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The sociedad rural Argentina and Argentine economic policy during the Radical era

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The sociedad rural Argentina and Argentine economic policy during the Radical era
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Turner, Blair Pierce, 1947-
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1986
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English

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Agriculture ( jstor )
Beef ( jstor )
Cattle ( jstor )
Financial investments ( jstor )
Immigration ( jstor )
Imports ( jstor )
Meats ( jstor )
Political parties ( jstor )
Prices ( jstor )
Voting ( jstor )

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THE SOCIEDAD RURAL ARGENTINA AND ARGENTINE ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE RADICAL ERA: 1916-1930





By

BLAIR PIERCE TURNER


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


1986

































Copyright 1986

by
Blair Pierce Turner









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


A dissertation seems to be the kind of project for which many persons must be thanked. By definition, it is an undertaking guided and assisted by many. Among those are Professors David Bushnell, Lyle McAlister, and Terry McCoy,

and the other members of my committee, who provided guidance and suffered through years of patient waiting. Their expertise and teaching skills have made my graduate career possible.

The Department of History and Politics and the Office of the Dean of the Virginia Military Institute helped in many ways, especially keeping me employed during the writing of this dissertation and providing research funds.

I was also greatly assisted by a Fulbright Grant to conduct research in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1981. The staffs of the Fulbright office, La biblioteca de la Sociedad Rural Argentina, and the Instituto Torcuato di Tella in Beunos Aires were of great help during that period.

My quatitative work was assisted by the Data Center at

the University of Wisconsin, Madison and the staff of the Computing Center at the Virginia Military Institute.


iii









In addition, many individuals h-elped in many ways. I thank especially Sandra McGee-Deutsch,, Richard Walter, Kristine Jones, Doug Richmond, and Theron Nuniez for their encouragement. And my parents contributed in many ways, not the least of which was fiscal.

But, more than all the others combined, regardless of their official position or contributions, I thank my wife. She kept me alive and made me believe this was worth doing.










TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . .**.************

ABSTRACT. . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . e . . Vi

CHAPTER





TIWO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE, 1870-1916 .o. 9


THREE THE PATTERN OF INTERNAL ECONOMIC GROWTH

IN THE GOLDEN AGE, 1870-1930. .9.9 .52



FOUR THE EXPORT-LED ECONOMY, 1870-1930 . o. 91



FIVE ARCHITECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1916-29:
THE SRA AND THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS.o . 127


six DEALING WITH THE CRISIS IN THE ECONOMY, 1916-1929:
THE SRA AND THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS . 160 Notes . . . . . . . .-- - - - - ------------. . . .200

SEVEN CONCLUSIONS . . . . s .o.see.204 APPENDIX I VARIABLE LIST AND DATA INPUTS FOR ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS CONDUCTED IN CHAPTER FOUR . . 209 APPENDIX II TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
CONDUCTED IN CHAPTER FOUR. . . . . .238 APPENDIX III METHODOLOGIES OF ROLL CALL ANALYSIS OF THE
ARGENTINE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS . 250





BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. . . . . . . . . . * . . o.275














Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy



THE SOCIEDAD RURAL ARGENTINA
AND ARGENTINE ECONOMIC POLICY
DURING THE RADICAL ERA: 1916-1930 By

Blair Pierce Turner

December, 1986

Chairman: David Bushnell
Major Department: History

The Radical party was brought to power in Argentina in 1916 by a series of political and social changes associated

with a period of economic expansion beginning in the late 19th century and is associated with the emergence of middle

sectors in Argentine political and economic life. The Sociedad Rural Argentina (the SRA) was founded in the middle of the 19th century and represented the established rural aristocracy. The Radicalsf as the government in power, and the SRA, as the representatives of beef

producing interests, had to combine their efforts to cope with crises in the export economy of the post World War I years.









An analysis of legislative activity concerning economic

issues in the Radical period indicates that the SRA had a specific, but shifting, policy with regard to economic issues. The Radicals, on the other hand, generated no consistent economic policy. due to factionalism within the party and lack of an apparent operational economic philosophy. While the Radical administrations and the SRA cooperated on some policy issues, government economic policy had little impact on the conditions which produced the economic crises during the period.


vii
















CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION






In an article published in 1961, Arthur P. Whitaker, Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania, coined the phrase "The Argentine Paradox." The paradox he cited was created by the juxtaposition of the seemingly well-developed economic, social and political institutions of Argentina with its apparently underdeveloped political behavior. The contrast was "striking" to Whitaker in 1961.

For some time past, the political behavior of
the Argentine people has been marked by the traits
of instability and perfervid nationalism that one associates with the economically underdeveloped and politically inexperienced peoples just
emerging from colonial subjugation in Africa and
Asia.1

In terms of cultural, social and economic development, he regarded Argentina as having advanced far beyond those "inexperienced peoples." Yet, in spite of the contemporary Frondizi government's commitment to democratic principles and international cooperation," the political norm in Argentina had come to be "rabid nationalism and political fragmentation. 112










The paradox Whitaker cited in 1961 was that, while Argentina had often appeared to be politically developed, it

had not behaved that way; its political history since 1930 had been filled with revolts, coups and other breaks with "developed" political tradition. Whitaker made it clear that this situation was of "comparatively recent origin". In the

half century before 1930, Argentina enjoyed a remarkably rapid economic development, and this was paralleled by a seemingly harmonious growth in political grace." The paradox--the "fall from grace"--begins in 1930 with the overthrow of the Yrigoyen government by General Jos6 F. Uriburu.3

This view was not held by Whitaker alone. In his book Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel P. Huntington

expressed similar views as he discussed "masspreoin polities, of which Argentina was the prime example. A amass

praetorian" polity was one in which there was a high level of political participation on the part of the population but

the institutions of government constituted "law-neglecting systems, where the rulers acted in their own interests rather than those of the polity."4 Like Whitaker, but using different terms and analyses, Huntingon saw a paradox in the

Argentine situation in terms of "modernization" versus "traditionalism". "Modernization", meaning more open popular access to the political mechanism, is offset by

"traditionalism" (restricted access to power) in the actual










running of that mechanism. Huntington also cites the year 1930 as the beginning of paradoxical behavior in Argentina, at least as indicated by changing patterns of military intervention in politics.5

The year 1930 appears as a critical turning point in a host of other analyses of Argentine politics and economics.

It is seen as the beginning of "chronic political instability"6 or as the year when Argentina n*moved on to dictatorial forms" after a period of democratic growth.7 Economic historians have seen 1930 as the year marking a shift from an "o pen export economy" to a less productive, "partly closed"n economy as a result of the world depression of 1929. And this shift is seen as concomitant with a change in politics from "middle class liberalism" to conservative reaction".8 Even scholars concerned with a continuing political phenomenon such as populism see 1930 as a watershed year between "reformist" and "national developmentalist" types of populism9.

Even scholars writing in the years of seemingly steady progress up to the great depression were affected by the notion of the uniqueness of Argentina and (as a corollary) of the contradictory nature of 1930. writing in 1921, Austin F. MacDonald proclaimed

The fight for democracy has been won, and
Argentina has taken her rightful place among the
great free nations of the world.lO










In 1930 another scholar, Clarence H. Haring, was lamenting the fall of the Radical government in Argentina as "remarkable" because of the fact that the country was more developed and democratic than her neighbors. Argentina was "in a different category."ll

It must be recognized, of course, that 1930 appears as a

critical year for all of Latin America. Scholars have noted the "wave of revolts" in Latin America and called 1930 "a turning point in Latin American history."12 Haring, himself,

was moved to compare 1930 in Latin America to 1848 in Europe. 13

Thus, for Argentina the point is not so much that 1930 was a year of crisis--one that Argentines suffered along with sister nations and much of Europe--as that it ushered in Whitaker's "age of paradox." However, this dissertation will assert that the conditions which produced the paradox (seemingly developed structures contraposed to underdeveloped behavior) were already in existence before 1930. The "fall from grace" had started long before 1930. Indeed, Argentina was not sufficiently developed politically or economically before 1930 to create a genuine paradox; what happened in 1930 was therefore not paradoxical.

Scholarly opinion, including those examples cited above,

has tended to focus on the stunning economic growth and the relative political stability of the 1880-1930 per iod in Argentina. Compared to other countries in Latin America,










economic growth was indeed stunning and political affairs were handled with Whitaker's "grace". The development of the

export economy, based among other things on beef, certainly contributed to an economic explosion not matched in Latin America and comparable to previous boom periods in Western Europe and the United States. That prosperity was enhanced is true. That it was equally shared or prudently managed isr

however, something else.

The case can be made that this prosperity was fragile and temporary and that those managing it misperceived the situation, believing it stable and permanent. Part of this dissertation will examine the economic growth and offer the thesis that it was not as it appeared: that it was unstable, and dependent on foreign markets and foreign control. It was also short-lived, ending in fact before the great depression of 1929. Indeed it was in trouble soon after the First World

War even during the glory years of the 1920's when the Argentine economy was perceived by many to be so healthy. The reasons for this are complex and manifold and cannot be blamed solely on any one social or political group.

Still, significant changes were produced in the social structure of Argentina, creating a new and growing middle class and a large urban working class. Both groups seemed to

gain new economic power in the period of expansion and diversification of Argentina's economy. And the same period was.witness to an apparent opening of the democratic process










politically. The last period of the "Golden Age" is termed la 'epoca radical because of the emergence of a "middle sector" political party, the Uni6n C~vica Radical (UCR), which supposedly provided the middle class the same increased power in politics that it had been achieving in economics. The UCR in its many varieties seemed to usher in an era of honest elections, enhanced participation, and a government responsive to the wishes of at least the rising middle class, if not the entire population. That this new political movement failed in 1930 is often attributed to conservative dissatisfaction with the changes afoot in Argentina and a willingness to use the military to end the electoral process and the evils it was seen to be producing. In addition, the crisis of the world economy in 1929 and after is seen as a culprit, destabilizing the Argentine government. The creator of the middle class polity, Hipo'lito Yrigoyen, is also seen to be at fault, for he split the UCR

on personalist grounds, and his reelection in 1928 at an advanced age seemed to demand action on the part of reformers and conservatives alike. His insistence on personal control of the machinery of government and his reputation as the reclusive VelldQ. (armadillo) augured poorly for his continuance in power.l4

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the reforms of the Radicals were, themselves, less than profound: that they led to a shift in the electorate but not a shift in the process










of government or a change in real decision making. In addition, it can be demonstrated that the economic problems contributing to dissatisfaction and eventual dismantling of

the middle-sector government the Radicals created were evident long before Yrigoyen's second term and in fact were, if not created, at least abetted by the Radicals themselves. In the light of this interpretation, one is tempted to alter

Whitaker's thesis of a paradox to suggest that the Radical period was not the inauguration of a new norm, but rather an

aberration from an established pattern--that the paradox is that the Radical period occurred at all. It might be more correct to view the post-1930 period as a return to normal, and the Radical period as a temporary escape from the Argentine historical record.












1Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Argentine Paradox," The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 334 (March, 1961) , 104.

2Robert N. Burr, "Abstract," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 334 (March, 1961), 103.

3Whitaker, "The Argentine Paradox," 104.

4samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 81.










51Lid, 221.

6Peter G. Snow, Political Forces in Argentina (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 18.
peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy:
Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955 (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974) , xv.

8See, for example, Gilbert Wilson Merkx, "Political and
Economic Change in Argentina from 1870 to 1966" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968), 361.

9Michael L. Conniff, ed., T atin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 7.

10Austin F. MacDonald, "The Government of Argentina," Hispanic Amterican Jitstorial Review, 5: 1 (February, 1922), 82.

llClarence H. Haring, "Revolution in South America," Foreign Affairs, 9: 2 (January, 1931), 289.
12Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey Kline, Eds., Latin American Political and Development (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1979), 30.
13Haring, "Revolution in South America," 277.

14One contemporary author, commenting on the
revolutionary nature of the 1930 coup, argued that much of the responsibility for its occurance had to be laid on Yrigoyen's second term policies which alienated the very groups which had been the source of his support. See Ernest Galarza, "Argentina's Revolution and Its Aftermath," Foreign Policy Reports, 7 (October, 1931), 309-22.













CHAPTER TWO
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE,
1870-1916





The preceding introduction was not intended to suggest that there is no reason whatsoever to view 1930 as a critical year in modern Argentine history. That there was a

military coup for the first time since the constitutional founding of the republic and that epic changes would issue from that, is undoubted. But, for the purposes of this dissertation, it is what went before that year which is important. In this context, the year stands out as the culmination of a fifty-year period of an extraordinary and comprehensive metamorphosis of Argentina. One of the most remarkable aspects of this change is the great flood of immigrants into Argentina. For this reason, one author has

called the period "alluvial".1

This flood would eventually be responsible for profound social, economic, and political changes, but its first and

most obvious manifestation was demographic growth. The first national census was taken in Argentina in 1869 and the third in 1914, which roughly covers the "alluvial" era. Within that period, the population increase in Argentina is










impr essive-- some 352%. Extending the period to 1929, the population grew from 1,830,000 in 1869 to an estimated 11,600,000 in 1929: an increase of 534%. In the first quarter of the 20th century, the Argentine population sustained one of the highest growth rates in the world. while hardly densely populated even in 1929, Argentina was no longer an underpopulated backwater.2

More important than simply aggregate population growth, however, were the source of that growth and the effects it had on demographic and social structures. As Tables 1 and 2

indicate, the majority of the population growth in Argentina was the result of immigration rather than native

reproduction. Almost 60% of the expansion between 1869 and 1929 can be attributed directly to immigration.3

This massive immigration was not an accident of history or geography. It was caused partly by the apparent openness of the Argentine and the massive exodus from Europe in the tumult of the second half of the 19th Century. Of the some

40 millions who left Europe during this period, Argentina received over 12%. This influx was caused also by active Argentine policy. The constitution of 1853 contains more than one provision which calls for the promotion, directly or indirectly, of immigration. Article 14, which outlines the basic rights of citizens is not restrictive--it applies to all inhabitants, native and foreigner alike. Article 20

reenforces this notion by specifically granting to all










TABLE 1
TOTAL NET IMMIGRATION INTO ARGENTINA: 1857-1930



OVERSEAS , OVERLAND
ARRIVALS % OVERSEAS ARRIVALS ARRIVALS YEARS (x 1000) CONSIDERED LABORa (x 1000)

1857-60 12.7 87.40

1861-70 80.5 95.15 41
(as of 1869)
1871-80 90.7 93.82

1891-90 648.7 98.30

1890-1900 337.8 94.70 75
(1870-95)
1901-10 1,134.3 98.76

1911-20 280.0 96.11 91
(1896-1914)
1921-30 905.8 94.50

COLUMN
TOTALS 3,490.5 96.71 207



TOTAL NET IMMIGRATION, 1857-1930: 3,697,500


aImmigrants arriving 2nd or 3rd class boat passage.

Source: Dfaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History
of the Argentine Republic. Table 1.13, 23-24; Sociedad Rural Argentina, Anales de la Socieda
Rural Argentina, 59-64.











TABLE 2
IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE
ARGENTINE POPULATION: 1869-1929



A. 1869 population 1,830,000

B. Estimated net immigration
1869-1929 3,563,000

C. Estimated native
population growtha 4,000,000

D. Estimated immigrant
population growth
(E - ) 2,207,000

E. 1929 population 11,600,000

G. Total impact of immigration
(B + D) 5,770,000

H. Percent of population growth
1869-1929 due to immigration
)< 59.05
( x 100)


aExciuding the impact of immigration: based on an estimated growth rate of 2% per year as calculated by Dfaz Alejandro.

SqnucL-: compiled from Table 1.










"foreigners" the same rights as "citizens." The same article makes it very easy to obtain citizenship through naturalization; the maximum residence requirement was only two years. Even this brief period could be shortened by an immigrant "asserting and proving services to the republic."

The federal government was specifically called upon to "encourage European immigration" and could not

restrict, limit, or burden with any tax
whatsoever, the entrance into Argentine territory of foreigners who arrive for the purpose of tilling the soil, improving industries, and
introducing and teaching the arts and sciences.4

In addition, Congress is explicitly empowered to promote immigration in Article 67, section 16.

Even before the Constitution was written, the Argentine

government had undertaken efforts to promote immigration into its sparsely populated territory. In 1824, a

Commission of Immigration was formed to promote immigration opportunities to Europeans. Negotiations with the British firm of Baring Brothers to act as agents for immigration were initiated in 1825,, and included were provisions for paying the overseas passage of Europeans willing to settle in Buenos Aires Province. These efforts failed, in the short run at least, because the war in Uruguay in the late

1820's and subsequent civil conflicts among the provinces made the Argentine less attractive for potential

immigrants After the 1850's, however, with the provinces federated under their new constitution and the










establishment of at least a modicum of civil peace, immigration efforts were renewed.

In 1863, a private commission of leading citizens of Buenos Aires began to undertake efforts to assist

immigrants. An asylum for immigrants--a sort of halfway house--was founded to assist recent arrivals. But residents

could stay a week only, and other private efforts at immigrant assimilation failed. The commission disbanded in 1873.6

Governmental efforts were more sustained. A Central Commission for Immigration was founded by the federal government in 1869, followed by a separate Labor Office also focusing on immigration in 1872. The National Immigration and Colonization Act of 1876, the so-called Avellaneda Law (after president Nicolas Avellaneda, 1874-1880), combined both of these agencies under the directorship of a new General Department of Immigration within the Ministry of the Interior. Its explicit purpose was to stimulate immigration, providing funds for agencies

promoting immigration as well as overseas passage for immigrants, and to protect' those immigrants upon arrival. It also provided mechanisms for transfer of land to immigrants free or at reduced prices, as well as loans for

land purchase and the acquisition of stock and equipment. Specifically, immigrants with some capital and agricultural

skills were sought to settle the interior, which was soon










to be vastly expanded by new acquisitions in the Desert Campaigns of General Julio Argentino Roca.

But this campaign to "populate the desert", like earlier efforts at stimulating immigration, failed in its grand design because of difficulties in getting to and settling distant areas, hardships on the immigrants, and land-holding patterns which discriminated against new arrivals. Government policy did little to encourage the breakup of large, unproductive parcels of land, or to encourage immigrants to join the land market. Small parcels

were taxed disproportionately, making it more costly for immigrants to obtain them, thereby encouraging tenancy instead of ownership. Consistent with a pattern of land distribution established since colonial times, the best land was sold long before foreign arrivals could get at it.

Moreover, bond issues on land yet to be acquired by military expansion were sold to speculators to fund that very expansion. only the least desirable, most distant areas went unsold to remain available for acquisition by immigrants

Not surprisingly, then, immigrants avoided the

"desert. 11 Some did go to Patagonia and, in fact, constituted almost half the population there, but their numbers were minimal. For the most part, the immigrants opted in favor of the more fertile and geographically accessible pampas and littoral areas, especially the










provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Rfos. Their numbers and impact were more impressive there. (Table 3 clearly indicates these population movements.) But, here as elsewhere, most immigrants did not become land owners, but tenants on already owned but unworked land. The government

of late 19th century Argentina generally avoided direct intervention to promote immigrant land acquisition, relying

instead on laissez-faire policies and natural economic stimuli to provide opportunities. When the government did pass a homesteading act in 1884, it applied only to the worst areas: those south of the Rio Negro frontier. In general, immigration policy was aimed at gaining a work force, not creating an independent land-holding yeomanry. By 1914, only about 30jOOO immigrants had become

landowners. 8

Those who had controlled the land since colonial days clearly were not interested in losing it, and although the government was prepared to fund immigration agents and pay

overseas passages, official policy remained otherwise apathetic or even callous. In one case, a cash prize was offered ". . for the design of a ship which could carry live cattle in its European run and immigrants on its return."9 The flow of immigration was left to the control of market forces, peaking in economically prosperous times, and slacking off in down times. As one scholar concluded

Agriculturalists and immigrants were accepted as servants to build Argentina's greatness. They were
not, however, primary concerns of the nation.10










TABLE 3
PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
IN ARGENTINA: 1869, 1895, 1914



REGIONa / POPULATION CATEGORY YEARS

1869 1895 1914

Pampas and Littoral

% of total population in the region 41.3 58.2 64.3
% of region who were foreigners 24.6 32.8 34.4

Northeast

% of total population in the region 7.4 7.3 5.9
% of region who were foreigners (no data) 34.5 27.7

Central and Northwest

% of total population in the region 40.9 26.8 21.9
% of region who were foreigners 1.9 4.5 9.8


% of total population in the region 10.4 7.0 6.5

% of region who were foreigners 4.7 7.5 18.0

Patagonia

% of total population in the region 0 0.7 1.4
% of region who were foreigners (no data) 42.3 48.5



Source: compiled from Ernesto J. A. Maeder, "Poblaci6n e inmigraci6n en la Argentina," in Ferrari and Gallo, 555-74.
aRegions are composed of the following provinces or territories:
Pampas and Littoral: Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre
Rlos, La Pampa
Northeast: Corrientes, Misiones,Chaco, Formosa
Central and Northwest: C6rdoba, Santiago del Estero,
Tucuman, La Rioja, Catamarca, Slata, Jujuy
Cuyo: Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis
Patagonia: Rio Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, Tierra del
Fuego.


























10
50 I.I








II


CO
OVERSA IG

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SQMo: dpe fro Beh, 95-97.\\"li. '







fsemn vintner and mineAr.
"~ O . % 0 l'! -"'
v-a q- J I *q4 -4- YEAR


FIGURE 1
PROPORTIONS OF OCCUPATIONS
AMONG 2nd and 3rd CLASS PASSAGE OVERSEAS IMMIGRANTS



,Source: adapted from Beyhaut, 95-97.

Note: Agricultural occupations include farmer, rancher, fisherman, vintner and miner.










Regardless of elite attitudes and government policy concerning land distribution, the majority of incoming immigrants whose background could be ascertainedll had or were seeking occupations in the agricultural sector. This phenomenon held true until about 1915. Yet, for reasons outlined above, opportunity in the agricultural sector was severely limited, and most immigrants who did remain in the

agricultural sector became tenants or colonists. Colonists potentially had the ability to eventually own their land, but in fact contractual arrangements produced by the established landholders and their agents made the real opportunities for colonists hardly distinguishable from those of tenants. In addition, many immigrants were "golondrinas": migrant laborers crossing the Atlantic seasonally between Europe and Argentina. Their numbers got as high as 100,000 a year in the early 1900's. These migrants could earn several times more in a season in Argentina than in their native lands, but they were not encouraged to stay.12 in some years, in fact, the impact of

seasonal emigration from Argentina could make for net negative immigration, although this occurred when other factors, such as Italian reservists returning for duty in Italy during world War I, were also in play. In short, for many immigrants, the agricultural sector did not provide the opportunities for economic advancement, at least in terms of proprietorship, that they might have hoped for.





Whatever the intent of government policy regarding immigration, a population explosion occurred in the coastal

urban area and the littoral. The population grew at a rate of 374% for the littoral provinces, 551% for Buenos Aires province and 786% for the Federal Capital from 1869 to 1914.13 Hence, what government policy did effect was a demographic shift which it did not necessarily anticipate. Part of this shift was explosive urban growth,, not only in terms of the number of people living in urban areas, but in

the number of cities being created. While the majority of urban units were small (under 20,000 persons) , the demographic shift was nonetheless startling. over 2.5 million Argentines lived in cities larger than 20,000 by 1914 (See Table 4) . in short, a nation which had been roughly three-quarters rural in 1869 became two-thirds urban

by 1914. It was thus the urban sector of the economy which would in actuality become the source of employment for most immigrants to the greater Buenos Aires area. Immigrants who

had intended to become free-holding farmers became instead the workers in the new urban society.14

The creation of a predominantly urban society meant more

than simply a geographic shift in population; it meant the creation of a new culture. The old "creole" society, based on a two-strata system composed of elites and the masses who worked for them, was being replaced by a multiclass society:

one in which there were identifiable "middle sectors"






21



TABLE 4
URBAN GROWTH IN ARGENTINA: 1869-1914



YEAR
1869 1895 1914

Size of urban popu- popu- popuunits lation # of lation # of lation # of
in thousands (xl000) units (xl000) units (xl000) units

2 - 19 258 53 522 105 1,557 311

20 - 99 52 2 295 7 697 18

100 - 499 187 1 327 2

500 - 999 663 1

1000 + 1,576 1

497 56 1,480 113 4,157 332



Sgurce: Maeder, 562.





between the elites and masses. These middle sectors were distinct and separate from the traditional native groups not

only in terms of their economic activity but also in terms of origin and outlook. But they were not homogeneous, precisely because they were formed not of native Argentines, but of the new immigrant groups from different cultures and economic backgrounds. And they did not join the traditional Argentine culture partly because of the limitations on their opportunities to do so outlined above. Instead, they created a new culture distinct from and in some ways, in competition with the old.

This does not mean that the old culture was disappearing or that the elites were being displaced, although their role was being changed. The size and composition of the

landowning (and capital holding) elites remained more or less constant, but they began to be

transformed from "an austere, republican elite into a capitalistic oligarchy."17 They began to shift some of their

capital into the new urban market. Hence, while there was a growing polarity between the traditional -rural and the new-urban economies and societies, the dominant elites of each sector were one and the same.18 There would eventually be political repercussions stemming from this polarized society, and the elites would be forced to respond, but, in general, they continued to dominate the traditional economic sectors as well as capital formation for the new economy.










Even the traditional rural economy was itself undergoing

a change because of the new immigrant groups. Especially in the crop producing areas, tenancy and absentee ownership became the norm. And in the traditional ranching areas, land

was fenced, production practices changed, and old social roles were altered. As one author put it "nuestro gaucho degenero en peon.n19 Foreign ownership of agricultural production, never very large proportionately, declined from about a third in 1887 to only a quarter by 1914.20 This corresponds to a migration of immigrants in general f rom farm to non-farm occupations. The proportion of immigrants in the rural population steadily declined throughout the alluvial era (See Table 5) . In conjunction with increasing concentration of control of the rural sector, the change in the consumption markets with the emergence of the new urban

areas and the rise of new economic activities in those cities demanded an alteration in what the rural sector produced.21

The fundamental changes in Argentine society, however, occurred outside of either elite society or the rural economy. They occurred rather in the creation of the new urban middle sectors, whose members numbered about 50,000 in

1869 and well over 600,000 in 1914. The middle groups as a whole grew from 11% of the economically active population as

defined in the national censuses to 30% during the alluvial era.22 The middle sectors were composed of commercial and











TABLE 5
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF IMMIGRANTS:
FARM AND NON-FARM: 1857-1924



Years % Farm % Non-farm

1857-1870 76 24

1871-1890 73 27

1891-1910 48 52

1911-1924 30 70



~Surce: Table VIII in Gino Germani, "Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina," in Horowitz, 299.





industrial managers, professional groups, shop owners and other non-manual workers, and constituted the new factor on the Argentine social and economic scene. In relative terms, because of the influx of immigrant proprietors and workers,

the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy experienced large-scale growth and the rural sector shrank.

The elites may have still controlled the capital, but the new enterprises themselves were controlled by new economic actors: some 80% of the enterprises remained in foreign hands throughout the period from.the 1880's to 1914.23 (See Tables 6 and 7.) It must be noted, however, that many of these enterprises were small, employing only a

few persons. They produced for the domestic market (they accounted for about 2/3 of it) rather than for the growing export market. That market was not a "key sector in the national economy of the timen24 but it was one which was growing in importance. New industries to s upply new demands were created, and with them new social groups of industrial and commercial owners.

The urban middle sectors would make new demands on the political system of Argentina as well. They wanted different policies and different resource allocations: more education,

more industrialization,, more infrastructure, more public facilities. Earlier, the immigrants had felt that the source

of their welfare should come from the same laissez-faire prescriptions as the liberal elites had proposed for most of










TABLE 6
NATIVE AND FOREIGN OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES 1895-1914




Economic Sector and Year

1895 1914
Industry Commerce Industry Commerce

Number of owners
(in thousands)
Native 4.5 11.5 15.8 24.3
Foreign 19.6 32.7 31.5 65.2

Number of employees (in thousands)
Native 72.4 72.5 209.6 148.8
Foreign 103.3 47.4 200.6 170.1



Source: Vfisquez-Presedo, 139.










TABLE 7
PROPORTION OF NATIVE AND FOREIGN
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATIONS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR: 1895-1914


Native Foreign Total

Sector/Yepr/ChDg (%) (%) (%)

Agricultural

1895 23.7 13.2 36.9
1914 16.0 12.0 28.0

Change -30 -9 -24

Industrial

1895 18.8 11.6 30.4
1914 18.9 16.6 35.5

Change +.5 +43 +17

Commercial

1895 18.7 14.0 32.7
1914 19.0 17.5 36.5

Change +1.6 +25 +12



Source: Beyhaut, 104










the 19th century. But, more and more in the early 20th century, they began to believe that government action was the means to achieve these ends.25 They remained a very small proportion of the electorate, even after the electoral reforms of 1912, but they would make themselves heard in the

political arena soon afterwards.26 The changes they sought would not be accomplished easily or without turmoil.

The demand for change came earlier and more clearly from working class sectors and labor organizations.27 As will be

discussed in Chapter Three, Argentina's place in the world market economy was being drastically altered during the alluvial period. Infrastructure to move Argentina's goods to

Buenos Aires and thence overseas was being developed in the late 19th century, involving railroads, port facilities, food processing plants, and other industries. The work force

for these increasingly critical industries was dominated by immigrants, who often brought with them new ideas concerning

labor organizations. 28 Not surprisingly, it was in immigrant-dominated work places that organized labor activities first became important.29

Immigrant labor tended to be influenced by European doctrines of anarcho-sindicalism and socialism, creating highly politicized worker-protection organizations. The early unions tended to be craft oriented brotherhoods of workers, with little hierarchy and no dues, protecting their

own workers and avoiding any link with the government or










established political parties.30 in the last decades of the 19th century, of course, there were no established political

parties with which to ally, with the exception of the nascent Socialist Party. Loose-knit and competitive union federations, such as the Federaci6n Obrera de la Republica Argentina (FORAM and the Socialist dominated Confederaci~n Obrera Regional Argentina (CORA) were founded in the 1890's in an attempt to centralize and formalize labor efforts. The

FORA was more anarchist in approach, supporting a strategy of general strikes and violence to bring about an increase in labor power. The smaller CORA, fearing governmental repression, tended to avoid confrontation, working instead within the Socialist Party. Generally, the FORA view dominated, and labor efforts tended to take the form of strikes and agitation rather than political organization, not surprising in view of the lack of political reform to allow the new immigrants into the body politic.31

In spite of conflicts within labor, efforts at mobilization were vigorous throughout the 1890's. The elites and the government were willing to allow norm al law

enforcement networks deal with violence and were content to do little else. They were not willing to give labor

organization efforts any legal standing through legislation of any labor codes. An effort to create a general labor code was voted down by the Cfimara de Diputados, and labor leaders themselves opposed the bill, fearing governmental interference in unionizing efforts.32










In general, the government viewed problems with labor as

part and parcel of general immigration problems: a disease originating from outside. In 1902, Argentine workers were inspired by the Barcelona general strike and called the first general strike in Argentine history. The response of the Argentine government combined a growing fear of labor and left-wing agitation with a suspicion of immigrant groups. The Ley de Residencia (Ley 4144) , passed by both houses of the Argentine legislature on November 22, 1902, gave the president extraordinary powers to curtail the activities of labor. The president was not given any special powers to control strikes or violence; these were considered

to be already available under the state-of-seige clause of the constitution. Rather, the target of the law was the immigrant community itself. The president could expel any foreigner who threatened national security or public order and, further#, could bar entrance to Argentina of any foreigner whose "antecedents" suggested he might be a threat. The link between labor unrest and foreigners was clear, at least to the Argentine government. The real issues of labor problems in a changing economy were not addressed.33

The Ley de Residencia did not halt labor agitation or unrest, however, and efforts at organizing and violence continued. A peak of sorts was reached during the

celebrations of the national independence centennial in










1910. The FORA announced plans to "sabotage" governmentsponsored celebrations several days prior to the May 25 date. The attack on the national pride of Argentina which the planned protests seemed to constitute galvanized middle-sector support for government repression. Many in the

middle sectors had worked their way up from working class origins. They had a stake in the system and had become highly national istic.34 A week before the scheduled celebrations, "mobs of young hoodlums swarmed into the streets of Buenos Aires" and sacked the headquarters of FORA, CORA and the Socialist Party, as well as the newspapers La Protesta (anarchist) and L~a Vanguardia (socialist) .35

As a result, the government was moved to consider additional sanctions against the immigrant-labor nexus. on June 28, "in the space of a few hours after a bomb exploded in Buenos Aires' Teatro Col'on," the Ley de Defensa Social was enacted.36 It extended the provisions of the Ley de Residencia to include organizations as well as individuals. Any organization propagating anarchism could be banned by executive order. In subsequent action, the government outlawed FORA. Until the emergence of a new government after

1916, this effectively quieted overt labor activity. Anarchist agitation declined, while the strength of the less violent socialists increased.37










By the second decade of the twentieth century, then, new

social and economic realities faced Argentina. The "creole" society of patrones and peones had been replaced by a complex society of established native elites trying to control a growing urban immigrant society with different economic motives and political beliefs. Non-creole majorities in some sectors were bound to make demands and they would become a new source of power with which the established elites--willingly or otherwise--would have to deal.

The new economic order was already manifesting itself, with long-term and important effects (to be discussed later). The new political order, however, would take a bit more time to emerge, because while society and the economy were expanding, not only in the aggregate but also in terms of incorporating additional groups and sectors, the

political mechanism remained closed.38 The same elite who had tolerated, managed and sometimes abetted the shift in Argentine social structure was initially unwilling to tolerate any political changes. "A tightly restricted civil oligarchy dominated by the great landowners" still controlled the government.39

The predominant political attitude of the ruling elite has been characterized as "conservative" or "aristocratic" liberalism.4O Liberalism--in the sense of a desire for expanding economic opportunity and product ivi ty--was










combined with a determination to maintain tight control of that development. The idea of centrally directed economic growth was combined with a commitment to keep the controls firmly in the hands of those who had held them all through the 19th century, and

the members of the oligarchy believed that political power belonged to them by right and, furthermore, that it was patriotic not to surrender it to the men emerging from the
creole-immigrant mass.41

The attempt to promote economic development yet retain the

reigns of political power produced a system heavily dependent upon central authority and restricted to a small

group of actors. The executive branch of government kept itself in power by controlling and manipulating the electoral mechanism, especially through the widespread use of fraud.42

Yet the necessity of promoting economic development led

to conditions which would eventually undermine the elite's position. The same immigrants who were necessary to provide

the skills and labor of the growing economy, also provided a potential power base for new political forces. The same educational policies followed since the Presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868-74) created a literate mass capable of political action.43 The elite found itself in a contradictory and deteriorating situation. It was dependent

on the masses, but refused to acknowledge that dependence or to share political power.










Because of its attitude toward the
creol e- immigrant mass and because of its marked tendency to pull in and close its ranks, the oligarchy gradually weakened its foundations
without most of its members noticing the fact.44

The new socio-economic groups were diverse in origin and status: landowners of the upper littoral, forwardly mobile aristocrats from the interior who had not benefited from the export economy the large dependent groups of rural tenants, and native and immigrant urban middle

sectors. In many ways, these groups were equally committed to the liberal ideas of progress and expansion and supported the same economic system as the elite. They were not revolutionary. They did, however, have distinct economic goals.

The growth of organized labor has already been mentioned. The middle sectors, often composed of native sons of immigrant labor groups, may have been tied to the same export-oriented economy as the elite, but they sought expanded economic and political opportunity in urban society. They wanted expanded professional opportunities to

be provided from increased governmental and business activity which the establishment seemed unwilling or unable

to provide. These groups would form the core of a new popular-based political force, bent on reform of the political system, which emerged in the late 1800's.45

Just as there was a difference in origin among the social groups,, so there was diversity among the political










movements emerging from them. Anarcho-sindicalism gained support among workers, as has been noted. The Socialist Party was founded by Juan B. Justo in 1896, gaining most of its early support in the working districts of Buenos Aires.

And, in 1889 a civic youth organization--the Unifn Civica de la Juventud (UCJ)--was founded in Buenos Aires as a protest movement against the corruption of conservative government. The UCJ had broader appeal to the middle sectors of urban society, indicated by the fact that in

April of 1890, it was converted into an active political party--the Uni6n CIvica (UC)--to be a focus of opposition to the government of Miguel Ju-rez Celman (1886-1890). While these various political organizations made different appeals to urban society, they tapped a common desire to challenge the established political order.46

The opportunity for a united challenge was presented by

a political and economic crisis at the end of Celman's regime in 1889. Celman had attempted to construct a personalist regime, dominating not only the national and local machinery of government, but also the established conservative National Autonomous Party (PAN) .47 His play for power had alienated not only popular-based groups, but

members of the PAN as well, including Carlos Pellegrini, the influential former cabinet minister from Buenos Aires, and the party's founder and former president of the nation, General Julio Argentino Roca.48










President Celman had other problems. The Argentine

economy was in a crisis, following a binge of speculation which affected almost everyone (this will be covered in more detail in the next chapter). And Celman himself had become the symbol of all that was corrupt in the conservative regime. In July of 1890, a revolt by members of the military and supporters from the popular groups including the UC (which had just issued a manifesto for revolution) broke out. It was quickly put down, but faced with rebellion from within the PAN as well as without, Celman resigned the presidency in favor of Carlos Pellegrini.

The "Revolution of 1890" led to more than Celman's resignation. It resulted in the emergence of the UC as the focus of popular struggle against the conservative regime. The party's call for honesty and faithful representation in

government had tremendous appeal for the middle sectors, although less for the more radical labor groups. And the leadership of the party was filled with illustrious persons: Leandro Nicebro Alem, ex-president Bartolomi

Mitre, the governor of Buenos Aires Province Bernardo de Irigoyen, and Alem's nephew Hip6lito Yrigoyen, among others.49 Although the UC was clearly in opposition to the

government, it is hard to conceive of the party as particularly revolutionary. The leadership included much of

the. elite of Buenos Aires city and province, disaffected










from the mainstream conservatives (some of them were ex-PAN members), but not immigrant anarchists. Their interests lay

not in overthrowing the system but in taking it over.50

To this end, Mitre effected a deal with General Roca in 1891 to bring the Buenos Aires rebels back into the fold by combining the two national leaders in a presidential ticket

under a new alliance: the Uni6n Cfvica Nacional (UCN). While this move may have had some practical attractions, it was seen as an unprincipled compromise by the more

ideological of the UC's leaders, especially Alem and Yrigoyen. The 1891 "accommodation" resulted in a split in the UC, with Alem and his followers declaring against the deal and announcing a program of "relentless struggle" on principle against the corrupt established regime.51 Thus was established the Uni6n Crvica Principista (UCP). The principle of moral government demanded the UCP's abstention
from the corrupt electoral process at this time, but the strength of the new faction still threatened to upset a smooth transition of power. Partly as a result, Mitre and

Roca withdrew themselves from the impending presidential elections. However, they arranged a coalition instead around the candidacies of Luis Saenz Pena and Jose E. Uriburu which won the 1892 elections.

Unable to effect change through the electoral process, and committed to objectives that were incompatible with contemporary political rules, the Radicals, as they were










now tagged by the Mitre-Roca group, developed a strategy which was to serve them for the next two decades. They combined armed insurrection with abstention from the established political process. This intransigent policy combined moral indignation with action in the only way possible for a group committed to the belief in the immorality of Argentine elections. The results of this policy were mixed. Two attempted revolts in 1893 and 1895 failed, but the leaders escaped prosecution partly because of increasing popular support for their program.52 The PAN

continued to dominate elections, but the steadily growing UCR presence once again combined with factionalism within the PAN to produce a breakthrough in the political process.

The prosperity which the country had come to en3oy, combined with the knowledge that the leaders of the radicals really were not so different from themselves, allowed at least some conservatives to consider gradual electoral reform. They would co-opt the Radicals into becoming a "loyal opposition"53 with the conservatives retaining a majority in the elected houses. As long as the

Radicals abstained from political participation, the need for this particular solution to the problem may have

appeared less urgent, but a series of events in the early 1900's began to make the option more attractive.

In one episode, Carlos Pellegrini, as Minister of the Interior in Roca's second term as president, "was suddenly










made aware of the new importance and power of public opinion" in handling the national debt. He had worked out a
deal to consolidate and refinance Argentina's sizeable foreign debt by putting her customs revenues up as

collateral. This affront to national pride created an uproar sufficient to make Roca disavow both the plan and Pellegrini.54 Nationalist sentiment--especially widespread in the same middle sectors which were the base of power of

the UCR--had shown itself to be strong enough to affect government pol icy.

In another instance, Joaquin V. Gonzalez, who succeeded

Pellegrini as Minister of the Interior, sponsored a law which brought about a small measure of electoral reform. It

eliminated complete lists, under which all the seats in multi-member districts were competed for in a single unit,

and replaced them with single-seat electoral districts.55 Although the law clearly undermined conservative control of

elections, it was passed in 1902 and indicates that the reformist wing of the PAN was gaining the ascendancy. In addition, there was another aborted Radical revolt in 1905, indicating once again that the opposition movement was not

going to disappear.56 The appeal of electoral reform was growing stronger--not so much for its own sake but so that the PAN could continue to "rule without repression" and even generate a measure of "mass support".57 The anti-Roca,

reformist wing had gained the presidency in










1904, with the election of Manuel Quintana, and on his death, Jose Figuero, Alcorta, another supporter of reform, became president in 1906. He arranged for Roque Sgenz Pelia to become his successor in the 1910 elections and it was this younger Saenz Pena who undertook to bring about fundamental electoral reform.

S~enz Pe'ia at first offered Yrigoyen a post in his government in an attempt to subsume the Radical movement, but he was rebuffed. It was becoming apparent that only the

opportunity to participate in legitimate elections would calm the intransigents. The key to the reform was to force the Radicals into acceptable behavior: that is to say, voting. In as much as the Radical and conservative leaders were not dissimilar in social backgrounds, and since the PAN machinery was so solidly entrenched, accomodation seemed to carry little risk. In addition, the radical movement itself was hardly monolithic in its extremism, and had worked out accommodations with conservative regimes on

the provincial level.59 If a way could be found to bring the Radicals into national electoral politics, and if the majority party (assumed to be the PAN) could maintain a solid majority in the elected houses, then the Radicals could be denied real power and yet placated all in one move. There were genuine reformers within the government whose outlook was not so cynical,58 but, in any case, it seemed that reform without revolution was both possible and desirable.










The Electoral Reform Law of 1912 managed to accomplish this. It allowed for permanent registration which would lessen fraud and allow more Argentines to participate, thus

giving the Radicals the electoral clout for which they had fought. But the requirement for compulsory voting, while carrying no severe penalties, promised to force the Radicals into legal forms of protest. More extremist parties, such as the Socialists, on the other hand, represented in large part non-voting immigrants which would

not become an electoral threat. And, the process of the "incomplete list" giving two-thirds of the seats from a province to the majority party, one-third to the runner-up

party, and none to third parties,60 would assure PAN rule with a loyal or at least co-optedr Radical minority. Of course, effective male suffrage would be required to allow

enough Radical voters to participate to implement the scenario. It was the awareness of the Radical threat and the need to control it that allowed the law to pass; belief

in the virtues of electoral politics or a respect for the wisdom of Argentine voters was not necessary.

However, events did not progress quite according to scenario. The UCR captured a few congressional seats and remained a small minority until 1914. But, after that year,

the UCR, along with other reformist parties such as the Socialists and Progressive Democrats, began to increase their number of elected national representatives. 61 New










registrations apparently yielded more Radical than PAN voters. Also in 1914, Roque Sa~enz Pena, having become a reformist hero and having had the electoral reform law named after him, died. This may have upset the normal succession mechanism, for the 1916 national elections produced real surprises. in congressional elections, the combined Radical, Socialist, and Progressive Democrat forces captured a majority of the seats in the Camnara de Diputados for the first time. In the presidential elections, the Radicals captured the Presidency in their first legal try with 45.6% of the vote and widespread support for an Yrigoyen--Pelagio B. Luna ticket.62

While surely surprised, the conservatives were not particularly worried. Was not the leadership of the Radicals--was not Yrigoyen--a faction of the same elite which had ruled since 1880? Was not the export-led economy performing at record levels? Was not stability the goal of

all? While much has been made of the victory of the Radicals ushering in a new age of Argentine politics, the next chapters will suggest that in essence the conservatives were correct.



















iThe term is used by Jos6 Luis Romero as the title to Part Three of A History of Argentine Political Thought. Trans. Thomas F. McGann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963) , 165.
2For statistics and analyses of Argentine demographic growth during this period, see the following: Carlos F. Dfaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) , 23-24; Sociedad Rural Argentina, Anuario de la Socieidad Rural Argentina: estadfsticas econ6micas y agrarias (Buenos Aires:
Luis L. Gotelli, 1928), 59-64; and Gilbert Wilson Merkx, "Political and Economic Change in Argentina from 1870 to 1966" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968), Ch. 5.
3Studies of immigration and its impact on Argentine society are numerous and varied. Some emphasize economic factors, some sociological change. Some tend to focus on and criticize the absence of governmental policy, and others are concerned almost solely with demographic impact. Almost all,
however, are in agreement that immigration was one of the key factors in the series of social, economic and political changes which occurred in Argentina during this period. Some
of those studies (and specifically those used for this dissertation) include the following: Gustavo Beyhaut, et al, "Los inmigrantes en el sistema ocupacional Argentino," in
Torcuato di Tella, eL___, Argentina, sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971), 85-123; Roberto Cortes Conde, El progreso Argentino 1880-1914 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1979), 240-270; Gino Germani, "Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina," in Irving Louis
Horowitz, ed., Masses in Latin America (New York: Oxford, 1970), 289-330; Ernesto J. A. Maeder, "Poblaci6n e inmigraci6n en la Argentina entre 1880 y 1910" in Gustavo Ferrari and Ezequiel Gallo, eds., La Argentina del ochenta al centenario (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1980), 555-575; Jose Luis Romero, Ch. 6; James R. Scobie, Evolution on the Pampas: A Social History of Argentine Wheat, 1860-1910 (Austin: University of Texas, 1964), Ch. 3 and 7; Carl Solberg, "Immigration and Urban Social Problems in Argentina and Chile, 1890-1914," Hispanic American
Historical Review, 49: 2 (May, .1969) , 215-32; two










works by Richard J. Walter: "Politics, Parties, and Elections in Argentina's Province of Buenos Aires, 1912-42," Hispanic American Historical Review, 64: 4 (November, 1984), 707-35, and "The Socioeconomic Growth of Buenos Aires in the Twentieth Century" in Stanley R. Ross and Thomas F. McGann, eds., Buenos Aires: 400 Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 66-126; and Vicente Vazquez-Presedo, El caso Argentino: migraci6n de factores, comerciQ exterior y desarollo, 1875-1914 (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971), Ch. 3.

4Various sources containing the text of the Constitution exhibit disagreement on some particulars. For example, concerning the text of Article 25, one source (Peaslee) uses the term "encourage" regarding the government's obligation
towards immigration, while another (Fitzgibbon) uses "develop". It is assumed that such differences are a function of translation only. For constitutional references and interpretations, see Austin F. MacDonald, "The Government of Argentina," Hispanic American Historical Review, 5: 1 (February, 1922), 52-82; Russell H. Fitzgibbon, ed., The Constitutions of the Americas (as of January 1, 1948) (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1948), 12-31; and Amos J. Peasley, Constit utiorns of Nations, Vol. IVL The Americas (The.Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1970), 3-27.

5V5zquez-Presedo, 110.

6Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas, 123.

7Examinations of this persistent land-holding pattern can be found in Diaz Alejandro, 151-159; Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas, 114-121; CortEs Conde, El progreso argentinp, 149-188; and Vgzquez-Presedo, Ch. 3.
8As calculated from the Argentine census of 1914 by Carl Solberg in "Immigration and Urban Social Problems", 218.

9Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas, 125.

10Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas, 131-132. Scobie also gives special emphasis to the relationship between economic cycles and immigration flow.

11Second- and third-class passengers, who comprised the vast majority of immigrants, were subject to inspection and interrogation by immigration officials. Part of this process included ascertaining occupations.
12Scobie describes the lives of colonists, tenants and golondrinas in Revolution on the Pampas, 57-61.










13There is general agreement on these percentages since they are derived from the Argentine censuses. These particular figures are from Merkx, 72.
14The creation of an urban labor force was not
necessarily in contradition with government policy. Labor rural or urban - was relatively expensive in Argentina up to the 1860's and '70's. Part of immigration policy tried to encourage the immigration of persons to expand the general labor pool, as opposed to the number of rural settlers. This point is discussed in H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in
the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University, 1960) , 324-28.
15V~zquez-Presedo, 139.

16Three works which deal with the shift from the old society to the new are those cited by Germani and Romero,
and John J. Johnson's now famous Political Change in -Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). The three quoted terms are
taken, in order, from Romero, 167, Germani, 303, and Johnson, ix.

17Romero, 79.

18A good description of this dual elite can be found in Thomas C. Cochran and Ruben E. Reina, Capitalism in Argentine Culture; A Study of Torcuato di Tella and S.T.A.M.
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962) , 10-11.

19V~zquez-Presedo, 139.
20Comments on foreign ownership can be found in Dfaz Alejandro, 214-18; these figures are from Merkx, 90.
21This refers only to shifts in domestic consumption patterns. The major influence on production in the rural sector came from overseas markets. These will be discussed in Chapter Two.
22These middle sectors were self-defined by respondents to the census. A rural middle class comprised of small landowners and managers existed distinct from the urban middle sectors. As a proportion of the economically active population the rural middle class shrank during this period,
although it grew in absolute terms from 46,542 in the 1869 census to 56,110 in 1914. See Merkx, 88.

�23Merkx, 90.


24Germani, 303.











25For a description of the desires of the middle sectors, see Johnson, 4-11 and Chapter 6; Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America", Hispanic American Historical Review, 49: 1 (February, 1969), 81; and Walter, "Politics, Parties,, and Electionsm
26Walter discusses the shift in the electorate in Buenos
Aires province and emphasizes how few of the foreign born became voters in "Politics, Parties, and Elections", 714.
27 The origins and development of the labor movement in
Argentina, as distinct from the general phenomenon of immigration and the rise of the middle sectors, are covered in the following works: Robert J. Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: Free Press, 1965)f, Ch. 4; Samuel
L. Bailey, Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967), Ch. 1; Thomas E. Skidmore, "Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in Twentieth-Century Latin America," in Virginia Bernhard, ed., Elites, Masses. and Modernization in Latin America. 1850-1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 79-126; and, Richard J. Walter, The Socialist Party of Argentina. 1890-1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977).

28There had been at least one union established in Argentina before this time. The Printing Trades Workers' Union of Buenos Aires was originally a workers aid society founded in 1853. In the 1860's,, it took on the trappings of a real union, negotiating with employers over workers' benefits and calling strikes. But this was the exception. See Alexander, 35.

29Skidmore (92-93), especially, makes note of the different labor characteristics caused by the "export economy". It might be noted, however, that the same influx of immigrants which provided the new labor force and the new
European outlook also insured that the labor supply was large and "highly elastic to changes in real wages during most years," so that the pressure on employers to accede to labor demands was lessened. This point is made clear by Diaz Alejandro, 23.
30Tbere was an exception to these general characteristics. La Fraternidad, the railroad workers union, followed the model of United States unions: charging dues which went for sickness and unemployment benefits and remaining outside of the political struggles of the other labor organizations. See Alexander, 36.










31Details of the development of the labor federations and their conflicts can be found in Alexander, 36-37, and in Chapter 3 of Walter, The Socialist Party.

32The bill was introduced into the Camara de Diputados by Minister of the Interior Joaqufn V. Gonz~lez in 1904. See Bailey, 24-25, and Skidmore, 95-96.
33Bailey (p. 21) makes specific mention of the inspirational nature of the Barcelona strike. See Solberg, "Immigration and Urban Social Problems" (pp. 228-29) and Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas (p. 125) for detailed discussions on attitudes towards immigrants and their connection to the Ley de Residencia. As for the law itself, it was introduced by Miguel Cane, a conservative senator, and remained on the books until the presidency of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) . Several hundreds, perhaps thousands, of immigrants were deported under its provisions, and even
native Argentines were sent to internal exile in Patagonia in some cases. See Walter, The Socialist Party, 45 and 247, and Alexander, 37.
34Both Johnson and Romero discuss the differences between workers and the middle sectors and the importance of nationalist sentiments within the latter. See Chapters 1 and
6 respectively. See also Bailey, 33-34.
35Alexander, 37-38.

36Walter, The Socialist Party, 45-46.

37The 1910 episode is covered in detail by Alexander (37-38), Bailey (25-27), Skidmore (96-97) , and Walter, The Socialist Party (45-46).

38Some of the works previously cited in this chapter deal with the political developments which accompanied the social changes already discussed. They include the works by Bailey, Cortfs Conde, Johnson, Merkx, Romero, and Walter. In addition to those, there are several works which deal more exclusively with the politics of the alluvial era, although some of them by necessity also touch on topics covered above.
Several sources cover general political developments of the period. They include Natalio R. Botana, El orden conservador: la polltica argentina entre 1880 y 1916 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1979); Juan Eugenio Corradi, "Argentina," in Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, Latin America: the-5truggle with Dependency and Beyond (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974) , 305-407; Eduardo Crawley, A House Divided: Argentina, 1880-1980 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984) ; Roberto Etchepareborda, "La










estructura socio-politica argentina y la generacion del ochenta," Latin American Research Review, 13: 1 (1978) , 126-134 ; H. S. Ferns, Argentina (New York: Praeger, 1969); George Heaps-Nelson, "Argentine Provincial Politics in *an Era of Expanding Electoral Participation: Buenos Aires and Mendoza, 1906-1918" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Florida, 1975); John A. Peeler, Latin American Democracies: Colombia. Costa Rica, Venezuela (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1985) , especially the introduction, "The Theory and Practice of Liberal Democracy," 3-41; Karen L Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and Public Policy. 1890-1930 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Revoluci6n y contrarrevoluci6n en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Del Mar Dulce, 1970); David Rock, ed., Argentina in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1975); two works by Peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974) , and Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and Change (New York: Colombia University Press, 1969); and Peter G. Snow, Political Forces in Argentina (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971).
Other works which deal more specifically with the Radical party include Gabriel Del Mazo, El Radicalismo: ensayo sobre su historia y doctrina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1957); Ezequiel Gallo, Colonos en armas. r.as revoluciones radicales en la provincia de Santa Fe (1893) (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto, 1977) ; Ezequiel Gallo and Silvia Sigal, "La formaci6n de los partidos politicos contemporaneos: La Uni6n Cfvica Radical (1890-1916)," Desarrollo Econ6mico, 3: 1/2 (AbrilSeptiembre, 1963), 173-230; Lauro Lagos, Doctrina y acci6n radical (Buenos Aires: 1930); Felix Luna, Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Editorial Desarrollo, 1964) and as editor, "Noventa aios de radicalismo" Todo es Historia: NGmero Especial, 15: 170 (July, 1981); Rudolfo Puiggros, El Yrigoyenismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Alvarez, 1965); three studies by David Rock, "Machine Politics in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Radical Party, 1912-1930," Journal of Latin American Studies, 4: 2 (November, 1972), 233-256, Politics in Argentina: The Rise and Fall of - Radicalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) , and "The Rise of the Argentine Radical Party (the Uni6n Cfvica Radical) ,
1891-1916," Cambridge: Cambridge University, Centre of Latin American Studies, Working Papers No. 7 (n.d.); Carlos J. Rodrfguez, Irigoyen: su revolucion politica y social (Buenos Aires: Libreria y Editorial "La Facultad", 1943); Peter H. Smith, "Los Radicales Argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930," Desarrollo Econ6mico, 7: .25 (April-June, 1967), 795-829; Peter G.Snow, Argentine Radicalism: The History, and Qoctrine of the Radical Civic










Union (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965); and David Tamarin, "Yrigoyen and Per6n: The Limits -of Argentine Populism" in Michael L. Conniff, ed., Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 31-45.
Two works dealing with particular aspects of the period are Edgardo L. Amaral, Lisandro de la Torre y 1i; polftica de la reforma electoral de Saenz Pena. (Buenos Aires: 1961); and Darro Canton, Argentine Parlementarians in 1889. 1916. and 1946 (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato di Tella, 1966).
All these have provided the framework for the coverage of political developments which follows.
39Peeler, 25.

40Romero uses the term "conservative liberalism:" Merkx uses "aristocratic liberalism."
41Romero, 180-81

42The endemic nature of fraud in the Argentine political process has been noted by several scholars, including Walter in "Politics, Parties, and Elections", 721, and Rock, Politics in Argentina, 26,29.
In an interview in 1902, Carlos Pellegrini, exPresident, described the following episode (from Joaqurn V.
Gonzalez, La reform electoral Argentina as cited by Dario Canton in Argentine Parlementarians.
I remember that when I was a boy. . .even before
being able to vote, the custom had it that the struggle was limited to taking possession of the tables; this was the preliminary act of the election, and once a
party was in possession of a table, the election was by this very fact over: everybody knew that party would
win.
What was the basis for saying that? The very simple
fact that fraud was accepted and admitted as a regular
occurrence.
43A description of these educational reforms and their impact can be found in Merkx, 76-79.
44Romero, 199.

45The socio-economic makeup of the Radicals is discussed by Walter "Politics, Parties, and Elections", 717-18 and in
detail by Gallo and Sigal, 198-207. Rock emphasises the non-revolutionary nature of the middle sectors. and the UCR in Politics in Argentina, 19-24. Tamarin examines the relationship between populism and the radicals, claiming that "Radicalism is a classic representative of 'reformist era' populism" on page 31 of "Radicalsim and Per6n."











460n the origins of the UCJ and the Uni6n Crvica, see Rock, Politics in Argentina, 41. On the early Socialist Party, see Walter, The Socialist Party, Ch. 1 and 2.
47Gallo, Colonos en armas, 21-22.

48Rock, Politics in Argentina, 30

49Other personages included Vicente Fidel L6pez and Arist6bulo del Valle, making up the "old elite" element of leadership of the Radicals. See Romero, 209-10
50Rock and Smith, among others, emphasize this point. See Rock, Politics in Argentina, 32, and Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy, 9.
51Romero, 212.

52How much support was actually due to Radical programs is debatable. Both Gallo and Scobie point out that the 1893 revolt in Santa Fe had more to do with combatting the local PAN elite, than with supporting the Buenos Aires radicals. See Colonos en armas, 82, and Revolution on the Pampas, 154. Nevertheless, it was the Radicals who benefited.
53This point is made by Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy, 10.
54It is Rock's contention that this episode moved Pelligrini to the side of the reformers. He also points out the connection between nationalist issues and the middle sectors, as does Johnson. See Rock, Politics in Argentina, 33, and Johnson, 96-97. Nationalist sentiment also played a part in the passage of the Ley de Residencia of the same year. It would seem that this law, given the emerging class
structure of Argentina, was more a palliative to the emerging native middle class than to the older elites.

55As a result of this reform, district four, containing
working class portions of Buenos Aires, elected the first Socialist deputy, Alfredo L. Palacios, in 1904. See Walter, The Socialist Party, 73-74.
56Pellegrini, in fact, helped campaign for amnesty for the Radical rebels. See Romero, 201. Oddly enough, in a political system dominated by the presidency, Article 67, Section 17 of the Argentine Constitution gives the power of
amnesty to congress.

�57Rock, Politics in Argentina, 34.










58Romero (pp. 200-201) points out that genuine reformers were to be found within the conservative ranks.

590n the differences between the mainstream Radicals in Beunos Aires and elsewhere, specifically Mendoza, and on accommodations reached with the conservative regime, see George Heaps-Nelson, Ch. 3-5.

60Single-seat districts had been rescinded in 1910. See Walter, The Socialist Party, 248 (fn. 4).
61For specific statistics on elections from 1912 to 1916, see Darfo Cant6n, Materiales para el estudio de la sociologia polftica en la Argentina. Vol I (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato di Tella, 1968), 35-37.
621tid., 85-86.














CHAPTER THREE
THE PATTERN OF INTERNAL
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE GOLDEN AGE, 1870-1930





The social and political changes of the alluvial era were significant, in that they produced at least the appearance of a new society. Even more significant for Argentina, both at the time and for the future, were the economic changes which accompanied and sometimes drove those

social and political developments. The economic progress enjoyed by Argentina in this period is unparalleled in Latin

America and approaches what occurred in Europe and the United States during the same period. Argentina developed from a pastoral world backwater in 1880 to a leader in the world agri-commodities market by the beginning of the First World War. Argentina's economy entered a golden age of progress and expansion.

The period has also been termed "la bella 6pocan. Many, extend this period of economic expansion and productivity past the first world war, sometimes as far as 1930.1 often,

the years of Radical party governments from 1916-1930 are seen as part of, and even the capstone of this epoch.










As outlined in the previous chapter, the normal approach to the period after the unification of Argentina and the federalization of Buenos Aires is to see it as one of steady

--sometimes even spectacular--economic growth coupled with the gradual expansion of political opportunity. The period ends with the "revolution of 1930" which is seen as the death knell of what had been political development in the same way as the world depression is seen as the demise of Argentina's economic miracle. The half-century from 1880 to 1930, then, is seen as a package of progress--a classic example of political and economic development--which was cut short by economic and political violence.2

There are no aggregate figures, such as Gross National Product or Gross Domestic Product, to measure Argentine economic growth before 1900.3 Import figures, however, show that there was steady expansion of the Argentine economy at least as indicated by increasing imports from overseas trade

from the early 1870's to 1889. Total imports more than tripled from 49,125,000 pesos oro in 1870 to 164,570,000 in 1889. The economic crisis of 1890, which was integral to the

Jufirez Celman resignation fiasco (see previous chapter) halted this steady growth. Imports fell to a low of 67,208,000 pesos oro in 1891 and then began a slow climb reaching 1890 levels in the early 1900'S.4 The crisis of 1890 was severe, but its effects were not long-lived.










After 1900, indexed figures for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have been calculated and are represented in Figure 2. With the exception of WWI and the postwar recovery

period from 1914 to 1920, these figures too show a steady growth in the Argentine economy even in real terms as measured by fixed values of 1950 pesos. The Argentine economy grew almost four fold in the last 30 years of the "Golden Age".

Per-capita GDP shows a considerably less impressive expansion--a little over 50% for the period--lessening the personal impact of economic growth. This is due, of course, to the massive immigrant-fed population growth which Argentina experienced in the same period and which at least partly fueled that economic expansion. Even so, the overall record for the period as a whole is impressive.

Other authors view Argentina's development over the 50 years from 1880 to 1930 as a series of different stages, not

all of which are as positive as the period as a whole. Especially during the Radical period, some analysts perceive

a malaise, or at least a slowdown of economic development. Argentina ceased being an "expanding open export economy" and became a "stationary open" one: Argentina "marked time economically."5 In similar fashion, it has been argued that Argentina reached a "state of maturity" after the First World War when growth slowed,6 or worse, simply stagnated in

a pattern of "delay" until the economic collapse of the

















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ARGENTINE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
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1900-1929


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19301s.7 Hence, economic developments in Argentina were not

smooth and harmonious, but somewhat unstable.8 In fact, as Table 8 shows, some important indicators of economic progress actually peaked rather early in the period to be followed by actual decline in the 1920's, preceding the collapse of the 1930's. These indicators suggest that the golden age ended earlier than sometimes acknowledged.

Regardless of differing opinions of the exact

periodicity and pace of development, it is clear that at least some portions of the half century witnessed an extraordinary performance by the Argentine economy. Beginning as early as the 1860's the productive potential of

Argentina began to be recognized by possible customers and investors in industrializing Europe. From 1850 to 1880, the value of Argentine exports grew at a rate of 7.4% annually as exports from the Littoral of Argentina became

increasingly important The election of Bartolome Mitre as President in 1862 marked the beginning of Argentina's purposeful and methodical entry into the "international commodity and capital markets" and was followed by a period

of economic expansion through the 18701s.10 Once national consolidation became a reality in 1880, this potential began

to be fulfilled and Argentina underwent a period of sustained economic growth until the Baring crisis of 1890.

The crisis, named after the large and established British investment firm which was heavily involved, did not











TABLE 8
PEAK YEARS FOR SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
OF THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY



INDICATOR YE6R

INVESTMENT

Total Investment as % of GDP 1907
New investment per capita 1910
Total fixed investment per capita 1912
New foreign investment 1913
Total foreign investment 1913

RESOURCES

Rate of population growth 1906
New railroad mileage 1911
Number of immigrants per year 1912
Land under cultivation 1914

FOREIGN TRADE

Price of beef (Linears Market) 1919
Exports per capita 1920
Total foreign trade 1920
Total imports 1920
Beef exports (tons) 1924

STANDARD OF LIVING

Domestic beef consumption per capita 1923 % increase in GDP (post war) 1923
GDP per capita 1929




S5JaZ-g: Both the choice of indicators and the years are from Merkx, 129.










have a lasting impact in that the Argentine economy recovered and experienced even greater growth after 1890. The crisis did, however, point up some characteristics of the economy which would haunt subsequent Argentine development. The first characteristic is that of heavy reliance upon foreign investment to produce capital infrastructure. Argentina had relied almost exclusively on foreign money ever since the 1850's for capital investment needs, and when an orgy of speculation and over-borrowing by

large and small investors caused foreign funds to dry up, Argentina faced a fiscal crisis. Argentina's credit reputation currency valuer and exports all suffered.11

Perhaps more importantly, the crisis pointed out a chronic and unhealthy situation in the economy. Argentina depended upon foreign investment and earnings from exports to secure the funds needed to buy the imports which would fuel development. It also relied on the customs duties levied on imports to provide the government with revenues to run the country. Argentina suffered a continual lag between

what she could earn from exports and what she needed to import. And, state expenses and state revenues stayed out of

balance. Hence there was pressure to maintain high import duties to pay government expenses including debt service. But this made the costs of imported goods necessary for development more expensive and necessitated even higher levels of exports to balance imports. This situation existed before the Baring crisis, but was made most clear in 1890.










In order to escape this vicious cycle of revenue shortages, borrowing abroad, and the inability to face long-term payments, the country needed to increase exports and obtain more foreign exchange in gold. Increased exports would allow the government to buy gold inexpensively and meet its
outstanding loan obligations.12

Argentina avoided total collapse in the 1890's partly because it had just gone off the gold standard in 1885. In addition, the government budget was cut, and the world exports market fortuitously improved. The volume of exports,

if not the price, increased dramatically in the 1890's and Argentina was able to climb out of the crisis. In factthe period after 1890 and continuing to the First World War, at

least saw the most dramatic growth rates of the whole period.

It may be that aggregate growth is not the critical characteristic in an assessment of the Argentine economy. Possibly more important are the structural changes in

economic development during the period. Not only was the value of production in Argentina increasing, but the source of that value was changing too. After 1900 agricultural activities, while important, were declining as a share of Argentina's economic production and the industrial sector was growing. As a percentage of the GDP from 1900 to 1929, the production of the rural sector slipped from 38.1 to 30.9. At the same time, the contribution of the industrial sector rose from 12.9 to 16.5 and the service sector grew from 49.0 to 52.6. The apparent shift from agriculture to










industry might be somewhat exaggerated in these figures and

the shift is not large anyway, with agricultural production still accounting for almost a third of GDP even at the end of the period.13 Yet the figures appear to signify a diversifying as well as a growing economy. In addition, Argentina's industrial sector was growing at a faster rate than the rural sector, but her industrial economy never became as large as the rural sector and produced always for

domestic consumption, not for the export market. The industrial sector was not able to meet even domestic demand in spite of its growth, so most of Argentina's demand for manufactured goods had to be met by imports. In addition, in

spite of growth in mining, Argentina could not fill her needs for minerals. From 1900 to 1929, imports of industrial goods and materials equaled one quarter of Argentina's GDP,

and almost two thirds of these were ferrous metals and textiles.14

Other important changes in the Argentine economy have to

do with infrastructure changes. The wave of immigrants gave Argentina the labor pool needed--especially in skills and for economic activities not present earlier (as discussed in

the preceding chapter). The period also witnessed the construction of port facilities, power and commercial networks, and other essential industries which contributed to the growth statistics in non-agricultural areas cited above. Yet, the key piece of infrastructure--the key










economic input--upon which these immigrants were to work and whose products the ports were to handle was land.

Land expansion was constant over the period. Land was brought into use by conquest, or rather extension of Argentine control, and by the influx of labor already discussed. The cultivated land area of Argentina increased from just under 400 thousand hectares in 1872 to almost 26 million in 1930 with the period of greatest expansion coming

in the fifteen years before World War I. In the 1870's, grazing areas predominated, but wheat-growing land expands rapidly thereafter, becoming about one-third of the total by

the early 1900's and remaining at that level throughout the early 20th century. Lands in fodder declined from almost half the total in 1872 to about 20% in the first years of the 20th century, and then rebounded rapidly after 1905 as beef exports grew. The increase in fodder lands continued more or less steadily, reaching 41.5% of the total land area

cultivated in 1922, then declining to a 1930 level of 22.2% .15

Throughout the 19th century, fodder lands were

unimproved grazing lands, but with the emergence of a new market for Argentine beef in the first decade of the 20th century, a specific fodder--alfalfa--began to be

purposefully introduced.l6 Alfalfa has certain distinct advantages which make it a grazing crop of exceptional value. It yields the highest amount of protein per area










sown, permitting greatly increased yields of beef. And it is perennial, requiring little labor input. Later, actual grain

feeding of beef would be introduced, but alfalfa grazing remained a staple of Argentine beef production.17 Alfalfa growing was a key indicator of the direction of Argentina's

export economy. Since it was linked to the new beef industry, it became a more secure and lucrative use of land than grains.18

Patterns of land use shifted according to the perceived value of what the land could produce. Estancieros, particularly, regarded land as capital, as an input to be employed to reach a large foreign market.19 While the amount

of land in wheat tended to undergo slow and steady changes, the amount of land sown in fodder was unstable. There was a sudden and large expansion in fodder lands starting in 1907,

which settled after 1912, then occurred again in the first half of the 19201s.20 In many areas, c ereal production ceased entirely with obvious impact on the supply of grains

and on labor. Grain production often shifted from one producing area to another, with an impact on certainty of supply. A source in 1922 stated that "many areas which a decade ago produced large quantities of wheat and other grain grow almost none."2l As we shall see, these changes in land use were responses to market forces.

This pattern of shifting land usage is reflected in cattle statistics. The number of head of cattle produced in










Argentina fluctuated with the amount of land put over to fodder. Argentina' s ratio of cattle per capita was 6 times that of the Unites States in 1913, allowing for a

considerable surplus of available stock over domestic consumption.22 While sometimes increases in slaughter overcame the rate of cattle production,23 Argentine breeders

generally were able to take advantage of the existence of a domestic surplus and to respond rapidly to refurbish the supply of stock. This allowed a certain mobility in dealing with foreign markets.

Argentine land owners were able to respond en masse to market forces bacause land holding was so concentrated. Traditional latifundia patterns and commercial credit policies insured that land ownership did not become dispersed in spite of immigration and population growth.24 Argentine estancieros were thus able to keep herds together for generations, maintaining unsurpassed quality of breeding stock,25 and land prices and rents remained high in response

to its increasing productive value.26 The use of land as capital meant that while the pampean region was able to absorb a labor force of 800,000 immigrants up to 1914,27 they remained tenants, by and large. Shifting land to alfalfa production exacerbated the tenancy pattern. Cereal producing land--especially in the Northeast region: Entre Rfos and parts of Santa Fe and Corrientes, as well as Buenos

Aires Province, C6rdoba and San Luis--was converted into










grazing land and fodder producing areas. Once an area was sown in alfalfa, the need for tenants was terminated since alfalfa is a perennial with few requirements for tending. The tenants might move to another land parcel or to another owner, but their services were no longer needed for pasturage land (although the services of other ganadero workers might be, of course). The ease with which land use could be shifted created a migrant tenant class, some of whom moved out of agriculture altogether, who played a role in the social and political changes discussed in the previous chapter. It also made capital formation and technological application in the rural sector less urgent and attractive, because profits could be insured simply by changing crops, rather than increasing productivity. This would have economic impact later.28

If land was one important aspect of the Argentine economy, another was the phenomenal growth of the railroad network. Starting with only about 700 kilometers in 1870, the railroads had an average growth of about that same number per year throughout the period,, so that by 1913, Argentina had 32,500 kilometers of railroad, or 41.9 per inhabitant. This compares to 65 kilometers per person for Australia, 61.3 for Canada and 43.5 for the United States. Argentina's ratio was more than twice that for any other large Latin American country.29 Railroad expansion after the

start of World War I slowed drastically, but it revived in the 1920's to reach a total of 37,700 kilometers by 1927.










As well as serving as a consumer of materials and labor,

the rail road system served the obvious and critical functions of carrying goods and linking the interior of Argentina to overseas ports, especially Buenos Aires. In 1900, some 12,600,000 tons of cargo were being transported yearly at a cost (income to the railroads) of 41,401,00 pesos oro. By 1927, 53,698,000 tons of cargo were shipped at

a cost of almost 300 million gold pesos with profits to the railroads of 95.6 million pesos.30 The railroads were goods movers and money makers.

A glance at any maps of the railway networks shows the pattern as opposed to the size of expansion.31 Rail lines radiate from Buenos Aires as a hub to connect the productive

regions of the interior--from Tucuman in the north to the southern flanks of La Pampa and Buenos Aires province in the

south--to the ports of the coast. It is the land and its productive capacity which are being linked to an outlet. Land became accessible as the railroad web spun from Beunos Aires reached it, and agricultural colonization followed the

railroad web.32 More importantly, land became a capital asset when tied to the ports. The land was often owned prior

to the arrival of the railroad, but it became part of the productive sector of the Argentine economy only after the arrival of the railroads. For this reason--as well as its own prof itabil ity-- the railroad network was a key to Argentine development.33










Equally important was the way the railroads were developed. Two characteristics in particular are indicators of the evolving nature of the Argentine economy. One has been touched on above: the railroads were links for produce to foreign markets, not for persons. And, secondly, the railroads were predominantly foreign-owned. Hence, the railroad was not just a symbol of development but of a particular kind of development for Argentina.

Railroad expansion occurred in two stages which reflect ownership patterns. During the first stage,, up to the 1880's, expansion was slow with about 50% of the financing being domestic and the pace of investment tended to outstrip

returned revenues. After 1890, however, the pace of expansion picked up and foreign investment began to dominate. In part, the pace of investment quickened because of a return of confidence after weathering the 1890 crisis.

It quickened also because of the increasing use of state guarantees of profits. Investors would not undertake to finance railroads into undeveloped territory without some sort of government backing. Under various arrangements, the Argentine government guaranteed certain profit levels (often

as high as 7% per year) to railroad investors. By the 1890's, some 20% of national government indebtedness consisted of these guarantees. Even so, investors stuck to routes which would have proved profitable regardless of government action, so that unprofitable regional routes had










to be financed directly by the state.34 By the early 1900's, railroads had become sufficiently profitable that even state

regulation did not diminish investor enthusiasm, partly, no doubt, because the regulation was not particularly onerous and because certain priviledges, such as exemptions f rom duties on imported construction materials, were granted.35

Profitability and security were so attractive that by 1914 British investors, by far the major foreign ones, owned

between 70 and 75% of the railroad mileage in Argentina.36 Native investors seemed uninterested.

Argentines were not investors in railways or generally in joint-stock companies. Their wealth was largely land, and with the prospect of expansion. their resources were directed to the
acquisition of more land and its development.37

The native elites seemed content to profit from the land development boom which the railroads produced, rather than from the railroads directly. And, in general, real estate and land were more profitable.38 The land with its productive capacity was Argentine, but the key to its productive potential--the railroads--was British.

The phenomenon of foreign dominance of a key infrastructure element was not limited to the railroads. The

most famous product of Argentina's rich land resources and the one which has become synonymous with pampean society-beef--was in its turn to become dominated by foreign interests in a fashion similar to the railroads. In the same

way that the land was owned by Argentines, but its










productive capacity was determined by foreign interests through the railroads, so the great cattle assets of Argentina would become dominated by foreign interests through the frigorfficos. Frigorifficos are more than just slaughterhouses, or abattoirs; they also process meat by-products and prepare beef for shipping in a variety of forms. When meat production is oriented towards local

consumption, or only limited exporting in primitive forms such as dried beef, frigorffico technology is not important.

Nor does hide production require high levels of technology or investment. These, in fact, were the Argentine beef

products of consequence until the 1880's, and as long as they were, Argentine beef interests remained in Argentine hands.

In the 1880's, however, the emergence of a foreign technology--refrigeration--would allow Argentine beef to be transported long distances in palatable form.39 This meant that the world market--the real market--was now open to Argentine production. The very first successful frigorifico was established by George W. Drabble, a British entrepreneur, as the River Plate Fresh Meat Company in 1883,

eventually taken over by the firm of George Nelson and Sons.40 The majority of the early frigorificos, however, were founded with Argentine capital or as joint British-Argentine ventures.41 They were mutton-exporting ventures for the most part, because the technology available










could deal more easily with smaller carcasses, such as sheep, rather than large cattle.

The appearance of this new technology coincided with several fortuitous events outside of Argentina. In the United States, for example, domestic consumption of meat products was increasing, and the amount of surplus production for export was declining. At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain, already a consumer of Argentine

beef, would demand new supplies of meat to feed its troops in the Boer War, but dominion states, such as Australia, would be unable to meet that demand.42 A new market to consume what the new technology could produce was being created.

The advancement of refrigeration technology, and the opening of new markets as mentioned above, stimulated a shift to beef exports in the 1890 's. The Sociedad Rural Argentina had opened La Congelada Argentina plant in 1884, but it had failed because of capitalization and shipping problems.43 But on April 30, 1900, Britain closed its ports to what had been Argentina's major beef export: live animals.44 Now, the frigorffico technology had to be applied

to the beef trade if the major foreign market was to be maintained. once again, foreign capital was called upon, and Argentine government actions to guarantee profit levels and

exemptions from export duties were granted to stimulate investment.45 Argentines realized that the level of










investment needed to create a major industry capable of taking advantage of the new market situation was beyond their means. After the boost to the industry created by the Boer War and British contracts for food for the troops, British control of both the production and consumption end of the industry seemed inevitable. Even so, plants

capitalized by Argentines did open between 1902 and 1904, including the La Blanca plant, and Frigorffico Argentino.46

After 1904, however, foreign capital began to pour in in

earnest and from more than one source, so that within the next 13 years, the vast majority of the meat packing capacity wound up in foreign hands. Similar to the investment pattern in the railroads, once the real potential for profitability was established, foreign money took over the frigorifico trade. And profit levels for investment in frigorr~ficos were spectacular during this period, averaging over 10% per annum.47 But, unlike the railroads, the capital

for the expansion of the frigorflico industry now came from the United States. The major North American meat packers, with immense capital backing, saw the Argentine industry as not meeting its potential and determined to expand it. The United States companies came to dominate the Argentine frigorffico industry through takeovers of faltering Argentine plants or major new construction.48 By 1917, the US companies controlled some 57.4% of the frigorfico trade, while the Argentine share had fallen to less than 5%. Table

9 summarizes the situation.










TABLE 9
MAJOR FRIGORIFICOS IN ARGENTINA BY CONTROLLING COUNTRY AS OF 1919


OPERATING DATE OF
COMPANY COMPANY NAME FOUNDING

United States


Armour Armour
& Morris Swift



Wilson Britain Nelson & Sons Britain


Argentina Sansinena


Frigorffico Armour de La Plata

Sociedad Anonima La Blanca


Companla Swift de La Plata

New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co.

Frigorffico Wilson de la Argentina



River Plate Fresh Meat Co.

Las Palmas Produce Co. and Argentina

Smithfield and Argentine Meat Co.


Compania Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas, Ltda.


Souxce: Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Meat Packing Industry (1919), 24-35, 160-167, 172-73.

Nte: *indicates date of founding under named country: both formerly Argentine owned.


1911 1912*


1907 1909 1916*



1883 1886



1904


1891










The emergence of United States leadership of the frigorlfico industry altered the structure of the beef trade

in Argentina. North American firms seemed more aggressive and expansionist than established British and Argentine firms. were the new companies to rapidly expand beef buying,

ruinous competition for supply could be the result. Weaker firms might be driven out, and, in any case, the cost of beef to the frigorfficos was bound to go up. Before the appearance of the American firms, competition for supplies of cattle had been avoided by informal arrangement. Periodic

"friendly chats had assured each frigorffico of a reasonable supply of beef, without price competition. These early pools had worked well in keeping the growth of the industry controlled.49 Similar accommodations were worked out initially with the new arrivals.

In late November of 1911, it was agreed among the major frigorificos to meet every six weeks to establish production

quotas which would guarantee everyone an adequate supply of beef without competing for supplies of cattle. Under the pool cattle prices remained reasonably stable and profits were not excessive, averaging about 13.5%.50 However, under

the restraints of the pool , plant had not been used at capacity and the new arrivals were too strong to keep in line. By April, 1913, the U.S. firms felt in a position to break out of the restraints of quotas and did so. What followed was a brief price war--not in sales prices but in










bidding for cattle. This hurt small producers as the larger firms could sustain the higher payments and were controlling

the price paid for cattle. In general, the British and Argentine firms had no choice but to seek another accommodation with the U.S. producers. And? as long as they had a guaranteed share of a growing market and enjoyed the same advantages of limited competition, it was to their advantage to do so. In June 1914, a "new pool" was established with the U.S. Companies receiving the lion's share of the market. This arrangement, with occasional and minor interruptions, continued well into the 1920's. Thus, the domination of the frigorffico industry by U.S. firms was secured.

The suppliers of cattle and consumers of beef, of courser were affected by the se machinations. Beef producers were not affected as adversely as might be expertly in selling their cattle, as the price continued to rise in spite of the pools. Beef prices tended upwards until 1919, then dropped considerably to 1923, and then rose again for the rest of the 1920's. although never again reaching 1919 levels. The number of cattle bought for slaughter tends to follow, rather than oppose, price movements: rising to 1918,

then dipping but returning to those levels by 1922, then steadily climbing for the rest of the decade of the 1920's.51 Perhaps the presence of the pool dampened normal supply and demand interactions somewhat. When slaughter










increased, the supply of cattle did not rise so fast as to level off prices, nor did falling slaughter totals greatly reduce prices. On the other hand, the generally steady increase in herd size and in the price of production land indicate that the producers did not suffer undervaluation of their produce.

Cattle producers did, however, have to drastically alter

their production standards. Cattle now had to be bred simultaneously for heavier weights and higher quality of beef. Frigorrffico buyers, especially the North Americans,52 wanted heavier, younger steers for their plants.53 This required alterations in feeding and breeding. Slaughtering at an earlier age also temporarily affected the herd size.54

Costs of breeder bulls skyrocketed,55 and the use of supplemental feeds, such as alfalfa, increased. This, of course, affected the use of land resources, as has already been mentioned. The beef producer was entering a new world because of the frigorfficos.

Consumers in Argentina generally did not buy their beef

from the frigorifficos. They bought fresh meat, for the most part, which usually came from different grades of cattle. But, the necessary changes in beef raising would affect the

abundance of all grades and the pricing practices of the frigorfficos, being major consumers of cattle, affected all markets. Thus, while beef producers who sold directly to the

frigorlfticos were obviously at the mercy of the pool, so










too, to a lesser extent, were domestic producers and consumers. Prices at the Liniers market, the major market for domestic beef in Buenos Aires, rose rather steadily from 1911 to 1914t and steeply thereafter until 1920.

Per capita consumption reflected these price motions to some extent and fell off from 1914 to 1922, declining almost

40% from 1913 to 1918 alone. This was partly offset by increasing consumption of other meats such as mutton, lamb and pork.56 But, these meats were not the ones of choice, nor do they seem to have been as readily available in the major domestic markets, therefore demand for beef tended to

become rather inelastic in the decade of the 19201s.57 Generally, A rgentine meat consumption remained largely composed of beef and as a whole stayed rather steady and was

not reflective of per capita income or beef prices over the long haul. As we shall see, consumers did occasionally raise complaints about the beef industry, but to little avail.

The railroads and the frigorffico, industry are but two, although the most important, examples of a pattern of foreign dominance of Argentina's economy. Primary economic assets, such as land and cattle, had always been native owned, and when they became the basis of new grain and beef

exporting they continued to be so. But secondary inputs and processing plants were foreign owned. Investment in

mercantile or industrial ventures was less secure than inves . tment in traditional sectors such as land, and










immigrants and agents of foreign firms dominated in this sector. By the late 19th century, 90% of the import-export, wholesaling,, and retailing business was in foreign hands.58 This kind of concentration, as also happened in the frigorffico industry, continued into the 20th century.

Some of the seeming reluctance on the part of native Argentines to enter new economic enterprise may be attributable to cultural factors. The traditional Argentine elite spurned trading and industry for the most part.59 As we shall see, members of influential economic groups like the Sociedad Rural Argentina generally limited their activities to the primary sector and did not venture into industry. There were Argentine entrepreneurs, but they were usually immigrants or sons of immigrants and not part of the

landed elite.60 on the other hand, as long as cattle and land remained stable and profitable investments, incentives for expansion into more risky areas was lacking.

More to the point is that the materials and expertise necessary to create an industrial sector generally were not available locally. This meant that those items had to be imported, and as we have already seen this was an expensive proposition with implications for the rest of the economy. Foreign firms dominated the industrial sector because they had expertise and capital to do so and Argentines did not. The materials and machinery necessary to operate not only the. major industries themselves, but their shipping and










service ancillaries, had to be provided by foreign companies. For example, British shipping firms controlled sea transportation, handling over half the foreign shipping from Buenos Aires from 1895 on into the 1920's.61 After the First World War, North American industries moved into Argentina in numbers.62

Imports were the essential economic inputs for the development of Argentina.63 Forty percent of Argentine imports were comprised of foodstuffs, textiles, and iron and steel products in 1911, and this proportion rose to 50.5% by

1930. Argentina imported over half of its textiles and clothing, about 85% of its machinery, and almost 100% of its

petroleum and rubber products and electrical machinery.64 Imports were also essential to consumption: they constituted

between 38 and 41% of the goods consumed in Argentina from 1912 to 1927 .65 This level of imports necessitated maintenance of high levels of exports from Argentina's traditional rural sectors.

In addition, as already suggested, the budget of the Argentine government was driven by imports. On the average, over 40% of government receipts came from import levies each year from 1910 to 1929.66 However, the Argentine government

could produce a budget surplus only twice during this period, in 1920 and 1925, and the surpluses were modest. In

contrast, for the rest of the years, the budget deficit averaged 106 million pesos annually, with a peak deficit of










231 million in 1926.67 Thus, neither Argentine industries, nor consumers, nor the government could affort to curtail imports. This may explain, in part, why protectionaist tariff programs were generally not undertaken by

Argentina .68

The largest and most important of imports was capital. Between 1880 and 1930, Argentina imported, that is to say borrowed, almost all its funds for investment. In 1914, only

14% of the total financial debt in Argentina was held in country. This may have risen to as much as 50% by 1934, but foreigners probably still held the majority of the Argentine debt even after the onset of the depression of the 1930,s.69 Moreover, most capital came in the form of direct investment

in plant rather than actual loaned funds, which tended to equal about 25 to 30% of total foreign invested capital. Still, the amount of either was large: the total equaling almost half the GDP for most of the golden age.70 Argentina received fully a third of all the investment capital flowing

into Latin America.71 In addition, one country--Great Britain--owned consistently over half of that investment, sometimes as much as two-thirds. While interests of the United States grew in the 1920's, foreign ownership of capital in Argentina tended to remain highly concentrated in

the hands of investors from only one country. Table 10 summarises the total investment picture in Argentina from 1910 to 1931.










TABLE 10
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA, 1910-1931: TOTAL, BRITISH, UNITED STATES, AND THE-GDP (in millions of gold pesos)



Year 1910 1913 1917 1920 1923 1927 1931

Total 2,255 3,250 3,350 3,150 3,200 3,600 4,100

British 1,475 1,928 1,950 1,825 1,975 2,075 2,100

British
as % of
total 65.4 59.3 58.2 57.9 61.7 57.6 51.2

USA 20 40 85 75 200 505 807

USA
as % of
total .88 1.2 2.5 2.4 6.3 14.0 19.7

GDP* 4,196 4,875 4,213 5,424 6,431 7,761 7,906

Total
as % of
GDP 53.8 66.7 79.5 58.1 49.8 46.4 51.9



Sour.: Phelps, International Economic Position of Argentina, 99, 108 and Randall, 2-3.

*122te: GDP figures in 1935-1939 pesos. Therefore, "Total as % of GDP" is not a real percentage and is used for comparisons between years only.










Servicing the foreign debt--paying for that portion of foreign capital which was borrowed directly by the state-became a burden on the government. Total debt service, which

included payments to foreign investors and domestic ones, took 31% of government revenues by 1930. At least half, and

sometimes as high as three quarters, of this total went to foreign investors.72. Thus foreign debt service played a key role in making the era one of deficit spending.

The clearest demonstration of the problems inherent in Argentina's course of economic development could be seen in

the country's response to the First World War. The war seemed to offer Argentina an opportunity for increased wealth and internal investment. Export prices remained high,

and Argentina remained neutral so that she was prepared to continue trading with all her foreign customers. In reality,

Argentina's foreign trade declined. Because of Britain's ability to control shipping lanes, Argentina lost some customers, such as Germany, and expanded her business with the Allies, but the real decline came in imports because the

warring industrial nations could not maintain their earlier levels of exports. Partly as a result, budget deficits reached an average of 153 million pesos per year, an increase of almost 50% from the prewar period.73 In addition, imports became more expensive. Prior to the war, Argentina's terms of trade had consistently been good, but wartime prices ended that happy circumstance.










Nevertheless, the wartime increase in the amount and value of her exports enabled Argentina to amass considerable

reserves. These might have been used to create a domestic investment pool, but they were not. Some of the foreign debt was retired, but not a lot. Internal investment did increase

but it stayed where it always had, in land whose value continued to climb, and did not affect the pattern of foreign ownership of industry much. In fact, Argentina emerged from the war somewhat richer, but the economy was not particularly stronger than it had been before.74 It may

well have been impossible for Argentina to have done much else. Investment in industrial plant required imported materials, as always,, which she could not get. And, the war resulted in concentrating Argentine markets--both for

capital and for exports--even more as the United States joined Britain in driving competitors out of Latin America and some customers were lost.

The First World War is also a turning point in the pace

of development of the Argentine economy. As indicated earlier in this chapter, many indicators of economic growth took downturns at about this time. Investment continued but

not as rapidly as before. Infrastructure construction, at least in some of the critical areas, wss complete. The period immediately after the war presents an opportunity to examine in more detail the other crucial side of Argentina's

economic development equation: exports.




















1Jorge Abelardo Ramos considers the period to extend from 1904 to 1922 and the term "la bella 6poca" is from his Revolucifn y contrarrevoluci6n en la Argentina, Tomo III: la
bella fpoca. 1904-,1922 (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Mar Dulce, 1970) . Other authors extend the period to the revolution of 1930. Some examples include Carlos F. Dfaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University, 1970) , Lloyd G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in the Third World; 1850-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), and Peter H.- Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and Change (New York: Columbia University, 1969).

2In addition to the works cited above, further analysis of the Argentine economy during the period can be found in the following: Gustavo Beyhaut, et al, "Los inmigrantes en
el sistema ocupacional argentino," in Torcuato S. Di Tella, Gino Germani, and Jorge Graciarena, Argentina. sociedad de mans (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971); Roberto Cort6s Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina, 1880-1920," in Roberto Cortes Conde and Shane J. Hunt, eds., The -Latin American
Economies: Growth and the Export Sector, 1880-1930 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985) , 319-81, El progreso Argentino. 1880-1914 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1979), and "Tierras, agricultura y ganaderfa," in Gustavo Ferrari and Ezequiel Gallo (eds.) , Lra Argentina del ochenta al centenario (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1980) , 377-404; Carlos F. Dfaz Alejandro, "La economfa argentina durante el periodo 1880-1913," in Ferrari and Gallo, 369-376; Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo econ6mico Argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1973) ; H. S. Ferns, Argentina (New York: Praeger, 1969); Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy, Trans. Marjory M.
Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Tomas Roberto Fillol, Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine Case (Cambridge: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1961); Rogelio Frigerio, Economia polftica y polftica econ6mica nacional (Buenos Aires: Libreri'a Hachette, 1981) and Sintesis de a historia
critica de la economia Argejtina (Buenos Aires: Libreria Hachette, 1979); Ezequiel Gallo, Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Development in Argentina (1880-1930) (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1970); Wendel C. Gordon,










The Political Economy of Latin America (New York: Colombia University Press, 1965); Roger Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Gilbert Wilson Merkx, Political and Economic Change in Argentina from 1870 to 1966 (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968) ; Vicente Vgzquez-Presedo, El caso argentino: migraci6n de factores, comercio exterior y desarrollo., 1875-1914 (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971) and "La evolucion industrial (Argentina, 1880-1910)," in Ferrari and Gallo, 405-18; Richard J. Walter, "The Socioeconomic Growth of Buenos Aires in the Twentieth Century" in Stanley R. Ross and Thomas F. McGann, Buenos Aires: 400 Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) ; and United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America. 1949 (New York: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1951).

3There have been attempts to construct indices of some economic indicators for periods as early as the 1880's. A. G. Ford constructed an import and export price index based on 1900 price levels for the period 1881-1914 in his "Export Price Indices for the Argentine Republic, 1881-1914," InterAmerican Economic Affairs, 9: 2 (1955) , 42-54. Gilbert Wilson Merkx and John H. Williams also attempted similar indices for imports and other indicators. See, respectively, Merkx's work cited above and Williams' Argentine International Trade under Inconvertible Paper Money. 1880-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Reprint; New York: AMS Press, 1971).
4See Merkx's figures, p. 42.

5Merkx, 124, 361.

6Ferns, Argentina, 98.

7Di Tella and Zymelman, 66-67.

8Beyhaut, et al, 85-94 and Ferrer, 81.

9Cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 327.

10Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 324-25.
llThis interpretation of the Baring crisis relies heavily on Cort6s Conde,"The Export Economy of Argentina," 330-34, 342. In addition, see Di Tella and Zymelman, 54-55; Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 439-484; A. G. Ford, "Argentina and the Baring Crisis of 1890," Oxford Economic P. er, New Series, 8: 2 (June, 1956), 127-50; John E. Hodge, "Carlos Pellegrini and the Financial Crisis of 1890," Hispanic American Historical Review, 50: 3 (August, 1970),










499-523; Thomas F. McGann, Argentina, the United States, and
the Inter-American System: 1880-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 113-20; and Jose Luis Romero, A
History of Argentine Political Thought, Trans. Thomas F. McGann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 206-07
12Cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 334.

13Different index bases can create different
proportional shifts. For example, using 1950 figures as bases, the proportional increase for the industrial sector is smaller, although the percentages themselves are higher. See Dfaz Alejandro, 6, for indices based on both 1937 and 1950 bases.
14Draz Alejandro, 15-16.

15Data on land use are from Di Tella and Zymelman, 41, Dfaz Alejandro, 440, and Economic Commission for Latin America, 130.
16Cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 344.

17United-States beef producers had begun planting alfalfa, imported from Chile, as early as 1854. Its yield per acre was four times that of common hay grasses using early 20th century technology. See F. W. Woll, Productive Feeding of Farm Animals (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1916) , 114-17. According to the staff of the Veterinary College of Virginia Polytechnic and State University in an interview conducted on August 7, 1985, alfalfa's inherent advantage over other forage is its high concentration of a useful protein called saponin. A disadvantage of proteins like saponin, however, is that they
are foaming agents; today, saponin is chemically extracted and used as a foaming agent in beverages, fire extinguishers, and detergents. When digested in the rumen of
cattle, saponin can produce severe enough foaming to cause bloating, which in extreme cases can cause death. Cattle can be acclamated to high-protein feeds, however, and a
contemporary report indicates that bloating was not "a very serious menace" in Argentina. See A. D. Melvin, "The South American Meat Industry," Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture. 1913 (Washington, DC: USDA, 1914), 359.

18Such was the opinion of two foreign contemporaries, A.
D. Melvin, Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry, and George M. Rommel, Chief of the Animal Husbandry Division, Bureau of Animal Industry, both of the United States Department of Agriculture. See, respectively, "The South American Meat Industry," Yearbook of the United Sjates
Department of Agriculture, 1913 (Washington, DC, 1914),










347-64, and "Meat Production in the Argentine and Its Effect
Upon the Industry in the United States," Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture. 1914 (Washington, DC: USDA, 1915), 381-390.

19Cortis Conde makes this case in El progreso argentino, 129-140.

20Sociedad Rural Argentina, Anuario de la Sqciedad Rural Argentina: estadfsticas econ6micas y agrarias (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Rural Argentina, 1928), 20.

21United States Tariff Commission, Cattle and Beef in the United States: The Tariff Problems Involved (Washington,
DC.: United States Tariff Commission, Tariff Information Series No. 30, 1922), 57.

22Melvin, "The South American Meat Industry," 362-63
23This was the case between 1908 and 1913 as cattle slaughter increased and the time lag between bringing new lands into fodder and the production of saleable cattle became apparent. See George K. Holmes, "Argentine Beef," Farmers Bulletin 581: The Agricultural Outlook (Washington, DC.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1915), 39-40.

24Cortes Conde makes this case in El progress Argentino, 129-140, as does Joseph S. Tulchin in "El credito agrario en
la Argentina, 1910-1926," Desarrollo Econ6mico, 18: 71 (December, 1978), 381-408.

25Rommel, "Meat Production in the Argentine and Its Effect Upon the Industry in the United States," 385-86.

26For the progress of land prices see Norberto Ras and Roberto Levis. El precio de la tierra: s evoluci6n entre los ai~os 1916 y 1978 (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Rural Argentina, 1980), 10.

27Ferrer, 8.

28Land use and tenancy are discussed in Diaz Alejandro, 141-159; Horacio C. E. Giberti, "El desarrollo
agropecuario, " Desarrollo Econ6mico, 2: 1 (Abril-Junio, 1962), 65-126, and Historia ecoa6mica de la ganaderfa Argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Colar, 1961); James R. Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas: A Social ~History of Argentina Wheat. 1860-1910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964) and "Una revoluci6n agrfcola en la Argentina," Desarrollo Econ'mico, 3: 1/2 (Abril-Septiembre, 1963) , 111.-141; Carl Solberg, "Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in Argentina, 1912-1930," Journal of Inter-American Studies and
World Affairs 13: 1 (January, 1971), 18- 52; and Carl C.










Taylor, Rural Life in Argentina (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1948).
29Vasquez-Presedo, 44. In addition to the sources listed above covering economic and infrastructure developments, the
following concern themselves with railroad development in Argentina: A. G. Ford, "British Investment and Argentine Economic Development, 1880-1914," in David Rock, ed., Argentina in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1975), 13-40; Paul B. Goodwin, "The Central
Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1854-1881," Hispanic American Historical Review, 57: 4 (November, 1977), 613-632; Leland H. Jenks, "Britain and American Railway Development," The Journal of Economic History, 11: 4 (Fall, 1951), 375-88; Colin M. Lewis, "La consolidaci6n de la frontera argentina a fines de la decada del setenta: Los indios, Roca y los ferrocarrilles," in Ferrari and Gallo, 469-498; Winthrop R.Wright, British-owned Railways in Argentina: Their Effect on Economic Nationalism,
1854-1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974) ; and Eduardo A. Zalduendo, "Aspectos econ6micos del sistema de tansportes de Argentina," in Ferrari and Gallo, 439-68.
30These figures come from Vsquez-Presedo, 44 , Cortes
Conde, El progreso Argentino, 81, and Anuario, 103.
31See the maps in Wright, 53, 122.

32Railroads brought labor in the form of tenants to the new productive areas. Legislative homesteading attempts, made in the 1880's and '90's in an effort to link colonization in the form of ownership and railroads,
generally met with little success. See Gravil, 10-12, and Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 444.
33Paul B. Goodwin has argued that railroad building followed demand: that railroads "were built in response to clearly discerned market patterns and economic opportunity."
See "The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1854-1881," 613. There has been some debate over the issue of railroad-led development. Goodwin's case was criticised directly in Sylvester Damus's
"Critique of Paul B. Goodwin's 'The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1854-1881'," Hispanic American Historical Review, 58: 3 (August, 1978) , 468-74. And, most of the authors listed above, including Cortes Conde, Ferns, Frigerio, Giberti,
Gravil, and Wright have argued that railroads created demand: their construction preceded any real demand for their services in the areas in which they were constructed.










34The differentiation of stages of development is from Gravil, 6-8. See also Cortis Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 339-46; Ferns, Argentina, 100-101; and Wright, Chapters 3 and 4.

35Wright, 86-88.

36Gravil, 8 and Jenks, 375.

37Ferns, Argentina, 101.

38Ford, "British Investment," 33-35.

39For the history of the early efforts at refrigeration and the opening of the first frigorfficos, see chapter six of Companfa Swift de la Plata, Ganaderia Argentina: su desarrollo e industrializaci6n (Buenos Aires: Compagla Swift de la Plata, SA, 1957); Federal Trade Commission, Report on
the Meat Packing Industry, Part I (Washington DC: Federal Trade Commission, 1919); Horacio C. E. Giberti, Historia econ6mica de la ganaderla Argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones
Colar, 1961), Chapter 6; Gravil, 64-74; Simon G. Hanson, Argentine Meat and the British Market- Chapters in the History of the Argentine Meat Industry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1938), Chapter 3; Jorge Newton, Historia de la Sociedad Rural Argentina (Beunos Aires: Edtorial
Goncourt, 1966), 80-87; Peter Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Co iflict and Change (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969) , 33-34; and Vicente Vazquez-Presedo, El caso Argentino: migraci6n de factors, comercio exterior y desarrollo, 1875-1914 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1971), 177-82.

40Argentine nationalists might argue that the first frigorffico was a natively owned one. Eugenio Terrason, who owned a meat packing plant in San Nicolas, had provided the dressed beef for the first experimental voyage of the
refrigerator ship Frigorifique for the French firm of Charles Tellier. After its success, Terrason had converted his packing plant into a frigorffico with the purchase of a chilling machine with the capacity of 30,00 kilos per day. He exported his first load--mutton--in the Lord Ard in 1883. See Hanson, 53, and Compania Swift, 92.

41Federal Trade Commission, 163, and Gravil, 64.

42Hanson, 127-29.

43Hanson, 53, Newton, 80-87.

44Hanson, 50, 130-31.


45Gravil, 64.










46Federal Trade Commission, 163-64.

47As an example, the Sansenena company paid a dividend of 50% in 1902, 12.5% in 1903, 10% from 1904 to 1907, 12% from 1908 to 1909, and 15% in 1910: a total return-of 129% in only 9 years. The smaller River Plate firm averaged over 10% per year for the same period (Federal Trade Commission, 163).
48Armour and Morris took over the previously Argentine La Blanca operation in 1912, and Wilson acquired what had been the Frigorffico Argentino in 1916. And when the American firms built new plants, they were the newest and best. The 1911 Frigorffico Armour de la Plata was "the largest, finest, and most perfectly appointed packing house ever built anywhere," according to the July, 1915 edition of The Americas as cited in Federal Trade Commission, 173. See also pp. 163-64.
49The works listed in note 39 cover the era of the pool. The best source is Hanson.

50Hanson, 170.
51See Tables A4 and A16, Appendix II for prices at the Liniers market and for the total slaughter figures for the period. In general, the Liniers market bought for local consumption, and the firgorrficos bought directly from the estancias, so their price levels cannot be directly compared. However, in the period for which comparitive data
is available (1924-1927) , prices at Liniers and the estancias follow the same paths with the latter always being slightly higher. See Anuario, 266-67.
52American firms claimed that they bought heavier cattle
--dressed weight of 770 pounds--than the British or Argentine firms. The heavier cattle, in their view, were more saleable in the export market. See Federal Trade Commission, 170.
53Breeders did respond with heavier cattle for the frigorfficos. Data for 1924-1927 from pages 259-60 of Anuario indicate that the average dressed weight of a steer sold to the frigorrficos was 613 pounds, while those sold to domestic markets averaged 424 pounds.
54The age at slaughter decreased from an average of five
to six years to three when frigorffico buying began to affect the cattle industry. See Vgsquez-Presedo, 184. This is probably related to the decline in herd size in the same period as noted above.










55The top price paid for Shorthorn breeder bulls moved from 5,000 m$n in 1895, to 80,000 in 1913, 110,000 in 1920, and 152,000 in 1925. For Hereford bulls, the prices were 3,000 in 1896, 7,000 in 1906, 23,000 in 1912, and 50,000 in 1918 (all figures m$n).
56Consumption figures from the Sociedad Rural Argentina
indicate per capita beef consumption figures of 104.3 kilograms in 1913, dropping to 75.7 in 1918, rising to 136.4 in 1922, then leveling off for the rest of the decade. See Anuario, 277. Peter Smith's figures are somewhat different, but show a similar movement. See Politics and Beef, 74. While the population of Argentina grew, the number of cattle salughtered in the Liniers market remained stable during the period. See Table A18, Appendix I.
57This is the conclusion of Alieto A. Guadagni in "Estudio econometrico del consumo de care vacuna en Argentina en el periodo 1914-1959," in Desarrollo Econ6mico, 3: 4 (Enero - Marzo, 1964), 517-33.
58Eugene W. Ridings, "Foreign Predominance among Overseas Traders in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 20: 2 (1985), 5.
59Ridings discusses attitudes, as does Tomas Roberto Fillol in Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine Case (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1961).
60As an example of entrepreneurship, see the excellent study of Torcuato Di Tella by Thomas C. Cochran and Ruben E. Reina, Capitalism in Argentine Culture: A Study of Torcuato Di Tella and SI.A.M. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962).
61See Robert G. Albion, "British Shipping and Latin America, 1806-1914," The Journal of Economic History, 9: 4 (Fall, 1951), 361-374.
62A complete and reasonably contemporaneous study of North American interests in Argentina is included in Dudley Maynard Phelps, Migration of Industry to South America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).
63The importance of imports to the development of the Argentine economy is explained by Cort~s Conde in "The Export Economy of Argentina, 1880-1920," 319-81.
64Dfaz Alejandro, 210.

.65Dudley Maynard Phelps, The International Economic position of Argentina (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938), 12, 145.










66Harold Edwin Peters, The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1934), 70.
67According to calculations based on Tables A8 and A10, Appendix I.
68Tariff policy, expecially protectionist tariffs, has been the subject of debate. While most Latin American
nations embarked on protectionist programs following WWI, Argentina did not. Of course, such programs were not necessary during the war. See Dfaz Alejandro, 217 and
277-308, and Carl Solberg, "The Tariff and Politics in Argentina, 1916-1930," Hispanic American Historical Review, 53: 2 (May, 1973),, 260-84.
69Peters, 142-43 and Phelps, The Ipiternational Economic Position of Argentina, 113.
70These percentages are only approximate since GDP and
foreign investment have not been measured in exactly the same pesos. See Table 10.
71Ferrer, -89.

72Phelps, The International Economic PositiQn of Argentina, 118-19.
73Based on calculations from Tables A8 and A9, Appendix I.
74See Joseph S. Tulchin's excellent coverage of Argentine economics during the war in "The Argentine Economy
During the First World War," Review of the River Plate, (June 19, 1970), 901-03; (June 30, 1970), 965-67; (July 10,
1 9 7 0 ) , 4 4 - 4 6 . . . . .
















CHAPTER FOUR
THE EXPORT-LED ECONOMY,
1870-1930





While infrastructure building and the promotion of imports was essential to creating the new Argentine economy

of the golden age the development of exports was equally important. Some analysts suggest that exports were the key to Argentine economic development in the golden age-1 Even though Argentina's economy was becoming somewhat diversified

by the early 20th century,. "it still relied heavily on steady expansion of exports.n2 Figures of the proportion of

Argentina's total production being exported clarify the importance of exports. In 1912, some 44% of her total production was exported, declining to 34.4% in 1914, and rising to 42% in 1927.3

The world export economy increased roughly six-fold in the years 1870-1929.4 In the agricommodities portion of this

market Argentina was able to assume a primary place, becoming one of the world's principal exporters of certain products. Argentina's foreign trade grew at an average rate of almost 4.5% per year for the period 1880-1929.5 Indexed










foreign trade values show that this growth was not even,, suffering occasional declines, but showed spectacular performances at times, especially after 1900. As indicated in Table 11, foreign trade doubled from 1900 to 1905, doubled again by 1913, then almost again by the time it peaked in 1920. This in turn enabled Argentina to sustain her own remarkable overall economic growth.

For most of this period, exports accounted for the majority of the value of total foreign trade. From roughly 1890 to 1920, exports grew at a rate of 5.7% per year6: faster than total foreign trade. In 1889, the export to import ratio was roughly 3 to 2, shrinking slightly to 2 to 1 by 1908.7 As Figure 3 demonstrates, the total value of exports remained generally higher than that of imports until the 1920's, but during that decade Argentina's balance of trade suffered.

Along with the growth in volume and value, Argentine exports grew in diversity. The specific types of products within the agropecuarian sector became more diverse with the

creation of the chilled beef industry in the late 19th century and the rise of bulk grain exports in the 20th. Although some sectors of the economy, such as construction and mining, grew faster than the agricultural and ranching sectors, Argentina's reliance on her pampean produce remained almost complete











TABLE 11
INDEXED TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE OF ARGENTINA:
1880-1929


INDEX: MEAN OF 1910-1914 = 100


YFPAP


1880 1881 1882 1883 1884

1885 1886 8187 1888 1889

1890 1891 1892 1893
1894

1895 1896 1897 1898 1899

1900 1901 1902 1903
1904


INDEXED


12.4 13.5
14.5 16.7 19.3

21.0 19.6
24.0 27.2 30.3

28.9 20.3
24.4 22.6 23.1

25.6 27.2 23.7 28.7 35.9

31.9 33.5 33.6
41.9 53.7


VP 'a D


1905 1906 1907 1908 1909

1910 1911 1912 1913
1914

1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

1920 1921 1922 1923
1924

1925 1926 1927 1928 1929


INDEXED
17A r iiW


62.8 66.8 69.2 76.0 83 .2

91.4 88.8 112.8 120.7 86.3

115.5 111 .7 110.6
154.8 200.5

235.3 168.9 162.4 195.0
218.8

207 .4 192.0 221 .9 225.2 230.6


Source: Compiled f rom statistics in Sociedad Rural Argentina. Anuario de 1-a sociedad rural Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1928) , p. 8-9, 15.

Noe indices for 1928-29 calculated from data in United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of L~atin Amierica, 1949 (New York: 1951) , 98.


- -.1 VALUE




Full Text

PAGE 1

THE SOCIEDAD RURAL ARGENTINA AND ARGENTINE ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE RADICAL ERA: 1916-1930 By BLAIR PIERCE TURNER A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1986

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Copyright 1986 by Blair Pierce Turner

PAGE 3

ACKNC:WLEDGMENTS A dissertation seems to be the kind of project for which many persons must be thanked. By definition, . it is an undertaking guided and assisted by many. Among those are Professors David Bushnell, Lyle McAlister, and Terry McCoy, and the other members of my committee, who provided guidance and suffered through years of patient waiting. Their expertise and teaching skills have made my graduate career possible. The Department of History and Politics and the Office of the Dean of the Virginia Military Institute helped in many ways, e specially keeping me employed during the writing of this dissertation and providing research funds. I was also greatly assisted by a Fulbright Grant to conduct research in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1981. The staffs of the Fulbright office, La biblioteca de la Sociedad Rural Argentina, and the Insti tuto Torcua to di Tella in Beunos Aires were of great help during that period. My quatitative work was assisted by the Data Center at the University of Wisconsin, Madison and the staff of the Computing Center at the Virginia Military Institute. iii

PAGE 4

In addition, many individuals helped in many ways. I thank especially Sandra McGee-Deutsch, Richard Walter, Kristine Jones, Doug Richmond, and Theron Nunez for their encouragement. And my parents contributed in many ways, not the least of which was fiscal. But, more than all the others combined, regardless of their official position or contributions, I thank my wife. She kept me alive and made me believe this was worth doing. iv

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii ABSTRACT vi CHAPTER ONE Notes 7 '!WO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE, 1870-1916 9 Notes 43 THREE THE PATTERN OF INTERNAL ECONOMIC GRCMTH IN THE GOLDEN AGE, 1870-1930 52 Notes 82 FOUR THE EXPORT-LED ECONOMY, 1870-1930 91 Notes 122 FIVE ARCHITECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1916-29: THE SRA AND THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 127 Notes . .............. . .......................... . 157 SIX DEALING WITH THE CRISIS IN THE ECONOMY, 1916-1929: THE SRA AND THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 160 Notes 200 SEVEN CONCLUSIONS 204 APPENDIX I VARIABLE LIST AND DATA INPUTS FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CONDUCTED IN CHAPTER FOUR 209 APPENDIX II TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CONDUCTED IN CHAPTER FOUR 238 APPENDIX III METHODOLOGIES OF ROLL CALL ANALYSIS OF THE ARGENTINE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 250 Notes 262 BIBLIOGRAPHY 263 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 27 5 V

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE SOCIEDAD RURAL ARGENTINA AND ARGENTINE ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE RADICAL ERA: 1916-1930 By Blair Pierce Turner December, 19 86 Chairman: David Bushnell Major Department: History The Radical party was brought to power in Argentina in 1916 by a series of political and social changes associated with a period of economic expansion beginning in the late 19th century and is associated with the emergence of middle sectors in Argentine political and economic life. The Sociedad Rural Argenti.n.a. (the SRA) was founded in the middle of the 19th century and represented the established rural aristocracy. The Radicals, as the government in power, and the SRA, as the representatives of beef producing interests, had to combine their efforts to cope with crises in the export economy of the post World War I years. vi

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An analysis of legislative activity concerning economic issues in the Radical period indicates that the SRA had a specific, but shifting, pol icy with regard to economic issues. The Radicals, on the other hand, generated no consistent economic policy, due to factionalism within the party and lack of an apparent operational economic philosophy. While the Radical administrations and the SRA cooperated on some pol icy issues, government economic policy had little impact on the conditions which produced the economic crises during the period. vii

PAGE 8

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION In an article published in 1961, Arthur P. Whitaker, Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania, coined the phrase "The Argentine Paradox." The paradox he cited was created by the juxtaposition of the seemingly well-developed economic, social and political institutions of Argentina with its apparently underdeveloped political behavior. The contrast was "striking" to Whitaker in 1961. For some time past, the political behavior of the Argentine people has been marked by the traits of instability and perfervid nationalism that one associates with the economically underdeveloped and politically inexperienced peoples just emerging from colonial subjugation in Africa and Asia.I In terms of cultural, social and economic development, he regarded Argentina as having advanced far beyond those 11 inexperienced peoples. 11 Yet, in spite of the contemporary F rondiz i government's n commitment to democratic principles and international cooperation," the political norm in Argentina had come to be "rabid national ism and political fragmentation."2 1

PAGE 9

2 The paradox Whitaker cited in 1961 was that, while Argentina had often appeared to be politically developed, it had not behaved that way; its political history since 1930 had been filled with revolts, coups and other breaks with "developed" political tradition. Whitaker made it clear that this situation was of "corn para ti vely recent orig in". In the half century before 193 0, Argentina enjoyed a remarkably rapid economic development, and this was paralleled by a seemingly harmonious growth in "political grace." The paradox--the "fall from grace"--begins in 1930 with the overthrow of the Yrigoyen government by General Jose F. Uriburu.3 This view was not held by Whitaker alone. In his book Po 1 it i c.aL..Q.I..Qe.r_..i.IL~~ti..e.. , Samu e 1 P Huntington expressed similar views as he discussed "mass praetorian" polities, of which Argentina was the prime example. A 9 mass praetorian" polity was one in which there was a high level of political participation on the part of the population but the institutions of government constituted "law-neglecting systems, where the rulers acted rather than those of the polity."4 in their own interests Like Whitaker, but using different terms and analyses, Huntingon saw a paradox in the Argentine situation in terms of "modernization" versus "traditionalism". "Modernization", meaning more open popular access to the political mechanism, is offset by "traditional ism" (restricted access to power) in the actual

PAGE 10

3 running of that mechanism. Huntington al so cites the year 1930 as the beginning of paradoxical behavior in Argentina, at least as indicated by changing patterns of military intervention in politics.5 The year 193 0 appears as a er i ti cal turning point in a host of other analyses of Argentine politics and economics. It is seen as the beginning of "chronic political instabil ity"6 or as the year when Argentina "moved on to dictatorial forms" after a period of democratic growth.7 Economic historians have seen 1930 as the year marking a shift from an "open export economy" to a less productive, "partly closed" economy as a result of the world depression of 1929. And this shift is seen as concomitant with a change in politics from "middle class liberalism" to "conservative reaction".8 Even scholars concerned with a continuing political phenomenon such as populism see 1930 as a watershed year between "reformist" and "national developmentalist" types of populism9. Even scholars writing in the years of seemingly steady progress up to the great depression were affected by the notion of the uniqueness of Argentina and (as a corollary) of the contradictory nature of 1930. writing in 1921, Austin F. MacDonald proclaimed The fight for democracy has been won, and Argentina has taken her rightful place among the great free nations of the world.10

PAGE 11

4 In 1930 another scholar, Clarence H. Haring, was lamenting the fall of the Radical government in Argentina as "remarkable" because of the fact that the country was more developed and democratic than her neighbors. Argentina was "in a different category."11 It must be recognized, of course, that 1930 appears as a critical year for all of Latin America. Scholars have noted the "wave of revolts" in Latin America and called 1930 "a turning point in Latin American history. 11 12 Haring, himself, was moved to compare 1930 in Latin America to 1848 in Europe.13 Thus, for Argentina the point is not so much that 1930 was a year of er isis--one that Argentines suffered along with sister nations and much of Europe--as that it ushered in Whitaker's "age of paradox." However, this dissertation will assert that the conditions which produced the paradox (seemingly developed structures contraposed to under developed behavior) were al ready in existence before 1930. The "fall from grace" had started long before 1930. Indeed, Argentina was not sufficiently developed politically or economically before 1930 to create a genuine paradox; what happened in 1930 was therefore not paradoxical. Scholarly opinion, including those examples cited above, has tended to focus on the stunning economic growth and the relative political stability of the 1880-1930 period in Argentina. Compared to other countries in Latin America,

PAGE 12

5 economic growth was indeed stunning and political affairs were handled with Whitaker's "grace". The development of the export economy, based among other things on beef, certainly contributed to an economic explosion not matched in Latin America and comparable to previous boom periods in Western Europe and the United States. That prosperity was enhanced is true. That it was equally shared or prudently managed is, however, something else. The case can be made that this prosperity was fragile and temporary and that those managing it misperceived the situation, believing it stable and permanent. Part of this dissertation will examine the economic growth and offer the thesis that it was not as it appeared: that it was unstable, and dependent on foreign markets and foreign control. It was also short-lived, ending in fact before the great depression of 1929. Indeed it was in trouble soon after the First World war even during the glory years of the 1920 's when the Argentine economy was perceived by many to be so healthy. The reasons for this are complex and manifold and cannot be blamed solely on any one social or political group. Still, significant changes were produced in the social structure of Argentina, creating a new and growing middle class and a large urban working class. Both groups seemed to gain new economic power in the period of expansion and diversification of Argentina's economy. And the same period was . witness to an apparent opening of the democratic process

PAGE 13

6 politically. The last period of the "Golden Age" is termed la ep~a.___r;~...a.l_ because of the emergence of a "middle sector" political party, the llni.Qn c!:vic:a_.B.a.di.c.a.l CUCR), which supposedly provided the middle class the same increased power in politics that it had been achieving in economics. The UCR in its many varieties seemed to usher in an era of honest elections, enhanced participation, and a government responsive to the wishes of at least the rising middle class, if not the entire population. That this new political movement failed in 1930 is often attributed to conservative dissatisfaction with the changes afoot in Argentina and a willingness to use the military to end the electoral process and the evils it was seen to be producing. In addition, the crisis of the world economy in 1929 and after is seen as a culprit, destabilizing the Argentine government. The creator of the middle class polity, Hipolito Yrigoyen, is also seen to be at fault, for he split the UCR on personal ist grounds, and his reelection in 1928 at an advanced age seemed to demand action on the part of reformers and conservatives alike. His insistence on personal control of the machinery of government and his reputation as the reclusive ~e.J..J.l..dQ_ (armadillo) augured poorly for his continuance in power.14 Nevertheless, it can be argued that the reforms of the Radicals were, themselves, less than profound: that they led to a shift in the electorate but not a shift in the process

PAGE 14

7 of government or a change in real decision making. In addition, it can be demonstrated that the economic problems contributing to dissatisfaction and eventual dismantling of the middle-sector government the Radicals created were evident long before Yrigoyen's second term and in fact were, if not created, at least abetted by the Radicals themselves. In the light of this interpretation, one is tempted to alter Whitaker's thesis of a paradox to suggest that the Radical period was not the inauguration of a new norm, but rather an aberration from an established pattern--that the paradox is that the Radical period occur red at al 1. It might be more correct to view the post-1930 period as a return to normal, and the Radical period as a temporary escape from the Argentine historical record. Notes lArthur P. Whitaker, "The Argentine Paradox," ThfLAnn.a.l ~~Q_a__n_ _ _A_g.a.dem~_Qf__Q.1-it.i~a 1 arui__s._o ~i al Stl.ence.s , 334 (March, 1961), 104. 2Robert N. Burr, "Abstract," Th.e~~.Qf_...th..~.A.~lli..fill Academy_Qf.Jol~a.Lan.d_Socia~gims, 334 (March, 1961), 103. 3whitaker, "The Argentine Paradox," 104. 4 Samuel P. Hun ting ton, .Poli ti cal OrJ:ie.L_i_n_Chan.~nSJ societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 81.

PAGE 15

8 5.Ib.ig, 221. 6 Peter G. Snow, Politi~--1:Qrces in-..A.r.s.e.nt.ina. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 18. 7 Peter H. Smith, Arntina_ang_th.e Failu__r_e of Demo.~~~ con f 1 u:..t__a_IllQ.n~QJ._il.i.c.al. El i t as , 1 9 o 4 -1 9 i5. < Madi son w r : University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), xv. 8 see, for example, Gilbert Wilson Merkx, "Political and Economic Change in Argentina from 1870 to 1966" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968), 361. 9Michael L. Conniff, ed., Latin American Po_pJll..i.s_m_in ~Qm.P~.e.I..s.P.ecti~ (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982) , 7. lOAustin F. MacDonald, "The Government of Argentina," Hispaoi.LA....IT\.eJ. ican Iiirtot..i.al B..e..'l.ieli, 5: 1 , 82. 11 Clarence H. Haring, "Revolution in South Arner ica," Foreign Affairs, 9: 2 (January, 1931), 289. 12Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey Kline, Eds., Latin ~rican -..ol itic;al anLDe..'l.el.oi;2m.e.nt < Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1979), 30. 13Haring, "Revolution in South America," 277. 14one contemporary author, commenting on the revolutionary nature of the 1930 coup, argued that much of the responsibility for its occurance had to be laid on Yrigoyen's second term policies which alienated the very groups which had been the source of his support. See Ernest Galarza, "Argentina's Revolution and Its Aftermath," fQ.Uign Policy Repetl~, 7 (October, 1931), 309-22.

PAGE 16

CHAPTER '!WO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE, 1870-1916 The preceding introduction was not intended to suggest that there is no reason whatsoever to view 1930 as a critical year in modern Argentine history. That there was a military coup for the first time since the constitutional founding of the republic and that epic changes would issue from that, is undoubted. But, for the purposes of this dissertation, it is what went before that year which is important. In this context, the year stands out as the culmination of a fifty-year period of an extraordinary and comprehensive metamorphosis of Argentina. One of the most remarkable aspects of this change is the great flood of immigrants into Argentina. For this reason, one author has called the period "alluvial".l This flood would eventually be responsible for profound social, economic, and political changes, but its first and most obvious manifest a ti on was demographic grow th. The first national census was taken in Argentina in 1869 and the third in 1914, which roughly covers the "alluvial" era. Within that period, the population increase in Argentina is 9

PAGE 17

10 impressive--some 352%. Extending the period to 1929, the population grew from 1,830,000 in 1869 to an estimated 11,600,000 in 1929: an increase of 534%. In the first quarter of the 20th century, the Argentine population sustained one of the highest growth rates in the world. While hardly densely populated even in 1929, Argentina was no longer an underpopulated backwater.2 More important than simply aggregate population growth, however, were the source of that growth and the effects it had on demographic and social structures. As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, the majority of the population growth in Argentina was the result of immigration rather than native , . reproduction. Almost 60% of the expansion between 1869 and 1929 can be attributed directly to immigration.3 This massive immigration was not an accident of history or geography. It was caused partly by the apparent openness of the Argentine and the massive exodus from Europe in the tumult of the second half of the 19th Century. Of the some 40 millions who left Europe during this period, Argentina received over 12%. This influx was caused also by active Argentine pol icy. The constitution of 1853 contains more than one provision which calls for the promotion, directly or indirectly, of immigration. Article 14, which outlines the basic rights of citizens is not restrictive--it applies to all inhabitants, native and foreigner alike. Article 20 reenforces this notion by specifically granting to all

PAGE 18

TABLE 1 TOTAL NET IMMIGRATION INTO ARGENTINA: 1857-1930 11 ============----=-===-=====================================OVERSEAS ARRIVALS YEARS (x_l000) 1857-60 12.7 1861-7 0 80. 5 1871-80 90.7 1891-90 648.7 1890-1900 337.8 1901-10 1,134.3 1911-20 280. 0 1921-30 905.8 COLUMN TOTALS 3,490.5 % OVERSEAS ARRIVALS OVERLAND ARRIVALS ____ C_x-1.ilil.D.l CON.SIDE..8.EILLAa.O Ra 87 .40 95 .15 93.82 98 .3 0 94. 7 0 98.76 96 .11 94.50 96. 71 41 (as of 1869) 75 (1870-95) 91 (1896-1914) 207 =--=------------------------======-=---------====----======= TOTAL NET IMMIGRATION, 1857-1930: 3,697,500 =============---============================================ armrnigrants arriving 2nd or 3rd class boat passage. so u r c e : D ! a z A 1 e j a n d r o , E s say i_o_n_~~Q.D.Q m i c H..is_t.Q..r~ ~~tine ReLU,1.bl.i.c.. Table 1.13, 23-24; Sociedad Rural Argentina, Anal.e..s_.de_la Socieaag filll...a1-A.r.s~tina. , 5 9-6 4

PAGE 19

TABLE 2 IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE ARGENTINE POPULATION: 1869-1929 12 -----======================================================= A. 1869 population B. Estimated net immigration 1869-1929 C. Estimated native population growtha D. Estimated immigrant population growth (E ) E. 1929 population G. Total impact of immigration ( B + D) H. Percent of population growth 1869-1929 due to immigration (< _ __G_> ) ( X 100) 1,830,000 3,563,000 4,000,000 2,207,000 11,600,000 5,770,000 59.05 =================== ======================================== aExcluding the impact of immigration: based on an estimated growth rate of 2% per year as calculated by o!az Alejandro. source: compiled from Table 1.

PAGE 20

13 "foreigners" the same rights as "citizens." The same article makes it very easy to obtain citizenship through naturalization; the maximum residence requirement was only two years. Even this brief period could be shorte~ed by an immigrant "asserting and proving services to the republic." The federal government was specifically called upon to "encourage European immigration" and could not restrict, limit, or burden with any tax whatsoever, the entrance into Argentine territory of foreigners who arrive for the purpose of tilling the soil, improving industries, and introducing and teaching the arts and sciences.4 In addition, Congress is explicitly empowered to promote immigration in Article 67, section 16. Even before the Constitution was written, the Argentine government had undertaken efforts to promote immigration into its sparsely populated territory. In 1824, a Commission of Immigration was formed to promote immigration opportunities to Europeans. Negotiations with the British firm of Baring Brothers to act as agents for immigration were initiated in 1825, and included were provisions for paying the overseas passage of Europeans willing to settle in Buenos Aires Province. These efforts failed, in the short run at least, because the war in Uruguay in the late 1820's and subsequent civil conflicts among the provinces made the Argentine less attractive for potential immigrants.5 After the 1850's, however, with the provinces federated under their new constitution and the

PAGE 21

14 establishment of at least a modicum of civil peace, immigration efforts were renewed. In 1863, a private commission of leading citizens of Buenos Aires began to undertake efforts to assist immigrants. An asylum for immigrants--a sort of halfway house--was founded to assist recent arrivals. But residents could stay a week only, and other private efforts at immigrant assimilation failed. The commission disbanded in 187 3. 6 Governmental efforts were more sustained. A Central Commission for Immigration was founded by the federal government in 1869, followed by a separate Labor Office also focusing on immigration in 1872. The National Immigration and Colonization Act of 187 6, the so-cal led Avellaneda Law (after president Nicolas Avellaneda, 1874-1880), combined both of these agencies under the directorship of a new General Department of Immigration within the Ministry of the Interior. Its explicit purpose was to stimulate immigration, providing funds for agencies promoting immigration as well as overseas passage for immigrants, and to protect those immigrants upon arrival. It also provided mechanisms for transfer of land to immigrants free or at reduced prices, as well as loans for land purchase and the acquisition of stock and equipment. Specifically, immigrants with some capital and agricultural skills were sought to settle the interior, which was soon

PAGE 22

15 to be vastly expanded by new acquisitions in the Desert Campaigns of General Julio Argentino Roca. But this campaign to "populate the desert", like earlier efforts at stimulating immigration, failed in its grand design because of difficulties in getting to and settling distant areas, hardships on the immigrants, and land-holding patterns which discriminated against new arrivals. Government policy did little to encourage the breakup of large, unproductive parcels of land, or to encourage immigrants to join the land market. Small parcels were taxed disproportionately, making it more costly for immigrants to obtain them, thereby encouraging tenancy . . instead of ownership. Consistent with a pattern of land distribution established since colonial times, the best land was sold long before foreign arrivals could get at it. Moreover, bond issues on land yet to be acquired by military expansion were sold to speculators to fund that very expansion. Only the least desirable, most distant areas went unsold to remain available for acquisition by immigrants.7 Not surprisingly, then, immigrants avoided the "desert." Some did go to Patagonia and, in fact, constituted almost half the population there, but their numbers were minimal. For the most part, the immigrants opted in favor of the more fertile and geographically accessible pampas and littoral areas, especially the

PAGE 23

16 provinces of Santa Fe and Entre R1os. Their numbers and impact were more impressive there. (Table 3 clearly indicates these population movements.) But, here as elsewhere, most immigrants did not become land owners, but tenants on already owned but unworked land. The government of late 19th century Argentina generally avoided direct intervention to promote immigrant land acquisition, relying instead on laissez-faire policies and natural economic stimuli to provide opportunities. When the government did pass a homesteading act in 1884, it applied only to the worst areas: those south of the Rio Negro frontier. In general, immigration pol icy was aimed at gaining a work force, not creating an independent land-holding yeomanry. By 1914, only about 30,000 immigrants had become landowners.a Those who had controlled the land since colonial days clearly were not interested in losing it, and although the government was prepared to fund immigration agents and pay overseas passages, official policy remained otherwise apathetic or even callous. In one case, a cash prize was offered " for the design of a ship which could carry live cattle in its European run and immigrants on its return."9 The flow of immigration was left to the control of market forces, peaking in economically prosperous times, and slacking off in down times. As one scholar concluded Agriculturalists and immigrants were accepted as servants to build Argentina's greatness. They were not, however, primary concerns of the nation.IO

PAGE 24

TABLE 3 PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN ARGENTINA: 1869, 1895, 1914 17 ----------------=----===-=================================== REGIONa I PQEllLA.TlCllLCA~QBY YEARS lli2..2 1895 lil.i Pampas .aDQ--1.ittQ~~l % of total population in the region 41.3 58. 2 64. 3 % of region who were foreigners 24.6 32 .8 34.4 Northeast % of total population in the region 7.4 7.3 5.9 % of region who were foreigners (no data) 34.5 27.7 central a n_d_No r thw eAt. % of total population in the region 40.9 26.8 21.9 % of region who were foreigners 1.9 4.5 9.8 .c~ % of total population in the region 10.4 7.0 6.5 % of region who were foreigners 4.7 7.5 18. 0 Eatagonia % of total population in the region 0 0.7 1.4 % of region who were foreigners (no data) 42.3 48. 5 ----------------============================================ .source: compiled from Ernesto J. A. Maeder, "Pobl aci6n e inmigraci6n en la Argentina," in Ferrari and Gallo, 555-74. aRegions are composed of the following provinces or territories: Pampas and Littoral: Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Rfos, La Pampa Northeast: Corrientes, Misiones,Chaco, Formosa Central and Northwest: C6rdoba, Santiago del Estero, Tucuman, La Rioja, catamarca, Slata, Jujuy Cuyo: Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis Patagonia: Rio Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego.

PAGE 25

18 ===============----------------------=-===================== W.:.._:_ ~ ~kmED3'i.OR~R~ -~ --~ itBORERS : ' ' ' ' SO ::..:;t:c:::; "XX3wIBR CHATITS :=arid~ OEESS : [DNALS -~ ~ 70 60 ..--.....:+0 ' (X) ..-f 0 ['OJ ..-f . : ~=:cE '' '/,?< -------. 0 OJ OJ ..-f :. 0 ' OJ ..-f YEAR ~ 0 0 ' .... ,\ 0 ..::t N C\J ' ' ..-i .-t FIGURE 1 PROPORTIONS OF OCCUPATIONS AMONG 2nd and 3rd CLASS PASSAGE OVERSEAS IMMIGRANTS ---------===-------------------------------------======----~Qurce: adapted from Beyhaut, 95-97. ,N~: Agricultural occupations include farmer, rancher, fisherman, vintner and miner. , \ .. : . .

PAGE 26

19 Regardless of elite attitudes and government pol icy concerning land distribution, the majority of incoming immigrants whose background could be ascertainedll had or were seeking occupations in the agricultural sector. This phenomenon held true until about 1915. Yet, for reasons outlined above, opportunity in the agricultural sector was severely limited, and most immigrants who did remain in the agricultural sector became tenants or colonists. Colonists potentially had the ability to eventually own their land, but in fact contractual arrangements produced by the established landholders and their agents made the real opportunities for colonists hardly distinguishable from those of tenants. In addition, many immigrants were "golondrinas": migrant laborers crossing the Atlantic seasonally between Europe and Argentina. Their numbers got as high as 1 0 0 , 0 O O a ye a r in the ea r 1 y 1 9 O O ' s These migrants could earn several times more in a season in Argentina than in their native lands, but they were not encouraged to stay.12 In some years, in fact, the impact of seasonal emigration from Argentina could make for net negative immigration, although this occurred when other factors, such as Italian reservists returning for duty in Italy during World War I, were also in play. In short, for many immigrants, the agricultural sector did not provide the opportunities for economic advancement, at least in terms of proprietorship, that they might have hoped for.

PAGE 27

20 Whatever the in tent of government pol icy regarding immigration, a population explosion occurred in the coastal urban area and the littoral. The population grew at a rate of 374% for the littoral provinces, 551% for Buenos Aires province and 786% for the Federal Capital from 1869 to 1914.13 Hence, what government policy did effect was a demographic shift which it did not necessarily anticipate. Part of this shift was explosive urban growth, not only in terms of the number of people living in urban areas, but in the number of cities being created. While the majority of urban units were small (under 20,000 persons), the demographic shift was nonetheless startling. Over 2 .5 million Argentines lived in cities larger than 20,000 by 1914 {See Table 4). In short, a nation which had been roughly three-quarters rural in 1869 became two-thirds urban by 1914. It was thus the urban sector of the economy which would in actuality become the source of employment for most immigrants to the greater Buenos Aires area. Immigrants who had intended to become free-holding farmers became instead the workers in the new urban society.14 The creation of a predominantly urban society meant more than simply a geographic shift in population; it meant the creation of a new culture. The old "creole" society, based on a two-strata system composed of elites and the masses who worked for them, was being replaced by a multiclass society: one in which there were identifiable "middle sectors"

PAGE 28

TABLE 4 URBAN GRCMTH IN ARGENTINA: 186 9-1 914 21 ==========================================----==-==--------IE.AE 1869 1895 1914 Size of urban popupopupopuunits lation I of lation # of lation # of in thousana.s___lxl.Q.Q.Ql.__unitL__{_xlOOOl units
PAGE 29

22 between the elites and masses. These middle sectors were distinct and separate from the traditional native groups not only in terms of their economic activity but also in terms of origin and outlook. But they were not homogeneous, precisely because they were formed not of native Argentines, but of the new immigrant groups from different cultures and economic backgrounds. And they did not join the traditional Argentine culture partly because of the limitations on their opportunities to do so outlined above. Instead, they created a new culture, distinct from and in some way~ in competition with the old. This does not mean that the old culture was disappearing or that the elites were being displaced, although their role was being changed. The size and composition of the landowning (and capital holding) elites remained mo re or less constant, but they began to be transformed from "an austere, republican elite into a capitalistic oligarchy."17 They began to shift some of their capital into the new urban market. Hence, while there was a growing polarity between the traditional-rural and the new-urban economies and societies, the dominant elites of each sector were one and the same.18 There would eventually be political repercussions stemming from this polarized society, and the elites would be forced to respond, but, in general, they continued to dominate the traditional economic sectors as well as capital formation for the new economy.

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23 Even the traditional rural economy was itself undergoing a change because of the new immigrant groups. Especially in the crop producing areas, tenancy and absentee ownership became the norm. And in the traditional ranching areas, land was fenced, production practices changed, and old social roles were altered. As one author put it "nuestro gaucho degenero en peon."19 Foreign ownership of agricultural production, never very large proportionately, declined from about a third in 1887 to only a quarter by 1914.20 This corresponds to a migration of immigrants in general from farm to non-farm occupations. The proportion of immigrants in the rural population steadily declined throughout the alluvial era (See Table 5). In conjunction with increasing concentration of control of the rural sector, the change in the consumption markets with the emergence of the new urban areas and the rise of new economic activities in those cities demanded an alteration in what the rural sector produced.21 The fundamental changes in Argentine society, however, occur red outside of either elite society or the rural economy. They occurred rather in the creation of the new urban middle sectors, whose members numbered about 50,000 in 1869 and well over 600,000 in 1914. The middle groups as a whole grew from 11% of the economically active population as defined in the national censuses to 30% during the alluvial era. 22 The middle sectors were composed of commercial and

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24 TABLE 5 OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF IMMIGRANTS: FARM AND NON-FARM: 1857-1924 =-=====================---=============-----------====-=---Ye,g_r=s ________ i__Eg_[ID 1857-1870 1871-1890 1891-1910 1911-1924 76 73 48 30 % Non-f.a..t:m 24 27 52 70 =-=====-=-----=--=========================================== source: Table VIII in Gino Germani, "Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina," in Horowitz, 299.

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25 industrial managers, professional groups, shop owners and other non-manual workers, and constituted the new factor on the Argentine social and economic scene. In relative terms, because of the influx of immigrant proprietors and workers, the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy experienced large-scale growth and the rural sector shrank. The elites may have still controlled the capital, but the new enterprises themselves were control! ed by new economic actors: some 80% of the enterprises remained in foreign hands throughout the period from . the 1880 's to 1914.23 (See Tables 6 and 7.} rt must be noted, however, that many of these enterprises were small, employing only a few persons. They produced for the domestic market (they accounted for about 2/3 of it) rather than for the growing export market. That market was not a "key sector in the national economy of the time, "24 but it was one which was growing in importance. New industries to supply new demands were created, and with them new social groups of industrial and commercial owners. The urban middle sectors would make new demands on the political system of Argentina as well. They wanted different policies and different resource allocations: more education, more industrialization, more infrastructure, more public facilities. Earlier, the immigrants had felt that the source of their welfare should come from the same laissez-faire prescriptions as the liberal elites had proposed for most of

PAGE 33

TABLE 6 NATIVE AND FOREIGN OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES 1895-1914 26 ---=-======================================================= Number of owners (in thousands) Native Foreign Number of employees (in thousands) Native Foreign Economi~~~_and Year 1895 1914 .r.&.,n ... d...,u ... s<.Jt .... rL,.y'---_, c .... oLlm ... m .... e...-..r c_e ____ r n.d.u.s.t.cy com~~ 4.5 19.6 72. 4 103.3 11.5 3 2. 7 7 2 .5 47.4 15 .a 31.5 209.6 200.6 24.3 65.2 148. 8 17 0 .1 ------====-=-----=--======================================== .. source: vasguez-Presedo, 139.

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TABLE 7 PROPORTION OF NATIVE AND FOREIGN ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATIONS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR: 1895-1914 27 ============================================================ Native Foreign Total sector/Yeat.LCb~ng_ _ ..._ ____ Jl~> ____ C~~%~>~--~'~%)_ AgricultuLfil. 1895 1914 Change Industrial. 1895 1914 Change Commer~ 1895 1914 Change 23.7 16.0 -30 18. 8 18.9 +.5 18. 7 19 .o +1.6 13.2 12.0 -9 11.6 16.6 +43 14. 0 17.5 +25 36.9 2 a. o -24 30.4 3 5 .5 +17 3 2. 7 36.5 +12 =--======---------------==-==========-====================== ~Q.YI..Q.e.: Beyhaut, 104

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28 the 19th century. But, more and more in the early 20th century, they began to believe that government action was the means to achieve these ends .25 They remained a very small proportion of the electorate, even after the electoral reforms of 1912, but they would make themselves heard in the political arena soon afterwards. 26 The changes they sought would not be accomplished easily or without turmoil. The demand for change came earlier and more clearly from working class sectors and labor organizations.27 As will be discussed in Chapter Three, Argentina's place in the world market economy was being drastically altered during the alluvial period. Infrastructure to move Argentina's goods to Buenos Aires and thence overseas was being developed in the late 19th century, involving railroads, port facilities, food processing plants, and other industries. The work force for these increasingly critical industries was dominated by immigrants, who often brought with them new ideas concerning labor organizations.28 Not surprisingly, it was in immigrant-dominated work places that organized labor activities first became important.29 Immigrant labor tended to be influenced by European doctrines of anarcho-sindicalism and socialism, creating highly politicized worker-protection organizations. The early unions tended to be craft oriented brotherhoods of workers, with little hierarchy and no dues, protecting their own workers and avoiding any link with the government or

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29 established political parties.30 In the last decades of the 19th century, of course, there were no established political parties with which to ally, with the exception of the nascent socialist Party. LOose-knit and competitive union federations, such as the Federaci6n Obrera de la Republica Argentina (FORA) and the Socialist dominated ConfederacHSn Obrera Regional Argentina (CORA) were founded in the 1890 1 s in an attempt to centralize and formalize labor efforts. The FORA was more anarchist in approach, supporting a strategy of general strikes and violence to bring about an increase in labor power. The smaller CORA, fearing governmental repression, tended to avoid confrontation, working instead . . within the Socialist Party. Generally, the FORA view dominated, and labor efforts tended to take the form of strikes and agitation rather than political organization, not surprising in view of the lack of political reform to allow the new immigrants into the body politic.31 In spite of conflicts within labor, efforts at mobilization were vigorous throughout the 1890's. The elites and the government were willing to allow normal law enforcement networks deal with violence and were content to do little else. They were not willing to give labor organization efforts any legal standing through legislation of any labor codes. An effort to create a general labor code was voted down by the Cmara de Diputados, and labor leaders themselves opposed the bill, fearing governmental interference in unionizing efforts.32

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30 In general, the government viewed problems with labor as part and parcel of general immigration problems: a disease originating from outside. In 1902, Argentine workers were inspired by the Barcelona general strike and called the first general strike in Argentine history. The response of the Argentine government combined a growing fear of labor and left-wing agitation with a suspicion of immigrant groups. The Ley de Residencia (Ley 4144}, passed by both houses of the Argentine legislature on November 22, 1902, gave the president extraordinary powers to curtail the activities of labor. The president was not given any special powers to control strikes or violence; these were considered to be already available under the state-of-seige clause of the constitution. Rather, the target of the law was the immigrant community itself. The president could expel any foreigner who threatened national security or public order and, further, could bar entrance to Argentina Of any foreigner whose "antecedents" suggested he might be a threat. The link between labor unrest and foreigners was clear, at least to the Argentine government. The real issues of labor problems in a changing economy were not addressed.33 The Ley de Residencia did not halt labor agitation or unrest, however, and efforts at organizing and violence continued. A peak of sorts was reached during the eel eb rations of the national independence centennial in

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31 1910. The FORA announced plans to "sabotage" government sponsored celebrations several days prior to the May 25 date. The attack on the national pride of Argentina which the planned protests seemed to constitute galvanized middle-sector support for government repression. Many in the middle sectors had worked their way up from working class origins. They had a stake in the system and had become highly nationalistic.34 A week before the scheduled celebrations, "mobs of young hoodlums swarmed into the streets of Buenos Aires" and sacked the headquarters of FORA, CORA and the Socialist Party, as well as the newspapers La Protesn
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32 By the second decade of the twentieth century, then, new social and economic realities faced Argentina. The "creole" society of pa trones and peones had been replaced by a complex society of established native elites trying to control a growing urban immigrant society with different economic motives and political beliefs. Non-creole majorities in some sectors were bound to make demands and they would become a new source of power with which the established el ites--willingly or otherwise--would have to deal. The new economic order was already manifesting itself, with long-term and im po rtan t effects ( to be discussed later). The new political order, however, would take a bit more time to emerge, because while society and the economy were expanding, not only in the aggregate but also in terms of incorporating additional groups and sectors, the political mechanism remained closed.38 The same elite who had tolerated, managed and sometimes abetted the shift in Argentine social structure was initially unwilling to tolerate any political changes. "A tightly restricted civil oligarchy dominated by the great landowners" still controlled the government.39 The predominant political attitude of the ruling elite has been characterized as "conservative" or "aristocratic" liberalism.40 Liberal ism--in the sense of a desire for expanding economic opportunity and productivity--was

PAGE 40

33 combined with a determination to maintain tight control of that development. The idea of centrally directed economic growth was combined with a commitment to keep the controls firmly in the hands of those who had held them all through the 19th century, and the members of the oligarchy believed that political power belonged to them by right and, furthermore, that it was patriotic not to surrender it to the men emerging from the creole-immigrant mass.41 The attempt to promote economic development yet retain the reigns of political power produced a system heavily dependent upon central authority and restricted to a small group of actors. The executive branch of government kept itself in power by controlling and manipulating the electoral mechanism, especially through the widespread use of fraud.42 Yet the necessity of promoting economic development led to conditions which would eventually undermine the elite's position. The same immigrants who were necessary to provide the skills and labor of the growing economy, also provided a potential power base for new political forces. The same educational policies followed since the Presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868-74) created a literate mass capable of political action.43 The elite found itself in a contradictory and deteriorating situation. It was dependent on the masses, but refused to acknowledge that dependence or to share political power.

PAGE 41

Because of its attitude toward the creole-immigrant mass and because of its marked tendency to pull in and close its ranks, the oligarchy gradually weakened its foundations without most of its members noticing the fact.44 34 The new socio-economic groups were diverse in origin and status: landowners of the upper littoral, forwardly mobile aristocrats from the interior who had not benefited from the export economy, the large dependent groups of rural tenants, and native and immigrant urban middle sectors. In many ways, these groups were equally committed to the liberal ideas of progress and expansion and supported the same economic system as the elite. They were not revolutionary. They did, however, have distinct economic goals. The growth of organized labor has already been mentioned. The middle sectors, often composed of native sons of immigrant labor groups, may have been tied to the same export-oriented economy as the elite, but they sought expanded economic and political opportunity in urban society. They wanted expanded professional opportunities to be provided from increased governmental and business activity which the establishment seemed unwilling or unable to provide. These groups would form the core of a new popular-based political force, bent on reform of the political system, which emerged in the late 1800's.45 Just as there was a difference in orig in among the social groups, so there was diversity among the political

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35 movements emerging from them. Anarcho-sind ical ism gained support among workers, as has been noted. The socialist Party was founded by Juan B. Justo in 1896, gaining most of its early support in the working districts of Buenos Aires. And, in 1889 a civic youth organization--the UnH5n Civica de la Juventud (UCJ) --was founded in Buenos Aires as a protest movement against the corruption of conservative government. The UCJ had broader appeal to the middle sectors of urban society, indicated by the fact that in April of 1890, it was converted into an active political party--the Union c!vica (UC)--to be a focus of opposition to the government of Miguel Juarez Celman (1886-1890). While these various political organizations made different appeals to urban society, they tapped a common desire to challenge the established poiitical order.46 The opportunity for a united challenge was presented by a political and economic crisis at the end of Celman's regime in 1889. Celman had attempted to construct a personal ist regime, dominating not only the national and local machinery of government, but also the established conservative National Autonomous Party (PAN) .47 His play for power had alienated not only popular-based groups, but members of the PAN as well, including Carlos Pellegrini, the influential former cabinet minister from Buenos Aires, and the party's founder and former president of the nation, General Julio Argentine Roca.48

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36 President Celman had other problems. The Argentine economy was in a crisis, following a binge of speculation which affected almost everyone (this will be covered in more detail in the next chapter). And Celman himself had become the symbol of all that was corrupt in the conservative regime. In July of 1890, a revolt by members of the military and supporters from the popular groups including the UC (which had just issued a manifesto for revolution) broke out. It was quickly put down, but faced with rebellion from within the PAN as well as without, Celman resigned the presidency in favor of Carlos Pellegrini. The "Revolution of 1890 11 led to more than Celman's resignation. It resulted in the emergence of the UC as the focus of popular struggle against the conservative regime. The party's call for honesty and faithful representation in government had tremendous appeal for the middle sectors, al though less for the more radical labor groups. And the leadership of the party was filled with illustrious persons: Leandro Nicebro Alem, ex-president Bartolome Mitre, the governor of Buenos Aires Province Bernardo de Irigoyen, and Alem's nephew Hipolito Yrigoyen, among others.49 Although the UC was clearly in opposition to the government, it is hard to conceive of the party as particularly revolutionary. The leadership included much of the . elite of Buenos Aires city and province, disaffected

PAGE 44

37 from the mainstream conservatives (some of them were ex-PAN members), but not immigrant anarchists. Their interests lay not in overthrowing the system but in taking it over.SO To this end, Mitre effected a deal with General Roca in 1891 to bring the Buenos Aires rebels back into the fold by combining the two national leaders in a presidential ticket under a new alliance: the Union C1vica Nacional CUCN). While this move may have had some practical attractions, it was seen as an unprincipled compromise by the more ideological of the UC's leaders, especially Alem and Yrigoyen. The 1891 "accommodation" resulted in a split in the UC, with Alem and his followers declaring against the deal and announcing a program of "relentless struggle" on principle against the corrupt established regime.SI Thus was established the Uni6n Civica Principista (UCP). The principle of moral government demanded the UCP's abstention from the corrupt electoral process at this time, but the strength of the new faction still threatened to upset a smooth transition of power. Partly as a result, Mitre and Roca with drew themselves from the impending presidential elections. However, they arranged a coalition instead around the candidacies of Luis Saenz Pena and Jose E. Uriburu which won the 1892 elections. Unable to effect change through the electoral process, and committed to objectives that were incompatible with con.temporary political rules, the Radicals, as they were

PAGE 45

38 now tagged by the Mitre-Roca group, developed a strategy which was to serve them for the next two decades. They combined armed insurrection with abstention from the established political process. This intransigent policy combined moral indignation with action in the only way possible for a group committed to the belief in the immorality of Argentine elections. The results of this policy were mixed. Two attempted revolts in 1893 and 1895 failed, but the leaders escaped prosecution partly because of increasing popular support for their program 52 The PAN continued to dominate elections, but the steadily growing UCR presence once again combined with factional ism within the PAN to produce a breakthrough in the political process. The prosperity which the country had come to enjoy, combined with the knowledge that the leaders of the radicals really were not so different from themselves, allowed at least some conservatives to consider gradual electoral reform. They would co-opt the Radicals into becoming a "loyal opposition"53 with the conservatives retaining a majority in the elected houses. As long as the Radicals abstained from political pa rti cipa tion, the need for this particular solution to the problem may have appeared less urgent, but a series of events in the early 1900's began to make the option more attractive. In one episode, Carlos Pellegrini, as Minister of the Inter1or in Roca' s second term as president, "was suddenly

PAGE 46

39 made aware of the new importance and power of public opinion" in handling the national debt. He had worked out a deal to consolidate and refinance Argentina's sizeable foreign debt by putting her customs revenues up as collateral. This affront to national pride created an uproar sufficient to make Roca disavow both the plan and Pellegrini. 54 Nationalist sentiment--especial ly widespread in the same middle sectors which were the base of power of the UCR--had shown itself to be strong enough to affect government policy. In another instance, Joaquin v. Gonzalez, who succeeded Pellegrini as Minister of the Interior, sponsored a law which brought about a small measure of electoral reform. rt eliminated complete lists, under which all the seats in multi-member districts were competed for in a single unit, and replaced them with single-seat electoral districts.55 Although the law clearly undermined conservative control of elections, it was passed in 1902 and indicates that the reformist wing of the PAN was gaining the ascendancy. In addition, there was another aborted Radical revolt in 1905, indicating once again that the opposition movement was not going to disappear. 56 The appeal of electoral reform was growing stronger--not so much for its own sake but so that the PAN could continue to "rule without repression" and even generate a measure of "mass support".57 The anti-Roca, refoimist wing had gained the presidency in

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40 1904, with the election of Manuel Quintana, and on his death, Jose Figuero Alcorta, another supporter of reform, became president in 1906. He arranged for Roque Saenz Pena to become his successor in the 1910 elections and it was this younger Saenz Pena who undertook to bring about fundamental electoral reform. Saenz Pena at first offered Yrigoyen a post in his government in an attempt to subsume the Radical movement, but he was rebuffed. It was becoming apparent that only the opportunity to participate in legitimate elections would calm the intransigents. The key to the reform was to force the Radicals in to acceptable behavior: that is to say, voting. In as much as the Radical and conservative leaders were not dissimilar in social backgrounds, and since the PAN machinery was so solidly entrenched, accomodation seemed to carry little risk. In addition, the radical movement itself was hardly monolithic in its extremism, and had worked out accommodations with conservative regimes on the provincial level.59 If a way could be found to bring the Radicals into national electoral politics, and if the majority party (assumed to be the PAN) could maintain a solid majority in the elected houses, then the Radicals could be denied real power and yet placated all in one move. There were genuine reformers within the government whose outlook was not so cynical ,58 but, in any case, it seemed that reform without revolution was both possible and desirable.

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41 The Electoral Reform Law of 1912 managed to accomplish this. It allowed for permanent registration which would lessen fraud and allow more Argentines to participate, thus giving the Radicals the electoral clout for which they had fought. But the requirement for compulsory voting, while carrying no severe penalties, promised to force the Radicals into legal forms of protest. More extremist parties, such as the Socialists, on the other hand, represented in large part non-voting immigrants which would not become an electoral threat. And, the process of the "incomplete list" giving two-thirds of the seats from a province to the majority party, one-third to the runner-up party, and none to third parties,60 would assure PAN rule with a loyal, or at least co-opted, Radical minority. Of course, effective male suffrage would be required to allow enough Radical voters to participate to implement the scenario. It was the awareness of the Radical threat and the need to control it that allowed the law to pass; belief in the virtues of electoral politics or a respect for the wisdom of Argentine voters was not necessary. However, events did not progress quite according to scenario. The UCR captured a few congressional seats and remained a small minority until 1914. But, after that year, the UCR, along with other reformist parties such as the Socialists and Progressive Democrats, began to increase the.ir number of elected national representatives.61 New

PAGE 49

42 registrations apparently yielded more Radical than PAN voters. Also in 1914, Roque Saenz Pena, having become a reformist hero and having had the electoral reform law named after him, died. This may have upset the normal succession mechanism, for the 1916 national elections produced real surprises. In congressional elections, the combined Radical, Socialist, and Progressive Democrat forces captured a majority of the seats in the Camara de Diputados for the first time. In the presidential elections, the Radicals captured the Presidency in their first legal try with 45 .6% of the vote and widespread support for an Yrigoyen--Pelagio B. Luna ticket.62 While surely surprised, the conservatives were not particularly worried. was not the leadership of the Radicals--was not Yrigoyen--a faction of the same elite which had ruled since 1880? was not the export-led economy performing at record levels? was not stability the goal of all? While much has been made of the victory of the Radicals ushering in a new age of Argentine politics, the next chapters will suggest that in essence the conservatives were correct.

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43 lThe term is used by Jose Luis Romero as the title to Part Three of A HistQry .QL Argentine Political Thought. Trans. Thomas F. McGann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 165. 2por statistics and analyses of Argentine demographic growth during this period, see the following: Carlos F. D1az Alejandro, Essays on tb_~E..@..QQIIl_i.c_HistQ..t.~of the Ac~antine .Re.w,1.bl.i.Q C New Haven: Yale University Press, 197 0) , 23-24; Sociedad Rural Argentina, Anuario de la soci..edad Ru.ull_ Argentina: esta.d.Ls.ti.Qas_~n~~s y agraI.ias (Buenos Aires: Luis L. Gotelli, 1928), 59-64; and Gilbert Wilson Merkx, "Political and Economic Change in Argentina from 1870 to 1966" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968), Ch. 5. 3studies of immigration and its impact on Argentine society are numerous and varied. Some emphasize economic factors, some sociological change. Some tend to focus on and criticize the absence of governmental policy, and others are concerned almost solely with demographic impact. Almost all, however, are in agreement that immigration was one of the key factors in the series of social, economic and political changes which occurred in Argentina during this period. Some of those studies (and specifically those used for this dissertation) include the following: Gustavo Beyhaut, ~.t_ai, "Los inmigrantes en el sistema ocupacional Argentine," in Torcuato di Tel la, et al, Argentincl.i._~.i.e.d.a.d_ de IDcLqgS (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971), 85-123; Roberto Cortes Conde, El prog_r_e_so Arge.n.tiw _ _l._8.B:Cl.=.l..9.U C Bue nos Ai res: Edi tori al Sudamericana, 1979), 240-270; Gino Germani, "Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., fiasses ..irL_L_atin Arne..r~.a. (New York: oxford, 1970), 289-330; Ernesto J. A. Maeder, "Poblaci6n e inmigracion en la Argentina entre 18 80 y 1910" in Gustavo Ferrari and Ezequiel Gallo, eds., La Argentina del oche.n.u al centena.ll.Q. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1980), 555-575; Jose Luis Romero, Ch. 6; James R. Scobie, Rev o 1 ut i o n on th e E.ia.mpa.s...i.._...A_SQ~lll_H_is. to ry ..o.f-A.m(ll.tin~ Nheat,---1..B..6Jl.=.l.il..D. (Austin: University of Texas, 1964), Ch. 3 and 7; Carl Solberg, "Immigration and Urban Social Problems in . Argentina and Chile, 1890-1914," Hispanic Americ...a..n H i s t o r i c a 1 _R__e_ ~i e w , 4 9 : 2 < M a y , . 1 9 6 9 > , 2 1 5 3 2 ; t w o

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44 works by Richard J. Walter: "Politics, Parties, and Elections in Argentina's Province of Buenos Aires, 1912-42," .Hispanic Ame.r..i..Qan_.His.t2r.llal Revie'tl., 64: 4 (November; 1984), 707-35, and "The Socioeconomic Growth of Buenos Aires in the Twentieth Century" in Stanley R. Ross and Thomas F. McGann, eds., Buenos Air~...s_;___4._Q_Q._Y..e..ara. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 66-126; and Vicente Vazguez-Presedo, El caso Argentino; migutiQ.n_de.~es, come.r..d~~~J.Qr desarollo1 1875-1..91..4 (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971), Ch. 3. 4 various sources containing the text of the Constitution exhibit disagreement on some particulars. For example, concerning the text of Article 25, one source (Peaslee) uses the term "encourage" regarding the government's obligation towards immigration, while another (Fitzgibbon) uses "develop". It is assumed that such differences are a function of translation only. For constitutional references and interpretations, see Austin F. MacDonald, "The Government of Argentina," Hispanic Am.e..rican HistorLc.al. Review. 5: 1 (February, 1922), 52-82; Russell H. Fitzgibbon, ed., .l'he CQn._a.tit.utions of the Americ..a.s_ Cas of ._J~_L_ 1948) (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1948), 12-31; and Amos J. Peasley, .C.QilQ.til_y_tj...Q_ns__Qf Nati,Qns Vol_.,_ IV; The Americas (The . Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1970), 3-27. 5vazquez-Presedo, 110. 6 scobie, RevoltJ.tio.n_o_n_the Pam~, 123. 7 Examinations of th is persistent land-holding pattern can be found in D1az Alejandro, 151-159; Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas, 114-121; Cortes Conde, El progres2__a.ts~DQ, 149-188; and vazguez-Presedo, Ch. 3. 8As calculated from the Argentine census of 1914 by Carl Solberg in "Immigration and Urban Social Problems", 218. 9 scobie, Revolution on the ffilllpas, 125. 10 scobie, Bevolution_on_~h~.a.m~, 131-132. Scobie also gives special emphasis to the relationship between economic cycles and immigration flow. llsecondand third-class passengers, who comprised the vast majority of immigrants, were subject to inspection and interrogation by immigration officials. Part of this process included ascertaining occupations. 12scobie describes the 1 ives of colonists, tenants and golondri.nM in El.l!t.ion_on_th..e__Egmpas, 57-61.

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45 13There is general agreement on these percentages since they are derived from the Argentine censuses. These particular figures are from Merkx, 72. 14 The creation of an urban labor force was not necessarily in contradition with government policy. Labor rural or urban was relatively expensive in Argentina up to the 1860's and '70's. Part of immigration policy tried to encourage the immigration of persons to expand the general labor pool, as opposed to the number of rural settlers. This point is discussed in H. s. Ferns, Britain and Argen.tiruLin the Ninet..~11th C~.n.tJ.l~ (Oxford: Oxford University, 1960), 324-28. 15vazguez-Presedo, 139. 16Three works which deal with the shift from the old society to the new are those cited by Germani and Romero, and John J. Johnson's now famous Political Change in Lq_tin Americai T.h.e._Emergence of the Middle sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). The three quoted terms are taken, in order, from Romero, 167, Germani, 303, and Johnson, ix. l 7Romero, 79. 18A good description of this dual elite can be found in Thomas c. Cochran and Ruben E. Reina, Capittl.i.s.IIL_i_n Argentin.e._~l.lli.!J.L..e..t_A-fil.ug~f Torcuato di~~lla_anQ-.S~~M~ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 10-11. 19vazguez-Presedo, 139. 20comments on foreign ownership can be found in D!az Alejandro, 214-18; these figures are from Merkx, 90. 21This refers only to shifts in domestic consumption patterns. The major influence on production in the rural sector came from overseas markets. These will be discussed in Chapter Two. 22 These middle sectors were self-defined by respondents to the census. A rural middle class comprised of small landowners and managers existed distinct from the urban middle sectors. As a proportion of the economically active population the rural middle class shrank during this period, al though it grew in absolute terms from 46,542 in the 1869 census to 56,110 in 1914. see Merkx, 88 . 23Merkx, 90. 24Germani, 303.

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46 25 For a description of the desires of the middle sectors, see Johnson, 4-11 and Chapter 6; Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America", Hispanic AmeI.i.cao Histori~a.L~~, 49: 1 (February, 1969), 81; and Walter, "Politics, Parties, and Elections". 26walter discusses the shift in the electorate in Buenos Aires province and emphasizes how few of the foreign born became voters in "Politics, Parties, and Elections", 714. 27 The origins and development of the labor movement in Argentina, as distinct from the general phenomenon of immigration and the rise of the middle sectors, are covered in the following works: Robert J. Alexander, Organi~Lah~I .iJLLatin America (New York: Free Press, 1965), Ch. 4; Samuel L. Bailey, Labor, N~ and Politics in Argentiru1 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967), Ch. 1; Thomas E. Skidmore, "workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in Twentieth-Century Latin America," in Virginia Bernhard, ed., Elites. M~ses. and Modernization in-1.L-Uio America, 1850-1930.
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47 3loetails of the development of the labor federations and their conflicts can be found in Alexander, 36-37, and in Chapter 3 of Walter, ~lliL.Socialist._.fa..Lty. 3 2 The bil 1 was introduced into the Camara de Di put ados by Minister of the Interior Joaqu!n V. Gonzalez in 1904. See Bailey, 24-25, and Skidmore, 95-96. 33sailey (p. 21) makes specific mention of the inspirational nature of the Barcelona strike. See Solberg, "Immigration and Urban Social Problems" (pp. 228-29) and Scobie, ~on the.___Eampas Cp. 125) for detailed discussions on attitudes towards immigrants and their connection to the Ley de Residencia. As for the law itself, it was introduced by Miguel Cane, a co nse rva ti ve senator, and remained on the books until the presidency of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962). Several hundreds, perhaps thousands, of immigrants were deported under its prov is ions, and even native Argentines were sent to internal exile in Patagonia in some cases. See Walter, The SoGialist Parcy, 45 and 247, and Alexander, 37. 34Both Johnson and Romero discuss the differences between workers and the middle sectors and the importance of nationalist sentiments within the latter. See Chapters 1 and 6 respectively. see also Bailey, 33-34. 35Alexander, 37-38. 36walter, ~he sociqu...s_t_.fa.tly, 45-46. 37The 1910 episode is covered in detail by Alexander (37-38), Bailey (25-27), Skidmore (96-97), and Walter, .l'~ socialist Par~ (45-46). 38some of the works previously cited in this chapter deal with the political developments which accompanied the social changes already discussed. They include the works by Bailey, Cort~s Conde, Johnson, Merkx, Romero, and Walter. In addition to those, there are several works which deal more exclusively with the politics of the alluvial era, although some of them by necessity al so touch on topics covered above. Several sources cover general political developments of the period. They include Natalio R. Botana, El ord.e..n conservaa~ia pol!tica_a~gentina~nu~_l...8.BU y 191.6. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1979); Juan Eugenio Corradi, "Argentina, 11 in Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edel stein, Latin struggle ..h'ith Dependency and_S_~~Q.D.d (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), 305-407; Eduardo Crawley, A Ho u ae. Di v id.e.d:_A.r_g_e_n t i n_~la_8._~..8Jl. ( New Yo r k : S t . Ma r ti n ' s Pr es s , 1 9 8 4 ) ; Robe r to . E t ch e pa r e b o r d a , 11 L a

PAGE 55

48 estructura socio-politica argentina y la generacion del ochenta," Latin Arne....ti~a..n_~.Y..litit, 13: 1 (1978), 126-134; H. s. Ferns, A,tgentina (New York: Praeger, 1969); George Heaps-Ne! son, "Argentine Provincial Politics in an Era of Expanding Electoral Participation: Buenos Aires and Mendoza, 1906-1918" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Florida, 1975) ; John A. Peeler, Latin Ametlcan Democrac~ Colombia. Costa Rica...i.~ (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1985), especially the introduction, "The Theory and Practice of Liberal Democracy," 3-41; Karen L Remmer, Party Cornpetition_j_n__Argentina and Chile: Political ~t__an_d..J.Jm.l.Js _ _ Po 1 i c y , 1 8 9 O 1 9 3 O ( L in co 1 n : University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Reyoluci6n y contrarre.Y...Q.J.J.Ld~n_e:n__a Argentin.a. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Del Mar Dulce, 1970); David Rock, ed., Argenting_j,n__tb__e_ Twentieth_~~nt.l.!~y (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1975); two works by Peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democrac1l.-=-_conflict among Political Elites. 1904-1955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), and Politics and Beef in A.rgentina: Patterns of Conflict and Change (New York: Colombia University Press, 1969); and Peter G. snow, Political Forc.e.s in Ar.rumti,na < Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971). Other works which deal more specifically with the Radical party include Gabriel Del Mazo, .El Radical ismo: ensayo sobre su his.toria y d~.c.t..r..irul (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Gure, 1957); Ezequiel Gallo, Colonos en Jicmas. La& revol uciones radical es _e_n._j_q~rovincia de Santa Fe Cl893 > (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto, 1977); Ezequiel Gallo and Silvia Sigal, "La formaci6n de los partidos politicos contemporaneos: La Uni6n c!vica Radical (1890-1916>," oesarrollo Econ5rni~, 3: 1/2 CAbril Septiembre, 1963), 173-230; Lauro Lagos, Doctrina y accioq .r::adical (Buenos Aires: 1930); Felix Luna, Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Editorial Desarrollo, 1964) and as editor, "Noventa anos de radicalismo" Toda es Historia~~, 15: 170 (July, 1981); Rudolfo Puiggros, El Yrigoyenismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Alvarez, 1965); three studies by David Rock, "Machine Politics in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Radical Party, 1912-1930," Journal of Latin American studie~, 4: 2 (November, 1972), 233-256, Politics ~'rhe. Rise anLFall o.L_Radical ism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), and "The Rise of the Argent i n e Rad i ca 1 Pa rt y < th e uni 6.n___c_tu ca Ra a i ca 1 > , 1891-1916," Cambridge: Cambridge University, Centre of Latin American Studies, wo.r..king:_..g_pe_r.s-.NQJ-2 (n.d.); Carlos J. Rodrfguez, .Irigoyjill_~.s_.u_r__e...'l..O..l.~on politica y social (Buenos Aires: Libreria y Editorial "La Facultad", 1943); Peter H. Smith, "Los Radicales Argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930," DesarrQLlQ. Econ6mico. 7: . 25 (April-June, 1967), 795-829; Peter G.Snow, Argentine Radical ism: The Hist.~~~of t~ Radical civic . -----

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49 Union {Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965); and David Tamarin, "Yrigoyen and Per6n: The Limits of Argentine Populism" in Michael L. Conniff, ed., Latin Ameri~ Populism in ComparatiYL.Pfil~~e {Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 31-45. Two works dealing with particular aspects of the period are Edgardo L. Amaral, .L.i.s.a..ndL..Q_de_J.a Torrey la polftica la reforrna electorgJ.__ru:~~~~(Buenos Aires: 1961); and Darfo Canton, Argentin~J-9.ll~rnentuians jn 1889. 1916..i. and 1946 {Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato di Tella, 1966) All these have provided the framework for the coverage of political developments which follows. 39peeler, 25. 40Romero uses the term "conservative liberalism:" Merkx uses "aristocratic liberalism." 41Romero, 180-81 42The endemic nature of fraud in the Argentine political process has been noted by several scholars, including Walter in "Politics, Parties, and Elections", 721, and Rock, Politics in A~.tin.a, 26,29. In an interview in 1902, Carlos Pellegrini, ex President, described the following episode (from Joaqufn V. Gonzalez, L-'1-Leforma el ectot..a.L~ as cited by Dario canton in Argentine_B1Ile~tarian&. I rem ember that when I was a boy. even before being able to vote, the custom had it that the struggle was limited to taking possession of the tables; this was the preliminary act of the election, and once a party was in possession of a table, the election was by this very fact over: everybody knew that party would win. What was the basis for saying that? The very simple fact that fraud was accepted and admitted as a regular occurrence. 43 A description of these educational reforms and their impact can be found in Merkx, 76-79. 44Romero, 199. 45The socio-economic makeup of the Radicals is discussed by Walter "Politics, Parties, and Elections", 717-18 and in detail by Gallo and Sigal, 198-207. Rock emphasises the non-revolutionary nature of the middle sectors . and the UCR in Pol itic..a. in Argentina_, 19-24. Tamar in examines the relationship between populism and the radicals, claiming that "Radical ism is a classic representative of 'reformist era' populism" on page 31 of "Radicalsim and Peron."

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50 46 on the origins of the UCJ and the Union c!vica, see Rock, Politics in A..rmtirul, 41. On the early Socialist Party, see Walter, The Socialist Party, Ch. 1 and 2. 47 Gallo, Colonos en arrnas, 21-22. 48Rock, Politics J.n_AI.gentina, 30 49other personages included Vicente Fidel Lopez and Arist6bulo del Valle, making up the "old elite" element of leadership of the Radicals. See Romero, 209-10 50Rock and Smith, among others, emphasize this point. see Rock, Politics in At,.gentina, 32, and smith, Argentioct and the Failure of Dem.ru;.L~, 9. 51Romero, 212. 52How much support was actually due to Radical programs is debatable. Both Gallo and Scobie point out that the 1893 revolt in Santa Fe had more to do with combatting the local PAN elite, than with supporting the Buenos Aires radicals. see Colonos en .a.Ima~, 82, and Revolution o.n the PamJ;2a.S., 154. Nevertheless, it was the Radicals who benefited. 53This point is made by Smith, Argentin.a_aruj_the Failure of Dernociacy, 10. 54rt is Rock's contention that this episode moved Pelligrini to the side of the reformers. He also points out the connection between nationalist issues and the middle sectors, as does Johnson. See Rock, Politics ..i.n__Am.t.in.a., 33, and Johnson, 96-97. Nationalist sentiment also played a part in the passage of the Ley de Residencia of the same year. It would seem that this law, given the emerging class structure of Argentina, was more a palliative to the emerging native middle class than to the older elites. 5 5 As a result of this reform, district four, containing working class portions of Buenos Aires, elected the first Socialist deputy, Alfredo L. Palacios, in 1904. See Walter, The socialist PaL~~, 73-74. 56pellegrini, in fact, helped campaign for amnesty for the Radical rebels. See Romero, 201. Oddly enough, in a political system dominated by the presidency, Article 67, Section 17 of the Argentine Constitution gives the power of amnesty to congress . 57Rock, Politics in ALg~tina, 34.

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51 58 Romero (pp. 200-201) points out that genuine reformers were to be found within the conservative ranks. 59 on the differences between the mainstream Radicals in Beunos Aires and elsewhere, specifically Mendoza, and on accommodations reached with the conservative regime, see George Heaps-Nelson, Ch. 3-5. 60single-seat districts had been rescinded in 1910. See Walter, The socialist U1~, 248 Cfn. 4). 61For specific statistics on elections from 1912 to 1916, see oarfo Canton, .Material es para _il_ estudio de la. sociologia pol filia_e..n. la Ai:.gentina. -YQ.l__:l_ C Buenos Aires: Institute Torcuato di Tella, 1968), 35-37. 6 2 .Ibi.g , 8 58 6

PAGE 59

CHAPTER THREE THE PATTERN OF INTERNAL ECONOMIC GRCMTH IN THE GOLDEN AGE, 187 0-193 0 The social and political changes of the alluvial era were significant, in that they produced at least the appearance of a new society. Even more significant for Argentina, both at the time and for the future, were the economic changes which accompanied and sometimes drove those social and political developments. The economic progress enjoyed by Argentina in this period is unparalleled in Latin America and approaches what occurred in Europe and the United States during the same period. Argentina developed from a pastoral world backwater in 1880 to a leader in the world agri-commodities market by the beginning of the First World War. Argentina's economy entered a golden age of progress and expansion. The period has also been termed "la bella poca". Many, extend th is period of economic expansion and productivity past the first world war, sometimes as far as 1930.1 Often, the years of Radical party gave rnments from 1916-193 0 are seen as part of, and even the capstone of this epoch. 52

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53 As outlined in the previous chapter, the normal approach to the period after the uni ication of Argentina and the federalization of Buenos Aires is to see it as one of steady --sometimes even spectacular--economic growth coupled with the gradual expansion of political opportunity. The period ends with the "revolution of 1930" which is seen as the death knell of what had been political development in the same way as the world depression is seen as the demise of Argentina's economic miracle. The half-century from 1880 to 1930, then, is seen as a package of progress--a classic example of political and economic developrnent--which was cut short by economic and political violence.2 . . There are no aggregate figures, such as Gross National Product or Gross Domestic Product, to measure Argentine economic growth before 1900.3 Import figures, however, show that there was steady expansion of the Argentine economy at least as indicated by increasing imports from overseas trade from the early 1870 's to 1889. Total imports more than tripled from 49,125,000 pesos oro in 1870 to 164,570,000 in 1889. The economic crisis of 1890, which was integral to the Juarez Celman resignation fiasco (see previous chapter) halted this steady growth. Imports fell to a low of 67,208,000 pesos oro in 1891 and then began a slow climb reaching 1890 levels in the early 1900's.4 The crisis of 1890 was severe, but its effects were not long-lived.

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54 After 1900, indexed figures for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have been calculated and are represented in Figure 2. With the exception of WWI and the postwar recovery period from 1914 to 1920, these figures too show a steady growth in the Argentine economy even in real terms as measured by fixed values of 1950 pesos. The Argentine economy grew almost four fold in the last 30 years of the "Golden Age". Per-capita GDP shows a considerably less impressive expansion--a little over 50% for the period:--lessening the personal impact of economic growth. This is due, of course, to the massive immigrant-fed population growth which Argentina experienced in the same period and which at least partly fueled that economic expansion. Even so, the overall record for the period as a whole is impressive. Other authors view Argentina's development over the 50 years from 1880 to 1930 as a series of different stages, not all of which are as positive as the period as a whole. Especially during the Radical period, some analysts perceive a malaise, or at least a slowdown of economic development. Argentina ceased being an "expanding open export economy" and became a "stationary open" one: Argentina "marked time economically."5 In similar fashion, it has been argued that Argentina reached a "state of maturity" after the First World War when growth slowed,6 or worse, simply stagnated in a pattern of "delay" until the economic collapse of the

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55 ===============-====---===================================== FIGURE 2 ARGENTINE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND GDP PER CAPITA 1900-1929 =-=-=---------------------==--====-============-==========-Source: Merkx, 43 and Randall, 2-3.

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56 1930's.7 Hence, economic developments in Argentina were not smooth and harmonious, but somewhat unstable.8 In fact, as Table 8 shows, some important indicators of economic progress actually peaked rather early in the period, to be followed by actual decline in the 1920's, preceding the collapse of the 1930 's. These indicators suggest that the golden age ended earlier than sometimes acknowledged. Regardless of differing opinions of the exact periodicity and pace of development, it is clear that at least some portions of the half century witnessed an extraordinary performance by the Argentine economy. Beginning as early as the 1860's the productive potential of Argentina began to be recognized by possible customers and investors in industrializing Europe. From 1850 to 1880, the value of Argentine exports grew at a rate of 7.4% annually as exports from the Littoral of Argentina became increasingly important.9 The election of Bartolome Mitre as President in 1862 marked the beginning of Argentina's purposeful and methodical entry into the "international commodity and capital markets" and was followed by a period of economic expansion through the 1870's.10 Once national consolidation became a reality in 1880, this potential began to be fulfilled and Argentina underwent a period of sustained economic growth until the Baring crisis of 1890. The crisis, named after the large and established British investment firm which was heavily involved, did not --

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TABLE 8 PEAK YEARS FOR SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY 57 ----=---===-============================================-=== .IliDICATO INVESTMENT Total Investment as% of GDP New investment per capita Total fixed investment per capita New foreign investment Total foreign investment RESOURCES Rate of population growth New railroad mileage Number of immigrants per year Land under cultivation FOREIGN TRADE Price of beef (Linears Market) Exports per capita Total foreign trade Total imports Beef exports (tons) STANDARD OF LIVING Domestic beef consumption per capita % increase in GDP (post war) GDP per capita YEAR 1907 1910 1912 1913 1913 1906 1911 1912 1914 1919 1920 1920 1920 1924 1923 1923 1929 ---====-=================================================== SQ.u~: Both the choice of indicators and the years are from Merkx, 129.

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58 have a lasting impact in that the Argentine economy recovered and experienced even greater growth after 1890. The er isis did, however, point up some characteristics of the economy which would haunt subsequent Argentine
PAGE 66

In order to escape this v1c1ous cycle of revenue shortages, borrowing abroad, and the inability to face long-term payments, the country needed to increase exports and obtain more foreign exchange in gold. Increased exports would allow the government to buy gold inexpensively and meet its outstanding loan obligations.12 59 Argentina avoided total collapse in the 1890 's partly because it had just gone off the gold standard in 1885. In addition, the government budget was cut, and the world exports market fortuitously improved. The volume of exports, if not the pr ice, increased drama ti cal ly in the 1890 's and Argentina was able to climb out of the er isis. In fact, the period after 1890 and continuing to the First World war, at least, saw the most dramatic growth rates of the whole period. It may be that aggregate growth is not the critical characteristic in an assessment of the Argentine economy. Possibly more important are the structural changes in economic development during the period. Not only was the value of production in Argentina increasing, but the source of that value was changing too. After 1900 agricultural activities, while important, were declining as a share of Argentina's economic production and the industrial sector was growing. As a percentage of the GDP from 1900 to 1929, the production of the rural sector slipped from 38.1 to 30 . 9. At the same time, the contribution of the industrial sector rose from 12.9 to 16.5 and the service sector grew from 49.0 to 52.6. The apparent shift from agriculture to

PAGE 67

60 industry might be somewhat exaggerated in these figures and the shift is not large anyway, with agricultural production still accounting for almost a third of GDP even at the end of the period.13 Yet the figures appear to signify a di versifying as wel 1 as a growing economy. In addition, Argentina's industrial sector was growing at a faster rate than the rural sector, but her industrial economy never became as large as the rural sector and produced always for domestic consumption, not for the export market. The industrial sector was not able to meet even . domestic demand in spite of its growth, so most of Argentina's demand for manufactured goods had to be met by imports. In addition, in spite of growth in mining, Argentina could not fill her needs for minerals. From 1900 to 1929, imports of industrial goods and materials equaled one quarter of Argentina's GDP, and almost two thirds of these were ferrous metals and textiles.14 Other important changes in the Argentine economy have to do with infrastructure changes. The wave of immigrants gave Argentina the labor pool needed--especially in skills and for economic activities not present earlier (as discussed in the preceding chapter). The period also witnessed the construction of port facilities, power and commercial networks, and other essential industries which contributed to the grow th sta tis ti cs in non-agricultural areas cited above. Yet, the key piece of inf rastructure--the key

PAGE 68

61 economic input--upon which these immigrants were to work and whose products the ports were to handle was land. Land expansion was constant over the period. Land was brought into use by conquest, or rather extension of Argentine control, and by the influx of labor already discussed. The cultivated land area of Argentina increased from just under 400 thousand hectares in 1872 to almost 26 million in 1930 with the period of greatest expansion coming in the fifteen years before World War I. In the 1870 1 s, grazing areas predominated, but wheat-growing land expands rapidly thereafter, becoming about one-third of the total by the early 1900's and remaining at that level throughout the early 20th century. Lands in fodder declined from almost half the total in 187 2 to about 2 0% in the first years of the 20th century, and then rebounded rapidly after 1905 as beef exports grew. The increase in fodder lands continued more or less steadily, reaching 41.5% of the total land area cultivated in 1922, then declining to a 1930 level of 22.2%.15 Throughout the 19th century, fodder lands were unimproved grazing lands, but with the emergence of a new market for Argentine beef in the first decade of the 20th century, a specific fodder--alfalfa--began to be purposefully introduced.16 Alfalfa has certain distinct advantages which make it a grazing crop of exceptional value. It yields the highest amount of protein per area

PAGE 69

62 sown, permitting greatly increased yields of beef. And it is perennial, requiring little labor input. Later, actual grain feeding of beef would be introduced, but alfalfa grazing remained a staple of Argentine beef production.17 Alf al fa growing was a key indicator of the direction of Argentina's export economy. Since it was linked to the new beef industry, it became a more secure and lucrative use of land than grains.18 Patterns of land use shifted according to the perceived value of what the land could produce . Estancieros, particularly, regarded land as capital, as an input to be employed to reach a large foreign rnarket.19 While the amount of land in wheat tended to undergo slow and steady changes, the amount of land sown in fodder was unstable. There was a sudden and large expansion in fodder lands starting in 1907, which settled after 1912, then occurred again in the first half of the 1920's.20 In many areas, cereal production ceased entirely with obvious impact on the supply of grains and on labor. Grain production often shifted from one producing area to another, with an impact on certainty of supply. A source in 1922 stated that "many areas which a decade ago produced large quantities of wheat and other grain grow almost none."21 As we shall see, these changes in land use were responses to market forces. This pattern of shifting land usage is reflected in cattle statistics. The number of head of cattle produced in

PAGE 70

63 Argentina fluctuated with the amount of land put over to fodder. Argentina's ratio of cattle per capita was 6 times that of the Unites States in 1913, allowing for a considerable surplus of available stock over domestic consumption.22 While sometimes increases in slaughter overcame the rate of cattle production,23 Argentine breeders generally were able to take advantage of the existence of a domestic surplus and to respond rapidly to refurbish the supply of stock. This allowed a certain mobility in dealing with foreign markets. Argentine land owners were able to respond en masse to market forces bacause land holding was so concentrated. Traditional latifundia patterns and commercial credit policies insured that land ownership did not become dispersed in spite of immigration and population growtb.24 Argentine estancieros were thus able to keep herds together for generations, maintaining unsurpassed quality of breeding stock,25 and land prices and rents remained high in response to its increasing productive value. 26 The use of land as capital meant that while the pampean region was able to absorb a labor force of 800,000 immigrants up to 1914,27 they remained tenants, by and large. Shifting land to alfalfa production exacerbated the tenancy pattern. Cereal producing land--especially in the Northeast region: Entre R!os and parts of Santa Fe and Corrientes, as well as Buenos Ai res Province, Cordoba and San Lui s--was converted in to

PAGE 71

64 grazing land and fodder producing areas. Once an area was sown in alfalfa, the need for tenants was terminated since alfalfa is a perennial with few requirements for tending. The tenants might move to another land parcel or to another owner, but their services were no longer needed for pasturage land Cal though the services of other ganadero workers might be, of course). The ease with which land use could be shifted created a migrant tenant class, some of whom moved out of agriculture altogether, who played a role in the social and political changes discussed in the previous chapter. It also made capital formation and technological application in the rural sector less urgent and attractive, because profits could be insured simply by changing crops, rather than increasing productivity. This would have economic impact later.28 If land was one important aspect of the Argentine economy, another was the phenomenal growth of the railroad network. Starting with only about 700 kilometers in 187 O, the railroads had an average growth of about that same number per year throughout the period, so that by 1913, Argentina had 32,500 kilometers of railroad, or 41.9 per inhabitant. This compares to 65 kilometers per person for Australia, 61.3 for Canada and 43.5 for the United States. Argentina's ratio was more than twice that for any other large Latin American country.29 Railroad expansion after the start of World War I slowed drastically, but it revived in the 1920's to reach a total of 37,700 kilometers by 1927 . -

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65 As well as serving as a consumer of materials and labor, the railroad system served the obvious and critical functions of carrying goods and linking the interior of Argentina to overseas ports, especially Buenos Aires. In 1900, some 12,600,000 tons of cargo were being transported yearly at a cost (income to the railroads) of 41,401,00 pesos oro. By 1927, 53,698,000 tons of cargo were shipped at a cost of almost 300 million gold pesos with profits to the railroads of 95.6 million pesos.30 The railroads were goods movers and money makers. A glance at any maps of the railway networks shows the pattern as opposed to the size of expansion.31 Rail lines radiate from Buenos Aires as a hub to connect the productive regions of the interior--from Tucuman in the north to the southern flanks of La Pampa and Buenos Aires province in the south--to the ports of the coast. It is the land and its productive capacity which are being linked to an outlet. Land became accessible as the railroad web spun from Beunos Aires reached it, and agricultural colonization followed the rail road web. 32 More importantly, land became a capital asset when tied to the ports. The land was often owned prior to the arrival of the railroad, but it became part of the productive sector of the Argentine economy only after the arrival of the railroads. For this reason--as well as its own profitability--the railroad network was a key to Argentine development.33

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66 Equally important was the way the railroads were developed. Two characteristics in particular are indicators of the evolving nature of the Argentine economy. One has been touched on above: the railroads were links for produce to foreign markets, not for persons. And, secondly, the railroads were predominantly foreign-owned. Hence, the railroad was not just a symbol of development, but of a particular kind of development for Argentina. Railroad expansion occurred in two stages which reflect ownership patterns. During the first stage, up to the 1880 's, expansion was slow with about 50% of the financing being domestic and the pace of investment tended to outstrip returned revenues. After 1890, however, the pace of expansion picked up and foreign investment began to dominate. In part, the pace of investment quickened because of a return of confidence after weathering the 1890 crisis. It quickened al so because of the increasing use of state guarantees of profits. Investors would not undertake to finance railroads into undeveloped territory without some sort of government backing. Under various arrangements, the Argentine government guaranteed certain profit levels (often as high as 7% per year) to railroad investors. By the 1890's, some 20% of national government indebtedness consisted of these guarantees. Even so, investors stuck to routes which would have proved profitable regardless of government action, so that unprofitable regional routes had

PAGE 74

67 to be financed directly by the state.34 By the early 1900's, railroads had become sufficiently profitable that even state regulation did not diminish investor enthusiasm, partly, no doubt, because the regulation was not particularly onerous and because certain priviledges, such as exemptions from duties on imported construction materials, were grantea.35 Profitability and security were so attractive that by 1914 British investors, by far the major foreign ones, owned between 70 and 75% of the railroad mileage in Argentina.36 Native investors seemed uninterested. Argentines were not investors in railways or generally in joint-stock companies. Their weal th was largely land, and with the prospect of expansion. their resources were directed to the acquisition of more land and its development.37 The native elites seemed content to profit from the land development boom which the rail roads produced, rather than from the rail roads directly. And, in general, real estate and land were more profitable.38 The land with its productive capacity was Argentine, but the key to its productive potential--the railroads--was British. The phenomenon of foreign dominance of a key infrastructure element was not limited to the railroads. The most famous product of Argentina's rich land resources and the one which has become synonymous with pampean societybeef--was in its turn to become dominated by foreign interests in a fashion similar to the railroads. In the same way that the land was owned by Argentines, but its _ -:

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68 productive capacity was determined by foreign interests through the railroads, so the great cattle assets of Argentina would become dominated by foreign interests through the frigorfficos. Frigor1ficos are more than just slaughterhouses, or abattoirs; they also process meat by-products and prepare beef for shipping in a variety of forms. When meat production is oriented towards local consumption, or only limited exporting in primitive forms such as dried beef, frigorffico technology is not important. Nor does hide production require high levels of technology or investment. These, in fact, were the Argentine beef products of consequence until the 1880 's, and as long as they were, Argentine beef interests remained in Argentine hands. In the 1880's, however, the emergence of a foreign technology--refrigeration--would allow Argentine beef to be transported long distances in palatable form.39 This meant that the world rnarket--the real rnarket--was now open to Argentine production. The very first successful frigorffico was established by George W. orabble, a British entrepreneur, as the River Plate Fresh Meat Company in 1883, eventually taken over by the firm of George Nelson and Sons.40 The majority of the early frigorrficos, however, were founded with Argentine capital or as joint British-Argentine ventures.41 They were mutton-exporting ventures for the most part, because the technology available

PAGE 76

69 could deal more easily with smaller carcasses, such as sheep, rather than large cattle. The appearance of this new technology coincided with several fortuitous events outside of Argentina. In the United States, for example, domestic consumption of meat products was increasing, and the amount of surplus production for export was declining. At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain, already a consumer of Argentine beef, would demand new supplies of meat to feed its troops in the Boer War, but dominion states, such as Australia, would be unable to meet that demand.42 A new market to consume what the new technology could produce was being created. The advancement of refrigeration technology, and the opening of new markets as mentioned above, stimulated a shift to beef exports in the 1890 's. The Sociedad Rural Argentina had opened La Congelada Argentina plant in 1884, but it had failed because of capitalization and shipping problems.43 But on April 30, 1900, Britain closed its ports to what had been Argentina's major beef export: live animals.44 Now, the frigorffico technology had to be applied to the beef trade if the major foreign market was to be maintained. Once again, foreign capital was called upon, and Argentine government actions to guarantee profit levels and exemptions from export duties were granted to stimulate investment.45 Argentines realized that the level of .

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70 investment needed to create a major industry capable of taking advantage of the new market situation was beyond their means. After the boost to the industry created by the Boer War and British contracts for food for the troops, British control of both the production and consumption end of the industry seemed inevitable. Even so, plants capitalized by Argentines did open between 1902 and 1904, including the La Blanca plant, and Frigorffico Argentino.46 After 1904, however, foreign capital began to pour in in earnest and from more than one source, so that within the next 13 years, the vast majority of the meat packing capacity wound up in foreign hands. Similar to the investment pattern in the railroads, once the real potential for profitability was established, foreign money took over the frigorffico trade. And profit levels for investment in frigor!ficos were spectacular during this period, averaging over 10% per annum.47 But, unlike the railroads, the capital for the expansion of the frigorffico industry now came from the United States. The major North American meat packers, with immense capital backing, saw the Argentine industry as not meeting its potential and determined to expand it. The United States companies came to dominate the Argentine frigorffico industry through takeovers of faltering Argentine plants or major new construction.48 By 1917, the us companies controlled some 57.4% of the frigorffico trade, while the Argentine share had fallen to less than 5%. Table 9 summarizes the situation.

PAGE 78

TABLE 9 MAJOR FRIGORIFICOS IN ARGENTINA BY CONTROLLING COUNTRY As OF 1919 71 =========================================================== OPERATING .... c ..... o .... M_P ..... A~N_Y ___ c"""o_.M~P , ANY NAME united states Armour Armour & Morris Swift Frigorifico Armour de La Plata Sociedad Anonima La Blanca .J, Compania Swift de La Plata DATE OF FOUNDING 1911 1912* 1907 New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co. 1909 Wilson Britain Nelson & sons Frigorffico Wilson de la Argentina River Plate Fresh Meat Co. Las Palmas Produce Co. Britain and Argentina Smithfield and Argentine Meat Co. Argentina Sansinena .,.,_, . Compania Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas, Ltda. 1916* 1883 1886 1904 1891 ====---==---------------------=-=--=-=-==================== .source: Federal Trade Commission, .Report on th.~ Packin~_.Iruill.s...t..t.~ (1919), 24-35, 160-167, 172-73. ~Q.t.e.: *indicates date of founding under named country: both formerly Argentine owned.

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72 The emergence of United States leadership of the frigor1fico industry altered the structure of the beef trade in Argentina. North American firms seemed more aggressive and expansionist than established British and Argentine firms. Were the new companies to rapidly expand beef buying, ruinous competition for supply could be the result. Weaker firms might be driven out, and, in any case, the cost of beef to the frigor1ficos was bound to go up. Before the appearance of the American firms, competition for supplies of cattle had been avoided by informal arrangement. Periodic "friendly chats" had assured each frigor!fico of a reasonable supply of beef, without price competition. These . . early pools had worked well in keeping the growth of the industry controlled.49 Similar accommodations were worked out initially with the new arrivals. In late November of 1911, it was agreed among the major frigorfficos to meet every six weeks to establish production quotas which would guarantee everyone an adequate supply of beef without competing for supplies of cattle. Under the pool cattle pr ices remained reasonably stable and profits were not excessive, averaging about 13.5%.50 However, under the restraints of the pool, plant had not been used at capacity and the new arrivals were too strong to keep in line. By April, 1913, the U.S. firms felt in a position to break out of the restraints of quotas and did so. What followed was a brief pr ice war--not in sales pr ices but in

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73 bidding for cattle. This hurt small producers as the larger firms could sustain the higher payments and were controlling the price paid for cattle. In general, the British and Argentine firms had no choice but to seek another accommodation with the U.S. producers. And, as long as they had a guaranteed share of a growing market and enjoyed the same advantages of limited competition, it was to their advantage to do so. In June 1914, a "new pool" was established with the U.S. companies receiving the lion's share of the market. This arrangement, with occasional and minor interruptions, continued well into the 1920's. Thus, the domination of the frigorffico industry by U.S. firms was secured. The suppliers of cattle and consumers of beef, of course, were affected by these machinations. Beef producers were not affected as adversely as might be expectly in selling their cattle, as the price continued to rise in spite of the pools. Beef prices tended upwards until 1919, then dropped considerably to 1923, and then rose again for the rest of the 1920 's, al though never again reaching 1919 levels. The number of cattle bought for slaughter tends to follow, rather than oppose, price movements: rising to 1918, then dipping but returning to those levels by 1922, then steadily climbing for the rest of the decade of the 1920's.51 Perhaps the presence of the pool dampened normal sup.ply and demand interactions somewhat. When slaughter

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74 increased, the supply of cattle did not rise so fast as to level off prices, nor did falling slaughter totals greatly reduce prices. On the other hand, the generally steady increase in herd size and in the pr ice of production land indicate that the producers did not suffer undervaluation of their produce. Cattle producers did, however, have to drastically alter their production standards. Cattle now had to be bred simultaneously for heavier weights and higher quality of beef. Frigor!fico buyers, especially the North Americans,52 wanted heavier, younger steers for their plants.53 This required alterations in feeding and breeding. Slaughtering at an earlier age also temporarily affected the herd size.54 Costs of breeder bulls skyrocketea,55 and the use of supplemental feeds, such as alfalfa, increased. This, of course, affected the use of land resources, as has already been mentioned. The beef producer was entering a new world because of the frigorfficos. Consumers in Argentina generally did not buy their beef from the frigorfficos. They bought fresh meat, for the most part, which usually came from different grades of cattle. But, the necessary changes in beef raising would affect the abundance of all grades and the pricing practices of the frigor!ficos, being major consumers of cattle, affected all markets. Thus, while beef producers who sold directly to the frigor1ficos were obviously at the mercy of the pool, so

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75 too, to a lesser extent, were domestic producers and consumers. Prices at the Liniers market, the major market for domestic beef in Buenos Aires, rose rather steadily from 1911 to 1914, and steeply thereafter until 1920. Per capita consumption reflected these price motions to some extent and fell off from 1914 to 1922, declining almost 40% from 1913 to 1918 alone. This was partly offset by increasing consumption of other meats such as mutton, lamb and pork.56 But, these meats were not the ones of choice, nor do they seem to have been as readily available in the major domestic markets, therefore demand for beef tended to become rather inelastic in the decade of the 1920's.57 Generally, Argentine meat consumption remained largely composed of beef and as a whole stayed rather steady and was not reflective of per capita income or beef prices over the long haul. As we shall see, consumers did occasionally raise complaints about the beef industry, but to little avail. The railroads and the frigorffico industry are but two, although the most important, examples of a pattern of foreign dominance of Argentina's economy. Primary economic assets, such as land and cattle, had always been native owned, and when they became the basis of new grain and beef exporting they continued to be so. But secondary inputs and processing plants were foreign owned. Investment in rnercantil e or industrial ventures was less secure than investment in traditonal sectors such as land, and

PAGE 83

76 immigrants and agents of foreign firms dominated in this sector. By the late 19th century, 90% of the import-export, wholesaling, and retailing business was in foreign hands.SB This kind of concentration, as also happened in the frigor!fico industry, continued into the 20th century. Some of the seeming reluctance on the part of native Argentines to enter new economic enterprise may be attributable to cultural factors. The traditional Argentine elite spurned trading and industry for the most part.59 As we shall see, members of influential economic groups like the Sociedad Rural Argentina generally limited their activities to the primary sector and did not venture into industry. There were Argentine entrepreneurs, but they were usually immigrants or sons of immigrants and not part of the landed elite.60 On the other hand, as long as cattle and land remained stable and profitable investments, incentives for expansion into more risky areas was lacking. More to the point is that the materials and expertise necessary to create an industrial sector generally were not available locally. This meant that those items had to be imported, and as we have already seen this was an expensive proposition with implications for the rest of the economy. Foreign firms dominated the industrial sector because they had expertise and capital to do so and Argentines did not. The materials and machinery necessary to operate not only the . major industries themselves, but their shipping and . ---

PAGE 84

77 service ancillaries, had to be provided by foreign companies. For example, British shipping firms controlled sea transportation, handling over half the foreign shipping from Buenos Aires from 1895 on into the 1920 1 s.61 After the First World War, North American industries moved into Argentina in numbers.62 Imports were the essential economic inputs for the development of Argentina .63 Forty percent of Argentine imports were comprised of foodstuffs, textiles, and iron and steel products in 1911, and this proportion rose to 50.5% by 1930. Argentina imported over half of its textiles and clothing, about 85% of its machinery, and almost 100% of its petroleum and rubber products and electrical machinery.64 Imports were also essential to consumption: they constituted between 38 and 41% of the goods consumed in Argentina from 1912 to 1927 .65 This level of imports necessitated maintenance of high levels of exports from Argentina's traditional rural sectors. In addition, as already suggested, the budget of the Argentine government was driven by imports. On the average, over 40% of government receipts came from import levies each year from 1910 to 1929.66 However, the Argentine government could produce a budget surplus only twice during this period, in 1920 and 1925, and the surpluses were modest. In contrast, for the rest of the years, the budget deficit ave~aged 106 million pesos annually, with a peak deficit of

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78 231 million in 1926 .67 Thus, neither Argentine industries, nor consumers, nor the government could affort to curtail imports. This may explain, in part, why protectionaist tariff programs were generally not undertaken by Argentina.68 The largest and most important of imports was capital. Between 1880 and 1930, Argentina imported, that is to say borrowed, almost all its funds for investment. In 1914, only 14% of the total financial debt in Argentina was held in country. This may have risen to as much as 50% by 1934, but foreigners probably still held the majority of the Argentine debt even after the onset of the depression of the 1930's.69 Moreover, most capital came in the form of direct investment in plant rather than actual loaned funds, which tended to equal about 2 5 to 3 0% of total foreign invested capital. Still, the amount of either was large: the total equaling almost half the GDP for most of the golden age.70 Argentina received fully a third of all the investment capital flowing into Latin Arnerica.71 In addition, one country--Great Britain--owned consistently over half of that investment, sometimes as much as two-thirds. While interests of the Uni t e d St ates gr ew in the 1 9 2 0 ' s , f o reign owners h i p of capital in Argentina tended to remain highly concentrated in the hands of investors from only one country. Table 10 summarises the total investment picture in Argentina f rorn 1910 to 1931.

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TABLE 10 FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA, 1910-1931: TOTAL, BRITISH, UNITED STATES, AND THE 'GDP (in millions of gold pesos) 79 ---=-==============--==-=-==--================================ -Y-ea-r._ __ l-91~0...__~l~U_-lll~7 ___ 1~9_2~0 ___ 1~9-2.3..._ __ l~9-27L-_=1~1l Total 2,255 British 1,475 British as% of total 65.4 USA 20 USA as% of total 88 GDP* 4,196 Total as% of GDP 53.8 3,250 1,928 59 .3 40 1.2 4,875 66.7 3,350 1,950 58. 2 85 2.5 4,213 79. 5 . 3,150 1,825 57. 9 75 2.4 5,424 58.1 3,200 1,975 61.7 200 6.3 6,431 49.8 3,600 2,075 57 .6 505 14 .o 7,761 46.4 4,100 2,100 51.2 807 19. 7 7,906 51.9 ============================================================== source: Phelps, .rnternalio.naL~mJ.c Position of AL~antioa, 99, 108 and Randall, 2-3. *No..te: GDP figures in 1935-1939 pesos. Therefore, "Total as% of GDP" is not a real percentage and is used for comparisons between years only.

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80 Servicing the foreign debt--paying for that portion of foreign capital which was borrowed directly by the statebecame a burden on the government. Total debt service, which included payments to foreign investors and domestic ones, took 31% of government revenues by 1930. At least half, and sometimes as high as three quarters, of this total went to foreign investors.72. Thus foreign debt service played a key role in making the era one of deficit spending. The clearest demonstration of the problems inherent in Argentina's course of economic development could be seen in the country's response to the First World War. The war seemed to offer Argentina an opportunity for increased wealth and internal investment. Export prices remained high, and Argentina remained neutral so that she was prepared to continue trading with all her foreign customers. In reality, Argentina's foreign trade declined. Because of Britain's ability to control shipping lanes, Argentina lost some customers, such as Germany, and expanded her business with the Allies, but the real decline came in imports because the warring industrial nations could not maintain their earlier levels of exports. Partly as a result, budget deficits reached an average of 153 million pesos per year, an increase of almost 50% from the prewar period.73 In addition, imports bacame more expensive. Prior to the war, Argentina's terms of trade had consistently been good, but war.time prices ended that happy circumstance.

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81 Nevertheless, the wartime increase in the amount and value of her exports enabled Argentina to amass considerable reserves. These might have been used to create a domestic investment pool, but they were not. Some of the foreign debt was retired, but not a lot. Internal investment did increase but it stayed where it always had, in land whose value continued to climb, and did not affect the pattern of foreign ownership of industry much. In fact, Argentina emerged from the war somewhat richer, but the economy was not particularly stronger than it had been before.74 It may well have been impossible for Argentina to have done much else. Investment in industrial plant required imported . . materials, as always, which she could not get. And, the war resulted in concentrating Argentine markets--both for capital and for exports--even more as the United States joined Britain in driving competitors out of Latin America and some customers were lost. The First World War is also a turning point in the pace of development of the Argentine economy. As indicated earlier in this chapter, many indicators of economic growth took downturns at about this time. Investment continued but not as rapidly as before. Infrastructure construction, at least in some of the critical areas, wss complete. The period immediately after the war presents an opportunity to examine in more detail the other crucial side of Argentina's economic development equation: exports.

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82 Notes lJorge Abelardo Ramos considers the period to extend from 1904 to 1922 and the term "la bella ~poca" is from his Revoluci~~-&Qfil~arrevol.Y~i6.n_en la Argent.i..na, Torno III: la bel 1 a p~C..Q.L--1.9.0 4-192 2 C Buenos Air es: Editorial del Mar Dulce, 1970). Other authors extend the period to the revolution of 1930. Some examples include Carlos F. Dfaz Alejandro, .Essays o.n..._tb_e_~,0 nom ic History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven: Yale University, 1970), Lloyd G. Reynolds, Economic GI.Q~~b_in-.b..eJhird WQIJ...dL 1850-1..9.fill (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985}, and Peter H. Smith, Pol itics__~~f.__izL_A.tgentina: Patterns of conflict and Change (New York: Columbia University, 1969). 2 In addition to the works cited above, further analysis of the Argentine economy during the period can be found in the following: Gustavo Beyhaut, et al, "Los inrnigrantes en el sisterna ocupacional argentino," in Torcuato s. Di Tella, Gino Germani, and Jorge Graciarena, Arnlina~_sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971); Roberto Cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina; 1880-1920," in Roberto Cort~s Conde and Shane J. Hunt, eds., .1'be Latin American Economies: G.r.Q\i.th__aii_, ~--A.r...gJLJ1tina del ochenta ..al. centenar..iQ (Buenos Aires: Editorial sudarnericana, 1980), 377-404; Carlos F. oraz Alejandro, "La econornfa argentina durante el periodo 1880-1913," in Ferrari and Gallo, 369-376; Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zyrnelrnan, Las etapas__ael_ desarrollo eco.norni~ A.r,g.e..ntinQ ; E z eq ui el Gal 1 o, ~Exp_a.n.sio n arui Industrial De'i.e 1 cu>ro e11.t_.in..__Ar.g_(Ultl~_u_a_ B 0-1 9.3..01. C Bue nos Aires: Ins ti tuto Torcua to Di Tel la, 197 0) ; Wendel C. Gordon,

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83 The Pol~_l~ _ G.O_Il...Qmy_Qf_--1&.tin America {New York: Colombia University Press, 1965); Roger Gravil, ~he Anglo-Argentine ConnectiottL.._]__9.Q0-1939 {Boulder: westview Press, 1985); Gilbert Wilson Merkx, Political an~ __@..llQ.mic Change in Argentina ~..IIL--1...81..Q to 196 6 C Ph. o. dissertation, Yale University, 1968); Vicente vazquez-Presedo, El casQ. arg e nti.rto; m igrac i6n de f9,c to res. corne.c.cjJ) exterior Y. desarrollo. 1.8.25.=.l..9.l.J (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971) and "La evolucion industrial (Argentina, 1880-1910) ," in Ferrari and Gallo, 405-18; Richard J. Walter, "The Socioeconomic Growth of Buenos Aires in the Twentieth Century" in Stanley R. Ross and Thomas F. McGann, Buenos Ai{.es; 40Q_years {Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic survey s:>f Latin Arntl.i.ca. 1949 (New York: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1951). 3There have been attempts to construct indices of some economic indicators for periods as early as the 1880's. A. G. Ford constructed an import and export price index based on 1900 price levels for the period 1881-1914 in his "Export Price Indices for the Argentine Republic, 1881-1914," InterArnerican_Ec9JlQ~_A.ffi~, 9: 2 (1955), 42-54. Gilbert Wilson Merkx and John H. Williams also attempted similar indices for imports and other indicators. See, respectively, Merkx's work cited above and Williams' Argenti~ r o t e r n a ti.o..n.a.L_.T..r..a.de..~---1..ru;_Q_ny er t i bJ...e._...Eap..e r Mon eYL 1880-19QJl {Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Reprint; New York: AMS Press, 1971). 4see Merkx's figures, p. 42. 5Merkx, 124, 361. 6Ferns, Argentin.a., 98. 7oi Tella and Zymelman, 66-67. 8Beyhaut, et al, 85-94 and Ferrer, 81. 9corts Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 327. lOperns, Britain_anQ-Aigen.tina, 324-25. llThis interpretation of the Baring crisis relies heavily on Cortes Conde, "The Export Eco norny of Argentina," 330-34, 342. In addition, see Di Tella and Zymelrnan, 54-55; Ferns, Brittl.n.__a_ruLA..LCll.ILti..o.a, 439-484; A. G. Ford, "Argentina and the Baring Crisis of 1890," Qxford Ec_gnomk New Series, 8: 2 {June, 1956) , 127-50; John E. Hodge; "Carlos Pellegrini and the Financial Crisis of 1890," H is pan i c A_~~..art...Jl.ia.t.Q.r i c;_a 1 B e'il.ifili , 5 o : 3 CA ug u st , 197 o > ,

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84 499-523; Thomas F. McGann, ~rgentina~~-llnit~ states, ~ng the rnter-Arner..kan~~L-ia.8~-191! (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 113-20; and Jose Luis Romero, A History Qf_ Aige.ntine Po.1..iti.~al Thought, Tr ans. Thomas F. McGann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 206-07 12cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 334. 13oifferent index bases can create different proportional shifts. For example, using 1950 figures as bases, the proportional increase for the industrial sector is smaller, although the percentages themselves are higher. See ofaz Alejandro, 6, for indices based on both 1937 and 1950 bases. 14ofaz Alejandro, 15-16. 15oata on land use are from Di Tella and Zymelrnan, 41, ofaz Alejandro, 440, and Economic Commission for Latin America, 130. 1 6 cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 344. 17united . States beef producers had begun planting alfalfa, imported from Chile, as early as 1854. Its yield per acre was four times that of common hay grasses using early 20th century technology. See F. w. Woll, Product.ill Feeding Q,f_..f'.iJJJL.AiliID.all (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1916), 114-17. According to the staff of the Vet e r i n a r y Co 11 e g e of Vi r g in i a Po 1 y tech n i c and S ta t e University in an interview conducted on August 7, 1985, alfalfa's inherent advantage over other forage is its high concentration of a useful protein called saponin. A disadvantage of proteins like saponin, however, is that they are foaming agents; today, saponin is chemically extracted and used as a foaming agent in beverages, fire extinguishers, and detergents. When digested in the rumen of cattle, saponin can produce severe enough foaming to cause bloating, which in extreme cases can cause death. Cattle can be a cc 1 am ate d to high-pro t e in feeds , how eve r , and a contemporary report indicates that bloating was not "a very serious menace" in Argentina. See A. D. Melvin, "The South Ame r i can Me a t Ind u s try , " Ye a r bo o..k.__Q_f__tiL~~ DepartmeQL~.f___A_g_.r,i~Yl~-1..il~ (Washington, DC: USDA, 1914), 359. 18such was the opinion of two foreign contemporaries, A. D. Melvin, Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry, and George M. Rommel, Chief of the Animal Husbandry Div is ion, Bureau of Animal Industry, both of the United states Department of Ag r icul tur e. See, respectively, "The Sou th American Meat Industry," Yearboo.k_Q_L_tlLe__Unite.d._s.t.a~~~ Departrn~nt Q.L...Ag_(_i_~Y.l.t.UI.~ (Washington, DC, 1914),

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85 347-64, and "Meat Production in the Argentine and Its Effect Upon the Industry in the United States," Yearbook of the ~_o_~ot of J\,gricul.t.u..t..e., 19U (Washington, DC: USDA, 1915), 381-390. 19cortes Conde makes this case in El progreso aLg.e..nt.i.nQ, 129-140. 20sociedad Rural Argentina, Anuario de la Sociedad--EY.t.al Argentina: esta.d!.s.ticas .ec~oom.i.cas._~.QL.a~ (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Rural Argentina, 1928), 20. 2luni ted states Tariff Commission, Cattl_e_Ail_
PAGE 93

86 Taylor, Rural L..ife in .Ar.:.~ina C Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1948). 29vasquez-Presedo, 44. In addition to the sources listed above covering economic and infrastructure developments, the following concern themselves with rail road development in Argentina: A. G. Ford, "British Investment and Argentine Economic Development, 1880-1914," in David Rock, ed., Argentina in th.eJwentie.t.h~ntu~ (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1975), 13-40; Paul B. Goodwin, "The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1854-1881," Hispanic ~~.i.storical Review, 57: 4 (November, 1977), 613-632; Leland H. Jenks, "Britain and American Railway Development," The Journal of Economic History, 11: 4 (Fall, 1951), 375-88; Colin M. Lewis, "La consolidacion de la frontera argentina a fines de la decada del setenta: Los indios, Roca y los ferrocarrilles," in Ferrari and Gallo, 469-498; Winthrop R.Wright, British-owned Railways in Ar.g.e.n..tina: Their Effect on Economi~Jiational.i.sm~ 1854-1948. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); and Eduardo A. zalduendo, "Aspectos econ6micos del sistema de tansportes de Argentina," in Ferrari and Gallo, 439-68. 30These figures come from Vasquez-Presedo, 44 , Cortes Conde, El progres2-MSfilltiD.2, 81, and Anuario, 103. 3lsee the maps in Wright, 53, 122. 3 2 Railroads brought labor in the form of tenants to the new productive areas. Legislative homesteading attempts, made in the 1880's and '90's in an effort to link colonization in the form of ownership and railroads, generally met with little success. See Gravil, 10-12, and Ferns, Britain aoo Argentina, 444. 33paul B. Goodwin has argued that railroad building followed demand: that railroads "were built in response to clearly discerned market patterns and economic opportunity." See "The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1854-1881," 613. There has been some debate over the issue of railroad-led development. Goodwin's case was criticised directly in Sylvester Damus's "Critique of Paul B. Goodwin's 'The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1 8 5 4-1 8 81 ' , " H is pan i c_A_me.r_.i~.a.JL. H is t cu..i~a1-.R..e...Y...~ , 5 8 : 3 (August, 1978), 468-74. And, most of the authors listed above, including Cortes Conde, Ferns, Frigerio, Giberti, Gravil, and Wright have argued that railroads created demand: their construction preceded any real demand for their services in the areas in which they were constructed.

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87 34The differentiation of stages of development is from Gravil, 6-8. See also Cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina," 339-46; Ferns, A.t.S~ntina, 100-101; and Wright, Chapters 3 and 4. 35wright, 86-88. 36Gravil, 8 and Jenks, 375. 37Ferns, Argentina, 101. 38pord, "British Investment," 33-35. 39For the history of the early efforts at refrigeration and the oyening of the first f rigor [ficos, see chapter six of Compania Swift de la Plata, Ganaderfa_A,L.g,entina: IHl ,deparroll_Q___e_indY~.t.I.ializqciQ.n (Buenos Aires: Compan!a Swift de la Plata, SA, 1957); Federal Trade Commission, Report on ~a..c.k.in.~, Part I (Washington DC: Federal Trade Commission, 1919); Horacio c. E. Giber ti, Historia econ6mici:Ljje_l_a_~llil.Qe~Aigentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Colar, 1961), Chapter 6; Gravil, 64-74; Simon G. Hanson, Ar g e o t i.ruL.Mgl!.t __ q__u_d t b e _ati._tu.b._Mil.k.-e t ; c b ap t..e.u._in___tb..e History of thL-U~ntin~ Meat~ C Stanford: Stanford University Press . , 193 8) , Chapter 3; Jorge Newton, Histoua de 1 a Soc iedad.JtiU::..aL_A.1:.g~.n.a. C Beu nos Ai res: Edtor ial Goncourt, 1966), 80-87; Peter Smith, ~e.eL.in Argentina: Pclt.t..e.r..n.s of CQ.llf.l_k.t_ and Ch.a.ng_e C New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 33-34; and Vicente vazquez-Presedo, El cas..o_a_tino ; migraci~ de fact.oi.eL.. come re io erre..r..i.o.r._y__d_e.s.uI.Q.ll~ Ul? 5-1914 C Buenos A ires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1971), 177-82. 40Argentine nationalists might argue that the first frigor1fico was a natively owned one. Eugenio Terrason, who owned a meat packing plant in San Nicolas, had provided the dressed beef for the first experimental voyage of the refrigerator ship Frigorifique for the French firm of Charles Tellier. After its success, Terrason had converted his packing plant into a frigorffico with the purchase of a chilling machine with the capacity of 30,00 kilos per day. He exported his first load--mutton--in the Lord Ard in 1883. See Hanson, 53, and Compania Swift, 92. 4lpederal Trade Commission, 163, and Gravil, 64. 42Hanson, 127-29. 43Hanson, 53, Newton, 80-87 . 44Hanson, so, 130-31. 4 5 Grav il, 64.

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88 4 6Federal Trade Commission, 163-64. 47As an example, the Sansenena company paid a dividend of 50% in 1902, 12.5% in 1903, 10% from 1904 to 1907, 12% from 1908 to 1909, and 15% •in 1910: a total return of 129% in only 9 years~ The smaller River Plate firm averaged over 10% per year for the same period (Federal Trade Commission, 163) 48Armour and Morris took over the previously Argentine La Blanca operation in 1912, and Wilson acquired what had been the Frigorffico Argentine in 1916. And when the American firms built new plants, they we re the newest and best. The 1911 Frigori'fico Armour de la Plata was "the largest, finest, and most perfectly appointed packing house ever built anywhere," according to the July, 1915 edition of The Americaa as cited in Federal Trade Commission, 173. see also pp. 163-64. 49The works listed in note 39 cover the era of the pool. The best source is Hanson. 50aanson, 170. 5lsee Tables A4 and Al6, Appendix II for prices at the Liniers market and for the total slaughter figures for the period. In general, the Liniers market bought for local consumption, and the firgor1ficos bought directly from the estancias, so their price levels cannot be directly compared. However, in the period for which comparitive data is available (1924-1927), prices at Liniers and the estancias follow the same paths with the latter always being slightly higher. see 8nuario, 266-67. 52Arnerican firms claimed that they bought heavier cattle --dressed weight of 770 pounds--than the British or Argentine firms. The heavier cattle, in their view, were more saleable in the export market. See Federal Trade Commission, 17 0. 53Breeders did respond with heavier cattle for the frigorfficos. Data for 1924-1927 from pages 259-60 of Anuario indicate that the average dressed weight of a steer sold to the frigorfficos was 613 pounds, while those sold to domestic markets averaged 424 pounds. S 4 The age at slaughter decreased from an average of five to six years to three when frigorffico buying began to affect the cattle industry. See Vasquez-Presedo, 184. This is probably related to the decline in herd size in the same period as noted above.

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89 55The top pr ice paid for Shorthorn breeder bulls moved from 5,000 m$n in 1895, to 80,000 in 1913, 110,000 in 1920, and 152,000 in 1925 For Hereford bulls, the pr ices were 3,000 in 1896, 7,000 in 1906, 23,000 in 1912, and 50,000 in 1918 (all figures m$n). 56consumption figures from the Sociedad Rural Argentina indicate per capita beef consumption figures of 104 .3 kilograms in 1913, dropping to 75.7 in 1918, rising to 136~4 in 1922, then leveling off for the rest of the decade. See Anuario, 277. Peter Smith's figures are somewhat different, but show a similar movement. see Politics and Beef, 74. While the population of Argentina grew, the number of cattle salughtered in the Liniers market remained stable during the period. See Table Al8, Appendix I. 57This is the conclusion of Alieto A. Guadagni in "Estudio econometrico del consume de carne vacuna en Argentina en el periodo 1914-1959," in Desarrollo Economi~Q, 3: 4 (Enero Marze, 1964); 517-33. 58Eugene w. Ridings, "Foreign Predominance among Overseas Traders in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," Latin American Res~.t..e.LE~yie~, 20: 2 (1985), 5. 59 Ridings discusses attitudes, as do es Tomas Rober to F i 11 o 1 in .So c i a 1 F a.c.t..Q..J:..S.._i.n___E_Q_Q_ no m i c De 'l.el..o.p~ Argentin~se (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1961). 60As an example of entrepreneurship, see the excellent study of Torcuato Di Tella by Thomas c. Cochran and Ruben E. Reina, capitalism_ r .A_S_t..u._~Qf_Torcuato Di Tel 1 a -~S..&.~Jl... C Phi 1 ad e 1 ph i a : univ e rs i t y of Pennsylvania Press, 1962). 6lsee Robert G. Albion, "British Shipping and Latin America, 1806-1914," The JO..YI.filll of E.conomic H.istory, 9: 4 ( F al 1 , 19 51) , 3 613 7 4 62A complete and reasonably contemporaneous study of North American interests in Argentina is included in Dudley Maynard Phelps, MigratioJl_QL..I.ndJ.ts..t.r t-0 South Am.e.ti_Q (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936). 63The importance of imports to the development of the Argentine economy is explained by Cort~s Conde in "The Export Economy of Argentina, 1880-1920," 319-81. 64ofaz Alejandro, 210 . 65oudley Maynard Phelps, .The Inte.r.llii.tl.ollal Economic Position of Argentina (Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 1938), 12, 145.

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90 66 Harold Edwin Peters, The For.eig~bt_Q_f._ilie Argentine Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1934), 70. 67According to calculations based on Tables AB and Al0, Appendix I. 68Tariff pol icy, expecial ly protectionist tariffs, has been the subject of debate. While most Latin American nations embarked on protectionist programs following WWI, Argentina did not. Of course, such programs were not necessary during the war. See Dfaz Alejandro, 217 and 277-308, and Carl Solberg, "The Tariff and Politics in Argentina, 1916-1930," Hispanic American Historical Review, 53: 2 (May, 197 3) , 26 0-84. 69peters, 142-43 and Phelps, ~he International Econo~ Position of Argentina, 113. 70These percentages are only approximate since GDP and foreign investment have not been measured in exactly the same pesos. See Table 10. 71Ferrer, 89. 7 2 Ph e 1 p s , .l' be lnll r n a t i.o.n a 1 E ca no m i c s i t i a n o f Argentina, 118-19. 73aased on calculations from Tables A8 and A9, Appendix I. 74see Joseph s. Tulchin' s excellent coverage of Argentine economics during the war in "The Argentine Economy During the First world war," Beview of_tb_e_RiveL...P.l~, (June 19, 1970), 901-03; (June 30, 1970), 965-67; (July 10, 1970), 44-46.

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CHAPTER FOUR THE EXPORT-LED ECONOMY, 1870-1930 While infrastructure building and the promotion of imports was essential to creating the new Argentine economy of the golden age the development of exports was equally important. Some analysts suggest that exports were the key to Argentine economic development in the golden age .1 Even though Argentina's economy was becoming somewhat diversified by the early 20th century, "it still relied heavily on steady expansion of exports."2 Figures of the proportion of Argentina's total production being exported clarify the importance of exports. In 1912, some 44% of her total production was exported, declining to 34.4% in 1914, and rising to 42% in 1927.3 The world export economy increased roughly six-fold in the years 1870-1929.4 In the agricommodities portion of this market, Argentina was able to assume a primary place, becoming one of the world's principal exporters of certain products. Argentina's foreign trade grew at an average rate of almost 4.5% per year for the period 1880-1929.5 Indexed 91

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92 foreign trade values show that this growth was not even, suffering occasional declines, but showed spectacular performances at times, especially after 1900. As indicated in Table 11, foreign trade doubled from 1900 to 1905, doubled again by 1913, then almost again by the time it peaked in 1920. This in turn enabled Argentina to sustain her own remarkable overall economic growth. For most of this period, exports accounted for the majority of the value of total foreign trade. From roughly 1890 to 1920, exports grew at a rate of 5.7% per year6: faster than total foreign trade. In 1889, the export to import ratio was roughly 3 to 2, shrinking slightly to 2 to 1 by 1908.7 As Figure 3 demonstrates, the total value of exports remained generally higher than that of imports until the 1920's, but during that decade Argentina's balance of trade suffered. Along with the grow th in volume and value, Argentine exports grew in diversity. The specific types of products within the agropecuarian sector became more diverse with the creation of the chilled beef century and the rise of bulk industry in the late 19th grain exports in the 20th. Al though some sectors of the economy, such as constuction and mining, grew faster than the agricultural and ranching s e ct o r s , Ar gent i n a ' s re 1 i a n c e on he r pa mp ea n pr o duce remained almost complete.a

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TABLE 11 INDEXED TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE OF ARGENTINA: 1880-1929 93 ========================================================-== INDEX: MEAN OF 1910-1914 = 100 INDEXED INDEXED YEAR VALUE __lEAR VALUE 1880 12.4 1905 62.8 1881 13.5 1906 66.8 1882 14.5 1907 69.2 1883 16.7 1908 76~0 1884 19 .3 1909 83 .2 1885 21.0 1910 91 .4 1886 19 .6 1911 88.8 8187 24.0 1912 112.8 1888 27 .2 1913 120.7 1889 30.3 1914 86 .3 1890 28.9 1915 115.5 1891 20.3 1916 111.7 1892 24.4 1917 110.6 1893 22.6 1918 154. 8 1894 23.1 1919 200.5 1895 25.6 1920 235.3 1896 27. 2 1921 168.9 1897 23.7 1922 162~4 1898 28. 7 1923 195.0 1899 3 5. 9 1924 218.8 1900 31.9 1925 207 .4 1901 33.5 1926 192.0 1902 33.6 1927 221~9 1903 41.9 1928 225.2 1904 53.7 1929 230.6 =========--===--=========-=-==-============================ Source: Compiled from statistics in Sociedad Rural Argentina. Anuar.iQ_pe la socieaad rural Aman.tin.a. (Buenos Aires, 1928), p. 8-9, 15. ~: indices for 1928-29 calculated from data in United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic survey oL.La.tiILAmeLi~a.L-.l..2.A~ (New York: 1951), 98.

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94 =============================--==--===--==================== INDEXED TOTAL VALUE 250,--,----,.--~---.--,---,.--.----,---.----,--......---,--......---.----->< 1soi---------+----f-~~-+--------+-----.J z H 602 = :: :: .::: ::: ::: !; = •<:) = .. . "' "' I; .. .. .. .. .. .. t : t YEAR INDEXED PRICE LEVELS 80 ~~__._::---'::::::--~::=--~::=--~5=---'=:,:=---':!;--'=::=--""=!!-.J..~-.J..=-=.J..--~.J..--~.J..--i.J..-_~.L.-....Jl:; YEAR FIGURE 3 IMPORT AND EXPORT COMPARISON: INDEXED TOTAL VALUE AND PRICE LEVELS (MEAN OF 1910-1914 = 100} ====================---------=-====-===============-======== Source: Reproduced with alterations from ~nuario, 71 . . . ...

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95 Agropecuarian exports consisted of between 94-97% of all exports consistently from the 1870's to 1930's.9 Livestock products constituted 100% of al 1 agricultural exports and 95% of total exports in 1871, but had shrunk to 37% in 1929. Grain exports rose from Oto almost 60% in the same period. But the value of meat exports remained high. During the 20 years from 1908 through 1927, indexed values of meat exports exceeded those of grain 9 times--or almost half the time.IO The volume of grain exports was huge, but prices in the grain market fluctuated wildly at times causing grain values to rise and fall erratically (down 50% in one year from 1916 to 1917, for example). While the meat market suffered a crisis in the early 1920's, its swings were never so severe. Based on five year averages, the total value of all meat exports grew steadily from 1900 to 1915, then more than doubled by 1920, then fell off by 20% in the 1920 's.11 Indexed meat export prices rose from 100 to 152 from 1900 to 1914, while those of grain exports rose only to 136 .12 Generally, the export meat market was more attractive. For the period 1909-1923, chilled and frozen beef emerges as 64% of the total quantity of beef exports and 61% of their total value.13 So the role of frigor.1fico beef--and of meat in general--in the export picture remained dominant. This reliance on agropecuarian exports affected the real benefits Argentina could gain from her export economy. While Argentina's balance of trade was almost consistently

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96 positive until the 1920's, her terms of trade (ratio of export to import pr ices) were not so favorable. Figure 3 shows indexed price levels for imports and exports. Argentina was in the position, especially after the start of World War I, of having to constantly increase her volume of exports to maintain a positive trade balance. This was because import prices grew rather steadily after 1914, and export pr ices did not keep pace. Partly, this was due to currency inflation in Argentina .14 But it was al so due to the failure of international prices for Argentina's exports to rise as fast as the prices of the goods she imported, hence her poor negative balance of trade in the 1920's. Argentina relied on a limited group of exports to generate trade growth. Similarly, she relied on a limited group of customers: the Britain and the United States. Britain as a consumer, and the United states as a supplier dominated Argentina's total trade picture almost to the exclusion of other partners. British pounds for purchased goods flowed either back to Britain in the form of loan payments or investment profits or to the United States to pay for imports. The arrangement became so pronounced that it has been referred to as the "triangle trade. 11 15 As indicated in Table 12, these two countries alone accounted for almost half of all Argentine foreign trade from 1914 to 1934. Yet, largely because of indebtedness to Britain, what was a large positive balance of trade for commodities,

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TABLE 12 THE TRIANGLE TRADE: ARGENTINE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: 1914-1930 (in millions of gold pesos) 97 =============-=====================-----===-=======-======== -X-e=a=r=s==-----=lil4-20 1921-30 United Britain United States and Britain Totals as Percentage of Total Foreign Trade 54.7 44.8 Total Commodity Trade Balance with Argentina States -144 -1,057 +848 +1,391 Debt Payments to Britain 56 0 1,021 Total Balance of Payments Including Debt Service and Other Items United States Britain -179 +268 -1, 27 8 +320 1931-34 47.5 -151 +752 400 -275 +332 =========-========================================-========= .source: Grav il, "Anglo-u. s. Trade Rivalry in Argentina and the D'Abernon Mission of 1929," 52.

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98 became a total negative net bal a nee of payments of 812 million pesos for the 20 year period. The United States undertook to alter this situation, especially after World war I, by attempting to capture a larger share of the Argentine trade, especially imports, thus inaugurating what some contemporary observers labeled a "trade war."16 But the fundamental nature of the triangle was not altered: the United States bought too little, Britain bought too much, and Argentina owed too much. This combination insured that Argentina was not able to benefit as much as might be thought from her often positive balance of trade. The history of Ar gen tine-u. S. trade relations was somewhat stormy.17 Argentina carried a positive balance of trade with the US until the 1880's, but then began to import more. One reason was an established protectionist policy on the part of the United States. In 1913, eight of Argentina's primary exports entered the us duty free, by 1922, only hides could do so.18 The US policy against imports from Argentina guaranteed that the exports to Argentina would have to be paid for from British sources. Especially in the important beef market, the United States was not a useful partner. At the same time that the United States was disappearing as a competitor to Argentina in the export beef market, it disappeared as a potential customer.19 u.s. meat consumption was rising throughout the first three decades of the century,20 but imports had been

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---99 all but suspended as North American beef interests maneuvered to keep the domestic market for themselves.21 On the other hand, U.S. beef exports had been falling off for sometime. If Argentina lost a potential market in the US --which she never really had--then she was able to step into another market which the United States vacated. That new market, which came to dominate all Argentine exports, including meat, was Britain. It might be appropriate to call the United States an investment partner of Argentina if not a real trading partner. But Britain was so heavily involved in both investment and trading that we might call it Argentina's development partner. The influence of British investments and capital in the Argentine economy has been discussed in the previous chapter. British influence on exports was at least as great; Britain consumed 54.7% of Argentina's total exports from 1914 to 1920, 44.8% in the decade of the 1920's, and almost 48% in the first hal f of the 19 3 O ' s 2 2 In no market was British dominance so marked as in the beef trade.23 British-Argentine cooperation in the beef industry had long standing by the early 20th century. Not only was Britain a consumer of Argentine beef but British bulls had been the mainstay of breeding programs in Argentina.24 British judges were a common sight at the big cattle shows put on by the Sociedad Rural Argentina at their Palermo grounds in Buenos Aires25 The Prince of Wales even .I

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100 attended the exposition in August of 1925 .26 Once the frigorffico industry was established, Britain became almost the sole market for that er i ti cal portion of Argentine exports. On the average, Britain consumed a full g3% of all the beef exports from Argentina from 1910 through 1917. In some years, the proportion was as high as 98%27 British dominance of the Argentine export market did not necessarily work to Argentina's disadvantage. At least in terms of beef, Argentina enjoyed a favorable position within the market. The only real competitors to Argentine beef exporters were from New Zealand and Australia, and they were at a disadvantage because of shipping distances. Chilled beef lasted only about 40 days and Argentina was 21 days away.28 Most of the competitors' beef exports were frozen, which did not command as high a price as the more palatable chilled beef .29 For almost all the years between 1910 and 1927, Argentine beef commanded the highest pr ice in the British market, sometimes by a margin as large as 34%.30 However, this is not to say that beef prices were always satisfactory. The great Smithfield market of London affected prices for chilled beef everywhere in Britain, and hence everywhere in the world, because 20% of the total beef consumed in Britain went through it. And 80% of beef in Smithfield was imported, almost all of it from Argentina; in effect, Smithfield marketeers could set the price of Argentina's most important export to beef's most important

PAGE 108

101 market.31 And the prices paid at the British market did not always favor the supplier. The Smithfield price for chilled beef was a little over 37 pounds per ton in 1910. After a dip in prices for three years, it rose steadily to over 95 by 1917. Prices then began to fall slowly until 1921, when they collapsed, dropping 21% in only a year to 71 pounds. The next year saw the worst price ever: dropping over 33% to 47 pounds. Prices declined further until 1925, but less rapidly, and stayed down throughout the decade. 3 2 Frozen beef prices generally tended to remain lower, although sometimes they rose to counterbalance falls in the chilled price.33 But, as we shall see, frozen prices also appeared to be manipulable by British dealers, so the benefit to Argentina was limited. In general, it appears that Argentina's critical export economy was concentrated in a select group of agropecuarian exports sold in a concentrated market. Th~refore, Argentina was in a precarious position. This is certainly the argument of much of the literature upon which this and the preceding chapter have been based. One of the weaknesses of most of that literature is a lack of statistical analysis. While economic data of many kinds have been employed, little statistical study of those data has been done in most instances. Some of the studies were written prior to the invention of techniques used today, but most simply eschewed statistics in favor of other means of analysis.

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102 In an effort to gain a fuller understanding of the dynamics of the Argentine economy during the period of Radical Party dominance, and to take advantage of the insights that statistical analysis can provide, a series of economic characteristics have been measured for the period 1910-1927. Although not inclusive of the entire ~poca radical, this time period is one for which reasonably accurate data are available for those characteristics of interest. From these data a set of variables reflecting certain germane characteristics was constructed. The set consists of 24 variables which attempt to describe four basic categories of characteristics of the Argentine export-led economy: general Argentine economic characteristics, Argentine economic infrastructure, Argentine beef production characteristics, and British economic characteristics. General Argentine economic characteristics consisted of general descriptors of economic activity including such items as indexed foreign trade, GDP, annual government receipts (income) , indexed value of beef production, and others. Data on total land area under cultivation, kilometers of railroad, etc., were included in inf rast ruct ure character is tics. Argentine beef production characteristics measured the number of head of cattle of various types slaughtered for different markets. British economic characteristics focused on British beef consumption and foreign trade. Some of these data may have some

PAGE 110

103 limitations in terms of accuracy, and their scope is somewhat limited by the emphasis in this study on the beef producing sector of the economy. Nevertheless, they do give a picture of the Argentine economy not necessarily available from other sources. The variables employed and their descriptions are listed in Table 13. The particulars of each variable and their construction are discussed in Appendix I. The purpose of the construction of the variable set was to subject the data to certain techniques of statistical analysis whose purpose and characteristics are explained in Appendix II. Some significant phenomena emerged from computer manipulation which, while not totally overlooked in other literature, have not been fully appreciated before . The most general technique used, and the one which reveals the least specific information, is factor analysis. Factor analysis seeks to discover underlying relationships between sets of variables, rather than examine the peculiarities of each variable or specific relationships between variables. Therefore, it gives evidence of possible variable groupings, but not information about the exact extent or nature of the relationships which cause those groupings. In addition, factors themselves are undefined constructs; exactly what a factor connotes is determined by the variables which are associated with, or "load on," it. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 14.

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TABLE 13 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY 104 ============================================================ VARIABLE -~NA~M~E..___--=DE.S~R.Im . ~-----------------FORTRA AGVALEX AGPRI LINEARS BEEFVAL GDP GOVRECPT IMPRECPT GOVEXP Annual indexed value of total Argentine foreign trade Annual value of total Argentine agricultural exports (excluding pastoral products) Annual indexed average combined price of Argentine agropecuarian production Annual average price of novillos at Linears market Annual indexed value of argentine beef production Annual gross domestic product Annual total government income Annual total government import receipts Annual total government expenditures MA_r~g~e~o~t-i~o~e._..a-g_r~i~cc.:ul.tu.L.al infrastru.c..t..1.1L..e AREA Total land area sown FODDER Total land area sown in fodder WHEAT Total land area sown in wheat RR Total railway kilometers HERD Total number head of cattle ~A-r~g-e~o~t-i~o,~e._..b-e~~L~~d.Y.Q.t.iQn~racteristics TOTSLA Annual total of head of cattle slaughtered FRIGSLA Annual total of head of cattle slaughtered in LINSLA NOVSLA frigorfficos Annual total of head of cattle slaughtered for Linears market Annual total of head of novillos slaughtered British ecQDQ~_c_ha.r.~.c.t..etis~ GBPRICEC Annual average British chilled beef price GBIMPTSC Annual total quantity of British chilled beef imports GBPRICEF Annual average British frozen beef price GBIMPTSF Annual total quantity of British frozen beef imports GBIMPTST Annual total value of Argentine exports to Britain GBEXPTSA Annual total value of Argentine imports from Britain ==========-=--==-=-===----==================================

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105 TABLE 14 BEST FACTOR FITS BY VARIABLE: X = UNROTATED, R = ROTATED ============================================================ FACTORS VARIABLE I+ 2+ 23+ Gross domestic product X R Value of beef production X R Government expenditures X R Total area sown X R Railroad kilometers X R Area sown in wheat X R Total slaughter X R Slaughter at fr igor !ficos X R Slaughter at Linears X R Slaughter of novillos X R Import receipts X R Government income X R Indexed total foreign trade X R Total agricultural exports X R Indexed agricultural prices X R Herd size X R Total exports to Britain X R Total imports from Britain X R Price of novillos at Linears X R Area sown in fodder X R British imports of: frozen beef, pr ice: X R frozen beef, tons: X R chilled beef, price: X R chilled beef, tons: X R ==--==---------------=====================--==----==-=======

PAGE 113

106 In that table the variables have been collected into four groups according to their factor loading before and after rotation. The largest grouping consists of variables which load positively on Factor 1 (the general factor) both before and after rotation. As explained in Appendix II, this is a normal factor fit because Factor 1 is, by construct, a measure of the most general commonality among the variables. In fact, 18 of the 24 variables load best on Factor 1 prior to rotation. All the beef production characteristics and all but one of the infrastructure and general economic characteristics are in this group. This suggests that there is an underlying pattern of similarity, or at least collinearity among most of the variables. As discussed in Appendix II, this is to be expected by the nature of the data collected for these variables. Ten of the variables remain highly loaded on Factor 1 after rotation. The reason appears to be that the ten are all related, based upon their connection to beef production. All four beef production characteristics remain loaded on Factor 1, as does the indexed value of beef production, since it is an obvious product of real beef production. Government expenditures and GDP also are in this group, suggesting a relationship to beef production. However, this may simply be a result of general movements in the economy. The infrastructure characteristics of total area sown and area sown in wheat, as well as railroad kilometers, also fall in this group

PAGE 114

107 partly because of general economic growth again, but also because of the link between railroad accessibility and land corning into use (as discussed earlier). At the factor level of analysis, it is imprudent to suggest that all these variables are mutually dependent, but it is correct to suggest that they all move in the same direction, whether causally or not. The second grouping of variables is those which load on Factor 1 prior to rotation, but then rotate out to Factor 3+, which seems to be a trade factor. There are some mild surprises here. Government income, which we shal 1 see is closely related to government expenditures and total foreign trade, would be . expected to remain loaded on Factor 1. That it does not demonstrates clearly that it is more related to other variables within this second group than would appear obvious before rotation. Two variables dealing with agricultural characteristics (as differentiated from pastoral ones) are in this group as well. These seem to be related to total trade with Great Britain (total exports and imports to and from Britain) These groupings suggest a higher relationship among these variables than between those in group one. Hence, these may not be a closely related to the beef market. The anomalous variable is herd size, which might be expected to remain with the first group. That it rotates out indicates that herd size might be more closely related to general agricultural conditions, or the British market, than to actual beef production.

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108 Import receipts, because of the tax base of the Argentine economy, are highly related to government income, as we shall see. One would expect, then, for the variable IMPRECPT to remain loaded on Factor 1 after rotation. In fact, however, it rotates to Factor 3, loading with the characteristics in group two. This suggests a stronger correlation with agricultural conditions and the British market than with government expenditures, for example. This occurance, while not particularly surprising, seems somewhat anomalous at this point in the analysis. What is of more interest at this stage of the analysis is the set of variables which do not load on Factor 1. Six variables load on Factor 2 before rotation. Factor 2 appears to be the British market factor, since four of the variables which load on it are characteristics of the British market. Clearly the price of novillos at the Liniers market and the area sown in fodder are related in some general sense with British prices for and amounts of imported chilled and frozen beef. In addition, this relationship remains after factor rotation. What this indicates is a very strong relationship be tween these variables. This suggests that prices move similarly in both the British and Argentine markets, in spite of the fact that, as we have seen, supply of beef, as represented by slaughtering figures, factors out into a different group. The data further suggest that land is put over to fodder in response to prices of beef in both

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109 the Argentine and British markets--not an irrational thing for Argentine producers to do (as was discussed in Chapter Three). That the slaughter of beef in all Argentine facilities, and especially the total value of beef production does not load on this same factor suggests that those variables respond to different--not price basedeconomic forces. An additional interesting anomaly occurs in this Factor 2 group. Assuming normal supply and demand forces, it is not surprising to see that the price of chilled beef in Britain correlates negatively with the amount imported (hence the difference in loading on Factor 2+ and Factor 2-) But, frozen beef does not behave in the same fashion: both price and amount imported load on Factor 2+. This suggests some violation of normal supply and demand forces in the British frozen beef market. As will be discussed later, this is an unusual and significant phenomenon that affects the Argentine beef economy. In summary, the factor analysis suggests that almost all the variables are closely related, that some British economic characteristics are closely related to Argentine ones, and that there are some underlying associationsespecially between British beef consumption patterns and Argentine production patterns--which deserve further attention.

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110 Once general associations have been uncovered via factor analysis, a look at specific, bivariate associations is a useful step in uncovering the correlations which produced the clusters of variables. One of the most simple and revealing techniques is to construct a matrix of zero-order Pearson correlations for every possible variable pair. This technique is explained in Appendix II. From such a matrix, a best fit for each variable can be ascertained: which variable correlates best with each other variable. Some interesting pairings, which explain much of the factor clusters, are obtained. A summary of best fits is presented in Table 15 . . Many of the best-fit pairs are what would be expected and have been suggested in the earlier part of this chapter. Because Argentine foreign trade was so heavily concentrated in agricultural products, it is not surprising that indexed Argentine foreign trade fits best with the value of Argentine agricultural exports. In the same manner, GDP fits best with government income, along with government expenditures (although it is of passing interest to note that government expenditures and income are not best fits). And, as has been noted, total land area under cultivation fits best with railroad kilometers. Finally, composite variables, such as total slaughter, fit best with their most important component, such as frigorffico slaughter.

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111 TABLE 15 BEST PEARSON CORRELATION FITS CR indicates the variable pair is a reciprocal best fit) -----------------------===============~===================== VARIABLE British economic characteristics: British chilled beef price British chilled beef imports British frozen beef price British frozen beef imports Total exports to Britain Total imports from Britain Argentine economic characteristics: Indexed total foreign trade Value of agricultural exports Indexed agricultural prices Price of novillos at Liniers Indexed beef value Gross domestic product Government income Government import receipts Government expenditures VARIABLE British frozen beef price Government import receipts British chilled beef price British frozen beef price Value of agricultural exports value of agricultural exports Value of agricultural exports Indexed total foreign trade Total exports to Britain British frozen beef price Slaughter at frigorificos Government income Gross domestic product British chilled beef imports Gross domestic product Argentine agricurtu'ral infrastructure: Total land area sown Area sown in fodder Area sown in wheat Railway kilometers Bead of cattle Beef production characteristics: Total slaughter Slaughter at frigorfficos Slaughter of novillos Slaughter at Liniers Railway kilometers British frozen beef price Indexed beef value Total land area sown Indexed total foreign trade Slaughter at frigorificos Slaughter of novillos Slaughter at frigorificos Import receipts r .9648(R) .9120(R) .9648(R) .8386 .8640 .83 58 .9271 CR) .927l(R) 7 804 . 8446 .8955 .9557 CR) .9557 (R) .9120CR) .9125 .9267(R) .696 0 7 563 .9267(R) .8514 .9348 .9794(Rl .9794(R) 8655 -------------------------------=============================

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112 Other pairings, however, suggest some economic conditions which are not quite as predictable. Several show the close ties between Argentine conditions and the British market. The total value of Argentine agricultural exports is closely related to British imports from and exports to Argentina, indicating the overriding importance of Britain as both customer and supplier. While Argentine government income fits best with GDP, as noted, government import receipts, such a large part of government income, fit best with the price of chilled beef in Britain. Further, the amount of land sown in fodder, a clear indicator of Argentine producers' expectations for the beef market, fits best with the British price of frozen beef. This is also the case for the price of novillos at the Linears market, suggesting the impact of British pricing practices on the internal Argentine market. And the herd size in Argentina, rather than being correlated with some internal market force, correlates best with foreign trade levels. Some pairings, finally, seem unusual indeed. The amount of land sown in wheat, which one might assume would reflect foreign trade or respond to land being put over into fodder, actually fits best with the indexed value of Argentine beef production. This is probably a result of constant expansion of land under cultivation overriding any effect of particular land use. (In fact, the Pearson correlation for area in wheat and area in fodder is only -0.1671: a negative

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113 but weak association created by the fact that while the total area of land under cultivation steadily increases during the period, the amount of land in fodder peaks in 1922 and declines thereafter.) In addition, the correlation between the two variables is not as strong as in other pairings. In another pairing, slaughter at Liniers fits best with import receipts. This may well be a product of higher imports reflecting higher disposable incomes in Argentina and hence greater demand for beef. This relationship, however, cannot be ascertained from the available data and may, in fact, simply be a reflection of a random association of two variables whose values simply happen to increase at the same rate. This can be a problem with any zero-order Pearson correlations, espec1ally since no other variables are taken into account in the correlation equations. In addition, some British economic characteristics reflect unusual conditions. British chilled beef and frozen beef prices are best fits, strongly suggesting a lack of market competition between the two commodities. More interesting is the already noted strong and positive correlation between frozen beef imports into Britain and prices, and the fact that these two variables are the most common best fits with other variables. A possible explanation for these phenomena of the British market is that the shelf-life of frozen beef allowed it to escape

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114 normal market pressures and to therefore be a more pervasive influence within the British, and hence the Argentine market. Argentine ability to affect prices through production controls would be less with frozen than chilled beef, and if frozen beef pr ices can be controlled by the consuming country to the extent of affecting chilled prices, then the Argentine producer is indeed at the mercy of the consumer. This interpretation is not at odds with the data. Although best-fit pairing (zero order correlations) can yield useful information, the technique overlooks the possible impact of variables not in the pair on any one or both members of the pair. In the same way that factor analysis obscures specific information to gain general patterns, zero order correlations neglect more general information in order to highlight specific bivariate relationships. Hence a middle-level technique--one which is neither too general nor specific--is required to find information between the two other levels of analysis. This is especially important when considering a set of highly interrelated variables such as these concerning the Argentine economy. The fact that the Factor 1 cluster contained such a large proportion of the variable set suggest strongly that there is a high level of association among the variables which goes beyond the bivariate. Hence, an attempt to examine the interaction of groups of variables at . a level in between Pearson pairing and general factoring is desirable.

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115 One of the techniques useful in uncovering association between variables which are suggested by factor analysis is multiple regression analysis. This technique can reveal the nature and direction of an association between two variables while accounting for, or "controlling for", other variables which might influence the association of the original pair. Some variables which might seem associated because of similar loading on a factor can be further analyzed to discover the extent of and nature of their association: something not ascertainable via factor analysis. The multiple regression analysis used depends upon the Pearson correlation matrix, so that it will often repeat best fit information, but it will also uncover fits with other variables beyond the zero-order level. Therefore, several sets of variables were extracted from the original set of 24 for further analysis using multiple regression techniques. (See the tables in Appendix II for summaries of the equations for each of the dependent variables.) Most regression equations, especially after factor and Pearson correlation results have been analyzed, produce predictable information. The equations for slaughter data show no surprises, although British imports from Argentina show up in the equations, usually at the third or fourth step. The impact of British imports is small, but measurable and significant for total and frigorffico slaughter, indicating a small but noticeable impact. Of interest is

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116 that the equation for novillo slaughter, presumably an important input for the chilled beef trade, does not include British imports as an independent variable. A characteristic of the Argentine economic infrastructure yields an interesting example of the value of regression analysis for uncovering underlying relationships among variables. The area sown in fodder, already noted as one of interest, does not seem as associated with the price of frozen beef in Brita in as indicated from the earlier analyses. The best fit, the price of frozen beef, is entered into the equation on step one, but is then dropped after step three. What this indicates is that the relationship between fodder and the British price of frozen beef does exist, but it must be considered partially a result of the interaction of the other variables, including herd size, the total land cultivated, and the amount of land cultivated in wheat. All of these explain some of the variance in the fodder variable, and thus present a more complete and accurate picture of the influences on fodder production than just a zero-order correlation with the British frozen beef price. Therefore, a conclusion that the amount of land sown in fodder is dependent upon the British frozen beef price must be tempered with the realization that other economic factors are important as well. This does not so much negate an hypothesis of interaction between the British beef market and land use in Argentina, as it refines it.

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117 In a similar fashion, regression analysis reveals complex interactions of variables in the group of Argentine economic characteristics. Foreign trade, for example, is clearly dominated by agricultural factors, as indicated by indexed agricultural prices, value of agricultural exports, and slaughter at the frigorfficos. None of these relationships is unexpected, but their presence has not been demonstrated by other techniques. ( It must be noted that since there are no industrial variables available for the equation, the real impact of the agricultural sector may be overestimated.) Similarly, GDP, Argentine government receipts, and Argentine government import receipts are all affected by British economic factors, especially total British exports to Argentina and frozen beef prices. This reinforces observations of the close ties between Argentine economic characteristics and British market behavior. Of special interest are those Argentine economic characteristics which correlated unexpectedly with British market features. The value of Argentine beef production is most dependent on the level of slaughter in the fr igo r ff icos, as opposed to total slaughter, and on the price of novillos at Liniers, which itself is most dependent on the British frozen beef price. And indexed agricultural prices depend upon exports to Great Britain as well as herd size. What is revealed is a close int er dependency of Arg . entine economic factors with external (British) rather than internal (Argentine) forces.

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118 Much more can be made of the regression equations than what has been covered here. However, the purpose is not the construction of an all-inclusive economic "model" but rather the refinement of al ready existing assumptions about the nature of the Argentine economy. And, as pointed out in Appendix II, the collinearity of the data is such that drawing rigid conclusions is unwarranted. Even so, it does seem that statistical analysis of the limited data base constructed here warrants some comments concerning the economic situation of Argentina during the Radical period which go beyond those presented so far. Both the literature and the data seem to be in agreement that the key to understanding the development of Argentina's economy during this period is its nature as an agricultural producer for a non-domestic market. The combination of railroads and herds of cattle was the most important driver of early 20th century growth in Argentina. That combination, added to the potential productivity of the land, and the emergence of an immigrant work force, provided the material inputs for economic development. The momentum provided by these inputs peaked early, however, as rates of growth for land area, railroad track, and immigration collapsed after World War r.34 Table 8 in Chapter Three chronicles the peaks of other economic indicators. To that list can be added the total value of Argentine beef production in 1925, and total foreign trade,

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119 total British imports, and British imports of frozen beef in 1920. British imports of chilled beef continue to increase in the 1920's, but the price of that beef had already peaked in 1917.35 The post-war period was one of continual crisis in the Argentine export economy.36 certainly by the late 20's, the situation was becoming apparent to contemporary observers, as we shall see. Argentina seemed trapped by a concentration of exports and customers. Often, the prices for her agricultural produce fell at the same time that the quantity of her exports tended to fall. It was becoming clear that Argentina's reliance on concentrated markets and rural exports made her extremely susceptible to economic forces beyond her control. Yet, Argentina held to her position as a rural exporter. The economic leaders of Argentina had always been export oriented. They knew that the potential for a large domestic market was limited, in spite of immigration and that the real markets were foreign.37 It has been suggested by some scholars that the crucial rural export economy remained more in Argentine hands. 3 8 Domestic investment tended to remain in the traditional sector, where rates of return remained high and foreign competition was less keen. And, as has been pointed out, investment in land, especially beef-producing land seemed a most secure investment. Thus, estancieros had no in~entive to invest elsewhere as long as land prices kept going up and investment seemed secure.

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120 However, that the domestic elite actually controlled the export economy as a whole is debatable. In contrast to the proportion of the non-traditional economic sectors owned by foreign interests, such as industry and sales, domestic ownership of land and cattle certainly seems preponderant. But when considering what sectors of the whole export economy were actually owned by Argentines, the domestic elite does not seem in control. If the frigorfficos and the shipping lines were owned and controlled by foreign firms, and if the markets into which the rural products were inserted were controlled by foreign firms, one wonders how much impact Argentines, who own the primary means of production, actually had. Control of land and cattle was not sufficient to control the export market itself. Interestingly, there is evidence that at least one Argentine group with important interests in the export economy had a similar view of the situation. The Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), an association of the most important beef producers and landholders, seemed to have a precise and accurate perception.39 Certainly market conditions and export trade were of major concern to the SRA. During the period from 1916 to 1930, articles concerning exports and the beef industry are a constant in their journal, A~L.de. la Socied.eJL.RJ.lli!LA.L:g.e.n.tirulOf some 45 articles on exports, about 38% (17) focus on British market conditions, and make clear the SRA's understanding of the importance of the

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121 British market to the economic heal th of Argentina. This does not include the period of the worst collapse of meat prices {1923 to early 1924) when entire issues were devoted to analysis of the situation and presentations of the SRA's position.40 The SRA founded a statistics commission to keep track of economic data in 1922 and a permanent office to monitor production costs and frigor!fico sales in 1926.41 By the time of the publication of the Anuario de la sociedad Rural. Argentina; e~t;_adfsticas econ6micas y agraria.s in 1928 the SRA was certainly aware of the real condition of the export market. 42 By contrast, there is evidence that governmental agencies were neither as well informed nor as committed to programs of rural economic development or market protection. 43 Thus, at least by the late 1920 1 s, the most influential group in the beef business had accurate information concerning the true market situation.44 Yet, the general pol icy of the SRA, with only one exception, was not to attempt to rescue their export economy from foreign dominance, but to secure Argentina's position in a foreign dominated market. Radical government policy also advocated bilateral negotiations with Britain, rather than more aggressive policies aimed at escaping from limited markets. The next chapter will examine the formation of general policy positions by the SRA with regard to Argentina's export economy.

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122 Notes 1 several of the sources 1 isted in note 2 of the previous chapter emphasize the export economy. See especially the works by Cortes Conde, Gustavo Ferrari and Ezequiel Gallo, Dfaz Alejandro, Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymelrnan, Roger Gravil, Gilbert Wilson Merkx and Vicente Vasquez-Presedo. In addition, see A. G. Ford, "Cornrnercio exterior e inversiones extranjeras," in Ferrari and Gallo, 497-512; Hector Perez Brignoli, "The Economic Cycle in Latin American Agricultural Export Economies (1880-1930) ," L.s!.ti.n American_E_esearchJ~~, 15: 2 (1980), 3-33; Dudley Maynard Phelps, The Internati o..n.al Ec.Qrnk..:..I>osi tion of Argenti oa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938); Virgil Salera, Exchange Control .a.ruL_the_-fil.9.entine ~t..k.e.t (New York: AMS Press, 1968); and John H. Williams, Argentine .I o t e rn a..t..i.Q.n.a l T..Llld.e.._un__dar I n co n v e r t i b 1 e Pa p e r._ _ _aQ.D_~.,_ 1880-1.2.(Hl ( New York: AMS Press, 1971) 12. 2ofaz Alejandro, 10. 3 Phelps, .loteroa..tio.nal Eco~osi tion of Argentina, 4This estimate from Ferrer, 83. 5 These calculations based on data from Table 11. 6cortes Conde, "The Export Economy of Argentina, 1880-1920," 343. 7vasquez-Presedo calculates the import/export ratio as 33/24 for 1889 and 96/166 for 1908-1912. Seep. 193. 8ofaz Alejandro, 6. 9 Even today, Argentine exports are dominated by agriculture. In 1985, of Argentina's $8 billion of exports, 75% were agricultural, according to -1:he washin.q.t.Qil Pos..t, (April 4, 1986), C 10. lOsee An.U.a.rio., 75 and Tables A2,A5, and A6 in Appendix I .

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123 1 1 As calculated in Swift, 109. see also ~nuariQ, 73. 12Indexed price levels from Ford, "Export Price Indices for the Argentine Republic 1881-1914," 46. 13As calculated from data in J. E. Wrenn, rnternatio.nal Trade itL..M..e..ats an..d An.inLaL..a..U (Washington, DC: u.s. Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Bulletin No. 26, 1925), 178, 184. 14The following approximate exchange rates of the dollar from Phelps, Migration___Q.f__I_Ddustry America, Appendix III, 330, show the inflationary Argentine currency after the First world War. Peso Value -Y_e_a-r _____ ___.C_in_~n.tli 1905-1919 43 1920 39 1921 32 1922 36 1925 40 1927 42 1930 37 1932. 26 pesos to to So.u.th trend of 15For analyses of terms of trade see DiTella and Zymelman, 52-56; Ford, "Export Price Indices for the Argentine Republic 1881-1914,"; Roger Gravil, "Anglo-u.s. Trade Rivalry in Argentina and the D'Aubernon Mission of 1929," in Dav id Rock, Argentina in_ the Tweoti..e.th cen_tur~, 41-6 5; and Thomas F. McGann, Argentina, the United ~a..t.e..~ and theJnter-Ame.~.i..Q.an system. 1880-ill.A (Cambridge: Harvard Uni ver si ty, 1957) , Chapter 9, and "La Argentina y los Estados Unidos, 1880-1914," in Ferrari and Gallo, 659-64. 16see H. Hallam Hipwell, "Trade Rivalries in Argentina," Foreign Af..ta.ir.s, 8: 1 (October, 1929), 150-54, and Julius Klein, "Economic Rivalries in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, 3: 2 (December, 1924), 237-243. 17The best study of pre-world war I trade relations between Argentina and the United States is McGann's Ar gen tin.a.L-.tb.e_llnil.eJ;l-.S~.e.s.L-fillii_til.e_rn t er-Am eti..can-.S~.s.t.em.:. 1880-1914. 18Gravil, "Anglo-US Trade Rivalry," 45. 19For a history of United States meat exports see Wrenn, IndustriaL..I.X.ruie~ctt..s__and Animal Fa~, and Marketing Q~ Amer ican____M_e_g__t__l'..r.Q_duct s _iu_ J;xport _'fi:.a.d.e (Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Trade Information Bulletin No. 333, 1925), and United States Tariff Commission, cattl.e_.an~ Beef in th.e_tlnil_~.S.t.ru:esi the Ta.1:.if.f Problems Involved, (Washington, DC: Tariff Information Series No. 30, 1922).

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124 20 on u.s. beef consumption, see Lewis Corey, Meat ang Man. A Study of M0OQl.20.ULunionism. and Food Pol icy < New York: The Viking Press, 1950), 153-54. 2lsee the analysis of this situation in the Federal Trade Commission's Report on the Meat Packing Inci.u.s..~, and in Corey. 22see the figures on page 52 of Gravil, "Anglo-US Trade Rivalry." In addition, the following works focus on economic ties between Argentina and Britain: Robert G. Albion, "British Shipping and Latin America, 1806-1914," The Journal of Economic Histo~, 9: 4 (Fall, 1951}, 361-374; Forrest Capie, "Invisible Barriers to Trade: Britain and Argentina in the 1920's," .Inter-American EcJ;>nomic Afftlll, 35: 3 (1981), 91-96; Paul B. Goodwin, Jr., "Anglo-Argentine Commerical Relations: A Private Sector View, 1922-43," Hispanic American h.is.t2L.i.Q.a.l Review, 61: 1 f Col1f.l ict ang .Change (New York: Colombia University Press, 1969). In addition, the Anales Jle_..J...a _socieded Rural At.9Jm. . t.ina. carried series of articles on the British market continuously from 1914 through the 1920's. 24vasquez-Presedo lists numbers of imported British bulls on page 184. 25Judges from the United States, on the other hand, were never seen, according to Melvin and Rommel in "Meat Production in the Argentine and Its Effect Upon . the Industry in the United States," 389 . 26This prompted the Sociedad to publish a special issue of Anales, complete with pictures of the Prince, on October 1, 1925 to commemorate the event.

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125 27 Anuario, 235. ofaz Alejandro, p. 20, states that the level reached 99% in 1929. 2 8eanson, 146. 29see Tables A20 and A22 in Appendix I for chilled and frozen beef prices in Britain. 30According to price records in Anuario, 298, Australian and New Zealand beef prices exceeded those of Argentina only in the years 1911-13 and 1916-17 and by only slight margins. 31This is Hanson's analysis from pages 166-67. It is supported by Vasquez-Presedo, 186-88, and Gravil, 126-37. 32see Table A20, Appendix I. 33see Table A22, Appendix I. 34oavid Tamarin, ~he Arge_n~JliLll.em.L. 1930-1945t_A_Study in the Progins of Pe~uni.s.m. (Albuguergue: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 5-6. 35see Appendix I. 3 6 see Peters and Capie on the late 1920's export problems. Peter Smith, in Chapter 4 of Pol iti~ef., focuses on a single meat crisis in 1923-24. Analysis of the Anales de Ja so~tU:..aL_Argen...tirul. suggests that the SRA perceived three crisis periods. The first was in 1917-21, the second and the most severe in the 1923-24 period, and the last in 1926-27. 37 Elite attitudes towards export policy are explored in Di Tel la and Zyrnelrnan, 89-92; David Rock, Politics in Argentina; The R.i.s.~_:r.91.L_~~i.sm (Carnbr idge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 241-64; and Richard Walter, The Province Qf-nUeDos Air.e.s_afilLAL.S.e.n.ti.n~Qlil~ 1912-194.l (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Chapter 5. 38perns, for one, suggests this in The Argentine Republk, 89. 39The Sociedad Rural Argentina is mentioned with frequency in studies of Argentine economic history. But historical studies of the Sociedad are few. Jose Luis de Imaz in Los OWL__Ma_Qdan._J.T.ho~~~el, Trans: Carlos A Astiz and Mary F. McCarthy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970) devotes a chapter to the SRA. Jorge Newton published a single vol urne history of the Soc iedad on its centennial in 1966, but it is more of club history than a

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126 political or economic analysis. See Eistoria_.de_.l.a._..,SQ~iedad Rural Argentina en el centenatio de su~ (Buenos Aires: Editorial Goncourt, 1966). 40At least one major newspaper, ~, presented continual coverage of economic situations, although its editorial stance did not seem to be one of alarm. 4lsee Anal es, 60: 24 (December 15, 1926), 1089 and Anua rio, v. Instrumental in establishing the SRA off ices, and principal author of the Anuario, was the young Raul Prebisch, the same who would become the Executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the 1950 1 s. 42Logarithmic graphs on pages 22 and 24 in the Anuario show some of the same peaks of economic indicators as discussed in this chapter. 43There was an office of rural statistics, apparently under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture, as early as 1918, according to a column in La Prensa (January 27, 1918), p. 5. In addition, there was a section of the Ministry of Agriculture headed by one Juan E. Richeliet which studied the cattle situation and provided some statistical data for the debate on the antitrust law in 1923, as cited Argentine Republic, Congreso, Camara de Diputados, .Diario de_~~, 1922, 7 (April 5, 1923), p. 87. On the other hand, no statistical studies appear in the Diario de.__~e,siones of the Camara until 193 2. In testimony before the Cmara on April 5, 1923, the Minister of Agriculture, Tomas A. le Breton, stated that his own agency's did not contain official statistics at all, but compilations of "diverse opinions" which could not be officially accepted as accurate (Diario, 1922, 7 [April 5, 19231, 100). In addition, John P. Fogarty has pointed out that the Argentine government did not actively promote rural economic development until the 1950' s. see "Difusion de technologfa en areas de asentamiento reciente: el caso de australia ye de la argentina," Desarollo Economico, 17: 65 (Abril-Junio, 1977), 133-42. 44In all fairness, it must be admitted that the statistical techniques used in this chapter did not exist until the 1930's and, therefore, were not at the disposal of the SRA in the period in question.

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CHAPTER FIVE ARCHITECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1916-29: THE SRA AND THE CAMARA DE DIPUTAOOS As the previous chapters have attempted to demonstrate, the Radical period, at least after World War I, witnessed a series of setbacks for the Argentine economy. The world market which had been so generous to Argentina underwent changes which damaged her rural industries. Even the essential rural productive capacity was dominated by foreign interests. Nevertheless, al though we have seen that this situation was perceived by some influential groups in the economic sphere, such as the SRA, economic pol icy during the "Golden Age" was generally passive. Although some particular economic problems attracted political attention, Radical administrations appeared content to ride the somewhat turbulent wave of export expansion and the natural productivity of the pampas without much intervention. Argentina's situation during the Radical period necessitated maintenance of conditions conducive to foreign investment and confidence which, in itself, might have been reason enough to prevent major departures from traditional 127

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128 policies. Even so, Argentina did establish a quasi protectionist pol icy in support of her nascent industries. Yet, this policy was based almost exclusively on tariff duties and exchange control, rather than quota restrictions, so it was never capable of excluding specific foreign i terns .1 The most politically powerful economic group in Argentina--the rural producers, both native and foreignwas export minded, and to curtail imports (to promote import substitution) from their customers was obviously suicidal.2 Ever since President Mitre's time, imports had imports been important not only in balancing trade but in providing revenue. This traditional perception of the importance of imports was critical, for even "after 1930, when a radical change in the economic structure became imperative, the economic attitudes and political maneuvers of this group (the landholders) constituted one of the fundamental obstacles to national development." 3 The principal enunciator of the view of the rural producers was the Sociedad Rural Argentina. By the period in question, the SRA was a venerable, respected institution of some social eminence. The roots of the SRA were as old as the nation itself. During his brief tenure as national president from 1826 to 1827, Bernardino Rivadavia had attempted to found a society to stimulate rural production. A group of subscribers was organized, funds deposited in the

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129 Banco Nae ional, and the "Esta tuto de la Soc iedad Rural Argentina" was promulgated on April 12, 1826. 4 Subsequent political and economic turmoil in Argentina prevented any further development of Rivadavia's idea for some ye~rs. The SRA as constituted during the Radical period came into being in 1866, and held its first livestock exposition in 1875.5 The society grew with the Argentine economy and was instrumental in advancing the changes in the rural industry, leading to its prominent position by WWI. By that time, the society had become a powerful voice for rural producers and a careful observer of economic trends. As early as August, 1920, before the postwar crash in export values, the Confederation of Rural Societies, comprised of the national SRA and local rural societies, headed by Dr. Joaqu!n s. de Anchorena, called for investigations into beef pricing practices. The Confederation's report noted that the costs of beef production and, hence, market pr ices were cheaper in the United States and that a comparative investigation into the market structure and pricing mechanisms in Argentina and the United States should be undertaken in an effort to lower Argentine production costs.6 This call was amplified in a later meeting of the Argentine Commerce Confederationrepresenting all agrarian interests, not just the ganaderos --which called for efforts, especially in the meat industry, to seek new foreign markets and to try to overcome trade

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130 barriers, especially those in the United States. And, at almost the same time, the national Rural Society, also presided over by Dr. Anchorena, held a general meeting to generate proposals for action to deal with similai issues.7 Out of these sessions grew an "Organization for the Defense of Argentine Production"8 empowered to make recommendations for the rejuvenation of Argentina's meat industry to the national Rural Society and,. eventually, to the government. Thus, early in the post-WWI period, the SRA took a leadership position in pressing issues of concern to the rural export economy. The "Organization for Defense" and the Rural Society as a whole soon opened an offensive on behalf of their industry on a variety of fronts. The SRA was now under different and more aggressive leadership in the person of its 22nd president, Dr. Pedro T. Pages, a professional agricultural engineer.9 Under his direction, which lasted two terms from 1922 to 1926, the SRA was to fight more aggressively for protection from foreign interests, expand its influence in governmental pol icy formation, and seek to expand foreign markets for its produce. The new president sponsored a conference for the SRA and other agricultural and ranching groups in Buenos Aires on October 30, 1922, in which he and other officials presented a program for agricultural defense.IO Out of this meeting came calls for a "permanent defense plan" including a state owned national frigori'fico,

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131 reactivated antitrust legislation, a national cattle census, sale of cattle by live weight, and control of scales. This plan was the basis of campaigns which bore fruit in a series of legislative actions that together comprised the agricultural defense package in 1923. The details of those bills and their passage is covered in the next chapter. Partly as a result of that legislation, and a temporary improvement in world market conditions, President Pages was able to deliver the following optimistic address, translated into English for the convenience of His visiting Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales, at the opening of the society's great annual cattle show on August 21, 1925. Your Excellency, the President, Your Royal Highness, Minister of Agriculture, Ladies and Gentlemen: You are about to witness in this ring, the presentation of the most selected stock produced by breeders in this country, as necessary and indispensable elements for the conquest of the world markets, in which the Argentine Republic occupies the foremost rank, as a land producing and supplying the largest quantity, as well as the best quality of meat for export, and thus contributing to solve the difficult problem of feeding the 'old world' .11 The opulent surroundings of the Rural Society's splendid park in the Palermo district of Buenos Aires, the undeniable majesty of the prize-winning bulls on display from great Argentine estancias, and the rousing rhetoric of Dr. Pages and others to follow might have convinced a casual observer, and maybe even the Prince himself, that he was indeed at the center of a vibrant agricultural miracle.

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132 He might have felt himself to be at the social and economic center of a nation in its "golden age." In fairness to Ingeniero Pages, there was some reason for at least guarded optimism concerning Argentina's economy in 1925. In the previous year, the value of the meat industry's exports rose to their highest levels since 1919. And, for the first time in four years, Argentina enjoyed a favorable trade balance thanks in part to the resurgence of meat exports and an increase in the value of exports of agricultural products such as wheat and cereals. Since 1900 and before, the general pattern of the Argentine economy had been unprecedented and continuous economic . . growth. Perhaps in the face of such a tradition, it was difficult to accept that the "golden age" was ending. The informed observer, however, which more probably the Prince of Wales was, would have been aware of the quite different situation about which the journal of the SRA, Anales de la So~l..~t.S.e..Qt..ina, had been commenting for some five years. Even in the good year of 1925, there was some cause for alarm. Argentina was about to suffer a "crisis ganadera"--a marketing collapse in its vital beef industry from which it would not soon, if ever, recover. As we shall see in the next chapter, the SRA's efforts to attack the crisis on the domestic legislative front failed. The SRA had no more success on the foreign front. Both the Argentine Commerce Confederation in 1921 and Ingeniero

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133 Pages in his address had remarked on the importance of the agricultural world market and the necessity of Argentina's continued dominance of it. Hence the Rural Society began a close watch on activities in customer--and potential customer--nations, the most important of which was Great Britain. An unofficial, but prestigious, "Food Council" was formed in Great Britain in 1924, composed of businessmen, government officials, and university economists, which, while occasionally recognizing the importance of Argentina in the beef-producing world, was more concerned with beef prices in Great Britain and in fostering colonial --especially Australian and New zealand--production.12 By 1925-26, the colonies' share of the British market did surpass Argentina's, and al though Argentina regained the lead in 1927, still her share of the market had shrunk. What was equally frightening from an Arg . entine point of view was the expressed opinion of the Food Council (by 1925 the Royal Commission on Food Prices) that Argentina could not be relied upon for sustained beef supplies in the future and that Great Britain should take governmental action to promote her colonial production.13 Al though the Commission noted that part of this problem lay with foreign control of the meat packing industry in Argentinasomething the Rural Society could agree with--it pragmatically did not call for reform of that industry.14

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134 Fortunately for the Rural Society, the Royal Commission's work did not result in any concrete parliamentary action. But there were other real or potential customers with whom Argentina was al so having problems. French imports of Argentine beef had al ready declined drastically in the early 1920's, although they rebounded in 1924. But, in 1925, apparently under pressure to keep up prices of French beef, the government instituted a tariff of 22 centimes per kilo on imported beef. While Argentine exports to France continued to grow, any hopes for significant expansion into the French market seemed dashed.15 The same case applies to the less realistic--because of Uni tea States protectionist pol icies--goal of penetrating that foreign market. Partly because the United States had been so successful in protecting its own agricultural sector, the Rural Society viewed the agricultural industry there as one to be emulated. It lauded the way that, at least in the Society's perception, the agricultural industry was integrated in production, transportation, and sales. And it praised the U.S. Congress' efforts to aid agriculture through agricultural credits during the postwar recession. Efforts by the Rural Society to control the meat packers (discussed in the next chapter) and to create institutions such as a Rural Bank tend to confirm the

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135 impression that the Society favored u.s.-style legislation.16 They would push for it in the Camara de Diputados. After 1925, setbacks on the world market stage and the failure of the agricultural defense package led to a change in strategy on the part of the SRA.17 Complaints concerning the foreign-owned frigor1ficos continued with good reason.18 The pool of packing houses, whose activities had prompted so much legislative activity in 1923, finally suspended their cartel in January of 192519. This ushered in a period of intense competition which might have benefited producers looking for more open access to customers. In fact, however, 1925 was a period of market contraction and the same packing houses as before still dominated the buying market in Argentina, although in different proportions. The overall impact of these changes was that the influence of Great Britain--Argentina's number one customer--decl ined to the advantage of the United States.20 For the ranchers, too much competition proved as damaging as too little.21 A change in leadership of the SRA, with the election of a young (39 years old) Luis Duhau as 23rd President,22 brought a new approach to dealing with the industry's problems. Efforts to open new markets had not succeeded and the domestic legislation seemed failed too. Another major conference of rural societies, this time with

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136 representatives from Uruguay, who were facing similar problems, met from 19 to 25 April, 1926 in Buenos Aires. The minimum price law, passed in 1923, was still not being implemented effectively, so a committee drafted new proposed legislation, including provisions to expropriate frigor1ficos that refused to comply.23 Therefore, the Society shifted tactics in January of 1927. The new credo became "Compra a qui en nos compra: n "Buy from those who buy from us." 24 Specifically, this meant even closer ties to Great Britain, and an abandonment of Argentina's attempts to manipulate the world market on her own.25 President Duhau explained the policy at the National Exposition of the Ranchers of Rosario in August. Reciprocity means nothing more than the application of the motto of the Argentine Rural Society of "Comprar a quien nos compra." This does not imply an aggressive practice in international commerce which intends to provoke a tariff war, nor the absurd economic policy of trying to equalize what we acquire from a country with what we export to it. It is simply an emergency policy to sustain the self-interest of the nation at this moment.26 Duhau expanded on the policy later, stating that it was not supposed to establish permanent restrictions, 27 but in 1928, the Radical administration of Yrigoyen began negotiations with British trade representatives for some kind of more permanent, reciprocal agreement.28 The subsequent D'Abernon Pact of 1929, establishing specific reciprocal trade arrangements between Argentina and Great

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137 Britain, can be seen as a direct result of th is shift in policy by both the SRA and the administration.29 Thus, by the end of the 1920 's, the SRA found itself pursuing the same pol icy of accommodation with, and dependence upon, Great Britain which had characterized the preceding period. While the SRA went through an arduous process of articulating its position on the new economic realities of the period, the Radical administrations themselves would similarly generate a policy of sorts. The struggle to convert policy into reality would, by legal and constitutional necessity, be conducted in the Camara de Diputados, and, to a lesser extent, in the senado de la Naci6n. For its part, the Senate was a less diverse and less active body than the lower house. While its approval of legislation was necessary under a bicameral system, it does not appear to have been the house of origin for the economic reforms attempted under the radical regimes. In addition, it met less often and for shorter periods than the house, and considered and processed less legislation.30 The focus of governmental attention on economic, and, presumably, other problems, was in the camara de Diputado s. The Camara, as the most representative portion of the legislative branch, reflected the same changes in Argentine social and economic realities which produced the radical "revolution" as outlined in previous chapters. rt was an

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138 Argentina in microcosm, reflecting in its shifting composition and concerns those of the nation as a whole. The Camara provided a "spectrum of the country's constituent groups." Deputies were activists; "they articulate [d] the interests of their real and would-be followers."31 Another characteristic of the Cmara de Diputados which makes it important to this study is the fact that it is examinable in terms of its class composition, party, and regional divisions. In addition, like any representative body, it was a forum for various economic and other special interests, among them the Sociedad Rural Argentina.32 By tracing the characteristics, legislative production, and behavior of the Cmara de Diputados, it is possible to assess the real economic philosophy and pol icy of both the Radical government and the Sociedad Rural Argentina. Assuming that positions taken, especially on economic issues, might be reflective of the class structure of Argentine society, it is possible to assert that the class composition of the Camara de Diputados had a bearing on the kinds of actions produced to deal with the economic problems of the era. It is usually assumed that beef producing, at least on the large scale, was a function of the upper class: the aristocratic land-holding ranchers.33 One might further assume that their interests and influence would be reflected in Congressional activity. Previous studies of class origins of members of the Camara have suggested that class did not have an overt influence on voting, and

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139 therefore is not a meaningful variable to consider when looking for explanators of legislative output from the Camara.34 This conclusion, however, is based on the power of class across the board of all the votes taken over a long period and in comparison to other variables such as party and region. While it is may not be a profitable variable when run on its own, it is reflective of, and correlates well with, other meaningful variables such as SRA membership and party composition. Taken in isolation, the class composition of the Camara does have something to say concerning its activities. The shift in class composition of the various parties and of the CSmara itself is of interest in suggesting the shift in its representative basis and in its attitude towards legislating,35 in addition to the light it sheds on the possible influence of the ganaderos in the Camara. As Table 16 indicates, the upper class, at least as defined by various authorities on the basis of traditional social definitions, had substantial membership in the C~mara, with 76% of the Diputados being considered upper class in 1916, declining to only 44% by 1928.36 The steady decline in the numbers of upper class members suggests an opening up of the C~mara to groups with different interests and representing other groups besides established ganaderos and other elites. In addition, the progressive decline of the upper class in each political party (with the exception

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TABLE 16 MEMBERSHIP IN THE UPPER CLASS IN THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS BY PARTY AFFILIATION 1916-1929 ( in percentages) 140 ========================================================-=-ConservProgresAll session atives Radicals sives socialists Deputies 1916-17 81.6 7 0 .9 90.0 55.6 76 .o 1918-19 90.3 67.1 85.7 50.0 73.8 1920-21 92 54.9 84.2 50.0 63.9 1922-23 92.3 49.5 73.3 50.0 5 8 .8 1924-25 84.4 44.2 7 8 .6 42.1 55.0 1926-27 67.6 40.9 90.0 42.1 50.3 1928-29 68.8 36.6 100 so.a 44.9 --===---===--==========================------===-====-====== Source: Smith data set. See Appendix III.

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141 of the small Progressive Democrat party) is indicative of the increase of non-elite participation in political leadership roles and concomitant increase in other class representation. As might be expected, the conservatives have consistently the greatest proportion of upper class membership and the socialists the least. Equally predictable is the steady decline of aristocrats in each party as the Camara in general becomes less elite. Of more interest however, is the large upper class contingent among the Radicals during the first Radical era session, reflecting the aristocratic nature of Radical party leadership and the hold the elites still had over electoral posts even in Radical party dominated areas. Of course, the proportion of upper class individuals of Radical membership in the Camara declined as the general composition of the camara changed, although more rapidly. This reflects not only the changing electoral support of the Radicals and their party make-up, but regional differences as well. The central areas of Argentina C Buenos Ai res City and Province} were heavily represented by aristocrats in 1916 by a 6 to 1 ratio, but by 1922, this ratio had fallen to 4 to 3 and by 1928, numbers not of the upper class outnumbered aristocrats 47 to 27. In the Literal (Corrientes, Entre R1os and Santa Fe} aristocrats were outnumbered at the beginning (16 to 15} in the Camara. By 1922, the numbers had shifted

PAGE 149

142 slightly in favor of the upper class (18 to 17) , possibly as a result of the appearance of local independent Radical parties, but by 1928 had rebounded heavily in favor of non-aristocrats (24 to 11). Thus, in the coastal region as a whole, the upper class held a dominance early in the period, but this dominance was slowly eroded and eventually lost. In the interior, however, upper class dominance held on longer. Aristocrats outnumbered non-aristocrats in the Camara from the interior provinces Call remaining provinces) 39 to 7 in 1916, 34 to 17 in 1922, and 32 to 15 by 1928. The hold of the upper class remained stronger in the interior, and the Radical party weaker. As we examine SRA influence in the Camara, we will see that these figures will have some significance. Class per se may not have been an important factor, but as reflected in ganadero and SRA influence, we will see that it has some validity in interpreting deputy votes on certain economic issues. Perhaps of more importance than class distinctions within the Camara were regional divisions. In the Camara, of course, regional strengths represented population co ncen tra ti ons in the nation. In addition to population growth, which increased the number of Diputados from 125 in 1916 to 160 in 192237, shifts in population, and therefore regional power within the Cmara, occurred with interesting impact on the Radical party. See Tables 17 and 18.

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TABLE 17 REGIONAL STRENGTH IN THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 1916-1929 143 ================================================-----------Capital Beunos Coastal Interior Chamber Federal Aires Litoral Total Total Total Sessioa I I I I I I I I I I t \ 1916-17 20 16 28 22.4 31 24.8 79 63.2 46 36.8 125 100 1918-19 21 16. 7 28 22.2 31 24.6 80 63.S 46 36.S 126 100 1920-21 31 19.6 42 26.6 35 22.2 108 68.4 so 31.6 158 100 1922-23 32 20 42 26.3 35 21.9 109 68.l 51 31.9 160 100 1924-25 32 20 43 26.9 37 23.l 112 70 48 30 160 100 1926-27 32 20.4 40 25.5 35 22.3 107 68.2 so 31.8 157 100 1928-29 33 21.2 41 26.3 35 22.5 109 69.9 47 30 .1 156 100 =======================================---==---------------Source: Smith data set. See Appendix III.

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TABLE 18 CENTERS OF RADICAL POWER 1916-29 144 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Numbe.t: of sea~eld f rQm: Capital Buenos Aires Santa Fe Total as % session Federal Province Province all Radicals 1916-17 11 8 11 54.5 1918-19 15 13 11 53.4 1920-21 21 28 16 63.7 1922-23 22 28 13 57. 8 1924-25 16 30 15 64.2 1926-27 16 26 16 62.4 1928-29 23 27 19 61.6 ========-================================================== source: Smith data set. See Appendix III.

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145 The coastal region, consisting of the city and province of Buenos Aires and the Litoral provinces, always held a large majority in the Cmara: anywhere from 63 to 70% of the members. The relative strength of all the interior provinces declined steadily from 36 % to just over 3 0%. Thus, the impact of aristocratic concentration in the interior was undermined by the decline in members. The gains in the Camara came mostly in the center: Buenos Aires City and Province. These were the areas in which the Radical and Socialist parties were making their most important gains proportionally. Thus, population shifts significantly aided the new parties. Interestingly, the Literal provinces, centers of Radical party factionalism at least with regard to the Yrigoyenistas, gradually lost representation during the period. Radical solidarity or cohesion might thus have been enhanced; as we shall see, however, other factors prevented this from being the case. Indeed, factionalism increased in the Literal, overriding the area's decline in numbers. In the 1920 1 s, the number of Radical seats in the Camara held by Buenos Aires province remained roughly stable, with a peak of 30 in 1924-25 session, while the number of seats held by Santa Fe province, the Radical leader in the Literal, climbed from 11 to 19. Santa Fe Radicals often caused problems for the center of the party (usually Yrigoyenistas). Although Santa Fe's clout was partly offset

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146 by party strength in the Federal Capital, this too suffered a decline in the middle of the decade. Even though the City and Province of Buenos Aires were preponderant, Santa Fe's growing Radical strength became disruptive to party unity in the mid-1920's.38 The Radical party as a whole, however, enjoyed a working majority in the Camara for all but one of the seven sessions of the 1916 to 1929 period. As Table 19 shows, the Radicals gained a 57% majority in the 1918 elections and expanded this to 68% by 1924. The conflict between Personalista and Anti personal ista factions following the 1922 presidential race cost the Radicals some seats and their majority in the Chamber slipped to just under 60% for the years 1924 to 1928. The Radicals captured the largest number of seats both in absolute terms and in percentages in 1928, apparently riding Yrigoyen's coattails. Total numbers of Radicals did not tell the whole story, however. While the mainstream UCR al ways constituted the majority of Radicals, other dissident groups appeared in the 1920's. Local Radical parties, dominated by local leadership and sensitive to local issues, captured many seats in the Camara. In 1916, 49 of the 55 Radicals were UCR members. By 1924, however, 20 of the 95 radicals were members of local parties or factions which often voted at odds with the UCR. Regionalism, in addition to producing sensitivity to certain issues, created dissidence within the Radical party which would affect voting alignments in the Camara.

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TABLE 19 PARTY STRENGTH IN THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 1916-1929 147 ===========================================-==-===---------Conservatives Radicals Progressives Socialists Others Total Sf:SSiQC I I I I I ! I ! I I I I 1916-17 49 39.2 44 44.0 10 8.0 9 7.2 2 1.6 125 100 1918-19 31 24 .6 73 57 .9 14 11.1 6 4.8 2 1.6 125 100 1920-21 25 15.9 102 64.6 19 12.0 10 6.3 2 1.3 158 100 1922-23 26 16.3 109 68.1 15 9.4 10 6.3 0 0 160 100 1924-25 32 20.0 95 59.4 14 a . a 19 11.9 0 0 160 100 1926-27 34 21.6 93 59.2 10 6.4 19 12.1 l 1.6 -157 100 1928-29 32 20.5 112 71.8 l 0.6 10 6.4 l 1.6 156 100 ========================================-----=-=----=-=====Source: Smith data set. See Appendix III. __ ,:

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148 I n add i t i o n to fa c t i o n a 1 i s m and re g ion a 1 i s m , pa r t y strength and the party's real position within the Chamber were further separated by another factor: the endern ic problem of abstention and absenteeism in the C~mara. Peter Smith's study of the Cmara showed that non-voting was always at rather high levels. As the numbers in parentheses in Table 20 indicate, as many as 38% of the members of the Camara were non-voters in one session 0922-23) , and the average non-voting rate was almost 30% for the whole Radical period. Large non-voting percentages cause statistical problems, as discussed in Appendix III, as well as other problems for analysts seeking to understand the behavior of certain groups in the Camara. At a time when political participation was increasing and one might expect a higher level of activism among Diputados, this level of non-voting is somewhat surprising. In many cases, however, non-voting was due to purposeful abstention on a vote, rather than absence or apathy. Discerning the difference between the two for any one vote is quite difficult, however, since only those members casting yes or no votes appear in any vote count record in the Diario de Sesiones. Smith's technique was to count as absent any deputy who had missed five consecutive roll call votes. However, in the case of a series of votes cast on the same general issue, this tactic might list as absent a member who was purposefully abstaining f rem voting on that

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TABLE 20 PROPORTIONAL ABSENTEEISM AND VOTE ABSTENTION ON ECONOMIC ISSUES 149 IN THE RADICAL PARTIES IN THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 1916-1929 (in percentages) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Radicau 8ll P~u~ Ineligible Number or Total Total of Session Abstain Absent Not Voting Not Voting Votesl 1916-17 14 39.8 53.8 48.3 (31.2)2 10 1918-19 11 3 5 .6 46.6 45.5 (36.5) 15 1920-21 21.2 25. 4 46.6 43.1 (25.9) 17 1922-23 23.4 2 8. 7 52.1 48 (38.1) 8 1924-25 21 22.3 43.3 43.7 (26.2) 9 1926-27 13. 7 . 15.3 29 33.8 (17 .2) 8 1928-29 16.3 10 .1 26.4 29.5 (21.1) 4 =-=---=-=--================================================= Source: Smith data set. See Appendix III. Notes: lNumber of votes corresponds to the selected votes on economic issues listed in Appendix III, with the exception of the 1924-25 session, which is a random sample. 2 Percentages in parentheses are Smith's calculations of the rate for whole session. See Argentina_aruLthLfl!ilY~_Qf Democracy, 12 9.

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150 particular issue for some reason. Nevertheless, whether for purposes of casting a non-vote or merely because of absence, non-voting remained high. Casting a non-vote required, under the normal rules of the Camara, that the member actually leave the chamber.39 This was not true of simple voice or hand votes, since it was often noted in the Diario that not every member present voted. In fact, this situation was often the reason for demands for actual roll calls to force a yes or no vote. In this case, abstainers would then leave the Chamber. As a voting practice, this seems merely a quirk of the system, but, in fact, it could deny the house a quorum necessary to proceed with business. In at least one case in this study, the lack of a quorum allowed one side to postpone a vote long enough to gather up absentees, or cajole abstainers into voting, which changed the outcome of a certain issue. Of particular interest is the fact, demonstrated in Table 20, that non-voting was higher on economic issues, with almost half the Cmara not voting on economic issues in certain sessions. (This must be interpreted with caution, however, because of the relatively small number of votes involved in some years.) If one assumes the importance of economic issues, certainly to SRA members, during the decade of the 1920's especially, non-voting must be considered a from of purposeful action. Indeed, abstention on votes for officer selection was lower, indicating, perhaps, better

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151 party cohesion and discipline on purely partisan and control issues, and less cohesion and discipline on more complex economic issues. Within certain groups, specifically the Radicals and SRA members, non-voting on economic matters was even higher than the already high level among all deputies. Smith's figures (see Table 20} indicate that this is due largely to a large number of ineligible or absent members, rather than abstainers. Smith's definition of absence, however, is based on a deputy's having missed five consecutive votes which obviously might really include purposeful abstainers. In addition, there is no reason to assume more apathy among Radicals than other parties. The high rate of non-voting is more likely the result of factionalism within the Radical party which, by the 1920's, had become the largest and most diverse party in the Camara. Therefore, there seems to be some reason to believe that much of the non-voting has to do with purposeful abstention, rather than real absence. For SRA members, as indicated in Table 21, the non-voting rate is often closer to that for Deputies as a whole on these economic votes. This suggests a higher level of concern for economic issues, and a greater desire to have a vote count on these issues, among members of the SRA than among the Radicals. rn the examination of particular votes which follows, both Radical and SRA positions on certain issues will be affected by non-voting.

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152 In addition to more consistent voting, the SRA enjoyed considerable support in the C~mara, at least in terms of numbers of certain members and possible members. Table 22 outlines the numbers of certain members and possible members in the Camara for the 1916-29 period. In 1916, as many as 80% of the Diputados might have had some ties to the SRA.40 The number of Jockey Club members, perhaps a better indicator of the class composition of the Camara than of its attitude toward agricultural and economic issues, constituted 63% of the Camara. As occurred with upper class membership, the proportion of SRA and Jockey Club members declined steadily throughout the period, with a slight rebound in 1928 . This decline does not seem due to a decline in membership of the SRA, but to the changing class and regional composition of the Camara. Table 23 indicates that while the proportion of SRA members who were also from the upper class declined throughout the period, that proportion was always higher than among diputados as a whole. As the electorate returned more non-aristocratic diputados to the Camera, fewer SRA members were elected. The interior provinces became the bastion of SRA diputados, so that by 192 8, 43 % of the SRA members in the Camara were from the interior. How much this helped the SRA, however, is questionable, since the number of diputados from the interior was always heavily outweighed by those from the coastal provinces. And, even though at least 90 % of SRA

PAGE 160

TABLE 21 PROPORTIONAL ABSENTEEISM AND VOTE ABSTENTION ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AMONG SRA MEMBERS IN THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 1916-1929 C in percentages) 153 ==================================================--==-==== SRA MemQi;.[.,a All Pep~~ Ineligible Nwnber or Total Total of Session Abstain Absent Not Voting Not Voting Votesl 1916-17 16.4 28. 6 45 48.3 (31.2)2 10 1918-19 11.2 3 5 .1 46.3 45.5 (36.5) 15 1920-21 19.7 23.7 43.4 43.1 (25.9) 17 1922-23 15. 7 3 5 .6 51.3 48 (38.1) 8 1924-25 15 .2 26.6 41.8 43.7 (26.2) 9 1926-27 16 .3 2 8. 4 44.7 33.8 (17 .2} 8 192 8-29 15 .4 16.5 31.9 29. 5 ( 21 .1) 4 ============================================================ Source: Smith data set. See Appendix III. Notes: lNumber of votes corresponds to the selected votes on economic issues listed in Appendix III, with the exception of the 1924-25 session, which is a random sample. 2 Percentages in parentheses are Smith's calculations of the rate for whole session. See Argentina...an.d_.t.b..e__Failure of Democracy, 129.

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TABLE 22 SOCIEDAD RURAL ARGENTINA AND JOCKY CLUB MEMBERSHIP IN CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 1916-1929 (in percentages) 154 ============================================================ A: B: Active or Definite Possible Honorary SRA SRA JC session Member Member A + B Member 1916-17 19.2 6 0 .8 80 63.2 1918-19 11.1 59.5 70 .6 61.9 1920-21 12.6 55.7 68.3 51.3 1922-23 8.7 58.8 67.5 43.8 1924-25 11.9 58. 8 70. 7 48 .1 1926-27 . . 6.4 54.2 6 0 .6 42 1928-29 7.7 55.8 63.5 39.1 =======================================----================= Source: smith data bank. see Appendix III. ~= category B includes all diputados except those definately known to be or not ot be SRA members. Therefore, some of those included may not in fact be members .

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155 TABLE 23 CLASS COMPOSITION AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SRA MEMBERS IN THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS 1916-1929 (in percentages) (figures in parentheses are percentages for all Deputies) ==========================--===--====---=================== Members Members Members from from from Members in Central Litoral Interior session upper class proun~_s _ __,p~r~o~.v~i-o-c~e-s.__ __ p-r~ov~io-c~e~s..__ 1916-17 85.7 (76.0) 51.8 (38.4) 1918-19 88.9 (73.8) 55.6 (38.9) 1920-22 78.9 (63.9) 54.4 (46.2) 1922-23 78.0 (58.8) 50.8 (46.3) 1924-25 80.4 (55.0) 43.1 (46.9) 1926-27 80.0 (50.3) 32.5 (45.9) 19 2 8-2 9 6 5 9 C 4 4 9) 3 8 6 ( 4 7 4 ) 23.2 (24.6) 15.6 (24.6) 14.0 (22.2) 13.6 (21.9) 21.6 (23.1) 25.0 (22.3) 18.2 (22.4) 25.0 (36.8) 28.9 (36.5) 31.6 (31.6) 35.6 (31.9) 35.3 (30.0) 42.5 (31.8) 43.2 (30.1) =========================================================== Source: smith data set. see Appendix III.

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156 members lived in the coastal areas, their proportional representation within the diputado s from those areas was always much smaller and generally declined. In sum, the representation of the SRA was in decline during the period and became more and more restricted to the outmanned interior. This minority and regional character would affect the fortunes of SRA issues in the Camara. The next chapter will examine sets of roll call votes on economic issues in the Camara de Diputados from 1916 to 1929. The debates associated with these roll calls, and the actual voting itself, will be used to examine the impact of the SRA and the Radical parties on economic policy formation in the face of the social and economic realities discussed in previous chapters.

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lofaz Alejandro, 261. 2 .Ilu.Q, 217 3perrer, 99. 157 Notes 4Archivo General Nacional de la Republ ica Argentina, "Sociedad Rural: gobierno civil y militar," 1836, legajo 13/10/7; "Suministro de ganado y caballados," 1861, legajo 20/ 8/6. 5Newton, 52, 73-74. 6sociedad . Rural Argentina, Anales de la sociedad Bural Argentina. 54: 15 (August 1, 1920), 883. 7 Anales, 55: 15 (August 1, 1921), 586-88. 8 Anales, 55: 16 (August 15, 1921), 633-34; 18 (September 15, 1921), 679-82. 9Newton, 339-41. 10 Pedro T. Pages, crisis ganadera argentin.a (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Gadola, 1922). By this time, the SRA had a permanent committee for national defense of production. llAnales, 59: 19 (October 1, 1925), 941. 12Anales. 59: 10 (May 15, 1925), 457-59; 12 (June 15, 1925), 599-608; 16 (August 15, 1925), 801; 20 (October 15, 1925), 1133-34. 13Anales, 59: 20 (October 15, 1925), 1133-34. 14Anales, 59: 12 (June 15, 1925), 603. 15Anales, 59: 4 (February 15, 1925), 154; 6 (March 15, 1925), 263-64 . l6Anales, 55: 20 (October 15, (September 1, 1922), 467-68; 54: 93 6-40. 1921), 744-47; 56: 17 15 (August 15, 1920),

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158 17 Smith discusses this shift in Politics and Beef, 119-2 9. 18 Gravil, Anglo-Argentine~nnecti.Q.n, 74-75. 19 smith, Politics and_.l3.eef. 112-13 and Hanson, Chapter 9. 20 Gravil, Anglo-Argentine Conn~ti.Q.n, 179. 21 smith, Politics and Beef, 116-17 22Newton, 341-42. 2 3Anale~, 60: 9 (May 1, 1926) is a special issue devoted entirely to the proceedings of the Congreso de los Ganaderos del Rio de la Plata. The revisions to the minimum price law are contained in pages 124-26 and 135-36. 24 Anales, 61: 1 (January 1, 1927), 7-8. 25 Anales, 61: 2 (January 15, 1927) , 103; 6 (March 15, 1927) , 27. 26 Anales, 61: 16 (August 15, 1927), 820. 27 Anales, 61: 18 (September 15, 1927), 915-19. 28 Grav il, Anglo-A~ntine CQnn.e..c.tio..n , 165. 29 smith, Polit~_an.,d__B~, 128-29. 30For example, the Senate met for only 11 sessions and considered only 11 bills in the 1924-25 session. In the 1928-29 session, it met for 43 sessions and passed 136 pieces of legislation, but almost all of them were certifications of individual pension requests rather then laws. These data were compiled from Argentine Republic, Congreso, Senado de la Naci6n, Diario de Sesi.QM~ for 1924 and 1928. 31 smith, ArgentinLaDrl the Failure of Democr~~, xviii. 32Karen L .Remmer also makes the point that political conflict was clear cut in Argentina between administrations and opposition in this period, and that electoral representation was more reflective of real political differences than in other countries such as Chile. Thus, study of deputy behavior might indicate real political cleavage in Argentine society. see Party Competition in Arg . entina and Chil.e..i_Pol itical Recruitment and Public Policy, 1891)-ill..Q. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 109-11.

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159 33certainly this is the view of Jose Luis de rmaz in Chapters 5 and 6 of Los gue mandan (Those Who Rule) (Trans. Carlos A. Astiz. Albany: state University of New York Press, 1970) and in La clase alta de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Sociologia, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1962). 34smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democ~, 60-61. 35Fennell, 432-33. 36The definition of upper class is explained in Appendix A of Smith's Argentina and the Failure of Democracy. It involves judgments on class origin of deputies based upon a consensus of opinion by Srni th and Argentine sociologists and historians. 37The decline in the number of diputados from 1926 to 1929 is due to unseating for various reasons, not a decline in the number of seats. 38aoth Smith and Fennell conclude that party affiliation was the principal determinant of voting behavior among the variables they studied. Smith sees it as the consistently most important variable (with a few isolated exceptions), followed by region. Fennell argues that region was a determinant variable early, but that its impact was overridden by party by the end of the Radical period. See Smith, Argentina .aod the Failure of D~ocracy, 61-69, and Fennell, 372. 39Fennell, 422. 4 OThese categories were constructed by Smith in his data set discussed in Appendix III. Those in the "Possible" category are linked to the SRA by family name, but can not be positively determined to be members. Therefore, the total percentage of "Definite" plus "Possible" may be inflated. 411imiting the analysis to roll call votes presents certain problems, as will be mentioned in the next chapter. Some issues were not decided by roll calls. However, as the nature of the Camara changed during the Radical period, roll calls became more frequent and provide insights into the real importance of the issues considered and the parameters of political conflict. see Fennell, 428-440.

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CHAPTER SIX DEALING WITH THE CRISIS IN THE ECONOMY, 1916-1929: THE SRA AND THE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS Each of the seven sessions of the Camara de Diputados during the Radical era reflected different combinations of r e g i o n a 1 , pa r t y an d c 1 a s s com po n e n t s an d de a 1 t w i th different economic issues. The previous chapter suggested general patteins of behavior for all or certain parts of this period, generally focusing on political parties as the key determinants of deputy voting patterns. An examination of a set of specifically economic issues for the period reveals some different patterns of deputy behavior. Of course, political party remained an important consideration, but other character is tics can be seen to play a role when one examines votes in particular, rather than as a set of inputs to a larger statistical model. Focusing on individual issues has limitations, as outlined in Appendix III, but has the advantage of revealing dynamics of deputy behavior not perceivable in the larger models. The first notable characteristic of the 1916-17 session was that it was the first national session dominated by the Radicals. There had been Radical deputies since the 1912 160

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161 elections with the institution of the s~enz Pena law, and as early as 1914, Radicals held more seats than any single party (28 over 25 for the Conservatives) .1 By 1916, the Radicals held 55 of 125 seats and were clearly the major group. And they held the presidency for the first time. Whether or not this heralded a truly new epoch in Argentine politics is an issue of major debate, with some scholars contending that it was (see introduction) and others that it was not.2 Nevertheless, the 1916 elections can be seen as marking a new epoch at least in political terms. And, as has been shown, the war years were an economic watershed, so that one might expect 1916 to be a critical year for . economic issues in the Camara de Diputados. The votes selected for analysis of the first Radical session of 1916-17 are indicated in Table 24, along with their results. Of the ten votes, half focus on the one major economic issue of the session, the Sugar Tariff. For this reason, most of the votes of the session load on Smith's tariff factor: Factor I I (see Appendix I I I) In addition, the Sugar votes were numerous enough to provide insight into Radical and SRA voting patterns for economic issues for the session as a whole. The votes focused on an import tax on sugar to protect the sugar industry of north and western Argentina. Although not a major component of economic policy, protective tariffs were not new to Argentina. In fact, Sugar had been

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TABLE 24 PARTY AND SRA VOTES ON SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 1916-17 SESSION 162 --=--==============---===================================== NONWINNING SRA SRA ISSUE VOTE GROUPS VOTE VOTE Sugar tariff p RAD/PROGi SOC p T Sugar tariff p RAD/PROGi SOC p p Sugar tariff F CON F F Sugar tariff p CON F p Sugar tariff F CON/RAD F F Export tax F CON/ RAD F F Tariff for shoe industry p RAD p T Anti-locust campaign p RAD T p Agricultural defense p RAD T p -----===============--===================================== CON=Conservatives, PROG=Progressives, RAD=Radicals, SOC=Socialists, CONT=Contubernio: lower case indictates a minority position P = voted to pass or resolution passed F = voted to defeat or resolution defeated T = vote split, no predominant position within group

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163 protected, up to a domestic price of .41 pesos per kilogram, since 1912.3 In 1916, poor harvests forced the price of sugar up to the 41 level, above which the president was allowed to open Argentina to duty free imports under the 1912 law. But the presence of new politicians responsive to urban consumer groups both in the Radical and Socialist parties precipitated a renewed legislative struggle over sugar pitting protectionists against consumerists. Northwestern provincial representatives were predictably in favor of actions protecting the price level of sugar and so opposed lowering the price above which sugar had to rise to allow free importation. The protectionists lost the vote to lower the price to .40 pesos per kilogram on a regionally split vote. The Radicals voted 19 to 2 against the protectionist position and thus claimed the mantle of consumer advocates. But so did 11 Conservatives and almost all the Socialists. The SRA members voted for the protectionist side, but could not prevail. Hence, the Radicals could, and according to one scholar did, make political hay out of being consumer protectionists, especially in the increasingly important urban districts.4 Other sugar votes, concerning the mechanics and timing of the reimposition of protective tariffs, revealed a different Radical party. The Radicals split with the consumerists on these issues, allowing protectionist positions to prevail, and voting the SRA position three

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164 times on the four remaining votes. Partly this is a result of regional preference overriding party unity with interior Radicals voting against the coast. Partly it is a result of the still predominantly elite composition of the Radical leadership. The issue was not an overriding one to the SRA, perhaps because sugar growers were not a large SRA constituencyS. It received no coverage in the b,nales (although Solberg claims it was a major SRA issue). And, as Solberg--and the Socialists--pointed out, it was partly the result of Yr igoyen' s pol icy of trying to placate both groups: protectionists and consumers. In any case, the sugar votes indicate that Radical party unity was questionable, being often overridden by regional or other economic concerns. Yrigoyen was not running a monolithic entity even in the victory session of 1916-17. The budget bill for 1918 shows a similar Radical bias in favor of the agricultural sector (and a voting pattern which loads on the tariff factor), although not one which produced much controversy. A portion of the bill called for funding of an antilocust campaign and an office for nagricultural defense." This is the first time this important phrase, which really means protection of Argentine exports, appears.6 Neither issue generated much SRA interest in the Anales or on the Camara floor (SRA members split on both issues). But both issues were supported by Radicals as well as Socialists and a bloc of Conservatives. Nor was there a

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165 substantial regional split on the issues. Perhaps both were seen as national priorities, benefiting all across the board. Other proposals of more direct concern to consumers did not fare so well, either in the C~mara or within the Radical party. Partly this was the result of party conflict with the Socialists. Antonio de Tomaso and Enrique Dickmann, both Socialists from the Federal Capital elected in 1914, pressed consumer issues which hit closer to real concerns of the SRA: beef and leather production. Tomaso introduced a bill in September of 1917 to allow duty-free importation of beef and live animals from Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. It passed by voice vote with little opposition because, as Tomaso pointed out, it would result in little competition to the dominant Argentine industry. And, as Tomaso had to admit, the price benefit to consumers would also be slight.7 Tomaso and Dickmann tried to promote an export tax on Argentine beef with different results. All interior voters opposed the bill, as did Radicals and Conservatives from the coastal reg ions. The SRA opposed it too. 8 The socialists kept up the pressure, however, and a much milder bill was passed, once it had been watered down to the point that the SRA was not particularly upset.9 The same socialists tried to prevent the passage of a bill which would double the import duty on shoes. Leather was . of interest to the SRA. It was a heavily regional issue.

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166 Excluding the Socialist party votes, the bill was overwhelmingly supported by coastal areas where the native shoe industry was concentrated. The actual vote was only 34 to 28 in favor of the duty, but 11 of the opposition votes were Socialists. The Radicals were heavily coastal also, and supported the measure, overriding the coastal no votes of the Socialists. The SRA members, many of them Radicals, supported the measure too. While this vote was seen as anticonsumer by the Socialistsl0, it more truly seems to be an effort to protect specific regional interests. In its first session of dominance, the Radical party had not acted consistently either for or against consumers. At least part of the sugar controversy found the Radicals supporting consumers. Yet, when it came to products of direct interest to the SRA--beef and leather--the Radicals voted with the SRA. Hence, accurate characterizations of Radical economic policy in this early period are difficult to formulate. Of course, the SRA presence in the Camara, regardless of party, was still strong in the 1916-17 session, as was the proportion of upper-class members. And the strength of the Radicals in producing areas, such as Santa Fe, was a factor in producing their stance in favor of producers on some issues. However, neither the SRA nor the Radicals might be expected to be yet too concerned with economic issues in a period of general prosperity.

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167 The 1918-19 session witnessed another set of economic issues and continuing During this session, struggle between interest groups. 15 roll call votes were held on economic issues, and, once again, a single issue dominated the session to an even greater extent than sugar had in the 1916-17 session (see Table 25). Sugar did reappear in this session, as it would continually throughout the period. The Socialists again attempted to promote consumer interests, but this time found insufficient allies among the coastal and urban Radicals. A coalition of interior Radicals and most Conservatives, supported by the SRA members, defeated any attempts to alter the established bill and decrease protection for the industry. Debates were lengthy, but most votes were voice votes.11 The Socialists raised the issue of export taxes again, and again the SRA and the Radical members succeeded in defeating it. A bill to increase the amount of paper currency in circulation, strongly supported by some representatives from the interior, passed with the support of the coastal Radicals. It may have done so in exchange for a bill to increase the pensions of Railroad workers, a project supported by the urban Radicals and all the other parties, which the SRA-dominated interior opposed. The Radical parties, now holding a firm majority and experiencing more cohesion than in the last session, demonstrated an ability to carry legislation and dominate the Camara. This was very

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TABLE 25 PARTY AND SRA VOTES ON SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 1918-19 SESSION 168 --=-----==-=-==-=-===================== = =================== WINNING SRA _1_s_s_u_E ____________ ~Y"~O~T~E._ _ _.G~B=O~ll~P~S..._ ____ VOTE State of Siege P Emission of paper currency P Pensions for railroad workers Tax exemptions for railroads F War loan P War loan: postpone debate F War loan: postpone debate F War loan: close debate P War loan: to Germany P War loan: Germany excluded P War loan: repayment P war loan: funding F Tax on agricultural exports F War loan: reconsider Germany P Sugar tariff F RAD and others RAD RAD and others RAD RAD RAD RAD RAD RAD RAD CONT/rad CONT/rad CONT/rad RAD CON/ rad p F p F p p p T F F p F F F F NON SRA VOTE p p p F F F F p p p T p F p F ---------------------------------------------------------CON=Conservatives, PROG=Progressives, RAD=Radicals, SOC=Socialists, CONT=Contubernio: lower case indictates a minority position P = voted to pass or resolution passed F = voted to defeat or resolution defeated T = vote split, no predominant position within group

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169 apparent in the almost universal support for the president's request for a state of siege during the semana tdigica of January 1919. Only 4 Socialists and one Conservative opposed the bill giving the president extraordinary powers to deal with the crisis. While political debate raged over the issue later, all parties supported the president's request. The Radical party showed its real strength and discipline when dealing with the major issue of the session: a program to create a special loan fund for the victorious allies in Europe to purchase Argentine exports, especially wheat. This program occupied the C~mara almost exclusively from November 25, 1919 to January 14, 1920.12 The program began as an executive agreement negotiated on February 4, 1919 between representatives of Yr igoyen and the embassies of Great Britain, France and Italy. The representatives decided upon an amount of 200 million pesos to be allocated to the three foreign governments at 5% interest to purchase Argentine exports. Great Britain and France were to receive a loan of 80 million pesos each, and Italy was to receive 40 million. Yrigoyen forwarded the agreement in the form of a proposal for legislation to be added to the budget bill for 1919.13 Although the president and the SRA supported the measure, the Camara turned it over to a commission for study and possible alterations. The commission altered the interest to 5.25% and determined that 75% of the funds lent

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170 to each country should be spent on wheat and corn, with the remainder to be spent on other products. rt also proposed that the executive should fix price levels at 1918-19 (almost current) prices. rt finished its report on the 23rd of September but did not bring it to the floor of the house immediately because it referred it to the Senate for passage first. The committee presented its finished report, along with the Senate bill, letters of support for the commission from the president, and an amendment to the budget bill for allocation of the required funds, on 25 November.14 The formulation of the final package in the Camara went through a series of votes concerning postponement and closing of debate, inclusion of Germany in the proposal, and methods of funding and repayment. Party unity among the Radicals was rather remarkable throughout, with a few exceptions, allowing the president's package to pass almost in its original form. While regional differences had emerged in the past, when considering the sugar vote for example, region seemed to play no role within the Radical party in these votes, perhaps because selling more grain overseas was seen as good for all, and Yrigoyen' s control over the Radicals seemed stronger in this session.15 And the Radicals had sufficient numbers to carry votes alone if necessary. They singlehandedly brought the bill to the floor for debate on the 11th of December, 1919, against opposition which apparently viewed the program as a partisan one.

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171 Party discipline was important in almost all the votes, even though the Radicals did not carry their position consistently. Interior Radicals, who might favor a pro-exporter posi tion--a pro SRA-posi tion--did not tend to go against the majority position among Radicals. In fact, in several cases, it was a small renegade group of coastal Radicals which broke from the majority position. While a sizeable minority of Radicals broke with the mainstream on some votes, especially on the two votes in January of 1920 on the withdrawal of funds from the Central Bank and collective repayment of the loan by all borrowers, this minority had no predominant regional component: as many coastal Radicals broke as interior ones. On the other hand, on the important procedural votes in December and earlier in January, the Radical bloc held firm and carried its position unless the specters of absenteeism or abstention came into play. Those phenomena interfered with party discipline and cohesion. In the evening of December 17, a Socialist-Conservative coalition proposed to postpone debate to stall the proposal. All the voting Radicals voted against postponement and defeated the bill. However, abstention was sufficiently high that a lack of quorum was declared, nullifying the vote and effectively postponing debate until after the Christmas break .16 Party discipline among active voters was present, but party discipline sufficient enough to prevent renegade

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172 abstention was missing. When the c&mara reconvened in January, the postponement issue was brought again and the Radicals this time mustered enough votes to defeat it permanently. They were also able to close debate when they wanted and assure passage of the basic bill. They were not able to prevent partisan harassment, however. Dickmann was able to stall the proceedings by introducing a measure to add Germany to the 1 ist of loan recipients, perhaps in support of the notion of international Socialist solidarity. He succeeded in getting the issue to the floor on two occasions, but the proposal failed. Germany was not included in the loan package.17 The position. of the Radicals with respect to the SRA position in the Camara on the key votes became somewhat cloudy during this session. The SRA had expressed its position on the foreign loan issue in March of 1919, generally backing the measure, but proposing that higher price levels from the 1917-18 period be used for the sale price, and expressing concern about what currencies should be used for purchase and at what conversion levels.18 on some votes, such as debate opening and closing (although the SRA position was tied on closing), there seemed to be agreement. Yet, on other questions, such as extending the loan to Germany and the mechanics of repayment, the majority of the Radicals and the s RA took opposing positions. The apparent split seems to be a function of non-SRA Radicals

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173 voting in a bloc against SRA Radicals. In the most general terms, the supposed pro-administration position seems to be in opposition to the SRA, with minority Radical blocs voting with Conservatives for pro-SRA positions. Once again, however, it is difficult to assess from this set of votes alone the exact relationship between the Radicals and the SRA. In addition to issues voted on during the 1918-19 session, another topic came to the attention of the deputies which would prove to be the major focus of concern for years to come. On 21 September, 1920, several deputies spoke with concern of the general situation of agricultural exports. No specific areas of concern seemed to occupy all of them, but a general sense of mild alarm was apparent.19 This had already been anticipated by the SRA as early as 1917, in a note in the Anales concerning u.s. documents published in the Uruguayan Rural Federation's journal outlining possible postwar problems in the export market for beef.20 Partly in response to the concerns raised in those documents, a private group unofficially affiliated with the SRA, the Argentine Confederation of Commerce, Industry, and Production, sent a long statement, outlining its concerns for the future of the exports market, to the minister of agriculture in July and to the president in October.21 These concerns grew in early 1919 as the value of exports began to level off. The SRA called for a

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174 reorientation of agriculture in Argentina to confront new market realities, asserting that changes in production and marketing were needed.22 In addition, the SRA called for credit reforms, making credit more available through rural banks and freeing it from ties to price-based land collateral.23 The SRA was not overly alarmed at this point --export prices were leveling off, not yet declining--but a note of caution regarding the future was beginning to appear which would become a preoccupation in the next few years. The 1920-21 session was the last of the first Yrigoyen administration. The apparent popularity of that adminis tration had given the Radical party momentum and it now had a comfortable majority in the Camara of 64% of the seats. However, a worsening export picture and increasing agitation by the SRA would make the session a difficult one for the Radicals. A classic example of the government's problems in the Camara occurred in late January of 1921. Once again, the Yrigoyen administration, and the president himself, were attacked on an economic issue by the Socialists. On January 26, Federico Pinedo, a newly elected Socialist deputy from the Federal Capital, introduced a motion to censure the president. 24 Yrigoyen, and the Radicals, had neglected to obtain continuing legislation from 1920 to allow for funding the government into 1921. Budgets had been delayed before, but ttie government continued to receive taxes under expired

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TABLE 26 PARTY AND SRA VOTES ON SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 1920-21 SESSION 175 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ISSUE Wheat tax: Senate revision Investigation: sugar industry and government policy Rent control: duration Rent control: applicability Debate: agrarian crisis Development along railway Censure of Yrigoyen Censure of Yrigoyen Wool export tax: Senate revision Minimum wage: government employees Anti-dumping clause Meat market policies: interpellation Meat market policies: interpellation Agrarian policies: investigation Agrarian policies: investigation Agrarian policies: investigation Agricultural exports: tax removal WINNING VOTE GROUPS F CONT/ rads F RADS P PROG/SOC/rads P RAD/SOC/PROG F RAD/SOC/PROG P Unanimous P CONT F RAD P RAD/CON F RAD/con F RAD/CON T none F RAD P CONT/rad F RAD F RAD F RAD SRA VOTE T T T p T p T p p F F T T p p p T NON SRA VOTE F F p p F p T F p F T T T p F F F ======================================-=---================ CON=Conservatives, PROG=Progressives, RAD=Radicals, SOC=Socialists, CONT=Contubernio: lower case indictates a minority position P = voted to pass or resolution passed F = voted to defeat or resolution defeated T = vote split, no predominant position within group

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176 legislation in January of 1921. Apparently realizing the error, and its politically damaging potential, the president called the Camara back into session early to obtain authority for continued spending, claiming that it had misunderstood the law. La Prensa called this "institutional subversion".25 Pinedo called it a disgrace that the executive had collected taxes without authorization. Radicals rose to the defense of the administration, especially a new member, Emilio Cardarelli, who surprisingly was from Santa Fe, where Yrigoyen did not always enjoy personal support. Cardarelli was especially vocal, and almost violent in his defense, especially against the attacks of the . well-known Socialist, Antonio de Tomaso. Nevertheless, a coalition of all non-Radicals forced the motion to a roll call vote on the afternoon of the 26th. All the Conservatives, Progressives and Socialists voting voted yes, along with two Radicals, Rudolfo Arnedo, a new deputy from Santiago del Estero, and Pedro Caracoche, who had been elected in 1918 from Buenos Aires Province. Arnedo's provincial origin may account for his anti-Yrigoyen vote, but Caracoche's dissidence is unexplained. The Radicals, had they maintained the party discipline which had been displayed earlier, could have fended off this attack, but absenteeism hurt them again. All 36 no votes were cast by Radicals, and they lost the vote 36 to 38, with 84 deputies not voting. Fortunately, the second vice president, Dr.

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177 Valentin Vergara, a staunch UCR member from the Province of Buenos Aires, was presiding and took advantage of the large number of absentees to declare a lack of quorum and close the session. The next day, with the vote still pending (a lack of quo rum negated the verdict, but did not remove the issue) the Radicals rallied their forces. Arnedo was convinced somehow to change his vote, al though Caracoche stood firm. The SRA members generally opposed the administration, and three more Conservatives and six Socialists and Progressives joined the anti-government forces. But the Radicals had done their homework and had rustled up 16 nonvoting members to cast no votes. Yrigoyen was saved by a vote of 53 to 45--a victory and a quorum. The episode indica tea a problem for the government in the form of an emerging solid coalition of Conservatives, Socialists and Progressives who would band together to combat the Radical majority. The "contubernio," or "illegitimate union" as it was dubbea,26 was able to bring legislation to the floor and raise stiff resistance to government policy. While strict party unity could defeat it, defections of Radicals on certain issues were able to threaten, if not defeat, some majority Radical positions. And sometimes the Radicals needed outside help to prevail. One example involved the issue of instituting rent controls in the Federal Capital, which came to a vote on

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178 August 19, 1920. The issue was a regional one, pitting urban coastal Radicals favoring rent controls against interior members. The coastal Radicals and Socialists were able to pass both bills in the face of interior Radical opposition, but the coastal Radicals alone would not have prevailed. Similarly, on a September 21 vote to bring the issue of agricultural problems to the floor, the Radicals split, with the interior (with heavier SRA representation) voting in favor along with Conservatives. The Radicals prevented debate, but only by once again holding the coastal group together and allying with the Socialists to defeat the measure 45 to 34. The coastal Radicals needed the Socialists in both cases, . and in both cases the issues were of sufficient import to the Socialists to break them away from the contubernio. Absenteeism continued to play a role in the disruption of the Radical majority. On July 6, 1921, the eminent Juan Bautista Justo, the senior Socialist deputy, introduced an anti-dumping clause as an amendment clause to the pending antitrust bill.27 It was one in a series of amendments and articles aimed at the so-called "beef trust" of foreign-owned packing houses in Buenos Aires (see previous chapter). The measure would make illegal "the exportation to foreign markets of national products at pr ices lower than those in domestic markets. "28 The UCR opposed the measure and managed to defeat it by a large margin on voice vote.

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179 The clerk noted that only 80 had voted of the 158-member Camara. Justo therefore called for a roll call vote, supported by other Socialists, including Dickmann. The roll call was much closer: 35 to 27 to defeat. Sixty-three of the 102 Radicals holding seats were absent, and of the remaining 39 only 23 had opposed the amendment. SRA members, some of them Radicals, voted to defeat the amendment also. The vote was voided for lack of quorum, preserving its defeat, but, once again, the Radical coastal group needed assistance to preserve the government position, and absenteeism caused embarrassment. As the year 1921 wore on, and as economic issues of greater import, certainly to the SRA, came to the floor, the Radicals would have to muster better party unity and discipline ( in terms of attendance) to preserve their position. A matter closer to the heart of the SRA, and one in which government policy was attacked directly, would demonstrate the Radicals' vulnerability through another close escape. On July 15, for the first time, measures aimed at examining the meat market were brought to vote. 29 The SRA, through the Anales, was beginning in the summer of 1921 to call attention to the impending problems in exports, especially meat. A lack of response on the part of the administration prompted at least initial action in the Camara. The aristocratic and venerable Progressive party member, and probable ally of the SRA, Alberto Mendez

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180 Casariego Ca deputy since 1906) introduced a motion to call the governmental officials to task and to report to the Camara. This proposal had somehow been passed through the agriculture committee on which sat a majority of Radicals. In any case, after an inconclusive voice vote, the roll was called and the vote was tied. Nine dissident Radicals, mostly from the coastal or literal areas, had voted yes producing the tie. They included the President of the Agriculture Committee, Isaac Francioni from Santa Fe, perhaps because his province would be among those hurt by an export crisis. Loyal Radicals yielded all the no votes. Once again, there were fifty Radicals absent or not voting, including the newly elected Juan Jos~ Frugoni from the capital, who had been present for the voice vote, but who must have ducked out for the roll call. Some rapid parliamentary maneuvering, stalling, and, presumably, arm twisting followed in preparation for the tie-breaking vote. As it turned out, three dissident Radicals from Buenos Aires Province deserted the no ranks and abstained on the second vote. On the other hand, Francioni was somehow convinced to at least not vote yes again Che abstained), and Frugoni was gathered from the corridors to come in and cast a no vote. Three other Radicals shifted from the abstain column, and the party garnered a slim 44 to 43 victory to defeat what might have been a very embarrassing series of interrogations of administration officials. This time, the Radicals did it

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181 on their own, casting all the no votes, but once again abstention and absenteeism almost sank them. The Radicals were challenged again, for the last time during the session on major economic issues, in August and just barely stemmed the tide. At issue were administration agricultural policies, or more accurately the lack of them, in dealing with the decline of the export market. These attacks appear broader than the issue of the meat market, and the SRA seemed to play a larger role. A coalition of Conservatives, Socialists and some interior Radicals was calling the administration to task. In two votes on August 11, the Radical faithful once again faced a challenge on which they stood alone against all the other parties.30 The fir st vote, cal 1 ing for an investigation of the government's policy, passed by 70 to 50, with strong SRA support on the floor, and all 50 no votes being cast by Radicals, mostly from urban and coastal areas. Twenty-six Radicals, from both the coast and the interior, defected. Once more, party pressure was brought to bear, the issue was reopened with slightly different wording, and the Radicals rallied to defeat further investigations by a close vote of 58 to 55. This time, abstentions from the other side played the key role. Twelve Radical dissidents were convinced to abstain or shift their votes--almost all of them from the capital and Buenos Aires--while the Conservatives and Socialists lost 3 votes also. Somehow, Juan F. Cafferata, a

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182 Progressive from Cordoba, was convinced to shift to the Radical side, but the interior Radicals held fast, as did the SRA (although not as completely). The issue was raised again in September, and the Radicals narrowly escaped again on a 50 to 48 vote. As in August, almost all of the central-area Radical votes were cast. The Radicals staved off another attack late in the session when Justo, having altered his position on export taxes since 1916, tried to repeal the tax on agricultural exports on the grounds that it hurt farmers more than ranchers. 31 This time, most of the Radicals and the SRA voted together, although only 79 members voted and the SRA contingent was under represented and not unified. The next session, however, would raise more severe issues. The economy would undergo a true crisis, the SRA would gear up, and the Radicals would find themselves aligning with other groups to pass legislation. In addition, Marcelo T. de Alvear would occupy the Casa Rosada, and party unity would suffer. One of the Rural Society's first offensives was aimed at the meat packing industry: a cartel of packing and chilling companies which controlled the processing and sale of exported meat. The ensuing battle between the Rural Society, representing cattle producers, and the packers, representing the processing industry, has already been analyzed by Peter Smi.th~32 so it will not be reexamined at length here.

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183 Briefly, the Rural Society reopened the continuing debate over the packing "beef trust" and its control of prices going back to 1909.33 The fight pitted owners of the packing industry, dominated by foreign firms, against national cattle growers. The Rural Society sought minimum price guarantees for exported beef, governmental inspection and supervision, sale of cattle on a live-weight basis, and a government-owned packing house to compete with the foreign owned cartel. 3 _ 4 The 1922-23 session is the session of the great meat crisis during which these issues were brought to the floor of the Camara. Exports had declined in quantity and value at a rapid pace after 1919, and the warnings and er ies of despair of the SRA could no longer go unanswered. Also, the presidency had changed hands. The Radical s--and the Camara as a whole--would have to face demands far in excess of previous years and confront a real economic problem without the cohesion which had existed before. It would be a difficult, but in many ways a productive, session. The meat crisis, and general agricultural difficulties, occupied the Camara's time to such an extent that only one other economic issue appeared. This was the continuous regional struggle over the tariffs, especially those on sugar. It occupied the Cmara for a brief period at the end of the session (November 1923) but the results indicated regional and party lineups similar to those seen before.

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184 The main issue focused on the beef trade. Finally, the SRA, and the ranchers, held center stage. A series of measures, which would come to constitute the package for "agricultural defense," occupied both the Senado and the Camara. The main target was the foreign owned processing companies. The oldest pieces of legislation concerned with these issues were the antitrust bills which had been introduced by the Socialists as early as 1913. But no bills had been pa$sed, and, as we have seen, efforts to reactivate them in the 1920-21 session came to naught. With shifting economic conditions, a new congress and a new president, the beef trade situation came to the fore. On the first of February 1923, the senate received a letter from Alvear entreating it to open serious consideration of anti trust legislation and other measures to enhance the national economy. Alvear noted that previous proposals had not been ideal, and that current versions of the antitrust bill were far from perfect. But he emphasized that some legislative response to the current crisis was necessary.35 Although similar considerations were underway in the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate passed its own version of an antitrust law on 20 March and sent it to the Chamber of Deputies. The law appeared general in its application, declaring void any convention, practice, combination, amalgam or merger of capital tending to establish or sustain monopoly or profit from it, in one or more phases of production, of land, river or maritime traffic, in one location or many, or within the national territory.36

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TABLE 27 PARTY AND SRA VOTES ON SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 1922-23 SESSION 185 =========================================================== NONWINNING SRA SRA ISSUE VOTE GROUPS . VOTE VOTE Order of business: cattle er isis p RAD/CONT p p Control of meat trade F RAD/cont F F Order of business: cattle crisis p CON/RAD p p Tariff p RAD F p Tariff p RAD/SOC/PROG T p Sugar tariff p RAD/SOC/PROG T p Tariff p RAD/soc/prog T p Tariff p RAD/SOC/PROG p p =----==---================================================= CON=Conservatives, PROG=Progressives, RAD=Radicals, SOC=Socialists, CONT=Contubernio: lower case indictates a minority position P = voted to pass or resolution passed F = voted to defeat or resolution defeated T = vote split, no predominant position within group

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186 Also, any manipulations to make false profits--not justified by actual capital accumulation or sal es--or to destroy or dump products in order to sustain prices, along with a long list of other practices, were made illegal. Nowhere in the original law were frigorrficos mentioned, but there can be no doubt that they were the target. A law to create a nationally owned frigor!fico to compete with the foreign-owned ones was being considered at the same time. In addition, the history of the previous antitrust legislation clearly indicates a concern with foreign firms. The Chamber was also considering its own versions of legislation, al though the main issues did not come to the floor until April. Because of its long history in the Camara, it is not surprising that antitrust legislation was the first to be heatedly debated, even though it was not quite the first to be introduced. (The national frigor!fico bill actually preceded the antitrust hill. Laws were numbered by chronological order of introduction, andtThe national frigorffico bill was designated with number 11205 while the antitrust legislation was number 11210.) Three speeches, by three deputies from different parties reflecting different and opposing views of the situation, make clear what the real issue was. Mario M. Guido, an aristocrat from Buenos Aires province, gave the Radical point of view. His speech was long and detailed, interspersed with five-minute breaks and spreading over two days, and covered the main issue before the Camara.37

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187 Using statistics from U.S. and British sources, and those provided to the Ministry of Agriculture from the frigorificos themselves, Guido built a case that the Argentine beef producer, although tied to the British market, was nevertheless in a very good position. Natural market forces favored him because he was the world's best producer of the world's best beef product. What hurt him was "artificial factors. n38 If the natural market place were allowed to function, he would prosper. But he was in trouble because the market was not allowed to do so. The primary reason for the cur rent "economic disorder endured by the Argentine rancher" was the fact that the frigorificos would not give him a fair price for his product.39. And the frigor1ficos, of course, were owned by foreign, especially u.s., firms. Guido noted that the government had been tardy in alleviating this essential problem. Legislation had been attempted as early as 1913, but not passed. The time to do so had come.40 At 8:25 PM, noting Guido's fatigue, the president of the Chamber suggested a break until the following day. Guido did not need the next day to make his point--he was greeted with a standing ovation and prolonged applause, and was surrounded by congratulatory deputies. An issue which could cut across party lines and solve the agrarian crisis had been found: an attack on foreign dominance of the heart of the Argentine economy.

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188 Spokesmen for the other parties, even if they disagreed with the specific law involved or some aspect of it, echoed Guido's position. On 12 April, Luciano F. Molinas, an aristocrat from Santa Fe, spoke for the Progressives on a different piece of legislation in the agricultural defense package. 41 Molinas was addressing the minimum pr ice 1 aw, which called for a minimum guaranteed price on exported beef products to benefit the beef produce rs. He noted that it alone would not solve the problem, and pointed out many problems with it, comparing it to problems with coffee price supports in Brazil, as well as shortcomings of the defense package in general. Yet, he too pointed to the foreign-owned frigorif icos as the heart of the problem, garnering loud applause and er ies of "muy bien" from more than just the Progressive members of the Camara. Matias G. Sanchez Sorrondo, an aristocrat from Buenos Aires, gave the Conservative view on minimum price. He called it "fatherly vanity" of the government to seek to intervene so directly into economic processes and to pretend to be able to solve the problem. He also warned against excessive and totalitarian legislation which disregarded economic realities. But, in spite of his opposition to the bill in particular and to the administration, Sanchez Sorondo stirred the Camara with a tirade against the foreign frigorificos, monopolists, and all who supported them.42 Perhaps the feelings of the Camara were best summarized by a

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189 member of the SRA from Cordoba, Jose Heriberto Mart1nez of the Progressive party, who said simply that "todos los ganaderos de la republica nos apoyan."43 Judging by the Anales, he may well have been right, since the whole year of 1923 is devoted to coverage of the issue. The prospect of being able to gain the support of the ranchers in the name of national defense proved irrisistable to most deputies, and resulted in the keystone economic legislation of the period. As Smith and others have pointed out, the agricultural defense package did not work and was basically unenforceable,44 but the level of support for the measures is remarkable. Few of the numerous resolutions which led to the final legislation came to roll-call votes, but the procedures in the Camara suggest that roll-calls were unnecessary and not called for when voice votes or counts yielded indisputable results, and when a quorum was not in doubt. One may assume, then, that most of the resolutions carried large margins of support in well-attended sessions. Of the three roll calls available for these issues in the 1922-23 session (see Table 27), two are orders of business to call legislation to the floor. They both pass easily with widespread support from all parties. No identifiable blocs oppose them. The one defeated motion, on an early version of bill 11226 on regulation of the meat trade, was a result mostly of Radical opposition, but with a

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190 large minority of the other parties opposing it too. The party cohesion and polarity of the earlier sessions do not seem present in these votes. The agricultural crisis and the resulting legislative package seemed to unite the C~mara. The final agricultural defense package consisted of five measures, sanctioned in their complete and final form between 19 July and 28 September 1923. The package as a whole was rather sweeping and remarkable in scope, but one which dealt with a er i ti cal portion of Argentina's export economy. It was one which the SRA welcomed as recompense for all the hard work of its president and its committees for defense, of the newspapers La Raz6o., La Nacion. and !& Argentina, and, in effect, the whole nation.45 The victory over the economic crisis seemed achieved. Part one of the victory was the creation of a nationally owned frigor'i'fico to be constructed and operated in the federal capital. Law 11205 of 19 July authorized 10 million pesos for the construction of the plant to compete with foreign interests, thus assuring an Argentine presence in the industry and hopefully guaranteeing fairer prices. 46 This was followed by law 11210, the antitrust law, making all rnonopol istic practices in any industry illegal. A more omnibus peice of legislation, law 11226 for control of the meat industry, was passed on 28 September. Sometimes repeating sanctions of the anti trust bill, law 11226 put almost all aspects of meat trade under the auspices of the

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191 Ministry of Agriculture, including packers, butchers, marketers and shippers. It specifically forbade unfair weighing and pr icing practices, set standards of hygiene, allowed the Ministry to set tariffs, and generally allowed the government to intervene in the industry at almost any stage to control unfair practices. Article I of the law exempted establishments which handled less than 30 head of cattle a day, thus allowing small, mostly Argentine concerns to continue without restrictions, and aiming primarily at the larger, mostly foreign-owned, firms. Two other, more specific laws were recorded on September 28. One, law 11227, empowered the executive to set the minimum price to be paid to producers by frigorrficos for beef destined for export. The price, of course, was to reflect real world market conditions to prevent collusion among packers. The law al so al lowed the executive to set a maximum pr ice to consumers for internally consumed beef, once again to prevent collusion among packers and marketers. The last law in the package, and one for which the SRA had fought particularly, required that beef now be priced by live weight, rather than by head. This would undercut the pr ice fixing power exercised by the packers, or at least make it more difficult and visible. The nation was divided into two zones for the implementation of the bill. The zone in which most of the centers of consumption and exportation were concentrated--Buenos Aires and environs--was to be

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192 subject to the new law within 180 days of its promulgation. This meant that the principal foreign meat packers were to be subject to the law within a specific time period. They would be required to install scales at their own cost and under the supervision of the National Office of Weights and Measures of the Ministry of Agriculture. All the rest of Argentina, where local meat packing and butchering firms operated, would be subject to the law only when the administration determined, at its pleasure. That the target was the foreign-owned packing plants is obvious. The laws passed to deal with the crisis reflect the current conception of the problem. They did not attempt to ease Argentine dependence on specific markets or on specific products. They did not attempt to reallocate resources, create or define any overall economic policy, or delineate any major objectives. None of these goals seemed to be important either to the Camara or to the SRA. Instead, the laws did do one thing: they attacked the power of foreign interests in the Argentine economy, namely, the packing houses. That there was a crisis in agriculture was acknowledged. That it might have had something to do with world situations or market imbalances was acknowledged, but solutions to those problems were not approached. The thrust of all the laws was to preserve, or recreate, an advantageous position for Argentine producers of cattle products within established, or hopefully expanding,

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193 markets. The method to accomplish this was to alter the way the producer and the intermediate processor did business rather than altering the business, the market, or the Argentine industrial base. This was not an approach 1 imi ted to any one group. It was shared by the SRA and everyone else. It was not an organic Radical policy, because there does not seem to have been one. (Nor was there a united organic Radical party, as we have seen.) It was something that appealed on the basis of nationalism to all groups. At its essence, the program was a nationalistic one, not an economic one. The antitrust bill, the favorite of the Socialists, and therefore long opposed by the Radicals, became an anti-foreign-trust bill once the Radicals agreed to it. The national frigor1fico law was not an economic reform, but a nationalistic attempt to get the state involved in ownership to compete with foreign interests. The live weight law was a way to attack foreign buyers who were unfairly offering below-market prices to Argentine producers. The controls in the legislation on the meat trade were aimed at the foreign packers not Argentine producers. And the minimum price law was aimed at preventing the pa c k er s f r om us i n g th e w o r 1 d ma r k e t u n f a i r 1 y to manipulate the Argentine market. No one was looking to alter the world market, or the methods of production (except incrementally with new technology for the benefit and profit of the individual

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194 producer--as seen in Anales columns on techniques}. And no one suggested ousting the foreign packers al together. They could stay and the market could remain the same, just as long as Argentina got its fair share. Perhaps the agricultural defense package could have produced the beef producer's utopia that was dreamed of. But problems with its implementation became obvious very early. Almost the entire issue of the Anales for 15 January 1924 (Volume 58, number 2) was devoted to problems with enforcement of the minimum price law. The frigor.i'.'ficos were not taking the attack lying down. When implementation of the law was threatened, they simply quit placing new orders for beef, although old orders were still being filled. President Alvear, on the grounds that he was not required, but only empowered, to enforce the minimum price provision, withdrew it only three weeks after it was implemented.47 The law had stipulated that a healthy market would alleviate the necessity of enforcing the pr ice provisions; hopefully the market would improve. The meat market control law proved ineffective, too. Its sweeping provisions proved difficult to interpret and enforce. The executive produced an implementation decree in April of 192 4, outlining the investigation and prosecution process48 and indicating the complications which would eventually make the law unenforceable.

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195 Even in the seemingly clear-cut live weight law, pro bl ems proved insurmountable. The SRA noted, belatedly, that the real issue for ranchers had not been addressed: where the cattle would be weighed. Cattle weighed on the estancias before shipment would always be heavier and fatter then when they arrived, either by train or after being driven, at the frigorfficos or at Liniers. But the law made no provision for where the cattle had to be weighed. This, lamented the SRA, was a critical fault.49 By September, the issue was still not settled. The ranchers wanted scales at the railheads or at rural municipal centers and wanted the buyers to pay for them, but this was not happening. 50 The dispute over location and payment continued and apparently never was completely resolved. In effect, the Diputados' and SRA's efforts came to nought. As Professor Smith has succinctly pointed out, "Efforts to regulate the cattle and meat market thus ended in practical failur~.n51 While problems with implementation of the agricultural defense legislation dragged on, the Diputados, seemingly satisfied that they had done their job for protection of the beef industry, turned to other matters. Not one economic issue came to a roll-call vote in the 1924-25 session. The SRA, at least as its position was expressed in the Anales, felt the crisis to be ongoing. In February, the SRA proclaimed that the export picture was a national disaster52 but its members and supporters failed to bring any issues to

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196 the floor of the Camara. Eventually, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the SRA would turn to other tactics and forums for relief. For their part, the Radicals in the CSmara were having problems too. The Yrigoyen-Alvear battle over party control in 1922-23 had erupted into a bitter ideological struggle resulting in the well-known "personalista-antipersonalista" rupture in the party. This had dire results for party unity for the rest of Alvear's administration. The official branch of antipersonalism, the UCRAP (Union cfvica Radical Anti personal ista) listed only three members in the 1924-25 session, Cipriano Marco and Herminio Quiros from Entre Rfos and Miguel Sussini from Corrientes. But other Radical splinter groups were larger. Santa Fe, with the oldest Radical delegation, and Santiago del Estero had a total of 10 Radical deputies who constituted the UC.R Unificada and who declined participation with the UCR.53 In addition, a strange alliance in San Juan of an ex-UCR member, Belisario Albarracan and an ex-Conservative, Jose A. Correa, produced the UCR Bloquista. A classic example of factional ism based on regional affiliation came from Mendoza. Starting in the 1924 session, all the Radical deputies from Mendoza formed an independent faction under the control of the local caudillo and ex friend of Yrigoyen, Jose Nestor Lencinas. 54 ( By 1926, the Lencinistas in the Camara included two of the old man's sons

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197 and constituted an independent voting bloc of four members beyond the control of the mainstream UCR.) In total, some 20 deputies were members of dissident Radical groups compared to 75 listed as members of the UCR in 1924. Thus although the Radicals as a group continued to enjoy large majorities in the Chamber, the group was becoming more fragmented, and the ability of the Radicals to unilaterally control the chamber was once again threatened. The situation worsened in the 1926-27 chamber. The Unif icada faction picked up six more seats in off-year elections, although their strength remained in Santa Fe and Entre Rfos only. The UCRAP remained intact, no one having to stand for reelection until 1928, as was the case with the Bloquistas and Lencinistas. For the first time, the UCR del Pueblo (UCRP), which would become a mainstream group much later, appears with the election of Manuel A. Bermudez from Corrientes. Bermudez was enjoying a rejuvenated career: he had been a Conservative deputy from 1918-22. The 1926-27 session saw the OCR at its weakest since the beginning of Yr igoyen' s first term. Sixty-seven UCR members were faced with 26 Radical dissidents. This sometimes made the passage of administration programs difficult. The dominant issue, at least in terms of roll-call votes, of the last two Radical era sessions was the nationalization of petroleum. The issue itself does not appear to have been of particular concern to the SRA, but it

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198 did occupy much of the attention of the Camara.55 The tortuous debates and votes over the issue began in January of 1927. The most serious discussions came up in September of that year, and were reopened in September of 1928 in the next session. Table 28 summarizes the course of the struggle over the bills on petroleum. During the 1926-27 session, the Radicals could carry only two procedural votes: to bring the bill to the floor and to declare a quorum. All other votes were carried only with the aid of non-Radical groups. Factionalism was drastically reduced in the Camara with the 1928 election which brought Yrigoyen back to the Casa Rosada. Yrigoyen's coattails allowed the UCR to expand from 67 to 96 seats in the 1928 elections. The UCR Unificada still remained a threatening bloc but was now reduced to 11 seats. The UCR Bloquista's two seats in San Juan were not up in 1928, nor was Bermudez's UCRP seat from Corrientes. But the Lencinistas' hold on Mendoza col lapsed. Francisco J. Trianes, a newcomer, was elected in 1928 on the Lencinista ticket, but all the other seats went to the UCR. Proportionally, the UCRAP suffered the most. Cipriano Marco was ousted by Manuel C. Caceres, but the seat ramained in the hands of the UCRAP. However, Sussini lost his seat to the UCR, and Quiros defected to the conservative Frente Unico. In total, the dissidents dropped to only 16 seats, dominated by the Santa Fe Unificada coalition. The 96 UCR votes proved capable of carrying economic issues

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TABLE 2 8 PARTY AND SRA VOTES ON SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 1926-27 AND 1928-29 SESSIONS 199 =========================================================== 1926-27 SESSION NONWINNING SRA SRA ISSUE VOTE GROUPS VOTE VOTE Cattle industry: interpellation p CONT/rad p T Petroleum bill: consideration p RAD F p Petroleum issue: consideration p CONT/ rad p T Petroleum: quorum p RAD F p Petroleum: nationalization p RAD/SOC/PROG p p Petroleum: nationalization F CONT/rad F T Petroleum: nationalization p RAD/SOC/PROG p p Petroleum: nationalization p RAD/SOC/PROG F p 1928-29 SESS.I.O.N NONWINNING SRA SRA ISSUE VOTE GROUPS VOTE VOT~ Petroleum: nationalization p RAD p p Petroleum: nationalization p RAD p p Agricultural crisis: interpellation F RAD T F Agricultural crisis: interpellation F RAD p F =------------============================================== CON=Conservatives, PROG=Progressives, RAD=Radicals, SOC=Socialists, CONT=Contubernio: lower case indictates a minority position P = voted to pass or resolution passed F = voted to defeat or resolution defeated T = vote split, no predominant position within group

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200 independently without the aid of the other factions, as indicated by the two petroleum votes listed in Table 28. Some agropecuarian issues reappear in the last two Radical sessions. The SRA, in an effort to call the administration to task, forced its officials to answer an interpellation in the 1916-17 session, apparently with few satisfactory results. The vote succeeded because of the weakened Radical position noted above. In the 1928-29 session, however, the strengthened Radicals were able to prevent two similar attempts. In any case, the SRA had, as noted earlier, shifted its efforts away from the Camara to more direct action. NOTES loar10 cant6n, Materiales. 1, 33-35. 2For example, David Rock emphasises the oligarchic and elite character of Yrigoyen's first cabinet, and his personal ties to members of the elite, in Politics in Argentina, 95-96. 3carl Solberg, "The Tariff and Politics in Argentina, 1916-1930," HAIIB, 53: 2 (May, 1973), 267-70. 4 .llu.Q. SAs suggested by Fennell, 95.

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201 6Argentine Republic, Congreso, Camara de Diputados, Diario de ~siones, 1917: 8
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202 27 niario, 1921: 1 (July 6, 1921) , 788-93. 28 oiario, 1921: 1 (July 6, 1921) , 792. 29 niario, 1921: 2 (July 15, 1921), 110-40. 30 oiario, 1921: 2 (August 11, 1921) , 520-37. 31 niario, 1921: 5 (April 5, 1922) , 255-60. 3 2 smith, Politics and Beef, Chapters 4 and 5. 33 Anal es, 56: 24 (December 15, 1922), 701-19. 3 4 smith, Politics and Beef, 100. 3 5 niario, 1922: 1 (February 1, 1923) , 421. 36Argentine Republic, Congreso, Senado . de la Nacion, Diario de Sesiones, 1922: 1 Cno date), 583-84. 37 niario, 1922: 7 (April 5, 1923), 87-107. 3 8 oiario . . 1922: 7 (April 5, 1923), 94. 39 niario, 1922: 7 (April 5, 1923), 95. 40 oiario, 1922: 7 (April 5, 1923) , 103. 41 nia.r.:io, 1922: 7 (April 12, 1923), 227-31. 42 oiario, 1922: 7 (April 12, 1923), 231. 43 .IJ;u_g. 44 see Smith, Politics and Beef, 103 and Gravil, Anglo-Argentine--.C2Il~tio..n, 158. 45Anales, 57: 20 (October 15, 1923), 781-87. 46Texts of the bills were printed at the end of the session in Diaries of both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, as well as recapitulated in the Anales. 57: 20 (October 15, 1923), 781-87. 47smith, Politics and Beef, 100-103. 48Anales, 58: 10 (May 15, 1924), 613-15. 49Anales, 58: 14 (July 15, 1924), 825-27. 50Anales, 58: 17 (September 1, 1924), 963-64.

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203 51 smith, Politics and BeEU., 103. 52Anales. 58: 3 (February 1, 1924), 147-48. 53Based on an analysis of a random sample of ten votes during the session, these groups often voted in opposition to the UCR. 54Miguel Angel Scenna, "El radicalismo: noventa anos de historia," Todo es Historia. 170 (July, 1981), 24. 55For debates and votes on the petroleum issue, see Diario, 1927: 3 (July 27, 1927), 63-66; (July 28, 1927), 209-19; 4 (September 7, 1927), 424-58; (September 8, 1927), 477-79; 1928: 4 (September 17, 1928), 356-98; 5 (September 28, 1928), 618-33.

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CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSION Yrigoyen's last term proved short and disastrous for the Radical party. Even though the party demonstrated strong unity in the Camara de Diputados after 1928, political and economic difficulties overrode party power. While the crisis of 1930 certainly was severe, and, of course, ended Radical rule, the economic aspects of the er isis had been evident for a considerable period. It seems unwarranted to overstate the problems of the last years; the earlier years of Radical rule were problematical as well. As suggested in the introduction, there has been at times a consensus that the Radical period was one of general economic well-being, coupled with political and social reform. The evidence seems to suggest, however, that while it was a period of economic growth, this growth was not smooth or without crisis. Especially in the important rural sector, the SRA noted, and the data from Chapters Four and Five confirm, a series of crises and structural problems throughout the period. Certainly the SRA was alert and proposed solutions, although they were limited in scope. The 204

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205 Radicals, on the other hand, seemed much less concerned and less consistent, and more content with maintaining the status quo. While the SRA could demonstrate some constancy of purpose, in spite of the producer-fattener rift and other minor divisions, the same can not be said of the Radical party. In fact, especially by Alvear's term, it seems clear that there was no single united Radical party, much less a single unified Radical economic policy. While there was unity on some issues on the national level, or at least temporary coalitions for specific purposes, it was almost impossible for the Radicals to formulate consistent economic policy--even when dealing with critical issues involving the rural sector. Indeed, no one party could carry a long-term economic program, because of regionalism, personal political ambitions, and chronic absenteeism. These factors seemed paramount in determining the outcome of struggles over economic matters, as discussed in Chapter 6, in spite of evidence from other studies emphasizing the importance of party affiliation within the Camara. On the other hand, a united stance within the SRA on economic issues was not always apparent either. The voting record of members of the SRA in the cmara is not wholly consistent. Indeed, at times it becomes difficult to tell if the Society itself understood what it wanted. Perhaps it was

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206 beyond the capabilities of any one interest group such as the SRA, even when united, to deal with the economic problems facing the country, at least those involving the beef trade. Nevertheless, with all its efforts, and with its reputation for power, it is puzzling that the SRA did not meet with more success within the Camara. With the exception of the agricultural defense package, which every group seemed to support, the SRA failed to influence legislative pol icy to any great extent. Some authors suggest that at times the SRA really did get what it wanted, even if not through legislative channels: for example, the D'Abernon pact. (Peter Smith promotes this view in Chapter 5 on the meat war in Politics and BM~-> Others, such as David Rock, are not so sure that the Rural Society actually was able to influence events. (See Appendix 3 in his ~olitics in Argentina.> But more important seems to be an attitude, especially on the part of the Rural Society, that economic prosperity depended upon the maintenance of established trade patterns, especially with Britain. Hence the policy of "compra a quien nos compra." If there is a note of consistency in the Society's pronouncements as found in the Anal es in the 1920 's, that might be it. Hence Dr. Pages' optimistic and bullish speech of 1925 should be viewed as a declaration of aspirations for Argentina, rather than a description of actual realities. The SRA always contemplated breaking into

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207 new markets, but realized the impossibility of doing so. Even after the er isi s of the mid 192 O's, the SRA did not propose radical alteration of the export market. By 1927, the policy of bilateralism had become the watchword of the SRA, expressing the conviction that it was necessary and desirable to tie Argentina even closer to the British market. The policy sought security and stability of that market, which made at least short-term sense, but it also created an explicit interdependent situation in which Argentina was obviously the most dependent--wi tness the British ability and willingness to foster commonwealth ties at the expense of Argentina. Thus, even the SRA, with the best information and most concerted interest, opted for a quasi-dependent economic structure. In general, many in the SRA seemed to feel that Argentina was caught in a much too pleasant and long-running exchange relationship with Britain to even try to break out of traditional economic practices when bad times came. Analysis of voting patterns in the Camara confirms the existence of limitations on the part of the SRA in its attempts to affect the economic policy of the Radical administrations. Most SRA members in the Camara apparently did not perceive any alternative to merely seeking adjustments in the export situation, dominated by Britain, which already existed. There is a noticeable lack of any kind of industrialization program on the part of the SRA or

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208 the Radical administrations--unless one counts the entry of the state into the petroleum and frigorffico businesses. The former seems more a question of protecting a natural resource against foreign hegemony than developmentalism. The same can be said of the national frigorffico plan. rt was not suggested as a means to develop the frigorffico industry --which did not need expansion--but rather as a measure to control foreign-owned industries and insure fair competition within the established export market for beef. The five laws which were passed in the 1922-23 session as the agricultural defense package, along with occasional adjustments of the tariff structure, constitute the only active economic program pursued . by the SRA in the Radical years. Once the meat er isis of 1922-23 was "over" the SRA certainly kept track of the situation and raised several alarms, but was unable to affect another legislative program, even when it became obvious that the defense package was failing. In general, then, it appears that even in periods of economic crisis, the SRA sought the maintenance of traditional programs, based on established products. Even when Argentina suffered under this arrangement during years of falling prices, no alternatives were offered by the Radicals either. When it was in their interest to do so, especially when it could be interpreted as a nationalist po 1 icy, the Radicals in the Camara fol lowed the same program.

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APPENDIX I VARIABLE LIST AND DATA INPUTS FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CONDUCTED IN CHAPTER FOUR The economic analysis conducted in Chapter Four required the construction of a data set consisting of 24 variables with data entries for each of the 17 years from 1910 to 1927. Data were gathered from a variety of sources from both Argentina and the United States, al though one source in particular, the Anuario de la sociedad Rural Argentina: estadfsticas ~<20.6micas y agrarias compiled under the direction of RaGl Prebisch for the Sociedad Rural Argentina in 1928, was used as the sole source for 15 of the variables. Aside from its convenience and comprehensive format, the Anuario appears to be as accurately and carefully compiled as any source available. Many of its statistics are verified by other sources, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America's Economic Survey of Lat.in_A~li~L-1949 and Carlos F. D!az Alejandro's Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic (Yale Uni veristy Press: 197 0) , and contemporary documents from the United States Departments of Agriculture and 209

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210 Commerce. Some of the latter documents are used as sources for others of the variables. While the data for most of the variables were entered in "raw" form--in actual monetary units or weights, for example --some variables were constructed from indices. The variables FORTRA (annual total foreign trade), AGPRI (average annual agricultural price levels) and BEEFVAL (annual value of Argentine beef production) have data entries which are indexed figures. In each case, the index is based on a mean value for the actual raw data from 1910-1914. For the first two variables, the indexed value was taken directly from the Anuario. The third variable, BEEFVAL, is a construct by the author and is explained in Table A6 of this appendix. The advantage of indices is, of course, that they compensate for some of the influences of shifts in the value of currency during the period being examined. Certain of the data entries for three of the variables required construction of estimates. The value for total slaughter (TOTSLA) for all years up to 1927 consisted of a sum of the number of head slaughtered in the frigorificos and smaller butchering establishments, the Liniers market, and combined municipal markets. For 1927, the value for the municipal markets was not available. Therefore, an estimate for this value was constructed based on the fact that those markets averaged 33 .26% of the total for 1920-1926. Hence

PAGE 218

211 the figure given in the Anuario of 4,650,000 for the other markets is taken as 66. 7 4% of the true total and the total for 1927 was estimated to be 6,967,000 head slaughtered Centered in the data set as 7 .o million). Similarly, the number of head of novillos slaughtered CNOVSLA) in 1927 given in the Anuario also excluded those from the municipal markets. In the same fashion as for TOTSLA, the true value for NOVSLA in 1927 was calculated to be 3,818,021 head and the figure 3.8 was entered in the data set for 1927. The figures for the total number of head of cattle extant in Argentina from 1910-1927 (HERD) had to be interpolated from available census and herdbook data. Cattle censuses were conducted in 1895, 1908, 1914, 1922 and 1930, and the figures for these censuses were obtained from the United Sates Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 1409, Agricultural survey of So!tth_America (Washington, DC: June, 1926), p. 31. Simple straight line interpolations were constructed for the years between censuses and entered as data points for each year in millions of head. This has the effect of flattening the distribution curve of the number of head, giving the probably false impression of steady growth or decline in the number of cattle over the years between censuses. But the construction of estimates was necessary in order to give the variable sufficient data points to be employed in the analysis.

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212 The remainder of this appendix consists of a set of tables indicating the data input for the computer analysis of each variable. Discussion of the specific techniques employed in the analysis is covered in Appendix II.

PAGE 220

213 TABLE Al -======-=================================================== VARIABLE NAME: FORTRA VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual indexed value of total Argentine foreign trade VARIABLE UNIT: mean of 1910-1914 value= 100 YEAR DA T~EIT 1910 91.4 1911 88.8 1912 112.8 1913 120. 7 1914 86.3 1915 115. 5 1916 111.1 1917 110.6 1918 154.8 1919 200.5 1920 23 5 .3 1921 168.9 1922 162.4 1923 195.0 1924 218. 8 1925 207.4 1926 192.0 1927 221.9 ========---------------------------==-=-=================== source: Anuario, 8-9, 15.

PAGE 221

214 TABLE A2 ========-=============----=---=========----------=======--VARIABLE NAME: AGVALEX VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual value of total Argentine agricultural exports (excluding pastoral products) VARIABLE UNIT: millions of pesos oro YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 185 .5 1911 128. 9 1912 263.6 1913 2 87 .o 1914 168.0 1915 2 93 .8 1916 227 .8 1917 124.2 1918 238.3 1919 401.9 1920 642.6 1921 368.1 1922 390.5 1923 3 96 .1 1924 543.5 1925 415 .6 1926 3 80 .3 1927 5 80. 7 ======================---------------===================-== source: Anuario, 125

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215 TABLE A3 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VARIABLE NAME: AGPRI VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual indexed average combined price of Argentine agropecuarian production VARIABLE UNIT: mean of 1910-1914 = 1000 YEAR DATA rm 1910 1019 1911 984 1912 993 1913 987 1914 1015 1915 1154 1916 1101 1917 .1837 1918 1360 1919 1483 1920 2133 1921 1721 1922 1484 1923 1512 1924 1626 1925 1738 1926 1422 1927 1314 =========================------======-----------=========== source: Anuario, 46

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216 TABLE A4 ======================--------=====-===-------------------VARIABLE NAME: LINIERS VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual average price of novillos at Liniers market VARIABLE UNIT: pesos per head YEAR DA.l'A_INPUT 1910 113.0 1911 112.9 1912 116.6 1913 115. 0 1914 161.5 1915 166.0 1916 17 8 .6 1917 . 16 0. 2 1918 182.0 1919 213.2 1920 207.8 1921 158 .6 1922 107 .4 1923 108.2 1924 128.4 1925 156 .2 1926 143 .1 1927 139.5 ========----------====-==================---------=-==----= source: AnuariQ, 254, 259, 261, 262

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217 TABLE AS =========================================================== VARIABLE NAME: BEEFVAL VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual indexed value of Argentine beef production VARIABLE UNIT: mean value 1910-1914 = 100 YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 66 1911 88 1912 101 1913 116 1914 129 1915 137 1916 165 1917 . 171 1918 230 1919 211 1920 168 1921 125 1922 112 1923 152 1924 249 1925 263 1926 222 1927 227 ==============================================---=---====== source: Table A6

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218 TABLE A6 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------YEAR 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 INDEXED VALUE OF BEEF PRODUCTION 1908-1917 VOLUMEa VALUEC 61.6 76.2 47 69 .8 79.0 55 81~0 81.9 66 108.4 80.8 88 109.8 92.3 101 97.9 118.1 116 102.8 125.8 129 102. 8 133.6 137 114 .2 144.1 165 128.4 133.3 171 156 .o 147.4 230 120 .o 17 5. 7 211 98 .1 171.4 168 100. 7 124.5 125 145.3 77.0 112 197.4 77.2 152 224.5 111.1 249 216.6 121.3 263 202.1 109.9 222 190d 119 .6 227 =========================-=============--------=--========== source: sociedad Rural Argentina, Anuario, 40, 46. Notes: a b C d Indexed number of head slaughtered; index: mean of 1910-1914 = 100. Indexed pr ice levels for beef; index: mean of 1910-1914 = 100 value= Volume x P~ 100 Author's estimate.

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219 TABLE A7 =========================================================== VARIABLE NAME: GDP VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual Gross Domestic Product VARIABLE UNIT: millions of 1935-39 pesos YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 4196 1911 4265 1912 4802 1913 487 5 1914 4528 1915 4668 1916 4549 1917 4213 1918 . 4953 1919 5120 1920 5424 1921 5534 1922 5912 1923 6431 1924 6964 1925 693 8 1926 7337 1927 7761 ============-------------------============================ source: Randall, 2-3.

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---------------220 TABLE AB ==================================================--==----= VARIABLE NAME: GOVRECPT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual total government income VARIABLE UNIT: millions of pesos YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 302.5 1911 310.5 1912 336.4 1913 349.3 1914 250.1 1915 230.3 1916 23 2 .6 1917 228.2 1918 2 97 .6 1919 368.4 1920 481.5 1921 421.l 1922 426.1 1923 524.1 1924 57 4 .9 1925 640.3 1926 616.5 1927 655.4 ==----------------=====================-=------------=-==== source: Argentine Republic, Congreso, Camara de Diputados, oiario de sesiones, 1928, v, 454.

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221 TABLE A9 ----------------==-===---------======---------------------VARIABLE NAME: IMPRECPT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual government import receipts. VARIABLE UNIT: millions of pesos YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 173.0 1911 177.0 1912 188.4 1913 199. 2 1914 118. 4 1915 94.9 1916 104.9 1917 96.7 1918 88.5 1919 111.3 1920 160.3 1921 160.5 1922 183 .1 1923 242.5 1924 256.4 1925 302.4 1926 2 85 .9 1927 2 80 .9a ==========-=-==-=--==----===========================-=--=== source: AnuariQ, 96 ~= aestimate

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222 TABLE Al0 ======================-=========================-==-----=== VARIABLE NAME: GOVEXP VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual total government expenditures VARIABLE UNIT: millions of pesos YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 411.2 1911 416.6 1912 404.2 1913 403.4 1914 419 .6 1915 399.8 1916 374.6 1917 3 89 .6 1918 421.1 1919 427 .9 1920 459.8 1921 546.4 1922 613.2 1923 533.7 1924 5 80 .o 1925 630.9 1926 6 52 .3 1927 885.5 =======-----------==--=========================--=----===== Source: Argentine Republic, Congreso, Camara de Diputados, Diario de sesirn, 1928, v, 454

PAGE 230

223 TABLE All --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VARIABLE NAME: AREA VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: total land area sown VARIABLE UNIT: millions of hectares YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 15.9 1911 17.6 1912 19 .1 1913 20.2 1914 21.1 1915 21.4 1916 21.5 1917 20.7 1918 22.2 1919 21.7 1920 22.3 1921 21.4 1922 20.5 1923 21.4 1924 22.7 1925 21.7 1926 23.0 1927 23.1 ==========--=-------------------=========================== Source: United Nations, Economic Comission for Latin America, Economic survey of LatiILAmerica. 1949, 130.

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224 TABLE Al2 =====================================================-===== VARIABLE NAME: FODDER VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: total land area sown in fodder VARIABLE UNIT: millions of hectares YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 4.7 1911 5.4 1912 5.6 1913 5.8 1914 6.6 1915 7.4 1916 7.5 1917 7.6 1918 a.a 1919 8.1 1920 8.4 1921 8.4 1922 a.s 1923 7.9 1924 a.a 1925 6.1 1926 6.0 1927 5.6 ==============--------------=============================== source: United Nations, Economic Comission for Latin America, Economic survey of Latin America, 1949. 130.

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225 TABLE Al3 =========================================================== VARIABLE NAME: WHEAT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: total land area sown in wheat VARIABLE UNIT: millions of hectares YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 5.8 1911 6.3 1912 6.9 1913 6.9 1914 6.6 1915 6.3 1916 6.6 1917 6.5 1918 7.2 1919 6.9 1920 7.0 1921 6.1 1922 5.8 1923 6.6 1924 7.0 1925 7.2 1926 7.8 1927 7.8 ====================------------=========================== Source: o{az Alejandro, 440

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226 TABLE Al4 ===========================================-====----==--=== VARIABLE NAME: RR VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: total railway kilometers VARIABLE UNIT: thousands of kilometers YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 28. 0 1911 30.l 1912 31.5 1913 3 2. 5 1914 33.5 1915 33.7 1916 33.8 1917 33.8 1918 33.8 1919 33.9 1920 33.9 1921 33.9 1922 3 4 .o 1923 34.1 1924 34.2 1925 3 4 .s 1926 3 4. 6 1927 37.7 ==========----------=======================----------====== Source: Anuario, 103

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227 TABLE AlS =========================================================== VARIABLE NAME: HERD VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: total number of head of cattle VARIABLE UNIT: million head YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 28.0 1911 27.5 1912 26.9 1913 26.4 1914 25.9 1915 27 .3 1916 28. 7 1917 30.1 1918 31.5 1919 3 2. 9 1920 34.3 1921 3 5. 7 1922 37.1 1923 36.5 1924 3 5 .9 1925 3 5. 2 1926 34.6 1927 3 4. 0 =======----------====-----------=-========================= Source: Anuario, 366; United Nations, Economic Comission for Latin America, Economi~SJ.!rvey of Latin America. 1949, 133; United States Department of Agriculture, Agriclutural survey of south America (June, 1926}, 31.

PAGE 235

228 TABLE Al6 ======-=-=-====--=-=--------=============================== VARIABLE NAME: TOTSLA VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual total slaughter of cattle VARIABLE UNIT: million head YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 2.7 1911 3.6 1912 3.5 1913 3.0 1914 3.2 1915 3.2 1916 3.6 1917 4.0 1918 4.9 1919 3.8 1920 3.1 1921 3.3 1922 4.9 1923 6.7 1924 7.6 1925 7.4 1926 6.8 1927 7.0 ============================---============================ source: Anuario, 243

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229 TABLE Al 7 =========================================================== VARIABLE NAME: FRIGSLA VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual frigor1fico cattle slaughter VARIABLE UNIT: million head YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 1.0 1911 1.3 1912 1.4 1913 1.3 1914 1.4 1915 1.5 1916 1.9 1917 2.2 1918 3.1 1919 2.2 1920 1.7 1921 1.5 1922 1.9 1923 3.0 1924 3.8 1925 3.3 1926 3.1 1927 3.2 =====================================================--==== source: Anuario, 243 -1

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230 TABLE Al8 =======================-------==---------=----------------VARIABLE NAME: LINSLA VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual Liniers cattle slaughter VARIABLE UNIT: million head YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 .7 1911 .7 1912 .6 1913 .4 1914 .4 1915 .4 1916 .4 1917 .4 1918 .4 1919 .4 1920 .4 1921 .6 1922 .9 1923 1.1 1924 1.1 1925 1.1 1926 .9 1927 .9 =====-----------------==-====-----===----------======---=-source: AnuariQ, 247-48

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231 TABLE Al9 =======================-===-===========----==-=-=-======-=VARIABLE NAME: NOVSLA VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: total annual slaughter of novillos VARIABLE UNIT: million head YEAR DA~A INPUT 1910 1.6 1911 2.0 1912 2.2 1913 2.4 1914 2.3 1915 2.2 1916 2.5 1917 2.8 1918 3.7 1919 2.7 1920 2.2 1921 2.2 1922 2.8 1923 3.5 1924 4.0 1925 3.7 1926 3.5 1927 3.8 ======-=--============-----=============================--= source: Anuario, 243

PAGE 239

232 TABLE A20 ======-===============----=--==========------===-----====-= VARIABLE NAME: GBPRICE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual average British chilled beef price VARIABLE UNIT: pounds sterling per ton YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 37.l 1911 31.2 1912 36.8 1913 36.5 1914 42.0 1915 60 .6 1916 72.1 1917 . 95 .2 1918 92.4 1919 91.7 1920 90.5 1921 71.2 1922 47.1 1923 44.2 1924 44.7 1925 51.4 1926 46.1 1927 43.2 ==============--=-------------------======================= source: Anuario, 298

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233 TABLE A21 =====================================-===================== VARIABLE NAME: GBIMPTSC VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual total quantity of British chilled beef imports VARIABLE UNIT: thousands of tons YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 161.5 1911 197 .8 1912 195 .o 1913 260.7 1914 225.1 1915 132.8 1916 94.9 1917 75.9 1918 8.3 1919 6.4 1920 51.5 1921 152. 8 1922 303.2 1923 3 86. 7 1924 419.5 1925 417.6 1926 491 .4 1927 527. 7 ========-==============-===--------------==---============= source: Anuario, 300

PAGE 241

234 TABLE A22 ======================------=-==-====------------------=--VARIABLE NAME: GBRPICEF VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual average British frozen beef price VARIABLE UNIT: pounds sterling per ton YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 29 .1 1911 27.7 1912 30 .3 1913 31.1 1914 42 .6 1915 5 8 .2 1916 61.6 1917 . 71.5 1918 93.8 1919 92.7 1920 91.2 1921 69.8 1922 42.6 1923 39.5 1924 40.2 1925 43.7 1926 43.6 1927 43.4 =======================================----------------=--= source: Anuario, 298

PAGE 242

235 TABLE A23 =========================================================== VARIABLE NAME: GBIMPTSF VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual total quantity of British frozen beef imports VARIABLE UNIT: thousands of tons YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 190.6 1911 173.4 1912 208.0 1913 193.9 1914 192.4 1915 2 85. 7 1916 255.8 1917 .2 3 3 .1 1918 374.6 1919 3 20. 8 1920 415 .2 1921 404.6 1922 199.8 1923 240.5 1924 199.0 1925 195. 7 1926 176.9 1927 131.0 -----------===--================-------------============== source: Anuario, 300

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236 TABLE A24 =========================================================== VARIABLE NAME: GBIMPTST VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual total value of Argentine exports to Britain VARIABLE UNIT: millions of pounds sterling YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 29.0 1911 27 .3 1912 40.8 1913 42.5 1914 37.2 1915 63.9 1916 51.6 1917 48.4 1918 63.0 1919 81.7 1920 128.0 1921 68.4 1922 56.6 1923 64.9 1924 79.0 1925 6 8. 9 1926 67.5 1927 76.5 ===========----------------=================-=---------=-== Source: Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 223

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237 TABLE A25 =========================-==--=---=--==----=----==---===--= VARIABLE NAME: GBEXPTSA VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: annual total value of Argentine imports from Britain VARIABLE UNIT: millions of pounds sterling YEAR DATA INPUT 1910 19.1 1911 18 .6 1912 20.6 1913 22.6 1914 14.6 1915 11.5 1916 13.9 1917 12.9 1918 17.6 1919 21.2 1920 4 2 .9 1921 27.6 1922 22.7 1923 2 8 .1 1924 27.3 1925 2 9 .1 1926 23.1 1927 27.9 =======================-----=------------------------===--source: Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine connection, 223

PAGE 245

APPENDIX II TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CONDUCTED IN CHAPTER FOUR The analysis of the Argentine economy from 1916 to 1929 contained in Chapter Four depends upon three statistical techniques. Considered from the most simple and specific to the most complex and general, they are: Pearson correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis, and factor analysis. Each technique has particular advantages and restraints, and each is affected by the nature of the data to which it is applied. The characteristics of the data have already been explored in Appendix I. The purpose of this appendix is to clarify the nature of each of the statistical techniques which has been applied to the data. The techniques all require that the data have certain characteristics. The data must be measured at the interval level, and must be generally linearly related and more-or-less normally distributed. The data used in this analysis fit these descriptions. They are generally linearly related, principally because they all tend to measure economic phenomena whose values change in the same direction 238

PAGE 246

239 over time. The data are also roughly normally distributed, although when plotted in a frequency distribution, they tend to produce very flat curves with a negative kurtosis. This derives from two factors: each data point is individual so that there are no modes in the distribution for the most part. Secondly, each variable has only 17 data points providing for a minimal chance of data point repetition and a large range in comparison to N even though some variables have large variance. The small number of data points would be a serious problem if inferential analysis were being employed. But even though each variable has only 17 data points, those constitute the entire population for purposes of this study so that inference is not at issue. In addition, it might be argued that drawing conclusions from such a small number of cases per variable runs the risk of a form of Type II error stemming from the smal 1 population size. However, because inferences from sample statistics such as mean and standard deviation are not employed in this analysis, this problem also is not considered relevant. Aside from possible data problems, the three techniques employed all have restraints of their own. The Pearson correlation analysis is of the zero-order type: each variable is compared to each other variable for collinearity without accounting for any influence of any other variables. Since almost all the variables are positively related and

PAGE 247

240 since their direction of change over time is generally positive, this analysis produces a large number of seemingly significant correlations. Of the 246 possible correlations, 202, or over 73%, produced coefficients with significances smaller than 0.1. And of these, 149 (54% of the total) were coefficients larger than O .s. such a large proportion of significant and sizeable coefficients suggests a considerable amount of correlation between all the variables. It could be argued that the small "N" for each variable should caution against drawing firm conclusions from the data. And the nature of the variables themselves, some of which are indices based upon other variables, suggests a considerable amount of built-in collinearity. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the kind of analysis undertaken in Chapter Four, these potential problems do not seem to be serious. The conclusion that the variables are highly correlated seems valid. The first set of tables at the end of this appendix lists all the significant zero-order correlations, either positive or negative, above a value of .s for all the variables used in the analysis. Discussion of the conclusions drawn from this analysis is included in Chapter Four. A second level of analysis, using the same data, was performed using multiple regression techniques. The data are required to conform to the same characteristics for this

PAGE 248

241 analysis as for the Pearson correlation analysis. Multiple regression analysis, however, is capable of indicating correlations among variables beyond the bivariate level. A variable is selected as dependent, and the impact of various combinations of more than one independent variables on it can be assessed. In this method, the impact of variables outside of a selected pair can be measured and relationships beyond simple bivariate ones can be determined. The particular regression technique employed for the analysis in Chapter Four was stepwise regression analysis, using default values as prescribed by the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences release 7 .9. In this procedure, the independent variable with the highest Pearson correlation is compared to the dependent variable first. Subsequent independent variables are entered into the regression equation in the order of their impact on the dependent variable. Thus, the equation yields a hierarchy of independent variables, extracted from a matrix of Pearson correlations, listed in order of the amount of variance in the dependent variable they can explain. This method tends to repeat much of the information al ready gained from the Pearson correlation analysis since the first independent variable to be entered has already been ascertained. But, it contributes new information concerning the relationship between the independent variables and their relative impact on the dependent variable.

PAGE 249

242 For the analysis in Chapter Four, nineteen of the total of 24 variables were selected as possible dependent variables. In 17 equations, the Pearson correlation "best fitn emerged as the best regression predictor as expected. Usually, further additions of variables explained the behavior of the dependent variable only slightly better. In the case of two equations--for the two variables concerning government receipts from imports (IMPRECPT) and area sown in fodder (FODDER)--the single best fit was entered in the equation first, but was subsequently dropped from the equation when its predictor value fell. This is caused by the interaction of some other variable with the predictor variable which is greater than the interaction between the predictor and the dependent variable. In both situations, this is the result of high collinearity between the nbest fit" independent variable and some other variable. This anomaly is explored in the discussion of the results of the analysis in Chapter Four. A tabular summary of all the regression equations generated is included in the tables at the end of this appendix. The final, and most general, level of analysis performed was factor analysis. In general, factor analysis involves the mathematical construction of synthetic variables which are actually combinations of real variables. These mathematical constructs are the nfactorsn. They are created to measure commonalities of the real variables and therefore

PAGE 250

243 tend to indicate underlying relationships between "clusters" of the real variables. A correlation is computed for each variable with each factor to determine a best fit. Variables which fit well with a certain factor are said to "load" on that factor. Thus, variables which tend to load highly on a certain factor are assumed to constitute a cluster of variables with some underlying commonality. In this manner, underlying relationships of a general nature can be detected between the variables. A number of factors are constructed, so that possible different clusters of variables can be revealed. usually, the first factor constructed is so general as to allow almost all the variables to cluster around it. Then, further and less generalized factors are created until the clusters of variables are exhausted. There can be as many factors created as there are variables, in which case some factors would have clusters of only one variable. Obviously, this situation explains very little since the purpose of the technique is to examine groups of variables. Often, only 2 or 3 factors can be created which yield any large clusters. In the case of the analysis in Chapter Four, only 3 factors generated useful clusters. Especially in the case of the 24 economic variables, which have already been cited as highly correlated, the "loading" of the variables on Factor 1 is very large and universal. Nevertheless, six of the variables load higher on

PAGE 251

244 a second artificially constructed factor than on Factor 1 (five load positively and one negatively). This, in general, indicates a commonality among those five variables different from that among all the others. In this situation, then, factor analysis provides a means to distinguish those six variables from the other eighteen. Because of the generalized nature of Factor 1, it is often desirable to mathematically alter it to break up the synthetically large cluster it generates. Once again, this can be accomplished by artificially changing the value of the factor by a technique known as factor rotation. The technique involves shifting the value of the factors themselves so as to change the measure of correlation between them and the variables. The purpose of this shifting is to see if any of the variables then change their loading on any of the factors. In the analysis for Chapter Four, ten of the variables which loaded highly on Factor 1 remained highly loaded after rotation, but seven "rotated out". That is to say that seven of them loaded higher on another factor after rotation. This suggests that there is an underlying relationship between those seven which is not shared by the other 10 and which is not revealed by the very general nature of Factor 1. In addition, one other variable which had clustered on Factor 1 was shifted to Factor 2and therefore may be considered to be somehow related to the other variable (GBIMPTS) which

PAGE 252

245 both before and after rotation was loaded on that same factor. However, all the variables which had initially loaded on Factor 2 remained so loaded after rotation, suggesting a correlation with the factor and among themselves strong enough to withstand the effects of rotation. As with all factor analysis, then, this particular one uncovered some relationships among the variables not necessarily apparent from other techniques. These characteristics and their meaning in terms of economic analysis of Argentina, as well as a tabular summary of the factor analysis, are discussed in Chapter Four.

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TABLE A26 REGRESSION EQUATION SUMMARIES OF BRITISH ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 246 ============================================================ Dependent Best Independent Multiple Variable Fit variable R R2 GBIMPTS X IMPRECPT 9120 .8318 GBEXPTSA .9463 .8955 RR .9663 .9337 GBPRICE .9861 .9725 AGPRI 9915 .9831 GBIMPTSF X GBPRICEF .83 86 7033 BEEFVAL 8862 7 854 GBEXPTSA 918 . 8 .8441 GBIMPTST X AGVALEX .86 40 .7466 GBPRICEF 97 44 .9495 ==========================================-=================

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247 TABLE A27 REGRESSION EQUATION SUMMARIES OF ARGENTINE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS -----==-=-====-============================================= Dependent Best Independent Multiple variable Fit variable B R2 FORTRA X AGVALEX .9271 .8595 FRIGSLA .9671 .9353 AGPRI 97 97 .9599 AGVALEX X FORTRA .9271 .8595 GBPRICE .9630 .9274 GBIMPTST .9813 .9629 AGPRI X GBIMPTST 7 804 .6090 HERD .8428 7103 AGVALEX 9076 .8238 LINIERS X GBPRICEF .8446 .7133 BEEFVAL X FRIGSLA .8955 .8018 LINIERS 9714 .9436 GBIMPTSF 97 90 .9584 GDP X GOVRECPT 9557 .9134 RR 97 96 .9496 GBEXPTSA .9915 .9831 AGVALEX 993 8 .9876 GOVRECPT X GDP 9557 .9134 GBEXPTSA .9825 .9653 IMPRECPT 993 4 .9880 GBPRICEF 997 4 .9949 AREA .9986 .997 2 IMPRECPT GOVRECPT .9599 .9213 GBPRICEF .9913 .9827 GOVEXP .9933 .9867 FORTRA .9965 .993 0 GBPRICE .997 9 .996 0 AGPRI .9990 .9980 -----------------===========-----------==-==---=============

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TABLE A28 REGRESSION EQUATION SUMMARIES OF ARGENTINE AGRICULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE 248 ============================================================ Dependent Best Independent Multiple Variable Fit variable R R2 FODDER HERD 7909 .6255 IMPRECPT .9109 .8298 AREA .9366 .8772 GOVEXP .9612 .9238 WHEAT .9842 .9686 WHEAT X BEEFVAL 7 563 .5720 FODDER 847 2 7178 AREA .9278 .8607 RR X AREA .9267 .8588 GOVEXP .9553 .9126 GDP 97 56 .9518 HERD X FORTRA .8514 .7249 WHEAT .9111 .8301 AGVALEX .9652 .9316 GDP .9790 .9585 ===========================-=-=--========---==--============

PAGE 256

TABLE A29 REGRESSION EQUATION SUMMARIES OF ARGENTINE BEEF PRODUCTION CHARACTERISTICS 249 -----=----=---==-====---===-================================ Dependent Best Independent Multiple Variable Fit variable R R2 TOTSLA X FRIGSLA .9348 .8739 LINSLA .9900 .9800 GBIMPTS .997 0 .9940 FRIGSLA X NOVSLA .9794 .9592 BEEFVAL .9845 .9692 LINSLA .9904 .9808 GBIMPTS .9933 .9866 NOVSLA X FRIGSLA .97 94 .9592 LINSLA . . X IMPRECPT .86 55 7 491 TOTSLA .9066 .8219 WHEAT .9892 .9785 RR .9921 .9843 ============================================================

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APPENDIX III METHODOLOGIES OF ROLL CALL ANALYSIS OF THE ARGENTINE CAMARA DE DIPUTAOOS Roll call analysis affords the researcher a tool to examine underlying dimensions of legislator behavior. As Lee Fennell has succinctly put it with regard to the Camara de Diputados of Argentina, roll call analysis enables the researcher to: identify the major dimensions of conflict, determine the intensity of conf 1 ict along these dimensions, and locate the deputies in terms of both party and region [or other characteristics] on each of these dimensions."! If the assumption of Chapter Five, that voting behavior in the Camara de Diputado s can us understand Radical and SRA policies, is correct, then roll call analysis can be a valuable tool in explaining those policies. There have been two comprehensive analyses of voting behavior in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, both of them conducted in the early 1970's. The first is contained in the doctoral dissertation in political science cited above completed at the University of Florida by Fennell in 1970. The other was undertaken by Peter Smith, then of the 250

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251 University of Wisconsin, for the publication of his book, Ar gen tin a and th..e.-1.fl il ur e...._Qf Det110..QL.acy: conf 1 i ct among Political Elites, 1904-1955, which appeared in 1974.2 Both studies focused on conflict within the Chamber based on political party, regionalism, and, to a lesser extent, class origins of the Deputies. Both sought to understand the dynamics of voting in the Chamber not simply in terms of the issues involved, but in terms of composition of identifiable groups in the Chamber who were involved in contested issues. The emphasis of these studies is, therefore, cleavage with i n the Deputies, thus forcing a concentration only on votes in which there was definite contest over issues. Obviously, these are of the most interest statistically because they guarantee a certain variance in the voting patterns, but this automatically excludes votes in which meaningful cohesion or unanimity might be involved. Hence, these studies are inherently contest oriented, rather then issue oriented. Both studies al so employed quantitative analysis on a broad scale to analyze activities in the Congress rather than focusing on specific issues or groups of deputies. Both sought to uncover general voting trends and patterns over a long period of some fifty years. Fennell's study focused on class and region as determinants of behavior of Argentine Deputies from the beginning of the Radical period in 1916 to the I

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252 administration of Arturo Umberto Illia of 1963-66. Fennell collected deputy votes on a selected set of issues for certain sessions during that period. The sessions included 1916-18 and 1926-28 during the first radical period, as well as four other sessions in the 1930 's, '40 's, and '60 's. Fennell employed Guttman scale analysis as his primary technique of analysis. This analysis is well explained by Fennell in his dissertation,3 and in its essence consists of selecting votes on similar or otherwise linked issues, then comparing a deputy's vote on each issue with each other issue. From this a scale of voting behavior, based on matching votes on similar issues, can be constructed and a Deputy ranked on that scale depending upon how well, or how poorly, his votes tend to match. Then, character is tics of Deputies who rank high or low on the scale can be compared to ascertain those character is tics which might influence voting behavior. The two characteristics which might influence a Deputy's rank in which Fennell was interested were class and region. Region was easily defined by identifying the Deputy's province of election. For his definition of class, Fennell relied on party identification, based on hypotheses co nee rning the appeal of each party which he constructed from national election results. Hence, his study is limited to congressional sessions falling immediately after national elections.

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253 Employing Guttman scale analysis and limiting the definition of class to those characteristics which could be determined by party alignment in national elections created limitations in Fennell 's analysis. For example, only six sessions in the fifty year period from 1916 to 1966 were considered. This eliminated sessions, such as those during the 1920-23 period, in which significant issues were considered. Of the seven separate congresses convened between 1916 and 1930, Fennell considered only two. In addition, within those two sessions, only a portion of the roll-call votes could be analyzed because of the design characteristics of Guttman analysis. Votes which did not fit a category, or which could not be paired with other issues could not constitute a scale item, and were therefore eliminated. Thus, Fennell considered 24 of a possible 45 votes in the 1916-17 session, and 39 of a possible 67 in the 1926-27 session. Meaningful seal es can be constructed in this manner, and Fennell 's analysis is enlightening, but several issues of importance must, by necessity, be deleted in this analytical structure. Similarly, concentration on conflict as a determinant characteristic limits the roll calls which can be analyzed. Fennell determined to select only roll-call votes in which at least 5% of the Deputies voting cast votes for the minority position. This further limited the number of issues he could consider under his analytical scheme.

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254 The above criteria for analysis also restrict the number of Deputies who can be included in any seal e of rol 1-cal 1 votes. A Deputy who abstains on a certain roll call may have to be dropped from the entire scale of votes because Guttman scale analysis is ratio based on "yes" versus "no" positions, and too many non-votes will skew the statistical results too much to make them meaningful. Non-voting, even in only a minority of the votes included in a scale, can eliminate a deputy from the analysis. Thus, for the 1916-17 session, _ Fennell's most inclusive scale, measuring partisanship in the Chamber, included 71% of the actual Deputies, while his least inclusive scale, based on religious divisions, included only 33% of the Deputies. It may be argued that the number of Deputies voting, and therefore included in the scale, indicates the importance of the issues involved in constructing the scale, and therefore scales with few deputies can be dismissed as unimportant. This sometimes flies in the face of intuitive assumptions. The issue of protection for the sugar industry was a major economic issue of the 1916-17 session, and one which involved significant conflict, but only 55% of the Deputies could be counted in Fennell' s scale for the votes on that issue. The scales for the 1926-27 session are somewhat more inclusive, ranging from 87% scale based on voting for inclusion of Deputies on the credentials, to a low of 43%

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255 constructed from votes on pension issues. It must be admitted that the reason for deputy deletion--absenteeismconstitutes a difficult problem for any analytical technique concerned with roll-call voting. Nevertheless, Fennell's scales, while admirably suited for broad analysis, delete too many important economic issues during the Radical period. Peter Smith took a somewhat different but still broad statistical approach to similar data. smith assembled an extraordinary set of data on members of . the C~mara de Diputados of Argentina from 1900 to 1955.4 Included in this data set were biographical data on each deputy and selected roll-call votes on a large series of issues. The biographical data included such information as age, place of birth, occupation and date of election of each deputy. In addition, Smith compiled data on social and political status, including membership in the Sociedad Rural Argentina, the Jockey Club, and various positions held during the deputy's political career. The data set also contained judgments as to the class status of each deputy, based on both Smith's and others, perceptions. (See the explanation of this variable in Chapter Five.) Thus, the set is probably the most complete biographical source for Argentine deputies extant in one package. In addition to biographical data, the set includes the vote of each deputy for every contested roll-call vote from

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256 the 1904-05 session until 1954. A total of 1,052 roll-call votes were coded for all the sessions of the Camara de Diputados from the 1904-05 session to 1952-55: a much larger set than used by Fennell. Once again, however, Smith was interested in examining conflict and cleavage in the Camara, so he selected only those votes in which there was a 10% minority registered. Yet, because he covered all the sessions, Smith's collection of votes is much larger than Fennell' s even though Smith's measure of contestation was more severe. With such a large data set, the creation of scales based on certain collections of votes might have been an extremely time-consuming task, and might have resulted in several votes being discarded, as Fennell found necessary. Instead, Smith conducted a factor analysis on all the votes listed. This had the advantage of including in the analysis the maximum number of votes considering the contest requirement. On the other hand, it also necessitated approaching the larger data set with an even broader technique than Guttman sealing. Factor analysis, as already discussed in the previous Appendix, results in the creating of artificial pseudovariables, which can be correlated with any other variables in the data set. Thus, Smith could discover underlying alignments of voting behavior, or Deputy attitude, using all the votes available. In this instance,

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257 Smith was able to discover some factors which at times seemed related to characteristics such as region, class or party. For example, those votes which correlated highly with the regional factor could be determined to be influenced by some regional attitude held by the Deputies as a whole. Smith discovered that almost universally--and especially during the Radical period--political party weighed the heaviest with voting patterns, although as discussed in Chapter Five, region sometimes played a roll too. Using factor analysis, Smith also derived the correlation of each roll-call vote with each factor. Table A30 displays the best factor correlations for each vote considered in this study. Most votes, as is to be expected, correlate best with the general factor I. Unfortunately, this does not provide the researcher with much information. votes on tariffs produce correlations with factor 2, the tariff factor. Other votes, however, seem spread out over other factors. Thus, while general patterns of vote-fit can be ascertained, the value of factor analysis at the level of individual votes is limited. Its value in determining underlying characteristics can be similarly limited. Even when successful in revealing these characteristics, factor analysis often produces very weak associations. For example, in some years even the most consistently powerful characteristic Smith discovered, party affiliation, carried a correlation of only .04 with certain

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TABLE A30 SIGNIFICANT FACTOR LOADS ON SELECTED ECONOMIC VOTES GENERATED BY SMITH: 1916-1929 258 ------------------------===-======-=-====================~== session/Issue 1916-17 Sugar tariff Sugar tariff Sugar tariff Sugar tariff Sugar tariff Intervention in Buenos Aires Prov. Export tax Tariff for shoe industry Anti-locust campaign Agricultural defense in budget 1918-19 State of Seige (semana trajica} Emission of paper currency Pensions for railroad workers Tax exemptions for railroads war loan War loan: debate postponement War loan: debate postponement War loan: debate closing War loan: to Germany war loan: Germany excluded war loan: collective repayment war loan: Caja de Conversion funds Tax on agricultural products War loan: Germany reconsidered Sugar tariff 1920-21 Wheat tax: Senate revision Investigation: sugar industry and government policy Rent control: duration Rent control: applicability Debate on agricultural crisis Development along railway Censure of Yrigoyen Censure of Yrigoyen Wool export tax: Senate revision I Factor II III IV .81 7 2 .85 -.85 7 4 -.63 .6 0 .61 .69 -.38 .34 .51 .54 76 -.68 -.85 7 8 7 5 7 5 7 9 7 3 .3 3 .82 .5 8 5 9 -.62 .77 -.48 .48 -.39 .39 .52 -.53 .49 V .55 .85 .85

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Table A30 continued session/Issue (1920-21 continued) I Factor II III IV Minimum wage: government employees .64 Anti-dumping clause 46 Meat market policies: interpellation -.45 .46 Meat market policies: interpellation -.45 .46 Agrarian policies: investigation .77 Agrarian policies: investigation .85 Agrarian policies: investigation .59 Agricultural exports: tax removal .70 1922-23 Order of business: cattle crisis Control of meat trade Order of business: cattle crisis Tariff Tariff Sugar tariff Tariff Tariff 1926-27 Cattle industry: interpellation Petroleum bill: consideration Petroleum issue: consideration: 7 3 7 9 .84 -.78 -.86 .64 .81 7 8 .66 .58 -.66 Petroleum: quorum for debate Petroleum: nationalization Petroleum: nationalization Petroleum: nationalization Petroleum: nationalization -.53 -.69 1928-29 Petroleum: nationalization Petroleum: nationalization Agricultural crisis: interpellation Agricultural crisis: interpellation -.52 -.53 -.59 7 2 76 -.72 -.74 .51 259 V -.59 -.53 -.44 =========---------========================================== source: smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy, 152-171.

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260 factors. On the average, party correlated with all factors at a level of 35.6, but most of this level is attributable to the fact that so many votes loaded on the general factor,6 which is always the most inclusive and most vague. Because the discr irnina tory power of the general factor is weak, conclusions drawn from it are often not applicable to specific cases. In addition, the propensity of any individual Deputy is lost in the grouping of votes necessary to obtain a factor. It is impossible to tell what deputies voted which way in this analysis, exactly because it is the grouping of the votes that produces the variables necessary for factor analysis. The advantage of Guttman scaling is lost in exchange for inclusion of the maximum number of votes. Both Fennell and Smith were able to arrive at informative and interesting, but rather general, conclusions, some of which have been mentioned in Chapter S. What neither mode of analysis was able to do was provide specific information on enough votes on economic issues to be used in this study. Fennell' s scales can yield the specific votes of deputies, but not on enough issues. Smith's analysis covers all the issues, but does not yield specific information on individual deputy votes. This study employs the simpler, but more specific, analytic technique of crosstabulation to analyze specific votes on economic issues. This technique allows the

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261 researcher to identify small groups of deputies, and even individual deputies, and their votes on any individual issue. Uncontested votes need not be excluded from the analysis. The crosstabulation technique employed in this study produced a series of bivariate tables for each vote categorizing deputies in terms of their vote and one other characteristic. 7 Deputy votes can be analyzed in terms of any identifiable character is tic of the deputies. Thus, the regional or class components of voting behavior can be ascertained for any issue. In addition, the votes of SRA members of the Camara can be obtained, as well as the vote of any party group. The obvious advantage of this technique is that it allows analysis of each vote on the basis of many criteria. There are disadvantages to this technique, however. Focusing on one vote at a time prevents analysis of a series of votes. In addition, separate vote analysis on a large number of votes is extremely time consuming; hundreds of different tables were produced. Multi-variate analysis can be performed to a 1 imi ted extent, by producing tables for subgroups generated by previous crosstabulations. For various mathematical reasons, however, this form of multivariate analysis has severe limitations, especially since crosstabula tion is designed for nominal and ordinal levels of measurement. Moreover, uncontested votes often

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262 produced cell sizes which were too small to allow correct construction of summary statistics. For this study, however, crosstabulation proved to be a valuable tool. Fennell and Smith had already constructed the analyses for large blocs of votes, for which crosstabulation is inappropriate, but the focus of this study is a limited set of votes over a limited time period. For this purpose, crosstabulation analysis, simple and unglamorous as it is, was able to uncover information not available in the other s t u d i e s Notes 1 Lee Cameron Fennell, Class and Region in Argentina.LA Study of Political Cleavage, 1916-:.1.9.6...2.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Albion, Robert G. "British Shipping and Latin America, 1806-1914," The Journal of Eco..nomic History, 9: 4 (Fall, 1951), 361-374. Alexander, Robert J. Organized__Li_abor .i.IL_L.uin ]\meris::....a. New York: Free Press, 1965. Amaral, Edgardo L. Lisandro_de-1.a... Torre y la pol 1tica de l.a. ~electoral de Saenz Pena. Buenos Aires: Edgardo L. Amaral, 1961. Angel Scenna, Miguel. "El radical ismo: noventa a nos de historia." TQ.dQ.Js Hist,Qti,a, 170 (July, 1981), 24. Archive General Nacional de la Republ ica Argentina, "Sociedad Rural: gobierno civil y militar," 1836, legajo 13/10/7; "Suministro de ganado y caballados," 1861, legajo 20/8/6. Argentine Republic, Congreso, Camara de Diputados. Diario de sesiones. Buenos Aires: 1916-1929. Argentine Republic, Congreso, Senado de la Nacion .D..i..atio. de Sesion~. Buenos Aires: 1917-1929. As ch er , w il 1 i am. .S~__.th.e._EQ_Q r; The Pol_il..i.9-B__Qf_ Redi st r ibJJ..t.i.Q..n__in__L_atin Amei:~a.Cambridge: Harvard University, 1984. Bailey, Samuel L. Labor, Ni!.tiM.0LlsJD, and_Qlitic~__in Argentina. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 197 4. Bernhard, Virginia, ed. Elites, ~li_es, and -119~ in Latin-AmetiQa.L.. _ 1850-193~. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979. Beyhaut, Gustavo, R. Cortes Conde, H. Gorostegui, and s. Torrado. "Los inrnigrantes en el sistema ocupacional Argentine," in Torcuato di Tella, Gino Germani, and . Jorge Graciarena. Argentina. sociedad de__m.a..s.a.s C Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1971), 85-123; 263

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267 Frigerio, Rogelio. Economia polf:tica y pol1tica economica. nacional. Buenos Aires: Libreria Hachette, 1981. _________ sintesis de la historia critica de ls. econornfa argentina. Buenos Aires: Libreria Hachette, 197 9. Galarza, Ernest. "Argentina's Revolution and its Aftermath, "Foreign Pol icy Reports, VII (October, 1931), 309-322. Gallo, Ezequiel. Agrarian Expansion and Industrial Developm{tllt in Argentina (1880-1930}. Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato di Tella, 1970. _______________ Colonos en armas. Las Revoluci..Qrn Radicales en la provincia de Santa Fe Cl893). Buenos Aires: Editorial del Institute, 1977. ____________ and Sil via Sig al, "La formaci6n de los partidos polfticos contemporaneos: La Uni~n Cfvica Radical (1890-1916) ," nesarrollo Ec~mko., 3: 1/2 (Abril-Septiembre, 1963), 173-230. Germani, Gino. "Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed. Masses in Latin Americ.a.. New York: Oxford, 1970; 289-330. Giberti, Horacio C. E. "El desarrollo agropecuario," Desarrollo E~rnico, 2: 1 (April-June, 1962), 65-126. ___________ Histor..ia Econo.m.i_ca de la _g__rnder1a argentina. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Solar, 1961. Goodwin, Paul B., Jr. "Anglo-Argentine Commercial Relations: A Private Sector View, 1922-43," Hispanic Amer.i.cao Historical Revie'd., 61: 1 (February, 1981), 29-51. "The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1854-1881," Hispanic American H.i_storical Review, 57: 4 (November, 1977), 613-632. Gordon, Wendell c. The Political Economy of La~in America. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Gravil, Roger. The Anglo-Argentine Connection. 1900-1~. Boulder: westview Press, 1985.

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270 Newton, Jorge. Historia de la Socie.dad Rural Argentina en el centenario .de_su fUQdaci6n. Buenos Aires: Editorial Goncourt, 1966. Pages, Pedro T. Crisis ganade ra argentin.a.. Buenos Aires: Imprenta Gadola, 1922. Peasley, Amos J. Constitutions of Nations. VQ1. IV; The Americas. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1970. Peeler, John A. Latin American Democracies: Colombia. Costa Rica. venezueu. Chapel Hill: university of North Carolina, 1985. Perez Brignoli, Hector. "The Economic Cycle in Latin American Agricultural Export Economies (1880-1930)," Latin American Research Review, 15: 2 (1980), 3-33. Peters, Harold Edwin. The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1934. Phelps, Dudley Maynard. Migration of Industry to south America. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936. ___________ The International Economic Positio.n of Argenti_n_a_. Philadelphia: university of Pennsylvania Press, 1938. Puiggros, Rudolfo. El yrigoyenism.Q.. Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Alvarez, 1965. Ramos, Jorge Abelardo. Revolucion y contrarrevo1uci6n e.n_l_a Argentina. Buenos Aires: Editorial Del Mar Dulce, 197 0. Randal 1, Laura. An Economic History of Argentina in~ Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Ras, Norberto, and Roberto Levis. El precio de la t.i..e..rJ:..a. su evolucion entr~~nos 1916 .Y.. 1978. Buenos Aires: sociedad Rural Argentina, 1980. Remrner, Karen L. Party Co~tition in Argentina and Chil~ Political Recrui..t.rnent and Public Pol..L~ 1890-1930. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1984. Reynolds, Lloyd G. Economic Growth in the Third world, 1850-1980. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.

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271 Ridings, Eugene W. "Foreign Predominance among Overseas Traders in Nineteenth-Century Latin America." Latin Ame.r..igan Research Review, 20: 2 <1985), 3-27. Rippy, J. Fred. eritish_Investments in Latin America. 1822194 9; A case study in the Operations of Pr i v..a..t..e Enterprise in Retarded Regions. Harnden, Connecticut: Archon, 1959. Rock, David. "Machine Politics in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Radical Party, 1912-1930," J.ournal of Latin American studies, 4: 2 (November, 1972), 233-256. ______ Politics in Argentina; The Ris~.Jlf Radicalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. ______ "Radical Populism and the Conservative Elite, 1912-1930," in David Rock, Ed. Argentina in the Twentieth Century, Pittsburgh: university of Pittsburgh, 1975, 66-87. ______ ~The rise of the Argentine Radical Party (the .llrlion Civica Radical> , 1891-1916," University of Cambridge, Centre of Latin American Studies, working Papers No. 2. Cambridge, n.d. Rodrfguez, Carlos J. .lilloyen; su revoluci6n pol.ill~ social. Buenos Ai res: Librer ia y Edi tor ial "La Facul tad", 1943. Romero, Jose Luis. A HistoJL-.Of Argentine Political Thought. Trans. Thomas F. McGann . Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. Rommel, George M. "Meat Production in the Argentine and Its Effect Upon the Industry in the United states," Yearbook of the united states Department of Agriculture, 19U (Washington, DC: USDA, 1915), 3 81-3 90. Ross, Stanley R. and Thomas F. McGann, eds. filleoos Aires~ 400 Years. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982. Salera, Virgil. Exchange Controljill_d the Argentin'L.M..~r.k..e..t New York: AMS Press, 1968.

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272 Scobie, James R. Revolutioll..._Qn the Pampas: A social History of Argentine Wheat. 186 0-191 o. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964. Skidmore, Thomas E. "Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in Twentieth-Century Latin America," in Virginia Bernhard, ed. ElitesJ Masses. and Modernization in Latin Ameri~ai 1850-1930, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979, 79-126. smith, Peter H. Argentina and _th_e._ Failure of Demo er~ conflict among Political Elites. 1904-1955. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. ________ "Los radicales argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930," DesarrollQ Economico, 7: 25 (April-June, 1967), 795-829. _______ Politics__an_ct Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and~New York: Colombia University Press, 1969. Snow, Peter G. -A_r_g-e_n_t-i_n~e~---~---~--S~i-s~t~o~r-y,__a-n=g Doctrine of th Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1965. Pol it ical For.c...e..Li.n__Argentina. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971. Sociedad Rural Argentina. Anal es ge la sociedad Ru.ull. Argentina. Buenos Aires: Sociedad Rural Argentina, 1916-1929. ____ An ua r io de .la.. soc i eda.d__fill_i:_al Argentina; es ta.of sticas ecOJ16.micas y agrar~. Buenos Aires: Luis L. Gotelli, 1928. Solberg, Carl. n Immigration and Urban Social Problems in Argentina and Chile, 1890-1914," Hispanic American Historical Rev_i~, 49: 2 (May, 1969), 215-32. _____________ "Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in Argentina, 1912-1930," Journal of Inter-American studies and N,orld Affai~, 13: 1 (January, 1971), l 8-52. ____________ "The Tariff and Politics in Argentina, 1916-193 o," Hispanic American _H_istor ica.1-.E.ev iew., 53: 2 (May, 1973), 260-284.

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273 Tamarin, David. The Argilltine Labor Movement. 1930-1945: A study in the P~ess of Peronis.,m. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985. ______________ "Yr igoyen and Peron: The Limits of Argentine Populism," in Michael L. Conniff, ed. Latin American Populism in comparative Perspective. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982; 31-45. Taylor, Carl c. Rural Life in Argentina. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948. Tulchin, Josephs. "The Argentine Economy During world war," Review of the River Plate 1970), 901-03; (June 30, 1970), 965-67; 1970), 44-46 the First C June 19, (July 10, "El credito agrario en . la Argentina, 1910-1926," Desarrollo Econ6mico, 18: 71 (December, 1978), 381-408. United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic survey of Latin~ 1949. New York: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1951. United States Tariff Commission, cattle and Beef in th~ united states: The Tariff Problems Involved. Washington, DC: United States Tariff Commission, Tariff Information Series No. 30, 1922. Vanger, Milton I. "Politics and Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America," Hispanic American H..istorical Review, 49: 1 (February, 1969), 80-93. Vzquez-Presedo, Vicente. El caso argentino; factores. com_e.i;cio exterior y 1875-1914. Buenos Aires: Editorial de Buenos Aires, 1971. ,..,. ,:i,.. rn1grac10~ desarrollo. Universitaria _______________________ "La evoluci6n industrial (Argentina, 1880-1910)," in Gustavo Ferrari and Ezequiel Gal lo, eds. La Argentina del ochenta al centenario. Buenos Aires: Editorial sudamericana, 1980; 405-18; Walter, Richard J. "Politics, Parties, and Elections in Argentina's Province of Buenos Aires, 1912-42," Hispanic American Historical Review, 64: 4 (November, 1984), 707-35.

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274 _______________ . The Province of Buenos Aires and Argentine Po_l_i_t..L~l912-1943. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. ________________ The sociali~~ Party of Argentina. 1890-1930. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977. __________________ "The Socioeconomic Growth of Buenos Aires in the Twentieth Century," in Stanley R. Ross and Thomas F. McGann, eds. Buenos Aires: 400 Years. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982; 66-126 The Washington Post. Washington, DC: 1986. Whitaker, Arthur P. "The Argentine Paradox," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and social science, 334 (March, 1961), 103-112 . Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey Kline, eds. Latin American Politics and Development. Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1979. Williams, John H. Argentina International Trade with Inconvertible Paper Money: 1880-1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920; Reprint: New York: AMS Press, 1971. Woll, F. w. Eroductive Feeding of Farm AnLmals. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1916. Wrenn, J. E. International Trade in Meats and Animal ~ctl..s washington, DC: u.s. Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Bulletin No. 26, 1925. ______ Marketing of__Aill~rican Mea..L~Progucts in Export Trade. Washington, DC: u.s. Department of Commerce, Trade Information Bulletin No. 333, 1925. Wright, Winthrop R. British-owned R.ilways in Argen.t.iruu. Their Effect on Economic Nationalism, 1854-1948. Austin: University of Texas, 1974. Zalduendo, Eduardo A. "Aspectos economicos del sistema de tansportes de Argentina," in Gustavo Ferrari and Ezequiel Gal lo, eds. La Argentina_ del och~nta al centenario. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 19 80; 43 9-6 8.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Blair Pierce Turner was born in California in 1947 and spent his youth traveling from ocean to ocean with his submariner father and family. He entered prep school in 1960, learned the arts of satire and expediency, and enjoyed the company of extraordinarily intelligent persons. Skills learned there carried him th rough another superb institution, St. Andrews Presbyterian College, and a somewhat lesser but also stimulating one, the United States Navy, which gave him a tour of Vietnam. He survived to enter graduate school at the University of Florida, where, in spite of flaunting all the required academic conventions, he nevertheless received excellent tutelage. He had already acquired a wife who paid in all ways for everything. He received his M.A. in 1975, spent some time teaching, but not serving, in prisons in Florida, went to Argentina on a Fulbright Fellowship in 1981, and got a real job at the Virginia Military Institute in 1982. After some delay and several crises, he delivered this dissertation in 1986. 27 5

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my l)pi nio n it conforms to acc eptable standar ds of schol a r.l y presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertationTu~gr~: of __ ::to:z::i~:::p::~David sdhnell, Chair ma n Professor of History ----I certify that I have read this stud y and that in my opinlon it conforms to acceptable standar ds of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in sco pe and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor , of Philosophy. _:KJ_&-_JL~Jd~{Ll~ZK~tLyle N. McAlister Distinguished Service Professor of History I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly prese11t~tion and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. l~l j __ j_J I k;/~ -----------Terry L. McCoy , Professor of Latin American Studies I certify that I have read this stud y and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. -------------Har ry W. Pa u 1 , Professor of Histor y I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is ful y adequate~ scope and quality, as a dissertation for_t _:egr:r~ -tor,;/;.hilosophy. ~orge E. POZZ tt~ ;;ofes or of History

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and qu.al ity, us a dissertation for7A~ . de~refr / of D.ct.or of Philosophy. v ; i , , L u Y; /' . / ,'/ 1(. ,., 1 -,/ / ~ / . -f ,,,../ ~ I ::' / / / '? V //1t4 ' .,,, f {~o~-=~:::~~=:o~=:--This dissertation was submitted to Graduate Faculty of the Department of History in the College of Liberal Ar ts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted for partial fulfillment of the requirements of tbe degret: of Doctor of Philosophy. December, 19 86 Dean, Graduate School

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