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The Rise of Presidential Preeminence: Presidential-Congressional Rhetorical Relations, 1978-2006

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The Rise of Presidential Preeminence: Presidential-Congressional Rhetorical Relations, 1978-2006
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CLARK, ALLISON JOANN ( Author, Primary )
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2008

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Domestic policy ( jstor )
Foreign affairs ( jstor )
Group purchasing organizations ( jstor )
Health care industry ( jstor )
Political parties ( jstor )
Speeches ( jstor )
State of the Union Address ( jstor )
Taxes ( jstor )
Terrorism ( jstor )
War ( jstor )

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Copyright Allison Joann Clark. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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11/30/2007
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659872151 ( OCLC )

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1 THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL PREEMIN ENCE: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RHETORICAL RELATIONS, 1978-2006 By ALLISON JOANN CLARK A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

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2 2007 Allison Joann Clark

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3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my parents and famil y, specifically Mom, Daddy, Uncle Jack, and Donny. I would also like to thank my disse rtation committee – Dr. Dodd, Dr. Conley, Dr. Rosenson, Dr. Scher, and Dr. Kaid. Finally, I would like to thank ever yone else who helped make this achievement possi ble (you know who you are).

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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................3 LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................. ..........7 LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................ .......10 ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ............12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................14 Power of Persuasion............................................................................................................ ...15 The Puzzle of Rhetorical Agenda Setting...............................................................................19 Theoretical Perspectives on Presidential Persuasiveness.......................................................22 Political Factors.............................................................................................................. .22 Congressional/Institutional Factors.................................................................................24 Political Time................................................................................................................. .28 The Central Questions.......................................................................................................... ..30 Data and Methods............................................................................................................... ....34 Measuring Influence............................................................................................................ ...37 Research Outline............................................................................................................... ......39 2 UNIFIED GOVERNMENT AND PR ESIDENTIAL PERSUASION...................................42 96th Congress, 1979-1981.......................................................................................................43 103rd Congress, 1993-1995.....................................................................................................48 108th Congress, 2003-2005.....................................................................................................53 109th Congress, 2005-2007.....................................................................................................56 Partisanship in Unified Government......................................................................................59 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .........60 3 POLITICAL FACTORS AND PR ESIDENTIAL PERSUASION........................................74 Electoral Mandates............................................................................................................. ....74 Early vs. Late................................................................................................................. .........84 First vs. Second Term.......................................................................................................... ...86 Presidential Approval Ratings................................................................................................87 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .........89 4 POLITICAL TIME.................................................................................................................96 Reagan and the Politic s of Reconstruction.............................................................................97 Bush I and the Politics of Articulation...................................................................................98

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5 Carter and the Politics of Disjunction...................................................................................100 Clinton and the Politics of Preemption.................................................................................101 The Political Time of Bush II...............................................................................................103 Levels of Presidential Infl uence Across Political Time.......................................................106 Politics of Disjunction Revisited – Carter vs. Bush II..........................................................108 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .......108 5 CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT..................................................112 Why Speak?..................................................................................................................... .....112 Who Speaks?.................................................................................................................... ....114 Chamber Matters................................................................................................................ ..115 Party Affiliation.............................................................................................................. ......117 Length of Service.............................................................................................................. ....118 Party Leaders and Committee Chairs...................................................................................120 Institutional Changes in Congress........................................................................................120 Congressional Factors and Presidential Influence................................................................123 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .......125 6 DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN POLICIES.....................................................................130 Presidential Influence in Foreign Affairs.............................................................................130 Presidents and Foreign Policy, 1978 – 2006........................................................................134 Jimmy Carter, 1978 – 1980..................................................................................................135 Ronald Reagan, 1981 – 1988................................................................................................137 George H.W. Bush, 1989 – 1992..........................................................................................139 Bill Clinton, 1993 – 2000.....................................................................................................140 George W. Bush, 2001 – 2006..............................................................................................141 Domestic vs. Foreign – Overall Le vels of Presidential Influence........................................142 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .......144 7 INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION...............................151 Carter and the Iranian Hostage Crisis...................................................................................153 Bush I and the Persian Gulf War..........................................................................................154 Bush II and 9/11............................................................................................................... .....159 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .......160 8 GEORGE W. BUSH: A CASE STUDY.............................................................................167 2001 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses.........................................167 2002 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses.........................................170 2003 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses.........................................175 2004 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses.........................................177 2005 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses.........................................179 2006 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses.........................................181 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... .......182

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6 9 PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION CONC LUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.....................193 Political Factors.............................................................................................................. ......193 Political Time................................................................................................................. .......196 Institutional Factors.......................................................................................................... ....198 Types of Policy................................................................................................................ .....201 Discussion..................................................................................................................... ........203 Implications and Final Thoughts..........................................................................................205 APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY...............................................................................................................211 B MEASUREMENT................................................................................................................218 LIST OF REFERENCES.............................................................................................................224 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.......................................................................................................327

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7 LIST OF TABLES Table page 1-1 Presidential Leve ls of Influence.........................................................................................41 2-1 Party Identification of Speaking Members........................................................................72 2-2 Levels of Influence During Unified Government..............................................................72 2-3 Levels of Influence During Divided Government.............................................................73 3-1 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1981.........................................................................90 3-2 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1982.........................................................................90 3-3 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1983.........................................................................90 3-4 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1984.........................................................................90 3-5 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1985.........................................................................90 3-6 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1986.........................................................................91 3-7 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1987.........................................................................91 3-8 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1988.........................................................................91 3-9 Presidential Leve ls of Influence.........................................................................................91 3-10 Levels of Influence Early in the First Term.......................................................................91 3-11 Levels of Influence Late in the First Term........................................................................92 3-12 Levels of Influence in the Second Term............................................................................92 3-13 Presidential Approval an d Level of Influence at Time of SOU Address..........................92 4-1 Presidential Influence Across Political Time...................................................................111 4-2 Numeric Levels of Influence by President.......................................................................111 4-3 Numeric Levels of Influence During a Presiden t’s First Term........................................111 5-1 Speaking Members by Chamber......................................................................................126 5-2 Speaking Members by Party Affiliation..........................................................................126 5-3 Speaking Members by Party Control of the House.........................................................126

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8 5-4 Speaking Members by Party Control of the Senate.........................................................126 5-5 Speaking Members by President’s Party Affiliation.......................................................126 5-6 Average Partisan Difference for Individual Presidents...................................................126 5-7 Average Length of Service When Speaking, 1978 – 2006..............................................127 5-8 Percentage of Party Leader and Committee Chairs, 1978 – 2006...................................127 5-9 Presidential Influence Based on Av erage Years Speaking Members Served..................127 5-10 Presidential Influence Base d on Speaking Party Leaders................................................126 5-11 Presidential Influence Base d on Speaking Committee Chairs.........................................126 6-1 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress.................146 6-2 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress.................146 6-3 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress.................147 6-4 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress.................147 6-5 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress.................148 6-6 Levels of Influence Based on Emphasis of Domestic Policies........................................149 6-7 Average Level of Influence Du ring Domestic Policy Discussion...................................149 6-8 Percentage of First SOU Addre sses Devoted to Foreign Affairs....................................149 6-9 Percentage Change from First to Last SOU Address on Foreign Affairs........................150 7-1 1979 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type............................................................163 7-2 1980 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type............................................................163 8-1 Discussion of Domestic/F oreign Policies by Bush II......................................................191 8-2 Discussion of Domestic/F oreign Policies by Congress...................................................191 9-1 Levels of Influence During United/Divided Government...............................................209 9-2 Levels of Influence Early vs. Late in a President’s First Term.......................................209 9-3 Levels of Influence First vs. Second Term......................................................................209 9-4 Presidential Approval Ratings and Levels of Influence..................................................209

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9 9-5 Levels of Influence During Political Time......................................................................209 9-6 Presidential Influence and Average Years Speaking Members Served (AYS)...............209 9-7 Percent of Party Leaders (PL) Speaking and Presidential Influence...............................210 9-8 Percent of Committee Chairs (CC) Speaking and Presidential Influence.......................210 9-9 Emphasis of Domestic Policy and Levels of Presidential Influence...............................210 A-1 Number of Speeches Coded Each Year...........................................................................216 A-2 Domestic and Foreign Policies Coded.............................................................................217 B-1 Topics Discussed by the President and Congress............................................................223 B-2 Presidential Leve ls of Influence.......................................................................................223

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10 LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 2-1 1979 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................64 2-2 1979 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................64 2-3 1980 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................65 2-4 1980 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................65 2-5 1993 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................66 2-6 1993 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................66 2-7 1994 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................67 2-8 1994 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................67 2-9 2003 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................68 2-10 2003 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................68 2-11 2004 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................69 2-12 2004 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................69 2-13 2005 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................70 2-14 2005 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................70 2-15 2006 SOU Address Topics.................................................................................................71 2-16 2006 Congressional Response Topics...............................................................................71 7-1 1990 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................163 7-2 1990 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................164 7-3 1991 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................164 7-4 1991 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................165 7-5 1992 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................165 7-6 1992 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................166 8-1 2001 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................185

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11 8-2 2001 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................185 8-3 2002 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................186 8-4 2002 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................186 8-5 2003 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................187 8-6 2003 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................187 8-7 2004 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................188 8-8 2004 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................188 8-9 2005 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................189 8-10 2005 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................189 8-11 2006 SOU Address Topics...............................................................................................190 8-12 2006 Congressional Response Topics.............................................................................190 8-13 Domestic Policies Discussed by Bush II and Congress...................................................191 8-14 Foreign Policies Discussed by Bush II and Congress......................................................192

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12 Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL PREEMIN ENCE: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RHETORICAL RELATIONS, 1978-2006 By Allison Joann Clark May 2007 Chair: Lawrence C. Dodd Co-chair: Richard Conley Major: Political Science This dissertation looks at th e evolution of presidential-cong ressional rhetorical relations from Jimmy Carter in 1978 to George W. Bu sh in 2006. My study shows that presidents increasingly shape and dominate the nature and framing of nationa l policy agendas in ways that demonstrate growing preeminence over Congress. This evolution is examined by analyzing presidents’ State of the Union addresses and subsequent congre ssional responses to them in speeches made by members on the floors of the Hous e and Senate. Specifically, this research shows the extent to which members of Congre ss respond to presidents’ State of the Union addresses by embracing the president’s age nda priorities and justificatory language, by challenging his priorities and language, or by ignoring them. Different factors which may affect a president’ s ability to influence the legislative agenda are also examined. Political factors such as divided government, electoral mandates, when the president is speaking during his term, and presidential approval ratings are all considered. Factors specific to the pres ident and Congress such as political time and institutional characteristics are also explored. Additionally, whether the president is discussing domestic or foreign policies is also taken into consideration. Ultimately, it is determin ed which factors allow

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13 presidents the most influence and which ones place the greatest limitations on presidential persuasion. Aside from uncovering patterns of presidential influence, my dissertation also shows the value of using rhetoric as a measure. Usi ng rhetoric as a measure is a relatively unique endeavor, and overcomes some of the difficulties of previous measures used to evaluate presidential-congressional relati ons. Therefore, my dissertati on makes a contribution to the political science field in that it offers new insight into pres idential-congressiona l relations, as well as provides a fruitful ag enda for future research.

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14 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The roles of the president a nd Congress in the American pol itical system have changed greatly since the 19th century. Whereas Congress used to be preeminent, most scholars agree that the president has increasingly become the more powerful player during the 20th century (Cooper 2005). The increase in presidential preeminence is generally traced back to Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the actions he t ook in trying to deal with the Great Depression and World War II (WWII). Roosevelt exercised tremendous pres idential power, especially in his role as Commander-in-Chief when handling foreign affair s, which set a precedent for future presidents (Schlesinger 1973). Roosevelt’s actions also a llowed presidents to have more control over policy than they previously had. The shift to wards presidential policy dominance had continued to increase, and can be seen in the growth of presidential liaison re lations in Congress and presidents’ increasing ro les in policy initiation, crafting, and enactment. This dissertation looks at th e evolution of presidential-c ongressional relations over the last 28 years, starting with Jimmy Carter. It provides evidence which shows that presidents increasingly shape and dominate the nature a nd framing of national policy agendas. This evidence comes from the examination of presiden ts’ State of the Union (SOU) addresses, and subsequent congressional responses to them in speeches made by members on the floor of the House and Senate. Specifically, this research shows the extent to which members of Congress respond to Presidents’ SOU addresses by embracing the president’s agenda prio rities and justificatory language in their speeches during the weeks following his address, by challenging his priorities and language, or by ignoring them. This resear ch also reveals the policy areas in which presidents appear more or less preeminent, and identifies shifts in presidential preeminence

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15 across policy domains over time. The extent to which the acceptance or rejection of the president’s agenda is influenced by factors distinctive to Congre ss, such as its organizational structure and norms during different institutional eras, the charact er of internal pa rtisan context, and the growth of ideological extremism are also examined. Developments in the presidency, such as the role of political time and its im pact on presidential assertiveness and success in agenda dominance, are take n into consideration. Power of Persuasion The ability of presidents to persuade is sa id to have played a role in the rise of presidential preeminence over Congr ess, which is the reason I decided to focus on speeches and rhetoric. Scholars, such as Rich ard Neustadt, suggest that persua sion is really the central power that presidents possess within our constitutio nal structure (1990). Based on this premise, presidential persuasion is closely tied to presidential preeminence. If modern presid ents are able to persuade Congress, and do so often, then pres idential preeminence over Congress is likely to grow. According to scholars, modern presidents ha ve increased their abili ty to persuade in Congress. This growing persuasiveness has been at tributed to presidents’ abilities to lead the nation during times of crisis a nd war, with critical crises and wars increasing as the nation has emerged as the world’s dominant economy and military power. Their persuasiveness is then reinforced by their access to modern communica tion technologies that increase their national visibility and instant acc ess to citizens, with citizens help ing convince members of Congress to take presidential leadership seri ously (Edwards 2003; Kernell 1997). Given these arguments, examining the relatio nship between presidential speeches and subsequent speeches in Congress provides one way to examine a critical argument made regarding presidential preeminence – the assertion that presidents have increasingly dominated

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16 the national policy agenda thr ough their persuasive powers w ith members of Congress. Investigating congressional responses to presiden tial speeches, in other wo rds, is a relatively direct way to determine whether presidents do influence the polic y agenda discussed by legislators, and to clarify what effects the chan ging congressional eras, the shifting character of political time, and the emergence of ideological ex tremism have had on these patterns. In so far as presidents appear to influence or shape the policy agenda discussed by members, we can say that they appear to have some success in effo rts at one aspect of persuasion -setting the rhetorical agenda of Congress. Scholars have found that rhetoric can often serv e as a source of power for heads of state (Zarefsky 2002). This power is often derived from using rhetoric to provide an interpretation of events by framing them in a certain way. Even t hough a majority of the framing literature relates to how the media frames news stories, the same concept can be applied to how the president presents issues to Congress and the public. Framing can be defined as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues , and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Entman 2003, 417). In other words, framing is when issues are presented from a certain angle (Callaghan and Schnell 2001). By framing an issue, the president is able to define and give meaning to it, and then suggest possible solutions. Therefore, framing issues has the potential to give presidents more influence in Congress because it could force members to discuss policies on the president’s terms. To further investigate the re lationship between the presiden t and Congress, my research specifically looks at the rhetor ical interaction between presid ents and Congresses by examining congressional responses to pr esidents’ SOU addresses. Be sides analyzing SOU addresses themselves, I also looked at speeches made by members of Congress dur ing the weeks following

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17 the SOU addresses to determine the extent to which members of Congress followed, challenged, or ignored the presidents’ agenda leadership in the speeches. State of the Union addresses are a particularly appropriate moment at which to examine presidential-congressional interaction because they are traditionally given on an annual basis. In Article II, Section III of th e Constitution, it states that the president “shall from time to time give to the Congress information of th e state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedi ent...” Therefore, it is not prescribed that the president must give a SOU address every year even though presidents have typically done so. It is also not mandated that the president deliver the SOU address himself. Originally, SOU addresses were written by the president and then read in Congress by someone else. Woodrow Wilson was the first president to deliver the SOU address in person before both houses of Congress. The increased importance and attention give n to the SOU address shows why it is an appropriate juncture at which to examine presidential-congressiona l relations. Modern presidents have typically delivered the SOU addre ss in person on an annual basis, and used it as a forum to outline their legislative policy goals (Cohe n 1982). In fact, it has been argued that in the 20th century SOU addresses have become a key pow er for the president in his role as chief legislator (Hoffman and Howard 2006). This is du e to the type of rhetor ic used by the president during his SOU address. Scholars have assigned various names to this type of rhetoric – deliberative rhetoric (Campbell and Jamieson 1990; Malbin 1983; Tulis 1987), policymaking rhetoric (Hoffman and Howard 2006), etc. – to diffe rentiate it from the rhetoric presidents use when addressing only the public. Re gardless of what it is called, the point is that during the SOU

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18 address presidents use rhetoric to try and identi fy public problems, offer solutions, and ultimately lead Congress and the public (Hoffman and Howard 2006). Therefore, examining SOU addresses should di splay the legislative agenda the president is trying to pursue, while analyzing the subse quent congressional respon ses should show whether members of Congress are receptive to this agenda. This research helps fill a void in presidential and congressional literature, with prior studies focused primarily on growth in presidential functions or on leadership success as seen in roll call vote victories in Congress. Neither of these actually examines the issue of presidential persua sion in a direct manner. In fact, increased functions for presidents may actually be driv en by congressional mandates which presidents resist, for example, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security which President George W. Bush initially opposed. Similarly, the appearance of roll call vote success could arise because of the effectiveness of congressional party leaders despite in effectual presidential leadership or persuasion. In contrast to growing functi ons of presidents or roll ca ll vote success, congressional responses immediately following major presidential speeches such as SOU addresses is a better way to examine whether there is actual rhetorical persuasion occu rring on the part of presidents, in terms of the adoption of agenda concerns and language of the pr esident by individual members of Congress. Moreover, this response by members can be more closely assumed to be authentic, whereas so many other moments of response, such as on roll call votes, reflect institutional pressures and constr aints that have become highly in stitutionalized in the modern Congress. One of the main advantages of using rhetoric as an indicator of persuasion is that congressional speeches do not have many institu tional constraints on them, especially such

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19 “open time” speeches as informal “one-minute” a ddresses in the House of Representatives. Members of Congress can give such speeches on the floors of the House and Senate without leadership approval, and without the same partis an pressures on members as seen in speeches given during legislative debates or in roll call votes . Therefore, using rhetoric as an additional and new indicator of presidential persuasiveness reveals other aspe cts of leadership success and policy dominance by presidents, separate from such things as increased functions and quantitative success at policy enactment. Additionally, and critical ly, rhetorical responses by memb ers of Congress to presidential speeches can be content analyzed and measured in ways that allow us to trace the rise and fall of congressional acquiescence, challenge, and dismi ssiveness in reaction to pr esidents. With such measures we can then assess more clearly the extent to which increases or decreases are occurring in presidential persuasion, the policy areas in which these patterns are occurring, the historical conditions in which they are occurring, and the congressional actors who are most involved in the process. Such measures allow us to explore the issue of presidential persuasion and preeminence in new ways, assessing whether or not increases and changes are taking place regarding this phenomena. The Puzzle of Rhetoric al Agenda Setting In the most basic terms, the puzzle of presiden tial persuasion lies in one simple question: are presidents increasingly successf ul in persuading members of C ongress to follow their lead in the policy agenda they propose to Congress and in the rationale for the agenda that they articulate? The dependent variable for the dissertation is thus a straightforward one: the success or failure of presidents to use their SOU message to legislative agenda discussed by members of Congress. The ability of presiden ts to influence the le gislative agenda ther efore is a component of persuasion. Before analyzing the president’s ability to influence the legislative agenda, it is

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20 first necessary to set out and address a numbe r of interpretive concerns to ensure that congressional responses are measured in sensible, systematic, and thorough ways. One interpretive concern regards measuring va riations in persuasive ness, specifically in regards to presidential persuasive ness over the legislativ e agenda. To measure persuasiveness, it is necessary to look at which topics the pres ident is addressing and whether Congress is responding to the same matters; whether Congress is responding in a positive or negative way; and whether members of Congress are using simila r language as the presid ent in discussing these matters. Therefore, at the most basic level, it is necessary to see which topics the president is discussing in his SOU address, and whether members of Congress are discussing the same topics. For example, if a president spends 50 percent of his speech discussing health care, and members of Congress hardly mention health car e during the weeks followi ng his speech, then it can be concluded that the pres ident was not very successful at persuading the congressional agenda. Therefore, it was important to examine the topics the president discussed in his SOU addresses, which items he emphasized, and whethe r he laid out clear plans of action to take regarding certain matters. Besides looking generally at the topics each pr esident discusses, I also paid attention to whether presidents were discussing domestic or foreign affairs. According to Aaron Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, presidents are usually more succe ssful in getting Congress to support their foreign agenda than their domestic agenda (1966). Assuming this to be true, then presidents should be able to more easily persua de Congress regarding issu es related to foreign affairs such as military operations, than on domestic issues such as welfare or social security. Besides looking at whether members of Congress are discussing the same issues as the president, I also looked at how the issues were being discussed. Just beca use the president talked

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21 about implementing a new social security progr am and members of Co ngress also discussed social security, does not mean that it was discus sed in the same manner. For example, whereas the president may have said that implementing a new social security program would have a positive effect and make Americans feel more secure as they aged, members of Congress may have said just the opposite. Congr ess may have talked about the sa me idea, but said that the new social security program would je opardize social security and in turn make Americans feel more insecure. Therefore, it was necessary to see how the president and members of Congress were discussing the same issues. Was the presiden t talking about an issue positively whereas members of Congress were discussing the same issu e negatively, or vice versa? It was also important to see which issues seemed to draw the most differences between presidents and Congress. This revealed the i ssues on which presidents were most persuasive, and also the topics which were most divisive. Besides looking at the ways issues are disc ussed, persuasiveness can also be measured by looking at the actual language used by a presiden t and seeing if members of Congress use similar language when discussing the same issues. For example, in discussing education policy in his 2001 SOU address, George W. Bush said that he refused to “leave any child behind in America” (2001). In responding to his address, members of Congress adapted the language used by Bush into the phrase “no child left behind” and used it repeatedly. Eventually, this phrase became part of the title of a major piece of education legislation which wa s passed in 2001. This is just one example of specific language used by a presiden t also being used by members of Congress. I argue that when members of Congress use similar la nguage to that used by the president, it is an indication of his persuasiveness.

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22 Based on these various measures of persuasi on, I am able to draw conclusions regarding the president’s ability to influence the congressional agenda over the last 28 years. For influence to have increased, I would expect to see memb ers of Congress discussing more of the same topics as the president, speaking of them in the same way, and increasingly using the same language. I would also expect to see more members of Congre ss speaking in response to the SOU addresses. For influence to have decrea sed, I would expect th e opposite to be true. Besides focusing on persuasive ness and whether presidential influence has increased, it is also necessary to look at what else is happening across the same time period. Specifically, what effects do different congressional eras, political time, ideological extremism, and election results have? Do these things cause pr esidential influence to increase, or do they have the opposite effect? These questions show the importance of paying attention to the context under which each SOU address was given. Looking at these contextual variables may help show why some presidents were more persuasive than others, and how that influenced the general trend of increasing presidential preeminence over time. Theoretical Perspectives on Presidential Persuasiveness Now that presidential persuasivene ss has been discussed in con ceptual terms, it is necessary to examine the various theoretical perspec tives which may also impact presidential persuasiveness. There are three main areas which may affect a president’s ability to persuade – political factors, congressional/institu tional factors, and political time. Political Factors There are many different political factors wh ich could potentially impact presidential persuasiveness, one of which is divided govern ment. There are two main schools of thought regarding divided government and its affect on presidential-congressi onal relations. One

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23 argument, perpetuated by James Sundquist, is th at divided government causes the government to be less productive because of the inability of the president and Congress to cooperate (1983). Under divided government, the president and Co ngress are likely to have different views on national policies, which make them less likely to work together. Anot her reason critics of divided government claim makes it more ineffectiv e is because it is harder for voters to hold either party accountable (Quirk and Nesmith 2000). Even though these are some of the reasons why divided government is supposedly not as productive as unified government, other scholar s such as David Mayhew claim that divided government does not affect the ability of Congre ss to get things done (1991). Somewhere in between Sundquist and Mayhew ar e another group of scholars who believe that divided government matters sometimes depending on othe r political conditions (C onley 2003). For the purpose of this dissertation rese arch, it will be assumed that divided government does affect a president’s ability to persuade, but that it is only one piece of the equation. Therefore, although it is likely for a president to be more persuasi ve under unified government and less persuasive under divided government, this is unlikely to be absolute. Besides divided government, another political factor likely to affect presidential persuasiveness is whether or not a president has (or claims to have) an electoral mandate. An electoral mandate can be defined as when citizens use their votes as a way to tell the government their preferences regarding certain issues (Peters on, et al, 2003). In othe r words, an electoral mandate indicates a shift in public opinion in a certain direction. Assuming that members of Congress are single-minded seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974), then they are likely to adjust their positions in response to an electoral mandate.

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24 It is important to note that a president does not actually ha ve to receive an electoral mandate for members of Congress to adjust th eir positions. The president only has to be perceived as having received an electoral manda te in order to affect congressional behavior (Peterson, et al, 2003). Assuming that recei ving an electoral mandate does influence congressional behavior, then it is also likely to increase a president’s ability to persuade. However, since an electoral mandate in regards to the president can only occur every four years, it would be expected that electoral mandates would only have an affect on presidential persuasiveness immediately following a presidential election. This is consistent with other scholars who claim that the effect s of electoral mandates on congre ssional behavior are likely to endure only a short period of time before dissipating (ibid). Other political factors which may impact the ability of a president to persuade Congress are whether the president is speaking early or la te during his term, and wh ether or not it is his first or second term. For example, a president may not wield as much influence towards the end of his second term when presidents are often vi ewed as being “lame ducks”. A final political factor to consider is whether or not the president is speaking during a period of crisis. For example, if a president is speaking during a time of war, he is likely to be more persuasive. Congressional/Institutional Factors The main congressional factor which may affect a president’s ability to persuade is the congressional era during which a president is speaking. Four main congressional eras characterize Congress over the last 60 year s – textbook, reform, post-reform, and conditional party government periods. Each era is characterized by different institutional arrangements in Congress, some of which may impact who is most likely to speak in Congre ss, and if they are apt to speak in support of the president or not. Briefly discussing each congressional era should

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25 show how these different institutional arrang ements can potentially affect presidential persuasiveness. The textbook era of Congress occurred from the end of WWII until about 1960. During this period, Congress was characterized by stro ng committee government, coalitional politics, and conservative policies (Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Members of Congress were more specialized, and were often expe rts about the topics discussed in their committees (Sinclair 2000). Even though it may seem that this institu tional arrangement would not be conducive to presidential influence, that is far from the case. “In the Textbook Congress, even more than in the 1930s, congressional party leader s, with little internal organi zational power and more divided parties, had little choice but to rely on the president to set policy goals and provide political muscle” (Cooper 2005, 381). The reform era of Congress took place dur ing the 1960s and 1970s. This period was marked by many changes taking place regarding th e internal structure of Congress. In the House, the reform process started in 1958 when the Democratic Study Group formed to organize reform in the House. Whereas the House had a formal reform process, the Senate did not. The only official rule change in the Senate was in re gards to the filibuster, when the number of votes needed to invoke cloture decreased from 67 to 60. However, there were many other changes that took place both in the House and Senate as the result of the suggestions of the Joint Committee which formed in 1965. The suggestions of the Joint Committee led to the Legislative Re organization Act of 1970. One purpose of this Act was to reduce the power of committees and their chairmen. For example, the Act required committees to adopt writ ten rules; allowed a committee majority to be able to hold a special meeting to address measur es opposed by the chair; and said that committee

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26 reports must be filed within seven days of a meeting (Deering and Smith 1997; Kravitz 1990). The Act also tried to prevent secrecy by requi ring that committees must announce meetings publicly at least a week ahead of time and publish the results of ro ll call votes, including how each member had voted and whether they did so in person or by proxy. Also in regards to committee secrecy, in the Senate there were to be no closed hearings held except under special circumstances, and in the House, committee busin ess meetings had to be open except during bill mark-ups (Kravitz 1990). The many reforms that took place during a relati vely short period of time are likely to have affected how members of Congress respon ded to the president, and I would expect congressional response during this period to be different than that which took place during the textbook Congress. As the power of committees and their chairs continued to diminish into the post-reform Congress, I would expect the respons es to the president by members of Congress to further change. Whereas the textbook Congress was charac terized by strong committees, committees played a less important role duri ng the post-reform era while the role of parties increased. In the post-reform Congress, parties acted as a centraliz ing agent and served many different functions. For example, parties “socialized new members, distributed committee assignments, set the legislative agenda, disseminated information, and carried out other tasks that are essential to Congress’s law-making, oversight, and representative functions” (Herrnson 2000, 256). All of these functions (and others) allowed parties to gain influence over their members. This, along with the weakening of the committee system, led to parties playing a much larger role in the post-reform Congress.

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27 The role of parties has in creased even more since the Republican revolution of 1994 resulting in a new congressional era, conditional party government. So far, this era has been characterized by not only by strong parties, but also by pronounced party leadership and strong ties to the president during periods of unified gove rnment. This should mean that more members are speaking out in both support and opposition to th e president. It is also likely that party leaders are speaking more to send cues to their party members. Overall, the change from a committee contro lled to a party dominated Congress should have an effect on presidential persuasion and how members of Congress respond to the president. However, since this dissertation analyzes onl y the last 30 years a nd not the last 60, the main focus will be on looking at how institutiona l procedures and norms during the post-reform and conditional party congresses af fect congressional response to the president. Institutional influence should be particularly pronounced as the role of parties in Congress increase. Besides the different congressi onal eras, another congression al factor which may affect how a member of Congress responds to the president is which chamber he or she is in. There are many electoral and institutional differences be tween the House and Senate which may cause Representatives and Senators to respond to the pr esident differently. Basic electoral differences between the two chambers are that members of the House serve two-year terms whereas members of the Senate serve six-year terms. Serving only a two-year term may limit the way members of the House can respond to the president si nce they have to pay more attention to their re-election chances than Senators who do not have to concentrat e as much on their re-election until the latter part of their terms. This differenc e is likely to cause members of the Senate to more aggressively challenge the president than members of the House who have to pay more attention to re-election.

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28 Another electoral difference that could a ffect the way members of Congress respond to the president is that members of the House focus more on their constituencies whereas members of the Senate concentrate on more national issu es (Carmines and Dodd 1985). Once again, this difference may limit the way members of the House respond. Besides electoral differences, there are also institutional differences which may af fect the way members of Congress respond to the president. The main factor likel y to have an impact on congressi onal response is that the Senate is typically more ideological and policy-oriented than th e House (Carmines and Dodd 1985; Richardson and Munger 1990). This means that Senators are more likely to respond to the president, and also that their re sponses are likely to be more va ried and ideologically extreme. Finally, it is important to consider the possibility that members of Congress are not actually being persuaded by the pr esident, but instead are comm unicating viewpoints they would have expressed anyways, regardle ss of the president. In look ing at literature regarding cuetaking, scholars contend that people most likely to be persuaded are those already predisposed to a certain viewpoint (Bond and Fleischer 1990; Kuk linski and Hurley 1994). Therefore, it would make sense to find that members of the pres ident’s party were more likely to support his positions and use similar rhetoric. Additionally, other scholars have shown that people tend to be selective in the information they pay attention to, and that those who are knowledgeable about a specific issue are more likely to react when presented with information regarding it (Iyengar 1990). This again suggests that members of Congre ss might be predisposed to respond to certain information due to factors other th an the president being persuasive. Political Time Political time could also potenti ally affect a president’s ability to persuade. Political time, which Stephen Skowronek defines as “the historical medium through which authority structures have recurred,” has four categories (2002, 30). The first two, opposed or affiliated,

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29 concern the attitude the incoming president has towards the outgoing administration. An opposed president is one who challenges the prev ious president’s agenda and often replaces it with another one, whereas an affiliated president is associated with the previous president and continues to work on and possibly complete his agenda. The third and fourth categories of political time, resilient or vulnerable, deal with the previous institutional arrangement. If the institutional arrangement under the outgoing president is resilient, then it will be much harder for the incoming president to make institutional ch anges if he so desires. However, if the governmental arrangements are vulnerable when a pr esident takes office, it will be much easier for him to make changes to them. Using the categories of opposed, affiliated, res ilient, and vulnerable, Skowronek develops four classifications of political time. These four categories of political time are relevant to this dissertation research because the period of political time in which a president is speaking may greatly affect his ability to persuade Congress. The first type of political time is called the politics of reconstruction, which is when there is a president who is opposed and institutions that are vulnerable. Presidents pres iding during this time period, such as Ronald Reagan, have the best opportunity to change the political system because they came in opposing the previous president’s agenda and the public was in favor of change. Since the resistance to presidents in this situation is usually weak, they are able to make more drastic changes to the government if they choose. These presidents should also have the best opportunity to persuade. The second type of political time is called th e politics of disjunction, which is when the previous institutional arrangements are still vulnerabl e, however, there is an affiliated president. This is problematic because the president is a ssociated with a certain agenda that is not considered the best solution to th e current problems. If the presid ent continues to adhere to the

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30 previous agenda then he risks al ienating his political allies. Presid ents presiding during this time period, such as Jimmy Carter, are also less li kely to be able to persuade Congress. The last two types of political time deal with institutional ar rangements that are resilient. The politics of articulation is when there is an affiliated president dealing with resilient institutional arrangements. These presidents, such as George H.W. Bush, are generally seen as presiding over a stable, normal period because they are committed to the previous agenda and it works. Therefore, presidents presiding during the polit ics of articulation are likely to be more persuasive since they are presenting issues in a way which is alre ady largely accepted. The opposite is true of presidents presidi ng during the politics of preemption. During the politics of preemption, the political agenda of the outgoing president is still playing out, however, the incoming president wa nts to pursue a different agenda. These presidents, such as Richard Nixon, are the “wild cards of presidential history, and are often singled out for flaws of character” (Skowronek 2002, 44). However, Bill C linton would also fall into this category. They are also likely to be less persuasive since they are presenting agendas which are unattractive to most. The Central Questions The main question is whether or not there is evidence that different presidents succeed in varying degrees in setting the rhetorical agenda of Congress in their SOU addresses, and in clarifying whether or not this success seems sh aped by differing contexts in which the speeches are presented or different topics on which the sp eeches focus. The main expectation of this dissertation is to find that pres idential influence in Congress has increased resulting in the president playing a larger role in policy formation. Even though I expect to find a gradual increase in presidential persuasion over time, sp ecifically in regards to the legislative agenda, I also anticipate finding fluctuations in a president’s ability to pe rsuade due to other factors.

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31 One set of factors that may a ffect presidential success in set ting the rhetorical agenda for Congress is political factors. Th e literature on presidential-congre ssional relations suggests that one political factor that can shape presidential influence in Congress is the presence of divided versus unified government (Binder 2002; C onley 2003; Fiorina 2002; Mayhew 1991; Sundquist 1992). I believe that under divided government a president will have less influence over the legislative agenda then under unified governme nt. This is because fellow members of a president’s party are more likely to be receptiv e to his message than members from the opposing party. Another political factor likely to affect presidential influen ce is whether or not a president has an electoral mandate. Presidents perceived as having an electoral mandate will likely have a better ability to persuade. This is because litera ture suggests that if members of Congress believe that the public elected the presiden t based on certain policy positions, then in the interest of their own re-election, members will likely adjust their policy positions to be closer to those of the president (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Hershey 1994; Peterson, et al, 2003). This makes members of Congress especially vulnerable to presidential persuasion. Two other political factors that are likely to affect presidential influence are whether the president is speaking early or late in his term, and if it is the pr esident’s first or second term. Based on the literature, I expect to find mixed results in regards to when in his term a president is speaking (Brace and Hinckley 1991; EshbaughSoha 2005; Lewis and Strine 1996). If a president was just elected by a large margin, or received an electoral mandate, then he would likely be more persuasive in the beginning of his term. However, if a president did not win by a large margin, or if the election re sults were questionable as in the case of George W. Bush, then I would expect a president to be less persuasive ea rly in his term. Therefore, I do not expect to

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32 find a discernable pattern in rega rds to a president’s persuasive ability based on when during his term he is speaking. I do expect to find a pattern regarding whet her a president is spea king in his first or second term. I believe that presidents will have a better ability to persuade during their first term than in their second. This is because presidents are often viewed as more ineffective during their second term when they no longer ha ve to think about re-election. Another political factor which may affect presidential influence over the congressional agenda is the president’s approva l rating. Presidents with higher levels of approval are more likely to have more leverage in Congress, therefore making it likely that they will have more influence (Bond, Fleischer, and Wood 2003; Bra ce and Hinckley 1992; C onley 2000; Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 1998; Ostrom and Simon 19 85; Rivers and Rose 1985; Sullivan 1991). Besides political factors, pr esidential-congressional literature suggest s that institutional factors such as the congressional eras should also impact a presid ent’s ability to influence the legislative agenda, as well as whom in Congr ess responds to the president (Dodd 2005; Herrnson 2000; Lehnen 1967; Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Rohde 1991). In regards to presidential persuasiveness, the exertion of influence over Congr ess by the president is lik ely to be gradual. This is because as Congress changes from bei ng committee dominated to party dominated, there is more room for the president to play a larger role. Even though the different congressional eras should have an effect on the president’s ability to persuade, they are likely to have even more of an impact on who responds to the president. For example, I expect to find that pa rty leaders become increasingly likely to speak as Congress moves from post-reform to conditional party government. Also during the conditional party era, I would expect more ideologically ex treme members to speak. This will likely cause

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33 more varied responses to the president. Ultimat ely, I expect the different congressional eras to largely determine which members of C ongress speak and what they say. Besides congressional eras influencing congr essional response, the chamber a member of Congress is in will also likely influence how he or she responds. For example, I would expect Senators to respond more frequently than Repres entatives. This is because members of the House have to concentrate more on re-election a nd they focus more on their constituencies. I also believe that the responses given by Senators will be more varied and ideologically extreme since the Senate is typically a mo re diverse, and individualistic body. Besides institutional factors, literature sugge sts that political time will also likely impact the president’s abil ity to influence the legi slative agenda (Lewis a nd Strine 1996; Milkis 1995; Skowronek 1997). I expect to find that presidents speak ing under the politics of reconstruction will have to best opportunities to persuade. This is because presidents have the best opportunity to create change under the poli tics of reconstruction since th e president is opposed to the previous president’s agenda, and in stitutions are vulnerable to change . Presidents are also likely to be persuasive under the politics of articulatio n. During this political time, presidents are committed to a previous agenda and it works, so members of Congress are likely to be easily persuaded. Even though presidential persuasion is lik ely under the politics of reconstruction and articulation, presidents under the politics of preem ption will likely have the least opportunity to persuade. This is because under the politics of preemption, the presid ent is opposed to the previous regime, but institutions ar e resilient. Since the president would be trying to change an agenda that most do not want changed, then he is not likely to have much success persuading members of Congress. Presidents are also not likely to have persuasive success under the

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34 politics of disjunction. This is due to presidents promoting an ag enda which is not the best one to deal with the current problems. Therefor e, members of Congress are not likely to be persuaded. Finally, the types of policies a president is di scussing and the presence of an international crisis should affect a president’s influence in Congress. According to the two presidencies thesis, presidents are more successful when pursuing foreign policies than domestic policies (Wildavsky 1966). Based on this thesis, as well as the work of other scholars, I would expect to find that presidents are better able to influen ce the foreign policy agenda in Congress than the domestic policy agenda (A ndrade and Young 1996; Bond and Fleischer 1988; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Wood and Peake 1998). Additionally, international crises will also likely increase a president’s influence of Congress due to a “rally around the flag” effect (Mueller 1985; Sinclair 2004). In exploring these central questions, my expect ations for this dissertation are for it to serve as somewhat of a pretest for my methods and measurement. I hope to learn from the coding, measurement, and empirical probing befo re expanding my disse rtation to include additional data and test hypothese s. Aside from improving my methods and measurement, my dissertation will show that there is a real mean ingful response to the president’s SOU address made by members of Congress, and that this resp onse varies over time according to the president and other factors, and seems to do so in some pa tterned ways. I can then build on these findings and create a larger research agenda in which I will do more extensive testing. Data and Methods The main source of data for this disserta tion research was be SOU addresses and the subsequent responses to them by members of Congress. State of the Union addresses were

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35 analyzed for every year begi nning with Jimmy Carter in 19781, and ending with George W. Bush in 2006. This time period was chosen for several reasons. Initially, my intent was to analyze speeches from WWII to the present, however, due to time constraints this time period had to be reduced. In looking at modern pres idents, Ronald Reagan was a logi cal place to start since he is considered the “Great Communicator.” However, I chose to go back to Carter to hopefully see a contrast between Carter, who wa s considered somewhat rhetoric ally challenged, and Reagan and the presidents who succeeded him. Transcripts of the SOU addresses from were obtained from the C-SPAN website (http://www.c-span.org/execu tive/stateoftheunion.asp ). Besides analyzing the SOU addresses from 1978 through 2006, speeches given on the floors of the House and Senate during the five days Congress was in session immediately follow ing each SOU address were also be examined. The relevant congressional speeches from 1985 to the present were obtained from the Congressional Record available on Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe . Congressional speeches given prior to 1985 were obtained from mi crofiche housed at the University of Florida Law Library. The SOU addresses were the first speeches to be analyzed since to fully understand how members of Congress were responding to them, it was first necessary to know what is being said. In looking at the SOU addresses, each one was coded for the topics the president was discussing; how much time he was spending discussing them; wh at plans, calls to action, or solutions the president was offering for each topic; whether he specifically mentioned Congress and if so, in what context; and what specific words or phrases the president used when discussing each item. 1 Jimmy Carter did not give a SOU address in 1977.

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36 Based on the topics discussed in a SOU addr ess, congressional speeches were then chosen for each year. Speeches were chosen based on policies discussed by the president meaning that not all speeches given during the five days Congress was in session immediately following the SOU address were analyzed. For a sp eech to be chosen, it had to reference some topic also mentioned by the president. However, it did not have to be a topic that the president spent a lot of time discussing. For example, ev en if the president onl y mentioned health care once in his speech, any congressional speech menti oning health care would still be coded. This resulted in the vast majority of speeches given during the five day period to be analyzed. Most of the speeches not analyzed were focused on topi cs which were not policy related, for example, speeches congratulating the winning Super Bowl team. Appendix A further discusses the criterion used in selecting which speeches to code. Once the relevant speeches were selected fo r each year, they were then systematically content analyzed to see whether members of Co ngress were discussing the same topics as the president; whether they were re sponding in positive or negative s ways; and whether they were using similar language as the president in discus sing these matters. To help do this, I consulted the book, Content Analysis for the So cial Sciences and Humanities , by Ole R. Holsti. One way described by Holsti to conduct a co ntent analysis is to come up with a series of themes to look for in the text being evaluated. Holsti said th e “categories should refl ect the purposes of the research, be exhaustive, be mutually exclusiv e, independent, and be derived from a single classification principle” (95). Since I was not looking for themes , I took the same basic idea and applied it to policies discussed. For example, were the president and members of Congress discussing health care, social security, etc.?

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37 I also conducted what Holsti refers to as a contingency analysis. Holsti describes contingency analysis as coding ma terial based on the absence or presence of a certain attribute within the document. In other words, I would look for certain words and characteristics each president used to describe the different policy areas, and also the words and characteristics members of Congress were using as well. This was largely done by coding the speeches for the presence or absence of specific topics (0 absence, 1 presence). Aside from determining which topics memb ers of Congress were discussing and the manner in which the issues were being discussed, datasets were also created which included descriptive information about each member of C ongress speaking during the period. Some of these variables related to partisanship such as a member’s party identification, whether the member waas from the same party as the president, and whether the member was in the majority or minority party in Congress. Other variables in cluded the chamber in which the speaking member resided, the number of years the member was in office, and whether the member was a party leader and/or a committee ch air. These datasets allowed me to explore a set of questions and ascertain whether the study of SOU addresses is a productive way to understand presidential agenda setting over the last 28 years. Measuring Influence Once the SOU addresses and congressional re sponses were coded, they had to be assessed to determine the level of influence the president had in Congress at any given time. This was a multi-step process with the concentr ation on the amount of agreement in the topics being discussed by the president and member s of Congress and the language used when discussing the topics. Therefore, the first st ep was to determine whether the president and members of Congress were discussing the same topics. This was done by comparing the three topics most discussed by both the president a nd Congress as a whole. By rank ordering the

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38 topics discussed by the president and members of Congress, it can be determined whether or not there was topic agreement, and ultimately how influential the president was in determining which topics members of Congress were discussing. If there was a lot of topic agreement – for example, the three main topics discussed by th e president and members of Congress matched up, or maybe even two of three topics for each – then it could be argued that the president was able to exert influence over the congressional agenda. However, if there was little or not topic agreement, then it could be argued that the presid ent was not able to exert as much influence in Congress. This process is discussed in much more detail in Appendix B. Aside from looking at the topi cs being discussed, I also an alyzed the speeches to see whether the topics were being discussed in the same way. Th is is important to determine because the president might be able to influence the topics being discussed in Congress, but that does not mean he also has influence over the conten t of the discussions. Th erefore, presidential influence is two-fold: influence over the congr essional agenda, but also influence over policy content. To measure policy content, it is neces sary to see how the president and members of Congress are discussing the same issues. In looking at presidential influence over bot h the congressional ag enda and content of discussion, it is possible to label the amount of in fluence the president has in Congress each year. Four labels were developed in regards to leve ls of presidential influe nce – high, high partisan, medium, and low. For a president to have a high le vel of influence, there would have to be topic agreement, and the president and members of Co ngress from both parties would have to discuss the topics in the same way. There would also have to be topic agreement between the president and members of Congress for the president to ha ve a high partisan level of influence. The

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39 difference is that in this category, the president only has to influence the content of discussion among members of his own party. There are several scenarios under which a presid ent’s influence could be labeled medium. One is if there was partial topic agreement and some similarities in how the president and members of Congress were discussing the same t opics. However, a president could also be labeled as having a medium level of influence if there was topic agreement but not content agreement, or more rarely, when there was c ontent agreement but not topic agreement. For example, the president and memb ers of Congress are emphasizing different topics, but they are discussing the same topics in largely the same ways. Finally, a president was labeled as having a lo w level of influence when there was both topic disagreement and the president and memb ers of Congress were discussing topics in different ways. Based on these f our categories of influence, I was able to create a table which looked at levels of presidential influence over time (Table 1-1, al so reprinted as Table 3-9 and Table B-2). Looking at this table provides an initial g limpse into some of the findings of this dissertation. As can be seen, during the 28 years encapsulated in my study, there were only three periods of high influence, three periods of hi gh partisan influence, 11 periods of medium influence, and 10 periods of low influence, one of which can possibly be excluded due to limited data. This table will be re ferenced throughout the dissertati on as presidential influence is explored through different lenses. How this ta ble was formulated and additional information regarding measurement can be found in Appendix B. Research Outline The rest of my dissertation w ill take each one of these fact ors into consideration. The next chapter looks at how divided government , or more specifically how unified government,

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40 affects presidential persuasive. My third chapter then explores the effects of other political factors such as electoral mandates, whether a pres ident is speaking early or late during his term, and presidential approval ratings. Once some of the political f actors are discussed, specific fact ors related to the president and Congress are examined. Chapter 4 focuses on the president’s ability to persuade by looking at the impact of political time on presidential influence in Congress. Chapter 5 then examines the impact of congressional eras, specifically pa ying attention to the incr easing role of political parties in Congress. Other institutional factor s related to Congress, su ch as which chamber a speaking member is from, are al so taken into consideration. The focus of my dissertation th en shifts towards the types of policies being discussed – particularly whether the policies are domestic or foreign. Chap ter 6 presents evidence which shows that the key to understand ing presidential influence might not actually be the factors discussed so far, but might instead be based on whether presidents are discussing domestic or foreign policies. I argue in this chapter that regardless of other f actors, presidents have the most influence in Congress when discussing foreign policies. More support for these findings are discussed in Chapter 7, which considers how intern ational crises affect presidential influence, and Chapter 8 which looks specifically at the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the influence of George W. Bush. In Chapter 9, my overall findings are stated, conclusions are drawn, and the broader implications of this research are discussed.

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41 Table 1-1. Presidential Levels of Influence Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II First Year High High Partisan High Partisan Second Year Low High Medium High Partisan Low Third Year Low Medium High Low Medium Fourth Year Low Medium Medium Low Low Fifth Year Low* Medium Medium Sixth Year Medium Medium Low Seventh Year Medium Eighth Year Medium Low *This may not be accurate as there were a limited number of responses analyzed in 1985.

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42 CHAPTER 2 UNIFIED GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION Exploring the effects of divi ded government on presidential-c ongressional relations is not a new endeavor. Many scholars ha ve studied the effects of di vided government, however, there is not a clear consensus on whether or not di vided government matters. Some scholars claim divided government makes government less effec tive and decreases coop eration between the president and Congress (Sundquist 1992), while others assert th at divided government does not have an impact on the productivity of Congress or the leadership ability of the president in Congress (Binder 2002; Fiorina 200 2; Mayhew 1991). For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that divided government does have an impact on presidential-co ngressional relations, and that presidents are more like ly to be influential during periods of unified government. This chapter seeks to show whether th is is true by examining presiden tial influence during periods of unified government. During periods of unified government, the pr esident and Congress are more likely to work together to achieve legislative goals whic h will help each electorally (Conley 2003). This encourages cooperation between the pr esident and legislators, which is likely to lead to increased presidential power in Congress. Also during periods of unified government, presidents are better able to carry out their role as chief legislator, for exampl e by helping set the congressional agenda (Sundquist 1992). To test these assertions, the periods of unified government during the 28 years being studied in this research were examined. Out of the 14 different congresses I examined, government was unified during only five of them.2 If presidents are more persuasive when 2 Although there was unified government at the beginning of the 107th Congress, this changed when Senator James Jeffords of Vermont changed his party affiliation from Republican to Independent on May 24, 2001, which gave

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43 government is unified, then I should have found that members of the 95th, 96th, 103rd, 108th, and 109th congresses were discussing largely the same topics as the president, were responding positively to his positions on these topics, and we re using similar language in discussing them. Since I examined only one year during the 95th Congress (1978), I will primarily focus on the 96th, 103rd, 108th, and 109th congresses in trying to determine wh ether presidents are indeed more influential in Congress when government is united. 96th Congress, 1979-1981 During the 96th Congress, the House and Senate we re both overwhelmingly controlled by Democrats, and Democrat Jimmy Carter was pr esident. Even though it seems these conditions would make it likely for Carter to have great influence in Congress, this was hardly the case. For example, in looking at the topics discussed by Carter in his 1979 and 1980 SOU addresses and the topics discussed by members of Congress in their subsequent re sponses, very different topics were being discussed. During the 1979 SOU address, Carter empha sized both domestic and foreign policies (see Figure 2-1). He discussed economic policy the mo st, spending about 13.4 percent of his speech on it. Carter’s key concerns regarding the ec onomy were inflation, and whether or not the country was headed into a rece ssion. He discussed several stra tegies for reducing inflation, including passing a fiscally responsible budget, encouraging Americans not to live beyond their means, decreasing the unemployment rate, and providing adequate heal th care to citizens. The second and third most discussed topics were foreign affairs and nuclear weapons, each of which Carter spent about 12.1 percent of his speech addressing. In regards to foreign affairs, Carter said, “We have no desire to be the world's poli ceman. But America does want to working majority of the Senate to the Democrats. For th e sake of this dissertation, government during 2001-2003 will be considered divided.

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44 be the world's peacemaker” (1979). Carter especi ally expressed this sentiment when discussing China and the Middle East. He also discussed making peace with the Soviet Union. This discussion fell into both the foreign affairs and nuclear weapons categories b ecause one of Carter’s main concerns was the possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Unio n. He said, “Cooperation with the Soviet Union serves the cause of peace, for in this nuclear age, world peace must include peace between the super powers – and it must mean th e control of nuclear arms” (Carter 1979). While the three main topics discussed by Cart er were the economy, foreign affairs, and nuclear weapons, members of C ongress focused on an entirely different set of policies (see Figure 2-2). The most discussed topic in Congress was the budget, which was the main emphasis of 25 percent of the congressional responses. Of t hose representatives speaking predominantly about the budget, 80 percent of them spoke negatively about it. Most shared a sentiment similar to that of Representative R obert Badham of California. He said, “The new budget falls far short of expectations on three fronts. It does too little to balance our budget. It does too little to reverse the damage done to our defense posture in the first two years of the Carter administration. It does not cut spending for social programs” (Badham 1979). It is interesting that the b udget was the most discussed topi c in Congress considering that Carter devoted only 3.8 percent of his speech to it. Carter also said that the budget he sent to Congress is “a stringent but a fair budget” and one that “p rovides enough spending restraint to begin unwinding inflation” (1979). This contrasts greatly with most of the comments made by legislators regarding Carter’s budget. The second most discussed topi c in Congress was the SOU addre ss in general. Instead of focusing on a specific policy, 20 percent of the speech es were simply critiques of the President’s

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45 address, and all of them were negative critiques. The main criticism made was that Carter had not actually addressed anything in his speech. Not surprisingly, 75 percent of these responses came from Republicans. The third most discussed topic was educat ion, which also was the main topic of 20 percent of the congressional responses. There we re a wide range of topi cs discussed regarding education ranging from school busing to more funding for higher education. Members were especially upset that Carter’s budget reduced fund ing for education as a means to help control inflation. “In my view, reducing the federal commitment to educati on is a shortsighted approach to fighting inflation” (Ford 1979) . All of the members of Congress who focused on education were Democrats. This is especially interesting considering that Carter mentioned education only twice during his address. Members of Congress not only emphasized topics Carter spent little time discussing, they also largely ignored those topics that were Carter’s main focu s. For example, Carter spent the largest percentage of his speech discussing the economy, but the economy was not the main topic of one of the congressional res ponses. In fact, the economy was only mentioned in 35 percent of congressional speeches, and in flation in only 40 percent. There was even less discussion in Congress of nuc lear weapons. It was also not the main topic of any congressional res ponses, and only one member even mentioned nuclear weapons. The one topic members of Congress did address was foreign affairs. It was the main topic of 15 percent of the congressional responses. Like Carter, members also discussed the Soviet Union and China. The difference between the topics addresse d by Carter and those discussed by members of Congress was also apparent in 1980, however , not to same extent as in 1979. In his 1980

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46 SOU address, Carter spoke overw helmingly about foreign policies (see Figure 2-3). The main topic of his address was the S oviet Union, of which he spent about 21.1 percent of his speech discussing. Carter was especially concerned with the Soviet Union’s “military aggression” towards Afghanistan. He said one of the main challenges facing the U.S. and world was “the steady growth and increased projection of S oviet military power beyond its own borders” and that “the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War” (Carter 1979). Besides being concerned about the Soviet Union, Carter also di scussed his concerns about other countries. Foreign affairs was the second most discussed topic in his address, accounting for about 19.4 percent of it. Carter was speaking during the Iran hostage situation, which was reflected in his addre ss. He said, “At this time in Iran, 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarc hy” (Carter 1980). Aside from Iran, Carter also discussed progress being made in th e Middle East, Africa, and Israel. The third most discussed topic by Carter was energy policy. He said that the U.S. must have an energy policy that is clea r and comprehensive. “The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our exce ssive dependence on foreig n oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation's security” (Carte r 1980). Carter also called on Congress to “act promptly” in passing energy legislation, and aske d American citizens to continue with their energy conservation efforts. Even with Carter’s call on members of Congr ess to address energy policy, energy was the main topic of only two of the congressional resp onses, and was only mentioned in three of the speeches analyzed. Instead, the topic discusse d most by members of Congress was the budget, which was the focus of 31 percent of speeches (s ee Figure 2-4). Of those members concentrating

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47 on the budget, 88.9 percent of them spoke of it in a negative manne r. Members were especially upset that the budget was not balanced. Representa tive Gerald Solomon said, “Contrary to what President Carter has promised the American peopl e repeatedly, the budget has not been balanced by the end of his first term” (1980). Members were also concerned about the tax implications Carter’s budget would have on the American public. Representative E.G. Shuste r of Pennsylvania said, “The Carter budget thus turns Uncle Sam into a pickpocket whose long ar m reaches through the pockets of the American taxpayers all the way down to their socks” ( 1980). Even though members of Congress were concerned about the budget, Carter only mentione d it once during his speech. He said that as a way to strengthen the economy, the deficit ne eded to be reduced and the budget balanced. The only topics that both Cart er and members of Congress di scussed dealt with foreign affairs. Foreign affairs was the second most discussed topic in Congress, accounting for 28.6 percent of responses. However, even though forei gn affairs were being discussed by both Carter and members of Congress, they were not bei ng discussed in the same way. Many members questioned Carter’s foreign policy regarding th e Soviet Union, Iran, Chin a, and Afghanistan. Representative Barry Goldwater, Jr., of Californi a said that he has “watched this country’s foreign policy be guided by nearsighted and ofte n hypocritical moralizing th at has nothing to do with reality (1980). Representa tive Ronald Paul of Texas al so questioned Carter’s foreign policies when discussing the possibility of engaging in military action overseas. “Instead of talking about killing our boys and girls and draining our people’ s wealth, let us build up our own defenses, get out of some of these entangling alliances, and use our power judiciously” (1980). Besides both discussing different topics, and discussing simila r topics in different ways, members of the 96th Congress also spoke of Carter in a largely negative way. In 1979, Carter

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48 was mentioned in 60 percent of the congressional responses. Of those who mentioned him, 72.7 percent of members spoke of him negatively, while only 27.3 percent spoke of him positively. In 1980, members were even more negative towards Carter – he was mentioned in 80 percent of speeches, and of those who mentioned him, 93.8 pe rcent did so in a negative manner. Not surprisingly, most of the members speaking ne gatively about Carter were Republicans. However, this raises an interesting question: are members of the minority party more likely to speak during periods of unified government, and if so, are they more likely to speak of the president negatively? We will reconsid er this question after discussing the 103rd, 108th, and 109th congresses. 103rd Congress, 1993-1995 During the 103rd Congress, Democrats once again controlled both Congress and the White House, however, there was a much differe nt relationship between President Bill Clinton and members of Congress than there had been betw een members of Congress and Carter. This is evident by looking at the topics discussed by Cl inton in his 1993 and 1994 SOU addresses, and the responses given to thes e addresses by members. During the first SOU address of his presid ency in 1993, Clinton spoke predominantly about domestic policies (see Figure 2-5). The main topic talked a bout by Clinton was the economy, of which he spent almost 18 percent of his speech discussing. Clinton was concerned with the state of the economy, and particularly the size of the natio nal debt. Therefore, he spent a large portion of his speech pitching his economic recovery package. Part of Clinton’s proposed economic program involved a tax increase which would supposedly target people who earned higher incomes. Clinton said that in order to reduce the national debt and improve the economy then taxes would have to be rais ed, and that it was only fair to increase taxes on those who made the most.

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49 Employment, particularly creating more jobs and increasing wages, was another component of Clinton’s economic recovery plan . Employment was the second-most discussed topic by Clinton, accounting for 10.3 percent of his address. Clinton said that addressing the unemployment problem was essent ial to improving the economy. The third-most discussed topic by Clinton wa s health care, which accounted for just less than 10 percent of his speech. Clinton said that ther e was a health care cr isis in the country which needed to be addressed. He said that Firs t Lady Hilary Clinton woul d be leading the effort to provide all Americans w ith adequate health care. Just as Clinton addressed the economy the mo st in his address, the main topic discussed in Congress was also the economy (see Figure 26). The economy was the main topic of 41 percent of congressional responses . There was a very evident part isan divide in how members of Congress discussed the economy and Clinton’s economic recove ry plan. Democrats were largely supportive of Clinton’ s plan and spoke of it positiv ely, while most Republicans questioned Clinton’s proposals for improving the economy. One of the biggest criticisms by Republi cans of Clinton’s econo mic plan concerned increasing taxes. That is why the second-mo st discussed topic by members of Congress was taxes, which was the main topic of 23.6 percent of congressional respon ses. More than twothirds of members mentioning taxes were Republican s, so not surprisingly, none of them were in favor of a tax increase. In fact, of all the members mentioning taxes, 72.9 percent were opposed to increasing taxes, even for the wealthiest people in the country. Many members felt that instead of raising taxes, th ere should be spending cuts. After taxes, the next most discussed topi c was the budget, which was the main topic of 18.6 percent of responses. Much of the discussi on regarding the budget was related to how it fit

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50 into Clinton’s economic recovery plan. Many members claimed that if Clinton was serious about reducing the deficit and improving the econ omy then there needed to be more spending cuts in his budget. Republican s especially thought that there were not enough spending cuts. In fact, several of them gave speeches offering s uggestions of where additional budget cuts could be made. In comparison, Clinton spent about 3.7 8 percent of his address discussing the budget. He did not mention spending cuts , but instead mainly discussed programs he intended to fund. In 1993, for the most part Clinton and memb ers of Congress were discussing the same topics. The exception was health care, which Clinton spent a considerable amount of time discussing but was the main topic of only three pe rcent of congressional responses. Even though Clinton and members of Congress were discussing largely the same issues, there was an obvious partisan divide in how members of Congress were discussing the issues. For example, Democrats seemed to discuss the issues in much the same way as Clinton, whereas Republicans were more likely to challenge Clinto n and be critical of his proposals. This partisan divide was also apparent when looking at the 1 994 SOU address and the subsequent congressional respon ses (see Figures 2-7, 2-8). In 1994, the main topic discussed by Clinton was health care, which accounted for 17.3 pe rcent of his address. During his address, Clinton outlined his plan for na tional health care. Clinton said national health care was necessary because there were millions of uninsured Americans, many of whom were unable to pay their medical costs when f aced with unexpected health probl ems. He said, “Our goal is health insurance everybody can depend on: comprehe nsive benefits that c over preventive care and prescription drugs [and] health premiums th at don't just explode when you get sick or you get older...” (Clinton 1994). C linton said improving the health care system would strengthen America overall.

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51 The second most discussed topic by Clinton was crime, of which he spent a little over eight percent of his speech discussing. Clin ton said he was sending a crime bill to Congress which would help “violence and prevent crime” (1994). He said part of this could be accomplished by increasing the number of police officers, and also by encouraging more community policing. Also, Clinton said his crim e bill would target children in crime-ridden neighborhoods to try and educate and mentor them in hopes of preventing them from becoming criminals themselves. The third most discussed topic by Clinton was foreign affairs in general, which accounted for 7.38 percent of his address. Clinton did not focus his discussion of foreign affairs primarily on one country, but instead talked about a variety of countries. He was particularly concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, however , said he was optimistic that countries would cooperate in disarming. For example, he mentioned Russia and how it was abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons and in stead helping the United States (U.S.) build an international space station. He also discussed how the U.S. was helping some of the Eastern European countries eliminate their nuclear weapons in exchange for more economic stability. In looking at the congressional responses, members of Congress di scussed many of the same topics as Clinton. The predominant topi c discussed in Congress was also health care, which was the main topic of 46.5 percent of speech es. Similar to 1993, there was also a partisan divide evident in 1994. The majority of memb ers discussing health care were Democrats (65.1 percent), and they were largely in favor of Clinton’s health ca re plan. Many of the Democrats speaking told stories of constituents in their dist ricts who either could no t get insured because of preexisting conditions, or who we re faced with major medical problems while uninsured. Democrats said these examples were evidence of a health care crisis which needed to be

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52 addressed, and that Clinton’s plan was a start. Republicans countered by saying that there was not a health care crisis, and that Clinton’s plan would take away Americans’ abilities to choose their own doctors. The next most discussed topi c in Congress was crime, whic h was the main topic of 20.9 percent of responses. Of those members discussi ng crime, it was almost evenly split between Democrats and Republicans. Unlike the discussion of health care, there was not as much of a partisan divide in regards to crime. Most Re publicans spoke in support of Clinton’s crime bill, however, many Republicans also accused Democrat s in Congress, particularly Democratic leadership, of not putting forth a bill like the one Clinton was proposing. For example, Republican Newt Gingrich said, “We, on the Repub lican side, stand ready and eager to work with the Democratic leadership, if they will only schedule a crime bill to meet the objectives the President outlined” (1994). The third most discussed topic by memb ers of Congress was drug policy, which accounted for seven percent of th e congressional responses. All of the members discussing drug policy were Republicans, and most criticized Clinton for not paying e nough attention to the national drug policy. For example, Republican William Clinger said of Clinton: “He waited nearly five months to appoint a drug czar, dr astically cut his staff, missed deadlines for submitting a drug strategy, and has senior members of his administration openly advancing or at least studying legalizatio n” (1994). Drug policy was a topic that Clinton did not spend much time discussing in his SOU address, only mentioning it four times. Once again, although Clinton and members of Congress were discussi ng largely the same topics, there was still an evident partisan divi de. However, there was not nearly the same amount of negativity towa rds Clinton as there had been towa rds Carter. In 1993, 65 percent of

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53 members spoke of Clinton positively, and 35 percen t spoke of him negatively. Not surprisingly, all of the members speaking of Clinton positively were Democrats and all of them speaking of Clinton negatively were Republicans. In 1994, fewer members spoke positively about Clinton. In fact, the percentage was almost evenly spl it, with 54.5 percent speaking of Clinton positively, and 45.5 speaking of him negatively. Of those members speaking positively about Clinton, 76.5 percent were Democrats, and of those member s speaking negatively about Clinton, 92.9 percent were Republicans. 108th Congress, 2003-2005 The 108th Congress was the first period of unifi ed Republican control examined. One interesting aspect of the two SOU addresses gi ven by George W. Bush (Bush II) during this Congress is that they both focused primarily on fo reign affairs. In his 2003 SOU address, the most discussed topics by Bush II were three in terrelated topics – Ira q, nuclear weapons, and terrorism (see Figure 2-9). Bush II spent just over 19 percent of his speech discussing Iraq. Since this was the SOU address immediately pr eceding the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, most of Bush II’s discussion of Iraq dealt with telling the American publ ic why military action might be necessary. Part of Bush II’s rationale for military intervention in Iraq was that it would be part of the war on terror. Terrorism was the second most di scussed topic by Bush II, accounting for almost 16 percent of his speech. Bush II said that targ eting countries which suppor t or could potentially support terrorists, such as Iraq, would help preven t another attack like th e one that occurred on September 11, 2001. Also related to terrorism is the third most discussed topic by Bush II, nuclear weapons (15.6 percent). Bush II was es pecially concerned a bout “outlaw regimes” seeking nuclear weapons.

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54 Members of Congress also spent the most time discussing Iraq and a possible military operation there (see Figure 2-10). Republicans disc ussing Iraq used much of the same rhetoric and rationale as Bush II – particularly empha sizing weapons Iraq was thought to possess and Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations (U .N.) weapons inspectors. Democrats, however, used different rhetoric. Most Democrats speaking were not convinc ed that Iraq had weapons and thought that the weapons inspectors should be given more time before resorting to military action. Even though the most speeches given in Congres s were in regards to Iraq, the other topics members of Congress concentrated on were not ones emphasized by Bush II. For example, the second most discussed topic was health care, whic h Bush II only spent a l ittle over four percent of his speech discussing. The third and fourth most discusse d topics by Congress were the economy and AIDS, each the main topic of 9.8 per cent of congressional responses. Similarly, Bush II spent a little over four percent of his sp eech on each of these topics as well. So Bush II and members were discussing similar issues, however, members were likely to spend time discussing domestic policies than the President. This trend continued in 2004. Bush II discu ssed similar topics in 2004 as he had in 2003, however, in a slightly different order (see Figure 2-11). In hi s 2004 SOU address, Bush II spent 13.8 percent of his speech discussing terrorism, making it the most disc ussed topic in his address. Bush II discussed terrorism similar to the way he had in 2003 – mainly by invoking images of the September 11, 2001 and other te rrorist attacks, as well as updating the nation on the progress of the war on terror. The topic Bush II discussed second most was fo reign affairs. Bush II mainly discussed the Middle East region in general, as well as di scussing military action in Afghanistan. The third

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55 most discussed topic by Bush II was Iraq, whic h accounted for 11.5 percent of his speech. By the time of his speech in 2004, the U.S. had been involved in a military operation in Iraq for about ten months and already overthrown Sa ddam Hussein. Therefore, in 2004, Bush II’s discussion of Iraq was concerned mainly wi th U.S. reconstruction efforts there. While Bush II discussed mainly foreign po licies in 2004, members of Congress discussed primarily domestic policies (see Figure 2-12). The main topi c of the most congressional speeches was health care, which accounted for a little over 16 percent of all congressional responses. Members of Congress continued and furthered the Pres ident’s discussion of health care, particularly regarding adding prescription drug coverage to Medicare. Although not everyone saw this program as ideal, members thought it was at least an improvement. “It is not the greatest thing in the world, but it certainly is a huge step forward, and I think seniors will really enjoy this benefit. I am glad the Pr esident took this leader ship.” (Kingston 2004). The second and third most discussed topics in Congress were Iraq and the budget, each accounting for 12.9 percent of congr essional responses. In regard s to Iraq, Republicans used similar rhetoric to Bush II, for example focu sing on reconstruction effo rts in Iraq. However, most Democrats speaking about Iraq tried to expl ain why they had initially voted for the military operation but now no longer felt it was necessary. The budget was the third most discussed t opic in Congress. This is surprising considering that Bush II only mentioned the bud get four times during his address. Another difference in 2004 was that members of Congress did not mention the President as often. Whereas almost 80 percent of members mentione d Bush II in 2003, only a li ttle over half did in 2004. However, of those mentioning Bush II, almost 65 percent of members did so in a negative manner.

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56 109th Congress, 2005-2007 In 2005, the main topic of Bush II’s address wa s social security, which was the first time since 2001 that his focus was on a domestic policy (see Figure 213). Bush II spent approximately 20.43 percent of his address discussing social security, especi ally his plan for the privatization of social security. Bush II said that without reform social security was headed for bankruptcy. He said that under th is plan, social security benef its for older Americans would not change, but younger Americans would ha ve to opportunity to invest pa rt of their social security in private accounts. Even though the main topic discussed by Bu sh II in 2005 was a domestic policy, the next two topics were both foreign policies. The s econd most discussed t opic by Bush II was Iraq, which accounted for 12.77 percent of his speech. Bu sh II said that it was essential to spread freedom and democracy in Iraq as a way to comb at terrorism. Terrorism was the third most discussed topic by Bush II, acc ounting for 11.5 percent of his address. Aside from discussing terrorism in regards to Iraq, Bush II also talked about the importance of fighting terrorism in other Middle Eastern countries. Congress also spent the most time discussing so cial security, which was the main topic of 32.6 percent of the speeches (see Figure 2-14). Th ere was a large partisan divide in discussing social security, with most Democrats critical of Bush II’s plan to privati ze social security. In fact, about two-thirds of the members who spoke predominantly about social security were Democrats criticizing Bush II’s pl an. One criticism was that Bush II inaccurately predicted that social security was headed towards bankruptcy. “He says the Social Security system is in crisis. He predicted last night that at a certain time th e Social Security system would be bankrupt. But it is not in crisis, and it will not be bankrupt. He is simply wrong” (Dorgan 2005). Another criticism was that Bush’s plan would remove the guarantee of income for senior citizens.

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57 “Privatization will replace the security of a gua ranteed check for a guaranteed gamble” (Mikulski 2005). Republicans who spoke in favor the privatiz ation plan used much of the same rhetoric Bush II had. The second most discussed topic by me mbers of Congress was the budget, which accounted for 29.1 percent of responses. There was also a large partisan divide when discussing the budget, with Republicans praising Bush II’s budget, and Democrats criticizing it. For example, Republican Judd Gregg said, “The botto m line is this: The President has proposed a stringent, responsible budget whic h moves us toward reducing the de ficit by half in the next four years. That is what we need to do” (2005). However, comments supportive of Bush II’s budget such as this one were countered with statemen ts such as the one made by Democrat Sherrod Brown. Brown said, “The President's everyman-for-himself budget neglects our communities and betrays our moral values as a nation” (2005). It is interesting that members spent so much time discussing Bush II’s budget considering he only mentioned it three times during this SOU address. The third most discussed topic by member s of Congress was Iraq, which was the main topic of 10.5 percent of congressi onal responses. There was also a partisan divide in discussing Iraq, with some Democrats wanting to pull Ameri can troops out of Iraq. In response to those members, Republican Mitch McConnell said, “We will leave Iraq some day, when the Iraqi democracy has taken hold and when the Iraqi m ilitary and Iraqi police can provide for their own security and not a day before th at” (2005). Republicans also spoke of Iraq in much the same way as Bush II, mainly by trying to emphasize progress which had been made there. In 2006, Bush II discussed a much wider variety of topics than he had in previous years, and did not spend an overwhelming amount of time on any one topic (see Figure 2-15).

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58 However, he still tended to emphasize foreign polic ies. The topic Bush II discussed the most was terrorism, which accounted for a little over eight percen t of his address. Bush II discussed progress that had been made in the war on terror, as well as em phasized why it was important to continue the fight. The second most discussed topic by Bush II was Iraq, of which he spent 5.5 percent of his speech discussing. Bush II said that the U.S. was helping Iraq build an inclusive government, reconstruct their economy, and was also helping trai n Iraqis to provide th eir own security. The third most discussed topic by Bush II was a dom estic one – the economy. Bush II described the economy as “healthy and vigorous, and growing fast er than other major industrialized nations” (2006). Bush II said that jobs had been create d which helped the grow th of the economy, and that his economic plan would contin ue to create jobs. Bush II also said that part of his economic plan was to continue to provi de tax relief to Americans. By 2006, Congress had returned its focus almo st entirely towards domestic affairs (see Figure 2-16). The main topic discussed by me mbers of Congress was the budget, accounting for 19.4 percent of the responses. There was agai n a partisan divide, with most Republicans speaking in favor of Bush II’s budget. For exam ple, Republican James Barrett said, “I applaud the President for submitting a budget proposal that will meet America's needs while maintaining fiscal accountability and responsibility” (2006). However, Democrats criticized Bush II’s budget saying it was anything but responsible. Demo crat Timothy Ryan said, “This Republican Congress continues to borrow and borrow and bo rrow and spend and spend and spend, really, like drunken sailors, like there is no end in si ght; and our country canno t continue to go down this irresponsible path” (2006).

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59 The next most discussed topic by Congre ss was energy, accounting for 14.5 percent of congressional responses. Most members sp eaking about energy were concerned with the increasing gas prices. “The exorbitant cost of fu el is one of the most critical issues facing our nation” (Leahy 2006). Of those members who said there was an energy crisis, 68.8 percent were in favor of finding new sources of energy other than oil. Bush II also discussed energy in his address, spending a little over f our percent of his speech on it, and was also in favor of finding alternative sources of energy. The third most discussed topic by members of Congress was civil ri ghts. Most of the discussion centered around Coretta Scott King, w ho died shortly before the SOU address and was applauded by Bush II. In fact, all of the members discussing civil rights also mentioned King. It is interesting that so many members mentioned King and civil rights considering that Bush II only mentioned her twice at the beginning of his speech. Partisanship in Unified Government In returning to the question of how members of the minority party behave during periods of unified government, the behavior of members of the majority pa rty also must be considered. For example, if members of the minority party ar e more likely to criticize the president, does that mean that members of the majority party are le ss likely? Asked a differe nt way, are members of the majority party more likely to speak in s upport of the president dur ing periods of unified government? To answer these questions, it first has to be determined who was sp eaking during the four periods of unified government examined. Table 2-1 shows the percentage of speakers in each year that were Democrat and Republican. L ooking at the table, there appears to be no discernable pattern in regards to who is speaking in response to th e president. However, I would

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60 like to suggest that when more members of the minority party speak, it is an indication of less presidential influence in Congress. For example, after analyzing Carter’s SOU addresses in 1979 and 1980, and the subsequent congressional response s, it appears that he had littl e influence in Congress, even among members of his own party. That it is why it is not surprising that th ere were considerably more Republicans speaking than Democrats. This suggests that Republicans wanted to speak as a way to challenge Carter, and that Democrats were unwilling to speak in defense of him. However, in looking at the other examples of uni fied government, there does not appear to be a pattern. During the 96th, 108th, and 109th congresses members of one pa rty were not consistently talking more than members of the other. This suggests that while partis anship may play some role in who decides to sp eak, it does not appear to be the predominant factor. Even though the party affiliations of memb ers may not influence who speaks, it does have an effect on what is being said. This is pa rticularly true in regard s to whether members are speaking about issues in the same manner as the president, and whether or not they challenge him on these issues. As is apparent in the four periods of unified government examined, members of the presiden t’s party are likely to discuss polic ies using similar language as the president, whereas members from the opposing pa rty typically discuss to pics using different rhetoric. This is consistent with research conducted by other scholars which has found that presidents are more likely to receive support from their parties during periods of unified government (Conley 2003). An exception to this, as was evident during the Carter presidency, is when there is a lack of unity w ithin a political party (Sundquist 1992). Conclusions The real issue appears to be not whether there is unified or divided government, but instead each president’s relationshi p with Congress. This is cons istent with other scholars who

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61 found having unified government does not necessaril y mean increased presid ential leadership in Congress (Fiorina 2002; Mayhew 1991). In othe r words, while having unified government definitely gives presidents the potential to be mo re influential, it does not necessarily mean they will. This can be seen by looking at Tables 2-2 and 2-3, which show levels of presidential influence during both divided and united government. During unified government approximately 55.6 percent of years were low infl uence, 22.2 percent of years medium influence, and 22.2 percent of years were high partisan. Looking at periods of divided government, approximately 27.8 percent of years were low in fluence, 50 percent of years were medium influence, 5.6 percent of years were high partis an influence, and 16.7 percent of years were high influence. Therefore, presidents actually appear to have less influence during periods of unified government although there does not really seem to be a discernable patter n. Instead, there is a mix of high, medium, and low levels of in fluence during both types of government. Instead, other factors come into play. For exam ple, in looking at th e three presidents in this example, the only one who was not very in fluential, even among members of his own party, was Carter. The probable explanation for this is that Carter never had a good relationship with Congress from the onset. According to scholars w ho have studied Carter’s presidency, instead of trying to work with members of Congress, Carter had a “tendency to lambaste Congress and to ignore or undermine supporters on the domestic measures he proposed” (Glad 1980, 426). This led to feelings of resentment towards Ca rter, even among his supporters (Glad 1980). Aside from his behavior towards members of Congress, Carter al so angered Democrats by making budget cuts to domestic programs which caused many to feel that Carter was moving the Democratic Party away from its traditional support of social programs (Haas 1992). This

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62 was especially true of the 1980 budget, in which Carter recommended reducti ons in areas such as housing, Medicare, and Social S ecurity, yet included a three percent increase for military spending (ibid). Looking at these examples, it is evident why Carter was not able to exert more influence in Congress. Clinton appears to have had more influen ce than Carter in Congress, at least with members of his own party. Members of Congress were discussing largely the same topics as Clinton during 1993 and 1994, however, not always in the same manner. Democrats typically discussed policies using the same rhetoric as Clinton, whereas Republicans were more likely to challenge Clinton’s policies. Even though Clin ton was getting much more support from his party than Carter was, Clinton wa s still not able to influence Re publicans. This was especially true in regards to his health care plan. However, Clinton a nd the Democrats in Congress were still able to accomplish other dom estic policy goals (Conley 2003). Bush II also had much influence in Congr ess with members of his own party, however, faced similar problems with Democrats as C linton had with Republicans in Congress. Republicans used much of the same rhetoric as Bush II when discussing policies, whereas Democrats discussed items differen tly and were more critical of Bush II. Another difficulty for Bush II was that members of Congress did not always follow Bush II’s lead in setting the national agenda. Bush II was much more likel y to discuss foreign affairs whereas Congress focused predominantly on domestic policies. Th is suggests that presidents may have varying levels of influence in Congress depending on whet her they are discussing foreign or domestic policies. This question will be further addressed in Chapter 7. Overall, whether government is unified or divided does not seem to the predominant factor in determining presidential influence in Congress, but just one of a number of factors.

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63 The other factors affecting presid ential influence should become more apparent in the following chapters.

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64 TopicH um a n Ri ght s Campai gn Fi nanc e W e apon s F or ei gn Affai r s A gr i cult ure Empl oy ment C i vil R ights Economy E ner gy M ilitary/Defense H eal t h Care E ducati on B udgetPercent20 10 0 Figure 2-1. 1979 SOU Address Topics TopicEducation S.O.U. (general) Budget Bureaucratic Reform Foreign Affairs Employment InflationPercent20 10 0 Figure 2-2. 1979 Congressional Response Topics

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65 TopicS o viet U n ion Hu m an Ri g hts W e a po ns For e ign Affairs E m p l oymen t Tra d e E co nomy Energy Mil it ary/D ef ense Health Care Educat ion BudgetPercentage40 30 20 10 0 Figure 2-3. 1980 SOU Address Topics TopicIran Energy Taxes Budget Inflation Military/Defense Soviet Union Foreign AffairsPercent40 30 20 10 0 Figure 2-4. 1980 Congressional Response Topics

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66 TopicCri m e Campai gn Fi nanc e Wel f ar e Weapons E m pl oy ment T r ade B ur eaucr acy E nviron me n t E conomy E ner gy M i l i t ar y/ Def ense H eal t h Care S ocia l S e curit y E ducati on T axes B udgetPercentage20 10 0 Figure 2-5. 1993 SOU Address Topics TopicBureaucracy Campaign Finance Employment Economy Guns Health Care Education Taxes BudgetPercent50 40 30 20 10 0 Figure 2-6. 1993 Congressional Response Topics

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67 TopicGun Cont r ol C r i m e Drug Policy Weapons National Security E m ploym ent C i vil R ights Environment Mi l i t ar y/ Def ense Educat i on BudgetPercentage20 10 0 Figure 2-7. 1994 SOU Address Topics TopicsCrime W el fare T rade C ampaign Finance F orei gn A ffai r s E m p l oymen t D rug Polic y E co nomy G uns He alth C ar e Ed u cation T axe s B udge tPercent50 40 30 20 10 0 Figure 2-8. 1994 Congressional Response Topics

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68 TopicAIDS Drug Policy W e ap ons Foreign Affairs N at i onal S ec u r i t y I r aq Af g hanistan Terrorism E m ploym ent B ur eaucr ac y Environment Economy Energy Mi l i t ar y/ Def ense Heal t h C a re Social S e curity Educat i on Tax e s BudgetPercentage30 20 10 0 Figure 2-9. 2003 SOU Address Topics TopicsAIDS Other Environment Iraq Energy Health Care Taxes Economy Military/Defense TerrorismPercent50 40 30 20 10 0 Figure 2-10. 2003 Congressional Response Topics

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69 TopicDrug Policy I m m i gr at i on Weapons Foreign Affairs National Security I r aq T er r or i sm Employment T r ade E conomy Energy Military/Defense Heal t h C a re Socia l Securit y Educat i on Taxes BudgetPercentage16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Figure 2-11. 2004 SOU Address Topics TopicOth e r Immigration Iraq He a lt h Ca re Drug Poli c y Budg e t Ec o n o my Foreign Affairs Employm e n t Mil i ta r y /De f e n s e TerrorismPercent20 10 0 Figure 2-12. 2004 Congressional Response Topics

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70 TopicAIDS D r ug Pol i cy Immigration W e ap ons Foreign A f f airs National Security Iraq T er r or i sm E m ploym ent Environme n t Economy E ner gy Mi l i t ar y/ Def ense Health Care Social S e curity Education Tax e s BudgetPercentage30 20 10 0 Figure 2-13. 2005 SOU Address Topics TopicsOt h er I mm igratio n Ir a q Health Care Taxes Budget H ome land S ec urity Military/Defense Social Security Terroris mPercent40 30 20 10 0 Figure 2-14. 2005 Congressional Response Topics

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71 TopicC r ime AIDS Drug Policy Immigration W e lf ar e W e apon s Foreign Affairs N at i onal S ec u r i t y I raq T er r or i sm E m ploym ent Trade Bureaucracy Environment Economy Ener gy Mi l i t ar y/ Def ense Heal t h C a re Socia l Securit y Education Taxes BudgetPercentage10 8 6 4 2 0 Figure 2-15. 2006 SOU Address Topics TopicsN ucl ea r Weapon s Ir a q E n e rg y H ealt h C are F o r ei g n A ffai rs Educ a tion Taxe s Budget Econ o my Civil Rights Homelan d Security Military/Defense Imm i gr a tion TerrorismPercent30 20 10 0 Figure 2-16. 2006 Congressional Response Topics

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72 Table 2-1. Party Identification of Speaking Members Democrat Republican 96th Congress 197945% 55% 198029.2% 70.8% 103rd Congress 199355.9% 44.1% 199450% 50% 108th Congress 200347.6% 50% 200467.7% 32.3% 109th Congress 200559.3% 40.7% 200641.3% 58.7% Table 2-2. Levels of Influe nce During Unified Government 1978 Low 1979 Low 1980 Low 1993 High Partisan 1994 High Partisan 2003 Medium 2004 Low 2005 Medium 2006 Low

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73 Table 2-3. Levels of Influe nce During Divided Government 1981 High 1982 High 1983 Medium 1984 Medium 1985 Low 1986 Medium 1987 Medium 1988 Medium 1990 Medium 1991 High 1992 Medium 1995 Low 1996 Low 1997 Medium 1998 Medium 2000 Low 2001 High Partisan 2002 Low

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74 CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL FACTORS AND PR ESIDENTIAL PERSUASION As shown in Chapter 2, having unified or di vided government is not the deciding factor in whether or not a president is able to exert infl uence in Congress. This chapter seeks to explore some other political factors and their possible im pact on presidential persuasion. One factor that might affect presidential influence is whether or not the president has (or claims to have) an electoral mandate. Having an electoral mandate will likely allow presidents to exert more influence in Congress. A second pot ential factor in regards to pr esidential influence is whether the president is speaking early or late during his term, and whethe r he is speaking during his first or second term. It is likely that presidents will have more influence when speaking at the beginning of their term, or duri ng their first term, and less infl uence towards the end of their term, or when speaking during th eir second term. A third politic al factor which may affect a president’s influence is presidential approval rati ngs. Presidents will likely be more influential when they have higher approval ratings and less in fluence when their approval ratings are lower. Examining electoral mandates, when a presiden t is speaking, and presid ential approval ratings will help show whether these po litical factors affect a presid ent’s influence in Congress. Electoral Mandates Andrew Jackson was the first president ever to claim he had an electoral mandate, even though he did not use that exact terminology (Dah l 1990). When presidents claim to have an electoral mandate upon taking office, what does th at mean and does it allow for more influence over Congress? First it is necessary to define what is meant by an electoral mandate since scholars studying electoral mandates have used va rious definitions. For example, one simplistic definition is that an electoral mandate is wh en citizens send messages about their preferences using votes (Peterson, et al, 2003). However, other scholars claim that mandates can be divided

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75 into various types – policy, personal, and party (Hershey 1994). For the purposes of this dissertation, electoral mandates will be defined as a strategic interaction between presidents and Congress (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005). If a president claims to have an electoral ma ndate, what effect does th at have? First, it is necessary to point out that for an electoral mandate to be effective, one does not actually have to exist, but simply has to be perceived to ex ist (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Hershey 1994; Peterson, et al, 2003). Potentially, electora l mandates could allow the president to have the authority necessary to carry out his policy ag enda (Hershey 1994). This is because electoral mandates are believed to alte r congressional behavior (Cohe n 1982; Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Hershey 1994; Peterson, et al, 2003). If a president claims to ha ve an electoral mandate, then members of Congress are likely to take notice. Members of Congress are most lik ely to respond to claims of a mandate if the president is popular, or sometimes even if the pr esident is unpopular but hi s policies are in line with those of Congress (Grossback, Peterson, an d Stimson 2005). This makes sense assuming that members of Congress are indeed single-mi nded seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974), and strongly influenced by concerns about re-elec tion (Arnold 1990; Griffin 2006). If a popular president claims to have an electoral manda te, then members of Congress will likely be influenced out of concern for their own electoral wellbeing. This chapter seeks to show whether or not electoral mandates have an impact on electoral behavior by examining two years the presiden t may have had a mandate – 1980 and 1984. When studying electoral mandates, 1980 is sometimes cited as a year when the pr esident received an electoral mandate (Hershey 1994). However, othe r scholars do not think Ronald Reagan had an

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76 electoral mandate in 1980 because he won with le ss than 51 percent of the popular vote, and that more voters were voting against Jimmy Ca rter than for Reagan (Dahl 1990). This raises the question of how is it determined whether the president has an electoral mandate? Usually electoral mandates are asso ciated with landslide elections (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Hershey 1994). That is why more scholars agree that Reagan had an electoral mandate in 1984 th an in 1980 (ibid). In 1984, Reagan won re-election with 58.8 percent of the popular vote, and won the electoral votes of every state except Minnesota, which was the home state of Reagan’s opponent, Walter Mondale (http://www.uselectionatl as.org/RESULTS/index.html ). However, some scholars contend that part of Reagan’s victory came not from voter s reaffirming his policies, but instead from Mondale’s poor campaigning. To determine whether Reagan was able to exert more influen ce in Congress during 1981 and 1985, therefore possibly indicating the effects of electoral mandates, the level of influence he had during these two years will be compared with the rest of his presidency. If Reagan did receive electoral mandates in 1980 and 1984, then ther e should have been spikes in his influence during 1981 and 1985. For Reagan to have been mo re influential during these years, I would expect to find that members of Congress were di scussing the same topics as Reagan and also using largely the same rhetoric. Also, it will be determined whether Reagan claimed to have a mandate during his SOU addresses in 1981 a nd 1985, and whether any members of Congress said Reagan had a mandate in their speeches. If Reagan was not more influential during 1981 and 1985 in comparison to the rest of his presidency, this could suggest that electoral mandate s do not have an im pact on presidential influence or congressional behavior. This would be consistent with the claims of some scholars

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77 that electoral mandates do not exist (Dahl 1990; Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005). The existence of electoral mandate s is generally questioned by sc holars who view voters as too “uninformed, unopinionated, and uninvolved for ther e to be a clear policy signal” (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005, 406). However, it could also be that all presidents receive more influence during the first year of their term. In 1981, Reagan did not specifically state he had an electoral mandate. Instead, he discussed the economy the most, followed by empl oyment and taxes (see Table 3-1). In his address, Reagan acknowledged that the economy wa s not performing well, and outlined his plan to improve the economy which included decr easing the unemployment rate and taxes. Members of Congress also did not state that Reagan had an electoral mandate. The most discussed topic in Congress was also the economy (36.4 percent). Similar to Reagan, members of Congress also said the economy was in poor shape and needed improvement. Most members of Congress sounded optimistic about Reagan ’s economic plan, even though Democrats controlled Congress at the time. Aside from the economy, the next most discussed topic by members of Congress was the budget (13.6 percen t). Even though the budget is somewhat related to discussions of the economy, Reagan only spent a little over thr ee percent of his speech discussing the budget. Finally, me mbers of Congress also discu ssed taxes (11.4 percent). Not surprisingly, most Republicans s upported Reagan’s plan to cut taxes, while most Democrats were somewhat skeptical. The economy was again the main topic disc ussed by Reagan in 1982 (see Table 3-2). Reagan again acknowledged that the economy was in a recession, but said that unlike previous recessions in the U.S., his economic plan would be an effective solution to the problem. Reagan said his economic plan included decreasing gov ernment spending, taxes, and unemployment.

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78 Federalism was the second most discussed topi c by Reagan. Reagan sa id that control of programs such as welfare and education needed to be returned to the states. He said that allowing states to control more programs would decrease the size of th e national government, as well as decrease government spendi ng. The third most discussed topic by Reagan was foreign affairs. Reagan mainly discussed the relations hip between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the ongoing peace talks between the two countries. Members of Congress again discussed largely the same topics as Reagan in 1982. The most discussed topic in Congr ess was the economy, with members also discussing Reagan’s economic plan and other possible solutions to en ding the recession. Related to discussion of the economy was the second most disc ussed topic in Congress, empl oyment. Members of Congress were also concerned with decr easing the high level of unemplo yment by creating new jobs. The third most discussed topic in Congress was federalis m. There was more of a partisan divide in the discussion of federalism, with most Republican s in favor of giving more power to the states. Reagan continued to discuss similar topics in 1983. The economy was again the most discussed topic (see Table 3-3). Reagan started his address by sa ying “the state of our Union is strong, but our economy is troubled” (1983). Howe ver, he also said that his economic plan combined with the “courage, patience, and stre ngth” of Americans woul d allow the U.S. to persevere (Reagan 1983). The second most discussed topic in 1983 was foreign affairs. Reagan again discussed the Soviet Union. He said that while U.S. relations with the Soviet Union had improved, that there were still peace negotiations taking place, particul arly regarding the pro liferation of nuclear weapons. Reagan discussed employment the third most. Once again he said that unemployment was too high and that more jobs needed to be created.

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79 In 1983, Congress discussed largely different to pics than Reagan (see Table 3-3). The main topics discussed in Congre ss were social security and trad e (15.4 percent each). In his SOU address, Reagan discussed how he had b een working with members of Congress in a bipartisan manner to help secure social secur ity. However, many members of Congress felt the social security issue was not yet resolved and that they were not being included as much as they should. In regards to trade, members mainly di scussed making sure trad e with other countries was fair to U.S. workers. The next most discussed topics in Congre ss were the economy and weapons (11.5 percent each). In regards to the econom y, members of Congress again discussed ways to improve the economy, proposing many of the same solutions as Reagan – lowering unemployment, reducing government spending, etc. Members of Congress also used much of the same rhetoric as Reagan in their discussion of nuclear weapons. Like Re agan, one of their main concerns was negotiating weapons reduction with the Soviet Union. So even though members of Congress and Reagan placed emphasis on different topics, they were discussing them largely in the same way. In 1984, Reagan once again discussed the economy the most (see Table 3-4). Reagan said that a key to economic recovery was to reduce government spending and thereby bring the federal deficit down. The second most discussed topic by Reagan was foreign affairs. Reagan again discussed peace negotiations and reducing nuclear arms, however, he also discussed continued peace efforts in the Middle East, Cent ral America, and southern Africa. Reagan discussed taxes the third most. Reagan mainly discussed taxes in the context of lowering them as part of his economic recovery plan. Congress also discussed the economy and sp ecifically the economic recovery plan, however, almost half of the congressional res ponses focused on the budget (see Table 3-4).

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80 While most members agreed that government spending should be reduced, there was vast disagreement on what should be cut from the budget. Republicans typically supported Reagan’s proposed budget cuts, while Democrats challenged them. The third most discussed topic by members was foreign affairs. Similar to Reagan ’s discussion of foreign affairs, members were concerned mainly with the Soviet Union, but al so with peace in other countries as well. In 1985, again Reagan did not explicitly stat e he has a mandate, however, he did imply that he was re-elected because Americans we re satisfied with his economic program and improvements in the economy whic h occurred during his first term in office. This lead the economy to again be the most disc ussed topic (see Table 3-5). Somewhat related to Reagan’s discussion of the economy was the next most discu ssed topic, taxes. Reagan said he would not raise taxes as a way to balance the budget, but instead would reduce government spending. The third most discussed topic by Reagan was forei gn affairs, of which he mainly discussed the Soviet Union and Nicaragua. An interesting situation occurred in regard s to congressional res ponses in 1985. The day immediately following the SOU address, 14 congressi onal responses related to Reagan’s address were analyzed. However, then Congress ad journed for 10 days. Once Congress resumed session, no members were discussi ng topics related to Reagan’s SOU address. Of the congressional responses coded, four of the 14 we re in regards to space travel (28.6 percent), which Reagan only briefly mentioned in his addre ss. Other than that, two speeches each were on the budget, the military, and the economy. It appears as though members of Congress were discussing similar issues, however, it is difficu lt to make any generalizations since so few speeches were analyzed. Based on the fact that the speeches analyzed were generally supportive

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81 of Reagan’s policies and that more members did not challenge Reagan, this could be evidence of increased influence due to the pe rception of an electoral mandate. For the first time during his presidency, the economy was the not the topic Reagan discussed most in his 1986 SOU address (see Tabl e 3-6). Instead, the main topic discussed by Reagan was foreign affairs (8.7 percent). As in his previous addresses, Reagan again discussed the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union. However, Reagan also discussed spreading freedom, and specifically me ntioned Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Reagan discussed taxes the second most ( 8.1 percent). Reagan said he remained committed to not raising taxes. He also cr iticized members of Congress who said it was necessary to raise taxes by repeating his charge that instead government spending needed to be reduced. Reagan said, “We do not face large deficits because American families are undertaxed; we face those deficits because the Fe deral Government overspends (1986)”. The third most discussed topic by Reagan was th e budget (7 percent). Reagan said that it was necessary to have a balanced budget, and that passing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation would help do that. Members of Congress were esp ecially responsive to Reagan’s discussion of the budget. The budget was the main topic discussed in Congress, accounting for 46.3 percent of responses (see Table 3-6). Some members of Congress, particularly Democrats, were critical of Reagan’s budget, claiming that his spending cuts were in the wrong areas. For example, Representative Bill Richardson sai d, “If you depend on Pentagon dollars, you're in good shape. If you depend on domestic spending, fo rget it, you're in deep trouble” (1986). The second most discussed t opic in Congress was the econo my. Members of Congress were concerned about the national debt, and findi ng ways to continue economic growth. The third most discussed topic in Congress was the m ilitary and defense. There were a variety of

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82 topics discussed in relation to the military and defense, most of which concerned the Department of Defense. In 1987, Reagan discussed largely the same topics he had in 1986 (see Table 3-7). Foreign affairs was again the main topic discusse d by Reagan (28.9 percent). Reagan said that it was apparent that the Soviet Union was trying to expand their power, and that the presence of their military in countries such as Syria, Vietna m, and Nicaragua was evidence of that. Reagan also discussed Latin America. He said that “ over 90 percent of the peopl e of Latin America live in democracy,” and that Nicaragua was one of th e last communist countries to remain (Reagan 1986). Therefore, he said the U.S. should suppo rt the efforts of the “freedom fighters” to overthrow the Communis t Sandinista government. Somewhat related to his discussion of fore ign affairs, was the second most discussed topic by Reagan – the budget. Reagan said that Congress made defense cuts to his budget which would not allow the U.S. to be able to effec tively assist other countri es and protect national interests. Instead, he said cuts needed to be made in other areas, su ch as welfare. Also somewhat related was the third most discussed to pic by Reagan – the mili tary. Reagan mainly discussed the service men and women stationed in other countries, and once again mentioned the necessity of adequate military/defense funding. Members of Congress were also discussing mainly foreign policy topics in 1987 (see Table 3-7). The main topic discussed in Congr ess was weapons. Most members continued to express concern over the possessio n of weapons by the Soviet Union, and how this was a threat to U.S. national security. Related to this wa s the second most discu ssed topic in Congress – foreign affairs. Members of Congress discussed la rgely the same countries as Reagan. The main

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83 difference was that not all members of Congress were convinced that the U.S. should continue funding the opposition to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The third most discussed topic in Congre ss was the budget. The majority of members discussing the budget were Republicans, and they used much of the same rhetoric used by Reagan. For example, members of Congress also said the budget needed to be balanced. Additionally, members of Congress responded to Reagan’s call to give him the line-item veto by saying that it was necessary for the president to have that power as a way to have a more fiscally responsible budget. Reagan used his SOU address in 1988 to summarize some of the things he had accomplished during his presidency. This resulted in him discussing many of the same topics he had during his previous seven a ddresses (see Table 3-8). Fore ign affairs was again the main topic of his address, and he once again discussed U.S. relations w ith the Soviet Union. Reagan also discussed U.S. assistance to other countries and said that it ha d helped the image of the U.S. He said, “We've replaced ‘Blame America’ with ‘Look up to Am erica’” (Reagan 1988). The second most discussed topic by Reagan was the budget. Reagan said less progress had been made regarding the budget, and that bud get deadlines were stil l continuing to not be met. Once again, Reagan also asked Congress to give the president the power of the line-item veto. Reagan was more positive in his discussion of the economy, which was the third most discussed topic. Reagan said that the economy was “strong and grow ing” and that to keep it that way, it was necessary to keep inflation low and employment high. Members of Congress also discussed foreign affairs the most (see Table 3-8). Members were mainly concerned with the situation in Ni caragua, and many were he sitant to provide any

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84 more assistance to the Contras. Even though Reag an did mention the situation in Nicaragua, his discussion of it was much different fr om that taking place in Congress. The second most discussed t opic in Congress was weapons. Members again discussed the possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and arms control. The third most discussed topic in Congress was the budget. Members discussing the budget were largely supportive of Reagan and his proposals, such as sending the president 13 separate appropriations bills. In looking at Reagan’s influe nce across his presidency, it appears to vary. Reagan discussed the same main topi cs – the economy, the budget, fore ign affairs, weapons, and the military – throughout his presidency. For the most part, members of Congress were also discussing the same topics. However, members of Congress were not always discussing them the same way. For example, not all members ag reed with Reagan’s economic recovery plan, particularly not raising taxes. Also, members of Congress pu t much more emphasis on some topics – such as the situation in Nicaragua – than Reagan did. So is there any evidence that Reagan had electoral mandates in 1980 and 1984? Looking at Reagan’s influence during 1981 and 1985, there seems to be in conclusive evidence as to whether an electoral mandate existed, and if s o, whether it had any effect on Reagan’s influence in Congress. Even though Reagan did have a hi gh level of influence in 1981, his influence in 1985 was low. However, what appears to be Re agan’s low influence in 1985 could actually be caused by so few speeches being analyzed. Therefor e, no conclusions can be drawn in regards to electoral mandates and their affect on presidential influe nce in Congress. Early vs. Late Another political factor which could potentially affect pres idential influence in Congress is whether the president is speaking early or late in his term. Scholars contend that presidents

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85 have the best ability to influence Congress ea rly in their terms (Eshbaugh-Soha 2005; Lewis and Strine 1996). This is likely because support for the president is generall y higher at the beginning of his term and then decreases over time (Brace and Hinckley 1991). Also, presidents speaking early in their terms are likely to exert more influence since they probably have not yet established a solid relationship w ith Congress, meaning they are less likely to be on bad terms with Congress. Therefore, I expect to find that presidents have the highes t level of influence in Congress during the first year of their term and th at their level of influence decreases over time. Comparatively, presidents will likely have less infl uence at the end of their term when members of Congress have less incentive to cooperate, an d presidents could be viewed as lame ducks. To see whether this is the case, the level of influence the president had during each year of his presidency was labeled hi gh, high partisan, medium, or low. For the president to have a high level of influence, then members of Congress would have to discuss the same topics as the president and use largely the same rhetoric. When only members of the president’s party discussed the same topics and used the same rh etoric, then the level of influence was labeled high partisan. The level of influence was labe led medium when either members of Congress were discussing the same topics but using di fferent rhetoric, or members were discussing different topics but using the same rhetoric. Fi nally, low levels of influence are when members of Congress were both discussing differen t topics and using different rhetoric. Table 3-9 shows the levels of influence each president had throughout hi s term or terms. Looking at the table, several patterns emerge. Firs t, it is important to not e that influence was not evaluated during the first year of either Carter or Bush I’s presidencies. As mentioned previously, Carter did not give a SOU address in 1977. As for Bush I, Congress was in recess for a month after his 1989 SOU address, th erefore no responses could be analyzed.

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86 In looking at the first years of the other thr ee presidents, all of them had either high or high partisan levels of influence, which can be s een in Table 3-10. In fact , in looking at the first two years of a president’s first te rm, 62.5 percent of years were either high or high partisan. This suggests that influence is higher at the beginning of a president’s term. In looking at influence after th e first year, it does seem to decrease. Presidents had low levels of influence during 50 percent of the last two years of their first term, 40 percent of years were medium influence, and only 10 percent high influence (see Table 3-11). Therefore, presidents appear to have more infl uence at the beginning of their terms. First vs. Second Term This is also true for the beginning of a pres ident’s second term. Influence increases again during the fifth year, or the first ye ar of the president’s second term . Three of the five presidents included in this dissertation served second term s – Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II. For Clinton and Bush II, their levels of in fluence increased from low to me dium between their fourth and fifth years. Reagan’s influence actually decreas ed from medium to low between his fourth and fifth years, however, this is not necessarily reliable due to a limited amount of data available for his fifth year. Nonetheless, looking at Table 312 provides evidence that presidents receive a bump in influence immediately following an election. In looking at influence during a president’s fi rst term compared to his second term, there does seem to be a slight decrease. This is co nsistent with scholars who claim that influence decreases after the second year of a president’s second term when he is viewed as a lame duck (Lewis and Strine 1996). Table 3-12 shows that the difference does not appear to be terribly stark. For example, in looking at Reagan’s second term, even though he seems to have less influence overall, he still retains a medium level of influence throughout his second term.

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87 Clinton’s influence definitely d ecreases during his second term, part icularly at the end when his presidency was surrounded by scandal. Even though only two years of Bush II’s second te rm have been examined thus far, it also appears that he is losing influe nce in Congress. Considering his decreasing levels of public approval and that Democrats regained contro l of Congress during th e November 2006 midterm elections, it is unlikely that his in fluence will increase. In fact , I would expect to see conflict increase between Bush II and Democrats in Congre ss, and Bush II’s overall level of influence to decrease even further. Presidential Approval Ratings Aside from when a president is speaking, anot her political factor that could potentially affect presidential persuasion is the president’s approval ratin g. Public support is a crucial resource for the president (Edwards 2004), partic ularly because a higher approval rating can give presidents more leverage in Congress (Bond, Fleischer, and Wood 2003; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Conley 2000; Lockerbie, Borrelli, and He dger 1998; Ostrom and Si mon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985; Sullivan 1991). However, the corre lation between presiden tial approval and presidential influence in Congre ss is not always consistent. Th ere have been instances when high presidential approval did not translate into legislative suc cess. For example, after the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Bush I had a high level of approval but was not ab le to exert influence in Congress (Bond, Fleischer, and Wood 2003; Ca nes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002; Collier and Sullivan 1995). Examples such as this have led more recent studies to conclude that there is no correlation between presidential persuasion and le gislative success (Colli er and Sullivan 1995). Other studies have found that although the relationship betw een presidential approval and influence in Congress is not alwa ys consistent, that there is a correlation (Bond, Fleischer, and Wood 2003). These scholars attribute the variati on in the relationship to partisan changes in

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88 Congress. They find that as partisanship in C ongress increases, that the effect of presidential approval decreases (ibid). Therefore, it would be expected that presidenti al approval would not have as much of an effect on presidential infl uence in Congress as th e parties become more polarized. By looking at each president’s approval at the time they gave their SOU address, and then looking at how members of Congress responded, it can be determined whether presidents with higher approval ratings were more influential in Congress. Consiste nt with the studies previously discussed, I expect to find this rela tionship to vary over time with some presidents better able to capitalize on their high approval. If I find this to be the case then I hope to also be able to identify the factors which allow some pr esidents to benefit from their high approval more than others. Table 3-13 shows each president’s approval at the time of their SOU address as well as their level of influence. In examining the tabl e, it appears that ther e is no correlation between presidential approval and influe nce in Congress. For example, in 2002 when Bush II had 84.45 percent approval, he had little in fluence over the topics being di scussed in topics and the way they were being discussed. So even though Bush II had high approval, hi s influence in Congress was low. Similarly, in 1983, Reagan was able to exert a high level of influence in Congress while having less than half of the public’s approval. There seems to be no consistent pattern rega rding the relationship between presidential approval and legislative success. The lowest levels of approval for presidents in my study were between 37.27 and 49.89 percent. Howe ver, presidents within this range were able to have low, medium, and high levels of influence. The same is true for the highest levels of approval, from 60.65 to 84.45 percent. Presidents within this range also had lo w, medium, and high levels of

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89 influence. Therefore, I have to conclude that presidential approval has no effect on presidential influence in Congress. Conclusions Unfortunately, due to the difficult nature of defining electoral mandates and the limited data I had, I am not able to make any conclusi ons regarding the effect of electoral mandates on presidential influence. I also found that a president’s level of a pproval does not have an impact on his influence in Congress. However, conclusi ons can be drawn about the impact of when a president speaks during his term. It appears that presidents ar e able to exert more influence in Congress at the beginning of their terms. Looki ng at each president’s level of overall influence during each year of their term, mo st presidents started out with a higher level of influence which eventually decreased as time went on. The same is true for presidents serving two terms. The influence of presidents increased during the first year of their se cond term and then decreased agai n after that. Al so, presidents tended to have the lowest level of influence duri ng the last two years of their second term, which is consistent with the idea that presidents are “lame ducks” at th e end of their second term. This suggests that electoral mandates may not even matter, but instead, that all pr esidents are likely to have a higher level of influence du ring the first year of their te rm, be it their first or second. Therefore, the political factor that matters is when during his term a president is speaking.

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90 Table 3-1. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1981 Reagan Congress Economy 24.4% Economy 36.4% Employment 11.5% Budget 13.6% Taxes 11.5% Taxes 11.4% Table 3-2. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1982 Reagan Congress Economy 20.3% Economy 31.3% Federalism 11.2% Employment 18.8% Foreign Affairs 10.8% Federalism 12.5% Table 3-3. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1983 Reagan Congress Economy 27% Social Security 15.4% Foreign Affairs 12.1% Trade 15.4% Employment 10.2% Economy 11.5% Table 3-4. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1984 Reagan Congress Economy 12.6% Budget 49% Foreign Affairs 11.8% Economy 17.6% Taxes 6.9% Foreign Affairs 13.7% Table 3-5. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1985 Reagan Congress Economy 11.6% Economy 36.4% Taxes 10.3% Budget 13.6% Foreign Affairs 9.8% Taxes 11.4%

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91 Table 3-6. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1986 Reagan Congress Foreign Affairs 8.7% Budget 46.3% Taxes 8.1% Economy 12.2% Budget 7% Military 9.8% Table 3-7. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1987 Reagan Congress Foreign Affairs 28.9% Weapons 27.4% Budget 8% Foreign Affairs 19.4% Military 6.5% Budget 12.9% Table 3-8. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1988 Reagan Congress Foreign Affairs 13.4% Foreign Affairs 63.8% Budget 12% Weapons 8.5% Economy 8.8% Budget 6.4% Table 3-9. Presidential Levels of Influence Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II First Year High High Partisan High Partisan Second Year Low High Medium High Partisan Low Third Year Low Medium High Low Medium Fourth Year Low Medium Medium Low Low Fifth Year Low* Medium Medium Sixth Year Medium Medium Low Seventh Year Medium Eighth Year Medium Low *This may not be accurate as there were a limited number of responses analyzed in 1985. Table 3-10. Levels of Influence Early in the First Term First Year Second Year Carter Low Reagan High High Bush I Medium Clinton High Partisan High Partisan Bush II High Partisan Low

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92 Table 3-11. Levels of Influe nce Late in the First Term Third Year Fourth Year Carter Low Low Reagan Medium Medium Bush I High Medium Clinton Low Low Bush II Medium Low Table 3-12. Levels of Infl uence in the Second Term First Year Second Year Third Year Fourth Year Reagan Low Medium Medium Medium Clinton Medium Medium Low Bush II Medium Low N/A N/A Table 3-13. Presidential Appr oval and Level of Influence at Time of SOU Address 1978 51.87% Low 1979 43.27% Low Carter 1980 57.58% Low 1981 55.44% High 1982 47.33% High 1983 37.27% Medium 1984 55.05% Medium 1985 57.89% Low 1986 71.97% Medium 1987 49.89% Medium Reagan 1988 52.98% Medium 1990 66.96% Medium 1991 74.32% High Bush I 1992 43.96% Medium 199356.66% High P. 199453.06% High P. 199543.54% Low 199645.91% Low 199760.82% Medium 199866.95% Medium Clinton 200064.29% Low 200161.72% High P. 200284.45% Low 200360.65% Medium 200453.55% Low 200557.07% Medium Bush II 200643% Low

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96 CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL TIME As outlined in Chapter 1, political time is a term coined by scholar Stephen Skowronek which can be used to classify presidents based on their association with the previous president’s agenda and the institutional stru ctures present when they take office. More specifically, presidents can be either affiliated or opposed to the previous president’s agenda, and institutions can be either resilient or vulnera ble. Based on these categories, presidents can be classified as presiding during the politics of reconstruction, articulation, di sjunction, or preemption. Since each type of political time encompasses its own advantages and challenges, presidents may be more or less able to exert influence over C ongress depending on the type of political time with which they are associated. Even though only five presidents are examined in this dissertation, each type of political time is represented. Jimmy Carter falls under the politics of disjunction, Ronald Reagan under the politics of reconstruction, George H.W. Bu sh under the politics of articulation, and Bill Clinton under the politics of preemption. George W. Bush will be discussed separately since he does not neatly fit into one of th e categories. Instead, he seems to fit both into the politics of articulation and the pol itics of disjunction. Looking at each type of political time and th e president that presid ed during it should be helpful in showing whether presidents are able to exert more influence during certain periods of political time. This chapter will thoroughly exam ine each type of political time and presidents’ ability to exert influence duri ng them. Conclusions will then be drawn about which type of political time is likely to allow pres idents the most infl uence in Congress.

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97 Reagan and the Politics of Reconstruction During the politics of reconstr uction, presidents are opposed to the previous president’s agenda and institutions are vulnerable. This means that presidents presiding during this time have the best opportunity to create change. Also, there are fewer c onstraints on presidential power during the politics of recons truction (Lewis and Strine 1996). This means that presidents during this time period should be able to ex ert influence in Congress. Reagan was a reconstructive president, th erefore examining his presiden cy should show the amount of influence he had in Congress. One of the main staples of Reagan’s pr esidential campaign in 1980 was his economic recovery plan. Reagan repeat edly pointed out that double-dig it inflation, high unemployment, and poor overall economic performan ce were indicators that Carter was not an effective leader. Therefore, Reagan challenged Carter and promised to change course if elected president. The economic situation also caused institutions to be vulnerable in 1980, meaning people were ready for a change. So as a reconstruc tive president, was Reagan able to exert influence in Congress? Reagan’s main focus when taking office, and throughout both of his terms, was the economy. As shown in Chapter 3, the main topi c of his first five SOU addresses was the economy. Members of Congress were also discussing the economy. In 1981 and 1982, the economy was the main topic of the most congre ssional responses. Members of Congress were using largely the same rhetoric when discus sing the economy, and most were supportive of Reagan’s economic plan. This is surprising considering that Democrats controlled the House throughout Reagan’s presidency. Toward the end of Reagan’s first term as president, his influence in Congress began to dissipate. In 1983 and 1984, Reagan was still focusing on the economy while Congress started discussing other topics, such as social security and the budget. However, many of the topics

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98 discussed by Reagan and members of Congress re mained the same – for example, foreign policy topics such as the military and nuclear weapons. Reagan regained some of his influence at the beginning of his second term, however, never to the sa me level it was at the beginning of his first term. This is consistent with other reconstructive presidents. Most reconstructive presidents eventually encounter problems at some point during their presidency (Milkis 1995). These problems could be court battles, wars, or in Reagan’s case the Iran Contra Affair. The Iran Contra Affair was very problematic for Reagan and shifted the attention of Congress away from Reagan’s domestic agenda. This is probably why Reagan was less influential during his second term. Bush I and the Politics of Articulation Scholars have pointed out that political time te nds to be cyclical and follow set patterns. For example, the politics of reconstruction are usually followed by the politics of articulation (Milkis 1995; Skowronek 1997). This was the case in 1988 when George H.W. Bush (Bush I) was elected as Reagan’s successor. Bush I was seen as presiding during the politics of articulation because he was affiliated with Reagan ’s agenda and institutions were resilient to change. According to Skowronek, presidents pres iding during the politics of articulation are at somewhat of a disadvantage because they are ex pected to stick to the previous president’s agenda. Therefore, thei r level of influence in more constrai ned (Lewis and Strine 1996). This makes it difficult for articulate presidents to de fine legislation in th eir own terms and fully exercise the power of the presiden cy (Skowronek 1997). Therefore, it is expected that presidents during this political time can ex ert influence in Congress, howev er, only if they do not venture too far from the previ ous president’s agenda.

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99 Only three years of Bush I’s presidency we re analyzed because Congress was in recess the month after Bush I’s SOU address in 1989. L ooking at the rest of Bush I’s presidency, he appeared to exert a medium level of influen ce in Congress. In 1990, the three topics most discussed by Bush I were foreign affairs, educat ion, and the military. However, the three main topics discussed by members of Congress were the environment, the military, and social security. Even though some of the topics differed, Bush I and members of Congre ss were discussing a lot of the same policies. For exam ple, the next most discussed to pics by legislators were foreign affairs and education. Also, members of Congress were using much of the same rhetoric when discussing the same topics as Bush I. In 1991, Bush I was able to exert even more influence in Congress. When Bush I gave his speech in 1991, the U.S. was involved in the Pe rsian Gulf War, so not surprisingly, foreign affairs and the military were two of the main t opics he discussed. Members of Congress also spent the most time discussing foreign affairs and the military. They discussed the Persian Gulf War in largely the same terms as Bush I, and also spent time expressing gratitude towards the troops. By 1992, some of Bush I’s influence in C ongress diminished. The main topics he discussed were the economy, foreign affairs, and the military. Members of Congress also discussed the economy the most, howe ver, they put more emphasis on it than Bush I, and most of the other topics they focused on were also ec onomic related – for example, employment and taxes. Members of Congress were more likely to criticize Bush I in 1992, especially in regards to his decision to increase taxes which he had pl edged not to do. However, he still received a fair amount of support from members of his own party.

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100 In looking at the overall level of influence Bush I was able to have in Congress, it seems consistent with the politics of articulation. Wh en Bush I stuck to discussing the economy and perpetuating Reagan’s economic plan, he was able to exert influence. However, when deviating from Reagan’s agenda, he was more likely to be cr iticized. The exception to this was the Persian Gulf War. Even though this was a new issue, Bush I was still able to shape the course of discussion on the Persian Gulf War. This makes sense considering presidents do not usually come into office with welldeveloped foreign policy agendas. Therefore, when discussing whether or not presidents are affiliated or opposed to the previous president’s agenda, what is really being discussed is the previous president’s domestic agenda. Ther e are probably instances where presidents are associated with the previous president’s foreign policy agenda as well, however, this is not as likely. Issues of influence in regards to dom estic and foreign policies, as well as further discussion of Bush I’s presidency, will take place in Chapter 7. Carter and the Politics of Disjunction Presidents are classified as presiding duri ng the politics of disjunction when they are affiliated with the previous president’s agenda, but institutions are vulnerable. This means that changes need to be made, but the president is not making them. Carter’s presidency is an example of the politics of disjuncti on. Carter thought he could revi ve the liberal political agenda by simply fixing a few pieces of it. He said that it was not the agenda wh ich needed alterations, but the government’s implemen tation of it (Skowronek 1997). Looking at Carter’s influence in Congress, it was relatively low, es pecially considering there was unified government. For the most pa rt members of Congress were emphasizing much different issues than Carter, a nd also discussing them using diffe rent rhetoric. For example, Carter spent a lot of time discussing foreign a ffairs while members of Congress spent a lot of

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101 time discussing the budget. Carter’s low level of influence in Congress is further evidenced by the large amount of criticism he receiv ed, even from members of his own party. This is consistent with literature regardi ng the politics of disjunc tion. Presidents under the politics of disjunction often face a fragmented party which fre quently questions the ability of the president to govern (Lewis and Strine 1996). Unfortunately, this opposition to the president tends to increase as time goes on, as was the case with Carter. By th e last year of his presidency, it was evident that Carter was not able to exert much influence in Congress, and that there was increasing criticism of him. Clinton and the Politics of Preemption Presidents also have a more difficult time influencing Congress during the politics of preemption. Under the politics of preemption, the president is opposed to the previous agenda but institutions are resilient. This means that the president is trying to change the discourse while the agenda of the old re gime is still being carried out . This was the case during the presidency of Bill Clinton. When Clinton was elected in 1992, he was committed to pursuing a new economic policy, however, Reaganomics was still playing out. Initially however, Clin ton was able to exert influence in Congress. In 1993, the main topics discussed by Clinton were the economy and taxes, which were also the topics discussed th e most by members of Congress. At the time, Congress was controlled by Democrats, and there was a definite partisan divide evident. Members of the Democratic Party tended to use similar rhetoric to Clinton, while members of the Republican Party were more likely to cr iticize his policies and offer their own. There was a similar trend in 1994, with the par tisan divide growing even more apparent. The main topics discussed by Clinton and memb ers of Congress in 1994 were health care and crime. Once again, Democrats used largely the sa me rhetoric as Clinton and were supportive of

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102 his policies while Republicans used different rhetoric and were cr itical of Clinton. Republicans were especially critical of Clin ton’s plan to provide universal h ealth care coverage to Americans. During the midterm elections in 1994, Repub licans were able to regain control of Congress which greatly reduced Clinton’s level of influence. In 1995, Clinton discussed a variety of topics and did not spend an abundance of time on any of them, whereas Congress focused overwhelmingly on the budget. The budge t, particularly passing a balanced budget amendment, was one plank of the Contract w ith America which was la rgely responsible for returning control of Congress to the Republicans. Therefore it is not surprising that Republicans in Congress spent so much time discussing the b udget. It was evident from the topics being discussed in Congress that the legislative agenda was being di ctated by the Contract with America, and not by Clinton. This trend continued in 1996. However, in 1997, after Clinton won re-electi on and Republicans lost seats in the House, Clinton was able to regain some influence. The main topic discussed by Clinton was education, which was also the main topic discussed by member s of Congress. The partisan divide evident throughout the majority of Clinton’s presidency wa s surprisingly not evident in the discussion of education. This suggests Clinton had a bit of influence over this policy area. However, Clinton also discussed foreign affairs and health care whic h received little attention in Congress. Instead, the next most discussed topic in Congress was again the budget. In 1998, Clinton spent the most time discussi ng education, foreign affairs, and health care. A large number of congres sional speeches also focused on education and health care, however, the most congressional speeches were again on the budget. In 1999, there were no congressional responses because the Senate was holding Clinton’s impeachment hearings.

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103 In 2000, the main topics discussed by Clin ton were education, the economy, and health care. Members of Congress also discussed the economy and health care, however, the topic of the most congressional responses was taxes. By this point, Clinton was considered to be somewhat of a lame duck. That combined with the general distaste for Clinton by Republicans in Congress did not allow him to have very much influence. Overall, I am not convinced that presid ing during the politics of preemption caused Clinton to wield less influence as much as the partisan warfare which was taking place throughout Clinton’s presidency. When Democrat s controlled Congress, Clinton appeared to have much more influence than after Republi cans gained control. Once Republicans gained control, there was a constant battle between Clinton and Republicans over the agenda, the budget, and Clinton’s personal life. Therefore, his lack of influen ce cannot be solely attributed to political time. This makes it difficult to formulate any ge neralizations about pr esidential influence during the politics of pre-emption. The lack of influence by Clinton appears to be caused more by the partisan warfare that was taking place than anything to do with the politics of preemption. This suggests that presidential influence during the politics of preemption is affected not by political time, but instead by other factors. The Political Time of Bush II Looking at the presidency of George W. Bush (Bush II), aspects of both the politics of pre-emption and the politics of articulation are pres ent. Bush II faced an uphill battle from the beginning when the legitimacy of his presidency wa s questioned after he lost the popular vote in the 2000 election. Bush II was opposed to Clinton’s agenda and inst ead pursued what he called a compassionate conservative agenda. However the situation was different for Bush II than it had

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104 been for Clinton during the politics of pre-em ption. Even though government was divided when he took office, Bush II was still able to influence the legislative agenda. In 2001, the main topics discussed by Bush II were the economy, taxes, and education, which were also the three main topics disc ussed by members of Congress. Even though members of Congress were discussing the same topi cs, there was a partisan divide in regards to rhetoric – Republicans used much the same rhetor ic as Bush II while Democrats spoke of the same policies using different terms. Bush II’s presidency changed drastically af ter the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Any questions of Bush II’s legitimacy as presid ent disappeared as the country looked towards him for leadership. As will be discussed furthe r in Chapters 6 through 8, this resulted in an interesting relationship between Bush II and Co ngress in 2002. While Bush II’s SOU address focused on terrorism, foreign affairs, and the m ilitary, members of Congress discussed domestic policies almost exclusively. Therefore, Bush II was not influencing th e domestic agenda in Congress, however, the lack of response by Congr ess in regards to foreign policy may indicate he was able to exert much influe nce over the foreign policy agenda. In 2003, Bush II again focused on foreign polic ies – this time foreign affairs, nuclear weapons, and terrorism. While members of C ongress also overwhelmingly discussed foreign affairs, particularly the impending military operation in Iraq, they again also emphasized domestic policies. In regards to discourse on Iraq, Bush II was able to exert a lot of influence. Bush II made the case for a possible military ope ration in Iraq by drawing connections between Iraq and terrorism. Even though some Democrat s expressed skepticism in regards to this linkage, they were still not overly critical of Bush II or a possible military operation in Iraq.

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105 In 2004, Bush II again spent a large portion of his address on foreign affairs and terrorism, however, he spent some time discussing do mestic policies such as health care. Health care was the main topic of the mo st congressional responses, and was discussed using largely the same rhetoric as Bush II. Aside from health care, members of Congress also discussed Iraq and the budget. The discourse surround ing the discussion of Iraq was mu ch different in Congress. Many of the speeches given in Congress on Iraq were by members trying to explain why they initially voted to authorize use of force and w hy they no longer felt military intervention in Iraq was necessary. In 2005, the main topics discussed by Bush II were foreign affairs, social security, and terrorism. During his SOU address, Bush II especia lly focused on social security. He said that without revisions, social security was headed towards bankruptcy. Therefore, he proposed establishing private social secu rity accounts for younge r workers. Members of Congress spent the most time responding to Bush II’s social secu rity plan. The responses were very partisan, with Republicans speaking largely in support of Bush II’s plan, and Democrats criticizing his plan and questioning whether so cial security was even trul y headed towards bankruptcy. Bush II’s level of influence decreased ev en more in 2006. In 2006, the main topics discussed by Bush II were foreign affairs, terrorism, and the economy, while members of Congress spoke primarily of the budget, energy, and ci vil rights. At this juncture, the political environment had started to change. Americans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the policy in Iraq and rising oil prices, which wa s reflected in speeches made by members of Congress. This taken into consideration with the fact that 2006 was an election year suggests that Bush II’s lack of influence can be partiall y attributed to the quest for electoral success by members of Congress.

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106 Overall, looking at the influence of Bush II across his presidenc y, he started with a medium level of influence which escalated to a high level of influence immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks. This level of infl uence eventually diminished as time went on suggesting that Bush II’s influen ce likely had more to do with pr esiding during a period of crisis than during a specific political time. Looking at Bush’s presidency, the aspects of the politics of pre-emption and articulation are apparent. For example, when Bush II firs t took office, he was trying to change from Clinton’s domestic agenda to a more conser vative domestic agenda. This was met with resistance by Democrats, who at the time c ontrolled Congress. However, once Republicans regained control of Congress, Bush II and Republicans were pursuing the same agenda. Therefore, as long as Bush II adhe red to the Republican agenda, he was able to exert influence in Congress and receive vast support from Republican members. That is why he does not seem to fit neatly into any of the political time categ ories. Instead, Bush II’s presidency seems to encompass different types of politic al time depending on other factors. Levels of Presidential Influence Across Political Time Looking at the overall influence of a presiden t across his term or terms, it does appear that the political time during which he is presidin g has an impact. This is further displayed in Table 4-1. Building on the levels of presidential influence table in Chapters 1 and 3 (Tables 1-1 and 3-13), Table 4-1 shows the average level of influence a president had during his presidency and the political time during which he was pres iding. To determine the average level of influence a president had, the level of influe nce the president had during each year of his presidency was assigned a numeric va lue which could then be averaged. The coding scheme was as such: low levels of influence were coded 1, medium levels 2, high partisan levels 2.5, and high levels 3. For example, during the three years of Bush I’s

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107 presidency analyzed, he had two medium and one high level of influence. Therefore, I added 2, 2, and 3, and divided by 3 so his average was 2.3 which corresponded with a medium level of influence. If a president’s numerical aver age fell between 1 and 1.75, his influence was categorized as being low, 1.76 and 2.5 medium, and 2.51 and 3 high. High partisan was not included as a category for an overall level of influence because I felt that doing so may be inaccurate (i.e. numbers do not show whether the re sponses in Congress were partisan). Table 4-2 shows the numeric averages along with the category of in fluence for each president. In looking at the presidents accord ing to their average levels of influence, three presidents – Carter, Bush II, and Clinton – had low levels , while the other two pr esidents – Reagan and Bush I – both had medium levels of influence. This is consistent with the findings discussed so far in this chapter in that th e politics of reconstruction and ar ticulation seem allow the most potential for influence, whereas the politics of disjunction and pre-empt ion appear to limit the amount of influence a president can have in Cong ress. This finding becomes even more apparent when looking at the average level of influence du ring a president’s first term, as shown in Table 4-3. Looking at the presidents’ first terms may be a more accurate way to determine their levels of influence during different political times. This is because all the presidents served at least one term, whereas only three of five presid ents served two. Table 4-3 shows that Reagan had the highest level of influence among the five presidents, which would be expected considering he was the only president to se rve during the politics of reconstruction. Looking at Tables 4-2 and 4-3 also help settle the dispute over which political time Bush II falls under. As discussed above, it was unclear whether Bush II fell un der the politics of

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108 articulation or pre-emption, however, based on his overall level of influence, it seems that he might be better classified as presid ing during the politics of disjunction. Politics of Disjunction Revi sited – Carter vs. Bush II The politics of disjunction – when the pr esident is affiliated but institutions are vulnerable – seems to aptly describe Carter’s presidency, but could it also apply to Bush II’s as well? There are many similarities between Carter and Bush II’s presidencies. For one, both were unlikely choices for president. Carter was seen as an outs ider, and both were viewed as lacking the political experience nece ssary to serve as president. Another key similarity is that both presided during periods of unified government which should promote presidential influence in Congress, yet both had low levels of influence. As for being affiliated presidents, Carter had hoped to revive the liberal policy agenda, whereas Bush II was associated with compassiona te conservatism. Both Carter and Bush II heavily emphasized foreign affairs while member s of Congress, includi ng members of their own parties, focused on domestic policies. Finally, in accordance with the po litics of disjunction, presidents presiding during this political time tend to become more unpopular as time goes on which is clearly the case with both Carter and Bush II. Therefore, I would suggest that Bush II also falls under the politics of disjunction and that the relation ship between Carter and Bush II warrants more analysis at a later date. Conclusions Overall, political time appears to be a good i ndicator of presidential influence. During the politics of reconstruction, pres idents are able to exert the mo st influence because they are opposed to the previous agenda and institutions are vulnerable. This was apparent during Reagan’s presidency when he was able to a ccomplish much of his economic agenda, even under divided government. Presidents pr esiding during the politics of artic ulation also are able to exert

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109 influence assuming they do not stray too far from the previous president’s agenda. This was evident in looking at Bush I’s presidency. When he adhered to Reagan’s agenda, Bush I was able to exert influence. He only lacked infl uence when trying to pursue his own agenda, or redefine items on Reagan’s agenda. Presidents during the politics of disjunction have the le ast opportunity to influence Congress. Since presidents dur ing the politics of di sjunction are pursuing an agenda that is largely ineffective, it is left up to members of Co ngress to set the discourse. As with Carter, this results not only in a lack of influence by the pres ident, but also in an increasing hostility towards him, even among members of his own party. Presidential influence during th e politics of preemption is hard er to generalize. It is possible for presidents to exer t influence during the politics of preemption, however, much of this is determined by the partisan make-up of C ongress. As seen with Clinton, he was able to exert influence when Democrats controlled C ongress, but had hardly any influence when Republicans gained control. Therefore, presiden tial influence during th e politics of preemption is affected not by political time, but rather by other factors such as unified or divided government. Finally, it is harder to classify Bush II, however, when looking at all the evidence it appears that he best falls under the politics of disjunction. Similar to Carter, Bush II was committed to perpetuating an agenda that did not necessarily work and this resulted in less success in influencing the legisla tive agenda as time went on. Fo r example, during the first two years of Bush II’s presidency there was much policy agreement in the topics being discussed by Bush II and members of Congress. However, as Bush II’s presidency progressed, members of Congress were no longer discussing the same topics as Bush II, and eventually were not even

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110 discussing the same topics in the same manner. This is consistent with presidents serving under the politics of disjunction. Theref ore, as previously mentioned, Bush II and Carter seem to have more in common than originally t hought and this is definitely a re lationship that warrants further research.

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111 Table 4-1. Presidential Infl uence Across Political Time Politics of Reconstruction Politics of Articulation Politics of Disjunction Politics of Pre-emption President Influence President Influence President Influence President Influence Reagan Medium Bush I Medium Carter Low Clinton Low Bush II Low Table 4-2. Numeric Levels of Influence by President President Numeric Average Level of Influence Carter 1 Low Bush II 1.58 Low Clinton 1.71 Low Reagan 2.28 Medium Bush I 2.3 Medium Table 4-3. Numeric Levels of Influe nce During a President’s First Term President Numeric Average Level of Influence Carter 1 Low Bush II 1.63 Low Clinton 1.75 Low Bush I 2.3 Medium Reagan 2.5 Medium

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112 CHAPTER 5 CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT The focus thus far in this dissertation has been mainly on the presiden t and his influence in Congress. However, part of the president’s infl uence in Congress also concerns who in Congress is responding to him. What possible motivations do members of Congress have to speak? Is there something distinct about members of Congress who decide to speak? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by examining aggregate level data about all the members of Congress who spoke during the 28 years studied in this dissertation. Looking at which chamber the members were in, their party affiliation, their leng th of service, and whether they were a party leader or committee chair should show whether certain types of members are more likely to speak than others. Aside from discussing which members are most likely to speak in Congress, this chapter will also examine how institutional norms and procedures during the post-reform and conditional party congresses affect congressional response to the president. The transition from a committee controlled to a party dominated Congress should have an impact on who responds to the president, and how members re spond. It is likely that mo re party leaders respond during conditional party government, and that congre ssional responses become more partisan. Why Speak? One way to evaluate Congress and the way it fits into the larger politi cal system is to look at the actions of its individual members (M ayhew 2002). Although there are many different actions members of Congress can undertake, this dissertation is mainly concerned with the decision of a member to speak on the floor of the House or Senate. To help determine why some members decide to speak and others do not, it is necessary to understand what motivates congressional behavior.

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113 Members of Congress have many different motivations behind their actions. One prevalent theory is that memb ers are “single-minded seekers of re-election” (Mayhew 1990, 5). Therefore, members of Congress calculate their behavior based on what will be in their best interest electorally. Assuming this to be true, then members should only de cide to speak if they think it will assist in their reel ection efforts. This suggests that there may be something distinct about members who decide to speak that di fferentiates them from members who do not. Another motivation potentially affecting the actions of members of Congress is their desire to shape public opinion. Although memb ers are portrayed as se rving in Congress to represent their constituents’ interests, this is not always the case. Some scholars contend that members of Congress are more likely to shap e and mobilize public opinion than passively represent the positions of their constituents (Mayhew 2002). If this is the case, then another possible reason a member might decide to speak is if he or she is trying to shift public opinion in one direction or the other. Speaking can prove to be fairly influential because public opinion about “political issues may be substantially shaped by the selecti on and presentation of information” (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, 223) . Therefore by emphasizing certain issues and downplaying or eliminating others, members of Congress may be able to influence public opinion through their speeches. Another way members of Congress try to infl uence public opinion is by taking stands on certain issues. Taking stands is when members “register a position on some matter before some audience” (Mayhew 2002, 90). For example, if a member spoke in favor of military action on the floor of the House or Senate , that would qualify as taking a stand. Taking stands are often aimed at the president, especially in opposition to his position on an issue. Opposition can be defined as “any effort by a member of Congress to thwart the aims or impair the standing of a

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114 presidential administration” (Mayhew 2002, 107). So in other words, opposition is any time a member of Congress vocali zes his or her disagreeme nt with the president. Even though members of Congress try to shap e public opinion by ta king stands and using certain types of information, the main way memb ers seek to influence public opinion is by issue framing. Framing can be defined as when a me mber of Congress tries to define and give meaning to an issue (Callaghan and Schnell 2001) . Usually framing involves focusing on certain aspects of events or issues as a way to encour age a particular interpre tation, evaluation, or solution (Entman 2003). Often the frames used by members of Congress are very different from those used by the president. By using competing frames, members of Congress can try to limit the amount of influence the president has in sett ing the congressional agenda. This may provide members of Congress, particularly members of the opposition party, with additional motivation to speak. Who Speaks? There is little literature rega rding who speaks in Congress, however, research indicates that certain types of members are more likely to speak than others. One possible difference that could affect who speaks is whether the member is in the House or the Senate. Due to the institutional differences between the two chambers, it is likely that there will be differences between the types of members who speak in the House, and the types of members who speak in the Senate. For example, in looking at member s of the House who made floor speeches, it was found that party leaders and ideologically extrem e members (either very conservative or very liberal) spoke more often than other members (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). Also, minority party members were more likely to speak as a way to offer policy alternatives (ibid). In the House, it was found that high ranking committee members were less likely to speak, however, in the Senate, they were more likely to speak (Lehnen 1967; Maltzman and

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115 Sigelman 1996). Also, scholars found that there were likely to be fewer members speaking in the Senate than in the House (Lehnen 1967). Finally, in the House, scholars do not think seniority matters in regards to who speaks, wh ereas in the Senate, members who have served longer are more likely to speak (L ehnen 1967; Maltzman and Sigleman 1996). Chamber Matters In looking at the 617 members of Congress whose speeches were included during the 28 years of this study, there were clearly more memb ers speaking in the Hous e than in the Senate (see Table 5-1). Of the members speaki ng, 73.6 percent were from the House of Representatives, while 14.4 percen t were Senators. This is cons istent with other scholars who claimed members serving in the Senate were less likely to speak (Lehnen 1967). It is important to note that there could ha ve been more speeches by both members of the House and Senate due to the way speaking member s were classified. Me mbers were classified as either serving exclusively in the House or Se nate, or as having served in the House and then the Senate. In regards to the 12 percent of speaking members who served in the House and then the Senate, no notation was made in the aggregat e-level data about which chamber the member was in when they spoke. This means that these members could have spoken while in the House, in the Senate, or potentially while in both ch ambers since many members spoke more than once over the course of their congressi onal careers. However, even if all of the members serving in both chambers spoke while they were in the Sena te bringing that percen tage to 26.4, there would still be significantly more res pondents speaking in the House. The evidence clearly indicates that there we re more members responding to the president in the House than in the Senate. However, this does not necessarily mean that members of the House are more likely to speak. The reason for this is because there are more members of the House than of the Senate. Therefore, simply based on probability, more members of the House

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116 than from the Senate would be likely to speak. When taking into consideration that members of the House make up 435 of the 535 seats in C ongress, then approxima tely 81.3 percent of Congress is composed of representatives. Th erefore, unless more th an 81.3 percent of the congressional responses are from members of the House it is difficult to argue that representatives are really speaking more than members of the Senate. Aside from the differences in size between the House and Senate, there are other institutional differences which may cause member s of the House to speak more. For example, members of the House serve shorte r terms. By serving two year terms instead of six year terms in the Senate, members of the House have less time to make their mark, and also have to think more about re-election. This lik ely encourages them to speak mo re, while senators do not have the same time considerations. Another institutional difference that may re sult in members of the House speaking more is that the House is a more complex and formal institution than the Senate. In the House, party leadership and the Rules Committee largely dict ate the agenda and debate, meaning that open time speeches may be one of the few opportunities repr esentatives have to express their opinions. In comparison, with fewer restraints on debate in the Senate, senators have more opportunities to speak, therefore decreasing the importance of ope n time speeches. Also, members of the Senate are more likely to receive media coverage than members of the House. By having other outlets to express their points of view, senators have to rely less on open time speeches. Based on these institutional differences, it ma kes sense that members of the House would speak more in response to the president than members of the Senate. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that there we re consistently more members of the House who respond to the president’s SOU address.

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117 Party Affiliation When looking at the number of Democrats and Republicans speaking in response to the president, the number is almost equal. Of me mbers responding to the president’s SOU address across the 28 years, 51.1 percent were Democr ats and 48.6 percent were Republicans (see Table 5-2). There were also two Inde pendents who spoke. This suggests that partisanship does not make a difference in who speaks. However, th e results look a little di fferent when looking at specific years. Scholars have suggested that minority part y members are more likely to speak in Congress, particularly when there is unifi ed government (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). Therefore, it would be expected that more Democrats would sp eak during Bush II’s presidency, more Republicans would speak at the beginning of Clinton’s presidency, etc. Also, minority party members are also more likely to speak even when there is divided government. However, looking at Tables 5-3 and 5-4 below, th is does not appear to be the case. During the 28 years studied in this disserta tion, Democrats were in control of the House for 16 years. Looking at Table 5-3 shows that Democrats spoke more both while they were the majority and minority party in Congress. This su ggests either that Republicans are less likely to speak when in control of the House, or that Re publicans are less likely to challenge the majority party. While Democrats controlled the House fo r 16 of the 28 years studied, they only controlled the Senate fo r 12 of 28 years. Interestingly, even though Democrats were the minority party more in the Senate, they spoke less than they did in the House. Th at being said, Democrats still spoke slightly more than Republicans, even when retaining control of the Senate. These tables suggest that the party in control of the House and Sena te does not affect which party members speak.

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118 Even though which party is controlling each chamber does not seem to make a difference in regards to who speaks, does the president’s party affiliation matter as to who is speaking? Looking at Table 5-5 suggests that it does. There are clearly more Republicans speaking when a Democrat is president, and Demo crats speaking when a Republican is president. The president’s party affiliation appears to ma tter not only on an aggregate leve l, but also when looking at specific presidents. Table 5-6 shows whether the opposition party to the president in Congress spoke more on average throughout each presidency. In looking at th e table, it appears that there were slightly more Democrats speaking during Carter’s pres idency, and slightly more Republicans during Bush I’s presidency. However, during Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II’s presidencies, there were clearly more members of the opposition party sp eaking across their pres idencies. This is interesting considering these are the three two-term presidents examined in this research. Also notable is Reagan’s presidency, during which there was an average of 24 percent more Democrats speaking than Republicans. Looking at these results suggests that pa rty affiliation only affects who speaks sometimes. It appears that on the aggregate le vel, there is little difference between whether Democrats or Republicans speak. Also, when lo oking at which party controls Congress, it does not appear that minority party members are a ny more likely to speak than majority party members. However, the party affiliation of th e president did seem to have an impact on who spoke, with members of the opposit e party more likely to speak. Length of Service Although partisanship does not appear to have a large impact on which members of Congress speak, the length of time they have served in C ongress does. The average length of time speaking members served was 15.5 years. This differs from the average number of years all

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119 members, both speaking and non-speaking, served. For example, during the 109th Congress, the average length of service in the House was 9.3 years, and in the Senate was 12.1 years. However, the average length of time a speaking member served during the 109th Congress was 13.8 years. There is a similar trend present du ring other congresses. This suggests that on average speaking members served longe r than non-speaking members. Since the amount of time a member served wh en speaking was not accounted for in the aggregate data, this could mean one of two things. One, it could suggest that only members who have served longer decide to speak. However, it could also mean that speaking members of Congress are able to retain thei r positions longer. To try to de termine which the case is, it is necessary to look at the average length of service for each year (see Table 5-7). When looking at the average length a speaking member served each year, it is apparent that most members have been in Congress for seve ral years before deciding to speak. The lowest average was 6.34 years in 1995, which can likely be attributed to the influx of new members of Congress caused by the Republican Revolution of 1994. In fact, it seems that there is a slight decline in the number of years a speaking member served im mediately following each election. This suggests that some new members may decide to speak as soon as they take office. In looking at the average time a member served in Congress when speaking, it is interesting that more senior members were sp eaking during Bush II’s pr esidency. While the average was low during his first year of of fice (8.05), this number almost doubles by 2002 (15.79). This suggests that the September 11, 2001 may have had an impact on which members of Congress were speaking, with more senior members deciding to speak. Overall, it appears that seniority matters in w ho speaks in Congress. If it did not, then the average length of time members had served when speaking would be much lower. However,

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120 when the average across 28 years is 15.5 years, a nd the lowest average during any of those years was 6.34 years, this is evidence that seniority does matter. Party Leaders and Committee Chairs One other factor that may affect who speaks in Congress is whether the member is a party leader or committee chair. Looking at the a ggregate level data, there were clearly more committee chairs speaking than party leaders. Of the 617 members speaking across the 28 years, 21.9 percent were committee chairs while only 8.1 per cent were party leaders. This suggests that committee chairs are more likely to speak. There are several possible explanations for this, one being that committee chairs are likely to be more knowledgeable about policies discussed in thei r committees. Having more knowledge about a topic might cause members to have a stronger opinion and also make them more likely to want to share their opinions. Looking at Table 5-8, which shows the percen tage of party leaders (PL) and committee chairs (CC) during each year, it is apparent that there was a larg e variation in th e percentage of party leaders and committee chairs speaking from y ear to year. There also does not appear to be any discernable pattern in regards to the variation. One interesting finding is that there was a much larger percentage of party leaders a nd committee chairs during 2002 and 2003. These are the same two years during which there was an incr ease in seniority. Again, it could be an effect of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks since thes e are the two years immediately following the attacks. The impact of the terrorist att acks will be more closely examined in Chapter 8. Institutional Changes in Congress Now that who was speaking in Congress has be en discussed, it is important to see how this relates to broader institutional changes wh ich took place in Congress during the 28 years studied. There are four main c ongressional eras that characteri ze Congress over th e last 60 years

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121 – the textbook, reform, post-reform, and condi tional party government periods. These congressional eras range from strong committees during the textbook Congress to strong parties during conditional party government. It is important to examine th e different institutional norms and procedures during the four congressional eras to see whethe r they affect how members of Congress respond to the president. Just two congressional eras are encompassed in this dissertation since it only examines Congress from 1978 through 2006. Therefore, the main focus will be looking at institutional norms and procedures related to the post-reform and conditional party government eras. The numerous reforms that were implemented in Congress during the 1970s caused committee chairs to lose influence and parties to gain influence. For example, during the post-reform Congress, parties started playing a larger role in committ ee assignments and setting the legislative agenda (Herrnson 2000). However, the influence of parties was not top-down, meaning it is not party leaders which drive legislation. Instead, during conditional party governmen t, the roles are reversed and widespread support for policies among party member s in Congress is what causes party leaders to use the tools at their disposal to promote the positions of the party (Rohde 1991). Committee members are expected to not interfere with popular legislation, a nd party members who consistently oppose legislation are chastised by losing or not obtaining desired committee assignments (ibid). Therefore, during conditi onal party government members of Congress are expected to support their party. The era of conditional party government has al lowed the role of parties to increase in Congress. The role of parties became even mo re pronounced after the Re publican revolution in 1994. The two major parties have become more uni fied internally, and also have become more

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122 polarized from each other. This has allowed part y leaders to have more influence in Congress, and also has caused party members to have a st ronger tie to the presid ent when government is unified. Some of these changes are evident from looking at the 28 years studied in this dissertation, whereas others are less apparent. One obvious change is the increasing partisan response to the president. Duri ng Carter’s presidency, there was not as much partisan unity and Democrats were not always supportive of the presid ent. As was seen in Chapter 2, there were varying responses to Carter in Congress which cannot necessarily be attributed to partisanship. Democratic members of Congress responded to Cart er very differently, with many of them not afraid to openly critici ze him in Congress. The way members of Congress responded duri ng Reagan and Bush I’s presidencies were different. While there still was not partisan unity, Republicans were more likely to be supportive of Reagan and Bush I, while Democrats were more likely to oppose the pr esidents. The partisan divide in congressional respons es did not become overtly evident until Clinton’s presidency. During Clinton’s presidency, Democrats tended to discuss the same topics as Clinton and do so using the same rhetoric, while Republicans were extremely oppositional and critical of Clinton. This partisan divide continued during Bush II’s presidency. The main difference was that Bush II seemed to receive even more support from Republicans in Congress than Clinton had from Democrats in Congress while he was presiden t. This is evident not only from examining the rhetoric used by Bush II and members of Congr ess, but also by the fact that Bush II did not veto any legislation until July 2006 mainly becau se the Republican-controlled Congress was not passing any legislation with which he disagreed. Therefore, the ev idence confirms that parties

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123 did start playing a stronger role during the pos t-reform Congress culminating in the era of conditional party government. Even though there is eviden ce that the institutional change s which took place in Congress affected the way members responded to the presid ent, there is less evidence to suggest that who was responding changed. For example, due to th e increasing importance of parties in Congress, it would be expected that the pe rcentage of party leaders spea king would increase. However, looking at Table 5-8, this is clearly not the case. Also, since the role of committees in Congress diminished during this period, it would be expect ed that the percentage of committee chairs speaking would decrease, however, this is also not the case. Therefore, even though the institutional changes taking place in Congress did cause members to respond in a more partisan manner, they did not largely affect who responded. Congressional Factors and Presidential Influence Now that which types of members are more likely to speak have been discussed, it is necessary to see how this correspond s to presidential levels of influence. One way to do this is to look at the average number of years a speaking member served compared to a president’s level of influence during that year. Are presidents more influential when younger members speak or does it make a difference? Table 5-9 shows the average number of years a member served when speaking (AYS) and the president’s in fluence during that year (LI). An interesting pattern is revealed when exam ining the table. It appears that presidents had more influence when the speaking members had served fe wer years in Congress and less influence when more senior members of Congr ess were speaking. This suggests that one component of presidential influence in Congress is not being challenged by the members with longer tenure. It also suggests that presidents might be more successful at persuading more junior members of Congress.

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124 There is more evidence to support this clai m when looking at presid ential influence based on the percentage of party leaders speaking in Congress. Table 5-10 shows the percentage of party leaders (PL) during each year along with the president’s level of influence during that year. Although there is not as identifiab le of a pattern as in Table 59, it still shows that when there were the highest percentages of party leaders in Congress, the presidents had lower levels of influence. For example, during the five years when party leaders made up more than 10 percent of the speaking members, presidents had low leve ls of influence during every year except one during which there was a medium level of influence. Again this suggests that presidents are not able to exert as much influence when certain types of members are speaking, which means that part of a president’s level of influenc e comes from who is responding to him. Finally, Table 5-11 shows presidential infl uence based on the percentage of committee chairs speaking. Similar to Tabl e 5-10, there is not an easily identifiable pattern, however, again there appears to be lower levels of influence when the largest pe rcentage of committee chairs are speaking. Another interesting finding from looking at Tabl es 5-9, 5-10, and 5-11 is that there again appear to be similarities between the presidencies of Carter and Bush II. In all three tables, Carter and Bush II are listed at the high end – high number av erage of years members served when speaking, high percentage of party leaders, and high percentage of committee chairs. Also, during these years Carter and Bush II both had low levels of influence. Similar to the discussion at the end of Chapter 4, these findings suggest th at there are many simila rities between Carter and Bush II’s presidencies and their relationships with member s of Congress. Again, this warrants more research at a later date.

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125 Conclusions In looking at the speaking members from 1978 through 2006, it appears that members of the House and those who have served longer ar e more likely to speak than members of the Senate and newer members. Also, it appears that there is an inverse relationship between seniority and a president’s level of influence. The longer number of years a member has served when speaking seems to correspond with a lower level of influence fo r the president. Aside from chamber and seniority, whether a member is a party leader or committee chairs appears to make some di fference, however, it varies widely each year. Looking at the percentage of party leaders and committee chairs speaking each year co mpared to levels of presidential influence sh ows a somewhat similar pattern to that found in regards to seniority, however, not enough to draw any strong conclusions. The one factor that does not seem to have an impact is party affiliation. Almost an equal number of Democrats and Republicans spoke during the 28 years, and there were not significantly more members of th e opposition party speaking. Ther efore, members of the House and members who have served longer are mo st likely to respond to the president. In regards to the impact of institutional changes in Congress, the decreasing role of committees and the increasing role of parties did have an effect on congr essional response to the president. Looking at congre ssional responses from Carter through Bush II, the responses became more partisan over time, with responses being the most partisan during Bush II’s presidency. Even though the institutional changes affected how members of Congress responded, they did not have an impact on who responded.

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126 Table 5-1. Speaking Members by Chamber Percentage House 73.6% Senate 14.4% House and Senate 12% Table 5-2. Speaking Members by Party Affiliation Percentage Democrat 51.1% Republican 48.6% Independent.3% Table 5-3. Speaking Members by Party Control of the House Democratic Control Republican Control Democrats 55.78% 49.3% Republicans44.22% 42.3% Table 5-4. Speaking Members by Party Control of the Senate Democratic Control Republican Control Democrats 51.4% 50.2% Republicans48.6% 49.8% Table 5-5. Speaking Members by President’s Party Affiliation Democratic President Republican President Democrats 48.5% 56.3% Republicans51.5% 43.7% Table 5-6. Average Partisan Diffe rence for Individual Presidents Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II Opposition Party -1.46% +24% -0.8% +2.56% +5.07%

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127 Table 5-7. Average Length of Service When Speaking, 1978 – 2006 1978 12.47 1979 11.97 1980 12.76 1981 8.95 1982 10.59 1983 10.77 1984 7.84 1985 10.92 1986 11.34 19879.55 198810.83 199010.48 199111.96 199212.80 19938.84 19949.24 19956.34 199610.18 1997 8.22 1998 9.95 2000 10.24 2001 8.05 2002 15.79 2003 17.07 2004 13.45 2005 12.17 2006 13.87 Table 5-8. Percentage of Party Leader and Committee Chairs, 1978 – 2006 Year PL CC 1978 17% 18.9% 1979 6.3% 21.9% 1980 23.8% 7.1% 1981 9.1% 11.4% 1982 3.1% 15.6% 1983 3.8% 3.8% 1984 5.9% 2% 1985 7.7% 0% 1986 7.3% 4.9% YearPL CC 19878.1% 12.9% 19888.5% 14.9% 19909.7% 9.7% 19917% 7% 19926.6% 6.6% 19935% 7.5% 19948.2% 2.4% 19951.7% 1.7% 19965.1% 10.2% Year PL CC 1997 1.7% 8.6% 1998 8% 9.3% 2000 7.1% 8.3% 2001 9.4% 12.5% 2002 16.7% 23.8% 2003 21.4% 26.2% 2004 6.5% 3.2% 2005 7% 5.8% 2006 11.1% 11.1% Table 5-9. Presidential Influence Based on Average Years Speaking Members Served AYS Year LI 6.34 1995 Low 7.84 1984 Medium 8.05 2001 High P. 8.22 1997 Medium 8.84 1993 High P. 8.95 1981 High 9.24 1994 High P. 9.55 1987 Medium 9.95 1998 Medium AYS Year LI 10.181996 Low 10.242000 Low 10.481990 Medium 10.591982 High 10.771983 Medium 10.831988 Medium 10.921985 Low 11.341986 Medium 11.961991 High AYS Year LI 11.97 1979 Low 12.17 2005 Medium 12.47 1978 Low 12.76 1980 Low 12.80 1992 Medium 13.45 2004 Low 13.87 2006 Low 15.79 2002 Low 17.07 2003 Medium

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126 Table 5-10. Presidential Influen ce Based on Speaking Party Leaders PL Year LI 1.7% 1995 Low 1.7% 1997 Medium 3.1% 1982 High 3.8% 1983 Medium 5% 1993 High P. 5.1% 1996 Low 5.9% 1984 Medium 6.3% 1979 Low 6.5% 2004 Low PL Year LI 6.6%1992 Medium 7% 1991 High 7% 2005 Medium 7.1%2000 Low 7.3%1986 Medium 7.7%1985 Low 8% 1998 Medium 8.1%1987 Medium 8.2%1994 High P. PL Year LI 8.5% 1988 Medium 9.1% 1981 High 9.4% 2001 High P. 9.7% 1990 Medium 11.1% 2006 Low 16.7% 2002 Low 17% 1978 Low 21.4% 2003 Medium 23.8% 1980 Low Table 5-11. Presidential Influence Based on Speaking Committee Chairs CC Year LI 0% 1985 Low 1.7% 1995 Low 2% 1984 Medium 2.4% 1994 High P. 3.2% 2004 Low 3.8% 1983 Medium 4.9% 1986 Medium 5.8% 2005 Medium 6.6% 1992 Medium CC Year LI 7% 1991 High 7.1% 1980 Low 7.5% 1993 High P. 8.3% 2000 Low 8.6% 1997 Medium 9.3% 1998 Medium 9.7% 1990 Medium 10.2%1996 Low 11.1%2006 Low CC Year LI 11.4% 1981 High 12.5% 2001 High P. 12.9% 1987 Medium 14.9% 1988 Medium 15.6% 1982 High 18.9% 1978 Low 21.9% 1979 Low 23.8% 2002 Low 26.2% 2003 Medium

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130 CHAPTER 6 DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN POLICIES Most presidents begin their term in o ffice with a domestic policy agenda they want to pursue. Although most presidents have foreign policy goals as well, these are generally not as fully developed and instea d either are partially inherited from the previous administration or are created over time in response to international events and conflicts (Wood and Peake 1998). Does the t ype of policy the president is pursuing affect the level of influence he is able to have in Congress? Does the president specifically focus on one type of policy as a way to gain influence? In other words, does whether the president is tryi ng to influence the domestic or foreign policy agenda in Congress make a difference in his success? Th is chapter seeks to an swer these questions by looking at why presidents might decide to focus on foreign policy and whether they are ultimately able to exert more influence in Congress by doing so. Presidential Influence in Foreign Affairs Do presidents have more influence over foreign policy than domestic policy? According to Aaron Wildavsky’s “two pres idencies” thesis, the answer is yes. Wildavsky’s thesis states that presidents have more control and influence over foreign affairs than domestic affair s (1966). According to Wildavsky, it is often hard for presidents to gain support for their domestic policies, but it is easier for them to be successful in the foreign policy realm. If Wildavsky’s thesis is correct, then presidents should be able to exert more influence in Congress when pursuing foreign policy goals than domestic policy goals. One reason presidents may be more autonom ous in regards to foreign affairs is because foreign policy objectives generall y do not require the same approval from

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131 Congress as domestic polic y objectives (Andrade and Young 1996). There are a few ways presidents can create foreign policy, howev er, all of them can be restricted in some way by Congress. One power the president has is the ability to issue an executive agreement, which is an agreement between the United States and another country or countries (Edwards 1980). Executive agreements do not require the consent of Congress and are as binding as treaties, however, they cannot conflict w ith any other prior stat utes. Also, Congress can in effect reject execu tive agreements by not appropr iating funds to support them, although this is rare. One means Congress does have to stop th e president’s actions in foreign affairs comes from the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The War Powers Resolution requires the president to consult with Congress prio r to and throughout military action, and to remove troops if Congress has not declared wa r or passed a resoluti on authorizing use of force within 60 days. Time can be extended 30 days at the presid ent’s request. Even though this resolution does limit the president’s ability to act in foreign affairs, it is questionable what constitutes consultation with Congress, and there is debate whether the president could put th e United States in a position dur ing 60 days where congressional withdrawal of troops would be difficult (Edwards 1980). The president’s role in introducing forei gn affairs into the po litical system is another reason why he may be more successful in the foreign policy realm. Whereas domestic policies are often introduced by me mbers of Congress and interest groups, the president is the primary venue for the intr oduction of foreign policy (Wood and Peake 1998). This is because the president is th e only political actor who can speak for the

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132 United States as a nation, and the American public often expects him to do so, especially in times of crisis. In other words, “foreign policy is primarily centered on the presidency due to constitutional obligations, the need for strong centralized leadership, and expectations by the public and other institutions” (Wood and Peake 1998, 181). Wildavsky says that presidents are esp ecially successful in regards to foreign policy when they present it as a way to help protect the nation (1966). This suggests that one reason presidents may be more successful with foreign policy is due to a “rally around the flag” effect. A “rally around the flag” effect can be described as when something occurs which evokes patriotism in Americans (Sinclair 2004). Usually this effect is “associated with an event which (1 ) is international and (2) involves the United States and particularly the president directly ; and it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply focused” (Mueller 1985, 208). Sin ce the president is s een as the primary representative of the United States, “rally around the flag” effects usually cause public approval of the president to increase and allow the president more influence in foreign affairs. Therefore, one possible cause of pr esidents wielding more influence in foreign affairs may be a result of a “r ally around the flag” effect. Even though “rally around the flag” eff ects, constitutional provisions, and the president as the national figurehead all seem to explain why presidents may be more influential in regards to foreign affairs, there are still many scholars who dispute Wildavsky’s thesis. One interesting argument is that the two presidencies thesis does not hold true for all presidents, but primarily fo r Republican presiden ts (Bond and Fleisher 1988; Sigelman 1979). This argument claims that “Republican administrations are characterized by two presidencies while De mocratic administrations are not” (Bond and

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133 Fleisher 1988, 755). One possible explanation for this is that Democratic presidents typically fare better with domestic policy th an Republican presidents, so there is a more stark difference between a Republican presiden t’s success in domestic and foreign policy. Another possible explanation is that Republican presidents tend to receive more support from their party leaders and committee chairs in Congress than do De mocratic presidents (Bond and Fleisher 1988). Aside from ways presidents can potentially influence foreign affairs, there is also the question of motivatio n. Why would presidents seek to influence foreign affairs as opposed to domestic affairs? The most obvious answer is because they likely have more influence in the foreign policy realm, however , there may be other motivations as well. One is that world events, such as wars and crises, may force a president to concentrate on foreign policy. When hostages were taken in Iran during Jimmy Carter’s presidency or terrorists attacked the U.S. during George W. Bush’s presidency – these types of events force presidents to focus their attention on foreign policy. Another theory is that presidents ma y focus on foreign policies as a way to distract attention away from domestic problems, sometimes even going so far as to engage in a military operation (Andrad e and Young 1996; Brace and Hinckley 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Ostrom and Job 1986) . So if there are internal problems in the United States, for example, if the level of unemployment is hi gh, then the president may want to focus the public’s attention el sewhere. Also, focusing on foreign policies has a tendency to increase presidential approval (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992).

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134 Another possible motivation for presidents to focus on foreign affairs is that if they do indeed wield more power in that re alm, then they are more likely to accomplish their foreign policy goals than their domestic policy goals (Andrade and Young 1996). Presidents generally like to enact as many of th eir policies as possible, particularly if they are running for re-election. Fi nally, scholars have found that th ere is a direct and inverse relationship between a presiden t’s emphasis on foreign affairs and his level of influence in Congress (ibid). In other words, presid ents who do not have as much influence in Congress are more likely to focus on foreign po licies than those pres idents with higher levels of influence. Presidents and Foreign Policy, 1978 – 2006 To determine whether or not presidents are able to exert more influence in Congress when pursuing foreign policies, the to pics being discussed by both the president and members of Congress during the 28 years be ing researched in this dissertation were labeled as either domestic or foreign policies. Examples of policies that were classified as domestic are topics such as education, so cial security, and hea lth care, whereas the military, nuclear weapons, and international trade are examples of policies that were identified as foreign. Once the policies for each year were classified, percentages were calculated which showed the amount of each president’s SOU address spent on domestic and foreign policies. Classify ing policies as either domestic or foreign also showed the percentage of time members of Congress spent on each. When looking at the results, there are seve ral possible indicators that the president is exerting more influence in the foreign policy realm. One pot ential indicator of influence is that when the president discusse s foreign policies, members of Congress also discuss them using largely the same terms. This suggests that there would be a

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135 correlation between the percentage of forei gn and domestic policie s discussed in the president’s SOU address and the percentage of foreign and domestic policies discussed by members of Congress. A second indicator of influence would be when the president spends a large portion of his speech discus sing foreign policies but Congress does not respond. This would suggest that members of Congress are unwilling to challenge the president and therefore are allowing him to be very influential in shaping foreign policy. For the president to not be exerting more influence in regards to foreign policy, then it would be likely that members of Congress would spend more time discussing foreign policies than the president. Another possible indicator of a lack of presidential foreign policy influence would be if memb ers of Congress are discussing different foreign policy issues than the president, or if they are discussing them using largely different rhetoric. This chapter will look at each of the 28 y ears being studied in this dissertation by president to determine whether or not presidents were able to exert more influence in the foreign policy realm. The results are grouped by president so that any external factors which may affect presidential influence can be addressed. For example, the September 11, 2001 attacks during George W. Bush’s presiden cy are likely to have an impact on his influence. After discussing the influence of each president, I should be able to draw larger generalizations about the effect of do mestic and foreign polic ies on presidential influence. Jimmy Carter, 1978 – 1980 In 1978, Carter and members of Congress spent almost the same amount of time discussing domestic and fore ign policies (see Table6-1). Looking at Table 6-1, the president spent 65.5 percent of his SOU addr ess on domestic policies, while 60.4 percent

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136 of congressional speeches were also about domestic policies. This means that 34.5 percent of Carter’s speech was devoted to foreign po licies, as were 39.6 percent of congressional responses. In looking at the types of fore ign policies being discussed, Carter talked about other count ries, particularly the Soviet Union. Carter was especially concerned with the arms race between the U. S. and Soviet Union, and called for a ban on nuclear explosives. Members of Congress al so discussed the Sovi et Union, and agreed that something had to be done regarding nucle ar weapons. This sugge sts that Carter was able to set the foreign policy agenda in rega rds to the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons. In 1979, Carter spent even more time di scussing foreign affairs while Congress shifted its focus back to domestic policies. Carter spent the majority of his SOU address (56.6 percent) on foreign policie s, while the vast majority of congressional responses were on domestic policies (85 percent). Agai n, Carter was discussi ng the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons. Looking at the historical context of Carter’s 1979 SOU address, it took place about six months before an agr eement was reached to limit strategic nuclear weapons launchers as part of the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). This helps explain why Carter sp ent a large portion of his address discussing the Soviet Union, nuclear wea pons, and SALT II in particular. However, members of Congress were larg ely uninterested in di scussing the Soviet Union or SALT II. Only two members sp eaking in 1979 mentioned the Soviet Union, and only one mentioned SALT II. Instead, me mbers of Congress were more concerned with domestic policies such as the budget and education. Since members of Congress were not challenging Carter re garding the Soviet Union or SA LT II, this suggests that he was given quite a bit of leeway concerning foreign affairs.

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137 In 1980, Carter spent even more of his a ddress on foreign affairs (76.6 percent). Carter began his speech by addressing the Iranian hostage crisis, which he referred to as “international terrorism”. Aside from th e Iranian hostage situation, Carter again discussed the Soviet Union, focusing on wh at he called their “military aggression” towards Afghanistan. The percentage of congressional responses increased from 1979 to 54.2 percent, meaning the majority of speeches made by members of Congress concerned foreign affairs. While members of Congress were di scussing the Soviet Union and foreign affairs in more general terms, only 25 percent of members mentioned the Iranian hostage crisis. However, members of Congress were much mo re likely to challenge Carter’s foreign policy in 1980 – many members questioned whet her American foreign policy was headed in the right direction. This suggests that Congress took away some of the flexibility they had given Carter in regards to foreign affa irs, meaning that he had less influence over foreign affairs in 1980 than he had in 1979. Just after looking at Carter’s influen ce regarding foreign affairs suggests that Congress is willing to give the president a fair amount of cont rol over foreign affairs for a while, however, are not afraid to take it away if the president pursues foreign policies with which they disagree. It will be inte resting to see if this trend continues when looking at the other presidents and th eir influence over foreign affairs. Ronald Reagan, 1981 – 1988 While there were some discrepancies in the amount of time Carter and members of Congress spent discussing domestic and fo reign affairs, there was more correlation between the amount of time Reagan and member s spent discussing both types of policies. For example, in 1981, Reagan spent 90.1 percen t of his address on domestic affairs and

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138 81.9 percent of congressional responses were on domestic affairs. This trend continues as can be seen in Table 6-2. The one exception was in 1988 when Congress spent much more time than Reagan discussing foreign affairs. The majo rity of the congressional responses in 1988 focused on the Iran Contra Affair. Members of Congress were conc erned about the role of the Reagan Administration in the affair, as well as the s ituation in Nicaragua. Many of the members of Congress discussed whether or not the U.S. should continue to provide aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, with some legislators expressi ng concern over providing additional aid. For example, one member of Co ngress said that continuing to provide the Contras with aid would “insure c onflict, not pea ce” (Viscolsky 1988). Reagan made no mention of the Iran Cont ra Affair, but did briefly discuss the situation in Nicaragua, and aske d Congress to “sustain the fr eedom fighters” in order to help provide “peace, freedom, and democracy in Nicaragua” (1988). As seen in some of the congressional responses, members of Congr ess were not afraid to challenge Reagan on providing aid to the Contras. So even though Reagan and Congress both discussed Nicaragua, Reagan did not spend nearly as much time on it as members of Congress. This suggests that Congress had more contro l over leading the discussion on Nicaragua than Reagan in 1988. Overall, it appears that Reagan was not overly influential in regards to foreign affairs. He did dictate the discussion of foreign affairs somewhat in that when he discussed foreign affairs, members of Congress did as well, and they also generally used similar rhetoric. However, Congress clearl y had more influence in the discussion of foreign affairs in 1988. Congress wanted to discuss the Iran Contra Affair, and Reagan

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139 clearly did not want to address the issue. Although Reagan and Congress both discussed Nicaragua, aside from asking for additional aid for the Contras, Reagan did not have a lot to say on the issue which allowed Congress to largely set the terms of debate. George H.W. Bush, 1989 – 1992 In 1989, no congressional responses were eval uated. This is due to the fact that the SOU address was on February 9, and C ongress adjourned until February 21. This was too long of a period be tween the time George H.W. Bush (Bush I) delivered his address and members had a chance to respond. In 1990, Bush I spent about 43 percent of his address on foreign affairs, whereas only about a quarter of congressional responses were on foreign policies (see Table 6-3). Bush I discussed a variety of different foreign policies, most concerning Eastern Europe and Soviet military presence there. The lack of comments made by Congress suggests they we re unwilling to challe nge Bush I on these issues, therefore giving him leverage over foreign policy. In 1991, Bush I spent almost an equal amount of time discussing domestic and foreign affairs. During this period, the U.S. was involved in the Persian Gulf War, which was viewed as a largely popular military ope ration. In his address, Bush I mainly discussed the justification for the war and its larger purpose. “What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, wher e diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirati ons of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law” (Bush 1991). More than half of the congressional responses in 1991 were devoted to foreign policy (see Table 6-3). Members of Congress also discussed Iraq, however, they focused more on the troops stationed in the Middle East. Many members of Congress expressed their support for the troops and encouraged Americans to do the same. Based on the

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140 foreign policy topics discussed and rhetoric used by members of C ongress, it is evident they were satisfied with Bush I’s foreign pol icy, particularly in regards to the Persian Gulf War. Therefore, Bush I was able to exert a fair am ount of influence over foreign affairs in 1991. In 1992, Congress shifted its focus primarily back to domestic affairs while Bush I continued to discuss foreign policies. By this point the Persian Gulf War had successfully ended, and Bush I was campaigning for re-election. At the time of his SOU address, Bush I’s popularity was at a little under 44 percent approval (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ data/popularity.php). This suggests that his emphasis on foreign affairs was partially due to his de sire to gain influence and increase his approval rating. As has been pointed out by other scholars, the state of the economy is one of the most influential factors a ffecting a president’s public approval (Andrade and Young 1996; Brace and Hinckley 1991). So with th e economy performing poorly in 1992, Bush I likely focused on foreign policies as a way to distract public attention from domestic problems. The fact that Congress left fo reign affairs largely unaddressed in their responses suggests that Bush I’s strategy of focusing on forei gn affairs to gain influence may have been somewhat successful. Bill Clinton, 1993 – 2000 In looking at the percentage of time Clinton and members of Congress spent discussing foreign affairs during Clinton’s pr esidency, it is obvious by looking at Table 6-4 that Congress generally deferred to the pr esident. In Clinton’s first SOU in 1993, he spent only 2.9 percent of his speech on forei gn affairs, and none of the congressional responses addressed foreign pol icy. However, for the remai nder of Clinton’s two terms,

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141 he spent between 17 and 27.2 percent of his a ddresses discussing foreign affairs, while congressional responses focused on foreign a ffairs ranged between zero and 9.3 percent. Without looking at the circumstances, these percentages suggest th at Congress generally deferred to Clinton regarding foreign affairs. There were two years during Clinton’s pr esidency when Congress did not discuss foreign affairs at all. For example, in 1997, Clinton spent 27 percent of his address outlining his foreign policy agenda. Clint on said that the North American Trade Organization (NATO) needed to be expanded by 1999 to include former Soviet countries; that the U.S. must continue and expand trad e with Asia; and that overall the U.S. must embrace the challenge of a global economy. C linton also said that American security must be ensured by preventing countries fr om acquiring and using nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. must maintain a “strong a nd ready military” (1997). However, not one member of Congress spoke about foreign affa irs. This again suggests that Congress allowed Clinton to have a certain amount of leeway in regards to foreign affairs since they were unwilling to challenge his foreign policy. George W. Bush, 2001 – 2006 Of all the presidents rese arched in this dissertatio n, the most pronounced example of Congress deferring to the pr esident came after the Septem ber 11, 2001 attacks. Before the terrorist attacks, George W. Bush (Bush II) focused mainly on domestic policies, as did Congress (see Table 6-5). Once the terroris t attacks occurred, Bu sh II quickly shifted his focus towards foreign policies, spending a little over half of his 2002 SOU address discussing foreign policies. Surprisingly, C ongress did not address foreign affairs in 2002 and instead seemed to wait for Bush II to set the foreign policy agenda and see how the public would respond.

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142 Congress only started addressing forei gn policy issues in 2003 after Bush II started discussing potential military acti on in Iraq. Many members of Congress challenged Bush II’s foreign policy, especially in regards to Iraq, during their responses in 2003. However, by 2004, Bush II still spent a little over half of his address on foreign affairs while Congress started returning thei r focus to domestic policies. Bush II’s presidency, and particularly his shift from do mestic to foreign policies is discussed in much further detail in Chapter 8. Domestic vs. Foreign – Overall Le vels of Presidential Influence To further assess the levels of influe nce presidents have in Congress when discussing domestic and forei gn policies, it is necessary to categorize presidential influence according to the amount of time each president spends discussing each type of policy. Table 6-6 classifies presidents as either high domestic, medium domestic, and low domestic depending on the percentage of time they spent discussing domestic policies and their correspondi ng levels of influence. Presidents were classified as high domes tic if they spent 75 percent or more of their SOU address discussing dom estic policies, medium dome stic if between 50 percent and 74 percent of their address was devoted to domestic policies, and low domestic if less than 50 percent of their speech was on domes tic policies. When looking at the aggregate data presented in the table it actually appear s that presidents are more influential when talking about domestic policies. For example, when calculating an average level of influence for each category of domestic po licy discussion (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B for the methods used) presidents actually ha d higher levels of influence when spending more time discussing domestic policies. This can be seen in Table 6-7 which shows the numeric averages for each level of domestic policy discussion.

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143 Table 6-7 shows that presidents had a me dium level of influence when spending at least 75 percent of their speech discu ssing domestic policies wh ich tapered down to a low level of influence when spending less th an 50 percent of their speech on domestic policies. Although this seems to greatly cont radict my findings, it does not. Instead, it has to do with the way levels of influence are measured. As previously discussing in Chapter 3, a president’s level of influence is based on two main factors: agreement in topics discussed by the presid ent and members of Congress, and the content of that discussion. When the president and members di scussed the same topics using largely the same rhetoric influence was labeled high, whereas influence was low when different topics were being discussed in different ways. However, how does this measurement scheme work when looking at foreign policies? I would like to suggest that it cannot be viewed in the same way. The reason for this is because foreign polic ies are handled in different ways than domestic policies. As discussed at the begi nning of this chapter, presidents have more means to carry out foreign policies without C ongress than they do in regards to domestic policies. For example, presidents can use the War Powers Resolution to send troops into combat without congressional approval, but the president has no means of enacting universal health care without the cooperation of Congress. Therefore, in order to have influence over the domestic policy agenda in Congress, members of Congress would have to be discussing the same issues as th e president and doing so in largely the same way. However, in regards to foreign policies, the fact that Congress is not discussing the foreign policy issues being discussed by the pr esident can be an indication that Congress is allowing the president to pursue his own foreign policy agenda. Therefore, just

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144 because a president might have slightly more topic and content agreement when discussing domestic policies does not necessarily mean his influence over domestic policies is greater. Also, the evidence suggests that presiden tial influence over foreign policies might not be consistent, but instea d may vary over time according to specific factors. Conclusions Looking at the results, several conclusions about presidential influence in foreign policy can be drawn. One is that presidents do appear to exert more influence regarding foreign policy, even if sometimes that influe nce is only temporary. Each of the five presidents discussed exerted more influence than Congress over foreign affairs at some point during their presidency. Sometimes this influence was more pronounced than others – for example when Bush II spent 56.7 percent of his SOU address discussing foreign affairs and only 2.4 per cent of congressional response s focused on foreign policy. Regardless of the case, the president’s influenc e in foreign affairs was evident either by him clearly setting the agenda and members of Congress following suit, or by members of Congress refusing to challenge the president on his foreign policies. A second conclusion is that aside from focusing on foreign affairs in response to international events and crises, presiden ts do seem to sometimes purposely focus on foreign policy as a way to potentially gain influence in Congress. This was clearly evident in 1992 when Bush I was running for re-election, his popularity was low, and he spent a third of his address on foreign affairs. Also, an interesting pattern emerges when looking at when presidents tend to emphasize foreign affairs. For example, with the exception of Bush I in 1989, Table 6-8 shows th at presidents typically do not focus a lot on foreign affairs during their first SOU address.

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145 This trend makes sense in that during their first SOU address presidents have typically not established a rela tionship with Congress yet so th ere is no need for them to emphasize foreign policy as a way to gain infl uence. The reason this may not have been the case with Bush I in 1989 is because he had been vice president during Reagan’s presidency, and therefore already had estab lished a relationship with Congress. Also, Table 6-9 shows that in all of the cases the percentage of time presidents spent on foreign affairs between their first SOU a ddress and their last increased. Therefore, it appears that as their presiden cies progress, presidents are likely to spend more time discussing foreign affairs. This could be par tially in response to international events and crises that arise, but is also likely part of a strategy used by presidents to increase their in fluence in Congress. Overall, discussing foreign affairs is not a surefire way to gain influence, howev er, under the right circumstances a president could have success in doing so.

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146 Table 6-1. Discussion of Do mestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress DomesticForeign 1978 President65.5% 34.5% Congress60.4% 39.6% 1979 President43.4% 56.6% Congress85% 15% 1980 President23.4% 76.6% Congress45.8% 54.2% Table 6-2. Discussion of Do mestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress DomesticForeign 1981 President90.1% 8.9% Congress81.8% 18.2% 1982 President77.6% 22.4% Congress87.5% 12.5% 1983 President73.7% 26.3% Congress61.6% 38.4% 1984 President72% 28% Congress78.5% 21.5% 1985 President70.6% 29.4% Congress71.5% 28.5% 1986 President66.7% 33.3% Congress80.4% 19.6% 1987 President43.4% 56.6% Congress46.8% 53.2% 1988 President60.5% 39.5% Congress21.3% 78.7%

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147 Table 6-3. Discussion of Domestic and Fore ign Affairs by the Pr esident and Congress DomesticForeign 1990 President 57% 43% Congress 74.2% 25.8% 1991 President 49.4% 50.6% Congress 38.5% 61.5% 1992 President 68.6% 31.4% Congress 91.2% 8.8% Table 6-4. Discussion of Do mestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress DomesticForeign 1993 President97.1% 2.9% Congress100% 0% 1994 President77.7% 22.3% Congress97.6% 2.4% 1995 President80.3% 19.7% Congress98.3% 1.7% 1996 President83% 17% Congress94.2% 5.8% 1997 President73% 27% Congress100% 0% 1998 President75.3% 24.7% Congress90.7% 9.3% 2000 President79% 21% Congress94% 6%

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148 Table 6-5. Discussion of Do mestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress DomesticForeign 2001 President 92.3% 7.7% Congress 98.4% 1.6% 2002 President 43.3% 56.7% Congress 97.6% 2.4% 2003 President 38.4% 61.6% Congress 46.4% 53.6% 2004 President 48.1% 51.9% Congress 69.4% 30.6% 2005 President 48.8% 51.2% Congress 81.3% 18.7% 2006 President 51.9% 48.1% Congress 77.5% 22.5%

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149 Table 6-6. Levels of Influence Base d on Emphasis of Domestic Policies Year President Influence High Domestic 1981 Reagan High 1982 Reagan High 1993 Clinton High Partisan 1994 Clinton Low 1995 Clinton Low 1996 Clinton Medium 1998 Clinton Medium 2000 Clinton Low 2001 Bush II High Partisan Medium Domestic1979 Carter Low 1983 Reagan Medium 1984 Reagan Medium 1985 Reagan Low 1986 Reagan Medium 1988 Reagan Medium 1990 Bush I Medium 1992 Bush I Medium 1997 Clinton Medium Low Domestic 1980 Carter Low 1981 Carter Low 1987 Reagan Medium 1991 Bush I High 2002 Bush II Low 2003 Bush II Medium 2004 Bush II Low 2005 Bush II Medium 2006 Bush II Low Table 6-7. Average Level of Influe nce During Domestic Policy Discussion High Domestic 2 Medium Medium Domestic 1.78 Medium Low Domestic 1.56 Low Table 6-8. Percentage of First SOU Addresses Devot ed to Foreign Affairs 19818.9% 198924.75% 19932.9% 20017.7%

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150 Table 6-9. Percentage Cha nge from First to Last S OU Address on Foreign Affairs Carter +42.1 Reagan+30.6 Bush I +6.6 Clinton+18.1 Bush II+40.4

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151 CHAPTER 7 INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION Many studies have been conducted regardi ng the effect of crises on presidential approval. According to these studies, pres idential approval increas es during periods of crisis (Callaghan and Virtanen 1993; Ja mes and Rioux 1998; Sigelman and Conover 1981). This chapter looks at some reasons why presidents may gain support during periods of crisis, and whether periods of crisis cause presidential influence over the legislative agenda to increase as well. The main reason times of crisis increase presidential support is that outside threats generally promote cohesion (Sigelma n and Conover 1981). Therefore, any disagreements tend to disappear – at least temporarily – so that the crisis can be addressed. People especially rally around th e president during times of international crisis. This is because in his role as head of state, the president serves as a single figurehead for the country that citizens can look towards. Due to these factors, presidential support is not only likely to in crease during times of crisis, but presidential influence in Congress is al so likely to increase. This is consistent with literature on “rally around the flag” effects. A “rally around the flag” effect is when an event occurs which evokes strong responses of patriotism from citizens (Sinclair 2004). T ypically, the event has to be international, involve the U.S. directly, and be “specific, dramatic, and sh arply focused” (Mueller 1985, 208). Scholars have found that “rally around the flag” effects cause presidential support to increase not only with the public, but also with members of Congress as well (Callaghan and Virtanen 1993; Hetheri ngton and Nelson 2003; James and Rioux 1998; Sigelman and Conover 1981; Sinclair 2004).

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152 There are two main schools of thought regarding the cause of rally effects. One is the patriotism school which says that peopl e rally around the presid ent during times of crisis because he is a symbol of national unity, a type of living flag (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). However, the second school of th ought says that rally effects occur when opposition leaders in Congress do not challenge the president, or they make mildly supportive statements (ibid). For the sake of this dissertation, the main concern will be congressional behavior. If members in Congress from the opposition party speak supportively of the president, or at least do not challenge him, this will be indicative of a rally effect and therefore presidential influence. To determine whether this is the case, th ree different crises and their impact on presidential influence will be examined – the Iranian hostage crisis, the Persian Gulf War, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Although there were other international conflicts the U.S. was involved in during th e 28 years studied in my dissertation, these three were chosen because they fit the criter ion outlined by Mueller as likely to elicit a rally around the flag effect. This is because a ll three crises are international, involve the U.S. directly, and were focused events. If presidents are able to exert more influence in Congress during periods of crisis, then certain behavior should be expected of members of Congress. One, members of Congress should be discussing the same topi cs and doing so using similar rhetoric. However, the biggest difference in congression al behavior during times of crisis should be the way members of the opposition party behave. At the beginning of a crisis, congressional behavior shoul d not be affected by partis anship (Sigelman and Conover 1981). This means that members of the oppos ition party should be supportive of the

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153 president, or at least not ove rly critical of him. Howeve r, opposition support should start to dissipate the longe r the crisis lasts. It is also important to note that opposition support will likely only be in regards to foreign policy, and particularly th e crisis at hand. This means that it is possible for there still to be a partisan divide in regards to dom estic policies. So in looking at presidential influence during the Iranian hos tage crisis, Persian Gulf Wa r, and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, responses will be examined both based on partisanship, and whether the main topic was foreign or domes tic. This should show whether presidents are able to gain support from the opposition party during times of crisis. Carter and the Iranian Hostage Crisis The Iranian hostage crisis began on November 4, 1979, when American hostages were taken at the American Embassy in Iran. After the hostage crisis began, Carter’s public approval rating increased dr astically. If the crisis increased Carter’s approval, then did it also cause his influence in Congress to increase? For his influence in Congress to have also increased, then there should be a noticeable difference between the level of influence Carter had at th e beginning of 1979 and the begi nning of 1980. However, in looking at his overall level of influence, Carter’s influence in Congress was low throughout his presidency, and did not seem to increase due to the Iranian hostage crisis. Looking at the congressional responses, there was an increase in responses on foreign affairs between 1979 and 1980 both by Democrats and Republicans (see Tables 7-1 and 7-2). However, not all the foreign affa ir responses were about Iran. In fact, there were more congressional speeches discussi ng the Soviet Union and China, than ones about the crisis situation in Iran. This suggests that even t hough members were not

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154 speaking in support of Carter’s handling of the hostage situat ion in Iran, they were also not openly criticizing him. However, members were not afraid to cri ticize Carter’s domestic policies. Carter received much criticism in Congress – both from Democrats and Republicans. Members of Congress were not only critical of Carter ’s domestic policies, but also of Carter personally. Therefore, the fact that members were not criticiz ing Carter in regards to his foreign policies suggests that he was able to exert more influence in the foreign policy realm. However, this influence was temporary. Bush I and the Persian Gulf War While Carter’s presidency was discussed in detail during previous chapters, Bush I’s presidency has yet to be di scussed in the same detail. In order to determine whether Bush I was able to exert more influence duri ng the Persian Gulf War, it is necessary to closely examine Bush I’s presidency – specifically looking at 1990 through 1992. Analyzing these years will show the influence Bush I had during the Persian Gulf War in comparison to the influence he had in year s both before and after the war. For the Persian Gulf War to have allowed Bush I more influence, then it w ould be expected that he would have more influence in 1991, whic h is when the U.S. was involved during the military operation. For the war in Iraq to have not given Bush I more influence, then his influence across the three years should remain relatively the same. In 1990, the main topic discussed by Bush I was foreign affairs, accounting for 18.7 percent of his speech (see Figure 7-1). Bush I discussed spreading freedom to the rest of the world, and how many of the form er Communist countries had become free democracies. The second most discussed topic by Bush I was education. Bush I discussed spending more money on programs such as Head Start, as well as raising the

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155 overall standards “of our schools, our teachers, of our kids, of our parents, and ourselves” (1990). The third most discussed topic by Bush I in 1990 was the military. Bush I congratulated the military for a job well done in Panama, and said that soon the rest of the troops from Panama would be returning to the U.S. While Bush I was mainly discussing foreign policies, members of Congress were focused more on domestic policies (see Figur e 7-2). The main topic discussed by members of Congress in 1990 was the envi ronment (17.7 percent). Specifically, members discussed Bush I’s plan to amend and improve the 1970 Clean Air Act, and also his proposal to make the Envi ronmental Protection Agency a cabinet department. Most members discussing these proposals were suppor tive. For example, Senator Orrin Hatch said that Bush I’s plan was a “flexible, market-driven approach to cleaning our air” (1990). However, not all members thought Bush I was doing enough in terms of the environment. For example, Senator Al Gore sa id that Bush I had failed to address global warming so far in his presidency (1990). The second most discussed topic in C ongress was the military (16.1 percent). Some members of Congress – predominantly Republicans – praised Bush I’s plan to reduce the presence of American troops in central Europe. However, many Democrats criticized Bush I’s defense budget was too larg e and that more cuts were needed. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy offered a Democratic alternative to the Bush I defense budget. The third most discussed topic in Congr ess was social secu rity, accounting for 14.5 percent of responses. Even though most of the responses cam e from Republicans,

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156 both Democrats and Republicans were in agr eement that the social security trust fund should not be used for other purposes. As Representative Thomas Campbell said, “keep your cotton-pickin' hands off Social Security” (1990). Although Bush I and members of Congre ss were discussing largely different topics in 1990, this changed in 1991 after the Persian Gulf War began. In his 1991 SOU address, Bush I spent the most time discussing Iraq (see Figure 7-3). Bush I started off his address discussing the Persian Gulf War a nd its larger implications. He said, “What is at stake is more than one small country ; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind -peace and security, freedom , and the rule of law” (Bush 1991). Aside from discussing Iraq, the next mo st discussed topic by Bush I was foreign affairs in general. Bush I discussed the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and spreading democracy and freedom to Eastern European and Latin American countries. The third most discussed topic by Bush I was the economy. Bush I said that even though the country was fighting a recession, ther e was still reason to be optimistic. He said, “Together, since 1981, we've created almo st 20 million jobs, cut inflation in half, and cut interest rates in half” (Bush 1991). In 1991, members of Congress also spent the most time discussing Iraq (see Figure 7-4). There was no debate regarding whether or not th e U.S. should be in Iraq. Members agreed that it was necessary to re taliate against Iraq for their invasion of Kuwait, and therefore were supportive of Bu sh I. However, members of Congress did discuss whether or not Saddam Hussein should be allowed to remain in power. Some

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157 members expressed fear that if left in power, Hussein could continue to cause instability in the Middle East. The next most discussed topic by members of Congress was the military. In their discussion of the military, most members of Congress discussed troops actively serving in Iraq. Specifically, members mentioned a nd expressed gratitude to service men and women from their districts a nd states who were serving. Aside from discussing Iraq and the milita ry, members of Congress also discussed the budget. There was a fairly large partisan divide evident in discussions of the budget, with most Republicans supporti ng the budget and most Democr ats criticizing it. Even though members of Congress were discussing the budget, Bush I only spent about three percent of his speech on it. Similarly, even though Bush I spent a large portion of his speech discussing the economy, only 1.8 percen t of congressional responses focused on the economy. Although Bush I appeared to gain influe nce in Congress in 1991, at least in regards to foreign policies, th is influence seems to have diminished by 1992. In his 1992 SOU address, the main topic discussed by Bush I was the economy (see Figure 7-5). Bush I said that even though inflation and interest rates were down, that unemployment was too high. He said that Congress needed to bring “the same courage and sense of common purpose to the economy that we brought to Desert Storm” (Bush 1992). Bush I also said that it was necessary for Congress to pass his economic plan in order to meet the economic needs of the U.S. Aside from the economy, Bush I again focused on foreign policies. The next most discussed topic by Bush I was foreign affairs in general. Bush I discussed

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158 American success in the Persian Gulf War, as well as the continuing talks with the Soviet Union. Related to his discussion of foreign affairs was the third most discussed topic by Bush I – the military. Bush I mainly thanked troops for their performance during the Persian Gulf War. In 1992, members of Congress also disc ussed the economy the most (see Figure 7-6). Similar to Bush I, members of Congr ess were concerned about the state of the economy and discussed possible solutions. Mo st Republicans were s upportive of Bush I and his plan for the economy. However, many Democrats were critical of the President and suggested that he had not even truly outlined an economic plan. For example, Representative Rosa DeLauro said that Bu sh I she did not hear Bush I discuss any economic plan which would benefit the majority of Americans. Instead she said that, “what I heard was the same message of tax cuts for the wealthy and trickle-down hopes for everyone else” (DeLauro 1992). The next two topics discussed most by members of Congress were also ones which Bush I spent time discussing. The s econd most discussed topic by Congress was unemployment. Just as Bush I had discussed rising levels of employment and needing to address them, so did Congress. The differe nce was again partisan in that Republicans were largely supportive of Bush I, while Democr ats were largely critic al. Similarly, there was also a large partisan difference in th e way members of Congress discussed taxes, which was the third most discussed topic. In looking at the three year s of Bush I’s presidency which were analyzed, it is apparent that he was able to exert more influence during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 – at least in regards to foreign affairs. Members of Congress were largely supportive of

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159 Bush I in regards to his Iraq policy. Not only did they speak supportively of him, but there were also not members of Congress criticiz ing him. It also appears that Bush I was able to retain his influence over foreign affa irs, even after the Persian Gulf War ended. However, in regards to domestic policies, Bush I was not able to increase his influence in Congress either during or af ter the Persian Gulf War. Bush II and 9/11 The case of George W. Bush (Bush II) and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was very different from that of Cart er and the Iranian hostage crisis, and from Bush I and the Persian Gulf War. The larges t jump in presidential approval recorded by Gallup occurred after the September 11, 2001 te rrorist attacks when Bush II’s approval climbed 35 points (Edwards 2004). Almost immediately, the country looked towards Bush II for leadership in the time of crisis. Was Bush II able to use this public support to exert influence in Congress? The level of influence Bush II exerted in Congress did change between his 2001 and 2002 SOU addresses, however, not in the way expected. In 2001, Bush II and members of Congress were discussing largely the same topics. However, in 2002, when Bush II switched his focus to foreign policie s, members of Congress continued to talk about domestic policies. This suggests that Bu sh II was able to wield a large amount of influence over foreign affairs immediatel y following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The effect of the September 11, 2001 attacks on Bush II’s influence in Congress, as well as whether or not Bush II was able to retain this influence is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.

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160 Conclusions Overall, the results show that presidents potentially have the ability to exert much more influence during times of cr isis, however, there are limits to this influence. One has to do with partisanship. Presidents are typical ly able to exert more influence during times of crisis because the behavior of oppositi on party members in Congress changes. Opposition members in Congress are less likely to criticize and challenge the president, at least in regards to foreign affairs. Both Carter and Bush II were presid ing during unified government when their crises occurred, however, members of their own parties responded very differently. While Democrats in Congress initially supported Carter, this support was temporary. Republicans in Congress during Bush II’s presidency were much more consistent with their support. Having a majority Republican Congress which was largely supportive is likely one reason Bush II was able to exert mo re influence during and after his crisis than Carter. Even though Bush I was presiding du ring divided government, Republicans and Democrats in Congress responded to him much in the same way they did to Bush II. Republicans were typically supportive of Bush I and his policies, while Democrats were mostly critical. Therefore, unified or di vided government does not seem to be what matters, but instead the relationship each i ndividual president ha s with members of Congress. A second limitation in regards to presid ential influence during periods of crisis has to do with the distinction between foreign and domestic policies. While a president’s influence may increase in regards to foreign a ffairs, it does not necessarily also increase in regards to domestic affairs. This is es pecially apparent when looking at Bush II and

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161 9/11. Even though Democrats were not initia lly challenging Bush II in his response to the September 11, 2001, attacks, they were not hesitant to continue criticizing his domestic programs. Therefore, the influence gained by presidents during times of crisis is limited to foreign policy. A final limitation on the president’s influe nce during times of crisis is that the increase in influence is likely to be tem porary. Depending on the type of crisis, some presidents may be able to sustain their highe r level of influence longer than others. For example, the increased support for Carter and therefore his in creased influence was much more short-lived than that of Bush II. Ca rter’s approval increased from 37.8 percent to 51.5 percent following the onset of the Iranian hostage crisis (http://www.presidency.u csb.edu/data/popularity.php ). Carter’s approval peaked at 57.6 percent in January of 1980, but was down to 39.1 percent again by the end of March 1980 (ibid). In contrast, Bush I’s approval increased almost 20 percentage points – from 64.3 percent to 82.7 percen t once fighting began in the Pers ian Gulf War on January 17, 1991 (ibid). Bush I’s approval peaked at a s lightly over 89 percent when the war ended on February 28, 1991, and his approval remained above 60 percent until the end of October 1991. Therefore, Bush I was able to retain his increased approval longer than Carter. Bush II’s approval increased even more dr astically than his father’s. Bush II’s approval peaked at 90 percent on September 22, 2001, and still remained at above 80 percent for almost six months afterwards (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). A year after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Bush II’s a pproval was still hovering around 70 percent (http://www.presidency.u csb.edu/data/popularity.php ). Therefore, it appears that not

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162 only is a president’s approval likely to increase during periods of crises, but their levels of influence in Congress are as well.

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163 Table 7-1. 1979 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type Foreign Domestic Democrat 37.5% 62.5% Republican7.1% 92.9% Table 7-2. 1980 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type Foreign Domestic Democrat 66.7% 33.3% Republican50% 50% TopicsCri m e A ID S D r ug Pol i cy Weapons F or ei gn A f f ai r s A gr i cult ur e Empl oy ment Civil Rights B ur eaucr acy E nviron ment Economy Military/Defense H eal t h Care S ocia l S e curit y E ducati on T ax e s B udgetPercentage20 10 0 Figure 7-1. 1990 SOU Address Topics

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164 S.O . U. (g e nera l ) Bur e aucr a cy Edu c atio n Soc ia l Se c urity For eig n A ff airs Dru g Pol icy E co no my Mili tar y/D ef ens e H ea lth C are E nv iro nm en t T ax es B ud ge tPercent20 10 0 Figure 7-2. 1990 Congressional Response Topics TopicsC am paign Fin anc e C r i m e AIDS D r ug Poli cy Weapons Foreign A ffairs I r aq Employm ent Trade Civil Righ t s Bureaucracy Envi r onment Economy Energy M i li t ar y/ D ef e nse Heal t h C ar e Educat i on Taxes BudgetPercentage30 20 10 0 Figure 7-3. 1991 SOU Address Topics

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165 Energy F ore ign A ffai rs Emplo y men t D ru g P o licy E con om y Weapo n s M ilit ary /De fe nse Health Care Ir aq Enviro n men t T a xes B udg etPercent30 20 10 0 Figure 7-4. 1991 Congressional Response Topics TopicsC r i me AI D S Drug Policy W e lf ar e W e a pons Fore i gn Affair s N at i onal S ec u rity E m p l oym ent Tr a d e C ivi l R ights B ur e au c racy Econom y Mili t ary/Defe nse Health Care Socia l S ecur ity Education Taxes BudgetPercentage10 8 6 4 2 0 Figure 7-5. 1992 SOU Address Topics

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166 S. O . U . ( ge neral) Social S ec u rity Crim e Bureaucracy For ei gn Af f airs Employm e nt Drug Poli cy Econom y W eapons M i litary/D e fense Heal t h Care Energy T a xes BudgetPercent40 30 20 10 0 Figure 7-6. 1992 Congressional Response Topics

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167 CHAPTER 8 GEORGE W. BUSH: A CASE STUDY In looking at the five presidents examined in this dissertatio n and their emphasis on domestic and foreign policies, no presiden t made as dramatic of a policy shift as George W. Bush (Bush II) after the Sept ember 11, 2001 attacks. As mentioned in previous chapters, Bush II started his pr esidency talking almost exclusively about domestic policies and shifted his focus to foreign policies after the terrorist attacks. This chapter seeks to take a more in-depth look at Bush II’s presidency and his drastic shift from domestic to foreign policies. Specifically, this chapter looks at the effect of Bush II’s policy shift on his level of influence in Congress, and how member s of Congress responded to the change of policy focus. Also, the chapter examines wh ether Bush II continued to concentrate on foreign policies long after the September 11, 2001 attacks, or whether he shifted his focus back to domestic policies. This is done by analyzing and discussing each year of Bush II’s presidency from 2001 through 2006. 2001 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses Bush II’s 2001 SOU address focused predominantly on domestic policies (see Figure 8-1). The three items he discussed most were the budget, taxes, and health care. Bush II spent the most time talking about th e budget. In approxi mately 16.2 percent of the sentences Bush II mentioned the budget which he called “reasonable” and “responsible”. Bush II said that hi s budget was based on the philosophy that “government should be active, but limite d; engaged, but not overbearing” (2001). Besides the budget, the next most discusse d topic was taxes. Bush II spent about 14.3 percent of his SOU address discussing ta xes, and more specifically, his plan to

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168 institute a tax cut. Bush II said his plan wa s to “return [money] to the people who earned it in the first place” (2001). Part of Bush II’s rationale for his tax cut plan was that the budget surplus showed that taxes were too hi gh. Bush II said, “The people of America have been overcharged and, on their behalf, I am here asking for a refund” (2001). Bush II said that his tax plan would benefit peopl e from all tax brackets, and would help the economy. He said, “To create economic gr owth and opportunity, we must put money back into the hands of the people w ho buy goods and create jobs” (Bush 2001). The third most discussed topic in Bush II’s 2001 SOU address was health care. Bush II spent approximately 10.9 percent of his speech discussing health care in general, as well as more specific hea lth care items such as Medicare and a prescription drug plan. Bush II said that people need “quality h ealth care” and that more money was being budgeted for medical research. Bush II also said that his budget increased funding for Medicare, and that a prescription drug plan was being developed for low-income senior citizens. He said this was because “no seni or in America should have to choose between buying food and buying prescr iptions” (Bush 2001). Members of Congress also focused on do mestic policies, and discussed mainly the same topics as Bush II (see Figure 8-2). However, there was a very evident partisan divide in how members of Congr ess discussed these topics. For example, the main topic discussed in Congress was taxes, accounti ng for approximately 39 percent of the responses. Approximately 93.3 percent of Re publicans were supportive of Bush II’s plan for tax cuts, as compared to only 6.7 percent of Democrats. Those members of Congress speaking in favor of the tax cuts used a simila r rationale as Bush II, saying that a surplus showed taxpayers were paying too much a nd therefore should be refunded through a tax

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169 cut. “Rejecting a plan to use a portion of th e surplus for tax relief is the equivalent of paying for a gallon of milk at the grocery store with a $10 bill and having the cashier refuse to give you back the change” (Davis 2001). Members also agreed with Bush II that the tax cuts were beneficial to people from all tax brackets, and that it only made sense for those who put in the most to get back the most. Those members not supportive of Bush II’s tax cut plan rejected these lines of rationale, and said that the tax cuts would unfairly benefi t the wealthy. The wealthy “receive 43 percent of the Bush tax cut. Sadly, there are literally millions of families that receive no benefit from the President’s tax cu t. They are people who pay a payroll tax and not an income tax. They are taxed families. They need relief” (Durbin 2001). Besides being concerned that the tax cu ts would primarily benefit the wealthy, unsupportive members also expressed concern that there would not be enough money to sustain such a large tax cut. There was also a partisan divide be tween members of Congress discussing the budget. The budget was the second most disc ussed topic, accounting for a little over 23 percent of the congressional responses. No t surprisingly, all of the members who said they were supportive of Bush II’s budget were Republicans, and 87.5 percent of the members not supportive of Bush’s budget were Democrats. The rhetoric used by members of Congr ess when speaking in support of the budget was similar to rhetoric used by Bush II. For example, Representative James Gibbons of Nevada said, “This budg et is responsible. It is visi onary, and it is right for our future” (2001). However, the biggest criticism of Bush II’s budget made by members of Congress was that his calculations were in accurate. “The budge t claims to provide

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170 massive tax cuts and maximize reduction of th e national debt and keep our commitments under Social Security and Medicare and make the investments needed to keep the nation strong. It makes five claims that are arithmetically impossible. The numbers simply do not add up” (Kennedy 2001). There was a much less partisan response to education, which was the third most discussed topic in Congress a nd accounted for 15.6 percent of the responses. About twothirds of the members who spoke about educa tion were supportive of Bush II’s stance. Looking at the partisan makeup of this s upport, 57.1 percent came from Republicans, and 42.9 percent from Democrats. Many member s of Congress, regardless of party, used similar rhetoric to Bush II when discussing e ducation. This was especially true in regards to the phrase “no child left behind” which Bu sh II used in his address. For example, Republican Senator Kay Hutchison said, “We wa nt no child in our country to be left behind” (2001). Similarly, Democratic Repr esentative Major Robert Owens said, “Here we are with President Bush producing a plan which says he will leave no child behind” (2001). 2002 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses Bush II delivered his 2002 SOU address a little over four months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Not su rprisingly, his speech focused primarily on foreign policies (see Figure 8-3). Bush II started off his 2002 SOU address by saying: “As we gather tonight, our nation is at war, our economy is in reces sion, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers.” From th is statement and onward, it was apparent that Bush II was discussing ve ry different topics than he had in 2001. The three main topics discussed by Bush II in 2002 were te rrorism, the military, and homeland security.

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171 Terrorism was definitely the predominant topic, with Bush II spending almost a quarter of his speech discussing it. In speak ing about terrorism, Bush II said, “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the worl d like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning” (2002). That is why he sa id one of the goals in the war on terrorism was “to prevent regimes that sponsor terror fr om threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction” (2002). He was especially concerned with making sure another attack like the ones that took place on September 11, 2001, did not happen again. Bush II also issued a resolve to countries that might have weapons which could be used to commit terrorist acts. He said, “The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons” (Bush 2002). Besides discussing terrorism in general, th e next most discusse d topic by Bush II was the military and defense, of which he spen t a little over nine percent of his speech discussing. Bush II said that the U.S. would not be able to fight the war on terrorism without the members of the ar med services, and praised thei r efforts overseas. He said, “The men and women of our Armed Forces ha ve delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States: Even 7,000 m iles away, across oceans and continents, on mountaintops and in caves -you will not escape the justice of this nation” (Bush 2002). The third most discussed topic was ho meland security, which accounted for 6.7 percent of Bush II’s address. Bush II said that the September 11, 2001 attacks illustrated the need for heightened home land security. “America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased

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172 vigilance at home.” Bush II also said that increased homeland security would be beneficial all around. He said, “Homeland s ecurity will make America not only stronger, but, in many ways, better” (Bush 2002). Members of Congress responded much diffe rently to Bush II in 2002 than they had in 2001. In 2001, members responded by di scussing largely the same issues the president had discussed. However, in 2002, while the President focused overwhelmingly on foreign policy, members of Congress larg ely ignored foreign policy and instead concentrated on domestic issues (see Figure 84). The three topics which dominated the speeches given by members of Congress were the economy, the budget, and taxes. Approximately 28.6 percent of responses given by members of Congress focused on the economy. Of those members who me ntioned the economy, 52.4 spoke of it in a negative way, whereas the rest spoke of the eco nomy in a neutral manner. An example of the type of negative rhetoric used is a st atement made by Senator Thomas Carper of Delaware. He said, “We have had a sick ec onomy, and we have been working to try to figure out how we might ensure the full, complete, and healthy recovery of that economy” (Carper 2002). Besides discussing an economic downturn, 50 percent of the speaking members in Congress also labeled the economy as being in a recession. Of those who stated the economy was in a recession, ther e was little partisan divi sion with 57.1 percent being Republicans and 42.9 percent Democrats. However, the reasons members gave for the recession were more partisan. Democrat s typically blamed the recession on the September 11, 2001 attacks. For example, Sena tor Daniel Akaka from Hawaii said, “The slowdown of our Nation's economy has been a matter of increasing concern following the

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173 terrorist attacks on September 11th. Millions of Americans ar e dealing with the economic repercussions of the attacks on our Nation” (2002). However, Republicans were more likely to claim the recession started before th e 2000 presidential elec tion. “As far as the economy is concerned, the downturn started be fore President Bush ever took office, before we ever knew that the dastardly act s which occurred on September 11 would ever happen to us” (Grassley 2002). There was also a partisan divide regard ing the budget, of which 23.8 percent of speaking members of Congress addressed. Republicans largely supported Bush II’s budget and claimed that it would help accomplish the goals of Americans. “The President's budget meets the requirements of victory and the test of responsibility. The President's budget holds government accountable for results that address these priorities of the American people: Winning the war on te rrorism, strengthening protections of our homeland, and revitalizing our economy a nd creating jobs” (Stearns 2002). However, many Democrats claimed the budget to be “unbalanced” (Reid, February 5, 2002). “The Administ ration's new budget is wrapped in the flag. Literally. It has a beautiful red, white and blue cover. But the fine print insi de should be written mostly in red ink. Contrary to one pledge af ter another, from one Administration official after another, this plan rejects a balan ced budget in favor of a ‘borrow and spend’ approach” (Doggett 2002). Republicans and Democrats also disagreed on what to do about tax cuts, which were the primary topic of 21.4 percent of c ongressional responses. Of the members who said they were still in favor of a tax cu t, 90 percent were Republicans, and only 10 percent were Democrats. Speaking in favor of tax cuts, Republican Representative

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174 Spencer Bachus said, “when Congress makes a commitment to give Americans tax relief, it should honor that commitment. To put it plainly, Americans should get the tax cuts that they have been promised. Ameri cans should have the tax relief that they desperately need” (2002). However, many Democrats felt that economic changes which took place following the September 11, 2001 att acks made tax cuts no longer feasible. “Unfortunately, when it comes to the tax cut, the administration is unw illing to admit that the world has changed. If future tax cuts wh ich disproportionately favor our wealthiest citizens are treated as a sacred cow, many of the programs that help our neediest citizens will be sacrificed” (Kennedy 2002). The three main topics discussed by members of Congress – the economy, the budget, and taxes – were largely unaddressed by Bush II in his SOU address. Bush II only discussed the economy in 4.3 percent of his address, and the budget and tax cuts 3.4 percent and 2.9 percent respectiv ely. In regards to the econo my, Bush II did state that there was an economic recession, however, he did not spend much time discussing a plan to revive the economy. He did mention revi ving the economy as one of the goals of his budget: “My budget supports three great goals fo r America: we will win this war; we’ll protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy” (Bush 2002). However, even the goals of Bush II’s budget were more focused on foreign policy and national security issues. Bush II said the main way he hoped to revive the economy was by creating jobs and cutting taxes. He said, “The way out of the recession, the way to create jobs, is to grow the economy by encouraging investme nt in factories and equipment, and by speeding up tax relief so pe ople will have more mone y to spend” (Bush 2002).

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175 Just as the topics discussed most by Congr ess were not ones Bu sh II spent a lot of time discussing, the topics Bush II talked the most about were largely unaddressed by Congress. For example, Bush II spent 23 pe rcent of his address discussing terrorism, whereas it was the primary topic of only one congressional speech. In fact, terrorism was only discussed in 14.3 percent of all the congressional speeches analyzed. More members of Congress mentioned the Septem ber 11, 2001 attacks (28.6 percent), but only 7.1 percent mentioned the potential for future terrorist attacks. Surprisingly, not one member of Congress mentioned weapons of ma ss destruction. Even fewer members of Congress discussed the military. The military and/or defense was not the main topic of any of the congressional speeches analyzed, and only mentioned in 23.8 percent of speeches. Sim ilarly, homeland security was also not the main topic of any of the congressional sp eeches. However, homeland security was discussed in some capacity in 28.6 percent of speeches. 2003 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses Bush II again addressed foreign policies in his 2003 SOU address (see Figure 8-5). When Bush II gave his address, ther e was much discussion about the U.S. possibly entering into a military operation in Iraq. Congress passed a resolution to authorize use of military force against Iraq in Octo ber 2002, and the Bush Administration was increasingly trying to link a military opera tion in Iraq to the war on terrorism. Not surprisingly, Iraq was the topic discussed most by Bush II in his 2003 SOU address, accounting for just over 19 percent of his sp eech. In discussing Iraq, Bush II tried to justify military action there. Bush II’s main justification was that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that he could pot entially use to attack the U.S., or that

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176 Hussein could give or sell them to some te rrorist group who would. So in discussing Iraq, Bush II continuously tried to draw links between Hussein and terrorism. The topic discussed the next most by Bush II was terrorism, which accounted for 15.96 percent of his speech. In discussing te rrorism, Bush II made several mentions of the September 11, 2001 attacks, and also cite d other terrorist atta cks which had taken place. Bush II also discussed the progress of the war against terrorism, and said that the U.S. was winning this war. He said that th e United States had “terrorists on the run, and [are] keeping them on the run. One by one, th e terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice” (Bush 2003). The third most discussed topic by Bush II was nuclear weapons (15.6 percent). Although Bush II predominantly talked about nu clear weapons in relation to Iraq, he also discussed other “outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chem ical, and biological weapons” (2003). For example, Bush II identif ied Iran as a government which “pursues weapons of mass destruction,” and said that North Korea was “using its nuclear program to incite fear and s eek concessions” (2003). One similarity between the topics Bush II discussed and the ones addressed by Congress was that the President and members of Congress both disc ussed Iraq the most (see Figure 8-6). Iraq was the number one to pic discussed by legi slators, and was the main topic of almost 44 percent of congre ssional responses. Also, many members of Congress, particularly Republicans, discussed Iraq in terms similar to those used by the President. Many members cited specific w eapons Iraq was thought to possess, just as Bush II had in his address. Members also poi nted out that Iraq had repeatedly failed to

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177 comply with U.N. weapons inspectors. This was the same rationale Bush II had used in his address when trying to ju stify potential military action. However, of those who mentioned Iraq, only a little more than half were in favor of military action, and not surprisingly, they were all Republicans. Democrats who spoke in opposition to taking military action agains t Iraq rejected Bush II’s claims. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy said, “The administration has totally failed to make the case that Saddam Hussein is an imminent threat to our securi ty” (2003). Besides feeling that there was not enough evidence to justify military ac tion in Iraq, other members thought weapons inspectors should be given more time, attempts to reach a diplomatic solution should be exhausted first, and that military action in Iraq should only occur multilaterally. Other than discussing Iraq, most of the rest of the speeches given by members of Congress focused on domestic policies. Th e second most discusse d topic in Congress was health care (12.2 percent), followed by th e economy and AIDS (each at 9.8 percent). Even though these were the topics emphasi zed by members of Congress, Bush II spent only about four percent of his speech on each health care, the economy, and AIDS. Therefore, aside from Iraq, Bush II and memb ers of Congress were clearly discussing different topics, with legisl ators choosing to emphasize predominantly domestic policies. 2004 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses In his 2004 SOU address, Bush II again emphasized foreign policies, focusing on terrorism, Iraq, and foreign affairs in gene ral (see Figure 8-7). Bush II discussed terrorism the most, spending about 13.8 percen t of his address on it. Similar to his discussion of terrorism in 2002 and 2003, Bush II invoked images of the September 11, 2001 attacks and discussed preventin g future terror ist attacks.

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178 The next most discussed topic by Bush II was foreign affairs, which accounted for 13.45 percent of his speech. Bush II discu ssed the Middle East re gion in general, and also updated the nation on occurrences in Af ghanistan. He also responded to criticism that the military action in Iraq was a unilateral one by discussing American allies and specifically naming who they were. Bush II also once again mentioned North Korea and their desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq was the third most discussed topic by Bush II (11.5 percent). Between his 2003 and 2004 SOU addresses, the United States began a military operation in Iraq and overthrew Hussein, so this had an effect on how Bush II discussed Iraq. In 2004, Bush II focused his discussion of Iraq more on spread ing democracy there and how the Iraqis had been liberated. He did however acknowledge th ere were factions in Iraq which continued to fight against U.S. troops, and that this was making Iraq’s transition to democracy more difficult. Although the three main topics discu ssed by Bush II in 2004 again focused on foreign affairs, the topics discussed by me mbers of Congress shifted even more towards domestic policies (see Figure 8-8). Members of Congress spent the most time discussing health care (16 percent of speeches). Simila r to Bush II’s discussion of health care, members of Congress discussed the rising co st of prescription drugs and a possible solution. Even though not all members agreed with Bush II’s plan to add prescription drug coverage to Medicare, members were stil l discussing health care using largely the same rhetoric as Bush II. The second and third most discussed topi cs in Congress were Iraq and the budget, each accounting for 12.9 percent of congressional responses. Much of the discussion of

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179 Iraq in Congress involved members trying to e xplain why they had initially voted in favor of the military operation. Members claimed that they voted in favor of the operation primarily because Iraq was thought to have weapons of mass destru ction. However, no weapons had been found, and this caused ma ny members to express anger towards the Bush II administration. For example, Repr esentative Joseph Hoeffel of Pennsylvania said, “But we have not found the weapons of mass destruction, and it is clear that an extraordinary amount of exaggeration and d eception occurred from the White House on the subject of weapons of mass destruction before we went to war in order to win congressional support for going to war” (2004 ). So even though members of Congress were discussing Iraq, most were not discussing it using the sa me rhetoric as Bush II. The budget was the third most discussed t opic in Congress, which is surprising considering that Bush II only mentioned the budget four times during his address. Once again, this shows that member s of Congress were focused more on domestic affairs than on foreign affairs. Also, even though there we re some similar issues emphasized by Bush II and members of Congress, by 2004, legislator s were discussing these issues in largely different ways. 2005 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses During his 2005 SOU address, Bush II di scussed a domestic policy the most for the first time since his 2001 address (see Figur e 8-9). In 2005, Bush II spent about 20.4 percent of his address discussing social securi ty. Bush II expressed concern that social security was headed towards bankrupt, and ther efore offered his plan to privatize social security as a solution. Although the main topic discussed by Bush II was a domestic policy, the next two topics he discussed most were foreign policie s. The second most discussed topic by Bush

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180 II was Iraq, which accounted for about 12.8 percent of his speech. Bush II said it was important for the U.S. to succeed in Iraq as a way to combat terrorism. He said, “Our men and women in uniform are fighting terrorist s in Iraq, so we do not have to face them here at home” (Bush 2005). Bush II also said that the U.S. had already been successful in Iraq, citing the Iraqi elections as evidence. The third most discussed topic by Bush II was terrorism, which accounted for 11.5 percent of his speech. Bush II was con cerned not only with preventing terrorism by U.S. military action in Iraq, but also with preventing terrorism elsewhere in the Middle East. He said, “To promote peace in the br oader Middle East, we must confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursu e weapons of mass murder” (Bush 2005). For example, he mentioned Syria and Iran. Bush II also discussed progress being made in the war on terror, specifically mentioning improved national intelligence, expanded research on defenses against chemical and biologi cal weapons, and improved border security. Social security was also the most disc ussed topic in Congress (see Figure 8-10). Members of Congress responded to Bush II’s call to privatize social security along largely partisan lines. Republicans in Congress used much of the same rhetoric as Bush II and were mostly supportive of his plan, while Democrats used different rhetoric and were mostly critical of Bush II and his so cial security plan. Some Democrats even questioned whether or not social secur ity was truly headed towards bankruptcy. The budget was the next most discusse d topic in Congress, accounting for 29.1 percent of responses. There was also a partisan divide between members discussing the budget. Similar to the partisan divide present in the discussion of social security, Republicans were largely supportive of Bush II’s budget while Democrats were critical.

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181 It is surprising that there was so much disc ussion of the budget cons idering that Bush II only mentioned it three ti mes during his address. Although members of Congress mainly di scussed domestic policies in 2005, Iraq was the third most discusse d topic (10.5 percent of responses). Again there was a partisan divide – this time in regards to what the next course of acti on should be in Iraq. Similar to the rhetoric used by Bush II, Repub licans wanted to “stay the course” in Iraq. Many Democrats on the other hand wa nted to pull troops out of Iraq. 2006 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses Although Bush II discussed a wider variet y of topics in 2006, his emphasis was still on foreign policies (see Figure 8-11). Bush II discussed terrorism the most, spending a little over eight percent of hi s address on it. He said, “To promote peace in the broader Middle East, we must confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder” (Bush 2006). For example, he mentioned Syria and Iran. Bush II also discussed progress being made in the war on terror, specifically mentioning improved national intelligence, expanded rese arch on defenses against chemical and biological weapons, and im proved border security. Iraq was the next discussed topic by Bush II accounting for 5.5 percent of his speech. Bush II discussed the progress the U.S. was making in Iraq, but also acknowledged the presence of militants in Iraq. Even with the presence of the militants, Bush II said the U.S. and Iraqis would ultimatel y be victorious. He said, “I am confident in our plan for victory; I am confident in the will of the Iraqi people; I am confident in the skill and spirit of our military. Fellow citizens, we are in this fight to win, and we are winning” (Bush 2006).

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182 Although the majority of topics discusse d by Bush II were still foreign policies, he did also address some domestic policies. For example, the third most discussed topic by Bush II was the economy. Bush II said he wanted to continue economic growth by creating more jobs and providing more tax relief. Even though Bush II’s focus was still on foreign policies, by 2006, Congress had returned its focus almost entirely toward s domestic policies (see Figure 8-12). As was the case in regards to congre ssional discussion of domestic affairs throughout most of Bush II’s presidency, there was again an evident partisan divide. For example, the most discussed topic in Congress was the budget, and as was the case in previous discussions of the budget, Republicans spoke largely in favor of it while Democrats were mostly critical. An exception to this partisan divide was congressional discussion of energy, which was the second most discussed topic. Regardless of party affiliation, members of Congress were concerned with increasing gas prices and spoke about finding alternative sources of energy. Conclusions In looking at the results, se veral different conclusions can be drawn about Bush II, Congress, and the relationship between the tw o. First, it is evident that Bush II does change his focus from domestic to foreign policies after the Sept ember 11, 2001 attacks. Examining the topics Bush II discussed in 2001, 92.3 percent of them were domestic policies (see Table 8-1). However, in 2002, only 43.26 percent of the topics discussed by Bush II were domestic, and by 2003, that number decreased to 38.44 percent. Even though by 2006 Bush II was spending more time discussing domestic policies (51.9 percent), his attention to domestic policies never returned to where it was before the

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183 September 11, 2001 attacks. This shows that the terrorist attacks did ha ve a direct effect on the topics being discussed by Bush II. While the September 11, 2001 attacks had an effect on what Bush II was discussing, they did not have nearly the same impact on the policies discussed by members of Congress (see Table 8-2). Before the terrorist attacks in 2001, 98.4 percent of congressional responses focused on domestic policies. In 2002 after the terrorist attacks, 97.6 percent of congr essional responses were still on domestic policies. Congress only started spending more time disc ussing foreign policies after Bush II started discussing a military operation in Iraq. For example, right before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, 53.6 percent of c ongressional responses were on foreign policies. This appears to be a short-te rm change though because by 2006, 77.5 percent of congressional responses again focused on domestic policies. Looking at how the September 11, 2001 te rrorist attacks imp acted the policies discussed by Bush II and Congress suggests that the terrorist attacks did not have nearly the impact on the policy concerns of Congre ss as they did on Bush II’s policy agenda. This is consistent with the idea that presiden ts typically wield more power in the foreign policy realm (Wildavsky 1966). By members of Congress largely igno ring terrorism and other foreign policy issues, it can be concluded that member s were unwilling to challenge Bush on these issues. Like other scholars have suggested, this implies that in the immediate post-September 11, 2001 environment, there was more bipartisan unity and Bush able to exert a tremendous amount of influence over foreign policy (Nelson 2003; Sinclair 2004).

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184 Even though there may have been some bipartisan unity in regards to foreign policy immediately after the September 11, 2001 a ttacks, this was not the case in regards to domestic policy (see Figure 8-13). There wa s a consistent partisan divide in the way members of Congress discussed domestic pol icies. Generally, Republicans would discuss domestic policies much in the same way as Bush II, sometimes even using the exact same language. This suggests that Bush II did have influence in Congress at least with members of his own party. However, Demo crats were typically critical of Bush II’s policies and were not afraid to challenge him. Also, any bipartisan unity in regards to foreign affairs immediately after the terrorist attacks appears to have diminished by the time Bush II and members of Congress started discussing Iraq in 2003 (see Figure 8-14). So although the September 11, 2001 terrorist atta cks seem to have caused a short-term change in partisanship related to foreign affairs, this effect quickly dissipated. Overall, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks changed Bush II’s focus from domestic to foreign, had little impact on the policy focus of Congress, and only temporarily altered the partis an relationship between Bush II and Congress. Although Bush II gained a lot of influence over fo reign affairs immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, this influence wa ned as time went on. This is evident by more members of Congress challenging Bush II on his foreign policies, particularly Iraq, and also their refusal to fund certain foreign policy expenditures. So while the terrorist attacks did have an influence on presidenti al-congressional relations, it was not a permanent impact.

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185 TopicsCampai gn Fi nanc e T er r or i sm A gr ic ul ture E m pl oy ment T ra de Civil Rights B ur eaucr acy Env i r on ment Economy E ner gy M ilitary/Defense H eal t h Care S ocial Security E ducati on T ax e s B udgetPercentage20 10 0 Figure 8-1. 2001 SOU Address Topics Main Topic of the ResponseSurplus Energy Military/Defense Health Care Social Security Education Taxes BudgetPercent50 40 30 20 10 0 Figure 8-2. 2001 Congressional Response Topics

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186 TopicsWelfare Foreign A f f airs N at i on al S ec urity I r aq Terr or i sm Agri c ul t ure E m ploym ent T r ade E nv i r onment Economy Energy Military/Defense Health Care Social S e curity Educat i on Taxes BudgetPercentage30 20 10 0 Figure 8-3. 2002 SOU Address Topics Main Topic of the ResponseEnvironment Welfare Energy Health Care Social Security Taxes Budget Economy Employment TerrorismPercent40 30 20 10 0 Figure 8-4. 2002 Congressional Response Topics

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187 TopicAIDS Drug Policy W e ap ons Foreign Affairs N at i onal S ec u r i t y I r aq Af g hanistan Terrorism E m ploym ent B ur eaucr ac y Environment Economy Energy Mi l i t ar y/ Def ense Heal t h C a re Social S e curity Educat i on Tax e s BudgetPercentage30 20 10 0 Figure 8-5. 2003 SOU Address Topics TopicsAIDS Other Environment Iraq Energy Health Care Taxes Economy Military/Defense TerrorismPercent50 40 30 20 10 0 Figure 8-6. 2003 Congressional Response Topics

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188 TopicDrug Policy I m m i gr at i on Weapons Foreign Affairs National Security I r aq T er r or i sm Employment T r ade E conomy Energy Military/Defense Heal t h C a re Socia l Securit y Educat i on Taxes BudgetPercentage16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Figure 8-7. 2004 SOU Address Topics TopicOth e r Immigration Iraq He a lt h Ca re Drug Poli c y Budg e t Ec o n o my Foreign Affairs Employm e n t Mil i ta r y /De f e n s e TerrorismPercent20 10 0 Figure 8-8. 2004 Congressional Response Topics

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189 TopicAIDS D r ug Pol i cy Immigration W e ap ons Foreign A f f airs National Security Iraq T er r or i sm E m ploym ent Environme n t Economy E ner gy Mi l i t ar y/ Def ense Health Care Social S e curity Education Tax e s BudgetPercentage30 20 10 0 Figure 8-9. 2005 SOU Address Topics TopicsOt h er I mm igratio n Ir a q Health Care Taxes Budget H ome land S ec urity Military/Defense Social Security Terroris mPercent40 30 20 10 0 Figure 8-10. 2005 Congressional Response Topics

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190 TopicC r ime AIDS Drug Policy Immigration W e lf ar e W e apon s Foreign Affairs N at i onal S ec u r i t y I raq T er r or i sm E m ploym ent Trade Bureaucracy Environment Economy Ener gy Mi l i t ar y/ Def ense Heal t h C a re Socia l Securit y Education Taxes BudgetPercentage10 8 6 4 2 0 Figure 8-11. 2006 SOU Address Topics TopicsN ucl ea r Weapon s Ir a q E n e rg y H ealt h C are F o r ei g n A ffai rs Educ a tion Taxe s Budget Econ o my Civil Rights Homelan d Security Military/Defense Imm i gr a tion TerrorismPercent30 20 10 0 Figure 8-12. 2006 Congressional Response Topics

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191 Table 8-1. Discussion of Domes tic/Foreign Policies by Bush II Domestic Foreign 2001 92.3% 7.7% 2002 43.3% 56.7% 2003 38.4% 61.6% 2004 48.1% 51.9% 2005 48.8% 51.2% 2006 51.9% 48.1% Table 8-2. Discussion of Domes tic/Foreign Policies by Congress Domestic Foreign 2001 98.4% 1.6% 2002 97.6% 2.4% 2003 46.4% 53.6% 2004 69.4% 30.6% 2005 81.3% 18.7% 2006 77.5% 22.5% Year2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001Percent100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Bush Congress Figure 8-13. Domestic Policies Discussed by Bush II and Congress

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192 Year2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001Percent100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Bush Congress Figure 8-14. Foreign Policies Di scussed by Bush II and Congress

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193 CHAPTER 9 PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS Throughout the previous eight chapters, this dissertati on examined the evolution of presidential-congressional re lations over the last 28 years. Specifically, it looked at different factors which affect the president’s ability to shape and dom inate the framing of the national policy agenda in Congress. Poli tical factors, political time, institutional factors, and the effect of pursuing differen t policy types were all examined. As was shown, certain factors allow pr esidents to wield more power than do other factors. Overall, this dissertation has shown that presidents have beco me increasingly more influential over the agenda in Congress. Political Factors One political factor examined was divide d government. My expectation was that presidents would be more persuasive dur ing periods of unified government. By examining the five periods of unified government contained in my research, I was able to determine that unified government does not have an effect on presiden tial influence, and in some cases presidents actually seemed to have less influence during periods of unified government. Table 9-1 shows whether presid ents had high, medium, or low levels of influence during both unified and divided gove rnment. As shown, presidents had low levels of influence during more than half of the years during which there was unified government. Therefore, it is not necessarily unified or divided government that matters, but instead each president’s individual relationship with Congress. For example, Carter had a poor relationship with Congress and therefore wa s not able to wield much influence. In contrast, Bush II and members of the Republi can party were alrea dy pursuing largely the

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194 same agenda so there were times when Bush II was able to exert more influence (or at least appear to). As was shown and will be di scussed further, there are factors other than divided or unified government that have an impact on a president’s relationship with Congress, and therefore his ab ility to exert influence. Another finding was that members of the opposition party do not speak more during periods of unified government. A lthough it seems that opposition party members would be more likely to speak as a way to challenge the party in power, this was not the case. However, even though members of th e opposition party were not more likely to speak during periods of unified government, they typically used diffe rent rhetoric than the president and other major ity party members. Therefor e, unified government may not have encouraged members of the opposition pa rty to speak, but it did have an effect on what they said. A second political factor considered was whether or not the president had (or was perceived as having) an electoral mandate. Since Reagan was the only president included in this study that was thought to have an electoral mandate , I examined the influence he had throughout his presidency to see whether he was able to exert more influence during the first year of each of hi s two terms (1981 and 1985). While I found that he did have more influence in 1981, I was not able to ma ke solid conclusions about his influence in 1985 due to a small number of speeches analyz ed. Therefore, I was not able to make conclusions about whether havi ng an electoral mandate – r eal or perceived – allowed presidents to wield more power in Congress. One discovery made related to this was that when a president is speaking during his terms does matter. In looking at influen ce during each year of a president’s term, it

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195 became evident that presidents typically are able to wield more power during the first year of their term. This rela tionship is shown in Table 9-2. Table 9-2 shows that presidents were able to be more influential early in their terms as opposed to late in their terms. For example, presidents had a high level of influence during 62.5 percent of the early years of their pres idencies as compared to having a low level of influence during 50 percent of the later years of their presidencies. This is likely because presidents have yet to establish a relations hip with Congress. However, it was determined that even presid ents beginning their se cond term in office receive a bump in influence dur ing their first year. This s uggests that influence is not increased based on the margin of victory by which a president wins an election, but instead due to the fact that he won. It was also determined that presidents do not have as much influence during their second term in office as they did during their fi rst. Three of the five presidents included in this study served two terms. In all th ree cases, the president’s influence started to decrease in the last two years of his second term. Table 9-3 shows the levels of influence the three presidents had in their first te rm as compared to their second. During 41.7 percent of the years of presidents’ first te rms they had high levels of influence as compared to there not being one year of high influence during any of the president’s second terms. This is consis tent with the perception that presidents are often “lame ducks” at the end of thei r last term in office. A less conclusive political factor exam ined was presidential approval ratings. Although this analysis was somewhat preliminar y, there does not appear to be a strong correlation between a president’s approval rating and his level of influence in Congress.

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196 Table 9-4 examines this relationship. As s hown, it does appear that having an approval rating of below 50 percent results in having a lower level of infl uence in Congress – presidents who had less than 50 percent approva l also had low levels of influence in 50 percent of cases. However, having a higher approval rating does not necessarily translate into having a higher level of influence. Of those years where presidents had more than 50 percent approval, only about 26 percen t also had high levels of influence. In looking at political factors overall, unified or divided government does not seem to affect presidential influence in Congress. Presid ents are just as likely to influence Congress during divided government as they are during unified government, and maybe sometimes even more so. Also, electoral mandates do not seem to matter. One political factor that does make a difference is when during his term a president is speaking. Presidents appear to have more influence during th e beginning of their term. Also, presidents have more influence during their first term than their second. Finally, there does seem to be some relationship betw een presidential approva l ratings and levels of influence, however, more research needs to be conducted before concrete conclusions can be made. Political Time In looking at the four type s of political time – the politics of reconstruction, articulation, disjunction, and pr e-emption – it was determin ed that the political time during which a president is presiding does matter. Presidents presiding during the politics of reconstruction have the best abilit y to persuade. This is because during the politics of reconstruction the president is opposed and institu tions are vulnerable. For example, Reagan was able to wield much influence during his presidency because economic change was desired and Reagan was seeking new economic policy. Therefore

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197 during the politics of reconstruction change is wanted and the president is willing to provide it, allowing him a lot of room for influence in Congress. Presidents presiding during the politics of articulation al so have the potential to be influential in Congress. However, arti culate presidents are more limited than reconstructive ones in that presidents during the politics of articulation can only exert influence as long as they adhe re to the previous agenda. If president’s stray from the previous agenda, then they are likely to wiel d less influence. This was apparent when examining Bush I’s presidency. Bush I was able to have influence in Congress when adhering to Reagan’s agenda, however, lost in fluence when he strayed too far from it. Presidents are the least li kely to wield influence duri ng the politics of disjunction. During the politics of disjunction, the pres ident is affiliated but institutions are vulnerable. For example, during Carter’s pr esidency, he was trying to pursue an agenda that was clearly not the solution to the natio n’s problems. Therefore, as was shown by looking at Carter’s presidency, presidents durin g the politics of disjunction are unlikely to exert a lot of power in Congress. The only political time during which genera lizations could not be made regarding influence was the politics of pre-emption. Du ring the politics of pre-emption, presidents are opposed but institutions are resilient. Clinton fit into this category, and by looking his presidency, it seemed that what mattered wa s not political time but partisanship. For example, during the beginning of Clinton’ s presidency when there was unified government, he was able to exert much more in fluence than at the end of his second term when there was divided government and much partisan conflict.

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198 Bush II was much harder to place in term s of political time. Initially, I thought he fell somewhere between the pol itics of articulation and th e politics of pre-emption, however, after examining all the presidents I de termined that Bush II was better classified as falling under the politics of disjunction. There are many reas ons for this that I discuss in Chapter 4, however, the main one is the similarities between Carter and Bush II’s presidencies. Table 9-5 shows the levels of influen ce presidents were able to have during different periods of political time. In l ooking at political time overall, presidents presiding during the poli tics of reconstruction have the best potential to be persuasive. Presidents during the politics of articulation also have the ability to exert influence, however, they are more limited than presiden ts during the politics of reconstruction. Presidents during the politics of disjunction ha ve the least ability to wield influence in Congress. Finally, presidents during the politi cs of pre-emption may or may not be able to be persuasive depending on other factors. Institutional Factors It was determined that certain instit utional factors aff ect who in Congress responds to the president. For example, memb ers of the House are much more likely to respond to the president than members of the Se nate. As was discussed in Chapter 5, this is likely because of institutional differences between the House and Senate. In the House, there are more members, terms are shorter, and members are more constrained by chamber rules and majority party leadership. Also, senators are likely to have more outlets available to express their opinions and respond to the president. Therefore, it makes sense that members of the House would be more likely to take advantage of open time speeches.

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199 Aside from which chamber a member re sides in affecting who speaks, it was determined that a member’s party affiliation did not make a difference. Members of the opposition party were no more likely to speak than members of the majority party. In fact, it was found that regardless of which party controlled Congress, Democrats tended to speak slightly more than Republicans. The only exception to this was that the party affiliation of the president did seem to have some impact on who spoke. Members from the party opposite of the president, regardle ss of which party controlled Congress, were slightly more likely to speak then member s of Congress from the same party as the president. Even though party affilia tion did not make much of a difference in determining who in Congress spoke, the amount of time a member served in Congress did matter. The average length of time speaking member s had been in Congress was 15.5 years. This suggests that most members did not speak immediately upon taki ng office. Instead, members tended to wait until they had been in office for at least a full term or more before speaking. Also, a relationship was found between the average number of years a member had served when speaking and the level of pr esidential influence. Table 9-6 shows this relationship, which appears to be inverse. For example, presidents had a low level of influence during 75 percent of the years when speaking members had served at least 13 years or more. This is compared to presiden ts having low levels of influence during only about 11 percent of years when members had served less than 10 years when speaking. In regards to whether a member was a pa rty leader or committ ee chair, it did not seem to make much of a difference in who spoke. Even though party leaders and

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200 committee chairs spoke more during certain years, no discernable pattern was found. Therefore, even as Congress transitioned from being committee centered to party dominated, no pattern was found in regards to party leaders and committee chairs speaking. However, there were some patterns found in regards to leve ls of presidential influence when more party leaders and comm ittee chairs were speaking. Similar to the inverse pattern found in regards to the aver age number of years a member had served when speaking, Tables 9-7 and 9-8 show th at presidents were likely to have less influence when more party leaders and comm ittee chairs were speaking. For example, presidents had low levels of influence duri ng 75 percent of the y ears when the highest percentage of party leaders were speaking. Aside from institutional factors relate d to who was speaking, there were also institutional factors related to changes in congressional norms and procedures which affected presidential influence. As Congre ss moved from the post-reform era into the era of conditional party government, parties gained more control in Congress. This lead not only to parties becoming more important, bu t also to parties becoming more unified internally, and more polariz ed from one another. The changing congressional eras affected presidential influence in Congress in that there was a more evident partisan divide in how members responded to the president. By the time Clinton became president, Demo crats were discussing largely the same issues as Clinton and discussing them in much the same way, while Republicans were consistently challenging the President. Rela ted to this, the positions of the two parties became farther apart from one another, and there was more unity within each party.

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201 Therefore, institutional factors do have an influence on both who in Congress is speaking, as well as what they are saying. Members of the House and members who have served in Congress longer are more likely to speak than members of the Senate and newer members of Congress. Party affiliation and whether a member is a party leader or committee chair does not seem to affect which members speak. Even though changes in congressional norms and procedures did not a ffect who spoke, they did have an impact on what was being said. It was evident that speeches in Congress grew more partisan over time as parties became the dominant force in Congress, grew more unified internally, and became more polarized from each other. Types of Policy One of the largest and most interesting fi ndings of this dissertation was in regards to the impact the types of policies a presiden t was discussing had on hi s influence. It was found that whether a president is discussing domestic or foreign policies does matter. Consistent with Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, presidents are able to wield more power when discussing foreign policies. Howe ver, this influence is not evident in the way expected. In regards to domestic polic ies, influence was usually identified when members of Congress discussed the same topics as the pres ident and talked about them using largely the same rhetoric. However, in regards to foreign policies, it was found that members of Congress would defer to the pres ident by not discussing the issues. In not challenging the president, members of C ongress were allowing him large amounts of influence over foreign affairs. This can be seen in Table 9-9, whic h looks at levels of presidential influence based on th eir emphasis on domestic affairs. Looking at the table shows that presiden ts discussing domestic policies the most also had higher levels of influence, whereas those presidents focusing on foreign affairs

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202 had lower levels of influence. Although this seems to contradict my findings, there is a logical explanation for it. As discussed in Chapter 6, presidents who are weak on domestic policies often focus on foreign polic ies as a way to try and increase their influence. Even though they may be able to gain some influence over foreign affairs, they are still weak presidents and therefore get labeled as having an overall low level of influence. Bush II is a good example of this phenomenon in that he was able to exert tremendous influence over foreign affairs however was not able to transfer that influence to domestic policies. Aside from overall influence over foreign affairs, presidents were able to be especially persuasive in Congress regard ing foreign affairs surrounding international crises. By examining presidential influence during the Iran hostage crisis, Persian Gulf War, and immediately following the Septembe r 11, 2001 attacks, it was determined that not only is it likely for presid ential support to incr ease during periods of crisis, but that presidential influence increases as well. Howe ver, clearly not all presidents are able to sustain their heightened support and influence as long as others. For example, Carter’s influence during the Iran hosta ge situation was relatively short lived compared to Bush I’s influence during the Persian Gulf Wa r and Bush II’s influence following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Finally, one of the most fascinating exam ples in regards to presidential influence was Bush II’s presidency. Bush II starte d his presidency on uncertain terms which caused some to question his cap ability to ever ex ert influence in Congress. However, Bush II proved to have much success in Congress. Part of this can be attributed to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Bush II was give n tremendous influence after the attacks in

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203 regards to foreign affairs. However, Bush II was also able to be successful in Congress because for most of his presidency he ha d a Republican majority that was pursuing largely the same policy agenda. Now that Bu sh II has lost support, is not wielding as much influence regarding foreign affairs, and no longer has a Republican majority in Congress, it will be interesti ng to see how his relationship and therefore influence in Congress changes. In regards to the type of policies a pr esident is discussing, presidents discussing foreign policies are typically able to wiel d more power than when pursuing domestic policies. Members of Congress generally defe r to the president on foreign policy issues, however, are not afraid to challenge the pres ident when they think he is leading the country in the wrong direction. Presidents are especially able to exert power in Congress surrounding international crises, however, this influence is usually limited to foreign affairs. Discussion Many of my findings run counter to what other scholars have said about presidents and their abilities to persuade. For example, some scholars have found that presidents are not very successful at persua ding the public (Edwards 2003). If presidents are truly not able to persuade the public, then some could ques tion their ability to persuade members of Congress as well. Howe ver, I would like to s uggest that the first step in understanding the conditions under whic h the president can or cannot persuade the public is to look at a president’s relationship with political elites. This is consistent with the two-step flow of communication theory which suggests that effective communication with the public or iginates with political elite (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). Therefore, anal yzing congressional speeches shows the

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204 conditions under which the president is succe ssful at setting the rh etorical agenda. Additionally, it has the potential to show how the president’s message is transmitted to the public and through which channels. There has also been much criticism regarding Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis. Some scholars have discredited Wild avsky’s thesis altogether saying that it no longer applies (Cohen 1982; Shull and Le Loup 1981; Sigelman 1979). For example, some scholars believe that wars are now less able to build congre ssional support for the president (Cohen 1982). Other scholars believe th at the two presidenci es thesis does not hold true for all presidents, but instead mainly applies to Republican presidents (Bond and Fleischer 1988; Sigelman 1979). This is likely because Democratic presidents typically fare better at domestic policies, and Republicans get more support from their party leaders and committee chairs in Congress (Bond and Fleischer 1988). One of the greatest criticisms of Wildavsky’ s thesis is that its basis was the use of boxscores, which are considered to have reliability and validity problems (Bond and Fleisher 1988; Edwards 1985; Sigelman 1979). However, sc holars other scholars have tried to discredit Wildavsky using other questionable measures such as key votes (Sigelman 1979). Key votes are issues chosen and analyzed by CQ based on meeting one or more the following criteria: being “a matter of controversy, a test of presidential or political power, [and/or] a decision of potentia lly great impact on the lives of Americans” (Shull and Vanderleeuw 1987, 573). Key votes show the members in Congress who supported and opposed the president, however, th ere are generally a small number of key votes each year – usually between five a nd 20 and many are not related to foreign policy issues.

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205 While I acknowledge the need to impr ove upon my methods and measurement, I believe that my findings are le gitimate. Using rhetoric as a measurement has shown that there are variations regarding presidents’ abil ities to influence the rhetorical agenda of Congress, and that these variati ons are due to specific factor s which can be measured. In adding to this research, I should be able to further validate my findings and respond to scholars who may dispute them. Implications and Final Thoughts There are several implications of this research. One concerns the use of rhetoric as a measure. This dissertation has shown the value of using rhetoric as a measure of presidential-congressional rela tions. Unlike roll call votes an d other previous measures that have been used, using rhetoric provi des additional insight into the relationship between individual presidents and congresses. For example, while using roll call votes as a measure might show a partisan division in Congress in that De mocrats are voting one way and Republicans are voting the other, it reveals nothing about why that partisan divide exists. In using rh etoric, the specific reasons why Democrats and Republicans take different positions on the same issue can be shown. Another implication of this research is that showi ng the factors which allow presidents to wield more infl uence in Congress could potentiall y allow scholars to predict which presidents will be more influential. For example, presiding during a period of unified government or having a high appr oval rating does not necessarily mean a president will be influential. However, when a national crisis occurs, or the president is focusing on foreign policies, he will likely be able to exert more influence. Knowing which factors affect presidential influence could also potentially allow presidents to utilize this information to thei r benefit. For example, if a president realized that after a

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206 national crisis, such as a terrorist attack, he could wield more power in Congress, then he might decide to pursue different pieces of legislation then he w ould have otherwise. Overall, the findings of this dissertati on are important because they provide new insight into presidential-congr essional relations. Looking at the language used by the president and members of Congr ess shows how they interact with one another, and how this relationship is affected by partisanship. Also, in examining this relationship, it was shown which issues were most likely to cause conflict (for example domestic issues such as taxes) and which issues were less divisive (usually foreign affairs issues). Therefore, much has been unveiled about presidential-congressi onal relations from this dissertation, and it has also laid the f oundation for future research. My findings as a whole suggest that looking at congression al responses to presidential speeches does begin to provide an additional dimension to understanding presidential persuasion as seen in agenda setting. I found that there is a real variation in the president’s capacity to set the rhetorical agenda of C ongress in the w eeks after the SOU address, and that this is a pattern wh ich has never been discovered by political scientists before in this clear manner. The pattern shows that some presidents in certain contexts have much more success in setting the rhetorical agenda then do other presidents in different contexts. Moreover, my findi ngs show that there is some degree of consistency between these patterns and othe r patterns as discussed in presidentialcongressional literature. Even though my findings are in conflict with those of so me other scholars, such as George Edwards who finds that presidents are not very successful in persuading the public (2003), I find that pres idents are also limited in persuading members of Congress

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207 so that presidents have high levels of in fluence in only six of the 28 years of this dissertation. However, ther e is real variation among pr esidents and the variation indicates that presidents are more apt to be influential under certain circumstances, for example early in their term and during the politics of reconstruction. In addition, my findings seem to suggest that some factor s such as divided government, which is contested in the lite rature on presidential influence in Congress, are irrelevant to presidents’ success in setting the agenda. However, my study only contains 28 years, and during these 28 years there is only one of a small number of presidents over the last 80 years considered to be a good communicator: Reagan. Not included are presid ents such as Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and possibly Harry Truman – presidents who had some success in agenda setting at least in some years and contexts. Therefore, I intend now to move beyond the dissertation to build on my research by extending it back to Herbert Hoover. Adding an additional forty or fifty years to my study will help me further explore the questions raised in this di ssertation, and also do so in a more quantitatively rigorous manner. As previously stated, my intention is to extend my research back to Herbert Hoover so that I can explore the interac tion between the president and Congress both before and after the Great Depression. It w ould also allow me to examine the effects of other economic crises such as recessions and oil shortages. Aside from looking at other economic conditions, extending my research w ill also allow further exploration of the difference between a president pursuing fore ign and domestic polic ies by looking at the effects of other military operations such as World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Another

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208 potential factor worth explori ng is whether presidents with prior congressional experience had better relationships with Congress. Fi nally, I will continue to examine the factors included in this dissertation – political f actors, political time, and various other congressional and institutional factors. Doing so should allow me to build on the findings of this dissertation, and hopefully provide more evidence for the patterns I found.

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209 Table 9-1. Levels of Influence During United/Divided Government United Government Divided Government High Influence 22.2% 22.2% Medium Influence 22.2% 50% Low Influence 55.6% 27.8% Table 9-2. Levels of Influence Early vs. Late in a President’s First Term Early Late High Influence 62.5% 10% Medium Influence 12.5% 40% Low Influence 25% 50% Table 9-3. Levels of Infl uence First vs. Second Term First Term Second Term High Influence 41.7% 0% Medium Influence 25% 66.7% Low Influence 33.3% 33.3% Table 9-4. Presidential Approval Ra tings and Levels of Influence Less Than 50% Approval More Than 50% Approval High Influence 12.5% 26.3 Medium Influence 37.5% 42.1% Low Influence 50% 31.7% Table 9-5. Levels of Infl uence During Political Time Politics of Reconstruction Politics of Articulation Politics of Disjunction Politics of Pre-emption High Influence 25% 33.3% 11.1% 28.6% Medium Influence 62.5% 66.7% 22.2% 28.6% Low Influence 12.5% 66.7% 42.8% Table 9-6. Presidential Influence and Aver age Years Speaking Members Served (AYS) 0 – 9.99 AYS10 – 12.99 AYSAbove 13 AYS High Influence 44.4% 14.2% Medium Influence 44.4% 42.9% 25% Low Influence 11.1% 42.9% 75%

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210 Table 9-7. Percent of Party Leaders (P L) Speaking and Presidential Influence 0 – 7% CC 7.1% – 14.9% CC 15% and Above CC High Influence 25% 27.2% Medium Influence 41.7% 45.5% 25% Low Influence 33.3% 27.3% 75% Table 9-8. Percent of Committee Chairs (CC) Speaking and Presidential Influence 0 – 7% CC 7.1% – 14.9% CC 15% and Above CC High Influence 20% 25% Medium Influence 50% 41.7% 25% Low Influence 30% 33.3% 75% Table 9-9. Emphasis of Domestic Policy and Levels of Presidential Influence High Domestic Medium Domestic Low Domestic High Influence 44.4% 11.1% Medium Influence 22.2% 77.8% 33.3% Low Influence 33.3% 22.2% 55.6%

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211 APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY There are two key components to my analyses – the SOU addresses and the congressional responses. Separate, but sim ilar, coding schemes were used for each. The first speeches coded were SOU addresses. When coding these addresses, a sentence was my unit of analysis. I was coding for topics discussed such as education, social security, the budget, etc. Also, each sentence could contain more than one topic. Based on how many sentences the president discussed each topi c, I could establish the percentage of the speech he spent on any one policy. In some cases, the president would go into great detail about certain topics, whereas others he might only mention once. Once the SOU addresses were coded, the congressional speeches were analyzed. The selection of these speeches and coding sche mes used were slightly more complicated than for the SOU addresses. First, it is necessary to discuss how the speeches were chosen. Congressional speeches were chosen from the weeks following each SOU address. Specifically, I chose speeches gi ven during the five days Congress was in session immediately following th e SOU address. It was rare that these would be five consecutive days, but instead they usually spanned a two week period. The transcripts of the speeches were obt ained from the Congressional Record, and the speeches chosen were given in both the House and the Senate. The speeches were not those given as part of debate, but instead we re open time speeches. For example, in the Senate, many of the speeches were given dur ing morning business, and in the House, many of the speeches were one-minute speeches. I did not include speeches that were an extension of remarks.

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212 This resulted in a different number of speeches being coded for each year. The number of speeches coded for each year range d from 14 to 163, with the average number of speeches coded each year being 63. Table A-1 shows the number of speeches coded in each the House and Senate for every year included in my study. Not all of the speeches given during the five days Congress was in session immediately following the SOU address were ch osen to be analyzed. Instead, speeches were chosen based on policies di scussed by the president. For a speech to be chosen, it had to reference some topic also mentioned by the president. Howeve r, it did not have to be a topic that the president spent a lot of time discussing. For example, even if the president only mentioned health care once in his speech, any congressional speech mentioning health care would still be coded. This resulted in the vast majority of speeches given during the five day period to be analyzed. Most of the speeches not analyzed were focused on topics which were not policy related, fo r example, speeches congratulating the winning Super Bowl team. Also, some of the topics discussed by the president were broad enough to encapsulate numerous congressional speeches. For example, if the president discussed foreign affairs, as he did to some extent in every SOU address. In regards to foreign affairs, the president would generally refer to different countries – so he might discuss Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. However, if a congressional response focused on China, even if the president never mentioned China, it would still be chosen because it was related to foreign affairs. Therefore, becau se of the presence of these broad categories most of the speeches given in Congress were coded. In other words, I was not randomly choosing which congressional responses to analyze, and was not simply choosing

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213 speeches which I thought would support my thesis . Rather, I was trying to find a way to choose speeches to code for which one might expect the president’s SOU to set the Speaker’s agenda. This seemed essential becau se of the vast array of speeches devoted to minor concerns like the Super Bowl, to local is sues of interest to constituents, and to seemingly insignificant policy statements of little relevance to broad national politics. In focusing on speeches that contained at least one item mentioned in the SOU message of the president, I believed I had located a reas onable population of congressional speeches for which the president could realistically be expected to ‘set the policy agenda’ for Congress. My questi on then was: among those congressional speeches that mentioned any item discussed by a president’s SOU, and thus for which we can assume an opportunity existed for the legi slator to follow the pr esident’s policy lead, did the president in fact set the overa ll policy agenda of the speech or not? Once the congressional speeches were chos en, they were coded systematically. First, it was coded whether the speech discusse d a single topic or multiple topics (0 single topic, 1 multiple topics). Then the main topic of each response was coded. This was determined by looking at which topic was discus sed in the most sentences. For example, if the speech had ten sentences and six were de voted to education, then the main topic of the speech was coded as education. If two topics were discussed in the exact same number of sentences, then I looked at the title of the sp eech to solve the dispute. Aside from coding the main topic of the speech, the speech was also coded for the presence of a variety of topics. For exam ple, it was coded whether the member speaking mentioned topics such as social security, heal th care, the budget, spec ific countries, etc. Generally the items were coded 0 for absence of the topic and 1 for presence of the topic.

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214 This allowed me to later compare the t opics members of Congr ess were emphasizing with the ones being focused on by the president to see if they were discussing similar or different topics. I also coded the speeches to see wh ether the members of Congress were discussing topics in the same manner as th e president. For example, in 2005 when discussing social security, Bush II presented hi s plan for creating priv ate social security accounts. Therefore when analyzing congres sional speeches in 2005 which mentioned social security, I looked fo r whether or not members men tioned creating private social security accounts, and if so, whether th ey were in favor of this plan. In addition to coding each speech for the topics discussed, I also coded the speeches for whether the member specifically mentioned the SOU address and/or the president. If a member mentioned the presiden t, then I wanted to know in what context. Many times members would simply refer to th e president in a neutral context. For example, a member might start off by saying, “L ast night, the Presid ent talked about the environment.” So the member was simply stating fact and in cluding none of their opinion. However, members also sometimes used negative and positive connotations when referring to the president. An example of a positive statement would be if a member said, “I want to commend the Presid ent on his fantastic leadership.” In contrast, a negative statement would be if a member said, “The President’s actions have deeply hurt the economy.” Basically, positive statements were those which complimented the president and/or his actions, whereas negative statements were those which criticized the president. However, in the majority of cases, members spoke of the president in a neutral manner.

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215 Finally, information about each member of Congress speaking was recorded. I coded whether the member was in the House or the Senate, his or her party affiliation, how long he or she served in Congress wh en speaking, and whether the member was a party leader or committee chair. Recording this information allowed me to determine whether certain types of members were more likely to speak than others. It also displayed whether members of the president’s party were more or less likely to agree with him, and whether this support wa s constant or varied by president.

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216 Table A-1. Number of Speeches Coded Each Year Year House Senate 1978 15 36 1979 20 6 1980 24 18 1981 39 7 1982 33 0 1983 15 9 1984 47 4 1985 9 5 1986 30 11 Year House Senate 1987 44 18 1988 36 12 1990 35 24 1991 35 11 1992 59 31 1993 124 39 1994 66 27 1995 122 7 1996 88 27 Year House Senate 1997 40 18 1998 46 29 2000 58 26 2001 47 18 2002 14 28 2003 8 34 2004 38 20 2005 50 37 2006 32 31

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217 Table A-2. Domestic and Foreign Policies Coded Domestic Policies Foreign Policies Budget Military/Defense Taxes Trade Health Care Terrorism Social Security Specific Countries Energy Security Economy Weapons Environment Immigration Bureaucracy Allies Civil Rights Military Operations Employment Agriculture Welfare Crime Drug Policy Gun Control

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218 APPENDIX B MEASUREMENT Once the SOU addresses and congressional responses were coded, they had to be assessed to determine the level of influence the president had in Congress at any given time. This was a multi-step process with the concentr ation on the amount of agreement in the topics being discussed by the president and member s of Congress and the language used when discussing the topics. Therefore, the first st ep was to determine whether the president and members of Congress were discussing the same topics. This was done by comparing the three topics most discussed by both the president and Congress as a whole. A direct comparison of percentages was not done because two different methods were used to determine the topics receiving the most emphasis by the president and Congress. The topics discussed in the SOU addre ss by the president could be rank ordered depending on the percentage of sentences he devote d to each. For example, if the president spent 25 percent of his speech on the military, 10 per cent on health care, and 15 percent on social security, then the topics would be rank ordered military, social security, and health care. In contrast, the amount of time spent by members of Congress on topics was calculated based on the main topics of the speeches. As discu ssed in the methodology section (Appendix A), each congressional response was coded for a main topic. Looking at these main topics, it could then be determined the percentage of speeches devote d to each topic by Congress. For example, if 20 speeches were being analyzed and 10 were fo cused on education, five on the military, three on the environment, and two on the economy, then the topics could be rank ordered education, military, environment, and economy based on the pe rcentages of congressional speeches devoted to each (50 percent, 25 percent, 15 pe rcent, and 10 percent respectively).

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219 Once the topics for each year were ranked or dered, they could then be compared. In continuing with this particular example, a table might be devel oped which looks like Table B-1. Simply from looking at the table and without look ing at percentages, it is apparent that the president and members of Congre ss were largely discussing differe nt topics. After the initial comparison, percentages were then also taken into consideration. For example, I might first look at the topics discussed by the president. The main topic he discussed was the military. I would then look over and see that the military is th e second most discussed t opic by Congress. Even though a direct comparison of th e percentages cannot be made, I could see how much of the SOU address or congressional speeches were devoted to a topic. So in th is case, the president spent 25 percent of his address discussing the military and 25 pe rcent of speeches in Congress were also on the military. Therefore, this s uggests that both the president and members of Congress were spending a bit of time discussi ng the military, so there is topic agreement. An example of topic disagreement might occu r when looking at the main topic discussed by members of Congress. Fifty percent of congr essional speeches were on education, however, education is not listed in the t op three topics discussed by the pr esident. I would then look down the rank ordered list of topics discussed by the pr esident to find education. If education was the fourth most discussed topic by the president – say he spent nine percent of his speech on it – then it might be determined that there was some topi c agreement. Education was one of the topics discussed more by the president and the most discussed topic by members of Congress. However, if education was towards the bottom of the topics discussed by the president – maybe he only mentioned it once – then th ere would be topic disagreement . The president barely made mention of education yet that is what Congress wants to discuss.

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220 Therefore, by rank ordering the topics di scussed by the president and members of Congress, it can be determined whether or not there was topic agreement, and ultimately how influential the president was in determining whic h topics members of Co ngress were discussing. If there was a lot of topic agreement – for exam ple, the three main topics discussed by the president and members of Congress matched up, or maybe even two of three topics for each – then it could be argued that the president wa s able to exert influence over the congressional agenda. However, if there was little or not to pic agreement, then it could be argued that the president was not able to exert as much influence in Congress. However, this is only part of the measuremen t of presidential influe nce. The other part has to do with whether the president and members of Congress are discussing the same topics in the same ways. Yes, there might be topic agr eement if the president and members of Congress are discussing largely the same topics, however, if they are discussing them in completely different ways, then the presiden t is not exerting as much influe nce. Therefore, presidential influence is two-fold: influence over the congr essional agenda, but also influence over policy content. To measure policy content, it is neces sary to see how the president and members of Congress are discussing the same issues. A good example of the presiden t and members of Congress discussing the same topic in different ways is in 2003 when discussing whethe r or not to pursue a m ilitary operation in Iraq. The discussion of Iraq was very partisan, with Republican members of Congress discussing Iraq using much of the same rhetoric as Bush II, while Democratic members of Congress were discussing Iraq using different terms. Bush II and Republican members of Congress emphasized that Iraq possessed weapons of ma ss destruction and that Saddam Hussein’s failure to disarm was an indication that he planned to use these weapons either direc tly or indirectly to harm the

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221 U.S. In contrast, Democratic members of Congr ess said that U.N. weapons inspectors should have more time to search for weapons before military action was taken. Therefore, even though Bush II and members of Congress were both discu ssing Iraq in 2003, they were talking about it in different ways. This shows that Bush II’s influence over the term s of discussion surrounding Iraq was somewhat limited, at least in regard s to the Democratic members of Congress. In looking at presidential influence over bot h the congressional ag enda and content of discussion, it is possible to label the amount of in fluence the president has in Congress each year. Four labels were developed in regards to leve ls of presidential influe nce – high, high partisan, medium, and low. For a president to have a high le vel of influence, there would have to be topic agreement, and the president and members of Co ngress from both parties would have to discuss the topics in the same way. There would also have to be topic agreement between the president and members of Congress for the president to ha ve a high partisan level of influence. The difference is that in this category, the president only has to influence the content of discussion among members of his own party. There are several scenarios under which a presid ent’s influence could be labeled medium. One is if there was partial topic agreement and some similarities in how the president and members of Congress were discussing the same t opics. However, a president could also be labeled as having a medium level of influence if there was topic agreement but not content agreement, or more rarely, when there was c ontent agreement but not topic agreement. For example, the president and memb ers of Congress are emphasizing different topics, but they are discussing the same topics in largely the same ways. Finally, a president was labeled as having a lo w level of influence when there was both topic disagreement and the president and memb ers of Congress were discussing topics in

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222 different ways. Based on these f our categories of influence, I was able to create a table which looked at levels of presidential influence over time (Table 1-1, al so reprinted as Table 3-9 and Table B-2). Aside from assigning a level of influence to each president for each year, I also was able to calculate an average level of influence. This could be done for a partic ular presidency, or for other categories such as political time. To de termine the average level of influence a president had, the level of influence the president had dur ing each year of his presidency was assigned a numeric value which could then be averaged. The coding scheme was as such: low levels of influence were coded 1, medium levels 2, high partisan levels 2.5, and high levels 3. For example, during the three years of Bush I’s presidency analyzed, he had two medium and one high level of influence. Therefore, I added 2, 2, and 3, and divided by 3 so his average was 2.3 which corresponded with a medium level of influence. If a president’s numerical aver age fell between 1 and 1.75, his influence was categorized as being low, 1.76 and 2.5 medium, and 2.51 and 3 high. High partisan was not included as a category for an overall level of influence because I felt that doing so may be inaccurate (i.e. numbers do not show whether th e responses in Congress were partisan).

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223 Table B-1. Topics Discussed by the President and Congress President Congress Military Education Social Security Military Health Care Environment Table B-2. Presidential Levels of Influence Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II First Year High High Partisan High Partisan Second Year Low High Medium High Partisan Low Third Year Low Medium High Low Medium Fourth Year Low Medium Medium Low Low Fifth Year Low* Medium Medium Sixth Year Medium Medium Low Seventh Year Medium Eighth Year Medium Low *This may not be accurate as there were a limited number of responses analyzed in 1985.

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224 LIST OF REFERENCES Abdnor, James. 1983. “The Agricu ltural Economy.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Abercrombie, Neil. 1993. “Schoolkids and the Deficit.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Abercrombie, Neil. 1996. “Budget Matters.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Abourezk, James. 1978a. “Cruise Missi le Testing in Zaire.” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexis-nexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/ congcomp>. Abourezk, James. 1978b. “Acreage Limitations, Fam ily Farms, and Family Life.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Abraham, Spencer. 1996. “U.S. Troops as Peacekeepers.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Adams, Brockman. 1992. “Unemployment Compensation.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Alexander, William. 1979. “Response to the President’s Budget.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Alexander, William. 1981. “Reduction of G overnment Spending and Cutting of Taxes Not Enough to Stop Inflation.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Alexander, William. 1982. “Farmers Hit by Economy.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Alexander, William. 1983a. “Government Must Ta ke the Lead in Ending Economic Distress.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Alexander, William. 1983b. “President Reagan ‘Excommunicated’ by Wall Street Journal.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. .

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225 Alexander, William. 1984a. “War in Cent ral America Continues Despite President’s Statements.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Alexander, William. 1984b. “The President’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Allard, Wayne. 1992. “Repeal the Social Se curity Earnings Test.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Allard, Wayne. 1994a. “Health Care Reform.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Allard, Wayne. 1994b. “Health Care Reform Package Should Be on Budget.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Anderson, Glenn. 1986. “Where We’re Going, We Need Good Roads.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Andrade, Lydia and Garry Young. 1996. “Preside ntial Agenda Setting: Influences on the Emphasis of Foreign Policy.” Political Research Quarterly 49.3 (September): 591-605. Andrews, Michael. 1986. “Placing a ‘Chall enger’ Plaque on the New Space Station.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Andrews, Michael. 1987. “The Need to Halt Nuclear Testing.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Andrews, Robert. 1992. “Our Senior Citizens Must Be Included in the Economic Recovery Program.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Andrews, Thomas. 1992. “Tax Fairness.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Annunzio, Frank. 1979a. “Congressmen Annunzi o Supports Constitutional Amendment.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. .

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226 Annunzio, Frank. 1979b. “Use More Cash to Curb Inflation.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Annunzio, Frank. 1983. “Government Must Take the Lead in Ending Economic Distress” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Anthony, Beryl. 1982. “Interest Rates – Can We Afford Them?” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Applegate, Douglas. 1991. “Three Ways to S how Support for Our Troops.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Applegate, Douglas. 1992a. “America’s Vetera ns Have Long Memories.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Applegate, Douglas. 1992b. “Where Are the Jobs?” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Armey, Richard. 1986. “Who Makes the Decisi ons in Washington?” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Armstrong, William. 1988. “The Nicar aguan Resistance.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. Logic of Congressional Action . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ashbrook, John. 1979. “Pro-Communist Appeas es Have Their Day.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Ashbrook, John. 1980. “Deceptions in State of the Union Message.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . AuCoin, Les. 1984. “Foreign Aid Package.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. .

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227 AuCoin, Les. 1988a. “President Reagan’s Reque st for Aid to the Contras Will Kill the Peace Process.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . AuCoin, Les. 1988b. “Expression of Opposition to Further Funding of Contras.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . AuCoin, Les. 1992. “Cut Defense and Save the Economy.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Bachus, Spencer. 1993. “Why Congress Applauds the Clinton Program.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Bachus, Spncer. 1994a. “Creating Jobs in the Community.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bachus, Spencer. 1994b. “Show American People Clinton Health Care Pl an.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Badham, Robert. 1979. “The New Budget.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Badham, Robert. 1986. “Stealth Bomber.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Baker, Howard. 1981. “President R eagan’s Address.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Baker, Howard. 1983. “The President’s Stat e of the Union Address.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Baker, William. 1995. “Vote for Barton Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ballenger, Cass. 1993a. “Health Care Reform.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Ballenger, Cass. 1993b. “One Dev ilish Detail.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. .

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228 Ballenger, Cass. 1994. “Stand a nd Deliver.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ballenger, Cass. 1995a. “Days of Defi cit Spending Near End.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ballenger, Cass. 1995b. “The Contract with America Book.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ballenger, Cass. 1996a. “State of the Un ion Analysis on Target.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Ballenger, Cass. 1996b. “President Clint on and Big Government.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Barnard, Druie. 1981. “The Reagan Economic Plan.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Bartlett, Dewey. 1978. “NAACP Energy Policy Statement.” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 Febr uary 2006. < http://web.lexisnexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>. Bartlett, Dewey. 1996. “Era of Big Government Over.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Bartlett, Dewey. 1996. “President’s Actions Speak Louder Than Words.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Barton, Joe. 1995. “The Tax Limitation Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bass, Charles. 1995. “Pass a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bayh, Birch. 1978. “The Executive Order on Intelligence Activitie s.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. .

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229 Becerra, Xavier. 1995. “Protect Social Security in Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bennett, Robert. 1994. “The President’s Stat e of the Union Address.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bentley, Helen. 1987. “Reforming Tax Reform.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Bentley, Helen. 1991a. “Smallest Child ren are Victims.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Bentley, Helen. 1991b. “Whose Pump is Being Primed?” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Bentsen, Kenneth. 1995. “The Impact of the Balanced Budget Amendment on Houston.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bevill, Tom. 1981. “Interests of the Majority Mu st Not be Sacrificed for Benefits of a Selfish Few.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Biaggi, Mario. 1983. “President’s State of th e Union Message Calls for Enactment of Port Development Legislation.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Biaggi, Mario. 1984. “The 1985 Budget Proposal Se ts America Back in Commitment to Poor, Needy, Aged, and Mentally Ill.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Biaggi, Mario. 1986. “New York Leads Nation in State Tax Amnesty Program.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Bilbray, James. 1991. “The President’s Budget is a Sham.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Binder, Sarah. 2002. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock . Washington: Brookings Institute. Bingaman, Jesse. 1988. “INF Veri fication and Sandia National Laboratories.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. .

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230 Bingaman, Jesse. 1991. “Missile Prolifer ation, ATBM’s, and SDI.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 12, 2006. . Bingaman, Jesse. 1997. “Education.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Bingham, Jonathan. 1979. “Legislation to Amen d Higher Education Act of 1965.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Blackwell, Lucien. 1993. “In Support of Presiden t Clinton’s Program for Economic Recovery.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Blute, Peter. 1993. “President’s Plan Puts the Federal Government First.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Boehner, John. 1993a. “It’s the Spending, Stupid.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Boehner, John. 1993b. “Goodbye Smoke and Mirrors, Hello Hats and Rabbits.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Boehner, John. 1994a. “Thoughts on the State of the Union Address.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Boehner, John. 1994b. “Fund Needed for Immediate Relief.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Boehner, John. 1995. “Contract with America.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Boehner, John. 1996. “Boehner Sees No Prospect of Default.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Bond, Christopher. 1990. “The Clean Air Act.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. .

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231 Bond, Jon and Richard Fleisher. 1988. “Are Th ere Two Presidencies? Yes, But Only for Republicans.” The Journal of Politics 50.3 (August): 747-767. Bond, Jon and Richard Fleischer. 1990. The President in the Legislative Arena . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bond, Jon, Richard Fleischer, and B. Dan W ood. 2003. “The Marginal and Time-Varying Effect of Public Approval on Pr esidential Success in Congress.” The Journal of Politics 65.1 (February): 92-110. Boner, William. 1979. “Presi dent Carter’s Fiscal Year 1980 Budget.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Boner, William. 1983. “Repeal Withholding of Di vidend and Interest Income.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Boner, William. 1985. “A Second Amer ican Revolution.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Bonior, David. 1984. “And Now, the H earing Impaired?” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Bonior, David. 1990. “Social Security.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Bonior, David. 1994a. “There is a H ealth Care Crisis.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bonior, David. 1994b. “Yes, There is a H ealth Care Crisis.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bonior, David. 1996. “President Presents Challenges for the Nation.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Bono, Sonny. 1995. “The Contract with America.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Boren, David. 1985. “The Family Farm in America.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. .

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232 Boren, David. 1991. “An America Wort hy of Our Troops.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 12, 2006. . Boren, David. 1993. “President Clinton’s Stat e of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Boren, David. 1994. “Aid for Trade.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bosco, Douglas. 1987. “Points of Disagreement Between Our Founding Fathers and President Reagan.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Bouquard, Marilyn. 1982. “Members of Congr ess Should Not Receive Tax Benefits.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Boxer, Barbara. 1984. “Is Reagan ’s Budget Fair?” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Boxer, Barbara. 1992. “America Needs to Take Care of its Own and Needs to do it Now.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Brace, Paul and Barbara Hinckley. 1991. “The Structure of Pres idential Approval: Constraints within and across Presidencies.” The Journal of Politics 53.4 (November): 993-1017. Brace, Paul and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents . New York: Basic Books. Breaux, John. 1990. “Negotiations of the Clean Air Bill.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Breaux, John. 1993. “The Health Care System.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Breaux, John. 1995. “Welfare Reform Summit.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Brennan, Joseph. 1988. “The Tragedy of Nicaragua.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. .

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233 Broomfield, William. 1980. “Over 300 Soviet Ag ents Operating in New York.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Broomfield, William. 1990. “Gorbachev’s Propos al on Opposition Parties in the Soviet Union.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Broomfield, William. 1991. “Don’t Le t Saddam Off the Hook.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 12, 2006. . Broomfield, William. 1992. “The President’s Challenge to Congress.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Brown, Sherrod. 1993. “President’s Economic Program Makes Good Economic Sense.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Brown, Sherrod. 1995. “The Republican Magic Massa ge to Balance the B udget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Brownback, Sam. 1997. “Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Bryan, Richard. 1990. “The President’s Stat e of the Union Speech.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Bryant, Ed. 1995. “Protect Social Security in a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Bumpers, Dale. 1990. “State of the Union.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Bumpers, Dale. 1993a. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Bumpers, Dale. 1993b. “President’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. .

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234 Bunn, Jim. 1995. “Pass the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Burke, Herbert. 1978. “Energy Poli cy and Black People.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Burns, Conrad. 1991. “Operation Homefront.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Burton, Danny. 1991. “Use What Has to Be Used.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Burton, Danny. 1992. “Overcharging the Medicare Program.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Burton, Danny. 1993a. “Straight Talk About Tax Increases and the Deficit.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Burton, Danny. 1993b. “What the Clinton Plan Really Does is Hurt America.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Burton, Danny. 1993c. “Recipe for Econom ic Disaster.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Bush, George H.W. 1989. “State of the Union Address.” 9 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 14 March 2006. . Bush, George H.W. 1990. “State of the Union Address.” 31 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 15 March 2006. . Bush, George H.W. 1991. “State of the Union Address.” 29 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 18 March 2006. . Bush, George H.W. 1992. “State of the Union Address.” 28 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 20 March 2006. .

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235 Bush, George W. 2001. “State of the Union Address.” 27 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 1 December 2005. . Bush, George W. 2002. “State of the Union Address.” 29 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 2 December 2005. . Bush, George W. 2003. “State of the Union Address.” 28 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 8 December 2005. . Bush, George W. 2004. “State of the Union Address.” 20 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 12 December 2005. . Bush, George W. 2005. “State of the Union Address.” 2 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 15 December. . Bush, George W. 2006. “State of the Union Address.” 31 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 18 December. . Byrd, Harry. 1980a. “Registration for the Draft.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Byrd, Harry. 1980b. “The Carter Budget: To tal Surrender to Inflation.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Byrd, Harry. 1980c. “Trade Sanctions Ag ainst the Soviet Union.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Byrd, Harry. 1980d. “The President’s Budget.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1978. “A Realistic Assessment of the State of Our Union.” 20 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexisnexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>. Byrd, Robert. 1980a. “Defense Criteria.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. .

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236 Byrd, Robert. 1980b. “The Developmen t of Alcohol Fuels.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1980c. “Allied Cooperation.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1980d. “Pursuing our Vital Interests.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1983. “The President’s Stat e of the Union Message.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1984. “The Administration’s ‘Spend and Borrow’ Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1986. “The State of the Union.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1990. “American Foreign A ssistance in the 1990s.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Byrd, Robert. 1992. “America’s Future.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Callaghan, Karen and Simo Virtanen. 1993. “Revised Models of the ‘Rally Phenomenon’: The Case of the Carter Presidency.” The Journal of Politics 55.3 (August): 756-764. Callaghan, Karen and Frank Schnell. 2001. “Assessi ng the Democratic Debate: How the News Media Frame Elite Policy Discourse.” Political Communication 18.2, 183-212. Callahan, Herbert. 1993. “A Prescription for Business as Usual – Tax and Spend.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Camp, David. 1994. “Support for the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 1990. Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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237 Campbell, Thomas. 1990. “Keep Your Cotton Pickin ’ Hands Off Social Secu rity.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Scott de Marchi. 2002. “Presidential Approval and Legislative Success.” The Journal of Politics 64.2 (May): 491-509. Cantwell, Maria. 1993. “In the Presence of the President’s Economic Package.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Capps, Lois. 1997. “Top Priority for Education.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Cardin, Benjamin. 1988. “Vote ‘No” on Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Cardin, Benjamin. 1994. “Health Care Crisis Af fects Maryland State Empl oyees.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Carman, Gregory. 1981. “Let us on a Bipartis an Basis Restore the Economy and the Faith of the American People in the American Dream.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Carmines, Edward and Larry Dodd. 1985. “Bic ameralism in Congress: The Changing Partnership.” In Congress Reconsidered , eds. Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Carper, Thomas. 1986. “Let Us Improve on the President’s Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Carr, Milton. 1978. “Saving the Pere Marquette River.” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Carter, Jimmy. 1978. “State of th e Union Address.” 19 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 31 January 2006. . Carter, Jimmy. 1979. “State of th e Union Address.” 25 January. C-Span State of the Union Address Transcript . 3 February 2006. .

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238 Carter, Jimmy. 1980. “State of th e Union Address.” 21 January. C-Span State of the Union Address Transcript . 10 February 2006. . Castle, Michael. 1996. “Getting our Fina ncial House in Order.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Chabot, Steve. 1996. “State of the Union.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Chaffee, John. 1983. “The Nuclear Freeze Resolution.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Chaffee, John. 1987. “Mandating Adherence to SALT II Arms Limits.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Christensen, Jon. 1995a. “Ten Reasons Why th e American People Deserve a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Christensen, Jon. 1995b. “Singing Versus Shouting.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Christensen, Jon. 1995c. “A Year-long Campai gn to Amend the Constitution.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Church, Frank. 1978. “Proposed Sale of F-15 Aircraft to Saudi Arabia.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Clayton, Eva. 1993. “The President’ s Economic Package.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Clayton, Eva. 1996a. “Wake up, Republicans.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Clayton, Eva. 1996b. “Teenage Pregnancy.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Clement, Robert. 1995. “In Support of the Stenholm Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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239 Clinger, William. 1994. “Bad News on Drug Control.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Clinton, William. 1993. “State of the Union Address.” 17 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 12 April 2006. . Clinton, William. 1994. “State of the Union Address.” 25 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 14 April 2006. . Clinton, William. 1995. “State of the Union Address.” 24 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 18 April 2006. . Clinton, William. 1996. “State of the Union Address.” 23 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 22 April 2006. . Clinton, William. 1997. “State of the Union Address.” 4 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 26 April 2006. . Clinton, William. 1998. “State of the Union Address.” 27 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 30 April 2006. . Clinton, William. 1999. “State of the Union Address.” 19 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 3 May 2006. . Clinton, William. 2000. “State of the Union Address.” 27 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 5 May 2006. . Clyburn, James. 1993. “It’s Time to Put up or Shut up.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Clyburn, James. 1994. “Provide Health Care for All.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Coats, Daniel. 1984. “A Balanced Budget Amendment.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. .

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240 Coats, Daniel. 1992. “The President’s Speech.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Coble, Howard. 1996. “Federal Tobacco Policy.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Coburn, Thomas. 1997. “The Balanced Budget Amen dment and Social Security.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Cochran, William. 1992. “Leader of the Age.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Cochran, William. 1993. “State of the Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Cohen, Jeffrey. 1982. “The Impact of the Modern Presidency on Presidential Success in the U.S. Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 7.4 (November): 515-532. Cohen, Jeffrey. 1995. “Presidential Rh etoric and the Public Agenda.” American Journal of Political Science 39.1 (February): 87-107. Collier, Kenneth and Terry Sullivan. 1995. “N ew Evidence Undercutting the Linkage of Approval with Presidential Support and Influence.” Journal of Politics 57.1: 197-209 Collins, Cardiss. 1981. “Courage.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Collins, James. 1981. “House Needs to Cut Committee Expenses.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Collins, Cardiss. 1993. “President Clinton’s Economic Plan.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Collins, Cardiss. 1996. “Prosperity and Futu re of America’s Young People.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Collins, James. 1982. “The New Federalism.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Conley, Richard. 2000. “The Electoral and Policy Context of Divided Government and Presidential Support in Congress: Nixon and Bush Compared.” Polity 32.4 (Summer): 595621.

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241 Conley, Richard. 2003. The Presidency, Congress, and Divided Government . College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Conrad, Kent. 1992. “Weak Medicine.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Conrad, Kent. 1997. “The President’s Budget Plan.” 10 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Conte, Silvio. 1980. “President’s Budge t for Fiscal Year 1981.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Conte, Silvio. 1986. “Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Amendment.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Conte, Silvio. 1990. “Criticism of th e President’s Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Conte, Silvio. 1991. “Saddam Hussein – Not a Man of His Word but a Man of Lies.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 12, 2006. . Conyers, John. 1978. “Tax Cuts, Inflati on, and Unemployment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Conyers, John. 1995. “Balance the Budget Without a Constitutional Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Cooper, Joseph. 2005. “From Congre ssional to Presidential Preemin ence: Power and Politics in Late Nineteenth-Century America and Today.” In Congress Reconsidered , eds. Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 363-394. Coughlin, Robert. 1991. “CNN’s Coverage from Baghdad is Saddam’s Propoganda.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Coughlin, Robert. 1992. “State of the Union: A Program for Economic Growth in America.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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242 Courter, James. 1987a. “Budget Reforms Begin with Ending CR’s.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Courter, James. 1987b. “Time to Break Relations with Managua.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Cox, Charles. 1993. “Grab Your Wallet a nd Call the Sheriff.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Craig, Larry. 1984. “Budget De ficits.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Craig, Larry. 1992. “The Presid ent’s Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Craig, Larry. 1994. “The President’s Stat e of the Union Message.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Cranston, Alan. 1978a. “The Panama Canal Tr eaties: A Top Priority.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Cranston, Alan. 1978b. “Panama Canal Treaties Ga in Support in California.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Cranston, Alan. 1978c. “Panama Canal Treaties.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Cranston, Alan. 1988. “United States-Japan Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Needs Revision.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Cremeans, Frank. 1995. “Stop the Bickering.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Crockett, George. 1988. “Adminis tration’s ‘Assurances’ Regarding Contra Aid.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . C-SPAN website (http://www.c-span.org/exec utive/stateoftheunion.asp ).

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243 Cummings, Elijah. 1997. “Creating Opport unities for our Children.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . D’Amato, Alfonse. 1990. “A Bold Move By President Bush.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Dahl, Robert. 1990. “Myth of the Presidential Mandate.” Political Science Quarterly 105.3 (Autumn): 355-372. Danner, Patsy. 1993. “Coleman Elementary School.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Danforth, John. 1985. “United States-Japan Trade.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Danielson, George. 1979. “The State of the Union Message.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Danielson, George. 1981a. “President Reagan’s Regulatory Reform Proposals.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Danielson, George. 1981b. “Regulat ory Reform.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Dannemeyer, William. 1986. “To Kill Two Bi rds With One Stone.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Daschle, Tom. 1992. “Comprehensive Health Care Reform.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Daschle, Tom. 1993a. “It’s Time to St ep Up to the Plate.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Daschle, Tom. 1993b. “The Presiden t’s Economic Plan.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Daschle, Tom. 1996. “The President’s St ate of the Union Address.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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244 Daschle, Tom. 1997. “Public Concern About our Health Care System.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Daub, Harold. 1988. “Restoring Preferential Tax Treatment for Capital Gains.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Davis, Robert. 1979. “The Elf Submarine Communications System.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . DeConcini, Dennis. 1994. “Bosnia’ s Second Winter.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Deering, Christopher and Steven Smith. 1997. Committees in Congress . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. DeFazio, Peter. 1987. “Nuclear Tes ting Moratorium.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . DeFazio, Peter. 1988. “Can We Believe the Admi nistration Wants Peace in Central America?” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . DeFazio, Peter. 1995a. “The National Debt and the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . DeFazio, Peter. 1995b. “The Reform of Am erica’s Welfare and Hunger Programs.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Degette, Diana. 1997. “Education: A Federal Priority.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . De La Garza, Eligio. “The Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . DeLauro, Rosa. 1992. “A Deafening Silence.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . DeLauro, Rosa. 1992. “The Answer to Un employment is Jobs.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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245 DeLauro, Rosa. 1994a. “Some Face Financial Ruin From Health Care Crisis.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . DeLauro, Rosa. 1994b. “No Health Care Crisis?” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . DeLauro, Rosa. 1995. “Urging Passage of the Gift Ban.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . DeLauro, Rosa. 1996. “Defaulting on the Debt.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . DeLauro, Rosa. 1997. “Preparing America for the 21st Century.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . DeLay, Tom. 1991. “Continuing Brutal Crackdo wn by Soviets of Baltic Republics .” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . DeLay, Tom. 1992a. “Democrats Have Absolutely No Concept of What Drives Our Economy.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . DeLay, Tom. 1992b. “A 6000-Percent Increase in Spending Since President Washington.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . DeLay, Tom. 1993. “Janet Reno – Gun Control Radical.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Dellums, Ronald. 1981. “Is Freed om Being Viewed as a Domestic Luxury?” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Derrick, Butler. 1993a. “Isn’t that Fair?” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Derrick, Butler. 1993b. “South Carolinians Supp ort President Clinton’s Economic Program.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Derrick, Butler. 1993c. “Support Sought for Brady Bill and Extension of Unemployment Benefits.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. .

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246 Derrick, Butler. 1994. “Real Reasons for Health Care Reform.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Devine, Samuel. 1979. “What the State of th e Union Message Did Not Say.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Devine, Samuel. 1980. “Carter Budget In adequate for Defense.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Dewine, Michael. 1997. “Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Diaz-Balart, Lincoln. 1995. “Congress Must Pa ss the Balanced Budget Amendment to Protect the American Way of Life.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Dickey, Jay. 1993. “A Call for Sacrifice in Washington.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Dingell, John. 1996. “U.S. Monetary Policy.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Dixon, Alan. 1981. “Balancing the Distribution of Federal Dollars Back to the States.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Dodd, Larry and Bruce Oppenheimer. 2005. “A D ecade of Republican Control: The House of Representatives, 1995-2005.” In Congress Reconsidered , eds. Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Doggett, Lloyd. 1996a. “Time for Congress to Work Together.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Doggett, Lloyd. 1996b. “Protect Medicare.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1978a. “Energy Dependence.” 20 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexis-nexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>.

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247 Dole, Robert. 1978b. “Panama Canal Treaties: A Review of the Record.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1978c. “The Budget.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1986. “The Farm Bill.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1987. “The Line-Item Veto.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1988. “Consider the INF Treaty in Context.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1992a. “President Bush’s St ate of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1992b. “The President’s Budget.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1992c. “More Take-Home Pay for Americans.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1993a. “A Lesson in Clintonomics.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1993b. “The President’s Economic Package.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1994. “The Biggest Budget Lie.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1996a. “Additional Statements War on Drugs.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Dole, Robert. 1996b. “The New Drug Czar.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Domenici, Pete. 1987. “Budget Reform.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. .

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248 Domenici, Pete. 1992. “The State of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Domenici, Pete. 1993. “State of th e Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Domenici, Pete. 1994. “Violent Crime.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Domenici, Pete. 1995a. “The Path to a Budget Package.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Domenici, Pete. 1995b. “Budget Scor ekeeping Report.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Doolittle, John. 1994. “Are the American People R eady for the Clinton Health Care Plan?” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1981. “Dealing with Governme nt Spending and Taxing Policy Does Not go Nearly Far Enough.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1986. “The President’s Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1988a. “Food, Not Guns, For Central America.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1988b. “A $36 Million Inve stment in Life.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1990. “The Misuse of Soci al Security Surpluses.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1993. “Changing the Country’s Economic Direction.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1996. “A Way to Balance the Budget.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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249 Dorgan, Byron. 1997a. “The Constitutional Ame ndment to Balance the Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Dorgan, Byron. 1997b. “Education.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Dornan, Robert. 1985. “The B1 Bomber.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Dornan, Robert. 1986. “The Politics of Defense is Best When it is No Politics.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Dornan, Robert. 1995. “The State of the Union Speech.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Dornan, Robert. 1996. “President Attempts to Bask in Heroes’ Honor.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Downey, Thomas. 1984. “Supply-side Economic s – A Dismal Failure.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Downey, Thomas. 1987. “President Has Kicked Arms Race Into High Gear.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Doyle, Michael. 1995. “Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Dreier, David. 1984. “Budget Deficits.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Dreier, David. 1988. “Ortego is Using the Peace Process to Eliminate Contras.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Dreier, David. 1991. “Hooray for Our Troops.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Dreier, David. 1993a. “Stop Pattern of Tax and Spending.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. .

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250 Dreier, David. 1993b. “Specific Suggestions for President Clinton.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Dreier, David. 1993c. “More Suggestions for Deficit Reduction.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Dreier, David. 1996a. “Reflection on th e State of the Union.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Dreier, David. 1996b. “President Clinton’s Stat e of the Union Speech and Border Patrol for California.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Duncan, John. 1992. “The Overregulation of Our Economy.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Duncan, John. 1993. “Cut Spending First.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Duncan, John. 1994a. “President’s Acti ons Don’t Match Words.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Duncan, John. 1994b. “Do We Need Hea lth Care Reform?” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Duncan, John. 1994c. “Health Care Problems Caused by Too Much Government, Not Too Little.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Dunn, Jennifer. 1993. “The Engine of our Economic Growth.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Durbin, Richard. 1988a. “No Accountability for Contra Aid.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Durbin, Richard. 1988b. “Stop Fueli ng Fires of War.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. .

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251 Durbin, Richard. 1992. “Defining Moment in State of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Durbin, Richard. 1993. “St opping GOP – Gridlock on Parade.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Durbin, Richard. 1994. “Republicans Uncomforta ble with Clinton’s Success.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Durbin, Richard. 1995a. “Battle of the Contracts.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Durbin, Richard. 1995b. “A Question of Priorities.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Durenberger, David. 1980. “Administration’s Propos ed Fiscal Year 1981 Budget.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Durenberger, David. 1990. “The State of the Union Speech.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Durenberger, David. 1993. “Health Care.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Eckart, Dennis. 1982. “The Unemployed.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Edgar, Robert. 1983. “OMB Forces VA to I gnore Directive of Congress.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Edwards, George C. 1976. “Presidential Influen ce in the House: Pres idential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power.” The American Political Science Review 70.1 (March): 101-113. Edwards, George. 1980. Presidential Influence in Congress . San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman and Company. Edwards, George. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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252 Edwards, George. 2003. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Edwards, George C. 2004. “Riding High in the Po lls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion.” In The George W. Bush Presidency , eds. Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 16-45. Ehlers, Vernon. 1995a. “Congress Must Exclud e Programs for the Young and Elderly from Balanced Budget Amendment Cuts.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ehlers, Vernon. 1995b. “Give Credit Where Credit is Due.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Emerson, Norvell. 1983. “Prote ction of Farmers in Grain Elev ator Failures.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Entman, Robert. 2003. “Cascading activation: Contesting the White House’s frame after 9/11.” Political Communication 20.4, 415-432. Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew. 2005. “The Po litics of Presidential Agendas.” Political Research Quarterly 58.2 (June): 257-268. Eshoo, Anna. 1993. “Clinton’s Economic Plan.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Ewing, Thomas. 1994. “The Presiden t’s Tax Increase.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Exon, James. 1992. “The State of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Exon, James. 1993. “The Crisis That Confronts Us.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Faircloth, Duncan. 1994. “The President’s St ate of the Union Address.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Faircloth, Duncan. 1996. “Welfare Reform.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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253 Farr, Sam. 1996. “Schools and Information Super Highway.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Farr, Sam. 1997. “More on Campaign Finance Reform.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Fazio, Victor. 1993. “A Leader With Courage and Wisdom.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 22, 2006. . Fazio, Victor. 1997. “Campaign Finance Reform.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Feighan, Edward. 1987. “Members Urged to Legislat e an End to Nuclear Testing.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Feingold, Russell. 1993. “President Clinton’s De ficit Reduction Spending Cuts.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Feingold, Russell. 1994. “Long-Term Hea lth Care Reform.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Fingerhut, Eric. 1993a. “Americans Still do not Trust Congress.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Fingerhut, Eric. 1993b. “Support for the Brady Bill.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Fiorina, Morris. 2002. Divided Government . New York: Longman Publishers. Fish, Hamilton. 1984. “The Taking of Water.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Fish, Hamilton. 1987. “A Salute to the President.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Flake, Floyd. 1992. “The State of the Union and Unemployment Benefits.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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254 Flake, Floyd. 1993. “Head Start and Job Co rps are Great Successes.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Foley, Thomas. 1990. “Response to the State of the Union.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Foley, Thomas. 1996. “The Border Patrol in Florida.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Forbes, Michael. 1995a. “Congress Needs a Th ree-Fifths Tax Limitation on the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Forbes, Michael. 1995b. “The 100 Day Nightmare.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ford, William. 1979. “President Carter’s Fiscal Year 1980 Budget for Education.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Ford, William. 1987. “Raising the Minimum Wage.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Ford, William. 1997. “Creating Opportuni ties for our Children.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Fowler, Wyche. 1990. “Presidential Leadership.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Fowler, Wyche. 1993. “An Economic Growth Package, or a Government Growth Package?” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Fox, Jon. 1995. “Getting Our Fiscal House in Order.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Frank, Barney. 1984. “Insufficient Security at White House Causes Bogus Budget to be Sent to Congress.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Frank, Barney. 1987. “We Will All Be the Losers.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. .

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255 Frank, Barney. 1993a. “An Ode to Budge t Constructionists.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Frank, Barney. 1993b. “One of the Main Differe nces Between the Parties.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Franks, Robert. 1993a. “Preside nt Clinton is Following New Jers ey Governor Florio’s Failed Budget Blueprint.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Franks, Robert. 1993b. “Spending and Taxes.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Frelinghuysen, Rodney. 1995. “Time to Keep the Promise of a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Frenzel, William. 1981. “House Urged to Vote Against Committee Budget Increases.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Frey, Louis. 1978. “Solar Energy Cuts More th an Salary Increases at Doe.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Frisa, Dan. 1996. “Talk is Cheap.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Frost, Jonas. 1993. “True Leadership.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Furse, Elizabeth. 1995. “Help us Pa ss Lobbying Reform.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Gallegly, Elton. 1987. “In Support of the Stat e of the Union Address.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Gallegly, Elton. 1990. “It Would Be Tragic to Legalize Drugs Now.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. .

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256 Ganske, Greg. 1995. “The People Demand a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Garcia, Robert. 1982. “A Protest to th e Soviet Government.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Garn, Edwin. 1978. “Abusing the Civil Service.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Gejdenson, Samuel. 1984. “The Pres ident’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Gejdenson, Samuel. 1992a. “Fairness to Defense Workers.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Gejdenson, Samuel. 1992b. “We Need a Presid ent Who Puts People Back to Work.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Gekas, George. 1985. “The Line -item Veto.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Gekas, George. 1991a. “Implementation of St ate of the Union Provisions.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Gekas, George. 1991b. “The Allied Coalition is Allied and United in their Actions.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Gekas, George. 1991c. “What Will Congre ss Do With the Budget?” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Gekas, George. 1994. “The Great Debate of 1994.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Gephardt, Richard. 1981. “President Reag an’s Economic Proposals.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. .

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257 Gephardt, Richard. 1993. “Not ‘What is in it for me,’ but ‘What’s in it fo r us’?” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Gephardt, Richard. 1994. “A Crisis in American Health Care.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Gillmor, Paul. 1990. “End Committee Turf Battles for More Effective War on Drugs.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Gillmor, Paul. 1995. “Voting on the Issues Americans Demand.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Gillmor, Paul. 1996. “State of the Union.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Gilman, Benjamin. 1988. “More Violence in Co lombia Related to Dr ug Trafficking.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Gilman, Benjamin. 1992. “Preventative Health Care.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Gilman, Benjamin. 1996. “Compromise on Budget Needed Now.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Gingrich, Newt. 1980. “State of the Union Me ssage Needs Clarification.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Gingrich, Newt. 1981. “House Administration Committee Increases Committee Spending.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Gingrich, Newt. 1984a. “The President’s St ate of the Union Address.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Gingrich, Newt. 1984b. “Democrats Want to Gu t Defense and Massively Raise Taxes.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. .

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258 Gingrich, Newt. 1986. “Trip Reports Should Re flect Actual Expenses .” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Gingrich, Newt. 1993. “How We Cu t the Deficit.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Gingrich, Newt. 1994. “A Real Crime Fight.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Gingrich, Newt. 1995. “Republican Making Prog ress on their Contract with America.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Glad, Betty. 1980. Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House . New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. Glickman, Daniel. 1984. “The Administration’ s Balanced Budget Approach: The Numbers and the Rhetoric Don’t Add Up.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Glickman, Daniel. 1988. “FBI Investigation of U.S. Groups Opposed to Reagan’s Central American Policies.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Glickman, Daniel. 1992. “The Pr esident’s Speech.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Glickman, Daniel. 1993. “Working Together on the President’s Program.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Goldwater, Barry. 1979. “Jimmy Carter Makes Me Feel Good.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Goldwater, Barry. 1980. “Realism in U.S. Foreign Policy.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Gonzalez, Henry. 1987. “Economic Dilemmas No. 2.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Goodlatte, Robert. 1997. “The Need for Congr ess to Pass a Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. .

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259 Goodling, William. 1982. “Emergency Youth Empl oyment Tax Incentive Act Introduced.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Gore, Albert. 1990. “Global Warming.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Gorton, Thomas. 1990. “The Defense Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Gorton, Thomas. 1992. “Our Economic Problems.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1990. “Earth Day Countdown.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1992a. “How Much is Too Much?” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1992b. “Get Lost, Boat Tax.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1993a. “Specific Cuts.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1993b. “A Blizzard in Washington.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1993c. “Fifty Ways to Cut the Budget.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1993d. “Suggested Cuts in Spending for President Clinton.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1993e. “A Difference of Opinion.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1994a. “Health Care Reform Now.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Goss, Porter. 1994b. “What Are We Saying Yes To?” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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260 Gradison, Willis. 1978. “Anatoly Sharansky is Be ing Unjustly Detained by the Soviets.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Gradison, Willis. 1983. “Include Me mbers of Congress in Social Secu rity System.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Gramm, William. 1993. “The Pres ident’s Plan.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Gramm, William. 1994. “Health Care.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Grams, Rod. 1994. “State of the Un ion and Health Care.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Grassley, Charles. 1986. “Iowa’ s Slumping Economy.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Grassley, Charles. 1987. “The Agricultural Crisis in Perspective.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Grassley, Charles. 1992. “Tax Benef its for Higher Education.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Grassley, Charles. 1993. “State of the Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Green, Eugene. 1994a. “Time to Put the Empha sis on Crime and Health Care Reform.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Green, Eugene. 1994b. “Health Care Reform.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Green, Eugene. 1995. “Contract with America Threatens Social Security.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Green, Eugene. 1995b. “Effects the Balanced Budget Amendment Will Have on Houston.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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261 Green, Eugene. 1996. “Common Ground fo r All Americans.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Green, William. 1988. “Mission to Planet Earth.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Greenwood, James. 1996. “Balancing the Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Gregg, Judd. 1984. “Amendment to Permit Vol untary School Prayer .” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Gregg, Judd. 1986. “Balancing th e Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Gregg, Judd. 1997a. “Education.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Gregg, Judd. 1997b. “The President’s Budget Proposal.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Griffin, John. 2006. “Electoral Competition and De mocratic Responsiveness: A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis.” Journal of Politics 68.4 (November): 911-921. Grossback, Lawrence, David Peterson, and Ja mes Stimson. 2005. “Comparing Competing Theories on the Causes of Mandate Perceptions.” American Journal of Political Science 49.2 (April): 406-419. Gunderson, Steven. 1990. “Social Securi ty is Bipartisan.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Gunderson, Steven. 1991. “Proclamation Supporting U.S. Troops.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Gunderson, Steven. 1992. “Democrats Have No Alternatives to Pres ident’s Proposals.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Gutierrez, Luis. 1993a. “Sacrif ice at the Top: Introduci ng a Pay Freeze for Members of Congress.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. .

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262 Gutierrez, Luis. 1993b. “Will Congress March at the Head of the Parade?” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Gutierrez, Luis. 1993c. “A Call for Change.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Gutierrez, Luis. 1995. “A Plea for Real Change, Not Fake Changes.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Haas, Garland. 1992. Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration . Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers. Hamburg, Daniel. 1994. “There is a Health Care Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hance, Kent. 1982. “Withholding Tax on Interest and Dividend Income is Counterproductive.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Hancock, Melton. 1992. “Correcting the Dama ge Caused by the 1986 Tax Reform Act.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Hansen, Clifford. 1978. “Forewor d to Wymoning.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Harkin, Thomas. 1982. “We Need Action Now.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Harkin, Thomas. 1996a. “Fraud, Waste, and Abus e in the Medicare Program.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Harkin, Thomas. 1996b. “Reducing Nuclear Tensions in the World.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Harris, Claude. 1991. “Persian Gulf: Th e Mail Must Go Through.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 12, 2006. . Harrison, Frank. 1984. “Agent Orange Veterans’ Bill.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. .

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263 Hastings, Alcee. 1997. “Education Infrastr ucture Initiative.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Hatch, Orrin. 1978a. “Is There Really Support for the Panama Canal Treaty?” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexisnexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>. Hatch, Orrin. 1978b. “MX Mobile Missile System.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Hatch, Orrin. 1978c. “Russia’s New Surprise Weapon.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Hatch, Orrin. 1988. “National School Counseling Week.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Hatch, Orrin. 1990. “Clean Air Legislation.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Hatch, Orrin. 1994a. “The Need for Presidentia l Leadership on the Crime Bill.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hatch, Orrin. 1994b. “The Need to Regain Anti-G ang Provision of the Crime Bill.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hatch, Orrin. 1996. “Drug Related Child Abuse.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Hawkins, Augustus. 1982. “In Support of the Goodling Bill.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Hayakawa, Samuel. 1980. “National Defense is Affordable.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Hayakawa, Samuel. 1981. “The President’s Progr am for Economic Recovery.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Hayworth, Samuel. 1995a. “Sound Familiar?” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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264 Hayworth, Samuel. 1995b. “Media ’s Assertion of Americans’ A nger Off Base.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hayworth, Samuel. 1995c. “We Will Work to Keep Our Promises.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hayworth, Samuel. 1995d. “Republican C ontract with America.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hayworth, Samuel. 1996a. “Move Togeth er to Attack Deficit.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Hayworth, Samuel. 1996b. “Debt Ceiling Must be Linked to Balanced Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Hefley, Joel. 1987. “Turning Amer ica Around: The Goal of the 100th Congress.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Hefley, Joel. 1992. “Let Us Forget About Politics and Go to Work.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Heflin, Howell. 1983. “National War on Violen t Crime and ABC Broadcast.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Heflin, Howell. 1987a. “Calenda r Tax Years.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Heflin, Howell. 1987b. “Supporting Voca tional Education.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Heflin, Howell. 1988. “The Contras Mu st Not Be Abandoned.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Heinemen, Fred. 1995. “Support the Three-Fifths Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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265 Heinz, Henry. 1987. “Salt Bindi ng Legislation.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1981. “The Arrest and Trial of the President of the Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1987. “The Soviets Have Violated the Main SALT II Sublimit.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1991. “Protestors Do Threat en Conduct of Gulf War.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1993a. “Irresponsible Congress? Here is Today’s Boxscore.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1993b. “Irresponsible Congress? Here is Today’s Boxscore.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1994a. “Irresponsible Congress? Here is Today’s Boxscore.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1994b. “Irresponsible Congress? Here is Today’s Boxscore.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1994c. “Irresponsible Congress? Here is Today’s Boxscore.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1994d. “Irresponsible Congress? Here is Today’s Boxscore.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1995. “Is Congress Irresponsible? You Be the Judge of That.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1996a. “The Bad Debt Boxscore.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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266 Helms, Jesse. 1996b. “The Bad Debt Boxscore.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1996c. “The Bad Debt Boxscore.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1996d. “The Bad Debt Boxscore.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1996e. “The Bad Debt Boxscore.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1997a. “The Very Bad Debt Boxscore.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1997b. “The Very Bad Debt Boxscore.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1997c. “The Very Bad Debt Boxscore.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1997d. “The Very Bad Debt Boxscore.” 10 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Helms, Jesse. 1997e. “The Very Bad Debt Boxscore.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Herger, Walter. 1996. “An End to Big Government.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Herrnson, Paul. 2000. Congressional Elections . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Hershey, Marjorie Randon. 1994. “The Meaning of a Mandate: Interpretati ons of ‘Mandate’ in 1984 Presidential Election Coverage.” Polity 27.2 (Winter): 225-254. Hetherington, Marc and Michael Nelson. 2003. “Ana tomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism.” PS: Political Science and Politics 36.1 (January): 37-42. Hiler, John. 1982. “The Taxpayer Paid Democratic Response.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Hillard, Earl. 1995. “Urging Members to Join in Supporting the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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267 Hillis, Elwood. 1980. “The President and Congress Must Respond to Soviet Union.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Hinchey, Maurice. 1995. “Balan ce the Budget and Reduce the Fede ral Deficit.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hoagland, Peter. 1991. “EPA Tries, But Lose s, Grand Canyon Air Battle.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Hoagland, Peter. 1993. “A Rare Display of Political Courage.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Hoagland, Peter. 1994. “Members Urged to Conti nue Deficit Reduction Efforts, Resist Special Interest Legislation.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hoekstra, Peter. 1997a. “Education at a Crossroads.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Hoekstra, Peter. 1997b. “Answer to Education Problems Not in Washington.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Hoffman, Donna and Alison Howard. 2006. Addressing the State of th e Union: The Evolution and Impact of the President’s Big Speech . Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Hoke, Martin. 1993. “Clinton Economic Progr am Opinion Editorial.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Hoke, Martin. 1995a. “Has the Presid ent Become a Republican?” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hoke, Martin. 1995b. “Celebrating the Passage of the Balanced B udget Amendment.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hoke, Martin. 1996. “Scare Tactic s and Demagoguery.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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268 Hollings, Ernest. 1991. “It’s Time to Pay the Bi lls, and Let’s Start by Pa ying for this War.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Hollings, Ernest. 1992. “The State of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Holsti, Ole R. 1969. Content Analysis for the So cial Sciences and Humanities . Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Holt, Marjorie. 1981. “Do Not Underestimate the Patriotism and Good Sense of the People.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Horn, John. 1993. “It is Spending, Not Ta xes, Mr. President.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Horn, John. 1994. “A Call for Real Reform.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Howard, James. 1982. “The New Federalism Highway.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Hoyer, Steny. 1995. “Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Hoyer, Steny. 1996. “Honoring Past Commitments is Not a Gambling Disorder.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Hubbard, Carroll. 1980a. “Abandonment of Selective Services a Tragic Mist ake.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Hubbard, Carroll. 1980b. “Cruel Irony in Iran.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Hughes, William. 1988. “Coast Guard Cuts in the Continuing Resolution.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Humphrey, Gordon. 1987. “Soviet Invasi on of Afghanistan.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. .

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269 Hunter, Duncan. 1984. “You Can’t Fool the American People.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Hunter, Duncan. 1987. “Soviet Union is Trying to Sever American Hemisphere.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Hutchison, Kathryn. 1996. “Bal anced Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Hutchinson, Timothy. 1993. “Cut Spending First.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Hutchinson, Timothy. 1997. “Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Hutto, Earl. 1987. “Just Say No to Drugs Week.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Hutto, Earl. 1991. “Prayers for Our Missing Crewme mbers in the Persian Gulf.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Inhofe, James. 1987. “President’s Stat e of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Inhofe, James. 1996a. “Major Concerns.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Inhofe, James. 1996b. “The Tax Code.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Inhofe, James. 1996c. “The Mi ssile Threat.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Inouye, Daniel. 1978. “The Illegitimate Child of the Mental Health Movement.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Ireland, Andrew. 1992. “Small Business Will Save America.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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270 Istook, Ernest. 1993. “President Clinton Offers New Taxes, Not Spending Cuts.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Jackson-Lee, Shelia. 1995. “Adverse Impacts of Contract with America.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Jackson-Lee, Shelia. 1996a. “Congress Must Be Responsible on Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Jackson-Lee, Shelia. 1996b. “Fulfilli ng our Responsibilities.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Jackson-Lee, Shelia. 1996c. “Debt Ceiling.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Jackson-Lee, Shelia. 1996d. “The Lo oming Default Crisis.” 31January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Jackson-Lee, Shelia. 1997a. “Creating Oppor tunities for our Children.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Jackson-Lee, Shelia. 1997b. “Responding to the President’s Call for Campaign Finance Reform.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . James, Patrick and Jean Sebastien Rioux. 1998. “Int ernational Crises and Linkage Politics: The Experience of the United States, 1953-1994.” Political Research Quarterly 51.3 (September): 781-812. Jefferson, William. 1993. “President Clinton’ s Plan Needed to End Republican Borrow and Spend Disaster.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Jeffords, Jim. 1988. “Considering Our Op tions on Contra Funding.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Johnson, Eddie. 1994. “Investments in Our Future : Where Are Our Priorities?” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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271 Johnson, Eddie. 1996. “Matching Word s with Actions?” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Johnson, Nancy. 1995. “Cutting the Federal Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Johnson, Nancy. 1997. “Providing Probability for Medigap Enrollees.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Johnston, Harry. 1993. “Commitment to Reducing the Deficit.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Jones, Walter. 1995a. “Off to a Great Start on the Contract with America.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Jones, Walter. 1995b. “Support BBA with Three-Fifths Requirement.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Jones, Walter. 1995c. “A Great Night for the Cause of Liberty.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Jones, Walter. 1996. “The Debt Ceiling Increase.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Kaptur, Marcia. 1984. “President Reagan ‘Stays the Course’ is a Disa ster.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Kaptur, Marcia. 1986. “American Business Frustrated by Unfair Tr ade Practices.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Kasich, John. 1993. “Tax Us Today and Get to the Cuts Down the Road.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Kassebaum, Nancy. 1992. “Foreign Aid Reform.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Kassebaum, Nancy. 1996. “Health Insurance Reform.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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272 Kasten, Robert. 1992. “Pass Growth Plan by March 20th.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Kemp, Jack. 1980. “The Carter State of the Union Message.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Kennedy, Edward. 1978. “Humanitarian Problem s of Southeast Asia.” 20 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexisnexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>. Kennedy, Edward. 1990. “Proposing a $169 Billion P eace Dividend Over the Next Five Years.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Kennedy, Edward. 1991. “Israel’s Rest raint in the War.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Kennedy, Edward. 1992a. “President’s Plan Fa vors Special Interests, Neglects American Workers.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Kennedy, Edward. 1992b. “Our Economic Future.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Kennedy, Edward. 1995. “Protection of Medicare.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Kennedy, Edward. 1996a. “No Default.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Kennedy, Edward. 1996b. “Health Insurance Reform.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Kennelly, Barbara. 1986. “Oil Import Fees.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Kennelly, Barbara. 1991. “Be Br ave, Melissa.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Kennelly, Barbara. 1995a. “We Need to Get Our Own House in Order.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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273 Kennelly, Barbara. 1995b. “Improve Child Support Enforcement System.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Kennelly, Barbara. 1996. “Pass a Clean Debt Ceiling Now.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Kernell, Samuel. 1997. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Kerrey, Robert. 1990. “State of the Union.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Kerrey, Robert. 1993. “Making Tough Choices.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Kerry, John. 1994. “Health Care.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Kessel, John. 1974. “Parameter s of Presidentia l Politics.” Social Science Quarterly 55: 8-24. Kim, Jay. 1993a. “Run Government Like a Business and Eliminate Pork Barrel Spending Programs.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Kim, Jay. 1993b. “Hot Line Callers: Clin ton’s Plan Perplexing.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Kindness, Thomas. 1984. “The Budget Deficit.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Kingston, Jack. 1993. “Middle-class Taxpayers an Endangered Species?” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Kingston, Jack. 1994. “Clinton Health Care Qu estion No. 357, and Others.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Kingston, Jack. 1995a. “Act Now on Cont ract with America.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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274 Kingston, Jack. 1995b. “Democrats, Not Republican s, Raised Taxes on Social Security.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Kingston, Jack. 1996. “President Should Put Hi s Pen Where His Mouth Is.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Kleckza, Gerald. 1988. “Contra Aid.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Kleckza, Gerald. 1995. “Social Security Exemption Reduced to Sense-of-Congress Resolution.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Klein, Herbert. 1993. “Clinton Plan Fo cuses on the Future.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Klein, Herbert. 1994. “Constituents Know Ameri cans Suffer from Health Care Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Klink, Robert. 1995a. “Enact Lobbying Reform.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Klink, Robert. 1995b. “Balanced Budget Amendmen t Won’t Balance the Budget.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Knollenberg, Joseph. 1993. “T ax Increases Are Not the Answer.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Knollenberg, Joseph. 1995. “Min imum Wage.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Knollenberg, Joseph. 1996. “Actions Speak Louder than Words.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Kohl, Herbert. 1994. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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275 Kolbe, James. 1988. “Let’s Negotiate a Unit ed States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Kopetski, Michael. 1993. “Health Care Reform and Mental Health Care.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Kopetski, Michael. 1994. “There is a Health Care Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Kramer, Kenneth. 1979. “A Constitutional Amendm ent to Require a Balanced Federal Budget.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Kravitz, Walter. 1990. “The Advent of the Mode rn Congress: The Legi slative Reorganization Act of 1970.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 15.3 (August): 375-399. Kyl, Jon. 1987. “Helping the President to Put America First.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Kyl, Jon. 1994. “Drug Use Still National Crisis.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Kyl, Jon. 1996a. “Balancing the Budget.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Kyl, Jon. 1996b. “The Potential Threat of Nuclear Missiles.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Lagomarsino, Robert. 1984. “Argentine Democracy.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Lagomarsino, Robert. 1990. “Establish Department of Environmental Protection.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Lagomarsino, Robert. 1991. “Gulf Wa r Demostrations.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Lagomarsino, Robert. 1992. “Accepti ng the Challenge.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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276 LaHood, Ray. 1995. “The Fig Leaf that Was Good Enough.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Lampson, Nicholas. 1997. “Time to Cr ack Down on Gangs.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Lantos, Thomas. 1981a. “Need for Greater Allied Effect to Counter Soviet Expansionism.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Lantos, Thomas. 1981b. “American Universi ties Are Not for Sale.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Lantos, Thomas. 1987. “Iran’s Most Recent Outrage.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Latta, Delbert. 1981. “Congressmen Latta Hails Reagan ‘Blueprint’ for Economic Recovery.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Lautenberg, Frank. 1992. “Needed: Bolder and Stronger Leadership.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Lautenberg, Frank. 1997. “The President’s Fiscal Year 1998 Budget.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Lazarsfeld, Paul, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. The People’s Choice . New York: Columbia University Press. Leahy, Patrick. 1978. “Vermont’s Woodfire Power System.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Leahy, Patrick. 1990. “The President’s Stat e of the Union Message.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Leahy, Patrick. 1993. “We Must Get Out of the Deficit Ditch.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. .

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277 Lehman, Richard. 1984. “Water Resource Projects Law Enforcemen t Authority.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Lehman, Richard. 1987. “Expression of Deep Concern About Upcoming Nuclear Testing.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Lehnen, Robert. 1967. “Behavior on the Senate Fl oor: An Analysis of Debate in the U.S. Senate.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 11.4 (November): 505-521. Levin, Carl. 1983. “Soviets Not Ahead in ‘Virtu ally Every Measure of Military Power’.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Levin, Carl. 1984. “President Reagan Will be Judged by his Actions, Not His Words.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Levin, Carl. 1986. “Let Us Debate the President’s Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Levin, Carl. 1991. “The Presiden t’s Budget Falls Short of Meeti ng Unmet Needs.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Levin, Carl. 1992a. “DOD Inventory of Supplies and Parts.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Levin, Carl. 1992b. “We Need to Create More Jobs: Americans Are Not Lazy.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Levin, Carl. 1993. “We Must Get Out of the Deficit Ditch.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Levine, Meldon. 1987. “Arms Export Reform Act of 1987.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Levitas, Elliot. 1982a. “We Must Balance the Budget.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. .

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278 Levitas, Elliot. 1982b. “Federalism.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Levitas, Elliot. 1984. “Let us Stop Reading Budge t Fairy Tales; Let us Work Together to Bring Deficits Down.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Lewis, Thomas. 1990. “The Role of Internationa l Trade in the War Against Illegal Drugs.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Lewis, Thomas. 1995a. “Two Men Worthy of Praise.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Lewis, Thomas. 1995b. “The Republican Prom ise to the American People.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Lewis, Thomas. 1996. “A Great State of the Union.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Lewis, David and James Michael Strine. 1996. “W hat Time is it? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time.” The Journal of Politics 58.3 (August): 682-706. Lieberman, Joseph. 1990. “Globa l Warming.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Lieberman, Joseph. 1993. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Light, Paul. 1981. “Passing Noni ncremental Policy: Presiden tial Influence in Congress, Kennedy to Carter.” Congress & the Presidency 9 (Winter): 61-82. Light, Paul. 1982. The President’s Agenda: Domestic Po licy Choice From Kennedy to Carter. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Lightfoot, James. 1985. “Wake Up, America.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Linder, John. 1995. “Change Means Less G overnment, More Freedom.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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279 Livingston, Robert. 1994. “Three Time Lose r Laws Gaining Popularity.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Lockerbie, Brad, Stephen Borrelli, and Scott Hedger. 1998. “An Integrative Approach to Modeling Legislative Success in Congress.” Political Research Quarterly 51.1 (March): 155172. Long, Jill. 1991a. “Military Family Preservation Act.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Long, Jill. 1991b. “Unemployment Insurance Program May Undergo New Shortfalls.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Long, Jill. 1993. “A Call for Americans to Work in the National Interest.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Long, Jill. 1994. “Toward a Compassionate Health Care System.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Lott, Trent. 1982. “A Plea fo r Cooperation.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Lott, Trent. 1984. “Democratic Statements of Concern About Deficit.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Lott, Trent. 1996. “Balanced Budget a nd Debt Ceiling Limit.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Lowey, Nita. 1992a. “President Challenged in High Stakes Poker Game on the Budget.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Lowey, Nita. 1992b. “Americans Want Comprehe nsive Strategy to Get Economy Moving.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Lowey, Nita. 1995. “Middle Class Promised Protection in President’s Positive Agenda.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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280 Lowey, Nita. 1996. “Congress Should be Work ing on Substantive Issues, Not Discussing Government Default.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Lowey, Nita. 1997a. “The President’s E ducation Initiative.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Lowey, Nita. 1997b. “Creating Opportunitie s for our Children.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Lukens, Donald. 1990. “Responsible Defense Reduction.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Lungren, Daniel. 1982. “Responses to th e ‘New Federalism’.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Lungren, Daniel. 1984. “Balanced Budgeteers?” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Lungren, Daniel. 1986. “Let Us All Sh are the Sacrifice.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Luther, William. 1995. “Congress Needs a ThreeFifths Tax Limitation on the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mack, Connie. 1984a. “Line-item Veto Constitutional Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Mack, Connie. 1984b. “Concern but No Solutions for Size of Deficits.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Mack, Connie. 1992. “American Work ers’ Productivity.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Mack, Connie. 1993. “State of the Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Malbin, Michael. 1983. “Rhetori c and Leadership: A Look Back ward at the Carter National Energy Plan.” In Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and

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281 Congress in the 1980s , ed. Anthony King. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 217. Maltzman, Forrest and Lee Sigelman. 1996. “The Politics of Talk: Unconstrained Floor Time in the U.S. House of Representatives.” The Journal of Politics 58.3: 819-830. Markey, Edward. 1986. “Budget Document Show s Administration’s Re al Priorities.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Markey, Edward. 1987. “A Declaration of War on Arms Control.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Markey, Edward. 1988. “The Contras of the Past, the Peace Plan is the Future.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Marlenee, Ronald. 1985. “Blackmail Has No Place in Developing a Remedy for Agricultural Crisis.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Martin, Lynn. 1986. “The President Has Kept the Law.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Martin, Lynn. 1991. “Outrage Expressed at Medi a’s Treatment of U.S. POW’s.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Martini, William. 1996. “State of the Confusion.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mascara, Frank. 1995. “Pledge to Accept No Gifts from Lobbyists.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mathews, Harlan. 1993. “President Clinton’s De ficit Reduction Spending Cuts.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Mathews, Harlan. 1994. “Support for the St ate of the Union Message.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mathias, Charles. 1981. “The Economy.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. .

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282 Matsui, Robert. 1984. “The President’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Matsunga, Spark. 1985. “Our Next Fron tier is in Space.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Mattox, James. 1981. “President Reagan’s Economic Proposals.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press Mayhew, David. 1990. Congress: The Electoral Connection . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mayhew, David. 1991. Divided We Govern . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mayhew, David. 2002. America’s Congress . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mazzoli, Romano. 1988. “Advancing Peace in Central America.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1990. “The President’s Pr oposed Budget Must Be Kind and Gentle to Louisville and Jefferson County, KY.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1991a. “Kentucky Hospital Group Points to Problems in Quality and Cost of Health Care.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1991b. “Approval of the Unit ed States-Soviet Role.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1992a. “Pass Extension of Unemployment Benefits.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1992b. “We Need to Provide Health Care for All American Workers, Including the Unemployed.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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283 Mazzoli, Romano. 1993a. “President Clinton Challenges America.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1993b. “Let’s Give the Presid ent the Campaign Finance Reform Bill He Has Requested.” 22 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1993c. “Americans Are Alre ady Experiencing the Payoff from President Clinton’s Economic Plan.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1993d. “House Should Extend the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1993e. “Campaign Fi nance Reform.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1994a. “Campaign Reform is Vital.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1994b. “Job Links: Putti ng People Back to Work.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mazzoli, Romano. 1994c. “Urging the Administrati on to Maintain Illegal Status of Drug Use.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . McCain, John. 1993. “Health Care.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . McCandless, Alfred. 1992. “Repeal the Social Security Earnings Limitation.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . McCandless, Alfred. 1994. “America’s Nationa l Drug Policy Risks Children’s Lives.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . McCarthy, Carolyn. 1997a. “State of the Union.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. .

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284 McCarthy, Carolyn. 1997b. “Touch the Future: Invest in Educati on.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . McCarthy, Karen. 1995a. “The Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . McCarthy, Karen. 1995b. “The Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . McClure, James. 1986. “The Necessity for Mo re Than 100 B-1B Bombers.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . McCollum, Bill. 1993. “The Real Issue is How We Make the Changes.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . McConnell, Mitch. 1986. “Farm Crisis in Rural America.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . McConnell, Mitch. 1996. “Curbing Youth A ccess to Tobacco Products.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . McCrery, James. 1993. “The Facts on the President’s Plan Must Co me to Light.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . McCurdy, David. 1983. “Legislation to Combat Math and Science Teacher Shortage” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . McCurdy, David. 1987. “We Must Strengthen Our Conventional Forces.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . McCurdy, David. 1990. “Condemning Angola M ilitary Offensive.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . McEwen, Robert. 1986. “N ational Security Decisionmaking.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. .

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285 McEwen, Robert. 1991. “All Who Serve in th e Persian Gulf Are America’s Finest.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . McGovern, George. 1978. “Airline Deregulation.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . McGovern, James. 1997. “Crusade for Education.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . McHale, Paul. 1993. “Time to Focus on the Ne xt Generation, Not the Next Election.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . McInnis, Scott. 1997. “On the State of the Union.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . McIntyre, Mike. 1997. “The Importan ce of Education.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . McKinney, Cynthia. 1993. “Clinton’ s Economic Plan.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . McKinney, Cynthia. 1996. “Pre sident Tries to Bring Natio n Together.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . McNulty, Michael. 1990. “The Pres ident’s Speech.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Meehan, Martin. 1995. “Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Meek, Carrie. 1995. “Senior Citizens, Wake Up.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Melcher, John. 1986. “The President’s B udget is Not Realistic.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Menendez, Robert. 1993. “Government Ge tting Down to Business.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Metcalf, Jack. 1995. “Balanced Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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286 Metcalf, Jack. 1996. “Balance the Budget.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Metcalf, Jack. 1997. “The Balanced Budget Ame ndment and Social Security.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Metzenbaum, Howard. 1978. “Consumer Prot ection and Energy Goals.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Metzenbaum, Howard. 1994. “A Conti ngent Workforce.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mica, John. 1996a. “State of the Uni on Message Lacks Facts.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Mica, John. 1996b. “Democrats So-Called Scams are Shams.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Michel, Robert. 1979. “What is Ne w Mr. President?” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Michel, Robert. 1980a. “What is an ‘Atte mpt to Gain Control’?” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Michel, Robert. 1980b. “A Humpty -Dumpty Budget?” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Michel, Robert. 1981. “A Pledge of Support for Legislative Schedule.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Michel, Robert. 1987. “Democratic Budget is Bogged Down Like Metro.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Michel, Robert. 1992. “The President’s Ec onomic Growth Initiativ e.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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287 Mikulski, Barbara. 1990. “L iteracy Act and Education Excellence Act.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Mikulski, Barbara. 1993. “We Must Get Ou t of the Deficit Ditch.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Milkis, Sidney. 1995. “What Politics Do Presidents Make?” Polity 27.3 (Spring): 485-496. Miller, Clarence. 1992. “Tax Credit for First-ti me Homebuyers is High light of State of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Miller, George. 1987. “Were You Sta nding and Cheering, Too?” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Miller, George. 1993a. “President’s Plan Pr omises Deficit Reduction and Long-term Economic Growth.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Miller, George. 1993b. “The President Speaks the Truth.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Miller, George. 1993c. “The Clinton Plan De serves Bipartisan Support.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Miller, George. 1995a. “Trusting the People to Make Decisions on a Balanced Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Miller, George. 1995b. “Republi can Leadership on Record Agai nst Social Security.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Miller, George. 1996a. “President’s Budget Meets the Test.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Miller, George. 1996b. “Republicans Asked to Pass Clean Debt Limit.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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288 Miller, George. 1997. “Campaign Finance Reform in the 105th Congress.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Mineta, Norman. 1988. “Opposing Contra Aid.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Mineta, Norman. 1991. “Reintroduction of Emerge ncy Oil Market Stability Act.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Minge, David. 1993. “We Need More Larry’s.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Mink, Patsy. 1991. “Thoughts Regarding the Issue of Journalistic Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Mink, Patsy. 1992. “Where is th e Leadership?” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Mink, Patsy. 1993. “Support Urged for President Clinton’s Economic Plan.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Mitchell, George. 1987. “Arms Control: Window of Opportunity.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Mitchell, George. 1990. “The Stat e of the Union.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Mitchell, George. 1990. “Education Ac tion This Week.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Mitchell, George. 1992. “Arms Prolif eration and China.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Moakley, John. 1986. “Historic Preservation Thr eatened by the Presiden t’s Proposed Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Moffett, Anthony. 1980. “The Communications Gap in the Middle East.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. .

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289 Mollohan, Alan. 1984. “The President’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Montgomery, Gillespie. 1981. “Democrats Golden Opportunities for Cooperation with Reagan Administration.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Montgomery, Gillespie. 1984. “Action Needed to Recall Marines from Lebanon.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Montgomery, Gillespie. 1985. “IRR Manpow er Initiative.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Moody, Jim. 1984. “Inconsistencies in th e President’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Moody, Jim. 1991. “Tax Relief on Middle Income Families Needed, Not Tax Breaks for the Wealthy.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Moran, James. 1992. “In Support of Extending Unemployment Benefits.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Moran, James. 1993. “A Call for Passage of the Brady Bill.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Morella, Constance. 1997. “Creating Oppor tunities for our Children.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Morgan, Clifton and Kenneth Bickers. 1992. “D omestic Discontent and the External Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36.1 (March): 25-52. Morrison, Sidney. 1982. “Concern for Closing of Job Services Offices.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Moseley-Braun, Carol. 1994. “A Call of Action for Change.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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290 Mottl, Ronald. 1981. “Buy American.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1979. “The Latest Estimates of Soviet Strategic Strength.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1991. “International Law and the Gulf Crisis.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1994. “Homic ides by Gunshot.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1995. “Homicides by Gunshot in NYC.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Mueller, John and Kent Johnson. 1985. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion . New York: John Wiley and Sons. Murkowski, Frank. 1987a. “The Bedr ock of Democracy.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Murkowski, Frank. 1987b. “Atomi c Veterans.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Murkowski, Frank. 1992. “The President’s Call for a National Energy Strategy.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Murkowski, Frank. 1993. “Health Care.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Murkowski, Frank. 1995. “United States-North Korea Framework Agreement.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Murkowski, Frank. 1996a. “The Government Shutdowns Were Not Congress’ Fault.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Murkowski, Frank. 1996b. “Increase in the Debt Ceiling.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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291 Murray, Patty. 1997. “Breast Cancer Screeni ng Guidelines Resolution.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Myers, John. 1979. “The President Delivered hi s State of the Union Address.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Myrick, Sue. 1995. “Business As Usual Must Go On: Congress Must Pass the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Nagle, David. 1990. “George Bush’s Pres idency: Study, Study, Study.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Neal, Richard. 1995a. “Child Support Now.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Neal, Richard. 1995b. “Child Support Now.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Nelson, Michael. 2003. “George W. Bush and Congress.” In Considering the Bush Presidency , eds. Gary Gregg and Mark Rozell. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 141-159. Nelson, Thomas, Zoe Oxley, and Rosalee Claw son. 1997. “Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects.” Political Behavior 19.3 (September): 221-246. Neumann, Mark. 1997. “The Balanced Budget Amen dment and Social Securi ty.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Neustadt, Richard. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents . New York: The Free Press. Nickles, Donald. 1992. “The President’s St ate of the Union Address.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Nickles, Donald. 1993a. “State of the Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Nickles, Donald. 1993b. “President Clin ton’s Economic Proposal.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. .

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292 Northup, Anne. 1997. “Pass the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Norton, Eleanor. 1993. “President Does the Right Thing.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Norwood, Charles. 1995. “Pass a Balanced Budget Amendment to Protect Our Children’s Future.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Nunn, Samuel. 1992. “Supporting Our Men an d Women in Uniform.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Oakar, Mary. 1983. “Legislation Introduced to Depoliticize Social Security.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Oakar, Mary. 1985. “Doublespeak.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Oakar, Mary. 1986. “Actions Speak Louder Than Words.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Obey, David. 1988. “Outrageous Prevention of Justice in El Salvador.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Obey, David. 1993. “Comparison of the Budget Pr oposal of President Clinton with Previous Budget Proposals.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Olver, John. 1996. “Congress Should Balance the Budget in the Right Way.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Ostrom, Charles and Brian Job. 1986. “The Pr esident and the Use of Political Force.” The American Political Science Review 80.2 (June): 541-566. Ostrom, Charles and Dennis Simon. 1985. “Promi se and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity.” American Political Science Review 79.2: 334-358.

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293 Owens, Major. 1994. “Comments on the State of the Union Address.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Owens, Major. 1997a. “Creating Opportuni ties for our Children.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Owens, Major. 1997b. “More on Netday.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Owens, Major. 1997c. “Educa tion Issues.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Oxley, Michael. 1988. “The Drug War Con tinues in Colombia.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Oxley, Michael. 1992. “The President’s Comp rehensive Drug Strate gy.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Packwood, Robert. 1979. “Peace in the Middle East.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Packwood, Robert. 1993. “State of th e Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Packwood, Robert. 1994. “Health Care.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Pallone, Frank. 1996a. “Maintain Envi ronmental Protection.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Pallone, Frank. 1996b. “Call for a Cl ean Debt Ceiling.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Pallone, Frank. 1996c. “Pass a Clean De bt Ceiling Extension.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Pallone, Frank. 1996d. “Bring Up a Clean Bill to Extend the Debt Limit.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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294 Pallone, Frank. 1997a. “President Correctly Places Nation’s Education System at the Top of our Priority List.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Pallone, Frank. 1997b. “Political System Overhaul.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Pallone, Frank. 1997c. “Comprehensive Ca mpaign Finance Reform.” 11 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Panetta, Leon. 1978. “The State Civil Rights Committees Act.” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. Panetta, Leon. 1982. “A Balanced and Fair Budge t Resolution or None at All.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Panetta, Leon. 1983. “One Hundred Years of Civ il Service Myths and Rea lities.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Parris, Stanford. 1981. “The Growth of Imperial Presidency.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Parris, Stanford. 1990. “Keep Our Commitment to Civil Service and Mi litary Annuitants.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Paul, Ronald. 1980. “The Chilli ng Talk of War.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Paul, Ronald. 1981. “The Message for Flint.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Paul, Ronald. 1982. “There’s No Libe rty Without Life.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Payne, Donald. 1995. “Higher Minimum Wage Produces Additional Jobs.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Pearson, James. 1978. “Energy.” 20 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. .

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295 Pease, Donald. 1981. “Defense Spending Commitments.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Pease, Donald. 1983a. “Introdu ction of Social Security Refo rm Act of 1983.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Pease, Donald. 1983b. “TRA Training for Disp laced Industrial Workers.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Pell, Claiborne. 1984. “Testing of F-15 ASAT System.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Pell, Claiborne. 1986. “National School and Guidance Counselor Week.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Pell, Claiborne. 1987. “Education: The Powe rful Weapon of a Free People.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Pell, Claiborne. 1990. “How to Fight Global Warming.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Pell, Claiborne. 1991. “Iraq Must Comply w ith Geneva Conventions, Give ICRC Access to POW’s.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Pell, Claiborne. 1992. “President’s Nuclear Initiatives.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Pell, Claiborne. 1993. “President Clinton’s St ate of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Pelosi, Nancy. 1988. “In Opposition to Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Pelosi, Nancy. 1992. “Children Are S till Having Nightmares.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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296 Pelosi, Nancy. 1993. “Continued Unempl oyment Concerns.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Pelosi, Nancy. 1994. “Health Care Crisis: Many Americans are One Paycheck Away from Being Uninsured.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Pelosi, Nancy. 1995. “Let Us Have Truth About Social Security.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Penny, Timothy. 1993. “No More Busi ness as Usual.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Percy, Charles. 1978a. “Future of Trucking Deregulation.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Percy, Charles. 1978b. “Support for Panama Canal Treaties.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Percy, Charles. 1981. “Proposed Arms Sales.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Perkins, Carl. 1982. “We Should Lear n From History.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Peterson, Douglas. 1992. “America’s Forgotten Allies: The Veterans of South Vietnamese Army.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Peterson, David, Lawrence Grossback, James S timson, and Amy Gangl. 2003. “Congressional Response to Mandate Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 47.3 (July): 411-426. Petri, Thomas. 1982. “Resolution Introduced to Proclaim March 21, 1982, as Afghanistan Day.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Petri, Thomas. 1990. “A Misleading Standard of Comparison in Education.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Peyser, Peter. 1982. “Deficits Mu st be Reduced.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. .

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297 Pickett, Owen. 1991. “United States Needs a Po licy for Energy Independence.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Pickle, James. 1982. “Social Security Student Benefits.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Pickle, James. 1983. “Social Security Issue Not Yet Settled.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Pomeroy, Earl. 1993. “Larry Villella, a 14-Year-Old Patriot.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Pomeroy, Earl. 1995. “A Need to Specify Where the Cuts Take Place.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Porter, John. 1988. “The Continuing Resolu tion: The Gipper Won’t Sign it and the Budget Clock is Running.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Powell, Richard. 1999. “Going Public Revisite d: Presidential Speechmaking and the Bargain Setting in Congress.” Congress and the Presidency 26 (Fall): 171-191. Pressler, Larry. 1990. “Middle East Military Base.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Pressler, Larry. 1992. “A Challenge to Act.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Price, David. 1993. “This is the Moment.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Price, David. 1994. “Health Care: Time for Change.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1978. “Genocid e and Human Rights.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1979a. “Youth and Minority Unemployment.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. .

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298 Proxmire, William. 1979b. “Ratification of the Genocide Convention.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1979c. “The Cities’ Increas ing Dependence on Federal Aid.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1980a. “The Economic Effect s of Sanctions Against the Soviet Union.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1980b. “Now is the Time for a Budget Surplus.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1983a. “Scientists Answer to U.S. First Use of Nuclear Bomb Policy.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1983b. “Why We Need Fl exibility on Both Sides in Nuclear Arms Reduction Talks.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1984a. “Facts on th e Nuclear Arms Buildup.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1984b. “Can We Verify Nuclear Explosions Underground Down Below a Single Kiloton?” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1985. “Can Massive Deficits Lead the Way to Permanent Prosperity?” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1986a. “The Terrible Cons equences of a Reasonable Economic Forecast.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1986b. “Could the Reagan Initiative on Underground Nuke Testing Advance Arms Control?” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. .

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299 Proxmire, William. 1986c. “Star Wars Will Devast ate More Essential Research.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1986d. “Yes, the Massive Federal Deficits Are Our Prime Economic Problem.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1987a. “The Reagan Admini stration: An Arms Co ntrol Disaster.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1987b. “Yes, The Time for Doom and Gloom Has Come.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1987c. “Why Arms Control is E ssential to National Security.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1988a. “Mission of Arms C ontrol: To Strengthen Nuclear Deterrence.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1988b. “Is U.S. Econo mic Policy Torpedoing Our NATO Allies?” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1988c. “How Do We Br ing Democracy to Nicaragua?” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Proxmire, William. 1988d. “Women in the Milit ary – Time for a Change.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Pryor, David. 1992. “The Defense Budget.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Pryor, David. 1993. “Empower America.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Pursell, Carl. 1990. “Elementary Sc hool Counseling Act.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. .

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300 Quirk, Paul, and Nesmith, Bruce. 2000. “Divided Government and Policymaking: Negotiating the Laws.” The Presidency and the Political System . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 507-530. Rahall, Nick. 1984. “The Balanced Budget Amendment – A Republican Scapegoat.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Railsback, Thomas. 1978. “Merit Selection of Federal Judges and Prosecutors.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Ramstad, James. 1994. “Abolish New Taxes.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ratchford, William. 1982. “Concerns the President Overlooked.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Ravenel, Arthur. 1990. “Secretary Chen ey Needs Update.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Ray, Richard. 1988. “In Support of Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Ray, Richard. 1991. “Administration’s Overtone to Saddam Hussein is Inappropriate.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Reagan, Ronald. 1981. “State of th e Union Address.” 18 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 13 February 2006. . Reagan, Ronald. 1982. “State of the Union Address.” 26 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 18 February 2006. . Reagan, Ronald. 1983. “State of the Union Address.” 25 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 23 February 2006. . Reagan, Ronald. 1984. “State of the Union Address.” 25 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 23 February 2006. .

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301 Reagan, Ronald. 1985. “State of th e Union Address.” 6 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 26 February 2006. . Reagan, Ronald. 1986. “State of th e Union Address.” 4 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 2 March 2006. . Reagan, Ronald. 1987. “State of the Union Address.” 27 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 6 March 2006. . Reagan, Ronald. 1988. “State of the Union Address.” 25 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript . 10 March 2006. Regula, Ralph. 1980. “The Other Budget.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Reid, Harry. 1991. “War Patience.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Reid, Harry. 1994. “The State of the Union.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Reid, Harry. 1994. “America’s Health Care in Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Reuss, Henry. 1982. “President Reagan, Meet President Hoover.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Reynolds, Mel. 1993. “President Clinto n’s Economic Plan.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Richardson, Lillian and Michael Munger. 1990. “Shirking, Repr esentation, and Congressional Behavior: Voting on the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act.” Public Choice 67: 1133. Richardson, William. 1986. “The Stat e of the Union.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Richardson, William. 1991. “Administration’s Budget: Nothing But Smoke and Mirrors.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. .

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302 Richardson, William. 1993a. “President C linton Hit a Home Run.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Richardson, William. 1993b. “The Presid ent’s Economic Plan.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Richardson, William. 1994a. “Crime Bill is No Place for Partisanship.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Richardson, William. 1994b. “America’s Goal in H ealth Care Reform: To Provide Security for American Families.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Richardson, William. 1995. “Different Appro aches to a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Richmond, Frederick. 1978. “Congressmen Rich mond Meets with Farmers.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Ridge, Tom. 1986. “President’s Budget Eliminates the UDAG Program.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Ridge, Tom. 1990. “Republican Task Force Pr otects Social Securit y.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Riegle, Donald. 1994. “Health Ca re Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Ritter, Donald. 1991a. “We Need an Energy Strategy.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Ritter, Donald. 1991b. “Japan is in the Big Leagues Now.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Ritter, Donald. 1992. “The President Has Given us a Blueprint for Economic Recovery.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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303 Rivers, Douglas and Nancy Rose. 1985. “Passing th e President’s Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 29.2: 183-196. Roberts, Herbert. 1978. “Americans Buried in the Panama Canal Zone.” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexisnexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>. Rockefeller, John. 1993. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Roemer, Timothy. 1993. “Good Programs, Spe nding Cuts, and Reform of Congress.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Rohde, David. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Rohrabacher, Dana. 1992. “Democrats Complain and Play Politics While American Economy Sinks and People Suffer.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Rohrabacher, Dana. 1993. “What President Clin ton Says Really Means.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Rohrabacher, Dana. 1996. “President Has No t Kept His Promises.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Roth, William. 1978. “President’s Tax Cuts Will Not Offset Tax Increases.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Roth, William. 1981. “Time for Governme nt to Cut Back.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Roth, William. 1993. “State of the Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Rowland, John. 1987. “The Message of the Presiden t is Clear: Let Us Get on With the Work Facing This Historic C ongress.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. .

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304 Rudd, Eldon. 1979. “U.S. Credibility Rests on Ac tion to Honor Defense Commitments to the Republic of China.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Rudd, Eldon. 1980. “The President’s Proposed 1981 Federal Budget is a Fiscal Disaster.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Rush, Bobby. 1993. “Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Sanford, Terry. 1990a. “The Pres ident’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 5 April 2006. . Sanford, Terry. 1990b. “Air Force Units from No rth Carolina Participate in Operation Just Cause.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Santorum, Rick. 1993. “More Budg et Cuts.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Sarpalius, William. 1991. “My Vision: Ma ke America a Better Place to Live For Our Children.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Sarpalius, William. 1993. “We Have to Change the Direction in Which Our Country is Going.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Sasser, James. 1978a. “Farmers Deserve Our Support.” 20 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexis-nexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>. Sasser, James. 1978b. “True Tax Reform.” 20 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Sasser, James. 1987a. “The Lack of Cata strophic Health Insurance.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Sasser, James. 1987b. “Catastrophic Health Care for the Elderly.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Saxton, Hugh. 1990a. “Money Laundering Bill.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. .

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305 Saxton, Hugh. 1990b. “Fifty-five Percent of Our Armed Services Are Made Up of Either Reservists or Guardsmen.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Saxton, Hugh. 1994. “New Jersey is Op en for Business.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Schiff, Steven. 1990. “A Proposed Reduction of Social Security Revenues.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Schlesinger, Arthur. 1973. The Imperial Presidency . New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Schroeder, Patricia. 1981a. “Our Allies Must Also Do More in Defense.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1981b. “NATO Must Do More.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1981c. “A Balanced Budget Remains Elusive.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1984. “Reagan is Sending Hi s Bills to Our Kids – They Cannot Vote.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1987. “Zero Arms Cont rol Agreements Under President Reagan.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1992. “Romer Rains on Bush’s Blue-Sky Budget.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1995a. “Take a L ook Under the Hood of the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1995b. “Time to End Freebie Culture.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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306 Schroeder, Patricia. 1995c. “Getting Tough on Child Support Enforcement.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1996a. “Holdi ng the Nation Hostage.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Schroeder, Patricia. 1996b. “Campaign Reform.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Schulze, Richard. 1987. “The Blue Collar ITC.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1987. “A Fumble by the Gipper.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1991. “America Must Rally Support for Israel’s Cause and Security.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1992. “Great Speech, Wrong Audience.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1993a. “Put up or Shut up.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1993b. “Pass Safe Sc hools Act and Brady Bill.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1995. “Protecting Social Se curity in a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1996a. “Holding Debt Ceiling Hostage is Bad Politics.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1996b. “Dumb and Much Dumber.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Schumer, Charles. 1996c. “The Meani ng of our Current Debate.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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307 Scott, Robert. 1994. “Urging a Responsible Debate on Crime.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Seastrand, Andrea. 1995. “Gridlock.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Seastrand, Andrea. 1996. “Actions Speak Louder than Words.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Seiberling, John. 1984. “The Presid ent’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Sensenbrenner, Frank. 1981. “Generation Skipping Tax Relief Act.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Sensenbrenner, Frank. 1993. “Support the Brady Bill.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Seymour, John. 1992. “A Message of Hope and Optimism.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Shannon, James. 1983. “High Technology Trade Act of 1983.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Shaw, Eugene. 1990. “Fraudulen t Free Medical Screening Test s for Senior Citizens.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Shaw, Eugene. 1993. “Time to End the Luxury Tax on Boatbuilding.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Shays, Christopher. 1996a. “Balancing the Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Shays, Christopher. 1996b. “Getting our Fi nancial House in Order.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. .

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308 Shull, Steven and Lance LeLoup. 1981. “Reassessing the Reassessment: Comment on Sigelman’s Note on the ‘Two Presidencies’ Thesis.” The Journal of Politics 43.2 (May): 563564. Shumway, Norman. 1987. “President Reagan is No Lame Duck.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Shuster, E.G. 1980. “President Carter’s Budget.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Shuster, E.G. 1980. “Carter Tax Burden Hi ghest in Peacetime History.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Sigelman, Lee. 1979. “A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis.” The Journal of Politics 41.1 (November): 1195-1205. Sigelman, Lee and Pamela Johnston Conover. 1981. “The Dynamics of Presidential Support during International Conflict Situations: The Iranian Hostage Crisis.” Political Behavior 3.4: 303-318. Sikes, Robert. 1978a. “The Farmers’ Bill for the 100-percent Parity.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. . Sikes, Robert. 1978b. “The Continuing Contro versy over the Canal Treaty.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. . Sikes, Robert. 1978c. “Wasteful and U nnecessary Destruction.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. . Sikes, Robert. 1978d. “A Further Effort to Assist the Farmer.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Sikorski, Gerald. 1984. “The Pres ident’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Simon, Paul. 1984. “United States-S oviet Relations.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Simon, Paul. 1993. “President Clinton’s Stat e of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. .

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309 Simon, Paul. 1996. “Student Loans a nd Corporate Welfare.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Simpson, Alan. 1990. “The President’s Stat e of the Union Address.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Simpson, Alan. 1991. “Global Warming.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Simpson, Alan. 1992. “President Bush’s Stat e of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Simpson, Alan. 1993. “The President’ s Economic Program.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 22, 2006. . Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. Unorthodox Lawmaking . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Sinclair, Barbara. 2004. “Patriotism, Partis anship, and Institutional Protection: The Congressional Response to 9/11.” In Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism , ed. Richard Conley. New York: Prentice Hall, 121134. Skaggs, David. 1987. “Past Time for a Nucl ear Test Moratorium.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Skaggs, David. 1992. “Honesty, Please , Mr. President.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Skaggs, David. 1994. “No Health Care Crisis?” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Skaggs, David. 1995. “Spell Out Plan for Balanced Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Skowronek, Stephen. 2002. The Politics Presidents Make . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Slattery, James. 1984a. “State of the Union Message.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. .

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310 Slattery, James. 1984b. “Commonsense in Federal Budgeting.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Slattery, James. 1988. “Calling on the President to Withdraw His Request for Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Slattery, James. 1992. “Tax Withholding, A R ude Surprise for Taxpayers.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Slattery, James. 1993. “Commending the Presiden t for Leadership in Cutting the Deficit.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Slaughter, Daniel. 1986. “The President’s Propo sal for Catastrophic Coverage.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Slaughter, Daniel. 1988. “Lessons fro m Iran-Contra Affair.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Smith, Lamar. 1988. “Further Contra Aid Would Continue Pressure on Or tega.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Smith, Lamar. 1993a. “The Largest Ta x Hike in History.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Smith, Lamar. 1993b. “Unplug the Sp ending Machine.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Smith, Lamar. 1993c. “Financing Ca mpaign Promises.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Smith, Lamar. 1994. “Mr. Clinton Should Meet Mr. Kuenstler.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Smith, Lamar. 1996a. “The Two Clintons: Rhetoric vs. Reality.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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311 Smith, Lamar. 1996b. “Supporting Immi gration Reform.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Smith, Lamar. 1996c. “Ballistic Missile Defense.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Smith, Lawrence. 1990a. “Global Warming and President Bush.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Smith, Lawrence. 1990b. “Federal Retirees – Not Social Security Recipients – In Jeopardy.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Smith, Lawrence. 1991a. “America Must Not Fo rget Who Its Enemies Are.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Smith, Lawrence. 1991b. “What Kind of Count ry Will Our Troops Come Home to?” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Smith, Lawrence. 1992a. “President’s State of the Union Message: No Whole Cloth, Only Bandaids.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Smith, Lawrence. 1992b. “The United Stat es-Japan Relationship.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Smith, Nick. 1996a. “Limiting Increase in Marketable Debt.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Smith, Nick. 1996b. “Budget Impasse.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Smith, Nick. 1996c. “The Dangers of Threatening Default.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Smith, Nick. 1997. “A Proposal to Keep So cial Security Solvent.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. .

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312 Smith, Robert. 1984. “Action Needed to R ecall Marines from Lebanon.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Smith, Robert. 1993. “State of the Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Smith, Virginia. 1987. “Legislation to Promote Ta x Fairness for Farmers, Ranchers, and Small Businesses.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Smith, Virginia. 1988. “Diesel Fuel Exci se Tax Collection Bill.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Snowbarger, Vincent. 1997. “Support a Consti tutional Amendment to Require a Balanced Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Solomon, Gerald. 1980. “President’s 1981 B udget Still Not Balanced.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Solomon, Gerald. 1982. “Legislation Dealing with Draft Registrati ons.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Solomon, Gerald. 1987. “President Reagan Sti ll a Rallying Point for the American People.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Solomon, Gerald. 1991. “Real Nobility is in Our Armed Forces in the Gulf.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Solomon, Gerald. 1993. “Shortfall in Presiden tial Deficit-Cutting Goal.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Solomon, Gerald. 1995. “How to Shri nk the Federal Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Souder, Mark. 1995. “Urging the Passage of the Balanced Budget Amendment with the Supermajority Provision.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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313 Souder, Mark. 1997. “The Balanced Budget Ame ndment and Social Security.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Sparkman, John. 1978. “Proposed Arms Sales.” 20 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexis-nexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>. Specter, Arlen. 1992. “Focusing on the Economic Problems.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Specter, Arlen. 1994. “Health Care.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Stabenow, Deborah. 1997. “Creating Opportun ities for our Children.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Stallings, Richard. 1992. “Make the Amer ican Dream Live Again.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 15, 2006. . Stark, Fortney. 1995. “The Republican Lead ership and Newtspeak.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Stearns, Cliff. 1992. “Unrealisti c Regulations Will Cost Central Florida Jobs.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Stearns, Cliff. 1993. “President Clinton – Excuses Versus Reality.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Stearns, Cliff. 1994a. “Three Strike s and You’re Out.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Stearns, Cliff. 1994b. “Union County’s Re sponse to Crime.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Stearns, Cliff. 1996a. “Clinton Finally Sees the Light – Finally Agrees to Less Government.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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314 Stearns, Cliff. 1996b. “Let Us Judge Pres ident by Past Performance.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Stearns, Cliff. 1996c. “How Fair Are Our Taxes?.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Steger, Wayne. 1997. “Presiden tial Policy Initiation and the Politics of Agenda Control.” Congress and the Presidency 24: 17-36. Stenholm, Charles. 1983. “Pilot Program in Air Force for Critical Family Housing Shortages.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Stevens, Theodore. 1978a. “Alaskan Oil Trims Foreign Fuel Imports.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Stevens, Theodore. 1978b. “Alaskan O il Cuts Import Demands.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Stevens, Theodore. 1978c. “Energy Policy Developments.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Stevens, Theodore. 1980a. “The President Speaks Loudly and Carri es a Small Stick.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Stevens, Theodore. 1980b. “The Olympic Games.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Stevens, Theodore. 1980c. “Comments on th e President’s Fiscal Year 1981 Budget.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Stevens, Theodore. 1980d. “American Personnel in Iran.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Stewart, Donald. 1980. “The 1980 Olympics.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Stratton, Samuel. 1978. “House Armed Servic es Staff Study Proves U.S. Missile Force Vulnerable by 1981.” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexis-nexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>.

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315 Stickland, Ted. 1994. “The Insurance I ndustry’s Commericals.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Stupak, Bart. 1995. “Truth-in-Budgeting Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Stupak, Bart. 1996a. “Appeal for a Clean Debt Limit Extension.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Stupak, Bart. 1996b. “Financial Credibility.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Sundquist, James. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System . Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute. Sundquist, James. 1992. Constitutional Reform and Effective Government . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute. Sullivan, Terry. 1991. “The Bank Account Presid ency: A New Measure on the Temporal Path of Presidential Influence.” American Journal of Political Science 35: 686-723. Swett, Richard. 1993. “Cutting the Nation’s Budge t Deficit Should be like a New England Barn Raising.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Swindall, Patrick. 1987. “The Pres ident’s Agenda.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Symms, Steven. 1983. “Fair Trade.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Tallon, Robert. 1987. “The Taxpayers ’ Bill of Rights.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Talmadge, Herman. 1978a. “Panam a Canal Treaties.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Talmadge, Herman. 1978b. “America’ s Farm Crisis.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Thomas, Craig. 1990. “Keeping Promises to the American People.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. .

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316 Thomas, Craig. 1992. “Move Forward With Pres ident’s Economic Program.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Thomas, Craig. 1993. “Country Needs Strong Dose of Bilateral Credibility.” 22 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Thomas, Craig. 1994a. “A Shorter St ate of the Union.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Thomas, Craig. 1994b. “What a Difference.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Thomas, Craig. 1996a. “The Successes of the Past Year.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Thomas, Craig. 1996b. “Consistency in Leadership.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Thomas, Craig. 1997. “Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Thurber, James. 1991. Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Thurber, James. 1991. “Represe ntation, Accountability, and Effici ency in Divided Government Control.” PS: Political Science and Politics 24.4 (December): 653-657. Thurmond, Strom. 1978. “Competition in the Coal Industry.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. . Thurmond, Strom. 1981. “Study on Soviet Attitude on Military Equivalence.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Thurmond, Strom. 1990. “In Support of the Army’s Light Forces Initiatives.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Thurmond, Strom. 1991. “President Bush’s Dr ug Control Strategy for 1991.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. .

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317 Thurmond, Strom. 1992. “President Bush’s State of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Tiahrt, Todd. 1995. “Give People Change.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Tiahrt, Todd. 1996. “State of th e Union Analysis.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Torricelli, Robert. 1990. “More Ac tion, Fewer Studies.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Traficant, James. 1987a. “President Reagan Would Have Us March Without Boots and Without Food in Our Stomachs.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Traficant, James. 1987b. “A Dangerous Precedent in Health Care.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Traficant, James. 1988. “Let Us Rememb er the American People.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Traficant, James. 1990. “More on the Iran-Contra Scandal.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Traficant, James. 1990. “It Worked for Sears, Roebuck, Why Not for Uncle Sam?” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Traficant, James. 1991a. “Big Oil Comp anies Party All Night Long.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Traficant, James. 1991b. “Thoughts on the President’s Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 12, 2006. . Traficant, James. 1993. “Bipartisanship Means Support for President Clinton’s Programs.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Traficant, James. 1994a. “Our C ountry Needs Jobs.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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318 Traficant, James. 1994b. “Jobs – The R eal Four-Letter Word.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Traficant, James. 1995a. “Americans Guilty Unt il Proven Innocent on Disputes with the IRS.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Traficant, James. 1995b. “No Mo re Aid to Russia.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Traficant, James. 1996. “D eals, Deals.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Troldahl, Verling. 1966. “A Field Test of a Modified ‘Two-Step Flow of Communication’ Model.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 30.4 (Winter): 609-623. Tucker, Walter. 1993a. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Tucker, Walter. 1993b. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Speech.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Tucker, Walter. 1993c. “In Support of the Brady Bill.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006. . Tucker, Walter. 1995. “Congress Must Balanc e the Budget, but do it the Right Way.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Tulis, Jeffrey. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency . Princeton: Princeton University Press. U.S. Election Atlas. http://www.uselectionatlas .org/RESULTS/index.html Upton, Frederick. 1996. “Getting our Financial House in Order.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Valentine, Tim. 1987. “Battling the School Dropout Problem.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. .

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319 Vanik, Charles. 1978. “Administration’s Tax Reduction and Tax Reform Package Should Not be Tied Together.” 23 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 February. . Vanik, Charles. 1979. “Welcome News on Fr eedom of Emigration.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Vanik, Charles. 1980. “Shifti ng Tax Burdens.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Vento, Bruce. 1988. “Just Say ‘No’ To More Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Vento, Bruce. 1996. “Cuts in Education Funding Could Result in Human Deficit.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Visclosky, Peter. 1988. “Disdain for Law Note d in the Iran-Contra Affair.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Visclosky, Peter. 1990. “The ‘Si gn’ President.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Visclosky, Peter. 1994. “The Health Care Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1981a. “The President’s Message.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1981b. “Suggested Study of the Administration’s Economic Program.” 25 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1982. “Discharge Petition fo r House Joint Resolution 149, Balanced Budget.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1985. “Mr. Stockman H eaps Further Abuse on American Farmers.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1986. “Missouri Land-Gran t Colleges Victimized by President’s Budget Cuts.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. .

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320 Volkmer, Harold. 1994. “Three Strike s and You’re Out.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1995a. “Feel Good Resolution.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1995b. “Introduction of the Welfare to Self-Sufficiency Act of 1995.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1996a. “Let Us Tell the Truth.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1996b. “Do-Nothing Congress.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1996c. “Now is the Time to Work Together to Raise the Debt Ceiling.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Volkmer, Harold. 1996d. “A Balanced Budget.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Vucanovich, Barbara. 1984. “Considering a Li ne-item Veto Amendment.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Vucanovich, Barbara. 1987. “Vucanovich Supports President’s State of the Union Address.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Waldholtz, Enid. 1995a. “Urging the President to Help Implem ent Reforms Contained in the Contract with America.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Waldholtz, Enid. 1995b. “Keeping the Promise.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1981a. “Congress Should Not Break Ranks with the Workingman.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1981b. “Reagan Tax Program Does Not Help the Rich and Soak the Poor.” 23 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 Fe bruary 2006. .

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321 Walker, Robert. 1982. “Two Outlooks on America.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1984a. “School Prayer Constitutional Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1984b. “Things We Could Do Today.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1986a. “The Empty Barrel Emits Strange Noises.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1986b. “Congress Should Spend Nece ssary Time to Legislate Responsbily.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1987. “Democrats Ar e For More Taxes.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1990. “Comments on Democr atic Speeches of Today.” 7 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1991a. “We Should Be More than a Little Suspicious.” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1991b. “Democrats Want a Socialist Budget.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1992. “Congress Should Put Aside Partisanship and Do What is Right for America.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1993a. “Trust, but Verify.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1993b. “Extension of Un employment Benefits.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1994. “A Real Crime Fight.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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322 Walker, Robert. 1995. “The Real Agenda.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Walker, Robert. 1996. “What the Debate is About.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Wallop, Malcolm. 1979. “The Latest Estimates of Soviet Strategic Strength.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Walsh, James. 1993. “The Devil is in the Details.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006. . Ward, Michael. 1995. “Restoring Public’s Trust in the House.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Waters, Maxine. 1992. “State of the Union Address: Warmed Over Reaganomics.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Watkins, Wesley. 1987. “Action Urged to End Unfair Trade Practices.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Watt, Melvin. 1993. “Time to Stop Being Pe nnywise and Pound Foolish.” 18 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Watt, Melvin. 1995a. “The 100 Day Nightmare.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Watt, Melvin. 1995b. “Republican Cont ract with America.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Watt, Melvin. 1995c. “What Ever Happe ned to our Gift Ban?” 30 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Weaver, James. 1984a. “Problems with th e Grace Commission’s Report.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Weaver, James. 1984b. “The Budget is Out of Control.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. .

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323 Weber, John. 1984. “Budget Hypocrisy Honor Roll.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006. . Weber, John. 1986. “March 1 Sequestration Orde r is a Bad Way to Reduce the Deficit.” 6 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Weicker, Lowell. 1980. “A Call for Reducti on in OPEC Oil Imports.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1979. “Eliminating School Asbestos Hazards.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1980. “The Issue of Inflation is About to Become a Great National Issue.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1981. “Ronald Reag an’s Proposal.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1982. “Special Order on Reagan Budget Cuts as They Impact on Children.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1986. “Mr. President, Please End the Fantasy.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1987. “Nucl ear Testing.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1988. “Contra Aid and the Iran-Contra Scandal.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Weiss, Theodore. 1988. “Contra Atrocities.” 2 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Weldon, Theodore. 1987. “Working with the President on His Agenda.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 22 2006. .

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324 Weldon, Theodore. 1993. “Democrats Should Get Specific.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. Ap ril 20, 2006. . Weldon, Theodore. 1996. “Increase in Debt Ce iling Must be Linked to Balanced Budget Commitment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Weller, Gerald. 1995. “Actions Speak Louder Than Words.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Whittaker, Robert. 1980. “Update on the Whittaker Resolution.” 28 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. “The Two Presidencies.” Trans-Action 4 (December). Wilson, Charles. 1979. “Commemorating 30th Anniversary of NATO Alliance.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Wilson, Charles. 1980. “Nuclear Fuel Needed for Weapons Modernization.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Wirth, Timothy. 1981. “President Reagan Should Not be Penny Wise and Pound Foolish in Budget Cuts.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Wirth, Timothy. 1988. “Ozone Layer Threatened.” 1 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. March 29 2006. . Wise, Robert. 1992. “Support the Emergency Unem ployment Compensation Bill.” 4 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. . Wise, Robert. 1994. “The Health Care Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Wise, Robert. 1997. “Support my Balanced Budget Substitute Amendment to the Constitution.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Wood, B. Dan and Jeffrey Peake. 1998. “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting.” American Political Science Review 92.1 (March): 173-184.

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325 Woolf, Lester. 1980. “People’s Republic of China.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006. . Woolsey, Lynn. 1995a. “Keeping Americans in the Dark About the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Woolsey, Lynn. 1995b. “Majority Urged to Join in Fight to Clean up Congress.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Woolsey, Lynn. 1995c. “Child Support.” 31 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Woolsey, Lynn. 1996a. “Education.” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Woolsey, Lynn. 1996b. “Dangerous Cuts in Education.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006. . Wright, James. 1981. “United States Must be Made Energy Independent Again.” 19 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006. . Wyden, Ronald. 1986. “Let Us Reject the Double Standard on the Issue of Government Waste.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006. . Wylie, Chalmers. 1979. “Federal Sp ending Legislation.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006. . Wynn, Albert. 1993. “In Support of President Clinton’s Economic Stimulus and Deficit Reduction Program.” 24 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006. . Wynn, Albert. 1995a. “The Greatest Incentive to Work in America is the Ability to Earn a Decent Wage.” 25 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Wynn, Albert. 1995b. “Haste Makes Waste.” 26 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. . Wynn, Albert. 1996. “Why Do We Not Ha ve a Budget Deal?” 24 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006. .

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326 Wynn, Albert. 1997. “Focus on Education in the 21st Century.” 5 February. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006. . Yates, Sidney. 1982a. “Unemployment Insuranc e and Employment Services.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Yates, Sidney. 1982b. “Job Services Offices to Close.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Zablocki, Clement. 1982. “Let Poland be Pola nd: A Day of Solidarity with the People of Poland.” 27 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006. . Zarefsky, David. 2002. “The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership.” In The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership , ed. Leroy Dorsey. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Zeliff, William. 1992. “Let Congress Get to Wo rk and Get Something Done.” 29 January. Congressional Record . Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006. .

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327 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Allison Joann Clark was born and raised in Brooksville, Florida. She attended Hernando High School, where she was a third-generation gr aduate, as well as valedictorian. Allison pursued her Bachelor’s degree at the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida where she initially studied journalism before deciding on political science. After graduating magna cum laude with a Bachelor’s degree in political scienc e, Allison attended the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida for graduate work. Upon co mpletion of her Ph.D. in political science, Allison hopes to gain employment teaching full time at a four-year university.