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Turkey, identity, and European Union enlargement

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Title:
Turkey, identity, and European Union enlargement
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Cosan, Amy Michelle
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[Gainesville, Fla.]
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University of Florida
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Cultural preservation ( jstor )
Databases ( jstor )
Discourse ( jstor )
Financial investments ( jstor )
Government corruption ( jstor )
Gross domestic product ( jstor )
Investment banking ( jstor )
Investment credit ( jstor )
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Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF ( lcsh )
ENLARGEMENT, EUROPEAN, GERMANY, IDENTITY, TURKEY, UNION
Economic conditions -- Turkey ( lcsh )
Ethnic relations -- Turkey ( lcsh )
European Union -- Turkey ( lcsh )
European Union -- Membership ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis, M.A ( lcsh )
Social life and customs -- Turkey ( lcsh )
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government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
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ABSTRACT: This thesis compares Turkey with the Central and Eastern European Countries in terms of fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria for European Union Accession. I argue that Turkey and the Central and Eastern European Countries are at the same level politically and economically in terms of fulfilling the Europeans Union's criteria. Even though they are at the same level, Turkey has received less favorable treatment from the European Union compared to the Central and Eastern European countries. The reason for this difference is the result of how Europe has defined itself and "others." Those who are seen as "different" from the current European Union member states are likely to received less favorable treatment than those who are seen as "like" the current European states. Through an analysis of the German print media's portrayal of Turkey vis vis Poland, I show how Turkey has been seen as "other" vis a vis Europe and how Poland has been seen as "European" in the past seven to eight years. To do the German print media analysis, I use the Constructivist approach, which deals with the construction of identity.
Thesis:
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Florida, 2003.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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Title from title page of source document.
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Includes vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Amy Michelle Cosan.

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University of Florida
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Copyright Cosan, Amy Michelle. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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5/1/2008
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TURKEY, IDENTITY, AND EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT By AMY MICHELLE COSAN A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLOR IDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2003

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Copyright 2003 by Amy Michelle Cosan

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iii TABLE OF CONTENTS page LIST OF TABLES...............................................................................................................v LIST OF FIGURES..........................................................................................................vii ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................vi ii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 2 HISTORY OF EU AND RELATIONS BETWEEN EU AND CANDIDATES.........3 3 OVERVIEW OF COPENHAGEN CRITERIA.........................................................17 4 ECONOMIC COMPARISON BETWEE N TURKEY AND THE CEECS...............23 5 POLITICAL COMPARISON BETWEE N TURKEY AND THE CEECS...............36 Turkey......................................................................................................................... 37 Hungary......................................................................................................................44 Poland......................................................................................................................... 47 Romania......................................................................................................................51 Slovak Republic..........................................................................................................55 The Baltic States.........................................................................................................61 Bulgaria....................................................................................................................... 65 The Czech Republic....................................................................................................69 Slovenia......................................................................................................................7 3 6 IDENTITY FORMATION.........................................................................................76 7 TURKEY OR ORIENT AS EUROPEÂ’S "OTHER"..................................................78 8 POLAND AS "EUROPEAN"....................................................................................92 9 GERMAN MEDIA, TURKEY AND POLAND........................................................94 Turkey.......................................................................................................................10 1 Poland.......................................................................................................................11 9

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iv 10 CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................135 APPENDIX A THE HERITAGE FOUNDATIONÂ’S DE SCRIPTIONS OF RATINGS FOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS....................................................................................138 B GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE (S TRAFGESETZBUCH, STGB)..........................146 C ABBREVIATIONS, TERMS AND DEFINITIONS...............................................149 Abbreviations............................................................................................................149 Terms and Definitions..............................................................................................149 D ECONOMIC TABLES.............................................................................................151 LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................198 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...........................................................................................219

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v LIST OF TABLES Table page 1 Trade and Price Liberalization Comparison..........................................................24 2 Market Barriers and Exits Comparison..................................................................25 3 Legal System Comparison.....................................................................................26 4 Macroeconomic Comparison.................................................................................26 5 Financial Sector Comparison.................................................................................31 6 Human and Physical Capital Comparison.............................................................33 7 Government Policy Comparison............................................................................34 8 Trade Integration Comparison...............................................................................34 D-1 Comparison between Turkey and the CEECs with other indicators....................151 D-2 Means of the CEECs............................................................................................154 D-3 Medians of the CEECs.........................................................................................157 D-4 Poland..................................................................................................................160 D-5 Hungary................................................................................................................163 D-6 Czech Republic....................................................................................................166 D-7 Slovak Republic...................................................................................................170 D-8 Slovenia................................................................................................................173 D-9 Estonia..................................................................................................................17 7 D-10 Latvia...................................................................................................................1 80 D-11 Lithuania..............................................................................................................183 D-12 Bulgaria................................................................................................................18 6

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vi D-13 Romania...............................................................................................................190 D-14 Turkey..................................................................................................................19 4

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vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure page A-1 Trade policy grading scale...................................................................................138 A-2 Government expenditures s cale for developing countries...................................139 A-3 Government intervention grading scale...............................................................140 A-4 Capital flows and foreign investment grading scale............................................141 A-5 Banking and finance grading scale......................................................................142 A-6 Wages and prices grading scale...........................................................................143 A-7 Property rights grading scale...............................................................................144 A-8 Regulation grading scale......................................................................................145

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viii Abstract of Thesis Presen ted to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master of Arts TURKEY, IDENTITY, AND EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT By Amy Michelle Cosan May 2003 Chair: Amie Kreppel Major Department: Political Science This thesis compares Turkey with the Ce ntral and Eastern European Countries in terms of fulfillment of the Copenhagen Crite ria for European Union Accession. I argue that Turkey and the Central and Eastern Eu ropean Countries are at the same level politically and economically in terms of fulfilling the Europe ans Union's criteria. Even though they are at the same level, Turkey ha s received less favorable treatment from the European Union compared to the Central a nd Eastern European countries. The reason for this difference is the result of how Europe has defined itself and "others." Those who are seen as "different" from the current European Union member states are likely to received less favorable treatment than those who are se en as "like" the current European states. Through an analysis of the German print media's portrayal of Turkey vis vis Poland, I show how Turkey has been seen as "other" vis a vis Europe and how Poland has been seen as "European" in the past seven to eight years. To do the German print media analysis, I use the Constructivist approach, wh ich deals with the cons truction of identity.

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1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION While Turkey is largely at the same le vel as many of the Central and Eastern European states (CEECs) in fulfilling the economic and political criteria for European Union (EU) accession, it has received less favor able treatment from the European Union in comparison to the Central and Eastern Eu ropean states. Turkey was not courted to apply for EU membership, whereas the CEEC s were; the CEECs were invited to attend and engage in regular meetings regularly in the various EU institutions far in advance of accession, whereas Turkey was not; the CEECs have all started EU accession negotiations (some have finished), whereas Tu rkey has not; and Turkey was not given an accession date--instead Turkey was given (A very and Cameron, 2001: 17-19; Park, 2000: 323). The difference in treatment stems from the European Union’s identity construction of the Central and Eastern European states as “European” and “like” current EU Member states, and its identity construction of Turkey as “Other” and “diffe rent” from current EU Member states. I demonstrate the existence of these constructions by analyzing the German media’s discourse on Turkey and Pola nd (representative of the CEECs) in the past decade. Before launching into the comparisons between the CEECs and Turkey, it is necessary to discuss briefly the history of the EU’s integration and enlargement; and its relations with the current candidate states. An important aspect of this discussion is the definition of the European Union as a special kind of community that requires a sense of “we-ness” or common identity. In the next two sections I present the economic and

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2 political comparison between Turkey and the C EECs, with the conclusion that they are basically at the same level in terms of fu lfilling the criteria for EU accession. To begin the discussion of Europe’s and the EU’s iden tity construction of Turkey as "other" and the CEECs as ‘like,’ I present some key as pects of the general process of identity formation, followed by a history of Europe’s co nstruction of Turkey as ‘other.’ Then I discuss the German media’s representations of Turkey and Poland in the last 10 years. This is followed by a brief analysis of th e discourse of EU officials on Turkey and Poland; and some implications concerning the EU as a whole in its representations of and perspective on these two states.

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3 CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF EU AND RELATIONS BETWEEN EU AND CANDIDATES One may ask why enlargement is such a se nsitive issue for the European Union. To understand the EUÂ’s relations with prospect ive Member states, it is necessary to first define what type of political-economic body the Union is and what is involved in letting new states join this body. The European Union is essentially an amalgamated securitycommunity1 that is also economically based. Within the EU there is a se nse of "we-ness," a common government with administrative cap acity over the entire domain, and a high level of integration, which ar e the main characteristics of an amalgamated securitycommunity (Deutsch, 1994: 115-137). It is also integrated economically. This is especially relevant since th e introduction of EMU in the late 1990s. The economic and political characteristics are very clear when one looks at all the various laws, institutions, and policies that are created and enforced by the EU bureauocracy.2 This sense of "we-ness"Â’ however, requires some clarification. By "we-ness," I mean the sense that all members of a community believe in the same principles and have expectations of common behavi or (Deutsch, 1994: 115-137). In the case of the EU, these 1 There are other possible ways to classify the EU. For instance, Sweet and Sandoltz refer to the EU as having a political-statelike structure. Other political scientists refer to the EU as an international organization. For more on the term amalgamated security-community, see Karl Deutsch's "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area" in The European Union , edited by Brent Nelson and Alexander Stubb. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2nd Ed.1994. 2 For more information on the laws, regulations, and po licies of the EU, see the EU Maastricht Treaty, the EU Treaty of Nice, and The Europ ean Union: Structure and Process by Clive Archer and Fiona Butler (2001).

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4 should be democratic and economic principles , as it is a political/economic community where members solve disputes among themse lves peacefully through the rule of law. However, many EU officials and EU citizen s instead base this ‘we-ness’ on core values that are not necessari ly political or economic. The core values often include a common way of life, a common religious her itage (Judeo-Christian), and/or a common history in their definition of ‘we-ness.’ For ex ample, an EU-related report stated: “it is generally accepted that there is a body of common accepted values in Europe [EU]“ (Dehaene and Paszkowska, 2001: 59) 3 Even as early as 1973, the Commission stated in a declaration called “Declaration on the European Identity” that the Member states (nine at that time) shared “the same attitudes to lif e” and the desire to respect “the cherished values of their legal, political, and mo ral order” (Commission, 1973: 119). While legal and political values do refer to democratic principles, attitudes toward life and moral order imply a religious and cultural basis. In the Treaty on European Union, ratified in 1993, EU officials state that th ere is a “common cultural heritage” in Europe (EU, 1992: Article 128). What these EU of ficials and many EU citizens th ink constitutes the EU or European "we-ness" is similar ideals, inst itutions, and cultures: where the cultures all stem from the Judeo-Christian religion; Greco-Hellenistic ideas of government; philosophy and art; Renaissance humanism ; the ideals of the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution; and the ideals of social democracy and the rule of law (Bozdaglioglu, 2001: 127; Shore, 1993: 792). This sense of religious and cultural "we-ne ss" has been a part of Europe’s history for a long time, at least in the sense that Europeans have identified themselves as 3 This report was done by the Reflection Group at Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies (EUI), which is affiliated with the EU.

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5 different from other regions’ citizens since th e Crusades in the 11th century. This concept is elaborated on in Chapter 7. EU political and economic integration (and expansion through enlargement), however, is a recent phe nomenon, and one that continues today. It has been at times a quick and easy process and at other times a difficult and bargaindriven one. Integration ha s often been especially difficult after enlargements, since institutions, policies, and procedures usually have had to be adapted to an increase in membership and to various political and economic differences among the incoming states and old Member states. One of the easiest and most successful peri ods of integration occurred in the first decade of the EU/EC’s existence4. The EU began in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community. Its members were Fran ce, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy. The only arena of po licy-making they shared was in coal and steel production. This was followed by the creation of Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community) and the EEC (European Economic Community ) in 1957 (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 1). The next decade witnessed further developm ents on the path toward an integrated Europe with the first intra-EEC tariff reducti ons of 1959 (which marked the first step in the transition to a common market) (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 2). Economic and institutional integration continued during this period, culm inating with the completion of the customs union in 1968; and the Merger treaty of 1967 (in which the institutions of the Euratom, the ECSC, and the EEC merged). The steps taken toward deepening the Community 4 The name ‘European Union (EU)’ was not used until 1 993 with the Treaty on European Union. From 1957-1986, EEC was used, and from 1987-1993, EC was used. For the purpose of simplicity, I will use only the term EU or European Union throughout the paper.

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6 during these years were not as easy as in the previous decade because the question of state sovereignty came to the fore. The six c ountries of the EU feared that their own national sovereignty would be trampled by the majority of other countries in EU decision-making. Matters came to a head in 1965 with the “Empty Chair Crisis”(Dinan, 1999: Chapter 2). This crisis occurred as a result of a disagreement between France and the rest of the Members over a Commissi on proposal concerning the funding of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The di sagreement was resolved in 1966 with the Luxemburg Compromise5 (Dinan, 1999: 46-48). The 1966 Co mpromise was the first of many bargaining resolutions to come on the path toward deep integr ation (Dinan, 1999). During this same time period enlargemen t was forestalled because of French President DeGualle’s fear of Great Britain’s influence diminishing French power in the Community. In 1967 Great Britain, Denmar k, Ireland, and Norway all applied for membership (Dinan, 1999: 38). Great Britain’s application was veto ed by France in 1963 and again in 1967. The applications for th e other countries were put on hold until negotiations resumed in 1970 (Dinan, 1999: 58) . In 1973, Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland were finally accepted into the EU (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 3). The 1970s were a crucial time for EU integration regarding the European Parliament (EP), one of the EU’s main inst itutions. Amendments to the Treaty of Rome in 1970 gave the EP, with the Council, join t responsibility for the EU’s budgetary 5 The Luxemburg Compromise had the following provisions: “1.When issues very important to one or more member countries are at stake, the members of th e Council will try, within reasonable time, to reach solutions which cane be adopted by all members of the Council, while respecting their mutual interests, and those of the Community. 2. The French delegation considers that, when very important issues are at stake, discussions must be continued un til unanimous agreement is reached. 3.The six delegations noted that there are divergence of views on what should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.4. However, they consider that this dive rgence does not prevent the Community’s work being resumed in accordance with new procedure”(Dinan, 1999: 49).

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7 spending. Since a 1975 agreement, the EP has th e right of discharge of the generalbudget. In 1979, the EP was elected directly by EU citizens for the first time (Dinan, 1999: Chapters 2 and 3). The end of the of Bretton Woods system a nd other global issues of the 1970s led to further economic integration with the launc hing of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. Through this zone of moneta ry stability, the economies of the Member states were able fight inflation and rec over from the economic problems of the 1970s. The system functioned around the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which included a “parity grid and divergence indicator” gr ounded in the European Currency Unit (ECU) (Dinan, 1999: 85-88). Further integration occurred through the ESPRIT (European Strategic Program for Research and Deve lopment in Information Technology) program6 (Dinan, 1993: 93-100). The mid-1980s was a successful period of deepening, especially in comparison to the integration slump of th e 1970s. The White Paper was brought forward in 1985,which was a plan that detailed how the single ma rket was to be completed by the end of 1992 and thus, was one of the most important docum ents in the EU’s history. The White Paper led to the first signicant treaty reform si nce the Community’s conception The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 (Dinan, 1999: 109113). This treaty revision created a foreign and security policy, a revision of the Treaty of Rome, and an endorsement of the 6 This program brought forth technological collaboratio n throughout the EC’s manufacturers, smaller firms, and universities (Dinan, 1999: 93-100).

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8 goal to create a true single market. The SEA had numerous accomplishments in furthering integration7 (Dinan, 1999; 113-124). Before and after the SEA, the EU enlarged again. In 1981 Greece entered the EU, with Spain and Portugal following in 1986. En largement was viewed cautiously as it would add three states that were all poorer than current Member st ates. Greece and Spain were especially troublesome for France as bot h were was largely ag riculturally based and thus would give France much competition within the EC. However, it was clear, even to France, that it was politically necessary for all three to be admitted into the EC to safeguard their newly democratic governments, as political integrati on would foster their democratic institutions. Thus, this wave of enlargement was the first time that supporting and protecting newly democra tized countries was an im portant consideration in enlargement and integration. In a sense, there was a conflict be tween the enlargement countries economic integration and political integration. One was deemed as costly, while the other as necessary (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 5). The 1990s were even more successful in deepening integration in the Community, although not without some strife, which again shows how difficult it ha s been for the EU to develop a level of deep integration betw een the Member states. The main achievement of the early 1990Â’s was the Treaty for European Union (The Maastric ht Treaty), which 7 The list of accomplishments included: the use of QM V (qualified majority voting) which could expedite the single market, increased integration in related so cial and economic sectors, the enhancement of the ECÂ’s international reputation through the incorporation of foreign policy and security cooperation, and the formal creation of the European Council (Dinan, 19 99: 113-124). The European Council, which first existed informally in the 1970's, is composed of he ads of state and government of the Member states who meet regularly in summits to discuss the main developments and/or problems of the EU. Some of the key summits have been turning points in the EU's history, such as the Milan Summit in 1985 or the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 (Dinan, 1999: Chapter9).

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9 went into effect in November of 19938 (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 6). The Treaty only came about after intense bargaining between those stat es that were against deep integration,led by Great Britain, and those that advocated furt her integration and a federal-like system, led by Germany. The British camp specifically was opposed to an EU with strong centralization, EMU, and legi slative bodies with the power to infringe upon national sovereignty. The pro-integr ationists advocated a highly centralized EU with strong governing bodies, EMU, and a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Ultimately, the federalists gained more, through the incorporation of EMU, the growth in power of the EP and the European C ouncil, and the extension on Community competence, as all of these developments form the TEU made the EU a more powerful supranational body. The anti-integ rationists were given the in corporation of subsidiary, which was the provision that the EU would not govern in policy areas that were suited more for national or regional governance, to limit the infringement of the EU on national interests and the winning of an opt-out for Denmark in regards to the EMU (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 6). Like the TEU legislation, the 1995 "Eftan " (EFTA was the European Free Trade Area) enlargement encountered problems, though not in the areas of economics, as the incoming states of Austria, Sweden, and Finl and were quite wealt hy. Rather, there was a conflict over then EFTA obligations on the part of those states in the areas of environmental policy, energy polic y, and agricultural policy. In tegration was thus tested again through enlargement. How would thes e states be able to integrate into the 8 It created a basic three pillar design: European Community (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as well as a plan for European Monetary Union (EMU) and provisions of opt-outs for Denmark and Great Br itain as regards EMU (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 6).

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10 Community when they wanted to keep their own standards, which were higher compared to the EUÂ’s, in these areas? Eventually, comp romises were reached, such as the granting of a four-year transition peri od for environmental policy, in which the incoming states could keep their higher environmental stan dards. After the four years, the EU environmental directives would be reviewed. The EU also recognized its need to reform its own institutions before the EFTA enla rgement, but only came up with a meager solution called the Ioannina Compromise that allowed Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to be used more often in the EUÂ’s decisi on making processes. The enlargement finally occurred in 1995 (Dinan, 1999: Chapter 7). In the past few years, further deepen ing of the EU has occurred through the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, which amended th e original Treaties of the Union, added more capacity for a Common Foreign and S ecurity Policy, and changed decision-making rules. The Treaty of Nice of 2002 made some of the institutional changes necessary for the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and introduction of the Euro in 20029 (EU, 2002). Recently, the Euro common currency was in troduced for twelve Member states, which is the highest form of economic integratio n between countries. It is clear that the 9 Specifically the Treaty of Nice stipulates that starting January 1, 2005, only one Commissioner per Member State will be allowed in order to make ro om for the Commissioners from the new Members (Nice Treaty, 2002: Article 4). Previously, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain had two Commissioners each, while the other Members had on e each (Dinan, 1999: 214215). Once the Union admits in a 27th state, then the number of Commissioners will be less than the number of Member states. To allow for as much equal representation as possible, a rotation of the Member states with Commissioners will be enacted. Moreover, all Commissioners, includin g the President, will be appointed by a qualified majority by the European Council and approved by the European Parliament (Nice Treaty, 2002: Article 2). QMV was extended and the principle of enhanced coop eration was created. This allowed for Members to increase their level of integration in specific arenas , but with the requirement of a minimum of eight Member States per common position/action (Nice Treaty, 2002: Article 2). Other reforms were made in the European Parliament (EP) struct ure to account for new Member states. The number of Parliament members (MEPÂ’s) was raised from 700 to 732. Moreover, the EP gained more power in the Treaty through the extension of co-decision with the Council in seven provisions, including in the area of asylum and immigration, which will begin on January 1, 2004 (Treaty of Nice).

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11 European Union today, with the introduction of EMU and the provi sions in the Nice Treaty, is very different from the EU of th e 1970s when the first enlargement occurred. The EU of today has the capacity to implem ent laws, regulations, and polices in many economic and political areasfrom fishi ng rights, to agricu ltural production, to immigration, to labor (although not tax, health or welfare). The EU has complete free movement of labor, products, and finances w ithin its borders, and the Member states are under the jurisdiction of a common judiciary. When a state joins the EU, it must completely open its economy, populace, institutions , etc. to the other EU Member states. In essence, an incoming state lo ses its borders in relation to th e other EU states. By the same token, the EU risks much in letting more states join. An unprepared incoming state could threaten the integration th e EU has worked so hard to achieve the last fifty years by not being able to fulfill the EU’s laws and policies (or the so called aquis communitaire). The fact that the EU is a co mmunity of states that work intimately together over so many policy areas, even sharing the same curre ncy, makes the idea of "we-ness," in terms of common democratic and ec onomic principles, in such an amalgamated securitycommunity important. While "we-ness" in term s of democratic and economic aspects is essential for the EU, "we-ness" that is defined by a common cultural and historical heritage is not. Though many EU officials and citizens subscribe to the cultural and historical view of "we-ness," it is not n ecessarily an official requirement for EU Membership. The EU states in the TEU: “Any European state may apply to become a Member of the European Union” (EU, 1993: Article O). Since the wording as to what “European” refers to is so vague, there are many interpretations as to what that means.

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12 The ambiguity of this term has many impli cations for how Europe defines itself and “others.” It seems that most EU citizen s and EU officials have based this term “European” in the same way they have viewed the term "we-ness" that Europeans share a common historical and cultural heritage. The implications of the interpretations of the terms "European" and "we-ness" are discussed in the concluding section of this paper. However, one can say that an applicant rega rded as “other,” whether it be based on politco-economical principles, geographic placem ent, or cultural and historical ideas, will likely face severe obstacles in its relations with European Union. This is where Turkey has encountered problems in its accession as pirations and where the CEECs have been fortunate. Since many Europeans see "w e-ness" as meaning having a similar historical/cultural heritage Tu rkey tends to be represented and thought of as "other" and the CEECs as "European" by Europe. This argum ent will be discussed in chapters seven and eight. The upcoming enlargement has many Europeans nervous about the scope of enlargement that will have to occur with so many countries joining at once. The integration process, once these new Members join, will be extremely complicated (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 34-37). No less than eight CEECs, in addition to two Mediterranean countries (Malta and Cyprus), are slated for the 2004 enlargement. This will then be followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. As seen in the previous waves of enlargement, the highest number of states to join the Union per enlargement was three. All of the incoming states (e xcept Cyprus) are also much poorer than the current EU Member states. Most of the Central and Eu ropean states, for example, have around only half the EU average in GDP per capita (In foBASE Europe, 2001). However, the CEECs

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13 are fortunate in that they al ready have unique relationships with current Member states due the existence of cultural, political, and historical affi nities between these states. These relationships are sim ilar to patron-client relationships. The CEECs can ask particular EU Member states for advice, aid, or even support in the application process. For example, Austria has a special relationshi p with Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, as they were once part of th e Austria-Hungarian Empire, and thus a part of Austria’s history (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 127-128). As anothe r example, Germany has close ties with Poland due to Poland havi ng been a part of various German empires in the18th and 19th century, as well as Germa ny’s occupation of the country during WWII (Orlow, 1995). The official relations between the EU and the CEECs can be said to have commenced with the signing of association agreements between the two groups in 1991 (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 16). This was fo llowed in 1993 by the European Council’s stunning announcement at Copenhagen: The associated countries of central and eastern Europe th at so desire shall become members of the Union. Accession will take pl ace as soon as a country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions” (cited in Av ery and Cameron, 1998: 17). Such a promise by the EU was unusual since the EU typically does not seek or encourage states to apply. Moreover, none of the C EECs had yet submitted an application for membership. This enthusiastic welcoming of the CEECs on the part of the EU was truly exceptional (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 24-25). Applications soon followed in 1994 from Hungary and Poland. In 1995, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria applied. The Czech Republic and Slovenia followed in 1996 in s ubmitting applications (Avery and Cameron,

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14 1998: 17). After applying, the CEECs were allo wed to participate in regular meetings with the various inst itutions of the EU, represented by ministers and other government officials, which gave them a feeling of bel onging to the EU and offered them knowledge of the functioning of the EU machinery. The invitation to attend and engage in such meetings regularly so far in advance of accession was never extended to previous incoming Members (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 19). Again, the EU showed that it was extremely enthusiastic in regards to the CEECs joining the EU family. Shortly after the last application by a CEEC was submitted, the Commission began to collect data for its opinions in the CEEC applicant states. The Commission collected the data in 1996, using data from 19901996, and produced their assessments of the CEECs in 1997. These opinions were publishe d in the Agenda 2000 paper (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 34). On the basis of these opinions, accession talks were opened in 1998 with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus and with Romania, the Slovak republic, Latvia, Lit huania, Bulgaria and Malta (Avery and Cameron, 1998:13). By the end of 2002, accordi ng to the “Presidency Conclusions at Copenhagen”, the Czech Republic, Estonia, H ungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Cyprus had finished accession negotiations and were given the accession date 2004 (EU, 2002). The “Presidency Conclusions at Copenhagen also stated that Bulgaria and Romania were still in the process of negotiations and were given the accession date of 2007 if further progress had been made in fulfilling the criteria (EU, 2002). Turkey’s relationship with the EU has not been so smooth. The first formal agreement between Turkey and the EU was an association agreement in 1963 (Avery and

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15 Cameron, 1998: 93). Turkey then formally appl ied for membership in 1987 and then in 1995 Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 93-94). The Commission first submitted opinions on Turkey in 1989, shortly after Turkey had applied. Since they were unfavor able, no accession talks were started at that point (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 34). The relationship grew tenser in 1997 when Turkey was denied accession (candidacy) status, formally on the basis of its failure to meet the political requirements, at the Luxemburg Summit10 (Park, 2000: 323). Instead of gi ving Turkey candidacy status, the European Council “put Turkey’s applic ation on hold, placing it behind all other applications in the queue” (Dinan, 1999: 196) . It was not until th e end of 1999 at the Helsinki summit that Turkey was given acces sion status (Park, 2000: 323). Despite the granting of candidacy status, Turkey was stil l put in a separate category from the CEEC applicant states and “appeared unlikely to atta in membership in the near term” (Donfried, 2001: 4). Turkey was the only applicant state with whom there were no accession negotiations, a situation th at has continued up until pr esent (Park, 2000: 323). In December of 2002 at the Copenhagen Summit, Turkey was given the date of 2004 for the beginning of accession talks if the Commission in its opinion at the end of 2004 finds that Turkey has fulfilled all the criteria (EU, 2002). The offer, though, was conditional and only came after much pressu re and earnest diplomacy by Turkey (Park, 2000). There certainly is no guarantee that the EU will begin accession talks with Turkey in 2004, much less give Turkey an accession date. In general, then, Turkey has been given a rather lukewarm reception by the EU and has been repeatedly placed behind the 10 I show in the comparison section that though Tu rkey did not fulfill the po litical criteria for accession, neither did many of the CEECs.

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16 CEECs in the queue for receiving candidacy status, in starting accession talks, and in receiving an accession date, despite the fact that Turkey applied for membership much earlier than the CEECs (Park, 2000: 323; EU, 2002). Before discussing the specific requirements for EU accession, a description of the overall process of enlargement is necessary. The main stages of the enlargement process are: the application for membership; the op inion of the Commission, which speaks for the EU as a whole; the opening of negotia tions; the conclusion of negotiations; and accession (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 24). The granting of candidacy status is another important step in accession process and usually occurs between the declarati on of the opinions and the start of accession talks.

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17 CHAPTER 3 OVERVIEW OF COPENHAGEN CRITERIA As stated before, any “European” country th at fulfills all the criteria for accession join the Union (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 23). As ther e is no designation of what the borders of "Europe" are in the Treaties, one can broadly argue for the “European” status, in terms of geography, of any country that is a part of the general area surrounding the European Union, which could thus include all ten Central and Easter n European countries (CEECs), Malta and Cyprus, as we ll as Turkey, Albania, etc. During the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, the European Union laid out the criteria that applicant states must fulfill to be admitted into the Union. The criteria are divided into three main categories: two ba sed on the economy and one based on political conditions.1 I discuss the political criteria in the next section after the economic comparisons between the candidate countries. As listed in the EU’s Agenda 2000 , the two economic criteria are “the existence of a f unctioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and ma rket forces within the Union” (EU , 2000). The existence of a functioning market econo my is based on the following subcriteria: An equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free interplay of market forces; prices, as well as trade, are liberalized 1 There is a third criterion for membership stated in the Copenhagen criteria: the ability to fulfill the acquis communautaire. This criterion is not being used in this paper as it can only be assessed once countries have started the accession negotiations. Since Turkey and the EU have not started accession negotiations yet, no comparison can be made between the CEECs and Turkey. The fact that it’s fulfillment can only be ascertained at the accession negotiations, which is esse ntially the end of the enla rgement process, makes it less important than the other criteria for the purposes of this paper.

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18 Significant barriers to market entry (est ablishment of new firms) and exit (bankruptcies) are absent The legal system, including the regulation of property rights, is in place; the courts enforce laws and contracts Macroeconomic stability incl uding adequate price stabili ty and sustainable public finances and external accounts Broad consensus about the e ssentials of economic policy The financial sector is sufficiently we ll developed to channel savings towards productive investment (Hoffman, 2002).2 The capacity to cope with competitive pre ssure and market forces within the Union is achieved when There is a functioning market economy, w ith a sufficient degree of macroeconomic stability for economic agents to make d ecisions in a climate of stability and predictability; There is a sufficient amount, at an appropriate cost, of human and physical capital, including infrastructure (energy suppl y, telecommunication, transport, etc.), education and research, and future developments in this field; The extent to which government policy a nd legislation influence competitiveness through trade policy, competition policy, state aids, support for small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs), etc. The degree and the pace of trade integrat ion a country achieve s with the Union before enlargement. This applies both to the volume and the nature of goods already traded with member states; The proportion of small firms, partly because small firms tend to benefit more from improved market access, and partly because a dominance of large firms could indicate a greater reluctance to adjust The last three subcriteria require some explanation. Regarding government policy and legislation, the Commission in its country reports generally looks forgive out state 2 Nina Hoffman, message from The EC's En largement and Phare Information Centre

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19 aids, such as subsidies or other transfers, to enterprises? If so, then the government is not letting the economy operate freely. For assess ing a country’s compa tibility with the EU, naturally the Commission looks at the percentage of goods that have been exported to and imported from the EU, as well as the changi ng nature of the goods being exported and imported. For example, a growing industrial sector means that exports are becoming more sophisticated and high-tech. The last subcriterion refers to SME growth in a candidate country. SMEs are viewed as an impor tant part of the business sector, as they are easily adaptable to changing business envi ronments. A large percentage of total labor force employed in these types of firms would indicate a healthy business sector. In assessing the fulfillment of the economi c criteria for accession, I have chosen a variety of economic indicators. While there are a myriad of possible indicators that one can use in assessing the economic development of a country, I have chosen the ones that seem the most relevant. All of the economic indicators I have opted to use in regard to both economic criteria are those frequently used by the EU Commi ssion in its regular country reports in the 1995-2002 period, or ones that were specifically noted as important by the Commission‘s Enlargement Office, as represented by Nina Hoffman. Most of these indicators were also used by the Inte rnational Monetary Fund (IMF) in its country reports during the 1995-2002 period. To ensure that I have unbias ed data, I have gotten most of the actual statistical data from the IMF and World Bank (WB), both of which are exogenous to the EU enlargement process. In addition, I have used the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom reports for data on the FDI barrier s, regulations, the legal system, government intervention, the banki ng sector, and the trade and price liberalization of each

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20 candidate country.3 All sources are noted in the charts of the economic statistics that are used in the case study comparisons. Below is a list of the economic indicators used in the case study comparisons. Criteria of a functioning market economy: Trade and price liberalization:4 privatization data (when the information is available) tariff rating government interference rating price regulation rating Market barriers and exits: the number of new firms (when the information is available) the number of bankruptcies (when the information is available) foreign investment barriers rating banking sector quality rating The legal system: regulations rating the enforcement of laws, contra cts, and property rights rating Macroeconomic stability5: current account balance (a positiv e account means a sound economy) GDP growth rate (the higher, the better) external (foreign) debt as a % of GDP (the lower the better) public debt (which must be below 60% by EU standards) general government budget balance (for a healthy economy, should be 2-3% GDP) general government expenditure to GDP ratio (the higher the expenditure, the lower the amount of savings in th e economy and the lower the capital spending, which weakens the economy) government consumption (should be 10-20% GDP) 3 The Heritage Foundation is affiliated with the highly respected Wall Street Journal, which is the cornerstone information source for American businessmen. It has often used data from the WB and the WB has posted information about Index of Economic Freedom reports on its website. 4 The various ‘ratings,’ or scores, are based on the Heritage Foundation’s rating system, which is on a scale of 1-5, 1 being the best score possible and 5 being the worst score possible. For more information about its rating system, including what the Heritage Foundation bases its scores on, see Appendix a. 5 For definitions of the various economic terms, see Appendix b.

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21 national savings (the normal figure should be 10-20%GDP) inflation rates (6% or above is c onsidered high for a market economy) unemployment rates (the highe r, the weaker the economy) export growth (higher is better) domestic demand growth ra te (higher is better) IMF per capita income (the lower the income, the lower the savings in the economy and the few Foreign Di rect Investment inflows)6 CPI (lower is better, around 2-4% is typical for market economies) IMF, WB Trade balance (positive is better than negative) agriculture as % of GDP exports as a % of GDP A broad consensus for economic policy refers to coordination of economic policies. Lastly, regarding the financial sector, the following indicators must be reviewed: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) infl ows (the higher, the better for the economy FDI Stock (if a state has a high amount, it means it attracts foreign investors) overall domestic investment (should be around 24% GDP) to GDP ratio (the higher the spending, the better the economy) real effective exchange rates (large ch anges from year to year=volatile, bad for investing) lending interest rates7 the ownership of banks (should be all or mostly private-owned, some foreignowned) the percentage of bank assets owne d by the government (the lower the better) domestic credit as % GDP (higher is better) credit to the private sector (the higher, the better) stock market capitalization (the higher the better)(when the information is available) For the second economic criteria, the following indicators are used: Regarding the human and physical capital, including infrastructure (energy supply, telecommunication, transport, et c.), education and research: 6 The Commission usually used GDP per capita, rather than gross national income (GNI) per capita, Atlas method. I use the latter instead of the former since it was more easily available for all years and all countries. 7 The Commission usually used real interest rates, which are often between the lending rate and deposit rate. The lending rate was more accessible than the real interest rate for the count ries studied for the years 1995-2001 and still gives one some idea of the interest rates of the countries.

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22 primary, secondary, and ter tiary school enrollments (when the information is available) unemployment rate telecommunications and tr ansport as a % of GDP the amount of energy imported as a % of energy consumed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) infl ows (the higher, the better for the economy) overall domestic investment (should be around 24% GDP) to GDP ratio (the higher the spending, the better the economy) In terms of the extent to which govern ment policy and legislation influence competitiveness (through trade policy, competition policy, state aid, support for SMEs, etc.) percentage of GDP government spends on subsidies amount of government inte rvention in the economy Regarding trade integration with the Union before enlargement: percentage of goods exported to th e EU and imported from the EU industryÂ’s share of the economy (% GDP) growth rate of industry sector In terms of the proportion of SMEs in economy percentage of employment in SMEs (when the information is available)

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23 CHAPTER 4 ECONOMIC COMPARISON BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE CEECS In comparing Turkey and the CEECs in the economic criteria, I will be mainly referring to the 1995-2001 time period. The y ear 1995 is a useful starting date for the comparison between Turkey and the CEECs, as the CEECs applied for membership around 19951and Turkey signed its Customs Union tr eaty with the EU, which has been the most progressive step thus far in the EU-Turkey relationship, in 1995. The year 2001 is the best ending date as 2001 data is th e most recent availabl e. Since the list of economic data is so lengthy, I will only show a sample from each category within the two economic criteria for the in-depth discussi on in the case study comparison section. To give a clear idea of where Turkey stands in comparison to the CEECs, I will give the range of the CEECs for each sta tistic, taking the lowest and the highest values of all the CEECs. I will also provide the mean and median of the CEECs values for each statistic in Appendix d. For each countryÂ’s data for all of the indicators, see Appendix 3, Tables 114. In all of the categories Turkey and the C EECs were at basically the same level. There are some indicators in which Turkey was superior to the CEECs and there are some indicators in, which the CEECs were better than Turkey. For the most part, however, TurkeyÂ’s economic performan ce lied within the range of the CEECs performances, which indicates the striking si milarity between Turkey and the CEECs in 1 Hungary and Poland applied in 1994; Romania, Slovaki a, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria applied in 1995;the Czech Republic and Slovenia applied in 1996.

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24 the economic realm as far as the primary criteria for membership is concerned. For example, the degree of the governmentÂ’s contro l over prices (the indicator for the degree of price liberalization) in the CEECs for all years was moderate (rating of two to three). This means that the situati on in the CEECs varied from the government having control over some prices and wages, but not enough to significantly affect a countyÂ’s GDP, to one in which the government controlled the prices and wages of most business sector, which significantly affected GDP. TurkeyÂ’s ra tings for all years fell within that range with a rating of three. One could thus say that both Turkey and the CEECs had a moderate level of price libera lization. The results were similar in terms of trade policy (tariffs) and the degree of government interven tion. Turkey for most years had a rating of two for the former and latter, while the CEEC s varied from a good score of 1 to a rather poor score of 4 for the former and generally a score of 2 to 3 for the latter (with worse exceptions for 1995 and 1996). 2Below is a table of the scores for all years: Table 1.Trade and Price Liberalization Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Reg. (Turkey)a 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Price Reg. (CEECs)b 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 3 Tariff (Turkey)c 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 Tariff (CEECs)d 1 to 4 1 to 4 1 to 4 1 to 4 1 to 4 1 to 4 1 to 4 Gov't. Intervention (Turkey)e 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 Gov't Intervention (CEECs)f 2 to 5 2 to 4.5 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 3 1.5 to 3 2 to 3 a,c,e The Heritage FoundationÂ’s reports on Turkey for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b,d,f The Heritage FoundationÂ’s report s for each CEEC for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1 999, 2000, 2001 2 Again, for more information concerning the Heritage Foundations rating system, see Appendix a

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25 The scores of the CEECs varied greatly in terms of the market entry/exit barriers. Generally for the foreign investment/capital flows environment and the quality of the banking sector, the CEECs ranged from very good to only moderate. If the environment for foreign investment/capital flows is favorab le, then the market is very open, and thus, entry to the market is easy and accessible. The quality of the banking sector refers to both the provision of efficient and functio ning bankruptcy laws that allow for easy market exits, but also the efficiency of its lending practices, which of course affects the chances for SME start-ups (market entry) Al so, if the banking sector is owned by the government, it prohibits foreign investment in the financial sector, as foreign investors would have no bank shares to buy and it would give the financial sector as a whole the appearance of being unfriendly to private ownership of shares or entire companies (which often would be foreign-based). In regards to both banking sector qua lity and the foreign investment/capital flows environment, Turkey was rated on par with the CEECs with an average score of 2 (Table 2). Table 2. Market Barriers and Exits Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 FI Barrier (Turkey)a 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 FI Barrier (CEECs)b 1 to 2 1 to 4 1 to 3 1 to 3 1 to 3 1 to 3 1 to 3 Bank/Finance (Turkey)c 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 Bank/Finance (CEECs)d 1 to 3 1 to 4 1 to 3 1 to 3 1 to 3 1 to 3 1 to 3 a.c The Heritage FoundationÂ’s reports on Turkey for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b,d The Heritage FoundationÂ’s reports for each CEEC for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Turkey also was rated as belonging to the sa me level as the CEECs in the quality of the legal system. The legal system is good if property rights and contracts are uniformly enforced and if there is no co rruption. Another important aspect of the legal system is its level of regulations. If a c ountry has restrictive, unclea r, or arbitrarily enforced

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26 regulations, then it is seen as not being ope n to investors and business entrepreneurs. In this regard, Turkey was generally rated as be ing fairly open with a score of two for both property rights/ contracts enforcement and a low amount of unfavorable regulations. The CEECs generally had scores of two to four, wh ich would indicate that they were rated as being fairly open to mostly closed to inve stors and business entrepreneurs (Table 3). Table 3. Legal System Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Regulation Rating (Turkey)a 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 Regulation Rating(CEECs)b 1 to 4 1 to 4 1 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 Property/Legal System Rating(Turkey)c 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Property/Legal System Rating (CEECs)d 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 2 to 4 a,c The Heritage FoundationÂ’s reports on Turkey for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b,d The Heritage FoundationÂ’s reports for each CEEC for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Just as with the previous categories, Turk ey was on the same level as the CEECs in macroeconomic stability. TurkeyÂ’s figures for unemployment rates, ex ternal debt, and per capita income all were with in the range of the CEECs. However, TurkeyÂ’s budget balance and inflation rates for some years in this time frame were worse off than the CEECs. The CEECs, though, were worse o ff in current account balances and GDP growth rates for a few years in comparison to Turkey. One can see similar patterns in the other economic indicators li sted in Appendix d. Table 4. Macroeconomic Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Current Account Balance(%GDP) (Turkey)a -1.4% -1.3% -1.4% 1% -0.7% -4.9% 3.4% Current Account Balance(%GDP) (CEECs)b -10.2% to 2.1% -10.6% to .2% -12.2% to 4.2% -12.1% to -.5% -11.2% to -2.7% -6.9% to 2.8% -10% to 6.5% a,b IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook for 1995-2000 figures; various IMF sources for 2001 figures (see Appendix d)

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27 Table 4. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 External Debt (%GDP)(Turkey)c 43.6% 43.8% 48.4% 51.2% 55.6% 59.1% 78% External Debt (%GDP)(CEECs)d 13.7% to 77% 21.1% to 97% 22.6% to 100.4% 23.9% to 85.5% 24.9% to 84.2% 27.7% to 88.9% 29.1% to 78.3% GDP Growth Rate(Turkey)e 6.9% 7% 7.6% 3.1% -4.7% 7.4% -6.2% GDP Growth Rate(CEECs)f -.8% to 7.1% -10.9% to 6.2% -7% to 10.4% -4.8% to 5.1% -4.5% to 5.2% 1.8% to 6.9% 1.1% to 7% Unemployment Rate(Turkey)g 6.6% 5.8% 6. 9% 6.2% 7.3% 6.6% 8.5% Unemployment Rate(CEECs)h 3.5% to 15.2% 4% to 13.7% 4.8% to 15% 6.1% to 16% 6.7% to 17% 6.4% to 18.6% 5.7% to 19.5% Budget Balance (% GDP)(Turkey)i -4.1% -8.4% -7.8% -7.8% -11.8% -10.8% -16.8% Budget Balance (%GDP)(CEECs)j -6.4% to .4% -10.3% to .4% -5.2% to 2.2% -5.9% to 4.8% -8.5% to 3.7% -4% to 1% -5.3.% to .4% Per Capita Income(Turkey)k $2,810 $2,880 $3,190 $3,160 $2,900 $3,100 $2,530 Per Capita Income(CEECs)l $1370 to $8290 $1200 to $9290 $1180 to $9870 $1230 to $9720 $1390 to $9980 $1520 to $10050 $1560 to $9780 Inflation Rate (Turkey)m 93.7% 82.3% 85. 7% 84.6% 56% 50% 56% Inflation Rate (CEECs)n 9.1% to 62% 5.8% to 123% 3.5% to 949.1% 4.6% to 59.1% 3% to 48% 1% to 44% -.5% to 37% Gov't Consum. (%GDP)(Turkey)o 10.8% 11.6% 12.3% 12.7% 15.2% 14.1% NA Gov't Consum. (%GDP)(CEECs)p 11.3% to 25.4% 10.7% to 24.1% 10.5% to 23% 10.2% to 24.4% 10.2% to 23.7% 9.8% to 21.8% 11% to 21.3% c IMF Turkey Country Report (C.R.) 00/14 for 1995-1996; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1997-2001 d Various IMF C.R.Â’s for each country (see Appendix d) e,f IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook g,h IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook for 1995-2000 figures (except Slovenia, only to 1999); other IMF sources for 2001 (see Appendix d) i IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 j Various IMF C.R.Â’s for each country (see Appendix d) k,l WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for 1995-2000 figures; WB databases for 2001 figures m IMF Statistical Databases n Various IMF and WB sources (see Appendix d) o IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1996 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1997-2001 p Various IMF C.R.Â’s for each country (see Appendix d) In terms of economic policies, Turkey wa s generally consistent. Every government leader and governing politi cal party during this time period sought to implement the economic policies necessary to develop EU re lations, from the Customs Union in 1995 to

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28 the desire for EU accession, which intensified in th e past few years. Closer ties with the EU was one of the most important foreign pol icy goals for each admini stration within this period. There were a decent number of forei gn-owned banks. Banks gave out of much credit, particularly from 1999-2001 and governme nt spending and consumption was also kept low which tends to stimulate savings a nd investment. TurkeyÂ’s legal system and relatively low tariffs and government inte rvention occurrences likewise made the economy very open. The tendency for high in flation, high budget deficits, and low FDI inflows (in comparison to the CEECs) were the areas that needed to be improved for Turkey to be faithful in achieving full m acroeconomic stability for EU accession. There was noticeable improvement in inflation and FDI inflows in 2000 and 2001, a likely result of Turkey having successfully imple mented the latest IMF program. (IMF, 2002) Some CEECs, in comparison, did not have a broad consensus in economic policymaking during this time period. For example, in Slovenia there were significant market barriers, especially in the mid to late 1990s. There was al so a lack of privatization, which conflicted with the desired attainment of sound market economic policy for EU accession. Even as late as 1999, the governme nt still owned over 40% over the total banking sector assets and foreign invest ors owned only 20 (IMF, 2001). The amount of foreign investment was also lower than many of the other CEECs. The Slovak RepublicÂ’s adherence to a strong economic policy was similarly inconsistent. A major reason for this lack of consistency stems from the Meciar government that was in power until 1998. Wh ile this government generally desired to transform the Slovak Republic to a free market economy, there were some areas in which it acted contrary to achieving a free market economy. For instance, Meciar himself was

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29 skeptical about privatizati on. This skepticism led the gove rnment in 1995 to canceled large-scale privatization plans. It was not until 1997 that privatization began again, and even then, it was not in the strategically important sectors like heavy industry, weapons production, banks and public u tilities (Goldman, 1999: Chapte r 4). This trend continued into the late 1990s with the government havi ng had control over a significant amount of bank assets and stimulating little forei gn investment. It was not until 2000 that improvements were made in these sectors. In Poland there was generally a broad cons ensus about economic policies, in that the state and private sector players were wo rking towards prospective EU membership. One area that needed better policies was in the area of privatization. The state, though recognizing the need for large scale priva tization to achieve EU membership, often worked against this process by holding onto al most 3000 firms and limiting private sector investment (Organization for Economic C ooperation and Development (OECD), 2002). Thus, the privatization area needed more supportive policy-making. Latvia was generally consistent in its ec onomic policies, in that both the state and the private sector sought EU membership and thus, implemented most of the policies needed for EU accession. The major problem areas were with bank lending (credit) to the private sector, which was weaker than in other CEECs and Turkey, and government spending, which should have been reduced to aid other aspects of macroeconomic policy, such as savings and investment. In Lithuania, like Latvia, there was generally a broad consensus in policy-making as seen by the successful privatization and liberalization program. However, better policies needed to be carried out in correcting the trade and budget deficits, as they were

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30 counteracting the benefits produced by the privatization program. Despite the overall success in privatization of formerly governme nt-owned enterprises, LithuaniaÂ’s banking sector did not offer much credit to the pr ivate sector. Both overall domestic credit and credit to the private sector were much lo wer than in most CEECs and Turkey (IMF, 2000-2002). Bulgaria was the country w ith the least broad consensu s in policy-making. While Bulgaria did attempt to make some reforms for eventual EU accession, it did so only in some areas. Other areas, such as in public a nd external debt, were consistently weak. While it had actively renewed the private sect or with the privatiz ation of many banks, bank lending to the private sector was weak, at similar levels to Latv ia and Lithuania, and the unemployment rates were some of the highest in all of the candida te countries for this time period. Moreover, while FDI inflows were high, investment at home was lower than the other CEECs and Turkey. Up until 1998, BulgariaÂ’s inflation rates were extremely high, as were its lending interest rates until 1997. Only since 2000 have some of these problems been addressed. Like Bulgaria, Romania made some necessa ry reforms to establish a free-market economy and neglected other reforms that we re necessary to open up the economy. While external debt and government spending were kept low, Romania had runaway inflation rates and high trade deficits. There also wa s little privatization in the banking sector, which can be seen in Table 13 in Appendix d. Moreover, from 1997 to 2001, there was little bank lending to the privat e sector. RomaniaÂ’s legal syst em was continually plagued with corruption and inefficiency, which limite d its prospects for private sector growth

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31 and foreign investment, two important elemen ts necessary for an open functioning market economy (The Herita ge Foundation, 1995-2001). In general, three states were well off in economic policy consistency. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia all had in general a broad consensus on economy policies, though a more cohesi ve policy should have been made to lower government spending in all three countries. In additi on, Estonia needed lowe r trade and current account deficits to match its strong private sect or and Hungary need a lower external debt for each year. The general soundness and economic consistency can be seen in the tables listed throughout the case studies and in A ppendix 3. In general, then, the CEECs had some very successful states, some very weak states, and some moderately successful states in terms of economic policy-making. Tu rkey fit into this range with a fairly consistent level of consensus in policy-making. TurkeyÂ’s financial sector development largely equaled that in the CEECs. Exchange rate volatility was m oderate for most years and fit within the range experienced by the CEECs. TurkeyÂ’s overall domestic cred it and investment to GDP ratio were on a similar footing to the CEECs. However, FDI inflow was lower in Turkey than in the other candidate states (Table 5). Table 5. Financial Sector Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 FDI Inflow (%GDP)(Turkey)a 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 1.3% FDI Inflow (%GDP)(CEECs)b 0.7% to 10% 0.7% to 7.4% 1.1% to 9.2% 1.3% to 11.1% .9% to about 11.5% 1% to 10.5% 2.4% to 10% Real Effective Exchange Rate Change(Turkey)c 5.4 2 5.7 16.7 5.9 17.3 26.9 a,b United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Statistical Database, 1995-2001 c IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1996; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1997-2001

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32 Table 5. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Real Effective Exchange Rate Change(CEECs)d 1.2 to 14.5 0.3 to 14 0.7 to 16.8 .8 to 26.5 .8 to 17.1 .1 to 9.4 .1 to 16.7 Change in Lending Interest Rate(Turkey)e NA 14.1% 17.9% 10.5% NA NA NA Change in Lending Interest Rate(CEECs)f .3% to 35.2% .3% to 8.8% .7% to 99.5% .4% to 26.5% .1% to 17.1% 1% to 9.3% .2% to 3.7% % Banking Assets Owned By Gov't (Turkey)g 43.5% 42.8% 38.7% 41.1% 38.3% 37.6% 34.2% % Banking Assets Owned By Gov't (CEECs)h 15.2% to 69% 7.3% to 77.8% 6.4% to 74.7% 8.5% to 71% 20% to 47.1% NA NA Investment (%GDP)(Turkey)i 25.5% 23.8% 25.1% 24.2% 23.3% 24.5% NA Investment (%GDP)(CEECs)j 15.7% to 34% 8.4% to 34.9% 11.9% to 35.2% 14.7% to 34.7% 16.1% to 28.5% 18.3% to 31.1% 20.4% to 31.9% Domestic Credit (% GDP)(Turkey)k 28.9% 34.5% 38.4% 41.5% 50.9% 51% 64.9% Domestic Credit (%GDP)(CEECs)l 12.8% to 67.3% 8.5% to 68.5% 11.5% to 66.7% 12.1% to 70.3% 15.3% to 68.9% 11.2% to 67.2% 12.4% to 69.9% d IMF 2002 Statistical Year book for Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovak Republic; for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Romania, various IMF C.R.Â’s for those countries (see Appendix d) e IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1998; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1999-2001 f IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook g IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1998 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1999-2001 figures h Various IMF C.R. for each country (see Appendix d) i IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1996 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1997-2000 figures j,l Various IMF C.R. for each country (see Appendix d) k IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1998 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1999-2001 figures The second economic criteria, the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, presented si milarities between Turkey and the CEECs. In terms of human and physical capital, infrastr ucture and education, Turkey and the CEECs balanced out at the same leve l. For instance, the CEECs ge nerally had higher rates of secondary enrollment in education, but Turk ey generally had higher rates in primary enrollment in education. Transport and Telecommunication rates were generally the

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33 same, as were investment-to GDP rations. Turk eyÂ’s FDI inflows, as mentioned earlier, were lower than the other statesÂ’ inflows (Table 6). Table 6. Human and Physical Capital Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Primary Enroll. (Turkey)a 105% 105% 107% 100% NA NA NA Primary Enroll. (CEECs)b 89% to 100% 94% to 104% 94% to 104% 82% to 101% NA NA NA Secondary Enroll. (Turkey)c 56% 56% 58% 70% NA NA NA Secondary Enroll. (CEECs)d 66% to 96% 77% to 104% 76% to 104% 76% to 104% NA NA NA Telecommun. &Transport (%GDP)(Turkey)e 12.6% 13.1% 13.9% 13. 6% 14.0% NA NA Telecommun. &Transport (%GDP)(CEECs)f 6.2% to 16% 6.5% to 17% 6.5% to 16.8% 6.4% to 16.7% 6.6% to 15.3% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)(Turkey)g 0.5% 0.4% 0. 4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 1.3% FDI Inflow (%GDP)(CEECs)h 0.7% to 10% 0.7% to 7.4% 1.1% to 9.2% 1.3% to 11.1% .9% to about 11.5% 1% to 10.5% 2.4% to 10% Investment (%GDP)(Turkey)i 25.5% 23.8% 25.1% 24.2% 23.3% 24.5% NA Investment (%GDP)(CEECs)j 15.7% to 34% 8.4% to 34.9% 11.9% to 35.2% 14.7% to 34.7% 16.1% to 28.5% 18.3% to 31.1% 20.4% to 31.9% a,b,c,d World Development Indicators Database e,f United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Statistical Database; Turkey for 20002001; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 g,h UNCTAD Statistical Database i IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1996 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138 for 1997-2000 figures j Various IMF C.R. for each country (see Appendix d) Turkey and the CEECs were generally the sa me in terms of government policies for trade and competition. TurkeyÂ’s government rare ly intervened in the functioning of the economy, as seen by the good government interfer ence rating of 2 and by the low level of subsidies given by the state to enterprises. In fact, those s ubsidies that were given were only to the agricultural sector. The CEECs ge nerally had higher subsidies than Turkey, which showed more government involvement in at least some companies in the CEECs

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34 than in Turkey, but had overall government intervention scores like Turkey, except for 1995 and 1996 where very poor scores were given (Table 7). Table 7. Government Policy Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Gov't Spend. On Subsidies (%GDP)(Turkey)a 0.2% 0.4% 0.9% 0.3% 0.3% .3% (e) NA Gov't Spend. On Subsidies (%GDP)(CEECs)b 0.5% to 8.5% .4% to 8.2% 0.3% to 8.3% 0.5% to 8.4% 0.4% to 8.9% 0.2% to 7.9% 0.8% to 9.7% Gov't Interference Rating(Turkey)c 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 Gov't Interference Rating(CEECs)d 2 to 5 2 to 4.5 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 3 1.5 to 3 2 to 3 a IMF Turkey C.R. 98/104 for 1995-1996 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 01/89 for 1997-2000 figures b Various IMF C.R. for each country (see Appendix d) c,d The Heritage Foundation Reports for each country 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Both Turkey and the CEECs had a high le vel of trade integr ation with the EU, particularly from 1999-2001. TurkeyÂ’s exports and imports fell well wi thin the range of the CEECs, except in 2001 wher e it was just under for both e xports and imports. In terms of industry growth, which shows a greater sophistication in the types of goods being produced, Turkey was on par with the CEEC s and in 1998, even exceeded them (Table 8). Table 8. Trade Integration Comparison Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % Goods Exported To EU(Turkey)a 51.2% 49.7% 59.2% 50% 54.0% 52.2% 51.6% % Goods Exported To EU(CEECs)b 36.4% to 70.1% 32.9% to 66.5% 32.5% to 71.2% 38% to 72.9% 50.1% to 76.1% 47.9% to 76% 54.8% to 74.2% %Goods Imported From EU(Turkey)c 47.1% 53% 51.1% 52.4% 52.6% 48.8% 44.7% %Goods Imported From EU(CEECs)d 34.8% to 66.8% 35.2% to 67.5% 38% to 75.3% 45.4% to 75.7% 48.4% to 68.9% 44.3% to 67.8% 49% to 67.6% a IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1996 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 01/89 for 1997-2001 figures b Various IMF C.R. for each country (see Appendix d) c IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14 for 1995-1996 figures; IMF Turkey C.R. 01/89 for 1997-2001 figures d V arious IMF C.R. for each country (see Appendix d)

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35 Table 8. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Industry Growth Rate(Turkey)a 7.4% 6.4% 9. 2% 17.7% -6.7% 6.9% NA Industry Growth Rate(CEECs)b -8.6% to 24.2% -9.3% to 9% -11.2% to 14.6% -10.2% to 9.4% -10.1% to 7.2% -10.2% to 15.3% NA e,f 2002 World Development Indicators Database Though the data for the SME sector was not very accessible, there was one year per country regarding SME employment that I wa s able to find. Unfort unately, it was not the same year for each country. But one can still ge t some idea of the general amount of SME development for these countries during this ti me period. In the last 2-3 years, over 76% of TurkeyÂ’s overall employment was in the SME sector (Unite d Nations (UN), 2003). Within the years 1995 to 1997, the CEECs had SME employment rates ranging from 21.5% to 66.4%. (UNECE, 1996; Szabo, 1997) It is likely that from 1998-2001 these figures improved in the CEECs, perhaps to the point of being on par with Turkey by 2001 or 2002.

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36 CHAPTER 5 POLITICAL COMPARISON BETWEE N TURKEY AND THE CEECS When looking at the figures of SME employme nt and all the figures listed in this study, it is clear that Turkey and the CEECs in the time period of 1995-2001 were at the same level in terms of fulfilling the econom ic criteria for EU accession. Politically, this was also the case. Turkey had blemishes in its political situation dur ing this time period, mostly in regards to prisoners, the Kurdish mi nority, and the rule of law. However, some of the CEECs, had problems with prisone r treatment, abuses against minorities, restrictions on some fundamental freedoms, a nd corruption within th e government and its bureaucracy. These will be discussed in depth in the following section. The political criteria for EU accession can be divided up into two broad categories: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law and stability of institutions guaranteeing human rights and re spect for and protection of minorities. In its Regular Country Reports, the Commission tends to look at the following indicators with regard to the first category. There must be a legislative body whos e members are elected by all citizens of age. The legislature should also be transparent a nd having at least some degree of sovereignty over the state (Com mission, 2001). There should be a system of checks and balances between the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches, as well as a division of powers. In terms of the executive, it should be either elected by the populace directly or indirectly through a party system (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 2002). According to its 2001 and 2002 Regular Country Reports, the commi ssion requires that the judicial branch should be independent and there should be civilian cont rol over the

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37 military. There should be no corruption in the government or its civil service and both should be relatively transp arent (Commission, 2001, 2002). In terms of the second category, the Comm ission, in its Regular Country Reports, tends to look at human rights (i f the police violates rights, if the rights of asylum seekers are violated, if there is human or arms traffi cking, if there is fr eedom of expression and religion, womenÂ’s rights) and minority rights (i f there are laws that limit the rights of minorities or if there is violence or bi as against minorities) (Commission, 2001). In comparing Turkey and the CEECs politically, I will present each in the order of their application date, with Turkey being fi rst with the earliest application date. Turkey Before describing TurkeyÂ’s political s ituation during the 1995 -2001 period, it is necessary to mention the history of the te rrorism in Turkey. Turkey was unique in comparison to the CEECs in that it had to ba ttle a massive terrorist insurgency from 1978 to 1999. None of the CEECs had to contend w ith such a severe s ecurity threat. This security threat was very influe ntial on TurkeyÂ’s political development, even into the late 1990s. The terrorist group in question was the Kurdistan WorkerÂ’s Party ( Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan ) or the PKK. It was formed in 1978 by Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan out of two main sources: the Kurdish Nationa list Movement and the Marxist-Leftist Movement of the 1960s (Gunter, 1997: 23) . The ultimate goal of the PKK was an independent Kurdish state. This was to be accomplished through force. Terrorism targets included those from the state (soldiers, pol icemen, supporters, leaders) and civilians during various periods (G unter, 1997: 42-81).

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38 The effects of the PKK insurgency were serious for Turkey. By 2000, more than 30,000 people had been killed in the fights be tween the Turkish military forces and the PKK militants (Ergil, 2000: 128). The PKK killed both opponents and moderates and often forced villagers in the Kurdistan ar ea to choose between it and the Turkish State (Fuller, 1993: 116). Despite the use of violen t tactics, the PKK had much support from the Kurds.1 (Gunter, 1997: 42-43). The extreme level of violence, coupled with the broad support among the Kurdish population, at least until the mid-1990s, cau sed great concern for the Turkish government: “With the level of viol ence growing and the people of the southeast showing public support for the PKK, the situation appeared poised on the edge of a regional civil war”(Robins, 1993: 665). The P KK, since 1989, had isolated the Kurdish area from the rest of the world, calling it a “n o-go area” and had threatened the stability of all of Turkey (Robins, 1993: 658). The PKK terrorist movement greatly influenced the 1982 constitution, which was what the Turkish political system was based on during the period covered here. The constitution greatly limited free speech and minority rights, as the government feared that if these freedoms were unrestricted, Kurdish nationalism and the PKK movement would grow and pull apar t Turkey (Gunter, 1997: 11-12). However, amendments have been made to the constitution since 1982. 1 In 1995, 1,267 interviews were done with mostly Kurds (only 3.6% of the interviews were with nonKurds). 46% of the respondents stat ed that they supported the PKK’s tactics and policies (Gunter, 1997: 129).

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39 Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament As of 1995, the Constitution has provided for the sharing of power between the legislative branch (The Turkish Grand Nati onal Assembly, or TGNA) and the executive and judicial branches (Tur key, 2001). The AssemblyÂ’s members were elected by the populace in fair and free elections duri ng this period (Esmer, 2002: 1-7). The executive and civil service This branch, which includes the Prime Mini ster and the President, is quite strong (Turkey, 2001; Esmer, 2002: 1-7). Important political, economic, a nd social reforms, such as the 1995 pre-Customs Union reform package, were in itiated by the Prime Minister. However, both the le gislative and the executive institutions are symbolically overshadowed by the lack of civilian cont rol over the military (Kubicek, 2002: 3-4). However, one could argue that it has helped Turkey stave off Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. The Turkish public greatly has trusted the military and has seen it as a benefit to the country (Kubicek, 2002: 3-4). The judiciary The judiciary, which is composed of th e Constitutional Cour t and the Supreme Court, is independent (Turkey, 2001). The Cons titutional Court in particular is very influential in TurkeyÂ’s political system. Fo r example, in 1998 the C ourt issued a decree that banned the Welfare Party, an Islamicbased political party. This was done in accordance with a law that forbids religious-bas ed political parties (Rumford, 2002: 62-63).

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40 Corruption Corruption was a problem in Turkey dur ing the 1995-2001 period. As one political scientist stated: “Turkish democracy and so ciety in general also suffer [ed] from widespread corruption”(Kubicek, 2002: 5). Human Rights and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons The police sector, in general, was a problem throughout the 1995-2001 period. There were widespread reports of torture and other abuses. Some detainees even died in custody. Moreover, those policemen charged w ith the crimes often received light or no punishment. (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1996-2002a). The 2001 amendment limit of pre-trial detention was shorte ned to 2 to 4 days, which s hould lower the instances of torture (Amnesty Internati onal, 2002). Prison conditions were often poor, and inmates reported incidents of ill-treatment. After 1999, Turkey amended the Turkish Penal Code, which improved the mechanisms for individu als to complain about ill treatment and torture and enabled these complaints to be resolved more efficiently (Arikan, 2002: 4243). Recently, the prison system was refo rmed by “the introduction of greater transparency and accountability, and reinfo rcement of supervision”(Vural, 2003). Trafficking There were no problems in trafficki ng of human beings (HRW, 1996-2002a). Asylum There were no major problems in terms of protection of asylum seekers except in 2001. In that year, many people from Iran, northern Iraq and Africa sought asylum in Turkey but were denied protection and se nt back to their countries (HRW, 2002a).

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41 Freedom of religion There was the continuation of laws that fo rbid the formation of ethnically (which usually meant Kurdish) or religiously based pol itical parties, or ge neral public religious speech. This law was meant to prevent Islamic extremists and Kurdish separatists from either violating TurkeyÂ’s secular-based po litical system or tearing apart TurkeyÂ’s territorial integrity (Rumfor d, 2002). These fears were understa ndable in light of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout Muslim countries during the 1980s and 1990s and in light of the real threat of Kurdish sepa ratism, as put forth by the Kurdish nationalist parties, at least until the mid-1990s, and by the PKK. This law was only sporadically enforced, as seen by the existence of va rious religious and Kurdish based parties throughout the 1990s and even, their success in elections, There were, however, some exceptions, such as the Virtue Party which was banned in 2001.2 Another limit in religious rights was that wear ing religious attire, like the Is lamic womanÂ’s headscarf, was illegal in public office or school. But it mu st also be noted that the wearing of headscarves in schools was unlawful in Fran ce until 1995, as well as in public office and schools in Germany according to a recent court decision (U.S. Department of State, 1999; BverwG, 2002). This restriction in Turkey was based on the separation of Church and State. Religious attire, including the head scarf, was widely worn by Turkish citizens outside of school and public office (Rumford, 2002: 265). 2 Another example was the banning of the Welfare Party in 1998. However, the 1998 decree to ban the Welfare Party was upheld in European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR said that Turkey did not violate human rights when it ba nned the Welfare Party as this pa rty was a threat to democracy and secular principles (Rumford, 2002: 62-63).

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42 Freedom of speech and press Despite the “vocal, mostly free press, small but active civil society, and hotly contested elections” there were restrictions on speech present during this time (HRW, 1997). Individuals could not expr ess views that went against Turkey’s secularism or territorial integrity (Arika, 2002: 24). Like the law that limited religious and ethnic political parties, it was meant to protect Turkey from Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. It was not so different fr om the restrictions that many European governments, like Germany, placed on free spee ch and political activity, particularly against neo-Nazi extremists, to protect state security3 (Kubicek, 2002:15). In 2001, these restrictions were relaxed in Turkey such that only actions against Tu rkey’s secularism or unity were considered criminal. The changi ng of the wording to ‘actions’ could widen freedom of expression (Amnesty Internati onal, 2002). Up until 2001, however, journalists were frequently imprisoned for discussi ng the two controversia l topics (HRW, 19962002a). Women’s rights In 2000 and 2001,women’s rights were not adequately protected while in police custody. Some women reported that they were sexually assaulted while being held by the police (HRW, 2001, 2002a). General Most of the incidents of major human right s violations were related to the PKK. Both the Turkish forces and the PKK committe d human rights violations, which included the killing of civilians (Kubicek, 2002: 3). The PKK’s leader was captured in 1999, and, 3 See Appendix 1 for the set of German laws that pertain to this restriction

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43 by 2002, fighting in the Kurdish area had larg ely stopped, which should greatly diminish human rights violations ther e in the future (HRW, 2002; Kubicek, 2002: 3). There were also attacks by armed illegal pol itical organizations against political civilians throughout the 1995-2001 period, although these attacks bega n to decrease in the late 1990’s (HRW, 1996-2002a). Lastly, the death was not abolished until 2002, although there was a moratorium on the death penalty for the time period of 1995 – 2001. Minority rights First, Turkey’s view of minorities must be explained. Turkey has viewed all nonMuslims as minorities and guaranteed their rights since the Treaty of Lusanne in 1923 (Tastan, 2001: 146). Muslims, including Kurds, were regarded as Turks, not minorities. Other Muslim minorities such as Georgians, Bo snians, Albanians, etc. that lived in Turkey accepted being ‘a Turk’ and were a ssimilated (Ergil, 2000: 125). Kurds, on the other hand, resisted assimila tion, due to several factors.4 The result of these factors meant that the Kurds were, for the most part, unassimilated and unmodernized (Ergil, 2000: 125). Despite the Kurdish resistance to assim ilation into Turkish society, there was no discrimination against Kurds at the individual or societal level. A quarter of the top business people in Turkey were Kurdish and at least one-fourth of th e members elected to the Assembly since the birth of the Republic was of Kurdish origin (Ergil, 2001: 176; Ergil, 2000: 126). Moreover, from the time of the 1920s to 2001, Kurds rose to important government and military offices, including gene rals, cabinet ministers, and even the 4 Until recent immigration to the Western part of Turkey , the Kurds had been largely cut off due to “their remote location in the mountainous southeastern regions, divided along tribal lines, and economically dependent on local landed elites”(Ergil, 2001: 125).

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44 presidency (Ergil, 2000: 126). Infringements on rights were limited to political ones (as discussed earlier with the poli tical party laws) and cultural ones, particularly in terms of the Kurdish language. Expression of the Kurdish language was limited in public broadcasts, newspapers, and in educa tion until 2001. In 2001, language laws were amended such that minority languages could be broadcast, pub lished, and taught in language courses. Kurdish, however, could still not be taught in universities or be used on independent radio or television (HRW, 2002a, 2003; Amnesty International, 2002). Despite these changes in the la w, there were still incidents of suppression of the Kurdish language (HRW, 1996-2002a). It is clear from looking at TurkeyÂ’s political system during the time period of 19952001 (as well as the mention of 2002 for recent changes), that it had improved considerably in its democrat ic record, but alarming problems still remained. Minority rights for the Kurds were still incomplete, po lice brutality continued, and the freedoms of expression and the press were still far from complete. Moreover, the military still remained a powerful force in politics. All of these reforms, as well as the others discussed, need to occur, before Turkey coul d be considered fully democratic. Some of these problems were likewise a part of HungaryÂ’s political situation duri ng this period. Hungary Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament As of the 1989 Constitution, the legislative br anch has shared power with the other branches of government. The members of H ungaryÂ’s parliament were elected by the citizenry in fair and free elections during this period (Bozoki, 2002: Chapter 8).

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45 The executive and civil service The executive branch consists of a President and a Prime Minister. The President was popularly elected in fair and free el ections during the period under study. The Prime Minister is usually the head of the largest party in the governing co alition. The executive branch, as well as the other branches, is independent of the military as civilians had control over that body (Bozoki, 2002: Chapter 8). Judiciary The judicial branch, which has the Constitu tional Court as its highest court, was independent (Bozoki, 2002: Chapter 8). Ther e were no major problems with functioning of the judiciary (HRW, 1996-2002a). Corruption Corruption was widespread (Molnar, 2001: 354; Orkeny and Scheppele,1999: Chapter 3). State officials fre quently agreed “to be bought o ff to look the other way when someone [was] doing something illegal“ (O rkeny and Scheppele, 1999: 67). Organized crime was also widespread, as cities in Hungary, particularly Budapest, were centers of a criminal underworld, including the mafia. In four years there we re 140 bomb explosions unsolved, though it was suspected that the mafi a did these bombings. This caused the public to distrust the police and even gove rnment officials, many of whom were suspected of having mafia connections (Molnar, 2001: Chapter 8). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons Throughout the 1995-2001 period, police ofte n physically and psychologically abused detainees, particularly foreigners, minors, and the Roma. Moreover, the police tended to ignore violence done against Roma and even participated in violent acts against

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46 them. Prison conditions were overcrowd ed, unhygienic, and “inhuman” (HRW, 1997; HRW, 1996-2002a). Trafficking Hungary was a place of orig in, transit, and de stination for human trafficking in 2001 (HRW, 2002a). Asylum Detention centers for asylum seekers, pa rticularly those detention centers on Hungary’s borders, were badly kept and thos e seeking asylum were often held there for long periods of time. In 1999 Hungary’s human rights ombudsman stated that the border facilities were “unc ivilized and intolerable”(HRW, 2000). Freedom of religion Religious groups faced discrimination in 2000 with the passage of a tax law that gave sales tax exemption to only Hungary’s six “historical” churches, which excluded 98% of registered churches . Human rights groups stated that this law showed an “increasing tendency in Hungary to privilege certain religions over others”(HRW, 2001). Freedom of speech and press Problems occurred in the independence of the media. The government had political responsibility for journalists and broadcaste rs and was often hostile towards the press. The government sought to control the media to limit criticism (Molnar, 2001: Chapter 8; Sos, 1999: Chapter 6; HRW, 2002a). Women’s rights Women’s rights were violated during th is period due to the government’s inadequate response to domestic violence and the frequent police hostility to women victims (HRW, 2002a).

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47 Minority rights Jews and gays faced discrimination a nd even violence (Molnar, 2001: 345-346; HRW, 2002a). The Roma were discriminate d against in the education, employment, housing, and the criminal justice system (H RW, 1996-2002a). They were often physically attacked, while the government did not adequate ly seek prosecutions for the perpetrators of these crimes (HRW, 1996-2002a). The Roma were “isolated, despised, and denied effective participation in th at process that is [was] sh aping the new Hungary“(HRW, 1996). When looking at Hungary’s human and minor ity rights record, as well as the high level of corruption, it is clear that Hungary had some alarming problems in establishing a truly democratic system. Some of the same problems can be seen when looking at Poland during this period. Poland Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament Both the “Little Constitution of 1992” and the 1997 Constitution gave the legislative branch shared power with the ot her branches of government. The members of Poland’s parliament were elec ted by the citizenry in fair and free elections during this period (Krol, 2002: 68-70). The only probl em with the overall law-making and implementation process was that the content of laws were not genera lly accessible to the public, as laws often entered into force befo re civil servants and citizens had the chance to be informed of it (Kurczewski, 1999: 187).

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48 The executive and civil service The President was directly elected by the populace in fair and free elections during the 1995-2001 period. The executive branch, as we ll as the other branches, is independent of the military, as civilians have contro l over that body (Krol, 2002: 68-70; Paczolay, 1999: 124). The President shares power with th e other branches and thus did not have excessive power (Krol, 2002; Chapter 5; Skapska, 1999: 165-166; Sadurski, 1999: Chapter 8). The only problem in th e civil service was corruption ( United Press International , 2000). The judiciary The judicial branch, which has the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court as its highest courts, was independent from the other branches (Kurczewski, 1999: Chapter 10; Czaplinski 1998: Chapter 2). In the judi ciary “administration of justice was malfunctioning“ and “systematically deterior ating” (Kurczewski, 1999:187-199). In some areas, judicial decisions were inaccessible and the implemen tation of a court’s decision was frequently impossible (Kurczewski, 1999: 187). The increasing volume of cases, the lack of judicial skills, a p oor bureaucratic system, and in adequate expenditure for the judicial system made the esta blishment of the rule of law in Poland extremely difficult. The judiciary's inefficiency led to the devel opment of a ‘mafia’ in Poland to provide the quick and effective implementation of justice and retrieval of debt payment (Kurczewski, 1999: 200). These significant “thr eats to the rule of law amount [ed] to threats to Polish democracy in general” (Kurczewski, 1999: 201-202). Corruption The biggest blemish in Poland’s democratic progress was in the area of corruption. In a World Bank report in 2000 stated that there was widespread corruption “at the

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49 highest levels” including top pol iticians and judges who had accepted bribes or kickbacks (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2000). In a survey done by Demoskop, it was shown that 58% of the members of Parliament believed that corruption was either “frequent” or “very frequent” among Poland’s politicians ( United Press International, 2000). Bribes were also common in the civil services, whic h, in combination with the corruption of the higher offices, created a general distrust of st ate institutions (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2000). In the Demoskop surveys it was also show n that “corruption in Poland is [was] so tightly woven into the fabric of life that even many doctors expect [ed] bribes” ( United Press International , 2000).5 Corruption was likewise widesp read in the business sector.6 All of these survey result s showed that throughout the 1995-2001 time period, there was “rampant corruption in Poland” ( United Press International , 2000). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons There were no reported violations of rights by the police or in prison. Trafficking There were no reports of tr afficking of human beings. Poland engaged in various arms sales to countries with poor human rights records (HRW, 2002b). Asylum There were no problems in the protection of asylum seekers during this period. 5 About 39% of those surveyed said they knew someone who uses [used] bribery on their job or in their business. Some 71% said they had encountered corr upt government clerks and 78 % said that giving “a present” helped a patient rece ive good medical care (United Press International, 2000). Not only did top officials, regular civil servants, and doctors regularly engage in acts of corruption, but so did police officers and public-transit officers (United Press International, 2000). 6 In a World Bank report, it was shown that there was much corruption in public procurment and privatization in relations to pa rliament, where laws could be “bought for dolla rs 3m apiece.”( The Financial Times , 2001)

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50 Freedom of religion There were no major problems with s uppression of freedom of religion. Freedom of speech and press The press was required to disclose conf idential sources of information, which limited its ability to attract sources of information (Sadur ski, 1999: 186). Moreover, the independence of the media was compromised. Th ere was a lack of re sources to create a strong newspaper or private TV station and th ere were many attempts by politicians to influence the boards of the public TV and ra dio stations. Moreover, board members were nominated by the parliament and Pr esident (Krol, 2002: Chapter 5). Women’s rights Women’s rights were also inadequate duri ng this period. In the constitution that was until 1997, women were restricted to the ty pe of work they could do (Fuszara, 199: 223-253). The lower pay given to women also sowed the active discrimination against women in Poland during this period (Fuszara, 1999: 223-253). General The effort to combat crime, particularly newer forms like the mafia, frequently resulted in the government's use of extra m eans, which infringed on some civil rights and increased “the State’s control of citiz en’s lives” (Kurczewski, 1999: 187-189). As shown by the arms trafficking, th e rampant corruption throughout Polish society, the problems with the j udiciary, as well as the other examples discussed earlier, Poland had some problems that were hindran ces to the full consolidation of Polish democracy during the 1995-2001 period. Roma nia likewise had problems in its democratic record during this period.

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51 Romania Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament The legislative branch is composed of tw o chambers the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Both bodies were elected by the citiz enry in free and fair elections during this period (Pippidi, 2002: Chapter 10; Agh, 1998: 268; Tismaneanu, 1997: 422). The competence of the legislature as a law making body was hampered until 1997 by President Iliescu, who rule d through government decrees (Tismaneanu, 1997: Chapter 10). The executive and civil service The executive branch is composed of a President and a Prime Minister. The President is elected directly by the citizenry and the Prime Minister is appointed by the president (Pippidi, 2002: Chapter 10; A gh, 1998: Chapter 8). Under Iliescu, the Presidency had excessive power and was aut horitarian. Iliescu used the many secret service agencies to prevent his authority from being challenged (Agh, 1998: Chapter 8; Tismaneanu, 1997: Chapter 10). The secret serv ices in this way “directly influence [d] the political process” (Tisman eanu, 1997: 408). Iliescu’s term was described as based on “traditional communism with national populism, in which there was a quasi-charismatic party-movement with a leader suspicious of , and often hostile to, impersonal democratic procedures and with an exaltation of th e ethnically homogenous community”(Agh, 1997: 273). The civil service was weak and depende nt on Iliescu and ran like a patronage

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52 system.7 Even after Iliescu left power, the auth oritarian power stru ctures remained (Gallagher, 2001: Chapter 14). The judiciary The highest court of the judiciary is th e Constitutional Court. The judiciary is independent according to the constitution, but this independence is questionable as judges are appointed by the government (Tismaneanu, 1997: Chapter 10) Corruption Widespread corruption was a severe problem during the Iliescu regime, such that it was a serious hindrance to economic improvement in Romania. In 1995, the coalition government was plagued by charges of corr uption (Roper, 1997: 182-191). There was also the problem of a high crime rate and a proliferation of orga nized crime (Pippidi, 2002:148). Even after Iliescu le ft power after 1996, endemic corruption still plagued the government and military, as anti-corruption measures were not supported by the courts and prosecution service, which hindered its e ffectiveness (Gallagher, 2001: Chapter 14). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons There were numerous incidents of poli ce abuse and torture throughout this period, particularly against minorities. Moreover, RomaniaÂ’s prison conditi ons were very poor (HRW, 1998). Trafficking Trafficking of women was a major pr oblem and victims faced inadequate protection from the government. Sometimes, th e police were involved in these activities 7 Local officials had to be loyal to the central govern ment. For example, in 1995, 10% of the local officials were dismissed by the government, most of which we re from opposition groups (Tis maneanu, 1997 : 407).

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53 (HRW, 1999-2001). Romania also engaged in arms trafficking to countries with terrible human rights records (HRW, 2002b). Asylum There were no major violations of the protection of asylum seekers. Freedom of religion Freedom of religion was regularly violat ed under the Iliescu regime through the prohibition of certain religi ous gatherings (HRW, 1997). After Iliescu left power, religious groups still often f aced discrimination (HRW, 1999). Freedom of speech and press The Iliescu government frequently jeopardiz ed the media’s independence. National television and the print media were completely controlled by Iliescu. The secret services organized information leaks about politicians, published secret police files, and watched over journalists and other Iliescu opponents “t o prevent his authority being challenged” (Gallagher, 2001: 400; Tismaneanu 1997: Chap ter 10). Moreover, Iliescu’s government repeatedly intimidated and harassed newspape rs that were critical of its policies (Tismaneanu, 1997: 409). There were also la ws enforced throughout this period that punished the media with imprisonment or fines for defamation or offending public officials (HRW 1996-2002a). Freedom of expression was also undermined when the Iliescu government in 1995 passed laws that forb id the public display of the national flag, other national symbols, or singing othe r countries’ national anthems (HRW, 1996). Women’s rights In the latter part of this time period, women were often harassed by the police and faced discrimination (HRW, 1999-2001).

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54 Minority rights Minority rights were first questioned by the language of the constitution, which stated that Romania was a national unitary st ate and that the Romanian language was the only official language of the state. The edu cation law of 1995 greatly limited education in languages other than Romanian (Maracz, 1996: 214-216; HRW, 1996). Minority rights were further undermined in 1995 through Iliesc u’s party formation of a coalition with nationalist extremist groups like the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), which were “vehemently anti-Hungarian, antiSemitic, and nostalgic for the Ceausescu regime”(Roper, 1999: 184-185). Minorities were seldom helped by the government in addr essing violations of th eir rights, as these grievances were denounced as “subvers ive actions meant to destroy Romania” (Tismaneanu, 1997: 409). The Roma’s rights were the most severely violated of all minority groups, as they faced discrimination in education, employment , housing, and the penal system. They also experienced frequent physical attacks by citizen s and the police, but th e perpetrators were rarely charged (HRW, 1996-2002a). The Hungarian minority also faced much discrimination. Local authorities often inflamed ethnic tensions between the Roma nian majority and the Hungarian minority.8 Even after Iliescu left office, laws that w ould strengthen minority ri ghts were not passed by parliament (Gallagher, 2001: Chapter 14). There was much discrimination against hom osexuals, as seen by the 1996 passage of an amendment to the penal code that criminalized homosexual activity. Any person 8 Local officials had to be loyal to the central govern ment. For example, in 1995, 10% of the local officials were dismissed by the government, most of which we re from opposition groups (Tis maneanu, 1997 : 407).

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55 that engaged in sex acts with a person of th e same sex could be imprisoned for up to three years (HRW, 1997). In 2001, the laws against homosexual activity were still enforced (HRW, 1999-2002a). One could thus sum up Romania’s pre 1997 pol itical system as one characterized by: “a deeply ingrained authorita rian leadership style . . .official attempts to curtail the independence of the media and to limit free dom of expression; fragmentation of the opposition, lack of a common vision for the public good, and the rise of nationalist parties and their endorsement by the gove rnment” (Tismaneanu, 1997: 439). Little changed in the political system after Iliesc u’s departure (Gallagher, 2001: Chapter 14). In 2000, Iliescu won the Presiden tial elections, while his part y and the PRM won most of the seats in parliament (British Broad casting Corporation News (BBC), 2000). The reelection of a party “tinged with romantic ethno-nationalist notions that border on the neo-fascist” did not bode well for Romania’s future (Braun, 2000). As one expert warned after the 2000 elections: “Unle ss the other parties behave in a more public-spirited way than they have done since 1989, nationalist ment alities will acquire an even stronger grip on the electorate than before, opening up the po ssibility of political isolation and renewed authoritarianism in Romania”(Gallagher, 2001: 411). A similar history of a dictatorial government could be seen in the case of the Slovak Republic. Slovak Republic Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament The legislative branch consists of one parliamentary chamber, the Slovak National Council (SNC), which was elected by the popula ce in free and fair elections during this period (Goldman, 1999: 56-58). During the M eciar regime, which lasted until 1999, the

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56 parliament lacked any real power in comp arison to the executive branch. In addition, Meciar, as Prime Minister, kept the SNC ill-informed and intimidated opposition in the political system. Moreover, Meciar made it his policy to punish those ‘disloyal’ individuals who left his pa rty (Innes, 2001: 245; Goldma n, 1999: 72-73). For example, Meciar was able to deprive SNC member Gualieder (who was a former member of Meciar’s party) of his seat by forcing the Mandate and Immunity Committee to submit a forged resignation letter that the member in question claimed he never wrote (Goldman, 1999: 77). After Meciar left office in the be ginning of 1999, the rela tionship between the SNC and the executive branch improved. The executive and civil service The executive branch is composed of a president and a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and the President are selected by th e SNC. Usually the Prime Minister is the head of the largest party in the govern ing coalition (Goldm an, 1999: 56-58). The government is independent of the military, as there is civilian control over that body (Pridham, 1999: 1227). Until 1999 there were perp etual confrontations between President Kovak and Prime Minister Meciar, with Me ciar going beyond the bounds of legality to undermine Kovak’s authority.9 These confrontations ultimately “undermined the credibility, already fragile, of the democratic order” (Goldman, 1999: 73). Secondly, Meciar created a situation in which the Slovak Republic was a virtual dictatorship (Pridham, 1999: 1226). Important public a ppointments were done by the central government and given to those that were tied to the MDS party, cr eating something akin 9 Another example of Meciar's use of intimidation can be seen in his alleged involvement with the kidnapping of President Kovak’s son in 1995. Top police officials were fired after voicing their suspicions of Meciar's involvement (Goldman, 1999: 72-73).

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57 to a patronage system within the governm ent bureaucracy (Goldman, 1999: 78). Most experts in the Republic and abro ad criticized the Meciar govern ment for its “disregard for the rule of law, its substandard human and minority rights guarantee s, and its weakened democratic institutions” (Szomolanyi, 1999: 118). The effects of the Meciar regime could still be felt in 2001 (Pridham, 1999: 1228). The judiciary The judiciary has as its two highest courts the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court (Goldman, 1999: Chapter 3) . The judiciary’s independence was frequently jeopardized duri ng the Meciar period through la ws that were passed. For example, during late 1995, laws were passed that placed restrictions on the competency of the Constitutional Court to declare laws unconstitutional (Goldman, 1999: 77). In addition, Meciar and his cabinet repeatedly ignored the Cons titutional Court’s decisions on important cases, which seriously undermined the Court’s authority and effectiveness (Innes, 2001: 245). Corruption Corruption was widespread in the Slova k Republic throughout the time period of 1995-2001. Many government offici als had ties with organize d crime (Kusy, 1999: 107). Bribes and “gifts” to government official s were common occurrences. In the Grodeland study, it was shown that a majority of those interviewed from the Slovak Republic said that giving an official a bribe or a gift was the most effectiv e strategy to get help and that bribery was common in their country between officials a nd citizens (Grodeland, et al, 1998). Corruption in the government bureaucr acy continued to be a problem through 2001 (The Heritage Foundation, 1995-2001).

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58 General Two other aspects of the Slovak political system need to be mentioned. Though the elections of 1998 were free and fa ir, there was a very serious violation of the democratic order with the 1997 Referendum on NATO memb ership and amendment of a law that would allow for the direct election of the President. It had been approved by the Constitutional Court, but Meciar, who feared the direct election of the President, resorted to unconstitutional means to keep the questi on off the ballot by orde ring the Ministry of the Interior to distribute to polling stations only those ballots w ithout the Presidential question on it (Goldman, 1999: 79-82). Opposition groups were largely marginali zed in the political process during the 1995-2001 period. Members of the minority opposition could not take part in bodies that regulated and supervised important state f unctions. Meciar and his party (Movement for Democratic Slovakia, or MD S) also greatly reduced the representation of non-MDS members of the SNC on the important pa rliamentary committees. These laws ran contrary to established parliamentary practice in the EU countries and violated standard liberal rules and norms. By 1997, outside criticisms of these laws forced the government to amend them, but the new law did not go far enough in reinstating meaningful participation of other par ties (Szomolanyi, 1999: 133-137). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons There was frequent police brutality, part icularly against the Roma minority and inaction by the police to stop ski nhead violence (HRW, 1995-2001).

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59 Trafficking There were no reports of the trafficki ng of women during this time period. The Slovak Republic was a regular arms supplier to countries with atrocious human rights records or weapons embargos against them , such as Angola and Liberia (HRW, 2002b). Asylum There were no violations of th e rights of asylum seekers. Freedom of religion The rights to religious freedom we re protected du ring this period. Freedom of speech and press Top executives for Slovak Radio and the Bo ard of TV and Radio broadcasting were selected from the MDS party, which turned th e mass media into a political tool. Meciar also restricted how much stat e-run networks could cover opposition groups and forbid the broadcasting of shows that cr iticized government policy. The government also threatened and intimated the print media thr ough 2001 (Goldman, 1999: 74-76; HRW, 2002a). The right to free speech was further undermined with the1996 amendment to the penal code, which restricted the right of Slovak citizens and in some case s foreigners in the Republic to organize or express opinions perceived to be damaging to the state (HRW, 1997). This was still enforced in 2001 (HRW 2002a). Over all, Meciar’s control over the media was “a serious obstacle to post-independence Slovaki a’s efforts to develop a stable and secure democratic system” (Goldman, 1999: 76). Women’s rights There was a lack of adequate antidomestic violence laws (HRW, 2001).

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60 Minority rights According to the constitution, the offici al state language of the Republic was Slovak, which means that only the Slovak language could be used in official communication (Szomolanyi, 1999: 119). The co nstitution did not guarantee the right to education in a language other than Slova k (Maracz, 1996: 204). National minority communities could not form political parties. In 1995, the government passed a Language Law that reinforced the exclusive use of the Slovak language in all important circumstances, including dealings with st ate and local officials, even in medical consultations. Exclusive use of other languages in the media or cultural activities, even in a minority-dominated community, was highl y restricted (Pogany, 1998: 165; HRW, 1996-1999). Various parts of the 1995 Langua ge Law were in “clear breach of established norms regarding freedom of expression” (Pogany, 1998:184). In 1999, the government passed a law that allowed for the us e of other languages in state business, but only in those towns where the minority population exceeded 20% (Bitusikova, 2002: 57; HRW, 2000). The Hungarian’s minority’s political representation was undermined in 1996 through Meciar’s redrawing of the borders of regions for electoral representation. The borders reduced the representation for the Hungarian minority as they were “gerrymandered deliberately to prevent the Hungarians reaching 20% in any of them” (Bitusikova, 2002: 57). There we re widespread violations of the rights of the Slovak Republic’s other large minority, the Roma. Th ey faced discrimination in employment, health care, and education, as well as physical attacks against them, particularly by the police and skinheads, throughout the 1995-2001 period (HRW, 1996-2002a).

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61 In sum, the Slovak Republic had alarming blemishes in its democratic record. Meciar and his party, used illegal methods to consolidate power a nd turn the fledgling Republic into a virtual autocracy, with blatant vi olations of democratic rules, the rule of law, and minority and human rights (Kusy, 1999: 103). While a few improvements were made during the 1999-2001 period, repeated mi nority rights, human rights, and civil rights violations continued, as did widesp read corruption (Bitusikova, 2002: 57; HRW, 2000, 2001; The Heritage Foundation, 1995-2001). There were also problems with minority rights in the Baltic States. The Baltic States Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament All the Baltic States (Estonia, Latv ia, and Lithuania) have one-chamber parliaments, which were directly elected the citizenry in free and re gular elections during this period. The legislature shares power w ith the executive and judicial branches (Juviler, 1998: Chapter 7; Ruus, 2002; R uncis, 2002; Girnius, 2002). There were no problems with the parliaments of Estonia and Latvia, but there were some flaws with the Parliament of Lithuania during the period under study. Many of the laws were poorly drafted, vague and inconsistent. Many memb ers of Parliament were not adequately trained to participate in parliament and often did not attend sessions. The executive during the early part of this period was free from the censure and supervision during this period, such that Prime Minster Slezevicius had no qualms about ignor ing the parliament (Girnius,2002: Chapter 4).

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62 The executive and civil service All three states had a Prime Minister a nd a president as their executive branch. Generally there were no major problems with the executive branch in Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania’s problem was in the relationshi p between the executive and the legislative branch, discussed in the Parliament secti on (Girnius, 2002: Chapter 4). There were no serious flaws in the civil services of Estonia and Latvia, but the civi l service in Lithuania was saturated with corrupti on (Girnius, 2002: Chapter 4). The judiciary Each Baltic state had an inde pendent judiciary with at l east one high court (Girnius, 2002: Chapter 4). There were generally no pr oblems with Estonia’ s judicial system. However, Latvia and Lithuania did have pr oblems with their judi ciary in terms of efficiency and corruption. The courts were weak and often committed acts of corruption (Juviler,1998: 110). In Lithuania the judges not only tended to be corrupt, but were also poorly trained and often lacked the necessary knowledge to adequately interpret and apply legislation in economic matters (Girnius, 2002: 55). Corruption Only Lithuania had a grave problem with corruption. Corruption was especially common in the government and business sect or such that is was described as “endemic”(Girnius, 2002: 54). Public official s frequently violated the rule of law and many people in the private sector evaded taxation. A WB 1995 surv ey of 200 businesses in Lithuania found that corruption inhi bited business growth, among other things10 10 The WB reported that 54% of the 200 businesses they surveyed had paid bribes to government officials, 80% of 200 foreign investors had been asked for bribes, and 90% of the 200 foreign investors said corruption was an obstacle for the growth of their business (Girnius, 2002: 54).

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63 (Girnius, 2002: 54). The widespr ead corruption led to the public ’s general distrust of their government (Girnius, 2002: 51). In Lithua nia, organized crime flourished and the government did not support the reporting of organized crime (Juviler, 1998: Chapter 7). In terms of illegal trade, both Estonia and Lithuania had a significant “shadow economy,“ an economy based on the illegal trading of al cohol, tobacco, and other substances (Ruus, 2002: 28-50; Girnius, 2002: 51-54). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons Estonia and Latvia did not ha ve any violations of civil or human rights in the penal system. However, the penal system in Lithuania violated some basic rights of suspects as they were often kept in custody for tens days without being charged and even up to eighteen months in pre-trial detention. There was also th e tendency for police brutality and conditions in prisons were ex tremely harsh (Girnius, 2002: 53). Trafficking There were no reports of the trafficking of human beings in any of the Baltic States. Asylum There were no obstacles in the protection of asylum seekers in all three countries. Freedom of religion There were no major violations of religi ous rights in any of the Baltic States. Freedom of speech and press Though in Estonia and Latvia there were no vi olations in the rights of the press or the right to free speech, in Lithuania reporte rs who worked for state-owned television and radio were sometimes pressured not to critic ize the government's po licies (Juviler, 1998:

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64 Chapter 7). There was also a regulation that allowed the government to sue the media for damaging their “honor and di gnity” (Girnius, 2002: 56). Women’s rights In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, women’s rights were not adequately protected in terms of domestic abuse, violence, a nd job discrimination (Juviler, 1998: 112). Minority rights In terms of minority rights, the biggest obstacle for both Estonia and Latvia was with their citizenship laws. Both states ha d significant minority populations, particularly Russian ones. The citizenship laws in both countries had stringent language and knowledge tests, which disenfranchised 30% of the population from being able to participate in politics in both counties. A draft bill was subm itted to the legislature in the mid-1990’s that would come into effect in 2005 and would allow only the Latvian language to be used in secondary educati on (Runcis, 2002: 38-50). In 1995 the Riga city council repeatedly denied non-citizen groups to assemble and hold demonstrations to protest against discrimination (Juviler, 1998: Chapter 7). In Estonia there was a 1993 civil service law passed that stated that no non-citizen af ter January 1, 1996 could be hired to work in the civil service (Juviler, 1998: Chapter 7). This meant that the high positions in the bureaucracy as well as in the judicial system were controlled by ethnic Estonians (Ruus, 2002: Chapter 25-37). Problems in minority rights were also apparent in Bulgaria during the time period under study.

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65 Bulgaria Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament The legislative branch is composed of one chamber, the National Assembly. The parliament shares power with the executive branch and the judicial branch. Elections were free and fair, although not necessarily regular duri ng this period (Drezov, 2001: 415; Melone, 1998: Chapters 6, 8). The one fl aw in the legislative branch was the constant battles between the President and par liament and within parliament itself. In general, “hatred, an appetite for power, a nd not a little corrup tion” characterized Bulgaria’s political party system during th e period under study (Perry, 1999: 193-218). The executive and civil service The executive wing of the government consists of a President and a Prime Minister. The President is directly elected by the popul ace (Melone, 1998: Chapter 6). Other than the infighting between the pres ident and parliament, there were no major problems in the executive branch (Perry, 1999: 193-218). The tasks of the government's administration and the status of civil servants were not delineated in the constitution, which hindered the Council of Ministers from effectively exer cising control over its administration (Melone,1998: 218). There was also no restric tion on partisan appointments (Kolarova, 2002: 159). The judiciary The judiciary’s administrative staff and equipment were insufficient and overburdened, which led to inefficiency a nd a legitimation crisis (Melone, 1998: 228; Kolarova, 2002: 155). Its independence was th reatened as judges could be moved from

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66 one jurisdiction to another and were often appointed on political partisanship (Melone, 1998: Chapter 9). Corruption Corruption in the government was so widesp read that “the corrupt nature of the elite was [is] taken as a given”(Krastev, 2002: 49). 11Though there were many 49). Respondents in the Grodeland survey reported th at they had to frequently offer bribes, even for services that were considered a right not a favor (Grodeland, et al, 1998).12 The government of the late 1990’s up until 2001 di d not adequately fight “the rampant corruption” that permeated a ll of public life. Anticorrupti on efforts were unenthusiastic and little enforced, and laws concerning the m onitoring of compliance to rules were often unclear (Barany, 2002: 147-148). Crime was also a significant problem as demonstrated by a 2001 report by the National Service for the Fight Against Organi zed Crime which reported that there were over one hundred armed gangs of organized criminals, each with about 500 members, active in Bulgaria. Throughout the 19952001 time period, there were numerous mafia wars and public murders of policemen or pr ivate security officers (Kolarova, 2002: 157). General Though elections were fair and free, there was an instance wher e the transfer of power was violent. In early 1997, the Union of Democratic Forces party (UDF) sought 11 In a recent Freedom House survey, fifty percent of t hose polled said that the situation in 2001 was worse than in 1989. Only seventeen percent said that the situation had improved (Krastev, 2002: 40). The results of this survey were similar to the Grodeland study. In their study, almost all respondents said that the behavior of officials had worsened since 1989 and, overall, they were discontent with officials (Grodeland, et al, 1998). 12 For example, bribes were often necessary to get prop er care by those in the medical field. Even police officers extorted bribes. Those polled also said that they thought corruption was increasing (Grodeland, et al, 1998).

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67 early elections to oust the Bulgarian Socialis t Party (BSP) from the position of majority party in the ruling coalition, as well as the BSP prime minister. The UDF’s supporters attacked the parliament's building in earl y 1997, which began a series of violent mass demonstrations in which several hundred pe ople died (Agh, 1998: Ch apter 7). Eventually, the BSP capitulated and called for early elect ions (Agh, 1998: Chapter 7). According to Agh, the dangerous conditions that led to the transfer of power were “almost bordering a civil war” (Agh, 1998: 249). While the popular prot ests showed active c itizen interest in politics in Bulgaria, it also showed “ a re turn to the violent pa tterns in politics”(Agh, 1998: 249). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons Throughout the 1995-2001 period there was freq uent police brutality, especially the Roma. Several individuals di ed in “suspicious circumst ances involving the police” in 1997. Pre-trial detentions were often ex cessively long. The prisons were often overcrowded, unsanitary, and lacked adequate food (HRW, 1996-2002a). Trafficking There was a significant woman trafficking system in Bu lgaria during this period. The government's response to human traffi cking was also inadequate and below international standards. Arms trafficking to countries with human rights abuses or weapons embargos against them was also alarming (HRW, 2001). Asylum There were no violations of the prot ection of individuals seeking asylum.

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68 Freedom of religion Religious groups faced “official restricti ons and societal hostility” throughout this period (HRW, 1996-2002a). Religious rights we re limited by the constitution's law against the creation of religious political parties (Drezov, 2001: 430). Freedom of speech and press The media faced government interference. The government had supervisory authority over national radio and televi sion (Kalorova, 2002: 159). Throughout the 19952001 period, the government attempted to sile nce state radio‘s criticism of it (HRW, 1996-2002a).13 Until 2000, journalists could be imprisoned for libel or slander. This law was often used by the government to pr essure the media. Even after 2000, the government could still impose fines for libel or slander (HRW, 1996-2002a). There were also physical attacks against journalists throughout this time period, particularly against those investigating corruption (HRW, 1996-2002a). Women’s rights Women’s rights were poorly protected. For example, Bulgaria did not have antidiscrimination laws (HRW, 2002a). General Bulgaria did not abolish the death penalty until 2000 (HRW, 2001). Minority rights Ethnic Turks and Roma were the tw o largest minorities. Throughout 1995-2001, the Roma faced discrimination in education, h ealth care, and other areas and they were frequently attacked by both the police and private citizens. Sometimes, they were 13 In 2001, nineteen were fired after protesting the appo intment of Ivan Borislavov as director-general of the National Radio and Television Council (HRW, 2002).

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69 pressured to leave their homes by villagers14 (HRW, 1996-2002a). Mino rity rights were further limited by the constitution's law agai nst the creation of ethnic political parties (Drezov, 2001: 430). The gay community was also discriminated against, at least until 1997, in the form of police assau lts and harassment (HRW, 1996-1998). When looking at BulgariaÂ’s human and minority rights record, as well as its treatment of the media and th e widespread corruption, it seem s that there were serious problems in BulgariaÂ’s attempts to conso lidate a democratic system. Some of these democratic deficiencies could be seen when looking at the Czech RepublicÂ’s political and social system from 1995-2001. The Czech Republic Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament The legislative branch of government is co mposed of two chambers the Assembly of Deputies and the Senate (Pogany, 1995: 137-1 42). The members of these bodies were elected directly by c itizenry in free and fair elections during this period (Kavan and Palous, 2002: 82). The executive and civil service There is a Prime Minister and a Presid ent in the executive branch (Pogany, 1995: 137-142). The main problem with the executive branch was in the delineation of Presidential powers in the constitution where delegation of Presidential powers was vague and inconsistent (Paczolay, 1999: 120-124). Th is was also the case with the Prime Minister position, as seen during KlausÂ’s re gime, which lasted until late 1997. There 14 For example, in 2001, 500 residents of the Stezherovoa drew up a petition to expel Roma from the village. As a result, many Roma abandoned their homes in the village and left (HRW, 1996-2002).

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70 were neither legal nor parliamentary reviews of his party, nor any self-regulating bodies (Innes, 2001: 220-236). The civil service was ge nerally filled with only those who were supporters of Klaus‘s party, which turned it into a patronage system. This problem continued even after the Klaus government left office (Kavon and Palous, 2002: 85). The judiciary The judicial system has the Constitutional C ourt as its highest court. The judiciary did not have complete independence as the Se nate had final consent over the prosecution of judges of the Constitutiona l Court (Sladecek, 1999: 87). Corruption In 1997, the Czech Minister of Justice cl aimed that corruption was a ‘serious problem’ in the Czech Republic, in public administration, law enforcement, and the political elite (Grodeland, et al, 1998: 652). By 1997, “it became commonly recognized worldwide that the Czech Republic suffered from systemic corruption”(Appel, 2001: 1). By late 1998, many of the mainstream political parties had been charged with severe acts of corruption (Appel, 2001). In the Grodeland st udy, a majority of those interviewed from the Czech Republic, said that the most e ffective strategy for receiving help from government officials was to give a “gift” or a bribe (Grodeland, et al, 1998). In 1997, the public trust in the government was at 16% (Innes, 2001: 242). By 2000, much of the youth saw ‘democratic politics’ in the Republic as corrupt and did not see how they could be true citizens (Innes, 2001: 242). These acts of corrupti on were made possible during the Klaus regime, and even afterwards, by the government’s indifference to the problem. The government had power over ke y ministries and judicial bodi es that could detect and prosecute acts of corruption (Appel, 2001) . Though new laws were passed in 1999 to

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71 counteract corruption, the overall efficacy of these laws after1999 was disappointing (Appel, 2001). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons There was widespread police brutality, part icularly against the Roma, and a lack of enforcement against acts committed against minorities.15 The police often expressed “sympathy” with skinheads by allowing them to hold unauthorized marches and threaten minorities. A report issued by the Czech Helsinki Committee in mid-1998 stated that there was “widespread police violence, corr uption, and discrimination against women in recruitment” (HRW, 2000). Police misconduct often occurred in pr e-trial detention. There were no major problems with pr ison conditions duri ng this period. Trafficking In 2000, the Czech Republic was a country of origin, transit, and destination for the trafficking of women (HRW, 2001). The Czech Republic was a major arms trafficker to countries with horrible human abuse records or countries who had arms embargos against them, such as Syria, and Yemen (HRW, 2002a; HRW, 2002b). Asylum There were no violations of the rights of asylum seekers during this period. Freedom of religion Religious rights were prot ected during this period. 15 For example, in 2000 at the IM F and WB meetings, the police used violence against protesters. Those that were detained by the police experienced fu rther police abuse and torture (HRW, 2001, 2002).

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72 Freedom of speech and press In late 2000 Jiri Hodac, who was affiliated with the ruling party, was appointed by parliament to the position as head of Czech television (HRW, 2002a; Appel, 2001). WomenÂ’s rights WomenÂ’s rights were protected during this period. General The Lustration Law that was in pla ce throughout the 1995-2001 was designed to keep out those who had actively participat ed in various posts during the Communist regime (Kavan and Palous, 2002: 89). Many in dividuals were not given fair trials and many who had not represented the communist regime were prosecuted. The law became a political tool to defame opponents (Pri ban, 1999: 52; Kavan a nd Palous, 2002: 89). Minority rights The Citizenship Law, which was pass ed in 1993, continued to pose serious violations of minority rights. This law referred to obtaining ci tizenship, which was required even for those, particularly the Ro ma, who were born in the Czech Republic. Its requirements on residence, criminal ity, and ancestry affected the Roma disproportionately, and thus were discrimina tory. Some Roma who met the requirements were denied citizenship by local official s without reason (HRW, 1996 -1998). This law was not amended until mid-1999 (HRW, 2000). The Roma were subject to a growing numb er of violent attacks against them, as well as, discriminatory practices against them in education, health care, and employment (HRW, 1996 2001) Often, there was little at tempt to investigate and prosecute those who attacked Roma (Kavan a nd Palous, 2002: 88; HRW, 1996-2001).

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73 In sum, there were some serious democratic deficiencies in the Czech Republic during the period under study. The political system, under Klaus in particular, was characterized by its refusal to reform the ci vil service, the judiciary, human rights, and the legal structure (Innes, 2001: 236). A few of these problems were also a part of the Slovenian system, although not to the extreme of the Czech Republic. Slovenia Democracy and the Rule of Law Parliament Slovenia has two chambers in its legislat ive branch the National Assembly and the National Council. The National Assembly wa s elected by the public in free and fair elections during the period unde r study. The National Council is selected by combination of regional and occupational bodies (Agh, 1998: Chapter 6; Horowitz, 1999: 109-110). The executive and civil service The executive branch consists of a President and a Prime Minister. The President is directly elected by the populace. The executive shares power with the other two branches (Agh, 1998: Chapter 6; Horowitz, 1999: 109-110). The executive, as well as the judicial and legislative branches, is independent of the military, as there is civilian control over that body (Kuzmanic, 2002: 127). There were no significant problems in the civil service. The judiciary The judicial branch was i ndependent but weak, as it wa s continually backlogged in cases and was beset by the rapid increase in crime and corruption during this period (Kuzmanic, 2002: 121-134).

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74 Corruption Corruption was not only a wide spread problem in the judiciary, but also in the political elite (Kuzmanic, 2002: 121-134). Th e general consensus was that “corruption and clientism [were] part of the postsocialist climate” (Kuzmanic, 2002: 122). Human and Minority Rights Police, pre-trial detention, and prisons There were no significant violations by the police in terms of ci vil or human rights. Prison conditions were not a major problem during this period. Trafficking There was no human or arms trafficki ng in the country dur ing this period. Asylum There were no violations of the rights of asylum seekers during this period. Freedom of religion Religious rights were prot ected during this period. Freedom of speech and press The board of the national TV was composed of representatives of political parties in the same proportions as in Parliament, which weakened the medium‘s independence. Many radio and TV stations were finan ced by the government. In 1995, the government interfered in the editorial policy of the highly respected Ljubljana daily newspaper (Ramet, 1997: 189-217; Ku zmanic, 2002: 121-134). Women’s rights The only problem in women’s rights was that they were paid less than men (Ramet 1997: 189-217).

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75 Minority rights There were no significant violations of minority ri ghts during this period. As seen by these examples, there were few problems in Slovenia’s democratic record. While corruption, the government's interference with the media, and women’s rights were flaws in Slovenia’s political system, they could easily be reformed. On the whole, Slovenia was one of the most stable and respected democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Agh,1998: Chapters 5 and 6, 1998; Vukadinovic, 2001: 439). It is clear that when comparing Turkey and the CEECs politically, there were many similarities. In particular, Turkey, the Sl ovak Republic, Romania, and the Czech Republic were very similar in their records. Thus , it would appear that Turkey fulfilled the political criteria, as well as the economic crite ria, as much as the CEECs. One could thus conclude that there was some unofficial requirement that Tu rkey did not meet, but that the CEECs did. This unofficial “criterion” relates back to th e sense of “we-ness” that is part of the EU. As stated before, many Europ eans, including EU offi cials, think of “weness” as being historically, culturally, and religiously based. Because of this pervasive view of what “we-ness” means, Turkey wa s not accepted during this time period, nor before this time period, as being “like” the cu rrent EU member states . Rather, it was seen as being “other.” The CEECs, though, were pe rceived as being “like” the current EU member states. To understand Turkey’s “otherness” and the CEECs “likeness” vis a vis the EU, or Europe in general, it is necessa ry to use the constructivist approach, which centers on the idea of identities being socia lly constructed, and not inherently given.

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76 CHAPTER 6 IDENTITY FORMATION Constructivism, as stated before, is ba sed on the notion that identities are not a given, but a result of social construction. Often, such a cons truction is based on perceived differences between actor A and actor B. As William Connolly states in the book Cultures of Insecurity , any identity, be it of an individua l, state, or other group, “is always established in relation to a se ries of differences that have become socially recognized” (Weldes, et al, 1999: 11). The author s of Cultures of Security Identity also point out that identity is constructed by culture and that “otherness” both constitutes and threatens an identity. Social identities are not fixed but dynamic and ar e perpetually contested and negotiated, constructed and reconstructed (S hore, 1993: 783). Moreover, there is not one “truth” or one “reality.” Reality is itself a construction (Weldes, et al, 1999: 14). Reality and identities “emerge out of a process of representation through which individuals whether state officials, leaders, or members of nationalist movements, journal editors, or users of the Internet, for example describe to themselves and others the world in which they live” (Weldes, et al, 1999: 14). Discour ses are especially in fluential in producing and re-producing identities and “worlds.” Di scourse provides the meeting-place where the consciousness of the “other ” and the subject meet. Only through this meeting with the other through discourse can the subject know itself and the world (Neumann, 1999: 13). This identity formation is important for region-building, or by extension, community-building and functioning. To esta blish this “we-ness” or common identity, the participants in this region or community, mu st recognize what one is not, just as much

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77 as what one is, since group identity “is not conceivable without an other from which self can be differentiated” (Neumann, 1999: 148). Th us, a group, just like an individual or an actor, needs this differentiation between itself and others to create an identity or sense of “we-ness.” The self-identity of the subject group could be constructed out of an origin or task common to the collective, such as speaking similar languages, having similar religions, or similar values, etc (Therbon, 1995: 230-231). The “other“ may be delineated in “any terms of non-identity, family, tribe, ethnicity, class, religion, and so on”(Therbon, 1995: 223). This process inherently creates bound aries of inclusion a nd exclusion (Shore, 1993: 782). Turkey, as an “other” to the curr ent EU member states , has been excluded from joining the EU, as well as from being a part of the “European’ family since the time of the Crusades, as is discussed in Chap ter 7. By contrast, the CEECs have been perceived as “European” for centuries, with the exception of the Cold War period. In discussing Turkey’s otherness and the CEECs “ likeness” in terms of membership in the EU, one can look at the way Turkey has been presented in the German media vis a vis Poland in the post-Maastricht Treaty era. Th e relevance for this comparison is discussed in Chapter 8. However, before discussing in depth the discourse in Germany concerning Turkey and Poland, it is helpful to understand the way Turkey has been (re) presented by “Europeans’ since the 12th century, as these (re) presentations contin ue to influence the perception and reproduction of Tu rkey’s identity today, as will be shown in the analysis of German media discourse.

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78 CHAPTER 7 TURKEY OR ORIENT AS EUROPE’S "OTHER" The first encounter between Europe, mean ing the area that today is comprised by the current EU member states, and Turkey took place in the 11th century when Turkey was a part of the broader budding Islamic civ ilization (Hentsch, 1992: XIV 29). At this time, the Islamic civilization was greatly more advanced in science and mathematics than the peoples in Europe. Europe was only a co mpilation of tribe-like groups and city-state areas. Areas of southern Europe traded si gnificantly with the Islamic areas of the Mediterranean and there was much mutu al understanding betw een the southern Europeans and the Mediterranean Muslims. In fact, there were many Christian (European) settlements in the Islamic lands. These Europeans lived peacefully with their Islamic neighbors (Hentsch, 1992: 23-29). So one may ask what happened in the 11th cen tury to change this picture of mutual understanding and peace. There were two reason s for this change. One was the desire by the Catholic Church, which was the most power ful institution in Europe at that time, to find and reclaim Jerusalem and an Eden, two highly symbolic places. Jerusalem was located in the Islamic areas, as was suppos edly Eden (Hentsch, 1992: 29). The Pope at the time, Urban II, saw the northwestern peoples of Europe as the best groups to convince to reclaim these two sites, as well as the Ho ly Land in general, as they had the least contact with Islamic peoples of all Europeans. Since they had such little contact with Muslims, and thus less familiarity with them, it would be easier to persuade them that the Muslims were “enemies”(Hentsch, 1992: 30) . Moreover, by occupying the northwestern

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79 elites and knights with a great “task,” Pope Urban thought he would be able to strengthen the Papacy through gained prestige (by showing that the Pope could un ite Europe, at least for a common cause) and power (Hentsch, 1992: 30). The second reason for the initiation of the Crusades stemmed from the interests of the then-emperor of the Byzantine Empire, Alex Comperos. He sought to regain the re gion of Asia Minor, which was lost to the Selijuk Turks in 1071. To accomplish this goal, Alex asked the Pope and the Pope’s ‘northern army’ for aid (Hentsch, 1992: 30). To persuade the elites of northwestern Europe, Urban constructed a mythic and generic anti-Christian enemy by combining the religious ferv or of northern Europe with southern Europe’s memories of invading Sa racens (Henstch, 1992: 30-34). At one point, the Pope stated: Oh what a disgrace, if a race [Muslims] so despised, base, and the instrument of demons, should overcome a people endowed with faith in the all-powerful God, and resplendent with the name of Christ (Hentsch, 1992: 30). Using this identity creation of the 'Muslim enemy,' the Pope called for a liberation of people in Jerusalem and other Christian settleme nts in Muslim lands, despite the fact that the Christians in these settlements saw no need to be “liberated.” To do this task, he called for northern Europeans to fight the Turks, who had nothing in common with the Saracens except the Islam religion (Henstch, 1992: 30-34). Thus began the clash between Muslim peoples, particularly the Turkish peopl e, and Europeans (Christians), as well as the representation of Turks and other Muslims as the “enemy” of Europe. The representation of Muslims (particularly Turks) as Europe’s rival still forms the West’s (Europeans’) view of Islam and Islam’s fo llowers to this day (Hentsch, 1992: 23). It must also be noted that the Islamic peoples at this time were far from being fanatical. In fact, many Muslims did not unders tand the Christian religious fervor behind

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80 the Crusades (Hentsch, 1992: 30-34). Southe rn Europeans likewise did not view the Crusades as necessary. Southern Europeans, as stated before, understood and admired their Islamic neighbors. They did not see thei r world and the Islamic world as separate and inherently in opposition. Even after th e Crusades, trade between the Southern Europeans, mostly those that inhabited Spain, Italy, and Si cily, and the Islamic world continued to flourish (Hentsch, 1992: 34-42). A similar perspective c ould be seen with the Christians who lived in Muslim lands during this time. As mentioned before, the Christians in the Muslim lands did not feel that they needed to be "liberated." There was no sense of alienation, nor were Muslims pe rceived as threatening (Henstch, 1992: 3034). One can see a current example of such a community in Syria today. Christian Syrians, which are a large minority, are well in tegrated in the mainly Muslim Syria and have generally not faced discrimination. They perceive themselves as being Syrian as much as Muslim Syrians do (Philips, 2003). This shows how the chasm between Europe and the Islamic world in the 11th-13th centuri es was mostly create d, rather than having been a natural development From the beginning of the Crusades un til the 13th century, the Church propagated the identity of the Muslim (Tur k) as being the enemy of Euro peans, as well as the idea that Muslims or Turks were “inferior.” Th is negative discourse of "Mohammedan heresy" by the Church continued until recent attempts to ‘universalize’ the Church’s message. This long history of viewing Muslims as the “other” is today one basis for the average European‘s instinctive devaluation of Mus lims and Arabs (Hentsch, 1992: 39). One could thus say that this first encounter between Europe (excluding the southernmost regions that traded with the Muslim world) and th e Islamic area is still in the Western and

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81 European deep collective conscious (Hentsch, 1992: 23). As one politic al scientist stated about this Crusade-based identity of Muslims: This image was to sink deep roots in the collective unconscious, and in the collective subconscious, roots so deep that the image remains insidiously active, always ready to spring back to life in Western [European] public opinion (Hentsch, 1992: 36). From the 13th to the 15th century, the average European received most of their information from the Church. Since the Church continually reconstr ucted and represented Muslims as inferior infidels, most Europeans held and promulgated th at same view. Only the elites during this pe riod showed admiration for Muslims, and even there it was solely in the field of science. This general anti-Muslim racism, even by the elites in areas outside of science, is what ha s lingered most in the collectiv e view of the West (Europe) (Hentsch, 1992: 45-46). From the 15th to 17th century, Europe engaged in the process of discovering itself. Particularly from the 16th century on, mo dern Europe began to emerge. This came about through a reorientation of Europe more towards the Atlantic rather than the Mediterranean. Power increased in Brita in and France, while the Mediterranean weakened economically. The Westphalian sy stem of the 17th century signaled the creation of powerful European nation-sta tes (Hentsch, 1992: 50-57; Neumann, 1999: 51). It was also the first time that a sociological/pol itical view, not just a religious-based view, emerged about Muslims, mostly in regards to the Ottoman Empire (present day Turkey) (Hentsch, 1992: 50-57). The Ottoman Empire was the most powerful actor in the European-Mediterranean area in the 15th cen tury, when it reache d its pinnacle. It controlled almost all of the Mediterranean, which included one quarter of the European continent (Hentsch, 1992: 50-57; Neumann, 1999: 40). This expansive empire reminded

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82 Europeans of 7th century Arab or Muslim invasions on the Mediterranean, which had permanently changed history in that area (Hentsch, 1992: 50-57). Throughout the 15th17th centuries, fear of Turks in Europe increased and decreased with the Ottoman Empire’s fluctuations in power. The crisis poi nt came with the Ottoman Empire’s attempt to siege Vienna in 1683. But the Europeans we re able to repel the Turks. The Turkish danger was viewed by Europeans as the late st version of the assault of Islam on Christianity that had been going on fo r centuries (Neumann, 1999: 44). In 1699, the Ottoman Empire and Europe signed the Trea ty of Carlowitz, whic h ended the AustroOttoman War. This defeat of the Turks by Eu rope marked the beginning of the Ottoman Empire's decline and the affirmation of Eur ope’s military superiority compared to other civilizations that was to re main throughout the next two centuries (Neumann, 1999: 51). As mentioned before, Europe’s view of Turkey and the rest of the Islamic world at this point was not just base d in religious terms. It was al so sociological and political. By the end of the 14th century and beginning of the 15th century, “the Turk” was seen more as a secular or cultural threat than a re ligious one. From the 15th century to the 17th century, writers began to refer to the civilizati on in the "East" or Islamic area as barbaric and static (Neumann, 1999: 44-52) . This representation of “the Turk” as barbaric meant that they “must be inferior to civilized Europe on all accounts; and, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, even the military abilities of the Turks were disparaged”(Neumann, 1999: 45). In the 16t h century, Machiavelli was the first to construct and present the image of “despotic Orientalism” through his comparisons of French and Ottoman institutions in which Fr ance stood for Europe and the Ottoman was “the other.” These political differences were justified by Europe’s history, which was

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83 traced, back to ancient Greece. One must point out that the French kings during the 16th century were autocratic in rule through the divine right of kings doctrine. Despite this, Machiavelli’s representation was widely accepte d. This image has been continually (re) produced in European discourse up until toda y (Hentsch, 1992: 61-68). However, that does not mean that the religious aspects di sappeared. Representations of Muslims and "the Turk" in European discourse during this period continued to be influenced by the Crusade and medieval representations (Neuma nn, 1999: 44-46). Moreove r, this view of the Turkish or Muslim "other" reinforced th e collective of Europe, as "the Turk" was perceived as a dangerous force sent by God to punish Christendom for its sins (Neumann, 1999: 45). It was also believed during the 16t h century that Turks could be converted through “reason or authority” (Hentsch, 1992: 67). This could be achieved through the process of studying Turks, discovering their at tributes and defects. This idea paved the way for the dominant discourse of the 18th a nd 19th centuries, the Orientalist discourse, in which "the other" was seen “as matter to be devoured, then digested“ (Hentsch, 1992: 68). By the 17th century, one could find freque ntly in the European discourse that Europe was seen as “decidedly Christian in character” and that it was different from the Islamic Ottoman Empire (Neumann, 1999: 50). In addition, Europe bega n to define itself and “civilization” in general in terms of “hum anity,” “law,” and “social mores” and used these aspects to differentiate itself from “o thers,” including the O ttoman Empire. This reinforced the identity of Europe as “civi lized” and the Ottoman Empire and other nonEuropean civilizations as “bar baric” (Neumann, 1999: 52).

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84 An example of this representation of the Ottoman Empire can be seen in the work of Gottfried Liebniz, a famous 17th century German historian, philosopher and diplomat, who described Turks as not only barbaric, bu t also ignorant and da rk (Hentsch, 1992: 93103). Similarly, European travelers like Jean Thevenot, described Turks as “arrogant,” “little inclined toward the sciences,“ and as “sodomite s” (Hentsch, 1992: 84). Despite the Ottoman Empire’s military dec line at the turn of the 18th ce ntury, Turks continued to be perceived and represented as a cultural threat (Neumann, 1999: 52). Ironically, though the Turks were seen as a cultural threat in the 17th century, the O ttoman Empire was at the same time in fashion in Europe, particular ly in the arts where it was regarded as exotic (Hentsch, 1992: 93-103). In the 18th century, Europe ’s identity and sense of superiority over the Ottoman Empire and other parts of the East, now ofte n referred to as “the Orient,” deepened (Neumann, 1999: 52). Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the dominant European discourse on the Ottoman Empire and other Muslim areas was “Orientalist” discourse. Orientalism was a style of thought based upon an “ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time ) “the occident”(Said, 1979: 2). It also was characterized by dealing with the Orient by “making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, teachi ng it, settling it, ruling over it”(Said, 1979: 3). This differentiation and method of dealing with the Orient had the consequence of reinforcing not only the Orient’s identity as “other” but also reinforcing Europe’s own identity (Said, 1979: 3). Various themes of the Orientalist discourse, such as the despotism of the Orient, the sensuality of Or ientals (Muslims), the cruelty of Orientals (Muslims), the backwardness of Orientals, etc. were defined, produced, and then

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85 reproduced in the discourse of French, British, and German historians, writers, travelers, etc. (Said, 1979: Chapter 1). The importance of Orientalist discours e in propagating and reinforcing the “otherness” of the Ottoman Empire and other Muslim areas cannot be overstated. As Said states in the opening of his book: “Without examining Orientalism as a discourse, one cannot possibly understand the enormously sy stematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage even produ ce the Orient politi cally, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientificall y, and imaginatively” (Said, 1979: 3). When looking at the works of 18th and 19t h century European Orientalists, one must note that in all these wo rks, the people from “the East” never spoke for themselves. For example, when the French Flaubert wr iter met an Egyptian woman, she never was able to speak of herself (her emotions, history, etc). Flaubert spoke for her and represented her in his writings. Thus, what cons titutes an identity in cultural discourse is not a truth but a mere representation. As Said states "cultura l discourse and [the] exchange within a culture that is comm only circulated by it is not “truth” but representations . . . [in at least written la nguage] there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a re-presence, or a representation. . .the writte n statement is a presence to the reader by the virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made superogatory and any such real thing as “the Orient” "(Said, 1979: 21). Flaubert was just one of many European authors who visited the Orient in the 19th century. In one of his works, Flaubert described a scene in Cairo dealing with a monkey and a jester to demonstrate the Orient’s “queerness.” Thus, as was the case in the 17th century, the Orient was represented as “s trange” and “different” from Europe (Said,

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86 1979; Hentsch, 1992: 93-103). Flau bert, like many other Europ ean scholars and travelers also saw himself as the deliverer of the Orient. Only he could bring it to life and speak for it (Said, 1979). Other themes that flowed th rough Orientalist disc ourse were that of Muslim inferiority or barbarism and that of Muslim despotism. The French writer, Chateaubriand, stated that Islam was a cult that was “civilizatio n’s enemy . . .favorable to ignorance, to despotism. . .” (Said, 1979: 172). Other 18th and 19t h century writers and scholars represented the Oriental s, particularly Turks, similarly. Famed 19th century law theorist James Lorimer stated that: In the case of the Turks, we have had bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of civilization to barbarians w ho have proved to be incapable of performing its duties, and who possibl y do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind (Neumann, 1999: 57). The British statesman Edmund Burke describe d the Turks in the same light: “What had these worse than savages to do with the powers of Europe, but to spread war, destruction, and pestilence among them?” (Neumann, 1999: 53). Rudyard Kipling, a British writer, also brought forth this idea of the “White Man’s” superior ity over the people of the Orient. In one poem, Kipling wrote “Now this is the road that the White Men tread when they go to clean a land [the Orient]” (Said, 1979: 226). German scholar/travelers, such as Herd er, Schopenhaeur, and Schlegel, etc., saw the Orient as “ a stanched source, a dr ied-up river bed” (Hentsch, 1992: 139). The German philosopher Georg Hegel added to this German and European perspective of the Orient as inferior to Europe by representing it as “instinct ively refusing to evolve” and “stagnant” (Hentsch, 1992: 140). For Hegel, onl y European civilization had been able to achieve the most “progressed“ stage in hi story, while the Orient was relegated to history‘s “infancy” (Hentsch, 1992: 140-142). Later in the 19th century, Karl Marx

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87 echoed this Hegelian notion of the European civilization as the only one capable of progressing and the Orient as barbaric a nd stagnant (Hentsch, 1992: 146-147). These examples show the theme of Europeans regard ing Orientals, particularly Muslims, as people who knew nothing about li berty or civilization, were incapable of progressing, and thus were “inferior” (Said, 1979). After examining numerous texts by European scholars, Said sums up their goal as “reasserting the technological, political, and cu ltural supremacy of the West” (Said, 1979: 246). This lead to the identity of an “us” as liberal, educated, superior and a “them” as despotic, ignorant, and inferior. Moreover, th e people of the Orient were generalized so that the uniqueness of individua ls could not be recognized. As Said states “the "Arab" or "Arabs" (Muslim or Muslims) have an aura of apartness, definiteness, and the collective self-consistency such as to wi pe out any traces of individu al Arabs with narratable life histories” (Said, 1979: 229). This collective “A rab” or “Oriental” id entity then was reproduced continually throughout the Orientalist discourse. The French scholar Antoine Sacy is cons idered the father of Orientalism. His works marked the beginning of this discour se, where his texts “were [are] passed down from one generation of students to the ne xt” (Said, 1979: 129). Other European writers like Flaubert, Chateaubriand, Renan, and Kipling, to name a few, built upon Sacy’s foundation and constructed a discourse that ve rified itself through cr oss-referencing and cross-correspondence. All the scholars were experts on each other’s works and referred to each other to legitimize the discourse and their representations of the Orient. By the end of the 19th century, “the executive power of such a system of reference . . . was considerable” (Said, 1979: 234).

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88 The 20th century continued the Orientalist tradition, as well as the view of the Muslim "threat" to Christendom from the Cr usade/medieval period. This was especially the case with the Turks as the Ottoman Empire transformed into the Turkish State in the early 20th century. The Turks continued to be “others,” even as the founder of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Attaturk, sought to create a “Western” state (Bozdaglioglu, 2001: 229). Moreover, this identity of the Ottoman Turk as other was homogenized and later gained strength with the creation of modern Turkey (Neumann, 1999: 59). One of the principal methods by which Orie ntalists delivered the Orient, including Turkey, to the West in the early 20th century was by “the means of the disseminative capacities of modern learning, its diffusive apparatus in the learned professions, the universities”, which Said goes on to say, were “built upon the prestigious authority of the pioneering scholars, traveler s, and poets, whose cumulative vision had shaped a quintessential Orient” (Said, 1979: 221). Thus , the views of the “O rient” held by the learned Europeans of the 20th century were based largely on identities and representations of the Orientalist discourse , where the people from the Orient were constructed and reconstructed as “not like us” and culturall y “different” (Said, 1979). This Orientalist discourse, as already noted, was greatly shaped by the discourse among Europeans from centuries past. One can s ee the impact of the Orientalist discourse in the writings of the famous 20th century statesman T.E. Lawrence: “the Arab appealed to my imagination . . .[they have] a mental and moral fatigue, a race trained out . . . I know I am a stranger to them, and always will be” (Said, 1979: 229). Said sums up his argument about Orientalist discourse’s impact on modern Europe in the end of his book when he states: “The principal dogmas of Orie ntalism exist in their purest forms today in

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89 studies of Arabs and Islam. One is the abso lute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, deve loped, humane, superior, and th e Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior” (Said, 1979: 300). In looking at these and other examples fr om Said, as well as other scholars, one could find several themes in the Orientalist discourse of the 18th20th centuries. There was the theme of Islam as a symbolic threat, which could be traced back to the time of the Crusades, and later, the time of th e Ottoman Empire (Said, 1979; Hentsch, 1992; Lueg, 1995; Kappert, 1995). Ind eed, for Europe, Islam was “a lasting trauma” and by the 20th century, European civilization had “incor porated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues and vices, as somethi ng woven into the fabric of life”(Said, 1979: 59-60). This echoes the idea that the "Muslim enemy," particularly "the Turk" of the 11th-14th centuries, was an image imprinted in the collective conscious of Europeans (Hentsch, 1992: 23). Another theme that was present in the European discourse during the 18th-20th century was that of the Oriental, particular ly the Turk or Ottoman, as being despotic (Said, 1979; Hentsch, 1992: 82-92; Neumann, 1999:Chapter 2; Kappert, 1995: 34). This theme could be traced back to Machiavelli, who first represented th e Muslim as despotic in his comparison of the Ottoman and Fr ench institutions (Hentsch, 1992: 61-68). A third theme in the representations of Orientals or Muslims was that of “strangeness” or the exotic (Said, 1979; He ntsch, 1992: 92-103). Like the previous two themes, this theme had roots in history, which in this case was the 17th century (Hentsch, 1992: 93-103).

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90 A fourth theme was that of the inferior ity, backwardness, OR barbarism of the Oriental or Muslim (Said, 1979; Neumann, 1999: Chapter 2; Hentsch, 1992: 82-92). This theme dated back to the 15th century when mu ch of the discourse discussed the barbaric and static quality of the Ottoma n people (Neumann, 1999: 44-52). Another common theme of this discourse was that of the sensual and lustful Oriental which dated back to the 17th cen tury through the repres entations of various European travelers (Said, 1979; Hentsch, 1992: 84-133). One could also see the theme of Muslims be ing seen as always in groups or hordes, not as individuals (Said, 1979). These repres entations not only created generic or homogenized identities of Muslim s, but also reinforced the idea of Muslims as a threat, as if their sheer number would e nvelop Europeans (Christians). One last theme was that of the Orient being dominated, owned, or found by Europe. Europe was often represented as in control of the Orient's or Turkey’s destiny or as being necessary for a successful Oriental or Turkish state. A majority of these themes remain a part of European discourse today. Many Europeans believe that Turks are not Europeans, which is a perspective that “goes back to the Middle Ages”(Bozdaglioglu, 2001: 128). Tu rks are instead the “other,” which is a continuation of the identity given to them by Europeans since the Crusades. This view contrasts greatly with how the Turks percei ve themselves. Turks see themselves as "European" or "Western" (Bozdaglioglu, 2001; Baier, 1994). Despite the Turks' persistence in positing their "European-ness," they have perpetually been identified as “other" by the very audience they seek accepta nce from the Europeans. Moreover, this "otherness" has not remained one-dimensional. It has continually been reinvented and

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91 expanded upon, such that the 11th century relig iously based identity became by the 20th century a multi-layered ident ity that was religious, political, social, and cultural. As Neumann argues: Present-day representations of Turkey thus carry with them the memory of earlier representations. These memories are among the factors operative in todayÂ’s Turkish-European discourse, and this di scourse remains part of the discourse on European identities (Neumann, 1999: 62).

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92 CHAPTER 8 POLAND AS "EUROPEAN" Poland's place in Europe has changed fr equently throughout its history, but its "European" credentials have not been seriously challenge d, except during the Cold War era. This of course, is in st ark contrast to Turkey's histor y with Europe, as was discussed in the previous section. One of the most accurate ways to gauge Poland's "Europeanness" through time is to look at maps of Eu ropean area. The Holy Roman Empire, which existed from the mid-13th century to the early 19th century, stretched from Eastern France, to Northern Italy, to Western Poland. In fact, most of what is today Western and Northern Poland was the eastern border of this great empire. From the 18th century to World War I, Southern Poland was part of the Hapsburg Empire, which, like the Holy Roman Empire, is considered to be one of the foundations of "European" history. Both empires were Catholic in character. Today Poland is uniformly Catholic. In fact, many scholars and political scientists al ike argue that Poland's history as part of these great empires and as part of the Catholic Church's do mains make it "European." As one writer states of Poland (a s well as Hungary and the Czec h Republic): "For thousands of years their [Poles, Czechs, and Hungarian s] nations have belonged to the part of Europe rooted in Roman Christianity. They have participated in every part of its history" (Kundera, 1984: 33). Kundera also points out that Poland, like Hungary and the Czech Republic, has the architectural, musical, and lit erary past that many think is the basis for "European" culture, (Ku ndera, 1984: 35).

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93 By the 19th century, the northern part of Poland was part of the German Confederation (Orlow, 1995: Chapter 1). The S outhern part remained in the Hapsburgs' possession. This experience as part of the Confederation is the origin of Poland's Germanic quality. In the 20th century, Poland' s political situation changed frequently. After World War I, Poland was granted indepe ndence. However, in World War II it was occupied by Nazi Germany. After World War II, Poland's political system dramatically changed, as did its "European" identity. Afte r the war, Poland was communist and thus became part of one of Western Europe's "O ther"-the Communist Bl oc. As Kundra argues, Poland Poles "woke up to discover that they we re now in the East" (Kundra, 1984: 33). Poland's "other-ness" and "not quite European " quality could be seen by the motto of the upcoming EU enlargement "Return to Europe ." This phrase refers to the accession of ten CEECS, including Poland, scheduled for 2004. With the word "return," it is clear that the underlying meaning is that for a time, Po land and the other CEECs had been "gone" from Europe. This phrase also encapsulates the idea that in at least before the Cold War, Poland and the other CEECs had been part of "Europe" and that they will once again be a part of "Europe."

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94 CHAPTER 9 GERMAN MEDIA, TURKEY AND POLAND These present-day representations of Eur opean discourse on the various candidate countries, naturally affect the EU membersh ip discourse. Just as with the broader European discourse, EU membership discourse has represented Turkey as “other” and “un-European” and countries like Poland as "l ike" and "European." As mentioned before, looking at how Germany’s media has portrayed Turkey and the CEECs in recent years is an excellent case study for looking at the discourse of EU membership. In fact, one must take German opinion into ac count when understanding and predicting developments in the EU accessi on process. Germany is one of the three "economic and political heavyweights" in th e Union (the other tw o being Great Britain and France) (Baier, 1994: 180). Like Great Br itain and France, Germany has had and will continue to have many more votes in th e Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, two of the three institutions th at decide who will join the EU and who will not. As Baier points out regarding Germany, Great Britain and France: "Their policy decisions regarding Turkey will likely have strong impact on the other small states [in the EU]" (Baier, 1994: 180). This is echoed by pol itical scientist Chri stina Wood who argues that because of its economic and political weight in the Union, many EU members are "sympathetic" to Germany's position on Turkish membership (Wood, 1999: 115). Germany's power in shaping the course of EU enlargement is apparent when one considers that Germany's opposition to Turkish EU membership is and has been "a major obstacle to Ankara's Europeanization polic ies" (Baier, 1994: 189). Germany's ability to

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95 "slow Turkish entry into the EU" is reflected by former Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's belief that Germany was "the mo st important obstacle to Turkey's EU membership" (Baier, 194: 186; Bozdagliogl u, 2001: 113).). At the same time, Yilmaz stated that "Germany is trying hard for East ern Europeans' membership [EU membership] . . ." (Bozdaglioglu, 2001: 113). Yilmaz's view of German hostility to Turkish entry into the EU is reflected by the argument of Wood w ho states that Germany is one of the "two most important gate-keepers to clos er ties to the EU" (Wood, 1999: 115). One may ask why the media is a relevant place to look for the discourse on the candidate countries. Certainly novels, scholar ly books and journals, travelogues, and political tracts were the most widely used sources for in formation on other countries by both the general public and political offici als in the pre-20the century period. Said demonstrates this insightfully in his Orientalism book. However, it is common knowledge that in the post WWII era, people in most countries get their information from television (news programs, travel programs, et c), newspapers, and news magazines. This argument is reflected by the recent Eurobarome ter survey results in which Germans were asked where they got their general news info rmation and where they got their information about the EU. Generally, Germans used te levision, radio, and newspapers to get information. In terms of getting informati on about the EU in particular, the most frequently used sources were television (69%), newspapers (51%), radio (33%), conversations with friends, etc., (19%) and weekly news magazines (16%)(EU, 19992002). Therefore any one of these mediums woul d be important in shaping public opinion and the opinions of political leaders. While it is obvious that the opinions of political leaders matter in the developments of EU enla rgement, it may be not so obvious that the

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96 opinions of the public also matter. But public opinion does matter. The general public affects enlargement through elections (electi ng proenlargement or anti-enlargement leaders, electing leaders who ar e for/against a particular EU candidate state, etc.) as well as through other means. As White et al. point out: Public attitudes will be decisive [[regardi ng the process of enlargement], wherever the issue is put to a referendum; and they underpin all aspects of enlargement, from choices in election campaigns to goods in shops, from population movements to service in the armed forces in pursuance of a European security and defense policy (White et al., 2002: 136). However, I am limited by the sources I can use in determining which views, ideas, themes, pieces of information, etc. have b een presented to the public via the three important mediums mentioned earlier. The ar chives of German television programs are practically impossible to obtai n, particularly here in the United States. Thus, the only available sources for the purposes of this pa per are newspapers and newsmagazines. I am also limited by time and resources in terms of looking at the German media's representations of the various EU candidate st ates. While it would be most informative to examine how Turkey and all of the CEECs are represented in the German media, clearly it would take too much time to look at all thirteen countries. No t only is looking at Turkey vis a vis one of the CEECs more feasible, but it also allows for a more in-depth study. The CEEC used should be the country most similar to Turkey in terms of size, ties to Germany, etc to provide a balanced comparative study. A CEEC candidate country that does not have close ties with Germa ny, such as Romania, would invalidate the comparison as one could argue that the str ong amount of familiarity with one candidate state (Turkey) and the lack of familiarity with the other (Romania) would significantly bias the results of the compar ison. Of all of the CEECs, Pola nd is the country that best fits these parameters. Both Turkey and Pola nd have large populati ons and are large in

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97 land area. More importantly, bot h countries have had a clos e relationship with Germany in the last 60 or so years. Turkey’s relationship with Germany began in the early 1960’s. After World War II, Germany began to rebuild its economy and, by the 1970’s, the process was so successful that it was named the “Wirtschaftswunder” or “economic miracle.” In the midst of this development, Germany ran out of able-bodied male workers and ha d to recruit workers from Italy to be able to sustain the econo mic growth. But even these workers were not enough; therefore Germany in 1961 signed a labo r treaty with Turkey to recruit more workers (Chin, 2002: 46-47). By 1973, the number of Turks in Germany reached 893,000 (Chin, 2002: 55). Today the number is 2,423,047, which represents 70% of the Turkish population in Europe (Ogleman et al., 2002: 3). This number makes them the largest minority in Germany today (Ogleman et al., 2002: 3). The significant number of Turks makes them importantly politically, sociall y, and economically in Germany (Ogleman et al., 2002: 1-3). When one adds that 25% of Turkey’s exports go to Germany, and 15% of Germany’s exports go to Turkey, it is clear that Turkey and Germany have had an important and close relationship for th e last forty years (Baier, 1999: 189). Poland’s history with Germany dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries when much of what is today Poland was part of the Prussian Empire and the German Confederation (Orlow, 1995: Chapter 1). However, it is the last 60 years that has been the most influential in its relationship to Germany. Germany conquered Poland in WW II, seeking to reclaim the former German te rritory that was lost after WWI (Orlow, 1995:107-210). After World War II, many Germ an-Poles fled to West Germany and were part of the first influx of workers n ecessary for Germany to rebuild (Chin, 2002: 50-

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98 51). Despite the majority of German-Poles ha ving left Poland after the war, a substantial minority remained (Czapliniski, 1992: 163-173) . From the 1950Â’s to the 1990Â’s, there was a series of treaties be tween the two countries. The most important was the 1991 Treaty on Good Neighborhoodliness and Friend ly Cooperation, which stated that Germany and Poland would work together at the social level th rough direct contact between the populations of the two countries and the development of cultural relations, as well as in internationa l security matters through regular interaction betwee n the countries prime ministers and foreign mini sters. Germany also stated in the Treaty that it supported the accession of Poland into the EU (C zapliniski, 1992: 167-168). This treaty had, in essence, cemented the close relationship that had existed between the two countries for decades. The strong relationship between Germany and each of the two states make them ideal case studies in comparing GermanyÂ’s pe rspectives and representations of Turkey and a state from Central a nd Eastern Europe (Poland). Moreover, Turkey and Poland share similar characteristics. Both countri es have large popula tions, and are large landmasses. These factors make them an ex cellent pair for comparing GermanyÂ’s view and discourse of Turkey versus Europe. In looking at the discourse on Turkey and Poland in the German newspapers, I used the following three newspapers: Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Die Tagezeitung ( TAZ ) , and Die Sueddeutsche Zeitung (SD) . Each of these newspapers represents a different part of the political spectrum, with FAZ on the right, TAZ on the left, and SD on the center. Moreover, each newspape r is the most important newspaper for their prospective audience. These three newspapers had the best archives, particularly

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99 FAZ, which made them a more useful source for this study than other German newspapers. I must also mention that ther e were more articles on Poland and Turkey from FAZ than from any of the ot hers. This is a result of FAZ being a more substantive or "thicker" newspaper. There are simply many more pages and articles in FAZ than any of the others. This factor is likely one reason why FAZ is generally considered to be the most important newspaper in Germany. I will also use the two of the more well known and important news magazines, Der Spiegel and Focus Magazin . As with the newspapers, these selections represent a different part of the political spectrum, with Der Spiegel on the left and Focus Magazin on the right. There were generally mo re articles about both countries in Der Spiegel than in Focus Magazin , as the former is a much more substantive magazine publication, like FAZ is among newspapers. However, Der Spiegel 's archives only went back to 1999, which limited the number of articles availabl e. I also could not find any articles on Turkey in Focus Magazin in the year 1995, which is one reason why there were fewer articles on Turkey compared to Poland in the 1995 period. Most of the articles that fo cused on either Turkey or Poland and that I was able to access tended to be simple fact-reporting meaning, that there was no commentary, analysis, or presentation of ideas or concepts. Moreover, many of these fact-articles were quite short (only a few lines). One could argue that the choice of which facts to report in itself adds to the propagation of various repr esentations and percepti ons of a country or people. However, for brevity's sake, I am anal yzing those articles that were 'deeper' and had clear opinions or more of an analytic ap proach. I must also mention that there were more of these types of articles on Turkey than on Poland. I can only assume the reason

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100 for this discrepancy is due to the tendency to speak louder and more frequently against something than for something. As will be show n later in this section, Turkey tended to draw arguments against its membership and Poland for its membership. I must also mention the political life of Germany. In many of these articles, especially in the 2002 period ar ticles, the journalists featur e German political leaders. These leaders comment on Turkey and Pola nd, and sometimes, make arguments for or against Turkey's or Poland's EU membersh ip. The two largest and most important political parties in Germany are the Christ ian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The CDU is a pa rty on the right, while the SPD is a party on the left. For many years until 1998, the CDU was the ruling party. Since 1998, the SPD has been the ruling party, led by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Recent polls, however, have indicated that the CDU now are favored by 51% of the German citizenry, according to a recent opinion poll (Agence France-Pres se, 2003). Such a high figure is rare in Germany's multi-party system. The CDU has consistently argued against Turkish accession into the EU and this stance is reflected in the print media ar ound time of the December 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit. Some important members of the CDU th at are represented in the articles, either by reference or direct quotation, include former Chancellor Kohl, Wolfgang Schaueble (current head of the CDU), Ed mond Stoiber (current head of the CSU, a Bavarian sisterparty to the CDU), and Michael Glos (forme r head of the CSU). Leaders from other political parties, including the SPD, have al so advocated to exclude Turkey from EU membership. These include SPD member and former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, HansGert Poettering (the current leader of th e conservative EPP faction in the European

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101 Parliament), and Frank-Michael Bauer (hea d of a major Hamburg political party, the Schill Party). However, not all German poli tical leaders are against Turkish accession. The current German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroe der (SPD), has consistently been in favor of Turkish accession. Poland is a different story. Generally, most German political leaders, from both ends of the political spectrum, have been in favor of Poland's accession into the EU. One can see this tendency in the articles on Poland during these time periods, where former Chancellor K ohl (CDU), current Chancellor Schroeder (SPD), former German President Roman He rzog (CDU), and current German President Johannes Rau (SPD) are quoted as being stau nch supporters of Poland's entry into the EU. Turkey I have chosen three years that each have an important date in recent Turkish history and/or EU history, to ensure high coverage of Turkey in German newspapers. One is the year of November 1994 to October 1995, which surrounds the March 6th, 1995 Customs Union Treaty between Turkey and the EU. Anot her is the year of April 1998 to March 1999, which includes February 16, 1999, the date of OcalanÂ’s (the leader of the PKK) capture. Lastly, IÂ’m using the year of Ma y 2002 to April 2003, which includes the Dec.12 to Dec. 13th EU Copenhagen Summit in wh ich Turkey was given a only quasi-date for accession talks in 2004. With all of these time periods, I will be looking not only at how the journalists themselves represent Turk ey, but also how German political leaders represent Turkey in their disc ourse through the print media. It must be noted that there was great variation in the y ears in the amount of reporting on Turkey. There were more articles in the late 2002/early 2003 period th an the late 1994/early 1995 period and the late 1998/early 2000 period. This discrepancy is a result of both the relative relation to

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102 EU developments and the importance of the event for Germans. Obviously, while Ocalan's capture was important for Turkey, it was likely not as important to the average German. The Customs Union was only an econo mic trade treaty between Turkey and the EU. However, the 2002 Copenhagen Summit centered around full EU membership developments, and included discussions be tween Turkey and th e EU concerning EU membership. These discussions were a more important event for Germans than the other two events chosen, as many Germans are anxious about Turkish accession. Some Germans think Germany would be inundated wi th an influx of Turkish immigrants if Turkey gained EU accession. Other Germans th ink Turkey could not integrate into the EU because of perceived cultural differen ces (Baier, 1994: 185-190; Bozdaglioglu, 2001: 126-151). Many German political and economic leaders also fear the power Turkey would have in the EU institutions because of its population (Baier, 1994: 185-190). This would explain the tendency for German politic al leaders to present Turkey as not deserving EU membership. The themes that appeared throughout the discourse on Turkey in the German newspapers and newsmagazines were those themes that have been a part of the European discourse on Turkey for centuries. There were six themes in the German media regarding Turkey in these time periods: The theme of Turkey as backwards, inferior, or barbaric The theme of Turkey as despotic The theme of Islam as a threat to Europe or the EU The theme of Turks or Muslims as hordes, ready to engulf Europe. The theme of Turkey as exotic or strange The theme of Turkey as inherently “not European” There were two themes that appeared in the commentative or analytical articles on Turkey in the 1995 period: the theme of Turkey as barbaric or backwards (part of the

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103 general theme of Turkey or the Orient as infe rior to Europe) and the theme of Turkey as despotic. Both themes date back to the 18t h century in the Orient alist discourse. These themes were likely present in the German print media in this time period due to the continuation of PKK terrorist activities in Germany, as well as Turkey. Those PKK supporters who had emigrated from Turkey to Germany had in the early to mid 1990's caused many problems in Germany (Gunter, 1997) .In fact in 1993, the PKK and its front organizations were banned from Germany. Around this same time period, Ocalan began to threaten Germany in an attempt to st op funding for the Turkish government (Gunter, 1997). The PKK activity, both in Germany and in Turkey, did not subside until 1999 when Ocalan was captured. Also, Kurds in Germany who were not necessarily PKK supporters but still public advo cates of Kurdish separatism, inundated the German media with their views on the Turkis h state and their stories of Turkish oppression throughout the 1990's. Germany's sympathy for the Kurds reached a high point in 1995 after Turkish forces attacked PKK militants in north ern Iraq (Gunter, 1997). Many European journalists, including German one s, greatly critici zed Turkey for these actions, as they believed Turkey was attacking Kurdish civilians rather than terrori sts (Gunter, 1997:19). These aspects of German society aro und this time period likely influenced Germans' view of Turkey as a generally ba rbaric and despotic country. For example, consider a Sueddeutsche Zeitung article by the journalist Chimelli who described the Kurdish area in Turkey after a trip there. He portrayed this area as being controlled by feudal style Kurdish landowners, who have guards and money provided to them by the Turkish government. Nothing in this area ca n occur without the permission of these landowners (Chimelli, 1995). Perhaps a little more extreme, Faller, TAZ journalist calls

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104 Turkey in the title of her article “Folterlan d” (Tortureland), which clearly paints a broad representation of Turkey as a land of to rture for everyone (Fal ker, 1995). In 1999, the major themes that appeared in the German print media on Turkey were again the theme of Turkish despotism, as we ll as the theme of Turkey as exotic. The theme of Turkish despotism remained in the German print media due to the capture of Ocalan in February of 1999. As mentione d before, Germany and Turkey had been dealing with PKK terrorism for some years be fore Ocalan was finally captured and the terrorism abated. As mentioned before, desp ite the violence of the PKK, many Germans sympathized with the Kurds' fight for independence from Turkey. The large Kurdish immigrant population had been deluging Germ an society and media with stories of Turkish oppression for years. Therefore, the opinion/analytical ar ticles of the 1999 period that focused on Turkey tended to portray the Turkish government as brutal and intoxicated with power, both curr ently (then 1995) and in descriptions of past events. Consider the FAZ travel article by Marc Siemons in which modern Turkey is described as based on a “radical laicism” and “authoritarianism of politics and the military" (Siemons, 1998). Siemons further desc ribes the Turkish political system as one that mercilessly destroyed pre-1920’s traditi ons like the “mystical De rvish order” and has restricted public displays of religion (S iemons, 1998). This representation of an “authoritarian” Turkey echoes the centuries ol d portrayal of Turkey/Ottoman Empire as despotic. Siemons also brings the theme of Tu rkish exoticism into his travel article when describing the Turkish city Sanliurfa as “like a bazaar” with “bedlam” that is “impenetrable“(Siemons, 1998). This image of a chaotic bazaar is no t only clearly meant be bring up a sense of the exotic, but also one of disorder. Turkey is chaotic, which

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105 contrasts to the writerÂ’s familiarity with order in Europe. Moreover, the image of a chaotic bazaar reinforces the connection the journalist makes between today's Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. One may question whether the travel section is important in the formation of views and as a source of information for most Germans. I argue that it is just as important as the political sections of the print media, as it does influence the public 's perspective of a country through detailed descri ptions and brief political commentaries of the country. From my experience as a teacher in German, I know that many Germans travel outside of Germany, particularly to Turkey, which makes th e travel section a frequently read section of the newspaper. The theme of Turkish despotism was likewise seen in the political sections of the print media in the month right after Ocal an's capture, which again shows how the PKK/Kurdish separatist movement influenced the German media. Two journalists for Der Spiegel , Udo Ludwig and Georg Mascolo, argue that The Caliph of Cologne, Metin Kaplan, was using the asylum laws in Germ any because in his home country of Turkey "he is threatened with political persecuti on and even the death penalty"(Ludwig and Mascolo, 1999). Such a descri ption understates Kaplan's ro le as the leader of a fundamentalist group and terrorist organization and murderer of a man who was his rival (he was arrested in Germany shortly befo re the appearance of this article) (BBC, Associated Press, 1999). Political persecuti on usually is against someone who is only politically active and who has only sought to exercise the rights of free speech, etc. Someone like Kaplan who has committed murd er and sponsored terrorism is not just politically active and exercising free speech.

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106 Der Speigel journalist Bernhard Zand likewise po rtrays Turkey as despotic in the month after Ocalan's capture. He writes that th e Turkey's capture of Ocalan "puts Turkey in a power-trip" and a "nati onal hysteria" (Bernhard, 1999). Th is presents the image of Turks as being intoxicated with power in addi tion to being irrationa l (having "hysteria"). The references to Turks as power-hungry a nd irrational re-presents the centuries old European notion of Turks or Orientals being na turally despotic and incapable of rational or intellectual thought and hence incapable of forming a democratic society and political system. Put in this light, Turkey is presented as not belonging to the EU, since it is not truly democratic. In the 2002 period, most of the commentativ e or analytical articles were in November and December of 2002. This is a result of the Copenhagen Summit in midDecember of 2002, which was very meaningful to all EU citizens, particularly Germans. Final negotiations were done with the 2004 acces sion states and Turkey and EU officials had their most serious discussion yet re garding Turkish membership. Even though Turkey was only given a quasi-date for talks about accession, many Germans began to fear an eventual Turkish accession. As mentioned before, many Germans feared Turkish membership because of the likely influx of more Turkish immigrants (Baier, 1994: 185186). Therefore, many journalists reflected a nd reinforced both public opinion on Turkey and the views of German political leader s that Turkey should not be given EU membership. They accomplished this by portraying Turkey as not "European" and as not deserving EU membership. One can classify th ese portrayals by themes. In general, there were five themes that can be pointed out here: The theme of Turkey as backwards/barbaric/inferior The theme of Islam as a threat to Europe

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107 The theme of Turkey as exotic or strange The theme of Muslims or Orientals being in masses or hordes The theme of Turkey as "non-European" The first theme is clear when one looks at a travel article by FAZ journalist Andreas Kilb. He describes Turkey mainly in terms of its past, so that Turkey is seen as static. Generally only images of an ancient, pre-m odern, and rustic Turkey are presented to the reader. Kilb writes of seeing a “shepherd” who was walking over “the dried-up, rustycolored plain” with his goats (Kilb , 2002). Here Turkey is represented as very rustic and not modern. This representation continues th roughout the article as Kilb mainly only points out “antique buildings” and “ruins,” as if Turkey is only a museum for ancient relics (Kilb , 2002). These images of an old land are reinforced by the continual recitation of Turkey’s history from centuries ago, whic h are interrupted only by the appearance of ruins of various ancient ci ties and the rare appearance of something modern. These rare modern appearance s are the tall tourist hotels that were built on the coast during the tourist boom. They are described ne gatively as “Bettenburgen des heutigen Tourismus,” which literally means “bed-castle s for today’s tourism.” A “bed-castle” in German is a negative reference to unsightly hi gh-rise hotels like those one might find in rapidly overdeveloped tourist ar eas. The writer goes on to de scribe these structures as filling the coastline with “savings nests made of stone like a pockmarked face with scars” (Kilb , 2002). Thus, even when Turkey tries to be modern, it fails, leavi ng its ancient past as the only thing of worth. This image of Turkey as unable to progress or be modern is reflected by Hoeffe of the FAZ, who describes today’s political system in Turkey as being based on “Sippen-

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108 und Klientelmentalitaet” (kinship mentality), which again brings forth the image of a backwards, pre-modern Turkey (Hoeffe , 2002). Not only is Turkey represented as backwa rd and unable to progress, but also as inferior to Europe, which like th e other aspects of this first theme, is centuries old. In a December TAZ article, Frank-Michael Bauer, the l eader of a major Hamburg political party, the Schill Party, argues that Turkey s hould not be given EU membership, as the “quality of Turkish EU-citizens” is not in any way comparable with the quality of the “French, Danish, Dutch, and the Greek” citizens ( TAZ , 2002). With this statement, Turks are presented as inferior to Europeans, a them e that harkens to the earlier representations of Turkey/Ottoman Empire. In the article, Baue r also brings forth the theme of Islam as a threat to Europe and therefore gives another reason why Turkey should not be let into the Union. For example, Bauer states that Islam is “not a peaceful religi on” and later that the members of his party view their votes as a step to effectivel y counteract a “creeping Islamization of Europe under the guise of an EU accession” ( TAZ , 2002). This “creeping Islamization of Europe” immediately connects to the European’s long-held memory of the Islam enemy of the Crusades and the Otto man threat at the gates of Vienna in the 17th century. This theme of Turkey as inferior to Eu rope and thus not be longing in the EU is reiterated by Hans-Gert Poettering, the lead er of the conservative EPP-faction in the European Parliament, in a December Focus Magazin article. He states that Turkey is a “Sorgenkind” (problem child) vis a vis Europe and "does not fit at all in the over fifty years of integration of post World War II Europe" ( Focus Magazin, 2002). The term

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109 "Sorgenkind" is an importan t use of words as it has th e connotation in the German language of being in an inferior position. The writer of this article brings forth the theme of Turkey as not European when he describes the lack of accessi on negotiations between the EU and Turkey with the image of the Orient. He states: "The Orient Express still has not left for Europe" ( Focus Magazin , 2002). Here it puts Turkey in the cate gory of the Orient, a term which has the implications of an "other" oppos ite to Europe (the Occident), as pointed out by Said in Orientalism . The journalist also presents the them e of Islamic Turkey as a threat to Europe through a blatant allusi on to the Crusades. He stat es that: “99.8% of Turkey believes in Islam, a religion which has been bound to Christendom (old Europe) in a centuries old feud” ( Focus Magazin , 2002). The writer uses this basis, as well as Turkey's "higher birth rate," (the theme of Muslim s or Orientals being in hordes or great populations), for his argument of why Turk ey should not be invited into the EU. The unnamed writer of a FAZ October article presents the image of Turkey as barbaric in order to show why Turkey should not be in the EU. He stat es that “great parts of the [Turkish] state apparatus and the citi zenry are distant from occidental democracy and the rules of civilization” ( FAZ , 2002a). Here, the commentator not only states that Turkey is basically undemocra tic and uncivilized, but uses the term “occidental” which refers back to the Orient a nd Occident dichotomy of Orient alist discourse that has been around since the 18th century. The writer goes on to counter an argument that an unnamed German politician made to let Turkey into the EU, and, in doing so, reveals the themes of Islam as a threat and of Turkey as inferior and barbaric. Th e politician argued that Turkey should be let

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110 into the EU to protect Turkey from Islami sts taking over its political system. The writer then questions this argument, saying that EU accession may not be able to prevent that from happening, but that EU accession would allow for the Islamists to “move freely in the EU”( FAZ , 2002a). In addition, the commentator st ates that this pol itician would not want to have to deal with th e “inner fights of Turkey at the expense of Germany and the EU”( FAZ , 2002a). This portrays a Turkey having in ternal crises due to Islamists as an inevitable occurrence. He re, the idea of Muslims moving freely around Europe is presented as something that is both undesi rable and dangerous. In addition, Turkey is portrayed as unstable and barbar ic, full of internal turmoil a nd chaos, and thus, not ready to enter the Union. The theme of Turkey being inferior vis a vis Europe is reiterated repeatedly through the German print media in December through the argument that the EU should have a “special relationship” or “pri vileged partnership” with Turk ey rather than give Turkey full EU membership ( Sueddeutsche Zeitung , 2002b; Feldmeyer, 2002; Winkler, 2002; Schwarz, 2002; Der Spiegel , 2002a). This reinforces the idea that Turkey is not equal to the current Europe, hence the reason for gi ving it a sub-membership into the EU. The theme of Islam as a threat to Europe was seen in many late 2002 articles. For instance, Ralfe Best e et al., in their Der Spiegel article "Where does Europe end" feature the German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler who argues that Turkey should not be a part of the EU because of the hundreds of years of wars between the Otto man Empire and the European Occident (Beste et al., 2002). With this argument, Ulrich brings forth the image of Orient and Occident, which have the impli cations of Europe as civilization and Turkey as a barbaric and threatening "other," as shown by Said in Orientalism . It also brings

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111 forth the idea of Islam as threatening to Europe, as was viewed throughout the 15-19th century, the time of the Ottoman Empire. The writers later reinforce this idea of Islam as a threat by connecting this theme with the them e of Muslims or Orientals being in hordes, as shown when they paraphrase Ulrich's argu ment in the following statement: "After an accession [of Turkey] of ninety million Turk s in 2013, there would be more Muslims than Protestants in the EU" (Beste et al., 2002). Ulrich argues that these factors would make the EU's accession of Turkey a "willful de struction of Europe" (Beste et al., 2002) The writers themselves similarly argue that Turkey should not be let in to the EU due to its large population of Muslim s, as seen when they state: The admission of Turkey this much is true would fundamentally change the present power structure in the Union. If one calculates the current growth of population, Turkey would be by an accessi on in 2013, with ninety million people, possibly the largest state in the Community with all the consequences resulting from the distribution of influence and m oney in Brussels (Beste et al., 2002). Through this portrayal of a future Turkey, the authors juxtapose the themes of Islam as a threat and Muslims or Orientals being in large masses. They also add a more political dimension to their argument by presenting an influential Turkey in Brussels as dangerous. It is interesting that they do not say why Turkey possibly having much influence and wealth in Brussels afte r accession would be so dangerous. The journalists later connect the theme of Is lam as a threat to the theme of Turkey as strange or exotic to Europeans in order to strengthen their argument of why Turkey should be denied membership. They write th at the "sheer masses of the newcomer [Turkey] strengthens the diffuse feeling of the threat of a strange culture, a notion which certainly was not there with the accession of Orthodox Greece" (Beste et al., 2002). They clearly present a Christian stat e (Greece) as "like" other Eu ropean states and a Muslim state (Turkey) as "different" from European states. They also show the theme of Turkey

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112 as politically and socially backwards when th ey refer to Turkey as being an "unstable democracy" and as having a society that "i s not yet mature" (Beste et al., 2002). This statement is ironic considering the peaceful transitions of power through fair and free elections, something that was not always car ried out in the CEECs during the post Cold War period. The theme of Turkey as exotic is clearl y a part of the May travel article on the Turkish city Ilca by FAZ journalist Peter Hahn. Ilca is a place where one must “absolutely force oneself in this place to prevail over its indolence. Now and then, one must pull oneself together and “travel to Tu rkey” so that the stay in Ilca does not only turn out to be just another stay in a similar hotel as in so many countries”(Hahn, 2002). His argument that one must travel outside of Ilca to "t ravel to Turkey" suggests that he does not consider this modern Turkish city to be th e “real Turkey,” which he implies is very different from what Europeans usually see wh en they travel through Europe. To see the “real Turkey,” one must tr avel outside of Ilca. FAZ journalist Harold Staun in his November evokes the memory of the Ottoman invasion through his argument that the Ottoman invasi on of Europe has already happened, as seen by the “Durchdoenerisierung” (doener-ization) of the inner cities of Europe (Staun, 2002). The doener is a Turkis h fast-food item that is sold throughout Germany, and other parts of Europe, by Turks w ho immigrated there. It is a food that is cheap, unhealthy, and associated with the poorer immigrants from Turkey. Such an image of European cities being turned into “doe ner cities” by incoming Turks is certainly not meant to invoke favorable feelings, but rather it is meant to invoke th e newest form of an Ottoman or Turkish invasion.

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113 The theme of Turkish despotism can be seen in Heinrich Winkler's Focus Magazin article. He presents Turkey's political system as authoritarian and undemocratic, as seen in when he states: "Turkey has in the past century carried out through the use of force a kind of forced secularization . . .Turkey th erefore has not become a western democracy despite all of the reforms" (Winkler, 2002b) . This commentary echoes those arguments made by European Orientalist writers who presented Turks and other Orientals as inherently despotic and unable to achieve a democratic society and political system (Said, 1979). He also reveals the theme of Turkey la cking the quality of being "European." He asks the question "Does Turkey fit into the European Union?" and answers with "No." He later argues that "If Europe outgrows itself essentially, the EU can no longer appeal to a European We-ness" (Winkler, 2002b) Through hi s portrayal of Turkey as despotic and essentially "un-European," Winkler seeks to make a case for why Turkey should not be let into the EU. An anonymous Der Spiegel journalist presents Turkey similarly in a December 2002 article. The writer portrays Turkey as aggressive in it s attempts to get an EU accession date, as seen in the quote by CDU-Eu rope Representative Elmar Brok: "Turks wanted to gain entrance into the Club with their shotgun cocked and failed" ( Der Spiegel , 2002b). The image of Turks trying to force th eir way in with "their shotgun cocked" evokes images of warlike and violent Tu rks, which echoes the theme of Turkish despotism. Der Spiegel journalists Sylvia Schreiber and Bernhard Zand feature in their November article EU Commission Guenter Verh eugen, whom they describe as believing that "no EU Member state knows how to d eal with a police state on the Bosporous

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114 signified by Islam and the military" (Schrieb er and Zand, 2002). Later in the article the journalists use a statement Prodi made confiden tially to the head of one of the German Lands: "A multitude of European states woul d not ratify an accession [with Turkey] right now" (Schrieber and Zand, 2002). Through these statements, the writers portray Turkey as a despotic country and a country not wanted in the EU. The theme of Muslims or Orientals in larg e hordes ready to e nvelop and/or burden Europe is reiterated throughout the print media in the last two months of 2002. For example, Willy Passet in his FAZ article “The EU does not need Turkey” states that the EU has already accepted millions of Turks, particularly in Germany, and that these millions of Turks all came with “empty hands and initially immigrated into the social system before they could take a part in th e workforce. A consider able portion of them continues to live that way at the expense of the German people” (Passet, 2002). In many articles by the German print media in 2002, the journalists mention Turkey’s population of 66/80 million inhabitants (the number differs with news sources), which continually reinforces the images of hordes of Turks “invading” the European economies and social systems (Hermann, 2002; Passet, 2002; Beste et al., 2002; Focus Magazin, 2002; Der Spiegel , 2002a; Bolesch, 2002). Many journalists also mention that Turkey would be able to have as many votes in the EU institutions as Germany, France, Great Br itain, or Italy, as if to say that a Turkey equal in political power to the ‘core’ EU states would be not only undesirable, but dangerous. For example, in a December article of Der Spiegel the former Chancellor Schmidt not only “warns” Germany and th e EU of Turkey’s population and the immigration of Turks into the EU countries, but adds that Germany’s population of Turks

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115 will “soon double,” meaning that Germany should especially fear Turkey’s accession into the EU ( Der Spiegel , 2002c). The theme of Turkey as inherently “nonEuropean" can be seen in the December article by TAZ journalist Patrik Schwartz. In this article, Michael Glos, who is the head of the German CSU party, states: “Turkey doe s not belong to the European cultural sphere“(Schwarz , 2002). Around the same time, FAZ journalist Karl Feldmeyer describes a meeting that occurred in 1997 between the Ch airmen of European Parties, after which the then Belgian Prime Minster Martens said th at all of those present “were in agreement that Turkey could not become a candidate for EU membership, because it was not part of the European sphere of culture, and would th erefore make the development of a European identity impossible” (Feldmeyer, 2002). Feldmeyer goes on to say that former Chancellor Kohl, who was present at the meeting, never denied or confirmed this (Feldmeyer, 2002). It is also important to note that Kohl did say something sim ilar to what was said at that meeting, when he spoke to the German pre ss during that year. For example, in a 1997 Der Spiegel article that featured K ohl, Kohl states that “fro m geography class [I] do not recall that Anatolia is a part of Europe”( Spiegel , 1997). Anatolia (Anatolien in German) is a name for Turkey that has ne gative connotations in German. In a FAZ article by Marc Siemons, Wolfga ng Schaeuble, who is the head of the CDU party in Germany, states that Turkey doe s not share in the “his torical experiences” of Europe (Siemons, 2002).Schaueble pos its a similar argument against Turkish accession in the December article by Sueddeustche Zeitung journalist Nico Fried. He states: "As a whole, it [Turkey] is not a part of Europe" (Fried, 2002) . In both articles,

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116 this important German politician argues that because of its "non-European-ness," Turkey should not be accepted into the Union. Edmund Stoiber, who is head of the CSU, the Bavarian sister-party of the CDU, states in a December Sueddeustche Zeitung article and a December Der Spiegel article that the accession of Turkey into the EU w ould be “the end of the political union of Europe” ( Sueddeustche Zeitung , 2002b; Der Spiegel , 2002a). In this same Der Spiegel article, Stoiber goes on to say according to the unnamed journalist that Turkey "has a different historical and cultural background th an the current accession candidates. Turkey is not a part of the value community of Europe" ( Der Spiegel , 2002a). In both the Sueddeutsche Zeitung article and the Der Spiegel article, Stoiber makes it clear that he believes Turkey should no be a part of the EU because of its lack of "European-ness." If Turkey is accepted into the Union, he ar gues, then the Union will be destroyed. FAZ journalist Heinrich Winkler in his December commentary states a similar sentiment, namely that “ . . . the cultural imprintings of Turkey and Europe [are] too different” and later that if Turkey acceded in to the EU “ . . . The European idea would be dead” (Winkler, 2002a). Thus, Turkey is pres ented not only as bei ng “different” from Europe, but also that letting Turkey in would actually destroy Europe. It is also important to note the commen ts of Valery Giscard d'Estaing in the German media during the 2002 period. He is not only a former French President, but also the current head of the European Conventi on, which is an EU body that was founded in February of 2002 (European Movement, 2003). Its objectives are to analyze problems and developments in the EU concerning all th e major issue areas, from the competencies of the EU, to economic governance, to security and defense. It will then prepare and

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117 present its policy recommendations to the European Council in June of 2003 (European Movement, 2003). Certainly it is relevant to analyze the public stance of the head of such an important political body within the EU. In several countries around the world, including Germany, Giscard's views on enlargement have been publicized in the print media. For example, Sueddeutsche Zeitung journalist Cornelia Bo lesch features Giscard in her November 2002 article, in which he states that Turkey's accession into the EU would "be the death of the European Union" (Bolesch, 2002). Bolesch later writes that Giscard believes that Turkey "is not a Eur opean country" (Bolesch, 2002). Not only does Giscard put Turkey in the “ non-European” category, but also says that Turkey is so dangerous/inferior that letting Turkey in would actually destroy it politically. It is also important to also examine the official discourse of EU officials throughout 1995-2003, which is a significant time period due to the prominence of the issue of EU enlargement. EU documents and speeches are available online to the EU public, including in Germany, and thus, are an important source for information on EU enlargement. The speeches and documents by the EU Commission are particularly important. The EU Commission plays a crucial ro le in the EU enlargement process, as it is the main body that reviews the candida tes on whether they meet the Copenhagen Criteria or not. Thus, other EU officials ta ke the opinions of th e Commission concerning enlargement and the candidate countries very seriously. The two most important Commissioners in the enlargement process are the Commission President, currently Romano Prodi, and the Commissioner in charge of Enlargement, currently Guenter Verheugen. Many of the themes from the Germ an media are present in the speeches and documents of these Commissioners in the 1995-2003 period: the th eme of Turkey as

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118 inferior vis a vis Europe, the theme of Turkey bein g controlled by Europe, and the theme of Turkey as "non-European." Consider the following excerpt from a speech by Commissioner Verheugen, at Den Haag in November of 1999: I have said in the European Parliament that, were there no history to the Union’s relations with Turkey, we could consider a completely different strategy. We could, for example, form a highly developed asso ciation with Turkey ... History, however, precludes this option. If we deprive Turkey of the prospect of accession, we will be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in the country. Then the question might become: “Who lost Turkey?” (Verheugen, 1999). Here, Turkey is presented as doomed to have “things go wrong.” It is Europe that has the power to allow or prevent it from happening, not Turkey. This brings forth the theme of Turkey or Orient as being dominated by Europe and being regarded as inferior vis a vis Europe. Only Europe can bring success to Tu rkey. This sense of European domination or ownership of Turkey is reinforced by the image of Turkey being “lost” by Europe. The theme of ownership and “finding” the Orient dates back to the Orientalist literature, where the Orient was only “real” after bei ng “found” and then represented by Europeans (Said, 1979). Both Verheugen and Commission Presiden t Prodi have presented Turkey as "different" from other applicant countries in their speeches from the last four years. For example, in one speech, Verheugen states Turk ey is: “unique because of its cultural and historical heritage, as well as its people”(Verheugen, 2001b). Again, Turkey is presented as not having the same cultural heritage or history as Europe, such that the Turkish citizens would not be compatible with Europ eans. Turkey’s “uniqueness” or “specialness” is reiterated over and ove r in the discourse of EU offi cials. In another Verheugen speech, Turkey’s relation with the EU is “exceptional” (Verheugen, 2001a). In a speech

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119 by Commission President Romano Prodi, Turkey “calls for special treatment” (Prodi, 1999). It is clear that for many in the EU, Turkey is not “European,” and thus must be treated “differently.” These ideas are supported by the EU’s treatment of Turkey vis a vis the CEECs: Turkey was not invited to appl y, where as the CEECs were; the CEECs were invited to attend and engage in regular meeti ngs regularly in the various EU institutions far in advance of accession, whereas Turkey was not; the CEECs have all started EU accession negotiations (some have finished), whereas Turkey has not; and the CEECs were given an accession date, whereas Turk ey was not (Avery and Cameron, 2001: 1719; Park, 2000: 323). It is clear from the discou rse in the German print media and among prominent EU officials, that the European Union’s identi ty or sense of “We-ness” is perceived in cultural, religious, and historical terms. This identity construction excludes Turkey, which has been represented as not ‘”suitabl e to Europe” because it shares “a different culture and civilizatio n” (Bozdaglioglu, 2001: 232). As long as the EU continues to define its “we-ness” in cultural/historical term s, Turkey will remain “other” and continue to face obstacles in its EU membership aspirations. Poland Poland, in comparison, has been regarded as “European” by both the German print media and European/EU leaders. Pola nd’s “European” character was pointed out through six main themes: Poland is part of Europe’s history/culture Poland joining the EU is inevitable Poland is a successful state Poland and Germany are “equals” Germany and Poland are compatible Poland in the EU would strengthen the EU.

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120 These themes were revealed through the repe ated use of images, such as Poland and Germany ‘building the European house togeth er’ or Poland ‘coming home.’ The former image represents Germany and Poland together leading Europe in the future, while the latter image shows that Poland already is perc eived as having been a part of Europe and was only divided from it by the Cold War. By presenting Poland in such a light, the German media can persuade German citizen s, German leaders, and perhaps other European citizens who read the German print media, that Poland ‘belongs’ in the EU and that Poland is a politically important state fo r both Germany and the EU as a whole. This contrasts greatly with the German media’s representations of Turkey, which portray Turkey as ‘not European,’ not a successful state, and not equal to Germany or other EU states. As with the analysis of Turkey, I have chosen three years for my analysis of Germany’s portrayal of Poland in the me dia: January 1995 to December 1995, March 1999 to December 2000, and May 2002 to April 2003. Each of these year-periods contains an important date or event in Pola nd's or the EU's history in which Poland would be covered. Romania applied for EU membership on June 22, 1995. This marked the middle point of all CEEC applications for EU membership, with some before in 1994 and some after in 1996. The entire two-year period of applications is one in which the future accession of the CEECs, including Poland, was publicly discussed in all EU countries. Using the middle year in this 1994-1996 period in sures the existence of great coverage of Poland the German media. Other important even ts that would insure the German media's coverage of Poland were Poland’s en try into NATO March 15, 1999 and Poland's October 2000 Presidential el ections. Using the time period between these two dates

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121 insures coverage of Poland. The period of 2002-2003 includes the date of Poland receiving an EU accession date of 2004 at the Copenhagen Talks of December 12-12, 2002. It is significant to note th at I discovered a lack of ne gative representations of Poland in the some five hundred articles I wa s able to access during these time periods. That fact in itself makes the case that Turkey and Poland were represented quite differently in the print media during similar time periods. As with Turkey, I used the FAZ, the TAZ , the Sueddeustche Zeitung , Der Spiegel , and Focus Magazin . Unfortunately, Focus Magazin published almost exclusively only factually based articles, rather than the type being looked at in this paper. There was only one opinion or analytically based article duri ng these time periods, and that was one from 2002 in which Poland was presented in a nega tive light. However, su ch a representation of Poland during any of these time periods was ra re in the German print media, as is seen when one looks at the other print media used in this paper. As with Turkey, I was also limited by what news archives I could access. Nonetheless, I would argue that these newspapers are fairly represen tative of the German print me dia, as each comes from a different part of the political spectrum, the FAZ being conservative, the TAZ on the left, and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung on the center, and Der Spiegel on the left. Moreover, both the FAZ and the TAZ are among the most important news sources for th eir prospective political audience, and Der Spiegel is the most important news magazine for the left and is possibly the most famous and important news magazine in Germany. As with Turkey, the time periods diffe red significantly in terms of scope of coverage of Poland. There was more commentary on Poland in the 1995 and 2000

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122 periods than the 2002-2003 period. This is likely a result of the developments of Poland's relationship to both the EU and Germany. The reason for the greater coverage in the 1995 period was likely a result of the influences of events of the early 1990's. In 1991, Germany and Poland signed the Treaty on Friendship and Neighborly Relations, which, as mentioned earlier in this section, not only set up the framework for cooperation be tween the two countri es at the social, cultural, and political levels, but also intr oduced the promise of German support for the accession of Poland into the EU. (Czapliniski, 1992: 167-168). Eventually, Germany also became an ardent supporter of Poland's NATO entry (Freudenstein, 1998). Many Germans also felt indebted to Poland, as well as the Czech Republic, for helping bring about the peaceful unification of Germany in 1989 -1990 and for helping in the East German embassy refugees crisis (Freudenste in, 1998: 45-46). This sense of indebtedness was widespread among the German populace, as political scientist Roland Freudenstein points out: This element of gratefulness is not only prevalent in the German political class but is widespread among the population, and it gives rise to a commitment to help Germany's central European neighbors in their aspirations to EU and NATO membership (Freudenstein, 1998: 46). This commitment can be seen in the 1993 when German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe began the talk of NATO enlargement concer ning Poland and the other Visegrad countries (Freudenstein, 1998: 53). As such an avid s upporter of Poland's entry into NATO and the EU, Germany naturally was very interest ed in Poland's 1994 application for EU membership, which was in the beginning of th e two-year application period for all of the CEECs. Throughout the 1994-1996 period, Germans we re likely very interested in the developments between the EU and Poland, as well as between the EU and the other

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123 CEECs. This is reflected by the greate r number of articles on Poland during the 1995 period. The 1999-2000 period was also more active in terms of the German media's coverage of Poland. This is lik ely a result of Germany's interest in Poland's entry into NATO and in the political outcome of the Presidential elections. Germany's close political cooperation with Poland makes th ese events very important for Germans. Moreover, after Poland became a member of NATO, it was likely important for many Germans that Poland next be invited into th e EU, which would complete its "return to Europe," a concept repeated throughout the o fficial discourse of the EU concerning the CEECs. In the 2002-2003 period, Poland finished accession negotiations. While this was an important event, it is likely that Poland fi nishing these negotiations and being given an accession date was not very surprising, a nd hence not very noteworthy, for most Germans. This argument seems logical cons idering the extensive lobbying effort the Germans had done in Brussels on behalf of Poland's accession since the early 1990's. The themes that were a part of the 1995 discourse were: the theme of Poland having the same cultural and historical background as Europe (and Germany in particular), the theme of Poland's entry into th e EU as natural or inevitable, the theme of Germany and Poland being equals, the theme of Germany and Poland being compatible, and the theme of Poland as a successful stat e. All the these themes helped to portray Poland as deserving EU membership, whic h was a very important issue in the 1995 period, as pointed out earlier.

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124 The theme of Poland and Germany shari ng the same historical and cultural background is clear in FAZ 's October article, in which th e unnamed journalist writes of the “shared history” of Germans and Poles ( FAZ , 1995c). Here, not only do Poles have the same historical background as Germans, but also by extension, with Europeans in general. The journalist connects this theme to the theme of Germany and Poland being partners in furthering Europe by referring to former Chancellor Kohl's argument that Germany and Poland will build a "s hared [common] house for Europe" ( FAZ , 1995c). Here, Germany and Poland are presented as partners and Poland is presented as strengthening the EU. The EU will be more su ccessful if Poland joins it (a "shared house of Europe" will be built). The journalist e nds the article by connecting the theme of Germans and Poles as partners to the id ea that German and Poles could work well together. The journalist quotes Chancellor Kohl in a speech Kohl gave to an audience of German and Polish youths, in which Kohl told the young people in rega rds to the future: “it belongs to you, shape it!” ( FAZ , 1995c). If they are so similar at such a basic, albeit important level (youths eventu ally grow up into tomorrow's leaders), then surely Poland could be integrated in the EU at other levels, one could argue after reading this article. The theme of Germany and Poland being e qual partners on a quest for furthering Europe’s development was reiterated in TAZ 's October article. The anonymous journalist features a statement made by former German President Herzog at a ceremony for a WWII memorial. In this article, Herzog states that the memorial is “an important step on the path for Poles and Germans into a Europ ean future” (TAZ, 1995). Here, Germans and Poles are presented as going on a path togeth er, a path that will bring Europe into the future. Not only is Poland presented as an e qual partner to Germany, but also that Poland

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125 already is and will be ‘European. ’ This impr esses the German public with the idea that Poland is ‘one of them’ and thus should be a part of the EU. It al so portrays Poland as helping to further the EU in the future. This theme of Germany and Poland as e qual partners, as well as the theme of Poland as compatible with Germany, is reflected in a FAZ article from July. The anonymous journalist features fo rmer Chancellor Kohl statin g that through his visit, relations between Poland and Germany “has be en strengthened.” He later states that Poland is an “important neighbor” and that Poland and Germany “are looking into the future together“ ( FAZ, 1995b). Kohl also refers to Germ any as an advocate for Poland’s entry into the EU. Through these representa tions, Poland and Germany are portrayed as equals in a strong partnership. Poland is al so represented as bei ng politically important, including in the future. This forms much of the basis for Kohl's, and by extension, the journalist's, argument that Poland should be a member of the EU. This argument is deepened through the incorpora tion of the theme of Poland as ‘naturally’ a part of the EU. Kohl states: “Europe w ithout Poland is a torso” ( FAZ , 1995b). Through this image Poland is portrayed as an integral part of Europe, such that a Europe without Poland is like an incomplete body. This biological reference moreover reinforces the representation of Poland’s entry into the EU as inevita ble, as it is by “nature” necessary. The image of Poland as naturally "European," as well as the idea that Poland's entry into the EU is inevitable, is reinforced in another FAZ July article that features former Chancellor Kohl. The unnamed journalist writes that Kohl held the opinion that within this decade [the 1990s], Poland will find its way into the EU and into the security structures in the framework of NATO. Later in the article, Kohl states that because of its

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126 democracy and rule of law, Poland “natura lly has a place in the European Union” ( FAZ , 1995a). Here, Kohl, and by extension, the journa list, presents Poland as inevitably joining the EU and NATO, since it “naturally” alrea dy has a place there. This image of Poland inherently possessing “European-nes s” is tied to the fact that Poland is a successful state politically (it is a democracy and adheres to the rule of law). According to Kohl's argument, Poland is meant to be in the Union because it is so successful and “European." Kohl deepens this perspec tive by calling the tying of the young democracies (which includes Poland) to the Euro-Atlantic stru ctures (EU and NATO) a “commandment of solidarity between the European people”(FAZ, 1995a). The use of the word “commandment” adds a sense of moral oblig ation for Germany and the EU to bring Poland, as well as the other CEECs, into th e EU. Again, by presenting Poland in such a way, Kohl and the journalist are able to portr ay Poland as one of “us” (Europeans) and therefore must be let into the EU. The journalist adds other themes to his or her article through us ing Kohl's reference to Poland and German as partners and nei ghbors. According to the journalist, Kohl remembers "the good tradition of the German/Polish relations when German and Polish democrats worked together for freedom" ( FAZ , 1995a). Kohl later is quoted as calling Germany and Poland “a promising neighborhood” ( FAZ , 1995a). Through these statements, Poland is presented as having been a part of Europe before WWII and that it has been again a part of Europe since the end of the Cold War. According to Kohl and the journalist, Poland is a part of the same “neighborhood” as Germany. In connection to this idea of Poland as ‘European,’ the theme of Poland and German as equals is revealed through the description of Po land and Germany working together for freedom. These

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127 portrayals of Poland again present to th e German public the image of Poland as 'European" and a political partner to Germany. For example, in one FAZ 's October article, the unnamed journa list reports that more than 60,000 youths from Germany and Poland in 1995 participated in exchange programs between German and Poland ( FAZ , 1995d). The featuring of these programs reinforces the idea that Germans and Poles are of the same culture and that they were so compatible socially/culturally/ politically, that one c ountryÂ’s students could study and learn at the same level in the otherÂ’s school system. It is also important to note that during these time periods, there was no mention of Turkish-Ge rman exchange programs. Like the other articles during this period, Poland is repres ented as being "like" Germany (and Europe) and thus should be admitted into the EU. Poland is also represented as "Europ ean" in the articles of the 1999-2000 period. Poland's "European-ness" is brought forth thr ough the theme of Poland as naturally or inevitably a part of Europe , the theme of Poland strength ening the EU, the theme of Poland and Germany as partners, and the them e of Poland being a successful country. As mentioned before, the many Germans saw Poland 's entry into the EU as the next step after Poland's recent NATO entry. The German me dia at this time reflects this belief through using these themes in its portrayal of Poland. One could argue that the German media not only reflects German public opinion but also reinfor ces it. It may also affect the public opinion of other EU countries, as FAZ and Der Spiegel are read throughout Europe. Der Spiegel journalist Andrej Rybak presents a very positive picture of Poland in his October 1999 article. He writes that "The Polish economy . . .is today a successful

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128 model for the consequent transition from a state economy to a market economy" (Rybak, 1999). Here, and throughout the entire articl e, Rybak portrays Poland as a strong and successful country. This would certain ma ke Poland appear to many readers as a desirable EU member. This sentiment is rein forced later in the article through Rybak's description of Poland as "an island of po litical and economic stability" (Rybak, 1999). This view of Poland contrasts greatly with how Turkey is portrayed during a similar period. In the articles from 1998-1999, Turk ey is portrayed as "hysterical," "authoritarian", and "chaotic." The theme of Poland as naturally a part of Europe can be seen in the December article by Sueddeutsche Zeitung journalist Nico Fried. Fried features current Chancellor Schroeder on a visit to Poland. In the article, Schroeder states that the Polish nation is “rooted deeply in the European history and culture . . .Poland belongs in Europe, Poland belongs to Europe” (Fried, 2000). Not only ar e Poles presented as being "like" other Europeans in terms of history and culture, but also that they are ‘rooted’ in it they are ‘naturally’ part of Europe, lik e a plant to its ground. This image is tied to the idea that Poland’s entry into the EU as inevitable. Th e fact that Poland inhe rently is 'European" makes it unquestionable that Poland would at so me point enter the EU. This portrayal of Poland makes it necessary that Poland be poli tically and economically brought into the European family, as it has been there already culturally and historically. Moreover, this necessity of bringing Poland into the EU is an obligation of the EU, according to Schroeder and Fried. Fried quotes Schroeder as calling “a commandment of historical justice” (Fried, 2000). Again, Poland is presented as a natural member of the EU since it has historically b een a part of Europe. Its memb ership was inevitable as the

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129 righting of the "wrong" ("histor ical justice") of it having been separated politically from Europe by the Cold War. Chancellor Schroeder makes similar statements in other articles, of the period, including the December FAZ article that featured Schroeder ( FAZ , 2000). Schroeder adds moral implications to his ar gument by stating in Fried's article that “it was a duty of Germany/EU to complete what needs to be completed” (Fried, 2000). The argument of the need for the EU/Germany to bring Poland into the EU is given added weight by the moral implications of it being from God (“commandment”) and by the sense that it is a “duty.” The moral/polit ical implications for Poland's EU accession are blatantly laid out towards the end of th e article when Schroeder calls the accession a “political and moral necessity . . . and a success for us all in the end” (Fried, 2000). Moreover, bringing Poland into the EU would strengthen the EU ("a success for us all in the end"). These portrayals of Poland and Germany’s relations w ith Poland make the argument that Poland should not only be brought into the EU out of moral and political obligation, but for the bette rment of the EU itself. The representation of Poland's entry into the EU as inevitable is reinforced in Fried's article with Schroeder's argument that “no foreign rule, no dictatorship was able to tear Poland from the heart of Europe and suppress Poland’s orientation towards Europe” (Fried, 2000). Here, Poland is presented by Schroeder and the journalist as such an inherently "European" nation that not even political nightmares of dictatorship or foreign occupation could destroy its "European-n ess". This unconquerable "European" quality makes its eventual membership in the EU as inevitable, a natural pa rt of history. This portrayal of Poland also pain ted Poland as politically successful, since it was able to survive intact as "European" de spite the struggle with political obstacles. This is in stark

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130 contrast to the German media’s representations of Turkey during this as being inferior and a political failure be cause of its political and social obstacles. Both Fried and the journalist from the December FAZ article incorporate the theme of Germany and Poland as equal partners in their articles thro ugh the portrayal of Germany as an advocate for Poland’s entry into the EU Fried, 2000, FAZ , 2000). Fried quotes Schroeder as saying that Germany is w illing to make great efforts in Nice “for the sake of Europe, but also for the sake of our friendship with Poland” (Fried, 2000). The German chancellor makes it clear to German c itizens, as well as other German leaders, that Germany and Poland were equal as seen in their “friendship.” This sentiment was also revealed through the continued political support of Germany for Poland’s accession desire. Moreover, Poland’s accessi on into the EU is presented as necessary for Europe. This connects to the theme of Poland being pr esented as a benefit to the EU, an addition that would strengthen it. . This is in stark contrast to the frequent representation in the German media of Turkish membership in th e EU as a threat, something that would “destroy” it. In the FAZ article, the journalist quotes Schroeder as saying that "Germany supports the Polish wish for an as qui ck-as-possible accession to the EU" ( FAZ , 2000). This shows the theme of Germany and Poland as equals, as Germany is such a strong advocate of Polish EU membership. This positive view of Poland is reiterated in the September Der Spiegel article by Juergen Hogrefe and Juergen Leinemann. The writers argue that Ch ancellor Schroeder's September visit to Poland should "show the nearest neighbor of the new German government that Schroeder is through and through a friend of Poland's" (Hogrefe and

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131 Leinemann, 1999). Not only are Poland and Ge rmany presented as friends, which suggests equality between the two, but also that Poland is Germany's close neighbor. The words neighbor and friend immediately put Po land into the "European" category, as it is close to Germany, literally and figuratively. This contrasts greatly with the way Turkey is often presented in the 1995-2003 articles. Turkey instead is often portrayed as alien and far away on the Bosporous. This theme of Germany and Poland being part ners, as well as the theme of Poland's entry into the EU as natura l or inevitable, is seen in the 2002 period through the May Sueddeutsche Zeitung article. The unnamed journalist features German President Rau, who calls for an early admission of Poland in to the EU: “We want Poland to be among the new members in the EU” ( Sueddeutsche Zeitung , 2002a). The image of Germany and Poland as partners is reinforced when Rau states: “When Germany and Poland start building the European house in the EU together, that will offer a completely new perspective for the future of a relationship between th ese two neighboring countries" ( Sueddeutsche Zeitung , 2002a). Poland is not only pres ented as being politically and culturally equal to Germany, as seen in the image of Poland and Germany building “Europe’s house” together, but also that it is a part of Europe already, as it is “neighboring” Germany. In addition, Poland’s entry into the EU is again presented as inevitable, as Rau said “when,” not “if,” Ge rmany and Poland start to “build Europe’s house.” Moreover, Poland is portrayed as be ing a strong country, since it (with Germany) is presented as leading the EU into the future. Again, this is in stark contrast to the way Turkey is portrayed in the German news me dia during this same time period. Turkey is often presented as a threat or da nger to the EU rather than as an attribute to or leader of

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132 the EU. The theme of Poland as inherently 'E uropean" is also revealed in this article when the journalist states that “toda y Poles and Germans live as good neighbors” ( Sueddeustche Zeitung , 2002a). By referring to Poles as “neighbors,” the journalist reinforces the image of Poland as being " like" Germans (and Europeans in general). EU officials similarly portrayed Po land as “European" during the 1995-2003 period. In a 2000 speech, Commission President Prodi, in reference to the accession of the CEECs (which includes Poland), spoke of “t he tide of history” a nd the “noble task of reuniting Europe” which would lead to “ a st rong, prosperous Eur ope playing a leading role on the world stage”(White et al, 2002: 136). Here, Poland, as well as the other CEECs is represented as already being a part of Europe, as the upcoming enlargement is “re-uniting” Europe. In addition, Prodi por trays the accession of these states as strengthening Europe, which is in stark cont rast to the way European leaders portray Turkey during this time period. In their view, Turkey would ‘destroy’ Europe if it joins. As another example, Prodi, in his speech from October of 1999 to the European Parliament, spoke of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the upcoming enlargement of the CEECs. He stated: For the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire we have the opportunity to unite Europe and this time it will not be by force of arms, but on the basis of shared ideals and agreed co mmon rules ” and later “I believe this a strong message of political solidarity with the applican t countries . . . (Prodi, 1999). Here, Prodi not only states that these countries and the current EU states had the same ideals and rules, but he connects them hist orically through the reference to the Roman Empire. This brings forth the idea that the CEECs share the same hi storical foundation as the current EU Member states. He also stated that they are politically compatible with the current EU states (“political solidarity”). La ter he called the people in the CEECs “fellow

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133 Europeans,” which again portrays Poland a nd the other CEECs as 'European" (Prodi, 1999). Commissioner of Enlargement, Guenter Verheugen, represents the CEECs similarly in his speech before a conference at Den Haag in 1999. For instance, in the speech he states that “We [the EU] do not want to have walls in Europe anymore” and later that “Enlargement is the most effective means we have of upholding our shared values across Europe” (Verheugen, 1999). With these statements, Verh eugen presents the CEECs as already a part of Europe, but of a Europe that had been separated by walls in the past (the Iron Curtain). He also portrays the CEECs as possessing the same values as the current EU Member states, which thus make them ‘European.’ This contrasts significantly with the EU’s portr ayal of Turkey. In their discourse on Turkey, Turkey is represented as "unique" and "different" fr om current EU Member states and as a problematic country. It is clear from these examples, that during the time period of 1995-2003, Poland was portrayed in the German media and in th e EU discourse as "like" the current EU Member states. These representations ar e the basis for the notion held among many Germans that Poland should be a part of the EU. The themes of Poland as part of Europe’s history and culture, Poland’s join ing the EU is inevitable, Poland as a successful state, Poland and Germany as “e quals,“ Germany and Poland as compatible and Poland in the EU as strengthening th e EU, could be seen throughout the German print media’s discourse on Poland during the various year-periods analyzed here. In addition, the discourse of EU officials likewise portrayed Po land and the other CEECs as "European" in character and as politically the same as the current EU Member states.

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134 These representations significantly contrast with the representation of Turkey by the German media and EU/European leaders durin g similar time periods. Turkey was instead portrayed as "backwards and inferior," "exot ic," "despotic," "da ngerous," and "not European."

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135 CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION The representations of Turkey vis a vis Poland in the German print media and the EU discourse are important indicators of how Germans and key EU officials view these two countries. The German mediaÂ’s representa tions, because they both create/reinforce GermansÂ’ perceptions of Turkey and Poland, and because they continually produce and reproduce the identity of Turkey as not "European" and Poland as "European," are important actors in determining the way Germany interacts with Turkey and Poland. This includes the way Germany acts in terms of each countryÂ’s bid for EU accession. Since Germany is so important in the EU as a re sult of its economic and political power, its influence, either for or against a stateÂ’s entr y into the EU, is critical. The representations of Turkey and Poland in the EU discourse is likewise important, as it affects the views of German citizens, and perhaps some EU citizens and officials, which is then reflected in the votes of the current EU Member states in determining who is allowed to join the Union and who is not. As was seen in the German print media and EU discourse analysis, the identity of the EU/Europe has tended to be based on cultura l, historical, and reli gious factors rather than just political and economic ones. There are implications that it is not just the Germans who view European-ness as cultural, historical, and religi ous, and thus, Turkey as "not European" and Poland (as well as ot her CEECs) as "European." I have already shown that many EU officials have perceived and have con tinually represented Turkey and Poland (and the other CEECs) as not "European" and "European," respectively.

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136 Public opinion among EU citizens would seem to indicate a similar perspective. In a series of Eurobarometer surveys done from March 1999 to November 2001, EU citizens were asked: “For each of the following count ries, would you be in favor of or against it becoming a part of the European Union?” ( Eurobarometer , 1999-2001). In these surveys, Turkey was rated consistently as the leas t favored candidate stated for accession and Poland as one of the most favored ( Eurobarometer , 1999-2001). In the case of Turkey, its identity as "other" vis a vis Europe culturall y, historically, religiously has a long history, one that dates back to the Crusades of the 11th century. The identity of Turkey as "other" by Europeans is the re ason behind the less favorable treatment given to Turkey by the EU. Tu rkey was not courted to apply for EU membership, whereas the CEECs were; the CEEC s were invited to attend and engage in regular meetings regularly in the various EU institutions far in advance of accession, whereas Turkey was not; the CEECs have all started EU accession negotiations (some have finished), whereas Turkey has not; and Turkey has not been given an accession date (instead only a quasi-date for accession talk s) (Avery and Cameron, 2001: 17-19; Park, 2000: 323). This differential treatment cannot be explained by the official Copenhagen accession criteria, as Turkey and the CEECs were at the same level economically and politically in the 1995-2001 period. Romani a, the Slovak Republic, and the Czech Republic were very similar politi cally, particularly in terms of human and minority rights. Moreover, none of the other states, with the exception of Sloven ia, had unproblematic democratic records. In terms of the economy, Turkey generally fit within the range of statistics reported for the CEECs in the various economic indicators.

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137 The reason for the difference in treatment is instead due to the way most Europeans have defined the "European" iden tity or ‘we-ness,’ which was the other criteria laid out officially by the EU. The TEU Treaty states that: “Any European state may apply to become a Member of the European Union” (EU, 1993: Article O). However, the term "European" is vague and thus could be interp reted in a variety of ways. Europeans could chose to define its ‘we-ness’ or identity in political/economic terms, in which case Turkey could have a chance to join. However, Europeans have instead defined its identity in cultural, historical, and religious terms, which puts Tu rkey as an applicant in a different category from the CEECs, a categor y that has produced less favorable treatment compared to the CEECs by the EU. As long as the EU/Europe continues to define its identity or “we-ness” in cultural/historical terms, Turkey will c ontinue to face serious obstacles in obtaining ‘the green light’ to join the Union.

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138 APPENDIX A THE HERITAGE FOUNDATIONÂ’S DE SCRIPTIONS OF RATINGS FOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS Factor #1: Trade Policy (Tariffs) Trade policy is a key factor in measuring economic freedom. For example, when a government taxes directly through tariffs, or impedes through non-tariff barriers, the importation of a certain product, some group of people in that country will produce that product instead of another pr oduct they may be better suit ed to producing. The import limitation reduces economic freedom by discour aging individuals fr om applying their talents and skills in a manner that they know or believe will be better for them. The variables of trade policy are: weighted aver age tariff rate, non-tari ff barriers, corruption in the customs service. Trade Policy Grading Scale 1) Very low weighted average tariff rate less than or equal to 4%. 2) Low weighted average tariff rate great er than 4% but less than or equal to 9%. 3) Moderate weighted average tariff ra te greater than 9% but less than or equal to 14%. 4) High weighted average tariff rate great er than 14% but less than or equal to 19%. 5) Very high weighted average tariff rate greater than 19%. Figure A-1. Trade policy grading scale.1 1 All figures in Appendix A are from William Beach and Gerald O'Driscoll, Jr., "Cha pter 5: Explaining the Factors of the Index of Economic Freedom ," 2002, at http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/2003/c hapters/Chapter5.html. (last visited April 2003).

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139 Factor #2: Government Intervention in the Economy This factor measures government's dire ct use of scarce resources for its own purposes and government's control over re sources through ownership. The measure comprises both government consumption and government production. Transfer payments, which consist of compulsory exchange of titles over resources among individuals, are excluded from this measure. Government consumption consists of net purchases of goods, services, and structures (for example, bridges and build ings); wages paid to government employees; net purchases of fixed assets; and invent ory changes in government enterprises. Government production is measured as desc ribed below. The measure of government intervention is distinct from government's re gulatory role and complements the measure of fiscal burden. The variables of govern ment intervention in the economy are: government consumption as a percentage of the economy, government ownership of businesses and industries share of government revenues from state-owned enterprises and government ownership of property, econom ic output produced by the government. Government Expenditures Scale for Developing Countries (Government Expenditures Crit eria as Percent of GDP) 1) Very low Less than or equal to 15%. 2) Low Greater than 15% but less than or equal to 20%. 3) Moderate Greater than 20% but less than or equal to 25%. 4) High Greater than 25% but less than or equal to 30%. 5) Very high Greater than 30%. Figure A-2. Government expenditure s scale for developing countries.

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140 Government Intervention Grading Scale 1) Very low Less than or equal to 10% of GDP. 2) Low Greater than 10% but le ss than or equal to 25% of GDP. 3) Moderate Greater than 25% but less than or equal to 35% of GDP. 4) High Greater than 35% but le ss than or equal to 45% of GDP. 5) Very high 45% or more of GDP. Figure A-3. Government inte rvention grading scale Factor #3: FDI or Capital Flows Barriers Restrictions on foreign investment limit the inflow of capital and thus hamper economic freedom. By contrast, little or no re striction of foreign investment enhances economic freedom; foreign investment provide s funds for economic expansion. For this category, the more restrictions a country im poses on foreign investment, the lower the level of economic freedom and the higher the score. The variables of capital flows and FDI barriers are: foreign investment code, re strictions on foreign ownership of business, restrictions on the industries and companies open to foreign investors, restrictions and performance requirements on foreign compan ies, foreign ownership of land, equal treatment under the law for both foreign a nd domestic companies, restrictions on repatriation of earnings, and availability of local financing for foreign companies.

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141 Capital Flows and Foreign Investment Grading Scale 1 Very low Open and impartial treatment of foreign investment; accessible foreign investment code; almost no rest rictions on foreign investments except for fields related to national security. 2 Low Restrictions on investments in few sectors, such as utilities, companies vital to national security, and natural resources; limited, efficient approval process. 3 Moderate Restrictions on many invest ments, but official policy conforms to established foreign investment c ode; bureaucratic approval process. 4 High Investment permitted on a case-by-case basis; possible presence of bureaucratic approval process and corruption. 5 Very high Government seeks activ ely to prevent foreign investment; rampant corruption. Figure A-4. Capital flows and fore ign investment grading scale Factor # 4: Bank and Finance Sector In most countries, banks provide the esse ntial financial services that facilitate economic growth; they lend money to start bus inesses, purchase homes , and secure credit to purchase consumer durable goods, in addi tion to furnishing a safe place in which individuals can store their ea rnings. The more banks are controlled by the government, the less free they are to engage in these activities. One consequence of heavy bank regulation is restricted econo mic freedom; therefore, the more a government restricts its banking sector, the higher its score and the lower its level of economic freedom. In developed economies, commercial banks are relatively less important; a higher proportion of credit is supplied in organized securities markets. Over the years, the authors have devoted more attention to th e non-banking part of the financial services industry (insurance and securitie s). The variables of the ba nk and finance sector are:

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142 government ownership of banks, restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and subsidiaries, government in fluence over the allocation of credit, government regulations, and freedom to offer a ll types of financial services, securities, and insurance policies. Banking and Finance Grading Scale 1 Very low Government involvement in the financial s ector negligible; very few restrictions on foreign financ ial institutions; banks may engage in all types of financial services. 2 Low Government involvement in the financial sector minimal; few limits on foreign banks; country may maintain some limits on financial services; domestic bank formation may face some barriers. 3 Moderate Substantial government influence on banks; government owns or controls some banks; government controls credit; domestic bank formation may face significant barriers. 4 High Heavy government involvement in the financial sector; banking system in transition; banks tightly controlled by government; possible corruption; domestic bank forma tion virtually nonexistent. 5 Very high Financial institutions in chaos; banks operate on primitive basis; most credit controlled by gove rnment and goes only to state-owned enterprises; corruption rampant. Figure A-5. Banking and fi nance grading scale Factor #5:Wages and Price Regulation In a market economy, prices allocate resour ces to their highest use. A firm that needs more employees may signal this need to the market by offering a higher wage; an individual who greatly values a home on the ma rket offers a higher price to purchase it. Prices also act as signals to producers and consumers by conveying information that otherwise would be prohibitiv ely costly to obtain. For example, if the demand for a good increases, this will be reflected in the pr ice of the product and will be a signal to producers to increase production. The variab les of wages and price regulation are:

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143 minimum wage laws, freedom to set prices privately without gove rnment influence, government price controls and the extent to which government price controls are used, government subsidies to businesses that aff ect prices, and government role in setting wages. Wages and Prices Grading Scale 1) Very low The market sets prices of goods and services, and the country either does not have a minimum wage or the evidence indicates that the minimum wage applies to a small portion of the work force and is therefore not relevant in wage setting. The govern ment may participate in collective bargaining as long as it does not impose those wage agreements on other sectors or on workers that are not immediate parties to the agreement. 2) LowThe government controls prices on some goods and services, but controls do not apply to a significant portion of national output. The government either has a minimum wage that applies to a significant portion of the work force or extends collective bargaining agreements across industries or sectors and on workers th at are not immediately party to the agreement. 3) Moderate The government controls prices of goods and services that constitute a significant portion of national output, government-set wages apply to a large portion of the work force, or both. 4) High The government determines mo st prices of goods and services and most wages. 5) Very high Wages and prices of goods and services are almost completely controlled by the government. Figure A-6. Wages and pr ices grading scale Factor #6: Property Rights The ability to accumulate private property is the main motivating force in a market economy, and the rule of law is vital to a fully functioning free-market economy. Secure property rights give citizens the confidence to undertake commercial activities, save their income, and make long-term plans because they know that their income is safe from expropriation. This factor examines the extent to which the government protects private

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144 property by enforcing the laws and how safe private property is from expropriation. The less protection private property receives, the lower the level of economic freedom and the higher the score. The variables of prope rty rights are: free dom from government influence over the judicial system, commerci al code defining cont racts, sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contra ct disputes, government expropr iation of property, corruption within the judiciary, delays in receiving judicial decisi ons, and legally granted and protected private property. Property Rights Grading Scale 1) Very high Private property guara nteed by the government; court system efficiently enforces contracts; justic e system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property; corruption nearly nonexistent and expropriation unlikely. 2) High Private property guarant eed by the government; court system suffers delays and is not always stri ct in enforcing contracts; corruption possible but rare; expr opriation unlikely. 3) Moderate Court system inefficient and subject to delays; corruption may be present; judiciary may be influen ced by other branches of government; expropriation possible but rare. 4) Low Property ownership weakly pr otected; court system inefficient; corruption present; judici ary influenced by other branches of government; expropriation possible. 5) Very low Private property ou tlawed or not protected; almost all property belongs to the state; country in such chaos (for example, because of ongoing war) that property protection is nonexistent; judi ciary so corrupt that property is not effectively pr otected; expropri ation frequent. Figure A-7. Property ri ghts grading scale Factor #7: Regulation Regulations and restrictions make it di fficult for entrepreneurs to create new businesses. In some countries, government officials frown on any private-sector initiatives; in a few, they even make them illegal. Although many regulations hinder business, the most important are associ ated with licensing new companies and

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145 businesses. In some countries, as well as ma ny states in the United States, the procedure for obtaining a business license can be as simp le as mailing in a registration form with a minimal fee. The variables of regulation are: licensing requirements to operate a business, ease of obtaining a business licen se, corruption within the bu reaucracy, labor regulations, such as established work weeks, paid vacati ons, and parental leave, as well as selected labor regulations, environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations, and regulations that impose a burden on business. Regulation Grading Scale 1) Very low Existing regulations stra ightforward and applied uniformly to all businesses; regulations not much of a burden for business; corruption nearly nonexistent. 2) Low Simple licensing procedur es; existing regulations relatively straightforward and applied uniformly most of the time, but burdensome in some instances; corruption possible but rare. 3) Moderate Complicated licensi ng procedure; regulations impose substantial burden on business; ex isting regulations may be applied haphazardly and in some instances are not even published by the government; corruption may be present and poses minor burden on businesses. 4) High Government-set production quot as and some state planning; major barriers to opening a business; comp licated licensing process; very high fees; bribes sometimes necessary; corruption present and burdensome; regulations impose a great burden on business. 5) Very high Government impedes the creation of new businesses; corruption rampant; regulations applied randomly. Figure A-8. Regulation grading scale

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146 APPENDIX B GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE (STRAFGESETZBUCH, STGB) As promulgated on 13 November 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 945, p. 3322). Translation provided by at http://www.bmj.de Section 86 Dissemination of Means of Propaganda of Unconstitutional Organizations (1) Whoever domestically disseminates or pr oduces, stocks, imports or exports or makes publicly accessible thro ugh data storage media for dissemination domestically or abroad, means of propaganda: 1. of a party which has been declared to be unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court or a party or organization, as to whic h it has been determined, no longer subject to appeal, that it is a substitute or ganization of such a party; 2. of an organization, which has been banned, no longer subject to appeal, because it is directed against the constitutional order or ag ainst the idea of international understanding, or as to which it has been determined, no longer subject to appeal, that it is a substitute organization of such a banned organization; 3. of a government, organization or institution outs ide of the territorial area of application of this law which is active in pursuing the objectives of one of the parties or organizations indicated in numbers 1 and 2; or 4. means of propaganda, the cont ents of which are intended to further the aims of a former National Socialist organization, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine. (2) Means of propaganda within the meani ng of subsection (1) shall only be those writings (Section 11 subsection (3)) the conten t of which is directed against the free, democratic constitutional order or the idea of international understanding. . . Section 86a Use of Symbols of Un constitutional Organizations (1) Whoever: 1. domestically distributes or publicly uses , in a meeting or in writings (Section 11 subsection (3)) disseminated by him, symbols of one of the parties or organizations indicated in Section 86 subsecti on (1), nos. 1, 2 and 4; or 2. produces, stocks, imports or exports objects which depict or contain such symbols for distribution or use domestically or abroa d, in the manner indicated in number 1, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine.

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147 (2) Symbols, within the meaning of subsection (1), shall be, in particular, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting. Symbol s which are so similar as to be mistaken for those named in sentence 1 shall be deemed to be equivalent thereto. (3) Section 86 subsections (3) a nd (4), shall apply accordingly. Section 130 Agitation of the People (1) Whoever, in a manner that is ca pable of disturbing the public peace: 1. incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them; or 2. assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming segments of the population, shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years. (2) Whoever: 1. with respect to writings (Section 11 subsection (3)), wh ich incite hatred against segments of the population or a national, raci al or religious group, or one characterized by its folk customs, which call for violent or arbitrary measures against them, or which assault the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning or defaming segments of the population or a previously indicated group: a) disseminates them; b) publicly displays, posts, presents, or otherwise makes them accessible; c) offers, gives or makes accessible to a person under eighteen years; or (d) produces, obtains, supplies, stocks, o ffers, announces, commends, undertakes to import or export them, in order to use them or copies obtained from them within the meaning of numbers a through c or facilitate such use by another; or 2. disseminates a presentation of the cont ent indicated in number 1 by radio, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine. (3) Whoever publicly or in a meeting approve s of, denies or renders harmless an act committed under the rule of National Socialis m of the type indicated in Section 220a subsection (1), in a manner capable of distur bing the public piece shall be punished with imprisonment for not more th an five years or a fine. (4) Subsection (2) shall also apply to writings (Section 11 su bsection (3)) with content such as is indicated in subsection (3). (5) In cases under subsection (2), also in conj unction with subsection (4 ), and in cases of subsection (3), Section 86 subsectio n (3), shall apply correspondingly. Section 131 Representation of Violence (1) Whoever, in relation to writings (Section 11 subsection (3)), whic h describe cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of viol ence against human beings in a manner which expresses a glorification or rendering harmless of such act s of violence or which represents the cruel or inhuman aspects of the event in a manner which injures human dignity: 1. disseminates them; 2. publicly displays, posts, presents, or otherwise makes them accessible; 3. offers, gives or makes them accessible to a person under eighteen years; or

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148 4. produces, obtains, supplies, stocks, offers , announces, commends, undertakes to import or export them, in order to use them or copies obtained from them within the meaning of numbers 1 through 3 or facili tate such use by another, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine. . .

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149 APPENDIX C ABBREVIATIONS, TERM S AND DEFINITIONS Abbreviations EU European Union CEEC Central and East ern European Country GDP Gross Domestic Product WB World Bank IMF International Monetary Fund OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development CPI Consumer Price Index FDI Foreign Direct Investment UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises GNI Gross National Income C.R. Country Report W.P. Working Paper HRW Human Rights Watch Terms and Definitions Current account balance account of all international tr ansactions between Country X and the rest of the world; incl udes goods, services, and assets GDP total gross domestic product of Country X GDP growth rate the rate of increased GDP production External debt The amount of money, credit, etc. ow ed by Country X to the rest of the world Public debt The cumulative total of all government borrowing minus repayments and is financed by citizens General government budget balance an account of all government revenue and government expenditure General government expenditure amount of money spent by the government

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150 General government consumption the level of government spe nding related to its role as State provider; includes public sect or salaries and purchasers of goods and services like office supplies Per capita income The average amount of money earne d by each citizen in County X in a year Domestic demand growth rate The increased demand for Country XÂ’s produced products by Country XÂ’s own consumer population Trade balance net difference between merchandise exports and merchandise imports FDI inflow The amount of foreign investment goi ng into Country X in a given year FDI stock The total amount of foreign investment already in Country X by a given year Domestic credit The sum of credit to the non-financial public sector, credit to the private sector, and other accounts Credit to the private sector comprises loans, advances and bills discounted to the private sector Stock market capitalization Value of companiesÂ’ outstanding shares Domestic investment (%GDP) This indicator measures the share of investment in relation to total production. It is obtained by dividing gr oss fixed capital formation by the GDP

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151 APPENDIX D ECONOMIC TABLES Table D-1. Comparison between Turkey a nd the CEECs with other indicators Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Public Debt/ GDP Ratio(Turkey)41.8%47.1%43.7%45.6%61.7%58.2%96% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio(CEECs) 14.3% to 111.1% 13.1% to 105.8% 7.6% to 110.4% 5.8% to 80.2% 6.5% to 87.7% 5.9% to 80.5% 5.7% to 70% 5.7% to 70% Export Growth (% GDP)(Turkey)NANANA5.8%-15.7%12.3%-1.5% Export Growth (% GDP)(CEECs) 1.1% to 35.8% -4.5% to 28.3% -1.2% to 42.8% -12.9% to 20.4% -16.4% to 8.7% 7.3% to 38% -7.7% to 17% -7.7% to 17% Exports (% GDP) (Turkey)20%21.5%24.6%24.3%24.7%25.3%31.7% Exports (% GDP) (CEECs) 25.9% to 72.4% 24.6% to 67.1% 25.5% to 78.4% 23.7% to 79.7% 26.1% to 77.2% 28.1% to 95.4% 17.2% to 91.8% 17.2% to 91.8% Agriculture (% GDP)(Turkey)15.7%14.1%14.5%17.5%14.6%13.6%NA NA Agriculture (% GDP)(CEECs) 3.9% to 19.8% 3.9% to 19.2% 3.9% to 23.4% 4.2% to 16.8% 3.9% to 14.5% 3.7% to 12.3% 3.8% to 13.4% 3.8% to 13.4% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)(Turkey)22.1%26.7%27.7%29.5%35.9%37.1%44.2% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)(CEECs) 34.7% to about 50% 34% to 47.2% 33.1% to 49.7% 35.6% to 47.7% 35.5% to 46.6% 33.2% to 46.7% 31.4% to 46% 31.4% to 46% Trade Balance (% GDP)(Turkey)-5.2%-5.8%-8.2%-7.1%-5.6%-11.0%-3.2% Trade Balance (% GDP)(CEECs) -18.7% to 1.7% -23.4% to 1.4% -24.4% to 3.1% -21.2% to -2.1% -25.8% to -2.5% -15.8% to -2.4% -17.9% to -2.1% -17.9% to -2.1% Domestic Demand Growth Rate(Turkey)6.1%10%9.1%0.7%-4.2%10.5%NA NA Domestic Demand Growth Rate(CEECs) -3.8% to 10.3% -2% to 17.9% .8% to 9.4% -,7% to 13.9% -6.2% to 5.6% 0% to 5.1% -1.5% to 7.2% -1.5% to 7.2% CPI Index(Turkey)93.6 82.3 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4 CPI Index(CEECs) 9 to 62.1 5.8 to 121.6 6.1 to 1061.2 4.6 to 59.1 0.8 to 45.8 1 to 45.7 1.3 to 34.5 1.3 to 34.5 -see individual country charts for source information NA = Not Available

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152 Table D-1. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 FDI Stock ($US Billions) (Turkey)$5.103 $5.825 $6.630 $7.570 $8.353 $9.335 $12.601 FDI Stock ($US Billions) (CEECs) $0.352 to $11.919 $0.554 to $14.961 $1.041 to $16.086 $1.547 to $22.479 $1.795 to $26.075 $2.081 to $33.603 $2.216 to $42.433 $2.216 to $42.433 # of Banks(Turkey)68 68 72 75 81 79 66 (Nov.) 66 (Nov.) # of Banks (CEECs)12 to 8112 to 8111 to 835 to 8314 to 7714 to 7715 to 74 15 to 74 % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)(Turkey)12%12%11%9%9%9%9% % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total) (CEECs) 5% to 33% 6% to about 80% 6% to 67% 5% to 20% 6% to 22% 8% to 19% 7% to 20% 7% to 20% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks) (Turkey)32%32%31%29%31%28%30% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks) (CEECs) 18% to 60% 13% to 67% 7% to 52% 13% to 73% 17% to 51% 17% to 71% 27% to 81% 27% to 81% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP) (Turkey)16.4%19%21.9%22%21%22.9%18.6% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP) (CEECs) 8.7% to 66.6% 7.3% to 64.7% 10.9% to 65.4% 10% to 56.9% 11.1% to 52.6% 9.4% to 48.6% 10.2% to 41.5% 10.2% to 41.5% see individual country charts for source information NA = Not Available

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153 Table D-1. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Tertiary Enrollment (Turkey)18%18%21%14%NANANA NA Tertiary Enrollment (CEECs) 18% to 39% 22% to 42% 22% to 42% 26% to 53%NANANA NA Unemployment Rate(Turkey)6.6%5.8%6.9%6.2%7.3%6.6%8.5% Unemployment Rate(CEECs) 3.5% to 15.2% 4% to 13.7% 4.8% to 15% 6.1% to 16% 6.7% to 17% 6.4% to 18.6% 5.7% to 19.5% 5.7% to 19.5% Imported Energy (%Energy Consumed) (Turkey)57.6%60.1%61.1%60.2%61.7%NANA NA Imported Energy (%Energy Consumed) (CEECs) 1.1% to 81.9% 5.3% to 76% 3.8% to 73.1% 10.2% to 72.9% 10.7% to 71.5%NANA NA IndustryÂ’s Share of Economy (% GDP)(Turkey)30.5%27.9%28.1%25%24.3%25.1%25.6% IndustryÂ’s Share of Economy (% GDP)(CEECs) 29.7% to 44.2% 28.7% to 44.8% 27.9% to 44.1% 28.1% to 41.5% 25.7% to 40.8% 25.3% to 41%NA NA see individual country charts for source information NA = Not Available

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154 Table D-2. Means of the CEECs Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 Tariff Rating 2.3 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 Gov't Intervention Rating 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 Private Sector (%GDP)57.5%62.2%65.8%66.4%67%72.1%73.1% # New Firms NANANANANANANA NA # Bankruptcies (only 3-4 countries)1331 1450 1135 1171 1350 1373 1497 FI Barrier Rating 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.1 2 2.1 2.1 Bank/Finance Rating 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 Regulation Rating 2.6 2.9 2.8 3 3 3 2.9 Property/Legal System Rating 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 Current Account Balance(%GDP) -2.6%-5.4%-5.3%-6.2%-6.1%-4.9%-4% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio 40.2%38.6%34.8%31.5%34.2%33.3%32.5% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)39.5%42.6%47.2%46.3%49.6%52.6%51.9% GDP Growth Rate 4.4%2.6%3.5%2.9%1.3%4.4%4.1% Exports (%GDP)45.5%46.5%48.7%47.9%46.6%53.8%52.8% Agriculture (%GDP)8.6%8.7%9.3%8.1%7.2%6.7%7.3% Export Growth NA6.7%16%7.1%-3%16.5%7.7% Unemployment Rate 9.8%9.1%8.6%9.2%10.7%11.4%11.6% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)-3.1%-3.3%-2.4%-1.8%-2.9%-2.7%-2.4% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)42.3%41.1%40.3%41.2%42.1%40.5%40.1% see individual country charts for source information each figure is from at least 7 countries, unless otherw ise stated. If there were only less than 4 countries with data for a given indicator, then no mean was done, which is represented by NA NA = Not Available

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155 Table D-2. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Government Consumption (%GDP) 18.2% 17.9% 17.9% 18.8% 18.7% 18.3% 17.8% Per Capita Income $3,255 $3,587 $3,795 $3,829 $3,911 $4,052 $4,140 Trade Balance (in % GDP) -6.1% -8.8% -8.5% -9.1% -7.9% -7.8% -8.5% Inflation Rate 27.4% 29.5% 118.5% 15.4% 9.7% 8.8% 8.5% Domestic Demand Growth Rate 5.8% (5 states) 5.5% (5 states) 4.7% (5 states)5.7% 12.2% 2.5% 3.1% (6 States) CPI Index 27.7 29.3 130.1 14.7 9.1 10.8 8.7 FDI Inflow (%GDP) 3.2% 2.7% 4% 5% 4.7% 5.5% 5.2% FDI Stock ($US Billions) $3.292 $4.247 $5.048 $7.129 $8.239 $9.923 $12.164 Real Effective Exchange Rate Change 5.8 6.9 6.6 10.2 6.7 4.7 5.8 Lending Interest Rate Change 11.6 10.9 15.3 3 3.1 2.6 1.3 # of Banks 39 37 35 34 35 34 28 (5 States) % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total) 10% (4 States) 29% (6 States)23% 12% 11% 12% (6 States) 14% (4 States) % Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't NA NA 45.7% (5 States)39.8% 36.7% (6 States)NA NA Investment (% GDP) 23.3% 24.3% 25.7% 26% 24.8% 25.2% 25.5% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks) 29% (5 States) 29% 28% 36% 31% (6 States) 35% (6 States) NA Domestic Credit (% GDP) 32.5% 35% 35.1% 37.2% 37.1% 36.9% 37.4% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP) 24.4% 25% 25. 9% 25.2% 25.8% 22.6% 24% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) 9.6% (5 States) 11.3% (6 States) 14.7% (6 States) 14.5% (6 States) 14.7% (6 States)NA NA see individual country charts for source information each figure is from at least 7 countries, unless otherwis e stated. If there were only less than 4 countries with data for a given indicator, then no mean was done, which is represented by NA NA = Not Available

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156 Table D-2. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Primary Enrollment 96%99%99%94%NANANA NA Secondary Enrollment 85%91%91%90%NANANA NA Tertiary Enrollment 27%30%30%40%NANANA NA Unemployment Rate 9.8%9.1%8.6%9.2%10.7%11.4%11.6% Telecommun. & Transport (%GDP) 9%9.4%9.7%10.2%10.6%NANA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)46.3%45.6%43.8%41.4%44.8%NANA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)3.2%2.7%4%5%4.7%5.5%5.2% Investment (% GDP)23.3%24.3%25.7%26%24.8%25.2%25.5% Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)3.1%2.8%3.1%3.1%3.1%2.9%3% Gov't Intervention Rating 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 IndustryÂ’s Share of Economy (% GDP)36.2%35.5%34.8%33.8%32.7%32.9%NA NA Industry Sector Growth Rate 6.1%3.4%3.7%2.5%-1.5%6%NA NA % Goods Exported To the EU 52.7%51.9%54.5%60%63.5%63.3% 64.9% (6 States) 64.9% (6 States) % Goods Imported From the EU 53.1%53.7%56.5%60.1%52.3%55.2% 57.8% (6 States) 57.8% (6 States) % of Employment in SMEÂ’s 39.4% (5 States)NA 52.4% (4 States)NANANANA NA see individual country charts for source information each figure is from at least 7 countries, unless otherw ise stated. If there were only less than 4 countries with data for a given indicator, then no mean was done, which is represented by NA NA = Not Available

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157 Table D-3. Medians of the CEECs Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 Tariff Rating 2 3.5 2.5 2 2 2 2 Gov't Intervention Rating 3 2.75 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 Private Sector (%GDP)60%64%68%67%65%70%75% # New Firms NANANANANANANA NA # Bankruptcies (only 3-4 countries)1444 1363 1540 1584 1641 1698 1752 FI Barrier Rating 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 Regulation Rating 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 Property/Legal System Rating 2 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 Current Account Balance(%GDP) -0.5%-6.3%-6.1%-5.9%-5.6%-5.5%-4.7% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio 18.8%24.5%23.5%24.9%28.7%29.6%29.5% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)33.1%36.6%45.4%46.4%47.6%49.3%50.3% GDP Growth Rate 4.5%4.7%4.6%4.5%1.5%4.4%4.2% Exports (%GDP)45.8%49.6%49.5%47.8%44.2%52.2%51.6% Agriculture (%GDP)7.6%6.9%5.6%6%5.7%5.3% 5.3% (6 States) 5.3% (6 States) Export Growth 12.4% (4 States)4.7%10.5%8.7%0.6%14.5%7.2% Unemployment Rate 9.9%8.9%7.9%8.5%9.6%10.8%10.6% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)-3.3%-2.8%-2.4%-1.2%-3.4%-3.2%-2.2% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)41.5%41.3%40.8%41.7%42.6%40.2%39.1% see individual country charts for source information each figure is from at least 7 countries, unless otherwis e stated. If there were only less than 4 countries with data for a given indicator, then no median was done, which is represented by NA NA = Not Available

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158 Table D-3. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Government Consumption (%GDP) 19.7% 19.5% 19.1% 19.7% 19.8% 19.4% 19.9% Per Capita Income $2,960 $3,320 $3,605 $3,660 $3,630 $3,640 $3,755 Trade Balance (in % GDP) -4.5% -8.4% -8.6% -7.5% -7.3% -6.4% -7.8% Inflation Rate 27.6% 21.7% 9.9% 10.7% 7% 6% 5.7% Domestic Demand Growth Rate 6.7% (5 States) 3% (5 States) 4.4% (5 States)6.5% 3.9% 1.8% 3.5% (6 States) CPI Index 28.1 21.5 10 9.4 4.7 9.4 6.6 FDI Inflow (%GDP) 1.2% 1.9% 3.7% 4.3% 4.4% 5.4% 3.7% FDI Stock ($US Billions) $0.980 $1.230 $1.873 $2.517 $2.763 $3.898 $4.980 Real Effective Exchange Rate Change 4.2 8 4.9 10.1 3.6 4.7 5.8 Lending Interest Rate Change 7.1 5.3 5.5 2.5 3 2.3 0.7 # of Banks 35 34 30 27 31 29 28 (5 States) % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total) 17% (4 States) 23% (6 States)18% 13% 10% 10% (6 States) 15% (4 States) % Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't NA NA 49.3% (5 States)39.7% 41.4% (6 States)NA NA Investment (% GDP) 24.2% 24.5% 25.6% 26.9% 26.7% 26.4% 26% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks) 22% (5 States) 25% 28% 33% 27% (6 States) 32% (6 States) 79% (4 States) Domestic Credit (% GDP) 30.1% 33.5% 32.5% 34.7% 36.9% 38.5% 40.6% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP) 19% 23% 22% 22% 25% 18% 25% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) 5% (5 States) 9% (6 States) 9% (6 States) 13% (6 States) 14.5% (6 States)NA NA see individual country charts for source information each figure is from at least 7 countries, unless otherwis e stated. If there were only less than 4 countries with data for a given indicator, then no median was done, which is represented by NA NA = Not Available

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159 Table D-3. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Primary Enrollment 97%99%99%94%NANANA NA Secondary Enrollment 86%93%93%87%NANANA NA Tertiary Enrollment 27%28%33%41%NANANA NA Unemployment Rate 9.9%8.9%7.9%8.5%9.6%10.8%10.6% Telecommun. & Transport (%GDP) 8.4%9%9%9.7%10.2%NANA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)50.4%51.9%50.9%50.9%52.2%NANA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)1.2%1.9%3.7%4.3%4.4%5.4%3.7% Investment (% GDP)24.2%24.5%25.6%26.9%26.7%26.4%26% Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)2.7%2.4%2.8%2.3%2.3%2.3%2.3% Gov't Intervention Rating 3 2.75 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2 IndustryÂ’s Share of Economy (% GDP)35.1%35.1%33.8%33.4%32.8%33.2%NA NA Industry Sector Growth Rate 5.9%3.9%6.5%4.3%-2.5%5.7%NA NA % Goods Exported To the EU 54.4%53.8%58.3%62.9%64.5%64.6%65.6% % Goods Imported From the EU 55.8%56.1%57.4%60.3%55.1%55.4% 59.6% (6 States) 59.6% (6 States) % of Employment in SMEÂ’s 32.8% (5 States)NA 52.7% (4 States)NANANANA NA see individual country charts for source information each figure is from at least 7 countries, unless otherwis e stated. If there were only less than 4 countries with data for a given indicator, then no median was done, which is represented by NA NA = Not Available

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160 Table D-4. Poland Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Tariff Rating b 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 Gov't Intervention Rating c 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 Private Sector (%GDP) d 60% 60% 65% 65% 65% 70% 75% (e) # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Bankruptcies f 1358 1405 1540 1584 1641 1698 1752 FI Barrier Rating g 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating h 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Regulation Rating i 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Property/Legal System Rating j 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 Current Account Balnce (%GDP)k 0.7% -2.3% -4% -4.3% -8.1% -6.3% -4% Public Debt (%GDP)l 57.9% 51.2% 49.8% 43.2% 44.5% 42.5% 44.5% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)m 34.6% 33.1% 34. 5% 37.3% 42.2% 44% 39.5% GDP Growth Rate n 6.8% 6% 6.8% 4.8% 4.1% 4.1% 1.1% Export Growth o NA 6.9% 11.4% 10.6% -12.5% 7.3% -7.7% Exports (%GDP)p 25.9% 24.6% 25.5% 28.2% 26.1% 29.4% 17.2% (e) Agriculture (%GDP)q 7.4% 6.9% 5.5% 4.7% 3.9% 3.7% NA Unemploy't Rate r 15.2% 13.2% 10.5% 10.4% 13% 15% 16.2% a,b,c , g,h,i,j The Heritage Foundation Po land Reports: all years d , l IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years f IMF Poland C.R. 00/61: 1995,1996 ; IMF Pola nd C.R. 02/128: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 k,r IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook for 1995-2000; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: 2001 m IMF Poland C.R. 01/67: 1995; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128:1996,1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Poland C.R. 02/127: 2001 n IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years o IMF Poland C.R. 01/56:1996,1997; IMF Poland C.R. 02/127: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 p IMF Poland C.R. 98/51: 1995, 1996; IMF Poland C. R. 99/32: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Poland C.R. 02/127: 2001 q IMF Poland C.R. 98/51: 1995,1996; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128 for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 r IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years

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161 Table D-4. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Gov't Budget Balance(% GDP)a -3.1% -3.3% -3 .2% -3.3% -3.4% -3.1% -5.3% Government Expenditure (% GDP)b 45.4% 46.4% 43.7% 42.5% 42.2% 39.7% 46% Gov't Consumption (%GDP)c 16.6% 16.4% 16% 15.4% 15.6% 15.5% 14.4% Per Capita Income d $2,890 $3,420 $3,810 $3,940 $4,010 $4,190 $4,240 Trade Balance (in % GDP)e -1.5% -5.7% -7.9% -8.7% -9.3% -8.3% -8% Inflation Rate f 26.8% 20.2% 15.9% 11.7% 7% 7% 5% Domestic Demand Growth Rate g 6.7% 9.6% 9.4% 6.5% 5% 1.8% -1.5% CPI Index h 27.9 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 10.1 5.4 FDI Inflow (%GDP)i 0.7% 1.9% 2.1% 3.1% 4.1% 5.1% 3.7% FDI Stock ($US Billions)j $7.843 $11.463 $14.587 $22.479 $26.075 $33.603 $42.433 Real Effective Exchange Rate k 100 108.8 111.4 117 112.3 121.6 138.3 Lending Interest Rate l 33.5 26.1 25 24.5 17 20 18.4 # of Banks m 81 81 83 83 77 77 NA % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)n 33% 30% 18% 16% 9% 9% 10% % of Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't o 68.3% 66.6% 49.3% 48.1% NA NA NA Investment (% GDP)p 19.8% 21.9% 24.6% 26.2% 26.4% 26.3% 22.5% (e) a IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: all years b,c IMF Poland C.R. 00/61: 1995; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Poland C.R. 02/127: 2001 d WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years e IMF Poland C.R.00/45: 1995; IMF Poland C.R. 01/56: 1996, 1997; IMF Poland C.R. 02/127: 1998, 1999, 2000; f IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 g IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: all years h IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years i,j, UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years k,l IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years m IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: 1997, 1998, 1999 ; IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: 2000 n , p IMF Poland C.R. 99/32:1995, 1996; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 o IMF Poland C.R. 99/32: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998

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162 Table D4. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)a 19% 27% 35% 37% 51% 60% 64% Domestic Credit (% GDP)b NA 33.5% 34.9% 36.4% 39% 37.5% 37.1% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)c 13% 15% 19% 20% 24% 30% 19% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP)d 4% 6% 8% 13% 18% NA NA Primary Enrollment e 98% 96% 96% 99% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment f 96% 98% 98% 87% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment g 27% 24% 25% NA NA NA NA Unemploy't Rate h 15.2% 13.2% 10.5% 10.4% 13% 15% 16.2% Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)i 6.6% 6.5% 6.5% 6. 4% 6.6% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)j 1.1% 5.3% 3. 8% 10.2% 10.7% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)k 0.7% 1.9% 2.1% 3.1% 4.1% 5.1% 3.7% Investment (% GDP)l 19.8% 21.9% 24.6% 26.2% 26.4% 26.3% 22.5% (e) Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)m 3.5% 3.3% 3.1% 2.8% 2.7% 2.3% 2.4% Gov't Intervention Rating n 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 a IMF Poland C.R. 99/32:1995, 1996; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b IMF Poland C.R. 02/127; all years c IMF W. P. 01/141: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Poland C.R. 02,127: 2000, 2001 d IMF W. P. 01/141: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 e,f,g , j WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart h IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years i UNECE, 2001: 1995-1999 k UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years l IMF Poland C.R. 99/32:1995, 1996; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 m IMF Poland C.R. 00/61:1995,1996; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128:1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 n The Heritage Foundation Poland Reports: all years

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163 Table D-4.Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Industry’s Share of Economy (% GDP)a 38.9% 37.5% 37.3% 36. 3% 35.8% 36.2% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate b 10.4% 7.6% 10.3% 4.3% 3% 6.8% NA % Goods Exported To the EU c 70.1% 66.5% 64.2% 70. 9% 70.6% 76% 69.2% % Goods Imported From the EU d 64.7% 63.9% 63. 8% 69.9% 65.0% 61.2% 61.4% % of Employment in SMEs e NA NA 60.6% NA NA NA NA a,b WB 2002 World Development Indicators Da tabase all years represented in chart c,d IMF Poland C.R. 01/67: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Poland C.R. 02/128: 2001 e UNECE “Development of SME sector in the Visegrad Countries” by Antal Szabo: 1997 Table D-5. Hungary Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Tariff Rating b 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 Gov't Intervention Rating c 2 3 3 3 2.5 1.5 2 Private Sector (%GDP)d 60% 70% 75% 80% 80% 80% 80% (e) # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating g 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating h 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 Regulation Rating i 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 Property/Legal System Rating j 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Current Account Balance(%GDP)k -5.7% -3.7% -2.1% -4.9% -4.4% -2.8% -2.1% Public Debt (%GDP) l 86.4% 72.8% 63.9% 61.9% 60.7% 57.6% 53.2% a,b,c,g,h,i,j The Heritage Foundation Hungary Reports: all years d , l IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years k , IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/109: 2001

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164 Table D-5. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)a 70.9% 61% 54.6% 55.8% 64.5% 65.7% 65.1% GDP Growth Rate b 1.5% 1.3% 4.6% 4.9% 4.5% 5.2% 3.8% Exports (%GDP)c 34.4% 39.8% 45.5% 50.6% 53% 61.2% 60.5% Agriculture (%GDP)d 6.2% NA NA NA NA NA NA Export Growth e 12.4% 8.4% 26. 4% 20.4% 8.7% 11.3% 10.8% Unemployment Rate f 10.2% 9.9% 8.7% 7.8% 7% 6.4% 5.7% General Gov't Budget Balance(% GDP)g -6.4% -3.5% -4.8% 4.8% 3.7% -3.7% -3.3% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)h about 50% 47.20%49.7% 47.7% 46.6% 46.7% 45.8% Government Consumption (%GDP)I 11.3% 10.7% 10.5% 10.2% 10.2% 9.8% 11% Per Capita Income j $4,140 $4,350 $4,510 $4,480 $4,620 $4,710 $4,800 Trade Balance (in % GDP)k -3.9% -2.6% -1.2% -2.1% -2.5% -4.0% -2.1% Inflation Rate l 28.3% 23.5% 18.3% 14.4% 8% 7% 12% Domestic Demand Growth Rate m -3.8% -0.8% 4.4% 7.8% 4.0% 5.1% 2.1% CPI Index n 28.3 23.5 18.3 14.3 10 9.8 9.2 FDI Inflow (%GDP)o 10% about 5%4% 3.5% 3% 2.5% NA FDI Stock ($US Billions)p $11.919 $14.961 $16.086 $18.517 $19.299 $19.804 $23.562 Real Effective Exchange Rate q 100 102.7 108 107.2 109 109.7 118.5 a IMF Hungary C.R. 00/59: 1995, 1996 IMF Hungary C.R. 02/109: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 2001 b, n I MF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years c, i,m IMF Hungary C.R. 97/104: 1995, 1996; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/109: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 d IMF Hungary C.R. 97/104: 1995 e IMF Hungary C.R. 00/59: 1995,1996, 1997; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/111: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 f, q IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years g,h IMF Hungary C.R. 97/104: 1995, 1996; IMF Hung ary C.R. 02/109: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 j WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years k IMF Hungary C.R.99/27: 1995; 1996; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/109: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 l IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 o,p UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years

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165 Table D-5. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Lending Interest Rate a 32.6% 27.3%21.8% 19.3% 16.3% 12.6% 12.1% # of Banks b 35 33 NA 37 36 33 41 % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)c NA NA NA 5% 6% NA Almost 0% % Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't d NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Investment (% GDP)e 24.1% 24.5%27.7% 29.7% 28.5% 31.1% 27.3% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)f 60% 67% NA 73% NA NA NA Domestic Credit (% GDP)g 36% 36% NA 58.5% 52.5% 52.9% 48% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)h 23% 23% 25% 23% 26% 10-25% 25% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP)I 5% 12% 33% 29% 31% NA NA Primary Enrollment j 97% 103%103% 82% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment k 81% 98% 97% 98% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment l 19% 25% 24% 34% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate m 10.2% 9.9% 8.7% 7.8% 7% 6.4% 5.7% Telecommun. & Transport (%GDP)n 9% 9.2% 9.7% 9.9% 10.2% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)o 48% 50% 50.3% 53.1% 54.6% NA NA a IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years b , c IMF Hungary C.R. 97/103: 1995, 1996 ; IMF Hungary W.P. 01/141: 1998, 1999; 2000 (bank # only), IMF Hungary C.R. 02/112: bank # 2001 e IMF Hungary C.R. 97/104: 1995, 1996; IMF Hung ary C.R. 02/109: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2000 f IMF Hungary C.R. 97/103: 1995, 1996; IMF Hungary W.P. 01/141: 1998 g IMF Hungary C.R. 97/103: 1995, 1996; Hungary IMF C.R. 00/59: 1998, 1999; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/109: 2000, 2001 h IMF W. P. 01/141: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/112: 2000, 2001 i IMF W. P. 01/141: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 j,k,l,o WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart m IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years n UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999

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166 Table D-5. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 FDI Inflow (%GDP)a 10% about 5%4% 3.5% 3% 2.5% NA Investment (% GDP)b 24.1% 24.5% 27.7% 29. 7% 28.5% 31.1% 27.3% Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)c 3.8% 3.9% 4.1% 4.6% 4.6% 4.3% 4.3% (p) Gov't Intervention Rating d 2 3 3 3 2.5 1.5 2 Industry’s Share of Economy (% GDP)e 32.3% 31.7% 33. 8% 33.7% 34% 33.4% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate f 5.9% 1.6% 11% 8% 7.2% 9.2% NA % Goods Exported To the EU g 62.8% 62.7% 71.2% 72. 9% 76.1% 75.1% 74.2% % Goods Imported From the EU h 61.5% 59.8% 62.8% 64.1% 65.1% 58.4% 57.8% % of Employment in SMEs I NA NA 45.9% NA NA NA NA a UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years b,c,g,h IMF Hungary C.R. 97/104: 1995, 1996; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/109: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 d The Heritage Foundation Hungary Reports: all years i UNECE “Development of SME sector in the Visegrad Countries” by Antal Szabo: 1997 e,f WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart Table D-6. Czech Republic Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Tariff Rating b 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 Gov't Intervention Rating c 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Private Sector (%GDP)d 67% 72% 76% 78% 77% 80% 75% # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating g 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating h 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a,b,c,g,h The Heritage Foundation Czech Republic Reports: all years d IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years

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167 Table D-6. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Regulation Rating a 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 Property/Legal System Rating b 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Current Account Balance(%GDP)kc -2.6% -7.2% -6 .8% -2.3% -2.7% -5.2% -4.6% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio d 15.3% 13.1% 13% 13.1% 14.5% 17% 19.5% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)e 33.1% 36.6% 41. 1% 43.7% 43.1% 43.7% 38.5% GDP Growth Rate f 5.9% 4.3% -0.8% -1.2% -0.4% 2.9% 3.6% Export Growth g NA 6% -1.2% 13% -0.1% 7.8% 12.7% Exports(% GDP)h 48% 48.3% 42.2% 45.4% 48% 56.5% 51.6% (p) Agriculture (% GDP)I 4.4% 4.3% 4.1% 4.3% 3.9% 4% 3.8% Unemployment Rate j 3.5% 4% 4.8% 6.1% 8.6% 9% 8.1% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)k -2.5% -2.3% -2.3% -1.4% -3.1% -3.5% -2.4% (p) General Government Expenditure (% GDP)l 41.5% 40.6% 40.9% 40.9% 41.9% 43.7% 44.7% (p) Government Consumption (%GDP)m 20.6% 20.5% 19.8% 19.4% 20.3% 20.3% 19.9% Per Capita Income n $4,420 $5,150 $5,280 $5,160 $5,130 $5,250 $5,270 Trade Balance (in % GDP)o NA NA -9.2% -4.6% -3.5% -6.1% -5.5% Inflation Rate p 9.1% 8.8% 8.4% 10.7% 3% 1% 6% a,b The Heritage Foundation Czech Republic Reports: all years c , j IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Year book; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Czech Republic C.R. 02/168: 2001 d IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years e,i IMF Czech Republic C.R. 00/119: 1995, 1996 IMF Czech Republic C.R. 02/168: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 2001 f IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years g IMF Czech Republic C.R. 01/110: 1996; IMF Czech Republic C.R.02/167 :1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 h IMF Czech Republic C.R. 96/147: 1995, 1996; IMF Czech Republic C.R. 02/167: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 k,l,m IMF Czech Republic C.R. 99/91: 1995, 1996, 1997 ; IMF Czech Republic C. R 02/168: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 n WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years o IMF Hungary C.R. 99/27: 1995; 1996; IMF Hungary C.R. 02/109: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 p IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001

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168 Table D-6. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Domestic Demand Growth Rate a NA NA NA NA 0.3% 4% 4.9% CPI Index b 9 8.8 8. 5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 FDI Inflow (%GDP)c about 4.9% 2.2% 3.6% 4.4% about 11.5% 8.5% 8.7% FDI Stock ($US Billions)d $7.350 $8.572 $9.234 $14.375 $17.552 $21.644 $26.764 Real Effective Exchange Rate e 100 106.7 107.5 116.3 114.7 114.8 121.3 Lending Interest Rate f 12.8% 12.5% 13.2% 12.8% 8.7% 7.2% 7% # of Banks g 55 53 50 45 42 42 NA % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)h NA NA NA 11% 10% 10% NA % of Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't i NA NA NA 23.2% 23.2% NA NA Investment (% GDP)j 32% 34.9% 32.8% 29.7% 28.1% 29.7% 30.0% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)k 22% 25% 28% 29% 33% 43% NA Domestic Credit (% GDP)l 67.3% 65.5% 66.7% 58.7% 55.6% 53.9% 46.9% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)m 66.6% 64.7% 65.4% 56.9% 52.6% 48.6% 35.9% Stock Market Capitalization (% GDP)n 30% 31% 24% 21% 19% NA NA Primary Enrollment o 96% 104% 104% 90% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment p 96% 99% 99% 82% NA NA NA a IMF Czech Republic C.R. 02/167: 1999, 2000, 2001 b IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years c,d UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years e,f IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years g,h,i,k IMF Czech Republic C.R. 99/90: 1995, 1996, 1997 ; IMF W.P. 01/141: 1998, 1999, 2000 j IMF Czech Republic C.R 99/91: 1995; IMF Czech Republic C.R. 00/96: 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Czech Republic C.R. 02/167: 1999, 2000, 2001 l,m IMF Czech Republic C.R. 00/119: 1995; Hungary IMF C. R. 01/112: 1996; IMF Czech Republic C.R.02/168: 1997, 1998, 1999,2000,2001 n IMF W. P. 01/141: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 o,p WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart

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169 Table D-6. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Tertiary Enrollment a 21% 23% 24% 26% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate b 3.5% 4% 4.8% 6.1% 8.6% 9% 8.1% Telecommun. & Transport (%GDP)c 8.1% 7.7% 8.2% 8. 4% 9.7% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)d 23.1% 23.8% 23% 25.4% 27.6% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)e about 4.9% 2.2% 3.6% 4.4% about 11.5% 8.5% 8.7% Investment (% GDP)f 32% 34.9% 32.8% 29.7% 28.1% 29.7% 30.0% Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)g 8.5% 8.2% 8.3% 8.4% 8.9% 7.9% 9.7% (p) Gov't Intervention Rating h 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Industry’s Share of Economy (% GDP)i 44.2% 44.8% 44. 1% 41.5% 40.8% 41% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate j 10% 9% -1.4% -10.2% -3.8% 4.3% NA % Goods Exported To the EU k 60.9% 58.2% 59.9% 64.2% 69.2% 68.5% 68.9% (p) % Goods Imported From the EU l 61.1% 62.4% 61. 5% 63.5% 64.2% 62% 61.8% (p) % of Employment in SMEs m 66.4% NA 43.6% NA NA NA NA a,d, i, j WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart b IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years c UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 e UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years f IMF Czech Republic C.R 99/91: 1995; IMF Czech Republic C.R. 00/96: 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Czech Republic C.R. 02/167: 1999, 2000, 2001 g IMF Czech Republic C.R. 99/90: 19 95,1996, 1997, 19 98, 1999; IMF Czech Repub lic C.R. 02/ 168: 2000, 2001 h The Heritage Foundation Czech Republic Reports: all years k,l IMF Czech Republic C.R. 99/91: 1995, 1996; IMF Czech Republic C.R. 02168: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 m UNECE “SMEs in Countries in Transition” IND/AC 3.1/1 1996: 1995; UNECE “Development of SME sector in the Visegrad Countries” by Antal Szabo: 1997

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170 Table D-7. Slovak Republic Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Tariff Rating b 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 Gov't Intervention Rating c 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 Private Sector (%GDP)d 60% 70% 75% 75% 75% 80% 80% (e) # New Firms e NA 4231 5953 6515 -2001 2587 1947 # Bankruptcies f 1530 1321 1755 1831 2161 2008 2351 FI Barrier Rating g 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 Bank/Finance Rating h 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Regulation Rating i 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 Property/Legal System Rating j 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 Current Account Balance(%GDP)k 2.1% -10.6% -9.6% -10% -5.9% -3.5% -8.6% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio l 24.6% 24.5% 23. 7% 26% 28.4% 30.4% 34% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)m NA 38.8% 50.9% 54.1% 52.1% 54.6% 55.8% GDP Growth Rate n 6.7% 6.2% 6.2% 4.1% 1.9% 2.2% 3.3% Exports (%GDP)o 57.4% 53.2% 56.1% 59.2% 61% 71.8% 74% Agriculture (%GDP)p 5.3% 4.8% 4.6% 4.2% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% Export Growth q NA 2.9% 9. 6% 11.1% -4.8% 16.3% 6.4% Unemployment Rate r 13.2% 11.1% 10.9% 11.9% 16% 18.6% 18.6% a,b,c , g,h,i,j The Heritage Foundation Slovak Republic Reports: all years d , l IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years e , o,p , IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/209: all years f IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/198: all years k , r IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: 2001 m IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 2001 (used GDP in US$ from IMF and WB databases) n IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years q IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/209: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001

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171 Table D-7. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)a 0.4% -1.3% -5.2% -4.7% -3.3% -3.5% -4% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)b 48.3% 44.9% 46.2% 43.9% 44% 42.7% 39.6% Government Consumption (%GDP)c 20.7% 22.8% 21.7% 21.8% 19.8% 19.8% 20% Per Capita Income d $3,090 $3,550 $3,860 $3,870 $3,770 $3,700 $3,700 Trade Balance (in % GDP)e 1.7% -11.2% -9.5% -10.6% -4.3% -2.4% -8.5% Inflation Rate f 9.9% 5.8% 6.1% 6.7% 7% 6% 5.3% Domestic Demand Growth Rate g 10.3% 17.9% 3.8% 6.9% -6.2% 0% 7.2% CPI Index h 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.7 12 7.3 FDI Inflow (%GDP)i NA NA 1.1% 3.1% 1.9% 10.5% 7.2% FDI Stock ($US Billions)j $0.810 $1.379 $1.539 $2.267 $2.868 $4.634 $6.109 Real Effective Exchange Rate k 100 99.68 104.62 102.34 99.92 109.26 107.78 Lending Interest Rate l 16.9% 13.9% 18.7% 21.2% 21.1% 14.9% 11.2% # of Banks m NA NA 29 25 23 21 21 % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)n NA NA 17% 20% 22% 19% 20% a IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 99/112 : 1995, 1996, 1997; IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/209: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 99/112 : 1995; IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 c,e, g IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: all years d WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years f IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 h IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years i,j UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years k,l IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years m,n IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 99/112: 1997; IMF W.P. 01/141: 1998, 1999; 2000; IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/198: 2001

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172 Table D-7. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't a 69% NA 53.8% 50% 47.1% NA 7.4% Investment (% GDP)b 26.5% 33.6% 35.2% 34.7% 28.2% 26.4% 31.9% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)c NA NA 45% 44% 43% 48% 80% Domestic Credit (% GDP)d 50% 68.5% 66.1% 70.3% 68.9% 67.2% 69.9% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)e 28% 32% 45% 46% 39% 31% 41.5% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP)f 7% 12% 9% 5% 4% NA NA Primary Enrollment g 97% 102% 102% 101% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment h 91% 94% 94% 86% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment i 20% 22% 22% 27% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate j 13.2% 11.1% 10.9% 11.9% 16% 18.6% 18.6% Telecommun. & Transport (%GDP)k 8.6% 8.7% 8.4% 10. 8% 11.1% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)l 72% 73.1% 73. 1% 72.9% 71.5% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)m NA NA 1.1% 3. 1% 1.9% 10.5% 7.2% Investment (% GDP)n 26.5% 33.6% 35.2% 34.7% 28.2% 26.4% 31.9% a IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 99/112: 1995, 1997 ; IMF W.P. 01/141: 1998, 1999; Slovak Republic C.R. 02/198: 2001 b , n IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: all years c IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 99/112: 1997 ; IMF W.P. 01/141: 1998, 1999, 2000; Slovak Republic C.R. 02/198: 2001 d IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: 1995; Slovak Republ ic C.R. 02/209: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 e,f IMF W. P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: 2000, 2001 g,h,i , l WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart j IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years k UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 m UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years

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173 Table D-7. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)a NA 3.8% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 3.9% 2.6% Gov't Intervention Rating b 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)c 36.1% 36.7% 33. 8% 31.9% 31.6% 31% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate d 24.2% 5.8% -2.4% -2.9% 0.9% 0.4% NA % Goods Exported To the EU e 37.4% 41.3% 47. 1% 55.5% 59.5% 58.8% 59.9% % Goods Imported From the EU f 34.8% 37.3% 43.6% 49.7% 51.7% 48.8% 49% % of Employment in SMEs g 32.8% NA 59.4% NA NA NA NA a IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b The Heritage Foundation Slovak Republic Reports: all years c,d WB 2002 World Development Indicators Da tabase all years represented in chart e,f IMF Slovak Republic C.R. 02/210: all years g UNECE “SMEs in Countries in Transition” IND/AC 3.1/1 1996: 1995; UNECE “Development of SME sector in the Visegrad Countries” by Antal Szabo: 1997 Table D-8: Slovenia Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a NA 3 3 3 3 3 3 Tariff Rating b NA 4 4 4 4 3 3 Gov't Intervention Rating c NA 2 3 3 3 3 3 Private Sector (%GDP)d 45% 45% 50% 50% 55% 65% 65% (e) # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating g NA 4 3 2 2 3 3 Bank/Finance Rating h NA 2 2 2 2 3 3 Regulation Rating i NA 3 3 3 3 3 2 a,b,c , g,h,i The Heritage Foundation Slovenia Reports: all years d IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years

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174 Table D-8. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Property/Legal System Rating a NA 4 3 2 2 2 2 Current Account Balance(%GDP)b -0.5% 0.2% 0.1% -0.8% -3.9% -3.4% -0.4% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio c 18.8% 22.7% 23.2% 23.7% 24.5% 25.1% 25.4% (p) External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)d 28.6% 21.1% 22.6% 25.1% 26.9% 34.3% 36% (p) GDP Growth Rate e 4.1% 3.5% 4.6% 3.8% 5.2% 4.6% 3% Exports (%GDP)f 44.7% 44.1% 46.2% 46.4% 42.9% 48.7% 50.2% Agriculture (%GDP)g 3.9% 3.9% 3. 9% (e)NA NA NA NA Export Growth h 1.1% 3.3% 11.6% 6.7% 1.7% 12.7% 7% Unemployment Rate i 7.4% 7.3% 7.1% 7.7% 7.4% 7% 6.4% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)j 0.1% 0.4% -1.7% -0.9% -0.9% -1.4% -1.6% (p) General Government Expenditure (% GDP)k 43.1% 42.4% 43.2% 43.6% 44.2% 44.1% 44.6% (p) Government Consumption (%GDP)l 20.2% 20.1% 20.4% 19. 7% 19.5% 19.4% 21.30% Per Capita Income m $8,290 $9,290 $9,870 $9,720 $9,980 $10,050 $9,780 Trade Balance (in % GDP)n -5.1% -4.4% -4.3% -4% -6.2% -6.3% -3.3% (p) a The Heritage Foundation Slovenia Reports: all years b IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years c Slovenia C.R. 02/77: all years d Slovenia C.R. 01/76: 1995, 1996; Slovenia C.R. 02/77: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 e IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years f IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/78: all years g IMF Slovenia C.R. 99/23: 1995, 1996, 1997 h IMF Slovenia C.R. 00/56: 1995, 1996; IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/77: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: 2001 i IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/78: 2000, 2001 j,k Slovenia C.R. 01/76: 1995; Slovenia C.R. 02/77: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 l Slovenia C.R. 99/23: 1995, 1996, 1997; Slovenia C.R. 02/78: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 m WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years n IMF Slovenia C.R. 01/76: 1995, 1996; Slovenia C.R. 02/77: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001

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175 Table D-8. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Inflation Rate a 12.6% 9.7% 9.1% 8.6% 7% 6% 10% Domestic Demand Growth Rate b 9.9% 3% 5.1% 3.9% 5.6% 1.4% 0.1% (e) CPI Index c 13.5 9.9 8.4 8 6.1 8.9 8.4 FDI Inflow (%GDP)d 0.9% 1% 2% 1.3% 0.9% 1% 2.4% FDI Stock ($US Billions)e $1.763 $1.998 $2.207 $2.766 $2.657 $2.809 $3.250 Real Effective Exchange Rate f 100 97.1 97.8 100.8 100 97.6 97.7 Lending Interest Rate g 23.4% 22.6% 20% 16.1% 12.4% 15.8% 15.1% # of Banks h 33 31 28 24 25 25 28 % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)i 9% 10% 11% 8% 8% 8% NA % Total Banking Sector Assets onwed By Gov't j NA NA NA 39.7% 47.1% NA NA Investment (% GDP)k 21.4% 22.5% 24.1% 25.6% 28.4% 27.8% 25.3% Foreign Ownership of pBanks (% of Total Banks)l 18% 13% 14% 13% 20% 20% NA Domestic Credit (% GDP)m 42.4% 41.5% 41.7% 45.6% 48.5% 51.2% 53.3% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)n 27% 29% 29% 35% 37% NA NA Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP)o 2% 4% 9% 13% 11% NA NA Primary Enrollment p 98% 98% 98% 94% NA 94% NA Secondary Enrollment q 91% 92% 92% 99% NA NA NA a IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 b IMF Slovenia C.R. 00/56:1995, 1996, 1997; Slovenia C.R. 02/77: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 c IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years d,e UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years f,g IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years h,i,j,l IMF Slovenia C.R. 01/161: 1995, 1996, 1997 ; IMF W.P. 01/141: 1998, 1999, 2000 k IMF Slovenia C.R 01/76: 1995, 1996; IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/77: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 m IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/77: all years n,o IMF W. P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 p,q WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart

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176 Table D-8. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Tertiary Enrollment a 32% 36% 36% 53% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate b 7.4% 7.3% 7.1% 7.7% 7.4% 7% 6.4% Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)c 7.7% 7.6% 8% 8.2% 8.2% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)d 52.8% 56% 53. 7% 52.1% 54.1% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)e 0.9% 1% 2% 1.3% 0.9% 1% 2.4% Investment (% GDP)f 21.4% 22.5% 24.1% 25.6% 28.4% 27.8% 25.3% Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)g 1.9% 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4% (p) Gov't Intervention Rating h NA 2 3 3 3 3 3 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)i 38.5% 38.5% 38.2% 38. 5% 38.3% 38.3% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate j 3.1% 3% 6.5% 4.2% 4% 7.1% NA % Goods Exported To the EU k 67.0% 64.6% 63. 6% 65.5% 66.1% 63.9% 62.2% % Goods Imported From the EU l 66.8% 67.5% 67.4% 69.4% 68.9% 67.8% 67.6% % of Employment in SMEs m 21.5% NA NA NA NA NA NA a , d , i,j WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart b IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/78: 2000, 2001 c UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 e UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years f IMF Slovenia C.R 01/76: 1995, 1996; IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/77: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 g IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/78: all years h The Heritage Foundation Slovenia Reports: all years k,l IMF Slovenia C.R. 02/78: all years m UNECE “SMEs in Countries in Transition” IND/AC 3.1/1 1996: 1995

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177 Table D-9. Estonia Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Tariff Rating b 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 Gov't Intervention Rating c 2 2 2 2 2.5 2 2 Private Sector (%GDP)d 65% 70% 70% NA NA NA NA # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating g 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bank/Finance Rating h 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Regulation Rating i 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Property/Legal System Rating j 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Current Account Balance(%GDP)k -4.4% -9.1% -12.2% -9.2% -5.7% -5.8% -6.2% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio l NA NA 7.6% 5.8% 6.5% 5.9% 5.7% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)m NA NA 57.4% 53.3% 58.7% 59.4% 61% GDP Growth Rate n 4.6% 4% 10.4% 5% -0.7% 6.9% 5% Export Growth o NA NA 42. 8% 16.7% 1.3% 38% 7.3% Exports (% GDP)p 72.4% 67.1% 78.4% 79.7% 77.2% 95.4% 91.7% Agriculture (% GDP)q 7.9% 7.5% 7.9% 7.2% 6.7% 6.3% 6.3% Unemployment Rate r 9.7% 10% 9.7% 9.9% 12.3% 13.7% 12.6% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)s -1.3% -1.5% 2.2% -0.3% -4.6% -0.7% 0.4% a,b,c , g,h,i,j The Heritage Foundation Estonia Reports: all years d IMF Estonia C.R. 99/74: 1995, 1996, 1997 k , r IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years l IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years m IMF Estonia C.R. 02/133: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 2001 n IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years o IMF Estonia C.R. 01/97: 1997; IMF Estonia C.R. 02/134: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 p,q IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995, 1996: IMF Estonia C.R. 02/133: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 s IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995, 1996; IMF Estonia C.R. 02/134: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001

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178 Table D-9. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 General Government Expenditure (% GDP)a 41.4% 40.4% 37.6% 39. 6% 43% 39.4% 38.3% Government Consumption (%GDP)b 25.4% 24.1% 22.1% 21.8% 23.7% 21.8% 20.7% Per Capita Income c $3,030 $3,220 $3,400 $3,450 $3,490 $3,580 $3,810 Trade Balance (in % GDP)d -18.7% -23.4% -24.4% -21. 2% -15.8% -15.8% -14.5% Inflation Rate e 28.8% 23.1% 10.6% 10.7% 4% 5% -0.5% Domestic Demand Growth Rate f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA CPI Index g 29% 23.1 11.2 8.1 3.3 4 5.8 FDI Inflow (%GDP)h 5.6% 3.4% 5.8% 11.1% 5.9% 7.7% 10% FDI Stock ($US Billions)i $0.674 $0.825 $1.148 $1.822 $2.475 $2.645 $3.155 Real Effective Exchange Rate j 100 108 110.1 123.8 137.6 130.7 131.6 Lending Interest Rate k 16.0% 13.7% 19.8% 16.7% 8.7% 7.6% 9.4% # of Banks l 15 14 11 5 NA NA NA % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)m NA NA NA NA NA NA NA % of Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't n NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Investment (% GDP)o 26.7% 27.8% 30.9% 29.4% 24.5% 24.6% 26.7% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)p NA NA NA NA NA NA NA a,d IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995, 1996; IMF Estonia C.R. 02/134: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Estonia C.R. 02/133: 2000, 2001 c WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years e IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 g IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years h,i UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years j IMF Estonia Public Information Notice (P.I.N.) 99/55: 1995, 1996; IMF Estonia (P.I.N.) 02/68: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 k IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years l IMF Estonia C.R. 99/74: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 o IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Estonia C.R. 02/133: 2000, 2001

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179 Table D-9. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Domestic Credit (% GDP)a 12.8% 19.9% 32.5% 32.9% 34.8% 39.5% 44.1% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)b 15% 18% 26.5% 25.3% 26% 26% 28% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP)c NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Primary Enrollment d 91% 94% 94% 96% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment e 86% 104% 104% 104% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment f 38% 42% 42% 47% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate g 9.7% 10% 9.7% 9.9% 12.3% 13.7% 12.6% Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)h 10.5% 10.8% 12.2% 13. 8% 14.5% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)i 38.4% 33.6% 33. 4% 38.7% 39.4% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)j 5.6% 3.4% 5.8% 11.1% 5.9% 7.7% 10% Investment (% GDP)k 26.7% 27.8% 30.9% 29.4% 24.5% 24.6% 26.7% Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)l 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% Gov't Intervention Rating m 2 2 2 2 2.5 2 2 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)n 29.7% 28.7% 27. 9% 28.1% 25.7% 27% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate o 7.6% 4.4% 14.6% 7.3% -6.6% 3.3% NA % Goods Exported To the EU p 54.7% 51% 56.6% 61.7% NA NA NA a,b IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995, 1996; Estonia IMF C.R. 02/133: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 d , e,f,i , n,o WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart g IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years h UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 j UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years k IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Estonia C.R. 02/133: 2000, 2001 l IMF Estonia C.R. 00/102: 1995,1996; IMF Estonia C.R. 02/133:1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 m The Heritage Foundation Estonia Reports: all years p IMF Estonia C.R. 99/74: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998

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180 Table D-9. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 % Goods Imported From the EU a 66% 66.4% 75.3% 75.7% NA NA NA % of Employment in SMEs b 54.1% NA NA NA NA NA NA a IMF Estonia C.R. 99/74: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 b UNECE “SMEs in Countries in Transition” IND/AC 3.1/1 1996: 1995 Table D-10. Latvia Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a NA 2 2 2 2 2 2 Tariff Rating b NA 4 4 2 2 2 2 Gov't Intervention Rating c NA 2 2 2 2 2 3 Private Sector (%GDP)d 60% 60% 60% NA NA NA NA # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating g NA 3 2 2 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating h NA 3 2 2 2 2 2 Regulation Rating i NA 3 2 3 3 3 3 Property/Legal System Rating j NA 3 3 3 3 3 3 Current Account Balance(%GDP)k -0.4% -5.4% -6 .1% -10.7% -9.8% -6.9% -10.0% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio l 16.1% 14.4% 12% 10.5% 13% 13.2% 13.8% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)m NA 41.1% 49.6% 49.1% 57.2% 66.6% 71.2% (e) GDP Growth Rate n -0.8% 3.3% 8.6% 3.9% 1.1% 6.6% 7% Exports (%GDP)o 46.9% 50.9% 51% 51.3% 43.8% 45.8% 45.7% a,b,c , g,h,i,j The Heritage Foundation Latvia Reports: all years d IMF Latvia C.R. 98/47: 1995, 1996, 1997 k IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years l IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years m IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001 n IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years o IMF Latvia C.R. 99/77 1995; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001

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181 Table D-10. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Agriculture (%GDP)a 7.7% 6.7% 5.6% 4.2% 4.1% 4.2% 4.1% Export Growth b 32% 28.3% 9.4% 9.4% -6.1% 9% 7% Unemployment Rate c 6.6% 7.2% 7% 9.2% 9.1% 7.8% 7.7% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)d -3.9% -1.8% 0.3% -0.8% -3.9% -3.3% -1.9% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)e 40.5% 39% 40.7% 43.3% 44% 40.7% 37.8% Government Consumption (%GDP)f NA 21.6% 19.1% 21.4% 20.5% 19% NA Per Capita Income g $2,160 $2,190 $2,300 $2,390 $2,520 $2,920 $3,260 Trade Balance (in % GDP)h -13% -15.5% 15% -18.6% -15.4% -14.8% -17.9% (e) Inflation Rate i 25% 17.6% 3.5% 4.6% 7% 4% 2% Domestic Demand Growth Rate j NA NA NA NA NA NA NA CPI Index k 25 17.6 8. 4 4.6 2.4 2.6 2.5 FDI Inflow (%GDP)l 4% 7.4% 9.2% 5.9% 5.2% 5.7% 2.7% FDI Stock ($US Billions)m $0.615 $0.936 $1.272 $1.557 $1.795 $2.081 $2.216 Real Effective Exchange Rate n NA 95.2 100 115.8 125.4 125.6 NA Lending Interest Rate o 34.6% 25.8% 15.3% 14.3% 14.2% 11.9% 11.2% a IMF Latvia C.R. 00/100: 1995, 1996; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/149: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b IMF Latvia C.R. 00/78: 1996, 1997; IMF Latvia C.R. 10: 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: 2001 c IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/77: 1995; MF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001 d,e IMF Latvia C.R. 00/100: 1995; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001 f IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 g WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years h IMF Latvia C.R.00/100: 1995; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001 i IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 k IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years l,m UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years n IMF Latvia P.I.N. 02/5: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 o IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years

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182 Table D-10. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 # of Banks a 42 35 31 27 23 21 NA % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)b 5% 6% 6% 7% NA NA NA % Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't c 15.2% 7.3% 6.4% 8.5% NA NA NA Investment (% GDP)d 17.6% 18.8% 22.8% 27.6% 27% 27.1% 27.7% (p) Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)e 26% 40% 52% 56% NA NA NA Domestic Credit (% GDP)f 14.1% 12.9% 14.6% 18% 19.1% 24.5% 30.5% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)g 8.7% 7.3% 11.1% 10% 15% 15% 28.9% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP)h NA 2.7% 5.3% 5.8% 5.4% 7.5% NA Primary Enrollment i 89% 96% 96% 94% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment j 85% 84% 84% 87% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment k 26% 33% 33% 51% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate l 6.6% 7.2% 7% 9.2% 9.1% 7.8% 7.7% Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)m 16% 17% 16.8% 16.7% 15.3% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)n 81.9% 76% 62.8% 58. 3% 60.8% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)o 4% 7.4% 9.2% 5.9% 5.2% 5.7% 2.7% a IMF Latvia C.R. 99/99: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1999, 2000 b,c,e IMF Latvia. C.R. 99/99: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 d IMF Latvia C.R. 00/100: C.R. 97/104: 1995; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Latvia C.R. 10: 2001 f IMF Latvia C.R.00/100: 1995, 1996; Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001 g IMF Latvia C.R. 99/99: 1995, 1996; Latvia C.R. 02/ 11: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001 h IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 i,j,k,l WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart m IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/149: 2001 n UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 o UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years

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183 Table D-10. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Investment (% GDP)a 17.6% 18.8% 22.8% 27.6% 27% 27.1% 27.7% (p) Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)b NA 0.8% 5.2% 4.7% 5.2% 5% NA Gov't Intervention Rating c NA 2 2 2 2 2 3 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)d 33.1% 31.1% 32.2% 30. 2% 27% 25.3% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate e -8.6% 3.3% 12.9% 6% -3.4% 5.1% NA % Goods Exported To the EU f 44% 44.7% 48. 9% 56.6% 62.5% 64.6% NA % Goods Imported From the EU g 49.9% 49.3% 53.2% 55.3% 54.5% 52.4% NA % of Employment in SMEs h 22% NA NA NA NA NA NA a IMF Latvia C.R. 00/100: 1995 IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Latvia C.R. 10: 2001 b IMF Latvia C.R. 00/78: 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Latvia C.R. 10: 1999, 2000 c The Heritage Foundation Latvia Reports: all years d,e WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database: all years represented in chart f,g IMF Latvia C.R. 00/100: 1995; IMF Latvia C.R. 02/11 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 h UNECE “SMEs in Countries in Transition” IND/AC 3.1/1 1996: 1995 Table D-11. Lithuania Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a NA 3 3 3 3 3 2 Tariff Rating b NA 4 2 1 1 1 1 Gov't Intervention Rating c NA 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 Private Sector (%GDP)d 65% 68% 70% NA NA NA NA # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f 36 76 110 98 247 414 388( by Sept.) FI Barrier Rating g NA 3 2 2 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating h NA 4 3 3 3 3 3 a,b,c , g,h The Heritage Foundation Lithuania Reports: all years d IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/96: 1995; Lithuania C.R. WB Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization Database; 1996, 1997 f IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/96: 1995, 1996, 1997; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001

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184 Table D-11. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Regulation Rating a NA 3 3 3 3 3 3 Property/Legal System Rating b NA 3 3 3 3 3 3 Current Account Balance(%GDP)c -10.2% -9.2% -10.2% -12.1%-11.2%-6% -4.8% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio d 14.3% 15% 16.2% 22.8% 29% 28.8% 29.1% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)e 13.7% 30.2% 34% 34.8% 42.6% 42.9% 44.8% (p) GDP Growth Rate f 3.3% 4.7% 7.3% 5.1% -3.9% 3.9% 4.5% Exports (%GDP)g 53% 53.4% 54.5% 47.2% 39.7% 45.2% NA Agriculture (%GDP)h 10.7% 11.2% 10. 4% 9% 7.1% 8% NA Export Growth i NA NA 24.1% -2.9% -16.4%20.6% 17% Unemployment Rate j 7.3% 6.2% 6. 7% 6.5% 10% 12.6% 12.9% (p) General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)k -4.8% -4.5% -1.8% -5.9% -8.5% -2.7% -1.9% (p) General Government Expenditure (% GDP)l 36.8% 34.2% 33.7% 38.1% 40.2% 33.2% 31.4% Government Consumption (%GDP)m 19.7% 18.9% 19% 24.4% 22.2% 21.3% NA Per Capita Income n $1,690 $1,910 $2,220 $2,540 $2,640 $2,930 $3,270 Trade Balance (in % GDP)o -11.6% -9.8% -10.6% -11.9%-10.3%-6.4% -5.8% Inflation Rate p 39.7% 24.6% 8.9% 5.1% 3% 2% 1% a,b The Heritage Foundation Lithuania Reports: all years c IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years d IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years e IMF Lithuania C.R. 01/40: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 , 1999; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 2000; IMF Lithuania 02/8: 2001 f IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years g,h IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/96: 1995; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 i IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/73: 1997; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/8: 1998; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/131: 1999, 2000; IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: 2001 j IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/131: 2001 k,l,o IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/96: 1995; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Lithuania C.R.: 02/131: 2001 m IMF Lithuania C.R. 01/40: 1995; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 n WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years p IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001

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185 Table D-11. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Domestic Demand Growth Rate a 5.8% -2% 0.8% 1.3% 3.9% 3.9% (p) NA CPI Index b 39.5 24.7 8.8 5.1 0.8 1 1.3 FDI Inflow (%GDP)c 1.2% 1.9% 3.7% 8.6% 4.6% 3.3% 3.7% FDI Stock ($US Billions)d $0.352 $0.700 $1.041 $1.625 $2.063 $2.334 $2.665 Real Effective Exchange Rate e 101.2 111. 6 127.1 138.5 151.5 158.5 NA Lending Interest Rate f 27.1% 21.6% 14.4% 12.2% 13.1% 12.1% 9.6% # of Banks g 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)h 25% 25% 23% 15% 14% 14% 7% % Total Banking Sector Assets Owned By Gov't i NA NA 44.2% 37.9% 35.9% 33.2% NA Investment (% GDP)j 24.7% 24.5% 26. 5% 24.4% 22.9% 20.7% 21.5% (p) Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)k NA 16.7% 7% 15% 21% 21% 27% Domestic Credit (% GDP)l 12.9% 8.5% 11.5% 12.1% 15.3% 11.2% 13.1% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)m 15.2% 11.1% 10.9% 11. 3% 13% 11.5% 11.6% Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP)n NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Primary Enrollment o 96% 98% 98% 94% 101% NA NA Secondary Enrollment p 84% 86% 86% 90% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment q 28% 31% 33% 41% NA NA NA a IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/96: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Lithuania C.R.01/40: 1999, Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 2000 b IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years c,d UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years e IMF Lithuania P.I.N. 99/68: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Lithuania P.I.N. 02/4: 1999, 2000 (reconfigured using 1995=100 index) f IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years g,h , k IMF Lithuania C.R. 99/96: 1995, 1996; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/19: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 i IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/19: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 j , l,m IMF Lithuania C.R. 01/40: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 2000; Lithuania C.R. 02/131: 2001 o,p,q WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart

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186 Table D-11. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Unemployment Rate a 7.3% 6.2% 6. 7% 6.5% 10% 12.6% 12.9% (p) Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)b 9.4% 9.5% 9. 6% 9.6% 11.5% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)c 59.1% 55.4% 56.7% 53. 3% 55.2% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)d 1.2% 1.9% 3.7% 8.6% 4.6% 3.3% 3.7% Investment (% GDP)e 24.7% 24.5% 26. 5% 24.4% 22.9% 20.7% 21.5% (p) Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)f 1.1% 1.3% 0.9% 0. 5% 0.4% 0.2% NA Gov't Intervention Rating g NA 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)h 34% 33.4% 33.4% 32.9% 31.3% 33% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate i 2.6% 3.2% 6.5% 9.4% -10.1%1.8% NA % Goods Exported To the EU j 36.4% 32.9% 32.5% 38% 50.1% 47.9% NA % Goods Imported From the EU k 37.1% 42.4% 46.5% 50.2% 49.7% 46.5% NA % of Employment in SMEs l NA NA NA NA NA NA NA a IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/131: 2001 b UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 c , g,i WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart d UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years e IMF Lithuania C.R. 01/40: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 2000; Lithuania C.R. 02/131: 2001 f , j,k IMF Lithuania C.R.99/96:1995; IMF Lithuania C.R. 02/9: 1996, 1997, 1998,. 1999, 2000 g The Heritage Foundation Lithuania Reports: all years Table D-12. Bulgaria Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Tariff Rating b 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 a,b The Heritage Foundation Bulgaria Reports: all years

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187 Table D-12. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Gov't Intervention Rating a 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 Private Sector (%GDP)b 48% 52% 57% 57% 57% 70% 72% (e) # New Firms c NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies d NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating e 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating f 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Regulation Rating g 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Property/Legal System Rating h 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Current Account Balance(%GDP)i -0.2% 0.2% 4.2% -0.5% -5.5% -5.8% 6.5% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio j 111.1% 105.8% 110. 4% 80.2% 87.7% 80.5% 70% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)k 77% 97% 100.4% 85.5% 84.2% 88.9% 78.3% GDP Growth Rate l 4.3% -10.9% -7% 3.5% 2.4% 5.8% 4.5% Export Growth m 35.8% -4.5% 2. 6% -12.9% -4.5% 20.1% 6% Exports (% GDP)n 44.7% 55.4% 58. 3% 47.0% 44.5% 55.7% 55.7% (p) Agriculture (% GDP)o 12.7% 14.2% 23.4% 16.8% 14.5% 12.3% 12.1% (p) Unemployment Rate p 14.7% 13.7% 15% 16% 17% 16.4% 19.5% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)q -5.6% -10.3% -2.4% 0.1% -0.9% -1% -0.9% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)r 41.3% 42% 33.1% 37% 39.6% 39.7% 38.6% Government Consumption (%GDP)s 15.2% 11.9% 12.5% 15.3% 16.6% 17.9% 17.6% a , e,f,g,h The Heritage Foundation Bulgaria Reports: all years b , j,n,o,p,r,q IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years i IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: 2001 k IMF Bulgaria C.R. 00/54: 1995, 1996 IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 2001 l IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years m IMF Bulgaria C.R. 01/53: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 ; IMF Bulgaria C.R 02/174: 1999, 2000, 2001 s IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years

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188 Table D-12. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Per Capita Income a $1,370 $1,200 $1,180 $1,230 $1,390 $1,520 $1,560 Trade Balance (% GDP)b 0.7% 1.4% 3.1% -3% -8.3% -9.3% -11.6% Inflation Rate c 62% 123% 949.1% 22.3% 3% 6% 7% Domestic Demand Growth Rate d NA NA NA 13.9% NA NA NA CPI Index e 62.1 121.6 1061.2 18.8 2.6 10.4 7.5 FDI Inflow (%GDP)f 0.7% 1.1% 4.9% 4.2% 6.3% 7.9% 5.1% FDI Stock ($US Billions)g $0.445 $0.554 $1.059 $1.547 $2.160 $3.162 $3.850 Real Effective Exchange Rate h 100 85.8 102.6 116.4 118.8 120.7 126.5 Lending Interest Rate i 59% 123.5% 24% 13.2% 12.8% 11.5% 11.1% # of Banks j NA NA NA NA NA NA 35 % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)k NA about 80% about 67% NA NA NA 19.8% % of Total Banking Sector Assets Owned by Gov't l NA NA NA NA 20% NA NA Investment (% GDP)m 15.7% 8.4% 11.9% 14.7% 17.9% 18.3% 20.4% Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)n NA NA NA NA NA NA 74% Domestic Credit (% GDP)o NA NA 29.5% 18.9% 17.7% 17.4% 18.5% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)p NA NA 12.9% 12.4% 14.2% 14% 15.8% Stock Market Capitalization (% GDP)q NA NA NA NA NA NA NA a IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years b WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years c IMF Bulgaria C.R.00/54: 1995; 1996; IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 d IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 e IMF Bulgaria 00/53: 1998 f IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years g,h UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years i IMF 2001 Financial Statistical Yearbook: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Bulgaria P.I.N. 02/82: 2001 j IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years k,l,m IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/73: years represented n IMF Bulgaria C.R. 00/53: 1995;, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Bulgaria 02/174: 1999, 2000, 2001 o,p IMF Bulgaria C.R. 00/53: 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Bulgaria 02/174: 200, 2001

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189 Table D-12. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Primary Enrollment a 94% 99% 99% 93% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment b 78% 77% 77% 87% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment c 39% 41% 41% 43% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate d 14.7% 13.7% 15% 16% 17% 16.4% 19.5% Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)e 6.2% 7.5% 7. 5% 8.2% 8.7% NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)f 55.7% 53.8% 51.4% 49. 6% 50.3% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)g 0.7% 1.1% 4.9% 4.2% 6.3% 7.9% 5.1% Investment (% GDP)h 15.7% 8.4% 11.9% 14.7% 19.1% 15.7% 17.8% (e) Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)i 1.1% 0.8% 1. 1% 2% 1.6% 1.1% 1% Gov't Intervention Rating j 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)k 32.7% 30.2% 28.2% 28. 7% 26.8% 27.8% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate l 0% -9.3% -11.2% 4.3% -4.4% 15.3% NA % Goods Exported To the EU m 39.3% 40.2% 43. 9% 50.5% 52.1% 51.6% 54.8% % Goods Imported From the EU n 38.3% 35.2% 38% 45.4% 48.4% 44.3% 49.4% % of Employment in SMEs o NA NA NA NA NA NA NA a,b,c , f , k,l WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart d IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years e UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 g UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years h IMF Bulgaria C.R. 00/53: 1995;, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Bulgaria 02/174: 1999, 2000, 2001 i IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years j The Heritage Foundation Bulgaria Reports: all years m,n Bulgaria C.R. 00/54: 1995, 1996; IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001

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190 Table D-13. Romania Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 Tariff Rating b 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 Gov't Intervention Rating c 5 4.5 3 3 3 3 2 Private Sector (%GDP)d 45% 55% 60% 60% 60% 60% 65% (e) # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating g 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 Bank/Finance Rating h 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 Regulation Rating i 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Property/Legal System Rating j 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Current Account Balance(%GDP)k -5% -7.3% -6.1% -6.9% -3.6% -3.7% -5.9% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio l 17.6% 28.1% 27.7% 27.8% 33.6% 31.6% 29.8% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)m 18.8% 24.9% 26. 9% 23.9% 24.9% 27.7% 29.1% GDP Growth Rate n 7.1% 3.9% -6.1% -4.8% -1.2% 1.8% 5.3% Export Growth o NA 2.3% 4. 6% -1.6% 2.4% 21.9% 9.8% Exports (% GDP)p 27.6% 28.1% 29.2% 23.7% 30.1% 28.1% 28.7% Agriculture (% GDP)q 19.8% 19.2% 18% 14. 4% 13.3% 11.1% 13.4% (p) Unemployment Rate r 10% 7.8% 6% 6. 4% 6.9% 7.3% 8.6% a,b,c , g,h,i,j The Heritage Foundation Romania Reports: all years d , l IMF Bulgaria C.R. 02/173: all years k IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Romania C.R. 02/194: 2001 m IMF Romania C.R. 98/123: 1995, 1996 IMF Romania C.R. 02/194: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; 2001 n IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years o IMF Romania C.R. 00/159: 1996; IMF Romania C.R. 03/11: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 p IMF Romania C.R. 01/16: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Romania C.R. 02/194: 2000, 2001 q IMF Romania C.R. 98/123:1995; IMF Romania C.R. 03/12: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 r IMF 2001 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Romania C.R. 02/194: 2001

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191 Table D-13. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)a -3.4% -4.8% -5.2% -5.5% -3.6% -4% -3.3% General Government Expenditure (% GDP)b 34.7% 34% 33.9% 35.6% 35.5% 35.4% 33.8% Government Consumption (%GDP)c 13.7% 11.6% (p) NA NA NA NA NA Per Capita Income d $1,470 $1,590 $1,520 $1,510 $1,560 $1,670 $1,710 Trade Balance (% GDP)e -4.5% -8.4% -5.6% -6.3% -3.7% -4.6% -7.5% Inflation Rate f 32.2% 38. 8% 154.8%59.1% 48% 44% 37% Domestic Demand Growth Rate g NA NA NA -0.7% -2.9% 1.6% 5.9% CPI Index h 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 FDI Inflow (%GDP)i 1.2% 0.7% 3.4% 4.9% 3.1% 2.8% 2.9% FDI Stock ($US Billions)j $1.150 $1.081 $2.305 $4.335 $5.441 $6.517 $7.636 Real Effective Exchange Rate k 83.9 75. 9 88.4 114.9 97.8 107.1 NA Lending Interest Rate l NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # of Banks m NA 35 37 45 41 42 NA % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)n NA 20% 19% 16% 10% 10% NA % of Total Banking Sector Assets Owned by Gov't o NA 77.8% 74.7% 71% 46.8% about 50% NA Investment (% GDP)p 24.3% 25.9% 20.6% 17.7% 16.1% 19.7% 21.9% (p) a,b IMF Romania C.R. 01/16: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Romania C.R. 02/194: 1999, 2000, 2001 c IMF Romania C.R. 98/123: 1995, 1996 d WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years e IMF Romania C.R.03/12: all years f IMF W.P. 01/140: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 g IMF Romania C.R. 03/12: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 h IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years i,j UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years k IMF 2001 Financial Statistical Yearbook: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 m,n,o IMF Romania C.R. 01/16: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 p IMF Romania C.R. 03/12: all years

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192 Table D-13. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)a NA 17% 16% 20% 17% 17% NA Domestic Credit (% GDP)b 24.1% 28.9% 18.7% about 21% 19.4% 14.1% 12.4% Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)c 22.8% 24.6% 14. 2% 12-13%11.1% 9.4% 10.2% Stock Market Capitalization (% GDP)d NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Primary Enrollment e 100% 104% 104% 94% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment f 66% 78% 76% 76% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment g 18% 23% 23% NA NA NA NA Unemployment Rate h 10% 7.8% 6% 6. 4% 6.9% 7.3% 8.6% Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)i 8.1% 9.4% 9.7% 9.7% NA NA NA Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)j 30.4% 29.4% 29. 7% 29.1% 23.5% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)k 1.2% 0.7% 3.4% 4.9% 3.1% 2.8% 2.9% Investment (% GDP)l 24.3% 25.9% 20. 6% 17.7% 16.1% 19.7% 21.9% (p) Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)m 4.1% 4.4% 2.5% 1.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.1% Gov't Intervention Rating n 5 4.5 3 3 3 3 2 a IMF Romania C.R. 01/16: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 b,c IMF Romania C.R. 98/123: 1995, 1996, 1997; IMF Romania C.R. IMF Romania C.R. 01/16: 1998; IMF Romania C.R. 00/159: 1999; IMF Romania C.R. 03/12: 2000, 2001 e,f , g,j WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart h IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: all years i UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 k MF 2001 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 199 6, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Romania C.R. 02/194: 2001 l IMF Romania C.R. 03/12: all years m IMF Romania C.R. 98/123: 1995, 1996, 1997; IMF Romania c.R. 00/159: 1998; IMF Romania C.R. 01/16: 1999; IMF Romania C.R. 03/12: 2000, 2001 n The Heritage Foundation Romania Reports: all years

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193 Table D-13. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)a 42.7% 42.5% 39.2% 36. 4% 35.9% 36.3% NA Industry Sector Growth Rate b 5.8% 5.7% -9.8% -5.2% -1.6% 6.2% NA % Goods Exported To the EU c 54.1% 56.5% 56.6% 64.5% 65.5% NA NA % Goods Imported From the EU d 50.5% 52.3% 52.5% 57.7% 55.1% NA NA % of Employment in SMEs e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA a,b WB 2002 World Development Indicators Da tabase all years represented in chart d,e IMF Romania C.R. 011/116: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999

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194 Table D-14. Turkey Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Price Regulation Rating a 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Tariff Rating b 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 Gov't Intervention Rating c 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 Private Sector (%GDP)d NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # New Firms e NA NA NA NA NA NA NA # Bankruptcies f NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FI Barrier Rating g 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Bank/Finance Rating h 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 Regulation Rating i 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 Property/Legal System Rating j 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Current Account Balance(%GDP)k -1.4% -1.3% -1.4% 1% -0.7% -4.9% 3.4% Public Debt/ GDP Ratio l 41.8% 47.1% 43. 7% 45.2% 61.7% 57.7% 92% External (Foreign) Debt (%GDP)m 43.6% 43.8% 48. 4% 51.2% 55.6% 59.1% 78% GDP Growth Rate n 6.9% 7% 7.6% 3.1% -4.7% 7.4% -6.2% Export Growth o NA NA NA 5.8% -15.7% 12.3% -1.5% Exports (% GDP)p 20% 21.5% 24. 6% 24.3% 24.7% 25.3% 31.7% Agriculture (% GDP)q 15.7% 14.1% 14.5% 17.5% 14.6% 13.6% NA Unemployment Rate r 6.6% 5.8% 6.9% 6.2% 7.3% 6.6% 8.5% General Gov't Budget Balance (% GDP)s -4.1% -8.4% -7.8% -7.8% -11.8% -10.8% -16.8% a,b,c,g,h,i,j The Heritage Foundation Tu rkey Reports: all years k IMF 2002 Financial Statistical Yearbook: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; IMF Turkey C.R. : 2001 l,m IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/55: 1999, 2000, 2001 n IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years o IMF Turkey C.R. 02/137: 1998; Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1999, 2000, 2001 p IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Turk ey C.R. 01/89: 1999, 2000; Turkey C.R. 02/21: 2001 q IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1999, 2000 r IMF 2001 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 2000, 2001 s IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: all years

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195 Table D-14. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 General Government Expenditure (% GDP)a 22% 26.7% 27.7% 29.5% 35.9% 37.1% 44.2% Government Consumption (%GDP)b 10.8% 11.6% 12.3% 12.7% 15.2% 14.1% NA Per Capita Income c $2,810 $2,880 $3,190 $3,160 $2,900 $3,100 $2,530 Trade Balance (% GDP)d -5.2% -5.8% -8.2% -7.1% -5.6% -11.0% -3.2% Inflation Rate e 93.7% 82.3% 85.7% 84.6% 56% 50% 56% Domestic Demand Growth Rate f 6.1% 10% 9.1% 0.7% -4.2% 10.5% NA CPI Index g 93.6 82.3 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4 FDI Inflow (%GDP)h 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 1.3% FDI Stock ($US Billions)i $5.103 $5.825 $6.630 $7.570 $8.353 $9.335 $12.601 Real Effective Exchange Rate j 85.7 85. 7 87.7 104.4 110.3 127.6 100.7 Lending Interest Rate (Short Term)k 176.7% 162.6% 144.7% 155.2%NA NA NA # of Banks l 68 68 72 75 81 79 66 (Nov.) % of Gov't Owned Banks (% of Total)m 12% 12% 11% 9% 9% 9% 9% % of Total Banking Sector Assets Owned by Gov't n 43.5% 42.8% 38.7% 41.1% 38.3% 37.6% 34.2% Investment (% GDP)o 25.5% 23.8% 25.1% 24.2% 23.3% 24.5% NA a IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: all years b IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1999, 2000 c WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database for all years d IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995; 1996, 1997; IMF Turkey C.r. 02/138: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 e IMF Statistical Database: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database: 1999, 2000, 2001 f IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996; Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 g IMF 2002 World Economic Outlook: all years h,i UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years j,k IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 l,m IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 n,o IMF Turkey C.R. 98/104: 1995 ; IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1999, 2000, 2001

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196 Table D-14. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Foreign Ownership of Banks (% of Total Banks)a 32% 32% 31% 29% 31% 28% 30% Domestic Credit (% GDP)b 28.9% 34.5% 38. 4% 41.5% 50.9% 51.0% 64.9% (Nov.) Credit to Private Sector (%GDP)c 16.4% 19% 21. 9% 22% 21.4% 22.9% 18.6% Stock Market Capitalization (% GDP)d NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Primary Enrollment e 105% 105% 107% 100% NA NA NA Secondary Enrollment f 56% 56% 58% 70% NA NA NA Tertiary Enrollment g 18% 18% 21% 14% NA NA NA Unemployment Rate h 6.6% 5.8% 6.9% 6.2% 7.3% 6.6% 8.5% Telecommun. & Transport (% GDP)i 12.6% 13.1% 13.9% 13.6% 14.0% 14.2% 15.7% Imported Energy (% Energy Consumed)j 57.6% 60.1% 61. 1% 60.2% 61.7% NA NA FDI Inflow (%GDP)k 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 1.3% Investment (% GDP)l 25.5% 23.8% 25.1% 24.2% 23.3% 24.5% NA Gov't Spending On Subsidies (% GDP)m 0.2% 0.4% 0.9% 0.3% 0.3% .3% (e) NA Gov't Intervention Rating n 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 a IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 b IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 c IMF Turkey C.R. 98/104: 1995 ; IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1996, 1997, 1998; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1999, 2000, 2001 e,f,g,j WB 2002 World Development Indicators Database all years represented in chart h IMF 2001 Financial Statistical Yearbook; 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 2000, 2001 i UNECE, 2001: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 k UNCTAD Statistical Database: all years l IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 m IMF Turkey C.R 98/104: 1995, 1996; IMF Turkey C.R. 01/89: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 n The Heritage Foundation Tu rkey Reports: all years.

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197 Table D-14. Continued Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Industry's Share of Economy (% GDP)a 30.5% 27.9% 28.1% 25% 24.3% 25.1% 25.6% Industry Sector Growth Rate b 7.4% 6.4% 9.2% 17.7% -6.7% 6.9% NA % Goods Exported To the EU c 51.2% 49.7% 59.2% 50% 54.0% 52.2% 51.6% % Goods Imported From the EU d 47.1% 53% 51. 1% 52.4% 52.6% 48.8% 44.7% % of Employment in SMEs e NA NA NA NA NA NA 76.7% a,b WB 2002 World Development Indicators Data base: all years represented in chart. c,d IMF Turkey C.R. 00/14: 1995, 1996, 1997; IMF Turkey C.R. 02/138: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 e UN Report on Turkey at http://un/org.tr/unido/documents

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219 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Amy Cosan attended Florida State Un iversity from 1994-1998 and received a Bachelor of Arts in English Literature and German. From January of 2002 to May of 2003, she attended the University of Florid a and received a Master of Arts in International Relations in May of 2003.