'. May 24, 2002.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2006138.stm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

BBC News. "Bush hails 'al-Qaeda killer' arrest." March 4, 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2817441.stm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

BBC News. "Pearl murderer defiant after verdict." July 15, 2002.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2128578.stm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

BBC News. "Top al-Qaeda suspect in US custody" September 15, 2002.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2261136.stm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Borders, William. "Pakistani dismisses $400 million in Aid Offered U.S as 'Peanuts.'" The New
York Times. January 19, 1980, sec. A.

Branigan, William. "Pakistan Seeks Billions in U.S Aid." The Washington Post, January 23,
1980, sec. A.

Buchanan, Patrick. "What the Indian giver got." March 7, 2006.
http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=49144. (last accessed May 9,
2007)

Burki, Shahid. "Developing the Tribal Belt." Dawn, January 30, 2007.
http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/30/op.htm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Bush, George W. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." September
20, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. (last
accessed May 9, 2007)

Claibome, William. "Bush at Khyber Pass: Whiff of War and Fine-Tuned Welcome." The
Washington Post, May 18, 1984, sec. A.









sources are those that do not bear a direct physical relationship to the event being studied. They

are made up of data that cannot be described as original."39

There are several problems associated with historical research. Sometimes there is not

sufficient data available to conduct historical research.40 Sometimes researchers show bias and

interpret historical events according to their liking.41 "Some researchers can accurately recite

the facts of events in chronological order but fail to integrate theses facts into meaningful

generalizations," said Mitra.42

The historical research for this thesis was conducted by relying on secondary materials,

reviewing relevant news stories in leading U.S. publications such as The New York Times, the

Washington Post, and Time magazine. Books about U.S.-Pakistan relations were also consulted.

The next chapter is a historical analysis of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. This will review

the role played by U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy in shaping and defining this

relationship.

















39 Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, Research Methods in Education, 161.
40 Ananda Mitra and Sam Lankford, Research Methods in Parks, Recreation, and Leisure Services (Champaign:
Sagamore Publishing, 1999), 86.
41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 87.









Mazari, Shireen. "US Threats to Pakistan." The News.
http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=39130. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Melkote, Srinvas R. "Theories of Development Communication." In International and
Development Communication, ed. Bella Mody. London: Sage Publications, 2003.

Mitra, Ananda, and Sam Lankford. Research Methods in Park, Recreation, and Leisure Services.
Champaign: Sagamore Publishing, 1999.

More, Molly, and John Anderson. "After Cold War, U.S-Pakistani Ties Are Turning Sour."
The Washington Post, April 21, 1993, sec. A.

Morse, Janice M. and Peggy Anne Field. Qualitative Research Methods for Health
Professionals. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 1995.

Musharraf, Pervez. In the Line ofFire: A Memoir. London: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

The New York Times. "Pointless Trip to Pakistan." March 3, 2006, sec. A.

Oberdorfer, Don. "U.S. and Pakistan Progressing on New Aid Plan." The Washington Post.
April 22, sec. A.

Pakistan Facts. "Sept. 11 Commission Says Pakistan Must Do More to fight terror," November
15, 2005. http://www.pakistan-facts.com/article.php?story=20051115201703951. (last
accessed May 9, 2007)

Pak Tribune. "US Assured Us Bajaur Like Incidents Not to Happen Again: FO." January 31,
2006, http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?132830. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Pincus, Walter. "Muslims' Own Debates Called Key to Future." The Washington Post, February
16, 2006, sec. A.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.

Reuters. "Goodbye Pakistan: US ends quake relief mission." March 30, 2006.
http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyd=SP 117230. (last accessed
March 19, 2007)

Rice, Susan. "Can 'Freedom Only' secure our future?" McGill International Review, Fall 2005.
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/rice/fall2005.pdf (last accessed March 19,
2007)

Schmidt, Dana. "Pakistan to Get Arms." The New York Times. February 14, 1954, sec. E.

Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.









The sample of knowledgeable Pakistani elites was selected to address the questions of the

study. The interviewees were recruited through personal and family contacts. The main

purpose of these interviews was to explore both current opinions as wells as new ideas from

which both countries could work in tandem to defeat extremism. Telephone interviews were

recorded and transcribed.

In qualitative field research, analysis of data is not a one-step process, but rather a

"continuous, systematic process which runs simultaneously with data collection."29 According

to Babbie, spreadsheets can also be effectively utilized to process and analyze qualitative data.30

This study made use of the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet software, to analyze the interview data.

Historical research on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was also conducted for this thesis.

The primary purpose of this research was to identify issues which define and affect the current

US-Pakistan relationship.

The historical method can be defined as "an act of reconstruction undertaken in a spirit of

critical inquiry designed to achieve a faithful representation of a previous age."31 Historical

research can also be utilized to study the cause and effect of past events on present and future

events. "The act of historical research involves the identification and limitation of a problem or

an area of study, sometimes the formulation of a hypothesis (or set of question); the collection,

organization, verification, validation, analysis and selection of data; testing the hypothesis (or

answering the questions), where appropriate; and writing a research report. This sequence leads





29 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and i, .,. 1 ,, Communications, 231.

30 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 390.

31 Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison, Research Methods in Education, 5th ed. (London:
Routeldge Falmer, 2000), 158.









APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Do Pakistanis Hate the USA.?
* Why do you think the United States is not popular in Pakistan?

* In rationalizing his "War on Terror," President Bush said, "Americans are asking, why do
they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber--a democratically elected
government .... They hate our freedoms--our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech,
our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other." Do you agree/disagree
with this statement? Why?

* What steps can the U.S. take to remove your misgivings toward it?


US 'War on Terror' and Pakistan
* Do you think the current tactics and strategy employed by the U.S. in its "War on Terror"
are successful in eradicating terrorism? If yes/no, why?

* What are the reasons for terrorism?

* What is the best way to defeat terrorism?


Pakistan and the Taliban
* Recently, prominent U.S. officials have suggested that Pakistan is not doing enough to
curb Taliban living in Pakistan. Do you agree/disagree? Why?

* How should we deal with the Taliban?

* Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution that requires the U.S.
President to certify that Pakistan is playing its role in curbing the Taliban in Pakistan
before releasing military assistance to Pakistan. Some people have correlated this
resolution with the Pressler amendment, which in the past proved to be a thorn in the U.S.
Pakistan relationship. How it will impact the current relationship between the two
countries?









CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL REVIEW

The 1940s: Uncharted Waters

Even before Pakistan gained independence from Britain on 14 August, 1947, U.S. media

and politicians were not warm to the idea of Pakistan. "The partition of India 'sounds terrible' to

American ears after the experience of the U.S. civil war," said President Roosevelt in 1942.1 On

April 22, 1946, Time magazine carried a picture of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father and

founder of Pakistan, on its cover with a caption that said, "His Moslem tiger wants to eat the

Hindu cow." In the same story Time declared that Jinnah's political ascent was "a story of love

of country and the lust for power, a story that twists and turns like a bullock track in the hills."2

Similarly, on the eve of Jinnah's death in September 1948, Time carried another story titled

"That Man," which said, "Out of the travail of 400 million in the subcontinent have come two

symbols--a man of love and a man of hate. Last winter the man of non-violence, Gandhi, died

violently at the hand of assassin. Last week the man of hate, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, at 71, died

a natural death in Karachi, capital of the state he had founded."3

Furthermore, on the eve of Pakistani independence, Time carried a piece that described

Karachi, then capital of Pakistan, as a "dirty, noisy and in all respects unlovely" city.4 Moreover,

the same Time story declared that the people of Karachi "did not welcome Pakistan with the wild

enthusiasm that swept the new dominion of India. After all, Pakistan was the creation of one




1 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: DisenchantedAllies (Washington, D.C: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2001), 6.
2 Time, "Long Shadow," April 22, 1946, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,792780,00.html.

3 Time, "That Man," September 20, 1948, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,799165-1,00.html.
4 Time, "Better Off in a Home," August 25, 1947,
ll p "\\ .time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,798063,00.html.









but the way they were removed, the way they were bombed and slaughtered, still persists in the

minds of the people," he said.

One modernizing scholar believed that the strategy employed in the "war on terror" is a

flawed one that is having opposite effect. She believed that, instead of curbing terrorism, the

"war on terror" has resulted in a loss of a tremendous amount of innocent life. "People of every

country, including Americans, feel scared and unsafe. If America continues with its current

aims, then time is not far away when the world will be grappled with a Third World War, which

will be a gigantic and an atomic war and destruction will be unimaginable," she said.

A political advisor to the chief minister of the Punjab Assembly said that a majority of

Pakistanis believe that there should be a war against terrorism, but the way the U.S. by just is

pursuing it, just by focusing on brute military strength, is causing a lot of resentment among

Pakistanis.

Some modernizing elites believed that the U.S. has lost the credibility to lead the struggle

against terrorism. They believe that United Nations, not the U.S., can play a significant role in

freeing the world from the menace of terrorism. A Pakistani businessman said, "The best way to

deal with terrorism is to let United Nations play their role. Every issue regarding to any manner

should be given to the United Nations. If America has some reservations, then it should go to the

United Nations. It is not the way to deal with the matter by itself without going to a proper forum

that is United Nations."

A member of the Punjab Assembly believes that terrorism will cease to exist if the U.S.

withdraws its forces from Muslim countries and lets the UN take over the reconstruction process.

He said that the U.S. should withdraw its forces from all Muslim countries. After that withdraw,

fair and free elections supervised by the UN should take place in Afghanistan and Iraq. "The









innovations to others within their community."4 In other words, they are the "critical link

between policy makers and general public."5 Moreover, the majority of scholars argue that

elites, because of their higher status, can cause others to follow their lead. 6 Elites also tend to be

highly educated and wealthy, and are exposed to external sources of information.7

For conceptualization purpose, serving and retired military officers, which include army,

navy, and air force officers, are recognized as military elites. Members of think tanks, who

support modernist perspectives, those politicians, businesspersons, scholars, journalists, are

identified as modernizing elites. Lastly, religious leaders and clerics, who are in positions to

sway public opinion, are identified as religious elites.

A unit of analysis is defined as "the what or who is being studied."8 Each elite opinion

leader was considered a unit of analysis, because the researcher was studying the individual

belonging to a group, not the group itself. A study based on observations representing a single

point in time is defined as a cross-sectional study.9 Because this study took place over a short

period of time from April 1, 2007, to April 30, 2007, it can be considered a cross-sectional study.

The majority of explanatory studies that deal with public opinion are cross-sectional in nature.10







4 Gershon Feder and Sara Savastano, "The role of opinion leaders in the diffusion of new knowledge: The case of
integrated pest management," World Development 34, no. 7 (2006).

5 Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion andAmerican Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 39.
6 Feder and Savastano, "The role of opinion leaders in the diffusion of new knowledge."

Ibid.

8 Babbie, The Practice ofSocial Research, 94.

9 Ibid., 102.

10 Ibid.










border infiltration of terrorists between Pakistan and Afghanistan and stated that "Pakistan must

do more to fight terror."103

As far as the war on terror is concerned, Pakistan has deployed 80,000 troops on the

Pakistan-Afghan border and is actively pursuing terrorists.104 Additionally, Pakistan's intentions

regarding its role in war on terror is made quite evident in a statement by President Musharraf,

"All foreign militants should leave, otherwise they would be crushed."105 Moreover, the U.S.

State Department's 2004 report, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," also hails Pakistan and

President Musharraf, who himself has been a victim of terrorism, as a steadfast and important

ally in the war on terror.106 In addition, Pakistan has arrested and handed over more than 700

known terrorists to the U.S. 107 Here are some of the important terrorist arrested by Pakistan:

* Abu Farraj al-Libbi, the number three man in Al-Qaeda and suspected of carrying out
assassination attempts against President Musharraf. His arrest was hailed by President Bush
by declaring that a major threat to peace loving people was removed. He had a bounty of $5
million. 108

* Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, known to be an alleged planner of the 9/11 attacks. President
Bush called his arrest a "serious blow" to Al-Qaeda. He was on the FBI's most wanted list
for several years and was carrying a bounty for $25 million. 109



103 Pakistan Facts, "Sept. 11 Commission says Pakistan must do more to fight terror," November 15, 2005,
hlp \ \ \ .pakistan-facts.com/article.php?story=20051115201703951.
104 Pak Tribune, "US assured us Bajaur like incidents not to happen again: FO," January 31, 2006,
hIp \\ \ .paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?132830.
105 Asif Shahzad, "Leave Pakistan or die, Musharraf warns all foreign militants," The Scotsman, March 24, 2006,
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=459262006.
106 Anwar Iqbal, "U.S. terror report absolves Pakistan," The Washington Times, April 29, 2004,
hIllp \ \ \ .hvk.org/articles/0404/70.html.
107 Nasir Malick and Francis Harris, "Bush hails arrest of al-Qa'eda number three," Telegraph, May 5, 2006,
lp \\ \\ \\.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?\Inl= ncIs 2. '15/05/05/wlibbi05.xml.
108 Ibid.
109 BBCNews, "Bush hails 'al-Qaeda killer' arrest," March 4, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/2817441.stm.










Indians, we would not have minded so much. We could understand U.S. favoritism towards

Israel [also a nuclear power] as a special case, but not the refusal to sanction India while hitting

so hard at Pakistan."34 Therefore, to discourage Pakistan's desire to acquire nuclear bomb, in the

1979 U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan, completely derailing the U.S.-Pakistan

alliance.

The 1980s: Partners, Not Allies

On December 26, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan across Amu Darya,

signaling the expansion of Communism across South Asia and, therefore, drastically changing

the dynamics of the then lukewarm U.S.-Pakistan relations.35 According to Thomas Thornton, a

former National Security Council staff member, U.S. foreign policy regarding Pakistan

"overnight, literally ... changed dramatically."36 Initially, President Carter tried to gain

Pakistan's support to confront Communism, but no agreement could be reached. Due to its past

experience with the United States, Pakistan wanted the U.S. to "prove its credibility and

durability."37 Furthermore, the Carter administration's initial offer of $400 million was

dismissed as "peanuts" by Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq.38 According to President Zia, the

$400 million of U.S. aid "will buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much





34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 245.
36 Thomas Thornton, "Between Two Stools?: U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan in the Carter Administration," Asian
Survey, October 1982, 969, quoted in Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: DisenchantedAllies
(Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 245.
37 Stuart Auerbach, "Pakistan Ties Arms Aid to Economic Assistance," The Washington Post, January 14, 1980, sec.
A.

38 William Borders, "Pakistani Dismisses $400 million in Aid Offered by U.S as 'Peanuts,'", The New York Times,
January 19, 1980, sec. A.









Halloran, Richard. "Weinberger Meets Zia and Afghan Refugees." The New York Times. October
2, 1983, sec. A.

Heck, Ronald. Studying Educational and Social Policy. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
2004.

Holsti, Ole R. Public Opinion andAmerican Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1997.

Iqbal, Anwar. "US Govt Urged to Focus on Nation, not Govt: Congressional Report's Advice."
Dawn, April 1, 2007. http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/01/top 11.htm. (last accessed May
9, 2007)

Iqbal, Anwar. "US Legislation Seeks Ban on Assistance to Pakistan." Dawn, January 25, 2007,
http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/25/topl.htm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Iqbal, Anwar. "U.S. Terror Report Absolves Pakistan." The Washington Times, April 29, 2004.
http://www.hvk.org/articles/0404/70.html. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Jaaferlot, Christophe, ed. A History of Pakistan andIts Origins. London: Anthem Press, 2004.

Khan, Riaz "Pakistan Condemns Deadly US Air strike." Eccentric Star. January 14, 2006.
http://eccentricstar.typepad.com/public_diplomacy weblogn/2006/01/pakistanis_prot.ht
ml. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Knowlton, Brain. "Intelligence Committee Senators Discuss Pakistan Air Strike." The New York
Times. January 15, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/politics/15cnd-
senators.html?ex=1166245200&en=4276a34fa5350a3d&ei=5070. (last accessed May 9,
2007)

Kux, Dennis. The United States andPakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Washington,
D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001.

MacFarquhar, Neil. "Anti-U.S. Feeling Leaves Arab Reformers Isolated." The New York Times,
August 9, 2006. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0809-07.htm. (last accessed
May 9, 2007)

Mahmood, Safdar. Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, 1947-1999. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000.

Malik, Iftikar. State and Civil Society in Pakistan. London: Macmillan, 1997.

Malick, Nasir, and Francis Harris "Bush Hails Arrest of al-Qa'eda Number Three." Telegraph,
May 5, 2006. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/05/05/
wlibbi05.xml. (last accessed May 9, 2007)









"even replace western style institutions on the basis of medieval precedents."20 The Jamaat-i-

Islami and Jamiyyat-ul Ulma Islam were the key players in this group.21

Since independence, Pakistan has had three different constitutions and suffered four

military coups.22 According to Saeed Shafqat, author of the book Civil-Military Relations in

Pakistan, since its independence, Pakistan has failed to establish a stable and working political

structure; instead, the search has evolved into two "political contradictions": a military-

hegemonic political system and a party-dominated political system.23 The military-hegemonic

political system's "primary objective was to curb participatory politics and subordinate the

political parties and other autonomous interest groups to military hegemony."24 On the other

hand, the party-dominated political system's "primary concern was to subordinate the military-

bureaucratic elites to civilian-led party dominance, and to build an alternative to military rule."25

The military plays a key role in the political affairs of Pakistan. According to Iftikhar

Malik, author of the book State and Civil Society in Pakistan, "Pakistan's polity has been under

the influence of the military through most of its history, and even when not in power [the

military] has been 'behind the steering wheel.'26" According to Stephen Cohen, "Pakistan's

history shows that the army cannot run Pakistan effectively by itself but the army is also

unwilling to entrust civilians completely with the job."27 In sixty years of Pakistani


20 Ibid., 241-242.

21 Ibid., 243.

22 Ibid., 61.

23 Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 3.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Iftikar Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997), 71-72.

27 Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, (Summer 2003), 19.









that the U.S. is not popular in Pakistan because of its biased support of Israel in the Middle East

conflict. Modernizing elites believe that the U.S. must resolve the above mentioned problems if

it wants to gain the confidence of the Pakistani people.

Religious Elites

There seems to be a consensus among religious elites that American involvement in Iraq

and its stagnant Middle East policy is a cause of dissatisfaction and dislike among Pakistani

people for the U.S.

Religious elites also cite American support of Israel as the reason for Muslim antipathy

toward America. One religious scholar said, "Because the real matter of concern is not their

[American] system, i.e., freedom or democracy, the actual problem lies with their undue and

injustice policies towards the Third World countries, especially their own hatred, e.g., Muslims

rather than Islamic system, their interference in the matter of other countries, and their support

for Israel, etc."

A local cleric also blamed U.S. support of dictators as a reason for Pakistani resentment

toward the U.S. He said that the U.S. classifies itself as a democracy, yet, to promote and

safeguard its national interests, it support undemocratic dictators in Pakistan. Second, the U.S. is

using the support of the government of Pakistan to destabilize other Muslim countries. Pakistani

leaders might be friends of the U.S., "but there is no importance of the U.S. in Pakistan's

community," he said

Religious elites also believe that America in the form of its war on terror is actually

waging war against Islam. A local cleric said, "Pakistan is a Muslim country and America is

tagging the Muslims as terrorists. Because of that, America is not being given much importance

among common [Pakistani] people."









CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH METHODS

There are three main purposes of social research: exploration, description, and

explanation.1 An exploratory study is conducted "to develop an initial, rough understanding of

some phenomenon."2 Descriptive studies are conducted to precisely measure and to report about

certain characteristics of a certain population.3 According to Earl Babbie, "Explanation is the

discovery and reporting of relationships among different aspects of the phenomenon under study.

Whereas descriptive studies answer the "What's so?" explanatory ones tend to answer the

question "Why?"

The purpose of this study is to explain the underlying reasons for the growing discontent

within the people of Pakistan toward the people of the U.S. and its government. Moreover, after

explaining the reasons behind Pakistani dissent toward the U.S., this study will go one step

further and suggest remedies to counter the growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan. In order to

explain these negative sentiments, the researcher used selective interviews to survey the three

main sectors of the Pakistani elite: the military elite, the modernizing elite, and the religious

elite. This allowed the researcher to compare and contrast opinions held by a broad spectrum of

the Pakistani elite.

The researcher chose to interview elites because they are the agents who can shape or sway

Pakistani public opinion. "Such individuals have the status, expertise, links to external sources

of knowledge, or experience that enable them to provide information and advice about





1 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont: Thomson Higher Education, 2006), 115.
2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.









CHAPTER 4
INTERVIEW FINDINGS

For the purpose of this study there were three major topics of inquiry (see appendix B):

Do Pakistanis hate the U.S.?; Pakistan views on the U.S. "War on Terror"; and Pakistan's

relations with the Taliban.

Do Pakistanis Hate the U.S.?

Military Elites

The majority of the military respondents agreed with the statement that American freedoms

have nothing do with hatred toward America. A Pakistani army colonel said, "No one hates

Americans or America. Pakistani people like American liberty, respect American values, admire

the American education system, and adore their welfare system. Most of the people living in this

region desire to get settled or at least visit America once in their lifetime."

Several military elites pointed out American duplicity in policies at home and abroad and

complained that instead of exporting democracy, it supports dictators and undemocratic regimes.

Pakistani military elites also blamed the contradictions in domestic policy, which enshrines the

principles of democracy and freedoms, and U.S. foreign policy, which blatantly supports

dictators.

A retired three-star general said:

America is considered a country which is a hypocrite, which supports dictators irrespective
of the fact that dictators flaunt the basic human rights of the people-America claims to be
the champion of basic human rights! These are the glaring drawbacks in American policies
which are rejected by the people. Let me emphasize that people do like American
freedoms. But they hate what Bush does.

Citing examples of U.S. support of dictators, a retired brigadier general said that the U.S.

lost its credibility as a champion of human rights and democracy, when it lent its support to

dictators like Pinchot, Somoza, and Stroessner, who abrogated human rights and political









Recently, two prominent American officials, Director of Intelligence John Negroponte and

Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, have accused Pakistan of providing "Refuge" to the

Taliban in Pakistani territory and not doing enough to counter their threat.115 Negroponte, in

testimony to the U.S. Senate, said, "eliminating the safe haven that the Taliban and other

extremists have found in Pakistan's tribal areas is not sufficient to end the insurgency in

Afghanistan." 116

Responding to these types of allegations, the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. said, "We

are already standing on our head, what else we could do? They [the U.S.] should not blame us

for their failures."117 Moreover, responding to critics of Pakistani efforts regarding the Taliban

in the North West Frontier Province, Governor Lt-Gen (ret.) Ali Mohammad Jan Aurakzai, a key

man in dealing with the Taliban, said that NATO was oblivious to the on-ground realities: the

reason that Afghan resurgence is gaining momentum is not because Pakistan is providing the

Taliban with safe havens inside Pakistan, but because moderate Afghan citizens are joining the

ranks of the Taliban. 18 According to Brian Cloughely, author of the book "Pakistan Army,"

"what has happened is that U.S. air attacks on Afghan villages, together with Iraq-style military

brutality by ground troops, have led the majority of Afghans to detest Americans and, by

association, all foreign troops in their country."119



115 Yahoo News, "US Again Accuses Pakistan of Providing "Refuge" to Taliban," January 26, 2007,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070127/wl_sthasiaafp/usattacksafghanistan.
116 Shireen M. Mazari, "US Threats to Pakistan," The News, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=39130.

117 Anwar Iqbal, "US Legislation Seeks Ban on Assistance to Pakistan," Dawn, January 25, 2007,
hup % \\\ .dawn.com/2007/01/25/topl.htm.
118 M. Ziauddin, "Britain will never win in Afghanistan: Aurakzai," Dawn, November 27, 2006,
limp \ %\ \ .dawn.com/2006/11/27/top8.htm.
119 Brian Cloughley," Stop Blaming Pakistan," Counter Punch,
Ihup \\ \ .counterpunch.org/cloughley07112006.html.









stick. They don't want false promises. They want a permanent friendship, not opportunity-

based partnership. Every nation has the right to choose friends, but permanence of relations has

its own virtues. If Americans think that their foreign policy seeks to have national-interest-

oriented policy, then it will not gain trust of the country which also has NATO status. That trust

must be visible to convince the populace to align them with American thought. No more

sermons to do more."

A retired general stressed the need for better relations between the U.S. government and

the people of Pakistan as an avenue for a better relationship between the two countries. He cited

the recent Congressional Research Service's report which has advised the U.S. government to

plan the aid in such a way that it benefits the nations, not the governments. He stressed that

rather than rewarding Pakistani leadership, the relations between two countries will flourish if

the U.S. makes conscious efforts to build Pakistan's political and social institutions, rather than

rewarding its leadership.

To summarize, military elites believe that the destabilization of Iraq has caused much

hostility in the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan They are also unanimous in their opinion

that blatant U.S. support for Israel against Palestine is also one the main reason for the hostility

found in the people of Pakistan toward the U.S. They also link the resolution of the Middle East

crisis as a key to a better relationship between the two countries. Military elites think that the

U.S. is unreliable and an unpredictable friend, one who befriends Pakistan just to promote or

protect its own national interests. Pakistani military elites want a stable relationship with the

U.S., one that protects and promotes the national interests of the both countries. Military elites

blame U.S. support of Pakistani dictators as a cause of Pakistani hatred.










peace. However, unlike many other threats faced by the world, terrorism is not a tangible

enemy: terrorism is an ideology thriving on the disempowerment and impoverishment of our

fellow human beings. "The U.S. is not waging war against Iraq, or Baathists, or even Muslims.

It is not fighting a place or entity but a concept-'terrorism.' What enemy can be more of a

phantom, impossible to kill or contain, than an idea?" says Robert Sparkland, a contributor to the

Seattle Post-Intelligencer.

After 9/11, President Bush appeared to accept that the U.S. is unsuccessful in reaching out

to the Arab and Muslim world when he said, "We are not doing a very good job of getting our

message out."6 Furthermore, President Bush also wondered why the Arab world fails to

understand what the U.S. really stands for.' "When one is not understood by the other, it is often

an indication that one does not understand the other either."8 This also means that, as far as the

Muslim world is concerned, U.S. public diplomacy is ineffective and has failed to reach its

objectives of winning the hearts and minds of Muslims. Public diplomacy is defined as a

"government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about

understandings for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institution and culture, as well as its national

goal and current policies."9 Successful public diplomacy is a communication that is "two-way

reciprocal rather than simply one-way with America dictating its policy to others."10


5 Robert Sparkland, "U.S Wages War on a Concept," Seattle Post Intelligencer, August 11, 2006,
hlp \ \ \ .commondreams.org/views06/0811-30.htm.
6 R.S. Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World: A Strategic Communication
Analysis," Foreign Policy in Focus, November, 2001, http://www.fpif.org/papers/communication.html.

Ibid.

8Ibid.

9 Hans N. Tuch, C. i,,iiraml, I. ,i the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
1990), 3.

10 Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World."









been used in the development of a nuclear bomb.66 In the light of these developments,

Republican Senator Larry Pressler introduced an amendment that required the U.S. President to

annually certify that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear bomb. This new certification

nullified the earlier six year exemption granted to Pakistan that had enabled Pakistan to acquire

U.S. military aid.67 Pakistani President Zia knew that as long as Afghanistan was occupied by

the Soviets and Pakistan did not explode a nuclear device, even enrichment of uranium to

weapons grade would not "breach the embarrassment barrier," which would restrain the

Congress from ratifying the Pressler amendment.68 President Zia was right: in 1987, despite of

clear evidence that Pakistan was actively acquiring nuclear capability, President Reagan used

U.S. national interest as a reason to certify the Pressler amendment.69

In December 1987, the Kremlin signaled Washington that Russian troops would be leaving

Afghanistan within twelve months.70 This meant post-war Afghan reconstruction was not a

priority for U.S. foreign policy. "Our main interest was getting the Russians out. Afghanistan,

as such, was remote from major U.S. concerns," said Acting Secretary of State Michael

Armacost.71 In September of 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign

Minister Boris Pomkin signed an accord which called for both sides to stop supplying arms to

various Afghan factions. With this accord the U.S. finally "washed its hands of Afghanistan."72



66 Rick Atkinson, "Nuclear Parts Sought by Pakistan," The Washington Post, July 21, 1984, sec. A.

67 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 277.

68 Ibid., 278.

69 Ibid., 286.

70 Ibid.

1 Ibid., 287.

72 Ibid., 317.









advocated foreign policy tilted towards India.23 In doing so, he incensed Pakistan by giving $1

billion in aid to India; compared to $150 million Pakistan was getting; despite the fact that

Pakistan was earning the wrath of Soviet Union for supporting U.S. policies.24 Furthermore,

Pakistan's diplomatic relations with China proved to be another thorn in the U.S.-Pakistan

relationship. The U.S. considered Communist China a major threat in Asia; thus, it wanted to

counterbalance China's influence supporting India. Pakistan wanted to have good relations with

China, because since India was a common enemy of both China and Pakistan.25 Therefore, U.S.

support of India during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, created a great strain in U.S.-Pakistan

relationship.26 Moreover, during the 1965 war between Pakistan and India, the U.S placed an

arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, denying Pakistan its only source of arms, whereas

India continued receiving arms shipments from the Soviet Union. Even SEATO and Central

Treaty Organization (CENTO) agreements failed Pakistan.27 The thing that chagrined Pakistan

the most was the refusal of the U.S. to play a major role in post-war peace negotiations. Instead,

it was the Soviet Union, a long-time Indian friend, who, with the blessing of the U.S., played the

key role.28










23 Ibid., 115.

24Ibid., 118-119.
25 Ibid., 141-142.

26 Ibid., 114.
27 Ibid., 161.

28 Ibid., 165.









Governor Aurakzai also pointed out that Pakistan was doing far more than the NATO

coalition, as it has deployed 80,000 troops on the Pakistan-Afghan border, which is twice more

than NATO forces present in Afghanistan, and has lost around 750 of its soldiers. "We're

physically manning the border; our troops are sitting there on the zero line. Damn it, you also

have a responsibility. Go sit on the border, fight like soldiers instead of sitting in your bases ...

Either they (NATO) are trying to hide their own weaknesses by leveling allegations at Pakistan

or they are refusing to admit the facts," said Aurakzai.120

Current relations between the United States and Pakistan are strained, at best. An editorial

in The New York Times declared the recent state visit of President Bush as "a pointless trip to

Pakistan," where "the Bush-Musharraf meeting is one between two leaders far more interested in

guns than butter."121 Moreover, this trip to Pakistan, the ground zero for fanaticism, could have

proved vital to overcome the great divide between Islam and the West. Unfortunately, the

editorial said, it was "overshadowed by Mr. Bush's misbegotten nuclear pact with Pakistan's

blood enemy, India."122 Additionally, instead of using this trip to build a bilateral relationship

with the Pakistani people by inking a free-trade treaty that "could tangibly bind America to

Pakistan in a way that no number of summit meetings or sales ofF-16 fighter jets could ever

manage," it was wasted on futile discussion regarding a recent nuclear deal between the U.S. and

India.123 Feelings in Pakistan regarding the visit by President Bush were well-expressed by Pat

Buchanan, a former Presidential candidate and conservation commentator, who said that by

transferring nuclear technology to India, President Bush has "insulted" President Musharraf, an

120 Ziauddin, "Britain will never win in Afghanistan: Aurakzai."

121 The New York Times, "Pointless Trip to Pakistan," March 3, 2006, 22.
122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.









One religious elite blamed homosexuality and other problems as reasons for Pakistani

dislike of the U.S. He said, "Inhuman and immoral values prevailing in the culture and society of

western nations, especially homosexuality, obscenity, vulgarity, deterioration of family and

relatives, is the reason that many people do not like America."

To summarize, religious elites believe that the destabilization of Iraq is causing much

hostility in the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan. Religious elites are unanimous in their

opinions that blatant U.S. support for Israel against Palestine is the main reason for the hostility

found in the people of Pakistan toward the U.S. They also link a resolution of the Middle East

crisis is a key to a better relationship between the two countries. Religious elites also agree that

U.S. support for Pakistani military dictators like General Ayub, General Zia, and General

Musharraf, who all had close relationships with the U.S. government, is a cause of much

antagonism toward the U.S.

The U.S. "War on Terror" and Pakistan

Military Elites

A retired major general called current tactics employed by the U.S. in its "war on terror"

"not successful." He said that the U.S. is using military tactics to resolve political problems

faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. He believed that the use of brute force is causing a lot of

"collateral damage," a main cause of resentment toward the U.S. He believed that the U.S.

"should use the instrument of the political, economic, and social policies to resolve the issue of

terrorism. This can be complemented by suitable and minimum use of military force."

Military elites also stressed a need for change in current tactics employed in the "war on

terror." The "USA has to adopt tactics and strategy based on co-assistance, support of just cause

of people, and stop aggression against sovereign states on self-styled and self-assumed facts like

weapons of mass destruction," said a retired colonel. Military elites also blamed flawed U.S.









such a short time? Modernizing elites also suggest a political solution, rather than a military

solution, to overcome the Taliban.

Religious Elites

A local cleric blamed Afghanistan for not doing enough against the Taliban. He said,

"Pakistan is doing all that is possible to stop terrorism in its surroundings. It is the weakness of

Afghan government which is causing failures against Taliban."

Another cleric blamed the Afghan government for supporting terrorism. He said,

"Pakistan wants to exterminate terrorism from its atmosphere, but Afghan government is

exporting terrorism in Pakistan to weaken it."

A religious scholar blamed the U.S. and the current Afghan government for the recent

spiraling of Taliban. He said, "Pakistan is doing his best in this regard, but the wrong U.S.

foreign policy of supporting corrupt war lords in Afghanistan is making Taliban popular among

local people. There was a peace when Taliban were in power, now Afghanis are being crushed

by the current corrupt government."

To summarize, religious elites believed that Pakistan has done enough to curb the Taliban.

The solution to wipe out the Taliban does not lie with Pakistan, it lies with the government of

Afghanistan. They believe the current Afghan government consists of unpopular war lords, who

persecute the Afghan population, consequently, ordinary Afghans are turning to the Taliban.

From these interviews it is quite clear that the U.S has a serious image and credibility

problems in Pakistan. While public diplomacy provides the necessary tools to sway Pakistani

opinion in favor the U.S., this effort will require the U.S. to alter its foreign policy toward

Pakistan. The next chapter will discuss how the U.S. can employ diplomacy to wins hearts and

minds in Pakistan. It will also discuss the limitation of U.S. diplomacy in pacifying Pakistani

resentment toward them.









In the field of social science, survey research is the most widely employed research

method.11 Survey research is considered "the best method" to indirectly describe the opinions of

a large population. 12 According to Earl Babbie, "surveys are also excellent vehicles for

measuring attitudes and orientations in a large population."13 On the other hand, qualitative

interviews are also excellent sources for gathering information. "Contrasted with survey

interviewing, the qualitative interview is based on a set of topics to be discussed in depth rather

than based on the use of standardized questions."14 Bingham and Moore define qualitative

interviews as "conversation with purpose" in which "researcher and informant become

'conversational partners.'"15 There are several advantages associated with interview research.

Interview research usually has a response rate as high as 80 to 85%. 16 Interviews also essentially

eliminate "don't know" and "no" answers.17 They also provide the interviewer with a unique

opportunity to "probe" for the desired response and answer. 1 According to Dayman and

Holloway, data collected in interviews pertain within the confines of the social context, so, "the

responses you derive from interviews are the subjective views of interviewees. Your evidence,

therefore, is based on participants' interpretations of their experiences and is expressed in their

own words, using the jargon and speech styles that are meaningful to them."19 Interview


1 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 244.

12Ibid.

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 306.

15 Christine Daymon and Immy Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and -i, i.1. / ,,i
Communications (London: Routledege, 2002), 166.

16Babbie, The Practice ofSocial Research, 264.

17 Ibid., 265.

18 Ibid.









research sometimes leads to the "discovery of different dimensions, aspects, or nuances of

concepts. In such cases, the research itself may uncover and report aspects of social life that

were not evident from the outset of the project." 20

On the other hand, there are certain disadvantages associated with interview research.

Sometimes an interviewee might fabricate information to enhance self-esteem and self-image.

Interviews are quite time-consuming and laborious and can take a toll the on researcher.21

Generally, there are three types of qualitative interviews: unstructured, non-standardized

interviews, semi-structured interviews, and structured or standardized interviews.22 Unstructured

interviews are devoid of predefined questions about the interview agenda. They can be an

excellent source of evidence, but also result in a heavy "dross rate."23 Semi-structured

interviews, also called focused interviews, are widely used in qualitative research. The questions

are not asked in any predefined pattern, but are based on an interview guide that contains "the

issues or topics to be covered and the line of inquiry to be followed."24 Structured or

standardized interviews are seldom used in qualitative field research. Every respondent is asked

to answer the same predefined set of questions. As Daymon notes, "Therefore, they tend to

direct participants responses, prohibiting you and your interviewee from exploring together the

meaning of the object of inquiry."25


19 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and i A, .,. 1,,i Communications, 167.

2Babbie, The Practice ofSocial Research, 110.
21 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and A /,, .,. 1 ,,i Communications, 184-
185.

22Ibid., 170-171.
23 Ibid., 170.

24Ibid., 171.
25 Ibid., 171-172.









development programs," explains Waisboard.11 Therefore, the new development place their

emphasis theories put its weight on a bottom-up approach that promotes "the development of

critical consciousness and collective mobilization at the local level."12 In development projects,

however, the state cannot be completely ruled out. It still plays an important role in the design

and application of development projects.13

In light of elite Pakistani opinion that the U.S. must make its economic aid visible to the

people of Pakistan, the U.S. government can use the technique of development communication

as a tool for development projects in Pakistan: this will help the U.S. not only improve its image

in Pakistan, but also stamp out terrorism and the Taliban.

Therefore, it is essential to look at various development communication models that can be

utilized by the U.S. in Pakistan. According to Srinivas Melkote, the most accepted definition of

development means to alleviate the social and economic conditions of people,14 although there is

also a debate among communication scholars on what are the real indicators of development. 15

Most development communication theories are based on modernization theories. The

modernization perspective is derived from neoclassic theory and is based on the notion that

western and capitalist model can be infused to spur development in all types of environments.16

This perspective is rejected by Melkote "for its negative view of culture, especially religious




1 Ibid,. 148.
12 Ibid., 152.

13 Ibid., 148.
14 Srinvas R. Melkote, "Theories of Development Communication," In International and Development
Communication, ed. Bella Mody (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 129.
15 Ibid., 130.

16 Ibid., 131.









moderate Afghan groups."5 According to the author of this paper, if the CIA had restrained

and kept an oversight on the ISI, preventing it from giving money to fundamentalist

organizations, today's Afghanistan would not have been a heaven for terrorists.

This new alliance was a blessing in disguise for Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq's

dictatorship. Instead of being repudiated for suspending the constitution, General Zia gained

stature and became an international champion for opposing Communism and allowing 3.2

million Afghan refugees entry into Pakistan.56

Unlike previous U.S.-Pakistan alliances, this new alliance was based on new semantics

which meant that, for the first time, the U.S. and Pakistan were "partners, not allies." As Kux

observed, "Their relationship was a marriage of convenience," bound together with the goal to

expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Furthermore, this time Pakistanis were not under the false

impression that the U.S. was going to support them against any war with India.57

In December of 1982, Pakistani President Zia embarked upon an official state visit to the

U. S. During this visit, President Zia was severely criticized by the U.S. press for his regime's

suspension of democracy and for Pakistan's nuclear aspirations. Responding to criticism over

Pakistan's human rights record, Zia said, "We have a constitutional government. It is a civilized

government. We are not bunch of clowns."58

During early 1980s, it was customary for U.S. officials to visit Peshawar, Pakistan, to

address Afghan refugees settled there in temporary refugee camps. The Khyber Pass, the



55 Ibid., 275.
56 Ibid., 266.

57 Ibid.
58 Bernard Weinraub, "Zia Sees No Quick Solution to Soviet Afghanistan," The New York Times, December 8,
1982, sec. A.









interests prior taking any action. Pakistan is already doing enough to curb the international

terrorism while maintain its own national interests. No other country has the right to force

Pakistan to do anything against its own interests," he said.

Few military elites blamed the U.S. as the cause of the current chaos in Afghanistan. A

retired colonel said, "The USA is trying to fight his "War of Interest" on the shoulders of others.

All these problems are the creation of USA. Pakistani government has done more than its

capacity, power, and resources against the support and wishes of its own people."

A serving Pakistan army colonel also rebuked U.S. assertions that Pakistan is not doing

enough. He said,

Pakistan has deployed more troops as compared to USA and NATO ISAF troops. Pakistani
forces have suffered more causalities comparing to USA or NATO troops deployed in
Afghanistan. Pakistan has captured the majority of al-Qaeda people who were hiding in
various part of Pakistan, which were subsequently handed over to U.S. Moreover,
Pakistan is also taking political and economical steps in the region bordering Afghanistan,
which is paying dividend now. Pakistan cannot kill its own people just to please U.S.
policymakers and think tanks who possess partial knowledge

The majority of military elites believed that the threat of the Taliban can only be

neutralized through a political solution. A retired general said,

The Taliban are the by-product of the Afghan Jihad struggle against Communists. After
the war, this Pashtoon group dominated the Afghan scene after surviving the intra-
fratricide and an unending feud among Afghan militants. These people projected the
religious cult of a specific Imam and injected a phenomenon of the Caliphate's time not
practically possible at this time. These hamlet people are ridden with a very narrow mind
and believe in dogmas, rituals and reject open mindedness and can't move with the
demand of the time. They only need motivation through liberal education to be imparted
through the locals and not the foreigners. They need money to make their houses, attend
schools, have treatment in hospitals and communication infrastructure to reach out to the
world and allow the world to reach out to them. It will take time. Instead of hounding
them with rifle, they need butter to feed. We shouldn't propagate them as terrorists, but
coin some other term as brave people who need decent living and a decent education.
Through pacification programs and helping Pakistan's government to join them in their
efforts, we can tame these unguided and uneducated people. Patience and time will make
the impact.









An online interview, such as by e-mail communication, is also recognized by scholars like

Mann and Stewart as a good tool to conduct asynchronous interviews.26 E-mail interviews allow

"participants to be more reflective because they can take time to respond in a more measured

,,27
way.

Since the purpose of this study is to examine contemporary elite Pakistani attitudes toward

the U.S., qualitative interviews were used as a research method to collect data because they

allowed the interviewer to explore the perspectives and perceptions of various stakeholders. In

order to collect data for this study, 26 elite opinion leaders were interviewed either by semi-

structured telephone or e-mail interviews. For reliability, both sets of interviews utilized the

same questions (see Appendix 2 for interview guide). The questions contained in the interview

guide were carefully formulated to focus on the dynamics that define the current Pakistan-U.S.

relationship.

According to Patton, there are three types of interview questions: experience questions,

feeling questions, and knowledge questions.28 For example:

* Experience question: What is your experience in dealing with US government officials?

* Feeling question: How do you feel about the new sanctions imposed on Pakistan by
President Bush?

* Knowledge questions: What steps should be taken to defeat terrorism?


In our interview guide questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are knowledge questions, while questions 1, 2,

7, and 9 are experience questions.




26 Ibid., 173.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 173.









situation is your problem," replied Secretary Haig.45 Third, was the modus operandi: it was

decided that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will train Pakistani Inter Services

Intelligence (ISI); in return, ISI would train the Mujahideen (Afghan resistance).46 The author

believes that these modalities reflect the double standards inherent in then-current U.S. foreign

policy. In subsequent years, when the U.S. did not need an alliance with Pakistan, the Bush and

Clinton administrations used the same reasons to impose military and economic sanctions on

Pakistan.

In 1981, a $3.2 billion, five-year aid package was approved for Pakistan. Part of this

package was F-16 aircraft, the most sophisticated at that time. Initially, the U.S. was reluctant to

sell those aircraft to Pakistan, but when Pakistan related the sale of the aircraft to a test of

American sincerity, the U.S. decided to equip Pakistan with F-16s. The sale of those aircraft was

indicative of Pakistan's strong bargaining position in this new alliance.47 U.S. ambassador to

Pakistan Arthur Hummel termed the sale of the F-16s "an unnecessary luxury."48 As far as

Pakistan's reasons for acquiring F-16s was concerned, General Arif concluded that there were

two: Pakistan wanted an edge over Indian air power and wanted to provide a morale boost to the

Pakistani people. "The acquisition of the aircraft became a symbol of national virility. The

whole issue caught the imagination of the Pakistani public," said Ronald Spiers, U.S.

ambassador to Pakistan.49




45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 257.

47 Ibid., 259.
48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 260.









CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS

From the responses of the Pakistani elites, it is quite clear that the U.S.-Pakistan

relationship is in need of realignment. First, U.S. policy makers need to stop giving sermons

about "doing more." They need to realize that the on-ground realities in Pakistan and

Afghanistan are different from what they perceive. To eradicate terrorism, Pakistan and the U.S.

need to map out a comprehensive strategy that also embraces political, administrative, and

economic dimensions. Second, Pakistani elites want a relationship between themselves and the

people of the U.S., not a relationship between the U.S. government and President Musharraf.

Pakistan wants to build a broad-based, stable, and long-term relationship with the U.S. Pakistanis

wants to have the same freedoms and liberties that Americans enjoy, which is only possible

through a relationship between two democracies, not between a democracy and dictatorship. "In

keeping with the traditional diplomacy of the past, America has focused its efforts on securing

the support of leaders in the region, leaving those leaders the task of securing the support of the

people there. Instead of being able to rally their people, more and more of these leaders are

alienating themselves from their publics," said Zaharna1. Therefore, it is imperative for the U.S.

to change its policy toward Pakistan and start talking directly to the people of Pakistan.

Finally, U.S. aid to Pakistan must not be solely military hardware and armaments; instead,

it should first and foremost focus on poverty alleviation and welfare projects in Pakistan.

Recently, the Congress Research Service has published a report that calls for a

rearrangement of U.S foreign policy. This report recommends a closer bond with the people of



1 R.S. Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World: A Strategic Communication
Analysis," Foreign Policy in Focus, November, 2001, http://www.fpif.org/papers/communication.html.









embarked upon a struggle against India. On the other hand, as far as Pakistan was concerned, if

the war against Soviet Union to gain freedom was justified, so was war in Kashmir.85

As discussed earlier, soon after the Soviets withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. started

to walk away from Afghanistan. "That walk became a run in 1992," thus, "Washington allowed

its allies in the region, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, free reign to sort out the ensuing Afghan civil

war," wrote Ahmed Rashid.86 The sole reason Pakistani President Zia supported Afghan

resistance fighters was to have a stable Afghan government favorable to Pakistan, a dream not

realized since the independence of Pakistan.87 After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Peshawar-

based Afghani freedom fighters formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG), despite the fact

that Kabul was still ruled by the Communist-backed General Najibullah.88 However, in 1992,

after three year of war between AIG and Najibullah, the AIG emerged as victors. Unfortunately,

right after the victory, a civil war broke among AIG factions.89 When Pakistan support of the

Afghan warlord Hekmetyar, a member of AIG, failed to yield any success in 1994, in southern

Afghanistan Pakistan found a new instrument for its Afghan policy: the Taliban. The Taliban

were the new breed of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. They were the graduates of the

same fundamentalist madrassas that had earlier provided the recruits to fight Soviets in

Afghanistan.90 During the period of 1994-1995, the U.S. supported the Taliban politically

because it viewed them as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia, and pro-western, while totally ignoring their



85 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 322-323.

86 Rashid, Taliban, 175.

8 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 282.

88 Ibid., 297.

89 Ibid., 317.

90 Ibid., 344.









"Afghanistan is no longer on our radar screen," said one State Department official.73 "For

ordinary Afghans the U.S. withdrawal from the scene constituted a major betrayal, while

Washington's refusal to harness international pressure to help broker a settlement between the

warlords was considered a double betrayal," wrote Ahmed Rashid, the author of the book

"Taliban."74 The author believes that this hands-off approach toward Afghanistan by the U.S. is

partly responsible for present Quagmire occurring in that country.

The 1990s: Decade of Decay

In February of 1989, the last remaining Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan, ending the nine

year invasion.75 In October of 1990, President Bush refused to sign the Pressler amendment

certification; therefore, the $564 million economic and military aid package to Pakistan was

frozen.76 Most of the Pakistani public and press deplored this decision, and declared the United

States a "fickle friend." Furthermore, the majority of Pakistanis echoed the sentiment "with the

Afghan war over, the United States no longer needs] Pakistan. You Americans have discarded

us like a piece of used Kleenex."77 According to The Washington Post, "The plunge in U.S.-

Pakistan relations illustrates what can happen in a poor country when it is no longer needed by a

superpower."78 Furthermore, this event proved to a pivotal in U.S.-Pakistan relations: "the

action effectively ruptured the bilateral security partnership that had flourished during 1980s,"




73 Ibid.

74 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 177.

75 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 297.
76 Ibid., 310.

SIbid.

8 Molly More and John Ward Anderson, "After Cold War, U.S-Pakistani Ties Are Turning Sour," The Washington
Post, April 21, 1993, sec. A.










* Omar Saeed Sheikh, sentenced to death on the charges of murdering Wall Street journal
reporter Daniel Pearl.110

* Abu Zubaydah, whose 2002 arrest resulted in warnings about possible attacks on the Statue
of Liberty and Brooklyn Bridge. Abu Zubaydah also revealed Flight 93 was supposed to
crash into the White House.111

* Ramzi Binalshibh, an alleged coordinator of the 9/11 attacks, was responsible for the USS
Cole attack and the U.S. embassy bombing in Tunisia.112

Moreover, despite the full cooperation extended by the Pakistani government, the U.S.

carries out strikes inside Pakistani territory with seeming disregard for Pakistani sovereignty.

These types of actions not only tarnish the already shaky U.S. image in Pakistan, but also

undermines the Pakistani government's role as an effective agent against terrorism by causing

civil unrest in the country. For example, on January 13, 2006, a U.S. drone, in clear violation of

Pakistani airspace, fired a missile on Damadola, Pakistan, killing eighteen people, including

women and children. This attack was carried out based on flawed intelligence that Ayman al-

Zawahiri might be in that area. 113 On top of that, instead of being apologetic about the loss of

innocent life, U.S. officials arrogantly defended these attacks. "My information is that this strike

was clearly justified by the intelligence," said Senator Trent Lott, a former Senate majority

leader. 114



110BBC News, "Pearl Murderer Defiant After Verdict," July 15, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/2128578.stm.

111 BBC News, "Bin Laden Lieutenant 'Gave Warnings,"' May 24, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2006138.stm.

112 BBC News, "Top al-Qaeda Suspect in US Custody," September 15, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/2261136.stm.

113Riaz Khan, "Pakistan Condemns Deadly US Air strike," Eccentric Star January 14, 2006,
http://eccentricstar.typepad.com/public_diplomacyweblog_n/2006/01/pakistanisprot.html.
114 Brain Knowlton, "Intelligence Committee Senators Discuss Pakistan Air strike," The New York Times, January
15, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/politics/15cnd-
senators.html?ex=1166245200&en=4276a34fa5350a3d&ei=5070.









Yahoo News. "US Again Accuses Pakistan of Providing 'Refuge' to Taliban." January 26, 2007,
http://au.news.yahoo.com/070126/19/127n7.html. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Yusufzai, Rahimullah. "Pakistani Taliban' claim responsibility." The News.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=4100. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Zaharna, R. S. "American public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world: A strategic
communication analysis." Foreign Policy in Focus, November, 2001.
http://www.fpif.org/papers/communication.html. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Ziauddin, M. "Britain Will Never Win in Afghanistan: Aurakzai." Dawn, November 27, 2006.
http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/27/top8.htm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)









non-NATO ally in 2004, Pakistan is still subject to discriminatory treatments vis-a-vis India and

is often blamed for 'not doing enough,' said a naval officer.

Military elites also believed that unconditional American support for Israel is also a cause

of resentment toward America. A retired general said that Pakistanis do not like many U.S.

policies in Middle East. "They think that America is unjustified in helping the Israelites

irrespective of their malice-ridden designs and plans against the Palestinians. When the whole

world cries out against Israel, why do Americans still support the atrocious policies of Israel?

When the UNO condemns Israel, why USA votes in the Security Council against the world

opinion? People in Pakistan are not very educated. They are born with closed minds and

continue to follow the rituals that they learn from their parents. The animosity against the

Israelites injected into their minds is repeated in the media, in the religious sermons. So a friend

of Israel is a foe of Islam and Pakistan. America is a die-hard friend of Israel, so Israel foe of

Islam and Pakistan," he said. The same general also emphasized that Pakistan does not have any

hatred toward the people of Israel. "Moderate Pakistanis respect the Prophets of Israel, they

respect the Holy Books of Judaism, they respect the Jews who lived along the side of their

Prophet, but they reject what the Israel is doing to the Palestinians," he said.

According to military elites, The U.S. needs to water down overtly aggressive foreign

policy and create workable solutions to Middle East crises to rehabilitate its negative image in

Pakistan. Responding to the question, How can the United States remove these misgivings, a

Pakistan naval officer said, "There are no misgivings in the minds of Pakistanis about America.

These are the ground realities." He commented that the majority of conflicts faced by the world

would cease to exist if the U.S. would rein in its hypocritical policies toward other countries,

stop interfering in the affairs of other countries, stop bullying other countries, and stop









In this study, Pakistani elites pointed out few reservations that are beyond the scope and

dimensions of U.S. policy. According to a recent study conducted by the University of

Maryland, 85% of Pakistanis responded that terrorism is "never justified."32 Moreover, an

overwhelming 78% of Pakistanis want terrorist to be brought to justice.33 A majority of

Pakistanis reject terrorism, and a majority of Pakistani elites dismiss force as a logical tool and

tactic to defeat terrorism. Therefore, regardless of the content of the message communicated

through U.S. public diplomacy, it will fail to stimulate the desired response from the people of

Pakistan as long as no substantial changes are made to U.S. foreign policy. "No amount of spin

in public diplomacy will compensate for an American foreign policy that negatively affects

others. In communication between peoples, actions still speak louder than words," said

Zaharna.34

One can conclude that U.S. efforts in Pakistan must turn away from coercion toward

development programs that support the Pakistani people in meeting both their spiritual and

materials needs. This will create a climate that will build favorable public opinion toward the

U.S. in Pakistan.













32 Kenneth Ballen, "The Myth of Muslim Support for Terror", The Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 2007,
Lhp \ .csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html.

3 Peter Ford, "Why Do They Hate Us?" The Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 2001,
hup \ \\ .csmonitor.com/2001/0927/plsl-wogi.html.
34 Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World."









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Michael Leslie for his patience and dedication. I would

also like to thank Dr. Bemell Tripp and Dr. Juan Carlos Molleda for their support and help.









Future studies on this subject should use a probability sample. Instead of qualitative

interviews, a focus group approach would provide the opportunity for a debate among Pakistani

elite opinion leaders, which could reveal new information not possible to access via interviews.

Moreover, due to the current U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S.

image is very poor in Pakistan. This may have further skewed the elite opinions gathered for this

study.

Despite the fact that participants in this study were promised confidentially, many

influential military generals and political leaders refused to participate in it. Also, responses

elicited through religious elites were not cohesive and comprehensive.

Biases resulting from the wording of some questions might also have resulted in biased

answers. Courtesy biases of interviewees also could have affected the responses they gave, i.e.,

respondents might have felt compelled to give suitable answers to help the researcher to achieve

the main objective of the study: to unearth the reasons behind U.S. unpopularity in Pakistan.

Moreover, in order to look good, the respondents might have resorted to socially desirable

answers. Interviewer's reactions to interviewee's answers and interviewer's efforts to probe for

answers might also have biased interviewee's responses. The researcher's own association and

identification with Pakistan and desire to obtain suitable data might also have generated some

biases.

Nonetheless, the study was able to identify some underlying reasons for Pakistani dislike

toward the U.S. government and to suggest some remedies for reducing the animosity between

the two countries.









activities in their countries. "[The] same has been done in the Middle East, including Pakistan.

The simple explanation that all was done in the best interest of the country is not well taken in

our country [Pakistan], where people are stunned to watch the dichotomy in U.S. policies," he

said.

A point to be noted is that the word "dictator" was only used by retired military elites.

Since Pakistan is ruled by General Pervez Musharraf, a military dictator, serving military elites

refrained from using the word dictator and decried American efforts to promote democracy in

Pakistan. They believed that the Pakistanis are uneasy with U.S. efforts to thrust American-Style

democracy upon them. They also believed that the ideology and theory behind western-style

democracy is incompatible with the local culture and way of life in Pakistan. They stressed that

democracy is an evolutionary process which needs time to flourish. "In fact, America has just

one recipe and unilaterally wants everyone to adopt that. America has reached this state in a few

centuries and it is an evolutionary process, whereas other nations are still struggling in their

evolutionary process and will take some more time in reaching the stage when U.S.-brand

democracy can be beneficial for them," said a Pakistani army colonel.

Military elites also blamed American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan as a root cause

of hatred toward it. A retired general asked, "Who has granted the right to the Americans to

come and occupy Iraq? Who grants them liberty to snatch the liberty of a sovereign state? Why

are they in Afghanistan? The law of the jungle, "might is right", is being pursued by the

Americans. The diction "Boss is always right" is a motto of the U.S. People think that

Americans are the people who do not respect the religious, ethical values of other nations and

religions." Military elites also cited the false pretences under which Iraq was invaded as a reason

for Pakistani dissent. "Devastation in Afghanistan for so-called eradication of terrorism and in









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2006. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\07\story_7-3-
2006_pg5_1. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Shahzad, Asif "Leave Pakistan or Die, Musharraf Warns All foreign Militants." The Scotsman,
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(last accessed May 9, 2007)

Sparkland, Robert. "U.S Wages War on a Concept." Seattle Post Intelligencer. August 11, 2006.
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Steeves, H. Leslie. "Development Communication as Marketing, Collective Resistance, and
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Communication, ed. Bella Mody. London: Sage Publications, 2003.

Strait, James D., and David Sloan. Historical Methods in Mass Communications. Northport:
Vision Press, 2003.

Taubman, Philip. "Afghan Refugees Hear Shultz Vow 'We Are With You.'" The New York
Times. July 4, 1983, pg.1.

Thornton, Thomas. "Between two stools?: U.S policy toward Pakistan in the Carter
Administration." Asian Survey, October 1982, 959-977. Quoted in Dennis Kux, The
United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Washington, D.C:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001.

Time. "Better Off in a Home." August 25, 1947.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,798063,00.html. (last accessed May
9, 2007)

Time. "Long Shadow." April 22, 1946.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,792780,00.html. (last accessed May
9, 2007)

Time. "That Man." September 20, 1948.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,799165-1,00.html. (last accessed May
9, 2007)

Tuch, Hans S. Cmiiiiiiiiitiuiig ith the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas. New York:
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Wasisbord, Silvio. "State, development, and communications." In International and
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Weinraub, Bernard. "Zia Sees No Quick Solution to Soviet Afghanistan." The New York Times,
December 8, 1982, sec. A.










passage linking Pakistan to Afghan refugee camps, was declared as a "well-worn VIP path."59

"Fellow fighters for freedom, we are with you," said Secretary of State George Shultz to

cheering Afghan refugees.60 "I want you to know that you are not alone. You will have our

support until you regain the freedom that is rightfully yours," said U.S. Secretary of Defense

Casper Weinberger, while visiting an Afghan refugee camp.61 In May 1984, Vice President

George Bush visited Pakistan, where he praised the Afghan freedom fighters "indomitable spirit

of freedom," which he thought had "earned the admiration of free men everywhere."62 During

this visit, Mohammad Nasir Khan, a local Afghan refugee, thanked Vice President Bush because

"he [Bush] has helped the Jihad of the Afghans."63 Recounting the passion resonated by U.S.

officials while addressing the Afghans, then Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes said

that Shultz got so emotionally "carried away when he visited the Afghan tribal near Peshawar. I

thought he was going to grab a gun and run off into Afghanistan."64

Pakistan's aspiration to acquire nuclear capability was still a causing much friction in U.S.-

Pakistan relations. On April 4, 1984, Pakistani daily Nawi-i-Waqat broke a story that claimed

Pakistani scientists had been successful in enriching uranium to weapons grade.65 Furthermore,

during the same period, three Pakistanis were arrested for smuggling equipment that could have




59 William Claiborne, "Bush at Khyber Pass: Whiff of War and Fine-Tuned Welcome," The Washington Post, May
18, 1984, sec. A.
60 Philip Taubman, "Afghan Refugees Hear Shultz Vow 'We Are With You,'" The New York Times, July 4, 1983,
pg. 1.
61 Richard Halloran, "Weinberger Meets Zia and Afghan Refugees," The New York Times, October 2, 1983, pg. 4.

62 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 272.
63 Claiborne, "Bush at Khyber Pass."

64 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 271.
65 Ibid., 275.









persuasive to the United States only a decade later.8 On the other hand, to resolve the Kashmir

dispute between India and Pakistan, President Truman did came forward with a proposal on

August 31, 1949, stating to the United Nations the United State's wish to hold a plebiscite on the

Kashmir issue.9 Nevertheless, Pakistan's willing support of the U.S. in its strategic ambitions to

fight Communism in Korea and its policy in the Middle East found little favors with U.S. policy

makers. 10

The 1950s: Emergence of an Alliance

Eisenhower's presidency ushered a new era in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Two pivotal trips

were responsible for the U.S. foreign policy shift in favor of Pakistan, those of Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon, who each visited the subcontinent in

1953. After his visit to South Asia, Dulles told the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) that

Jawaharlal Nehru, then Prime Minister of India, was an "utterly impractical statesman."1

Regarding Pakistan, Dulles told the Foreign Affairs Committee that "those fellows [Pakistanis]

are going to fight any communist invasion with their bare fists if they have to."12 Similarly, after

his South Asian visit, Nixon reported that Nehru was "the least friendly leader" in Asia.13 In his

NSC briefing Nixon said, "Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for."14 This new

shift in U.S. foreign policy was described by Dana Adams Schmidt in The New York Times, who

wrote "the importance of bringing in Pakistan on the defense of the Middle East is greater than

8 Ibid., 21.

9 Ibid., 29-30.

10 Ibid., 37.

11 Ibid., 56.
12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 60.
14 Ibid., 61.









independence, the Pakistan Army has ruled the country for almost thirty years, clearly making it

a major source of political power in Pakistan.

In the early days of its independence, Pakistan was essentially a dominant-party political

system, ruled by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The degeneration and intra-party splits

within the PML led to a multiple party system.28 After the most recent parliamentary election

held in 2002, the Pakistan Muslim League (QA) [PML (QA)], the current ruling party and a

splinter group of the PML, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and Pakistan Muslim League (N)

[PML (N)], another splinter group the of Pakistan Muslim league, have emerged as the three

main modernist political parties.29

For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the 2002 elections resulted in the emergence of

an Islamic party, the Mutttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), as political contenders. Before these

elections, religious hardliners were never able to acquire even 5% of the total vote.30 Polling

12.28% of the total vote in 2002, MMA won 58 parliament seats out of a total of 342.31 They

also became the main opposition party at the national level. At the provincial level, MMA was

able to form its government in North West Frontier Province and a collation government in

Baluchistan province.32

According to a public opinion poll conducted last year in Pakistan by the International

Republican Institute, President Pervez Musharraf, a military general, was the most popular leader

28 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), 117.
29 Election Commission ofPakistan, "Detailed Position of Political Parties/Alliances in National Assembly General
Elections --2002," ltp \\ \\\ .ecp.gov.pk/content/GE-2002.htm.

30 Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," 9.
31 Election Commision ofPakistan, "Detailed Position of Political Parties/Alliances in National Assembly General
Elections--2002," ltp \\ \\\ .ecp.gov.pk/content/GE-2002.htm.
32 Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," 9.









The U.S. strategy to support Afghan insurgents against the Soviets was an integral part of

the Regan Doctrine: to embark upon a strategy to impede the rising influence of Communism in

Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. On the other hand, the

stratagem adopted by the CIA concentrated on narrower specifics: "The aim of the program was

to cause pain. It was revenge after the series of U.S. defeats in Vietnam, Angola, Horn of Africa,

etc. It was payback time," said a U.S. intelligence officer.50

At the outset, the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was kept concealed. There were "No

signs that Pakistan is prepared to take on the role as conduit for increased U.S. and Western

military aid to rebel forces fighting in Afghanistan," reported The Washington Post. 51 Initially,

the CIA was spending $30 million annually, matched fully by Saudi Arabia.52 Furthermore,

distribution of funds was carried out by ISI, who funneled money to fundamentalist Islamic

organizations, especially to Gulbuddin Hektmatyar, an anti-American fundamentalism war

lord.53 When describing these fundamentalist organizations, a former CIA official said, "They

were all brutal, fierce, bloodthirsty and basically fundamentalist. There were no Thomas

Jeffersons on a white horse among the Afghan resistances leaders."54 The CIA, which was in

charge of U.S.-Afghan policy, was constantly warned about turning blind eye toward funds being

channeled to fundamentalist Afghan organizations. Eliza Van Hollen, a U.S. State Department

Afghan Specialist, warned the CIA that the funds were giving these fundamentalist organizations

"a potent form of political patronage, strengthening their standing and weakening that of more


50 Ibid., 261.
51 Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. and Pakistan Progressing on New Aid Plan, The Washington Post, April 22, 1981, sec. A.

52 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 262.

53 Ibid., 274.

54 Ibid.









TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S ..............................................................................................................4

ABSTRAC T ......................................................................... 7

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ............... ............................... ............................. .8

2 R E SE A R C H M E TH O D S ............................................................................ ..................... 15

3 H ISTO R IC A L R E V IEW ............................................................................... .. .............23

T he 1940s: U uncharted W waters ......................................................................... .................. 23
The 1950s: Emergence of an Alliance........................................................... .... ....25
The 1960s: D decade of Stalem ate ........................................................................ ...............26
T he 1970s: A alliance C rum bles ....................................................................... ..................28
T he 1980s: P partners, N ot A llies...................................................................... ..................29
T he 1990s: D decade of D ecay ..................................................................... ......................36
T he 2000s: W ar on T error .......................................................................... .....................40

4 IN TE R V IE W FIN D IN G S ......................................................................... .......................47

D o P akistanis H ate the U .S.? ............................ ................................. ...............................47
Military Elites .......... ....... .. ......... ....................... 47
M modernizing E lites ........................ .. ........................ .. .... ........ ........ 53
Religious Elites ............................. .................. 55
The U.S. "War on Terror" and Pakistan ..................................................................56
M military E lites ................................................................................ 56
M modernizing E lites ........................ .. ........................ .. .... ........ ........ 59
R elig iou s E lites ................................................................................ 6 1
P akistan and the T alib an ............ .... ............................................................ .. .. ....... ..... 62
M military E lites ................................................................................ 62
M modernizing E lites ........................ .. ........................ .. .... ........ ........ 64
Religious Elites ............... ................. ............. ............ .......... ...... 66

5 IM PL IC A T IO N S ................................................................67

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ...........................................................................75

APPENDIX

A IN T E R V IE W E E L IST ............................................................................... ....................... 80

B INTERVIEW GUIDE........................................... 82









Modernizing Elites

The majority of interviewed modernizing elites believe that contradictions between the

ideology that governs American domestic policy and the ideology that governs American foreign

policy is the real cause for the Pakistani resentment toward the U.S., not American freedoms

Emphasizing this point, one elite Pakistani businessman said, "Yes, it is true people hate a

democratically elected government that creates problems for other democracies and supports

dictators. They hate their freedom to jeopardize other's Freedom. They hate their freedom of

religion to declare other religions as terrorists. They hate their freedom of speech making others

speechless. They hate the freedom to vote for the oppressors. They hate the assembly which

always ruins the global order."

Modernizing elites also blamed U.S. support for Pakistani military dictators as one reason

for Pakistani odium toward the U.S. They believed that U.S. democracy, freedom of speech, and

freedom to vote has nothing to do with Pakistani resentment toward the U.S. "These are the

most likeable virtues of a great nation. We also want to have the same in our country;

unfortunately, Americans by supporting military dictators have never allowed us access to these

ingredients of liberty and freedom," a member of the National Assembly said.

Some of the modernizing elites blamed blatantly aggressive U.S. foreign policy as a reason

for Pakistani resentment toward America. A political advisor to a chief minister said that

American society is flourishing with democracy and freedom of speech, but its over-fixation

with world domination is the real cause of hatred toward America. One modernizing elite

declared the war on terror as a war for American supremacy. "America is being hated in the

whole world, either by expressly or impliedly, due to its foreign policies. This is not a war

against terrorism. In fact this is a lust of supremacy and to rule the world in the name of war

against terrorism and targeted Muslim countries and proceeding in pick and choose manner









While addressing the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush

said, "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you

are with the terrorists."11 Responding to President Bush's statement, Zaharna, a contributor to

Foreign Policy in Focus, said, "Such ultimatums are often perceived as threats and initiate a

cycle of defensive communication in which the audience is immediately cued to get their guard

up. Defiance, not cooperation, is often the response."12

It is imperative that we find a new strategy to deal with the concept of defeating terrorism.

One of the stratagems that can defeat terrorism is the ideology of economic well-being and

prosperity. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said, "Poverty and instability lead to weak states

which can become heavens for terrorists and other criminals."13 According to John D.

Negroponte, the U.S. director of national intelligence, "entrenched grievances such as corruption

and injustice and the slow pace of economic, social and political change in most Muslim-

majority nations all continue to fuel the global jihadist movement."14

This means that the U.S. needs to realign and refocus its war on terror tactics and employ

public diplomacy to foster better relations with Muslim world. This requires understanding the

real reasons for resentment toward the U.S.

The purpose of this study is to examine U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy and its effects

on elite Pakistani attitudes toward the U.S. It is the thesis of this study that those attitudes vary





1 Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."
12 Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World."

13 Susan Rice, "Can 'Freedom Only' Secure Our Future?" McGill International Review, Fall (2005).
Ihp \\ n\ .brookings.edu/views/articles/rice/fall2005.pdf.
14 Walter Pincus, "Muslims' Own Debates Called Key to Future," The Washington Post, February 16, 2006, sec. A.









CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In rationalizing his "War on Terror," President Bush said, "Americans are asking, why do

they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber--a democratically elected

government .... They hate our freedoms--our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our

freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."1

A Herald-Gallup poll conducted after the breakout of the Iraq war in 2003 found that 69%

of Pakistanis said they would "hurt America where possible."2 But do "they" really hate our

freedom or it is something else they detest? According to James Zogby, president of the Arab

American Institute, people in general do not hate American people or American culture. They

enjoy American music, movies, and food. "It's not our values, it's not our democracy, it's not our

freedom it's [American foreign] policy they don't like," he says.3

Rather than creating friends in the Middle East, United States (U.S.) foreign policy and

public diplomacy seems to be particularly adept at creating more enemies. "The very people

whom the United States wanted to encourage to promote democracy from Bahrain to Casablanca

instead feel trapped by a policy that they now ridicule more or less as 'destroying the region in

order to save it,'" writes Neil MacFarquhar of The New York Times.4 The only strategy

employed in the war on terrorism is "brute force," misleading us into believing that total

annihilation of our unknown enemy through force is the only way to ensure long lasting world


1 George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001,
Illlp \ \ \ .whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
2 Christiana Fair and others, The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), 286.

3 Richard S. Dunham, "It's Not Americans That Arabs Hate, Businessweek, April 15, 2002,
hup \\ 0\ .businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2002/nf20020415_0109.htm.
4 Neil MacFarquhar, "Anti-U.S. Feeling Leaves Arab Reformers Isolated," The New York Times, August 9, 2006,
hlip \\ \ .commondreams.org/headlines06/0809-07.htm.









To summarize, religious elites blamed social injustice and the political and economic

unrest currently prevalent in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a cause for the flourishing of terrorism.

Religious elites also equated U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as occupations

of Muslim land, which is causing Pakistani resentment toward the U.S.

Pakistan and the Taliban

Military Elites

Responding to accusations made by several high-ranking U.S. officials that Pakistan must

do more to stop the cross-border movement of members of the Taliban from Pakistan to

Afghanistan, a retired general said,

While sitting in USA, it is very difficult to perceive the ground realities in Afghanistan and
northern areas of Pakistan. With vast resources at the disposal of the coalition forces
mainly comprising of the US forces, they have not been able to crush the Taliban.
President Karzai, just confined to his fortress of Presidential House, has not been able to do
much to contain the Taliban. He shrugs off his responsibility by blaming Pakistan. The
border is porous, laced with treacherous mountains and unreachable routes. It is just not
possible to barbwire the whole length of this border. Almost 100,000 Pakistani troops are
manning the border, yet it is not becoming possible to put a check on the movement of the
Taliban who have intimate family relations along both sides of the border. These so-called
Taliban or Mujahideens are the direct product of the 1980s when America was fighting
against Communism. These fanatics, assembled from all over the world, are still in the
northern areas, which are completely hostile to the Pakistani troops. The terrain is hostile
being mountainous and thoroughly friendly to the locals. Pakistan Army has already lost
troops and weapons in these areas and its mere presence against these local and foreign
militants is de-popularizing the present government, which is already under intense
pressure from the religious parties harboring militants in their wings-so dangerously
creating law and order situation undermining the writ of the government. From one side
local population is turning against the present regime because of its anti-terrorism policies,
on the other side these terrorists get re-agitated and mount further pressure through
sabotage, suicide bombings. As if this was not enough, U.S. yet puts more pressure "to do
more." Does all this keep the government? No. Government needs breathing space
through sincere acknowledgement of the U.S., sincere acknowledgement from Afghan
government, which is bent upon blaming Pakistan for its own misgivings and short-falls.

A naval official challenged the authority of American officials for asking Pakistan to do

more. "Who is America to order someone to do something? We are not an American colony,

but a sovereign and independent nation. Like America, we also have to consider our own









tactics employed in the war on terror as a main cause of the current chaos in Afghanistan and the

flourishing of terrorism in the world. "I think present American strategy is further flourishing

terrorism instead of eradicating it. We need to understand the true identity of the

people/organizations being termed as terrorists by America. Who created al-Qaeda in the first

place? It was created by America itself to fight Soviets in Afghanistan. Osama bin-Laden was

on American payroll. He and his companions were trained by CIA. We need to understand the

reasons why these slaves turned against their master. The reason is the faulty American

strategy," said a naval elite.

Explaining the repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a general who was

directly involved in that conflict said that terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan is related to the

Middle East situation augmented by the 1980s war against Communism. He further stated,

This so called war of "Jihad" [Afghan struggle against the Soviets] took its present
trajectory when war in Afghanistan against USSR was over. There were no further
objectives of these Jihadis who had so blatantly fought against the Russians. Now their
cause shifted to Palestine, and creation of a fundamentalist government in Afghanistan.
Leading to unending fratricide and internal feuds among these Jihadis, they spread out to
various global sites of turmoil and fighting, including Africa, Middle East, Iraq, more
importantly to Kashmir and Pakistan. This is our own creation, not from some outside
land. We created a monster to kill Communism but we failed to assign it other tasks.
Monster needed a place to do foul and execute its evils, but we neither provided it an outlet
nor did we tame it to lose its pampered passion. Concept of Frankenstein evolved here and
took us by throat. We are to be blamed. Now a monster has merged with the locals in
small scale, the poison has spilled over to the innocent people who are unemployed,
uneducated, yet educated at Madrassas propagating bigoted and narrow-mindedness. We
know an empty mind is evil's mind. So we have created volumes of evil minds who are
host to terrorism. The sanctuaries of these close-minded people flourish all along
Afghanistan and Pakistan border.

Even the military elites who support the current "war on terror" policy believe that it was

poorly executed. According to a retired general, after the American attack on Afghanistan in

2001, the Taliban were on the run and the U.S. failed to chase them to their final conclusion. He

said,









and not for its result."23 The basic purpose of this type of participatory approach is to "facilitate

conscientization of marginalized people globally to the unequal social, political, and spatial

structures in their societies."24 Most of the time, this type of approach is not applied properly.

Most current development has to do with "control," which is reserved primarily for the

"experts." This type of development purportedly requires equal partnership between

marginalized people and the expert, but the "outcome in most cases has not been true

empowerment of the people, but the attainment of some indicator of development essentially

old wine in new bottles."25

Fortunately, there are two models of development communication which can overcome the

above mentioned problems. First is participatory action research (PAR). In this process, the

people on their own develop methods of consciousness-raising of their existential situation; the

knowledge that is generated or resuscitated is by collective and democratic means. This is

followed by reflection and critical self-evaluation, leading to endogenous social action.26

Poor and marginalized people are dominated by three distinctive ways: control of the

recourses of "material production," control of resources of "knowledge production," and control

"over power that legitimizes the relative worth and utility of different epistemologies/

knowledges."7 Most of the time, the needs and wants of the marginalized and oppressed people







23 Ibid., 138.
24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 138.

26 Ibid., 139.
27 Ibid.









Cohen, Louis, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison. Research Methods in Education. 5th ed.
London: Routeldge Falmer, 2000.

Cohen, Stephen. "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan." The Washington Quarterly. Summer 2003.
http://www.twq.com/03summer/docs/03summercohen.pdf. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Cloughley, Brian. "Stop Blaming Pakistan." Counter Punch. July 11, 2006.
http://www.counterpunch.org/cloughley07112006.html. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Curtis, Lisa. "Strengthening Pakistani Resolve against Taliban." The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1331.cfm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Daily Times. "U.S. Gaining Popularity in Pakistan." December 21, 2005.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005 %5C12%5C21% 5Cstory_21-12-
2005_pg7_51. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Dawn. "A New Presseler Law?" January 26, 2007. http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/26/ed.htm.
(last accessed May 9, 2007)

Dawn. "Musharraf ahead of Benazir, Nawaz in Popularity Poll." December 16, 2006.
http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/16/topl.htm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Dawn. "Pakistan Not Doing Enough to Fight Terror: US Paper." July 27, 2005.
http://www.dawn.com/2005/07/27/nat3.htm. (last accessed May 9, 2007)

Daymon, Christine, and Immy Holloway. Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and
Marketing Communications. London: Routledge, 2002.

Dunham, Richard S. "It's Not Americans That Arabs Hate. Businessweek, April 15, 2002.
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2002/nf20020415_0109.htm.

Election Commission ofPakistan. "Detailed Position of Political Parties/Alliances in National
Assembly General Elections--2002." http://www.ecp.gov.pk/content/GE-2002.htm. (last
accessed May 9, 2007)

Fair, Christiana, Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Peter Chalk, Theodore W. Karasik, Rollie Lal,
lan O. Lesser, and David E. Thaler. The Muslim World after 9/11. Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2004.

Feder, Gershon, and Sara Savastano. "The role of opinion leaders in the diffusion of new
knowledge: The case of integrated pest management." World Development 34, no. 7
(2006).

Ford, Peter. "Why Do They Hate Us?" The Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 2001.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0927/p sl-wogi.html. (last accessed May 9, 2007)









resources, has failed to pacify Iraq, then why does it expect Pakistan to curb the Taliban in such a

short period of time with limited resources at its disposal.

In dealing with the Taliban, modernizing elites also believed in a political solution rather

than a military solution. A member of the National Assembly said,

Northern people, a non-Pushtoon community, is in government and Pushtoons are out of
government. So a friction exists. Pushtoons should be taken into government, be given
proper representation and be looked after. They need "Pat" not "Push." More pressure
generates more hatred. We must remember when Taliban were in power, there was peace
in the country. Production of opium has ceased but now neither peace is there nor is
opium is extinct-it is on the increase.

A Pakistani businessman said, "Taliban are not terrorists. The word 'Terrorists' which is

being used only for Taliban, is creating more annoyance in them. They should be dealt [with] as

the normal citizens. They should not be hated just because they are fighting in the name of

religion. If America is against Muslims, then Taliban are against America."

A businessman blamed the U.S. for the creation of the Taliban and asked the U.S. to find a

solution. "Taliban are a menace created by USA, so they should suggest a remedy," he said.

One Pakistani scholar believed that Pakistanis should support the Taliban. He said, "Well,

as far as my personal opinion is concerned, we should support Taliban for whatever vices they

may have. There was peace in Afghanistan when they were in command."

To summarize, modernizing elites believe that Pakistan has exhaustively pursed the

Taliban and cannot do more. The war on terror is very unpopular in Pakistan. Therefore, due to

public pressure, Pakistan cannot pursue overtly aggressive the U.S. policies. Some elites believe

that there is no quick solution to the Taliban problem; it requires long-term surgical efforts.

They also believe that if the U.S. with all its military might and resources, has failed to stop the

violence in Iraq, then how can it expect a poor country like Pakistan to accomplish those goals in









The 2000s: War on Terror

Before 9/11, Pakistan was the only country that had diplomatic ties with the Taliban.97

According to President Musharraf, Pakistan was maintaining diplomatic relations with the

Taliban and its leader Mullah Omar for geostrategic reasons. "If we had broken with them, that

would have created a new enemy on our western border, or vacuum of power there into which

have stepped the Northern Alliance, comprising anti-Pakistan elements," said Musharraf 98

On September 12, 2001, one day after the attack on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powel told President Musharraf, "You are either

with us or against us."99 Musharraf replied, "I told him that we were with the United States

against terrorism, having suffered from it from years, and would fight along his country against

it," replied Musharraf.100 The next day, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State told the Pakistani

Director of Inter Services Intelligence that if Pakistan did not support the United States, then

Pakistan "should be prepared to be bombed back to Stone Age."101

Despite being a contributing partner in the war on terror, Pakistan is usually being

criticized by U.S. media and politicians. "It is not that Pakistanis are more inclined toward

terrorism than are citizens of any other country. It is that (Gen) Musharraf is unable, or

unwilling, to confront the terrorists in his midst," sated a Los Angeles Times editorial.102

Moreover, the 9/11 Commission also passed judgment on Pakistan's efforts to control the cross-


97 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line ofFire: A Memoir (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 200.

98 Ibid., 203.

99 Ibid., 201.
100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102Dawn, "Pakistan not doing enough to fight terror: US paper," July 27, 2005,
hup \%" .dawn.com/2005/07/27/nat3.htm.









Islamic fundamentalist doctrine, oppression of women, and "the consternation they created in

Central Asia largely because Washington was not interested in the larger picture."91 During this

period, U.S. diplomats, who visited Afghanistan, were pleased with the assurances they got from

the Taliban that they wound vehemently oppose Iran and would exterminate poppy and heroin

production. Moreover, for next few years the United States supported the Taliban because of a

project by Unocal, a U.S. multinational vying to build oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia

through Afghanistan. In 1995, the Taliban took Herat, Afghanistan, and closed down all the girls

schools. Astonishingly, the United States considered the Taliban's takeover of Herat "as a help

to Unocal."92 Furthermore, in May of 1996, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for South Asia told the

U.S. Senate, "Afghanistan has become a conduit for drugs, crime, and terrorism that can

undermine Pakistan."93 Unfortunately, her testimony fell to deaf ears and there was no policy

shift, although in the later part of 1997, U.S. policy toward the Taliban started to change because

of feminist opposition to the oppression women suffered under the Taliban. Since President

Clinton relied heavily on the support of women for his re-election, "there was no way the U.S.

could be seen as soft on Taliban."94 Additionally, during 1998 and 1999, U.S. support for the

Taliban evaporated because of the Taliban's support for Osama Bin Laden.95 "U.S. policy

appeared to have come full circle, from unconditionally accepting the Taliban to unconditionally

rejecting them," wrote Ahmed Rashid.96



91 Rashid, Taliban, 176.
92 Ibid., 177.

93 Ibid., 178.
94 Ibid., 176.

95 Ibid., 176-177.
96 Ibid., 182.









DO THEY REALLY HATE US?
THE LIMITS OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY



















By

HAMMAAD SHAMS


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2007









wrote Dennis Kux.79 In November 1991, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Security Affairs

Reginald Bartholomew visited Pakistan to address Pakistan's aspiration to acquire nuclear

weapons. During a meeting with Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Bartholomew

charged, "We can't change our policies. You have to change yours," and walked out of the

room.8o Later, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary met with Bartholomew and told him that Pakistan

felt that the United States "was trying to bully them."81

Furthermore, Pakistan's support for Kashmiri insurgents was proving to be the new thorn

in the fragile U.S.-Pak relations. "If you get hit with this on top of Pressler, that will end the

U.S.-Pakistan relationship," the undersecretary of state for political affairs cautioned the

Pakistani ambassador regarding Pakistan's support of Kashmiri insurgents.82 Furthermore, the

same training camps that trained Afghan Mujahideen were now training a new breed of

fundamentalist, who were fighting not only in Afghanistan, but also in Kashmir. These were the

same Arab and Pakistani fighters who had earlier engaged the Soviets in Afghanistan.83 "We

fought the Afghan war 14 years, and now people who were committed to our side are suddenly

seen as villains and branded as terrorists," Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan told The

Washington Post. 84 According to Dennis Kux, as far as Americans were concerned, the same

"Freedom Fighters," who fought the Soviets automatically became terrorists when they





79 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 311.

80 Ibid., 314.

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 316.

83 Ibid., 322.
84 More and Anderson, "After Cold War, U.S-Pakistani Ties Are Turning Sour."









Pakistan rather than its government.2 According to this report, the U.S. can "improve its image

in Pakistan by making aid more visible to ordinary Pakistanis." Confirming the sentiments of

Pakistani elites, this report also states that "the US partnership with Pakistan would probably be

on firmer footing through conditioned programs more dedicated to building the country's

political and social institutions than rewarding its leadership."3

In the past, there were instances where direct U.S. aid has helped enhance its image in

Pakistan. On October 8, 2005, a massive earthquake hit Northern parts of Pakistan killing at

least 73,000 people. In response to this the U.S. army launched a humanitarian relief mission, its

biggest since the Berlin air lift.4 This was the first instance in the history of U.S.-Pakistan

relations that Pakistanis saw the compassionate side of the U.S. What were the results? The U.S.

favorable rating among Pakistanis jumped from 23% to 46%, while support for Osama bin-

Laden dropped from 51% to 33%. Of those polled 78% said that they have a favorable image of

the U.S. because of this relief mission.5 "This poll documents the most significant shift in

Pakistani, indeed Muslim, public opinion since 9/11," said Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani

information minister.6 This suggests that the U.S. can begin to eradicate terrorism and improve

its image by direct involvement in development projects. "Clearly, American humanitarian

assistance can make a significant and immediate difference in eroding the popular support base




2Anwar Iqbal, "US Govt Urged to Focus on Nation, Not Govt: Congressional Report's Advice," Dawn, April 1,
2007, ihp %\ \ .dawn.com/2007/04/01/top 1l.htm.

3Ibid.
4 Reuters, "Goodbye Pakistan: US Ends Quake Relief Mission," March 30, 2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyld=SP 17230.
5 Daily Times, "U.S. Gaining Popularity in Pakistan," December 21, 2005,
hup \ .dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005%5C12%5C21%5Cstory_21-12-2005_pg7_51.
6 Ibid.









for global terrorists. The U.S. 'war on terror' has not," said Ken Billen, the President of Terror

Free Tomorrow, a non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C.7

Furthermore, from the opinions of Pakistani elites it is very clear rehabilitation of the

Tribal Belt through economic incentives is the key to defeating terrorism and the Taliban.

According to Shahid Javed Burki, a former finance minister of Pakistan, Pakistan estimates that

$8 billion is needed over ten years to reform the Tribal Belt, a semi-autonomous area located at

the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. "These amounts should be made available rather than

spent on more vigorous military campaigns," said Burki.8 But this does not mean that the

development money should be given directly to the government of Pakistan. Instead, this

requires direct interaction with the people of Pakistan to make sure that the money channeled for

development projects in spent on development projects, not by corrupt Pakistani government

officials. According to Silvio Waisbord, "Once darling of development projects, the state has

fallen from grace in recent decades." 9 In addition, due to the lackluster performance of states in

various development projects, states are deemed unnecessary. In the past, developing states

played a dominant role in controlling the resources and decision-making process, without being

effective in bringing about any significant success. Thus, the majority of the current

development programs utilize grassroots approach in conjunction with NGOs and civic

associations. 10 "This shift towards a 'scale-down,' 'small is beautiful' approach has been

responsible for diminishing interest in the state as an analytical category and as a central actor in



Ibid.
8 Shahid Burki, "Developing the Tribal Belt," Dawn, January 30, 2007, hup \\ \ \ .dawn.com/2007/01/30/op.htm.

9 Silvio Wasisbord, State, development, and communications," In International and Development Communication,
ed. Bella Mody (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 147.

10 Ibid., 148.









A naval officer asserted that there is no need to get rid of the Taliban. He said that the

Taliban are the byproduct of a social and political system. "Like America, Afghanistan also had

the right to choose any system of government for itself. Taliban are a community with certain

beliefs and they have all the rights to exist in this world like other communities," he said.

To summarize, military elites vehemently reject U.S. assertions that Pakistan is not doing

enough. Military elites believe that Pakistan has been given more to do than what it possibly can

accomplish. Military elites believe the problem lies in Afghanistan, where U.S. forces have

failed to eradicate the Taliban. They think that the current U.S.-supported Afghan government is

comprised of ruthless war lords who are despised by the majority. Military elites also believe

that the U.S. government is oblivious to ground realities in Afghanistan. Instead of pursuing a

military solution, the U.S. must seek a political solution to blunt the Taliban.

Modernizing Elites

Modernizing elites also believed that Pakistan is doing its best to stop the Taliban and that

American criticism was unfair. A member of the National Assembly said, "Pakistan cannot do

more." People of Pakistan believe that President Musharraf is a stooge of America who is

pursuing the U.S. agenda without consulting them. "That is why government is not able to do

any more," he said.

A Pakistani scholar said that Pakistan has done more to deter terrorism and the Taliban

than any other country. "Pakistan has done whatever they could. Not any other country has done

that much including USA. Why USA is not succeeding in Iraq? Should Pakistan be blamed for

that? Republican governments, wrong policies are the main cause," he said.

One modernizing elite believed that dealing with the Taliban is not as easy as it sounds and

will take an ample amount of time. She said that if the U.S. with all its military might and









L IST O F R E F E R E N C E S .............................................................................. ...........................83

B IO G R A PH IC A L SK E T C H .............................................................................. .....................89





















































6









Furthermore, Pakistanis developed a tremendous liking for the U.S. for its unflinching help

during the 2005 earthquakes in which 70,000 lives were lost. Pakistan should be helped

financially, economically, politically and educationally to advance its development. This will

help to broaden their intellectual dimensions to put them on the path to free thinking and valuing

the meaning of freedom and liberty. Extension of welfare projects, spread over the whole of the

country including the Tribal Belt, would auger well for bringing the two countries closer.

It is quite evident from the responses of Pakistani elites that U.S. Middle East policy is one

of the main reasons for the anti-Americanism prevalent in Pakistan. Therefore, the USA must

find a suitable solution to the Middle East crisis. Currently, Pakistan and Israel do not have

diplomatic relations. The U.S., a staunch supporter of Israel and "ally" of Pakistan, can move

the Middle East crisis in a new direction by helping Israel and Pakistan to establish diplomatic

relations.

This study relied on non-probability sampling to select a sample of Pakistani elites.

Therefore, the elites opinion revealed during this study may not be representative of the full

range of Pakistani elite opinion.

The responses elicited through e-mail interviews were short and limited in scope.

Telephone interviews on the other hand, allowed the researcher to probe more deeply for

answers. The responses received were more unreserved and informative.

Due to financial restraints, the researcher was not able to travel Pakistan to do in-person

interviews. In-person interviews would have allowed the research to probe more effectively and

also allowed the researcher to register facial expressions and body language and respond to it.

This might have resulted in richer data.









more influential in this region than the United States."39 Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi

told The Washington Post, "The assistance must be commensurate with the size of the threat."40

The incoming Reagan administration admitted that Pakistan needed far more U.S. support

than promised by the Carter administration. "I know we have had problems, but these are going

to change" incoming Secretary of State Alexander Haig told a Pakistani diplomat.41 Main point

of this new, emerging alliance was to "give Pakistan confidence in our commitment to its

security and provide us reciprocal benefits in term of our regional interests," said Assistant

Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes.42 The new alliance revolved around three main modalities.

First was the nuclear issue: Pakistan made it clear from the start that it would make no

compromise on the nuclear issue. In reply, Secretary Haig assured Pakistan that the nuclear

issue "need not become the centerpiece" of this new alliance. On the other hand, any nuclear

explosion conducted by Pakistan will lead to enormous strain on this new alliance.43 Therefore,

the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee voted 10-7 to temporarily waive the economic sanctions

for the next 6 years.44 These sanctions had been imposed by the Carter administration in

reaction to Pakistan's desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Second was the issue internal politics

(during this period, the Pakistani constitution was suspended and marshal law was imposed in

Pakistan): "We would not like to hear the type of government we should have," General K.M

Arif, Vice Chief of the Pakistan Army Staff, told Secretary Haig. "General, your internal


39 Stuart Auerbach, "Pakistan Seeking U.S Guarantees in Formal Treat," The Washington Post, January 18, 1980,
sec. A.

40 William Branigan, "Pakistan Seeks Billions in U.S Aid," The Washington Post, January 23, 1980, sec. A.

41 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 256.
42 Ibid., 256-257.

43 Ibid., 257.

44 Ibid., 260.









target. This terrorist attack was carried out in direct retaliation for the Pakistan Army's

bombardment of a Madrassa school (alleged to be training terrorists) in Bajur, a town near the

Pakistan-Afghan border, which left eighty people dead. 129

Nonetheless, there have been recent signs of a fragmentation in Pakistani elite public

opinion, with some factions aligning themselves with the anti-American sentiments held by a

major portion of the Pakistani population. "The more Pakistan and its leadership have sacrificed

in order to deliver Al Qaeda to the U.S. and be the most committed ally in the war against terror,

the more abuse has been hurled at it from the U.S.," said Shireen M. Mazari, a liberal Pakistani

scholar and journalist. 130

This fragmentation represents a threat to the continued stability of Pakistan as a U.S.

partner. Clearly, if the U.S. is to continue to have Pakistan as its ally, it is important to better

understand the opinions of the Pakistani elites and the Pakistani population in order to nurture

more favorable attitudes to the U.S. and decrease anti-Americanism and its threat to American

strategic interests. In conclusion, it seems more likely that it is American policy toward Pakistan,

not American freedoms that arouse negative feelings in the people of Pakistan towards the U.S.

Through interviews with members of the Pakistani elite, the next chapter of this thesis examines

the current Pakistani point of view towards U.S. These interviews will also establish the role

played by U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy in shaping the opinions of Pakistani elites.








129 Rahimullah Yusufzai, "'Pakistani Taliban' claim responsibility," The News,
Imp \\ \ .thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=4100.
130Mazari, "US Threats to Pakistan." The News, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=39130.









Iraq for eliminating non-existent WMDs, are also among the reasons for hatred for America

among Muslims," said a naval elite.

While citing past experiences, military elites declared America an unfaithful friend. "We as

Pakistani feel that the USA has always cheated and deceived Pakistan at the time of crises. The

history is full of instances of American betrayal," said a retired general. Military elites believed

that Pakistan played a key role in 1960s and 1970s to defeat communism in the Middle East. In

return, Pakistan expected full-fledged U.S. support in its war against India, which never

materialized. "But unfortunately they have realized that instead of helping Pakistan in 1971 with

the Seventh Fleet, it never even opposed Indian policies against Pakistan. Though Nixon's

policy did support Pakistan in 1971, people still waited for the Seventh Fleet (to act)," said a

retired three-star general.

The two countries again became allies in late 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan to secure access to Middle East oil reserves. Pakistan played a key role in this war

by opening its territory to provide logistical support to Afghan resistance groups who were

fighting to expel the Soviets. As soon as the Soviets began to leave Afghanistan in 1988, the

strategic alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan also crumbled and the U.S. left the area without

stabilizing Afghanistan. Military elites blame this sudden abandonment of Afghanistan by the

U.S. as the sole reason for prevalent instability in that country.

After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the U.S. and Pakistan became

allies again. The sole reasons for this alliance were that the U.S. needed Pakistan's help to

capture Osama bin Laden and to eradicate the threat posed by the Taliban. Military elites

believed that the new alliance was on unequal footings. "Despite being declared as the major









widely and have multiple origins, the understanding of which can lead to a new approach to

public diplomacy geared toward winning the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan.

According to Stephen Cohen, a fellow at the Brookings Institute, Pakistan has been ruled

by a "secular establishment." 15 It consists of "an oligarchy consisting of less than one thousand

military, political, bureaucratic, business, and media elites." 16 According to Tariq Rahim, a

contributor to the book A History ofPakistan andIts Politics, at the onset of Pakistan's

independence from Great Britain, there were three main "protagonist" groups vying to set the

constitutional and ideological agenda for the future of the newly born nation: the secularizing

elites, the modernists, and the men of religion.17 The secularizing elites consisted of three main

elements. The first group was of bureaucrats and civil servants who had served during British

occupation, the British-trained military, and the elite lawyers. This group believed in the

ideology that "religion and politics must be kept separate" from each other.18 The second group,

"the modernists," was comprised of politicians who were members of the Muslim League, the

political party most involved in Pakistan's independence from Great Britain. This group wanted

to ingrain Islamic values into Pakistani politics and constitution, but they were "reluctant to

abandon their own political culture-that of a western-style democracy on the British model,

where laws are made by elected assemblies. They simply wanted to impart an Islamic legitimacy

to their own institutions," writes Rahim.19 Lastly, the "men of religion" were followers of

orthodox Islam, thus religiously and politically conservative. They wanted to reorganize or

15 Stephen Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, (Summer 2003):
uIp \ \\ \ .twq.com/03summer/docs/03summer_cohen.pdf.
16 Ibid.

7 Christophe Jaaferlot, ed., A History ofPakistan and its Origins (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 240.
18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 241.









23. Local Cleric, Faisalabad, Pakistan.

24. Local Cleric, Lahore Pakistan.

25. Author and scholar, Lahore, Pakistan.

26. Pastor, Lahore Pakistan.










to a new understanding of the past and its relevance to the present and future."32 According to

Heck, "Historical research examines questions related to how and why phenomena occur."33 The

primary difference between the historical research method and other research methods is that

historical research relies exclusively on existing data.34 Historical research methods can be

utilized in both quantitative as well as qualitative research.35 There are two prominent schools of

historical research, the positivistic and idealist. Mores and Field writes, "In the positivistic or

neo-positivistic school of historical research, an attempt is made to reduce history to universal

laws. Discovery, verification, and categorization of data are used to analyze the data, and there

is an effort to show cause-effect relationship."36 On the other hand, "In the idealist school,

intuition and experience are ingredients of interpretation. From this perspective, historians

believe it is necessary to get inside the event and rethink the thoughts of the originator in relation

to the content of his or her time, place, and situation to make adequate historical

interpretations."37

Historical research relies on two sources of data: primary and secondary. "Primary sources

are the raw materials of history. They are contemporaneous records, or records in close

proximity to some past occurrence. Or they might be original documents."38 "Secondary



32 Ibid.

33 Ronald Heck, Studying Educational and Social Policy, (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 212.
34 Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, Research Methods in Education, 158.

35 Heck, Studying Educational and Social Policy, 212.
36 Janice M. Morse and Peggy Anne Field, Qualitative Research Methods for Health Professionals, (Sage
Publication, 1995), 33.

37 Ibid.

38 James D. Strait and David Sloan, Historical Methods in Mass Communications, (Northport: Vision Press, 2003),
158.









BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Hammaad Shams was born on July 5, 1978 in Sargodha, Pakistan. The eldest of three

children, he grew up mostly in Lahore, Pakistan, graduating from Army Public High School in

1993. He received his BA in Communications from the Augusta State University in May 2004.

Currently, he is pursuing a degree in MA in Mass Communications from the University of

Florida.









having its own vested interest and curbing Muslim countries for establishing its supremacy in the

world."

Another modernizing elite believed that by conducting a reckless war on terrorism, the

U.S. itself has become a terrorist. She said, "Because we the Pakistanis think that he [Bush] is

the master terrorist. Look at the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now his latest plans to attack

Iran."

Only one modernist elite mentioned the past unreliable Pakistani-American friendship as a

cause of resentment toward America. He said the U.S. is not popular in Pakistan because it has

continually displayed disloyalty toward Pakistan in order to promote and safeguard its own

national and strategic interests. "Pakistan even suffered a lot, but still U.S. has never been

valuing and acknowledging Pakistan's suffering during the Afghanistan invasion by the USSR

and during the War on Terrorism," he said.

Just like military elites, modernizing elites also believed that a changing U.S. involvement

in Iraq and the Middle East peace process is a linchpin for improving its image in Pakistan. A

member of the Punjab Assembly said, "The American policies should not have bias towards

religion. America should deal with Middle East countries in an open and fair manner, giving

equal treatment to Palestine and Israel. The unfair treatment in Palestine has sent a very negative

signal among all the small and large Muslim countries."

To summarize, modernizing elites believe that the conflict between U.S. domestic policy

and foreign policy is a cause of Pakistani detestation. The U.S., which itself is flourishing with

the virtues of freedom and democracy, supports dictators like Musharraf, who openly denies the

Pakistani public access to democracy and freedom. Modernizing elites also blame the U.S. for

the chaos that resulted after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Modernizing elites also believe


































2007 Hammaad Shams









United Nations should provide all possible help to conduct free, fair, and impartial elections

without the interference of military forces of any country, especially the USA," he said.

Few modernizing elites linked terrorism to social problems. A member of the National

Assembly said, "Give education to the masses, listen to their grievances, and address their

problems. No religion allows terrorism, [neither] does Islam. But these people are wrongly

motivated and need comforts, facilities and guidance."

To summarize, the modernizing elites think that the war on terror is a war against Muslim

countries to occupy their oil reserves. They also think the fight against terrorism warrants a

political solution, not brute force. Moreover, modernizing elites blame the rise and flourishing

of terrorism on unfriendly U.S. policies toward Pakistan, which were implemented post-soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan. Modernizing elites believe that terrorism will exist as long as the

quandary in the Middle East exists and the Iraq war exists.

Religious Elites

The majority of religious elites blamed social problems as a cause for the flourishing of

terrorism. According to a local cleric, the people of Pakistan are being crushed by the shackles of

poverty and unemployment. Justice is up for auction. Fundamentalist are taking advantage of

ordinary Pakistanis' helplessness. They brainwash and recruit them by teaching them dreams of

rewards available for them in the afterlife. These brainwashed Pakistanis eventually become

terrorists, who carry out heinous crimes against humanity. Government needs to take stern action

against this threat.

One religious elite blamed the occupation of Muslim land by foreign forces as a reason for

increased terrorism. He said, "Undue occupation of Muslim territories by foreign forces is the

only reason for terrorism. For example, Indian occupation of Kashmir and Israeli occupation of

Palestinian land."









ally in the war on terror who took more risks than any other.124 Likewise, the negative effects of

Bush's trip to Pakistan were quite evident from the fact that on the eve of President Bush's visit,

the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index nosedived and lost 462 point.125

Recently, the newly elected U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation which called

for curbs on American assistance to Pakistan. This new legislation requires the U.S. President

to certify that Pakistan is doing its best to stop the Taliban insurgency in its territory before

releasing U.S. military assistance to Pakistan.126 This type of legislation is not new for Pakistan

and is the cause of a deep-rooted resentment of the Pakistani people toward U.S. According to

Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation, the decision to halt U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990 because

of concerns over its nuclear program was unwise. "Most U.S. policymakers acknowledge that

this was a mistake, because it cost the U.S. valuable leverage and stoked strong anti-U.S.

sentiment that still exists in the country."127 An editorial in a leading Pakistani English daily,

Dawn, equated this legislation with the Pressler Amendment passed in 1985.128

In fact, Pakistan remains a strong ally of the United States in the Middle East. Its

government has taken considerable risks to support U.S. policy objectives of which the mass of

its population has been extremely critical. For example, recently a terrorist organization called

"Pakistani Taliban" claimed responsibility for murdering forty-two Pakistan Army soldiers. This

signaled a major shift in terrorist policy, essentially making the Pakistan Army a known terror

124 Pat Buchanan, "What Indian River Got," Ihp \ \ \ .wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=49144.

125 Farhan. Sharif, "KSE-100 Index nosedives after Bush's Pakistan visit," Daily Times, March 12, 2006,
1lp \ \ \ .dailytimes.com.pk/default.
126 Anwar Iqbal, "US Legislation Seeks Ban on Assistance to Pakistan," Dawn, January 25, 2007,
hup % \\\ .dawn.com/2007/01/25/topl.htm.
127 Lisa Curtis, "Strengthening Pakistani Resolve Against Taliban," The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wml331.cfm.
128 Dawn, "A New Presseler Law?" January 26, 2007, www.dawn.com/2007/01/26/ed.htm.









Afghanistan, not because of Pakistan, but because of the current Afghan government. Pakistani

elites believe that the current Afghan government is comprised of non-Pushtoon war lords, yet,

60% of the Afghan population and all of the Taliban are Pushtoon As long as Pushtoon and

Taliban are kept out of power, the Quagmire in Afghanistan will continue,

Pakistan elites believe that recent peace deal between the Pakistan government and the

local tribes, which is heavily criticized by U.S. policy makers, is the best way to defeat the threat

posed by the Taliban. Due to this peace deal, the tribal leaders have unanimously declared war

against the Taliban. To crush the Taliban, supportive local tribesmen must be befriended, not

alienated.

Pakistani elites also belittle accusations by the U.S. media and politicians that Pakistan is

not doing enough to tackle the Taliban and terrorism. They believe U.S. elite media and

politicians are oblivious to facts and devoid of knowledge of on the ground realities. Pakistani

elites believe that Pakistan has fought the war on terror with all the resources that it could

muster. Pakistani efforts in regard to the war on terror deserve American gratitude, not American

criticism. Pakistani elites also believe that Pakistan should not be put under undue duress to "do

more"; instead, it should be acknowledged as a strong partner which has stood shoulder to

shoulder with the U.S. in its war on terror.

Despite the predominantly anti-American Pakistani elite opinion, all is not lost. All

affluent Pakistani people send their children to the U.S. for education and go themselves for

medical check up and proudly talk about their relatives living in USA. In fact, the USA is like a

dreamland for most. Educated people remain current about it. Also American technology,

ranging from cars to tanks, is very popular in Pakistan and is considered more dependable

compared to technology coming from other regions.









must continue keeping intimate watch over these clashes to get boost out the results.
Government must provide lucrative compensation to Taliban now fighting on Pakistan's
side. Government must win over the prominent leaders of Taliban. Social sector
development must continue alongside creating political space in political parties with anti-
Taliban and anti-extremist orientation.

To summarize, military elites believe that current U.S. tactics and policies employed in the

war on terror are futile and, instead of eradicating terrorism, are the main causes for the rise in

terrorism. Military elites are unanimously sending a clear message to U.S. policymakers that

what is perceived by U.S. totally contradict the realties that are seen on the ground. Pakistani

elites believe that terrorism cannot be defeated by brute force only; instead, the war on terror

should focus on political, and economic, social issues. The U.S. should invest in upgrading and

developing educational and social infrastructure in Pakistan.

Modernizing Elites

Some modernizing elites equated the "war on terror" with a war against Muslims. One

modernizing elite said, "It is not war on terrorism, its war against Muslims. America is targeting

only Muslims under this strategy like its attack on Iraq and Afghanistan. America is targeting the

innocent people of Muslim countries by calling them terrorists." Some Pakistani elites equated

the "war on terror" to war for oil. "There is no terrorism in the world. It is only the unfair

treatment by USA and UK coupled with their desire to pump oil without a meter [fuel gauge]

from Middle East and particularly from Iraq without a meter which has introduced the word

"terrorism." It is like saying that if some country occupies USA and tries to run it in its own

control and social manner will give birth to terrorism in USA," said a member of the Punjab

Assembly.

Modernizing elites also believe that the toppling of the Taliban in the name of the "war of

terror" was not justified. A member of the National Assembly believed that the Taliban were a

legitimate Afghan government that was illegally bombed into extinction. "That is commendable,









without implementing a political solution and leaving Pakistan alone to suffer the consequences

of the Taliban. Pakistani elites believe that Pakistan always has been treated as a disposable

friend by the U.S. They want a relationship that is based on mutual national interest of both

countries, not on the self-interest of the U.S. government. Pakistan wants to build a broad-

based, stable, and long-term relationship with the U.S. It wants to enjoy the same freedoms and

liberties enjoyed by the U.S. population. A segment of the elite is deeply disturbed about U.S.

policies in Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to see these issues amicably resolved,

putting a lid on people's frustration regarding these issues. It is not the American people and

their enshrined principles of fair playing that are disliked, but rather specific American actions

in the Middle East and Iraq that annoy the people of Pakistan.

Pakistani elites also vehemently disapprove of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Religious and

modernizing elite dismiss the war on terror conducted in Iraq as a war for oil and Middle East

domination. Pakistani elites believe that, by targeting Muslim countries only, the U.S. has

unleashed a war against Muslims, not a war against terror.

Pakistani elites also decry the strategies employed by the U.S. in its war on terror. They

think that the U.S. is trying to solve a political problem through the instrument of blunt and brute

force. Pakistani elites believe that terrorists thrive on conflict; therefore, as long as conflicts in

Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East are not resolved, terrorism will continue to burgeon.

Pakistani elites are aware of the threat posed by terrorism against Pakistan, but they want to

confront terrorism with a strategy that contains the ingredients of political, social, educational,

and economic development.

Pakistani elites believe that the Taliban is a political movement; thus, it can only be

pacified through a political solution. They believe that the Taliban are flourishing in









The 1970s: Alliance Crumbles

President Nixon, on taking office in 1970, argued in favor of close relations with Pakistan

so it could withstand the pressures of the Soviet Union.29 In July 1971, Pakistan played a major

role in establishing a bilateral relationship between China and the United States.30 During the

India-Pakistan war of 1971, Pakistan expected the United State's help in view of the 1959

agreements of cooperation that spelled out U.S. support against any Indian incursions against

Pakistan. Instead, support withered away in the loopholes of U.S. legalities, keeping Pakistan

from receiving U.S. support. Despite this, President Nixon did authorize the dispatch of a task

force of eight U.S. ships to warn the Indians and the Soviets to refrain from further aggravating

the situation between Pakistan and India. It is on the record that it was timely admonitions and

threatening caveats by the U.S. government that brought a cease-fire between Pakistan and India

and more devastation was averted.31 Furthermore, in response to the Indian nuclear test in 1974,

Pakistan decided to acquire nuclear technology. Due to this decision, Pakistan invited the wrath

of all the western countries, including the U.S.32 The author of this paper believes that there was

discrimination in the treatment of India and Pakistan regarding their pursuit of nuclear

armaments: Washington remained quite when India carried out its nuclear explosion, but it

chastised Pakistan for the same action. On top of that, instead of taking action against India, the

Carter administration decided to supply enriched uranium fuel to India.33 Regarding this

situation, a top Pakistani diplomat said, "If the United States had applied sanctions against the


29 Ibid., 171.

30 Ibid., 182.
31 Ibid., 201-204.

32 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 221.

33 Ibid., 239.









CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Today, Pakistan is one of the most geo-strategically important states in the world. On its

north and East, it borders two rising global powers, China and India, respectively. On its west it

borders two ticking time-bombs: Afghanistan and Iran. In the past, Pakistan has been a reliable

and dependable ally to the U.S. In the 1960s, Pakistan sustained Soviet wrath and animosity by

allowing the U.S. to use its military bases for U-2 spy aircraft. Pakistan helped the Nixon

administration to establish diplomatic relation with China. During the 1980s, Pakistan played a

key role in defeating Communism and ending the Cold War when it helped the U.S. blunt the

Soviet desire to gain access to warm waters to control the flow of Middle East oil.

All Pakistani elites interviewed agreed that American freedoms have nothing to do with

American unpopularity in Pakistan. They all blame the contradictions in American domestic

policy and foreign policy. They are appalled at American support for dictators, who deny

Pakistanis the virtues of freedom and democracy. They believe that with disregard for

democracy and freedoms, the U.S. supports Pakistani dictators in order to protect and promote its

own national interest. In the 1960s, the U.S. supported Pakistani dictator General Ayub to

counter the threat of the spread of Communism in the Middle East In the1980s, the U.S.

supported Pakistani dictator General Zia to deny the soviets the access to Middle Eastern oil

reserves. Since 2001, in the name of its "war on terror," the U.S. has supported another Pakistani

dictator, General Musharraf. Why? If the fruits of democracy and freedom have made the U.S.

the most powerful country in world, then why deny the people of Pakistan the same virtues?

Due to the past unreliable friendship, Pakistani elites do not trust the U.S. Military elites

are angered at the U.S. for not supporting Pakistan in its wars in 1965 and 1971 against India.

They also are angered at the U.S. for abandoning Afghanistan after the soviet withdrawal in 1989



























To my parents and teachers, who have taught me to discriminate between right and wrong.









culture, for its patriarchal biases, and for its androcentrism."17 Additionally, this approach

implies that for third world countries to develop, they have to forgo their cultural traditions.

Consequently, the modernization perspective places too much emphasis on GNP, which includes

industrialization and economic growth. Hence, they ignore the humanistic aspects of

development. 18 According to Melkote, "It is usually futile and may be unethical for

communications and human service professionals to help solve minor and/or immediate problem

while ignoring the systematic barriers erected by societies that permit or perpetuate inequalities

among citizens."19

Consequently, it is essential to explore other alternatives "to the overtly perspective and

top-down model of modernization." 20 Melkote believes that there is a need to formulate a model

that which is designed to equate growth with equality, availability of basic human needs, and

need for meaningful and fulfilling interpersonal relationships.21 The alternative paradigm of

development communication observes "development as a process that should provide people

with access to appropriate and sustainable opportunities to improve their lives and the lives of

others in their communities."22 This model finds its roots in the notion of active participation of

concerned individuals at the grass root level. This model also recognizes participation as a

fundamental human right that should be ingrained in any development model "as an end in itself





17 Ibid., 132.

18 Ibid.,

19 Ibid., 143.
20 Ibid, 133.
21 Ibid., 137.

22 Ibid.









clever man, Jinnah; the difference between a slick political trick and a mass movement was

apparent in the contrast between Karachi and New Delhi."5

Pakistan gained its independence during the initial period of cold war, when the U.S. and

its allies were involved in an ideological struggle to confine the spread of Communism; thus, the

world was divided between U.S. block and the Soviet bloc. Pakistan right from the start allied

itself with the U.S. and whole-heartedly joined the U.S. camp because "Pakistan [is] a

democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our

interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K and the U.S.A.,

than with Russia," said Jinnah on September 7, 1947.6

As far as initial U.S.-Pakistan relations were concerned, President Truman's era was one of

stalemate. Mutual parleys continued between the U.S. and Pakistan, where Pakistan always

emphasized the commonality of interest against Communist domination but the U.S. faced a

difficult decision, choosing between Pakistan and India on the issue of Kashmir, a disputed

region claimed by both Pakistan and India: favoring one country automatically antagonizes the

other.7 Furthermore, a Pakistani request of a loan of $2 billion over five years for economic

development and defense purchases was also rebuffed; instead, only $10 million was granted.

On this occasion, the dismayed Pakistani foreign minister said, "Well-known friendship of

Pakistan toward the U.S. and Pakistan's obvious antipathy to the Russian ideology would seem

to justify serious consideration by the U.S. Government of the defense requirements of

Pakistan." This rationale for providing assistance to Pakistan would become pervasive and



5 Ibid.
6 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 20.

Ibid., 27.









the importance of preserving pleasant relations with Mr. Nehru."15 Moreover, Pakistan entered

into a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the U.S. on May 19, 1954, to enable Pakistan

to maintain its internal security.16 To deter Communism, Pakistan, Australia, Thailand, France,

New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. formed the South East Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO) on September 8, 1954.17 Moreover, Pakistan's genuine feelings

of friendship were recognized and its role as a real "bulwark" against communism was

appreciated: yet Pakistan remained an ally who was not fully embraced to withstand the

challenges of the communism.18 Moreover, in 1953, the United States also came forward to help

Pakistan in its food crisis.19 During the Eisenhower presidency, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship

reached its pinnacle, when Pakistan was dubbed the "most allied ally in Asia."20

The 1960s: Decade of Stalemate

Despite few major developments, the Kennedy presidency saw a decline in U.S.-Pakistan

relations. In 1962, Pakistan provided a base to the United states at Badaber, Peshawar, for

electronic monitoring of Soviet missile tests and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Russia.21

Furthermore, the U.S. played a major role in negotiating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, a

water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan.22 Despite this, President Kennedy, who was

quite impressed with the "soaring idealism" of Indian Prime Minister Nehru, therefore,

15 Dana Schmidt, "Pakistan to Get Arms," The New York Times, February 14, 1954, sec. E.

16 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 67.

17 Ibid., 72.

18 Ibid., 62.

19 Ibid., 53.
20 Ibid., 74.

21 Ibid., 91.

22Ibid., 113.









APPENDIX A
INTERVIEWEE LIST

1. Lieutenant General (Retired).

2. Major General (Retired).

3. Brigadier General.

4. Colonel (Retired).

5. Lieutenant. Commander, Pakistan Navy.

6. Lieutenant Colonel.

7. Anonymous officer, Pakistan Army.

8. Brigadier General (Retired).

9. Member of Parliament, Punjab Assembly.

10. Member of National Assembly.

11. Political Advisor to Chief Minister.

12. Political Advisor to former Prime Minister of Pakistan.

13. Candidate for National assembly.

14. Think Tank.

15. Prominent Businessman, Faisalabad, Pakistan.

16. Prominent Businessman, Lahore, Pakistan.

17. Political Advisor to member of National Assembly.

18. Scholar, Lahore, Pakistan.

19. Businessman and Social Worker, Lahore Pakistan.

20. Scholar, Lahore, Pakistan.

21. Doctor and religious scholar: Lahore Pakistan.

22. Bishop, Lahore, Pakistan.









Today, Karzai [Afghan president] is holed up in his bunkered Presidential Palace and
coalition forces have not adopted offensive posture to deny the hideouts to the Taliban.
They live, prosper, prepare in and around Qandhar [Afghanistan] and in the treacherous
terrain of Pak-Afghanistan border. Once they were on their heels, they should have been
denied any opportunity to reequip and consolidate. Instead, probably resources were
utilized to protect Kabul and its residents. This was no tactics worth success. The time
was spent in blaming each other, allowing the terrorists to take advantage of their division
and digging hard in their trenches. So America has, so far, failed in taking good hold of
the militants. So we can say that fractured relations among the concerned parties,
including Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S., Coalition Forces, and even India, have led to
American failure. A comprehensive broad-based strategy aiming at "Pacification" of the
hostile population is needed. People in Afghanistan live in isolated hamlets in far off
areas, including tribal belt in Pakistan. They project themselves as bands of self-styled
guardians of faith and public morality. They are the polluters of the minds of these
ignorant and uneducated people. They need motivation, but with care and sensitivity. So
U.S. needs to take it seriously, which so far it has not done. So both on military and
political fronts, U.S. has not been able to deliver.

One military elite blamed hunger, poverty, and illiteracy the main reasons for the

flourishing of terrorism. He said that people tend to subscribe to an ideology of fanaticism when

they live a meaningless life devoid of any hope for a better tomorrow. These types of people

have no access to liberal education to widen their horizons about the vast opportunities of

meaningful life.

One retired general believed that terrorist thrive and survive on military conflicts all over

the world. He said that we need to deny them the fighting grounds all over the world by

resolving the Middle East issue, Iraq problem, and Afghanistan unrest. He argued that once

turmoil in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East cease to exist, the motivation and passion of

terrorist to fight will diminish.

A retired brig. general believed that a recent peace deal between Pakistan and the tribes

along the Pakistan-Afghan border, which is profoundly criticized by U.S. officials, is working

and is a way forward to eradicate terrorists along that border. He said,

Present clashes between foreign militants and local fighters supported by the government
of Pakistan are effectively flushing out the foreign militants and their local collaborators,
which may result in lying of arms by these foreigners. Government and Pakistan army









are disregarded by the elites. Therefore, PAR allows poor and oppressed people to capture

control of the development process and tame it according to their own needs and wants.28

Another successful alternative model to modernization is the concept of empowerment.

According to Melkote, "community empowerment is the process of increasing control by groups

over consequences that are important to their members and to others in the broader

community."29 Empowerment can also be defines as the "manifestation of social power at

individual, organizational, and community levels of analysis." One good thing about

empowerment the model is that it focuses on the proportioned relationship between the pertinent

people, while treating all communication participants equally in a "subject-subject" relationship

rather than the "subject-object" association practiced in diffusion and marketing approaches.

Therefore, in contrast with the modernization perspective, in the empowerment perspective "the

locus of control in this process rests with the individuals and groups involved and not with

experts, the development communication professional, or the sponsoring organizations."30

Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to solve the menace of terrorism. Moreover, bombs

and bullets are certainly not the preferred option. Furthermore, western models of development

models, which are based on capitalism, also show no promise in this regard. According to

Steeves, "Nonmaterial considerations of religion and spirituality are seldom examined in the

scholarship or practice of western development aid-except as obstacles to change under the

dominant paradigm of modernization."31


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 140.

30 Ibid., 142.
31 H. Leslie Steeves, "Development Communication as Marketing, Collective Resistance, and Spiritual Awakening:
A feminist Critique," In International and Development Communication, ed. Bella Mody (London: Sage
Publications, 2003), 227.









Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

DO THEY REALLY HATE US?
LIMITS OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

By

Hammaad Shams

August 2007

Chair: Michael Leslie
Major: Mass Communication

After the tragic events of 9/11, the U.S. public searched for reasons for these horrific

attacks. President George W. Bush and like-minded others reasoned that hatred for U.S. freedom

by terrorists was the prime reason for the attack. Is it U.S. freedom or something else that is

fomenting resentment toward the United States? To answer this question a study was conducted

to survey opinions of Pakistani elites in the context of contemporary U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Pakistani politics are complex, but there are three main ruling factions: the military, lay elites

(politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics), and the clerics. Therefore, the

opinions of military elites, modernizing elites, and religious elites were studied. Semi-structured

interviews were used to collect data. These interviews allowed the researcher to explore the

perspectives and perceptions of these important stakeholders.

The findings of this study contradict President Bush's assertion that freedoms enjoyed in

the U.S. foment hatred. Rather, U.S. foreign policy was found to be the real reason for animosity

toward the U.S. This study also analyzed why current U.S. public diplomacy has failed to

achieve the desired results and how public policy can be modified to help assuage Pakistani ill

feelings toward the U.S.









in Pakistan. He was closely followed by Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, a member of

PML (QA), former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the president of PPP, and former Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharrif, the president of PML(N).33













































33 Dawn, "Musharraf ahead of Benazir, Nawaz in Popularity Poll," December 16, 2006,
mhp %%" .%.dawn.com/2006/12/16/topl.htm.




Full Text

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1 DO THEY REALLY HATE US? THE LIMITS OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY By HAMMAAD SHAMS A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

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2 2007 Hammaad Shams

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3 To my parents and teachers, who have taught me to discriminate between right and wrong.

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4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to sincerely tha nk Dr. Michael Leslie for his patience and dedication. I would also like to thank Dr. Bernell Tripp and Dr. Ju an Carlos Molleda for their support and help.

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5 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................4 ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ..............7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... .8 2 RESEARCH METHODS.......................................................................................................15 3 HISTORICAL REVIEW........................................................................................................23 The 1940s: Uncharted Waters................................................................................................23 The 1950s: Emergence of an Alliance....................................................................................25 The 1960s: Decade of Stalemate............................................................................................26 The 1970s: Alliance Crumbles...............................................................................................28 The 1980s: Partners, Not Allies..............................................................................................29 The 1990s: Decade of Decay..................................................................................................36 The 2000s: War on Terror.....................................................................................................40 4 INTERVIEW FINDINGS......................................................................................................47 Do Pakistanis Hate the U.S.?..................................................................................................47 Military Elites................................................................................................................ ..47 Modernizing Elites..........................................................................................................53 Religious Elites............................................................................................................... .55 The U.S. War on Terror and Pakistan.................................................................................56 Military Elites................................................................................................................ ..56 Modernizing Elites..........................................................................................................59 Religious Elites............................................................................................................... .61 Pakistan and the Taliban....................................................................................................... ..62 Military Elites................................................................................................................ ..62 Modernizing Elites..........................................................................................................64 Religious Elites............................................................................................................... .66 5 IMPLICATIONS................................................................................................................... .67 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................75 APPENDIX A INTERVIEWEE LIST............................................................................................................80 B INTERVIEW GUIDE.............................................................................................................82

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6 LIST OF REFERENCES............................................................................................................. ..83 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.........................................................................................................89

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7 Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts DO THEY REALLY HATE US? LIMITS OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY By Hammaad Shams August 2007 Chair: Michael Leslie Major: Mass Communication After the tragic events of 9/11, the U.S. pub lic searched for reasons for these horrific attacks. President George W. Bush and like-minde d others reasoned that ha tred for U.S. freedom by terrorists was the prime reason for the attack. Is it U.S. freedom or something else that is fomenting resentment toward the United States? To answer this quest ion a study was conducted to survey opinions of Pakistan i elites in the context of contem porary U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistani politics are complex, but there are thre e main ruling factions: the military, lay elites (politicians, bureaucrats, busine ss people, and academics), and the clerics. Therefore, the opinions of military elites, modernizing elites, and religious elites were studied. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data. These in terviews allowed the researcher to explore the perspectives and perceptions of these important stakeholders. The findings of this study cont radict President Bushs assertion that freedoms enjoyed in the U.S. foment hatred. Rather U.S. foreign policy was found to be the real reason for animosity toward the U.S. This study also analyzed why current U.S. public diplomacy has failed to achieve the desired results and how public policy can be modified to help assuage Pakistani ill feelings toward the U.S.

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8 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In rationalizing his War on Terror, Presid ent Bush said, Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber--a democratically elected government. They hate our freedoms--our fr eedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.1 A Herald-Gallup poll conducted af ter the breakout of the Iraq war in 2003 found that 69% of Pakistanis said they woul d hurt America where possible.2 But do they really hate our freedom or it is something else they detest? According to James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, people in general do not hate American people or American culture. They enjoy American music, movies, and food. It's not our values, it's not our democracy, it's not our freedom it's [American foreign] policy they don't like," he says.3 Rather than creating friends in the Middle Ea st, United States (U.S .) foreign policy and public diplomacy seems to be particularly adept at creating more enemies. The very people whom the United States wanted to encourage to promote democracy from Bahrain to Casablanca instead feel trapped by a policy th at they now ridicule more or less as destroying the region in order to save it, writes Neil MacFarquhar of The New York Times .4 The only strategy employed in the war on terrorism is brute fo rce, misleading us into believing that total annihilation of our unknown enemy through force is the only way to ensure long lasting world 1 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 2 Christiana Fair and others, The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), 286. 3 Richard S. Dunham, It's Not Americans That Arabs Hate Businessweek April 15, 2002, http://www.businessweek.co m/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2002/nf20020415_0109.htm. 4 Neil MacFarquhar, Anti-U.S. Feelin g Leaves Arab Reformers Isolated, The New York Times August 9, 2006, http://www.commondreams.org/ headlines06/0809-07.htm.

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9 peace. However, unlike many other threats face d by the world, terrorism is not a tangible enemy: terrorism is an ideology thriving on th e disempowerment and impoverishment of our fellow human beings. The U.S. is not waging wa r against Iraq, or Baathists, or even Muslims. It is not fighting a place or entity but a concep tterrorism. What enemy can be more of a phantom, impossible to kill or contain, than an id ea? says Robert Sparkland, a contributor to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer .5 After 9/11, President Bush appeared to accept th at the U.S. is unsuccessful in reaching out to the Arab and Muslim world when he said, We are not doing a very good job of getting our message out.6 Furthermore, President Bush also wondered why the Arab world fails to understand what the U.S. really stands for.7 When one is not understood by the other, it is often an indication that one does not understand the other either.8 This also means that, as far as the Muslim world is concerned, U.S. public diplomacy is ineffective and has failed to reach its objectives of winning the hearts and minds of Muslims. Public diplomacy is defined a s a governments process of communicating with fo reign publics in an a ttempt to bring about understandings for its nations ideas and ideals, it s institution and culture, as well as its national goal and current policies.9 S uccessful public diplomacy is a communication that is two-way reciprocal rather than simply one-way w ith America dictating its policy to others.10 5 Robert Sparkland, U.S Wages War on a Concept, Seattle Post Intelligencer August 11, 2006, http://www.commondreams.org/ views06/0811-30.htm. 6 R.S. Zaharna, American Public Diplomacy in th e Arab and Muslim World: A Strategic Communication Analysis, Foreign Policy in Focus November, 2001, http://www.fpif.org/papers/communication.html. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 3. 10 Zaharna, American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World.

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10 While addressing the joint session of C ongress on September 20, 2001, President Bush said, Every nation, in every re gion, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.11 Responding to President Bushs statement, Zaharna, a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus said, Such ultimatums are often perceived as threats and initiate a cycle of defensive communication in which the a udience is immediately cued to get their guard up. Defiance, not cooperation, is often the response.12 It is imperative that we find a new strategy to d eal with the concept of defeating terrorism. One of the stratagems that can defeat terrori sm is the ideology of economic well-being and prosperity. British Prime Minister Tony Blair sai d, Poverty and instability lead to weak states which can become heavens for terrorists and other criminals.13 According to John D. Negroponte, the U.S. director of national intelligence, entrenched grievances such as corruption and injustice and the slow pace of economic, so cial and political change in most Muslimmajority nations all continue to fuel the global jihadist movement.14 This means that the U.S. needs to realign a nd refocus its war on terror tactics and employ public diplomacy to foster better relations with Muslim world. This requires understanding the real reasons for resentment toward the U.S. The purpose of this study is to examine U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy and its effects on elite Pakistani attitudes toward the U.S. It is the thesis of this study th at those attitudes vary 11 Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. 12 Zaharna, American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. 13 Susan Rice, Can Freedom Only Secure Our Future? McGill International Review Fall (2005). http://www.brookings.edu/views/ articles/rice/fall2005.pdf. 14 Walter Pincus, Muslims' Own Debates Called Key to Future, The Washington Post February 16, 2006, sec. A.

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11 widely and have multiple origins, the understand ing of which can lead to a new approach to public diplomacy geared toward winning the h earts and minds of the people of Pakistan. According to Stephen Cohen, a fellow at the Br ookings Institute, Pakistan has been ruled by a secular establishment.15 It consists of an oligarchy consisting of less than one thousand military, political, bureaucratic, business, and media elites. 16 According to Tariq Rahim, a contributor to the book A History of Pakistan and Its Politics at the onset of Pakistans independence from Great Britain, there were th ree main protagonist groups vying to set the constitutional and ideological agenda for the fu ture of the newly born nation: the secularizing elites, the modernists, and the men of religion.17 The secularizing elites consisted of three main elements. The first group was of bureaucrats and civil servants who had served during British occupation, the British-trained military, and the elite lawyers. This group believed in the ideology that religion a nd politics must be kept separate from each other.18 The second group, the modernists, was comprised of politicians who were members of the Muslim League, the political party most involved in Pakistans independence from Great Britain. This group wanted to ingrain Islamic values into Pakistani politic s and constitution, but they were reluctant to abandon their own political cultu rethat of a western-style de mocracy on the British model, where laws are made by elected assemblies. They simply wanted to impart an Islamic legitimacy to their own institutions, writes Rahim.19 Lastly, the men of re ligion were followers of orthodox Islam, thus religiously and politically c onservative. They wanted to reorganize or 15 Stephen Cohen, The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2003): http://www.twq.com/03summer/docs/03summer_cohen.pdf. 16 Ibid. 17 Christophe Jaaferlot, ed ., A History of Pakistan and its Origins (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 240. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 241.

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12 even replace western style institutions on the basis of medieval precedents.20 The Jamaat-iIslami and Jamiyyat-ul Ulma Islam were the key players in this group.21 Since independence, Pakistan has had three different constitutions and suffered four military coups.22 According to Saeed Sh afqat, author of the book Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, since its independence, Pakistan has fa iled to establish a stable and working political structure; instead, the search has evolved into two political contradictions: a militaryhegemonic political system and a party-dominated political system.23 The military-hegemonic political systems primary objective was to cu rb participatory politics and subordinate the political parties and other autonomous interest groups to military hegemony.24 On the other hand, the party-dominated political systems pri mary concern was to subordinate the militarybureaucratic elites to civilian-led party dominance, and to build an alternative to military rule.25 The military plays a key role in the political affairs of Pakistan. According to Iftikhar Malik, author of the book State and Civil Society in Pakistan Pakistans polity has been under the influence of the military th rough most of its history, and even when not in power [the military] has been behind the steering wheel.26 According to Stephen Cohen, Pakistans history shows that the army ca nnot run Pakistan effectively by itself but the army is also unwilling to entrust civilians completely with the job.27 In sixty years of Pakistani 20 Ibid., 241-242. 21 Ibid., 243. 22 Ibid., 61. 23 Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 3. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Iftikar Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997), 71-72. 27 Cohen, The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2003), 19.

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13 independence, the Pakistan Army has ruled the co untry for almost thirty years, clearly making it a major source of political power in Pakistan. In the early days of its independence, Pakist an was essentially a dominant-party political system, ruled by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML ). The degeneration and intra-party splits within the PML led to a multiple party system.28 After the most recent parliamentary election held in 2002, the Pakistan Muslim League (QA) [PML (QA)], the current ruling party and a splinter group of the PML, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and Pakistan Muslim League (N) [PML (N)], another splinter gr oup the of Pakistan Muslim lea gue, have emerged as the three main modernist political parties.29 For the first time in the history of Pakistan, th e 2002 elections resulted in the emergence of an Islamic party, the Mutttahida Majlis Amal ( MMA), as political contenders. Before these elections, religious hardliners were never able to acquire even 5% of the total vote.30 Polling 12.28% of the total vote in 2002, MMA won 58 pa rliament seats out of a total of 342.31 They also became the main opposition party at the nationa l level. At the provincial level, MMA was able to form its government in North West Frontier Province and a collation government in Baluchistan province.32 According to a public opinion poll conducted la st year in Pakistan by the International Republican Institute, President Pervez Musharraf, a military general, was the most popular leader 28 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947-1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 117. 29 Election Commission of Pakistan Detailed Position of Political Parties/ Alliances in National Assembly General Elections --2002, http://www.ecp .gov.pk/content/GE-2002.htm. 30 Cohen, The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, 9. 31 Election Commision of Pakistan Detailed Position of Political Parties/Alliances in National Assembly General Elections--2002, http://www.ecp.gov.pk/content/GE-2002.htm. 32 Cohen, The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, 9.

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14 in Pakistan. He was closely followed by Pakistani Prime Minist er Shaukat Aziz, a member of PML (QA), former Prime Minister Benazir Bhut to, the president of PPP, and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharrif, the president of PML(N).33 33 Dawn Musharraf ahead of Benazir, Nawaz in Popularity Poll, December 16, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/16/top1.htm.

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15 CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH METHODS There are three main purposes of social research: exploration, description, and explanation.1 An exploratory study is conducted to develop an initial, rough understanding of some phenomenon.2 Descriptive studies ar e conducted to precisely measure and to report about certain characteristics of a certain population.3 According to Earl Babbie, Explanation is the discovery and reporting of relationships among di fferent aspects of the phenomenon under study. Whereas descriptive studies answer the Wha ts so? explanatory one s tend to answer the question Why? The purpose of this study is to explain the underlying reasons for the growing discontent within the people of Pakistan to ward the people of the U.S. and its government. Moreover, after explaining the reasons behind Pakistani dissent toward the U.S., this study will go one step further and suggest remedies to counter the grow ing anti-Americanism in Pa kistan. In order to explain these negative sentiments, the researcher used selective interviews to survey the three main sectors of the Pakistani elite: the military elite, the modernizing elite, and the religious elite. This allowed the researcher to compare a nd contrast opinions held by a broad spectrum of the Pakistani elite. The researcher chose to intervie w elites because they are the agents who can shape or sway Pakistani public opinion. Such individuals have the status, e xpertise, links to external sources of knowledge, or experience that enable them to provide information and advice about 1 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont: Thomson Higher Education, 2006), 115. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

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16 innovations to others within their community.4 In other words, they are the critical link between policy makers and general public.5 Moreover, the major ity of scholars argue that elites, because of their higher status, can cause others to follow their lead. 6 Elites also tend to be highly educated and wealthy, and are exposed to external sources of information.7 For conceptualization purpose, serving and retired military officers, which include army, navy, and air force officers, are recognized as military elites. Members of think tanks, who support modernist perspectives, those politicians businesspersons, schol ars, journalists, are identified as modernizing elites. Lastly, religious leaders and cl erics, who are in positions to sway public opinion, are identifi ed as religious elites. A unit of analysis is defined as t he what or who is being studied.8 Each elite opinion leader was considered a unit of analysis, becau se the researcher was studying the individual belonging to a group, not the group it self. A study based on obser vations representing a single point in time is defined as a cross-sectional study.9 Because this study took place over a short period of time from April 1, 2007, to April 30, 2 007, it can be considered a cross-sectional study. The majority of explanatory studies that deal wi th public opinion are cro ss-sectional in nature.10 4 Gershon Feder and Sara Savastano, The role of opinion leaders in the diffusion of new knowledge: The case of integrated pest management, World Development 34, no. 7 (2006). 5 Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 39. 6 Feder and Savastano, The role of opinion leaders in the diffusion of new knowledge. 7 Ibid. 8 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 94. 9 Ibid., 102. 10 Ibid.

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17 In the field of social science, survey rese arch is the most widely employed research method.11 Survey research is considered the best me thod to indirectly desc ribe the opinions of a large population.12 According to Earl Babbie, surve ys are also excellent vehicles for measuring attitudes and orient ations in a large population.13 On the other hand, qualitative interviews are also excellent sources for gath ering information. Cont rasted with survey interviewing, the qualitative interview is based on a set of topics to be discussed in depth rather than based on the use of standardized questions.14 Bingham and Moore define qualitative interviews as conversation with purpose in which researcher and informant become conversational partners.15 There are several advantages asso ciated with interview research. Interview research usually has a re sponse rate as high as 80 to 85%.16 Interviews also essentially eliminate dont know and no answers.17 They also provide the interviewer with a unique opportunity to probe for the desired response and answer.18 According to Dayman and Holloway, data collected in interviews pertain within the confines of the so cial context, so, the responses you derive from interviews are the subj ective views of intervie wees. Your evidence, therefore, is based on participants interpretations of their experiences and is expressed in their own words, using the jargon and speech styles that are meaningful to them.19 Interview 11 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 244. 12Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 306. 15 Christine Daymon and Immy Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications (London: Routledege, 2002), 166. 16Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 264. 17 Ibid., 265. 18 Ibid.

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18 research sometimes leads to the discovery of different dimensions, aspects, or nuances of concepts. In such cases, the research itself may uncover and report aspects of social life that were not evident from the outset of the project. 20 On the other hand, there are certain disadvantag es associated with interview research. Sometimes an interviewee might fabricate inform ation to enhance self-esteem and self-image. Interviews are quite time-consuming and laborio us and can take a toll the on researcher.21 Generally, there are three types of qualitative interviews: unstructur ed, non-standardized interviews, semi-structured interviews, and structured or standardized interviews.22 Unstructured interviews are devoid of predefined questions about the interview agenda. They can be an excellent source of evidence, but also result in a heavy dross rate.23 Semi-structured interviews, also called focused interviews, are wide ly used in qualitative research. The questions are not asked in any predefined pattern, but are based on an interview guide that contains the issues or topics to be covered and the line of inquiry to be followed.24 Structured or standardized interviews are seldom used in qual itative field research. Every respondent is asked to answer the same predefined set of questi ons. As Daymon notes, Therefore, they tend to direct participants responses, prohibiting you a nd your interviewee from exploring together the meaning of the object of inquiry.25 19 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications 167. 20Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 110. 21 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications 184185. 22 Ibid., 170-171. 23 Ibid., 170. 24 Ibid., 171. 25 Ibid., 171-172.

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19 An online interview, such as by e-mail comm unication, is also rec ognized by scholars like Mann and Stewart as a good tool to conduct asynchronous interviews.26 E-mail interviews allow participants to be more reflective because they can take time to respond in a more measured way.27 Since the purpose of this study is to examine contemporary elite Pakist ani attitudes toward the U.S., qualitative interviews were used as a research method to collect data because they allowed the interviewer to explore the perspectives and perceptions of vari ous stakeholders. In order to collect data for this study, 26 elite opi nion leaders were inte rviewed either by semistructured telephone or e-mail inte rviews. For reliability, both sets of interviews utilized the same questions (see Appendix 2 for interview guid e). The questions contained in the interview guide were carefully formulated to focus on the dynamics that define the current Pakistan-U.S. relationship. According to Patton, there are three types of interview questions: experience questions, feeling questions, and knowledge questions.28 For example: Experience question: What is your experien ce in dealing with US government officials? Feeling question: How do you feel about the new sanctions imposed on Pakistan by President Bush? Knowledge questions: What steps s hould be taken to defeat terrorism? In our interview guide questions 3, 4, 5, 6, a nd 8 are knowledge questions, while questions 1, 2, 7, and 9 are experience questions. 26 Ibid., 173. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 173.

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20 The sample of knowledgeable Pakistani elites wa s selected to address the questions of the study. The interviewees were recruited through personal and family contacts. The main purpose of these interviews was to explore both current opinions as wells as new ideas from which both countries could work in tandem to de feat extremism. Telephone interviews were recorded and transcribed. In qualitative field research, an alysis of data is not a one-step process, but rather a continuous, systematic process which runs simultaneously with data collection.29 According to Babbie, spreadsheets can also be effectively utilized to process and analyze qualitative data.30 This study made use of the Micros oft Excel spreadsheet software, to analyze the interview data. Historical research on the U. S.-Pakistan relationship was al so conducted for this thesis. The primary purpose of this resear ch was to identify issues whic h define and affect the current US-Pakistan relationship. The historical method can be defined as an ac t of reconstruction undertaken in a spirit of critical inquiry designed to achieve a faithful representation of a previous age.31 Historical research can also be utilized to study the cause an d effect of past events on present and future events. The act of historical research involve s the identification and limitation of a problem or an area of study, sometimes the formulation of a hypothesis (or set of que stion); the collection, organization, verification, validation, analysis and selection of data; testing the hypothesis (or answering the questions), where appropriate; and writing a research report. This sequence leads 29 Daymon and Holloway, Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications 231. 30 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 390. 31 Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison, Research Methods in Education 5th ed. (London: Routeldge Falmer, 2000), 158.

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21 to a new understanding of the past and its relevance to the present and future.32 According to Heck, Historical research examines questi ons related to how and why phenomena occur.33 The primary difference between the historical resear ch method and other research methods is that historical research relies exclusively on existing data.34 Historical resear ch methods can be utilized in both quantitative as well as qualitative research.35 There are two prominent schools of historical research, the positivistic and idealist. Mores and Field writes, In the positivistic or neo-positivistic school of histori cal research, an attempt is made to reduce history to universal laws. Discovery, verification, and categorization of data are used to analyze the data, and there is an effort to show cause-effect relationship.36 On the other hand, I n the idealist school, intuition and experience are ingred ients of interpretati on. From this perspective, historians believe it is necessary to get insi de the event and rethink the thought s of the originator in relation to the content of his or her time, place, and situation to make adequate historical interpretations.37 Historical research relies on two sources of data: primary a nd secondary. Primary sources are the raw materials of history. They are co ntemporaneous records, or records in close proximity to some past occurrence. Or they might be original documents.38 Secondary 32 Ibid. 33 Ronald Heck, Studying Educational and Social Policy (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 212. 34 Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, Research Methods in Education 158. 35 Heck, Studying Educational and Social Policy 212. 36 Janice M. Morse and Peggy Anne Field, Qualitative Research Methods for Health Professionals, (Sage Publication, 1995), 33. 37 Ibid. 38 James D. Strait and David Sloan, Historical Methods in Mass Communications (Northport: Vision Press, 2003), 158.

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22 sources are those that do not bear a direct physical relationship to the event being studied. They are made up of data that cannot be described as original.39 There are several problems associated with hi storical research. Sometimes there is not sufficient data available to conduct historical research.40 Sometimes researchers show bias and interpret historical events according to their liking.41 Some researchers can accurately recite the facts of events in chronologi cal order but fail to integrate theses facts into meaningful generalizations, said Mitra.42 The historical research for this thesis was conducted by re lying on secondary materials, reviewing relevant news stories in leading U.S. publications such as The New York Times the Washington Post, and Time magazine. Books about U.S.-Pakista n relations were also consulted. The next chapter is a historical analysis of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. This will review the role played by U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy in shaping and defining this relationship. 39 Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, Research Methods in Education, 161. 40 Ananda Mitra and Sam Lankford, Research Methods in Parks, Recreation, and Leisure Services (Champaign: Sagamore Publishing, 1999), 86. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 87.

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23 CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL REVIEW The 1940s: Uncharted Waters Even before Pakistan gained independence from Britain on 14 August, 1947, U.S. media and politicians were not warm to the idea of Paki stan. The partition of In dia sounds terrible to American ears after the experi ence of the U.S. civil war, sa id President Roosevelt in 1942.1 On April 22, 1946, Time magazine carried a picture of M uhammad Ali Jinnah, the father and founder of Pakistan, on its cover with a caption th at said, His Moslem tiger wants to eat the Hindu cow. In the same story Time declared that Jinnahs political ascent was a story of love of country and the lust for power a story that twists and turns like a bullock track in the hills.2 Similarly, on the eve of Jinnahs death in September 1948, Time carried another story titled That Man, which said, Out of the travail of 400 million in the subcontinent have come two symbols--a man of love and a man of hate. La st winter the man of nonviolence, Gandhi, died violently at the hand of assassin. Last week th e man of hate, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, at 71, died a natural death in Karachi, capital of the state he had founded.3 Furthermore, on the eve of Pakistani independence, Time carried a piece that described Karachi, then capital of Pakistan, as a dir ty, noisy and in all re spects unlovely city.4 Moreover, the same Time story declared that the pe ople of Karachi did not welc ome Pakistan with the wild enthusiasm that swept the new do minion of India. After all, Pa kistan was the creation of one 1 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 6. 2 Time, Long Shadow, April 22, 1946 http://www.time.com/time/magazine /article/0,9171,792780,00.html. 3 Time That Man, September 20, 1948, http://www.time.co m/time/magazine/article/0,9171,799165-1,00.html. 4 Time Better Off in a Home, August 25, 1947, http://www.time.com/time/magazine /article/0,9171,798063,00.html.

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24 clever man, Jinnah; the difference between a sl ick political trick and a mass movement was apparent in the contrast between Karachi and New Delhi.5 Pakistan gained its independence during the init ial period of cold war, when the U.S. and its allies were involved in an id eological struggle to confine th e spread of Communism; thus, the world was divided between U.S. block and the Sovi et bloc. Pakist an right from the start allied itself with the U.S. and whole-heartedly join ed the U.S. camp because Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the so il of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more w ith the two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K and the U.S.A., than with Russia, said Jinnah on September 7, 1947.6 As far as initial U.S.-Pakistan relations were concerned, President Trumans era was one of stalemate. Mutual parleys continued between the U.S. and Pakistan, where Pakistan always emphasized the commonality of interest agains t Communist domination but the U.S. faced a difficult decision, choosing between Pakistan and India on the issu e of Kashmir, a disputed region claimed by both Pakistan and India: favor ing one country automati cally antagonizes the other.7 Furthermore, a Pakistani request of a loan of $2 billion over five years for economic development and defense purchases was also rebuffed; instead, only $10 million was granted. On this occasion, the dismayed Pakistani fore ign minister said, Well-known friendship of Pakistan toward the U.S. and Pakistans obvio us antipathy to the Russian ideology would seem to justify serious consideration by the U.S. Government of the defense requirements of Pakistan. This rationale for providing assist ance to Pakistan would become pervasive and 5 Ibid. 6 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 20. 7Ibid., 27.

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25 persuasive to the United States only a decade later.8 On the other hand, to resolve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, President Truman did came forw ard with a proposal on August 31, 1949, stating to the United Nations the Un ited States wish to hold a plebiscite on the Kashmir issue.9 Nevertheless, Pakistans willing support of the U.S. in its st rategic ambitions to fight Communism in Korea and its policy in the Middle East found little favors with U.S. policy makers.10 The 1950s: Emergence of an Alliance Eisenhowers presidency ushered a new era in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Two pivotal trips were responsible for the U.S. fore ign policy shift in favor of Pakist an, those of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon, who each visited the subcontinent in 1953. After his visit to South Asia, Dulles told the U.S. National Secur ity Council (NSC) that Jawaharlal Nehru, then Prime Mi nister of India, was an u tterly impractical statesman.11 Regarding Pakistan, Dulles told the Foreign A ffairs Committee that those fellows [Pakistanis] are going to fight any communi st invasion with their bare fists if they have to.12 Similarly, after his South Asian visit, Nixon reported that Nehr u was the least friendly leader in Asia.13 In his NSC briefing Nixon said, Pakistan is a c ountry I would like to do everything for.14 This new shift in U.S. foreign policy was described by Dana Adams Schmidt in The New York Times who wrote the importance of bringing in Pakistan on the defense of the Middle East is greater than 8 Ibid., 21. 9 Ibid., 29-30. 10 Ibid., 37. 11 Ibid., 56. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 60. 14 Ibid., 61.

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26 the importance of preserving plea sant relations with Mr. Nehru.15 Moreover, Pakistan entered into a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement w ith the U.S. on May 19, 1954, to enable Pakistan to maintain its internal security.16 To deter Communism, Pakistan, Australia, Thailand, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, th e United Kingdom, and the U.S. formed the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) on September 8, 1954.17 Moreover, Pakistan s genuine feelings of friendship were recognized and its role as a real bulwark against communism was appreciated: yet Pakistan remained an ally who was not fully embraced to withstand the challenges of the communism.18 Moreover, in 1953, the United Stat es also came forward to help Pakistan in its food crisis.19 During the Eisenhower presidenc y, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship reached its pinnacle, when Pakistan wa s dubbed the most allied ally in Asia.20 The 1960s: Decade of Stalemate Despite few major developments, the Kennedy presidency saw a decline in U.S.-Pakistan relations. In 1962, Pakistan provide d a base to the United states at Badaber, Peshawar, for electronic monitoring of Soviet missile tests and U-2 reconna issance flights over Russia.21 Furthermore, the U.S. played a major role in negotiating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, a water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan.22 Despite this, President Kennedy, who was quite impressed with the soaring idealism of Indian Prime Minister Nehru, therefore, 15 Dana Schmidt, Pakistan to Get Arms, The New York Times February 14, 1954, sec. E. 16 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 67. 17 Ibid., 72. 18 Ibid., 62. 19 Ibid., 53. 20 Ibid., 74. 21 Ibid., 91. 22 Ibid., 113.

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27 advocated foreign polic y tilted towards India.23 In doing so, he incen sed Pakistan by giving $1 billion in aid to India; compared to $150 milli on Pakistan was getting; despite the fact that Pakistan was earning the wrath of Sovi et Union for supporting U.S. policies.24 Furthermore, Pakistans diplomatic relations with China pr oved to be another thorn in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The U.S. considered Communist Chin a a major threat in Asia; thus, it wanted to counterbalance Chinas influence supporting India. Pakistan wanted to have good relations with China, because since India was a comm on enemy of both China and Pakistan.25 Therefore, U.S. support of India during the Sino -Indian War of 1962, created a gr eat strain in U.S.-Pakistan relationship.26 Moreover, during the 1965 war between Pa kistan and India, the U.S placed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, denyi ng Pakistan its only source of arms, whereas India continued receiving arms shipments from the Soviet Union. Even SEATO and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) agreements failed Pakistan.27 The thing that chagrined Pakistan the most was the refusal of the U.S. to play a ma jor role in post-war pe ace negotiations. Instead, it was the Soviet Union, a long-tim e Indian friend, who, with the bl essing of the U. S., played the key role.28 23 Ibid., 115. 24 Ibid., 118-119. 25 Ibid., 141-142. 26 Ibid., 114. 27 Ibid., 161. 28 Ibid., 165.

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28 The 1970s: Alliance Crumbles President Nixon, on taking office in 1970, argued in favor of close relations with Pakistan so it could withstand the pre ssures of the Soviet Union.29 In July 1971, Pakistan played a major role in establishing a bilateral relationship between China and the United States.30 During the India-Pakistan war of 1971, Pakistan expected the United States help in view of the 1959 agreements of cooperation that spelled out U.S. support against any Indian incursions against Pakistan. Instead, support withered away in the loopholes of U.S. legalities, keeping Pakistan from receiving U.S. support. Despite this, Presid ent Nixon did authorize the dispatch of a task force of eight U.S. ships to warn the Indians a nd the Soviets to refrain from further aggravating the situation between Pakistan and India. It is on the record that it was timely admonitions and threatening caveats by the U.S. government that br ought a cease-fire between Pakistan and India and more devastation was averted.31 Furthermore, in response to the Indian nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan decided to acquire nucle ar technology. Due to this deci sion, Pakistan invited the wrath of all the western countries, including the U.S.32 The author of this pa per believes that there was discrimination in the treatment of India and Pakistan regarding their pursuit of nuclear armaments: Washington remained quite when In dia carried out its nu clear explosion, but it chastised Pakistan for the same action. On top of that, instead of taking action against India, the Carter administration deci ded to supply enriched uranium fuel to India.33 Regarding this situation, a top Pakistani diplomat said, If the United States ha d applied sanctions against the 29 Ibid., 171. 30 Ibid., 182. 31 Ibid., 201-204. 32 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 221. 33 Ibid., 239.

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29 Indians, we would not have minded so muc h. We could understand U.S. favoritism towards Israel [also a nuclear power] as a special case, but not the refusal to sanction India while hitting so hard at Pakistan.34 Therefore, to discourag e Pakistans desire to acq uire nuclear bomb, in the 1979 U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Pakista n, completely derailing the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. The 1980s: Partners, Not Allies On December 26, 1979, the Soviet Union i nvaded Afghanistan across Amu Darya, signaling the expansion of Comm unism across South Asia and, th erefore, drastically changing the dynamics of the then luke warm U.S.-Pakistan relations.35 According to Thomas Thornton, a former National Security Council staff member U.S. foreign policy regarding Pakistan overnight, literally changed dramatically.36 Initially, President Carter tried to gain Pakistans support to confront Communism, but no agreement could be reached. Due to its past experience with the United States, Pakistan wa nted the U.S. to prove its credibility and durability.37 Furthermore, the Carter administ rations initial offer of $400 million was dismissed as peanuts by Pakistans President Zia-ul-Haq.38 According to President Zia, the $400 million of U.S. aid will buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 245. 36 Thomas Thornton, Between Two Stools?: U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan in the Carter Administration, Asian Survey October 1982, 969, quoted in Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 245. 37 Stuart Auerbach, Pakistan Ties Arms Aid to Economic Assistance, The Washington Post, January 14, 1980, sec. A. 38 William Borders, Pakistani Dismisses $400 mil lion in Aid Offered by U.S as Peanuts,, The New York Times January 19, 1980, sec. A.

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30 more influential in this region than the United States.39 Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi told The Washington Post The assistance must be commensurate with the size of the threat.40 The incoming Reagan administration admitted th at Pakistan needed far more U.S. support than promised by the Carter administration. I know we have had problems, but these are going to change incoming Secretary of State Al exander Haig told a Pakistani diplomat.41 Main point of this new, emerging alliance was to give Pakistan confidence in our commitment to its security and provide us recipro cal benefits in term of our re gional interests, said Assistant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes.42 The new alliance revolved around three main modalities. First was the nuclear issue: Pa kistan made it clear from the start that it would make no compromise on the nuclear issue. In reply, Secr etary Haig assured Pakistan that the nuclear issue need not become the centerpiece of this new alliance. On the other hand, any nuclear explosion conducted by Pakistan will lead to enormous st rain on this new alliance.43 Therefore, the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee voted 10-7 to temporarily waive the economic sanctions for the next 6 years.44 These sanctions had been imposed by the Carter administration in reaction to Pakistans desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Second was the issue in ternal politics (during this period, the Pakistani constitution wa s suspended and marshal law was imposed in Pakistan): We would not like to hear the type of government we should have, General K.M Arif, Vice Chief of the Pakistan Army Staff, told Secretary Haig. General, your internal 39 Stuart Auerbach, Pakistan Seeking U.S Guarantees in Formal Treat, The Washington Post January 18, 1980, sec. A. 40 William Branigan, Pakistan Seeks Billions in U.S Aid, The Washington Post January 23, 1980, sec. A. 41 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 256. 42 Ibid., 256-257. 43 Ibid., 257. 44 Ibid., 260.

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31 situation is your problem, replied Secretary Haig.45 Third, was the modus operandi: it was decided that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agen cy (CIA) will train Paki stani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI); in return, ISI would train the Mujahi deen (Afghan resistance).46 The author believes that these modalities reflect the double sta ndards inherent in then-current U.S. foreign policy. In subsequent years, when the U.S. did not need an alliance with Pakistan, the Bush and Clinton administrations used the same reasons to impose military and economic sanctions on Pakistan. In 1981, a $3.2 billion, five-year aid package wa s approved for Pakistan. Part of this package was F-16 aircraft, the most sophisticated at that time. Initially, the U.S. was reluctant to sell those aircraft to Pakistan, but when Pakistan related the sale of the aircraft to a test of American sincerity, the U.S. decided to equip Pakist an with F-16s. The sale of those aircraft was indicative of Pakistans strong bargaining position in this new alliance.47 U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel termed the sale of the F-16s an unnecessary luxury.48 As far as Pakistans reasons for acquiring F-16s was concer ned, General Arif concluded that there were two: Pakistan wanted an edge over Indian air power and wanted to provide a morale boost to the Pakistani people. The acquisition of the aircra ft became a symbol of national virility. The whole issue caught the imagination of the Pa kistani public, said Ronald Spiers, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.49 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., 257. 47 Ibid., 259. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., 260.

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32 The U.S. strategy to support Afghan insurgents against the Soviets was an integral part of the Regan Doctrine: to embark upon a strategy to impede the risi ng influence of Communism in Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and elsewher e in the Third World. On the other hand, the stratagem adopted by the CIA concentrated on narr ower specifics: The aim of the program was to cause pain. It was revenge afte r the series of U.S. defeats in Vietnam, Angola, Horn of Africa, etc. It was payback time, said a U.S. intelligence officer.50 At the outset, the U.S. involvement in Afgha nistan was kept concealed. There were No signs that Pakistan is prepared to take on the role as conduit for increased U.S. and Western military aid to rebel forces fighting in Afghanistan, reported The Washington Post .51 Initially, the CIA was spending $30 million annually, matched fully by Saudi Arabia.52 Furthermore, distribution of funds was carri ed out by ISI, who funneled mo ney to fundamentalist Islamic organizations, especially to Gulbuddin Hektma tyar, an anti-American fundamentalism war lord.53 When describing these fundamentalist organi zations, a former CIA official said, They were all brutal, fierce, bloodthirsty and basi cally fundamentalist. There were no Thomas Jeffersons on a white horse among th e Afghan resistances leaders.54 The CIA, which was in charge of U.S.-Afghan policy, was constantly warn ed about turning blind eye toward funds being channeled to fundamentalist Afghan organizations Eliza Van Hollen, a U.S. State Department Afghan Specialist, warned the CIA that the funds were giving these fundamentalist organizations a potent form of political patronage, strengthenin g their standing and weakening that of more 50 Ibid., 261. 51 Don Oberdorfer, U.S. and Pakistan Progressing on New Aid Plan The Washington Post April 22, 1981, sec. A. 52 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 262. 53 Ibid., 274. 54 Ibid.

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33 moderate Afghan groups.55 According to the author of this paper, if the CIA had restrained and kept an oversight on the ISI, prev enting it from giving money to fundamentalist organizations, todays Afghani stan would not have been a heaven for terrorists. This new alliance was a blessing in disgui se for Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haqs dictatorship. Instead of being repudiated fo r suspending the constitution, General Zia gained stature and became an international cham pion for opposing Communism and allowing 3.2 million Afghan refugees entry into Pakistan.56 Unlike previous U.S.-Pakistan alliances, this new alliance was based on new semantics which meant that, for the first time, the U.S. and Pakistan were partners, not allies. As Kux observed, Their relationship was a marriage of convenience, bound together with the goal to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Furthermore, this time Pakistanis were not under the false impression that the U.S. was going to s upport them against an y war with India.57 In December of 1982, Pakistani President Zia emba rked upon an official state visit to the U. S. During this visit, President Zia was seve rely criticized by the U.S. press for his regimes suspension of democracy and for Pakistans nuc lear aspirations. Responding to criticism over Pakistans human rights record, Zi a said, We have a constitutional government. It is a civilized government. We are not bunch of clowns.58 During early 1980s, it was customary for U.S. of ficials to visit Peshawar, Pakistan, to address Afghan refugees settled there in tem porary refugee camps. The Khyber Pass, the 55 Ibid., 275. 56 Ibid., 266. 57 Ibid. 58 Bernard Weinraub, Zia Sees No Quick Solution to Soviet Afghanistan The New York Times December 8, 1982, sec. A.

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34 passage linking Pakistan to Afghan refugee cam ps, was declared as a well-worn VIP path.59 Fellow fighters for freedom, we are with you, said Secretary of State George Shultz to cheering Afghan refugees.60 I want you to know that you ar e not alone. You will have our support until you regain the freedom that is righ tfully yours, said U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, while visiting an Afghan refugee camp.61 In May 1984, Vice President George Bush visited Pakistan, where he praise d the Afghan freedom fighters indomitable spirit of freedom, which he thought had earne d the admiration of free men everywhere.62 During this visit, Mohammad Nasir Kha n, a local Afghan refugee, thanke d Vice President Bush because he [Bush] has helped th e Jihad of the Afghans.63 Recounting the passion resonated by U.S. officials while addressing the Afghans, then Assi stant Secretary of State Nicholas Veliotes said that Shultz got so emotionally carried away when he visited the Afghan tribal near Peshawar. I thought he was going to grab a gun and run off into Afghanistan.64 Pakistans aspiration to acquire nuclear capability was still a causing much friction in U.S.Pakistan relations. On Ap ril 4, 1984, Pakistani daily Nawi-i-Waqat broke a story that claimed Pakistani scientists had b een successful in enriching uranium to weapons grade.65 Furthermore, during the same period, three Pakistanis were ar rested for smuggling equipment that could have 59 William Claiborne, Bush at Khyber Pass: Whiff of War and Fine-Tuned Welcome, The Washington Post May 18, 1984, sec. A. 60 Philip Taubman, Afghan Refugees Hear Shultz Vow We Are With You, The New York Times July 4, 1983, pg. 1. 61 Richard Halloran, Weinberger Meets Zia and Afghan Refugees, The New York Times October 2, 1983, pg. 4. 62 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 272. 63 Claiborne, Bush at Khyber Pass. 64 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 271. 65 Ibid., 275.

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35 been used in the development of a nuclear bomb.66 In the light of these developments, Republican Senator Larry Pressler introduced an amendment that required the U.S. President to annually certify that Pakistan was not developi ng a nuclear bomb. This new certification nullified the earlier six year exemption granted to Pakistan that had enabled Pakistan to acquire U.S. military aid.67 Pakistani President Zia knew that as long as Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviets and Pakistan did not explode a nucl ear device, even enrichment of uranium to weapons grade would not breach the embarra ssment barrier, which would restrain the Congress from ratifying the Pressler amendment.68 President Zia was ri ght: in 1987, despite of clear evidence that Pakistan was actively acqui ring nuclear capability, President Reagan used U.S. national interest as a reason to certify the Pressler amendment.69 In December 1987, the Kremlin signaled Washingt on that Russian troops would be leaving Afghanistan within twelve months.70 This meant post-war Afghan reconstruction was not a priority for U.S. foreign policy. Our main inte rest was getting the Russians out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from major U.S. concerns said Acting Secretary of State Michael Armacost.71 In September of 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pomkin signed an accord which ca lled for both sides to stop supplying arms to various Afghan factions. With this accord the U. S. finally washed its hands of Afghanistan.72 66 Rick Atkinson, Nuclear Parts Sought by Pakistan, The Washington Post July 21, 1984, sec. A. 67 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 277. 68 Ibid., 278. 69 Ibid., 286. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., 287. 72 Ibid., 317.

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36 Afghanistan is no longer on our radar scr een, said one State Department official.73 For ordinary Afghans the U.S. withdrawal from the scene constituted a major betrayal, while Washingtons refusal to harness international pr essure to help broker a settlement between the warlords was considered a double betrayal, wrote Ahmed Rashid, the author of the book Taliban.74 The author believes that this hands-off approach toward Afghanistan by the U.S. is partly responsible for present Quag mire occurring in that country. The 1990s: Decade of Decay In February of 1989, the last remaining Soviet soldiers left Afghani stan, ending the nine year invasion.75 In October of 1990, President Bush refused to sign the Pressler amendment certification; therefore, the $564 million economic and military aid package to Pakistan was frozen.76 Most of the Pakistani public and press de plored this decision, an d declared the United States a fickle friend. Furthermore, the majori ty of Pakistanis echoed the sentiment with the Afghan war over, the United States no longer need [s] Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used Kleenex.77 According to The Washington Post The plunge in U.S.Pakistan relations illustrates wh at can happen in a poor country when it is no longer needed by a superpower.78 Furthermore, this event proved to a pivotal in U.S.-Pakis tan relations: the action effectively ruptured the bilateral security pa rtnership that had flourished during 1980s, 73 Ibid. 74 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale Univer sity Press, 2001), 177. 75 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 297. 76 Ibid., 310. 77 Ibid. 78 Molly More and John Ward Anderson, After Cold War, U.S-Pakistani Ties Are Turning Sour, The Washington Post April 21, 1993, sec. A.

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37 wrote Dennis Kux.79 In November 1991, U.S. Undersecre tary of State for Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew visited Pakistan to addr ess Pakistans aspirati on to acquire nuclear weapons. During a meeting with Pakistani President Ghulam Isha q Khan, Bartholomew charged, We cant change our policies. You ha ve to change yours, and walked out of the room.80 Later, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary met with Bartholomew and told him that Pakistan felt that the United States was trying to bully them.81 Furthermore, Pakistans suppor t for Kashmiri insurgents wa s proving to be the new thorn in the fragile U.S.-Pak relations. If you get hit with this on top of Pre ssler, that will end the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, the undersecretary of state for political affairs cautioned the Pakistani ambassador regarding Pakistan s support of Kashmiri insurgents.82 Furthermore, the same training camps that trained Afghan Mu jahideen were now tr aining a new breed of fundamentalist, who were fighting not only in Afgha nistan, but also in Kashmir. These were the same Arab and Pakistani fighters who had earlier engaged the Soviets in Afghanistan.83 We fought the Afghan war 14 years, and now people who were committed to our side are suddenly seen as villains and branded as terrorists, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan told The Washington Post .84 According to Dennis Kux, as far as Americans were concerned, the same Freedom Fighters, who fought the Soviets automatically became te rrorists when they 79 Kux, The United States and Pakistan 311. 80 Ibid., 314. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid., 316. 83 Ibid., 322. 84 More and Anderson, After Cold War, U.S-Pakistani Ties Are Turning Sour.

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38 embarked upon a struggle against In dia. On the other hand, as far as Pakistan was concerned, if the war against Soviet Union to gain free dom was justified, so was war in Kashmir.85 As discussed earlier, soon after the Soviets withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. started to walk away from Afghanistan. That walk became a run in 1992, thus, Washington allowed its allies in the region, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, free reign to sort out the ensuing Afghan civil war, wrote Ahmed Rashid.86 The sole reason Pakistani President Zia supported Afghan resistance fighters was to have a stable Afghan government favor able to Pakistan, a dream not realized since the independence of Pakistan.87 After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Peshawarbased Afghani freedom fighters formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG), despite the fact that Kabul was still ruled by the Communist-backed General Najibullah.88 However, in 1992, after three year of war between AIG and Najibulla h, the AIG emerged as victors. Unfortunately, right after the victory, a civi l war broke among AIG factions.89 When Pakistan support of the Afghan warlord Hekmetyar, a member of AIG, failed to yield any success in 1994, in southern Afghanistan Pakistan found a new instrument fo r its Afghan policy: the Taliban. The Taliban were the new breed of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. They were the graduates of the same fundamentalist madrassas that had earlier provided the re cruits to fight Soviets in Afghanistan.90 During the period of 1994-1995, the U.S. supported the Taliban politically because it viewed them as anti -Iranian, anti-Shia, and pro-west ern, while totally ignoring their 85 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 322-323. 86 Rashid, Taliban, 175. 87 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 282. 88 Ibid., 297. 89 Ibid., 317. 90 Ibid., 344.

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39 Islamic fundamentalist doctrine, oppression of wo men, and the consternation they created in Central Asia largely because Washington was not interested in th e larger picture.91 During this period, U.S. diplomats, who visite d Afghanistan, were pleased with the assurances they got from the Taliban that they wound vehemently oppos e Iran and would exterm inate poppy and heroin production. Moreover, for next few years the Un ited States supported the Taliban because of a project by Unocal, a U.S. multinational vying to bu ild oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan. In 1995, the Taliban took Hera t, Afghanistan, and closed down all the girls schools. Astonishingly, the United States consider ed the Talibans takeover of Herat as a help to Unocal.92 Furthermore, in May of 1996, the U.S. A ssistant Secretary for South Asia told the U.S. Senate, Afghanistan has become a condui t for drugs, crime, and terrorism that can undermine Pakistan.93 Unfortunately, her testimony fell to deaf ears and there was no policy shift, although in the later part of 1997, U.S. polic y toward the Taliban started to change because of feminist opposition to the oppression women suffered under the Taliban. Since President Clinton relied heavily on the support of women for his re-elect ion, there was no way the U.S. could be seen as soft on Taliban.94 Additionally, during 1998 and 1999, U.S. support for the Taliban evaporated because of the Ta libans support for Osama Bin Laden.95 U.S. policy appeared to have come full circle, from uncondi tionally accepting the Taliban to unconditionally rejecting them, wrote Ahmed Rashid.96 91 Rashid, Taliban, 176. 92 Ibid., 177. 93 Ibid., 178. 94 Ibid., 176. 95 Ibid., 176-177. 96 Ibid., 182.

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40 The 2000s: War on Terror Before 9/11, Pakistan was the only country th at had diplomatic ties with the Taliban.97 According to President Musharraf, Pakistan was maintaining diplomatic relations with the Taliban and its leader Mullah Omar for geostrateg ic reasons. If we had broken with them, that would have created a new enemy on our western border, or vacuum of power there into which have stepped the Northern Alliance, comprisi ng anti-Pakistan elements, said Musharraf.98 On September 12, 2001, one day after the atta ck on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Po wel told President Mush arraf, You are either with us or against us.99 Musharraf replied, I told him th at we were with the United States against terrorism, having suffered from it from ye ars, and would fight along his country against it, replied Musharraf.100 The next day, U.S. Deputy Secr etary of State told the Pakistani Director of Inter Services Inte lligence that if Pakistan did not support the United States, then Pakistan should be prepared to be bombed back to Stone Age.101 Despite being a contributing partner in the war on terror, Pakistan is usually being criticized by U.S. media and poli ticians. It is not that Pakistanis are more inclined toward terrorism than are citizens of any other countr y. It is that (Gen) Mu sharraf is unable, or unwilling, to confront the terrorists in his midst, sated a Los Angeles Times editorial.102 Moreover, the 9/11 Commission also passed judgment on Pakistans efforts to control the cross97 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 200. 98 Ibid., 203. 99 Ibid., 201. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102Dawn Pakistan not doing enough to fight terror: US paper, July 27, 2005, http://www.dawn.com/2005/07/27/nat3.htm.

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41 border infiltration of terrorists between Pakistan and Afghanistan and stated that Pakistan must do more to fight terror.103 As far as the war on terror is concerned, Pakistan has deployed 80,000 troops on the Pakistan-Afghan border and is actively pursuing terrorists.104 Additionally, Pakistans intentions regarding its role in war on terro r is made quite evident in a statement by President Musharraf, All foreign militants should leave, otherwise they would be crushed.105 Moreover, the U.S. State Departments 2004 report, Patterns of Global Terroris m, also hails Pakistan and President Musharraf, who himself has been a vict im of terrorism, as a steadfast and important ally in the war on terror.106 In addition, Pakistan has arrest ed and handed over more than 700 known terrorists to the U.S. 107 Here are some of the importa nt terrorist arrested by Pakistan: Abu Farraj al-Libbi, the number three man in Al-Qaeda and suspected of carrying out assassination attempts against President Musharraf. His arrest was hailed by President Bush by declaring that a major threat to peace lo ving people was removed. He had a bounty of $5 million.108 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, known to be an alle ged planner of the 9/11 attacks. President Bush called his arrest a seri ous blow to Al-Qaeda. He wa s on the FBIs most wanted list for several years and was carrying a bounty for $25 million.109 103 Pakistan Facts Sept. 11 Commission says Pakistan must do more to fight terror, November 15, 2005, http://www.pakistan-f acts.com/article.php?story=20051115201703951. 104 Pak Tribune US assured us Bajaur like incdents not to happen again: FO, January 31, 2006, http://www.paktribune.com/ news/index.shtml?132830. 105 Asif Shahzad, Leave Pakistan or die, Musharraf warns all foreign militants, The Scotsman March 24, 2006, http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=459262006. 106 Anwar Iqbal, U.S. terror report absolves Pakistan, The Washington Times April 29, 2004, http://www.hvk.org/articles/0404/70.html. 107 Nasir Malick and Francis Harris, Bush ha ils arrest of al-Qa'eda number three, Telegraph May 5, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtm l?xml=/news/2005/05/05/wlibbi05.xml. 108 Ibid. 109 BBC News Bush hails 'al-Qaeda killer' arrest, March 4, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2817441.stm.

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42 Omar Saeed Sheikh, sentenced to de ath on the charges of murdering Wall Street journal reporter Daniel Pearl.110 Abu Zubaydah, whose 2002 arrest resulted in warn ings about possible attacks on the Statue of Liberty and Brooklyn Bridge. Abu Zubaydah also revealed Flight 93 was supposed to crash into the White House.111 Ramzi Binalshibh, an alleged coordinator of th e 9/11 attacks, was re sponsible for the USS Cole attack and the U.S. embassy bombing in Tunisia.112 Moreover, despite the full cooperation extended by the Pakistani government, the U.S. carries out strikes inside Pakistani territory w ith seeming disregard for Pakistani sovereignty. These types of actions not only tarnish the alr eady shaky U.S. image in Pakistan, but also undermines the Pakistani governments role as an effective agent agai nst terrorism by causing civil unrest in the country. For example, on Janu ary 13, 2006, a U.S. drone, in clear violation of Pakistani airspace, fired a missile on Damadola, Pakistan, killing eighteen people, including women and children. This attack was carried out based on flawed intelligence that Ayman alZawahiri might be in that area.113 On top of that, instead of be ing apologetic about the loss of innocent life, U.S. officials arroga ntly defended these attacks. My in formation is that this strike was clearly justified by the intelligence," said Senator Trent Lott, a former Senate majority leader.114 110BBC News, Pearl Murderer Defiant After Verdict, July 15, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2128578.stm. 111 BBC News Bin Laden Lieutenant 'Gave Warnings,' May 24, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2006138.stm. 112 BBC News Top al-Qaeda Suspect in US Custody, September 15, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2261136.stm. 113Riaz Khan, Pakistan Condemns Deadly US Air strike, Eccentric Star January 14, 2006, http://eccentricstar.typep ad.com/public_diplomacy_weblog_n/2 006/01/pakistanis_prot.html. 114 Brain Knowlton, Intelligence Committee Se nators Discuss Paki stan Air strike, The New York Times January 15, 2006, http://www.nytimes .com/2006/01/15/politics/15cndsenators.html?ex=1166245200&en=4276a34fa5350a3d&ei=5070.

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43 Recently, two prominent American officials, Director of Intelligence John Negroponte and Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, have accused Pakistan of providing Refuge to the Taliban in Pakistani territory and no t doing enough to counter their threat.115 Negroponte, in testimony to the U.S. Senate, said, eliminati ng the safe haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in Pakistan's tribal areas is not sufficient to end the insurgency in Afghanistan.116 Responding to these types of allegations, the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. said, We are already standing on our head, wh at else we could do? They [the U.S.] should not blame us for their failures.117 Moreover, responding to critics of Pakistani efforts regarding the Taliban in the North West Frontier Provi nce, Governor Lt-Gen (ret.) A li Mohammad Jan Aurakzai, a key man in dealing with the Taliban, said that NAT O was oblivious to the on-ground realities: the reason that Afghan resurgence is gaining momentum is not because Pakistan is providing the Taliban with safe havens inside Pakistan, but because moderate Afghan citizens are joining the ranks of the Taliban.118 According to Brian Cloughely, author of the book Pakistan Army, what has happened is that U.S. air attacks on Af ghan villages, together with Iraq-style military brutality by ground troops, have led the major ity of Afghans to de test Americans and, by association, all foreign troops in their country.119 115 Yahoo News US Again Accuses Pakistan of Providing "Refuge" to Taliban, January 26, 2007, http://news.yahoo.com/s/af p/20070127/wl_sthasia_afp/usattacksafghanistan. 116 Shireen M. Mazari, US Threats to Pakistan, The News http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=39130. 117 Anwar Iqbal, US Legislation Seeks Ban on Assistance to Pakistan, Dawn January 25, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/25/top1.htm. 118 M. Ziauddin, Britain will never win in Afghanistan: Aurakzai, Dawn November 27, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/27/top8.htm. 119 Brian Cloughley, Stop Blaming Pakistan, Counter Punch http://www.counterpunch.org/cloughley07112006.html.

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44 Governor Aurakzai also point ed out that Pakistan was doing far more than the NATO coalition, as it has deployed 80,000 troops on the Pa kistan-Afghan border, which is twice more than NATO forces present in Afghanistan, and has lost around 750 of its soldiers. We're physically manning the border; our troops are sitting th ere on the zero line. Damn it, you also have a responsibility. Go sit on the border, fight like soldiers instead of sitting in your bases. Either they (NATO) are trying to hide their ow n weaknesses by leveling al legations at Pakistan or they are refusing to admit the facts, said Aurakzai.120 Current relations between the Unite d States and Pakistan are stra ined, at best. An editorial in The New York Times declared the recent state visit of Pr esident Bush as a pointless trip to Pakistan, where the Bush-Musha rraf meeting is one between two l eaders far more interested in guns than butter.121 Moreover, this trip to Pakistan, th e ground zero for fanaticism, could have proved vital to overcome the great divide be tween Islam and the West. Unfortunately, the editorial said, it was overshadowed by Mr. Bush's misbegotten nuclear pact with Pakistan's blood enemy, India.122 Additionally, instead of using this trip to build a bilateral relationship with the Pakistani people by inking a free-trade treaty that could tang ibly bind America to Pakistan in a way that no numb er of summit meetings or sales of F-16 fighter jets could ever manage, it was wasted on futile discussion regardi ng a recent nuclear deal between the U.S. and India.123 Feelings in Pakistan regarding the vis it by President Bush were well-expressed by Pat Buchanan, a former Presidential candidate a nd conservation commentator, who said that by transferring nuclear technology to In dia, President Bush has insul ted President Musharraf, an 120 Ziauddin, Britain will never win in Afghanistan: Aurakzai. 121 The New York Times Pointless Trip to Pakistan, March 3, 2006, 22. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid.

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45 ally in the war on te rror who took more risks than any other.124 Likewise, the ne gative effects of Bushs trip to Pakistan were quite evident from th e fact that on the eve of President Bushs visit, the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Inde x nosedived and lost 462 point.125 Recently, the newly elected U.S. House of Re presentatives passed legislation which called for curbs on American assistance to Pakistan. This new legislation requires the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan is doing its best to stop the Taliban insu rgency in its territory before releasing U.S. military assistance to Pakistan.126 This type of legislati on is not new for Pakistan and is the cause of a deep-rooted resentment of the Pakistani people toward U.S. According to Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation, the decisi on to halt U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990 because of concerns over its nuclear program was unwis e. Most U.S. policymakers acknowledge that this was a mistake, because it cost the U.S. valuable levera ge and stoked strong anti-U.S. sentiment that still exists in the country.127 An editorial in a leading Pakistani English daily, Dawn equated this legislation with th e Pressler Amendment passed in 1985.128 In fact, Pakistan remains a strong ally of th e United States in th e Middle East. Its government has taken considerable risks to support U.S. policy objectives of which the mass of its population has been extremely critical. For exam ple, recently a terrorist organization called Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for murd ering forty-two Pakistan Army soldiers. This signaled a major shift in terrorist policy, esse ntially making the Pakistan Army a known terror 124 Pat Buchanan, What Indian River Got, http ://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=49144. 125 Farhan. Sharif, KSE-100 Index nosedives after Bushs Pakistan visit, Daily Times March 12, 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. 126 Anwar Iqbal, US Legislation Seeks Ban on Assistance to Pakistan, Dawn January 25, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/25/top1.htm. 127 Lisa Curtis, Strengthening Pakistani Resolve Against Taliban, The Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.o rg/Research/MiddleEast/wm1331.cfm. 128 Dawn A New Presseler Law? January 26, 2007, www.dawn.com/2007/01/26/ed.htm.

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46 target. This terrorist attack was carried out in direct retaliation for the Pakistan Armys bombardment of a Madrassa school (alleged to be training terrorists) in Bajur, a town near the Pakistan-Afghan border, whic h left eighty people dead.129 Nonetheless, there have been recent signs of a fragmentation in Pakistani elite public opinion, with some factions aligning themselves with the anti-American sentiments held by a major portion of the Pakistani popula tion. The more Pakistan and its leadership have sacrificed in order to deliver Al Qaeda to the U.S. and be the most committed ally in the war against terror, the more abuse has been hurled at it from the U. S., said Shireen M. Mazari, a liberal Pakistani scholar and journalist.130 This fragmentation represents a threat to th e continued stability of Pakistan as a U.S. partner. Clearly, if the U.S. is to continue to have Pakistan as its all y, it is important to better understand the opinions of the Paki stani elites and the Pakistani population in order to nurture more favorable attitudes to the U.S. and decrea se anti-Americanism and its threat to American strategic interests. In conclusi on, it seems more likely that it is American policy toward Pakistan, not American freedoms that arouse negative feelings in the people of Pakistan towards the U.S. Through interviews with members of the Pakistani el ite, the next chapter of this thesis examines the current Pakistani point of view towards U.S. These interviews will also establish the role played by U.S. public diplomacy and foreign polic y in shaping the opinions of Pakistani elites. 129 Rahimullah Yusufzai, Pakistani Taliban claim responsibility, The News, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=4100. 130Mazari, US Threats to Pakistan. The News http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=39130.

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47 CHAPTER 4 INTERVIEW FINDINGS For the purpose of this study there were thr ee major topics of inquiry (see appendix B): Do Pakistanis hate the U.S.?; Pakistan view s on the U.S. War on Terror; and Pakistans relations with the Taliban. Do Pakistanis Hate the U.S.? Military Elites The majority of the military respondents agreed with the statement that American freedoms have nothing do with hatred toward America. A Pakistani army colonel said, No one hates Americans or America. Pakistani people like Am erican liberty, respect American values, admire the American education system, and adore their welf are system. Most of the people living in this region desire to get settle d or at least visit Ameri ca once in their lifetime. Several military elites pointed out American duplicity in policies at home and abroad and complained that instead of exporting democracy, it supports dictators and undemocratic regimes. Pakistani military elites also bl amed the contradictions in dome stic policy, which enshrines the principles of democracy and freedoms, and U.S. foreign policy, which blatantly supports dictators. A retired three-star general said: America is considered a country which is a hypocrite, which supports dictators irrespective of the fact that dictators fla unt the basic human rights of th e peopleAmerica claims to be the champion of basic human rights! These are the glaring drawbacks in American policies which are rejected by the people. Let me emphasize that people do like American freedoms. But they hate what Bush does. Citing examples of U.S. support of dictators, a retired brigadier genera l said that the U.S. lost its credibility as a champion of human ri ghts and democracy, when it lent its support to dictators like Pinchot, Somoza, and Stroessn er, who abrogated human rights and political

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48 activities in their countri es. [The] same has been done in the Middle East, including Pakistan. The simple explanation that all wa s done in the best interest of the country is not well taken in our country [Pakistan], where people are stunned to watch the dichotomy in U.S. policies, he said. A point to be noted is that the word dicta tor was only used by retired military elites. Since Pakistan is ruled by General Pervez Musha rraf, a military dictator, serving military elites refrained from using the word di ctator and decried American e fforts to promote democracy in Pakistan. They believed that the Pakistanis are une asy with U.S. efforts to thrust American-Style democracy upon them. They also believed that the ideology and theory behind western-style democracy is incompatible with the local culture and way of life in Pakistan. They stressed that democracy is an evolutionary process which n eeds time to flourish. In fact, America has just one recipe and unilaterally wants everyone to adopt that. America has reached this state in a few centuries and it is an evolutionary process, wh ereas other nations are st ill struggling in their evolutionary process and will take some more time in reaching the stage when U.S.-brand democracy can be beneficial for them, said a Pakistani army colonel. Military elites also blamed Am erican intervention in Iraq an d Afghanistan as a root cause of hatred toward it. A retired general asked, Who has granted the right to the Americans to come and occupy Iraq? Who grants them liberty to snatch the liberty of a sovereign state? Why are they in Afghanistan? The law of the jungl e, might is right, is being pursued by the Americans. The diction Boss is always right is a motto of the U.S. People think that Americans are the people who do not respect the re ligious, ethical values of other nations and religions. Military elites also cited the false pretences under which Iraq was invaded as a reason for Pakistani dissent. Devastati on in Afghanistan for so-called er adication of terrorism and in

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49 Iraq for eliminating non-existent WMDs, are al so among the reasons for hatred for America among Muslims, said a naval elite. While citing past experiences, military elites declared America an unfaithful friend. We as Pakistani feel that the USA has always cheated and deceived Pakistan at the time of crises. The history is full of instances of Am erican betrayal, said a retired ge neral. Military elites believed that Pakistan played a key role in 1960s and 1970s to defeat communism in the Middle East. In return, Pakistan expected fullfledged U.S. support in its wa r against India, which never materialized. But unfort unately they have realized that inst ead of helping Pakistan in 1971 with the Seventh Fleet, it never even opposed Indi an policies against Pakistan. Though Nixons policy did support Pakistan in 1971, people still wa ited for the Seventh Fleet (to act), said a retired three-star general. The two countries again became allies in la te 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to secure access to Mi ddle East oil reserves Pakistan played a key role in this war by opening its territory to provide logistical support to Afgha n resistance groups who were fighting to expel the Soviets. As soon as th e Soviets began to leave Afghanistan in 1988, the strategic alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan also crumbled and the U.S. left the area without stabilizing Afghanistan. Mili tary elites blame this sudden abandonment of Afghanistan by the U.S. as the sole reason for prevalent instability in that country. After the terrorist a ttacks in New York and Washington, the U.S. and Pakistan became allies again. The sole reasons for this alliance were that the U.S. needed Pakistans help to capture Osama bin Laden and to eradicate the th reat posed by the Tali ban. Military elites believed that the new alliance was on unequal foo tings. Despite being d eclared as the major

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50 non-NATO ally in 2004, Pakist an is still subject to discriminato ry treatments vis--vis India and is often blamed for not doing e nough, said a naval officer. Military elites also believed that unconditional American suppor t for Israel is also a cause of resentment toward America. A retired gene ral said that Pakistanis do not like many U.S. policies in Middle East. They think that Amer ica is unjustified in helping the Israelites irrespective of their malice-ridde n designs and plans against the Palestinians. When the whole world cries out against Israel, w hy do Americans still support the atrocious policie s of Israel? When the UNO condemns Israel, why USA votes in the Security Council against the world opinion? People in Pakistan are not very educ ated. They are born with closed minds and continue to follow the rituals that they learn from their parents. The animosity against the Israelites injected into their minds is repeated in the media, in the religious sermons. So a friend of Israel is a foe of Islam and Pakistan. America is a die-hard friend of Israel, so Israel foe of Islam and Pakistan, he said. The same general also emphasized that Pakistan does not have any hatred toward the people of Isr ael. Moderate Pakistanis respect the Prophets of Israel, they respect the Holy Books of Judais m, they respect the Jews who lived along the side of their Prophet, but they reject what the Israel is doing to the Palestinians, he said. According to military elites, The U.S. need s to water down overtly aggressive foreign policy and create workable solutions to Middle East crises to reha bilitate its negative image in Pakistan. Responding to the question, How can th e United States remove these misgivings, a Pakistan naval officer said, There are no misgivi ngs in the minds of Pakistanis about America. These are the ground realities. He commented that the majority of conflicts faced by the world would cease to exist if the U.S. would rein in its hypocritical policies toward other countries, stop interfering in the affairs of other count ries, stop bullying other countries, and stop

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51 pretending to be global policeman. Being the so le superpower does not give it any rights to enforce law of the jungle in the world. What a ll America requires to improve its image is total shift in its current polici es and tactics, he said. One military believed that the United States could reduce the menace of terrorism by 75%, if it could honestly resolve Middle East crises. According to a retired brigadier general, the co llateral damage resul ting from conflicts all over the world makes it difficult for the government of Pakistan to support U.S. policies. He said, In todays global world when r eal time pictures reach the living room, Muslims all over the world and Pakistanis in specific saw the auth orities at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib inflamed their passions. As if it was not e nough, Washingtons support for Israel continued unabated as before even after the massive bom bings in Lebanon. It became morally impossible to support U.S. policies in fighting terrorism. The same retired brigadier general argued th at it is American compassion, not American aggression, that holds the key for a better U.S. im age. He also declared the Bush doctrine--U.S. has the right to invade any country that poses a threat to its s ecurityas illegal. A Pakistani general said that it is not desira ble to use force to influence inte rnational events. It would rather be more becoming if it uses its soft power of persuasion, financial help, and its strength of culture, values and prestige. He believes that American pop culture and its style of government, with freedom of speech, respect of the law, and equal rights, is the only viable weapon available to America to defeat terrorism. Military elites also stressed the need for genuine friendshi p between the two countries and for help to improve the basic infrastructure in Pakistan. A retired th ree-star general said, Pakistanis dont like policy of stick and carrot. They woul d only appreciate carrot without

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52 stick. They dont want false promises. They want a permanent friendship, not opportunitybased partnership. Every nation has the right to choose friends, but permanence of relations has its own virtues. If Americans think that thei r foreign policy seeks to have national-interestoriented policy, then it will not gain trust of the country which also has NATO status. That trust must be visible to convince the populace to al ign them with American thought. No more sermons to do more. A retired general stressed the need for better relations between the U.S. government and the people of Pakistan as an avenue for a better relationship between the two countries. He cited the recent Congressional Research Services report which has a dvised the U.S. government to plan the aid in such a way that it benefits the nations, not the governments. He stressed that rather than rewarding Pakistani leadership, the relations between two countries will flourish if the U.S. makes conscious efforts to build Pakistan s political and social institutions, rather than rewarding its leadership. To summarize, military elites believe that the destabilization of Iraq has caused much hostility in the Muslim world, especially in Paki stan They are also unanimous in their opinion that blatant U.S. support for Israel against Palest ine is also one the main reason for the hostility found in the people of Pakistan toward the U.S. They also link the resolution of the Middle East crisis as a key to a better rela tionship between the two countries. Military elites think that the U.S. is unreliable and an unpredictable friend, one who befriends Pakistan just to promote or protect its own national interests. Pakistani m ilitary elites want a stable relationship with the U.S., one that protects and promotes the national in terests of the both countr ies. Military elites blame U.S. support of Pakistani dictat ors as a cause of Pakistani hatred.

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53 Modernizing Elites The majority of interviewed modernizing elites believe that contradictions between the ideology that governs American domestic policy a nd the ideology that gove rns American foreign policy is the real cause for the Pakistani rese ntment toward the U.S., not American freedoms Emphasizing this point, one elite Pakistani busin essman said, Yes, it is true people hate a democratically elected government that creat es problems for other democracies and supports dictators. They hate their freedom to jeopardi ze others Freedom. They hate their freedom of religion to declare other religions as terrorists. They hate their freedom of speech making others speechless. They hate the freedom to vote for the oppressors. They hate the assembly which always ruins the global order. Modernizing elites also blamed U.S. support for Pakistani military dictators as one reason for Pakistani odium toward the U.S. They belie ved that U.S. democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom to vote has nothing to do with Pakistan i resentment toward the U.S. These are the most likeable virtues of a grea t nation. We also want to have the same in our country; unfortunately, Americans by supporting military dict ators have never allowed us access to these ingredients of liberty and freedom, a member of the National Assembly said. Some of the modernizing elites blamed blatan tly aggressive U.S. foreign policy as a reason for Pakistani resentment toward America. A poli tical advisor to a chief minister said that American society is flourishing with democracy and freedom of speech, but its over-fixation with world domination is the real cause of ha tred toward America. One modernizing elite declared the war on terror as a war for Ameri can supremacy. America is being hated in the whole world, either by expressly or impliedly, du e to its foreign policies. This is not a war against terrorism. In fact this is a lust of supremacy and to rule the world in the name of war against terrorism and targeted Muslim countri es and proceeding in pick and choose manner

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54 having its own vested interest a nd curbing Muslim countries for es tablishing its supremacy in the world. Another modernizing elite believed that by conducting a reckless wa r on terrorism, the U.S. itself has become a terrorist. She said, Becau se we the Pakistanis th ink that he [Bush] is the master terrorist. Look at the situation in Ira q, Afghanistan, and now his latest plans to attack Iran. Only one modernist elite mentioned the past unreliable Pakistani-American friendship as a cause of resentment toward America. He said th e U.S. is not popular in Pakistan because it has continually displayed disloyalty toward Pakistan in order to promote and safeguard its own national and strategic interests. Pakistan even suffered a lot, but still U.S. has never been valuing and acknowledging Pakistans suffering during the Afghanistan invasion by the USSR and during the War on Terrorism, he said. Just like military elites, modernizing elites also believed that a changing U.S. involvement in Iraq and the Middle East peace process is a linchpin for improving its image in Pakistan. A member of the Punjab Assembly said, The Am erican policies should not have bias towards religion. America should deal wi th Middle East countries in an open and fair manner, giving equal treatment to Palestine and Israel. The unfair treatment in Palestine has sent a very negative signal among all the small and large Muslim countries. To summarize, modernizing elites believe that the conflict between U.S. domestic policy and foreign policy is a cause of Pakistani detestation. The U.S., which itself is flourishing with the virtues of freedom and democracy, supports di ctators like Musharraf, who openly denies the Pakistani public access to democracy and freedom Modernizing elites also blame the U.S. for the chaos that resulted after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 Modernizing elites also believe

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55 that the U.S. is not popular in Pakistan because of its biased support of Is rael in the Middle East conflict. Modernizing elites be lieve that the U.S. must resolv e the above mentioned problems if it wants to gain the confiden ce of the Pakistani people. Religious Elites There seems to be a consensus among religious elites that American involvement in Iraq and its stagnant Middle East policy is a cause of dissatisfaction and dislike among Pakistani people for the U.S. Religious elites also cite Am erican support of Israel as th e reason for Muslim antipathy toward America. One religious scholar said, B ecause the real matter of concern is not their [American] system, i.e., freedom or democracy, the actual problem lies with their undue and injustice policies towards the Th ird World countries, especially their own hatred, e.g., Muslims rather than Islamic system, thei r interference in the matter of other countr ies, and their support for Israel, etc. A local cleric also blamed U.S. support of di ctators as a reason for Pakistani resentment toward the U.S. He said that the U.S. classi fies itself as a democracy, yet, to promote and safeguard its national interests, it support undemocr atic dictators in Pakistan. Second, the U.S. is using the support of the government of Pakistan to destabilize other Muslim countries. Pakistani leaders might be friends of the U.S., but ther e is no importance of the U.S. in Pakistans community, he said Religious elites also believe that America in the form of its war on terror is actually waging war against Islam. A local cleric said, Pakistan is a Muslim country and America is tagging the Muslims as terrorists. Because of th at, America is not being given much importance among common [Pakistani] people.

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56 One religious elite blamed homosexuality a nd other problems as reasons for Pakistani dislike of the U.S. He said, Inhuman and immoral values prevailing in the culture and society of western nations, especially homosexuality, obsce nity, vulgarity, deterioration of family and relatives, is the reason that ma ny people do not like America. To summarize, religious elites believe that the destabilization of Iraq is causing much hostility in the Muslim world, especially in Paki stan. Religious elites are unanimous in their opinions that blatant U.S. support for Israel against Palestine is the main reason for the hostility found in the people of Pakistan toward the U.S. They also link a resolution of the Middle East crisis is a key to a better rela tionship between the two countries. Religious elites also agree that U.S. support for Pakistani military dictators like General Ayub, General Zia, and General Musharraf, who all had close relationships w ith the U.S. government, is a cause of much antagonism toward the U.S. The U.S. War on Terror and Pakistan Military Elites A retired major general called current tactics employed by the U.S. in its war on terror not successful. He said that the U.S. is using military tactics to resolve political problems faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. He believed that the use of brute force is causing a lot of collateral damage, a main cause of resentment toward the U.S. He believed that the U.S. should use the instrument of the political, economic, and social po licies to resolve the issue of terrorism. This can be complemented by suitable and minimum use of military force. Military elites also stressed a need for change in current tactics employed in the war on terror. The USA has to adopt ta ctics and strategy based on co-a ssistance, support of just cause of people, and stop aggression against sovereign states on self-styled a nd self-assumed facts like weapons of mass destruction, said a retired colonel. Military elites also blamed flawed U.S.

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57 tactics employed in the war on terror as a main cau se of the current chaos in Afghanistan and the flourishing of terrorism in the wo rld. I think present American strategy is further flourishing terrorism instead of eradicati ng it. We need to understa nd the true identity of the people/organizations being termed as terrorists by America. Who created al-Qaeda in the first place? It was created by America itself to fight Soviets in Afghanistan. Osama bin-Laden was on American payroll. He and his companions we re trained by CIA. We need to understand the reasons why these slaves turned against their master. The reason is the faulty American strategy, said a naval elite. Explaining the repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a general who was directly involved in that conflict said that terror ism in Afghanistan and Paki stan is related to the Middle East situation augmented by the 1980s war against Communism. He further stated, This so called war of Jihad [Afghan str uggle against the Soviet s] took its present trajectory when war in Afghanistan agains t USSR was over. There were no further objectives of these Jihadis who had so blatan tly fought against the Russians. Now their cause shifted to Palestine, a nd creation of a fundamentalist government in Afghanistan. Leading to unending fratricide and internal fe uds among these Jihadis, they spread out to various global sites of turmoil and fighti ng, including Africa, Middle East, Iraq, more importantly to Kashmir and Pakistan. This is our own creation, not from some outside land. We created a monster to kill Communism but we failed to assign it other tasks. Monster needed a place to do foul and execute its evils, but we neither provided it an outlet nor did we tame it to lose its pampered passi on. Concept of Frankenstein evolved here and took us by throat. We are to be blamed. No w a monster has merged with the locals in small scale, the poison has spilled over to the innocent people who are unemployed, uneducated, yet educated at Madrassas propa gating bigoted and narrow-mindedness. We know an empty mind is evils mind. So we have created volumes of evil minds who are host to terrorism. The sanctuaries of these close-minded people flourish all along Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Even the military elites who support the curren t war on terror policy believe that it was poorly executed. According to a retired general, after the American at tack on Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban were on the run and the U.S. faile d to chase them to their final conclusion. He said,

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58 Today, Karzai [Afghan presiden t] is holed up in his bunkere d Presidential Palace and coalition forces have not adopted offensive pos ture to deny the hideout s to the Taliban. They live, prosper, prepare in and around Qa ndhar [Afghanistan] and in the treacherous terrain of Pak-Afghanistan border. Once they were on their heels, they should have been denied any opportunity to reequip and cons olidate. Instead, probably resources were utilized to protect Kabul and its residents. This was no tactics worth success. The time was spent in blaming each other, allowing the te rrorists to take advantage of their division and digging hard in their trenches. So Ameri ca has, so far, failed in taking good hold of the militants. So we can say that fractu red relations among the concerned parties, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S., Coalit ion Forces, and even India, have led to American failure. A comprehensive broad-base d strategy aiming at Pacification of the hostile population is needed. People in Afghanist an live in isolated hamlets in far off areas, including tribal belt in Pakistan. They project themselves as bands of self-styled guardians of faith and public morality. They are the polluters of the minds of these ignorant and uneducated people. They need mo tivation, but with care an d sensitivity. So U.S. needs to take it seriously, which so far it has not done. So both on military and political fronts, U.S. has not been able to deliver. One military elite blamed hunger, poverty, a nd illiteracy the main reasons for the flourishing of terrorism. He said that people tend to subscribe to an ideology of fanaticism when they live a meaningless life devoid of any hope for a better tomorrow. These types of people have no access to liberal education to widen their horizons about the vast opportunities of meaningful life. One retired general believed that terrorist thri ve and survive on military conflicts all over the world. He said that we need to deny them the fighting grounds all over the world by resolving the Middle East issue, Iraq problem, and Afghanistan unrest. He argued that once turmoil in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East cease to exist, the mo tivation and passion of terrorist to fight will diminish. A retired brig. general believed that a recent peace deal between Pakistan and the tribes along the Pakistan-Afghan border, which is prof oundly criticized by U.S. officials, is working and is a way forward to eradicate terr orists along that border. He said, Present clashes between foreign militants a nd local fighters supported by the government of Pakistan are affectively flushing out the foreign militants and their local collaborators, which may result in lying of arms by these foreigners. Government and Pakistan army

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59 must continue keeping intimate watch over th ese clashes to get boost out the results. Government must provide lucrative compensa tion to Taliban now fighting on Pakistans side. Government must win over the promin ent leaders of Taliban. Social sector development must continue alongside creating po litical space in political parties with antiTaliban and anti-extremist orientation. To summarize, military elites believe that cu rrent U.S. tactics and policies employed in the war on terror are futile and, instead of eradicatin g terrorism, are the main causes for the rise in terrorism. Military elites are unanimously sendi ng a clear message to U.S. policymakers that what is perceived by U.S. totall y contradict the real ties that are seen on the ground. Pakistani elites believe that terrorism ca nnot be defeated by brute force only; instead, the war on terror should focus on political, and economic, social is sues. The U.S. should invest in upgrading and developing educational and social infrastructure in Pakistan. Modernizing Elites Some modernizing elites equated the war on terror with a war against Muslims. One modernizing elite said, It is not war on terrorism, its war against Muslims. America is targeting only Muslims under this strategy like its attack on Iraq and Afghanistan. America is targeting the innocent people of Muslim countries by calling them terrorists. Some Pakistani elites equated the war on terror to war for oil. There is no terrorism in the world. It is only the unfair treatment by USA and UK coupled with their de sire to pump oil without a meter [fuel gauge] from Middle East and particularly from Iraq without a meter which has introduced the word terrorism. It is like saying th at if some country occupies US A and tries to run it in its own control and social manner will give birth to terrorism in USA, said a member of the Punjab Assembly. Modernizing elites also believe that the toppli ng of the Taliban in the name of the war of terror was not justified. A member of the National Assembly believed that the Taliban were a legitimate Afghan government that was illegally bombed into extin ction. That is commendable,

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60 but the way they were removed, the way they were bombed and slaughtered, still persists in the minds of the people, he said. One modernizing scholar believed that the st rategy employed in the war on terror is a flawed one that is having opposite effect. She believed that, instead of curbing terrorism, the war on terror has resulted in a loss of a tremendous amount of innocent life. People of every country, including Americans, feel scared and uns afe. If America continues with its current aims, then time is not far away when the world will be grappled with a Third World War, which will be a gigantic and an atomic war and de struction will be unimaginable, she said. A political advisor to the chief minister of th e Punjab Assembly said that a majority of Pakistanis believe that there s hould be a war against terrorism, but the way the U.S. by just is pursuing it, just by focusing on brute military st rength, is causing a lot of resentment among Pakistanis. Some modernizing elites believed that the U.S. has lost the cred ibility to lead the struggle against terrorism. They believe that United Nati ons, not the U.S., can play a significant role in freeing the world from the menace of terrorism. A Pakistani businessman said, The best way to deal with terrorism is to let United Nations play their role. Every issue regarding to any manner should be given to the United Nations. If America has some reservations, then it should go to the United Nations. It is not the way to deal with the matter by itself without going to a proper forum that is United Nations. A member of the Punjab Assembly believes th at terrorism will cease to exist if the U.S. withdraws its forces from Muslim countries and lets the UN take over the reconstruction process. He said that the U.S. should withdraw its forces from all Muslim countries After that withdraw, fair and free elections supervised by the UN shoul d take place in Afghanistan and Iraq. The

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61 United Nations should provide all possible help to conduct free, fair, and impartial elections without the interference of military forces of any country, especially the USA, he said. Few modernizing elites linked terrorism to so cial problems. A member of the National Assembly said, Give education to the masses, listen to their grievan ces, and address their problems. No religion allows terrorism, [ne ither] does Islam. But these people are wrongly motivated and need comforts facilities and guidance. To summarize, the modernizing elites think th at the war on terror is a war against Muslim countries to occupy their oil reserves. They al so think the fight against terrorism warrants a political solution, not brute force. Moreover, modernizing elites blame the rise and flourishing of terrorism on unfriendly U.S. policies toward Pakistan, which were implemented post-soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Mo dernizing elites believ e that terrorism will exist as long as the quandary in the Middle East exis ts and the Iraq war exists. Religious Elites The majority of religious elites blamed soci al problems as a cause for the flourishing of terrorism. According to a local cl eric, the people of Pakistan are being crushed by the shackles of poverty and unemployment. Justice is up for au ction. Fundamentalist ar e taking advantage of ordinary Pakistanis helplessness. They brainwash and recruit them by teaching them dreams of rewards available for them in the afterlife. These brainwashed Pakistanis eventually become terrorists, who carry out heinous crimes against humanity. Government need s to take stern action against this threat. One religious elite blamed the occupation of Mu slim land by foreign forces as a reason for increased terrorism. He said, U ndue occupation of Muslim territo ries by foreign forces is the only reason for terrorism. For example, Indian occupation of Kashmir a nd Israeli occupation of Palestinian land.

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62 To summarize, religious elites blamed soci al injustice and the political and economic unrest currently prevalent in Pakistan and Afghanist an as a cause for the flourishing of terrorism. Religious elites also equated U.S. military inte rventions in Iraq and Af ghanistan as occupations of Muslim land, which is causing Pakistani resentment toward the U.S. Pakistan and the Taliban Military Elites Responding to accusations made by several high-ra nking U.S. officials th at Pakistan must do more to stop the cross-border movement of members of the Taliban from Pakistan to Afghanistan, a retired general said, While sitting in USA, it is very difficult to pe rceive the ground realit ies in Afghanistan and northern areas of Pakistan. With vast resour ces at the disposal of the coalition forces mainly comprising of the US forces, they ha ve not been able to crush the Taliban. President Karzai, just confined to his fortress of Presidential House, ha s not been able to do much to contain the Taliban. He shrugs o ff his responsibility by blaming Pakistan. The border is porous, laced with treacherous mountains and unreachable routes. It is just not possible to barbwire the whole length of th is border. Almost 100,000 Pakistani troops are manning the border, yet it is not becoming possi ble to put a check on the movement of the Taliban who have intimate family relations along both sides of the border. These so-called Taliban or Mujahideens are th e direct product of the 1980s when America was fighting against Communism. These fanatics, assemble d from all over the world, are still in the northern areas, which are completely hostile to the Pakistani troops. Th e terrain is hostile being mountainous and thoroughly fri endly to the locals. Pakist an Army has already lost troops and weapons in these areas and its mere presence against these local and foreign militants is de-popularizing the present gove rnment, which is already under intense pressure from the religious parties harbor ing militants in their wingsso dangerously creating law and order situation undermining th e writ of the government. From one side local population is turning agains t the present regime because of its anti-terrorism policies, on the other side these terrorists get re-a gitated and mount furt her pressure through sabotage, suicide bombings. As if this was not enough, U.S. yet puts more pressure to do more. Does all this keep the government? No. Government needs breathing space through sincere acknowledgement of the U.S ., sincere acknowledgement from Afghan government, which is bent upon blaming Pakistan for its own misgivings and short-falls. A naval official challenged the authority of American officials for asking Pakistan to do more. Who is America to order someone to do something? We are not an American colony, but a sovereign and independent nation. Like Am erica, we also have to consider our own

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63 interests prior taking any action. Pakistan is already doing e nough to curb the international terrorism while maintain its own national interests. No other country has the right to force Pakistan to do anything against its own interests, he said. Few military elites blamed the U.S. as the ca use of the current chaos in Afghanistan. A retired colonel said, The USA is trying to fight his War of Interest on the shoulders of others. All these problems are the crea tion of USA. Pakistani governme nt has done more than its capacity, power, and resources against the support and wishes of its own people. A serving Pakistan army colonel also rebuked U. S. assertions that Pakistan is not doing enough. He said, Pakistan has deployed more troops as compar ed to USA and NATO ISAF troops. Pakistani forces have suffered more causalities comp aring to USA or NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan. Pakistan has captured the majo rity of al-Qaeda people who were hiding in various part of Pakistan, wh ich were subsequently handed over to U.S. Moreover, Pakistan is also taking polit ical and economical steps in the region bordering Afghanistan, which is paying dividend now. Pakistan cannot kill its own people just to please U.S. policymakers and think tanks who possess partial knowledge The majority of military elites believed th at the threat of the Taliban can only be neutralized through a political solu tion. A retired general said, The Taliban are the by-product of the Afghan Jihad struggle against Communists. After the war, this Pashtoon group dominated th e Afghan scene after surviving the intrafratricide and an unending feud among Afghan militants. These people projected the religious cult of a specific Imam and inject ed a phenomenon of the Caliphates time not practically possible at this time. These haml et people are ridden with a very narrow mind and believe in dogmas, rituals and reject open mindedness and cant move with the demand of the time. They only need motivati on through liberal educa tion to be imparted through the locals and not the foreigners. Th ey need money to make their houses, attend schools, have treatment in hospitals and comm unication infrastructure to reach out to the world and allow the world to reach out to th em. It will take time. Instead of hounding them with rifle, they need butter to feed. We shouldnt propagate th em as terrorists, but coin some other term as brave people who need decent living and a decent education. Through pacification programs and helping Paki stans government to join them in their efforts, we can tame these unguided and unedu cated people. Patience and time will make the impact.

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64 A naval officer asserted that there is no need to get rid of the Taliban. He said that the Taliban are the byproduct of a social and political system. Like America, Afghanistan also had the right to choose any system of government for itself. Taliba n are a community with certain beliefs and they have all the rights to exist in this world like other comm unities, he said. To summarize, military elites vehemently reject U.S. assertions that Pakistan is not doing enough. Military elites believe that Pakistan has been given more to do than what it possibly can accomplish. Military elites believe the problem li es in Afghanistan, where U.S. forces have failed to eradicate the Taliban. They think that the current U.S.-supported Afghan government is comprised of ruthless war lords w ho are despised by the majority. Military elites also believe that the U.S. government is oblivious to ground r ealities in Afghanistan. Instead of pursuing a military solution, the U.S. must seek a pol itical solution to blunt the Taliban. Modernizing Elites Modernizing elites also believed that Pakistan is doing its best to stop the Taliban and that American criticism was unfair. A member of the National Assembly said, Pakistan cannot do more. People of Pakistan believe that Pres ident Musharraf is a stooge of America who is pursuing the U.S. agenda without consulting them. That is why government is not able to do any more, he said. A Pakistani scholar said that Pakistan has done more to de ter terrorism and the Taliban than any other country. Pakistan has done what ever they could. Not any other country has done that much including USA. Why USA is not succeed ing in Iraq? Should Pakistan be blamed for that? Republican governments, wrong polic ies are the main cause, he said. One modernizing elite believed th at dealing with the Taliban is not as easy as it sounds and will take an ample amount of time. She said th at if the U.S. with al l its military might and

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65 resources, has failed to pacify Iraq, then why does it expect Pakistan to curb the Taliban in such a short period of time with limite d resources at its disposal. In dealing with the Taliban, m odernizing elites also believed in a political solution rather than a military solution. A member of the National Assembly said, Northern people, a non-Pushtoon community, is in government and Pushtoons are out of government. So a friction exists. Pushtoons should be taken into government, be given proper representation and be looked after. Th ey need Pat not Push. More pressure generates more hatred. We must remember when Taliban were in power, there was peace in the country. Production of opium has ceased but now neither peace is there nor is opium is extinctit is on the increase. A Pakistani businessman said, Taliban are not terrorists. The word Terrorists which is being used only for Taliban, is creating more annoyance in them. They should be dealt [with] as the normal citizens. They should not be hated ju st because they are fighting in the name of religion. If America is against Muslims, then Taliban are against America. A businessman blamed the U.S. for the creation of the Taliban and asked the U.S. to find a solution. Taliban are a menace created by USA, so they should suggest a remedy, he said. One Pakistani scholar believed that Pakistanis should support the Taliban. He said, Well, as far as my personal opinion is concerned, we should support Taliban for whatever vices they may have. There was peace in Afghanistan when they were in command. To summarize, modernizing elites believe that Pakistan has exhaustively pursed the Taliban and cannot do more. The war on terror is very unpopular in Pakist an. Therefore, due to public pressure, Pakistan cannot pursue overtly aggressive the U.S. policies. Some elites believe that there is no quick solution to the Taliban problem; it requires long-term surgical efforts. They also believe that if the U.S. with all its military might and resources, has failed to stop the violence in Iraq, then how can it expect a poor c ountry like Pakistan to accomplish those goals in

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66 such a short time? Modernizi ng elites also suggest a political solution, rather than a military solution, to overcome the Taliban. Religious Elites A local cleric blamed Afghanistan for not doing enough against the Taliban. He said, Pakistan is doing all that is possible to stop te rrorism in its surroundings. It is the weakness of Afghan government which is causing failures against Taliban. Another cleric blamed the Afghan govern ment for supporting terrorism. He said, Pakistan wants to exterminate terrorism fr om its atmosphere, but Afghan government is exporting terrorism in Pakistan to weaken it. A religious scholar blamed the U.S. and th e current Afghan government for the recent spiraling of Taliban. He said, Pakistan is doing his best in this regard, but the wrong U.S. foreign policy of supporting corrupt war lords in Afghanistan is making Taliban popular among local people. There was a peace when Taliban were in power, now Afghanis are being crushed by the current corrupt government. To summarize, religious elites believed that Pakistan has done enough to curb the Taliban. The solution to wipe out the Ta liban does not lie with Pakistan, it lies with the government of Afghanistan. They believe the current Afghan gove rnment consists of unpopular war lords, who persecute the Afghan population, co nsequently, ordinary Afghans are turning to the Taliban. From these interviews it is quite clear that the U.S has a serious image and credibility problems in Pakistan. While public diplomacy pr ovides the necessary tools to sway Pakistani opinion in favor the U.S., this effort will require the U.S. to alter its foreign policy toward Pakistan. The next chapter will discuss how the U.S. can employ diplomacy to wins hearts and minds in Pakistan. It will also discuss the lim itation of U.S. diplomacy in pacifying Pakistani resentment toward them.

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67 CHAPTER 5 IMPLICATIONS From the responses of the Pakistani elites, it is quite clear that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in need of real ignment. First, U.S. policy makers need to stop giving sermons about doing more. They need to reali ze that the on-ground realit ies in Pakistan and Afghanistan are different from what they perceive. To eradicate terrorism, Pakistan and the U.S. need to map out a comprehensive strategy that also embraces political, administrative, and economic dimensions. Second, Pakistani elites wa nt a relationship between themselves and the people of the U.S., not a relationship between th e U.S. government and President Musharraf. Pakistan wants to build a broadbased, stable, and long-term relati onship with the U.S. Pakistanis wants to have the same freedoms and liberties that Americans enjoy, which is only possible through a relationship between two democracies, not between a democracy and dictatorship. In keeping with the traditional diplomacy of the past, America has focused its efforts on securing the support of leaders in the regi on, leaving those leaders the task of securing the support of the people there. Instead of being able to rally th eir people, more and more of these leaders are alienating themselves from their publics, said Zaharna1. Therefore, it is imperative for the U.S. to change its policy toward Paki stan and start talking directly to the people of Pakistan. Finally, U.S. aid to Pakistan must not be sole ly military hardware and armaments; instead, it should first and foremost focus on poverty alle viation and welfare projects in Pakistan. Recently, the Congress Research Service ha s published a report that calls for a rearrangement of U.S foreign policy. This repor t recommends a closer bond with the people of 1 R.S. Zaharna, American Public Diplomacy in th e Arab and Muslim World: A Strategic Communication Analysis, Foreign Policy in Focus November, 2001, http://www.fpif.org/papers/communication.html.

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68 Pakistan rather than its government.2 According to this report, th e U.S. can improve its image in Pakistan by making aid more visible to ordina ry Pakistanis. Confirming the sentiments of Pakistani elites, this report also states that t he US partnership with Pakistan would probably be on firmer footing through conditioned programs more dedicated to building the countrys political and social institutions than rewarding its leadership.3 In the past, there were instances where direct U.S. aid has helped enhance its image in Pakistan. On October 8, 2005, a massive earthquak e hit Northern parts of Pakistan killing at least 73,000 people. In response to this the U.S. army launched a humanitarian relief mission, its biggest since the Berlin air lift.4 This was the first instance in the history of U.S.Pakistan relations that Pakistanis saw the compassionate side of the U.S. What were the results? The U.S. favorable rating among Pakistanis jumped from 23% to 46%, while support for Osama binLaden dropped from 51% to 33%. Of those polled 78% said that they have a favorable image of the U.S. because of this relief mission.5 This poll documents the most significant shift in Pakistani, indeed Muslim, pub lic opinion since 9/11, said Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani information minister.6 This suggests that the U.S. can be gin to eradicate terrorism and improve its image by direct involvement in development projects. Clearly, American humanitarian assistance can make a significant and immediat e difference in eroding the popular support base 2Anwar Iqbal, US Govt Urged to Focus on Nation, Not Govt : Congressional Reports Advice, Dawn April 1, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/01/top11.htm. 3 Ibid. 4 Reuters Goodbye Pakistan: US Ends Quake Relief Mission, March 30, 2006, http://today.reuters.com/News/Crise sArticle.aspx?storyId=SP117230. 5 Daily Times, U.S. Gaining Popularity in Paki stan, December 21, 2005, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005%5C12%5C21%5Cstory_21-12-2005_pg7_51. 6 Ibid.

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69 for global terrorists. The U.S. war on terror ha s not, said Ken Billen, the President of Terror Free Tomorrow, a non-profit organiza tion based in Washington, D.C.7 Furthermore, from the opinions of Pakistani e lites it is very clear rehabilitation of the Tribal Belt through economic incentives is the key to defeating terrorism and the Taliban. According to Shahid Javed Burki, a former finan ce minister of Pakistan, Pakistan estimates that $8 billion is needed over ten years to reform th e Tribal Belt, a semi-autonomous area located at the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. These amounts should be made available rather than spent on more vigorous military campaigns, said Burki.8 But this does not mean that the development money should be given directly to the government of Pakistan. Instead, this requires direct interaction with th e people of Pakistan to make su re that the money channeled for development projects in spent on development pr ojects, not by corrupt Pakistani government officials. According to Silvio Waisbord, Once darling of development projects, the state has fallen from grace in recent decades. 9 In addition, due to the lackluster performance of states in various development projects, states are deemed unnecessary. In the pa st, developing states played a dominant role in controlling the reso urces and decision-making process, without being effective in bringing about any significant su ccess. Thus, the majority of the current development programs utilize grassroots appr oach in conjunction with NGOs and civic associations.10 This shift towards a scale-down, small is beau tiful approach has been responsible for diminishing interest in the state as an analytical category a nd as a central actor in 7 Ibid. 8 Shahid Burki, Developing the Tribal Belt, Dawn January 30, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/30/op.htm. 9 Silvio Wasisbord, State, development, and communications, In International and Development Communication, ed. Bella Mody (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 147. 10 Ibid., 148.

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70 development programs, explains Waisboard.11 Therefore, the new development place their emphasis theories put its weight on a bottom-up a pproach that promotes the development of critical consciousness and collective mobilization at the local level.12 In development projects, however, the state cannot be completely ruled out. It still plays an important role in the design and application of development projects.13 In light of elite Pakistani opinion that the U. S. must make its economic aid visible to the people of Pakistan, the U.S. government can us e the technique of development communication as a tool for development projects in Pakistan: th is will help the U.S. not only improve its image in Pakistan, but also stamp out terrorism and the Taliban. Therefore, it is essential to look at various development comm unication models that can be utilized by the U.S. in Pakistan. According to Srinivas Melkote, the most accepted definition of development means to alleviate the so cial and economic conditions of people,14 although there is also a debate among communication scholars on wh at are the real indicators of development.15 Most development communication theories ar e based on modernization theories. The modernization perspective is derived from neoc lassic theory and is ba sed on the notion that western and capitalist model can be infused to s pur development in all types of environments.16 This perspective is rejected by Melkote for it s negative view of culture especially religious 11 Ibid,. 148. 12 Ibid., 152. 13 Ibid., 148. 14 Srinvas R. Melkote, Theories of Development Communication, In International and Development Communication, ed. Bella Mody (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 129. 15 Ibid., 130. 16 Ibid., 131.

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71 culture, for its patriarchal bias es, and for its androcentrism.17 Additionally, this approach implies that for third world countries to devel op, they have to forgo th eir cultural traditions. Consequently, the modernization perspective pl aces too much emphasis on GNP, which includes industrialization and economic growth. Hen ce, they ignore the hum anistic aspects of development.18 According to Melkote, It is usually futile and may be unethical for communications and human service professionals to help solve minor and/or immediate problem while ignoring the systematic barriers erected by societies that permit or perpetuate inequalities among citizens.19 Consequently, it is essential to explore other alternatives t o the overtly perspective and top-down model of modernization. 20 Melkote believes that there is a need to formulate a model that which is designed to equate growth with equality, availability of basic human needs, and need for meaningful and fulfilling interpersonal relationships.21 The alternative paradigm of development communication observes development as a process that should provide people with access to appropriate and sustainable opportun ities to improve their lives and the lives of others in their communities.22 This model finds its roots in th e notion of active participation of concerned individuals at the grass root level. This model also recognizes participation as a fundamental human right that shou ld be ingrained in any developm ent model as an end in itself 17 Ibid., 132. 18 Ibid., 19 Ibid., 143. 20 Ibid, 133. 21 Ibid., 137. 22 Ibid.

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72 and not for its result.23 The basic purpose of this type of pa rticipatory approach is to facilitate conscientization of marginalized people globally to the unequal social, politi cal, and spatial structures in their societies.24 Most of the time, this type of approach is not applied properly. Most current development has to do with cont rol, which is reserved primarily for the experts. This type of development pur portedly requires equal partnership between marginalized people and the expert, but the outcome in most cases has not been true empowerment of the people, but th e attainment of some indicator of development essentially old wine in new bottles.25 Fortunately, there are two models of deve lopment communication which can overcome the above mentioned problems. First is participator y action research (PAR). In this process, the people on their own develop methods of consciousne ss-raising of their exis tential situation; the knowledge that is generated or resuscitated is by collective and democratic means. This is followed by reflection and critical self-evalu ation, leading to e ndogenous social action.26 Poor and marginalized people are dominated by three distinctive ways: control of the recourses of material production, control of resources of knowledge production, and control over power that legitimizes the relative wo rth and utility of different epistemologies/ knowledges.27 Most of the time, the needs and want s of the marginalized and oppressed people 23 Ibid., 138. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 138. 26 Ibid., 139. 27 Ibid.

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73 are disregarded by the elites. Therefore, PA R allows poor and oppre ssed people to capture control of the development process and tame it according to their own needs and wants.28 Another successful alternative model to mode rnization is the con cept of empowerment. According to Melkote, community empowerment is the process of incr easing control by groups over consequences that are important to th eir members and to others in the broader community.29 Empowerment can also be defines as the manifestation of social power at individual, organizational, and community le vels of analysis. One good thing about empowerment the model is that it focuses on th e proportioned relationship between the pertinent people, while treating all communi cation participants equally in a subject-subject relationship rather than the subject-object association prac ticed in diffusion and marketing approaches. Therefore, in contrast with the modernization pe rspective, in the empowerment perspective the locus of control in this pro cess rests with the individuals and groups involved and not with experts, the development communication prof essional, or the sponsoring organizations.30 Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to solve the menace of terrorism. Moreover, bombs and bullets are certainly not the preferred option. Furthermore, western models of development models, which are based on capitalism, also show no promise in this regard. According to Steeves, Nonmaterial considerations of religion and spirituality are seldom examined in the scholarship or practice of west ern development aidexcept as obs tacles to change under the dominant paradigm of modernization.31 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., 140. 30 Ibid., 142. 31 H. Leslie Steeves, Development Communication as Mark eting, Collective Resistance, and Spiritual Awakening: A feminist Critique, In International and Devel opment Communication, ed. Bella Mody (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 227.

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74 In this study, Pakistani elites pointed out few reservations that are beyond the scope and dimensions of U.S. policy. According to a recent study conducted by the University of Maryland, 85% of Pakistanis responded that terrorism is never justified.32 Moreover, an overwhelming 78% of Pakistanis want terrorist to be brought to justice.33 A majority of Pakistanis reject terrorism, and a majority of Pakistani elites dismiss force as a logical tool and tactic to defeat terrorism. Therefore, rega rdless of the content of the message communicated through U.S. public diplomacy, it will fail to stimula te the desired response from the people of Pakistan as long as no substantia l changes are made to U.S. fore ign policy. No amount of spin in public diplomacy will compensate for an Am erican foreign policy that negatively affects others. In communication between peoples, actions still spea k louder than words, said Zaharna.34 One can conclude that U.S. efforts in Pakistan must turn away from coercion toward development programs that support the Pakistani people in meeting both their spiritual and materials needs. This will create a climate th at will build favorable public opinion toward the U.S. in Pakistan. 32 Kenneth Ballen, The Myth of Muslim Support for Terror, The Christian Science Monitor February 23, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html. 33 Peter Ford, Why Do They Hate Us? The Christian Science Monitor September 27, 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0927/p1s1-wogi.html. 34 Zaharna, American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World.

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75 CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Today, Pakistan is one of the most geo-strategi cally important states in the world. On its north and East, it borders two rising global powers, China and India, respectively. On its west it borders two ticking time-bombs: Afghanistan and Iran. In the past, Pakistan has been a reliable and dependable ally to the U.S. In the 1960s, Pa kistan sustained Soviet wrath and animosity by allowing the U.S. to use its military bases for U-2 spy aircraft. Pakistan helped the Nixon administration to establish diplomatic relation wi th China. During the 1980s, Pakistan played a key role in defeating Communism and ending the Cold War when it helped the U.S. blunt the Soviet desire to gain access to warm waters to control the flow of Middle East oil. All Pakistani elites interviewed agreed that American freedoms have nothing to do with American unpopularity in Pakistan. They all bl ame the contradictions in American domestic policy and foreign policy. They are appalled at American support for dictators, who deny Pakistanis the virtues of freedom and democr acy. They believe that with disregard for democracy and freedoms, the U.S. supports Pakistan i dictators in order to protect and promote its own national interest. In the 1960s, the U.S. supported Pakistani dict ator General Ayub to counter the threat of the spread of Communism in the Middle East In the1980s, the U.S. supported Pakistani dictator General Zia to de ny the soviets the access to Middle Eastern oil reserves. Since 2001, in the name of its war on terror, the U.S. has supported another Pakistani dictator, General Musharraf. Why? If the fruits of democracy and freedom have made the U.S. the most powerful country in world, then why de ny the people of Pakistan the same virtues? Due to the past unreliable friendship, Pakistani elites do not trust the U.S. Military elites are angered at the U.S. for not supporting Pakist an in its wars in 1965 and 1971 against India. They also are angered at the U.S. for abandoning Afghanistan after the so viet withdrawal in 1989

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76 without implementing a political solution and leav ing Pakistan alone to suffer the consequences of the Taliban. Pakistani elites believe that Pa kistan always has been treated as a disposable friend by the U.S. They want a relationship that is based on mutual nati onal interest of both countries, not on the self-interest of the U.S. government. Pakistan wants to build a broadbased, stable, and long-term relati onship with the U.S. It wants to enjoy the same freedoms and liberties enjoyed by the U.S. population. A segment of the elite is deeply disturbed about U.S. policies in Israel, Iraq, an d Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to se e these issues amicably resolved, putting a lid on peoples frustrati on regarding these issues. It is not the American people and their enshrined principles of fair playing that ar e disliked, but rather spec ific American actions in the Middle East and Iraq that annoy the people of Pakistan. Pakistani elites also vehemently disapprove of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Religious and modernizing elite dismiss the war on terror conduct ed in Iraq as a war for oil and Middle East domination. Pakistani elites believe that, by ta rgeting Muslim countries only, the U.S. has unleashed a war against Muslims, not a war against terror. Pakistani elites also decry the strategies em ployed by the U.S. in its war on terror. They think that the U.S. is trying to solve a political problem through th e instrument of blunt and brute force. Pakistani elites believe th at terrorists thrive on conflict; therefore, as long as conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East are not re solved, terrorism will continue to burgeon. Pakistani elites are aware of the threat posed by terrorism against Pakistan, but they want to confront terrorism with a strategy that contains the ingredients of political, social, educational, and economic development. Pakistani elites believe that the Taliban is a political movement; thus, it can only be pacified through a political so lution. They believe that the Taliban are flourishing in

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77 Afghanistan, not because of Pakistan, but because of the current Afghan government. Pakistani elites believe that the current Afghan government is comprised of non-Pushtoon war lords, yet, 60% of the Afghan population and all of the Ta liban are Pushtoon As long as Pushtoon and Taliban are kept out of power, the Quagmire in Afghanistan will continue, Pakistan elites believe that recent peace d eal between the Pakistan government and the local tribes, which is heavily criticized by U.S. po licy makers, is the best way to defeat the threat posed by the Taliban. Due to this peace deal, the tribal leaders have unanimously declared war against the Taliban. To crush the Taliban, supportive local trib esmen must be befriended, not alienated. Pakistani elites also belittle accusations by the U.S. media and politicians that Pakistan is not doing enough to tackle the Taliban and terror ism. They believe U.S. elite media and politicians are oblivious to facts and devoid of knowledge of on the groun d realities. Pakistani elites believe that Pakistan has fought the war on terror with a ll the resources that it could muster. Pakistani efforts in regard to the war on terror deserve American gratitude, not American criticism. Pakistani elites also believe that Pakistan should no t be put under undue duress to do more; instead, it should be acknowledged as a strong partner which has stood shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. in its war on terror. Despite the predominantly anti-American Paki stani elite opinion, all is not lost. All affluent Pakistani people send their children to the U.S. for education and go themselves for medical check up and proudly talk about their relative s living in USA. In fact, the USA is like a dreamland for most. Educated people remain current about it. Also American technology, ranging from cars to tanks, is ve ry popular in Pakistan and is considered more dependable compared to technology coming from other regions.

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78 Furthermore, Pakistanis developed a tremendous liking for the U.S. for its unflinching help during the 2005 earthquakes in which 70,000 lives were lost. Pakistan should be helped financially, economically, politically and educati onally to advance its development. This will help to broaden their intellectua l dimensions to put them on the path to free thinking and valuing the meaning of freedom and liberty. Extension of welfare projects, spread over the whole of the country including the Tribal Belt, would auge r well for bringing the two countries closer. It is quite evident from the re sponses of Pakistani elites that U.S. Middle East policy is one of the main reasons for the anti-Americanism prev alent in Pakistan. Therefore, the USA must find a suitable solution to the Middle East crisis Currently, Pakistan and Israel do not have diplomatic relations. The U.S., a staunch supporte r of Israel and ally of Pakistan, can move the Middle East crisis in a new direction by helping Israel and Pa kistan to establish diplomatic relations. This study relied on non-probability sampling to select a sample of Pakistani elites. Therefore, the elites opinion revealed during this study may not be re presentative of the full range of Pakistani elite opinion. The responses elicited through e-mail interv iews were short and limited in scope. Telephone interviews on the other hand, allowed the researcher to pr obe more deeply for answers. The responses received were more unreserved and informative. Due to financial restraints, the researcher was not able to travel Pakistan to do in-person interviews. In-person interviews would have allowed the research to probe more effectively and also allowed the researcher to register facial expressions and body language and respond to it. This might have resulted in richer data.

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79 Future studies on this subject should use a probability samp le. Instead of qualitative interviews, a focus group approach would provide the opportunity for a debate among Pakistani elite opinion leaders, which coul d reveal new information not po ssible to access via interviews. Moreover, due to the current U.S. military ope rations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. image is very poor in Pakistan. This may have furt her skewed the elite opin ions gathered for this study. Despite the fact that participants in th is study were promised confidentially, many influential military generals and political leaders refused to participate in it. Also, responses elicited through religious elites were not cohesive and comprehensive. Biases resulting from the wording of some que stions might also have resulted in biased answers. Courtesy biases of inte rviewees also could have affected the responses they gave, i.e., respondents might have felt compelled to give suitab le answers to help the researcher to achieve the main objective of the study: to unearth the reasons behind U. S. unpopularity in Pakistan. Moreover, in order to look good, the respondents mi ght have resorted to socially desirable answers. Interviewers reactions to interview ees answers and interviewers efforts to probe for answers might also have biased interviewees re sponses. The researchers own association and identification with Pakistan and desire to obtai n suitable data might also have generated some biases. Nonetheless, the study was able to identify some underlying reasons for Pakistani dislike toward the U.S. government and to suggest some remedies for reducing the animosity between the two countries.

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80 APPENDIX A INTERVIEWEE LIST 1. Lieutenant General (Retired). 2. Major General (Retired). 3. Brigadier General. 4. Colonel (Retired). 5. Lieutenant. Commander, Pakistan Navy. 6. Lieutenant Colonel. 7. Anonymous officer, Pakistan Army. 8. Brigadier General (Retired). 9. Member of Parliament, Punjab Assembly. 10. Member of National Assembly. 11. Political Advisor to Chief Minister. 12. Political Advisor to former Pr ime Minister of Pakistan. 13. Candidate for National assembly. 14. Think Tank. 15. Prominent Businessman, Faisalabad, Pakistan. 16. Prominent Businessman, Lahore, Pakistan. 17. Political Advisor to member of National Assembly. 18. Scholar, Lahore, Pakistan. 19. Businessman and Social Worker, Lahore Pakistan. 20. Scholar, Lahore, Pakistan. 21. Doctor and religious sc holar: Lahore Pakistan. 22. Bishop, Lahore, Pakistan.

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81 23. Local Cleric, Faisalabad, Pakistan. 24. Local Cleric, Lahore Pakistan. 25. Author and scholar, Lahore, Pakistan. 26. Pastor, Lahore Pakistan.

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82 APPENDIX B INTERVIEW GUIDE Do Pakistanis Hate the USA.? Why do you think the United States is not popular in Pakistan? In rationalizing his War on Terror, Presid ent Bush said, Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber--a democratically elected government. They hate our freedoms--our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. Do you agree/disagree with this statement? Why? What steps can the U.S. take to remove your misgivings toward it? US War on Terror and Pakistan Do you think the current tactics and strategy employed by the U.S. in its War on Terror are successful in eradicati ng terrorism? If yes/no, why? What are the reasons for terrorism? What is the best way to defeat terrorism? Pakistan and the Taliban Recently, prominent U.S. officials have suggested that Pakistan is not doing enough to curb Taliban living in Pakistan. Do you agree/disagree? Why? How should we deal with the Taliban? Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution that requires the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan is playing its role in curbing the Taliban in Pakistan before releasing military assistance to Paki stan. Some people have correlated this resolution with the Pressler amendment, which in the past proved to be a thorn in the U.S. Pakistan relationship. How it will impact th e current relationship between the two countries?

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83 LIST OF REFERENCES Atkinson, Rick. Nuclear Pa rts Sought by Pakistan. Washington Post July 21, 1984, sec. A. Auerbach, Stuart. Pakistan Seeking U.S Guarantees in Formal Treat. The Washington Post January 18, 1980, sec. A. Auerbach, Stuart. Pakistan Ties Arms Aid to Economic Assistance. The Washington Post. January 14, 1980, sec. A. Babbie, Earl. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont: Thomson Higher Education, 2006. Ballen, Kenneth. The myth of Muslim support for terror, The Christian Science Monitor February 23, 2007. http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html (last accessed May 9, 2007) BBC News. Bin Laden lieutenant 'gave warnings'. May 24, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/americas/2006138.stm (last accessed May 9, 2007) BBC News. Bush hails 'al-Qaeda killer' arrest. March 4, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/south_asia/2817441.stm (last accessed May 9, 2007) BBC News. Pearl murderer defiant af ter verdict. July 15, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/south_asia/2128578.stm (last accessed May 9, 2007) BBC News. Top al-Qaeda suspect in US custody September 15, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/south_asia/2261136.stm (last accessed May 9, 2007) Borders, William. Pakistani dismisses $400 million in Aid Offered U.S as Peanuts. The New York Times. January 19, 1980, sec. A. Branigan, William. Pakistan Seeks Billions in U.S Aid. The Washington Post January 23, 1980, sec. A. Buchanan, Patrick. What the I ndian giver got. March 7, 2006. http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=49144 (last accessed May 9, 2007) Burki, Shahid. Developing the Tribal Belt. Dawn January 30, 2007. http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/30/op.htm (last accessed May 9, 2007) Bush, George W. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. September 20, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (last accessed May 9, 2007) Claiborne, William. Bush at Khyber Pass: Whiff of War and Fine-Tuned Welcome. The Washington Post May 18, 1984, sec. A.

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85 Halloran, Richard. Weinberger Meets Zia and Afghan Refugees. The New York Times October 2, 1983, sec. A. Heck, Ronald. Studying Educational and Social Policy. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004. Holsti, Ole R. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. Iqbal, Anwar. US Govt Urged to Focus on Na tion, not Govt : Congressi onal Reports Advice. Dawn April 1, 2007. http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/01/top11.htm (last accessed May 9, 2007) Iqbal, Anwar. US Legislation S eeks Ban on Assistance to Pakistan. Dawn January 25, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/25/top1.htm (last accessed May 9, 2007) Iqbal, Anwar. U.S. Terror Report Absolves Pakistan. The Washington Times April 29, 2004. http://www.hvk.org/ar ticles/0404/70.html (last accessed May 9, 2007) Jaaferlot, Christophe, ed A History of Pakistan and Its Origins. London: Anthem Press, 2004. Khan, Riaz Pakistan Condemns Deadly US Air strike. Eccentric Star January 14, 2006. http://eccentricstar.typepad.com/public_di plomacy_weblog_n/2006/01/pakistanis_prot.ht ml (last accessed May 9, 2007) Knowlton, Brain. Intelligence Committee Sena tors Discuss Pakistan Air Strike. The New York Times. January 15, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/politics/15cndsenators.html?ex=1166245200&en=4276a34fa5350a3d&ei=5070 (last accessed May 9, 2007) Kux, Dennis. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001. MacFarquhar, Neil. Anti-U.S. Feeling Leaves Arab Reformers Isolated. The New York Times August 9, 2006. http://www.commondreams.or g/headlines06/0809-07.htm (last accessed May 9, 2007) Mahmood, Safdar. Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, 1947-1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Malik, Iftikar. State and Civil Society in Pakistan. London: Macmillan, 1997. Malick, Nasir, and Francis Harris Bush Ha ils Arrest of al-Qa'eda Number Three. Telegraph May 5, 2006. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/m ain.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/05/05/ wlibbi05.xml (last accessed May 9, 2007)

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87 Sharif, Farhan. KSE-100 Index Nosedi ves after Bushs Pakistan Visit. Daily Times. March 7, 2006. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/defau lt.asp?page=2006\03\07\story_7-32006_pg5_1 (last accessed May 9, 2007) Shahzad, Asif Leave Pakistan or Die, Musharraf Warns All foreign Militants. The Scotsman March 24, 2006. http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=459262006 (last accessed May 9, 2007) Sparkland, Robert. U.S Wages War on a Concept. Seattle Post Intelligencer. August 11, 2006. http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0811-30.htm (last accessed May 9, 2007) Steeves, H. Leslie. Development Communicati on as Marketing, Collective Resistance, and Spiritual Awakening: A feminist Critique. In International and Development Communication, ed. Bella Mody. London: Sage Publications, 2003. Strait, James D., and David Sloan. Historical Methods in Mass Communications. Northport: Vision Press, 2003. Taubman, Philip. Afghan Refugees Hear Shultz Vow We Are With You. The New York Times. July 4, 1983, pg.1. Thornton, Thomas. Between two stools?: U.S policy toward Pakistan in the Carter Administration. Asian Survey, October 1982, 959-977. Quoted in Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 19472000: Disenchanted Allies. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001. Time. Better Off in a Home. August 25, 1947. http://www.time.com/time/m agazine/article/0,9171,798063,00.html (last accessed May 9, 2007) Time. Long Shadow. April 22, 1946. http://www.time.com/time/ma gazine/article/0,9171,792780,00.html (last accessed May 9, 2007) Time. That Man. September 20, 1948. http://www.time.com/time/ma gazine/article/0,9171,799165-1,00.html (last accessed May 9, 2007) Tuch, Hans S. Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990. Wasisbord, Silvio. State, devel opment, and communications. In International and Development Communication, ed. Bella Mody. London: Sage Publications, 2003. Weinraub, Bernard. Zia Sees No Quic k Solution to Soviet Afghanistan. The New York Times December 8, 1982, sec. A.

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89 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Hammaad Shams was born on July 5, 1978 in Sa rgodha, Pakistan. The eldest of three children, he grew up mostly in Lahore, Pakista n, graduating from Army Public High School in 1993. He received his BA in Communications from the Augusta State University in May 2004. Currently, he is pursuing a degree in MA in Mass Communications from the University of Florida.