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The Challenge of Cattle Ranching to Common Property: A Case Study in the Isoso, Bolivia

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Title:
The Challenge of Cattle Ranching to Common Property: A Case Study in the Isoso, Bolivia
Creator:
VILLASENOR, VERONICA ( Author, Primary )
Copyright Date:
2008

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Subjects / Keywords:
Agricultural land ( jstor )
Cattle ( jstor )
Cattle ranching ( jstor )
Communities ( jstor )
Indigenous peoples ( jstor )
Joint ownership ( jstor )
Land use ( jstor )
Livestock ( jstor )
Mennonite ( jstor )
Natural resources ( jstor )

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University of Florida
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Copyright Veronica Villasenor. Permission granted to University of Florida to digitize and display this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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Full Text











THE CHALLENGE OF CATTLE RANCHING TO COMMON PROPERTY: A CASE
STUDY INT THE ISOSO, BOLIVIA.

















By

VERONICA VILLASENOR


A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
2007

































Copyright 2007

by

Veronica Villasenor






























To Diego and Laura, whose love made life more meaningful. They have been my
inspiration to believe in conservation and development as an alternative for a better world
for them and the next generation. This dedication is also for my family, Elisa(s), Laura
and Carlos, whose love and support have been always unconditional. To the Isosefio-
Guarani people who introduced me to part of their Nandereko.









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to my thesis committee. Grenville Barnes, Carmen Diana Deere and

Ignacio Porzecanski for their guidance and patience. To Ignacio Porzecanski for the

intellectual support he provided and for his helpful advice. Thanks to Andrew Noss for

his willingness to step in at short notice to read this thesis.

Thanks also to my children Diego and Laura, without their love I would not have

survived this process. Special thanks to Cece Noss who has supported my writing over

the first drafts.

My studies in Gainesville were founded by Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS),

and a Tropical Conservation and Development Program (TCD) Fellowship supported me

during part of write-up process.

In Bolivia, there are so many people to thank. Thanks to WCS, Capitania del Alto

y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the Ivi lyambae Foundation for facilitating my research and to

Andy Noss, Zulema Barahona, Oscar Castillo, Erick Eulert, Jose Avila and Veronica

Calderon for their valuable advice. In Isoso I would like to thank Felicia, Juanita,

Isadora, Crecencio, Ilda. Thanks to WCS and CABI administrative team.




















TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENT S .............. .................... iv


LI ST OF T ABLE S ............ ...... ._._ .............._ viii.


LI ST OF FIGURE S .............. .................... ix


AB S TRAC T ......_ ................. ............_........x


CHAPTER


1 INTRODUCTION ................. ...............1.......... ......


Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the Isoso............... ...............1..
Research Questions............... ...............2
M ethods ................ ...............3...
Structure of the Thesis............... ...............5.


2 COMMON PROPERTY AND THE EXPANSION OF CATTLE RANCHING:
LITERATURE REVIEW ................. ...............8.......... ......


Security of Tenure and Property Rights Arguments............... ...... ...........
The Common Property Argument and Community-Based Conservation ..................1 1
Common Property and Indigenous People ................. ...............16........... ...
Factors Favoring the Expansion of Cattle Ranching ................. ................. ...._20
Increase in Consumption ................. .... ... ..............2
Market-Driven Changes in Production Practices .............. .....................2
Live stock Production-Geographic Shift ................. .............. ......... .....24
Governm ent Incentives.................... ... ... ... .....................2
Cattle Ranching as a Complement to the Rural Livelihood Strategy of the
Poor ................ ....... ... ..... ........... .............2
National Context and Bolivian Lowlands................ ...............2


3 THE ISOSO AND STAKEHOLDERS .....__.....___ ..........__ ...........3


The Isoso and the Gran Chaco ............ ......__ ...............30.
The Guarani Isosefio Communities .............. .... ...............36..
The Guarani Way of Life : The Nandereko ......___ ..... ... ._ ........._.....3 7
Guarani-Isoseno Communities .............. ...............38....
The Isoso frontier ............. ..............38.....











The Alto Isoso .............. ...............39....
The Central Isoso ................ ...............39...
The CorazC~n Hist6rico del Isoso ................. ...............39...............
The Karai-Isoso ................. ...............41.................
The Bajo Isoso............... ...............42.
Returning to Isoso .............. ...............42....
Land Use in Guarani Isoso .............. .... ..... .............4
CABI, the Guarani Isosefio Political Organization .............. ....................4
Other Stakeholders............... ........... ........4
Cattle Ranches and Agro-Industry .............. ...............48....
M ennonites .............. ...............49....
Peasants or Small Farmers............... ...............51
Institutional Stakeholders ............ .....__ ......__ .......... 5

4 THE ISOSENTO IVI IYAMBAE AS COMMON PROPERTY ................ ...............54


Nandereko: Nature and Characteristics of the Group ............ ..... .._.__............55
Moa: Space and Natural Resources Use and Boundaries..........._.._..... ......_.._.. .....58
Tekoata and Mbaapo: Institutional Arrangements and Normative Regime ...............62
R ules ................ ... .... .. ..... .............6
Monitoring and Sanctions lyamnbae .................. ....___ ......___...........6
Collective Arrangement and Conflict Resolution .............. ....................6
Neemoai: Relationships between the Group and External Forces ................... ...........66
Contrasting the Common Property (CPR) and Community-Base Management
(CBM) Framework to the Mba~yu ......__...._.__._ ......._._. ...........7

5 CATTLE RANCHING IN ISOSO .............. ...............73....


The Expansion of Cattle Ranching in Isoso ..................... .......................... 7
The Conquest of Original Peoples' Territories "La Conquista de la Vaca"........74
Modernization: Cattle Ranching Subsidized by the Bolivian State ....................75
Big Proj ects and the Cattle Raising Incentive Among Isosefios ................... ......76
The Isosefios Cattle Ranching ............... ...............77....
The Individual Cattle Ownership Regime ................. .......___ .........__ ..78
The Semi Private-family System ............... ... .......___.....__ ............8
The Isosefio Cattle Communal Ownership System ................ .........__ .......80
Land Use by Cattle Ranching Ownership Regime and Management System ....83
The Private Landholders in the Isoso .............. ...............84....
Individual Cattle Ranching System ................ ...............85........._....
The Mennonite System ........._.._.. ........ ...............86......
Ecological and Socioeconomic Effects .............. ...............88....

6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS............... .............9


APPENDIX FIELD QUESTIONNAIRE .............. ...............98....

LI ST OF REFERENCE S ....._.._................. ........_.._.........11












BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................. ...............111......... ......


















LIST OF TABLES


Table pg

1-1 Total Interviews............... ...............

2-1 Different Types of Property Regimes. ........._.._.. ........._.. ......11_._. ...

2-2 Population, Land and Cattle Herd in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)
Contrasting to World Indexes. ............. ...............23.....

2-3 Cattle Ranching Systems of Meat Production ................. ................. ..........23

3-1 Population in the Communities of Isoso. ................ ................. ..............40

3-2 Main Land Use in Isoso, per Sub-zones. ...._.._.._ .... .._._. ........_..........4

3-3 Private Stakeholders, Not-Isosefio Owners, in the Isoso. ............. ....................48

3-4 Mennonite System in the Isoso. ............. ...............51.....

5-1 Number of Isosefios Owners and Number of Head of Cattle by Type of Property
Regime by Community in Isoso. ......___ ... .....___ ....___ ...........7

5-2 Distribution of Individual Cattle Ownership .......__ ..........__ ........._.__.....79

5-3 Family System in Isoso. ............. ...............81.....

5-4 Cattle Ranching Proj ects. ................ ...............82..___.. ....

5-5 Number of Head of Cattle and Land Use by Ownership Regime and
Management System in the Guarani-Isoso ................. .............. ......... .....83

5-6 Cattle Ranching Systems Non-Guarani Isosefio in the Isoso ................. ...............84

5-7 Demographic and Productive Characteristics of Mennonite Colonies in the
Isoso. ............ ..................87.


















LIST OF FIGURES


Figure pg

1-1 Map of the Isoso and the Kaa lya National Park in the Santa Cruz Gran Chaco.......2

2-1 Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights and Potential Role of the M~bayu. .............9

2-2 The Common Property and Community Based Resource Management
Fram work. ............. ...............13.....

2-3 Distribution of Poor Livestock Keepers Worldwide. .........._.._. ........_.. ........26

3-1 Location of the Communities in the Alto y Baj o Isoso............._ .........._ .....3 1

3-2 Annual Rainfall in Charagua. .............. ...............32....

3-3 Map of the TCO-Isoso and Location of Different Stakeholders ................... ...........35

3-4 Land Use in the Frontier and Alto Isoso (Sub-zone 1 & 2). ............. ...................46

3-5 Land Use in the Central, Historic Heart and Kara and Bajo Isoso (Sub-zone3, 4
and 5) ............... ...............46...

4-1 Guarani-Isosefio Strategically Vision-M~bayu .............. ...............56....

4-2 Guarani Isosefio Strategically Planning Based on Mba~yu Contrasting to
Common Property and Community Base Management Theories............................71

4-3 Contrasting the Garani Isosefio M~bayu and Common Property and Community-
Base Framework. ............. ...............72.....

6-1 A Cattle Ranching Strategy based on the Guarani Isosefio Mbayu. ........................92
















Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

THE CHALLENGE OF CATTLE RANCHING TO COMMON PROPERTY:
A CASE STUDY INT THE ISOSO, BOLIVIA

By

Veronica Villasenor

May 2007

Chair: Grenville Barnes
Major Department: Latin American Studies

The Isosefios live along the Parapeti River in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia. Like many

other indigenous groups in Latin America, they share a common property territory and their main

organizational structures are well developed. These structures, particularly the communal

asa~mblea~s and the strong inter-institutional links between Capitania delAlto y BajolIsoso

(CABI) and the external world, have allowed them to adapt and incorporate their

economic strategies but still maintain their Nandereko (the Guarani way of life) and the

M~bayu (vision as People).

Cattle ranching is the principal productive activity in the area and it is also the main

ecological concern because it leads to overgrazing. The goal of this research was to

understand the forces contributing to the expansion of cattle ranching in the Isoso as well

as their effects on the Guarani Isosefio's common property institutions and natural

resources. I examined the Guarani-Isosefio institutions based on their M~bayu vision

within the Common Property and Community Based Management frameworks. I










employed individual and group interviews to gather data and participated in several

community meetings. The participant observation approach and research of secondary

documents helped me to understand their living conditions as well as their demographic

and production systems. Through group interviews with community members I explored

issues such as access to natural resources on common land as well as the role of cattle in

the Isosefio's life.

At the community level, the Isosefio people are concerned with problems that

accompany the expansion of cattle ranching, including the increased pressure on land and

natural ecosystems such as the riverine forests. Certain communities are taking specific

decisions to regulate the presence and impact of cattle. Because cattle ranching as a

productive activity was only relatively recently adopted by the Isosefios, it is essential for

them to adapt local institutions and norms, and establish monitoring systems to balance

economic benefits with the maintenance of the ecological integrity of the Chaco

ecosystem.

Cattle-raising will continue to play a part in the Isoso because it complements the

livelihood of the communities, providing protein and income. Cattle ranching can also

contribute to socioeconomic development, and, if the management is sustainable, it could

support a biodiversity conservation strategy in their communal land Tierra Comunitaria

de Origen (TCO) Isoso. In contrast to industrial agriculture with its concomitant

deforestation, cattle-ranching can be a less threatening activity, and for this reason it is

included as a central element in the CABI and Isosefio's development strategy.















CHAPTER 1
INTTRODUCTION

Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the Isoso

The study site of this thesis is the Alto y Bajo Isoso (Isoso) the home of 10,000

Guarani-Isosehio people living in more than 20 communities along the banks of the Parapeti

River (Figure 1-1). Like many other indigenous groups in Latin America, the Isosefios share a

common property territory. I have been connected with the Isoso since the end of 1997

when I began my work as the coordinator of the Kaa lya National Park (KNP)

management plan. The Guarani Isosefio political organization, Capitania delAlto y Bajo

Isoso (CABI), was the leader of that planning process. Since then, my interest in

indigenous peoples has emerged through my analysis of conservation issues. During that

process, planning was viewed as social mobilization because it was focused on the

perspective of those most affected by the protected area administration the local

population. For this reason, I developed a deep concern for the process of conservation

and development in the Bolivian Chaco.

The Isoso and KNP is part of the region of the Gran Chaco in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The

Bolivian Gran Chaco is ecologically significant worldwide because it is one of the few

remaining well conserved dry tropical forests and it protects important endemic species

of flora and fauna (Navarro et al 1998). A regional evaluation made by Nature Serve

(2006) consider the dry Gran Chaco as a priority site for conservation. Cattle ranching is

the principal productive activity in the area (PLUS 1996; CIPCA 1997; CABI 2001) It is










also the main ecological concern because it leads to overgrazing (Saravia Toledo et al.

1996; Navarro 1998, 2002; Taber, Navarro and Arribas 1997).

The obj ective of this research is to understand the forces contributing to the

expansion of cattle ranching in the Isoso as well as their effect on the Guarani Isosefio's

common property institutions and natural resource management.


XpoEaClo~


Figure 1-1. Map of the Isoso and the Kaa lya National Park in the Santa Cruz Gran
Chaco. (Source: Jose Avila, Kaa-lya Project/CABI)

Research Questions

The broad question addressed in my research is whether it is possible to develop a

cattle ranching strategy that is economically, socially and ecologically beneficial to the

Isosefio community. To attempt to answer this, I address several more specific questions:

*What are the factors contributing to expansion of cattle in the Isoso?










* What are the effects of this expansion on common property institutions and natural
resources?

* How does cattle ownership affect access to land and natural resources among the
Isosefios?

* What are the social and ecological costs of expanding cattle ranching in the
community?

* Who is introducing cattle in the communal areas in the Isoso and how is it
influencing other livelihood strategies?

Methods

I have used an ethnographic qualitative method for this research including open-

ended interviews, participant observation and of secondary documents research (Bernard

1994). I adopted an inductive research approach: departing for the field with the research

questions in hand, but once on site maintaining an open mind (Bernard 1994). This

allowed me to deal with dynamic challenges such as the cattle ranching in Isoso. In many

senses I maintained my original questions, although some theoretical and practical

arguments were formulated resulting from encounters with people at the field site and

from the interviews conducted during the summer of 2005 when I visited the Isoso.

More specifically, my research involved the following steps. In Isoso, I participated

in community meetings and in the Isosefio's daily life, so I could understand their living

conditions as well as their demographic and production systems. I employed two

different kinds of interviews, one individual and the other in a group (Table 1-1). I

interviewed people from the following four Isosefio communities: Pikirenda, Rancho

Nuevo, Ivasiriri and Isiporenda. These communities are representatives of the region

(Chapter 4). Through these group interviews with community members I explored issues

such as access to natural resources on the common land as well as the role of cattle in the

Isosefio's life.









Table 1-1. Total Interviews
Community Group Communal Key informant
interview (total Meeting
participants)
Isiporenda 4
Ivasiriri 25 1 2
Rancho Nuevo 15 3
Pikirenda Coropo 20 1 2

Key informant 6
CABI*

Group interviews were conducted in three communities as unstructured surveys.

Each interview was conducted with 15 to 25 members of each community. Due to the

fact that few Isosefios spoke Spanish fluently, the communal captain from Ivasiriri and

Rancho Nuevo translated questions into Guarani and responses were then translated back

into Spanish. These interviews were a quick and effective means of gathering data.

Women were well represented in all the group interviews. For the individual interviews I

interviewed other representatives from CABI, KNP personnel and others involved in

CABI proj ects.

This thesis is not only the result of three months of field research, but also an

accumulation of my experiences and contact with Isosefios' culture. As a CABI-WSC

technical staff member I maintained contact with Guarani leaders and Guarani people, I

participated in several assemblies and I supported CABI in meetings with different

authorities and private stakeholders such as cattle ranchers, No Governmental

organizations (NGO) and petroleum companies. I visited some cattle ranches neighboring

the Isoso. As a member of CABI-WCS, I was part of a research team and had formal

contact with scientists and other technicians working in the area. The formal as well as









the informal conversations with community members during tea hour (porear) also

provided me with valuable insights.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is comprised of seven chapters. The present chapter (Chapter 1)

introduces the problem and the methods used on this research. Chapter 2 presents a

review of the literature on common property and community base natural resource

management as well as the main factors linked to the expansion and global integration of

cattle ranching are identified. Common property theory arose partially as a response to

the ideas exposed by Garrett Hardin in his well-known "Tragedy of the Commons"

article (1968). Hardin largely overlooked social institutions and rules among common

users and predicted that open access would lead to the destruction of natural resources.

According to the main proponents of common property regimes (CPR), Berkes (1989)

and Ostrom (1990), CPR are structured arrangements in which group membership is

known, outsiders are excluded, and rules are developed and enforced. Consequently, CPR

offer potential for community-based conservation (CBC) which could benefit from

interdisciplinary science conservation which incorporates a more elaborate understanding

of social-ecological interactions (Berkes 2004).

On the other hand different factors motivate the expansion of cattle ranching in

Latin America: population growth, changes in consumption patterns, the relation to the

market economy, national and international policies favoring cattle ranching. Today,

cattle ranching plays two main roles: it is part of a subsistence and food security strategy

to millions of poor people. Cattle ranching is also a maj or international agribusiness

supported by national and international development policies. No matter which causes,










cattle expansion is one of the greatest pressures leading to land use change and

deforestation in the tropical forests of Latin America.

Chapter 3 describes the physical and social landscape of the study area, the Tierra

Comunitaria de Origen (TCO) Isoso in the Bolivian Chaco. Different stakeholders are

described. Special emphasis is given to description and analysis of the Guarani-Isosefios,

whose community tenure system is a main characteristic. The Isosefios differ from their

neighbors and other stakeholders in terms of ethnicity, historical presence in the area,

livelihood systems, and culture. However, they have had a long term contact within the

market economy as temporary wage workers for harvesting sugar cane, assisting cattle

ranchers and other wage jobs. As a result they have not been as isolated as other

indigenous groups in Latin America. Despite this history of market activity, the Isosefios

maintain a subsistence economy and a strong cultural identity based on common property

rights to the land and natural resources the Ivi lyambae or "land without owners".

Chapter 4 presents a comparative analysis of the theoretical basis of CPR and CBM

frameworks and the development vision of the Guarani-Isosefios their Mba~yu. I

analyze similarities, coincidences, and contrasts between the Guarani-Isosefio vision and

the CPR/CBM theoretical framework. The purpose of this comparative analysis is to

establish the degree to which the Guarani-Isosefio, through their particular M~bayu,

conform, practice, and will be able to maintain CPR institutions in the face of cattle

expansion.

Chapter 5 describes cattle ranching in the TCO-Isoso. Originally cattle were

introduced by the karai (in the Isosefio language the word is used to defmne white people

and criollos). Today 8% of the Isosefio population owns cattle. Within the TCO-Isoso









boundaries cattle raising is the main productive activity. Cattle is raised by several private

cattle ranchers including Mennonites who arrived in the mid-1990s, and the recently

established agro-industry in the area, based on private ownership of land.

Chapter 6 presents my conclusions and recommendations. The main challenge, in

Isoso, is to improve and develop cattle ranching management systems that will maintain

the natural potential of the resources and traditional social values in a changing context.

To make that possible, internal institutions and political organizations need to be adapted

to use community governance effectively to develop the economic potential of cattle

ranching. Guarni Isosefio political organizations must position themselves so as to

influence local, departmental, and national policies that favor those changes.















CHAPTER 2
COMMON PROPERTY AND THE EXPANSION OF CATTLE RANCHING:
LITERATURE REVIEW

The fruits belong to all and the earth to no one

--Rousseau

Security of Tenure and Property Rights Arguments

A variety of theories and approaches regarding property rights and tenure security

have been proposedwa which have influenced tenure policy, land reform and

development programs in developing countries. According to Ellsworth (2002), scholars

differ in their perception of what tenure security is, who should get it, its virtues for

society, and how it is obtained. In addition, empirical evidence shows that there is not a

single property regime that is inherently more efficient, optimal or ideal.

In developing countries, varying community property rights systems can be found,

some of which have survived the colonial era, despite the attempts to destroy them as

well as their natural resource base. In the words of Ellsworth, "during all this time the

voices of their members have been demanding a place in the world emphasizing the non-

market value of tenure security." Based on the western understanding of efficiency,

scholars and policy makers have generally supported property rights as individual, private

and tradeable titles. Private property is viewed as the indispensable precondition for

economic growth and development, and therefore assumed to be the cause of the

prosperity of Western countries. Two main theories supporting this view can be traced

back to Demsetz and Hardin (Figure 2-1). The evolutionary theory of property rights










proposed by Demsetz (1967) and Alchian and Demsetz (1973) argues that increasing

population pressure and commercialization of agriculture tend to cause the emergence of

private property rights as if it were a natural change in land tenure systems with time

(Otsuka and Place 2001). Hardin's (1968) tragedy of the commons model predicted the

eventual overexploitation or degradation of all resources and proposed that privatization

of public holding of resources was the solution.



Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights
and Potential Role of the M bayu
Physical
Private investment to
Individual Irnprove land
Ownership quality
Increase use of
Common or Population State Public labor us ng and
Customary increases Ownership land saving
Ownership Land become (Protected Areas)


"Tragedy of the
commons"
MbayuOpen access


Development of the land tenure institutions







Figure 2-1. Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights and Potential Role of the Mba~yu.

The evolutionary theory has influenced the resource management paradigm,

including protected areas policies (Maphosa 2002; Richards 1997; Berkes 1989, Brogden,

2003; Piurek 2003) and land reform programs. In the late 1980s and 1990s most countries

under the influence of the World Bank promoted individualized property regimes as the

means to achieve higher investment and increased productivity. It was argued that more










individualized land tenure regimes would not only allow a greater return on investment

but also create a demand for land improvements and increase credit worthiness and

farmer' s access to formal credit (Wilson and Nolan 2001; Deininger 2003). At the same

time to protect wildlife-rich areas and evade the "tragedy of the commons" the World

Bank supported the creation of new protected areas and the strengthening of national

protected area administration in different countries. According to this policy, protected

areas would evade the tragedy of the commons by taking them away from community

property and conferring them to state administration under a state property regime (West

and Brockington 2006). From these points of view, community property and indigenous

systems provided inadequate tenure security to obtain the rewards of investments made to

improve productivity or conserve biodiversity. In the context of land markets and land

redistribution, it was generally assumed that land would be transferred to the most

efficient user.

Nevertheless, in more recent times those assumption has been questioned (Jodha

2001; Wilson and Nolan 2001 ). Land titled to private landlords resulted in the

smallholder, peasant communities as well as from indigenous peoples loosing access to

land and a greater concentration of land among a few landholders (Jodha 1992, 2001;

Romero 2003; Scoones 2002; Wilson and Nolan 2001). Furthermore, accumulated

evidence and an expanding body of literature have revealed that arbitrary local population

exclusion from natural resource management can have negative effects upon natural

resources and their conservation (Jodha 1992, 2001; ILRI 1995; Kolhler-Rollefson 1993).


SWilson and Nolan (2001) cite different studies supporting as the main outcome of land registration
programs a decreased incidence of land disputes as a sign of tenure security. However, little relationship
could be found between land rights or land title and the use of formal credit; with regards to productivity or
farm investments, no relation could be found.










The nature of resource management within each maj or property regime is summarizes in

Table 2-1 below.

Table 2-1. Different Types of Property Regimes.
Open Access Resource rights are neither exclusive nor transferable and are owned
in common, but openly accessible to everyone, and therefore
effectively the property of no-one.


State Property





Common
Property

(private and
customary)


Individual
Private Property


Ownership and management control is held by the nation state.
Access can be severely limited e.g., military areas, government
office and buildings, or more open as with state property that is held
on behalf of the public e.g., highways, navigable rivers, beaches,
and forests.

Use rights for the resources are controlled by an identifiable group
and are not privately owned or managed by governments; there exist
rules concerning who may use the resources, as well as who is
excluded from using the resources, and how it may be used. Often
defined as indivisible, inalienable, not open to prescription, and land
cannot be attached for mortgage or lien purposes (inembargable).

Use rights to resources is attached to land ownership and freely
transferable as a market commodity; in some instances the state
imposes minimal management requirements e.g., management plan
or plan2 de ordenamniento predial (POP) in Bolivia.


Several studies reveal different factors that either enable or inhibit collective action,

and demonstrate how, in many cases, local populations are able to find ways to

appropriately manage the commons even under relatively complicated and adverse

conditions (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990, 1999; Otsuka and Place 2001). While the list of

those factors continues to grow, what is clear is that Hardin' s and Demsetz's predictions

are far from the only possible outcomes. Alongside individual private property, different

types of property regimes persist worldwide (Table 2-1)

The Common Property Argument and Community-Based Conservation

Common property activists and academics argue that common natural resources

make a significant contribution to the livelihood and economy of rural people. Common










property resources fill crucial gaps in the resource and income flows from other

resources, provide complementary inputs into agricultural systems, and often supply a

maj or source of livelihoods for indigenous peoples. According to Ellsworth (2000),

common property scholars identify the following virtues of common property:

* It supports a physical and cultural space that strengthens social links among people
across time

* It can be the most efficient way to manage natural resources

* It often provides access to survival resources and sustenance (gives a "place in the
world") to millions of peoples worldwide.


Broadly speaking, under common property systems the natural resources are

accessible to the whole community and no individual has exclusive property rights (Jodha

1994). Research has shown that under common property, the rights of individuals are

defined and limited (Jodha 1994; Richards 1997; Otsuka and Place 2001, Berkes 1989,

2004; Ostrom 1990, 1992, 1999). Common property regimes are structured arrangements

in which group membership is known, outsiders are excluded, and rules are developed

and enforced. Hence, common property differs from open access. The examination of

existing common property regimes shows a number of factors favoring viable and

sustainable common property resources (CPR) management. Agrawal (2001: 1653)

argues that these factors can be split into four sets of variables: characteristics of the

resources, the nature of groups that depend on resources, the particulars of regimes or

institutions through which resources are managed and the nature of relationships between

a group and external forces and authorities such as markets, states, and technology

(Figure 2-2).







13




Com mon Property Framework
(Agaw- 201 B1Eril.- 19; Os-o 19 b 192


Common Prope rtyeue Bounarie *Natural Resources Characteristics.
*Well defined boundaries and Size

Community Based
*Clearly defined membership
Management (CBRM) I Group *Past successful experiences
Leadership
characteristics ,, ,,g ,, t identities and interest
*Concemed with environmental Local knowledge
management ue n om
Institutional ansn r
*Enabling local participation arrangement & *Monitoring
*Recognizing the local communities' normative *Enforcement and sanction
role for the development and *Accountability
implementation of environmental regime *ef. .
policies
*External rules, policies and
*Context-sensitive planning Relationship institutions.
with the external *External support Nested
institutionS *Level of support, enforcement
& contradictions
Governance :Social and Ecological Systems
Self organization, Trust, Mutual monitoring, Combining different kind of knowledge, Learning from
crisis; Collaborative learning; Social networks; Reciprocity...
(Berkes 2004, 2005; Lane and McDonald 2005; Ostrom 199 .

Figure 2-2. The Common Property and Community Based Resource Management
Framework.

On the other hand, community-based conservation (CBC) was defined by Lane and

Mc Donald (2005) in general terms, like "the deliberate, programmatic decentralization

of authority and resources to communities for the purposes of environmental


management." CBC as an inclusive and people oriented approach to conservation is in

part a reaction to the failures of exclusionary conservation (Berkes 2004). It consists of a

diverse set of practices, but common conceptual and operational foundations to this

bottom-up vision include (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Lane and McDonald, 2005; Berkes

2004):

*Decentralizing government agencies and institutions concerned with environmental
management










* Recognizing the local communities' role for the development and implementation
of environmental policies

* Enabling local participation in more context-sensitive planning.


Despite the general acceptance of CBC, as a theoretical and practical approach

among resources management programs, some conservationists have concerns about the

emphasis on community-participation because this emphasis may attenuate the

conservation efforts (Campbell et al. 2000). According to Campbell et al. (2000) the

institutional control over common resources, which is essential for effective common

property resource management, is challenged by the pressure for removing it from the

traditional institutional systems based on a complex of norm. The factors, identified as

challenges to the CBC and CPR include

* national policies and legislation supporting privatization;
* proj ects that do not take in account local organization;
* changing and differentiated household strategies;
* new connections to markets;
* the loss of legitimacy of local organizations; and
* changing resource characteristics.

The discussion about the use of CBC and CPR approaches, Berkes (2004), Agrawal

and Gibson (1999), Ostrom (1999 and 2006) and Lane and Mac Donald (2005) express

concern about the conceptualization of a community which is generally defined as

"community as a distinct, relatively homogenous, spatially fixed social group that shares

a consciousness of being a community and which is characterized by consensus and

solidarity" (Lane and MacDonald 2005. pp713). Those authors argue that communities

are not static and harmonious social groups. On the contrary, communities are, and are

composed by, actors with interests, imperatives and agendas of their own. Consequently,

recognize and understand the manner in which they deal with differences within









community is fundamental to avoiding the further entrenchment of elites and the

increased marginalization of certain social groups leading to unjust outcomes. For that

reason, these authors propose that a focus on local institutions, rather than communities,

might provide for a more robust and effective approach. Berkes (2004) affirms that

communities are embedded in larger systems, and proposes that it may be more useful to

(re)think CBC in terms of "environmental governance and conservation action that stars

from the ground up but deals with cross-scale relations [promoting] a systems view of the

environment, a perspective that sees humans as part of ecosystems, and an emerging

practices of participatory management" (Berkes 2004 pp 28). Land and MacDonald

(2005) suggest that the CBC framework has the potential to take into account terms of

responding to environmental issues, in the context of the realities and complexities of

environmental governance. On other hand, CBC requires us to consider the overlap of

formal and informal institutions engaged in resource management and their interactions

at multiple political scales. Regarding CPR action, Berkes (2004, 2005) Olsson, Folke &

Berkes (2003), Bowles and Gintis (2000) and Brogden (2003) argue that the identity and

permanence of a group are not static, and therefore, successful natural resources

management depend on certain essential conditions

* cooperation, reciprocity, individual reputation and trust among the different group's
members and between the group and the external institutions;

* the resilience of local groups and communities;

* the capacity to learn from crisis and to nurture their organization;

* the capacity for self organization and conflict management;

* the capacity to combine knowledge and cooperative learning, learning by doing;
and

* correctly information flow.









From thus literature review a trend in the CPR and CBC approaches is noticed:

Agrawal (2001), Ostrom (1999, 2006), Berkes (1989, 2004, 2005), Olsson, Folke &

Berkes (2003) shifted from the community as the center of attention in a local context to

one that focuses more broadly on the nature of groups and their internal institutions as

well as their relationship with external institutions in a cross scale context. CPR,

including CBC, approaches has provided a general framework for analysis which

integrates ecological and socioeconomic systems under common property regimes.

Common Property and Indigenous People

We are on the edge of our last spatial frontiers, there are no additional territories
and resources, at a global scale, to mitigate the consequences and misbalances of
the actual predominant development patterns. [Castillo 2006]

While scholars discuss the issue, grassroots movements are looking for a "place in

the world" (Ellsworth 2000). Indigenous and traditional peoples inhabit a significant part

of the most bio-diverse regions of Latin America and the world. For indigenous peoples

the environment is intrinsically linked to their livelihood and cultural values, and

consequently with their territorial rights and struggle for autonomy (Arambiza 1998).

Even though indigenous peoples are not homogenous groups, as was previously assumed,

common access to land and to natural resources characterize them all around the world.

Far from being a simple open access system, individual rights are culturally restricted.

Rights of individual community members are usually established through customs, and

transfers of these rights are vested in the extended family, clan, or community (Otsuka

and Place 2001).

In recent years, different countries in Latin America have been increasingly

confronted with the need to address the territorial demands of indigenous peoples,

especially where they comprise a high percentage of their rural population. Since the end










of the 1980s the indigenous movement has gained a voice in the international forum and

has been increasingly integrated into international agendas,2 including that of

conservationists TOCOgnizing their rights to common access to natural resources and the

right of ownership and possession of the lands which they traditionally occupy has come

to be internationally recognized. In contrast to a discourse that favors the privatization

and individualization of rights to valued resources, the indigenous movement struggles to

defend their traditional tenure systems which typically are characterized by collective

rights. Indigenous common property systems continue to thrive and grow in Latin

America (Riverstone 2005). Indigenous people focus on land tenure issues because

property rights affect the way in which other policies will work.

Escobar (2005) and Hayck (2002) refer to indigenous peoples as perhaps the most

striking challenge to the dominant culture and socio-economic models of Latin American

societies. Indigenous people must confront opposing value systems. The capitalist

system, which is growth-oriented and embedded in globalizing imperativeS4 Sees human

beings as economic entities driven by self-interest. This is oriented around the wide

exclusion of direct access to the means of production and livelihood, and the requisite

outside-controls such as government or law to solve conflicts between self-interested

individuals (Heilbroner 1985). Opposing these values are the indigenous people's

2 COnvention No 169 of the General Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted, at
its seventy-sixth session (1989), concerns about indigenous and tribal peoples. It recognized officially the
aspirations of indigenous peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development and maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions within the framework of the
States in which they live.

3 Rio 1992 for example.

4 Globalization as predominant economic driving force during the last decades (1989 to 2005), determine
the global agenda of crucial themes and the correspondent integration and modification of the institutional
politic of multilateral organisms like the IMF, WB, UN and at national levels the "structural adjustments"
of the states.









attitudes toward the land as common property, and particular relationships to it as part of

their culture and identity. In capitalism, nature is an inert obj ect, and people are the

master to transform it to their own benefit (Heilbroner 1985; Richards 1997). Therefore,

the path to development and growth is to make the land productive by cutting forests,

setting up cattle ranches, drilling oil, and promoting export agriculture. In contrast,

indigenous peoples maintain their own approach to the land that sees human activity as

part of, and dependent on, the natural world based on the idea of self-sufficiency (Hayck

2002).

In Latin America before the 1990s indigenous peoples were widely viewed as

backward, primitive, even deficient, and deep racism was rampant because of a failure to

see anything positive in their cultures, languages, and way of life. Kirby (2003) identifies

some structural and non-structural causes that opened a space for the emergence of the

indigenous question in the 1990s which took governments and analysts by surprise. At

that time, a well-educated young indigenous leadership developed a new political agenda

and dedicated themselves to fostering and protecting their people's distinct cultural

traditions, languages and world view. Kirby (2003) distinguishes the undermining of the

socialist paradigm with the end of the Cold War and with it "the left" who tended to view

indigenous peoples as a part of the oppressed class rather than having their own identity.

At the same time, indigenous groups throughout Latin America mobilized to oppose the

official celebration of the 500 years of the Americas' "discovery", calling their response

"500 years of indigenous resistance". Moreover, in "Rio 92" indigenous peoples were

recognized as important stakeholders in conservation, as forest guardians and holders of

ancestral knowledge.









There is no convincing empirical evidence that one type of property rights is

inherently more efficient, optimal, or ideal. The notion of what constitutes "efficiency",

"ideal", and "optimal" are themselves context-specific and constantly changing in a given

society. Today, various types of property rights can be found coexisting worldwide: state

ownership, individual or private and common property. The actual world economic

system supports the privatization and individualization of land property (Richards 1997).

Despite this, in many parts of the world the common property regime survives; in others,

the common property regime does not survive at all or it changes over time to adapt to

new circumstances; and, in other places, entirely new common property rules have been

built (Ellsworth 2004).

According to Richards in 1997 a total of two million square kilometers in the

Amazon Region were indigenous territories under common property management

regimes (CPMR), including the Amazon Region of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,

Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela. This means that 25% of the Amazon

Region is occupied by an indigenous population of 925,000 peoples (Richards 1997).

Evidence suggests that over a half of Mexico' s forest are on community land (Antinori

and David 2004). According to Castillo (2006), protected areas and indigenous territories

are becoming the last remaining reserves of natural resources in Latin America. The

configuration of indigenous territories overlapping protected areas, despite the

contradictions, are part of the best possible alternatives for increasing the quality of life,

and at the same time, preserve the environment. Moreover, the social, ethnic and cultural

institutions and rights of local people may be strengthened in the process.









Thus, this could simultaneously and preserve the environment, in other words to

achieve conservation and development.

Factors Favoring the Expansion of Cattle Ranching

Over thousands of years, human cultures and the physical environment across vast

rangeland areas have been shaped by herding animals (FAO/GIEWS 2001). Cattle have

been a central element in the African pastoralists' livelihood and culture (Scooner 2002;

Cousins 1992; Bodley 1988). Cattle ranching was supported by European governments as

a strategy to conquer territories in the Americas and support the European accumulation

of wealth in the silver mines. The introduction of cattle was the main way that changed

the ancestral livelihood of Indigenous peoples in the "New World."

Today, livestock production accounts for more than the half of total value of

agricultural output (Steinfeld 2002; Kaimowitz 1996). The strong increase of production

of meat, particularly in the developing world over the past twenty-five years, is called

"the food revolution" or "the livestock revolution" (Owen 2002). This revolution has

changed not only farming and distribution practices but also the economic, social and

physical landscapes (Steinfeld 2002; Hall, Ehui and Delgado 2004; Black and Nicholson

2004; FAO 2005; Naylor et al. 2005). The costs of social equity, environmental

sustainability and public health have often been increased (Steinfeld 2002; Naylor et al.,

2005). According to Steinfeld (2002) the "livestock revolution" is connected to the

following factors: (1) a rapid and dynamic increase in consumption of livestock products

principally in developing countries, (2) a change in livestock production practices from

local multi-purpose activity to an increasingly market-oriented business, (3) a geographic

shift of livestock production from temperate to warmer ant tropical environments, (4) the

national government and international-development incentives and subsides, and (5) an









increasing requirement and competitiveness on grazing and water resources, managed

today under common property regimes.

Increase in Consumption

In developing countries between 1980 and 2004, per capital consumption of meat

doubled and production tripled (FAO 2005). Globally, population growth and changing

food consumption habits are predicted to double the demand for livestock and its

production in the developing countries over the next twenty years (Pica-Ciamarra 2005;

Leonard 2005; Owen 2002). Urbanization, rising incomes, and the globalization of trade

are the main reasons mentioned for the growth in meat consumption in developing

countries favoring meat consumption (Vera 2001, Blake and Nicholson 2004). According

to Blake and Nicholson (2004), about 70% more meat will be consumed in 2020 than in

2000, and most of it (60% global production) will be consumed in developing countries

(Delgado et al. 1999 cited by Blake and Nicholson 2004).

In contrast with worldwide indices, in Latin America the 77% of the total

population lives in cities (Vera 2001) while the world average is 49% (Table 2-2). The

consumption of meat in Latin America was calculated as 35 to 45 kg per capital, with the

bovine meat making up approximately 50% of that total (21 kg). This indicates that in

contrast to per capital consumption African and developed countries, Latin Americans eat

considerable more bovine (and buffalo) meat per capital (Table 2-2).

Market-Driven Changes in Production Practices

The "livestock revolution" has focused on industrial-scale operations that have

increasingly gained control over raising, processing and marketing of meat.

Industrializing livestock systems have based on declining real prices for feed grains,

advances that have improved feed-to-meat conversion efficiencies, animal health, and










reproduction rates, as well as cheaper transportation costs and trade liberalization (Naylor

et al. 2005; Uptom 2004; Vera 2001). Today we see different production systems (Table

2-3), although there is a tend to shift from the traditional system based on natural

grassland to a more intensive cattle ranching systems based on management and market

specialization: a) highly intensive grass-feed finishing operations, b) breeding-growing

systems, and c) extensive breeding systems (Vera 2001; Porzecanski personal comment

2006).

FAO has estimated that industrial livestock operations are growing twice as fast as

traditional mixed farming systems and six times as fast as grazing systems (Steinfeld

2002; FAO 2005). This fast growth has defined economies and ways of life across many

prairies and rangelands across the world. In Central and South America land has become

concentrated in the hands of a few and large areas have been transformed into soybean

monoculture and cattle ranches (Hillstron & Hillstron 2004; Naylor et al. 2005). This

situation has become a threat, not only to the tropical forest but also to the survival of

local communities and indigenous people who inhabit it.

Despite the industrial livestock system prevalence, an alternative market for

extensive grass-feed system production is developing globally. Product from pastoral

systems have become more valuable because there is evidences that the meat of these

systems has a lower saturated fat and is richer in iron and omega 3 fatty acids (Vera

2001). Together with those nutritional characteristics of meat produced on pastoral

systems, those systems are, in general, more compatible with ecosystems and the

maintenance of biodiversity, than highly intensive and industrial ones.





































Social and Economic
Characteristics


Table 2-2. Population, Land and Cattle Herd in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)
Contrasting to World Indexes.


LAC/Total
(%)


LAC


World


Human Polulation, millions (2005)
Total
Rural
Total area (million ha)
Ha per capital (2005)
Consumption of animal protein (% of total protein)
1992
Meat per capital consumption (1992), kg/year
Cattle million head (1995)
Head per capital
Grassland (million ha)
Meat production, millions of tons (1995)
LAC
LAC-tropical
Source Vera (2001) and FAOstast 2006


553
127 (22.6%)
2054
3.7


6499
3315 (51%)
13098
2.0


8.50%
3.80%
15.7


43.3
21
337.9
0.7
590


34.8
10
1306.5
0.23
3361.7

53.2


Table 2-3. Cattle Ranching Systems of Meat Production.
System of Production & Ecological Characteristics
Management Characteristics


Highly intensive (industrial)
Grass-feed finishing operation.





Mixed farming systems
breeding-growing .





Extensive razing system.
Grass-feed systems based
mainly on native grassland
with little or no crops
integration.


Not connected to the local
environmental characteristics.
Intensive production. Include
the urban or peri-urban
production in developing
countries

Based on grass with strategic
feed supplementation which
integrates livestock and crop
production on the same farm.



Agro-ecological conditions
strongly define the nature and
scope of livestock-
environment interactions in
grazing systems. In this
system livestock interact with
land, water, and plant and
animal biodiversity,
especially wildlife.


It is strongly market driven,
making them less resilient to
market upheavals than other
systems. Connected to
industrial systems


These represent the main
systems for smallholder
farmers; resource use is often
highly self-reliant as nutrients
and energy flow from crops to
livestock and back

Grazing livestock is a
fundamental source of
livelihood for million people
around the world, mostly
living on common property.
Many of them have become
the base to extensive breeding
systems









Livestock Production-Geographic Shift

For several reasons, including higher energy prices and more rigorous pollution

controls, livestock production in the industrial world is moving to warmer areas of

developing countries (Steinfeld 2002; Naylor 2005; Kaimowitz 1996). In the developing

world, there has been a strong shift in production to the more tropical zones aided by

the recent availability of better disease control, advances in ruminant nutrition, and

breeding systems technologies. Modern, intensive meat production is threatening

important ecosystems since it requires the use of large quantities of natural resources,

particularly land and water (Hill and York 2003).

In Latin America the index of land per capital is higher than the world one (Table 2-

2). This supposed availability of land made "South America, in particular, together with

Africa, the biggest world arable reserve of land" (Vera 2001:6 based on Gallopin et al.,

and WRI 1996). Over the last decades, millions of cattle have been "moved" into the

more humid savannas in Asia, Africa and Latin America, challenging community

property rights to natural resources and in turn the subsistence systems of rural people

(Steinfeld, 2002). For example, China and Brazil alone increased production by 59

million ton between 1967 and 1998 (FAO 2005). Brazil has become the world' s largest

producer of beef and is the second-largest consumer, only behind the United States.

Government Incentives

Government incentives related to development of infrastructure used in livestock

production feed, water, energy, roads, fencing as well as policies regarding market

prices and subsidies are increasingly being recognized as the direct driving forces related

to cattle ranching expansion (Hill and York 2003). At the same time, credit and trends

toward privatization act as important indirect incentives promoting the expansion of









cattle ranching. During the 1960s and 1970s, international agencies such as the World

Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the US Agency for International

Development (USAID) supported efforts to promote beef production and exports as a

central focus of economic growth (Williams 1986 cited by Kaimowitz 1996). In the

1970s the cattle industry came under criticism on both environmental and social grounds.

A series of critical studies prompted by Parsons focused the attention on the negative

effects of livestock expansion on forests (Kaomowitz 1996).

Over the last few decades Latin American countries have been pushed to adopt

economic reforms designed to encourage investment and entrepreneurship, promoting the

privatization of large tracts of land. According to Naylor et al. (2005), land conversion in

the Brazilian grassland and rainforest exemplifies the large impact of the continued

expansion of cattle ranching, a product of a national development policy. The large and

medium-sized ranches account for about 70% of the total clearing activity (Naylor et al.

2005). According to Fearnside (2005) by 2003 the forest cleared in Brazilian Amazonia

had reached 648,500 km2 the 16.2% of the 4 millions km2 Originally forested portion of

Brazil's Legal Amazon Region, including approximately 100,000 km2 Of "old" (pre-1970)

deforestation in Para and Maranhio.

Cattle Ranching as a Complement to the Rural Livelihood Strategy of the Poor

There are around 500 million rural poor people around the world that depend on

raising livestock for some or all of their food and income (Figure 2-3) (FAO 2005; Pica-

Ciamarra 2005). Small farmers rely on livestock to pull their ploughs, fertilize their

fields, and serve as a source of food and as saving that can be cashed in when needed.

Many rural households base their livelihoods on a few animals fed on grass and forage

from common property pastures and forest. Peasant and indigenous communities are also










increasing their livestock numbers as a complement to their subsistence economy and as

a "savings account" to use in times of scarcity and emergency (Mock 2005).



West Asia
and North
Africa
Sub Saharac~ Z
Africa A i


Latin
A me rica




Figure 2-3. Distribution of Poor Livestock Keepers Worldwide. Source FAO (2005: 6)

National Context and Bolivian Lowlands

Located at the core of the South America, Bolivia is characterized by its natural and

cultural diversity. The total area is 1,098,581 km2 with altitudes varying from 6,000

meters above sea level in the Andean cordillera to fewer than 200 meters above sea level

in the lowland of the Eastern plain. Bolivia is characterized by a great diversity of

ecological and cultural conditions. According to the 2002 National Census the total

population was 8,274,325. The Indigenous population represents 62% of the total

population; the great maj ority are Quechuas and Aymaras living in the highland and

valleys. In contrast, the eastern lowlands indigenous are 150,000 to 200,000 peoples

representing 2.5% of the total population, but belonging to more than 38 ethno-linguistic

groups (1995 indigenous census). Among those 60,000 Guaranies live in 246

communities (FAO 2004).

Even though Bolivia is identified as an Andean highland country, three-fourths of

the territory is tropical lowlands. Due to the ecological conditions of the Bolivian

lowlands and the mineral interest of the colonial and early republican governments, the










lowland Bolivian indigenous peoples were not militarily controlled during the colonial

and early Republican times. However, the Jesuit and Franciscan missions and the rubber

boom in the second half of the nineteenth century made life difficult for lowland Bolivian

indigenous peoples. But the subsistence base of hunter-gatherers and cultivators in the

remaining tropical forests never was as threatened as it was by the later advance of

loggers, settlers, agribusiness, drug dealers, cattle raisers, and miners who have

intensified their activities since the 1950s. The Bolivian national development strategy

since the 1950s has been oriented towards the international market and economic

diversification proposed by the Plan2 Bohan. 6 COnsequently, the 1953 Agrarian Reform

supported the distribution of land in the valley and the Andes, while in the eastern

lowlands the "neo-latifimdio was legalized to embrace agro-industrial development

(Urioste 1992; Kay & Urioste 2005). Therefore, the rights of lowlands' indigenous

peoples were denied or viewed as a barrier to be eliminated. The market' s advance in the

form of the businessmen, ranchers, and entrepreneurs motivated by the riches of the

forests has been supported by policies of governments, international agencies, and

political parties.

The development policies were reflected in the 1955 Govemnment Plan which urged

the colonization of tropical lowlands by Europeans and highland peasants. Considering

western technology as the solution to "the lack of productive use" of regional lands,



5 Development as a concept was created after the World War II. Harry Truman offered "development" as
fair deal for the undeveloped world; by this concept prosperous western societies constitute the model that
the rest of the world should strive to attain. The concept was created to justify the assistance of the more
prosperous, or "first world" countries to the less prosperous "third world" in becoming more "advanced"-
high levels of industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of the agriculture, rapid growth of
material production, and the adoption of modern education and cultural values (Escobar 1994).
6 US Bohan mission that visited Bolivia in 1948. As a result of this in 1953 the Bolivia received $5 million
in economic aid. By 1958 total US assistance accounted for one third of the national budget, making
Bolivia became the largest recipient of US aid in Latin America (Klein 1982: 238 in Beneria-Surkin 2003)










between 1954 and 1962, colonies of foreign Mennonites were established, and colonies

of Russians, Eastern Europeans, and Japanese were also set up. These foreign colonizers

were seen as a means to ensure the modernization of lowland agriculture. Since 1985,

with the Supreme Decree No. 21060,7 the Bolivian economy has changed even more

radically, with the liberalization of the markets. Agro-industry mechanized agriculture,

cattle ranching and logging continued receiving important support from the Bolivian

state in the name of "development". They had access to cheap and abundant credit,

subsidized prices, and failed to pay rural property taxes (Boj anic 1988 cited by Beneria-

Surkin 2003; Kay & Urioste 2005). This agricultural bonanza also resulted from a shift

to large-scale production of export crops, which were more profitable. Land

concentration and high rates of deforestation were registered. For example, in Santa Cruz

in 1950 the cultivated area was only 60 thousand hectares and that increased to over a

million after the mid 1980s. In the 1990s, just 4 % of land holders in Beni and Santa Cruz

owned 82% of the land (Fundacion Tierra, 2005). According to Camacho et al. (2001) in

Santa Cruz Department 1,424,033 ha were deforested between 1993 and 2000. Private

cattle ranching is an important productive activity in the lowland departments of Beni and

Santa Cruz (Fairfield, 2004; Plan del Uso del Suelo 1996). The cattle herd in Bolivia

consists of 5,730,025 head, and the 72. 6% of this herd is found in those departments.

Cattle ranching is an important productive activity in Bolivian lowland contributing

to Bolivia' s GPD (Bojanic 2001, cited by Fairfield, 2004) and it significantly supports



SBy 1983, the foreign debt represented 80% of Bolivia's gross domestic product, and the country fall into
hyperinflation. President Paz Estenssoro (1985-89) in 1985 adopted the New Economic Plan known as
Decree # 21060, termed a free-market "shock treatment". The decree deregulated prices, eliminated
subsidies and supports, devalued the currency, and suspended foreign payments. The impact was
immediate: unemployment and migration of relocated workers was massive.






29


rural incomes and diversified household activities (Faifield 2004). Despite this increased

role of cattle ranching, its influences on communal institutions are poorly researched in

the Bolivian context.















CHAPTER 3
THE ISOSO AND STAKEHOLDERS

todos esos lugares no tenian duefios karai, por eso al primer Capitan lo llamabamos
lyambae (sin duefio). Este territorio era libre. Asi era nuestra tierra [all those places
did not have an owner, thus the first Captain was named lyamnbae (without owner).
This territory was free. That our land was] Agustin Chiraye, araakua iya (duefio del
consej o), La Brecha. (cited by Dixhoorn 1996)

The Isoso and the Gran Chaco

The Isoso is part of the southern portion of the Bolivian department of Santa Cruz

in the Chacoan province of Cordillera, and the Municipality of Charagual is located

between 630and 610 30' West longitudes and 1703 8' and 20015' South latitudes (map 3-

1). Situated in the tropical dry forest of the Bolivian Chaco, it is part of the "Gran Chaco

Americano" ecoregion which is the continent's second most extensive forested region

after Amazonia. The Gran Chaco extends over parts of Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia,

with a small portion in Brazil, occupying in all more than 1,000,000 km2. The broad

climatic gradients, together with geological and topographic characteristics, generate a

wide diversity of environments such as wide plains, swamps, and seasonally flooded

savannas, and a great variety of forest and scrublands. The Gran Chaco is characterized

by a high diversity of animal and plant species adapted to its extreme conditions (Taber et

al. 1994, 1997; Navarro et al. 1998).







SCharagua is the municipality (Bolivian administrative unit) which includes the Isoso. There is also a
town of Charagua, west of the Isoso, which is the municipal headquarters.











SGuandere



V -brAguaratlThe Bajo Isoso

Plklrenda

San Silvestre I~ Koropo
Mlni 4 YovI
Yuqu lP Aguer gua Corazozn Histrodico
Rancho Nuevo )b Rancho Viejo
Tamachindl 1
Le Brecha 'C The Central Isoso
IvasIrlrl
Yepiroa
K~apeatindl I
K Lorna
K< Brecha )
K< Montenegro aThe Alto Isoso
Ki Guazu




K~araparl The Isoso Frontier
Isiporenda I


Figure 3-1. Location of the Communities in the Alto y Baj o Isoso.

The Bolivian Chaco is a physiographic unit, a continuation of the "Beni" plain


(llanura Beniana), extending across 13,766,3 km2 and three Bolivian departments:


Chuquisaca, Tarija and Santa Cruz. The Chaco has a semi-tropical, semi-arid climate

with extreme temperatures with the median temperature from 260C to 250C; and


extremes reaching 430 C under shadow in summer (January) and in winter the


temperature could drop below zero degrees because of cold winds from Antarctica, called

surazos from June to August (Dixhoorn 1996; Navarro 1998; Taber 1994). The dry


season lasts from 4 to 8 months per year from May to September, some years extending


until December. Rainfall is less than 1000 mm in the northern part and in the Andean


foothills and averages 300 mm in the plain. The annual and monthly variability in rainfall
















1600-
1400
S1200-
1000-
E 800
600-
*4400-
200-





0 Rainfall (January) in Rainfall (Feb to Dec)


(Figure 3-2) as well as the soil mosaic is an important characteristic of the Chaco

landscape.


Figure 3-2. Annual Rainfall in Charagua, Source Dixhoorn (1996).

The Chaco has been known since the Inca times as the territory of "good hunting",

because of its richness of fauna, principally large mammals such as the Chacoan peccary

(Catagonus wagneri), white lipped peccary (Talyassu pecari), collared peccary (Pecari

tajacu), tapir (Taxpirus terrestris), guanaco (La~na guanicoe vogli), giant armadillo

(Priodontes nzaxintus), gray brocket deer (Mazanza gouazoupira), and jaguar (Panthera

onca). The Bolivian Gran Chaco located in the department of Santa Cruz represents the

best conserved area of this threatened ecorregion.

The Bolivian Gran Chaco is a center not only of natural but also of cultural

diversity. The region was home to groups of nomadic hunters, gatherers and fishermen,

and some sedentary agriculturalists. Different linguistic groups such as the Zamuco -

Ayoreode; Tupi Guarani Isosefio, Ava, and Simba; and Matako/Maka Mataco and

Weenhayek are present in the Bolivian Gran Chaco (TNC et al. 2005). The Bolivian Tupi










Guarani or "Chiriguanos2" Were characterized by their strong warrior society and the

ability to defend their land; they maintained their independence much longer than any

other indigenous group in Latin America. This, along with their historical interaction with

the external world (colonial, post-colonial, other indigenous groups, etc.) makes them

somewhat unique. Unfortunately, what they share with the rest of the indigenous peoples

of America is having witnessed the severe erosion of both their land base and access to

natural resources (Albo 1992, Beneria-Sukin 2003). During the first half of the twentieth

century, the Guarani were on the brink of extinction. After the Republican military

intervention in 1892 with the battle of Kuryuki,3 their resistance was shattered leaving

little hope for their future. Some Guarani communities lost almost all of their population

Guarani people moved to haciendas in the Bolivian Chaco or emigrated to Argentina to

work in the sugar cane harvests as zafr~eros temporary rural workers in the sugar cane

harvest (Albo 1992; Heyck 2002). Francisco Pifarre (cited by Albo 1990) estimated that

26,000 Guarani emigrated to Argentina in the early decades of the twentieth century, and

nearly 80,000 Guarani and mestizos were obligatorily sent to the northern rain forest to

work on rubber plantations. Throughout this period, multiple forms of resistance

including both armed struggle and strategies of negotiation had developed. The Chaco

War in the Guarani territory, which lasted from 1932 to 1935, dispersed them even more

and the few remaining people were absorbed by the haciendas. The 1953 Agrarian


2 The term "Chiriguano" is not accepted by the Guarani themselves due it use in a discriminatory way by
the others. Guarani is a more generic name referring to the wide family present in five nations: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chiriguano is a more specific name for Guarani in the west near to
the Andes Cordillera in Bolivia including the Mbya, Ava, Isosenos and Simba (Albo 1990).

3 IH One day more than 800 Guarani were killed by the Bolivian army. In total Guarani deaths exceeded
more than 3000, and 2000 Guarani were taken prisoner and dispersed in different regions as peones (Albo
1990).










Reform did not benefit the Guarani people. The Agrarian Reform formalized the new-

latifimdio to support the governmental programs based on agro-industrial development

(Urioste 2003, n/d; Kay and Urioste 2005). The Guarani never accepted the redistribution

of land that they still regarded as theirs.

Despite the dispersion, the Guarani people were not assimilated as peasant or

simple labor workers but continued the struggle through a strategy of political

negotiation, maintaining their basic values, language and dignity. Through the years

many Guarani have returned to their communities, even though today some of them are

still "captives" on the haciendas while others are living in isolated communities with very

little land (Villegas 2006). However, in some cases the Guarani exert political control

over relatively large land areas through communities united in the form of Capitanias.

One of these areas is the Isoso where the Capitania del Alto y Baj o Isoso (CABI) is

located .

At present, the Isosefio villages are the only ones in the study area, however,

several other stakeholders neighbor and interact with the Isosefio people:

1. Cattle ranchers and Agro-industry entrepreneurs.

2. Mennonite colonies.

3. Peasants.

4. The local, regional and national authorities. The Municipality of Charagua, the
province of Cordillera and departmental authorities of Santa Cruz.

5. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs): Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS),
Apoyo para el Campesino Indigena del Oriente Boliviano (APCOB), Centro de
Investigaci6n y Promoci6n del Campesinado (CIPCA).

6. Catholic and Evangelical churches that support development and production proj ects.

7. Private petroleum companies.










Map. Location of different Property Regimes
andi stakeholders in the TCO-Is~oo


Santa Cruz














P_4


Argentina


/


Polygons 1- 5
SPrivate Properties (titled)
Private Properties (title in
rrrocess)
- CABI titled land
~I Rivers: Grrande and Parapeti
I TCO Isoso limits

SArea of Mennonite colonies in
Pol-3


Isoseriio communities


Figure 3-3. Map of the TCO-Isoso and Location of Different Stakeholders.


" %i









The Guarani Isosefio Communities

More than twenty communities, dispersed along the banks of the Parapeti River,

are politically organized in the Capitania delAlto y Bajo Isoso (CABI). The National

Census (2002) registered 6,363 people in Isoso. However, according to CABI's own

estimation there are around 10,000 inhabitants. That difference may be explained by the

high seasonal migration outside of the Isoso to the sugar cane harvest. Despite those

differences Table 3-1 based on the Bolivian National Census of 2002, gives an idea of the

population distribution among the Isosefio communities. Isiporenda, the southern-most

community, is about 60 kilometers from the municipal center Charagua. The most

northern-most community along the Parapeti river banks, Kuarirenda, is over 150

kilometers from Charagua (Map 3-1). Even though during the dry season several routes

lead to Isoso, the most stable access from Santa Cruz city is through Charagua, requiring

about 7 to 9 hours to reach La Brecha, the central Isosefio community.

The Guarani -Isosefio people are originally derived from a fusion between a

migratory Tupi- Guarani group and the Arawak-Chane peoples established on the

Parapeti banks. The Guarani -Isosefio communities have experienced the aggression of

the colonizers and the Republican military repression, and later the Chaco War, which

practically left the Isoso empty. The present communities in Isoso share a set of specific

cultural characteristics: the Nande reko "our Guarani way of life"; a common origin

and history; the Mba~yu (vision or dream); CABI as their political organization; and the

TCO Isoso as their common territorial demand. Therefore, they constitute a demographic

entity .

4 Between the 1940's and 1960's the area was intensively explored by hydrocarbon companies. The seismic
testing lines opened at that time are used as roads.









The Guarani Way of Life : The Randereko

Despite having suffered military devastation, the Guarani-Isosefio maintain many

aspects of their 'traditional' livelihood strategies. The Nandereko is based on cooperative

work and reciprocity as one of the main internal values which keeps the society and the

extended family units together, it is the basis of social and economic relations (Albo,

1992; Beneria-Surkin 2003; Heyck 2002).The household is the unit of production and

reproduction. Each household is composed of an extended family and is part of a social

network known as Teta (community or village). The communal life characterized by

strong kinship ties and reciprocal relationships is the most important element of the

Nandereko.

The Isosefio livelihood is based on a subsistence economy. They farm for their own

consumption' and only the excess is sold. The main crops are corn, rice, yucca- manioc,

kumanda or beans and joco (squash). Some households cultivate fruit trees such as

banana, citrus and papaya. Hunting, fishing and gathering are important elements of their

livelihood strategy. There are more than 135 species of plants used by the Isosefio and

botanically described (Bourdy 2002). Bourdy describes the medicinal and non medicinal

uses such as human food, animal feed, handicraft, construction materials, firewood, toys,

decoration, agricultural practices and veterinary medicine. According to Cuellar et al.

(2004), 21 different species of mammals, 9 of birds and one reptile are the most

frequently hunted animals by the Isosefios. Breeding domestic animals and their

integration into the labor market are important complements to livelihood strategies.

They raise goats, pigs, chickens and cattle. Many Isosefio are wage-workers such as

SAccording to Beneria-Surkin (1988) to replace the subsistence production the Isosehio must earn 17.46 Bs per
work-hour.










peons in cattle ranches or jornaleros in the sugar cane harvest, school teachers,

technicians in NGOs and governmental institutions.

Guarani-Isoseno Communities

The present-day Guarani Isosefio communities are not completely uniform.

According to common kinship, history, ethnicity, etc., the communities can be grouped in

six different "sub-zones" (Combes 1999), going from south to north, summarized as

follows (Figure 3-1).

The Isoso frontier

Coming from town of Charagua, which is located west of Isoso the first two

communities are Isiporenda and Karapari (Figure 3-4). This is a fragile but fertile

frontier. Fragile because the closeness to town of Charagua and the more constant contact

with non- Guarani people makes them susceptible to many different cultural influences,

and fertile because the river' s water is available almost all the year allowing them a rich

harvest. This is a transition between the karai and Guarani worlds. The community is

occupied, in addition to Isosefios, by Ava- Guarani and Tapiete, and also many karai'~~~~kkkkk~~~~kkkk

have had their ranches and homes in Isiporenda. They have developed a relation of

mutual cooperation with the Mennonites neighbors (my observation). The Mennonites

and Isiporenda inhabitants have exchanged of experiences and knowledge. In the summer

of 2005, I observed that the Mennonites' presence was crating incentive for agricultural

market-oriented production in Isiporenda. The Guarani producers rent machinery and use

technology from the Mennonites, who, in turn, rent land from Isiporenda. Interviewees

talked about school children and teachers helping Mennonites harvest cotton as a part of


6 Karai is the Guarani term referring to miollos, mestigos and whites, all those groups that are not Guarani or other
indigenous people that they identify.










an unofficial agreement of cooperation between the Isiporenda community and the

Mennonite community.

The Alto Isoso

Continuing to the north by the main road, one reaches Kopere Guasu, Kopere

Montenegro, Kopere Brecha, Kopere Loma, Kapeatindi and Yapiroa. All these

communities originated from the ancestral communities Grundeiti and Samnouti. The four

Koperes are almost like neighborhoods of one large community (Figure 3-4). In Kopere

Guasu there are many Ava- Guarani, whose predecessors came to work as peons in the

ranches. Those communities conserve Guarani traditions such as Arete Gua~su (the main

celebration of good harvest) and together they began negotiating for a legal communal

title beginning in 1922. They received the official title in 1948.

The Central Isoso

Ivasiri, La Brecha and Tamachindi are included in the same communal title

received in 1947 and reconfirmed in 1978. This zone oflIsoso once was known as

Guirayoasa. At the beginning of the 1900s only one community was located on the

eastern bank of the Parapeti River (Figure 3-5). Experiencing severe problems with

ranchers, people decided to move to the western bank where they founded three

communities before the Chaco War. Today one of those communities, La Brecha, is the

political center of Isoso.

The Coraz6n Hist6rico del Isoso

The historical heart of the Isoso is located on the eastern bank (Figure 3-5) and it is

the place where the first Guarani Isosefio arrived; guided by female leader, Kaa Poti, they

established the first community known as Kovei. The present communities of Koropo,










Table 3-1. Population in the Communities of Isoso.


Community


ARAKAE INE
1999 2002


(INE2002)


The Isoso Frontier
Isiporenda
Karapari
The Alto Isoso
Kopere Guazu
Kopere Montenegro
Kopere Brecha
Kopere Loma
Kapeatindi
Yapiroa
The Central Isoso


274 300 162
as 149 80


64
35
93
94
125
294

173
348
172


61
44
80
134
107
261

191
376
208

271
15

109
155
220
167


Ivasiriri 463
La Brecha SD
Tamachindi 525
The Corazon historico del Isoso


870


493 222
31 16


12 Rancho Nuevo
13 Mini
14 Yuqui*
15 Rancho Viejo
16 Aguaraigua
17 Yovi
18 Koropo
19 Pikirenda*
The Karai Isose
20 San Silvestre
21 Paraboca
The Bajo Isoso
22 Kuarirenda
23 Aguarati
24 Guandare*
The Returning i
25 Joseravi
26 Tetarembei


108
122
215
147


o







Isoso


102 56
90 45

586 307
338 179


158 101
13 8


279
159


TOTAL 7,077 6,363 3,166 3,197
Source INE Bolivia, National Census 2002 and Combes (1999).
Notes:


1,171


The Bolivian National Census of 2002 did not register the population of Yuqul, Plklrenda and Guandare, probably because
those communities are too small, dispersed and closely related to other communities. Their population may have been
included in the counts for other communities, ( Yuqul could be Included in Mini, Plklrenda In K~oropo and Guandare In
K~uartrenda). Combes (1999) does not report population of Mini, Yuqul, Plklrenda, Guandare, Joseravl and Tetarembel
because those communities were established after 1999, originally being cattle ranches (suestos ganaderos). Because the
communities frequently change location, as well as experiencng dlsintegratlon and the establishment of new communities, It
Is not surprising that figures of the number of villages and population differ according to different sources. Today, It seems
that infrastructure such as schools and health services are factors that Influence a more fixed location.


No.
No of inhabitants Male Female
Households










Aguaraigua,Yovi, Guairapembi (Rancho Viejo) and Yarumbairu (Rancho Nuevo) all

originated from the first Guarani-Isoseno community of Kovei. According to Albo (1990)

the first title for Yovi and Aguaraigua was received in 1927. And in 1947 Koropo was

included. Koropo, Yovi and Aguaraigua always have worked together, and have shared

Arete Gua~su. Despite the same origin Guairapembi was left behind. Unfortunately it has

been surrounded by ranches with which there were perpetual confrontations, issues that

deeply affected them. Land tenure problems were growing, as well as problems of access

to natural resources, and they could not title their land. The community was divided;

some of them moved to the western river bank for a more peaceful life, and established

Yarumbairu (Rancho Nuevo), later Mini and Yuki. In 1962 the titling process was

initiated by the three communities together and when they received the title in 1969 it

was for land located on the western bank. Guairapembi never got a title until it was

included in the common TCO-Isoso title.

The Karai-Isoso

Many karai have lived in the Isoso since they first arrived in the mid-1800s. Some

of them live far away on their ranches, but others live in the communities together with

the Guarani-Isosefios. Those that live in the communities and take part in the communal

life are considered members. Mixed communities as Koropo and Aguarati are examples

of such communities. But three communities are inhabited almost only by karai:

Paraboca, Tamane and San Silvestre (Figure 3-5). They were incorporated into the CABI

organization in 1997. Then during the TCO titling process, Tamane negotiated to become

private property, and they received one family title. Paraboca and San Silvestre officially

decided to be part of CABI as communities.










The Bajo Isoso

Kuarirenda and Aguarati (Figure 3-6) are part of a history of moves. Because of the

changes in the river (floods and drought) and the ranchers' pressures, these communities

have continually changed location. Kuarirenda received a title to its land in 1972, but the

conflicts with cattle ranchers continued.

Returning to Isoso

A new Guarani -Isosefio sub-zone is recently taking shape in the TCO-Isoso. The

Isosefios that had lived outside the Isoso, including some that worked as peons on

neighboring ranches, decided to establish two new communities Joseravi and

Tetarembei, both supported by CABI. These new communities are located north from

Kuarirenda and their organization of production differs from the rest of Guarani -Isoso.

Land is divided into nuclear family plots which in many cases are clearly delimited by

fences. Inside those areas are located the house, the farming plot and domestic animals .

Each community has a communal "capitan" who maintains relationships with CABI

leaders. The community members still have strong ties with the urban areas, for example

most of the children are studying in urban schools (in Santa Cruz city) and only visit their

parents during the holidays. Sometimes the mother lives with the children in the city

during the school year.

Land Use in Guarani Isoso

Land is considered to be common property that the ancestors have left for all

members of the community (Beneria-Surkin 2003). Land tenure will be deal in Chapter 4,

but the history is summarized briefly below. Customary common property rights


SObservation made during my Tetarembei field trip 2004, when I was gathering information for a waste
management program and visited several houses









characterized the Guarani Isosefio Nandereko. The cattle ranchers' arrival forced the

Guarani Isosefio people to seek a new way to defend the common access to land and

natural resources. After shifting from warriors to negotiators, they obtained seven

communal titles that included almost all communities 65,000 ha, (Figure 3-1).

The Territory is the central element in the struggle to subsist, around which the

indigenous peoples have tended to proj ect an essential construction of identity. For this

reason and their immersion in land tenure dynamics, since the 1980s indigenous people in

the lowlands have mobilized to demand the titling of their lands and territories (Albo

1996). As a result, Bolivia, and other Latin American countries, has recognized some

indigenous land and territorial rights over the last few decades. The agrarian reform or

Ley INTRA (Law no. 1725 of 1996) recognizes the indigenous people's territorial demand

as Tierra~s Comunitaria~s de Origen (TCO) in accordance with the International Labor

Organization (ILO) Convention 169 (Romero 2003). During the elaboration of the Santa

Cruz Land Use Plan (Plan del Uso de Suelo de Santa Cruz, PLUS, froml992 to 1995)

and the INTRA Law (from 1994 to 1996) CABI actively participated, designing their own

proposal for indigenous territories. Together with other indigenous peoples, forming the

Central Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivian (CIDOB), they argued for the legal

recognition of indigenous peoples' territories or communal land of origin (TCO). The

Guarani Isosefios officially presented their demand for TCO-Isoso, at the time the INTRA

Law was approved in 1996, and CABI guaranteed the financial support to complete the

administrative title process (saneamniento SAN-TCO). Following the approval of INRA

Law (1996)8 CABI has been a key actor in the SAN-TCO process.


SThe results of the process of TCO titling "saneamiento in Bolivian lowland shows the next data: 55 TCO formally
demanded 25,794,177 hectares of thenl only 3,214,565 hectares were titled as TCO only five TCO completely titled










The Guarani Isosefio people can hunt and collect everywhere in their territory and

each family or household can clear and farm the quantity of land that is needed to support

their livelihood. Farming, hunting and gathering are part of the Guarani Isosefios

Nandereko. The main use areas, to agriculture, cattle ranching, and village facilities

including housing, were surveyed by FII-CABI technicians, at the end of 2004 and

beginning of 2005' (Table 3-2).

Table 3-2. Main Land Use in Isoso, per Sub-zones.
CattleArea AgriculArea UrbanArea Total Area
Sub-zone (ha) (ha) (ha) (ha)
The Isoso Frontier 7,028 180 46 7,254
The Alto Isoso 28,817 896 108 29,821
Central Isoso 16,228 971 106 17,305
The Coraz6n hist6rico del
Isoso 19,570 821 183 20,573
The Karai Isoso 30,549 5 47 30,601
The Bajo Isoso 28, 160 454 137 28,751
Returning to Isoso 4,020 0 164 4,184
TOTALS (ha) 134,372 3,326 790 138,489
Source CABI Data Base 2005


Urban Area in Table 3-2 is the area where houses and village infrastructure are

located. School buildings, health services and churches, as well as a soccer field are

found in almost every community or village. The households are dispersed on both sides

of the road. Beneria-Surkin (2003) provides a description of a typical Isoso household:

Beyond on both sides of the road one can see typical one room Izocefio houses.
The area immediately surrounding the house is cleared of any vegetation but nearby
a few trees and vegetation is always left. Usually roofs are thatched with palm
leaves but some houses have corrugated metal roofs and others are made of tiled
roofs. Occasionally, one finds an isolated house, but it is more common to find

and 3() partially. Ironically, 4.2 million hectares were titled as private to third party inside the TCO's demands. The
government weakness, the agrarian elites' pressure, and corruption among the governmental officers are the main
elements that characterize the land saneamiento during these ten years. As a result of this negative balance the peasant
and indigenous movements still support the common property as a keystone to their strategy to subsist and take a place
in the world.
9 In summer of 2()(5 I interviewed Zulema Barahona and Crecencio Arambiza (FII-CABI technicians responsible for
the survey) and other peoples in the communities. I had access to CABI data base.









several houses near each other, each one belonging to one of the nuclear families
that make up a household. [Beneria-Surkin 2003]

With respect to agricultural areas, all household farming plots are located together

in the same area on the banks of the Parapeti River (Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 where the

agricultural plots are represented by green polygons). Agricultural plots belong to the

families, or households and, who have the right to use, but not to sell or rent the land to

others. According to Beneria-Surkin (2003), the Isosefios believe "that one should not

exaggerate" and should use only what is needed. Therefore, the farming plots vary from

approximately 2.3 to 7 hectares (this size of familiar plot substantially differs from the

peasant or small farmers and colonists who legally demand 50 ha plots). Some areas are

planted and the rest of the plot is left fallow. The "Karai" and "Returning to Isoso"

subzones present a notable difference in household structure and land use distribution in

relation to the other Isosefio communities. In Tetarembei and Joseravi ("Returning to

Isoso") there is not a common agricultural area because each family has a rectangular plot

where they have the house, animals and cultivated area, following the more typical

Bolivian peasant land settler pattern. The Karai Isoso has the smallest farming area and

the larger dedicated to cattle ranching.

The total areas used as cattle ranching are shown in Table 3-2. While cattle

ranching characteristics in Isoso will be developed in Chapter 5. However, it is important

to highlight that the area occupied by cattle ranching is considerably greater than that

under other uses. According to the data, immense areas of the commonly held lands are

used for herds of cattle.

















: *piatindi
*. .a operr Loma
.- .I h. Montenegro
; Guazu





Karapari


SFenced area by Big Projects


f~aml caare ranch ng


- Parapetl river
Rural roads
-TCO -Isoso Ilrnits


Not scale


Village ".Urban. area


SFarrnng area


Figure 3-4. Land Use in the Frontier and Alto Isoso (Sub-zone 1 & 2).


fa ateranching


I I


Figure 3-5. Land Use in the Central, Historic Heart and Kara and Bajo Isoso (Sub-zone3,
4 and 5).


F enced area byt ig Pojects Villge Urban" aea pParapet rer Not scale

Fened reaI IFarrningarea TCO -Isose Ilmits









Other important land uses areas, such as hunting and gathering areas, are more

difficult to identify. Some gathering and hunting areas have been identified by WCS

technical staff which has researched hunting and collecting practices for several years.

Those areas partially overlap with farming and cattle ranching areas, and are not included

in this table.

CABI, the Guarani Isosefio Political Organization

The communal M~burubicha or captain is the customary authority in each Guarani

Isosefio community. The main decisions affecting the Isoso are taking in the Gran

Asamnblea which is the meeting of all communal Mbhurubicha headed by the Capitan

Grande, that is the Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI). CABI is a strong grassroots

organization that is key at local and regional levels. It has become a political actor

adopting a practical strategy of negotiation (Beneria-Surkin 2003). CABI has achieved

several successes with respect to participate in and control of natural resource

management and development proj ects (Chapter 4).

Other Stakeholders

Other stakeholders in the TCO Isoso include several private properties are located

within the TCO-Isoso. According to the INRA law, a process of land tenure

regularization must be completed (saneamniento o SAN-TCO) to obtain a communal title.

The saneamniento of the TCO Isoso is still in process; for technical and administrative

purposes the area was divided into five polygons. The national and departmental

governments are responsible for the legal process of SAN-TCO, beside the application of

development and conservation policy. After the passing of the Popular Participation Law

in 1994 the municipal government became the most important institution at the local

level. The Municipality is charged with planning, implementing and supervising










environmental and development programs and proj ects. Various non governmental

organizations (NGO) also are present in the TCO Isoso such as CIPCA, APCOB, WCS,

as well the Catholic and Evangelical churches. Two gas pipelines run near the TCO

borders (Figure 3-1). One runs from Santa Cruz to Argentina on the western limits of the

TCO Isoso. The other runs from Santa Cruz to the Brazilian border to the north, inside of

TCO Isoso. Therefore, the petroleum companies are important stakeholders in this area.

According to the SAN-TCO preliminary data the following kinds of private properties are

located in the TCO-Isoso (Table 3-3).

Table 3-3. Private Stakeholders, Not-Isosefio Owners, in the Isoso.
Total TCO
Stakeholders Pol 1 Pol 3 Pol 4 Pol 5
Isoso
Cattle ranchers
No. Owners 84 55 30 44 213
Hectares 166,223 164,558 116,103 269,378 716,262
Agro-industry
No. Owners 24 24
Hectares 116,339 116,339
Mennonites Colonv*
No. Owners 2 4 6
Hectares 23,866 44,217 68,083
Peasant "unions" ("sindicato
campesinos")
No. Owners* 2 4 6
Hectares 8,951 433 9,384
Total owners 112 63 30 44 249
Total hectares 315,379 209,208 116,103 269,378 910,068
Source preliminary data SAN-TCO 2006 O. Castillo
Six Mennonite colonies include almost 1,460 families (Table 3-4). Six peasants unions
involve several families.

Cattle Ranches and Agro-Industry

Cattle ranches in the Southern areas (polygons 3 and 5) are extensive. It is an

activity with a low yield, complementing other livelihood strategies (Linzer 1998). In the

north (Polygons 1 and 4) the cattle ranches are generally larger, varying in size between

2,000 hectares and 15,000 hectares and characterized by a high investment in machinery









and infrastructure. Their administration and management are handled by full-time

technicians as well as temporary personnel during the harvest season. The main crops are

rice, sorghum, soybean, cotton, sunflower, and improved grass. Those ranches are

influenced by agro-industrial activity and market oriented production, from the

surrounding plain to Santa Cruz city and Pailon, and are linked with the credit system and

main Bolivian markets. The agro industry, in the plains surrounding Santa Cruz city and

Pailon, began in the 1970s with credit support from the World Bank and Inter-American

Development Bank (Kay and Urioste 2005). The Tierra~s BJajas proj ect, during the 1980s

and 1990s, supported the fast-expanding agricultural frontier based on extension, through

intensive production.

Cattle ranchers, of both zones, are organized in local and regional associations

which offer them important political and technical support. At the local level the

Asociaciones de Ganaderos de Charagua, y de Cordillera (AGACHARAGUA and

AGACOR) and at the regional level the Federacion de Ganaderos de Santa Cruz

(FEGASACRUZ) are strong civil institutions that have tended to exert decisive influence

at regional and national levels in policy-making and implementation of official

development programs.

Mennonites

In the southern part of the Isosefio territory between Isiporenda and Charagua

(Polygon 3), four Mennonite colonies are located in the TCO-Isoso: Pinondy, Pinondy

Itaguazurenda, Casa Grande and Durango. In addition two colonies are located in the

northern (Polygon 1): La Milagrosa and Santa Clara. The members of these colonies









came from Canada, Mexico, Paraguay and some from different parts of Bolivia. 10 The

Mennonites who recently came from Canada have economic and technical support from

their Canadian Mennonite-institutions, and they tend to be more flexible in their religious

practices. The Mennonites who moved from Paraguay and other parts of Bolivia tend to

be more orthodox and do not have technical support. The total Mennonite population is

more than 10,000 peoples or 1,465 families (Table 3-4). They have one or several general

titles for the entire colony (Table 3-3), but internally they divide the area into family

plots. The nuclear family is the economic and reproductive unit, they have big families

with an average of seven members. There is a strict gender and generational division of

labor within the family and colony.

The Mennonites practice intensive agrarian entrepreneurship, presenting particular

characteristics. Their production system is based on a stable social organization; they

have common religion, customs, culture, education, values, etc. Colonies are established

and organized under a chief administrator of each colony. Diversification of the

productive system is an important Mennonite strategy. They grow different crops and

livestock for domestic consumption and the market. Their industry of milk products

(cheese and butter) is an important income to individual households. They practice

mechanized agriculture and the livestock is a complementary activity. However, it is

intensively-managed. Altogether Mennonites, in the TCO Isoso, have 17,092 head of

cattle (CABI 2005; SAN TCO 2006 FII-CABI, Castillo pers comments 2006).

Mennonites use family labor and sometimes hire workers. Their population growth

is high; consequently their creasing need for land is a main concern for them and for their

"' The first Mennonites came to Bolivia in the 1950's. Their actual population depends from the internal
high population growth and their slowly but permanently immigration to Bolivia.










Table 3-4. Mennonite System in the-Isoso.
Colony Homes Population AreaTotal (ha)

Polygon 3
Pinondi 300 2,700 15,734
Pinondi Itaguazurenda 164 1,472 8,180
Durango 374 3,366 13,834
Casa Grande 109 981 6,469
Sub total 947 8,519 44,217
Polygon 1
La Milagrosa 353 3,178 16,245
Santa Clara 166 1,491 7,621
Sub total 519 4,669 23,866
TOTAL 1,465 13,189 68,083
Source O. Castillo and Noss personal comments (CABI-WCS)
Preliminary data SAN-TCO-Isoso 2006

neighbors. After ten years of their presence in the areas they occupy shows the highest

rate of deforestation and the most intensive agricultural use in the entire TCO Isoso.


Peasants or Small Farmers

The peasants, located in Polygon 1 and Polygon 3, are migrants or colonist from the

western highlands and valleys. They arrived before the TCO-Isoso was "immobilized" (in

1996). They are organized in agrarian union (sindicatos agrarios), a typical strategy

among the Bolivian peasants. Even though they have communal title in the name of the

agrarian union the land is divided in family plots of 50 hectares; the nuclear family is the

unit of production and reproduction. They produce crops for the market and domestic

consumption, normally they raise small domestic animals (chickens, swine and ducks).

According to saneamniento data, six sindicatos agrarios occupy 9,384 ha. There is no

information about how many families there are.

Institutional Stakeholders

Administratively the Isoso is a municipal district within the municipality of

Charagua, in the province of Cordillera within the Santa Cruz department. Altogether the










representatives of those governmental institutions are important regional stakeholders and

CABI maintains a permanent relationship and coordination with them (Chapter 4).

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Wildlife Conservation Society

(WCS) or APCOB ("Apoyo y Promoci6n del Campesinado del Oriente Boliviano")

technically support CABI in the implementation of different activities. WCS has provided

an important support in environmental and conservation programs as well as in the

institutional strengthening process of CABI in arenas like negotiation with hydrocarbon

companies, or with the national government on the arena of the NPK administration

agreement. Other Bolivian NGO, like APCOB and CIPCA focus their support on

productive proj ects.

The Franciscans and Jesuit Missionaries could not influence the Isoso during the

colonial period as they did on a vast area of the Bolivian lowlands. However, during the

1970s and 1980s, the Catholic and later the Evangelical Church established presence in

the area. The Catholic and Evangelical churches have promoted productive proj ects such

as cattle ranching. According to Benaria-Surkin (2003) the Evangelical presence in Isoso

is promoting cultural and socioeconomic changes among Guarani Isosefios.

Two gas pipelines are located alongside the northern and the western borders of the

TCO Isoso: Gasbol and Gasyrg. (Figure 1-1 and Figure 3-1). Since 1997,

GasTransBoliviano (GTB), a consortium of oil companies has been present in the area.

GTB is the owner of the massive Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline (Gasbol). Due to the

international and national requirements the owners of the pipeline had to implement a



11 GTB consortium includes the multinationals ENRON and Shell, the Bolivian partially state-owned
Yacimientos Petroliferos y Fiscales de Bolivia (YPFB), the Brazilian state-owned Petrobras and a other
partners.









Plan de Manej o Ambiental (Environmental Management Plan, PMA) and a Plan de

Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas (Indigenous Peoples Development Plan, PDPI) in

order to limit the socio-economic and ecological impacts of this pipeline.

Transierral2 HOw operates the Gasyrg pipeline which began its construction in 2002

and its operation in 2003. The Gasyrg extends from Yacuiba to Rio Grande (Figure 1-1

and Figure 3-1) and connects the southern Bolivian gas fields of San Alberto and San

Antonio with the Gasbol pipeline. Transierra supports the Indigenous Peoples

Development Planning Program (PA-PDI) and the PRAC (Programa de Relacionamiento

y Apoyo Comunitario).

The Isoso area is a complex fabric of different stakeholders. Among them the

Guarani Isosefios are key actors in planning and implementing development programs in

their territory.
























12 Transierra is a consortium integrated by Andina S.A., Repsol YPF S.A. Petrobras
Bolivia S.A. and Total E&P Bolivie S.A.















CHAPTER 4
THE ISOSENTO IVI IYAMBAE AS COMMON PROPERTY

Current theory describes common property as an institution of self-governance that

evolves when participants agree to impose limits on their individual claims. The survival

of common property resources in Isoso implies a long-term history. Despite the current

process of transformation and the uncertain future, the Guarani-Isosefios have

consciously decided to preserve the Ivi-lyanabae land without owner or communal

ownership right and community tenure system as the keystone of their Mbayu dream

or vision as indigenous people. The Guarani-Isosefio Mba~yu embraces five central

elements: Moailete identity; Arakud knowledge; Mborerekua union; lyambae

"without owner" or autonomy; and Yandeyarigui the common origin related to

grandmothers. All these components are closely tied together, and cannot be separated

from the territory land and natural resources. In other words: the Guarani-Isosefio

M~bayu is the vision to remain united as Guarani-Isosefio people, having a common

origin, strong identity and culture, respecting the traditional knowledge the Nandereko or

Guarani-Isosefio way to be. The Guarani-Isosefio territory is the M~bayu' s space

dimension including the land and natural resources. The political and administrative

autonomy of their territory is a crucial obj ective.

The M~bayu was formally incorporated into CABI's strategy planning by the

asa~mblea ofMburuvicha the main Guarani-Isosefio communal institution. The

asa~mblea is a meeting where decisions are done by Guarani-Isosefio captains of all

communities. In July 2005 I interviewed Oscar Castillo, who is a technician supporting









CABI, at his office in Santa Cruz. He explained how CABI developed their strategic plan

with the purpose to maintain, support and develop self-governance in the Isoso. I

understand that this planning is not a static formula, nor a theoretical one. The plan was

elaborated by M~buruvicha asamblea on the basis on their vision or Mbayu to survive as

Guarani-Isosefio People. The M~buruvucha identified those customary institutions which

have supported their subsistence as People. Consequently the strategic plan is supported

by four pillars (Figure 4-1).

* NTeemoai that refers to CABI as the Guarani Isosefio political organization and its
relationship with the external institutions.

* Moa, referring to organization and use of the space and natural resources, the
management of their territory.

* Tekoata that is the institutional and organizational strength.

* Mbaapo the self organization, productive alternatives, education and sustainable
development.

More extensive explanation is developed in this chapter, which focuses on the

cultural elements and institutions that shape and support the Guarani Isosefio M~bayu as

well as on the similarities and differences among the M~bayu and the Community Base

(CBM) and Common Property (CPM) management frameworks.

Randereko: Nature and Characteristics of the Group

According to common property theory the membership of a communal group must

be well defined. Size of the group, common knowledge, past successful experiences, trust

and identity are other mentioned group characteristics needed to be successful in common

resource management (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001; Olsom, Folkes and

Berkes 2003).

















Territory and
Natural Resources


MOA

*Use (occupation) of the
space & natural
resources
*Management planning
basing on the natural
and social
characteristics.


MBAAPO

*Self-organization
*Implementation of
sustainable productive
experiences.
*Education, Knowledge
and learning


TEKOATA

*Institution-build ra and

*Capacitating and
participation of Guarani
Isosenos members.
*Rules and internal
agreements


RIEEMOAl

*CABI and itsexternal
relationships:
*Other indigenous and
grassroots .: ?1~:~r ,
Government, private
sector, NGOs, a


Figure 4-1. Guarani-Isosefio Strategically Vision-Mbayu.

The Isosefios have a strong identity that allows them to resist and survive as


indigenous peoples. The Nandereko or Guarani Isosefio way of life is based on their

communal life. According to Albo (1990) there are three aspects that reveal the Guarani-

Isosefio communal life:


* The celebration which involves the convite (to share). On different occasion
members of the community share hunted prey, harvested corn, food, etc. with other
members. The Arete Gua~su or celebration of good harvest is a special occasions to
share among communities.

* The group work is based on cooperation and reciprocity. The Isosefio as a group
share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that are part of their social capital.
Therefore, the adult men are required do communal work such as maintaining
water channels and fence repair, cleaning farming areas, construction and
maintenance of roads, serving in communal offices, etc. Women support bringing
food and chicha.


* The a~samnblea are the decision-making space at communal and entire Isoso levels.


MBAYU _Vision

Nanderek o


Moailete-Identity
Arakua -Knowledge
Mborerekua-Unity
lyambae- Autonomy
Yandeya rigu i-Origi n









In day to day life each Isosefio belongs to a teta or community or village.

Communities are small enough for people to know each other. Therefore, membership is

explicitly defined. Each Isosefio household is provided with exclusive rights to use a

farming plot and forest resources inside the common property.

In the Isosefio communities, I observed that use rights to the communal forest were

clearly defined by interviewees. The authority interviewed in Isiporenda indicated, for

example, that a third party does not have the right to cut a tree inside the communal

boundaries. The interviewees in Pikirenda mentioned one case, an issue concerning a

neighboring karaik~~~~kkkkk~~~~kkkk or criolla-family who had gained a private title to a plot of property

and who then was also trying to use communal lands to raise their herd. The members of

this family are well known, and like other local karai, they took part in some communal

activities, but once they obtained a private title the community no longer considered that

those karaik~~~~kkkkk~~~~kkkk are no part of Isosefio community. Problems came when the family still

wanted to claim communal advantages. In the same way Tamane, a Karai community,

decided to title their land as private property. Once the Asamnblea approved it, they lost

the right to participate in communal programs and benefits.

Isosefios participate in different activities, organizing "work-groups" or/and

associations that use the communal resource pool, for example a group of hunters, or

the Cupesi-flour producers associations in Pikirenda and Ivasiriri. Those groups are

generally voluntarily made up of neighbors or close kinship members who are well

known to each other. Therefore, I observed that, the membership within those groups is

well defined based on limited size, trust, common knowledge and past successful

experiences.









Some cattle ranching associations have been formed by the Isosefio. In Isiporenda

the association takes care of a communal herd of cattle (Edda Parada informant).

The Isosefio membership is well defined by their Guarani Isosefio way of life or

Nandereko and their common vision of themselves reflected on the M~bayu. The Guarani

Isosefio people have a common origin YanYYYYYYYY~~~~~~~~~deyrgi a strong union -M2borerekua and

they shared the traditional knowledge Arakua all these are characteristics distinguishing

them from the others.

Moa: Space and Natural Resources Use and Boundaries

According to the common property theory, defined boundaries are one of the

most basic characteristics essential to effective common property institutions (Ostrom,

1990, 1999; Agrawal 2001). To Isosefios, the M~oa one of the strategic pillar of the

Mba~yu refers to the use of space and natural resources, as well as the definition of the

physical boundaries.

The Isosefios identify different types (levels) of boundaries within their territory

(1) the broader territorial boundaries, ancestral dominium and actual TCO in process of

titling; (2) the customary village's boundaries; (3) the household use areas like family

farming plots; and (4) the boundaries introduced by proj ects and institutions for

productive activities or natural resource management.


According to Albo (1990) when the Guarani people arrived at the Parapeti bank

they were searching for the Ivi lyamnbae, which means the land without owners. Once

they settled in Isoso and conquered the Chane people, they continued to struggle to

consolidate their territory. The concept of territory holistically includes the farming area,










the forest, rivers, flora and fauna that support the Isosefio's livelihood and with "whom"

they coexist (Albo 1990).

For the Isosefio these resources are accessible to all, they can collect fish and hunt

in this common territory. According to Castillo (2006) between the 1700s and the

beginnings of the 1900s the Isosefio "original dominion" was at least 3 million hectares.

The boundaries have been defined to exclude others and to guarantee their right of access

to their means of subsistence, and formally be recognized as People. The Isosefio fought

physically to defend their territorial access to natural resources. First, they fought against

other indigenous peoples like the Avas and Ayoreode, and later against the cattle

ranchers, and the crown's and Republican government's military forces. After the

Kuruyuki battle in 1894, the Isosefios shifted their strategy from defending their territory

militarily to seeking legal recognition and requesting legal titling. The first communal

title dates from 1932 and included two communities: Yovi and Aguaraigua. By the 1980s

65,000 ha. were titled and almost all communities were included in seven communal

titles (Combes 1999; Winer 2003; Albo 1990; Castillo 2006). Despite the legal titles,

problems with cattle ranchers continued. Moreover, the 1980s brought more complexes

issues.' The expansion of the Bolivian agricultural frontier supported by the Lowland

Proj ect (Proyecto Tierra~sBJajas del Este), an initiative of the World Bank and Bolivian

government, threatened the Isosefio people's survival.


1 Throughout the 1970s and 80s, numerous other national development plans also focused on areas occupied by indigenous
peoples, pushing them onto marginal lands. This situation and the democratic transition in the country inspired among
indigenous peoples the resistance to new market forces that led to alliances, not only at the national but also at the
international level. In 1982 the Confeleracion Incliena clel Oriente cle Bolitid (CIDOB) was created congregating all indigenous
groups of the Bolivian lowlands; and was an important fonun permitting the definition of their own vision of development
and resistance strategies. The struggle for their rights has led to a process of enipowerment taking nmnerous fonns such as
mass mobilization and niarchesl, and day by day activities; winning seats in parliament and municipalities; and taking part in
consultations at national and international level with multilateral bodies. From 1993 to 1997 was a period of constant
reiteration of indigenous rights and Bolivia has redefined its relations with indigenous peoples by sanctioning new laws
(Hirsch 2003).










Lo que ahi se necesita es un titulo comun para todo el Isoso, desde Tarenda (junto a
San Antonio de Parapeti) hasta el ultimo bafiado. (What is necessary there is one
title for all the Isoso, from Tatarenda [near to San Antonio de Parapeti] to the last
swamp). [Testimony from Juan Feliciano Arandico, the communal captain of
Rancho Viej o recovered by Albo 1990 pp 37]

Dn. Arandico referred to one title for all communities as a way to defend the

Isosefio territory all together -M2borerekua against the cattle ranchers and agro industry

encroachment. Because the Isosefio maintained the structure as indigenous people,

combining concepts of territory, autonomy, and identity (Castillo 2006), they visualize

their territory as a geographic space in the Chaco in which they can not only survive, but

thrive, as an independent people in the "Ivi lyamnbae" and sustain the Isosefio 2bayu and

the Nande reko.

As a result of Bolivian normative reform between 1993 -1996, some approved Laws

became key legal instrument to seek the consolidation oflIsosefio territory and natural

resources management. In their role of negotiators, the Isosefios supported the creation of

the protected area in the Gran Chaco, the National Park Kaa lya (NPK) in 1995. The

environmental Law No. 1333 enacted in 1993 allowed CABI participation on the

elaboration of the technical proposal to create the NPK. CABI worked together with

WCS and the National Direction of Biodiversity Conservation to define the protected

area boundaries as well as their participation in the NPK administration. The NPK

encloses important areas of Isosefio' s traditional use and mystical. The creation of the

NPK was viewed by the Isosefio as a way to define boundaries and to stop the aggressive

advance of the agricultural frontier. Therefore, the Isosefio people protect their territory.

Once the new agrarian reform law was approved, the INRA Law no 1725 in 1996, CABI

requested the official recognition of Isoso' s boundaries as Tierra Comunitaria de Origen-

Isoso (TCO Isoso) to formalize their ownership right. The titling of the TCO- Isoso has










been in process since 1998. At present more than 560,000 hectares are communally

titled in CABI's name (A. Noss and O. Castillo pers. comm.).

At the same time, internal boundaries separating different use areas are established

inside the Isoso. Clear internal boundaries reduce conflict over limited resources. For

example, the farming plots limited to irrigated land in the Parapeti river banks are

distributed to each Isosefio family. The firewood collection areas are well distinguished

among communities. Some hunting areas are exclusive to those who have "good relation

with the lyas" (Combes 1998; Noss and Painter 2004).

Members of each community are familiar with their village boundaries, excluding

outsiders from using their communal resources. But not all Isosefios have a clear

understanding of the TCO-Isoso boundaries. Before the titling process had begun, during

the elaboration of NPK' s management plan in 1999, almost all old men could identify the

boundaries of the TCO-Isoso and the historical attachment with their ancestors' territory.

But for young people and women who almost never leave the community the TCO

boundaries were difficult to identify (Linzer and Villasenor 1999).

In the summer of 2005, during the communal meetings, the TCO-Isoso boundaries

seem to be more appreciated among Isosefios. They are expanding their space-

expectation.

During an interview in summer of 2005, the Mbhuruvicha of Rancho Nuevo

narrated to me how they are fencing a new area far away from the village but inside the



2 According to CABI's register 564,000 hectares are titled to CABI as conununal and 165,000 to private
owners. According to press information in Bolpress.com published on October 2005 and the note of press
there were titled 560,636 hectares in favor to CABI and 10 thousand Guaranie peoples families. In all the
process of TCO Isoso it was titled 174,159 hectares to 71 properties. According to the last preliminary data
(data facilitated by Castillo CABI-WCS).









TCO titled area. In Isiporenda, the communal Mbhuruvicha and his adviser complained

about one individual who permanently tries to invade into the TCO titled land the

Isiporenda' s people recognize that area as theirs, being the traditional hunting area and

source of wildlife to the community members.

The boundaries among Guarani Isosefio communities are not physically established

and are relatively flexible among the Guarani Isosefio people (comments from interview

and personal observation). Inside the boundaries characteristic social and ecological

systems are present. The M~oa together with the Nandereko integrates the ecological and

social systems existent in the TCO-Isoso and the Kaa lya NP. These elements are central

to develop the rules and institutions for natural resource management in Isoso.

Tekoata and Mbaspo: Institutional Arrangements and Normative Regime

The biggest challenge to CABI is to seek a better way of life for the Guarani-

Isosefio people, respecting the M~bayu and the Nande reko. Consequently, to guarantee

appropriate management, it is necessary to develop institutional arrangements and rules.

Cooperative decision making and implementation of activities are essential elements. The

Tekoata and Mbaapo, CABI consciously has incorporated elements to improve self

organization, education and training, to strength technical skill, negotiation capacity and

decision making, and to develop natural resource management experiences.

Rules

Rules of use are essential for the management and access to common natural

resources. The rules regarding appropriation of natural resources must be well defined

and adapted to the particular natural and social common property context (Ostrom 1990).

Johnson and Nelson (2004) suggest that collective arrangements must be perceived as fair

by the communal members of the common property institution, and must be collectively









made to be responsive to all of the resource users and to changing ecological or social

conditions, and be acceptable (Johnson and Nelson 2004). In addition there must be

mechanisms of conflict resolution, correction and sanctions for departures from the rules

(Berkers 1989; Agrawal 2001; Olsson et al. 2003).

Within the Isosefio well-known rules are established ascribing certain activities and

use in the different areas. For example, all fishing and hunting areas are not the same: the

access to remote sacred areas, such as the ponds of YandyariY~~~~YYYY~~~~YYY $ or other areas in the forest

near to the hills, are restricted to those with a respectful behavior (Combes 1988). Only

those who know and have the approval of the Kaa lya, or spirit guardian responsible for

ensuring the forest, can gain access (Combes 1998; Noss and Painter 2004).

According to Combes (1998), Beneria-Surkin (2003) and Noss and Painter (2004)

some cultural rules have weakened. Noss and Painter suggest that some traditional rules

that contribute to sustainable use and conservation are being undermined by

socioeconomic changes over the past decades, including new hunting technologies and

changes in employment patterns; reduction of the areas accessible to Isosefio hunters by

the installation of private properties and Mennonite colonies; and the growing population

in the Isoso, among other changes.

Monitoring and Sanctions lyambae

Monitoring common resource use ensures that a communal management system,

defined by rules and boundaries, allows only the group members to carry out the intended

activities. According to Ostrom (1990), monitoring and sanctions imposition should be

applied by members of a communal entity or by persons accountable to the members of


3 Yandeyari here is referring to the place.










the group. Monitoring and sanction of violations are necessary to rule enforcement within

a common property institution.

Monitoring and sanctions of inappropriate activities are established among

Isosefios. The Mbhuruvicha or captains are responsible for dealing with infractions of

internal rules and for maintaining order within the community. At the same time the

community is small enough that everyone generally knows what everyone else is doing,

and therefore an unofficial monitoring is going on.

Despite monitoring every day activities is customary experience, the Isosefio have

to adapt new rules to the present harsh socioeconomic and ecological changes. Attitudes

towards wildlife are not severe they are continuously adapted to peoples experiences in a

changing socioeconomic and ecological environment. There is some experience of self

monitoring by hunters, combining and supporting scientific and local knowledge that

supply elements to raise awareness of natural resources (wildlife) management at the

communal and indigenous territory level (Noss, Cuellar and Cuellar 2001, 2004; Noss

and Cuellar 2003; Noss and Painter 2004).

The Cupesi- associations in Pikirenda and Ivasiriri. In those communities a group

of women have organized themselves in an association. Those associations are supported

by CABI and their communal assemble to experimentally produce Cupesi flour for the

market. In both communities, the interviewed identified administrative training as a key

necessity. They are looking for support to develop skills such as bookkeeping to

monitoring the administration of the cupesi production. In those cases the introduction of

new productive activity involves new skills to monitoring it.










Collective Arrangement and Conflict Resolution

The communal asamblea is the place where communal decisions affecting the

community are made j ointly. It is the forum where all members of one community

together to the communal M~burubicha make decisions and coordinate community

activities such as reparation of water channels or communal infrastructure, and decide

whether to participate or not in a proj ect or program.

The Isoso "Gran Asamnblea is the place where all communal M~buruvicha~s or

captains, the women-M~buruvicha, and the communal assistants make the maj or decisions

affecting all Isoso. In general, Isoso has a well-established and functional means of

ensuring collective decision-making and conflict resolution with the participation of

community members according to the central principles of2~borerekua -unity and

lyamnbae autonomy.

The decision-making process takes time. One asamblea is not enough. The

analysis, discussion and joint decisions must be internalized. The asamblea has rules too:

respect for elders gives them more authority than any one younger; shouting and verbal

confrontations are not allowed (personal comment Angel Yandura). Albo (1990)

describes the main role that the flee ija, literally elders "owners of the word" play in

the community life and asamblea.

There are some trend of communal cattle ranching organization and institutional

development that can be identified. In a few communities, such as in Isiporenda and

Yapiroa, a core of cooperative organization is found. Members of the cooperative take

weekly turns taking care of the herd and the infrastructure. Decisions are made in the

communal asamblea. In Aguarati and Ipapio (Tamachindi) cattle owners have formed

associations to improve and implement cattle ranching practices, having invested in









infrastructure acquisition and maintenance. Mixed-management (private/communal):

private cattle herds are allocated inside the communal fences, with the owners agreeing to

contribute to the communal infrastructure's maintenance. Some communities administer

a monetary fund and owners pay monthly (Based on interviews: Zulema Barahona,

Crecencio Arambiza, Eda Parada, Alejandro Arambiza, Andrew Noss).

Individually-owned free-grazing cattle -which sometimes invades agricultural

plots, and always feeds on the riverine forest- still represents the main challenge to

Guarani Isosefio institutions. The free-grazing herds comprise a maj ority of the cattle in

the region (68% of total cattle of Guarani Isosenos owners) and it involves a large

number of smallholders without investment capacity who consider their cattle a

complementary form of sustenance. Different communities are taking specific decisions

attempting to regulate the cattle's presence. For example, in 2001 the cattle owners from

Koropo were made to move further North and establish Pikirenda, a new cattle ranching

community (From interview with the captain of Pikirenda). In this way, they solved the

invasion to farming plots by free grazing cattle, but did not alleviate the pressure on the

riverine forest. On the other hand, in Yapiroa the community reacted against the planned

clearance of the riverine forest. The clearance was suggested by the technical people from

the cattle-ranching proj ects, and the community decided to move the proj ect away from

the riverine forest to protect that valued ecosystem which brings them shadow,

temperature regulation, wood, firewood, fruits, and flood protection.

Reemoai: Relationships between the Group and External Forces

Common property institutions are not isolated. Therefore the relationship between

the community or group and the external forces and authorities are important elements to

take into account. CABI refers to its relationship with the external institutions as the









Neemoai which includes their relationship with other grassroots indigenous

organizations, the municipal government, the regional and national governments, the civil

society and the private sector.

The relationship between the Isoso and external forces has been changing through

time. The Guarani-Isosefios were essentially warriors and they defended their territory

militarily against the cattle ranching expansion "la conquista de la vaca" during the

colonial and early republican period (Albo 1992). The Spanish crown officially declared

war against the Guarani people who resisted until the beginning of the 1890s. After a

military defeat, the Isosefio leaders shifted their struggle's strategy from warriors to

negotiators (Albo 1990; Beneria-Surkin 2003). Therefore, the M~buruvisha Casiano

Barrientos in 1927 and later Bonifacio Barrientos in the 1940s were the first local

authorities officially recognized as Capitan Grande delAlto y Bajo Isoso by the regional

and national government. They traveled to Santa Cruz and La Paz to demand the

legalization of their communal land as a strategy to be recognized as indigenous peoples

with their own identity.

They [the Guarani] demonstrate a renewed cultural energy, this time focused on
inclusion rather than resistance, but with the crucial caveats that their culture and
language be respected, via bilingual education, and their history rescued from
official distortion. [Albo, 1990 cited by Beneria-Surkin 2003]

During the 1980s a Natural Resources Protection Plan for the department of Santa

Cruz was designed and implemented. Then, a discussion process was stimulated among

Isosefio about the scale and impact of Santa Cruz's expanding agro-industries and about

how they were to improve their own economic status without losing traditional social

structures and values. Therefore, CABI established strategic alliances with other

indigenous groups. CABI supported the formation of the Central de Pueblos Indigenas de









Santa Cruz in 1981 and ten years later the Confederacion Indigena del Oriente Bolivano

(CIDOB).

CABI has achieved a strong capacity to negotiate at local, regional and national

levels. They exercise their rights based on official and legal mechanisms. The following

facts are the most important achievements on the natural resource management terrain:

* The co-management of the Gran Chaco-Kaa lya National Park (KNP) (1995). In
1995, after the creation of the KNP an agreement of its co-administration was
signed between CABI and the national government. With a surface of 3.4 million
hectares this park is the largest in Latin America and the first co-administrate by an
indigenous organization in Latin America.

* The governance of an indigenous municipal district, making CABI the legal
political authority in Isoso. Under the Popular Participatory Law (1994), CABI is
recognized as the first indigenous municipal district government in Bolivia.

* The coordination of development activities of NGOs working in Isoso. Agreement
with APCOB, CIPCA,

* CABI also formed alliances with Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) since the
beginning of 1990s. WCS had begun a program in 1995, to both develop the Park
and promote a sustainable rural development process. The alliance gave them
access to USAID funding and other revenue generated from hydrocarbon activity
within the Park and the TCO-Isoso.

* The co-administration of the Plan de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas4 (PDPI)
through an important agreement with the petroleum private companies (Chapter 3
Stakeholders) and the state (1997 to 2004). The PDPI sought to reduce or mitigate
any negative social and economic impacts of the pipeline' s on the indigenous
peoples living in the area affected by its construction. The PDPI is supported by a
found of $3.7 million that included $1.5 million to support land titling for
indigenous territorial claims by the Guarani-Isosefios, the Chiquitanos and
Ayoreodes.



SThe Bolivia-Brazil Gas pipeline (Gasbol) carries gas from south of Santa Cruz to Porto Alegre- Brazil,
crosses 250 kilometres of TCO-Isoso and KNP land. As a condition the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank required the pipeline owners to design and implement the PMA and the PDPI
(Chapter 3). The PMA defined the actions to be taken during and after the construction of the pipeline to
reduce any negative environmental impacts associated with the construction of the pipeline.










* The agreement between CABI and Transierra the petroleum consortium (2002-
2006) to implement and monitoring the PRAC and PDI.

* Their territorial demand as TCO-Isoso is recognized by the Bolivian government
and other international institutions such as the World Bank and USAID which are
supporting their demarcation and natural resource management planning.

CABI entered those arrangement having as its main obj ective the defense of

Guarani-Isosefio land rights as well as strength self governance. These successful

achievements are unprecedented among lowland indigenous organization in Bolivia.

National recognition as authority in the region enables CABI to prevent further incursions

into their territory by ranchers and large-scale agriculturalists (Arambiza 1996 cited by

Beneria-Surkin 2003).

There is not doubt that CABI is an important stakeholder that is officially

recognized at local and national levels. Despite CABI's political achievements it has not

been strong enough to confront the influences exercised by the large cattle ranchers.

Large cattle ranchers in the eastern lowland are well organized both locally and

nationally. During three different presidential governments they have impeded the titling

of TCO-Isoso through different mechanisms. The "carrying capacity" for cattle ranching

is one of the most contradictory technical arguments used by the landlords and cattle

ranchers to impede TCO land titling. On the other hand, cattle ranchers have taken

advantage of the TCO titling process as many private owners received titles before TCO

titles were signed and they did not pay the cost of the titling.

The current president, Evo Morales, during his inaugural speech used the words of

a Guarani leader "tratenme como a una vaca" meaning "treat me as you would treat a

cow" referring to 25 hectares for each cow used by cattle ranchers to justify the land

concentration in the Chaco region (Ortiz 2006). The relationship between CABI and the









current government representation is difficult to predict. After the nationalization of the

Bolivian hydrocarbons, the issue of land began to gain attention at the national level (La

Raz6n 2006). The Bolivia's turbulent political climate (Hylton 2006) is covering the

hope of great advances. The current government does not clearly differentiate between

highland and lowland Indigenous people and it seeks land to distribute among the

highland peasants (La Razon 2006-2, 3). Consequently, the lowland indigenous territories

are threatened and lowland Indigenous peoples are on the alert (La Raz6n 2006-2).

On the other hand, the cattle ranchers and private owners of the eastern lowlands do

not have the national support that they had before, but they are part of the Santa Cruz

departmental social movement at regional level. That gives them the power to have

political and economic influence in the decision making process. Therefore, CABI's

political strategies to relate to external institutions has to be adapted to different contexts.

A the present time CABI is playing in different local and national scenarios. For example

the main Guarani Isosefio leader Bonifacio Barrientos capitan grande actually occupies a

Congressman at national level and Marcelino Apurani is the provincial authority

strengthening CABI's regional relationships. The Guarani Isosefio are making progress in

developing practical negotiation capacities develop negotiation capacities.

Contrasting the Common Property (CPR) and Community-Base Management
(CBM) Framework to the Mbayu

It is possible to find a close similarity between the theoretical CPR and CBM

framework and the Guarani Isoseno strategically planning process based on the M~bayu

(Figure 4-2). Nevertheless the Mba~yu is not a fixed theoretical framework it is the result

of practical experience with a long history. Its creators are their own protagonist. The

Guarani Isosefio' s resolution to survive as indigenous peoples is the 2bayu' s main







71



obj ective. The Ivi lyamnbae or land without owner or the "land without evil" has guided

the Guarani through centuries. They fight to reach self governance in a territory shaped


by different social and ecological systems. The elements of the M~bayu are tied to each

other and they are part of the all spheres of Guarani Isosefio life. The Mba~yu is also a


political decision.


Contrasting the CPR & CBM framework to the CABI planning (?)


Common Property Community Base Mbayu
Management Framework Moafiete-Identity; Arakus -Knowledge;
Mborerekua-Unity; lyambae- Autoramy;
I it a 121; J B1Erk 1989; Ostrom 1990, 1992) Yandeyarigui- Origin
Governance : Social and Ecological Systems Territory: Common Land and
(Ewrkes 2114, -llll Lane and McDonald 2005, Ostrom 1999)NaulReors

Clearly deistil-1 meler up (1anderekO Communal~lfe cooperation. assemble. convite
Past li sflil epleriene Identty, without owner, knowledge
Lea1-r ilip Group
andInerst CharacteriStiCS *Historical defense of territory: ttling of
Loa kn1 I 11 communal lands, Kasr lya NP and TCO
boundaries.
MOS *Management planning based on natral and
Na~ra Resorcessocial characteristics .
rt BoundarieS *Kaa lya NP and TCO ecological zoning:
I 1-l itlarlarlevaluaton of ecolog cal and social systems.
and S*II
MbaapO *Sustainable productive experiences,
te or g-t ll-st rI Educaton, Knowledge and learning
Fu sarin 111: Institutional
Coif~litres Itin1 alran ement & *Insttton-bulldlng and organlzatonal
iol 1 tori strength.
Ent uemnt it ur st, a r normative regime Tekoata .Capacitatng and participation of Guaran,
A liritablip~ Iscseeto rrembers.
*Rules and Internal agreements

In titlons r Reainhpwt CABI and its external relationships:
Et risI up, the external Neemoai *Other indigenous and grassroots
organizatons Government, private sector,
Leve -I Iupp rt & institutions osa




Figure 4-2. Guarani Isosefio Strategically Planning Based on Mba~yu Contrasting to
Common Property and Community Base Management Theories.

CABI is a strong grassroots organization that decided to keep communal land as a


central element in their subsistence as indigenous people. They do not deny improving


the well being of their communities and therefore they have a vision of themselves as the


M~bayu. The M~bayu incorporates the main principles to maintain social unity and allow

live in comoono t the Guarani Isosefio as social unity and live in a common territory.











On the other hand I argue that the M~bayu is a vision that encompasses a political

dimension and decision making mechanisms. The Mba~yu is a conscientious political

decision related to their subsistence as Guarani Isosefio people, it is a life project. The


M~bayu is a practical and historical experience and the communities are the responsible

stakeholders (Figure 4-3).


Common Property Community
Base Management Framework
IArrawal 21:1:1; Berb es 1989; Ostrorn 199:1, 1992)

Governance : Social and
Ecological Systems ieerkes 2004.
200:5, Lane and Mclonald 21:05, O:strorn 1999)


Mbayu and Territory:
Guarani-Isoseno vision and planning based
on the Nande-reko (life in community).

Common property of land and natural
resources
Practical experience. Responsible of
Political decisions


Rande-reko social &ecological system
Identity;
Unity, cooperation group work,
Autonomy, not-owner;
Traditional knowledge;
Common origins

Self Governance local institutions
Ilndividual-household
Communal assemble and M~buruviche
communities are the main stakeholders -
CABI and Great Assemble are the political
decision-maker.

Partnerships and co-responsibility


Concerned with environmental
management

Recognizing the local communities' role L/
for the development and
implementation of environmental policies '

Enabling local participation
more context-sensitive planning


External directive and objectives


Figure 4-3. Contrasting the Garani Isosefio Mlbayu and the Common Property and Community-
Base Management Framework.

The NTandereko is a social and ecological fabric embracing the main social


principles in a specific landscape or territory which includes the land and ecosystems.

The autonomy or self governance is a central element to the Guarani Isosefios and they

are strengthening their traditional institutions in the changing context they seek for

external co-responsible partnerships that support their Mbayu.















CHAPTER 5
CATTLE RANCHING INT ISOSO

Cattle raising is the largest land use in the TCO-Isoso. The regional land use plan

of Santa Cruz Department (PLUS) recommends extensive cattle ranching as the main

productive activity on the Santa Cruz Chaco and farming and protection on the river

banks of Parapeti river (PLUS 1995). According to Combes (1999) and Alb6 (1992),

once livestock were introduced by the karaik~~~~kkkkk~~~~kkkk in the middle of the nineteenth century, this

radically changed the life in Isoso. Since that point, the history of Isoso has been a history

of conflicts between the Isosefios and the cattle ranchers. In spite of this, this one sees a

growing number of cows belonging to Isosefio in the communities.

At present, cattle ranching activities are in the hands of two different social groups:

1) Guarani Isosefio cattle ranching characterized by the customary and legal communal

land ownership; and 2) the private landholders characterized by individual private land

ownership regime.

The Expansion of Cattle Ranching in Isoso

Three phases of cattle ranching expansion can be identified in Isoso:

* The conquest of original peoples' territories ("la conquista de la vaca"). Since the
colonial period with the implementation in the 1950's of Bohan plan

* The "Bolivian agrarian modernization" private livestock production nourished by
the State and international cooperation. From the 1950's to the beginning of the
1990's

* The "big cattle ranching proj ects" characterized by the introduction of communal
livestock projects founded by NGOs and churches in the Isoso.









A brief description of each of them helps to understand the present cattle ranching

situation in Isoso.

The Conquest of Original Peoples' Territories "La Conquista de la Vaca"

In Bolivia, cattle expansion has been associated with the extension of the

conquerors' power and then the Republican (Govemnment) occupation of the original

people's territories. First the missionary, then the military and private interests introduced

cattle as a way to "civilize" and conquer the aboriginal cultures. According to Saravia

Toledo (n/d), cattle livestock were introduced in the Chaco forest after the mid-1700s by

the Franciscan missions. After Bolivian independence (1825) the Chaco region of the

country was designated for livestock production. As an incentive, the government offered

one square legua (5.6 square kilometers or approximately 3.5 square miles) to whomever

occupied the area. The deepest penetration was through the Parapeti and Pilcomayo rivers

to the East. The Isoso is not an exception to this pattern, despite a long resistance which

denied the religious missions access and repelled the colonial and Republican military.

Finally during the 1840s or 1850s cattle were introduced by a Mr. Mercado, a criollo or

"karaik~~~~kkkk~~~~kkkk (Combes 1999). According to testimony collected by Combes (1999), Mr.

Mercado come to Isoso as a young person and lived among the Isosefio. As an adult, he

introduced the first head of cattle and opened the Isoso to other cattle ranchers who came

to Isoso with their cows and laborers. The cattle invaded Indigenous' farming, gathering

and hunting areas. The growth in number and extension of ranches limited the Isosefios'

access to land and natural resources that they previously had access to. And worst of all,

ranchers came with the intention to reproduce the "criollo" hierarchical system within the

Isoso, which the Isosefio had to continually resist. Combs (1999) relates how cattle









ranchers intended to impose themselves as captains in the communities, or tried to

incorporate the Isosefio people as laborers in the hacienda system.

Modernization: Cattle Ranching Subsidized by the Bolivian State

Since 1960s under the banner of "modernization," a gradual expansion toward the

Chacoan plain was officially stimulated by the Bolivian government which granted the

land and infrastructure for livestock production. For example, during this time the

government built water reservoirs and wells to stimulate cattle ranching, particularly

northwest of the actual TCO-Isoso (in the area knowing as M\~edanosd~~~~~ddddd~~~~ Fociles or "Arenales

de los Guanacos) (Saravia -Toledo 1996). During the military governments in the 1970s

and 1980s land and monetary resources were distributed through a web of corruption.

Close friends and family members of the military elite received vast expanses of land and

credit (credit which never had to be repaid, and which led the "Banco Agricola" to

bankruptcy). According to Romero (2005), almost seven million hectares were

distributed during the Banzer military government (1971 to 1978). In the Chacoan

province of Cordillera one individual could receive more than one "mega-parcel" of land,

for example, the well known Gutierrez family received five parcels with a total of 96,874

hectares in the Santa Cruz Chacoan region (Romero 2005).

During my visits to Isoso, I had participated in the relaxed chatter that accompanied

drinking tea at my host families. In Pikirenda several neighbors shared with me their

stories about: "thousands of cows grazing on the neighboring plain" and great "feasts at

Otto Le6n ranch". The men were peons at Mr. Le6n' s ranch a close friend of that time

President Banzer. Surrounding the community of Rancho Viejo, one can see the evidence

of the ranchers' "good times": Otto Le6n' s abandoned infrastructure, machinery, cleared

land, and water channels. The community itself was completely surrounded by ranches









which limited access to natural resources and livelihood sources (Combes 1999; Albo

1990). Therefore, it is possible to understand why Rancho Viejo is the poorest

community today (Beneria-Surkin 2003).

Over time many of the great private ranchers like Otto Le6n have collapsed.

Without subsidies from the BancoB~~~~BBBBB~~~~BBBB Agricola, and after overgrazing the pastures, they

could not survive economically (personal comment of veterinarian Mr Eurlet).The

"golden era" passed, but the peons and "cowboys" settled in the Isoso establishing the

Karai Isoso, sharing their attachment to cattle ranching activities and poverty with the

Isosefio.

More recently, since 1995, some Mennonite colonies have been established. The

first Mennonite arrived in Bolivian territory between 1954 and 1962, together with other

colonizers (colonies of Russians, Eastern Europeans, and Japanese were also set up).

These foreign colonizers were seen as means to ensure the modernization of lowland

agriculture. Therefore, they received several incentives to colonize new areas and clear

the forest. Even though cattle raising is not a main productive activity for the Mennonite,

they have significant herds. The Mennonite land management system is actually

questioned by some because their agricultural practices are highly destructive of soil

properties (Linzer 1998, CABI, FII and WCS 2001).

Big Projects and the Cattle Raising Incentive Among Isosefios

The "Big proj ects" ("Los Grandes Proyectos") phase began in 1995 with the

Kovei proj ect which fenced 6,781 has for communal livestock production. Since 1995

nine big proj ects have been supported by different resources and implemented through

NGOs working with community members. NGOs such as CIPCA and APCOB together

with the Catholic and Evangelical churches are the most influential promoters of cattle









ranching within Isosefio. At present the government of the Autonomous Community of

Valencia is a main sponsor of cattle ranching proj ects in Isoso, supporting proj ects in

Kopere(s), San Silvestre and Yapiroa. The general outputs of those projects have been

more fenced area, water wells, rustic water reservoirs and cowboys' shelters, leading to

the introduction of more herds of cattle. Proj ects have not yet achieved their objectives:

communal production of commercial meat.

The "big projects" introduced cattle by different ways, but often by buying one or

more bulls with proj ect funds, while the community's members contributed heifers.

Barahona (2005) relates how dairy cows were introduced through 25 pregnant Holland

cows. Each person who received one of those cows had in turn to give one pregnant cow

to another community member and so on. As a result there are 45 Holland -cows in Isoso

today (Barahona 2005).

The Isosefios Cattle Ranching

Many Isosefio have begun independently raising livestock as a complementary

subsistence activity. Cattle is introduced by individual initiative among the Guarani-

Isosefio people via different means: buying or receiving them as wages from neighboring

ranchers; or as a pay for taking care of the cattle herd of family or communal neighbors,

who live or work in the city (Barahona 2005). The 2004 cattle census registered the

number of cattle per owner, as well as some management characteristics, which are

summarized in Table 5-1. According to the data among the Isosefio three main cattle

ownership regimes can be differentiated:

* Individual cattle ownership (under free grazing or fenced management systems)
* Communal cattle ownership (under free grazing or fenced management); and
* Family or group cattle ownership under fenced management.








78



Table 5-1. Number of Isosefios Owners and Number of Head of Cattle by Type of

Property Regime by Community in Isoso.
Cattle Cattle Family
No. individual individually conununally owned
Conununity Population owners owned owned cows
Owners
Owners Using
Free Big Free Free
grazing projects Grazing Fenced grazing
cows fences cows cows cows Fenced
1 Isiporenda 300 31 171 67


4
3


48
3 176


Karapari
Kopere Guazu
Kopere Montenegro
Kopere Brecha
Kopere Loma
Kapeatindi
Yapiroa*
Ivasiriri
La Brecha*
Tamachindi

Koropo
Pikirenda*

Aguaraigua
Rancho Viejo*
Rancho Nuevo
Yovi

Yuqui*
Mini
San Silvestre
Paraboca
Kuarirenda

Aguarati
Guandare*
Joseravi
Tetarembei


10
20 20


8 6 31 50
7 96
17 87
30 703a
40 510
51 529,
6 114
8 74 64 300
8 189
18 94
10 121a
16 238
33 230
0 0
2 49
40 635
7 107
18 14 382 60
15 7 296 180
4 490
8 15
9 320"
393 104 5,695 610

Total owners 497 Total head of cattle


13
15
48




47
10
27
7
11
0
0
0
10
10
0
10
10
25
10




283

8,314


277
217
493
435


31
102
90
586
338


158
13
6,363


928 798


TOTAL


Source CABI data base June 2005; Barahona 2005

a. Data of Yapiroa, La Brecha, Rancho Viejo and Tetarembei lvere uncompleted, having the name of owners but not the
number of cattle. I understand that data were introduced latter, and Barahona 2005 includes the general number of cattle
heads for those communities. I used her general data, in bold italics in this table.


The Individual Cattle Ownership Regime


The maj ority (76% of the total) of the Isosefio herd is individually owned.


According to my interviews, cattle are assigned to different members within the










household as a means to secure an effective source of cash for each person. I take into

account a total of 300 owners registered in the CABI databases (Table 5-2) to calculate

the median and the mode of herd of cattle per person. The median is seven head of cattle

per owner, and the mode two head of cattle per owner. The maximum number of cows

belonging to one individual is 263 head (in Guandare).

Table 5-2. Distribution of Individual Cattle Ownership.
Percent of
Number of head of Number of Percent of total cattle
Cattle per owner owners owners Total cattle herd
1-5 127 42% 373 9%
6-10 73 24% 591 14%
11-15 43 14% 573 14%
16-20 17 6% 325 8%
21-50 24 8% 725 17%
51-75 8 3% 561 13%
76-100 3 1% 237 6%
101< 5 2% 798 19%
Total 300 100% 4,183 100%

Source CABI data base June 2005

It is important to notice that 66% of owners have between one and ten head of

cattle. 6% of the owners have more than 50 head of cattle. There is an indicator of

possible wealth accumulation. The social impacts resulting from this situation must be

studied. There are differences among individuals and communities but, in general, herd

management is almost absent. The largest part of those herds (89%) is freely grazing on

the communal land, invading the farming plots, river banks and household areas (field

observation). This situation should be regulated because so many free grazing cows are

overgrazing the communal forest and grasslands. This is a challenge to the Guarani

institutions that should regulate it. On the other hand individually owned herd (11% of


I do not take in account data of Yapiroa, La Brecha and Rancho Viejo because I did not have access to the
detailed data of those communities. I use the data of Barahona 2005 to complete table 5.1










individual ownership cows) is located inside the communal fences (Table 5-1). Free

grazing herds can be grouped only during the dry season when the cows seek water and

then the communal water-reservoirs are the only source for the cattle (Saravia Toledo

personal comment, Barahona 2005 and field observation).

Therefore, cattle are individually or privately owned but their management depends

on communal resources such as communal water-reservoirs, communal fences and

communal grassland and forest.

The Semi Private-family System

Some Isosefio families or groups of families are able to invest in cattle and fences.

With the approval of the community, the herds are located on communal land, and cattle-

owners do not have ownership rights to the land but have usufruct rights to natural

resources: wild fruit, forage, pasture and water. According to the CABI data base (June

2005) and cattle census (2004) there are 18,824 hectares fenced under this management

system. Around 10 % (798 cows) of the total Isosefios' herd belong to seven family

groups (Table 5-1 and Table 5-3). I did not collect information about the technical

management (sanitary, feed, and reproductive). However, according to the calculated

mean of 23 hectares per cattle head as animal this is an exceedingly extensive managed

sy stem.

The Isosefio Cattle Communal Ownership System

The communal property system is directly related to the big proj ects "Los Grandes

Proyectos". Barahona (2005) includes a description and background of each one of the

nine proj ects established in Isoso. Two main trends can be differentiated. On the one

hand, the herd belongs to the whole community and it is placed in the fenced area of the

communal land (Table 5-1 and Table 5-4). A total of 43,851 hectares were fenced by the










Table 5-3. Family System in Isoso.
No head of Fenced area
Name Community Owners cattle (hectares)
Propieda Karapiti...
Kapeatindi Group of families -494.2
Familia Sacarias
San Silvestre Sacarias Montengro 99 3,528.4
Montenegro
D. Garcia, Nolberta
Propiedad Ipapiao Tamachmndi .346 1,708.4
and Maqulades Castro
San Silvestre/.
Campo Grande Family Sanchez -8,162.7
Koropo
Fortaleza
Kuarirenda Francisco Sanchez 172 4,930.5
Chunka
Kuarirenda 181-
Guandare..
Aguarati Group of familhes--
Total 798 18,824.1
Source: CABI data base June 2005

big proj ects; within this area a total of 928 head of cattle are owned and managed

communally. As was mentioned before, these fences, infrastructure and head of cattle

were sponsored by NGOs: CIPCA 16%, APCOB 35% and the government of Valencia

sponsoring the 49% of total fenced areas. The second trend refers to those cows in

communal ownership that are freely grazing (Table 5-1). Those herds belong to 17

different communities and 70% of them were acquired though the PRAC program (CABI

database 2005).

The "Big Proj ects" have generally had the same strategy: to build the infrastructure

- including fences, water wells, and other facilities and to introduce "reproductive bulls."

The life time of proj ect implementation and technical support is two years on average.

After the NGO's support finished few communities find their own way to organize the

cattle ranching production. Frequently the proj ects are almost abandoned.

In Isisporenda the Yaitarenda proj ect left 20 heifers and one bull (stallion) today

they have 67 head of cattle. Yaitarenda proj ect in Isiporenda has an animal charge of

















Table 5-4. Cattle Ranching Proj ects.


Proj ect-name Community Sponsor Situation Cattle Cattle Total Fenced area
Head Head cattle (hectars)
Communal Private


378


Guaripaku


Kovei


Karumbei

oo Comunidad
~3Guaricusari

Aguarati

Yateirenda
Isiporenda
Yapiroa
Propiedad
SanSilvestre

Rancho Nuevo

Rancho
Nuevo2
Total


Kopere (4)

Koropo, Yovi,
Aguaraigua

Kuarirenda


Kopere (4)

Aguarati

Isiporenda

Yapiroa
San Silvestre

Rancho Nuevo

Rancho Nuevo


20 398


300 450


10,596.64


6,781.15


1,186.97

2,830.84

7,486.95

4,279.78
637.5

9,833.73

159.68

28.72

43,821.96


APCOB


APCOB

CIPCA/PDPI

APCOB

CIPCA

GV

GV


610 1538


Source CABI data base 2005










1 11.7 hectares per head of cattle and Guaripaku proj ect in Kopere has an animal charge

of 26.6 hectares per head of cattle. These high numbers are related to poor management.

Land Use by Cattle Ranching Ownership Regime and Management System

Table 5-5 shows that free grazing individual cattle are the most numerous, as well

as using the most extensive area, without control over where the animals forage, when

they give birth, etc. Owners expend the minimum effort, time and resources on their herd.

Among the main problems of big proj ects are (1) the implementation of cattle

ranching technology without observation of the Chaco ecological conditions, (2) the short

term support that do not allow develop local institutions, and (3) absence of

commercialization strategy. Despite that, the Isosefios accept big proj ects because they

bring more heads of cattle and infrastructure such as fences and water well which are

high valued by the communities.

Table 5-5. Number of Head of Cattle and Land Use by Ownership Regime and
Management System in the Guarani-Isoso.
Cattle Individual Cattle Communal Cattle Family Total
Ownership Ownership Ownership Cattle
Regime / Ownership
Management Free Fenced (1) Free Fenced (1) Fenced (2)
system grazing grazing
No. Head of
Cattle 5,695 610 283 928 798 8,314
Land Use
(hectares) 68,340 3,396 43,851 18,824 134,411
Hectares/head
of cattle 12 12 47.3 23.6 16.17
Note (1) the individual cattle fenced is located inside of the communal ownership fenced area. (Source: CABI
data base June 2005).

The individual herds inside communal fences, 610 head of cattle which belong to

104 owners (Barahona 2005 and CABI data base, June 2005) seems to be an interesting

trend. According to Barahona (2005) and Arambiza (interviewed in summer 2005), some









communities are establishing norms to use communal fences. For example, in Kovei the

Isosefio's private cattle use the fenced area and their owners pay monthly per head to the

communal administration.

The Private Landholders in the Isoso

Cattle ranching by private landholders is the most extensive activity overall in

TCO-Isoso. A complete private landholder's register should result from the SAN-TCO

process. The partial information was available through FII technical office and is

summarized in Table 5-6.

Table 5-6. Cattle Ranching Systems Non-Guarani Isosefio in the Isoso.
Polygon/ category Number of Total Area Head of Agriculture
owner (ha) cattle (ha)
POLYGON 1
Agroindustry Cattle ranching 11 64,677 6,333 12, 117
Mennonite Colony 2 23,866 3,700 8,000
Privates 40 106,706 12,542 1,183
Cattle ranching 34 87,625 10,152
Mixed 6 19,081 2,390 1,183
Subtotal 53 195,249 22,575 21,300
POLYGON 3
Mennonite Colonies 4 44,217 13,392 8,000
Privates Cattle ranching 26 115,561 11,804 336
Peasant-Agriculture 4 433
Subtotal 34 160,211 25,196 8,336
POLYGON 4
Military 1 11,918 200 100
Privates Cattle ranching 29 104,185 16,294
Subtotal 30 116,103 16,494 100
POLYGON 5
Private Cattle ranching 44 269,378 36,555
Subtotal 44 269,378 36,555
TOTAL 161 740,941 100,820 29,736

Source preliminary data Saneamiento TCO Isoso
FII-CABI









Data reveal that there are two main types of private cattle ownership systems. On

one hand, there is the individual cattle ranching system that includes the extensive

traditional cattle ranches, the mixed-ranches with agricultural forage as food supplement

and the agro-industry. On the other hand, there is the Mennonite cattle ranching System

differentiated by the collective organization of production and strong social fabric inside

the colonies.

Individual Cattle Ranching System

According to Linzer (1998) as well as the preliminary data of TCO-Isoso titling

process (SAN-TCO-Isoso) the cattle ranches with extensive management are located on

the Southern area of the TCO-Isoso (polygons 3 and 5) while the "mixed ranches" and

agro-industry are generally located on the Northern part (polygons 1 and 4). Different

ecological and socioeconomic factors influence this pattern. Firstly, ecological factors

such as the annual rainfall regime that varies from SE to NW from 475 mm to 1000mm

annual rainfall. Rainfall patterns are associated with different natural forage availability.

Secondly, the distance and access to the main cities influence the commercialization

opportunities. The northern area is closer to Pailon and Santa Cruz which are most

important agro-industrial developed areas in Bolivia. The southern areas are more

isolated and the access is too difficult on the rain season.

Cattle ranches in the Southern areas practice more extensive cattle ranching, an

activity with low yield complementing other livelihood strategies (Linzer 1998). The herd

is frequently free-ranging with poor management, without control over livestock

movements or genetic selection. The criollo race predominates because it resists the

extended dry season (CABI 2001). The cattle is sold year round but principally in the dry









season. The cattle is transported on the hoof by truck to the commercial areas of Santa

Cruz and Chuquisaca (cattle ranchers comments).

Concordant with south-north ecological transition, cattle ranching systems tend to

shift from extensive to mixed cattle ranching. Mixed cattle ranching in this area is

characterized by cultivated grass, fenced areas, application of breeding, health and feed

technologies. This activity is influenced by the agro-industry located in the northern areas

of the TCO-Isoso (Polygons 1 and 4), which is characterized by the high investment in

machinery and infrastructure. The private properties in those areas are generally large,

between 2,000 hectares and 15,000 hectares. The administration and management are

handled by full-time technicians as well as temporary personnel during the harvest

season. The market oriented production is linked with the credit system and main

markets in Santa Cruz and Pailon.

The Mennonite System

Mennonites have been established in two areas of the TCO Isoso (Table 3-4 and

Table 5-6). In the South between the Isosefio communities oflIsiporenda and the town of

Charagua (Polygon 3), four Mennonite colonies were established in 1995: Pinondy,

Pinondy Itaguazurenda, Casa Grande and Durango. Two other colonies, La Milagrosa,

and Santa Clara, were established later in the Northern part of the TCO Isoso (polygonl).

The population of all together is approximately 10,000 peoples. Commercial agriculture

is their main activity and livestock is a complement, however, it is intensively-managed.

Altogether, the Mennonites have 17,092 head of cattle (database CABI May 2006 and

personal comment Castillo).









Table 5-7. Demographic and Productive Characteristics of Mennonite Colonies in the
Isoso.
Colonia Homes Population AreaCattle AreaAgric Cattle (a) AreaTotal
(c) (c) (ha) (b) (ha) (a) (ha) (a)
Poligon 3
Pinondi 300 2,700 9,800 2,800 4,500 15,800
Pinondi
Itaguazurenda 164 1,472 6,500 1,800 2,600 8,000
Durango 374 3,366 11,480 2,400 4, 195 13,980
Casa Grande 109 981 5,437 1,000 2,097 6,437
Sub total 947 8,519 33,217 8,000 13,392 44,217
Poligone 1
La Milagrosa 353 3,278 6,400 8,000 1,200 16,245
Santa Clara 166 1,491 6,035 ;,..? 2,500 7,621
Sub total 519 4,769 12,435 8,000 3,700 23,866
TOTAL 1,466 13,288 45,652 16,000 17,092 68,083
Sources:(a) preliminary data SAN-TCO. (b) CABI-FII Oscar Castillo comments. (c) INE
national census 2002


Mennonites raise dairy cattle for auto consume, butter and cheese industry. Among

Mennonites women are responsible for the herd of cattle. Strong cultural believes limit

men's participation in cattle raising activities. Despite that fact, there is evidence that

some Mennonites are shifting to more cattle ranching activities in the northern part of the

TCO Isoso (field visit 2003). One Mennonite was interviewed and he identified the

subsequent poor harvest and dry season as major motivation to shift from agricultural

production to more cattle ranching production. Many Mennonites have preferred selling

their land before adopting more cattle ranching activities because this shift implies

significant cultural changes. Those Mennonites who are raising more cattle are buying

more land to expand the cattle ranching activity. Consequently, those Mennonite-ranchers

are increasing their plot size and becoming more individual owners.









Ecological and Socioeconomic Effects

There is evidence of overgrazing and soil erosion caused by the herd of cattle in the

Isoso (Leon 2003; Winer 2003; Navarro 1998, 2002; Guerrero 2002). The Isosefio's free

grazing cattle contribute to the overgrazing in more extensive area using 71,736 hectares.

Two main elements contribute to the overgrazing in Isoso, the first is directly related to

the management system and the second is related to the natural condition of the dry

Chaco.

On one hand, the livestock in Isoso has been characterized as "unmanaged"

(Linzer, 1998; Saravia Toledol996, personal comments2002). "Unmanaged" means that

livestock have been generally under-rotated, temporally or locally overstocked, without

sanitary and reproductive control. On the other hand, the rainy season in the Chaco is

concentrated at the end of spring and summer (September to February), and is

characterized by a high variability inter-annually, seasonally, and monthly. That means a

high fluctuation of grass production from year to year. Therefore, variability and

unpredictability are part of the Chaco climate.

The forage-resources in the Chaco are numerous and belong to different strata:

arboreal, shrub and herbaceous (Saravia Toledo 1994; Avila 2002). Saravia-Toledo

(1994) indicates that in "El Salvador" an experimental cattle ranch in the Bolivian

Chaco it was observed that cattle consume foliage, fruits, twigs or entire plants of 11

arboreal species, 20 shrubs, 66 herbaceous non-grasses and 50 grasses. Despite of that

variability and that the Isosefio herds occupy extensive woodlands and grassland areas,

the herds in Isoso tend to congregate in some areas because, as other herbivore-ungulates,

they forage selectively (Saravia Toledo 1994; Gordon 2004) and because they seek water

sources which are scarce in the Chaco dry forest (Adamoli 1972; Saravia Toledo 1994










personal comment 2002; Linzer 1998). In others words, the cattle concentrate in some

areas where the grass is more palatable and where water is available. Consequently those

areas become overgrazed.

According to Saravia Toledo (1996), Navarro and Avila (in Guerrero 2002), Leon

(2002) the maj or effects related to overgrazing are: Soil-compaction, degradation and loss

of forage resources, transformation of the landscape due to the invasion of woody

elements in the grassland, changes in the vegetation composition and habitat degradation

for the wild animals and change in vegetation composition due the alteration of

vegetation regeneration, the limited natural re-growth of palatable species, favoring the

non-palatable.

The riverine forest is one of the ecosystems more pressured by the free Isosefio

cattle. For example, an evaluation of that forest resource shows that the natural re-growth

of mesquite (Prosopis chilensis) is threatened by the cattle grazing, and to find specimens

under 30 years of age in some areas of Isoso is almost impossible today (Leon, 2003).

The new community of Tetarembai was established in the area of the Bu Ii( a dm dellsoso

(wetland). Their cattle ranching development is a threat for this important ecosystem.

In the social terrain, data reveals that few individuals only 3% of the owners are

accumulating individual wealth in form of cattle and they are using considerable area in

the communal land. There is not information about social consequences from this fact

even though it is possible expect differences in power relations. In the other hand cattle is

an important livelihood in general the Isosefio are expecting to raise more cattle they are

seeking for more cattle ranching proj ects.




Full Text

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THE CHALLENGE OF CA TTLE RANCHING TO COMMON PROPERTY: A CASE STUDY IN THE ISOSO, BOLIVIA. By VERONICA VILLASENOR A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2007

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Copyright 2007 by Veronica Villasenor

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To Diego and Laura, whose love made lif e more meaningful. They have been my inspiration to believe in conservation and deve lopment as an alternative for a better world for them and the next generation. This dedicat ion is also for my family, Elisa(s), Laura and Carlos, whose love and support have b een always unconditional. To the IsoseoGuarani people who introduced me to part of their andereko

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iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks to my thesis committee. Gre nville Barnes, Carmen Diana Deere and Ignacio Porzecanski for their guidance and patience. To Ignacio Porzecanski for the intellectual support he provided and for his he lpful advice. Thanks to Andrew Noss for his willingness to step in at s hort notice to read this thesis. Thanks also to my children Diego and Laur a, without their love I would not have survived this process. Special thanks to Cece Noss who has supported my writing over the first drafts. My studies in Gainesville were founded by Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and a Tropical Conservation and Developmen t Program (TCD) Fellowship supported me during part of write-up process. In Bolivia, there are so many people to tha nk. Thanks to WCS, Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the Ivi Iyambae Founda tion for facilitating my research and to Andy Noss, Zulema Barahona, Oscar Castillo, Erick Eulert, Jose Avila and Veronica Calderon for their valuable advice. In Is oso I would like to th ank Felicia, Juanita, Isadora, Crecencio, Ilda. Thanks to WCS and CABI administrative team.

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v TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv LIST OF TABLES...........................................................................................................viii LIST OF FIGURES...........................................................................................................ix ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ..x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the Isoso.................................................1 Research Questions.......................................................................................................2 Methods........................................................................................................................3 Structure of the Thesis..................................................................................................5 2 COMMON PROPERTY AND THE EXPA NSION OF CATTLE RANCHING: LITERATURE REVIEW.............................................................................................8 Security of Tenure and Property Rights Arguments.....................................................8 The Common Property Argument a nd Community-Based Conservation..................11 Common Property and Indigenous People.................................................................16 Factors Favoring the Expansion of Cattle Ranching..................................................20 Increase in Consumption.....................................................................................21 Market-Driven Changes in Production Practices................................................21 Livestock Production-Geographic Shift..............................................................24 Government Incentives........................................................................................24 Cattle Ranching as a Complement to the Rural Livelihood Strategy of the Poor..................................................................................................................25 National Context and Bolivian Lowlands...................................................................26 3 THE ISOSO AND STAKEHOLDERS......................................................................30 The Isoso and the Gran Chaco....................................................................................30 The Guarani Isoseo Communities............................................................................36 The Guaran Way of Life : The andereko .........................................................37 Guaran-Isoseno Communities............................................................................38 The Isoso frontier.........................................................................................38

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vi The Alto Isoso..............................................................................................39 The Central Isoso.........................................................................................39 The Corazn Histrico del Isoso..................................................................39 The Karai-Isoso............................................................................................41 The Bajo Isoso..............................................................................................42 Returning to Isoso........................................................................................42 Land Use in Guaran Isoso..................................................................................42 CABI, the Guarani Isoseo Political Organization.............................................47 Other Stakeholders......................................................................................................47 Cattle Ranches and Agro-Industry......................................................................48 Mennonites..........................................................................................................49 Peasants or Small Farmers...................................................................................51 Institutional Stakeholders....................................................................................51 4 THE ISOSEO IVI IYAMBA E AS COMMON PROPERTY.................................54 andereko : Nature and Characteristics of the Group.................................................55 Moa : Space and Natural Resources Use and Boundaries...........................................58 Tekoata and Mbaapo: Institutional Arrangements and Normative Regime...............62 Rules....................................................................................................................62 Monitoring and Sanctions Iyambae .....................................................................63 Collective Arrangement and Conflict Resolution...............................................65 eemoai : Relationships between the Group and External Forces..............................66 Contrasting the Common Property (CPR) and Community-Base Management (CBM) Framework to the Mbayu ............................................................................70 5 CATTLE RANCHING IN ISOSO.............................................................................73 The Expansion of Cattle Ranching in Isoso...............................................................73 The Conquest of Original Peoples Te rritories La Conquista de la Vaca........74 Modernization: Cattle Ranching Subsidized by the Bolivian State....................75 Big Projects and the Cattle Ra ising Incentive Among Isoseos.........................76 The Isoseos Cattle Ranching....................................................................................77 The Individual Cattle Ownership Regime...........................................................78 The Semi Private-family System.........................................................................80 The Isoseo Cattle Communal Ownership System.............................................80 Land Use by Cattle Ranching Ownership Regime and Management System....83 The Private Landholders in the Isoso.........................................................................84 Individual Cattle Ranching System.....................................................................85 The Mennonite System........................................................................................86 Ecological and Socioeconomic Effects......................................................................88 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS.........................................................91 APPENDIX FIELD QUESTIONNAIRE.........................................................................98 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................101

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vii BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................111

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viii LIST OF TABLES Table page 1-1 Total Interviews..........................................................................................................4 2-1 Different Types of Property Regimes......................................................................11 2-2 Population, Land and Cattle Herd in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Contrasting to World Indexes..................................................................................23 2-3 Cattle Ranching Systems of Meat Production..........................................................23 3-1 Population in the Communities of Isoso..................................................................40 3-2 Main Land Use in Isoso, per Sub-zones...................................................................44 3-3 Private Stakeholders, Not-Isoseo Owners, in the Isoso.........................................48 3-4 Mennonite System in the Isoso................................................................................51 5-1 Number of Isoseos Owners and Number of Head of Cattle by Type of Property Regime by Community in Isoso...............................................................................78 5-2 Distribution of Indivi dual Cattle Ownership............................................................79 5-3 Family System in Isoso............................................................................................81 5-4 Cattle Ranching Projects..........................................................................................82 5-5 Number of Head of Cattle a nd Land Use by Ownership Regime and Management System in the Guaran-Isoso...............................................................83 5-6 Cattle Ranching Systems Non-Guaran Isoseo in the Isoso...................................84 5-7 Demographic and Productive Characte ristics of Mennonite Colonies in the Isoso.........................................................................................................................87

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ix LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1-1 Map of the Isoso and the Kaa Iya National Park in the Santa Cruz Gran Chaco.......2 2-1 Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights and Potential Role of the Mbayu ...............9 2-2 The Common Property and Comm unity Based Resource Management Framework...............................................................................................................13 2-3 Distribution of Poor Live stock Keepers Worldwide. ..............................................26 3-1 Location of the Communities in the Alto y Bajo Isoso............................................31 3-2 Annual Rainfall in Charagua....................................................................................32 3-3 Map of the TCO-Isoso and Loca tion of Different Stakeholders..............................35 3-4 Land Use in the Frontier and Alto Isoso (Sub-zone 1 & 2).....................................46 3-5 Land Use in the Central, Historic H eart and Kara and Bajo Isoso (Sub-zone3, 4 and 5)........................................................................................................................46 4-1 Guaran-Isoseo Strategically VisionMbayu ..........................................................56 4-2 Guaran Isoseo Strategically Planning Based on Mbayu Contrasting to Common Property and Community Ba se Management Theories............................71 4-3 Contrasting the Garani Isoseo Mbayu and Common Property and CommunityBase Framework.......................................................................................................72 6-1 A Cattle Ranching Strategy based on the Guarani Isoseo Mbayu.........................92

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x Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts THE CHALLENGE OF CATTLE RANC HING TO COMMON PROPERTY: A CASE STUDY IN THE ISOSO, BOLIVIA By Veronica Villasenor May 2007 Chair: Grenville Barnes Major Department: Latin American Studies The Isoseos live along the Parapeti River in th e eastern lowlands of Bolivia. Like many other indigenous groups in Latin America, th ey share a common property territory and their main organizational structures are well developed. These structures, particularly the communal asambleas and the strong inter-institutional links between Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the external world, have allowe d them to adapt and incorporate their economic strategies but still maintain their andereko (the Guarani way of life) and the Mbayu (vision as People). Cattle ranching is the principal productive activ ity in the area and it is also the main ecological concern because it leads to overgra zing. The goal of this research was to understand the forces contributing to the expans ion of cattle ranching in the Isoso as well as their effects on the Guarani Isoseos common property institutions and natural resources. I examined the Guaran -Isoseo institutions based on their Mbayu vision within the Common Property and Community Based Management frameworks. I

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xi employed individual and group interviews to ga ther data and participated in several community meetings. The participant observa tion approach and research of secondary documents helped me to understand their livi ng conditions as well as their demographic and production systems. Through group interv iews with community members I explored issues such as access to natura l resources on common land as well as the role of cattle in the Isoseos life. At the community level, the Isoseo pe ople are concerned with problems that accompany the expansion of cattle ranching, including the increas ed pressure on land and natural ecosystems such as the riverine forests. Certain communities are taking specific decisions to regulate the presence and imp act of cattle. Because cattle ranching as a productive activity was only relativ ely recently adopted by the Is oseos, it is essential for them to adapt local institutions and norms, and establish monitoring systems to balance economic benefits with the maintenance of the ecological integrity of the Chaco ecosystem. Cattle-raising will continue to play a part in the Isoso because it complements the livelihood of the communities, providing prot ein and income. Cattle ranching can also contribute to socioeconomic development, and, if the management is sustainable, it could support a biodiversity conserva tion strategy in their communal land Tierra Comunitaria de Origen (TCO) Isoso. In contrast to i ndustrial agriculture with its concomitant deforestation, cattle-ranching can be a less thre atening activity, and for this reason it is included as a central element in the CA BI and Isoseos development strategy.

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1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the Isoso The study site of this thesis is the Alto y Bajo Isoso (Isoso) the home of 10,000 Guarani-Isoseo people living in more than 20 communities along the banks of the Parapeti River (Figure 1-1). Like many other indigenous gr oups in Latin America, the Isoseos share a common property territory. I have been connected with the Isoso since the end of 1997 when I began my work as the coordina tor of the Kaa Iya National Park (KNP) management plan. The Guarani Isoseo political organization, Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI), was the leader of that planni ng process. Since then, my interest in indigenous peoples has emerged through my anal ysis of conservation issues. During that process, planning was viewed as social mobilization because it was focused on the perspective of those most a ffected by the protected area administration the local population. For this reason, I de veloped a deep concern for the process of conservation and development in the Bolivian Chaco. The Isoso and KNP is part of the region of the Gran Chaco in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The Bolivian Gran Chaco is ecologically significant worldwide because it is one of the few remaining well conserved dry tropical forest s and it protects important endemic species of flora and fauna (Navarro et al 1998). A regional evaluation made by Nature Serve (2006) consided the dry Gran Chaco as a priority site for conservation. Cattle ranching is the principal productive activ ity in the area (PLUS 1996; CI PCA 1997; CABI 2001) It is

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2 also the main ecological concern because it leads to overgrazing (S aravia Toledo et al. 1996; Navarro 1998, 2002; Taber, Na varro and Arribas 1997). The objective of this research is to un derstand the forces contributing to the expansion of cattle ranching in the Isoso as well as their effect on the Guarani Isoseos common property institutions and na tural resource management. Gasbol G a s y r g Figure 1-1. Map of the Isoso and the Kaa Iy a National Park in the Santa Cruz Gran Chaco. (Source: Jose Avila Kaa-Iya Project/CABI) Research Questions The broad question addressed in my research is whether it is possible to develop a cattle ranching strategy that is economically, so cially and ecologically beneficial to the Isoseo community. To attempt to answer this I address several more specific questions: What are the factors contributing to expansion of cattle in the Isoso?

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3 What are the effects of this expansion on common property institutions and natural resources? How does cattle ownership affect access to land and natural resources among the Isoseos? What are the social and ecological cost s of expanding cattle ranching in the community? Who is introducing cattle in the communa l areas in the Isoso and how is it influencing other liv elihood strategies? Methods I have used an ethnographic qualitative method for this research including openended interviews, participant observation and of secondary document s researche (Bernard 1994). I adopted an inductive rese arch approach: departing for the field with the research questions in hand, but once on site maintain ing an open mind (Bernard 1994). This allowed me to deal with dynamic challenges su ch as the cattle ranc hing in Isoso. In many senses I maintained my original questions although some theore tical and practical arguments were formulated resulting from en counters with people at the field site and from the interviews conducted during the summer of 2005 when I visited the Isoso. More specifically, my research involved th e following steps. In Isoso, I participated in community meetings and in the Isoseos daily life, so I could understand their living conditions as well as their demographic and production systems. I employed two different kinds of interviews, one individua l and the other in a group (Table 1-1). I interviewed people from the following four Isoseo communities: Pikirenda, Rancho Nuevo, Ivasiriri and Isiporenda. These comm unities are representativ es of the region (Chapter 4). Through these group interviews wi th community members I explored issues such as access to natural resources on the comm on land as well as the role of cattle in the Isoseos life.

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4 Table 1-1. Total Interviews Community Group interview (total participants) Communal Meeting Key informant Isiporenda 4 Ivasiriri 25 1 2 Rancho Nuevo 15 3 Pikirenda Coropo 20 1 2 Key informant CABI* 6 Group interviews were conducted in three communities as unstructured surveys. Each interview was conducted with 15 to 25 members of each community. Due to the fact that few Isoseos spoke Spanish fluen tly, the communal captain from Ivasiriri and Rancho Nuevo translated questions into Guaran i and responses were th en translated back into Spanish. These interviews were a quick and effective means of gathering data. Women were well represented in all the group interviews. For the individual interviews I interviewed other representatives from CA BI, KNP personnel and others involved in CABI projects. This thesis is not only the result of three months of field research, but also an accumulation of my experiences and contact with Isoseos culture. As a CABI-WSC technical staff member I maintained contact with Guarani leaders and Guarani people, I participated in several assemblies and I s upported CABI in meetings with different authorities and private stakeholders such as cattle ranchers, No Governmental organizations (NGO) and petroleum companies. I visited some cattle ranches neighboring the Isoso. As a member of CABI-WCS, I was part of a research team and had formal contact with scientists and other technicians working in the area. The formal as well as

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5 the informal conversations with community members during tea hour ( porear ) also provided me with valuable insights. Structure of the Thesis The thesis is comprised of seven chap ters. The present chapter (Chapter 1) introduces the problem and the methods used on this research. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on common property and commun ity base natural resource management as well as the main factors linked to the expansion and gl obal integr ation of cattle ranching are identified. Common property theory arose partially as a response to the ideas exposed by Garrett Hardin in his well-known Tragedy of the Commons article (1968). Hardin largely overlooked social institutions and rules among common users and predicted that open access would lead to the destruction of natural resources. According to the main proponents of common property regimes (CPR), Berkes (1989) and Ostrom (1990), CPR are structured ar rangements in which group membership is known, outsiders are excluded, and rules are de veloped and enforce d. Consequently, CPR offer potential for community-based cons ervation (CBC) which could benefit from interdisciplinary science conservation which incorporates a more elaborate understanding of social-ecological inte ractions (Berkes 2004). On the other hand different factors motiv ate the expansion of cattle ranching in Latin America: population growth, changes in consumption patterns, the relation to the market economy, national and internationa l policies favoring cattle ranching. Today, cattle ranching plays two main roles: it is part of a subsistence and food security strategy to millions of poor people. Cattle ranching is also a major international agribusiness supported by national and inte rnational development policie s. No matter which causes,

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6 cattle expansion is one of the greatest pr essures leading to land use change and deforestation in the tropical forests of Latin America. Chapter 3 describes the physical and soci al landscape of the study area, the Tierra Comunitaria de Origen (TCO) Isoso in the Bolivian Chaco. Differe nt stakeholders are described. Special emphasis is given to description and analysis of the Guaran-Isoseos, whose community tenure system is a main characteristic. The Isoseos differ from their neighbors and other stakeholders in terms of ethnicity, historical pr esence in the area, livelihood systems, and culture. However, they have had a long term contact within the market economy as temporary wage workers for harvesting sugar can e, assisting cattle ranchers and other wage jobs. As a result th ey have not been as isolated as other indigenous groups in Latin America. Despite th is history of market activity, the Isoseos maintain a subsistence economy and a strong cultural identity based on common property rights to the land and natural resources the Ivi Iyambae or land without owners. Chapter 4 presents a comparative analysis of the theoretical basis of CPR and CBM frameworks and the development visi on of the Guaran-Isoseos their Mbayu I analyze similarities, coincidences, and cont rasts between the Guaran-Isoseo vision and the CPR/CBM theoretical framework. The purpos e of this comparative analysis is to establish the degree to which the Guar an-Isoseo, through their particular Mbayu conform, practice, and will be able to main tain CPR institutions in the face of cattle expansion. Chapter 5 describes cattle ranching in th e TCO-Isoso. Originally cattle were introduced by the karai (in the Isoseo language the word is used to define white people and criollos). Today 8% of the Isoseo population owns cattle. W ithin the TCO-Isoso

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7 boundaries cattle raising is the main productive activity. Cattle is raised by several private cattle ranchers including Mennonites who a rrived in the mid-1990s, and the recently established agro-industry in the area based on private ow nership of land. Chapter 6 presents my conclusions and recommendations. The main challenge, in Isoso, is to improve and develop cattle ranc hing management systems that will maintain the natural potential of the resources and trad itional social values in a changing context. To make that possible, internal institutions and political organizations need to be adapted to use community governance effectively to develop the economic potential of cattle ranching. Guarni Isoseo political organizati ons must position themselves so as to influence local, departmental, and nationa l policies that favor those changes.

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8 CHAPTER 2 COMMON PROPERTY AND THE EXPA NSION OF CATTLE RANCHING: LITERATURE REVIEW The fruits belong to all and the earth to no one --Rousseau Security of Tenure and Property Rights Arguments A variety of theories and a pproaches regarding property rights and tenure security have been proposedwa which have infl uenced tenure policy, land reform and development programs in developing countries According to Ellsworth (2002), scholars differ in their perception of what tenure secu rity is, who should get it, its virtues for society, and how it is obtained. In addition, empiri cal evidence shows th at there is not a single property regime that is inherently more efficient, optimal or ideal. In developing countries, varying commun ity property rights systems can be found, some of which have survived the colonial er a, despite the attempts to destroy them as well as their natural resource base. In the wo rds of Ellsworth, during all this time the voices of their members have been demandi ng a place in the world emphasizing the nonmarket value of tenure security. Based on the western understanding of efficiency, scholars and policy makers have generally suppo rted property rights as individual, private and tradeable titles. Private property is viewed as the indispensable precondition for economic growth and development, and therefore assumed to be the cause of the prosperity of Western countries. Two main th eories supporting this view can be traced back to Demsetz and Hardin (Figure 2-1). The evolutionary theory of property rights

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9 proposed by Demsetz (1967) and Alchian a nd Demsetz (1973) argues that increasing population pressure and commercialization of ag riculture tend to cause the emergence of private property rights as if it were a natu ral change in land tenure systems with time (Otsuka and Place 2001). Hardin's (1968) trag edy of the commons model predicted the eventual overexploitation or de gradation of all resources a nd proposed that privatization of public holding of resources was the solution. Figure 2-1. Evolutionary Theory of Prope rty Rights and Potential Role of the Mbayu The evolutionary theory has influenc ed the resource management paradigm, including protected areas policies (Maphos a 2002; Richards 1997; Berkes 1989, Brogden, 2003; Piurek 2003) and land reform programs. In the late 1980s and 1990s most countries under the influence of the World Bank promot ed individualized property regimes as the means to achieve higher investment and incr eased productivity. It was argued that more

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10 individualized land tenure regimes would not only allow a greater return on investment but also create a demand for land improveme nts and increase credit worthiness and farmers access to formal credit (Wilson and Nolan 2001; Deininger 2003). At the same time to protect wildlife-rich areas and ev ade the tragedy of the commons the World Bank supported the creation of new protecte d areas and the strengthening of national protected area administration in different countries. Accordin g to this policy, protected areas would evade the tragedy of the comm ons by taking them away from community property and conferring them to state admini stration under a state property regime (West and Brockington 2006). From these points of view, community property and indigenous systems provided inadequate tenure security to obtain the rewards of investments made to improve productivity or conserve biodiversit y. In the context of land markets and land redistribution, it was generally assumed that land would be transferred to the most efficient user. Nevertheless, in more recent times those assumption has been questioned 1 (Jodha 2001; Wilson and Nolan 2001 ). Land titled to private landlords resulted in the smallholder, peasant communities as well as from indigenous peoples loosing access to land and a greater concentration of land among a few landholders (Jodha 1992, 2001; Romero 2003; Scoones 2002; Wilson and Nolan 2001). Furthermore, accumulated evidence and an expanding body of literature have revealed that arbitrary local population exclusion from natural resource manageme nt can have negative effects upon natural resources and their conservation (Jodha 1992, 2001; ILRI 1995; Kolhler-Rollefson 1993) 1 Wilson and Nolan (2001) cite different studies su pporting as the main outcome of land registration programs a decreased incidence of land disputes as a sign of tenure security. However, little relationship could be found between land rights or land title and the use of formal credit; with regards to productivity or farm investments, no relation could be found.

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11 The nature of resource management within ea ch major property regime is summarizes in Table 2-1 below. Table 2-1. Different Types of Property Regimes. Open Access Resource rights are neither ex clusive nor transferable and are owned in common, but openly accessibl e to everyone, and therefore effectively the property of no-one. State Property Ownership and management control is held by the nation state. Access can be severely limited e.g., military areas, government office and buildings, or more open as with state property that is held on behalf of the public e.g., highw ays, navigable rivers, beaches, and forests. Common Property (private and customary) Use rights for the resources are controlled by an identifiable group and are not privately owned or ma naged by governments; there exist rules concerning who may use the resources, as well as who is excluded from using the resources, and how it may be used. Often defined as indivisible, inalienabl e, not open to prescription, and land cannot be attached for mortgage or lien purposes (inembargable). Individual Private Property Use rights to resources is attach ed to land ownership and freely transferable as a market commod ity; in some instances the state imposes minimal management requirements e.g., management plan or plan de ordenamiento predial (POP) in Bolivia Several studies reveal different factors that either enable or in hibit collective action, and demonstrate how, in many cases, local populations are able to find ways to appropriately manage the commons even under relatively complicated and adverse conditions (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990, 1999; Ot suka and Place 2001). While the list of those factors continues to grow, what is clear is that Hardins and Demsetzs predictions are far from the only possible outcomes. Alongside individual private property, different types of property regimes persist worldwide (Table 2-1) The Common Property Argument and Community-Based Conservation Common property activists and academics argue that common natural resources make a significant contribution to the liv elihood and economy of rural people. Common

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12 property resources fill crucial gaps in th e resource and income flows from other resources, provide complementary inputs into agricultural system s, and often supply a major source of livelihoods for indigenous peoples. According to Ellsworth (2000), common property scholars identify the following virt ues of common property: It supports a physical and cultural space that strengthens social links among people across time It can be the most efficient way to manage natural resources It often provides access to survival resources and sustenance (gives a place in the world) to millions of peoples worldwide. Broadly speaking, under common property systems the natural resources are accessible to the whole community and no indi vidual has exclusive property rights (Jodha 1994). Research has shown that under comm on property, the rights of individuals are defined and limited (Jodha 1994; Richards 1997; Otsuka and Place 2001, Berkes 1989, 2004; Ostrom 1990, 1992, 1999). Common property re gimes are structured arrangements in which group membership is known, outside rs are excluded, and rules are developed and enforced. Hence, common property diffe rs from open access. The examination of existing common property regimes shows a number of factors favoring viable and sustainable common property resources (C PR) management. Agrawal (2001: 1653) argues that these factors can be split into four sets of va riables: characteristics of the resources, the nature of groups that depend on resources, the particulars of regimes or institutions through which resources are manage d and the nature of relationships between a group and external forces and authoritie s such as markets, states, and technology (Figure 2-2).

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13 Figure 2-2. The Common Property and Co mmunity Based Resource Management Framework. On the other hand, community-based conser vation (CBC) was defined by Lane and Mc Donald (2005) in general terms, like t he deliberate, progra mmatic decentralization of authority and resources to communiti es for the purposes of environmental management. CBC as an inclusive and people oriented approach to conservation is in part a reaction to the failures of exclusionary conservation (Berkes 2004). It consists of a diverse set of practices, but common con ceptual and operational foundations to this bottom-up vision include (Agrawal and Gibs on 1999; Lane and McDonald, 2005; Berkes 2004): Decentralizing government agencies and in stitutions concerned with environmental management

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14 Recognizing the local communities role for the development and implementation of environmental policies Enabling local participation in mo re context-sensitive planning. Despite the general acceptance of CBC, as a theoretical and practical approach among resources management programs, some conservationists have concerns about the emphasis on community-participation because this emphasis may attenuate the conservation efforts (Campbell et al. 2000). According to Campbell et al. (2000) the institutional control over common resources, which is essential for effective common property resource management, is challenged by the pressure for removing it from the traditional institutional systems based on a complex of norm. The factors, identified as challenges to the CBC and CPR include national policies and legislati on supporting privatization; projects that do not take in account local organization; changing and differentiated household strategies; new connections to markets; the loss of legitimacy of local organizations; and changing resource characteristics. The discussion about the use of CBC and CPR approaches, Berkes (2004), Agrawal and Gibson (1999), Ostrom (1999 and 2006) a nd Lane and Mac Donald (2005) express concern about the conceptualization of a co mmunity which is generally defined as community as a distinct, relatively homogenous, spatially fixed social group that shares a consciousness of being a community and which is characterized by consensus and solidarity (Lane and MacDonald 2005. pp713) Those authors argue that communities are not static and harmonious social groups On the contrary, communities are, and are composed by, actors with interests, imperativ es and agendas of their own. Consequently, recognize and understand the manner in whic h they deal with differences within

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15 community is fundamental to avoiding the further entrenchment of elites and the increased marginalization of certain social groups leading to unjus t outcomes. For that reason, these authors propose that a focus on local institutions, rather than communities, might provide for a more robust and effec tive approach. Berkes (2004) affirms that communities are embedded in larger systems, and proposes that it may be more useful to (re)think CBC in terms of environmental gov ernance and conservati on action that stars from the ground up but deals with cross-scale re lations [promoting] a systems view of the environment, a perspective that sees humans as part of ecosystems, and an emerging practices of participatory management (Berkes 2004 pp 28). Land and MacDonald (2005) suggest that the CBC fram ework has the potential to ta ke into account terms of responding to environmental issues, in the c ontext of the realitie s and complexities of environmental governance. On other hand, CBC re quires us to consider the overlap of formal and informal institutions engaged in resource management a nd their interactions at multiple political scales. Regarding CP R action, Berkes (2004, 2005) Olsson, Folke & Berkes (2003), Bowles and Gintis (2000) a nd Brogden (2003) argue th at the identity and permanence of a group are not static, and therefore, successful natural resources management depend on certain essential conditions cooperation, reciprocity, indi vidual reputation and trust among the different groups members and between the group and the external institutions; the resilience of local groups and communities; the capacity to learn from crisis and to nurture their organization; the capacity for self organization and conflict management; the capacity to combine knowledge and cooperative learni ng, learning by doing; and correctly information flow.

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16 From thus literature review a trend in the CPR and CBC approaches is noticed: Agrawal (2001), Ostrom (1999, 2006), Berkes (1989, 2004, 2005), Olsson, Folke & Berkes (2003) shifted from the community as th e center of attention in a local context to one that focuses more broadly on the nature of groups and their internal institutions as well as their relationship with external inst itutions in a cross scale context. CPR, including CBC, approaches has provided a general framework for analysis which integrates ecological and socioeconomic systems under common property regimes. Common Property and Indigenous People We are on the edge of our last spatial fr ontiers, there are no additional territories and resources, at a global scale, to mitig ate the consequences and misbalances of the actual predominant developm ent patterns. [Castillo 2006] While scholars discuss the issue, grassr oots movements are looking for a place in the world (Ellsworth 2000). Indigenous and tr aditional peoples inhabit a significant part of the most bio-diverse regions of Latin America and the world. For indigenous peoples the environment is intrinsically linked to their livelihood and cultural values, and consequently with their territorial right s and struggle for autonomy (Arambiza 1998). Even though indigenous peoples are not homogenous groups, as was previously assumed, common access to land and to natural resource s characterize them all around the world. Far from being a simple open access system, individual rights are culturally restricted. Rights of individual community members are usually established through customs, and transfers of these rights are vested in th e extended family, clan, or community (Otsuka and Place 2001). In recent years, different countries in Latin America have been increasingly confronted with the need to address the territorial demands of indigenous peoples, especially where they comprise a high percen tage of their rural popul ation. Since the end

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17 of the 1980s the indigenous movement has ga ined a voice in the international forum and has been increasingly integrated into international agendas,2 including that of conservationists3 recognizing their rights to common access to natural resources and the right of ownership and possession of the land s which they traditionally occupy has come to be internationally recognize d. In contrast to a discourse that favors the privatization and individualization of rights to valued res ources, the indigenous m ovement struggles to defend their traditional tenure systems which typically are characterized by collective rights. Indigenous common prope rty systems continue to thrive and grow in Latin America (Riverstone 2005). Indigenous pe ople focus on land tenure issues because property rights affect the way in which other policies will work. Escobar (2005) and Hayck (2002) refer to indigenous peoples as perhaps the most striking challenge to the domi nant culture and socio-economic models of Latin American societies. Indigenous people must confront opposing valu e systems. The capitalist system, which is growth-oriented an d embedded in globalizing imperatives4 sees human beings as economic entities driven by self-i nterest. This is oriented around the wide exclusion of direct access to the means of production and liveli hood, and the requisite outside-controls such as government or law to solve conflicts be tween self-interested individuals (Heilbroner 1 985). Opposing these values are the indigenous peoples 2 Convention No 169 of the General Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted, at its seventy-sixth session (1989), concerns about indigenous and tribal peoples. It recognized officially the aspirations of indigenous peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions within the framework of the States in which they live. 3 Rio 1992 for example. 4 Globalization as predominant econom ic driving force during the last decades (1989 to 2005), determine the global agenda of crucial themes and the corresp ondent integration and modification of the institutional politic of multilateral organisms like the IMF, WB, UN and at national levels the structural adjustments of the states.

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18 attitudes toward the land as common property, a nd particular relationshi ps to it as part of their culture and identity. In capitalism, natu re is an inert object, and people are the master to transform it to their own benefit (Heilbroner 1985; Richards 1997). Therefore, the path to development and growth is to make the land productive by cutting forests, setting up cattle ranches, dril ling oil, and promoting expor t agriculture. In contrast, indigenous peoples maintain thei r own approach to the land that sees human activity as part of, and dependent on, the natural world based on the idea of self-sufficiency (Hayck 2002). In Latin America before the 1990s indige nous peoples were widely viewed as backward, primitive, even deficient, and deep racism was rampant because of a failure to see anything positive in their cultures, language s, and way of life. Kirby (2003) identifies some structural and non-structural causes th at opened a space for the emergence of the indigenous question in the 1990s which took gov ernments and analysts by surprise. At that time, a well-educated young indigenous lead ership developed a new political agenda and dedicated themselves to fostering and protecting their people s distinct cultural traditions, languages and world view. Kirby ( 2003) distinguishes the undermining of the socialist paradigm with the end of the Cold Wa r and with it the left who tended to view indigenous peoples as a part of the oppressed class rather th an having their own identity. At the same time, indigenous groups thr oughout Latin America mobilized to oppose the official celebration of the 500 years of the Am ericas discovery, ca lling their response years of indigenous resistance Moreover, in Rio 92 indigenous peoples were recognized as important stakeholders in cons ervation, as forest guardians and holders of ancestral knowledge.

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19 There is no convincing empirical evidence that one type of property rights is inherently more efficient, optimal, or ideal. The notion of what constitutes efficiency, ideal, and optimal are themselves context-specific and constantly changing in a given society. Today, various types of property rights can be found coexisting worldwide: state ownership, individual or private and co mmon property. The actual world economic system supports the privatiza tion and individualization of land property (Richards 1997). Despite this, in many parts of the world the common property regime survives; in others, the common property regime does not survive at all or it changes over time to adapt to new circumstances; and, in other places, enti rely new common prope rty rules have been built (Ellsworth 2004). According to Richards in 1997 a total of two million square kilometers in the Amazon Region were indigenous territori es under common property management regimes (CPMR), including the Amazon Regi on of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela. This means that 25% of the Amazon Region is occupied by an indigenous population of 925,000 peoples (Richards 1997). Evidence suggests that over a half of Mexicos forest ar e on community land (Antinori and David 2004). According to Castillo (2006), protected areas and indigenous territories are becoming the last remaining reserves of natural resources in Latin America. The configuration of indigenous territories overlapping prot ected areas, despite the contradictions, are part of the best possible alternatives for increasing the quality of life, and at the same time, preserve the environment. Moreover, th e social, ethnic and cultural institutions and rights of local people may be strengt hened in the process.

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20 Thus, this could simultaneously and preser ve the environment, in other words to achieve conservation and development. Factors Favoring the Expansion of Cattle Ranching Over thousands of years, human cultures and the physical environment across vast rangeland areas have been shaped by herdi ng animals (FAO/GIEWS 2001). Cattle have been a central element in th e African pastoralists liveli hood and culture (Scooner 2002; Cousins 1992; Bodley 1988). Cattle ranchi ng was supported by European governments as a strategy to conquer territories in the Americas and support the European accumulation of wealth in the silver mines. The introduc tion of cattle was the main way that changed the ancestral livelihood of Indigenous peoples in the New World. Today, livestock production accounts for more than the half of total value of agricultural output (Steinfeld 2002; Kaimow itz 1996). The strong increase of production of meat, particularly in the developing worl d over the past twenty-five years, is called the food revolution or t he livestock revolution ( Owen 2002). This revolution has changed not only farming and distribution practices but also the economic, social and physical landscapes (Steinfeld 2002; Hall, Ehui and Delgado 2004; Black and Nicholson 2004; FAO 2005; Naylor et al. 2005). The co sts of social equity, environmental sustainability and public health have often b een increased (Steinfeld 2002; Naylor et al., 2005). According to Steinfeld (2002) the liv estock revolution is connected to the following factors: (1) a rapid and dynamic incr ease in consumption of livestock products principally in developing countries, (2) a ch ange in livestock pr oduction practices from local multi-purpose activity to an increasingl y market-oriented business, (3) a geographic shift of livestock production from temperate to warmer ant tropical environments, (4) the national government and intern ational-development incentives and subsides, and (5) an

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21 increasing requirement and competitivene ss on grazing and water resources, managed today under common property regimes. Increase in Consumption In developing countries between 1980 and 2004, per capita consumption of meat doubled and production tripled (FAO 2005). Gl obally, population growth and changing food consumption habits are predicted to double the demand for livestock and its production in the developing countries over th e next twenty years (Pica-Ciamarra 2005; Leonard 2005; Owen 2002). Urbani zation, rising incomes, and the globalization of trade are the main reasons mentioned for the gr owth in meat consumption in developing countries favoring meat consumption (Vera 2001, Blake and Nicholson 2004). According to Blake and Nicholson (2004), about 70% more meat will be consumed in 2020 than in 2000, and most of it (60% global production) wi ll be consumed in developing countries (Delgado et al. 1999 cited by Bl ake and Nicholson 2004). In contrast with worldwide indices, in Latin America the 77% of the total population lives in cities (Ver a 2001) while the world average is 49% (Table 2-2). The consumption of meat in Latin America was cal culated as 35 to 45 kg per capita, with the bovine meat making up approximately 50% of that total (21 kg). This indicates that in contrast to per capita consumption African a nd developed countries, Latin Americans eat considerable more bovine (and buffalo) meat per capita (Table 2-2). Market-Driven Changes in Production Practices The livestock revolution has focused on industrial-scale oper ations that have increasingly gained cont rol over raising, processing and marketing of meat. Industrializing livestock systems have based on declining real prices for feed grains, advances that have improved feed-to-meat conversion efficiencies, animal health, and

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22 reproduction rates, as well as cheaper transpor tation costs and trade liberalization (Naylor et al. 2005; Uptom 2004; Vera 2001). Today we see different production systems (Table 2-3), although there is a tend to shift from the traditional system based on natural grassland to a more intensiv e cattle ranching systems base d on management and market specialization: a) hi ghly intensive grass-feed finishi ng operations, b) breeding-growing systems, and c) extensive breeding system s (Vera 2001; Porzecanski personal comment 2006). FAO has estimated that industrial livestock operations are growing twice as fast as traditional mixed farming systems and six times as fast as grazing systems (Steinfeld 2002; FAO 2005). This fast grow th has defined economies and ways of life across many prairies and rangelands across the world. In Central and South America land has become concentrated in the hands of a few and larg e areas have been transformed into soybean monoculture and cattle ranches (Hillstron & Hillstron 2004; Naylor et al. 2005). This situation has become a threat, not only to the tropical forest but also to the survival of local communities and indige nous people who inhabit it. Despite the industrial livestock system prevalence, an alternative market for extensive grass-feed system production is developing globally. Product from pastoral systems have become more valuable because there is evidences that the meat of these systems has a lower saturated fat and is ri cher in iron and omega 3 fatty acids (Vera 2001). Together with those nutritional charact eristics of meat produced on pastoral systems, those systems are, in general, more compatible with ecosystems and the maintenance of biodiversity, than high ly intensive and industrial ones.

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23 Table 2-2. Population, Land and Cattle Herd in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Contrasting to World Indexes. LAC World LAC/Total (%) Human Polulation, millions (2005) Total 553 6499 8.50% Rural 127 (22.6%) 3315 (51%) 3.80% Total area (million ha) 2054 13098 15.7 Ha per capita (2005) 3.7 2.0 Consumption of animal protein (% of total protein) 1992 43.3 34.8 124 Meat per capita consumption (1992), kg/year 21 10 210 Cattle million head (1995) 337.9 1306.5 25.9 Head per capita 0.7 0.23 Grassland (million ha) 590 3361.7 17.6 Meat production, millions of tons (1995) LAC 11.2 53.2 21.1 LAC-tropical 8.1 15.2 Source Vera (2001) and FAOstast 2006 Table 2-3. Cattle Ranching Sy stems of Meat Production. System of Production & Management Characteristics Ecological Characteristics Social and Economic Characteristics Highly intensive (industrial) Grass-feed finishing operation. Not connected to the local environmental characteristics. Intensive production. Include the urban or peri-urban production in developing countries It is strongly market driven, making them less resilient to market upheavals than other systems. Connected to industrial systems Mixed farming systems breeding-growing. Based on grass with strategic feed supplementation which integrates livestock and crop production on the same farm. These represent the main systems for smallholder farmers; resource use is often highly self-reliant as nutrients and energy flow from crops to livestock and back Extensive razing system. Grass-feed systems based mainly on native grassland with little or no crops integration. Agro-ecological conditions strongly define the nature and scope of livestockenvironment interactions in grazing systems. In this system livestock interact with land, water, and plant and animal biodiversity, especially wildlife. Grazing livestock is a fundamental source of livelihood for million people around the world, mostly living on common property. Many of them have become the base to extensive breeding systems

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24 Livestock Production-Geographic Shift For several reasons, including higher ener gy prices and more rigorous pollution controls, livestock production in the industrial world is moving to warmer areas of developing countries (Steinfeld 2002; Naylor 2005; Kaimowitz 1996). In the developing world, there has been a strong shift in produc tion to the more tropical zones aided by the recent availability of be tter disease control, advances in ruminant nutrition, and breeding systems technologies. Modern, inte nsive meat production is threatening important ecosystems since it requires the use of large quantities of natural resources, particularly land and water (Hill and York 2003). In Latin America the index of land per capita is higher than the world one (Table 22). This supposed availability of land made South America, in particular, together with Africa, the biggest world arable reserve of land (Vera 2001:6 ba sed on Gallopin et al., and WRI 1996). Over the last decades, millions of cattle have been moved into the more humid savannas in Asia, Africa a nd Latin America, challenging community property rights to natural resources and in turn the subsistence systems of rural people (Steinfeld, 2002). For example, China and Brazil alone increased production by 59 million ton between 1967 and 1998 (FAO 2005). Brazil has become the worlds largest producer of beef and is the second-largest consumer, only behind the United States. Government Incentives Government incentives related to developm ent of infrastructure used in livestock production feed, water, energy, roads, fenci ng as well as policies regarding market prices and subsidies are increasi ngly being recognized as the direct driving forces related to cattle ranching expansion (Hill and York 2003). At the same time, credit and trends toward privatization act as important indire ct incentives promoting the expansion of

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25 cattle ranching. During the 1960s and 1970s, inte rnational agencies such as the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank a nd the US Agency for International Development (USAID) supported efforts to pr omote beef production and exports as a central focus of economic growth (Williams 1986 cited by Kaimowitz 1996). In the 1970s the cattle industry came unde r criticism on both environm ental and social grounds. A series of critical studies prompted by Pa rsons focused the attention on the negative effects of livestock expansion on forests (Kaomowitz 1996). Over the last few decades Latin American countries have been pushed to adopt economic reforms designed to encourage investment and entrepreneurship, promoting the privatization of large tracts of land. According to Naylor et al. (2005), land conversion in the Brazilian grassland and rainforest exem plifies the large impact of the continued expansion of cattle ranching, a product of a national development policy. The large and medium-sized ranches account for about 70% of the total clearing ac tivity (Naylor et al. 2005). According to Fearnside (2005) by 2003 th e forest cleared in Brazilian Amazonia had reached 648,500 km2 the 16.2% of the 4 millions km2 originally forested portion of Brazil's Legal Amazon Region, including approximately 100,000 km2 of "old" (pre-1970) deforestation in Par and Maranho. Cattle Ranching as a Complement to the Rural Livelihood Strategy of the Poor There are around 500 million rural poor people around the world that depend on raising livestock for some or all of their food and income (Figur e 2-3) (FAO 2005; PicaCiamarra 2005). Small farmers rely on lives tock to pull their ploughs, fertilize their fields, and serve as a source of food and as saving that can be cashed in when needed. Many rural households base their livelihoods on a few animals fed on grass and forage from common property pastures and forest. Peasant and indigenous communities are also

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26 increasing their livestock numbers as a comp lement to their subsistence economy and as a savings account to use in times of scarcity and emergency (Mock 2005). Asia Latin America Sub Sahara Africa West Asia and North Africa Figure 2-3. Distribution of Poor Livestock Keepers Worldwide. Source FAO (2005: 6) National Context and Bolivian Lowlands Located at the core of the South America, Bolivia is characterized by its natural and cultural diversity. The total area is 1,098,581 km2 with altitudes varying from 6,000 meters above sea level in the Andean cordille ra to fewer than 200 meters above sea level in the lowland of the Eastern plain. Bolivia is characterized by a great diversity of ecological and cultural conditions. Accordi ng to the 2002 National Census the total population was 8,274,325. The Indigenous populati on represents 62% of the total population; the great majority are Quechua s and Aymaras living in the highland and valleys. In contrast, the eastern lowla nds indigenous are 150,000 to 200,000 peoples representing 2.5% of the to tal population, but belonging to more than 38 ethno-linguistic groups (1995 indigenous census). Am ong those 60,000 Guaranies live in 246 communities (FAO 2004). Even though Bolivia is identified as an Andean highland country, three-fourths of the territory is tropical lo wlands. Due to the ecological conditions of the Bolivian lowlands and the mineral interest of the co lonial and early repub lican governments, the

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27 lowland Bolivian indigenous pe oples were not militarily controlled during the colonial and early Republican times. However, the Je suit and Franciscan mi ssions and the rubber boom in the second half of th e nineteenth century made life difficult for lowland Bolivian indigenous peoples. But the subsistence base of hunter-gatherers a nd cultivators in the remaining tropical forests never was as thre atened as it was by the later advance of loggers, settlers, agribusiness, drug dealer s, cattle raisers, and miners who have intensified their activitie s since the 1950s. The Bolivian national development5 strategy since the 1950s has been or iented towards the interna tional market and economic diversification proposed by the Plan Bohan.6 Consequently, the 1953 Agrarian Reform supported the distributio n of land in the valley and th e Andes, while in the eastern lowlands the n eo-latifundio was legalized to embrace agro-industrial development (Urioste 1992; Kay & Uriost e 2005). Therefore, the righ ts of lowlands indigenous peoples were denied or viewed as a barrier to be eliminate d. The markets advance in the form of the businessmen, ranchers, and entr epreneurs motivated by the riches of the forests has been supported by policies of governments, international agencies, and political parties. The development policies were reflected in the 1955 Government Plan which urged the colonization of tropical lowlands by Europeans and hi ghland peasants. Considering western technology as the solution to the l ack of productive use of regional lands, 5 Development as a concept was created after the Wo rld War II. Harry Truman offered development as fair deal for the undeveloped world; by this concept prosperous western societies constitute the model that the rest of the world should strive to attain. The concept was created to justify the assistance of the more prosperous, or first world countries to the less prosperous third world in becoming more advancedhigh levels of industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of the agriculture, rapid growth of material production, and the adoption of modern education and cultural values (Escobar 1994). 6 US Bohan mission that visited Bolivia in 1948. As a result of this in 1953 the Bolivia received $5 million in economic aid. By 1958 total US assistance accounted for one th ird of the nationa l budget, making Bolivia became the largest re cipient of US aid in Latin America (Klein 1982: 238 in Beneria-Su rkin 2003)

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28 between 1954 and 1962, colonies of foreign Me nnonites were establis hed, and colonies of Russians, Eastern Europeans, and Japanese were also set up. These foreign colonizers were seen as a means to ensure the mode rnization of lowland agriculture. Since 1985, with the Supreme Decree No. 21060,7 the Bolivian economy has changed even more radically, with the liberalizat ion of the markets. Agro-indus try mechanized agriculture, cattle ranching and logging continued rece iving important support from the Bolivian state in the name of development. They had access to cheap and abundant credit, subsidized prices, and failed to pay rural property taxes (Bojanic 1988 cited by BeneriaSurkin 2003; Kay & Urioste 2005). This agri cultural bonanza also resulted from a shift to large-scale production of export crops, which were more profitable. Land concentration and high rates of deforestation we re registered. For example, in Santa Cruz in 1950 the cultivated area was only 60 thousa nd hectares and that increased to over a million after the mid 1980s. In the 1990s, just 4 % of land holders in Beni and Santa Cruz owned 82% of the land (Fundacion Tierra, 2005). According to Camacho et al. (2001) in Santa Cruz Department 1,424,033 ha were deforested between 1993 and 2000. Private cattle ranching is an important productive activ ity in the lowland depa rtments of Beni and Santa Cruz (Fairfield, 2004; Plan del Uso del Suelo 1996). The cattle herd in Bolivia consists of 5,730,025 head, and the 72. 6% of this herd is found in those departments. Cattle ranching is an important productive activity in Bolivian lowland contributing to Bolivias GPD (Bojanic 2001, cited by Fa irfield, 2004) and it significantly supports 7 By 1983, the foreign debt represented 80% of Bolivia s gross domestic product, and the country fall into hyperinflation. President Paz Estenssoro (1985-89) in 1985 adopted the New Economic Plan known as Decree # 21060, termed a free-mark et shock treatment. The decree deregulated prices, eliminated subsidies and supports, devalued the currency, and suspended foreign payments. The impact was immediate: unemployment and migrati on of relocated workers was massive.

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29 rural incomes and diversified household activi ties (Faifield 2004). De spite this increased role of cattle ranching, its in fluences on communal institutio ns are poorly researched in the Bolivian context.

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30 CHAPTER 3 THE ISOSO AND STAKEHOLDERS todos esos lugares no tenan dueos karai, por eso al primer Ca pitn lo llambamos Iyambae (sin dueo). Este territorio era libre. As era nuestra tierra [all those places did not have an owner, thus the first Captain was named Iyambae ( without owner). This territory was free. That our land was] Agustn Chiraye, araakua iya (dueo del consejo), La Brecha. (cited by Dixhoorn 1996) The Isoso and the Gran Chaco The Isoso is part of the southern portion of the Bolivian department of Santa Cruz in the Chacoan province of Cordillera, and the Municipality of Charagua1 is located between 63and 61 30 West longitudes and 17 and 2015 South latitudes (map 31). Situated in the tropical dry forest of the Bolivian Chaco, it is part of the Gran Chaco Americano ecoregion which is the continents se cond most extensive forested region after Amazonia. The Gran Chaco extends over parts of Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia, with a small portion in Brazil, o ccupying in all more than 1,000,000 km2. The broad climatic gradients, together with geologica l and topographic characte ristics, generate a wide diversity of environments such as wide plains, swamps, and seasonally flooded savannas, and a great variety of forest and scrublands. The Gran Chaco is characterized by a high diversity of animal and plant species adapted to its extreme conditions (Taber et al. 1994, 1997; Navarro et al. 1998). 1 Charagua is the municipality (Bolivian administrativ e unit) which includes the Isoso. There is also a town of Charagua, west of the Isoso, which is the municipal headquarters.

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31 Figure 3-1. Location of the Communiti es in the Alto y Bajo Isoso. The Bolivian Chaco is a physiographic unit, a continuation of the Beni plain (llanura Beniana), extending across 13,766,3 km and three Bolivian departments: Chuquisaca, Tarija and Santa Cruz. The Chaco has a semi-tropical, semi-arid climate with extreme temperatures with the medi an temperature from 26C to 25C; and extremes reaching 43 C under shadow in summer (January) and in winter the temperature could drop below zer o degrees because of cold wi nds from Antarctica, called surazos from June to August (Dixhoorn 1996; Navarro 1998; Taber 1994). The dry season lasts from 4 to 8 months per year fr om May to September, some years extending until December. Rainfall is less than 1000 mm in the northern part and in the Andean foothills and averages 300 mm in the plain. The annual and monthly va riability in rainfall

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32 (Figure 3-2) as well as the soil mosaic is an important characteristic of the Chaco landscape. 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 16001978 1981 19 83 19 8 5 1987 1989 19 92 19 94Rainfall mm/year Rainfall (January) Rainfall (Feb to Dec) Figure 3-2. Annual Rainfall in Charagua, Source Dixhoorn (1996). The Chaco has been known since the Inca times as the territory of good hunting, because of its richness of fauna, principally large mammals such as the Chacoan peccary ( Catagonus wagneri), white lipped peccary ( Tayassu pecari), collared peccary ( Pecari tajacu), tapir ( Tapirus terrestris), guanaco ( Lama guanicoe vogli), giant armadillo (Priodontes maximus), gray brocket deer ( Mazama gouazoupira), and jaguar ( Panthera onca). The Bolivian Gran Chaco located in the de partment of Santa Cruz represents the best conserved area of this threatened ecorregion. The Bolivian Gran Chaco is a center not only of natural but also of cultural diversity. The region was home to groups of nomadic hunters, gath erers and fishermen, and some sedentary agriculturalists. Different linguistic groups such as the Zamuco Ayoreode; Tupi Guaran Isoseo, Ava, a nd Simba; and Matako/ Maka Mataco and Weenhayek are present in the Bolivian Gran Chaco (TNC et al. 2005). The Bolivian Tupi

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33 Guaran or Chiriguanos2 were characterized by their strong warrior society and the ability to defend their land; they maintained their independence much longer than any other indigenous group in Latin America. This, along with their historical interaction with the external world (colonial, post-colonial, other indige nous groups, etc.) makes them somewhat unique. Unfortunately, what they sh are with the rest of the indigenous peoples of America is having witnessed the severe erosion of both their land base and access to natural resources (Albo 1992, Bene ria-Sukin 2003). During the first half of the twentieth century, the Guaran were on the brink of extinction. After the Republican military intervention in 1892 with the battle of Kuruyuki,3 their resistance was shattered leaving little hope for their future. Some Guaran comm unities lost almost all of their population. Guaran people moved to haciendas in the Bo livian Chaco or emigrated to Argentina to work in the sugar cane harvests as zafreros temporary rural workers in the sugar cane harvest (Albo 1992; Heyck 2002). Francisco Pifa rre (cited by Albo 1990) estimated that 26,000 Guaran emigrated to Argentina in the ear ly decades of the twentieth century, and nearly 80,000 Guaran and mestizos were obligatorily sent to the northern rain forest to work on rubber plantations. Throughout this period, multiple forms of resistance including both armed struggle and strategi es of negotiation had developed. The Chaco War in the Guaran territory, which lasted from 1932 to 1935, dispersed them even more and the few remaining people were absorbed by the haciendas. The 1953 Agrarian 2 The term Chiriguano is not accepted by the Guaran themselves due it use in a discriminatory way by the others. Guaran is a more generic name referring to the wide family present in five nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Ch iriguano is a more specific name for Guaran in the west near to the Andes Cordillera in Bolivia including the Mbya, Ava, Isosenos and Simba (Albo 1990). 3 In one day more than 800 Guaran were killed by the Bolivian army. In total Guaran deaths exceeded more than 3000, and 2000 Guaran were taken prisoner and dispersed in different regions as peones (Albo 1990).

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34 Reform did not benefit the Guaran people. The Agrarian Reform formalized the newlatifundio to support the government al programs based on agro-industrial development (Urioste 2003, n/d; Kay and Urioste 2005). The Guaran neve r accepted the redistribution of land that they still regarded as theirs. Despite the dispersion, the Guaran people were not assimilated as peasant or simple labor workers but continued the struggle through a strategy of political negotiation, maintaining their basic values language and dignit y. Through the years many Guaran have returned to their commun ities, even though today some of them are still captives on the haciendas while others are living in isol ated communities with very little land (Villegas 2006). However, in some cases the Guarani exert political control over relatively large land areas through co mmunities united in the form of Capitanias. One of these areas is the Isoso where the Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) is located. At present, the Isoseo villages are the only ones in the study area, however, several other stakeholders neighbor and interact w ith the Isoseo people: 1. Cattle ranchers and Agro-industry entrepreneurs. 2. Mennonite colonies. 3. Peasants. 4. The local, regional and nationa l authorities. The Municipality of Charagua, the province of Cordillera and departme ntal authorities of Santa Cruz. 5. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs): Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Apoyo para el Campesino Indgena del Oriente Boliviano (APCOB), Centro de Investigacin y Promocin del Campesinado (CIPCA). 6. Catholic and Evangelical chur ches that support developmen t and production projects. 7. Private petroleum companies.

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35 Figure 3-3. Map of the TCO-Isoso and Location of Different Stakeholders.

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36 The Guarani Isoseo Communities More than twenty communities, dispersed along the banks of the Parapeti River, are politically organized in the Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI). The National Census (2002) registered 6,363 people in Isoso. However, according to CABIs own estimation there are around 10,000 inhabitants. That difference may be explained by the high seasonal migration outside of the Isoso to the sugar cane harv est. Despite those differences Table 3-1 based on the Bolivian Na tional Census of 2002, gives an idea of the population distribution among the Isoseo comm unities. Isiporenda, the southern-most community, is about 60 kilometers from th e municipal center Charagua. The most northern-most community along the Parapeti river banks, Kuarirenda, is over 150 kilometers from Charagua (Map 3-1). Even though during the dry season several routes4 lead to Isoso, the most stable access from Santa Cruz city is through Charagua, requiring about 7 to 9 hours to reach La Brech a, the central Isoseo community. The Guaran -Isoseo people are original ly derived from a fusion between a migratory TupiGuaran group and the Ar awak-Chane peoples established on the Parapeti banks. The Guaran -Isoseo communities have experienced the aggression of the colonizers and the Republican military repression, and later the Chaco War, which practically left the Isoso empty. The present communities in Isoso share a set of specific cultural characteristics: the ande reko our Guaran way of life; a common origin and history; the Mbayu (vision or dream); CABI as thei r political organization; and the TCO Isoso as their common territorial demand. Therefore, they constitute a demographic entity. 4 Between the 1940s and 1960s the area was intensively explored by hydrocarbon companies. The seismic testing lines opened at that time are used as roads.

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37 The Guaran Way of Life : The andereko Despite having suffered military devastation, the Guaran-Isoseo maintain many aspects of their traditional livelihood st rategies. The andereko is based on cooperative work and reciprocity as one of the main internal values which keeps the society and the extended family units together, it is the ba sis of social and ec onomic relations (Albo, 1992; Beneria-Surkin 2003; Heyck 2002).The household is the unit of production and reproduction. Each household is composed of an extended family and is part of a social network known as Teta (community or village). The communal life characterized by strong kinship ties and recipr ocal relationships is the mo st important element of the andereko The Isoseo livelihood is based on a subsis tence economy. They farm for their own consumption5 and only the excess is sold. Th e main crops are corn, rice, yuccamanioc, kumanda or beans and joco (squash). Some households cul tivate fruit trees such as banana, citrus and papaya. Hunting, fishing a nd gathering are important elements of their livelihood strategy. There are more than 135 sp ecies of plants used by the Isoseo and botanically described (Bourdy 2002). Bourdy de scribes the medicinal and non medicinal uses such as human food, animal feed, handi craft, construction mate rials, firewood, toys, decoration, agricultural pr actices and veterinary medicine. According to Cuellar et al. (2004), 21 different species of mammals, 9 of birds and one reptile are the most frequently hunted animals by the Isose os. Breeding domestic animals and their integration into the labor market are impor tant complements to livelihood strategies. They raise goats, pigs, chickens and cattle. Many Isoseo are wage-workers such as 5 According to Beneria-Surkin (1988) to replace the subs istence production the Isoseo must earn 17.46 Bs per work-hour.

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38 peons in cattle ranches or jornaleros in the sugar cane harvest, school teachers, technicians in NGOs and governmental institutions. Guaran-Isoseno Communities The present-day Guaran Isoseo communities are not completely uniform. According to common kinship, history, ethnicity, etc., the communities can be grouped in six different sub-zones (Combes 1999), going from south to nor th, summarized as follows (Figure 3-1). The Isoso frontier Coming from town of Charagua, which is located west of Isoso the first two communities are Isiporenda and Karapari (Fi gure 3-4). This is a fragile but fertile frontier. Fragile because the closeness to town of Charagua and the more constant contact with nonGuaran people makes them susceptib le to many different cultural influences, and fertile because the rivers water is availa ble almost all the year allowing them a rich harvest. This is a transition between the karai and Guaran worlds. The community is occupied, in addition to Is oseos, by AvaGuaran a nd Tapiete, and also many karai6 have had their ranches and homes in Isipor enda. They have developed a relation of mutual cooperation with the Mennonites neighbors (my observation). The Mennonites and Isiporenda inhabitants have exchanged of experiences and know ledge. In the summer of 2005, I observed that the Mennon ites presence was crating incentive for agricultural market-oriented production in Isiporenda. The Guarani producers rent machinery and use technology from the Mennonites, who, in turn, rent land from Isipor enda. Interviewees talked about school children a nd teachers helping Mennonites ha rvest cotton as a part of 6 Karai is the Guaran term referring to criollos mestizos and whites, all those groups that are not Guaran or other indigenous people that they identify

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39 an unofficial agreement of cooperation between the Isiporenda community and the Mennonite community. The Alto Isoso Continuing to the north by the main road, one reaches Kopere Guasu, Kopere Montenegro, Kopere Brecha, Kopere Loma Kapeatindi and Yapiroa. All these communities originated from the ancestral communities Urundeiti and Samouti The four Koperes are almost like neighborhoods of one large community (Figure 3-4). In Kopere Guasu there are many AvaGuaran, whose pr edecessors came to work as peons in the ranches. Those communities conser ve Guaran traditions such as Arete Guasu (the main celebration of good harvest) a nd together they began negot iating for a legal communal title beginning in 1922. They received the official title in 1948. The Central Isoso Ivasiri, La Brecha and Tamachindi are included in the same communal title received in 1947 and reconfirmed in 1978. This zone of Isoso once was known as Guirayoasa. At the beginning of the 1 900s only one community was located on the eastern bank of the Parape ti River (Figure 3-5). Experi encing severe problems with ranchers, people decided to move to the western bank where they founded three communities before the Chaco War. Today one of those communities, La Brecha, is the political center of Isoso. The Corazn Histrico del Isoso The historical heart of the Isoso is located on the eastern bank (F igure 3-5) and it is the place where the first Guaran Isoseo arri ved; guided by female leader, Kaa Poti, they established the first community known as K ovei. The present communities of Koropo,

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40 Table 3-1. Population in the Communities of Isoso. Community No of inhabitants Male Female No. Households ARAKAE 1999 INE 2002 (INE2002) The Isoso Frontier 1 Isiporenda 274 300162138 62 2 Karapari 85 1498069 26 The Alto Isoso 3 Kopere Guazu 124 1256461 19 4 Kopere Montenegro 108 793544 12 5 Kopere Brecha 229 1739380 39 6 Kopere Loma 287 22894134 40 7 Kapeatindi 196 232125107 31 8 Yapiroa 780 555294261 95 The Central Isoso 9 Ivasiriri 463 364173191 73 10 La Brecha SD 724348376 136 11 Tamachindi 525 380172208 89 The Corazn histrico del Isoso 12 Rancho Nuevo 870 493222271 114 13 Mini 311615 11 14 Yuqui* 15 Rancho Viejo 378 217108109 50 16 Aguaraigua 379 277122155 44 17 Yovi 725 435215220 81 18 Koropo 370 314147167 51 19 Pikirenda* The Karai Isoso 20 San Silvestre 145 1025646 19 21 Paraboca 35 904545 16 The Bajo Isoso 22 Kuarirenda 728 586307279 85 23 Aguarati 376 338179159 47 24 Guandare* The Returning Isoso 25 Joseravi 15810157 28 26 Tetarembei 1385 3 TOTAL 7,077 6,3633,1663,197 1,171 Source INE Bolivia, National Census 2002 and Combes (1999). Notes: The Bolivian National Census of 2002 did not register the population of Yu qui, Pikirenda and Guandare, probably because those communities are too small, dispersed and closely rela ted to other communities. Thei r population may have been included in the counts for other communi ties, ( Yuqui could be included in Mini Pikirenda in Koropo and Guandare in Kuarirenda). Combes (1999) does not re port population of Mini, Yuqui, Pikirend a, Guandare, Joseravi and Tetarembei because those communities were established af ter 1999, originally being cattle ranches ( puestos ganaderos ). Because the communities frequently change location, as well as experiencing disintegration and the establ ishment of new communities, it is not surprising that figures of the numb er of villages and population differ accordin g to different sources. Today, it seems that infrastructure such as schools and health services are factor s that influence a more fixed location.

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41 Aguaraigua,Yovi, Guairapembi (Rancho Viej o) and Yarumbairu (Rancho Nuevo) all originated from the first Guarani-Isoseno comm unity of Kovei. According to Albo (1990) the first title for Yovi and Aguaraigua was received in 1927. And in 1947 Koropo was included. Koropo, Yovi and Aguaraigua always have worked together, and have shared Arete Guasu. Despite the same origin Guairapemb i was left behind. Unfortunately it has been surrounded by ranches with which there we re perpetual confrontations, issues that deeply affected them. Land tenure problems were growing, as well as problems of access to natural resources, and they could not ti tle their land. The community was divided; some of them moved to the western river ba nk for a more peaceful life, and established Yarumbairu (Rancho Nuevo), later Mini and Yuki. In 1962 the titling process was initiated by the three communities together a nd when they received the title in 1969 it was for land located on the western bank. Gu airapembi never got a title until it was included in the common TCO-Isoso title. The Karai-Isoso Many karai have lived in the Isoso since they first arrived in the mid-1800s. Some of them live far away on their ranches, but others live in the communities together with the Guarani-Isoseos. Those that live in the communities and take part in the communal life are considered members. Mixed commun ities as Koropo and Aguarati are examples of such communities. But three communities are inhabited almost only by karai: Paraboca, Tamane and San Silvestre (Figure 35). They were incorporated into the CABI organization in 1997. Then during the TCO titling process Tamane negotiated to become private property, and they received one family title. Paraboca and San Silvestre officially decided to be part of CABI as communities.

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42 The Bajo Isoso Kuarirenda and Aguarati (Figur e 3-6) are part of a histor y of moves. Because of the changes in the river (floods and drought) and the ranchers pressures, these communities have continually changed location. Kuarirenda received a title to its land in 1972, but the conflicts with cattle ranchers continued. Returning to Isoso A new Guaran -Isoseo sub-zone is recen tly taking shape in the TCO-Isoso. The Isoseos that had lived outside the Isoso, including some that worked as peons on neighboring ranches, decided to estab lish two new communities Joseravi and Tetarembei, both supported by CABI. These new communities are located north from Kuarirenda and their organiza tion of production differs from the rest of Guaran Isoso. Land is divided into nuclear family plots which in many cases are clearly delimited by fences. Inside those areas are located the house, the farming plot and domestic animals7. Each community has a communal capitan w ho maintains relationships with CABI leaders. The community members still have st rong ties with the urban areas, for example most of the children are studying in urban schoo ls (in Santa Cruz city) and only visit their parents during the holidays. So metimes the mother lives with the children in the city during the school year. Land Use in Guaran Isoso Land is considered to be common property that the ancestors have left for all members of the community (Ben eria-Surkin 2003). Land tenure will be deal in Chapter 4, but the history is summarized briefly below. Customary common property rights 7 Observation made during my Tetarembei field trip 2004, when I was gathering information for a waste management program and visited several houses

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43 characterized the Guaran Isoseo andereko The cattle ranchers arrival forced the Guaran Isoseo people to seek a new way to defend the common access to land and natural resources. After shifting from warri ors to negotiators, they obtained seven communal titles that included almost all communities 65,000 ha, (Figure 3-1). The Territory is the central element in the struggle to subsist, around which the indigenous peoples have tended to project an essential constr uction of identity. For this reason and their immersion in land tenure dyna mics, since the 1980s indigenous people in the lowlands have mobilized to demand the t itling of their lands and territories (Albo 1996). As a result, Bolivia, and other Lati n American countries, has recognized some indigenous land and territorial rights over the last few decades The agrarian reform or Ley INRA (Law no. 1725 of 1996) recognizes th e indigenous peoples territorial demand as Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO) in accordance with the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 (Romero 2003) During the elaboration of the Santa Cruz Land Use Plan (Plan del Uso de Suel o de Santa Cruz, PLUS, from1992 to 1995) and the INRA Law (from 1994 to 1996) CABI actively participate d, designing their own proposal for indigenous territories. Together with other indigenous peoples, forming the Central Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Boliv ian (CIDOB), they argued for the legal recognition of indigenous peoples territories or communal la nd of origin (TCO). The Guaran Isoseos officially presented their demand for TCO-Isoso, at the time the INRA Law was approved in 1996, and CABI guarantee d the financial support to complete the administrative title process ( saneamiento SAN-TCO). Following the approval of INRA Law (1996)8 CABI has been a key actor in the SAN-TCO process. 8 The results of the process of TCO titling saneamiento in Bolivian lowland shows the next data: 55 TCO formally demanded 25,794,177 hectares of them only 3,214,565 hectares were titled as TCO only five TCO completely titled

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44 The Guaran Isoseo people can hunt and co llect everywhere in their territory and each family or household can clear and farm the quantity of land that is needed to support their livelihood. Farming, hunti ng and gathering are part of the Guaran Isoseos andereko The main use areas, to agriculture, ca ttle ranching, and village facilities including housing, were surveyed by FII-C ABI technicians, at the end of 2004 and beginning of 20059 (Table 3-2). Table 3-2. Main Land Use in Isoso, per Sub-zones. CattleArea AgriculAreaUrbanArea Total Area Sub-zone (ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) The Isoso Frontier 7,02818046 7,254 The Alto Isoso 28,817896108 29,821 Central Isoso 16,228971106 17,305 The Corazn histrico del Isoso 19,570821183 20,573 The Karai Isoso 30,549547 30,601 The Bajo Isoso 28,160454137 28,751 Returning to Isoso 4,0200164 4,184 TOTALS (ha) 134,3723,326790 138,489 Source CABI Data Base 2005 Urban Area in Table 3-2 is the area wher e houses and village infrastructure are located. School buildings, health services and churches, as well as a soccer field are found in almost every community or village. The households are dispersed on both sides of the road. Beneria-Surkin (2003) provides a description of a typica l Isoso household: Beyond on both sides of the road one can see typical one ro om Izoceo houses. The area immediately surroundi ng the house is cleared of any vegetation but nearby a few trees and vegetation is always left. Usually roofs are th atched with palm leaves but some houses have corrugated metal roofs and others are made of tiled roofs. Occasionally, one finds an isolat ed house, but it is more common to find and 30 partially. Ironically, 4.2 million hectares were titled as private to third party inside the TCOs demands. The government weakness, the agrarian elit es pressure, and corruption among the governmental officers are the main elements that characterize the land saneamiento during these ten years. As a result of this negative balance the peasant and indigenous movements still support the common property as a ke ystone to their strategy to subsist and take a place in the world. 9 In summer of 2005 I interviewed Zulema Barahona and Cr ecencio Arambiza (FII-CABI technicians responsible for the survey) and other peoples in the communities. I had access to CABI data base.

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45 several houses near each other, each one belonging to one of the nuclear families that make up a household. [Beneria-Surkin 2003] With respect to agricultural areas, all hous ehold farming plots ar e located together in the same area on the banks of the Parapeti River (Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 where the agricultural plots are represented by green polygons). Agricultural plots belong to the families, or households and, who have the right to use, but not to sell or rent the land to others. According to Beneria-Surkin (2003), the Isoseos believe that one should not exaggerate and should use only what is neede d. Therefore, the farming plots vary from approximately 2.3 to 7 hectares (this size of fa miliar plot substantially differs from the peasant or small farmers and colonists who le gally demand 50 ha plot s). Some areas are planted and the rest of the pl ot is left fallow. The Kar ai and Returning to Isoso subzones present a notable difference in househ old structure and land use distribution in relation to the other Isoseo communities. In Tetarembei and Joseravi (Returning to Isoso) there is not a common agricultural area because each family has a rectangular plot where they have the house, animals and cultivated area, following the more typical Bolivian peasant land settler pattern. The Kara i Isoso has the smallest farming area and the larger dedicated to cattle ranching. The total areas used as cattle ranching are shown in Table 3-2. While cattle ranching characteristics in Isos o will be developed in Chapter 5. However, it is important to highlight that the area o ccupied by cattle ranching is considerably greater than that under other uses. According to the data, imme nse areas of the commonly held lands are used for herds of cattle.

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46 Figure 3-4. Land Use in the Frontier and Alto Isoso (Sub-zone 1 & 2). Figure 3-5. Land Use in the Cent ral, Historic Heart and Kara and Bajo Isoso (Sub-zone3, 4 and 5).

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47 Other important land uses areas, such as hunting and gathering areas, are more difficult to identify. Some gathering and hunting areas have been identified by WCS technical staff which has rese arched hunting and collecting pr actices for several years. Those areas partially overlap with farming a nd cattle ranching areas, and are not included in this table. CABI, the Guarani Isose o Political Organization The communal Mburubicha or captain is the customar y authority in each Guarani Isoseo community. The main decisions affecting the Isoso are taking in the Gran Asamblea which is the meeting of all communal Mburubicha headed by the Capitan Grande that is the Capitania del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI). CABI is a strong grassroots organization that is key at local and regional levels. It has become a political actor adopting a practical strategy of negotiation (Beneria-Surkin 2003). CABI has achieved several successes with resp ect to participate in and control of na tural resource management and development projects (Chapter 4). Other Stakeholders Other stakeholders in the TCO Isoso incl ude several private properties are located within the TCO-Isoso. According to the INRA law, a process of land tenure regularization must be completed ( saneamiento o SAN-TCO) to obtain a communal title. The saneamiento of the TCO Isoso is still in pro cess; for technical and administrative purposes the area was divided into five polygons. The national and departmental governments are responsible for the legal proces s of SAN-TCO, beside the application of development and conservation policy. After th e passing of the Popular Participation Law in 1994 the municipal government became the most important institution at the local level. The Municipality is charged with planning, implementing and supervising

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48 environmental and development programs and projects. Various non governmental organizations (NGO) also are present in th e TCO Isoso such as CIPCA, APCOB, WCS, as well the Catholic and Evangelical chur ches. Two gas pipelines run near the TCO borders (Figure 3-1). One runs from Santa Cruz to Argentina on the western limits of the TCO Isoso. The other runs from Santa Cruz to the Brazilian border to the north, inside of TCO Isoso. Therefore, the petroleum companies ar e important stakeholders in this area. According to the SAN-TCO preliminary data th e following kinds of pr ivate properties are located in the TCO-Isoso (Table 3-3). Table 3-3. Private Stakeholders, No t-Isoseo Owners, in the Isoso. Stakeholders Pol 1 Pol 3 Pol 4 Pol 5 Total TCO Isoso Cattle ranchers No. Owners 84553044 213 Hectares 166,223164,558116,103269,378 716,262 Agro-industry No. Owners 24 24 Hectares 116,339 116,339 Mennonites Colony* No. Owners 24 6 Hectares 23,86644,217 68,083 Peasant "unions" (sindicato campesinos) No. Owners* 24 6 Hectares 8,951433 9,384Total owners 112633044 249 Total hectares 315,379209,208116,103269,378 910,068Source preliminary data SAN-TCO 2006 O. Castillo Six Mennonite colonies include almost 1,460 families (Table 3-4). Six peasants unions involve several families. Cattle Ranches and Agro-Industry Cattle ranches in the Southern areas (pol ygons 3 and 5) are extensive. It is an activity with a low yield, co mplementing other livelihood stra tegies (Linzer 1998). In the north (Polygons 1 and 4) the cattle ranches are generally la rger, varying in size between 2,000 hectares and 15,000 hectares and characte rized by a high investment in machinery

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49 and infrastructure. Their administration and management are handled by full-time technicians as well as temporary personnel dur ing the harvest season. The main crops are rice, sorghum, soybean, cotton, sunflower, and improved grass. Those ranches are influenced by agro-industri al activity and market orie nted production, from the surrounding plain to Santa Cruz city and Pail on, and are linked with the credit system and main Bolivian markets. The agro industry, in the plains surrounding Santa Cruz city and Pailon, began in the 1970s with credit suppor t from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (Kay and Urioste 2005). The Tierras Bajas project, during the 1980s and 1990s, supported the fast-expa nding agricultural frontier based on extension, through intensive production. Cattle ranchers, of both zones, are organi zed in local and regional associations which offer them important political and t echnical support. At the local level the Asociaciones de Ganaderos de Charagua, y de Cordillera (AGACHARAGUA and AGACOR) and at the regional level the Federacion de Ganaderos de Santa Cruz (FEGASACRUZ) are strong civil institutions that have tended to exert decisive influence at regional and national levels in polic y-making and implementation of official development programs. Mennonites In the southern part of the Isoseo te rritory between Isiporenda and Charagua (Polygon 3), four Mennonite colonies are located in the TCO-Isoso: Pinondy, Pinondy Itaguazurenda, Casa Grande and Durango. In addition two colonies are located in the northern (Polygon 1): La Milagrosa and Santa Clara. The members of these colonies

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50 came from Canada, Mexico, Paraguay and some from different parts of Bolivia.10 The Mennonites who recently came from Canada ha ve economic and technical support from their Canadian Mennonite-institutions, and they te nd to be more flexible in their religious practices. The Mennonites who moved from Para guay and other parts of Bolivia tend to be more orthodox and do not have technical support. The total Mennonite population is more than 10,000 peoples or 1,465 families (Table 3-4). They have one or several general titles for the entire colony (Table 3-3), but in ternally they divide the area into family plots. The nuclear family is the economic and reproductive unit, they have big families with an average of seven members. There is a strict gender and ge nerational division of labor within the family and colony. The Mennonites practice intensive agrarian entrepreneurship, pr esenting particular characteristics. Their production system is based on a stable social organization; they have common religion, customs, culture, educa tion, values, etc. Colonies are established and organized under a chief administrator of each colony. Diversification of the productive system is an important Mennonite strategy. They grow different crops and livestock for domestic consumption and the market. Their industry of milk products (cheese and butter) is an im portant income to individua l households. They practice mechanized agriculture and the livestock is a complementary activity. However, it is intensively-managed. Altogether Mennonites, in the TCO Isoso, have 17,092 head of cattle (CABI 2005; SAN TCO 2006 FII-CABI, Castillo pers comments 2006). Mennonites use family labor and sometimes hire workers. Their population growth is high; consequently their cr easing need for land is a main concern for them and for their 10 The first Mennonites came to Bolivia in the 1950s. Their actual population depends from the internal high population growth and their slowly but permanently immigration to Bolivia.

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51 Table 3-4. Mennonite System in the-Isoso. Colony Homes Population AreaTotal (ha) Polygon 3 Pinondi 3002,70015,734 Pinondi Itaguazurenda 1641,4728,180 Durango 3743,36613,834 Casa Grande 1099816,469 Sub total 9478,51944,217 Polygon 1 La Milagrosa 3533,17816,245 Santa Clara 1661,4917,621 Sub total 5194,66923,866 TOTAL 1,46513,18968,083 Source O. Castillo and Noss personal comments (CABI-WCS) Preliminary data SAN-TCO-Isoso 2006 neighbors. After ten years of their presence in the areas they o ccupy shows the highest rate of deforestation and the most intensiv e agricultural use in the entire TCO Isoso. Peasants or Small Farmers The peasants, located in Polygon 1 and Pol ygon 3, are migrants or colonist from the western highlands and valleys. They arrived before the TCO-Isoso was immobilized (in 1996). They are organized in agrarian union ( sindicatos agrarios ), a typical strategy among the Bolivian peasants. Even though they have communal title in the name of the agrarian union the land is divided in family pl ots of 50 hectares; the nuclear family is the unit of production and reproduction. They pr oduce crops for the market and domestic consumption, normally they raise small domestic animals (chickens, swine and ducks). According to saneamiento data, six sindicatos agrarios occupy 9,384 ha. There is no information about how many families there are. Institutional Stakeholders Administratively the Isoso is a municipa l district within the municipality of Charagua, in the province of Cordillera within the Santa Cruz department. Altogether the

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52 representatives of those governmental institu tions are important regional stakeholders and CABI maintains a permanent relationship a nd coordination with them (Chapter 4). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) or APCOB (Apoyo y Promocin de l Campesinado del Oriente Boliviano) technically support CABI in th e implementation of different activities. WCS has provided an important support in environmental and conservation programs as well as in the institutional strengthening pr ocess of CABI in arenas lik e negotiation with hydrocarbon companies, or with the national government on the arena of the NPK administration agreement. Other Bolivian NGO, like AP COB and CIPCA focus their support on productive projects. The Franciscans and Jesuit Missionaries co uld not influence the Isoso during the colonial period as they did on a vast area of the Bolivian lowlands. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Catholic and later the Ev angelical Church esta blished presence in the area. The Catholic and Evangelical church es have promoted productive projects such as cattle ranching. According to Benaria-Surkin (2003) the Evangelical presence in Isoso is promoting cultural and socioeconomic changes among Guaran Isoseos. Two gas pipelines are located alongside the northern and the west ern borders of the TCO Isoso: Gasbol and Gasyrg. (F igure 1-1 and Figure 3-1). Since 1997, GasTransBoliviano (GTB), a consortium of oil companies11 has been present in the area. GTB is the owner of the massive Bolivia-B razil gas pipeline (G asbol). Due to the international and national requirements the owners of the pipeline had to implement a 11 GTB consortium includes the multinationals ENRON and Shell, the Bolivian partially state-owned Yacimientos Petroliferos y Fiscales de Bolivia (Y PFB), the Brazilian state-owned Petrobras and a other partners.

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53 Plan de Manejo Ambiental (Environmental Management Plan, PMA) and a Plan de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas (Indige nous Peoples Development Plan, PDPI) in order to limit the socio-economic and ecol ogical impacts of th is pipeline. Transierra12 now operates the Gasyrg pipeline which began its construction in 2002 and its operation in 2003. The Gasyrg extends from Yacuiba to Rio Grande (Figure 1-1 and Figure 3-1) and connects the southern Bo livian gas fields of San Alberto and San Antonio with the Gasbol pipeline. Tran sierra supports the Indigenous Peoples Development Planning Program (PA-PDI) and the PRAC (Programa de Relacionamiento y Apoyo Comunitario). The Isoso area is a complex fabric of different stakeholders. Among them the Guarani Isoseos are key actors in planni ng and implementing development programs in their territory. 12 Transierra is a consortium integrated by Andina S.A., Repsol YPF S.A. Petrobras Bolivia S.A. and Total E&P Bolivie S.A.

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54 CHAPTER 4 THE ISOSEO IVI IYAMBAE AS COMMON PROPERTY Current theory describes common property as an institution of self-governance that evolves when participants agree to impose limits on their individual claims The survival of common property resources in Isoso implies a long-term history. Despite the current process of transformation and the uncerta in future, the Guarani-Isoseos have consciously decided to preserve the Ivi-Iyambae land without owner or communal ownership right and community tenure system as the keystone of their Mbayu dream or vision as indigenous pe ople. The Guaran-Isoseo Mbayu embraces five central elements: Moaete identity; Araku knowledge; Mborerekua union; Iyambae without owner or autonomy; and Yandeyarigui the common origin related to grandmothers. All these components are closel y tied together, and cannot be separated from the territory land and natural resour ces. In other words: the Guaran-Isoseo Mbayu is the vision to remain united as Gu aran-Isoseo people, having a common origin, strong identity and culture, respecting the traditional knowledge the andereko or Guaran-Isoseo way to be. The Guaran-Isoseo territory is the Mbayu s space dimension including the land and natural re sources. The political and administrative autonomy of their territory is a crucial objective. The Mbayu was formally incorporated into CABIs strategy planning by the asamblea of Mburuvicha the main Guaran-Isoseo communal institution. The asamblea is a meeting where decisions are done by Guaran-Isoseo captains of all communities. In July 2005 I interviewed Oscar Castillo, who is a technician supporting

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55 CABI, at his office in Santa Cruz. He explai ned how CABI developed their strategic plan with the purpose to maintain, support a nd develop self-governance in the Isoso. I understand that this planning is not a static formula, nor a th eoretical one. The plan was elaborated by Mburuvicha asamblea on the basis on their vision or Mbayu to survive as Guaran-Isoseo People. The Mburuvucha identified those customary institutions which have supported their subsistence as People. C onsequently the strate gic plan is supported by four pillars (Figure 4-1). eemoai that refers to CABI as the Guar ani Isoseo political organization and its relationship with the external institutions. Moa, referring to organization and use of the space and natural resources, the management of their territory. Tekoata that is the institutiona l and organizational strength. Mbaapo the self organization, productive al ternatives, education and sustainable development. More extensive explanation is developed in this chapter, which focuses on the cultural elements and institutions that shape and support the Guarani Isoseo Mbayu as well as on the similarities and differences among the Mbayu and the Community Base (CBM) and Common Property (CPM) management frameworks. andereko : Nature and Characteristics of the Group According to common property theory th e membership of a communal group must be well defined. Size of the group, common knowl edge, past successful experiences, trust and identity are other mentioned group charac teristics needed to be successful in common resource management (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001; Olsom, Folkes and Berkes 2003).

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56 Figure 4-1. Guaran-Isose o Strategically VisionMbayu. The Isoseos have a strong identity that allows them to resist and survive as indigenous peoples. The andereko or Guarani Isoseo way of life is based on their communal life. According to Al bo (1990) there are three aspect s that reveal the GuaranIsoseo communal life: The celebration which involves the convite (to share). On different occasion members of the community share hunted pr ey, harvested corn, food, etc. with other members. The Arete Guasu or celebration of good harvest is a special occasions to share among communities. The group work is based on cooperation a nd reciprocity. The Isoseo as a group share generalized norms of reci procity and trust that are part of their social capital. Therefore, the adult men are required do communal work such as maintaining water channels and fence repair, clea ning farming areas, construction and maintenance of roads, serving in comm unal offices, etc. Women support bringing food and chicha The asamblea are the decision-making space at communal and entire Isoso levels.

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57 In day to day life each Isoseo belongs to a tta or community or village. Communities are small enough for people to know each other. Therefore, membership is explicitly defined. Each Isoseo household is provided with exclusive rights to use a farming plot and forest resour ces inside the common property. In the Isoseo communities, I observed that use rights to the communal forest were clearly defined by interviewees. The authority interviewed in Isiporenda indicated, for example, that a third party does not have the right to cut a tree inside the communal boundaries. The interviewees in Pikirenda me ntioned one case, an issue concerning a neighboring karai or criolla -family who had gained a privat e title to a plot of property and who then was also trying to use communal lands to raise their herd. The members of this family are well known, and like other local karai they took part in some communal activities, but once they obtained a private title the comm unity no longer considered that those karai are no part of Isoseo community. Problems came when the family still wanted to claim communal advantag es. In the same way Tamane, a Karai community, decided to title their land as private property. Once the Asamblea approved it, they lost the right to participate in communal programs and benefits. Isoseos participate in different ac tivities, organizing work-groups or/and associations that use the communal resour ce pool, for example a group of hunters, or the Cupesi-flour producers associations in Pikirenda a nd Ivasiriri. Those groups are generally voluntarily made up of neighbors or close kinship members who are well known to each other. Therefore, I observed th at, the membership within those groups is well defined based on limited size, trust, common knowledge and past successful experiences.

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58 Some cattle ranching associations have b een formed by the Isoseo. In Isiporenda the association takes care of a communal herd of cattle (Edda Parada informant). The Isoseo membership is well defined by their Guarani Isoseo way of life or andereko and their common vision of themselves reflected on the Mbayu The Guarani Isoseo people have a common origin Yandeyrigui a strong union Mborerekua and they shared the tr aditional knowledge Arakua all these are characte ristics distinguishing them from the others. Moa : Space and Natural Resources Use and Boundaries According to the common property theo ry, defined boundaries are one of the most basic characteristics essential to eff ective common property institutions (Ostrom, 1990, 1999; Agrawal 2001). To Isoseos, the Moa one of the strate gic pillar of the Mbayu refers to the use of space and natural resources, as well as the definition of the physical boundaries. The Isoseos identify different types (lev els) of boundaries w ithin their territory (1) the broader territorial boundaries, ancestral dominium and actual TCO in process of titling; (2) the customary v illages boundaries; (3) the hous ehold use areas like family farming plots; and (4) the boundaries introduced by projec ts and institutions for productive activities or natural resource management. According to Albo (1990) when the Guaran i people arrived at the Parapeti bank they were searching for the Ivi Iyambae which means the land without owners. Once they settled in Isoso and conquered the Chan e people, they continued to struggle to consolidate their territory. The concept of territory holistically includes the farming area,

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59 the forest, rivers, flora and fauna that s upport the Isoseos live lihood and with whom they coexist (Albo 1990). For the Isoseo these resources are accessible to all, they can collect fish and hunt in this common territory. A ccording to Castillo (2006) between the 1700s and the beginnings of the 1900s the Isoseo original dominion was at least 3 million hectares. The boundaries have been defined to exclude others and to gu arantee their right of access to their means of subsistence, and formally be recognized as People. The Isoseo fought physically to defend their territorial access to na tural resources. First, they fought against other indigenous peoples like the Avas a nd Ayoreode, and late r against the cattle ranchers, and the crowns and Republican governments military forces. After the Kuruyuki battle in 1894, the Isose os shifted their strategy fr om defending their territory militarily to seeking legal r ecognition and requesting legal titling. The first communal title dates from 1932 and include d two communities: Yovi and Aguaraigua. By the 1980s 65,000 ha. were titled and almost all comm unities were included in seven communal titles (Combs 1999; Winer 2003; Albo 1990; Ca stillo 2006). Despite the legal titles, problems with cattle ranchers continued. Moreover, the 1980s brought more complexes issues.1 The expansion of the Bolivian agricu ltural frontier suppor ted by the Lowland Project ( Proyecto Tierras Bajas del Este ), an initiative of the World Bank and Bolivian government, threatened the Is oseo peoples survival. 1 Throughout the 1970s and 80s, numerous other national development plans also focused on areas occupied by indigenous peoples, pushing them onto marginal lands. This situation and the democratic transition in the country inspired among indigenous peoples the resistance to new market forces that led to alliances, not only at the national but also at the international level. In 1982 the Confederacion Indigena del Oriente de Bolivia (CIDOB) was created cong regating all indigenous groups of the Bolivian lowlands; and was an important forum permitting the definition of their own vision of development and resistance strategies. The struggle for their rights has led to a process of empowerment taking numerous forms such as mass mobilization and marches1, and day by day activities; winning seats in parliament and municipalities; and taking part in consultations at national and international level with mult ilateral bodies. From 1993 to 1997 was a period of constant reiteration of indigenous rights and Bolivia has redefined its relations with indigenous peoples by sanctioning new laws (Hirsch 2003).

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60 Lo que ah se necesita es un titulo comn para todo el Isoso, desde Tarenda (junto a San Antonio de Parapeti) hasta el ltimo baado. (What is necessary there is one title for all the Isoso, from Tatarenda [near to San Antonio de Pa rapeti] to the last swamp). [Testimony from Juan Feliciano Arandico, the communal captain of Rancho Viejo recovered by Albo 1990 pp 37] Dn. Arandico referred to one title for all communities as a way to defend the Isoseo territory all together Mborerekua against the cattle ranc hers and agro industry encroachment. Because the Isoseo maintain ed the structure as indigenous people, combining concepts of territo ry, autonomy, and identity (C astillo 2006), they visualize their territory as a geographic space in the Chaco in which th ey can not only survive, but thrive, as an indepe ndent people in the Ivi Iyambae and sustain the Isoseo Mbayu and the ande reko As a result of Bolivian normative reform between 1993-1996, some approved Laws became key legal instrument to seek the consolidation of Isoseo territory and natural resources management. In their role of nego tiators, the Isoseos s upported the creation of the protected area in the Gran Chaco, th e National Park Kaa Iya (NPK) in 1995. The environmental Law No. 1333 enacted in 1993 allowed CABI participation on the elaboration of the technical proposal to create the NPK. CABI worked together with WCS and the National Direction of Biodiversit y Conservation to de fine the protected area boundaries as well as their participat ion in the NPK administration. The NPK encloses important areas of Isoseos tradit ional use and mystical. The creation of the NPK was viewed by the Isoseo as a way to define boundaries and to stop the aggressive advance of the agricultural frontier. Therefore, the Isoseo people pr otect their territory. Once the new agrarian reform law was approved, the INRA Law no 1725 in 1996, CABI requested the official recogn ition of Isosos boundaries as Tierra Comunitaria de Origen Isoso (TCO Isoso) to formalize their owne rship right. The titling of the TCOIsoso has

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61 been in process since 1998. At present2 more than 560,000 hectares are communally titled in CABIs name (A. Noss and O. Castillo pers. comm.). At the same time, internal boundaries sepa rating different use ar eas are established inside the Isoso. Clear inte rnal boundaries reduce conflict over limited resources. For example, the farming plots limited to irri gated land in the Parapeti river banks are distributed to each Isoseo family. The fire wood collection areas ar e well distinguished among communities. Some hunting areas are ex clusive to those who have good relation with the Iyas (Combes 1998; Noss and Painter 2004). Members of each community are familiar with their village boundaries, excluding outsiders from using their communal resour ces. But not all Isoseos have a clear understanding of the TCO-Isoso boundaries. Before the titling process had begun, during the elaboration of NPKs management plan in 1999, almost all old men could identify the boundaries of the TCO-Isoso and the historical attachment with their ancestors territory. But for young people and women who almost never leave the community the TCO boundaries were difficult to identify (Linzer and Villasenor 1999). In the summer of 2005, during the communa l meetings, the TCO-Isoso boundaries seem to be more appreciated among Is oseos. They are expanding their spaceexpectation. During an interview in summer of 2005, the Mburuvicha of Rancho Nuevo narrated to me how they are fencing a new area far away from the village but inside the 2 According to CABIs register 564,000 hectares ar e titled to CABI as communal and 165,000 to private owners. According to press information in Bolpress.com published on October 2005 and the note of press there were titled 560,636 hectares in favor to CABI an d 10 thousand Guaranie peoples families. In all the process of TCO Isoso it was titled 174,159 hectares to 71 properties. According to the last preliminary data (data facilitated by Castillo CABI-WCS).

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62 TCO titled area. In Isiporenda, the communal Mburuvicha and his adviser complained about one individual who permanently tries to invade into the TCO titled land the Isiporendas people recognize that area as th eirs, being the traditional hunting area and source of wildlife to the community members. The boundaries among Guaran Isoseo comm unities are not physically established and are relatively flexible among the Guar an Isoseo people (comments from interview and personal observation). Inside the boundari es characteristic so cial and ecological systems are present. The Moa together with the andereko integrates the ecological and social systems existent in the TCO-Isoso and the Kaa Iya NP. These elements are central to develop the rules and institutions for natural resource management in Isoso. Tekoata and Mbaapo: Institutional A rrangements and Normative Regime The biggest challenge to CABI is to s eek a better way of life for the Guarani Isoseo people, respecting the Mbayu and the ande reko Consequently, to guarantee appropriate management, it is necessary to de velop institutional arrangements and rules. Cooperative decision making and implementation of activities are essential elements. The Tekoata and Mbaapo, CABI consciously has incorporat ed elements to improve self organization, education and tr aining, to strength technical sk ill, negotiation capacity and decision making, and to develop natural resource management experiences. Rules Rules of use are essential for the management and access to common natural resources. The rules regarding appropriation of natural resources must be well defined and adapted to the particular natural and social common pr operty context (Ostrom 1990). Johnson and Nelson (2004) suggest that collectiv e arrangements must be perceived as fair by the communal members of the common proper ty institution, and must be collectively

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63 made to be responsive to all of the resource users and to changing ecological or social conditions, and be acceptable (Johnson and Ne lson 2004). In addition there must be mechanisms of conflict resolution, correction a nd sanctions for departures from the rules (Berkers 1989; Agrawal 2001; Olsson et al. 2003). Within the Isoseo well-known rules are esta blished ascribing certain activities and use in the different areas. For example, all fishing and hunting areas are not the same: the access to remote sacred ar eas, such as the ponds of Yandeyari,3 or other areas in the forest near to the hills, are restricted to those with a respectful behavior (Combs 1988). Only those who know and have the approval of the Kaa Iya, or spirit guardian responsible for ensuring the forest, can gain access (C ombs 1998; Noss and Painter 2004). According to Combs (1998), Beneria-Surk in (2003) and Noss and Painter (2004) some cultural rules have weakened. Noss and Pa inter suggest that some traditional rules that contribute to sustainable use and conservation are being undermined by socioeconomic changes over the past decad es, including new hunting technologies and changes in employment patterns; reduction of the areas accessible to Isoseo hunters by the installation of private properties and Mennonite colonies; and the growing population in the Isoso, among other changes. Monitoring and Sanctions Iyambae Monitoring common resource use ensures that a communal management system, defined by rules and boundaries, allows only th e group members to carry out the intended activities. According to Ostrom (1990), m onitoring and sanctions imposition should be applied by members of a communal entity or by persons accountable to the members of 3 Yandeyari here is referring to the place.

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64 the group. Monitoring and sanction of violations are necessary to rule enforcement within a common property institution. Monitoring and sanctions of inappropri ate activities are established among Isoseos. The Mburuvicha or captains are responsible for dealing with infractions of internal rules and for maintaining order w ithin the community. At the same time the community is small enough that everyone ge nerally knows what everyone else is doing, and therefore an unofficial monitoring is going on. Despite monitoring every day activities is customary experience, the Isoseo have to adapt new rules to the present harsh soci oeconomic and ecologica l changes. Attitudes towards wildlife are not severe they are conti nuously adapted to peoples experiences in a changing socioeconomic and ecological environm ent. There is some experience of self monitoring by hunters, combining and supportin g scientific and local knowledge that supply elements to raise awareness of natura l resources (wildlife) management at the communal and indigenous territory level (Noss, Cuellar and Cuellar 2001, 2004; Noss and Cuellar 2003; Noss and Painter 2004). The Cupesi associations in Pikirenda and Ivasiriri. In those communities a group of women have organized themselves in an association. Those associ ations are supported by CABI and their communal assemble to ex perimentally produce Cupesi flour for the market. In both communities, the interviewed identified administrative training as a key necessity. They are looking for support to develop skills such as bookkeeping to monitoring the administration of the cupesi pr oduction. In those cases the introduction of new productive activity involves ne w skills to monitoring it.

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65 Collective Arrangement and Conflict Resolution The communal asamblea is the place where communal decisions affecting the community are made jointly. It is the forum where all members of one community together to the communal Mburubicha make decisions and coordinate community activities such as reparation of water channels or communa l infrastructure, and decide whether to participate or not in a project or program. The Isoso Gran Asamblea is the place where all communal Mburuvichas or captains, the womenMburuvicha, and the communal assistants make the major decisions affecting all Isoso. In general, Isoso has a well-established a nd functional means of ensuring collective decision-making and conflic t resolution with the participation of community members according to the central principles of Mborerekua unity and Iyambae autonomy. The decision-making process takes time. One asamblea is not enough. The analysis, discussion and joint deci sions must be internalized. The asamblea has rules too: respect for elders gives them more author ity than any one younger; shouting and verbal confrontations are not allowed (pers onal comment Angel Yandura). Albo (1990) describes the main role that the ee ija literally elders owner s of the word play in the community life and asamblea. There are some trend of communal cattle ranching organization and institutional development that can be identified. In a few communities, such as in Isiporenda and Yapiroa, a core of cooperative organizati on is found. Members of the cooperative take weekly turns taking care of the herd and the infrastructure. Decisions are made in the communal asamblea In Aguarati and Ipapio (Tamachi ndi) cattle owners have formed associations to improve and implement cat tle ranching practices, having invested in

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66 infrastructure acquisition and maintenan ce. Mixed-management (private/communal): private cattle herds are allocated inside the communal fences, with the owners agreeing to contribute to the communal infrastructures maintenance. Some communities administer a monetary fund and owners pay monthly (Based on interviews : Zulema Barahona, Crecencio Arambiza, Eda Parada, Alejandro Arambiza, Andrew Noss). Individually-owned free-gr azing cattle which some times invades agricultural plots, and always feeds on the riverine fore ststill represents the main challenge to Guarani Isoseo institutions. The free-grazing he rds comprise a majority of the cattle in the region (68% of total cattle of Guarani Isosenos owners) and it involves a large number of smallholders w ithout investment capacity w ho consider their cattle a complementary form of sustenance. Different communities are taking specific decisions attempting to regulate the cattles presence. For example, in 2001 the cattle owners from Koropo were made to move further North a nd establish Pikirenda, a new cattle ranching community (From interview with the captain of Pikirenda). In this way, they solved the invasion to farming plots by free grazing cattle but did not alleviate the pressure on the riverine forest. On the other hand, in Yapiro a the community reacted against the planned clearance of the riverine fo rest. The clearance was suggested by the technical people from the cattle-ranching projects, a nd the community decided to m ove the project away from the riverine forest to prot ect that valued ecosystem which brings them shadow, temperature regulation, wood, firew ood, fruits, and flood protection. eemoai : Relationships between the Group and External Forces Common property institutions are not isol ated. Therefore the relationship between the community or group and the external forces and authorities are important elements to take into account. CABI refers to its relati onship with the external institutions as the

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67 eemoai which includes their relationship w ith other grassroots indigenous organizations, the municipal government, the regional and national governments, the civil society and the private sector. The relationship between the Isoso and ex ternal forces has been changing through time. The Guaran-Isoseos were essentially warriors and they de fended their territory militarily against the cattle ranching expansion la conquis ta de la vaca during the colonial and early republican period (Albo 1992). The Spanish crown officially declared war against the Guaran people who resisted until the beginning of the 1890s. After a military defeat, the Isoseo leaders shifted their struggles strategy from warriors to negotiators (Albo 1990; BeneriaSurkin 2003). Therefore, the Mburuvisha Casiano Barrientos in 1927 and later Bonifacio Barrie ntos in the 1940s were the first local authorities officially recognized as Capitan Grande del Alto y Bajo Isoso by the regional and national government. They traveled to Santa Cruz and La Paz to demand the legalization of their communal land as a strate gy to be recognized as indigenous peoples with their own identity. They [the Guaran] demonstrate a rene wed cultural energy, this time focused on inclusion rather than resistance, but with the crucial caveats that their culture and language be respected, via bilingual edu cation, and their history rescued from official distortion. [Albo,1990 c ited by Beneria-Surkin 2003] During the 1980s a Natural Resources Protec tion Plan for the department of Santa Cruz was designed and implemented. Then, a discussion process wa s stimulated among Isoseo about the scale and impact of Santa Cruzs expanding agro-industries and about how they were to improve their own economic status without losi ng traditional social structures and values. Therefore, CABI es tablished strategic alliances with other indigenous groups. CABI supported the formation of the Central de Pueblos Indigenas de

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68 Santa Cruz in 1981 and ten years later the C onfederacon Indigena del Oriente Bolivano (CIDOB). CABI has achieved a strong capacity to nego tiate at local, regional and national levels. They exercise their rights based on official and legal mechanisms. The following facts are the most important achievements on the natural resource management terrain: The co-management of the Gran Chaco-K aa Iya National Park (KNP) (1995). In 1995, after the creation of the KNP an ag reement of its co-administration was signed between CABI and the national government. With a surface of 3.4 million hectares this park is the largest in Lati n America and the first co-administrate by an indigenous organization in Latin America. The governance of an indigenous munici pal district, making CABI the legal political authority in Isoso. Under the P opular Participatory Law (1994), CABI is recognized as the first indigenous munici pal district government in Bolivia. The coordination of development activities of NGOs working in Isoso. Agreement with APCOB, CIPCA, CABI also formed alliances with Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) since the beginning of 1990s. WCS had begun a program in 1995, to both develop the Park and promote a sustainable rural developm ent process. The alliance gave them access to USAID funding and other revenue generated from hydrocarbon activity within the Park and the TCO-Isoso. The co-administration of the Plan de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas4 (PDPI) through an important agreement with the petroleum private companies (Chapter 3 Stakeholders) and the state (1997 to 2004). The PDPI sought to reduce or mitigate any negative social and economic impact s of the pipelines on the indigenous peoples living in the area affected by its construction. The PDPI is supported by a found of $3.7 million that included $ 1.5 million to support land titling for indigenous territorial clai ms by the Guaran-Isoseos, the Chiquitanos and Ayoreodes. 4 The Bolivia-Brazil Gas pipeline (Gasbol) carries ga s from south of Santa Cruz to Porto AlegreBrazil, crosses 250 kilometres of TCO-Isoso and KNP la nd. As a condition the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank required the pipeline owners to design and implement the PMA and the PDPI (Chapter 3). The PMA defined the actions to be taken during and after the construction of the pipeline to reduce any negative environmental impacts associat ed with the construction of the pipeline.

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69 The agreement between CABI and Transi erra the petroleum consortium (20022006) to implement and monitoring the PRAC and PDI. Their territorial demand as TCO-Isoso is recognized by the Bolivian government and other international institutions such as the World Bank and USAID which are supporting their demarcation and natura l resource management planning. CABI entered those arrangement having as its main objective the defense of Guarani-Isoseo land rights as well as strength self governance. These successful achievements are unprecedented among lowla nd indigenous organization in Bolivia. National recognition as authority in the region enables CABI to prevent further incursions into their territory by ranchers and largescale agriculturalists (Arambiza 1996 cited by Beneria-Surkin 2003). There is not doubt that CABI is an impor tant stakeholder that is officially recognized at local and national levels. Desp ite CABIs political achievements it has not been strong enough to confront the influences exercised by the larg e cattle ranchers. Large cattle ranchers in th e eastern lowland are well organized both locally and nationally. During three different presidential governments th ey have impeded the titling of TCO-Isoso through different mechanisms. Th e carrying capacity for cattle ranching is one of the most contradict ory technical arguments used by the landlords and cattle ranchers to impede TCO land titling. On the other hand, cat tle ranchers have taken advantage of the TCO titling process as many private owners received titles before TCO titles were signed and they did not pay the cost of the titling. The current president, Evo Morales, during his inaugural speech used the words of a Guaran leader tratenme como a una vaca meaning treat me as you would treat a cow referring to 25 hectares for each cow used by cattle ranchers to justify the land concentration in the Chaco region (Ortiz 2006). The relationship between CABI and the

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70 current government representati on is difficult to predict. Af ter the nationaliz ation of the Bolivian hydrocarbons, the issue of land began to gain attention at the national level (La Razn 2006). The Bolivias tu rbulent political climate (H ylton 2006) is covering the hope of great advances. The current governme nt does not clearly differentiate between highland and lowland Indigenous people a nd it seeks land to distribute among the highland peasants (La Razon 2006-2, 3). Conse quently, the lowland indigenous territories are threatened and lowland Indigenous pe oples are on the alert (La Razn 2006-2). On the other hand, the cattle ranchers and pr ivate owners of the eastern lowlands do not have the national support th at they had before, but they are part of the Santa Cruz departmental social movement at regional le vel. That gives them the power to have political and economic influence in the d ecision making process. Therefore, CABIs political strategies to relate to external inst itutions has to be adapte d to different contexts. A the present time CABI is playing in differe nt local and national scenarios. For example the main Guarani Isoseo l eader Bonifacio Barrientos capitan grande actually occupies a Congressman at national level and Marce lino Apurani is the provincial authority strengthening CABIs regional relationships. The Guarani Isoseo are making progress in developing practical negotiation capaci ties develop negotiation capacities. Contrasting the Common Property (CPR) and Community-Base Management (CBM) Framework to the Mbayu It is possible to find a close similari ty between the theoretical CPR and CBM framework and the Guarani Isoseno stra tegically planning process based on the Mbayu (Figure 4-2). Nevertheless the Mbayu is not a fixed theoretical framework it is the result of practical experience with a long history. Its creators ar e their own protagonist. The Guarani Isoseos resolution to surv ive as indigenous peoples is the Mbayu s main

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71 objective. The Ivi Iyambae or land without owner or the land without evil has guided the Guarani through centuries. They fight to reach self governance in a territory shaped by different social a nd ecological systems. The elements of the Mbayu are tied to each other and they are part of the all spheres of Guarani Isoseo life. The Mbayu is also a political decision. Figure 4-2. Guaran Isoseo St rategically Planning Based on Mbayu Contrasting to Common Property and Community Base Management Theories. CABI is a strong grassroots organization that decided to keep communal land as a central element in their subs istence as indigenous people. They do not deny improving the well being of their communities and therefore they have a vision of themselves as the Mbayu. The Mbayu incorporates the main principles to maintain social unity and allow live in comoono t the Guaran Is oseo as social unity and live in a common territory.

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72 On the other hand I argue that the Mbayu is a vision that encompasses a political dimension and decision making mechanisms. The Mbayu is a conscientious political decision related to their subsistence as Guaran i Isoseo people, it is a life project. The Mbayu is a practical and historical experien ce and the communities are the responsible stakeholders (Figure 4-3). Figure 4-3. Contrasting the Garani Isoseo Mbayu and the Common Property and CommunityBase Management Framework. The andereko is a social and ecological fabric embracing the main social principles in a specific landscape or territo ry which includes the land and ecosystems. The autonomy or self governance is a central element to the Guarani Isoseos and they are strengthening their traditional institutions in the changing context they seek for external co-responsible part nerships that support their Mbayu

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73 CHAPTER 5 CATTLE RANCHING IN ISOSO Cattle raising is the largest land use in the TCO-Isoso. The regional land use plan of Santa Cruz Department (PLUS) recomme nds extensive cattle ranching as the main productive activity on the Santa Cruz Chaco and farming and protection on the river banks of Parapeti river (PLUS 1995). Acco rding to Combs (1999) and Alb (1992), once livestock were introduced by the karai in the middle of the nineteenth century, this radically changed the life in Is oso. Since that point, the history of Isoso has been a history of conflicts between the Isoseos and the cattle ranchers. In sp ite of this, this one sees a growing number of cows belonging to Isoseo in the communities. At present, cattle ranching activities are in the hands of two different social groups: 1) Guarani Isoseo cattle ranching charac terized by the customary and legal communal land ownership; and 2) the private landholders characterized by indi vidual private land ownership regime. The Expansion of Cattle Ranching in Isoso Three phases of cattle ranching expansi on can be identified in Isoso: The conquest of original peoples territories ( la conquista de la vaca ). Since the colonial period with the implementa tion in the 1950s of Bohan plan The Bolivian agrarian modernization private livestock production nourished by the State and international cooperation. Fr om the 1950s to the beginning of the 1990s The big cattle ranching projects char acterized by the intr oduction of communal livestock projects founded by NGOs and churches in the Isoso.

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74 A brief description of each of them help s to understand the present cattle ranching situation in Isoso. The Conquest of Original Peoples T erritories La Conquista de la Vaca In Bolivia, cattle expansion has been associated with the extension of the conquerors power and then the Republican (Government) occupation of the original peoples territories. First the missionary, then the military and private interests introduced cattle as a way to civilize and conquer the aboriginal cultures. According to Saravia Toledo (n/d), cattle livestock were introduced in the Chaco forest after the mid-1700s by the Franciscan missions. After Bolivian i ndependence (1825) the Chaco region of the country was designated for livestock producti on. As an incentive, the government offered one square legua (5.6 square kilometers or approximately 3.5 square miles) to whomever occupied the area. The deepest penetration was through the Parapeti and Pilcomayo rivers to the East. The Isoso is not an exception to this pattern, despite a long resistance which denied the religious missions access and re pelled the colonial and Republican military. Finally during the 1840s or 1850s cattle were introduced by a Mr. Mercado, a criollo or karai (Combs 1999). According to testim ony collected by Combs (1999), Mr. Mercado come to Isoso as a young person and lived among the Isoseo. As an adult, he introduced the first head of cattle and opened the Isoso to other cattle ranchers who came to Isoso with their cows and laborers. Th e cattle invaded Indigenous farming, gathering and hunting areas. The growth in number and extension of ranches limited the Isoseos access to land and natural resources that they previously had access to. And worst of all, ranchers came with the in tention to reproduce the criollo hierarchical system within the Isoso, which the Isoseo had to continually resist. Combs (1999) relates how cattle

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75 ranchers intended to impose themselves as captains in the communities, or tried to incorporate the Isoseo people as labo rers in the hacienda system. Modernization: Cattle Ranching Subsidized by the Bolivian State Since 1960s under the banner of moderniza tion, a gradual expansion toward the Chacoan plain was officially stimulated by the Bolivian government which granted the land and infrastructure for livestock production. For example, during this time the government built water reservoirs and wells to stimulate cattle ranching, particularly northwest of the actual TCO -Isoso (in the area knowing as Medanos Fociles or Arenales de los Guanacos ) (Saravia Toledo 1996). During the military governments in the 1970s and 1980s land and monetary resources were distributed through a web of corruption. Close friends and family members of the military elite received vast expanses of land and credit (credit which never had to be repaid, and which led the Banco Agricola to bankruptcy). According to Romero (2005) almost seven million hectares were distributed during the Banzer military government (1971 to 1978). In the Chacoan province of Cordillera one indi vidual could receive more than one mega-parcel of land, for example, the well known Gutierrez family received five parcels with a total of 96,874 hectares in the Santa Cruz Chacoan region (Romero 2005). During my visits to Isoso, I had participat ed in the relaxed chatter that accompanied drinking tea at my host families. In Pikirenda several neighbors shared with me their stories about: thousands of cows grazing on the neighboring plain and great feasts at Otto Len ranch. The men were peons at Mr Lens ranch a close friend of that time President Banzer. Surrounding the community of Rancho Viejo, one can see the evidence of the ranchers good times: Otto Lens abandoned infrastructure machinery, cleared land, and water channels. The community it self was completely surrounded by ranches

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76 which limited access to natura l resources and livelihood sources (Combes 1999; Albo 1990). Therefore, it is possible to unde rstand why Rancho Viejo is the poorest community today (Beneria-Surkin 2003). Over time many of the great private ra nchers like Otto Len have collapsed. Without subsidies from the Banco Agricola, and after overgrazing the pastures, they could not survive economically (personal co mment of veterinarian Mr Eurlet).The golden era passed, but the peons and co wboys settled in the Isoso establishing the Karai Isoso sharing their attachment to cattle ranching activities and poverty with the Isoseo. More recently, since 1995, some Mennonite colonies have been established. The first Mennonite arrived in Bolivian territo ry between 1954 and 1962, together with other colonizers (colonies of Russian s, Eastern Europeans, and Japanese were also set up). These foreign colonizers were seen as mean s to ensure the modernization of lowland agriculture. Therefore, they received severa l incentives to colonize new areas and clear the forest. Even though cattle raising is not a main productive activity for the Mennonite, they have significant herds. The Mennonite land management system is actually questioned by some because their agricultural practices are highly destructive of soil properties (Linzer 1998, CABI, FII and WCS 2001). Big Projects and the Cattle Raising Incentive Among Isoseos The Big projects ( Los Grandes Proyectos) phase began in 1995 with the Kovei project which fenced 6,781 has fo r communal livestoc k production. Since 1995 nine big projects have been supported by di fferent resources and implemented through NGOs working with community members. NGO s such as CIPCA and APCOB together with the Catholic and Evangeli cal churches are the most in fluential promoters of cattle

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77 ranching within Isoseo. At present the gove rnment of the Autonomous Community of Valencia is a main sponsor of cattle ranc hing projects in Isoso, supporting projects in Kopere(s), San Silvestre and Yapiroa. The ge neral outputs of those projects have been more fenced area, water wells, rustic water reservoirs and cowboys shelters, leading to the introduction of more herds of cattle. Projects have not yet achieved their objectives : communal production of commercial meat. The big projects introduced cattle by different ways, but of ten by buying one or more bulls with project funds, while the communitys members contributed heifers. Barahona (2005) relates how dairy cows we re introduced through 25 pregnant Holland cows. Each person who received one of those co ws had in turn to give one pregnant cow to another community member and so on. As a result there are 45 Holland -cows in Isoso today (Barahona 2005). The Isoseos Cattle Ranching Many Isoseo have begun independently raising livestock as a complementary subsistence activity. Cattle is introduced by individual in itiative among the GuaraniIsoseo people via different means: buying or receiving them as wages from neighboring ranchers; or as a pay for taki ng care of the cattle herd of family or communal neighbors, who live or work in the city (Barahona 2005). The 2004 cattle census registered the number of cattle per owner, as well as so me management characteristics, which are summarized in Table 5-1. According to th e data among the Isoseo three main cattle ownership regimes can be differentiated: Individual cattle ownership (under free gr azing or fenced management systems) Communal cattle ownership (under free gr azing or fenced management); and Family or group cattle ownership under fenced management.

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78 Table 5-1. Number of Isoseos Owners and Number of Head of Cattle by Type of Property Regime by Community in Isoso. Community Population No. individual owners Cattle individually owned Cattle communally owned Family owned cows Owners Free grazing cows Owners Using Big projects fences Free Grazing cows Fenced cows Free grazing cows Fenced 1 Isiporenda 300 31 171 67 2 Karapari 149 4 48 10 3 Kopere Guazu 125 3 3 176 20 20 378 4 Kopere Montenegro 79 5 Kopere Brecha 173 8 6 31 50 13 188 6 Kopere Loma 228 7 96 15 7 Kapeatindi 232 17 87 48 8 Yapiroa* 555 30 703a 9 Ivasiriri 364 40 510 10 La Brecha* 724 51 529a 47 11 Tamachindi 380 6 114 10 346 12 Koropo 314 8 74 64 300 27 150 13 Pikirenda* 8 189 7 14 Aguaraigua 277 18 94 11 15 Rancho Viejo* 217 10 121a 0 16 Rancho Nuevo 493 16 238 0 17 Yovi 435 33 230 0 18 Yuqui* 0 0 10 19 Mini 31 2 49 10 20 San Silvestre 102 40 635 0 99 21 Paraboca 90 7 107 10 22 Kuarirenda 586 18 14 382 60 10 140 353 23 Aguarati 338 15 7 296 180 25 5 24 Guandare* 4 490 10 25 Joseravi 158 8 15 26 Tetarembei 13 9 320a TOTAL 6,363 393 104 5,695 610 283 928 798 Total owners 497 Total head of cattle 8,314 Source CABI data base June 2005; Barahona 2005 a. Data of Yapiroa, La Brecha, Rancho Viejo and Tetarembei were uncompleted, having the name of owners but not the number of cattle. I understand that data were introduced latter, and Barahona 2005 includes the general number of cattle heads for those communities. I used her gene ral data, in bold italics in this table. The Individual Cattle Ownership Regime The majority (76% of the total) of th e Isoseo herd is individually owned. According to my interviews, cattle are as signed to different members within the

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79 household as a means to secure an effective source of cash for each person. I take into account a total of 300 owners registered in the CABI database1 (Table 5-2) to calculate the median and the mode of herd of cattle per person. The median is seven head of cattle per owner, and the mode two head of cattl e per owner. The maximum number of cows belonging to one individual is 263 head (in Guandare). Table 5-2. Distribution of Individual Cattle Ownership. Number of head of Cattle per owner Number of owners Percent of owners Total cattle Percent of total cattle herd 1-5 12742%3739% 6-10 7324%59114% 11-15 4314%57314% 16-20 176%3258% 21-50 248%72517% 51-75 83%56113% 76-100 31%2376% 101 52%79819% Total 300100%4,183100% Source CABI data base June 2005 It is important to notice that 66% of ow ners have between one and ten head of cattle. 6% of the owners have more than 50 head of cattle. There is an indicator of possible wealth accumulation. The social imp acts resulting from this situation must be studied. There are differences among individual s and communities but, in general, herd management is almost absent. The largest part of those herds (89%) is freely grazing on the communal land, invading the farming plot s, river banks and household areas (field observation). This situation should be regulat ed because so many free grazing cows are overgrazing the communal forest and grassla nds. This is a challenge to the Guarani institutions that should regulate it. On the other hand individually owned herd (11% of 1 I do not take in account data of Yapiroa, La Brech a and Rancho Viejo because I did not have access to the detailed data of those communities. I use the data of Barahona 2005 to complete table 5.1

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80 individual ownership cows) is located insi de the communal fences (Table 5-1). Free grazing herds can be grouped only during the dry season when the cows seek water and then the communal water-reservoirs are the only source for the cattle (Saravia Toledo personal comment, Barahona 2005 and field observation). Therefore, cattle are individually or priv ately owned but their management depends on communal resources such as communal water-reservoirs, communal fences and communal grassland and forest. The Semi Private-family System Some Isoseo families or groups of families ar e able to invest in cattle and fences. With the approval of the community, the he rds are located on communal land, and cattleowners do not have ownership rights to the land but have usufruct rights to natural resources: wild fruit, forage, pasture and wa ter. According to the CABI data base (June 2005) and cattle census (2004) there are 18,824 hectares fenced under this management system. Around 10 % (798 cows) of the total Isoseos herd belong to seven family groups (Table 5-1 and Table 5-3). I did not collect information about the technical management (sanitary, feed, and reproductive) However, according to the calculated mean of 23 hectares per cattle head as animal this is an exceedingly extensive managed system. The Isoseo Cattle Communal Ownership System The communal property system is direc tly related to the big projects Los Grandes Proyectos . Barahona (2005) includes a descri ption and background of each one of the nine projects established in Isoso. Two main trends can be differentiated. On the one hand, the herd belongs to the whole community and it is placed in the fenced area of the communal land (Table 5-1 and Table 5-4). A total of 43,851 hectares were fenced by the

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81 Table 5-3. Family System in Isoso. Name Community Owners No head of cattle Fenced area (hectares) Propieda Karapiti Kapeatindi Group of families 494.2 Familia Sacarias Montenegro San Silvestre Sacarias Montengro 99 3,528.4 Propiedad Ipapiao Tamachindi D. Garcia, Nolberta and Maquiades Castro 346 1,708.4 Campo Grande San Silvestre/ Koropo Family Snchez 8,162.7 Fortaleza Kuarirenda Francisco Snchez 172 4,930.5 Chunka Kuarirenda 181 Guandare Aguarati Group of families Total 798 18,824.1Source: CABI data base June 2005 big projects; within this area a total of 928 head of cattle are owned and managed communally. As was mentioned before, these fences, infrastructure and head of cattle were sponsored by NGOs: CIPCA 16%, APCO B 35% and the government of Valencia sponsoring the 49% of total fenced areas. Th e second trend refers to those cows in communal ownership that are freely grazing (Table 5-1). Those herds belong to 17 different communities and 70% of them were acquired though the PRAC program (CABI database 2005). The Big Projects have generally had the sa me strategy: to build the infrastructure including fences, water wells, and other faci lities and to introduce reproductive bulls. The life time of project implementation and technical support is two years on average. After the NGOs support finished few commun ities find their own way to organize the cattle ranching production. Frequently the projects are almost abandoned. In Isisporenda the Yaitarenda project left 20 heifers and one bull (stallion) today they have 67 head of cattle. Yaitarenda proj ect in Isiporenda has an animal charge of

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82 Table 5-4. Cattle Ranching Projects. Project-name Community Sponsor SituationCattle Head Communal Cattle Head Private Total cattle Fenced area (hectars) Guaripaku Kopere (4) GV 378 20 398 10,596.64 Kovei Koropo, Yovi, Aguaraigua APCOB 150 300 450 6,781.15 Karumbei Kuarirenda APCOB 140 60 200 1,186.97 Comunidad Guaricusari Kopere (4) CIPCA/PDPI 188 50 238 2,830.84 Aguarati Aguarati APCOB 5 180 185 7,486.95 Yateirenda Isiporenda Isiporenda CIPCA 67 67 4,279.78 Yapiroa Yapiroa GV 637.5 Propiedad SanSilvestre San Silvestre GV 9,833.73 Rancho Nuevo Rancho Nuevo 159.68 Rancho Nuevo2 Rancho Nuevo GV 28.72 Total 928 610 1538 43,821.96 Source CABI data base 2005

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111.7 hectares per head of cattle and Guaripaku project in Kopere has an animal charge of 26.6 hectares per head of cattle. These hi gh numbers are related to poor management. Land Use by Cattle Ranching Ownershi p Regime and Management System Table 5-5 shows that free grazing indivi dual cattle are the most numerous, as well as using the most extensive area, without control over where the animals forage, when they give birth, etc. Owners expend the minimu m effort, time and resources on their herd. Among the main problems of big projects are (1) the implementation of cattle ranching technology without observation of the Chaco ecological condi tions, (2) the short term support that do not allow develop lo cal institutions, and (3) absence of commercialization strategy. Despite that, the Isoseos accept big projects because they bring more heads of cattle and infrastructure such as fences and water well which are high valued by the communities. Table 5-5. Number of Head of Cattle and Land Use by Ownership Regime and Management System in the Guaran-Isoso. Cattle Ownership Regime / Individual Cattle Ownership Communal Cattle Ownership Family Cattle Ownership Total Management system Free grazing Fenced (1) Free grazing Fenced (1) Fenced (2) No. Head of Cattle 5,695 610283928798 8,314 Land Use (hectares) 68,340 3,39643,85118,824 134,411 Hectares/head of cattle 12 1247.323.6 16.17Note (1) the individual cattle fenced is located inside of the communal ow nership fenced area. (Source: CABI data base June 2005). The individual herds inside communal fences, 610 head of cattle which belong to 104 owners (Barahona 2005 and CABI data base June 2005) seems to be an interesting trend. According to Barahona (2005) and Aram biza (interviewed in summer 2005), some

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84 communities are establishing norms to use co mmunal fences. For example, in Kovei the Isoseos private cattle use the fenced area a nd their owners pay monthly per head to the communal administration. The Private Landholders in the Isoso Cattle ranching by private landholders is the most extensive activity overall in TCO-Isoso. A complete private landholders register should result from the SAN-TCO process. The partial information was avai lable through FII technical office and is summarized in Table 5-6. Table 5-6. Cattle Ranching Systems Non-Guaran Isoseo in the Isoso. Polygon/ category Number of owner Total Area (ha) Head of cattle Agriculture (ha) POLYGON 1 Agroindustry Cattle ranching1164,6776,333 12,117 Mennonite Colony 223,8663,700 8,000 Privates 40106,70612,542 1,183 Cattle ranching 3487,62510,152 Mixed 619,0812,390 1,183 Subtotal 53195,24922,575 21,300 POLYGON 3 Mennonite Colonies 444,21713,392 8,000 Privates Cattle ranching 26115,56111,804 336 Peasant-Agriculture 4433 Subtotal 34160,21125,196 8,336 POLYGON 4 Military 111,918200 100 Privates Cattle ranching 29104,18516,294 Subtotal 30116,10316,494 100 POLYGON 5 Private Cattle ranching 44269,37836,555 Subtotal 44269,37836,555 TOTAL 161740,941100,820 29,736 Source preliminary data Saneamiento TCO Isoso FII-CABI

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85 Data reveal that there are two main type s of private cattle ow nership systems. On one hand, there is the indivi dual cattle ranching system that includes the extensive traditional cattle ranches, the mixed-ranches with agricultural forage as food supplement and the agro-industry. On the other hand, ther e is the Mennonite ca ttle ranching System differentiated by the collective organization of production and strong social fabric inside the colonies. Individual Cattle Ranching System According to Linzer (1998) as well as th e preliminary data of TCO-Isoso titling process (SAN-TCO-Isoso ) the cattle ranches with extensive management are located on the Southern area of the TCO -Isoso (polygons 3 and 5) while the mixed ranches and agro-industry are generally located on the Northern part (polygons 1 and 4). Different ecological and socioeconomic factors influen ce this pattern. Firstl y, ecological factors such as the annual rainfall regime that varies from SE to NW from 475 mm to 1000mm annual rainfall. Rainfall pattern s are associated with different natural forage availability. Secondly, the distance and access to the main cities influence the commercialization opportunities. The northern area is closer to Pailon and Sa nta Cruz which are most important agro-industrial developed areas in Bolivia. The southern areas are more isolated and the access is t oo difficult on the rain season. Cattle ranches in the Southern areas pract ice more extensive cattle ranching, an activity with low yield complementing other livelihood strategies (L inzer 1998). The herd is frequently free-ranging with poor management, without control over livestock movements or genetic selection. The criollo race predominates because it resists the extended dry season (CABI 2001). The cattle is so ld year round but prin cipally in the dry

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86 season. The cattle is transported on the hoof by truck to the commercial areas of Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca (cattle ranchers comments). Concordant with south-north ecological transition, cattle ranching systems tend to shift from extensive to mixed cattle ranchi ng. Mixed cattle ranchi ng in this area is characterized by cultivated grass, fenced area s, application of breeding, health and feed technologies. This activity is influenced by the agro-industry located in the northern areas of the TCO-Isoso (Polygons 1 and 4), which is characterized by th e high investment in machinery and infrastructure. The private properties in those areas are generally large, between 2,000 hectares and 15,000 hectares. The administration and management are handled by full-time technicians as well as temporary personnel during the harvest season. The market oriented production is linked with the credit system and main markets in Santa Cruz and Pailon. The Mennonite System Mennonites have been established in two areas of the TCO Isoso (Table 3-4 and Table 5-6). In the South between the Isoseo communities of Isiporenda and the town of Charagua (Polygon 3), four Mennonite col onies were established in 1995: Pinondy, Pinondy Itaguazurenda, Casa Grande and Dura ngo. Two other colonies, La Milagrosa, and Santa Clara, were established later in th e Northern part of the TCO Isoso (polygon1). The population of all together is approxima tely 10,000 peoples. Commercial agriculture is their main activity and livestock is a co mplement, however, it is intensively-managed. Altogether, the Mennonites have 17,092 head of cattle (database CABI May 2006 and personal comment Castillo).

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87 Table 5-7. Demographic and Productive Charact eristics of Mennonite Colonies in the Isoso. Colonia Homes (c) Population(c) AreaCattle (ha) (b) AreaAgric (ha) (a) Cattle (a) AreaTotal (ha) (a) Poligon 3 Pinondi 300 2,7009,8002,8004,500 15,800 Pinondi Itaguazurenda 164 1,4726,5001,8002,600 8,000 Durango 374 3,36611,4802,4004,195 13,980 Casa Grande 109 9815,4371,0002,097 6,437 Sub total 947 8,51933,2178,00013,392 44,217 Poligone 1 La Milagrosa 353 3,2786,4008,0001,200 16,245 Santa Clara 166 1,4916,035..?2,500 7,621 Sub total 519 4,76912,4358,0003,700 23,866 TOTAL 1,466 13,28845,65216,00017,092 68,083 Sources:(a)preliminary data SAN-TCO. (b) CABI-FII Oscar Castillo comments. (c) INE national census 2002 Mennonites raise dairy cattle for auto c onsume, butter and cheese industry. Among Mennonites women are responsible for the herd of cattle. Strong cultural believes limit mens participation in cattle raising activities Despite that fact, there is evidence that some Mennonites are shifting to more cattle ra nching activities in the northern part of the TCO Isoso (field visit 2003). One Mennonite was interviewed and he identified the subsequent poor harvest and dry season as ma jor motivation to shif t from agricultural production to more cattle ra nching production. Many Mennonite s have preferred selling their land before adopting more cattle ranc hing activities because this shift implies significant cultural changes. Those Mennonite s who are raising more cattle are buying more land to expand the cattle ranching activ ity. Consequently, t hose Mennonite-ranchers are increasing their plot size a nd becoming more individual owners.

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88 Ecological and Socioeconomic Effects There is evidence of overgrazing and soil eros ion caused by the herd of cattle in the Isoso (Leon 2003; Winer 2003; Navarro 1998, 20 02; Guerrero 2002). The Isoseos free grazing cattle contribute to th e overgrazing in more extens ive area using 71,736 hectares. Two main elements contribute to the overgrazing in Isoso, the fi rst is directly related to the management system and the second is re lated to the natural condition of the dry Chaco. On one hand, the livestock in Isoso has been characterized as unmanaged (Linzer, 1998; Saravia Toledo1996, personal comments2002). Unmanaged means that livestock have been generally under-rotated, temporally or locally overstocked, without sanitary and reproductive control. On the other hand, the rainy s eason in the Chaco is concentrated at the end of spring and su mmer (September to February), and is characterized by a high variab ility inter-annually, seasonally, and monthly. That means a high fluctuation of grass pr oduction from year to year. Therefore, variability and unpredictability are part of the Chaco climate. The forage-resources in the Chaco are num erous and belong to different strata: arboreal, shrub and herbaceous (Saravia Toledo 1994; Avila 2002). Saravia-Toledo (1994) indicates that in El Salvador an experimental cattle ranch in the Bolivian Chaco it was observed that cattle consume fo liage, fruits, twigs or entire plants of 11 arboreal species, 20 shrubs, 66 herbaceous nongrasses and 50 grasses. Despite of that variability and that the Isos eo herds occupy extensive woodlands and grassland areas, the herds in Isoso tend to congregate in some areas because, as other herbivore-ungulates, they forage selectively (Saravia Toledo 1994; Gordon 2004) and because they seek water sources which are scarce in the Chaco dr y forest (Adamoli 1972; Saravia Toledo 1994

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89 personal comment 2002; Linzer 199 8). In others words, the ca ttle concentrate in some areas where the grass is more palatable and wh ere water is available. Consequently those areas become overgrazed According to Saravia Toledo (1996), Nava rro and Avila (in Guerrero 2002), Leon (2002) the major effects relate d to overgrazing are: Soil-co mpaction, degradation and loss of forage resources, transformation of th e landscape due to the invasion of woody elements in the grassland, changes in the vegetation composition and habitat degradation for the wild animals and change in ve getation composition du e the alteration of vegetation regeneration, the limited natural re -growth of palatable species, favoring the non-palatable. The riverine forest is one of the ecosyst ems more pressured by the free Isoseo cattle. For example, an evaluation of that fo rest resource shows that the natural re-growth of mesquite ( Prosopis chilensis ) is threatened by the cattle grazing, and to find specimens under 30 years of age in some areas of Is oso is almost impossible today (Leon, 2003). The new community of Tetarembai wa s established in the area of the Baados del Isoso (wetland). Their cattle ranching development is a threat for this important ecosystem. In the social terrain, data reveals that few individuals only 3% of the owners are accumulating individual wealth in form of cattle and they are using considerable area in the communal land. There is not information a bout social consequences from this fact even though it is possible expect differences in power relations. In the other hand cattle is an important livelihood in general the Isoseo are expecting to raise more cattle they are seeking for more cattle ranching projects.

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90 Despite the fact that cattle is individually owned within the household, the women are only 29% of the total owners. In gene ral among the Isoseos cattle ownership is linked to a cash economy. For example, the wo mens association of cupesi producers in Ivasiriri decided to buy cattle with their profit. Those fact s tell us that the low women ownership is a result of the less women connection with the cash money economy but this a issue to be explored. Well-defined boundaries in the case of cattle ranch activities can be a positive asset for better management and limited the area of ecological damage. But on the other hand, extensive fenced areas limit access to natural resources and exclude part of the Isoseo population from common property resources. The Mennonite agricultural and livestock activity is highly intensive. Their herd of cattle are concentrated in a small areas cons equently they feed th em with high quality products are maintained in good health and sanita ry care. This investment has its returns: milk and cheese production are quite high. Ho wever, the Mennonites higher rates of deforestation, soil erosion and water consumpti on are the main problems associated with their activity in the Isoso. Additionally, Mennonites do not have enough land to support their population growths n ecessities. Today they are leasing communal land in Isiporenda for their agricultu ral production. Therefore they represent one of the most immediate ecological and socioeconomic threats in the TCO Isoso.

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91 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS Having examined the Guaran-Isos eo institutions based on their Mbayu vision within the CP and CBC framework, I argue th at the Isoseo communities can face cattle ranching expansion challenges su ccessfully on the strength of their internal institutions. As long as the Mbayu continues to be the prevaili ng institutional arrangement, the Isoseo communities will find the design of the organizational structure to manage the expansion of cattle at social, economic and ecological levels (Figure 6-1). Figure 6-1 illustrates how the Mbayu is a holistic approach that allows Isoseo to take advantage of economic opportunities a nd integrate them into their own social ecological approaches. The main organizationa l structures are in place and are operative, including in the Tekoata and the eemoa. These, particularly the asambleas and the strong inter-institutional links between CABI and the external world, allow them to adapt and incorporate changes into cattle initia tives that will achieve social equity and environmental sustainability. Worldwide, and the Isoso is no an excepti on, pressure on land and water resources from livestock production will increase (Upton 2004; Fairfield 2004; Kaimowitz 1996; Naylor et al. 2005). So will the threat from poorly managed operations. The extent of these pressures highlights the need to suppor t traditional institutions so that they are capable of making adequate management deci sions, elaborating proper goals, promoting technological changes and monitoring thei r implementation. This will ensure that livestock contribute to br oad development goals, minimi zing the potential damage to

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92 social and environmental sustainability: to k eep the ecosystem functi onality and access to healthy natural resources a nd to achieve wellbeing for the Guarani Isoseo people. Figure 6-1. A Cattle Ranching Strate gy based on the Guarani Isoseo Mbayu The Guarani Isoseo institutions have s hown to be resilient. Despite having experienced different shocks, from the c onquest to market penetration, the GuaranIsoseo institutions have retained essentia lly the same function and structure based on their identity or andereko At present, the Isoseo pe ople are discussing the cattle ranching problems in the communities with the support of the CABI -Ivy Iyambae Foundationwhich gathered information (C ABI/FII 2005; CABI/FII 2006) and organized a set of workshops in the communities (Barahona 2005; field observation). People understand that their survival and autonomy as people is connected to the way they will

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93 maintain the andereko and the Mbayu Different communities are taking specific decisions attempting to regulate the cattles presence. The examples of Coropo-Pikirenda, and Yapiroa (Chapter 4) demonstrate that if the Guaran Isoseo institutions have adequate information, they are able to take decisions favoring CP resources and their access by community members. Their vision and their practice, emphasizing selforganization, support an adaptive management strategy and collabo rative learning. The support of technical and scientific information is helpi ng make decisions in a changing context. Therefore, collaboration of institutio ns and advisers plays an important role. The Mbaapo and eemoa in Figure 6-1 are the strategically elements of the Mbayu that deal with these issues. Cattle, insofar as it may complement the Isoseo household income, may play a positive part in their economy, but it also represents a threat to important ecosystems such as the riverine forests that prov ide firewood, wild fruits, wood, temperature regulation and protection from floods. Fre quently, individual own free-grazing herds destroy fences on farming plots and invade them. In this way cattle can compete against the communities stability and can become a source of conflict. This reinforces the present conclusion about the importance of management of the herd, of availability of cattle ranching technology and the developm ent of regulations among Guarani Isoseo cattle owners. In the andereko the individual approach coexists with communal institutions. Hence the challenge is to rec onciler the individual cattle ranching with the community base management according to the Mbayu because it provides a framework for establishment of an adequate regula tion. It can also provide a basis for the

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94 introduction of newer manageme nt strategies. Internal in stitutions ruling communal life are responding to these challenges. Among the CABIs main concerns are to build up alternatives and models of sustainable development and strength the intern al capacities and institutions to afford the changing context. Cattle-raising will continue to play a part in the Isoso because it complements the livelihood of the communities, providing protein and income. Cattle ranching can also contribute to socioeconomic development, and, if the management is sustainable, it can also suppor t a biodiversity conservation strategy in the TCO -Isoso. As opposed to industrial agriculture with its co ncomitant deforestati on, cattle-ranching can be a less threatening activity, and for this reas on it is included as a central element in the CABI and Isoseos development strategy. But it must direct management toward sustainable practices, combining development with conservation. Cattle ranching is, a productive activity only relatively recently adopted by the Isoseos. Consequently, it is necessary to adapt local institut ions and norms, and establish monitoring systems in order obtain socio-economic benefits while maintaining the ecological integrity of the most important and representative Chaco ecosystems. The role of scientific and technical informati on is essentially to develop the specific management rules and regimes. CABI must pl ay an important role in seeking financial and technical support to strengthen institu tions and promote technologies that will increase productivity, fulfillment with sta ndards and market access by Isoseo herds of cattle. This initiative must begin at local leve l, and it may be as pilot experience. It will be essential to include other stakeholders such cattle ranc hing associations, Mennonites, development agencies and non-governmental organizations in the elaboration and

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95 implementation of a local strategy for cattle ranching. CABI development strategy based on the Mbayu must maintain both dimensions c onservation and development, because both objectives are interdependent. The local strategy for cattle ranching must be contemplated as part of the TCO zoning on the basis of its ecological characteri stics, taking into account not only the desirable integrity and functionality of the ecosystems, but also the way the communities are prepared to establish best practices fo r its exploitation by cattle. This has deep ecological and social implications that will certainly affect the kinds of institutions: individual, cooperative, associ ation or communal, that th e communities will eventually choose to employ. Other subsistence and econo mic opportunities must be contemplated: farming as the main resource to feed themse lves; hunting as an important source of meat, gathering and harvesting fruits, honey and pl ants collection areas, sources of wildlife areas, for example. Private initiatives of conservation must be included. Those areas could be biodiversity corridors, wildlife source areas, or extensive-use areas for recreation or ecotourism, for example. WCS, CABI and the communities should expe ct to develop proposals regarding the conservation of the Chaco ecosystem, while ac cepting, at certain levels, cattle production systems. The possible scenarios vary accordi ng to how to face cattle expansion; whether by accepting an increase in individually owned he rds in fenced parcels, or to promote the expansion by means of well-regulated commu nal herds grazing in communal lands, or more probably a combination of those. Su ch a course of action requires accurate information about the ecosystem, in the form of ecological data of local forage potential, soil and vegetation fragility and interactions between cattle and wildlife. The above are

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96 all ecological and they should be stud ied with a double purpose: knowledge for conservation and possible cattle management implications. At another level, CABI must strengthen thei r capacity to negotiate to maintain local regional, national (and interna tional) relationships eemoa i (Figure 6-1). CABI has to attempt firstly to consolidate and secure TCO-Isoso land tenure rights in order to negotiate with authorities a nd prevent the immigration, expa nsion, or occupation by other stakeholders. The main objective is to ma intain the control over the territory and resources. Secondly CABI has to attempt to support pro-poor policies that deliberately promote the potential for poverty reduction. Therefore, the Isoseo communities and small producers are not likely to be exclude d from the benefits of cattle market. In other words, an effective Isoso cat tle-ranching strategy must cover different fronts. All fronts are import ant and are complementary: the technical and productive spheres; the natural resources base and functionality, the in ternal institutions of self governance and social learning; the political sphere (that is, the relationships with external institutions); and th e economic front. CABI should adopt an adaptive focus in their planning process. They should play atte ntion to what is happening in the context of local, regional and intern ational environment. Respond to new situation or environmental, social and economic signals adjusting the actions by innovation through local experimentation based on local and scie ntific knowledge and practical application. Adjusting management practices according to what is happening on the ground and face of non-linear dynamics and uncertainty.

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97 And concordant with Brogdens (2003) sugge stion, other international-stakeholders together to Isoseos are responsible for worl dwide events to maintain the global system under collective watch.

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98 APPENDIX FIELD QUESTIONNAIRE Interview: Natural resources and la nd access in the TC O-Isoso, Bolivia. Community __________ Date ___________ Location ____________ Interviewee position(s) ________________ I. NATURAL RESOURCES TENURE AND ACCESS. A. Cupesi uses and access i. If some body wants to harvest cupesi fruits can they do so anywhere within the communal land? For subsistence onl y, or also for commercialization? iii. Is permission needed? Whom? iv. Is harvesting conducted as an indivi dual or group economic activity? v. If the trees are harvested within ones parcel how benefit are distributed? vi. Is there a limit on how many trees can be harvested to commercialization? vii. If the crops are harvested and sold. Wh at is the product selling? Is there additional work (transportation, transf ormation, conservation, storage)? Who does the additional work? viii. How are benefits distributed? ix. Is trees harvest a common or individual action? x. Does much harvest occur in the co mmunity (for subsistence and for commercialization)? xi. Who does the work? Do the men a nd women equally participate in harvesting? xii. Who buys the product? Where? What price? xiii. Do only the people who do the work get money, or is it shared with other community members (or in communal necessities)? xiv. How much time are the members of a family involved in the project? xv. Is the family/community perceived benefits from the project? xvi. Are there changes about decision making? xvii. Why people decide participate or not? xviii. Do people abide by the communal rule s on harvesting activity, and if not, what measures are taken? B. Cattle ranching i. How long has the cattle ranching proj ect existed for? Who is the institutional sponsor?

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99 ii. How does the community select the place for cattle ranching project? Who decide? Does the community pa rticipate in the decision? iii. Who is the cattle owner? Is an indi vidual, group or community ownership? iv. Who does the work in the project? Is individual, group or communal activity? iii. How many members participate? iv. How are distributed the benefits? v. Are there an administrative structure and the decision making inside cattle ranching project? Explain vi. Is there cattle extra project in the community? Is there a limit on how many cattle can be owned by each communal member? How are the characteristics of the individual cattle management? vii. Is there a limit of how many cattle can be per surface? viii. Do people abide by communal and management rules on cattle ranching? ix. Why people chose to participate or not? x. How much time are the members of a family involved in the project? xi. Is the family/community perceived benefits from the project? xii. Are there changes about decision making? xiii. What the men do in the project? What the women do? II. LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFLICTS A. External conflicts: Land i. Have there been or are there currently any conflicts over land with outsiders? ii. What is/was the nature of th e conflict? (e.g., land invasion..) iii. What is/was the role of external govern ment (State, regional, or local) or NGOs? iv. What is/was the role of technology (e.g., land titles, maps, GPS, etc.)? B. External conflicts: Natural Resources i. Have there been or are there currently any conflicts with outsiders over natural resources? ii. What is/was the nature of the conflict? (e.g., illegal loggi ng, hunt, extraction) C. Internal conflicts: Land i. Have there been or are there curren tly any conflicts ove r land within the community or between communities? ii. What is/was the nature of the conflic t? (e.g., boundary disputes, conflicting claims) iii. What is/was the role of local and ex ternal government (State, regional, or local) or NGOs? iv. What is/was the role of the internal government? v. What is/was the role of technology (e.g., land titles, maps, GPS, etc.)

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100 D. Internal conflicts: Natural Resources i. Have there been or are there currently any conflicts over natural resources within the polygon? ii. What is/was the nature of the conflict? (e.g., different uses, ore different users to the cupesi trees or cattle ranching surface) iii. What is/was the role of internal a nd external governmen t (Local government, State or regional) or NGOs? iv. What is/was the role of the internal government? v. What is/was the role of technology (e.g., land titles, maps, GPS) Take note about informant gender and age.

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101 LIST OF REFERENCES Adamoli, J., R. Neumann, A. D. Ratier a nd J. Morello. 1972. El Chaco aluvional salteo. Revista de Investigaciones Agropecuarias, INTA Buenos Aires, Argentina. Serie 3. Clima y Suelo. 9 (5), 165-237. Agrawal, A. and C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment and disenchantment: The role of community in natural resource conservation. World Development. 27 (4), 629-649. Agrawal, A. 2001. Common Property Institut ions and Sustainable Governance of Resources. World Development. 29 (10), 1649-1672. Albo, X. 1990. Los Guarani-Chiriguano: La comunidad hoy Cuadernos de Investigacin no.32. CIPCA. La Paz. Ankersen,T. and G.Barnes. 2004. Inside th e polygon: Emerging community tenure systems and forest resource extraction. In Working Forests in the Neotropics D. Zarin, R. Janaki, F. Putz and M. Schmink (Eds.). Columbia University Press, N.Y. 156-177 Antinori, C. and B. David. 2004. New interd isciplinary research on Mexicos common property forests. Panel abstract tenth bi ennial conference of the international association for the study of common property (IASCP). Oaxaca, Mxico. Arambiza, E. 1998. El rea protegida Kaa-Iya del Gran Chaco: cuando pueblos indgenas y conservacionistas colabora n. In Andrew Gray, Marcus Colchester, and Alejandro Parellada (eds.), Derechos Indgenas y Conservacin de la Naturaleza. Copenhagen: IWGIA. Avila, J. 2002. Edafologa y forrajes Parque Nacional y ANMI Kaa Iya del Gran Chaco. In Ecologa del Fuego en el Parque Nacional y Area Natural de Manejo Integrado Kaa Iya del Gran Chaco, Santa Cruz. Bolivia J. Guerrero (ed.). CABI/WCS. Santa Cruz, Bolivia.135-165. Barahona, Z. 2005. Estudio ganadero en el Alto y Bajo Isoso ao 2004: Informe de resultados. Informe tcnico no. 128 WCS-CABI Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Beneria-Surkin, J. 2003. Decentralization questioned: The structuring and articulation of Guarani participation in conservati on and development in Izozog, Bolivia A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for PhD of Philosophy in Urban Planning. UC Berkeley.

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102 Berkes, F. 1989. Common Property Resources. Ec ology and Community-based Sustainable Development Bekhaven Press. Berkes, F. 2004. Rethinking community-base conservation. Conservation Biology 18 (3), 621-630 Berkes, F and C. S. Seixas. 2005. Building resilience in Lagoon social-ecological systems: A local-level perspective. Ecosystems 8 (8), 967-974 Bernard, H. 1994. Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Blake, R.W. and C.F. Nicholson. 2004. Li vestock, land use change and environmental outcomes in the developing world. In Responding to the Livestock Revolution the Role of Globalization and Imp lication for Poverty Alleviation Owen et al (Eds.). Notingham University Press, UK. 133-153. Blaser, M., H.A. Feit and G. McRae. 2004. Indigenous peoples and development processes: New terrai ns of struggle. In: In the Way of Development. Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects and Globalization Blaser, M., H.A. Feit and G. McRae (Eds.). Zed Books. Bodley, J.H. 1988. Tribal Peoples and Development Issues: A Global Overview Mountain View, California. Mayfield publication. Bourdy, G. 2002. Plantas del Chaco II. Usos tradicionales Izoceno-Guarani Santa Cruz, Bolivia. UMSA-FUNDACI ON KAA IYA-IRD-CABI-WCS-HNB-CYTED-OEA Bowles, S. and Gintis. 2000. Social capital and community governance. University of Massachusetts. Working paper. Brogden, M. 2003. Assessing environmental outcomes of community-based collaborative: What research and theory streams can help us? Paper prepared for the CBCRC.June 12, 2006 from http://www.cbcrc.org/2003sp eakerpapers/Mette%20Brogden.pdf Camacho, O., W. Cordero, I. Martnez, D. Rojas. 2001. Tasa de Deforestacin del Departamento de Santa Cruz, Bolivia 1993-2000 Santa Cruz. Ed. El Pais. CABI, FII and WCS. 2001. Plan de Manejo del Parque Nacional y rea de Manejo Integrado Kaa-Iya del Gran Chaco Santa Cruz Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificacin, Servicio Nacional de reas Protegidas. CABI/FII. 2005. Base de Datos Electrnica. CABI/FII 2006. SAN-TCO Isoso Preliminary Data 2005 and 2006.

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111 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Veronica Villasenor was born in Mexico City. She received her Bachelor of Science in biology from the Karkov State Univ ersity, Ukraine. She was a member of the technical team implementing the Bolivian Biodiversity Conser vation Project (PCBB) 1994 to 1997 responsible for the implement of the Bolivian National Protected Areas System. As a PCBB member she participated in the supervision of three management plans and the organization of national rangers system. From 1998 to 2000, Veronica technically supported the KAA-IYA project (joint project of the Capitana de A lto y Bajo Isoso and the Wildlif e Conservation Society). She was responsible for coordinating the preparati on of the management plan for the Kaa Iya del Gran Chaco National Park (KINP), using an integrated, multidisciplinary and participatory focus. From 2001 to 2004, she coordinated other studi es that could provide information to the management plan for the Tierra Com unitaria de Origen (TCO) Isoso. She also supported the implementation of the manageme nt plan strategy and promoted the binational coordination between Bolivian a nd Paraguayan conservation initiatives.