Citation
Methods to Evaluate the Emotional Response to U.S. Antiterrorism Measures

Material Information

Title:
Methods to Evaluate the Emotional Response to U.S. Antiterrorism Measures
Creator:
PAK, BRIAN H. ( Author, Primary )
Copyright Date:
2008

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Airport security ( jstor )
Criminals ( jstor )
Data security ( jstor )
Emotional expression ( jstor )
Emotional security ( jstor )
Home security ( jstor )
School security ( jstor )
Security guards ( jstor )
Terrorism ( jstor )
X ray surveys ( jstor )

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
Copyright Brian H. Pak. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Embargo Date:
12/31/2006
Resource Identifier:
496174537 ( OCLC )

Downloads

This item is only available as the following downloads:


Full Text

PAGE 1

METHODS TO EVALUATE THE EMOT IONAL RESPONSE TO U.S. ANTITERRORISM MEASURES By BRIAN H. PAK A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN BUILDING CONSTRUCTION UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2005

PAGE 2

Copyright 2005 by Brian H. Pak

PAGE 3

This document is dedicated to my parents for their love and s upport throughout my life and education.

PAGE 4

iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge numerous peopl e for helping me during my graduate studies at the University of Florida. I would especially like to thank my professor and chairman, Kevin Grosskopf, for his generous time, advice, and commitment to this study. Throughout my graduate studies he has encouraged me to develop independent thinking and research skills. I am also very grateful for having an excellent graduate committee and wish to thank Raymond Issa and Jorge Villegas for their continual suppor t, assistance, and encouragement. I wish to thank Robert Blackwood and Read Hayes of the University of FloridaÂ’s Loss Prevention Team for allowing me to use the offender videos in my study. I owe a special note of appreciation to Sujin Ki m and Janet Pak for assisting me with miscellaneous tasks in my research. Finally, I would like to thank my family. My parents were a constant source of support and encouragement, and I thank my si ster for her encouragement and enthusiasm throughout my studies.

PAGE 5

v TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................vii LIST OF FIGURES.........................................................................................................viii ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... ..x 1 INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 Problem Statement........................................................................................................1 Objectives..................................................................................................................... 2 Hypothesis....................................................................................................................2 Research Overview.......................................................................................................2 2 LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................................5 Definition of Terrorism.................................................................................................5 The Effects of 911 on Antiterrorism.............................................................................6 Antiterrorism.................................................................................................................7 Antiterrorism Security Measures..................................................................................9 Public Perception of Terrorism and Antiterrorism Post September 11, 2001............15 Summary of Literature Review..................................................................................17 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...................................................................................18 Design of the Experiment...........................................................................................18 Individual Emotional Response Survey......................................................................18 Instrumentation...........................................................................................................19 Visible vs. Non-visible Antiterrorism Measures........................................................20 Pilot Surveys...............................................................................................................22 Pilot Survey 1......................................................................................................22 Pilot Survey 2......................................................................................................23 Research Sample.........................................................................................................24 Antiterrorism Security Measures Evaluate d Using Domestic Criminal Surrogates...24 Statistical Analysis......................................................................................................25 4 DATA ANALYSIS........................................................................................................26

PAGE 6

vi Results........................................................................................................................ .26 Descriptive Statistics...........................................................................................26 Descriptive Statistics of th e Visible Security Measures......................................28 Descriptive Statistics of the Non-Visible Security Measures..............................28 Test Hypothesis H1.............................................................................................29 Test Hypothesis H2.............................................................................................32 5 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................33 Limitations..................................................................................................................34 Suggestions for Future Research................................................................................34 Conclusion..................................................................................................................35 APPENDIX A PHOTOGRAPHS..........................................................................................................36 B SURVEY INSTRUMENTATION................................................................................50 C SURVEY...................................................................................................................... .53 D IRB APPROVAL MATERIAL....................................................................................64 E SURVEY DATA...........................................................................................................69 F DOMESTIC CRIMINALS CO MPARED TO TERRORIST........................................79 LIST OF REFERENCES...................................................................................................82 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.............................................................................................85

PAGE 7

vii LIST OF TABLES Table page 1: Antiterrorism Security Breakdown..................................................................................8 2: Pilot Survey 1 Non-visible Results................................................................................22 3: Pilot Survey 1 Visible Results.......................................................................................23 4: Pilot Survey 2 Results....................................................................................................24 5: Descriptive Statistics...................................................................................................... 26 6: Means and Standard Deviation for Visible Security Measures.....................................28 7: Means and Standard Deviation fo r Non-Visible Security Measures.............................29 8: Means and Standard Deviation for AdSAM Pleasure, Arousal, Dominance................29 9: Survey Data................................................................................................................. ...69

PAGE 8

viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1: AdSAM perceptual map................................................................................................27 2: Illustrates the final photographs within the AdSAM perceptual map...........................30 3: Chart of antiterrorism photograph means......................................................................31 4: Airport X-ray security station (Picture 1)......................................................................36 5: Barbed wire fence (Picture 2)........................................................................................36 6: Traffic security by police officer (Picture 3).................................................................37 7: Bollards securing the front of building (Picture 4)........................................................37 8: Security Camera (Picture 5)...........................................................................................38 9: Armed security w ith dog (Picture 6)..............................................................................38 10: Security barriers along bu ilding perimeter (Picture 7)................................................39 11: Fingerprint scan (Picture 8).........................................................................................39 12: Homeland security advisory system (Picture 9)..........................................................40 13: Bollards along street (Picture 10)................................................................................40 14: Security in place for cr owd control (Picture 11)..........................................................41 15: Lights along sidewalk (Picture 12)..............................................................................41 16: Concrete bollards along street (Picture 13)..................................................................42 17: X-ray and metal detection device in building entry way (Picture 14).........................42 18: Lighted parking lot (Picture 15)...................................................................................43 19: Planted plinth wall (Picture 16)...................................................................................43 20: Armed guards (Picture 17)...........................................................................................44

PAGE 9

ix 21: Armed guard performing traffic security (Picture 18).................................................44 22: Security officer and dog polici ng airline travelers (Picture 19)...................................45 23: Cement bollards at Nati ons Capitol (Picture 20).........................................................45 24: Temporary fencing (Picture 21)...................................................................................46 25: Military security performi ng gate control (Picture 22)................................................46 26: Access control using auto matic gate (Picture 23)........................................................47 27: Jersey barriers along street (Picture 24).......................................................................47 28: Cameras on corner of building (Picture 25).................................................................48 29: Oklahoma city bombing aftermath (Picture 26)..........................................................48 30: Explosion (Picture 27).................................................................................................49 31: Isolated glass security booth (Picture 28)....................................................................49 32: SAM the self-assessment manikin..............................................................................51

PAGE 10

x Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Bu ilding Construction METHODS TO EVALUATE THE EMOT IONAL RESPONSE TO U.S. ANTITERRORISM MEASURES By Brian H. Pak December of 2005 Chair: Kevin Grosskopf Cochair: Raymond Issa Major Department: Building Construction In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, security across the world was increased in the anticipation of another terrori st attack. Many of the security measures seen were highly “visible” in nature. The ove rt use of visible security measures became known as “Fortress America.” The purpose/in tent of this research is to develop a methodology to 1) assess the emotional e ffects such measures impose on populations protected and 2) compare the effectiveness of visible and non-vi sible antiterrorism measures to deter terrorist acts. Twenty-eight (28) photographs of both vi sible and non-visible security measures were obtained to test this theory. The Advertising Self-Assess ment Manikin (AdSAM) method, which utilizes non-verbal visual tec hniques to process the emotions perceived by the subject, was used in this part of the study. This method of testing was originally used by the University of Florida’s College of Journalism and Communications, which was

PAGE 11

xi designed to test the effect of visual s timuli on consumer purchase intentions with photographs and advertisements. The phot os went through two pilot tests which narrowed the final photos used in the study to seven (7). The data were statistically analyzed using the SPSS statistical package. Results indicated a significant difference in emotion toward visible and non-visible antiterrorism measures. Although the res pondents were not repr esentative of any particular population group, th is study indicated that “visible” security measures may cause a sense of fear, whereas non-visible security measures may convey feelings of comfort, relaxation, and serenity. The second part of the study researched offender responses to visible and nonvisible antiterrorism measures. The intenti on of the study was to obtain interviews of terrorist surrogates on their em otional reaction to the differe nt antiterrorism measures. Due to the lack of statistical data the resear cher could not support or refute the second null hypothesis stating that the offender’s em otional response to non-visible security measures will not be significantly different from visible security measures.

PAGE 12

1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Problem Statement In the aftermath of the terrorist atta cks on September 11, 2001, building security and safety has become an increasingly impor tant design objective. As a result, building design and construction professionals have em braced antiterrorism m easures to create a more human environment that is difficult to at tack, resilient to the consequences of such incidents, and protective of its population and assets. Specifically, antiterrorism strategies seek to change the fundamental natu re of terrorist targets by lessening their real and symbolic value to terrorists, while simultaneously reducing their physical vulnerability to terrorist threats. Although terrorist att acks are often measured in lo ss of life and destruction, the immeasurable toll and intended c onsequence of terrorism is fear. The power of terror lies not only in the attacks themselves, but also in the expectation and unpredictability of an attack. It is well known from psychologica l studies in humans and animals that the strongest form of conditioning occurs when th e reward or punishment is unpredictable. This variable ratio (VR) condi tioning demands more attentio n and its effect last much longer. Quick to adopt a “guns, guards and gate s” posture following 911, it has become apparent that many antiterrorism measures may actually intensify and reinforce public perceptions of siege or vuln erability, and thus heighten the sense of anticipation and imminent danger. Ironically, measures that engender such negative or misplaced

PAGE 13

2 behavioral responses, may also fail to provi de a significant deterren ce or defense against terrorist activity. Objectives As a result, the goals of this resear ch are to develop a methodology to 1) Assess the emotional effects such measures impose on populations protected. 2) Compare the effectiveness of visible and non-visible antiterrorism measures to deter terrorist acts. Hypothesis Two null hypotheses were deve loped for this study: H1. RespondentÂ’s emotional response to non-visible security measures will not be significantly different from res pondentÂ’s emotional response to visible security measures. H2. OffenderÂ’s emotional response to non-visible security measures will not be significantly different from of fenderÂ’s respondent emotional response to visible security measures. Research Overview To test the null hypotheses, the study conduc ted two separate tests. The first null hypothesis was tested using twen ty-eight (28) phot ographs of both visi ble and non-visible security measures. The Advertising Self -Assessment Manikin (AdSAM) method, which utilizes non-verbal visual techniques to pr ocess the emotions perceived by the subject was used in part of this study. This method of testing was chosen based on its successful history in the University of FloridaÂ’s Sc hool of Journalism a nd Communication. The photos went through two pilot tests which narr owed the final photos to be used in the

PAGE 14

3 study down to seven (7). The data was then statistically an alyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS). The results in the study challenged the firs t null hypothesis. The data provided a significant difference between visible and non-visible secur ity measures. RespondentÂ’s reactions to visible security measures indicated that such measures stimulate negative pleasure and dominance, and were associated with varying degrees of displeasure and lack of control. However, among the visibl e security measures surveyed, passive or inanimate measures such as security fenc ing and surveillance equipment appeared to stimulate significantly less arousal in res pondents, when compared to active security measures such as guards, weapons, and K-9 dogs. Although neither type of visible security measure was found to be particularly pleasurable, passive measures were clearly shown to have the least negative, or in some cases, potentially positive societal response. Respondent reactions to non-visible security measures such as decorative bollards and planter barriers, indicated that such measur es stimulate positive pleasure and dominance and negative arousal. Such responses showed a pattern of emotions consistent with leisure and relaxation. The second null hypothesis studied the o ffenderÂ’s response to visible and nonvisible antiterrorism measures. The inten tion of the study was to obtain interview of terrorist surrogates on their em otional reaction to the differe nt antiterrorism measures. The second null hypothesis was tested using domestic criminal videos obtained from University of FloridaÂ’s Loss Prevention Team. These videos were studied to compare the emotional response of domestic criminal offenders to visi ble and non-visible

PAGE 15

4 antiterrorism measures. Due to the lack of research in the study, th e researcher could not support or refute the second null hypothesis.

PAGE 16

5 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW Definition of Terrorism The definition of terrorism is one that is usually complex and controversial. In the 1790’s, the term terrorism was used to refer to the terror during the French Revolution by the revolutionaries against their enemy. The wo rd terrorism as used in this study implies to an act of violence by a state against its domestic enemies. In the 20th century, terrorism has been applied most frequently to violence intended either directly or indirectly at governments in an effort to influence policy or topple an existing regime (Terrorism, 2005). The word terrorism is not legally define d in all jurisdictions, but many of the definitions share a common element. Terrorism is defined as the use or threat of violence and seeks to create fear, among a wide audien ce. As is defined by the Code of Federal Regulations, terrorism is: “The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a governmen t, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Terrorism, 2004). In the United States, a large amount of te rrorist acts involve small extremist groups who use terrorism to achieve an objective. Some actions taken by local, state and federal law enforcement include monitoring suspected terrorist groups and limiting the resources of these groups. Terrorist at tacks can take several forms, depending on the technological means available to the terrorist, the nature of the political issue motivating the attack, and the points of weakness of the terrorist’s target . Bombings have been the most frequently

PAGE 17

6 used terrorist method, but other possible terrorist attacks incl ude attacks at transportation facilities, utilities or othe r public services or chemi cal or biological agents (Backgrounder, 2005). The Effects of 911 on Antiterrorism On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by a series of coordinated terrorist a ttacks. The attacks were the most lethal ever carried out in the United States. The 2,986 death toll exceeded th e toll of 2,403 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Arguabl y the most significant event to have occurred thus far in the 21st Century, the September 11, 2001 attacks in terms of the profound economic, social, cultural, and military effects have been the most noteworthy in the United States and many other pa rts of the world (September 11, 2001, 2005). Immediately following the tragic events of September 11th, departments and agencies across the federal government took step s to strengthen the safety and security of the American people. The United States deployed over 4,000 FBI special agents and 3,000 support staff to the internat ional investigation of the a ttacks. The USA Patriot Act was implemented to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investig atory tools, and as well as many other purposes. The U.S. also placed the nation’s air, land, and seaports of entry on Alert Level 1, ensuring a more thorough examination of people and cargo entering its borders. Sixteen Hundred National Guardsman were depl oyed to assist in securing the nation’s borders (Office of the Press Secretary, 2002). With all the different security measures implemented after September 11th, the United States was labeled by some as “Fortr ess USA” (Kiely, 2005). Airports added a

PAGE 18

7 more thorough search of baggage and passe ngers, as well as the addition of armed security guards and barriers at airports (Carr, 2002). With the heightened security at airports came heightened security at capitols and government buildings. The U.S. Capitol became interrupted by armed security guards, checkpoints, fences, and barricades, which on ce was a magnificent la ndscape once visited by tourist around the world (Schwartzman, 2005). The newly implemented underground visitor center is one answer, which will also be used as a remote screening facility, where visitors can be searched for expl osives and weapons (Flint, 2002). State capitols are imitating some of the s ecurity measures implemented at the U.S. Capitol. Some of these measures replicat ed by officials are the deployment of more police and surveillance cameras. Some state capitols required vis itors to pass through metal detectors and X-ray machines guarded by armed guards. Concrete barricades known as “Jersey barriers” are a common barri cade that surrounds state capitols, the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memori al. These barricades as well as other security measures have cluttered the park ac ross the street from the White House, making the once open and inviting park a thin g of the past (Kiely, 2005). Antiterrorism FEMA has defined Antiterrorism as: “A defensive measure used to devalue, deter, deny and defend populations and property to terrorist acts” (A ntiterrorism, 2004). Antiterrorism measures can be broken down into three different strategies: perimeter and access control, surveillance, and communications. These strategies are then further broken down into types: phys ical, technological, and operational. Physical measures tend to use shapes and sp atial arrangements to create controlled access, barriers, visibility and other non-mechani cal means to create a defensible space.

PAGE 19

8 Technological measures use mechanical means to achieve control, surveillance, lighting, communications, and other actuated hardware to gather intelligence, interdict a threat or mitigate the effects of hostile or criminal activity. Operational measures use human resources to reinforce access control, surveillance, and emergency response. Technological and operational measures may also include modes of communication to better prepare and pr otect the public. Table 1: Antiterrorism Security Breakdown StrategyType Measure(s) Perimeter and Access Contro l PhysicalSecurity fencing, barriers, barricades, bollards, plinth walls, landscaping features TechnologicalOperable barriers, arresting devices, electronic access systems, biometric identification systems, ID cards , visitor trackin g s y stems OperationalArmed and unarmed security, guard booths, gate houses, restricted parking, restricted access zones, visitor and vehicle screenin g p rocedures SurveillancePhysicalO p en Areas TechnologicalLighting, CCTV and video monitoring, intrusion detection devices Operationalarmed and unarmed security, concentrated p edestrian access and circulation CommunicationsTechnologicalAlarm systems, public information systems, signage, emer g enc y call boxes OperationalEmergency notification and response planning and exercises, public emergency broadcast systems, colored-coded warnin g s y stems. When assessing the vulnerability of a bu ilding to terrorism, many factors must be considered. The assessment process i nvolves the assessment of asset value, threat/hazard, vulnerability, risk, and risk to help architects and engineers identify the best and most cost-effective terrorism m itigation measures for each buildingÂ’s unique security needs.

PAGE 20

9 Asset value assessment involve s identifying critic ality of assets and identifying the number of people in a buildi ng (Brown and Lowe, 2003). Threat/Hazard assessment involves iden tifying each threat/hazard, defining each threat/hazard, and determining threat level for each threat/hazard (Brown and Lowe, 2003). Vulnerability assessment involves identif ying site and building systems design issues, evaluating design issues against type and level of thr eat, and determining level of protection sought for each mitigation measur e against each threat (Brown and Lowe, 2003). Risk assessment involves th e likelihood of occurrence, im pact of occurrence, the determination of relative risk for each th reat against each asset, and selection of mitigation measures that have the greatest benefit/cost for reducing risk (Brown and Lowe, 2003). The process of devaluing, deterring, denying and defending involves planning and strategy. Many factors must be considered be fore the proper security measures can be implemented. Some of the different types of security measures will be researched further in the study. Antiterrorism Security Measures While not all terrorist att acks can be prevented, antiterrorism measures can lessen the effects of an incident. FEMA states th e process of mitigating hazards before they become disasters is similar for both natura l and human-caused hazards; whether dealing with natural disasters or terrorism , the mitigation process involves: 1) Identifying and organizing resources.

PAGE 21

10 2) Conducting a risk or threat a ssessment and estimating losses. 3) Identifying mitigation measures that wi ll reduce the effects of the hazards and creating a strategy to deal with the m itigation measures in priority order. 4) Implementing the measures, evaluating the results, and keeping the plan up-todate. This is the four-phase process known as mitigation planning. (Antiterrorism, 2004) Following September 11th, visible security features b ecame part of the landscape in Washington, D.C. and across the Nation. The response came with strengthening of safety measures at public buildings, upgrading screen ing at airports, freezing assets of groups with suspected terrorist ti es, and detaining more than 1,000 non-citizens for questioning (Carr, 2002). Washington, D.C. and other government enti ties saw security measures borne of terrorism, such as jersey ba rriers, bollards, fences, and heavily armed guards surrounding public places such as the United States Capito l and the Lincoln Memorial. On the White House, Secret Service agents could be seen standing on the roof from day to day, and police cruisers could be seen parked outside the gates. H eavy concrete barricades known as “jersey barriers” protect public buildings and monuments. From the White House to the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to the Jefferson Memorial, visible security measures covered these landmarks (Schwartzman, 2005). The U.S. Capitol, state capitols, and ot her government entities saw the effects of the addition of many of the anti terrorism securities seen all over the nation. Tony Beard chief sergeant-at-arms for the California state Senate said “Capitol buildings are symbols of government, and the people who inhabit them are symbols, too.” But if the capitols

PAGE 22

11 symbolize something, so does the security that is being erected around them (Kiely, 2005). After the Oklahoma City bombing whic h occurred in 1995, Pennsylvania Avenue was closed by President Bill Clinton for securi ty measures. The Avenue which is home to the White House is yet to be reopened by President George W. Bush. Furthermore, shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001 th e Secret Service was forced to barricade the street behind the White House as well. “It looks like a war zone,” frets Bill Hanbury, CEO of the Washington convention bureau. “A ll those barriers send a very negative message to our visitors” (Kiely, 2005). The once serene landscapes of the U.S. Ca pitol are now interrupted by checkpoints, fences and concrete barricades. Officials at state and local governments are deploying more police and surveillance cameras, mu lling the need for barricades and metal detectors, and struggling to strike a balan ce. “You don’t want to restrict access to government,” says Bill Morgan, Chief of Conne cticut’s state capitol police. “But you do want to make it as safe as you can” (Kiely, 2005). Eight hundred million dollars of reconstr uction improvements has been approved by the National Capitol Planni ng Commission in acknowledgment to the negative impact of Washington’s visible post September 11t h antiterrorism security measures. Strategically placed, fortified benches and la mpposts and subtle landscaping tricks are among some of the changes the NCPC has recommended. Chairman John Cogbill states that the goal of the project is to protect th e nation’s landmarks in a way that “doesn’t make it look like you are sitting in Beirut” (Kiely, 2005). Capitol Police Chief Terry Gainer is pleas ed to report that “t he ugly sewer-pipe

PAGE 23

12 planters” around the campus are being repla ced with more discreet, but even more formidable metal bollards. These bollards are built to deny access to vehicles full of explosives before any damage may occur. Similar bollards are being installed around the White House (Kiely, 2005). The lines are also affected by the addition of visible security measures, that Peter Sweeney of Mansfield, Mass., found the high ly visible security around the nation’s capitol “comforting” but added, “I don’t like th e restrictive access. This is our White House and our Capitol building” (Kiely, 2005). Another place that saw a major change in s ecurity is the airports and other means of transportation. Shortly after September 11th National Guard troops were sent into New York City. About 300 of the National Guard tr oops each carrying rifles were deployed to 19 airports across New York as a display of fo rce, at security checks. Industry experts have stated that armed troops at the air ports would be enough of a deterrent to be effective (Milgram, 2001). In addition to the armed National Guard troops, airport security has gone to different measures to ensure the safety of passengers. Airport security has limited air travelers to one carry-on bag and one persona l item on all flights. Spokesman for the airports have recommended passengers to use pu blic transportation to get to the airport, because of difficulties parking and congested curbside access is likely to be controlled and limited. Screener checkpoints have also been revamped with ticketed passengers being the only people allowed beyond the scr eener checkpoints. A ll electronic items, such as laptops and cell phones may be subjec ted to additional scre ening, and all metal

PAGE 24

13 objects should be removed prior to passing th rough the metal detectors (Airport Security Issues, 2004). Planners in Washington D.C. have r ecommended that government buildings and national landmarks be protected from terrori st attacks by relativel y simple landscaping techniques. Raised concrete planters a nd benches, streetlamps, and even drinking fountains reinforced with hi gh-strength steel are some of the different landscaping techniques recommended. Government buildin gs would also increase buffer zones by eliminating street lanes now used for pa rking. Some other types of landscaping techniques recommended are grade changes th at form barriers. These grade changes could be implemented at the Jefferson and Lincoln memorials and Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. These changes would eventually repla ce the visible security measures consisting of concrete barriers, street closures, and temporary guard shacks implemented in Washington D.C. a nd across the country (Flint, 2002). The National Capitol Urban Design and Securi ty Plan is transforming the way that federal government secures its land and buildin gs in the nation’s cap itol. NCPC continues to plan additional improvements in securi ty planning and design throughout the nation (National Capital Planning Commission, 2004). “The National Capitol Planning Commi ssion provides overall planning guidance for federal land and buildings in the National Capitol Region, which includes the District of Columbia, Prince George's and Montgom ery Counties in Maryland, and Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties in Virginia, including the cities and towns located within the ge ographic area bounded by these c ounties.” The NCPC seeks

PAGE 25

14 to protect and enhance the hi storical, cultural, and natural resources of the nationÂ’s capitol (About NCPC, 2004). Pennsylvania Avenue at the White Hous e is one example in which non-visible security designs are used to create a safe r and more positive feeling in and around the building. The new civic space featuring non-visible security measures now grace Pennsylvania Avenue, and is part of the re design of AmericaÂ’s Main Street. This transformation of Pennsylvania Avenue has ch anged it from one cluttered with visible post September 11th security measures to a be autiful civic area benifitting one of the nationÂ’s most prominent and visited destinations . The project is a result of the work of dozens of federal, local, and civic agenci es that worked with the National Capital Planning Commission, as well as the Federa l Highway Administration, which managed construction of the project (Flint, 2002). Security measures first appeared on Penns ylvania Avenue after security concerns forced its closure in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the number of barr iers cluttering the hi storic Avenue soon proved to be overwhelming. Disheartened by th e appearance of AmericaÂ’s Main Street, the National Capital Planning Commission in 2001 proposed the redesign of the Avenue, and in 2002 selected Michael Van Valkenburgh A ssociates to create a safe and beautiful pedestrian space (White House, 2004). Following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Pennsylvania Avenue, was one of the plan's primary focus areas. The plan called for non-visible security measures to substitute for the visible security measures in place. These non-visible security measures

PAGE 26

15 created distinguished, pedestrian-oriented public space that respects the historic integrity of the street (White House, 2004). In November 2004, Pennsylvania Avenue wa s reopened as a dignified new civic space featuring pedestrian-friendly amenities an d furnishings. The redesign of America's Main Street has transformed the Avenue from one cluttered with visible post September 11th security measures to a beautiful ci vic area implementing non-visible security measures which benefited one of the nation' s most prominent and visited destinations (National Capital Planning Commission, 2004). Another non-visible security project imple menting these new security measures is the Washington Monument. Surrounded by jersey barriers and other non-visible security measures, the monument grounds had become un attractive. The new non-visible security scheme included pedestrian pathways, sunke n seating walls, upgraded lighting, granite benches, and hundreds of new trees to comp lement the monument’s landscape setting (Flint, 2002). “The idea is to improve security while maintaining public access and an attractive streetscape,” said Alex Krieger, principal in the architectural firm Chan, Krieger in Cambridge, the lead consultant report. Otherwise security needs will be addressed with barricades and street and building closures, which “will fundamentally change the public environment in ways that I don’t think people are really aware of” (Flint, 2002). Public Perception of Terrorism and Antiterrorism Post September 11, 2001 Before the events of September 11, 2001, citizens of the United States were not preoccupied with terrorism and possible attacks. Although many citizens knew that a terrorist attack was possible, most did not be lieve a terrorist attack would occur on U.S. soil. The events of September 11th had a great impact on the citizens of the United

PAGE 27

16 States. Terrorist destroyed more than U.S. buildings, they struck fear in the American psyche (Schmidt, 2002). The design of the bodyÂ’s alarm system is geared toward protecting the individual from threats. But people do not just react to threats; they anticipate them as well. Anticipatory fear has two distinct modes: anxiety, a preoccupation with an impeding threat, and worry, the internal struggle to find a way to escape danger (Schmidt, 2002). Americans had difficulty grappling with th e NationÂ’s sudden loss of security. In the weeks immediately after the attacks, a survey of 668 Am ericans by the Institute of Social Research, reported that 49 percent of participants felt their sense of safety and security had been shaken. And some 62 pe rcent said they had difficulty sleeping (Schmidt, 2002). The September 11th attacks made way for a period of transition among the citizens of the United States (Williams, 2002). Psychological science has identified four influences on our institutions about risk. Firs t, we fear what our ancestral history has feared. Second, we fear what we cannot contro l. Third, we fear wh at is immediate, and finally, we fear whatÂ’s readily availabl e in our memory (Myers, 2001). Many people harbor a small disquieting fear a fear of attack by unseen agents at unexpected times using unthinkable weapons (Schmidt, 2002). An overwhelming majority of people belie ve that there is a significant likelihood of further terrorist attacks on US soil and express concern and worry about the prospect. Many worry that a close friend or relative will be a victim of an at tack. However, only a minority are concerned that it would happe n in their community (Terrorism, 2002). Soon after the attacks of Septem ber 11th a poll was taken by the New York Times on October

PAGE 28

17 25-28 that found that 88% of the participants be lieved it very likely that there would be another terrorist attack on Am erican soil (Terrorism, 2002). The sense of fear was heightened duri ng the transitional period post September 11th. The human body deals with trauma a certain way in order to cope with the stress involved. However, it is believed that the media also significantly influences the perception of terrorism. This may also have an effect on the perception of antiterrorism security measures. The perception of visibl e and non-visible security measures may be also effected by the media. Summary of Literature Review Terrorism is defined as the systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring a bout a particular political objective. Post September 11th security measures brought about visi ble antiterrorism measures that may have unintentionally reinforced feelings of fear and vulnerability. This brought about questions of the image being portrayed by the capitol buildings and other government buildings. The visible antiterrorism measures that were implemented were addressed by the National Capital Planning Commission and a few other government organizations to build a safer and more aesthetically pleasing Nations Capitol. Thes e non-visible security measures may have proven to be the answer to the negative emotions some people felt about the visible security measures post September 11th.

PAGE 29

18 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Design of the Experiment The goals of this research is to devel op a methodology to 1) assess the emotional effects such measures impose on populations pr otected and 2) compare the effectiveness of visible and non-visible antiterrorism measures to deter terrorists acts. The participants used to assess the emo tional effects of visible and non-visible antiterrorism measures were undergraduate students from the M.E. Rinker School of Building Construction, University of Florida. The participants were asked to respond to photographs of visible and non-visible an titerrorism measures using the AdSAM procedure. Offender video of domestic criminal su rrogates, were used to compare the effectiveness of visible and non-visible antiterrori sm measures. Given the difficulty in gaining access to actual terro rists, criminal surrogates were instead questioned on their approach to buildings, the operations of the criminal scene, what the offender would look for while performing criminal activities and the techniques the offender used to exploit vulnerabilities in security. Individual Emotional Response Survey A database of photographs representing bot h visible and non-visible antiterrorism measures was assembled. A total 28 pictur es were used from various illustrations (Appendix A).

PAGE 30

19 Instrumentation The Advertising Self-Assessment Manikin (AdSAM) method was used for the pilot and final survey research. The AdSAM me thod is a non-verbal measure that assesses emotional responses. This surveying method was used to measure the respondent’s emotional response to photographs of visual and non-visual antiterrorism measures. The emotional reactions of the participants were measured using three different emotional dimensions: pleasure, arousal, and dominance (Appendix B). SAM – Self-Assessment Manikin This study used a non-verbal measure of emotional response, the Self Assessment Manikin (SAM), which has three continuous nine -point scales to measure the dimensions of Pleasure, Arousal, an d Dominance (PAD). The pleasure (P) dimension rangi ng from pleased to annoyed. People tend to spend more time on certai n activities, depend ing on the level of pleasure and satisfaction associated with th at activity (Holbrook and Gardner, 1998). “Generally, the effects of pleasur e lead to a desire to be expo sed to a stimulus for a longer period of time and create greater le vels of liking" (Villegas, 2001). The arousal (A) dimension ranging from excited to relaxed. Many researchers have come to believe that low levels of arousal imply a sense of boredom while high levels may be consider ed an overwhelming e xperience (Villegas, 2001). Finally, the dominance (D) dimension ra nging from dominant to submissive. Dominance can be seen as the feelings i nvolved in freedom of choice (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974). “The feelings involved w ith dominance are lowered when a person interacts in an environment or with stimuli that limits the form of behavior and are

PAGE 31

20 enhanced by settings that f acilitate a greater variety of behaviors. The effects of low dominance indicate an individual' s lack of effort to dominate the environment, thereby rendering a person unwilling to make a decision” (Mehrabian, 1995). The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) presen ts the Mehrabian and Russell’s three PAD dimensions and was designed as an alternative to the sometimes-cumbersome verbal self-report measures (Lang, 1985). SA M represents each of the PAD dimensions with a graphic character arrayed along a conti nuous nine-point scale (ranging from -4 to 4). Pleasure was represented by symbols from a smiling to frowning character. Arousal graded by a SAM with a sleepy character with closed eyes to an excited character with eyes open. The Dominance scale shows the SAM ranging from a small character representing being controlled to a very large character re presenting being in-control or empowered. Some of the advantages of using th e AdSAM method are for one it is a clear visually oriented scale that eliminates th e majority of the probl ems with the verbal measures or nonverbal measures that are based on human photographs. The SAM scale is also a scale in which subjects may co mplete in less than 15 seconds, allowing numerous stimuli to be tested in a shor t amount of time and causing less respondent fatigue than the verbal measur es (Morris, 1995). Another ad vantage of the SAM scale is that both children and adults readily iden tify with the SAM figure and easily understood the emotional dimensions it represents (Lang, 1985). The next part of the test had the participants then proceed to fill out a demographic questionnaire (Appendix C). Visible vs. Non-visible Antiterrorism Measures Visible antiterrorism measures are defined as those security measures that can be easily identifiable by the public. Non-visible antiterrorism measures are those measures

PAGE 32

21 that are not readily identifiabl e as being security measures. The security measures used were categorized by perimeter and access contro l, communication, and surveillance. Due to the use of human participants, th e survey was submitted to the Internal Review Board (IRB) for approval. The te st was submitted on February 24, 2005 and was approved on March 1, 2005 (Appendix D). The survey began with participants signi ng a consent form allowing the participant to be a part of the study, and detailing both the risks and benefits of the study. (Appendix C). To begin the survey Participants were fi rst asked to read this fictitious headline: Headline: The University of Fl orida Prepares for Terrorism AP Newswire — The federal government has identified University of Florida as a likely target for terrorist activity due to the concentration of young people in one place and because of the easy access to cam pus environments to general public visitors, which could make the campus pa rticularly vulnerable to an unexpected attack. In anticipation of th is outcome, building construc tion experts at University of Florida have taken proactive measures to deter such actions with increased perimeter and access controls to campus , additional surveillance throughout campus, and increased security systems. This headline intended to place the photogr aphs of visual and non-visual security measures to be viewed within the contex t of terrorism. The study then tested the participants using the AdSAM method of surveying to test the emotional response to different antiterrorism security measures. The photographs of antiterrorism security measures were shown to groups of res pondents in a classroom environment for approximately 30 seconds to a minute on a pr ojector in the front of the room.

PAGE 33

22 Pilot Surveys Pilot Survey 1 Pilot Survey 1 started with 28 pictures labe led 1-28, and were categorized as either visible or non-visible antiterrorism security measures. The pilot test was conducted on 28 University of Florida Building Construction gr aduate students chosen to not conflict with the University of Florida Building Cons truction upper division undergraduate students used in the final survey. Thir teen of the twenty-e ight pictures were selected based on the total mean scores for pleasure, arousal, and dominance. Total mean scores were determined by taking a total of the absolute value of each photographs pleasure, arousal and dominance score, and then dividing this to tal score by three. Photographs were then split into visible and non-visible categorie s. The seven non-visible photographs were chosen based on the total mean score being 1.25 or higher. The six visible photographs were chosen based on the total mean score being 1.65 or higher. The Pilot Survey 1 mean scores are shown in Table 2 and Table 3: Table 2: Pilot Survey 1 Non-visible Results Picture #DescriptionPleasure A rousal DominanceTotal 4Bollards-1.333.67-1.002.00 5Security Camera up Close-1.171.33-1.331.28 8Fingerprint Scanning device1.500.331.671.17 10Bollards Along Street-2.003.50-2.832.78 12Light Post-2.832.83-2.332.67 13Concrete Bollards-0.563.000.561.37 15Parking Log at Night-0.441.78-1.221.15 16Plinth Wall with Plants-2.893.22-1.112.41 20Bollards Along Government Building0.562.33-0.781.22 23Mechanical Gate0.331.560.560.81 25Cameras on Building0.561.89-1.331.26 28Glassed in Security Booth1.001.331.001.11

PAGE 34

23 Table 3: Pilot Survey 1 Visible Results Picture #DescriptionPleasure A rousal DominanceTotal 1Airport X-ray0.171.50-0.500.72 2Barbed Wire Fence2.83-2.173.172.72 3Armed Police Officer Checkpoint2.00-0.330.831.06 6Armed Security With Dog3.50-3.002.332.94 7Security Barricades with Fence1.172.17-0.671.33 9Homeland Security Advisory System1.171.17-2.671.67 11Police Officers Performing Crowd Control2.50-2.172.672.44 14X-ray Scanning Device in Front of Building0.890.89-0.110.63 17Close up of Armed Guard2.44-2.001.001.81 18Armed Military Guard Checkpoint1.00-0.330.440.59 19Police Officer with Dog Checking Baggage1.00-0.330.330.56 21Temporary Security Fence1.780.89-0.441.04 22Military Guard at Checkpoint1.000.670.220.63 24Jersey Barriers Along Street0.221.220.560.67 26Building Demolished by Explosion4.00-2.831.832.89 27Explosion1.50-1.831.501.61 Pilot Survey 2 In Pilot Survey 2, the test started with 13 pictures, 6 visible and 7 non-visible photographs. The pilot tests were conducted on 43 graduate students at the M.E. Rinker School of Building Construction. Seven pictures were selected out of the 13 for the final test. Three visible pictures a nd four non-visible pict ures were selected for the final test based on the highest total mean score of the photographs. Mean scores were determined by taking a total of the absolute value of each photographs pleasure, arousal and dominance score, and then dividing this to tal score by three. The four non-visible photographs were chosen based on the total m ean score being 1.50 or higher. The three visible photographs were chosen based on th e total mean score being higher 1.25 or higher. The photograph number 26 was not chosen although its total mean score was 2.73, because the photo did not represent any of the different types antiterrorism security measures. The Pilot Survey 2 mean scores are shown in Table 4:

PAGE 35

24 Table 4: Pilot Survey 2 Results Picture #namePleasure A rousalDominanceTotal V isible/Non-Visible 2Barbed wire fence1.93-0.63-1.231.26Visible 4Building protected by post-1.072.301.091.49Non-Visible 5Camera in your face1.231.47-1.791.50Non-Visible 6Gun man with dog2.53-2.07-2.142.25Visible 9Terrorism alert signage0.370.81-0.090.43Visible 10Post along road-1.672.421.791.96Non-Visible 11Crowd control1.07-1.23-1.281.19Visible 12Lighted walkway-1.931.771.531.74Non-Visible 13Bollards along sidewalk-0.981.931.531.48Non-Visible 16Plinth wall along sidewalk-2.442.302.402.38Non-Visible 17Armed guard in front of building1.47-1.28-1.471.40Visible 25Security cameras on corner of building0.471.930.050.81Non-Visible 26Mass destruction3.33-2.53-2.332.73Visible The photographs selected from Pilot Survey 2 were used for the final photographs for the study. All photographs can be seen in the Appendix B. Research Sample The participants used for the final survey constitute d of upper division undergraduate students at the M.E. Rinker Se nior School of Building Construction at the University of Florida. A total of 142 uppe r division undergraduate students participated in the final test of the different antiterrori sm measures. The subjects were taken from several different undergraduate classes in the School, and participants were awarded extra credit points from those professors particip ating. The research sample was not intended to be representative of a single popula tion group. This “convenience” survey was intended as a preliminary investigation into the possible effects visible and non-visible security measures used on the public, and to provide justificati on for more in-depth research, representative studies to follow. Antiterrorism Security Mea sures Evaluated Using Domestic Criminal Surrogates Because of the difficulties of interviewing and obtaining information from incarcerated terrorists, the study obtained video interviews of domestic criminals. The videos were obtained from the University of Florida’s Loss Prevention Team of domestic criminal surrogates. Interviews of dome stic criminal surrogates were used from

PAGE 36

25 researchers of security devices used on Gille tte products. These videos were created to question the different defense mechanisms us ed by Gillette and the strategy in which a criminal may challenge these defense mechanisms. The titles of the videos were: ThiefCam = Interview of domestic crim inal offenders and the method and people that were involved in the crime. ThiefCamII = Interview of domestic crim inal offenders and the method and people that were involved in the crime. The Offender Fixture Evaluations Unedited Video Clips HRP – 2 = Video of Criminal offenders in the process of performing criminal acts. These videos were each analyzed to see wh at crime prevention strategies were most effective on these domestic criminals. Statistical Analysis Data was analyzed using the Statistical P ackage for the Social Sciences (SPSS). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine statistical significance of the relationships between the two groups – “v isible” and “non-visi ble” antiterrorism measures. The ANOVA test is a test that measures the di fference between means of two or more groups. The ANOVA test was select ed, because of its ab ility to tests the difference between two or more mean groups.

PAGE 37

26 CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS Results Descriptive Statistics The results of the study between visible and non-visible antiterrorism measures were obtained by examining the significant diff erences between the two different types of antiterrorism measures (Appendi x E). Table 3 shows the desc riptive statistics of the two groups. Table 5: Descriptive Statistics Pleasure A rousalDominance V isibleMean -1.810.59-1.66 N 426426426 Std. Deviation 1.972.2491.908 Non-VisibleMean 1.8-2.21.45 N 568568568 Std. Deviation 2.0432.0722.141 The descriptive statistics provide info rmation about the visible and non-visible antiterrorism measures tested in the final te st. The statistics show a significant difference in the emotional response of th e two antiterrorism measures. Using the AdSAMÂ’s PAD score, the two gr oups showed an inte resting comparison in the emotional reactions to the antiterrorism security photographs. On all three emotional responses, there were significan t results between the two groups. When comparing the pleasure domain between visi ble and non-visible anti terrorism measures the respondents tended to ha ve the opposite emotional res ponse. The results of the visible pleasure were -1.81 and 1.80 for the non-visible. Similar to the pleasure domain the dominance domain followed this effect. Th e results of the visible dominance domain

PAGE 38

27 were -1.66 and 1.45 for the non-visible. The arousal domain, like the pleasure and dominance domains saw the two antiterrorism measures having the opposite effect on the respondents. The mean scores were meas ured on a nine-point scale ranging from negative 4 to zero to positive 4. Figure 1: AdSAM perceptual map Figure 1 shows an AdSAM perceptual ma p that illustrates a 2D comparison between Pleasure and Arousal. From this ma p, most visible antiterrorism measures were shown to bring about feelings in the bottom right quadrant, which would carry emotions of tense, fearful, disgusted, terrified, and afraid. The non-visible security measures fell into the top left quadrant which brought a bout emotions of secure, serene, relaxed, leisurely, and reserved.

PAGE 39

28 Descriptive Statistics of the Visible Security Measures Participants in the study tended to react to the visible security measures with a negative emotional response to pleasure and dominance. The guard and dog (Appendix A, Figure 9) and security guard with m achine gun (Appendix, Figure 20) had similar emotional responses displeasing, arousing, a nd dominating feeling to the respondent. According to Mehrabian this combination of PAD scores bring about emotions causing aghast, bewilderment, distress, pain, insecu rity, and being upset (Mehrabian, 1995). As for the barbed wire fence (Appendix A, Fi gure 5) the pleasure and dominance domain remained negative, but the arousal brought emo tions slightly negative emotions as well. According to Mehrabian, this combination of PAD scores brings about emotions of boredom, despair, fatigue, loneliness, sadne ss, and being subdued (Mehrabian, 1995). Table 6: Means and Standard Deviat ion for Visible Security Measures No.DescriptionMeanStandard DeviationMeanStandard DeviationMeanStandard Deviation 2Barbed Wire Fence (Visible)-1.851.77-0.632.092-1.541.7 6Guard and Dog (Visible)-1.892.2281.32.097-1.762.114 17Security Guard with Machine Gun (Visible)-1.691.8911.092.049-1.71.894 PhotographsPleasureArousalDominance Descriptive Statistics of the Non-Visible Security Measures Participants in the study tended to react to the visible security measures with a positive pleasure and dominance while negatively responding to arousal. Bollards Along Street (Appendix A, Figure 13), Street Light s (Appendix A, Figure 15), and Plinth Wall (Appendix A, Figure 19) all had strong reac tions to all the PAD scores. These nonvisible photographs brought about pleasurable and dominant emotions that did not arouse the participants as much. This combination of emotions showed that non-visible security measures brought about emotions of ease, comf ort, relaxation, satisfa ction, security, and being unperturbed (Mehrabian, 1995). Picture 5 (Camera) is a security measure that was shown to have the reactions of displeas ure, not aroused, and dominated. These

PAGE 40

29 combinations of emotions bring about feeli ngs such as disdain, indifference, selfishuninterest, lack of caring, and l ack of concern (Mehrabian, 1995). Table 7: Means and Standard Deviati on for Non-Visible Security Measures No.DescriptionMeanStandard DeviationMeanStandard DeviationMeanStandard Deviation 5Camera (Non-Visible)-0.21.793-1.222.032-0.451.926 10Bollards Along Street (Non-Visible)2.121.626-2.641.81.961.738 12Street Lights (Non-Visible)2.511.785-2.352.1182.031.782 16Plinth Wall (Non-Visible)2.771.461-2.582.0192.251.91 PhotographsPleasureArousalDominance Test Hypothesis H1 The first hypothesis states the responde ntÂ’s emotional response to non-visible security measures will not be significantly different fr om the respondentÂ’s emotional response to visible s ecurity measures. Results showed that there were significant differences in the levels of pleasure, arousal, and dominance between the visible and non-visible groups Table 8: Means and Standard Deviation for AdSAM Pleasure, Arousal, Dominance No.DescriptionMeanStandard DeviationMeanStandard DeviationMeanStandard Deviation 2Barbed Wire Fence (Visible)-1.851.77-0.632.092-1.541.7 5Camera (Non-Visible)-0.21.793-1.222.032-0.451.926 6Guard and Dog (Visible)-1.892.2281.32.097-1.762.114 10Bollards Along Street (Non-Visible)2.121.626-2.641.81.961.738 12Street Lights (Non-Visible)2.511.785-2.352.1182.031.782 16Plinth Wall (Non-Visible)2.771.461-2.582.0192.251.91 17Security Guard with Machine Gun (Visible)-1.691.8911.092.049-1.71.894 PhotographsPleasureArousalDominance The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, r , a dimensionless statistical index that ranges from -1.0 to 1.0, reflects the extent of a linear relationship between two data sets where 1.0 is a perfect positive correlation and -1.0 is a perfect negative correlation. Statistical analysis using Pearson r shows a nearly perfect positive correlation ( r = 0.99) between pleasure and dominance, meaning that a positive change in pleasure would be expected to correspond to a proportionately positive change in dominance, and that a negative change in pl easure would be expected to correspond to a proportionately negative change in dominance.

PAGE 41

30 Figure 2: Illustrates the fi nal photographs within the AdSAM perceptual map. Further analysis revealed a profound i nverse correlation between pleasure and arousal ( r = -0.94) and domina nce and arousal ( r = -0.93), meaning that a positive change in either pleasure or dominance would be expected to correspond to a proportionately negative change in arousal, and that a negativ e change in either pleasure or dominance would be expected to correspond to a propor tionately positive ch ange in dominance (Figure 11). Respondent reactions to visible security measures indicated that such measures stimulate negative pleasure and dominance and we re associated with varying degrees of displeasure and lack of contro l. However, among the visible security measures surveyed, passive or inanimate measures such as s ecurity fencing and su rveillance equipment appeared to stimulate significantly less arous al in respondents when compared to active

PAGE 42

31 security measures such as guards, weapons, and K-9 dogs. Differences in arousal resulted in profoundly different expressions of displ easure; from submissiveness and conformity for passively visible security measures to suspiciousness and fear for actively visible security measures. Although neither type of visible security measure was found to be particularly pleasurable, passive measures were clearly shown to have the least negative, or in some cases, potentially positive soci etal response. Respondent reactions to nonvisible security measures such as decorative bollards and planter ba rriers indicated that such measures stimulate positive pleasure and dominance and negative arousal. Such responses showed a pattern of emotions c onsistent with leisure and relaxation. Means of Anti-terrorism Security Measures-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 Pleasure -1.85-0.2-1.892.122.512.77-1.69 Arousal -0.63-1.221.3-2.64-2.35-2.581.09 Dominance -1.54-0.45-1.761.962.032.25-1.7 Barbed Wire Fence (Visible) Camera (NonVisible) Guard and Dog (Visible) Bollards Along Street (NonVisible) Street Lights (Non-Visible) Plinth Wall (Non-Visible) Security Guard with Machine Gun Figure 3: Chart of antiterrorism photograph means The surveys show profound differences in how security measures are perceived by the public. Within the context of terrorism, a vast majority of respondents felt tense,

PAGE 43

32 suspicious, and fearful. When presenting ma ny of the non-visible security measures, the majority of respondents felt disdai n, indifferent, bored, and relaxed. Test Hypothesis H2 The second hypothesis states that offende r emotional response to non-visible security measures will not be significantly different from offender respondent emotional response to visible security m easures. Due to the difficulty in obtaining interviews with members of Al-Qaeda or other terroristsÂ’ surrogates, terrorist interview was not within the scope of this research. With the help of the University of FloridaÂ’s Loss Prevention Team, videos of domestic criminal surrogates were obtained for the study. The videos of the domestic criminals were interviews of pr ofessional criminals on the different defense mechanisms used by Gillette. The interviews also went into the strategy in which these criminals may challenge the defense mechanis ms. The videos were titled ThiefCam1, ThiefCam2, The Offender Fixture Evaluations Unedited Video Clips, and HRP-2. These videos went into different aspe cts of crime, live footage, a nd the technique used to steal merchandise (Appendix F). Due to the lack of statisti cal data the researcher coul d not support or refute the second null hypothesis stating the offenderÂ’s em otional response to non-visible security measures will not be significantly different from visible security measures.

PAGE 44

33 CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS The goals of this research was to devel op a methodology to 1) assess the emotional effects such measures impose on populations pr otected and 2) compare the effectiveness of visible and non-visible antite rrorism measures to deter te rrorist acts. This study was intended to determine whether or not there was a difference in the emotional response between visible and non-visible antiterrorism me asures. The results of this study showed a significant difference in emotions between the visible and nonvisible antiterrorism measures. The ANOVA conducted between the two groups of antiterrorism measures revealed a strong emotional response from the “visible” and “non-visible” measures. This study showed that a strong correlation between antiterrorism measures and the emotional responses gathered from the AdSA M test were closely correlated to the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: H1. Respondent emotiona l response to nonvisible security measures will not be significantly different from respondent emotional response to visible security measures. An interesting part of the study showed each of the different PAD domains had a significant difference between vi sible and non-visible antiterro rism measures. The study intended to prove that visible antiterrorism measures were believ ed to bring negative feelings. The non-visible antiterrorism measur es were believed to bring positive if not feelings of boredom. The study showed that the majority of visible antiterrorism

PAGE 45

34 measures indeed brought about negative feel ings and placed the visible antiterrorism measures in the bottom right quadrant of the perceptual map, while the majority nonvisible antiterrorism measures brought about positive results placing these measures in the top left quadrant. H2. Offender emotional re sponse to non-visible security measures will not be significantly different from of fender respondent emotional response to visible security measures. Due to the lack of resources to obtain terrorist surrogates to interview, the study used video recorded interview of domestic cr iminal surrogates. After reviewing these videos, the study showed to have an insufficien t data, and would not be able to prove or rejected the null se cond null hypothesis. Limitations Some limitations of the study have to be addressed. The sample size for one was not representative of any populat ion or group of people. This restricted the results from composing a true representation of a population group. The criminal interviews may not have give n the correct representation of a terrorist, and the different aspects in which a terrori st criminal reacts. Having the domestic criminal videos may have been the closest repr esentation of a terrorist , but a true idea of terrorism may not be discovered without th e perceptions and opinions of terrorist. Suggestions for Future Research Future research may attempt to not give the headline to allow the participants to attempt a test in which the participants may not have knowledge of the terrorism objective. This will allow the surveyor to give answers without bias. This study was not done with a particular popul ation in mind. To continue research

PAGE 46

35 of this study, a certain population should be ta ken into consideration. This will allow the opinions of the participants to be tied to demographic information pending on their work environment, past experience, and knowledge of terrorism. Conclusion In the past few years’ antiterrorism has been a popular topic in and out of the media. Seeing the deployment of military, the barricading of your most popular tourist attractions and government buildings, and the uncomfortable search and examination at your local airport are all seen throughout the United States. This common theme of a “fortress security” may be taki ng on the feeling of apathy and comfort. What some think of as the answer to “fortre ss security” is the implementati on of “non-visible” sustainable security measures. These security measures ha ve shown to be the s ecurity measures that brought about feelings of comfort, ap athy, and control by the AdSAM method of evaluation, and may be the solution to the f ear and discomfort brought about by security measures post September 11th.

PAGE 47

36 APPENDIX A PHOTOGRAPHS Figure 4: Airport X-ray secu rity station (Picture 1) Figure 5: Barbed wire fence (Picture 2)

PAGE 48

37 Figure 6: Traffic security by police officer (Picture 3) Figure 7: Bollards securing the fr ont of building (Picture 4)

PAGE 49

38 Figure 8: Security Camera (Picture 5) Figure 9: Armed security with dog (Picture 6)

PAGE 50

39 Figure 10: Security barriers along building perimeter (Picture 7) Figure 11: Fingerprint scan (Picture 8)

PAGE 51

40 Figure 12: Homeland security a dvisory system (Picture 9) Figure 13: Bollards along street (Picture 10)

PAGE 52

41 Figure 14: Security in place for crowd control (Picture 11) Figure 15: Lights along sidewalk (Picture 12)

PAGE 53

42 Figure 16: Concrete bollards along street (Picture 13) Figure 17: X-ray and metal detection devi ce in building entry way (Picture 14)

PAGE 54

43 Figure 18: Lighted parking lot (Picture 15) Figure 19: Planted plinth wall (Picture 16)

PAGE 55

44 Figure 20: Armed guards (Picture 17) Figure 21: Armed guard performing traffic security (Picture 18)

PAGE 56

45 Figure 22: Security officer and dog polic ing airline travel ers (Picture 19) Figure 23: Cement bollards at Nations Capitol (Picture 20)

PAGE 57

46 Figure 24: Temporary fencing (Picture 21) Figure 25: Military security perf orming gate control (Picture 22)

PAGE 58

47 Figure 26: Access control using automatic gate (Picture 23) Figure 27: Jersey barriers along street (Picture 24)

PAGE 59

48 Figure 28: Cameras on corner of building (Picture 25) Figure 29: Oklahoma city bombing aftermath (Picture 26)

PAGE 60

49 Figure 30: Explosion (Picture 27) Figure 31: Isolated glass s ecurity booth (Picture 28)

PAGE 61

50 APPENDIX B SURVEY INSTRUMENTATION The survey instrumentation used in th is experiment was the AdSAM method of testing. AdSAM utilizes cutting edge non-ve rbal, visual techniques to accurately research the human emotional responses. Ad SAM has been shown to be highly predictive of behavior. AdSAM visually represents Mehrabian and RussellÂ’s three-dimensional PAD approach. Although Several methods for measuring em otional responses have been tested with the greatest support for the dimensi onal approach (Holbrok and Westwood, 1989). This approach holds that emotions are dime nsional and measurements of response can be plotted in a single three-dimensional space. The axes of the space, the dimensions that compose each emotion, are named pleasure, arousal, and dominance (PAD). These emotions are bi-polar with the pleasure emotion running from pl easant to unpleasant, arousal running from aroused to asleep, and dominance running from in-control to controlled (Morris and McMullen, 1995). The AdSAM approach basis its non-ver bal measure of testing on the threedimensional PAD approach. The SAM visu ally represents Mehrabian and RussellÂ’s three PAD dimensions and was designed as an alternative to the sometimes-cumbersome verbal self-report measures (Lang, 1985).

PAGE 62

51 Figure 32: SAM the self-assessment manikin SAM depicts each PAD dimension with a graphic character arrayed along a continuous nine-point scale. For pleasure, SAM ranges from a smiling, happy figure to a frowning, unhappy figure; for arousal, SAM rang es from sleepy with eyes closed to excited with eyes open. The dominance sc ale shows SAM ranging from a very small figure representing a feeling of being controlled or submissi ve to a very large figure representing in-control or a powerful feeli ng. SAM has been used in numerous psycho physiological studies since its de velopment. Visual oriented scales such as SAM using a graphic character eliminate the majority of pr oblems associated with verbal measures or

PAGE 63

52 nonverbal measures that are based on human photographs. The AdSAM test also only takes 15 seconds, allowing numerous stimuli to be tested in a short amount of time and causing less respondent wear out than other verbal measures (Morris, 1995). The SAM is also a culture-free, language-free character that is suitable for children, adults, and people from different countries a nd cultures (Morris, 1995). The AdSAM method of testing is a method th at appears to be useful and an easy tool to implement for measuring affective res ponses with a wide range of applications. The use of the SAM model may be beneficial in this area of research because of its low amount of user wear, its ability to be tested on children as we ll as adults, and its culturefree and language free measurements.

PAGE 64

53 APPENDIX C SURVEY Read the following news clip from the Associated Press Newswire carefully: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------Headline: The University of Florida Prepares for Terrorism AP Newswire — The federal governme nt has identified University of Florida as a likely target for terroris t activity due to the concentration of young people in one place and because of the easy access to campus environments to general public visitors, which could make the campus particularly vulnerable to an unexpected attack. In anticipation of this outcome, building construction experts at University of Florida have taken proactive measures to deter such actions with increased perimeter and access controls to campus, additional surveillance throughout campus, and increased security systems. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------DIRECTIONS The following questions ask you to indicate your feelings and perceptions toward a series of photographs. You will use the ADSAM scale to indicate your feelings after viewing each picture. The scales included in the questionnaire are meant to gauge your reactions to the photographs. There are no right or wrong answers . View each photo carefully, and decide where your opinion would be most accurately reflected on the ADSAM scale. Then, mark your answer. You may refuse to answer any question. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PAGE 65

54 The following questions will be used for statistical purposes only. Your answers will be held in the strictest confidence. 7. How old are you? (check one) 01. Under 18 02. 18-20 03. 21-24 04. __ Over 24 8. What is your gender? (check one) 01. Male 02. Female 9. What is your marital status? (check one) 01. Single (not divorced or separated) 02. Married 03. Divorced or legally separated 04. Widowed 10. What is your race? (check one) 01. Caucasian/White 02. African American/Black 03. Hispanic/Latino 04. Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander 05. Native American 06. Other (please specify) 11. Which of the following describes your military status? 01. ROTC 02. Active military 03. Military – completed terms of enlistment or retired 04. Military reservist 05. None of the above 12. Has your personal life been directly impacted by terrorism? 01. Yes 02. No 13. Do you know anyone whose life has been impacted by terrorism? 01. Yes 02. No

PAGE 66

55 Picture #2

PAGE 67

56 Picture #5

PAGE 68

57 Picture #6

PAGE 69

58 Picture #10

PAGE 70

59 Picture #12

PAGE 71

60 Picture #16

PAGE 72

61 Picture #17

PAGE 73

62 Picture #26

PAGE 74

63 Thank you for your participation! Please remove the consent form and return your completed questionnaire to the research administrator. Debriefing Statement The news story and accompanying images were shown to generate an emotional response from the research participant. The University of Florida remains vigilant in its efforts to ensur e campus security. Mean while national, state, and local anti-terrorist campaigns have been developed to encourage public preparedness in the event of a terrori st attack. The researchers have no knowledge that the feder al government has identified t he University of Florida in particular — or college campuses in general — as a “high risk” target. For more information on this experi ment, please refer to the section entitled “Whom to contact for more informa tion” on the reverse side of this page.

PAGE 75

64 APPENDIX D IRB APPROVAL MATERIAL “IRB is the Internal Review Board which is a committee mandated by the National Research Act, Public Law 93-348, to be es tablished within each university or other institution that conducts biomed ical or behavioral research involving human participants and receives Federal funding for research i nvolving human particip ants. The purpose of the IRB is to review all protocols for human research before the re search is conducted to determine whether the research plan has ade quately included the ethical dimensions of the project. The administration of IRBs is conducted by the Office of Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), within the National Institutes of Health. Institutions not in compliance with the law may lose Federal f unding” (Origins of the Internal Review Board). “One of the main ethical res ponsibilities of a Prin cipal Investigator is to ensure that potential participants have been provided w ith all the information they might reasonably need to know. Any research protocol utilizi ng human participants re quires the informed consent of those participants. Potential partic ipants have the right to know what they are being asked to do prior to voluntary particip ation, no matter what the nature of the protocol and no matter how innocuous it may seem. The procedure of advising potential participants and obtaining voluntary agreement is known as the informed consent process. Informed consent is a process that involve s providing participan ts a description of the planned procedure in language appropria te to the level of understanding of the

PAGE 76

65 participant(s) and that requests voluntary participation in acc ordance with 45 CFR 46.116. If this is done, and the pa rticipant's signature is obtai ned, then legally effective written informed consent has been obtain ed. Note that OPRR requires that written informed consent documents have an expiration date affixed by the UFIRB at the time of approval (see IV). The UFIRB may make a de termination to waive the requirement for the investigator to obtain a si gned consent form for some or a ll participants as outlined in 46 CFR 46.117(c). In cases where the UFIRB de termines that writt en documentation of consent may be waived and that consent may be obtained orally, a written version of the process to be delivered orally to the participant must be included in the protocol.” (Informed Consent Process, 2005) Example of Informed Consent Form:

PAGE 77

66 Informed Consent Disclosure Agre ement for Student Participants Purpose of the study: The purpose of this study is to evaluate the audienceÂ’s emotional and cognitive response to antiterrorism building design measures. What you will be asked to do in the study: If you choose to participate in the study, you will be exposed one image and asked to complete a questionnaire that asks for your response to th e image and opinions about its content. The questionnaire should take approxi mately 15 minutes to complete. Risks: There is no personal discomfort, stress, or persona l risks associated with participating in this study. Compensation: For participating in this study you will receive extra credit points for your participation. The number of extra credit points awarded will be at the discretion of the instructor at a maximum of 2% of the studentÂ’s total grade and is communicated to you in advance of your participation. You are free to withdraw without penalty at any time during the study. If the student is enrolled in multiple courses that offer credit for participation in this study, s/he will only receive points from one instructor and for one class to be specifi ed by the student on the first questionnaire. Benefit There are no direct benefits for participation in this study besides the ex tra credit offered by the class instructor. Confidentiality: The results of your participation will be confidentia l to the extent provided by law. As such, the researcher will have no way of associating your respon ses directly with you. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw your consent at any time during the survey without penalty. In the event that you do withdraw consent, the results of your participation, to the extent that they can be identified as yours, will be re turned to you, removed from the research records, or destroyed. You may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: If you would like to learn more about the study, you may contact Dr. Kevin Grosskopf in the Rinker School of Building Construction (Rnk 316) by telephone at (352) 273-1158 or by email at kgro@ufl.edu or Brian Pak by telephone at (407)-3 46-1374 or by email at bpak@ufl.edu. Whom to contact about your rights as a research participant in the study: UFIRB Office, Box 112250, University of Fl orida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; ph. 392-0433 Agreement: I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and have received a copy of this description. Participant Signature: Date: Principal Investigator: Date:

PAGE 78

67 Informed Consent Disclosure Agreement Purpose of the study: The purpose of this study is to evaluate the audienceÂ’s emotional and psychological response to antiterrorism measures. What you will be asked to do in the study: If you choose to participate in the study, you will be exposed one image and asked to complete a questionnaire that asks for your response to th e image and opinions about its content. The questionnaire should take approxi mately 15 minutes to complete. Risks: There is no personal discomfort, stress, or persona l risks associated with participating in this study. Compensation: For participating in this study you will receive extra credit points for your participation. The number of extra credit points awarded will be at the discretion of the instructor at a maximum of 2% of the studentÂ’s total grade and is communicated to you in advance of your participation. You are free to withdraw without penalty at any time during the study. If the student is enrolled in multiple courses that offer credit for participation in this study, s/he will only receive points from one instructor and for one class to be specifi ed by the student on the first questionnaire. Benefit There are no direct benefits for participation in this study besides the ex tra credit offered by the class instructor. Confidentiality: The results of your participation will be confidentia l to the extent provided by law. As such, the researcher will have no way of associating your respon ses directly with you. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw your consent at any time during the survey without penalty. In the event that you do withdraw consent, the results of your participation, to the extent that they can be identified as yours, will be re turned to you, removed from the research records, or destroyed. You may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: If you would like to learn more about the study, you may contact Dr. Kevin Grosskopf in the Rinker School of Building Construction (Rnk 316) by telephone at (352) 273-1158 or by email at kgro@ufl.edu or Brian Pak by telephone at (407)-3 46-1374 or by email at bpak@ufl.edu. Whom to contact about your rights as a research participant in the study: UFIRB Office, Box 112250, University of Fl orida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; ph. 392-0433 Agreement: I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and have received a copy of this description. ParticipantÂ’s Copy

PAGE 79

68 Debriefing Statement The news story and accompanying images were shown to generate an emotional response from the research participant. While the University of Florida remains vigilant in its efforts to ensure campus security, and while national, state, and local anti-terrorist campaigns have been developed to encourag e public preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack, the researchers have no knowledge that the federal government has identified the University of Florida in partic ular — or college campuses in general — as a “high risk” target. For more information on this experiment , please refer to the section entitled “Whom to contact for more information” on the reverse side of this page.

PAGE 80

69 APPENDIX E SURVEY DATA Table 9: Survey Data Survey # P1 Pl1 Ar1 Dom1P5 Pl5 Ar5 Dom5P6 Pl6 Ar6 Dom6 1 2 2 -3 -4 5 -2 1 2 6 3 -4 -4 2 2 0 4 0 5 2 0 -4 6 -2 4 -1 3 2 2 2 -2 5 0 2 0 6 4 0 -2 4 2 2 2 0 5 -2 2 4 6 -2 -2 0 5 2 2 2 0 5 0 2 -2 6 4 0 0 6 2 -2 2 0 5 -4 4 2 6 -2 -2 2 7 2 2 -1 -2 5 -1 2 -1 6 3 -2 3 8 2 0 -2 -2 5 2 -2 -4 6 4 -2 -3 9 2 0 2 -2 5 2 0 0 6 3 -1 -2 10 2 2 4 -2 5 0 4 -1 6 3 0 -3 11 2 2 0 -2 5 0 4 0 6 -4 -2 2 12 2 -1 4 0 5 0 0 0 6 3 -1 -3 13 2 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 6 -2 -2 4 14 2 -4 0 -2 5 0 0 -2 6 4 -2 -4 15 2 4 0 2 5 4 -4 0 6 -2 0 -4 16 2 2 0 1 5 3 4 1 6 -4 -1 4 17 2 0 0 0 5 -1 1 1 6 3 -3 -3 18 2 2 0 0 5 1 2 -2 6 2 -1 -2 19 2 -2 -2 -2 5 2 0 0 6 4 -4 -4 20 2 1 0 -2 5 1 0 -1 6 2 -1 -3 21 2 4 -1 -4 5 3 0 -4 6 4 -2 -4 22 2 4 -2 4 5 0 0 0 6 3 2 0 23 2 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 6 2 -1 0 24 2 4 0 -2 5 0 3 0 6 4 -4 -4 25 2 2 -1 -3 5 -2 1 -2 6 -3 -2 -4 26 2 0 -1 -1 5 0 0 0 6 1 -2 -1 27 2 2 0 0 5 -1 2 3 6 3 -1 -4 28 2 2 0 -2 5 -1 0 0 6 -4 -4 -1 29 2 2 2 -3 5 1 0 -1 6 3 -1 -2 30 2 0 0 -2 5 1 -2 0 6 4 -3 -2 31 2 1 1 -1 5 1 -2 -3 6 4 -3 -4 32 2 3 0 -2 5 -2 3 1 6 3 -2 -2 33 2 2 -3 -2 5 -2 2 2 6 0 0 -1 34 2 2 -2 -3 5 3 -3 -4 6 0 -2 0 35 2 3 0 -1 5 2 0 0 6 0 -2 -4 36 2 2 3 0 5 0 2 0 6 3 -1 -2

PAGE 81

70 Table 9. Continued Survey # P1 Pl1 Ar1 Dom1P5 Pl5 Ar5 Dom5P6 Pl6 Ar6 Dom6 37 2 2 4 -2 5 0 4 -2 6 1 2 0 38 2 4 -4 -2 5 0 4 4 6 4 -4 -4 39 2 2 0 0 5 0 2 2 6 4 -2 -2 40 2 2 0 -3 5 0 4 2 6 1 1 3 41 2 2 2 -4 5 0 3 -2 6 3 0 -4 42 2 0 4 0 5 4 4 0 6 -4 4 4 43 2 3 2 -2 5 -2 0 -1 6 1 -4 -4 44 2 2 2 -2 5 -4 2 0 6 4 -4 -4 45 2 0 2 0 5 0 2 0 6 2 -2 -2 46 2 4 -4 -4 5 4 -4 -4 6 2 -3 -4 47 2 0 4 -1 5 3 -2 -2 6 3 -2 -4 48 2 4 3 -4 5 1 2 0 6 4 -2 -2 49 2 4 0 -3 5 0 1 -1 6 2 -1 -2 50 2 4 2 -2 5 4 2 -2 6 2 0 -1 51 2 4 -2 -3 5 0 4 0 6 0 2 -2 52 2 2 1 -2 5 2 -1 -1 6 1 1 -2 53 2 4 0 -4 5 0 2 -1 6 4 -1 -4 54 2 4 0 -4 5 0 0 -4 6 0 -2 -4 55 2 2 0 -2 5 0 -2 -4 6 0 -4 1 56 2 0 0 0 5 1 0 -1 6 -1 1 0 57 2 1 0 -1 5 0 -1 -1 6 -1 -1 -3 58 2 2 2 -1 5 0 4 0 6 3 1 -2 59 2 2 0 -1 5 0 -1 1 6 2 -1 1 60 2 2 2 2 5 2 4 -2 6 0 -4 -2 61 2 2 4 0 5 0 4 0 6 3 -2 -3 62 2 4 -2 0 5 0 0 0 6 2 0 -2 63 2 4 0 -2 5 0 2 0 6 4 -2 -4 64 2 1 0 0 5 -2 2 -2 6 4 -3 -2 65 2 0 3 2 5 -2 4 0 6 4 -2 0 66 2 2 0 -2 5 0 0 0 6 4 -2 -3 67 2 2 2 -2 5 0 0 0 6 0 -2 0 68 2 2 2 -2 5 0 4 0 6 4 -2 -4 69 2 2 4 0 5 -2 3 4 6 0 1 0 70 2 4 -4 -4 5 4 -2 -1 6 4 -4 -3 71 2 2 0 2 5 0 2 0 6 3 -1 -2 72 2 0 4 0 5 1 0 -2 6 1 -1 -1 73 2 0 0 -2 5 -3 2 0 6 1 -2 -1 74 2 0 0 -3 5 0 0 -2 6 -2 3 0 75 2 4 0 -4 5 0 2 0 6 4 -2 3 76 2 1 -1 -1 5 0 -1 0 6 2 -2 -3 77 2 4 -1 -3 5 4 2 -4 6 3 -3 -1 78 2 2 0 -2 5 0 2 0 6 3 -2 -2 79 2 2 0 -2 5 1 1 -1 6 4 -3 -4 80 2 4 -2 -3 5 0 1 -4 6 4 -4 -4

PAGE 82

71 Table 9. Continued Survey # P1 Pl1 Ar1 Dom1P5 Pl5 Ar5 Dom5P6 Pl6 Ar6 Dom6 81 2 2 0 -2 5 0 0 -1 6 2 -2 -3 82 2 4 -2 -4 5 2 0 0 6 4 -4 -2 83 2 -2 2 2 5 0 2 2 6 0 0 2 84 2 4 0 -4 5 1 0 0 6 4 4 -4 85 2 0 4 -2 5 0 0 2 6 4 -4 0 86 2 0 2 -2 5 0 4 0 6 2 0 -2 87 2 0 1 -2 5 0 4 1 6 2 0 -3 88 2 2 3 -1 5 2 1 -1 6 4 -3 -3 89 2 4 -3 -3 5 0 0 0 6 4 -4 -4 90 2 -3 2 2 5 2 0 -2 6 4 -2 -4 91 2 2 0 -2 5 0 2 0 6 0 0 -2 92 2 4 4 -4 5 0 4 0 6 -2 4 0 93 2 2 0 -3 5 1 3 -2 6 3 -2 -4 94 2 2 -2 -2 5 -4 2 0 6 1 -4 -2 95 2 2 2 -1 5 -2 4 2 6 3 -2 -1 96 2 4 -4 -4 5 -4 4 0 6 -2 4 2 97 2 2 2 -2 5 2 -2 -2 6 4 -4 -4 98 2 1 0 -2 5 -2 2 2 6 2 -2 0 99 2 0 0 -2 5 -2 2 4 6 3 -4 -4 100 2 0 2 -2 5 0 2 -4 6 0 0 -4 101 2 0 2 0 5 0 2 0 6 2 2 -2 102 2 0 4 3 5 -1 4 2 6 0 4 2 103 2 2 -1 -3 5 -1 2 0 6 2 -1 1 104 2 3 -2 -3 5 2 -2 -3 6 2 0 -2 105 2 1 3 0 5 -1 -2 2 6 -3 -2 0 106 2 4 -3 0 5 2 0 2 6 4 -4 2 107 2 2 0 -2 5 4 4 0 6 4 -2 -4 108 2 -4 4 2 5 -4 3 2 6 -4 0 0 109 2 4 0 -2 5 0 2 -2 6 2 -2 -2 110 2 2 1 0 5 0 2 0 6 2 0 0 111 2 0 4 0 5 0 3 2 6 4 -4 -2 112 2 2 -2 -2 5 -4 0 -4 6 4 -4 -4 113 2 4 2 -4 5 -2 3 4 6 2 -2 -2 114 2 3 0 -3 5 -1 1 1 6 4 -3 -4 115 2 4 2 -2 5 1 -2 -2 6 4 -4 -4 116 2 0 3 -1 5 0 2 -2 6 -1 -2 -2 117 2 4 0 -3 5 2 -1 -2 6 3 -1 -2 118 2 1 1 -3 5 2 1 -1 6 0 -2 -4 119 2 3 0 -3 5 2 0 0 6 3 -2 -2 120 2 2 -2 -3 5 0 4 0 6 1 2 2 121 2 0 2 -1 5 -2 1 0 6 1 1 -2 122 2 2 0 0 5 3 -1 -2 6 3 -2 -2 123 2 3 -2 -2 5 0 4 2 6 0 -2 2 124 2 1 2 -3 5 2 0 -3 6 4 2 -2

PAGE 83

72 Table 9. Continued Survey # P1 Pl1 Ar1 Dom1P5 Pl5 Ar5 Dom5P6 Pl6 Ar6 Dom6 125 2 4 -2 -2 5 2 -3 -4 6 4 -4 -4 126 2 4 -2 -1 5 0 4 0 6 4 0 0 127 2 4 0 -4 5 0 4 0 6 2 -2 -2 128 2 0 3 0 5 1 -1 -2 6 2 -2 -3 129 2 2 0 0 5 0 -2 -2 6 0 -4 -2 130 2 1 3 -2 5 -1 3 0 6 2 -1 -2 131 2 -1 2 4 5 -2 2 4 6 0 1 4 132 2 3 -2 -3 5 -1 -2 0 6 3 -4 -2 133 2 0 0 0 5 4 -4 -4 6 -4 -4 -2 134 2 2 0 -2 5 0 2 0 6 2 -1 0 135 2 4 4 -4 5 1 2 -1 6 4 3 -4 136 2 4 -3 -3 5 0 3 -4 6 4 -2 -4 137 2 4 4 -2 5 2 4 4 6 4 2 -4 138 2 2 4 -1 5 0 2 -1 6 4 -2 -2 139 2 4 4 -2 5 0 2 -2 6 4 4 -4 140 2 0 -1 -1 5 -1 2 0 6 2 -2 -3 141 2 4 4 -4 5 -4 0 -1 6 3 2 0 142 2 4 0 -2 5 2 0 -2 6 3 -2 -4 Survey # P10 Pl10 Ar10Dom10P12 Pl12Ar12Dom12 P16 Pl16Ar16Dom16 1 10 -4 4 -2 12 0 -1 -2 16 -4 4 2 2 10 -3 4 0 12 -4 3 4 16 -2 2 2 3 10 -2 0 2 12 -2 -2 0 16 -4 2 4 4 10 -2 2 3 12 -4 -2 3 16 0 2 2 5 10 0 2 0 12 -4 4 2 16 -4 4 0 6 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 0 4 4 7 10 -1 2 1 12 0 1 0 16 -4 2 3 8 10 -2 2 0 12 0 2 -2 16 -3 3 2 9 10 -2 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -2 4 4 10 10 -3 4 2 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 11 10 -4 4 0 12 -4 4 0 16 0 4 0 12 10 -1 2 2 12 -4 4 4 16 -3 4 4 13 10 -2 0 0 12 -4 2 2 16 -2 2 2 14 10 -2 4 0 12 -4 -4 0 16 -4 -4 0 15 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 0 16 10 1 4 0 12 4 4 0 16 4 4 0 17 10 -3 4 3 12 -4 3 3 16 -3 3 3 18 10 -2 3 2 12 -3 3 3 16 -2 2 4 19 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 2 3 16 -4 4 4 20 10 -3 3 0 12 -3 4 0 16 -2 4 0 21 10 -2 4 2 12 -4 4 2 16 -4 4 4 22 10 -3 3 3 12 -3 4 3 16 -3 2 3 23 10 0 4 0 12 -2 4 0 16 -4 4 4

PAGE 84

73 Table 9. Continued Survey # P10 Pl10 Ar10Dom10P12 Pl12Ar12Dom12 P16 Pl16Ar16Dom16 24 10 -4 0 3 12 -3 1 3 16 -2 -2 4 25 10 -2 4 1 12 -1 4 4 16 -4 4 1 26 10 -2 1 0 12 -2 1 1 16 -1 0 0 27 10 -2 0 3 12 -4 0 2 16 -4 -1 1 28 10 0 4 2 12 -4 4 2 16 -4 2 2 29 10 -2 2 3 12 -3 3 3 16 -3 3 3 30 10 -3 3 1 12 -4 3 3 16 -4 4 4 31 10 -3 3 2 12 -4 4 3 16 -4 4 4 32 10 -2 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 33 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 34 10 -3 3 2 12 -4 3 3 16 -4 4 4 35 10 -4 0 2 12 -4 4 4 16 -2 0 2 36 10 -1 3 0 12 3 4 1 16 -3 2 2 37 10 -2 2 0 12 -2 1 1 16 -3 0 0 38 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -2 4 4 39 10 -4 4 4 12 -2 4 4 16 -4 4 4 40 10 -2 1 -2 12 -2 1 0 16 -1 1 0 41 10 -1 4 1 12 -2 4 2 16 -4 2 4 42 10 4 4 4 12 0 4 0 16 0 4 0 43 10 -2 1 3 12 -3 0 2 16 -4 2 2 44 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 0 16 -2 2 -2 45 10 0 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 0 4 4 46 10 1 2 1 12 -3 -2 4 16 -2 2 4 47 10 -3 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 48 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 1 4 16 -4 1 4 49 10 -2 4 0 12 -4 4 1 16 -3 4 0 50 10 0 2 0 12 -2 0 0 16 -2 0 0 51 10 -4 4 2 12 -4 4 0 16 -4 4 0 52 10 -3 4 -1 12 -4 4 3 16 -2 3 0 53 10 -1 4 0 12 -1 4 0 16 -4 4 1 54 10 -4 4 0 12 -4 2 3 16 -4 0 -3 55 10 -4 4 2 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 56 10 -3 3 2 12 -2 3 3 16 -2 4 2 57 10 -1 4 0 12 1 -1 -1 16 -2 2 1 58 10 -2 4 1 12 -2 2 1 16 -2 3 1 59 10 -4 3 4 12 -3 3 3 16 -4 3 4 60 10 4 -4 -4 12 -2 4 4 16 -2 4 4 61 10 -2 2 2 12 -2 0 0 16 -2 0 2 62 10 -3 3 3 12 -3 3 3 16 -4 4 4 63 10 0 4 2 12 -2 4 3 16 -4 4 4 64 10 -4 3 2 12 -4 4 3 16 -4 4 3 65 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -3 2 4 66 10 -2 2 2 12 -1 2 1 16 -3 2 3 67 10 -2 -2 2 12 -2 -2 2 16 -2 -2 2

PAGE 85

74 Table 9. Continued Survey # P10 Pl10 Ar10Dom10P12 Pl12Ar12Dom12 P16 Pl16Ar16Dom16 68 10 -2 -2 2 12 -4 -2 -2 16 -4 -4 2 69 10 0 4 4 12 0 3 3 16 -2 1 3 70 10 -1 2 1 12 -2 3 2 16 -2 4 2 71 10 -3 3 0 12 -4 4 1 16 -1 4 0 72 10 -3 4 2 12 -2 2 1 16 -2 4 2 73 10 -3 3 3 12 -1 0 -1 16 -3 3 2 74 10 0 4 1 12 0 3 0 16 0 3 1 75 10 -4 0 0 12 4 2 0 16 -4 0 0 76 10 -2 4 2 12 -3 4 4 16 -3 4 3 77 10 -3 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 78 10 -4 4 4 12 -3 2 2 16 -4 4 1 79 10 -3 4 3 12 -4 4 3 16 -3 4 3 80 10 -3 4 3 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 81 10 -2 0 0 12 -3 3 1 16 -2 3 2 82 10 -2 2 4 12 -4 4 -2 16 -4 4 4 83 10 -2 4 2 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 84 10 -2 -2 0 12 -4 -2 0 16 -4 -4 0 85 10 0 4 0 12 0 4 0 16 0 4 0 86 10 2 4 3 12 -2 4 3 16 -3 4 2 87 10 0 4 2 12 -2 4 4 16 -2 4 3 88 10 -2 4 2 12 -4 4 3 16 -4 4 3 89 10 -1 3 0 12 1 1 1 16 -2 4 -1 90 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -3 2 2 91 10 -2 2 2 12 -4 4 3 16 -4 4 4 92 10 -4 0 2 12 -2 4 0 16 0 4 0 93 10 -4 0 3 12 -3 0 2 16 -4 0 4 94 10 -1 3 3 12 0 2 2 16 0 4 3 95 10 -4 4 3 12 -4 -4 4 16 -4 4 4 96 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 97 10 -4 0 2 12 -4 0 2 16 -4 4 4 98 10 -4 4 4 12 -3 3 2 16 -3 4 4 99 10 -4 4 4 12 -3 2 3 16 -2 4 4 100 10 -2 4 2 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 0 101 10 -2 4 0 12 -4 4 0 16 -1 3 0 102 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 3 16 -4 4 4 103 10 -1 2 1 12 -3 4 2 16 -4 4 4 104 10 0 0 0 12 -1 1 2 16 0 0 0 105 10 0 0 3 12 2 3 4 16 0 3 4 106 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 107 10 0 4 0 12 -2 4 2 16 -4 4 2 108 10 -4 4 2 12 -4 4 2 16 -4 4 2 109 10 0 3 0 12 -2 3 2 16 -4 3 2 110 10 -2 4 4 12 -2 2 2 16 -4 4 2 111 10 0 2 0 12 -2 4 0 16 -2 4 4

PAGE 86

75 Table 9. Continued Survey # P10 Pl10 Ar10Dom10P12 Pl12Ar12Dom12 P16 Pl16Ar16Dom16 112 10 -2 4 2 12 0 2 -2 16 -4 4 4 113 10 -4 4 4 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 114 10 -4 4 3 12 -4 3 2 16 -4 4 4 115 10 0 -2 -4 12 2 -3 -3 16 -4 2 -2 116 10 0 4 3 12 -2 4 4 16 -2 4 4 117 10 -2 -1 3 12 -2 1 2 16 -2 1 3 118 10 -4 3 4 12 -2 -2 2 16 -4 -4 3 119 10 -2 3 3 12 -3 3 3 16 -4 3 -4 120 10 -3 4 3 12 1 -1 -2 16 -4 4 4 121 10 -2 3 2 12 -4 4 4 16 -4 4 4 122 10 -2 1 1 12 -4 3 2 16 -2 2 2 123 10 0 4 4 12 -3 3 3 16 -3 4 4 124 10 -2 -2 2 12 -2 -2 -2 16 -1 -1 -2 125 10 1 3 0 12 1 -2 0 16 2 1 0 126 10 -4 0 4 12 -4 0 4 16 -4 0 4 127 10 -2 4 4 12 -4 -2 4 16 0 0 0 128 10 0 2 0 12 0 2 0 16 -2 4 2 129 10 -2 2 0 12 -2 2 0 16 -4 -2 0 130 10 -3 3 3 12 -3 3 3 16 -1 2 -1 131 10 -2 4 4 12 -2 2 4 16 -2 4 4 132 10 -2 2 3 12 -2 2 2 16 -3 3 3 133 10 -2 -2 0 12 0 -2 2 16 -4 0 -4 134 10 -2 4 4 12 -2 4 4 16 -3 4 4 135 10 -4 -1 4 12 -4 4 3 16 -2 4 3 136 10 -4 4 4 12 -2 4 3 16 -3 4 4 137 10 0 2 4 12 0 2 4 16 -2 0 4 138 10 -2 0 2 12 -2 0 1 16 -2 1 2 139 10 -1 0 0 12 -1 0 1 16 -2 -2 0 140 10 -2 2 0 12 -2 4 2 16 -4 2 3 141 10 -2 2 2 12 -4 -2 2 16 -2 -2 0 142 10 -1 2 2 12 0 4 0 16 -2 0 4 Survey # P17 Pl17 Ar17Dom17P26 Pl26Ar26Dom26 1 17 2 -3 -3 26 4 -4 -4 2 17 0 2 2 26 4 -2 0 3 17 2 0 -4 26 4 -2 -4 4 17 2 -2 0 26 2 -4 4 5 17 4 -2 -2 26 4 -2 -2 6 17 -2 0 0 26 4 -4 -4 7 17 2 -2 3 26 3 -3 -4 8 17 -3 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 9 17 2 -2 -3 26 4 -4 -4 10 17 2 -2 -3 26 4 -4 -4

PAGE 87

76 Table 9. Continued Survey # P17 Pl17 Ar17Dom17P26 Pl26Ar26Dom26 11 17 -4 -4 -2 26 4 -4 -4 12 17 3 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -3 13 17 0 0 0 26 2 0 -2 14 17 2 0 -2 26 4 -4 -4 15 17 2 -2 0 26 4 -4 -4 16 17 -4 -4 4 26 2 -1 -2 17 17 3 -3 -2 26 4 -4 -4 18 17 1 -1 -2 26 4 -4 4 19 17 2 -4 -2 26 4 -4 -4 20 17 2 -2 -3 26 3 -3 -3 21 17 4 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 22 17 1 -2 3 26 0 -2 -2 23 17 2 0 -2 26 4 -2 -3 24 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 25 17 -4 3 1 26 4 -4 -4 26 17 0 -2 -2 26 1 -1 -1 27 17 3 3 -3 26 4 3 -3 28 17 -4 -4 2 26 4 -4 -4 29 17 2 -1 -1 26 4 -4 -3 30 17 3 -3 -3 26 4 -4 -3 31 17 4 -3 -4 26 4 -4 -4 32 17 2 -1 -1 26 4 -4 -4 33 17 -2 2 1 26 2 -3 -2 34 17 1 -1 -2 26 4 -4 -4 35 17 -1 2 0 26 4 -4 -4 36 17 2 -2 -2 26 4 -3 -3 37 17 3 -2 -1 26 4 -4 -2 38 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 39 17 4 -4 -3 26 4 -4 -4 40 17 1 1 0 26 3 -2 -2 41 17 0 1 -3 26 4 -1 -4 42 17 0 2 0 26 4 -2 0 43 17 2 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 44 17 0 -1 -1 26 4 -4 -1 45 17 0 0 0 26 2 3 0 46 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 47 17 4 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 48 17 1 0 -1 26 4 -2 -4 49 17 3 -2 -3 26 4 -3 -3 50 17 4 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 51 17 0 2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 52 17 3 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 53 17 4 -1 -4 26 4 -3 -4 54 17 3 0 -2 26 4 -4 -1

PAGE 88

77 Table 9. Continued Survey # P17 Pl17 Ar17Dom17P26 Pl26Ar26Dom26 55 17 0 -3 0 26 4 -4 -4 56 17 0 0 -1 26 2 1 -1 57 17 0 -1 -2 26 2 -3 -2 58 17 3 1 0 26 2 1 0 59 17 0 -1 -1 26 3 1 -3 60 17 2 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 61 17 2 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 62 17 3 -3 -4 26 4 -4 -4 63 17 3 0 -2 26 4 -4 -3 64 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 65 17 2 0 0 26 4 -4 -4 66 17 1 -1 -2 26 4 -3 -3 67 17 0 -3 0 26 4 -4 -2 68 17 4 -2 -4 26 4 -2 -4 69 17 3 -1 -2 26 4 -1 -3 70 17 4 1 -1 26 4 -4 -3 71 17 0 1 1 26 3 -2 -4 72 17 2 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 73 17 2 -2 -3 26 4 -3 -4 74 17 1 -2 -1 26 3 -3 -3 75 17 2 0 -2 26 4 -4 3 76 17 2 -3 -2 26 4 -4 -4 77 17 2 2 0 26 4 -4 -4 78 17 0 0 -2 26 3 -1 -1 79 17 3 1 -4 26 4 -4 -4 80 17 3 -2 -3 26 4 -2 -3 81 17 2 -3 -3 26 4 -4 -3 82 17 2 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 83 17 0 3 1 26 3 0 -1 84 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 85 17 1 -2 1 26 2 -4 2 86 17 3 -1 -1 26 4 -2 -3 87 17 2 0 0 26 3 1 -2 88 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 89 17 3 -4 0 26 4 -4 -4 90 17 1 0 0 26 4 -4 -4 91 17 2 -2 -3 26 4 0 -1 92 17 0 4 2 26 4 4 -4 93 17 2 0 -2 26 4 -2 -4 94 17 0 -1 -2 26 2 -2 -3 95 17 2 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -3 96 17 0 0 0 26 4 -4 -2 97 17 2 -4 -4 26 4 -4 0 98 17 2 0 -1 26 2 -1 0

PAGE 89

78 Table 9. Continued Survey # P17 Pl17 Ar17Dom17P26 Pl26Ar26Dom26 99 17 2 -2 -2 26 4 -3 0 100 17 0 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 101 17 1 3 0 26 4 0 0 102 17 -1 4 2 26 3 2 2 103 17 0 1 -1 26 4 -4 -3 104 17 2 -1 -2 26 3 -2 -3 105 17 -3 -2 2 26 2 -2 2 106 17 4 -4 2 26 4 -4 -4 107 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 108 17 4 -1 1 26 4 -3 0 109 17 2 0 -2 26 4 -4 2 110 17 1 0 -2 26 2 0 -1 111 17 2 2 -2 26 4 -2 -2 112 17 2 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 113 17 2 -1 -1 26 4 -4 2 114 17 4 -2 -3 26 4 -4 -2 115 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 116 17 1 -2 -1 26 2 0 0 117 17 1 4 -4 26 4 -2 -4 118 17 0 0 -2 26 4 4 0 119 17 2 -2 -2 26 4 -1 -4 120 17 0 1 -1 26 4 -4 -4 121 17 -1 3 0 26 3 -1 0 122 17 2 -1 -1 26 3 -2 -2 123 17 0 0 1 26 4 -4 -3 124 17 4 3 -2 26 4 4 -4 125 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 0 126 17 4 -2 -2 26 4 -4 4 127 17 0 0 -4 26 4 -4 2 128 17 3 -4 -3 26 4 -4 -4 129 17 2 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 130 17 3 -1 2 26 4 -3 -3 131 17 0 0 2 26 2 -1 1 132 17 3 -2 -2 26 4 -4 -4 133 17 -2 0 -4 26 -3 -4 -2 134 17 4 -4 -4 26 4 -4 -4 135 17 4 -2 -1 26 4 -4 -2 136 17 2 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 137 17 4 4 -4 26 4 0 2 138 17 2 -2 -1 26 4 -2 -2 139 17 4 3 -4 26 4 4 -4 140 17 3 -2 -4 26 4 -4 -4 141 17 4 -2 -4 26 4 -2 -4 142 17 2 -2 -3 26 4 -4 -4

PAGE 90

79 APPENDIX F DOMESTIC CRIMINALS COMP ARED TO TERRORIST Domestic criminals and terrorist may not have the same intentions, but techniques and criminal knowledge may be similar. Many of the techniques used by both may transfer in the way they approach their ta sk. As you will see, domestic crime and terrorism may not be as diffe rent as some may think. Terrorist attacks are not just spontane ous events. Many of these attacks are planned attacks in which training, practice, a nd money are invested. In video ThiefCam1 a wholesale operation is disc ussed. In many of these instances warehouses areas are chosen. “Reason we choose this neighborhood , this warehouse, because it’s very quiet place, industrial area, truck pulls in…truck pu lls out; it’s no big deal, the truck is a normal thing see how many trucks are parked he re, it’s usually a warehouse area. There’s not much police here. I mean, enforcement, they have local enforcement which are hired by these guys” (ThiefCam1). Modes of transportation are an important as pect in terrorism and domestic crime. Transportation can be used as a weapon in a terro rist attack or as the attack itself. In domestic crime a method of transportation is often used to either escape or load the merchandise targeted. As a consequence to terrorism, moving tr ucks are something symbolic of suspicious criminal involvement. “He never use trucks to for the mercha ndise because truck attracts, I mean, you know, it’s like your transporting something., van is like, usually family van, don’t use tag

PAGE 91

80 numbers, don’t use tag numbers, you use d ealer tags or those temporary tags on there…and he bring like 3 or 4…sometime he use 4 or 5 7 trucks. And like 4 vans, 5 vans, 6 vans...depends...take all th e seats out of the vans, because it don’t get any much attention…easy to move the mercha ndise...police don’t look at it...you know, sometime…Uhaul truck gets a little atten tion by the cops...local cops” (ThiefCam1). As domestic criminals perform their task through the buildin g the eyes and ears must be paid attention to. Domestic criminal s have the ability to locate the so called “blind spots” of an area. These “blind spots” are areas in which the cameras can not see you. Like terrorist, domestic criminals make an attempt to hide their identity from personnel and cameras. Interviewer: “So you have a lot of blind areas.” “A lot of blind areas If I stand right here the cameras right above me can’t see me so the shelves if be better if they were shorter for one but um look at that’s funny you have a sign that says security camera th at’s like one of those things that’s” Interviewer: “ So does that impact you?” “I a got a saying about lock on doors “locks and cameras and stuff like that locks are designed to keep honest people out.” So if you’re dishonest you’re not going to care if it says security camera.” In the case of 9/11, terrorists were able to bring weapons on board an airline. With increased security in airports, people must go through a series of scans and checks before entering the airplane. Like terrorists, domes tic criminals must be aware of the scans and checks of the targeted area. Stores these days install Electronic Alarm System (EAS) devises, which should deter domestic criminals from stealing merchandise from the store.

PAGE 92

81 “What’s really good is if I put an alarm strip in somebody else’s bag on my way out the door. And the alarm will go off for them but most of the time, who cares. That just let’s me know there is an alarm. But like I said but I don’t know if you walked out the store and the alarm goes off if a nybody is going to do anything.”

PAGE 93

82 LIST OF REFERENCES About NCPC. (2004). National Capital Pl anning Commission. Retrieved August 15, 2005, from http://www.ncpc.gov/about.html Airport Security Issues. (2002). Airsafe.com. Retrieved July 8, 2004, from http://www.airsafe.co m/issues/security.htm Antiterrorism. (2004). FEMA. Retrieved October 23, 2004, from http://www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/ Backgrounder. (2005). FEMA: Hazards . Retrieved March 9, 2005, from http://www.fema.gov/hazards/terrorism/terror.shtm Brown, M. D. and Lowe, A. S. (2003). Risk Management Series Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. Retrieved http://www.fema.gov/pdf/fima/426/fema426.pdf. Carr, K. (2002). Security by Desi gn. Retrieved November 22, 2005, from http://www.csoonline.com/read/110802/briefing_design.html Flint, A. (2002). Safeguards in cities c ould get new look. Retrieved July 7, 2002, from http://www.boston.com/globe/natio n/packages/after_sept11/070702.htm Holbrook, M. B. and Gardener, M P. (1998). How Motivation Moderates the Effects of Emotions on the Duration of Consumption. Journal of Business Research, 42(3), 241252. Holbrook, M. B. & Westwood, R. A. (1989). The role of emotion in advertising revisited: Testing a typology of emotional respon ses. In P. Cafferata & A. Tybout (Eds.), Cognitive and affective responses to a dvertising, (pp. 353-372). Lexington, MA: Lexington Press. Informed Consent Process. (2005). Retrieved August 25, 2005, from http://irb.ufl.edu/irb02/ifc.html Kiely, K. (2005). Post-9/11 security hinde rs access at capitols. Retrieved May 18, 2005, from http://www.usatoday.com/news/na tion/2002-08-04-fortress-usat_x.htm Lang, P.J. (1985). The Cognitive Psychology of Emotion: Anxiety and the Anxiety Disorders. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Eribaum.

PAGE 94

83 Mehrabian, A. (1995). Framework for a Co mprehensive Description and Measurement of Emotional States. Department of Psyc hology University of California, 341-361. Mehrabian, A. and Russell, J. A. (1974). Th e Basic Emotional Impact of Environments. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 38, 283-301. Meyers, D. (2001). Do We Fear the Right Things? Retrieved November 23, 2005, from http://www.davidmyers.org/Brix?pageID=65 Milgram, J. (2001). Airport guards armed, but their rifles aren’t loaded. Retrieved October 13, 2001, from http://www.recordonline.com/ archive/2001/10/13/onsbulle.htm Morris, J. (1995). Observations: SAM: The Self-Assessment Manikin an Efficient Cross-Cultural Measurement of Emotional Response. Re trieved January 16, 2005, from http://www.adsam.com/observations.pdf Morris, J. D. and McMullen, J. S. (1995). Measuring Multiple Emotional Responses To a Single Television Commercial. Retrieved January 16, 2005, from http://www.adsam.com/Chapter2.pdf National Capital Planning Comm ission. (2004). Security and Urban Design. Retrieved July 22, 2005, from http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_i nit/security/security.html Office of the Press Secretary. (2002). St rengthening Homeland Security Since 9/11. Retrieved April 11, 2002, from http: //www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=114 Origins of the Internal Review Board. Retrieved from http://irb.ufl.edu/irb02/origin.html Schmidt, B. (2002). Fear not: Americans have been very jittery lately. As we cautiously open our mail, terror is ever present. Here , we take a look at fear itself – Feature – Statistical Data Included. Retrieved January 12, 2005, from http://www.findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_m1175/is_I_32/ai_82261801 Schwartzman, P. (2005) D.C. Scenes No Postcard Captures. Re trieved March 27, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/articles/A3677-2005Mar26.html September 11, 2001. (2005). Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved October 8, 2005, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/September_11,_2001_attacks Terrorism. (2002). Americans & the Wo rld Retrieved. Retrieved January 14, 2002, from http://www.americansworld.org/digest/global_issues /terrorism/terrorism_perception.cfm Terrorism. (2004). FEMA: Hazards. Retrieved November 1, 2004, from http://www.fema.gov/hazards/terrorism/ Terrorism. (2005). Encyclopedia Britanni ca Online. Retrieved September 15, 2005, from http://www.britannica.com/original?content_id=1447

PAGE 95

84 Villegas, J. (2001). Measurement and th e Role of Emotions While Browsing on the Web, University of Texas at Aus tin, Department of Advertising. White House. (2004). Pennsylvania Ave nue Project. Retrieved November 10, 2004, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/pennproject/index.html Williams, Dai. (2002). Psychological Aftermath of September 11th Is there a 9-11 Transition? Retrieved July 23, 2002, from http://www.eoslifework.c o.uk/pdfs/911transition23J.pdf

PAGE 96

85 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Brian Pak was born on March 16th, 1980, in Huntsville, Alabama. He completed his bachelorÂ’s in business administrati on with a concentration on management information systems in 2002 from the University of Central Florida. He will receive his Master of Science in Building Constructi on in December 2005 from the University of Florida.