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Milo Hascall and the Suppression of Democratic Newspapers in Civil War Indiana

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Milo Hascall and the Suppression of Democratic Newspapers in Civil War Indiana
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BULLA, DAVID WILLIAMS
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2008

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Civil wars ( jstor )
Counties ( jstor )
Freedom of the press ( jstor )
Governors ( jstor )
Journalism ( jstor )
News media ( jstor )
Newspapers ( jstor )
Political parties ( jstor )
Slavery ( jstor )
War ( jstor )

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Copyright David Williams Bulla. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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8/31/2009
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439097281 ( OCLC )

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MILO HASCALL AND THE SUPPRESSION OF DEMOCRATIC NEWSPAPERS IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA By DAVID WILLIAMS BULLA A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2004

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank several people for pushing me through my graduate years toward completion of this project, which began when I saw Ken Burns’ film “The Civil War” in the early 1990s and picked up speed a few years later with my reading of David Herbert Donald’s Lincoln. I will start my acknowledgements with Mark L’Esperance, education professor at East Carolina University who encouraged me to chase the goal of pursuing a doctoral degree in 1991 when we served as assistant basketball coaches at James B. Dudley High School in Greensboro, North Carolina. Sometime after that, my cousin Maggie Shimon, a resident of New Orleans, Louisiana, provided a major dose of inspiration, insisting I would succeed in my graduate school endeavors. Another person who encouraged me in my graduate studies was Dr. Kay Phillips of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would also like to thank three of my former editors for their contributions to my career: Irwin Smallwood, Wilt Browning, and Allen H. Johnson. At Indiana University, where I received my master’s degree in journalism, I would like to thank David Weaver for turning me in the right direction on this project. Dr. Weaver pointed me toward two writers whose scholarship would prove so valuable to this study, Fredrick Seaton Siebert and Jeffrey A. Smith. Also at Indiana, I was fortunate enough to come under the influence of several professors, including Jack Dvorak, Carol Polsgrove, Edward Gubar, Michael Evans, Andy Rojecki (now at the University of Illinois at Chicago), and Cleve Wilhoit. Three scholars whose work originated at IU also ii

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have been critical to the development of this study: Jon Paul Dilts, Craig D. Tenney, and Stephen E. Towne. They provided the backbone for my historical analysis and interpretation of press suppression in the Hoosier State during the Civil War. Towne’s continued exhaustive research on the press in Civil War Indiana has made my interpretation far less tenuous than it would have been otherwise. I want to also mention the work of John W. Miller, whose 1982 bibliography of Indiana newspapers provided a wealth of details for my study. Emma Lou Thornbrough’s cultural study of Indiana from 1850-1880 and Gilbert R. Tredway’s examination of Democratic opposition to Lincoln in Indiana were also essential to my study. I would also like to thank Brian Hartz and Ivan Eikenberry of Bloomington for housing me while I did research in Indiana. At the University of Florida, I was very fortunate to have my first class with Leonard Tipton, who stimulated my interest in communication ideas and theory. I would also like to thank my teaching mentor, Julie E. Dodd, who, along with Dr. Wilhoit at Indiana, helped me sharpen my teaching skills. I would also like to thank Gregory A. Borchard, journalism professor at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas. Dr. Borchard and I served under Dr. Dodd as teaching assistants at UF, and we have shared our thoughts about Civil War journalism history and teaching with many long conversations. He has also been a careful reader of my research. Thanks also to Rob Marino, Jody Hedge, and the UF Editorial Office for all of their help. This paper would not be possible without the invaluable assistance of my committee, led by Bernell Tripp, who has helped shape it on every step of its journey toward completion. Dr. Tripp insisted all along that this be a paper that based on what I was seeing and reading as a researcher, not on preconceived notions from secondary iii

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sources. I have been a very lucky novice scholar to be afforded that level of freedom. Dr. Bertram Wyatt-Brown has been a most exacting editor and has constantly reminded me of the war’s enormous social, political, and military complexity. The mind and work of Wyatt-Brown is a treasure not only for the University of Florida but also for U.S. historical scholarship. Dr. Meg Lamme has been a sounding board for a wide range of ideas on this topic, especially where this paper fits into nineteenth-century mass communication history, what it ultimately means to the world of communications history scholarship, and what it means to the vein of study for my career. She has constantly challenged me to make connections to the larger body of U.S. journalism history scholarship. Dr. Marilyn Roberts recruited me to the University of Florida, and I am indebted to her for my career at UF. I appreciate all he guidance she has given me. The best part of this research has been the reading of primary documents. I would like to thank the staffs at the following libraries and archives: Indiana State Library in Indianapolis; Indiana Commission on Public Records, Indiana State Archives in Indianapolis; Allen County Library in Fort Wayne; Smathers Library at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida; Library of Congress; Elkhart County, Indiana, Historical Society; Goshen, Indiana, Public Library; Marshall County, Indiana, Historical Society; Dayton, Ohio, Public Library; Chicago Historical Society; Indiana University at Bloomington Main Library, the Lilly Library, and the School of Journalism Library; the Roux Library at Florida Southern College; the Center for Archival Collections at Jerome Library, Bowling Green State University; Main Library, University of Central Florida in Orlando; and the Lincoln Bookstore in Chicago. iv

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I want to thank my mother, Rebecca Williams Bulla, for providing me with the love to see this project through to its completion; my sister Catherine Bulla Rachide, for constantly reminding me that I would see this project to the end and become a college professor one day; my friend Joseph D. Pearlman for helping keep things in perspective; and my wife, Kalpana Ramgopal, for keeping me on track and focused when I wanted to branch out and study other communication phenomena. Kalpana is a thorough editor, and she constantly has encouraged me to “Cut, cut, cut” and to tell her what a journalist today can learn from Civil War press suppression. She also refused to let me procrastinate. v

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..................................................................................................ii LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................ix ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 Statement of Purpose..................................................................................................13 Significance of Historical Study.................................................................................15 Literature Review.......................................................................................................20 Methodology...............................................................................................................38 Structure of Dissertation.............................................................................................44 Implications................................................................................................................45 Notes...........................................................................................................................48 2 MILO HASCALL’S WORLD: INDIANA IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA...................58 Goshen Attorney.........................................................................................................60 Indiana Society at Mid-Century..................................................................................64 “One Country, One Constitution, One Destiny”........................................................67 Slavery and Temperance.............................................................................................70 Religious Life in the 1850s and 1860s.......................................................................74 Indiana’s Politics in the 1850s and 1860s...................................................................76 Indiana’s Democrats Prefer to Compromise with the South......................................78 Attitudes Toward Slavery...........................................................................................86 The Election of 1860..................................................................................................91 Hascall: A Morton Man..............................................................................................96 Notes.........................................................................................................................100 3 LEGAL, THEORETIC CONTEXT OF FREE PRESS IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA.................................................................................................................109 Borrowing From the British......................................................................................111 Adams’ Sedition Act.................................................................................................114 The Sedition Act.......................................................................................................116 vi

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Polk and the Press.....................................................................................................121 The Constitution and the Press.................................................................................125 The Hypotheses of Siebert and Stevens....................................................................130 Siebert on Government-Press Relations during War................................................135 Freedom of the Press in a Democracy......................................................................137 Notes.........................................................................................................................142 4 JOURNALISM IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA............................................................150 The Ideology of the Transition Party-Personal Press in Indiana..............................156 Home Rule and Race................................................................................................162 Political Patronage and the Party-Personal Press in Indiana....................................166 Suppression in the North..........................................................................................177 Leading Editors in Indiana........................................................................................181 Ownership Patterns: An Effect of Suppression........................................................185 Suppression More Likely in Northern Indiana.........................................................188 Democratic Editors’ Philosophy...............................................................................190 Notes.........................................................................................................................192 5 UNIONISM AND EMANCIPATION IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA........................200 Pro-War Sentiment...................................................................................................203 Emancipation Proclaims End of Unity in Indiana....................................................207 Framing Emancipation..............................................................................................218 Disaffection for the War...........................................................................................219 Framing Power and Freedom....................................................................................224 “Harmless Thunder”.................................................................................................230 Notes.........................................................................................................................238 6 MILO SMITH HASCALL, HIS CIVIL WAR CAREER, AND HIS CONFRONTATION WITH INDIANA’S DEMOCRATIC PRESS.......................245 Hascall in the Civil War...........................................................................................246 Commander of the District of Indiana......................................................................250 Generals’ Orders.......................................................................................................255 Hascall and a New York Editor................................................................................260 Cessation of Normal Politics....................................................................................265 Notes.........................................................................................................................270 7 PRESS RESPONSES TO SUPPRESSION IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA................277 Vallandigham Trial...................................................................................................278 Hoosier Republican Editors Defend Hascall............................................................282 The Hascall-Edgerton Dialogue...............................................................................287 A Change in Public Opinion.....................................................................................291 Protecting Soldiers....................................................................................................301 The Higher Ground...................................................................................................304 vii

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Notes.........................................................................................................................307 8 AFTERMATH OF PRESS OFFICIAL SUPPRESSION IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA.................................................................................................................314 Storey Raises a Little Hell........................................................................................316 Response to the Suppression of the Chicago Times.................................................319 Dayton, Ohio, Press War..........................................................................................321 Knocking on Freedom’s Door: New York Journalists’ Resolutions........................326 General Meredith and the Republican Press.............................................................329 Lincoln and Suppression...........................................................................................333 Notes.........................................................................................................................336 9 CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................343 The Spirit of Free Press............................................................................................343 Hascall the Good Soldier..........................................................................................349 Transition from Party-Personal to Independent-Commercial Press.........................353 Long-Term Effect of Suppression............................................................................356 Further Study on Press Suppression in the Midwest during Civil War....................358 Notes.........................................................................................................................360 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................363 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................381 viii

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LIST OF TABLES Table page 1-1 Status of newspapers in cities where suppression occurred.....................................47 2-1 Newspaper ownership patterns, 1861 to 1865.......................................................191 3-1 Key dates in the life of Milo Smith Hascall...........................................................268 ix

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE SUPPRESSION OF DEMOCRATIC NEWSPAPERS IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA By David Williams Bulla August 2004 Chair: Bernell Tripp Major Department: Mass Communication This dissertation is a policy case study that examines the effect of official suppression on the Democratic press in Indiana during the spring of 1863. Indiana’s Democratic newpspaper editors were subject to General Order No. 9, which proclaimed that all newspaper editors and public speakers that encouraged resistance to the draft or any other war measure would be treated as traitors. The order was made by Brigadier General Milo Smith Hascall, commander of the District of Indiana, who was amplifying General Order No. 38 of Major General Ambrose Everts Burnside, the commander of the Department of the Ohio. Burnside’s order declared that criticism of the president and the war effort was tantamount to “declaring sympathies with the enemy.” As a result of Hascall’s edict, eleven Democratic editors in Indiana faced suspension of their newspapers. Throughout the war in Indiana, Union soldiers and/or Republican activists intimidated other Democratic editors, ransacking their offices and sometimes running them out of business. President Abraham Lincoln, who had suspended the writ of habeas x

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corpus in 1862, claiming presidential prerogatives given by the Constitution at times of invasion or rebellion, had some misgivings along political lines about the intimidation of Democratic newspapers, but let it continue in Indiana for from April 25 to June 6, 1863. Eventually, because of the machinations of Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton, Lincoln’s War Department wired Burnside to relieve Hascall of his command in Indianapolis, thus ending the season of official suppression after only six weeks. Burnside would rein in the Chicago Times and suppress delivery of anti-Lincoln papers and books via the post office, but no government policy would squelch the press in Indiana again. This study looks at this episode in its cultural context, considering political, legal, military, social, and journalistic factors. Primary documents that were analyzed include Indiana newspapers from 1863 and letters and correspondences from the principals involved, including Hascall, Burnside, Lincoln, and Congressman Joseph Ketchum Edgerton, who opposed the press suppression. This inquiry found that Democratic newspapers in majority Republican counties were more likely to face suppression, even if constraints on the Democratic press were more necessary in majority Democratic counties. The study concludes that while a short-term chilling effect occurred in Indiana, the free-press tradition survived in the long run. Although four of the eleven suppressed Democratic newspapers were out of business by April of 1865, all but two of the eleven were in operation by 1875, just as nine of the eleven Republican newspapers in those cities still existed in 1875. xi

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On May 5, 1863, at five o’clock in the morning, Daniel E. “Ed” VanValkenburgh slept in the backroom of Wheeler’s Bank in Plymouth, Indiana, a town twenty-six miles south of South Bend in the north-central region of the nineteenth state. VanValkenburgh, the editor of the Plymouth Weekly Democrat, was awakened by a soldier who broke down the door to his room. Twelve more soldiers found their way into the bank, and their lieutenant asked VanValkenburgh to get dressed. The lieutenant then informed VanValkenburgh that he was being conveyed down the Michigan Road to Indianapolis. There awaited Milo Smith Hascall, a brigadier general and commander of the District of Indiana, a man who had spent most of his adult life in Goshen, which is twenty-six miles northeast of Plymouth. 2 The editor lived in a twenty-nine-year-old town of approximately 1,000 inhabitants that first had a newspaper in 1851. By 1863, Plymouth had two newspapers, one for each major political party. So political were the town’s citizens that newspaper obituaries would include their party affiliation. However, the affiliation was left out of the paper of the opposition party. 3 On April 30, VanValkenburgh had written an editorial in the Weekly Democrat denouncing Hascall, who on April 25 had released General Order No. 9. The order stated that any newspaper or public speaker giving encouragement to those who would resist the Enrollment Act of 1863 “or any other law of Congress passed as a war measure, or that endeavor to bring the war policy of the Government into disrepute” would be treated as a traitor and subject to a military commission. 4 Officially, 1

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2 newspapers editors faced the prospect of suppression if Hascall deemed content in their papers to be disloyal. In response to the general order, VanValkenburgh wrote: “Brig. Gen. Hascall is a donkey, an unmitigated, unqualified donkey, and his bray is long, loud and harmless – merely offensive to the ear, merely tends to create a temporary irritation Will Brig. Gen. Hascall please inform us why the citizens of Illinois and Kentucky, sister States, are permitted to express their minds freely, and the citizens of Indiana alone selected for this abject submission.” 5 Hascall, who had served as a teacher, county court clerk, and district attorney in Goshen, did not take the name-calling lightly and sent his soldiers to arrest VanValkenburgh as a political prisoner and to suppress the Weekly Democrat. The soldiers transported VanValkenburgh first to Indianapolis and then to Cincinnati, where Major General Ambrose Everts Burnside heard VanValkenburgh’s story. Burnside, who was born in Indiana and who, as commander of the Department of the Ohio, was Hascall’s commanding officer, discharged the editor. Burnside advised the editor “to be more careful in the future as to the manner in which he criticized those in authority.” 6 A week later, VanValkenburgh resumed publication, printing a half-sheet. It included an editorial that stated the Weekly Democrat would have to live with the same rules “imposed upon every journal” in the Department of the Ohio under Burnside’s General Order No. 38. 7 VanValkenburgh did not mention Hascall’s order, which was based on Burnside’s General Order 38 of 13 April 1863, which considered declaring sympathies with or aiding the enemy in any way as treasonous. 8 Hascall’s General Order No. 9 served as a reminder to dissident editors in Indiana that he intended to enforce

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3 Burnside’s Order No. 38, which applied to Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and most of Kentucky. 9 Thus, in the middle of the United States’ bloodiest war and in the middle of the country, while the union and the freedom of the slaves hung in the balance, President Abraham Lincoln and his military subordinates interpreted the primary constitutional right of freedom of the press as being subject to extra-legal constraints. The U.S. Constitution does not say that freedom of the press depends on circumstances, nor does the Indiana Constitution, although the state constitution does include a responsibility-for-abuse clause in the free press section of its bill of rights. 10 At the time of the Civil War, the state supreme court had heard no cases that interpreted the vaguely worded responsibility-for-abuse clause. Based on the policies and actions of Burnside, Hascall by-passed the First Amendment and suspended newspapers in Indiana by invoking the president’s privilege to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during times of extreme political emergency. Under this umbrella, Hascall harassed the Democratic editors of Indiana, including VanValkenburgh, who was jailed. Hascall and Burnside believed that by suspending habeas corpus Lincoln was giving them tacit approval to silence disloyal Democrats in this way. Lincoln never formally gave his generals the power to squelch editors and would only step in to overturn their decisions if he thought what they had done went too far. Meanwhile, Hoosier Democratic editors argued that civilian authority had supremacy over the military because the war was not taking place in Indiana. The Democrats worried about the degree to which their civil rights were being infringed upon. They even worried that democratic processes would be suspended – a legitimate concern

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4 since Burnside would declare martial law in Kentucky in July and only allow “loyal” persons of his choosing to vote while federal soldiers guarded the polls. 11 The pro-Democratic Detroit Free Press, which had a strong influence on the Democratic newspapers of Indiana, supported the war and the Union, but its editor, Henry N. Walker, worried that the absence of freedom of the press in Indiana and elsewhere where suppression was taking place made “the ballot-box a farce” and gave the Republicans an unfair advantage in elections. 12 Republican editors countered that maintaining the Union was more important than maintaining civil rights and the war was only a temporary condition. When peace returned, Republican editors maintained, unfettered expression would too. Of course, that would be in a Union that the Republicans controlled politically. This study focuses on the suppression of Democratic newspapers in Indiana during the spring of 1863. It takes into account legal, political, military, and journalistic factors that resulted in the attempt to silence Democratic editors in the Hoosier State. The major legal issue includes the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which Lincoln interpreted to be within his power during a rebellion, and the matter of whether civilian or military authorities had jurisdiction in the Northern states. Suspending the writ of habeas corpus, something done by both Lincoln and Congress by the spring of 1863, opened the door for suppression of the Democratic press in Indiana. The majority of Northerners silenced by Lincoln and his subordinates were Democrats. In Indiana, there were twelve acts of official suppression during the war, all coming against Democratic newspapers. 13 Hascall was responsible for suppressing eleven Democratic papers, all within six weeks during the spring of 1863. The twelfth act

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5 of suppression occurred in 1862 when the Union Army briefly silenced the editor of the pro-war Democratic newspaper in New Albany, Indiana, for divulging too much information about troop movements, but it allowed him to return to press after he promised to be more circumspect in the future. 14 Because unfettered free expression is essential in a democracy and because there is no evidence to suggest that Hoosier editors in the mid-nineteenth century thought otherwise, press suppression had the potential of giving the Republicans an advantage in elections at a time when the Democrats were making major gains at the ballot box across the state. What agents of the federal government did to the press in Indiana during the war suggests that the Republicans and their military allies had doubts about the efficacy of some democratic processes – including unlimited freedom of the press – in wartime. The two-party system, often lauded as making the North stronger than the South in this war, was seen as impeding the progress of the war by Lincoln and his military subordinates. Debates about war policy or an alternative to war, tinged with political rhetoric, infuriated both Union officers and soldiers, most of whom were volunteers. The political press in Indiana severely tested the flexibility of the First Amendment. In Indiana, journalism was a remnant of the party press era of 1800-30. The editors published four-page newspapers that cost a reader $2 to $3 a year. 15 The content included advertising, fiction, editorials, and news reports, which were interpreted along party lines. 16 These newspapers were not the mass-produced, steam-press penny papers of the nation’s mainly Eastern urban areas. These newspapers were produced on hand presses and had circulations of less than 900. 17

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6 In general, U.S. newspapers were undergoing major changes during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. It was a transitional stage in which the political-personal press was gradually giving way to the penny and professional press. The men and women who produced American newspapers and magazines tended to favor one political cause or party. While some newspapers, led by the New York Times nationally and the Indiana Journal in the Hoosier State, were already searching for a different approach to journalism, less biased and personal, and more dispassionate, most reporters and editors fit into partisan political camps and wrote with an agenda. Democratic reporters and editors tended to downplay victories and overstated defeats. Republicans overstated victories and emphasized the importance of loyalty to the federal government. Overall, there was an increased emphasis on reporting because of the nature of war, with its battles and strategy, and the invention of the telegraph, which caused more and more newspapers to report fresh war news because it could be transmitted far faster than before. 18 At the same time, the newspapers of the Civil War era already were beginning to be dominated by commercial interests. A Civil War newspaper in Indiana, usually four pages in length, contained advertising on all of its pages. 19 Yet the papers of Indiana tended to still be driven more by politics than their counterparts in the East, and the editors of Indiana lived more on the frontier and often had to fend for themselves. It was not unusual for a Hoosier editor to have guns in his newspaper office. 20 While political animosity often was communicated in very personal terms, newspaper owners did not limit themselves to political warfare. They also tried to drive competitors out of business. Indeed, violence against Democratic newspapers was often egged on by Republican

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7 editors hoping to bankrupt their rivals. Republican editors often wished openly that harm might come the editor or building of the Democratic paper in town. The editors of the Republican newspapers in Richmond, Indiana, let it be known that they hoped Richmond Jeffersonian editor James Elder would meet harm. Elder, who took out an insurance policy of $2,000 for his personal protection, was subsequently seriously wounded by a railroad worker who hit the editor on the head with a heavy wrench. 21 Generally, few if any precedents had been established in Indiana for legal restrictions on writing about the military. 22 Statehood came in 1816 – after the Alien and Sedition Acts and the War of 1812 – and anti-abolitionist legislation in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s was not aimed at the nineteenth state. There had been no test of the state’s responsibility-for-abuse clause in the press section of its bill of rights. Furthermore, there had been very few court cases involving newspapers, and less than a handful involving libel. Indiana’s press suppression during the Civil War was not an isolated phenomenon. Editors in Maryland or Missouri, pro-slave states that stayed in the union, faced suppression too, as did editors in New York, Oregon, and California. 23 Most scholarly research, though, focuses on New York editors, who took the greatest liberties to criticize Lincoln’s war and his war measures. There are only a few case studies of Midwestern suppression. These include the incarceration of Dubuque, Iowa, Herald editor Dennis A. Mahony, the suppression of Wilbur F. Storey’s Chicago Times, mob intimidation of the Columbus, Ohio, Crisis, and the military commission trial, conviction, and banishment of Democratic maverick Clement L. Vallandigham, a former congressman and newspaper

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8 editor who still contributed to the interpretive writing for the Democratic paper in Dayton, Ohio. 24 The suppression of Democratic newspapers in Indiana by Hascall, commander of the District of Indiana, had a temporary chilling effect on political press of the nineteenth state, and it, combined with other factors, led to the end of partisan journalism in Indiana in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Of the eleven Democratic newspapers that Hascall suppressed during the war, seven survived and remained in business at the end of the war. Three of the Democratic papers changed their names after suppression. The Franklin Democratic Herald closed down in 1863 after it was destroyed for the second time during the war by Union troops and never re-opened. 25 Ten of the eleven Democratic newspapers had Republican counterparts in their towns, and all ten of those Republican papers remained in business at the end of the war. Two Republican changed their names. (See Table 1 below.) The Hascall incident was part of a broader official attempt to suppress Democratic newspapers in the North during the Civil War, and the depth of that suppression has been underplayed in most histories of Civil War journalism. Unlike Maryland and Missouri, Indiana was not a slave state, and most of its Democratic editors supported the union, though not emancipation. 26 The fact that Hascall went after editors of newspapers in the northern two-thirds of the state, most of them near his home of Goshen, suggests he felt confident he could intimidate the Democratic editors in places like Plymouth, South Bend, and Warsaw because he was intimate with the Republican political leaders in these towns, men who owned or significantly influenced pro-Union newspapers. The brigadier general ignored

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9 the Democratic editors in the area’s largest city, Fort Wayne, precisely because he knew the Democrats were stronger there and the press was more sophisticated in Allen County. He also did not threaten editors in Indianapolis, which was split between Republicans, led by Governor Oliver P. Morton, and the Democrats, who had the majority in the legislature and a powerful paper in the Indiana State Sentinel. Hascall also did not suppress Democratic editors in the southern counties, where he had less intelligence and where pro-South feelings were more prevalent. In essence, the closer a county was to losing its Republican majority in political offices, the less likely occurrence of suppression there. On the legal side, Civil War suppression would mark the last time in U.S. history when military leaders appointed by the leaders of one political party officially suppressed editors representing another party. In the future, attempts to control the press during wartime would come in other ways. After the Supreme Court ruled against the suspension of habeas corpus in 1866, the executive branch left editors alone. Instead, presidents resorted to controlling the flow of information. Major free-expression cases – Schenck v. U.S. and Abrams v. U.S. – popped up after the passing of the Sedition Act of 1918. 27 Using the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gitlow (1925) that there would be a universal understanding of free press and free speech, instead of state-by-state interpretation. Thus, in the twentieth century and beyond, an interpretation of Indiana’s responsibility-for-abuse clause would become moot. The next time the writ of habeas corpus was effectively suspended would be during World War II when Japanese Americans were rounded up and placed in concentration camps. Those Japanese Americans lost all of their civil rights, and when they tried to publish

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10 camp newspapers, they were subject to censorship. During World War II, the media in general chose to limit its critique of war policy. Self-censorship was seen as more desirable than government regulation. Hascall played a major part in increased suppression of the Democratic press in the Civil War, as part of a pattern of intimidation by the military. As scholar Stephen E. Towne of Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis noted in a 2003 study, “many more incidents [of violence and intimidation against the Democratic press] have been completely overlooked” by previous studies. 28 In a 1986 study, Jon Paul Dilts of Indiana University found a total of twenty-nine episodes of “threats or actions” against the Democratic press in Civil War Indiana. 29 Towne’s 2003 study found sixty-nine incidents of intimidation or suppression against Democratic newspapers and another twenty-two against Republican newspaper. 30 Towne found twenty-three cases of violent intimidation of Democratic newspapers by federal troops or veterans. Clearly, Hascall’s edict created an atmosphere in which violence and intimidation against Democratic newspapers in Indiana during the war was an acceptable practice – behavior that runs counter to both the Indiana and U.S. free press tradition but is not unheard of during wartime. The suppression of Democratic newspapers in Civil War Indiana was simultaneous to the loss of long-held power by the Democratic Party in the state. The Democrat’s decline moved the state away from the transitional political-personal press era. This study maintains that the Democratic editors became less partisan after the war because independence made free-press principles easier to assert in times of political turmoil. Indiana’s Democratic party was in disarray after the war, so many editors decided to sell.

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11 Thomas Tigar of the Fort Wayne Sentinel was representative of this group. Tigar had run the Sentinel for twenty-three years. Instead of continuing a paper whose party openly opposed emancipation, Tigar retired and took up such civic activities as being a member of the school board, volunteering for the fire department, and working on the board of health. 31 After the war, independence was not yet the norm in Indiana journalism. Even the few Indiana editors who claimed to be independent usually were not. “It was a time when a editor either sought political office himself or played a major role in deciding who did,” observed Harry J. Maihafer. 32 The census of 1860 counted 4,051 periodicals in the U.S., with 186 in Indiana, and the overwhelming majority of newspaper editors claimed political allegiance. 33 After the Civil War, something happened because the partisanship began to wane. Gradually, editors put less emphasis on the political-interpretative function of the press and put more on the informative function, both the news and advertising role. This did not happen instantaneously in April of 1865. It was a gradual process. Some of the Democratic papers in Indiana went out of business after they were suppressed or intimidated. Other Democratic papers went out of business because the economy in Indiana was fairly sour during the war, Many other Democratic papers stayed in business. Of those, most chose to turn down the volume and be less vituperative against Lincoln and Hascall’s General Order No. 9, especially after news that VanValkenburgh had been arrested and sent to Cincinnati circulated around the state. William David Sloan, a journalism historian, has noted the time after the Civil War was a chaotic one for the U.S. press. Sloan says “the successful newspapers trimmed

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12 [emphasis Sloan’s] their political sails, strengthened their financial base through advertising, and changed their news to ride through the swirling, changing times.” 34 In general, all of the editors in Indiana became more dependent on advertising, and the emphasis on war news, especially on who died and who won battles, opened eyes to the informative function of the press. Switching from an interpretive to an informative function meant that editors needed to claim political independence. In turn, political independence would make criticism of the government in times of crisis more acceptable to society because it would not be seen as merely partisan politics. The Democratic editors learned a lesson: they discovered they could not rely on the editors of the opposition party to defend their First Amendment rights during a time of extreme political crisis. This study does not make the case that these newspaper editors ended the political function, at least not entirely. Rather, over time, the press after the war emphasized the political function less and emphasized other functions more. Consequently, when the next political crisis would come, newspaper editors in Indiana would be in a position to be more united on the principles of the free-press guarantee in the First Amendment and the Indiana Constitution. Journalists continued to struggle with government controls on the press in the twentieth century during extreme political crises, but journalists would be more united in their commitment to freedom of the press. If censorship were to occur, it often would be self-censorship or censorship brokered behind the scenes. The boom of professionalism in the twentieth century fostered this process, which included the development of professional schools of journalism beginning with the University of Missouri in the early

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13 decades of the century. More and more, journalists came to see that they were on the same side in their relationship with government. Statement of Purpose This dissertation looks at the Hascall press suppression incident in depth. It places Indiana press suppression in 1863 into its cultural context. It examines legal, political, military, and journalistic factors that led to Hascall’s General Order No. 9 and the brigadier general’s recall by Lincoln’s Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. It also places Civil War press suppression in its place in U.S. journalism history and looks at it as a phenomenon within the development of the U.S. press. This study offers an interpretation of the state of the First Amendment during the Civil War. It tries to isolate the free-press tradition in the United States up until the time of the war and, therefore, attempts to avoid the present-mindedness that sometimes handicaps studies of freedom of the press. It will show that the free-press tradition survived despite both the itch to suppress by the government and the urge to push the boundaries of reasonable political speech to an extreme by members of a partisan press. Media historians have tended to view suppression of the press as either a necessary evil during times when the stability of government is in jeopardy or as abomination against free-thinking men. What actually occurred in Indiana is somewhere in between these two views of suppression. Because the press suppression under study here occurred during a civil war, drawing all Democratic editors with the same stroke of disloyalty would be inaccurate. Most Democratic editors wanted the Union restored, but they differed in their understanding of how it should be restored. This included some editors who opposed the war and wanted a negotiated peace.

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14 This dissertation also looks at generals Hascall and Burnside and editor VanValkenburgh as men trying to do their jobs, as citizens of a democratic republic during the time of its most extreme political crisis, and as men who thought they were doing what the situation dictated. Thus, this study shows that communication and suppression of communication are inseparable in wartime, and that the principals on both sides are very human actors. In war, journalists will always face problems with access and knowing what limits are placed on what they write. It was the case in the Civil War, and it was also the case in the U.S.-Iraq War, which occurred why this study was taking place. Government officials eternally will think it is best at deciding what limitations ought to be placed on the press, while journalists always think they should determine those limits. In some cases, the two groups can come to a compromise, but that is not always the case. In a society with a free-press tradition, principle calls for the press to make the final determination. Even Abraham Lincoln understood this. Yet power tends to make the call more often than not, and that means that the press will get to make the call only if it develops a level of strength. Over time, experience has shown that the strongest press is a united, professional, and economically sound press. Even the, government will do what it naturally does – it will seek access to and control of information and ideas. Previous studies have attempted to look at press suppression in Indiana in three ways: (1) as part of a broader national picture of the Union Army and the Lincoln administration attempting to control the press during the war under the principle of emergency war powers; (2) as supporting Fredrick Seaton Siebert’s hypothesis about the relationship between government and the press during periods of social and political instability; and (3) as an attempt to show that press suppression and intimidation in the

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15 state during the war was part of a historical pattern of violence against dissenters in the U.S. The present study explains how the journalism of the period impacted suppression and to demonstrate that other studies have tended to underplay the conditions created by the party press. It shows how the party press contributed to Hascall and Burnside’s decision to suppress, and it explicates the defense of suppression by Republican editors and the defense of freedom of the press by Democratic editors. In the end, the study finds that it was paradoxical that a minority party’s newspaper editors contributed to the expansion of the historical area of press freedom even as it advocated policy that stalled the freeing of black men. Significance of Historical Study None of the existing studies on suppression and intimidation of the press in Civil War Indiana fully takes into account the partisan and personal nature of journalism in the state at the time. These inquiries tend to be Developmental or Consensus studies. They attempt to place suppression in Indiana in terms of the development of the press in the state or to place suppression in terms of how it contributed to the Union victory and the destruction of slavery. They do not focus on the ideological war waged between Indiana’s Democratic and Republican editors, an internal struggle that took place parallel to the larger conflict between the two sections of the country. The Developmental studies assume that journalism led politics, when the opposite was the case. The Consensus studies assume that most Hoosier editors wanted a war for union and freedom for the slaves. That was the case for approximately half of the editors in the state. The war for the Union was the primary motive for almost all editors of both parties, but emancipation was only a primary objective for a minority of Republican editors in the state.

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16 Editors of both parties in Indiana were interpreters of events within two major political ideologies: those who favored a new America without slavery and those who favored the pre-war America with its constitutional protection of slavery in the Southern states. Both types of editors were not primarily reporters of the news. Rather, they were commentators who manipulated new information within specific political agenda. This study of press suppression in Indiana works within a broader cultural context, namely the fight over how the country’s major political institutions would continue and how the two major political ideologies in Indiana contended to determine the shape of those institutions. This fight, which was ever evolving, centered on freedom, mainly the freedom of the slaves. Ironically, the Democratic editors, who supported the constitutionally sanctioned right of Southerners to hold slaves, would have their freedom of expression hindered by those Republican editors who wanted freedom for the slaves. The editors of Indiana were political functionaries, and many of them would have waged political war against their opponents no matter the cause. Their jobs were to inform and galvanize voters, to serve as party cheerleaders. This study includes the cultural context of press suppression and tries to isolate Indiana journalism in the war in terms of its meaning within Hoosier society. The context allows the historian to go beyond the surface story of press suppression and focus on the foundation on which the events of the spring of 1863 occurred. As historian Gerald J. Baldasty observed in his study of the press in the Jacksonian era, too many nineteenth-century press studies focus on the “great men” of the newspaper world. A contextual study focuses “on the on the interactions between a variety of social groups.” 35 It describes the social structures and political complexities in which suppression took place,

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17 as well as how and why the communication phenomenon took place. Hoosier newspapers were mouthpieces of their parties and prophets of gloom, doom, and boom. The people of Indiana read them to be informed, swayed, and entertained, and they read them with the same intensity that today’s Americans watch television. Newspapers were an everyday aspect of nineteenth-century Indiana life, as much as churches, trains, and corn. The understanding of freedom of the press held by the various principals in this study represents a large part of the intellectual context that made up nineteenth-century Indiana. Citizens of the state lived mainly in small towns and on farms, and politics was as familiar part of the social landscape as the churches in every town. Hascall was a teacher, attorney, and businessman in Goshen before the war. He had practiced law in Elkhart County and served as a prosecuting attorney and county clerk, both elected positions. His brother, Melvin B. Hascall, owned the Goshen Democrat in the 1840s and again in the 1870s, and his brother-in-law and law partner, Ebenezer Mattoon Chamberlain, served as a Democratic judge, state senator, member of the Indiana house, and a U.S. congressman. The family had been solidly Democratic before Milo and another brother, Amasa N. Hascall, jumped to the Republican Party in the late 1850s. Most Hoosier attorneys had read the state constitution, but placed little emphasis on that part of the bill of rights that dealt with freedom of the press. Article 1, Section 9 of the 1816 Indiana Constitution had a responsibility-for-abuse clause that made each citizen accountable for spoken or written words. Similar wording is found in the 1851 Indiana Constitution. Yet neither the 1816 or 1851 constitution spelled out what abuse meant. That lack of clarity in the state constitution left it to the courts and the legislature to determine what abuse meant and how the state could implement any limitation of the

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18 generally broad area of press freedom. 36 Yet there was little if any interpretation of the responsibility-for-abuse clause by courts in the state. Hascall’s report on his tenure as commander of the District of Indiana makes no mention of this clause as a defense for General Order No. 9. Furthermore, this inquiry looks at Civil War press suppression in Indiana from the perspective of the middle party in a complex political contest that involved the new Republican Party, the Northern Democrats, and the Southern Democrats. Positioned in the middle, the Northern Democrats attempted to stay a conservative course while upholding the Union but were facing pressures from the two extremes, the abolitionists in the North and the secessionists in the South. Indiana’s Democrats saw union in almost religious terms yet persisted in their Jeffersonian-Jacksonian vision that would uphold slavery in the South. It was a difficult political balancing act. Thus, generally, Indiana’s Democrats accepted the temporary sovereignty of the Republican Party and supported the war. That dynamic changed in September of 1862 with announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation. From that point forward, the Democrats became less united about the war and intensified their criticism of Lincoln and the war effort. Democrats in Indiana were a diverse lot. They were conservatives in the southern counties who had kin in Southern states. They were immigrant Catholics in the state’s larger cities. They were small farmers who just wanted a piece of land to cultivate and harvest. They were merchants and manufacturers along the Ohio River who did not want war to interrupt their trade. They were former Whigs who were discontented with the radical Republicans.

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19 Their political arguments were not out of the mainstream as is sometimes portrayed by historians, and their plight continues to have relevance to the study of politics in a democracy, which often relies on coalitions. Previous studies have tended to see Democratic editors as being disloyal and favoring peace. However, most Indiana Democrats were not for separate nations because they were too imbued with unionism. Some wanted a negotiated peace, but they wanted the South to return to the union, and after Fort Sumter, they wanted it by coercion. Democrats hoped this could be accomplished with as little bloodshed as possible. In the spring of 1861, they were not expecting or supporting a protracted war. The Republicans needed the Democrats in the Civil War, and Lincoln needed Indiana, especially since he had to worry about the loyalty of its slave-holding neighbor to the south. The early coalition between Republicans and Democrats, never in total harmony, kept Indiana supportive of the war. That would change in September of 1862, not just because of the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation, but also because of Lincoln’s general suspension of the writ of habeas corpus two days later. The Democrats also wanted to regain political power and took advantage of Lincoln’s ill-timed edicts to score stunning victories at the poll that fall. The Democrats’ relative position in the political battle occurred in the context of civil war and demonstrated the vulnerabilities that the minority party faces in times of extreme political tension. Thus, official suppression of the Democratic press in Civil War Indiana makes for a case study of how the majority and minority interact in times of extreme political crisis and how this interaction affects freedom of the press.

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20 Literature Review This section examines the scholarly literature most directly related to the suppression of Democratic newspaper editors in Indiana. The literature centers on works that have been undertaken in the last fifty years, a time when scholarly activity on this issue has been most vigorous. This review of the literature looks at journalism history, press law, theory of freedom of the press, Indiana history, political history, and military history. The period starts with the 1951 publication of Robert S. Harper’s Lincoln and the Press, which attempted to document press suppression throughout the North. Harper’s book, though, underestimated the degree of suppression and intimidation in Indiana in particular. It is also likely that Harper underestimated suppression and intimidation throughout the North. The suppression of Democratic newspapers in Indiana has been dealt with in several studies. The first significant study came from Craig D. Tenney, whose 1977 Indiana University dissertation titled “Major General A.E. Burnside and the First Amendment” focuses on Burnside and the press of the Midwest. Tenney says Burnside was working in the political realm, “subduing Copperhead influence.” 37 This is important for the full understanding of the Hascall affair because he was working as Burnside’s surrogate in Indiana. Tenney’s study focuses on Burnside’s suppression of Storey’s Chicago Times. Tenney provides some detail of Hascall as commander of the District of Indiana in 1863. This study is the first to show that Harper’s 1951 study was not rigorous enough. The first focused study of press suppression in Indiana is Dilts’ 1986 attempt to test Siebert’s hypothesis about press freedom and government stability. Siebert’s hypothesis claims that the area of freedom of expression decreases during times of political crises.

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21 Dilts’ study focused on the variables of Union military losses and the pressure of political opposition and whether press restraints increased as a consequence of these factors. The Indiana University professor assumed that the state government would be the institution that would constrain the press. While the stability of the state government in Indiana was a key issue in 1863, the larger issue was the stability of the federal government. Hascall and Burnside were agents of the federal government, and indeed they were doing primarily political actions as members of the military a long way from the battle zone. There is a distinction between state and federal action, but Siebert’s hypothesis does not take into account such an arrangement. The officers and soldiers who suppressed and intimidated newspapers in Indiana in effect did the handiwork of the Lincoln Administration, which benefited politically from the vigilantism. Dilts admitted that “we would have expected 1863, the most critical year for Indiana, to be the year with the greatest number of incidents [of suppression], as it was.” 38 Thus, he supported Siebert’s proposition. The strong arm of Hascall only came to bear on Indiana’s newspaper editors because the political fortunes of the state were changing, because the war news since December of 1862 was anything but good for the Lincoln Administration, and because Democrats were disenchanted with conscription, the income tax, civil rights violations, and emancipation. Three recent studies have shown the depth of press suppression and intimidation in the state. Stephen E. Towne’s “Killing the Serpent Speedily” looks at the behind-the-scenes politics during Hascall’s tenure as Commander of the District of Indiana. His 2003 paper, “Works of Indiscretion,” counts the number of acts of violence against editors in Indiana during the war. Towne includes suppression as an act of violence or intimidation

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22 against the press, mainly by Union soldiers. Towne concludes that Hascall’s policy had a chilling effect on Democratic editors: “Several outspoken editors refrained from their usual vitriolic condemnation of federal war policy and measured their words carefully.” 39 Furthermore, Towne’s study suggests that the Union military conducted a more intense “war” against the Democratic press, not just in Indiana but also in the Midwest as a whole, than previous studies had found. 40 Towne suggests a more thorough analysis of press intimidation and suppression needs to be conducted in other Northern states, especially in Indiana’s neighbors, Illinois and Ohio, where the Democrats had a majority in both the state legislatures and the national congressional delegation after the 1862 elections, to expand “our knowledge and understanding of the scope of the threat to press freedom.” 41 Towne and Bruce Bigelow studied some of the sociological factors of suppression in “Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration: The Polls and the Press.” 42 They found that the Democratic editors were relatively young – the average age was 30 – and that they were from diverse backgrounds. Towne’s “West Point Letters of Cadet Milo S. Hascall, 1848-1850” 43 in the Indiana Magazine of History examined letters Hascall wrote while he was at the U.S. Military Academy. These letters provide a snapshot into Hascall’s state of mind during his formative years at the academy. W.H.H. Terrell’s Indiana in the War of the Rebellion was the Morton administration’s official report. 44 The version used for this study was a reprint of the first volume published in 1960. It includes basic statistical data about the number of men from Indiana who participated in the war and the development of the state militia as well as reports on internal discontent about the prosecution of the war. Charles E. Canup’s “Conscription and Draft in Indiana” found that despite some resistance to the

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23 draft, the conscription system in the state worked and that only 10,822 Hoosiers were forced into the war out of a total of 173,178 who were eligible to be drafted in the fall of 1862. 45 Another Civil War study of Indiana is John D. Barnhart’s “The Impact of the Civil War on Indiana.” 46 Barnhart’s Cultural study emphasizes the effect of the war on the institutions of Hoosier society, such as family, churches, and political parties. Barnhart points out that the war severely challenged democracy in Indiana, embarrassed the Democratic Party at the outset, and later divided Hoosier families and political parties. Barnhart’s study touches on the importance of the press in Indiana society and notes that major political players like Caleb B. Smith, Schuyler Colfax, and Samuel E. Perkins owned or edited newspapers. Barnhart also discussed the ease that the state had in filling its military quota in the first two years of the war, but that changed after emancipation and the fall elections of 1862. It was much more difficult to raise volunteers after that. Kenneth M. Stampp’s Indiana Politics During the Civil War detailed the overall political background to Hascall’s suppression of the Democratic press. 47 Emma Lou Thornbrough’s Indiana in the Civil War Era: 1850-80 provided much of the context for what was happening in Indiana in the war period. 48 Thornbrough’s study showed that Indiana was a fast-growing state that had almost a religious reverence for union, yet much of the state was settled by Southerners who wanted no part of a war to beat down the South. Gilbert R. Tredway’s Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration shows that Hoosiers Democrats were not a homogenous group and the “Copperhead” label was inaccurate. 49 Some wanted peace for economic and cultural reasons, and others supported Lincoln and the war, and still others sided with the Confederacy.

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24 Extending these studies to the Midwest in general is Edward C. Smith’s The Borderland in the Civil War, which looked at the economic, political, and social dimensions of life in the Ohio River Valley during the Civil War. 50 It puts the war in into a context, observing that the country was not evenly split between North and South, that the Midwest was another powerful region that was pro-Union but not anti-slavery. John W. Miller’s Indiana Newspaper Bibliography is a compendium of information about newspapers in the state. 51 Miller put together a history of every newspaper in every country of the Nineteenth State from 1804 until 1982. Some of the anecdotal evidence in Miller’s study conflict with information in the county histories. William Wesley Woollen’s “The Indiana Press of the Olden Time” provided sketchy information about several of the suppressed papers and their Republican counterparts. 52 For example, Ignatius Mattingly, editor of Marshall County Republican, became the postmaster in Bourbon, Indiana, and editor of the Bourbon Mirror after the war. His loyalty to the Republicans earned him a federal position. Donald F. Carmony’s “Highlights in Indiana Newspaper History” provides a history of daily newspapers in the nineteenth century. 53 Carmony said that daily papers only began to thrive when telegraph lines were established throughout the state. Norma Jean Thiele’s master’s thesis titled “A History of the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel” analyzed the conditions the paper faced in nineteenth-century Fort Wayne, including labor disputes, health concerns, and immigration. 54 Thiele also unearthed the fact that the Goshen Democrat was a benefactor of the Sentinel. James Hannam Butler’s “Journalism in Indiana” dealt with the political nature of the state’s early newspapers. 55 Butler pointed out that a boom in newspaper startups took place during closely contested

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25 state and political contests. S.N.D. North’s “The Newspaper and Periodical Press” provided census data from 1840 through 1880 on Indiana’s newspapers. 56 It shows the growth of the industry in the state in terms of number of papers (16 to 467) and circulation (27,830 to 661,111). An abundance of information about the Hascall family is available at the Center for Archival Collections in the Jerome Library at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Box number six of the Bentley Family Papers includes twelve folders devoted to the Hascalls, including “The Hascall Family in America,” whose author is unknown. 57 It details the migration of the Hascalls from Somerset, England, to Salem, Massachusetts, and eventually to Le Roy, New York, and then to Goshen, Indiana. The family history focuses on Milo Smith Hascall’s father, Amasa Hascall. The Bentley Family Papers also includes some of the papers of Ebenezer Mattoon Chamberlain, Hascall’s law partner and a relative of Gettysburg hero Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. Milo Hascall’s post-war financial endeavor is described in Wilber L. Stonex’s “Salem Bank of Goshen, Indiana.” 58 Charles S. Voorhees’ Speeches of Daniel Voorhees of Indiana is a collection of the Terre Haute congressman’s oratory. 59 Voorhees exemplified the overblown oratory of the day that influenced Democratic editors, and these speeches provide insight into the ideology of a leading Democrat in Indiana. One of his House speeches is supposed to be about conscription but is a diatribe against emancipation cloaked in constitutional arguments and steeped in racism. Frank Smith Bogardus’ “Daniel W. Voorhees” showed a prominent pro-union Democrat who wanted to the avoid war at all costs eventually coming around. 60 Voorhees, who had a profound influence on Indiana’s Democratic

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26 editors, was a stalwart opponent of Lincoln. Yet he did not let that get in the way of his support for ordinary soldiers. Bogardus said Voorhees could keep abstract argument separate from the needs of the men who fought the war. Emma Lou Thornbrough’s “Judge Perkins, the Indiana Supreme Court, and the Civil War” discussed Jeffersonian-Jacksonian ideology and the explication of that ideology by Indiana Supreme Court Justice Samuel E. Perkins. 61 Bruce Bigelow’s “The Clash of Cultures: Border Southerners and Yankees in Antebellum Indiana” scrutinized the understanding of social life in Civil War Indiana, observing that it was the most “Southern” of the Midwestern states in that at least a quarter of its citizens had come from the South and wanted to be left alone to live a simple agrarian lifestyle without federal government interference. 62 During the war, federal oversight of civil rights was a major area of interest for Indiana’s Democrats. Because Lincoln either encouraged or tacitly approved of many cases of federal suppression, his understanding of the First Amendment requires description in this study. Lincoln valued the civil liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but he thought the rebellion to be a special case that required certain rights to be suppressed for security reasons. David Herbert Donald’s Lincoln included a narration of the events leading up to the May 5, 1863, arrest of Clement L. Vallandigham, the ex-congressman from Ohio whom Burnside silenced, and the White House view of Democratic criticism of the war. 63 A Consensus historian, Donald showed how Burnside had been defrocked and moved to the Department of the Ohio, and that the general wanted to show how loyal and competent he was to the president. Donald also demonstrated how there was plenty of pressure on Lincoln to do something about the Peace Democrats. The abolitionists not only wanted to win the war, but also wanted to

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27 end slavery. They complained that some the Union generals were going slowly in the first two years of the war because of their ties to the Democratic Party. This was perhaps true of George McClellan, who would run against Lincoln as a Democrat in 1864. Furthermore, Donald notes that Lincoln had to deal with calls for the resignation of Secretary Seward, a Democrat who was for a peaceful solution to the secession crisis, and the embarrassment of losing three major battles in Virginia between August of 1862 and May of 1863, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. James G. Randall’s Lincoln the President: Midstream defended Lincoln’s abuse of civil rights because they were temporary and because the author contends that Lincoln always knew there were boundaries. 64 Randall failed to report that Lincoln waffled on the suppression of the Chicago Times and paints the president as almost a civil libertarian who was sensitive to the sovereignty of Morton as governor of Indiana. He failed to mention Morton’s fervid support of suppression of the Times, the Indianapolis Indiana State Sentinel, and Dayton, Ohio, Empire. William Marvel’s Burnside provided a study of what the major general was going through in the second half of 1862 and first half of 1863. 65 Marvel’s portrait helped establish Burnside’s motives for establishing General Order No. 38. This Consensus study showed that while Burnside was not a champion on the battlefield, he was a competent soldier who was generally admired by his men. His command of the Department of the Ohio gave him the opportunity to redeem himself for the disaster at Fredericksburg on Dec. 13, 1862. The study showed a man who often had to deal with a critical press. Julia Jenkins Morton’s “Trusting To Luck: Ambrose E. Burnside and the American Civil War,” provided a complement to Marvel’s study. Morton’s dissertation

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28 illuminates Burnside’s position on General Order No. 38. 66 It also narrates John Morgan’s unsuccessful raid of Indiana and Ohio, a third piece of military news – after Gettysburg and Vicksburg – that helped the Union side in the summer of 1863. Stephen W. Sears’ Chancellorsville provided insight into the behind-the-scenes politics that led to Burnside’s dismissal as commander of the Army of the Potomac in January of 1863. 67 Sears shows how two brigadier generals, John Newton and John Cochrane, fooled the president into reassigning Burnside in a misguided attempt to restore George B. McClellan to the head of the Union’s largest army. 68 Joseph E. Stevens’ 1863: The Rebirth of a Nation looked at the social revolution that took place in the North during the war and complements Marvel and Sears. 69 However, Stevens underplayed the complexity of the political turmoil in the Midwest. Stevens claimed that Democrats in the Midwest who thought the South would enter into a Confederation that excluded New England were mistaken, since Jefferson Davis wanted an independent nation, not a South-Midwest confederacy. 70 James L. Vallandigham’s A Life of Clement L. Vallandigham supplied information such as speeches, letters, and editorials the Ohio congressman wrote. 71 It also included a chapter on his years as editor of the Dayton Empire. William V. McPherson’s “Clement Laird Vallandigham: The Forgotten Radical” argued that Vallandigham was too rational in his rhetoric and that he failed to meet the emotional needs of his audience. 72 It is an interesting take on Vallandigham as a failed orator as opposed to a political martyr. Robert C. Cheeks’ “Clement Laird Vallandigham: American Constitutionalist” noted that Vallandigham introduced legislation in Congress that would make it a crime for Lincoln

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29 to suppress anti-war editors. 73 The proposed bill did not survive in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. Carl M. Becker’s “Newspapers in Battle: The Dayton Empire and the Dayton Journal During the Civil War” gave the background of Vallandigham’s arrest by Burnside. 74 The man who replaced Vallandigham as editor of the Democratic Empire was murdered just before Vallandigham’s Mount Vernon speech, the basis for Burnside’s arrest of the former congressman. Mount Vernon is where Vallandigham called Lincoln a despot, but he also told his audience that political change should be made at the ballot box. The day after the Ohio Democrat was arrested, the Republican Dayton Journal was burned to the ground by readers of the Empire. Frank L. Klement’s The Limits of Dissent had the most in-depth look at Vallandigham’s arrest, trial, exile, and return. 75 It examined Democratic opposition to the war, and Klement paid particular attention to public opinion and its role in the elections of 1862 and 1864. Klement wrote critically of the Democrats but is much more concerned with publicizing Lincoln’s civil rights abuses. Although it is not exactly a defense of Vallandigham, the book serves to legitimize his politics and dissent. Klement’s Lincoln’s Critics stated that it is an exaggeration to suggest only political opponents of the Lincoln Administration were suppressed, “but too many Democratic newspapers were suppressed.” 76 The author also explored mob rule and the political activity of secret societies at this time. This revisionist study emphasized Lincoln’s abuse of the civil rights, including freedom of the press, and portrayed Vallandigham as a martyr for free expression. Klement’s The Copperheads in the Middle West was the first work in his trilogy on Democratic dissent, and it holds that Republican editors and

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30 politicians overestimated the strength of the secret societies. 77 It also showed that the term “Copperhead” came to mean just about all Democrats. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies offered evidence from official government documents of the war, including orders by and correspondence between Hascall and Burnside. 78 It also contained correspondence from Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton about Hascall, as well as Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck’s opinion of the situation in Indiana in the spring of 1863. However, it did not include enough of the record to show what motivated Hascall and Burnside in the spring of 1863. Little of their official correspondence with subordinates and each other is included here. Gil Hinshaw’s “From 10,500 Battles: A Handbook of Civil War Engagements” is a resource for obtaining battle statistics and key dates in the war. 79 The general background of the Civil War is provided in a trio of works by Princeton historian James M. McPherson, who sees the war in revolutionary terms and thus legitimizes the perspective that sees the Northern Democrats as being resistors to national progress. McPherson’s Antietam: The Battle Changed the Course of the Civil War maintains that Antietam was the key battle of the war, not Gettysburg, because it gave Lincoln the opportunity to announce the Emancipation Proclamation as a war measure. 80 Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era shows Lincoln’s response to the Democratic opposition to his administration. 81 This chapter looks at Vallandigham, New York’s Horatio Seymour, and Ohio’s Samuel S. Cox, as well as the political background to the suppression movement. At 862 pages, McPherson’s book is a modestly brief overview of the Civil War period. Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction,

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31 Third Edition puts the war into context and is critical for understanding what went before and what went after. 82 Another Consensus study of war comes from Donald and James G. Randall’s The Civil War and Reconstruction. 83 This interweaves the military aspects of the war with its political and legal components. Christopher Dell’s Lincoln and the War Democrats demonstrates the fragile pro-war coalition that existed in the North. 84 Dell shows how the coalition of Republicans and War Democrats worked together to overturn Peace Democratic gains made in the election of 1862. Mildred C. Stoler detailed the influence of Democrats on the Republican Party in her 1938 Indiana University dissertation. 85 Indiana Democrats who became Republicans over Kansas-Nebraska in the 1850s were conservative and did not want a radical like Seward as their president. Thus, they settled on Lincoln as the moderate choice for president, and Lincoln did well in the northern two-thirds of the state in 1860 – especially in Indianapolis and Lafayette – in large part because of former and current Democrats who saw him as the best middle-ground candidate. The McPherson and Donald-Randall studies attempted to respond to Progressive interpretations of the war that put greater emphasis on economic inequality. The Progressives tended to see the press as being agents working in a holistic framework in which journalists worked toward the ultimate re-uniting of the nation. This may have been the case of the overwhelming majority or Republican editors, but the majority of Democratic editors did not have the same notions of reunion as their counterparts and did not work for the same kind of reunion. The political unity that these historians ascribe to journalism did not exist since the majority of the papers in the North were partisan in nature.

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32 Kevin Phillips’ The Cousins’ War: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America examines religious, political, and economic variables. 86 Phillips explained the migration patterns of East Coast Americans into the Midwest. He explained that the lower Midwest – along the Ohio River – had people of very different stock from those of the upper Midwest. Editors in places such as Cincinnati, Dayton, Columbus, Louisville, and New Albany were from Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the mountains of North Carolina. The editors in Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, and Fort Wayne were from New England or were descendants of German and Dutch settlers from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Thus, the author claimed in this book that the lower North was basically conservative and much more likely to be sympathetic to the Confederacy, while the upper North had fewer cultural ties to the South and was less sympathetic. Phillips pointed out that there were no gubernatorial elections in the key states of Illinois, Indiana and Ohio in 1862, a year when those three states brought large majorities in the House of Representatives for Democrats. Phillips maintained that Lincoln was fortunate that those states did not have state-wide elections in 1862. If they had, the Peace movement would have likely reached a critical mass. Harper’s Lincoln and the Press discusses how the Lincoln Administration wanted censorship but could not find a department that could best handle press relationships. 87 As a result, Treasury, War, and State all took turns at it. Harper’s study also looks at how Democratic newspapers were barred from the mail by several military officers. David B. Sachsman, B., S. Kittrell Rushing, and Debra Reddin van Tuyll’s The Civil War and the Press is a series of essays coming out of the annual Symposium on the Nineteenth Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression at the University of Tennessee at

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33 Chattanooga. 88 The most useful essays for the present study include Janice L. Bukovac’s look at the Michigan Democratic Party and the Fifteenth Amendment, John Glen’s look at Sherman and the press, and Reed W. Smith’s examination of Samuel Medary. Another key journalism study is Justin E. Walsh’s To Print the News and Raise Hell!, a biography of Chicago Times editor Wilbur F. Storey. 89 Walsh’s revisionist work sees the Democrats of the Midwest as having many factions, but that Storey’s anti-Lincoln voice was the party’s loudest. Walsh’s study provides a Developmental study of Storey, chronicling the editor’s professional career from its start in Indiana to its end in Chicago. It has less depth on the suppression of the Chicago Times than Tenney’s study, but it places Storey’s career into context without minimizing his contributions to journalism because of his verbal attacks on Lincoln and the war. Hazel Dicken Garcia’s Journalistic Standards in Nineteenth Century America helped establish the journalistic culture of the time. 90 Dicken Garcia’s study, though, underplayed the partisan nature of the Northern press at the time. Edwin and Michael Emery’s The Press and America, Seventh Edition: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media gave an overview of press-government relations during the Civil War. 91 Frederic Hudson’s Journalism in the United States is a Developmental study that looks at the journalism of the antebellum and war period. 92 Hudson saw the major development of the period as being the movement toward reporting and away from opinion-making. Hudson thought the party press was a dark period in the development of U.S. journalism. J. Cutler Andrews in The North Reports the Civil War developed Burnside’s motivation for issuing Order No. 38. 93 Burnside and Hooker hardly got along at Fredericksburg, another major Union loss, and Burnside was subjected to fierce criticism

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34 in the New York press. 94 In Reporting the Wars, Joseph J. Mathews showed that so thorough was the degree of conflict in the Civil War that major battles were fought without reporters on hand. 95 In effect, American journalism of the 1860s did not have enough resources to adequately cover all facets of the war. This was a major handicap for Indiana’s press. No paper in the state routinely had a reporter at the front line, so Hoosiers were mainly reading accounts of corresponding papers or from the Associated Press. Frank Luther Mott’s American Journalism, A History saw the party press as “the Dark ages of American Journalism.” 96 Mott is critical of military censorship. He said the coverage of the war was more direct than in previous wars, but that journalism standards, particularly in terms of writing, were low. Mott’s flaw is that he saw twentieth-century journalism as being superior and measures the practices of the 1860s against that bar. John F. Marszalek’s Sherman’s Other War teased out much of the history of media-government relations during times of American war. 97 If Lincoln offered some sort of middle ground in government-press relations, General William Tecumseh Sherman offers the extreme. Any student of this subject needs to start his or her study with the first chapter of this book. It looks at telegraphic and mail censorship, official and unofficial guidelines, General Burnside silencing Vallandigham, and General Dix closing down two anti-war New York papers. “During the course of the war,” Marszalek observed, “some ninety-two newspapers were subjected to some form of restriction, while forty-seven others were attacked by mobs, often times soldiers on leave.” Sherman had a standing order that anybody who wrote anything for publication would be arrested and treated as a spy.

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35 In Bohemian Brigade, Louis Starr noted: “The Lincoln administration had stumbled onto controlling the news almost inadvertently.” 98 A riot had occurred in Baltimore involving those who favored Southern secession. Reporters in Washington were comparing notes on the riot and preparing to telegraph their reports north. An order came down at the telegraph office not to send any transmissions. As it turned out, the blackout was ordered by a colonel who was trying to seize conspirators in Washington who had loaded several ships with flour and other provisions for the Southern army. From there the censorship efforts of the Lincoln administration were arbitrary and haphazard. Press suppression involved legal considerations, and War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power by Jeffrey A. Smith concludes that media and military must work together because neither has ultimate legal authority over the other. 99 The chapter titled “The Rise of Presidential Prerogatives” looks closely at how Lincoln suppressed free speech and press during the war. A neo-libertarian, Smith points out that there was never any action from Congress that specifically gave Lincoln the power to suppress the press. This is mainly a constitutional study that relies on primary sources. Siebert’s Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Controls cautions, “Freedom of the press is not and never can be absolute.” 100 Furthermore, his four major propositions offer a framework for studying the issue of press freedom during wartime: (1) “the extent of government control of the press depends on the nature of the relationship of the government to those subject to the government”; (2) “the area of freedom contracts and the enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and of the structure of society increases”; (3) “the more heterogeneous a society, the more freedom of expression it will

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36 tolerate; and (4) “the more developed a society, the more subtle will be the controls it exerts on expression.” The second proposition comes into play in the present study, but the other three are relevant too. Thomas Carleton Hanson’s “Press Freedom and War Restraints: Siebert’s Proposition II and Stevens’ Proposition III in the Case of the Los Angeles Star” discusses the suppression of the Los Angeles Star by Lincoln during the Civil War. 101 Henry Hamilton, the Star editor, criticized the management of the war at a time when the Union was losing. Hanson makes the argument that society in Los Angeles shared Hamilton’s views, and that the editor was simply giving his readers what they wanted. In his book Free Speech “The People’s Darling Privilege,” Michael Kent Curtis retreats to Blackstone’s definition of a free press – no prior restraint – as his starting point for studying the sedition and freedom of expression. 102 It points to the odd twists and turns in this story as Southern legislatures suppressed abolitionist speech and writings before the war and then the Republican administration of Lincoln suppressed critics of his political and military policies during the war. This study places suppression in context of Lincoln’s need to keep Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky in the Union. It provides an in-depth look at Burnside’s General Order 38 and the subsequent arrest and exile of Vallandigham. It also looks at Burnside’s suppression of the Chicago Times and Democrats’ pleas to Lincoln to not further damage the Bill of Rights. Curtis makes s connection between press freedom and constitutional democracy. Mark E. Neely, in The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties, focuses on the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and looks at the suspension of free speech and free press in Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio. 103 It also shows how Lincoln rarely

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37 suppressed political dissent in the press in New York because the Democrats were in power there and controlled the majority of the city’s newspapers. Harold L Nelson’s Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court examines primary documents from the Civil War, many from Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and helps develop the mindset of the Union’s military leaders. 104 Stanton did not oppose suppression in theory because he wanted to get a hold on dissent in the Midwest. Yet Stanton, like Lincoln, was a pragmatist and preferred subtle forms of control. He told a major general to allow the suppressed Chicago Times to resume publication: “The irritation produced by such acts is in his [Lincoln’s] opinion likely to do more harm than the publication would.” Stanton would later produce a Republican victory in the New Hampshire gubernatorial campaign of 1863 by having a War Democrat run as a third-party candidate and producing a draw in the election, which sent the choice to the majority-Republican legislature. 105 Randall’s Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln attempts to soften Lincoln’s record on civil rights. 106 Randall shows the regrets Lincoln and his cabinet had for Burnside’s arresting and trying of Vallandigham. William H. Rehnquist’s All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime offers a narrative of Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and its ramifications for civil rights. 107 The title comes from this statement Lincoln made to Congress on July 4, 1861: “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated.” Rehnquist deals with Vallandigham, Burnside, and Lambdin P. Milligan, an Indiana Democrat closely associated with the Huntington Democrat and a former friend of Stanton’s who was jailed for treason near the end of the war for his alleged role in a secret society. The Supreme Court Justice says martial law in the Civil War was largely

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38 ad hoc, depending almost entirely on the officer in charge in a particular part of the country. Rehnquist recounts the Indianapolis Treason Trials, and he says the Milligan decision of 1866 “is justly celebrated for its rejection of the government’s position that the Bill of Rights has no application in wartime.” 108 Margaret A. Blanchard’s essay “Free Expression and Wartime: Lessons from the Past, Hopes for the Future” narrated how John Merryman of Maryland recruited men to form a squad that would join the Confederate Army, and Lincoln had Merryman thrown in jail without cause. 109 The case blew up on the president when Supreme Court Justice Roger B. Taney, working as a federal district judge, issued a writ of habeas corpus. It was ignored, and Taney wrote an opinion challenging Lincoln’s right to suspend the writ. Blanchard showed that the case never went to the Supreme Court, and the issue was not resolved until 1866 in Ex Parte Milligan, which said that if civil courts are open, then military commissions do not have jurisdiction. A series of articles dealt with legal education in nineteenth-century Indiana. These included William Watson Woollen’s “Marion County Bar” and Leander J. Monks’ “Legal Education in Indiana.” 110 Both provided information about what lawyers had to read to prepare for their careers. Charles W. Taylor’s Biographical Sketches and Review of the Bench and Bar of Indiana provided portraits of nineteenth-century Indiana attorneys, including their education. 111 Methodology This study is primarily a historical narrative. It is an examination of Hascall and the Civil War Indiana press in its historical context. The narrative of this study offers a structured way of explaining how a member of the federal military attempted to control the expression of newspaper editors in Indiana in 1863. The historical context includes

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39 the military and political fighting of the war and the development of the press in the United States in the nineteenth century. Analyzing and interpreting the content of the Democratic and Republican newspapers of Indiana in the war period make up the bulk of the primary research for this study. Among the papers analyzed were the existing papers that were suppressed. These include the following: Plymouth Democrat, South Bend Forum, Columbia City News, Warsaw Union, Winamac Democrat, and Stark County Press. The study also includes a frame analysis of Democratic and Republican editorials about the Emancipation Proclamation. It analyzes Republican and Democratic newspapers from the following Indiana cities: Indianapolis, Fort Wayne, Richmond, South Bend, Delphi, Logansport, Plymouth, Goshen, and Evansville. These cities have been chosen because they had robust newspaper traditions at the time and because copies of both a Democratic and Republican paper in these towns exist in the Indiana State Library. Ownership patterns were also studied for this dissertation. Ownership was analyzed for Democratic and Republican papers in the following cities were suppression occurred: Plymouth, Columbia City, Huntington, Rushville, South Bend, Bluffton, Warsaw, Winamac, Hartford City, Franklin, and Knox. To compare to the general status of ownership change in the state, papers in these cities were compared to the Democratic and Republican papers in a group of cities that were chosen randomly. An analysis of ownership in the major towns in counties chosen randomly includes these counties: Bartholomew, Cass, Dearborn, Delaware, Fountain, Gibson, Knox, LaPorte, Morgan, Ohio, Pike, Tipton, Wabash, and Wayne. The ownership trend in this group was compared and contrasted to that of the eleven cities where suppression occurred.

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40 The context of Hascall’s specific role in press suppression in Indiana in 1863 was developed by examining military communication by Hascall, Burnside, and Lincoln; public letters written by Hascall to Indiana’s newspaper editors; Hascall’s correspondence with Burnside; the newspaper exchange between Hascall and Democratic Congressman Joseph K. Edgerton of Fort Wayne; communication by Governor Morton, including the many letters he received from citizens about alleged Democratic disloyalty and secret societies. This study focuses on the newspapers of northern Indiana, in the towns that are within seventy-five miles of Goshen, where Hascall lived and was an attorney before the war. Commentary by editors from other Democratic and Republican newspapers, especially the Indianapolis Journal, Indianapolis Indiana State Sentinel, the Fort Wayne Sentinel, and the Fort Wayne Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, further develop the context. Non-Indiana newspapers were also examined, including ones from New York, Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati, Dayton, and Columbus, on the basis of their understanding and interpretation of key events in the spring of the 1863. Papers from these cities were chosen because of the tendency of Indiana editors to borrow heavily from out-of-town papers. Text from papers in these cities frequently appeared in Hoosier newspapers, and editors of the larger city papers often provided political leadership for newspapers in the small towns. A thorough textual analysis of the framing of the Emancipation proclamation helps illuminate how rhetoric shaped the political debate between Democrats and Republicans. The majority of the documents examined came from the 1861-1865 period. However, to understand the press background, several newspapers from the 1840s and 1850s were

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41 consulted. Hascall’s brother briefly owned the Goshen Democrat in the late 1840s, and the Fort Wayne Sentinel was studied in depth to see how an editor and his paper grew as a town became a city – and a political editor became a professional editor. This study features an emphasis on the interrelationship between Hascall and the society in which he and the Democratic editors he suppressed lived. The thoughts and actions of Hascall cannot be separated from the political, legal, and military issues of the era in which he lived. The portrait of Hascall developed here shows a highly professional man who wanted to help Burnside efficiently counteract the loss of manpower at a critical moment in the war. It also looks at where he came from, how he was educated, and what mindset he brought to suppression. In citing both primary and secondary sources, this inquiry grapples with the verifiability of facts, interpretive bias, the limits of time and place, and the difficulties of proving causation. The research built the bibliography in an evolutionary manner, keeping itself open to new studies and not limiting itself to books, scholarly journals, newspapers, manuscripts, diaries, correspondence, and government documents. The focus at all times was on newspaper content, especially in the months of April, May, and June of 1863. This study also remained open to the use of any material that might be relevant to press suppression during the Civil War in general and in Indiana in particular. One piece of documentary evidence so discovered was a photograph of a newspaper building from the period. Primary documents were evaluated in terms of the internal and external criticism concepts developed by William David Sloan and James D Startt. 112 For example, Hascall and other principals’ hand-written notes were hard to read. Collation was used to

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42 determine if in fact a written memo to a subordinate was that of the brigadier general’s or that of somebody else. It was also double checked with certain rhetorical tendencies found in his West Point correspondence and his report of his tenure as commander of the District of Indiana in the Union Army. Avoiding a sense of present-mindedness was a key component of the study. The objective was to see the political, social, legal, and military landscape as the principals involved saw it. For example, twenty-first-century notions of racial equality prejudice an understanding of the overtly racist attitudes of almost all of the principals in this study. Likewise, there was a conscious attempt to avoid presuming the twenty-first-century understanding of the First Amendment and the relationship between press and government, especially since this study was also conducted during a time of war – but a very different war. The typical libertarian understanding of press freedom that is the mainstream in U.S. journalism today has no place in a study that attempts to accurately understanding press suppression in the Indiana of 1863. However, it does provide a guidepost for what lies ahead in the history of the First Amendment. This study attempts to answer the following questions: (1) What response did Democratic and Republican editors have to official press suppression in Indiana? (2) How did Hascall’s suppression of Democratic newspapers affect the suppressed newspapers? (3) Did press freedom in Indiana survive suppression? (4) How effective was Hascall’s policy? (5) Did this episode of official press suppression in Indiana confirm or reject Siebert’s hypothesis about press-government relations in times when the stability of a government is in jeopardy?

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43 This case study explores press freedom from a cultural perspective. It demonstrates a paradox: political movements that are not progressive sometimes sustain or promote – even advance – press freedom. Conversely, more progressive political movements can hinder press freedom, if only temporarily. By all accounts, Hascall was not a bully or a brutish man. He did try to shut down the press or establish a censor’s office. Later in the war, he would even help spare the life of several deserters by saying that the application of military law was not consistent. 113 Hascall did what Burnside asked him to do in Indiana because he thought the war necessitated extra-legal means to achieve the ultimate goal of victory and defeat of the Confederacy. The arguments used to defend press suppression were no different than those used by John Adams, Andrew Jackson, and James K. Polk. 114 Wartime creates a special situation, and unusual expediencies are used to deter citizens’ behavior that potentially aids the enemy. Whether or not there such a necessity is debatable. What Lincoln achieved in the Civil War is the expansion of the war powers to allow the president to have the prerogative to decide when press suppression and intimidation can take place. For a man who advanced equality and freedom with one bold stroke on Sept. 22, 1862, this precedent creating a tool for press suppression in wartime is an unfortunate and paradoxical legacy for the sixteenth president. The media in twentiethand twenty-first-century wars has had to live with this legacy. The U.S. government has become more sophisticated in how it contracts the area of press freedom during wartime, and the press constantly seeks ways to contend with this sophistication. This study also shows that a partisan press model has a major flaw in that newspapers were not united on a principle of freedom of the press. The Civil War press

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44 only believed in freedom of the press for the minority – or the victors. That the Republican editors of Indiana cheered on Hascall and Burnside shows that partisanship came before principle. Essentially, this weakens the overall power and importance of the press in a democratic society, and it seems one of the major consequences of the Civil War was that the U.S. press became more united after the war, perhaps in part because of Democratic press attrition but also because journalists learned to make the interpretive function secondary to the informative function as a way to survive economically. Structure of Dissertation This study is a narrative of the events, ideas, and processes that led to official press suppression in Indiana in the spring of 1863. It is designed to give a coherent interpretation of how suppression took place in the nineteenth state. Chapter Two examines Indiana society in the 1860s, and Chapter Three looks at the legal and theoretic context of suppression. It looks at both the federal and state constitutions, and Siebert’s hypotheses about the relationship between the government and the press during wartime. Chapter Four illustrates the nature of the party press in Civil War Indiana. Chapter Five looks at the concepts of unionism and emancipation, key issues that united and divided the state. Chapter Six follows the career of Hascall and narrates his suppression of the state’s Democratic newspapers in the spring of 1863. Chapter Seven touches on the immediate consequences of press suppression, particular the response of both Republican and Democratic editors. Chapter Eight looks at the aftermath of official press suppression in Indiana and assesses Hascall’s spring in Indiana in terms of the broader history of federal suppression of the press in the Civil War. Chapter Nine, the conclusion, sums up the narrative and deliberates on the broader picture of press suppression and discusses

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45 unresolved issues, as well as the direction of future research of press suppression by journalists caught in the middle of strong political or social forces. Implications The suppression of Democratic newspapers in Indiana had a temporary chilling effect on Democratic editors in the state. It occurred before the demise of the party press in the state in the last few decades of the nineteenth century. The inference is that Indiana’s Democratic editors learned a lesson about the relationship between a partisan political press and the area of press freedom during wartime. Yet it is unclear if Democratic editors learned such a lesson. The vast majority of the Democratic newspapers that Hascall suppressed in Indiana survived after the war. Partisanship did not die out immediately after the war, and some Hoosier newspapers stayed closely associated to political parties well into the twentieth century. Yet most of the editors of the suppressed papers got out of journalism, and Democratic editors in general moved on. Thomas Tigar’s highly successful Fort Wayne Sentinel, which he had owned for more than two decades, is the epitome of Democratic newspaper demise. Tigar, who supported Democrats for decades, nonetheless supported the war. He generally espoused a more moderate view than his brethren. If any Democratic editor should have survived the war, it was Tigar. Yet he closed up shop in 1865. This study also suggests that what happened with the Democratic editors in Civil War Indiana was part of a larger phenomenon involving the relationship between the executive branch of the federal government and the press. The expansion of presidential powers during the Civil War had specific effects on the area of press freedom, though enforcement of federal power was dependent upon the interpretations and motivations of federal officers like Hascall and Burnside. Contraction continued during the twentieth

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46 century and into the twenty-first century. In some cases, such as World War II, the press tended to go along with the decrease in the area of press freedom during wartime. In other cases, such as Vietnam, it did not. A question that remains is this: What is the validity of Lincoln’s elasticity argument – that is, that wartime requires a temporary suspension of some civil rights? The president claimed the war power were temporary and that the press would regain its area of freedom after the war. Moreover, what effect if any exists in peacetime on having temporary suspension during wartime? The proper relationship between government and the pressure as well as the increased area of press freedom is presumed to resume after conflict ends. Another critical question is this: in a democracy, do the citizens really want a weakened press during wartime? What are the benefits? The responses to this question from government and media tend to be self-serving. Government says suppression is desirable for reasons for security. The press says unfettered communication is desirable because elections have not been suspended and voters need the best information they can get about all aspects of society. What, though, is best for a democratic nation? It is a question that is still unanswered. Finally, Siebert’s hypothesis is supported by this study. As the war news for the Union moved in a negative direction, dissent increased, and as dissent increased, the government contracted the area of press freedom in Indiana. Because Governor Morton had effectively neutralized the majority-Democratic legislature, the Republicans remained in control of the state government in the Hoosier State. Thus, Hascall had the necessary condition for suppression, a chorus of Republican editors who supported his attempts to squelch the Democratic press. Furthermore, many of the most Democratic

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47 counties in the state had the highest percentage of men fighting the war, and thus these men were not a home to support the rights and opinions of the Democratic editors. By contrast, the Democratic editors in New York, who were far more vituperative than their Hoosier counterparts, were allowed to write freely because Democrats controlled the state and city governments there. Table 1-1: Status of newspapers in cities where suppression occurred Democratic newspapers City County Title of Paper Cond. Apr. 1865 Exist 1875 Bluffton Wells Banner Existed Yes Columbia City Whitley News Name changed to Post Yes, as Post Franklin Johnson Democratic Herald Destroyed in 1863 No Hartford City Blackford Blackford Democrat Shut down in 1863 Yes, as *-News Huntington Huntington Democrat Existed Yes Knox Starke Starke County Press Existed No Plymouth Marshall Democrat Existed Yes Rushville Rush Jacksonian Existed Yes South Bend St. Joseph Forum Shut down in 1863 Yes, as Herald Warsaw Kosciusko Union Existed Yes, as Nat. Union Winamac Pulaski Pulaski Democrat Closed in -, Yes, as Democrat Re-opened as Repub. paper in 1864 7/11 = 64 percent 9/11 = 82 percent 8/11 = 73 percent *-Hartford City News had changed its affiliation to Republican in 1873. Republican newspapers City County Title of Paper Cond. Apr. 1865 Exist 1875 Bluffton Wells Union Existed Yes, as Chronicle Columbia City Whitley Republican Existed Yes, as Commercial Franklin Johnson Jeffersonian Existed Yes Hartford City Blackford Union Existed No Huntington Huntington Indiana Herald Existed Yes Knox Starke No paper in Civil War ------------Plymouth Marshall Republican Existed Yes Rushville Rush Republican Existed Yes South Bend St. Joseph St. Joe Valley Register Existed Yes Warsaw Kosciusko Northern Indianian Existed Yes

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48 Table 1-1 Continued. Republican newspapers City County Title of Paper Cond. Apr. 1865 Exist 1875 Winamac Pulaski Republican Existed Yes 10/10 = 100 percent 9/10 = 90 percent Notes Plymouth, Indiana, Weekly Democrat , May 14, 1863. 2 Daniel McDonald, History of Marshall County, Indiana (Mount Vernon, IN: Windmill Publications, 1908), 394-95. 3 “History” of Plymouth, Indiana, Chamber of Commerce. URL: http://www.plychamber.org/pages/cityhistory.html. 4 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian , April 30, 1863. 5 Plymouth, Indiana, Weekly Democrat , April 30, 1863. 6 McDonald, 394-95. 7 Plymouth, Indiana, Weekly Democrat , May 14, 1863. 8 Robert N. Scott et al., ed., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), Series II, Vol. V, 480. 9 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 222. 10 Indiana’s First Constitution, 1816, [online]. Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, accessed: 10 October 2003; available at: http://www.statelib.in.us/www/ihb/resources/doconst1816artI .html. Also see Manuscript Constitution, Indiana State Library. 11 Lewis Collins and Richard Collins, History of Kentucky, Volume I (Louisville, KY: John P. Morton Company, 1924), 127. 12 Detroit, Michigan, Free Press , June 5, 1863.

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49 13 Stephen E. Towne, “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War.” Paper presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Oct. 31, 2003, 12-14. 14 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 231-232. 15 Columbia City, Indiana, News, May 5, 1863. The News charged either $2 a year if a customer paid in advance or $2.50 if paid within the year. 16 Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, May 18, 1863. Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, May 28, 1863. Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, May 18, 1863. 17 S.N.D. North, “The Newspaper and Periodical Press,” Tenth Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1884), 186-187. 18 Hazel Dicken Garcia, Journalistic Standards in Nineteenth-Century America (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 54. 19 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, May 11, 1863. New Albany, Indiana, Daily Ledger, May 16, 1863. 20 Phillip J. Tichenor, “Copperheadism and Community Conflict in Two Rivertowns: Civil War Press Battles in Prairie du Chien and La Crosse, Wisconsin, 1861-65,” presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, Chattanooga, Tennessee, October 2002, 8. Also see the Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, “Extra,” March 20, 1863. 21 Gilbert R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 28-29. 22 Joseph J. Mathews, Reporting the War (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), 81. Mathews notes that not only was there no legal context for censorship or suppression, there was no major war experience for U.S. journalism to put to use when the conflict began. The Mexican War had taken place far from most of the newspapers in the country. 23 Harper, 154. Harper discusses Charles C. Fulton, editor of the Baltimore American, who was arrested on orders from Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton for reporting he did at the Peninsula in Virginia. See 141-153 for press suppression in Missouri. 24 Carl M. Becker, “Newspapers in Battle: The Dayton Empire and the Dayton Journal During the Civil War,” Ohio History: The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society, 44.

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50 25 John W. Miller, Indiana Newspaper Bibliography (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), 205. 26 Harper, 231-33. Lincoln barred California papers from the mails, and Brigadier General George Wright ordered the suspension of mail delivery of several Democratic papers in Oregon. 27 Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1999), 56-66. 28 Towne, 2003, 1. 29 Jon Dilts, “Testing Siebert’s Proposition in Civil War Indiana,” Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1, Spring 1986, 367. Dilts’ study was admittedly limited. He only looked at 37 newspapers when there were 186 in Indiana in 1860 and, by 1870, there were 293. 30 Towne, 2003, Appendix A and B. Throw out two of the incidents against Republican newspapers that Towne discovered in his study, because those were cases were tornadoes destroyed newspaper offices. 31 Norma Jean Theiel, “A History of the Fort Wayne Sentinel,” master’s thesis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1958), 23. 32 Harry J. Maihafer, War of Words: Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War Press (Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 2001), 1. 33 Maihafer, 1. Also see S.N.D. North, The Newspaper and Periodical Press, U.S. Census Office (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1884), 186-187. 34 William David Sloan, The Media in America, A History (Northport, AL: Vision Press, 2002), 200. 35 Gerald J. Baldasty, “The Press and Politics in the Age of Jackson,” Journalism Monographs, No. 89, August 1984, 1-28. Baldasty’s study shows how the press of the 1820s and 1830s, Indiana’s formative years, was intricately related to political parties. Parties cultivated newspapers, and editors often were major political figures. Parties subsidized newspapers through patronage and start-up money. Little of this had changed by 1861, at least in the nation’s interior, including Indiana. This is a key understanding because newspapers were defined by their structural limitations – that is, those who funded them, who made them, and who read them. With mid-nineteenth-century newspapers so close to political parties and so politically oriented, an understanding of press suppression at that time starts with this basic structural framework. 36 William P. McLauchlan, The Indiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 40.

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51 37 Craig D. Tenney, “Major General A.E. Burnside and the First Amendment: A Case Study of Civil War Freedom of Expression,” Dissertation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University School of Journalism, 1977), 228. 38 Dilts, 368. 39 Towne, 2003, 7-8. 40 Harper. His 1951 study is the basis for this entire vein of historic research on Union press suppression in the Civil War. It is clear now that Harper’s examination was a first foray into the subject and that the degree of press suppression in the North was more intense than his study reveals. 41 Towne, 2003, 11. 42 Bruce Bigelow and Stephen E. Towne, “Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana: The Polls and the Press,” Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 5, October 2001, 71-81. 43 Stephen E. Towne, “West Point Letters of Milo S. Hascall, 1848-1850,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. XC, No. 3, September 1994, 278-294. 44 W.H.H. Terrell, Indiana in the War of Rebellion: Report of the Adjutant General, A Reprint of Volume One of the Eight-Volume Report Prepared by W.H.H. Terrell and Published in 1869 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1960). Terrell’s report describes the development of the militia and the draft in the state. It is a one-sided, pro-Morton document that portrays dissidence and anti-war sentiment in broad terms. 45 Charles E. Canup, “Conscription and Draft in Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 1914, 70-83. 46 John D. Barnhart, “The Impact of the Civil War on Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 57, No. 3, September 1961, 185-224. 47 Kenneth M. Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1949). 48 Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era: 1850-80 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1995). 49 Gilbert R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973). 50 Edward C. Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War (New York, NY: AMS Press, 1970).

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52 51 John W. Miller, Indiana Newspaper Bibliography (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1982). 52 William Wesley Wollen, “The Indiana Press of the Olden Time,” Biographical and Historical Sketches of Early Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Hammond and Company, 1883), 538-559. 53 Donald V. Carmony, “Highlights in Indiana Newspaper History,” The Indiana Publisher, Vol. 9, No. 1, December 1944, 3, 6. 54 Norm Jean Thiele, “A History of the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel,” M.A. thesis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1958. 55 James Hannam Butler, “Journalism in Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 1926, 297-333. 56 S.N.D. North, “The Newspaper and Periodical Press,” Tenth Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1884). 57 Bentley Family Papers, Center for Archives Collection, Jerome Library, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, MS-720. 58 Wilber L. Stonex, “Salem Bank of Goshen, Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1927, 83-91. 59 Charles S. Voorhees, ed., Speeches of Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana, Embracing His Most Prominent Forensic, Political, Occasional, and Literary Addresses (Cincinnati, Ohio: Clarke & Company, 1875). 60 Frank Smith Bogardus, “Daniel W. Voorhees,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 27, 1931, 91-103. 61 Emma Lou Thornbrough, “Judge Perkins, the Indiana Supreme Court, and the Civil War,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 60, No. 1, March 1964, 79-96. 62 Bruce Bigelow, “The Clash of Culture: Border Southerners and Yankees in Antebellum Indiana,” Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 2, 1998, 1-8. 63 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (London: Jonathan Cape. London. 1995). 64 James G. Randall, Lincoln the President: Midstream (Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., 1952). 65 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

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53 66 Julia Jenkins Morton, “Trusting To Luck: Ambrose E. Burnside and the American Civil War,” Ph.D. dissertation (Kent, OH: Kent State University, 1992). 67 Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). 68 Ibid., 1-25. Brigadier generals John Newton and John Cochrane visited President Lincoln on Dec. 30, 1862, on behalf of Major generals William Franklin and William Smith. Newton and Cochrane told Lincoln that Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, who had replaced General George B. McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac, could not possibly succeed leading the Union’s most important army. Both feared that a repeat of Fredericksburg was not just possible but probable, and that it would be the destruction of the Northern army. Lincoln listened carefully and did nothing. He left Burnside in power, for the time being. A month later, after an unsuccessful attempt to re-engage the Confederates in the infamous “Mud March,” Burnside was relieved of his command and replaced, not by McClellan, but by Joseph Hooker. Before he stepped down, Burnside had both Newton and Cochrane dismissed from the Army of the Potomac. Newton was re-assigned to the Florida Keys, and Newton, a Democratic politician from New York before the war, resigned and went home to resume his political career. 69 Joseph E. Stevens, 1863: The Rebirth of a Nation (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1999). 70 Ibid., 110. 71 James L. Vallandigham, A Life of Clement L. Vallandigham (Baltimore, MD: Turnbull Brothers, 1872). 72 William V. McPherson, “Clement Laird Vallandigham: The Forgotten Radical,” M.A. thesis (Warrensburg, MO: Central Missouri State University, 1993). 73 Robert C. Cheeks, “Clement Laird Vallandigham: American Constitutionalist,” Southern Partisan, Winter 2001. 74 Carl M. Becker, “Newspapers in Battle: The Dayton Empire and the Dayton Journal During the Civil War,” Ohio History: The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society, Vol. 99, Winter-Spring 1990, 29-50. 75 Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1970). 76 Frank L. Klement, Lincoln’s Critics (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 1999). 77 Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads of the Middle West (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1960). Klement’s book opened a vein of revisionism about Civil War dissidence in the North. It shows that Democrats in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois had policy

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54 differences with Republicans that was not treasonous but was politics as usual – in wartime. For example, Hoosier antipathy for increased federalism, in the form of taxation, conscription, and emancipation, was not simply going to disappear because a war was under way. Klement also brings to light Burnside’s intimidation of the electoral process in Kentucky, an even more serious offense than the suppression and intimidation of the press in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. In several Kentucky precincts, military officials literally prevented citizens who were unlikely to vote Republican from casting their ballots. 78 Russell A. Alger, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899). 79 Gil Hinshaw, “From 10,500 Battles: A Handbook of Civil War Engagements” (Hobbs, NM: Superior Printing Company, 1996). 80 James M. McPherson, Antietam: The Battle Changed the Course of the Civil War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002). 81 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1988). 82 James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, Third Edition (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2001). 83 David Herbert Donald and James G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1969). 84 Christopher Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975). 85 Mildred C. Stoler, “Influence of the Democratic Element in the Republican Party of Illinois and Indiana, 1854-1860,” Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1938. 86 Kevin Phillips, The Cousins’ War: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999). 87 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951). 88 David B. Sachsman, Kittrell Rushing, and Debra Reddin van Tuyll, The Civil War and the Press (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000). 89 Justin E. Walsh, To Print the News and Raise Hell! A Biography of Wilbur F. Storey (Chapel Hill , NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1968). The story of Storey is his development as an editor in northwest Indiana and in Michigan. In 1839, the nineteen

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55 year-old Storey criticized a La Porte, Indiana, judge, who countered with the threat of verbal chastisement. It was the first brush Storey had with a government official, and it was far from the last. 90 Hazel Dicken Garcia, Journalistic Standards in Nineteenth Century America (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 91 Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, The Press and America, Seventh Edition: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992). 92 Frederic Hudson, Journalism in the United States (New York, NY: Harper’s, 1873). 93 J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955). 94 Marvel, 159-106. Burnside generally liked most people, but he did not like Joe Hooker because the latter had a tendency to criticize openly those above him – a no-no in the world of the military. It was also personal between Burnside and Hooker, going back o the battle of South Mountain when one of Burnside’s best men, Jesse Reno, had been killed in part because Hooker was slow to move when called upon by Burnside. Hooker also was reluctant to hold a position at Fredericksburg and rode back to tell Burnside his view of the situation. This was based in large part on the wholesale slaughter of Northern troops Hooker had witnessed at Marye’s Heights. Later, Hooker would decide the city could not be defended by the Army of the Potomac. Burnside agreed. Later, in late January of 1863, Burnside would hand Lincoln and ultimatum: either Hooker goes or Burnside goes. The president chose to remove Burnside and elevate Hooker to commander of the Army of the Potomac. 95 Joseph J. Mathews, Reporting the Wars (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1957). 96 Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, A History: 1690-1960, Third Edition (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1962). 97 John F. Marszalek, Sherman’s Other War: The General and Civil War Press (Memphis, TN: Memphis State University Press, 1981). 98 Louis M. Starr, Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Newsmen in Action (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954). 99 Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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56 100 Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Controls (Champaign-Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1952). 101 Thomas Carleton Hanson, “Press Freedom and War Restraints: Siebert’s Proposition II and Stevens’ Proposition III in the Case of the Los Angeles Star,” M.A. thesis (Fullerton, CA: California State University at Fullerton, 1995). 102 Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, “The People’s Darling Privilege” (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000). 103 Mark E. Neely, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991). 104 Harold L. Nelson, Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court (Indianapolis, IN: Bobb-Merrill Company, 1967). 105 Dell, 232-233. 106 James. G. Randall, James G., Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964). 107 William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998). 108 Ibid., 137. 109 Margaret A. Blanchard, “Free Expression and Wartime: Lessons from the Past, Hopes for the Future,” Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1992. Vol. 69, No. 1, 5-17. 110 William Watson Woollen, “Reminiscences of the Early Marion County Bar,” Indiana Historical Society Publications, Volume VII (Indianapolis, IN: C.E. Pauley & Company, 1923), 185-208; Leander J. Monks, ed., “Legal Education in Indiana,” Courts and Lawyers of Indiana, Volume II (Indianapolis, IN: Federal Publishing Company, 1916), 470-479. 111 Charles W. Taylor, Biographical Sketches and Review of the Bench and Bar of Indiana, Together with a History of the Judiciary of the State and Review of the Bar from the Earliest Times to the Present, with Anecdotes, Reminiscences, etc. (Indianapolis, IN: Bench and Bar Publishing, 1895). 112 William David Sloan and James D. Startt, Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1989), 117.

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57 113 Thomas P. Lowry, Don’t Shoot That Boy! Abraham Lincoln and Military Justice (Mason City, IA: Savas, 1999), 129. Hascall recommended to Burnside that William Aughenbaugh, who had deserted the 44th Ohio, not be shot since five other deserters tried by the same military court had not received a death sentence. Burnside pardoned Aughenbaugh and had him returned to duty. President Lincoln signed Burnside’s pardon order. 114 Adams, Jackson, and Polk all participated in the suppression of newspapers and gave Lincoln precedents to justify a heavy-handed approach to government-press relations. Adams forced the Alien and Sedition acts on the country. Jackson used military censorship during the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812. Polk allowed military officers to suppress five U.S. and five Mexican newspapers during the Mexican War. Adams and Polk’s came while they were president. Jackson’s actions against the press came while he was an Army general.

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CHAPTER 2 MILO HASCALL’S WORLD: INDIANA IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA Milo Smith Hascall was no a martial monster who wanted to end freedom of the press in his state. He was Yankee immigrant to the northern part of the state who had tried several professions before he came to Goshen, Indiana, in September of 1847. 1 Milo Hascall was West Point educated and a self-taught lawyer. He also was a businessman and a leading citizen of Goshen. Nothing in his past suggested that he would trample on journalists’ right to print as they pleased. Indeed, one of his brothers had been an editor and would be again after the war. Hascall had been born in Le Roy, New York, on 5 August 1829, and raised there for the first eighteen years of his life. (For the highlights of Hascall’s life, see Table 3-1 below.) His father, Amasa Hascall, was born in Thompson, Connecticut, on 28 July 1877, and his mother, Phoebe Diana Smith Hascall, was born 31 December 1792, in Benson, Vermont. 2 Milo Hascall was their ninth and last child. Two of the Hascall children, Hiram and Ella, died young. 3 His other siblings included Chauncey S., Phobe Ann, Amasa N., Avaline, Melvin B., and Henriette. Amasa Hascall, a farmer in Le Roy, had served in the War of 1812 and was active in Genesee County Whig politics, becoming a constable and collector. He toured his jurisdiction on horseback, reining in the desperados of western New York. Amasa also played the violin and was paid for his performances. 4 Phoebe Smith Hascall died in 1852, and Amasa Hascall married his first wife’s cousin, Vesta G. Alderman, who had two sons by a previous marriage. 58

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59 Although Milo grew up on a farm, he attended school throughout boyhood and at 16 began to study at Ingham Academy. 5 Le Roy, between Rochester and Buffalo, struggled economically in the 1830s and 1840s, and the family migrated west to Elkhart County in Indiana. When Milo arrived in Goshen, he worked for brother Chauncey S. Hascall, who was the first Hascall to come to Elkhart County, in 1837, and owned a general store. Using his family’s connections, Milo Hascall earned a nomination by Indiana Democratic Congressman Charles W. Cathcart to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. He attended USMA from 1848 until 1852, graduating fourteenth in a class of forty-three. His studies there included algebra, geometry, trigonometry, French, geography, English grammar, ethics, and rhetoric. 6 His class read Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 7 The Goshen resident was in fairly heady company while at West Point. Among the men who attended the U.S. Army training school at the same time as Hascall were Phillip Sheridan, who would serve as a Union general a decade later; Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte Jr., great nephew of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte; Marshall Tate Polk, nephew and adoptive son of President James K. Polk; Thornton A. Washington, a descendant of George Washington; and William R. Calhoun, grandson of John C. Calhoun, who like Thornton Washington served in the Confederate Army. 8 Of these, only Bonaparte finished higher than Hascall in the class of 1852. 9 After West Point, Hascall performed garrison duty and served as a brevet second lieutenant in the Second Artillery at Fort Adams, Rhode Island. Yet this was a century before the military-industrial complex and a civilian career was more exciting and more lucrative than being a member of a peacetime, insubstantial army. With little chance for

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60 promotion in the peacetime Army, Hascall resigned his military commission at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, on 30 September 1853, did some traveling, and returned to Goshen. 10 He worked at the Hascall store but did not like the work, so he became a teacher for a brief time. Milo Hascall was one of several members of his family who served as teachers in Goshen, including Chauncey S. Hascall’s wife, Emma Brown Hascall, as well as brothers Melvin B. and Amasa N. Hascall. His brother-in-law and future law partner, Ebenezer Mattoon Chamberlain, also had been an educator, opening a school in Goshen when he first came to Elkhart County in 1832. 11 Chamberlain said Goshen was a more diverse town than the communities in the southern parts of Indiana. Residents migrated to Elkhart County from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, Illinois, Germany, and England. 12 Goshen Attorney In the fall of 1853, Milo Smith Hascall returned to Goshen and became a railroad contractor for the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad but soon read law under Chamberlain, his brother-in-law who had read for the bar in Bangor, Maine. 13 No evidence exists of what Hascall read, but at that time law students who attended Indiana University studied international, constitutional, and common law as well as equity and would read the following: Story’s “Commentaries on the Constitution,” “Equity,” and “Equity Pleading”; Chitty on contracts, bills, and pleading; Stephen on pleading; and Kent’s “Commentaries.” 14 After he read for the law, Hascall began a career as an attorney, including a stint in the late 1850s as prosecuting attorney for the Court of Common Pleas and clerk of the Elkhart Circuit Court, both elected positions. Typically, Chamberlain and Hascall dealt with squabbles over land, and much of their practice centered on foreclosures. 15

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61 In the early years in Goshen, the family was Democratic politically, and one of Milo S. Hascall’s brothers had been a co-owner of a Democratic newspaper in Goshen during the late 1840s. The first mention of Melvin B. Hascall owning the Goshen Democrat occurred in that paper in November of 1846. The Democrat announced that brothers Erastus W.H. and William R. Ellis were terminating their co-ownership of the paper by “mutual consent.” 16 The names of Melvin B. Hascall and Erastus Ellis appeared on the masthead that week. 17 The announcement said that Erastus Ellis would handle the editorial responsibilities and that the paper would remain “a faithful chronicler of the events of the day, and a true and steadfast exponent of Democratic Principles, as we understand them.” 18 Melvin B. Hascall stayed on as co-owner until 1848 and would own the paper again after the Civil War. The newspaper, under a different title, would be in the Hascall family again in the twentieth century in the hands of publisher Frank L. Hascall. 19 Advertising for Hascall & Earle’s general store appeared while Melvin B. Hascall shared the helm of the Democrat with Erastus Ellis. 20 The store advertised saddles, harnesses, ladies’ clothing, and “Fall and Winter Goods.” The owners also solicited farmers to sell them wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, flax seed, beeswax, Timothy seed, ginseng, tallow, hides, and staves. Advertising for the store was a mainstay in both the Goshen Democrat and the Republican Goshen Times for the next several decades. One Hascall advertisement would claim that “if ‘O’d Hascall’ has got the things you want, it’s no use to spend time to look any where else.” 21 The relationship between the Hascalls and E.W.H. Ellis continued after Ellis and Melvin Hascall split as co-owners of the Democrat. In 1852, Ellis and Chauncey S.

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62 Hascall became partners in a dry goods, grocery, and hardware store. 22 By 1858, the store would be owned by Chauncey Hascall, Martin Brown, and Charles B. Alderman. 23 It was called Hascall, Alderman & Brown’s Dry Goods and Groceries. Charles Alderman’s mother was Vesta Alderman, who had married Amasa Hascall after Phoebe Hascall died 17 October 1852. Charles Alderman was a lifelong Democrat who would serve as Goshen’s mayor from 1875 until 1882. 24 Milo Hascall married Julia Swift of Elkhart on 27 November 1855, and they had only one child, who died in 1857. 25 Julia Swift Hascall would spend plenty of time at the front with her husband. Both she and Melvin Hascall’s wife served as nurses. Milo Hascall’s first wife died on 11 September 1883. Like his father, Milo would re-marry, exchanging vows with Rose Schwarz Miller of Canton, Ohio, on 22 June 1886. 26 Rose Hascall also had been married before and was a Canton socialite. In the 1850s, the Hascall brothers became split politically. While Milo would follow E.W.H. Ellis to the Republican Party on the basis of anti-Nebraska sentiment, both Chauncey and Melvin remained active in the Democratic Party beyond the Civil War. Both held various appointed and elected positions, and Melvin proved to be a War Democrat who served as a colonel in the Civil War. In 1858, a Goshen newspaper printed a song written by Milo Hascall about the good fortunes that awaited the Republicans in the fall election, a song he sang at the party Basket Dinner Meeting in Jefferson Township. 27 In the summer of 1858, he was considered for county treasurer but came in second to friend and future banking partner John W. Irwin. 28 At this time, Milo Hascall was both an attorney and a real estate agent.

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63 In the summer of 1859, Republicans chose Hascall to stand for county clerk on the same ticket with Erastus Ellis, who ran for county auditor, and future partner Irwin, who ran for treasurer. The Goshen Times made the case for Hascall’s election, saying that the attorney “is a zealous, active, and earnest Republican – battles for the cause valiantly, through good and through evil report. He is capable, honest, and deserving.” 29 On 11 October 1859, Hascall won the clerk’s race, and Ellis and Irwin also won. Republicans swept the county-wide slate of offices. 30 Hascall would serve on the Central Committee of the Elkhart County Republican Party the following spring when it decided its candidates for the 1860 fall elections. The Elkhart Republicans backed Abraham Lincoln for president. On June 22, 1860, Republicans of the Tenth Congressional District met at Kendalville. That day Hascall introduced a resolution allowing members of the minority of county or district conventions to vote independently of the majority, and “the resolution was finally laid upon the table.” 31 That is, it did not pass The tide in Elkhart County shifted from the Democrats to the Republicans in the election of 1854. The Republican majority continued to expand in 1856, and Milo Hascall rode with that rising tide. The Goshen Democrat blamed the Democracy’s setbacks on Methodists. “They are made up for the most part of uneducated and selfish men, as little acquainted with the laws which govern them as they are faithful to the religion they profess to teach.” 32 The Democrats’ attack on Methodism was due in large part to temperance, which Hoosier Republicans accepted in forming a coalition with Free Soilers, Know Nothings, moderate Whigs, and anti-Nebraska Democrats. The Hascalls’ prominence in Goshen was both political and social. They were so prominent that the building where they worked was called “Hascall’s Building,” and it

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64 was located on “Hascall’s lot.” 33 Later, there would be a Hascall Hall and a Hascall Hotel. A typical advertisement for Milo Hascall’s law and real estate practice would request potential clients to call on him at Hascall’s Building, “first door to the left up stairs.” 34 Indiana Society at Mid-Century The state that Milo Smith Hascall lived in was a relatively young one. Indiana had become a state in 1816, and at mid-century it still in many ways resembled a frontier society. Since farming was the rule and most people lived in rural areas, life was fairly stark – planting and harvesting, followed by long winters and unpredictable springs. Hoosiers tended to be Jeffersonian-Jacksonian in political sentiment, believing in small farms, small towns, and small government. The emphasis was on democracy, republicanism, equality, limited government, and laissez-faire capitalism. Hoosiers were frugal and spent little money on government. The governor received no salary, and streets in cities were unpaved and unlit. Garbage was not collected, and rarely did towns build sewage systems. Lawlessness was not uncommon, and public services were scant. Private security forces performed the role of the police, and vigilantism occurred frequently. Newspaper editors kept shotguns in their printing offices in case of a surprise attack by disgruntled readers or members of the opposition party. 35 It was this violent and frontier society in which press suppression took place in 1863. Indeed, throughout the Civil War years in Indiana, violence and threatened violence against the press was routine. Indeed, twenty-seven percent of Democratic newspapers in the state experienced acts of violence against them during the Civil War. 36 Yet significant change was taking place. Most of the pioneers had already moved farther west to the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains, and they left “cleared fields and

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65 peaceful communities” in Indiana by mid-century. 37 Civilization in the form of churches, schools, newspapers, theaters, railroads, and the telegraph tempered the “bleakness of western life” and began to erode the sense of Indiana being the frontier. 38 Similarly, railroad construction in the 1850s was extensive. In 1850, the Hoosier State had 228 miles of completed track. By 1860, the number of miles jumped to 2,135 – the single greatest increase in railroad mileage in any decade in the state’s history. 39 The rail business was very profitable during the war. 40 Meanwhile, the population, although it was still overwhelmingly rural, was gradually becoming more urban. In 1850, 95.5 percent of the population was rural, and, by 1860, the figure was 91.4 percent. 41 Indiana had 988,416 people in 1850 and 1,350,428 in 1860. 42 Only Ohio and Illinois had greater populations among the Midwest states in 1860. Another significant change was immigration. The immigrant population of the Hoosier State doubled from 1850 to 1860. 43 Most of those immigrants were Germans and Irish. In 1860, fifty-six percent of the foreign-born residents of Indiana were from Germany, and most of them were artisans and laborers. 44 The Irish comprised twenty percent of the foreign-born population in 1860, most extremely poor. 45 Many Irish came to Indiana escaping the potato famine back home. Illiteracy was high among the Irish, who played a major role in building the canals and railways in the Hoosier State. The majority of the Germans and Irish were Catholics, though some of the Germans were Lutheran, German Evangelical, or Reformed. 46 Another major change was the rapid ascent of the Republican Party in a state that had been dominated been the Democrats for most of its history. In some ways, Indiana

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66 had the hallmarks of developing nation. Democracy, while fully in place, was full of corruption. Immigrants could vote before obtaining citizenship. Both Democrats and Republicans used illegal voters in the election of 1856, and some Democrats voted more than once. Newspaper editors were often political operatives in the state, many of them major players. Editors produced highly partisan sheets – most of them weeklies – that were long on interpretation and short on informative reporting. Editors played crucial roles in helping develop government policies and reader attitudes. Politicians either bought their own newspapers or gave patronage to them in order to gain favorable public opinion in the press. It was as natural for politicians in nineteenth-century Indiana to own or heavily influence newspapers as it is for today’s politicians to hire press secretaries and marketing experts to create advertising strategies. Socially, the Hoosier State tended to be modest and conservative. Hoosiers wanted a quiet, secure lifestyle. They did not have to be overly successful in terms of material gain, but they wanted to have enough to sustain themselves and make a decent living. Their democratic and republican institutions “are diffusing over their citizens the benign influences of domestic quiet, wholesome laws, and the preservation of their civil and religious rights and privileges.” 47 They subscribed wholly to the Bill of Rights, although the State Constitution was written with a built-in sense of responsibility for not abusing the rights and privileges of natural law. One of the reasons for this conservative bent was the fact that the majority of the folks who settled the Hoosier State had come from the South. In 1860, “Indiana still had more Southerners than any other state north of the Ohio,” and, at that time, fifty-seven percent of Indiana’s population was born in Indiana. 48 Hoosiers had brought with them

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67 many of the agriculturally-based attitudes of the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian majority in the South. Farming, family, and putting food on the table were constants. While the majority of Hoosiers had some connection to the South, they wanted little to do with slavery – either the aristocracy of the planter class or the competition and migration of blacks. After the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, most Hoosiers were sympathetic to slaves. Yet colonization remained the preferred solution once abolition had been implemented. Fear of racial mixing in society was the rule in Indiana, though some Quakers in the eastern counties of the state believed in assimilation. Yet the trend was away from Southern-influenced Hoosiers. By 1850, the majority of people who migrated from free states eclipsed those who had migrated to Indiana from slave states. 49 Most Hoosiers came from Ohio, followed by Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and New York, respectively. 50 Emigration from Indiana was significant but did not outpace immigration to the state. However, the rate of exodus did increase during the 1860s and 1870s. 51 Despite Know Nothingism and no major urban area, Indiana’s foreign-born population grew from approximately six percent of the population as a whole to nine percent by 1870. 52 The counties with the highest percentage of foreign-born residents were Vanderburgh, Allen, Marion, Dearborn, and La Porte. 53 By 1870, in Evansville, approximately thirty percent of the population was born in other countries, and the figure was twenty-eight percent in Fort Wayne. 54 Blacks, mainly from the South, did move to Indiana in this period, and the black population of the state was between one and two percent in the 1850s and 1860s. 55 . “One Country, One Constitution, One Destiny” A conservative spirit existed in the Midwest, and this form of conservativism carried with it an anti-secession attitude. “One country, one constitution, one destiny”

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68 was an often-heard rallying cry in Indiana. 56 Historian Kenneth M. Stampp declared that Hoosiers “professed a blatant nationalism and an unwavering faith in the grand future in store for the American nation. ‘Manifest destiny’ was an article of faith and not an empty phrase to be exploited by the demagogic politician.” 57 In general, Hoosiers were thrifty, hard working, skeptical of too much government, placed a great deal of importance on integrity, and believed in free – as opposed to slave – labor. Hoosiers were strongly nationalistic, and they felt the union of states was nearly sacred. Their belief in limited government would be tested in the Civil War. The Democrats would come to believe that much of Lincoln’s approach to the war effort eroded Jeffersonian democracy. During the war, Democratic mass meetings frequently re-endorsed the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798. Indiana’s Democrats were also anxious about the growing power of the military. 58 They feared that overall centralization effort of Lincoln and the Republicans was a revolution that went back to Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, the great Federalists. The U.S. Constitution and national destiny superseded regional interests. “Devotion to the Union was strong in Indiana, and as the growing sectional bitterness between North and South created increasing tensions, Indiana leaders and newspapers repeatedly reaffirmed this devotion” to the union. 59 With unionism so strong, other principles tended to be subordinated. Indiana accepted the Compromise of 1850, as long as it kept the Union together. Hoosiers tended to stay moderate on the issue of the expansion of slavery. Richard W. Thompson, a Whig from Terre Haute, said: “Both Northern and Southern ultra groups went too far. The ultra feelings of neither of these parties have yet – to any great extent – reached the West.” 60 Suspicion and resentment toward the Northeast was universal,

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69 although Democrats tended to be more willing to express this sentiment. Many of Indiana’s citizens felt the needs and wants of the Northeast superseded those of the other major regions of the country, and that the Midwest states were under-represented in national policy-making decisions. Indiana society of the 1850s and 1860s was also diverse. This was due in large part to “the tug of divergent economic forces” – bankers, factory owners, merchants, railroad, timber, farmers, farm hands, mechanics – who did not have one overwhelming interest that kept them together, except of course survival. While almost sixty percent of the society was native born, thirty-seven percent were people who had migrated from other states and ten percent of Indiana’s population was foreign born. In addition to corn, flour, and hogs, Hoosiers also harvested timber. The lumber and furniture industries flourished, with walnut being the wood of choice. The building of the railroads in the 1850s was another major source of industry, and mining was developed in Brazil and Terre Haute. Coal production jumped from nearly 60,000 tons in 1850 to 320,000 tons in 1865. 61 With the railroads came the development of the limestone industry, especially in Bedford and Bloomington. In the southern part of the state, the building of steamboats was a major industry. Centered in Jeffersonville and New Albany, the industry shifted its production to government contracts during the war. Flour grist mills, meatpacking, and the manufacture of farm equipment were also prevalent in the state. Industrial companies in general were rather small enterprises with an average of only 3.5 employees per operation. 62 The wartime economy featured increasing investment. Capital investment grew from $7.75 million in 1850 to $52.05 million in 1870. 63 There was a panic in 1857, but

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70 the war, while straining the monetary system, produced no bank failures in Indiana. Congress introduced greenbacks and placed a tax on state bank notes to try to remove them from circulation. Predictably, Democrats objected to the centralization of the banking industry. Wages generally rose during the war, by about a dollar for most types of labor. Most Hoosiers worked on farms. Manufacturing occupations were fourth behind farming, professional/personal services, and trade/transportation. The economy generally grew during the war, though southern Indiana suffered recession because of the decreased commerce on the Ohio River. Southern-county Hoosiers ignored a law by the governor during the war that made it illegal to send goods to Louisville or further down the Ohio. Pro-Union vigilantes inspected boats, rail cars, and warehouses. 64 A severe economic downturn for the entire state would not come until eight years after the war ended. Slavery and Temperance The biggest social issues in these two decades were slavery and temperance. One legacy of migration from the South was the complex history of race in Indiana, and this is a key to understanding the mindset of most Democratic newspaper editors in Indiana during the Civil War. Before it became a state, Indiana had slavery, even though it was not supposed to exist under the bylaws of the Northwest Ordinance. Yet antislavery forces won the day in the first state constitutional convention in 1816. Slavery was prohibited by the first constitution, which included a provision making it impossible to ever introduce slavery into the state, but no such provision was made for segregationist measures. 65 Indiana would develop anti-black laws at later constitutional conventions. Historian Emma Lou Thornbrough, who has written extensively about race in Indiana, observes:

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71 “There were few persons who wanted to see slavery introduced into the state, but there was widespread and intense race prejudice and fear of the competition of Negro labor – due in part to the fact that a large part of the population of Indiana came from the nonslaveholding class of southern whites.” 66 Like most Midwesterners, Hoosiers wanted little to do with blacks. They wanted a sanctuary from what they considered the messy conditions in the South. Hoosiers felt the slave-owning planters were immoral and indecent for forcing others to do their work for no pay, but they also felt that blacks were an inferior race. Negrophobia was not just commonplace. It was the mindset of almost all Hoosiers. “The result was a proscriptive code designed to keep the small Negro population in an inferior position and to prevent the settlement of Negroes from the slave states,” Thornbrough wrote. 67 Blacks represented only 1 percent of the population, and anti-black codes of the mid-century were severe. A Negro was defined as anyone with one-eighth or more of “black blood.” Hoosier laws stated that only white men could vote, and blacks could not testify in court if a white man was a party in the case. Intermarriage was forbidden. Blacks had to post bond if they entered the state, which was forfeited if one was charged with a crime. Blacks were not allowed to enter the state to settle. Those blacks already in the state were encouraged to colonize elsewhere. 68 Not until after the war were black children able to attend public schools. They were not allowed in public schools even if they paid their own tuition. One group consistently protested against these race-based laws, the Quakers in eastern Indiana. Many of the Quakers migrated to Indiana from North Carolina, where their anti-slavery views were not tolerated in public, including in newspapers. So

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72 sympathetic to the black condition were the Quakers that they took part in the underground networks that helped runaway slaves move to sanctuary in the North and Canada. Fugitive slaves frequented Quaker towns, and the Underground Railroad went through Richmond. Indiana Quakers saved freed blacks from being returned to the South and provided education for black children. 69 Many Christians found it hard to reconcile black inferiority with Christian dogma. Yet few Hoosiers advocated abolition and assimilation. They believed the fact was that the United States was a white nation, and that blacks faced few prospects for success in the country. Since blacks could never attain equality in the state, assimilation would establish a permanent underclass. Thus, even the most open-minded Hoosiers preferred the colonization solution. The Indiana Colonization Society was formed in 1829. It hoped to colonize freed blacks in Africa, where they would sow the seeds of Christianity. 70 Indiana’s race policy could be summed up succinctly: Prevent blacks from moving in and move out blacks living in the state. Many Quakers thought expatriation was unrighteous and opposed it. Almost everybody else thought it was the best solution. “Almost every session of the Indiana legislature passed a resolution in favor of colonization. In his message to the General Assembly in 1850 Governor Wright pointed out that both southern and northern states were adopting increasingly harsh measures toward free Negroes and urged that Indiana take her stand ‘in this great struggle for the separation of the black man from the white,’ as the only means of ameliorating the condition of the unfortunate Negro.” 71 The Indiana legislature started a colonization fund in 1852. From 1852 until 1865, a law remained on the books in Indiana that provided for

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73 this fund. The state legislature also petitioned Congress to use federal funds to colonize blacks. Some Hoosiers saw through the sham of colonization and began to move toward an abolitionist point of view. The militant antislavery movement developed slowly in Indiana, probably because racism was too deep-seated in large part because of the feeling of separateness that whites coming mainly from the South had adopted earlier in the nineteenth century. It remained small even through the war. The slavery issue caused a schism in one denomination. The Old School and New School Presbyterians split in 1837. The New School Presbyterians “bombarded every General Assembly of the church with memorials on the subject of slavery.” 72 Henry Ward Beecher of Lawrenceburg saw that colonization and abolition were polar opposites on a moral scale. The Methodist newspaper The True Wesleyan withdrew from the church because the Methodist Church in Indiana would not exclude slaveholders from membership. 73 The recently formed Disciples of Christ tended to stay away from the race issue. Alexander Campbell, the founder of the Indianapolis-based church, wanted to let abolitionists and anti-abolitionists grapple this slavery among themselves. Meanwhile, Ovid Butler, founder of what would become Butler University, believed in universal brotherhood. He preached against enforcement of Fugitive Slave Law. Another schism developed among Quakers, this one over abolition and who owned the issue. The Indiana Yearly Meeting of Anti-Slavery Friends closed its churches to antislavery lectures. The Indiana Quaker church wanted the drive against slavery to come from within. The Quaker church in the state did not want its member taking part in other antislavery associations.

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74 Eventually, Quakers who remained active in other antislavery societies split with the main church in the state and formed the Indiana Yearly Meeting of the Anti-Slavery Friends. 74 This group opposed both slavery and colonization. It represented about eight percent of the Quakers in Indiana. Some Quakers thought that agitating against slavery should not be done in public ways or through political action, but that it should remain a spiritual matter. Religious Life in the 1850s and 1860s While the Quakers were influential, they were relatively small in numbers and confined mainly to the eastern part of Indiana. Methodists and Baptists were the most numerous denominations in the state, followed by the Presbyterians and the Disciples of Christ. Catholic numbers were rising in the northern part of the state, especially in Fort Wayne, which had considerable immigration of Irish and Germans. There were only two Congregational churches in the state, according to the 1850 census. The Bible and God were referred to frequently, and biblical authority was often invoked in public speeches and writing. A reference to God was included in the 1851 preamble to the Indiana Constitution, which emphasized democracy and a gracious and providential God: “We the people of the State of Indiana, grateful to Almighty God for the free exercise of the right to choose our own form of government.” 75 For the powerful Methodists, conscience was the key to life. They believed in keeping their lives and faith simple. Earnest prayer was critical to salvation. Religion was important component of the social order of mid-century Indiana. Sunday was a day of rest and worship. While religion was a mainstay in Indiana society in the 1850s, ministers did not make much money. Typically, ministers made approximately $100 per year. That increased to approximately $600 by 1863. Salary was not always paid in cash. Food,

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75 clothing, and furniture were also used as payment. 76 The use of itinerants was not uncommon, especially among Baptists, the state’s second largest denomination. Baptist itinerants received about half the pay of Methodist ministers. Revivals, conversions, the teaching of morals, and imparting information from the Bible were key elements of Hoosier religion. Sunday school was a major part of the process, though their numbers declined during the war. 77 Churches prohibited the playing of games on Sunday, including the new sport of baseball, because they diminished the importance of the spiritual matters. The sale of alcohol was banned on Sundays. Things loosened up during the war. The expansion of the rail system also had an impact on the piety of Hoosiers. Germans were blamed for turning the Sabbath into a day of pleasure. 78 The need to raise troops to fight the war would cause a decline in attendance. Yet some congregations experienced revivals during the war because of the strong emotions raised by the political questions and the deaths of so many thousands of soldiers. Prayers became more oriented toward victory and survival and less toward spiritual matters. Ministers served as chaplains, and some Methodists preachers recruited troops or enlisted themselves. 79 Churches played a key role in education as Sunday schools nurtured reading. However, Indiana was behind the other Northern states in public education. At the time of Indiana Constitutional Convention in 1851, it had the lowest literacy rate of any Northern state because it “had never levied a tax or paid out money for an educational purpose.” 80 Caleb Mills, a classics professor at Wabash College, castigated the state for not doing something about the education of its young. Mills felt spending for education would outweigh the consequences of not educating Hoosier children. 81 Part of the

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76 problem was that Hoosiers believed public schools mainly benefited the poor and therefore were of relatively insignificant value for taxpayers. Furthermore, Hoosiers felt education was solely a local priority and that the state government should stay out of the schooling business. The 1851 state constitutional convention began to turn the tide in favor of public education by providing for common schools with free tuition and open admissions. 82 Accordingly, the constitution provided for a state superintendent of public instruction, a paid position. The common (public) schools were supported by state taxes, and local authorities administered the schools. Indiana schoolhouses were small and generally inadequate, but by 1859 nearly 700 had been built and 7,500 by 1865. 83 Teaching was not a full-time occupation, and teachers received approximately $50 to $60 a year in pay. In part, the salary was low because of an Indiana Supreme Court ruling that made it illegal for local townships to supplement or pay for teachers’ salaries. 84 During the war, education went backwards. Schools were closed for several years at a time, especially in southern Indiana. Bills were proposed in the General Assembly to make it legal for localities to raise taxes for education, but they languished and were never passed. One fruit of the war was that Governor Oliver P. Morton extended common schools admissions to blacks in 1865. Church-sponsored education tended to be rare and was found mainly in places were there was a lack of common schools. Catholics built the most extensive education program of the church schools. Approximately twenty-five percent of the parishes in Indiana had parochial schools by 1850. 85 Indiana’s Politics in the 1850s and 1860s Politically, slavery also was a complex issue. The anti-slavery Liberty Party came to Indiana in 1841. Liberty Party leader Stephen S. Harding of Ripley County thought the

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77 U.S. Constitution was antislavery and that the founding fathers “had not expected it to be perpetuated.” 86 The major result of the Mexican War in the late 1840s was that the U.S. had to decide the nature of new territories – whether they would be free or slave. Generally, at the start of the 1850s, both Democrats and Whigs supported the principles of the Wilmot Proviso, which meant that they opposed the spread of slavery in the territories. David Wilmot was a first-term Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania. His amendment to an appropriations bill said that there would be no slavery in any territory coming from Republic of Mexico. The Wilmot Proviso became the seeds of sectional conflict for the next two decades. It came out of Northern Democrats getting weary of Southern dominance of the party, and it was payback for Southern Democrats sabotaging the Van Buren campaign in 1844. Wilmot was not pro-black and did not want to see blacks diffuse throughout the continent. He knew most Western settlers wanted no blacks in the territories – free or slave. Unlike many Quakers and others who sympathized with the plight of Africans in North American, Wilmot was not a humanist. For men like Wilmot, outlawing slavery in the territories was just politics. Gideon Welles, a Connecticut Democrat who would later serve as Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, voiced the thoughts most Hoosiers were thinking about the slavery-in-the-territories question: “we are not to extend the institution of slavery as a result of this war.” 87 Meanwhile, in response to the James K. Polk administration’s conquering of the vast Mexican territories, the Free Soil Party was established in 1848, and both Hoosier Whigs and Democrats began to adopt Free Soil policies. George W. Julian, a Free Soil Party member, was elected to Congress from eastern Indiana. The

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78 progressive Julian, who benefited from Democratic support, not only opposed slavery but also believed in a woman’s right to vote. Paris C. Dunning, the Democratic Governor of Indiana in the late 1840s and early 1850s, said in 1849 that the slave states had the right to own slaves, but that Congress had the power to prohibit slavery in newly conquered territories. Dunning termed slavery “a baleful influence.” 88 Then came the Compromise of 1850, and political diversity took off in Indiana. Because of the gold rush, California came into the U.S. with no pair. Oregon would also come in without a paired slave state in the southwestern territories. California was very conservative. Indeed, its first two senators were Democrats. Yet it was a free state. The chief architects of the Compromise of 1850 were two nearby senators, Whig Henry Clay of Kentucky and Democrat Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. In carving up the Mexican territories won by Polk and in response to the policies of the Zachary Taylor administration, Congress decided to admit California as a free state, though its political makeup was favorable to the Democrats and the South. Meanwhile, Utah and New Mexico would be allowed to have popular sovereignty – that is, they would choose whether they would be slave or free. Slavery was adopted in both states, but both states had few slaves. The slave trade was abolished in Washington, D.C. Furthermore, the Fugitive Slave Law was made more stringent. The Compromise of 1850 passed narrowly and mirrored the fragile regional divisions in the country. Indiana’s Democrats Prefer to Compromise with the South In the 1850s, the pro-Democrat Indiana State Sentinel editor Jacob P. Chapman opposed slavery in general and its extension in the territories in particular. Indiana Democratic Congressman Graham N. Fitch chastised Southern Democrats who talked about secession over admitting California as a free state. Joseph A. Wright, Indiana’s

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79 governor from 1849 until 1857, supported the Compromise of 1850. In general, though, Hoosiers believed in compromising with the Southerners to prevent disunion, and they wanted to take advantage of the anti-Taylor sentiment created by the president’s policy of making new free states out of the territories conquered in the Mexican War. Taylor, a Southern Whig who owned slaves, pushed for California and New Mexico coming in as free-labor states. This actually worked in the Democrats’ favor. Southern Democrats felt betrayed, and the Whigs lost their appeal nationwide. Whigs in Indiana remained in a compromise position – no extension of slavery in the territories and no right to interfere with slavery in the state where it already existed. Hoosier Democrats, though, were alarmed by the Compromise. They wanted to avoid irritating their Southern brethren. Union was more important than limiting the expansion of slavery. Most Hoosier Democrats figured that a good chunk of the territories would not be hospitable for a slave system because of the climate and topography. Thus, slavery in the territories was more about a large political argument than a reality for human beings, so they took an attitude of compromise with the South. As the 1850s began, the Democrats began to distance themselves from the Free Soil principles that they had adopted in 1849. A sort of weariness over slavery began to emerge in Indiana. Hoosier Democrats focused on what they termed the “finality” of the Compromise. It was the final solution to the slavery problem, and Democrats in the state wanted no more agitation from either extreme. In order to preserve the peace and save the union, Democrats wanted it to be as far as either side would go. The entire Hoosier delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives voted for a resolution that stated that the Compromise of 1850 was the final law on slavery and that further agitation against

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80 slavery was unwarranted. The Indiana Democratic state convention endorsed the same resolution in 1852. Perhaps in large part because this was the sentiment of most Hoosiers, Democrats dominated the election results in the state in 1852. Democrats dominated politics in Indiana. Only in 1836 and 1840 had Indiana voted for a Whig. Democrats had a stranglehold on Indiana from 1842 until the Civil War. In 1850, Democrats controlled the legislature, all state officers were Democrats, both U.S. Senators were Democrats, and eight of the ten congressmen from Indiana were Democrats. Approximately two-thirds of the representatives to the 1850 Indiana Constitutional Convention were Democrats. The Democrats placed the emphasis on a strict interpretation of the Constitution, limited government, low tariffs, and opposition to monopolies. Most Hoosier Democrats opposed slavery. Yet some Democratic editors who opposed slavery nonetheless worried about what would happen with its abolition. Mainly, they were concerned about the flow of blacks to the North if slavery ended. They worried blacks would increase the competition for jobs. These Democratic editors wanted a program in place to deal with the dramatic change in U.S. society if abolition should come to pass. Meanwhile, the Indiana Whigs were smaller in numbers than Democrats and generally lacked cohesion. What kept them together was their dislike for Democrats. Whigs were also held together in part because most admired Henry Clay of Kentucky. Hoosier Whigs tended to be bankers, attorneys, businessmen, or newspapermen. John D. Defrees, owner of the Indianapolis Journal who had migrated to Indiana from Tennessee, was one of the leading Whigs in the state. Schuyler Colfax, editor of South Bend

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81 Register, was another prominent Whig. Born in Virginia, Richard W. Thompson of Terre Haute, supported government aid to the railroads, but Thompson was no friend of the abolitionists. The Whigs would disappear in the 1850s but were resurrected as the Republicans and would become one of the most significant political entities in U.S. history. Indiana Whigs opposed the extension of slavery in the territories, but they refused to advocate interference in states that already had slavery. Hoosiers in general felt more comfortable with a conservative policy of accepting the constitutional status quo – a basically free-labor North and a slave-labor South. Racial equality was an abstraction to most Hoosiers, and the few Quakers and Free Soilers who might be for it were too much in the minority. This was part of a larger national pattern: “During the 1850s, the Free Soilers and Republicans tried to enact black suffrage in a few other Northern states, but failed So pervasive was racism in many parts of the North that no party could win if it endorsed full racial equality.” 89 Both Hoosier Democrats and Whigs (Republicans) did not see ending slavery in the South as a winning political issue. The best policy was to avoid it through compromise. Another key social issue in Indiana was temperance. In 1847, Indiana legislature passed a law that allowed townships to have referendum that would determine if liquor licenses would be issued in those localities. 90 German and Irish immigrants, a fast-growing segment of the population, opposed restrictions on alcohol. Furthermore, distillery owners in the state, many of whom were German, opposed restrictions on the sale of alcohol. Many ordinary citizens thought the campaign to make all drinkers of spirits into devils went too far. 91 Some Democrats opposed temperance laws because it would lead to the seizure and destruction of private property, which they deemed as

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82 unconstitutional as taking a Southern planters’ slaves. These factors made Hoosier politicians a little hesitant on temperance. Indiana had several temperance publications, including John W. Osborn’s Temperance Advocate. Other issues did not quite take off the way slavery and temperance did. The Right to vote for women had little popular support in Indiana. Still, in 1859, Dr. Mary F. Thomas of Richmond presented a petition with more than a thousand signatures on it to the state legislature asking for equal political rights for women. Thomas spoke before the legislature, the first time in Indiana history that a woman had done so. Peace activism also made only a small ripple in the political currents. Thornbrough notes: “Some of the same persons who were interested in the antislavery and temperance movements were interested in the peace movement. A convention of delegates from various parts of the state met in Indianapolis in June, 1851, to pass resolutions approving the objects of the World Peace Convention which was to meet at Frankfurt-am-Main in 1851. Jeremiah Sullivan was president of the convention.” 92 Generally, though, pacifism met with little interest in the state, in part because Quakers were focused on antislavery. Partisanship was hallmark of Indiana politics as the Civil War approached. Politics was a non-stop activity in Indiana in the 1850s and 1860s. Article I of the 1816 Indiana State Constitution: “We declare, That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights; among which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” 93 In 1852, Democrats put up Franklin Pierce on a states’ right, pro-Compromise-of-1850 platform. Meanwhile, Winfield Scott won the nomination of the Whigs, who said

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83 they would acquiesce to the Compromise of 1850. The Free Soilers chose John P. Hale on a platform that opposed the Compromise of 1852. Pierce won, and the Whigs and Free Soilers were dead. Nationally, the rise of the Republicans came directly from the 4 January 1854 bill by Committee on the Territories chairman Stephen A. Douglas that called for popular sovereignty in the territories. It was a bill that would organize the land west and northwest of Missouri. The Nebraska Territory included Nebraska, most of the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming, part of Idaho, and part of Colorado. Missouri did not want to be surrounded on three sides by free states, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act in effect repealed the Missouri Compromise. It opened the way to a new free-for-all to determine which new states coming out of territories would be slave and which free. Douglas maintained that the Compromise of 1850 itself had repealed the Missouri Compromise because it made popular sovereignty the law of the land above 36-30. Douglas felt that the climate would prevent slavery from taking in much of the Nebraska Territory. The bill was a victory for Southern Democrats, but it also woke up the North as abolitionists now had their issue. Protest meetings took place all over the North in the spring and summer of 1854. There was a fusion of Whigs, disaffected Democrats, Free Soilers, and Know Nothings. “The Republicans took over the Free Soil commitment to the principle of the Wilmont Proviso as heir central tenet: no slavery in the territories, no more slave states.” 94 The Kansas-Nebraska Act came continued the process of diversifying Hoosier politics. Kansas-Nebraska splintered the Democrats into two main groups, those who opposed the repeal of Missouri Compromise of 1820 and those who went along with President Pierce,

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84 including Jesse D. Bright, Indiana’s three-term U.S. Senator. The former saw the Missouri Compromise as a solemn pledge. 95 What the Missouri Compromise had established was a political algebra as Americans colonized the continent. Missouri came in as a slave state, while Maine came in as a free state. From that point forward, for every slave state admitted, a free state would be admitted every time the country expanded. The supporters of Kansas-Nebraska took their cue from the Indiana State Sentinel, which branded its opponents as abolitionists. 96 Another Democratic paper in Indianapolis countered that most Democratic newspaper editors in the state did not favor Kansas-Nebraska. 97 In the long run, majority of the Hoosier congressional delegation caved and supported the act. Only two Democrats and one Whig from Indiana voted against Kansas-Nebraska as it made its way through the U.S. House, and both Hoosier senators voted for it. 98 Yet this made for chaos. In district meetings, many Hoosier Democrats expressed disapproval of Kansas-Nebraska, and they were “read out of the party.” 99 These men began to talk of forming a new political party that opposed popular sovereignty. Many of those Hoosier Democrats who opposed Kansas-Nebraska also were for temperance. Indiana Democrats had opposed extension of slavery in 1848 and 1849. Now, with Douglas’s popular sovereignty, they were allowing territorial citizens to decide the question. This was a reversal of policy. Democrats claimed that in neither Kansas nor Nebraska there was a majority for slavery within the state. Immigration was another major social and political issue. In 1850, there were 55,000 aliens in the state. By 1860, that number had reached 110,000. 100 Indiana only required one year of residence for aliens to acquire the right to vote, as long as the stated

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85 their intention to become citizens. This was a Democratic measure, and most German and Irish immigrants were pro-Democratic because of it. Some Whigs became attracted to the Know Nothing movement, which was anti-immigrant in character. Whigs wanted to see the elimination of the right to vote for aliens who had not become citizens yet. The Know Nothing movement, also known the American Party, diffused rapidly in Indiana, replacing the Whigs. The Know Nothings in Indiana were anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant. 101 Their main goal was to see that only U.S. natives voted and were elected to political office. The People’s Party was a fusion of old Whigs, anti-Nebraska Democrats, some Know Nothings, and Free Soilers, who had renamed themselves Free Democrats. 102 Anti-Nebraska and pro-prohibition, the People’s Party would become the Republican Party. Their main goals were the restoration of the principles of the Missouri Compromise and preventing the extension of slavery into the territories. Hoosier Democrats, who had a stranglehold on Indiana politics since 1840, now found themselves vulnerable. Although they had opposed the extension of slavery in 1849 and 1849, the Democrats now supported Douglas and popular sovereignty. To many, this made the Democrats look like they were proslavery. The Indiana State Sentinel said that no Hoosier Democrat if he were living in Kansas or Nebraska would vote for slavery. The newspaper added that self-determination and states’ rights were valuable principles in a democratic society. 103 So the Peoples Party focused on antislavery. The Democrats countered with charges of anti-immigrant bias because the Fusionists included the Know Nothings. To broaden their base, the Fusionists included pro-temperance men. 104 That was perhaps the

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86 decisive facts as the Peoples Party swept the elections of 1854, when prohibition became the law in Indiana. 105 However, prohibition was short-lived. Judge Samuel Perkins of the Indiana Supreme Court ruled the prohibition law was unconstitutional in 1855. Perkins, who also was editor of the Richmond Jeffersonian, was commenting on the arrest of German-born citizen who had been arrested for breaking the prohibition law (need a footnote; See Richmond and Indy papers). Judge Perkins, a Democrat, feared a Hoosier revolution if prohibition remained the law of the state. “News of the decision was telegraphed throughout the state, and the saloons were back in business,” Thornbrough noted. 106 The Peoples Party would have a temperance plank in 1856, but it was not a major issue in that election. 107 Just as temperance became a liability for the emerging Republican Party, the Democrats were beginning to find that favoring Kansas-Nebraska was a losing position for them. In Kansas, where men from other states were agitating for slavery, popularity sovereignty was a sham. Meanwhile, Hoosiers began to move to Kansas in 1856, and they had a close-up view of what was happening in a territory that would achieve statehood on Jan. 29, 1861. With these migrating Hoosiers writing relatives, friends, and business associates back home, Indiana was more interested in popular sovereignty issue than most Northerners. Attitudes Toward Slavery Issues involving slavery were also becoming more important to Hoosiers. The Fugitive Slave Law provision of the Compromise of 1850 frustrated many Hoosier politicians, but they supported it in order to avoid disunion. While Democratic editors tended to uphold the law, Republican editors abhorred it but gave in because it was the law of the land and that lawlessness was unacceptable. Overall, the Fugitive Slave Law

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87 strengthened antislavery sentiment in Indiana. Hoosiers viewed runaway slaves sympathetically, and the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin in 1852 opened the eyes of an even higher percentage of Hoosiers. Sympathy for freed slaves increased and focused attention on an Indianapolis resident named John Freeman. A black, Freeman had lived in Indianapolis for a decade before a man from Missouri tried to arrest him and return him to his owner in the slave state that was farthest north and west. Although Freeman was jailed for more than two months, he was freed because there was no proof that he was the escaped slave for whom the Missouri man was looking. 108 The case further turned public opinion in the state against the Compromise and Kansas-Nebraska. Between 1840 and 1860, two Democrats dominated Indiana politics, Jesse D. Bright and Joseph A. Wright. Bright was Indiana’s U.S. senator from 1845 to 1862, while Wright was governor from 1849 to 1857. Wright and Bright were rivals. Bright, who lived in Madison, had moved to Indiana from New York. He owned land in Kentucky that was worked by slaves. Because he served three terms, Bright built considerable power in the U.S. Senate. He was mentioned as a presidential candidate in 1857. Wright, a Methodist, had come to Indiana from Pennsylvania as a boy. He had grown up on a poor farm. Wright was for colonization, temperance, and agriculture. In 1856, Indiana’s Democrats endorsed popular sovereignty, supported Bright for president, and condemned the anti-immigrant mindset of the Know Nothings. Other than Bright, Ashbel P. Willard became the top man in the Democratic Party in the state. Willard, the lieutenant governor under Wright, was nominated for the governor’s post in 1856. Bright wanted to be president, but he failed to earn enough national support to make his candidacy feasible. He disdained Douglas of Illinois and settled on James

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88 Buchanan, who would become the Democratic candidate to face Republican John C. Fremont. The Indiana Republicans were a fragile group. A few Hoosier Whigs switched to the Democracy because they thought the Peoples Party was too sectional in nature. 109 Some Free Soil men were upset with Indiana Republicans for not being more anti-slavery. The Peoples Party platform called for the immediate admission of Kansas as a free state and a five-year requirement for naturalization. The party opposed any extension of slavery in the territories and declared that immigrants could not vote before they became citizens of the state. In 1856, the Peoples Party chose as its gubernatorial candidate Oliver P. Morton, who would become the state’s most powerful politician during the Civil War. Morton, a former Democrat, moved away from the Democrats because he opposed the Wilmot Proviso and wanted stay out of the slavery issue. Morton was also uneasy with popular sovereignty. In the late 1850s, both Democrats and Republicans in Indiana considered themselves to be conservatives. Republicans in Indiana wanted to conserve the integrity of the Missouri Compromise, with one new free-labor state for every new slave stated admitted. The Democrats thought they were conserving the limited-government principles of the Founding Fathers. The Whig faction of the Republicans said they were conservatives because they had been around so long. The Whigs continued to praise the legacy of Henry Clay. They claimed that if Clay were alive in 1856, he would have been a Republican. These Hoosier Whigs denounced radical Republicans as abolitionists who would cause disunion. The Whig Republicans wanted no part of such disharmony.

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89 Democrats, meanwhile, wanted to conserve the social order in Indiana and began to appeal more and more to Hoosiers’ Negrophobia. In the October 1856 elections, Willard defeated Morton by less than 6,000 votes. 110 Among the key issues in the campaign with South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks’ cane attack on Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner and the political turmoil in Kansas. Sumner delivered a speech titled “The Crime Against Kansas,” and Brooks caned Sumner for what he called libel against his cousin, South Carolina Senator Andrew Butler. Brooks was praised profusely in the South, but Hoosiers were outraged. Hoosier Democrats openly used the race card and charged Republicans with being amalgamationists who would give blacks full equality, with that leading to intermarriage. 111 Appeals to save white girls from black husbands abounded. Overall, Democrats sustained power in Indiana. In November of 1856, Buchanan defeated Fremont by approximately 24,000 votes in Indiana. 112 Democrats maintained both U.S. Senate seats and six seats in the U.S. House – compared to five for the Republicans. One new trend found some German-born Hoosiers switching to the Republicans. By 1860, only one of eight German-language newspapers in the state supported Douglas. In 1856, Republicans swept Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin while making major inroads in Illinois. The Democrats maintained a majority in the Indiana House, but the Republicans, with two Know Nothings joining an alliance, held a one-vote edge in the Indiana State Senate. Thus, the Republican influence in the Hoosier State was growing quickly. During the 1856 campaign, Republicans and Democrats seemed civilized enough. They often rode together as they made speeches across the state. On the day of the

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90 election, voting irregularities were common in Indiana. Thornbrough notes that state law “required the voter to vote in the township or precinct in which he resided, and inspectors were required to sweat that they would ‘not knowingly’ permit an unqualified person to vote, but there was no provision for voter registration and no guarantee that election boards would be bipartisan.” 113 Some voters were paid to vote. Candidates provided the ballots, and the state provided locked ballot boxes. “Candidates tried to have their ballots printed on a distinctive type and color of paper – a practice which made it easy to determine whether or not voters voted that they were paid to do.” 114 Governor Wright, who left office in 1857, feared election corruption would lead to rule by an “unlicensed mob.” 115 Republicans said that Democrats, mostly Irish immigrants, voted more than once. Democrats countered that Republicans in some counties brought in voters from other counties to vote for Republicans in local elections. 116 Because the Republicans had a majority in the Indiana Senate, the state was left in gridlock until 1861. In 1857, the two houses were in such a stalemate that they failed to act on budget issues before the session was over. Accordingly, Indiana failed to raise revenue and appropriate money to state operations in 1857. Because of this financial crisis, the Indiana institute for the blind and the state hospital for the insane had to be closed for a few months. 117 Events in Kansas began to shape Democratic national politics, and there was fallout in Indiana. In 1857, President Buchanan and Senator Douglas of Illinois battle over Kansas. The territorial government, favoring slavery, held a constitutional convention at Lecompton, Kansas. The Lecompton constitution made it impossible to abolish slavery in Kansas. Because he wanted the Kansas question to be settled, Buchanan accepted

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91 Lecompton. Douglas, though, was convinced that the majority of the people in Kansas wanted it to be free. Indiana’s senators and its eight Democratic congressmen voted for Lecompton, but the people of Indiana seemed more on Douglas’ side. Thirty Democratic newspapers in the state condemned Lecompton, and three-fourths of the Democratic press in the state opposed Lecompton. 118 Under the leadership of Morton, Republicans improved to seven seats from Indiana for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1858, a gain of two seats, and, as the 1850s ended, the Republican Party was growing in the northern part of the state where Goshen’s Milo Smith Hascall would come down on the Democrats the hardest in 1863. Hascall knew Indiana. He knew there would be less opposition to General Order No. 9 in the northern part of the state, and he believed Republican editors would actively endorse his no-dissent policy. The Election of 1860 Hoosier Republicans put success over principle in 1860. The wanted a winner for president. The major goal: Republicans wanted to win a majority in the Indiana legislature. This would be so they could elect a Republican to the U.S. Senate and could re-district the state to suit their desires. Yet Republicans were not united on their view on slavery. “Except for a handful of old Free Soil-Liberty men Republicans were inclined to be cautious and to try to do nothing which might alienate the most conservative old-line Whigs in southern Indiana.” 119 The pragmatic Morton believed it was best to put slavery on the back burner. Hoosier Republicans, though, did oppose the extension of slavery into the territories. Indiana’s Republicans supported Abraham Lincoln for president in 1860. A former Whig and a Midwestern, Lincoln was seen as a moderate, as less likely to support

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92 the abolitionist agenda the way Seward would. Lincoln also would appeal to Republican conservative and be more attractive to German voters than Edward Bates, the Missourian who had been a Know Nothing supporter in 1856. 120 Hoosier Republicans opposed William H. Seward because he was too radical and wanted a candidate who could win Indiana – and nationally. Thus, Lincoln was their man. Both Morton and Henry S. Lane, a banker, lawyer, and former congressman from Crawfordsville, held that nominating Seward would lead to Republican defeat in Indiana. Lane was nominated for governor and Morton for lieutenant governor. But Lane would be made senator if Republicans won the Indiana legislature, and Morton would move into the governor’s seat. Democrats in Indiana supported Douglas. Because of this, Bright lost his power in the state. Popular sovereignty remained the key plank for Democrats, who also endorsed the Dred Scott decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. For governor, Democrats nominated Thomas A. Hendricks. Indiana Democrats stuck with Douglas through the Charleston and Baltimore conventions. Indiana Democrats were infuriated with Southern Democrats for splitting up the party, privately believing “that the Democratic split insured a Republican victory.” 121 Meanwhile, Bright supported Breckenridge and worked to wrestle control of the Democrats back. He constructed a newspaper in Indianapolis called the Old Line Guard to promote his views and policies. Lane, who had fought in the Mexican War, said Republicans could live with the compromises in the Constitution over slavery. Lane also supported the Fugitive Slave Act. Morton said slavery should be prohibited in the territories and opposed the Dred Scott decision. Scott was a Missouri slave of an Army surgeon who had lived in Illinois and Wisconsin. Illinois was a free state, and Wisconsin

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93 had been a free territory at the time Scott lived there. The owner died in 1846, and Scott sued his heirs for freedom. The case made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled Scott was still a slave, not a citizen, and his sojourn in free states or territories did not free him. Indiana Republicans condemned the decision. Democrats pushed the image of Republicans seeing blacks as being equal, especially when it came to suffrage. Some Democrats warned that Republican policies would lead to black migration to Indiana. This would put blacks in competition for white-held jobs. Democrats also claimed that Republicans favored blacks more than poor white immigrants – a theme that would continue through the Civil War. Morton began to claim that slavery in the territories would inhibit white emigration to the West. Indirectly, this meant that slavery was actually beneficial to Indiana because it would keep whites in the state from moving westward. However, Morton was not about to make this argument. In 1860, Indiana Republicans requested that Seward avoid the state during the campaign. In October, Lane won the U.S. Senate seat and Morton won the gubernatorial race, and Republicans gained a seven-to-five edge in the Hoosier delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives. Republicans now held both the state house and senate. Then, in November, Lincoln won Indiana and the national vote. With a Republican in the White House, the Democratic editors of Indiana worried that the Southern states would secede. When South Carolina seceded, the Hoosier union sentiment stayed firm. Both Republicans and Democrats in Indiana called for compromise and avoiding the use of force to stop secession. The pro-Republican Indianapolis Journal wrote that the Southern states did not have the right to secede, but it also said that war was horrible. The Journal argued for the return of the Missouri

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94 Compromise line and the abolition of personal liberty laws, which forbade Indiana officers from aiding in the arrest of fugitive slaves or using their jails for holding runaway slaves – an example of states’ rights in a Northern state. Union meetings were called throughout the state. Hoosiers held tenaciously to the concept of one nation. The hope was that the seceding states would see their folly and eventually return to the fold. Both Republicans and Democrats in the state thought the secession crisis was temporary, and the union would be restored by summer, if not sooner. One man in Indiana began to clamor for putting the rebellion down with force, and that was the governor elect. Morton claimed in November of 1860 that coercion was merely enforcement of the law: “If it was worth a bloody struggle to establish this nation, it is worth one to preserve it.” 122 Public opinion began to shift after Morton’s speech, but still the majority in Indiana favored compromise and peace. Democrats in particular began to think Morton was agitating for war. The economic situation was a major issue. A business slump occurred at the end of 1860 and beginning of 1861. The southern part of Indiana had closer ties to the South because the Ohio River was a major transportation outlet to the rest of the world. Southern-county Hoosiers did not want to be on the boundary between hostile nations. They feared what would happen if they could not sell their goods down the river and onward to the Mississippi River and New Orleans. Stagnation was the rule in the counties along the Ohio River. The legislature passed the Felonies Act, which made it illegal to correspond with or sell commerce to the Confederates, and Morton tried to prevent Hoosiers in the southern part of the state from sending goods down the river to sell in Louisville or New Orleans. 123 As a consequence, southern-county Hoosiers asked for

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95 relief from the state government. However, legislators from the northern part of the state had little interest in relief, and the two sides did not reach a compromise. Morton sent a Hoosier delegation to a peace conference in Virginia in February 1861, but Morton thought war was inevitable. The governor was impatient with Lincoln’s seeming inactivity and went to Washington, D.C., in March to express his support of a tough policy on the South. Morton also told the president that Indiana would supply troops for the military force that would be needed to quell the rebellion. Some Democratic editors thought Indiana should side with the South for economic reasons. They believed that Indiana had more in common with the Southern states than with New England. They also felt that choosing Lincoln would mean choosing rail as the main way to transport goods, as opposed to choosing the river routes to the South. Then the Confederate occupation of Fort Sumter occurred on 13 April 1861. Democratic newspaper editors in Indiana blamed what they considered to be an abolition administration in Washington. This was due in large part to the presence of Seward in Lincoln’s cabinet. Soon, though, most of the newspapers in the state support the necessity of putting down the rebellion. The pro-Democratic Indiana State Sentinel said it supported Lincoln and union, but that it had the right to criticize the policies of the Republicans. Even Democratic newspapers that did not want to fight secession believed a large federal force should be raised to protect the federal capital. Patriotism replaced partisanship in the spring of 1861. Union became the rallying cry for almost all Hoosiers. Morton began to see himself as a war governor. On 24 April 1861, he proclaimed: “We have passed from the field of argument to the solemn fact of war.” 124 A resolution of the legislature announced that Indiana was firmly behind the

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96 defense of the U.S. government, and that Indiana would provide men and money for war. “Although the war which was beginning ultimately resulted in a vast expansion of Federal powers and a diminution in the role of the states, much or the war effort, particularly in the early stages, was borne directly by the states. The role of the war governors was of crucial importance, and no governor played his role more valiantly or effectively than did Morton.” 125 Hascall: A Morton Man Morton’s role was to raise troops. In Goshen, Hascall was a Morton man. The attorney helped lead the enlistment campaign in Elkhart County, where the pro-war sentiment was high. Indiana raised more troops than the federal quota required. Morton also had to purchase the arms for Indiana soldiers to fight the war. In effect, the governor was building up his own power base. Not only was his the political leader of the state, he was also Indiana’s military leader, though he never dressed in uniform. Morton was so pro-war that he took little time in raising troops. He wanted aggressive action taken against the Confederates. Morton had purchased arms and supplies for Indiana troops, who received supplies – blankets, underclothes, utensils – from citizen donations. 126 Indeed, Morton and the federals generally did not get along. He thought Indiana was being neglected and constantly let the Lincoln administration know his views on the war. Morton was very concerned about his neighbor to the South. Lincoln had a go-slow policy on Kentucky. The president did not want to lose the slave state. He thought it was of strategic value. He was sure that a tough policy would push public opinion in favor of joining the Lower South. Morton wanted none of that. He thought rebel forces in Kentucky needed to be dealt with severely. Morton wanted Indiana troops in West Virginia to be relocated in Kentucky.

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97 Thornbrough observes that the counties in southern Indian feared Kentucky would secede and “thus bring the boundary of the Confederacy to the Ohio River. Lincoln’s policy of seeming inaction, which was based on advice from Union men in Kentucky to wait for the Confederates to strike the first blow, was viewed with scorn and impatience by the active Morton. The latter sought to interfere personally in Kentucky’s affairs and urged the occupation of strategic points in Kentucky by Union forces.” 127 Yet Lincoln would not budge. Morton had his critics, too, including Michael C. Garber, editor of the Madison Courier. Garber wrote that Morton kept the troops in the center of the state and failed to protect the southern border of Indiana from potential marauders from Kentucky. Garber also complained that Morton was awarding state contracts to out-of-state bidders rather than Hoosier businessmen. 128 Morton and the federal authorities clashed over recruitment policies and the care of Indiana’s troops. Morton was anxious that Indiana’s soldiers would be treated as second-class citizens. The governor was providing thousands of men to fight the war. He was asking them to die for their state and country, and he wanted them to receive the recognition and compensation that he felt they deserved. While Hoosiers were eager to fight in 1861, they did not have a general agreement on why they were fighting. In 1861, the legislature passed resolutions stating Indiana should not support a war of aggression against slavery of any other constitutional rights belonging to any state. Most Hoosiers supported the Crittendon resolution of July 1861, which would revert back to the east-west line of the Missouri Compromise. The rallying cry for Crittendon was the “Constitution as it is, the government as it was.” 129 Democrats were critical of both abolition and secession. Democrats were middle men. The Indiana

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98 State Sentinel said that the union must be preserved, and that it could not be preserved by abolition. Most Hoosier Republicans were cautious about the slave issue. Worried anti-slavery talk might turn voters against the Republicans. They also worried about losing the slave states that had stayed in the Union. Pro-abolition Republicans believed that since slavery had been the reason for the war, abolition was its logical objective. In the long term, peace could only be maintained through universal emancipation. Schuyler Colfax, the St. Joseph Valley Register editor and congressman from South Bend, wanted to confiscate slaves in the South because they gave the Confederates’ strength at home. Colfax argued that slaves were doing the behind-the-scenes work that kept the Rebel army marching. Liberate the slaves, Colfax held, and the South’s military machine would fall apart. It was addition by subtraction, and, for Republicans like Colfax, abolition became a military measure. 130 By 1863, this would be a policy that would divide Indiana along party lines, with Republicans accepting emancipation as a war measure and Democrats viewing it as a social goal that wreck havoc on the state after the war. Meanwhile, the militia of the state had to be organized. In the spring of 1861, Morton had little difficulty getting volunteers. Hoosiers were eager to serve. In fact, no matter how it is computed, Indiana ranked second in the percentage of her population that served in the Union military. The problem was there were more volunteers than there were arms and provisions. After Fort Sumter, Lincoln initially only called for 4,000 men from Indiana, but more than 12,000 volunteered from the Hoosier State in less than a week and Morton offered 10,000 to the U.S. Army on 15 April 1861. 131 Hascall, for instance, raised a large continent of volunteers from Elkhart County, but it was late in

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99 getting to Camp Morton in Indianapolis and had to be sent back home. 132 Individuals who were not picked in their hometown units also wandered into camp. Some men volunteered in the spirit of unionism. Others looked forward to adventure. Still others needed the money, and others “saw through the field of active military service the road to future success.” 133 Two major problems that Morton faced were the fact that there had been no regular militia in twenty-five years and a dearth of officers in the state. Only a handful of West Point graduates lived in Indiana, including Goshen attorney Hascall. Other West Point alumni included Thomas A. Morris and Joseph J. Reynolds. Several Hoosiers had fought in the Mexican War, including Lew Wallace, whom Governor Morton appointed to the office of Adjutant General after Sumter. Regimental commands were offered to men who performed recruiting duties in their hometowns. Morton also went after prominent Republicans around the state, many of whom, like Hascall and Wallace, had been Democrats only a decade before. Early in the war, in the spirit of unity that ruled in Indiana, Morton also rewarded Democrats with commands. 134 Commissions and advancement in the Indiana militia depended largely on Morton’s approval. Yet, as time passed, companies began to elect their own officers. 135 In the summer of 1861, Morton signed the Six Regiments Act. It established six regiments to form a brigade that would serve for three months. Hascall served as a captain and aide-de-camp under Brigadier General Thomas A. Morris. Some of those regiments had been organized and drilling on their own before the war began. 136 Most of the men in the original six regiments re-enlisted for three years when their three months were up later in 1861. Overall, Indiana would organize fifty-three infantry regiments,

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100 three cavalry regiments, and twelve batteries of artillery in the first year of the war. Most regiments came from the same county, but some were based on nationality, such as the all-German Thirty-Second and the all-Irish Thirty-Fifth. 137 Enlistments would begin to lag during the following winter. The war went on longer than expected, and the coldness of winter dampened the war spirit. The war news was marginally better in the spring of 1862, especially with victories on the western front. Sensing the end might be near and that it had enough troops to finish the job, the federal War Department stopped recruiting volunteers. Morton, of course, was so pro-war that he just acted as if Washington had not stopped the recruiting process. 138 When the Lincoln administration realized the war was not going to end in the summer of 1861 as the military tide turned in favor of the Confederacy, Morton discovered a new state of affairs in Indiana: men did not want to enlist. Mostly, these were farmers who did not want to fight while it was time to plant, manage, and harvest their crops. The governor urged Lincoln to adopt a conscription policy. 139 Congress authorized Lincoln to start a preliminary draft on 17 July 1862, and the second most controversial government policy of the war was borne. Only emancipation would cause more controversy in Indiana. The development and maintenance of the draft would severely test civil liberties – and civil authority – in the Hoosier State. Notes 1 Stephen E. Towne, “West Point Letter s of Cadet Milo S. Hascall, 1848-1850,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 90, No. 3, September 1994, 278. 2 “The Hascall Family in America,” Bentley Fa mily Papers, Center for Archives Collection, Jerome Library, Bowling Green State Univ ersity, Bowling Green, Ohio, MS-720, Box 6, Folder 2, 7.

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101 3 Ibid., 7. 4 Ibid., 9. 5 Ibid., 18. 6 Towne, 1994, 289. 7 Ibid., 290. 8 Ibid., 286-87. 9 Ibid., 293. See footnote 38. 10 “Hascall Family in America,” 19. 11 Ebenezer Mattoon Chamberlain, “Journal of Chamberlain of a Trip from Maine to Indiana in 1832,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 1919. Chamberlain calls the prairie of northern Indian a “the glory of the we st.” He adds, “There is something new and wild and romantic in the country of this region, which notwithstanding the absence of th e long friends, and that social intercourse in the jarring elements of society here to which I have b een accustomed, in the land I remembered with fond regret, has tolerably reconciled me to th is place.” Chamberlain said the farmers of the region were “pleasant,” and he enjoyed spear-fishing for pike and sturgeon in the little lakes of Elkhart County. 12 Ibid. 13 “Hascall Family in American,” 19. Ebenezer Mattoon Chamberlain said that one of the reasons he migrated to Indiana was because the standards for obtaining the bar were lower in Indiana. Chamberlain had read for three years under Elisha H. Allen in Bangor from 1829 to 1832. He said he would have to “r ead law three years longer” in Maine, but “I could save one of two years’ practice in the profession” by m oving to Indiana. See “Journal of Ebenezer Mattoon Chamberlain, 1832-1935,” in Bentley Family Papers, Center for Archives Collection, Jerome Library, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, MS-720. 14 Charles W. Taylor, Biographical Sketches and Review of the Bench and Bar of Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Bench and Bar Publishing, 1895), 165. Also see Leander J. Monks, ed., Courts and Lawyers of Indiana, Volume II (Indianapolis, IN: Federal Publishing Company, 1916) 474. 15 See Benjamin Hoover v. George Hoover, William a Shafer, and R.M. Randall as an example, Elkhart County, Indiana, Times , Nov. 25, 1858. Benjamin Hoover sought foreclosure against George Hoover, Shaf er, and Randall in Common Pleas Court.

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102 16 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 5 November 1846. 17 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 5 November 1846. 18 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 5 November 1846. 19 John W. Miller, Indiana Newspaper Bibliography (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), 98-99. Melvin B. Hascall owned the Goshen Democrat in 1873. Frank L. Hascall owned the Goshen News from 1954 until the 1980s. 20 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 14 January 1847. 21 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 26 June 26 1858. 22 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 6 April 1853. 23 Elkhart County, Indiana, Times, 6 May 1858. 24 Towne, 1994, 281. 25 “Hascall Family in America,” 20. 26 Ibid., 21. 27 Elkhart County, Indiana, Times, 24 June 1858. 28 Elkhart County, Indiana, Times, 8 July 1858. 29 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 6 October 1859. 30 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 3 November 1859. 31 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 28 June 1860. 32 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 15 October 1858. 33 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 16 July 1856. 34 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, 16 July 1856. 35 Phillip J. Tichenor, “Copperheadism and Community Conflict in Two Rivertowns: Civil War Press Battles in Prairie du Chien and La Crosse, Wisconsin, 1861-1865,” presented at the Symposium on the 19th Century press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, Chattanooga, Tennessee, October 2002, 8.

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103 36 Stephen E. Towne, “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War,” presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Oct. 31, 2003, 7. 37 Kenneth M. Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1949), 1. 38 Ibid., 1. 39 James G. Randall and David Herbert Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1969), 8. 40 William H.H. Terrell, Indiana in the War of the Rebellion: Report of Adjutant General of Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: 1859), Vol. 1, 396. Republished in 1960 by the Indiana Historical Bureau (one volume, 603 pages). 41 Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1995), 363. 42 Randall and Donald, 5-6. 43 United States Bureau of the Census, 10th Census, I, 431. 44 Thornbrough, 547-549. Many Germans who came to Indiana were escaping the failing potato crop back home. Others came for political reasons after the uprisings in 1848. While the first generation of Germans belonged to the bottom half of the socioeconomic spectrum, they would rise quickly in Indiana. By 1880, many were businessmen, especially in the brewery business. Others owned theaters. Germans were also represented well as attorneys and physicians. 45 Ibid., 553. 46 Ibid., 549. 47 Indiana State Board of Agriculture, Annual Report, (Indianapolis, IN: 1851), 255. 48 Stampp, 2. 49 Thornbrough, 540. 50 Ibid., 540. 51 Ibid., 541. 52 Ibid., 545.

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104 53 United States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census, I, 431-432. 54 Thornbrough, 547. 55 Thornbrough, 541. 56 Joseph A. Wright, An Address Delivered at the Installation of Rev. L. W. Berry, D.D., as President of Indiana Asbury University, July 16, 1850 (Indianapolis, IN: 1850), 15. 57 Stampp, 3. 58 Ibid., 191. 59 Thornbrough, 3. 60 William W. Woollen, Richard W. Thompson Papers (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Division, Indiana State Library, June 8, 1847 manuscript), 355. 61 United States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census (1880), XV, 646-647. 62 Ibid., 928-931. 63 Ibid., 928-931. 64 Stampp, 79. 65 Thornbrough, 13. 66 Ibid., 13-14. 67 Ibid., 14. 68 Ibid., 14-15. 69 Ibid., 16. 70 Ibid., 16. 71 Ibid., 17. 72 Ibid., 21. 73 Ibid., 22.

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105 74 Ibid., 24. 75 Charles Kettleborough, editor, 1851 Indiana Constitution, Manuscript Constitution, (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, Indiana State Library). 76 Thornbrough, 599. 77 Ibid., 618. 78 Ibid., 622-623. 79 Estel Neace, “Methodism in Indiana during the Civil War,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis (Indianapolis, IN: Butler University, 1961), 21-22. 80 Thornbrough, 462. 81 Charles W. Moores, “Caleb Mills and the Indiana School System” (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society Publications, III, No. 6, 1905), 414. 82 Indiana State Constitution of 1851, Article VIII, Section 1. 83 Thornbrough, 469, 476. 84 Ibid., 470. 85 See Charles Blanchard, History of the Catholic Church in Indiana (Logansport, IN: two volumes, 1898). 86 Ibid., 25. 87 Eric Foner, “The Wilmot Proviso Revisited,” Journal of American History, 61 (September 1969), 270. 88 Thornbrough, 28. 89 James McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, Third Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 90. 90 Thornbrough, 32. 91 Ibid., 33. 92 Ibid., 37. See the Indianapolis Indiana State Sentinel, June 15, 1851. 93 Kettleborough, 1851 Indiana Constitution.

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106 94 McPherson, Ordeal By Fire, 101. 95 Thornbrough, 55. 96 For more information about the rise of the Republicans in Indiana, see Roger H. Van Bolt, “Indiana in Political Transition, 1851-1853,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 49, 1953, 131-160. 97 Indiana Free Democrat, Feb. 16, 1854. 98 Thornbrough, 56. 99 Ibid., 57. 100 United States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census (1880), I, 431. 101 Thornbrough, 61. 102 Ibid., 61. The Know-Nothing movement in the 1840s and 1850s was a coalition of secret societies and minority political parties that joined forces with the Whigs in 1854. Their main purpose was to serve as a political and cultural blocking force against immigrants, especially Irish and German Roman Catholics. The Free Soil Party opposed slavery’s expansion into the territories and advocated the federal government’s giving away land in the West. Free Soilers were attempting to move away from some of the labor issues that arose in the East as immigration engulfed the coastal cities. Their slogan was “free soil, free speech, free labor, and free men.” 103 Indianapolis, IN, Indiana State Sentinel, September 8, 1854. 104 Thornbrough, 64. 105 Ibid., 67; The Indiana prohibition law made it illegal to manufacture and sell alcohol, except for medicinal purposes. 106 Ibid., 68. 107 Ibid., 69. 108 Ibid., 51. 109 In Indiana, the party that would become the Republican Party still called itself the Peoples Party in 1856. At that time, Whigs were gaining greater control of this fusion party. 110 Thornbrough, 76.

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107 111 Ibid., 75. 112 Ibid., 76. 113 Ibid., 40. 114 Ibid., 40. 115 Ibid., 41. 116 Ibid., 77. 117 Ibid., 79. 118 Ibid., 80. 119 Ibid., 85. 120 Ibid., 87. 121 Ibid., 89. 122 Thornbrough, 101. Also see fn. 30; in William Dudley Foulke, Life of Oliver P. Morton, Including His Important Speeches, Bowen-Merrrill, Indianapolis, 1898, Volume I, 87-93. 123 Stampp, 78. 124 Thornbrough, 106. 125 Ibid., 107. 126 Terrell, 8. 127 Ibid., 108. 128 Stampp, 85. 129 Frank L. Klement, Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), 1. While Clement L. Vallandigham was best known for saying the “Union as it was” line, it is not clear who originated it. Daniel W. Voorhees frequently said it in his speeches, and many Democratic editors in Indiana adopted it as a political slogan. 130 Thornbrough, 114.

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108 131 Ibid., 124. Terrell, 5. Since the militia was a state entity, it had to be offered over to the federal government to fight the war. It was as if Lincoln and the War Department were renting out the troops from the various states in the North. 132 Pictorial and Biographical Memoirs of Elkhart and St. Joseph Counties, Indiana (Chicago, IL: Goodspeed Brothers, 1893) 721. 133 Stampp, 88. 134 Thornbrough, 130. 135 Ibid., 131. 136 Ibid., 125. Also see Catharine Merrill, The Soldier of Indiana in the War for the Union, two volumes (Indianapolis, IN: Merrill and Company, 1866-1869). 137 Ibid., 126. 138 Ibid., 131. 139 Ibid., 131.

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CHAPTER 3 LEGAL, THEORETIC CONTEXT OF FREE PRESS IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA Hascall’s precise understanding of freedom of the press is not known for certain because he did not write anything down about either the First Amendment or the press clause in the Indiana Constitution. It can be inferred that he thought editors ought to act responsibly during the war. He did write a letter in the Goshen Republican newspaper attacking the “disloyal” course that the Goshen Democratic paper was taking early in the war. 1 Of course, that was the same Democratic paper his brother had owned in the 1840s and would again in the 1870s. Clearly, though, Hascall’s General Order No. 9 was in opposition to the general spirit of press freedom on both the state and federal constitutions. Yet is also true that conceptualizations of freedom of the press had little development in the nineteenth century, especially in state and federal courts. That would come in the twentieth century with such cases as Gitlow v. New York, Near v. Minnesota, and New York Times v. Sullivan. 2 Still, even in a frontier state like Indiana, journalists generally understood freedom of the press in the libertarian sense, but neither the federal or state constitutions offered guidance about constraints on press behavior in wartime. Social, political, and economic conditions have a role to play in the relative degree of freedom of the press. For example, wartime conditions have generally meant a contraction of the area of freedom for the press, while peacetime has generally meant an expansion. Likewise, the interpretation of the courts, both state and federal, has had an affect on press freedom, as have political events. Because each state has its own press 109

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110 clause, there has never been one unchangeable and universal concept of press freedom in the United States. Societal needs also have had a role in interpreting the degree of freedom of expression. A typical reading found an expansion of press freedom for the party in power and a reduction for the party out of power. This was particularly the case during the party press era of the nineteenth century, the time period this study examines. Yet it was also the case during the Revolutionary War period. A level of hypocrisy existed in that Americans espoused civil rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press, but they opposed free expression by those loyal to the colonial governments. This freedom of the press for majority-party journalists was a view held by journalists. Meanwhile, legal and historical perspectives about First Amendment rights are different. Constitutional scholars and journalism historians have not developed a consensus about what the framers understood about free expression, especially during a time of extreme political crisis such as a civil war. In large part, this is because the framers did not write down their views on the application of the principles in the First Amendment, no records exist of the debates on the amendment. 3 Ultimately, the adopted First Amendment is very concise and somewhat ambiguous, and its current understanding has developed through historical, social, political, and professional challenges to the understanding that posits a broad area of freedom of expression. Still, it is true that the freedom of the press in the United States comes out of tradition that feared a strong central government, and the general principle – the rule, not the exception – in the nation’s history has been that newspaper printers, publishers, and editors have printed with minimal government restraints. 4 In large part, this protectivist

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111 stance originated because the United States was founded in an independence movement with a firm basis in freedom of thought, conscience, and expression, including the freedom of the press. That the leadership of the thirteen original colonies attacked the British monarchy with words, as well as arms, had no small role in the adoption of a strong free-press tradition in the nation’s history. This led to the adoption of the Virginia Declaration of Rights free press clause when the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution. From there, though, the First Amendment has undergone a voyage that has not always stayed the course of the revolutionary era. 5 Instead, as the nation has developed and faced different political, social, and economic situations, freedom of the press has been interpreted in more than one fixed way. Moreover, the free-expression tradition of today includes a right for the people to be informed. Yet nowhere in Madison’s early or final draft of the First Amendment does he mention this right. This quasi-right has evolved over time as a natural outgrowth of the freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and the right to utter public criticism. The free-press clause of the First Amendment may imply the public’s right to be informed, but it is not stated explicitly. The right to know goes back to John Milton in the Areopagitica. 6 Borrowing From the British The U.S. principle of freedom of the press derives from the British tradition of the common law, in which Sir William Blackstone held that the government could not exercise prior restraint but could punish after publication through seditious libel laws. The U.S. tradition of free expression, then, comes as a response to 300 years of press restrictions that included those seditious libel laws, as well as licensing and printer bonds. 7 One view of the First Amendment is that it repudiates the English common law

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112 and allows for greater freedom of expression that British citizens had in the eighteenth century. 8 In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton was skeptical about any definition of freedom of the press that did not “leave the utmost latitude for evasion.” For Hamilton, freedom of the press was desirable, but any successful description in a constitution was impractical. He said it was dependent on public opinion, the spirit of the times, and the sentiment of the government. 9 The American free press tradition started with the trial of the New-York Weekly Journal printer John Peter Zenger in 1735. This case, which resulted in jury nullification because the jury ignored the narrow instructions of the judge, helped establish a precedent that juries could return not guilty verdicts in seditious libel cases and that truth could be a defense, as opposed to the defense trying to distance itself from the actual publishing of offending words. 10 Legally, though, it did nothing to change seditious libel. 11 What it did, though, was change public opinion. Gradually, Americans came to view truthful public criticism of government, based on skepticism, as legitimate expression. Thus, a resistance to government prosecutions of seditious libel developed in pre-revolutionary English North America, and prior restraint became less widely accepted. 12 Americans came to believe, in the words of historian Leonard W. Levy, “intemperance in governing justified intemperance in expression” and that criticism of an arbitrary administrator, if true, is not criminal. 13 The British colonial government did not stop trying to silence its critics. Contempt of the colonial legislative assembly replaced seditious libel as the manner in which the government tried to silence wayward printers. First Amendment scholar Don R. Pember wrote that American printers were incarcerated and fined “for publications previously

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113 considered seditious.” 14 Yet newspaper printers began to write what they pleased, setting the tone for the next 270-odd years of American journalism. Overall, the area of press freedom expanded, as did the diversity of ideas and thoughts on a variety of subjects – from politics to religion to science. The American Revolution continued the pattern of expansive press freedom, and the failure of Articles of Confederation and the original Constitution to contain a list of civil rights, including freedom of the press, was highly controversial and led directly to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The reasons for free expression, including the freedom of the press, include the discovery of truth through the sampling a multiplicity of ideas. Moreover, participation in democracy is enhanced by a free exchange of ideas and the advancement of knowledge, while an open forum provides for a check on abuse of power by government officials. The free flow of information allows society to better diagnose, understand, and solve its problems, and, under natural law, human beings tend to desire to express themselves without inhibitions because it leads to self-fulfillment. 15 James Madison, the Virginia statesman, was a primary architect of the First Amendment. Madison, a firm believer in freedom of religion and a states’ rights advocate who wanted a limited central government, was skeptical about a national bill of rights because he thought the state constitutions had sovereignty and because he feared that changing the instrument would become too easy and too routine. 16 Other framers said many natural or inherent rights existed and that it would be inconsistent to list some and not others. 17 Yet Madison changed his mind for political reasons and wanted to see the inclusion of the amendments to the Constitution. 18 He wanted to see an enumeration of

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114 acknowledged principles because he feared that a powerful legislature might enact laws that would tightly control the press. 19 Madison’s 1789 work on a select committee in the United States Houses of Representative centered on the careful inspection of free-expression clauses in the various state constitutions. Madison, who emphasized free conscience and freely practicing religion, pushed through an amendment that would become the federal free-expression standard. The first draft stated: “No state should infringe the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, nor the right of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press.” 20 Madison felt this amendment was the most important one, though at the time it was actually the fourteenth, not the first. However, the Senate rejected it because it gave the states the power to prohibit or not prohibit. The language was re-written, resulting in the existing First Amendment, and a total of twelve amendments were sent to President George Washington in September of 1789. Ten of those were ratified on December 15, 1791. Adams’ Sedition Act The first major challenge to the First Amendment came less than a decade later in the form of the Sedition Act. In 1798, President John Adams, a Federalist, pushed this law through Congress. The Sedition Act, which came out of a partisan debate, made it illegal to print false, scandalous, and malicious words about the president, Congress, or the federal government, exempting only the vice president, which was held by Republican Thomas Jefferson. Under the Sedition Act, the federal government convicted fourteen editors, all Republicans, and three Republican newspapers faced suspension. 21 Jefferson wrote: “The object of that [act] is the suppression of the Whig [Republican] press.” 22 The

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115 Federalists thought the Constitution gave Congress the power to pass seditious libel laws and insisted on the Blackstonian interpretation of freedom of the press. 23 Scholar Jeffrey A. Smith noted that the government arrested journalists for publicly declared statements of opinion that were neither impossible to prove as being true nor false. One journalist received a fine and nine-month jail sentence for a pro-Jeffersonian election pamphlet that “accused the president of being a ‘professional aristocrat’ and ‘hoary headed incendiary’ who wanted to embroil the country in a war with France. Realizing that it would not be used against them, Federalist journalists had called for the statute and urged its use against the ‘Gallic’ competitors.” 24 The lone Federalist skeptic in the Sedition Act debate was John Marshall, who thought it was intended to “create, unnecessarily, discontents and jealousies.” 25 Much the same partisan arguing would take place in Indiana in 1863, with Republicans supporting suppression and Democrats invoking a libertarian view of freedom of the press. Jefferson won the presidency in 1800, and he released all jailed under the Sedition Act and let the bill die during his term. 26 Madison and Jefferson vigorously denounced the Sedition Act, claiming that the First Amendment protects freedom of expression by congressional restraint and denies the federal government from being able to try individuals for sedition. Under the Virginia Report of 1799-1800, the Virginia General Assembly adopted Madison’s interpretations, and Jefferson’s opinions were published in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. 27 Jefferson centered his arguments on the rule of reason, the sovereignty of the people over the government, and the right of the people to unrestricted discussion in a democracy. 28

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116 Jefferson and Madison leaned toward a libertarian view of freedom of expression. Libertarians see freedom of expression in terms of principle. They are not concerned with pragmatism or compromise but see the right to expression as a natural inclination and that no other human being or group of human beings should prevent that person from thinking, saying, or writing what he pleases. The libertarian is an absolutist. That is, in his view, there are no limits on free expression. In examining the issue in the colonial and revolutionary periods, Levy came to the conclusion that there was no purely libertarian view of freedom of expression during the constitution-framing years and reasoned that the Sedition Act was the turning point in the history of the First Amendment. Levy was of the opinion that seditious libel under the common law did not disappear with the American Revolution and Constitution. He also held that the framers formed no consensus about the nature of expression. However, the Republican response to the Sedition Act was libertarian in nature, and while it was a partisan view, it “launched the rapid emergence of the new libertarianism in America.” 29 Levy showed that legal and journalistic interpretations of freedom of the press have developed over time. With the exception of Madison, every other major figure in the early stages of the nation’s history was rarely consistent in his understanding of free expression. 30 Madison made libertarian defenses of freedom of the press from the time of his work on the select committee until he was president. The Sedition Act The first major challenge to the First Amendment came less than a decade later in the form of the Sedition Act. In 1798, President John Adams, a Federalist, pushed this law through Congress. The Sedition Act, which came out of a partisan debate, made it illegal to print false, scandalous, and malicious words about the president, Congress, or

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117 the federal government, exempting only the vice president, which was held by Republican Thomas Jefferson. Under the Sedition Act, the federal government convicted fourteen editors, all Republicans, and three Republican newspapers faced suspension. 31 Jefferson wrote: “The object of that [act] is the suppression of the Whig [Republican] press.” 32 The Federalists thought the Constitution gave Congress the power to pass seditious libel laws and insisted on the Blackstonian interpretation of freedom of the press. 33 Scholar Jeffrey A. Smith noted that the government arrested journalists for publicly declared statements of opinion that were neither impossible to prove as being true nor false. One journalist received a fine and nine-month jail sentence for a pro-Jeffersonian election pamphlet that “accused the president of being a ‘professional aristocrat’ and ‘hoary headed incendiary’ who wanted to embroil the country in a war with France. Realizing that it would not be used against them, Federalist journalists had called for the statute and urged its use against the ‘Gallic’ competitors.” 34 The lone Federalist skeptic in the Sedition Act debate was John Marshall, who thought it was intended to “create, unnecessarily, discontents and jealousies.” 35 Much the same partisan arguing would take place in Indiana in 1863, with Republicans supporting suppression and Democrats invoking a libertarian view of freedom of the press. Jefferson won the presidency in 1800, and he released all jailed under the Sedition Act and let the bill die during his term. 36 Madison and Jefferson vigorously denounced the Sedition Act, claiming that the First Amendment protects freedom of expression by congressional restraint and denies the federal government from being able to try individuals for sedition. Under the Virginia Report of 1799-1800, the Virginia General

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118 Assembly adopted Madison’s interpretations, and Jefferson’s opinions were published in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. 37 Jefferson centered his arguments on the rule of reason, the sovereignty of the people over the government, and the right of the people to unrestricted discussion in a democracy. 38 Jefferson and Madison leaned toward a libertarian view of freedom of expression. Libertarians see freedom of expression in terms of principle. They are not concerned with pragmatism or compromise but see the right to expression as a natural inclination and that no other human being or group of human beings should prevent that person from thinking, saying, or writing what he pleases. The libertarian is an absolutist. That is, in his view, there are no limits on free expression. In examining the issue in the colonial and revolutionary periods, Levy came to the conclusion that there was no purely libertarian view of freedom of expression during the constitution-framing years and reasoned that the Sedition Act was the turning point in the history of the First Amendment. Levy was of the opinion that seditious libel under the common law did not disappear with the American Revolution and Constitution. He also held that the framers formed no consensus about the nature of expression. However, the Republican response to the Sedition Act was libertarian in nature, and while it was a partisan view, it “launched the rapid emergence of the new libertarianism in America.” 39 Levy showed that legal and journalistic interpretations of freedom of the press have developed over time. With the exception of Madison, every other major figure in the early stages of the nation’s history was rarely consistent in his understanding of free expression. 40 Madison made libertarian defenses of freedom of the press from the time of his work on the select committee until he was president.

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119 Freedom of the Press in the Nineteenth Century Generally, there was little legal action on the First Amendment front during the nineteenth century. When the Civil War came, the First Amendment had faced challenges during the War of 1812 and Mexican War, and on the state level with the anti-abolitionist laws of Southern states. Yet it had rarely been interpreted in the courts, especially on the federal level. 41 Between 1791 and 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court heard only twelve cases involving the First Amendment. Legal scholar Michael Gibson wrote: “the relative silence of the court regarding freedom of expression during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century reflects that the federal government was not attempting to limit the rights of its citizens.” 42 The major pre-Civil War incidents in which the press clause of the First Amendment was tested came during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. Both cases involved military officers suppressing civilian newspapers. At least four Federalist papers were attacked during the War of 1812. General Andrew Jackson declared martial law in New Orleans and censored a Federalist paper in that city. The paper’s editor published a letter critical of Jackson for not lifting martial law once the Treaty of Ghent had been signed. Judge Dominick Hall tried to free the editor with a writ of habeas corpus, but Jackson had Hall banished from New Orleans. Once formal word of the treaty reached Jackson, the judge returned to New Orleans and promptly fined the general $1,000 for contempt of court. Madison, by then the president, asked Jackson to report on the matter. Jackson claimed military necessity required him to act against the press. The president did not punish his military officer, but he did say that Jackson acted unconstitutionally and would have to answer to the Constitution. 43

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120 It was not clear if the Articles of War applied to civilians, nor was it clear who had the authority to impose martial law. Jackson said he had to submit to the law and paid the fine. Congress would later refund Jackson, but it never cleared his name in the event. Jackson showed an indifference to civil rights when they got in the way of military objectives. He defended himself by saying that unfettered free speech was incompatible with military discipline, and that freedom of the press “is more dangerous when it is made the vehicle of conveying intelligence to the Enemy or exciting to mutiny among the soldiery.” 44 In Jackson’s view, rights could be suspended in the short term to ensure “the permanent preservation of constitutional Rights, & that there could be no question whether it was better to depart, for a moment from the exercise of our dearest privileges, or have them wrested from us forever.” 45 Madison said no words in the Constitution vindicated Jackson’s actions. Although Madison was not moved by Jackson’s interpretation of things, later presidents would be. In many ways, this temporary suspension of rights for their long-term preservation became the basis for the Lincoln-Republican-Union Army defense of what happened in Indiana in the spring of 1863. It was the basis for Lincoln’s argument in the Corning Letter that responded to New York Democrats who opposed the Vallandigham conviction. It is also ironic in that it came from one of the ideological giants of the Democrats, Jackson, who was in many ways the grandfather of American pragmatism and was one of the two gods of Hoosier Democrats at mid-century. Jackson’s heavy-handedness did not end with the War of 1812. He would later try to enact a law that would stop the mailing of antislavery publications to the South. Congress did not buy it. Individual Southern states then passed their own laws. Some

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121 Southern postal carriers decided not to deliver abolitionist mail on their own to avoid mob action. This created a tension because Washington was telling the postmasters to deliver the mail since its delivery conformed to the law of the land. Jackson’s tendency to control the press contrasted with Madison’s hands-off approach. For his part, Madison did not claim an executive prerogative to silence dissident journalists during the War of 1812, one of the few times in U.S. history when the country has been invaded. Madison resisted the urge to suppress, and this was a sign that at least one of the founding father’s preferred libertarian principles to security-first rationales for martial law and suppression of the press. It is not clear if martial law is constitutional – nor is it clear that the United States can declare it in invaded countries. War is rather murky on constitutional issues. Smith observed: “The publications that survived became semi-official voices of the military, printing general orders and poetry submitted by soldiers.” 46 However, attacks by Whig editors back in the United States were not suppressed. Yet, Smith continued, the use of the military in a summary fashion against journalists in remote parts of the country was relative safe policy. “However, inasmuch as military justice exists to retain military discipline and martial law is not authorized by any specific provision of the Constitution, commanders did not have definite authority for their actions against civilians, even if they thought criticism was treasonous,” Smith observed. 47 Polk and the Press During the Mexican War, President James K. Polk, a Democrat, supported the suppression of both American and Mexican newspapers in the war zone. According to historian James McPherson, Manifest Destiny tended to be more attractive to Democrats because they wanted space and wanted it quickly. Republicans wanted to be patient and

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122 were willing to take more time. Historians tend to agree that Polk and the Democrats viewed expansionism partly as a way to increase the number of slave states. Polk wanted to expand U.S. territory, and he countered criticism of his war and war policy by saying his critics were aiding and abetting the enemy. In war zones, U.S. military officers used martial law to suspend civil liberties, including freedom of the press. Ten newspapers – five American and five Mexican – were suppressed by officers in the field. 48 Polk’s party organ in Washington, D.C., the Union, said newspapers in the war zone critical of the administration were treasonous. 49 The leading Whig paper said leadership ought to respect freedom of the press and be able to withstand intensive public criticism. 50 Newspapers printed critical correspondence from soldiers. General Zachary Taylor, a Whig, criticized the war in a personal letter that was leaked to the press, and Polk complained publication of the letter gave aid to the enemy because it contained sensitive information. 51 Taylor replied that the letter was not meant for publication, and it contained nothing of value for the enemy – other than the appearance that a key general opposed the degree of war. He added that other soldiers and politicians had also expressed misgivings about the war. Secretary of War William Marcy brought up Paragraph Sixty-Five of Army regulations: No letter by servicemen should appear in public for at least a month after the termination of a campaign. The Whig congressmen pointed out that uncritical correspondence from soldiers routinely appeared in newspapers like The Union, and the thirty-day rule had been ignored in those pro-war or neutral cases. A pattern developed in which critical newspapers were shut down, censored, or faced economic pressure or the threat of violence, while the surviving papers became the

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123 semiofficial voices of the military. 52 General Ambrose Everts Burnside, who would play prominently in the press suppression of Democratic newspapers in the Midwest in 1863, similarly targeted “disloyal” papers while having a pro-union paper constructed when he conquered eastern North Carolina in 1862. The use of military action against the press of the opposite party’s press far from Washington and New York was much more palatable than jailing the editors of the nation’s most prominent newspapers. Now two precedents existed for the use of martial law to silence the wayward press during wartime. Madison inveighed against Jackson, but did not punish him. Later, the Democrats and Whigs avoided a direct look at civil rights violations in the Mexican War because the president was of one party and the key generals who instituted martial law were of the other party. Polk’s single-minded pursuit of the expansionist war precluded criticism from the Whig editors. Another test was the anti-abolitionist laws in the South from roughly 1830 to 1850. More than thirty abolitionist newspapers were started in the North during this twenty-year span. Lawmakers in the South responded to their abolitionist diatribes by enacting laws making it illegal to criticize slavery because they claimed abolitionist sentiment would incite slave riots. 53 These state laws criminalized the publishing and possession of anti-abolitionist newspapers. The most severe penalty was death, on second offense. Southern states attempted to get extradition on wayward editors from Northern states. They also attempted to suppress the mail. The former never worked, and the latter worked only occasionally. As president, Jackson himself denounced the mailing of incendiary anti-abolitionist publications to the South. 54

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124 Wartime continued to be the time when restraints on the press would be a major issue. During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln, his administration, and the military would undertake a concerted, albeit a fragmented, campaign to control the press, especially Democratic newspapers. Lincoln also took control of the telegraph wires, which were owned by a private company, and his administration stopped the delivery via the mails of certain anti-war, anti-Republican publications. 55 In the twentieth century, the government tried various approaches to control of the press in wartime. In World War I, Congress passed and President Woodrow Wilson signed sedition and espionage acts. The former gave the president the power to create a censorship board and the Committee on Public Information, a propaganda organization. The latter gave the postmaster general the authority to exclude seditious materials from the mails. During World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created an office of censorship and another propaganda department. After graphic coverage of the war in Vietnam – in which nightly television broadcasts from the front lines displayed the savage nature of war – the executive branch decided to be less open, and access to the military and the theaters of operation diminished in the Gulf War and the current war in Iraq. This trend shows that even without a party press, the federal government still has the regulatory itch in times of war, but it also shows that the government had to develop more sophisticated ways to impose press constraints in a highly developed democratic society. This state of affairs contrasted to the relative ease with which Hascall implemented rather Draconian constraints in 1863 Indiana. Indeed, the nature of the press changed dramatically after the Civil War. During the next 140-odd years, U.S. newspapers became less partisan-interpretive and more

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125 commercial-informative. The newspapermen of the Civil War era were working within a party format, especially away from the major Eastern urban areas. In Indiana, every newspaper had a political affiliation, and with the single exception of the Indianapolis Journal, none had a sophisticated commercial orientation yet. The Constitution and the Press Legally, the means for interpreting the legitimacy of suppressing the press in the North – including Indiana – came from three specific sections of the U.S. Constitution. First, the First Amendment states that Congress “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” and guarantees the freedom of religion, speech, press, peaceable assembly and the right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 56 These words of the amendment, written by Madison and based in part on ideas about civil liberties he shared with Jefferson, are bolstered by centuries of libertarian thought. The values that free expression advance include attaining self-fulfillment, practicing self-government, pursuing freedom of thought, checking the misuse of power and resolving conflict. 57 However, there is nothing in the First Amendment about executive control of expression. Although Congress could make no law, the president might be free to fashion press constraints if conditions warranted such action. Yet Indiana Congressman Daniel W. Voorhees argued frequently that the Constitution gave the president no power over the press. Voorhees declared: “If the Congress of the United States cannot, under the Constitution, pass any law interfering with the freedom of speech [or the press], can anybody else do it? No.” 58 The limits imposed on free expression by Lincoln, his administration, and his military officers during the war came from Article I, Section 9 and Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution. Invoking these two sections of the Constitution directly challenged

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126 the free expression tradition not only on the federal but also on the state level. For example, the constitution of Pennsylvania states: “The printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine proceedings of the legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof.” 59 The free expression tradition represented in this state constitution makes no mention of a suspension of free expression at times of war. Meanwhile, Article I, Section 9 touches on the privileges of those charged with federal crimes: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.” 60 Lincoln believed this section gave him the power to imprison citizens of the nation without having to tell them why they were being arrested. The president did not seem to think he needed approval from Congress to arrest and confine of thousands of dissenters. 61 Congress did pass its own Habeas Corpus Act on March 3, 1863, but it did not say whether previous suspensions by the president were legal. 62 During the spring of 1863, Burnside and Hascall used this justification for suspending the writ to bolster their ploy to suppress free expression in the Midwest. This interpretation of executive war powers would receive two major legal challenges. Former Ohio Congressman Clement Laird Vallandigham, arrested by Burnside on May 1, 1863, mounted one of the challenges and the other came from a Hoosier named Lambdin P. Milligan. In the Vallandigham case, the Supreme Court would rule in favor of the Lincoln government, upholding the legality of military commissions in the Northern states during the war. In 1864, the court rebuffed the plea of Vallandigham’s attorney that a civilian court should have tried the Democrat. According

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127 to legal scholar James G. Randall, Vallandigham’s attorney argued: “The charge on which the prisoner was tried was unknown to the law and the sentence was in excess of jurisdiction.” 63 A lower court judge had ruled that the military commissions that tried citizens such as Vallandigham were necessitated by the war situation. 64 The Supreme Court did not say exactly the same thing. In fact, it seemed to duck the whole issue by refusing to review the military commission that tried and convicted Vallandigham. The Supreme Court said it did not have jurisdiction over a military court, and, thus, the decision seemed to justify the lower court judge’s view that the military commissions in the civil war were legal. 65 That Congress was not allowed to review, debate, and vote on such a concept seems to have been missed by not only the Lincoln administration and the wartime Congress, but also by Civil War legal scholars. Two years later, in Ex Parte Milligan, the Supreme Court reversed itself on this issue. A member of two pro-South secret societies, Milligan helped Confederate prisoners gain their release and marched with them into Kentucky and Missouri to return to fighting the Union. 66 A resident of Huntington, Indiana, Milligan had been convicted of treason by a military commission and received a capital sentence. A military commission sentenced Milligan to be hanged on May 19, 1865, which would come after the end of the war. Milligan appealed to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and won. The court announced, “If there was a law to justify this military trial, it is not our province to interfere; if there was not it is our duty to declare the nullity of the whole proceedings.” 67 The decision added that the Constitution does not legitimize martial law for the threat of invasion. Rather, there has to be an actual invasion. At the time of Milligan, the South had not invaded Indiana, although John Morgan had invaded Indiana

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128 and Ohio in the summer of 1863. In effect, the court ruled that the war did not suspend the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Justice David Davis wrote, “the Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, at all times, and under all circumstances.” 68 Randall concluded that Lincoln’s war powers were extensive and if overused, they offered the “opportunity for dictatorship.” 69 However, Randall did not think Lincoln went too far. Congress appeared to check some of Lincoln’s power by requiring prisoners to be indicted in civilian courts, but this was impractical and universally ignored. Randall maintained that the improper use of military commissions in areas not under invasion was exceptional, and that Lincoln was not as disposed as military officers like Burnside to overuse constraints on the press. Randall wrote that in most cases all that occurred was detention, and he called chapter in U.S. law “unfortunate.” 70 Randall concluded that Lincoln and his underlings modestly suppressed the Democrats and their editors. Mark E. Neely, whose Pulitzer Prize-winning The Fate of Liberty confirmed Randall’s study, maintained Lincoln too broadly defined dangerous speech. Yet Neely said Lincoln and his generals really did not chill the press to an unacceptable degree. 71 Measuring this degree is difficult. F.C. Ainsworth did an exhaustive study of the National Archives that revealed 13,535 arrests for political reasons from February 1862 until April 1865. Neely believes this number has to be exaggerated, or the definition of a political prisoner was too broad. Therefore, Neely maintained the high number of Northern political prisoners was not unreasonable. 72 That is, in Neely’s view, Lincoln and his military officers were right to arrest dissidents. However, it is not clear why the number might have been exaggerated or how the term political prisoner was constructed.

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129 Rather, the question is what degree of squelching dissent in a democracy is reasonable? Neely pointed to Lincoln’s use of the Andrew Jackson precedent to justify his suspension of habeas corpus. Lincoln said Jackson’s declaration of martial law in New Orleans and defiance of habeas corpus in 1815 did not mean “the permanent right of the people to public discussion, the liberty of free speech and the press” were abridged. 73 Another legal issue that arose was the tendency of criticism to disaffect the citizens of the Northern states. Republican papers like the Cincinnati Commercial felt criticism of the Lincoln government had a paralyzing effect on the public. The Commercial editor said: “All denunciation of the President, his measures and his motives, in so far as it has any effect at all, being to destroy public confidence in the Government and to disaffect the people, is to that extent, fatal in its tendencies.” 74 Criticism of the government is, to a certain extent, destabilizing. Such is the contentious nature of democracy. Yet the Republican papers did have a point – civil war is an exceptional case. Furthermore, another key political question is whether the existence of the government has primacy over the form of government? Do traditions, habits, and rights matter more than the stability of the government? Vallandigham, for example, thought that he was being loyal to the principles of self-government, and he thought that was more important than being loyal the principals of government. The third relevant section of the Constitution concerns the definition of treason. Article III, Section 3 states: “Treason against the United States, shall consist in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” 75 This portion is particularly important because Lincoln and his military leaders decided to interpret political speech and political commentary in newspapers that did not support the

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130 war effort as being tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Furthermore, Burnside would use the two witnesses’ clause to ensnare Vallandigham. Harold Nelson, a First Amendment scholar, observed that the nature of the relationship between the government and those who were most concerned about free expression reached a major pass during the Civil War that by the end of the war the press had learned that total war meant compromising on some democratic forms, including even freedom of the press. Meanwhile, the government came to realize “that a people tutored in access to news needed information when war came if its maximum support was to be elicited.” 76 The political leaders of the party in power had to balance the expectation for a nearly unlimited flow of information with the need for security. Support for a war effort is a two-way street; the government needs the support of its citizens, but citizens need an understanding of events, administration, and policies to make informed democratic citizens. The Hypotheses of Siebert and Stevens Fredrick Seaton Siebert, in his study of civil war and free expression in the English Civil War, developed the hypothesis that “the area of freedom contracts and the enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and of the structure of society increases” Similarly, Siebert held that “the extent of government control of the press depends on the nature of the relationship of the government to those subject to the government.” 77 Another theoretical framework to consider is that of James D. Stevens, who maintains that the more heterogeneous a population the greater the freedom of expression it will tolerate, even in a time of war. 78 Because Indiana was more homogenous in its population, it was easier to suppress dissenters such as the Hoosier State Democratic

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131 editors. It is worth noting that Lincoln’s administration did far less in trying to check the fulminations of newspapers in New York, by far the North’s most heterogeneously populated city, than it did in the more homogenously populated Midwest. From the legal perspective, Hascall’s intimidation of the Hoosier Democratic editors would mark the last time in U.S. history when editors representing one political party in a single state would be officially suppressed by military leaders. In the future, the control over the press during wartime would come in other ways. After the Supreme Court ruled against the suspension of habeas corpus in 1866, the executive branch would learn to leave editors alone and put more emphasis on controlling the flow of information and framing wars for mass audiences using propaganda techniques. Major free expression cases – Schenck v. U.S. and Abrams v. U.S. – emerged just after World War I after the passing of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, but none involved press suppression. 79 There was no real press suppression in World War II as the overwhelming majority of newspapers in the U.S. were supportive of the war effort. 80 While Hascall was trying to coerce the Democratic editors of Indiana to watch their language, Burnside had Vallandigham tried by the military commission. Burnside charged Vallandigham with publicly expressing sympathies for the rebellion, “declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its effort to suppress an unlawful rebellion.” 81 Although no copy of the speech is extant, Vallandigham allegedly said Lincoln had a plan to end the war the day before Fredericksburg. Vallandigham, who supposedly spat on a copy of General Order No. 38, also said that Lincoln was about to set up district governments all over the country. 82 At the trial, the verbose Burnside introduced a letter from Richmond saying

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132 proposing that Southern Senators’ return to Congress. The two plainclothesmen then testified against him. Congressman S.S. Cox of Ohio was the only witness that the Vallandigham team called. After three hours of deliberations, the commission found the ex-congressman guilty. Vallandigham applied for a writ of habeas corpus, but Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt, a Democrat, denied it. 83 The commission sentenced Vallandigham to a prison in Boston for the duration of the war, but Lincoln commuted it to exile to the South. Vallandigham was released in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, eventually boarded a blockade runner to Bermuda, and went on to Canada. He would run for governor of Ohio in the fall of 1863 and lose in a landslide to Republican newspaper editor John Brough. Vallandigham would also show up at the 1864 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Indiana’s Responsibility-for-Abuse Clause On the state level, freedom of the press is guaranteed, but the Indiana Constitution, like several other state constitutions, includes a responsibility clause: “That the printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the Legislature, or any branch of Government; and no law shall ever he made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts, and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man; and every Citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” 84 Indiana, therefore, was one of several states that did not have an absolutist-libertarian construction of freedom of expression. The Hoosier Constitution did not specify what the “responsibility for the abuse of that liberty” meant. It is a verbatim borrowing of the wording in the New York Constitution. 85 Thus, an interpretation of what the responsibility clause implied would be subject to interpretation.

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133 However, the Indiana courts did not interpret the responsibility clause in the nineteenth century. Of course, it is no surprise such abstract arguments were not made during the Civil War, when the Union’s survival was at stake and the resources of the state were directed toward fighting the war and defending the state. As Margaret A. Blanchard observed, the responsibility-for-abuse clause in several states showed that more and more state governments had come to the conclusion that freedom of the press and freedom of speech “had to be limited by requiring the responsible exercise of the rights promised.” 86 It is important to remember that Hascall came from New York, and the New York Constitution’s press clause well could have been his understanding of freedom of the press, and that what happened in Indiana in the spring of 1863, in the brigadier general’s judgment, represented the misuse of freedom of the press by some Democratic editors in the state. Clearly, though, the federal constitution’s guarantee that Congress cannot abridge of freedom of the press would have to be interpreted within these state constitutions that called for responsibility of the right. That would not occur until World War I, so Lincoln, Burnside, and Hascall had no guidance on the subject. During the press crisis in Indiana in the spring of 1863, no Republican editors made direct reference to the “responsibility-for-abuse” clause in the Indiana State Constitution as they defended Hascall and attacked the Democratic editors. This was a situation where abuse could be debated, but perhaps the Republican editors felt this was a federal issue, and therefore the First Amendment superseded Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. For the Republican editors of Indiana, loyalty was more the issue than abuse of liberty.

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134 Thus, a paradox exists in the U.S. version of freedom of the press. The vaguely worded U.S. Constitution offers no limits on free expression. It says that Congress – though not the president or the courts – cannot abridge the five freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. Yet some state constitutions, including the one adopted by Indiana, stated there is a limit to free expression, and that limit is being responsible for the abuse of expression, though no branch of the state government could make laws restraining expression. The suggestion is that citizens must self-censor themselves, must know when he should speak publicly and when he should be silent. Yet the Indiana Constitution does not specify what abuse really means and does not establish how an individual can self-enforce this responsibility. Alexander Meiklejohn, in his twentieth-century exegesis of freedom of expression, came to the conclusion that U.S. citizens do have responsibilities, and those include freely participating in self-government – which the government cannot regulate. Meiklejohn also said that government can regulate freedom of expression in that it can determine how citizens peaceably communicate in an assembly, or it can determine what community standards will allow to be proscribed. However, Meiklejohn said one type of speech cannot be restrained: communication that is related to the democratic process – meaning any spoken or written words that ultimately have an effect on election, including words that question the nature of the Constitution or government policy during a war. In his estimation, the government serves the interest of the citizens, and political speech is an expression of the will of those citizens. Thus, political speech is inviolate. 87 In his view, Burnside and Hascall, working for the federal government, would have had the right to make sure that all voices that wanted a public could be heard and that no voice

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135 could drowned out another. Yet they had no given power to silence any political speech, even those that could be construed as anti-war or pro-Confederacy. In Meiklejohn’s view, Indiana’s Democratic editors had the right to express themselves on the actions and policies of the Lincoln administration, on judicial interpretations, and on any laws made by Congress. 88 Thus, Meiklejohn condemns arbitrary use of power over the press by any branch of government. He is saying the First Amendment has an absolutist construction that prevents conditional abridgement as occurred in Civil War Indiana. Siebert on Government-Press Relations during War Siebert, a scholar at the University of Illinois in the twentieth century, undertook an exhaustive study of press freedom in England from the time the first book was published there until the time of the American Revolution. Siebert’s observation was that government control over the press declined over time. The University of Illinois scholar examined three primary facets of government control: (1) the nature of control, (2) the degree of enforcement, and (3) the degree of compliance. Siebert concluded that while government control declined as England developed, that control waxed and waned, depending on political conditions. Furthermore, the scholar shows that it is the nature of government to exercise a certain level of control – to promote order and stability – over the press, in much the same way that the government seeks a level of control over other elements of society. 89 Likewise, government attempts to regulate any publication that undermines “the basic structure of society.” 90 Siebert holds a consensus develops in society – by the majority in a democracy – that a certain level of control is desirable, and that no control of expression would lead to chaos. The question is what form and what degree of control, and then how well does the government enforce the limits and how much does a citizen comply with them.

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136 Siebert posited two hypotheses about the nature of government control over the press: (1) the extent of control depends on the relationship between the government and the governed; and (2) the area of freedom decreases, and enforcement of restraints expands as the stresses on the structure of society and the stability of government increase. 91 A more secure government has less need to develop restraints on the press. Conversely, an insecure government is more likely to develop restraints. Likewise, the “more direct the accountability of the governors to the masses, the greater the freedom of the press.” 92 The area of freedom of the press tends to expand in democratic societies, but even a democratic government will contract that freedom during times of extreme political crises, especially during wartime. During the Civil War in Indiana, there was only one occasion in which official contraction of press freedom took place, and that was in the spring of 1863 under Milo Smith Hascall’s General Order No. 9. 93 Hascall’s order was a case of official suppression. In announcing General Order No. 9 to the public on April 25, 1863, Hascall noted that extreme measures were necessary because he claimed he had evidence of agitation by covert societies in Indiana. 94 The brigadier general believed that Indiana society was in grave political danger and feared an uprising in the state. Yet there was little evidence that pro-Democratic secret societies had the wherewithal to start a rebellion. Indiana was virtually a dictatorship by the spring of 1863, under Governor Oliver P. Morton. Press freedom in the Hoosier State would have been expected to contract under Siebert’s hypothesis. It did for the six weeks that Hascall, an officer of the federal government, was in power as the military commander of the state. However, it did

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137 not contract because of Morton shut down the majority-Democratic legislature when it tried to pass pro-peace resolutions. Although he wanted aggressive action against dissent, Morton never thought Hascall had jurisdiction. So the governor did not openly support what the Goshen attorney was doing. Yet he did not stand in the way either, though he clearly wanted Hascall removed from office. 95 Morton wanted to keep the Democrats under control, but he wanted to do it himself, in his own way, with his men. He wanted no part of Burnside and Hascall’s meddling in his state. There is no way to know if and how Morton would have come down on the Democratic editors, though he often complained about their treasonous words. Once Hascall stirred up the hornets’ nest, no discreet political leader would go the suppression route again. Yet Morton demanded loyalty of Democrats all over the state. He looked to the Kentucky and Maryland paradigms, where “military force was systematically employed to suppress legitimate political opposition and to insure the election of supporters of the administration.” 96 General Jerry T. Boyle dispersed Democratic convention in Frankfurt, Kentucky, on Feb. 18, 1863. In effect, Hascall would do the same thing at a Democratic mass meeting in Indianapolis in May of 1863, at the height of his bitter war with the opposition press in the state. Freedom of the Press in a Democracy Another aspect of the contraction of the area of freedom during times when the government feels insecure is the nature of the government. That is, in a democracy, freedom of the press comes to mean unfettered freedom for the majority and restraints for the minority. This tends to get ratcheted up during war, and that is what happened in Indiana as Republican editors screamed to Hascall that they knew of Democratic editors

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138 who were “endeavoring to bring the war policy of the government into disrepute.” These Republican editors praised Hascall and wanted to see him do more to “treasonous” and “disloyal” Democratic editors. Suppression was not only legal but a necessary war measure to keep Democrats from appealing to covert elements that wanted to drive a wedge between the Northeast and Midwest. The Republican editors were not concerned with the First Amendment rights of their Democratic brethren. Historian G.R. Tredway, who has written extensively about the Democrats of Civil War Indiana, reasoned that the Republican editors were concerned only with partisan politics: “To Republicans any manifestation of discontent with their conduct of state and national affairs could only be treason.” 97 Of course, as Tredway noted that Democrats “protested mightily against the abridgement of a free press” and connected it to the Lincoln administration’s overall suppression of civil rights. Democratic editors told their readers to retaliate, but few if any Republican papers faced violence from Democrats. 98 Most incidents of intimidation of Republican editors in Indiana came from Union soldiers. This lack of retaliation by Democrats suggests that there was a chilling effect in Civil War Indiana, and that Hascall’s policy was effective, even if he did not last more than six weeks in office as commander of the military district. After Burnside removed Hascall following Morton’s repeated requests for his head, intimidation replaced suppression as the main way to tone down recalcitrant Democratic editors. “Countenanced by partisan officials,” mob action became the method of restraint of Democratic editors, and the primary members of the mob were Union soldiers. 99 Tredway claimed that Democrats were concerned about “the possibility that the administration would interfere with the free elective process in the North in order to keep

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139 itself in power” and that this “would mean the end of political democracy and the inauguration of a one party state, the embryo of which seemed already discernible in arbitrary arrests, military trials, and the covert sanctioning of partisan violence directed against opponents of the administration.” 100 In the parlance of the twentieth century, Morton and the Republicans seemed to be wielding power in a banana republic. Hascall was trying to chase down deserters and Confederate sympathizers, to keep enrollments above the quota level, but, in the long run, his official suppression of the press helped to develop an atmosphere of increased restraint. Perhaps one reason the aggressive Morton did not act against the Democratic press of Indiana was the fact that his power was limited. Jon Dilts, a media law scholar at Indiana University, suggested that Morton did not act against the press because the state government was too unstable to counter Democratic press criticism of the Lincoln war effort. 101 Thus, the federal government, in the form of the military, had to step in. In one level, this was the case. Yet Morton was far too egotistical to let the federal government have all the credit if suppression worked. Rather, Morton did not stand in the way of Hascall and soldier-led mobs as they attacked the Democratic press, precisely because intimidation of Democratic journalists helped neutralize the political opposition in the state, an opposition that was on the rise in the spring of 1863. It was a delicate balancing act because too much heavy-handedness would unduly upset the Democrats. Thus, Morton had Hascall called off, and the governor was able to finesse the promotion of a more circumspect district commander in Orlando B. Willcox to replace Hascall. The hiring of Willcox to replace Hascall did not mean Morton wanted to let up on the

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140 Democratic editors. Indeed, in the weeks after Hascall’s removal, Democrats in Indiana were feistier than ever, some even resorting to violence against draft officers. Meanwhile, the Democrats really had little choice in accepting this temporary chilling effect on their right to press freedom, even if they were not really choosing themselves to act responsibly. Tredway remarked: “It should have been plain that self-interest dictated to Indiana Democrats that they confine themselves to the field of legitimate politics. In view of the election results the preceding autumn, ordinary political activity would be much more likely to bring them success than an armed revolt.” 102 Furthermore, the military was far better armed and equipped to fight than the Democrats who opposed the war or the war policies. The best way for the Democrats to fight was in the legislature and at the ballot box. The work of Hascall, with the tacit approval of Burnside, Morton, and the Lincoln administration, worked to counteract those legitimate political objectives of the Hoosier Democrats and their representatives in the press. While the nature of government has an effect on the degree of constraints, social factors also come into play. Scholar John D. Stevens looked at sociological factors and held that the “more heterogeneous a society the more freedom of expression it will tolerate.” 103 Indiana was fairly heterogeneous society in 1863. Politically, like the nation, it was fragmented, and radical changes had been taking place since the Mexican War. Socially, although immigration was taking place, especially from Germans and Irish, emigration from the state was happening too. The state was essentially divided into southern, central, and northern thirds. Southern Hoosiers were descendants of men and women who had traveled from North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Hoosiers in the central part of the state had settled from the southern part of the state,

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141 while the northern third was inhabited by settlers from New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, as well as the German and Irish immigrants. Newspapers themselves mirrored the heterogeneity of the state. There were Republican, Democratic, Peoples Party, Whig, Free Soil, and Union papers. Most newspapers were written in English, but a number were written in German. Denominational papers existed too, with Quaker and Methodist papers being the most conspicuous. Thus, Indiana was relatively heterogeneous, and this explains, in part, why Hascall’s period of suppression was short – and why Morton did not choose to come down hard on the Democratic press before or after Hascall’s six weeks in office in Indianapolis. Of course, Morton did not have to further agitate the Democrats with official state action because soldiers and veterans did the work for him. In the election of 1860, Republicans won because they had majorities in most of the counties in the northern two-thirds of the state. Support for the Democrats was stronger in the southern third of the state. 104 Editors in counties where Southern descendants were more numerous, mainly in the southern third of the state, saw less suppression and intimidation than the counties where the descendants were from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania. Democratic editors had greater immunity from Hascall where Southern descendants with pro-Democratic sentiments were present. Suppression in Indiana during the Civil War was somewhat limited because of the vigorous and heterogeneous press in the state. Every town had at least two newspapers, and most had more than two. Few publishers and editors were in the business to make lots of money. Because politics mattered most to them, their unfettered expression of those ideas was a central principle – and one in keeping with the federal free-press clause.

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142 Still, the state abuse clause left a gray area that enabled Hascall to engender support from the Republican newspaper editors, who, emboldened by the support of both the state and federal executive branches, strongly upheld the silencing of Democratic editors. Notes 1 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 18 April 1861. 2 Gitlow v. New York nationalized the First Amendment. That is, state constitutions could not trump the federal Constitution’s free-expression guarantee. Justice Edward T. Stanford, writing for the 7-2 majority, said: “We may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press – which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress – are among the fundamental rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.” See 268 U.S. 652, 45 Supreme Court, 625, 630, 1925. It is also worth noting here that the Court stated in Gitlow: “It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of the speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.” Ibid., 666. In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court struck down a state’s prior-restraint regulation. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 Supreme Court 625, 1931. New York Times v. Sullivan established that public figures would have to accept the criticisms that come with life in the political arena. It established the test of “actual malice,” knowledge that a statement about a public official was false or “with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 Supreme Court 710, 1964. A publisher would not have to prove the truth of statements made in his/her publication. Rather, the plaintiff would have to prove the falsity of the statements. In other words, the Supreme Court ruled criticism of the government was protected by the First Amendment, and combined with Gitlow this was universal. 3 John D. Zelezny, Communications Law: Liberties, Restraints, and the Modern Media (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1997), 36. 4 Ibid., 36. 5 Robert J. Wagman, The First Amendment Book (New York, NY: Pharos Books, 1991), 34-36. Wagman points out that the Virginia Declaration of Rights convention draft said: “Liberty of the press cannot be canceled, abridged, restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.” For the national document, James Madison, toned it down to: “The people shall not be deprived of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.” In 1789, a Madison-led select committee of the U.S. House of

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143 Representatives edited this down to: “The freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the government for a redress of grievances, shall not be infringed.” This was the basis for the final draft of the First Amendment, which was ratified along with the other nine amendments in the Bill of Rights in 1791. 6 Zelezny, 31. Milton wrote: “Give me liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all other liberties.” The Puritan poet, who was arguing for the right to advocate divorce, felt government should not restrain communication, that truth and falsehood grappled in debate, and that ultimately truth would win. 7 Don R. Pember, Mass Media Law (Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark Publishers, 1997), 34. 8 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, Eighth Edition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1927), 901-902. 9 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Number Eighty-Four,” in The Federalist Papers, Clinton Rossiter, ed., (New York, NY: Mentor Book, Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1999), 481-482. Hamilton asked: “Why should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?” Hamilton thought it better to leave out the Bill of Rights because the exactness of the definitions would tempt those men with tyrannical tendencies to exercise regulatory powers that would limit the very freedoms the Americans had fought for in their revolution. He did not want the federal government to have the power to regulate the press. Hamilton also thought a bill of rights was necessitated by the existence of a monarch – that is, it was a compact between the regal governor and the governed. Since the United States would have no monarch, it did not need a bill or rights. Indeed, in Hamilton’s view, the Constitution itself was a declaration of a bill of rights – a formal declaration of independence from the monarchial form of government. In a sense, Hamilton was a minimalist and wanted to keep the Constitution as tight as possible and not open to interpretation that would increase rather than decrease the government’s regulatory powers. 10 Marc A. Franklin, David A. Anderson, and Fred H. Cate, Mass Media Law: Cases and Materials, Sixth Edition (New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2000), 3. 11 Pember, 37. 12 Ibid., 3. 13 Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), 38. 14 Pember, 34, 37.

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144 15 Zelezny, 32-34. 16 Dwight L. Teeter Jr. and Don R. Le Dud, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and Broadcast Media (Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press, 1995), 10. 17 Wagman, 37. 18 Garry Wills. James Madison (New York, NY: Times Books, 2002), 39. Madison had thought the Constitution perfect. Then he ran for Congress on a pro-amendment platform to counter Virginia political foe Patrick Henry’s strongly anti-federalist platform that called for amendments. Madison would oversee the call for 19 amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 10 of which were ratified. 19 Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problems of Prerogative Power (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 29. 20 Wagman, 40. 21 Franklin, Anderson, and Cate, 3. 22 Wagman, 45. 23 James Morton Smith, Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), 136. 24 J.A. Smith, 85. 25 Herbert A. Johnson, editor, The Papers of John Marshall (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), John Marshall to St. George Tucker, November 18, 1800, 6: 14-15. 26 C.G. Remmo, “Freedom of the Press,” Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1944-1945, 316, 318. Jefferson said of the Sedition Act: “I considered and now consider that law to be a a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image.” 27 Franklin, Anderson, and Cate, 3. Also see “An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled ‘An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States,” The Avalon Project [online]. New Haven, CT: Yale University Law School, accessed: April 12, 2004; available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/sedact.htm. 28 Teeter and Le Duc, 29. 29 Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), 309.

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145 30 Levy, 281. Levy writes: “James Madison, the most influential of all the Framers, is possibly the one person of outstanding distinction whose record is clean and consistent [as a libertarian on free expression].” 31 Franklin, Anderson, and Cate, 3. 32 Wagman, 45. 33 J.M. Smith, 1956, 136. 34 J.A. Smith, 85. 35 Herbert A. Johnson, editor, The Papers of John Marshall (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), John Marshall to St. George Tucker, November 18, 1800, 6: 14-15. 36 C.G. Remmo, “Freedom of the Press,” Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1944-1945, 316, 318. Jefferson said of the Sedition Act: “I considered and now consider that law to be a a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image.” 37 Franklin, Anderson, and Cate, 3. Also see “An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled ‘An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States,” The Avalon Project [online]. New Haven, CT: Yale University Law School, accessed: April 12, 2004; available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/sedact.htm. 38 Teeter and Le Duc, 29. 39 Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), 309. 40 Levy, 281. Levy writes: “James Madison, the most influential of all the Framers, is possibly the one person of outstanding distinction whose record is clean and consistent [as a libertarian on free expression].” 41 Margaret A. Blanchard, in her essay “Filling in the Void, Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to Gitlow,” in Bill Chamberlin and Charlene J. Brown’s The First Amendment Reconsidered (New York, NY: Longman, 1982), 14-59, shows that states interpret freedom of the press in the nineteenth century, but she makes citations from Indiana. 42 Wagman, 46. 43 J.A. Smith, 92-93.

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146 44 Ibid., 92. 45 Ibid., 92. 46 Ibid., 95. 47 Ibid., 95. 48 Ibid., 94. 49 Ibid., 95. 50 Washington, DC, National Daily Intelligencer, 25 May 1847. 51 Zachary Taylor to William L. March, 3 March 1847, in 30th Congress, First Session, House Executive Documents, Vol. 7, No. 60, 8-9-810. 52 Ibid., 95. 53 Ibid., 46. 54 J.A. Smith, 93. 55 John W. Burgess, The Civil War and the Constitution 1859-1865, Volume II (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910), 222-223. Postmaster General Montgomery Blair defended the suppression of the New York Daily News from entering Philadelphia via the mail in August of 1861 because of the emergency of the rebellion. Blair said no such power existed in peacetime, and he said that only the postmaster general, not any local postmaster, could determine what publications should not be delivered. The House Judiciary Committee investigated Blair and upheld his power, even though that contradicted the wording of the First Amendment. 56 U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights, 1793. 57 J.A. Smith, 45. 58 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 26 May 1863. 59 Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat, June 4, 1863. See also Article 1, Section 7 from the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (http://sites.state.pa.us/PA_Constitution.html), and Article XII of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1776 (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm). 60 United States Constitution, 1787. 61 J.A. Smith, 115.

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147 62 Mark E. Neely, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 1991), 68. 63 James Garfield Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 178. 64 Ibid., 174. 65 Ibid., 179. 66 Ibid., 180. 67 Ibid., 181. 68 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S., 4 Wallace, 1-143, 1866. 69 Randall, 1964, 183. 70 Ibid., 184. 71 Neely, 1991, 223. 72 Ibid., 233. 73 Roy P. Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 269. In response to Vallandigham, Lincoln wrote Erastus Corning of New York that the “permanent right” of free expression “suffered no detriment whatever by that conduct of General Jackson or its subsequent approval by the American Congress.” See Robert N. Scott, et al., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), Series II, Vol. VI, 9. 74 Cincinnati Commercial, April 23, 1863. 75 United States Constitution, 1789. 76 Harold L. Nelson, editor, Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), xxvii. 77 Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Controls, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1952), 10. 78 Ronald T. Farrar and John D. Stevens, Mass Media and the National Experience: Essays in Communication History (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1971), 14.

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148 79 Wagman, 60-65. 80 J.A. Smith, 63. The writ of habeas corpus was effectively suspended during World War II when Japanese Americans were rounded up and placed in concentration camps in the western half of the country. During World War II, Congress passed the Smith Act with almost no resistance from Congress. The Smith Act made it illegal to say or write words that favored the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. 81 Scott, Series II, Vol. 5, 634. 82 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 242. 83 Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, “The People’s Darling Privilege” (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 200), 311. 84 Indiana Manuscript Constitution, 1816, Article I, Section 9, Indiana State Library. 85 The New York Constitution says: “Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press” (quoted in Blanchard, 18). 86 Blanchard, 18-19. Blanchard notes: “The movement toward this freedom-and-responsibility standard cannot be termed accidental. The same language appeared in far too many state constitutions to be happenstance.” Yet it is also worth noting that the defender of such a press guarantee, James of the New York Supreme Court, wrote his opinion in favor of responsibility in 1804, two years after Thomas Jefferson let the Alien and Sedition Acts die out. 87 Alexander Meiklejohn, “The First Amendment Is an Absolute,” The Supreme Court Review, Philip B. Kurland, ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 257. 88 Ibid., 258. Meiklejohn says: “Every citizen may be required to pledge loyalty, and to practice loyalty, to the nation. But his loyalty may never be tested on the grounds of adherence to, or rejection of, any belief. Loyalty does not imply conformity of opinion. Every citizen of the United States has Constitutional authority to approve or to condemn any laws enacted by the Legislature, any actions taken by the Executive, any judgments rendered by the judiciary, any principles established by the Constitution.” 89 Siebert, 9. 90 Ibid., 9. 91 Ibid., 10.

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149 92 Ibid, 10. 93 G.R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 26. 94 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, April 30, 1863. 95 Tredway, 27. 96 Ibid., 29-30. 97 Ibid., 30. 98 Ibid., 29. 99 Ibid., 27. 100 Ibid., 29. 101 Jon Paul Dilts, “Testing Siebert’s Proposition in Civil War Indiana,” Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1986, Vol. 62, No. 12, 368. 102 Tredway, 31. 103 John D. Stevens, “Freedom of Expression: New Dimensions,” in Mass Media and the National Experience, Stevens and Ronald T. Farrar (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1971). 104 Bruce Bigelow and Stephen E. Towne, “Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana: The Polls and the Press,” Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 5, October 2001, 78-79. Bigelow and Towne found that violence against Democratic editors was lower in counties with high percentages of descendants from the South in them than in counties with high percentages of descendants from the Northeast. Thus, Democratic editors were more vituperative in counties where Hascall had fewer Republican connections. The presence of a Democratic majority in a county developed a sense of immunity from government constraints.

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CHAPTER 4 JOURNALISM IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA Just as the period of 1861-65 was a transitional era in the history of Indiana politics and society, so too was it a transitional phase for journalism. The party press of the 1820s and 1830s was gradually being replaced by a new type of journalism that was still partisan but also was becoming more personal. Although Indiana’s newspapers supported political parties, the rapid growth of newspapers in the state meant there was a lower percentage of papers receiving patronage. Thus, a journalism was emerging that was equal parts political and personal. The editor’s personality was a central feature of the paper, and he interpreted the news in terms of his own political beliefs. Editors tended to be leaders in their towns, and ownership often helped them advance their personal objectives, including attaining political and economic success. Thus, the journalism of mid-century Indiana can be described as the transitional political-personal press. Meanwhile, technology was changing how journalists told their stories. Telegraph was becoming ubiquitous, allowing reporters in the field to transmit information back to the home office over long distances. 1 Reporters made use of the relatively new technology, providing instant updates on battles and other war news. This led to the creation of extras, secondary editions printed when significant telegraphic news was sent back to the home office. 2 In some cases, extras had to be printed when Democratic newspapers were suspended or destroyed. When James Elder’s paper in Richmond, Indiana, was destroyed by rioters, he printed a one-sheet “Extra” the following week to explain why his subscribers were not receiving their paper that week. He also told his 150

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151 side of the story, speculating that the words of the three Republican papers in town had prompted the riot, which resulted in the destruction of his $2,000 printing facility. 3 The telegraph lines in Indiana were built along the ever-growing railroad tracks in the state. As the railroad mileage expanded quickly in the 1850s, so too did the telegraph lines in the state. When the Civil War came, some editors of Indiana dailies began printing so-called “telegraph” editions that updated military information over night. This was part of an expansion movement in Hoosier journalism in which newspaper owners were increasing productivity by expanding from weeklies to dailies to extra editions. One such paper was the Logansport Democratic Pharos, which came out with a single-sheet Daily Telegraphic Pharos in 1861 as the war intensified. 4 The enormous amount of information the telegraph could deliver led in part to the invention of the inverted-pyramid form of news writing, whereby the reporter writes an information-filled first paragraph that summarizes the main topic immediately. Stories were also much shorter because the telegraph company charged for transmission by the word. It was cheaper to write less flowery prose and focus on the key information that a reporter wanted to impart to his readers. 5 Likewise, for the first time in the history of mainstream U.S. journalism, the emphasis on speed caused reporters to become stars because by-lines were used to tell the public who had written the story, although most reporters used pseudonyms to avoid detection by the military authorities who attempted to control their access to vital information. 6 Another technology that had an impact on Civil War journalism was photography, which was in its infancy. Photography was beginning to boom as a small business in several towns in the state. Photographic rooms opened to exhibit and promote

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152 photography. 7 Hoosier soldiers routinely visited photographers to have their pictures taken. Although photographs of the Civil War appeared in exhibitions, the visual record of the conflict captured the graphic horrors of war in a way that had never been seen before. Two magazines rose to prominence during the war, Harper’s Weekly and Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, because of their use of artwork. Both took advantage of advances in printing to publish more graphic information than newspapers did. Portraits of prominent players in the war, as well as drawings of battles and maps, became staples of these two magazines. A few Hoosiers subscribed to these national weeklies, but most Hoosiers saw little of the war through this new technology. Those who did get to view photographs were more likely to see works of traveling art, such as Goodwin and Wilder’s “Polyorama of the War.” 8 Most newspapers in Indiana were four-page weeklies. The front page usually had advertising and news on it, and sometimes fiction or poetry. The second page consisted of national and international news and editorials as well as more advertising. The rest of the paper was usually a combination of local news and classified advertising. Most editors did not make huge profits from their journalistic endeavors – usually only a few hundred dollars per year. In fact, many only were able to run their papers with help from political parties or wealthy patrons or partners. Abraham Lincoln himself was a silent partner in a German-language newspaper in Illinois. In 1850, there were approximately 100 newspapers in Indiana. By 1860, there were approximately 180 newspapers in the state, and, by 1880, there were nearly 500 newspapers in Indiana. 9 Almost all were weeklies in the small towns of the state. The best guess by historians is that the majority of Indiana newspapers in that period lasted

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153 only a year. 10 Four hundred dollars was a typical year’s income – $1,600 for advertising and subscriptions, as opposed to $1,200 for expenses, most of which was expended on printing paper. A paper cost from a penny to five cents per edition. Harper’s and Frank Leslie’s, the two national weeklies, were eight cents for each edition. Subscriptions were highly encouraged, and they averaged, for a year’s worth of a newspaper, from $1 to $3. Discounts were given for payment at the start of the subscription. Editors encouraged readers to spread the word about a newspaper, and friends of the editors often helped expand the circulation rolls. “More Subscribers Wanted” notices appeared frequently. 11 Advertising was growing in popularity among Hoosier editors as a way to increase revenue, and column-inches devoted to advertising continued to increase. Most editors required advertisers to pay before publication. Five lines or less typically would cost 50 cents for the first publication. After that, it cost twenty-five cents if no changes were made in the advertisement. Public service announcements for charities cost twenty-five cents for five lines or less. 12 A half a column would cost $25 and a whole column $40. 13 A wide variety of goods were pushed on the pages of these four-sheeters. These included: government bonds, insurance, bank services, physicians’ services, hotels, tobacco products, furniture, clothing, shoes, food, drugs, fake remedies, liquor, tools, sewing machines, musical instruments, ice, books, stationery, land, gold, artwork, jobs, paint, house decorations, and dramatic presentations. Several ads pushed “bitters,” a cure-all for many of the disabilities that soldiers faced from combat and sickness. The ads claimed that consumption of bitters would save “hundreds of lives.” 14 Some advertising was disguised as news items. For example, a Fort Wayne paper on one occasion interspersed

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154 the following sentence throughout its page-two columns: “Remember the sale of building lots in ‘North Side Addition,’ tomorrow at 1 o’clock.” 15 In an 1850 Indiana newspaper, most news was national, exchanged by telegraph or correspondence, but newspapers also devoted a great deal of space to political speeches, government proclamations, and new laws. By the Civil War, more papers were including local news. For example, a Fort Wayne Republican newspaper commented on the elections of 1864 as follows: “The election passed off quietly in this city yesterday. Scarcely any one was refused a vote, indeed a large aggregate vote was needed to allow a large copperhead majority. The only effort of the opposition was to get men to vote, the consequence was that the largest vote ever polled in Fort Wayne was received. The copperhead majority in the township is, we learn, less than sixteen hundred. We can scarcely imagine why they confined themselves to that number, and we feel thankful they not make it more.” 16 A typical Indiana paper would include crime, court, church, agricultural, business, and political news. Prices of goods from a grocer were included, as were train schedules. Newspapers also included notices about when doctors and dentists would be in their offices. Birth, marriage, and death notices appeared too. An example of a death notice read: “John Lamb, who was committed to the county jail last week for assault and battery on his wife, died of delirium tremens last evening.” 17 No further commentary was provided. Another Fort Wayne paper routinely carried reports on crop conditions from around the state. After giving an assessment on how the crops were doing in Allen County, it quoted other newspapers from around the state on crop conditions in those locales. For

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155 example: “The St. Joseph Register says of that section: As far as we can learn, the late cool nights have not in the least damaged the fruit, and the prospects of a very heavy fruit crop this season are very flattering.” 18 Another type of local news was political announcements. Men announcing their candidacy for office would ask the editors of the party’s papers to write a few lines, such as the following in a Fort Wayne paper: “C.A. Reker offers himself as a candidate for County Register, subject to the decision of the Democratic Convention.” 19 Some news items were simply statements of facts from government documents or the census. The following sentence appeared in a South Bend paper: “The Quakers of Indiana have paid two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to the U.S. Treasury for exemption from military duty.” 20 No commentary accompanied the statement. Another way newspapers generated copy was from an exchange of information from other newspapers, especially by newspapers of the same political party. For example, the Richmond Jeffersonian printed a Cincinnati Enquirer account of a mob destroying a Democratic newspaper in Ohio. The Cincinnati paper noted that the Democratic leaders of Greenville, Ohio, issued an ultimatum that unless Republican leaders brought the rioters to justice, the Republican paper would suffer a similar fate. “The [Republican] leaders agreed to fulfill the demands made upon them No arrests had been made up to yesterday morning,” the Enquirer reported. 21 Another source of content was transcripts of official government documents from out-of-state newspapers and official war reports. Indiana newspapers could not afford to cover the war from the front, much less other significant national news. When news of the war against native Americans reached Hoosier eyes, it usually came in the form of

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156 federal government reports. When Indians attacked an outpost in Minnesota, newspapers in Indiana ran a report by Brigadier General H.B. Sibley, who was the commander of U.S. forces in that state. Sibley’s report, which had appeared in the St. Paul Press, made no attempt to do its own reporting and ran Sibley’s report as is. One Indiana newspaper stated Sibley’s narrative was “a correct account of the affair.” 22 The editor offered no evidence why the narrative of events in Minnesota was “correct.” Since many newspapers were used to government patronage and did not have enough money for a reporting staff, they leaned on local, state, and federal officials for “official” news and information. Long, bombastic speeches from Congress, the president, state houses, and governors often appeared, as did historical documents, especially letters or papers from the founding fathers to validate a particular political idea. The orders of military officers were routinely run during the war. The Ideology of the Transition Party-Personal Press in Indiana Political ideology played a large rule in the transitional party-personal press in Civil War Indiana. Democrats in the state worried about the expansion of federal powers, particularly those of the president. The Democratic editors represented the middle ground between what they saw as two radical groups: the secessionists in the South, who had no desire for reunion; and the radical abolitionists in the Northeast, who wanted to destroy slavery while forcing reunion. While some Hoosier Democrats believed “the war was a mistake and that there was no way that it could be won,” as newspaper historian George Douglas observed, most Democrats in the state supported the war but upheld their right to criticize the prosecution of the war. 23 Many interpreted every Southern victory as a sign that peace talks should commence.

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157 Race was another key issue for Indiana’s Democratic editors, who were men who lived in a free state but were suspicious of blacks, free or slave. Indiana had a law that required black men to pay a bond of $500 to enter the state. This law resulted from the perception of citizens in Indiana that blacks were prone to violence and crime. 24 Furthermore, the state wanted to discourage blacks from entering their states and taking existing jobs for lower wages, and a number of Indiana’s Democrat editors intended to promote local growth by being pro-immigration – which meant attracting and maintaining European immigrants to their communities. 25 Democratic editors argued that the mass migration of freed slaves into these towns would disrupt this process. Likewise, blacks were not allowed to vote in Indiana, which had been founded by Southern non-slaveholding whites who lived in a state in which blacks represented less than one percent of its population, and most Hoosier Democrats wanted to maintain this racially homogenous population. 26 Hoosier Democrats were generally disciples of Thomas Jefferson and his diffused agrarian, anti-central government vision of America. These latter-day Jeffersonians – farmers, laborers, and mechanics – found urbanity unattractive, and they not only believed in small, limited government, but also in small towns and direct democracy. In their eyes, a concentration of a mass of people brought only social hardship and political sham, namely overcrowding, poverty, crime, and a reliance on a republican form of government. Therefore, they had little interest in industrialism, which they saw as being driven by the greed of factory owners. What they wanted was a government conducive to agriculture without debt and a government that kept the domestic peace. Indiana’s Democrats believed in an honest job that earned an honest wage. Suspicious of paper

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158 wealth and speculation, Jeffersonian Democrats thought both brought corruption. 27 They thought democracy was the best government for achieving this. The greater the participation by all male citizens – except black men – the greater the social harmony. They were skeptical that the greed of industrialization would throw society out of balance. Democrats were by no means Marxists, yet they were not eager to build a society based only on the profit motive. These Jeffersonians wanted to preserve the Constitution as they believed it had been conceived by the founders, to protect the liberties it guaranteed from any form of tyranny and to protect property rights. In this sense, they were conservatives. Similarly, Jefferson believed in a free press that would serve as a watchdog over the government, thus giving individual citizens more free time to spend on their own interests. Jefferson believed that citizens had to watch their government officials closely to hold them accountable. “The plea of necessity is no excuse no excuse for a violation of politicians’ oath of office,” Jefferson said. “Recollect the price of Liberty is eternal vigilance.” 28 Jefferson believed the press would help inform the public and make the government respect citizens more. Yet the press sometimes tried Jefferson’s patience. When he was president, Jefferson was stung by the criticisms of Federalist newspaper editors. Yet he refused to give into the itch to censor, though he did uphold the necessity of libel law against false accusations. He wrote, “I admit that restraining the press to truth, as the present laws do, is the only way of making it useful.” 29 He said the press was “impotent when it abandons itself to falsehood,” but that it was a “noble institution” when concerned with truth and was “equally the friend of science and civil liberty.” 30 The Hoosier Democratic editors, though not always truthful in their political attacks on

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159 Lincoln, nonetheless thought freedom of the press a noble institution and alluded to Jefferson’s thoughts on civil rights. 31 Jefferson did not trust government. He felt it intruded upon personal liberty. However, this trust in personal liberty did not extend to non-white men – or women for that matter – though Jefferson personally felt slaves would one day be free, and that Southerners would come to understand that slavery’s demise was inevitable and part of the same spirit of liberty the colonists felt in the American Revolution. 32 Since the colonists did not move to emancipation, he knew one day the paradox would have to be dealt with by the country. Thus, the U.S. Constitution central to the political ideology of Indiana’s Democrats, who tended to read it much more literally than their Republican counterparts, especially the sections that dealt with the powers enumerated to the states. For the Democrats, the Constitution gave shape to the American Revolution. It was prescriptive, and its core was passed down from previous generations. Indiana’s Democrats believed the Constitution protected them from martial law during the war. “The military power is and must remain subordinate to the civil power,” stated the signers of a resolution passed by “Twenty Thousand Loyal Citizens of Illinois” in response to Ambrose Burnside’s suppression of Storey’s Chicago Times. 33 The signers proclaimed that when the military overstepped its boundaries, its orders and proclamations became void. As strict constructionists of the Constitution, Democrats construed the Bill of Rights literally and ignored the “responsibility-for-abuse” clause of the Indiana Bill of Rights. Dawson’s Fort Wayne newspaper published key civil liberties passages from the constitutions of the original thirteen states. Dawson was fond of the following sentence

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160 that appears in several constitutions from New England states: “The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State.” 34 Democratic editors in Indiana conveniently did not refer to the press responsibility clause in their own state’s constitution. In response to Vallandigham’s conviction and exile, as well as Hascall’s war on Democratic editors, Voorhees claimed the Constitution was just as valid in wartime as in peace and said nothing in the Constitution made civil rights conditional. He said the Constitution guaranteed that Congress would make no law abridging freedom of expression, and the executive branch would not ignore the rights of citizens to freely speak, write or assemble. 35 Voorhees said that a public discussion of issues of the day was an “undeniable right.” 36 He added, “The Constitution made our Union; without it the Union would have never have had an existence.” 37 The Democrats rejoiced when Supreme Court Justice Roger B. Taney, a Catholic and a Democrat, issued a writ of habeas corpus as a circuit judge in Maryland for John Merryman, who had been placed in the jail in Baltimore, Maryland, for an indefinite period. Taney wrote in Ex Parte Merryman that only Congress had the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 38 Another major influence on the thinking of Indiana’s Democratic editors was the political philosophy of Andrew Jackson, who created a powerful political machine that relied extensively on the press to communicate its agenda. Jackson relied on rural editors to plant his political messages. When he came to power as president, he rewarded those editors with spoils. The slaveholding Jackson’s political ascendancy “increased political participation to a level previously unknown in America,” notes historian Reed Smith in his examination of Medary. 39 Foe example, the Ohio editor received printing contracts from the government after Jackson was elected. 40

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161 The essence of Jacksonianism was representative government for citizens who were equal before the law – in this case, white men. This meant none of those equals could be subject to the arbitrary rule of anyone. Minority rights would also be protected. For Jacksonsians, there was an ever-present struggle between power and liberty, and that liberty must resist power’s tendency to expand. This required the individual to put aside his selfish desires and to put society first. This civic virtue was critical to the success of society. If it were corrupted, then society would change. Thus, Jacksonians looked at change with suspicion, seeing it as a sign of corruption. What made this Jacksonian philosophy unique is that civic virtue was available to all free white men, including the poor. The ideology was widely popular in the United States, and it was largely responsible for the Democratic Party’s strength for much of the first half of the nineteenth century. In Indiana, Jacksonianism extended to the way society saw the legal profession. Hoosiers opposed having a professional class of lawyers who attended law schools, precisely because professionalization would create class conflict. 41 The problem was that Jacksonian ideology was available only to white men. Black men – as well as women and children – did not fit into this universe as equals. Jacksonianism held to a theory of black inferiority, which came from the German concept of herrenvolk, which held that Africans were created separately from whites and were not part of the human family. 42 Stephen Douglas, Lincoln’s Illinois archrival, would use this concept to extrapolate that Jefferson’s “all men are created equal” did not apply to blacks. The herrenvolk hypothesis was also used to justify slavery and white superiority. In the spring of 1863, the Democratic paper in Dayton, Ohio, quoted Jackson’s “Prophecy” of

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162 the war: “The Abolition party is a disloyal organization. Its pretended love of freedom means nothing more nor less than a dissolution of the Union.” 43 Jacksonian ideology was also pro-agrarian, pro-Union, and anti-centralization. Jacksonianism held that small farms, business, and government were better than large farms, business, and government. This philosophy, central to the Democrats’ understanding of their country, was called “republicanism.” 44 As editor Medary put it, many Democrats were “unawed by the influence of the rich, the great, or the noble.” 45 They tended to live on small family farms that often had poor soil, and they had little or modest education with low literacy. 46 The Midwest Democrats were losing economic and political power as the North, under the leadership of the Republicans, turned to a more capitalist and industrialist economic system. Accordingly, they opposed tariffs, which caused farm prices to decrease and consumer goods to increase. 47 Many of Indiana’s Democratic editors framed their opposition to the war along these lines: the agrarian, anti-tariff Midwest against the industrial, pro-tariff Northeast. Hoosier Democrats also admired Jackson for seeing the union as sacred, something that had caused him to split with Calhoun and the other states’ rights advocates. 48 Home Rule and Race Many Democratic newspapers echoed Jacksonian-Jeffersonian philosophy in their often working-class mission statements. The Indiana Jacksonian said its pages would serve as “the Farmer’s, Mechanic’s and Working Man’s Advocate.” 49 As the only newspaper in Rush County, Indiana, the Jacksonian said it would try to focus less on politics and more on “home interests and home improvement,” and that it would “throw open our columns for the discussion of all matters which affect the public weal, and the free expression of the opinions of all parties upon all subjects of general interests.” 50 The

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163 focus was on issues important to farmers, mechanics, and laborers, small producers tended to be suspicious of both the top and bottom of society. 51 That is, they were suspicious of both slave owners and industrial owners. They were also suspicious of slaves, who worked for free and were dependent on their owners. These Midwest workers did not want to be seen as dependent. The Democrats of Indiana were often wage earners who saw their place in so ciety as a middle state that led to economic independence – small farming or self-employed craft labor. 52 Democrats not only did not want the competition from freed slaves, they also wanted a sort of utopia in the frontier free, from constant reminders of dependent labor. They were free, and slaves were not. Furthermore, most free blacks in the Midwest had little political or social freedom, a state of affairs reinforced in the 1850s by the Dred Scott case. The Democrats saw themselves as free white labor. 53 This was a critical distinction from the not free black labor in the South, and because of the racial ideology of white superiority that permeated both the North and the South, the Democrats believed there was little chance that labor unity inclusive of blacks and whites would be established in the United States. Many Hoosier Democrats viewed both slave owner and slave as emasculated, and neither was ruggedly individualistic, as the dominant ideology of the frontier required of men. Slaves were dependent of the paternalism of the masters. The slave owners were dependent on the slaves to do their manual labor. The Indiana Democrats thought they should do their own work, and dependence was a sign of weakness. A literary work that had an effect on the Democratic editors of Indiana was Uncle Tom’s Cabin, the pro-abolition novel written by Harriett Beecher Stowe. Uncle Tom’s

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164 Cabin served as a lightning rod for abolitionism. The anti-abolitionist Democrats had to take note of it, even if they intensely disagreed with its message. Because the novel was so successful at changing public opinion, it was a force with which the conservatives had to reckon. The reaction of Democratic newspapers to Uncle Tom’s Cabin was predictable. The Putnam County, Indiana, Sentinel observed the novel’s popularity in England: “Anything calculated to misrepresent American institutions to their injury would not fail to be received with open arms by the British public; more especially when it pandered to their anti-slavery prejudices, as does Uncle Tom.” 54 The Putnam County editor praised the novel for being “ingeniously contrived, and skillfully woven for effect. But we think we have a number of popular novels, wherein slavery is introduced, which in point of art, and incident, and most certainly in point of purity, chastity and vigor of style and a high-toned, manly and independent American spirit, are vastly superior.” The editor did not name these novels. The editor of the Democratic paper in Indianapolis, reacting with denial, said “we do not admit that the state of the negro-slave is anything like what is pictured in Uncle Tom’s Cabin There may be solitary cases approaching its abomination.” 55 The Democratic editors also read magazines to help form their ideas about politics. One of these magazines was the New York-based The Old Guard, which the Lincoln Administration suspended in 1862 for opposing the war. Editor C. Chauncey Burr resumed publication in 1863 and said his mission was to verbally fight against despotism and “mongrelization.” 56 Originally an abolitionist, Burr changed his mind on that issue after a tour of the South. He came to conclude that African Americans were inferior. Burr

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165 thought there were multiple acts of creation and several species within the genus Homo. He thought mental aptitude and abilities differentiated these Homo species. The editor held that blacks were dependent on whites and freedom would lead to blacks’ extinction. 57 He tried to frame slavery as progressive, maintaining it was beneficial to both blacks and whites. Whites were needed to organize black labor, and blacks provided the required manual labor and did it much better than their white counterparts. This compact made for a more efficient society. He also claimed that most blacks who came to North America had been slaves in Africa. 58 The New York magazine editor believed society naturally had a hierarchical order, and free will simply allowed men to foolishly try to work against that order. He saw history as a struggle between order and disorder, and he thought Lincoln and the Republicans were hell-bent on creating social disorder in North America. He also saw history as deterministic, holding that societies naturally formed ruling and subservient classes. On the political front, Burr felt that states’ rights were essential because the will of the people was better represented at the state level. Thus, state governments were sovereign over the federal government. Burr feared that as the country grew one section or group of people would use the federal government to force its political desires on the other sections or groups. He thought decentralization would keep this from happening and that permanent national gridlock was desirable. He echoed Madison’s idea that the diversity created as the country expanded westward checked decentralization. 59 A supporter of New York governor Horatio Seymour, Burr railed at Lincoln for subverting the Constitution. He said Lincoln had no constitutional authority to coerce the Southern states back into the Union. Likewise, the president had no constitutional

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166 authority to suppress Northern dissent or suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 60 Like Vallandigham, Burr did not advocate violent resistance to the Lincoln Administration. He told his readers to use the ballot box and the judicial system to fight what he saw as Lincoln’s tyranny. After the war ended, he continued to frame Republicans as dictators, pointing to the military occupation of the South as evidence. 61 Political Patronage and the Party-Personal Press in Indiana Hoosier editors benefited from their political connections with patronage in the form of government contracts for printing or postmaster positions when the party they supported was in power. For example, James H. McNeely, owner of the Evansville Journal, became postmaster after he supported Lincoln in the 1860 election. 62 Dr. Hubbard M. Smith, owner of the pro-Republican Vincennes Gazette, became postmaster in his town in March of 1861. 63 Editors also benefited from increased readership due to the state’s increasing population. The rise in population in the towns and cities led to the first dailies in 1850. Leading this trend was the Indianapolis Indiana Journal, which went daily as it covered the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851. 64 By 1860, a dozen dailies operated in the Hoosier State. The dailies all continued to publish weeklies, while some would add telegraphic editions during the war. The trend toward dailies continued after the war. By 1880, Indiana editors produced 45 daily newspapers throughout the state. 65 Some papers printed a Sunday issue that was more like a magazine, including features and fiction. A wire service also contributed to the development of Hoosier journalism. The Associated Press came to the state in 1856 when the Indianapolis Indiana Journal and Indianapolis Indiana State Sentinel began subscribing to the combine, but most papers in the state could not afford the service. 66 The Indianapolis Indiana Journal was something

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167 of an early corporate conglomerate. An opponent of Jacksonianism in the first decade of the state’s history, the newspaper came of age as a pro-Whig organ. Owner John D. Defrees, who had previously owned a paper in South Bend, sold the Journal in 1854 to a group headed by Ovid Butler, who hired Berry R. Sulgrove to be the editor. 67 Butler and the other owners let Sulgrove run the paper without interference. Sulgrove rang the alarm of Democratic capitulation to the South. In Sulgrove’s view, if the Democrats got their way, the war would come to every town and village in Indiana. The editor sowed the seeds of keeping the war far from the home front. The Journal also owned a book binding concern and had a post office. All three operations were housed in the Indiana State Journal Buildings in downtown Indianapolis. While the overwhelming majority of newspapers in Indiana were in English, a growing number were in German. The first was the Indiana Volksblatt Und Telegraph, a pro-Democratic paper that began publication in Indianapolis in 1848. 68 The Volksblatt printed daily, weekly, and Sunday editions. It would last until 1918, when anti-German sentiment made it unpopular. A Free Soil paper, the Freie Presse Von Indiana, began in 1853, also in Indianapolis. 69 The Freie Presse was pro-Democratic and opposed slavery. 70 Successful German-language papers were also launched in Evansville and Fort Wayne. 71 Evansville had both Republican and Democratic German-language papers during the war. Fort Wayne, a bastion of the Democratic party, had only a pro-Democratic German newspaper during the war. A Republican paper, the Indiana Volksfreund, started in 1871. 72

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168 During the war, the editors of newspapers continued to print largely political interpretations of the news with highly personal styles that often featured ad hominem attacks on their opponents, especially the editors of other parties. While the Civil War era remained largely a period of the party press, changes were on the way toward a more commercial and professional press, especially in the urban areas of the North. Although he advised President Abraham Lincoln in the election of 1864, Henry J. Raymond of the New York Times moved to make the reporting in his paper more neutral, concise, and accurate. 73 In the countryside, though, most of the newspapers were closely associated with either the Republicans or Democrats, and this led to hotly contested free expression debates in the North. For example, when General Ambrose Everts Burnside published on 13 April 1863, General Order No. 38 to squelch free expression in the Midwest states, Republican editors cheered him, citing the war necessity, and Democratic editors cursed him, citing the First Amendment as guaranteeing their right to publish as they pleased. Democratic newspaper editors were intimidated and officially suppressed. Sometimes the mails carrying Democratic papers were not delivered, and the commercial telegraph lines were brought under control of the War Department. General Winfield Scott, head of the U.S. Army early in the war, had ordered transmissions be self-censored on 8 July 1861. Then, during the first battle of Bull Run, Scott ordered the telegraphs to be silent. 74 The following winter, Lincoln gave Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton the authority to censor telegraphic transmissions. 75 Meanwhile, reporters in the Civil War were not embedded with the military in any systematic fashion. Rather, it was up to the generals in the field to decide if a journalist could witness the action. General William T. Sherman abhorred journalists and tried to

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169 have one New York reporter executed for treason. 76 Grant was friendlier to the press and made one reporter, Sylvanus Cadwallader, who served as a spy, an aide-de-camp, and later a political adviser. 77 While the military handling of reporters at the front depended on the attitudes of the commanders, the attempt to control the chorus of criticism directed at the president from urban editors was almost non-existent. Rather, Lincoln worked with a few editors to counter the criticisms came from New York’s Democratic editors. Only Raymond and Horace Greeley stood behind Lincoln for the majority of the war, and Greeley was all over the map, even calling for a peace conference during the middle of the war, as well as entertaining his own presidential ambitions. Greeley, though, did constantly push for a war of emancipation. It is not clear how much influence he had over Lincoln on this matter, but it is clear that the president listened to the New York Tribune editor closely. Another major development was the rise of press associations, cooperatives that made it less expensive to cover the war but also centralized the flow of information and potentially reduced journalistic competition. This was a way for newspapers to pool information at a time of reporter shortages because so many reporters had to serve in the military. Many Indiana newspaper editors served in the Union Army during the war. For example, a short list shows that editors of the Blackford County Democrat, Columbia City News, Logansport Journal, Goshen Democrat, Greene County Times, Madison Courier, Crown Point Register, Steuben Republican, Liberty Herald, and the Franklin Jeffersonian all served in the army. 78 Their absence had an effect on the quality of journalism. The fact that there were fewer trained journalists to do the work meant that editors had to rely on inexperienced helpers – or do all the work themselves.

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170 A press association gathered news for most papers in the South and in part this explains why Confederate newspapers seemed to have one political voice and one set of predictable frames in which to cast the news. Whereas the Associated Press had started before the war and continued to expand during the war, the Confederate Press Association was created to help Southern newspapers deal with a dearth of reporters during the war. P.A. superintendent John S. Thrasher implemented a series of standards and practices, including a call for clear and concise writing. Thrasher also advised reporters to develop sources within the Confederate Army, but not to reveal CSA military secrets. 79 In both the North and South, the press associations utilized a cooperative reporting approach that fed this ever-growing news orientation of newspaper audiences, and both the Northern and Southern associations helped develop a common set of standards and practices for the profession. Thus, the press, North and South, built a need for news in the public. The war stories were dramatic, and the political, social, and economic fate of the nation hung in the balance. Editors North and South had a profound effect on the political crisis that caused the war, and then they debated endlessly on how to either wage, win, or stop the war. The penny press era, with its sensationalism and emphasis on crime, corruption, and domestic disturbances, would come a decade later in Indiana. Most of the newspapers in Indiana in the 1860s still were in a frontier, booster mode. In a way, this went along with the partisan press because party papers were always advocating something. By 1861, most papers in the state were aligned with either the Republicans or the Democrats, although a few Free Soil, Peoples Party, independent, religious, and one

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171 issue papers existed too. Almost every town had a least one Republican newspaper and one Democratic paper. Many had more than one for each party. Another way for the political parties to build an identity was the inclusion of artwork on the editorial page. Most papers in Indiana carried some sort of logo under the masthead. Many Republican papers had the U.S. flag under the masthead on the second page. 80 The Marshall County Republican had an eagle landing on a flag pole with the Stars and Stripes wrapped around the pole. 81 Most Democratic papers had no such artwork, though the Indiana State Sentinel in Indianapolis included an embossing of a watch. 82 The Plymouth Democrat had a graphic in which an eagle rested on a flag pole with the word D-E-M-O-C-R-A-C-Y written on the stripes of the flag. 83 The Fort Wayne Sentinel, which flip-flopped between being a Democratic and Republican paper, had a logo in which two hands are shaking over the U.S. Constitution. 84 Hoosiers were intent on maintaining politics as usual during the war. According to Indiana historian Gilbert R. Tredway, this because each party refused “to put the country’s interests above party advantage. The 1860s featured political vituperation and personal journalism to a degree astonishing to the twentieth century mind.” 85 Editors were often major players in the political process, and propaganda filled their columns. Schuyler Colfax, one of the pre-eminent Hoosier politicians of the war, had been editor of the South Bend Free Press. Sulgrove, the editor of the Indianapolis Journal, was closely aligned with Indiana’s war governor, Oliver P. Morton. During the war, the Journal was sold to Morton’s private secretary, William R. Holloway. 86 John W. Dawson owned the Fort Wayne Times, which switched names to Dawson’s Daily Times & Union. After the war, Dawson became governor of the Utah territories. 87 Samuel E. Perkins, the chief

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172 justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, had been the editor of Richmond Jeffersonian, a paper that was subject to mob attack in March of 1863. 88 Joseph Bingham, editor of the Indiana State Sentinel, was the chairman of the Democratic Party in Indiana. 89 Moreover, townspeople knew the identity of the editors, as well as the editorials they wrote. This was before the time of anonymous, team-oriented editorial writing, though commentary did not carry a by-line. Party discipline was the rule, and editors regularly carried the tickets of their party in upcoming election. Announcements about local, state, and national mass meetings of the party were routinely included on the editorial page. What the editors wrote was largely analytical and interpretive, and news and commentary often appeared on the same page. The United States had operated in a free-expression environment that had fostered a diversity of political opinion since Thomas Jefferson failed to renew the Alien and Sedition Acts when he became president in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Journalists operated as leading political operatives, and, until the war, spouted their beliefs and their political venom without threat of official censorship. Their newspapers were aimed at audiences who shared their political point of view. These editors did not merely set agenda, but they also framed what they wanted their readers to think – and urged them to vote a particular way. For the most part, the editors reinforced previously held positions. Rarely were editors trying to change the opinions of independent voters. Mostly, they countered the political spin of the opposition press. James Elder, the editor of the Democratic paper in Richmond, had to defend himself from charges of being a member of the clandestine Knights of the Golden Circle. 90 His defensive editorial appeared just three days before a mob destroyed his

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173 printing office. Elder made the point that Republican editors had a vested interest in seeing the suspension or destruction of Democratic newspapers. He argued, “The Abolitionist editors reason, ‘if we suppress all the other papers, we shall make more money.’ ” 91 Indiana’s journalists did not make a name for themselves as reporters during the Civil War. Most papers received their information from other newspapers and telegraphic exchanges. There was little original reporting from the front. J. Cutler Andrews’ The North Reports the Civil War does not list a single Hoosier reporter in his 813page study. Dispatches from Cincinnati newspaper reporters were the most likely to find their way into Indiana papers. The work of New York and Chicago reporters also made it into Indiana papers. The Indianapolis Indiana Journal published a report with a Cincinnati dateline on Nov. 9, 1864, that provided detailed information about General William T. Sherman’s troop strength and strategic intentions. The result was that Washington countered with planted stories that were designed to mislead the Confederates. 92 Because mid-century U.S. political history was dynamic, both Republicans and Democrats would undergo dramatic changes in the 1850s and 1860s. The Democrats would be divide by the election of 1860. The Southern Democrats would lead the move to secede, while the Northern Democrats themselves divided into pro-war and pro-peace factions. In the first two years of the war, most Northern Democratic newspapers supported the war and only after two bloody years did a peace movement begin to catch on. A dramatic power struggle was at hand in the Hoosier State during the spring after the Emancipation Proclamation took effect on 1 January 1863. Even the Republicans

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174 were not totally united. Governor Oliver P. Morton disagreed with Lincoln Administration decisions about military personnel who served in the state’s shadow federal government. Indeed, Morton supported states’ rights when it came to the sovereignty of his government in Indianapolis. As governor of the Hoosier State, he thought he was in control of all things Hoosier. He grew exasperated when the Lincoln Administration ignored or barely acted on any of his communications to Washington. He was especially frustrated with Lincoln’s handling of Kentucky. The president wanted to be careful with the Border State, but Morton wanted the Commonwealth run with an iron Republican fist. He did not want any chance of an invasion of Indiana by Confederates through Kentucky. In the spring of 1863, Morton faced several opportunities to tighten the reins in Indiana. Riots broke out in Fort Wayne and Indianapolis during mass political rallies. The former was a mass meeting of pro-abolitionists in heavily Democratic Allen County on May 2. Afterwards, mobs on both sides attacked and counterattacked. The ruckus lasted approximately ten minutes without fatalities. Eventually, the mayor and marshal restored order. 93 The latter, called the Battle of Pogues Run, occurred on 20 May 1863 during a Democratic mass meeting near the state house. Hascall had troops and cannons on the street to remind the Democrats who was in charge. Late in the afternoon, Union soldiers stopped a speech by Senator Thomas A. Hendricks. The cavalry moved in, and the masses began a stampede to leave the area. A Republican assumed the podium and began a pro-Lincoln speech. As Democrats boarded their trains for home, the shot off pistols. Soon Union troops boarded the trains to confiscate weapons, but many of the Democrats

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175 threw their weapons out the windows, many of the arms landing in nearby Pogues Creek. 94 These episodes were part of a pattern of internal violence in the state. In March, a group of Union soldiers riding through Richmond, Indiana, on a transport train disembarked and destroyed the local Democratic newspaper. 95 In May, Hascall, the commander of the District of Indiana and head of its shadow federal government, would suspend publication of eleven Democratic newspapers in the state. 96 During the entire war, sixty-nine cases of suppression and intimidation of Democratic editors occurred in the Hoosier State, although only twelve of those were official federally sponsored suppression. 97 Since Hascall was responsible for eleven of those in only six weeks during the spring of 1863, Morton lost patience with the Union officer whom he thought was unnecessarily upsetting Democrats, a large voting bloc at the time. Morton eventually petitioned Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton for Hascall’s removal because the governor was afraid the Union military officer was over-agitating the Peace Democrats in the Hoosier State. 98 Indeed, Morton had never been thrilled with Hascall as federal military leader of the state. Even though Hascall was a volunteer from Goshen in the northern part of the state, Morton had seen a personal friend, Henry B. Carrington, supplanted by Hascall in April. The governor covertly worked to remove Hascall, whom he considered less organized and effective than Carrington. 99 The level of suppression of the Democratic press reached its apex during 1863. Those eleven cases of press suppression and intimidation in Indiana during 1863 represented the highest single-year total of the war. 100 The overwhelming majority of those cases came while Hascall was in office and Democrats were rallying against what

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176 they now considered to be an abolitionist war. When Morton effectively closed down the general assembly to prevent its planned entreaties to the South for a peace conference and raised money privately to run the state government, the role of the federal military shadow government increased dramatically. Indiana was a state in turmoil, and Hascall, working as Department of the Ohio Commander Ambrose Everts Burnside’s proxy, worked to stifle the Democrats as the war news took a turn for the worse. Starting with Shiloh in the spring of 1862, Hoosier Democrats began to see the war negatively. Approximately one-tenth of the 13,047 Union casualties at Shiloh were Hoosiers. After Antietam in September of 1862, Burnside would replace George McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside, a native of Liberty, Indiana, would oversee the disastrous Union loss at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in December of 1862, and he was reassigned to a post in Cincinnati, overseeing the federal shadow governments in the Midwestern states. When Hascall took office in Indianapolis in the spring of 1863, the Union, now under the direction of Joseph Hooker, was about to suffer another loss, this time at Chancellorsville, Virginia. The Democratic editors, already tired of the overall carnage of the war, as well as the draft, income tax, and emancipation, became even more critical of Lincoln, the military, and the Republicans and their editors, who argued for suppression of disloyal editors. The whole situation was a remarkable communications mess, but more importantly it was, like the war, a contest for power, and framing supplied the way to power. Words like “loyalty” and “disloyalty” indicated how entrenched political positions were, but because the war itself was so lengthy and so dynamic, the molding and maintenance of public opinion was not insignificant. Every military event had a political consequence. A

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177 long-standing professional army did not exist in the North or the South. While most Northern soldiers, for example, certainly favored the war effort, many of their brethren back home had somewhat different views of the war. The interpersonal communication between father and son, brother and brother, and friend and friend had major political significance. While the soldiers’ views tended to be affected most heavily by their personal experience, the views of the men back home were affected by the editorials and news in their hometown papers. What the editors wrote and how they wrote their words molded public opinion. The very existence of the United States as a one-nation entity hung in the balance, and the editors played a central role in the opinion-making dynamic of the period. Suppression in the North Newspapers were not suppressed in Indiana alone. They were suppressed throughout the North, especially in the first two years of the war. Suppression of disloyal Democratic papers occurred in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Louis. One scholar estimated that at least sixty Democratic papers faced suppression, although that number is well below the actual level of suppression. Editors faced various forms of suppression and intimidation. Soldiers tarred and feathered Ambrose Kimball, the editor of the Essex County Democrat in Haverhill, Massachusetts. 101 Union soldiers arrested Philadelphia Evening Journal editor Albert D. Boileau on 28 January 1863, and took him to Fort McHenry in Baltimore. The government suspended Boileau’s newspaper because he unfavorably compared Lincoln’s intellectual capacities to those of Jefferson Davis. Democrats back in Pennsylvania asked the governor to intercede. Under pressure from Major General Robert C. Schenck, Boileau wrote a letter expressing his regret for criticizing the Lincoln administration.

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178 Schenck then released Boileau. 102 Walter S. Asbell, editor of the Baltimore Sun, chose not to criticize the Lincoln administration rather than go to jail. Asbell’s then simply ignored Lincoln and the national government. 103 Burnside attempted to silence Wilbur F. Storey suppressed his pro-Democratic Chicago Times at the end of Hascall’s tenure in Indiana before Lincoln rescinded the suppression order, and John C. Fremont’s activities against the press in Missouri rivaled those of Burnside and Hascall. Fremont, who at the time was commander of the Department of the West, declared martial law in 1861 and suppressed the War Bulletin and the Missourian. Both papers had printed information about military movements. 104 A third paper, the St. Louis Christian Advocate, was warned it was about to be suppressed and told to “be a religious paper, as it professes to be, and it will never come under the discipline” of the military. 105 The military closed down the St. Louis Morning Herald, while the Missouri Republican and St. Louis Democrat began printing loyal editorials. 106 Fremont also barred five New York newspapers and the Louisville Courier from the mails. 107 That Burnside and Hascall worked to intimidate Hoosier editors who were critical of the war or the war effort demonstrates scholar John D. Stevens’ hypothesis that greater press freedom is tolerated in a heterogeneous society. 108 Criticism of Lincoln was by a larger number of Hoosiers, and it took a special effort by the federal authorities to impose their anti-free expression policies on the state. For historical reasons, Indiana was more heterogeneous than Missouri, and it was therefore harder to impose restraints on the area of freedom. Although Governor Oliver P. Morton remained quiet and tacitly seemed to approve of General Order No. 9, he did nothing to publicly support Hascall. Thus, this made the suppression of the Democratic editors in Indiana a more difficult proposition. If

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179 Morton had been closer to Burnside and Hascall, perhaps the chilling effect in Indiana would have been far less temporary. James Brooks of the New York Express was much bolder, more vituperative, and more persistent in inveighing against the Lincoln administration than editors in states that were more homogeneous socially and politically. Furthermore, Indiana was in the middle of what were then called the Western states, and many Democrats in the region were against the war in general terms. They tended to be older than their Republican counterparts and had no desire to fight on the battlefield. They were generally much better disposed toward the South because so many citizens of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois had migrated from North Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Furthermore, both abolitionists and anti-abolitionists formed secret societies that made plans for terrorist activities against the other, and many Democrats supported a plan to have the West break off from the East and a form a third regional nation that might or might not work in concert with the South to form a new nation that would have leverage against the Eastern states. In addition, the largest group of critical editors published in New York City, a place that had strong economic ties to the South. The North was, at best, struggling to gain the upper hand in the war during the spring of 1863, when the major events studied here occurred. Confederate General Robert E. Lee was beginning an invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Burnside had been moved to the Department of the Ohio after he failed to lead the Army of the Potomac to victory at Fredericksburg. As he was settling in at Cincinnati to administer the Union effort in what would become the Midwest, Joseph Hooker, Burnside’s successor in the East, lost at Chancellorsville, Virginia. Even the death of Confederate Lieutenant General

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180 Stonewall Jackson, killed accidentally by his own troops at Chancellorsville, could do nothing to lift the spirits of Lincoln and the North. Meanwhile, General Grant was having an up-and-down time of it in Vicksburg, a key battle in the Western theater of operations, and Confederate renegade John Morgan was also beginning to put terror in the hearts of the Northerners. In the next two months, it would seem, especially in Indiana, that the failures of the president and the Union military in prosecuting the war would be turned against those Hoosier dissidents who opposed the chief executive politically or who, in fact, supported the South. Either way, the news was not good at that time for the North, and Burnside and Hascall did what many military governments had done at a time when they are on the defensive – tightened up the civil liberties of their own citizens, in this case, Democratic political leaders, including Democratic newspaper editors in the Hoosier State. Democratic editors in Indiana believed that abolitionist Republicans were just as fanatical as sectionalists as the slaveholders in the South. Most importantly, Hoosier Democratic editors portrayed the worst elements of the Republican Party as being revolutionists who were tearing apart the legitimacy of the U.S. Constitution. As will be discussed later, they were the ideological followers of Edmund Burke, a conservative English political philosopher whose chief criticism of the French Revolution was that it unleashed chaos, lawlessness, and unspeakable violence on society. Democrats in Indiana wanted a stable social order. That meant a return to the social order before the war. Since Indiana was not a seceding state, Democrats believed it was in good working order, and the last thing needed was a shift in its structures.

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181 Of course, this reactionary attitude included concerns about the social and economic structures, especially the emigration of free and poor blacks from the South – as well as having to pay reparations to the Southern slaveholders for the loss of their property. Hoosier Democrats were particularly concerned about being taxed to compensate for Lincoln and Congress taking the constitutionally supported property of the Southern planters. They feared that the income tax law passed on 5 August 1861, would establish a precedent for increased taxation on victorious Northerners after the war. 109 Leading Editors in Indiana In Indiana, the leader of the Democratic press was the Indiana State Sentinel in Indianapolis. It had started in 1841 during the heyday of the Democratic stranglehold on the state. The Sentinel was actually a daily when the legislature was in session from 1841 until 1844. The rest of the time, it was either a twiceor thrice-weekly until it became a daily in 1851. For a while, the paper was housed in the old Capitol in downtown Indianapolis. 110 It was incorporated in 1857, becoming known as the Sentinel Company. 111 Joseph J. Bingham and John Doughty owned the paper at the start of the Civil War, and the Sentinel supported Stephen A. Douglas in the election of 1860. Before he enlisted in July of 1861, Doughty sold his share to John R. Elder and John Harkness, who owned the Indiana State Guard. Effectively, the two papers were merged. Bingham led the charge in early years of the war, maintaining that Democrats would remain an opposition party with the right to criticize and disagree with Lincoln and the Republicans. Bingham believed that if the South turned the war into a quagmire, it would help Democrats regain power in the North. 112 Bingham would lead the chorus against the unnecessary slaughter, high taxes, and economic deprivation. He believed

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182 rational human beings would not pay such a high price for a political stalemate. “Let us reason together. Let humanity, intelligence and common sense settle the controversy,” Bingham wrote. 113 On 31 August 1861, soldiers and citizens forced Bingham to take a loyalty oath administered by the mayor of Indianapolis. 114 Other major Democratic editors in the state at the start of the war included Thomas Tigar of the Fort Wayne Sentinel, William Drapier of the St. Joseph County Forum, John H. Scott of the Evansville Gazette, James Elder of the Richmond Jeffersonian, Lucienne G. Matthews of the New Albany Ledger, M.R. Slater of the Franklin Democratic Herald, Ransom Hastings of the Lafayette Argus, Grafton F. Cookerly of the Terre Haute Journal, Samuel A. Hall of the Logansport Democratic Pharos, and D.E. VanValkenburgh and John G. Osborne of the Plymouth Democrat. The industrious Tigar made the Sentinel a daily on 1 January 1861. 115 Hastings opposed the Civil War and was ostracized by both Republicans and Democrats in Lafayette. Hastings was assaulted by a recruiting officer on 1 September 1861. 116 Before Lincoln installed Burnside in Cincinnati and Burnside hired Hascall to shepherd the Hoosier State, there had already been several incidents of press intimidation in Indiana. These incidents occurred against the backdrop of press intimidation in Missouri, Maryland, and even Iowa, a state that was proud of its support of the war and abolition. On 8 August 1862, the War Department issued an order granting the president the authority to use military commissions to deal with those citizens who discouraged voluntary enlistment in speech or writing. Among those arrested under this order was Dennis A. Mahony, the editor of the Dubuque, Iowa, Herald and a Democrat running for Congress. 117 Mahony, who had been state printer in 1854, the owner of Iowa’s first

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183 daily, and a congressman from 1859 to 1861, was held in a Washington, D.C., prison for three months, starting on 14 August 1862. 118 He opposed secession, but he was against the quelling of the rebellion and abolition. After he was released, he wrote The Prisoner of the State, a book that argued the First Amendment was not suspended by the necessities of war. 119 Likewise, newspapers from Key West, Florida, to Bangor, Maine, to La Crosse, Wisconsin, to Albany, Oregon, were suppressed. 120 At the same time, many Democratic papers were intimidated by the threat of violence or were damaged partially by mob action. Of course, in towns where Democrats had the majority, Republican papers faced similar intimidation. In Indiana, the Terre Haute Journal had supported Stephen A. Douglas in the 1860 presidential election. On 21 October 1861, the Journal was destroyed by members of the Forty-Third Indiana Regiment, men who were not enamored of editor Grafton F. Cookerly’s anti-war, anti-Republican stance. 121 Supportive of both Vallandigham and Indiana Democratic Congressman Daniel W. Vorhees, the Journal did not resume publication until December 12. 122 Cookerly sold the paper in 1862 to John S. Jordan and J.B. Edmunds, who had owned it earlier. 123 Also in the fall of 1861, a Union recruiting officer beat up Lafayette Argus editor Ransom Hastings, who approved of Southern secession. Hastings opposed the war and was disliked by both Republicans and Democrats. 124 The recruiting officer who pummeled the editor was provoked by Hastings’ criticism of enlistments in the military. 125 Like many of the Democratic editors of the period, Hastings eventually found the endeavor to be too much, ending publication of his daily paper on 15 September 1864. 126

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184 In the fall of 1862, New Albany Ledger editor Luciene G. Matthews was arrested under the Fifty-Seventh Article of War of 1806 for publishing information about where Indiana soldiers had been assigned. 127 Matthews reported to General Horatio G. Wright in Cincinnati. 128 Wright released the editor, who claimed he copied the story from another paper. Because the Ledger was “a Democratic paper supporting the war probably served as a mitigating circumstance in the case,” journalism historian Robert S. Harper observed. 129 There were other forms of suppression. For example, the military often drove reporters from the field, saying that their reports were aiding the enemy. Similarly, the telegraph was taken over by the military on 8 July 1861. 130 This made it difficult for reporters to transmit their dispatches to their editors. Sometimes transmission was cut when a paper was trying to send a report to a wire service. The Chicago Times reported a dispatch about troop movements to the Associated Press was censored “without any notice of such suppression being given to the agent.” 131 Another mode of suppressing newspapers was via the mails. In Memphis, Major General S.A. Hurlbut, who was from Illinois, banned the circulation and mailing of the Chicago Times early in 1863 for publishing “false and calumnious articles against the President of the United States, and giving aid and comfort to the public enemy.” 132 Another way to control information flowing to newspapers was to intimidate soldiers who acted as anonymous war correspondents. Private Newton B. Spencer described General George Meade as a “military charlatan” in correspondence sent to the Pen Yan Democrat in Yates County, New York. The military tried Spencer under the

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185 Fifty-Seventh Article of War for giving intelligence to the enemy. Spencer was acquitted of those charges. 133 In general, the relationship between reporters and the military was up to the commanders in the field. General George Meade issued General Orders No. 67 in 1861, making it acceptable for reporters to describe battles once they were completed. 134 William T. Sherman thought reporters were spies because they gave information to the enemy. 135 On the other hand, General Ulysses S. Grant used his favorite reporter, Sylvanus Cadwallader of the Chicago Times, as a spy and secretary. Grant eventually made Cadwallader an aide when Grant became president after the war. 136 Ownership Patterns: An Effect of Suppression Hascall’s suspension of the eleven Democratic newspapers from 25 April to 6 June 1863, had a temporary chilling effect on the Democratic press of Indiana because it destabilized the ownership of those papers and even put several papers out of business. For purposes of this study, relative stability of a newspaper was determined by the number of owners a paper had in a given period of time – in this case, from April of 1861 to April of 1865. An inverse relationship was established. That is, the more owners for a given newspaper over those four years, the less stability it had. In other words, a higher rate of ownership transfer by a newspaper represented less stability, and a lower rate meant greater stability. A comparison of the ownership patterns of the Democratic and Republican newspapers in the eleven Indiana cities where suppression took place in 1863 shows that Republican ownership was more stable than Democratic. On average, Republican papers in those cities were owned by 1.7 owners (single owners or ownership groups) from 1861 to 1865, or just a little less than two owners per paper. By contrast, Democratic papers in

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186 those cities were owned by 2.9 owners, or almost three owners per paper. (See Table 2-1, Part 1 below.) Of the eleven counties examined, the Rush County Jeffersonian in Rushville had the most ownership turnover during the war. This Democratic paper had six different owners. Rush County saw frequent violence between the parties during the war, and two draft officials were murdered there in 1863. 137 Four of the eleven counties had at least three owners for their Democratic papers, and two of the eleven counties had three owners for their Republican papers. Five of the eleven counties had a single Republican owner during the paper, compared to two with a single Democratic owner. Another group of newspapers was chosen randomly from cities in Indiana in which suppression of Democratic newspapers did not occur during the Civil War. In this group, ownership change for Democratic papers was, on average, almost doubled (2.9 to 1.6, or 1.8 to 1) in towns where suppression occurred from those where it did not occur. (See Table 2-1, Part 2 below.) Ownership change for Republican papers was, on average, slightly lower (1.7 to 2.0, or 0.8 to 1) in towns where suppression occurred from those where it did not occur. Thus, suppression had a temporary negative – chilling – effect on the stability of Democratic newspapers. Suppression had little or no positive effect on Republican papers. Republican papers gained little themselves from suppression, although they benefited from the negative effects on Democratic ownership, especially when Democratic papers shut down permanently, changed their names, or were destroyed. This left the Republican newspapers with no or weakened Democratic competitors. The conclusion can be made that suppression contributed to the temporary instability of Democratic newspapers. However, politics played a factor in the conditions

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187 of the day. The fact that the Republican Party was in power during the Civil War contributed to the financial stability of the Republican newspapers since patronage was still the rule in these latter days of the partisan press era. Indeed, in the group of thirteen counties randomly chosen for analysis, twelve had Republican newspapers and only nine had Democratic newspapers. In other words, the Republican press existed more frequently because it was the party in power. That the Republican papers were more stable during the war may also be attributable to the tendency of the party to attract the business class, whose acumen for making a profit may have been a bit more acute than that of their Democratic counterpart. That the Democratic Party suffered perhaps the greatest collapse of party power in the nation’s history certainly had an effect. Journalism in the Midwestern states during the 1860s had not progressed as much as it had in the East. In Indiana, journalism was a remnant of the party press era of 1800-30. The editors published four-page newspapers that cost a reader $2.50 a year. The content included advertising, editorials, and news reports, which were interpreted along party lines. Little artwork accompanied the articles. This was a text-heavy era. These newspapers were not the mass-produced, steam-press penny papers of the nation’s urban areas. They were produced on hand presses for circulations of only a few thousand at the most. In general, U.S. newspapers were undergoing major changes during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. It was a transitional stage in which the political and personal press was giving way to first the penny and then the professional, commercial press of the twentieth century. The men and women who produced American newspapers and magazines tended to favor one political cause or party.

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188 At the same time, the newspapers of the Civil War era already were beginning to be dominated by commercial interests. A typical Civil War newspaper contained plenty of advertising on its front page, with news and commentary starting on the second page. Despite the presence of these classified-like ads on the front page, Midwestern newspapers still tended to be driven more by politics than their counterparts in the East. The page-two analysis and commentary section was the heart of the newspaper, the place where the editor’s voice reached full volume. Hascall’s official suppression of the Democratic editors in Indiana, though it lasted only six weeks, came at a time when the Democrats had gained the advantage in the state general assembly and in the congressional delegation. Major General John C. Fremont did harass editors in Missouri, but it was a border and slave state. Indiana was neither. Suppression was also widespread in Maryland, another slave state. Newspapers were suppressed in California and Oregon, but this was far from the war’s main conflict. Most of Indiana’s Democrats supported the union, though not conscription or emancipation. 138 Suppression More Likely in Northern Indiana The fact that Hascall went after editors primarily in the northern part of the state, all near his home of Goshen, suggests he felt confident he could intimidate the Democratic editors of Plymouth, South Bend, Warsaw, Bluffton, Columbia City, Winamac, Huntington, Rushville, Hartford City, Franklin, and Knox because he was intimate with the Republican political leaders in these towns. Furthermore, the brigadier general bypassed the Democratic editors in the area’s largest city, Fort Wayne, precisely because he knew the Democrats were stronger there and the press was more sophisticated in Allen County. He also did not threaten editors in Indianapolis, which was split between Republicans, who had the executive branch, and Democrats, who had the majority in the

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189 legislature. This re-confirms Stevens’ hypothesis that constraints work better in homogeneous societies. Since Fort Wayne and Indianapolis had more Democratic support, it would require greater governmental power to support restraint. With the federal military government and state governor out of phase, suppression in Allen and Marion counties was a more difficult proposition. From 1861 to the late summer of 1862, the war tended to unify the press in Indiana. After Lincoln announced the Emancipation Proclamation on 22 September 1862, the unity disappeared. Democrats began to become more and more critical of the war, while Republicans dug in and began to see the political battle in terms of loyalty and disloyalty. The generally muddy war news of the first two years of the conflict intensified the divide, as did Democratic concerns about conscription and their economic future in a nation of freed slaves and dispossessed slave owners. In a sense, both Democratic and Republican editors began to dabble in the politics of fear. First Burnside’s edict and then Hascall’s added fuel to the fire. Governor Morton remained quiet, seemed to tacitly approve of the measures, and yet worked behind the scenes to get rid of Hascall and returned a closer ally to the head of the federal shadow government in Indiana. Republican editors cheered Hascall. Democrats cursed him, then desisted while swearing loyalty. Those eleven newspapers that Hascall suppressed generally faced tough times in the first decade after suppression. Seven still existed after the war, three shut down after suppression, and one was destroyed that same year in another incident. Two of the seven that still existed in 1865 changed their titles, and the Pulaski County Democrat actually did not print a paper for more than a year after Hascall’s suppression before coming back as a Republican paper, the Weekly Herald.

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190 Thus, only five of eleven remained pro-Democratic papers with the same title they had the day before Hascall suppressed them. Thus, Hascall’s attempt to suppress was successful, though by no means absolute. Four papers out of eleven went out of business, and only five remained intact by the end of he war. Meanwhile, in April of 1865, Republican papers existed in ten of the eleven counties where Democratic papers were suppressed. Only one county, Starke, did not have a Republican paper during the war, and the Pulaski County Republican only came into existence in April of 1865. In the long run, papers connected to both parties survived. By 1875, nine of the eleven Democratic newspapers were operating again, although five under new names. Only one of the nine papers changed allegiance from the Democrats to the Republicans. Of the Republican papers in the cities where suppression occurred, nine of the ten remained in existence in 1875, all Republican. Democratic Editors’ Philosophy In conclusion, an observation can be made about the relationship between the editorial tendencies of the minority and majority newspapers. In a two-party press system in a democracy at times of grave political crisis, the press of the majority party tends to provide the arguments for and information supportive of constraints on expression. The press of the minority party tends to provide the arguments for and information supportive of unlimited expression. The leaders of the majority tend to call on the intellectual resources that support limited expression, while the leader of the minority called on the intellectual resources that support unlimited expression. Indiana’s Democratic editors during the Civil War tended to espouse the ideas of that would support their advocacy of states’ right, unlimited civil liberties, limited government, and racial superiority. The tone of their discourse was reactionary and

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191 defensive. Many of them felt the abolitionists had painted the Southerners into a corner. Lincoln, who was unable to win the war quickly, became a revolutionary in their mind, especially when he created the conscription laws and the Emancipation Proclamation. The Democrats’ political ideology ultimately served to help develop the history of freedom of the press in the United State. Paradoxically, though, it continued the long tradition of hampering the civil rights of blacks. It continued the same paradox that Jefferson, the slave owner and champion of liberty, failed to resolve in the founding moments of the nation’s history. The contradictions would not be worked out completely by the Civil War verdict, and Democratic editors in counties with Democratic majorities continued to spout their vituperation unchecked throughout the war. Table 2-1: Newspaper ownership patterns, 1861 to 1865 Part 1. Counties with suspended Democratic papers Counties analyzed: Blackford, Huntington, Johnson, Kosciusko, Marshall, Pulaski, Rush, St. Joseph, Starke, Wells, Whitley Number of counties with Democratic papers = 10 Number of counties with Republican papers = 10 Total number of Democratic owners from 1861 to 1865 = 29 Average Democratic ownership = 2.9 Total number of Republican Owners from 1861 to 1865 = 17 Average Republican ownership = 1.7 *-Part 2. Counties without suspended Democratic papers Number of counties with Democratic papers = 9 Number of counties with Republican papers = 13 Total number of Democratic owners from 1861 to 1865 = 14

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192 Table 2-1 Continued. *-Part 2. Counties without suspended Democratic papers Average Democratic ownership = 1.6 Total number of Republican Owners from 1861 to 1865 = 24 Average Republican ownership = 2.0 *-Using John W. Miller’s Indiana Newspaper Bibliography, the author randomly chose other counties to study for changes in newspaper ownership. An initial number was selected by picking a number by closing the author’s eyes and simply opening up Miller’s book to a random page. That page number was 19. It was made the starting point of the study – that is, the first page in Miller to analyze would be page 19. A second number was chosen by taking the square of 19, taking its cosine, and then adding the last two digits (7 +7) to come up with 14. Thus, every 14 pages after 19 were examined. If both Democratic and Republicans papers did not exist for a particular city, then it was skipped and the author advanced 14 pages for his next selection. In all, 13 counties were selected for this part of the analysis. Democrats had papers in nine of those counties, and Republicans had papers in 12 of those counties. Notes 1 Kathleen Enders, “The Press and the Civil War, 1861-1865,” in The Media in America: A History, Fifth Edition , ed. by William David Sloan (Nort hport, AL: Vision Press, 2002), 159. 2 Ibid., 159. 3 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian , 20 March 1863. 4 John W. Miller, Indiana Newspaper Bibliography (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), 38. 5 Enders, 160. The writing was more concise bu t would still look stilted by 20thand 21stcentury standards. Some Civil War reporting was even poetic. Still, in general, Civil War reporter and editors tended to ge t to the main point far earlier in a story than had been the case before the war, when over-blown prolixity permeated journalism. 6 Ibid., 160. Abolitionist, women’s, and other sp ecialty newspapers had already moved to by-lines before the war. 7 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union , 13 May 1863. 8 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union , 23 May 1863.

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193 9 Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era, 1850-1880 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1995) 672, 679. 10 Ibid., 672. 11 For example, see the Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian on 7 May 1863. 12 Warsaw, Indiana, Northern Indianian, 7 May 1863. 13 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, 21 May 1863. 14 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 3 June 1863. 15 Ibid., 15 May 1863. 16 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Daily Gazette, 9 November 1864. 17 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Weekly Sentinel, 4 July 1863. 18 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Weekly Sentinel, 30 May 1863. 19 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 6 June 1863. 20 South Bend, Indiana, St. Joseph County Forum, 16 May 1863. 21 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, 10 March 1864. 22 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, 14 May 1863. 23 Douglas, 62. 24 Paul F. Johnson, A History of the American People (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1997), 318. 25 Tichenor, 5. 26 Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era: 1850-1880 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1995), 14. 27 Ronald Lora and William Henry Longton, ed., The Conservative Press in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century America (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 10. 28 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, May 4, 1863.

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194 29 Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball, Thomas Jefferson, Political Writings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 276-277. Letter to Williams Short, Sept. 6, 1808. 30 Ibid., 273. Letter to Thomas Seymour, Sept. 11, 1807. 31 South Bend, Indiana, Forum, May 16, 1863; Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily Sentinel, June 9, 1863. 32 Thomas Jefferson, Writings (New York, NY: The Library of America, 1984), 1344-45. 33 Chicago, Illinois, Times, June 5, 1863. 34 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, June 2, 1863. 35 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, May 26, 1863. 36 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, May 16, 1863. 37 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, May 16, 1863. 38 Klement, 1999, 32. 39 Smith, 25. 40 Ibid., 26. 41 Leander J. Monks, Legal Education in Indiana, Volume II (Indianapolis, IN: Federal Publishing Company, 1916), 472. 42 Cowden, 214. 43 Dayton, Ohio, Daily Empire, April 14, 1863. 44 David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness, Revised Edition (New York, NY: Verso, 1991) 43. 45 Klement, 1999, 54. 46 Ibid., 54. 47 Ibid., 48. 48 Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York, NY: Noonday Press, 1990), 121-122. At a Jefferson birthday dinner in Washington on April 13, 1830, Jackson had followed a speech by states’ rights advocate Robert Y Hayne

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195 with the toast, “Our Federal Union. It must be preserved.” Vice President John C. Calhoun countered, “The Union, next to our liberties, the most dear.” 49 Rushville, Indiana, Indiana Jacksonian, Oct. 28, 1852. 50 Ibid. 51 Roediger, 44. 52 Ibid., 45. 53 Ibid., 47. 54 Cited in the Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana State Sentinel, Feb. 14, 1863. 55 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana State Sentinel, Feb. 10, 1853. 56 Lora, 73. 57 Ibid., 74. 58 Ibid., 75. 59 Ibid., 75. 60 Ibid., 76. 61 Ibid., 78. 62 Thornbrough, 675. 63 Miller, 211. 64 Ibid., 679. 65 Ibid., 683. / 66 Ibid., 681. Their circulations did not generate enough revenue. Most papers were weeklies with between 500 and 5,000 readers. Also see the United States Bureau of Census, Tenth Census, 1880, VIII, Part 1, 170-171, 181-183. 67 Miller, 274. 68 Thornbrough, 686. 69 Ibid., 686.

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196 70 Miller, 268. 71 Thornbrough, 686-687. 72 Miller, 6. 73 Michael Buchholz, “The Penny Press,” in The Media in America: A History, Fifth Edition, ed. by William David Sloan (Northport, AL: Vision Press, 2002), 138. 74 Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problems of Prerogative Power (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 100. 75 Ibid., 100. 76 John F. Marszalek, Sherman’s Other War: The General and the Civil War Press (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 141-163. 77 Smith, 103. 78 Miller, 22, 38, 98, 138, 197, 205, 225, 420, 446, 509. 79 Ford Risley, “The Confederate Press Association: Cooperative News Reporting of the War,” Civil War History (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press), Vol. 47, No. 3, September 2001, 222. 80 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 2 October 1862. 81 Plymouth, Indiana, Marshall County Republican, 6 November 1862. St. Joseph County Valley Register, 21 May 1863. 82 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, 11 May 1863. 83 Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat, 11 June 1863. 84 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, 14 April 1863. 85 G.R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 41. 86 Thornbrough, 678. 87 Ibid., 676. 88 Ibid., 676.

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197 89 Stephen E. Towne. “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War,” Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga conference paper, Fall 2003, Appendix A, 12. Bingham was threatened for what was perceived to be a disloyal editorial on 18 April 1861, and a pro-Union crowd forced him to take the loyalty oath on 31 August 1863. 90 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, 12March 1863. 91 Ibid., 28 May 1863. 92 J. Cutler Andrews. The North Reports the Civil War (Pittsburgh, PA; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955), 576-577. 93 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 5 May 1863 94 Tredway, 33-34. 95 Miller, 494. 96 Towne, 2003, 12-13. 97 Jon Paul Dilts, “Testing Siebert’s Proposition in Civil War Indiana,” Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1. Spring 1986, 366. 98 Stephen E. Towne, “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863,” Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga conference paper, Fall 2002, 7 and 10. 99 Towne, 2002, 11. 100 Dilts, 368. 101 Harold L. Nelson, ed., Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), 48-49. 102 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 233-235. 103 Joe Skidmore, “The Copperhead Press and the Civil War,” Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1939, 349. 104 Ibid., 142.

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198 105 American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events (New York, NY: Appleton & Company, 1862), Vol. 1, 328-329. 106 Ibid., 143. 107 Ibid., 142. 108 John D. Stevens and Ronald T. Farrar, Mass Media and the National Experience: Essays in Communications History (New York, NY: Harper & Row), 1971. Stevens’ Proposition III states: “The more heterogeneous a society the more freedom of expression it will tolerate.” 109 James Garfield Randall and David Henry Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1969), 344. The graduated income tax was 3 percent on income of $800 or more per year. In 1864, it was revised to be 5 percent on up to $5,000, 7.5 percent on $5,000 to $10,000, and 10 percent on more than $10,000. Those who made less than $800 paid no income tax. That level was reduced to $600 with the 1864 tax law. 110 Miller, 275. 111 Ibid., 275. 112 Tredway, 48. 113 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Sentinel, Jan. 5, 1863. 114 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Sentinel, and Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, Sept. 2, 1861. 115 Miller, 8. 116 Towne, 2003, Appendix A, 12. 117 Smith, 105. 118 Robert K. Thorp, “The Copperhead Days of Dennis Mahony,” Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1966, 680. 119 Ibid., 105. 120 Harper, 232-33. 121 Ibid., 229.

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199 122 Miller, 462. 123 Ibid., 462. Cookerly’s paper, destroyed by Union soldiers on 21 October 1861, was suspended for two months, and he sold it in 1862. 124 Ibid., 432. 125 Ibid., 432. 127 Ibid., 432. 128 Harper, 232-33. 129 Ibid., 232. 130 Smith, 99-100. 131 Chicago Times, 7 May 1863. 132 Ibid., 16 February 1863. 133 Smith, 105-106. 134 Ibid., 108. 135 Ibid., 107. 136 Ibid., 103. 137 John D. Barnhart, “The Impact of the Civil War on Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 57, No. 3, September 1961, 212. 138 Harper, 231-33. Lincoln barred California papers from the mails, and Brigadier General George Wright ordered the stoppage of mail delivery of Democratic newspapers in Oregon.

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CHAPTER 5 UNIONISM AND EMANCIPATION IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA This chapter analyzes Republican and Democratic newspapers in a few select Hoosier cities in September and October of 1862 and in January of 1863. It will isolate and interpret frameworks in the text. Newspapers from the following Indiana cities were analyzed: Indianapolis, Fort Wayne, Richmond, South Bend, Delphi, Logansport, Plymouth, Goshen, and Evansville. These cities were chosen because they had robust newspaper traditions at the time and because copies of both a Democratic and Republican paper in these towns exist in the Indiana State Library in Indianapolis. This analysis focuses more on how the content producers utilized framing than it does on what effect the content frames had on audiences, although clearly something happened to the white male voters of Indiana after Lincoln announced the Proclamation in September of 1862. Republicans saw a major reversal in fortune after the fall elections of that year – so much so that the Lincoln Administration used desperate and unconstitutional measures to hold the North together politically in the remaining years of the war – especially universalizing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The study also examines a period of time that was crucial in the development of journalism in the Hoosier State. In the spring of 1863, Hoosier newspaper editors would live under two unique government orders that directly impacted the practice of journalism. First, Major General Burnside, the commander of the Department of the Ohio, promulgated General Orders 38 in April of 1863. It stated that anyone encouraging men not to enlist or making oral or written critical or derogatory comments about the war 200

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201 effort of the Lincoln Administration would be subject to arrest and a military commission (trial) without benefit of a writ of habeas corpus. A few weeks later, Brigadier General Hascall, the commander of the District of Indiana and Burnside’s subordinate, sent out General Orders No. 9, which stated he intended to enforce No. 38, especially for those recalcitrant newspaper editors who were carping at the President. Both Democrats and Republicans in Civil War Indiana had no desire for a divided nation. Even most Peace Democrats in the state wanted re-union, although not with abolition. 1 They wanted a return to the antebellum status quo and wanted it through a negotiated settlement sooner rather than later. Once the war began in April of 1861, Democratic editors used their concept of unionism to maintain a sense of political loyalty when Republican editors were charging many Democrats with being disloyal. For Hoosier Democrats, the concept of unionism was a political weapon designed to keep hard-line Republican Governor Oliver P. Morton from painting the opposition party as abettors of the rebels in the South. The trumpeting of unionism was every bit as much as the framing process – rhetorical strategy – as the Republican editors calling the Democrats “Copperheads,” “Butternuts,” and “traitors.” Yet unionism also was a genuine political principle to which almost all Hoosiers subscribed before, during, and after the war. Indiana, as a middle state in the middle of the country, saw the union as being in its best interest. As a territory of the early West, Indiana had desired statehood, and Hoosiers wanted to see the country grow – not so that slavery could expand, but primarily so that people could always migrate to locate better land to farm and to find greater economic, political, and cultural freedom. When the war came, few if any Hoosiers saw disunion as

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202 being in their vested interest. Indeed, Hoosiers did not want to be an interior nation with no ready access to the oceans or subject to taxes imposed by the Confederacy on trade down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. 2 Democratic notions of unionism shared some traits with Republican notions of unionism. Both parties wanted to sustain the federal government because both wanted a strong national identity to make the United States a viable entity in the world of nations. Each recognized that the nation was young. Fragmentation of a nation less than a century old would hurt its standing in the world, especially in the eyes of Europe. Both parties wanted to continue the great experiment of a constitutional republican democracy North American style. Similarly, both parties wanted to avoid being as divided as Europe, and both parties ultimately favored manifest destiny, though at different paces and for different reasons. Yet the differences between the two forms of unionism were significant and provided the critical rhetorical framing that went on during the war. Both parties’ editors used the frames to paint pictures of how the United States should be united. Democrats – and some moderate Republicans – subscribed to a picture or frame of unionism that was largely conservative. Indiana’s Democrats harbored no hatred toward the South. Indeed, they tended to believe that Northern abolitionists had backed Southern Democrats into a corner, and secession was an inevitable response to such badgering. Hoosier Democrats, who tended to have Southern roots, saw their brothers in the South as erring, but capable of repentance. The 1860s would be a time to flush out the extremists on both sides, the abolitionists in the North and the firebrands in the South. The Civil War was an indication that extremism had won the day, and democracy could not survive such a state

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203 of affairs. In the eyes of the Democratic editors, extremism must be defeated, so both Northern abolitionism and Southern secessionism must be buried. That the country had gotten to the point of war embarrassed many Hoosier Democrats. 3 Indiana’s Democrats believed the solution would come politically, at the ballot box. They saw themselves as the loyal opposition, and their political objective was to regain power and then change would occur. Their goal was for Northern Democrats to regain the presidency and Congress in 1864. At that point, Southern Democrats would end their rebellion and rejoin the union, although few thought about what would happen if the South decided not to return. Voting Lincoln out of office became the chief political objective of Democrats in the Nineteenth State. Accordingly, criticism of Lincoln spiked, particularly as the military progress of the war was limited at best with the narrow win at Antietam, the disaster at Fredericksburg, and the political machinations involving leadership of the Army of the Potomac. Pro-War Sentiment The majority of Indiana’s Democrats were pro-war until September of 1862, but all along they refused to support a war of “conquest” or “subjugation.” They wanted no interference with slavery in the South, though most opposed its extension in the territories. Their rallying cry from Representative Daniel W. Voorhees, who borrowed it from Clement L. Vallandigham, was “the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was,” a refrain that could be found in almost every Democratic paper in the state. 4 Keeping the rule of law was paramount for Democrats, and the Constitution was the law of the land. If it could be ignored, then rule by the people was in jeopardy. Of course, keeping the Constitution intact meant sustaining slavery in the South and in the border states, making constitutional discipline more important than universal freedom. Democrats in Indiana

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204 believed that the Constitution must not be allowed to become a meaningless piece of paper. If slavery were to be outlawed, it must be done legally, by an amendment to the Constitution. When Lincoln announced the Emancipation Proclamation, ostensibly as a war measure, many Hoosier Democrats saw it as a desperate and unconstitutional action by the chief executive. For them, permanent abolition could not be achieved by presidential edict. On that September day in 1862, Indiana’s Democrats believed that Lincoln turned his back on moderation. While Republicans focused on winning the war as quickly as possible, Democrats took the broader view and worried about the aftermath of war. Hoosier Democratic newspaper editors speculated on the nature of reconstruction, and radical reconstruction was their great fear. Radical reconstruction meant no clemency and a realignment of the socioeconomic order in the South. Meanwhile, in the Democrats’ alternative vision of reconstruction, this would be a time when Northern and Southern Democrats would re-unite and control the nation’s politics. The South would have slavery, and the North would have free labor. White men’s property and freedom would face no threats in either section of the country. The control of property would not be transformed by social and political revolution. In their view, conservatives and moderates would save the day. Hoosier unionism also meant supporting Union soldiers. Again, this was strategic. The Democrats did not want to be seen as impeding the war effort. Thus, editors like Joseph J. Bingham of the influential Indiana State Sentinel in Indianapolis led the way in encouraging draft enlistments. Indeed, Bingham personally recruited soldiers, and other Democratic editors in the state took his lead and did likewise. 5 In part, this was personal. Bingham did not want Berry Sulgrove, editor of the pro-Republican Indiana Journal, to

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205 do anything better than he did. Therefore, Bingham, who by May of 1861 said the government in Washington “must be sustained,” made sure the Indiana State Sentinel was a recruiting leader, but the editor’s stance on the war was also pragmatic politics. 6 Bingham did not want to give Sulgrove and the other Republican editors in the state any ammunition that Hoosier Democrats were being disloyal. Bingham knew that disloyalty would erode Democratic power. Furthermore, the Republicans had been democratically elected. Resistance to the laws the majority party made was tantamount to anarchy. If anarchy ruled, then the Constitution and freedom would die. Indiana’s Democrats had the French Revolution in mind, and they did not want a repeat of the bloodbath that occurred at the end of the eighteenth century. Hoosier Democrats were not enamored of conscription, but most editors told their readers to cooperate with the development of lists of potential draftees – which, for the most part, is what the Civil War draft turned out to be in Indiana, a pool of names that was rarely tapped. Furthermore, the Democracy, as the party was then known, had plenty to lose. The Democrats had been the dominant party in Indiana for most of the state’s existence. Their philosophy had dominated the drafting of the state constitution. Throughout the sectional crisis of the 1840s and 1850s, Hoosier Democrats had remained staunch unionists. They had remained moderate, playing the strategic game of not alienating any political group too much. Joseph A. Wright, the Democratic governor of the state from 1849 until 1857, cast his lot with a national destiny, not Northern or Southern destiny. He had the following inscribed on a block of Indiana limestone in the Washington Monument at the federal capital: “Indiana knows no North, no South, nothing but the Union.” 7 In 1850, Wright said Indiana “plants herself on the basis of the Constitution; and takes her stand in

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206 the ranks of American destiny.” 8 When the war came, Hoosier Democrats were not about to back down from their long-held devotion to union. If anything, the secession movement in the South served to strengthen Hoosier Democrats’ unionism because they did not want to lose the political advantage gained by portraying Republicans, especially pro-abolition Republicans, as extremists whose political views were harmful to the republic. During the election of 1860, Hoosier Democratic editors warned their readers repeatedly that black equality as pushed by the Republicans would lead to Southern secession. The Democrats had been reading Democratic newspapers in the South, and they blamed Lincoln and the Republicans for pushing the South toward withdrawal from the union. Hoosier Democratic editors claimed Republicans who agitated for the end of slavery were treasonous because they were forcing the country into civil war. 9 In essence, Republican attitudes and policy were the cause of nullification. In early 1861, Democratic editors frequently called for union meetings that urged the president elect to be conciliatory and willing to compromise. The Democratic editors urged all political leaders to abandon any policies that would lead inexorably to conflict. They wrote that states had the right to control their domestic institutions and urged all not to violate the Constitution and those laws passed by state and federal legislatures. Democrats began to take on the tone of the law-abiding party. It was a frame by which they tried to force Republicans to take stances that did not go against the Constitution, which upheld slavery. It was a persuasive way to shape the debate, and even the pro-Republican Journal in Indianapolis tended to agree with the Democrats, primarily because Sulgrove feared coercion would mean economic ruin for Indiana because of its

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207 proximity to vulnerable Kentucky. 10 Sulgrove wrote: “Of what value will an union be that needs links of bayonets and bullets to hold it together?” 11 William Steele Holman, a veteran Democratic congressman from the Fourth District in the southeastern part of the state, said Indiana would “concede and concede and concede, and compromise and compromise and compromise” to preserve the union. 12 Another constitutional freedom that rallied Democrats was the right to bear arms. Governor Morton, using federal funds, provided weapons to Republicans and other loyalists as a deterrent against Democrats with anti-war or anti-Lincoln sentiments. Morton wanted to make sure opponents of the federal administration would not get any ideas about covert resistance. 13 State and local officials made it difficult for Democrats to purchase guns during the war, and Democratic editors countered that this violated their Second Amendment rights. After all, Indiana was still in the Union. Although Democrats were able to get arms on what amounted to a black market, editors complained bitterly that anti-arms policy aggravated relations between Republicans and Democrats. Democratic resentment of Republicans increased, in response to the implication that non-Republicans who wanted guns were disloyal. To help quell Republican suspicions that Democrats were forming well-armed secret societies that might rebel against the federal government, Bingham denounced both disloyal and loyal secret societies. 14 Emancipation Proclaims End of Unity in Indiana For the first sixteen months of the war, Hoosier Democrats were able to maintain a fairly consistent pro-union theme, but that posture weakened on September 22, 1862. The Emancipation Proclamation, which would take effect on Jan. 1, 1863, ended slavery in the conquered lands in the South. Although it had no effect on slavery in the loyal slave states, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, it set the stage for

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208 the Thirteenth Amendment, which after the war outlawed the institution permanently throughout the country. It set into motion the integration of the Union army, for more than 189,000 African Americans would serve in Lincoln’s military. 15 This enlistment of black men helped give the North a manpower advantage in the last two years of the war, something that went a long way toward guaranteeing eventual Union victory. Viewed from the distance of the twenty-first century, the Emancipation Proclamation seemed like a just, benign, and righteous edict. Lincoln took the high moral road, and he also added another 190,000 men to his military machine. However, it was not a popular decision when Lincoln made it public, and for the Democratic editors of Indiana, it was the beginning of the end of their enthusiastic support for the war. Yet it was not the only cause of Democratic dissatisfaction. The quagmire at the front, poor leadership of the military, and the erosion of wartime civil rights also contributed to sagging Democratic keenness for the war. Nonetheless, it was the Emancipation Proclamation that galvanized all of the criticisms of the president’s war. Why was Lincoln’s edict so unpopular? The president’s new policy offered little for white men North and South, who wanted no part of the social, economic, and cultural implications of black equality. The edict so upset Northern Democrats – and even some moderate Republicans – that the Democrats staged significant off-year election victories in the months after the bloody battle at Antietam. The greatest gains came in Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois. A Republican majority of sixty-four seats in the House of Representatives from the Thirty-Seventh Congress would narrow to only twenty-three seats in the Thirty-Eighth Congress. 16 Indiana went from having a Republican majority in its congressional delegation to an overwhelming Democratic majority.

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209 Meanwhile, the major cities of the North, responding to both conscription and emancipation, erupted into violence that would not be equaled again until the 1960s. In July, as the battle at Gettysburg came to a dramatic and decisive close, the streets of New York had their own civil war, as mainly Irish immigrants took out their displeasure with both emancipation and the draft on the city’s free blacks. Similar riots occurred in Chicago and Detroit. Even smaller cities like Indianapolis and Fort Wayne, Indiana, had civil unrest. The newly arrived Irish feared that the freed blacks would take their low-paying jobs, as had already happened along the docks of the Ohio River in Cincinnati. 17 Freed men used to getting no pay would accept very low pay from employers and would force out those men who were used to slightly higher wages. Why the immigrants took out their frustrations on the newly freed slaves and not the owners speaks volumes about the nature of racism in the United States, and race was a central issue of the war. The newspaper editors of the North played a major role in the politics of the war, which were inextricable linked to its military facets. The journalism of the day was based more on party than commercial interest. Most newspapers were small and had circulations of less than a thousand. Editors who subscribed to the philosophies of Edmund Burke, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson sided with the Democrats. Editors who were fond of the defunct Whigs, free soil, free labor, and unlimited capitalism favored the Republicans. It was still a frontier country, and agriculture was in its twilight years as the nation’s primary industry. The spoils of political victory went to the newspaper editors who supported the winning party. State and federal printing contracts helped underwrite the cost of printing and distributing daily and weekly newspapers, as well as one-page daily telegraphic sheets. Advertising was primitive, and

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210 except for in major cities, the commercial press that would become the hallmark of twentieth-century journalism had not yet matured. Although Lincoln clearly did not have public opinion on his side when he announced the proclamation, he needed as many newspaper editors on his side as he could muster. He needed to sell all of his war policies to the voting public, and no policy – not even the new income tax or conscription – was less popular than emancipation. Republican editors generally were loyal to Lincoln and tended to support the edict. Democratic editors, who faced suppression and intimidation at the hands of the Administration, military, and Republican activists at a time when the interpretation of the First Amendment was not as libertarian as it would become in the twentieth century, screamed that the emancipation was unconstitutional. Democrats said the Constitution allowed Southerners to hold men and women in bondage while counting each slave as three-fifths human for the purpose of determining proportional congressional representation. They thought ending slavery had to be changed by a constitutional amendment, and, of course, they knew Republicans did not have the votes in enough of the states to make that happen. Many War Democrats and some moderate Republicans also opposed emancipation. The majority in the North felt the war was only about saving the union and nothing more. Even Indiana’s Union Party, a coalition of the Republicans and War Democrats, opposed a war for the abolition of slavery, when they met in the summer of 1862 to gear up for the fall elections. 18 Lincoln’s decision to add the freeing of blacks as a major casus belli came dangerously close to alienating not only key swing voting groups in the Hoosier State, but nearly all of the eligible voters. 19 There were just too few abolitionists in the state.

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211 The continued stranglehold that the party press maintained on journalism meant that a significant amount of text in Indiana newspapers was written with a particular political bent, and that events and issues framing emancipation were written with this bias in mind. Indeed, the party press editors were often major players in the political process, and their editorial content amounted to propaganda. For example, Congressman Schuyler Colfax had owned and remained close to the St. Joseph County Register, Supreme Court Judge Samuel E. Perkins edited papers in Richmond and Indianapolis, and John W. Dawson, who helped found the Republican Party in Indiana and would serve as governor of the Utah Territory, owned Dawson’s Daily Times & Union in Fort Wayne. 20 Mid-century U.S. political history was dynamic, and both Republicans and Democrats would undergo dramatic changes in the 1850s and 1860s. The Democrats would be divided in half by the election of 1860. The Southern Democrats would lead the move to secede, while the Northern Democrats themselves divided into pro-war and pro-peace factions, though the pro-war faction was the larger of the two. Indiana serves as a case study because it was one of the states where the balance of power between Republicans and Democrats was very close and the situation dynamic. A dramatic power struggle was at hand in the Hoosier State during the spring after the Emancipation Proclamation took effect. Even the Republicans were not totally united. Although Governor Morton wanted to squelch internal dissent, he did not agree with Lincoln Administration decisions about military personnel who served in the state’s shadow federal government. Riots broke out in Fort Wayne and Indianapolis during mass political rallies in the spring of 1863. The newly formed draft was so unpopular that violence was visited upon the enlistment office of Blackford County in October of 1862

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212 and threats of violence were directed at the draft commission of Fountain County in the winter of 1862-1863. 21 In March, a group of Union soldiers riding through Richmond, Indiana, on a transport train disembarked and destroyed the local Democratic newspaper, an event that was cheered on by the Republican paper and the city’s mayor. 22 The same troops attempted to do the same thing in Indianapolis to the Indiana State Sentinel later in the day. 23 In May, Hascall, the federal commander of the District of Indiana, suspended eleven Democratic newspapers in the state, causing Governor Morton to lose patience with the Union officer whom he thought was unnecessarily upsetting Democrats, who had the majority in the legislature and a significant voting bloc. Morton, who wanted to be tough on dissidents and traitors, but in a low-key way, eventually petitioned Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton for Hascall’s removal because the governor was afraid the Union military officer was over-agitating the Peace Democrats in the Hoosier State. 24 Morton had never been thrilled with Hascall as federal military leader of the state. Even though Hascall was a volunteer from Goshen in the northern part of the state, Morton had seen a personal friend, Henry B. Carrington, supplanted by Hascall in April. The governor considered Hascall less organized and effective than his friend Carrington. 25 The level of suppression of the Democratic press reached its apex during 1863, with twenty-five cases of press suppression and intimidation in Indiana, the highest single-year total of the war. 26 Twenty-one of those twenty-five involved Democratic newspapers, and all of the cases of official press suppression – all against Democrats – came while Hascall was in office and Democrats were rallying against what they considered an abolitionist war. 27 When Morton effectively closed down the general

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213 assembly because it wanted to introduce entreaties to the South for a peace conference and raised money privately to run the state government, the role of the federal military shadow government increased dramatically. Indiana was a state in turmoil. Hascall, working as Department of the Ohio Commander Ambrose E. Burnside’s proxy, worked to stifle the Democrats as the war news took a turn for the worse. The first negative war news came in the spring of 1862 with reports of the carnage at Shiloh, Tennessee, and some Hoosier Democratic editors began to see the war negatively. Approximately one-tenth of the 13,047 Union casualties at Shiloh were Hoosiers. Then, in the summer of 1862, Confederate General Braxton Bragg invaded Kentucky, which had remained in the Union but as still a slave state. Martial law was declared in Hoosier towns along the Ohio River. Two small, poorly equipped companies of Hoosier volunteers were dispatched to Kentucky to repel CSA General Kirby Smith, who had advanced into northern Kentucky from his base in Knoxville, Tennessee. Battles occurred at Richmond and Munfordsville, both losses for the Indiana companies. 28 Union General Don Carlos Buell eventually arrived and checked the advance at Perryville, Kentucky. 8 October 1862, was a key date in the war for Hoosiers, but Washington thought Buell had not done enough and ordered him to be replaced by William F. Rosecrans. 29 Buell, a Democrat, also refused to raise black volunteers and requested a court martial, though he instead had a private hearing. 30 Still, the news would get worse. After Antietam, Burnside replaced George McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac because McClellan had failed to chase Robert E. Lee and decisively defeat the Confederates. Burnside, a native of Liberty, Indiana, would oversee the disastrous Union loss at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in

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214 December of 1862. The editor of the Cannelton Reporter observed: “Burnside’s first battle, we fear, will prove one of the saddest of the war. We hope the removal of Buell will not prove to be as great a blunder as the removal of McClellan.” 31 In January of 1863, Burnside was reassigned to a post in Cincinnati overseeing the federal shadow governments in the Midwest states. Also in January, the battle of Stones River, Tennessee, ended indecisively. Hascall participated in the battle, commanding the Union First Brigade, First Division of the Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland on the left flank. 32 The Union suffered 12,906 casualties in the battle, approximately 1,200 more than the Confederates. 33 At the same time, negative attitudes toward conscription abounded in the Hoosier State. One reason was that there had been plenty of volunteers when the war started, but many regiments, including Hascall’s Seventeenth from Elkhart County, had been sent home because Washington said it had too many soldiers. Now, two years later, when recruiters could find few able-bodied men to sign up, few Hoosiers had a strong sentiment for the draft. Nonetheless, on 17 July 1862, Congress passed a law that authorized states to use conscription if they could not maintain their quotas. A commissioner was appointed in each county to make a list of all male citizens ages eighteen to forty-five. The lists, with exemptions, were forwarded to Indianapolis, and the state commissioner for the draft determined which counties had met their quotas. Those counties that had not were instructed to draw names from their list and send the draftees to Indianapolis. Under the “Commutation Clause,” a substitute could be hired for $300. 34 When Lincoln asked for 300,000 more men from the nation on 4 August 1862, Indiana assumed it failed to meet its state quota. Indiana, whose adjutant general described

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215 recruiting as being in a “very languid state” at this time, conscripted 3,003 men, though later it would be discovered that the state had actually exceeded its quota and actually should not have forced anybody on the draft rolls to serve. 35 Democrats, who saw themselves as the common people, felt that being forced to fight for principles they opposed made them like European serfs coerced to fight “under a military despotism.” 36 Class warfare also reared its ugly head. A growing sentiment against the war included a sense that wealthy Republicans who favored it were staying at home leaving poor Democrats to do combat. Congressman Holman of Aurora attacked the Commutation Clause and tried to have it removed by amendment to the Conscription Act but lost by twenty votes. 37 Furthermore, the draft included the substitution fee that the wealthy could afford, and many Democrats felt this clause in the law made the war one for the rich, fought by the poor. In addition to the draft resistance that occurred in Blackford and Fountain counties in October of 1862, violence over conscription would occur in Boone, Fulton, Johnson, Putnam, Rush, Sullivan, Greene, and Monroe counties in the spring of 1863. 38 Threats were made against draft commissioners in Randolph and Knox counties. 39 It must be presumed there were threats elsewhere, but they were not reported in the press. The worst of it came in Rushville, where an enrollment officer was murdered. 40 The unpopularity of the draft, combined with the Emancipation Proclamation and the indecisive war news, gave Democrats the grist they needed for the 1862 fall elections. Even the pro-war New Albany Ledger, which had been a Democratic paper before the war, stopped supporting Morton and the Union Party and returned to the Democratic fold. Joseph J. Bingham’s Indiana State Sentinel led the drum beat against emancipation,

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216 asking pro-war Democrats if they would “sit down to the abolition feast.” 41 Morton pleaded for no parties during the war, although the Union Party over which he presided held its state convention in the summer of 1862 to prepare for the fall elections. 42 Morton also made the argument that the maintenance of slave labor in the South enabled the CSA to have the (white) men available to fight the war. He said: “If the rebels do not desire the Government of the United States to interfere with their slaves, let them cease to employ them in the prosecution of the war. Deprive them of slave labor, and three-fourths of the men composing their armies would be compelled to return home to raise food upon which to subsist themselves and families.” 43 Democratic leaders like Congressman Daniel W. Voorhees and U.S. Senator Thomas A. Hendricks supported conscription because it was the law of the land, and the Democrats wanted to be seen as the rule-of-law party. 44 They counseled repeal of the law by voting a Democratic majority to Congress. In the spring of 1863 when Hascall took office in Indianapolis, the Army of the Potomac, now under the direction of Joseph Hooker, was about to suffer another loss, this time at Chancellorsville, Virginia. The Democratic editors, already tired of the overall carnage of the war, as well as the draft, income tax, emancipation, and the organization of black troops, became even more critical of Lincoln, the military, and Republican editors, who argued for suppression of disloyal editors. 45 The whole situation was a communications clutter, but more importantly, it was, like the war, a contest for power, and framing supplied the way to power. Words like “loyalty” and “disloyalty” indicated how entrenched political positions were, but because the war itself was so lengthy and so

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217 dynamic, the molding of public opinion was not insignificant. Every military event had a political consequence. A long-standing professional army did not exist North or South. While most Northern soldiers, for example, certainly favored the war effort, fathers, brothers, and friends back home often had different views of the war. The interpersonal communication between father and son, brother and brother, and friend and friend had major political significance. While the soldiers’ views tended to be affected most heavily by their personal experience, the views of the men back home were affected by the editorials and news in their hometown papers and the talk around town. One man in Monroe County pleaded with his son to quit fighting after emancipation: “I am sorry that I have a son in the servis [sic] to help uphold the old traitor’s Emansapation Proclamation Bill lay down your arms and come home if you can.” 46 What the editors wrote and how they wrote their words molded public opinion. The very existence of the United States as a one-nation entity hung in the balance, and the editors played a central role in the opinion-making dynamic of the period. A frame analysis of Indiana’s newspapers of 1862 and 1863 showed competing representations of emancipation, the key political issue of the day. 47 A textual analysis attempted to describe the structural and rhetorical elements related to emancipation, with an emphasis on the relationship between freedom and power. 48 Republican and Democratic editors developed frames that arose in the aftermath of the Emancipation Proclamation’s announcement in late September and early October of 1862 and its taking effect in January of 1863. Editors emphasized certain traits of emancipation. They also excluded some information and elaborated upon other information in their editorials on

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218 emancipation. Other components of framing include headlines, type of article, and placement on the page. Framing Emancipation Media scholar Robert M. Entman defines framing as selecting attributes of an issue or individual and making them “more salient in a communicating text.” 49 The goals of framing include (a) defining or describing a problem, (b) providing a causal interpretation, (c) evaluating a problem and (d) providing a treatment or solution. 50 In essence, as Entman noted, “Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions.” 51 Republican editors tended to frame emancipation in terms of how it would help the Union gain military victory while avoiding the agitation of Democrats with appeals to the morality of abolition or the immorality of slavery. On the other hand, Democratic editors emphasized legal ramifications of emancipation. Another way to look at framing is through vocabulary, content choice, and sentence complexity. The buzzwords and phrases the editors employed cued readers, and the level of sentence complexity corresponded to how the two sides framed their arguments, Republicans focusing on loyalty and the Democrats on constitutionality. Framing ultimately is about editorial selection and prominence, or salience. As scholar Charlotte Ryan has noted, media framing is “a central political activity,” essential to the development of party positions on the issues of the day. 52 In the journalism of the Civil War, frames were developed by editors who were central members of political parties wrestling for control of the country in the hour of its deepest crisis. The framing contest was undiluted, and the gatekeepers were party hacks, not neutral editors. In a sense, there was no traditional framing dialogue because editors were preaching to the

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219 choir. Still, the Democratic and Republican editors performed a key role in ordering information about emancipation, and they shaped their readers’ view of this significant presidential order when the political order of the country – and, in particular, Indiana – underwent unremitting change. The Emancipation Proclamation was a key political action taken at a critical juncture in the war. Lincoln had seen what he thought would be a three-month war involving only 75,000 men become a two-year-old conflict involving hundreds of thousands of men that tested the political will of the states that had remained in the Union. His generals proved ineffective, and the South, needing only to defend itself against Northern “invasion,” was holding its own on the battlefield. Among Northern resource advantages were superior manpower, industrial capacity, and communication and transportation lines. However, the less-than-expeditious prosecution of the war left many in the North ambivalent about fighting it any longer. Peace advocacy grew in the fall of 1862 and the first half of 1863. Disaffection for the War In Indiana, the growing disaffection for the war was largely due to its length. It was also due to the fact that many in the state had Southern and Jeffersonian roots, and the majority of Hoosiers were not interested in fighting a war of abolition. The pragmatic Lincoln, who was never a friend of slavery, though he was not an avowed abolitionist either, was having problems increasing enrollments of soldiers. Thus, he hit on a policy that would help increase enlistments while ameliorating some of the political heat from the vociferous abolitionist wing of the Republican Party centered in New England. He decided to free the slaves in the Confederate states, though not in the slave states that remained in the Union. His hope was that the slaves would leave the plantations and join

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220 the Union Army. He knew it was a gambit, but he was nearing desperation after the Union suffered almost twice as many casualties as the Confederacy in the Second Battle of Manassas in late August 1862. 53 The Proclamation, though, alarmed many Northerners, especially Democrats in the Midwest and Irish and German Catholic immigrants in major Northern cities, both of whom were sizable political groups. The Midwest Democrats wanted reunion, but they had little use for abolition because they feared that freed blacks would compete for jobs at a time of economic recession. The Peace Democrats, as they came to be called, wanted to go back to the status quo ante. The immigrants, who distrusted the many anti-immigrant Know-Nothings who joined the Republican Party in large numbers in the late 1850s, also feared free blacks would take their low-level manual labor jobs. For example, Irish and Germans immigrants rioted in Cincinnati in 1863 after they were laid off from their jobs on the docks of the Ohio River only to be replaced by freed blacks who received lower wages. 54 These two groups of Northerners believed Lincoln was changing the objective of the war from reunion to abolition. The journalism of the Civil War era was almost entirely of a partisan nature. Very few newspapers in the North were neutral or independent. A few in the larger cities had been moving in that direction just before the war, but the conflict so divided the country that staying on the sidelines wasn’t an option. The party press meant that a significant amount of text in newspapers of the Midwest – and Indiana in particular – was written with a particular political bent; events and issues were written from a specific point of view. The party press editors were often major players in the political process, and their editorial content amounted to propaganda. What the editors wrote was largely analytical

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221 and interpretive, and their editorial content did not exist in an era of objective, neutral, independent, and unbiased reporting. Instead, journalists operated as leading political operatives, and their newspapers were aimed at audiences who shared their political point of view. These editors did not merely set the agenda; they also framed what they wanted their readers to think. Indeed, framing was a central activity of these party journalists. Placement, positioning, word order, and word choice were as important as issue choice. Ultimately, framing is about inclusion and exclusion, and whatever frames the editors on both side chose to use had as much to do with including the arguments that would reinforce their opinions and exclude the arguments that would reinforce their opponents’ arguments. Burnside would make the most famous arrest of the war, nabbing Vallandigham, who was tried, convicted and exiled to the South for calling Lincoln a dictator in a speech. Hascall would suspend 10 newspapers in Indiana before Gov. Morton and Secretary of War Stanton decided Hascall was doing more political harm than good and relieved him of command in Indianapolis in June of 1863. Then Burnside suspended a Democratic newspaper in Chicago. Editor Wilbur F. Storey raised a ruckus, and the Democratic-majority Illinois legislature censured Burnside. Lincoln waffled and eventually had Burnside rescind the suspension order. Meanwhile, Democratic editors attacked Lincoln and the military, claiming violations of their rights under the First Amendment. They also continued their attack on emancipation, saying it made the Fugitive Slave Law moribund, as well as complementary issues like the new federal income tax and the draft, which they claimed was illegal because it was not in the Constitution. 55 Ultimately, the war of words would

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222 focus on the reason for the war: union or emancipation. Whether or not the war could have two causes was a central part of the framing. The Democrats tended to avoid such complexity, while the Republican editors championed it. Headlines helped frame the discussion. Typical Democratic headlines included “Lincoln’s Infamous Proclamation,” “The Present Crisis,” and “Lincoln’s Proclamation”; typical Republican headlines included “The President’s Proclamation,” “The President’s Emancipation Proclamation,” “The Proclamation,” and “The Emancipation Proclamation.” Democratic editors either were negative or personal, while Republican editors tended to be more neutral, formal or deferential. Almost all of the articles occurred on the second page of either daily or weekly newspapers that were usually four pages in length. The second page was generally reserved for editorial comment with news and commercial advertising often appearing on the front page. There were two types of editorials dealing with emancipation: (1) those that dealt with the issue entirely and (2) those that dealt with the issue in passing. The majority of the cases were single-issue editorials. In terms of placement, editorials on emancipation tended to come on the top half of the page – above the fold. Ten of fifteen Republican editorials were above the fold; ten of thirteen Democratic editorials were above the fold. This suggests that the editors felt this subject was a high priority for readers. Both Republican and Democratic papers printed the proclamation in its entirety after Sept. 22 when Lincoln first made it public. In a few cases, both Republican and Democratic editors chose to print only key excerpts of the document. The proclamation was generally printed on either page one or page two, usually near the top of the page.

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223 Complementary commentary was provided, in all cases on page two. When the proclamation took effect on 1 January 1863, most of the newspapers reprinted Lincoln’s edict. Several major themes emerged in examining the words about emancipation from both Republican and Democratic editors in Indiana. These included power, constitutionality, loyalty, freedom, race, and revolution. Here the frames worked along dichotomous lines. For example, the theme of disloyalty from Republican editors was countered by the theme of loyalty from the Democratic editors. Republican editors hammered away at how Democrats were being essentially disloyal in not supporting the President’s war measures. On the other hand, Democratic editors claimed that Democrats had loyally fought for the war and reserved the right to criticize its prosecution and policies, and even the right to offer another way through the conflict – namely, diplomacy. Another major frame dealt with the legality of the edict. Democrats questioned its constitutionality, while Republicans defended its constitutionality. Democrats claimed that slavery was directly dealt with in the Constitution and assumed its prohibition would require constitutional measures like an amendment – which history affirmed with the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment after the war. However, an amendment was difficult to achieve, and the nation had been too divided to get anywhere close to the three-fourths hurdle necessary to make a change to the Constitution. On the other hand, the Republicans claimed that an act of rebellion was unconstitutional and any measure designed to end it was appropriate.

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224 Imagery also helped frame the debate over emancipation. For example, Republican editors sometimes referred to the rebellion as a monster that had to be tamed. One editor referred to slavery as the cornerstone of Confederacy. Tear down slavery, the editor implored, and you destroy the Confederacy. A Democratic editor called the proclamation “harmless thunder” because he thought it was more verbal than practical. 56 Framing Power and Freedom What stands out in analyzing the commentary of the partisan editors in these nine cities is how both sides tended to use power and its relationship to freedom as the organizing principle of emancipation. The contrast comes when the editors developed their frames for each. Republican editors saw power as a necessary and inevitable tool in ensuring the freedom of the Union from rebellion and the ultimate freedom of the slaves. The Democratic editors saw emancipation as going against the grain of the Constitution and the nation’s history. In forcing emancipation down the throats of the Southerners, the Lincoln Administration was quite literally destroying the economic liberty of Southern white male slaveholders. In the opinion of the Democratic newspaper editors, this opposed everything that the American Revolution stood for. Likewise, the Democrats saw emancipation of the black man in terms of a new, unwanted revolution. What’s interesting is that none of the Democratic editors claimed the secession movement itself was legitimate. They hesitated to use the eighteenth-century independence movement as an analog because they did not want to see the country divided. They believed a diplomatic solution could be reached, and Northern radical abolitionists were as dangerous to the nation as fire-breathing Southern slaveholders. George D. Copeland, editor of the Republican newspaper in Goshen, saw the proclamation in terms of military power. To Copeland, it was merely a war measure

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225 “which we believe calculated to weaken and finally compel a surrender of the enemy.” 57 He said the Constitution gave Lincoln the power to “use every means known to civilized warfare in the suppression of the rebellion,” including killing rebels, freeing their slaves, and/or destroying their property. 58 Copeland also said the Confederates had forfeited their constitutional rights when they started the rebellion. He added that the Rebels could avoid emancipation by laying down their arms. 59 Strictly speaking, this was true, for Lincoln did give the Southerners 100 days to end the rebellion without loss of their slaves. Copeland also hit on the disloyalty theme. He warned that no Northerners should interfere in behalf of the Confederacy, directing this warning at the Copperheads. “Let all good citizens rally to the support of the President in his efforts to crush out this monster insurrection and cease finding so much fault and all will be well,” Copeland wrote. 60 Ignatius Mattingly and John D. Devor, the editors of the Republican newspaper in Plymouth, framed the debate this way: “If we have a right to take the rebels horses and mules, and guns and powder, why not their slaves.” 61 Mattingly and Devor saw it as a matter of presidential prerogative, and they had no doubt Lincoln had the right to free the Southerners’ slaves. They also focused on the religious and moral dimensions of the issue. They wrote that opponents of the proclamation would “provoke the wrath of God upon the nation for our injustice and oppression of the colored race. No man who has any justice or mercy in his heart can justify American slavery.” 62 Hence, opposing abolition was tantamount to supporting injustice. Alfred Wheeler, the editor of the Republican paper in South Bend, saw the proclamation in terms of Northern good fortune. Writing in the first week of January 1863, Wheeler correlated emancipation’s taking effect with a Union victory at

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226 Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and small victories elsewhere in the Volunteer State, in Kentucky and an attack on Vicksburg. Wheeler wrote: “We have no rebel successes in any quarter to reports to offset any of the above.” 63 Northern victories and stalemates put the Union ahead, in Wheeler’s mind. The proclamation would continue that momentum. Wheeler failed to mention the Democratic gains at the poll in the fall of 1862, but that was another matter. Appealing to a sense of history in their readers, Republican editors Thomas H. Bringhurst and Joseph Dague in Logansport alluded to past American documents. This was central to developing a sense of patriotism and loyalty. They wrote that the Emancipation Proclamation was similar in stature to the Declaration of Independence because it divorced the nation from an awful institution, slavery. The Cass County editors, whose paper had favored the Whigs in the 1850s, called slavery the cornerstone of the Confederacy. When it “is removed, the whole fabric will crumble.” 64 Bringhurst and Dague also wrote that neither Lincoln nor the North could be held responsible for the death of slavery. Rather, the responsibility belonged to the Southern slaveholders who forced the war on the nation with secession and Fort Sumter. If the Southerners had not forced the issue, emancipation “would never have been necessitated.” 65 Furthermore, “Constitutional Liberty” could only be saved through emancipation. 66 They observed that emancipation promised “the dawn of a glorious morning, which promises to reunite and establish our national institutions upon a firmer basis than ever.” 67 The moment for a new reunited nation was at hand, and Democrats better support it or keep quiet and allow it to happen.

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227 Meanwhile, the Indianapolis Journal was perhaps the most modern Republican newspaper in the state. The paper was owned by the Journal Company, which included Ovid Butler, Joseph M. Tilford, James M. Matthews, and Rawson Vaile. 68 They hired a veteran journalist, Berry R. Sulgrove, to edit the paper. The Journal Company, closely associated with Governor Morton, provided the money for the enterprise, and Sulgrove handled the editorial responsibilities. 69 On Jan. 3, 1863, Sulgrove chose not to provide commentary about the new law but simply reported what the Emancipation Proclamation said. It was placed between a paragraph on the inauguration of New York Governor Horatio Seymour, a Democrat, and a report about the exclusion of the pro-Democratic Chicago Times from Chicago Board of Trade reading room. Sulgrove provided commentary two days later. It was more matter-of-fact than most of the editorials written about the Emancipation Proclamation. It claimed that Lincoln had the right to free the slaves under the war powers of the executive branch. The Journal editor affirmed the right a president has to suppress a rebellion and to use whatever means necessary to end the rebellion. Then Sulgrove’s piece put the edict in perspective by pointing to the heroic situation Lincoln found himself in. He said, “An act of graver responsibility it has rarely fallen to the last of man to perform.” 70 He ended in a religious tone, hoping the Emancipation Proclamation would have “the gracious favor of Almighty God.” 71 The Goshen Times’ Copeland also saw Lincoln in heroic terms, as the savior of the country, and the proclamation was the instrument of salvation. Copeland wrote in a January 1863 editorial that the president would be best remembered for freeing the slaves

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228 precisely because the proclamation was a “great declaration of Freedom.” 72 Again invoking the Declaration of Independence, a Republican editor emphasized freedom. Delphi Journal editor James Scott chose not to print his own commentary about the proclamation in his Republican newspaper. Instead, he ran what Governor Morton had to say about emancipation. Morton, always loyal to Lincoln, favored the edict, saying it was “a stratagem of war.” 73 The governor went against the opinions of Senator Joseph A. Wright and Lincoln cabinet member Caleb Smith, who were among the state’s most formidable politicians. 74 Smith believed emancipation would hurt morale and enlistments because Hoosiers would resent serving in the Army with black men. 75 In the party press era, it was not unusual for the editor of a party organ to defer to the words of a congressman, senator, governor, or another party leader. Likewise, John H. Scott, the editor of the Democratic newspaper in Evansville, chose not to print his own views after the initial September announcement. Instead, he ran a series of views from newspapers in Philadelphia and New York. This, too, was a frequent practice in mid-century journalism. Scott attempted to have balance with some of the papers supporting emancipation and some against it. Perhaps the most revealing of those editorials was from the New York Journal of Commerce. Its editor observed that the Emancipation Proclamation would distinctly draw the lines between supporters and opponents of the Lincoln Administration. 76 Democratic editors viewed the proclamation with antipathy. They saw the proclamation as a constitutional issue, believed that the chief executive did not possess the authority to end an economic practice that was allowed by the Constitution. Doing so amounted to the type of usurpation reserved for a dictator or monarch, and they added

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229 that this went along with the general tenor of trampling civil liberties that began with the suspension of habeas corpus. 77 Daniel E. VanValkenburgh, editor of the Plymouth Democrat, had similar concerns about Lincoln’s abuse of power. He observed, “It may be that our liberties are ‘clean gone forever.’ ” 78 VanValkenburgh, who would see his paper suspended by Hascall in May of 1863, felt Lincoln had gone too far in dealing with the so-called “fire in the rear,” the dissent of Democrats in the North. The Plymouth Democrat editor thought that the loyal people of Indiana deserved better than martial law. Hoosiers had been loyal to Lincoln and fought for the war. VanValkenburgh believed that Democrats who had come to favor a negotiated settlement of the conflict were being treated with the heavy hand of the federal government. The editor was also skeptical about how emancipation would aid the North in winning the war. VanValkenburgh feared abolitionists were misleading Lincoln. The Plymouth editor referred to comments Lincoln made to the so-called Chicago Committee before he announced the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln had told the pro-abolition group in August that he had his own misgiving about emancipation. “Is there a single Court or magistrate or individual that would be influenced by it there [in the South]. And suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me, to throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them [blacks],” he asked rhetorically. 79 VanValkenburgh asked: “Could the President himself successfully answer his own objections to the emancipation policy?” 80 VanValkenburgh thought he could not. Goshen Democrat editor William H. Norton was equally skeptical. Norton, whose paper was owned by Hascall’s brother Melvin B. Hascall in the 1840s and 1870s, asked

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230 rhetorically: “What good is to be accomplished by this, we are unable to say.” 81 Norton also observed that abolitionists had howled for this edict since the day the war began. He wondered aloud why Lincoln worried about how to feed and clothe the freed slaves, but decided to go ahead with the order. “Why so sudden a change,” Norton asked. 82 The editor thought the president was not being forthright, that he had planned to free the slaves all along. Lincoln had told the Chicago group in August that he even feared some blacks would give their guns to Confederate soldiers and that border state soldiers would go over to the South, but Norton had no illusion. Here Norton interjected race into the argument. He thought the Emancipation Proclamation changed the war objective from that of re-union to “the extermination of the white population in the South.” 83 VanValkenburgh also said emancipation was based on a “hateful dogma of political equality of the races.” 84 The Plymouth wordsmith supplied no explanation as to how a party that favored the common man could be against political equality. “Harmless Thunder” Thomas Tigar, the editor of the Fort Wayne Sentinel in heavily Democratic Allen County, ran an editorial by Wilbur F. Storey of the Chicago Times. Storey focused his September 1862 editorial on the constitutional issue. Storey said Lincoln could not derive from the Constitution any power that allowed him to free the slaves. He added that military necessity served the Constitution, not the other way around. Storey called the proclamation “brutum fulmen,” harmless thunder, since it was practically unenforceable. 85 Sarcastically, Storey took aim at abolitionists who claimed emancipation would end the war within thirty days of its taking effect. Storey wrote: “We are anxious to behold the stupendous and magnificent results which were to flow, like a

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231 mighty stream, from the proclamation.” 86 Many Democratic editors in Indiana read Storey closely and framed the issue similarly. Samuel A. Hall, editor of the Logansport Democratic Pharos, continued the power theme. He fretted that emancipation would be a powerful tool for the Confederacy, not the Union. Hall thought Lincoln’s order would backfire. “Its only effect is to place in the hands of the rebel leaders a most effective argument to rally the entire strength of the South against the government, as indicating a determination to adopt abolition measures so far as it lies in the power of the Administration to do so,” Hall said. 87 Calling the order unwise, impolitic, and unjust, Hall also observed that there had been a few small public demonstrations in Logansport in support of the Emancipation Proclamation, but that they were small. He wrote: “The demonstrations were decidedly unpopular among all Democrats, and also a large portion of the Republicans who are for the Government but not for crazy abolitionism – are for the Union but do no believe a negro is as good as a white man.” 88 Hall, like so many of the Democratic wordsmiths, could not avoid bringing race into his emancipation framework. Indeed, they assumed their audience preferred such framing. Earlier, Hall had run a pro-Republican Newburyport Herald editorial that labeled causing a revolution among the slaves uncivilized and improper for a Christian nation. The Newburyport editor worried that a slave uprising would be primarily directed against white women and children since the men were off fighting the war. Hall worried about atrocities committed against females. He also returned to the constitutional frame, saying that breaking its spirit would make the Union no better than the Confederacy. By any means necessary “is the doctrine of revolutionists.” 89 Alluding to the French Revolution,

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232 Hall reasoned, “No man’s life would be safe and all property [would be] worthless.” 90 This mention of the brutal horror of the French Revolution was common among Democratic editors. Hall also said that the abolitionists had somehow tricked the President. He said, “This proclamation was issued against the will and better judgment of the President.” 91 Hall was suggesting that Lincoln was too weak to stand up to the radicals in his own party. Ultimately, Hall concluded that emancipation made secession just and necessary as a self-defense measure by the Southerners because it put the freedom of black men ahead of union as the primary reason for the war. Milton R. Graham, editor of the Delphi Weekly Times, also used the power frame. Echoing the arguments of the Indiana State Sentinel in Indianapolis, Graham questioned whether Lincoln had the constitutional power to free the slaves. In fact, Graham did a little homework. He had a copy of the daily minutes of the U.S. House of Representatives from 11 February 1861. In it he found that the House adopted a resolution stating that neither the federal government nor the people of the non-slaveholding states had the constitutional right to interfere with slavery in any states of the Union. 92 Of course, Graham failed to tell his readers that this resolution was made by the Democratic-majority Thirty-Sixth House before Lincoln took office in March of 1861, although it is true that before he took office the president did agree with its sentiment. Lincoln also thought in those days that the majority of Southerners would oppose secession and thought the war chatter was a bluff. Graham, who also wondered why the president caved in to the abolitionists, saved his strongest attack for Lincoln’s proposal to financially compensate Southern slaveholders who gave into emancipation. The Delphi Democrat editor said: “Do the

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233 people of Indiana feel included to be taxed to pay for the slaves of even the loyal men of the South?” 93 Hall also said any colonization plan of the freed slaves was “visionary and impracticable.” 94 Eventually, Lincoln agreed with this assessment. Political power was also centermost in the thoughts of John R. Elder and John Harkness, editors of the Indiana State Sentinel, whose paper was intimidated twice by the Union military during the war. Elder and Harkness wondered about what effect emancipation would have on the fall elections in 1862, and their concerns would prove prophetic since Democrats scored a major victory in the nineteenth state in the October election. Elder and Harkness also framed the matter in terms of manliness, claiming that freeing the slaves to get them to fight against their masters was embarrassing to North white men. They wrote: “It is a confession of weakness – an acknowledgement that twenty millions of white people, with every advantage on their side, can not conquer six millions of whites, shut out from the world, and entirely reliant upon their own resources to carry out the war.” 95 Elder and Harkness worried about what the proclamation would do to those in the Union military who did not want to fight for abolition. The Democratic editors framed emancipation in terms of constitutional power. Based on their interpretation of constitutional law, they believed Lincoln was misusing his power, especially after he suspended the writ of habeas corpus. They were outraged and thought they once-moderate president was turning into a revolutionary. This new attitude of the president flew in the face of the Democrats’ Burkean mindset. On the other hand, Republican editors saw emancipation primarily as a war measure, and one that took the high moral road. The Republican editors wanted good news from the war front, and the freeing of black men to help fight it was a pragmatic stratagem to them.

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234 The editors of Civil War Indiana did not try to hide or imbed frames in inverted pyramid news stories. Their persuasive pieces accomplished that work directly. Reporting was limited for these small journalistic operations that usually had circulations of less than 1,000 readers. Information came from the telegraph, other newspapers, and gossip, and the editors shaped the content of their papers. Since they needed patronage, the editors were often dependent on political parties to maintain solvency. The majority of their readers already held strong political positions. Yet it was a time of major political change in U.S. history. After all, the Republican Party had been around only for a decade and had only taken control on the national level because of the bolting of the Southern Democrats in 1860. The framing contest was particularly important in 1863 as Democrats gained more and more at the polls. Because each party was divided, swaying blocs was critical to the success of the governing alliance. Without the pro-war Democrats, Lincoln would not have successfully prosecuted the war. The Republicans showed that negative terms could isolate the opposition and diminish their political arguments. Republican editors referred to the Democrats as Copperheads, the venomous snakes, and repeated the mantra that supporting the Democrats was hazardous and would ruin the nation. This negative framing reinforced the idea that disloyalty harmed the Union and, at the same time, reinforced nationalism. Like politics itself, political discourse had limitations in time of war, the Republicans held. They would also defend the military’s suppression and intimidation of Democratic editors in the Hoosier State in May and June of 1863 precisely because they wanted to limit the two-party system as much as possible during the war. The words of the

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235 Republican editors would contribute to an atmosphere that allowed pro-Union mobs to destroy several Democratic newspapers in the state, and Hascall’s General Order No. 9 would create a chilly atmosphere for political words that were not perceived to be loyal to Lincoln and the military. Framing emancipation would prove crucial because of the more favorable war news that would come in the summer of 1863. The military victories caused Democratic criticisms of the policy to lose much of their sting, and the more positive Republican frames ultimately won the day as the overwhelming majority of Hoosiers would come to accept black freedom and black participation in the Union military. When General George McClellan lost the presidential election to Lincoln in 1864, his failed candidacy showed how quickly public opinion could change. Known as a soldier-friendly general, McClellan polled only twenty-two percent of the military vote and only twenty-nine percent of the vote among soldiers in the Army of the Potomac. 96 Lincoln had benefited from victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga. Yet the war bogged down again in 1864, and Lincoln himself felt he was ripe for an upset. However, Union soldiers and sailors had learned to accept emancipation, and enough Democrat civilians who wanted to restore the union had come to tolerate Lincoln’s new cause for fighting. Thus, the war-measure frame won the contest of public opinion. This chapter in U.S. journalism history shows just how dependent frames can be on outside factors such as military events and the failure to get either England or France to recognize the South. The Republican editors succeeded at defining and evaluating the Union’s problem in the second year of the war as being one of insufficient manpower to fight a war of attrition

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236 with the South. The Republican editors avoided making it a war about racial or economic reality. Rather, they made it about freedom and equality and alluded to the Declaration of Independence. Instead, it became a war for reunion with newly freed men making the difference. Their newfound freedom would make them highly motivated fighters. Freeing black men and having them fight in the war was the solution Lincoln and the North needed to gain the upper hand. The Democratic editors countered with frames that painted Lincoln as a dictator and a monster. They settled on constitutionality as their main frame. The Chicago Times’ Storey was particularly brilliant at this tactic. He and his allies also thought emancipation would rally Democrats North and South. It did, but in the long run the Democratic frames were not enough to unite the party nationally, and Lincoln prevailed in the fall of 1864. He made the war a revolution for freedom. African Americans’ service in the Union military proved decisive, and they became a pivotal voting bloc for the Republicans during Reconstruction. There is no greater symbol of this transformation in U.S. politics than the fact that CSA President Jefferson Davis’ seat in the U.S. Senate before the war went to a black Republican from Mississippi after the war. The Democrats’ constitutional frame may have had greater legal merit, but the Republicans’ pragmatic war-measure frame became a sort of national philosophy. If it works, it must be right. Emancipation worked. It won the war, and it gave a new meaning to Thomas Jefferson’s words about all men created equal from the Declaration of Independence. Ironically, Robert E. Lee proposed emancipation for the heavily Democratic Confederacy in the waning days of the war. 97 It was too late. Lincoln’s ploy had already made the difference in the war’s outcome and the future of the United States.

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237 Only World War I equaled the Civil War for intrusions on press freedom in the history of the United States, and perhaps no state’s editors faced more official limitations on its freedom to print words than the Democratic editors of Indiana. The bitter political and military conflict was much more important than the civil rights of newspaper editors. As twentieth-century press critic William J. Small has noted about wartime journalism, “a troubled electorate at such times is willing to look the other way.” 98 Retrospectively, the Republicans’ frames had the advantage of the changing military fortunes. The conflict hung in the balance, and the words of both the Republican and Democratic editors were powerful instruments in helping to determine the outcome. Those words were framed in four major ways: in terms of power, freedom, legality, and loyalty. Free labor was the way in the North, even if the Yankees, except the abolitionists, were not open to black social freedom. The freedom to fight for the Union was the ultimate expression of black power at a time when almost all African Americans were powerless. The Republican editors, taking their cue from their president, tapped into that expression with their war-measure frame. Blacks’ fighting for Union and their own freedom was one of several decisive factors in the war, though ultimately manpower, gun power, and technological power proved the difference. Lincoln’s Emancipation was a gambit, but it worked in the long run – and proved to be a seminal presidential edict in the nation’s history. Manpower was the North’s biggest advantage. The Union had at least at two-to-one advantage in manpower over the Confederacy. Editors on both sides ultimately realized that frames made complex political, social, and military issues easier to grasp. The frames selected what information needed to be made more prominent to readers. Republican editor defined emancipation in terms of

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238 manpower for the Union military to achieve its goals, while Democratic editor defined it as an erosion of political and economic liberty because of presidential abuse of power. Editors of both parties interpreted the issue in terms of power, with freedom as complementary issue, and each offered a solution that would save the country within a context, in a way that was consistent with their view of the nation and the ideology that served as its theoretical basis. The editors included some aspects of the issue while avoiding others. For example, the Republicans focused on the manpower issue and avoided the legal issue of whether the president had the authority to free the slaves. Democrats focused on the erosion of freedom caused by a president who was overstepping his constitutional power and avoided the immorality of slavery. Editors on both sides did this because they were seeking specific reactions from their audiences. The framing phenomenon limited the public debate to a shouting contest between the ideas that each side wanted to feature and avoided sober deliberations about the major issues in the war. Journalists served as ideological cheerleaders more than watchdogs of press liberty, and the information-gathering function of the press suffered – as did the democratic process. Notes 1 Some Peace Democrats did prefer a divided country, and some wanted to let the Northeast go and to unite with the South to form a new confederation. 2 John D. Barnhart, “The Impact of Civil War on Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History , Vol. 57, No. 3, September 1961, 187-188. 3 Ibid., 188.

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239 4 Joseph E. Stevens, 1863: The Rebirth of a Nation (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1999), 73. Clement L. Vallandigham was best known for the phrase, but Daniel W. Voorhees, the Indiana Congressman, picked it up and spread to the Democratic editors of the state. 5 G.R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 60. 6 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, May 10, 1861. 7 Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era, 1850-1880 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1995), 3. 8 Indiana Senate Journal, 1849-1850, 15. 9 Thornbrough, 97. 10 Kenneth M. Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1949), 51. 11 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Journal, 10 November 1860. 12 Israel George Blake, The Holmans of Veraestau (Oxford, OH: University of Miami Press, 1943), 94-96. 13 Tredway, 70-71. 14 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana State Sentinel, 24 June 1862. 15 James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2001), 383. McPherson, in footnote 42 on 306, says that 2.1 million served in the Union Army and Navy. The 189,000 black soldiers and sailors made up 9 percent of the total – but that would have been 22 percent of the CSA military force. 16 Infoplease.com, “Composition of Congress by Political Party” [online]: accessed: 17 March 2003; available at: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html. Also see James G. Randall and Herbert David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1969), 458. Randall and Donald say the Republican majority went from 64 to 27. 17 Frank L. Klement. Lincoln’s Critics: The Copperheads of the North, (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 1999), 95-96. 18 Technically, the Republican Party did not exist during the war. At the outset, Governor Morton appealed to Democrats to join him in a single political party for the duration of the war. This became Indiana’s Union Party.

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240 19 Barnhart, 198. 20 Thornbrough, 676. 21 Barnhart, 200. 22 Tredway, 27. 23 Ibid., 27-28. 24 Stephen E. Towne, “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863,” presented at the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Fall 2002, 7, 10. 25 Ibid., 11. 26 Dilts, 368. 27 Stephen E. Towne, “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War,” presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Oct. 31, 2003, 12-14. 28 Barnhart, 197. 29 Ibid., 197. 30 Christopher Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), 213. 31 Cannelton, Indiana, Reporter, Dec. 19, 1862. 32 Stewart Sifakis, Who Was Who in the Civil War (New York, NY: Facts on File Publications, 1988), 290. 33 Gil Hinshaw, “From 10,500 Battles: A Handbook of Civil War Engagements” (Hobbs, NM: Superior Printing Company, 1996), 30. 34 Dell, 214. 35 W.H.H. Terrell, Indiana in the War of the Rebellion: Report of the Adjutant General (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1960), 50. By Terrell’s computations,

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241 Indiana contributed 8,008 men more than was called for by the Aug. 4, 1862, call from the president. 36 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, March 11, 1863. 37 Dell, 214. 38 Tredway, 15. 39 Ibid., 16. 40 Ibid., 15. 41 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana State Sentinel, Sept. 24, 1862. 42 Barnhart, 198. 43 Stampp, 99. 44 Ibid., 204. 45 Ibid., 98. The federal government began to organize black troops in May of 1863. Indiana did not begin raising black troops until Nov. 30, 1863, five months after Hascall’s reign as federal commander of the District of Indiana. 46 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, Feb. 28, 1863. 47 Donna Lee Dickerson, The Course of Tolerance: Freedom of the Press in Nineteenth-Century America (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990), 166. Chris A. Paterson. “Transference of Frames in Global Television,” in Stephen D. Reese et al., Framing Public Life (Mahwah, NJ: Elbaum, 2001), 341. 48 Ibid., 1990, 166. 49 Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1993, 52. 50 Ibid., 52. 51 Ibid., 55. 52 Charlotte Ryan, Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organizing (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991), 73. 53 Hinshaw, 26.

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242 54 Frank L. Klement, “Catholics as Copperheads during the Civil War,” Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, January 1994, 37. 55 Dell, 214. The Democrats conveniently forgot that state conscription had been employed in the War of 1812. 56 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, Sept. 23, 1862. 57 Goshen, Indiana, Times, Oct. 2, 1862. 58 Goshen, Indiana, Times, Jan. 8, 1863. 59 Goshen, Indiana, Times, Oct. 2, 1862. 60 Goshen, Indiana, Times, Oct. 2, 1862. 61 Marshall County, Indiana, Republican, Jan. 8, 1863. 62 Plymouth, Indiana, Republican, Jan. 15, 1863. 63 St. Joseph Valley (Indiana) Register, Jan. 8, 1863. 64 Logansport, Indiana, Journal, Sept. 27, 1862. 65 Logansport, Indiana, Journal, Sept. 27, 1862. 66 Logansport, Indiana, Journal, Sept. 27, 1862. 67 Logansport, Indiana, Journal, Sept. 27, 1862. 68 John W. Miller, Indiana Newspaper Bibliography (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), 276. 69 Ibid., 276. 70 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Journal, Jan. 5, 1863. 71 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Journal, Jan. 5, 1863. 72 Goshen, Indiana, Times, Jan. 8, 1863. 73 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, Oct. 10, 1862.

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243 74 Stampp, 147. Caleb B. Smith was Lincoln’s Secretary of the Interior from 1861 to 1863. Joseph A. Wright was one of Indiana’s two U.S. Senators in 1862-1863. Appointed by Governor Oliver P. Morton, Wright replaced long-time political rival Jesse D. Bright, expelled from the U.S. Senate for allegedly expressing sympathy for Jefferson Davis. 75 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana State Sentinel, July 17, 1862. 76 Evansville, Indiana, Weekly Gazette, Oct. 4, 1862. 77 Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1999), 115. Congress went along with Lincoln and passed the Habeas Corpus Act in March of 1863. 78 Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat, Oct. 2, 1862. 79 Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat, Oct. 2, 1862. “Would my word free the slaves when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States,” Lincoln asked. Lincoln also worried about the fate of freed blacks in the South after the war. 80 Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat, Oct. 2, 1862. 81 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, Sept. 24, 1862. 82 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, Oct. 24, 1862. 83 Goshen, Indiana, Democrat, Jan. 7, 1863. 84 Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat, Oct. 30, 1862. 85 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, Sept. 23, 1862. 86 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, Sept. 23, 1862. 87 Logansport, Indiana, Democratic Pharos, Jan. 7, 1863. 88 Logansport, Indiana, Democratic Pharos, Jan. 7, 1863. 89 Logansport, Indiana, Democratic Pharos, Oct. 8, 1862. 90 Logansport, Indiana, Democratic Pharos, Oct. 8, 1862. 91 Logansport, Indiana, Democratic Pharos, Jan. 16, 1863. 92 The vote was 116 to 4.

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244 93 Delphi, Indiana, Weekly Times, Oct. 4, 1862. 94 Delphi, Indiana, Weekly Times, Oct. 4, 1862. 95 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana State Sentinel, Sept. 24, 1862. 96 McPherson, 2001, 493. 97 Ibid., 515. 98 William J. Small, Political Power and the Press (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 71.

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CHAPTER 6 MILO SMITH HASCALL, HIS CIVIL WAR CAREER, AND HIS CONFRONTATION WITH INDIANA’S DEMOCRATIC PRESS At the start of the Civil War, Milo Smith Hascall was ready for action. Because he was one of the few Hoosiers who had gone to West Point, he immediately set about rallying to arms the men of Elkhart County. As soon as President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to put down the secession of the Southern states Hascall and his brother, Melvin B. Hascall, volunteered for the Indiana Militia. Indiana’s quota was initially set at six regiments, or 4,683 men. 1 On 14 April 1861, Hascall enrolled as a private. 2 He helped establish the Seventeenth Indiana Volunteers (infantry). All men in the Seventeenth I.V. were from Elkhart County. Hascall was unanimously chosen captain of the Seventeenth Regiment, and Edmund R. Kerstetter was chosen as his first lieutenant. 3 Kerstetter would remain an officer on Hascall’s staff for the next three years. The Seventeenth was not one of the original six regiments that served from Indiana, and it was not initially accepted by Republican Governor Morton. 4 However, the governor heard that Hascall was a West Point man, so on 27 April 1861, he made the Goshen attorney a captain and aide-de-camp to Brigadier General Thomas A. Morris, stationed at Camp Morton in Indianapolis. 5 On the day that the Goshen Times printed Lincoln’s call for volunteers, a letter by Milo S. Hascall was printed in the paper stating his belief that the Goshen Democrat was taking a “traitorous course” by printing telegraphic news that would give aid and comfort to the Rebels. Hascall did not give specifics about what the newspaper had printed that 245

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246 might help the South, nor did he explain how Southerners would read the Goshen Democrat in a timely fashion that might actually have helped the Confederate Army, which was just being formed. Yet the letter helps establish the sentiment of the time and Hascall’s mindset during the war. He also made the either-or argument he would make two years later when he established General Order No. 9. Hascall wrote in 1861: “There is only half a dozen [Democrats in Goshen] to my knowledge that sympathize with it [The Democrat] now, and they will very soon ascertain that matters have come to that pass now that makes it evident that those that are not for their country are against it.” 6 Hascall said those people expressing any sympathy with the Rebels after Fort Sumter “have no rights which freemen can or ought to respect.” 7 This argument essentially would be the one he would use in a public debate on press suppression with Fort Wayne Congressman Joseph Ketchum Edgerton two years later as Edgerton tried to ascertain the specifics of what Hascall was forbidding in terms of public speaking and in the press in Indiana. It is also worth noting that Hascall would not suppress the Goshen Democrat in the spring of 1863 when he harassed Democratic editors in surrounding counties. Perhaps his forbearance was due to the fact that his brother Melvin B. Hascall had owned the paper and still was close to some of its supporters. Or perhaps as a consideration to his brother’s former ties to the paper, any intimidation Milo Hascall attempted against the Goshen Democrat was done quietly through back channels. Hascall in the Civil War In 1861, Milo Smith Hascall worked as a captain under General Thomas A. Morris and served at Philippi, West Virginia, a small skirmish. Hascall was commissioned as a colonel and given command of the Seventeenth Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment.

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247 The regiment took part in successful action at Greenbrier, West Virginia, in October of 1861, after which Hascall moved the Seventeenth to Louisville, Kentucky. In December of 1861, Hascall was given command of the Fifteenth Brigade, Army of the Ohio. By January of 1862, he had risen to the rank of colonel. 8 He was allowed a trip home to rest during the winter of 1862, and then he took command of a brigade under General Don Carlos Buell. Before he left, the Goshen Times called for the Army to make him a brigadier general. 9 First, though, the Army raised his rank to lieutenant colonel. 10 From Cairo, Illinois, he wrote a letter to C.W. Stevens that appeared in the Goshen Times. Surveying the scene, Hascall commented: “I have had so much to see to, and have had so little sleep that am in no condition to write. Bands are playing, regiments are marching, and the whole atmosphere smells of war. Everybody you meet is a soldier, and I begin to realize that we have work on our hands.” 11 A week later, the Seventeenth Regiment Indiana Volunteers (I.V.) was in New Haven, Kentucky. At this point in the conflict, Indiana had supplied fifty-two regiments to the war effort – forty-six more than the original April 1861 call-up. By April of 1862, Hascall had attained the rank of brigadier general, and he and his brigade arrived on April 7 at Shiloh, Tennessee, a day after that bloody battle ended. A report by Hascall from Shiloh was printed in the Goshen Times a week after the battle. Hascall, now working under Buell, wrote from the field in Corinth, Mississippi, approximately twenty miles south of Shiloh. He was in charge of both the Seventeenth Regiment I.V. and the approximately 600-man Third Ohio Cavalry. Hascall said he and his men arrived at midnight on April 7, and “early next morning I had my whole Brigade in the present position in the advance, ready to fight the enemy should he again attack, or

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248 for any other duty that might be assigned it.” 12 But the fighting was over, and Hascall’s men had missed it thanks in large part to rainy weather and orders to try to engage the Confederate cavalry near Lawrenceburgh, Tennessee. 13 On 25 April 1862, Hascall traveled to Perryville, Kentucky, but he was not engaged in the battle there. In June, a report appeared in the Goshen Times that a soldier named Joseph Guthridge was slandering Hascall’s reputation. Guthridge, who had deserted from his regiment, allegedly called Hascall a coward. Colonel John T. Wilder’s letter to the Times claimed that Guthridge “was guilty of forgery, and all manner of lying and swindling.” 14 Wilder offered a reward of $30 to anyone who would arrest Guthridge. Wilder added: “None but those that have deserted or been compelled to leave the regiment speak disparagingly of him [Hascall].” 15 Milo Hascall’s brother, Melvin B. Hascall, resigned from the Army in June of 1862, apparently because he needed to attend to personal matters back in Goshen. 16 Melvin Hascall’s men praised him in a letter to the Goshen Times: “we desire in this public manner to testify our appreciation of his high qualities as a gallant officer and courteous gentleman.” 17 Two months later, CSA General Braxton Bragg invaded Kentucky, and southern Indiana began to dig in for a possible invasion. Indiana sent two rag-tag regiments to Kentucky to try to slow down the Confederates and give the federal military time to prepare a defense of Cincinnati. Hoosiers fought battles at Richmond and Munfordville, Kentucky, and just slowed the action enough for Buell to arrive in time to repulse the Rebels from Perryville. 18 The Seventeenth Regiment I.V. began to publish a paper occasionally in the fall of 1862. It was called the “Union Comet,” and readers were charged a small price – which

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249 could be paid in cocks, whiskey, applejack, or toothbrushes. Providing news of Milo Hascall’s brigade, it apparently was aimed at soldiers and their families. 19 Meanwhile, the Whitley County, Indiana, Republican reported that Hascall was sick and convalescing in Bardstown, Kentucky. The Whitley County Republican said, “His extensive knowledge of military science and his great coolness in the hour of danger render him a very efficient officer.” 20 After the Northern disaster in Fredericksburg, Virginia, with four Hoosier regiments taking part in the battle, the behind-the-scenes machinations against Burnside as leader of the Army of the Potomac, and the major Democratic gains in Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio in the fall of 1862, the Union Army needed a shot of confidence and energy. 21 Things were not much better for the Army of the Ohio. Hascall took part in the Stones River, Tennessee, battle of 31 December 1862 to 2 January 1863, fighting in the “Red Forest” under General Thomas J. Wood as a division commander. The battle is termed a draw, with casualties reaching 12,906 for the Union and 11,739 for the CSA. 22 Hascall reported his division had 211 men killed, 915 wounded, and 167 missing. When the battle started, his division had 4,887 men. Hascall added that “it rained very hard all day January 3 rd and during the night, so that our men and officers suffered severely.” 23 Hascall was wounded in this battle. 24 Hascall commanded the First Division of the Twenty-First Corps of the Army of the Cumberland from 9 January to 19 February 1862. He returned to Goshen and gave a patriotic speech in early March at Hascall’s Hall. He told the crowd that the peace movement did more harm than good to the Union cause, and if all deserters would be returned to their regiments, then the draft would not have to be implemented. 25 Indiana in

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250 the 1850s and 1860s was an agricultural state. More than half of the state’s workers had occupations on farms. The overwhelming majority of farmers lived on small farms. Corn was the main crop, with wheat second, and hogs were the chief livestock. Indiana had the nation’s seventh largest population in 1850 and the sixth largest in 1860, with population growth in the 1850s being 36.6 percent and 24.4 percent in the 1860s. 26 In 1850, only 4.5 percent of the population lived in cities, and the largest chunk of the population lived along the Ohio River, but the population in the center of the state was growing rapidly because of the superior topsoil in that part of the state. During the 1860s, the central part of the state became more populated than the southern part of the state. 27 Many of the settlers who migrated to the northern two-thirds of the state from western New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio were attracted to the potential high crop yield in the Hoosier State because of the quality of the topsoil. Commander of the District of Indiana When Hascall gained command of the District of Indiana, the negative war news and the Emancipation Proclamation had helped the Democrats gain control of both houses of the state legislature and the majority in the congressional delegation. Resistance to the draft was intense in more in many counties, and counties on the Ohio were suffering economically because the Mississippi was closed to New Orleans, and Governor Morton and his closest allies feared a guerilla invasion of the state by Confederate renegades. Burnside brought in Hascall to relieve Carrington, but it is not exactly clear when Hascall became commander of the District of Indiana. 28 Hascall said he was ordered from Murfreesboro to Indianapolis “about the 1 st of March” in 1863. 29 He was mentioned as being in Indianapolis a month before he issued General Order No. 9. The Goshen Times

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251 reported on March 5 that Hascall had established headquarters in Indianapolis, where Hascall said General William S. Rosecrans ordered him to Indianapolis to help with returning deserters from the Army of the Cumberland in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. 30 Rosecrans “charged [Hascall] with the duty of superintending the work of returning to their regiments all deserters and others absent without authority from the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.” 31 Hascall claimed there were more than 30,000 deserters in the three states. 32 The Times also reported the number of absent soldiers was “astonishingly large” and requested that both military and civilians assist in rounding up deserters. 33 Hascall estimated the number of deserters from the Army of Cumberland to be about one-third of Rosecrans’ “entire army,” and the Goshen officer believed that Copperhead influences had caused them to desert. 34 Hascall wrote the he was transferred from the Army of the Cumberland to the Department of the Ohio by order of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. 35 Brigadier General Henry B. Carrington apparently was still the commander of the District of Indiana in April, though Hascall was already in Indianapolis working for Burnside. As late as April 14, Carrington promulgated General Order No. 5, outlawing the carrying of concealed weapons and intimidating citizens into leaving their homes. 36 On April 19, he published General Order No. 6, calling out the covert Knights of the Golden Circle, charging them with treason by agitating the public in the state with anti-Union, anti-war sentiment. Carrington also condemned the wearing of concealed weapons and subversive emblems – copperheads and butternuts – and he pleaded with the press and public men to

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252 refrain from agitating the public. 37 Carrington’s proclamations already had Democrats on edge when Hascall officially took power in April. The brigadier general wrote that he took over for Carrington on 15 April 1863. 38 The Indianapolis Daily Journal, the main Republican paper in the capital city, printed General Order No. 8 on April 23, stating Hascall’s temporary assumption of command for the District of Indiana, with the rest of his commanding officers being long-time aide Captain Edmund Kerstetter, First Lieutenant James R. Hume, and First Lieutenant A.R. Franklin. 39 This order came just three days after the Indianapolis Daily Journal printed Carrington’s General Order No. 6. Hascall’s General Order No. 8 is dated 22 April 1863. In describing the situation in Indiana as being a “quasi rebellion against the General government,” Hascall added that “large number of copperheads & traitors being armed, and in camp drilling in Brown Co. and various other locations in the state. To meet this state of things I issued my order ‘No. 9.’ ” 40 On April 29, the Indianapolis Weekly Indiana State Sentinel printed General Order No. 9, dated 25 April 1863, which stated that Hascall intended to enforce Major General Burnside’s General Order No. 38, which outlawed treasonous words in the press and by politicians. 41 Hascall explicitly targeted those papers or speakers that encouraged resistance to the Conscription Act “or any other law of Congress passed as a war measure, or that endeavor to bring the war policy of the Government into disrepute.” 42 The Goshen Times noted that Hascall had replaced Carrington, stating that the paper did not know the cause of the latter’s removal, but Carrington had been a bit too hyperactive for Burnside’s taste. The Times also remarked that “Gen. Hascall will undoubtedly fill the position with credit to himself and to the satisfaction of all loyal men” and recommended the careful reading of General Order No.

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253 9 by all Copperheads. 43 Some Democratic editors thought Hascall would be easier or less effective on dissidents, but the Times said there were no grounds “for hoping that Gen. Hascall will be any more lenient with them than Gen. Carrington has been.” 44 General Order No. 9 stated that Hascall “had no partisan feelings or interests.” Hascall asked men of both parties to co-operate with all measures that would keep the peace in Indiana. He said he did not intend to interfere with the civil matters of the State. The order also stated that Hascall intended to carry out Burnside’s General Order No. 38. 45 Hascall declared: “Unmistakable evidence has reached him [Hascall] that the provisions of this Order have been, and are being, violated in various parts of the State. This is unfortunately, in many instances, by well meaning men, who are led astray by newspapers and public speakers.” 46 Thus, it is clear Hascall had a keen eye on the state’s Democratic editors, and many of them decided to tone down their language. General Order No. 9 also stated that Hascall would hold such editors and public speakers accountable for their words. Hascall added: “There is no use in trying to dry the stream while its fountains are allowed to flow.” 47 He then mandated that newspapers and orators who advised or encouraged resistance to the draft, any measure Congress had passed for the prosecution of the war or the Lincoln administration’s war policy would be treated as having committed treason. To justify his proclamation, Hascall said: “The country will have to be saved or lost during the time that this Administration remains in power, and therefore he who is factiously and actively opposed to the war policy of the Administration, is as much opposed to his Government.” 48 In effect, Hascall viewed dissent against the Lincoln administration as opposition to the government. The

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254 commander of the District of Indiana was, in effect, reiterating his April 1861 broadside against the Goshen Democrat. The Indiana State Sentinel took Hascall to task for limiting civil liberties, observing that candid discussion of unwise policy would be legitimate political speech, spoken or written. The editors of the Sentinel asked, “Does this mean that the war policy of the Administration is not to be discussed at all except to praise it?” 49 What if the policy of the administration or the actions of the military was unnecessarily killing Union soldiers or unnecessarily prolonging the war? The Sentinel presumed that Hascall was acting alone and did not have the blessings of his superiors in striking down “fair and free discussion of public measures.” 50 On May 1, Hascall announced General Order No. 10, in which he castigated those persons working for the government to collect deserters and other official business who “not unfrequently [sic] transcend the limits of their duties in an arrogant, overbearing manner.” 51 Hascall said the confidence and respect of the community was being eroded by the actions of such men. The Cannelton Reporter, a Democratic paper, wondered why Hoosier Democrats were being singled out. The editor there asked why Democrats in other states and all Republicans “who enjoy the right of denouncing what they think is wrong, and who exercise that right” did not have to watch what they printed. 52 The Reporter called for a special session of the Indiana legislature to overturn General Order No. 9. 53 The paper, which was pro-war but anti-abolition, poked fun at Hascall and the order, saying: “What is Order No. 9 like its author? Because it is a cipher [0] with a tail to it.” 54 Later, the paper printed an attempt by Englebart Zimmerman, the editor of the suspended pro-Democratic Columbia City News, to call on Hascall in Indianapolis to ascertain why his

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255 paper was being singled out. The report of the talk between Zimmerman and Hascall makes the brigadier general look weak and ineffective because he admits fair criticism of the federal government is allowable. 55 During his six weeks as commander of the District of Indiana, Hascall attempted the suppression of at least eleven newspapers in the state, all Democratic, all in the northern two-thirds of the state. The Goshen lawyer would also oversee a near disastrous security detail at a Democratic mass meeting in Indianapolis on May 20, in which he had received intelligence beforehand suggesting that some of the attendees would attempt the seize the government arsenal. 56 During his reign, a near riot would occur at a Union League mass meeting in heavily Democratic Fort Wayne, a draft riot took place in Blackford County, and protestors hampered the draft process in Fountain County. 57 To say the least, in the spring of 1863, Indiana was in a state of political instability that it had not seen since before statehood in 1816. Generals’ Orders Yet Hascall was not acting alone. The brigadier general was carrying out the internal war policy of his commanding officer, Burnside, who in turn was doing what he thought Lincoln wanted him to do at a time when desertions were high and public opinion of the war effort was low. Burnside’s General Order No. 38 had been promulgated on April 16, 1863, nine days before Hascall’s General Order No. 9 was released by his aide, Captain Edmund R. Kerstetter. Burnside had Hascall act because of intelligence the major general had received from Hascall’s predecessor Carrington, whose picture of what was happening in Indiana was largely formed by Morton. Based on intelligence he was receiving from around the state, Carrington was convinced a rebellion was about to occur in Indiana and wanted a military buildup to put it down.

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256 Morton also wanted a strong military presence in the state. Morton thought resistance to the draft was treasonous and echoed Lincoln that dissidence was “fraught with great danger to the public peace.” 58 Morton did, though, differentiate between those who criticized the war effort and those who advocated secession or rebellion, and yet he also upheld Burnside and the Lincoln administration’s doctrine of temporary suspension of civil liberties – and his own prerogative to stymie the Indiana legislature by sending Republican representatives to Madison, Indiana, to prevent a quorum. Morton declared: “It must be borne in mind that the exercise of the plainest rights and privileges may be greatly modified by circumstances; that what may be proper or innocent and harmless at other times may be dangerous and criminal at another.” 59 Historian William Marvel observed that Burnside wanted “to discourage Southern sympathizers with the fear of brute force rather than the use of it.” 60 Carrington, who seems to have been more willing to use force, said in General Order No. 6 that anyone in Indiana expressing sympathy with the Rebels would be forwarded beyond the Northern lines. Those who committed acts for the benefit of the South would be tried, and, if convicted, face the death penalty. 61 Carrington also outlawed the wearing of butternut and copperhead emblems. 62 Of course, Morton, too, was worried. The governor believed secret societies had formed all over the town and was concerned about activities in Noble, Wayne, Fountain, Warren, Johnson, Blackford, Jay, and Knox counties. 63 Yet Morton did not like Hascall, even if the Goshen attorney’s aggressiveness was much more in keeping with the governor’s own personal ideas about how the war ought to be prosecuted. General Order No. 9 was not the wrong law. Rather, it was the wrong man making martial law.

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257 What was happening under Hascall in Indiana was part of a larger effort by Burnside to control the political rhetoric in the Department of the Ohio. In the middle of Hascall’s reign in Indiana, an editors’ war occurred in Dayton, Ohio, after Clement Laird Vallandigham had been squirreled away to Cincinnati by Burnside’s subordinates early on May 5 in a fashion similar to that of VanValkenburgh. The main characters in Dayton were editors William T. Logan of the pro-Democracy Daily Empire and Lewis Marot and William Rouzer of the pro-Republican Daily Journal. Vallandigham had been editor of the Empire from 1847 until 1849, and his pro-union, pro-peace, and anti-abolition ideas continued to color the paper’s editorials through the Civil War. 64 Vallandigham was still writing some of the paper’s editorials in 1863. 65 In his May 5 commentary on the Vallandigham arrest, Logan pointed the finger at Provost Marshal Edward Parrott and the Republican leadership in town. He also told his readers to save their freedoms through “blood and carnage” if necessary and the day after Vallandigham’s 3 a.m. arrest by 150 members of the 115 th Ohio Regiment, Democrats burned the Journal office and six other adjacent businesses. 66 Logan was arrested and sent to Cincinnati, and martial law was declared in Dayton. The Daily Empire was closed, and Marot and Rouzer printed their paper on the press of the United Brethern House in Dayton. 67 Meanwhile, they offered an advertisement in the Journal for the sale of a “Valuable Democratic Newspaper Establishment.” 68 Logan restarted publication of the Daily Empire in August. Although he had suspended the writ of the habeas corpus the previous September, President Lincoln was embarrassed by the situation in the Midwest. He did not want his military agents to treat civilians with a heavy hand. He was also upset that he had learned

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258 about the matter in the newspapers, which would indicate he had not known beforehand about General Order No. 38 or Hascall’s anti-press order in Indiana. 69 Instead of letting Vallandigham sit in jail for the remainder of the war, the president exiled the popular and loquacious ex-congressman to the South, which did not want him either. Although Valiant Val, as he was called, hoped for re-union with the Southern states, he learned the Confederates wanted independence. He said he might be in favor of recognizing independence. 70 A man without a country, Vallandigham sailed for Bermuda and then Canada. Eventually, in absentia, he lost the 1863 Ohio gubernatorial race to former newspaperman John Brough in a landslide that ended Valiant Val’s political career as an office seeker, though he still worked diligently behind the scenes. 71 Just as Vallandigham was being arrested, tried, and convicted by a military tribunal, the attention of the nation’s Democratic editors had another cause to defend – the First Amendment rights of Indiana’s newspaper editors. After Plymouth’s Daniel E. VanValkenburgh was arrested on May 5, several papers received letters of intimidation from Hascall on May 8. The St. Joseph County Forum in South Bend received a letter from Hascall stating the general had copies of the May 3 rd edition of the Forum. 72 Editor William Drapier, who opposed the war, apparently had stated his intention to violate General Order No. 9. 73 Drapier told Hascall to “get over” Order No. 9, writing: “We make no retraction of principle. We compromise no right of an American citizen.” 74 Hascall did not seem to have a sense of humor, and on May 23 he had Drapier arrested and suspended the paper. Drapier’s paper returned to operation on 16 June 1866, and he sold the Forum that August to Edward Molloy. 75 A Union Army veteran, Molloy bought the paper and changed the paper’s title to The National Union. 76

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259 On May 8, Engelbart Zimmerman, the editor of the Columbia City News, received a letter similar to Drapier’s letter. It said: “You can now take your choice – publish an article taking back your threats of resistance to that order [No. 9] and your comments designed to destroy its usefulness and hereafter publish a loyal paper, or you can discontinue the publication of your paper until further orders,” Hascall wrote. 77 Zimmerman, who had seen his paper mobbed by Republicans back in March, did not change his tone. Accordingly, Hascall, an attorney in Goshen before the war, had the editor arrested, but released him after listening to Zimmerman’s side in the case. 78 Another paper receiving a letter from Hascall on May 8 was the Bluffton Banner. In a letter printed in Dawson’s Daily Times and Union in nearby Fort Wayne, the editor of the Banner boldly said he would ignore Hascall’s tyranny and continue business as usual. 79 Hascall sent an intimidating letter to Warsaw Union editor E. Van Long on May 11. 80 In the letter, Hascall said he had seen the Union from three days before and that it contained Long’s intention to violate General Order No. 9. 81 The brigadier general asked the editor to retract his statement. Hascall said, “A failure to attend promptly to this admonition will not be overlooked.” 82 Long countered in an open letter that he could not retract anything because the brigadier general was not specific in what he found objectionable. Long went on to write that there was no rebellion in Indiana and therefore General Order No. 9 had no legitimacy in the state. “The civil law is ample for a redress of grievances If the force that has been placed at the disposal of Gen. Hascall to enforce this order were placed in the field to operate against the enemies of this country, it would be more in accordance with good sense,” Long observed. 83 Hascall also shut

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260 down the Pulaski County Democrat in May of 1863. 84 The Pulaski Democrat was suspended for two weeks, but what words it printed that offended Hascall are uknown. 85 Other Democratic papers that faced suppression by Hascall included the Huntington Democrat, the Rushville Jacksonian, the Franklin Weekly Democratic Herald, and the Hartford City Blackford County Democrat. 86 Union Army soldiers attempted to arrest Huntington Democrat editor Samuel Winters, but a crowd sympathetic to the newspaper prevented the arrest. 87 The Rushville editor was threatened with arrest not for words he wrote, but for a speech he made at a political rally. 88 It is not clear whether the Franklin or Hartford City papers were merely threatened or actually suppressed. 89 More in keeping with the announced reason for his command in Indianapolis, Hascall had General Order No. 11 published on 11 May. 90 It reported that all enemy prisoners in the state captured before 1 April had been exchanged. Ten days later, the Goshen Times reported that Hascall had “notified several Copperhead newspapers in this State, that they must apologize for recent articles in their papers and improve their loyalty, or their paper will be suppressed and the editors arrested.” 91 Hascall and a New York Editor While all of this was going on, Hascall had an exchange with New York Express editor James Brooks. Democratic papers throughout Indiana published Brooks and Hascall’s letters. Brooks’ paper had already been suppressed from the mails in the Middle Department, roughly the Mid-Atlantic states. In response to an Express editorial about his proclamation, Hascall called Brooks “witty and smart” and said Order No. 9 “was issued after mature deliberation and consultation.” 92 Hascall added, “It is fortunate your publication is not published in my District.” 93

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261 Brooks countered that even if Hascall was the commander of New York, the Democratic governor of the state – Horatio Seymour – would “find a place in the Tombs” for Hascall. Brooks continued, “You labor, I see, under the not uncommon delusion with men of your military caliber, that the Administration is the Government, and that the ‘war policy’ of the Administration is “The Supreme Law of the Land,’ not the Constitution of the United States. Or, in other words, that ‘No. 38’ or ‘No. 39,’ is the Government of the United States.” 94 Eventually, Burnside himself would get irritated with Brooks and would stop the mailing of the New York Express to the Midwest. While Hascall and Brooks took aim at one another, a flurry of activity occurred during the first week of June. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton sent a letter to Burnside on 1 June 1863 suggesting the Commander of the Department of the Ohio ask for Hascall’s resignation. Stanton was alarmed that the press suspensions were irritating Hoosiers unnecessarily and might be hampering Morton’s efforts to run the state. “The proper limit of military power in such cases,” Stanton wrote, “is at the request to aid and not supersede the State authority.” 95 The Secretary of War worried that “indiscreet commanders” would only irritate loyal governors and other state officials who were aiding the Union war effort. 96 Stanton concluded that Lincoln agreed with this point of view and encouraged the general to find a more circumspect military leader for Indiana. Morton had wanted a large military force in the state, mainly to protect the capital in case of a thrust by Confederates from Kentucky. However, Hascall had sent every available man south to fight – which is exactly what Burnside wanted. Morton also thought Hascall knew little about the state – and in a sense this was true because Hascall was from northern Indiana, and the state government had been dominated by the bottom

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262 two-thirds for most of its existence. 97 Most importantly, though, Carrington was closer to Morton and would do as he was told. On 1 June 1863, the Chicago Times printed a letter from a writer claiming to be a resident of Goshen, Indiana. In it, the writer claimed that Hascall had no common sense and “was always considered the family fool.” 98 It’s not clear if Burnside saw this broadside at his officer, but nonetheless he drew up orders to quiet the Times that very same day. Thus, weighing his options with Hascall, Burnside sent word to Chicago to shut down the Times, who editor, Wilbur F. Storey, constantly criticized the Republicans and the Lincoln administration. 99 On June 3, Burnside had the Times suspended. Storey’s paper printed racist material and made fun of Lincoln, whom Storey called a despot. 100 After Burnside said the Times was disloyal and incendiary, the Republican-majority Illinois House of Representatives passed a resolution denouncing Burnside’s action, saying it violated state and federal law. New York papers roasted the major general. Even the New York Times, generally supportive of Lincoln and Burnside, criticized Burnside’s use of force. “Any person who knows anything of the character of our institutions, will readily see that such proceedings as the suppression of the Chicago Times by military force, will create far more formidable evils than they correct,” the New York Times stated. 101 Lincoln revoked the suspension, though he actually sent a second telegraph revoking the first order. However, Burnside received it too late. 102 The Columbia City News in Indiana then announced in its June 6 edition that Hascall had written the Starke County Press and ordered editor Joseph A. Berry to change his tone to one more loyal to

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263 the Lincoln government. 103 The letter must have been written before June 5. The signals from the government remained, at best, confusing for Democratic editors. Both Republicans and Democrats were suspicious of one another in Indiana. Republican editors thought some Democratic editors were sending veiled messages to party members to lukewarmly support the war or not participate in the draft. Democrats feared Republicans were spying on them and telling Hascall about their political activities. For example, Plymouth Weekly Democrat editor VanValkenburgh, who missed publishing one issue of his paper after he was arrested and shipped to Cincinnati, was sure that Republicans in Plymouth were feeding Hascall with a steady list of disloyal Democrats. The editor wrote: “There have probably been one hundred names reported from our county to Gen. Hascall, as fit subjects for arrest as disloyalists Of all the contemptible, disreputable, groveling, low, mean unmanly, despicable occupations any human being can engage in, this reporting is the meanest and lowest.” 104 Highly attuned to all the political machinations at the time, VanValkenburgh received a report about Hascall’s demise and wrote on May 28 that Hascall “has been removed from the command of Indiana.” 105 His report came out a week before other mentions of Hascall’s resignation. The Goshen Times tried to quell rumors that Hascall had been relieved of his command. Reporting that Hascall was in Goshen, it declared: “He was appointed to his present command by General Burnside without any solicitation on his part or that of his friends, and is sustained by the Commander-in-chief, Abraham Lincoln.” 106 Goshen’s Republican newspaper continued to support General Order No. 9 and provided an argument for suppression that was ambiguous in its definition of “aid” and “comfort” for

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264 the enemy. It proclaimed: “Open sympathy with treason and every thing that tends to give the rebels aid and comfort must be put down at any sacrifice!” 107 Based on the wording of Hascall’s order, this meant that legitimate criticism of the Lincoln administration, the war policy, or the war effort – as well as the usual political broadsides of an election – could be seen as treasonous. Morton said nothing publicly, even though he was working to have Hascall sacked through his political network. Burnside, who admired Hascall’s loyalty and attempt to enforce the principles of General Order No. 38, decided to go along with Lincoln and Stanton. Burnside asked Hascall to resign, although Hascall claimed it was his idea to resign. Nonetheless, on June 6, Hascall issued General Order No. 14 announcing his resignation. 108 Along with Hascall’s resignation, the announcement included a paragraph from Burnside stating that the District of Indiana and the District of Michigan were being combined into one district under General Orlando B. Willcox. 109 Burnside, writing from Lexington, Kentucky, thanked Hascall for his “hearty co-operation and very efficient service and aid in carrying out the policy adopted by this department.” 110 Hascall used the occasion to rescind General Order No. 9, saying he did it “without instructions from any source in order to leave his successor free to adopt such course as in his judgment will best subserve the public interest in the States of Indiana and Michigan.” 111 Hascall later admitted that General Order No. 9 had gained a “notorious” reputation “through the loyal states.” 112 He said he was about to have the “traitorous papers and rabid copperheads in various parts of the state” dealt with the same way the federal government would with Lambdin P. Milligan, Joseph J. Bingham, Horace Heffren, William A. Bowlers, and the other alleged secret society members arrested for treason in

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265 1864. 113 However, Hascall stated that “the president having revoked General Burnside’s order for the suppression of the Chicago Times and not receiving the cooperation from the General government and state authorities which I deemed essential in carrying out my programme I informed General Burnside that I thought my usefulness was at an end in Indiana.” 114 Hascall said that Willcox relieved him of his command of the District of Indiana on 5 June 1863. 115 Burnside granted Hascall thirty days’ leave after the brigadier general resigned from his Indiana command. Hascall went home to rest before rejoining the Army of the Cumberland later in the summer. 116 Except in the eyes of the editor of the Goshen Times and a few other Republican editors, Hascall had not been a popular leader in the state. According to Marvel, key Republicans in Indiana and Illinois wanted Hascall’s removal. Along the way, Burnside learned that nobody in cabinet approved of General Order 38 and its enforcement. 117 Plymouth’s VanValkenburgh said Hascall “was a burning disgrace to our State, and has laid up for himself a treasure of infamy.” 118 The New Albany Ledger, which had been pro-war most of the first two years of the conflict, said Hascall “won more honorable fame in the field with his sword, than he has done as commander of this department by his ‘orders’ and arbitrary acts.” 119 The Buffalo, New York, Commercial Advertiser called Hascall’s actions in Indiana “unofficer-like.” 120 Cessation of Normal Politics Despite the response to the Chicago Times suppression, Burnside believed that restrictions should be even tighter. On June 3, he made a public statement that best explained his rationale for suppressing civil liberties. In General Order No. 90, the major general stated that the rebellion required a cessation of normal politics and the need of citizens to suspend their civil liberties. He noted that the citizen-soldier had to give up his

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266 freedom of expression, so it was not too much to ask citizens to make similar sacrifices. Burnside observed: “The citizen would be unjust to the soldier, as well as unfaithful to his country, if, while enjoying the comforts of home, he would be unwilling to give a portion of a privilege which the soldier resigns altogether. That freedom of discussion and criticism which is proper in the politician and journalist in time of peace, becomes rank treason when it tends to weaken the confidence of the soldier in his officers and in his Government.” 121 Burnside, of course, emphasized that the loss of civil liberties was a temporary state of affairs for both the citizen-soldier and the citizen. In response to the negative public perception of General Orders No. 38 and No. 9, Burnside offered the president his resignation as commander of the Department of the Ohio – just as he offered his resignation as commander of the Army of the Potomac after Fredericksburg. Lincoln again did not accept it. He would go on to help with the Union Army’s defense of East Tennessee in the fall of 1863. By December of 1863, Burnside headed home to Rhode Island for a rest and then was asked to run the Army in the Northeastern states. 122 The Goshen Times reported that Hascall and Kerstetter were in Goshen at the time of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the two battles that did more for the Union and Republican cause nationally and in Indiana than anything that Burnside or Hascall could do with their internal war on dissent and treason. The Times reported that Hascall was on his way to Cincinnati and would “most likely be assigned a command in Burnside’s Department immediately upon his arrival” there. 123 Before that, he helped in the pursuit of Confederate renegade John Morgan in Indiana in mid-July. As was the case in the spring, Hascall actually replaced Carrington as leader of the band of Hoosiers attempting to track

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267 down and arrest Morgan. Carrington was either slow to respond to orders from Governor Morton, or, as Hascall alleged, he was too drunk and “utterly unfit to trust with that or any other duty.” 124 After the failed pursuit of Morgan, Hascall reported to Major General George Lucas Hartsuff in the Twenty-Third Corps of the Department of the Ohio and was stationed in Lexington, Kentucky. 125 By the fall, Hascall was in Knoxville, Tennessee, commanding a division under Burnside. In the next year, he would take part in the Union’s attempt to re-conquer East Tennessee and northern Georgia. By October of 1864, he would retire for good from the Union Army. When he wrote his report about his wartime activities after the war, Hascall included very little detail about his suppression of the Democratic press in the state. Much more detail was given to the events of May 20 in Indianapolis and the pursuit of John Morgan. It was as if press suppression did not merit such specificity, but it also was a painful memory for the man from Goshen because public sentiment against General Order No. 9 was so strong. Hascall’s loyalty to Lincoln, the Republicans, and the Union Army left him with a blind spot, and he was unable to foresee the predictable reaction of Indiana society of the 1860s to press suppression. Hoosiers were far too independent to let a military man dictate to them about freedom of the press. Hascall was a citizen-soldier. Before the war, he worked as a prosecutor in Elkhart County, an elected position. He had responded as soon as Lincoln called for volunteers because he was a West Point graduate who might have made a career in the military. He did not think what Burnside asked him to do in Indiana was in any way out of line.

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268 Hascall believed the situation merited drastic measures, and thus he implemented General Order No. 9. Table 3-1: Key dates in the life of Milo Smith Hascall Born 5 August 1829 in Le Roy, New York Attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1848-52 and graduated fourteenth in a class of forty-three Performed one year of garrison duty and artillery service (Second Artillery) in Fort Adams, Rhode Island Not much chance for promotion in peacetime Army, so Hascall resigned his military commission Returned to Goshen and worked as teacher, attorney, railroad contractor, district attorney, and county clerk of courts; his brother, Melvin B. Hascall, owned the Goshen Democrat in the late 1840s Became a Republican in the 1850s; as a Republican, ran for Elkhart County Clerk, a public office, and won; he followed in the footsteps of Elbridge G. Chamberlain, his brother-in-law, who had been Elkhart’s clerk in the 1840s Married Julia Swift of Elkhart, 27 November 1855; their only child died in 1857 At the start of the Civil War, volunteered for the Union Army from Indiana Helped establish Seventeenth Indiana Volunteers (infantry); all men in the regiment were from Elkhart County Worked as a captain under General Thomas A. Morris Served at Philippi, West Virginia, a small skirmish Commissioned as a colonel, given command of the Seventeenth Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment Took part in action at Greenbrier, West Virginia, in October of 1861 Moved Seventeenth to Louisville, Kentucky In December of 1861, Hascall was given brigade responsibility, Fifteenth Brigade, Army of the Ohio On 7 April 1862, arrived at Shiloh, Tennesee, a day after that bloody battle ended Worked under Don Carlos Buell at the battle of Corinth, Mississippi On 25 April 25 1862, Hascall was promoted to brigadier general Travels to Perryville, Kentucky; not engaged in the battle there Took part in Stones River, Tennessee, battle 31 December 1862 to 2 January 1863 Fought in “Red Forest” under General Thomas J. Wood; became a division commander there Hired to track down deserters as the head of the District of Indiana in the spring of 1863 – started that post in March and was promoted to commander of the district in April Attempted to suppress eleven newspapers in northern two-thirds of Indiana in May-June 1863 Relieved of command in Indiana on 5 June 1863 Briefly led Indiana soldiers in pursuit of CSA guerilla John Morgan in mid-July 1863 Served in Twenty-Third Corps of Army of the Ohio in July and August 1863; stationed in Lexington, Kentucky Traveled to Knoxville, Tennessee, in the fall of 1863; took part in the Union occupation of Knoxville Commanded a division as part of the U.S. Army’s Twenty-Third Corps in the siege of Atlanta under General John M. Schofield’s Army of the Ohio; serves in various battles leading up to Atlanta campaign, including Kennesaw Mountain Schofield recommended Hascall for a promotion to major general (second star) Hascall did not receive that promotion; it is not known why (political?) Resigned from the Union Army on 27 October 1864 Returned to Goshen, became co-owner of Salem Bank and a lumber business, worked in veterans affairs; brother Melvin B. Hascall regains ownership of Goshen Democrat in 1873 Julia Swift Hascall died 11 September 1883

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269 Table 3-1 Continued. Married Rose J. Miller, a Canton, Ohio, socialite, in 1886 Moved to Chicago and worked in real estate in the 1890s, building two hotels (Hotel Hascall and Lexington Hotel) Died 30 August 1904 in Oak Park, Illinois Buried at Forest Home Cemetery in Forest Park, Illinois Hascall family regains ownership of Goshen Democrat in the twentieth century; paper is renamed the Goshen Times and is published by Frank Hascall for more than three decades

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270 Notes 1 W.H.H. Terrell , Indiana in the War of the Rebellion: Report of the Adjutant General (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1960), 6. 2 Milo Smith Hascall, “Report” to W.H.H. Te rrell (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana State Archives, Commission on Public Records), 1. 3 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 25 April 1861. 4 Milo Smith Hascall, “Autobiography,” Indi ana State Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana, undated, 2. 5 Terrell, 12. 6 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 18 April 1861. 7 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 18 April 1861. 8 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 30 January 1862. 9 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 30 January 1862. 10 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 13 February 1862. 11 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 13 February 1862. 12 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 24 April 1862. 13 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 24 April 1862. 14 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 5 June 1862. 15 Goshen, Indiana, Times , 5 June 1862. 16 It is not clear why Melvin B. Hascall re signed from the Army. However, his wife, Mary Euphemia Moore Hascall, had accompanied h im to the front, but their 2-year-old daughter Kate Vesta Hascall was sickl y. She would die on Oct. 17, 1863, and nephew Jerome Hascall Chamberlain observed in a lett er to his sister “Molly,” Mary Henriette Chamberlain Grosh, that “Uncle Mell has gon e to drinking again.” See Jerome Hascall Chamberlain to Mary Henriette Chamberlain Grosh, Nov. 19, 1863, Bentley Family Papers, MS-720, Box 1, Folder 12, Center fo r Archival Collections, Jerome Library, Bowling Green State Univers ity, Bowling Green, Ohio.

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271 17 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 3 July 1862. 18 John D. Barnhart, “The Impact of the Civil War on Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 57, No. 3, September 1961, 197. 19 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 30 October 1862. 20 Reprinted in the Goshen, Indiana, Times, 30 October 1862. 21 Barnhart, 195. 22 Gil Hinshaw, “From 10,500 Battles: A Handbook of Civil War Engagements” (Hobbs, NM: Superior Printing Company, 1996), 30. 23 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 12 February 1863. 24 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 252. 25 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 5 March 1863. 26 United States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census (1880), I, 5. 27 Ibid., I, 388-389. 28 The District of Indiana included all the counties in the Hoosier State, and Hascall had his command in Indianapolis. It was part of the Department of the Ohio, which included Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Kentucky, and Illinois. In June of 1863, Indiana and Michigan would be combined into one district. These districts gave the Union military a presence in the North. The army protected key cities, attempted to round up deserters and wayward Confederate prisoners, and maintain civic order. 29 Hascall, “Autobiography,” 7. 30 Hascall, “Report,” 3. 31 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 5 March 1863. 32 Hascall, “Autobiography,” 7. 33 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 5 March 1863. 34 Hascall, “Report,” 3. 35 Hascall, “Report,” 3.

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272 36 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, 14 April 1863. 37 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, 20 April 1863. 38 Hascall, “Report,” 3. 39 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, 23 April 1863. 40 Hascall, “Report,” 3. 41 Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, 29 April 29 1863. 42 Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, 29 April 1863. 43 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 30 April 1863. 44 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 30 April 1863. 45 Richmond Jeffersonian, 30 April 1863. 46 Richmond Jeffersonian, 30 April 1863. 47 Richmond Jeffersonian, 30 April 1863. 48 Richmond Jeffersonian, 30 April 1863. 49 Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, 6 May. 50 Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, 6 May 1863. 51 Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat, 14 May 1863. 52 Cannelton, Indiana, Reporter, 22 May 1863. 53 Cannelton, Indiana, Reporter, 29 May 1863. 54 Cannelton, Indiana, Reporter, 29 May 1863. 55 Cannelton, Indiana, Reporter, 5 June 1863. 56 Hascall, “Report,” 4. 57 Barnhart, 200.

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273 58 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 18 June 1863, proclamation by Gov. Oliver P. Morton, dated 11 June 1863. 59 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 18 June 1863, proclamation by Gov. Oliver P. Morton, dated 11 June 1863. 60 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 232. 61 Plymouth Weekly Democrat, 16 April 1863. 62 Ibid., 23 April 1863. 63 Terrell, 353-359. 64 James L. Vallandigham, A Life of Clement L. Vallandigham (Baltimore, MD: Turnbull Brothers, 1872), 55-60. 65 Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 151. 66 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 241. 67 Carl M. Becker, “Newspapers in Battle: The Dayton Empire and the Dayton Journal During the Civil War,” Ohio History: The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society, Vol. 99, Winter-Spring1990, 44. 68 Dayton, Ohio, Daily Journal, 19 May 1863. 69 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1988), 597. 70 Ibid., 598. 71 Harper, 251. 72 Ibid., 252. 73 Robert N. Scott, et al., eds., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1891), Series II, Vol. V, 725. 74 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 18 May 1863. 75 Miller, 402.

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274 76 John B. Stoll, History of Indiana From Its Exploration to 1922; Also an Account of St. Joseph County from Its Organization (Dayton, OH: Dayton Historical Publishing, 1922), 151. 77 Scott., The War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. V, 725. 78 Vincennes, Indiana, Western Star, 16 May 1863. 79 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times and Union, 13 May 1863. 80 The War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. V, 725-26. 81 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 26 May 1863. 82 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 26 May 1863. 83 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 26 May 1863. 84 Miller, 373. 85 Stephen E. Towne, “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, in 1863,” paper presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, October 2002, 6. 86 Stephen E. Towne, “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War,” paper presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Oct. 31, 2003, Appendix A, 12-13. 87 Towne, 2003, 13. Towne notes the crowd was between 50 and 200. 88 Towne, 2003, 13. 89 Towne, 2003, 13. Miller (Indiana Newspaper Bibliography, 22) says that the Blackford County Democrat stopped publication in 1861 when editors William and Samuel McCormack enlisted in the Union Army. Benjamin Shinn (Biographical Memoirs of Blackford County, Indiana, Chicago, IL, Brown Publishing, 1900, 262) says the paper was discontinued in 1861. Patricia A. Kriegbaum (Historical Background of Blackford County, Hartford City, Indiana, 33) says that once James W. Ruckman started the Hartford City Union in 1861, not enough patronage existed to keep two newspapers afloat, and the Democrat “soon expired.” 90 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 14 May 1863.

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275 91 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 21 May 1863. 92 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 19 May 1863. 93 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 19 May 1863. 94 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 19 May 1863. 95 The War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. V, 724. 96 Ibid., 723-726. 97 Stephen E. Towne, 2002, 4. 98 Chicago, Illinois, Times, June 1, 1863. 99 Ibid., 726. 100 Smith, 115. University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee journalism professor Jeffrey A. Smith wrote that 101 New York Times, 13 June 1863, 4. 102 Smith, 116. 103 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 6 June 1863. 104 Plymouth Weekly Democrat, 21 May 1863. 105 Plymouth Weekly Democrat, 28 May 1863. 106 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 4 June 1863. 107 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 4 June 1863. 108 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 8 June 1863. 109 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, 8 June 1863. 110 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, 8 June 1863. 111 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, 8 June 1863. 112 Hascall, “Report,” 4.

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276 113 Hascall, “Report,” 4. 114 Hascall, “Report,” 4. 115 Hascall, “Report,” 4. 116 The War of Rebellion, Series II, Volume V, 759. 117 Marvel, 238. 118 Plymouth Democrat, 28 May 28 1863. 119 Reprinted in the Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, 15 June 1863. 120 Reprinted in the Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, 15 June 1863. 121 Indianapolis, Indiana, Weekly Indiana State Sentinel, 8 June 1863. 122 Marvel, 335-36. 123 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 2 July 1863. 124 Hascall, “Report,” 6. 125 Hascall, “Report,” 4.

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CHAPTER 7 PRESS RESPONSES TO SUPPRESSION IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA The response to Hascall’s General Order No. 9 in the press of Indiana was divided along party lines. Generally, Democratic editors defied the order, counseled defiance, or criticized Hascall for allowing Republican editors to be critical of policy or performance. On the other hand, Republican editors hailed it as a necessary measure during a rebellion, and some forwarded the names of dissident Democratic editors to Hascall. The arguments against Hascall’s order centered on the free-expression tradition guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, while the arguments for suppression echoed Lincoln’s public safety argument for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during a rebellion or invasion. Oddly, the Republican editors did not cite the Indiana Constitution’s bill of rights and its responsibility-for-abuse clause in the free-press section. Neither did Democratic editors challenge responsibility-for-abuse, since this might have been a good time to question whether this phrase should even be in the state constitution. It seems as if the state constitution did not matter in the debate – in a sense, a sign that on this issue, the general government was sovereign, even if Democrats did not admit it publicly. Yet Democrats acted like the federal constitution was the law of the land. The arguments both sides would use in Indiana were reprises of those that were made in Ohio after Burnside had Vallandigham arrested in Dayton on 5 May 1863 and tried the next day by the military commission in Cincinnati. Burnside charged Vallandigham with publicly “declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its effort to suppress an 277

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278 unlawful rebellion.” 1 Although no copy exists of the Mount Vernon, Ohio, speech of 1 May 1863, it was used against the former congressman is extant, Vallandigham allegedly said Lincoln had a plan to end the war the day before Fredericksburg and that Lincoln was about to set up district governments all over the country. The spies who took notes during the Mount Vernon speech also reported that Vallandigham said he would spit on General Order No. 38. 2 Vallandigham Trial At the trial, Vallandigham introduced a letter from a Confederate in Richmond proposing that Southern senators return to Congress. This was supposed to be evidence that some Southerners who, like Vallandigham, were ready to go to the peace table. The two plainclothes spies who were among the crowd at Mount Vernon testified against Vallandigham, while Congressman S.S. Cox of Ohio was the only witness the defense called. After three hours of deliberations, the military commission found the ex-congressman guilty. During the trial, Vallandigham applied for a writ of habeas corpus, but it was denied by Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt, a Democrat. 3 The commission sentenced Vallandigham to stay in a Boston prison for the duration of the war, but Lincoln commuted it to exile to the South – and Jefferson Davis had the Ohioan sent to Wilmington, North Carolina, as, in effect, a prisoner of war. Vallandigham, initially released in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, did not stay in Wilmington long. He boarded a blockade runner to Bermuda and went on to Canada. He ran for governor of Ohio in the fall of 1863 and lost in a landslide to Republican newspaper editor John Brough. Vallandigham appeared at the 1864 Democratic Convention in Chicago, but the congressional defeat in the fall of 1862 and the military court conviction in the spring of 1863 effectively ended his political career.

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279 Democratic editors were not charitable with Judge Leavitt’s decision. Wilbur F. Storey, editor of the Chicago Times, found Leavitt’s decision to be “discouraging.” 4 Storey reminded his readers that the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus lay in the hands of Congress, not the president or any representative of the executive branch. Storey also chastised Leavitt for making “support of the war policies of the administration the standard for loyalty.” 5 Meanwhile, a generally pro-Democratic editor in Fort Wayne, Indiana, wondered why Democratic editors in Ohio and Indiana were being singled out for press suppression. “The Abolition citizens in the eastern states are permitted to exercise this privilege, without restraint, of questioning, opposing or condemning, the acts of the present administration,” the editor observed. 6 New York editors could write what they pleased, but editors in Burnside’s department had to choose their words carefully or face punishment. Some Republican editors denounced the proceedings, including Leavitt’s legal decision and Vallandigham’s conviction. 7 Yet most Hoosier Republican editors supported Leavitt and the conviction. They were happy to see both Vallandigham and dissident Democratic editors put in their place. Likewise, they cheered Hascall’s general order for being just as aggressive against dissidence as Burnside’s order was. The editor of the St. Joseph Valley Register cheered Hascall’s suppression of his Democratic competitor and concluded that the South Bend Forum editor’s decision to stop publication proved it was a disloyal paper. 8 The editor of the Logansport Journal equated agitating against the draft the same as allowing a person to come into town to “incite our young men to commit robberies.” 9 The Journal editor asked his readers if they would excuse such behavior on the principle of free speech?

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280 The response of the Indiana press to Hascall’s order followed party lines. While Democratic editors fashioned a consensus opposing General Order No. 9, they were too spread out to hold a meeting about the general orders and failed to lodge a formal collective protest. In New York, editors did not face that same problem of being so spread out. 10 They assembled to discuss federal suppression in the Midwest and its potential effect on the whole nation – but especially in New York City, where the majority of the newspapers were Democratic. Fernando and Benjamin Wood sponsored the protest meeting in New York, and most newspapers in the city encouraged citizens to attend. 11 “Everywhere public opinion, without distinction of party, is pronouncing against Burnside’s course,” observed the New York Herald. 12 The New York Evening Post added, “The Government can not punish men for treason because their talk tends to give aid and comfort to the enemy.” 13 This was an important distinction. What if words were meant to be politically critical of the standing president but not supportive of the enemy? Furthermore, how could anyone accurately determine the true intention of a speaker or writer? Since the death of the Alien and Sedition Acts under Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, the working principle in the United States had been political opinions were not subject to libel. What effect words tended to have was not easy to gauge. A few Republicans looked at the general order in practical political terms. They worried that Burnside’s actions were unnecessary and had gone too far. For example, Indiana Republican politician Orville Hickman Browning thought Vallandigham’s arrest was arbitrary and did more harm than good. 14 Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles declared the arrest and military conviction of Vallandigham to be unconstitutional. 15

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281 One exception was Henry R. Raymond of the New York Times, which ran both sides of the story in its news columns, while continually praising Burnside in its editorials throughout the spring and summer of 1863. The New York newspaper defended the trial of Vallandigham, saying that the former congressman had hurt the military with his remarks. Therefore, the military had jurisdiction since it was the offended party, and a department of the military did exist in Ohio. 16 In explaining General Order No. 38, the New York Times proclaimed: “The military necessity for such a procedure is obvious to any intelligent man. No truly loyal man would think of complaining of it. None but a disloyal man would attempt to influence a crowd by denouncing it as usurpation, and declaring his intention to disregard it.” 17 The Times editor added that self-preservation was the first necessity of war, implying that the rights guaranteed in the Constitution took on a secondary status in wartime. 18 Of course, this also implied that peacetime rights, privileges, and legal processes could be suspended. Later, the Times celebrated the nomination of Vallandigham for the Democracy’s gubernatorial slot in Ohio because it further established the differences between loyal and disloyal men in the North. 19 The Lincoln administration and the military effectively worked together to suspend the press while Republican editors explained why suspension had to be undertaken. Although they were being good team players during a time of the party press, Republican editors were essentially hypocrites, rationalizing suppression of disloyal newspapers while applauding the benefits of a free press. 20 In effect, because the party press remained dominant during the Civil War, many newspapermen thought the First Amendment applied only to editors who supported the majority party.

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282 Freedom of the press, in this view, was contingent upon the current standing of the political parties. Such a view potentially could give majority editors an upper hand that would have an economic impact on their enterprises. It opposed Madison’s understanding that the press clause in the First Amendment was in place to protect the tyranny of the majority over the minority and to guarantee a plurality of political ideas that could be sorted out by citizens in the so-called market place of ideas. 21 There is nothing that Madison wrote to suggest freedom of the press could be temporarily suspended or that majority opinions would be protected and minority opinions would not be protected. Indeed, Madison held to the opinion that the good that comes with the freedom of the press is “inseparable” from the evil of those who abuse the right. Madison declared: “However desirable those measures might be which might correct without enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised in America.” 22 Little or no press legislation or judicial decisions occurred in the first six decades of the nineteenth century. Thus, no corrective measures were in place when the Civil War began. When Brigadier General Hascall issued General Order No. 9 on April 25, 1863, the Republican editors of Indiana offered many of the same arguments Raymond did in their support of suppression. George D. Copeland, editor of the pro-Republican Goshen Times, said: “Hascall is on the right track and we hope he will not falter in his efforts to crush out home treason Open sympathy with treason and every thing that tends to give the rebels aid and comfort must be put down at any sacrifice!” 23 Hoosier Republican Editors Defend Hascall Even before Hascall came to power in Indianapolis, Thomas H. Bringhurst and Joseph Dague, editors of the pro-Republican Logansport Journal, railed that free speech that aided the Confederacy was a “perversion.” 24 The editors added: “The injury done the

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283 Government in its great struggle against rebellion, under this plea [for free speech] can never be estimated.” 25 This, too, was a key distinction because it made it seem as if the extent of Northern collaboration with the Confederacy was sufficiently large enough to cause substantial problems for the prosecution of the war and the political stability of the states that remained in the Union. Thus, words that did not directly contribute to the war effort could be construed as being harmful to it. Such an interpretation defined press loyalty broadly. Later, the Logansport editors expanded this argument, stating that opposing the Lincoln administration was the same as opposing the Constitution – a broadside to the Democrats, who thought of themselves as having the upper hand along constitutional lines. Bringhurst and Dague wrote: “That instrument strictly requires the government it provides for, to suppress domestic insurrections, and maintain it as the supreme law of the land.” 26 In other words, saving the U.S. government was the best way to save the U.S. Constitution. This argument also moved the framing of the political argument away from the right of states to secede in the same way that the Americans had seceded from the British monarchy. The implication was that the U.S. Constitution was agreed upon by the majority of the representatives of the thirteen original colonies and that any state or states that seceded violated the spirit of democracy, where the majority’s will – not the monarch’s will – rules. This line of reasoning emboldened Republican editors in Indiana and allowed them to focus on Democratic loyalty in a democratic nation and on the will of the majority – in the North – to fight and win the war. James Scott, editor of the Republican newspaper in Delphi, called the Democrats “vampires” because of their

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284 dissident words and said calls for a six-month truce would enable the Confederates to recruit more men. 27 Hascall took umbrage when Plymouth Democrat editor-in-chief VanValkenburgh criticized him on May 5, calling him a “donkey” whose bray created only a “temporary irritation.” 28 Accordingly, Hascall had VanValkenburgh arrested and suspended publication of the Plymouth Democrat. Union soldiers transported VanValkenburgh first to Indianapolis, where he met with Hascall, and then to Cincinnati, where Burnside heard VanValkenburgh’s story. After VanValkenburgh agreed not to call Hascall a “donkey” again, he swore an oath of allegiance. Burnside then discharged the editor, advising him “to be more careful in the future as to the manner in which he criticized those in authority.” 29 A week later, VanValkenburgh printed a half-sheet, including an editorial that stated the Plymouth Democrat would have to live with the same rules “imposed upon every journal” in the Department of the Ohio under Burnside’s General Order 38. 30 The orders were having the desired chilling effect that Burnside and Hascall wanted. The Marshall County Republican, the Plymouth Democrat’s rival, applauded Hascall and said the Democrats “may as well submit or travel, first as last.” 31 To let VanValkenburgh’s invective pass would have set a “precedent of mischievous effect.” 32 Editors Ignatius Mattingly and John D. Devor reasoned that once Hascall made the order, he had to enforce it, or it would lose its punch. When Lincoln flip-flopped and reversed Burnside’s 3 June 1863 suppression of Storey’s Chicago Times, Mattingly and Devor expressed disdain, saying: “We can not see what consistency the President sends troops South to put down the rebellion, and leave those behind who are doing all they can to foster it.” 33

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285 Alfred Wheeler, editor of the Republican paper in South Bend, stated that the definition of being Democratic was being disloyal, and it was “an impossibility to publish a paper that was both loyal and Democratic.” 34 Wheeler implied that Democratic papers ought to shut down for the duration of the war. The Warsaw Northern Indianian proclaimed: “Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. They [Democrats] want their rights and they should receive them in the shape of a rope around their necks.” 35 The Indianapolis Journal was far less emotional than the Warsaw paper, but it agreed that free expression had its limitations and conditions. Its editors argued there was no absolute free expression in the British common law tradition and liberty might be restrained in certain circumstances. The Journal said: “A press reeking with licentiousness, or labouring in the interest of treason is not less dangerous than when muzzled by tyranny. No man has a right to publish what is pernicious to peace and good order and government and religion without incurring the penalty which the law has affixed to the crime of libel.” 36 Few libel suits against newspapers were brought to Indiana’s highest court before the Civil War, so there is little evidence to ascertain accurately the legal status of freedom of the press in the Hoosier State in the 1860s. In Clarkson v. McCarty, an 1841 decision, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled in favor of a plaintiff who sued a newspaper for printing a libelous statement by a third party. 37 The court held that allowing a paper to print a third-party libel threatened “the peace of society.” 38 In Johnson v. Stebbins, reviewed in 1854, the state supreme court said a defendant must prove the actions of which a plaintiff is alleged to be guilty before the justices could determine if a newspaper was justified in printing an article about the plaintiff. 39 In this case, Christopher C. Stebbins, publisher of The Spirit of the West in Columbus, printed an

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286 article that alleged the town postmaster lived and worked in a building that was of “low character.” Stebbins said he received this intelligence from a writer in Taylorsville, and, if true, the publisher wished the post office were in the hands of others. 40 Stebbins believed the statements made in the letter to be true and said he had no malice against the plaintiff, Benajah Johnson, who sought $5,000 in damages because he claimed that the editor defamed his reputation. Stebbins said Johnson kept a grocery in the post office where liquor was stored, and those who purchased the liquor also stayed in the house and were said to disturb the peace. The Bartholomew Circuit Court ruled in favor of Stebbins, but the Indiana Supreme Court overturned the ruling on a technicality. However, the court maintained that the plaintiff could not “have much reason to complain if the character of the house should be called low” because Johnson was selling liquor to “drunken men.” 41 In effect, if the allegation was true and the actions in the house were infractions under the recently established temperance laws of Indiana, then libel did not occur. Neither case had much of a bearing on what Hascall did, but each showed that the courts in Indiana held newspaper editors responsible for the words they printed – that the words must be true and not malicious. The Indiana Supreme Court, for most of the war, had a Democratic majority, led by Judge Samuel E. Perkins, a strict constructionist who emphasized personal liberty and opposed restraints on private property. A Perkins interpretation overturned the state’s prohibition law in the 1850s. Perkins, who at one time had been the editor of the Richmond Jeffersonian, supported the war as long as it was prosecuted “constitutionally and for a constitutional object.” 42 He feared the building of a “great consolidated military and enormously costly government. 43 After resolutions were passed in the Indiana

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287 legislature in 1863 condemning military arrests of civilians in the state, Perkins and the court took on several cases involving the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, though none involved newspapers. Generally, across the nation, journalists upheld libertarian notions of a free press in 1863. Even Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune and a leading abolitionist, assembled a meeting of editors in New York after Burnside suppressed the Chicago Times in June of 1863. Greeley and a bipartisan group of editors struck a compromise. These editors inveighed against suppression of the press, but they also censured any inciting of treasonous actions. Nonetheless, the editors upheld the right of the “press to criticize freely and fearlessly the acts of those charged with the administration of the Government, and their civil and military subordinates, and that any limitations of this right, created by necessities of war, should be confined to the localities where hostilities exist, or are immediately threatened.” 44 Indiana was not such a place, although Confederate renegade John Morgan would invade briefly in July and Governor Morton constantly worried about Kentucky being over-run by the Southern army and what effect that would have on Indiana. The Greeley group upheld the freedom of the press in all cases except where battles were taking place. Only there would restrictions apply. In many ways this represented Lincoln’s view, except for the fact that the president had a change of heart at the last minute and telegraphed Burnside to forget his revocation of the Chicago Times suspension. However, this second communication arrived at the major general’s office in Cincinnati too late. 45 The Hascall-Edgerton Dialogue The man making the strongest argument for unfettered communication that spring in Indiana was not an editor. He was a Democratic politician, and his defense of freedom

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288 of the press was played out in the newspapers of the state. Tenth District Congressman Joseph Ketchum Edgerton, a Fort Wayne attorney and businessman who had made much of his money on the railroads, argued that the Constitution was not suspended by war because Indiana was not a seceding state or a place where the war was taking place, and that the necessary civilian governments were in place to keep the peace and run the municipal governments of the state. A Jeffersonian who believed in limited government, Edgerton said the Bill of Rights was the law of the land and that no military leader had the right to squelch free expression. Edgerton had written a letter to E. Van Long, editor of the pro-Democratic Warsaw Union. In the letter, which appeared in many northeast Indiana newspapers in early May of 1863, Edgerton denounced the Conscription Act. He also said that Hascall’s order would backfire and mobilize Democrats. Hascall countered that the security of the public and the need of the federal government to survive the war superseded free speech and press. This debate extended back to the days of Madison and Hamilton. This aligned the personal freedoms in the federal Bill of Rights with states’ rights and against the power and stability of the central government. Boiled down, this was the classic confrontation between the needs of the individual and the needs of government in a democracy. At a time of severe political instability, the tension between individual rights and state needs intensified – just as Siebert’s hypothesis predicted. The debate began with Edgerton asking Hascall to clarify a few items in General Order No. 9. The brigadier general responded, followed by Edgerton’s own response. Then newspapers, primarily Democratic organs like the Indianapolis Indiana State Sentinel, commented on the exchange. All of this happened while Hascall was busy

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289 intimidating newspapers in the northern two-thirds of the state, with the most famous case being the arrest of Plymouth Democrat editor VanValkenburgh. 46 One week after Hascall’s 25 April 1863 order was made public, Edgerton, a resident of Allen County, sent Hascall a letter that was published in dozens of newspapers in the state. In it, Edgerton tried to express a civil tone, saying that Hascall’s intentions in enacting the order seemed to be patriotic. “It seems to recognize the fact that opposing political parties may still be permitted to exist,” Edgerton wrote, “and yet co-operate to restore harmony and good feeling in the State.” 47 However, the congressman from Fort Wayne had questions about the specifics of the brigadier general’s new policy regarding civil rights. Edgerton, as a politician, wanted Hascall to clarify exactly what he meant when he wrote that all newspaper editors and public orators who “endeavor to bring the war policy government into disrepute” and were “actively opposed to the war policy of the administration” would be subject to incarceration and trial by a military commission. 48 In other words, was Hascall saying that Hoosiers could not publicly list grievances against the government and criticize government actions and policies – rights that are part and parcel of the democratic process in a society that has a free-expression clause in its constitution? Hascall responded to Edgerton on May 5 – a letter sent to newspapers in the state by one of the parties and made public by Edgerton’s brother, Alfred P. Edgerton. 49 In the document, the Union military leader defined allegiance as practical loyalty, not in legal or theoretical terms. Hascall wrote: “You know as well as I, that practically, during the next two years, there is no difference between the Administration and the Government. You cannot destroy or impair the one without effecting the other similarly.” 50

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290 The Union officer was right. Because of the federal election schedule and the war powers of the president granted by the Constitution, the Lincoln administration, with a Republican majority in both houses of Congress, was in fact the federal government for the next two years – until the 1864 elections. Lincoln had a mandate until March of 1865. This was a constitutional issue that the Democrats could do nothing about. 51 Yet, in another sense, Hascall was off the mark. While the Democrats were effectively out of power and had at, best minimum, input on war policy, they certainly had the right to criticize the government and to use their criticisms to build a base of power that would oppose Lincoln and the Republicans in 1864. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits any opposition party from campaigning and devising political strategy during war, though sometimes there is a gentleman’s agreement to moderate the partisan bickering during war. The nature of criticism was another matter. The Constitution prohibits treason, which, in part, is defined as giving aid and comfort to the enemy. By the spring of 1863, the Republicans had come to see any criticism of the war and anything that was not directly aiding the war effort as treason. It was debatable whether some Democrats telling citizens not to join the military was actually giving the Confederates aid and comfort. After all, there had not been a draft before. Moreover, just because the Republicans had the upper hand in the federal government, especially with control of Congress and the executive branch, they did not dominate all state and local political institutions in the North. In many locales, Democrats held the majority. If they supported different war policies and objectives, including peace, there really was nothing that Lincoln and the Republicans could legally do about it.

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291 This was a perilous time for the administration. The war effort generally was not going well, and the conflict had gone on far too long. Desertions from the Union Army were staggering. Burnside’s failure at Fredericksburg and the opinion of so many soldiers about his competence after that defeat and the awful “Mud March” in January of 1863 had morale at an all-time low. Behind the scenes in the winter of 1863, Joseph Hooker worked successfully to have Burnside demoted. 52 General McClellan had his allies working against Burnside too. When Hooker took charge of the Army of the Potomac on 25 January 1863, more than 85,000 men were absent without leave, and an average of 200 deserted each day. 53 The antipathy of the troops led to a prodigious amount of drinking of spirits, making the soldiers useless for combat. A Change in Public Opinion Meanwhile, Northern political leaders feared that the elections of 1862 marked a major change in public opinion. The whole situation was a mess. Hearts and minds had to be won. The spring of 1863 would be a key juncture in the war. Men with the background and knowledge of Hascall and Burnside knew this well. As West Point graduates, they believed that organization and planning would win the war. Now they found themselves in the position of having to apply their organizing and planning skills to political problems in the Midwest, not at the front. While Hooker was busying refurbishing the Army of the Potomac, Burnside tried to make amends for Fredericksburg by building a model federal district government in Cincinnati, and he chose Hascall to carry out his policies in Indiana. 54 Burnside was called to the Queen City when Horatio Wright decided to step down from his command of the Department of the Ohio because the U.S. Senate had failed to confirm his promotion to major general. 55 Wright was convinced that

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292 a second invasion of Kentucky was about to take place. He called for 10,000 more men for his department. Burnside would bring two divisions with him to Cincinnati. Burnside and Hascall sought to devise and carry out practical political solutions in an environment that was still politically hot, in part, because the U.S. has two-year congressional terms. Practical politics had not been suspended, and the Democrats were not about to sit back and let the Republicans maintain power without a fight. Lincoln needed Congress to pass laws that were not covered under the war powers – such as the internal revenue, confiscation, conscription, and emancipation. The House of Representatives had changed dramatically in March of 1863 after Democrats made large gains in the previous fall. Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana’s delegations to Washington all became majority Democratic, which helped to narrow the Republican lead in the House of Representatives from 60 to 23. On the state and local level, Democrats made gains as well. For example, both the Indiana and Illinois legislatures took on Democratic majorities, resulting in their governors literally shutting down the state houses for the remainder of the war. 56 Hascall was saying either you or for the Republicans or you are against the government of the U.S. and are therefore in favor of the government of the Confederacy. A citizen who might be against the war based on conscience, as a few Quakers were, or a citizen for the war but opposed, say, to conscription, would, in Hascall’s reasoning, be a traitor. This was a perilous form of reasoning for a military governor to be making, particularly in a state not under attack. It irritated Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton, who had not been enthusiastic about Hascall’s command in Indianapolis from the start. 57

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293 Hascall also wrote that it was appropriate to carp about government policy and action during peacetime, but such inveighing is inappropriate during wartime. The laws that Lincoln and Congress passed were the laws of the land until a new Congress and/or president were elected. “Possibly, they are not the wisest and best that could have been enacted,” Hascall continued. “That, however, is a matter which does not concern either of us here. Enough for us to know that they have been agreed upon by the only rightful and proper authorities known to our government.” 58 Hascall could not see that an opposition policy might actually improve the war effort and decrease the number of men sacrificed. In his mind, the Lincoln administration offered the best approach to fighting the war. The brigadier general also said that Democratic resolutions finding fault with the Republicans were “evil,” and he implied that they were intended to wreck havoc on the Union war effort. Yet, in Hascall’s calculations, criticism did not mean conscientious objection to the war or offering a better way to fight it. “The only practical effect, then, of allowing newspapers and public speakers to inveigh against these measures is to divide and distract our own people, and thus give material ‘aid and comfort’ to our enemies,” Hascall wrote. 59 This argument was frequently cited by Republican editors and politicians as well as Union military officials. The war, they maintained, created a special circumstance, and harmony was essential to fighting it effectively. It would be awful, in their opinion, if the North lost the war because its citizens were fragmented and the out-manned South was less divided. Likewise, always in the back of the minds of the Republicans was the belief that the nation’s history was in the balance. They feared that such a relatively young nation could be torn apart permanently by secessionism, and that the British or some other foreign power might use the conflict to further the divide. That

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294 the South courted the British and French for official recognition throughout the war was not lost on the Republicans or the Northern military leaders. Hascall also said the Irish and “secessionist” element in Edgerton’s Fort Wayne were deluded. He lumped Edgerton with Terre Haute Congressman Daniel Wolsey Voorhees, a leading Hoosier Democrat and an ally of Vallandigham. Hascall said that he would hold Edgerton responsible for any violence or mob activity that took place in Fort Wayne as a result of anti-war rhetoric. “I take deep interests in you for more reasons than one,” Hascall concluded. 60 Thus, Hascall was setting up his governance as a sort of police state, keeping political intelligence on Democrats, something that Morton was doing on his own but lacked the resources to do as effectively as the federal district commander. Morton, it must be noted, was so short of cash for the state government during the war that he had to use creative financing to keep the government in Indianapolis running. 61 Morton envied the sort of power and intelligence Hascall had at his disposal. The brigadier general made it clear he wanted to go after political leaders, including newspaper editors, because they were the ones inflaming ordinary citizens – potential soldiers. He used two figures of speech to drive home this point. First, he compared the situation to a small pox epidemic. Would it be right to condemn his patients for the progress of the disease? Likewise, would it be right to incarcerate citizens for what they say when newspapers editors and public speakers are spewing forth the ideas that contaminated them? Then he added memorably: “To kill the serpent speedily it must be hit on the head.” 62 In other words, Hascall believed he must initially stop the political leadership of the opposition, and then negative public opinion would die down. The district commander did not want to wait for litigation to figure out what was right. He

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295 preferred to silence the “disloyal” expeditiously, and given the perils the Union faced that spring, he had some justification for so precisely carrying out Burnside’s wishes. Edgerton, on his way to England since Congress was in recess, replied to Hascall on May 12, having read Hascall’s May 6 letter in the New York Evening Express. Edgerton said that any intelligent Hoosier construed General Order No. 9 to mean that free speech and free press were suppressed under Hascall’s military administration in the state. Edgerton questioned whether General Order No. 9 would promote Hascall’s intent to “restore harmony and good feeling in the State.” 63 Edgerton said that Hascall should “recede as soon as gracefully as you can from the arbitrary purpose you have indicated.” Edgerton, who had studied law under William Swetland in Plattsburg, New York, when the congressman was 16, said there would be no disturbance of the peace in Indiana as long as Hascall did not constrain the constitutional rights of the citizens of the nineteenth state. 64 Edgerton claimed Indiana’s citizens would ignore General Order No. 9. Furthermore, the congressman said that Hoosiers had a legal government seated in Indianapolis and did not need a federal military presence in the state to supersede the civilian government. He noted: “It is not in rebellion, nor in a state of war, nor ‘disloyal.’ It has a constitution and laws of its own, all accordant with the constitution of the United States Among the civil rights of the people of Indiana are the rights of free speech, free press, and free courts. The people of Indiana have done nothing to forfeit these rights. They cannot forfeit them, for they are inherent and inalienable.” 65 Forfeiture could occur only by amending the Indiana’s Constitution. This was where Edgerton had the rhetorical advantage on Hascall. The U.S. and Indiana constitutions guarantee freedom of the press, and the national founders believed

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296 it to be a natural right. No legal interpretation existed in Indiana or in Washington to indicate the suspension of the writ habeas corpus superseded these rights. Thus, in a free state, freedom of the press was seen as unqualified. Edgerton said General Order No. 9 would not survive the ordeals of judicial review and popular defiance, though it is important to note that a U.S. Supreme Court decision about the suspension of the writ would not come until 1866. Thus, Hascall’s order could stand, given this legal limbo. Edgerton then launched into rhetoric that was popular with his largely Democratic constituents in Fort Wayne. He wrote: “The people of Indiana are not slaves – they are freemen. They will read and think; they will assemble and make and hear speeches; they will freely discuss public affairs, and freely resolve and vote upon them, and they organize political parties, some opposed to, some favoring the Administration, and you cannot prevent it.” 66 He went on to say that citizens of Indiana would form political parties and vote for and against the government in power. He compares the citizens’ exercising these rights to the nature of the sea with its inevitable rolling of the tide on the beach – with Hascall vainly trying to tell the tide not to roll to the shore. Hascall might as well try to beat the air, Edgerton wrote. 67 The Fort Wayne congressman had no reason to mention Indiana’s Constitution responsibility-for-abuse clause. If he had, then he would have had to admit that Hascall had justification to constrain some of the Democratic editors. Ironically, the states’ rights argument along these lines would have hurt the Democrats and helped the Republicans. Perhaps that’s why neither side referred to Indiana’s press clause. Neither the federal government nor the Republicans had the power to stop freedom of expression, Edgerton reasoned. “You may attack it and temporarily abridge or trammel

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297 it, but you can not subvert it,” he wrote. 68 Rather, attempts at suppression would lead only to Republican losses at the poll, Edgerton held. The congressman found Hascall’s threat to hold Democratic leaders responsible for the actions of others as unworthy of comment. Edgerton supported peace, prosperity, and the restoration of the Union, although he preferred to suppress the rebellion by non-military means. The Fort Wayne congressman also said he opposed such federal laws as emancipation and confiscation. “I believe the administration has justly forfeited the confidence of a large majority of the people, even in the States faithful to the Union,” he contended. 69 He continued that a change in the administration must come at the ballot box, and that such a change would only occur if politicians could freely express themselves as is guaranteed by the Constitution. Edgerton added that his criticisms of Lincoln resonated with a majority of the Tenth District who voted Edgerton into office the previous fall. He said would support Lincoln when he thought he ought to and oppose him when thought it necessary. Edgerton stated, “I will never, as long as life and intelligence remain, surrender my constitutional right to freely discuss, approve or condemn, in a constitutional way, and as I think the public good may demand, any policy or measure, be it for peace or war, of any administration, State or national.” 70 Likewise, the Evansville Democratic newspaper made the case that political speech in particular was protected by the Constitution. That Evansville editor observed: “The real security of the American constitution and government is the sentiment and opinion of the people, and it is consequently their duty to observe the conduct of the government, and it is the privilege of every man to give them full and just information on

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298 that important subject.” 71 The editor concluded that freedom of the press was inseparable from the other freedoms guaranteed to the nation’s citizens and newspapers serve as a “great public monitor.” 72 Edgerton asked why Morton was silent as Hascall was making a mockery of the federal and state right to free speech and press. Edgerton wanted Morton to rebuke Hascall, but Morton remained silent throughout. The Fort Wayne resident felt Hascall was making Morton into “a mere cipher and pageant.” 73 In fact, Morton was upset with what the Union brigadier general was doing. However, behind the scene, he was expressing his displeasure to his political allies. 74 Morton was afraid that Burnside and Hascall were doing more harm than good – that their edicts were only fanning the flames of Democratic defiance and indirectly decreasing Morton’s power. Furthermore, the governor was infuriated with Burnside for removing Brigadier Henry B. Carrington, who preceded Hascall as commander of the Indiana District. Carrington, Morton’s close ally who had served as his military intelligence officer in the state, was not as ostentatious as Hascall, preferring to work quietly in the background. Morton wanted both Burnside and Hascall reassigned and sought to influence Henry W. Halleck, the chief of the military in Washington, in hopes Halleck would persuade Lincoln to fire both. He also enlisted the help of David Davis, a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. 75 Morton sent a letter to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton asking that Hascall be reassigned. 76 Stanton then sent a letter to Burnside asking the general if it would be propitious to remove Hascall from command in Indiana. 77 In late May, the Delphi Times reported that Morton opposed “any further arrests in Indiana by the military authorities.” 78

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299 Morton’s sentiment prevailed, for on June 5 Hascall published General Order No. 14, which rescinded General Order No. 9 and announced that Hascall would soon be relieved of his command in Indianapolis. The brigadier general did not challenge his removal from the District of Indiana. In fact, he seems in part to have wanted it, since so many Republicans had sent him letters about acts of disloyalty that it had become difficult to weed out the legitimate concerns of disloyalty from petty partisan payback. The two problems with Hascall’s order were: (1) connecting loyalty to the U.S. government with loyalty to the Republican Party and (2) failing to make reference to the abuse clause in the Indiana Constitution’s free-press provision. He made an argument for shutting down civil liberties, saying it was conditional based on loyalty to the Republican administration in Washington. Hascall made it an offense to endeavor to “bring the war policy of the government into disrepute.” That is, even if a citizen made legitimate criticisms of the government’s prosecution of the war, he was subject to military arrest and imprisonment. In effect, any opposition to the Lincoln administration amounted to treason. This would make it impossible to have democratic dialogue. While many aspects of the war effort probably did not need exhaustive debate, major issues like conscription and funding it did. Democratic speakers and writers felt they had the right to express themselves freely and openly. In essence, Hascall was saying that the Lincoln administration could act like a dictatorship and demand loyalty from all citizens. He gave no room for a loyal opposition or minority rights. He could not conceive of the Union in any other terms than the successful prosecution of the war by Lincoln and the Republicans.

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300 The Republican newspapers in the nineteenth state supplied the arguments in favor of the criticism-is-treason approach. A Republican paper in Indianapolis wrote: “[Hascall’s] determination to crush the budding disloyalty which, in the name of Democracy, has so nearly ripened into treason, is so manifest from his order, that no one can mistake his meaning. In this work he has the hearty cooperation and confidence of all loyal men.” 79 Republicans deluged Hascall with intelligence about “disloyal” Democratic editors. 80 Military leaders like Burnside and Hascall argued that silencing Lincoln’s critics would stymie any signals the South might be getting that the Northern states were in political disharmony. Meanwhile, soldiers, as well as civilians who favored the Republicans, tended to take their general orders to mean that intimidation of Democratic free expression was acceptable. In fact, a strong case could be made that Lincoln and his generals gained more not by systematically suppressing free speech, but by looking the other way or not vigorously prosecuting mob intimidation of Democratic newspaper editors and Democratic public speakers. Such an example had occurred only a month before office when Union troops returning from the South ransacked the office of the Richmond Jeffersonian and tried the same against the Indiana State Sentinel in Indianapolis. 81 The military personnel of the Civil War operated under a different system from civilians, and it did not tend to promote freedom the way the Bill of Rights does. It was a hierarchical system, not democratic, and in the case of Hascall, who had been educated at West Point, this relationship had been well developed in his head. Orders came from the top down, so Union soldiers themselves gave up freedoms and privileges when they

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301 entered the military. Officers and soldiers accustomed to fighting in a long and bloody war were more concerned with survival than peacetime rights. Information that might directly lead to one’s death was certainly treasonous, and information that might indirectly help the enemy was noxious in the eyes of officers, soldiers, and their families. The personal was more important than the political to these men and women. Protecting Soldiers Hascall had on his mind the wives, children, parents, and siblings of the soldiers. This was by far the bloodiest conflict in U.S. history. Hascall was a West Point man and knew that the wounding and killing caused tremendous damage to society. He did not want Indiana to contribute any more to the suffering than was necessary. It was a humanitarian argument, and perhaps his best. Hascall wrote: “As I value the lives of our hundreds of thousands of gallant soldiers in the field, as I regard the feelings, bereavements, and sufferings of their anxious families and friends at home, and as I regard the true interests of our State and nation, I am going to see to it that in Indiana, at least, such [disloyal] men have no abiding place.” 82 In essence, Hascall thought giving up a few rights, privileges, and comforts during wartime was the least civilians could do as the body count rose every day. Yet Hascall did not answer Edgerton’s key charge: Why should the military government supersede the civilian government in the state? Governor Morton, the legislature, and state courts were running and were they not sovereign? If Indiana’s citizens felt that words spoken or written ought to be regulated, they could petition their representatives to vote for such regulations. Of course, the civilian government was operating, and Lincoln had not worked out this messy issue of jurisdiction when he suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the District of Indiana faced a legal paradox

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302 that would not be settled until after the war, when the U.S. Supreme Court would decide the suspension of habeas corpus had been illegal. James Elder, the editor of the pro-Democratic Richmond Jeffersonian, had provided an argument similar to Edgerton’s in a late April editorial, claiming the U.S. Constitution was the supreme law of the land. “There can be no other just test of loyalty but fidelity to the Constitution,” he wrote. 83 Elder said Democrats were obeying the law, and that such obedience was a Democrat’s duty. “A man is no longer a Democrat when he fails this duty,” Elder wrote. Likewise, Elder found a hole in Hascall’s argument that the Lincoln administration was the government. He wondered what if Lincoln lost in November of 1864. Would that not suggest another political leader and his party could use different policies and measures to prosecute the war and save the union? In Elder’s understanding of government, the Constitution was sovereign, not the chief executive. Furthermore, Congress had no authority to abridge press freedom, and the role of the press was outside the executive’s reach. The Constitution did not give the president the power to regulate the press, and the Supreme Court had made no ruling conceding such a prerogative. There was no all-encompassing conspiracy to suppress the Democratic press of Indiana. Lincoln had no master plan, but he did not suppression, whether it was the loyal slave states of Missouri and Maryland early in the war or the Midwestern states that went Democratic in the fall of 1862. Some military officials – Burnside, Hascall, John C. Fremont in Missouri, 84 George Wright in Oregon, 85 and Robert C. Schenck in Pennsylvania 86 – were simply more zealous than other officers in cracking down on dissident editors. In the long run, Hascall and his ilk failed to permanently quell free

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303 expression. However, they showed that it could be done on a limited basis for a relatively short period of time. Furthermore, they had plenty of support from both Republican and War Democrat newspaper editors. The partisan nature of Civil War-era press ensured that there would be no broad-based understanding of free expression during the war. Perhaps the most important thing to remember is that Lincoln, who had Burnside installed as head of the Department of the Ohio and who did not oppose the Vallandigham conviction, did not end the press suppression in Indiana himself. Lincoln tended to give the military leaders in the field broad powers to police the press. The policy of the federal government depended largely on the commanders in the field. While Ulysses S. Grant used Sylvanus Cadwallader of the Chicago Times as a secretary, William Tecumseh Sherman court-martialed Thomas Knox of the New York Herald. 87 Morton worked to have Hascall removed as the Union military leader in Indiana, but this wasn’t really because he feared what Hascall was doing to the First Amendment. Rather, he was afraid that Hascall would irritate Democrats enough to have them vote Morton out of office. Morton himself requested that several Hoosier newspapers be silenced during the course of the war. 88 So while a comprehensive conspiracy to limit political discussion was at work, the attitude that newspapers could be silenced was prevalent. It is an attitude that is powerfully attractive during wartime. It tends to have its largest sway with those in the military and in the government, and it tends to be framed in terms of free expression being as much a responsibility as a right. Edgerton, the one-term congressman, had the best argument against the military and government officials who wanted to establish a chilling effect on free expression:

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304 “You may attack it,” he wrote, “and temporarily abridge or trammel it, but you cannot subvert it. On the contrary, if you and the Administration and the party you serve persist in your attacks upon them, free speech and free press will certainly in the end subvert you.” 89 This was the argument of the men who fought for the American Revolution – men like Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, and Samuel Adams. Tyranny would produce a greater desire for liberty. The Higher Ground Here the Hoosier Democrats, even if they were more driven by self-serving politics than idealism or libertarianism, had the higher ground than the Republicans. Eleven Democratic newspapers were suppressed by Hascall in the 52 days he served as the Union military leader of Indiana. 90 By the time Burnside suppressed Storey’s Chicago Times in June, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, at Morton’s urging, had removed Hascall from command. 91 Lincoln did nothing to oppose the move, perhaps in part because he was busy deciding what to do with the Times. Lincoln would flip-flop on the suppression of that newspaper. At first the president opposed the suspension of the Times’ circulation, but he wanted to let Burnside do his job without interference. Then he decided to rescind Burnside’s order as a relatively bi-partisan group came out against the suppression of Storey’s paper. Finally, Lincoln rescinded his initial rescindment of Burnside’s order, but the major general in Cincinnati received it too late and had already let the Times return to publication. In other words, Lincoln had no hard-and-fast rule, except perhaps to try to measure public opinion – that is, to evaluate matters on the pragmatic level of political expediency. 92 If public opinion spiraled against suppression, Lincoln would get involved

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305 and order his generals to stop. Otherwise, he stayed neutral, at least publicly, and let matters play out. Generally, historians of the nationalist persuasion have under-estimated the significance of having perhaps the nation’s greatest president maul press rights. It has been easy to say that this was because the political crisis of the Civil War was so grave. While that is true, it is also true that once free expression was let loose on the American public by the Bill of Rights there really was no turning back. That Republican editors championed suppression does not speak well of the party press era. Certainly, abolitionist editors pursued a cause, but mainstream Republican editors simply wanted to maintain local and state government printing contracts that would come to journalists who supported the party. As the Democratic editor of the Richmond, Indiana, newspaper wrote of Chicago’s newspaper environment, “The Tribune (Rep.) is very anxious to put out of the way the Times, a better newspaper, as a newspaper (to say nothing of its politics).” 93 The bottom line was economics. Hascall’s offensive against the Democratic editors did not come to an end because either side won the war of ideas and words. Rather, Governor Morton felt uncomfortable with Hascall in power. Morton covertly worked to have both Hascall and Burnside removed from power in the Midwest. He made several trips to Washington, D.C., to plead his case. Stanton wrote on 1 June 1863, that he would give Morton half of his wishes: “No one can understand better than yourself what harm may be done by an indiscreet or foolish military officer, who is constantly issuing military proclamations and engaging in newspaper controversies upon questions that agitate the public mind. For this

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306 reason it is thought by the President that General Hascall is not adapted to the service in which is engaged in the State of Indiana.” 94 Burnside, at Stanton’s requested, relieved Hascall on the fifth-second day as commander of the District of Indiana. Hascall figured that Morton was miffed because the governor apparently had not been consulted when the decision was made to relieve Carrington. 95 General Henry W. Halleck had warned Burnside not to incite Democrats too much – that so doing would only make matters tougher for the Republicans politically. 96 In a sense, though, it was because Burnside incited Morton that the major general lost Hascall’s services in Indianapolis. The intimidation of Democratic editors continued after 5 June 1863, but never again did official suppression take place. On average, there were 17.5 acts of violence and intimidation carried out against Hoosier newspapers during the war. After Hascall’s reign ended, five more cases of violence or intimidation occurred in the Hoosier State in 1863. 97 There would be twenty cases in 1864 and one in 1865. 98 Republican papers witnessed twenty-two cases of violence or threatened violence during the war. 99 Of the sixth-nine cases of violence or intimidation against Indiana papers during the war, twelve were clear cases of official suppression – and eleven of those twelve involved Hascall. The twelfth instance occurred on 28 November 1862, when the Union Army arrested Lucienne G. Matthews, the editor of the pro-Democratic, pro-war New Albany Ledger, for publishing the identity of Indiana brigades and divisions and their locations and movements. 100 Matthews was arrested under the 57 th Article of War and shipped to Cincinnati, where he claimed reprinting the information from another newspaper. Matthews was warned not to publish such information again. 101

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307 It is important to note than no incidences of press suppression occurred in Ohio, Michigan, or Illinois during the time Hascall was in charge in Indiana. Hascall ran two Democratic newspapers out of business with his bullying. Republican Congressman Godlove Orth of Indiana declared in 1864, “A man is free to speak as long as he speaks for the nation” and added that no member of the House should be allowed to speak against the nation. 102 Notes 1 Robert N. Scott, et al., eds., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), Series II, Vol. 5, 634. 2 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 242. 3 Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, “The People’s Darling Privilege”: Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 311. 4 Chicago, Illinois, Times , 20 May 1863. 5 Chicago, Illinois, Times , 20 May 1863. 6 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union , 27 May 1863. 7 Harper, 245. 8 St. Joseph County, Indiana, Register , 21 May 1863. The Register also stated that it believed the Forum was on shaky financial grounds. 9 Logansport, Indiana, Journal , 28 February 1863. 10 No evidence exists to suggest that Democra tic editors met May 20 in Indianapolis at the mass meeting in the state capital. Yet ma ny Democratic editors attended the mass meeting and they almost certainly exchange d opinions about and st rategies for dealing with Hascall and General Order No. 9. 11 Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent (Lexington, KY: Univers ity Press of Kentucky, 1970), 180.

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308 12 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, 20 May 1863. 13 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, 25 May 1863. 14 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), 441. 15 Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1911), 321-22. Burnside’s friend Rev. Augustus Woodbury also had some reservations about the arrest and conviction of Vallandigham along constitutional lines. 16 New York Times, 23 June 1863. 17 New York Times, 23 June 1863. 18 New York Times, 15 May 1863. 19 New York Times, 13 June 1863. 20 Mark E. Neely Jr., The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 93. 21 Robert Allen Rutland, James Madison: The Founding Father (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1987), 162-163. Madison held that the press had an unlimited right to criticize officeholders of all ranks. It is assumed this would include military personnel, who represent the executive branch. The Democratic editors of Indiana also could have used Madison’s separation-of-powers argument against Burnside and Hascall. Madison, in analyzing the Alien and Sedition Acts, said they gave the president both legislative and judicial powers. 22 James Madison, “Address to the People,” Jan. 23, 1799, quoted in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., James Madison: A Biography in His Own Words (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1974), 225-226. 23 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 4 June 1863. 24 Logansport, Indiana, Journal, 28 February 1863. 25 Logansport, Indiana, Journal, 28 February 1863. 26 Logansport, Indiana, Journal, 16 May 1863. 27 Delphi, Indiana, Journal, 20 May 1863.

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309 28 Daniel McDonald, A Twentieth Century History of Marshall County, Indiana: Volume I (Chicago, IL: Lewis Publishing Company, 1908), 292. 29 McDonald, 394-95. 30 Plymouth, Indiana, Weekly Democrat, 14 May 1863. 31 Marshall County, Indiana, Republican, 14 May 1863. 32 Marshall County, Indiana, Republican, 14 May 1863. 33 Marshall County, Indiana, Republican, 11 June 1863. 34 St. Joseph Valley, Indiana, Register, 21 May 1863. 35 Warsaw, Indiana, Northern Indianian, 21 May 1863. 36 Greencastle, Indiana, Putnam Banner Republican, May 21, 1863. The Greencastle newspaper reprinted an editorial by the Indianapolis Journal. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who has studied civil liberties cases during the Civil War in depth, says Lincoln could not by any manner or means be described as a supporter of civil rights. The goal of accomplishing military political objectives outweighed individual civil liberties in the Civil War. Rehnquist says courts may be better off not considering suppression-writ cases until a war had ended. See Rehnquist’s remarks to the Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana. Oct. 28, 1996. 37 Isaac Blackford, Report of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the Judicature of the State of Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Bowen-Merrill, 1890), 574-575. 38 Ibid., 575. 39 Albert G. Porter, Indiana Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the Judicature of the State of Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Bowen-Merrill, 1886), 376. 40 Ibid., 376. 41 Ibid., 378. 42 Samuel E. Perkins, “Speech of Judge Perkins at Mass Meeting Held at Richmond, Indiana, 25 September 1860,” pamphlet, no date, no printer. 43 Quoted in Emma Lou Thornbrough, “Judge Perkins, the Indiana Supreme Court, and the Civil War,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 60, No. 1, March 1964, 82. 44 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, 10 June 1863.

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310 45 Stephen E. Towne, “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863,” presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, Chattanooga, Tennessee, October 2002, 12. 46 Towne, 2002, 6. 47 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 21 May 1863. 48 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 21 May 1863. 49 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, 6 May 1863 50 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, 13 May 1863. 51 Neely, 118. Neely observed: “With the possible exception of the depth of Confederate resolve, nothing shaped the Civil War more than the United States Constitution. For the war effort, the most important provisions were Article II, section 1, establishing the four-year term for the president, and Article, section 2, making the president the commander-in-chief of the army and navy.” The U.S. system calls for four-year terms for the president, who can only be recalled by an impeachment process that requires two-thirds of senators to vote for removal. There are no calls for election such as those that exist in parliamentary systems or no recalls as is the case for the chief executive of some states. 52 Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 1-4. Desertions in general during the war were amazingly high, probably more than 200,000 for the four years. Low pay -$11 to $16 a month – and late pay combined with the high carnage rate, bureaucratic incompetence, lack of arms and other materials, excessive marching, weather-related illnesses, over-extended service, monotony in the camps, and panic on the eve of battle contributed to the desertion rate. See James G. Randall and David Herbert Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1969) 329-331. Also see Sears, 17. Sears shows that the Emancipation Proclamation ran off many Union soldiers in the winter of 1863. 53 Joseph E. Stevens, 1863: The Rebirth of a Nation (New York, NY: Bantam, 1999), 173. General Joseph Hooker rejuvenated the Army of the Potomac by increasing discipline, granting furloughs, instilling pride by giving each corps its own special insignia badge. 54 Stevens, 109. Stevens believes Burnside attempted to “to rebuild his reputation” as the commander of the Department of Ohio. It is reasonable to assert that Burnside’s zealousness in pursuing dissidents in Ohio was a personal attempt to overcome his recent past and prove his worth to Lincoln and his fellows in the military.

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311 55 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 222. 56 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1988), 596. Faced with calls for peace and moves for the legislatures to take over the state militias, the governors of Indiana and Illinois closed down their capitols. Indiana’s Oliver P. Morton told Republican legislators to take the rest of the war off, and the Democrats were left without a quorum to stay open. He ran the government on private funds for the duration of the war. Illinois’ Richard Yates, with the tacit approval of the White House, closed the legislature in Springfield in June of 1863. Press suppression in such an atmosphere does not seem like such a major issue. 57 Towne, 2002, 4. 58 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 21 May, 1863. 59 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 21 May, 1863. 60 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Daily State Sentinel, 13 May 1863. 61 McPherson, 1988, 596. Not only did Morton create a private treasury to run the state government by borrowing from banks and businesses, he also drew on a special service fund in the U.S. War Department for approximately $250,000. 62 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 21 May 1863. 63 New York, New York, Times, 18 May 1863. 64 Valley of the Upper Maumee River, with Historical Account of Allen county and the City of Fort Wayne, Indiana. The Story of its Progress From Savagery to Civilization, Volume II (Madison, WI: Brant and Fuller, 1889), 63-66. Edgerton’s law background was more impressive than Hascall’s. Edgerton’s father, Bela Edgerton, had been educated at Middlebury College and served as an attorney and magistrate in Clinton County, New York. Joseph K. Edgerton attended the public schools of Clinton County and then Plattsburg Academy. In addition to reading law with William Swetland in Plattsburg, he later became “a student in the law office of Dudley Selden and James Mowatt” in New York, New York, and was admitted to the New York bar in 1839. He practiced law in New York for five years before moving to Fort Wayne in 1844. 65 Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana Weekly State Sentinel, 18 May 1863. 66 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 18 May 1863. 67 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 18 May 1863.

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312 68 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 18 May 1863. 69 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 18 May 1863. 70 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 18 May 1863. 71 Evansville, Indiana, Weekly Gazette, 9 May 1863. 72 Evansville, Indiana, Weekly Gazette, 9 May 1863. 73 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 18 May 1863. 74 Towne, 2002, 9. 75 Towne, 2002, 10. 76 Towne, 2002, 10. 77 Scott, War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. 5, 664-65. 78 Delphi, Indiana, Times, 30 May 1863, quoting the Indiana State Sentinel. 79 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, 28 April 1863. 80 Gilbert R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 27. 81 Towne, 2002, 7. 82 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 21 May 1863. 83 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, 30 April 1863. 84 Harper, 142. 85 Harper, 232. 86 Harper, 234. 87 Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1999), 103, 106. 88 Towne, 2002, 13. 89 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily State Sentinel, 15 May 1863.

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313 90 Towne, 2002, 7. 91 Tredway, 35. 92 Polk suspended Mexican and Texas newspapers, but Texas was not in the union yet. Roosevelt allowed newspapers in Japanese-American concentration camps to be censored or suppressed, thus violating even Blackstone’s no prior restraint principle. Lincoln was one of only four presidents in U.S. history to grant the military the power to suspend newspaper publication – the others were James Polk in the Mexican War, Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II, and George W. Bush in the Iraq War, though none suspended U.S. newspapers. 93 Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, 28 May 1863. 94 Scott, War of the Rebellion, 1899, Series II, Vol. V, 724. 95 Craig Davidson Tenney, “Major General A.E. Burnside and the First Amendment: A Case Study of Civil War Freedom of Expression,” Dissertation. Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 1977, 173. 96 Scott, War of the Rebellion, 1899, Series II, Vol. V, 664-65. 97 Stephen E. Towne, “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War,” presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Oct. 31, 2003, 13. 98 Ibid., 13. 99 Ibid., 14. 100 Ibid., 14. 101 Harper, 231-32. 102 Congressional Globe, Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session, 1506, 1864.

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CHAPTER 8 AFTERMATH OF PRESS OFFICIAL SUPPRESSION IN CIVIL WAR INDIANA The same week that Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton succeeded in getting Hascall removed as the commander of the District of Indiana, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside continued the harassment of Democratic editors in the Midwest. Instead of reducing the pressure on Democratic editors, which Hascall’s reassignment might have dictated based on Washington’s coolness to suppression in Indiana, Burnside went after Wilbur Fisk Storey, the most successful Democratic editor in the Midwest. The loquacious Storey’s anti-abolition Chicago Times was the most powerful newspaper in the region’s fastest growing city. He had long been a thorn to the Republicans. In fact, Morton had said in 1862 that the federal government should silence Storey’s paper as well as the Indiana State Sentinel and the Dayton, Ohio, Empire. 1 On 3 June 1863, Burnside suspended the circulation of the Times because of Storey’s anti-Lincoln, pro-peace vituperation. Burnside claimed that the Times had been repeatedly disloyal and that Storey’s words were incendiary. Storey also made fun of Lincoln, whom the editor called a despot. 2 Therefore, Burnside, in issuing General Order No. 84, invoked General Orders No. 38 to shut down Storey. The major general sent a telegram from Cincinnati to Storey’s office on the evening of 2 June 1863, saying: “You are hereby notified that I have issued an order stopping the publication of your paper, which order will be published in the morning papers of this city.” 3 Burnside told Storey the military would seize his office if he did not cease publication. 314

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315 Storey had followed the suppression crisis in Indiana closely, just as he had written repeatedly about the Vallandigham arrest, trial, and conviction. The Chicago editor was convinced that in response to the fall elections of 1862 Republicans were conspiring to silence the Democrats in Indiana and Ohio. He felt the infringement of civil rights had more to do with politics than with war necessity. Storey ran the Hascall-Edgerton dialogue in its entirety, the response of New York newspapers to Vallandigam and suppression, and the exchange between Hascall and James Brooks of the New York Express. 4 All of this was prominently displayed, appearing on the front page of the Chicago Times. 5 Just before he demoted Hascall, Burnside read this open exchange and was miffed with Hascall. The major general in Cincinnati asked for an explanation from the brigadier general in Indianapolis. Hascall explained that his letter was not meant to be published in any newspaper, but that Brooks and other Democratic editors chose to make it public. Hascall wrote: “If you had seen the article in their paper that called forth my letter I think you would say that I was justified in writing them the private letter I did.” 6 Burnside then warned Hascall to be careful not to agitate the Democrats during the upcoming mass meeting in Indianapolis. 7 After Hascall suppressed the St. Joseph County, Indiana, Forum, Storey’s Times defended Forum editor William H. Drapier: “The publisher of the Forum prefers to suffer the destruction of his business rather than surrender the freedom of the press. The head and front of his offending is that he disapproves the partisan war policies of the administration and denies the legal power of Brig. Gen. Hascall to override the authority of the Constitution and laws.” 8 Drapier chose to shut down rather than to swear

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316 allegiance to Hascall and take the loyalty oath, and the Forum remained closed until June of 1866. 9 The Forum would change titles to the South Bend National Union that year. 10 Storey Raises a Little Hell Storey, who held that it’s “a newspaper’s duty to print the news and raise hell,” also ran a story about the suppression of the Columbia City, Indiana, News. 11 Outraged at the assault on the Democratic press in Indiana, Storey went on the offensive. On May 19, The Chicago Times editor ran a rumor from the Philadelphia Bulletin alleging that Washington had relieved Hascall of his command in Indianapolis. Storey commented: “As strong a stomach as the administration has, it could not swallow the proceedings [in Indiana].” 12 Another article in the Times reinforced the Hascall demotion rumor on May 22. The Times’ correspondent in Indianapolis wrote: “A man better acquainted with the feeling and temper of the people is needed in Indiana if we need any military commander at all.” 13 Storey printed further speculation the next day from his Cincinnati reporter, who claimed Burnside had called Hascall down for a meeting and relieved his fellow West Point alumnus. 14 In a May 27 editorial, Storey claimed that both Burnside and Hascall would be removed from their current commands. 15 On the same day, U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Davis, who just happened to be in Indiana for a few weeks, seconded Morton’s assessment in a correspondence to Stanton: “I have been for several weeks, and am, perfectly satisfied that the immediate removal of General Hascall is demanded by the honor and interests of the government.” 16 Davis, a personal friend of Lincoln’s, apparently had been dispatched to Indianapolis by the president to ascertain what was really happening in the nineteenth state. 17 Morton also pressured Burnside to release A.J. Douglass, the detained state senator in Indiana. Burnside alleged Douglass had uttered treasonous words and had him arrested on General

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317 Order No. 38. Morton, who earlier had been a proponent of aggressive and rigorous suppression, sent a messenger to Cincinnati to tell Burnside to ease up. 18 On May 30, Morton sent a telegram to Lincoln expressing his concern with the political expediency of General Order No. 38. 19 Morton also said that governors, not district commanders, should handle internal problems. At the same time, Burnside sent Lincoln a telegram offering his resignation for his handling of the Vallandigham incident earlier in the month. Lincoln replied: “When I shall wish to supersede you I will let you know.” 20 Lincoln and Stanton conferred, and then the Secretary of War wrote a letter to Burnside telling him that the president was counseling the removal of Brigadier General Hascall from command of the District of Indiana. Stanton, too, suggested that Hascall be removed. 21 Basically, the president and his war secretary did not want to upset a Republican governor of a key Midwest state who zealously supported the war effort. In essence, the governor was sovereign in Indiana and would determine what course to take to counter dissent. Stanton wrote: “The natural aversion of our people to the exercise of military powers without necessity will be greatly stimulated by any feeling the State Executives that the General Government is disposed to interfere in matters of administration which properly belong to them or which they are able to manage.” 22 The results of the previous fall’s elections were speaking volumes. Ironically, in a war that would decide the supremacy of the central government over states’ rights, a governor of a Midwest state was successfully championing his right to run his state as he pleased, and the president of the United States concurred with the Indiana governor. Lincoln believed a man of “discretion and prudence” should replace Hascall. Stanton added in his letter to Burnside: “It is not expected that with the arduous and

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318 responsible duties of your office you will be able under any circumstances to satisfy everyone. The utmost that can be expected is to avoid unnecessary irritation.” 23 In some ways, this was the same thing that had happened to Burnside when he was the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln ordered him to prosecute the war vigorously. Burnside, ever dutiful, actively went after Robert E. Lee and the Army of the Northern Virginia, but things did not go very well. Therefore, the president told his general to be careful and discreet. The main problem with this Stanton-Burnside communication of 1 June 1863 was not its message but the fact that the secretary sent it by mail, not telegraph. It did not reach Cincinnati until June 12, ten days after Burnside’s General Order No. 84. Because the order reached Ohio so late, Burnside likely felt he had a mandate from the president to continue his onslaught against the press since Lincoln did not accept the major general’s resignation. Burnside’s General Order had four parts: (1) it suppressed the publishing of the Chicago Times; (2) ordered Brigadier General Jacob Ammen to execute the suspension of the Times; (3) prohibited circulation of the New York World in the Department of the Ohio; and (4) ordered postmasters and newspaper sellers to comply with the suppression of both publications. 24 On June 2, Ammen dispatched Captain James S. Putnam of Camp Douglas in Chicago to see Storey and announce the order. 25 Once they received it, at approximately 11 a.m., Story and his partner, Ananias Worden, ignored Burnside’s order. 26 Storey countered by applying for an injunction from Judge Thomas Drummond of the U.S. circuit court to prevent Putnam from suspending operations at the Times. The writ went through at midnight, though it was only a temporary injunction. Drummond

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319 would make a permanent ruling on June 3. 27 The Times staff, which was armed, continued to work into the night. Burnside, though, sent another order to Putnam: “You will see that no more publications of it [The Times] are made; and, if necessary, you will take military possession of the office.” 28 Early in the morning of June 3, several members of the Times’ staff stood guard and reported to the office that Union troops were on their way. Approximately 8,000 copies of the paper had been printed, and some were already circulating on the street. The soldiers took control of the office, and later that day the editor went to court. 29 However, Drummond, with Supreme Court Justice Davis at his side, refused to hold a hearing because Putnam had not been notified that it was taking place. 30 Response to the Suppression of the Chicago Times The reaction of a bi-partisan group of politicians and editors to Burnside’s squelching of the Times was as intense as the reaction to Vallandigham’s arrest and Hascall’s suppression of the Hoosier Democratic newspapers. The Republican-majority Illinois House of Representatives passed a resolution by a forty-seven to thirteen vote denouncing Burnside’s action, saying it violated state and federal law. 31 New York papers roasted the general. Even the New York Times criticized Burnside’s use of force: “Any person who knows anything of the character of our institutions, will readily see that such proceedings as the suppression of the Chicago Times by military force, will create far more formidable evils than they correct.” 32 The newspaper also noted: “Whether the powers which he claims to exercise over freedom of speech and of the press do actually belong to his office or not, it is very clear that they should never be instructed to any man whose zeal outruns his judgment.” 33

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320 In Chicago, a group of Republicans met to sign a petition to Lincoln to revoke the order. Among the signees were Chicago Mayor Francis C. Sherman, Senator Lyman Trumbull, and Congressman Isaac N. Arnold, a friend of the president. 34 The petition was sent to Lincoln by telegraph. That night a crowd estimated by the Times to be 20,000 attended a mass meeting in the courthouse square in Chicago in which speakers from both parties condemned Burnside’s order. Resolutions were passed, including recognition that the “military power is and must remain subordinate to the civil power.” 35 Some Democrats in the crowd wanted to visit the office of the Republican Chicago Tribune to do harm to it, but cooler heads prevailed. 36 Upset and embarrassed, Lincoln revoked the suspension, though he actually sent a second telegraph revoking the first order because further intelligence revealed that many Republicans in Indiana agreed with the suppression of the Times. However, Burnside received this rescinding of the president’s revocation too late, and the major general dutifully revoked his suspension of the Chicago Times and his order to stop the circulation of the New York World in the Department of the Ohio. 37 Lincoln apparently put a great deal of weight on the telegraphic message he received from Trumbull and Arnold. Meanwhile, Stanton sent Burnside a message telling him that the secretary must be informed on all future newspaper questions. 38 Thus, on June 5, Storey’s paper opened with the headline “REVIVED” and printed Burnside’s revocation of General Order No. 84. 39 Storey wrote free expression was above even the Constitution. He added, “The safeguards thrown around them by our constitution are but a solemn and august recognition of their awful sanctity.” 40

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321 Joseph Medill, editor of the Chicago Tribune, was aghast at the revocation of the order. Medill said the order should have been sustained and the president should not have buckled. 41 The Tribune editor even went so far as to call the lifting of the order “a triumph of treason.” 42 Meanwhile, the New York World said the Chicago Tribune was lucky Lincoln order the revocation because a Democratic mob was threatening to attack Medill’s office. The World even said the Tribune wanted Storey’s paper free to print so it would avoid violence. The Tribune countered that it could handle any mob action from “Copperheads that might attempt its destruction.” 43 The truth of the matter is that both papers were so well fortified with arms that violence against either was unlikely. On June 5, Hascall sent a telegram to Burnside saying that he would rescind General Order No. 9 because he thought Lincoln’s decision to overturn the suppression of the Chicago Times indicated policy. 44 It is not known if Burnside responded to the telegram. Of course, that same day, Burnside placed Orlando B. Willcox in charge of the District of Indiana, and Hascall stepped down the next day. All along, the brigadier general had assumed his services in Indianapolis would only be temporary. On June 6, he rescinded General Order No. 9 and announced his leaving the District of Indiana. Burnside then instructed Hascall to take thirty days leave before going to Cincinnati for reassignment. 45 The news of his demotion traveled slowly in some places. For example, the Columbia City News in Indiana then announced in its June 6 edition that Hascall had written the Starke County Press and ordered editor Joseph A. Berry to change his tone to one more loyal to the Lincoln government. 46 Dayton, Ohio, Press War In Ohio, events in Dayton had been deteriorating since the fall murder of Bollmeyer. The Dayton Journal had started a club called the Union League, and sons of

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322 Union Leaguers and sons of Copperheads, as the anti-war Democrats were known, clashed in the county’s public schools. Union League students wore eagle buttons to school, while Copperhead students wore butternut charms. Unionist students tried to get the butternuts removed from school grounds, and eventually a fight took place. The Union League students were arrested and charged with assault. 47 Then the Dayton Journal reported on April 17 that two female students wearing red-white-and-blue rosettes on their blouses had been asked to remove them Southeastern School principal John Hall. 48 Journal editor Lewis Marot called this a treasonous act, especially since no principal had taken action against those students wearing butternuts. Marot thought wearing the butternut was worthy of federal attention, knowing full well that little likely would be done on the local level since the majority of the Montgomery County Ohio School Board was Democrats. He wrote that General Order 38 had a direct application and that Burnside should punish the school’s principal. 49 In April, the Daily Empire, which Vallandigham had once edited and still heavily influenced, printed a short editorial noting that Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune and a Lincoln confidant, had written during the winter that “if by the first of May the Administration had made no visible progress towards putting down the rebellion, it was their duty to make the ‘the best attainable peace and end the war.’ ” 50 Upon hearing the contents of Hascall’s General Order No. 9 in Indiana, Vallandigham sent a letter to former President Franklin Pierce expressing his indignation at this suppression of civil liberties. On May 1, Vallandigham made a speech on the porch of the Curtis Hotel in Mount Vernon. The Columbus Crisis reported that Vallandigham “showed and established

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323 conclusively which was the true Union, and which the disunion party.” 51 The ex-congressman also said that he did not have to ask Lincoln, Burnside or the governor of Ohio for the right to speak. 52 He said that right came from the Constitution. He closed by saying that remedy for all evils is the ballot box and that citizens should use it to hurl “King Lincoln” from his throne. 53 Burnside had dispatched two plainclothesmen to the speech, and they took copious notes of the speech. Vallandigham knew the men were in the crowd. A magazine report said that the orator declared “the present war is an injurious, cruel and unnecessary war – a war not being wage for the preservation of the Union, but for the purpose of crushing out liberty and establishing a despotism – a war for the freedom of the blacks and the enslaving of the whites.” It also reported Vallandigham characterized Order No. 38 as a “base usurpation of arbitrary authority, and that the sooner the people informed the minions of usurpated power that they will not submit to such restrictions the better.” 54 On May 4, a visitor from Dayton was in Cincinnati and told Burnside he would send him a telegraph at 8 p.m. that night if Vallandigham were at his home on 323 First Street in Dayton. 55 That night, the telegraph sputtered its message and Burnside sent a detail of sixty-seven men of the 115 th Ohio Regiment led by Captain Charles G. Hutton on the midnight train to Dayton. They arrested Vallandigham at 2:30 a.m. and secreted him back to the Queen City by daylight. There he was placed in a military prison. The headline in the Daily Empire on the day of the arrest read, “Vallandigham Kidnapped. A Dastardly Outrage!! Will Freemen Submit? The Hour For Action Has Arrived. Your Liberties Are Endangered!!! Does the Spirit of Freedom Still Live?” 56 With his paper selling for a vastly inflated 50 cents on the street that day, editor Logan

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324 wrote of the incident, “The frantic cries of a wife the piteous tears of a little child for the safety of its father were all disregarded, as a savage would disregard the cries of a helpless infant he was about to brain.” 57 Logan complained that no formal charges were made: “He was not told what crime he was dragged, in the dead hour of the night, from his family and friends.” 58 Logan added that it was against the background of such illegal arrests that the people voted overwhelmingly for Democrats in the previous November’s elections. A group of Dayton citizens led by Mayor William H. Gillespie took the train to Cincinnati and demanded a chance to speak with the prisoner. Burnside had already moved Vallandigham from the military prison to the luxurious Burnet House. The general allowed the Dayton contingent to visit the prisoner and told them Vallandigham would have trial by a military commission. Vallandigham said the military commission had no jurisdiction to try him, but Gillespie said he would ask Cincinnati attorney Edward A. Ferguson and two Dayton politicians to defend the former congressman. 59 That night a mob of agitated Democrats torched the Journal and six surrounding businesses. 60 The damage by the fire amounted to $40,000. 61 By 10 p.m., troops from Cincinnati had arrived and martial law was declared. Logan was arrested and sent to Cincinnati, and the Daily Empire was suppressed by Burnside and put up for sale. The Journal missed a single day of publication before using a press offered by the United Brethern Printing House to resume work with a four-page paper printed on paper that was eight inches by twelve inches. 62 The Journal blamed the Empire and Dayton’s leading Democrats for the riot. Marot said that the whole thing began back in the fall when an Empire editorial inspired

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325 the mob to seek Brown’s lynching. Logan’s fall 1862 and May 5, 1863, editorials sent a signal to Democrats that it was appropriate to shed blood in the streets. 63 By May 14, the Journal was printing a classified ad announcing the sale of “A Valuable Democratic Newspaper Establishment.” Two days later, the Journal quoted the Toledo, Ohio, Commercial as saying that Vallandigham had given a speech in February 1861 saying the country should be divided into four or five independent districts. Each district would have representation in Congress, and each would have an absolute veto over any legislation. 64 In its May 18 edition, the Republican paper published a letter from a soldier named S.C. Mercer in the 33 rd Indiana Volunteers stationed in Nashville, Tennessee. Mercer praised Burnside for the arrest of Vallandigham, saying it was encouraging the soldiers in the field. 65 In the military prison in Cincinnati, Vallandigham wrote to Greeley, asking the New York Tribune editor to write an editorial that would help earn Vallandigham his freedom from his military imprisonment. Burnside lifted martial law in Dayton on 21 May 1863 and offered his resignation to Lincoln on May 29. 66 Marot would continue his journalism career at the Chicago InterOcean, and Thomas and William Hubbard bought the Empire, which would be destroyed by Union soldiers a year later. 67 Suppression was not confined to the Department of the Ohio that spring. In Tennessee, all of the newspapers in Tennessee were suppressed on 12 April 1863. 68 On May 2, the Easton, Maryland, newspaper was suspended and the editor arrest. 69 In June, New York Express editor James Brooks saw his paper barred from the Middle Department by Major General Robert C. Schenck. 70 In the winter and spring of 1863, Brigadier General George Wright issued an order barring six Democratic papers in Oregon from circulation in the Department of Oregon. 71

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326 Knocking on Freedom’s Door: New York Journalists’ Resolutions Only one bipartisan response was made to the spring of suppression in the North, and that came at the Astor House in New York on June 8. 72 Those attending the journalists’ meeting at Cooper Institute included Brooks of the Express, Horace Greeley of the Tribune, Parke Goodwin of the Evening Post, John Clancy of the Leader, Anson Herrick of the Atlas, Theodore Tilton of the Independent, William C. Prime of the Journal of Commerce, Oswald Ottendorfer of the Staats Zeitung, J. Beach of the Sun, Eli Comstock of the Argus, M.S. Isaacs of the Jewish Messenger, P.J. Meehan of the Irish American, Robert McFarlane of the Scientific American, C. Mathews of the New Yorker, and William Cauldwell and H.P. Whitney of the Sunday Mercury. The editors chose Greeley to be editor and Comstock to be secretary. 73 Not attending were James Gordon Bennett of the Herald, William Cullen Bryant of the Post, Manton Marble of the World, and Henry J. Raymond of the Times. 74 The group of journalists opened the gates to the era of professionalism in U.S. journalism because they agreed to a free-press philosophy that went beyond politics. They resolved that the press should criticize “firmly and fearlessly the acts of those charged with the administration of the Government, also those of all their civil and military subordinates, whether with intent directly to secure greater energy, efficiency, and fidelity to public service, or in order to achieve the same ends more remotely through the substitution of other persons for those in power.” 75 The journalists said that journalists had no privilege to “invite, advocate, abet, uphold, or justify treason or rebellion.” 76 While the editors condemned treason, they insisted that freedom of the press was inviolate. They resolved that the security argument that Lincoln used to defend the

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327 suspension of the writ of habeas corpus could only be used against journalists in “localities where hostilities exist or are immediately threatened.” 77 This foreshadowed the conditions that Oliver Wendell Holmes would allow for the squelching of free expression – that is, his clear-and-present-danger stipulation. The New York resolutions were significant because they represented the bipartisan sentiments of a group of journalists. However, Greeley and his associates did not make the committee into a permanent organization concerned with freedom of the press and other journalistic issues. Furthermore, no follow-up meeting was held to ascertain the impact of the initial resolutions. 78 The resolutions failed to make the strict constructionist’s argument that the First Amendment contained no language that allowed for its violation. They did not discuss how much access their reporters needed to cover the war comprehensively and accurately, or the nature of the relationship between the military and the press during wartime. Thus, while a door had been constructed to the concept of the modern professional press with the beginnings of an openly libertarian philosophy, the entire house around that door would not be constructed until the twentieth century. What, then, to make of Hascall’s general order and the suppression of newspapers in Civil War Indiana? First, the official suppression of Indiana’s Democratic newspapers ended on June 6, 1863. This is important because no other official orders were handed down during the war. What the order did, though, was help stimulate a climate of intimidation and violence that was uniquely intense in U.S. journalism history. Through Hascall’s reign as commander of the District of Indiana, fifty-three cases of intimidation and violence had occurred in the state in twenty-six months, forty-eight against

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328 Democratic newspapers. After Hascall, in the last twenty-two months of the war, thirty-eight instances of violence and intimidation would occur, twenty-six against Democratic newspapers. Most of the violence would come from Union soldiers, who managed to burn or destroy two newspapers in the state – the Petersburg Reporter and the Franklin Weekly Herald Democrat, which would also be sacked by civilians in a separate incident. 79 Hascall served to fan the flames in a society that was already prone to violence against the press. What makes Hascall’s place in the journalism of Indiana during the Civil War was that his actions were based on official policy that came from up the chain of command. He did what Burnside had ordered for the entire Department of the Ohio, and Burnside was doing what he thought Lincoln wanted based on the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by the president and Congress in order to make arrests against those citizens who might be working directly or indirectly to aid the Confederates’ cause. Indeed, Lincoln wrote Burnside on 29 May 1863 that once the Vallandigham arrest had been made, the whole cabinet was “for seeing you through with it.” 80 In other words, the president neither stopped Burnside’s employment of General Order No. 38 nor did he ask the general to rescind the order. A month after the suppression of the Times, Chicago experienced riots over the draft. Five counties in Indiana and several in Ohio and Michigan also saw draft resistance, and in New York the draft riots turned into urban warfare with a decidedly racial overtone. General civil chaos was upon the North even as the victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg brought the best military news of the war. In Indiana, the weeks after Hascall’s removal were replete with acts of dissidence and violence. W.H.H. Terrell’s 1869 report after the war lists seven of these, including the assassination of the

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329 draft officers in Sullivan and Decatur counties. 81 Morton issued his own proclamation about these acts of violence against draft officers, and it warned citizens not to resist any war measure. Morton said citizens could meet peaceably to criticize the government but could not urge or participate in armed resistance against any government officer “in the performance of his duties.” 82 These post-Hascall incidents demonstrate Carrington, Hascall, Burnside, and Willcox’s contention that Indiana, like several other Northern states, faced a very serious internal political crisis. General Meredith and the Republican Press Only one other case of an arrest by a military authority in Indiana occurred after 6 June 1863, and that occurred in Decatur where the editor of the Eagle was arrested for draft evasion. 83 However, this was not a case of official suppression abridging the free-press rights of the editor because he was arrested for violating the conscription act. Two newspapers were threatened by a brigadier general in 1864, but in this case the Union Army officer, Solomon Meredith, was not the commander of the District of Indiana. Solomon, a native of Greensboro, North Carolina, who had been wounded at Gettysburg, was serving as the commander of the garrison at Cairo, Illinois. A friend of Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton and now a permanent resident of Wayne County, Indiana, Meredith had agreed to run for Congress against George W. Julian, one of the governor’s long-time political rivals. The Indianapolis Journal supported the six-foot-seven Meredith, portraying him as a military hero because of wounds he received at Second Manassas and Gettysburg as well as his contributions to the battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Meredith, a former U.S. Marshal who had served four terms in the Indiana House of Representatives before the war, accused Julian of being an enemy of Lincoln. Julian’s friends branded Meredith a Copperhead because he

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330 had opposed emancipation and the use of armed black troops. 84 Julian supporters also condemned Meredith for being a backer of George B. McClellan, whom Lincoln had canned as the commander of the Army of the Potomac. 85 Democrats in the district overwhelmingly favored Meredith to Julian, who was an abolitionist. During the 1864 congressional race, the Delaware County, Indiana, Free Press claimed that Meredith in effect had embezzled money from the U.S. government while he served as marshal. The Free Press, based on information given by an anonymous source in Wayne County, said the brigadier general owed the federal government $600 to $700. 86 Solomon threatened the Free Press and the Winchester Journal, both Republican papers supporting Julian. 87 The Free Press countered that anything it had written about Meredith could be proven. 88 Julian defeated Meredith in the election, but later the brigadier general assaulted the congressman with a rawhide whip. However, Meredith used his political connections to have the assault charges dropped. Hascall never engaged in such outlandish behavior. He was not temperamental or boorish. The brigadier general was a man who believed in reason, had a sense of fairness, and thought the law should be applied with a sense of consistency. Like Burnside, he seemed to want to make a name for himself by doing what he thought was wanted by Washington – that is, by being an effective military leader. His biggest military experience before he took over in Indianapolis in April of 1863 was at bloody Stones River, Tennessee. Why did he pick on the Democratic newspaper editors only in the northern two-thirds of the state, mainly in the towns surrounding Goshen? One reason is that he was a cautious man. If he was going to uphold the spirit of Burnside’s General Order No. 38,

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331 Hascall wanted to only take action where he had intelligence. The best information he received came from friends and Republican editors in the northern third of Indiana. Furthermore, the Democrats were not as powerful in those counties as they were in the southern part of the state, and because Hascall knew the politics and the people of northern Indiana better. This is a key finding in the study: in times of crisis, government is more likely to suppress a minority than a majority. It is easier to quell a mouthy minority than to suspend the civil rights of the majority, who may also criticize the government’s actions and policies. It is also significant that what happened in Indiana deals with the layering of government. In the localities where suppression took place, the local authorities did not take action against the Democratic newspapers. Action was taken by Hascall, a representative of the federal government. The central body is more likely to take action against vituperative political utterances than the local because the local leaders have to deal with consequences at the local level. If a county judge or marshal had put, say, VanValkenburgh in jail for his words, then he would have had to worry about the political fallout during the next elections. In other words, his job would have been on the line. Hascall had no such worries. His job was controlled by Burnside, who had his own headaches with the civil peace and enrollments in Kentucky and even had several anonymous threats on his life in May of 1863. 89 Furthermore, the Hascall suppression episode in Indiana showed that suppression is more likely to occur in times of crises against the minority. Likewise, as John Stevens’ hypothesis predicts, heterogeneous conditions had an effect on press suppression in Indiana. Hascall’s suppression was only somewhat effective in Indiana, precisely because the political and social conditions in northern part of the state were less homogenous

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332 during the civil war than they were in the first few years of statehood and after the war. Comparatively, though, Indiana was far more homogeneous than, say, New York City. Suppression was not even attempted in New York precisely because there was greater heterogeneity there – and because the Democrats had the majority in that city. Hascall was following what he thought Burnside wanted him to do in Indiana, and Burnside was doing what he thought Lincoln wanted him to do in the Midwest. Yet because of Lincoln’s rescinding of the Chicago Times suppression order, many historians have portrayed the president as treating the press in an even-handed fashion – that, in effect, even if abhorred the words of certain Democratic editors, he was not going to abridge their rights to publish freely. As historian Gilbert R. Tredway has observed, Lincoln tends to get a whitewashing when it comes to suppression in the Midwest. Yet the president allowed Hascall and Burnside to suppress from April 13 until June 4. Tredway noted that on May 8 Lincoln sent a telegram to Burnside initially approving of the arrest and trial of Vallandigham, and that “six weeks afterwards Lincoln defended the treatment of Vallandigham by equating opposition to his administration with subversion, precisely the same reasoning Burnside had used.” 90 In other words, the president was not the ultimate champion of unfettered expression, written or oral, and his leadership in this regards certainly had some effect on Burnside and Hascall. Both the president and Governor Morton wanted a vigorous prosecution of the war, perhaps the governor even more so than the national leader of his party. 91 Morton said that the Union needed military leaders who were “men of strong intellect whose head is inspired by his heart, who believes our cause is sacred and that he is fighting for all that is dear to him and his country.” 92 Hascall and Burnside,

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333 both West Point, graduates, were such men, but Morton was concerned that enforcement of the two general orders would increase the growing Democratic opposition to the war. It was not be accurate to say that Lincoln and Morton were waffling on domestic dissidence. Rather, Morton wanted a man he could control in Hascall’s office, and the president did not want to upset loyal governors, especially those who had written openly that he should more vigorously prosecute the war. Lincoln and Suppression The best argument that Lincoln used to counter the chorus against the assault on civil liberties came in his reply to a letter written by a group of pro-Union Democrats in Albany, New York, on 16 May 1863. These Democrats held that they had made considerable political sacrifices to support the war and now were being asked to give up their constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. In what has become known as the “Corning Letter,” the president replied that the civil courts were “utterly incompetent” to handle the criminal problems arising from the rebellion, simply because the sheer number of traitors involved – all the citizens of the seceding states and anybody in the North aiding or abetting the rebels. 93 He said the Constitution’s provision that allowed the writ of habeas corpus to be suspended in times of invasion or rebellion showed that the founding fathers understood the necessity of suspension. He added that suspension of the writ was primarily preventive, not reactive. Lincoln admitted that Vallandigham was arrested for his opposition to the war effort. The president did not admit that a peace solution was even an option in a theoretic sense. Then he uttered his most cogent words in the exchange: “Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?” 94

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334 Burnside made much the same argument in March of 1864 when he was speaking before a group in Chicago about his suppression of the Chicago Times: “I am as much of an advocate for the liberty of speech and of the press as any many on the face of the globe can be, but when I am sent into a department to command soldiers who are to fight the enemies of my country, and who should be strengthened in all possible ways by giving them encouragement, and by giving them clothes to wear, and food to eat, and recruits to fill their ranks; when I find men in that department opposing all these means of strengthening the soldiers in the army, I will strike these men in the precisely the same way that I would strike an enemy in arms against them. It is my duty to my country and my duty to God, to strengthen these men, who have daily for years endangered their lives in the presence of the enemy. I would fail in my duty if I did not risk all I have in this world in the way of reputation and position or even of life itself to defend and strengthen these poor soldiers who are in the field, risking their lives in defense of their country.” 95 After the furor over the suppression of the Times, Lincoln was careful with the press. When Major General John M. Schofield arrested a Democratic editor in Missouri for printing a presidential letter, Lincoln replied: “Please spare me the trouble this is likely to bring,” and only arrest editors when “they may be working palpable injury to the Military.” 96 Lincoln’s situation was not constitutionally different from the one President James Madison faced in the War of 1812. Madison faced a British invasion, and when General Andrew Jackson suppressed the press in New Orleans, Madison chastised his military officer, saying that he had violated the Constitution and would have to answer for his conduct. 97 Jackson learned little about freedom of the press from Madison, for when

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335 serving as the seventh president Jackson denounced the abolitionist press and called for severe penalties against them. 98 If Hascall and Burnside had an accurate understanding of the state of society in Indiana, their solutions to the problems they faced deserve serious deliberation. The level of treasonous activity in Indiana in the Civil War is hard to measure. Both parties had secret orders, the Democrats the Sons of Liberty and Knights of the Golden Circle, and the Republicans the Union League. Each side worked covertly to further their political aims, and all three societies were influential. Henry B. Carrington, Hascall’s predecessor, issued an order restricting the sale of arms in an attempt to slow down the Sons and Knights. Carrington, who said the Knights of the Golden Circle, had almost 100,000 armed members in the state, believed it to be serious enough that he thought Indiana was about to face its own internal civil war. 99 Yet Carrington, who wanted a political job and did not want to fight in the field, was entirely partisan and did nothing when Union troops destroyed the Richmond Jeffersonian. While secret societies existed in the Hoosier State during the war, Carrington over-estimated their strength. However, the aggressive, cunning Morton believed Carrington and countered with a propaganda war against the covert societies. When Orlando B. Willcox took over for Hascall on 5 June 1863, Willcox immediately sent a message to these secret cliques on both sides: “The common safety now demands that all such associations should be discontinued, no matter to what political party they belong.” Willcox said their existence exposed “the country to martial law, and discourage the people from enlisting in the defense of the nation.” 100 Matters did not seem to improve in Indiana because the aggressive brigadier general had been

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336 removed. A month after Hascall’s removal from Indianapolis, Burnside wrote to Stanton letting him know that the civilian authorities could not handle the discord there, especially as it related to enforcing the draft in Sullivan, Rush, Monroe, and Greene counties. 101 For his part, Hascall, after resting for a month in Goshen reported to Cincinnati in mid-July. Burnside directed him to eastern Tennessee, and he was assigned a divisional command in the Twenty-Third Corps. He would take part in the defense of Knoxville and later fought in the Atlanta campaign and was recommended for a promotion to major general. He did not receive the promotion and resigned from the Union Army on 27 October 1864. 102 He returned to Goshen and, with John Irwin, became owner of Salem Bank and a manufacturer of lumber. The last ten years of his life, he lived in Oak Park, Illinois, and worked in real estate. He died on 30 August 1904. The Goshen Democrat remained in the Hascall family into the twentieth century. Melvin B. Hascall, who relied on his brother Milo for financial help in tough times, owned the newspaper in the 1870s, and Frank L. Hascall owned it from 1954 until the late 1980s. 103 For his part, Ed VanValkenburgh was out of journalism in the fall of 1863. He left the Plymouth Democrat on 22 October 1863, but he returned to own the paper from 1868 until 1874. Despite a $5,000 bond the owners of the Democrat had to put up in case VanValkenburgh violated General Order No. 9, the paper survived the war. 104 It continued until the start of another war – World War II. 105 Notes 1 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 257; see also Justin E. Walsh, To Print the News and Raise Hell! A Biography of Wilbur F. Storey (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 161.

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337 2 Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1999), 115. 3 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 3 June 1863. 4 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 12, 18, and 19 May 1863. 5 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 18 May 1863. Storey ran Edgerton’s response to Hascall, the New York press on Vallandigham, and a preview of the May 20 Democratic Mass Meeting in Indianapolis. 6 Milo S. Hascall to Ambrose E. Burnside, Burnside Papers, Record Group 94, Box 25, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 7 Ambrose E. Burnside to Milo S. Hascall, Order Book, 86, Department of the Ohio, March through June 1863, Ambrose Everts Burnside Collection, Rhode Island State Historical Society, Manuscripts Division, Providence, Rhode Island. 8 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 19 May 1863. 9 John B. Stoll, History of Indiana from Its Exploration to 1922; Also an Account of St. Joseph County from Its Organization (Dayton, OH: Dayton Historical Publishing Company, 1922), 151. D.C. Rush purchased the St. Joseph County Forum in November of 1866 and installed Edward Molloy as editor. 10 John W. Miller, Indiana Newspaper Bibliography (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), 401-402. Molloy, who had been a Union soldier, Molloy began to edit the Forum in 1866 and bought it in 1867, when he changed the title to The National Union. The Forum operated in one of the hotbeds of Republicanism in the state in South Bend. Congressman Schuyler Colfax had owned the St. Joseph County Register before the war and continued to insert influence on editor Alfred Wheeler during the war. It must also be noted Storey began his journalism career in St. Joseph County, at the Mishawaka Tocsin. 11 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 19 May 1863. 12 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 19 May 1863. 13 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 21 May 1863. 14 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 22 May 1863. 15 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 27 May 1863. 16 Ibid., 369. The Davis-to-Stanton letter is dated 27 May 1863.

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338 17 Gilbert R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 273. 18 Craig D. Tenney, “Major General A.E. Burnside and the First Amendment: A Case Study of Civil War Freedom of Expression,” Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1977, 189. 19 Roy Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), Vol. 6, 237. 20 Scott, The War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. 5, 717. The letter is dated May 29, 1863. 21 Ibid., 723. 22 Ibid., 723-724. The letter is dated 1 June 1 1863. 23 Ibid., 723-724. 24 Harper, 258. 25 Ibid., 259. 26 Tenney, 198. 27 Harper, 259. 28 Chicago, Illinois, Tribune, 4 June 1863. 29 Harper, 259. 30 Chicago, Illinois, Tribune, 4 June 1863. 31 Harper, 260. 32 New York, New York, Times, 13 June 1863. 33 Quoted in the Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian, 18 June 1863. 34 Harper, 260, and Chicago, Illinois, Times, 5 June 1863. 35 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 5 June 1863. 36 Ibid., 260. 37 Smith, 116.

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339 38 Harper, 261. 39 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 5 June 1863. 40 Chicago, Illinois, Times, 5 June 1863. 41 Chicago, Illinois, Tribune, 5 June 1863. 42 Chicago, Illinois, Tribune, 5 June 1863. 43 Philip Kinsley, The Chicago Tribune, Volume I (New York, NY: Knopf, 1943), 275. 44 Milo S. Hascall to Ambrose E. Burnside, Burnside Papers, Box 25. 45 Scott, War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. 5, 759. 46 Columbia City, Indiana, News, 6 June 1863. 47 Becker, 37. 48 Ibid., 41. 49 Dayton, Ohio, Journal, 17 April 1863. 50 Dayton, Ohio, Daily Empire, 23 April 1863. 51 Vallindigham, 252. 52 Klement, 1970, 153. 53 Klement, 1970, 154. 54 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 23 May 1863, 130. 55 Klement, 1970, 154. 56 Dayton, Ohio, Daily Empire, 5 May 1863. 57 Dayton, Ohio, Daily Empire, 5 May 1863. 58 Dayton, Ohio, Daily Empire, 5 May 5 1863. 59 Klement, 1970, 160. 60 Harper, 241.

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340 61 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 23 May 1863, 130. 62 Becker, 44. Also see Harper, 241. 63 Dayton, Ohio, Journal, 6 May 1863 . 64 Dayton, Ohio, Journal, 16 May 1863. 65 Dayton, Ohio, Journal, 18 May 1863. 66 Harper, 248. 67 Ibid., 249. 68 Scott, War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. 5, 476. 69 Tenney, 234. 70 Harper, 254-255. 71 Ibid., 232. 72 New York, New York, Times, 9 June 1863. 73 New York, New York, Times, 9 June 1863. 74 Tenney, 236; New York, New York, Times, 9 June 1863. It is not clear who J. Beach of the New York Sun was. At the time, Moses S. Beach and Alfred E. Beach were editors of the Sun. 75 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 9 June 1863. 76 New York, New York, Times, 9 June 1863. 77 Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union, 9 June 1863. 78 Mark E. Neely Jr., The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 101. 79 Stephen E. Towne, “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War,” presented to the Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Oct. 31, 2003, 13. 80 Abraham Lincoln to Ambrose E. Burnside, in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 237.

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341 81 W.H.H. Terrell, Indiana in the War of the Rebellion: Report of the Adjutant General, A Reprint of Volume One of the Eight-Volume Report Prepared by W.H.H. Terrell and Published in 1869 (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1960), 359-360. One of the murdered draft officers was State Senator J. Frank Stevens of Manilla, Indiana. 82 Ibid., 360-361. 83 Towne, 13. 84 Kenneth M. Stampp, Indiana Politics during the Civil War (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1949), 226. 85 Delaware County, Indiana, Free Press, 24 March 1864. 86 Delaware County, Indiana, Free Press, 17 March 1864. 87 Towne, 14. 88 Delaware County, Indiana, Free Press, 31 March 1864. 89 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 245. 90 Tredway, 274. 91 See Oliver P. Morton MSS, 1862-1863, Manuscript Division, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana. Morton wrote an open letter to Lincoln on Oct. 17, 1863, in a Washington, DC, newspaper saying: “In my opinion, if our arms do not make great progress within the next sixty days our cause will be almost lost.” 92 Ibid. 93 Scott, War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. 6, 6. One of the attendees who signed the resolutions was Erastus Corning. 94 Ibid., 8. 95 Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal, March 24, 1864. 96 Basler, ed., Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume VI, Abraham Lincoln to John M. Schofield, 1 October 1863. 97 Smith, 93. 98 Ibid., 93.

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342 99 Scott, War of the Rebellion, Series II, Vol. 5, 363-367. An Indianapolis grand jury investigating secret societies in the summer of 1862 put the number of Knights of the Golden Circle in the state at 15,000. See Tredway, 115. The grand jury indicted sixteen men, but not a single one was convicted. 100 New Albany, Indiana, Ledger, 8 July 1863. 101 Scott, War of the Rebellion, Series III, Vol. 3, 371. 102 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 24 November 1864. 103 Goshen, Indiana, News, 8 March 1990. The Democrat became the Goshen News-Times and Democrat in 1933. Frank L. Hascall shortened the title to the Goshen News in 1954. 104 John D. Barnhart, “The Impact of the Civil War on Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 57, No. 3, Sept. 1961, 210. 105 Miller, 302.

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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION This dissertation has shown how a Union officer briefly suppressed almost a dozen newspapers in Indiana in the spring of 1863. What Brigadier General Milo Smith Hascall did to the Democratic press of Indiana in was implemented within the spirit of the responsibility-for-abuse clause in the press section of the Indiana Constitution. Yet the state’s courts had not interpreted the clause by the Civil War, and neither the military nor journalists had any guidance from the judiciary as to what was acceptable and what was not. Meanwhile, public opinion generally favored letting newspaper editors publish what they pleased, although many Republican editors strongly supported the power to suppress. The suppressed Democratic editors and their cohorts claimed that they could not be restrained by a man serving under the federal chief executive. They observed that the U.S. Constitution referred to no government power for press restraint and specifically said that Congress could not abridge the freedom of the press. Therefore, Hascall had no jurisdiction over the press and ought to leave editors alone. Hascall, on the other hand, believed the North had a war to win and that civil rights could be abridged temporarily to prevent intentional or unintentional aiding of the South. The Spirit of Free Press In the background of press suppression in Civil War Indiana was the Bill of Rights. However, each political camp had its interpretation of the press clause. In part, this is because the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is broad and vague. On the other 343

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344 hand, the press section of the Indiana Constitution is confusing. It states: “The free communication of thoughts, and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man.” It then says every citizen may speak and print freely, but is “responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” 1 No cases of legal interpretation of this section of the state constitution had occurred by the start of the Civil War. General Order No. 9 offered an opportunity for such a judicial test. However, Democratic editors failed to challenge the abuse clause. Hascall could have argued that the Democratic editors were abusing their freedom of the press, but he did not chose to make the case that some editors were going beyond fair criticism and in effect hurting the Union war cause and, indirectly, helping the Confederacy. Neither did Republican editors speak of the responsibility of the Democratic press for the abuse of its freedom to print what it pleased. Thus, neither side tested the wording in court, and without a legal test Hascall could have argued that he was responding to editors who were abusing their right to freedom of the press because they were potentially helping put Union soldiers in harm’s way with words that were unsupportive of the war effort. Likewise, Democratic editors did not choose to sue Hascall on grounds that he was violating their federal civil rights. Such litigation would not become standard until the twentieth century, and there was no precedent from Indiana’s courts to give counsel on the issue. The Indiana Supreme Court had heard only a handful of libel cases, but none involved seditious libel. Thus, no interpretation of the responsibility-for-abuse clause existed. Subsequent federal judicial interpretation in the twentieth century would render the wording of state press clauses less binding then the interpretations of the First Amendment, but that had no effect on General Order No. 9. Similarly, Congress failed to

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345 take action against the executive branch when the commanders of the military districts took action against the civilian press. The First Amendment advises Congress not to abridge the freedom of the press. The assumption is that this is a congressional area of concern and that the president has no power over the press. However, the green light that Congress gave to the president and his military leaders with the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 3 March 1863, provided a level of confidence that any extra-legal proceedings against newspaper editors would be tolerated by the legislature. There was a congressional investigation of telegraph censorship, but none of military suppression of the press. 2 Although President Lincoln had taken the high moral ground in freeing the slaves with the Emancipation Proclamation, he had taken the low ground in suppressing the rights of newspaper editors. Yet the freeing of the slaves outweighed the abridgement of freedom of the press. As Wake Forest University law professor Michael Curtis has observed, Democrats’ calls for unfettered free expression “would be more inspiring if so many Americans of African descent had not been omitted from their political calculus.” 3 Hascall and Burnside consistently held that they were protecting Union soldier by suppressing editors whose words might harm the war effort. The necessities of war required the temporary suspension of certain liberties to ensure all the liberties in the Bill or Rights would be restored for both white and black men after the war. Thomas Paine had maintained at the time of the American and French Revolutions that freedom’s limit was in “the power of doing whatever does not injure another.” However, Paine also said those “limits are determinable only by the law,” not by military leaders or commissions. 4

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346 Yet does a president have to abridge one freedom to win another? Hascall, with the approval of Major General Ambrose Everts Burnside and no impediments from the president, suspended the free-press guarantee of the First Amendment in a state that was not being attacked by the Confederate Army, although there were several raids on the state by renegade Confederates and the status of its southern neighbor Kentucky was up in the air for much of the war. If the First Amendment is subject to arbitrary wartime abeyance, the Constitution is clear that Congress cannot abridge the right. Thus, at times of war, presidents, including Lincoln, have assumed the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and some have expanded that power to include temporary suspension of other civil liberties. Such a power for the president is fraught with the possibility of abuse, and this is what Thomas Jefferson had worried about at the beginning of the Republic: “I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.” 5 The Lincoln administration’s suspension of free expression pitted two contradictory needs in a democratic republic – the one for survival against the one for a free exchange of information and ideas so that the citizenry might make rational political choices when elections were still being held. In the long view, the clash between men like Hascall and the Democratic editors of Indiana served to strengthen the free press tradition in the United States. Yet it was a steep price to pay for both. Hascall lost his command of the federal district and returned to the front. Plymouth Democratic editor D.E. VanValkenburgh and many of the other Democratic editors of Indiana lost their clout. Lincoln and the majority in his cabinet thought they had the prerogative to see the First Amendment as elastic. They believed government self-preservation superseded

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347 individual rights in a rebellion. Lincoln also knew that he lived in a democratic society and had to win re-election and try to maintain Republican control of Congress. He also wanted the country to still resemble what the founding fathers had in mind, except without slavery. Intimidating or arresting editors and suspending their newspapers had a chilling effect. Several newspapers, like the Democratic paper in South Bend, went out of business after they were suppressed. After the Hascall suppression episode, the suppressed Democratic newspapers in Indiana faced less stability in change of ownership than Republican papers in the same cities. Thus, the unconstitutional soft wall of support from the suspension of habeas corpus helped the sixteenth president win the internal political fight in Indiana – and the North as a whole. General Order No. 38 and General Order No. 9 acted as weather balloons about how far Lincoln and his military leaders could advance suppression. The waffling on the suppression of the Chicago Times showed that the president did not want agitate potential Democratic voters, and yet he also knew a sizable number of Republicans and some War Democrats favored silencing recalcitrant editors. As long as these edicts produced political expedient results, Lincoln was apt not to countermand them. However, if public opinion went too far against the president, he would overturn or modify a particular order. Yet Lincoln never requested the rescinding of either general order. He also never sent a general directive of his own outlawing the suppression orders. Why did the Republicans and the Union military leaders think that military officials had the power to suppress free expression during a war? The precedent that had the greatest effect on their thinking came from the American Revolution. At that time, Patriots routinely intimidated Loyalists speakers and editors, many of whom were thrown

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348 in jail without a writ of habeas corpus. Furthermore, Union military leaders rationalized that the war effort was supreme to other considerations, including civil rights. Many generals and other officers felt the free exercise of civil liberties was inappropriate when it either directly or indirectly led to aiding and abetting the enemy. Thus, it is not inaccurate to say that freedom of the press for the majority was not an unusual concept in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the United States. Yet it is important to remember that Lincoln needed the Democrats of Indiana. He knew full well that the fragile coalition in Indiana – and Ohio and Illinois – was essential to success in the war and for a second Lincoln term in the White House. The political situation required an appeal to the continued loyalty of the Indiana Democratic press. At the same time, if the war had been ended in 1862 or 1863, the national Democratic Party would have still been in a position to determine the outcome of the 1864 election, precisely because it would have picked up a major bloc in Southern voters. Of course, the war did not end in either of those years, and the Republican Party became more powerful after Gettysburg and Vicksburg. 6 In the final analysis General Order No. 9 helped Republican newspapers in several Indiana cities to improve their competitive status against weakened Democratic counterparts. Democratic papers lost readers, and subscriptions were critical to their economic wellbeing. The implementation of the order was immediately followed by two major Union victories in July of 1863, giving Republicans the news they needed to turn public agenda away from civil rights abuse. Suppression also helped destabilized the competition in these cities just as Republicans would make advances in the fall of 1863 elections and continued those gains the next fall. On the other hand, General Order No. 9

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349 worked outside the framework of the federal constitution, and it often had the opposite effect that it was intended to have: rather than quiet the Democrats, it agitated them to shout against civil rights abuse and turned public opinion against the Republicans. Furthermore, Hascall’s order and Burnside’s suppression of the Chicago Times encouraged New York journalists to make resolutions about the nature of press freedom in wartime. The resolutions were not binding, but they represented the beginnings of a more unified press, one that went beyond party lines to uphold the more libertarian tradition in the First Amendment. This paper has also shown that Democratic editors resisted suppression and Republican editors applauded. Democrats held that political speech was sacred, while the Republicans agreed, as long as those political words were loyal to the majority. The suppressed newspapers faced difficult times in the years immediately after Hascall constrained them, but in the long run nine of eleven were back in business in 1875, with only one of those nine converting to the Republicans. Thus, in the long run freedom of the press in Indiana survived Hascall’s official suppression. Moreover, Hascall’s suppression policy confirmed Siebert’s hypothesis about press-government relations in times when the stability of a government is in jeopardy. As forces threatened Indiana during 1863, Hascall tightened the reins. Hascall the Good Soldier It is a mistake to vilify Hascall as a man who hated the press and acted upon that hatred. When the war began and just before he joined the army, he made a bitter verbal attack against the Goshen, Indiana, Democrat. 7 While he accused the Democrat of treason, he only asked that his subscription be canceled. He did not agitate rioters to destroy it. Later, in the spring of 1863, he may have acted imperiously and excessively.

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350 He would have been wise at that time to be more politic. Still, Hascall’s understanding of the necessity of suppression was not that different from that of Lincoln, Burnside, and many Republican newspaper editors in the Hoosier State, and it certainly was not outside the spirit of the Indiana Constitution’s “responsibility-for-abuse” clause. It would be more accurate to say that Hascall hated the press that did not throw its support behind the soldier in the field. Hascall had been educated at West Point, and he understood, respected, and upheld the military culture well. Part of that culture included the sense of brotherhood, of watching the back of one’s fellow soldiers. It also included the hierarchical structure of communication and command. The need to have information flow in the same way was not lost on the brigadier general from Goshen. Burnside wanted conformity in the Midwest, and Hascall set out to achieve that goal in Indiana. Burnside’s handling of Vallandigham set a precedent, and Hascall did his job the way he thought Burnside wanted him to do it. Hascall was the good soldier. Good soldiers are not necessarily free communicators, and war and press freedom are often strange bedfellows. Furthermore, Hascall was civic-minded and did not maintain an anti-press attitude throughout his life. After all, his brother Melvin B. Hascall owned the Goshen Democrat in the 1840s and again in the 1870s. Indeed, Milo S. Hascall helped his brother through some tough financial times and indirectly subsidized that Democratic paper. Hascall did not see freedom of the press as a relic of the past as William Tecumseh Sherman did. Like his boss Burnside, he did think that the freedom could be abused in wartime, if the war aims required it.

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351 It is difficult to infer Hascall’s intentions in the spring of 1863. Because his tenure as the commander of the District of Indiana was so short, it is impossible to know how far he would have taken suppression. He certainly thought a problem existed and acted accordingly. Yet no editor was thrown in jail for more than few days. None was sent to a distant prison to sit and rot for six months like Iowan Dennis Mahony. Did Hascall just want to chill the air, or did he plan to shut down as many Democratic editors as he could investigate? The documentary evidence is scant, but his correspondence to and from Burnside suggests that Hascall would have maintained General Order No. 9 as long as he was the commander of the District of Indiana. If Morton had not sought his removal, suppression of the Democratic press in Indiana would have continued. A year before the suppression spring in the Department of the Ohio, Burnside established a pro-Union newspaper in eastern North Carolina while the Union Army under his command occupied the coastal section of that state. 8 Why did Burnside not attempt to shape public opinion in the Midwest by building similar papers instead of suppressing Democratic orators and editors? The major general could have pushed his political and military objectives in the Department of the Ohio in a pro-active instead of a reactive way. He and Hascall had at their disposal thousands of men to run the department, and Hascall’s troops had run a publication in Tennessee. Of course, taking of a Democratic press in a rebel state was one thing. Doing it in a loyal state was another. The larger picture, though, is that the Lincoln administration and the military controlled the press in an ad hoc, haphazard manner during the Civil War. Lincoln did want to control the press to the extent that it could be done without hurting the Republicans’ political fortunes, but his administration seemed ill equipped to do it in a systematic way,

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352 especially on the enforcement level since most able-bodied men were off fighting the war. When it worked, fine. Lincoln did not send off any reactive telegrams to his generals telling them to stop suppressing. When it did not, Lincoln preferred to close down restrictive policies and let editors print what they please. There is also the issue of the necessity and legality of district commanders. Henry Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the U.S. Army, thought they were unnecessary and suggested that Burnside send his district commanders in the Department of the Ohio to the front. 9 While Hascall was the only district commander in Burnside’s department to issue a broad policy against printed words that opposed the president and the war, other district leaders in the Department of the Ohio suppressed newspapers. Brigadier General Jeremiah Tilford Boyle suppressed the Louisville, Kentucky, Express for its “general tone.” 10 Brigadier General Henry B. Carrington, who proceeded Hascall as the commander of the District of Indiana, censored the pro-Democratic Indiana State Sentinel of Indianapolis after he disputed its report on a row between Union troops and civilians over the arrest of a deserter. 11 Yet Carrington and Brigadier General Jacob Ammen in Illinois actually helped Democratic editors. Carrington paid back a news agent for the Cincinnati Enquirer after Union soldiers threw copies of the paper into an Indianapolis creek. 12 Ammen stopped Union cavalrymen who were throwing the type of the Olney, Illinois, Herald into the street. Ammen made the men pay for the destroyed type. 13 While General Order No. 9 did have an effect on eleven Democratic newspapers in Indiana, its enforcement was so-so at best. Many more papers than those eleven printed anti-Lincoln or anti-war vituperation. In the end, Hascall mainly just scared Democratic

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353 editors of the Hoosiers State rather than shutting them down for the duration of the war. While there was a chilling effect, some Democratic editors were emboldened to increase the vituperation or resort to indirection and sarcasm, including VanValkenburgh, especially after Hascall was removed on June 6, 1863. What happened in Civil War Indiana began the movement of the Midwest press – and U.S. press in general – away from partisanship toward professionalism, commercialism, and political independence. This movement was counteracted by the expansion of federalism and the expansion of presidential powers. The federally backed suppression of the Democratic editors in Indiana worked in a small, immeasurable way and was a minor setback for press freedom. This is not to say that state governments did not try to retard press freedom. Southern state governments did before the war with their anti-abolitionist laws and attempts to extradite northern abolitionist editors. Furthermore, states like Indiana with its “responsibility-for-abuse” clause in the free press section of its constitution could have interpreted this responsibility in a way that narrowed the area of press freedom. However, with no test in the courts, interpreting the abuse of that freedom was up in the air. Transition from Party-Personal to Independent-Commercial Press After the Democratic editors’ episode in Indiana, a less partisan press gradually became the norm in the state. The post-war press in Indiana became less interpretive and more informative. It became hard for newspapers that were on the losing side of a major political battle to stay afloat. Newspapers became more sustainable during times of extreme political conflict. In the long run, the emancipation effort put a greater emphasis on civil rights and increased freedom overall in the United States, but the irony is that Lincoln and the

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354 military trampled on the free-press rights of Democratic newspaper editors in Indiana – not just those editors who were pro-South, but also Democratic editors who had legitimate criticisms of the war, conduct of the war, and the war policy. It made sense to Northern editors to suppress newspapers in the conquered lands of the South, but it was a hard sell to convince the majority of them to support suppression in the loyal states. So just as Lincoln and Burnside don’t get absolved of their sins against the press, Hascall does not get a free pass on this. What Hascall, as well as other Union generals, did to First Amendment in the Civil War represented a significant moment in the history of freedom of the press in the United States. Thus, the general enhancement of freedom had a bumpy road during the Civil War. Free labor, as opposed to slave labor, won the day, but all freedoms did not come through the war unscathed, and that, as Fredrick S. Siebert’s hypotheses predict, is to be expected in wartime when it comes to the relationship between communication and power. The powerful tend to contract the area of freedom of expression. A number of communicators react to this contraction with obedience and fear, and others react with disobedience and courage. And, in a time of a party press, still others react with support of such contraction in defense of political allies making contractive policies. The Democrats of Indiana were part of a national political party that if it had managed to stay together in 1860 would have remained the majority party in the United States. The Republicans (Whigs) had been the minority party for decades, and the fragmentation of the Democrats allowed a minority party to seize power in Washington. Yet what must be remembered is that the balance of power was fragile. Despite a substantial margin of victory in 1860, the Republicans faced a much narrower lead over

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355 Democrats in Congress after the mid-term 1862 elections. Furthermore, the command on power that the Democrats had at the state level waned too, as Democrats became the majority in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Republican newspaper editors supported the suppression of “disloyal” editors, and their arguments for suppression were based on two premises: (1) Not supporting the war fully hurt the war effort – discouraging enlistments meant fewer men to fight the war and therefore lengthened it, and (2) not backing the Lincoln war policies lowered morale because it showed the South a less-than-united front, and therefore also gave a psychology boost to the Confederate Army. The truth is that any criticism of a government at war can be construed as giving aid to the enemy. When reduced to an either-or proposition, that is the inevitable conclusion. A younger Abraham Lincoln did not seen the war powers of the president the way the Abraham Lincoln who was the sixteenth president of the United States did. In 1848, Congressman Abraham Lincoln, a Whig of Illinois, voted for a resolution that said President James K. Polk did not have the power to wage war on Mexico. Ironically, Lincoln’s law partner, William H. Herndon, thought the president had the war powers. Lincoln said that power solely rested with Congress: “Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object.” Lincoln wrote that no one single man “should hold the power of bringing this oppression” on the people. 14 Yet Lincoln had a change of heart by the spring of 1863. Conditions had changed, and in the “Corning Letter” he gave his clearest defense for squelching dissident editors: How could he shoot a soldier who deserts but could not stop the pen of an editor who encourages him to desert? It was

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356 unjust, inconsistent, and undemocratic for him to enforce discipline in the army and yet not be able to prevent agitators against enrolling. In war, a journalist who publishes information that indirectly and even unintentionally helps put soldiers in harm’s way is not necessarily immune from government restraints, but the problem in the Civil War is that Congress did not take up the issue. Of course, the federal government was busy trying to preserve itself, and freedom of expression was not a first priority for most legislators, nor for the president. Long-Term Effect of Suppression So, by 1875, almost all of the Democratic newspapers suppressed by Hascall had returned to operate, although about half under new names and one had switched its affiliation to the Republicans. The resiliency of the Democratic press in Indiana demonstrated the strength of the newspaper tradition in the U.S. – that it could withstand temporary restraints on press freedom. Nonetheless, Hascall, Burnside, and Lincoln continued the tradition of Adams, Jackson, and Polk of the executive branch’s itch to control the press during wartime – which would be repeated again in World War I, by a progressive president and a Democrat, in Woodrow Wilson. The Sedition Act of 1918 outlawed written contempt for the government, the Constitution, or the armed forces and gave the postmaster general the power to suppress the mail of violators. 15 Wilson also had the Censorship Board established to control information in and out of the government – and the nation. 16 Ultimately, the suppression of Indiana Democratic newspaper in the Civil War comes down to two issues, the quality of life and the survival of the nation. For Lincoln and his military leaders, the maintenance of the Bill of Rights came into conflict with the war aims of the nation. Upton Sinclair once wrote President Wilson asking: “What good

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357 does it do us to fight for freedom abroad if, in the mean time, we are losing it as home?” The same thing could have been asked of Hascall, Burnside, and Lincoln. Why fight for the freedom of black men in the South while asking white men in the North relinquish their civil rights? They might answer that the temporary suppression of free expression was a necessary compromise that had to be made until the war’s outcome was no longer in doubt. Yet even members of Lincoln’s cabinet tended to think that letting the press go was the best policy. In the long run, the party press that exacerbated and condoned suppression gradually disappeared. There were still signs of it in Indiana in the late nineteenth century, and a few party-affiliated papers existed in the state in the twentieth century. However, political and financial independence, the informative function, and professionalism would become the hallmarks of the Indiana press by the end of the nineteenth century. Two generations after Milo Smith Hascall, one of his descendants, Frank L. Hascall, the publisher of the Goshen News, would express these changes when he was interviewed near the end of his newspaper career: “I am 73 years old and I still get much satisfaction in knowing that the goal of our newspaper is to serve the community the best we can, and to give the readers a quality product every day.” 17 Yet suppression is a nasty subject that rears its ugly head each time the nation becomes involved in a war. As this dissertation was being written, the United States invaded and occupied Iraq. It dislodged Saddam Hussein from power and installed a democratic government in June of 2004. Even as it tried to build a democracy in Iraq, the United States suppressed a newspaper in that country. The Al Hawsa newspaper, published by supporters of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, was suspended for sixty days in

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358 the spring of 2004. U.S. troops sealed the building and anyone caught attempting to publish the paper faced a year in jail and a $1,000 fine. 18 Sadr was running an insurgency campaign against U.S-led coalition forces. The United States claimed that Al Hawsa was inciting Iraqis to violence against coalition troops. Once again, the principles of democracy stood opposition to war necessity. The U.S. military wanted to protect the coalition soldiers. Yet, at the same time, the United States was trying to develop democratic habits and structures in Iraq. Squelching press freedom countered the attempt to build the democracy there. The military, though, used the same arguments Hascall, Burnside, and Lincoln used: temporary suppression was necessary in such an extreme political crisis. In other words, developing countries sometime experience emergency periods when freedom of the press may have to be temporarily suspended. The military itch to suppress and the minority political entity’s desire to openly and freely communicate collide. Perhaps in both cases, the military would have been better off countering the strident vituperation of the minority press by either getting its side out clearly and effectively through the majority – mainstream – press or by building its own newspapers to counter the untruths and agitations of the minority press. Burnside had experimented in newspaper building in eastern North Carolina in 1863, and Hascall’s regiment had published a paper at the front. Both men knew how to marshal the resources to achieve such a goal. Further Study on Press Suppression in the Midwest during Civil War In the years after the war, it is not clear that the Democratic editors learned the same lessons Frank Hascall learned about journalism in the twentieth century. Future study needs to explore exactly what happened to the nature of journalism from 1865 to

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359 1880. Indiana journalism modernized. It became less political and personal. Yet most newspapers continued to be affiliated with political parties. Journalism historians also need to further develop the portrait of suppression and intimidation that occurred in the Midwest during the Civil War. The picture of press suppression and intimidation in Indiana is fairly focused, but the depiction of what happened in Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin requires further study. Furthermore, this inquiry has focused primarily on the suppressors. A follow-up study ought to examine the editors who fell victim to suppression, and the development of a comprehensive nineteenth-century newspaper bibliography for the entire Midwest is also highly desirable. Robert S. Harper, in his 1951 study, only had two instances of official press suppression by Hascall in Indiana in 1863. Jon Dilts did not specifically list the 1863 incidents in his 1986 study. He gave only a cumulative figure of 13 for the entire year. Stephen E. Towne’s 2002 and 2003 studies show a more extensive pattern of violence and intimidation against the Democratic press in Indiana. Thus, the historical record remains incomplete, but the picture is becoming clearer. The conditions that the Democratic press in Indiana faced in the Civil War were fraught with peril. Further study is needed to develop a more complete picture of Democratic press suppression in the North during the war, especially in the Midwest where the political tide was beginning to turn against Lincoln in 1862 and 1863. Furthermore, too many studies of Civil War journalism have come from the perspective that the press was an instrument of advancing freedom and unity – and this was true of the Republican press, but not of all of the Democratic press in the North. It

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360 was a time of a partisan press, and the Consensus perspective fails to capture the unfavorable conditions in which a large number of newspapers operated. An investigation of the Democratic press in Southern Indiana would shed further light on why Hascall did not enforce General Order No. 9 in that part of the state – the region that had the greatest number of citizens who had sympathy for the South. Such a study would also examine the degree of support Hascall received from Republican editors in those counties. Did those Republican editors fear expressing their support publicly? Another study would fully investigate and chart how well the Democratic press learned their lessons from suppression during the Civil War. What evidence exists that the Democratic press – and the party-personal press in general in the United States – would become more professional in the last three decades of the nineteenth century? How did this play out in Indiana and the other states where suppression took place? Finally, the Union Army suppressed newspapers throughout the South, especially in coastal cities like Norfolk, Virginia, and Key West, Florida. What connections can be made between the effort to suppress Southern papers and those in the Midwest? Notes 1 Charles Kettleborough, Constitution Making in Indiana, Volume I (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Collections, I ndiana Historical Society, 1916), 296. 2 Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951), 130-132. The House Judiciary Committee investigated pre ss complaints of censorship the winter of 1861-1862. The committee concluded that censorship of the telegraph occurred and revolved that “the government shall not interf ere with free transmission of intelligence by telegraph, when the same will not aid the enem y in his military of naval operations, or give him information concerning such operati ons on the part of the government, except when it may become necessary for the govern ment, under the authority of Congress, to assume exclusive control of the telegraph for its own legitimate purpos e, or to assert the right of priority in the transm ission of its own dispatches.”

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361 3 Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, “The People’s Darling Privilege”: Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 356. 4 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, Rights of Man, and other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine (New York, NY: Signet Classic, 2003), 217-218. 5 Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, Sept. 23, 1800, from Thomas Jefferson, The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Adrienne Koch and William Harwood Peden, eds. (New York, NY: The Modern Library, Random House, 1944), 558. 6 As James G. Randall and David Herbert Donald observed about the political fortunes of the war: “Many who voted for Lincoln in 1864 were supporting with some reluctance a party which was being transformed contrary to their desires. This transformation of the Republican party and its attainment of dominating power was one of the major political developments of American history” See James G. Randall and David Henry Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1969), 454. 7 Goshen, Indiana, Times, 18 April 1861. 8 Richard H. Abbott, “Civil War origins of the Southern Republican press,” Civil War History, Vol. 43, No. 1, 41-42. Burnside installed George Mills Joy, a sergeant in the Union Army from Massachusetts, to edit the New Bern Daily Progress. Previously, the paper had been a pro-secession paper. It supported Lincoln and North Carolina loyalist Edward Stanly, though for a time it opposed abolition. Joy was able to earn a federal government printing contract with the help of Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William H. Seward. In the fall of 1863, Joy renamed the newspaper the North Carolina Times and became an advocate of emancipation. 9 Robert N. Scott, et al., eds., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1891), Series III, Vol. 3, 385. 10 Harper, 212. 11 Ibid., 327. 12 Cincinnati, Ohio, Gazette, 19 March 1863. 13 Harper, 226. 14 Abraham Lincoln to William Herndon, Feb. 15, 1848. Cited in Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 94.

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362 15 Ibid., 132. 16 Ibid., 132. 17 Goshen, Indiana, News, 8 March 1990. 18 “Protests as U.S. closes Iraqi Paper: Publishers Accused of inciting violence” [online]. CNN.com. 28 March 2004, accessed: 28 March 2004, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/03/28/iraq.main/index.html.

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LIST OF REFERENCES Abbott, Richard H. “Civil War Origins of the Southern Republican Press.” Civil War History. Vol. 43, No. 1, March 1997, 38-50. Abzug, Robert H. “The Copperheads: Historical Approaches to Civil War Dissent in the Midwest.” Indiana Magazine of History. Vol. 66, No. 1. March 1970, 40-55. Andrews, J. Cutler. The North Reports the Civil War. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 1955. Andrews, J. Cutler. The South Reports the Civil War. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970. Angelo, Frank. On Guard: A History of the Detroit Free Press. Detroit Free Press, Detroit, MI, 1981. Appleby, Joyce and Terence Ball. Thomas Jefferson, Political Writings. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. 1999. Ashley, Perry J., editor. American Newspaper Journalists 1690-1872. Gale Research Company, Detroit, MI, 1985. Baldasty, Gerald J. “The Press and Politics in the Age of Jackson.” Journalism Monographs. No. 89. August 1984, 1-28. Banta, D.D. History of Johnson County, Indiana. Brant & Fuller, Chicago, 1888. Barnhart, John D. Valley of Democracy: The Frontier versus the Plantation in the Ohio Valley. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1953. Barnhart, John D. “The Impact of the Civil War on Indiana.” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 57, No. 3, September 1961, 185-224. Bartholomew, Henry. Pioneer History of Elkhart County, Indiana. Goshen Printing, Goshen, IN, 1930. Basler, Roy P. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1990. Becker, Carl M. “Newspapers in Battle: The Dayton Empire and the Dayton Journal During the Civil War.” Ohio History: The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society (Columbus, OH), Vol. 99, 1998, 29-50. 363

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364 Beathard, Ronald. “Indiana Newspaper History: An Annotated Bibliography.” Ball State University, Muncie, IN, 1974. Bigelow, Bruce. “The Clash of Cultures: Border Southerners and Yankees in Antebellum Indiana.” Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences (Indianapolis, IN), Vol. 2, 1998, 1-8. Bigelow, Bruce and Stephen E. Towne. “Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana: The Polls and the Press.” Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences (Rensselaer, IN), Vol. 5, 2001, 71-81. Biographical and Historical Sketches of Kosciusko County, Indiana. Lewis Publishing County, Chicago, 1887. Merrill, Indianapolis, 1967. Blackford County, Indiana, Democrat. January to June 1863. Blackford, Isaac. Report of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the Judicature of the State of Indiana. Bowen-Merrill, Indianapolis, IN, 1890. Banchard, Charles. History of the Catholic Church in Indiana. Logansport, Indiana, two volumes, 1898. Blanchard, Margaret A. “Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to Gitlow.” The First Amendment Reconsidered. Bill F. Chamberlin and Charlene J. Brown, eds. Longman, New York, 1982, 14-59. Bluffton, Indiana, Banner. January to June 1863. Boatner, Mark Mayo. The Civil War Dictionary. David McKay Company, New York, 1959. Bogardus, Frank Smith. “Daniel Wolsey Voorhees.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review. Vol. 6, 1919-1920, 532-555. Brown, Austin H. Papers. Indiana Division. Indiana State Library. Indianapolis, IN. Buchholz, Michael. “The Penny Press,” in The Media in America: A History, Fifth Edition, ed. by William David Sloan. Vision Pres.. Northport, Alabama. 2002. Buley, R. Carlyle. The Old Northwest: Pioneer Period, 1815-1840. Vol. 2. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1978. Burgess, John W. The Civil War and the Constitution 1859-1865, Volume Two. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1910. Burke, Edmund. The Portable Edmund Burke. Isaac Kramnick, ed. Penguin, New York, 1999.

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365 Burnside, Ambrose Everts. Burnside Papers, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, DC. Butler, James Hannam. “Newspapers in Indiana.” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 1926, 297-333. Calhoun, John C. A Disquisition on Government. C. Gordon Post, editor. Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, IN, 1953. Cannelton, Indiana, Reporter. January to June 1863. Canup, Charles E. “Conscription and Draft in Indiana.” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 1914, 70-83. Carmony, Donald F. “Highlights in Indiana Newspaper History.” The Indiana Publisher, Vol. 9, No. 1, December 1944, 3, 6. Catton, Bruce. Civil War. Fairfax Press, New York, 1984. Chamberlain, Ebenezer Mattoon. “Journal of Chamberlain of a Trip from Maine to Indiana in 1832.” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 1919. Cheek, H. Lee, Jr. Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political Theory of the Disquisition and Discourse. University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2001. Chicago, Illinois, Times. January to June 1863. Chicago, Illinois, Tribune. January to June 1863. Cincinnati, Ohio, Commercial. January to June 1863. Cincinnati, Ohio, Enquirer. January to June 1863. Cincinnati, Ohio, Gazette. January to June 1863. Colfax, Schuyler. Papers. Lilly Library. Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana. Collins, Lewis and Richard H. Collins, History of Kentucky, Volume I. John P. Morton Company, Louisville, KY, 1924. Columbia City, Indiana, News. September 1862 to June 1863. Connersville, Indiana, Fayette and Union Telegraph. January to June 1863. Congressional Globe, 38 th Congress, First Session, 1506, 1864. Cooley, Thomas M. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, Eighth Edition. Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, MA, 1927.

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367 Ellis, L.E. “The Chicago Times During the Civil War.” Illinois State Historical Society Transactions for the Years 1932. Illinois State Historical Library Publication No. 39. Emery, Edwin and Michael Emery. The Press and America, Seventh Edition: An Intepretive History of the Mass Media. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1992. Enders, Kathleen. In “The Press and the Civil War, 1861-1865,” in The Media in America: A History, Fifth Edition, ed. by William David Sloan. Vision Press. Northport, Alabama. 2002. Entman, Robert M. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1193, 51-58. Evansville, Indiana, Weekly Gazette. January to June 1863. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. Supreme Court, 4 Wallace, 1-143, 1866. Farrar, Ronald T. and John D. Stevens. Mass Media and the National Experience: Essays in Communication History. Harper & Row, New York, 1971. Fitzhugh, George. Sociology For The South, Or The Failure of Free Society. Ayer Company Publishers, Manchester, NH, 1998. Foner, Eric. “The Wilmot Proviso Revisited,” Journal of American History. 61, September 1969. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War, a Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian. Random House, New York, 1963. Foulke, William Dudley. Life of Oliver P. Morton, Including His Important Speeches (Two Volumes). Bowen-Merrrill, Indianapolis, 1898. Fort Wayne, Indiana, Daily Gazette. January to June 1863. Fort Wayne, Indiana, Dawson’s Daily Times & Union. January to June 1863. Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel. January to June 1863. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated News. April to July 1863. Franklin, Indiana, Weekly Democratic Herald. January to June 1863. Franklin, Marc A., David A. Anderson, and Fred H. Cate, Mass Media Law: Cases and Materials, Sixth Edition. Foundation Press. New York, New York. 2000. French, William M., Life, Speeches, State Papers and Public Services of Gov. Oliver P. Morton. 1864.

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368 Gary, A.L. and E.B. Thomas. Centennial History of Rush County, Indiana, Volume I. Historical Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1921. Gienapp, William E. Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America: A Biography. Oxford University Press, New York, 2002. Goshen: The First One Hundred Fifty Years, 1831-1981. News Printing Company, Goshen, IN, 1981. Goshen, Indiana, Democrat. November 1846 to April 1853; September 1862 to July 1863. Goshen, Indiana, News. 8 March 1990. Goshen, Indiana, Times. May 1858 to June 1886. Grant, Alfred. The American Civil War and the British Press. McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, NC, 2000. Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. Charles L. Webster & Company, New York, 1885. Gray, Ralph D. Indiana History: A Book of Readings. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994. Gray,Wood. The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads. Viking, New York, 1942. Hanna, John. Papers. Lilly Library. Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana. Hanson, Thomas Carleton. “Press Freedom and War Restraints: Seibert’s Proposition II and Stevens Proposition III in the Case of the Los Angeles Star.” Master’s thesis, California State University at Fullerton. Fullerton, California. 1995. Harper, Robert S. Lincoln and the Press. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1951. Harper’s Weekly. April to July 1863. Harris, Brayton. Blue & Gray in Black & White: Newspapers in the Civil War. Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 1999. “Hascall Family in America,” Bentley Family Papers, Ms-720, Center for Archives Collection, Jerome Library, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio. Hascall, Milo Smith. “Autobiography.” Indiana State Archives. Indianapolis, Undated.

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369 Hascall, Milo Smith. “Personal recollections & experiences: concerning the Battle of Stone River.” Goshen, Indiana, Times Publishing Company, 1889, a paper read by request before the Illinois Commander of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the US, at Chicago, Feb. 14, 1889. Hascall, Milo Smith. “Report” to Indiana Adjutant General W.H.H. Terrell. Indiana State Archives, Commission on Public Records. Indianapolis, Undated. Hinshaw, Gil. “From 10,500 Battles: A Handbook of Civil War Engagements.” Superior Printing Company, Hobbs, NM, 1996. History of Elkhart County, Indiana. Charles Chapman & Company, Chicago, 1881. History of Huntington County, Indiana. Brant & Fuller, Chicago, 1887. History of Lawrence and Monroe Counties, Indiana. Indianapolis, 1914. Holman, William S. Papers. Manuscript Division. Indiana State Library. Indianapolis, Indiana. Hovey, Alvin P. Papers. Lilly Library. Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana. Howard County, Indiana, Tribune. April to June 1863. Huntington, Indiana, Democrat. April to June 1863. Huntington, Indiana, Herald. April to June 1863. Indiana State Board of Agriculture, Annual Report. Indianapolis, IN,1851. Indianapolis, Indiana, Indiana State Sentinel. April 1861 to July 1863. Indianapolis, Indiana, Daily Journal. April 1861 to July 1863. Jefferson, Thomas. The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Adrienne Koch and William Harwood Peden, eds. The Modern Library, Random House, New York, 1944. Jefferson, Thomas. Writings. The Library of America, New York, 1984. Johnson, Herbert A., editor. The Papers of John Marshall University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill. 1974. Johnson, Paul. A History of the American People. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., New York, 1997. Kaler, S.P. and P.H. Maring. History of Whitley County, Indiana. Bowen, Chicago, 1907.

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370 Kenworth, Leonard S. The Tall Sycamore of the Wabash. Bruce Humphries Publishers, Inc., Boston, 1936. Kettleborough, Charles. Constitution Making in Indiana, Volume I (Reprint). Indiana Historical Collections, Indianapolis, 1971. Kettleborough, Charles, ed. Manuscript Constitution (1851 Indiana Constitution). Indiana Historical Bureau, Indianapolis. Kinsley, Philip. The Chicago Tribune, Volume I. Knopf, New York, 1943. Klement, Frank L. “Carrington and the Golden Circle Legend in Indiana during the Civil War.” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 61, No. 1, March 1965, 31-52. Klement, Frank L. “Catholics As Copperheads During the Civil War.” Catholic Historical Review, January 1994, Vol. 80, No. 1, 36-58. Klement, Frank L. The Copperheads in the Middle West. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960. Klement, Frank L. The Limits of Dissent. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1970. Klement, Frank L. Lincoln’s Critics. White Mane Books, Shippensburg, PA, 1999. Kriegbaum, Patricia A. “Historical Background of Blackford County, Hartford City, Indiana.” Undated. Lafayette, Indiana, Journal. April to June 1863. Lane, Henry S. Papers. Lilly Library. Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana. Lawrenceburg, Indiana, Democratic Register. Aprilto June 1863. Letter Books, Department of the Ohio, “Letters Sent,” No. 5, Record Group 94, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. Levy, Leonard W. Emergence of a Free Press. Oxford University Press. New York, New York. 1985. Lofton, John. The Press as Guardian of the First Amendment. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1980. Logansport, Indiana, Democratic Pharos. September 1862 to July 1863. Logansport, Indiana, Journal. September 1862 to July 1863. Long, E.B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac. 1861-1865. Doubleday, New York, 1971.

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371 Lora, Ronald and William Henry Longton, editors. The Conservative Press in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century America. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1999. Lowry, Thomas P. Don’t Shoot That Boy! Abraham Lincoln and Military Justice. Savas Publishing Company, Mason City, IA, 1999. Madison, Indiana, Daily Courier. April to June 1863. Marshall County, Indiana, Republican. September 1862 to July 1863. Maihafer, Harry J. War of Words: Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War Press. Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 2001. Manual of Goshen. Butler & Knox. Goshen, IN, 1889. Marshall, John A. An American Bastille: A History of the Illegal Arrests and Imprisonment of American Citizens during the Late Civil War. Philadelphia, 1879. Marszalek, John F. Sherman’s Other War: The General and Civil War Press. Memphis State University Press, Memphis 1981. Marvel, William. Burnside. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1991. Mathews, Joseph J. Reporting the Wars. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1957. Matthews, Lloyd J., ed. Newsmen & National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? Brassey’s, Washington, DC, 1991. McCormick, Joseph N. A Standard History of Starke County, Indiana, Volume I. Lewis Publishing Company, Chicago, 1915. McDonald, Daniel. A Twentieth History of Marshall County, Indiana, Volume I. Lewis Publishing Company, Chicago, 1908. McDonald, Joseph D. Papers. Lilly Library. Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana. McLuachlan, William P. The Indiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT 1996. McPherson, James M. Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution. Oxford University Press, New York, 1990. McPherson, James M. Antietam: The Battle Changed the Course of the Civil War. Oxford University Press, New York, 2002. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Ballantine Books, New York, 1988.

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372 McPherson, James M. Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, Third Edition. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2001. Media Law in Indiana. Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum. Indianapolis, Indiana. 1987. Meiklejohn, Alexander. “The First Amendment is an Absolute.” The Supreme Court Review. Philip B. Kurland, ed. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961, 245-264. Merrill, Catharine. The Soldier of Indiana in the War for the Union, two volumes. Merrill and Company, Indianapolis, 1866-1869. Miller, John W. Indiana Newspaper Bibliography. Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, 1982. Monks, Leander J., ed., Courts and Lawyers of Indiana, Volume II. Federal Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1916. Moores, Charles W. “Caleb Mills and the Indiana School System.” Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Society Publications, III, No. 6, 1905. Morton, Oliver P. Papers. Manuscript Division. Indiana State Library. Indianapolis, Indiana. Morton, Samuel George, J.C. Nott and George R. Gliddon. Types of Mankind: Or, Ethnological Researches, Based Upon the Ancient Monuments, Paintings, Sculptures, and Crania of Races and Upon Their Natural, Geographical, Philological, and Biblical History. Lippincott, Grambo & Company, Philadelphia, 1854. Neace, Estel. “Methodism in Indiana during the Civil War,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis. Indianapolis, Indiana,: Butler University, 1961. Neely, Mark E.: The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties. Oxford University Press, New York, 1991. Neely, Mark E. The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002. New Albany, Indiana, Ledger. April 1861 to July 1863. New York, New York, Express. April to June 1863. New York, New York, News. April to June 1863. New York, New York, Times. September 1862 to July 1863. New York, New York, World. April to June 1863.

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373 North, S.N.D. “The Newspaper and Periodical Press.” U.S. Census Office, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1884. “Order Books.” Department of the Ohio, March through June 1863, Ambrose Everts Burnside Collection, Rhode Island State Historical Society, Manuscripts Division, Providence, RI. Perkins, Samuel E. “Speech of Judge Perkins at Mass Meeting Held at Richmond, Indiana, 25 September 1860,” pamphlet, no date, no printer. Perman, Michael. Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1998. Perry, James M. A Bohemian Brigade: The Civil War Correspondents – Mostly Rough, Sometimes Ready. Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 2000. Peterson, Merrill D., ed. James Madison: A Biography in His Own Words. Harper & Row, New York, 1974. Phillips, Kevin. The Cousins’ Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America. Basic Books, New York, 1999. A Pictorial History of Wells County: Towns and Townships. Donning Company. Virginia Beach, VA, 1999. Pictorial and Biographical Memoirs of Elkhart and St. Joseph Counties, Indiana. Goodspeed Brothers, Chicago, 1893. Plymouth, Indiana, Democrat. September 1862 to July 1863. Porter, Albert G. Indiana Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the Judicature of the State of Indiana. Bowen-Merrill, Indianapolis, IN, 1886. Pulaski County, Indiana, Democrat. April-June 1863. Power, Richard L. Planting Corn Belt Culture: The Impress of the Upland Southerner and Yankee in the Old Northwest. Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. 17. Indianapolis, 1953. Randall, James G. Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1964. Randall, James G. Lincoln the President: Midstream. Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton, NY, 1952. Randall, James G. “The Newspaper Problem in Its Bearing upon Military Secrecy During the Civil War.” American History Review, Vol. 23, January 1918, 303-324.

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374 Randall, James G. and David Henry Donald. The Civil War and Reconstruction, Second Edition. D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA, 1969. Reese, Stephen C., Oscar H. Gandy and August E. Grant, editors. Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, 2001, 7-65. Rehnquist, William H. All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998. Rehnquist, William H. “Civil Liberty and The Civil War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials.” Law School, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1997. Reidelbach, John G. “A Century of Achievement in Pulaski County, Indiana.” Self-published, 1939. Remmo, C.G. “Freedom of the Press.” Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1944-1945, 314-321. Reynolds, Donald E. Editors Make War. Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1966. Richmond, Indiana, Jeffersonian. September 1862 to June 1863. Richmond, Indiana, Palladium. March-June 1863. Risley, Ford. “The Confederate Press Association: Cooperative News Reporting of the War,” Civil War History (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press), Vol. 47, No. 3, September 2001, 222-239. Roberts, Nancy L. “Ten Thousand Tongues Speaking for Peace: Purposes and Strategies of the Nineteenth-Century Peace Advocacy Press.” Journalism History, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 1995, 13-28. Rockport, Indiana, Weekly Democrat. April-June 1863. Rodgers, Thomas E. “Liberty, Will, and Violence: The Political Ideology of the Democrats of West-Central Indiana During the Civil War.” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 92, No. 2, June 1996, 131-59. Roediger, David R. The Wages of Whiteness (Revised Edition). Verso. New York, 1991. Rossiter, Clinton, ed. The Federalist Papers. Mentor Book, Penguin Putnam, Inc. New York. 1999. Rushville, Indiana, Jacksonian. May-June 1863. Rusk, Ralph Leslie. The Literature of the Middle Western Frontier, Volume I. Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, New York, 1962.

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375 Rutland, Robert Allen. James Madison: The Founding Father . University of Missouri Press, Columbia, MO, 1987. Ryan, Charlotte.Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organizing. South End Press, Boston, MA, 1991. Sachsman, David B., S. Kitrell Rushing and Debra Reddin Van Tuyll. The Civil War and the Press. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2000. St. Joseph Valley, Indiana, Register. September 1862 to June 1863. Salem, Indiana, Democratic Banner of Liberty. April to June 1863. Salem, Indiana, Union Advocate. April to June 1863. Salem, Indiana, Washington Democrat. April to June 1863. Scott, Robert Garth. Forgotten Valor: The Memoirs, Journals, and Civil Wars Letters of Orlando B. Willcox. Kent State University Press, Kent, 1999. Scott, Robert N. et al., eds. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1891. Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1996. Shinn, Benjamin G. Biographical Memoirs of Blackford County, Indiana. Bowen, Chicago, 1900. Siebert, Fredrick S., Wilbur Schram, and Theodore Peters. Four Theories of the Press. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1963. Siebert, Fredrick S. Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Controls. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1952. Sifakis, Stewart. Who Was Who in the Civil War. Facts on File Publications, New York, 1988. Skidmore, Joe. “The Copperhead Press and the Civil War.” Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1939, 345-55. Sloan, William David. The Media in America: A History, Fifth Edition. Vision Press, Northport, AL, 2002. Small, William J. Political Power and the Press. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1972. Smith, Edward Conrad. The Borderland in the Civil War. AMS Press, New York, 1970.

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376 Smith, Jeffrey A. War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power. Oxford University Press, Cary, NC, 1999. Smith, James Morton. Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1956. Smith, Reed W. Samuel Medary & the Crisis: Testing the Limits of Press Freedom. Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1995. Smith, Reed. W. “The Paradox of Samuel Medary, Cooperhead Newspaper Publisher.” The Civil War and the Press. David B. Sachsman, S. Kittrell Rushing and Debra Riddin van Tuyll, editors. Transactions Books, Piscataway, NJ, 2001, 291-306. South Bend, Indiana, Forum. September 1862 to June 1863. Stampp, Kenneth M. Indiana Politics During the Civil War. Indiana Historical Bureau, Indianapolis, 1949. Starke County, Indiana, Press. May-June 1863. Starr, Louis M. Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Newsmen in Action. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1954. Stevens, Joseph E. 1863: The Rebirth of a Nation. Bantam, New York, 1999. Stoll, John B. History of Indiana From Its Exploration to 1922; Also an Account of St. Joseph County from Its Organization. Dayton Historical Publishing, Dayton, Ohio. 1922. Stoler, Mildred C. “Influence of the Democratic Element in the Republican Party of Illinois and Indiana, 1854-1860.” Doctoral dissertation. Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana. 1938. Stonex, Wilber L. “Salem Bank of Goshen, Indiana.” Indiana Magazine of History. Vol. 23, No. 1. 1927, 83-91. Stowe, Harriett Beecher. Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Bantam Books. New York, New York. 1981. Originally published in 1851. Sulgrove, Berry R. History of Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 1884. Sullivan, Indiana, Democrat. April to June 1863. Talese, Gay. The Kingdom and the Power. The World Publishing Company. New York, New York. 1966.

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378 Towne, Stephen E. “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863.” Paper delivered at the Fall 2002 Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, held at University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Chattanooga, Tennessee. October 2002. Towne, Stephen E. “West Point Letters of Cadet Milo S. Hascall, 1848-1850.” Indiana Magazine of History. Vol. 90, No. 3. September 1994, 278-94. Towne, Stephen E. “Works of Indiscretion: Violence against the Press in Indiana during the Civil War.” Paper presented to the Symposium on the 19 th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression. Chattanooga, Tennessee. Oct. 31, 2003. Tredway, G.R., Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration. Indiana Historical Bureau. Indianapolis, Indiana. 1973. Tredway, Gilbert R. “Indiana against the Administration, 1861-1865.” Doctoral dissertation. Indiana University. Bloomington, Indiana. 1962. United States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census, Washington, DC, 1880. Van Bolt, Roger H. “Indiana in Political Transition, 1851-1853,” Indiana Magazine of History. Volume 49, 1953, 131-160. Vallandigham, James L. A Life of Clement L. Vallandigham. Turnbull Brothers. Baltimore, Maryland. 1872. Valley of the Upper Maumee River, with Historical Account of Allen county and the City of Fort Wayne, Indiana. The Story of its Progress From Savagery to Civilization, Volume II. Brant and Fuller. Madison, Wisconsin. 1889. Vincennes, Indiana, Weekly Gazette. April to June 1863. Vincennes, Indiana, Western Sun. April to June 1863. Voorhees, Charles S., ed. Speeches of Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana, Embracing His Most Prominent Forensic, Political, Occasional, and Literary Addresses. Robert Clarke & Company. Cincinnati, Ohio. 1875. Wabash, Indiana, Intelligencer. April to June 1863. Wabash, Indiana, Plain Dealer. April to June 1863. Wagman, Robert J. The First Amendment Book. Pharos Books. New York. 1991. Walsh, Justin. To Print the News and Raise Hell! A Biography of Wilbur F. Story. University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 1968.

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379 Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of Union Commanders. Louisiana State University Press. Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 1964. Warsaw, Indiana, Northern Indianian. April to June 1863. Warsaw, Indiana, Union. April to June 1863. Washington, DC, National Daily Intelligencer, 25 May 1847. Watson, Harry L. Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America. Noonday Press. New York. 1990. Watts, Edward and David Rachels. The First West: Writing from the American Frontier, 1776-1860. Oxford University Press. New York. 2002. Weaver, Abraham E. A Standard History of Elkhart County, Indiana: An Authentic narrative of the Past, with Particular Attention to the Modern Era in the Commercial, Industrial, Educational, Civic and Social Development. Two Volumes. American Historical Society. Chicago, Illinois. 1916. Webben, Hubert H. Civil War Iowa and the Copperhead Movement. Iowa State University. Ames, Iowa. 1980. Welles, Gideon. Diary of Gideon Welles. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, Massachusetts. 1911. Willis, High E. “Freedom of Speech and of the Press,” Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 7, April 1929, 445-455. Wills, Garry. James Madison. Times Books, New York, 2002. Woollen, William Watson. Biographical and Historical Sketches of Early Indiana. C.E. Pauley & Company. Indianapolis, Indiana, 1883. Woollen, William Watson. “Reminiscences of the Early Marion County Bar.” Indiana Historical Society Publications, Volume VII. C.E. Pauley & Company. Indianapolis, Indiana, 1923, 185-208. Woollen, William Watson. Richard W. Thompson Papers. Indianapolis, Indiana. Indiana Division, Indiana State Library, June 8, 1847 manuscript. Woollen, William Wesley. “The Indiana Press of the Olden Time.” Biographical and Historical Sketches of Early Indiana. Hammond & Company. Indianapolis, Indiana, 1883, 538-559. Wright, Joseph A. An Address Delivered at the Installation of Rev. L. W. Berry, D.D., as President of Indiana Asbury University, July 16, 1850. Indianapolis, Indiana, 1850.

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380 Wright, Joseph A. “Eulogy of Stephen A. Douglas.” Indiana State Sentinel Print. Indianapolis, Indiana. 1862. Zelezny, John D. Communications Law: Liberties, Restraints, and the Modern Media. Wadsworth. Belmont, California. 1997.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH David Bulla is a native of Greensboro, North Carolina, where he attended Grimsley Senior High School and delivered his hometown newspaper as a teenager. His father, Joseph Redding Bulla, was an industrial engineer for Western Electric (AT&T) and a commander in the Naval Reserves. Father and son were amateur radio operators and avid readers of newspapers. Joseph Bulla died in 1986. David’s mother, Rebecca Williams Bulla, still lives in Greensboro and is a retired administrative assistant for the Graduate School of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Before he began work on his doctoral degree at the University of Florida, Bulla earned his B.A. in English from UNC at Greensboro and his M.A. in journalism from Indiana University in Bloomington. He has an extensive background in sports journalism, having worked for the Greensboro News & Record, Durham Sun, Winston-Salem Chronicle, Black College Sports Review, and Peegs.com. Bulla won sports journalism awards from the National Newspaper Publishers Association and the North Carolina Press Association in 1986-87. He also taught high school journalism and English in North Carolina throughout the 1990s. He was the adviser of newspapers at Greensboro Smith and Dudley high schools and served as vice president for newspapers of the North Carolina Scholastic Media Association in 1999. Bulla focuses his research on the history of U.S. journalism, especially the history of freedom of the press and Civil War journalism. Other research interests include convergence, sports communication, scholastic journalism, and literary nonfiction. He won the Frances Wilhoit Award for research at Indiana University in 2001; had the 381

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382 outstanding student research paper in 2002 for the Scholastic Journalism Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication; and was named the top teaching assistant for UF’s College of Journalism and Communications and honored as a top teaching assistant for the university in 2002-03. Bulla, who taught introductory media writing, literary journalism, and sports writing at UF, began his college teaching career in August 2004 at the Greenlee School of Journalism and Communications at Iowa State University in Ames, Iowa. Bulla also teaches at the High School Journalism Institute at Indiana University. He is married to journalist Kalpana Ramgopal, a newspaper designer and former features reporter for the New Indian Express in Chennai, India. Bulla enjoys sports, nature, reading, music, and traveling. He is a former high school basketball and cross-country coach. He has had the good fortune to work under the following master teachers: Steve Hankins, Irwin Smallwood, Allen H. Johnson, Cleve Wilhoit, Jack Dvorak, Kay Phillips, Julie Dodd, and Bernell Tripp. He would also like to mention three teachers who had a profound effect on his life: UNCG literature professor Walter Beale, retired UNCG physics professor Richard Whitlock, and novelist-essayist Walker Percy.