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Effects of Extensive Television and Newspaper Exposure to Terrorism Reporting on Fear of Victimization and Curtailing Civil Liberties:  Media Use Interactions and Gender Differences

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Effects of Extensive Television and Newspaper Exposure to Terrorism Reporting on Fear of Victimization and Curtailing Civil Liberties: Media Use Interactions and Gender Differences
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RAGSDALE, ANDREW MARK ( Author, Primary )
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2008

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Civil liberties ( jstor )
Crime victims ( jstor )
Fear of crime ( jstor )
News content ( jstor )
Newspapers ( jstor )
Public records ( jstor )
Terrorism ( jstor )
Viewers ( jstor )
Violence ( jstor )
Women ( jstor )

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Copyright Andrew Mark Ragsdale. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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6/1/2004
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434595871 ( OCLC )

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EFFECTS OF EXTENSIVE TELEVISION AND NEWSPAPER EXPOSURE TO TERRORISM REPORTING ON FEAR OF VICTIMIZATION AND CURTAILING CIVIL LIBERTIES: MEDIA USE INTERACTIONS AND GENDER DIFFERENCES By ANDREW MARK RAGSDALE A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2003

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Copyright 2003 by Andrew Mark Ragsdale

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This thesis is dedicated to the trees whose lives may have been spared by my decision to submit this thesis electronically. May you sway at ease in the wind of the electronic age!

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank Mary Ann Ferguson, Ph.D., my mentor and advisor during my time as a graduate student and employee in the College of Journalism and Communications, for guiding me through the research and writing of this thesis, and for agreeing to serve as chair of my committee. Without the guidance, encouragement, sense of humor and incredible patience provided by Dr. Ferguson, this thesis would never have been started. My sincere gratitude is also extended to Dr. Linda Perry and Dr. Leonard Tipton, who, as engaging and thought-provoking professors of public relations and journalism, provided valuable insight about the world of mass communications and life in general. Lastly, my heartfelt appreciation goes out to my loving wife, Jill, whose abundance of patience was almost exhausted by the infinite number of “reminders” I required from her during the course of my graduate studies. iv

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................iv LIST OF FIGURES.........................................................................................................viii ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................xi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 Terrorism and the Mass Media....................................................................................1 Terrorism and Civil Liberties......................................................................................4 Cultivation Theory.......................................................................................................5 Research Questions......................................................................................................6 2 LITERATURE REVIEW.............................................................................................9 History.........................................................................................................................9 How Cultivation “Works”.........................................................................................11 Measuring/Assessing Cultivation..............................................................................12 Cultivation Analysis..................................................................................................13 Cultivation, Violence, Victimization and Acquiescence...........................................14 Terrorism and Fear-inducing Mass Media................................................................16 Television versus Other Media..................................................................................18 Cultivation and Gender Effects.................................................................................19 Issues in Cultivation Research...................................................................................20 The “Weakness” of Cultivation Correlations............................................................29 3 METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................................31 Survey........................................................................................................................31 Variables....................................................................................................................32 Television Exposure...........................................................................................32 Fear of Victimization..........................................................................................33 Willingness of Respondents to Curtail Civil Liberties.......................................33 Survey Questions Gauging Attitudes Towards Civil Liberties.................................34 v

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4 FINDINGS..................................................................................................................36 Hypothesis One..........................................................................................................36 Television Viewing Measured as a Linear Measurement..................................37 Television Viewing Measured in Three Distinct Groupings..............................38 Hypothesis Two.........................................................................................................40 Television Viewing as a Linear Measurement...................................................40 Television Viewing Measured in Three Distinct Groupings..............................41 Hypothesis Three.......................................................................................................42 Civil Liberties: Index Measurement..................................................................43 Civil Liberties: Measured Individually.............................................................44 Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis.........................................44 Curtail right of access to some public records.............................................46 Curtail access to some public meetings........................................................46 Concern over new anti-terrorism laws vs. restriction of freedom of information...............................................................................................47 Concern about limits on public access to information.................................48 Threat of terrorism vs. concern about access to information.......................49 Respondents’ justification for government restrictions on civil liberties....50 Hypothesis Four.........................................................................................................52 Civil liberties: Measured Individually...............................................................52 Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis.........................................52 Curtail right of access to some public records.............................................53 Curtail access to some public meetings........................................................54 Concern over new anti-terrorism laws vs. restriction of freedom of information...............................................................................................55 Concern about limits on public access to information.................................56 Threat of terrorism vs. concern about access to information.......................58 Justification for state or federal restrictions on civil liberties......................59 Civil liberties: Index Measurement...................................................................60 Hypothesis Five.........................................................................................................61 Hypothesis Six...........................................................................................................65 Civil Liberties: Index Measurement..................................................................65 Civil Liberties: Measured Individually.............................................................65 Curtail right of access to some public records.............................................66 Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis.........................................68 Hypothesis Seven.......................................................................................................70 Hypothesis Eight........................................................................................................72 Civil Liberties: Measured Individually.............................................................72 Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis.........................................72 Curtail right of access to some public records.............................................73 Curtail access to some public meetings........................................................74 Concern over new anti-terrorism laws vs. restriction of freedom of information...............................................................................................75 Concern about limits on public access to information.................................76 Threat of terrorism vs. concern about access to information.......................77 vi

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Justification for state or federal restrictions on civil liberties......................78 Civil Liberties: Index Measurement..................................................................78 5 DISCUSSION.............................................................................................................81 Summary....................................................................................................................81 Television Exposure to Terrorism and the Belief of Becoming a Victim of Terrorism.........................................................................................................81 Fear of Victimization and the Willingness to Curtail Civil Liberties................83 Television, Newspapers, and the Belief of Becoming a Victim of Terrorism...84 Gender and Victimization...................................................................................85 Gender and the Willingness to Curtail Civil Liberties.......................................85 Limitations.................................................................................................................87 Design.................................................................................................................87 Questionnaire......................................................................................................87 Sample................................................................................................................88 September 11......................................................................................................89 Conclusions................................................................................................................90 Future Research.........................................................................................................91 APPENDIX FOI QUESTIONNAIRE..............................................................................96 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................106 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................109 vii

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure page 1.1: Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism by Hours per day Watching Television Coverage of Crisis...............................................................37 1.2: Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism by Level of Television Consumption of Terrorist Crisis............................................................................39 2.1: Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism by Hours per day Watching Television Coverage of Crisis.................40 2.2: Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism by Television Consumption of Terrorist Crisis....................................42 3.1: Attitude Towards Civil Liberties After Sept. 11 by the Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism...........................................................................44 3.2: Willing to Curtail Civil Liberties During Crisis by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism..........................................................................45 3.3: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Records During Crisis by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism.............................................46 3.4: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Meetings During Crisis by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism.............................................47 3.5: Anti-terrorism Laws: Too Restrictive vs. Not Strong Enough by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism.............................................48 3.6: Concern About Passing Laws Limiting Access to Public by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism...............................................................49 3.7: Change in Concern About Access to Information Since Sept. by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism.............................................50 3.8: Justification for the Government to Curtail Civil by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism..........................................................................51 4.1: Willingness to Give Up Civil Liberties During Crisis by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism................................53 viii

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4.2: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Records During Crisis Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism................................54 4.3: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Meetings Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism................................................55 4.4: Anti-terrorism Laws: Too Restrictive vs. Not Strong Enough by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism................56 4.5: Concern About Laws Limiting Access to Public Information by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism................57 4.6: Change in Concern About Accessing Information Since Sept. 11 by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism................58 4.7: Justification for Government Restricting Civil Liberties by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism................................59 4.8: Attitude Towards Civil Liberties After Sept. 11 by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism.......................................61 5.1: Total Media Consumption and the Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism................................................................................................................63 5.2: Total Media Consumption and the Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism...............................................................64 6.1: Level of Total Media Consumption and the Willingness to Curtail Access to Public Records.......................................................................................................67 6.2: Level of Total Media Consumption and the Willingness to Give Up Civil Liberties During Times of Crisis...........................................................................68 7.1: Belief of Personally Likely to Become Victim of Terrorism by Gender...................70 7.2: Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become Victim of Terrorism by Gender...............................................................................................................72 8.1: Willing to Give Up Civil Liberties During Times of Crisis by Gender....................73 8.2: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Information by Gender.....................................74 8.3: Willing to Limit Access to Public Meetings by Gender............................................75 8.4: Anti-terrorism Laws: Too Restrictive vs. Not Strong Enough by Gender...............76 8.5: Concern About Laws Limiting Access to Public Records by Gender.......................76 ix

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8.6: Change in Level of Concern About Accessing Public Records Since Sept. 11 by Gender...............................................................................................................77 8.7: Justification for Government to Curtail Civil Liberties by Gender...........................78 8.8: Attitudes Towards Civil Liberties After Sept. 11 by Gender....................................79 x

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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Mass Communication EFFECTS OF EXTENSIVE TELEVISION AND NEWSPAPER EXPOSURE TO TERRORISM REPORTING ON FEAR OF VICTIMIZATION AND CURTAILING CIVIL LIBERTIES: MEDIA USE INTERACTIONS AND GENDER DIFFERENCES By Andrew Mark Ragsdale August 2003 Chair: Mary Ann Ferguson Major Department: Journalism and Communications Using the fundamental hypothesis of cultivation theory (i.e., heavy viewers of television are more likely to believe that the world is a “mean and scary” place), this study examines the impact that heavy consumption of television coverage of the September 11 crisis had on the public with regards to people’s beliefs about becoming victims of terrorism. Additionally, this study examined how media and “victimized” audiences felt about their civil liberties—particularly with regards to the right to access public information—during times of crisis, and their willingness to curb these civil liberties in an effort to prevent harm from future acts of terrorism. Data for this study were culled from a statewide random telephone survey (n = 446) in which respondents were asked questions pertaining to their media usage habits, knowledge and beliefs about state freedom of information laws, attitudes towards the first xi

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amendment, and their willingness to curtail their civil liberties for protection from terrorism. Data from this study do not reveal a direct association between the amount of television or newspaper consumption of terrorism reporting and the belief of the likelihood of becoming a victim of terrorism, but do reveal the existence of media interactions (among various levels of television and newspaper consumption) and gender differences and the belief of the likelihood of becoming a victim of terrorism and the willingness to curtail civil liberties. In particular, those who were classified as Light Viewers of television and either Medium or Heavy Readers of newspaper reporting on terrorism were significantly less likely than Heavy Viewers to indicate they were willing to have constraints placed on their civil liberties. Similarly, those classified as Heavy Viewers and Light Readers were the group most likely to indicate they are willing to have constraints placed on these civil liberties. Data from this study also revealed that females are significantly more likely than males to believe that someone they care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism. Furthermore, females were significantly more likely than males to answer that they are willing to have their access to public records and public meetings curbed, to have constraints placed on their civil liberties during times of crisis, and to be less supportive, in general, about supporting and maintaining their civil liberties during times of crisis. xii

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In the months immediately following the horrific events of September 11, 2001, it was next to impossible to turn on a television or radio—or open a newspaper or magazine, for that matter—without being confronted by images, stories and reports about the devastating effects and far-reaching consequences of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. A few weeks after these initial terrorist attacks, the news added yet more fear and speculation for the American people to digest with its coverage of the anthrax attacks (and hoaxes) being delivered through the United States postal service. More than a year after these terrifying events, newspaper and television news continue to dedicate significant coverage to the ongoing events and reactions taking place as a result of these terrorist attacks. Certainly, following the events of September 11, a great number of people were watching more television than they normally would to find out what had happened, what went wrong, and what was being done to amend these problems and alleviate our fears. What this hungry television audience may have learned from watching television coverage of the terrorist crisis, however, may have been more profound and more subtle than they had been expecting. Terrorism and the Mass Media Without doubt, the terrorists responsible for the atrocities of September 11 purposefully coordinated the attacks on the World Trade Center to maximize television coverage of the events, thus maximizing the effects of their terror. “No producer could 1

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2 have staged the horror for television more dramatically,” writes John Higgins (2001) in Broadcasting & Cable (p.3). By crashing the first hijacked jetliner into the World Trade Center Tower 1 at rush hour, the terrorists caught the attention of TV stations’ morning traffic helicopters ringing Manhattan well positioned to deliver live pictures a few minutes later as the second passenger jet plowed into Tower 2. As the twin towers stood for their final hour, television crews had time to capture images of frightened evacuees pouring through the streets, trapped office workers clinging to the outside of the buildings and—most chillingly—terrified jumpers choosing to plunge to their deaths rather than face the 2,000-degree flames consuming the upper floors. And finally, TV captured the New York City icons’ slow collapse into the streets. (Higgins, 2001, p.3) This assessment of Higgins and numerous other journalists and news reporters lends credibility to Higgins’ assertion that the “attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was made for TV” (p. 3), and that “terrorism has become an act of mass communications” (Joan Deppa, in Higgins, 2001, p. 3). Scott Stossel (2001) makes the argument for the symbiotic relationship between television and terrorism, stating that whereas “[T]elevision relies on the potent visual image to attract viewers terrorism, which traffics in potent visual images, relies on television as a transmission mechanism” (2). Stossel elaborates on this relationship: By serving the public interest, which requires broadcasting terrorist actions (and the effects of terrorist actions), television is also serving the terrorists’ interests: transmitting horrifying images to massive numbers of people, thereby engendering mass anxiety and instability (Stossel, 2001, p. 2). Roxanne Farmanfarmaian (2002) also explores the link between media and terrorism by illustrating how the natural evolution of a newsworthy event can cause the event to morph into a story that appears to be larger than life. Farmanfarmaian states that the first goal of the news media is “to always provide a compelling story” (Farmanfarmaian, 2002, p. 161). After the initial reporting of a “successful” story, the media will then “stretch out the story for as long as it can, transmuting it little by little

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3 from hard news to soft as events slow down” (p. 161; see also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 138). In order to keep the story alive and “counter the risk of boredom” as the “hard news” aspects fade, Farmanfarmaian contends that over time the statements made and “views expressed start becoming more extreme, labels and countdowns are introduced, manhunts and conspiracy theories become common fare” (p. 161). The tendency of the media to “stretch” a story can have profound effects on the viewing public, especially when the story being stretched revolves around terrorism and terrorist actions, such as the events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks of 2001. Farmanfarmaian writes that the “stretching” and exaggerations of terrorist attacks can reach absurd proportions, as in the case of the anthrax scare in the US, where over the course of several weeks the number of victims and the quantity of evidence remained extremely small, and there were no arrests. Yet, the amount of radio and television time and newsprint columns devoted to the subject insured it remained front-page “news.” (p. 161) The continuous outpouring of “stretched” news pertaining to the anthrax attacks, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and unfolding coverage of the new “war on terrorism” taking place in Afghanistan was indeed a “media windfall”of coverage and public attention. How much attention these actions deserved to receive is up for debate. However, as Farmanfarmaian notes about the anthrax attacks in particular, but equally true for the attacks of September 11, “the articulated speculation [of the media] amplified emotions, leading to rumor and panic in a country already suffering from a siege mentality.” Thus “the media played into the terrorist’s hands through coverage that was much broader, in fact, than the actual substance, or dimension, of the attack” (p. 161).

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4 This position also is held by Richard Barnet (1996), who, writing about the terrorist attacks that took place during the Clinton administration, stated that the point of a terrorist attack is to produce a reaction more devastating than the attack itself; thus, “the more panic a terrorist bomb sets off, the greater the success” (1996, p. 5). Terrorism and Civil Liberties Media coverage of terrorism and terrorist attacks has the potential to cause more than just an increase in fear, anxiety and xenophobia among the viewing public. Although some argue anti-terrorism actions taken by the government have successfully been used to “unite the country behind a confused foreign policy” and “polish the President’s image,” public fear of terrorism, war or different political ideologies historically has been used by politicians “to justify centralization of authority, stripping away of citizens’ rights, surveillance and executions,” with “politicians in both parties [calling] for still broader government powers and increased expenditure to fight the global war on terrorism” (Barnet, 1996, 2). These measures, taken to boost security against terrorism, have included passage of broad congressional bills (e.g., the Terrorism Prevention Act of 1998, and the USA Patriot Act of 2001) “boosting the powers of the federal government to exact the death penalty, limit appeals of convicts on death row, deport suspect foreigners and wiretap U.S. citizens—all in the name of making us feel safe” (Barnet, 1996, p. 2). While it appears true that the terrorists responsible for the devastation of September 11 and the anthrax attacks have succeeded in awakening the realization of a great many people “to the possibility of their own sudden death” (Barnet, 1996, p. 4), it is much more likely that an American will die as a result of an automobile accident, heart attack, or complications from smoking than as the victim of a terrorist plot. And although Barnet

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5 was specifically referring to the Terrorism Prevention Act of the Clinton Administration when speaking on the after-effects of terrorism legislature, his statements are equally applicable to the USA Patriot Act of the Bush Administration: “Armed with [anti-terrorism legislation, the government,] in the name of national security, strikes out ineffectually abroad and at home hacks away at our historic freedoms” (Barnet, 1996, p. 6). Cultivation Theory While a great deal of uncertainty exists regarding the immediate effects that watching television has on its audience, most do not doubt that television plays an important role in helping people to understand and define the world in which we live. George Gerbner’s theory of cultivation posits that television has become humanity’s primary “storyteller,” whose stories are woven together to “form the mainstream of our popular culture” (Signorielli and Morgan, 1996, p. 114). Cultivation theorists argue that people construct their beliefs about the “real world” in part from observations they make while watching television. Further, Gerbner et al. have conducted a considerable number of studies indicating that television creates a “greater sense of apprehension” among heavier viewers (i.e., those who watch a great deal of television), and that these viewers are “more likely than comparable groups to overestimate one’s chances of involvement in violence” (Gerbner et al., 1994, p. 5). The likelihood of suffering a fate similar to those in the Pentagon and World Trade Center terrorist attacks—or from exposure to anthrax—is small. However, the theory of cultivation suggests that repeated exposure to crime and violence on television—especially realistic violence (see Nabi and Sullivan, 2001), such as the planes slamming

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6 into the World Trade Center—increases heavy viewers’ perceptions that they are likely to become victims of crime and/or violence. Research Questions This paper examines the relationship of heavy exposure to television coverage of the terrorist attacks (including both the events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks) and the degree to which this audience was likely to identify themselves as likely to become victims of terrorism. Further, this paper will explore how willing this “victimized” audience would be to put constraints on their basic civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. One of the fundamental hypotheses of Gerbner’s cultivation theory is that heavy exposure to television results in viewers who are more apt to believe they live in a mean and scary world. For the purpose of this study, the “mean and scary world” belief is defined as the belief that the respondent, or someone close to the respondent, will become a victim of terrorism. Researchers examining cultivation have also determined that heavy exposure to television also produces “a willingness to accept potentially repressive measures in the name of security” (Morgan, 2002, paragraph12). Under most circumstances, the civil liberties we are guaranteed by the United States Constitution are deemed as powerful tools and protective devices that “we the people” have to protect ourselves against government tyranny. However, during times of crisis, these same “protections” may be viewed as obstacles for the government in carrying out its duties of protecting its citizenry (see Paulson, 2002). Since people living in fear of terrorism wish, like others, for their anxieties to be lessened (if not completely eliminated), it is likely those in most

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7 fear would be more willing to do whatever it takes to preserve their “security” or piece of mind. The second question this paper examines is whether television has a stronger effect than newspapers alone in the creation of an audience that believes they are likely to become victims of terrorism, and whether those who are television-dependent are more willing than a newspaper audience to give up their civil liberties in the name of protection against terrorism. On September 11 and several days immediately thereafter, most of the major television networks suspended regularly scheduled programming and advertisements, opting for around-the-clock coverage of the terrorist crisis. Indeed, many non-news cable and broadcast channels (e.g., MTV, ESPN, The Learning Channel, The Home Shopping Network, QVC, etc.) dropped their regular programs so they could relay the live images of the news from other network feeds (Higgins, 2001, p.6). Viewers were continuously bombarded with the images of the planes striking the towers, people and debris falling to the streets below, the collapse of the buildings and the complete devastation of several city blocks in lower Manhattan. While newspapers also provided extensive coverage and pictures of the attacks, television coverage was available 24 hours every day, and viewers watched the news unfold as it happened. If the ultimate goal of terrorism is to strike fear in the minds of those who witness the terrorists’ assaults (as discussed above), then television certainly plays a key role in the dissemination of terror. Since television clearly has a more profound visual impact on its audience, it appears reasonable that television coverage of the terrorist crisis would elicit stronger fear than newspapers in the belief of becoming victims of terrorism.

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8 The final question this thesis examines is whether or not gender plays a role in the likelihood that a person believes he or she will become a victim of terrorism, and whether males or females would be more likely to give up their civil liberties in the name of protection against terrorism. Numerous studies have demonstrated that females tend to exhibit more fear than their male counterparts. Indeed, in general, women are “more easily frightened” than males (Cantor, 2002; Birnbaum & Croll, 1984). Also, cultivation scholars have demonstrated that “TV news significantly predicted [females’] fear” (Chiricos et al., 2000, p. 762), and that “female is the personal trait most consistently linked to fear of crime” (p. 765). Chicoros et al. also determined in an earlier study (1997) that “the relationship between television news and fear of crime is exclusive to women” (Weimann, p. 110), and that women’s fear of becoming a victim of crime was 25% higher than that of men (p. 110). While it is impossible in the scope of this thesis to determine the exact causal mechanisms for the development of people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, it is worth examining the relationship between heavy exposure to television coverage of the terrorist crises and people’s fear of becoming victims of terrorism. If it is evident that heavy exposure to television news was related to significant segments of the population worrying about becoming victims of terrorism, it is worrisome to think of the possible ramifications of these terrorism—and news-induced fears. How far would a population scared of becoming victims of terrorism be willing to go to protect itself? What rights would they be willing to give up? In the long run, it may be a more frightening scenario to imagine a nation sacrificing its constitutional rights than one afraid of unsuspected—and unspecified—terrorist attacks.

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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW George Gerbner, the preeminent scholar behind the creation of and continuing support for cultivation theory, began his studies of media and media effects—particularly that of television—in the early 1960s. It was not until the late 1960s, however, that Gerbner and his colleagues began in-depth research into the long-term cultivating aspects of television, to become known as “cultivation theory.” Since the inception of the Cultural Indicators project in the late 1960s, scholars and researchers have published hundreds of studies and articles relating to, confirming, reaffirming and challenging the basic hypotheses and concepts of Gerbner’s cultivation theory. This literature review will provide a basic introduction to cultivation theory, its conception, some of its limitations, how it has evolved, and the impact it predicts for the television audience watching news coverage of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. History In the late 1960s, Congress founded The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (NCCVP) to explore the causes behind the increasing amount of violence taking place in America (Signorielli & Morgan, 1996, p. 112). In turn, the NCCPV commissioned George Gerbner to examine the effects that television violence had on stimulating violence and aggression in the television-viewing public. The result was the creation of the Cultural Indicators project, established in 1969, which began a decades-long research project monitoring the amount and types of violent content found 9

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10 in television programming and assessing the relationship between television violence and violence in the real world. In an article written in 1969, Gerbner expressed his goal of creating a measurement system of “cultural indicators” with which to monitor “the pulse of the nature and tempo of [the] transformation” taking place in society as a result of mass communicated messages (p. 138). Gerbner argued that mass communication, particularly television, has become the “the basis of community consciousness” (p. 140), through which “communities cultivate shared and public notions about facts, values, and contingencies of human existence” (p. 138). The Cultural Indicators project was conceived to “identify and track” these so-called “facts” and “values,” and any notions or “conclusions they might cultivate across TV’s diverse publics” (Gerbner & Gross, 1976b, p. 175). Gerbner realized from the outset that examining the cultivating effects of television would require extensive (and extended) long-term research. Moreover, Gerbner realized the difficulty of narrowing the independent variable of his research to television exposure. While Gerbner’s task of investigating the role that television plays in creating or propagating violence in society was ambitious (if not daunting), he stated that his purpose was not to pinpoint any direct or immediate media effects. Rather, he was “concerned with the collective context within which, and in response to which, different individual and group selections and interpretations of messages take place” (p. 139). Gerbner also alludes in this article to one of the recurring effects revealed through cultivation research regarding the perception of a “mean and scary world.” Gerbner

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11 states, “Selective habits of participation in one’s cultural environment limit each of us to risky, and often faulty, extrapolation about the cultural experience of heterogeneous communities” (p. 138). In other words, since humans cannot see the “whole picture” of every event or story all of the time, they rely on only a few sources from which they must piece together the “whole story.” Because of this natural and unavoidable condition, Gerbner foreshadows the findings of numerous future cultivation studies: heavy viewers of television have faulty perceptions about the “real world” as a result of extrapolating the limited, yet abundant, images and messages taken from the “stories” they see on television. How Cultivation “Works” When Gerbner and his colleagues discuss cultivation, they are not referring to any “direct,” specific media effects television has on its audience. Rather, they refer to cultivation as the long-term socialization and “enculturation” of the television audience in learning, understanding and accepting the various characteristics, roles and behaviors people play in society. In the first installment of The Violence Profile, an ongoing series of research studies of the Cultural Indicators project started in 1967, Gerbner and Gross begin with the assertion that television has become the predominant “storyteller” and “the central cultural arm of American society” (1976b, p. 175). They then differentiate the role television plays from that of other media of mass communication, demonstrating how television is the farthest-reaching, most pervasive and “centralized cultural influence to permeate both the initial and the final years of life” (p. 176), as well as all points in between. Gerbner and Gross then credit television as being “the flagship of industrial mass culture” (p. 177), which they claim is responsible for creating the “socially

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12 constructed ‘reality’ [which] gives a coherent picture of what exists, what is important, what is related to what, and what is right” (p. 176). From the portrait that Gerbner and Gross paint, television assumes the epic task of being both the primary tool of socialization and the teacher of culture, for audiences rich and poor alike. Gerbner and Gross do, however, differentiate between the television world and the “real” world to illustrate a subtle, yet powerful effect of television enculturation. They describe the real world as consisting of obscure motives, ambiguous outcomes, complex personalities and unpredictable people, where “the truth is never pure and rarely simple,” whereas the world depicted on television is more like “an open book,” where “problems are never left hanging, rewards and punishments are present and accounted for [and] the rules of the game are known and rarely change” (p. 179). Moreover, besides inviting the viewer into the “important and fascinating institutions” of medicine, law, big business, etc., the television audience also is exposed to “the important people” who fill these roles. Thus, the television audience is provided with “the broadest common background of assumptions not only about what things are but also about how they work, or should work, and why” (p. 179). In this manner, Gerbner and Gross contend, television cultivates its audience—all of society—into accepting and expecting certain elements of the television world as being truthful and representative of the real world. Measuring/Assessing Cultivation In an article published in Psychology Today (April 1976a), Gerbner and Gross illustrate how cultivation works (in theory) by asking the reader to imagine a cave-dwelling hermit whose only connection to the outside world is through a television set in his cave. If the hermit’s knowledge of the real world is based exclusively on the images and “stories” he sees on television, it would follow that his perceptions and understanding

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13 about the real world would be synonymous with his view of television-based reality, and “[h]is view of human nature would be shaped by the shallow psychology of TV characters” (p. 42). Gerbner and Gross realize that nobody is entirely dependent on television for their complete understanding and view of the world, but they point out that most of us do not have first-hand experience with most of the situations and institutions (e.g., police raids, criminal trials, corporate boardrooms, hospital emergency rooms, etc.) seen on television, either (pp. 42-43). Because much of television’s entertainment programming is based on storylines revolving around these themes, Gerbner and Gross postulate that much of people’s perceptions about these societal functions are, to a large extent, based upon the depictions they see on television: We assume, therefore, that TV’s standardizing and legitimizing influence comes largely from its ability to streamline, amplify, ritualize, and spread into hitherto isolated or protected subcultures, home, nooks, and crannies of the land [these] conventional capsules of mass produced information and entertainment. (1976b, p.181) Cultivation Analysis The challenge of detecting cultivation effects was met through Gerbner’s (and his colleagues’) development of the three-pronged Cultural Indicators project. The first step of the Cultural Indicators project was the institutional process analysis, which examines “how the flow of media messages [are] produced, managed, and distributed” (Signorielli & Morgan, p. 112). The second step, message system analysis, was designed as a periodic, longitudinal content-analysis of “large and representative aggregates of television output” (Gerbner & Gross, 1976b, p. 181), which was designed to “track the most stable, pervasive, and recurrent images in media content, in terms of the portrayal of violence, minorities, gender-roles, occupations, and so on” (Signorielli & Morgan, p.

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14 112). The manner in which these “recurrent images” and themes are measured is through the third step of the Cultural Indicators approach, cultivation analysis, which studies how people’s exposure to television contributes to their perceptions and beliefs about the real world (p. 112). Cultivation analysis, which is the focal point for most of the research involving cultivation theory, is examined by creating a battery of questions about the “social reality” portrayed in television programming from analyzing the data collected from the message system analysis process. For each of the questions created, researchers designate a “television answer,” which is the answer a heavy viewer of television would believe most likely to be true about the real world based on his or her observations of watching “the world” portrayed on television (Gerbner & Gross, 1976b, p. 182). In order to determine the extent to which television “cultivates” its audience into beliefs about society, researchers examine the “cultivation differential,” which is the degree of difference in the number of television answers given by heavy viewers and light viewers (p. 182). Gerbner (and his colleagues) contend that, in theory, after controlling for gender, age and other demographics, heavy viewers of television will be more likely to give the television answer to questions than light viewers, thereby supporting the existence and the extent of the cultivating effects of television. Cultivation, Violence, Victimization and Acquiescence The most studied features of cultivation relate to the effects of exposure to television and people’s perceptions about violence in the real world. Indeed, an increase of violence in the real world is what led to the creation of the Cultural Indicators project in the first place. Another explanation that Gerbner and his colleagues suggest for the continued interest in studying television’s effect on perceptions of real world violence is

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15 the proliferation of violence and violent acts depicted on television, both dramatic and real. Although Gerbner was originally commissioned by the NCCVP to determine the role that television violence played in the formation of actual real-world violence, Gerbner quickly realized that the effects of media violence “may be much more far-reaching” than “the stimulation of occasional individual aggression” (1976b, p. 178). In a 1975 survey of 300 middle school students, Gerbner and Morgan found that television violence leads viewers to “perceive the real world as more dangerous than it really is,” and stated that this exaggerated perception of fear “must also influence the way people behave” (1976a, p. 45). Instead of television violence inciting people to react aggressively, however, Gerbner and Morgan asserted that “consequences of even greater social concern” regarding exposure to television violence are increased “expectation[s] of violence or passivity in the face of injustice” (1976b, p. 178). Many years later, as part of the ongoing Cultural Indicators “Violence Profile” research series, Gerbner and his colleagues (again) found that heavy viewers express greater apprehension, mistrust, alienation and perceptions of living in a dangerous world than do lighter viewers, regardless of “whatever real dangers may lurk outside [their] homes” (1994, paragraphs 22-25). In a meta-analysis of media violence, Potter (1999) discusses both the immediate and long-term effects of television violence. One of the most significant findings with regards to the immediate effects of exposure to media violence is that it can lead to fear effects (p. 36). With regards to this thesis, it is assumed that the television coverage of the terrorist attacks of September 11 was effective (albeit, unintentional) in producing a

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16 significant amount of fear in the American public. As for the long-term effects of exposure to television violence, which is what cultivation was conceived to analyze, Potter states that one of the most significant results of heavy television watching is for people to exaggerate their likeliness of being victimized (p. 41). Therefore, with regards to exposure to television coverage of the terrorist crisis of 2001, the above discussion of cultivation analysis yields the following hypotheses: H1 Heavy viewers of television news about the terrorist crisis are more likely than light viewers to believe they are likely to become victims of terrorism; and H2 Heavy viewers of television news about the terrorist crisis are more likely than light viewers to believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism. Terrorism and Fear-inducing Mass Media Cantor’s (2002) ongoing research into the effects of fear-inducing mass media further justifies the alarm about violence on television. Cantor states that “the fear induced by mass media exposure is often long lasting, with sometimes intense and debilitating effects” for its audiences (p. 289). Citing two studies on the effects of fear caused from the mass media (Harrison & Cantor, 1999; Hoekstra, Harris & Helmick, 1999), Cantor found that fear-arousing media “revealed a variety of intense reactions, including generalized anxieties, specific fears, unwanted recurring thoughts, and disturbances in eating and sleeping” (p. 290). Moreover, Cantor found that as many as “one-third of those who reported having been frightened said that the fear effects had lasted more than a year” (p. 190).

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17 In their study (based on four years of cultivation analysis and surveys), Gerbner and Morgan (1976b) conclude that Ritualized displays of any violence (such as in crime and disaster news, as well as in mass-produced drama) may cultivate exaggerated assumptions about the extent of threat and danger in the world and lead to demands for protection. (Gerbner & Morgan, 1976b, p. 194) Furthermore, this “[h]eightened sense of risk and insecurityis more likely to increase acquiescence to and dependence upon established authority, and to legitimize its use of force” (p. 194). Gerbner and his colleagues come to the same findings in their 1994 research and state that heavy viewers who perceive the world as mean and scary “may accept and even welcome repression if it promises to relieve their anxieties” (1994, paragraph 26). Potter (1993) further confirms this tendency for heavy viewers to “give in” to authority by highlighting research that reveals how heavier viewers of crime programs are more likely “to show a bias against civil liberties” (p. 575). These findings lead to the next set of hypotheses: H3 People who identify themselves as likely to become victims of terrorism are more likely and willing to put constraints on their civil liberties than those who do not consider themselves likely of becoming victims of terrorism; and H4 People who believe that someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism are more likely to put constraints on their civil liberties than those who do not believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism.

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18 Television versus Other Media Cultivation scholars acknowledge that for the most part, the cultivating images presented in the television world do not differ dramatically from the images of social reality presented in other media (Signorielli & Morgan, 1994, p. 114). However, unlike other media (e.g., newspapers, movies and the Internet), television is more readily available for mass consumption, being available in virtually every home in the country, 24 hours a day. Also, television usage does not require the same levels of literacy, income or “interaction” as newspapers and the Internet (and movies or theatrical productions, for that matter), therefore making it (television) more accessible to a greater number of people than its media counterparts. Since the very premise (and success) of television programming is based on the images (and accompanying sounds) and the immediacy of the information it is able to present its audience, the most vivid and graphic stories are the ones that appear on television, and represent a large part of the world of television programming. The more dramatic, colorful, powerful and “gripping” the story being told, the more likely a television user will be to hone in on that particular story, undoubtedly the case with the stories surrounding the terrorist attacks September 11, 2001. In a major cultivation study undertaken by Chircoros, Eschholz and Gertz (1997) examining the effects of the audience in regards to level of television-induced fear, the researchers found that while significantly higher levels of fear are expressed by viewers of television news, the “reading [of ] newspapers has no apparent relationship to fear” (p. 348). Therefore, this thesis hypothesizes:

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19 H5 Heavy television viewers are more likely than newspaper readers to identify themselves (or someone they know) as likely of becoming victims of terrorism; and thus, H6 Heavy television viewers are more likely than newspaper readers to put constraints on their civil liberties in the name of protection against terrorism. Cultivation and Gender Effects Even more significant than the findings on television news versus newspaper consumption and the fear of crime, Chircoros et al. (1997) found that “the relationship between television news and fear of crime is exclusive to women and almost entirely exclusive to white women” (p. 352). In another examination of this report and its supporting literature, Chircors, Padgett and Gertz (2000, p. 765) report that the trait most consistently linked to fear of crime is female (Ferraro and Lagrange, 1992; Karmen, 1991; Warr, 1984). Circoros et al. (1997) explain this phenomenon as the result of females being “the audience most likely to see itself victimized in the news” (p. 354). This is consistent with the findings of various other cultivation and media effects scholars. Cantor (2002, pp. 301-302) reports that in a meta-analysis examining 59 studies conducted between 1987 and 1996, Peck (1999) found that females are significantly more fearful than are males. Parker, McMorris, Smith and Murty (1993) also review a significant volume of literature on fear of crime and report that the “most consistent findings are that women are more fearful than men” (p. 723). Parker et al. suggest that this fear may be a result of women being (or believing they are) less capable of defending themselves.

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20 These findings lead to the final set of hypotheses: H7 Females, regardless of media use, will be the group most likely to believe they (or someone they know) will become victims of terrorism; and H8 Females will be the group most likely willing to put constraints on their civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. The findings of Chircoros et al. (1997) do not suggest that the level of fear in males is not affected by exposure to television news. First, their study examined (as their independent variable) total news consumption as the measurement for television exposure (Chircoros et al., 2000, p. 770), whereas the independent variable in this thesis is (the more accurate) “television news coverage of the terrorist crisis” (see Methods section for discussion). Second, whereas females are more likely than their male counterparts to see people like themselves (i.e., females) as victims of crime on television news (Chircoros et al., 1997, p. 354), the victims of the crimes of September 11, 2001 were both male and female. Therefore, although women (in general) may be more likely than men to believe they will become victims of terrorism as a result of watching news coverage of the terrorist crises, a fair number of men should report high levels of fear as well, having seen both women and men as victims of the terrorist attacks. Finally, the explanation that Parker et al. set forth (i.e., women are less capable of defending themselves) should not affect these results, since neither females or males can offer much defense against terrorist attacks like those witnessed in 2001. Issues in Cultivation Research The difficulties that Gerbner and Gross initially identified as problems in measuring cultivation are some of the same problems that today’s cultivation scholars

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21 continue to address. Indeed, Signorielli and Morgan (1994), colleagues of Gerbner (and Gross) and two of the major researchers behind the continuing development of cultivation theory, admit that cultivation is perhaps the most heavily criticized theory of all mass communications research (p. 118). While it is assumed as fact that television plays a part in shaping the worldview of its viewers—thus, “cultivating” their perceptions of reality—Signorielli and Morgan realize that no one is as isolated in their newsgathering and interpretations of the real world as the imaginary “cave dweller” described above, and that people formulate their conceptions of the world from culling numerous and varied resources. For this reason, great challenges arise in attempting to determine the extent to which television alone is responsible for “cultivating” reality. The central problem encountered in cultivation research is establishing exposure to television as the exclusive independent variable in the research model. The primary reason for this difficulty is the extent to which television viewing is a part of people’s lives. “If nearly everyone “lives” to some extent in the world of television,” write Gerbner and Gross (1976b), “clearly we cannot find unexposed groups who would be identical in all important respects to the viewers. We cannot isolate television from the mainstream of modern culture because it is the mainstream” (p. 180). Thus, Gerbner (and his colleagues) was challenged with developing a model in which television exposure would be the legitimate independent variable through controlling for a wide variety of other variables (e.g., age, education, gender, occupation, income, neighborhood, other media used, etc.). Gerbner and his colleagues also reveal another difficulty presented to researchers examining cultivation. Since cultivation analysis “is concerned with the more general

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22 and pervasive consequences of cumulative exposure to cultural media” rather than the immediate effects of any particular media message or presentation, “cultivation research is not suited to an experimental paradigm” (Signorielli & Morgan, p. 119). Instead, Gerbner et al. contend that The goal of cultivation analysis is to determine whether differences in the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of light and heavy viewers reflect differences in their viewing patterns and habits, independent of (or in interaction with) the social, cultural, and personal factors that differentiate light and heavy viewerscultivation analysis attempts to document and analyze the independent contributions of television viewing to viewers’ conceptions of social reality. (Signorielli & Morgan, p. 119) In a major reanalysis of the original data that Gerbner and his colleagues examined and reported as evidence of the existence of cultivation effects, Hirsch (1980) criticized the original findings and concluded that “acceptance of the cultivation hypothesis as anything more than an interesting but unsupported speculation is premature and unwarranted” (pp. 404-405). Hirsch’s major contention was that Gerbner et al. limited their findings to two types of television viewers: heavy and light viewers. Hirsch demonstrated that when two new levels of viewers, nonviewers and extreme viewers, were included in the analysis, the nonviewers were “consistently more fearful [and] alienated” than the light viewers, while the extreme viewers were “less perturbed” than the heavy viewers (p. 404). Hirsch thus concluded that the introduction of these new categories of viewing “severely undermine” Gerbner’s hypothesis that a linear relationship exists between exposure to television and the expected “television answers.” In light of this finding, this research will break down television viewing into a wider range of categories for analysis. Yet, as Gerbner, his colleagues and numerous other cultivation researchers do in their research, this paper will primarily focus on the cultivating effects found in audiences of light and heavy viewers, with a only a minor

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23 examination of the effects on the more extreme ends of television viewing, or nonviewing. Another problem that critics point to as a major obstacle or fault in cultivation analysis involve differences over definitions, particularly over the questions of: What is violence?; What is a violent act?; and, How is violence unitized? (Signorielli & Morgan, p. 118). For all intents and purposes, these problems are moot with regards to this thesis. The reader would be hard pressed to find anyone who disagrees with the fact that terrorism is violence, and that the terrorist actions that were committed in September of 2001 were, indeed, treacherous acts of violence. It also should be noted that although cultivation studies rely on the “most stable and repetitive images and portrayals presented” that viewers of television are exposed to over long periods of time, this research, with a relatively small time frame of only a few months, meets the necessary criteria of “stable and consistent imagery” as discussed by Signorielli and Morgan (p. 120). Additionally, even though the bulk of early work on cultivation analysis focuses on the cultivation effects gathered from the sum-total viewing experience of a wide variety of dramatic, entertainment and news programming, further work in this field has proven that specific types of programming (e.g., news programs/coverage) lead to the same, if not stronger, cultivating effects. One of the first major studies challenging Gerbner’s cultivation findings was the work done by Doob and Macdonald (1979). In their examination of cultivation, Doob and Macdonald were able to replicate and verify Gerbner’s findings that heavy television exposure does indeed lead to increased amounts of fear and greater feelings of becoming a victim of crime (p. 171). However, Doob and Macdonald sought to examine the

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24 possibility of a confounding/intervening variable other than television exposure to explain why respondents were so frightened of becoming victims of crime: whether or not the neighborhoods in which respondents lived were likely to skew the results. They found that although heavy viewers of television were “more likely to indicate fear of their environmentthat this relationship disappears when attempts are made to control for other variables, including the actual incidence of crime in the neighborhood” (p. 177). While Doob and Macdonald’s findings may indicate the need to control for crime in the neighborhoods of the respondents in this survey, a more plausible explanation and justification for not doing so is offered. Doob and Macdonald’s research methodology focused on the answers given to questions regarding more localized types of crime (e.g., robberies, burglaries and assaults in one’s neighborhood, or the threat of violence on the subway or way home from work). The very nature of the terrorist attacks of September 11 is that terrorism can strike anyone, anywhere, at any time, regardless of the level of violence in one’s neighborhood. While it may be an interesting study to examine whether urban or rural respondents are more likely to believe they will become victims of terrorism, this thesis does not examine that question. Weaver and Wakshlag (1986) also introduce research criticizing previous cultivation studies. Their main contention with cultivation is that the relationship between television exposure and fear of criminal victimization found to exist in previous studies is, “at best, contingent upon other variables, if not entirely spurious” (p. 142). Weaver and Wakshlag proposed in their research that the “direction and strength of the relationships between” television exposure and the likelihood of believing one would be a victim of crime were contingent upon:

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25 (a) the viewer’s predominant modality of criminal victimization experience (direct, interpersonal, or mediated); (b) type of television programs viewed (crime-related or noncrime-related); and (c) the contextual nature of the perceptions being considered. (p. 144) Weaver and Wakshlag’s findings reveal that “television’s influence on social perceptions is not as globally applicable as previously assumed” (p. 152), and that “perceptions of personal vulnerability to crime are multidimensional” (p. 153). First, Weaver and Wakshlag find that direct (first-hand) criminal victimization experience produced “significantly greater personal anxiety” than either interpersonal or mediated experience (p. 151). While the survey used in this study does inquire whether or not the respondent “knows someone who was a victim of the recent terrorist attacks,” the data does not provide information about personal victimization experience. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any of the respondents (all living, Florida residents) were victims of the terrorist attacks, which is the fear of victimization that this paper seeks to examine. Secondly, Weaver and Wakshlag found that “for respondents who reported mediated experience exclusively”—like the vast majority, if not all, of the respondents in this study—“crime related viewing was related positively to concerns for personal safety in hypothetical situations similar to those typically depicted in television” (p. 153). Furthermore, Weaver and Wakshlag find that “the enhancing impact of exposure to crime-related programming on perceptions of personal vulnerability to crime appears limited to only those viewers in the mediated experience modality” (p. 154). Again, since it is assumed that all the respondents in this study are limited to the “mediated experience modality” regarding their victimization experience with terrorism, the hypotheses of this study remain valid.

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26 The third finding of Weaver and Wakshlag pertains to the type of programming consumed by the respondents of their study. They found that non-crime related programming had no effect on people’s perceived vulnerability to crime, while crime-related programming revealed relationships to the opposite effect (p. 153). Accordingly, this paper specifically sets out to examine the effects only of television news coverage pertaining to the terrorist attacks of 2001, not to television programming in general. Finally, Weaver and Wakshlag report that although correlations exist between television exposure and fear of victimization, “the question of causality remains an unresolved issue” (p. 154). Another basic assumption of this thesis is that before the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing television coverage of these atrocities, U.S. citizens were, for the most part, completely oblivious, nonchalant or not worried about becoming victims of terrorism. Therefore, it is assumed—only with extreme caution—that any correlation between television exposure and fear of victimization found in this paper is indicative of causation. Research conducted by Sparks and Ogles (1990) to differentiate between the dependent variables used to assess cultivation effects proved to be useful to this study as well. Sparks and Ogles are concerned primarily with distinguishing between measures that gauge “fear of victimization” and those who assess “the probability of being victimized,” and they stress the importance of cultivation researchers to take careful precautions to differentiate between these measures. Of particular interest to this thesis, Sparks and Ogle suggest that events that are “perceived as a threat to one’s sense of well-being, but judged as not very likely to occur, should generally be less likely to induce great levels of fear” (p. 352.). However,

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27 they also assert that the “perceived ability to cope with a given threat” plays a major role in one’s fear response, with the less control one perceives to have in avoiding or minimizing a threat, the greater the fear that perceived threat will create (p. 352). While becoming a victim of terrorism is highly improbable, the actual control one has in avoiding or preventing terrorist threats is severely limited. Thus, these competing factors may cancel each other out. Potter and Chang (1990) focused their critique of cultivation analysis on the various measures used by researchers to gauge television exposure. After reviewing literature discussing the lack of “uniform messages” (a necessary condition for cultivation to take place) across various genres of television programming, and the various manners of measuring television exposure, Potter and Chang seek to determine the most effective measurement of television exposure for studying cultivation effects. Potter and Chang list five operationalizations of television exposure: total exposure, exposure to program types, exposure to type while controlling for total viewing (TCT), the proportional exposure of (and among) all program types, and weighted proportions (p. 317). They then set these five operationalizations as independent variables to measure eight cultivation effects, subjecting them to two separate methods of analysis (partial correlation coefficients, and a series of multiple regressions) to determine the power of the five operationalizations (p. 319-321). In both analyses, Potter and Chang found that ‘total viewing’ was the least successful of the five operationalizations as a predictor of cultivation effects (p. 328). Potter and Chang found that (for the correlative analyses) the ‘proportional’ operationalization was the best predictor of cultivation, followed by TCT, weighted

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28 proportion and type (p. 328). For the multiple regressions, they found that type, proportion, and TCT “were all equally good with weighted proportion as being less so” (p. 328). Thus, their major finding was that “exposure to particular kinds [italics added] of programs is predictive of cultivation measures over and above the predictive power of total viewing alone” (p. 329). Potter (1993) offered a longer, more thorough critique of cultivation research several years later with an extensive literature review of the major findings and criticisms of cultivation research up to that point. Potter again suggests the need for further examination of the various methods of measuring television exposure in cultivation analysis, as well as reviewing the assumption of uniform messaging in television programs, the “strength” of cultivation in nonselective viewing, contingent variables, the use of controls, and the causal relationships associated with cultivation. Potter offers several interesting research questions to further the study of cultivation, but states that “the only way to establish a really convincing case for cultivation theory” is through longitudinal research and examination (p. 598), which, up to this point, has not been attempted. Potter concludes his examination of cultivation by declaring that in order to get beyond the “weak effect” that current cultivation research continues to reveal, and to build a “stronger explanatory system [w]e need to move beyond descriptions of whether an effect occurs or not and focus more on explaining why and how those effects occur” (p. 597). Admittedly, the focus of this thesis is on examining if an effect (i.e., causality) has taken place, recommendations will be made for studies to assess why and how those effects occur.

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29 In another in-depth literature review on research regarding mass media and the fear of crime, Heath and Gilbert (1996) conclude that although media messages only affect some of the people some of the time, the mass media definitely plays a role in stimulating fear in society, in general (p. 385). Heath and Gilbert review the findings of several scholars examining when mass media is most likely to generate the greatest amount of fear in society. Of particular interest to this thesis, Heath and Gilbert (p. 384) report that the relationship between media exposure and fear of crime is strongest: when fear is measured at the societal-level instead of the personal level (i.e., when the aggregate fear of the sample population is studied instead of the degree of fear of any particular individual) (Tyler & Cook, 1984); when non-local (as opposed to local-) fear is measured (Heath & Petraitis, 1987); when fear of violence is measured instead of the probability of violence (i.e., measuring people’s fears becoming victims of crimes rather than their odds of becoming victims) (Sparks & Ogles, 1990); and when fear of urban (as opposed to rural) areas is measured (Zillmann & Wakshlag, 1985). All these findings are consistent with the hypotheses put forth in this paper. Terrorism, by its very nature, is designed to stimulate fear in the hearts of entire communities, not just in select individuals. Likewise, the terrorist attacks were definitely a “non-local” event (with regards to the respondents of this paper) that took place in the most “urban” of all places (i.e., New York City and Washington, D.C.). Finally, this paper examines the fear of becoming a victim of terrorism, not the actual probability of becoming a victim of terrorism. The “Weakness” of Cultivation Correlations Although critics of cultivation theory (such as Hirsch and Potter) point to relatively small correlations in which most cultivation studies result, citing this as evidence of the weakness of the theoretical model, Gerbner et al. (1980) justify these small numbers as

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30 the result of how heavily reliant we are on television for its cultivating messages. Gerbner et al. offer an analogy of how even the smallest of effects can have sever repercussions: Given our premise that television’s images cultivate the dominant tendencies of our culture’s beliefs, ideologies, and world views, the observable independent contributions of television can only be relatively small. But just as an average temperature shift of a few degrees can lead to an ice age or the outcomes of elections can be determined by slight margins, so too can a relatively small but pervasive influence make a crucial difference. The “size” of an “effect” is far less critical than the direction of its steady contribution. (Gerbner, et al., p. 14) In their 1980 research, Gerbner (et al.) found a strong correlation between heavy television viewing and a general “mistrust” of people (p. 17). However, they stated that although no individual control is fully responsible for this relationship and that “simultaneous controls greatly reduce its strength the relationship remains statistically significant” (pp.16-17). In other words, Gerbner argues that as long as there is the slightest positive correlation between exposure to television and the designated “television answers,” there is proof enough that cultivation is taking place, and that television, indeed, has a (potentially) tremendous effect on society. Weimann’s (2000) meta-analysis of cultivation and media effects research also discusses the consistent “very moderate or even small effects” revealed by cultivation studies (p. 113). Weimann, however, sides with Gerbner and a number of other cultivation scholars, saying that “small effects may have very serious consequences,” and that television violence “may have a large effect on small numbers of children and adults, as well as small effect on large numbers of people” (p. 113).

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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY Survey The data reported in this thesis was obtained from a statewide, scientific random (telephone) survey conducted during the fall of 2001 designed to measure the level of knowledge and the opinions held by Floridian residents about the state’s policies and practice of “open government.” The FOI survey (Appendix) asked a broad range of questions to gauge the media usage habits of respondents, specific knowledge they have about Florida’s open government policies and exemptions, their attitudes toward the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and the United States Bill of Rights, their occupation, education and other demographic information, as well as whether the respondents were worried about becoming victims of terrorism. The survey was conducted by 70 trained student interviewers from the University of Florida’s College of Journalism and Communications as a requirement for satisfactory completion of a public relations research methods course. Each of the 70 interviewers were required to conduct six complete phone interviews with Floridians 18 or older between the dates of October 26 and November 14, 2001. The interviewers called Florida residents from a random sample of phone numbers purchased from GENESYS Sampling Systems. Interviewers attempted to contact respondents at each number up to six times before discarding the number. The phone interviews averaged 24 minutes each, and a total of 446 surveys were completed. The completion rate was 39% for valid numbers. 31

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32 The final data of the survey were weighted by an age-plus-gender formula (calculated from the 2000 Florida census data) prior to analyses in order to diminish the age and gender disproportion in respondents. The sampling error is +/3 percent at a (90% or 95%) confidence level. Variables Of particular interest to this thesis are the questions from the survey pertaining to the respondents’ media usage habits (specifically, the amount of media consumed regarding the terrorist crises of 2001), concern about becoming victims of terrorism, and willingness to give up various civil liberties for the sake of “protection” from terrorism. Television Exposure Based on the findings of Potter and Chang (1990) (and other cultivation researchers) discussed in the previous chapter, the most reliable method for examining cultivation in this paper would be through measuring the proportion of television viewing dedicated to coverage of the terrorist crises compared to the total television viewing of the respondents. Unfortunately, the survey used for this thesis does not measure the proportion of television viewing dedicated to coverage of the terrorist crises compared to total television viewing of the respondents. However, the survey question, “Last week, on the average, how many minutes or hours a day did you spend watching TV about the current national crisis?” provides reliable information regarding both the type and amount of this type of programming, both pertinent pieces of information for the research being conducted. Thus, we are not reliant on the more common—and less predictable—measure of “total exposure,” but instead can rely on the more accurate total time for the “type” of programming to which viewers were exposed.

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33 “Exposure” to media coverage of the terrorist crises was examined both as an absolute value (i.e., specific amount of hours and minutes spent watching television coverage of the crises each day), as well as by grouping the respondents into the three categories of light, medium and heavy viewers. Fear of Victimization According to Heath and Gilbert (1996) and Sparks and Ogles (1990), the relationship between media exposure and fear of victimization is the strongest when the fear of violence (e.g., terrorism) is measured instead of the probability of a violent act. The two survey questions used to gauge the respondents’ level of fear are (1) “You personally are likely to become a victim of terrorism?,” and (2) “Someone you care about will become a victim of terrorism?” While both of these questions ask about “the likelihood” of becoming a victim of terrorism, the possible responses were “agree,” “not sure” or “disagree,” thus focusing on the fear inherent in the individual providing the response. The survey did not ask the respondent to gauge the probability of whether they believed they (or someone they cared about) would become a victim of terrorism. Willingness of Respondents to Curtail Civil Liberties The study sought to determine public attitudes towards the First Amendment and civil liberties, as well as knowledge and attitudes about Florida’s Freedom of Information laws, but the focus of this thesis is limited to the impact exposure to media coverage of the September 11 and anthrax terrorist crises played on people’s willingness to curtail their civil liberties for the sake of protection from future terrorist attacks. The specific questions used to gauge the public’s attitudes towards their civil liberties post-September 11 are listed in Table 3-1.

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34 Table 3-1: Survey Questions Gauging Attitudes Towards Civil Liberties Survey Questions Gauging Attitudes Towards Civil Liberties Question 29 Some people say that during times of national crisis or war, some civil liberties may have to be suspended. Do you agree, are not sure, or disagree that we may need to give up some civil liberties in times of crisis? ( M = -0.5, SD = 0.78) Question 34 Recently, because of terrorism, Florida legislators have proposed changing Florida Public Records Law to restrict access to some records that are presently public. Do you agree, are not sure, or disagree that it is necessary to curtail your right of access to some Florida public records because of the threat of terrorism? ( M = -0.3, SD = 0.83) Question 35 Florida’s Open Meetings laws previously said the public has the right to attend meetings of many state and local governing bodies. Some people have proposed changes to these laws. Do you agree, are not sure, or disagree that it is necessary to curtail your right of access to some of Florida’s public meetings to curb terrorism? ( M = 0.04, SD = 0.89) Question 36 Does it concern you more that state government will not pass good antiterrorism laws because of freedom of information and First Amendment concerns, or that it will pass new anti-terrorism laws that put too much restriction on these freedoms? ( M = 0.02, SD = 0.80) Question 37 Some proposed changes include restricting access to public information that some think may be important because of terrorists’ activities. Does it concern you more that state government will not put enough limits on public access to information, or that new limits will prevent citizens from learning how effective state government is? ( M = 0.03, SD = 0.82) Question 46 The threat of terrorism has led you to be less concerned about public information being freely available than you were before September 11? ( M = 0.2, SD = 0.86) The data from the answers in Table 3-1 were combined to create an index measurement score to determine the degree to which respondents were willing to put constraints on their civil liberties. For each of the six index questions, a numeric value was assigned to each of the three possible responses. A positive response (i.e., answering that one is not willing to put constraints on his/her civil liberties) was given a score of ”; an answer of “not sure,” or a refusal to answer the question resulted in a score of

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35 ”; and a negative response (i.e., when the respondent answered he/she was willing to curtail their civil liberty) was given a score of “-1.” The mean score was then determined by dividing the respondent’s score by the number of items answered. The highest possible mean score, therefore, was ”; the lowest mean score possible was “-1.” Strongly positive index scores (i.e., those closest to a value of ”), therefore, represent respondents with strong beliefs about protecting their civil liberties, while strongly negative index scores (i.e., those closest to “-1” in value) represent respondents more willing to have their civil liberties curtailed.

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CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS Hypothesis One To examine the impact that news coverage of the terrorist attacks played on people’s beliefs that they are likely to become victims of terrorism, an analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was run comparing the amount of time respondents spent watching television news pertaining to the crisis (“Last week, on the average, how many minutes or hours a day did you spend watching TV about the current national crisis?”) with their response to the statement/question, “You personally are likely to become a victim of terrorism.” The range of responses to the question of how much time respondents spent viewing television coverage of the terrorist crises varied from zero minutes to 24 hours per day, with a mean time of 2.4 hours. Respondents were able to give answers of “agree,” “disagree,” or “not sure” to the question regarding the likelihood of becoming a victim of terrorism. However, in order to more clearly differentiate between the attitudes of respondents, the “not sure” and “agree” responses were grouped together for this particular hypothesis, as well as for Hypothesis Two. While those who answered “not sure” demonstrate an honesty in their inability to prophesize their fates, their hesitancy in providing a definitive response indicates they believe in the possibility of becoming victims of terrorism, thus, they were categorized as “believers.” The logic behind this decision follows that if people are strong in their belief either that they will or will not be a victim of terrorism, then an appropriate response is readily available (i.e., “agree” or 36

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37 “disagree”). Respondents who indicated they were uncertain (i.e., “not sure”) in their beliefs of becoming victims of terrorism clearly cannot be included among the ranks of those who firmly do not believe they will become victims, or they would have responded “disagree” to the question. Television Viewing Measured as a Linear Measurement A total of 161 of 427 respondents (or 37.7%) of this question answered either “Agree” (n = 66) or “Not Sure” (n = 95) to the question of whether they believed they would become victims of terrorism. A one-way ANOVA of these variables revealed that there is no significant difference ( F (35) = .80, p < .79) between the number of hours spent viewing television coverage of the crisis and whether or not a person believes he or she will become a victim of terrorism (Figure 1.1). Personally likely to become victim of terrorism byhours per day watching television coverage of crisis(F(35) = .80, p < .79)Hours/day watching "crisis" television1.0017.0014.0012.0010.007.005.504.003.002.001.25.90.67.40.25.09.08noneDisagree Not sure Agree1.00.0-1.0 Figure 1.1: Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism by Hours per day Watching Television Coverage of Crisis

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38 Although a cursory glance at Figure 1.1 exposes the lack of a linear relationship between time spent per day watching television coverage of the crisis and the viewer’s beliefs of victimization, closer inspection reveals a high number of self-reported “likely to become victims” in those who consumed between two and nine hours of terrorist-related news programming. Television Viewing Measured in Three Distinct Groupings In order to more closely replicate the methodology of Gerbner’s original cultivation studies, respondents were also separated into three categories of viewers (“Light,” “Medium,” and “Heavy”) based on the amount of time they spent watching television coverage of the terrorist attacks. It was determined that the “average viewer” spent between one and three hours per day watching television coverage of the terrorist attacks. Accordingly (if not somewhat arbitrarily), those who watched between one and three hours of crisis coverage per day were categorized as “Medium viewers”; those who consumed less than one hour are labeled “Light viewers”; and those who watched more than three hours per day of television coverage of the terrorist crisis are labeled “Heavy viewers.” It is helpful to remember that the survey for this study was conducted more than a month after September ll (October 26 to November 14). The mere observation that respondents were able to consume more than 10 hours per day of news strictly pertaining to the World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks is an indication of the significant amount of television coverage dedicated to the terrorist crisis of 2001. Conducting cross-tabulations between these three groups of television viewers and their corresponding beliefs about becoming victims of terrorism again revealed no significant association (X 2 (4) = 2.08, p < .73) between heavy viewing of television and the belief of becoming a victim of terrorism (Figure 1.2).

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39 Personally likely to become victim of terrorism bylevel of television consumption of terrorist crisis(chi sq(4) = 2.08, p < .73)Type of viewer (by group)Light viewersMedium viewersHeavy viewers100%80%60%40%20%0% Personally...victimAgreeNot sure/refusedDisagree 171814252421585865 Figure 1.2: Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism by Level of Television Consumption of Terrorist Crisis If the first hypothesis were supported, we would expect to see the largest percentage of agreement or “uncertainty from the Heavy viewers. Instead, Figure 1.2 reveals that, contrary to the first hypothesis, Heavy viewers of television actually are no more likely to believe they will become victims of terrorism than Light or Medium viewers (X 2 (4) = 2.08, p < .73). In conclusion, whether consumption of television coverage of the terrorist crises is examined in a linear fashion based on time spent watching television, or through groupings of Light, Medium and Heavy viewers, no significance was found linking television consumption of terrorism coverage to the belief that viewers would become victims of terrorism. Thus, the first hypothesis is rejected.

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40 Hypothesis Two The second hypothesis postulates there will be a relationship between television consumption of programming related to the terrorist crisis and the belief that someone the viewer cares about will become a victim of terrorism. The same tests were run on the data as for the first hypothesis, substituting the question, “Someone you care about will become a victim of terrorism?” from the survey for the question, “You personally are likely to become a victim of terrorism?” Television exposure was again measured both as a linear function and as three distinct groupings (i.e., Light, Medium and Heavy viewers). Television Viewing as a Linear Measurement Someone you care about likely to be victim byhours per day watching television coverage of crisis(F(35) = .84, p < .74)Hours/day watching "crisis" television17.0014.0012.0010.008.006.005.003.502.501.501.17.90.67.40.25.09.08noneDisagree Not sure Agree1.00.0-1.0 Figure 2.1: Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism by Hours per day Watching Television Coverage of Crisis

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41 Of the 427 respondents, 222 (51.9%) answered either “Agree” (n = 107) or “Not Sure” (n = 115) to the question of whether they believed someone they know will become a victim of terrorism. A one-way ANOVA between this response and the time spent watching television coverage of the crisis reveals no significant relationship ( F (35) = .84, p < .74) between the variables. Figure 2.1 shows no linear relationship between fear of victimization for someone close to the respondent and time the respondent spent watching television news about the terrorist crisis. It is interesting to note that although a linear relationship does not exist between these two variables, those who spent between two and ten (especially those viewing between six and ten) hours per day viewing “crisis” television were more likely to believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism. While it appears that this group of viewers is more likely to believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism, determining the breakdown of Light, Medium and Heavy viewers after looking at the data (in Figure 2.1) would produce biased and faulty conclusions. Instead, the following section will address the impact of television viewing on beliefs of victimization (for others) based on whether viewers fall into Light, Medium or Heavy viewing categories established prior to the revelation of the trend seen in Figure 2.1. Television Viewing Measured in Three Distinct Groupings Using the same parameters (established in the first hypothesis) for distinguishing between Light, Medium and Heavy viewers, a crosstabulation was conducted to determine if a relationship exists between the group (i.e., Light, Medium or Heavy viewer) to which a member belongs and their belief that someone they care about becoming a victim of terrorism. Once again, the response to the question “Someone you

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42 care about will become a victim of terrorism?” produced no statistically significant associations (X 2 (4) = 2.40, p < = .67) between Light, Medium and Heavy viewers. Figure 2.2 illustrates the lack of evidence supporting the second hypothesis. In essence, Light viewers were just as likely as Heavy viewers to believe someone they cared about would become a victim of terrorism, while the Medium viewers expressed slightly (but insignificantly) more concern, which contradicts Hypothesis Two. Based on these findings, we can conclude that the second hypothesis is not accepted. Someone you care about likely to become victim ofterrorism by television consumption of terrorist crisis(chi sq(4) = 2.40, p < = .67)Type of viewer (by group)Light viewersMedium viewersHeavy viewers100%80%60%40%20%0% Someone...victimAgreeNot sure/RefusedDisagree 242922282827494351 Figure 2.2: Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism by Television Consumption of Terrorist Crisis Hypothesis Three To measure the third hypothesis (i.e., People who identify themselves as likely to become victims of terrorism are more likely and willing to put constraints on their civil liberties than those who do not consider themselves likely to become victims of terrorism), a series of analyses was conducting measuring the response to the question, “You personally are likely to become a victim of terrorism?” with the six survey

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43 questions listed in Table 3-1, which revolve around the respondents’ attitudes and opinions about various civil liberties. The first test combines the six questions about civil liberties into an index, and measures the respondents’ score as such; the second test is a series of seven statistical analyses measuring the respondents’ answers to each of the six index questions, as well as to a question asking about possible situations in which the respondents deems it is “justifiable” for the government to curtail citizens’ civil liberties. Civil Liberties: Index Measurement If the third hypothesis were correct (i.e., people fearful of becoming victims of terrorism are more willing to put constraints on their civil liberties than those not fearful of becoming victims of terrorism), those who answered that they believe they are likely to become victims of terrorism would have a lower (or more negative) mean score on the six-question index (see Table 3-1) than those who do not believe they will become victims of terrorism. When measuring the degree to which respondents were willing to have constraints put on their civil liberties from the six-question index, the mean score for all respondents, regardless of their beliefs of becoming victims of terrorism, was very low (M = -.50). In other words, most of the respondents appeared to be willing to have their civil liberties curbed for the sake of curbing terrorism. A one-way ANOVA between the six-question index and the belief of becoming a victim of terrorism did not reveal a statistically significant relationship ( F (2) = .44, p < .65) between these variables. Thus, according to the results obtained from analyzing the index score with the respondents’ beliefs about becoming victims of terrorism, the third hypothesis must be rejected.

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44 It is worth noting, however, that respondents who are “not sure” as to whether they will become victims of terrorism appear to be the group most willing to sacrifice their civil liberties ( M = -.73). Figure 3.1 reveals that those frightened of becoming victims of terrorism are no more reluctant to sacrifice their civil liberties than those who do not believe they will become victims of terrorism ( M s = -.36 and -.45, respectively). Attitude towards civil liberties after Sept. 11 by belief ofpersonally likely to become victim of terrorism(F(2) = .44, p < .65)Personally likely to become victim of terrorismAgreeNot sure/refusedDisagreeMean index scores0.0-.1-.2-.3-.4-.5-.6-.7-.8-.9-1.0 -.4-.7-.4 Figure 3.1: Attitude Towards Civil Liberties After Sept. 11 by the Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism Civil Liberties: Measured Individually Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis When asked whether they agree, are not sure, or disagree that we may need to give up some civil liberties in times of crisis, almost two-thirds (63.8%) of all the respondents answered in the affirmative, thus revealing a willingness to sacrifice their civil liberties during times of crisis. A crosstabulation between “Willing to curtail civil

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45 liberties during times of crisis” and “Personally likely to become a victim of terrorism” reveals the similarities in attitudes (virtually identical) between those who either believe or do not believe they will become victims of terrorism with regards to sacrificing their civil liberties (see Figure 3.2). Willing to curtail civil liberties during crisis bypersonally likely to become victim(chi sq(4)=12.52, p<.02)Personally likely to become victimDisagreeNot sure/refusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Give up...civil lib.DisagreeNot sureAgree 2116182714705768 Figure 3.2: Willing to Curtail Civil Liberties During Crisis by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism The crosstabulation reveals a statistically significant (X 2 (4) = 12.52, p < .02) difference between the responses of those who answered “not sure” and those who provided decisive answers (i.e., “agree” or “disagree”) to the question of whether or not they will become a victim of terrorism (see Figure 3.2). Compared with the other two groups, those answering “not sure” about becoming victims of terrorism are twice as likely to be unsure about their willingness to sacrifice their civil liberties. In other words, the more uncertain a person is about the likelihood of becoming a victim of terrorism, the more uncertain they are about giving up some of their civil liberties.

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46 Curtail right of access to some public records With regards to the respondents’ willingness to curtail their right of access to some public records because of the threat of terrorism, no statistically significant association (X 2 (4) = 7.78, p < .10) was found between the responses of those who “agree,” are “not sure” or “disagree” (with the statement that they are likely to become victims of terrorism) (see Figure 3.3). In essence, whether or not a person believes they will become victims of terrorism has no apparent effect on their willingness to sacrifice their right of access to Florida public records. Curtail access to public records during crisisby personally likely to become victim(chi sq(4) = 7.78, p < .10)Personally likely to become victim of terrorismDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Curtail...public recDisagreeNot sure/ refusedAgree 2819252921605254 Figure 3.3: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Records During Crisis by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Curtail access to some public meetings Running a crosstabulation between “personally likely to become a victim of terrorism” and “curtailing access to some public meetings” revealed a near significant association (X 2 (4) = 9.08, p < .06) between the belief of becoming victims of terrorism

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47 and a respondent’s willingness to sacrifice his or her right to attend or access public meetings. Figure 3.4 reveals that those with uncertainty about becoming victims of terrorism are the most uncertain about surrendering their rights. Cutail access to public meetings bypersonally likely to become victim(chi sq(4) = 9.08, p < .06)Personally likely to become victim of terrorismDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Access...meetingsDisagreeNot sure/ refusedAgree 383345213218413537 Figure 3.4: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Meetings During Crisis by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Concern over new anti-terrorism laws vs. restriction of freedom of information Crosstabulations were performed between whether the respondents are more concerned about government not passing good anti-terrorism laws or passing new laws that put too many restrictions on their civil liberties and whether or not they personally believed they are likely to become victims of terrorism. The crosstabulation revealed no statistically significant relationship (X 2 (4) = 5.41, p < .25) between these variables (Figure 3.5).

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48 Anti-terrorism laws: Too restrictive vs. Not strongenough by personally likely to become victim(chi sq(4) = 5.41, p < .25)Personally likely to become victim of terrorismDisagreeNot sure/refusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Concern anti-terroriPass laws that aretoo restrictiveConcerned about bothFail to enact lawsstrong enough 342934344532312534 Figure 3.5: Anti-terrorism Laws: Too Restrictive vs. Not Strong Enough by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Concern about limits on public access to information When respondents were asked about whether they are concerned more about the state not putting enough limits on public access to information, or that the new limits will be too stringent, crosstabulation revealed a statistically significant association (X 2 (4) = 11.00, p < .03) between those who either do or do not believe they will be victims of terrorism and those who were not sure. Whereas about 45 percent of those uncertain about their fate (with regards to becoming victims of terrorism) indicated that they are equally concerned that the government may pass anti-terrorism laws that are either too restrictive or not strong enough, only 28 percent of those who disagreed and 33 percent of those who agreed that they would become victims of terrorism indicated that they are concerned both about anti-terrorism laws that are too restrictive or not strong enough (Figure 3.6).

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49 Laws limiting access to public information bypersonally likely to become victim(chi sq(4) = 11.00, p < .03)Personally likely to become victim of terrorismDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Laws accessing infoPass laws that are too restrictiveConcerned about bothFail to enact strongenough laws 412637334528262835 Figure 3.6: Concern About Passing Laws Limiting Access to Public by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Threat of terrorism vs. concern about access to information The study asked the respondents whether the threat of terrorism had led them to be less concerned about public information being freely available than they were prior to September 11. Crosstabulations revealed that there is a statistically significant relationship (X 2 (4) = 24.24, p < .001) between the belief of becoming a victim of terrorism and the response to the question, “The threat of terrorism has led you to be less concerned about public information being freely available than you were before September 11?” In particular, of those who are “not sure” as to whether they will become victims, 29 percent disagree that they are less concerned about accessing information since September 11, while 40 percent indicate they are “not sure” about their feelings towards accessing public information (Figure 3.7). In simpler terms, those least

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50 certain about becoming a victim of terrorism are also the least certain about their willingness to curtail their civil liberties. Less concerned about accessing informationsince Sept. 11 by personally likely to become victim(chi sq(4) = 24.24, p < .001)Personally likely to become victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Concern about accessDisagreeNot sure/refusedAgree 562953184018263129 Figure 3.7: Change in Concern About Access to Information Since Sept. by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Respondents’ justification for government restrictions on civil liberties One question in this study was an open-ended question asking the respondents what sort of things or events, if any, they think would justify the government (state or federal) placing restrictions on their civil liberties. The responses given were then assigned to one of three categories: “crisis/common good”; “terrorism/war/bombing”; and “nothing/no circumstance.” While over half (59.5%) of all respondents answered that terrorism or some other crisis would justify restricting their civil liberties (Figure 3.8), crosstabluation between this variable and the belief of a respondent personally becoming a victim of terrorism revealed no statistically significant relationship (X 2 (6) = 5.14, p < .53) between the two. Thus, although the majority of respondents believe there are certain

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51 circumstances that justify the government placing restrictions on their civil liberties, the fear of personally becoming a victim of terrorism has no apparent impact on people’s willingness to sacrifice their civil liberties. Justification for the government to curtail civilliberties by personally likely to become victim(chi sq(6) = 5.14, p < .53)Personally likely to become victim of terrorismDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% "Just" restrictionsCrisis/Common goodTerrorism/War/BombingNothing/Under nocircumstances 18464449433838 Figure 3.8: Justification for the Government to Curtail Civil by Belief of Personally Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism After reviewing the analyses above—both the compilation of the seven individual assessments and the preceding index measurement score—most of the tests suggest that the third hypothesis must be rejected. Thus, despite the fact that some of them show support for accepting the hypothesis, it is inaccurate to conclude from these results that those who believe they are likely to become victims of terrorism are not more likely to sacrifice their civil liberties than those who do not believe they will become victims of terrorism.

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52 Hypothesis Four The fourth hypothesis (i.e., People who believe that someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism are more likely to have constraints put on their civil liberties than those who do not believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism) was analyzed in the same manner as Hypothesis Three. First, the question, “Someone you care about will become a victim of terrorism?” was studied in relationship to each of the questions listed in Table 3-1, as well as the question about “justifications” for the government to curtail civil liberties. This question was then examined in comparison to the same six-question index (Table 3-1) used to examine Hypothesis Three. Civil liberties: Measured Individually Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis When comparing the relationship between respondents’ beliefs about someone they care about becoming a victim of terrorism and their willingness to give up civil liberties during times of crisis, no significant relationship was found (X 2 (4) = 4.22, p < .38). While 63.8% of the respondents stated that they were willing to suspend their civil liberties during times of crisis, no difference exists between this willingness and the belief about becoming a victim of terrorism (see Figure 4.1). Thus, the belief one holds about whether or not someone close to them is likely to become a victim of terrorism has no impact on that person’s willingness to have their civil liberties suspended.

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53 Willing to give up civil liberties during crisis bysomeone you care about becomes a victim(chi sq(4) = 4.22, p < .38)Someone you care about becomes victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Give up civil lib.DisagreeNot sureAgree 181620162213666367 Figure 4.1: Willingness to Give Up Civil Liberties During Crisis by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Curtail right of access to some public records More than half (54.4%) of all the survey respondents answered affirmatively to the question asking whether or not they were willing to curtail the right of access to public records. A near significant association (X 2 (4) = 7.69, p < .11) was found between those who agreed and those who disagreed and those who were not sure that someone they care about was likely to become a victim of terrorism. Figure 4.2 reveals the extent of the similarities between those who agree and those who disagree, and the slightly greater degree of uncertainty among those “not sure” as to whether or not they believe someone they know is likely to become a victim of terrorism.

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54 Willing to curtail access to public records during crisisby someone you care about becomes a victim(chi sq(4) = 7.69, p < .11)Someone you care about becomes victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Curtail..public rec.DisagreeNot sure/ refusedAgree 272024153020585055 Figure 4.2: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Records During Crisis Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Curtail access to some public meetings Whereas more than half of all respondents were willing to curtail their right of access to some public records, only slightly more than a third (37.3%) of the respondents agreed that they were willing to have their access to public meetings restricted. However, contrary to Hypothesis Four, those who believed someone they care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism are no more likely to give up their right to attend (or access the information from) public meetings that those who do not believe. A statistically significant relationship (X 2 (4) = 10.91, p < .03) was found between the responses of these two groups (i.e., agree and disagree) and those who are “not sure” (Figure 4.3). Not only are those who are uncertain about the likelihood of terrorism affecting someone they care about more uncertain about sacrificing their rights, they are also significantly less likely to disagree to having their access to public records curtailed.

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55 Willing to curtail access to public meetingsby someone you care about becomes a victim(chi sq(4) = 10.91, p < .03)Someone you care about becomes victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Access...meetingsDisagreeNot sure/ refusedAgree 413246203117393737 Figure 4.3: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Meetings Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Concern over new anti-terrorism laws vs. restriction of freedom of information With regards to respondents’ concern over the strengths and limitations of new anti-terrorism laws, a significant difference exists in the attitudes of those who do not believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism and those who do believe or are either not sure as to whether someone they care about will become a victim or terrorism. Namely, those who do not believe that someone they care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism have a greater amount of concern about the government passing anti-terrorism laws that are too restrictive than those who either agree or are not sure of the likelihood of someone they care about becoming a victim of terrorism (Figure 4.4). There is statistical significance to this relationship (X 2 (4) = 14.29, p < .007), though it does not support Hypothesis Four insofar as almost half (44%) of those respodents who believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism express equal concern

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56 about both of the possibilities suggested in this question. Despite the evidence gathered from this analysis suggesting that those who disagree about the prospect of terrorism striking close to home are more opinionated than the other two groups, there is not adequate data from this question to provide support for this hypothesis. Anti-terrorism laws: Too restrictive vs. Not strongenough by someone you care about becomes victim(chi sq(4) = 14.29, p < .007)Someone you care about..victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Concern anti-terrorPass laws that aretoo restrictiveConcerned about bothFail to enact lawsstrong enough 302837444427262836 Figure 4.4: Anti-terrorism Laws: Too Restrictive vs. Not Strong Enough by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Concern about limits on public access to information If Hypothesis Four were correct, then those respondents who believe that someone they care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism should be more concerned that the government should put enough limits on public access to information than they are about the prospect that these new limits will prevent citizens from learning how effective state government is. In other words, respondents who agreed with the statement “someone you care about will become a victim of terrorism” should be less concerned

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57 than those who disagreed (to the same question) about government passing too restrictive measures on their civil liberties. A crosstabulation between this variable and respondents’ beliefs of someone they care about becoming a victim of terrorism reveals a statistically significant relationship (X 2 (4) = 11.17, p < .03) between variables. Figure 4.5 shows how, contradictory to the hypothesis, those who agree someone they care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism are the most likely (albeit, slightly) to be concerned that the government will create new limits that prevent citizens from learning how effective their government is, and the least likely to be concerned about the government setting strong enough limits on public access to information. Laws limiting access to public information duringcrisis by someone you care about becomes victim(chi sq(4) = 11.17, p < .03)Someone you care about becomes victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Laws accessing info.Pass laws that aretoo restrictiveConcerned about bothFail to enact lawsstrong enough 422836344227253037 Figure 4.5: Concern About Laws Limiting Access to Public Information by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism

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58 The “not sure” group of respondents provides the most fluctuation in their opinions. Almost half (42%) of those who answered “not sure” as to whether they believed someone they care about would become a victim of terrorism stated that they were equally concerned about the government not setting strong enough limits and the government setting limits that are too restrictive. Threat of terrorism vs. concern about access to information Less concerned about accessing information sinceSept. 11 by someone you care about becomes victim(chi sq(4) = 33.57, p < .001)Someone you care about becomes victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% Concern about accessDisagreeNot sure/refusedAgree 522857213915263328 Figure 4.6: Change in Concern About Accessing Information Since Sept. 11 by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism A crosstabulation between the variables of “personally likely to become a victim” and whether a respondent was less concerned about public information being freely available than they were before September 11 revealed that over half of those who do or do not believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism (52.3% and 57.3%, respectively) disagreed with the statement that they are less concerned about

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59 public information being freely available than they were before September 11 (see Figure 4.6). In other words, despite their beliefs one way or the other (pertaining to someone they care about becoming victims of terrorism), respondents are serious when it comes to keeping information freely available to them. While a statistically significant association (X 2 (4)= 33.57, p < .001) exists between a respondent’s belief about someone they care about becoming a victim of terrorism and their level of concern about freely available public information, those “not sure” about the likelihood of terrorism striking someone they care about are far less concerned about loosing access to public information than their “worried” or “carefree” counterparts. Justification for state or federal restrictions on civil liberties Justification for government restricting civil libertiesby someone you care about becomes victim(chi sq(4) = 5.82, p < .45)Someone you care about becomes victimDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree100%80%60%40%20%0% JustificationCrisis/Common goodTerrorism/War/BombingNothing/Under nocircumstance 18395250433639 Figure 4.7: Justification for Government Restricting Civil Liberties by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism

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60 With regards to the open-ended question that asks for respondents to name any situation or event that would justify the government putting restrictions on their civil liberties, over half (59.5%) of all respondents cited that either terrorism, war, or some other crisis would provide sufficient justification (see Figure 4.7). However, there is no significant relationship (X 2 (4)= 5.82, p < .45) between a respondent’s beliefs about terrorism victimizing someone they care about and their feelings towards allowing the government to restrict their civil liberties for a “just” cause, or “justifiable” reason. Civil liberties: Index Measurement When using the index score to measure the overall attitude of respondents towards sacrificing civil liberties in the name of terrorism prevention, no evidence was found suggesting a relationship between this attitude and a respondent’s beliefs about someone they care about becoming a victim of terrorism. A one-way ANOVA between the mean score of respondents on the civil liberties index and their response to whether they believe someone they care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism revealed no statistically significant relationship ( F (2) = 1.54, p < .22) between these variables. Figure 4.8 does reveal, however, that, on the whole, all of the respondents —particularly those unsure about the likelihood of terrorism striking someone whom they care about—had a negative mean score on the civil liberties index, indicating a general willingness to curtail civil liberties during times of crisis. After assessing the attitudes of respondents to each of the survey’s seven questions—both individually and collectively (via the index measurement)—pertaining to the limiting, curtailing or sacrificing of civil liberties in the name of security against possible acts of terrorism, no significant link was found to exist between a respondent’s belief that someone they care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism and the

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61 willingness to curtail their rights to access public information or meetings, or otherwise sacrifice their civil liberties. Although there were some statistically significant relationships between various components of the civil liberties index and peoples’ beliefs about someone they care becoming a victim of terrorism, it is (again) inaccurate to conclude from these findings that Hypothesis Four should be accepted. Thus, with some reservations, based on the overall findings of this set of analyses, we must reject the fourth hypothesis. Attitude towards civil liberties after Sept. 11 by belief thatsomeone you care about will be victim of terrorism (F(2) = 1.54, p < .22)Someone you care about becomes victim of terrorismAgreeNot sure/refusedDisagreeMean index scores0.0-.1-.2-.3-.4-.5-.6-.7-.8-.9-1.0 -.3-.9-.4 Figure 4.8: Attitude Towards Civil Liberties After Sept. 11 by Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Hypothesis Five To test the fifth (and sixth) hypothesis, a new variable was created from the data set to group respondents into nine categories based on their level of total media consumption as measured by the time spent watching television and/or reading newspaper accounts of

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62 the terrorist crises (See Table 5-1). Cross tabulations and one-way ANOVAs were then conducted between this new variable and the two variables asking respondents whether or not they believed they (personally) or someone they knew were likely to become victims of terrorism to determine whether or not a relationship exists between these variables. Table 5-1: Level of Total Media Consumption (based on television viewing and newspaper reading of coverage of the terrorist crises of 2001) Time Reading Newspaper Level of Total Media Consumption (including television and newspaper coverage of the terrorist crises) Light Readers (Up to 1/3 hour per day) Medium Readers (Greater than 1/3, less than 1 hour per day) Heavy Readers (More than 1 hour per day) Light Viewers (Les than 1 hour per day) Group 1 (n = 54, 13.2%) Group 2 (n = 20, 5%) Group 3 (n = 37, 9.1%) MediumViewers (1 hour to less than 2 hours per day) Group 4 (n = 32, 7.8%) Group 5 (n = 29, 7.1%) Group 6 (n = 43,10.5%) Time Watching Television Heavy Viewers (More than 2 hours per day) Group 7 (n = 42, 10.3%) Group 8 (n = 41, 10%) Group 9 (n = 110, 27%) The cross tabulations and ANOVA revealed no statistically significant relationship ( p < 0.15 and .26, respectively) between the various levels of total media consumption and a respondent’s beliefs about whether he or she was likely to become a victim of terrorism. Likewise, cross tabulations and ANOVA revealed no statistically significant relationship ( p < 0.42 and 0.3, respectively) between the various levels of total media consumption and a respondent’s belief that someone they know is likely to become a victim of terrorism. Thus, hypothesis five is rejected. However, although no statistically significant relationships were found between the various levels of total media exposure and respondent beliefs about becoming victims of terrorism, further examination of the statistical tests performed is warranted. While two-thirds (61.3%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement that they, personally, were

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63 likely to become a victim of terrorism, the group of respondents most likely to disagree with the statement was Group Two (Light Viewers, Medium Readers), 83.3 percent of whom disagreed with the statement. The group least likely to disagree with the statement was Group Seven (Heavy Viewers, Light Readers), with only 45 percent disagreeing that they were likely to become a victim of terrorism (see Figure 5-1). Furthermore, while only 15.9 percent of all respondents agreed that they were likely to become victims of terrorism, Group Two was the group least likely (of the total media groupings) to agree (5.6%), and Group Seven was the group most likely to agree (25%). Total media consumption and the beliefof personally becoming a victim of terrorismLevel of total media consumption 2.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 1.00 4.00100%90%80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0% Personally...victimAgreeNot sureDisagree 211915251410341022303017213011566959554569696283 Figure 5.1: Total Media Consumption and the Belief of Personally Becoming a Victim of Terrorism These findings, although not statistically significant, appear to support the hypothesis insofar as the group with the greatest amount of television exposure and least amount of newspaper exposure (Group Seven) is the group most likely to agree (and least

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64 likely to disagree) that they will become victims of terrorism, while the group with the least exposure to television and medium exposure to newspapers (Group Two) is the group most likely to disagree (and least likely to agree) that they will become victims of terrorism. Total media consumption and the belief that someoneyou care about will become victim of terrorismLevel of Total Media Consumption 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00100%80%60%40%20%0% Somebody...victimAgreeNot sureDisagree 262337192422191131292832212131412818455032605547416151 Figure 5.2: Total Media Consumption and the Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become a Victim of Terrorism Similar patterns (although not statistically significant) were found in the relationship between total media exposure and respondent belief about someone they care about becoming a victim of terrorism. While close to half (47.9%) of all respondents disagreed that someone they cared about would become a victim of terrorism, Group Two was the group most likely to disagree with the statement (61.1%), and Group Seven was the group least likely to disagree (31.7%). Moreover, whereas only 24.7 percent of all respondents agreed to the statement that someone they care about is likely to become a

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65 victim of terrorism, the group least likely to agree to the statement was Group Two (11.1%), while the group most likely to agree to the statement was Group Seven (36.6%) (see Figure 5.2). Thus, in conformance with the hypothesis, those who consume the most television (and a minimal amount of newspaper) coverage of the terrorist crises are the group most likely to believe someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism, while those who consume the least television (and a moderate amount of newspaper) coverage of the terrorist crises are the most likely to disagree that someone they know will become a victim of terrorism. Hypothesis Six To examine the sixth hypothesis, that heavy television viewers are more likely than heavy newspaper readers to put constraints on their civil liberties during times of crisis, a one-way ANOVA was run between the level of total media exposure variable and the civil liberties index (Table 3-1), as well as for each of the individual variables within the index. Civil Liberties: Index Measurement Results from the one-way ANOVA between the level of total media exposure and the civil liberties index variable revealed no statistically significant relationships ( F (8) = 1.01, p < 0.43) between the levels of total media exposure and the attitudes of the respondents towards curbing their civil liberties during times of crisis. In other words, the level of total media exposure of a respondent does not significantly affect his or her mean score on the civil liberties index. Civil Liberties: Measured Individually In individual analyses of the six variables comprising the civil liberties index (and used to determine a respondent’s attitude towards their civil liberties), statistically

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66 significant relationships were found to exist between two of the variables and the respondent’s level of total media exposure: a respondent’s willingness to curtail their right of access to certain public records, and to curtail their civil liberties during times of crisis. Curtail right of access to some public records The results of a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant relationship ( F (8) = 1.01, p < .04) between an individual’s level of total media exposure and their willingness to curtail their right of access to some public records during times of crisis. In particular, significant relationships were found between the respondents in Group Three with those in Groups Five ( p < 0.012), Six ( p < 0.005) and Nine ( p < 0.004); and between respondents in Group Four with those in Groups Five ( p < 0.085, nearly significant) and Six ( p < 0.055). While respondents in Group Three (with a mean of 0.06) demonstrated the most reluctance in giving up their right of access to certain public records during times of crisis, with changes only in the amount of exposure to television coverage of the terrorist crises, respondents in Groups Six and Nine (both Heavy Readers, like Group Three) demonstrated a significant increase in their willingness to curtail their rights to access certain public records during times of crisis (Ms = -0.49 and .42, respectively). Also interesting to note is that by increasing exposure to television and decreasing the amount of newspaper reading, members of Group Five were significantly more willing to curb their access to certain public records (M = -0.48) than the Light Viewers and Heavy Readers of Group Three (M = 0.06) (see Figure 6.1).

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67 Level of total media consumption and thewillingness to curtail access to public records(F(8) = 1.01, p < .04)Level of Total Media Consumption987654321Mean (curtail your right to public records).3.2.1.0-.1-.2-.3-.4-.5-.6 -.4-.2-.2-.5-.5-.1.1-.1-.2 Figure 6.1: Level of Total Media Consumption and the Willingness to Curtail Access to Public Records The other significant relationship ( p < 0.055) between levels of total media exposure and willingness to curtail access to certain public records was found between Group Four and Groups Five and Six. While Group Four has a mean of .11 (indicating a mild willingness to curb their access to certain public records), by increasing the amount of newspaper consumption from that of Light Reader to Heavy Reader, the mean scores for Group Five and Six decrease to .48 and .49, respectively. This is an indication that moderate levels of television consumption (i.e., Medium Viewers) combined with heavy newspaper consumption actually increases the willingness of respondents to curtail their right of access to certain public records. Thus, the greater the total consumption of media, the greater the willingness of respondents to curtail rights to public records.

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68 Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis A one-way ANOVA between responses to the direct statement “we may need to give up some civil liberties in times of crisis” with the level of total media exposure variable revealed a significant relationship ( F (8) = 2.022, p < 0.05) between variables. Most striking are the relationships between Group Two and Group Five ( p < 0.02) and between Group Three and Group Nine ( p < 0.004) (see Figure 6.2). Level of total media consumption and the willingness togive up civil liberties during times of crisis(F(8) = 2.02, p < 0.05)Level of total media consumption987654321Mean (give up civil liberties during crisis)0.0-.1-.2-.3-.4-.5-.6-.7-.8-.9-1.0 -.6-.5-.4-.4-.7-.4-.2-.1-.5 Figure 6.2: Level of Total Media Consumption and the Willingness to Give Up Civil Liberties During Times of Crisis While Group Two has the highest mean score (-0.12) of the nine groups in the total media exposure variable (indicating the most reluctance to give up civil liberties during times of crisis), with changes only in the amount of television consumption (from Light Viewing to Medium Viewing), the mean decreases dramatically to -0.67 (for Group Five). Likewise, by increasing only the amount of television consumption (from Light

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69 Viewing to Heavy Viewing), the mean decreases from .19 (for Group Three) to .64 (for Group Nine). The impact of increased television consumption on one’s willingness to give up civil liberties is also evident in the relationship between Group Three and Group Five ( p < 0.015), where the mean decreases from .19 to .67 through an increase in television consumption and a decrease in the amount of newspaper consumption. While the previous findings reveal the impact of television consumption on one’s willingness to give up their civil liberties, it is important to note that this ANOVA also reveals that increased media exposure, in general, has a similar effect. In particular, a significant relationship exists between Groups Two and Nine ( p < 0.011), where the mean decreases from .19 to .64 (respectively) through an increase in both television and newspaper consumption. Likewise, a significant relationship ( p < 0.054) is found between Group Seven and Nine, where increasing the amount of newspaper consumption (from Light to Heavy Reading) for the Heavy Viewer reduces the mean from .36 (Group Seven) to -0.64 (Group Nine). Although consumption of television coverage of the terrorist crises of 2001 clearly had a relationship with respondents’ answers to questions asking about their willingness to give up their civil liberties and curtail their right of access to certain public records during times of crisis, there is not enough evidence from the several other civil liberties variables and civil liberties index to support hypothesis six. Therefore, despite the findings of the above section, and lacking possible evidence from further analyses, hypothesis six is rejected.

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70 Hypothesis Seven Examining the relationship between the gender of the respondents and their beliefs about the likelihood that they, or someone they care about, will become a victim of terrorism was accomplished through a simple crosstabulation of these three variables. Personally likely to become victim of terrorismby gender(chi sq(2) = 5.50, p < .065)GenderMaleFemale100%80%60%40%20%0% Personally...victimAgreeNot sure/refusedDisagree 171524165869 Figure 7.1: Belief of Personally Likely to Become Victim of Terrorism by Gender Of the 405 respondents who answered the question pertaining the likelihood of personally becoming a victim of terrorism, a relatively small group of 65 (16%) of the respondents answered that they “agree” that they are likely to become victims of terrorism. Crosstabulations revealed a near significant relationship (X 2 (2) = 5.50, p < .07) between gender and the belief of becoming a victim of terrorism, with females more likely than males to indicate that they believe they will become victims of terrorism (17.4% vs. 14.6%, respectively), and less likely to “disagree” (58.5% vs. 69.2%, respectively) that they would become victims (Figure 7.1). While there was not a large

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71 difference between the level of personal fear between men and women, it is worth noting that of those respodents who answered “not sure” as to whether or not they would become victims of terrorism, 61 percent were female. Thus, females tended to be more hesitant than males in making a definitive prediction of whether or not they would become victims of terrorism. Whereas 16 percent of the respondents indicated a belief of personally becoming a victim of terrorism, 25.3 percent of the respondents believe that someone they care about is likely to become victim of terrorism. A crosstabulation of gender with the “believe someone you care about will become a victim” variable revealed the existence of a statistically significant relationship (X 2 (2) = 10.48, p < .01) between males and females with regards to their fears of someone they care about becoming victims of terrorism. A cursory comparison between Figures 7.1 and 7.2 reveals an increase in, and in between, the proportion of males and females who believe someone they know will become a victim of terrorism. Females were significantly less likely than males (41% vs. 57%) to disagree with the statement, “someone you care about is likely to become a victim of terrorism.” Females also expressed a greater deal of uncertainty than males (30% vs. 22%) as to whether or not someone they care about, rather than themselves, is likely to become a victim of terrorism. After examining the data from these analyses, the seventh hypothesis is accepted with caution. While females in this survey were significantly more likely than their male counterparts (30% vs. 21%) to believe that someone they care about will become a victim of terrorism, only a small margin exists between males and females (17% vs. 15%) with regards their beliefs of personally becoming a victim of terrorism.

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72 Someone you care about likely to become victimof terrorism by gender(chi sq(2) = 10.48, p < .01)GenderMaleFemale100%80%60%40%20%0% Someone...victimAgreeNot sure/refusedDisagree 302130224157 Figure 7.2: Belief that Someone You Care About is Likely to Become Victim of Terrorism by Gender Hypothesis Eight To evaluate the final hypothesis (that females are the group most likely to be willing to put constraints on their civil liberties), crosstabulations were performed between the variable of gender and each of the questions in Table 3-1. A one-way ANOVA was also performed between gender and the mean score from the index created from the questions in Table 2 (and discussed in more detail under Hypothesis Three). Civil Liberties: Measured Individually Willingness to curtail civil liberties during crisis As previously indicated (under Hypothesis Three), 60 percent of the respondents agreed that they would be willing to suspend their civil liberties during times of crisis. A statistically significant relationship (X 2 (2) = 9.25, p < .02) exists between the gender of

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73 the respondent and their willingness to suspend civil liberties. While approximately the same percentage of females and males “agree” that they would suspend their civil liberties (68% and 66%, respectively) during times of crisis, about 13 percent of females (versus 22 percent of males) say they are willing to sacrifice civil liberties during times of crisis. Also, 20 percent of females (compared to 12 percent of males) answered they are “not sure” if they are willing to sacrifice civil liberties (Figure 8.1). Willing to give up civil liberties during crisisby gender(chi sq(2) = 9.25, p < .02)GenderMaleFemale100%80%60%40%20%0% Give up civil lib. DisagreeNot sureAgree 132220126866 Figure 8.1: Willing to Give Up Civil Liberties During Times of Crisis by Gender Curtail right of access to some public records Crosstabulation between gender and respondents’ willingness to curtail their right of access to some public records reveals another strong relationship (X 2 (2) = 19.57, p < .001) between these variables. About 64 percent of the females (compared to 44 percent of the males) responding to this question answered that they would be willing have their access limited to some of Florida’s public records (Figure 8.2). Even more revealing is

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74 the finding that while males and females were just as likely to remain “not sure” on the issue of curtailing their right of access to public records (22% and 20%, respectively), 33 percent of males (compared to 16 percent of females) “disagree” that they would be willing to limit their access to public information. Willing to curtail access to public informationby gender(chi sq(2) = 19.57, p < .001)GenderMaleFemale100%80%60%40%20%0% Curtail..pubic info.DisagreeNot sure/ refusedAgree 163320226444 Figure 8.2: Willing to Curtail Access to Public Information by Gender Curtail access to some public meetings Results of a crosstabulation reveals another strong relationship (X 2 = 6.74, df = 2, p < .04) between gender and the willingness to sacrifice one’s civil liberties. This time, however, the liberty being sacrificed is the right of access to some of Florida’s public meetings. Figure 8.3 indicates the increased likelihood that females would agree to surrender their civil liberties in the name of protection from terrorism. While 21 percent of males and females remain uncertain as to whether or not they would curtail their right to attend public meetings, 43 percent of females (versus 32 percent of males) were

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75 willing to curtail their rights, while only 36% (compared to 47 percent of males) disagreed that they were willing to sacrificing their right to attend meetings. Willing to limit access to public meetingsby gender(chi sq(2) = 6.74, p < .04)GenderMaleFemale100%80%60%40%20%0% Access to meetingsDisagreeNot sure/RefusedAgree 364721214332 Figure 8.3: Willing to Limit Access to Public Meetings by Gender Concern over new anti-terrorism laws vs. restriction of freedom of information When posed with the question of whether respondents have a greater fear of the government not passing good anti-terrorism laws or the government placing too many restrictions on our civil liberties in the name of protection from terrorism, responses were evenly divided amongst males and females (Figure 8.4), indicating the lack of a relationship (X 2 (2) = .03, p < .63) between gender and one’s willingness to sacrifice their civil liberties.

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76 Anti-terrorism laws: Too restrictive vs. Not strong enough by gender(chi sq(2) = .03, p < .63)GenderMale Female 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Concern..anti-terrorPass laws that are too restrictive Concerned about both Fail to enact laws strong enough 35 32 33 37 32 30 Figure 8.4 : Anti-terrorism Laws: Too Rest rictive vs. Not Strong Enough by Gender Concern about limits on public access to information Concern about laws limiting access to public records by gender(chi sq(2) = 1.69, p < .44)GenderMale Female 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Limit public accessPass laws that are too restrictive Concerned about both Fail to enact laws strong enough 35 35 30 35 35 30 Figure 8.5 : Concern About Laws Limiting Acce ss to Public Records by Gender

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77 A crosstabulation reveals that males and females are about equally divided on whether they fear more that the government will place too many or too few restrictions on the public’s ability to access information that allows the public to scrutinize the effectiveness of the government (Figure 8.5). Thus, there is no significant association between these variables (X 2 (2) = 1.69, p < .44). Threat of terrorism vs. concern about access to information A crosstabulation revealed no relationship (X 2 (2) = .20, p < .91) between gender and a change in the level of concern about public information being freely available since September 11. About half of the respondents indicated concern about the continuity of freedom of information in Florida, but there was no apparent relationship between gender and the impact it has on people’s concern for their civil liberties (see Figure 8.6). Less concerned about accessing public recordssince Sept. 11 by gender(chi sq(2) = .20, p < .91)GenderMaleFemale100%80%60%40%20%0% Concern about accessDisagreeNot sure/refusedAgree 494922232928 Figure 8.6: Change in Level of Concern About Accessing Public Records Since Sept. 11 by Gender

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78 Justification for state or federal restrictions on civil liberties With regards to the open-ended question asking, “What sort of things or events, if any, do you think justifies our state or federal government restricting the civil liberties or rights of Americans?,” a crosstabulation revealed a near significant relationship (X 2 (3) = 6.58, p < .09) between a respondent’s gender and his or her willingness to allow the government to restrict his or her civil liberties for “justifiable” reasons (Figure 8.7). Justification for government to curtail civil libertiesby gender(chi sq(3) = 6.58, p < .09)GenderMaleFemale100%80%60%40%20%0% "Just" restrictionsCrisis/Common goodTerrorism/War/BombingNothing/Under nocircumstance 141448463840 Figure 8.7: Justification for Government to Curtail Civil Liberties by Gender Civil Liberties: Index Measurement When conducting a one-way ANOVA between gender and the civil liberties index (see Hypotheses Three and Four for discussion), a significant relationship ( F (1) = 7.97, p < .006) was found to exist between the gender of the respondent and his or her overall attitude towards limiting their civil liberties. The maximum and minimum possible scores for the index are 1 (indicating that positive responses were given by the respondent

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79 for all six questions in the index) and (indicating negative responses for each of the six questions regarding civil liberties); a score of 0 (zero) indicates a neutral overall opinion about sacrificing one’s civil liberties. While the mean scores for male and female respondents, overall, were both negative (Figure 8.8), the difference between males and females is worthy of further exploration. Attitudes towards civil liberties after Sept. 11 by gender(F(1) = 7.97, p < .006)GenderFemaleMaleMean index scores0.0-.2-.4-.6-.8-1.0 -.9-.1 Figure 8.8: Attitudes Towards Civil Liberties After Sept. 11 by Gender Whereas the mean score for males was only slightly negative (M = -0.10), the mean score for females was .88. This reveals that, while the differences in response between males and females on some of the questions were only slight, overall, women were more likely to indicate a willingness to curb their civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. Although the differences of opinion between males and females were slight for some of the individual analyses, the three tests that indicated significant differences of

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80 opinion between males and females (i.e., willingness to give up civil liberties, curtail right of access to public records, and curtail right of access to public meetings), coupled with the overall mean score from the civil liberties index indicates that women are more unsure—and more likely—than their male counterparts to be willing to have constraints placed on their civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. Therefore, with regards to females’ willingness to give up civil liberties, their right of access to public records and public meetings, we can accept the validity of Hypothesis Eight.

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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION Summary While data from this research do not support the primary hypotheses of the paper (i.e., that heavy exposure to television coverage of the terrorist attacks leads to increased feelings of fear of becoming a victim of terrorism, or makes the viewer more willing to surrender his or her civil liberties), several of the findings from this research indicate the likelihood of the presence of television’s cultivating effects on its audience, thus warranting discussion and more thorough future investigations. Television Exposure to Terrorism and the Belief of Becoming a Victim of Terrorism With regards to the first two hypotheses in this study, no significant relationship was found to exist between the amount of television coverage respondents consumed regarding the terrorist crises of 2001 and whether or not they were likely to believe they, or someone they care about, were likely to become victims of terrorism. Regardless of the measurement used to study the amount of television consumption for the respondents (e.g., as a measure of exact time per respondent, or categorizing the respondents as “Light,” “Medium” or “Heavy” viewers), the data do not suggest the existence of the cultivation hypothesis that heavy exposure to television coverage of news about terrorism leads to increased fear of believing one will become a victim of terrorism. Thus, the first two hypotheses must be rejected in favor of the null hypothesis. Even though evidence is lacking from this study to confirm an association between heavy television consumption of news about the terrorist crises and greater levels of fear 81

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82 of becoming a victim of terrorism, it is interesting to note that the belief of becoming—or someone “you care about” becoming—a victim of terrorism increases sharply for those respodents who watched between six and ten hours of television coverage of the crisis per day. While there may be confounding variables that make this population more susceptible to believing they (or someone they care about) will become victims of terrorism, it is easy to see how a simple reclassification of Heavy Viewers to include only this group (i.e., those who consume between six and ten hours per day of television news about the crisis) would support the hypotheses of this study, as well as Gerbner’s theory of cultivation. However, this finding does merit further examination as to what, if not heavy exposure to television, makes this particular subset of the population more vulnerable to the fear of becoming victims of terrorism. Also, future research should also examine whether fear of victimization leads to an increased amount of television consumption, instead of vice versa. Although the first two hypotheses must be rejected due to a lack of corroborating data, 157 (35.4%) of the 446 respondents answered either that they agreed or were not sure as to whether or not they would become victims of terrorism. Even though this study does not provide evidence that television consumption of the terrorist crises is responsible for a third of the sample population to fear they will become victims of terrorism, it would be unsound to reject the notion that exposure to media coverage of the horrific events of September 11 did, indeed, play a major role creating this fear of terrorism. Regardless of the data, it is nothing if not a fact that, the media—especially television—plays a very significant role in the dispersion of information about terrorism. Without television coverage of the terrorist attacks of September 11, it is highly unlikely

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83 that over a third of the population of Florida would have fears as to whether they are likely to become victims of terrorism. Fear of Victimization and the Willingness to Curtail Civil Liberties Although the data in this study also lead to a rejection of the third and fourth hypotheses, the data reveal some interesting areas for further discussion. Most notable is that, contrary to the hypotheses, no significant differences exist between the level of support (or lack thereof) for maintaining civil liberties during times of crisis and whether or not the respondents believed they (or someone they cared about) would become victims of terrorism. Respondents, regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed that they (or someone they care about) would become victims of terrorism, were just as willing (or unwilling) to curtail their civil liberties during times of crisis. In the individual analyses where a statistically (or near statistically) significant relationship was found to exist between fear of victimization and the willingness to curtail civil liberties, it was the group “not sure” about whether they (or someone they care about) would become a victim of terrorism that was most likely to respond differently from the others. More specifically, those “not sure” about whether they (or someone they care about) are likely to become victims of terrorism were routinely the group most uncertain about how they felt about the curtailing of their civil liberties. For example, the “not sure” group was twice as likely as those who “agree” or those who “disagree” about becoming victims of terrorism to be “not sure” whether they would willing to give up their civil liberties during times of crisis. Similarly, those “not sure” about someone they care about becoming victims of terrorism were more likely to be “not sure” about their willingness to curtail their access to public records and public meetings.

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84 While the hypotheses incorrectly predicted that those who believe they (or someone they know) would become victims of terrorism would be the groups most willing to suspend their civil liberties (for the sake of protection against terrorism), close to 60 percent of all respondents answered that “terrorism,” “bombings” or “other crises” are justification for the government’s suspending the civil rights of the people. Likewise, despite the lack of a significant relationship between fear of becoming victims of terrorism and the overall willingness to curtail civil liberties, the overall attitude of the respondents towards maintaining the current well-being of our civil liberties during times of crisis reveals a less than enthusiastic show of support for their civil liberties from all groups. Television, Newspapers, and the Belief of Becoming a Victim of Terrorism Data from this study provide no evidence that heavy viewing of television has a stronger effect that heavy reading of newspapers on the fear of becoming victims of terrorism. Nor does this study provide enough data to support the hypothesis that heavy viewing of television is more powerful than heavy reading of newspapers in a person’s willingness to surrender their civil liberties during times of crisis. The data from this study do, however, reveal some interesting interactions between television and newspaper consumption with regards to their impact on a respondent’s willingness to give up their civil liberties and curtail their rights to access public records for the sake of protection against terrorism. In both of these instances, it was clear that respondents who were Light Viewers of television who are also Medium or Heavy Readers of newspaper were significantly less willing to allow constraints to be placed on their civil liberties than were those in the Medium or Heavy Viewers of television categories, indicating the strong impact of television over newspapers (with regards to

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85 terrorist coverage and a respondent’s willingness to curtail their civil liberties). Moreover, the data from this study revealed that, when coupled with heavy television consumption, heavy newspaper reading was correlated with an increased willingness of respondents to curtail their civil liberties during times of crisis. Therefore, although it was expected that respondent willingness to curtail civil liberties would decrease with increased amounts newspaper reading, the larger the amount of total media exposure, the more likely it was for respondents to be willing to curtail his or her civil liberties. Thus, increased newspaper reading by heavy viewers of television only served to increase the likelihood that a respondent would be willing to curtail his or her civil liberties. Gender and Victimization The data from this study indicate that females are significantly more likely than males to believe they (or someone they care about) will become a victim of terrorism. Likewise, females are also more likely to be uncertain than their male counterparts about becoming a victim of terrorism. This uncertainty of females about becoming a victim of terrorism indicates a stronger belief in the mere possibility of becoming a victim of terrorism, thus lending more support for the acceptance of the hypothesis that females are more likely to believe they (or someone they care about) will become a victim of terrorism. Gender and the Willingness to Curtail Civil Liberties Data from this study confirm the hypothesis that females are more willing than males to put constraints on their civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. Although some of the tests conducted revealed no relationship between gender and the willingness to curtail civil liberties, on the specific question asking respondents whether or not they agree that “we may need to give up some civil liberties during times of crisis,”

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86 88 percent of the females (compared to 78 percent of males) either agreed or were not sure. Data from this study also revealed that females were significantly more willing than males to curtail access to public records and public meetings, and significantly less likely to disagree to be willing to curtail their access to these same records and information. Similarly, females were slightly more likely than males to believe that “terrorism” or “some other crisis” justified the government in exercising the authority to curtail the civil liberties of its citizenry. Examination of an index score measuring the overall support of males and females towards upholding civil liberties during times of crisis reveals a strong willingness by both genders to curtail their civil liberties during times of crisis. The index, however, also reveals that females are significantly more likely than males to be willing to curtail their civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. With regards to the questions asking about the strength or the restrictive nature of new anti-terrorism legislation, the data revealed that men and women are equally concerned about the government acting with strength enough to protect the populace from terrorism, and with caution enough that they do not tread on the people’s cherished freedoms. The data indicate the people’s belief that the government must act in a strong, yet appropriate manner when working to protect its citizenry from terrorism. Furthermore, although the data reveal a lack of an association between gender and the opinions or values one has towards their civil liberties, these analyses do provide a degree of support to the argument that while citizens may be fearful of terrorism and are in want of government protection and security, they are also wary of loosing their ability to

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87 monitor the government’s performance (thus, their civil liberties) for the sake of the government providing “protection” against terrorism. Limitations Design One of the most obvious criticisms to be found for this cultivation-based study is the relatively short period of time after the crises that the data was collected. The central tenet of cultivation theory is that long-term exposure to television’s repeated messages produces “television answers” amongst heavy viewers. Long-term, as defined by Gerbner, would never be construed to equate to two months worth of television programming. Indeed, any experimental design testing cultivation in its purest form would require years-long research. However, the design and utility of this thesis remain valid since its goal is to examine the extent to which various levels of exposure to television coverage of the terrorist crises of 2001 impact the attitudes and beliefs of the television audience. Moreover, due to the severity of the events of September 11, the anthrax attacks in the weeks and months immediately following, and the intense coverage and speculation by the media, it seems reasonable to presume that heavy viewing of television coverage of the terrorist crises over a short period of time would have similar effects as long-term exposure to television coverage of more “mild” news or “current affairs.” Questionnaire While the questionnaire used in the 2001 Freedom of Information Survey is suitable for testing the hypotheses set forth in this research, the questionnaire was not specifically designed for cultivation research, thus presenting certain limitations to conducting cultivation analyses.

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88 Through their research, Potter and Chang (1999) determined that the most successful independent variable used for measuring television’s cultivating effects is an analysis of the specific type of programming consumed as a proportion of total television consumption. After this proportional measurement, the next most accurate model is an examination of the total exposure to type of programming consumed. The media usage questions on the 2001 Freedom of Information Survey do not provide adequate data to use the “proportional” independent variable; however, this study was able to use the next most accurate model of total type of specific programming consumed, and not on the more common—and less accurate—model of ‘total viewing’ of television. The questions used to measure the dependent (and independent) variable of “fear of victimization” also are limited in nature. Whereas Sparks and Ogle (1990) report that the most significant correlations between television exposure and fear of crime/victimization are found when researchers use a “fear of crime” index measurement, the Freedom of Information Survey asks only two questions directly related to fear of victimization (i.e., “You personally are likely to become a victim of terrorism,” and “Someone you care about will become a victim of terrorism). Although baseline data were not available to establish the level of fear (of becoming a victim of terrorism) prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, this study sought to examine the relationship between consumption of television coverage of the terrorist crises and fear of becoming a victim of terrorism, not the percentage change in fear subsequent to September 11 and the anthrax crises. Sample There may be limitations in the external validity of this study with regards to the sample population. Although the data used in this study was weighted for age and gender

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89 (thus, making the sample more comparable and consistent with the demographics of Floridians, as according to the 2000 census), the question remains: How representative is Florida’s adult population of adults living throughout the United States? Also, Florida’s rank as one of the most populated states may lead to residents believing they are more likely to suffer from terrorist attacks (since the goal of terrorism is to spread fear to as large an audience as possible). Finally, Florida enjoys the reputation of having some of the strongest laws in the nation guaranteeing its people open access to public records, meetings and information. Knowledge of these laws may make Floridians feel a stronger sense of attachment to their civil liberties than those in other parts of the country with less access to public records and information. September 11 The data used for this study was collected from a survey conducted in the months immediately following the horrific events of September 11. During this time, the nation saw a dramatic upwelling of patriotism and support for our political leaders and military personnel preparing for a war against terrorism, as well as a run on the market for American flags, and buttons and bumper stickers announcing how “united we stand.” This surge of patriotism may have had an impact on the survey results, particularly to how a respondent would choose to answer the questions about foregoing civil liberties during times of crisis. Although it may be argued that the most patriotic of the bunch—those zealous in their love and support for their country—would be willing to defend America’s civil liberties to the death, there is also a counter argument suggesting that the most patriotic would be willing to make any sacrifices necessary—including the curtailing of their civil liberties—for the protection of America and Americans against terrorism.

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90 The survey’s proximity to September 11, however, does not invalidate the study. On the contrary, this study sought to examine how exposure to the media’s coverage of September 11 related to the belief that viewers were likely to become victims of terrorism, and whether or not this would influence their attitudes towards curtailing their civil liberties. Conclusions This study sought to find a relationship between television consumption of the terrorist attacks of 2001, fear of becoming a victim of terrorism, and the willingness to curtail civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. Although the cultivation hypothesis that heavy television viewing of the terrorist crises would lead to increased levels of fear of victimization was not supported by the data from this study, television plays a definitive role in the transmission of terrorism from the actual source (or site) of an attack to the more widespread audience of television viewers. The lack of support for the hypothesis of this study does not suggest that television viewing has no impact whatsoever on the level of fear of viewers. However, it does reveal the need for more thorough investigations into how fear of becoming a victim of terrorism spreads from the actual source of terrorism to the population at large; if not through television and media coverage of the event, then how? Regardless of whether or not respondents in this study believed they (or someone they loved) would become victims of terrorism, the degree of support (or lack thereof) for maintaining civil liberties during times of crisis was consistent between both groups. Those believing they (or someone they care about) were likely to become victims of terrorism were just as uneasy about curtailing their civil liberties as those who were not fearful of terrorism, indicating a desire for full disclosure of information that may be

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91 pertinent to their protection from terrorism. Conversely, those not believing they (or someone they care about) were likely to become victims of terrorism were just as willing as the “believers” to sacrifice certain civil liberties if it would guarantee protection from future terrorist attacks. Future Research While no significant findings were made regarding the cultivation hypothesis that heavy television consumption of the terrorist crises of 2001 is related to one’s beliefs about becoming a victim of terrorism, this study introduced several questions for future research. Even though television consumption of the terrorist crises was not (directly) related to the fear of becoming a victim of terrorism, television certainly plays a role in disseminating this fear of terrorism to the population. Fifteen percent of the respondents in this study answered that they believed they personally would become a victim of terrorism, while 22 percent said they were not sure; similarly, 25 percent believed someone they cared about would become a victim of terrorism, while 27 percent were not sure. What, if not exposure to the media, are the significant contributing factors that cause this group of respondents to be fearful? In an article published concurrently with the writing of this thesis, Rubin et al. (2003) examined the cultivating impact of television exposure to terrorism reporting of September 11 and reported findings consistent with those in this thesis. The primary finding of Rubin et al. was that television exposure to terrorism reporting is not predictive of fear (Rubin et al., p. 128). Although the cultivation hypothesis of their study was not supported, like some of the findings in this thesis, Rubin et al. did determine that gender played a significant role in whether or not respondents in their survey indicated higher

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92 than normal levels of fear (p.136). Furthermore, Rubin et al. examined the role that various viewer characteristics and viewing motivations and intentions and played on viewers’ feelings of fear and safety, and found several variables unrelated to television exposure (e.g., the viewer’s gender and locus of control, the perceived realism of the programming, and the attention or inattention to what was being watched) that related to the onset of fear in the viewer (pp. 136-139). While no statistically significant relationship was found in this thesis between television consumption and fear of becoming a victim, a closer examination of Figure 1.1 presents the researcher with an interesting set of questions for further investigation. What are the specific factors, demographic or otherwise, that lead viewers of between six and nine hours of television news to be more likely to believe they will become victims of terrorism than those of other groups? For example, it is possible that this group is composed of (significantly) older adults or is primarily female, two groups that are more prone than others to label themselves as likely to become victims. Also, what are the demographic variables that permit one to dedicate six to nine hours per day to watching television solely regarding the terrorist crises of September 11, 2001? Would this population actually be a representative sample of the general population? Moreover, is it possible that this group was more fearful of becoming victims of terrorism, thus sought out as much information as possible from the media, thereby reversing the causal explanation? What are the motivating factors that prompted almost two-thirds (63.8%) of all survey respondents to answer that they believe we may need to give up some civil liberties during times of crisis? What civil liberties, specifically, would they be willing to

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93 sacrifice? For how long would they be willing to surrender these civil liberties? Would these respondents answer in the same manner if asked the same question in a new survey, conducted a year and a half after the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center? What role does “patriotism”—the fervent support for and love of one’s own county—play in people’s attitudes towards sacrificing their civil liberties? Does being “patriotic” indicate that person would be inclined to fight for their rights (i.e., their civil liberties) at all costs, or surrender these same rights for the sake of protecting one’s country and countrymen from terrorism? What has been the effect of passage of the Patriot Act, the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, the Information Awareness Office, the color-coordinated Terrorist Alert, and talk of a new addition to the Patriot Act (dubbed “Patriot II”) on people’s beliefs that they are likely to become victims of terrorism? In light of these new government programs and legislation, do people feel more or less secure regarding their protection from terrorism? Likewise, how have people’s attitudes towards surrendering their civil liberties for the sake of terrorism changed (if at all) since the inception of these various programs? The data from this study support the hypotheses that females are more likely than males to believe they will become victims of terrorism, and also significantly more willing than males to curtail their civil liberties during times of crisis. The consequences of this fear could have far reaching effects on the social and political arenas. Future studies should focus on what actions females are willing to undertake in order to secure themselves from attacks of terrorism. Could it be possible that a crafty politician could “harness” this fear, securing enough votes to get elected into office, or pass anti-terrorism

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94 legislation? Could a fear of terrorism and a willingness to curtail civil liberties combine to become a detriment to democracy? While this study does not provide evidence of a “television answer” (i.e., “I am, or someone I care about is, likely to become a victim of terrorism”) among heavy viewers of television coverage of the terrorist crises of 2001, it is not accurate to say that cultivation, as a theory, must be rejected. As noted in the limitations, the data for this survey were gathered only a few months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, falling much short of Gerbner’s original hypothesis that years of television watching lead the viewer to establish certain television-based beliefs. Even if strong correlations were found between heavy viewers and high levels of fear of becoming victims of terrorism, it is important to remember that correlation does not equate to causation. Many variables must be examined, and further research must be conducted to determine whether heavy exposure to television is the actual cause, or even one of many casues, of people believing they will become a victim of terrorism. As Weaver and Wakshlag (1998) conclude and recommend, “Longitudinal investigations hold the greatest promise for resolving [this] issue” (p. 155). A cultivation study with a repeat administration of the 2001 Freedom of Information Survey may prove to be the best mechanism for testing whether or not television exposure produces greater levels of fear (of becoming a victim of terrorism) and willingness to curtail civil liberties for the sake of protection against terrorism. However, over the course of the past year and a half, our country has engaged itself in a war “against terrorism,” and is now in the midst of a war with Iraq, and a campaign for the prevention of terrorism. The United States has also created an official terrorism alert

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95 system and two governmental departments—the Office of Homeland Security and the Office of Information Awareness—to warn and protect its citizens from terrorist threats. The media have been thorough in their coverage of all these developments, thus warranting future studies to determine the impact they have had on people’s fears of terrorism, and their attitudes about their civil liberties and constitutional rights.

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APPENDIX FOI QUESTIONNAIRE Interviewer Number ______ FOI Questionnaire University of Florida Fall 2001 Do not read anything in this column that is in italics, in brackets or otherwise noted. Copy in boldface should be emphasized. YOU ARE NOT TO READ ANYTHING IN THIS COLUMN. THIS IS ONLY FOR CODING PURPOSES. A. Hello: my name is .. I’m calling from the University of Florida’s College of Journalism and Communications. This is a survey about public issues in Florida. Your household has been randomly selected to represent people like you, so your participation is important. I’ve been instructed to speak to the adult over 18 who most recently celebrated a birthday. Would that be you? 1. Yes, continue with survey from C. 2. No ,continue with B below. B. May I speak with that person? 1. Yes, go back to No. A 2. If individual not home, follow instructions to make arrangements for call backs. C. You’re anonymous. We don’t know your name, and your phone number can’t be attached to this survey. You may refuse to answer any question, stop the interview at any time, or ask not to have your responses included. I can give you the name and phone number of my supervisor or the University’s Review Board now, or at the end of the survey, if you need it. First I’m going to ask you a few questions about where you get most news. (If desired give this name and number: Dr. Mary Ann Ferguson, 352-392-6660 or UFIRB Office, PO Box 112250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; phone (352) 392-0433.) 96

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97 1. People get news and information from many sources. Please tell me whether you get all, a great deal, some, a little, or none of your news and information from national TV news shows. All A great deal Some A little None 88. Don’t Know 99. Refused 2. What about local TV news programs? [Read if necessary, All, a great deal, some, a little or none?] 1. All 2. A great deal 3. Some 4. A little 5. None 88. Don’t Know 99. Refused 3. Local radio news? [Read if necessary, All, a great deal, some, a little or none?] 1. All 2. A great deal 3. Some 4. A little 5. None 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 4. The Internet? [Read if necessary, All, a great deal, some, a little or none?] All A GREAT DEAL SOME A LITTLE NONE 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 5. Newspapers, in print format? [Read if necessary, All, a great deal, some, a little or none?] ALL A GREAT DEAL A LITTLE NONE 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 6. Friends or family? [Read if necessary, All, a great deal, some, a little or none?] ALL A GREAT DEAL SOME A LITTLE NONE 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 7. Somewhere else? What would that be? [Write in] 8. Last week, on the average, how many minutes or hours a day did you spend watching TV about the current national crisis? 0. None ____ minutes a day ____ hours a day 88. Don’t know 99. Refused 9. Last week, on the average, how many minutes or hours a day did you spend reading news about the current national crisis? 0. None ____ minutes a day ____ hours a day 89. Don’t know 99. Refused I’m g oin g to read statements about p ublic records and 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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98 documents. While some changes have been proposed with regard to availability of these documents, I’m asking whether you think something has been true in Florida; that is, does the statement accurately reflect Florida Law, as it was prior to the events of September 11 th ? 10. The first statement is: “Florida law said everyone has the right to see any record of local and state officials and offices, unless that record is specifically exempted by law. Has this been true or false in Florida? 1. TRUE 2. FALSE 3. NOT SURE 99. Refused 11. Is it true or false that before September 11 th , in Florida, you had to put your request in writing rather than simply asking to see the public record? 4. TRUE 5. FALSE 6. NOT SURE 99. Refused 12. Before September 11 th, Florida law said you could be denied access to public records of local and state government if you were not a resident of the state of Florida? [If necessary say,] True or False? TRUE FALSE NOT SURE 99. Refused 13. Before September 11 th, when requesting public information in Florida, you were required to tell the record keeper why you wanted to see the information? [If necessary say,] True or False? TRUE FALSE NOT SURE 99. Refused 14. Before recent events, when requesting public information in Florida, you had to show identification to look at the record? [If necessary say,] True or False? TRUE FALSE NOT SURE 99. Refused 15. Before, in Florida, the news media have had more rights to obtain information held by the government than people who are not media employees? [If necessary say,] True or False? TRUE FALSE NOT SURE 99. REFUSED Florida’s Public Record’s Laws cover many different records, but not everyone is aware of what’s covered by law. Please tell me if you believe the following was true or false in Florida before September 11th. 16. That the reports nursing homes make to the state about patients’ accidents and injuries have been public? [If necessary say,] True or False? TRUE FALSE NOT SURE 99. REFUSED 17. What about county jail booking reports? [If necessary say,] Is it true or false that county jail booking reports have been public? 1. TRUE 2 FALSE 3 NOT SURE 99. REFUSED 18. State drivers’ license records? [If necessary say,] True or False? TRUE FALSE NOT SURE 99. REFUSED 19. County medical examiners’ records, including autopsy photographs? [If necessary say,] True or False? TRUE FALSE NOT SURE 99. REFUSED 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3.

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99 20. Please estimate the number of times, in your lifetime, you’ve requested a copy of or asked to see a record covered under Florida Public Records Law? 0. NEVER (SKIP TO QUESTION 26 AND PUT A 77 IN QUEST. 24 & 25) _____ TIMES Don’t Know 99. REFUSED 21. When you made those requests, about how many times were you were denied access or kept from getting a copy or inspecting a record that you believed was covered by Florida Law? 0. NEVER _____ TIMES 77. NEVER REQUESTED A PUBLIC RECORD 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 22. How many times have you requested a copy of an e-mail or Internet record covered by the Florida public records law? 0. NEVER _____ TIMES 77. NEVER REQUESTED A PUBLIC RECORD 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED Next are a couple of questions about your opinions on current issues. Many in our society believe that our rights, as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, are essential to a democracy, while others do not think they all are equally essential. 23. Would you say you agree, are not sure, or disagree that freedom of the press, for one, is essential to a democracy? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 24. What about free speech? [If necessary, say, Agree, are not sure, or disagree that free speech is essential to a democracy?] Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 25. What about the right to bear arms? [If necessary, say, Agree, are not sure, or disagree?] 1. Agree 2. Not Sure 3. Disagree 99. REFUSED 26. The right to a fair and public jury trial? [If necessary, say, Agree, are not sure, or disagree?] 1. Agree 2. Not Sure 3. Disagree 99. REFUSED 27. What about the right to privacy? [If necessary, say, Agree, are not sure, or disagree that our right of privacy is essential? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 28. What about freedom of religion? [If necessary, say, Agree, are not sure, or disagree?] Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 29. Some people say that during times of national crisis or war, some civil liberties may have to be suspended. Do you agree, are not sure, or disagree that we may need to give up some civil liberties in times of crisis? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 30. I’m g oin g to read y ou a list of some ri g hts from the Bill of Free speech 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1.

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100 Rights. Please tell me which one you personally think is most essential to a democracy? Freedom of speech, a free press, the right to bear arms, the right to a fair and public jury trial, the right of privacy, or freedom of religion? Freedom of the press Right to bear arms Right to a fair & public jury trial Right of privacy Freedom of religion All are equal None are important Other..specify 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 31. Which would you say is second in importance to a democracy? [Read if necessary: Freedom of speech, a free press, the right to bear arms, the right to a fair and public jury trial, the right of privacy, or freedom of religion?] Free speech Freedom of the press Right to bear arms Right to a fair & public jury trial Right of privacy Freedom of religion All are equal None are important Other..specify 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 32. If you thought that, because of terrorism, it might be necessary to put constraints on one or more rights, which one, if any, do you think could be constrained with the least harm to our democratic system? [Read if necessary: Freedom of speech, a free press, the right to bear arms, the right to a fair and public jury trial, the right of privacy, or freedom of religion?] Free speech Freedom of the press Right to bear arms Right to a fair & public jury trial Right of privacy Freedom of religion All are equal None are important Other..specify 88 DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 33. Which other one do you think could be constrained with the next least harm to the democracy? [Read if necessary: Freedom of speech, a free press, the right to bear arms, the right to a fair and public jury trial, the right of privacy, or freedom of religion?] Free speech Freedom of the press Right to bear arms Right to a fair & public jury trial Right of privacy Freedom of religion All are equal None are important Other..specify 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

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101 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 34. Recently, because of terrorism, Florida legislators have proposed changing Florida Public Records Law to restrict access to some records that are presently public. Do you agree, are not sure, or disagree that it is necessary to curtail your right of access to some Florida public records because of the threat of terrorism? 1. Agree 2. Not Sure 3. Disagree 99. REFUSED 35. Florida’s Open Meetings laws previously said the public has the right to attend meetings of many state and local governing bodies. Some people have proposed changes to these laws. Do you agree, are not sure, or disagree that it is necessary to curtail your right of access to some of Florida’s public meetings to curb terrorism? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 36. Does it concern you more that state government will not pass good anti-terrorism laws because of freedom of information and First Amendment concerns, or that it will pass new anti-terrorism laws that put too much restriction on these freedoms? 1. Fail to enact new laws 2. Pass too restrictive laws 3. Concerned about both 4. Concerned about Neither 88. Don’t know 99. Refused 37. Some proposed changes include restricting access to public information that some think may be important because of terrorists’ activities. Does it concern you more that state government will not put enough limits on public access to information, or that new limits will prevent citizens from learning how effective state government is? NOT PUT LIMITS ENOUGH NEW LIMITS WILL PREVENT CITIZENS FROM LEARNING ABOUT GOVERNMENT Concerned about both Concerned about neither 88. Don’t know 99. Refused People have different ideas about what the public information access laws should be. For the next few statements, please tell me whether you agree, are not sure or disagree that a statement reflects what you think the laws should be. 38. If someone you know died, you should be allowed access to the autopsy photos that might explain what happened? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 39. Before placing a relative in a nursing home, you should be able to view the state inspection records, violations, and long-term-care reports of the facilities. [If necessary, say, do you agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3.

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102 40. The privacy of the family of someone like NASCAR racer Dale Earnhardt should outweigh our right to view the autopsy photos to judge whether the medical examiner did an adequate job of determining the cause of death? [If necessary, say, do you agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 41. If government has information about potential dangers you may face in your community, workplace or in travel, you should have full and accurate information about those dangers? [If necessary, say, do you agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 42. Law enforcement officers should have access to your bank records, employment or school records, telephone conversations, or other personal information without a warrant? [If necessary, say, do you agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 43. The government should be allowed to release misleading information or tell lies to the press or citizens during times of national crisis? [If necessary, say, agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 4. 44. You personally are likely to become a victim of terrorism? [If necessary, say, do you agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 45. Someone you care about will become a victim of terrorism? [If necessary, say, agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 46. The threat of terrorism has led you to be less concerned about public information being freely available than you were before September 11? [If necessary, say, do you agree, are not sure, or disagree? Agree Not Sure Disagree 99. REFUSED 47. What sort of things or events, if any, do you think justifies our state or federal government restricting the civil liberties or rights of Americans? 0. Nothing SPECIFY 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 48. The next questions ask about your involvement in government. Would you say you are very involved, somewhat involved, not very involved or not at all involved in your local government, whether city, county or school board? [If asked what involvement means, say, Involvement might include attending meetings, voting, campaigning for candidates, writing letters to public officials, or lobbying and organizing protests. Very involved Somewhat involved Not very Involved Not at all involved 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED

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103 49. Your state government? [If necessary, say are you very involved, somewhat involved, not very involved or not at all involved? Very involved Somewhat involved Not very Involved Not at all involved 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 50. Working for local or state candidates? [If necessary, say are you very involved, somewhat involved, not very involved or not at all involved? Very involved Somewhat involved Not very Involved Not at all involved 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 51. We’re just about done. These last questions will help us compare you with others like yourself. What is your ethnicity or cultural background? HISPANIC / LATINO CAUCASIAN BLACK ASIAN AMERICAN INDIAN OTHER __________________ 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 52. Are you a U.S. citizen? YES NO If No, skip to Question 59 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 53. Are you a registered voter? YES NO If No, skip to Question 59 77. Not a citizen, skipped 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 54. Have you voted in any election within the past two years? YES NO 77. Not a citizen, skipped 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED 55. Which political party, Democrat, Republican, or other, do you consider closest to your own views? Democrat Republican Other NEITHER 88 DON’T KNOW 99. Refused 56. What best describes your political ideology: Very Conservative, Conservative, Moderate, Liberal, or Very Liberal? Very Conservative Conservative Moderate Liberal Very Liberal Don’t know 99. Refused 57. What is the highest level of education you have attained? Ph.D. M.D., Law Degree MASTERS DEGREE SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL FOUR-YEAR COLLEGE DEGREE SOME COLLEGE 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. 2. 1. 2. 1. 2. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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104 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. TRADE SCHOOL CERTIFICATION SOME VOCATION TRADE SCHOOL HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GED OR OTHER H.S. EQUIVALENCY SOME HIGH SCHOOL OTHER _______________________ 88. Don’t know 99 REFUSED What is your occupation or profession? [Probe if necessary to get a description of the occupation.] None Housewife/househusband Student Retired 88. Don’t know 99. REFUSED What religion, if any, do you consider yourself? Atheist/None Agnostic Baptist Catholic Christian Hindu Jewish Muslem Protestant Other ___________________ 88 Don’t know 99. Refused How old are you? ______________ YEARS OLD 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED What is your approximate personal annual pre-tax income? [If necessary say, your’s only; not that of your household)? $_____________________ PER YEAR 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED I only have two more questions. What is your zip code? []If necessary say, Remember you are anonymous, no one can connect your answers with your name. We ask this information for comparative purposes only. Zip CODE__________________ 88. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED Do you personally know someone who has been a victim of terrorism during the recent terrorism attacks? 1. No 2. Yes 88. Don’t know 99. Refused Thank you very much for your time. Is there anything else you’d like to tell me about your concerns about freedom of information and the current crisis in the country?

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105 Was the respondent male or female? male, female 88. Don’t know 1. 2. Thank you for participating in our survey. I can give you my supervisor’s name and phone number, or the phone number and address of the University’s Review Board, if you need it. Good evening. (If desired give this name and number: Dr. Mary Ann Ferguson, 352-392-6660 or UFIRB Office, PO Box 112250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; phone (352) 392-0433.) Record the following from the label: 8506239566 1 Milton 12113 383 63 686 62 6080 2 B Interviewers ID No. [___] [___] Area code [___] [___] [___] (first three digits of phone number) Exchange code [___] [___] [___] (second three digits of phone number) Replicate Number Circle one 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (right-most number on first line) City: __________________________________ FIPS CODE [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [___] [___] [___] (Five digit number on left) ADI Area of Dominant Influence [___] [___] [___] (Three digit number, begins with a 1, 3, 4 or 6) ADI Rank [___] [___] [___] (up to three digits, but most are two digits) DMA Designated Market Area [___] [___] [___] (three digit number and begins with either a 5 or 6) DMA Rank [___] [___] (two digit number) MSA Metropolitan Stat. Area [___] [___] [___] [___] (4 digit number) MST (Met. Status code) (circle one) 1 2 3 4 5 Nielsen Size (Circle Letter) A B C D E F`

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106 LIST OF REFERENCES Barnet, R. J. (1996, December 2). The terroris m trap: Anti-terrorism and the reality of civil rights. The Nation, 263 (18), 18-22. Birnbaum, D., & Croll, W. L. (1984). The etiology of children's stereotypes about sex differences in emotions. Sex Roles, 10 , 677-691. Cantor, J. (2002). Fright reac tions to mass media. In B. Jennings & D. Zillman (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (pp.287-306). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Carlson, J. M. (1983). Crime show viewing by pre-adults: The impact on attitudes towards civil liberties. Communication Research, 10 , 529-532. Chiricos, T., Eschholz, S., & Gertz, M. (1997) . Crime, news and fear of crime: Toward an identification of audience effects. Social Problems, 44 (3), 342-357. Chiricos, T., Padgett, K., & Gertz, M. (2000). Fear, TV news, and the reality of crime. Criminology, 38 (3), 755-785. Doob, A. N., & Macdonald, G. E. (1979). Televisi on viewing and fear of victimization: Is the relationship causal? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37 (2), 170179. Farmanfarmaian, R. (2002). The media and the war on terrorism: Where does the truth lie? Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15 (1), 159-163. Ferraro, K., & LaGrange, R. (1992). Are older people most afraid of crime? Reconsidering age differences in fear of victimization. Journal of Gerontology, 27 (5), 233-244. Gerbner, G. (1969). Toward “cultural indicato rs”: The analysis of mass mediated public message systems. Audio Visual Communication Review, 17 (2), 137-148. Gerbner, G., & Gross, L. (1976, April). The scary world of TV’s heavy viewer. Psychology Today, 14 , 41-45, 89-90. Gerbner, G., & Gross, L. (1976b). Living with television: The violence profile. Journal of Communication, 26 (3), 172-199.

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107 Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M. & Si gnorielli, N. (1980). The “mainstreaming” of America: Violence profile no. 11. Journal of Communication, 30 (3), 10-29. Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M. & Signorie lli, N. (1994). Growing up with television: The cultivation perspective. In B. Jenni ngs & D. Zillman (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (pp. 210-235). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Harrison, K. & Cantor, J. (1999). Tales from the screen: Enduring fr ight reactions to scary media. Media Psychology, 1 , 97-116. Heath, L., & Gilbert, K. (1996). Mass media and fear of crime. American Behavioral Scientist, 39 (4), 379-386. Heath, L., & Petraitis, J. (1987) . Television viewing and fear of crime: Where is the mean world? Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 8 (1-2), 97-123. Higgins, J. M. (2001, September 17). Made -for-TV terrorism. Broadcast & Cable, 131 (39), 3-8. Hirsch, P. (1980). The “scary world” of the nonviewer and other anomalies: A reanalysis of Gerbner et al.’s findings on cultiv ation analysis. Part I. Communication Research, 7 (4), 403-456. Hoekstra, S.J., Harris, R.J., & Helmick, A. (1999). Autobiographical memories about the experience of seeing frightening movi es in childhood. Media Psychology, 1 , 117140. Karmen, A.A. (1991). Victims of crime. In Joseph F. Sheley, Criminology: A contemporary handbook (pp. 121-38). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Morgan, M. (2002). Audience rese arch: Cultivation analysis . Retrieved July 2, 2002 from the World Wide Web: http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/A/h tmlA/audienceresec/audienceresec.htm Nabi, R. L., & Sullivan, J. L. (2001). Does television viewing relate to engagement in protective action against crime? A cultivati on analysis from a theory of reasoned action perspective. Co mmunication Research, 28 (6), 802-825. Parker, K. D., McMorris, B.J., Smith, E., & Mury, K.S. (1993). Fear of crime and the likelihood of victimization: A bi-eth nic comparison. Journal of Social Psychology, 133 , 723-732. Paulson, K. (2002, August 29). New “State of the First Amendment” survey suggests many Americans see freedoms as obstacles in war on terror. Press release

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108 retrieved on September 30, 2002, fr om the World Wide Web: http://www.freedom forum.org/templates/document.asp?documented=16836 Peck, E.Y. (1999). Gender differences in film -induced fear as a function of type of emotion measure and stimulus content: A meta-analysis and a laboratory study . Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Un iversity of Wisconsin-Madison. Potter, W. J. (1993). Cultivation theory a nd research: A conceptual critique. Human Communication research, 19 (4), 564-601. Potter, W. J. (1999). On media violence . Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Potter, W. J., & Chang, I. C. (1990). Tele vision exposure measure and the cultivation hypothesis. Journal of Broad casting & Electronic Media, 34 (3), 313-333. Rubin, A. M., Haridakis, P. M., Hullma n, G. A., Sun, S., Chikombero, P. M., & Pornsakulvanich, V. (2003). Television expos ure not predictive of terrorism fear. Newspaper Research Journal, 24 (1), 128-145. Signorielli, N., & Morgan, M. (1996). Cultivati on analysis: research and practice. In M. B. Salwen and D. W. Stacks (Eds.), An integrated approach to communication theory and research (pp. 111-126). Mahwah, NJ: La wrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Sparks, G. G., & Ogles, R. M. (1990). The di fference between fear of victimization and the probability of being victimized: Im plications for cultivation. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 34 (3), 351-358. Stossel, S. (2001, October 22). Terror TV: Television coverage of the World Trade Center attack. The American Prospect, 12 (18), 35. Tyler, T. R., & Cook, F. L. (1984). The mass me dia and judgment of risk: Distinguishing impact on personal and societal level judgm ents. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47 (4), 693-708. Warr, M. (1984). Fear of victimizat ion: Why are women and the elderly more afraid? Social Science Quarterly, 65 , 681-702. Weaver, J., & Wakshlag, J. (1986). Percei ved vulnerability to crime, criminal victimization experience, and televisi on viewing. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 30 (2), 141-158. Weiman, G. (2000). Communicating unreality . Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

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109 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Andrew Mark Ragsdale is a proud Floridia n and three-time University of Florida alumnus. Mr. Ragsdale received a Bachelor of Arts in history from Florida in the spring of 1996, and immediately began his second de gree in the university’s renowned ProTeach program in the College of Educa tion. Upon earning a de gree of Master of Education in secondary education (with an emphasis in social st udies), Mr. Ragsdale married his high school—and collegiate—swe etheart, Jill Alexandra Ellington, and whisked her away to Orlando, Florida, where he gained employment as a teacher of American history at Gotha Middle School. Following an incredibly successful firs t year of teaching—resulting in Mr. Ragsdale’s receipt of the eighth-grade clas s’s “Best Teacher of the Year” award—Mr. Ragsdale and his wife ventured north to Knoxville, Tennessee, wh ere his wife earned a master’s degree in public relations from the University of Tennessee. During their two years in Tennessee, Mr. Ragsdale explored the underworld of the hospitality industry by working his way up through the ranks of a cor porate restaurant, all the while dabbling in graduate history courses. In the fall of 2000, Mr. Ragsdale decided to re-enter the world of education from the vantage of a student, this time in pursuit of an elusive degree of Master of Arts in Mass Communication.