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Selecting Immigration in Modern Argentina: Economic, Cultural, International and Institutional Factors

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Selecting Immigration in Modern Argentina: Economic, Cultural, International and Institutional Factors
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SELECTING IMMIGRATION IN M ODERN ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, INTERNATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS By JULIA ALBARRACIN A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2004

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Copyright 2004 by Julia Albarracin

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This dissertation is dedicated to my family.

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iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Several institutions and persons made th is study possible. I thank the financial support provided by the University of FloridaÂ’ s College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, the Tinker Foundation, and the National Science Fo undationÂ’s Americas Program. I am also grateful for the guidance provided by my co mmittee chair, Professor Philip J. Williams, and to the rest of my committee members.

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v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................ix LIST OF FIGURES..........................................................................................................xii ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................xi ii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 2 IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE LITERATURE...................................................5 Introduction................................................................................................................... 5 Immigration and the Nation State.................................................................................6 Theories Explaining Immigration Control Policy........................................................7 Society Centered Approaches..............................................................................10 State Centered Approaches..................................................................................18 National Identity a nd Nation Building................................................................24 International Relations Approach es: Liberalism a nd Its Strands........................31 3 ARGENTINE IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 1853-1994...................................................................................................................35 Introduction.................................................................................................................35 Argentine Immigration Polic ies after Independence..................................................38 “Recuperating” Tradition: the Nation alists and Patriotic Education..........................47 Immigration Policies after the 1930s: Re fugees and Neighboring Immigration........56 Immigration Policies in the Peronist Era....................................................................64 Immigration Rules of the Military Regimes after 1955..............................................70 Control of neighboring migration........................................................................70 Immigrants and Communism..............................................................................74 Democratic Governments after 1955..........................................................................78 General Overview of the Immigration Po licies of the Argentine State 1876-1994...82

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vi 4 IMMIGRATION POLICIES AFTE R THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY 1983-1989........................................................................................90 Introduction.................................................................................................................90 Democratization by Collapse: The 1983 Argentine Transition to Democracy..........92 Argentina’s Foreign-Born Population in 1980...........................................................94 Giving Immigrants a “Break”: Amnesty Decree 780/84............................................97 Did economic reason shape the pa ssage of the 1984 amnesty?..........................97 Cultural factors shaping immigration polic ies: migrants in the print press.......102 Argentina: country of emigrants?...............................................................103 Portrayal of immigrants in the print press..................................................108 War Economy: 1985 Hardening of Immigration Rules............................................113 Economic factors shaping im migration restrictions..........................................114 Only skilled workers and investors are welcome in Argentina.........................119 Cultural reasons behind immigration policie s: immigration in the print press.122 International factors shaping immi gration policies during the 1980s...............128 Conclusions...............................................................................................................133 5 IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING PRESIDENT MENEM’S ADMINISTRATION: 1989-1995............................................................................134 Introduction...............................................................................................................134 Immigration Policies in the Early 1990s..................................................................135 Immigration to Argentina 1990s.......................................................................137 Economic Factors Shaping Argentin e Immigration Policies of 1993/1993......139 Cultural factors shaping Argen tine immigration policies 1993/1993.............142 Immigration Policies in 1994....................................................................................146 Argentine economy after 1993..........................................................................148 Does the fragile economic situation e xplain immigration policy changes of 1993 and 1994?..............................................................................................150 Cultural factors in the immigr ation decisions of 1994/1994.............................151 International factors shaping argentine immigration policies during the 1990s: the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).........................................................162 Conclusions...............................................................................................................169 6 ARGENTINE CONGRESS AND I MMIGRATION POLICYMAKING...............171 Introduction...............................................................................................................171 Immigration Policymaking: Institutional Framework..............................................172 The Delegative Democracy Argument.....................................................................174 What Led to Centralization of the Decision-Making Process?................................177 Crises and cfnsensus..........................................................................................177 Institutional features..........................................................................................180 Role of the Congress in immigration policymaking..........................................183 Immigration Issues in the Argentine Congress.........................................................186 Congressional committees.................................................................................187 Types of decisions that the Congress considers................................................188

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vii Activity of the Congress Relating to Immigration Issues 1983-1995......................190 Draft bills considered 1983-1989......................................................................196 Draft bills passed 1983-1989.............................................................................198 Other draft bills considered 1983-1989.............................................................202 Draft bills considered 1989-1995......................................................................206 Draft bills passed 1989-1995.............................................................................208 Other draft bills considered 1989-1995.............................................................218 Comprehensive immigration draft bills.............................................................221 Information Requests................................................................................................226 Their objective...................................................................................................226 Number, topics, and initiation of the information requests...............................229 Content of the information requests 1983-1995................................................234 Neighboring migration...............................................................................235 Central and Eastern European migration....................................................236 ExecutiveÂ’s response to the information requests.............................................238 Conclusions...............................................................................................................242 7 RECENT IMMIGRATION POLICY CHANGES...................................................246 Introduction...............................................................................................................246 Immigration Policies during the 1990s.....................................................................247 Immigration policymaking within the Executive..............................................247 Immigration agreements with Peru and Bolivia................................................248 New Immigration Policies: December 2003.............................................................250 Is the preference for European immigr ation no longer a part of Argentine immigration policies?.....................................................................................252 LegislatorsÂ’ beliefs regarding the imp act of different immigrant groups on Argentina...............................................................................................252 LegislatorsÂ’ beliefs about the impact of the different groups of neighboring immigrants on Argentina......................................................................256 LegislatorsÂ’ Beliefs about the impact of recent immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe on Argentina................................................................257 LegislatorsÂ’ beliefs about the imp act of different immigrant groups by political party........................................................................................261 Who can apply for a work visa in Argentina?...................................................263 Factors Shaping the Enactment of the Immigration Policies of 2003......................265 Conclusions...............................................................................................................267 8 CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................268 When Economic Hardship Opened an Opportunity for Selecting Immigrants........269 Cases in Which Independently of the Economic Situation, Ethnic Preferences Prevailed..............................................................................................................271 Cases in Which International Factors Were Influential............................................272 Congress and the Executive Branch in Immigration Policy-Making.......................274

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viii APPENDIX A IMMIGRATION RULES IN ARGENTINA 1853-1999.........................................276 B REGRESSION ANALYSES....................................................................................283 C ANALYSES OF IMMIGRATION PRINT MEDIA................................................291 D SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS...........................292 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................295 General and Argentine Works..................................................................................295 Newspapers...............................................................................................................311 Laws and Other Government Decisions...................................................................311 Government Documents...........................................................................................313 Interviews.................................................................................................................322 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................324

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ix LIST OF TABLES Table page 3-1 Regression Analysis fo r Dependent Variable Immigration policies for Neighboring Immigrants*........................................................................................86 3-2 Regression Analysis fo r Dependent Variable Immigration policies for European Immigrants*.............................................................................................86 4-1 National Origin of the ForeignBorn Population in Argentina in 1980..................96 4-2 Number of International Agreemen ts signed by Argentina and Selected Countries Between 1976 and 1989.........................................................................130 6-1 Composition of the Argentine Se nate by Political Party (1983-1995)...................181 6-2 Composition of the Argentine House of Representatives by Political Party (1983-1995)............................................................................................................182 6-3 Decisions Generated by both Chambe rs of the Argentine Congress and Vocabulary used in this Chapter............................................................................190 6-4 Immigration Laws and Other Decisions Considered by the Argentine Congress 1983-1989 (Absolute Numbers and Percentages)*................................................192 6-5 Degree of Effectiveness of Each Ch amber for Passing Immigration Decisions 1983-1989 (Number of Decisions Approved as a Percentage of those Proposed..193 6-7 Degree of Effectiveness of Each Ch amber for Passing Immigration Decisions 1989-1995 (Number of Decisions Approved as a Percentage of those Proposed..194 6-8 Productivity by Political Party 19831989 (Immigration decisions Proposed by Political Party)*......................................................................................................197 6-9 Effectiveness by Political Party 1983 -1989 (Immigration Decisions Approved by Political Party)...................................................................................................197 6-10 Productivity by Political Party 19891995 (Immigration Decisions Proposed by Political Party)*.................................................................................................197 6-11 Effectiveness by Political Party 1989 -1995 (Immigration Decisions Approved by Political Party)...................................................................................................197

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x 6-12 Law Drafts Senate 1983-1989................................................................................199 6-13 Law Drafts House 1983-1989................................................................................199 6-14 Origin of Laws Considered in the Senate 1983-1989............................................200 6-15 Origin of Laws Considered in the House 1983-1989.............................................200 6-16 Permissiveness of the I mmigration Legislation 1983-1989...................................200 6-17 Law Drafts Senate 1989-1995................................................................................209 6-18 Law Drafts House 1989-1995................................................................................210 6-19 Origin of Laws Considered in the Senate 1989-1995............................................211 6-20 Origin of Laws Considered in the House 1989-1995.............................................211 6-21 Permissiveness of the Immi gration legislation 1989-1995....................................211 6-22. Comparison of the Provisions of La w 22439 (1981) with the Draft Bills by Muñoz, Macedo and Toto......................................................................................227 6-23 Information Requests – House 1983-1989.............................................................230 6-24 Information Requests – Senate 1989-1995............................................................231 6-25 Information Requests – House 1989-1995.............................................................232 6-26 Information Requests Approved – 1983-89 (Radical Administration)..................233 6-27 Information Requests Proposed but Not Approved -1983-1989 (Radical Administration)......................................................................................................233 6-28 Information Requests Approved – 1989-1995 (Peronist Administration).............234 6-29 Information Requests Proposed but not Approved – 1989-1995 (Peronist Administration)......................................................................................................234 7-1 Argentine Legislators’ Beliefs about th e Impact of Immigrants from Different Countries on Argentina..........................................................................................253 7-2 Argentine Legislators Beliefs about th e Impact of Immigrants from Different Countries on Argentina Discri minated by Political Party......................................261 A-1 Immigration Policy Legislat ion and Regulations (1853-1998)..............................276

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xi A-2 Immigration Agreements with European Countries...............................................281 A-3 Immigration Agreements with South American Countries....................................281

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xii LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 3-1 Immigration Policies for Neighbor ing and European Citizens: 1876-1994.............89 4-1 National Origin of Neighboring Immi grants in 1980 Compared to Recent Arrivals.....................................................................................................................96 4-2 Portrayal of Immigrants in Th e Press 1983-1984: A Comparison between European, Latin American and Asian....................................................................109 5-1 National Origin of Neighboring Immi grants in 1991 and New Arrivals 1992/1994...............................................................................................................139 5-2 Negative Terms Referring to Im migrants Media Coverage 1992/1994.................143 5-3 Composition of the Negative Instances 1992-1994...............................................155

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xiii Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy SELECTING IMMIGRATION IN M ODERN ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, INTERNATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS By Julia Albarracin December 2004 Chair: Philip. J. Williams Major Department: Political Science Argentina’s history has been shaped extensively by immigration. Between 1830 and 1950, Argentina received 8.2 million European immigrants; a number topped only by the number of European immigrants to the Un ited States during the same period. After the 1930s, however, immigration to Argentina became increasingly non-European. Instead, it was dominated by countries of the Southern Cone. Paradoxically, while Argentina claimed to seek western European i mmigrants to build an economically viable, “civilized” society, its practi cal policy, if not law, prove d open to a great many more local, Latin American immigrants. Using a variety of qualitative and quanti tative methods, my study considered how economic, cultural, international, and instit utional factors influence state decisions regarding the selecti on and admission of foreign citizens in modern Argentina, with a particular emphasis on the period after the r eestablishment of democracy in 1983. I argue that although economic factors are importa nt in explaining immi gration policies and

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xiv often determine how many immigrants a country is willi ng to accept, notions of ethnic and/or cultural e ligibility of certain immi grant groups for membership in the “imagined community” dictate who is admitted. In this regard, my study shows an association between the positive/negative characteristics of certain groups of immigrants and the immigration policies involving these groups. My study also analyzed international factors such as wars, external threats, or cooper ative arrangements like the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) concluding that they may have an impact on immigration policies, sometimes offsetting the force of cr ises and/or ethnic pr eferences. Finally, my study explored the role of institutional fact ors in shaping immigration decisions. In Argentina, regardless of partisanship, an in formal arrangement seems to exist between the Executive branch and the Congress that c ontroversial immigration decisions are to be made by Executive decree. When Executive centralization combines with adverse conditions, immigration decisions te nd to be highly restrictive.

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1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Every year, millions of people leave th eir countries, fleeing violence, poverty, discrimination, or repressive regimes (Weine r, 1995). In recent years, immigration has reemerged as a hot domestic issue in most We stern democracies, and a source of friction in the international arena (Meyers, 1995). Although immigration policies vary greatly, both historically and among states, most capit alist democracies have closed immigration policies (Zolberg, 1999:83). Some authors beli eve that restrictive immigration policies prevail worldwide because they constitute a sine qua non condition for the maintenance of the international state system (Petras, 1980; Wallers tein, 1974; Zolberg, 2000). It is also argued that restrictions on access to me mbership are also crucial for democratic governance, which requires at least a mini mal sense of community (Carens, 1987; Walzer, 1981). Inclusionary and democratic to the inside, nation-stat es are exclusionary and undemocratic to the outside. Thus, the re lationship between inte rnational migration and modern states is ambivalent: it is one of mutual conditioning and exclusion at the same time (Zolberg, 1978). Modern states are invested with the right of self-determination. An expression of this right is the admission or rejection of new members (Jopkke, 1999:2). In most cases, these decisions on the acceptance of foreign citizens are highly discretionary and defined in relation to specified categories of persons established on the basis of a wide array of criteria, including objective socioeconomic and cultural attributes (degree of skill, education, wealth, religion, nationality, r ace) as well as moral political disposition

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2 (judged likely or unlikely to commit crimes, or to support or oppose a regime). To understand the factors shaping state decisionmaking regardin g immigration policy, it is helpful to consider the different spheres of social interaction that a person’s admission to a country involves. According to Aristide Zolberg (1999), immigrants of any kind are first and foremost workers and, secondly, a cu ltural and political presence. Immigrants are also subjects of nation states and as su ch can be affected by the relationship between sending and receiving countries. Based on this triple character of immig rants, my study explains 150 years of Argentine immigration policy de cisions (1853-2003). I argue th at theories that do not consider the complex nature of immigran ts and immigration policies are doomed to failure. Instead, accounts of decisions regardi ng the admission of foreign citizens need to pay attention to economic, cultural, and intern ational factors. They also need to study how those factors intersect th e decision-making process. In this regard, I argue that, although economic factors are important in explaining immigration policies and often determine how many immigrants a country is willing to accept, notions of ethnic and/or cultural eligibility of certa in immigrant groups for membership in the “imagined community” ( identity politics ) dictate who is admitted. Interna tional factors may also have an impact on immigration policies, sometimes offsetting the force of crises and/or ethnic preferences. Argentina’s immigration policies show a persistent preference for European immigration. Independently of the economic situation, the Argentine government encouraged European immigration on seve ral occasions. Howeve r, after the 1950s, immigration to Argentina was mostly fr om South American countries. Although the

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3 Argentine state tolerated these immigrants a nd made spasmodic efforts to regularize their immigration status, it never encouraged the i mmigration of these citizens. In December 2002, the presidents of the MERCOSUR countri es and associates (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile) announce d that they would allow free movement of people within their borders. A year la ter, the Argentine Congress passed a new immigration bill that prioritized the migrati on from those countries. What reasons led to the enactment of new immigration policies in 2003? Given the persistent preference for European immigration that Argentina has s hown for 150 years, is the preference for South American immigration likely to last ? I explore these questions throughout this study. Finally, after identifying the main factors shaping immigration policies, it is important to understand the actu al decision-making process. Argentina has been defined as a “delegative democracy” in which the Executive governs as “it sees fit” (O’Donnell, 1994). Also, immigration policy decision-making in Argentina has become increasingly centralized on the Executive. In turn, from the re-establi shment of democracy in 1983 until 2003, the Congress was unable to agree on a new immigration law to replace the one passed during the last military dictatorship. Why was the Argentine Congress unable to pass comprehensive immigration legislat ion for 125 years? What were the policy preferences of Argentine legi slators? Would the policies of the Argentine Congress have been more permissive than those enacted by Executive decrees? Does the Congress exert real control over the Executive? My Study answered these questions. Authors have emphasized the need to pr oduce more comparative immigration work that goes beyond the North Atlantic countries (Foner et al. , 2000). Argentina constitutes a

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4 key immigration receiving country for comparison. The history of Argentina has been shaped strongly by immigration. Be tween 1830 and 1950, 8.2 million European immigrants arrived in the country and only the US received more immigrants in that period. By 1914, one third of the Argentin e population was foreign born, mostly from Italy and Spain (Rock, 1987). Also, as happe ned in the US, Canada, and Australia, immigration has strongly shaped Argentina’ s history. Second, Argentina remains a major destination of immigrants within Latin Amer ica, receiving 80% of intra-Southern Cone migrants. This country has also paralleled the industrialized countries in that immigration originates increasingly from non-European countries, mainly the Southern-Cone. Yet, with rare exceptions (Novick, 1997; Oteiza a nd Aruj 1997), almost no literature focuses on understanding the immigration po licy shifts questioned here. To clarify the focus of my study, some not es are in order. First, immigration policies encompass the regulation of outward and inward movement across state borders, and also the rules governi ng the acquisition, maintena nce, loss, or voluntary relinquishment of “membership” in all its aspects: political, so cial, economic, and cultural (Zolberg, 1999:81). Th erefore, immigration policy has two dimensions and encompasses what is called immigrant polic y and immigration cont rol policy (Zolberg, 2000; Meyers, 2000; Lee, 1999). Immigrant policy deals with the situation and rights of immigrants once they settle in a country. My study focuses on the immigration control policy, concerned with the rules and procedur es that govern the selection and admission of foreign citizens. Refugee and asylum po licies are not included in this study. In addition, my study deals with the immigra tion policies enacted, and not with their consequences or effectiveness.

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5 CHAPTER 2 IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE LITERATURE Introduction Authors refer to the last four decades of the twentieth century as a “new era of mass migration” (Foner et al. , 2000). International migr ation is inherently a political process that arises from the organization of the wo rld into categories of mutually exclusive sovereign states, commonly called the “Westphalian System”1 (Zolberg, 1999). Immigration involves the transfer of a person from the jurisdic tion of one state to that of another, and the eventuality of a change of membership in an inclusive community. The state, then, has a basic and distinctive interest in being able to control the flow of persons across its borders–in being able to compel, induce, discourage , or forbid the entry or exit of particular categories of persons (Brubaker, 1992:25). My study focuses on the immigration contro l policy, concerned with the rules and procedures that govern the selection and admissi on of foreign citizens. It draws primarily from the growing body of literature on immigr ation policy as a dependent variable and attempts to account for the reasons underlyi ng policy outputs. In th is chapter, I first address the relationship between international migration a nd the nation-state. Then, I present the different approaches proposed in the immigration liter ature to account for immigration policy– society centered, state cen tered, national identity, and international 1 Since the seventeenth century, the world has been increasingly divided spatially into nation-states where, since the nineteenth century, these separate populations have been constructed legally and ideologically by the legal categories of nationality and citizenship (Bovenkerk et al. , 1990).

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6 relations –and assess the explanatory value of these theories in general, and for the case of immigration policy in Argentina under study. Immigration and the Nation State Immigration policies vary greatly, histori cally, and among states in a given period. However, the most striking fact about immigr ation policies is that if one imagines a hypothetical continuum ranging from open to cl osed borders, most capitalist democracies are clustered narrowly around the close pole (Zolberg, 1999:83). Modern states are invested with the right of self-determination. An expression of this right is the admission, or rejection of new members (Jopkke, 1999:2). As Michael Walzer puts it, “the members of a political community have the collectiv e right to shape the resident population” (Walzer, 1983:52). In most cases, these decision s are highly discretionary and defined in relation to specified categories of persons es tablished on the basis of a wide array of criteria, including objective socioeconomic and cultural attributes (degree of skill, education, wealth, religion, nationality, r ace) as well as moral political disposition (judged likely or unlikely to commit crim es, to support or oppose a regime). Some authors believe that restrictiv e immigration regimes prevail worldwide because they constitute a sine qua non condition for the maintena nce of the international state system, as well as the privileged position of the core states amid highly unequal conditions (Petras, 1980; Wallerstein, 1974; Zolberg, 1999, 2000). It is also argued that restrictions on access to membership are crucial for democratic governance, which requires at least a minimal sense of comm unity (Carens, 1987; Walzer, 1981). Other authors, however, are more optimistic about the positive effects that diversity and

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7 difference can produce in a polity2 (Taylor, 1993; Young, 1990, 2000). Inclusionary and democratic to the inside, nation-states are ex clusionary and undemocratic to the outside. Thus, the relationship between in ternational migration and modern states is ambivalent: it is one of mutual conditioning and exclusion at the same time3 (Zolberg, 1978). Theories Explaining Immigration Control Policy To understand the factors shaping states decision-making regarding immigration policy, it is helpful to consider the different spheres of social inte raction that a personÂ’s admission to a country involves. A mentione d above, immigrants of any kind are first workers, from the perspective of the cap italist dynamics, and second, a cultural and political presence. Regarding the role of im migrants as workers, some concepts first developed by Marxists authors are widely a ccepted in immigration policy literature. For instance, most authors agree that immigrati on is a source of cheap labor that can help keep the cost of production down. Different th eories that account for immigration policy decisions center their atten tion on the way in which the ec onomic interests created around the admission of new workers shape immigration policy. This is particularly true of what I call society centered approaches. Thus, Marxism argues that immigrants constitute a reserve army of cheap labor that capitalists use according to their need s (Portes and Walt on, 1981; Petras 1981). Interest 2 According to Taylor (1993) the debate around certain kinds of issues, which establishes certain common goals despite radical disagreements about the means, can help to make the sense of a political community more vivid. 3 This ambivalence has grown and intensified over ti me. Under Mercantilism, labor scarcity has motivated absolutist states to prohibit exit whereas immigration was not an issue. Mercantilism gave way to a brief period of liberalism, in which the removal of barriers to exist coexisted with non-existent restrictions on entry. But this liberal period was short and by the 1880s, European and new settler nations in the Americas and Australia imposed restrictions on entry. This gave way to the contradictory way in which states deal today with international migration: a generalized commitment to freedom of exit combined with severe restrictions on entry (See Jopkke op cit ).

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8 group theory contends that employers and et hnic groups are the main societal actors shaping immigration policy (Hollifiel d, 1992a; Joppke, 1999; Freeman, 1995). Even authors who believe that the st ate enjoys rela tive autonomy ( state centered ) explain how, despite the pressures exerted by certain societ al groups, the state nevertheless has its own immigration agenda (Simmons and Kehoane, 1992; Calavita, 1992). These theories are developed in detail in the next section. All types of immigrants also constitute a political and cultural presence. In this respect, immigrants are capable of affecting a country’s “way of lif e,” “cohesiveness,” or “identity” (Zolberg, 1999:84). Identity is wh at I am and what I am recognized for (Connolly, 1991). An identity is socially cons tructed and established in relation to a series of differences that ha ve become socially recognized.4 According to the constructivist approach, iden tity construction is possibl e by an interaction between circumstantial or human assignment on one hand and assertion on the other (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). Construction i nvolves both the passive experi ence of being “made” by external forces,5 including not only material circumstan ces but also the claims that other persons or groups make about the group in que stion; and the active process by which the group “makes” itself6 (Ibid p.80). My study focuses on the former aspect of identity construction. In particular, it is concerned with the way that cultural conceptions of 4 According to this author, identities are partially constructed by their social environments and permeated by relationships of power. Identity requires differen ce in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty. The definition of difference is a requirement built into the logic of identity. 5 South African whites, until the last half decade or so, strongly constr ained the freedom of South African blacks to construct their own identities (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998:80). 6 For an example of how ethnic groups construct th eir own identities see Nagel’s study (1996) of the resurgence of American Indian identity and culture.

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9 national identity, engineered by a country’s elites (Lai tin, 1986), shape immigration policy. Three primary things are at issue when d ealing with identities : the boundaries that separate group members from nonmembers, the perceived position of the group within the society, and the meaning attached to the identity (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998:8183). The criteria establishe d to separate a group’s members from its nonmembers have been typified as indicators of the existen ce of a nation. Both serve to constitute an imagined community (Anderson, 1991), wher eby a specific collection of people who normally would not know each other personally nevertheless believe that they share a common identity, and therefore, a common her itage and future. Creating national identity around specific characteristics serves as an inclusionary process w ithin the nation-state (Bovenkerk et al. , 1990). It also defines by implica tion others inside and outside the nation-state. Immigrants as subjects of nation-states are thereby influenced by the certain relationships that a state establishes with its peers; notably, those relationships that encompass sending and receiving countries. Although theories of international relations hardly fully account for domestic policy de cisions, they provide a picture of the international context in which state decisions take place. Realism, for instance, concerns how actual and potential conflicts among states and diplomatic agendas shape immigration policies (Miller and Papademe triou, 1983; Weiner, 1995). Neoliberalism and globalization theory , described in detail in the next section, also address the influence of international factors on immigration policies. Whereas the former por trays an optimistic view of the world and believes in inte rnational cooperation among states—insights

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10 particularly helpful when dealing with regional integration processes—(Cornelius et al. , 1995) globalization theorists complain that states should allow the free movement of people together with that of capital (Sassen, 1996a). Society Centered Approaches I group within this label Marxist theories and interest grou p approaches to the study of immigration co ntrol policy. The Marxist approach (Beard and Beard, 1944; Bovenkerk et al ., 1990; Castles and Kosack, 1985; Go rz, 1970; Marshall, 1973; Marx, 1976) argues that economic factors and a cla ss-based political proce ss shape immigration. According to Marxist theory, society is divided into two classes: the capitalist/bourgeoisie and the proletariat/working class. An individual’s class is determined by his relationships to the mean s of production. Immigra tion is the result of the submission of the worker to the organi zation of the means of production dictated by capital, and dictated by the uneven devel opment among sectors and regions and among countries (Castells, 1975:34). Capitalists im port migrant workers to exert a downward pressure on wages. Thus, migrants constitute an industrial reserve ar my of labor (Portes and Walton ,1981; Petras, 1981). E. Meyers (2000) describes seve ral elements that characterize Marxism . First, labor immigration is a structural part of cap italism, and serves the ruling class. Second, fluctuations in the economic cycle and unemp loyment rates influence immigration in the short term. Capitalists are interested in im porting labor in periods of economic expansion and low unemployment. The interests of the different dominant classes diverge according to their need for cheap labor. For instance, capital invested industri es or landowners may be more interested in cheap illegal immigr ant labor than in monopoly capital. Third, most authors emphasize the role of the capitalist class in prom oting immigration, and some

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11 also outline the role of unions in shapi ng immigration policies (Beard and Beard, 1944). In the latter case, unions’ pre ssure tends to be directed to restricting immigration, and therefore to protecting the interest s of the national working class. According to Bovenkerk et al. (1990), the reproduction of all forms of social organization depends first on production of the means of human existence; and second on the maintenance of a mechanism to regulate scar city in relation to socially defined human needs (that is, distribution ). Relationships of production and distribution are therefore essential in all modes of production and in all social formations. Bovenkerk et al. (1990) focus on state responses to immigration in relation to the processes of distribution . Regulation of scarcity implies decisions about who are to receive or share and who are not. Their study expressed this in the twin concepts of inclusion and exclusion (1990:483). Hence, effective regulation requi res the creation of a hierarchy by which people are organized into distin ct collectivities in order to effect the uneven distribution of scarce resources. Certain characteristics are chos en to typify individuals a nd sort them in groups. In this process, some individuals are included and allocated scarce resources, whereas other individuals are excluded .7 The complex processes of class formation and reproduction in the capitalist mode of production are based on these processes of inclusion and exclusion. There are also other non mate rial dimensions by which i ndividuals are excluded. Sexual difference and gendered division of labor is one possibility. Phenotypical characteristics, often referred to as “race,” are also widely signified to exclude certain groups of people from access to wage labor positions when thes e have been scarce; and to include other 7 The creation of a hierarchy requires the related processes of signification and categorization .

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12 groups of people, when recruiti ng in situations of labor forc es. This racialization of the process of class formation gives ri se to a racialized labor market. Alejandro Portes and John Walton (1981), in Labor, Class and the International System , consider the “circulation of labor as it affects the social relationships of production and promotes internal divisions w ithin the working class” (Portes and Walton, 1981:20). They regard population flows as the aggregate of results of individual choice, making little or no reference to short or longdistance, or internal or international migration. Authors have described “push” a nd “pull’ effects wit hout attention to the process by which these phenomena are created. Portes and Walton propose, instead, to view migration as a process that unfolds ove r time, with interacti on among a variety of actors. This process is disaggr egated into four components, each of which is governed by a distinct set of factors, ge nerally related to the existi ng configuration of the world system. International migration can be seen as “a way through which the exploited contribute to ever-expanding structures of economic domi nation and, simultaneously, the form in which they react to their constrai nts” (Portes and Walton, 1981:65). International migration also shows how economic concentr ation and inequality are perpetuated by the initiative of dominant groups and their vi ctims. Although many times ruling classes have resisted the loss of labor through emigration, this resistance has diminished, because immigrants can alleviate a threatening po litical situation pr oduced by the local mobilization of labor. Illegal workers are in most cases, tolerated. The function of migrant labor has been to increase the suppl y of cheap labor. This cheapness has been

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13 partly assured by fostering conditions that make migrants particularly vulnerable. For this reason, illegal immigration is widely tolerated. Marxist theory provides se veral insightful observations about immigration. First, most authors agree that the economic effect of immigration is to exert a downward pressure on salaries. Second, and consequently, it is also wide ly accepted in the literature that the flow of immigrants fa vors capitalists, and is feared by the resident working class. Marxism also helps understand, and correctly pr edicts the short-term correlation between economic cycles and immigration policies. In particular, it explains policies as instrumental to the interests of employers in times of economic expansion. Authors argue that Marxism has been particularly helpful in explaining illegal immigration and guestworker programs. Many authors writing on im migration policy use an interest group approach, and assume that the state serves as a neutral arena for societal interests.8 Some authors drawing on this approach assume that agr eement exists within society, and that law merely reflects such agreement (Durkheim , 1951, 1956; Parsons, 1951). Other theorists believe that groups compete within the valueneutral arena of the state. Classic works (Devine, 1957; Riggs, 1950) explain immigr ation policy in terms of interest groups. Other works share this tradition (Fre eman, 1995; Hollifield, 1992a; Joppke, 1999; Zolberg, 1991). 8 Meyers (2000) groups within the domestic approaches to the study of immigration policy, interest group and partisan politics . The latter argues that party programs can constitute a source of immigration policy. Faist (1994) recounts major statements by politicia ns in Germany, whereas Freeman (1979) and LaytonHenry (1992) describe inter and intra-par tisan debates over immigration in Britain.

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14 The pluralist or interest group view of immigration polic ymaking is that a variety of groups and individuals9 compete, bargain, and mutually adjust incrementally, pursuing policy goals that they believ e are in their self-interest10 (Fitzgerald, 1996:37). The state is, in this view, a “conflict resolving syst em” and a “common benefit organization” (Fitzgerald, 1996:37). According to Keith Fitz gerald (1996), the pl uralist system of policymaking exhibits certain features. It c onceives of political pr oblems as involving primarily the allocation of goods. In this regard, the state is not autonomous but a reactive allocation device.11 Second, individual behavior, us ually economically or culturally motivated, is the major explanatory variable . Third, the relative power of groups will decide which ones get their way or have the most influence. One well-known pluralist view of policy decision making is Lindblom’s incremental decision making. In this model, the political process is a set of rules allowing a considerable number of interests to wei gh into decision-making. A change in policy results in reactions and mob ilizations by various interests. Interest groups and other partisans anticipate the positions and strate gies of others and mutually adjust their positions accordingly. Ideally, an open process th at allows a wide range of interests to be represented may approach Pareto Optimality, th at is, changes that only improve interest positions (Lindblom, 1965). Lindblom acknowledges in his later work that resources are strongly distributed in favor of the econo mically powerfully groups (Lindblom, 1977). 9 The groups most commonly associated with immigration policy are employers and ethnic groups, which tend to support immigration, and unions and nationalists groups, which tend to oppose it (Esser and Korte, 1985). 10 See, for instance, Dahl and Lindblom (1976) and Dahl (1967). 11 Despite a general tendency to see political processes as a neutral, some pluralists recognize the importance of political structures as explanations fo r political results. Studies by Lindblom (1965, 1977) are examples of this.

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15 Gary Freeman (1979) attempts to account fo r immigration policies in Great Britain and France using an interest group perspective. Central to his analysis are the historical circumstances presented to policymakers as they grapple with the domestic policy process. Freeman shows how foreign policy elites, trying to respond to commitments made during the decolonization process, sought to maintain liberal immigration policies for persons from former colonies. Party leader s on the left tried to serve their actual constituents (who became less friendly to immigrants) while maintaining their commitment to socialistically oriented ideo logies that stressed the solidarity of an international working class. In turn, conservative parties struggled w ith their own commitments to constituents (the business community and th e culturally conservative), and ideologies like liberalism. Freeman pays particular atten tion to the role of elites’ ideology in explaining policy change. He explains that the multiple commit ments made by the elites to one another and to their constituents at one time impel problems in maintaining policy legitimacy. He shows that a legitimation deficit results from the interest group style of policymaking. Policies lack authority and rationality, a nd are systematically biased toward the preferences of specific elite groups. These incoherent polic ies also lack a moral vision. A more recent contribution by the same au thor (Freeman, 1995) provides valuable insights for the study of immigration policy from an interest group perspective. His analysis focuses on the role of distinct modes of interaction between elites and the public in shaping immigration policy. Freeman a sserts that the polit ical dynamics of immigration in liberal democraci es “exhibits strong similarities that are, contrary to the scholarly consensus, broadly expansioni st and inclusive” (Freeman, 1995:881). His

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16 starting point is a model in which state act ors who make policy are “vote-maximizers” with no special views or inte rests of their own but responsive to pressures from the public. The public, in turn, is composed of “utility-maximizers,” assumed to have complete information about the cons equences of policy alternatives. Freeman argues that the public’s mode of organization varies as a function of how the costs and benefits resulting from policies are distributed. In the case of immigration, benefits are concentrated whereas the costs te nd to be diffuse. The main beneficiaries of immigration are employers (who obtain ec onomic benefits) and ethnic groups (who support the admission of their co-ethnics). The costs include increased competition for jobs among some groups of the resident population and increased demand for certain services. The general pu blic, in turn, tends to be misl ed about the long-term costs and benefits of immigration, and tends to see the latter and ignore the former. The consequence of the distribution of costs analyzed by Freeman (1995) is the production of “client” politics. Small, well-or ganized groups, intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships w ith the officials res ponsible for it. This process, however, takes place outside of public view, and with little outside interference. Consequently, policymakers are more responsiv e to their advocating clients than to the general public (opposed or ambivalent).12 How and why the public comes to hold such views, however, is not specified (Zolbe rg, 1999). As a result, Freeman argues, immigration policies tend to be more liberal than public opinion and annual intakes larger than what is politically optimal (Freeman 1995). 12 The expansive tendency of immigration policy can be reversed because of economic reasons or the tendency of migration to generate more migration through networks.

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17 Interest group theory can explain some features of immigration policy that reflect the interests of specific or ganized groups. According to Fitzgerald, for instance, interest group pluralism would account for US family reunification policy and some aspects of labor market management policy (Fitzgerald 1996). Following FreemanÂ’s insights on the costs and benefits involved in immigration policy, employers of illegal workers can be logically expected to lobby to block efforts to control unsanctione d labor migration. At different times, members of ethnic groups can mobilize to aid their compatriots. In principle, the open political process of a pluralist societ y could explain some complex immigration policies. Effective resource mobiliz ation by particular social interests should predate these policy asp ects (Fitzgerald, 1996:41). A serious limitation of the interest group approach is that th ough the distribution of costs and benefits of particular policies doe s shape political dynami cs, policy issues do not arise in a political vacuum but rather in a field struct ured by previous historical experiences, and ongoing practices about whic h this model has little to say (Zolberg, 1999). Contemporary immigration policymaki ng takes place within a context of a prevailing worldwide restrictive immigrati on regime, which has to be explicitly accounted for. It is easy, after the fact, to identify supporters for policies and attribute policy initiation to this s upport (Fitzgerald, 1996). Plura list models do not explain, however, why social resources and private mo tives may fail to achieve policies sought by organized groups. These models underestimate th e full significance of political interests, political structures, and politic al power. The state is not the neutral arbitrator that this model claim.

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18 Interest group theory also tends to downplay the weight of identity, and culture in immigration policy. Brubaker argues that the “constrained discourse” regarding ethnicity and race is not a constant feature of li beral democracy, and cannot be accounted by Freeman’s “political economy” model (Br ubaker, 1995). Brubaker suggests that the analysis must make room for a “cultural-poli tical” story that is not logically independent from political economy. Domestic closure agai nst non-citizens does not always rest on material reasons alone. It is also based on an understanding of modern states as bounded nation-states, which treat members and non-me mbers differently. These states seek to express the will and further th e interests of distinctive and bounded nations, and their legitimacy depends on doing so (Brubaker, 1992:28). State Centered Approaches Theorists of the “ bringing the state back in ” approach tell us that the state enjoys a considerable amount of autonomy in maki ng its decisions (Calavita, 1992; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Fitzgerald, 1996).13 Relative to the interest group approach, this model places the emphasis on do mestic politics, but it does not sustain the neutrality of the state. Many studies follow this approach (Calavita, 1992; Fitzgerald, 1996; Simmons and Keohane, 1992), and focus on the role of the state in shaping immigration policy. Within this trend, the pure institutionalist approach argues that political institutions can be autonomous: th ey can form public policy according to the interests of the state and re main unaffected by interest groups. Other scholars believe 13 This strand within political science took its name from the edited volume Bringing the State Back in, edited by Evans, Rueschem eyer and Skocpol (1985). The “bringing the state back” in approach had the valuable purpose of bringing the state to the center of political analysis. This group of scholars perceived that pluralism and Marxism were not giving enough credit to the autonomy of the state.

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19 that the state promotes certain societal inte rests. Theories also differ with respect to whether the state is monolithic, or the various bureaucratic agencies pursue their own agendas in what is known as the bureaucratic model. Reg Whitaker in Double Standard (1987) traces immigrati on and refugee policy in Canada from 1945 onwards. He views the state as nearly autonomous . The title of the book refers to the different standards dominati ng Canadian Ministry of Interior for the admission of foreigners. These standards va ried from extreme vigilance over the admission of immigrants with sympathies toward post-War Communist regimes to temporizing attitudes toward t hose with Nazi or Fascist sy mpathies. Whitaker describes how “the policies and practices of immigration security have been deliberately concealed from the Canadian public, the press, member s of Parliament, and even bureaucrats” (Whitaker, 1987:4). In cooperation with the US, Canada diligently screened left-wing visitors and barred union leaders or others su spicious of being sympathetic to Communist interests. Whitaker succeeds in demonstrating that the domination of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police over the immigration department led to administrative restrictions upon citizens and applicants who had been aff iliated with the Communists (Whitaker 1987). Canadian discriminatory practices only ab ated when public opin ion in the seventies demanded explanation about ideological accusati ons used to discriminate against foreign citizens. Although the 1976 Immigration Act di stanced itself from the overt security domination characteristic of the previous policy, it still reserved wide discretionary powers for the Executive to decide over ad missions. Whitaker observes that by the time he was writing the book in 1987, that “double sta ndards” were still visible in Canadian

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20 immigration policy. As an example of this, th e author explains that two thirds of the refugees admitted through Canada’s category of “Designated Class” had come from Communist regimes. Keith Fitzgerald’s The Face of the Nation (1996) develops a theory of “improvisational institutionalism” intended to account for American immigration policy. The author argues that most empirical theories that guide research i gnore the role of the state in the policy process and conseque ntly yield a distorted and incomplete understanding of this country ’s immigration policy. His wo rk is founded on the division of immigration policy into three segmen ts dealing with front-door immigration (permanent residency), backdoor immigration (unsanctioned migrant laborers across the US border with Mexico), and refugee polic y. Fitzgerald argues that these segments display different policy dynamics, and that e ach of them can be accounted for by one of the major contending theories of policymaking. The development of these three segments is integral to the transformation of immigration policy from being decentra lized, and dominated by state and local governments to a national policy dominated by th e state. Fitzgerald explains that each segment has an identifiable policy network that includes a distinct set of actors who use a particular rhetoric to advance their goals. This study also contends that each policy network has remained uninvolved with the other networks although each group’s efforts may affect the interests of th e other two. The existence of th ree distinct policy networks pursuing diverse objectives leads to the conclu sion that immigration policy is disjointed and contradictory.

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21 Fitzgerald argues that once the state b ecame institutionalized as an actor in immigration policy in the 1920s, it pursue d its own interests both by developing a specific policy segment to serve its distinc tive needs (refugee policy) and by influencing the design of front-door and back-door policies to ensure that these two were compatible with its interests. The author concludes that improvisational institutionalism explains how the state has become the dominant actor in immigration policy and shows that state interests link all three segments and bring c oherence to an otherwis e contradictory policy. Therefore, the study succeeds in showing that th e state, or specific sectors within it, have a policy role that is indepe ndent of societal actors. Kitty Calavita (1980, 1992) is another scholar that has sustained that the state has certain degree of autonomy when deciding on immigration policy.14 The author borrows from the state centered scholars who insist that the state has its interests and periodically enjoys autonomy. Her interpretation of US immigration policymaking and the contradictions driving it dr aws on a dialectical-structura l model of law and state (Chambliss, 1980). This dialectical model posits that the political economy of a capitalist democracy contains contradicti ons, and that the law often represents the state’s attempt to grapple with, or reconcile the conflicts deri ved from those contradi ctions. The different resolutions that the state gives to these c onflicts many times lead to further conflicts. The main contradictions dr iving immigration policy ar e clearly developed in a contribution to an edited volume by this auth or (Calavita, 1998). In this study, Calavita identifies a number of tensions or “pai red oppositions” that ch aracterize immigration policy (Calavita 1998:92). First, there is an opposition between employers’ and workers’ 14 Calavita first introduced her theoretical approach in her doctoral dissertation (Calavita 1980).

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22 interests on the issue of immigration, making a “national economic in terest difficult to identify” (Ibid.). Second, the structure and composition of labor force needs are economic in nature, but they have profound political implications. The author explains that a tension often exists between the real needs of the economic structure at a given time, and the political ability or willi ngness to recognize those need s (Calavita 1998:93). Finally, Calavita argues that the liberal principles on which liberal democracies are grounded are sometimes at odds with the policy functions n ecessary to control im migration. The author believes that the state resolves these cont radictions, sometimes creating new ones. In turn, Calavita sees the state as fragme nted across institutional lines. The state not only faces contradictions from outside but also from within its own structure. As Calavita puts it, [T]he picture that emerges from my rese arch is of structural contradictions penetrating the institutions a nd bureaucracies of the stat e in different ways, posing different dilemmas, and eliciting differe nt responses dependi ng on the location of those institutions in the stat e apparatus” (Calavita, 1992:9). Calavita follows Evans et al. (1985:320) in that we n eed to probe the internal complexities of state structures while, at th e same time, avoid treat ing the state agencies “as disconnected collections of competing agencies”. These two points of view have to complement research. In Inside the State (1992), Calavita explains the activiti es of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) vis-à-vis th e Bracero Program, and related immigration policies. In addition to recognizi ng that the state has interests, the author believes that we need to consider that individua ls within agencies shape agen cy behavior. In contrast to other immigration specialists who argue that the INS has been the handmaiden of agricultural interests, Calavita explains the INS bureaucratic behavior as a function of its

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23 own bureaucratic interests. She argues th at the INS was capable of substantially independent action, often taking the lead in policy formation and aggressively persuading growers to cooperate. Calavita (1992) also ex plains that the INS occasionally ignored the demands of growers when those demands jeopardized this agency’s priorities. The authors writing within the “ state back in ” approach have the advantage of putting the state at the center of immigration policy analysis. The picture portrayed by the researchers reviewed above gives an idea of how intricate the policy decision-making process regarding immigration policy is. Unlike interest group theories, statist approaches leave room for poli tics, and culture. In this rega rd, Calavita’s development of the contradictions or “paired oppositions ” involved in immigration policy is a good starting point for analyz ing the state’s involvement in im migration policy. Understanding that immigrants constitute not only economic agents but also a political, and cultural presence; capable of shaping, or altering the identity of a na tion, is crucial for understanding immigration polic y. The cultural aspects of immi gration and the role of national identity in shaping migrant policy are furthere d developed in the next section. I believe both theories are more helpful when complemented with each other. Recent statist research provides detailed acc ounts of the processe s leading to major legislation. However, this research has not b een transformed into a systematic theoretical analysis of both the external pressures impinging on the stat e, and the internal dynamics of the legislative and administ rative bodies. In defense of the theorists of the role of the state in immigration policy, it shou ld be said that theorizing a bout the role of the state has proven a problematic task in political science in general. First, the notion of state has been problematic. The concept prop osed by the new statist approach, autonomy of the

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24 state , has not clarified the natu re of the state. Moreover, by exaggerating the split between the state and society (Jessop, 1990; Migdal, 1997; Mi tchel, 1991) state approaches have reified the state as an omni-powerful independent entity. I contend that a relational understanding of the multiple connections between state and society, which make them almost indisti nguishable from one another, can enrich a state perspective (Jessop, 1990; Laitin, 1986; Migdal, 1988; Mitchell, 1991; Scott, 1998). The challenge is to provide a theory that is, at the same time, rich and as systematic as possible. Second, an approach to study the ro le of the state also needs to address its double nature: structural and discursive (Jessop, 1990). Modern states are somehow paradoxical. For one thing, the growth in the nu mber of state institutions and power make them more independent from society. For a nother, there are many subsystems of power that penetrate society. This engenders a para dox in which modern societies reveal both a growing independence and a growing interdepen dence among their parts. For this reason, it is not enough to look at state structures. We also need to analyze state projects, political practices and discourses through which state’s interests are articulated. National Identity and Nation Building The scholarship on national identity and nation building implies that ideas of nation shape immigration policy (Bruba ker, 1992; Grimson 1999; Higham, 1955). Meyers (2000:1251) defines the “ national identity approach” as a group of theories that argue the unique history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality and the debates derived from them, and br oader social conflicts shape immigration policy. Ideas of nation and how the boundaries of the “imagined community” are drawn tell us about who is welcome and who is not in the polity. Thus, the figure of “alien” provides a differential signifier (Behdad, 1997) through which the nation both defines

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25 itself as an imagined community (Anderson, 1991), and draws the juridical boundaries of the legal community or the nation-state. These polar forces of identification and regulation solidify an ambivalent form of national consciousness that bridges the split between the nation and the state with its cy clical history of to leration and exclusion (Behdad, 1997). This cultural dimension of na tions is generally engineered by dominant elites through the st ate (Laitin, 1986:174). The national identity approach, when combined with materialist perspectives, provides a more compelling explanation of immigration policies. Higham in Strangers in the Land (1955) analyzes the histor y of American anti-immigra nt spirit and shows how it evolved its own distinct pa tterns. He defines nativism as, “intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign connections” (Higham 1955:4). The author identifies America’s three nativist respons es as Anti-Catholicism, racism, and antiradicalism. This study traces the history, causes and impact of all three of these reactions. Interestingly, the author believes that pr ejudice and nativism do not necessarily go hand in hand. He explains that nativism does not come from external forces or from new peoples, but from internal problems that s eem to threaten the well being of a nation. Higham thus shows that when the nati on was in an optimistic mood and the economy was strong, prejudice agai nst foreigners may have ar isen but not nativism. In these cases, there was no fear that Amer ica’s greatness would be somehow undermined. However, nativist anxiety arose during periods of depressions or ot her external threats that could cause a loss of faith in the pro cess of assimilation. Nativism, however, does not remain unchallenged. The continuous need for cheap labor, the liber al ideals, and the confidence of a country about being able to assimilate foreigners work against it.

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26 According to Higham, history moves in cycles and each outbreak of nativism leaves its mark. National identity theories explain variations on immigration policy according to the different conceptions of citizenship. Every modern state formally defines the set of persons that are members and residually designates “aliens” (Brubaker, 1992:21). According to T. H. Marshall (1992), citizenship is a status expressing capacity to be a full member of a community. Citizenship entails a bundle of rights as well as obligations. Territorial closure against non-c itizens serves vital a nd tangible state interests and it is essential to the modern territorial state a nd state-system. Domestic closure against noncitizens also rests on the idea that nation stat es are not only territori al states but also nation-states. The idea of nation as an imagined community implies a sense commonality with a group of people that I do not know face to face (Anders on, 1991). The exclusion of outsiders reinforces the sense of commonality and it is indispensable for the survival of the imagined community.15 Faced with mounting public pressure to control immigration and a material impossibility of regulating the forces of the global economy, politicians in many countries have turned increasingly to sy mbolic policy instrume nts to create the appearance of control (Massey, 1999; Calavita , 1992). Peter A ndreas (2000) tells us that 15 Meyers (2000) mentions three typical distinctions th at are made between countrie s, which partly overlap: 1) between settler societies and ethnic states; 2) betw een homogeneous and heterogeneous countries; and 3) between countries whose citizenship laws tend toward s jus sanguinis—citizenship by parentage—and those that tend to jus soli —citizen ship by place of birth. The first dis tinction illustrates the better disposition of settler societies—built by immigrants—to receive immigr ants on a permanent basi s. In contrast, ethnic states, typically European, se e ethnic diversity as a threat to the national unity. The second distinction, in a similar way, assumes that ethnically homogeneous c ountries are less likely to accept ethnically dissimilar permanent immigration than heterogeneous ones. Finally, the third distinction refers to the rules governing citizenship and is related to the other two. Thus, settler countries tend to adopt the principle of jus soli whereas ethnic ones tend to adopt the principle of jus sanguinis.

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27 it is wrong to assume that there was ever a tim e when states could perfectly control their borders. Evidence from Argentina, presented in the graph below, shows that since the Second World War there has been a signifi cant gap between what has been called “wanted” and “unwanted” immigration (Jopkke, 1999). Immigra tion policies have, therefore, acquired strong symbolic meani ngs: they reinforce territorial identities, symbolize and project an image of a state project, and relegitimize the boundaries of the imagined community (Andreas, 1999). Restrict ions on immigration may not be effective but they can still serve important political purposes. They can give the impression that state officials take care of problems associat ed by public opinion with immigration, such as unemployment, health risks, and crime. The conceptions of national identity lying behind immigration policies are disclosed through a state’s discourses. Seve ral works have analyzed public and media discourses with regard to immigration or et hnic minorities (Erjavec, 2001; Gotsbachner, 2001; Mehan, 1997; Motzafi-Hall er, 1998; Santa Ana, 1999; Schneider, 1998). Language is an active political force composed of prac tices, which systematically form the objects for which they speak (Foucault, 1972:49). Meaning develops th rough the strategic application of discursive prac tices and strategies. Additionally, I contend that there is a relationship between the media and nation building. Benedict Anderson posits that nations are imagined because, although fello w citizens do not know each face-to-face, an image of their communion lives in each one ’s mind. Newspapers are a “one-day best seller,” which have a crucial role in the construction of the “imagined community” that allow an extraordinary mass ceremony to take place (Anderson 1991:35). The ceremony consists in the almost simultaneous consum ption of the newspaper every morning or

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28 evening. Although this ceremony is performed in privacy, each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is bei ng replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others (Ibid). Otto Santa Ana (1999) analyzes the meta phors and metonyms used to characterize immigrants by supporters and opponents of Ca lifornia’s Proposition 187 directed to persuade the electorate to vote according to each other’s position. Proposition 187, an anti-immigrant referendum favorably voted, in tended to deprive immigr ants of a range of public benefits in California. The author c oncludes that the dominating metaphors used to portray immigrants were racist, and helped to construc t racism in society by portraying immigrants as undesirable, inferior beings. According to Santa Ana (1999), metaphors are ways of using the conceptual structures of the familiar to make sens e of a target domain. Metaphors in public discourses permit the creation of common ground by appeal to shared cultural frames. An example of a metaphor used to describe illeg al immigrants in the US public discourse is that of animals, for instance “ agents must quit the chase” (Ibid. p.200). Metonyms are part-to-whole relationships in which the immi grants stand as a part to the nation as a whole. These metonyms are linked as parts of two metaphors that are normally used to characterize the nation. First, in the metaphor of the nation as a body, immigrants can appear as a burden on the body or a diseas e afflicting the body. The second metaphor commonly used is the nation as a house. In this metaphor, immigrants can be characterized as dirt to be swept out. Many metaphors regarding immigrants express a threat to the nation in different ways.

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29 Hugh Mehan (1997)16 developed a different study al so dealing with the debates around Proposition 187. This author analyzes the discourses that fabricated immigrants as the enemy. He contends that the state, in an alliance with business and other elite interests, encourages citizen s to treat the immigrant a nd other excluded members of society as the enemy. This author believes that an understandi ng of the discursive practices of prejudice and discrimination helps us understa nd the structures of inequality in a society. He believes that the modes of representation are not only descriptive but also constitutive of the group being represented. The illegal alien designation, for instance, invokes the representa tion of people that are outside of society. The illegal alien designation, according to the author, invokes im ages of foreign, repulsive, threatening, even extra-terrestrial beings (Mehan, 1997:258). The illegal allien denomination is reinforced by the SOS metaphor implied in the title of the proposition, “Save Our State” (M ehan 1997:258). According to the author, it is not uncommon that immigrants be repres ented “as the enemy.” In this situation, undocumented workers are blamed for the ec onomic and social problems facing the people of a certain region or country. In many cases, discourses serve the purpose of distracting public opin ion from the activities of the gove rnment. Additionally, the use of indexical expressions such as “we” and “here” helps to create a shared sense of community, whereas the use of indexical wo rds such as “us” and “them” can be instrumental to exclude or insult (Meha n, 1997:259). These expressions were used to 16 The argument of the author does not really relate to how immigration policy is shaped. However, his disquisitions about the use of discourses practices against immigrants are of interest for this study. Mehan (1997) believes that after the end of the Cold War, th e search for enemies in the US has turned inward. The State, in an alliance with other powerful groups in soci ety, is encouraging to treat the immigrant, the poor and the unfortunate, as th e enemy (Mehan, 1997:250)

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30 alert the public to the dangers that the so ciety as a whole would face from undocumented immigrants. The national identity approach contributes to our understanding of immigration policies in several ways. First, it explores th e traditions and cultural idioms that “frame and shape judgments of what is political ly imperative” (Meyers, 2000:1255). State policies are not constructed in a vacuum, but influenced by the history and traditional ways of thinking of a society. Authors writi ng within this tradition shed light on how the boundaries between members and non-members are drawn in the national community and how these boundaries shape immigration po licy. Some authors also investigate how these processes of inclusion a nd exclusion are accentuated in periods when the national unity is considered to be at stake. Other studies reviewed in this section illustrate an often disregarded aspect of state action: its discursive practices. Through discour ses, the state contributes to shaping the imagined national community and defini ng the boundaries between members and nonmembers. A way of representing a group does not simply reflect its characteristics. Each mode of representation has the capacity of constituting the groups being represented. Language constitutes objects (Foucault, 1972: 49). One may argue that immigration policies are not always as effective as expected, and may sometimes fail to stop nonmembers from entering the country. Neverthe less, the existence of these discourses proves that immigration policies can have an important symbolic meaning in society, and are capable of uniting th e resident population.

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31 International Relations Approache s: Liberalism and Its Strands17 International relations theories can aid our understa nding of immigration policies. In this regard, they can complement the domestic politics approaches reviewed above. Liberalism holds an optimistic view of the international system and maintains that international economic interdependence, tr ansnational interac tions, international institutions, and the spread of democracy can jointly lead to cooperation and peace among states. In contrast to realism,18 liberalism assumes that non-state actors, such as international organizations and multinational corporations, are important in international relations. This approach also contends th at economic and social issues are no less important than military ones (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987). Some strands within liberalism have less influence in immigration polic y (Meyers, 2000). But others, remarkably, neoliberal institutionalism and globalization theory , shed light on immigration policymaking. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that supranati onal organizations and international regimes help overcome d ilemmas of common interest and common aversions, and facilitate co llaboration and coordination between countries (Meyers, 2000). Several authors (Cornelius et al. , 1994; Hollifield, 1992b; Keohane, 1985; Krasner, 1983; Zolberg, 1991) examine the applicability of neoliberal institutionalism to immigration. They conclude that internationa l regimes usually have had little impact on immigration policies. The authors writing from this perspective believ e that the receiving countries do not need to cooperate interna tionally, due to the hi gh political costs of 17 Realism is another approach that has been applied to immigration policy. Probably the most prominent approach to the study of international relations, r ealism focuses on actual and potential conflicts among states and emphasizes issues of security and strategy. 18 See previous note.

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32 immigration, the difficulty of distributing its benefits, and the almost unlimited supply of labor (Cornelius et al. , 1994; Hollifield, 1992b). This is reversed, however, in cases where special integration agre ements among countries exist. This theory may shed light on immigration policies within regional proce sses of integration like the European Union (EU) and MERCOSUR. Cornelius et al. argue that there is a convergen ce between advanced industrialized countries on such issues as the policy inst ruments chosen to control immigration, the efficacy of these instruments, the policy inst ruments chose to integrate immigrants, and public opinion (Haus, 1996). The second main argument of the book, of less interest for this study, is that there is a growing gap between national immigration policy goals and outcomes. The book is divided in three sections , focusing in turn on “traditional countries of immigration” (United States and Canada), on “reluctant countri es of immigration” (France, Germany, Belgium, and Britain), and on “latecomers to immigration” (Italy, Spain and Japan). Particularly interesti ng is the observati on that many Western industrialized democracies are grudgingly comi ng to recognize that effective control of immigration requires a rollback of civil a nd human rights for non-citizens (Cornelius et al. 1994:10) During the past decade, some authors within globalization theory have argued that globalization is challenging the stability and territoriality of the state, as well as its capacity to control its economic, and we lfare policies (Sassen, 1996a, 1996b; Soysal, 1994). Overall, authors posit that economic globalization is ca using a loss of sovereignty on the part of the state. Sassen (1996a) believ es that the nature of nation-states, based on territoriality, may have been transformed. This author ar gues that a combination of

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33 pressures—including the emergence of de facto regimes on human rights and the circulation of capital, as well as ethnic lobbies, European Union institutions, and unintended consequences of immigration pol icies, among others—have restricted the sovereignty of the state and reduced it s autonomy where immigration policy is concerned. Sassen analyzes both citizenship and im migration control policy (Sassen, 1996b). With respect to the latter she points out the difficulty of maintaining a double standard: a liberal one for trade and goods, and a restric tive one for immigrants. Sassen argues that states must reconcile the conflicting requi rements of border-free economies and border controls to keep immigrants out (Sasse n, 1996b:87). She also acknowledges the limited influence of globalization on immigration polic y. Generally, the inte rnational systems of labor circulation have been uncoupled from any notion of migration. Only the EU has formalized a regime that combines the free mobility of trade, capital and labor. In general, Sassen states, there is a consensus in the international community with regard to the sovereign right of the state to co ntrol its borders (Sassen 1996b:86-88). Neoliberal institutionalism has gained applicability in immigration policy with the removal of obstacles to the free movement of people within the EU, and the increased cooperation among its member states w ith regard to immigration policy. Globalization theory, in turn , contributes more to our understandi ng of the causes of international migration than to explaining immigration policies (see, for inst ance, Sassen, 1999). Its more compelling examples of how globalization influences immigration policy (the EU that enables the free movement of people and the impact of human rights on refugee

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34 policy) partly overlap with neoliberal institutionalism. Globalization theory has also been criticized for neglecting political vari ables in its analysis (Meyers, 2000).

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35 CHAPTER 3 ARGENTINE IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 18531994 Introduction This chapter explores the reasons that led to the enactment of Argentine immigration policies between 1853 and 1994. It shows that economic explanations need to be complemented with cultural ones when accounting for immigration decisions. For instance, economic factors such as labor sc arcity or unemployment may influence the number of immigrants that the country is willing to accept. However, identity politics accounts for the cases in which immigration policies prioritize certain group/s of immigrants. Namely, ideas about what groups of immigrants can constitute “ideal citizens” and are therefore “appropriate” for membership in the community can influence the immigration policies for these groups . As I show throughout this study, the conceptions of ideal citizen were rede fined over time. Nonetheless, Argentine immigration policies showed a recurrent pr eference for European immigration. Right after independence from Spain and until the 1930s, the immigration policies of the Argentine State strongly encouraged im migration. Several factors influenced this decision. For one, the liberal elit es wanted to incorporate Arge ntina into the world market as an agricultural exporter and needed agri cultural laborers for this purpose. Additionally, the immigration of Northern Europeans was supposed to have an important cultural (beneficial) impact on the Argentine so ciety. Reflecting these concerns, the 1853 Argentine Constitution was in principle open to immigration in general. However, the

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36 government was only authorized to promote immigration from European countries. The immigration policies that followed the constitution established immigration recruiting offices in Europe, and subsidized transpor tation and land. Immigrants from other Latin American countries that did not qualify as immigrants could take advantage of the lax naturalization rules. At the turn of the century, the ideas about who constituted an ideal citizen changed. The elites felt threatened because immigrants were acquiring positions of influence in the rigid post-colonial society, we re not adopting Argentine ci tizenship, and were joining unions, organizing strikes and causing civi l unrest. Without seriously restricting immigration, the government enacted importa nt deportation provisi ons to prevent the arrival and stay of potential troublemakers. Later on, a natio nalist ideology emerged that exalted Spanish language and culture as desira ble values to unite the national community. However, although these ideas had an impact on education and the establishment of mandatory military service, they did not immediately impact the rules for admission of foreign citizens. The great depression put an end to th e era of mass migration and liberal immigration policies. Most states during this period restricted immigration to preserve jobs for natives. Additionally, they selected groups of immigrants that could be easily assimilated into the different national comm unities. Argentina during this period enacted several immigration restrictions which mainly hurt Jewish and Spanish refugees trying to flee their countries. However, the Argentin e government used economic rationales to justify immigration decisions. Immigrati on from neighboring countries also became significant during the 1930s and the government enacted the fi rst norms to regulate this

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37 migration. However, the government only allowed these immigrants to apply for temporary visas and tolerated their economic role first in the regional agricultural economies and later in the i ndustrialization process. During the Peronist administration (19461955), immigration policies occupied an important place. The governmentÂ’s emphasis on industrialization generated a need for growing numbers of workers. Despite the ec onomic role attributed to immigrants, the government did not promote the immigration fr om different groups evenly. The Peronist administration signed immigration agreemen ts with Italy and Spain. Although the migration of citizens from bor dering countries was facilita ted through amnesty decrees, it was not encouraged through special agreemen ts. Other ethnic pref erences were also reflected in the Peronist immigr ation policies. As in the ea rlier period, the immigration of Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe was disc ouraged by different means. In contrast, the country received refuges that had formerly co llaborated with the Nazis in different parts of Europe. The immigration policies of the several m ilitary governments that followed the fall of Peron in 1955 had several features in co mmon. The military showed a strong interest in immigration policies and pa ssed several immigration rules and regulations. All of them showed a preference for European immigra tion and strong concern with strictly regulating the immigration from neighboring countries. In this regard, they enacted strict requirements for the admission of nei ghboring immigrants, accompanied by broad deportation provisions, and fine s to repress immigration offe nses. Ideological preferences complemented ethnic ones. The different military regimes shared a strong interest in the Cold War fight against communism and their i mmigration policies reflected this concern.

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38 Finally, the democratic governments af ter 1955 had contradictory immigration policies. For one thing, all of them passed am nesties to regularize the immigration status of immigrants from Southern Cone countri es. However, they did not pass permanent immigration rules to solve the situation of these immigrants in a more definitive way. Furthermore, after 1983, immigrants from La tin America were subjected to strict requirements in order to apply for a work visa in Argentina. Additionally, most governments had more open immigration policie s for Europeans than for citizens from Latin America. In this regard, several ad ministrations signed agreements or passed special rules to favor the immigration of Eur opean citizens. In what follows, I analyze the different factors shaping the Argentine immigration policies outlined above. Argentine Immigration Policies after Independence After independence, Argentineans sought to create a modern state. Still, the elites perceived that Argentina had neither a defined territory nor sufficient population. For one thing, Spanish-Americans were at war with the indigenous peoples in several areas.1 For another, several border disputes followed th e consolidation of the different nation-states in the Southern Cone. Even more importa ntly, the population of Argentina was also small. In Juan Bautista Alberdi’s words, with its scarce population “Argentina has only the ‘name’ and the ‘territory’” (Alberdi, 1966: 118). Estimates based on rudimentary data from the period situate th e population of the Argentin e territory roughly above 400,000 1 The effort to take up the North, inhabited by the Toba, Mataco and Mocobí concluded in 1911. With the euphemism “Conquest of the Desert,” which ended in 1883, the government appropriated all of the territories south of Buenos Aires. In this way, the government added new land to the Argentine territory. Also, authors like Sarmiento who blamed the nomadic Indians for the “barbarism” of the country substantiated the cause. However, some groups of Indians who lived in the center and West region of the country were not nomad as portrayed. Instead, the in creased pressure by Spaniards as well as this latter group’s demand for cattle and horses pushed the indigenous population to herd animals over large extensions of land. Nevertheless, the construction of the natives as nomadic and backward justified their massacre.

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39 people (Stahringer de Caramuti, 1975:14). Two years after independence, the Argentine (Río de La Plata) government devised the fi rst immigration policies. Despite the limited success of these policie s, the population in the 1840s was estimated at 1,000,000 (Lattes, 1973:65) and in less than thirty years th is number almost doubled (Solberg, 1970:14). The Census of 1869 revealed that 13% of th e population of the country was foreign born. Other countries in the Americas were enga ged in similar enterprises. Immigrants contributed to the expansion of agriculture and industrialization in the United States. South American countries were quick to re verse the restrictive colonial immigration policies after independence and enacted legisla tion authorizing immigr ants to settle and acquire property (Morner, 1985:20). During an impasse in the confrontation be tween Buenos Aires and the interior, the confederation passed a liberal constituti on in 1853. Eventually, the country would achieve peace ten years later. The 1853 Constitution established a representative and federal republic, not unlike th at of the United States. Equa lly important, it reflected a strong concern for populating the country. The preamble of this constitution invites all the good-willed citizens of the worl d to immigrate to Argentina if they wish. In its Bill of Rights, it consecrates civil ri ghts for all inhabitants and not just for citizens. However, another clause states the “F ederal government will encourage European immigration” (article 25). An interpretation of the consti tutional clauses in combination with the preamble leads to the conclusion that all migrants are welcome if the country is in need of their particular profession, i ndustry, or art. Moreover, state policies should always attend the economic needs of the c ountry. In turn, Europeans w ould be always welcome by virtue of their origin (Romagnolli, 1991:4) . The Supreme Court had at times followed

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40 this interpretation.2 However, in most cases, it has sustained broad sovereign power over the head of the Federal Government to restrict the entry of foreigners.3 As stated above, the constitution’s genero sity toward immigration is partly explained by the desperate need for populat ion. But the inflow of immigration was expected to have an important cultural im pact as well. Often, immigration policies are related to ideas of nation in that they mark off the desirable members of the legal community. Authors commonly refer to two types of national community: the Western or associational model or a Non-Western , ethnic one (Smith, 1991:11). The first model envisions the nation as an asso ciation of human beings livi ng in a common territory under the same government and laws. This was the ex ample that the United States used, since, as Michael Banton (1998:28) puts it, “[for] what was to bind t ogether the members of this new nation and distinguish them from the British, with whom they shared language, religion, culture and physical a ppearances?” The membership in this type of nation tends to be formal and newcomers can be incorporated. The Non-Western model, commonly associated with Germany, emphasizes a co mmunity of birth an d a native culture. A nation in this view is primarily a community of common descent a nd it is conceived in organicist4 terms. One is either born inside the co mmunity or outside of it. Immigrants, in principle, do not have a place in this t ype of community. Although these models in 2 In “Los Deportados del Chaco de la Armada Naci onal contra Estado Nacional,” the Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (May 6 1932, in Fallos 164:344) stated this doctrine. 3 See, “Vivir en Perpetuo Sitio, El Derecho, 183-1070. 4 It has been shown, however, that romantic, orga nicist authors like Herder did not create xenophobic conceptions of national identity. His ideas accepted that foreign influences could be positively channeled through assimilation into the community.

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41 practice rarely exist in their pure forms, they nevert heless provide a good starting point for analysis. From an examination of the 1853 constitutio nal clauses in the light of these two models, in principle, this legal framework seems to propose an associational type of community. However, the fact that th e government only encourages European immigration casts doubt in this regard. Why did the Founding Fa thers of Argentina prefer European immigration? What role does ‘des cent’ play in the new Argentine community? To answer to these questions, I now turn to the ideologues that were most influential during this period, namely, Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. These writers believed that European agricu ltural workers were necessary for Argentina to integrate into the world market as an agricultural exporter. A dditionally, there were strong cultural motives to promote European immigration. According to Jeane Delaney (1997) both Sarmiento and Albe rdi come closer to the Western model in that they privilege a political community above an ethnic one . Still, in my view, while in the case of Alderdi this might be true, Sarmiento is more skeptical of the capacity of the mixedrace population to “improve.” Both Sarmiento and Alberdi, at least in their initial works, are inspired by romantic (scientific) historicis m (Sorensen, 1996: 44).5 Both authors still shared the enlightenment postulates of Rousseau and Montesquieu. Noneth eless, they were skeptical that abstract solutions, which did not attend to hist ory, could work. “Human knowledge and consciousness had to account for ethnic , religious, and communal – in a word particularistic – features of human experience” (Adelm an, 1999:169). Sarmiento and 5 This author also rightly acknowledges that Sarmiento does not follow this group’s attachment to objectivity, but rather his work occupies a middle space between history and fiction.

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42 Alberdi were concerned with e xplaining the failure of Argent ina to consolidate after the 1810 Revolution and they searched for the answ er in history. But unlike the European romantics, who appealed to an intrinsic and embedded volksgeist for nation-building, the Argentine Romantics put law at the serv ice of constructing the state (Adelman, 1991:188/190). If the nation is an associational community, then anyone can be a member. As we will see in the paragraphs belo w, this is more the case for Alberdi than for Sarmiento. Born in a traditional family in Tucumán in the 1810s, Alberdi moved to Buenos Aires to study law. Later, he became a student of comparative law and provided the blueprint for the 1853 Constitution. Alberdi argued that the post-revolutionary civil war had been caused by the failure of the liberal elites to understand the Spanish America’s character and culture. Tr ue to his romantic tradition, he thought that the confrontation between Federals and Unitarios , or better, a synthesis of the two, should provide the bases for the organization of Argentina. Apparently, the constitution was to reflect the volksgeist but he was the one in charge of spelling it out. The synthesis he devised was a moderate federalism. Unlike Sarm iento, Alberdi thought Rosas, a Federal , had contributed to this synthesi s by centralizing power in hi s hands. Moreover, Rosas had made the masses more obedient with his iron rule. The solution was to formalize what Rosas was doing in practice (Adelman, 1999:182). His constitutional draft also included a pr ogressive bill of rights, mainly designed to attract European immigrat ion. In his view, the native population was not ready for self-rule. He therefore coined the famous phrase “to govern is to populate,” to express the view that immigration should be the main instrument for the transformation of Argentina.

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43 He thought education should play a major ro le but it was not enough. Even if one makes the “gaucho, the cholo, fundamental shar e of our popular masses, go through the transformation of the best e ducation system; not even in a hundred years you’ll get an English worker” (Ibid.: Chapter XV). The main pedagogic force for Alberdi was immigration itself. Europeans, who have modern work and consumption habits,6 will educate the rest of the population with th eir example. In clea r adherence to the Western model of nation, Alberd i also thought that la patria was not the territory but “freedom, wealth, order, and organized civilization on the native soil” (Alberdi, 1966:75). Within this view, the Argentine gauchos and indigenous population could be part of the imagined community, who through mestizaje7 could be trained in progress and freedom.8 One of Alberdi’s main rivals, Sarmiento, was also from the interior of Argentina, namely the province of San Juan. His early writings also partly9 adhered to historicism. In his book Facundo (1845), Sarmiento developed the first “cathedral” of the Argentine culture by setting out the terms of the debate through his “c ivilization or Barbarism” dilemma (Sorensen, 1996:13). In this book, he shows how environmental influences shape the national character. 10 The vast extension of the Argentine territories and the 6 Alberdi showed a clear preference for Anglo-Saxon immigration, for he thought Spaniards were not capable of forming a republic. See Alberdi, Bases , Buenos Aires, W. M. Jackson Inc, 1906, p. 226. 7 I use mestizaje as does L. Martínez-Echazábal, “ Mestizaje and the Discourse of National-Cultural Identity in Latin America, 1845-1959” (1998, Latin American Perspectives, 100, 25, 21-42) to refer to a process that does not necessarily mean miscegenation. Mestizaje can encompass intermarriage but it more importantly includes cultural fertilization between different groups. 8 Op. Cit ., p. 223. 9 I say partly because his work does not build on a strong concern with historical objectivity and his political positions, highly biased against Federales , are clear throughout his early work. 10 This view comes with the Rousseaunian idea th at men are naturally good, and therefore can be “civilized” under another regime. On this regard, see Banton 1998, pages 23 and ff.

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44 dangers facing the population in the rura l areas, Sarmiento thought, produced the barbarism of gauchos and caudillos (Sarmiento, 1988:75-85). To be sure, the Spanish colonial system made considerable dama ge as well. But equally important was indigenous barbarism . He thought that the gaucho, for instance, had all the faculties of the body but none of intelligence (Sarmiento, 1959:315). Even worse than the gaucho were the caudillos, which had, according to him, brought the country to ruins.11 The adverse environmental influences on the native population could be outweighed in part, through edu cation. Nevertheless, at times Sarmiento seems to give up on the local people. For instance, reflec ting on the population of Latin America he wonders in 1849, “ [h]ow many years, if not cen turies, will it take to lift up those degraded spirits to the level of cultivated men?”12 Furthermore, in the 1880s Sarmientos’ s lack of confidence in the local population deepens and extends to encompass Southern Europeans. Inspired by Darwinian evolutionism he attributes the United States’ success to the Anglo-Saxon racial composition of its population (Sarmiento, 1883). These contradictions make one believe that his political idea of nation was, from the start, biased against the capability of the local residents to accomplish real progress. To be sure, there were other ideas ab out nation available in Argentina. The Federales in the interior did not share the st andard knowledge that the Hispanic background and the racially mixed population we re the main problems in Argentina. As mentioned above, however, they did believe th ey could benefit from immigration. Some 11 Attacking caudillos Juan Manuel de Rosas and Facundo Quiroga constituted part of Samiento’s political agenda. Additionally, he was probably postulating himself for the national presidency, which he occupied between 1868-1874. 12 Samriento (1959), Volume II, P. 199.

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45 Argentine intellectuals later became increasingly concerned with the status of the native population, in particular, after immigration grew after 1880s. 13 While several writings criticized immigrants in general, the attacks on Jewish immigrants were particularly cruel (Castro, 1995).14 Still, the liberal blueprint prevailed. The Argentine State thus devoted muscular efforts to innumerable modernization and nation-building enterprises. For one thi ng, it worked to attract agricultural workers from Europe to populate the country. The Congress passed the Avellaneda Law in 1876, after a long debate that divided the su pporters of spontane ous and artificial immigration.15 The second position prevailed and st ate endeavors to populate Argentina included immigration offices in Europe, subsidized passages16 and land,17 temporary lodging, and free transport inland from port of arrival. According to this law, any immigrant that could prove his aptitude to develop an industry , art or useful occupation , could enjoy those advantages in the terri tory of Argentina. Between 1870 and 1914, 5.9 13 Joaquín V. González, intellectual, educator, and politician, criticized the “revolutio n of progress” because it was distancing Argentina from the glorious times during the 1880s. He found the source of tradition in rural life and thought the gaucho was the genuine fruit of tradition, synthesis of the Spaniards and the indigenous people. Also José Hernández defended the culture and cause of the gaucho in his Martin Fierro published in 1872. However, these views did not become popular until several years later, when the nationalists took a similar strand and recuperated some of this works. 14 The most renown work against Jewish immigrants is Julián Martel’s La Bolsa, in which the author attempted to blame Jewish financiers and businessmen for the Argentine crisis of 1890. Nonetheless, the government made explicit attempts to bring Jewish immigration during the 1880s. 15 Donald Castro explains in his dissertation The Development of Argentine Immigration Policy, 1890-1914 (1970) that the interior elites supported artificial i mmigration as a means of attracting agricultural workers to the interior with the incentive of acquiring subs idized land. The cattle elite of Buenos Aires, less interested in sharing their long acquired large estate s, preferred spontaneous immigration as a source of cheap labor. 16 Authors debate the extent to which the government made broad use of subsidized passages. For instance, Castro op. cit . pp.83 and ff., shows that the Congress outvote d the necessary funds for the passages, which were only established in the late 1880s and for a short period of time. 17 The land promised to immigrants was not always available. As agricultural exports expanded and land prices hiked, immigrants could not acquire land.

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46 million migrants arrived in Argentina, and more than half of them settled permanently in the country (Rock, 1987:141). The National Censuses of 1895 and 1914 show that population rose from 3 million to 7.8 million (Ibibd.:165). Between 1904 and 1914, immigrant arrivals averaged more than 100,000 a year. To be sure, the great numbers of northern European immigrants that Sarmient o and Alberdi dreamed of never arrived in the country. Most migrants were Italian, fo llowed by Spaniards, and by French, Russian and Turks. By 1914, around one third of the population of the country was foreign born, and in Buenos Aires that number climbed to 50% (Ibid.). What happened to the associational model of nation that would welcome “the good-willed citizens of the world”? The Ave llaneda Law considered as immigrant only transatlantic migrants who arrive on “ships,” whic h, at the time, only communicated with Europe. Additionally, the immigration offices we re established in European countries and nowhere else. Does this mean that immigran ts from neighboring countries, for instance, could not settle in Argentina? Many authors assume this is true (Pereyra, 2001; Novick, 1997) but I believe one needs to look at the citizenship requirements to find the answer. The reform of 1860 included in the constitutional text the requirements for the acquisition of citizenship. Anyone who had been residi ng in the country for two consecutive years could acquire Argentine citizenship (Article 25). Thus, even if an immigrant from Bolivia, China, or Africa could not qualify as immigrant , he/she could nevertheless apply for citizenship. Furthermore, Law 346, which regulated citizenship in 1869, included a special provision for the citizens of the former Rio de La Plata viceroyalty. According to this, any person who was born in Bolivia, Ur uguay, and Paraguay before the country’s independence could almost automatically become citizen. In 1895, there were some

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47 120,000 residents from the Americas who would not have qualified as immigrants for the Avellaneda Law (INDEC, 1999:11). By 1914 th at number almost doubled. The Argentine Constitution was so receptive of immigration that it created one of modern Argentina’s paradoxes: many times, it is easier to become a citizen than it is to become a resident .18 “Recuperating” Tradition: the Nati onalists and Patriotic Education Although the Avellaneda law was itself enacted during an economic crisis, Argentina soon faced a spectacular boom (Rock, 1987:157). Exports grew exponentially and this country became the third world exporter of grain (R apoport, 2002:74). The country during these years changed dramatical ly, and a wide middle class and an urban proletariat emerged. The plan to increase agri cultural production wa s successful. By the 1880s, Argentina had a mode rn, though exclusionary,19 and prosperous state. Despite the economic success, some unforeseen consequences arose. Several factors contributed to the emergence of nationalist ideology wh ich questioned the European immigration blueprint. An incipient commercial and indus trial capitalism, controlled by foreigners, challenged the dominance of the landowning elite s. Increased labor violence and activism were not related by the elites to those pro cesses of social and economic change. Instead, the ruling class blamed immigrants for these difficulties. Nevertheless, due to the strong dependence of the Argentine economy on fore ign labor, immigration policies remained mainly unchanged. Some legislation was pa ssed that banned certain ideologies and certain classes of people. 18 The constitutional provisions we are referring to ar e still in place and so is Law 346. Even when Decree 3213/84 established that the two years’ residence in th e country can be proved by a certificate issued by the immigration office, in other words, a lawful residence, it left the door opened to provide other evidence. Nevertheless, the courts have played a role in restricting the constitutional rights to migrants that have lawfully entered the country. See chapter 6. 19 The government approved universal male suffrage in 1912.

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48 The first waves of immigrants went pre dominantly to the rural areas and in 1914 immigrants represented 57% of people engaged in primary sector activities20 (Germani, 1966:170). But after the 1890s, a considerable por tion of migrants settled in cities. The population of the countryside was limited by tw o main factors: the traditional distribution of land ownership ( latifundia )21 and the methods that the su ccessive governments used to subdivide and allocate land22. As a result, only 8% of immigrants were landowners by 1895 and this number only increased by two percent by 1914 (Rock, 1987:140). The landowning elites were therefor e successful in increasing th eir profits by controlling the land and exporting grain and meat. However, they had no control over the development of an urban industrial sector, which could ch allenge the agricultural development model. The two-strata system of th e mid-nineteenth century was replaced by a much more complex one. Faced with the difficulties in acquiring land, immigrants moved to cities and took jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Also the middle sectors, now dominated by immigrants, expanded enorm ously. In 1895, migrants owned 80% of the industrial and commercial establishments (Germani, 1966:170). Many members of the ascending industrialist class were from poor, immigrant backgrounds (Bertoni, 2001:24). On the other hand, with the rise of industr ialism, not everyone wa s progressing at the same pace in Argentina. Sixty percent of immigrants and a large portion of the native 20 This number includes land and cattle-breeding opera tions owners, renters, administrators, and laborers. 21 In the Buenos Aires region, where land had been mostly devoted to cattle breeding and raising, landowners needed big parcels to make their enterprises profitable. As the nineteenth century progressed, ArgentinaÂ’s pastoral economy became more complex and labor intensive. Cattle breeding and the beef export industry required large numbers of laborers to erect fences and to plant alfalfa. Ranchers then welcomed immigrants but were still unwilling to share their land with them. 22 Only in the provinces of the Northeast did coloni zation succeed. In the rest of the country, it was not successful. The process of land allocation was ca rried out through the intervention of commercial companies and individuals, more interested in speculative activities than in settling immigrants on the land. This new entrepreneurial class became a strong pressure group in the successive years.

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49 population lived in poverty23 and were subjected to exploi tative working conditions. The urban proletariat, vulnerable to the cycl es of the economy that heavily depended on foreign investment and imports, became gr adually more active and organized. And, as Solberg (1970:233) puts it, Eager to explain the sudden growth of so cial maladies, widespread labor violence and anarchism the elites ne glected the importance of the deep social and economic forces at work and instead focused their attention on one of the agents of change, the immigrant. It is important to mention that a similar process occurred in the United States. Calavita observes that the ruling elites in this country also ignored the economic causes of labor unrest and focused on “undesirable” fore ign elements (Calavita, 1980:292and ff.). The predominant labor unions in early1900s Argentina professed socialist and anarchist ideologies.24 Although in 1895 and 1896 they organized roughly less than twenty strikes, the number of participants wa s increasing. At first Ar gentine legislators, fascinated with the success of the agricultural model, were reluctant to pass restrictive immigration policies. But when a strike in 1902 threatened to produce serious losses in grain for export, both chambers of the Congress approved the Residence Law (Law 4144). This norm allowed the Executive to expel any foreigners whose conduct was compromising public order and to prevent th e entry of those that because of their ideologies were likely to become troublemak ers. As in the United States (Calavita, 23 The average family of five people lived in a single room. Additionally, 73% of the inmates in the Buenos Aires beggars asylum were foreigners (See Rock, Argentina, 1987, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 94 and ff.). As in the cas e of labor unrest, the Argentine elites and intellectuals tried to account for beggary and poverty in terms of the individual, r acial, characteristics of the immigrant population. In this regard see Scarzanella, Ni gringos, Quilmes, Argentina, Universidad de Quilmes, 1999, pp. 24 and ff. 24 Skilled workers entered reformist socialist sindicates and unskilled proletariat jo ined the anarchist ones. The anarchist unions, more engaged in direct action, soon became highly visibl e through the organization of strikes.

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50 1980:294), this law in Argentina was probabl y “a qualified action” on the part of the state, which allowed the immigrant stream to continue by attempting to “filter” the undesirable elements. However, the Residence Law was rarely enforced25 and it did not decrease immigration to Argentina (Novic k, 1992:51). This law did not weaken labor unrest either, which peaked in 1910 and 1919.26 Other immigration measures adopted duri ng this period followed a similar logic. As poverty and crime27 became more pervasive the Argentines elites also blamed immigration. Ignoring the social roots of th ese problems, they focused on restricting paupers, people likely to become a public burd en or with a criminal record from applying for residency. This was done in Argentina th rough the enactment of two decrees in 1916 and 192328 (Stahringer de Caramuti, 1974:92). Seve ral other countries enacted similar immigration restrictions. Likely led by the United States, between 1906 and 1921, Brazil and Canada also adopted measures to prevent the migration of criminals, paupers, and the diseased (Timmer and Williamson, 1996: XIX.). 25 Until 1958 when the law was finally amended, only 383 people were deported. 26 For one thing, a band of vigilantes attacked socialist and anarchist unions, killing several people. Also, the 1919 strikes were repressed with the help of the ar med forces. The use of the military was not probably a smart choice. This increased the belief of the armed for ces that they are the guardi ans of internal security and that democratic governments’ weakness jus tifies their intervention in domestic politics. 27 Indeed, the field of criminology was developed after the 1880s in Argentina to explain immigrants’ rising crime. For more information, see Rosa del Olmo’s “Argentina and the Development of Criminology,” Social Justice, 26, 2 (Summer 1999) or Eugenia Scarzanella Ni gringos, Buenos Aires, Fondo de la Cultura Económica, 200. 28 The enactment of these decrees initiates a tradition of enacting immigration policies through decree. In 1923, for instance the Executive first submitted a law for Congress consideration. When this law was not enacted, the Executive made us e of a decree to pass this regulation, which contradicted the text of the Avellaneda Law that it was supposed to regulate. This institutional future of Argentine immigration laws is developed in chapter 6.

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51 Other preoccupations of the elites were apparently more cultural. Alberdi had provided a political definition of nation as a group of citizens liv ing in the territory of Argentina. However, since immigrants we re not becoming citizens “Argentina was a nation without citizens.”29 How could the Argentine nation become cohesive if populated by a mass of un-naturalized foreigners? By 1914, even after the establishment of universal male suffrage in 1912, roughly 2% of male foreigners had naturalized (Solberg, 1970:42). The reasons explaining th e lack of nationalization of immigrants also illustrate the motives why the Argentine ruling class felt threatened. For one thing, immigrants wanted to keep their home nationalities so that they could seek their home government protection if needed.30 And if, as Bauer puts it, to ca st-off foreign domination was the driving source of nationalism (Bauer, 1996: 72), impeding foreign intervention in domestic politics was not a less imperative reason. The other reason that probably lessened the naturalization of foreigners wa s the establishment of mandatory military conscription in 1901. Both strategic and cultura l reasons motivated th is novelty. First, Argentina had several border disputes with its neighbors.31 It then became crucial to have modern armed forces. By avoiding this serv ice to the nation immigrants were also avoiding a great deal of patriotic indoctrination. 29 Un pais sin ciudadanos is the title of a book published by Lucio Mansilla in Paris, in 1907 by Garnier. 30 For instance, the British government intervened activ ely to investigate the “Massacre of the Pampas,” when some sixty-one foreigners (Spanish, Italians, Fren ch and British) were killed by a band of armed men. For more details, see Lynch, Massacre , Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1998. Another example was the threat to send troupes to Uruguay in 1882 when the police tortured some Italian immigrants. For more details see Bertoni op cit. p. 25 and ff. Finally, in 1888 Arge ntina almost faced an international conflict with Italy over the administration of the Italian schools in Buenos Aires. 31 In the 1880s, for instance, Argentina almost went to war with Chile.

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52 It is often asserted that nationalism helps fill a vacuum in the liberal state (Breuilly, 1996:165). The hypothetical vacuum that nationalism fills is the gap left by the separation of state and society. Until the seventeenth century, the concept of politics was linked to both state and society and was counterposed to the oikos or private household (Jessop, 1990:350). It was only in the seventeenth century that politics was first linked to the idea of an abstract sovereign state , distinct from other parts of society (church, economy, civil associations). As the modern stat e intervened more and more in the affairs of its subjects it paradoxically appeared to be more detached from them (Breuilly, 1994:82). At the same time, states seek to abolish the distinction through the use of nationalism (Migdal, 2001:258). They therefore seek obedi ence and conformity through the use of nationalism, by merging persona l identities with th e collective selfconsciousness of the nation. In this way, states make their nationals perceive their wellbeing and the well-being of the state as one and the same. The state at the turn of the twentieth century in Argentina had little influence over civil society. Public education is crucial for modern stat es. For one thing, Ernest Gellner believes that it serves the purpose of spreading standardized high cu ltures to prepare people to survive under conditions in which the divisi on of labor and social mobility are highly advanced (Gellner, 1996:109). Nationalist educat ion also serves the purpose of shifting peopleÂ’s loyalty towards the na tion, and dissipating class iden tification or allegiance to other social or political un its. Schools transmit traditions and history. They form the future citizens and they promote patriotism in them. Immigrant schools in Argentina imparted education in foreign languages and emphasized patriotic allegiance to the European countries to which they belonge d. In 1882, the Argentine State established

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53 mandatory and secular education in La w 1420. The government shaped education curricula to include Argentine history a nd geography and after 1908 it gave impulse to the so-called “Patriotic Education” 1 908 (Escudé, 1992:191). The official education programs established during this period rema ined unchanged until 1939. As I show in the next paragraphs, this state nationalism recei ved important intellectual contributions by the nationalist movement that was developing at the time. The nationalist movement appeared at a moment in which division and specialization of labor were being transformed under developi ng capitalism, and fostered an idealized return to the pa st (Sorensen, 1996:147). It therefore began as a critique of positivism and a reaction to the concepts of “progress,” “materialism,” and “cosmopolitanism” it represented (Rock, 1993: 37). The model of nation of this generation came closer to the ethnic model described above. Na tionalists searched for ways to “Argentinize” the immigrant mass and they thought cultural nationalism could foster the amalgamation of the popul ation through its adherence to the national culture and values . These intellectuals also shared with Rodó and his Arielismo the cry against the growing Northern imperialism and for a re turn to spiritual values. Nationalists drew on diverse sources, including Nietzschean th inking, German nationalism, conservative Catholics, and the Spanish Generation of 1898 became more influential on this movement before 1914, and Maurras and other Fr ench thinkers did so in the 1920s. Later on, nationalists read classics like Plato and Thucydides (Rock, 1993:5). David Rock in his book Authoritarian Argentina (1993) tries to spell out the main features of Argentine nationalism with some success. I believe that beyond the common concerns of this generation described a bove, it is helpful to contrast the main

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54 representatives of this sc hool of thought, namely Manuel Galvéz, Leopoldo Lugones and Ricardo Rojas to avoid blurring major differences between them. First, it is dangerous to assume that nationalism in Argentina during th e first decades of the twentieth century is synonymous with Catholicism, Hispanophilia, an d authoritarianism. As I explain in the paragraphs below, out of the three aut hors under analysis here, only Galvéz, who successively supported all the governments that came to power between the 1920s and 1950s (democratic or not), praised the coloni al legacy and Catholicism. Lugones, who started as a socialist, became supportive of the military coup of 1930. Nonetheless, both he and Rojas despised Catholicism and the colonial heritage. A dditionally, Rojas was liberal and democratic, not distant from the legacy of Sarmiento. Manuel Galvéz, born in a traditional family in the Province of Santa Fe, wrote his book El Diario de Gabriel Quiroga in 1910 “to let people know the truth about Argentina” (Galvéz, 2001:80). He thought that to progress, Argentina needed to become a community of tradition and ideals (Ibid.:104). The Argent ine provinces, free from the influx of intense immigration, represented the Spanish tradition. Instead, immigrant Buenos Aires lacked personality and embodied materialistic values and superficiality. Argentina’s success of depended not so much on returning to the Spanish matrix as on incorporating new elements to this nucleu s (Devoto, 2002:49). In the words of Galvéz, Argentines had to produce the miracle of ma king Buenos Aires come to the provinces and the provinces come to Buenos Aire s (Galvéz, 2001:150). Buenos Aires had to contribute with its work ethics, hygiene, ra ilroads and schools. In turn, the provinces could restore patriotism, and create hope and noble aspirations. Galvéz showed some strong prejudices that seem an obstacle for an inclusive nation. In pa rticular, he believed

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55 the only religion compatible with the “Argentin e spirit” was Catholicism. More broadly, he advocated the expulsion of all followers of foreign religions and in ternationalist social doctrines (Ibid.:96). Both Rojas and Lugones were deeply invol ved in the design of education policies for the national government an made important contributions to the “P atriotic Education,” mainly by developing education strategies, curri cula and syllabi, a nd even writing history books. Lugones is probably one of the most c ontroversial writers of his generation. Born in Córdoba, he joined the socialist pa rty during his youth (Canedo, 1974:23). Maybe because of his early socialism, he was one of the few in his generation to oppose the Residence Law. He worked several years fo r the Department of Education. In this position, he advocated that educ ation should have a major role in the Argentinization of immigrants, by teaching them national valu es and native culture. In his first book La Guera Gaucha he exalted the role of caudillos in the wars of independence (Lugones, 1974) . Later on, in 1916, he thought the common gaucho embodied the spirit of the nation. He advocated that the book Martin Fierro,32 written by José Hernandez in 1872, should occupy the place of honor as the gauchesco founding book. Rojas was born in Santiago del Estero. While working for the Department of Education, he made a trip to Europe in or der to study the nationa list education of the European countries in order to make recommendations on how to produce a local nationalist education. With th e material collected during this trip, he wrote the book La Restauración Nacionalista in 1909. In this book he criticized cosmopolitanism and religiosity in Argentine private schools, and denounced them as both “immoral” and 32 This book, written in the form of a poem but in criollo language, criticizes the abandonment suffered by the gaucho in the initiation of the era of mass migration.

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56 “anti-Argentine” (Rojas, 1971:124). Although this critique applied to public schools in general, his privileged examples were the Jewish schools. Lugones thought history should have a central role in the education of Argentine children. Although he disliked the Federales and was ambiguous about the Indians, he nevertheless advocated that historically, Argentina was destined to become a crisol de razas. His crisol should take form as a fusion of all “races” that popul ated Argentina around the spirit of the independence revolution. These na tional identity ideas did no t have a short-term impact of the admission of foreign citizens. None theless, they soon spread beyond nationalist group, and many liberals came to share them during the 1920s and 1930s. Immigration Policies after the 1930s: Re fugees and Neighboring Immigration The economic development of Arge ntina between the 1880s and 1914 was unprecedented. By 1914, per capita income of Ar gentina equaled that of Germany, and was the output of Spain, Italy, Sweden a nd Switzerland (Rock, 1987: 172). The labor for the construction of this new economy came mainly from the Mediterranean but the capital was British (Ibid.:144). This model of dependent capitalism relied strongly on world export markets and foreign investment. Fo r that reason, it was highly sensitive to international economic cycles. For instance, Argentina faced economic crises in 1870s, 1890s, 1899, 1906, and 1914-18. Why, then, didn’t these economic downt urns lead to restrictive immigration policies? One possible explanation may be that immigration itself was sensitive to economic conditions (Mígue z, 2003:XV). As immigration movements diminished in adverse macroeconomic scenarios, maybe policy restrictions became unnecessary. Another plausible explanation is that landowni ng elites, which dominated the government until 1916, still benefited from attracting more immigrants despite the poor economics. However, the government reve rsed the generous immigration policies

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57 after the 1930s. On this occasion, economic reasons combined with cultural ones to shape the new immigration decisions. The great depr ession provided a justif ication to restrict immigration. In turn, an increased preoccupa tion with the assimilation of immigrants shaped immigration policie sÂ’ ethnic preferences. Immigration never reached its pre-First War peak of more than 100,000 a year. During the 1920s, 878,000 migrants entered th e country. As mentioned above, most immigrants came from Italy during the 19th century. As post-independence resentment towards Spain decreased, this group became more important and comprised 68% of immigration to Argentina for the deca de 1911-20 (Rapoport, 2001:144). Lower birth rates in Europe, a higher quali ty of life due to state interventionist policies, and emigration restrictions passed in Germany, It aly and Russia, influenced the migration pattern during this period (Stahringe r de Caramuti, 1974:91). During the 1920s, immigration became increasingly non-Latin. In the decade 1920-1930, arrivals from Poland occupied the third place, after Span iards and Italians. In 1928, they comprised 52% of total immigration to Argentin a (Senkman, 1991:191). Out of the 56 million Europeans that emigrated between 1820 a nd 1932, most came to the Americas. Almost 60% of them settled in the United States, 12% in Argentina, 9% in Canada, and 8% moved to Brazil. The Great Depression interrupted the era of mass migration in 1929. Most countries by the 1930s had abandoned thei r liberal immigration policie s. Two main reasons lay behind the new immigration policy trends. Fi rst, rising unemployment rates provided an economic rationale for immigration restric tions. However, not all immigration was equally restricted. An increased preoccupa tion with the assimilation of immigrants

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58 coupled with the perceived threat by the pot ential massive arriva l of refugees from Europe led to the enactment of several ethnic preferences in the Americas (Mármora, 1988:380). The United States led this restrictive wave when it first established the literacy test in 1917, and passed the first nationality quotas in 1921. Bolivia prohibited the entry of Chinese, Jewish, gypsies and bl acks, without special intervention of the highest authorities at the Interior Ministry (Senkm an, 1991:122). The 1936 General Population Law in Mexico conditioned the admi ssion of foreign citizens to the “national interest and their racial and cultural compatibility w ith the existing population” (Mármora, 1988:381). Canada, in turn, establis hed a literacy test in 1917, banned Chinese immigration in 1923, and seriously restrict ed all European immigration in 1930 (Timmer and Williamson, 1996:XVI). In December of 1930 the Argentine State passe d a decree that established a type of head tax for immigrants that were not co ming to work the land (Rapoport, 2001:271). In October of 1932, Argentine officials in tended to deport some 4,300 unemployed immigrants, who were living in improvised shantytowns in Buenos Aires (La Prensa, 10/27/1932). Almost forty percent of these unemployed were Polish, followed by Spaniards, Italians, Russians, Bulgarians, a nd Ukrainians. Likely, additional impetus to further restrict immigration came from countrywide unemployment numbers. A census conducted in 1932 showed that Argentina had almost 334,000 unemployed, twenty five percent of which were in Buenos Aires (La Prensa, 10/28/1932). Later, the Executive passed another decree, which required all prospe ctive immigrants to have a job offer or somebody who could support them to apply fo r residency in Argentina. Although further ethnic preferences were not pa ssed in Argentina during this time, most intellectuals

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59 agreed that immigrants should be selected according to their ca pacity to assimilate to the Argentine society. While some spoke of en couraging rural immigration from a broad range of European countries others believe d that most desirable immigration had to proceed from Latin Europe. These positions were clearly stated during the First Population Conference held in Buenos Aire s in October of 1940 (Museo Social, 1941). Immigration to Argentina dur ing this period had two ma jor novelties: first, the arrival of refugees fleeing Nazism (and to a lesser degree Fascism) and FrancoÂ’s regime in Spain, and second, the mounting numb ers of neighboring migrants. Jewish immigration was not a new phenomenon. Larg e numbers of Jewish immigrants had already arrived in the count ry by the 1930s. In the 1880s, President Roca sought to encourage the migration of Russian Jews (Castro, 1995:2-4). But at the turn of the century, Jewish immigrants became progressively associated with labor activism. Moreover, a wave of strong anti-Semitism fo llowed the 1919 strikes. In this occasion, a group of vigilantes attacked leftist unions Â’ members and offices. Among those attacked, there was an important number of Ru ssian Jews (Rock, 1987:202). Anti-Semitic discourses many times engender a paradox. They simultaneously or successively portray Jews as potential revolutionaries and exploita tive capitalists. The nationalist groups in Argentina strongly attacked Jewish immigrants on both grounds and equally despised the Spanish communist Republicans w ho lost against Franco in 1939. Anti-Semitism became a German state policy in 1933 (Wasserstein, 1999:4). Following the capture of power by the Nazis the half million German Jews were subjected to a series of le gal enactments that excluded them from civic and economic

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60 life.33 By 1939, Jewish emigration from the Reich had become a major European “problem.”34 Of the emigrants, about 57,000 went to the U.S.A, 53,000 to Palestine, and between 60,000 and 70,000 to Britain. Before the outbreak of the war refugees in important numbers went to Brazil, Argentin a and Canada. Nonetheless, some countries, notably Argentina and the United States, impos ed several bureaucratic obstacles to the arrival of Jews.35 In 1938, following the occupation of Au stria by Hitler’s troops, President Roosevelt called an international Confer ence to face the problems provoked by war refugees. Thirty-two nations sent representa tives to this meeting. According to William R. Perl (1995:79), the United St ates decided “to get out in fr ont and attempt to guide their pressure [internal groups pressuring for libera lized immigration policies], primarily with a view towards forestalling efforts to have the immigration laws liberalized.” At the conference, the United States representative st ated that something had to be done for the victims of the Nazi hatred and terror (La Prensa, 07/08/1938). However, right after this comment he added that the United States govern ment was not willing to change its quota law. The Argentine delegation, in turn, attempted to show that Argentina had proportionally received more Jewish refuges than any other country (La Prensa, 07/08/1938). Argentine Foreign Mi nister Le Bretton, after explaining that the need for 33 Jews were barred from employments, and later the Nuremberg laws prohibited intermarriage between “non-Aryan” “Aryan” Germans. Later Jewish property was confiscated and the community’s newspapers closed. 34 A total of 360,000 to 370,000 Jews left the borders of the expanded Reich between 1933 and 1939, which represented one third of the Jews who lived in the area (Wassestein 1999:6 and ff.). 35 In this regard, see on Argentina L. Senkman, Argentina, la Segunda Guerra Mundial, (Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1991) and on the US R. Breitman and A. M. Kraut, American Refugee Policy (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 1987).

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61 industrial labor was already covered, declar ed that the country was willing to receive agricultural workers. I already mentioned that Argentines had a major preoccupation with the assimilation of immigrants during this period. In this regard, the Foreign Minister Le Bretton explained that Argentina did not welcome “migrants who were planning to remain attached to their countries of or igin” (La Prensa, 07/09/1938). In 1938, rumors spread that Central European refugees were illegally entering Argentina from neighboring countries. Most news papers, including La Nación and La Prensa, which had remained loyal to the slogan “to govern is to populate” until then, raised their voices against immigration. In 1938, a decree establis hed that only agricultural workers could enter the country (Rapoport, 2001:271). It is important to mention that most potential refugees during this decade came from ur ban areas and did not therefore qualify as agricultural workers. In addition, Minister of Foreign Affairs Cantilo claimed that the refugees were not truly immigrants (Sen kman, 1991:158). Since these persons were fleeing political persecutions, this state offi cial reasoned, their deci sion to emigrate was not freely decided. According to this state offi cial, immigrants of this type would have been unwilling to assimilate into Argentin e society. Despite the several obstacles to immigration, some 22,500 Jewish refugees and 13,000 Spanish ones entered the country during this period. At the same time, the Spanish civil war was producing the largest emigration in Spanish history (Rubio, 2003). The Justo gove rnment was supportive of quasi-Fascist Franco and provided help to several of his followers during the firs t years of the civil war. However, when Franco’s troops marche d into Barcelona in 1939, increased numbers

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62 of republicans attempted to flee the country (Schwarzstein, 1997:425 and ff.). Following the conclusion of hostilities, governmental fo rces engaged in a wave of arrests and subjected detainees to systematic torture (Bunk, 2002:69). Between 15,000 and 30,000 people were incarcerated. The leaders of the re volution were tried a nd executed (Ibid.). The Argentine government believed Republican refugees were an “ideological threat.”36 According to Mario Rapoport, the Argentine government was more hostile to communist refugees than to Jewish ones (Rapoport, 2001:271). However, as I show in the next paragraph, common objections agai nst both groups of refugees were raised in the late 1930s. At least two other changes were taki ng place in Argentina that relate to immigration. For one thing, certain regiona l economies had been attracting South American immigrants for some years. In the Argentine Northwest, in particular in the provinces of Tucumán, Salta and Jujuy, sugar mills and tobacco plantations constituted the main economic activities until the 1980s. In this area, Bolivians were the most numerous manual workers engaged in thes e activities (Villar, 1984:453). Paraguayan labor had an early insertion in the forestry industries of th e Argentine Northeast. Later on, after the 1920s, Paraguayans also progressive ly found jobs in the production of cotton, yerba mate, and finally tea. Chilean immigra tion was at first directed to the economic activities developed in the Patagonia region; namely, hortic ulture, fruit-growing, wine production and related services. Later, Chilean workers also participat ed in the extraction of coal and oil, construc tion, as well as cattle-raising. 36 Ministerio de Agricultura, Memoria 1936, vol III, P. 471, cited in Schawrzstein (1997, note 12).

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63 As I mentioned above, the Avellaneda Law did not consider immigrants from South America. Despite this, these migrants managed to settle in Argentina. The 1869 Census showed the presence of some 43,000 bordering foreigners. By 1947, that number ascended to 330,000. To put it in perspective, while in 1914 migrants from the region represented almost 9% of the foreign popul ation, in 1960 they comprised 18% of the foreign population. For one thing, they may ha ve taken advantage of the naturalization provisions. For another, the entire administrative apparatu s of the Argentine State was devoted to attract and contro l European immigrants and immigration from neighboring countries was superficially controlled. For instance, during many years, migrants from neighboring countries were recrui ted at the border by contract ors. The migration officials at the border would sometimes limit themselv es to count the number of workers who were entering the country with each cont ractor (Villar, 1984:456) . After the job was done, migrants would leave the country in a similar way. Only in 1934, did the Argentine State make the first attempt to officially regulate neighboring migration. Decree 34111/34 established that fo reigners could enter the country as “tourists,” “seasonal workers” and “in transit passenge rs” (Villar, 1984:456). To become a seasonal worker it was necessa ry to apply for a visa in the Argentine consulate at the foreigner’s home country. For this reason, while contractors had the resources to file the nece ssary paperwork, immigrants who were coming on their own preferred to enter the country with the tourist visa, which, of course, did not habilitate them to work. This paralegal situation seems to have constituted a reasonable arrangement between seasonal neighboring migr ants and Argentine authorities for several years. To be sure, the Argentine elites st ill had a strong bias in favor of European

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64 immigrants. Evidence of this is the fact that this decree did not allow neighboring immigrants to stay permanently in Argen tina. In this regard, neighboring immigrants played the role that Mexican immigration play ed in the United States for several years. Faced with the increased labor demands of European born-workers, the Dillingham Commission on Immigration noted some special advantages of Me xican immigrants in 1911: The Mexican immigrants are providing a fa irly adequate supply of labor....While they are not easily assimilated, this is not of very great importance as long as most of them return to their native land. In Th e case of the Mexican, he is less desirable as a citizen than as a laborer.” (U S Congress Senate 1911:690-91, quoted in Calavita, 1994:58). In Argentina, neighboring immigrants also had these advantages. They constituted a less demanding labor and their desirability as ci tizens was not an issue until they started settling permanently in the country in the late 1940s. Immigration Policies in the Peronist Era At the end of World War II most Eur opean countries were embarked in interventionist economic policies. Argen tina was not an exception under Juan Domingo Perón. Peron first became popular while occupyi ng an important position at the Ministry of Labor. Later he participated in the m ilitary coup of 1943, and was elected president through popular and free elec tions in February 1946. Under Peron, Argentina’s industrialization process m oved forward. Between 1939 and 1945 the state engaged itself in strong intervention to foment local manuf acturing and some heavy industries. In 1944, tertiary exports represented as much as 70% of the to tal exports (Rapoport, 2001:339). Except for the year 1945, economic indicators during this period were overall positive. Real salaries, employment and per capita income all increased steadily (Ibid. 341). In

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65 turn, the well-being of the population in genera l and of the working class in particular also progressively improved. Under Peron, Argentina went back to ambitious immigration policies. Economic prosperity accounted for the number of immigran ts that the country was willing to accept. Additionally, immigrants had an important role both in agricultural and industrial production. However, the government showed predilection for certain groups of immigrants. During this period, the preoccupa tion with the assimila tion of immigrants continued. The government, likely influen ced by earlier nationalist movements and ongoing studies, sought to encourage immigrati on from Latin Europe (Italy and Spain). As in the preceding decade, the immigrati on of Jewish refugees was discouraged. However, the non-Latin origin of the immigra tion did not represent an obstacle when the government facilitated the immigration of ref ugees who had collaborated with the Nazis. After 1952, the migration from countries of the Southern Cone became increasingly significant. For the first time, the government facilitated this mi gration through amnesty decrees. Although during Peron’s government valu ed the contribution of this migration to the industrialization process, no general rules to regulate this migration were established. Many public officials within the Peronist administration considered that opening the country to immigration was a necessity. This belief was particularly prevalent among those in charge of economic policy. Howeve r, the ministers of Interior and Foreign Affairs, with strong ties to unions, viewed im migration as a way of lowering salaries of the working class. Despite this discrepanc y, immigration had an important place in the Perón’s first five-year government plan (Pla n Quinquenal), which procured the arrival of 50,000 foreigners a year (Oliveri, 1987:245). Fo r the first time, the immigration policies

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66 of the Argentine State were di rected to attract immigrants involved in a broad range of occupations and not just rural workers. In this regard, the government stated that the country was facing labor scarcity “because the industrial deve lopment is absorbing all the labor available” (Decree 13721/51). The expecta tions of the government with regard to the number of immigrants were superseded by actual arrivals. Between 1947 and 1955, 829,846 immigrants entered the country (Olive ri, 1987:244). Almost 60% of them were from Italy and 24% from Spain (Senkman, 1992). The government also sought to encourage immigration that could be assimilated into Argentine society. Some government offici als considered that immigrants from Latin Europe could be “more easily assimilated into Argentina.”37 During this time, there was a major preoccupation regarding the influence th at new waves of immi grants could have on the “Argentine national character.” To produce scientific studies on this matter, the government created the Ethnic National In stitute in 1946 (Senkman, 1992). Like the nationalist thinkers of the turn of the century, most researchers within this institute thought that the groups that c ould most easily assimilate to the Argentine population were those of Latin Europe. In this regard, they sought to avoid the crea tion of ethnic enclaves composed of people that having a different life style, could not integrate into Argentina (Senkman, 1992). Despite the significance of immigration during this period, no comprehensive immigration policies were passed. The main in struments for the promotion of European immigration during this time were the bila teral agreements signed with Italy (1947, 1948 and 1952) and Spain (1958). The availability of an estimate of some 4 million Italians 37 Annual Report of the Argentine Immigration Delegation in Europe for the year 1953, cited in Senkman 1992, note 42.

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67 trying to emigrate received pa rticular attention by the Ar gentine government (Senkman, 1985:111). The agreement with Italy mirrored the policies of the Argentine State from the end of the 19th century. Although it was dire cted to attract all kinds of workers and not just agricultural labor as did earlier policies, this accord faci litated immigration in several ways. Both governments had an active role in the recruitment of workers, compiling data about labor needed in Argentina and Italian ci tizens interested in emigrating (Romagnolli, 1991:214). In turn, they facili tated the transportation of immigrants to their final destination38 (Ibid. 217). The Argentine government sent a delegation in charge of implementing the migration agreement with Italy. In 1954, the Argentine government approved the constitution of the Intergove rnmental Committee for European Migration (Law 13345). The objective of this committee wa s to finance the emigration from Europe and later resettlement of migrants in count ries with labor scarc ity (Novick, 1992:66). Senkman (1992) believes there was a non-stated religious requirement for immigrants arrived during this period. This au thor bases this observa tion on the fact that Catholic immigrants represented 91 % of total immigration. As occurred during the 1930s, the immigration of Jewish refugees wa s discouraged. When Argentina entered the Second World War in 1945, the entry of immigrants from countries in war with Argentina was prohibited. When Europe wa s finally occupied by the Allies, some bureaucratic obstacles played against the migration of Jewish refugees. Argentine migration officials required immigrants to have official and legalized identification papers that many refugees lacked. Additiona lly, President Peron left an anti-Semitic person, Santiago Peralta, in charge of the Im migration Agency for a whole year after 38 The Italian government was providing transportation to the port of departure and the Argentine one was financing the transportation to Argentina.

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68 assuming power in 1946. This public official ’s discriminating practices were denounced by Jewish organizations a nd the Argentine press. Some exceptions were made with regard to the “Latin origin” requirement. Between 1947 and 1949, the country accepted an important number of refugees from Croatia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Aust ria and Germany that had presumably collaborated with the Nazis during the S econd World War (Senkman, 1992). I already mentioned that the most significant number of immigrants came from Italy and Spain. Additionally, 10,286 immigrants came from Germany, 8,668 from Portugal, 5,867 from France, 3,255 from Yugoslavia, 2,733 from Poland and 1,678 from Hungary (Senkman, 1992). Peron’s fascist style of government a nd leadership partly explains the warm reception given to Nazis in Argentina. Recen t research has shown the existence of a secret and corrupt organization directed to find safe havens for Nazis in Argentina.39 This organization likely included the Vatican, th e Argentine Catholic Church, Argentine public officials, and Swiss authorities. International factors may have also been f acilitating the arrival of Nazi colaborators to Argentina at the end of World War II. According to Leonardo Senkman (1985:109), the United States government perceived Arge ntina as a refugee for Nazis until 1946. The United Sates radical change came about when th is country requested the nation-states in the hemisphere to join the anti-Communist crusade. Per on’s government joined this crusade and discouraged immigration from co mmunist countries. Th e immigration from the Soviet Union and its satellite countrie s was forbidden through secret instructions imparted to the Argentine consuls in Eu rope (Senkman, 1985:118). Later on, the United 39 A recent work on this matter is Oki Goni’s The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Peron's Argentina, (New York: Granta Books, 2002).

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69 States permitted that Argentina participated in the migration of German scientists through the Rate Lane (Senkman, 1985:110). After 1952, ArgentinaÂ’s bordering countries constituted the main source of emigration. Pushed by the industrialization pr ocess, important numbers of Paraguayans, Bolivians, and to a lesser extent Chileans, became part of th e migration process directed to the urban centers in the pr ovince of Buenos Aires, and to other inner cities. Unlike the immigration from Europe, the one from ne ighboring countries was spontaneous and unorganized. Between 1951 and 1960, Paragua yans represented 26.5% of immigrant arrivals, followed in importance by Bolivia ns (11.3 %), Chileans (9.7 %), Uruguayans (4.3 %), and Brazilians (4 %); (Stahringer de Caramuti, 1975:107). In the Buenos Aires region, neighboring male migrants took jobs in different manufacturing industries and construction, while female ones did so in the domestic sector and manufacturing industries. Despite the growing importance of bordering migration, no permanent norms were passed to rule this migration. In July of 1949, the government passed the fi rst amnesty to regular ize the status of undocumented immigrants (Decree 15972/49). Presumably, this amnesty favored an important number of immigrants from the Southern Cone.40 In 1951, the Executive approved another amnesty favored all forei gn workers that had a job in Argentina (Decree 13721/51). An economic plan of su stained growth, full employment, and extensive social policies, make the integrati on of the migrants from the Southern Cone into the Argentine society a smooth process, despite the negative reactions of certain 40 No official data is available with regard to the foreigners that regularized their immigration status through this amnesty. It also supposed to have benefited both Jewish immigrants and Nazi and antiCommunist refugees.

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70 sectors of society that mour ned the end of the Golden era of European immigration (Perez Vichich, 1988:451). Immigration Rules of the Military Regimes after 1955 Peron was deposed by a bloody military coup in 1955. After this event, ArgentinaÂ’s history was dominated by instability and a strong military involvement in politics. Military regimes occupied power by force in the periods 1955-1958, 1966-1973, and 1976-1983. In 1962, the military deposed the democratic government and attempted a coup. A government backed by the military was th en elected and stayed in power for two years. Even when the milita ry were not intervening in pol itics in a direct way, their supposedly democratic governments lacked le gitimacy due to the ban on the Peronists from participating in democratic elections . This was the case of Presidents Frondizi (1958-1962), Guido (1962-1963), and Illia (1963-1966). Control of neighboring migration The military governments were actively involved in immigration policies and produced several immigration rules and re gulations. During these governments, the Congress was shut down and no bills or re gulations were demo cratically debated. Independently of the economic situation, the successive military governments in Argentina showed a strong c oncern with strictly regula ting the immigration from neighboring countries. This conc ern was reflected in the four norms that established general rules to regulate the admission of im migrants in successive military governments. For the first time, the concept of illegal im migrant was defined in the law. Additionally, broad deportation provisions permitted the Executive to expel undocumented immigrants from the country. Finally, fines were crea ted to repress immigration offenses. The ideologies of the different military regimes were not identical. Some of them were more

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71 nationalist and believed in str ong state intervention (for instance, President Ongania) while others implemented monetarist ec onomic policies and encouraged foreign investment. However, all of them shared a strong interest in the fight against communism. The immigration policies produced under military regimes reflected this concern. In 1963, President GuidoÂ’s government41(1962-1963) enacted Decree 4805/63, which was strongly concerned with the police aspects of immigration. This decree started by declaring the right of the Argentine nati on to rule the admissi on of foreign citizens according to changing circumstances. This right also included, the norm stated, the power to deport those immigrants that did not comply with the Argentine rules for admission of foreign citizens. The norm did not clearly indicate who could be legally admitted in Argentina and stated that subsequent regulati ons would establish the rules in this respect (Article 5). The decree define d as illegal the foreigner w ho entered the country without subjecting to the immigration controls, violated the rules for his stay once in the country, or overstayed her visa (Article 6). In these cases, the Immigration Agency could decide on the immediate deportation of these foreigners and arrest them as n ecessary (Article 7). In turn, immigrants could not appeal th e Executive decisions before the courts. Additionally, Decree 4805/63 crea ted penalties applicable to those who gave work or lodging to undocumented immigrants. Similarly, one of the objectives of Onga niaÂ’s (1966-1969) administration was to repress undocumented migration (Novivk, 1992:70 ). In this regard, the Executive enacted 41 I consider this president as military because he assumed power after the military deposed President Ongania in 1962 and thanks to the factions within the military that impeded them to agree on a military figure to head the government.

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72 a law called “Repression of Clandestine Im migration” in 1967 (Law 17294). This law stated that Argentine legislation was insuffi cient to control undoc umented migration and that the policy of passing amnesties had failed. This norm also explained that the extension of the Argentine borders with nei ghboring countries coup led with the liberal norms that ruled the admission of tourists were causing the existence of undocumented migration. This norm prohibited the work of undocumented immigrants and those not authorized to work by the Immigration Agency (Novick, 1992:71). At the same time, it forced employers and hotels to control the documents of immigrants and to report the existence of immigrants without lega l papers to the Immigration Agency. The military dictatorship of 1976, also known as the National Reorganization Process, displaced the Perónist government and established a military junta. Unlike previous military governments, known as bur eaucratic authoritarian (O’Donnell, 1988), which sought to develop the country thr ough selective industrialization, the military dictatorship of 1976 adopted strongly liberal economic policies in combination with repressive and authoritarian political ones. The military government was also concerned with population growth. To achieve this, the military, for one thing, prohibited the use of contraceptive methods. For another, it devoted efforts to encourage immigration that was both “healthy and culturally compatibl e” with the Argen tine population (Decree No.3938/77). Following the elites that consolidat ed the country in the 1880s, the military wanted to attract European migrants. As fo r the migrants from neighboring countries, the dictatorship believed that it s hould be carefully “selected an d controlled.” In this regard, this government decided that immigrants from bordering countries had to start their visa paperwork in their countries of origin (D e Marco, 1986:339). However, it is common for

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73 immigrants from bordering countries to go to Argentina on an expl oratory trip and once they find a job start the paperwork for their visa.42 The main immigration norms enacted dur ing the period were Decree 3938/77 and the Law 22439. Decree 3938/77 approved the po pulation objectives for Argentina and most of its provisions were reiterated in law passed th ree years later. Law 22439 was published in March 1981, and wa s entitled “General Law of Migration and Immigration Promotion.” The text of the law expressed th e conviction of the military government that the country needed increased population, and va lidated immigration as an instrument to achieve this goal. According to Romagnolli (1991) the 1981 law followed constitutional provisions by distinguishi ng between encouraged (European) and spontaneous immigration. This law provided ample powers to the Executive to design policies for both types of immigration. With regard to encour aged immigration, the no rm established that the Ministry of Interior woul d propose to the president the ru les and procedures to foment immigration of foreigners “whose cultural characteristics permit their integration into Argentine society” (articles 2 and 3). Additi onally, this ministry w ould prioritize certain areas of the country in n eed of population. The law also created a special fund for encouraged immigration, and gave several be nefits to immigrants admitted in this category, including tax exemptions, subsid ized passages, and temporary lodging. Additionally, this law provided the Execu tive with extensiv e powers to deport immigrants. In its article 95 it stated that the Ministry of Interior could expel from the 42 Immigrants from bordering countries suffered additional discrimination practices during this period. For instance, Argentina was at the brink of war with Chile in 1979. During the same year, the Executive passed Resolucion 64/79, which closed several border cr ossings with Chile, mostly in Mendoza province (De Marco 1986: 340). Additionally, the government hardly awarded any permanent residencies to the citizens of this country. In 1980, only 2% of permanent residences were awarded to Chileans and 97% of the temporary ones corresponded to them (De Marco 1986:339).

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74 country those foreigners that were sentenced to five years in prison or were engaged in activities affecting social p eace, national security or public order (Law 22439). Also, any person in violation of the immigration regul ations could be depor ted (Article 37). Immigrants and Communism The decade of the 1960s was an eventful one in Latin America. Castro consolidated his power despite the Bay of Pigs, the Cuba Missile Crisis, and the US attempts to destabilize his government. At the same time, the United States worried about the export of communism in Latin America. Throughout the hemisphere a clamor for political inclusion and social justice was rising (McShe rry, 2002:55). Within this context, the first guerrilla groups appeared in Argentina. With relatively little impact, several organizations sought to imitate Fidel Ca stro by leading a revolution from the Northwestern provinces of Salta and Ju juy. These organizations included the Uturuncos or Tigermen in 1959, the People’s Guerrilla Army in 1963 and the 17 de Octubre group in 1968 (Rock, 1987:353). Additionally, the only urban and right-wing group, Movimiento Nacional Re volucionario Tacuara , emerged in 1964. Nearly all members of these rural guerrillas were middle-class stude nts. Most of the members of these groups were captured and/or killed by the police. Only in 1970 new revolu tionary organizations emerged that remained active for several years. Despite the limited impact of the first guerrilla groups, the Argentine government enacted different norms to prevent the rise of comm unism. In January 1963, the Executive approved a decree called “Repression of Crimes against National Security” (Decree 788/63). This norm outlined the need to fight the “enemies of democracy and the free world” in order to preserve external s ecurity and guarantee internal peace. It also stated that some foreign doctrines threatened the Argentine way of life. The decree cited

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75 a series of international mee tings gathering countries within the Americas in which the defense of democratic institutions and protection against subversive acts were agreed upon. Although this norm was applicable to the entire population, it contained some special provisions for foreigners. The decree had fifty-four articles and punished a long list of crimes against “national security.” It first defined the crime of treason as the Argentine citizen who used w eapons against the Argentine nation or aided its enemies (Article 1). Additi onally, the decree repressed a l ong list of behaviors, including espionage, sabotage, and professing a doctrin e that promoted the use of violence or attempted to change the Argentine Constitution or some of its basic principles. Punishments for the crimes described in the norm ranged from a year in prison to life sentence. In turn, foreigners residing in Argentina could be condemned for the same crimes and to the same sent ences (Articles 6 and 7). Decree 4214/63, entitled “Rep ression of Communism,” prohibited the Communist Party and/or parties that pr ofessed communist ideologies from developing activities in Argentina. This norm stated that the Communist Party, due to its links with international communism, was destructive of the Argen tine nationhood. It also cited international agreements subscribed to by the Argen tine government to fight international communism. Persons considered “communist” ac cording to the broad definition of the norm,43 were banned from occupying positions in the civil service and academia, and could not receive government fe llowships (Article 5). The fo reign citizens considered communist were forbidden from entering the co untry and could be expelled automatically (Article 6 and 7). If the foreigners were na turalized Argentines, th e decree punished them 43 Communist is defined as a person who is a member of the Communist Party, who cooperated with any communist organization, or professed doctrines directed to institute a communist government.

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76 with the loss of citizenship and later depor tation (Article 10). Overall, this decree severely punished both Argentines and foreigne rs that could be linked in any way with the Communist Party. Another Decree passed in 1963, Decree 2457/63, contained rules that were only applicable to immigrants. The decree comm ented in the paragraph above prohibited the entry of persons of communist ideology to the country. Like ly, the government realized that receiving immigrants fleeing communi st regimes was an attractive option for Argentina. However, due to the “risks” a ssociated with accepting immigrants from communist countries, the Executiv e enacted rules to strictly control these immigrants. Migrants originating in communist countries were awarded a visa for a maximum of three months (Article 5). These migrants had to communicate to the Argentine authorities the date and place of arrival to Argentina (A rticle 6). Additionally, immigrants had to report to the federal police upon arrival in Ar gentina, occasion on which immigrants were given a special identification th at they could use inside the country (Article 7). In some cases, immigrants had to report to the police monthly (Article 15). Overall, these decree strongly restricted the freedoms enjoyed by immigrants from communist countries in Argentina. In 1963, the profusion of norms directed to control subvers ive activities and communism seemed to an extent overbl own. As mentioned before, the guerrilla movements during the 1960s had limited im pact on society. The year 1969, however, made military President Ongania preoccupied. In late May of 1969, the city of Cordoba erupted in a massive riot, primarily instigated by university students and automotive workers. After declaring a strike, protestors swept into the city cen ter, burning cars and

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77 buses along their way (Rock 1987:349). As th e riots developed, increased numbers of people joined the protestors. For forty eight hou rs rioters clashed with police forces. After the riots in Cordoba known as the Cordobazo, violence in Argentina did not stop. Within eighteen months of this viol ent outbreak, four highly prof essional guerrilla movements were active in Argentina.44 Although the Cordoba riots cl early resembled those that occurred in Paris in 1968, the government could not prove its contention that the Argentine disturbances had been caused by “outside agents” (Ibid. 350). Nonetheless, Ongania’s administration targeted immigrants . A law directed to the “Expulsion of the Undesirable” was passed at the end of Ma y. The law 18235 declared that the “recent developments in the country [ Cordobazo ], had demonstrated that the Executive needs an agile and effective tool to deport undesirable foreigners.” According to this norm the Executive could expel foreigners that had b een condemned by courts for serious crimes, or engaged in activities that could threat en social peace, security or public order (Article1). Of course, the Executive was in charge of interpreting which activities could threaten social peace, security or public or der. The deportees had no means for appealing the decision. The provisions of this norm were very similar to those of the Residence Law of 1902. The laws repressing communism and a pproving deportation provisions were unconstitutional on several grounds. This, of c ourse, should not be surprising because the military regimes themselves were unconstitutional when shutting down the Congress and erecting themselves as Presidents and legislators. Nonetheless, it may be illustrative to 44 Three of these groups were Peronist: Montoneros , Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP) and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). The other group, the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo, was of Trotskyite extraction.

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78 review all the arguments that made these nor ms unconstitutional. First, they created a criminal offense and awarded the Executive the power to determine the existence of this offense. This type of provision first disr espected the division of powers by erecting the Executive as judge of criminal behaviors. Second, it ignored the right of not being sentenced without a previous trial. Third, it deprived immigrants from the judges that should be in charge of trying them accordi ng to the Argentine legal system. It also disrespected the due process because the de fendants were deprived of their right of defense. Finally, it violated the civil rights awarded to inhabitants, including the abovementioned ones and the freedom to remain in the country. Democratic Governments after 1955 One main characteristic of the immigration policies of the democratic governments after PeronÂ’s first administrations (1 946-1955) were the amnesties enacted for neighboring immigrants. Strict rules for th eir admission that coul d not be enforced generated significant numbers of undocumen ted immigrants. Without changing the permanent rules for admission of neighboring immigrants, democratic governments limited themselves to enact temporary amnestie s to regularize the immigration status of bordering immigrants. Many of these amnestie s followed military regimes (Decree 3364 in 1958, Decree 49 in 1964, Decree 87 in 1974, and Decree 780 in 1983). The exception was the amnesty enacted during MenemÂ’s first administration, which regularized the status of the immigrants th at had become undocumented under AlfonsinÂ’s administration. After the 1930s, it became common to esta blish particular immigration rules for certain countries. Many times, this was done through bilateral agreem ents signed with the countries of emigration. I already mentioned that President Peron used this instrument to encourage the migration of Italian and Span ish citizens. President Frondizi (1958-1962),

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79 signed immigration agreements with Spain ( 1960), Japan (1961) a nd established special rules for the admission of Europeans residing in the former African colonies (Decrees 11619/60 and 5466/61). Other agreements of this sort were signed by President Illia with France in 1964 and more recently by Presiden t Menem with countries from Central and Eastern Europe in 1994. In contrast, the Ar gentine government never signed accords to encourage the permanent migration from bor dering countries. Some agreements were signed with bordering countries to regulate the work of seasonal migrants. In this regard were the agreements with Paraguay (1958) a nd Bolivia (1964). Two other agreements of this kind were signed by the military with Bolivia (1978) and Chile (1971). Three democratic governments enacted permanent rules for the admission of foreign citizens. President Il lia (1964-1966) made a serious attempt to systematize the rules for admission of foreign citizens. Af ter annulling all the decrees dealing with immigration since the end of the 19th century, Decree 4418/65 established the new immigration rules in 193 Articles. This norm has been described as the turning point in the immigration policies of democratic gove rnments, since it combined restrictive provisions with moderately broad criteria for admission (CELS, 2002:122). This decree distinguished between permanent (immigrants, refugees, former residents, and relatives of Argentines) and non-permanent immigrants (temporary residents, tourists, seasonal workers, persons in transit, awardees of political asylum, daily border crossings). The system established by this decree was consid erably complex. It is important to outline that within this norm immigrants were cons iderably free to immigrate to Argentina. Spontaneous immigrants were admitted as long as they arrived in the country at their own cost (Article 12).

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80 However, this decree had other norms that can be considered restrictive. For one thing, it established a long lis t of persons that were forb idden from immigrating to Argentina, including those with contagious or psychiatric illn esses, who lacked occupation or means of subsistence or had b een involved in prostitution, persons addicted to drugs, or those who were condemned for cr imes that were punished in Argentina with prison (Article 25). Additionally, this decree followed the definition of illegal immigrants established by Decr ee 4805/63 (Article 151). Unlike this latter decree, Decree 4418/65 gave the option to undocumented immigr ants of regularizi ng their immigration status before mandating their de portation (Article 152). This decree also rais ed the fines for people that offered jobs or lodging to undocumented workers (Article 173 and ff.). The law of 1981 left the requirements appl ying to each immigration category to the Executive. To fill this lacuna , Alfonsín’s government passed Decree 1434/87, which was later replaced in 1994 by Decree 1023/94. This former norm cited within the considerations taken into account for its enactment the severe economic and social conditions, and in the reduced capacity of th e Argentine nation to receive immigration. The decree established that the persons that could apply for residenc y were relatives of Argentines or permanent residents, skilled workers, artists, and s ports persons of known solvency, religious workers, and migrants with investment capital (Article 15). Also according to the text of the norm, these restrictive requirements would be removed once the country’s situation had changed. The D ecree 1434/87 stated in Article 16 that the National Direction of Migration could pass norms to specify or interpret the requirements established in article 15, according to new circumstances. Using these faculties, the migration agency passed reso lution 700/88, which provided th at Article 15 would not

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81 apply to European immigrants. Since “most of the migrants that provided the base for the growth and development of our nation came from Europe,” the norm explains, these migrants deserved special considerati on (Resolution 700/87). This exception for Europeans stayed in place until the enact ment of Decree 1023 of 1994, which did not make distinctions between Europeans and othe r migrants. However, that same year, the Ministry of Interior approved Resolution 4632/ 94 that allowed Europeans from Central and Eastern Europe to apply for residency in Argentina by solely proving origin and identity. The first two years of Menem’s first administration (1989-1995) showed no immigration policy changes. After the amnesty of 1992, the immigration policies in Argentina became more restrictive. In 1993, the Executive passed Decree 2771/93 enabling it to deport immigrants that were committing crimes or illegally occupying dwellings. As other norms with similar deportation provisions, this norm was questionable in the light of the rights aw arded to inhabitants by the Argentine Constitution. In June of 1994, the Executive passed Decree 1023/94, which regulated the provisions of Law 22439 from 1981, and am ended Alfonsín’s Decree 1434/87. The considerations cited in the norm that justifie d a change of immigration policy were highly contradictory. For one thing, the norm stated that the economic situ ation was better than in 1987. This observation was confusing a nd seemed like a prelude for liberal immigration measures. The decree also expl ained that the Executive was reformulating the population objectives of the country in th e light of the new socio-economic scenario and the integration process with MERCOSUR countries. In this regard, the government

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82 considered the norms passed by Decree 1023/94 as transitory. The decree also stated that government aimed at putting an end to illegal immigration. This decree’s clauses were si milar to those from Alfons ín’s government and they were more permissive in one respect and more restrictive in another one. They were more permissive because they did not require mi grants to be skilled. Instead, the decree admitted all types of workers with the only condition being that they had a written job contract from an Argentine employer (Article 27). This last requirement, however, made immigration policies stricter. Mo st migrants find jobs in info rmal sectors of the economy. In 1994, one quarter of male workers were em ployed in construction and as many as half of female migrants worked in the domes tic sector (Sana, 1999). Many employers are reluctant to sign job contracts for several reas ons. In particular, is not customary to sign written job contracts and, more over, employers fear legal and fiscal consequences. This is even truer of sectors of the economy th at are more informal. Additionally, the immigration office’s regulations obliged employ ers to provide proof th at they do not have any fiscal debts with the Federal Governme nt. These conditions make it highly difficult for migrants to get documented support from an employer. General Overview of the Immigration Policies of the Argentine State 1876-1994 The immigration policies of the Argentine St ate showed a persistent preference for European citizens. However, this preference had variations over time that responded to changing economic, social and political circ umstances. While until the 1930s, the ideal immigrant was the agricultural worker from Northern Europe after this date the government prioritized the immigration fr om Latin Europe. Until 1949, the immigration policies of the Argentine State did not men tion immigrants from neighboring countries.

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83 After that, the rules for the admission of immigrants from South America were less permissive than those for Europeans in sixty percent of the observations. Figure 3-1 summarizes the di scussion of Argentine immi gration policies developed above, showing the immigration policies for European and Neighboring Immigrants from 1876 to 1994. My dependent variable, immigrati on policy, has been translated into two indexes that measure these policies’ level of openness to European immigrants and to immigrants from the region, respectively (See Appendixes A and B). The graph covers from the first immigration law of the Argen tine State (1876) to Mene m’s first presidency (1989-1995). The indexes show the years in which policy changes took place and range from +5 to –5. A positive score denotes a pro-immigration policy whereas a negative score denotes an anti-immigration one. I adapted this index from Timmer and Williamson (1996) to fit the needs of this study. Thes e indexes have proved to be useful for highlighting the double standard that the Ar gentine government has repeatedly shown regarding immigration from Eur ope and from Latin America. Most authors agree that immigration is shaped by economic conditions. It is interesting to investigate whether this is true for the Argentine case. Shughart et al. (1986) found that restrictive im migration policies are negativel y correlated to real Gross National Product. According to the same aut hors, unemployment and real wages can also serve as explanatory factors but to a lesser de gree. In the case of Argentina, while the immigration rules for the admission of neighbor ing immigrants show an association with different economic indicators , the rules for admission of Europeans seem to run independently of these economic indicators. Three independent variables were used for

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84 the Argentine case: growth of Gross Domestic Product45, growth of real wages and unemployment rate46 (See Appendix 2 for details about the variables). In this study, a regression analysis includ ing Argentine GDP growth, real wages growth, and unemployment as independent variab les has shown interesting results.47 First, immigration policies toward immigrants from the region show a significant and positive correlation with GDP growth a nd growth in real salaries (See Table below). However, unemployment has the right sign, showi ng a negative correlation. However, unemployment is only marginally significant wi thin the model. So, in principle, it would seem that the immigration policies of the Argentine government tend to reflect economic conditions. Yet the preliminary conclusion changes when the same test is applied to determine the factors shaping immigration policies towa rd Europeans. None of the independent variables, GDP growth or unemployment, show any significant correlation with immigration policy openness. From this compar ison we can discern im portant features of 45 Argentine official statistics only measure domestic product, defined as the goods and services produced in a country in a given year, and not national product, defined as the goods and services produced by the nationals of a given country in a given year. However, I doubt that these numbers would differ greatly since Argentines do not have great investments abroad. 46 For Argentina, the only economic i ndicator that was available for a ll the years under analysis (18761994) was GDP growth. However, GDP growth does not show a significant correlation with the immigration policies for Europeans or neighboring immigrants for the first several decades. After the 1940s, GDP is marginally and positively correlated w ith the immigration rules for neighboring immigrants ( : .40; p: .06) and after the 1950s this correlation becomes stronger and significant ( : .47; p: .04). Statistics regarding real wages are available for the y ears after the 1940s. The gr owth in real wages was significantly and positively correlated to the immigration rules for neighboring immigrants ( : 62; p:.01). Although unemployment has a significantly correlated when included in the regression model presented below, when considered alone it show no significant correlation with the immigration rules under consideration ( :-.17; p: .67). 47 In the future, I am planning to conduct a time series analysis which will include cultural and political variables as well.

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85 policy-making in Argentina. First, my data suggests that immigrants from Europe are always welcome, regardless of the economic situation, their relationship to Argentina being something like “a marriage in sickness or in health.” Instead, immigrants from neighboring countries seem to be a thermome ter evaluating the macroeconomic situation: as soon as the economic situation becomes un certain, Argentina clos es its doors to them. Why, then, does the state of economy sh ape policies for immigrants from neighboring countries but not for Europeans? What determines this double standard for Europeans and Latin Americans? The fi rst possible explanation may be that

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86 Table 3-1. Regression Analysis for Depende nt Variable Immigration policies for Neighboring Immigrants* Dependent Variable Independent Variables GDP growth Unemployment Year Real Wages Growth .51-.42 .66 Policies for Neighbors p..04.07 .02 * N=13; R2=.81 Table 3-2. Regression Analysis for Depende nt Variable Immigration policies for European Immigrants* Dependent Variable Independent Variables GDP growth Unemployment Year Real Wages Growth .24 -.06 -.30 Policies for Europeans p. .59 .89 .51 *N=13; R2=.10 Immigrants compete with Argentines for the sa me jobs. Still, research indicates that the contrary seems to be the case. The Argentine labor force has been traditionally educated and skilled and should thus face more compe tition from Europeans than immigrants from the region. In the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, home to one third of the countryÂ’s population, fifty percent of natives work in th e service sector and a nother twenty percent in commerce (Sana, 1999). Studies show that neighboring immigrants seem to complement the native labor force fairly well since they occupy jobs that are not attractive for natives (Montoya and Perticara, 1995). These jobs are mainly concentrated in low-skilled and labor intensive sect ors of economy: construction (25%) and manufacturing (16%) for men and domestic service (50%) for women. These sectors

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87 have the lowest paying jobs with few fri nge benefits. For these reasons, Argentines should not feel threatened by immigrants from the region. These studies additionally show that the impact of immigration from the region on unemployment during the 1990s was minimal (Maguid, 1995; Sana, 1999). It may also be argued that this difference in legislative treatm ent can be explained by the weight the number of immigrants carrie s with respect to th e total population of Argentina (Timmer and Williamson, 1996). In the decade 1980-1990, for instance, 216,000 neighboring immigrants settled in the country, while European immigration was negative (Lattes and Bartoncell o, 1997). However, this reas oning does not apply to the period before the post WWII period, when immi grants from Europe were the majority group. In recent years it may be argued that th e number of European s was not significant when compared to that of immigrants from the Southern Cone. However, there are also exceptions to this. For instance, the plan to attract Central and Ea stern Europeans from 1992 was considerably ambitious. The amnesty act of 1992 awarded residency to 200,000 immigrants and the government offered to admit as many as 300,000 Central and Eastern Europeans to the country. Therefore, while th e government may have generally been less concerned about European immigration due to its small numeric significance, the opposite can be argued for the year 1992. In sum, economic concerns cannot account for the differe nt consideration that the Argentine government has afforded Europ ean and non-European immigrants. In this chapter, I attempted to tell a cultural-political story which is not completely independent from political economy. In the case of Argen tina, domestic closure against certain noncitizens does not (only) rest on material reasons. I argue that, although economic factors

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88 are important in explaining immigr ation policies and often determine how many immigrants a country is willing to accept, notions of ethnic and/or cultural eligibility of certain immigrant groups for membership in the “imagined community” dictate who is admitted. Thus, Argentine immigration policie s generally “welcome” certain groups of European immigrants, regardless of the economic situation. At the same time, they tend to restrict Latin American (or Jewish or Communist) immi gration and further discriminate against it in periods of economic hardship. In the next two chapters, I search to understand the economic, cultural and inte rnational factors shaping immigration policy decisions after the reestablishment of democracy in Argentina. I then turn my attention to the relationship between the Executive and the Congress in immigration policy-making.

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89 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 618 7 6 18 9 0 19 0 2 1 910 1 932 1 938 1 941 1 948 1 949 1 951 1 954 1 958 1 960 1 961 1 963 1 964 1 965 1 967 1 969 1 974 1 977 1 981 1 984 1 985 1987 1988 19 9 2 19 9 3 19 9 4 Policies for Neighboring Policies for European Figure 3-1. Immigration Po licies for Neighboring and European Citizens: 1876-1994

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90 CHAPTER 4 IMMIGRATION POLICIES AFTER THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY 1983-1989 Introduction Immigration policies after 1983 continued to show a preference for European immigration. A deteriorating economy provided an opportunity to restri ct immigration. In the following sections I address the state of the economy and the extent to which it shaped immigration policies. However, Argent ina still facilitated the immigration from European countries. What explains this pref erence for European immigration? I argue that the desirability of certain groups as members of the community can shape the immigration policies for these groups. In this regard, this chapter ex plores the images of immigration and the different groups of immigran ts in the print press. It shows that the preference for European immigration coincide s with a very optimistic view of this immigration. In 1983, Argentina faced a severe economic crisis. Despite economic hardship, the Executive enacted a generous amnesty, which be nefited immigrants from all origins in 1984. For one thing, the government needed to resolve the situation of 140,000 foreigners that had become undocumented under the strict immigration rules of the military years. For another, democratic pr inciples and human rights c onsideration may have also inspired this executive d ecision. Although the amnesty was supposed to pursue some economic goals, these seemed contradictory. At the same time, th e consideration of immigrants for inclusion in the imagined community seemed to be favorable during

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91 1984. Immigrants and immigration were not at all problematized. Furthermore, emigration of Argentines was a concern of th e Argentine state at the time. Even if the consideration of all immigrants was favor able, a notable preference for European immigration was obvious in the press in the early 1980s. As different economic plans achieved spar se success and the economic situation worsened, the Argentine rules for the ad mission of foreign citizens became more restrictive. In 1985, a questionable resolution by the Director of the Immigration Agency established new and stricter requirements to apply for a work visa. In 1987, these new requirements were passed by Executive decree. It is true that economic hardship probably influenced the enactment of these new immi gration rules. However, in 1988 another resolution by the Immigration Agency exempt ed European citizens from the application of the new rules. Can the state of the economy justify the passage of different immigration policies for different groups of immigrants? In the case of Argentina, it is not clear that the country was in need of European labor. Thus, two additional explanations are explored in this chapter to account for these diverse immigration rules for Europeans and non-Europeans. First, the desirability of Europeans as citizens may have been at work when enacting the prefer ential immigration rules for this group. An analysis of the immigration coverage in the print media supports this view. Finally, the last part of this chapter explores the weight of international factors in the immigration policy decision-making proces s. It argues that although the cooperation with Europe was considerable, this relations hip was not exceptional enough to justify the passage of special immigration rules for Eur opeans. Furthermore, the very same reasons that likely decreased the cooperation with some neighboring countries – i.e. the existence

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92 of military regimes in these countries – c ould have acted as an incentive for the enactment of more favorable immigration ru les for those countries. After providing the political and economic context of Alfonsín’s administration, this chapter reviews the above mentioned immigration decisions and their motivations. Democratization by Collapse: The 1983 Ar gentine Transition to Democracy Most scholars treat the 1 983 Argentine transition to democracy as a case of “bottom-up” democratization due to the collapse of the military regime (Haggard and Kaufman, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell at al. , 1986). The military government in Argentina was unsuccessful in mo st fronts. For one thing, the military left power in the midst of one of the worst economic crises. Economic hardship had impoverished a large portion of the lower stra tum of the population, a nd was later leading to the bankruptcy of severa l business groups. In addition, the government was blatantly corrupt and increasingly unpopular since the defeat in the Malvinas War against Great Britain in 1982. The armed forces also faced several internal power struggles (Cavarozzi, 1997:90). At the beginning of 1983, civilian nego tiations with the military did not seem fruitful. However, a multiparty front in charge of these negotiations successfully demanded the military’s withdrawal from pow er before the end of the year (Massun, 1999:21). Alfonsín, a member of the Union Civica Radical party, won the October 30th elections. 1 The new president was a strong critic of the military government, committed to the construction of a new democr atic order (Cavarozzi, 1997:100). 1 It was the first time that the Peronist party lost a fair election to the Radica ls. During the years during which the Peronist party was proscribed (1955-1973), two “democratic” presidents emerged from general elections: Arturo Frondizi in 1958 and Arturo Illia in 1963.

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93 Together with the resolution of the huma n rights violations and military question, Alfonsín’s administration was committed to getting the country out of the serious economic crisis. The 1980s were years of great international economic instability, characterized by fluctuating growth rates, pr ices, and trade and cap ital flows (Rapoport, 2000:858). As interest rates hiked, indebted Latin American countries were put under significant financial stress. Multilateral financial institutions, fearful of the collapse of several large banks, increased the pressure on poor countries to repay their debts. Within this context, Argentina was approachi ng default. In addition, the military had progressively liberalized the economy and opene d Argentine markets to foreign exports. The consequences of this liberalization became obvious by the late 1970s. Between 1975 and 1982, industrial employment had fallen by 40 %, industrial plants were reduced by 18%, and the country was at 70% of the industrial capacity (P erez Vichich, 1988:454). Besides, the gross domestic product had been stagnant since 1980, a nd the inflation rate reached 343% a year in 1983 (Rapoport, 2000:727-730). Alfonsín had stated during the electoral campaign that the Argentine severe economic crisis was due to the application of the “orthodox,” that is neoliberal, economic policies during the dictatorship. Consequently, Al fonsín’s first cabinet initiated a series of Keynesian economic reforms, which proved unsuccessful. The objectives of these economic reforms were ambitious and included achieving an annual growth rate of 5%, increasing real salaries by 8% , and improving tax collection. To achieve these goals, the government regulated salaries, public services tariffs, interest rates and exchange rates. Besides, Alfonsín’s administration decided no t to make payments on the external debt until the following year. This decision sought fo r one thing to avoid the drain of financial

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94 resources. At the same time, the governmen t was hoping to obtain better conditions for debt repayment through a jo int negotiation with other Latin American countries. Unfortunately, the economic measures did not achieve the desired results. Several obstacles contributed to this outcome, includ ing a steady inflation rate, pressures by the unions for higher salaries and a significan t fiscal deficit (Rapoport, 2000:907). In addition, the government had to resume the external debt negotiations with foreign creditors. By the end of 1984, it was obvious that the economic plan was completely unsuccessful (Cavarozzi, 1997:105). The cr isis did not, however, stop the first government plans for regularizing the immigration status of foreigners already residing in Argentina. After reviewing the main char acteristics of the foreign born population residing in Argentina at the beginning of the 1980s, I focus my attention in the first immigration decisions of Al fonsín’s administration. Argentina’s Foreign-Born Population in 1980 The Census of 1980 recorded a total 1.9 million foreigners living in Argentina. The concentration of immigrants in the City and Province of Buenos Aire s that started during the 1950s became more pronounced during this period. The total number of immigrants had grown in the Buenos Aires region by 23.3% between 1970 and 1980, while in the rest of the country it did so only by 9% (Organ izacion de los Estados Americanos, 1985:41). The Federal Capital and the Province of Buenos Aires were still the favorite destination of immigrants, housing 53% of the neighbor ing immigrants and 80% of non-neighboring ones (INDEC, 1997:11). The other areas with high proportion of neighboring immigrants were the Patagonia region (16%) and th e Northeast (15%). In 1980, neighboring immigrants represented 10% of the total population of the Patagonia region (Villar, 1984:466 and ff.). Non-neighboring immigrants, i.e. immigrants of any origin but

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95 bordering countries, only lived in significant numbers outside Buenos Aires in the province of Santa Fe (INDEC, 1997:11). With regard to the national origin of immigrants, the “old” European immigration still represented a significant share of the foreign born population of Argentina in 1980. The European countries with the most sign ificant numbers of immigrants were Italy (26%) and Spain (20%). Overall, non-neighbor ing migration still comprised 60% of the foreign born population (INDEC, 1997:10 and ff.). Out of the 753,000 neighboring immigrants living in Argentina in 1980, more than one third of them (35%) were from Paraguay and almost one third from Chile (29%). In turn, Bolivian and Uruguayan immigration each accounted for 15% of the ne ighboring citizens living in Argentina. In 1980, Brazil comprised only 5% of neighboring migration. At the beginning of the 1970s the most important countries of emigration to Argentina had been Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia (De Marco, 1986:335). Between 1976 and 1980, immigration from Uruguay became increasingly important, comprising 50% of the neighboring migration during the period. The military coup that took place in Uruguay in 1973 probably increased Uruguayan migration to Argentina. Likely, eco nomic factors also co ntributed, accounting for 80% emigration from Uruguay between 1979 and 1981 (Sapelli and Labadie, 1989:434). Despite the unstable economic situation, im migrant arrivals from the Southern Cone were steady after th e reestablishment of demo cracy. In 1983, some 90,000 people of that origin entered the country wh ile 220,000 did so in 1984 (De Marco, 1986:346). Some economies of the region were not mo re prosperous than the Argentine one. Paraguay, for instance, was facing a severe economic crisis during the time (De Marco,

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96 Table 4-1. National Origin of the Forei gnBorn Population in Argentina in 1980 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 UruguayBoliviaBrazilChileParaguay Origin of Immigrants Percentage Recent Arrivals by 1980 Census 1980 Figure 4-1 National Origin of Neighboring Im migrants in 1980 Compared to Recent Arrivals 1986:348). In addition, statistics regarding immi grant arrivals also include persons that travel to the country as tourists . It is therefore likely that th e repeated devaluations of the Country of Origin Percentage of the Foreign-Born Population Italy 25.7 Spain 19.7 Paraguay 13.8 Chile 11.3 Bolivia 6.2 Uruguay 6.0 Poland 3.0 Other Countries 14.3 Total 100.0

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97 Argentine currency made it convenient for the nationals of Uruguay and Chile to travel to and shop in Argentina. Nonetheless, the number of immigrants that se ttled in the country also increased. This is evidenced by the considerable increase in the number of residencies awarded during these years. During Alfons ín’s administration, the immigration agency awarded an average of 30,000 residencies yearly (not including those granted under the amnesty decree). In contra st, during the military dictatorship this government agency awarded less than 19,000 re sidencies each year and no amnesty was enacted during the period. 2 Giving Immigrants a “Break”: Amnesty Decree 780/84 Did economic reason shape the passage of the 1984 amnesty? We mentioned elsewhere that the state of the economy is likely to shape immigration policies. In genera l we expect an unstable macr oeconomic scenario to work against the enactment of generous immigrati on policies. However, this was not the case in Argentina in 1984. Alfonsín’s administ ration enacted Decree 780/84, which approved an amnesty for all foreigners. Passed in March of 1984, this decree was intended to regularize the immigration status of those migrants from any national origin that were residing in the country before December 1983. Public officials estimated the number of undocumented immigrants to be somewhere between 300,000 and 800,000 (Sassone, 1987:263). The amnesty, however, benefited on ly some 142,000 foreigners. Considering the government made immigration papers eas ily accessible for foreigners, it seems plausible that public officials had ov erestimated the number of undocumented immigrants. The visa applications were free of charge and could be filed in any of 2,500 2 Own estimate based on the number provid ed by the Argentine Immigration Agency.

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98 government offices located in different poi nts of the country (Iglesias, 1996:190). Therefore, it seems reasonable to hypothesi ze that most undocumented immigrants that were in Argentina at the moment a pplied for a visa under the amnesty. Amnesties had become common in Argentina after President Peron’s first administrations (1946-1955). For instance, 61 % of the 858.000 foreigners that obtained their permanent residence in Argentina between 1958 and 1985 did so through the socalled amnesty decrees (Sassone, 1987:267). In general, these amnesties tended to be directed to migrants from neighboring c ountries. The amnesty enacted in 1984, however, was applicable to any foreigner that was livi ng in Argentina. The former Director of the Immigration Agency, Evaristo Iglesias, explai ned that this decision was thought to help immigrants from South Korea, Taiwan, and Peru, who would not qualify as “neighboring migrants”.3 According to Iglesias, the government was expecting a significant number of visa applications from citizens of these count ries. Despite this, 95% of the migrants that applied for residency under this amnesty were from neighboring countries. Immigrants from Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay represente d 15% of the visa applications filed. Another fifty percent corresponded to immi grants from Chile. The high proportion of Chileans was due to the fact that the military government, while involved in a limit’s conflict with Chile, had discouraged the re gularization of the immi gration status of citizens from this country. One rationale to enact the amnesty seemed to be a practical consideration: the existence of people that had become undocum ented when strict policies had been in place. In this regard, the amnesty decree stat ed that the immigration policies during the 3 Author’s interview with Evaristo Iglesias, former Director of the Immigration Agency (1983-1987), March 22 2003.

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99 military dictatorship “were detached from th e socio-economic reality of the country and had left a large number of people without legal documents” (Decree 780/84). In addition, democratic principles and huma n rights’ considerations infl uenced the enactment of the several amnesty decrees passed in Ar gentina during the last sixty years.4 Due to the strict immigration policies enacted during military governments, most democratic governments after Peron passed an amnesty for foreign migrants (Frondizi in 1958, Illia in 1964, and Peron in 1974).5 For the particular case under an alysis, the immigration policies preceding Alfonsín’s administration had been hardly democratic. As a high ranking official of the Ministry of Interior explai ned, the law enacted duri ng the dictatorship of 1976-1983 was “restrictive, oriented to ideol ogical control and disrespectful of our Constitution” (Interior Under-Secretary Raul Galvan, Clarín 01/31/84) . The possibilities of obtaining a visa in Argentina during the military years were significantly decreased. For instance, while during th e period 1970-75 an average of 26,000 neighboring migrants obtained their residence in Argentina each year, that average dropped by 60% for the military period 1976-1983.6 However, the restrictiveness of the immigr ation policies of the different military governments in Argentina tended to be selec tive. According to former Adviser to the Immigration Agency’s Director Silvia Le pore, military governments had a strong bias against bordering migrants.7 For instance, the milita ry government was eager to 4 Author’s interview cited. 5 President Frondizi passed Decree 3364/58, Presid ent Illia Decree 49/64 and Peron Decree 87/74. 6 Author’s estimate based on data provided by Direccion Nacional de Migraciones, Radicaciones temporarias y Definitivas 1970-1980. 7 Author’s interview with Silvia Lepore, Former Advi ser to the Director of th e Immigration Agency (19841987), May 24 2003.

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100 encourage European immigration. At the same time, it wanted to strictly control the immigration from the Southern Cone. In this regard, this government obliged bordering immigrants to apply for residency in the Argentine Consulates abroad after 1976 (De Marco, 1986:339). It is co mmon for bordering migrants to trav el to Argentina in order to look for a job and later apply for residency on ce they have prospects of staying in the country. Due to the lack of resources, neighboring immigrants are unlikely to go back to their countries in order to apply for residenc y at an Argentine cons ulate. Therefore, the requirement of applying for a work visa at the migrants’ countries of origin had left important numbers of neighboring migrants without their legal documents. Since migrants in this situation are pushed to accept low paying jobs and many times exposed to abuses by employers, democratic values and human rights considerations serve as rationales for this type of exceptional polic y. Maybe precisely for this reason amnesties were also passed in adverse macroeconomic scenarios not only in 1984 but also in 1958, 1964 and 1974. I mentioned that the 1984 amnesty was enac ted in the midst of one of the most serious economic crisis. This circumstance does not mean, however, that economic considerations were absent from the norm. Economic issues i nvolved in immigration policies are several. As Kitty Calavita puts it, it is difficult to identify and/or pursue “a national economic interest” wh en deciding immigration polic ies (Calavita, 1994:77). On the one hand, certain economic sectors pressu re for more immigration as a source of cheap and unorganized labor. At the same time , immigrants are interested in obtaining jobs. The norm under analysis appeared to pu t itself on the side of immigrants, stating that the amnesty would frustrate the “spuri ous interests of thos e employers, who taking

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101 advantage of migrants who lack of legal documents, pay them unf air salaries” (Decree 780/84). However, a closer examination of th e decree may shed light on the diversity of interests involved in immigration issues. Likely, the Executive also re sponded to the concerns of unions when enacting the amnesty decree. Domestic unions do not bene fit from cheaper labor and non-unionized workers, and therefore are not too enthusiastic about immi gration. The amnesty decree appeared to be sympathetic to unions while attempting to bring fairness to the labor market. “Clandestine labor,” the norm explai ned, “represents unfair competition to the local labor, which is displaced by migran t one” (Decree 780/84). It is true that documented immigrants are less likely to be exploited than undocumented ones. However, this does not necessarily mean th at domestic labor was supportive of broad amnesties for the regularization of the immigra tion status of thousands of foreigners. In particular, the opinion of an adviser of the General Labor Confederation,8 one of the most important unions in Argentina, is illustrative in this respect. According to Mario Gasparri, amnesties help diminish “informality in labor markets, but they fail to select foreign workers according to the country’s needs.”9 In addition, Gasparri believed that foreign workers did not unionize as much as native ones, producing a division within the working class.10 Clearly, the amnesty decree cannot be reco nciling all these cont radictory interests at once. 8 Conferedacion General del Trabajo is one of the most powerful unions in Argentina, which represents workers of all sectors of the economy. 9 Author’s interview with Mario Gasparri, Adviser to the General Labor Conf ederation, December 19, 2002. 10 Ibid.

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102 I already mentioned that the economic situa tion was not stable enough as to justify the enactment of the amnesty decree of 1984. Also, there was no clear ec onomic interest that the amnesty decree was attempting to pursue. Instead, the different rationales mentioned in the text of the norm seem to be contradict ory. I also stated that democratic principles and human rights did seem to influence the enactment of the amnesty. Now I turn my attention to the weight that cultural f actors may have had on the enactment of the amnesty. In particular, it is a premise of this study that considerations about the ethnic or cultural appropriateness of certain groups of immigrants for membership in the imagined community can also be at work when deci ding over the admission of these groups. In particular, if immigrants and immigration are considered in a problematic way the immigration policies are not likel y to favor them. In what follows, I review the portrayal of immigration in the press during the pe riod. As I do this, I also touch upon the importance given to the emigration of Argentines . In particular, I attempt to show that in 1984 Argentines lamented their loss of popula tion and designed po licies to help the return of Argentines. I argue that preocc upation with emigration, together with the favorable consideration of immi gration as seen in the press, probably contributed to the enactment of the amnesty during the period. Cultural factors shaping immigration po licies: migrants in the print press The immigration coverage during the peri od that the amnesty was enacted in the newspapers La Nación and Clarín was favorab le to immigrants. Seventy percent of the instances coded were either using terms that showed respect for immigrants and/or spoke of beneficial impacts of immigration. Immi grants from all origins were treated in a respectful way and referred to as “immigrants from” or “citizens from.” I did not find terms as “ilegal” and “clandestino” that were often used in the pre ss to refer to bordering

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103 immigrants during the 1990s. The media coverage also attributed a beneficial impact to immigration on the Argentine society. In th is regard, the benefits coded more than doubled the risks. Furthermore, during this period Argentines hope d that immigration to Argentina would be restored to its historical numbers and lamented recent emigration of their fellow citizens. Argentina: country of emigrants? To be sure, Argentina had traditionally b een and still was a country of immigration. The net migration during the 1970s was positiv e, despite the decreasing numbers of Europeans arriving in the country. Nonethel ess, there was an increased concern among Argentines that the country had stopped be ing attractive both for Argentines and for immigrants. For instance, during an interna tional Conference entitled “Migration in the Americas” held in Buenos Aires in January 1984, researchers expressed ambitious hopes for democracy and economic growth. They wished that these two fact ors would facilitate the return of Argentines to the country and the growth of immigra tion to its historical levels (Clarín, 10/18/83). In a similar vei n, the director of the Newspaper Clarín, Ernestina Herrera de Noble, wr ote that, “it is the government’s responsibility to create the necessary conditions to make Argentina at tractive for both nativ es and foreigners” (Clarín , 10/23/1983.) Once this is accomplishe d and “immigration rate s are back to their historical levels,” Ms. Herre ra continued, “it will be obvious that the country is moving forward again.” Alfonsín had a major burde n on his shoulders. Democracy was not only supposed to bring “just salari es, bread, education, and housin g” (Cavarozzi, 1997:103). It was also expected to bring Argentines back home and restore immigration to its historical levels. These particular exp ectations during the transition to democracy in Argentina provided the background for the migration policies of the Arge ntine State. Together with

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104 the democratic and human rights considera tion reviewed above, the concern with the emigration of Argentines and the favorabl e view of immigration help explain the Argentine migration policies of this period. In the next paragraphs, I review the situation of emigration from Argentina and the policies devised to co pe with it. Later on, I show that although Argentines yearned immigra tion, not all immigration was considered equally beneficial. The emigration of Argentines had beco me significant since the 1950s. In 1960, some 45,000 Argentine scientists and prof essionals were working abroad. By 1983, estimates of Argentines living abroad ranged from 250,000 (Clarín, 10/02/83) to 700.000 (Iglesias, 1996:208). Economic considerations partly explained emigration. The poor economic performance, the frequent recession s and the lack of opportunities for social and economic progress were certainly mo tivating the emigration from Argentina (Graciarena, 1987:24). In addition, many emigra nts fled the country for other, non-less logical, reasons. During the different Arge ntine military governments, repression and political persecution had been widespread. Th e last military dictatorship (1976-1983) had been particularly bloody, leading to the disappearance of some 30,000 political opponents. Some politically threatened sectors of society managed to leave the country secretly. Others were given the option of ab andoning the country instead of or after being imprisoned by the military. When democracy was reestablished, the government showed a strong interest in the return of exiles to the country and cr eated different plans to make it happen. Argentina was considered to be a largely unpopulated country since its consolidation as a modern nation in the nineteenth century. A larger population was

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105 thought essential for the construction of a pr osperous country. This worry was reflected in the 1853 Constitution, in Peron’s administ ration Tri-Annual Plan (1973-1976), and in the population goals of the last milit ary government (Decree 1918/77). Although Alfonsín’s administration did not produce comprehensive population guidelines, the Director of the Immigration Agency, Evaristo Iglesias, seemed to share a concern with population growth. During a conference deli vered at the National Defense School,11 Director Iglesias explained that European immigration had provided the main source of population growth in Argentina for many decad es, which had been partly substituted by recent immigration from neighboring countri es (Iglesias, 1996:211 and ff.). He also lamented the loss of valuable human resources that had emigrated from the country. According to Iglesias, the num ber of exiles was comparable to the losing of a medium size Argentine province. All thes e factors, the former state of ficial thought, contributed to an aging and slow growing population. Intern ational migration was therefore a main preoccupation during Alfonsín’s government, but not only from the usual immigration perspective. To remedy emigration, the Executive devised a plan to facilitate the return of Argentine refugees living abroad, under the auspices of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Interna tional Organization fo r Migration (Clarín, 01/17/1984). Later on, this plan was forma lized through Decree 1798/84, and extended to all Argentines residing abroad and not ju st to the ones with refugee status. The government plan, however, fell short in the ai d provided to émigrés. Argentines abroad 11 Conference delivered at the XXXII Cycle of National Defense Studies, at the National Defense School, August 16 1985, published in Iglesias (1996).

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106 demanded jobs and housing loans, but those were not available.12 The only material aid in place was established by decree 464/85, which allowed emigrants to introduce their personal and professional assets free of taxes and tariffs. A pparently, the government was faced with a dilemma: Can we aid the Argentines that lived abroad during the dictatorship with subsidies, housing and jobs, while the rest of the population that stayed in the country receives nothing? The former Adviser to the Immigration Agency, Silvia Lépore, expressed this dilemma to the author.13 She explained how unfair it would have been to provide significant aid to exiles, while the Argentines that stayed received nothing. Economic considerations were, of course, pa rt of the impetus to attract Argentine émigrés. It was prejudicial for the country to lose so many professi onals. In this regard, decree 1798/84 stated that “the country had b een materially hurt when deprived from many of its remarkable citizens.” This decree also explained that many of these Argentine citizens had been recognized with honors and positions outside th e country. In this regard, the government created a special progr am for the “Return of Gifted Argentines” applicable to émigrés that because of their professions or occupations were of “special (economic) interest” for the country (R omagnolli, 1991:44). During this period, numerous newspaper articles and columns -as much as seventy percent of Clarín’s coverage of international migration -were devoted to the emigration of Argentines. Some of these articles lamented the conseque nces this “drain of human resources” (Clarín 12 Author’s interview with Silvia Lepore, Former Advi ser to the Director of th e Immigration Agency (19841987), May 24 2003. 13 Interview cited.

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107 10/02/83). Others adopted a more dramatic tone . For instance, an editorial from Clarín stated that the “massive exodus” of human resources had almost “bled the country’s working-age population to death” (Clarín, 2/03/84). The intensity of some these statements correctly suggests that other c onsiderations, beyond economics, were at play in the desire to draw exiles back home. The motherland14 had ejected thousands of Argent ines, thousands of her sons and daughters. This did not seem right. If we followed this path, “the nation will keep materially and spiritually impoverishing hers elf” (Clarín, 2/10/83). The boundaries of the national community had to be redrawn in order to re-include the victims of repression and despair. Even the legal texts showed an unusual “emotional” tone to refer to the “Argentine exodus.” Decree 1798 /84, for instance, stated that “the exile of several Argentines due to the political, social, and economic conditions the country has gone through during recent years has produced a gr eat moral damage to society” (Decree 1798/84). The political importance of the return of exiles becomes even clearer if we consider the place of honor that President Alf onsín gave to the return of exiles. This president set out to produce a clean break with the dictatorship, and he was determined to undo the unfair political persecu tions promoted during that regime. Maybe precisely for this reason, he showed a personal interest in the return of Argentines. In January 1984, President Alfonsín broadcaste d a message in a Spanish radio station, making a call to Argentine exiles, asking them to return hom e. “The Argentine nation will be again a country of peace and freedom as imagined by our Founding Fathers,” the president stated during his address (Clarín, 01/18/ 84). In this way, the Argentine president attempted to 14 In Spanish Patria, and Madre Patr ia and Nación are feminine nouns. To my knowledge, there is no equivalent to “Fatherland” in the Spanish language.

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108 project abroad a new image of peaceful and free Argentina in order to re-include the victims of the military dictatorship. Portrayal of immigrants in the print press I already mentioned the strong interest that the press coverage showed in the exile of Argentines. I also said that the immigr ation press coverage during this period was overall receptive of all immigrants as memb ers of the community. The written press, however, did not consider all immigration in an equally fa vorable way. I now explore the differences in the portrayal of three groups of immigrants that appeared in the press during this period, namely European, Asian, a nd Southern Cone immigrants. To be sure, the 1984 amnesty favored immigrants of any or igin. Nonetheless, I believe the differing judgments about the characteristics and imp acts of the different groups of immigrants help explain Argentina’s recurring pref erence for European immigration. For 1984, I found quantitative and qualitative differences in the portrayal of European, Asian and South American immigrants in the Argentine press. For starters, Europeans were praised the most in the press, receiving 66% of th e total positive instances coded. At the same time, 80% of what was said about Europeans was favorable to them, while this number decreased to 57% for Asians, and to 50% for neighboring immigrants. European immigration was idealized as a group of br ave people that came to contribute to the growth of Argentina with its hard work. In contrast, immigrants from the Southern Cone did not seem to comply with su ch heroic roles. Some stories that discussed the history of immigration to Argentina are illustrative in this respect. When describing European immigration, one article referred to the “Italian and Spanish immigrants from all regions that joined their efforts in the expansion of Argentina” (Clarín , 01/31/84). In a similar vein, another story spoke of the “millions of

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109 immigrants arrived from all parts of the globe that invested their generous contribution in founding the basis of Argentina” (Clarín 10/23/1983). As we can see, European 80 50 57 20 50 43 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 EuropeanNeighboringAsian Negative positive Figure 4-2 Portrayal of Immigrants in The Press 1983-1984: A Comparison between European, Latin American and Asian immigrants were portrayed in a heroic way. However, when the articles addressed the immigration from the Southern Cone they did not emphasize any major contribution by these immigrants. One of the articles mentioned above first explained how the immigration from Europe decreased while the immigration from Southern Cone countries became more important. “After the 1930s,” th e journalist continued, “Argentina has been attracting unemployed labor from bordering c ountries” (Clarín, 01/ 31/84). According to these views, European immigration had a majo r role in the constr uction of Argentina. Neighboring immigrants, in turn, were portray ed as a passive group of unemployed that happened to be attracted to Argentina. Maybe more illustrative were the articles th at provided details about the impact of immigration on the Argentine society. For in stance, one story expl ained how European

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110 immigrants came to constitute the Argentine middle class and founded hospitals, schools, orphanages, and rest-homes (Clarín, 10/18/1983). It also described how these immigrants developed the wine industry in the West of the country and, in general, developed the productive structure of Argentin a (Ibid.). This story also outl ined some contributions of the small Japanese community to society. However, this articl e, while supposedly reviewing the whole history of immigration to Argentina, had nothing to say about the Southern Cone immigration. This is a signifi cant omission if we consider that most immigration in the last fifty years or iginated in bordering countries. Even some articles that were supportiv e of neighboring immigrants provided considerably negative picture of the impact of neighboring immigrants on the Argentine society. One story, which covere d a request by the Catholic C hurch to grant residency to immigrants from the Southern Cone exem plifies this (Clarín, 01/22/1984). Although bishops interviewed intended to support the cause for th e regularization of these immigrants, they did not provide informati on about positive contri butions of bordering immigrants to the Argentine society. A doc ument by the Church cited by the journalist first stated that, due to the l ack of papers, immigrants from Southern Cone countries were exploited and could not exerci se their rights to education, health, housing, and freedom (Ibid.). The same document then explained that these immigrants lived in marginal areas in the periphery and that th is circumstance made it impossible for them to harmoniously integrate into the rest of the community. As one can see, these statements were trying to make one sympathetic to the cause of neighbor ing immigrants. Nonetheless, I personally believe that it would have been more eff ective to note some contributions of these immigrants to the Argentine society. To be su re, it may well be that the impact assigned

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111 to European immigration is related to the golden era of Argentina. But the benefits/problems assigned to immigrants fr om Europe and from South America were nevertheless contrasting. Other groups of immigrants also attracte d less admiration by the Argentine press. This was the case of the immigration from As ian countries, about which Argentines were at least, ambiguous. Argentina has an old Ja panese community that immigrated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Some Japane se immigrants work in horticulture while others run restaurants, dry cleaners, and ot her businesses. An article in the newspaper Clarín , while reviewing the history of im migration to Argentina, referred to the contribution of the Japanese community (Cla rín, 10-18-83). The stor y first treated these immigrants as “exotic.” Specifically, it stated that despite being “exotic, these Japanese immigrants had become part of the demogra phic peculiarities of Argentina” (Ibid.). The journalist appeared to be surprised the Japanese immigran ts were integrated into the Argentine society at all. In contrast, he noted the importa nt role played by Italian immigrants. “Italian immigrants,” the jour nalist continued, “had contributed to the formation of the Argentine middleclass and it s culture” (Ibid.). In addition, the story minimized the merit of the success of the Japanese community in Argentina. This was done when explaining the progress of Japanese immigrants in Argentina. In this regard, the article explained that these immigrants ha d come to Argentina with no resources and later became independent businessmen. But inst ead of attributing this success to some type of “immigrant work ethic,” so commonl y referred to when talking about European immigration, the journalist concluded that th ere was no explanation for this success.

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112 Another Asian country represented in Ar gentina is Laos. The different military governments during the Cold War had welcomed refugees fleeing communist regimes. In 1979, some 300 hundred families arrived from Laos, which was under control of the communist forces since 1975. Soon after their arrival, these Laotia n families received considerable attention by the press because of some complaints by neighbors that these immigrants were eating dogs. In 1984, a pr ess article in the newspaper La Nación attempted to assess the degree of integration th at the refugees from Laos had achieved in the country. As in the case of the Japanese immigration commented above, the journalist did not persuade the reader that Laotian immi grants had been easily integrated. The story started by lamenting that “it is true that some of these immigrants had shown some adaptation problems,” probably referring to t hose incidents publicized in the country years earlier (La Nación, 10/17/1983). The journalist also explai ned that adaptation problems were common in cases of forced migration. Later, the column acquire d a more positive tone when commenting on some successes achieved by the Laotian refug ees. The success included that 85% of the chiefs of household were employed, and that their children had learned Spanish and were performing well at school. However, the journalist seemed surprised that these immigrants were fairly integrated into the Argentine society. Furthermore, he transmitted the impression the integration of Laotian immigr ants required extraord inary effort on the part of the Argentine community. He did so by overly praising the hospitality of the Argentine community. According to the journa list, Argentines were hospitable because they did not discriminate against the Laotian immigrants on the basis of race or religion.

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113 We can conclude that the preference for Eu ropean immigration was still present in Argentina during 1983-1984 and likely influenc ed the enactment of more favorable immigration rules for Europeans in 1988. None theless, the consideration of immigrants and immigration in general was favorable for their inclusion in the imagined community. As in earlier periods, Argentines associated economic prosperity and immigration to the point that economic success could be j udged by the significance of international migration. International factors can also shape immigration policy decisions. For instance, the occurrence of certain events as wars and the existence of increased cooperation between countries are likely to influence immigration decisions. In 1984, however, the immigration rules of the Argen tine State were even for all countries. The amnesty favored foreigners from any nationa lity. For this reason, I believe it is not necessary to consider internat ional factors as a possible expl anation. Instead, I argue that this type of explanation helps illuminate the cases in which countries have specific immigration arrangements for different countries. War Economy: 1985 Hardening of Immigration Rules For a variety of reasons, the first econom ic plan did not bring about the desired recovery. At the beginni ng of 1985, Alfonsín appointed a new economic minister (Massun, 1999:87). In June 1985, when inflation rates were steaming ahead at an annual rate of 1,010%, the Minister Sourrouille announced the Plan Austral (Time, 07/01/84). This new plan included the launching of a new currency, salaries and price freezes, controlled interest and exch ange rates, and deficit reduction (Rapoport, 2000:911). Despite the efforts by Alfonsín’s administrati on, the recession strongly hit Argentina in 1985. The gross national product decreased by almost five percent, unemployment climbed almost two percent, and though real salaries slightly re covered, they resumed

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114 their declining tendency the next year (Rapaport, 2000:927). During 1986, the economic plan brought some stability to prices and fa vored growth. By the last trimester of 1986, the economic plan was in need of new adjustments because of the decline in the international prices of wheat and corn. For one thing, the fall of agricultural pri ces had reduced the state’s capacity to collect export taxes. For a nother, although inflation did not stop, public services tariffs were frozen. In addition, the weight of the interests on the external debt signified an increased drain of state resources. Within th is context, in February 1987 the government announced a new economic plan, which incl uded a new freeze on salaries and public services’ tariffs, a new and fixed exchange rate and lower interest ra tes. This new plan was short-lived and inflation soon rec overed its upward trend. Not surprisingly, Alfonsín’s party, the Radi cal Civic Union, was defeat ed in the September 1987 congressional and provincial elections (Massun, 1999:168).15 Despite a last effort of the radical administration for containing the cr isis through privatizations, unemployment climbed to 8.4% in 1989 and growth decrease d by five percent (Rappaport, 2000:929). Argentina had officially reached hyperinflation in May 1989. Economic factors shaping immigration restrictions The Director of the Immigration Agency, Evaristo Iglesias, accompanied this “war economy”16 with restrictive immigration policy measures. Making use of the wide powers conferred to the Executive by La w 22439, this state official passed two 15 The UCR loses its majority in the House, going from 130 to 117 representatives. In turn, Peronism wins governorships in seventeen provinces and radicalism can only retain three districts. 16 President Alfonsín used these dramatic words to refer to the state of the economy before a mass mobilization in Plaza de Mayo, convoked by him afte r the denunciation of a coup attempt. For more information, see Massun (1999) pages 90 and following; see also Cavarozzi (1997), pages 105 and ff.

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115 resolutions that decreased the possibilities of migrants of entering the country and/or obtaining a legal residency once in it. Resolution 2340/85 established new strict requirements for applying for an immigrant visa in Argentina. The provisions of this last norm were almost identical to those late r approved by Decree1434/87 described below. The other norm determined that migratory au thorities should try to detect what came to be called “false tourists” at the border (Resolution 1089/85). This latter resolution provided border inspectors with the possibility of evaluati ng, and therefore, rejecting, migrants that were likely to overstay their t ourist visas and unlawfully work in Argentina. In order to detect “false t ourists,” the resolution establis hed some guidelines that state officials should follow. These guidelines incl uded checking that the person had a return ticket to his/her country, the av ailability of a certain amount of money for the trip, and a place to stay in Argentina.17 At the same time, the Congress had not yet replaced the immigration legislation from the military dictatorship. The Radical administration had promised to submit a new immigration law for congressional consideratio n. Interior Secretary Raul Galvan created a special committee to produce a new immigrat ion law. The country, according to this state official, needed a law that reflected the population requirements of the country and the Argentine society. Apparently, the Radi cal administration perc eived that a decree enacting new immigration rules should not be delayed any longer. For one thing, the 1985 Director of the Migration Agency’s regulation of the law by lower hierarchy resolution was not considered an adequate legal instrument (Clarín, 10/4/85). For 17 Argentina does not require tourist visa from citizen s of most countries in the Americas and Western Europe. It does require it from Eastern European, African, and Asian ones. In contrast, countries like the US and Canada subject tourist from most origins to a double check: a visa application at the consulate and the admission procedure at the border.

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116 another, Director “Iglesias thought that submitting a law for congressional consideration would take too long.”18 Thus, Silvia Lepore explained, “he decided to smoothen the police character of the 1981 law, through a se t of rules enacted by presidential decree.” The Executive passed Decree 1434/87 in August 1987. The law of 1981 established that foreigners could be accepted in any of three categories: permanent, temporary, or transitory residents (article 12). Only the first two types of immigrants were allowed to work in Argentina. The law also left the requirements applying to each category to th e Executive. Decree 1434/87 stated that the persons that could apply for residency were relatives of Argentines or permanent residents, skilled workers, artists, and sports persons of known solvency, religious workers, and migrants with investment capital (Article 15). Also according to the text of the norm, these restrictive requirements w ould be removed once the country’s economic situation had changed. Decree 1434 /87 stated in its Article 16 that the National Direction of Migration could pass norms to specify or in terpret the requirements established in the article 15, according to new ci rcumstances. The following year, despite the fact that the economic situation was not improving, the Dire ctor of the Immigration Agency passed Resolution 700/88, which provided that the requirements of Decr ee 1434/87 would not apply to European immigrants. Since “most of the migrants that provided the base for the growth and development of our nation came from Europe,” the norm explained, “these migrants deserve special consid eration” (Resolution 700/87). One premise of this study is that in times of crises immigration policies are likely to become more restrictive. It is true that the economic situation was severe and I review 18 Author’s interview with Silvia Lepore, Former Advi ser to the Director of th e Immigration Agency (19841987), May 24 2003.

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117 below different material considerations take n into account by Argentine public officials when deciding immigration policies in the pe riod 1985-1987. I then tu rn to analyze the types of immigrants that Decree 1434/87 attemp ted to attract to the country. I will try to show that even before approving Reso lution 700/88, the govern ment was already discriminating against immigrants from Latin America. This statement is based on the fact that Latin American im migrants are neither investors nor skilled workers. In addition, I challenge the belief that Argent ina needed skilled immigrant labor. Since economics alone cannot explain why immigrati on rules remained more permissive for European citizens, I later expl ore the weight of cultural and international factors in the design of the Argentine rules for th e admission of foreign citizens. Economic hardship appeared to be a factor shaping immigration policies during this period. In a public presentation during 1985, th e former Director of the Immigration Agency explained that “the country has had generous immigration policies since the reestablishment of democracy and it was time for the government to reevaluate those policies” (Iglesias, 1996:190). Di rector Iglesias thought that the Argentine State should reassume its sovereign power in controlli ng immigration flows in a moment in which labor markets, public services, public hospita ls and schools were “saturated” (Ibid.). According to the former state official, Arge ntines had been “sharing” their poverty with their Latin American brothers but it was the government’s res ponsibility to stop this from happening (Ibid. 191). To be sure, the unemplo yment rates during this period were not high (5%) compared to those of the 1990s. S till, it is important to mention that the Argentine State still provides public and free education at all levels and free health services through public hospitals . Although there is no evidence that these services were

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118 “saturated,” some provincial governors ha d complained to the Director of the Immigration Agency that they were spendi ng considerable amounts of money in public services devoted to immigrants. Both former Director Iglesias a nd his adviser Silvia Lepore agreed that complaints from provi ncial governors that immigrants were overburdening public services were an importa nt factor shaping th e policy decisions of 1985 and 1987.19 Accordingly, Resolution 1089/85 explai ned that foreigners originally admitted as tourists, are staying in the count ry and therefore distorting the socioeconomic structure of urban centers. Interestingly, President Alfonsín provided a detailed justification for the enactment of the restrictive immigration measures of the period. In August 1986, several Catholic bishops sent a letter to the president, begging him to review the immigration policies of his government. Alfonsín replied to the letter defending the different government decisions that had made immigration policies st ricter. In the letter he stated that the exceptional circumstances that the country wa s going through justified the enactment of exceptional immigration measures.20 These exceptional circ umstances, according to Alfonsín, had been inherited from previ ous governments and included a significant unemployment rate, insufficient sanitary, educat ional and social infr astructure, and a high infant mortality rate. This situation demande d, according to him, the adoption of a “war economy,” which had to be borne by Argentin es and foreigners alike. And since the capacity of the Argentina to re ceive immigrants was reduced to a minimum, the arrival of 19 Author’s interviews with Evaristo Iglesias, form er Director of the Immigration Agency (1983-1987), March 22 2003 and Silvia Lepore, former Adviser to the Director of the Immigration Agency (1984-1987), May 24 2003. 20 Letter from President Raul Alfonsín to Bishop Romulo Garcia, October 7 1986, in Iglesias, E. Rindiendo Cuentas (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de La Nación , 1985), pp. 198-199 .

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119 immigrants to the country had to be interrupted for the duration of these exceptional circumstances. Overall, it seemed clear that there was an economic motivation for the immigration decisions of the period. However, two issues need fu rther exploration. Why was Argentina now requiring skilled work ers? Why was economic hardship only hardening immigration rules for non-European immigrants? Only skilled workers and investors are welcome in Argentina Decree 1434/87 was supposed to be a re sponse to the economic situation facing Argentina during the period. It is then important to analyze what type of immigration this decree intended to attract to the country a nd the (economic) role th at this immigration was supposed to play. Two of the admission categories created by this decree were strictly related to economic c onsiderations: skilled workers a nd migrants with investment capital. The latter seems reasonable in the cont ext of a severe economic crisis. The arrival of migrants that will make a productive inve stment in the country can create jobs and inject money into the countryÂ’s economy. Th e decision that the country needed skilled workers, however, raises some doubts. Firs t, it is clearly discriminating against immigrants from the Southern Cone since these immigrants do not qualify as skilled workers. The national census showed, for in stance, that the percentage of neighboring migrants who had not completed their pr imary schooling was 47 in 1980 and 33 in 1991 (INDEC, 1997). In addition, it is not at all clear the count ry was in need of skilled workers and that the labor provided by im migrants from bordering countries was no longer demanded. Since the early twen tieth century, the migration fro m nearby countries was seasonal and related to regional economic activities in the Norwest, Northeast, and South (Villar 1984:453-455). The Bolivian immigration was directed to the production of sugar and

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120 tobacco in the Northwest, Paraguayan immi gration specialized in the production of cotton, yerba mate and tea in the Northeast, and Chileans supplied the necessary labor for the Patagonian regionÂ’s horticu lture, fruit-growing, wine pro duction and related services. Although technological advances made most former manual activities more complex, agricultural activities in Argentina still em ployed a significant number of manual, nonqualified workers in the 1980s and 1990s. To take the example of the Southern part of the country, the percentage of ag ricultural workers in Neuque n, Rio Negro and Chubut that did not have complete primary schooli ng, ranged from 53 to 63% in 1991 (INDEC, 1996). In addition, the recession in Argentina did not hit all sectors of the economy evenly. Once international prices recovere d, primary and secondary agricultural products represented more than 70% of the co untryÂ’s gross national product in 1988-89 (Rappoport, 2000:929). Latin American states Â’ withdrawal from import substitution industrialization policies had left a significant number of people out of jobs (Montuschi, 1998:7). At the same time, agricultural produc tion (re)gained a cruc ial role in Latin American economies due to its resistance capacity to economic crises (Benencia, 1997:105). Therefore, it is not cl ear that depriving the regi onal agricultural economies from immigrant labor was in th e interest of the countryÂ’s eco nomy at all. Other activities also depended on foreign labor in Argentin a. Notably, construction had traditionally employed migrants, mostly in the South and in the Buenos Aires Area. Before hyperinflation, for instance, investing in constr uction and real estate constituted an option for those investors that wanted to preserve the value of their mone y (Coremberg, 2000:3). In addition, due to the lower re al salaries, this sector abso rbed unskilled labor displaced

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121 from the manufacturing industries (Ibid.). In 1993, for instance, almost 65% of those employed in construction in the Buenos Ai res Metropolitan Area did not have primary schooling (INDEC, 1993). In some Patagonia provinces, Chilean workers constituted 70% of the construction labor force.21 Considering the diverse im pact of the crisis on the sectoral and regional economics , together with the depende nce of certain regions and sectors on migrant unskilled labor, it is safe to say that Decree 1434/87 was not responding to the purported “populat ion needs” of the country. I mentioned before that economic cons iderations may have influenced the immigration policies of the Argentine Stat e during the period 1985-1988. I also tried to show that Decree 1434/87 was discriminating against immigrants from the Southern Cone and that the state lacked a clear economic motive to do this. Moreover, it is likely that this state decision deprived certain regional economies of the immigrant labor necessary for their development. As menti oned above, in 1988 the Argentine state made its preference for European immigration mo re explicit. Since then, immigrants from Europe could apply for residency in Argentin a by virtue of their national origin. The Director of the Immigration Agency at the tim e, Sergio Rodriguez Onetto, explained that the government was following the Constitutional mandate to encourage European immigration.22 However, this former state official also acknowledged that at the time when the Argentine Constitution was enacted thinking only of European immigration made sense. In the 1800s, Argentina mostly related with Europe and most immigrants 21 Construction is also an important activity for Chilean s in the Patagonia region. For instance, estimates for 1988 indicated that 30% of construction workers in Neuquen and 70% of people occupied in construction in Santa Cruz, were of Chilean origin. See Perez Vichich 1988, pages 459 and ff.. 22 Author’s interview with Sergio Rodriguez Onetto, former Director of the Immigration Agency (19871989), June 2 2003.

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122 came from this continent.23 Besides, during that time there were strong ethno-cultural motivations to encourage immigration from Europe.24 But what justified this differential treatment for Europeans in the 1980s? Cultural reasons behind immigration polic ies: immigration in the print press One possible explanation is that European immigrants were still considered more favorably for membership in the national co mmunity than immigrants from bordering countries or Asian ones. I have already showed that this wa s true during the early 1980s. In 1987, European immigration still occupied a place of honor in the Argentine press. The terms and impacts used to characterize this immigration were positive in 98% of the instances coded. European immigration was sti ll described in a laudable note. One article spoke of European settlers as “groups of men and women that came from other lands to add to the formation of modern Argentin a” and “enriched our culture through their harmonious integration to our national tradi tion” (Clarín, 06/27/1987). Or in the words of a different journalist, European immigrants were “thousands of men and women that arrived to Argentina, prepared for ever ything, to work non-st op (Clarín, 08/07/1987). Thus, the mythical contribution of European immigration to the construction of a great Argentina also appeared in the media in 1987. Surprisingly, immigration from bordering c ountries caught little attention from the press in 1987. Only 3 press articles during this period mention immigration of this origin. And even those stories that featured bordering immigrants ha ve few things to say about them. Furthermore, one column which depicted the history of immigration to Argentina 23 Interview cited. 24 For more information about the ideologies behind the encouragement of European immigration, see Chapter 3.

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123 completely disregarded the existence of the immigration from nearby countries in Argentina. In this column, the journalist stat ed that “forty years ago, Spanish, Italian and families from diverse nationalities constituted the last immigration movement to Argentina” (Clarín, 08/07/1987). The person writing this column appeared to ignore that there were close to a million neighboring immigrants living in Argentina by 1987, and that most of these immigrants had arrived in the country during thos e last forty years the journalist referred to. One po ssible explanation for the li ttle attention devoted to neighboring immigration in the press is that as economic crisis deepened, immigration from Southern Cone countries also decrease d. In particular, skyroc keting inflation rates and successive devaluations of the Argentine currency may have made Argentina less attractive for immigrants. And immigrants from closer countries are likely to respond to changing economic conditions more promp tly. Another possibl e account is that Argentines were (are) less proud of the cont ribution by immigrants from the Southern Cone to Argentina and therefore had less to say about this immi gration and/or were reluctant to acknowledge its benefits. I noted before th e contrasting portrayal of immigration from Europe and from other origins in 1983-1984. In 1987, neighboring immigrants had practically disappeared from the press. Interestingly, the discrimination against im migrants from Southern Cone countries in Argentina seemed to be a central preo ccupation of Pope John Paul II in 1987. During a visit to Argentina, the Pope made immigration the central topic in one his addresses to the Argentine people. In a speech delivered in Para ná, a Northeastern Argentine city part of the once called pampa gringa , the Pope first reviewed the history of immigration to Argentina. He then exalted the contribu tion of the different groups of European

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124 immigrants to the local cultural and religi ous heritage. He also praised the great disposition of the Argentine society to accept and integrate diverse groups of immigrants. In contrast to this disposition, the Pope noted, in “some places there are persistent prejudices against immigrants reflected in the f ear that the outsider that comes to work in the country will produce an imbalance in the host society” (Clarín, 04/10/1987). According to the Pope, these prejudices were seen in the lack of affection and even hostility with which immigrants from neighbori ng countries were treated (Ibid.). He also made a call for Argentines to remain with their hearts open. “If before you welcomed immigrants from the Old World,” the Pope claimed, “do welcome now your less privileged neighbors” (Ibid.). I mentioned before that the Catholic bishops complained to President Alfonsín about the restrictive immigr ation policies of the Argentine State. On a different note, the Pope suggested that the country was discriminating against immigrants from the Southern Cone. But the restrictive immigration policies during this period we re not only hurting immigrants from neighboring countries. With a few exceptions, most immigrants of nonEuropean origin had to prove they were e ither skilled workers or had an investment capital of 30,000 dollars in order for apply for a visa in Argentina during this period. It may therefore be fruitful to explore what was said in the press about other groups of immigrants. One immigrant group that was b ecoming increasingly visible in Argentina was the Korean one. Unlike immigration fr om the Southern Cone, immigration from Korea did receive attention from the pre ss in 1987. South Korean immigration to Argentina became significant during the 1970s (Jeon, 1998:1). At first, most Korean immigrants were of modest social background and settled in shantytowns in some Buenos

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125 Aires areas (Ibid. 2). During the 1980s, many of these immigrants came to the country with investment capital and constituted an entrepreneurial class. Although devoted to diverse economic activities, they soon excelle d in the textile industry earlier dominated by the Jewish community. At first Korean immi grants were using Argentina as a previous step for their emigration to the United St ates. Despite this, by 1985 some 36,000 Korean immigrants were living in Argentina. Most of them had settled in Buenos Aires and its surroundings. As was the case for other Asian groups mentioned above, the view of this immigration in the Argentine press was ambi valent. For instance, one article described the concentration of Korean immigrants in the neighborhood Flores Su r as the creation of a “Chinatown” in Buenos Aires (Clarín, 05/11/ 1987). For one thing, th is story positively portrayed this new ethnic dist rict as “colorful,” “full of the magic characteristic of millenarian cultures,” “bright,” and “enigmatic.” For another, the author seemed worried by the way Koreans were occupying this area of town. Examples of this worry are the comments that Koreans had “invaded” Flor es Sur or were “taking over the whole neighborhood.” To prove these statements, the journalist provided a paragraph summarizing “what anyone who visits this Koreatown” could see: “gracious and seductive Korean ladies, Korean schoolch ildren, Korean babies, female and male Koreans of all ages, sizes and condition app ear all over.” Thus, this ethnic neighborhood was described as attractive and picturesque. At the same time, other statements by the journalist made us think that Argentines also perceived Korean immigration as an “invasion.” While in the first two stories desc ribed above this is stated explicitly, in the

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126 last one cited the journalist uses reiteration (Korean…, Kore an…,) to create the image that Korean immigran ts are “all over.” The ambiguity of the journalist was also seen in other instances. In one of them, he provided the reader with contra sting characterizations of Ko rean immigrants. On the one hand, the journalist described these immigr ants as “good neighbors, good people, and hardworking.” He also pointed out that they did not pick fights with anyone and paid everything cash. But as the author released this positive information about Korean immigrants he also gave other that could make the reader less positive about this immigration. In this regard, he repeated a few times that th ese immigrants did not speak Spanish and needed the help of other me mbers of their communities to get by in Argentina. He also explained that while most Korean stores had signs both in Spanish and Korean others only exhibited signs in Korean. Maybe more shocking was the journalist’s judgment about the reasons why Koreans had migrated to Argentina. Underestimating the personal worth of thes e immigrants and without any empirical evidence, the journalist explained that Kor eans had partly moved to Argentina because they “had anonymous lives in Seoul.” Fina lly, after providing some success stories of Koreans he closed the story by predicting “they [Korean immigrants] multiply. They multiply…” Once again, after showing some pos itive traits of Korean immigration in Argentina, the journalist insinua ted the idea that Koreans were some type of invasion. Another story featuring Kor ean immigration during this period was less ambiguous and more openly critical of Korean i mmigration. Entitled “Koreans Advance over Businesses and small industries: From Seoul to Once,” the article devoted half a page to describe illegal and paralegal ways in which Korean immigrants were achieving

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127 economic success in the textile industry. To be sure, the journalist did acknowledge the existence of a “Korean expertise in the ma ss production of middle qua lity products at low prices” (Clarín, 08/30/1 987). But according to the journalis t, this expertise only partly explained Korean success. He also clarifie d that Korean businessmen had managed to lower costs by engaging in some “clande stine” practices, like disregarding labor agreements and evading taxes. For these re asons, the journalist stated, the textile workers’ union had been keeping an eye on these Korean entrepreneurs. Apparently, certain union leaders could not forgo that Kor ean businesses were payi ng salaries at least 30% below the legal minimum, making peopl e work between 14 and 16 hours a day, and employing women and children. Despite all th ese irregular practi ces, the journalist judged that these businessmen were not backi ng up and were still arriving in the country in significant numbers. This story was meant to make different Argentine audiences hostile to Korean immigration. First, the general public when s howing the different ways in which Korean immigrants were breaking the law. As Gilroy pu ts it, the law and the ideology of legality express and represent the nati on and national unity (Gilroy, 1991:74). According to this author, law is a national institution and adhere nce to its rule symbolizes the imagined community of the nation and expresses the funda mental unity and equality of its citizens. It therefore follows that if Korean immigrants did not respect this na tional institution they could be excluded from the national commun ity. But these immigrants were not petty criminals. According to the story, they were becoming successful businessmen thanks to the illegal practices in which they were in curring. Thus, the nativ e business class could feel threatened by this unfair competiti on. In addition, Korean entrepreneurs were

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128 exploiting the working class thr ough their illegal practices. In this regard, the newspaper story showed evidence that the unions were opposing these practi ces. One can say that the behaviors by Korean immigrants described in the article likely out raged most readers. Overall, the view of Korean immigrati on in the Argentine press in 1987 was not favorable. I tried to show that the Argentine pred ilection for European immigration remained in place during this period. This immigra tion received the immense majority of the positive instances used to describe immigran ts and their impact. At the same time, immigrants from the Southern Cone were almo st completely ignored in the press during this period. There is some evidence that this immigration decreased as economic instability became more pronounced. It is also likely that Argentines were less proud of this immigration and decided to ignore its c ontribution to Argentina. In turn, the press became progressively critical of immigrants from Korea. Overall, we can hypothesize that the ideas about European immigrants Â’ appropriateness for membership in the national community may have influenced the enactment of special immigration rules for them. International factors shaping im migration policies during the 1980s Finally, the relationships between th e sending and receiving countries can sometimes shape immigration policies. It may be therefore profitabl e to explore if the there exists some type of international ju stification for the distinctive immigration policies that the Arge ntine state had for Europeans a nd non-Europeans during this period. Was there some particular relationship with European countries that justified a special immigration treatment for its nationals? How were the international relationships with the immigration sending countries of the Southe rn Cone? After the reestablishment of

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129 democracy, Alfonsín’s administration devoted co nsiderable attention to foreign relations. During the military dictatorship the country ha d become progressively isolated. In the context of the Cold War, th e relationships with Western Europe gained significant importance for Alfonsín’s presidency. Alf onsín had little in common with President Ronald Reagan. But he hoped that the return of democracy and the ideological affinity between him and several of the European ruling parties would lead to fruitful relationships between the two (Rapoport, 2000: 896). President Alfonsín visited Spain, Italy, France and Germany. At the same ti me, important European leaders visited Argentina. The Argentine government reac hed understandings with its European counterparts in issues like disarmament, human rights in Latin America, and the redemocratization of Central America. Overa ll, the international image of Argentina changed during this period and the relationshi ps with Western Europe, so hurt during the military dictatorship, were recomposed. But Argentina expected Europe to differen tiate itself from the United States and provide a strong support for the external debt negotiations. This, how ever, did not occur. The European countries recognized the political nature of the Latin American external debts. But they nevertheless conditioned their investment to the negotiation of a previous agreement with the Internat ional Monetary Fund (Rapopor t, 2000:897). After this, the relationships between Argentina and Europe changed. Argentina privileged particular agreements with specific countries that encour aged private investment. In this vein were several cooperative agre ements signed with Italy and Spain, the main European countries of emigration to Argentina. In general, the relations with the European countries improved considerably during Alfonsín’s administration. But does the degree of

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130 international cooperation with Western Europe justify a special immi gration treatment for its citizens? For starters, there is no evid ence from my research that any European government had formally requested any speci al immigration consider ation. Nonetheless, I consider it may be fruitful to compare th e foreign relations that Argentina had with other Southern Cone countries in order to answer to that question. I mentioned above that 95% of the immigran ts that regularized their immigration status in 1983 were nationals of neighboring countries. It is then important to explore the state of the foreign relations of Argentin a with its neighboring countries. Alfonsín’s administration strongly prioritized the fore ign relations with other Latin American countries. This administration was determin ed to give impulse to Latin American integration, strengthen regional institutions, foment peace and reje ct any doctrine that aimed at subordinating the interests of the region to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The external debt became the most important problem on the Latin American foreign agenda. In this re gard, eleven Latin American nations arrived to Cartagena’s Consensus in June 1984 (R apoport, 2000:898). With lit tle success, this agreement sought a collective negotiation of th e external debts of the countries of the region. Table 4-2 Number of International Agreements signed by Argentina and Selected Countries between 1976 and 1989* Number of Agreements signed with each Country Period Uruguay Paraguay Brazil Bolivia Chile Spain Italy 19761983 44 71 54 49 34 19 13 19831989 48 18 125 24 21 36 59 * The information for this table was obtaine d from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website (htt p://www.cancilleria.gov.ar).

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131 With respect to the countries of the Southe rn Cone, it is important to mention that only Bolivia was under democratic rule in 1983. Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile were still under military rule. Therefore, th e leaders of these countries looked at the democratization process in Argentina with some distrust (Alconada Sempe, 1996:347). Likely, this circumstance al so had a negative impact on th e foreign relations between Argentina and its neigh bors. Paraguay and Chile25 remained under military rule until 1989 and 1990, respectively. This probably expl ains the decrease in the number of international agreements signed with these two countries during Alfonsín’s administration (1983-1989) when compared with the military period (see Table above). It is true, increased cooperation between count ries can lead to more open immigration policies. At the same time, the fact the some neighbori ng countries were still under military rule could have been an incentive to enact more permissive immigration rules for their citizens. This was the opinion of several Argentine legislators at the time. In three different occasions, Argentine congressmen requested that the Executive relaxed the immigration rules for neighboring immigrants. One of the main arguments used by legislators to justify the reque st was, precisely, that Chile and Paraguay were still under military rule. Both Uruguay and Brazil made their tran sition to democracy in 1985. After that, the cooperation with these countries increa sed considerably. During the mid-eighties, 25 Despite this, one of Alfonsín’s international prior ities was to improve the relationship with Chile, which had been deeply deteriorated during the military dictatorship. At the end of 1978, Chile and Argentina had been on the brink of war, due to some old limit disputes over certain islands of the Beagle Canal. This conflict “hibernated” until the democratic governme nt reassumed power. In 1984, the government was determined to find a peaceful resolution to the limit’s conflict with Chile (Rapoport 2000:879). In November of 1984, despite wide opposition from unions, the right and the Peronist party, the population favorably voted a referendum to accept a Vatican’s verd ict from 1970. Four days later the definite peace agreements were signed in the Vatican.

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132 Argentina initiated a considerab le integration process with Brazil and, to a lesser extent, with Uruguay. In 1985, Argentina signed agreements with Brazil to increase collaboration in nuclear, technical and industrial matters (R apoport, 2000:899). In December of 1986, both countries signed a series of integration agreements that provided the basis for the constitution of the Southern Common Market in the 1990s. I believe one can use the number of intern ational agreements signed with each country as a proxy for international cooperation. In this light, one can argue that Argentina established the most cooperative relations with Brazil (124 agreem ents) during this period (see table above). In turn, the cooperative relations achie ved with Uruguay (48 agreements) were comparable to those reached with Italy ( 59 agreements) and Spain (36 agreements). The foreign relations with these two Eur opean countries appeared to have been more profitable than with the countries Paraguay and Chile (18 and 21 agreements, respectively). However, as mentioned earlier, the existence of military regimes in these countries could have constituted a good reason for the enactment of more open immigration rules for their citizens. The num ber of agreements signed with Italy and Spain did surpass the number of agreements signed with Bolivia, which was not under military rule. Overall, in my view, the intens ity of the foreign relations with Europe did not seem exceptional enough as to justify a spec ial immigration regime for its nationals. At best, European citizens should have subjec ted to the same immigration rules for Brazil and Uruguay. Still, as mentioned above, Eur opean citizens after 1988 were only required proof of identity in order to apply for reside ncy in Argentina. All other immigrants had to comply with the stricter require ments imposed by Decree 1434/87.

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133 Conclusions The immigration policies duri ng Alfonsín’s government attempted to regularize the immigration status of all fore igners in 1984. This occurred despite the severity of the economic crisis. Human rights considerations and an Argentine tradition to grant residency to foreigners during democratic regimes influenced this decision. In addition, the existence of a positive view of immigrants and immigration in th e press, coupled with the Argentine preoccupation with the emig ration of Argentines likely helped the enactment of the amnesty decree. As the economic conditions worsened, th e Argentine immigration rules became stricter. While economic factors help us understand the approval of the general immigration rules in 1985 and 1987, they cannot account for the special immigration regime for European citizens passed in 1988. The persistence of a favorable view of Europeans for inclusion in the Argentine co mmunity likely shaped the immigration rules applicable to them. At the same time, the le ss favorable treatment of South American and Asian immigration in the press possibly in fluenced the immigration rules for them. Finally, there is no clear evidence that interna tional factors helped the passage of special immigration rules for Europeans. While the fo reign relations with Italy and Spain were friendly during this period, they were not stronger than those with Brazil and Uruguay. Furthermore, the existence of military dict atorships in Chile and Paraguay throughout the period could have induced the enactment of more favorable immigration rules for those countries.

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134 CHAPTER 5 IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING PRES IDENT MENEMÂ’S ADMINISTRATION: 1989-1995 Introduction For most of the 1990s the immigration polic ies of the Argentine State maintained a double standard: more permissive immigrati on rules favored European immigrants over Southern Cone ones. Economic stability brough t some favorable rules for Southern Cone immigrants. However, as economic conditions worsened, the state restricted the immigration of certain groups of immigrants. While it enacted strict immigration rules for Latin American immigrants, the state also facilitated the immigr ation of Central and Eastern Europeans. As showed through the an alysis of the immigration press coverage, immigrants from Europe were considered be neficial while immigrants from Southern Cone countries became increasi ngly perceived as problematic. The economic stability at the beginning of the decade coupled with a high exchange rate produced increased immigrati on to Argentina from neighboring countries. Likely, these favorable economic conditions influenced the establishment of lax immigration rules at the onset of the decade. It is also important to remember that Argentina signed the MERCOSUR agreement with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay in 1991. The creation of the bloc probably helped the passage of a generous amnesty for neighboring immigrants in 1992. However, the rules for admission of MERCOSUR and European citizens remained the same. Furthermore, Argentine public officials seemed more willing to cooperative with European countries.

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135 Although economic growth continued, by 1993 unemployment rates surpassed 9 percent. At this point the immigration polic ies of the Argentine State took their first restrictive turn when an Ex ecutive decree approved important deportation provisions. The following year, another decree es tablished new rules for the ad mission of foreign citizens in Argentina. The main policy change establis hed by this decree was to require a written job contract in order to be eligible for a work visa. Soon after, however, the Executive exempted Central and Eastern European immigr ants from the application of this decree. What explains this double standard? I argue that economic reasons alone cannot account for it. Otherwise, economic hardship should lead to more restrictive policies for everyone and not just for Southern Cone immigrants. I hypothesize that faced with an increasingly delicate economic situation, the Argentin e State sought obedience and conformity through the use of a na tionalist rhetoric that excluded ne ighboring immigrants first from the national community and later from the le gal one. Instead of reforming its economic plan, it blamed immigrants for most ills of the Argentine society. When immigration restrictions were passed, the public believed that these policy changes were in its best interest. Immigration Policies in the Early 1990s President Menem assumed his presidency earlier than he was supposed to because of the gravity of the economic crisis of 1989. By July infla tion hit a monthly rate of 197 percent, the internal debt had grown e xponentially, and the TreasuryÂ’s income had decreased dramatically in real terms (Rapopor t, 2000:926). Within th is context, outgoing President Alfonsin volunteered to leave the pr esidency six months earlier than expected. During his campaign, Menem had promised a productive revolution and a steep increase in salaries, known as salariazo . Soon after the presidential election took place in May

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136 1989, however, it became clear that he woul d not follow the statist, inward-oriented economic model characteristic of the Peroni st Party to which he belonged. Instead, Menem set out to transform Argentina th rough the implementation of a series of economic policies framed w ithin the so-called Washi ngton Consensus, such as macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalizati on, privatization, deregulation, and related marketoriented policies. To this end, he formed an alliance with conservative Argentine economic groups, external creditors, and neo liberal technocrats (Balsa, 2001:214). Very few positions in MenemÂ’s government were filled with Peronists (Levitsky, 2003:145). Menem appointed a member of th e most powerful Argentine economic group at the time, Bunge & Born, as his Minist er of Economy (Diaz, 2002:44). The orthodox economic plan that this new Mi nister devised first shocked th e Peronist legislators when presented for their consideration (Ibid.: 45). Despite this, th e Congress passed the Economic Emergency and the State Reform Laws. These laws became the backbone of the reforms that followed. They deregulate d the economy, liberaliz ed trade, and paved the road for broad privatizat ions. The other leg of Argen tinaÂ’s economic restructuring came about in 1991, when Domingo Cavallo wa s appointed Minister of Economy. Of a more heterodox nature (Palermo, 1998:41), the Convertibility Law was designed to control inflation and influence exchange rate s. For this purpose, the law prohibited the emission of money by the Central Banks and fi xed the exchange rate of the Peso-Dollar at one-to one. These economic measures seemed to have a favorable impact on the Argentine economy. But the international setting was also very favorab le. Interest rates in the United States remained low and capital was available for emerging markets. Inflation

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137 disappeared and the gross national product gr ew more than 10 percent in 1991. Exports increased during the early 1990s. However, due to the comparatively high prices in Argentina and the low tariffs, imports grew at a faster rate than e xports. Maybe for this reason, employment never performed really well during this period. It was at 6 percent in 1991 and followed a steadily ascending tende ncy after that (Rapoport, 2000:1024). Likely, the abrupt liberalizati on of trade coupled with the di fficulties in exporting that the fixed exchange rate produced contributed to the high unemployment ra tes in the 1990s in Argentina. Immigration to Argentina 1990s The stable macroeconomic scenario , and maybe more importantly, the comparatively high salaries that Argentina ha d to offer made it attractive to immigrants during the early 1990s. Between the year 1991 and 1992, almost 1 million immigrants from the Southern Cone entered the country and almost 20 percent of them settled in Argentina (Oteiza and Aruj, 1997:21). But before dealing with the immigrants arriving in Argentina during the 1990s, it may be useful to review the characteristics of the ones that were already in the country. By 1990, most immigration to Argentina originated in neighboring countries. The Census of 1991 reco rded almost 850,000 citizens from Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile livi ng in Argentina (INDEC, 1997:17). With regard to the geographic locat ion, 56 percent of these neighbo ring immigrants lived either in Buenos Aires City, in its Metropolitan Area , or in the Province of Buenos Aires. This tendency to settle in the Central region of Buenos Aires was more pronounced in 1991 than in 1980. Certain groups of immigrants , however, still preferred locations in the peripheral provinces bordering with their coun tries of origin. More than half of the Chilean immigrants, for instance, had settled in the Southern provinc es of the Patagonia

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138 region (Ibid. 20). Also more than one thir d of the Paraguayan immi grants lived in the Northeastern provinces and a similar proporti on of Bolivians did so in the Northwest region. With regard to the national origin of immigrants, neighboring ones comprised 52 percent of the foreign born population. The rest of the foreign born population was mainly composed by Italian (20 percent) a nd Spanish immigrants (14 percent). In 1991, as Figure 5-1 shows, one third of neighbor ing immigrants were from Paraguay and a similar proportion from Chile (INDEC, 1997:15) . These groups of immigrants were followed in importance by Bolivians ( 18%) and Uruguayans (16.5%). Although these national origin proportions we re maintained during the 1990s, new arrivals followed a different pattern. For one thing, Paraguayan immi grants lost their fi rst place to Bolivian immigrants. For another, immigration from Uruguay and Chile became less important (Texido et al. , 2003:22). At the same time, the number of immigrants from Peru, a nonneighboring country, doubled during the 1990s (Ibid.). Out of the immigrants that obtained their papers in the period 1992/94, 49% were from Bolivia, 27% from Paraguay, 13% from Chile and the rest from Brazil and Uruguay. The occupation of immigran ts varies with their ge ographic location (complete other regions). In Buenos Aires and it s surroundings, recent neighboring immigrants work in significant numbers in the domestic sector (41%), in construction (16%), and in manufacturing (14%); (Maguid, 1995). These se ctors have the lowest paying jobs with few fringe benefits. The rest of them ar e distributed between services (10%) and commerce (9%). Overall, two thirds of ne ighboring immigrants in the Buenos Aires

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139 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 UruguayBoliviaBrazilChileParaguay Origin of ImmigrantsPercentage 1991 Census 1992/1994 Amnesty Figure 5-1. National Origin of Neighbori ng Immigrants in 1991 and New Arrivals 1992/1994. Metropolitan Area have unskilled jobs. Studies show that ne ighboring migrants seem to complement the native labor force fairly well, since they occu py jobs that are not attractive for natives (Montoya and Perticara, 1995). The kinds of jobs that immigrants get are, of course, related to their educational level. For instance, while 20 percent of the native adults have not completed their primar y schooling this number climbs in the case of neighboring immigrants to more than one third (INDEC, 1997:38).1 Economic Factors Shaping Argentin e Immigration Policies of 1993/1993 I mentioned before that economic stab ility during the early 1990s increased immigrant arrivals to Argentina. Likely, it also influenced the enactment of moderately generous immigration policies during this period. In 1992, the Executive approved an amnesty that benefited 230,000 immigrants from Southern Cone countries (Decree 1 There are, however, some varia tions according to national origin. Brazilians, Uruguayans and Chileans residing in Buenos Aires are equally or more educated than natives.

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140 1033/92). The International Organization fo r Migration and Catholic Church had pressured for the regularization of immigr ants during the first years of MenemÂ’s Presidency.2 According to the former Director of the Immigration Agency, Jorge Gurrieri, two main reasons delayed the enactment of the amnesty.3 For one thing, amnesties had usually been enacted duri ng democratic government following military ones. The amnesties of 1958, 1964, and 1974 had followed this pattern. Apparently, it seemed difficult to justify why a democra tic government should make use of this supposedly exceptional measure. At the same time, Gurrieri thought th at the political and economic uncertainty following the hyperinf lation of 1989 did not help an earlier approval of the amnesty. When it was finally passed in June 1992, this amnesty allowed neighboring immigrants -i.e. immigrants from Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile -to apply for permanent residency in Argentina. This amnesty proved kind to neighboring immigrants. The requirements established by Decree 1033 of 1992 to apply for reside ncy were not demanding. Immigrants only needed to prove identity and date of entry to the country. And a birth certificate, which most of the times is costly to obtain, was not even required. Since many people expressed an interest in regularizing their immigrat ion status through this amnesty, the initial deadline of April 1993 was extended until December 31 1993. Also, the administrative procedure for the visa application during the amnesty was decentralized.4 This circumstance also made the applications for residency more available to immigrants, 2 AuthorÂ’s interview with Jorge Gurrieri, former Direct or of the Immigration Agency (1993-1995), July 15 2002. 3 AuthorÂ’s interview cited. 4 AuthorÂ’s interview with a former adviser of th e Under-Secretary of Population, July 4, 2003.

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141 since the paperwork could be in itiated in any of the twenty five regional offices of the Immigration Agency and in some municipa lities of the Greater Buenos Aires Region. These facilities, however, did not preclude the abuse by middlemen who took advantage of the desperate situa tion of undocumented immigrants. In some cases, investigations that followed the commission of crimes prove d the involvement of employees of the immigration agency and high ranking officials from foreign Consulates.5 At the same time, the Argentine government expressed an interest in attracting 300,000 Central and Eastern European citizens to Argentina (Página 12 and La Nación, 1/25/92). In February 1992, Presid ent Menem made this offer offi cial in a presentation to the European Parliament. Echoing the immigr ation policy from the 19t h century, the plan was to get financial assistance from internati onal institutions and ba nks in order to put this program into practice. The program would include Spanish courses, temporary lodging at arrival, and loans for housing and entrepreneurial activities (La Nación, 1/31/92). Although financial aid did not materialize (Cancille ria Argentina, 2002), other provisions facilitating the immigration of these European s remained in place. I already mentioned the possibility that stable econom ics may have influenced these immigration policies. How were immigrants portrayed in the press during this period? Do we note differences between different groups of immigrants? Were there other international considerations influencing st ate immigration decisions rega rding the admission of foreign citizens? I attempt to answer to these que stions in the remainder of this section. 5 Author’s interview cited.

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142 Cultural factors shaping Arge ntine immigration policies 1993/1993 I now turn my attention to the possibili ty that cultural factors may be shaping immigration policies. In particular, I i nvestigate how the process of immigration decision-making is traversed by national identi ty theories, which suggests that ideas of nation shape immigration policies. 6 Ideas of nationhood tell us what nations are and what holds them together. For this reason, they are also likely to pr ovide clues about who can be considered a desirable member of the community. Immigration policies are rules for admission of new residents. As such, they can be influenced by these ideas of nation and nationhood. Before, we saw some of thes e conceptions of ideal citizen as they developed throughout the history of Argentina. Are the differe nt groups of immigrants in 1992 considered as “desirab le” potential members of th e Argentine community? As mentioned elsewhere, the themes and terms used to refer to immigrants can be considered as the first indication of where they stand vis-à-vis members of the imagined community. In what follows, I describe how immigrants we re characterized in the print press during 1992. Overall, the media coverage of immigrat ion in 1992 was moderately positive and can be considered receptive of immigrants as new members of the imagined community. Out of the 124 instances coded, 47 percent are positive and 53 percent negative. As we 6 For general works on national identity and immigration see A. Behdad 1997, “Nationalism and Immigration to the United States,” Diaspora, 6, 2, 1997; to an extent K. Fitzgerald, K, The Face of The Nation: Immigration, The State and The National Identity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); or the classics by R. W. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) and J. Higham. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers Un iversity Press, 1995).

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143 will see for the periods 1993 and 1994, the posit ive instances referring to immigration are only 4 and 5 percent, respectively (See Figure 5-2). In 1992, migrants are overall treated in a respectful way compared to the later peri ods. Out of the instances that show respect for immigrants, 53 percent of them refer to th em as “citizens” -for instance, “citizens of Bolivia” or “citizens of neighbor ing countries.” In the late r period, the term immigrant becomes synonymous with “ilegal” and “clande stino,” and consequently, immigrants are never referred to as “citizens.” The mention of benefits associated with immigration is almost twice more frequent than that of risks. Among the desirable impacts of immigration, the most common is growth and economic prosperity, wh ich appears in 30 percent of the cases. 53 96 95 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 199219931994 % Negative instances Figure 5-2 Negative Terms Referring to Immigrants Media Coverage 1992/1994 Not all immigration, however , is considered equally beneficial. The favorable impact on the economy is attributed to th e immigration from Europe. In the period between January and June 1992, the project to bring immigrants from Central and Eastern

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144 Europe was intensely debated in the newspa pers. Some of the opinions supporting this plan resemble Sarmiento’s and Alberdi’s ideal s of bringing European population in order to foster development. For instance, on th ree occasions, Alberdi’s famous phrase “to govern is to populate” appears in La Nación to support the governme nt plan to attract European immigration (La Naci ón, 2/13/92, 2/20/92/, and 4/1/ 92). Foreign Minister Di Tella, when asked about the reasons to enc ourage European immigration stated that “in Argentina as well as in the US, immigration is associated with a process that was very positive in the past” (La Nación, 2/13/92). Or in the words of th e Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Petrella, “immigration from fa st-growing countries brings some of that push with it” (Página 12, 2/5/94). As we can see, Argentinean public officials are highly positive about the impact of European immigration on Argentina. During the period in which the 1992 amne sty was enacted, immigration from the Southern Cone also received attention from the press. In comparison to the coverage of European immigration, the portr ayal of migrants from the region is less favorable. The benefits attributed to this migration, in fact, are so mewhat more modest. Discourses do not show a causality between immigration fr om the region and the development and/or economic growth of the country. In ge neral, they limit themselves to an acknowledgement that neighboring migrants “ do work” and make a contribution to the Argentine economy. For instance, Decree 1033/92 states that “the majority of those persons, even without the necessary legal docum ents, develop activities that are useful for the country.” On a different note, discrimi natory attitudes towards Latin American immigrants are revealed in the statement by the Bolivian Minister of Interior that “migrants come to work in Argentina and they do not deserve to be treated as criminals”

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145 (Página 12, 3/31/92). At best, these statemen ts seem to be a call for “tolerating” immigration from the Southern Cone. Beyond this call for toleration, both the pre ss and public officials had very little to say about the benefits of immigration from th e Southern Cone. At times public officials, more than highlighting the benefits of im migration itself outline the impact of the amnesty decree. German Moldes, Secretary of Population, explains that the amnesty will “give more transparency to the labour market” and avoi d “the exploitation of undocumented workers” (Página 12, 6/6/92). Additionally, Decree 1033/92 stresses the need for “diminishing tax evasion and fiscal losses” due to undocumented migrant work. Although there is nothing intr insically wrong with these statements, they nonetheless contrast with the almost mythical impact on the economy that the immigration from Europe is supposed to produce. Although the immigration press coverage was overall receptive of immigration some pessimistic descriptors and themes we re coded during this period. Negative terms referring to immigrants in 1992 were found in 20 percent of the cases. It is important to note that eighty-seven percent of these nega tive terms were used in connection with immigrants from neighboring countries. The most common of those terms was “ilegal” and “clandestino” (51 percent) . The discussion of risks asso ciated with immigration is four to five times less frequent in 1992 th an in 1993/94, appearing only in 12 percent of the instances. Additionally, I did not encounter specific negative themes that repeatedly appeared in the news articles associated with immigrants. I be lieve this evidence, together with the moderately low occurrence of negative terms and themes, shows that a structured exclusionary discour se was not working to keep immigrants out of Argentina.

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146 Moreover, I argue that the lack of an exclusionary discour se toward migrants coupled with a stable macroeconomi c scenario contributes to more receptive immigration policies. Nonetheless, the preference for Eu ropean immigration is evident during this period. Immigration Policies in 1994 The year 1993 was a turning point for th e immigration policie s of the Argentine State. In 1993, the Executive passed a decree which empowered it to deport immigrants that were committing crimes. This decree was meant to “take care of the serious problem caused by the illegal occupation of dwellings and other crimes that alter social peace” supposedly caused by immigrants (Decree 2771/93). It was also directed to provide the Executive with an “agile and effective methodology to facilitate the immediate deportation of illegal immigrants.” This decree sadly resembles the infamous Residence Law of 1902, which was enacted to deport an archist and socialist activists who were altering order by their participation in the la bor movement. Both legal norms are in open conflict with the Argentine Constitution. But while the residence law was enacted during an era of restricted votin g rights and conservative gove rnments, Decree 2771/93 was passed under a supposedly democratic admini stration. In addition, the 1993 decree’s illegality is reinforced by the fact th at it was enacted by Presidential decree. The Argentine courts have provided se veral legal arguments to sustain the unconstitutionality of these deportation norms . For starters, the Argentine Constitution establishes that a person cannot be sentenced without due process (Article 18). Both norms under analysis here deprive immigrants of this right since the courts do not participate in the deportation process and immigrants cannot defend themselves. These norms can also be questioned on the grounds th at the Argentine constitution consecrates

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147 all civil rights to “inhabitants” and not just for citizens (Art icle 14). Although the definitions of “inhabitant” have varied across time, most legal opinions agree that a person that has resided several years in Ar gentina cannot be deported without violating the constitution. In addition, both norms viol ate the division of powers by allowing the Executive to judge who is committing a crime a nd/or affecting social peace and order. What made the Executive take such extrem e and questionable measures in 1993? After reviewing the other immigrati on policy changes that took place during this period, I will attempt to answer to this question. In 1994 the immigration policies in Argentina took another restrict ive turn. In June the Executive passed Decree 1023/94, which regulated the provisions of the Law 22439 from 1981, and amended Alfonsín’s Decree 1434/ 87. This norm established new rules for immigration into Argentina. It establishes th at the persons that can apply for residency are relatives of Argentines or permanent resi dents, workers with a written job contract, artists, and sports persons of known solvency, religious workers, and migrants with investment capital (Article 15). The clauses of this decree are similar to those from Alfonsín’s government and they are more perm issive in one respect and more restrictive in another one. They are more permissive because they do not require migrants to be skilled. Instead, the decree admits all types of workers with the onl y condition being that they have a written job contract from an Argentine employer (Article 27). This last requirement, however, makes immigration policie s stricter. Most migrants find jobs in informal sectors of the economy. In 1994, one qua rter of male workers were employed in construction and as many as half of female mi grants worked in the domestic sector (Sana, 1999). Many employers are reluctant to si gn job contracts for several reasons. In

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148 particular, is not customary to sign written job contracts and, moreover, employers fear legal and fiscal consequences. This is even truer of sectors of the economy that are more informal. Additionally, the immigration office’ s regulations oblige employers to provide proof that they do not have any fiscal debts with the Federal Government. It is important to emphasize that few m onths after this restrictive decree was approved, Central and Eastern Europeans were exempted from its application. Decree 1023/94 had opened the door for special immigrati on regimes, by stating that the Minister of Interior could establish them based on “ge ographic, historical or economic reasons” (Article 15.ll). A resolution by the Ministry of Interior (Resolution 4632/94) established the Central and Eastern European immigrants di d not need to have a job contract in order to apply for residency in Arge ntina. As mentioned earlier, the plan to bring Europeans from former-Communist countries originated in an invitation made by President Menen before the European Parliament and was m eant to alleviate the “immigration problems” that the fall of Communism was supposed to cause in Western Europe (Cancilleria Argentina, 2002). This policy for Europeans c ontrasts sharply with the norms enacted for other migrants, including those of MERCOSU R countries. As we will after reviewing the economic situation during 1993 and 1994, economic explanations cannot account for this double standard. Argentine economy after 1993 The Argentine economy by 1993 was not flour ishing. Despite the fact that the country was still growing, unemployment had been rising since 1991 and reached 10 percent during this year (Rapoport, 2000:1019). Between Ma rch 1991 and May 1995, almost 600,000 jobs were lost in Argentin a (Murillo, 1997:425). Several factors can account for the growth in unemployment. First, the layoffs produced as a consequence of

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149 the privatization process and other federal and local level state reforms. For instance, 103,500 employees of state-owned firms lost their jobs between 1989 and 1993 (Murillo, 1997:426). Second, the bankruptcy of severa l labor-intensive manufacturing and processing plants caused by the economic a nd trade liberalization. Some 220,000 jobs were lost in the import competing sectors lik e textile and clothing i ndustries and metallic products (Pessino, 1997:158). Fina lly, additional lay-offs came from cost-saving strategies used different business sectors to face the increased economic competition. Argentina has traditionally had (relative ly) low unemployment rates. During the 1970s and 1980s the main problem had been inflation. For instance, during the Presidential campaign of 1989 no political part y proposed any specific policy for job creation (Diaz, 2002:172). When it became clear that unemployment was a major problem, there were no alternatives to the ne oliberal blueprint. The unions, which had been traditionally Peronist, had supported Keynsian economic policies. When President Menem made his turn toward market-oriented reforms in Argentina, the main Argentine union split. The Federal Conf ederation of Workers (CGT) divided between those who were uncritically accepting MenemÂ’s economic reforms and those who believed in a more independent role of unions (Godi o, 2000:1193). The government had been pushing several laws to make labor markets more flexible. In 1991 a new labor law was passed that facilitated the hiring of workers on a temporary basi s and without severance pay. However, the government also needed the uni onsÂ’ support for the ex tensive privatization plan and other economic reforms and had to ma ke some concessions in order to obtain this support. In this regard, the government had to postpone plans to flexibilize labor markets and to de-regulate the union-run health insurance system, granted unions a share

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150 of the newly privatized industries, and a llowed the unions to participate in the new private pension market (Levitsky, 2003:146) . By 1993, MenemÂ’s administration had not managed to promote a major labor legislation reform. Does the fragile economic situation expl ain immigration policy changes of 1993 and 1994? Not completely. If the high unemployment rates were the main motivation underlying these policy changes the government should have closed the doors for all immigrants. However, it made important exceptions favoring Central and Eastern Europeans. One possible explanation to this double standard may be that neighboring immigrants compete with Argentines for the same jobs. However, the reality indicates that the contrary seems to be the case. The Argentine labor force has been traditionally educated and skilled, and thus should f ace more competition from Europeans than migrants from the region. In the Buenos Ai res Metropolitan Area, where one third of the population lives, 50 percent of natives work in the service sector and another 20 percent in commerce (Sana, 1999). Studies show that neighboring migrants seem to complement the native labor force fairly well, since they occupy jobs that are not attractive for natives (Montoya and Perticara, 1995). As mentioned ear lier, these jobs are mainly concentrated in low-skilled and labor intensive sect ors of the economy like construction and manufacturing for males, and domestic service for females. These sectors have the lowest paying jobs with few fringe benefits. For these reasons, Ar gentines should not feel threatened by migrants from the region. Thes e studies additionally show the impact of immigration from the region on unemploymen t during the 1990s was minimal (Maguid, 1995: Sana, 1999).

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151 It may also be argued that the differen ce in treatment can be explained by the weight migrants have with respect to the total population (Timmer and Williamson, 1996). In the decade 1980-1990, for instance, 216,000 neighboring immigrants settled in the country, while European immigration wa s negative (Lattes and Bartoncello, 1997). However, for 1992, this reasoning does not apply well. The amnesty of 1992 awarded residency to 230,000 migrants, and the governme nt in 1992 was offering to receive as many as 300,000 Central and Eastern European s in the country. So, while in general European immigration may be less of a st ate concern due to its small numeric significance, the opposite can be argued for the year 1992. In sum, economic approaches cannot account for the differentia l consideration that the Argentine State seems to give to European and non-European migrants. As Br ubaker (1992) suggests, our analysis must make room for a “cultural-polit ical” story that is logically dependent from political economy. In the case of Argentina, domestic closure against certai n non-citizens does not obviously rest on material reasons. We therefor e have to search for the answer in the cultural-political outlined below. Cultural factors in the immi gration decisions of 1994/1994 I mentioned before that ideas of nation can shape immigration policies. States also seek obedience and conformity through the use of nationalism (Migdal, 2001:250). The need for conformity is likely to be increas ed in times during which the state does not deliver its basic functions such as sustaini ng a viable economy. Nationalism, according to John Breuilly, is a response to the modern di stinction between state and society (Breuilly, 1994:390). In this case the transformation of society comes through the creation of a subset of it called the nation. When people feel themselves members of the nation, they come to believe that their own well-being a nd the well-being of the nation is one and the

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152 same. In the case of Argentina, I argue that in the midst of an economic downturn after the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, Menem’s administration sought obedience and legitimacy. In combination wi th other social groups, the Argentinean government signaled Latin American immigran ts as undesirable, by scapegoating them for unemployment, crime and most ills of the Argentinean society. In this way, the government distracted public opinion from the real causes of Argentina’s social problems. When Decree 2771/93, enabling the Ex ecutive to deport migrants breaking the law, was passed in December, 9 out of 10 Argentines declared immigration was hurting local labor (Página 12, 12/9/93). It seems that an “immigration crisis” em erged in Argentina in 1993 that prompted state action to resituate order (Heir and Gree nberg 2002). Jorge Gurrieri, former Director of the Immigration Agency, said that “Carre ras [Population Secretary at the time] felt he had to do something about this”7. According to Gurrieri, in 1993 and 1994 there were two realities: the “political te mperature” and what was trul y occurring with immigration. Sometimes, according to Gurrieri, public offi cials were responding more to the former than to the latter. Sergio Rodríguez One tto, a former high ranking official of the Immigration Agency, provided me with an accurate description of the circumstances under which immigration decisions were taken.8 When the Immigration Agency Immigration was proposing legislation, it had to balance the pressure by the construction workers union and the “official propaganda stating that the government would pass 7 Author’s interview with Jorge Gurrieri, former Dir ector of the Immigration Agency (1993-1995), July 15 2002. 8 Author’s interview with Sergio Rodriguez Onetto, former Director of Immigration Admissions at the Immigration Agency, June 2, 2003.

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153 severe legislation to avoid the loss of jobs of natives to foreigners.”9 Immigration became an extremely sensitive issue because it was linked to the fragile economic situation of natives. And “It is always easier to blame outsi ders,” another high rank ing official of the Immigration Agency told me.10 It seems that immigrati on restrictions became instrumental for the state in that they help ed dissipate fears that the economic plan was failing. The first event that triggered subsequent changes in immigration news coverage occurred on July 16 1993, when 350 Brazilians were hired to work in an electrical plant in Buenos Aires. Soon after this episode, Gerardo Martinez, the construction workers union leader, joined forces with other uni on leaders in demanding immigration quotas (Página 12, 7/16/93). The next day, Gustavo Beliz, Minister of Interior, accused immigrants of having more ri ghts than native wo rkers (Página 12, 7/17/93). Other public officials, including Luis Prol, Presidential Spokesman, and the newly appointed Minister of Interior Carlos Ruckauf joined this scapegoating of immigrants, blaming them for unemployment and the overload on public se rvices and accusing them of illegal occupation of dwellings. The Catholic Church reacted to the scape goating of immigrants and warned, about its dangers, though unsuccessfully11. In this climate, the media coverage on immigration issues became 96 percent negative. Immigrant became synonymous with “ ilegales” and “clandestinos” in almost 62 9 Interview cited. 10 Author’s interview with Adriana Alfonso, former Director of Legal Affairs of the Immigration Agency, July 14 2002. 11 Author’s interview with Father Ildo Gris, in charge of a religious NGOs dedicated to help immigrants, July 13 2001.

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154 percent of the cases. The gene ralizing discourse makes the re ader associate immigration with illegality, breaking the law, and disres pecting national institutions. As Paul Gilroy puts it, the law and the ideology of legality express and represent the nation and national unity (Gilroy, 1991). Law is “primarily a nati onal institution and adhe rence to its rule symbolizes the imagined community of the nation and expresses the fundamental unity and equality of its citizens” (Ibid.: 74). As soon as the associati on between immigration and law breaking is established, migrants can be excluded from the national community without regret. To reinforce the associati on of immigrants and illegality, newspaper articles constantly refer to the legal pr oblems created by immigration. Other examples include Minister of Interior Carlos Ruckauf’s justifica tion for increasing immigration controls to prevent “tourists from becoming illegal workers,” (Página 12, 9/12/93), or “thwarting any opportunity for criminal acts” (Página 12, 12/ 23/93). The criminalization of immigrants, however, reached its apog ee in the press coverage of 1994 when 55 percent of the risks associated with immigration referred to illegal or criminal activities. In 1993, the media established the criminality of immigrants as the second most important risk after unemploym ent, displacement of the native labor force, and “social dumping” (40 percent). Immigrants were accu sed of taking away jobs from Argentines, accepting lower salaries and representing unfair competition for Argentines. But these problems were not established in an objective or scientific way. Furthe rmore, even public officials have acknowledged that they were aw are of studies that showed the impact of immigration on unemployment was minimal12. In general, a na tionalistic rhetoric 12 Author’s interview with Jorge Gurrieri, former Direct or of the Immigration Agency (1993-1995), July 15 2002 and Adriana Alfonso, former Director of Legal Affairs of the Immigration Agency, July 14 2002.

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155 accompanied these statements that served to create a boundary between “us” and “them.” Carlos Ruckauf, for instance, declared th at the government “will regulate the admission of foreign citizens with the objective of prioritiz ing jobs for Argentines” (La Nación, 11/21/93). Also, the Minister of Interior stated th at “the 45,000 new jobs that the government expects to create next year are an important political motivation to put an end to illegal immigration” (La Nación, 12/3/93). As we can see, these statements not only hold immigration responsible for Argentina’s economic problems, they also aim to draw a line between “us,” 35 58 71 65 42 29 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 199219931994 YearPercentage negative terms and others problems Figure 5-3 Composition of the Negative Instances 1992-1994 Argentines, and “them,” immigrants that are cau sing “us” trouble. Even more divisive is the comment by Gerardo Martinez (leader of the construction workers union) that “many times foreign workers take more the side of the employer than the side of the union” (Página 12, 8/8/93). Therefore, while at least part of the government was aware that the

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156 impact of immigration on unemployment was not significant, immigrants were scapegoated to keep the public believing that their government was acting in their interest when policy changes took place (Migdal 2001). While the “negative impact” of immigrati on provided the reason to discursively marginalize immigrants, the reference to them as “slave labor” added legitimacy to the cause. The use of this term, which appear s in some instances in 1992, establishes a dichotomy between free-Argentine labor and slave-migrant labor, which becomes more pronounced in 1993 and 1994. The main differences between both periods is that in 1992 there was a concern for protecting immigran ts, and in 1993/94 the main objective became “protecting natives from the unfair compe tition” produced by “these slaves.” The portrayal of immigrants as slave labor leg itimizes the exclusion of immigrants in the name of the higher values of freedom and lib erty. For instance, Alberto Mazza, Minister of Health, said of immigrants, “these worker s are highly marginal since if that wasn’t the case, they wouldn’t accept to work as slaves ” (Página 12, 12/3/93). Or as Carlos Ruckauf puts it, “we don’t want more slave workers to come [to the country], because they cause us serious labor, sanitary, and security pr oblems” (Página 12, 12/3/93). It is also interesting that this disc ourse appeared at the moment when the government was pressuring the unions to accept additional labor reforms, which would take away many of the social rights won duri ng the post-war period. In general, the newspaper coverage of immigration issues in 1994 shows a continuation of the “immigration crisis” in itiated in 1993. Although th e negativity of the overall coverage decreases slightly, from 96 to 95 percent, the c ontent of the negative instances changes (See Figure 5-3). For one th ing, the mention of problems associated

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157 with immigrants’ increases from 58 to 71 pe rcent of the total negative instances. For another, there is an increased criminalization of migrants visible in two ways. The use of the term “ilegal” and “clandestino” become s more widespread, encompassing 62 percent of the negative terms used to refer to migran ts. We also notice a change in the definition of the risks linked to immigration. In this re spect, crime becomes the most important one, growing from 40 to 55 percent as articles stress the association between crime and immigration. As mentioned above, the legal system is an essential feature of the imagined community and non-compliance with it can justify the exclusion from it. Providing a legal manifestation of such exclusion, in January the government passed Decree 2771/93, which enable it to de port immigrants that were committing crimes. According to Página 12, with the passage of this decree “the government puts in the same bag both migrants and the reports re garding the illegal o ccupation of dwellings” (1/7/94). The increasing association between immigrants and crime was also related to irregularities detected in some visa app lications. Namely, many migrants turned to middlemen to get their visas. In December 11, the government prohibited the participation of these middlemen during the remainder of the amnesty period (La Nación, 12/11/93). Several columns expand on different details regarding these irregularities (La Nación 1/26, 1/28/, and 1/ 31; Página 12 1/27, 1/28/ and 2/1, all from 1994). As immigrants became increasingly crimina lized, the discourses of public officials became more threatening in their tone. Minist er of Interior Ruckauf explained that “any illegal foreigner who is disc overed violating the law will be repatriated” (La Nación, 1/11/94). On the same occasion, Ruckauf observed that the Executive would intensify border controls and that it was going to soli cit competitive bids to computerize the posts

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158 of immigration entry at the border. A dditionally, Decree 2771/93 increased control powers of the Executive, facilitating inspect ions that would become common in the second half of 1994. As it is often the case, those inspections w ould rarely target employers; rather, most of them would be conducted in hotels, apartments, and other places where immigrants lived. Another source from the same Ministry stated that “this decree [with deportation provision s] is a way of putting in bl ack and white the problem of illegal immigration" (Página 12, 1/7/94). As s oon as the decree was passed, 30 citizens of Peru were deported; this was followed by Mi nister Ruckauf’s threatening message that those deportations “were meant to teach a lesso n” (La Nación, 1/11/94). In a similar vein, the Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister, Fernando Petr ella, stated that “t hese deportations are framed in the new immigration policy that th e country will have, and these persons were not only not complying with the immigrati on regulations, but were also committing an infraction” (Página 12, 1/16/94). The government accompanied these discursive practices with control measures. In 1994, the Immigration Agency signed an agreem ent with the Argentine Tax Agency to conduct joint inspections at work places a nd hotels. In contrast to the later, the Immigration Agency did not have en ough resources to conduct inspections. 13 The rationale behind this agreement was to incr ease the Immigration Agency’s capacity to control undocumented work without devoting more resources to it.14 After this agreement 13 The data on inspections and deportation is very di fficult to obtain. For one thing, the Immigration Agency is reluctant to release such data. In add ition, the records are poor. For instance, Gerdarmeria Nacional, in control of 130 border crossing in Argentina, only keeps records since 1997. This was informed to me by Commandant Rocca, in charge of the Border Department of Gendarmeria Nacional during an interview conducted in June 23 2004. 14 Author’s interview with Lelio Marmora, in charge of the International Organization for Migration’s office in Argentina (1995-2002), July 21 2001.

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159 was signed, the capacity to enforce immigrati on regulations increas ed. Out of the 115 inspection conducted in 1994 and 1995, 80 were done in combination with the Argentine tax Agency. 15 During these inspections, the govern ment detected 151 infractions to immigration regulations were discovered. At the same time , the auxiliary immigration police bodies, Gendarmería Nacional, likely in creased its controls as well. While this force detected 816 undocumented workers in 1994, this number climbed to 3092 in 1995 and to 5259 in 1996.16 As Peter Andreas puts it, thes e visible controls have strong symbolic meanings, which project a favorable image of statehood and re-legitimize the boundaries of the imagined community (Andreas, 1999). The beginning of 1994 coincided with the deadline to apply for the amnesty benefits. Several newspaper articles accordi ngly devote space to describing the long lines and other difficulties facing immigrants appl ying for residency. Many of these articles also feature interviews with immigrants. Fo llowing Van Dijk’s (1994) argument that, in part, immigration news coverage is non-symp athetic to immigrants because journalists rarely ask immigrants or immigrant groups for information, I expected to find a connection between news that rely on immigrants and immi grant groups as sources of information and a more sympathetic treatment of immigration. Surprisingly, I did not find any significant connection between the two. Furthermore, some of these columns that at first sight seemed to show a concern fo r the problems facing migrants applying for residence turned out to be o ffensively racist. For instance: 15 Data obtained from the report by the Population Secretary in reply to an information request by the Chamber of Deputies identified as 5793-D-95. 16 See note 19.

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160 The spectacle of some 60 people lying on th e street is pretty sad. Darkness and lack of hygiene are not good company for the ni ght. They know it better than anyone: ‘and…what do you want me to do?’ they s eem to justify themselves; ‘if I don’t come at this time I will be left out of my papers,’ explaine d a man who wasn’t above 30, bag in hand, just out from th e construction site. (La Nación, 1/24/94) Yesterday could be nominat ed as the Day of the Undocumented Migrant, when during the day a great amount of ‘irre gulars’ crowded the surroundings of the National Direction of Migrat ion…, joining the ones that had preferred to spend the night there. (La Nación, 2/1/94) This open space [yard inside the Building of National Directi on of Migration] resembled a camping site, with groups of fa milies sitting or lying under trees, while alleviating their thirst with cold dr inks. Bits of conversation in Quechua intermingled with the noise from portable radios, the crying of babies, and the noise of the parrots. (La Nación, 2/1/94) The day after the amnesty deadline aimed at the regularization of migrants from neighboring countries, the Na tional Direction of Migra tion closed its doors to conduct a more than symbolic task: disinf ect the environment. (La Nación, 2/1/94) Those columns are interesting because they do not emphasize major impacts produced by immigration. By only describing with contem pt the disorderly situation produced by migrants in front of the immigration agenc y, they are intended to shock the Argentine white population. I consider these articles to belong in the category of “traditional racism” (Gilroy, 1991). Along with this type of article, there are those that were directed to show that immigration was out of control. Some colu mns explain the supposed “failure” of the amnesty, by showing that most “illegals” had not yet regularized their immigration status and or that migrants were “s till breaking in illegally in Argentina.” No country in the world had good statistics regarding undocumen ted migrants. When the amnesty was first enacted, the government had estimated that this measure would benefit between 150,000 and 400,000 migrants. Minister Jose Manzano, however, had stated that he thought the number would be closer to 150,000 (Página 12, 3/31/92). La Nación, in particular, always

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161 tended to exaggerate the number of undocumented migrants. Approximately 230,000 migrants applied for residency under Decr ee 1033/92. When the deadline to apply for residency was close, for instance, La N ación noted that “there would still be 400,000 illegal foreigners in Argentine territory” (1 /24/94). In the same article, the journalist devotes 101 lines to explain the ways in wh ich “immigrants filter into the country,” ignoring that most migrants subject themselv es to migration controls and overstay their visas. On January 31, La Nación reiterates that “that there will be other rules for the 400,000 foreigners that did not ap ply for residence.” In Febr uary 6, La Nación explains with resignation “neither sailors, gendarmes, policemen, rivers, jungles, nor mountains are enough barriers to stop the fl ow of nationals from neighbor ing countries” (2/6/94). In this section I have attempted to show that economic reasons alone do not account for the immigration restrictions of 1993 and 1994. As the economy deteriorated, immigrants from the Southern Cone were cons tructed as undesirable others. I argue that the state had an important role in this, but al so unions and the press itself contributed to the emergence of an “immigra tion crisis.” The process of exclusion of immigrants followed a progression. First, immigrants were mainly blamed for the economic problems facing the native labor force. A nationalistic rhetoric was used to create a boundary between Argentines and foreigners. Later im migrants became increasingly associated with breaking the law and disrespecting national institutions. The government did not reform its economic policy. Furthermore, it pushed the deregulation of the economy even further. The immigration restrictions passed in 1993 and 1994 for neighboring immigrants seemed to be justified in the na me of the common inte rest of the Argentine nation. Was MERCOSUR shaping Argentine immigration policies at all?

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162 International factors shaping argentine immigration policies during the 1990s: the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) International considerations can also be at work in the decision making process. Increased international coope ration between countries can lead to the solution of dilemmas of common interest in a cooperative manner (Cornelius at al. , 1994). In Argentina, as the liberalization of the economy advanced in the 1990s, so did the negotiations with Brazil, Uruguay and Paragua y for the establishment of the Southern Common Market, also known as MERCO SUR (Margheritis, 1999:54). Regional integration agreements can include interna tional migration on their agendas. The most notable case is the European Union, which has moved to the free movement of people within its boundaries. Although this situati on is unique, other regional integration agreements are likely to adva nce in the same direction. Armando Di Filippo (1999) classifies uni ons in the Americas in two types depending on how they deal with immigrati on issues. Unions of type A are mainly preferential trade agreements, which are suppos ed to come to a climax when the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) materi alizes in 2005. Type B unions seek more extensive integration and tend to create common markets. The four sub-regional agreements in Latin America, namely th e Andean Community, the Central American Common Market, the Caribbean community and MERCOSUR, are of this type. According to Di Filippo, only unions of type B are likely to include international migration matters on their agendas. Unions of type A seem to only deepen the rules of globalization at the regional level. In th e light of this typology, one can expect MERCOSUR to have an impact on immigration policies.

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163 The cooperation of the countries of the Southern Cone was significant before MERCOSUR. The immediate antecedent of th e MERCOSUR’s creation were a series of agreements signed with Brazil during the 1980s by President Alfonsi n, which finally put an end to a long history of rivalry betw een the two countries (Rapoport, 2000:1084). Although the migration of Southern Cone c itizens to Argentina ha s by no means been encouraged, some agreements were signed to facilitate the migration in the region. Since the 1940s, the countries of the Southern Cone have worked together in finding ways of simplifying the necessary documents for bor der-crossing (Zamperi, 1999: 26). Argentina and Uruguay went further to unify border cont rols in 1986. Other agreements between the member countries are directed to regulate the work of seasonal migran ts. Of this type are the agreements signed by Argentina with Ch ile in 1971, with Bolivia in 1978, and with Uruguay in 1974 (Ibid. 28-29). Paraguay and Uruguay signed similar agreements in 1975, and Chile and Paraguay did so in 1976 (Ibid.). MERCOSUR was constituted in 1991. Chile and Bolivia joined as associate members in 1992. The Asuncion Treaty of 1991 st ated that the member countries wanted to form a union, which would “involve the free circulation of goods, services, and factors of production” (Zamperi, 1999:45). The phr ase “factors of production” seems to encompass both the free movement of labor a nd capital. However, the original treaty was mainly commercial in its natu re and did not include ways of dealing with the social dimensions of integration (OIM, 1999:9). As negotiations progressed, social and laborrelated issues entered MERCOSUR’s agenda. Fo r instance, the ministers of labor of the member countries agreed to “develop an instru ment that would pay attention to the social and labor dimensions of integration” in 1991 (Di Filippo, 1999). Although it later slowed

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164 down, the impact of this regional integra tion arrangement on commerce was almost immediate. The economic exchange between the countries grew six times for 1994 (Rapoport, 2000:1085). With regard to mi gration issues in particular, although MERCOSUR was successful in placing migr ation on the agenda during the 1990s, only partial progress was achieved with respect to the exchange of information and unification of border control mechanisms (Kratochw il, 1995). Has MERCOSUR influenced the immigration policies of the Argentine State in the 1990s? One could expect to find more favorab le immigration policies for the MERCOSUR countries than for third countries. Yet this is not the case. As mentioned above, in 1992 the government designed an immigration pr ogram for Central and Eastern European immigrants. Although the implementation of this program was slow, a resolution (Resolution 700/88) from the Immigration Ag ency was still in place that exempted European immigrants from complying with the requirements of Decree 1434/87. Therefore, they were in a better position th an immigrants from the Southern Cone until 1992. The amnesty of 1992/94 left immigrants fr om neighboring countries in a position similar to that of Europeans with regard to the requirement to appl y for a work visa in Argentina. If immigrants’ membership in a MERCOSUR country does not translate into more open immigration policies for them it remain s to explore if this regional integration agreement appears as a motivation in the im migration policies of the Argentine State. The amnesty of 1992 has a clear connection with MERCOSUR. First, it was announced in a MERCOSUR meeting in Las Lenas in June 1992. President Menem stated in this occasion that “Argentina was h eaded toward a complete integration with its MERCOSUR partners” (La Prensa, 06/28/1992). It was during the same meeting that the

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165 presidents of the member countries agreed to produce a study of the immigration legislation of their countries with the objectiv e of proposing measures directed toward the free movement of people (Zamperi, 1999:50). Of course, the free movement of people did not gain serious consider ation until 2002. Nevertheless, immigration obtained a place on the MERCOSUR agenda. Decree 1033/92, which a pproved the amnesty, stated that its provisions were framed in the “Latin Ameri can brotherhood and inte gration principles.” According to a former Director of the Migra tion Agency, Jorge Gurrieri, at this point it seemed that President Menem’s immigrati on policies for MERCOSUR citizens would be very generous.17 This former state official based his observation on two facts. First, that Menem devoted half of his speech to exa lt the importance of the amnesty. And second, that the amnesty itself was much more perm issive than previous ones in terms of the documentation required in order to apply for a work visa. MERCOSUR also appears as a consideration in several statements by state officials when justifying the amnesty. The amnesty, howev er, is not seen as a natural consequence of MERCOSUR but rather the opposite. Argent ines hope that the amnesty will help the integration of the region. In this vein, several state officials have professed their faith that the regularization of the immi gration status of migrants is a necessary step for MERCOSUR. For instance, Jose Manzano, Minister of Interior, refers to the amnesty as “a first step in the deepening of the regional process of integration” (Página 12, 4/1/92). Likewise, Menem notes that the amnesty is a necessary step toward the complete integration of the region (Página 12, 6/27/ 92). Although there is nothing wrong with hoping that the amnesty will help the integrati on of the region, the position of Argentine 17 Author’s interview with Jorge Gurrieri, former Direct or of the Immigration Agency (1993-1995), July 15 2002.

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166 officials seems more self-int erested when dealing with the MERCOSUR countries. This will become clearer when in the paragraph below I develop the analysis of the Argentine cooperative attitude toward European count ries. Nonetheless, we can hypothesize that MERCOSUR influenced Argentine immigr ation policies during the early 1990s. At the same time it granted residency to undocumented workers from neighboring countries, the Argentine government was devisi ng the plan to bri ng Central and Eastern European immigrants to Argentina. In this case, Argentina had no special agreement linking it with these countries. What justified this special immigration preference for Europeans? The first answer that arises from my evidence is mere “solidarity” with the European situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This possibility is consonant with the opinion of a former high ranking official of the Immigrati on Agency, Sergio Rodríguez Onetto18, with several statements by other public o fficials, and an internal memo of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Sergio Rodríguez On etto expressed to me that “faced with the events after the fall of the Berlin Wall and keen to be long to the First World, Argentina offered itself as a promised land” 19 for immigrants from former-Communist Europe. Argentine public officials during this peri od emphasized their willingness to help in solving the immigration “probl ems” facing Europe. Presid ent Menem stated that “we have the intention of solvi ng problems that appear as a result of transformations in Eastern Europe, which will provoke a wave of immigrants” to Western Europe (La Nación, 3/31/92). And Foreign Affairs Minist er Di Tella, when offering to receive immigrants in Argentina, laments that in We stern Europe “the idea of immigration is not 18 Author’s interview with Sergio Rodriguez Onetto, former Director of Immigration Admissions at the Immigration Agency, June 2, 2003. 19 Interview cited.

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167 well accepted” (La Nación 2/13/92). Finally, an internal report from the Foreign Affairs Ministry explains that the complex situation created in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall and the Argentine Liberal Constitution justify the special immigration plan for Central and Eastern Europeans (Cancilleria Argentina, 2002). This Argentine cooperative attitude toward European count ries contrasts with the one shown toward Latin American countries. As mentioned above, I did not find rema rks showing major preoccupation for the problems facing the countries of South Ameri ca (many of which would certainly need a friendly hand). When state officials justify the amnesty of 1992, for instance, they do not talk about the benefits this decision may have for the South American countries from which immigrants originate. Furthermor e, in 1993 and 1994, government officials’ attitudes about the need to protect their ow n back yard contrast sharply with those showed toward Europe. For instance, in 1993, Presidential Secretary General Luis Prol declared that “we are not willing to lower our standard of living to solve the problem of the communities [for countries] of the re gion” (Página 12, 7/31/93). There are two possible answers to this Argentine selective “s olidarity”. One is that with the plan to bring Europeans the country was hoping to gain advantages of some sort. This explanation is feasible if we consider that the Argentin e government first wanted the European Union to contribute money for the special immigration plan. Immigrants with economic resources can certainly have a be neficial multiplier effect on a country’s economy. The second possible explanation is that Argentines still ha ve a racial preference for European immigrants. There is anecdotal ev idence to support this hypothesis. When

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168 Argentine state officials were trying to se ll their immigration plan to the European Parliament, they overstated the problem that the “wave” of immigrants from Eastern Europe would cause. At some point, European countries made a counteroffer that put European immigration problems into perspectiv e. If Argentina was so willing to help, why didn’t this country take the African and Middle Eastern immi grants residing in Europe instead? (Pagina 12, 02/14/1992). In a headline entitled “Unviable Dark-Skins,”20 the newspaper Pagina 12 published the answer given by the Under-Secretary of Population at the time, German Moldes (Ibid.). “No way,” said this public official, “our requirements make this possibility unviable” (Ibid). He then explained that immigrants had to have investment capital, could not come from countries with backward technology, and needed to have an established community in Argentina. It is important to recall that none of the Europeans that be nefited from the special immigration plan came with investment capital. Overall, MERCOSUR seems to have influenced the enactment of an amnesty decree for neighboring immigrants, the Argen tine State also maintained generous immigration rules for Europeans. The new link developed with the MERCOSUR countries, apparently, cannot compete with the historical preference for European immigration. This is first evidenced by th e more beneficial portrayal of European immigrants. Even with MERCOSUR in sight, immigrants from neighboring countries are at best tolerated. Second, Argentine offici als seemed more concerned with cooperating with Europe than with South American count ries. This cooperative attitude with Europe seemed to find a limit when Argentine public officials turned down the possibility of 20 They headline said “Morochos Inviables.” “Morocho” is a word used in Argentina to describe anyone with darker skin or hair.

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169 encouraging the immigration of African a nd Middle Eastern immigrants residing in Europe. Conclusions According to Aristide Zolberg (1999), from the capitalist perspective, immigrants of any kind are first and foremost work ers and, secondly, a political and cultural presence. This multiple character of immi gration helps shed light on the complex interests that are at stake when a state makes a decision regarding the selection and admission of foreign citizens. In this regard I argue that, although economic factors are important in explaining immigrati on policies and of ten determine how many immigrants a country is willing to accept, notions of ethnic and/or cultural eligibility of certain immigrant groups for membership in the “imagined community” ( identity politics ) dictate who is admitted. Although Argentina’s history shows a recurrent, even if qualified, preference for European immigration, millions of immigrants of indigenous origin arrived in the country since th e 1930s. Nonetheless, the att itude of Argentineans toward these migrants remains ambiguous. As s oon as the economic conditions become uncertain, the “doors” of Argentina close for them. Also during times of deep economic tran sformations, an opportunity arises to redraw the boundaries of the imagined comm unity. In this process of exchange, both traditional and new discourses about the appropriateness of certain immigrants for inclusion into the imagined community are re-negotiated. This ha ppened in Argentina between 1993 and 1994. Labor unions called atte ntion to the supposed worsening of the economic situation due to immigration fr om neighboring countries. While overlooking other possible weaknesses in its own economic model, the government blamed immigrants for the ills of Argentine soci ety. States seek obedience and conformity

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170 through the use of nationalism, by merging pers onal identities with the collective selfconsciousness of the nation. In this way, states make their nationals perceive their wellbeing and the well-being of the state as one in the same (Breuilly, 1994). Consequently, when the state deported “criminal immigrants ” it seemed to be taking care of internal security. The following year, the state limited immigration instead of making structural changes to the economic plan. The question regarding the possibility of solving immigration policies in a cooperative manner between states remains open-ended. The early 1990s offered some support for the affirmative, and both immigr ation policies toward European and nonEuropean immigrants followed this pattern. However, MERCOSUR did not even lead to more open immigration policies for the citizens of its member countries during the early 1990s. Furthermore, in 1993 and 1994, MERCOSUR did not seem to shape immigration decisions at all. Last Nove mber, MERCOSUR presidents announced their plan to allow “a free movement of people” in the region. It is worth noting that because of the severe economic depression Argentina has become a major country of emigration since 2001. Or, it may well be that the desperate need of markets for Argentine products can outweigh the perceived danger of losing jobs to foreigners. It remains to be seen if this complex political and socio-economic process of complete integration will take place in the Southern Common Market.

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171 CHAPTER 6 ARGENTINE CONGRESS AND I MMIGRATION POLICYMAKING Introduction The Argentine Constitution empowers the Congress to rule on the admission of foreign citizens to the countr y. Despite this, the immigrati on decision-making process in Argentina has become more centralized on th e Executive. This chapter first places the Argentine division of powers in historical context and explains the congressional powers in matters of immigration policies. The n, it explores the reasons underlying this centralization both theoretically and empirically. Does the de mocratization literature on “delegative democracy” (O’Donnell, 1994) he lp us in understanding the immigration decision-making process in Argentina between 1983 and 1995? What other factors have contributed to the enactment of immigration policies by Ex ecutive decree? I argue that the literature regard ing delegative democracy is a good poi nt of departure for analysis. However, it does not explain why the decisionmaking process in matters of immigration was also centralized during Al fonsín’s government, which is usually said to disconfirm the delegative democracy argument. In addition, this scholarship fails to account for cases in which the centralization of the decisi on-making process was caused by congressional inaction. The fact that the Congress did not pass a comprehensive immigration law does not mean that this body remained inactive in matte rs of immigration. In particular, after the creation of the congressional committees sp ecialized in immigr ation and population issues in 1990 and 1991, the in terest in immigration issu es increased dramatically.

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172 Between 1983 and 1995, the Argentine legislat ure dealt with 152 d ecisions regarding immigration matters. More than one third of them proposed immigration policy changes. Another 32% were directed to request information from th e Executive and one quarter of them aimed at influencing the latter to take a certain course of action. These Congressional decisions are analyzed in this chapter. How does the Congress relate with the Executive? Do the policies initiated in the Congress differ from those followed by the Presidency? What is the cont ent of the information request s? Are they responded to in timely manner by the Executive? Do they repr esent a check on presidential power? All these questions are explor ed in this chapter. Immigration Policymaking: Institutional Framework The 1853 Constitution establishes a federa l system and a division of powers between an Executive headed by a president, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary. Although the Argentine division of powers closely resembles that of the United States, the Argentine Executive is stronger than the American one. Juan Bautista Alberdi, who set the blueprint for the 1853 Argentine Cons titution, was fully aware of this difference (Alberdi, 1938:179). While writing the Argen tine Constitution he followed the example set by the American Constitution for the most part. However, Alberdi thought that the United StatesÂ’s Executive was not strong enough. He also believed that this circumstance had partly caused the Civil War in the US . For this reason, and with the purpose of avoiding anarchy, Alberdi copied the Chilean Executive. The Argentin e constitutionalists thus conceived the Presidency as the motor of the government (Llanos, 2001:68). First, according to the 1853 Constitution the president pr esents its own legisl ative initiatives for congressional consideration. Second, the veto po wer allows the presiden t to participate in

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173 the legislative process after congressional appr oval. Third, the president enacts decrees to regulate the provisions of congre ssional bills. Finally, the pres idents heads the state, the government, the public administration and the ar med forces, can declare the state of siege and intervene in the provincial affairs through the figure of federal intervention. Despite the existence of a strong Exec utive established by the 1853 Constitution, the Congress has clear powers in immigrati on policies. While the Federal Government has the power of authorizing the entry of fo reigners to the count ry (Article 25), the Congress has exclusive legisla tive power to rule the selec tion and admission of foreign citizens. In turn, provincial governments have concurrent powers to promote immigration in their territories within the legal framew ork that the Congress may establish. Despite the fact that the C onstitution empowers the Congress to legislate about immigration, the policymaking process in Argentina has beco me more centralized within the Executive since the 1930s. This tendency was most pr onounced during military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. The first immigration law enacted in 1876 was replaced in 1981. Paradoxically, this comprehensive immigration law was enacted during the last military dictatorship in 1981 (Novick, 1997). Passed without Congressiona l debate, this restrictive law, strongly concerned with the police aspects of immigra tion control, has provided the context within which constitutional government s have framed their immigration decrees after the reestablishment of democracy in 1983. Surprisingly, the Congress has only passed minor modifications to the law but wa s unable to agree on a new immigration law until 2003. For this reason, immigration polic ies between 1983 and 2003 were approved by Executive decree.

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174 The Delegative Democracy Argument Government by decree and Argen tina are not, at first sigh t, a surprising association. However, at this point, one needs to dis tinguish the different presidential periods. President Menem (1989-1999) ruled by decr ee on numerous occasions (O’Donnell, 1994). However, President Alfonsín’s style of government was more democratic and respectful of the separation of powers. As Peruzzotti (2001: 148) puts it, “[b]oth in its rhetoric and political practices, the Radica l government disconfirmed the delegativeness argument.” Alfonsín respected both the C ongress and the Judiciary. His administration made a conscious effort at self-limitation. For one thing, he didn’ t bypass the Congress through Executive decrees. Alfonsín’s had to share power with a Congress partly dominated by the opposition. According to Peru zzotti, there was also a high degree of cooperation between the major itarian parties in the Congress (Peruzzotti ,2001:150). For another, he offered the presidency of the Argentine Supreme Court to a leader of the opposition to ensure the independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, the judiciary’s autonomy undermined the government’s human rights’ strategy (Ibid. 149). Overall, a process of institutional differentiation in the direction of a separation of powers took place during this administration. Much has been said about the concentrati on of power in the head of the Argentine president during Menem’s administration. Gui llermo O’Donnell (1994) used the case of Argentina under President Menem as one of the paradigmatic examples of delegative democracy. A discretionary Executive is the co rnerstone of this distinctive democratic model where presidents rule free of mechanis ms of horizontal and vertical accountability, except from post facto electoral veredicts (Peruzzotti, 2001:1 35). In this way, presidents supposedly overcome opposition to economic re form by bypassing entrenched interests

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175 and appealing directly to th e people (Panizza, 2000:741). Pres idents in these delegative democracies rule by decree. In the case of Argentina, President Menem obtained an extensive delegation of powers from the C ongress, which allowed him to implement a broad range of economic reforms. No one deni es the existence of a pattern of government by decree in Argentina during the 1990s. During his first pr esidential tenure, Menem enacted 308 of the so-called ‘need and ur gency’ decrees (Per uzzotti, 2001:151). In contrast, Alfonsín only enacted ten during his administration. The picture that emerges from the im migration decision-making process is, however, different. I mentioned before that the decision-making style during Alfonsín’s administration was more democratic than in Menem’s. In the case of immigration policies, apparently, this distinction does not seem to hold. In both presidential periods immigration decisions were taken by Executiv e decree. Furthermore, during Alfonsín’s administration not only the president but also the Director of the Immigration Agency enacted immigration policies. The existen ce of a strong Executive should not imply, however, that the legislative and judiciary in Argentina were completely inactive. Mariana Llanos (2001), for inst ance, believes that Executive ’s strategies devised to bypass the Congress during the 1990s were cau sed by the latter’s refusal to be subordinate to the Executive’s wishes. As mentioned before, the Congress was productive in immigration matters between 1983 and 1995. Later in this chapter, I analyze the congressional role in immigration policies and the extent to which the Congress represented a check on the power of the Executive. In the next section, I analyze the role that Argentine legislat ors believed the Congress should have in immigration policy. For this purpose, I use data obtained from ques tionnaire applied to

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176 Argentine legislators in 2003. In addition, I draw data from decisions dealing with immigration generated in the Congress between 1983 and 1995. The literature explaining the emergen ce of delegative democracies generally includes structural and cultural arguments.1 I mentioned before that this literature does not explain why Alfonsín’s government show ed strong patterns of centralization in immigration policy-making. Furthermore, this literature does not account either for some specific features of immigration polic y-making. Between 1983 and 1995, the Executive made extensive use of the powers awarded by the Law of 1981. The centralization of the decision-making process in matters of immi gration was not, however, initiated by the Executive.2 The Argentine Congress could have pa ssed immigration legislation any time since the reestablishment of democracy in 1983. However, it chose not to do so. For this reason, I believe it is also important to asse ss the reasons why the Congress was unable to agree on a new immigration law for so many y ears. Thus, in the next section, I try to 1 O’Donnell’s argument in this respect is two-fold. One part of the argument is of structural nature. Delegative democracies emerge in countries affected by serious economic and political crisis. On the one hand, there is a state crisis whic h translates into a legitimacy and effectiveness deficit (O’Donnell 1994:137). Society does not trust the state because of its tendency to be colonized by private interests. On the other hand, there is an economic crisis of dramat ic dimensions that only exacerbates the crisis of the state. In addition, the cultural heritage of populism produces strong presidential systems in which the president is seen as the embodiment of the nation (O’Donnell 1994:56). The president in delegative democracies is paternalistic and he builds his power through majoritarian elections and with the support of a movement. Overall, O’Donnell suggests that Latin Am erica populist traditions are still alive and in good health (Peruzzotti 2001:135). Enrique Peruzzotti disagrees with the cultural claim made by O’Donnell. In his view, there has been an erosion of past populist/antipopulist allegiances which allowed for the emergence of an autonomous public opinion (Ibid. 140). In addition, this author believes that a new form of right-oriented culture has developed that has contributed to the constitutionalization of state-society relations. Peruzzotti believes that the phenomenon of dele gativeness is intimately associated to processes of collective learning triggered by the experience of successi ve hyperinflationary crises that culminated in the dramatic events of 1989.1 According to this author, hyperinflation left a deep cultural imprint on Argentine society, only comparable to the one previously left by state terrorism (Ibid. 146). While state terrorism contributed to the emergence of a culture of po litical self-limitation the 1989 hyperinflation crisis facilitated a reversion into praetorianism. According to this view, demands for political accountability were postponed in the face of a more immediate need at reestablishing normal economic conditions. 2 In 1989, for instance, the Exec utive submitted two laws for congressional approval (Laws 23696 and 23697), to obtain more power in matters of economic policy.

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177 account for this congressional inaction, draw ing on interview data with Argentine legislators and key actors of im migration policy in Argentina. What Led to Centralization of the Decision-Making Process? In this section I review di fferent factors explaining th e CongressÂ’s inability to pass comprehensive immigration policies. I first analyze the weight of crises on this congressional inability and the reasons that made it difficult for the Congress to reach a consensus. I then review some institutional features that may have influenced the congressional activity on immigration issues. Finally, I address legisl atorsÂ’ beliefs about the role that the Congress should have in im migration policies and their influence in the role that this body has played in immigration policies. Crises and cfnsensus According to my data, economic and other crises were important in explaining the centralization of the d ecision-making process in two ways. For one thing, they acted as an obstacle for passing immigration legislation, since more import ant (urgent) matters got in the way. In addition, economic crises were sa id to make the centralization of powers convenient. In 2003/2004, I interviewed a sample of 27 Argentine legislators (approximately 8% of the total number of le gislators), and asked them to asses the reasons why they thought the Congress had b een unable to agree on a new immigration law for some twenty years.3 Almost one third of the le gislators thought that urgent economic and political problems had delayed the passage of a new immigration law. These congresspersons believed that immigra tion policies had been given lower priority due to some more urgent matters. In this re gard, a Congresswoman of the Peronist Party 3 Since more than two thirds of the legislators th at responded to the questionnaire chose to remain anonymous, I decided not to identify any of legislators participating by name.

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178 thought that “the serious economic problems combined with the lack of institutional stability had deferred the enactme nt of a new immigration law.”4 In a similar vein, another legislator from the Radical Civic Union thought th at “legislators had given priority to other laws that at the moment were considered more urgent.”5 Concurring with these Argentine legislators, a representative of the Peruvian community in Argentina thought that successive crises in South Amer ica had led the Argentine State to postpone the enactment of immigration legislation.6 As one can see from these opinions, interviewees agreed that the economic a nd institutional crises facing Argentina had postponed the enactment of a new immigration law. In addition, the same crises that postpone d immigration matters also made it wellsituated for the Executive to pass immigr ation policies by decree. Some opinions emphasized the convenience of the flexibility enjoyed by the former to rule immigration matters according to changing circumstances. Only one congressman believed that the flexibility enjoyed by the Executive could lead to permissive immigration policies. In this regard, he expressed that “the law is open enough as to facili tate and foment the residence and integration of immigrants to the Argentine society.”7 Most opinions, however, argued that the flexibility concentrated in the Executive made it easy a nd convenient for it to restrict the entry of foreigners to the countr y. In this regard, a representative from a provincial party noted that the flexibility awarded to the Executive facilitated the 4 Questionnaire responded by a senator from the Peronist Party, Aug 7 2003. 5 Questionnaire responded by a representative from Radical Civic Union, Aug 20 2003. 6 Author’s interview with Gustavo Huayre, member of the Consejo Consultivo of the Peruvian Consulate in Argentina, May 10 2004. 7 Questionnaire responded by a senator from the Radical Civic Union, Aug 6 2003.

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179 enactment of immigration restrictions when the economic situation worsened.8 Other key actors involved in immigration policy issues al so shared this view . The Director of a graduate program in immigration law in Arge ntina, Professor Chausovsky, expressed that the Law from 1981 permitted the Executive to e xploit the weak positi on of the immigrant communities.9 Also, the former Director of the Immigration Agency, Jorge Gurrieri, expressed a similar view that the Exec utive found it unnecessa ry to pass a new immigration law, since it enjoyed broad power s thanks to the one dating from the last military dictatorship.10 Finally, one obvious reason that explains why the Congress was unable to agree on a new immigration law is that Argentine legi slators were unable to reach a consensus. An important number of legislators (32%) beli eved that this was the case in Argentina. Opinions of this sort included the comme nt by a Peronist cong resswoman who thought that the enactment of laws re quires of “long periods of negotia tions in order to achieve a consensus.”11 Maybe less obvious are the reasons why the consensus could not be reached. I believe there is truth to the co mment by a congresswoman from the Radical Civic Union who expressed that, “Argentine le gislators had shifted between permissive and restrictive immigration draft bills and were unable to agree on the best policy for the 8 Questionnaire responded by a representative from a provincial party, June 6 2003. 9 Author’s interview with Gabriel Chausovsky, Dir ector of the Graduate Degree in Immigration Law (Curso de Especialización en De recho de Extranjería), Universidad del Litoral, May 16 2003. 10 Author’s interview with Jorge Gurrieri, former Director of the Immigration Agency (1993-1995), May 5 2004. 11 Questionnaire responded by a senator from the Peronist Party, Sept 17 2003.

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180 country.”12 In this regard, Argentina has a strong self-image as a country of immigrants, which, I believe, works against the enactment of restrictive immigration rules. It has been suggested that the Congress had a hard time agreeing on new immigration legislation because there was a discrepancy between wa nted and unwanted immigration. According to Bogado Poisson, immigrants arrived in the co untry during the last fifty years, most of which originated in border ing countries and Peru, were not really wanted in a traditionally European Argentina.13 This circumstance, however, cannot be reconciled with the view of Argentina as a country of immigrants. Institutional features Different institutional features can explain the lack of agreement within the Congress to pass certain legisl ation. In multiparty systems, for instance, a highly divided legislature can lead to a deadlock. Argentina, however, has a two-party system in which the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the Peronist Party (PJ) have dominated politics since the en of World War II. Therefore, the com position of the Congress also tends to reflect the dominance of these two parties. While Radical President Alfonsín was in office (1983-1989), his party enjoyed a plurality in the House that ranged that from almost 45 to 51% (See Table 6-2). However, due to the stro ng influence of the PJ in the Argentine provinces, the UCR did not dominate the Se nate (See Table 6-1). During President Menem’s first administration, the PJ had a plur ality in both chambers ranging from 47 to 12 Questionnaire responded by a senator from the Radical Civic Union, May 21 2003. This senator is referring to the restrictive immigration draft bills that the Congress considered after 1995 that were left out of the present analysis. 13 See chapter 7 for an analysis of the beliefs of Argen tine legislators with regard to the impact of different groups of immigrants on Argentina. While it is true that European immigration arrived before WWII was considered the most beneficial for the country, immigrants from neighboring countries ranked higher than recent immigrants from Central and East ern Europe with regard to thei r purported favorable impact on the country.

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181 60% (Tables 6-1 and 6-2). The composition of both chambers during both periods translated in the number of affairs that each party managed to pass. As discussed later (See Tables 6-9 and 6-11), between 1983 and 1989 the PJ was more effective in pushing its proposals in the Senate while for the period 1989-1995 this party was more effective in both chambers. There was one important institutiona l change that was influencing the congressional activity with regard to immigration matters. Until 1980s, the Argentine House and Senate did not have a specific co mmittee in charge of immigration policies. Therefore, all the issues dealing with immigr ation matters were treated by the committees in charge of agricultural policies or fo reign affairs. The SenateÂ’s committee on Population and Human Devel opment was created in 1990 (R esolution275-S-90) and the HouseÂ’s committee on Populati on and Human Resources in 1991 (Resolution 516-D-90). Before these committees were created, the in terest on immigration matters appeared to have been limited. Evidence of this is, for in stance, were the small number of laws and other decisions submitted for congressional c onsideration that related to immigration matters. More specifically, wh ile both chambers discusse d 44 proposals dealing with immigration issues in the period 1983-1989, th is number climbed to 108 for the period 1989-1995. It seems natural that once a spec ialized body in charge of population and immigration policies was created, the interest in the topic increased considerably and immigration issues obtained a more si gnificant place on the le gislative agenda. In addition, I believe that the likelihood of passing a comprehensive immigration law also improved with the crea tion of the legislative committees. I base this judgment on the fact that before 1989 no comprehensive im migration law draft was considered by the

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182 Congress. In the period between 1989 and 1995, three proposals in this regard were submitted for congressional consideration. I argue that the creation of legislative committees specialized in immigration policie s created at least an opportunity for the enactment of a new immigration law. Noneth eless, the impact of the creation of the specialized committees was not immediate. As former Director of the Immigration Agency Gurrieri explained, “during Alfonsín’s administration there was no interest in enacting a new immigration law and this ci rcumstance did not change in the early 1990s.”14 Only in 1994 the first comprehensive immigration law draft was generated within the Argentine Congress. I believe th at the xenophobic outburst against immigrants triggered at the end of 1993 analyzed in th e preceding chapter, likely made Argentine legislators aware of their responsibi lity for producing immi gration policies. Table 6-1 Composition (%) of the Argentin e Senate by Political Party (1983-1995) Senatorial Period Political Party 1983-19861986-19891989-1992 1992-1995 P. Justicialista 45.745.754.2 60.5 P. Radical 39.139.129.2 20.8 Third Parties 15.215.216.6 18.7 Total 100.0100.0100.0 100.0 Table 6-2 Composition (%) of the Argentine Ho use of Representatives by Political Party (1983-1995) Period Political Party 19831985 19851987 19871989 19891991 19911993 19931995 P. Justicialista 43.7 24.438.247.245.1 49.4 P. Radical 50.8 50.844.935.432.7 32.7 Third Parties 5.5 24.816.917.422.2 17.9 Total 100.0 100.0100.0100.0100.0 100.0 14 Author’s interview with Jorge Gurrieri, former Dir ector of the Immigration Agency (1993-1995), May 5 2004.

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183 Role of the Congress in immigration policymaking Argentine legislators were ambiguous rega rding the role that the Congress should have in immigration policies. This ambigu ity may have played a role in this body’s inability to pass wide-ranging immigration legi slation for many years. For one thing, this body has been considerably active in matte rs of immigration th roughout both periods under analysis. For another, some legislators believed the Congress should have a limited role in immigration issues. The Congress was active in initiating decisions relating to immigration issues throughout both periods under analysis. As shown throughout this chapter, not only did it initiat e legislation but also exercise d considerable control over the Executive. This was an implicit way of stati ng the role of the C ongress in immigration issues. In addition, the Argentine legislature cl aimed its right to rule immigration issues in more explicit ways. For instance, the C ongress showed it distre ss with the Executive’s immigration policies after 1985 and its will that the latter changed them on three different occasions (137-S-86, 4549-D-85 and 2882-D-86). In this latter request, the Congress was asking the Executive to revoke its immigrati on policy and to establish more liberal immigration rules, until the Congress c ould agree on a new immigration law. In a similar way, Argentine legislators reacted when they learned about 1992 Executive’s plan to bring Central and Easter n European immigrants to Argentina. In these instances, the Congress demanded the Ex ecutive to give the legislative body the participation it deserved. For instance, the congres s required that the Executive open a debate with the participation of the former about the immigr ation policy with regard to Central and Eastern Europeans (5128-D-91). Even more emphatic was the statement that “the Constitution clearly empowers the C ongress to dictate rules on these matters [immigration matters]. However, the Executive has overridden this power when it

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184 initiated negotiations with European countries regarding the immigration of Europeans to Argentina” (5453-D-92). “If provided with the information requested,” another congressional document stated, “this Congress will make valuable contributions to the immigration policies of the Argentine State” (1303-D-92). As one can see, Argentine congresspersons claimed their dese rved role in immigration issues. Despite the Congress’s consid erably active role in immi gration policies, almost 31% of the legislators I interviewed in 2003/2004 believed that the Executive should have a strong role in immigration policies.15 Some legislators, fo r instance, thought that the Congress could not enact a new immigra tion law because the Executive did not provide enough guidance. For inst ance, a legislator from the Fr ente Grande explained that the Congress was unable to agree on a new im migration law “because the state did not dictate a strategy on the matter.”16 Three other congressmen from the radical Civic Union also shared this view. One of them expl ained that there “was no state policy in immigration matters.”17 Another congressman said that “in reality, there was not a clear immigration policy on the part of the Executive.”18 A third legislator from the same political party made the argument more explic it. This person explaine d that “if we agree that immigration policy is a st ate policy as is also, for in stance, foreign policy, it then makes sense if the Executive has th e last say on immigration matters.”19 As one can see, 15 The questionnaire for Argentine legislators did not include a question regarding role of the Congress in immigration policies. The comments analyzed in this section, came up in different open ended questions. Also for this reason, roughly more than one third of the legislators commented on the role of the Congress. 16 Questionnaire responded by a representative from Frente Grande, June 6 2003. 17 Questionnaire responded by a representative from the Radical Civic Union, Aug 26 2003. 18 Questionnaire responded by a senator from the Radical Civic Union, Sept 6 2003. 19 Questionnaire responded by a representative from the Radical Civic Union, Sept 16 2003.

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185 some Argentine legislators do not believe they are in charge of creating policies. They believed the Executive should take care of this task. On the contra ry, one would expect the Congress to assume this responsibility. If the Executive creates po licies, what should the Congress do then? Some legislators thought that the Congress s hould only exert post-facto control on the Executive’s actions. One Radical Civic Union legi slator explained that “the role of the Executive should be central in matters of immigration a nd the Congress and Judiciary should guard individual rights.”20 This person is right to point out that the role of the judiciary should be to protect i ndividual rights. However, I be lieve the role attributed to the Congress by the Argentine Constitution is mo re pro-active than this . In the particular case of immigration policies, the Congress is in charge of enac ting the corresponding legislation and, only in addition, of supervis ing the task of the presidency. Another legislator from the same party assigned an ev en more limited role to the Congress. This person explained that “the Congress should control and follow-up on the presidential immigration policies, with th e objective of obtaining fresh information about immigration flows and the efficacy of the immigration policies implemented by the Executive.”21 According to this version of th e role of the legislature, th is body would only inform itself about the policies implemented by the Execu tive. As it becomes obvious from these comments, these congresspersons in Argentin a believe in a limite d congressional role. 20 Questionnaire responded by a representative from the Radical Civic Union, Oct 2 2003. 21 Questionnaire responded by a Senator from the Radical Civic Union, Sept 6 2003.

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186 This belief may partly explain this bodyÂ’ s low commitment to producing comprehensive immigration legislation. I already showed that an important numb er of legislators declared that they believed in a strong presidential role in immi gration policy-making. In turn, they did not seem to believe that the Executive had a hi gh level of discretion according to powers attributed by the Law of 1981. In the questionn aire, congresspersons were asked to asses their agreement with th e statement that immigration legi slation in place was attributing excessive power to the Executive. Asked to ra nk their agreement with this statement from 1 to 5, 1 being completely disagree and 5 co mpletely agree, the average response was 2.86, below the indifference level. I did not find differences in this agreement with regard to political party. I have to admit that I was expecting Congress members to be more emphatic about the excessive powers attribut ed to the Executive by the law of 1981. Immigration Issues in the Argentine Congress One of the purposes of this chapter has been to investigate the reasons why the Argentine Congress was unable to agree on new immigration legislation for twenty years. In this section, I analyze what this legislativ e body had to say with regard to immigration issues. In what follows, I first explain how the Argentine congressional committees work and the types of decisions that the Argen tine Congress considers. Then, I provide a general overview of the draft bills and othe r documents that the Congress considered between 1983 and 1995. Later, I investigate all the draft bills that the Congress considered and passed over the period of 22 year s. As I do so, I pay pa rticular attention to the degree to which the policies of the Arge ntine Congress concurre d with those of the Executive. Finally, I address the extent to wh ich the Argentine legi slature represented a check on Presidential power regarding immigrati on policies. For this purpose, I scrutinize

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187 the instances in which the Congress request ed information from the Executive. In particular, I assess the motivati ons behind this information reque sts, their content, and the extent to which the Executive res ponded to congressional demands. Congressional committees The Argentine chambers of Senators and Deputies have specialized committees that deal with the diverse topics submitted to their consideration. In this regard, the Senate has twenty four committees while the House has fi fty-four. At the same time, there are five committees that are bicameral. The two comm ittees dealing with immigration issues are the committee on Population and Human Development in the Senate and the Committee on Population and Human Resources in the H ouse. The Senate’s committee has eighteen members and the House one has nineteen. Th e number of members in the senatorial committee is quite high if we consider th at this body has only 72 members while the House has 256. Both committees must issue their opinion in all matters relating to population development, immigration, hu man resources, population statistics, demographic matters, rural and urban growth.22 In addition, the Senate’s committee also deals with issues relating to child and adol escent development, th e elderly and women’s issues. The members of these committees are al so generally the ones initiating legislation and other decisions relating to immigration matters. As I mentioned above, the committees’ task is generally limited to issuing opinions regarding proposed legislation and other decisi ons. There are some instances, however, in which the committees can issue binding decisi ons. One case is when two thirds of the 22 The Population Senate committee’s mission is stipulat ed in the Article 81 of this chamber’s regulation (Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, 2003 ). The objectives of the Population committee of the House are determined in the Article 97 of this chamber’s regulation (Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 2004).

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188 members of senatorial committees23 (Article 106, Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la Nación 2003)or all the members of the H ouse committees (Article 204, Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Naci ón 2004) approve information requests.24 In this case, these requests are valid without further disc ussion or voting in the chamber. There are also other instances in which the committees can become influential on the rest of the Congress. The Senate, for instance, can approve a draft bill in gene ral and delegate the deliberation and voting of each article to th e committees (Article 178, Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la Nación 2003). In turn, th e House can vote a bill without debate and deliberation once this project has rece ived unanimous favorable opinion by the committee members (Article 152, Honorable Cá mara de Diputados de la Nación 2004). Types of decisions that the Congress considers The Argentine Congress deals with different types of decisions that may have an impact on the design of policies. In the Sena te, for instance, legislators can propose bills, decrees, resolutions, communi cations and declarations (A rt 125, Honorable Cámara de Senadores 2003).25 It may seem obvious to the reader that congresspersons can propose a “bill” or “law” for congressional consideration. These legal bodies are directed to change existing legislation or create new one on a di verse array of policy issues. “Decrees” are decisions that permit the Senate to make de terminations that have an administrative impact within this legislative body. “Resolutions ” are similar in nature to the “decrees.” Through “resolutions” the Senate communicates certain plans or determinations that do 23 The House has a similar rule but only valid for decisions that issue opinions and are related to certain events (Article 114, Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación 2004) 24 These types of decisions are described in the next paragraph. 25 In Spanish, leyes, decretos, resolu ciones, comunicaciones and declaraciones.

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189 not affect other government bodies. “Communica tions” are of central importance for this study. Through this type of decisions, the Se nate can request that the Executive provides information about certain matters and ask th e Executive to follow a certain course of action. Finally, the Senate uses “declara tions” to express the body’s opinions about different issues. The House of representatives, in turn, ha s its own array of decisions that it can propose and approve. In this regard, represen tatives can propose bi lls, resolutions and declarations26 (Article 116 and ff., Honorable Cáma ra de Diputados 2004). The meaning of “bills” poses no problem. As with the Senate, the house also expresses the body’s opinions about certain matters through “declara tions”. The meaning of “resolutions” is broader for the House than for the Senate. These decisions allow the House to adopt administrative decisions, and any other pronoun cement of mandatory ch aracter. In this regard, the House requests the Executive information or to follow a certain course of action through “resolutions.” Since the purpose of this study is not to confuse the reader but to enlighten him/her, I will try to simplif y the vocabulary for the sake of clarity. The term draft bills poses no problem since both chambers use the same word to refer to proposed changes to existing legislation or cr eation of new one. The terms “resolution” and “communication” will be replaced by the effect sought by each decision. For instance, if the decision requests certain information from the Executive it will be referred to as “information request.” If it inte nds to make the Presidency take a certain course of action it will be called “course of action request.” In turn, if the resolution 26 In Spanish, leyes, resolutiones, and declaraciones.

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190 simply makes a determination of a different kind, I will explain the nature of this determination. Table 6-3 Decisions Generated by both Chambers of the Argentine Congress and Vocabulary used in this Chapter Senate House This Chapter Law Law Law Decree Description of decision Resolution Description of decision Communication Resolution Information request or Course of action request Declaration declaration declaration Activity of the Congress Relating to Immigration Issues 1983-1995 In this analysis we consider two pres idential periods, one Radical (1983-1989) and one Peronist (1989-1995).27 As mentioned above, the Congress considered many more decisions dealing with immigration after the creation of the Population Committees in the Senate and House in 1990 and 1991, respectively. In this regard, the numbers of issues considered more than doubled between both periods under analysis (See Tables 6-4 and 6-6). Between 1983 and 1989 both houses consider ed a total of 44 d ecisions relating to immigration issues. For the period 1989-1995, th is number climbed to 108. Bills or laws are important instruments for creating policie s. During both periods, an important number of the proposals considered by the Congress (from 27 to 31%) were directed to create new legislation or modifying existing legisl ation. However, only in the second period under analysis some of these proposals include d comprehensive immigration draft bills (I analyze the content of some of these draft bills in the next section). The Argentine Congress also made use of the so-called information requests to require the Executive to account for different actions. The use of information requests 27 The presidential terms in Argentina used to last for six years. The Constitutional Reform of 1994 reduced the term to four years and permitte d reelection for one consecutive term.

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191 became more widespread during the second period under analysis, growing from 25 to 35%. Information requests covered a broad ra nge of issues and can constitute an important check on the Executive. They genera lly contained an exhaustive number of questions followed by statements regarding the congresspersons’ point of view on how affairs should be conducted. As I explain later, these requests did not limit themselves to require information. In addition, they were ge nerally intended to produce a change in the Executive’s behavior. In this re gard, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them from the requests for a course of action. In general term s, the latter documents referred to matters that were administrative in their nature. For in stance, legislators used this type of request to advise the Executive to open more re gional Immigration Agency offices. These instruments were very popular dur ing Alfonsín’s government, comprising 43% of the immigration affairs considered. Between 1989 and 1995, the use of this type of requests decreased to 21%. Likely, the decrease in course of action requests was compensated to some extent by the increase in information requests. I believe that, in their search to make the presidency more accountable, Argentine legislators probably opted for the latter because they provided a more effective means for supervising the Executive. These instruments can accurately communicate to the Executive the behavior the Congress expects from it. At the same time, they can provide the Congress with detailed information about the Executive’s affa irs. For these reasons , in this chapter I chose to analyze information requests in further detail. There seems to be a tradeoff between productivity and effectiveness. The Senate was less productive than the house in both periods under cons ideration (See Tables 6-4 and 6-6). In both cases, the number of affairs dealing with immigration considered in the

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192 House was between two and four times higher than the number dealt with at the Senate. N. Guillermo Molinelli et al (1999:438) has also shown this higher productivity of the Argentine House. The data provided by th ese authors show that between 1984 and 1995, the House generated around 31% of the drafts that became laws, while the Senate only produced 17% of them. Like mine, these numbe rs show that the SenateÂ’s productivity almost doubled that of the house. It is true that the House mo re than triples the Senate in size. However, I also noted earlier that de spite the chambersÂ’ difference in size the Population committees almost have the same number of members. Table 6-4 Immigration Laws and Other Decisions Considered by the Argentine Congress 1983-1989 (Absolute Numbers and Percentages)* Decisions Considered Senate House Total Total 935 44 Number of Laws 3 (33%)9 (26%) 12 (27%) Number of Information Requests None11 (31%) 11 (25%) Number of Courses of Action 5 (55%)14 (40%) 19 (43%) Number of Declarations 1 (11%)None 1 (02%) *The decisions that only have an internal administrative impact on th e Congress are not included in this graph. The House proposed two decisions of this nature the period 1983-1989. If the number of members may enhan ce the productivity of the Argentine congressional chambers, it certainly does not ha ve the same impact on effectiveness. By effectiveness, I mean the amount of projects th at are approved as a pe rcentage of the total number considered. As one can see in Tables 6-7 and 6-9 , the Senate was more effective in both periods. However, its effectiv eness was highly enhanced for the period 19891995, growing from 44 to 59%. In turn, the H ouseÂ’s effectiveness slightly decreased, from 40 to 37%. Based on data also provided by N. Molinelli et al (1994: 483), I estimated the effectiveness of both chambers of the Argentine Congress with regard to all

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193 affairs considered for the periods under study.28 The Senate effectiveness ranged from 58 to 68%. These numbers for the House varied between 23 and 29%. Although these numbers are not identical to mine, the di fference in effectiveness between the two chambers of the Argentine Congress seems to be consistent. Table 6-5 Degree of Effectiveness of Each Chamber for Passing Immigration Decisions 1983-1989 (Number of Decisions Approve d as a Percentage of those Proposed. Type of decision SenateHouse % Decisions Approved 44 (04/09)40 (14/35) % Laws Approved 66 (02/03)33 (03/09) % Information R. Approved N/A36 (04/11) % Course of A. Approved 25 (01/04)50 (07/14) I believe the smaller number of members may play a role in this increased effectiveness that the Senate enjoys. In addition, an institu tional feature e xplained above is probably important in accounting for this effectiveness as well. Namely, that the senatorial committees can approve different d ecisions when these decisions are supported by two third of their members. In contrast, the committees in the House need to gather unanimous support for their decisions in orde r to approve them. In addition, the Senate 28 The data does include all projects consider ed by the Congress except the bill drafts.

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194 Table 6-6 Immigration Laws and Other Decisions Considered by the Congress 19891995 (Absolute Numbers and Percentages)* Decisions Considered SenateHouse Total Total 3276 108 Number of Laws 9 (28%)25 (33%) 34 (31%) Number of Information Requests 15 (47%)23 (30%) 38 (35%) Number of Courses of Acti on 5 (16%)18 (23%) 23 (21%) Number of Declarations 1 (03%)2 (03%) 3 (03%) * The decisions that only have an in ternal administrative impact on the Congress are not included in this Table.1995. Table 6-7 Degree of Effectiveness of Each Chamber for Passing Immigration Decisions 1989-1995 (Number of Decisions Approve d as a Percentage of those Proposed. Decisions Considered Senate House % Decisions Approved 59 (19/32)37 (28/76) % Laws Approved 55 (05/09)28 (07/25) % Information R. Approved 73 (11/15)48 (11/23) % Course of A. Approved 80 (04/05)50 (9/18) has been dominated by the Peronist Party (PJ) since 1983 until 1995. This party enjoyed a majority that ranged from 45 to 60%. Likel y, this majority avoi ded the occurrence of stalemate in the decision-making process. The number of projects generated by political party varied across time (See Tables 6-8 and 6-10). During the 1980s, the PJ gene rated between more than two times more proposals than the UCR (See Table 6-8). Th e PJ generated 55% of the projects considered in the Senate while the UCR only contributed to 22% of them. This speaks well of the PJ considering the number of seat s this party held in the Senate during the period did not surpass the UCR in such a high proportion (See Table 61). In turn, the PJ initiated 34% of the affairs tr eated in the lower house while the UCR gave birth to only 14% of them. Again, the UCR shows low produc tivity in immigration issues considering

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195 the proportion of seats this party held in the House during this period ranged approximately from 45 to 51%, comfortably su rpassing the number of seats controlled by the PJ (See Table 6-2). At the same time, th e PJ managed to pass between 40 and 33% of those affairs it proposed in each chamber (See Table 6-9). In turn, during the period 1983-1989, the UCR could not pass any of its pro posals in the Senate. In the House, the UCR probably took advantage of the majority it enjoyed, succeeding to push forward 60% of its proposals. Third parties during this period were particularly active in immigration policy issues in the House. In this chamber, thei r productivity almost equaled that of the PJ and UCR added together.29 At the same time, 33% of these proposals were approved. During the period 1989-1995, the productivity of the two main parties, PJ and UCR, was more even in both Chambers (See Ta ble 6-10). In the Senate, the PJ proposed 25% of the immigration related projects and the UCR 12.5%. For the house, those numbers were 36 and 37%, respectively. The PJ was the most effective party in both chambers during this period (See Table 6-11) . In the Senate, it successfully pushed forward 75% of the decisions proposed. In the House, it did so with 67% of them. Surprisingly, third parties were more effective than the UCR, achieving an effectiveness that ranged between 54 and 64%. 30 To be sure, the UCR did not enjoy a majority in either chamber during this period, but it still had a clear first minor ity in both of them. 29 These parties were Movimiento Popular Neuquino , a regional party from Neuquén, and Democracia Cristiana, a social-democratic front which was important mainly in Buenos Aires and provided the basis for the later creation of FREPASO (Frente País Solidario). 30 The third parties with more immigration salience in the Senate were the Movimiento Popular Neuquino and Partido Autonomista. In the Ho use there was a diversity of small parties pushing immigration issues, including Movimiento Popular Fueguino, Democracia Cristiana, Movimiento Popular Jujeno, Movimiento al Socialismo, and Movimiento Popular Neuquino.

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196 Apparently, this circumstance did not help th is party’s effectiveness (ranging from 32 to 50%). Draft bills considered 1983-1989 Creating legislation is a main function of legislatures. Although the Argentine Congress was unable to agree on a comp rehensive immigration law until 2003, it nevertheless produced and/or considered di fferent draft bills re lated to immigration policies. In this section, I analyze the cont ent of these draft bill s. As I do so, I pay particular attention to those that receiv ed support by the Argentine Congress. I also compare these proposals with the Executive’ s immigration rules in place during each period. What type of immigration decisions did the Argentine Congress approve? What were the characteristics of th e proposals that did not obtain approval? Were the Argentine Congresspersons more liberal th an the presidency when it came to immigration policies? In the period 1983-1989, the Senate considered 3 draft bills relating to immigrants this period was small, it is clear that the Ex ecutive was effective in passing the legislation it submitted. As we can see in the tables below, the Presidency managed to approve all three draft bills it proposed (See Table 6-14 and 6-15). The ascendancy of the Executive was more pronounced in the Hous e, since two thirds of the legislation this body approved was initiated by the Executive (See Table 6-15 ). This more marked influence of the Executive on the house was coherent with the political situation in the Congress. As mentioned before, Alfonsín’s government had a majority in the House of Representatives but never controlled the Senate. With regard to the political parties originating the legislation, the UCR was more active in both chambers, being respons ible of two thirds of the legislation considered in the Senate and half of the legisl ation submitted for the Chamber of Deputies’ considera tion. The PJ did not initiate an y legislation in the Senate

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197 and proposed one piece for the HouseÂ’s consider ation. Third parties were more active in the House. Table 6-8. Productivity by Po litical Party 1983-1989 (Immigr ation decisions Proposed by Political Party)* Political Party Proposing SenateHouse PJ 5 (55%)12 (34%) UCR 2 (22%)5 (14%) Other None 15 (43%) *This table does not include the draft bills originated in a different chamber or the Executive Table 6-9. Effectiveness by Political Part y 1983-1989 (Immigration Decisions Approved by Political Party) Political Party Initiating SenateHouse PJ 2 (40%)4 (33%) UCR None 3 (60%) Other None 5 (33%) Table 6-10. Productivity by Political Part y 1989-1995 (Immigration Decisions Proposed by Political Party)* Political Party Proposing SenateHouse PJ 8 (25%)27 (36%) UCR 4 (12%)29 (37%) Other 10 (31%)13 (17%) *This table does not include the draft bills originated in a different chamber or the Executive. Table 6-11. Effectiveness by Political Party 1989-1995 (Immigration Decisions Approved by Political Party) Political Party Initiating SenateHouse PJ 6 (75 %)18 (67 %) UCR 2 (50 %) 9 (32 %) Other 7 (64 %)7 (54 %) With regard to the objective of the diffe rent draft bills during this period, almost seventy five% of them were proposing small changes to the immigration legislation. For instance, updating the amounts of penalties charged for im migration offenses, revoking rules applicable for immigrants originati ng in communist countries, or imposing HIV tests to immigrants. In addition, an important number of them were

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198 proposing amnesties for immigrants from Latin American countries. Finally, there was a group of draft bills that dealt with issues rela ted to immigration in a less direct way. This was the case of a proposal for the creation of different development regions in the country and another one approving the const itution of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration. Since a main interest of this study is to analyze the CongressÂ’s position with regard to immigration policies and its agreement with the immigration policies of the Executive, I coded each proposal considered by this body as positive, negative or neutral. I coded as positive those proposals that, if passed, would have made immigration policies in place more permissive. I coded as negative those dr aft bills that would have made immigration rules more restrictive. Finally, I coded as neut ral the different projects that did not have a direct impact on the rules for admission of foreign citizens. Out of the draft bills considered between 1983 and 1989 by both chambe rs of the Congress, 3 were coded as negative, 8 as positive, and 1 as neutral. As one can see, almost 70% of the proposals aimed at making immigration polic ies more liberal. In turn, ou t of the proposals approved by the Congress, 2 were negative, 2 were positiv e, and 1 was neutral. That is to say, forty percent of the draft bills passe d were enacting immigration re strictions and another forty percent of them were proposing more permissi ve immigration rules. Draft bills passed 1983-1989 Three bills that originated between 1983 and 1989 were passed. As mentioned before, the ideological record of the immigr ation decisions passed during this period was mixed. One bill was directed to improve the en forcement of immigration rules by raising

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199Table 6-12. Law Drafts Senate 1983-1989 ID No. Year Approved Party Description Permissive? 503-S 1985 UCR Impedes foreigners that are HIV positive from applying for a permanent visa 2876 1986 L. 23564 UCR Updates the amounts of the differe nt penalties applicable to immigration offenses 161-PE 1989 L. 23768 Revokes norms applicable to immigrants originating in communist countries + total: 2/approved: 1; + total: 1/ approved: 1; 0 total: 0/approved:0 Table. 6-13. Law Drafts House 1983-1989 ID No. Year Approved Party Description Permissive? 638-D 1983 Other Amnesty for foreigners of ne ighboring countries residing in Argentina + 900-D 1983 PJ Amnesty for foreigners of ne ighboring countries residing in Argentina + 1590-D 1985 PJ Amnesty for foreigners of ne ighboring countries residing in Argentina + 2876-D 1986 L. 23564 UCR Updates the amounts of the differe nt penalties applicable to immigration offenses 1470-D 1988 UCR Eliminates any applicable f ee to border crossings with bordering countries + 161-PE 1989 L. 23768 Revokes norms applicable to immigrants originating in communist countries + 1339-D 1984 PJ Regional development programs/ orientation of migration away from metropolitan area + 48-PE 1989 L. 23816 Approves creation of Intergovernmental Committee for Migration 0 total: 1/approved: 1; + total: 4/ approved: 1; 0 total: 1/approved: 1

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200 Table 6-14. Origin of Laws Cons idered in the Senate 1983-1989 Who Initiates Legislations? Bills Proposed Bills Approved PJ 00 UCR 21Third Parties 00Executive 11The Other Chamber 00Total 32 Table 6-15. Origin of Laws C onsidered in the House 1983-1989 Who Initiates Legislations? Bills Proposed Bills Approved PJ 30 UCR 21Third Parties 20Executive 22The Other Chamber 00Total 63 Table 6-16 Permissiveness of th e Immigration Legislation 1983-1989 Impact of the bill More RestrictiveMore PermissiveNeutral Proposed 381 Approved 221 the amounts charged for immigr ation offenses (2876-S-86).1 The deputies from the party in power (UCR) that proposed this modificati on thought that “the pena lties established in the Law 22439 are of vital importance for preventing the proliferation of illegal immigrants in the country” (Ibid. p.2628). These legislators also thought that these “illegal workers could generate a margin al labor market and represent an unfair competition to the native labor” (Ibid.). This modification to the existing legislation not only updated the amounts of the penalties but it also provided a mechanism for an automatic adjustment of these amounts according to the inflation rate. This law sought to enforce immigration rules by st rengthening the coercive mechanisms established earlier. 1 Passed as Bill (Ley) 23564.

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201 One bill passed during this period was clearly in the direction of making immigration rules more liberal.2 This bill was initiated by the Executive and aimed at revoking the strict controls th at were applicable to immi grants arriving from communist countries (161-PE-89). These controls ha d been approved by Decree 2457 from 1963, and subjected these immigrants to strict checks before and after arriving in the country. The annulment of this decree was justified, accord ing to the memorandum attached to the draft bill, because “it implied an unaccepta ble ideological discrimination which is no longer justified (Ibid.).” This memorandum hoped that this measure could improve Argentina’s relationships with Communist countries, in a cont ext in which “the Cold War was overcome” (Ibid.). Overall, this norm had the clear purpose of improving the conditions under which immigrants from communi st countries could arrive in Argentina. I believe that at that point, however, most of the controls that this norm was supposed to get rid of were not in place any longer. None theless, it was a healt hy, even if symbolic, reaffirmation of the democratic principl es that should guide immigration policies. A third bill passed during this time had also been initiated by the Presidency.3 This legal instrument approved some modifi cations to the constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), the antecedent of the International Organization for Migration. This institution a ssists immigrants that are in need of financial aid to reach their destination, refug ees and other victims of forced migration, and governments interested in recruiting im migrants. Considering the nature of the services provided by this in stitution, one can consider its endorsement by the Argentine 2 Passed as Bill (Ley) 23768. 3 Passed as Bill (ley) 23816. Although the House approve d it during Alfonsín’s presidency, the Senate did so in 1990, during Menem’s first administration.

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202 government as a step toward liberal immigr ation policies. Strict ly speaking, however, approving a constitution for the ICM does not equal to enacting liberal immigration policies. As the reader may remember, af ter 1985, the immigra tion policies of the Executive became stricter. Immigrants were re quired to be skilled or to have an investment capital in order to apply for a work visa. To an extent, the Congress accompanied these policies by raising the am ounts of the penalties charged to the immigration legislation offenders. The two more liberal laws that were passed (revoking the norms for immigrants from Communist countries and approving the constitution of the ICM) only had a limited impact of the immigration rules in place. Other draft bills considered 1983-1989 What other norms did the Argentine Congr ess consider during this time? Although the norms that are actually approved are the ones that make new policies, it may be interesting to examine the remaining draft bills that the Congre ss considered between 1983 and 1989. Only one of the remaining draft bills was aimed at enacting immigration restrictions. This project attempted to pr event HIV positive people from applying for a visa in Argentina. It did so by requiring a test to those pe rsons coming from areas of the word in which this disease was widespread. All the other projects considered during the period which did not become law (638-D-83, 900-D-83, 1590-D-85, 1339-D-84, 3802-D86 and 1470-D-88) sought to enact more liber al immigration policies. As soon as the Congress sessions resumed afte r the reestablishment of de mocracy in December 10 1983, different representatives star ted proposing programs to regul arize the immigration status of undocumented immigrants (638-D83, 900-D-83, 1590-D-85, and 3802-D-86). All these draft bills sought to award residenc y to either neighboring immigrants or immigrants from any Latin American country. As the reader may remember, the

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203 Executive did pass an amnesty soon after th e reestablishment of democracy (Decree 780/84). Some legislators from the Pe ronist Party prepared a plan for the creation of four development poles or regions in different parts of the country in 1984 (1339-D-84). These regions were supposed to have a seri es of tax exemptions and other advantages. The legislators proposing the plan gave a central role to migration (internal as well as international). They thought that the libe ral elites had create d a country in which development and people were concentrated in Buenos Aires. The solution for this group of legislators was to encourage development and migration to these four regions in the Northeast, Northwest, West and South of Arge ntina. Finally, anothe r draft bill generated during this period intended to encourage migr ation and tourism, by eliminating all fees applicable border crossings with neighbori ng countries (1470-D-88). By doing so, this bill sought to encourage migration and t ourism between Argentina and its bordering countries. As one can see, the majority of the draft bills that were cons idered by the Congress during this period were considerably more lib eral than the immigration policies that the Executive enacted after 1985. Furt hermore, on three occasions, Argentine legislators attempted to request the Ex ecutive to annul its immigration policies passed through Resolution 2340/85. Although these requests were not passed, they nevertheless show a congressional discomfort with the immi gration policies of the Executive (137-S-86, 4549-D-85, and 2882-D-86). The first of these deci sions was originated in the Senate and was written in a categorical tone. After not icing that Argentines had re-conquered democracy, it recalled that the constitution in vited “all good-willed citizens of the world”

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204 to immigrate to Argentina if they wished ( 137-S-86). Then, this resolution reviewed all rights that the Constitution consecr ated for all inhabitants and not just for citizens. “It is clear,” the resolution followed, “that the C onstitution did not esta blish priorities or discriminations based on economic, religious, pr ofessional, racial, or political reasons.” According to the legislator from the Per onist party authoring this request to the Executive, the government was discriminating against foreigners on the basis of their profession (by requiring them to be skill ed workers) and economic condition (by requiring them to have investment capital). In addition, this legislator believed that the immigration policies of the Presidency cont radicted its foreign policy toward Latin American countries. Finally, he considered that the Immigration Agency was enjoying excessive powers to decide who complied with the requirements to apply for a visa in Argentina. Overall, this le gislator believed the annulme nt of Resolution 2340/85 was absolutely necessary. One of the other requests to the Exec utive aimed at annulling the Executive’s immigration policies was also persuasive. Au thored by a legislators from a center left party,4 the text of this project stated that th e “Congress would be pl eased if the Executive annulled the Resolution 2340/85, passed by the Immigration Agency, which arbitrarily restricts the entry and settlement of immigr ants in Argentina…” (4549-D-85). The author estimated that after the deadline of the amnesty expire d in January of 1986, there were some 200,000 thousand immigrants in Argen tina that needed to regularize their immigration status. He also mentioned that the governments of some bordering countries and several human rights organizations had expressed their concern about the 4 This draft was presented by legislators from the Partido Intransigente, a center-left party founded in 1957 which was important during the 1980s, in particular, in the Province of Buenos Aires.

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205 immigration measures enacted in 1985. The legislator authoring this project then wondered, “but who are these fore igners that are now turned into illegal immigrants?” He replied that the majority of these immigrants were from Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, and had arrived in Argentina fleeing m ilitary dictatorships or seeking better opportunities. He then added that many of these migrants were of poor origin and occupied the roughest jobs in the country. For all these reasons, this legislator believed the Executive should annul Resolution 2340/85. The third request to the Executive to change its immi gration policy was proposed by a representative from the Peronist Part y for the House’s consideration (2882-D-86). The reasons for proposing the policy change ar e similar to the ones considered in the paragraphs above. The author of this reso lution was clearly pushing for more liberal immigration policies. This reso lution was innovative in two respects with regard to the other two discussed above. First, it acknowle dged that the Congress had to enact a new immigration legislation to replace the one le ft in place by the last military dictatorship. Instead of just criticizing the Executive’s immigration policies, the author of this resolution sketched a work plan for the C ongress to pass a new immigration law. In a way, this legislator seemed to be asking the Executive to only implement temporary measures until the new law was passed. In this regard, the resolution stated that “until a new immigration law is elaborated and approved, the Executive should pass another norm for the regularization of the immigration status of th e immigrants residing in the country” (Ibid.). In the meantime, the project later explained, it is the intention of the Congress to cooperate with th e Executive in the search of temporary solutions for the situation of immigrants. The project also emphasized that the Ex ecutive should consult

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206 with the Congress and the provinc es about the future decision s. Overall, this resolution provided a blue print for the way in whic h immigration decisions should take place. So far I have reviewed all congressional activity relating to draft bills on immigration issues for the period 1983-1989. Nine different draft bills were considered and only three of them were pa ssed. Only the bill regardi ng the amounts of the penalties for immigration offenses was as illiberal as the immigration policies of the Argentine Executive. The other two norms dealing with the rules from immigrants from communist countries and the constitution of the ICM were more liberal but of a more limited impact. However, if one complements this information with the rest of the draft bills that were considered in the Congress at this time a mo re liberal picture emerges. Three of these projects dealt with immigr ant rights and three other projects proposed different immigration rules favoring immigration. Furt hermore, on three emphatic documents both chambers of the Argentine Congress were requesting the Execu tive to change its immigration policies. Overal l, we can hypothesize that the Argentine Congress during Alfonsín’s government was more liberal than the Executive. Draft bills considered 1989-1995 During the period 1989-1995, congressional acti vity with regard to immigration issues increased immensely. Both houses consid ered a total a 34 draft bills, almost three times the amount considered for the period 1989-19955 (See Tables 6-17 and 6-18). With regard to where the different projects orig inated some interesti ng features arise (See Tables 6-19 and 6-20). First, the Senate wa s not prolific during this period. Although it considered 9 draft bills, none of them were initiated in this cham ber. Eighty percent of 5 This number duplicates the draft bills that went th rough both chambers (6) and counts as different those bill drafts that were reiterated.

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207 them were sent by the Lower House and the ot her twenty percent we re put forward by the Presidency. The House was more productive du ring the period, genera ting almost 90% of the draft bills related to immi gration it analyzed. The PJ re mained particularly active, originating roughly 50% of th e immigration bills the Hous e considered and a higher proportion of those passed. The UCR followed in productivity, generating 25% of the bills without managing to pass any of them. The Executive, in turn, was considerably effective in imposing its will to the House. In this regard, two thirds of the bills put forward by the Executive were passed. The draft bills initiated between 1989 a nd 1995 covered a variety of topics (See Table 6-17 and 6-18). More than seventy pe rcent of them proposed changes to the existing immigration legislation in topics such as the admission of handicapped people, deportation of immigrants, and the amounts charged for immigration offenses. Other draft bills dealt with rules for admission of fore igners in higher educ ation institutions, and the cases in which foreigners could occupy cer tain jobs. In addition, there was a group of draft bills that had an admi nistrative impact on the Immigration Agency, such as the decentralization of tasks within the regional offices and the creation of an administrative service. Finally, a number of proposals dealt w ith a diverse set of issues, ranging from the creation of a federal committee for migration to the approval of an agreement with the International Organization for Migration. In terms of the position of the draft bills considered with regard to the immigration policies in place (See Table 6-21), an important number of them were more restri ctive (32%). One third of them were more permissive and 40% of them would have made no direct impact on the immigration rules in place. As for the ones approved, most of them were of neutral impact (60%) and one

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208 third of them were more rest rictive than the immigration ru les in place. Only one of the draft bills approved made the immigration po licies of the Argentine State more liberal (8%). Draft bills passed 1989-1995 Five bills were passed between 1989 and 1995. Like in the preceding period, the bills approved by the Congress during this time had a mixed impact on immigration policies. Two bills were related to the Inte rnational Organization for Migration (48-PE-89 and 362-PE-90).6 One bill was related to the in ternal organization of the IA.7 Another draft removed an impediment for handicapped people to apply for a visa, and updated the amounts of the fines charged for immigration violations.8 Finally, one bill was passed that restricted the number of jobs occupied by immigrants.9 Three other bills were passed in the House but did not get approval in th e Senate. Two of these bills were enacting 6 Bill (Ley) 23816 and 24001. 7 Bill (Ley) 24008. 8 Bill (Ley) 24393. 9 Bill (Ley) 24493.

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209Table 6-17 Law Drafts Senate 1989-1995 ID No. Year Approved Party Description Permissive? Handicapped and Penalties 744-S 1993 PEN Revokes prohibition of applying for residency for handicapped; updates penalties 0 27-CD 1994 L. 24393 D Same 0 Deportation Provisions 63-CD 1993 D States that foreigners who br eak labor, taxation or social security laws should be expe lled from the country 6-D-93 77-CD 1994 D States that foreigners sentenced to prison be expelled from the country 1523-D-94 Other Changes to Immigration Legislation 66-CD 1993 D Facilitates the admission of foreigners in educational institutions 3150-D-92 + 92-CD 1993 L. 24493 D Reserves jobs in ships for Argentines; limitations for transitory immigrants to work Other 48-PE 1989 L. 23816 D Approves creation of Intergovernmental Committee for Migration 0 362-PE 1990 L. 24001 PEN Approves agreement with Inte rnational Organization for Migration 0 43-CD 1991 L. 24008 D Allows Immigration Agency to delegate tasks on regional offices and police 6305-D-90 0 total: 3/approved: 1; + total: 1/ approved: 0; 0 total: 5/approved: 4

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210Table 6-18 Law Drafts House 1989-1995 ID No. Year Approved Reiterated? Party Description Permissive? Com p rehensive Laws 5611-D 1994 UC R Pro p oses com p rehensive immi g ration law.+ 3341-D 1995 PJPro p oses com p rehensive immi g ration law+ 3300-D 1995 PJPro p oses com p rehensive immi g ration law+ Handica pp ed and Penalties 4449-D 1993 PJRevokes p rohibition of a pp l y in g for residenc y for handica pp e d + 71-PE 1993 L. 24393 Revokes p rohibition of a pp l y in g for residenc y for 0 5114-D 1993 UC R Revokes p rohibition of a pp l y in g for residenc y for + 2134-D 1994 PJU p dates p enalties for immi g ration offenses.0654-D 1995 YUC R Revokes p rohibition of a pp l y in g for residenc y for handica pp e d + 3128-D 1995 YPJRevokes p rohibition of a pp l y in g for residenc y for 0 De p ortation Provisions 0006-D 1993 Y PJStates that forei g ners who break labor , taxation or s. securit y 0616-D 1993 PJStates that forei g ners sentenced to p rison be ex p elled from the 1523-D 1994 Y YPJStates that forei g ners sentenced to p rison be ex p elled from the 5827-D 1994 YPJStates that forei g ners sentenced to p rison be ex p elled from the 4554-D 1993 Othe r Revokes Decree 2771/93 with norms for de p ortation of + Other Chan g es to Im m i g ration Le g islation 3150-D 1992 Y PJFacilitates the admission of forei g ners in educational + 2133-D 1993 UC R Char g es a fee to p eo p le that cross the border on a re g ular basis 2959-D 1993 L. 24493 PJReserves j obs for Ar g entines and documented immi g rants1785-D 1995 YUC R Char g es a fee to p eo p le that cross the border on a re g ular basis 5912-D 1995 Othe r Amnest y for borderin g mi g rants+ Othe r 41-PE 1990 Allows Immi g ration A g enc y to d ele g ate tasks on re g ional 0 6305-D 1990 L. 24008 YOthe r Allows Immi g ration A g enc y to dele g ate tasks on re g ional 0 4213-D 1992 Othe r Creates financial division in Immi g ration A g enc y 0 6014-D 1992 PJCreates a federal Committee for mi g ration0 0831-D 1995 YPJCreates a federal Committee for mi g ration0 362-PE 1990 L. 24001 PENA pp roves a g reement with International Or g anization for 0 total: 8/approved: 4; + total: 9/ approved: 1; 0 total: 8/approved: 7

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211 Table 6-19 Origin of Laws Cons idered in the Senate 1989-1995 Who Initiates Legislations? Bills ProposedBills Approved PJ 00 UCR 00 Third Parties 00 Executive 21 The Other Chamber 74 Total 95* Table 6-20 Origin of Laws C onsidered in the House 1989-1995 Who Initiates Legislations? Bills Proposed Bills Approved PJ 134 UCR 50 Third Parties 41 Executive 32 The Other Chamber 00 Total 257**Since bills need the approval of both chambers to become laws, these numbers do not coincide with the number of bills actually passed. Four bills were act ually passed, one of them had originated in the preceding presidential period. Table 6-21 Permissiveness of the Immigration legislation 1989-1995 Impact of the bill More restrictiveMore PermissiveNeutral Proposed 111013 Approved 417 deportation provisions and one of them was facilitating the admission of jailed immigrants in higher ed ucation institutions. The content of the bill that approved the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration was analyzed in th e preceding section. In 1991, the Argentine government also approved an agreement with the Internati onal Organization for Migration to cooperate in immigration issues. Although th is agreement involved some activities that could lead to increase the num ber of immigrants to Argentina, it did not produce a direct impact of the immigration polic ies of the Argentine State. Similarly, the draft bills that were authoriz ing the Immigration Agency to delegate tasks on its regional

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212 offices and auxiliary police bodies did not pr oduce a change in the immigration policies (41-PE-90, 6305-D-90 and 43-CD-91). It is interesting, however, that this modification to the law was needed because the Executive had exceeded its powers. The Immigration Agency had delegated powers for awarding vi sas to its regional offices and Argentine consulates through Decree 1434/87. However, acco rding to the Argentine legal doctrine, since the Immigration Agency’s powers ha d been awarded by law (Law 22439), only a norm of equal or higher hierarchy could c onsecutively delegate those powers. An administrative control tribunal (Tribunal de Cuen tas de la Nación) had objected to Decree 1434/87 (41-PE-90). The delegation of powers made by decree had consequently been declared illegal. It is true that the Executive was passing im migration decisions, partly, because the Congress was not replacing the Law of 1981, wh ich made it possible. However, in this case, the Executive was going further to di srespect the Argentine legal system. Something similar happened when the director of the Immigration Agency changed the rules for admission of foreign citizens through a resolution signed by him in 1985 (Resolution 2340/85). It was not customary (legal?) to change the rules for admission of foreign citizens through this type of norms. On this occasion, the Director of the Immigration Agency was so widely objected and criticized that the sa me norms had to be approved by Executive decree tw o years later (Dec ree 1434/87). These events show a worrisome tendency toward concentration of power on the Argentine Executive during a time in which, according to the theorists of delegative democracy, such a democracy was not even in place.1 1 The delegative democracy argument is generally related to Menem’s government and sometimes to his predecessor Perón but not to Alfonsín’s Presidency.

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213 A second bill passed during this period s howed a compromise between permissive and restrictive immigration policies. For one thing, this bill removed an impediment established in the Law of 1981, which prohi bited any person with a physical and/or psychical impairment from applying for a vi sa in Argentina. Si x different proposals dealing with the removal of this impedime nt were generated during the period (744-PE93, 4449-D-93, 71-PE-93, 5114-D-93, 654-D-95, a nd 3128-D-95). Of course, this impediment consecrated in the immigration law was highly discrimi natory and violated international agreements subscribed to by the Argentine governm ent. In addition, a particular case that achieved notoriety likely raised public awareness. A fourteen year-old girl from Uruguay, Carla Bernasconi, had been trying to get her visa for seven years (Pagina 12, 02/04/94). The rest of her family had succeeded in obtaining their papers but Carla had remained undocumented. In Februa ry 1994, the media echoed the unfairness of the situation. Soon afterwards, President Me nem awarded Carla permanent residency in Argentina. The Minister of Interior announced the good news to her family, in front of the television cameras. Later on, in November, Law 24393 was passed. This law established that impaired people would be aw arded the same immigra tion status as their tutors. Together with the removal of the impedi ments for impaired people to apply for residency in Argentina, the Executive submitted an update of the fines charged for violations to the immigra tion legislation (744-S-93, 71PE-93, and 27-CD-94). Proposals to update the amounts of the fines were also made by two representatives from the PJ (2134-D-94, and 3128-D-95). The Executive wa s strategic to make both proposals together. In the message that accompanied the draft bill, the President emphasized the

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214 importance of removing the obstacles for the re gularization of the im migration status of handicapped people. Little was said about th e restrictive aspects of the immigration legislation. More restrictive in its tone was the draf t bill by three representatives of the PJ which became law (92-CD-93 and 1959-D-93) . Passed in May 1995, this bill became known as the “national labor law” and was inte nded to “discourage the practice of hiring clandestine labor” (1959-D-93). According to the text accompanying the draft bill, “the crisis of the labor market made this bill necessary for guaranteeing the fair competition between businesses”(Ibid.) In reality, though, the newness of this legislation was minimal. The law declared that all remunerated work in the country should be conducted by Argentines or persons authorized by the Immigration Agency to work (Art. 1, Law 24493). These persons that could lawfully work were called by the law “national labor.” This declaration with regard to who could work did not modify the existing regulations on the matter. The labor and immigration legisl ation stated the same principle. The new law then explained that the Immigration Agen cy could not authorize transitory migrants to work if there was nati onal labor available to do the job (Art. 2, Law 24493). In principle, this article seemed to produce a ch ange in the country’s rules for admission of immigrants. However, only exceptionally were transitory workers authorized to work under Decree 1023/94.2 2 The Article 29 of the Reglamento de Migración passed by Decree 1023/94, established that transitory immigrants were those in transit, tourists, people r eceiving medical treatment, members of the crew of an international ship or airplanes arriving in the country, and investors or businessmen. Only exceptionally, the article explained, would transitory immigrants be authorized to work in artistic, religious, cultural, or professional activities.

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215 Furthermore, the Executive vetoed an article that stated that th e Ministry of Labor, in consultation with the unions, would dete rmine when there was (or was not) national labor available. Therefore, the requirement of determining if ther e was labor available was also vetoed in a way. The decree that vetoed the article only provided practical reasons for the decision. This nor m explained that the determina tion of the availability of national labor required complex studies that were not compatible with the expedited procedure followed to grant a temporary residency (Decree 845/ 95). Finally, the law created a severe penalty for firms hiring undoc umented workers. I already mentioned that the legislation from 1981 established di fferent fines for those hiring or lodging undocumented immigrants, which were also upd ated during this period. Yet, the penalty established in the norm under analysis was more extreme. According to the Article 4 of Law 24493, the government could close down a firm that hired 20% or more of undocumented workers. Closing down firms wa s a truly severe sanction. But so was hiring 20% of undocumented work ers. In this respect, I doubt, though, that a firm hiring such a high number of undocumented workers was ever discovered. In sum, this law was more a declaration of nationalistic principl es than an actual change in immigration policies. In this regard, the Congress may ha ve been in tone with the Executive in enacting strongly symbolic immigration meas ures in a moment in which the economic plan was showing weaknesses. The Lower House passed three other immigration bills that did not obtain later approval in the Senate.3 Since their approval in the House shows a considerable support on the part of the Argentine representatives, I believe they deserv e special examination. 3 In the legal jargon in Argentina, when a draft bill obtains approval in one chamber is said to have “media sanción.”

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216 Two of these bills were expanding the depor tation provisions established in the Law 22439 and were highly restric tive (6-D-93 and 1523-D-93) . The third project was authorizing immigrants to attend educational in stitutions (3150-D-92). It is important to remind the reader that the Law 22439 provide d the Executive with extensive powers to deport immigrants. In its article 95 it stated that the Ministry of Interior could expel from the country those foreigners that were senten ced to five years in prison or were engaged in activities affecting social peace, national security or public order (Law 22439). In turn, Article 37 allowed the Executive to expel from the country undocumented immigrants. In this regard, the deportation provisions of this law are very simila r to those of the 1902 Law. At the end of 1993, the Executive passed Decree 2771/93, which allowed it to deport those immigrants that were committi ng crimes or illegally occupying dwellings. The draft bills dealing with deportation provisions proposed in the Congress are in perfect harmony with this decree. The fi rst of the draft bills was proposed by a representative from the PJ and added a thir d case in which foreigners could be deported (6-D-93). In this regard, it stat ed that foreigners that relaps ed into violating labor, social security or taxation laws coul d be deported even if their c ondemnatory sentences did not reach five years. Among the considerations taken into account by the author to propose this hardening of deportation provisions were so me facts reflected in the media, regarding the hiring of undocumented immigrants by other immigrants. I believe this representative is referring to cases in which Korean immi grants were hiring undocumented Bolivians to work in textile industries. More importantly, this representative seemed to confirm my

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217 hypothesis that the ideas about immigrants re flected in the press are likely to shape immigration policies. The second draft bill under analysis achie ved more notoriety than its predecessor when it was approved in January 1995 (1523-D-94).4 Also submitted by a PJ representative, this bill’s pr ovisions were similar to thos e discussed in the paragraph above. However, this later bill went further to state that the Minist ry of Interior could deport any foreigner sentenced to six months in prison. The author of this bill reminded me of Paul Gilroy (1991:74) when stati ng that respect for the law was a basic requirement for belonging in the national comm unity. In this regar d, he explained that those who intend to integrate into our society “should assimilate to our life style, and social, cultural and moral values” (1523-D94). Laws, according to this representative, protect the highest principles of “Argentinity ” and social life, and should be respected by foreigners and nationals alike. The author then issued a warning, explaining that “those foreigners who are not willing to adapt to our society by complying with the law and respecting its values, should not stay…” He then justified that any foreigner who was sentenced for a crime that deserved prison should leave the country. The statements by this legislator parallel th e discourses of the Executive’ s officials during 1993 and 1994 regarding immigration. Furthermore, the news paper Pagina 12 compared this draft bill with the infamous Residence Law of 1902 (Pagina 12, 01/22/95). Another bill which received approval in the Senate was friendlier to immigrants (3150-D-92). According to the article 102 of Law 22439, only temporary or permanent residents could be educated in Arge ntina. This proposal, also submitted by 4 Two other draft bills similar to this were consid ered by the House but not passed (616-D-93 and 5827D94).

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218 representatives from the PJ, permitted that cert ain transitory immigrants that were in jail attend high school and higher education institut ions. This draft bill, if passed by the Argentine Congress, would not have had a br oad impact on the immigration policies of the Argentine State since it was applicab le to a small portion of the immigrant population. More specifically, th is draft bill allowed immigran ts that were in jail to complete their education. It none theless showed a high degree of respect for the rights of immigrants. The author of this proposal cite d a number of internat ional conventions to justify its provisions, including American Convention on Human Rights “Pact San Jose, Costa Rica” and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cu ltural Rights. He also noted that the Law of 1981 was unconstitu tional when depriving certain immigrants of their right to education. The author also believed that the provi sions of the Law of 1981 contradicted the process of integrat ion with Argentina’s bordering countries. Other draft bills considered 1989-1995 Overall, the general orientat ion of the bills approved by one or both chambers of the Argentine Congress in the period 1989-1995, wa s considerably restrictive. Except for the draft bills revoking the impediment for impa ired people to apply for a visa and the proposal regarding the facilita tion of a student visa for ja iled immigrants, all the other bills discussed above were highly restrictiv e and a good complement to the policies of the Argentine Executive. Furthermore, as shown above, the discourses by some legislators regarding immigration also pa ralleled those by the Executiv e’s state officials during 1993 and 1994. It is not possible to analyze all the draft bills considered during this period in detail. At this point, it may be interesti ng to explore some proposals aimed at making immigration policies more permissive. Some propos als in this regard we re initiated in the House of Representatives. Within this gr oup we count draft bills dealing with the

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219 annulment of Decree 2771/93 (4554-D-93), the en actment of an amnesty for immigrants (5912-D-95), and the democra tization of the immigrati on decision-making process through the creation of a federal committ ee of migration (6014-D-92 and 831-D-95). Finally, there were three draft bills proposi ng comprehensive immigration policies that constitute the object of the next section. Maybe the proposal that most openly conflicted with the Executive’s policies was the one submitted by a representative from a smaller leftist party to revoke Decree 2771/93 (4554-D-93). As mentioned in chapter 5, this decree allo wed the Executive to deport those immigrants that were committi ng crimes or illegally occupying dwellings. The representative pushing this draft bill used a variety of arguments to justify his proposal. According to him, the Executive’s decree was unconstitutional and contradicted criminal law. In addition, he accused the Ex ecutive of discriminating against immigrants. “Its discriminatory eagerness makes the Execu tive ignore all norms,” this representative explained. Finally, he noted that, mist akenly, Decree 2771/93 was not aiming at employers. According to the author of this draft bill, some employers were making immigrants work and live in conditions compar able to the middle ages. This legislator made a clear case against the deportation polic ies of the Argentine Executive. Besides, the justifications provided by him to revoke Decree 2771/93 were considerably persuasive. However, in the light of all th e draft bills generated within the Argentine Congress to harden deportation rules, it is not su rprising that this bill was not passed. Another draft bill proposed an amnesty for undocumented immigrants (5912-D95). This bill was also put forward by a representative from a smaller center left party, and sought to “improve the situation of th e poor immigrants of ne ighboring countries, in

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220 the context of a deep regional socioeconomic crisis” (Ibid.). According to the author of this proposal, these immigrants were subjected to situations of exploitation. The duty of the state, this representati ve thought, was to refrain its elf from adding to the xenophobic wave that was marginalizing these immigran ts. Instead, the government should look for ways of reverting the situation. Likely , this congressman was referring to the scapegoating suffered by immigran ts after 1993 in Argentina. “In moments of instability and job loss,” he followed, “the state should not encourage prejudices and discrimination on the part of the native population” (Ibid.). He finally exhorted the Congress to pass the draft bill and to put an end to the exclus ionary and discriminatory practices against immigrants (Ibid.). Overall, this congression al document contained considerably serious accusations with regard to the way the Executive was dealing with immigrants. Finally, one draft bill from the House whic h attempted to create a federal board of immigration policies (6014-D-92 and 831-D-95) . The idea was to cr eate a body with the participation of the Federal Government, the provinces and the City of Buenos Aires, which would be in charge of the plans to promote immigration. Two main types of rationales were behind the proposal. For one thing, the legislator proposing the creation of the committee showed evidence that th e Immigration Agency was not complying (could not comply) with its ro le of promoting immigrati on in the areas that Law 22439 had prioritized for the promotion of immigration.5 Furthermore, this agency was not keeping appropriate statistical records for th is purpose. In addition, the author of this proposal believed that the creation of the fede ral board would ensure that the will of the 5 This law organized the whole country in a decreasing order of importance for the promotion of immigration. The Southern provinces of Patagonia were in the higher end of the list while the City of Buenos Aires was in the lower end.

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221 provinces was heard and respected. Only immi gration policies conceived in this way, the author thought, would benef it all the provinces and th e country as a whole. This draft bill was promoting the creati on of a body that would have made the immigration decision-making process more de mocratic and rational. Although it did not enact in itself immigration policies, it is clear that the initiator believed that immigration should be encouraged and not restricted. He thought in this regard that the country needed an ambitious immigration policy. He also celebrated the ExecutiveÂ’s plan to attract immigrants from Central and Easter n Europe and thought that the Executive should bring more than 100,000 immigrants a year. When first submitted for consideration in 1992, this draft bill was cohe rent with the immigration policies of the Executive oriented to regularize the immigrati on status of neighboring immigrants and to encourage the immigration of Central a nd Eastern Europeans (6014-D-92). When resubmitted for approval 1995, however, this draf t bill was far more liberal than the immigration policies of the Ar gentine Executive (832-D-95). Comprehensive immigration draft bills One novelty during this period was that, for the first time since the reestablishment of democracy, some draft bills proposing a comprehensive body of immigration rules were submitted for congressional considera tion. I believe the creation of the population committees at the beginning of the 1990s facilitated the generation of these comprehensive immigration policy proposals. Thr ee draft bills of this kind were initiated in 1994 and 1995 in the House. Although these laws were not approved, they meant a positive move on the part of the Congress toward the passage of new immigration legislation to replace the one dating from the last military dictatorship. With some

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222 variation, these draft bills proposed immigration rules that were to some extent more liberal that the immigration rules in place. The first of these draft bills was authored by a representa tive from the UCR, Muñoz (5611-D-94), and the other two were proposed by representatives from the PJ, namely Macedo (3341-D-95) and Toto (3300-D-95). In Table 6-22, I show how these draft bills compared with Law 22439 with regard to cert ain features. When determining if a given country has liberal immigration policies, one first pays atten tion to the attitude that the government has with regard to immigrati on. That is to say, one inquires if the government encourages immigration, discourages it or does neither one. Out of the draft bills under analysis here, the only one that clearly stated that the Argentine government will encourage immigration to Argentina is th e one by Macedo (Article 7). Is this to say that the Law of 1982 was more liberal than the other two? In a way, it was. However, this latter law only meant to encourage the immi gration of “those fore igners whose cultural characteristics permit their integration into the Argentine society” (Article 2, Law 22439). The military understood that only Eu ropean immigration fulfilled this requirement. Another basic question that one inquires about when judging immigration policies is the degree to which a country is be ing selective when it comes to accepting immigrants. In addition, it is important to anal yze the criteria used to select immigrants. The draft bills under analys is did not innovate much when compared with the immigration rules in place at the time. They were either copying the general provisions of Law 22439 with regard to what is underst ood by permanent, temporary or transitory resident (Macedo, Article 27 and ff.) or the requirements for applying for each type of

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223 residency established in Decree 1023/946 (Muñoz, Article 13 and ff.; Toto, Article 22 and ff.). In one aspect, however, the draft bills differed. Unlike the other two, Macedo’s draft bill gave a central role to the regional integration process of MERCOSUR in the immigration policies of the Argentine St ate. His proposal st ated that MERCOSUR citizens could obtain a work visa at the borde r if they wanted to stay and work in Argentina (Article 32). One important feature of immigrant policie s is the bundle of right s that immigrants are awarded once they settle in the country. This bundle of rights w ill have an impact on the quality of life that foreigners can enj oy in the new country. Macedo’s draft bill was once again the most liberal one in this regar d. This proposal protecte d the civil rights of all immigrants (Article 68). In addition, it paid particular atte ntion to the protection of the right to education (Article 11). Finally, it stated that th e government should seek the integration of immigrants into Argentine soci ety, while, at the same time, respecting their cultural identity (Article 8). The other two projects repeat ed the provisions of Law 22439. Both bill drafts by Muñoz (Article 44) and To to (Article 50) established that permanent residents would enjoy of the civil rights of Argentines. However, they extended the protection of the labor laws to permanent or temporary resident s (Articles 47 and 53, respectively). Unlike citizens, immigrants in most countri es are not true members of the political community in that they can be deported fo r different reasons. Of course, the more discretion the state has to de port immigrants the most in secure the lives of these immigrants will be. The draft bill by Toto st ood out with regard to the protection that 6 On the provisions of Decree 1023/94, see Appendix 1.

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224 immigrants were given against deportation. It was the only one that obliged the Executive to give intervention to the courts when an immigrant was about to be deported (Article 45). In addition, and unlike Law 22439, all draft bills established that the Executive could give immigrants the option of regularizing th eir immigration status before deporting them (Muñoz, Article 31; Macedo, Article 99; and To to, Article 37). In one respect, however, these draft bills were hardening the deporta tion provisions of Law 22439. In this regard, all of them shortened the number of years in prison that a person needed to be sentenced to in order to be deported (Ar ticles 32, 106, and 39, respectively). Finally, Argentine legislators seemed to be concerned that the Executive had been deciding immigration policies in isolation. Pr obably for this reason, all draft bills paid particular attention to fi nding ways for making the decision-making process less centralized in the head of the Ministry of Interior. For this purpose, they all created boards which participated in the decision-ma king process. In the draft bills by Muñoz (Article 12) and Macedo (Article 15), the boa rds had advisory functions in matters of migration. In Toto’s proposal the functions of the board were broa der in two respects. First, it concerned itself not only with immi gration policies but also with population ones. Also, the board did not just recommend but it actually co-decided w ith the Ministry of Interior. The draft bills acknowledged the multif aceted nature of immi gration policies. In this regard, they proposed boards that included the participation of se veral representatives of different Executive’s agenci es. In addition, the boards s ought increased coordination between the Executive and the C ongress. In this regard, they also incorporated members of the congressional population committees. The agreed inclusion of these boards in the

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225 different draft bills shows a congressional concern with finding ways improving the policymaking and implementation processes. These draft bills proposing wide-ranging im migration policies complete the picture of the Argentine congressiona l activity with regard to im migration legislation for the period 1989-1995. Even if these draft bills di d not become law, the Argentine Congress was nonetheless taking its first steps in the direction of enacting new immigration policies. In addition, the proposals by Argen tine legislators to replace the law of 1981 were in the direction of ma king immigration policies more li beral. Although not all three draft bills were innovating with regard to the criter ia for the selection of foreign citizens, they all removed the discriminatory allu sions to the “cultural compatibility” of immigrants. Overall, they also extended th e bundle of rights awar ded to immigrants and made the deportation process more sensitive to the needs of immigran ts. Finally, all draft bills were aiming at making the immigr ation decision-making and implementation processes more participatory. Overall, between 1989 and 1995 the C ongress was significantly active in generating and approving immigration bills dealing with immigration issues. Although most of the legislation passed during this period was more restrictive than the immigration rules in place, some dissen ting views were obvious in the Argentine Congress as well. For starters, an important number of proposals that would have made immigration policies more liberal was consid ered (30%). In addition, some critical discourses emerged within the Congress th at were condemning the scapegoating of immigration. Finally, for the first time sin ce the reestablishmen t of democracy the Argentine Congress was initiating comprehe nsive immigration policies. All three

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226 proposals considered by the Congress dur ing the time were aiming at making immigration policies more liberal. Information Requests Their objective I already reviewed the congressional activ ity regarding draft bills dealing with immigration issues. The production of legisl ation provides the Congr ess with a direct way of creating policies. In addition, this body has more indirect ways of influencing immigration policies by making an impact on presidential behavi or. These ways are requesting the Executive to pr ovide information about cert ain issues and to follow a certain course of action. Information request s are a more indirect way of exercising power. In this type of request , the Congress asks the Presid ency to answer a number of questions that, in our case, ar e related to immigration issu es. In theory, the questions relate to information that the Congress may need to have in order to exercise its legislative function. In practice, the Congress exercises this power broadly and does not

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227Table 6-22. Comparison of the Provisi ons of Law 22439 (1981) with the Draft Bills by Muñoz, Macedo and Toto Law 22439 Muñoz Macedo Toto Encourages Immigration? Icultural characteristics permit integration into society Article 2 No According to the social needs of the country Article 7 No Types of Residency Permanent, Temporary and Transitory (does not specify requirements) Article 12 Permanent, Temporary and Non-resident (specifies requirements) Article 13 and ff. Permanent, Temporary, Transitory (does not specify requirements) Article 27 and ff. Permanent, Temporary and Non-Resident (specifies requirements) Article 22 and ff. MERCOSUR Citizens Natives of MERCOSUR can apply for Transitory Residency and work Article 32 Rights for Immigrants? Only permanent residents enjoy civil rights Article 15 Only permanent residents enjoy all civil rights Article 44 All Residents enjoy rights Article 68 Only permanent residents enjoy all civil rights Article 50 Undocumented are deported Article 37 Undocumented have options before deportation Article 31 Undocumented have options before deportation Article 99 Undocumented have options before deportation Article 37 Deportation Provisions Sentenced to 5 years in prison or for activities that affect social peace Article 95 Sentenced to 6 months in prison Article 32 Sentenced to 2 years in prison; or for activities that affect social peace Article 106 Sentenced to 6 months in prison Article 39 Who Decides Deportation? Ministry of Interior Article 37 Immigration Agency or Ministry of Interior Article 38 Immigration Agency or Ministry of Interior Article 102 Intervention to Courts Article 45 Decision of Immigration Policies Centralized on the Executive/Ministry of Interior Article 2 Immigration Agency, advised by National Immigration Board Articles 3 and 11 Executive advised by a National Immigration Board Articles 2 and 15 Immigration Agency and Federal Population Board Articles 2 and 3

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228 need to justify its intromission in any specific way. It just describes a problem that has been observed and asks for information about it. The questions in themselves function as a check, since they inquire about activit ies developed by the Executive in compliance with its different duties. These information requests send the messa ge that the Executive is “being watched.” In addition, Argentine legislators use the info rmation requests as a way of expressing their position on how certain official affairs should be conducted. In th ese cases, the motivation of legislators goes beyond the mere fam iliarity with a given situation. In general, there is an interest in sending a message of discomfort with a certain set of circum stances. For instance, on several different occasions the Congress requested that the Executive informed about the entry of immigrants to Argentina and its contro l (for instance, 4962-D-93, 1082-D-94, 2432-D-94 and 1587-S-92). These requests included a number of que stions related to the ways in which the entry was controlled at the border, data regardi ng legal and illegal entrie s, and measures taken by the Immigration Agency to prevent the work of undocumented immigrants. In addition, the messages accompanying the requests generally e xpressed the congression al concern about the proliferation of undocumented work and its c onsequences to the native population. These information requests, I argue, were not just dir ected to obtain information. They also constituted a way of telling the Executive “there is this problem and you should be doing something about it.” Following this distinction with regard to the purposes of the information requests, I have classified them in two main groups. The first group, called oversight , included those requests that aimed at acquiring information a bout certain events and, overall, provided a general oversight to the Executive’s task (See Tabl e 6-25, 6-26 and 6-27). I called c ritique/change a number of requests that were critical of a particular situati on and expressed their belief that a change in the

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229 ExecutiveÂ’s behavior could make a difference. I believe this s econd type of requests has the potential for enhancing the Congr essÂ’s control of the Executive, since it provides a means for expressing a point of view with respect to how certain affairs should be conducted. With regard to the nature of the information requests under analysis, all the ones processed between 1983 and 1989 were of the kind I have termed critique/change . For the period 1989-1995, the requests that demanded changes on the part of the Executive we re also dominant, comprising 74% of those considered. The other 26% aimed at mere oversight . Number, topics, and initiation of the information requests The number of information requests increased dramatically between the first (11) and second periods under analysis (38). The general increase in congressional activity related to immigration issues after the cr eation of the population committees partly explains this; however, the proportion of information requests also increased. While for the period 1983-1989, information requests comprised 25% of the total number of immigration-related issues, for the years 1989-1995 this number climbed to 35% (T ables 6-4 and 6-6). As mentioned earlier, legislators may have favored the use of informa tion requests over the use of requests for a course of action in their relationship with the Executive.1 Between 1983 and 1989, the House generated 11 information requests and only 4 were approv ed (See Tables 6-26 and 6-27). The Senate remained less active during the first period under analysis and it di d not propose a single information request. For the period 1989-1995, both chambers approved 11 information requests each and together considered another 26 that were not approved (See Tables 6-28 and 6-29). 1This decline seems to hold for other policy areas as well. I estimated to proportion of requests for a course of action in the total number of issues considered by the Congress for both periods. In 1983-1989, requests for a course of action comprised 71% of all affairs approved, while for 1989-1999 that number went down to 64%. In turn, the proportion of information requests went from 17 to 26%.

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230Table 6-23. Information Requests – House 1983-1989 ID No. Year Approved Responded?Party Description Objective General 3142-D 1985 PJ Entry of immigrants to the country/Data about visas awarded Critique/change 3629-D 1985 Other The policy by the Immigration Agency that requires capital to apply for residency/di scriminates against Latin American Critique/change 2486-D 1986 PJ Agreement with Soviet Union to bring Jewish immigrants to Argentina Critique/change 3594-D 1988 Other About the entry of immigrants that are HIV positive to the country Critique/change 2233-D 1989 Y Other Control of entry of Tourists in the South of Argentina Critique/change Irregularities Immigration Agency 2787-D 1987 Other Permits awarded to Asian immigrants to migrante to Argentina Critique/change 195-D 1988 Y YPJ The indictment in the Immi gration Agency’s office in Formosa related to Asian immigrants Critique/change 407-D 1988 Y YPJ The indictment in the Immi gration Agency’s office in Formosa related to Asian immigrants Critique/change 642-D 1988 Other The indictment in the Immi gration Agency’s office in Formosa related to Asian immigrants Critique/change 1649-D 1989 Other The indictment of Immigration Agency’s employees and other middlemen regarding illegal activities related to visas for Asian and neighboring immigrants Critique/change 2228-D 1989 Y Other The Executive’s lack of comp liance with projects for the Immigration of Asians Critique/change

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231Table 6-24. Information Re quests – Senate 1989-1995 ID No. Year Approved Responded?Party Description Critical of Executive? General 0234-S 1990 Y PJ The implementation of th e immigration legislation Oversight 1083-S 1991 UCR Inviting Ministers of Economy a nd Interior to inform about fees paid at international bridges Critique/change 71-S 1992 Y UCR The regulations for issui ng visas and passports Critique/change 1587-S 1992 Y Other How the entry of immigrants to the country is controlled (neighboring and Asian) Critique/change 1966-S 1993 Y YOther The extent to which the 1991 Census data has been processedOversight Central & Eastern European 1383-S 1992 Y YOther The plan to bring Centra l and Eastern Europeans Critique/change Neighboring migration 749-S 1993 Y Other Entry of Brazilian citi zens to the country. Critique/change 1408-S 1993 Y YPJ Employment of Brazilian worker s in an electrical plant. Critique/change 1692-S 1993 Y UCR How the amnesty passed by Decree 1033/92 is being implemented Critique/change 1967-S 1993 Other Partial outcome of Amnesty Decree of 1992 Oversight 341-S 1995 YOther Immigration Policy th e Executive is implementing Oversight 745-S 1995 Other The control measures at the borders Critique/change 1951-S 1995 Y Other The Official estimates rega rding the existence of 800,000 illegal immigrants Critique/change 1979-S 1995 Y YOther Data about neighboring immigran ts residing in the country Critique/change Illegal Activities 193-S 1992 Other Visas issued at the Argentine Consulate in Popular China Critique/change

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232Table 6-25. Information Requests – House 1989-1995 ID No. Year Approved Responded?Party Description Critical of Executive? General 4862-D 1990 Y PJ The memos elaborated by Interministerial Demography Committee Oversight 4564-D 1991 Other The Executive’s immigration policies and plans Oversight 2432-D 1994 Y YUCR The procedures used to control the entry of neighboring immigrants to the country/estimates of undocumented immigrants Critique/change 5793-D 1994 Y YUCR Inspections conducted by the Immigra tion Agency/Internal Revenue Agency Oversight Central & Eastern European 4844-D 1991 Other Menem’s offer before the European Parliame nt to bring 300,000 Central and Eastern European immigrants to Argentina Critique/change 4854-D 1991 UCR The existence of studies relating to the plan to bring Central and Eastern Europeans Critique/change 4983-D 1991 UCR Menem’s offer before the European Parliame nt to bring 300,000 Central and Eastern European immigrants to Argentina Critique/change 5108-D 1991 UCR “ Critique/change 1303-D 1992 Y UCR “ Critique/change 3420-D 1992 Y YUCR “ Critique/change 5401-D 1992 UCR “ Critique/change 5453-D 1992 UCR “ Critique/change Neighboring Migration 4962-D 1993 UCR The procedures used to control the entry of neighboring immigrants to the country/estimates of undocumented immigrants Critique/change 1082-D 1994 PJ The procedures used to control the entry of neighboring immigrants to the country/estimates of undocumented immigr ants in the NE province of Misiones Critique/change 2792-D 1995 Y YPS About the instructions given to the border control officers to control the amount of money that tourists have for their st ay in Argentina/violates constitution Critique/change Administration Immigration Agency 6298-D 1990 Y Other Expenses relating to the Immigration Agency offices in Cordoba Critique/change 2226-D 1992 UCR An employee from the Immigration Agency who was transferred Critique/change 2999-D 1993 Y PJ The administration of resources in the Immigration Agency Oversight 175-D 1995 Y YUCR A paid phone information service provided by the Immigration Agency Critique/change 691-D 1995 Y YUCR A paid phone information service provided by the Immigration Agency Critique/change 4838-D 1995 UCR About public bid to contract a priv ate service for immigration control Oversight Illegal Activities 708-D 1992 UCR The Immigration Agency’s Director declaration with regard to the ex istence of an illegal network in this agency that charges im migrants to grant them their papers Critique/change 5794-D 1994 Y YUCR The reasons why the Population Secretary has seized control over the Immigration Agency, impeding the latter from self-administration Critique/change

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233 I mentioned before that information request s play an important role in exercising oversight over the Executive. Precisely for this reason informati on requests were often initiated by opposition parties (See Table 626 through 6-29). While a radical president was in office between 1983 and 1989, all informa tion requests were eith er initiated by the Peronist Party or third partie s. In turn, when Peronist President Menem ruled between 1989 and 1995, 77% of the information requests we re either initiated by the Radical Party (8) or by other smaller parties (9). As one can see third parties became important in supervising Menem’s administration. Their as cendance was particularly significant in the Senate, in which they initiated 64% of the information requests approved. Two provincial parties were particularly active in initiati ng information requests in the Senate between 1989 and 1995. One of them was a center-left party from the Southern province of Neuquen (Movimiento Popular Neuquino) and th e other was a center-right party from the NorthEastern province of Corrientes (Parti do Autonomista). Both provinces border with countries that generate immigr ation to Argentina (Neuquen with Chile and Corrientes Table 6-26 Information Requests Approve d – 1983-89 (Radical Administration) Party Proposing Chamber No. IR Peronist Party Radical Party Other Parties % Responded Av. Delay in Response Senate None NoneNoneNoneNone N/A House 4 2None250 64 days Total 4 2None2None 64 days Table 6-27 Information Requests Proposed but Not Approved -1983-1989 (Radical Administration) Party Proposing Period No. IR Peronist PartyRadical PartyOther Parties Senate None NoneNoneNone House 7 2None5 Total 7 2None5

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234 Table 6-28 Information Requests Approve d – 1989-1995 (Peronist Administration) Party Proposing Chamber No. IR Peronist Party Radical Party Other Parties % Responded Av. Delay in Response Senate 11 31745 % 308 days House 11 27264 % 206 days Total 22 589None 257 days Table 6-29 Information Requests Proposed but not Approved – 1989-1995 (Peronist Administration) Party Proposing Period No. IR Peronist PartyRadical PartyOther Parties Senate 4 013 House 12 192 Total 16 1106 with Uruguay and Brazil). This circumstance pa rtly explains the interest of the abovementioned provincial partie s in immigration issues. Content of the information requests 1983-1995 The topics covered by the information re quests included a broad range of issues (See Tables 6-23, 6-24 and 6-25). Between 1983 and 1989, most of the information requests related to different i rregularities detected in th e immigration agency (55%) and the rest of them related to more general as pects of immigration po licies. The Immigration Agency has had serious corruption problems over the years. It is he althy that different dishonesty charges over time have generated a steady flux of information requests. Both chambers generated information requests related to corruption charges in the following period as well. For the period 1989-1995, the topi cs covered diversifie d a great deal (See Tables 6-24 and 6-25). One inte resting feature is that while the Senate seemed more interested in neighboring migr ation (54%), the House appeared to be more concerned with the migration of Central and Eastern Europeans (35%). I expl ore the position of the Argentine Congress with regard to these two immigration groups in further details in the

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235 next sections. The House also showed a signi ficant interest in different aspects of the administration of the Immigration Agency (26% ). Topics in this respect ranged from the preoccupation with the financial situation in a particular offi ce to objections related to a public bid directed to computerize immigrati on controls. In addition, both chambers dealt with information requests referri ng to issues that I have clas sified as general, concerned with more general aspects of immigration polic ies (Senate, 40 %; House, 12 %). In what follows, I analyze in more detail the conten t of the information requests regarding the immigration from neighboring countries a nd from Central and Eastern Europe. Neighboring migration I mentioned above that a set of informati on requests referred to the migration from the bordering countries. A total of 12 inform ation requests referred to this migration. Ten of these requests corresponded to the category that I have termed critique/change. For the period 1983-1989, there was only one information request that referred to immigration from bordering countries and it was supportive of immigrants from this origin. This congressional document stated that Resolu tion 2340/85, which required an investment capital to apply for a visa, was discrimi nating against immigrants from bordering countries (3629-D-29). For the period 1989-1995, mo st information (8/11) requests were in the direction of asking the government to apply stricter contro ls to the entry of neighboring immigrants (749-S-93, 1408S-93, 745-S-95, 341-S-95, 1951-S-95, 1979-S95, 4962-D-93 and 1082-D-94). Two of these re quests referred to certain events involving immigrants from Brazil and demande d information regarding the number of Brazilians that had obtained a visa, and the existence of contractors involved in the trafficking of these immigrants (749-S-93 a nd 1408-S-93). The rest of them were asking general questions about the number of undocumented immigrants from bordering

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236 countries, the measures taken by the Executive to control their entry to the country and to avoid their work, and the existence of illegal networks dedicated to the trafficking of these immigrants, among other things (341-S-95, 1951-S-95, 1979-S-95, 4962-D-93, and 1082-D-94). All these requests took the cl ear stand that they expected the Executive to exercise stricter controls on neighboring migrati on. While doing so, they provided different arguments to justify their e xpectation. Many of these argum ents contained nationalistic statements similar to the discourses relati ng to immigration by the Executive’s public officials in 1993 and 1994. In this regar d, they created a clear opposition between “Argentines” and “foreigners” and showed how the former group was being hurt by the latter. In this vein was the comment that “[t]his situation [the entry of Brazilian immigrants to the country] threatens the ri ghts of Argentines, re presenting an unfair competition to the native labor force” (749-S-93) . Or “the 800,000 illegals that are in the country represent one quarter of the Argentines that have employment problems” (1951S-95). As one can see, these zero-sum type of arguments were expected to persuade the Executive to control immigr ation from bordering c ountries more strictly. Central and Eastern European migration Another group of information requests related to the 1992 Executive’s plan to attract immigrants from Central and East ern Europe. There were nine information requests relating to this issue (1383-S-92, 4844-D-91, 4854-D-91, 4983-D-91, 5108-D91, 1303-D-92, 3420-D-92, 5401-D-92, and 5453-D-92). Three of them were approved (1383-S-92, 1303-D-92, and 3420-D-92). All these requests were directed to produce a change in the Executive’s actions with regard to this plan. In this regard, they were critical of the Executive’s plan on different grounds. For one thing, the Executive was

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237 accused of bad planning and lack of prepar ation for such an ambitious immigration program (1383-S-92, 1303-D-92, 3420-D-92, 5401-D92, and 5453-D-92). In this regard, the different information requests asked seve ral questions regarding the existence of studies to support the plan, and coordination and consulta tion with the provinces and national and international orga nizations. In addition, some statements in the requests were almost mocking the Executive’s lack of planning. For instance, one of the requests stated “what we [Argentines] cannot do it is to promote false expectati ons in thousands of families that see in Argentina a solution to th eir problems just to look good in front of the international community” (1381-S-92). Or anot her that expressed that “a random phrase [the invitation before the Eu ropean Parliament for Centra l and Eastern Europeans to migrate to Argentina] that came out of the President’s mouth could become a major mistake of serious consequences” (3420-D-92). It is obvious that Ar gentine legislators clearly disagreed with the way in which the Executive was implementi ng its plan to bring Central and Eastern Europeans. Argentine legislators also had more subs tantial objections. They expressed their view that Argentina’s economic and social situation was not appropriate for the promotion of immigration (1383-S-9 2, 3420-D-92, 5401-D-92, and 5453-D-92). These reports emphasized that either promoting im migration was not a good idea at all or that promoting immigration without investment capital was not a good idea. The first point of view was visible in one request which doubt ed that the governmen t was prepared to receive these immigrants while nationals were not getting much help in alleviating their poverty, or solving their housi ng and employment problems ( 1383-S-92). Or in another congressional document that reminded the Ex ecutive that Argentin a was part of the

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238 developing world and, as such, had serious une mployment problems to engage in plans to promote immigration (5453-D-92). Other legisl ators believed that the solution was to encourage immigration only if this immigration came along w ith investment capitals (3420-D-92 and 5401-D-92). “What benefit c ould Argentina expect,” one of these reports wondered, “from an immigration that wa s not creating jobs but adding to the rows of the working population ?”(5401-D-92). As we can see, Argentine legislators during this time were not persuaded that the Plan to attract European immigration was very appropriate for the Economic situation facing Argentina. Executive’s response to the information requests The information requests can be an effec tive way of supervisi ng the Executive if the latter responds to them. One problem that legislators face is that they do not have a way of forcing the Executive into compliance. This is part of the reason the legislators that I interviewed in 2003 were not satisfied with the way in which the Executive was responding to these requests. Only 14% of the legislators that responded to the questionnaire thought that the Executive was responding to the information requests in a satisfactory way. Another 27% expressed to be only partly satisfied. Finally, 55% of the congresspersons interviewed believed that the Executive was not doing a good job at responding to congressional requests. An important num ber of legislators (37%) commented on the length of time that the Presidency was taking to respond. Many of them thought that timing was a crucial factor in evaluating the e ffectiveness of the information requests’ responses. For the period 1983-1989, half of those reque sts that were passed were responded by the Executive (See Table 6-28). In addition, they were responded to in a considerably timely manner (a little over two months). Since the number of requests referring to

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239 immigration issues during the period was so small (N=4), it is not possible to make generalizations for Alfonsín’s administ ration. Between 1983 and 1995, the Presidency responded to 45% of the information requests or iginated in the Senate and 64% of those originated in the House (S ee Table 6-30). The time that the Executive took to respond during this period was less satisfactory, incr easing to an averag e of 8.5 months (257 days). These numbers do not speak very well of the Argentine Execu tive if one considers that, in theory, theses requests to the Executive are mandatory. Argentine legislators also had complaints regarding the quality of the responses by the Executive to information requests (27%). One legislator explai ned that the Reponses by the Executive did not only arrive late but also were many times too abstract to be helpful.157 One congresswoman explained that the depth of the responses by the Executive was not satisfactory.158 Finally, a representative pointed to the more ambitious objective of the information requests: changi ng the Executive’s behavi or. In this regard, he expressed that the responses to informa tion requests were many times formal and were not producing real changes in the Executive’s behavior.159 In order to assess the quality of responses under analysis, I analyzed the cont ent of six of the responses provided by the Executive to 3 information requests from the Senate (1383-S-92, 1408-S-93 and 341-S95) and three from the House (3420-D-92, 2792-D-95, and 5793-D-95). I paid particular attention to the clarity and organization in the presentation of the information, completeness of the information provided, a nd intelligibility of the answers to the 157 Questionnaire responded by a representative from the Radical Party, October 2 2003. 158 Questionnaire responded by a female representative from a provincial party, October 2 2003. 159 Questionnaire responded by a representative from the Radical Party, May 5 2003.

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240 question by legislators. In addition, I compared the style of the responses to the information requestsÂ’ one and assessed the ExecutiveÂ’s reaction to the statements by legislators criticizing the behavior by the Executive. I mentioned above that information requests many times had the purpose of producing a change in the behavior of the Executive, and that this purpose many times became clear in the message accompanying the in formation requests. For instance, if the request was inquiring about how the Ex ecutive was controll ing the influx of undocumented immigrants and the message referred to the serious consequences that this circumstance had for the native labor, one could understand that the members of the Congress wanted the Executive to exercise tight er control. I also mentioned instances in which statements in these messages were even sarcastic. The style of the responses was far more formal and impersonal. None of th e responses that I revi ewed responded to any of the comments that accompanied the requests. They just limited themselves to answer to the questions in an impersonal tone. In this way, the Executive avoided dealing with the criticisms by the Congress. In general, I noticed that the presentati on of the information in the responses was overall satisfactory. In one third of the cases it was not as concis e as one would wish. Apparently, the persons responding to the info rmation requests were investing time in gathering information from different areas. However, the information collected was not always organized in a single document. Th erefore, it was sometimes scattered along several pages. Particularly messy was the response to the request 5793-D-95, in which one could find an answer to one of the questi ons every five or six pages. In addition, the information provided was not always comp lete (1163-OV-95). Only 1 out of the 6

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241 responses analyzed here responded to all th e questions posed in a highly satisfactory manner. The rest of them skipped questions, proved incomplete data or did not answer the questions clearly. For inst ance, the request identified as 1408-S-93 posed a number of questions regarding the immigrati on status of some Brazilian wo rkers, the firm they were working for, legal actions initiated by the Argentine government regarding the hiring of these supposedly undocumented Brazilians, a nd some more details (843-PE-95). The response just contained the list of the Brazili an workers hired showing that they were authorized to work. It left four questions unanswered without even explaining that some of them did not apply. The report responding to request 5793-D95, regarding inspections conducted by the Immigration Agency, responded to all th e questions but provided incomplete data. For instance, the Executive was supposed to pr ovide data regarding deportations for the years 1990-1995 and it did so for the years 1994 and 1995 (1163-OV-95). However, this circumstance was ignored in the report and no explanation was provided about the information that was missing. Other reports we re not clear in res ponding to the questions posed. This was the case of both responses refe rring to the immigration from Central and Eastern Europe (3420-D-92 and 1383-S-93). On e of the questions posed referred to the existence of studies directed to decide wher e to locate immigrants. The answer to this question stated “we have conducted some studies in some areas of the country that would be appropriate for the immigration plan,” w ithout specifying any more details about the type of studies conducted, their results, or the areas of the country the Executive was referring to (474-OV-93). The other report re lated to the immigrati on from Central and Eastern Europe followed a similar pattern ( 605-PE-93). It never sp ecified the provinces

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242 that the Executive had contacted, or any de tails regarding the studies conducted to support the plan. Maybe, the Executive was evasive in its answers because, as the congressional members presumed, it was not well prepared for the immigration plan. It may well be that the timing and qual ity of the Executive’s responses are not ideal. The Congress lacks a way of enforci ng compliance or imposing other conditions. When requests are not responded to, the Congress sends notes to the Executive demanding the latter to comply with the request . In this light and considering all what has been said about the autocratic nature of the Argentine Executive during Menem’s administration, it is surprising that it responded to the requests by the Congress at all. As a congresswoman from a smaller center-left pa rty expressed to me “we proposed several times that the rules are changed so that we can demand the Executive to comply with the requests in a satisfactory and timely manner.”160 I concur with this congresswoman that formalizing a set of rules to govern inform ation requests may be a productive way of enhancing the control potential of these government decisions. In the meantime, I believe the information requests constitute a valuable tool for keeping an eye on the Executive’s behavior. Conclusions The literature on democratization does not fully account for the centralization of the immigration decision-making process in Argentin a. For one thing, this literature does not explain the emergence of a centralizing Executive during Alfonsín’s administration. Unlike President Menem, President Alfonsín is considered by the literature as a nonpersonalistic leader. In additi on, the literature fall s short in accounting for cases in which 160 Questionnaire responded by a legislator from Alternativa para una Republica de Iguales, Sept 4 2003.

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243 the delegation patterns arise as a conseque nce of congressional inability to pass legislation. Rather, the schol ars of delegative democracy tell us about a pro-active Executive that overrides the legislature. In immigration policy, however, the Executive ruled on the admission of foreign citizens b ecause the Congress did not take up on this responsibility. Scholars on democratization also tell us that economic and institutional crises shape the pattern of centralization of power in the Executive. Presidents in these cases face the need of generating quick institutional responses to urgent problems and are more likely to rule by decree. To be sure, crises may be a trigger to rule by decree. However, the Congress may have avoided the enactment of immigration rules by decree if it had ruled on the matter. Nonetheless, economic and institu tional crises likely played a role in this congressional inability in two ways. For one thing, they gave rise to more urgent matters that required congressional at tention. Therefore, other legi slative responsibilities were given priority over immigration. In additi on, not only the Executive found it convenient to enjoy flexible powers to rule immigration. As I showed above, legi slators also shared this view. The creation of the legislative commi ttees dealing with immigration put immigration issues on the legi slative agenda and created an opportunity for the passage of new immigration policies. However, this process was slow and no bills to enact comprehensive immigration policies were considered until the mid-1990s. When draft bills were generated in this regard, the posit ion of the Argentine Congress with regard to immigration was as restrictive as that of the Executive. Since the comprehensive draft bills presented by congressional consideration were generally liberal, they did not obtain

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244 sufficient consensus. In addition, I believe that the passage of minor modifications to the immigration legislation was easier for Arge ntine congresspersons than enacting wideranging restrictive immigration legislation. To be sure, it is true that the immigration from neighboring countries was never encourag ed by the Argentine State. Nonetheless, I believe ArgentinaÂ’s self image as a country of immigration worked against the enactment of restrictive and comprehensive im migration polices by the Congress. Overall, the immigration policies of the Argentine Congress di d not consistently differ from those of the Executive. In this regard, we need to di stinguish between both periods under analysis. Between 1983 and 1989, 70% of the proposals considered in the Argentine legislature were ai ming at making immigration rules more liberal. In addition, the draft bills approved during th is period were considerably lib eral as well. Furthermore, when the Executive enacted rest rictive immigration policies, the Congress expressed its distress in several documents. In the period 1989-1995, the pol icies of the Argentine C ongress with regard to immigration policies mirrored those by the Exec utive. Most measures proposed as well as the discourses relating to immigration were unf riendly to immigrants. Furthermore, as the information requests showed, the Argen tine Congress wanted more restrictive immigration rules both for European and ne ighboring immigrants. This does not mean, however, that the Congress was cohesive in th is respect. Some dissenting voices emerged within the Congress in the mi d-1990s that were critical of the immigration policies and practices of the Argentine St ate regarding neighboring immi grants. In addition, the draft bills proposing comprehensive immigration polic ies were directed to make immigration policies more open.

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245 The information requests are important instruments for making the Argentine Executive more accountable. The range of topics covered as well as the depth with which these instruments are designed give support to this belief. However, the ExecutiveÂ’s responses to these requests we re not completely satisfactor y. For one thing, the Executive did not always respond to them or took too l ong to do so. For another, the content of the responses were often unclear and complete . If rules were created to enforce the ExecutiveÂ’s compliance with the information re quests, their potential for supervising the Executive could be enhanced.

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246 CHAPTER 7 RECENT IMMIGRATION POLICY CHANGES Introduction In the late 1990s, the Ar gentine government made only minor changes to its immigration policies. During this time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gained an important role in immigration policymak ing. Within this context, immigration agreements signed with Peru and Bolivia were more sensitive to the needs of immigrants than the ExecutiveÂ’s immigration policies in place. These agreements facilitated the regularization of their immigration status. In turn, the enactment of immigration policies through bilateral agreements represents the reemergence of the use of bilateral agreements for enacting immigration policies. If policies continue to be designed in this manner, they are likely to reflect a number of issues on the foreign affairs agendas of the countries involved. These agreem ents are analyzed in the fi rst part of this chapter. In 2002, MERCOSUR presidents announced that they would allow for the free movement of people within the countries of the bloc. A year later, the Argentine Congress finally passed new and comprehe nsive immigration legislation, which represents a noteworthy change in the immigration policies of the Argentine state. First, this new immigration policy recognized an important number of rights on the part of immigrants. In addition, it prior itizes the immigration of citi zens of the Southern Cone. Does this mean that the preference for Eu ropean immigration is no longer part of Argentine immigration policies? What are th e factors shaping this new immigration decision? These questions are expl ored throughout this chapter.

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247 Immigration Policies during the 1990s Immigration policymaking within the Executive I discussed in the preceding chapter the Congress’s inability to agree on comprehensive immigration policies after the re establishment of democracy in Argentina. I also mentioned that most decisions were passed by Executive decree. However, the distribution of competencies within the Ex ecutive is more complex than what I have explained in the previous chapters. The main agency in charge of immigration policy is the Ministry of Interior. However, this ag ency shares some of its immigration policy powers with the Ministry of Foreign Affair s, and Ministry of Labor. Law 22520 of 1981 (modified by Decree 438/92 and Law 24190) stat es in Article 17 that the “Ministry of Interior will assist the Presid ent in the internal political governance, public order, and exercise of constitutional rights and guarantees.” With regard to migration policies, this agency deals with concession of asylum (Article 17.12), nationality law, and rights a nd duties of foreign ci tizens (Article 17.13), elaboration and implementation of internal and external migration policies (Article 17.18), and design of policies directed to de velop the frontier regions of the country (Article 17. 20). The agency in charge of implementing immigration policies is the National Direction of Migrat ion (referred to throughout his study as Immigration Agency), which is dependent on the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs participates in the concession of asylum, issu es related to nationality law, and in the design of immigration policies (Article 18). The Ministry of Labor intervenes in the decisions regarding labor migration (Article 23). Although this distribution of powers within the Executive seems highly complex, most general immigration norms are initiated within the Ministry of Interior and passed

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248 by presidential decree. The Immigration Ag ency has power for enacting interpretative norms, which generally deal with the admi nistrative procedures ruling the migration process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prom otes and signs international agreements for the admission of foreign citizens. These agre ements are generally bilateral and modify migration rules with respect to the citi zens from the countries subscribing these agreements. There are tensions and contradict ions between the policy objectives of these two ministries. In gene ral terms, the decisions designed by the Ministry of Interior during the 1990s placed the emphasis on increased c ontrol of irregular immigration. Instead, their peers in Foreign Affairs were supportive of more flexible immi gration policies, and based decisions on particular c onsiderations related to fore ign policy objectives (CELS, 2000:132). I argue that the active role of th e Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the second half of the 1990s facilitated the enactme nt of more liberal immigration rules. In this regard, immigration agreements were signed with Peru and Bolivia. Immigration agreements with Peru and Bolivia Immigration from Peru became significant during the 1990s. In 1999, an estimated 100,000 Peruvians were residing in Argentina (CELS, 2000:96). I mentioned earlier that in 1992 the Argentine government facilitated the regularization of the immigration status of immigrants from bordering countries. Ho wever, since Peru does not border with Argentina, its nationals did not benefit fr om the amnesty. The Peruvian government unsuccessfully requested to be included in the amnesty on several occasions (La Nación, 09/24/94). In 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs constituted a working group to negotiate immigration issues with Peru. As a consequence of the meetings organized by this working group, the Argentine government agreed to facilitate regularization of the

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249 immigration status of Peruvian s that were already residing in Argentina or wanted to migrate to this country. The norms for Peruvians were not as liber al as those of the amnesty of 1992, which only required proof of identity and date of en try to the country. After the first six months, the rules for Peruvian immigrants needed to comply with stricter requirements. One option was to obtain a job c ontract from an Argentine employer. A second option the citizens of this country were given was to re gister before the Taxation Agency as selfemployed. Although this second alternative seems attractive, different immigrant organizations complained that the payments to the Taxation Agency were extremely high for Peruvian immigrants. In this regard, immigrants needed to pay a monthly fee of approximately one hundred dollars independently of the profit made. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the same rules applied to Argentine citizens that were self-employed. These immigration norms were first approved by a Resolution of the Ministry of Interior but later formalized in an agreement between the Argentine and Peruvian governments in 1999. Bolivia also requested the Argentine gove rnment to pass another amnesty for its citizens. Bolivian immigration was the most numerous one during the 1990s. In 1999, the Argentine government signed an agreement with this country, which was identical to that signed with Peru the same year. Although these agreements with Peru and Bolivia did not modify the immigration rules in a substantial way, they were nevertheless helpful in giving immigrants time to comply with the immigration requirements. Furthermore, the immigration rules hardened when in 1998 the Ministry of Interior proposed a decree to prohibit immigrants to change their visa type once in the country (Decree 1117/98). As

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250 mentioned elsewhere, it is common for immigran ts to come on a tourist visa to Argentina and file their immigration papers once they fi nd a job. However, thanks to the agreements signed with Peru and Bolivia, these new rule s did not apply to th e citizens of these countries. In addition, these immigration agreements represent a different way of enacting immigration policies in Argentina. If the Mi nistry of Foreign Affairs continues its influence on immigration policies, these policie s are more likely to reflect the needs of the countries of emigration. In addition, an ar ray of other issues on the foreign agenda can become influential as well. For instan ce, the immigration agreement with Peru responded to the fact that the nationals of th is country were not included in the amnesty of 1992. Besides, it may have been a way of compensating Peru for Argentina’s past mistakes in the relationship with this country. President Menem signed a secret presidential decree (Number 103) on 24 January 1995, authorizing the sale of FAL rifles and ammunition to Venezuela. Evidence indi cated, however, that the weapons had been shipped clandestinely to the Ecuadorian por t of Guayaquil. Ecuador and Peru were involved in a border war at that time, a nd Argentina was bound by th e Rio Protocol to keep peace between the two countries. Therefor e, this special agreement for immigrants from Peru may have been a way of “saying sorry” for that mistake. New Immigration Policies: December 2003 The Congress passed a new immigration act in 2003 (Law 25871) to replace the one enacted during the last military dictatorsh ip. This new law has produced a historical change in the immigration policies of the Ar gentine State and it has two major novelties. First, the law recognizes an important bundl e of rights for immigr ants, including those consecrated in the Argentine Constitution and in the international agreements subscribed

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251 to by the Argentine government. Second, it awards citizens of MERCOSUR countries, and Bolivia and Chile a visa to work in Argent ina. With regard to the rights that rule immigration to Argentina, immigrants enjoy th e same rights as nationals with regard to social services, public goods, h ealth, education, justice, work, and social security (Article 6). Independently of their im migration situation, immigrants cannot be deprived of their right to education (Article 7), health and welfare (Artic le 8). In addition, immigrants enjoy the right to family reunification and to participate in local elections (Article 10 and Article 11). The state will encourage the inte gration of immigrants through different means (Article 14) and the regularization of th eir immigration status (Article 15). Finally, the deportation of immigrants is permitted in fewer cases and immigrants have the right to appeal the decision before a judge (Articles 61 and ff.). I mentioned several times throughout this dissertation that Ar gentine immigration policies showed a recurrent preference for Eu ropean immigration. This new law changes this circumstance. First, it facilitates the immigration of MERCOSUR citizens discussed below. In addition, it guarantees the right to migrate and bases this right on the principles of equality and universality (Article 4). This provision is consistent with the policy preferences of Argentine le gislators I observed during a survey conducted in 2003 and 2004. I discuss below the str ong support that legislator s showed for preferential immigration for MERCOSUR citizens. In a ddition, 40% of the respondents thought that immigration policies should be broad and provi de an equal treatment to all citizens. In this case, Argentine legislat ors were proposing generous immigration policies for all citizens and not just for those of MERCOSU R countries. In addition, only 4% of the legislators surveyed believed Argentina s hould select immigrants according to their

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252 national origin. Maybe more importantly, only 8% of them believed immigration policies should respond to the constitutional mandate of prioritizing the immigration from European countries. Does this mean that the preference for European immigration no longer exists in Argentina? Is the preference for European immigrat ion no longer a part of Argentine immigration policies? Since its consolidation as a modern nation, Argentina has shown a recurrent preference for European immigration. This study argues that cu ltural factors likely shaped immigration policies. In particular, it states that th e ideas about how appropriate are certain groups of migrants for membership in the imagined community are likely to shape immigration policies toward them. Chapte rs 4 and 5 developed an analysis of the media coverage on immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, and showed that European immigrants were considered more appropr iate to be members of the Argentine community than other groups. At this point, it is interesting to explore Argentine legislators’ beliefs about the different groups that constitute the immigrant population in the country. Legislators’ beliefs regarding the impa ct of different immigrant groups on Argentina In the survey administered to the memb ers of the Argentine Congress, I asked legislators to rank the impact of different groups of immigrants on Argentina from 1 to 5 (1 standing for “not beneficial at all” and 5 for “absolutel y beneficial”). The question was posed in broad terms with regards to what was meant by “impact” to allow respondents to evaluate a different range of issues (economic, social, racial, cultural, and so on) in their responses. The different groups of immigr ants were European until WWII, Arab, neighboring immigrants (Uruguayan, Brazi lian, Paraguayan, Bolivian, Chilean), and

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253 recent arrives from Central and Eastern Europe . As expected, the benefits attributed to European immigrants arrived before WWII was the highest (4.35) . This finding is consistent with the entrenched belief in the Argentine society that immigration from Europe contributed to the construction of a great country, which was among the faster growing in the world at the beginning of th e 20th century. The second highest beneficial impact corresponded to immigrants from Arab countries (3.74). Immigration from Arab countries to Argentina was also signifi cant during ArgentinaÂ’s golden era. This immigration has been long settle d in the country, mostly concen trated in the Northwest. Table 7-1. Argentine LegislatorsÂ’ Beliefs about the Impact of Immigrants from Different Countries on Argentina Immigrant Groups LegislatorsÂ’ Belief about the Impact of Immigrant Group* Europe before WWII 4.35 Arab Countries 3.74 Uruguay 3.48 Brazil 3.67 Paraguay 3.26 Bolivia 3.22 Chile 3.39 Central & Eastern Europe 3.14 *Score ranges from 1 to 5 -1 (not bene ficial at all)5 (a bsolutely beneficial) The beliefs about the impact of neig hboring immigration were, however, less optimistic. The average score that immigran ts from neighboring countries received regarding their impact on Argentina was 3.46. This finding is coherent with the media coverage of neighboring immigration analyzed in the preceding ch apters. As shown in those chapters, the Argentine print press por trayed immigration from Europe in an idealized manner. At the same time, it depi cted immigration from neighboring countries in a modest way and its impact as prejudicial . Likely, the narratives about how Western Europeans in the 19th and early 20th century contributed to the sp ectacular growth of

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254 Argentina were shaping legislatorsÂ’ preference s. Of course, there is some truth to this argument. At the end of the 19th century, exports grew exponen tially and Argentina became the third world exporter of grain (Rapoport, 2002:74). Argentina never reached the growth rates that it achieved at the beginning of the 20th century. In the minds of many Argentines, Argentina was in its way to become another United States. However, the agricu ltural model produced a strong dependence on foreign capitals and was not accompanied by an industrialization process. Therefore, this idealized project of the conservative elites to build a fast-growi ng immigrant nation was probably not sustainable. Nonetheless, immigrants from neighboring countries participated from the start in the agricultural economies of the different Argentine regions. In addition, they provide d part of the labor force for the industrialization initiated in the 1930s. However, these contributi ons by neighboring immigr ants are usually ignored. Likely, the process of stig matization of neighboring c ountries immigrants during the 1990s analyzed in the chapter 5 was also shaping legislatorsÂ’ judgments regarding the impact of the different immigrant groups on Ar gentina. As mentioned earlier, Argentine public officials, some unions and even th e press constructed immi grants from South American countries as undesirable others. In a moment in which the economic plan was evidencing some setbacks and needing some ch anges, immigrants were scapegoated for unemployment, crime, and most ills of th e Argentine society. There is additional evidence that this process of stigmatiza tion may have shaped views on neighboring migration. A public opinion study shows that while 60% of Argentines had a positive view of neighboring migration in 1994, this number had decreased to 21% in 2001

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255 (Nueva Mayoria, 2001). Likely, the margin alization of South American immigrants occurred during the 1990s in combination with the narratives discussed above contributed to lower score that neighboring immigrants obtained. In addition, many immigrants from neighboring countries are of i ndigenous origin. Therefore, one may think there could be some racial preference at work when judgi ng their impact on the Argentine society. I believe there is some truth to this argument as well. Argentines considered themselves to be Western European both in their descent and culture. In a survey opinion poll from 2001, 72% of the persons surveyed expressed they thought that discrimination against other r aces, cultures, or nati onalities in Argentina is “significant” or “quite si gnificant” (Gallup Argentina, 2001). Minorities in Argentina are, however, small. The indigenous populat ion was decimated and no one knows what happened to the descendents of the former slav es. This leaves us with the 2.5% of the population that comes from neighboring countries as the main group that sticks out as “different.” There is also an important Jewish community which has certainly suffered discrimination in the past. Opinion polls show that Argentines would be more tolerant for racial diversity than for cultural one. Fo r instance, 29% of respondents of a survey thought it was better for the country if people looked alike (Catterberg, 2000). In contrast, the other 69% judged diversit y was better for the country. However, when asked about cultural diversity Argentines’ opinions cha nged. In another study, people were asked if the arrival of people from different culture s was good for the country. Only 34% of the respondents thought this was good or very good (Gallup Argentina, 2001). Another 62% was either indifferent or thought it was bad or very bad for the country. Maybe this

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256 cultural intolerance also explains the lowe r beneficial impact attributed to the immigration from Central and East ern Europe analyzed below. LegislatorsÂ’ beliefs about the impact of the different groups of neighboring immigrants on Argentina But Argentine legislators did not view all neighboring immigrants in the same way. The highest consideration went to Brazilian immigrants, a population that cannot be considered white. This finding makes sens e considering Brazili an immigration to Argentina has not been numerous in recent years and comprised less than 5% of the neighboring migration in 1991 (INDEC, 1997:17) . In general, the extent to which populations feel threatened by newcomers is proportional to the size of the immigrant population. In addition, I believe Argentines have traditionally admired Brazilians above all other countries of the region. The historical economic success of Brazil explains part of this attitude. Also, the main sport for Ar gentines and Brazilians alike is soccer. The international rivalry between the two countries in this sport has probably made Argentines respect Brazilians even further. Argentine legislators also pe rceived Uruguayans to be rela tively beneficial to the country (3.48). Although a bit more numer ous than Brazilian, Ur uguayan immigration to Argentina has not been significant in recent years. In addition, Uruguayans are hardly considered foreigners in Argentina. Like Argentines, they are mostly descendents of European immigrants. Also, their accent is al most indistinguishable from the Argentine one. Finally, the migration from Uruguay tends to be middle class and it is the most educated within the different immigrant gr oups. Furthermore, this groupÂ’s educational attainment is even higher than that of the native population (INDEC, 1997:34). I believe all these factors may also contribute to the per ceived beneficial impact of this migration.

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257 After Uruguayans, Argentine legislators t hought the most beneficial impact came from Chileans (3.39). This immigration has a long tradition in Argentina and it already comprised one quarter of the immigration fr om bordering countries in 1869 (Rapoport, 2000:576). Beyond this fact, I cannot find other reasons why the impact of Chileans on Argentina would appear more beneficial than that of Bolivians and Paraguayans. Chileans contributed to one third of the ne ighboring migration living in Argentina in 1991 and their level of education was similar to that of Boliv ians and Brazilians (INDEC, 1997:35). Finally, Argentine congresspersons co nsidered immigrants from Bolivia and Paraguay to be the least beneficial among the neighboring groups. Nu merically, these two groups were the most important during the 1990s. Out of the immigrants that obtained their papers in the period 1992/94, 49% were from Bolivia and 27% from Paraguay. These immigrants, together with those fr om Peru, were the main targets of the xenophobic campaigns of the 1990s. LegislatorsÂ’ Beliefs about the impact of recent immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe on Argentina Surprisingly, Argentine legislators belie ved the impact of Central and Eastern European immigrants on the Argentine societ y was less beneficial (3.14) than that of neighboring one. Does this tota lly disconfirm the possibility that Argentine legislators have racial preferences? At first sight, the answer seems to be affirmative. I showed in chapter 5 that in the beginning of the 1990s both the press and public officials were highly optimistic about the plan to attract Central and east ern European immigrants to Argentina. Throughout the 1990s, this view in the press change d. However, not all Central and Eastern European immigrants were negatively viewed in the press. The group that became stigmatized in the press was the Romanian one. As I show below, this group

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258 of immigrants was racialized as “gypsy.” This stigmatization of Romanian immigration in the press may have shaped the negative image that Argentine legislators had about immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe. The plan for Central and Eastern Europ eans immigrants went on without major problems during the 1990s. Some 8944 immi grants benefited from the program (Cancilleria Argentina ,2002). Seventy one percent of these immi grants came from Ukraine. Although unemployment among recent arrivals was considerably high (26%) the government recorded no unemployed with in the group that arrived between 1994 and 1998. Since most visa application came fr om Ukraine, the Argentine government conducted a survey with those interested in immigrating to Argentina. The information obtained in this survey is helpful in port raying the type of immigration arriving to Argentina during this time and their percep tions about Argentina. The educational attainment of these prospec tive immigrants was considerab ly high. Sixty-six percent of the participants in the government survey had tertiary education and 32% had completed a college degree. All of them have comple ted their primary schooling. These immigrants also had a positive view regarding the experience of other Ukrainians that emigrated to Argentina. Seventy five percent of the Uk rainians surveyed th ought the experience of their fellow citizens in Argentina was good. Over all, the immigration experience of these Europeans did not justify the negative attit ude of Argentine legislators toward them. In contrast, Romanian immi gration became problematic and visible at the end of the 1990s in Argentina. Presumably, most of them arrived after 1998. Many of these immigrants were playing music in the streets and panhandli ng. In 2001, 30% of the people begging in the streets in Buenos Aires city were thought to be Romanian (La

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259 Nación, 11/03/01). The press soon baptized th em as “gypsies” (La Nación, 12/18/99). “They are identifiable even if women don’t wear those wide skirts we were told about when we were kids. However, we know they are gypsies,” the reporter followed confidently, “because their kids play the accord ion and they all look like they come from a different century, from a di fferent world” (Ibid.). As one can see, these immigrants were portrayed by the journalist as exotic to the point of belonging to a different world. However, there’s something familiar about thes e immigrants to the reporter. According to him/her, these immigrants’ accent could be mistaken with that of shantytown kids. However, according to the journalist, a quick glance was enough dissipate the mistake. Why could a quick glance be enough to disti nguish a shantytown kid from a Romanian one? As another reporter stated, it was a novelt y to see a blonde kid with blue eyes begging in the streets of Ar gentina (La Nación, 11/01/01). The characterization of these immigrants became very negative during this period. The main accusation against them was that they were pretenders and liars. These immigrants declared to be Romanian ref ugees. However, the press created doubts about both the origin and status of this migration. For instance, one press article stated that many of these immigrants were probably coming from the former Yugoslavia (La Nación, 11/03/01). On one occasion, a source fr om the Rumanian embassy stated that these immigrants were not refugees because they were not fleeing persecution of any kind. According to this person, Rumanians we re just coming to Argentina to beg (La Nación, 02/02/00). However, on another occasion, the Rumanian Ambassador denied that immigrants seen in the stre ets were Rumanians (La Naci ón, 04/21/01). As one can see,

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260 the confusion in the press made the read er doubt the truthfulne ss of the supposedly Rumanian immigrants. Not only was the origin of these immigr ants questioned. In addition, Rumanians were said to lie about their health, family and other conditions to make people feel sorry for them. “Fake blind people,” “mute that sp eak” and “children walking away from their wheelchairs” populated Buenos Aires downt own, another article stated (La Nación, 02/02/2000). According to this article, Romani an immigrants were faking all kinds of illnesses to succeed in their begging. The journa list writing this story also thought that there were organizations behi nd this “industry of begging” (Ibid.). He believed all the beggars had the same signs asking for people’ s sympathy, the same chairs and the same accordions. The association between Romanians and fake/lies was so significant, that on several occasions Romanians were just referr ed to as “false Romanians,” or “false Romanian kids” (La Nación, 03/14/01, 04/21/01,08/18/01, 02/23/02, 01/10/03, and 04/13/04). Due the inconveniences surr ounding Immigration from Romania, the Argentine government stopped awarding visas to Romanians that were benefiting from the special immigration program for Cent ral and Eastern Europeans (La Nación, 02/02/00). After this, Romanians attempted to enter Argentina from its bordering countries. In February of 2002, 49 Rumanians we re deported back to Bolivia (La Nación, 02/25/01). These negative views of Romanian immigrants in the print press may have been shaping legislators beliefs about the impact of Central and Eastern European migration on Argentina.

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261 LegislatorsÂ’ beliefs about the impact of different immigrant groups by political party In Argentina, political parties have remain ed silent regarding immigration issues in their political campaigns. Despite this ci rcumstance, I found important differences between the members of the Peronist and Radical parties regarding their views on immigration. The members of these two partie s had contrasting beliefs about the impact of the different groups of immigrants on Argent ina. To be sure, members of the Peronist and Radical parties considered the impact im migration of European immigration before WWII to be beneficial (4.20 and 4.44, respectively). However, they disagreed on the impact of the other groups of migrants on Argentina. More specifically, the members of the Radical Civic Union appeared to only be optimistic about the European immigration before the Second World War. Their consid eration of Arab i mmigration (3.33) was considerably lower than that of their Peronist counterparts (3.80). Even more contrasting were the views regarding neighboring migra tion and recent immigrati on from Central and Eastern Europe. With regard to the first group, while PJ member assigned them an Table 7-2 Argentine Legislators Beliefs about the Impact of Immigrants from Different Countries on Argentina Disc riminated by Political Party Immigrant Groups LegislatorsÂ’ Belief about the Impact of Immigrant Group Peronist Party Radical Party Europe before WWII 4.20 4.44 Arab Countries 3.80 3.33 Uruguay 3.90 2.78 Brazil 3.78 3.38 Paraguay 3.70 2.56 Bolivia 3.50 2.67 Chile 3.70 2.78 Central & Eastern Europe 3.56 2.44 average beneficial score of 3.71, this number decreased to 2.83 for members of the Radical Civic Union. In turn, Peronist congre sspersons believed recent immigration from

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262 Central and Eastern Europe had been consid erably beneficial ( 3.56) but their Radical counterparts assessed it below the level of “neither beneficial nor prejudicial.” There is a plausible explanation for this difference with regard to neighboring migration. The Radical Civic Union is a middle class party and most of its constituents are descendents from former European set tlers. In contrast, neighboring immigrants tend to become part of the working class and are likely to support the Pe ronist party. Further research should be conducted with regard to the Radical’s low estimation of Arab and Central and Eastern European immigration. I can preliminarily say that members of the Radical Civic Union believed that immigra tion from Western Europe was clearly the most beneficial one. In comparison with their Pe ronist peers, they also held the view that Arab, neighboring and Centra l and Eastern European migr ation were not significantly beneficial for Argentina. A belief, however, does not automatically tran slate into a policy choice. Overall, all members of the Argentine parliament showed a predilection for Eu ropean immigration. However, they did not show an important di sposition to pass immigration policies that encouraged European immigration. I first base this conclusion on the fact that only 8% of the members of the Congress surveyed expresse d their agreement with this type of policy. In addition, Argentine legislat ors decided to leave their preferences aside in 2003 and enacted preferential immi gration rules for citizens of MERCOSUR countries. MERCOSUR is considered a strategic allia nce in today’s Argentina. Apparently, Argentine legislators are willing to favor immi gration policies that likely consolidate the bloc. In addition, I review below some othe r reasons that shaped the passage of new immigration policies in 2003.

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263 Who can apply for a work visa in Argentina? The 2003 law establishes different case s in which immigrants can obtain a permanent, temporary or transitory visa. Th e only foreigners that acquire an automatic permanent residency are relatives of Arge ntine citizens (Article 22). The law also establishes fourteen cases in which immigr ants can apply for a temporary residency, including those that come to work for an em ployer, retired people, investors, scientists and skilled workers, sports persons, represen tatives of different religions, st udents and nationals of MERCOSUR countries, Chile or Bo livia (Article 23). Fi nally, transitory immigrants are tourists, people in transit, a nd seasonal workers (Article 24). They are two major novelties with regard to Decree 1023/94. First, immigran ts are not required to have a job contract in order to be eligible for a visa. Besi des, nationals of MERCOSUR countries can apply for temporary visas. Th e message that accompanied the law stated that requiring a job contract was unrealistic considering that most immigrants work informal markets. The faci litation of visas to MERCOSU R citizens deserves special consideration. In December of 2002, the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay announced that the countries would soon allo w the free movement of people within MERCOSUR. It is still not clear how th is “free movement of people” would be implemented in the region. It seems unlikely that the countries w ill allow a true “free movement of people,” encompassing the remova l of border controls as was done in the European Union. Although the materializat ion of this announcement may involve a complex process of homogenization of labor, social security and other legislation, Argentine legislators show a strong agreemen t with this measure. Almost 90% of the

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264 legislators surveyed between 2003 and 2004, e xpressed to me that they would vote affirmatively for this measure. At the same time, Argentine legislators considered that MERCOSUR should be a consideration when deciding im migration policies. Another qu estion in the survey asked legislators to indicate the ch aracteristics that the immigra tion policy for Argentina should have. Ninety-two percent of the respondents expressed that immigration policies should be generous and consider in tegration agreements in thei r provisions. In addition, some space was provided in the survey for general comments. One third of the respondents to the survey added comments related to MERCOSUR in these spaces. Some of these comments expanded on the type of immigrati on policies that Arge ntina needed. For instance, one legislator from the Peronist part y expressed that “Argentina needs to debate a new immigration policy that takes into account the new challenges and demands posed by the regional integration process.” In a similar vein, a congresswoman from th e same party explained that Argentina needs to discuss a new legal framework to rule the international migration within the MERCOSUR countries. Still anot her legislator from the Per onist Party went further and stated that freedom is always positive and that the best immigration policy was the complete freedom of movement. As one can see, Argentine congresspersons had a significant interest in adapti ng the immigration policies of the Argentine state to fit MERCOSUR needs. These findings are consiste nt with the provision in the new law, which allows MERCOSUR citizens to work in Argentina.

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265 Factors Shaping the Enactment of the Immigration Policies of 2003 Furthermore, the announcement of the presid ents of MERCOSUR to allow the free movement of people in their territories may ha ve influenced the passage of the law itself. As mentioned earlier, democracy in Arge ntina was reestablished in 1983, and only twenty years later did the Congress agree on a new immigration law. What made the enactment of a new law possible in 2003? One possible explanation is that the progress of MERCOSUR may have acted as a catalyst for the passage of new le gislation. Brazilian President Luiz Lula da Silva and his Arge ntine peer Nestor Kirchner are both strong critics of globalization. Both presidents also share the idea that MERCOSUR should occupy an important place on their agendas. T hus, the new impulse given to the Southern Common Market may be shaping Argentine immi gration policies. Four out of the six key players in immigration policymaking that I in terviewed in 2004, believed the progress of MERCOSUR influenced the passage of the ne w immigration legislation. For instance, the president of the SenateÂ’s committ ee on Population and Human Development expressed to me that the pr ogress of MERCOSUR toward the free movement of people pressured Argentine legislators to agree on new legislation th at was in harmony with that progress. In a similar vei n, Ruben Giustiniani, former president of the Population and Human Resources Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, thought that the relevance given to the integration with the countrie s of the Southern C one in recent years contributed to the passage of the new immigration law. The progress of MERCOSUR may be im portant in explaining the end of congressional inactivity with re gard to immigration policies. However, other factors may also be at work. Notably, Argentina has beco me a country of emigration in recent years. According to Andres Solimano (2003:32), net in ternational migration to Argentina in the

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266 period 1995-2000 was negative, namely -82,235 pe ople. Since the peak of the Argentine crisis was in December of 2001, importan t numbers of people have abandoned the country since then. “The images of long lin es of Argentines waiting at the door of European consulates to obtain their visas a nd the Buenos Aires international airport full of youngsters fleeing to Europe and the Unite d States,” certainly presented President Kirchner’s government (2003-present) with a new scenario. The problem of today’s Argentina is how to make people to come to the country and not the reverse. The emigration of the native population is certainly an important consideration when enacting immigration policies. In addition, many immi grants left the country. However, the unemployment rates did not go down, reaching 14.5% at the end of 2003. Therefore, the xenophobic discourses of the 1990s that accused immigrants of taking away jobs from Argentines were discredited. Two additional factors may have influenced the passage of new immigration policies by the Argentine Congress. First, immigrants and human rights’ organization actively lobbied to obtain more liberal immigr ation policies for almost twenty years. The congressional committees on population issues worked actively with these organizations to agree on a new immigration law. Therefore, the new law had a strong support of civil society organizations intervening in immigr ation policymaking. In addition, the hard work of Ruben Giustiniani who authored th e law and also chaired the Population and Human Resources Committee of the Chamber of Deputies between 2000 and 2003 also helped the passage of the new immigration legislation. This current Argentine Senator worked hard to pass his immigrati on draft bill for several years.

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267 Conclusions Recent changes in Argentin e immigration polic ies that favor immigrants from MERCOSUR countries seem to reverse th e historic norms favoring European immigration. These changes may reflect the strong impulse given by the Brazilian and Argentine presidents to the bloc. MERCOSUR has been neglected during recent years. The decision to allow the free movement of people in the region may prove Southern Cone leadersÂ’ renewed commitment to this re gional integration agreement. This does not mean, however, that the bloc is likely to im pose decisions on its member countries. It is not MERCOSUR itself which is directly sh aping immigration policies. Rather, the strategic interest that leaders have in its pr ogress seems to be infl uencing these policies. Decreased immigration to Argentina coupl ed with the work of human rightsÂ’ organizations may have also influenced th e more favorable norms for Southern Cone immigrants. The preference for European immigration, however, remains in place. Argentine legislators believe the impact of European immi gration is considerably more beneficial to the Argentine society than the impact of Sout hern Cone immigration. Therefore, a racial preference may be at work that favors immigr ation from Europe. As I showed in this chapter, the belief that recent immigration from Central and Eastern Europe was not highly favorable to the country does not di sconfirm this fact. Th e analysis of the immigration press coverage in the late 1990s showed that there was a strong association of this group of immigrants with gypsies. Therefore, Argentine immigration policies may return to their historical preference fo r European immigration in the future.

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268 CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS According to Aristide Zolberg (1999), from the capitalist perspective, immigrants of any kind are first and foremost work ers and, secondly, a political and cultural presence. I add to this that immigrants are al so subjects of nation-states and as such can be affected by the relationships between the sending and receiving countries. This multiple character of immigration helps shed light on the complex interests that are at stake when a state makes a decision regard ing the selection and admission of foreign citizens. In this regard I ar gue that, although economic factor s are important in explaining immigration policies and often determine how many immigrants a country is willing to accept, notions of ethnic and/ or cultural eligib ility of certain immigrant groups for membership in the “imagined community” (ide ntity politics) dictate who is admitted. International factors may also have an impact on immigration policies, sometimes offsetting the force of crises and/or ethnic preferences. Except for the amnesties enacted sporadically, the state of the economy tende d to shape immigrati on policies after the 1930s. Sometimes, however, the impact of eco nomic hardship/prosp erity on immigration policies was not direct. Instead, economic hardship created oppor tunities to select immigrants with regard to other ethnic or cu ltural characteristics. On other occasions, ethnic preferences were established indepe ndently of the economic situation. Finally, international factors also in fluenced immigration decisions. In the case of Argentina, wars had the effect of making immigration po licies more restrictiv e. More recently, the Southern Common Market had been maki ng immigration policies more permissive.

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269 When Economic Hardship Opened an Opportunity for Selecting Immigrants On different occasions, economic hardsh ip influenced the desired number of immigrants and provided an opportunity to redefine who would be admitted in the national community. This happened in the 1900s, 1930s, 1980s and 1990s. After an intense economic crisis, the Ar gentine Congress passed the fi rst anti-immigration law in 1902. Deep economic and social transformations were producing stri kes and civil unrest in Argentina. Instead of attempting to unders tand the changes that were taking place in the Argentine society, the government blamed immigration. Consequently, it passed a law facilitating the deportation of anar chist and socialist immigrants. Although immigration was not seriously restricted and reached its peak ten years later, not any European immigrant would be longer accepte d in the Argentine community. The state could exclude those that because of their ideo logies were likely to become troublemakers. The great depression put an end to th e era of mass migration and liberal immigration policies. It is true that th e economy was not prosperous. However, most countries around the world were also preoccupied with the assimilation of immigrants. Within this context, Argentina enacted several immigration restrictions. In 1932, the government required a job contract in order to apply for a visa in Argentina. Later, additional immigration restricti ons mainly hurt Jewish and Sp anish refugees trying to flee their countries. Although racism and anti-communism may la y behind these restrictions, the government did not overtly use ethnic crite ria in the selection of foreign citizens. Instead, it utilized economic criteria to dis qualify Jewish and Re publican immigrants. The immigration policies of AlfonsinÂ’s government also provide another example in which economic hardship opened an opportunity for selecting immigrants according to their origin. As the economic conditions worsened during the 1980s, Argentine

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270 immigration rules became stricter. While economic factors help us understand the approval of the immigration restrictions of 1985 and 1987, they cannot account for the special immigration regime for European ci tizens passed in 1988. The persistence of a favorable view of Europeans for inclusion in the Argentine community likely shaped the immigration rules for this group of immigran ts. At the same time, the less favorable treatment of South American and Asian immigr ation in the press possibly influenced the immigration rules for them. Economic reasons alone are also insufficien t to account for the immigration policy changes of the 1990s. As the economy deterior ated, immigrants from the Southern Cone were constructed as undesirable others after 1993. While overlooking other possible weaknesses in its own economic model, the gov ernment blamed immigr ants for the ills of Argentine society. The process of exclusion of immigrants followed a progression. First, immigrants were mainly blamed for the econom ic problems facing the native labor force. A nationalistic rhetoric was used to create a boundary between Argentines and foreigners. Later, immigrants became increasingly associated with breaking the law and disrespecting national institutions. The government did not reform its economic policy. Furthermore, it pushed the deregulation of th e economy even further. When immigration restrictions were passed in 1993 and 1994, these measures seemed to be justified in the name of the common interest of the Argentine nation. At the end of 1994, the government excluded immigrants from Central and East ern Europe from the application of the immigration restrictions.

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271 Cases in Which Independently of the Economic Situation, Ethnic Preferences Prevailed Other times, the ideas about Europeans be ing appropriate potential members of the imagined community influenced immigra tion policies regardless of the economic situation. This happened in the 1850s and 1870s, 1940s and 1950s, and during the different military dictatorships that occupied power between 1955 and 1983. Until the 1930s, the immigration policies of the Argentine State were relatively independent of the economic situation and strongly encouraged Euro pean immigration. It is true, agricultural labor was essential to incorporate Argentina into the world markets as an agricultural exporter. But there were also strong cultural reason to encourage European immigration. In this regard, the elites thought that the immigration of Europeans would produce a positive cultural impact on the Argentine popu lation. The immigration of citizens from Latin American countries was not considered. The Peronist governmentÂ’s (1946-1955) em phasis on industrialization generated a need for growing numbers of workers. In addition, the preoccupation with the assimilation of immigrants increased duri ng this time. For one thing, the Peronist administration made the last se rious effort to attract immigr ants from Europe. In this regard, the Argentine government signed agre ements with Italy and Spain to promote immigration from these countries. In addi tion, the migration from bordering countries was growing in importance during this peri od. Although the migrati on of these citizens was facilitated through amnesty decrees, it wa s not encouraged like the immigration from Italy and Spain. Other ethnic pref erences were also reflected in the Peronist immigration policies. As in the earlier period, the immigra tion of Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe was discouraged by different means. In addi tion, the country received refuges that had

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272 formerly collaborated with the Nazis in diffe rent parts of Europe. None of these ethnic preferences was related to the economic situation. The immigration policies of the several m ilitary governments that followed the fall of Peron in 1955 had several features in co mmon. The military showed a strong interest in immigration policies and pa ssed several immigration rules and regulations. All of them showed a strong concern with strictly re gulating the immigration from neighboring countries while encouraging European immigrati on. In this regard, the military wanted to encourage immigration that was culturally co mpatible with the Argentine one. At the same time, they enacted st rict requirements for the ad mission of South American immigrants, including broad deportation pr ovisions and fines to repress immigration offenses. Cases in Which International Factors Were Influential I mentioned elsewhere that different fo reign affairs considerations can shape immigration policy decisions. In the case of Argentina, the First World War did not seriously impact immigration policies. However, the Sec ond World War and the Spanish Civil War triggered the enactment of further immigration restrictions in Argentina. The fear of the arrival of refugees from Nazi Europe and Spain justified these restrictions. First, in 1938 the government restricted the immigration of forei gners that were not coming to work in agriculture. In 1941, the government created a sp ecial war counsel to (arbitrarily) decide on the ad mission of foreign citizens on a one-by-one basis. The first world war no major impact. Second World Wa r made the government enact immigration restrictions. The Cold War influenced the immigration policies of the different military governments. This was particularly true afte r the 1960s. As Fidel Castro consolidated his

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273 power, the United States worried about the expo rt of communism in Latin America. Latin American military regimes mirrored this conc ern. Despite the limited impact of the first guerrilla groups that appear ed during the 1960s, the Ar gentine government enacted different norms to prevent the rise of comm unism. Some of these norms repressed crimes against national security, prohibited the en try of people professi ng a communist ideology to Argentina, and submitted immigrants from communist countries to strict controls. In addition, they approved important deportation pr ovisions applicable to those engaging in activities that could threaten public order. Punishments fo r these behaviors included deportation, prison and loss of the Argentine citizenship. Many of these norms remained in place throughout the 1970s. There is evidence that Argentina is on its way to solve immigration dilemmas in a cooperative manner with other states. In th e early 1990s, the Southern Common Market justified the amnesty for neighboring immigran ts. Later in the late 1990s the Argentine Executive signed immigration agreements with Pe ru and Bolivia. Finally, a year after the MERCOSUR presidents announced they would allow the free movement of people in 2002, the Argentine Congress passed new im migration rules that would allow any citizens from MERCOSUR members and asso ciates, to apply for a work visa in Argentina. It remains to be seen if the othe r states will pass similar immigration rules. Nonetheless, this new immigration rules signi fy a radical change with respect to the immigration policies that prioritized the immigration of European citizens. Also, Argentina passed this new immigration rule s in a moment in which the young population of this country was emigrating in significant numbers. But if Argentines really value the

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274 association with its Southern Cone peers as an opportunity for mutual trade and benefit, the government will likely leave these special immigration norms in place. Congress and the Executive Branch in Immigration Policy-Making The literature on democratization does not fully account for the centralization of the immigration decision-making process in Arge ntina for many years. For one thing, this literature does not explain the emergence of a centralizing Executiv e during AlfonsinÂ’s administration. In addition, it falls short in accounting for cases in which the delegation patterns arise as a consequen ce of congressional inability to pass legislation. Likely, economic and institutional crises played a role in this congressional inability in two ways. For one thing, they gave rise to more urgent matters that required congressional attention. In addition, these crises made it convenient fo r the Executive to enjoy of flexible powers to rule the admission of foreign citizens. In turn, the CongressÂ’s prospects of a pproving comprehensive immigration policies improved progressively. First, the creation of the legislative committees dealing with immigration put immigration issues on the le gislative agenda and created an opportunity for the passage of new immigration policies. However, this process was slow and no bills to enact comprehensive immigration policies were considered until the mid-1990s. When draft bills were generated in this regar d, the Argentine Congress was leaning toward restrictive immigration measures. Since th e draft bills presented by congressional consideration were considerably liberal, th ey did not obtain enough consensus. However, I believe ArgentinaÂ’s self image as a c ountry of immigration worked against the enactment of restrictive immigration polices as well. One can argue that the Argentine legislative body was facing a deadlock.

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275 The Argentine Congress approved new immi gration legislation in December of 2003. Prioritizing the immigration of Citizens from Southern Comm on Market countries, this new legislation apparently changes Arge ntinaÂ’s recurrent preference for European immigration for more than a hundred and fifty years. The progress of MERCOSUR seems to be an important priority in the ey es of Argentine legislators. However, the members of the Congress in Argentina still believe that Western European immigration was more beneficial to the country. Furt hermore, the provisio n that the Federal government should encourage European immigr ation is still part of the 150 years old Argentine Constitution.

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276 APPENDIX A IMMIGRATION RULES IN ARGENTINA 1853-1999 Table A-1 Immigration Policy Legi slation and Regulations (1853-1998) Year Norm Main Provisions 1853 Constitution Preamble invites all good-willed citizens of the world to immigrate to Argentina. Article 20 establishes that fo reigners have all the same civil rights as citizens. Article 25 establishes that the federal government will foment European immigration 1869 Law 346 Foreigners with two years of residence can acquire Argentine citizenship (Article 2). Persons that were born in the former Provinces of Rio de La Plata (Article 1.5). 1876 Law 817 (Avellaneda Law) Defines immigrant as a forei gner below seventy years of age that could prove his apti tude to develop an industry, art or occupation (Article 12) Creates offices in Europe to promote immigration to Argentina (Article 4) Immigrants are benefited w ith subsidized passages, temporary lodging, and transp ort inland from port of arrival. In addition, the govern ment helps them in finding a job or occupation (Article 14). Decides the creation of ag ricultural colonies and establishes the rules for thei r functioning (Article 61 and ff.).

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277 Year Norm Main Provisions 1902 Law 4144 (Residence Law) Allows the Executive to deport those immigrants that had committed crimes abroad (Article 1) or those that behave in ways that threaten nati onal security or public order (Article 2). The government can reject immigrants in the situations described above (Article 3). 1910 Law 7209 (Social Defense Law) Prohibits the entry to the count ry of criminals, anarchists or others that profess the use of violence against the government or those that were previously expelled from the country (Article 1). 1932 Decree of November 26 Prohibits the entry of immigrants that do not have a job in Argentina 1938 Decree 8972/38 Prohibits the entry of immigrants that do not come to work in the agricultural colonies 1941 Decree 100,908/41 Creates a special immigrati on counsel for the war period, which has to decide on the admission of foreigners 1949 Decree 15972/49 Amnesty that allows all foreigners to apply for residency by furnishing proof of identity and date of entry into the country. 1951 Decree 13721/51 Amnesty that allows “braceros” to apply for residency. 1954 Law 14345 Approves the constitution of Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. 1960 Decree 11619/60 Special treatment for Belgium’s citizens residing in Congo. 1961 Decree 5466/61 Facilitates the Immigration of Europeans formerly residing in African countries 1963 Decree 4805/63 Establishes basic rules for admission and deportation of immigrants. Consulates ca n award only temporary residencies and for a period of 6 months. Defines who is considered “illegal immigr ant” and authorizes the executive to deport these persons. Establishes penalties for violation of the immigration rules.

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278 Year Norm Main Provisions Decree 788/63 Represses a long list of crimes against “national security” (treason, espionage, sabotage, professing leftist ideologies, among others). Fo reigners receive the same penalties than Argentines th an range from a year in prison to life sentence. Decree 4124/63 Prohibits the Communist Party from Developing activities in Argentina. Banns communists from government and academic positions. Prohibits the entry of communist foreigners to the country. Punishes naturalized foreigners that participate in communist activities with the loss of citizenship. Decree 2457/63 Rules the admission of forei gners citizens of countries under communist regimes. It awards to these foreigners a visa for a maximum of three months. At the same time, the norm subjects them to se veral controls once they arrive in the country, such as periodically reporting to the Federal Police and carrying a special ID. 1964 Decree 49/64 Establishes an amnesty for migrants from neighboring countries, which allows them to apply for permanent residency by furnishing proof of identity, lack of criminal record and date of entry into the country. 1965 Decree 4418/65 Establishes the persons that can apply for permanent (immigrants, refugees, former residents, and relatives of Argentines) and non-permanents residency (temporary residents, tourists, seasonal workers, persons in transit, awardees of political asylum, daily border crossings). Establishes a list of pers ons who cannot apply for residency (those with illne sses, who have no occupation or means of subsistence, involved in prostitution or addicted to drugs, and those condemned for crimes that deserve prison sentences). It establishes important deportation provisions and increases the penalties imposed to those who give work or lodging to undocumented workers).

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279 Year Norm Main Provisions 1967 Law 17294 Prohibits the work of undocumented workers and persons not authorized to work by immigration agency. Obliges employers and hotels to c ontrol immigration papers. Employers can fire migrants that do not regularize their immigration status. 1969 Law 18235 Enables the Executive to de port a person who has been sentenced to prison or engages in activities that affect social peace, national security or public order. 1974 Decree 87/74 Establishes a generous am nesty for migrants from neighboring countries, which allows them to apply for permanent residency by furnishing proof of identity and date of entry into the country. 1977 Decree 3938/77 It provides that the government will encourage immigration that is healthy and culturally compatible with the native population (i.e. European). The government will also promote immigration to the country abroad, and will create jobs for immigrants. The federal government will also determine land for settlement. With respect to immigrants from the region, the Decree mandates that the Federal Government organizes a regime that carefully select s and channels immigrants. Important deportation provisions are still in effect from the previous government (Ley 18235). 1979 Resolution 64/79 Resolution 64/79 cl oses 15 border crossing with Chile. 1981 Law 22439 of 1981 Passed during the last military dictatorship and still in place, expresses a preference for European immigration and allows the Executive to create norms and procedures to encourage the immigrati on of foreigners “whose cultural characteristics permit integration into the Argentine society.” A special fund is created to finance the settlement of these immigr ants in regions of the country to be determined by Executive decision. The Executive is also in charge of creating the norms to select the rest of immigrants, who will be admitted in three categories: permanent, temporary, and transitory residents.

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280 Year Norm Main Provisions 1984 Decree 780/84 Amnesty passed during Alfonsín’s government that allows all foreigners to a pply for residency by furnishing proof of identity and date of entry into the country. 1985 Resolution 2340/85 Issued by the National Dire ction of Migration, also during Alfonsín’s Presidenc y, establishes that the only persons that can apply for a work visa are relatives of Argentines or permanent residents, skilled workers, artists, and sports person s of documented solvency, religious workers, and immi grants with investment capital. There is no distinc tion between Europeans and Latin Americans 1987 Decree 1434/87 Repeats the pr ovisions from Resolution 2340/85. 1988 Resolution 700/88 The last norm enacted during Alfonsín’s government, issued by the National Direc tion of Migration, exempts Europeans from the application of Article 15 of Decree1434/87. Europeans can apply for residence by merely furnishing proof of origin. 1992 Decree 1033/92 Approves an amnesty for immigrants from neighboring countries that allows them to apply for residency by furnishing proof of identity and date of entry into the country. 1993 Decree 2771/93 Gives extensive deportation powers to the Executive to deport immigrants caught in fraganti in the commission of a crime or engaged in ill egal occupation of dwellings. It also mandates increased inspections in the places where immigrants live. A lthough it was directed to immigrants from the region, I c onsider it applicable to all foreigners. 1994 Decree 1023/94 Requires a written job contract in order to be eligible for a work visa. It also allows these foreigners to apply for residence: relatives of Argen tines or permanent residents, artists, and sports person s of documented solvency, religious workers, and immi grants with investment capital. 1994 Resolution 4632/94 Passed by the Ministry of Interior in December, it formalizes the Plan from 1992 and enables citizens from Central and Eastern Europe to apply for permanent

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281 residency in the country. 1998 Decree 1117/98 Prohibits immigrants to change their visa type once they enter the country. Table A-2. Immigration Agreemen ts with European Countries Country Year Provisions Switzerland 1937 Facilitates the immigration for agricultural colonies. Denmark 1937 Favors immigration to Argentina. Low Countries 1938 Favors immigration to Argentina Italy 1947 Facilitates the im migration of agricultural and other kinds of ma nual and intellectual workers Spain 1948 Promotes the immigration of skilled workers Spain 1960 Facilitates immigration to Argentina Japan 1961 Promotes immigration of skilled workers and technological investments in Argentina. France 1964 Seeks the establishment of agricultural colonies in Argentina with French citizens formerly residing in North Africa. Table A-3 Immigration Agreements with South American Countries Country Year Provisions Paraguay 1958 Facilitates the hiring of seasonal workers Bolivia 1964 and 1978 Facilitates the hiring of seasonal workers Chile 1971 Establishes the rules applicable to seasonal workers Bolivia 1999 Nationals of both countries can obtain a temporary visa for six months. After this, they either comply with the requirements of Decree 1023/94 or register as selfemployed before the Taxation Agency.

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282 Peru 1999 Nationals of both countries can obtain a temporary visa for six months. After this, they either comply with the requirements of Decree 1023/94 or register as selfemployed before the Taxation Agency.

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283 APPENDIX B REGRESSION ANALYSES Dependent Variable My dependent variable is an index of im migration policy openness, ranging from –5 to +5. This index does not reflect policy effec tiveness, but captures the intention that decision-makers had in mind when enacting the immigration norms. The algorithm used for coding follows: 5. Active worker recruitment abroad, advertising offices, free land or subsidized land, subsidized travel, temporary lodging, free tr ansport inland from por t of arrival, easy naturalization, and legal property ownership; 4. The above, except for subsidized passage and transport inland; 3. Overseas immigration offices, debark ation coordination, land designated for settlement, easy naturalization, legal property ownership; 2. The Above, except for land designated for settlement; 1. Modest advertising, easy naturalizati on, legal property ownership, amnesties; 0. Open doors, no encouragement, no discouragement; -1. Regulations on shipping companies and/ or contracts for assisted passage; -2. Class restrictions on immi gration (no paupers, criminal s) or selective sourcecountry bans. –3. The above restrictions plus laws for registration, and deportation provisions; -4. Restrictive quotas, only skilled immigrants or migran ts with capital, or other selectivity measures designed to redu ce immigration volume significantly; -5. Closed (or only slightly ajar) doors, enforced. The coding of different immi gration policies was based on the main laws and decrees enacted by the Argentine government. Lower hier archy regulations, such as those passed by the Immigration Agency or Ministry of Interior, were only included when they produced a substantial modification or specifi cation of the content of the higher norms. This was the case for the years 1988 and 1994.

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284 Immigration Norms included in Figure 3-1 1876 Law 817: Strong encouragement of European immigration, immigration offices abroad, subsidized passage and land, tempor ary lodging, and easy naturalization. Europeans: 5 Neighboring: No rules 1902 Law 4144: Allows the Executive to deport thos e immigrants that had committed crimes abroad (Article 1) or those that behave in ways that threaten national security or public order (Article 2). Europeans: 1 Neighboring: No rules 1910 Law 7209: Prohibits the entry of certain classes (criminals, anarchists) and reiterates deportation provisions. Europeans: -0.5 Neighboring: No rules 1932 Decree of November 26: Prohibits the entry of those who do not have a job offer in Argentina. Europeans: -4 Neighboring: No rules 1938 Decree 8972/38: Prohibits the entry of immigr ants that do not come to work in the agricultural colonies. European: -4 Neighboring: No rules 1941 Decree 100,908/41: Creates a special immigra tion counsel for the war period, which has to decide on the admission of foreigners.

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285 European: -5 Neighboring: No rules 1949 Decree 15972/49: Amnesty that allows all fore igners to apply for residency by furnishing proof of identity and date of entry into the country. Agreements with Italy and Spain promote immigration from these countries by different means. Europeans: 4 Neighboring: 1 1954 Law 14345: Approves the constitution of Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, which promotes European immigration. Europeans: 5 Neighboring: 1 1960 Decree 11619/60: Special treatment for Belgium’s citizens residing in Congo. Europeans: 4 Neighboring: No encouragement/no discouragement, 0. 1961 Decree 5466/61: Facilitates the Immigration of Europeans formerly residing in African countries European: 4 Neighboring: No encouragement/no discouragement, 0. 1963 Decree 4805/63: Establishes basic rules for admission and deportation of immigrants. Consulates can award only temporary reside ncies and for a period of 6 months. Defines who is considered “illegal immigrant” a nd authorizes the executive to deport these persons. Establishes penalties for violation of the immigration rules. Some special agreements remain in place to promote immigration from Europe. European: -0.5 Neighboring: -3

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286 1964 Decree 49/64: Establishes an amnesty for immigrants from neighboring countries. Agreement signed with France to promote immi gration of French citizens to Argentina, counted as +1, adds one point to previous policies coded as +1 (See Appendix A for details about immigration nor ms from previous period). Europeans: 2 Neighboring: 1 1965 Decree 4418/65: Establishes th e persons that can apply fo r permanent (immigrants, refugees, former residents, and relatives of Argentines) and non-permanents residency (temporary residents, tourists, seasonal workers, persons in transit, awardees of political asylum, daily border crossings). Decides on persons who cannot apply for residency (criminals, handicaps) and enacts importan t deportation provisions and increases the penalties imposed to those who give work or lodging to undocumented workers). Makes no distinction between European and neighboring immigrants. Europeans: -2 Neighboring: -2 1967 Law 17294: Prohibits the work of undocumente d workers and persons not authorized to work by immigration agency. Obliges empl oyers and hotels to control immigration papers. Employers can fire migrants that do not regularize their im migration status. No distinction between European and neighboring immigrants. Europeans: -3 Neighboring: -3 1969 Law 18235: Enables the Executive to deport a pe rson who has been sentenced to prison or engages in activities that affect social p eace, national security or public order. Applies to all immigrants. Europeans: -4 Neighboring: -4

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287 1974 Decree 87/74: Establishes a generous amnest y for migrants from neighboring countries, which allows them to apply for permanent re sidency by proving identity and date of entry to the country. Europeans: not counted Neighboring: 1 1977 Decree 3938/77: Passed during the last military dictatorship, is a clear example of the double standard that characterizes Argentine immigration policy. It provides that the government will encourage immigration that is healthy and culturally compatible with the native population (i.e. European). The governme nt will also promote immigration to the country abroad, and will create jobs for im migrants. The federal government will also determine land for settlement. With respect to immigrants from the region, the Decree mandates that the Federal Government organi zes a regime that carefully selects and channels immigrants. Important deportation provisions are still in effect from the previous government (Ley 18235). Europeans: 3 Neighboring: -4 1981 Law 22439: Passed during the last military dict atorship and still in place, expresses a preference for European immigration and allows the Executive to create norms and procedures to encourage the immigration of foreigners “whose cultural characteristics permit integration into the Argentine society.” A special fund is created to finance the settlement of these immigrants in regions of the country to be determined by Executive decision. The Executive is also in charge of creating the no rms to select the rest of immigrants, who will be admitted in three categories: permanent, temporary, and transitory residents. Europeans: 4 Neighboring: -4 1984 Decree 780/84: Amnesty passed during Alfonsín’s government, which enables any foreigner residing in the country to apply for residency. Europeans: 1

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288 Neighboring: 1 1985 Resolution 2340/85 issued by the National Direc tion of Migration, also during Alfonsín’s Presidency, establishes that th e only persons that can apply for a work visa are relatives of Argentines or permanent residents, skill ed workers, artists, and sports persons of documented solvency, religious workers, and i mmigrants with investment capital. There is no distinction between Eur opeans and Latin Americans. Europeans: -4 Neighboring: -4 1987 Decree 1434/87: Repeats the prov isions from Resolution 2340/85. Resolution 700/88: The last norm enacted dur ing Alfonsín’s government, issued by the National Direction of Migration, exempts Europe ans from the applicati on of Article 15 of Decree1434/87. Europeans can apply for residenc e by merely furnishing proof of origin (coded like an amnesty for Europeans 1). Europeans: 1 Neighboring: -4 1992 Decree 1033/92: First decree enacted during Menem’s government, approves an amnesty for immigrants from neighboring countries that allows them to apply for residency by furnishing proof of identity and da te of entry into the country. Plan to encourage immigration from Centra l and Eastern Europe presented by President Menem before the European Parliament in February 1992. The plan includes subsidized passages, Spanish courses, financial aid for housing and different occupations (through non-subsidized loans from banks, promotion in offices abroad, and some indication of place for settlement) Europeans: 1 Neighboring: 1 1993 Decree 2771/93: a regulation mo tivated by increasing unrest ov er illegal occupation of dwellings by immigrants from neighboring c ountries. Underwritten by President Menem, gives extensive deportation powers to the Executive to deport immigrants caught in

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289 flaganti in the commission of a crime or in fraction. Although it was directed to immigrants from the region, I consider it appl icable to all foreigners. However, since the amnesty was still in place I added its socr e (-1) to the one fo r Decree 2771/94 (-3) and came up with a total score of –2. As for Eur opeans, they still can apply for residency without complying with any specific requireme nts beyond the presentation of a valid ID. Europeans: 1 Neighboring: -2 1994 Decree 1023/94: Requires a written job contract in order to be eligible for a work visa. It also allows these foreigners to apply for resi dence: relatives of Argentines or permanent residents, artists, and spor ts persons of documented solvency, religious workers, and immigrants with investment capital. Resolution 4632/94: passed by the Ministry of Interior in December that formalizes the Plan from 1992 and enables citizens from Central and Eastern Europe to apply for permanent residence in the country. Europeans: 1 Neighboring: -4 Independent Variables Real Gross National Product Growth (GDPGROWT) Percentage growth in the total amount of goods and services produced in the country from one year to the next. Obtained from M. Rapoport, Historia Economica y Social de la Argentina (Ediciones Macchi, Buenos Aires, 2000). Unemployment for the year (UNEMPLOYEAR) Percentage of the working population that is unemployed and actively looking for a job in a given year. Years 1969-1987, obtained from B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics. The Americas: 1750-1988 (M Stockton Press, New York, 1993). Years 1988-1994, obtained from M. Rapoport, Historia Economica y Social de la Argentina (Ediciones Macchi, Buenos Aires, 2000).

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290 Real Salaries Growth (REALGROW) Percentage of Growth in the level of r eal salaries from one year to the next. Years 1969-1989, obtained from M. Rapoport, Historia Economica y Social de la Argentina (Ediciones Macchi, Buenos Aires, 2000). Years 1990-1994, estimated from data about Real Wages Levels, obtained from Instituto Nacional de Estadí stica y Censos Database ( www.indec.gov.ar)

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291 APPENDIX C ANALYSES OF IMMIGRATION PRINT MEDIA The articles were collected from the news papers La Nación and Clarín for the years 1983-1987, and from La Nación and Página 12 for the years 1992-1994. The idea was to have a sample of the center (La Nación) and center-left print media in Argentina (Clarín and Página 12). All columns that discussed issues related to immigrants or immigration were coded for six month-periods in the years 19 83/1984 (October-March), 1987 (March-August), 1992 (January-June), 1993 (July-December), and 1994 (January-June). Opinion pieces were collected but have not been include d in the present anal ysis. A total of 135 newspaper articles were catalogued. The terms a nd themes refereed to different groups of immigrants (European and non-European immigrants were coded separately. Terms used to refer to immigrants: the te rms used to refer to immigrants were coded as negative or positive. The instances that showed respect and consideration for immigrants as human beings were coded posit ive while those that referred to them in ways that made them somehow undesirable we re coded as negative. Many terms such as immigrants, migrants, or immigration were evaluated as neutral and were not included. Additionally, the instances that disrespected i mmigrants, treated them as things or that tended to exaggerate the growth in immigr ant population were counted as negative. Problems and benefits associated with im migration: a reference to a beneficial effect of immigration was coded as positive. Instances that described different economic, health, or social problems associated w ith immigration were coded as negative.

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292 APPENDIX D SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS A survey was conducted with approximatel y 8 % of the members of the Argentine Congress (N=26). The sample is approximately representative of the composition of the Argentine Congress. Seventy percent of those surveyed were male and thirty percent of them were female. Forty-eight percent of th em belonged to the Pe ronist Party, thirty percent of them to the Radical Party, and fift een percent to third pa rties. Nineteen of those surveyed belonged to the House of Representatives and eight of them to the Senate. The text of the survey administered follows: I prefer if my ident ity is not revealed___ Gender: Political Party: Beginning of Mandate: End of Mandate: Congressional Committees in whic h the legislator participates: 1. Do you agree with the immigr ation policies of the Argent ine Executive that require a job contract in order to be eligible for a work visa? 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Completely agree Completely disagree 2. ¿Why? 3. It has been argued that the current immigr ation legislation gives discretional powers to the executive to decide on the admission of foreign citizens. Do you agree with this assessment? 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Completely agree Completely disagree

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293 4. Why do you believe the Congress has been unable to agree on a new immigration policy since the reestablishment of democracy? 5. To what extent do you believe the fo llowing groups of immigrants have been beneficial to the country? a. European (up to WWII): 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial b. From Arab Countries: 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial c. Paraguayan: 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial d. Bolivian: 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial e. Uruguayan: 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial f. Brazilian: 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial g. Chilean: 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial h. Recent immigrants from Central and eastern Europe: 1___ 2 ___ 3 ___ 4 ___ 5 ___ Not beneficial at all Absolutely beneficial 6. ¿Would you vote affirmatively for th e free movement of people within MERCOSRUR? Yes_____ No___ 7. Why?

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294 8. Argentina needs an immigration policy with the following characteristics (mark all that apply): a) Selective, which responds to the co untryÂ’s needs for prof essional and skilled workers___ b) Selective, with attention to the national origin of immigrants____ c) Selective, which esta blishes quotas with regard to profession/occupation___ d) Generous, which considers re gional integra tion agreements___ e) Generous, which gives equa l treatment to all nations___ f) That gives preferential treatment to Europeans, according to the Argentine Constitution___ g) That establishes special rules for seasonal workers that do not settle permanently in Argentina___ h) Other: i) Other: 9. In your experience, are the Congressiona l requests to the Executive satisfactorily responded by the latter? You can add as many comments and questions as you wish:

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295 LIST OF REFERENCES General and Argentine Works Adelman, J. 1999 Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and th e Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Alberdi, J. B. 1966 Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Organización Política de la República Argentina. Buenos Aires: Eudeba. Alconada Sempe, R. 1996 “Democracia y Política Exterior.” In La Politica Exterior Argentina y sus Protagonistas, 1880-1995. Ed. S. R. Jalabe. Buenos Aires: Nuevohacer, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. Anderson, B. 1991 Imagined Communities , Revised Edition. New York: Verso. Andreas, P. 1999 “Borderless Economy, Barricaded Border,” NACLA Report on The Americas, 33 (3):14-21. ________. 2000 Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Balsa, J. J. 2001 “El Estado Democrático y la Gobernabilida d. Sus efectos en la sociedad y en la economía.” In Estado, sociedad y economía en la Argentina (1930-1997). Ed. N. M. Girbal-Blacha. Quilmes: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Banton, M. 1998 Racial Theories . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bauer, O. 1996 “The Nation.” In Mapping the Nation. Ed. G. Balakrishnan . London & New York: New Left Review & Verso. Beard, C. A. and M. R. Beard 1944 A Basic History of The United States . New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co.

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296 Behdad, A. 1997 “Nationalism and Immigrati on to the United States,” Diaspora, 6(2):155-178. Benencia. R. 1997 “Transformaciones laborales en el agro argentino.” In Empleo y Globalizacion: La nueva cuestión social en la Argentina. Ed. E. Villanueva . Quilmes, Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Bertoni, A. L. 2001 Patriotas, Cosmopolitas y Nacionalistas: La Construcción de la Naciónalidad Argentina a fines del Siglo XIX. Buenos Aires: Fondo de la Cultura Económica. Bovenkerk, F., R. Miles and G. Verbunt 1990 “Racism, Migration and the State in We stern Europe: A Case for Comparative Analysis,” International Sociology, 5(4):475-490. Breuilly, J. 1994 Nationalism and the Nation-Sate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ________. 1996 “Approaches to Nationalism.” In Mapping the Nation. Ed. G. Balakrishnan . London & New York: New Left Review & Verso. Brubaker, R. W. 1992 Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ____________. 1995 “Comment on ‘Modes of Immigration Poli tics in Liberal Democratic States,’” International Mi gration Review, 29(5):903-6. Bunk, B. D. 2002 “Your Comrades will not Forget: Revolu tionary Memory and the Breakdown of the Spanish Second Republic, 1934-1936,” History & Memory , 14(1):65-92. Calavita, K. C. 1980 A Sociological Analysis of US Immigr ation Policy, 1820-1924 (Dissertation). Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International. ___________. 1992 Inside the State. New York: Routledge.

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297 ___________. 1994 “U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses : the Limits of Legislation.” In Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective . Ed. W. A. Cornelius, J. F. Hollifield and P. S. Martin. Stanford: Stanford University Press. _________. 1998 “Gaps and Contradictions in US Immigration Policy: An Analysis of Recent Reform Efforts.” In The Immigration Reader: America in a Multidisciplinary Perspective . Ed. D. Jacobson. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc. Canadian Embassy 2003 “Applying for a Temporary Resident Visa.” . Accessed 2003 February 3. Canedo, A. 1974 Aspectos del Pensamiento Político de Leopoldo Lugones. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Marcos. Carens, J. 1987 “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” Review of Politics, 49(2):25173. Castells, M. 1975 “Immigrant Workers and Class Struggles in Advanced Capitalism: The Western European Experience,” Politics & Society, 5(1):33-66. Castles, S. and G. Kosack 1985 Immigrant Workers and Class St ructure in Western Europe. New York: Oxford University Press. Castro, D. 1995 “We are a separate Race! The Images of the Jew in the Argentine Popular Theatre, 1890-1935.” Paper delivered at 1995 Latin American Studies Association, Washington, September 28-30. Catterberg, E. 2000 “Tolerancia étnica en Arge ntina.” . Accessed 2004 May 28. Cavarozzi, M. 1997 Autoritarismo y democracia (1955-1996). Buenos Aires: Cia Editora Espasa Calpe Argentina SA. CELS 2002 Informe Anual Sobre La Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Argentina. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.

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298 Chambliss, W. J. 1980 “On Lawmaking.” British Journal of Law and Society , 149-172. Winter. Connolly, W. E. 1991 Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox . Ithaca: Cornel University Press. Cormberg. A. A. 2000 “La reconversión productiva en el sector de la construc ción en Argentina durante al década de 1990.” Paper delivered at XXV AAEP Annual Meeting, Córdoba, Argentina, November 13-15. Cornelius, W., P. Martin and J. Hollifield 1994 Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective . Stanford: Stanford University Press. Cornell, S. and D. Hartmann 1998 Ethnicity and Race: Making Id entities in a Changing World. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press. Delaney, J. 1997. “”National Id entity, Nationhood, and Immigr ation in Argentina: 18101930.” Stanford Electronic Humanities Review, 5(2). . Accessed 2004 November 21. De Marco, G. 1986 “Extranjeros en la Argentina: cuantía y continuidad de los flujos inmigratorios limítrofes, 1970-1985,” Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos, 1(3):323-350. Devoto, F. J. 2001 “El revés de la trama: políticas migrat orias y prácticas admi nistrativas en la Argentina (1919-1949),” Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos, 41(162):281303. _________. 2002 Nacionalismo, fascismo y tradicionalismo en la Argentina moderna. Una historia. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno de Argentina Editores. Diaz, R. 2002. Prosperidad o ilusión? Las reformas de los 90 en la Argentina . Buenos Aires: Editorial Abaco de Rodolfo Depalma.

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299 Di Filippo, A. 1999 “Globalización, Integración regional y Migraciones.” . Accessed 2004 Jan 9. Divine, R. A. 1957 Immigration Policy, 1924-1952. New Haven: Yale University Press. Durkheim, E. 1951 Suicide. New York: Free Press. ___________. 1956 The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press. Erjavec, K. 2001 “Media Representation of the Discrimina tion against the Roma in Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovenia, Discourse & Society, 12(6):699-627. Escudé, C. 1992 Realismo periférico: fundamentos para la nueva política exterior Argentina. Buenos Aires: Planeta Política y Sociedad. Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol 1985 Bringing The State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fitzgerald, K. 1996 The Face of the Nation: Immigrati on, the State and The National Identity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Foner, N., R. G. Rumbaut and S. J. Gold 2000 “Immigration and Immigration Res earch in the United States.” In Immigration Research for a New Century: Multidisciplinary Perspectives . Ed. N. Foner, R. G. Rumbaut and S. J. Gold. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Foucault, M. 1972 The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. New York: Pantheon. Freeman, G. 1979 Immigrant Labor and Racial C onflict in Indus trial Societies . NJ: Princeton University Press. _________. 1995 “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” International Migration Review, 29(4):881.

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300 Gallup Argentina 2001 “Estudio de opinión publica sobre di scriminación.” . Accessed 2003 February 3. Gálvez, M. 2001 El Diario de Gabriel Quiroga: Op iniones sobre la vida Argentina. Buenos Aires: Tuarus. Gellner, E. 1996 “The Coming of Nationalism and Its In terpretations: The Myth of Nation and Class.” In Mapping the Nation. Ed. G. Balakrishnan. London & New York: New Left Review & Verso. Germani, G. 1966 “Mass Immigration and Mode rnization in Argentina,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 2(11):165-182. Gilroy, P. 1991 There Ain’t no Black in the Union Jack : The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Godio, J. 2000 Historia del movimiento Obrero Argentino (Volume 2). Buenos Aires: Corregidor. Gorz, A. 1970 “Immigrant Labor,” New Left Review, 61:28-31. Gotsbachner, E. 2001 “Xenophobic Normality: The Discriminatory Impact of Habitualized Discourse Dynamics,” Discourse & Society , 12(6):729-59. Graciarena, J. 1987 “Prologo.” In Dinámica migratoria Argenti na (1955-1984): democratización y retorno de expatriados. Ed. A. Lattes and E. Oteiza. Bu enos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina. Grimson, A. 1999 Relatos de la diferencia y la igual dad: los bolivianos en Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires: Eudeba. Haggard, S and R Kaufman. 1995 The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Haus, L. 1996 “Controlling Immigration: A Globa l Perspective” (book review), International Migration review, 30(2):600-601.

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310 Villar, J. M. 1984 “Argentine Experience in the Fi eld of Illegal Immigration.” International Migration Review , 18(3):453-73. Viotti, P. R. and M. D. Kauppi. 1987 International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism. New York: MacMillan. Wallerstein, I. 1974 The Modern World System, vol. 1, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. Walzer, M. 1981 “The Distribution of Membership.” In Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits. Ed. P Brown and H. Shue. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield. _____________. 1983 Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books. Wasserstein, B. 1999 Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945, 2nd Edition. London & New York: Leicester University Press. Weiner, M. 1995 The Global Migration Crisis: Cha llenges to Sates and Human Rights. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers. Whitaker, R. 1987 Double Standard: The Secret Hi story of Canadian Immigration . Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Limited. Young, I. M. 1990 Justice and the Politics of Difference . Princeton: Princeton University Press. ____________. 2000 Inclusion and Democracy . Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Zamperi, C. A. 1999 “Las Migraciones internacionales en el C ono Sur. Su repercusión en los procesos de desarrollo en integración. Unpublished thesis submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affaire, Argentina, in compliance with internal career requirements.

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311 Zolberg, A. 1978 “The Patterning of International Migra tion Policies in a Changing World System.” In Human Migration Patterns and Policies. Ed. W. H. McNeill and R. Adams. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. _________. 1991 “Bounded Sates in a Global Market: The Us es of Internationa l Migration.” In Social Theory for a Changing Society . Ed. P Bourdieu and J.S. Coleman. Boulder: Westview Press. _________. 1999 “Matters of the State.” In The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience. Ed. C. Hirschman, P. Kasanitz and J. De Wind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. _________. 2000 “The Politics of Immigration Policy: An Externalist Perspective.” In Immigration Research for a New Century: Multidisciplinary Perspectives . Ed. Foner, N., R. G. Rumbaut and S. J. Gold. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Newspapers Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1983-1987. La Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1983-2003. La Prensa, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1932, 1936, 1938, and June 28 1992. Página 12, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1992-1994. The Times, London, UK, February 1, 1992. Time, New York, United States, June 25 1984 and July 1 1984. Laws and Other Gove rnment Decisions Decree of November 26 of 1932 Decree 8972/38 Decree 100,908/41 Decree 15972/49 Decree 13721/51 Decree 11619/60

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312 Decree 5466/61 Decree 788/63 Decree 2457/63 Decree 4124/63 Decree 4805/63 Decree 49/64 Decree 4418/65 Decree 87/74 Decree 3938/77 Decree 780/84 Decree 1434/87 Decree 1033/92 Decree 2771/93 Decree 1023/94 Decree 845/95 Law 817 Law 14345 Law 17294 Law 4144 Law 7209 Law 18235 Law 22439 Law 24493 Resolution Dirección Nacional de Migraciones 64/79 Resolution Dirección Nacional de Migraciones 2340/85

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313 Resolution Dirección Nacional de Migraciones 700/88 Resolution Ministerio del Interior 4632/94 Government Documents Argentine Executive Cancilleria Argentina. 2002 “Política de Tratamiento Especial para Europa Central y Or iental.” Argentine Foreign Affairs Ministry, Internal Memo. Dirección Nacional de Migraciones Radicaciones otorgadas Ano 1980 a 1989: Radicaciones Permanentes. ____________________________ Estadísticas de Radicaciones Permanen tes y Temporarias, 1970-2002. Unplublished Statistics. File 474-OV-93. “Respuesta a la información solicitada por la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 3420-D92.” Unpublished. File 605-PE-93. “Respuesta enviada por el Ministerio de rel aciones exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, relacionada con la Co municación 1383-S-92.” Unpublished. File 843-PE-95. “Respuesta a la Comunicación 1408-S-93.” Unpublished. File 1163-OV-95. “Respuesta a la Resolución 5793-D-95.” Unpublished. Argentine House of Representatives Honorable Cámara de Diputados 2004 “Reglamento de la Honorable Cáma ra de Diputados de la Nación.” . Accessed Dec 8 2004. Files from the House of Representatives Cited 638-D-83. 1983 “Gutierrez and Altamirano: Radicación de finitiva de extranjeros de países limítrofes.” Trámite Parlamentario, 29. 900-D-83. 1983 “Niederhausern: Proyecto de Ley de regist ro de radicación definitiva de nativos de países Latinoamericanos en situ ación migratoria irregular. Trámite Parlamentario, 44. 1339-D-84. 1984 “Blanco: Creación de polos de desarrollo de Formosa, Jujuy, San Luis y Rio Negro, “ Trámite Parlamentario, 58. 503-D-85.

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314 1985 “Sigal and others: Síndrome de In munodeficiencia adquirida, exámenes prenupciales, cuestiones conexas,” Trámite Parlamentario, 122. 1590-D-85. 1985 “Niederhausern: Proyecto de Ley de regist ro de radicación definitiva de nativos de países Latinoamericanos en s ituación migrator ia irregular, Trámite Parlamentario, 50. 3142-D-85. 1985 “Rodriguez: Pedido de Informes sobre i ngreso y permanencia de extranjeros en el territorio nacional,” Trámite Parlamentario, 101. 3629-D-85. 1985 “Conte and Auyero: Pedido de informes : política que instrumenta la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones,” Trámite Parlamentario, 122. 4549-D-85 1985 “Rabanaque and others: Proyecto de Decl aración solicitando al Po der Ejecutivo deje sin efecto la Resolución 2340/85,” Trámite Parlamentario, 162. 2486-D-86. 1986 “García: Pedido de Informes sobre C onvenio con la Unión Soviética para la inmigración de ciudadanos soviéticos hebreos,” Trámite Parlamentario, 90. 2882-D-86. 1986 “Massei and others: Proyecto de Declar ación solicitando al Poder Ejecutivo sin efecto la Resolución 2340/85,” Trámite Parlamentario, 107. 2876-D-86. 1986 “Socchi and others: Modificar la Ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigración,” Trámite Parlamentario, 107. 3802-D-86. 1986 “Auyero and Conte: Proyecto de Ley de otorgamiento de radicación definitiva a todos los extranjeros lim ítrofes que la soliciten,” Trámite Parlamentario, 159. 2878-D-87. 1987 “Alzogaray: Pedido de Informes de suspen sión de otorgamiento de otorgamiento de permisos para entrar en nuestro país a los ciudadanos de la Republica China en Taiwán,” Trámite Parlamentario, 105. 195-D-88. 1988 “Díaz Bancalari: Pedido de informes: inmi gración ilegal de Asiáticos a Argentina,” Trámite Parlamentario , 4.

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315 407-D-88. 1988 “Frappiano and Dalmau: Pedido de informes: sumario criminal instruido ante el Juzgado Federal de la Ciudad de Formosa a personal de la delegación,” Trámite Parlamentario, 11. 642-D-88. 1988 “Gonzalez: Pedido de informes sobre i rregularidades cometidas en la delegación Formosa de…,” Trámite Parlamentario, 18. 1470-D-88. 1988 “Salduna: Cruce de personas o vehículo s por motivos turísticos en los pasos fronterizos entre la Republica Arge ntina y cualquier país limítrofe,” Trámite Parlamentario, 54. 3594-D-88. 1988 “Gallo: Pedido de informes sobre el ingr eso al país de presuntos portadores de SIDA,” Trámite Parlamentario, 150. 0048-PE-89 1989 “Mensaje 1298 y proyecto de ley: Constitución enmendada del Comité Internacional para las Migraciones…,” Trámite Parlamentario, 150. 1649-D-89. 1989 “Avila Gallo: Pedido de informes: Di rección Nacional de Migraciones sobre irregularidades en el ingreso y asentamien to de ciudadanos Bolivianos y de origen Asiático,” Trámite Parlamentario , 94 . 2228-D-89. 1989 “Avila Gallo: Pedido de Informes sobre incumplimiento de proyectos que dieron base para autorizar asentamientos de inmigrantes de origen Asiático,” Trámite Parlamentario, 125. 2233-D-89. 1989 “Clerici: Pedido de Informes sobre cont rol llevado a cabo por la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones respecto de los extranjeros que ingresan al país como turistas en la zona Austral,” Trámite Parlamentario, 126. 41-PE-90. 1990 “Mensaje 1879 y Proyecto de ley: Modific ación de la ley 22439 sobre facultades de la Dirección Naciona l de Migraciones,” Trámite Parlamentario, 112. 6298-D-90. 1990 “Gentile and others: Pedido de Informes s obre servicios y gastos en las oficinas del interior del país.” Trámite Parlamentario, 248.

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316 4564-D-91. 1991 “Bischoff: Pedido de Informes sobre las políticas y planes de inmigración,” Trámite Parlamentario, 187. 4844-D-91. 1991 “Molinas and others, Pedido de Informes s obre el ofrecimiento del Presidente de la Nación ante el Parlamento Europeo de reci bir trescientos mil ciudadanos de Europa del este en nuestro país, Trámite Parlamentario, 206. 4854-D-91. 1991 “Marelli and others: Pedido de Inform es sobre estudio de factibilidad y conveniencia realizados para radicar en territorio Argentino inmigrantes provenientes de Europa,” Trámite Parlamentario, 206. 4983-D-91. 1991 “Gracia de Novelli and others: Pedido de Informes sobre política poblacional en relación a anunciar inmigración de personas provenientes de Europa Central…,” Trámite Parlamentario, 212. 5118-D-91. 1991 “Ortiz Pellegrini: Pedido de Informes s obre el ingreso al país de inmigrantes provenientes del Este Europeo,” Trámite Parlamentario, 218. 0708-D-92. 1992 “Orgaz and Segui: Pedido de Informes s obre declaraciones de l ex Director de Migraciones Sr. Gustavo Druetta sobre la existencia de una organización clandestina para la tr amitación de pasaportes,” Trámite Parlamentario, 17. 1303-D-92. 1992 “Cavallari and Iglesias: Pedido de Informes sobre diversas cues tiones de la política migratoria del gobierno nacional,” Trámite Parlamentario, 34. 2226-D-92. 1992 “Raimundi and others: Pedido de Informes s obre el traslado de su puesto de trabajo de inspector Carlos Russo,” Trámite Parlamentario, 66. 3150-D-92. 1992 “De Nardo and Ferreyra: Proyecto de Le y modificaciones a la Ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigracion 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 98. 3420-D-92. 1992 “Espeche and others: Pedido de Informes sobre los lineamientos de la politica inmigratoria con relación al proyectado programa para…,” Trámite Parlamentario, 106.

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317 4213-D-92. 1992 “Bischoff and others: Proyecto de Ley: Cr eación del servicio administrativo de la Dirección Nacional de Población y Migrac ión del Ministerio del Interior,” Trámite Parlamentario, 149. 5401-D-92. 1992 “Bericua and Galvan: Pedido de Informes sobre los beneficios que aportara para nuestro país el denominado programa ope rativo para las migraciones de Europa Central y países del Este. Trámite Parlamentario, 215. 5453-D-92. 1992 “Golpe Montiel: Pedido de Informes sobre la existencia de un programa operativo para las migraciones de Europa Central y países del Este,” Trámite Parlamentario, 217. 6014-D-92. 1992 “Toto: Proyecto de Ley de Creación del Consejo Federal de Actividades Migratorias,” Trámite Parlamentario, 240. 0006-D-93. 1993 “Salusso: Proyecto de Ley modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 1. 0616-D-93. 1993 “Branda and Parada: Proyecto de Ley modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 16. 2133-D-93. 1993 “Vicchi and others: Proyecto de Ley aplicac ión de una tasa retributiva de servicios extraordinarios al tránsito vecinal y de turistas,” Trámite Parlamentario, 64. 2959-D-93. 1993 “Castillo and others: Pr oyecto de Ley sobre régime n para realizar tareas remuneradas en el territorio de la nación y en aeronaves,” Trámite Parlamentario, 97. 2999-D-93. 1993 “Parada and Barbera: Pedido de Informes sobre la administ ración de recursos financieros de la Dirección General de Migraciones,” Trámite Parlamentario, 99. 4449-D-93. 1993 “Arguello: Proyecto de Ley modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 177.

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318 4554-D-93. 1993 “Molinas and others: Proyecto de Le y de derogación del Decreto 2771/93,” Trámite Parlamentario, 192. 4962-D-93. 1993 “Di Tulio and others: Pedido de Inform es sobre el ingreso de inmigrantes provenientes de países limítrofes,” Trámite Parlamentario, 211. 5114-D-93. 1993 “Ortiz Maldonado and others: Proyect o de Ley modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 216. 1082-D-94. 1994 “Michitte: Pedido de Informes sobre el ingreso de inmigrantes provenientes de países limítrofes a la provincia de Misiones.” Trámite Parlamentario, 20. 1523-D-94. 1994 “Golpe and others: Proyecto de Ley modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 28. 2134-D-94. 1994 “Drisaldi: Proyecto de Ley sobre modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 45. 2432-D-94. 1994 “Pernasetti and others: Pedido de Informes sobre el control del ingreso y el egreso de personas a nuestro país,” Trámite Parlamentario, 60. 5611-D-94. 1994 “Muñoz and Golpe Montiel: Proyecto de Ley de Migraciones y Extranjería,” Trámite Parlamentario, 166. 5793-D-94. 1994 “Muñoz: Pedido de Informes sobre los ope rativos realizados por la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones y la Dirección General Impositiva,” Trámite Parlamentario, 186. 5794-D-94. 1994 “Muñoz: Pedido de Informes sobre los motivos que llevaron a la intervención de la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones,” Trámite Parlamentario, 186. 5827-D-94. 1994 “Bullrich and others: Proyecto de Ley sobr e régimen de expulsión de extranjeros del país,” Trámite Parlamentario, 187.

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319 0175-D-95. 1995 “Machado: Pedido de Informes sobre el servicio de información telefónica para tramites de regulari zación migratoria…” Trámite Parlamentario, 4. 0654-D-95. 1995 “Ortiz Maldonado: Proyecto de Ley modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 15. 0691-D-95. 1995 “Koth and Galante: Pedido de Informe sobre el arancelamiento de las llamadas telefónicas realizadas para requerir info rmación de la radicación de extranjeros,” Trámite Parlamentario, 15. 0831-D-95. 1995 “Toto: Creación del Consejo Federa l de Actividades Migratorias,” Trámite Parlamentario, 18. 1792-D-95. 1995 “Molinas and others: Pedido de Inform es sobre las instrucciones impartidas a puestos fronterizos sobre el ingreso de turist as en el país por pa rte de la Dirección Nacional Migraciones,” Trámite Parlamentario, 90. 3128-D-95. 1995 “Arguello: Proyecto de Ley de modificaciones a la Ley 22439,” Trámite Parlamentario, 104. 3341-D-95. 1995 “Macedo: Proyecto de Ley Régi men General de Migraciones,” Trámite Parlamentario, 112. 3300-D-95. 1995 “Toto and others: Proyecto de Ley Régimen General de Población y Migraciones,” Trámite Parlamentario, 111. 5912-D-95. 1995 “Cafiero and others: Proyecto de Ley de Amnistía amplia y gratuita para inmigrantes indocumentados,” Trámite Parlamentario, 243. Argentine Senate Honorable Camara de Senadores de la Nacion. 2003. “Reglamento de la Honorable Cámara de Senadores” (text according to Resolution 1388/02). . Accessed 2004 May 8.

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320 Files from the Argentine Senate Cited 137-S-86. 1986 “Saadi: Proyecto de Declaracion de derogación de Resolución 2340/85,” Diario de Asunto Entrados, 16. 161-S-89. 1989 “Mensaje y proyecto de ley derogando el Decreto 2457/63 (normas para el ingreso de extranjeros provenientes de países comunistas), ratificado por leyes 16478 y 22180, Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 53. 234-S-90. 1990 “Saadi de Dentone: Proyecto de comunicaci ón solicitando informes sobre diversos aspectos relacionados con la aplicación de la ley…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 31. 362-PE-90. 1990 “Mensaje y proyecto de ley aprobando el convenio entre la Republica Argentina y la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 55. 1083-S-90. 1990 “Losada y otros: Proyecto de resoluci ón invitando a los señores Ministros de Economía e Interior a concurri r a esta honorable cámara…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 147. 43-CD-91. 1991 “Proyecto de ley en revisión modificando el articulo 93 de la Ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigr ación en relación a la delegación de funciones…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 59. 71-S-92. 1992 “Lafferriere: Proyecto de comunicación solicitando informes acerca de las normas vigentes para extender permisos de re sidencia y pasaporte s a extranjeros,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 55. 193-S-92. 1992 “Romero Feris: Proyecto de comunicación solicitando informes acerca otorgamiento de visa y autorizaciones de residencia te mporaria por parte de la Dirección de Asuntos Consulares de la Chancillería…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 29. 1383-S-92. 1992 “Romero Feris: Proyecto de comuni cación solicitando informes acerca de la radicación de inmigrantes proveni entes de Europa Oriental,” Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, July 28 1993, pp. 1991-1992.

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321 1587-S-92. 1992 “Romero Feris: Proyecto de comunicación solicitando informes sobre el control de migraciones,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 237. 63-CD-93. 1993 “Proyecto de ley en revisión modificando la ley 22439 en lo que respecta a limitar el derecho de permanencia a infractores a leyes laborales, provisionales e impositivas.” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 141. 66-CD-93. 1993 “De Nardo: Proyecto de le y en revisión modificando el art 102 de la ley 22439, en lo que respecta a la admisión de alum nos extranjeros en establecimientos educativos.” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 141. 744-PE-93. 1993 “Presidencia de la Nación, Subsecretaria General, remite copia Mensaje 241/94 y proyecto de ley…,” Trámite Parlamentario , 206. 749-S-93. 1993 “Solana: Proyecto de comunicación soli citando informes sobre el ingreso de ciudadanos Brasileños a nuestro país…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 80. 1408-D-93. 1993 “Massot: Proyecto de comunicación solici tando informes sobre la ocupación de mano de obra Brasileña por la empresa Telecom,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 159. 1692-S-93. 1993 “Rivas: Proyecto de comunicación solicitan do informes acerca de la legalización de extranjeros,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 193. 1966-S-93. 1993 “Solana: Proyecto de comunicación soli citando informes acerca del estado de procesamiento en que se encuentran los datos del último censo…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 215. 1967-S-93. 1993 “Solana: Proyecto de comunicación so licitando informes acerca del régimen extraordinario de regula rización inmigratoria…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 215. 27-CD-94. 1994 “Proyecto de ley en revisión modificando la ley de migraciones 22439 respecto de la admisión de discapacitados y a reformar el régimen económico,” Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Nov 11 1994, 408889.

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322 77-CD-94. 1994 “Proyecto de ley en revisión sustituye ndo el art. 95 de la ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigración 22439,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados , 105. 341-S-95. 1995 “Solana: Proyecto de comunicación solicitando informes sobre política inmigratoria,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 26. 745-S-95. 1995 “Romero Feris: Proyecto de comuni cación solicitando informes acerca de las medidas implementadas por la dirección de Población y migraciones respecto al ingreso de extranjeros al país,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 61. 1951-S-95. 1995 “Romero Feris: Proyecto de declaraci ón solicitando informes sobre estimaciones oficiales que situarían en 800,000…,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 162. 1979-S-95. 1995 “Solana: Proyecto de comunicación soli citando informes sobre los inmigrantes limítrofes residentes en el país y otras cuestiones conexas,” Diario de Asuntos Entrados, 164. Interviews Alfonso, Adriana, former Director of Legal Affairs of the Immigration Agency. Interview with the author July 14 2002. Aruj, Roberto, researcher. Interv iew with the author July 10 2002. Bogado Poisson, Luis. Adviser International Organization fo r Migration. Interview with the author May 27 2004. Cafiero, Antonio, current Senator and Pres ident of the Committee on Population and Human Developemnt of the Argentine Sena te. Interview with the author July 11 2004. Chausovsky, Gabriel, Director of the Gradua te Degree in Immigration Law (Curso de Especialización en Derecho de Extranjería), Universidad del Litoral. Interview with the Author May 16 2003. Father Fabio, in charge of Pastoral Comm ission for Migration, Buenos Aires Archbishop. Interview with the au thor, July 28 2001. Gasparri, Mario, Adviser Confer eracion General del Trabajo. Interview with the author December 19, 2002.

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323 Giustiniani, Ruben, current Senator and form er President of the Population and Human Resources Committee of the Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003). Interview with the author May 26 2004. Gris, Ildo, in charge of the Catholic Committ ee for Migration (Comis ión Católica para las Migraciones). Interview w ith the author July 26 2001. Gurrieri, Jorge, former Director of the Im migration Agency (1993-1995). Interviews with the author July 15 2002 and May 12 2004. Huayre, Gustavo, member of the Consulting Counsel of the Peruvian Consulate in Argentina. Interview with the author May 10 2004. Iglesias, Evaristo, former Director of th e Immigration Agency (1983-1987). Interview with the author March 22 2003. Lepore, Silvia, former Adviser to the Dir ector of the Immigration Agency (1983-1987). Interview with the author May 24 2003. Marmora, Lelio, in charge of the Internati onal Organization for Migration’s office in Argentina (1995-2002). Interview wi th the author July 21 2001. Oteiza, Enrique. President of National In stitute against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism. Interview with the author June 14 2004. Rocca, Commandant of Gendarmeria Nacional, in charge of the Border Department (1998-present). Interviews with the author June 26 2004 and July 16 2004. Rodriguez Onetto, Sergio, former Direct or of the Immigration Agency (1987-1989). Interview with the author June 2 2003. Santillo, Mario, Director of the Latin American Center fo r Migration Studies (CEMLA). Interview with the author, July 12 2001. Vecino, Juan Manuel. Adviser to the Nati onal Institute against Discrimination (19992001), Xenophobia and Racism. Intervie w with the author, July 15 2001.

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324 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Julia Albarracin is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Political Scien ce at the University of Florida. Previously, she received a degree in Law from Universidad Nacional de La Plata (Argentina) and a Master in Intern ational Business from the Universidad de Belgrano (Argentina) and Ecole Nationale des Pontes et Chaussees (France). Her dissertation explores the economic, ethnic, international and institutional factors determining Argentine immigration policie s (1983-2003). Her dissertation research received support from the Tinker Foundation, the University of FloridaÂ’s College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and the Nati onal Science FoundationÂ’s Americas Program.