Citation
The early Latin American labor movement

Material Information

Title:
The early Latin American labor movement : Artisans and politics in Bogota, Colombia, 1832-1919
Creator:
Sowell, David Lee, 1952- ( Dissertant )
Bushnell, David ( Thesis advisor )
McAlister, L. N. ( Reviewer )
Chalmers, David M. ( Reviewer )
Doughty, Paul L. ( Reviewer )
Place of Publication:
Gainesville, Fla.
Publisher:
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1986
Language:
English
Physical Description:
viii, 385 leaves ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Artisans ( jstor )
Conservatism ( jstor )
Liberalism ( jstor )
Political organizations ( jstor )
Political parties ( jstor )
Political power ( jstor )
Politics ( jstor )
Tariffs ( jstor )
Voting ( jstor )
War ( jstor )
Arbeiterbewegung
Artesanos -- Bogotá
Bogotá (Colombia) -- History
Colombia -- Politics and government -- 1810
Dissertations, Academic -- History -- UF
History thesis, Ph.D.
Labor and laboring classes -- Colombia -- Bogotá
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Abstract:
Artisans participated actively in the politics of Bogoti during the first century of Colombia's nationhood. Craftsmen pursued various political objectives, foremost being the desire for tariff protection from the increased competition of foreign goods brought on by Colombia's fuller integration into the North Atlantic economy. Artisans also sought industrial education to improve their crafts, programs to enhance their social welfare, effective political participation, and an end to the partisan strife that ravaged the country. The initial opening for formal political expression came not from craftsmen, however, but as a result of the struggle for power between the Conservative and Liberal parties. In 1838, members of both groups helped organize societies designed to inculcate in artisans the ideologies of the emerging parties, including the concept of popular political participation. Ten years later, when tariff reform threatened the interests of Bogota's craft sector, artisans organized to defend themselves. Throughout the period of liberal reform (1847-54), artisans were integral factors in the capital's politics. The artisans' participation in the coup of Jose Maria Melo in 1854 signaled a recognition on their part that many of the reforms were contrary to their best interests. Thereafter, craftsmen pursued objectives consistent with their own socioeconomic interests and most attempted to isolate themselves from the partisan political struggle. By the 1870s, a combination of factors fragmented the artisan class, weakening its ability to organize the large groups common to earlier years. In the latter years of the nineteenth century, the artisan elites sought to protect themselves in mutual aid organizations, while the "rank and file" craftsmen were left without organized political expression. During the early years of the twentieth century, wage laborers began to emerge as important components of Bogota's working population. Several organizations attempted to represent the interests of both artisans and workers, but by the 1910s workers had assumed domination of the city's labor movement.
Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1986.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 368-384).
General Note:
Vita.
General Note:
Typescript.

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THE EARLY LATIN AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT: ARTISANS AND POLITICS IN BOGOTA, COLOMBIA,
1832-1919















By

DAVID LEE SOWELL


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


1986





Copyright 1986 by

David Lee Sowell

























For Christine and for Emily,
the two women who have done so much for making me realize
the value of life, and its promises for the future.


iii


















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


Numerous people helped in the completion of this dissertation, the most important being my wife, Christine. Without her support, both emotional and physical, it would not have been possible. I appreciate her labors more than these words can indicate. David Bushnell has been a constant reminder that scholarship and gentility are indeed compatible. His contributions to the refinement of this work are many, not the least his fine editorial abilities. Lyle McAlister helped me a great deal in learning the crafts of the historian. Jim Amelang has been both an unfailing critic and friend, even though we can not seem to find ourselves on the same continent very often. Jane Landers has been a special friend and confidant; her support helped me over some of the rougher hurdles of graduate school.

In Colombia, the staffs of the Biblioteca Nacional, the Archivo del Congreso, the Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, and the Archivo Nacional provided invaluable assistance in locating the material supporting this study. Special thanks are due to Francisco Gnecco Calvo for his assistance in making Bogott a comfortable living and working environment. Much of the inspiration for this work came from conversations over tinto with Oscar Saldarriaga V., a friend whose company is often missed.

Financial support for this project was provided by a Fulbright-Hays Grant and a Tinker Field Research Grant.


















TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMFVTS. iv

ABSTRACT. vii

CHAPTERS

1 INTRODUCTICN. 1

Objectives. 1 Definition of Terms. 3 Sources. 7 Historiography. 9

2 ARTISAN SOCIOECONOMIC EXPERIENCE, 1832-1919 .16

Introduction. 16 Economic Environment. 18 Social and Occupational Changes. 36 Conclusion. 45

3 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF ARTISANS, 1832-1845 .48

The Partisan Struggle for Power. . 48 The Appeal to the Masses, 1832-45. 55 Conclusion. 73

4 ARTISANS AND THE LIBERAL REFORM, 1845-54. 75

Overview. 75 La Sociedad de Artesanos, 1845-49. 77 Las Sociedades Demociraticas, 1849-51. 94 Division and Realignment, 1851-54. 118 El 17 de Abril. 143 Conclusion. 163

5 THE TRIUMPH OF RADICALISM, 1855-68. 169

Overview. 169 Liberal Reunification, 1855-59. 171 War, Reforms, and Economic Crisis, 1860-66 .186 La Sociedad de Unic~n de Artesanos, 1866-68 .205 Conclusion. 233





6 FRAGMENTATION OF THE ARTISAN CLASS, 1869-99 .


236


Overview . 236 Mutual Aid and Partisan Politics, 1869-79 . 238 N6nez, War, and the Regeneration, 1880-89 . 258 Plot, Repression, and Rebellion, 1890-99 . 271 Conclusion . 281

7 THE RISE OF THE WORKER'S LABOR MOVEMENT, 1899-1919 . 284

Overview . 284 Recovery and Reyes, 1899-1909 . 287 Industrialists and Workers, 1910-15 . 299 The Dawn of Workers' Socialism, 1916-19 . 324 Conclusion . o . 340

8 CONCLUSION . 343

The Partisan Struggle for Power . 343 Artisan Social, Economic, and Political Interests . 348 Craftsmen's Organizations: A Typology . 357 Artisan Political Activity . o . 363

BIBLIOGRAPHY . o . o . 368

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . o . 385





Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy



THE EARLY LATIN AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT:
ARTISANS AND POLITICS IN BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, 1832-1919

By

DAVID LEE SOWELL

August 1986


Chairman: David Bushnell
Major Department: History


Artisans participated actively in the politics of Bogotd during the first century of Colombia's nationhood. Craftsmen pursued various political objectives, foremost being the desire for tariff protection from the increased competition of foreign goods brought on by Colombia's fuller integration into the North Atlantic economy. Artisans also sought industrial education to improve their crafts, programs to enhance their social welfare, effective political participation, and an end to the partisan strife that ravaged the country.

The initial opening for formal political expression came not from craftsmen, however, but as a result of the struggle for power between the Conservative and Liberal parties. In 1838, members of both groups helped organize societies designed to inculcate in artisans the


Vii





ideologies of the emerging parties, including the concept of popular political participation. Ten years later, when tariff reform threatened the interests of Bogota"s craft sector, artisans organized to defend themselves. Throughout the period of liberal reform (1847-54), artisans were integral factors in the capital's politics. The artisans' participation in the coup of Jose Mar:(a Melo in 1854 signalled a recognition on their part that many of the reforms were contrary to their best interests. Thereafter, craftsmen pursued objectives consistent with their own socioeconomic interests and most attempted to isolate themselves from the partisan political struggle.

By the 1870s, a combination of factors fragmented the artisan

class, weakening its ability to organize the large groups common to earlier years. Tn the latter years of the nineteenth century, the artisan elites sought to protect themselves in mutual aid organizations, while the "rank and file" craftsmen were left without organized political expression. During the early years of the twentieth century, wage laborers began to emerge as important components of Bogota's working population. Several organizations attempted to represent the interests of both artisans and workers, but by the 1910s workers had assumed domination of the city's labor movement.


Viii


















CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION



Objectives



This study traces artisan political activity in Bogot'a, Colombia, from 1832 until 1919. 1It intends to reveal the social, economic, and political goals sought by artisans through active participation in a political system normally described as oligarchic. In the ninety years covered by this study, Bogotg and Colombia experienced marked economic and social change. Bogotg evolved from an isolated provincial town into a bustling city in tune with global rhythms. It was at the beginning of the national period a town with a largely self-sufficient economy, supported by traditional industries and linked to a limited regional market. By the 19109 the capital was in the throes of industrialization and. had been integrated into both national and international markets. Colombia's external economic role changed from that of a colonial source of gold bullion for Spanish coffers, to the




1 Colombia underwent several name changes during the nineteenth century: Colombia (along with Ecuador and Venezuela), from 1819 until 1830; La Repiablica de la Nueva Granada, from 1830 until 1857; La Confederacion Granadina, from 1857 until 1863; Los Estados Unidos de Colombia, from 1863 until 1886; and, finally, La Repeoblica de Colombia, from 1886 to the present. For the sake of clarity, I will use Colombia throughout the study.





supplier of preferred coffee to the tables of the United States and Europe.

Transformation of the Colombian economy bad a fundamental impact upon the artisans of Bogota'. Introduction into the global economy shattered their protected position in the colonial system. Many craftsmen suffered economic dislocation or proletarianization through the loss of their traditional economic niche. A few artisans emerged as small industrialists, but most suffered deterioration of their social and economic positions. Artisan social relations were transformed in the wake of radical changes in their productive functions. Relationships with other members of their class were redefined, as were those with individuals of other classes. These socioeconomic changes created special problems, which in turn called into being new class interests.

In order to understand the context in which artisans pursued their specific concerns, much attention will be directed toward Colombia's political system. The struggle for power between elite-dominated Conservative and Liberal parties was the dynamo for nineteenth-century Colombian politics. Elites strove to implement their own ideological programs and competed for limited governmental positions. In so doing, they drew non-elite social groups into the political process in an effort to enhance their chances for domination of the state apparatus. Competition for power first enabled artisans to gain a political voice and in time offered them the opportunity to express their class objectives. Artisans were not wholly dependent upon elites for political mobilization, however; at times they organized for satisfaction of their own ambitions. Yet tradesmen could not isolate





themselves from established parties and thus the narrative of their political activity is closely intertwined with that of the larger process.

Both changing socioeconomic conditions and the general political environment affected the tempo of artisan political activity. It is possible to speak of a more or less homogeneous artisan class in the beginning of the national period. Internal stratifications were present, but these did not override its essential homogeneity. This situation existed until the 1860s. During the 1840s, 18509, and 1860s the most cohesive artisan organizations functioned. As Bogotfi's economy was transformed during the last third of the nineteenth century, differences in the artisan class became more significant. Fragmentation of the artisan class resulted in the demise of broad mobilizations. By the beginning of this century skilled independent craftsmen, journeymen associated with the emerging industrial concerns, proletarianized laborers, and various other types of workers made up the city's working population. This division of the labor force, clearly visible by the 1910s, coincided with the replacement of artisans as leaders of the Colombian labor movement by workers associated with industrial production and transportation systems.



Definition of Terms



Artisans in nineteenth-century Bogota existed as individuals

linked by common involvement in the mode of production. In the purest sense they were independent producers who practiced a skilled trade. Such a definition, of course, did not accurately apply to all people





who were labelled artisans. At one end of the skilled trade spectrum were individuals barely differentiated from unskilled laborers. At the other end were near-bourgeoisie who did very little manual labor themselves and who subsisted on the labor of others. Yet both flextremes" might identify themselves and be identified by others as artisans. Clearly, one must go beyond purely occupational categories in order to identify the craftsmen of the period.

The traditional Spanish derision of manual labor helps in this

regard. Certain levels of society would never refer to themselves as artisans because the term implied an inferior social status. These men were the hidalgos of colonial times; for the national period I shall refer to them as "elites." Artisans were separated from the elite by the fact that their economic well-being sprang from consistent and close contact with manual labor.

Delimiting the artisan from the worker is much more difficult. Trades in nineteenth-century Bogota' were not so organized as to make this division readily apparent. The lack of accurate descriptive information aggravates the problem. Moreover, for political purposes artisans often identified themselves as part of the pueblo, which consisted in the main of workers. However, artisans at times also separated themselves from the pueblo, a self-description which helps distinguish the artisan and the worker.

Artisans consistently identified themselves as skilled laborers, who, because of their productive ability were economically independent and contributed "positively" to society. Craftsmen expressed pride that their labor enabled them to be economically independent and not bound to others. Clearly the wage worker could not make this claim.









This is not to say that all people who called themselves artisans were economically independent; most were dependent upon others for raw materials, credit, and capital, but such needs did not negate a selfimage of economic independence. In fact, the vehement defense of this independence in the face of competition from foreign products suggests its importance for artisan self-definition.

Both skilled labor and economic independence contributed to the

artisans' perceived social value. Tradesmen were the productive sector of society. Many could read and write and others were well educated. Throughout most of the nineteenth century the political system afforded to a great number of artisans full citizenship, including the right to vote on the basis of property, income, literacy, or other criteria. This political status contributed greatly to their republican ideals, and to the struggle for control of their political destiny.

These factors combined to create a sense of what it meant to be an artisan in nineteenth-century Bogota. Above all, consciousness defined the artisan class. Craftsmen were the skilled producers of nineteenth century Colombian society, who, because of their contributions, felt that their opinions and needs merited consideration in the resolution of political and social questions. Artisans shared not only a common productive function, but they also perceived the common threat that foreign goods posed to their livelihood and social status. The danger of having their position in society undermined contributed greatly to a shared consciousness. So too did the recruitment of craftsmen by elite political groups.

While an artisan class existed throughout most of the nineteenth century, most of the statements which claimed to represent all artisans










in fact came from a limited portion of that class. An artisan elite, formed through its economic success or through its relationships with elite political parties, dominated artisan organizations, the artisan press, and the documentation which survives to illustrate the artisans' place in the century. I feel that these men, far from being unrepresentative of their class, maintained at least part of their leadership by their ability to express the general interests of the class. Therefore, while the vocal artisans came from a smaller section of the class, it seems that in most instances their comments mirrored the interests of the less articulate members of the artisan class.

Throughout this study reference will be made to organized artisan political activity. Artisans mobilized and were recruited by elite groups for different reasons. The most common form of artisan organization was electoral in nature. Such groups were generally short-lived and not directed by tradesmen. Other efforts were made by associated artisans to support a broader political goal than victory in a single election, such as the ongoing pursuit of tariff protection. On occasion artisans supplied both the impetus and direction for their own organizations, although political reality necessitated some connections with non-artisan sectors. Mutual aid societies are also considered to be a form of political mobilization in that they were always potential political actors, and sometimes quite influential. Finally, I consider direct action by crowds to be an articulation of political sentiment. In short, any activity that represented artisan political expression, formal or informal, will be treated as a form of political activity.









The second chapter makes a generalized analysis of economic and social conditions in the capital that influenced political activity. During the early years examined by this study the primary socioeconomic interests of artisans in the nineteenth century took shape. Chapters three through seven focus upon different stages of artisan political activity from 1832 until 1919. The years covered by the different chapters are determined by changes in the nature of that activity. At times these chapters coincide with "standard" political periodization, while at others they do not. Finally, the conclusion draws the entire period together, analysing both the social and economic factors which influenced artisan mobilization, and the political framework which allowed for their participation and expression.



Sources



My original intention was to conduct a study of the artisan class of nineteenth-century Bogota' in its fullest ramifications. Family relations, cultural characteristics, trade activities, and formal and informal associations were but a few of the facets to be addressed. In effect, I had wanted to do a labor history in the beat tradition of 11new social history." For too long social groups in Latin America have been studied solely for their political role. They have frequently been denied their own place in history, often being studied only in light of their exploitation by elite groups. I bad also hoped to avoid the time-worn treadmill of the more conventional sort of Marxist labor historiography. I was sure that I could examine artisans in light of their own social and cultural importance.









As it turned out, the zeal and expertise of bogotano rioters, along with non-violent destruction of archives, redefined my project. New methodologies are useful only when sources are available to support them. Such data are in large part absent for nineteenth-century Bogota. The alcaldia, home of information on local taxes, juridical procedures, and city government, was burned in 1903. Departmental archives were destroyed in 1948. Part of the archives of the diocese was destroyed in the 9 de abril. Notarial archives are extant, but disorganized to a point of limited utility unless one has years to research. Consequently, the nature of available sources dictated the political emphasis of my work.

Historians concerned with the political history on the period are blessed with abundant data in the Archivo del Congreso, numerous private collections of family papers, archives of the Academia Colombiana de Ristoria, several outstanding newspaper collections, and fine examples of political handouts and broadsides, to cite only the more obvious sources. Congressional archives, newspapers, and handouts offer a wealth of information on artisan political activity. Yet, while good data are available, their limitations define the scope of this work. Information on the artisan elite is more common than on the "1rank-and-file" artisan. One can locate data on artisan political societies, but not have access to their internal functions. Informal associations are particularly difficult to document. Information on trade activities, including apprenticeship systems, are almost nonexistent, although complaints about tariff policy abound. Social information must be gleaned carefully from sources and employed with more generalization than would be desired; even then, one must question









its representativeness. The data which remain dictate a political emphasis, although that emphasis has been balanced by an orientation toward social history. It is my hope that this work will improve upon traditional histories of the Latin American labor movement by presenting a more integrated history of a social class engaged in political activity.



Historiography



Histories of the Colombian labor movement share several analytical characteristics. Attention has centered upon institutional aspects of the twentieth century labor movement, as well as syndicalist, political, or strike activity. Thus incidents such as the 1924 strike of Barrancabermeja oil workers or the creation of the -Union de Trabajadores de Colombia are well documented. Most investigations therefore have been primarily concerned with "modern" workers. Workers lacking organizational expression have seldom been studied. Social characteristics are frequently discussed in relation to strike demands, but not in the formation of a working class culture or consciousness. Yet, despite the focus upon the twentieth century movement, we lack a clear understanding of the origins of the twentieth-century labor movement, especially its roots in artisanal activity of the previous century.

Little attention has been directed toward nineteenth-century labor history, or on the artisan sector of the population. 2Scholars of



2 Very few studies have examined urban workers in colonial
Colombia. Foremost are the series of articles by Humberto Triana y Antorveza, which include: "El aprendizaje en los gremios









Colombia's labor movement, illustrated by Miguel Urrutia Montoya in The

Development of the Colombian Labor Movement, examines only the

Democratic Society in discussing "labor in the nineteenth century."3 He

briefly mentions that mutual aid societies were formed in various

Colombian cities (though he does not included those of Bogota), but

allows them no political role. Not until the 1919 meeting of the

Workers' Assembly does Urrutia recognize laborers' political activity

in the Colombian capital during the current century. Edgar Caicedo

simply notes as an antecedent to discussion of the stages of the

Colombian labor movement:

The activities of mutualist organizations, from the middle of the nineteenth century, constitutes only
the prehistory of the syndicalist movement .
Those organizations were heterogeneous groups of
artisans, principally, with confused trade
ideologies and limited objectives. To say this is not to lessen recognition of the important social and political struggles undertaken by artisans of the Democratic Societies in the dawn of Colombian
capitalism.



neogranadinos," Boletin Cultural y Bibliogrifico, 8:5 (1965), 735-42; "El aspecto religioso en los gremios neogranadinos," Ibid., 9:2 (1966), 269-81; "Eamenes, licenclas, fianzas y elecciones artesanales," Ibid., 9:2 (1966). 65-73; "Extranjeros y grupos etnlcos en los gremios neogranadinos," Ibid., 8:1 (1965), 24-32; and "La libertad laboral y la supres16n de los gremios neogranadinos," Ibid., 8:7 (1965), 1015-21. For a discussion of the importance of artisans in cities of colonial Latin America, see Lyman Johnson, "Artisans," in Cities and Society in Colonial Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), ed. by Louisa Schell Hoberman and Susan Migden Socolow, 227-50.

Other studies in a similar vein include: Victor Manuel Moncayo and Fernando Rojas, Luchas obreras y politica laboral en Colombia (Bogota: La Carreta, 1978); Daniel Pecaut, Politica y sindicalismo en Colombia (Bogota: La Carreta, 1973); and Marco A. Cordoba A., Elementos de sindicalismo (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1977).
Migual Urrutia, The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).
Edgar Caicedo, Historia de las luchas sindicales en Colombia (Bogota: Ediciones CEIS,










Aside from the multitude of studies on the mid-century Sociedades Democrdticas de Artesanos de Bogots, very little is known of other
6
workers or of organizations in which they were influential. Few words have been dedicated to the social, cultural, or economic experiences of

workers, or to their political activity. Historical examinations of workers in cities other than Bogota have been even sketchier. In

short, little is known of the artisanal labor movement or of the transition from it to the modern labor movement.

Other areas of Latin America share similar historiographical

patterns, especially the institutional focus and the Marxist
7
methodological analysis. Labor historians of Latin America have, for the most part, bypassed the nineteenth century in the rush to examine

the twentieth century. Labor scholars and syndicalist activists have long dominated the discussion of the labor movement, adding a sense of urgency to their interpretations seldom found in the works of non-Latin




1982), 57.
6 The list of scholars drawn to examination of the Democratic Societies is extensive. Aside from Urrutia, representative studies include: Gustavo Vargas MartCnez, Colombia 1854: Melo, los artesanos y el socialismo (Bogota: Editorial la Oveja Negra, 1973); Enrique Gavir a Lievano, "Las Sociedades Democraticas o de artesanos en Colombia," Correo de los Andes, No. 24 (January-February 1984), 67-76; German R. Mejra Pavony, "Las Sociedades Democraticas (1848-1854): Problemas historiograficos," Universitas Humanistica, 11:17 (March 1982), 145-76; Antaloli Shulgovski, "La 'Comuna de Bogota' y el socialismo U'topico," America Latina, 8/85 (August 1985), 45-56.

For discussion of historiographical tendencies, see Kenneth
Paul Erickson, Patrick V. Peppe, and Hobart Spalding, Jr., "Research on the Urban Working Class and Organized Labor in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: What is left to be Done?" Latin American Research Review, 9:2 (Summer 1974), 115-42; Charles Bergquist, "What is being Done? Some Fecent Studies on the Urban Working Class and Organized Labor in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 16:1 (1981), 203-23.









scholars.8 Representative of the traditional Marxist approach are the works of Argentine sociologist Julio Godio, who places a great emphasis upon "ideological influences" and the development of labor unions. Godio, in referring to the nineteenth century, analyzes the 1850-80 period as one of a "workers' movement without a working class" and the 1880-1918 period as the years when both the class and the movement itself came into being. While he recognizes the importance of artisanal mutual aid associations as precursors of latter-day syndicates, be fails to appreciate the conservative nature of most artisan groups. For Godio, their importance was as a "brewing pot" for revolutionary ideologies.9 Many good histories of labor exist, especially in countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Cuba, or Brazil where labor's political power has had the strongest impact. Numerous attempts have also been made to pen "histories of the Latin American labor movement." On the whole these impress the reader with how "neatly" it all fits into a single package.

The works of Hobart Spalding Jr. and Charles Bergquist stand out as stimulating applications of dependentista ideas to examination of Latin American laborers. Spalding posits three general periods of organized labor in Latin America, each corresponding to a stage of intergration into dependent relations: the formative period (prior to World War One); the expansive and explosive period (World War One to






8 Judith Evans, "Results and Prospects: Some Observations on Latin American Labor Studies," International Labor and Working Class History, No. 16 (Fall 1979), 29-30.
9 Julio Godio, El movimiento obrero de Amrica Latina, 1850-1918 (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1978), 15-16.








the Depression); and the period of cooption and repression (1930 onward). Central to this periodization is global economic development and crisis, Latin American industrialization, workers' ideologies, and state political activities. Spalding concludes that governments have successfully restrained radical demands of laborers, thereby coopting their movement and keeping Latin America "safe" for foreign capitalists. 10By contrast, Bergquist suggests that pressures by laborers in dependent industries have challenged the historic social indifference of many Latin American governments and, in doing so, have ammeliorated socioeconomic conditions in many countries. Fe allows that workers have been powerful agents in shaping nations in twentieth century Latin America, with largely positive results. 11

Both of these works demand establishment of dominant export

industries and dependent economic relations that serve to catalyze the Latin American labor movement. This approach seems appropriate for the comprehension of the twentieth century movement, especially the analysis of Bergquist. It, however, does little to illuminate activity by organized laborers in the nineteenth century before a dependent export economy was fully operative. 12Moreover, as Bergquist points






10 Hobart Spalding, Jr., Organized Labor in Latin America:
Historical Case Studies of Workers in Dependent Societies (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), passim.
11 Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 1-14.

12For a recent study that argues that Colombia's entry into the world economy was retarded until the current century, see Jose Antonio Ocampo, Colombia y la economic mundial, 1830-1910 (Bogota: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984).








out, developing political systems in the nineteenth century strongly 13
color the character of this century's labor movements.

Only recently have historians begun to study nineteenth-century labor movements on their own terms. Paul Gootenberg's study of Lima artisans, Frederick J. Shaw's work on Mexico City, and Carlos Luis Fallas Monge's work on Costa Rica stand out as notable examples.14 Peter Blanchard adds much to the understanding of the transition from the early to modern labor movement in Peru.15 These exceptions aside, much remains to be done on the nineteenth century labor movement.

Labor historiography of nineteenth-century Latin America has only recently begun to be influenced by histories of European and United States laborers during the same period. Historians such as E. P. Thompson, David Montgomery, and William Sewell have contributed to a wealth of studies which explore the depth and significance of European and United States artisanal responses to industrialization. Unfortunately, the prerequisite social and cultural studies, and often even the political histories which would permit the same calibre of scholarship on Latin American workers, are generally lacking. Moreover, statistical data are scarce and often of dubious reliability.




13 Bergquist, Labor in Latin America, 376-78.

14 Paul Gootenberg, "The Social Origins of Protectionism and Free Trade in Nineteenth-Century Lima," Journal of Latin American Studies, 14:2 (November 1982), 329-58i Frederick J. Shaw, "The Artisan in Mexico City (1824-1853)," in El trabajo y los trabajadores en la historia de M4xico (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mixico, 1979), ed. by Elsa Cecilia Frost et al., 399-418; Carlos Luis Fallas Monge, El movimiento obrero en Costa Rica, 1830-1902 (San Jose: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 1983).
15 Peter Blanchard, The Origins of the Peruvian Labor Movement, 1883-1919 (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982).





15

Nonetheless, as I hope to demonstrate, the methodology devised by these scholars can help the historian of Latin America to suggest new interpretations of its labor movement.


















CHAPTER 2

ARTISAN SOCIOECONOMIC EXPERIENCE, 1832-1919





Introduction



In May 1846, 230 bogotano artisans petitioned the Colombian

Congress not to lower tariff rates on foreign merchandise competitive with their own products. The craftsmen were concerned that their already precarious economic situation would become intenable if they were faced with a flood of foreign competition. Their economic standing had suffered greatly during the War of the Supremes (1839-42) and had been dealt a further blow by the credit crisis of 1842. The petitioners claimed to speak not only for some 2,000 artisans and their families living in the capital, but also for tradesmen in other areas of the country. Lowered tariff rates, they argued, would damage this crucial productive sector of the domestic economy, a fate particularly unjust to artisans who had helped defend the government in the fighting a few years earlier. Moreover, negative repercussions would be felt by other social sectors as the artisan class became less productive and the economy in general deteriorated. IIn spite of these arguments,



1 Archivo del Congreso, Senado, proyectos negados, 1846, V, folios 118-26. (Hereafter AC.)





congress lowered tariff rates by about 33% the following year. In response, the same tradesmen formed La Sociedad de Artesanos de Boxotli with the intent to undertake political action to raise tariff rates to previous levels and also to work for mutual aid.

Several observations can be made from this incident. Artisans

first entered the formal political process in defense of their economic well-being, which had been undermined by war and financial crisis and which was further threatened by proposed tariff reductions. In expressing their concerns, tradesmen thought it important to stress both their socioeconomic importance as producers and their military sacrifices in support of the legal constitutional order. They noted, moreover, that not only would individual artisans be affected by the proposed legislation, but also that their families, other social sectors, and even the country as a whole would suffer in turn. Artisans did not view themselves in isolation, but as important components of a larger social environment that included the entire nation in its largest manifestation. As this example indicates, it is impossible to comprehend the tempo and nature of political activity by Colombian craftsmen by examining only their organizations or the political environment in which they functioned; artisan social and economic experiences must be taken into account as well.

Unfortunately, a survey of the various factors which shaped artisan socioeconomic fortunes from 1832 until 1919 faces several problems at the outset. Foremost among these is that little is known of specific facets of the social and economic conditions experienced by craftsmen during these years. At times substantive comments can be made, but most aspects of the craftsmen's changing circumstances can only be





18

dealt with tentatively. Analysis of the general economy of the capital can be conducted with relative ease, as can the study of regional and national trends and governmental policies which influenced economic development. But only tentative comments can be made regarding the most immediate facets of the tradesmen's economic activity.

Data illuminating artisan social and cultural norms are even more scarce, as are comprehensive analyses of bogotano society. Again it is possible to make only tentative comments regarding such questions as the location of artisans within the capital's social spectrum, their specific cultural practices, or their ideologies in comparison to those of non-skilled workers. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the descriptions which do exist probably are most appropriate for Ovelite" tradesmen and are not necessarily accurate appraisals of other artisans. The internal differentiation of the artisan class, and how this changed, can be presented only in general terms.

Nonetheless, in spite of these limitations, I sball try to present an analysis of artisan socioeconomic experience from the 18308 through the 1910s. It will require analysis both of general economic conditions and special observations on economic trends that affected artisans. Changes in the structure of the artisan class will then be described, especially as they influenced artisan political activity.





Economic Environment



An essential continuity marked the transition from the latecolonial to the early-national period, as the "Neo-Bourbon" state











continued to assume partial responsibility for economic development.2 The fledgling state retained much of the colonial fiscal system, but did make some minor changes. The principle holdovers were various monopolies (estancos), especially on tobacco; diezmos; and the tariff system. The Indian tribute was abolished, as were internal customs duties and most applications of the alcabala. Colonial revenue sources were the most reliable means to satisfy the fiscal needs of the state, and even those politicians who found them ideologically distasteful saw
3
the necessity of keeping the more lucrative ones.

The economic policy which most directly influenced artisans was the tariff. Little difference existed between the level of tariff duties from the late-colonial to early-national periods, but in neither instance were rates extremely high.4 Methods of assessment were altered and tariff schedules adjusted during the 1820s, but not the essential degree of protection. The tariff was the largest source of revenue for the government, and few officials, no matter their economic philosophy, were willing to reduce the already meager fiscal base of the






2 Historians use the term Neo-Bourbon in reference to the years
prior to the era of liberal reform, to suggest the essential continuity of Spanish economic patterns shaped by Bourbon reformers into the Republican period.
David Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Newark: University of Deleware Press, 1954), 78-81; William Paul McGreevey, An Economic History of Colombia, 1845-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 39; Luis Cspina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion en Colombia, 1810 a 1930 (Bogota: Editorial Santa Fe, 1959), 127; Lufs Eduardo Nieto Arteta, Economia y cultura en la historia de Colombia (Bogota: Editorial Viento del Pueblo, 1975), passim.
4
Mccreevey, Economic History of Colombia, 33.









government. Both the 1832 and 1833 tariffs afforded moderate protection to the craftsman; the latter schedule had protection, as well as revenue, as one of its formal objectives. 5

The degree to which these tariffs actually protected native crafts is disputed. Luis Ospina Vasquez suggests that artisan production was effectively buffered from foreign competition. 6Frank Safford, however, insists that craftsmen, especially those who produced consumer goods (shoes, clothing, etc.) suffered from the impact of foreign production. 7Neither scholar bases his claim on much more than informed opinion, so that resolution of this question must await the discovery of more substantial data. One should note, however, that artisans did not voice complaints about tariff policies during the years prior to passage of the 1847 tariff law. Thereafter, craftsmen often reflected upon the Neo-Bourbon tariff structure with nostalgia, suggesting that they had at least felt protected.

In addition to customs duties, local and provincial taxes on imported goods added to the economic protection of the native producer. 8So too did high transportation costs. The dismal condition

of the nation'sa roads served to insulate the Bogota artisan from foreign competition, and, although the Neo-Bourbon governments desired to improve the transportation infrastructure, mule teams continued to




5Ospina Vtsquez, Industria y protecc16n, 152-53.

6 Ibid., 172.

7Frank Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise In Central Colombia, 1821-1870" MP. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1965), 77, 15051.

8Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecci6n, 164.









carry most imports up the mountains from the Magdalena River to Bogota until late in the century. Attempts were made in the 1820s and 18308 to establish steam navigation on the Magdalena itself, but permanent service was not in place until 1847. By the 18609, however, upstream transportation costs had fallen by up to one-half, which, in combination with lower tariffs, contributed to an artisanal crisis in Bogota in the 1860s.

During the colonial period Bogota had been more an administrative than a productive center and consequently had a weak craft
10
tradition. The decadent state of its arts spurred viceregal authorities in 1777 to attempt organization of a guild system in order 11
to develop competent artisans. Guilds did not become firmly established, however, and their abolition in 1824 evoked little opposition.12

The capital served as the center of an upland market which

stretched from Ibagie to Bucaramanga. Commodities exchanged in the region were limited by extreme geographical obstacles and poor roads. Only the most valuable items--by weight--were traded. What little






Robert L. Gilmore and John P. Farrison, "Juan Bernardo Ethers and the Introduction of Steam Navigation on the Magdalena River," Hispanic American Historical Review, 28:3 (November 1948), 335-59; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 313-15; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecci6n, 216.

10 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 17-18.

11 Francisco Robledo, "Ynstruccin de gremios en gral.Pa todos oficios aprobada pr el Exmo Sor. Virrey del Rno. Siguense a ella quantos papeles y providens se han creado en el asunto," Revista del Archivo Nacional, Nos. 10-11 (October-November 1936), 13-37.
12 Bushnell, Santander Regime, 130.









evidence there is suggests that products made in Bogot'a did not circulate widely throughout this market, which was due at least in part to local production of most goods) but undoubtedly also because of the widespread introduction of foreign goods after Independence. British and other foreign products entering the country through the Magdalena River tended to constrict the capital's commercial influence. Indeed, Bogota soon became the distribution hub of imported items. 13John Steuart, writing in the 18309, noted the presence of abundant

- 14
quantities of British products in the Bogota marketplace. Artisans, particularly the less skilled, undoubtedly had little capacity to respond to such a challenge, although tariffs and geography moderated the threat before mid-century.

Economic stagnation undoubtedly contributed to Bogota's isolation prior to the 18609. Only in the 1830s was the economy even mildly stimulated, most likely by the return of peace. Capital was in extremely short supply after the exhaustion of loans from Britain in the l820s, and It remained scarce until the 18409. The situation was especially severe during the crisis caused by the breakup of Gran Colombia in 1830 and after the War of the Supremes. Judas Tadeo Landinez, a capitalist from Boyacd, helped sustain the government during the worst stages of the war, when tariff revenues had been cut off and the government was in a desperate situation. In April 1841




13 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 9-10. 102-05; Safford, The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a Technical Elite


eleven months (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1838), 145.


kAustin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 26.
14 John Steuart, B Ootg in 1836-7. Being a Narrative of an expedition to the Ca ital of New-Grenada and_ a residence there of









Landfnez loaned the government 120,000 pesos to pay official's salaries, followed by another 500,000 pesos three months later. With the very profitable results of the loans, Landinez invested heavily in Sabana land holdings, spurring other investors to do the same. The later half of 1841 saw Bogotd experience an explosion of speculation, sustained almost entirely by Landrnez's funds, which, as it turned out, were seriously stretched. In December of that year his bubble burst, dragging him and many other capitalists into bankruptcy. As a result of the speculation crisis, credit was almost completely unavailable in 15
Bogota for the 1842-43 years.

Government-aided industrial projects brighten this otherwise

gloomy portrait. Many early republican leaders, especially those from the highlands around Bogota, thought that Colombia should develop an industrial component to supplement its agricultural and mining base. Proponents of industrialization favored not only protective tariffs but also direct state stimulation of private industrial ventures. The common practice was for the government to issue a monopoly for production of a certain item for a given number of years in a specified region, so that an industry could develop in a protected environment. Privileges were extended to an iron works, china factory, paper plant, and factories for glass and textile production.16







15 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 68-80; Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 71-77; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 145; Jose Manuel Restrepo, Diario poli1ico y militar, 4 vols. (Bogoti: Imprenta Nacional, 1954), II, 283-84, 328.
16 Ospina Vdsquez, Industria y proteccidn, 161-84; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 157-72.











On the whole, these early industrial efforts were disappointing, although there were some successes. The china factory, managed by Nicola's Neiva and the English Peak brothers, began construction in 1832 and was producing china and porcelain two years later. Unfortunately, it was destroyed by fire in 1834, and sustained production was delayed until 1836. In 1837 the Neiva factory boasted two kilns, three stoves, and was said to have sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the entire nation. Sixty-one Colombians and four foreigners worked in the factory. While it experienced occasional misfortunes, the factory continued to operate through the end of the century. The Pacho Iron Works was given a 15-year monopoly in 1827 and was in production by the 1830s, albeit at a loss. A new owner made the enterprise a success in the 1850s, and by the 1860s it constituted an important factor in the regional economy, providing abundant quantities of lower-quality iron which supported many spin-off industries. 17

Other ventures did not fare as well. The paper mill began

production in 1836 but lasted only until 1849. The textile factory, probably the most sheltered industry under the tariff system, was producing good, inexpensive cotton fabric by 1838 that soon thereafter satisfied the needs of the Bogots market; but it was nonetheless bankrupt by January 1848. The glass works privileged in 1834 was a dismal failure. It was producing in 1837, using French craftsmen, but was closed by 1839. 18



17 Ospina Va~squez, Tndustria y protecci~n, 17; Saf ford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 157-66.
18 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 164-72; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecci4:ui, 167-68, 176, 182. Both Ospina and Safford









The benefits to the capital's artisans from these industries in terms of employment or expanded opportunity were probably limited. However, the same men who sponsored the industries also favored industrial and technical education, which could have helped craftsmen over the long term. Such educational endeavors were seen not only as an aid to industrial development, but also as a means to insure social order. in 1841 Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara began an "industrial fair" to reward good craftsmanship and moral achievement. 19The Philanthropic Society, of which Gutierrez was president, organized annual industrial expositions from 1842 until 1849. 20

Representative of the expositions was the 1846 fair. Prizes were awarded in at least ten catagorles. Quite significantly, only one machine was displayed, which, although it "was nothing new conceptually," won a prize. Cabinet making was the only skilled craft represented, but cloth from Socorro and china from the Neiva factory won awards. Poor participation plagued the fairs, so that after 1849










insist that the cause of these failures was not technical. Ospina cites as principal factors in their decline the disruptive effects of the War of the Supremes upon capital and labor, along with a lack of sustained governmental support. Safford suggests that the market for consumer goods was simply too small and that investors had been overly optimistic about expansion. They agree that the failure of these ventures disillusioned backers of Colombian industrialization and contributed greatly to the governmental reorientation toward export agriculture that took place In the 18409. Ospina Vasquez, Industriay proteccion, 180-84; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 179; Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 43.
19 Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 66-67.

20 El Dia, November 6, 1842.





the Society decided to bold them every four years. There is no evidence, however, that a fair was held after 1849. 21

During the Neo-Bourbon period, artisans labored under conditions with which they were familiar. Political unrest hindered their production, as did economic stagnation and the credit crisis. However, such bad been the state of affairs for most of the period since at least 1810. Aside from the few industrial efforts, the economic structure of the city and governmental policies in no way presented new challenges. Craftsmen struggled to earn a living, by and large unaffected economically by the change from colonial government to independence.

Reforms after 1845 radically altered the country's economic

structure by removing most colonial legacies. In general, the reform era, which lasted from 1845 until 1863, oriented the economy toward production of export crops, fiscally decentralized the government, and redefined the nature of the state's intervention in the economic affairs of the nation. The earliest reforms dealt with monetary and fiscal matters. An attempt was made to eliminate the confusion resulting from multiple currencies by minting a decimal-based silver real and a peso fuerte composed of ten resales. 22 Various decentralization laws reflected the belief that an economy should be allowed to function without direct interference from the central authorities. The diezmo was removed from church jurisdiction and given




21 Ibid., May 4, 1845, August 9, 1846; El Constitucional, July 4, 1846.
22 Under the old coinage eight resales made up the peso. The new system was in place after 1853.








to provincial governments. Certain revenues from stamped paper were also transferred to provincial authorities. In the same spirit, much of the rest of the state's fiscal apparatus was decentralized in 1850. At least initially, decentralization was a fiscal disaster. It was one reason for a drop in national revenues of 47% between 1849 and 1851. 23 Unsuccessful attempts were made to impose a national system of direct taxation to offset revenue losses, but only several states had any success with such methods.

A considerable portion of the drop in revenues was due to

demonopolization of tobacco production, which was begun in 1846 and completed in 1850. (Neither the salt nor aguardiente monopolies were altered.) Legislators anticipated that duties from increased production and exportation of tobacco would balance losses from demonopolization. Tobacco production boomed in the Ambalema area under the direction of the Montoya y Sa'enz firm, and tobacco became the most important export commodity through the 1870s. While it is questionable that revenue losses from demonopolization were indeed compensated by earnings from tobacco exports, the nation's economy was firmly reoriented towards production of export crops. 2

Fundamental to the emergence of an export economy were lower

tariff barriers. In 1847 the tariff was reorganized and duties lowered by about 33%. That measure undoubtedly stimulated trade, but it also served to threaten the position of Bogota's craftsmen. The 1851 tariff






23 lMemoria de Hacienda, 1859, as cited in McGreevey, Economic History of Colombia, 86.
24 Saf ford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 255.









raised duties on certain finished products somewhat, but it did not seek deliberately to protect native industries. Anti-protectionist philosophy was illustrated by the 1861 tariff, which explicitly stated that its sole purpose was for revenues. In that tariff, the cumbersome colonial arancel was replaced by a three-tiered system of assessment based upon weight. The 1861 tariff set the pattern for duties that 26
lasted until 1880. Efforts to facilitate international trade included granting duty-free status to several ports, and removal of taxes on international ships using the Magdalena River, although revenue needs forced the government to impose a mild tax on international river transportation in 1856. In addition, several attempts were made to improve the nation's infrastructure, most of which were unsuccessful.

The reforms liberalized land policies, sharply curtailed corporate ownership of land, increased distribution of tierras baldias, and took further steps to eliminate the Indian resguardo. The most significant reform in land tenure was the disamortization of church lands decreed by General Tomts Cipriano de Mosquera in 1861. The impact of disamortization has yet to be rigorously studied, but it undoubtedly contributed to the concentration of land in private hands, especially
27
in urban areas.






25 Ospina Vdsquez, Industria y protecci6n, 211.

26 Bushnell, "Two Stages of Colombian Tariff Policy: The Radical Era and Return to Protection (1861-1885)," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 9:4 (Spring 1956), 5-7.
27
On the general question of church-state relations, see Jorge Villegas, Colombia: Enfrentamiento iglesia-estado, 1819-1887 (Bogota: La Carreta, 1981.) See the BoletCn del Credito Nacional for reports of the commission charged with sale of church lands.







29

The economic climate of Bogota in large part reflected the success of exports or the disruption of war. In the late 1840s the city began to emerge from the economic doldrums occasioned by the War of the Supremes. The capital profited from monies generated by the expansion of tobacco, causing an economic upsurge which dominated the 1850.28 Unfortunately, the worldwide recession of 1857-58, coupled with the civil war of 1859-62, drove the economy into a deep recession which lasted throughout the 1860s. During this decade the city suffered some of the worst hardships of the century. By 1863 complaints circulated of general misery caused by the war of 1859-62 in the capital, which was said to have hurt artisans, but not to the extent that it did unskilled laborers. A year later, however, even many independent artisans were reportedly hard pressed to find work.29 In 1867 Miguel Samper penned his noted "La miseria en Bogota," which graphically narrated the city's miserable condition.

Beggars fill the streets and plazas . . The
worker can not find constant employment, nor can
the shop masters count on work; the property owner
neither receives rent payments nor new rents; the shop- keeper does not sell, nor buy, nor pay, nor is paid; one sees the importer's wares undisturbed in his store and his payments asleep in his wallet;
the capitalist do 1 not receive interest nor the
employees salary.








28 Miguel Samper, La miseria en Bogota y otros escritos (BogotA: Biblioteca Universitaria de Cultura Colombiana, 1969), passim; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecci6n, 228; El Neo-Granadino, April 9, 1857.
29 La Opinion, October 14, 1863, October 12, 1864, January 4, 1865.


30 Samper, La miseria en Bogota, 9, 11.









One artisan referred to the 1860s as the worst decade since the colonial period. 31Artisans certainly voiced more protests in the l860s than in any other decade of the nineteenth century.

Availability of credit was a particularly vexing problem, as funds to borrow were in short supply through most of the period for artisans. Customers were frequently required to advance the cost of their purchase because most craftsman did not have sufficient capital to buy necessary material. This normally meant that a loan would be arranged from a speculator (agiotista) at the prevailing rate of interest, a rate subject to constant fluctuation. During time of feared or actual civil strife, such as the months prior to General Jose- Mar:(a Melo's 1854 revolt, speculators withheld their capital and, consequently, evoked' the wrath of artisans. 32

Until 1845 the only sources of credit were the church or money lenders, and the quantities and interest rates were quite unpredictable. In that year, however, the Province of Bogota founded a Savings Bank (Caja de Ahorros) that survived until 1861. The bank made considerable funds available to its investors, who were drawn from all social sectors. In 1864 an attempt was made to establish in Bogota' a branch of the Bank of London, Mexico and South America, but it was






31 La Repiiblica, October 9, 1867.

32 On numerous occassion, the slogan "Abajo los ajiotistas" were associated with artisans. Agiotistas were money lenders who purchased government bonds issued to individuals in repayment for forced loans during wartime or as compensation for other debts. In the absense of other sources of credit, the speculator played an important role in the local economy. Malcolm Deas, "The Fiscal Problems of NineteenthCentury Colombia," Journal of Latin American Studies, 14:2 (November 1982), 318-20; Safford, "Commerce and Industry," 56-57.








short-lived. Beginning in 1871 with foundation of the Banco de Colombia, various lending institutions were established that lasted for some time. The Savings Bank probably offered tradesmen the most reliable source of credit. Although it has not been subjected to scholarly scrutiny, one of its objectives was to stimulate industry among workers, and many of its depositers were craftsmen. Most of the banks founded in the 1870s favored loans to commercial concerns, but one of these, the Banco Popular, was designed to help smaller investors. Its shares sold for'$50, and numerous artisans were among initial purchasers.

The system of industrial privileges that had been employed during the earlier period was not formally abrogated during the reform era, 34
but few new concessions were granted. The most important privilege was granted in 1855 for establishment of a woolen factory, which by the following year produced various types of cloth, some of which were purchased by the Army, but most by the general public. By 1858 some 60 workers, mostly women, labored in the factory for salaries up to 8
35
pesos a week. The factory did reasonably well prior to a tariff reduction on imported textiles in 1861 and remained in operation until 1888.36






Diario de Cundinamarca, June 21, 1877.

Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 101.

This was double the norm for campesinos and eight times the one peso per week wage earned by most women workers.
36 Guia official i descriptiva de Bogoti ( Bogota: Imprenta de la Naci6n, 1858), 73-76; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 182-83; Ospina Visquez, Industria y protecci(n, 229.





Numerous factories were established after the depression of the 1860s. In 1870 another china factory opened, as did the "Rey y Borda" match factory. In 1874 the latter employed over 200 women. One hundred and fifty women labored in that same year in a cigar factory. Also founded in the 1870s were the Chaves Chocolate plant, a quinine laboratory, and small consumer industries dedicated to the production of candles, soap, and perfume. 37

These early industries were oriented, on the whole, toward the

production of consumer goods using low technology and unskilled labor. They did not compete with skilled artisanal production; nor did they complement traditional crafts. Contrary to artisan protests, it seems unlikely that tariffs were lowered to a degree which rapidly undermined domestic crafts. The reorientation of the economy toward the external market which took place at mid-century ended the stagnation of the earlier period; yet at the same time it caused extreme disruption to the ambience to which artisans had been accustomed and fundamentally altered the composition of the capital's craft economy as marginal producers were increasingly threatened by foreign competition. This was especially the case for trades such as shoemaking, tailoring, and leather work. By contrast, most construction trades were little affected by lowered tariff rates and owed their prosperity (or lack of it) to improved general economic conditions. The depression of the 1860s was probably very important in determining which trades would remain competitive and which would be reduced in significance.






37 La America, April 9, 1874; Ospina Va'squez, Industria y protecci6n, 264-69.









Rafael Nunez, in his first presidential administration (18801882), repudiated many of the more dogmatic tendencies of economic liberalism. Once again the Colombian state began to intervene actively in the nation's economic development, principally through tariff measures and monetary policy. The National Bank, founded in 1881 and designed to meet the financial needs of the government, was empowered to emit a fixed supply of paper money, a policy which, in periods of moderate emmisions acted as a stimulus to the expansion of coffee, but, during illegal larger emissions in the 1890s, helped to destablize the
38
economy.

Nuinez favored protection of national industries; consequently one of his first acts was to press passage of the Tariff of 1880, which, although it lowered the basic rate, protected tailoring, shoemaking, and furniture production through a 257% surcharge. Ospina observes that the tariff was intended to foster factory production, but it undoubtedly eased the competition faced by domestic workshops as well. Tariff rates were raised 25% by two legislative measures in 1885 and 1886. Industrial growth in the Medellin area was stimulated by these tariffs, but their impact on bogotano industries was minor. Tariff rates crept upward through the 1890s and, after the War of 1000 Days (1899-1902), President Rafael Reyes strongly stimulated industrial growth through his tariff of 1905. This last measure again helped Medellf(n more than Bogota. 39







38 Ospina Visquez, Industria y protecci6n, 278, 323.

39Ibid., 300-07, 334-44.









Imposition of monopolies upon such ventures as cigar, cigarette,

and match production were still another aspect of governmental economic policy meant to not only spur development of these industries, but also provide unemployed urban women with jobs. Artisans were favored by Nunez's decrees creating "model shops" in 1881 and 1886, which were intended to train craftsmen in "practical" industrial arts. An outgrowth of these programs was the School of Arts and Trades, in operation by 1891. Six years later the School bad exposed 621 students to various sorts of industrial training. 40 Between 1905 and 1908, Reyes extended this program throughout the nation, but his focus was on general education rather than industrial training.

The economy slowly revived around 1870, due to a momentary

resurgence of tobacco exports, the first effects of coffee expansion, and the beginning of a growth period for the city. Bogota suffered a downturn in the 1880s, which was caused by tobacco's sharp drop in value, a temporary decline in coffee exports, and civil unrest. The capital's economy resumed It growth by 1886-87, which lasted into the mid-18909, when inflation, war, and fluctuating coffee prices in the international market combined to create a ten-year period of economic decline. After the War of 1000 Days, the capital entered a period of growth that lasted, with a few temporary exceptions, until the Depression.

Numerous small industries and factories were founded beginning in the 1880s, most of them sponsored by upper class Colombians who turned to manufacture from traditional commercial activities. This more




40 Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 206.









frequently was the case in Antioquia, but it was true to a limited extent for the capital, where foreign capital and enterprise also played an important role. For example, in 1883 "La Estrella de Bogotd," a cigarette factory, was founded using imported Cuban tobacco, Spanish paper, and Cuban cigar masters. The primary Colombian input was some 30-40 women workers. The women earned from two to seven pesos a week, depending on their output. "La Equitativa" chocolate factory was established shortly thereafter by Luiz M. Azcuenaga, also using mostly female labor. The earlier chocolate venture by the Chaves brothers continued in operation, employing over 100 workers (mostly women) by 1899. After the war, these chocolate plants combined their operations. 41

The first major industrial complex was the Bavaria brewery, run by German-born Rudolf Kopp and established in 1891. Kopp used German technology and brewery masters and Colombian labor. His factory was set up along German industrial patterns, which by 1894 included workers' housing next to the brewery. Weekly wages at Bavaria were reportedly the highest in the city, in addition to which the workers enjoyed health insurance, loans, sick pay, and up to two liters of beer a day. In return for such benefits, Kopp demanded rigid industrial discipline from his 300 male and female workers (1906). Complaints regarding the inflexibility of Bavaria's management were common and centered on the pace of work and control of time.42


41 Ospina Vsquez, Industria y protecci6n, 310, 314; El Criterio, June 4, 1883; La Crdnica, September 21, 1898, August 12, 1899; El Diario Nacional, July 27, 1918; Las Noticias, September 23, 1889.
42 Ospina Vasquez, Industrial y protecci6n 313; La Patria, June 22, 1894; El Correo Nacional, July 8, October 17, 1904; El Yunque, May 6, 1906.











The founders of Bavaria started a glass factory in 1896, which

prospered after the war. In the same period they established a china factory. In 1895 Silvestre Samper and Simeon Martfn also opened a glass factory using ten Spanish glass blowers and apprenticing 20 Colombian workers. By 1897 good glass was being produced, but poor management led to its early demise.43

The Regeneration's moves to draw women into industrial labor

evidenced some additional success after the war. "El Rey del Mundo," a cigarette factory owned by the Spaniard Esteban Verdu, employed 50 women in 1904. Verdu demanded strict discipline from workers, who, according to one visitor to the plant, worked like "human machines." The same commentator noted that this "kept them off the streets." By 1916 some 200 women and 50 men labored under similar conditions for Verdu. In the latter year, however, heavy taxes on tobacco forced closure of Verdu's plant and those of several of several other cigarette manufacturers.



Social and Occupational Changes



Available census data suggest that Bogoti grew slowly during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century before entering a period of sustained expansion. Although the accuracy of these data is




Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecc6n, 314-15; El Yunque, May 6, 1906; El Telegrama, February 14, 1895.

Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 303-04; El Yunque, May 6, 1906; El Telegrama, February 14, 1895.








questionable, they at least indicate the pace and timing of the city's growth. Enumerations made in 1793 and 1801 placed Bogota's population at 17,725 and 21,394 respectively. An 1843 census listed 40,086 inhabitants, but one taken only eight years later tallied 29,649 residents, a figure whose accuracy has correctly been doubted, but which also suggests that the 1843 count may be too high. Another census conducted in 1870 enumerated 40,833, also a questionable total, but one that did reflect sluggish growth. A visitor to the city in the 1870s claimed the population to be around 60,000, an estimation that seems rather more reliable, especially in light of latter surveys. Two counts in the 1880s, which yielded totals of 84,723 (1881) and 95,761 (1884), tend to confirm observations that Bogota began to undergo rapid expansion in the 1870s. By 1912, the city's population had reached 120,000.

Most descriptions of the bogotano social scene by outside observers suggest rather stable social classes through the last century. John Steuart, writing in the late 1830s, noted three strata; the poorest, made up of peons and "lower" house servants; the middle, consisting of artisans, small shopkeepers, and the "best" servants; and the highest level of society, which included hacendados, larger merchants, and






45 "Padron general de la poblacion de esta capital, segun los que se hicieron en el ano de 1793"; Alfonso Acevedo, Notas estadisticas de la provincia de la provincia de Bogota en el ano de 1844 (Bogota: np, 1844), 7; Clfmaco Calderon and Edward E. Britton, Colombia. 1893 (New York: Bureau of American Republics, 1893), 48; Alfred Hettner, Viajes por los andes colombianos (1882-1884) (Bogota: Archivo de la Economic Nacional, Banco de la Repiblica, 1976), 77; Eliseo Reclus, Colombia (Bogota: Papelerla de Samper Matiz, 1893), 407; Censo general de la Repr61ica de Colombia levantado el 5 de marzo de 1912 (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional, 1912), 336.









holders of important political posts. The distinction between middle and upper classes was accentuated by dress habits; artisans and their peers wore ruanas (a Colombian poncho) and the upper class men, coats. 46 Two German travelers in the l880s observed the same divisions, albeit with class boundaries somewhat less distinct and containing more complex strata. According to these accounts, the lowest rung on the social ladder was occupied by the "gente del pueblo, " or simply the pueblolo" These people were agricultural workers, day laborers, water carriers, and servants. The middle sector included artisans, some merchants, shopkeepers, and lesser government employees. The highest levels, alternately called the "superior class" or "nobles," consisted of the aristocracy of money, hacendados, and large merchants. 47

In spite of the basic continuity of major social strata, reports later in the century do indicate some important changes in their characteristics. Steuart had noted in the 1830s that the rich in Bogotg would hardly be termed wealthy by European standards; even leading government officials could be seen laboring in their stores. In the end he felt that distances between middle and upper sectors were often based more upon cosmetic distinctions than on economic resources. By the end of the century, social strata were separated by real differences in wealth, a situation that extended even to the artisan class, some of whom reportedly owned pianos and wore coats.







46 John Steuart, Bogotfi in 1836-7, 154-57.

47Ernst Rothlisberger, El Dorado: Estampas de viaje y cultura de la Colombia suramericana, (Bogotg: Banco de la Republics, 1963), 9396, 103; BHettner, ViaJes por los Andes, 72-77.








Data on the occupational composition of Bogota are limited. Only one of the censuses included occupational data in its published reports, that of 1912. Still, an idea of size of the artisan class can be suggested. The 1846 petition claimed that some 2,000 artisans, or about 5% of the 40,000-odd inhabitants, worked in the city. A newspaper article by a craftsman in 1868 estimated that fewer than 6,000, or ten percent, of the city's 60,000 residents were artisans.48 The 1912 census aggregated 8,968 persons of a total population of 120,000 into the category of "artes, oficios, y aprendices," all of which refer to artisanal activity.

Descriptions of the trade composition of Bogota's artisan class structure are simply not available, which forces the historian to make only hesitant observations. An 1881 guide listed 60 shoe shops, 50 tailors, a hundred or so carpentry shops, 20 printers, 25 blacksmiths, 50
and an "infinity" of masons. All these trades fit well within the spectrum of traditional crafts. The guide included no "modern" wage occupations filled by males, although females labored in cigar and match factories. A 1904 listing of trades represented in the "Sociedad Union de Industriales y Obreros" included most traditional trades, 51
along with brewerymen and electrical installers. A similar listing of






48 La Alianza, February 8, 1868.

Censo general de la Repiblica, 181.

50 Felipe Perez, Geograiia general fisica y polftica de los Estados Unidos de Colombia y geograffa particular de la ciudad de Bogoti (Bogota: Imprenta de EcheverrIa Hermanos, 1883), 400-04; 41620.


51
Los Hechos, June 18, 1904.





trades participating in a 1914 worker's celebration was dominated by traditional crafts, but also included "industrialists" (shop owners of 10-30 workers) and factory workers (from breweries, the electric company, glass factory, rail roads, chocolate and cement plants.) 52 While these glimpses do little to statistically analyse Bogota's occupational profile, they do tend to evidence a labor force consisting of both traditional artisanal workers and "modern" laborers associated with factories and wage labor after 1900.

One further insight on trade organizations merits mention. No

artisan organization was linked to a single trade prior to 1873, when a mutual aid society was founded for 68 printers. 53 Nine years later, a carpenters' guild was formed. In 1897 a shoemaker's group was organized. After the beginning of the century, workers' organizations were divided internally by trades. The same phenomena could be seen at public ceremonies, for example on Colombian Independence Day. Throughout the nineteenth century, parade participants included national employees, hacendados, merchants, and artisans. The 1910 centennial saw workers march not just as artisans, but also as carpenters, printers, masons, or similar trades and as political groups. 54 The increased identification of workers by their trade, as opposed to the general nomenclature of artisan, might well be indicative of the fragmentation and redefinition of the artisan class in the last third of the century.




52 El Tiempo, March 27, 1914.

53 La Amdrica, May 28, 1873.

54 Pan, July 3, 1910.







41

Only general comments can be made concerning shop organization and trade traditions. An 1858 account, "The Artisan of Bogota," claimed that during the colonial period masters (jfe or duenos del taller) and journeymen (oficios or _Jornaleros.) were clearly distinguishable, both socially and economically. Masters exerted some control over prices and successfully kept journeymen from establishing their own shops. Such control by masters over journeymen was shaken by the dissruption of the Independence period, but not eliminated. 5 In keeping with republican principles of equality, masters who tried to maintain their traditional powers were attacked in the press during the 1820s. 56By the 18309 journeymen reportedly established their own shops and undermined masters through lower prices. Masters complained that while the journeymen's labor was cheap, the quality of their goods was poor. 57At mid-century the master and journeyman were linked by collateral relations, by wages, and by more informal, traditional bonds. Masters still tended to dominate the relationship within the shop, but they lacked sufficient power to control all journeymen activities. 58By the end of the century, internal trade distinctions appear to have given way to the economic reality of who could own his own shop as the pinnacle of the craftsmen's profession.

Throughout the century, antagonisms separated native and immigrant craftsmen. In 1842, for example, bogotano artisans bitterly noted that




55El Nucleo, 1858. The issues of the paper were not dated.

56 La Bandera Tricolor, July 16, 1826.

57El Tiempo, May 13, 1858.

58 El Nucleo, 1858; La Alianza, December 10, 1866.









foreigners within the same trades (83 according to 1843 census)59 profited because they neither had to pay taxes nor perform military duty, also because upper-class natives preferred the prestige of their service, regardless of quality. Moreover, most foreign craftsmen were said to be unwilling to share knowledge of their trades with native
60
artisans. Similar public protests were voiced by tradesmen in 1867, 1875, and 1887. Native artisans, however, were ready to acknowledge the contributions of some foreigners in advancing the general state of
61
the arts.

While accusations against foreign craftsmen inevitably claimed that Colombian artisans produced goods of equal quality, as early as 1850 petitions for tariff protection requested that masters be brought 62
from abroad to teach native masters. Such requests were renewed after the crisis of the 1860s, when they resulted in approval of a plan to bring foreigners to Colombia to teach mechanical arts.63 In the end such aspirations were not realized, although several Colombians were sent abroad in the 1880s to study industrial trades.









Acevedo, Notas estadisticas, 7.
60 El Dla, July 17, 1842.

61 La Alianza, April 13, 1867; La Nacfbn, December 17, 1886, January 11, 1887; Diario de Cundinamarca, June 9, 1875.
62 AC, Camara, proyectos de leyes negados, 1850, X, folios 2831.
63 Saturnino Gonzlez et al., "Representacion al Congreso
nacional" (Bogota, 1868); El Bien P6blico, December 5, 1870; Diario de Cundinamarca, March 15, 25, 1872; Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 20304.









Certain work patterns, such as taking Monday off ("St. Monday") are commonly associated with artisanal and pre-industrial labor settings. Evidence exists to suggest that "hacer lunes," as it was referred to in Bogota, persisted through the last and into the present century. In 1867, the carpenter Rafael Tapfas criticized this habit, saying that the "Bacchanalian excess" of the Monday celebration not only lost the artisan an estimated 48 pesos yearly, but also gave rise 64
to heated political debate and violence. 6 bstile responses forced Tapais to say that his intention had not been to criticize anyone's work habits, but only to point out the loss of time and danger of mixing fun and politics.65 Thirty years later, a leading artisan defended the tradition by commenting that, since artisans were their own bosses, the days they chose not to work were their own decision.66 Early efforts to start factory production encountered problems when managers tried to impose a stricter discipline upon recently recruited laborers. One account noted that laborers wanted to enjoy their work and "hacer lunes." 67

As was noted in the preface, the definition of terms is a most

arduous task. Phrases or words were used in a social context that one






64
La Alianza, June 14, 1867.

65 Ibid., August 1, 1867; El Pueblo, July 13, 1867.

66 El Artesano, June 14, 1867.

67 El Correo Nacional, July 8, 1904. On the attempt to instill Taylorism into the Colombian mentality, see Alberto Mayor Mora, Etica, trabajo, y productividad en Antioguia: Una interpretaci n sociologica


Mundo, 1985), passim.


sobre la influence de la Escuela Nacional de Minas de la vida, costumbres e industrializacion regionales (Bogotg: Editorial Tercer





can only attempt to recreate in the absence of reliable documentation. The word "artisan" is particularly difficult to define conclusively. "Artisan" was often used quite differently by the same people according to the context. For example, an "artisan" newspaper in the 1860s argued that two-thirds of the nation's populace were artisans, if one included seamstresses and displaced craftsmen in that number. The same paper complained that the term artisan was used indiscriminately and that only 107. of the city's population deserved the title. 68 The explanation for the obviously contradictory usage is that in one instance an appeal was being made to the broader population and in the other artisans sought to set themselves apart from the "mass" for purposes of identification.

The newspaper referred to above alluded to a final aspect of artisan culture that merits inclusion with its comment that many masters had the "absurd idea" that they were the social superiors of journeymen and that some duenos were used as tools by members of political parties. 69 Since most voices raised by artisan leaders seeking to speak for the artisan class came from shop owners, a troublesome question central to this study must be asked. If masters saw themselves as unequal to journeymen, bow representative, then, were their voices? No unwavering answer can be presented, but one of the arguments to be forwarded by this thesis is that one can up to a point judge the representativeness of artisan leaders both by their ability successfully to mobilize their subordinate counterparts and by their




68 La Alia2a, October 20, 1866, January 23, February 3, 1868.

69 Ibid., December 10, 1866.





staying power as leaders. Artisans who were skilled and lasting advocates of their class were, as will be argued later, able to persist as leaders because they were more, rather than less, representative of those whose opinions are not available for historical examination.



Conclusion



Three periods, marked by changes in the characteristics of the

artisan class, divide the years under study. The 1830s through 1860s were characterized by general economic stagnation and a more homogeneous class experience. The final thirty years of the century saw the fragmentation of the artisan class in the face of foreign economic pressures and native industrialization. The first twenty years of the twentieth century witnessed workers employing both traditional and more modern productive techniques in a mixed-labor system, in which each laboring class bad its own social norms.

An analysis of state economic policies yields a different

periodization, one which suggests several clues to artisan economic experience. The years 1832-45 encompass the Neo-Bourbon period, so named because its structural apparatus contained many holdovers from Spanish colonial policies. After 1845, a transition to economic liberalization took place in which policy makers removed most of the system's colonial aspects and reoriented it to facilitate international trade and export agriculture. The state once again attempted to stimulate internal industries beginning in 1880, when protective tariffs were raised for certain industries. Post-1886 governments actively intervened in the economy, especially after 1904.





During the Neo-Bourbon period, craftsmen labored in an economic

environment rather similar to the late colonial period. The reforms of the 1840s and 18509 radically altered the country's economic structure, which, by the 1860s, negatively affected Bogot'a's artisans and shattered their relative social and economic uniformity. The artisan class was redefined during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century as trades hurt by foreign competition went into decline and others, largely unaffected by governmental policies, retained characteristics similar to those of the earlier period. Practitioners of displaced occupations and those of stable trades lost much of the shared experiences that bad earlier bonded the class, and, as a consequence, their social, economic, and political lives began to diverge. It was during these years that separate trade labels began to identify craftsmen. Moreover, by the 1890s, the creation of limited industrial and transport concerns gave rise to a small but important of modern" wage-labor sector. The dawn of the current century saw various types of laborers filling the occupational spectrum, the most significant in terms of their organized political expression being more traditional artisans and more modern wage laborers.

This suggests that the orientation of the country's economic structure toward participation in the world market created over the long term a two-tiered labor profile, a process visible after 1870 and clearly in place by the early 1900s. One of its levels was much more influenced by policies that aided the development of an export economy and increased importation of foreign manufactured goods. Artisans affected by these policies lost their productive independence in a slow process of proletarianization. Other sectors of the economy were





affected more by general economic conditions than by specific governmental programs. Many trades continued to employ traditional productive practices throughout the period studied and retained their status as independent artisanal producers. In 1919, however, this status, and the interests which accompanied it, bad changed greatly since 1832.

The transitions that redefined the artisan class are of particular importance for understanding artisan political activity over this 90year period. Both the credit crisis of the 18409 and the artisanal crisis of the 1860s prepared the way for intense political mobilizations by artisans. Significantly, both periods of activity occurred prior to increased fragmentation of the artisan class, which nevertheless retained essential internal cohesion. The same level of political activity would not return until the 1910s, when surviving artisans and emerging wage-laborers combined to initiate a new stage of political activity by Colombian workers.





CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF ARTISANS, 1832-45



The Partisan Struggle for Power



Colombia in the last century was a land of conflict. Perhaps its most apparent ebaracteriatic was its seeming inability to establish a stable political system. Wars repeatedly ravaged the country after the breakup of Gran Colombia in 1830. The War of the Supremes lasted from 1839 until 1842; insurrections occurred in both 1851 and 1854; the only civil war ever to successfully overthrow an incumbent government began in 1859 and ended in 1862; Conservatives rebelled in 1876-77; in 1885 and again in 1895 Liberals revolted; and, finally, the War of 1000 Days dragged on from 1899 until 1902. Numerous conflicts also took place on the local and regional level.

The most significant immediate cause of these national crises was the struggle for control of the state by the elite-dominated Liberal and Conservative parties. I The ideological stances taken by the parties were not so opposed, however, as to account for such intense conflicts. Liberals and Conservatives were only seriously separated on the programmatic issues of cburch-State relations and education. While




1
Throughout the text capitalized Conservative or Liberal will
refer to the parties, or to people identified with those organizations. Lower case will be used in other instances.





49

very real differences existed fin these areas, at least through the 1880s, control of the political process and of the state was the ultimate objective of both parties.

Control of the political apparatus in turn offered party members access to economic opportunities. Politics was probably the elite career of choice for most of the century, partly because few other opportunities existed. Emp eomanfa plagued the nation. Governmental revenues could never meet the salaries of all who aspired to official positions and, consequently, a fierce competition resulted for those available positions. Not until coffee became the backbone of the economy in the later years of the century did the situation change. Frank Safford's analysis of early party evolution suggests that the Conservative and Liberal parties were important as "brotherhoods" for mutual protection in the years of limited economic opportunity at the beginning of the Republican period. The creation of parties, aided by social attitudes that deemed governmental service an honorable occupation and by the favorable treatment by the parties of their clients help to explain certain economic and social factors underlying civil strife. However, they do not illuminate the initial basis for alignment of specific political groups. 2

Safford applies the Weberian concept of social location to suggest that access to institutions of power at the beginning of the national period was the primary determinant of party alignment. Proximity to






2 Safford, "Bases of Political Alignment in Early Republican
Spanish America," in New Approaches to Latin American History, ed. by Richard Graham and Peter Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974),78.








colonial centers of educational, political, or ecclesiastical power would more likely result in a conservative orientation aimed at maintaining institutions which favored one's "life chances." Those located at a greater distance from power centers would more likely be liberal, favoring reforms which would enhance their access to power.3

This application of the concept of social location has

considerable validity at least through the 1870s, when economic factors, as will be seen, begin to play a more important role as determinants of party alignment and ideology. It is helpful for understanding the origins of the few points of ideological conflict between Liberal and Conservatives. In defense of the institutional framework which favored their "life chances," Conservatives tended to hold a corporate world view which gave to the church a fundamental social role. This philosophy stipulated that the individual was subordinated to the church, which embodied universal morality. 4

Liberals, by contrast, were anti-institutional--until they created institutions more favorable to their own aspirations.- They tended to adhere to an atomistic philosophy, holding that individuals had the capacity to determine the morality of their actions. Liberals thus argued that educational institutions that imposed clerical authority hindered the individual from maturing to the point of making such






3Ibid., 102-03.

4
Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, El pensamiento colombiano en el siglo XIX (Bogot's: Editorial Temis Libreria, 1982-,95-97.

5Much of the arguement that follows is informed by Jaramillo and Saf ford, only when direct analysis are taken from their works will be they be cited.





51

decisions. Not surprisingly, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism dominated the philosophical approach of the first generation of Liberals.

In a certain sense, the issue at stake was the source of morality. Traditionalists maintained that while morality was an inherent part of the human being, Individuals could nevertheless not rationally comprehend morality in its fullness. Religion did encompass its totality, and the church acted as guardian of that knowledge. Those who felt disadvantaged by the traditional order argued that individual comprehension of morality was possible. These philosophical systems led directly to disputes regarding the proper social function of the church. Closely related to the church's social influence was the Jesuit question. To Liberals, the influence of Jesuits was antithetical to a Republic. Conservatives, on the other hand, valued the Jesuits as luminaries who served to maintain and expand the proper position of the church. Education, as a corollary to this religious question, was one of the most divisive issues of all. Santander's 1826 Education Plan, based upon Benthamite teachings, was strongly opposed by those politicians later identified with the Conservative party both at the time and later when Santander tried to revive it in the government of New Granada. When Conservatives won the War of the Supreme (1839-42), Mariano Ospina Rodr:(guez promptly issued an educational plan informed by more traditional standards. Not surprisingly, the 1870 educational reform process caused a similar uproar.

The beliefs and systems based upon those beliefs espoused by the two parties shared, however, more points of agreement than discord. There was, for example, little conflict along party lines on economic









matters. Pragmatic as opposed to optimistic appraisals of the government's fiscal situation were more likely to cause debate than was the proper economic orientation of the state. Tssues involving the economic well-being of the church, such as mortmain, were, of course, topics of ongoing dispute. No one questioned the theoretically contractual nature of government or the concept of popular sovereignty. Good governments were thought to be those that best represented the general interests of its citizens. The extent of active citizenship caused some disagreement, as did the degree to which strong central authority was needed to offset the ignorance of the masses, but no oneC thought in terms of a pure democracy or an aristocracy. Both parties distrusted the military as an institution, but neither was so opposed as to reject the aid of military leaders favorable to its cause. Even so, the structure of the state became a very important issue. The moves toward federalism beginning in the 1850s undertaken by both parties proved in the end disastrous. An effective political structure was not designed until the Constitution of 1886. That constitution gave the church a powerful social role, limited suffrage, and centralized the government, and in general satisfied conservative more than liberal objectives.

Just as the issues separating the parties were not wholly clear cut, some individuals are hard to place in either political camp. General Jose Marfa Obando was identified as a Santanderist liberal throughout his life, but his 1836 presidential candidacy split the ranks of those loyal to Santander. Tn the 1850s Obando nominally headed the draconian wing of the Liberal party, which undertook a major revolt in 1854. Another general, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, was









identified as a conservative, but his 1844 presidential candidacy and subsequent administration shattered the emerging Conservative party. In 1857 he ran for the presidency as head of the National party and two years later led the Liberal revolt against Conservative rule. After the 1863 R~ro Negro Convention, be was at bitter odds with the Radical faction of the Liberal party. In 1867 Mosquera imposed a dictatorship upon the Radical congress, and by 1869 he once again was in league with Conservatives. Both of these men were more personalistic than partyminded in their approach to power, although this is more true of Mosquera than Obando. Given their military bearing and populist orientations, It is tempting to refer to them as caudillos. Whether or not this is so, it is clear that any understanding of Colombian history prior to 1870 must take into consideration personalism and the appeal of military leaders.

Jaime Jaramillo Uribe has offered a further clue to the deciphering of nineteenth-century politics by pointing to the importance of generational influences. 6The "independence generation" was shaped by either traditional or Benthamite "mentalities." As a result, the conflicts of this era centered on education and the church. The desire to mold a united nation, however, moderated these divisive issues. A second generation, nurtured on the writings of the Romantics and less prone to compromise, came to power in the late 1840s. The Liberals among them dominated the political scene with few exceptions until the 18709. Conservatives assumed the role of the not-always loyal opposition, and caudillos continued to be important political




6 Jaramillo Uribe, Pensamiento colombiano, 30-33.





actors. The failures of Liberalism then spurred a pragmatic backlash, which was evident in the third generation and the 1886 Constitution. During the Regeneration, which began in the 1880s and lasted until the 1910s, coalitions tended to dominate the scene and produced an effective political structure that avoided the bloodshed of the earlier years, The policies of first the National party of Rafael Nunez and Miguel Antonio Caro, then the quinquenio of Rafael Reyes, and lastly the Republican Union illustrate the less sectarian nature of this last generation. (The fierce fighting of the period indicates, however, that coalitionists were by no means the sole political actors during these years.)

Throughout the century third (and occasionally fourth) parties appeared, generally drawing upon both the membership and ideological stances of the dominant groups. On occasion these were potent political forces in their own right. More frequently their fortunes were determined by their relationships with the traditional parties, largely because they drew their leadership from the same class, the elite. Other social sectors had little real influence on party programs or ideologies. Not unexpectedly, elite monopolization of the political process mirrored similar developments in the social and economic realms.

While the nineteenth-century social structure was quite stable, it was not frozen. Patron-client relations offered non-elites a certain degree of economic and social mobility; so too, politically, did the struggle between the parties. Elites needed clients in their struggle for power. In rural areas, the pursuit of clientage led to the creation by local bosses of self-perpetuating Liberal and Conservative





enclaves that have existed to the present. In larger urban centers, the establishment of clientage relationships fostered more competitive recruitment. Elite efforts to mobilize popular support for their party struggles were the first stimuli to the participation of non-elites in the political process. An appreciation of the parties' struggle for power is thus essential for an understanding of artisan political participation in the last century. Artisans and other middling social groups, because of their status as voters, were the principal targets of parties and factions trying to expand their base of support. Patrons and clients operated in a two-way relationship, however, which in time allowed artisans the opportunity to articulate their particular interests.



The Appeal to the Masses, 1832-45



The Constitution of 1832 established for New Granada a moderately centralized republic. In keeping with republican theory (and colonial precedents), local and regional governments shared power with central authorities, but most policy initiatives came from Bogotfi. The powers of the central government were divided among executive, legislative and judicial branches, but the executive retained extraordinary powers for use in emergency situations. All in all, the Colombian Constitution of 1832 was not so different from its Cdcuta predecessor. 7








7 William Marion Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1948),35-66, 109-51.









Many observers trace in embryonic form the alignments which

eventually became the Liberal and Conservative parties to dissension between adherents of Simo~n Bolfvar and Francisco de Paula Santander following Bolrvar's return to Gran Colombia from Peru in 1826, divisions which were also visible in the Convention of 1831. 8That convention had been called to reconstitute the government after the break-up of Gran Colombia and the abortive dictatorship of Rafael Urdaneta. Bolivarianos had lost most of their influence in that illfated effort, leaving the field open to persons loyal to Santander. Support for Santander as the first president of Colombia was nearly unamimous, but factions loyal to General Jose' Maria Obando and Jose Ignacio de M~arquez made the vice-presidential contest quite heated. The clash of these factions presaged the political divisions of the 1830s and the eventual alignment of the Conservative and Liberal parties.

Santander tried to impose Obando as his successor in the 1836

presidential election, which firmly placed Marquez at the head of the opposition group. Vicente Azuero refused to support Obando, and offered the Santanderistas a civilian option. Marquez won the divisive election, which in the end was decided by the congress. The factions which had emerged during the 1836 presidential campaign redoubled their efforts for the 1838 vice-presidential and congressional elections. Continuing controversy over the content of public education and the extent of religious influence in New Cranadan society gave this contest a decidedly ideological character. Supporters of Santander




8 Festrepo, Diario polftico y militar, 11, 228.









(progresistas) had set aside their differences in the wake of the earlier defeat and prepared to oust Marquez loyalists (moderados), who were supported by the church. Two political coalitions sought electoral victory. Efforts of the two groups to enlarge their electoral base included active recruitment of non-elite voters, which for the first time brought artisans openly into the political process.

Both sides recognized the possible rewards for such efforts.

Suffrage rights were granted by the constitution to males over the age of 21 (or married) who did not earn their subsistence as unskilled manual laborers or domestic servants. Criminals and the mentally insane were also barred from voting, as were those individuals who were
9
in default on debts to the nation. Independent craftsmen therefore constituted an important segment of the eligible electorate.

Members of the church hierarchy, along with leading moderates, organized La Sociedad Catk1ica in May 1838 in the hope of amplifying support for candidates sharing their ideological leanings. Its director was Ignacio Morales, and vice-director was Antonio Herrin. The Society's Executive Council included a representative from the Archbishopric, representatives from four religious orders, Pedro Herrera Espada, Juan Madiedo, and Jose F6lix Merizalde.10

The new group stressed the importance of morality and religion in both state and society and regretted that many public officials were






9 Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, 120; La Cr6nica Semenal, April 13, 1832.
10 Ignacio Morales et al., "Invitacin que hace la Sociedad Catolica de Bogoti a los fieles de la America" (Bogota, May 10, 1838).









not stressing public moral order. The Society recognized the virtues of President Marquez, but expressed fear for the introduction of men of "irregular conduct" into public office: "Without an eminently religious sentiment, it is not possible to implant the unique principles which constitute the legitmacy of government." According to the leaders cf the organization, New Granadan society had to be protected against foreign and atheistic ideas. They therefore aimed to counter the tendency among the youth of the upper class to abandon the doctrines of the church. The Society was vehemently opposed to the philosophies of Bentham, Tracy, and Broussals that were being taught in the educational system; utilitarian "love of pleasure" was unreservedly criticized. According to its teachings, the proper education, together with votes for Catholic representatives, would prevent the "infection" of such ideas from spreading through the nation.12

Efforts by the church to participate openly in the support of favorable candidates were not limited to Bogota. Catholic Societies were also established in Cali, Pasto, and Popayan. When the Catholic organization was founded in Pasto, the editors of El Investigador Cat6lico in Bogota claimed that it represented a genuine outpouring of support for the church. They discredited allegations that its members had been forced to join by official pressure.13







11 El Investigador Cat~lica, March 25, 1838.

12 Ibid., August 1, October 15, 1838; Morales et al.,
"Invitacion"; Jose Restrepo Posada, "La Sociedad Catolica de Bogota1838," Boletfn de Historia y Antiquidades, 43:499/500, 310-21.
13 rn Investigador Cat;lico, October 15, 1838.









While the Catholic Society in Bogota made no direct appeal to the artisan class, the latter was undoubtedly a target of mobilization efforts. Progressives appealed quite frankly to artisans for political support. In their political mouthpiece, La Bandera Nacional, Lorerzo Marfa Lleras, Florentino Gonzdlez, and Santander claimed that ministerial electors were generally clients of the president and thus represented little more than empleomania, whereas progressive electors were patriots who lived without having to "beg" from the executive.14 Moreover, ministerial voters were said to include the rank-and-file of the military who would vote according to orders, since they could not read. In June the paper suggested an electoral list of "honorable artisans and laborers" who "lived by the sweat of their brows" and who were only interested in the good of their country. Progressives did not go so far as to support any of the potential artisan electors in their official electoral list, but the appeal to craftsmen was clear.15

Santanderistas made a miserable showing in the elections. Of the 1,481 votes cast in Bogoti, according to an unofficial tally, 1,356 went to ministerials, 80 to progressives, and 45 went to candidates judged to be neutral.16 La Bandera Nacional blamed the loss on the patronage power of the administration and church.17 For their part,




14 La Bandera Nacional, May 27, 1838. Supporters of President Marquez were at the time referred to as "ministeriales," while the Santander camp were labeled progresistas.
15 Ibid., June 3, 17, 1838.

16 El Argos, June 24, 1838.

17 La Bandera Nacional, June 24, 1838.









moderates claimed that the victory represented the will of Bogota's voters. Administration supporters noted that despite efforts to recruit artisans and mechanics to the santanderista cause by using socially divisive language such as nobles and plebians, craftsmen had 18
favored the administration with their votes.

Election observers on both sides noted the use of political

societies in the electorial contest. Moderates claimed that, on the whole, activity by political societies was a positive contribution. 19 The opposition had an understandably different attitude. Progressives argued that three groups had participated in the election--the administration, the church, and themselves. The first two groups had united, bringing to bear both governmental revenues and the church's religious arsenal. In leveling allegations that the church had exploited the pious support of the "popular masses," progressives were forced to note that they were not criticizing religion, but rather defending republican principles which opposed the political activity of the church.20

In order to overcome such obstacles in the future, the

progressives realized that they, too, must politically educate the popular sectors. The initial vehicle for such education was La Sociedad Democrtica-Republicana de Artesanos i Laboradores Progresistas de la Provincia de Bogott(SDRAL). It had been founded on June 17, 1838, in the midst of the election process, but apparently did




18 El Argos, July 1, 1838.

19 Ibid.

20 La Bandera Nacional, June 24, July 1, 1838.









not take an active part in the campaign. Its objective was to

diffuse . . . useful knowledge . . . especially
that of politics and morality, so that citizens of
the republic can discharge and comply with their
rights 21nd obligations with intelligence and
pride.


The Society was also to disseminate information on industry, economic conditions, and political events to its members, who were said to number over one hundred. 22

El Labrador i Artesano, the mouthpiece of the organization, began publication in September. Its prospectus, probably written by Lleras, argued that political customs had prevented the development of equality in the nation, despite laws guaranteeing it. "Consequently, we want to be permitted to acquire (equality), by placing our customs and moral capacity in unison with our laws ."2 This would be accomplished by politicall instruction" of the

different classes of the state in the maintenance
of their interests, in the knowledge of their
public rights; moralizing their customs, showing
them the true philosophic road to the good, and
indentlying their interests with those of the
state.


The by-laws of the Society stipulated four membership categories; full (nato), instructor, honorary, and corresponding. Founding members had to excercise a profession or mechanical art, or be dedicated to






21 Ibid., July 22, 1838.

22 Ibid.

23 El Labrador i Artesano, September 16, 1838.

24 Ibid.









agriculture in some manner. Other members were required only to profess democratic-republican principles and to conduct themselves properly. At least 189 people became founding members, and some 123 accepted honorary memberships. 25

Although the president of the organization, Isidor Jos6 Orjuela, was a tinsmith, it seems that artisans had little control over the direction of the Society. Upper-class progressives such as Lleras and Juan Nepomuceno Vargas actually controlled it, and men of similar background were predominant among its instructors, who included Francisco Soto, Vicente Lonbana, Jose Duque Gomez, Florentino Gonzalez, Ezequiel Rojas, and Rafael Elislo Santander. Francisco de Paula Santander, Jos6 Marra Mantilla, Antonio Obando, and Vicente Azuero were all made honorary members.

The Democratic-Repubican Society sought to instill in its members progressive political and social precepts, together with appropriate moral training. It did so by means of publishing articles in the Society's paper and by giving lectures to the organization, which contained both utilitarian and republican messages. Vicente Azuero, for example, lectured on the nature of representative government established by the constitution. It was, be stated, designed to further the common interest, not that of any specific group or family. Azuero countered allegations of the "dangerous" ideological content of progressivism by insisting that democratic liberties were preeminently compatible with the church's value system.26 Ezequiel Rojas lectured on



25 Ibid. Membership lists are found in ibid., October 7, 14, 1838, January 20, 1839.
26 Ibid., November 4, 1838.





63

the science of morality, an address based directly upon the utilitarian principle that happiness motivates human behavior. Correct conduct, be explained, was based upon the need to provide for the good of the family, or of those close to the individual. If one did not work or were lazy, the ensuing hunger and vagrancy would plague both family and society. Work, on the other hand, gave the individual the means to pursue desires, provide for a family, and improve the general society. The goodness that ensued was the essence of morality. Prayer, Rojas reasoned, was the manner by which one thought about morality, by pondering the course of action which would produce the most good and general happiness. 27

Rafael Eliseo Santander was another speaker who attempted to

reconcile progressive morality with the role of religion in society. Santander argued that the country's system of government contained appropriate guarantees for legal equality, but that without a moral society that objective would never be achieved. It was necessary to moralize the population along evangelical lines for the general advancement of the nation. His proposals suggested that the state sponsor such moral education with the aid of the church, though without intimating that the church should direct the program or renouncing his own utilitarian convictions. 28

These messages by progressive speakers were repeated in the paper's articles and editorials of El Labrador y Artesano. One constant theme was that since people were born with different talents




27 Ibid., November 11, 1838.

28 Ibid., December 8, 1838.





64

and bad differing levels of wealth and comfort, equality before the law was all the more important to allow all persons to satisfy their needs and desires without infringement upon the desires of others. Since legislation alone did not guarantee such equality, it was necessary to educate the "inferior classes" for political participation as a barrier to establishment of an aristocratic government reminiscent of the colonial period. 29

The Democratic-Republican Society contributed to political

education, but it also worked toward instilling patterns of hard work and thrift among its members. Artisans and laborers were urge to celebrate fewer festivals and to complete promptly their contracted work. On several occasions craftsmen were warned that gambling was a waste of time and money, and, since it added nothing to the general happiness, should be abandoned. The initial editions of the paper also included articles pertaining to industrial education. Kew techniques for manufacturing sulfuric acid were described, as were methods to make incombustible candles and to apply copper plating. A series of articles by Santiago Umana described the cultivation and preparation of flax and its oil. Occasionally employment opportunities, such as the need for blacksmiths, masons, and carpenters to work on the church in Zipaquira, were brought to the readers' attention. 30

Specific public issues which warranted a progressive response were analysed by Lleras and other leaders of the Society. In December the




29 Ibid., September 23, October 1-8, December 16, 23, 1838, January 13, 1839.
30 Ibid., October 14, 21, 28, November 4, 18, 25, December 8, 16, 1838.









system of compulsive personal service on the government's behalf was discussed. This holdover from colonial years required certain citizens to give their labor to the state every year for public projects. Although an 1824 law had attempted to correct abuses, Lleras noted that inequalities in service still existed. Improvements on public facilities such as roads and jails were clearly needed, but avoidance of the work responsibilty was rampant: a particularly notorious abuse was said to be that of having servants fulfill one's work obligations, and then not pay them for their labor. This issue touched upon artisan class interests, but others included in the paper did not. For example, the question of clerical celibacy occupied the paper's pages in January and February 1839. Essentially it was argued that the current system was immoral, because it led to repeated violations and a lessening of public respect for the church's officials. Legalizing priestly marriage would correct that immorality and enable clergy to stand as positive examples of the marital institution. 31

The progressive's effort to mobilize support for their

ideological orientations was not confined to the capital. In October Lleras penned a letter to progressives throughout the country and urged them to form organizations modeled after that of Bogota. In the letter Lleras wrote that "instruction of the masses is the most essential guarantee of popular governmemts." Without citizens who were aware of and practiced their rights, the aristocracy dominated a country. Lleras insisted that the teachings of like-minded societies would raise






31 Ibid., December 16, 1838, January 20, 27, February 3, 10, 24, 1839.









the level of the inferior classes and would help make social classes more equal. Progressives in at least eight towns responded that they had founded similar groups by the end of February 1839. 32

Moves by progressives to recruit artisan support were countered by supporters of the administration. A. fictional account of a debate in a craftsman's shop derided the progressive effort to mobilize artisans as political allies. The owner of the shop had refused to join the SDRAL, and in defense of his stance claimed that progressives only wanted artisans to serve as a ladder for their electoral ambitions. If they had a genuine interest in artisan political education, he asked, why had It only begun in 1838? Santanderistas had dominated the capital's political scene since the early 1820s. The article suggested that the progressives' "unemployment" was the principal cause for their sudden interest in artisans, rather than any real commitment to the needs of that class. 33

After the June 1838 election, neither the Democratic-Repubican nor the Catholic Societies engaged in activity other than political education. In this, they differed greatly from political action societies of the next decade, but like the latter, both tried to extend their recruitment to other areas of the country. Significantly the Catholic stronghold in the Southern Cauca Valley was the focus of the Catholic Society, and the more "liberal" region of Santander was the center of progressive activity.






32 Societies were founded In Villa de Leiva, Tunja, Gacheta, Santa Marta, Cuicuta, Soata, La Mesa, and Santa Rosa de Viterbo.

33El Amigo del Pueblo, September 16, 1838.





It is noteworthy that both groups tried to instill into their

members principles of good citizenship with the end of ensuring order and social harmony. Different ideological foundations directed their efforts, but they shared a common destination. The Catholic Society suggested that adherence to the dogma of the church, and submission of self to proper teachings, would achieve a moral social order replete with proper liberty. Progressives, on the other hand, placed their faith in the ability of people to determine for themselves those actions which brought them happiness; a mutual understanding of useful actions would then guarantee social harmony and prosperity. By either route, citizens would advance the welfare of the society as a whole. Thus neither set of educational messages can be seen as subversive, or as purposely agitating social divisions.

In April 1839 a petition was presented to the congress, signed by 343 artisans, which suggests the efforts by members of the church to use this social class to its specific ends as it touched upon the principal religious debates of the period. However, it is not clear whether the petition was associated with the Catholic Society, because many of the names of artisans listed as members of the SDRAL were included on this document, which suggests that political boundaries bad not yet been firmly fixed among the tradesmen. The petition called for a restriction of the use of Benthamite texts and other "impious books" in education, in order not to corrupt the good customs of the Colombian people. No ecclesiastical reform should be passed, according to the petition's authors, without the consent of the church. Missionary colleges should be established to proselytize among the unfaithful, and a Seminary should be established for clerical education. It also asked






68

that the Jesuits be allowed to return to the country. The petition was clearly aimed at convincing the legislators that the interests of the church coincided with those of the state; it thus called on congress to reverse many of the legislative measures instituted earlier by Santander and his associates since the time of Gran Colombia.34

Rather than acting on the artisan's petition, in June 1839 the congress ordered several minor convents of Pasto closed. The subsequent pastuso revolt sparked the first of the major civil conflicts of the nineteenth century. General Pedro Alcantara Herrin was able to subdue the rebels by August, but General Jose Marfa Obando took advantage of the rebellion to declare himself in revolt in protection of religion and federalism. Not until September 1840 did the combined forces of Herrdn, Tomis Cipriano de Mosquers, and General Jose Marfa Flores of Ecuador defeat Obando. In the meantime, other areas of the country, generally those of a more progressive persuasion, joined the revolt. President Narquez responded to the new wave of insurrection by placing Vice-President General Domingo Caicedo in control of the government and by allowing Herran and Mosquera to take charge of the military operations. By mid-1842, finally, a troubled peace descended upon the country.

The war demonstrated a frequent role played by artisans, that of soldiers. The Constitution of 1832 stipulated that the National Guard was the primary auxilary support of the Army in an emergency, and the Guard was pressed into service in this conflict. Membership in the




AC, Senado, peticiones, 1839, XI, folios 79-86r; Bonifacio Quijano et al., "H. H. senadores i representantes" (Bogota, April 16, 1839).









Guard was restricted to active citizens, so that artisans made up the backbone of its force. Some sources indicate that three-quarters or more of the Guard were artisans.35

Though Guard service was primarily in support of the

administration, artisan support was courted by progressives as well. When the northern provinces revolted in late-1840, progressives in the capital published several handouts which advised craftsmen that the revolt was against Marquez, and not against Bogota. Artisans therefore had nothing to fear. The war, according to the handouts, had originated from Obando's defense of religion, and from the government's persecution of the same general for his alleged involvement in the murder of Marshal Antonio Jose Sucre. Artisans were urged to unite with the northern towns and demand an end to the fighting.36

The Guerra de los Sumpremos, as it came to be called, is generally recognized as a major factor in sharpening the political divisions which had become visible in the 1830s. Personal antagonisms, wartime animosity, and ideological differences combined to define more clearly the alignment of political forces. The moderate (ministerial) victors, who would in time form the base of the Conservative party, took advantage of their victory to reverse some of the legislative "errors" of the santanderistas. Progressives, who on their part constituted the foundations of the Liberal party, were either humiliated by defeat as in the case of Obando, or were forced to bide their time until the




Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, 145; Constitucional de Cundinamarca, June 10, 1832; El Dia, July 17, 1842.
36 IF1 Boletfn Liberal, October 13, 1840; Un Albanil, "Artesanos laborisos de Bogota" (Bogotd, 1840).









advent of more favorable political conditions. After the death of Santander in 1840, Azuero in 1844, and Soto in 1846, the progressive revival would be directed by a new generation of political actors.

For the time being, however, ministerials ruled the country.

Their ideological preferences can be seen in the Constitution of 1843 and in several other areas. The revised constitution enhanced the power of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative and the judiciary. While expanded, executive powers were also more clearly defined than had previously been the case. Meanwhile, suffrage 37
requirements remained essentially the same.

Ministerials naturally used their strengthened political position to reverse Santander's educational legislation. Tn 1840 they decreed that teachers could select their own textbooks, weakening the 1826 Plan of Studies. Bentham's The Principles of Universal Legislation was banned as a university text by Mariano Ospina Rodrfguez's 1842 educational plan (implemented in 1844).38 Ospina's campaign to purge New Granada of utilitarian and other "immoral" tendencies included inviting the Jesuits to return to Colombian soil. They were to serve, in J. Leon Helguera's words, as a "corps of conservative shock troops."39 In the end, their effectiveness toward obtaining Ospina's goal was extemely questionable, but there is no doubt that the "Jesuit




Joseph Leon Helguera, "The First Mosquera Adminstration in New Granada" (Pb. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1958), 5472.
38 Ibhn Lane Young, "The University Reform in New Granada, 18201850" (Pb. D. dissertation, Columbia Univeristy, 1970), 37-38, 78, 106111.


Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 34.







71

question" gave rise to extreme political controversy in the years after their arrival in 1844.

While moderates were attempting to implement their program for

Colombia, one of the first statements wbich reflected the sentiments of artisans, rather than their political mnobilizers, was an 1842 response to an article published in El Dfa, a leading ministerial newspaper, that praised the effect of foreign artisans had had upon native craftsmen. It held that despite initial resistence, foreign artisans bad built a solid reputation in Bogot'a, and had done much to improve the arts of the city. The thrust of the article was to warn against opposition among craftsmen to the arrival of Jesuit craft instructors, whom the author hoped would have the same beneficial influence as had foreign artisans. 40

"Some Native Artisans" responded in the same paper by admitting that, when foreign artisans arrived, native craftsmen had indeed been alarmed. This was not due to the competitive threat represented by foreigners, but rather to their formal status under the laws of the nation. While native tradesmen were obligated to fulfill military obligations, in either the Army or the National Guard, foreigners were exempt from that obligation. Thus they did not lose work to military service, and they enjoyed more time to pursue their crafts. The authors claimed that during the War of the Supremes a substantial majority of Bogota's craftsmen had been pressed into military service, while foreigners continued to practice their trades. Moreover,







40 El Dra, May 26, 1842.









foreigners were exempt from the multiple taxes which burdened the native. In short, they were

a privileged class that came to the Republic to
enjoy all its advantages, without any
responsibilities, while at the same time the other
part of this same class had to suffer all of the resonsibilit s, pay all the taxes, and face all
the dangers.


The article intimated that foreign craftsmen acted like caballeros, enriched themselves at the expense of native producers, and returned to their own countries without having contributed anything to Colombia. 42

This exchange on the subject of foreign artisans did not presage an immediate increase in artisan political involvement, even though the 1844 presidential election was surprisingly disputed. General Mosquera was supported by ministerials who recalled the seeming ineffectiveness of civilian President Mirquez, whereas ministerials who distrusted military men (especially Mosquera) sponsored Rufino Cuervo as a candidate. Opponents of the government, while subdued, lent their support to General Eusebfo Borrero, as did associates of the dissident ministerial Julio Arboleda. In the end, Mosquera polled 762 electoral votes, Borrero 475 and Cuervo 250, while the remaining 177 votes were scattered among numerous minor candidates. Congress was forced to select the president as no candidate had received a majority total.
43
They opted for Mosquera, the clear preference among the voters.


41
Ibid., July 17, 1843.

42 El Dia, July 17, 1843.

Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 37-38; Bushnell, "Elecciones presidenclales colombianas, 1825-1856," in Compendio de estadisticas historicas de Colombia, ed. by Miguel Urrutia Montoya and Mario Arrubla (Bogot&: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1970), 24957.





Conclusion



A primary characteristic of nineteenth-century Colombian politics was the struggle for power between the Conservative and Liberal parties. This struggle led directly, as has been seen, to the recruitment of artisans as potential supporters of one or the other group. It is notable that the initial participation by artisans in the political process did not originate with craftsmen but instead with party or factional military leaders. Organizations which sought artisan electoral support in this manner were present throughout the century and tended to be short-lived, generally disbanding after the election had been decided. To be sure, parties not only sought votes, but also attempted to convince tradesmen of the correctness of their party ideology and programs through educational efforts directed at artisan voters. The attempt to instill principles of political theory among craftsmen would later bear unanticipated fruit.

A rigid ideological orientation did not develop among politically active artisans in the 1830s or early 1840s, as suggested by the fact that many of the same names appeared as members of the SDRAL and as signers of the 1839 petition. It seems, In fact, that artisan interests and attitudes did not neatly fit the constraints of either party's ideology. As a result, in the years to come the ideological orientation of artisan organizations shared features of both parties, and often tradesmen aligned with third party groups. In the period immediately following, however, the most striking feature of artisan





74

political activity was to be the sheer increase in its scale and importance within the general political process.















CHAPTER 4

ARTISANS AND THE LIBERAL REFORMS, 1845-54



Overview



The majority of the liberal reforms were conducted during the presidential administrations of Tom~s Cipriano de Mosquera (1845-49) and Jose Hilario Lopez (1849-53). Many of the reforms passed in this era had been proposed In one form or another since the 18209, but most had been forestalled by ideological opposition or by liberal pragmatism. The most active proponents of reform have been called the Generation of 1849, men who were trained under the educational system instituted by Santander. The experience of the independence movement that had moderated both Santander and hiB associates did not, however, tarnish the liberalism of these men. They undertook reforms with idealistic zeal and faith in what they could make of the republic.

The young liberals, however, did not initiate the reform process. The undoctrinaire Mosquera introduced numerous programs designed to improve the nation's physical infrastructure, to reform its fiscal apparatus, and to foster growth of export agriculture, which included lowering tariff rates. Mosquera 's liberalization of the nation's economic system splintered his ministerial supporters, and led craftsmen to organize against perceived dangers to their well-being. Artisans in 1847 formed La Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogota in an effort to reverse his tariff legislation. The Society worked with the new









generation of liberals to support the "progressive" Jose Hilario Lopez for the 1849 presidential election. Although the artisan/liberal relationship bad serious ideological flaws, their cooperation expanded during the first part of the Lopez administration.

With the aid of the Sociedad Democratica de Artesanos, young

liberals continued the economic liberalization begun by Mosquera and attempted to redirect the nation's social and political orientation as well. They adopted measures which finally eliminated slavery, hastened the elimination of Indian resguardos, expelled the Jesuits, formally separated the church and state, and began political decentralization. These and many other reforms were incorporated into the Constitution of 1853.

Reactions to these reforms were far more violent than had been the case for Mosquera's reforms. Conservatives in the Cauca Valley staged an unsuccessful revolt in 1851. The Liberal party splintered into a wing of radical reformers (g6lgotas) and moderate reformers (draconianos). Artisans of the Democratic Society became disillusioned with the radicals when they could not secure tariff protection and with the general direction of the reform process. After 1852 they joined with draconians in an attempt to curb the more radical reforms. Failure of that effort led to an artisan-military-draconian revolt in April 1854. The 17 de abril sought to halt the reform tide and return the country to previous constitutional norms. The movement was defeated in December, 1854 and hundreds of artisans were forcibly removed from bogotano political activity by their exile to Panama.














La Sociedad de Artesanos, 1845-49



Mosquera's economic policy was controversial from the beginning. His first Minister of Finance, General Juan Clfmaco Ordonez, promptly resigned due to conflicts with Mosquera regarding the proper direction of Colombian economic policy. Lino de Pombo, whose economic beliefs tended to favor freer trade and less governmental economic restrictions, replaced Ord6nez on December 29, 1845. During Pombo's brief service widespread fiscal reform was initiated. Legislation credited to Pombo's guidance included the bill which transferred control of the government's Ambalema tobacco monopoly to private hands, repeal of the tax on gold exports, and adoption of a new monetary system. Pombo also helped to found a Caja de Ahorros for the Province of Bogota before he too resigned.1

Mosquera next named Florentino Gonzdlez to the cabinet vacancy. Gonzalez rapidly accelerated the liberalization of the economy. His vision of Colombia's economic future was described to the Congress of 1847 in "probably the most significant statement of purpose and plan ever made by a granadino finance minister."2 Gonzalez told Congress

In a country rich in mines and agricultural
products that could support a considerable and
profitable export commerce . . . laws ought not be proposed that turn development of industries away





1 Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 247-48; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 115.
2 Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 326.









from the occupations of agriculture and mining
� . . those that can produce more advantages
* . . We ought to offer Europe raw materials in order to facilitate exchanges and the profit they bring with them, and to furnish the consumer, at a
comfortable price, manufactured products.

Included in his visionary statement were proposals for fiscal reorganization, further currency reform, and the lowering of import duties, especially those on textiles. The long sheltered artisan class would be forced to participate in more "productive" and "profitable" industries.

The cobbler will learn to lay bricks, the tailor to
pole boats or to fish, the blacksmith to farm; and
while thty learn? And if they do not learn? They
succumb!


Artisans from both Bogota and Medellfn reacted to rumors of a

tariff revision by presenting petitions to Congress which constituted the most significant artisan-initiated political statements up to that time. The Bogota petition protested proposed tariff reductions on items such as "ready-made clothing, shoes, tools, and other manufactures" which would damage the country's industry and disemploy thousands who "foment the national wealth" by manual trades. Shoemakers and mechanics were already suffering thanks to existing tariffs, they argued; further cuts would cause their ruin. "Would it






Anibal Galindo, Historia econmica i estadlstica de la hacienda nacional desde la colonia hasta nuestros dias (Bogota: Imprenta de Nicolas Ponton i Compania, 1874), 56. See ibid., 56-60, for the full speech.
4 Jose Maria Madiedo, Ideas fundamentales de los partidos politicos de la Nueva Granada (Bogota: Editorial Incunables, 1985), 31-32.









be credible that the same Government that we defended," the artisans asked, "would now propose to ruin the useful and laboring class of society, rewarding us thus for our patriotism and our decisions (to support) the cause of legality?" The petitioners wrote that the nation was not so wealthy or so industrially advanced as to compete on an equal footing with Europeans. Artisans did not call for a return to Spanish exclusionary policies, but only for maintenance of the current duties.5 The petition from Medellfn expressed similar concerns.6

The Bogota petition was signed by 219 individuals, all of whom seem to have been artisans or mechanics. They claimed to represent more than 2,000 families in the capital who would be hurt by the proposed legislation. Agustrn Rodrfguez, a tailor and the first to sign the document, would become the first director of the Society of Artisans. Other signers who had played, or who would play a role in artisan politics include: Jose Marla Vega, Francisco Londono, Hilario Novoa, Narcisco Garai, and Rafael Tap:as. Many signers had been
7
members of the SDRAL or had signed the "books" petition of 1839. This petition represented the marshalled efforts of the more politically important artisans of the city.

Although it was reluctant to approve the tariff proposal, most likely due to fears of lost revenues, congress passed the measure, opening the door to freer trade with the Law of June 14, 1847. The new




AC, Senado, Proyectos Negados, 1846, V, folios 118-26. The petition was also published as a handout. See Agustfn Rodrfguez et al., "H. R. senadores" (Bogota, May 5, 1846).
6 AC, Camara, Informes de Comisiones, 1847, X, folios 229-241r.

Ibid., Senado, Proyectos Negados, 1846, V, folios 118-26.









tariff schedule reduced rates by about 30%, abolished all restrictive duties on transit, and combined previous multiple duties into a single tax levied at a maximum of 25 of the object's value.8

While frustrated in their attempts to block the new law, artisans had by no means given up the fight. In October 1847 the jefe polftico of Bogota received a letter signed by Ambrosio Lopez, Agustfn Rodriguez, Dr. Cayetano Leiva, Fransisco Torres Hinestrosa, and Francisco Londono informing him of the formation of La Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogota.9 At its first meeting in early November, the Society unanimously selected Agustfn Rodriguez as its first director, Cayetano Leiva, vice-director, and Martfn Plata, secretary. The Board of Directors consisted of Jose Maria Solano, Francisco Torres Hinestrosa, Francisco Londono, Pedro Aguilar, Rafael Lasso, Ambrosio Lopez, Bartolome Andrade, and Antonio Chaves. At its inception, the group was quite small, numbering only 10-15 principal members, all but 10
two of whom were artisans.

The importance of artisans' economic interests in the creation of the Society was later emphasized by Rodriguez




8 Galindo, Historia economic, 60-61; Republica de Colombia,
Codificacioi nacional de todas las leyes de Colombia desde el ano de 1821, hecha conform a la ley 13 de 1912, 34 vols. (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional, 1924- ), XII, 214-62. (Hereafter CN.); Ospina Vasquez, Industria i protecci6n, 208-14.
Hugo Latorre Cabal, Mi novelas Apuntes autobiograficas de Alonso Ldrpez (Bogota: Ediciones Mito, 1961), 26.
10 Agustin Rodrfguez, Al director i miembros de la Sociedad
Democratica (Bogota: np, 1849), 1, 2; Sociedad de Artesanos, Reglamento para su regimen interior i economic (Bogota: Imprenta de Nicolas Gomez, 1847), 16. Other members of the board included Camilo Cardenas, Dr. Evanjelista Duran, Jose Benito Miranda, Jose Marfa Vega, Francisco Garzon, Gregorio Lugo, and Hilarlo Novoa.









When the idea was happily conceived to found and
organize a Society composed of the artisans of the
capital, it was decided not only to focus their
patriotic sentiments, virtues, and loyalties, but
also to express the lamentable consequences of the barbaric law.,lowering import duties and allowing
introduction of foreign-made products crafted
equally as well in the country.


As the law of June 14 was said to attack directly the artisans' occupations and welfare, the Society was determined to make representations to the legislature to bring about its reform. The Society also claimed to look forward to the coming presidential elections and the "light of republicanism," which it thought would favor their interests.12

By-laws approved on November 18 described the purpose of the

organization as being "to promote the advancement of the arts and other areas that can help our well-being." Membership in the Society was open to artisans, agriculturalists, and to aficionados of the trades.13 Among its specific goals were: steady work for all members; obedience and respect for the government; and various forms of instruction for the membership, to include democratic theory, military skills, 14
principles of justice, and religious training. Obligations of the members included payment of a three real fee each month, aid to needy




11 Rodrfguez, Al director, 1.

12 Ibid.

13 Sociedad de Artesanos, Reglamento.

14 Reglamento de la Sociedad de Artesanos, BogotA, 1848. As cited by Jaramillo Uribe, "Las Sociedades Democriticas de Artesanos y la coyuntura polftica y social colombiana de 1848," in La personalidad hist6rica de Colombia y otros ensayos (Bogota: Editorial Andes, 1977), 205.









members, and the use of suffrage rights only with the advice of the Society. Members were cautioned not to present discourses disobedient to the laws of the land or to censure legal authorities, and they were to avoid personal, political, or religious issues. 15Despite this ban, there is little evidence that the Society discussed anything else.

Opposition to the Society quickly developed in response to a handout circulated by Ambrosio Lopez in which he claimed that the Society was designed to help an oppressed and threatened class. The editor of the Catholic El Clamor de la Verdad refuted Lopez's claim, stating that the secret society would do no more than serve as a machine for someone's electoral purposes--it would be used and then forgotten. The editor commented that the group appeared to be an enemy of Christ, based on a reference by Lopez to the banned book by Felicite de Lamennais. Lopez immediately denied any secret intentions on the part of the organization. He noted that the Society was entirely open and had only the laudable objective of uniting the artisans. 17El Clamor de la Verdad then softened its opposition to the Society, stating that its original objection had only been to Lamennais's book. The paper praised the openness of the organization but reminded artisans to be on their guard because of the upheavals of the times. 18









15Sociedad de Artesanos, Reglamento.

16 El Clamor de la Verdad, November 14, 1847.

17 lfl D~a, December 11, 1847.

18 El Clamor de la Verdad, December 26, 1847.









The Society had some 300 members by April of 1848 according to

AgustIn Rodrfguez, but he also reported that it was often difficult to meet the 20-person quorum necessary for a meeting. This changed, however, after May 4, 1848, when the group met to consider which candidate to back in the June presidential election, wbich paralleled that of 1836 in its importance for political alignment.19

Mosquera had not proven to be the doctrinaire ministerial that many had hoped, and by opening the Pandora's box of reform, his administration had splintered the party. At least four presidential candidates came from the divided ministerial ranks. Foremost was Mosquera's vice-president, Rufino Cuervo. Cuervo attracted the support of more conservative party members, but he did not appeal to moderates, who instead favored JoaquIn Jos' Gori, who had led internal party opposition to Mosquera. Gori opposed the new tariff, primarily on the grounds that it would cause a large revenue loss for the government, and consequently was supported by many artisans. Two generals, Eusebio Borrero and Joaqufn Barriga, also sought the presidency. The leading progressive was Florentino Gonzalez, who had been at the group's forefront since the death of Vicente Azuero in 1844. His service in the Mosquera administration alienated potential progressive support however, and Gonzalez was forced to enlist the service of ministerial moderates such as Lino de Pombo and Julio Arboleda.

With all these men drawing support from the ministerial ranks, progressives selected war hero General Jose Marfa Lopez as a unity candidate. As a military leader Lopez calmed the fears of those




19 Rodr(quez, Al director, 3; El Aviso, October 8, 1848.









remembering the ineffective peace-keeping efforts of Marquez ten years earlier. Lopez was closely identified with the exiled General Jose Marfa Obando, but he did not share Obando's stigma of having revolted. Lopez too was favored by many artisans, to whom he promised tariff protection.

In was during this period that young liberals of the Generation of 1849 began to speak at the Society's meetings and to assume an 20
important role in its deliberations. Some speakers presented the ideas of European thinkers such as Saint Simon, Proudhon, and Louis Blanc, or of the revolution that was occurring then in France, which has led some historians to argue that the programs of the Society and these French thinkers shared many common points. Such a conclusion needs to be qualified, as will be pointed out in the conclusion to this
21
chapter. In addition to hearing "socialist" doctrines preached, the Society listened to its guests' opinions on the various candidates. Francisco Javier Zaldua spoke in favor of the progressive Lopez; Jose de Obaldia praised Jose Marfa Obando; and Ezequiel Rojas also pledged his endorsement of Lopez, claiming that the general would return 22
Colombia to the legality of the days of Santander.






20 Ambrosio Lpez issued many of the invitations. Ambrosio
L6pez, El desegano o confidencias de Ambrosio L6pez, primer director de la Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogota, denominada hoi "Sociedad Democratica" escrito para conocimiento de sus consocios (Bogota: Imprenta de Espinosa, por Isidoro Garcla Ramfrez, 1851), 1-5.
21 For example, see Jaramillo Uribe, "La influencia de los romanticos frances y de la revolucion de 1848 en el pensamiento politico colombiano del siglo XIX," in La personalidad hist'rico de Colombia y otros ensayos, 181-201.
22 Latorre Cabal, Mi novela, 72.









The Society's election committees reported their findings to the membership on May 15. Francisco Londono, now director of the Society, personally favored Joaqufn Jose Goni, but a lengthy discussion led to an agreement to suppport Lopez. Their adherence centered on his demonstrated capacity to preserve the peace of the country.

What other thing can be more important to us than peace, order, and liberty, whose benefits provide us the free exercise of our work, the development
of our industry, the happiness of our hb9es, and
the tranquility of our domestic hearth?


The Society made no mention of LO'pez's political program, only that he represented liberal principles and order. 24

The decision to support Lopez was reaffirmed at the June 10

session, attended by some 400 people. Acting on a proposal by Amibrosio Lopez and Jose Mari'a Vergara Tenonio, the Society voted almost unamimously to work for Lopez's election. 25It accordingly appealed to artisans of the Province of Bogoti, acclaiming Lopez as a fighter for liberty, a soldier of the people, and a Catholic democrat. "Citizen General" Lopez was said to have "learned republican principles in the most sublime evangelical maxims of Christianity, and would make real the brilliant democratic theories and holy dogmas of equality." It was argued that he would eliminate laws which favored the privileged and speculators. The Society's cause was said to be that of the people, which was triumphing In Europe and America and, with Lopez, would






23La Amirica, June 4, 1848.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.








26
triumph also in Colombia. (The influence of young liberals can be clearly seen in the language of this appeal.)

Lopez was not the only candidate favored by artisans, however. As early as April 8, an author claiming to be a painter began a series of letters to the editors of El Dfa describing the various candidates. Lopez was rejected as being too susceptible to outside forces and was said to be unlikely to sustain the dignity of the office. Gonzalez was dismissed as a political novice. General Barriga drew mild praise from the painter, but not as a viable candidate. Rufino Cuervo was described as a man who spoke differently to all peoples in a courtly manner unbecoming a republican. Joaqufn Jose Gorl, on the other hand, was said to be preeminently fit for the role of a republican president. He was described as dignified, experienced, a moderate man of laws, and one who could direct the nation to rational progress. He was not, according to the author, the candidate of Mosquera, an identification which all candidates sought to avoid in this election.27 Another letter signed "Some true artisans" also supported the Cori candidacy. It railed against military candidates, most notoriously Mosquera, insisting that their insolence only brought misery and war to the country's people. Gori by contrast was said to be an honorable





26
El Aviso, June 18, 1848. A list of presidential electors
favored by the organization was published which included the names of the leading liberals of the capital, as well as numerous artisans. Artisans proposed from the barrio of Catedral included Martfn Plata, JosE Marfa Vergara Tenorio, Evanjelista Duran, and Rudecindo Suner; from San Victorino, Carlos MartAn, Francisco Londono, Ambrosio Lopez and Francisco Torres Hinestrosa; and from the barrio of Las Nieves, Pedro A. Castillo and Ramon Groot. Ibid.
27 El D(a, April 8, 22, 29, May 6, 13, 24, 1848.







87

liberal, who would calmly tolerate opposing beliefs; more than a man of a party, he was a candidate who represented all of the people. 28

Inevitably the artisans supporting Cori took issue with the Society's support of Lbopez, cautioning potential voters not to be misled by promises that Ldpez would repeal Mosquera 's tariff legislation and would deny entry into the country of foreign artisans. After all, one handout reminded its readers, such powers were constitutionally reserved for the congress and not the president. Artisans were cautioned not to put faith in men whose interests were opposite to their own, who laughed at the artisans in private and who would abandon them when they were no longer needed. The handout ended with the prophetic phrase: "Time will disillusion you." 29 Another proConi letter alleged that artisans comprised only one-tenth of the Society's 200 members. Even those artisans were described as being manipulated by outside forces, while the few craftsmen who did understand the situation were said to be resigning from the organization. Even Agustin Rodriguez reportedly handed in his resignation, only to have it rejected. 30

The Society formally rebutted these charges. Its board of

directors protested insinuations that artisans were unable to make political assessments by themselves. They could, and would, refuse to be misled by individuals who only wanted to divide and exploit the artisan class. A "great majority" of the organization's members was




28 Ibid., June 7, 1848.

29 "A los artesanos de Bogota" (Bogota, nd).

30 El Dfla, May 31, 1848.








31
said to be supporting Lopez. Interestingly, the Society's response used the word members instead of artisans--and said nothing about the defection of Rodriguez, who was at the time on the conservative electoral list for Cor. 32

When the presidential election finally took place, no candidate obtained a majority. In the nation as a whole, Lopez led the count with 725 electoral votes, Gori garnered 384, and Cuervo totalled 304; other candidates, mostly ministeriales, shared 276 votes. Together ministerial candidates received the greatest number of votes, but the election clearly demonstrated the deep fissures in their ranks. Of the 242 votes in the Province of Bogota, Lopez won 102, Gori 95, Cuervo 27, and 18 votes were garnered by others. Despite the efforts of the Society of Artisans in mobilizing support for Lopez, he fared worse in the capital than he did in its province; Gori tallied 31 votes, L6pez 12, Cuervo 8, and Mariano Ospina Rodr1guez one.33







31 La Amirica, June 18, 25, 1848.

32 El Nacional, June 11, 1848.

David Bushnell, "Elecciones presidenciales colombianas, 18251856," in Compendio de estadisticas historicas de Colombia (Bogotg, 1970), 258-59, 265; El Nacional, June 11, 1848; El Dia, June 28, July 1, 19, 1848. Twenty-nine of Cori's votes came from electors in the parrochial districts of Catedral, San Victorino, and Santa Barbara, while it appears that L6pez won the nine votes from Las Nieves. A curious change in the first and final electoral counts merits mention. In the first announcement, Agustin Rodr~guez, on the conservative list, and the artisan Jenaro Rufz, a progressive elector, both artisans were named as winning electors. Their names were absent from the final list; this happened to only one other of the thirty-one electors from Bogotd. El Dia, June 28, July 29, 1848. The Society reportedly spent 800 pesos on its campaign effort. The the money was recovered by a 20 de julio festival, a 250 peso gift from Juliin G6mez, and a 200 peso donation from Ambrosio L6pez. Cabal LaTorre, Mi novela, 35.









In Londono's October report on his term as the Society's director, he called the victory in Las Nieves a "splendid triumph." He claimed that fraudulent voting had denied liberals a win in Santa Barbara and that liberal victories in the other two barrios were prevented by 34
reprecussions from an incident on June 13. Yet these results clearly show the strength of the Cori candidacy in Bogota and, when coupled with various pro-Cori announcements in the press, suggest that artisans in Bogota were not completely swayed by the Society's electioneering. The artisan alliance with the young liberals who backed Lopez was far from secure even at this early date. Nonetheless, the Society of Artisans had demonstrated its potential as a political action group, a role which would be expanded in the coming years.

The Society also participated in local politics. In the December 1848 election for a new cabildo, 69 progressives were elected out of a total of 166. Five members of the Society were seated: Ambrosio Lopez, Cayetano Leivae, Juan Evanjelista Duran, Francisco Torres Hinestroza, and Francisco Visquez. Conservatives assessed these elections, which were quite heated, as proof of the progressives' unpopularity among the 35
citizens, as they were unable to obtain a majority.







El Aviso, October 8, 1848. On that day students and artisans rejoicing a verdict of innocent against several newspaper editors who had been accused of libeling the president were threatened with violence by the president. Only calming advice prevented Mosquera from using force against the celebrators. Helguera, First Mosquera Administration, 234-37; Helguera, "Tomis Cipriano de Mosquera as President," SELA, 25:1 (June 1981), 12. See El Progreso and La A9rica, both June 18, 1848, for opposing interpretations of the day's incident.
El Nacional, December 25, 1848.









Meanwhile, political tension was rising in anticipation of the selection of the president by the congress in March 1849. One paper claimed that a "certain" group of people were trying to spread the idea among the pueblo that an aristocracy existed in Colombia, one that should be ended just as it had been in France. The aim of such propaganda, the author wrote, was to agitate the artisans, because in fact no blooded, commercial, or political aristocracy existed. Artisans were warned of the motivations behind such propaganda, and reminded that, even if craftsmen had not yet been elected to high office, that was due to their lack of education, not the system's rigidity.36 Ambrosio Lopez responded that artisans could see perfectly well that an aristocracy of politicians did exist which lived off public monies and welfare. Insulting the artisans' intelligence did not, Lopez concluded, contribute to public tranquility.37

Beginning in mid-February 1849, the Society held meetings almost daily to prepare an election strategy. The agreed upon approach "was to frighten the weak (members of Congress) and do nothing more."38



36 Ibid.

El Aviso, January 11, 1849.

38 El Patriota Imparcial, March 1, 1850. It is difficult to determine who led the preparations for the elections. Both Ambrosio L6pez and Emeterio Heredia later claimed responsiblilty; others, however, contend that the locksmith Miguel Leon directed the Society's plans; still others believe that young liberals were in charge of its maneuvers. Lopez, El desengano, 23; Lopez, El triunfo sobre la serpiente roja, cuyo asunto es del dominio de la nacion (Bogota: Editorial Espinosa, 1851), 10; Emeterio Heredia, Contestacidn al cuaderno titulado "El desengano o confidencias de Ambrosio L,6pez etc." por El Presidente que fue de la Sociedad de Artesanos El 7 de Marzo de
1849 (Bogota: Imprenta de NGcleo Liberal, 1851), 41-45; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 102; Angel and Jose Rufino Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo y noticias de su 6poca 2 vols. (Bogota: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, Prensas de la Biblioteca Nacional, 1946), II, 126-28; La Civilizaci6n, December 27, 1849.









On March 1, the Society appointed a committee to ask the governor of the province to provide arms to members so that they might serve as a standing militia, ready to defend the country's republican institutions at a moment's notice. The arms were denied to the Society, but it was reported that they purchased all the pistols, knives, powder, and 39
ammunition in the capital. While the credibility of this report is doubtful, it does illustrate the anxiety aroused by the Society and its plans for the 7 de marzo.

Anxiety was not calmed when a group of artisans entered the

congress on March 2 and shouted down conservative speakers, an action which led to their expulsion.40 Such activities, In fact, recalled to many minds the incident that had occurred a year earlier in Caracas, Venezuela, when the Venezuelan Congress was invaded by a governmentinspired mob. In the attack on congress of January 24, 1848, several deputies and members of the guard were killed or wounded, bringing to an end congressional resistance to President Josi Tadeo Monagas. Mosquera prepared for similar disturbances in Bogot'a. The 500-man Fifth Battalion was placed on alert and charged with maintaining order. On the night before the selection, cannons filled with grape were 41
placed at key intersections of the city.








La Civilizacidn, January 10, 1850; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 102.
40 Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 127.

41 Latorre Cabal, Mi novela, 24; Isacc F. Holton, New Granada: Twenty Months in the Andes (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1857), 521.









The morning of the seventh broke clear and sunny. Congress was scheduled to open at 10:00 a. m., but long before a large crowd had occupied the spacious church of Santo Domingo where the selection would be held. First to enter were the artisans, next the goristas, then the cuervistas, and finally the students, who sat nearest the congressmen. The various sides were said to be about equally represented. A barrier of heavy tables separated the audience, estimated at 1,600 people, from
42
the congressmen. The session opened on time, and the voting began. At the end of the first round of voting, both L6pez and Cuervo had received 37 votes, and Cori 10, which removed him from the contest. Tn the second round, Cuervo improved his total to 42, Lopez to 40, and two votes were blank. At this point many people in the crowd thought that Cuervo had won. A tumult swept the audience that was calmed only when Jose de Obaldia leaped to the top of a table, shouting "Todavfa no hay elecciones." When order was restored, the third round of voting began. Due to insistent shouts by the audience it took over two hours to complete. At its conclusion, L6pez had 42 votes, Cuervo 39, and now three votes were blank. The last vote was that of Mariano Ospina Rodrfguez, which according to traditional accounts read: "I vote for General Jos6 Hilario Lpez so that the deputies will not be murdered." At this time, about 3:00 p. m., the spectators were expelled from the church. The crowd, now swollen to 4,000, waited ouside in the rain, which had begun between the second and third ballots. At 5:00 p. m. it was announced that the fourth round had resulted in the same talley as






42 Jose Marfa Cordovez Moure, Reminiscenicias de Santa Fe de Bogota, 9 vols. (Bogota: La Cruz, 1910), III, 343-46.




Full Text

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THE EARLY LATIN AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT: ARTISANS AND POLITICS IN BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, 1832-1919 By DAVID LEE SOWELL A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF P illLOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1986

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i Copyright 1986 by David Lee Sowell

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For Christine and for Emily, the two women who have done so much for making me realize the value of life, and its promises for the future. iii

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Numerous people helped in the completion of this dissertation, the most important being my wife, Christine. Without her support, both emotional and physical, it would not have been possible. I appreciate her labors more than these words can indicate. David Bushnell has been a constant reminder that scholarship and gentility are indeed compatible. His contributions to the refinement of this work are many, not the least his fine editorial abilities. Lyle McAlister helped me a great deal in learning the crafts of the historian. Jim Amelang has been both an unfailing critic and friend, even though we can not seem to find ourselves on the same continent very ofter.. Jane Landers has been a special friend and confidant; her support helped me over some of the rougher hurdles of graduate school. In Colombia, the staffs of the Biblioteca Nacional, the Archivo del Congreso, the Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, and the Archivo Nacional provided invaluable assistance in locating the material supporting this study. Special thanks are due to Francisco Gnecco Calvo for his assistance in making Bogota a comfortable living and working environment. Much of the inspiration for this work came from conversations over tinto with Oscar Saldarriaga V., a friend whose company is often missed. Financial support for this project was provided by a Fulbright-Hays Grant and a Tinker Field Research Grant. iv

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGM FNTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i V ABSTRA.CT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii CHAPTERS 1 INTRODUCTI CN' 1 Objectives........................................... 1 Definition of Terms.................................. 3 Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Historiography....................................... 9 2 ARTISAN SOCIOECONOMIC EXPERIENCE, 1832-1919 16 Introduction......................................... 16 Economic Environment................................. 18 Social and Occupational Changes...................... 36 Conclusion........................................... 45 3 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF ARTISANS, 1832-1845 48 The Partisan Struggle for Power...................... 48 The Appeal to the Masses, 1832-45.................... 55 Conclusion... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 4 ARTISANS AND THE LIBERAL REFORM, 1845-54 75 Overview............................................. 75 La Sociedad de Artesanos, 1845-49.... 77 Las Sociedades Democriticas, 1849-51........ ... 94 Division and Realignment, 1851-54 118 El 17 de Abril....................................... 143 Conclusion........................................... 163 5 THE TRIUMPH OF RADICALISM, 185.'3-68 ,.............. 169 Overview............................................. 169 Liberal Reunification, 1855-59 171 War, Reforms, and Economic Crisis, 1860-66....... .• . 186 La Sociedad de Union de Artesanos, 1866-68 205 Conclusion................. . . . . . . . . . . . 233 V

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6 FRAGMENTATION OF THE ARTISAN CLASS, 1869-99 ••.........• 236 Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 Mutual Aid and Partisan Politics, 1869-79 ••.•....•... 238 N6nez, War, and the Regeneration, 1880-89 .•.......•.• 258 Riot, Repression, and Rebellion, 1890-99............. 271 Conclusion ............................................. 281 7 THE RISE OF THE WORKER'S LABOR MOVEMENT, 1899-1919 ....• 284 Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 Recovery and Reyes, 1899-1909 ....•.•....•..•....•...• 287 Industrialists and Workers, 1910-15.................. 299 The Dawn of Workers' Socialism, 1916-19.............. 324 Cone lus ion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 8 CONCLUSION............................................. 343 The Partisan Struggle for Power ..•.•....•.....•.•..•. 343 Artisan Social, Economic, and Political Interests •... 348 Craftsmen's Organizations: A Typology .•.•......•..... 357 Artisan Political Activity 363 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................. 368 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 vi

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE EARLY LATIN AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT: ARTISANS AND POLITICS IN BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, 1832-1919 By DAVID LEE SOWELL August 1986 Chairman: David Bushnell Major Department: History Artisans participated actively in the politics of Bogota during the first century of Colombia's nationhood. Craftsmen pursued various political objectives, foremost being the desire for tariff protection from the increased competition of foreign goods brought on by Colombia's fuller integration into the North Atlantic economy. Artisans also sought industrial education to improve their crafts, programs to enhance their social welfare, effective political participation, and an end to the partisan strife that ravaged the country. The initial opening for formal political expression came not from craftsmen, however, but as a result of the struggle for power between the Conservative and Liberal parties. In 1838, members of both groups helped organize societies designed to inculcate in artisans the vii

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ideologies of the emerging parties, including the concept of popular political participation. Ten years later, when tariff reform threatened the interests of Bogota's craft sector, artisans organized to defend themselves. Throughout the period of liberal reform (1847-54), artisans were integral factors in the capital's politics. The artisans' participation in the coup of Jose Mar(a Melo in 1854 signalled a recognition on their part that many of the reforms were contrary to their best interests. Thereafter, craftsmen pursued objectives consistent with their own socioeconomic interests and most attempted to isolate themselves from the partisan political struggle. By the 1870s, a combination of factors fragmented the artisan class, weakening its ability to organize the large groups common to earlier years. In the latter years of the nineteenth century, the artisan elites sought to protect themselves in mutual aid organizations, while the "rank and file" craftsmen were left without organized political expression. During the early years of the twentieth century, wage laborers began to emerge as important components of Bogota's working population. Several organizations attempted to represent the interests of both artisans and workers, but by the 1910s workers had assumed domination of the city's labor movement. v iii

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Objectives This study traces artisan political activity in Bogota, Colombia, from 1832 until 1919. 1 It intends to reveal the social, economic, and political goals sought by artisans through active participation in a political system normally described as oligarchic. In the ninety years covered by this study, Bogota and Colombia experienced marked economic and social change. Bogota evolved from an isolated provincial town into a bustling city in tune with global rhythms. It was at the beginning of the national period a town with a largely self-sufficient economy, supported by traditional industries and linked to a limited regional market. By the 1910s the capital was in the throes of industrialization and . had been integrated into both national and international markets. Colombia's external economic role changed from that of a colonial source of gold bullion for Spanish coffers, to the 1 Colombia underwent several name changes during the nineteenth century: Colombia (along with Ecuador and Venezuela), from 1819 until 1830; La Republica de la Nueva Granada, from 1830 until 1857; La Confederacion Granadina, from 1857 until 1863; Los Estados Unidos de Colombia, from 1863 until 1886; and, finally, La Rep-oblica de Colombia, from 1886 to the present. For the sake of clarity, I will use Colombia throughout the study. 1

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supplier of preferred coffee to the tables of the United States and Europe. Transformation of the Colombian economy had a fundamental impact upon the artisans of Bogota. Introduction into the global economy shattered their protected position in the colonial system. Many craftsmen suffered economic dislocation or proletarianization through the loss of their traditional economic niche. A few artisans emerged as small industrialists, but most suffered deterioration of their social and economic positions. Artisan social relations were transformed in the wake of radical changes in their productive functions. Relationships with other members of their class were redefined, as were those with individuals of other classes. These socioeconomic changes created special problems, which in turn called into being new class interests. 2 In order to understand the context in which artisans pursued their specific concerns, much attention will be directed toward Colombia's political system . The struggle for power between elite-dominated Conservative and Liberal parties was the dynamo for nineteenth-century Colombian politics. Elites strove to implement their own ideological programs and competed for limited governmental positions. In so doing, they drew non-elite social groups into the political process in an effort to enhance their chances for domination of the state aparatu~. Competition for power first enabled artisans to gain a political voice and in time offered them the opportunity to express their class objectives. Artisans were not wholly dependent upon elites for political mobilization, however; at times they organized for satisfaction of their own ambitions. Yet tradesmen could not isolate

PAGE 11

themselves from established parties and thus the narrative of their political activity is closely intertwined with that of the larger process. 3 Both changing socioeconomic conditions and the general political environment affected the tempo of artisan political activity. It is possible to speak of a more or less homogeneous artisan class in the beginning of the national period. Internal stratifications were present, but these did not override its essential homogeneity. This situation existed until the 1860s. During the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s the most cohesive artisan organizations functioned. As Bogoti's economy was transformed during the last third of the nineteenth century, differences in the artisan class became more significant. Fragmentation of the artisan class resulted in the demise of broad mobilizations. By the beginning of this century skilled independent craftsmen, journeymen associated with the emerging industrial concerns, proletarianized laborers, and various other types of workers made up the city's working population. This division of the labor force, clearly visible by the 1910s, coincided with the replacement of artisans as leaders of the Colombian labor movement by workers associated with industrial production and transportation systeme. Definition of Terms Artisans in nineteenth-century Bogota existed as individuals linked by common involvement in the mode of production. In the purest sense they were independent producers who practiced a skilled trade. Such a definition, of course, did not accurately apply to all people

PAGE 12

4 who were labelled artisans. At one end of the skilled trade spectrum were individuals barely differentiated from unskilled laborers. At the other end were near-bourgeoisie who did very little manual labor themselves and who subsisted on the labor of others. Yet both "extremes" might identify themselves and be identified by others as artisans. Clearly, one must go beyond purely occupational categories in order to identify the craftsmen of the period. The traditional Spanish derision of manual labor helps in this regard. Certain levels of society would never refer to themselves as artisans because the term implied an inferior social status. These men were the hidalgos of colonial times; for the national period I shall refer to them as "elites." Artisans were separated from the elite by the fact that their economic well-being sprang from consistent and close contact with manual labor. Delimiting the artisan from the worker is much more difficult. Trades in nineteenth-century Bogota were not so organized as to make this division readily apparent. The lack of accurate descriptive information aggravates the problem. Moreover, for political purposes artisans often identified themselves as part of the pueblo, which consisted in the main of workers. However, artisans at times also separated themselves from the pueblo, a self-description which helps distinguish the artisan and the worker. Artisans consistently identified themselves as skilled laborers, who, because of their productive ability were economically independent and contributed "positively" to society. Craftsmen expressed pride that their labor enabled them to be economically independent and not bound to others. Clearly the wage worker could not make this claim.

PAGE 13

This is not to say that all people who called themselves artisans were economically independent; most were dependent upon others for raw materials, credit, and capital, but such needs did not negate a self image of economic independence. In fact, the vehement defense of this independence in the face of competition from foreign products suggests its importance for artisan self-definition. 5 Both skilled labor and economic independence contributed to the artisans' perceived social value. Tradesmen were the productive sector of society. Many could read and write and others were well educated. Throughout most of the nineteenth century the political system afforded to a great number of artisans full citizenship, including the right to vote on the basis of property, income, literacy, or other criteria. This political status contributed greatly to their republican ideals, and to the struggle for control of their political destiny. These factors combined to create a sense of what it meant to be an artisan in nineteenth-century Bogota. Above all, consciousness defined the artisan class. Craftsmen were the skilled producers of nineteenth century Colombian society, who, because of their contributions, felt that their opinions and needs merited consideration in the resolution of political and social questions. Artisans shared not only a common productive function, but they also perceived the common threat that foreign goods posed to their livelihood and social status. The danger of having their position in society undermined contributed greatly to a shared consciousness. So too did the recruitment of craftsmen by elite political groups. While an artisan class existed throughout most of the nineteenth century, most of the statements which claimed to represent all artisans

PAGE 14

6 in fact came from a limited portion of that class. An artisan elite, formed through its economic success or through its relationships with elite political parties, dominated artisan organzations, the artisan press, and the documentation which survives to illustrate the artisans' place in the century. I feel that these men, far from being unrepresentative of their class, maintained at least part of their leadership by their ability to express the general interests of the class. Therefore, while the vocal artisans came from a smaller section of the class, it seems that in most instances their comments mirrored the interests of the less articulate members of the artisan class. Throughout this study reference will be made to organized artisan political activity. Artisans mobilized and were recruited by elite groups for different reasons. The most common form of artisan organization was electoral in nature. Such groups were generally short-lived and not directed by tradesmen. Other efforts were made by associated artisans to support a broader political goal than victory in a single election, such as the ongoing pursuit of tariff protection. On occasion artisans supplied both the impetus and direction for their own organizations, although political reality necessitated some connections with non-artisan sectors. Mutual aid societies are also considered to be a form of political mobilization in that they were always potential political actors, and sometimes quite influential. Finally, I consider direct action by crowds to be an articulation of political sentiment. In short, any activity that represented artisan political expression, formal or informal, will be treated as a form of political activity.

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7 The second chapter makes a generalized analysis of economic and social conditions in the capital that influenced political activity. During the early years examined by this study the primary socioeconomic interests of artisans in the nineteenth century took shape. Chapters three through seven focus upon different stages of artisan political activity from 1832 until 1919. The years covered by the different chapters are determined by changes in the nature of that activity. At times these chapters coincide with "standard" political periodization, while at others they do not. Finally, the conclusion draws the entire period together, analysing both the social and economic factors which influenced artisan mobilization, and the political framework which allowed for their participation and expression. Sources My original intention was to conduct a study of the artisan class of nineteenth-century Bogota in its fullest ramifications. Family relations, cultural characteristics, trade activities, and formal and informal associations were but a few of the facets to be addressed. In effect, I had wanted to do a labor history in the best tradition of "new social history." For too long social groups in Latin America have been studied solely for their political role. They have frequently been denied their own place in history, often being studied only in light of their exploitation by elite groups. I had also hoped to avoid the time-worn treadmill of the more conventional sort of Marxist labor historiography. I was sure that I could examine artisans in light of their own social and cultural importance.

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8 As it turned out, the zeal and expertise of bogotano rioters, along with non-violent destruction of archives, redefined my project. New methodologies are useful only when sources are available to support them. Such data are in large part absent for nineteenth-century Bogota. The alcaldia, home of information on local taxes, juridical procedures, and city government, was burned in 1903. Departmental archives were destroyed in 1948. Part of the archives of the diocese was destroyed in the 9 de abril. Notarial archives are extant, but disorganized to a point of limited utility unless one has years to research. Consequently, the nature of available sources dictated the political emphasis of my work. Historians concerned with the political history on the period are blessed with abundant data in the Archivo del Congreso, numerous private collections of family papers, archives of the Academia Colombiana de Historia, several outstanding newspaper collections, and fine examples of political handouts and broadsides, to cite only the more obvious sources. Congressional archives, newspapers, and handouts offer a wealth of information on artisan political activity. Yet, while good data are available, their limitations define the scope of this work. Information on the artisan elite is more common than on the "rank-and-file" artisan. One can locate data on artisan political societies, but not have access to their internal functions. Informal associations are particularly difficult to document. Information on trade activities, including apprenticeship systems, are almost non existent, although complaints about tariff policy abound. Social information must be gleaned carefully from sources and employed with more generalization than would be desired; even then, one must question

PAGE 17

its representativeness. The data which remain dictate a political emphasis, although that emphasis has been balanced by an orientation toward social history. It is my hope that this work will improve upon traditional histories of the Latin American labor mo v ement b y presenting a more integrated history of a social class engaged in political activity. Historiography 9 Histories of the Colombian labor movement share several analytical characteristics. Attention has centered upon institutional aspects of the twentieth century labor movement, as well as syndicalist, political, or strike activity. Thus incidents such as the 1924 strike of Barrancabermeja oil workers or the creation of the Union de Trabajadores de Colombia are well documented. Most investigations therefore have been primarily concerned with "modern" workers. Workers lacking organizational expression have seldom been studied. Social characteristics are frequently discussed in relation to strike demands, but not in the formation of a working class culture or consciousness. Yet, despite the focus upon the twentieth century movement, we lack a clear understanding of the origins of the twentieth-century labor movement, especially its roots in artisanal activity of the previous century. Little attention has been directed toward nineteenth-century labor 2 history, or on the artisan sector of the population. Scholars of 2 Very few studies have examined urban workers in colonial Colombia. Foremost are the series of articles by Humberto Triana y Antorveza, which include: '' El aprendizaje en los gremios

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10 Colombia's labor movement, illustrated by Miguel Urrutia Montoya in The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement, examines only the 3 Democratic Society in discussing "labor in the nineteenth century." He briefly mentions that mutual aid societies were formed in various Colombian cities (though he does not included those of Bogota), but allows them no political role. Not until the 1919 meeting of the Workers' Assembly does Urrutia recognize laborers' political activity 4 in the Colombian capital during the current century. Edgar Caicedo simply notes as an antecedent to discussion of the stages of the Colombian labor movement: The activities of mutualist organizations, from the middle of the nineteenth century, constitutes only the prehistory of the syndicalist movement .... Those organizations were heterogeneous groups of artisans, principally, with confused trade ideologies and limited objectives. To say this is not to lessen recognition of the important social and political struggles undertaken by artisans of the Democra;ic Societies in the dawn of Colombian capitalism. neogranadinos,'' Boleti~ Cultural y Bibliogr~fico, 8:5 (1965), 735-42; "El aspecto religioso en los gremios neogranadinos," Ibid., 9:2 (1966), 269-81; '' EKamenes, licencias, fianzas y e lecciones artesanales," Ibid., 9:2 (1966). 65-73; "Extranjeros y grupos etnicos en los gremios neogranadinos," Ibid., 8:1 (1965), 24-32; and "La libertad laboral y la supresion de los gremios neogranadinos," Ibid., 8:7 (1965), 1015-2li., For a discussion of the importance of artisans in cities of colonial Latin America, see Lyman Johnson, "Artisans," in Cities and Society in Colonial Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), ed. by Louisa Schell Haberman and Susan Migden Socolow, 227-50. 3 Other studies in a similar vein include: Victor Manuel Moncayo and Fernando Rojas, Luchas obreras y politics laboral en Colombia (Bogota: La Carreta, 1978); Daniel Pecaut, Polftica y sindicalismo en Colombia (Bogota: La Carreta, 1973); and Marco A. Cordoba A., Elementos de sindicalismo (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1977). 4 Migual Urrutia, The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). 5 Edgar Caicedo, Historia de las luchas sindicales en Colombia (Bogota: Ediciones CEIS,

PAGE 19

Aside from the multitude of studies on the mid-century Sociedades Democraticas de Artesanos de Bogota, very little is known of other 6 workers or of organizations in which they were influential. Few words 11 have been dedicated to the social, cultural, or economic experiences of workers, or to their political activity. Historical examinations of workers in cities other than Bogota have been even sketchier. In short, little is known of the artisanal labor movement or of the transition from it to the modern labor movement. Other areas of Latin America share similar historiographical patterns, especially the institutional focus and the Marxist methodological analysis. 7 Labor historians of Latin America have, for the most part, bypassed the nineteenth century in the rush to examine the twentieth century. Labor scholars and syndicalist activists have long dominated the discussion of the labor movement, adding a sense of urgency to their interpretations seldom found in the works of non-Latin 1982), 57. 6 The list of scholars dra"'711 to examination of the Democratic Societies is extensive. Aside from Urrutia, representative studies include: Gustavo Vargas Martinez, Colombia 1854: Melo, los artesanos r el socialismo (Bogota: Editorial la Oveja Negra, 1973); Enrique Gavir a Lievano, "Las Sociedades Democraticas ode artesanos en Colombia," Correo de los Andes, No. 24 (January-February 1984), 67,-76; German R. Mejfa Pavony, "Las Sociedades Democraticas (1848-1854): Problemas historiograficos," Universitas Humanistica, 11: 17 (March 1982), 145-76; Antaloli Shulgovski, "La 'Comuna de Bogota' y el socialismo utopico," America Latina, 8/85 (August 1985), 45-56. 7 For discussion of historiographical tendencies, see Kenneth Paul Erickson, Patrick V. Peppe, and Hobart Spalding, Jr., "Research on the Urban Working Class and Organized Labor in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: What is left to be Done?" Latin American Research Review, 9:2 (Summer 1974), 115-42; Charles Bergquist, "What is being Done? Some recent Studies on the Urban Working Class and Organized Labor in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 16: 1 (1981), 203-23.

PAGE 20

12 scholars. 8 Representative of the traditional Marxist approach are the works of Argentine sociologist Julio Godio, who places a great emphasis upon "ideological influences" and the development of labor unions. Godio, in referring to the nineteenth century, analyzes the 1850-80 period as one of a "workers' movement without a working class" and the 1880-1918 period as the years when both the class and the movement itself came into being. While he recognizes the importance of artisanal mutual aid associations as precursors of latter-day syndicates, he fails to appreciate the conservative nature of most artisan groups. For Godio, their importance was as a "brewing pot" for 9 revolutionary ideologies . Many good histories of labor exist, especially in countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Cuba, or Brazil where labor's political power has had the strongest impact. Numerous attempts have also been made to pen "histories of the Latin American labor movement." On the whole these impress the reader with how "neatly" it all fits into a single package. The works of Hobart Spalding Jr. and Charles Bergquist stand out as stimulating applications of dependentista ideas to examination of Latin American laborers. Spalding posits three general periods of organized labor in Latin America, each corresponding to a stage of intergration into dependent relations: the formative period (prior to World War One); the expansive and explosive period (World War One to 8 Judith Evans, "Results and Prospects: Some Latin American Labor Studies," International Labor History, No. 16 (Fall 1979), 29-30. Observations on and Working Class 9 Julio Godio, El movimiento obrero de America Latina, 1850-1918 (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1978), 15-16.

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the Depression); and the period of cooption and repression (1930 onward). Central to this periodization is global economic development and crisis, Latin American industrialization, workers' ideologies, and state political activities. Spalding concludes that governments have successfully restrained radical demands of laborers, thereby coopting their movement and keeping Latin America "safe" for foreign 10 capitalists. By contrast, Bergquist suggests that pressures by laborers in dependent industries have challenged the historic social indifference of many Latin American governments and, in doing so, have ammeliorated socioeconomic conditions in many countries. He allows that workers have been powerful agents in shaping nations in twentieth 11 century Latin America, with largely positive results. 13 Both of these works demand establishment of dominant export industries and dependent economic relations that serve to catalyze the Latin American labor movement. This approach seems appropriate for the comprehension of the twentieth century movement, especially the analysis of Bergquist. It, however, does little to illuminate activity by organized laborers in the nineteenth century before a dependent 12 export economy was fully operative. Moreover, as Bergquist points 10 Hobart Spalding, Jr., Organized Labor in Latin America: Historical Case Studies of Workers in Dependent Societies (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), passim. 11 Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 1-14. 12 For a recent study that argues that Colombia's entry into the world economy was retarded until the current century, see Jos"e Antonio Ocampo, Colombia y la economic mundial, 1830-1910 (Bogota: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984).

PAGE 22

out, developing political systems in the nineteenth century strongly 13 color the character of this century's labor movements. Only recently have historians begun to study nineteenth-century labor movements on their own terms . Paul Gootenberg's study of Lima artisans, Frederick J. Shaw's work on Mexico City, and Carlos Luis 14 Fallas Monge's work on Costa Rica stand out as notable e x amples. Peter Blanchard adds much to the understanding of the transition from h 1 d 1 b . p 15 t e ear y to mo ern a or movement 1n eru. These e x ceptions aside, much remains to be done on the nineteenth century labor movement. Labor historiography of nineteenth-century Latin America has only recently begun to be influenced by histories of European and United States laborers during the same period. Historians such as E. P. Thompson, David :Hontgomery, and William Sewell have contributed to a wealth of studies which explore the depth and significance of European and United States artisanal responses to industrialization. Unfortunately, the prerequisite social and cultural studies, and often even the political histories which would permit the same calibre of scholarship on Latin American workers, are generally lacking. 14 Moreover, statistical data are scarce and often of dubious reliability. 13 Bergquist, Labor in Latin America, 376-78. 14 Paul Gootenberg, "The Social Origins of Protectionism and Free Trade in Nineteenth-Century Lima," Journal of Latin American Studies, 14:2 (November 1982), 329-58; Frederick J. Shaw, "The Artisan in Mexico City (1824-1853)," in El trabajo y los trabajadores en la historia de Mexico (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1979), ed. by Elsa Cecilia Frost et al., 399-418; Carlos Luis Fallas Monge, El movimiento obrero en Costa Rica, 1830-1902 (San Jose: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 1983). 15 Peter Blanchard, The Origins of the Peruvian Labor Movement, 1883-1919 (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982).

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15 Nonetheless, as I hope to demonstrate, the methodology devised by these scholars can help the historian of Latin America to suggest new interpretations of its labor movement.

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CHAPTER 2 ARTISAN SOCIOECONOMIC EXPERIENCE, 1832-1919 Introduction In May 1846, 230 bogotano artisans petitioned the Colombian Congress not to lower tariff rates on foreign merchandise competitive with their own products. The craftsmen were concerned that their already precarious economic situation would become intenable if they were faced with a flood of foreign competition. Their economic standing had suffered greatly during the War of the Supremes (1839-42) and had been dealt a further blow by the credit crisis of 1842. The petitioners claimed to speak not only for some 2,000 artisans and their families living in the capital, but also for tradesmen in other areas of the country. Lowered tariff rates, they argued, would damage this crucial productive sector of the domestic economy, a fate particularly unjust to artisans who had helped defend the government in the fighting a few years earlier. Moreover, negative repercussions would be felt by other social sectors as the artisan class became less productive and 1 the economy in general deteriorated. In spite of these arguments, 1 Archivo del Congreso, Senado, proyectos negados, 1846, V, folios 118-26. (Hereafter AC.) 16

PAGE 25

congress lowered tariff rates by about 33io the following year. In response, the same tradesmen formed La Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogota with the intent to undertake political action to raise tariff rates to previous levels and also to work for mutual aid. 17 Several observations can be made from this incident. Artisans first entered the formal political process in defense of their economic well-being, which had been undermined by war and financial crisis and which was further threatened by proposed tariff reductions. In expressing their concerns, tradesmen thought it important to stress both their socioeconomic importance as producers and their military sacrifices in support of the legal constitutional order. They noted, moreover, that not only would individual artisans be affected by the proposed legislation, but also that their families, other social sectors, and even the country as a whole would suffer in turn. Artisans did not view themselves in isolation, but as important components of a larger social environment that included the entire nation in its largest manifestation. As this example indicates, it is impossible to comprehend the tempo and nature of political activity by Colombian craftsmen by examining only their organizations or the political environment in which they functioned; artisan social and economic experiences must be taken into account as well. Unfortunately, a survey of the various factors which shaped artisan socioeconomic fortunes from 1832 until 1919 faces several problems at the outset. Foremost among these is that little is known of specific facets of the social and economic conditions experienced by craftsmen during these years. At times substantive comments can be made, but most aspects of the craftsmen's changing circumstances can only be

PAGE 26

18 dealt with tentatively. Analysis of the general economy of the capital can be conducted with relative ease, as can the study of regional and national trends and governmental policies which influenced economic development. But only tentative comments can be made regarding the most immediate facets of the tradesmen's economic activity. Data illuminating artisan social and cultural norms are even more scarce, as are comprehensive analyses of bogotano society. Again it is possible to make only tentative comments regarding such questions as the location of artisans within the capital's social spectrum, their specific cultural practices, or their ideologies in comparison to those of non-skilled workers. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the descriptions which do exist probably are most appropriate for "elite" tradesmen and are not necessarily accurate appraisals of other artisans. The internal differentation of the artisan class, and how this changed, can be presented only in general terms. Nonetheless, in spite of these limitations, I shall try to present an analysis of artisan socioeconomic experience from the 1830s through the 1910s. It will require analysis both of general economic conditions and special observations on economic trends that affected artisans. Changes in the structure of the artisan class will then be described, especially as they influenced artisan political activity. Economic Environment An essential continuity marked the transition from the late colonial to the early-national period, as the "Neo-Bourbon" state

PAGE 27

2 continued to assume partial responsibility for economic development. 19 The fledgling state retained much of the colonial fiscal system, but did make some minor changes. The principle holdovers were various monopolies (estancos), especially on tobacco; diezmos; and the tariff system. The Indian tribute was abolished, as were internal customs duties and most applications of the alcabala. Colonial revenue sources were the most reliable means to satisfy the fiscal needs of the state, and even those politicians who found them ideologically distasteful saw 3 the necessity of keeping the more lucrative ones. The economic policy which most directly influenced artisans was the tariff. Little difference existed between the level of tariff duties from the late-colonial to early-national periods, but in neither 4 instance were rates extremely high. Methods of assessment were altered and tariff schedules adjusted during the 1820s, but not the essential degree of protection. The tariff was the largest source of revenue for the government, and few officials, no matter their economic philosophy, were willing to reduce the already meager fiscal base of the 2 Historians use the term Nee-Bourbon in reference to the years prior to the era of liberal reform, to suggest the essential continuity of Spanish economic patterns shaped by Bourbon reformers into the Republican period. 3 David Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Newark: University of Deleware Press, 1954), 78-81; William Paul McGreevey, An Economic History of Colombia, 1845-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversiS)' Press, 1971), 39; I.ufs Ospina ~squez, Industria y proteccion en Colombia, 1810 a 1930 (Bogota: Editorial Santa Fe, 1959), 127; Lufs Eduardo Nieto Arteta, Economia y cultura en la historia de Colombia (Bogota: Editorial Viento del Pueblo, 1975), passim. 4 McGreevey, Economic History of Colombia, 33.

PAGE 28

government. Both the 1832 and 1833 tariffs afforded moderate protection to the craftsman; the latter schedule had protection, as 5 well as revenue, as one of its formal objectives. 20 The degree to which these tariffs actually protected native crafts / / is disputed. Luis Ospina Vasquez suggests that artisan production was effectively buffered from foreign competition. 6 Frank Safford, however, insists that craftsmen, especially those who produced consumer goods (shoes, clothing, etc.) suffered from the impact of foreign production. 7 Neither scholar bases his claim on much more than informed opinion, so that resolution of this question must await the discovery of more substantial data. One should note, however, that artisans did not voice complaints about tariff policies during the years prior to passage of the 1847 tariff law. Thereafter, craftsmen often reflected upon the Neo-Bourbon tariff structure with nostalgia, suggesting that they had at least felt protected. In addition to customs duties, local and provincial taxes on imported goods added to the economic protection of the native 8 producer. So too did high transportation costs. The dismal condition of the nation's roads served to insulate the Bogot; artisan from foreign competition, and, although the Neo-Bourbon governments desired to improve the transportation infrastructure, mule teams continued to 5 6 7 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 152-53. Ibid., 172. Frank Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise in Central Colombia, 1821-1870" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1965), 77, 15051. 8 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 164.

PAGE 29

carry most imports up the mountains from the Magdalena River to Bogota until late in the century. Attempts were made in the 1820s and 1830s to establish steam navigation on the Magdalena itself, but permanent service was not in place until 1847. By the 1860~, however, upstream transportation costs had fallen by up to one-half, which, in combination with lower tariffs, contributed to an artisanal crisis in ; 9 Bogota in the 1860s. 21 During the colonial period Bogot~ had been more an administrative than a productive center and consequently had a weak craft tradition. 10 The decadent state of its arts spurred viceregal authorities in 1777 to attempt organization of a guild system in order to develop competent artisans. 11 Guilds did not become firmly established, however, and their abolition in 1824 evoked little 12 opposition. The capital served as the center of an upland market which stretched from Ibague to Bucaramanga. Commodities exchanged in the region were limited by extreme geographical obstacles and poor roads. Only the most valuable items--by weight--were traded. w~at little 9 Robert L. Gilmore and John P. Farrison, "Juan Bernardo Elbers and the Introduction of Steam Navigation on the Magdalena River," Hispanic American Historical Review, 28:3 (November 1948), 335-59; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 313-15; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 216. 10 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 17-18. 11 Francisco Robledo, "Ynstruccion de gremios en gral.Pa todos oficios aprobada pr el Exmo Sor. Virrey del Rno. Siguense a ella quantos papeles y providens se han creado en el asunto," Revista del Archivo Nacional, Nos. 10-11 (October-November 1936), 13-37. 12 Bushnell, Santander Regime, 130.

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22 evidence there is suggests that products made in Bogota did not circulate widely throughout this market, which was due at least in part to local production of most goods, but undoubtedly also because of the widespread introduction of foreign goods after Independence. British and other foreign products entering the country through the Magdalena River tended to constrict the capital's commercial influence. Indeed, 13 Bogota soon became the distribution hub of imported items. John Steuart, writing in the 1830s, noted the presence of abundant 14 quantities of British products in the Bogota marketplace. Artisans, particularly the less skilled, undoubtedly had little capacity to respond to such a challenge, although tariffs and geography moderated the threat before mid-century. Economic stagnation undoubtedly contributed to Bogoti's isolation prior to the 1860s. Only in the 1830s was the economy even mildly stimulated, most likely by the return of peace. Capital was in extremely short supply after the exhaustion of loans from Britain in the 1820s, and it remained scarce until the 1840s. The situation was especially severe during the crisis caused by the breakup of Gran Colombia in 1830 and after the War of the Supremes. Judas Tadeo Landinez, a capitalist from Boyaca, helped sustain the government during the worst stages of the war, when tariff revenues had been cut off and the government was in a desperate situation. In April 1841 13 Ideal of (Austin: 14 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 9-10. 102-05; Safford, The the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a Technical Elite University of Texas Press, 1976), 26. John Steuart, Bogota in 1836-7. Being a Narrative of an expedition to the Capital of New-Grenada and a residence there of eleven months (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1838), 145.

PAGE 31

23 Land1nez loaned the government 120,000 pesos to pay official's salaries, followed by another 500,000 pesos three months later. With the very profitable results of the loans, Land1nez invested heavily in Sabana land holdings, spurring other investors to do the same. The later half of 1841 saw Bogota experience an explosion of speculation, sustained almost entirely by Land(nez's funds, which, as it turned out, were seriously stretched. In December of that year his bubble burst, dragging him and many other capitalists into bankruptcy. As a result of the speculation crisis, credit was almost completely unavailable in 15 Bogota for the 1842-43 years. Government-aided industrial projects brighten this otherwise gloomy portrait. Many early republican leaders, especially those from the highlands around Bogota, thought that Colombia should develop an industrial component to supplement its agricultural and mining base. Proponents of industrialization favored not only protective tariffs but also direct state stimulation of private industrial ventures. The common practice was for the government to issue a monopoly for production of a certain item for a given number of years in a specified region, so that an industry could develop in a protected environment. Privileges were extended to an iron works, china factory, paper plant, 16 and factories for glass and textile production. 15 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 68-80; Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 71-77; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecci~n, 145; Jose Manuel Restrepo, Diario polf'tico y militar, 4 vols. (Bogoti: Imprenta Nacional, 1954), II, 283-84, 328. 16 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecci6n, 161-84; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 157-72.

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24 On the whole, these early industrial efforts were disappointing, although there were some successes. The china factory, managed by Nicolas Neiva and the English Peak brothers, began construction in 1832 and was producing china and porcelain two years later. Unfortunately, it was destroyed by fire in 1834, and sustained production was delayed until 1836. In 1837 the Neiva factory boasted two kilns, three stoves, and was said to have sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the entire nation. Sixty-one Colombians and four foreigners worked in the factory. While it experienced occasional misfortunes, the factory continued to operate through the end of the century. The Pacho Iron Works was given a 15-year monopoly in 1827 and was in production by the 1830s, albeit at a loss. A new owner made the enterprise a success in the 1850s, and by the 1860s it constituted an important factor in the regional economy, providing abundant quantities of lower-quality iron 17 which supported many spin-off industries. Other ventures did not fare as well. The paper mill began production in 1836 but lasted only until 1849. The textile factory, probably the most sheltered industry under the tariff system, was producing good, inexpensive cotton fabric by 1838 that soon thereafter satisfied the needs of the Bogota market; but it was nonetheless bankrupt by January 1848. The glass works privileged in 1834 was a dismal failure. It was producing in 1837, using French craftsmen, but was closed by 1839. 18 17 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 17; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 157-66. 18 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 164-72; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 161-68, 176, 182. Both Ospina and Safford

PAGE 33

The benefits to the capital's artisans from these industries in terms of employment or expanded opportunity were probably limited. However, the same men who sponsored the industries also favored industrial and technical education, which could have helped craftsmen 25 over the long term. Such educational endeavors were seen not only as an aid to industrial development, but also as a means to insure social order. In 1841 Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara began an "industrial fair" to reward good craftsmanship and moral achievement. 19 The Philanthropic ,. Society, of which Gutierrez was president, organized annual industrial expositions from 1842 until 1849. 20 Representative of the expositions was the 1846 fair. Prizes were awarded in at least ten catagories. Quite significantly, only one machine was displayed, which, although it "was nothing new conceptually," won a prize. Cabinet making was the only skilled craft represented, but cloth from Socorro and china from the Neiva factory won awards. Poor participation plagued the fairs, so that after 1849 insist that the cause of these failures was not technical. Ospina cites as principal factors in their decline the disruptive effects of the War of the Supremes upon capital and labor, along with a lack of sustained governmental support. Safford suggests that the market for consumer goods was simply too small and that investors had been overly optimistic about expansion. They agree that the failure of these ventures disillusioned backers of Colombian industrialization and contributed greatly to the governmental reorientation toward export agriculture that took place in the 1840s. Ospina visquez, Industria y proteccion, 180-84; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 179; Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 43. 19 Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 66-67. 20 El Dia, November 6, 1842.

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the Society decided to hold them every four years. There is no evidence, however, that a fair was held after 1849. 21 During the Neo-Bourbon period, artisans labored under conditions with which they were familiar. Political unrest hindered their 26 production, as did economic stagnation and the credit crisis. However, such had been the state of affairs for most of the period since at least 1810. Aside from the few industrial efforts, the economic structure of the city and governmental policies in no way presented new challenges. Craftsmen struggled to earn a living, by and large unaffected economically by the change from colonial government to independence. Reforms after 1845 radically altered the country's economic structure by removing most colonial legacies. In general, the reform era, which lasted from 1845 until 1863, oriented the economy toward production of export crops, fiscally decentralized the government, and redefined the nature of the state's intervention in the economic affairs of the nation. The earliest reforms dealt with monetary and fiscal matters. ~n attempt was made to eliminate the confusion resulting from multiple currencies by minting a decimal-based silver 22 real and a peso fuerte composed of ten reales. Various decentralization laws reflected the belief that an economy should be allowed to function without direct interference from the central authorities. The diezmo was removed from church jurisdiction and given 21 Ibid., May 4, 1845, August 9, 1846; El Constitucional, July 4, 1846. 22 Under the old coinage eight reales made up the peso. The new system was in place after 1853.

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27 to provincial governments. Certain revenues from stamped paper were also transferred to provincial authorities. In the same spirit, much of the rest of the state's fiscal apparatus was decentralized in 1850. At least initially, decentralization was a fiscal disaster. It was one reason for a drop in national revenues of 47% between 1849 and 1851. 23 Unsuccessful attempts were made to impose a national system of direct taxation to offset revenue losses, but only several states had any success with such methods. A considerable portion of the drop in revenues was due to demonopolization of tobacco production, which was begun in 1846 and completed in 1850. (Neither the salt nor aguardiente monopolies were altered.) Legislators anticipated that duties from increased production and exportation of tobacco would balance losses from demonopolization. Tobacco production boomed in the Ambalema area under the direction of the Montoya y Saenz firm, and tobacco became the most important export commodity through the 1870s. While it is questionable that revenue losses from demonopolization were indeed compensated by earnings from tobacco exports, the nation's economy was firmly reoriented towards 24 production of export crops. Fundamental to the emergence of an export economy were lower tariff barriers. In 1847 the tariff was reorganized and duties lowered by about 33%. That measure undoubtedly stimulated trade, but it also served to threaten the position of Bogota's craftsmen. The 1851 tariff 23 Memoria de Hacienda, 1859, as cited in McGreevey, Economic History of Colombia, 86. 24 Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 255.

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28 raised duties on certain finished products somewhat, but it did not seek deliberately to protect native industries. 25 Anti-protectionist philosophy was illustrated by the 1861 tariff, which explicitly stated that its sole purpose was for revenues. In that tariff, the cumbersome colonial arancel was replaced by a three-tiered system of assessment based upon weight. The 1861 tariff set the pattern for duties that lasted until 1880. 26 Efforts to facilitate international trade included granting duty-free status to several ports, and removal of taxes on international ships using the Magdalena River, although revenue needs forced the government to impose a mild tax on international river transportation in 1856. In addition, several attempts were made to improve the nation's infrastructure, most of which were unsuccessful. The reforms liberalized land policies, sharply curtailed corporate ownership of land, increased distribution of tierras baldias, and took further steps to eliminate the Indian resguardo. The most significant reform in land tenure was the disamortization of church lands decreed by General Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera in 1861. The impact of disamortization has yet to be rigorously studied, but it undoubtedly contributed to the concentration of land in private hands, especially 27 in urban areas. 25 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 211. 26 Bushnell, "Two Stages of Colombian Tariff Policy: The Radical Era and Return to Protection (1861-1885)," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 9:4 (Spring 1956), j-7. 27 On the general question of church-state relations, see Jor~e Villegas, Colombia: Enfrentamiento iglesia-estado, 1819-1887 (Bogota: La Carreta, 1981.) See the Bolet{n del Credito Nacional for reports of the commission charged with sale of church lands.

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29 The economic climate of Bogota in large part reflected the success of exports or the disruption of war. In the late 1840s the city began to emerge from the economic doldrums occasioned by the War of the Supremes. The capital profited from monies generated by the expansion of tobacco, causing an economic upsurge which dominated the 1850s. 28 Unfortunately, the worldwide recession of 1857-58, coupled with the civil war of 1859-62, drove the economy into a deep recession which lasted throughout the 1860s. During this decade the city suffered some of the worst hardships of the century. By 1863 complaints circulated of general misery caused by the war of 1859-62 in the capital, which was said to have hurt artisans, but not to the extent that it did unskilled laborers. A year later, however, even many independent 29 artisans were reportedly hard pressed to find work. In 1867 Miguel Samper penned his noted "La miseria en Bogota," which graphically narrated the city's miserable condition. 28 Beggars fill the streets and plazas The worker can not find constant emplcyment, nor can the shop masters count on work; the property owner neither receives rent payments nor new rents; the shopkeeper does not sell, nor buy, nor pay, nor is paid; one sees the importer's wares undisturbed in his store and his payments asleep in his wallet; the capitalist dos~ not receive interest nor the employees salary. Miguel Samper, La miseria en Bogota y otros escritos (Bogota: Biblioteca Universitaria de Cultura Colombiana, 1969), passim; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 228; El Neo-Granadino, April 9, 1857. 29 La Opinion, October 14, 1863, October 12, 1864, January 4, 1865. 30 Samper, La miseria en Bogota, 9, 11.

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30 One artisan referred to the 1860s as the worst decade since the 1 i 1 d 31 A i i 1 i d i h 1860 co on a perio . rt sans certa n y vo ce more protests n t e s than in any other decade of the nineteenth century. Availability of credit was a particularly vexing problem, as funds to borrow were in short supply through most of the period for artisans. Customers were frequently required to advance the cost of their purchase because most craftsman did not have sufficient capital to buy necessary material. This normally meant that a loan would be arranged from a speculator (agiotista) at the prevailing rate of interest, a rate subject to ~onstant fluctuation. During time of feared or actual civil strife, such as the months prior to General Jose Mar{a Melo's 1854 revolt, speculators withheld their capital and, consequently, k d h h f . 32 evo e , t e wrat o artisans. Until 1845 the only sources of credit were the church or money lenders, and the quantities and interest rates were quite unpredictable. In that year, however, the Province of Bogota founded a Savings Bank (Caja de Ahorros) that survived until 1861. The bank made considerable funds available to its investors, who were drawn from all social sectors. In 1864 an attempt was made to establish in Bogota a branch of the Bank of London, Mexico and South America, but it was 31 La Republica, October 9, 1867. 32 On numerous occassion, the slogan "Abajo los ajiotistas" were associated with artisans. Agiotistas were money lenders who purchased government bonds issued to individuals in repayment for forced loans during wartime or as compensation for other debts. In the absense of other sources of credit, the speculator played an important role in the local economy. Malcolm Deas, "The Fiscal Problems of Nineteenth Century Colombia," Journal of Latin American Studies, 14:2 (November 1982), 318-20; Safford, "Commerce and Industry," 56-57.

PAGE 39

31 short-lived. Beginning in 1871 with foundation of the Banco de Colombia, various lending institutions were established that lasted for some time. The Savings Bank probably offered tradesmen the most reliable source of credit. Although it has not been subjected to scholarly scrutiny, one of its objectives was to stimulate industry among workers, and many of its depositers were craftsmen. Most of the banks founded in the 1870s favored loans to commercial concerns, but one of these, the Banco Popular, was designed to help smaller investors. Its shares sold for,. ~SO, and numerous artisans were among 33 initial purchasers. The system of industrial privileges that had been employed during the earlier period was not formally abrogated during the reform era, 34 but few new concessions were granted. The most important privilege was granted in 1855 for establishment of a woolen factory, which by the following year produced various types of cloth, some of which were purchased by the Army, but most by the general public. By 1858 some 60 workers, mostly women, labored in the factory for salaries up to 8 35 pesos a week. The factory did reasonably well prior to a tariff reduction on imported textiles in 1861 and remained in operation until 1888. 36 33 34 35 Diario de Cundinamarca, June 21, 1877. Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 101. This was double the norm for campesinos and eight times the one peso per week wage earned by most women workers. 36 Guia oficial i descriptiva de Bogota ( Bogota: Imprenta de la Nacion, 1858), 73-76; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 182-83; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 229.

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Numerous factories were established after the depression of the 1860s. In 1870 another china factory opened, as did the "Rey y Borda" match factory. In 1874 the latter employed over 200 women. One hundred and fifty women labored in that same y ear in a cigar factory. Also founded in the 1870s were the Chaves Chocolate plant, a quinine laboratory, and small consumer industries dedicated to the production 37 of candles, soap, and perfume. These early industries were oriented, on the whole, toward the production of consumer goods using low technology and unskilled labor. They did not compete with skilled artisanal production; nor did they complement traditional crafts. Contrary to artisan protests, it seems 32 unlikely that tariffs were lowered to a degree which rapidly undermined domestic crafts. The reorientation of the economy toward the external market which took place at mid-century ended the stagnation of the earlier period; yet at the same time it caused extreme disruption to the ambience to which artisans had been accustomed and fundamentally altered the composition of the capital's craft economy as marginal producers were increasingly threatened by foreign competition. This was especially the case for trades such as shoemaking, tailoring, and leather work. By contrast, most construction trades were little affected by lowered tariff rates and owed their prosperity (or lack of it) to improved general economic conditions. The depression of the 1860s was probably very important in determining which trades would remain competitive and which would be reduced in significance. 37 La America, April 9, 1874; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 264-69.

PAGE 41

33 Rafael N~nez, in his first presidential administration (18801882), repudiated many of the more dogmatic tendencies of economic liberalism. Once again the Colombian state began to intervene actively in the nation's economic development, principally through tariff measures and monetary policy. The National Bank, founded in 1881 and designed to meet the financial needs of the government, was empowered to emit a fixed supply of paper money, a policy which, in periods of moderate emmisions acted as a stimulus to the expansion of coffee, but, during illegal larger emissions in the 1890s, helped to destablize the 38 economy. Nunez favored protection of national industries; consequently one of his first acts was to press passage of the Tariff of 1880, which, although it lowered the basic rate, protected tailoring, shoemaking, and furniture production through a 25% surcharge. Ospina observes that the tariff was intended to foster factory production, but it undoubtedly eased the competition faced by domestic workshops as well. Tariff rates were raised 25% by two legislative measures in 1885 and 1886. Industrial growth in the Medellin area was stimulated by these tariffs, but their impact on bogotano industries was minor. Tariff rates crept upward through the 1890s and, after the War of 1000 Days (1899-1902), President Rafael Reyes strongly stimulated industrial growth through his tariff of 1905. This last measure again helped 39 Medellin more than Bogota. 38 39 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 278, 323. Ibid., 300-07, 334 -44.

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34 Imposition of monopolies upon such ventures as cigar, cigarette, and match production were still another aspect of governmental economic policy meant to not only spur development of these industries, but also provide unemployed urban women with jobs. Artisans were favored by Nunez's decrees creating "model shops" in 1881 and 1886, which were intended to train craftsmen in "practical" industrial arts. An outgrowth of these programs was the School of Arts and Trades, in operation by 1891. Six years later the School had exposed 621 students 40 to various sorts of industrial training. Between 1905 and 1908, Reyes extended this program throughout the nation, but his focus was on general education rather than industrial training. The economy slowly revived around 1870, due to a momentary resurgence of tobacco exports, the first effects of coffee expansion, and the beginning of a growth period for the city. Bogota suffered a downturn in the 1880s, which was caused by tobacco's sharp drop in value, a temporary decline in coffee exports, and civil unrest. The capital's economy resumed it growth by 1886-87, which lasted into the mid-1890s, when inflation, war, and fluctuating coffee prices in the international market combined to create a ten-year period of economic decline. After the War of 1000 Days, the capital entered a period of growth that lasted, with a few temporary exceptions, until the Depression. Numerous small industries and factories were founded beginning in the 1880s, most of them sponsored by upper class Colombians who turned to manufacture from traditional commercial activities. This more 40 Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 206.

PAGE 43

35 frequently was the case in Antioquia, but it was true to a limited extent for the capital, where foreign capital and enterprise also played an important role. For example, in 1883 "La Estrella de Bogota'," a cigarette factory, was founded using imported Cuban tobacco, Spanish paper, and Cuban cigar masters. The primary Colombian input was some 30-40 women workers. The women earned from two to seven pesos a week, depending on their output. "La Equitativa" chocolate factory was established shortly thereafter by Luiz M. Azcuenaga, also using mostly female labor. The earlier chocolate venture by the Chaves brothers continued in operation, employing over 100 workers (mostly women) by 1899. After the war, these chocolate plants combined their 41 operations. The first major industrial complex was the Bavaria brewery, run by German-born Rudolf Kopp and established in 1891. Kopp used German technology and brewery masters and Colombian labor. His factory was set up along German industrial patterns, which by 1894 included workers' housing next to the brewery. Weekly wages at Bavaria were reportedly the highest in the city, in addition to which the workers enjoyed health insurance, loans, sick pay, and up to two liters of beer a day. In return for such benefits, Kopp demanded rigid industrial discipline from his 300 male and female workers (1906). Complaints regarding the inflexibility of Bavaria's management were common and 42 centered on the pace of work and control of time. 41 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 310, 314; El Criterio, June 4, 1883; La Cr6nica, September 21, 1898, August 12, 1899; El Diario Nacional, July 27, 1918; Las Noticias, September 23, 188'g, 42 Ospina Vasquez, Industrial y proteccion 313; La Patria, June 22, 1894; El Correo Nacional, July 8, October 17, 1904; El Yunque, May 6, 1906.

PAGE 44

The founders of Bavaria started a glass factory in 1896, which prospered after the war. In the same period they established a china factory. In 1895 Silvestre Samper and Simeon Mart{n also opened a glass factory using ten Spanish glass blowers and apprenticing 20 Colombian workers. By 1897 good glass was being produced, but poor 43 management led to its early demise. The Regeneration's moves to draw women into industrial labor evidenced some additional success after the war. "El Rey del Mundo," a cigarette factory owned by the Spaniard Esteban Verdu, employed SO women in 1904. Verdu demanded strict discipline from workers, who, according to one visitor to the plant, worked like "human machines." The same commentator noted that this "kept them off the streets." By 1916 some 200 women and 50 men labored under similar conditions for Verdu. In the latter year, however, heavy taxes on tobacco forced closure of Verdu's plant and those of several of several other cigarette manufacturers. 44 Social and Occupational Changes Available census data suggest that Bogota grew slowly during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century before entering a period of sustained expansion. Although the accuracy of these data is 36 43 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 314-15; El Yunque, May 6, 1906; El Telegrams, February 14, 1895. 44 Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 303-04; El Yunque, May 6, 1906; El Telegrama, February 14, 1895.

PAGE 45

37 questionable, they at least indicate the pace and timing of the city's growth. Enumerations made in 1793 and 1801 placed Bogota's population at 17,725 and 21,394 respectively. An 1843 census listed 40,086 inhabitants, but one taken only eight years later tallied 29,649 residents, a figure whose accuracy has correctly been doubted, but which also suggests that the 1843 count may be too high. Another census conducted in 1870 enumerated 40,833, also a questionable total, but one that did reflect sluggish growth. A visitor to the city in the 1870s claimed the population to be around 60,000, an estimation that seems rather more reliable, especially in light of latter surveys. Two counts in the 1880s, which yielded totals of 84,723 (1881) and 95,761 (1884), tend to confirm observations that Bogota began to undergo rapid expansion in the 1870s. By 1912, the city's population had reached 45 120,000. Most descriptions of the bogotano social scene by outside observers suggest rather stable social classes through the last century. John Steuart, writing in the late 1830s, noted three strata; the poorest, made up of peons and "lower" house servants; the middle, consisting of artisans, small shopkeepers, and the "best" servants; and the highest level of society, which included hacendados, larger merchants, and 45 I 'Padron general de la poblacion de esta capital, segun los que se hicieron en el anode 1793"; Alfonso Acevedo, Notas estadlsticas de la provincia de la provincia de Bogota en el anode 1844 (Bogota: np, 1844), 7; Cl{maco Calder~n and Edward E. Britton, Colombia. 1893 (New York: Bureau of American Republics, 1893), 48; Alfred Hettner, Viajes por los andes colombianos (1882-1884) (Bogota: Archivo de la Economic Nacional, Banco de la Reptiblica, 1976), 77; Eliseo Reclus, Colombia (Bogota: Papelerla de Samper Matiz, 1893), 407; Censo general de la Republics de Colombia levantado el 5 de marzo de 1912 (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional, 1912), 336.

PAGE 46

38 holders of important political posts. The distinction bet~een middle and upper classes was accentuated by dress habits; artisans and their peers wore ruanas (a Colombian poncho) and the upper class men, coats. 46 Two German travelers in the 1880s observed the same divisions, albeit with class boundaries somewhat less distinct and containing more complex strata. According to these accounts, the lowest rung on the social ladder was occupied by the "gente del pueblo, "or simply the "pueblo." These people were agricultural workers, day laborers, water carriers, and servants. The middle sector included artisans, some merchants, shopkeepers, and lesser government employees. The highest levels, alternately called the "superior class" or "nobles," consisted 47 of the aristocracy of money, hacendados, and large merchants. In spite of the basic continuity of major social strata, reports later in the century do indicate some important changes in their characteristics. Steuart had noted in the 1830s that the rich in Bogot, would hardly be termed wealthy by European standards; even leading government officials could be seen laboring in their stores. In the end he felt that distances between middle and upper sectors were often based more upon cosmetic distinctions than on economic resources. By the end of the century, social strata were separated by real differences in wealth, a situation that extended even to the artisan class, some of whom reportedly owned pianos and wore coats. 46 John Steuart, Bogota in 1836-7, 154-57. 47 Ernst Rothlisberger, El Dorado: Estampas de viaje y cultura de la Colombia suramericana (Bogota: Banco de la Republica, 1963), 9396, 103; Bettner, Viajes por los Andes, 72-77.

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39 Data on the occupational composition of Bogota are limited. Only one of the censuses included occupational data in its published reports, that of 1912. Still, an idea of size of the artisan class can be suggested. The 1846 petition claimed that some 2,000 artisans, or about 51. of the 40,000-odd inhabitants, worked in the city. A newspaper article by a craftsman in 1868 estimated that fewer than 48 6,000, or ten percent, of the city's 60,000 residents were artisans. The 1912 census aggregated 8,968 persons of a total population of 120,000 into the category of "artes, oficios, y aprendices," all of 49 which refer to artisanal activity. Descriptions of the trade composition of Bogota's artisan class structure are simply not available, which forces the historian to make only hesitant observations. An 1881 guide listed 60 shoe shops, 50 tailors, a hundred or so carpentry shops, 20 printers, 25 blacksmiths, and an "infinity" of masons. SO Al 1 these trades fit well within the spectrum of traditional crafts. The guide included no "modern" wage occupations filled by males, although females labored in cigar and match factories. A 1904 listing of trades represented in the "Sociedad Union de Industriales y Obreros" included most traditional trades, along with brewerymen and electrical installers. 51 A similar listing of 48 49 50 La Alianza, February 8, 1868. Censo general de la Republics, 181. Felipe Perez, ol{tica de los Estados Unidos de Colombia eo raf a articular de la ciudad de Bogota (Bogota: Imprenta de Echeverr a Hermanos, 1883), 400-04; 41620. 51 Los Hechos, June 18, 1904.

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trades participating in a 1914 worker's celebration was dominated by traditional crafts, but also included "industrialists" (shop owners of 10-30 workers) and factory workers (from breweries, the electric 52 company, glass factory, rail roads, chocolate and cement plants.) 40 ~bile these glimpses do little to statistically analyse Bogota's occupational profile, they do tend to evidence a labor force consisting of both traditional artisanal workers and "modern" laborers associated with factories and wage labor after 1900. One further insight on trade organizations merits mention. No artisan organization was linked to a single trade prior to 1873, when a 53 mutual aid society was founded for 68 printers. Nine years later, a carpenters' guild was formed. In 1897 a shoemaker's group was organized. After the beginning of the century, workers' organizations were divided internally by trades. The same phenomena could be seen at public ceremonies, for example on Colombian Independence Day. Throughout the nineteenth century, parade participants included national employees, hacendados, merchants, and artisans. The 1910 centennial saw workers march not just as artisans, but also as carpenters, printers, masons, or similar trades and as political 54 . groups. The increased identification of ~orkers by their trade, as opposed to the general nomenclature of artisan, might well be indicative of the fragmentation and redefinition of the artisan class in the last third of the century. 52 53 54 El Tiempo, March 27, 1914. La Am~rica, May 28, 1873. Pan, July 3, 1910.

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41 Only general comments can be made concerning shop organization and trade traditions. An 1858 account, "The Artisan of Bogot~," claimed that during the colonial period masters (jefes or duenos del taller) and journeymen (oficios or jornaleros) were clearly distinguishable, both socially and economically. Masters exerted some control over prices and successfully kept journeymen from establishing their own shops. Such control by masters over journeymen was shaken by the 55 dissruption of the Independence period, but not eliminated. In keeping with republican principles of equality, masters who tried to maintain their traditional powers were attacked in the press during the 1820s. 56 By the 1830s journeymen reportedly established their own shops and undermined masters through lower prices. Masters complained that while the journeymen's labor was cheap, the quality of their goods was 57 poor. At mid-century the master and journeyman were linked by collateral relations, by wages, and by more informal, traditional bonds. Masters still tended to dominate the relationship within the shop, but they lacked sufficient power to control all journeymen 58 activities. By the end of the century, internal trade distinctions appear to have given way to the economic reality of who could own his own shop as the pinnacle of the craftsmen's profession. Throughout the century, antagonisms separated native and immigrant craftsmen. In 1842, for example, bogotano artisans bitterly noted that 55 El Nucleo, 1858. The issues of the paper were not dated. 56 La Bandera Tricolor, July 16, 1826. 57 El TiemEo, May 13, 1858. 58 El Nti'cleo, 1858; La Alianza, December 10, 1866.

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59 foreigners within the same trades (83 according to 1843 census) profited because they neither had to pay taxes nor perform military duty, also because upper-class natives preferred the prestige of their service, regardless of quality. Moreover, most foreign craftsmen were said to be unwilling to share knowledge of their trades with native artisans. 60 Similar public protests were voiced by tradesmen in 1867, 1875, and 1887. Native artisans, however, were ready to acknowledge the contributions of some foreigners in advancing the general state of 61 the arts. 42 While accusations against foreign craftsmen inevitably claimed that Colombian artisans produced goods of equal quality, as early as 1850 petitions for tariff protection requested that masters be brought 62 from abroad to teach native masters. Such requests were renewed after the crisis of the 1860s, when they resulted in approval of a plan to 63 bring foreigners to Colombia to teach mechanical arts. In the end such aspirations were not realized, although several Colombians were sent abroad in the 1880s to study industrial trades. 59 60 61 Acevedo, Notas estadisticas, 7. El Dla, July 17, 1842. La Alianza, April 13, 1867; La Naci~n, December 17, 1886, January 11, 1887; Diario de Cundinamarca, June 9, 1875. 62 AC, Camara, proyectos de leyes negados, 1850, X, folios 2831. 63 Saturnino Gonzalez et al., "Representacion al Congreso nacional" (Bogota, 1868); El Bien Publico, December 5, 1870; Diario de Cundinamarca, March 15, 25, 1872; Safford, Ideal of the Practical, 20304.

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Certain work patterns, such as taking Monday off ("St. Monday") are commonly associated with artisanal and pre-industrial labor settings. Evidence exists to suggest that "hacer lunes," as it was referred to in Bogota, persisted through the last and into the present century. In 1867, the carpenter Rafael Tap{as criticized this habit, saying that the "Bacchanalian excess" of the Monday celebration not only lost the artisan an estimated 48 pesos yearly, but also gave rise 64 to heated political debate and violence. lbstile responses forced Tapais to say that his intention had not been to criticize anyone's work habits, but only to point out the loss of time and danger of 65 mixing fun and politics. Thirty years later, a leading artisan defended the tradition by commenting that, since artisans were their 66 own bosses, the days they chose not to work were their own decision. Early efforts to start factory production encountered problems when managers tried to impose a stricter discipline upon recently recruited laborers. One account noted that laborers wanted to enjoy their work 67 and "hacer lunes." As was noted in the preface, the definition of terms is a most arduous task. Phrases or words were used in a social context that one 64 65 66 67 La Alianza, June 14, 1867. Ibid., August 1, 1867; El Pueblo, July 13, 1867. El Artesano, June 14, 1861. El Correo Nacional, July 8, 1904. On the attempt to instill 43 Taylorism into the Colombian mentality, see Alberto Mayor Mora, Etica, trabajo, y productividad en Antioquia: Una interpretacion sociologica sobre la influences de la Escuela Nacional de Minas de la vida, costumbres e industrializacion regionales (Bogot~: Editorial Tercer Mundo, 1985), passim.

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44 can only attempt to recreate in the absence of reliable documentation. The word "artisan" is particularly difficult to define conclusively. "Artisan" was often used quite differently by the same people according to the context. For e x ample, an "artisan" newspaper in the 1860s argued that two-thirds of the nation's populace were artisans, if one included seamstresses and displaced craftsmen in that number. The same paper complained that the term artisan was used indiscriminately and 68 that only 10% of the city's population deserved the title. The explanation for the obviously contradictory usage is that in one instance an appeal was being made to the broader population and in the other artisans sought to set themselves apart from the "mass" for purposes of identification. The newpaper referred to above alluded to a final aspect of artisan culture that merits inclusion with its comment that many masters had the "absurd idea" that they were the social superiors of journeymen and that some duenos were used as tools by members of 69 political parties. Since most voices raised by artisan leaders seeking to speak for the artisan class came from shop owners, a troublesome question central to this study must be asked. If masters saw themselves as unequal to journeymen, how representative, then, were their voices? No unwavering answer can be presented, but one of the arguments to be forwarded by this thesis is that one can up to a point judge the representativeness of artisan leaders both by their ability successfully to mobilize their subordinate counterparts and by their 68 69 La Alianza, October 20, 1866, January 23, February 3, 1868. Ibid., December 10, 1866.

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45 staying power as leaders. Artisans who were skilled and lasting advocates of their class were, as will be argued later, able to persist as leaders because they were more, rather than less, representative of those whose opinions are not available for historical examination. Conclusion Three periods, marked by changes in the characteristics of the artisan class, divide the years under study. The 1830s through 1860s were characterized by general economic stagnation and a more homogeneous class experience. The final thirty years of the century saw the fragmentation of the artisan class in the face of foreign economic pressures and native industrialization. The first t~enty years of the twentieth century witnessed workers employing both traditional and more modern productive techniques in a mixed-labor system, in which each laboring class had its own social norms. An analysis of state economic policies yields a different periodization, one which suggests several clues to artisan economic experience. The years 1832-45 encompass the Neo-Bourbon period, so named because its structural apparatus contained many holdovers from Spanish colonial policies. After 1845, a transition to economic liberalization took place in which policy makers removed most of the system's colonial aspects and reoriented it to facilitate international trade and export agriculture. The state once again attempted to stimulate internal industries beginning in 1880, when protective tariffs were raised for certain industries. Post-1886 governments actively intervened in the economy, especially after 1904.

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46 During the Neo-Bourbon period, craftsmen labored in an economic environment rather similar to the late colonial period. The reforms of the 1840s and 1850s radically altered the country's economic structure, which, by the 1860s, negatively affected Bogota's artisans and shattered their relative social and economic uniformity. The artisan class was redefined during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century as trades hurt by foreign competition went into decline and others, largely unaffected by governmental policies, retained characteristics similar to those of the earlier period . Practitioners of displaced occupations and those of stable trades lost much of the shared experiences that had earlier bonded the class, and, as a consequence, their social, economic, and political lives began to diverge. It was during these years that separate trade labels began to identify craftsmen. Moreover, by the 1890s, the creation of limited industrial and transport concerns gave rise to a small but important "modern" wage-labor sector. The dawn of the current century saw various types of laborers filling the occupational spectrum, the most significant in terms of their organized political expression being more traditional artisans and more modern wage laborers. This suggests that the orientation of the country's economic structure toward participation in the world market created over the long term a two-tiered labor profile, a process visible after 1870 and clearly in place by the early 1900s. One of its levels was much more influenced by policies that aided the development of an e x port economy and increased importation of foreign manufactured goods. Artisans affected by these policies lost their productive independence in a slow process of proletarianization. Other sectors of the economy were

PAGE 55

affected more by general economic conditions than by specific governmental programs. Many trades continued to employ traditional productive practices throughout the period studied and retained their status as independent artisanal producers. In 1919, however, this status, and the interests which accompanied it, had changed greatly since 1832. 47 The transitions that redefined the artisan class are of particular importance for understanding artisan political activity over this 90year period. Both the credit crisis of the 1840s and the artisanal crisis of the 1860s prepared the way for intense political mobilizations by artisans. Significantly, both periods of activity occurred prior to increased fragmentation of the artisan class, which nevertheless retained essential internal cohesion. The same level of political activity would not return until the 1910s, when surviving artisans and emerging wage-laborers combined to initiate a new stage of political activity by Colombian workers.

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CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF ARTISANS, 1832-45 The Partisan Struggle for Power Colombia in the last century was a land of conflict. Perhaps its most apparent characteristic was its seeming inability to establish a stable political system. Wars repeatedly ravaged the country after the breakup of Gran Colombia in 1830. The War of the Supremes lasted from 1839 until 1842; insurrections occurred in both 1851 and 1854; the only civil war ever to successfully overthrow an incumbent government began in 1859 and ended in 1862; Conservatives rebelled in 1876-77; in 1885 and again in 1895 Liberals revolted; and, finally, the War of 1000 Days dragged on from 1899 until 1902. Numerous conflicts also took place on the local and regional level. The most significant immediate cause of these national crises was the struggle for control of the state by the elite-dominated Liberal I and Conservative parties. The ideological stances taken by the parties were not so opposed, however, as to account for such intense conflicts. Liberals and Conservatives were only seriously separated on the programmatic issues of church-State relations and education. While 1 Throughout the text capitalized Conservative or Liberal will refer to the parties, or to people identified with those organizations. Lower case will be used in other instances. 48 I

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very real differences existed in these areas, at least through the 1880s, control of the political process and of the state was the ultimate objective of both parties. Control of the political apparatus in turn offered party members access to economic opportunities. Politics was probably the elite career of choice for most of the century, partly because few other opportunities existed. Empleomanfa plagued the nation. Governmental revenues could never meet the salaries of all who aspired to official positions and, consequently, a fierce competition resulted for those available positions. Not until coffee became the backbone of the economy in the later years of the century did the situation change. Frank Safford's analysis of early party evolution suggests that the Conservative and Liberal parties were important as "brotherhoods" for mutual protection in the years of limited economic opportunity at the beginning of the Republican period. The creation of parties, aided by social attitudes that deemed governmental service an honorable occupation and by the favorable treatment by the parties of their clients help to explain certain economic and social factors underlying civil strife. However, they do not illuminate the initial basis for 2 alignment of specific political groups. 49 Safford applies the Weberian concept of social location to suggest that access to institutions of power at the beginning of the national period was the primary determinant of party alignment. Proximity to 2 Safford, "Bases of Political Alignment in Early Republican Spanish America," in New Approaches to Latin American History, ed. by Richard Graham and Peter Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974),78.

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colonial centers of educational, political, or ecclesiastical power would more likely result in a conservative orientation aimed at maintaining institutions which favored one's "life chances." Those located at a greater distance from power centers would more likely be 3 liberal, favoring reforms which would enhance their access to power. This application of the concept of social location has considerable validity at least through the 1870s, when economic factors, as will be seen, begin to play a more important role as determinants of party alignment and ideology. It is helpful for understanding the origins of the few points of ideological conflict between Liberal and Conservatives. In defense of the institutional framework which favored their "life chances," Conservatives tended to hold a corporate world view which gave to the church a fundamental social role. This philosophy stipulated that the individual was 4 subordinated to the church, which embodied universal morality. 50 Liberals, by contrast, were anti-institutional--until they created c; institutions more favorable to their own aspirations.They tended to adhere to an atomistic philosophy, holding that individuals had the capacity to determine the morality of their actions. Liberals thus argued that educational institutions that imposed clerical authority hindered the individual from maturing to the point of making such 3 Ibid., 102-03. 4 Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, El ensamiento colombiano en el silo XIX (Bogota: Editorial Temis Libreria, 1982 , 95-97. 5 Much of the arguement that follows is informed by Jaramillo and Safford, only when direct analysis are taken from their works will be they be cited.

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51 decisions. Not surprisingly, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism dominated the philosophical approach of the first generation of Liberals. In a certain sense, the issue at stake was the source of morality. Traditionalists maintained that while morality was an inherent part of the human being, individuals could nevertheless not rationally comprehend morality in its fullness. Religion did encompass its totality, and the church acted as guardian of that knowledge. Those who felt disadvantaged by the traditional order argued that individual comprehension of morality was possible. These philosophical systems led directly to disputes regarding the proper social function of the church. Closely related to the church's social influence WclS the Jesuit question. To Liberals, the influence of Jesuits was antithetical to a Republic. Conservatives, on the other hand, valued the Jesuits as luminaries who served to maintain and expand the proper position of the church. Education, as a corollary to this religious question, was one of the most divisive issues of all. Santander's 1826 Education Plan, based upon Benthamite teachings, was strongly opposed by those politicians later identified with the Conservative party both at the time and later when Santander tried to revive it in the government of New Granada. When Conservatives won the War of the Supremes (1839-42), Mariano Ospina Rodr{guez promptly issued an educational plan informed by more traditional standards. Not suprisingly, the 1870 educational reform process caused a similar uproar. The beliefs and systems based upon those beliefs espoused by the two parties shared, however, more points of agreement than discord. There was, for example, little conflict along party lines on economic

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52 matters. Pragmatic as opposed to optimistic appraisals of the government's fiscal situation were more likely to cause debate than was the proper economic orientation of the state. Issues involving the economic well-being of the church, such as mortmain, were, of course, topics of ongoing dispute. No one questioned the theoretically contractual nature of government or the concept of popular sovereignty. Good governments were thought to be those that best represented the general interests of its citizens. The extent of active citizenship caused some disagreement, as did the degree to which strong central authority was needed to offset the ignorance of the masses, but no one thought in terms of a pure democracy or an aristocracy. Both parties distrusted the military as an institution, but neither was so opposed as to reject the aid of military leaders favorable to its cause. Even so, the structure of the state became a very important issue. The moves toward federalism beginning in the 185Os undertaken by both parties proved in the end disastrous. An effective political structure was not designed until the Constitution of 1886. That constitution gave the church a powerful social role, limited suffrage, and centralized the government, and in general satisfied conservative more than liberal objectives. Just as the issues separating the parties were not wholly clear cut, some individuals are hard to place in either political camp. General Jose Marta Obando was identified as a Santanderist liberal throughout his life, but his 1836 presidential candidacy split the ranks of those loyal to Santander. In the 185Os Obando nominally headed the draconian wing of the Liberal party, which undertook a major revolt in 1854. Another general, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, was

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identified as a conservative, but his 1844 presidential candidacy and subsequent administration shattered the emerging Conservative party. 53 In 1857 he ran for the presidency as head of the National party and t~o years later led the Liberal revolt against Conservative rule. After the 1863 R{o Negro Convention, he was at bitter odds with the Radical faction of the Liberal party. In 1867 Mosquera imposed a dictatorship upon the Radical congress, and by 1869 he once again was in league with Conservatives. Both of these men were more personalistic than party minded in their approach to power, although this is more true of Mosquera than Obando. Given their military bearing and populist orientations, it is tempting to refer to them as caudillos. Whether or not this is so, it is clear that any understanding of Colombian history prior to 1870 must take into consideration personalism and the appeal of military leaders. Jaime Jaramillo Uribe has offered a further clue to the deciphering of nineteenth-century politics by pointing to the importance of generational influences. 6 The "independence generation" was shaped by either traditional or Benthamite "mentalities." As a result, the conflicts of this era centered on education and the church. The desire to mold a united nation, however, moderated these divisive issues. A second generation, nurtured on the writings of the Romantics and less prone to compromise, came to power in the late 1840s. The Liberals among them dominated the political scene with few exceptions until the 1870s. Conservatives assumed the role of the not-always loyal opposition, and caudillos continued to be important political 6 Jaramillo Uribe, Pensamiento colombiano, 30-33.

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54 actors. The failures of Liberalism then spurred a pragmatic backlash, which was evident in the third generation and the 1886 Constitution. During the Regeneration, which began in the 1880s and lasted until the 1910s, coalitions tended to dominate the scene and produced an effective political structure that avoided the bloodshed of the earlier years. The policies of first the National party of Rafael Nunez and Miguel Antonio Caro, then the quinquenio of Rafael Reyes, and lastly the Republican Union illustrate the less sectarian nature of this last generation. (The fierce fighting of the period indicates, however, that coalitionists were by no means the sole political actors during these years.) Throughout the century third (and occasionally fourth) parties appeared, generally drawing upon both the membership and ideological stances of the dominant groups. On occasion these were potent political forces in their own right. More frequently their fortunes were determined by their relationships with the traditional parties, largely because they drew their leadership from the same class, the elite. Other social sectors had little real influence on party programs or ideologies. Not unexpectedly, elite monopolization of the political process mirrored similar developments in the social and economic realms. While the nineteenth-century social structure was quite stable, it was not frozen. Patron-client relations offered non-elites a certain degree of economic and social mobility; so too, politically, did the struggle between the parties. Elites needed clients in their struggle for power. In rural areas, the pursuit of clientage led to the creation by local bosses of self-perpetuating Liberal and Conservative

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55 enclaves that have existed to the present. In larger urban centers, the establishment of clientage relationships fostered more competitive recruitment. Elite efforts to mobilize popular support for their party struggles were the first stimuli to the participation of non-elites in the political process. An appreciation of the parties' struggle for power is thus essential for an understanding of artisan political participation in the last century. Artisans and other middling social groups, because of their status as voters, were the principal targets of parties and factions trying to expand their base of support. Patrons and clients operated in a two-way relationship, however, which in time allowed artisans the opportunity to articulate their particular interests. The Appeal to the Masses, 1832-45 The Constitution of 1832 established for New Granada a moderately centralized republic. In keeping with republican theory (and colonial precedents), local and regional governments shared power with central authorities, but most policy initiatives came from Bogota. The powers of the central govenment were divided among executive, legislative and judicial branches, but the executive retained extraordinary powers for use in emergency situations. All in all, the Colombian Constitution of 7 1832 was not so different from its Cucuta predecessor. 7 William Marion Gibson, The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1948),35-66, 109-51.

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Many observers trace in embryonic form the alignments which eventually became the Liberal and Conservative parties to dissension between adherents of Simon Bol{var and Francisco de Paula Santander following Bol(var's return to Gran Colombia from Peru in 1826, divisions which were also visible in the Convention of 1831. 8 That convention had been called to reconstitute the government after the break-up of Gran Colombia and the abortive dictatorship of Rafael Urdaneta. Bolivarianos had lost most of their influence in that ill fated effort, leaving the field open to persons loyal to Santander. Support for Santander as the first president of Colombia was nearly unamimous, but factions loyal to General Jose Maria Obando and Jose Ignacio de Marquez made the vice-presidential contest quite heated. The clash of these factions presaged the political divisions of the 1830s and the eventual alignment of the Conservative and Liberal parties. 56 Santander tried to impose Obando as his successor in the 1836 presidential election, which firmly placed Marquez at the head of the opposition group. Vicente Azuero refused to support Obando, and offered the Santanderistas a civilian option. Marquez won the divisive election, which in the end was decided by the congress. The factions which had emerged during the 1836 presidential campaign redoubled their efforts for the 1838 vice-presidential and congressional elections. Continuing controversy over the content of public education and the extent of religious influence in New Granadan society gave this contest a decidedly ideological character. Supporters of Santander 8 lestrepo, Diario pol{tico y militar, II, 228.

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(progresistas) had set aside their differences in the wake of the earlier defeat and prepared to oust Marquez loyalists (moderados), who were supported by the church. Two political coalitions sought electoral victory. Efforts of the two groups to enlarge their electoral base included active recruitment of non-elite voters, which for the first time brought artisans openly into the political process. Both sides recognized the possible rewards for such efforts. 57 Suffrage rights were granted by the constitution to males over the age of 21 (or married) who did not earn their subsistence as unskilled manual laborers or domestic servants. Criminals and the mentally insane were also barred from voting, as were those individuals who were 9 in default on debts to the nation. Independent craftsmen therefore constituted an important segment of the eligible electorate. Members of the church hierarchy, along with leading moderates, organized La Sociedad Catolica in May 1838 in the hope of amplifying support for candidates sharing their ideological leanings. Its director was Ignacio Morales, and vice-director was Antonio Herran. The Society's Executive Council included a representative from the Archbishopric, representatives from four religious orders, Pedro Herrera Espada, Juan Madiedo, and Jose Felix Merizalde.lO The new group stressed the importance of morality and religion in both state and society and regretted that many public officials were 9 Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, 120; La Cronica Semenal, April 13, 1832. 10 Ignacio Morales et al., "Invitacion que hace la Sociedad Cato1ica de Bogota a los fieles de la America" (Bogota, May 10, 1838).

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58 not stressing public moral order. The Society recognized the virtues of President Marquez, but expressed fear for the introduction of men of "irregular conduct" into public office: "Without an eminently religious sentiment, it is not possible to implant the unique principles which 11 constitute the legitmacy of government." According to the leaders cf the organization, New Granadan society had to be protected against foreign and atheistic ideas. They therefore aimed to counter the tendency among the youth of the upper class to abandon the doctrines of the church. The Society was vehemently opposed to the philosophies of Bentham, Tracy, and Broussais that were being taught in the educational system; utilitarian "love of pleasure" was unreservedly criticized. According to its teachings, the proper education, together with votes for Catholic representatives, would prevent the "infection" of such 12 ideas from spreading through the nation. Efforts by the church to participate openly in the support of favorable candidates were not limited to Bogota. Catholic Societies were also established in Cali, Pasto, and Popayan. wben the Catholic organization was founded in Pasto, the editors of El Investigador Catolico in Bogota claimed that it represented a genuine outpouring of support for the church. They discredited allegations that its members 13 had been forced to join by official pressure. 11 El Investigador Catolica, March 25, 1838. 12 Ibid., August 1, October 15, 1838; Morales et al., "Invitacion"; Jose Restrepo Posada, "La Sociedad Catolica de Bogota1838," Boletfn de Historia y Antiquidades, 43: 499 /500, 310-21. 13 rfl Investigador Catolico, October 15, 1838.

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59 While the Catholic Society in Bogota made no direct appeal to the artisan class, the latter was undoubtedly a target of mobilization efforts. Progressives appealed quite frankly to artisans for political support. In their political mouthpiece, La Bandera Nacional, Loreczo Har!a Lleras, Florentino Gonzalez, and Santander claimed that ministerial electors were generally clients of the president and thus represented little more than empleomania, whereas progressive electors were patriots who lived without having to "beg" from the executive. 14 Moreover, ministerial voters were said to include the rank-and-file of the military who would vote according to orders, since they could not read. In June the paper suggested an electoral list of "honorable artisans and laborers" who "lived by the sweat of their brows" and who were only interested in the good of their country. Progressives did not go so far as to support any of the potential artisan electors in their official electoral list, but the appeal to craftsmen was 15 clear. Santanderistas made a miserable showing in the elections. Of the 1,481 votes cast in Bogota, according to an unofficial tally, 1,356 went to ministerials, 80 to progressives, and 45 went to candidates 16 judged to be neutral. La Bandera Nacional blaimed the loss en the patronage power of the administration and church. 17 For their part, 14 La Bandera Nacional, May 27, 1838. Supporters of President Marquez were at the time referred to as "ministeriales," while the Santander camp were labeled progresistas. 15 Ibid. , June 3, 17, 1838. 16 El Argos, June 24, 1838. 17 La Bandera Nacional, June 24, 1838.

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moderates claimed that the victory represented the will of Bogota's voters. Administration supporters noted that despite efforts to recruit artisans and mechanics to the santanderista cause by using socially divisive language such as nobles and plebians, craftsmen had 18 favored the administration with their votes. Election observers on both sides noted the use of political societies in the electorial contest. Moderates claimed that, on the 19 whole, activity by political societies was a positive contribution. 60 The opposition had an understandably different attitude. Progressives argued that three groups had participated in the election--the administration, the church, and themselves. The first two groups had united, bringing to bear both governmental revenues and the church's religious arsenal. In leveling allegations that the church had exploited the pious support of the "popular masses," progressives were forced to note that they were not criticizing religion, but rather defending republican principles which opposed the political activity of 20 the church. In order to overcome such obstacles in the future, the progressives realized that they, too, must politically educate the popular sectors. The initial vehicle for such education was La Sociedad Democratica-Republicana de Artesanos i Laboradores Progresistas de la Provincia de Bogott(SDRAL). It had been founded on June 17, 1838, in the midst of the election process, but apparently did 18 19 20 El Argos, July 1, 1838. Ibid. La Bandera Nacional, June 24, July 1, 1838.

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not take an active part in the campaign. Its objective was to diffuse ... useful knowledge •.. especially that of politics and morality, so that citizens of the republic can discharge and comply with their rights 2 ind obligations with intelligence and pride. The Society was also to disseminate information on industry, economic conditions, and political events to its members, who were said to number over one hundred. 22 61 El Labrador i Artesano, the mouthpiece of the organization, began publication in September. Its prospectus, probably written by Lleras, argued that political customs had prevented the development of equality in the nation, despite laws guaranteeing it. "Consequently, we want to be permitted to acquire (equality), by placing our customs and moral 23 capacity in unison with our laws." This would be accomplished by "political instruction" of the different classes of the state in the maintenance of their interests, in the knowledge of their public rights; moralizing their customs, showing them the true philosophic road to the good, and indent~ 4 ying their interests with those of the state. The by-laws of the Society stipulated four membership categories; full (nato), instructor, honorary, and corresponding. Founding members had to excercise a profession or mechanical art, or be dedicated to 21 22 23 24 Ibid., July 22, 1838. Ibid. El Labrador i Artesano, September 16, 1838. Ibid.

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agriculture in some manner. Other members were required only to profess democratic-republican principles and to conduct themselves properly. At least 189 people became founding members, and some 123 25 accepted honorary memberships. 62 Although the president of the organization, Isidor Jose Orjuela, was a tinsmith, it seems that artisans had little control over the direction of the Society. Upper-class progressives such as Lleras and Juan Nepomuceno Vargas actually controlled it, and men of similar background were predominant among its instructors, who included Francisco Soto, Vicente Lombana, Jose Duque Gomez, Florentino Gonzalez, Ezequiel Rojas, and Rafael Elisio Santander. Francisco de Paula Santander, Jose Mar1a Mantilla, Antonio Obando, and Vicente Azuero were all made honorary members. The Democratic-Repubican Society sought to instill in its ~ernbers progressive political and social precepts, together with appropriate moral training. It did so by means of publishing articles in the Society's paper and by giving lectures to the organization, which contained both utilitarian and republican messages. Vicente Azuero, for e x ample, lectured on the nature of representative government established by the constitution. It was, ~estated, designed to further the common interest, not that of any specific group or family. Azuero countered allegations of the "dangerous" ideological content of progressivism by insisting that democratic liberties were preeminently compatible with the church's value system. 26 Ezequiel Rojas lectured on 25 Ibid. Membership lists are found in ibid., October 7, 14, 1838, January 20, 1839. 26 Ibid., November 4, 1838.

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63 the science of morality, an address based directly upon the utilitarian principle that happiness motivates human behavior. Correct conduct, he explained, was based upon the need to provide for the good of the family, or of those close to the individual. If one did not work or were lazy, the ensuing hunger and vagrancy would plague both family and society. Work, on the other hand, gave the individual the means to pursue desires, provide for a family, and improve the general society. The goodness that ensued was the essense of morality. Prayer, Rojas reasoned, was the manner by which one thought about morality, by pondering the course of action which would produce the most good and 27 general happiness. Rafael Eliseo Santander was another speaker who attempted to reconcile progressive morality with the role of religion in society. Santander argued that the country's system of government contained appropriate guarantees for legal equality, but that without a moral society that objective would never be achieved. It was necessary to moralize the population along evangelical lines for the general advancement of the nation. His proposals suggested that the state sponsor such moral education with the aid of the church, though without intimating that the church should direct the program or renouncing his 28 own utilitarian convictions. These messages by progressive speakers were repeated in the paper's articles and editorials of El Labrador y Artesano. One constant theme was that since people were born with different talents 27 28 Ibid., November 11, 1838. Ibid., December 8, 1838.

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64 and had differing levels of wealth and comfort, equality before the law was all the more important to allow all persons to satisfy their needs and desires without infringement upon the desires of others. Since legislation alone did not guarantee such equality, it was necessary to educate the "inferior classes" for political participation as a barrier to establishment of an aristocratic government reminiscent of the 29 colonial period. The Democratic-Republican Society contributed to political education, but it also worked toward instilling patterns of hard work and thrift among its members. Artisans and laborers ~ere urge to celebrate fewer festivals and to complete promptly their contracted work. On several occasions craftsmen were warned that gambling was a waste of time and money, and, since it added nothing to the general happiness, should be abandoned. The initial editions of the paper also included articles pertaining to industrial education. New techniques for manufacturing sulfuric acid were described, as were methods to make incombustible candles and to apply copper plating. A series of articles by Santiago Umana described the cultivation and prepartion of flax and its oil. Occasionally employment opportunities, such as the need for blacksmiths, masons, and carpenters to work on the church in Zipaquira, were brought to the readers' attention. 30 Specific public issues whfch warranted a progressive response were analysed by Lleras and other leaders of the Society. In December the 29 Ibid., September 23, October 28, December 16, 23, 1838, January 13, 1839. 30 Ibid., October 14, 21, 28, November 4, 18, 25, December 8, 16, 1838.

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65 system of compulsive personal service on the government's behalf was discussed. This holdover from colonial years required certain citizens to give their labor to the state every year for public projects. Although an 1824 law had attempted to correct abuses, Lleras noted that inequalities in service still existed. Improvements on public facilities such as roads and jails were clearly needed, but avoidance of the work responsibilty was rampant: a particularly notorious abuse was said to be that of having servants fulfill one's work obligations, and then not pay them for their labor. This issue touched upon artisan class interests, but others included in the paper did not. For example, the question of clerical celibacy occupied the paper's pages in January and February 1839. Essentially it was argued that the current system was immoral, because it led to repeated violations and a lessening of public respect for the church's officials. Legalizing priestly marriage would correct that immorality and enable clergy to d i i 1 f h 1 31 stan as post ve examp es o t e marita institution. The progressive's effort to mobilize support for their ideological orientations was not confined to the capital. In October Lleras penned a letter to progressives throughout the country and urged them to form organizations modeled after that of Bogota. In the letter Lleras wrote that "instruction of the masses is the most essential guarantee of popular governmemts." Without citizens who w-ere aware of and practiced their rights, the aristocracy dominated a country. Lleras insisted that the teachings of like-minded societies would raise 31 Ibid., December 16, 1838, January 20, 27, February 3, 10, 24, 1839.

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the level of the inferior classes and would help make social classes more equal. Progressives in at least eight towns responded that they had founded similar groups by the end of February 1839. 32 66 Moves by progressives to recruit artisan support ~ere countered by supporters of the administration. A fictional account of a debate in a craftsman's shop derided the progressive effort to mobilize artisans as political allies. The owner of the shop had refused to join the SDRAL, and in defense of his stance claimed that progressives only wanted artisans to serve as a ladder for their electoral ambitions. If they had a genuine interest in artisan political education, he asked, why had it only begun in 1838? Santanderistas had dominated the capital's political scene since the early 1820s. The article suggested that the progressives' "unemployment" was the principal cause for their sudden interest in artisans, rather than any real commitment to the needs of 33 that class. After the June 1838 election, neither the Democratic-Repubican nor the Catholic Societies engaged in activity other than political education. In this, they differed greatly from political action societies of the next decade, but like the latter, both tried to extend their recruitment to other areas of the country. Significantly the Catholic stronghold in the Southern Cauca Valley was the focus of the Catholic Society, and the more "liberal" region of Santander was the center of progressive activity. 32 Societies were founded in Villa de Leiva, Tunja, Gacheta, Santa Marta, Cucuta, Soata, La Mesa, and Santa Rosa de Viterbo. 33 El Amigo del Pueblo, September 16, 1838.

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It is noteworthy that both groups tried to instill into their members principles of good citizenship with the end of ensuring order and social harmony. Different ideological foundations directed their efforts, but they shared a common destination. The Catholic Society suggested that adherence to the dogma of the church, and submission of self to proper teachings, would achieve a moral social order replete with proper liberty. Progressives, on the other hand, placed their faith in the ability of people to determine for themselves those actions which brought them happiness; a mutual understanding of useful actions would then guarantee social harmony and prosperity. By either route, citizens would advance the welfare of the society as a whole. Thus neither set of educational messages can be seen as subversive, or as purposely agitating social divisions. 67 In April 1839 a petition was presented to the congress, signed by 343 artisans, which suggests the efforts by members of the church to use this social class to its specific ends as it touched upon the principal religious debates of the period. However, it is not clear whether the petition was associated with the Catholic Society, because many of the names of artisans listed as members of the SDRA.L were included on this document, which suggests that political boundries had not yet been firmly fixed among the tradesmen. The petition called for a restriction of the use of Benthamite texts and other "impious books" in education, in order not to corrupt the good customs of the Colombian people. No ecclesiastical reform should be passed, according to the petition's authors, without the consent of the church. Missionary colleges should be established to proselytize among the unfaithful, and a Seminary should be established for clerical education. It also asked

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68 that the Jesuits be allowed to return to the country. The petition was clearly aimed at convincing the legislators that the interests of the church coincided with those of the state; it thus called on congress to reverse many of the legislative measures instituted earlier by Santander and his associates since the time of Gran Colombia. 34 Rather than acting on the artisan's petition, in June 1839 the congress ordered several minor convents of Pasto closed. The subsequent pastuso revolt sparked the first of the major civil conflicts of the nineteenth century. General Pedro Alcantara Herran was able to subdue the rebels by August, but General Jose Marfa Obando took advantage of the rebellion to declare himself in revolt in protection of religion and federalism. Not until September 1840 did the combined forces of Herran, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, and General Joa~ Mar{a Flores of Ecuador defeat Obando. In the meantime, other areas of the country, generally those of a more progressive persuasion, joined the revolt. President Marquez responded to the new wave of insurrection by placing Vice-President General Domingo Caicedo in control of the government and by allowing Herran and Mosquera to take charge of the military operations. By mid-1842, finally, a troubled peace descended upon the country. The war demonstrated a frequent role played by artisans, that of soldiers. The Constitution of 1832 stipulated that the National Guard was the primary auxilary support of the Army in an emergency, and the Guard was pressed into service in this conflict. Membership in the 34 AC, Senado, peticiones, 1839, XI, folios 79-86r; Bonifacio Quijano et al., "H. H. senadores i representantes" (Bogota, April 16, 1839).

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Guard was restricted to active citizens, so that artisans made up the backbone of its force. Some sources indicate that three-quarters or 35 more of the Guard were artisans. Though Guard service was primarily in support of the 69 administration, artisan support was courted by progressives as ~ell. h~en the northern provinces revolted in late-1840, progressives in the capital published several handouts which advised crasftsmen that the revolt was against Marquez, and not against Bogota. Artisans therefore had nothing to fear. The war, according to the handouts, had originated from Obando's defense of religion, and from the government's persecution of the same general for his alleged involvement in the murder of Marshal Antonio Jose Sucre. Artisans were urged to unite 36 with the northern to'Nlls and demand an end to the fighting. The Guerra de los Sumpremos, as it came to be called, is generally recognized as a major factor in sharpening the political divisions which had become visible in the 1830s. Personal antagonisms, wartime animosity, and ideological differences combined to define more clearly the alignment of political forces. The moderate (ministerial) victors, who would in time form the base of the Conservative party, took advantage of their victory to reverse some of the legislative "errors" of the santanderistas. Progressives, who on their part constituted the foundations of the Liberal party, were either humiliated by defeat as in the case of Obando, or were forced to bide their time until the 35 Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, 145; Constitucional de Cundinamarca, June 10, 1832; El Dia, July 17, 1842. 36 7 Fl. Boletfn Liberal, October 1 3 , 1840; Un Albanil, "Artesanos laborisos de Bogota" (Bogota, 1840).

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advent of more favorable political conditions. After the death of Santander in 1840, Azuero in 1844, and Soto in 1846, the progressive revival would be directed by a new generation of political actors. For the time being, ho wever, ministerials ruled the country. Their ideological preferences can be seen in the Constitution of 1843 and in several other areas. The revised constitution enhanced the 70 power of the e x ecutive branch at the e x pense of the legislative and the judiciary. While expanded, executive powers were also more clearly defined than had previously been the case. Meanwhile, suffrage requirements remained essentially the same. 37 Ministerials naturally used their strengthened political position to reverse Santander's educational legislation. In 1840 they decreed that teachers could select their own textbooks, weakening the 1826 Plan of Studies. Bentham's The Principles of Universal Legislation was banned as a university text by Mariano Ospina Rodr{guez's 1842 educational plan (implemented in 1844). 38 Ospina's campaign to purge New Granada of utilitarian and other "immoral" tendencies included inviting the Jesuits to return to Colombian soil. They were to serve, in J. Leon Helguera's words, as a "corps of conservative shock 39 troops." In the end, their effectiveness toward obtaining Ospina's goal "7as extemely questionable, but there is no doubt that the "Jesuit 37 Joseph Leon Helguera, "The First Mosquera Adminstration in New Granada" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1958), 5472. 38 . . .,_h ~ v n 1850" (Ph. D. 111. Lane Young, "The University Reform in New Granada, 1820dissertation, Columbia Univeristy, 1970), 37-38, 78, 10639 Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 34,

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71 question" gave rise to extreme political controversy in the years after their arrival in 1844. While moderates were attempting to implement their program for Colombia, one of the first statements which reflected the sentiments of artisans, rather than their political mobilizers, was an 1842 response to an article published in El D{a, a leading ministerial newspaper, that praised the effect of foreign artisans had had upon native craftsmen. It held that despite initial resistence, foreign artisans had built a solid reputation in Bogota, and had done much to improve the arts of the city. The thrust of the article was to warn against opposition among craftsmen to the arrival of Jesuit craft instructors, whom the author hoped would have the same beneficial influence as had 40 foreign artisans. "Some Native Artisans" responded in the same paper by admitting that, when foreign artisans arrived, native craftsmen had indeed been alanned. This was not due to the competitive threat represented by foreigners, but rather to their formal status under the laws of the nation. While native tradesmen were obligated to fulfill military obligations, in either the Army or the National Guard, foreigners were exempt from that obligation. Thus they did not lose ~ork to military service, and they enjoyed more time to pursue their crafts. The authors claimed that during the War of the Supremes a substantial majority of Bogota's craftsmen had been pressed into military service, while foreigners continued to practice their trades. Moreover, 40 El D!a, May 26, 1842.

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foreigners were exempt from the multiple taxes which burdened the native. In short, they were a privileged class that came to the Republic to enjoy all its advantages, without any responsibilities, while at the same time the other part of this same class had to suffer all of the resonsibilit!!s, pay all the taxes, and face all the dangers. 72 The article intimated that foreign craftsmen acted like caballeros, enriched themselves at the expense of native producers, and returned to their own countries without having contributed anything to 42 Colombia. This exchange on the subject of foreign artisans did not presage an immediate increase in artisan political involvement, even though the 1844 presidential election was surprisingly disputed. General Mosquera was supported by ministerials who recalled the seeming ineffectiveness of civilian President Marquez, whereas ministerials who distrusted military men (especially Mosquera) sponsored Rufino Cuervo as a candidate. Opponents of the government, while subdued, lent their support to General Euseb!o Borrero, as did associates of the dissident ministerial Julio Arboleda. In the end, Mosquera polled 762 electoral votes, Borrero 475 and Cuervo 250, while the remaining 177 votes were scattered among numerous minor candidates. Congress was forced to select the president as no candidate had received a majority total. 43 They opted for Mosquera, the clear preference among the voters. 41 42 43 Ibid., July 17, 1843. El Dia, July 17, 1843. Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 37-38; Bushnell, "Elecciones presidenciales colombianas, 1825-1856," in Compendio de estadisticas histo"ricas de Colombia, ed. by Miguel Urrutia Montoya and Mario Arrubla (Bogota: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1970), 24957.

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73 Conclusion A primary characteristic of nineteenth-century Colombian politics was the struggle for power between the Conservative and Liberal parties. This struggle led directly, as has been seen, to the recruitment of artisans as potential supporters of one or the other group. It is notable that the initial participation by artisans in the political process did not originate with craftsmen but instead with party or factional military leaders. Organizations which sought artisan electoral support in this manner were present throughout the century and tended to be short-lived, generally disbanding after the election had been decided. To be sure, parties not only sought votes, but also attempted to convince tradesmen of the correctness of their party ideology and programs through educational efforts directed at artisan voters. The attempt to instill principles of political theory among craftsmen would later bear unanticipated fruit. A rigid ideological orientation did not develop among politically active artisans in the 1830s or early 1840s, as suggested by the fact that many of the same names appeared as members of the SDRAL and as signers of the 1839 petition. It seems, in fact, that artisan interests and attitudes did not neatly fit the constraints of either party's ideology. As a result, in the years to come the ideological orientation of artisan organizations shared features of both parties, and often tradesmen aligned with third party groups. In the period immediately following, however, the most striking feature of artisan

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political activity was to be the sheer increase in its scale and importance within the general political process. 74

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CHAPTER 4 ARTISANS AND THE LIBERAL REFORMS, 1845-54 Overview The majority of the liberal reforms were conducted during the presidential administrations of Tomis Cipriano de Mosquera (1845-49) and Jose Hilario Lopez (1849-53). Many of the reforms passed in this era had been proposed in one form or another since the 1820s, but most had been forestalled by ideological opposition or by liberal pragmatism. The most active proponents of reform have been called the Generation of 1849, men who were trained under the educational system instituted by Santander. The experience of the independence movement that had moderated both Santander and his associates did not, however, tarnish the liberalism of these men. They undertook reforms with idealistic zeal and faith in what they could make of the republic. The young liberals, however, did not initiate the reform process. The undoctrinaire Mosquera introduced numerous programs designed to improve the nation's physical infrastructure, to reform its fiscal apparatus, and to foster growtb of e x port agriculture, which included lowering tariff rates. Mosquera's liberalization of the nation's economic system splintered his ministerial supporters, and led craftsmen to organize against perceived dangers to their well-being. Artisans in 1847 formed La Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogota in an effort to reverse his tariff legislation. The Society worked with the new 7 5

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generation of liberals to support the "progressive" Jose Hilario Lopez for the 1849 presidential election. Although the artisan/liberal relationship had serious ideological flaws, their cooperation expanded during the first part of the Lopez administration. 76 With the aid of the Sociedad Democratica de Artesanos, young liberals continued the economic liberalization begun by Mosquera and attempted to redirect the nation's social and political orientation as well. They adopted measures which finally eliminated slavery, hastened the elimination of Indian resguardos, expelled the Jesuits, formally separated the church and state, and began political decentralization. These and many other reforms were incorporated into the Constitution of 1853. Reactions to these reforms were far more violent than had been the case for Mosquera's reforms. Conservatives in the Cauca Valley staged an unsuccessful revolt in 1851. The Liberal party splintered into a wing of radical reformers (g6lgotas) and moderate reformers (draconianos). Artisans of the Democratic Society became disillusioned with the radicals when they could not secure tariff protection and with the general direction of the reform process. After 1852 they joined with draconians in an attempt to curb the more radical reforms. Failure of that effort led to an artisan-military-draconian revolt in April 1854. The 17 de abril sought to halt the reform tide and return the country to previous constitutional norms. The movement was defeated in December, 1854 and hundreds of artisans were forcibly removed from bogotano political activity by their exile to Panama.

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77 La Sociedad de Artesanos, 1845-49 Mosquera's economic policy was controversial from the beginning. His first Minister of Finance, General Juan Cl{maco Ordonez, promptly resigned due to conflicts with Mosquera regarding the proper direction of Colombian economic policy. Lino de Pombo, whose economic beliefs tended to favor freer trade and less governmental economic restrictions, replaced Ordonez on December 29, 1845. During Pombo's brief service widespread fiscal reform was initiated. Legislation credited to Pombo's guidance included the bill which transferred control of the government's Ambalema tobacco monopoly to private hands, repeal of the tax on gold exports, and adoption of a new monetary system. Pombo also helped to found a Caja de Ahorros for the Province 1 of Bogota before he too resigned. Mosquera next named Florentino Gonzalez to the cabinet vacancy. Gonza'1.ez rapidly accelerated the liberalization of the economy. His vision of Colombia's economic future was described to the Congress of 1847 in "probably the most significant statement of purpose and plan ever made by a granadino finance minister. 112 Gonzalez told Congress 1 In a country rich in mines and agricultural products that could support a considerable and profitable export commerce ... laws ought not be proposed that turn development of industries away Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 247-48; Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise," 115. 2 Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," 326.

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from the occupations of agriculture and mining those that can produce more advantages We ought to offer Europe raw materials in order to facilitate exchanges and the profit they bring with them, and to furnish the consu~er, at a comfortable price, manufactured products. Included in his visionary statement were proposals for fiscal reorganization, further currency reform, and the lowering of import 78 duties, especially those on textiles. The long sheltered artisan class would be forced to participate in more "productive" and "profitable" industries. The cobbler will learn to lay bricks, the tailor to pole boats or to fish, the blacksmith to farm; and while th!y learn? And if they do not learn? They succumb! Artisans from both Bogota and Medellfn reacted to rumors of a tariff revision by presenting petitions to Congress which constituted the most significant artisan-initiated political statements up to that time. The Bogota petition protested proposed tariff reductions on items such as "ready-made clothing, shoes, tools, and other manufactures" which would damage the country's industry and disemploy thousands who "foment the national wealth" by manual trades. Shoemakers and mechanics were already suffering thanks to existing tariffs, they argued; further cuts would cause their ruin. "Would it 3 Anibal Galindo, Historia economics i estad!stica de la hacienda nacional desde la colonia hasta nuestros dias (Bogota: Imprenta de Nicolas Ponton i Compania, 1874), 56. See ibid., 56-60, for the full speech. 4 Jose Maria Madiedo, Ideas fundamentales de los partidos pol{ticos de la Nueva Granada (Bogota: Editorial Incunables, 1985), 31-32.

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be credible that the same Government that we defended," the artisans asked, "would now propose to ruin the useful and laboring class of society, rewarding us thus for our patriotism and our decisions (to support) the cause of legality?" The petitioners wrote that the nation was not so wealthy or so industrially advanced as to compete on an equal footing with Europeans. Artisans did not call for a return to Spanish exclusionary policies, but only for maintenance of the current 5 6 duties. The petition from Medell{n expressed similar concerns. The Bogot& petition was signed by 219 individuals, all of whom seem to have been artisans or mechanics. They claimed to represent more than 2,000 families in the capital who would be hurt by the proposed legislation. Agustrn Rodriguez, a tailor and the first to sign the document, would become the first director of the Society of Artisans. Other signers who had played, or who would play a role in artisan politics include: Jose Maria Vega, Francisco Londono, Hilario Novoa, Narcisco Garai, and Rafael Tap{as. Many signers had been 7 members of the SDRAL or had signed the "books" petition of 1839. This petition represented the marshalled efforts of the more politically important artisans of the city. Although it was reluctant to approve the tariff proposal, most likely due to fears of lost revenues, congress passed the measure, 79 opening the door to freer trade with the Law of June 14, 1847. The new 5 AC, Senado, Proyectos Negados, 1846, V, folios 118-26. The petition was also published as a handout. See Agustin Rodr{guez et al., "H. R. senadores" (Bogota, May 5, 1846). 6 7 AC, Camara, Informes de Comisiones, 1847, X, folios 229-24lr. Ibid,, Senado, Proyectos Negados, 1846, V, folios 118-26.

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80 tariff schedule reduced rates by about 301., abolished all restrictive duties on transit, and combined previous multiple duties into a single tax levied at a maximum of 25% of the object's value. 8 While frustrated in their attempts to block the new law, artisans had by no means given up the fight. In October 1847 the jefe polftico of Bogota received a letter signed by Ambrosio Lopez, Agustin Rodriguez, Dr. Cayetano Leiva, Fransisco Torres Hinestrosa, and Francisco Londono informing him of the formation of La Sociedad de ,,. 9 Artesanos de Bogota. At its first meeting in early November, the t' ,,. Society unanimously selected Agustin Rodriguez as its first director, Cayetano Leiva, vice-director, and Martin Plata, secretary. The Board of Directors consisted of Jose Maria Solano, Francisco Torres Hinestrosa, Francisco Londono, Pedro Aguilar, Rafael Lasso, Ambrosio Lopez, Bartolome Andrade, and Antonio Chaves. At its inception, the group was quite small, numbering only 10-15 principal members, all but 10 two of whom were artisans. The importance of artisans' economic interests in the creation of the Society was later emphasized by Rodriguez 8 Galindo, Historia economica, 60-61; Rep~blica de Colombia, Codificacion nacional de todas las leyes de Colombia desde el anode 1821, hecha confonne a la ley 13 de 1912, 34 vols. (Bogot~: Imprenta Nacional, 1924), XII, 214-62. (Hereafter CN.); Ospina Vasquez, Industria i protecci6n, 208-14. 9 Hugo Latorre Cabal, Mi novela: Apuntes autobiograficas de Alonso Lopez (Bogota: Ediciones Mito, 1961), 26. 10 ,,, { Agustin Rodrguez, Al director i miembros de la Sociedad Democratica (Bogota: np, 1849), 1, 2; Sociedad de Artesanos, Reglamento para su rejimen interior i economico (Bogota': Imprenta de Nicolas Gtmez, 1847), 16. Other members of the board included Camilo Cardenas, Dr. Evanjelista Duran, Jose Benito Miranda, Jose Maria Vega, Francisco Garzon, Gregorio Lugo, and Hilario Novoa.

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When the idea was happily conceived to found and organize a Society composed of the artisans of the capital, it was decided not only to focus their patriotic sentiments, virtues, and loyalties, but also to express the lamentable consequences of the barbaric law ... lowering import duties and allowing introduction of foreign-made pry1ucts crafted equally as well in the country. As the law of June 14 was said to attack directly the artisans' occupations and welfare, the Society was determined to make representations to the legislature to bring about its reform. The Society also claimed to look forward to the coming presidential elections and the "light of republicanism," which it thought would 12 favor their interests. 81 By-laws approved on November 18 described the purpose of the organization as being "to promote the advancement of the arts and other areas that can help our well-being." Membership in the Society was open to artisans, agriculturalists, and to aficionados of the trades. 13 Among its specific goals were: steady work for all members; obedience and respect for the government; and various forms of instruction for the membership, to include democratic theory, military skills, principles of justice, and religious training. 14 Obligations of the members included payment of a three real fee each month, aid to needy 11 12 13 14 Roddguez, Al director, 1. Ibid. Sociedad de Artesanos, Reglamento. Reglamento de la Sociedad de Artesanos, Bogota, 1848. As cited by Jaramillo Uribe, "Las Sociedades Democr;ticas de Artesanos y la coyuntura pol!tica y social colombiana de 1848," in La personalidad historica de Colombia y otros ensayos (Bogota: Editorial Andes, 1977), 205.

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members, and the use of suffrage rights only with the advice of the Society. Members were cautioned not to present discourses disobedient to the laws of the land or to censure legal authorities, and they were 15 to avoid personal, political, or religious issues. Despite this ban, there is little evidence that the Society discussed anything else. Opposition to the Society quickly developed in response to a handout circulated by Ambrosio Lopez in which he claimed that the Society was designed to help an oppressed and threatened class. The editor of the Catholic El Clamor de la Verdad refuted Lopez's claim, stating that the secret society would do no more than serve as a machine for someone's electoral purposes--it would be used and then 82 forgotten. The editor commented that the group appeared to be an enemy of Christ, based on a reference by Lopez to the banned book by Felicite ] 6 ,, de Lamennais. Lopez immediately denied any secret intentions on the part of the organization. He noted that the Society was entirely open 17 and had only the laudable objective of uniting the artisans. El Clamor de la Verdad then softened its opposition to the Society, stating that its original objection had only been to Lamennais's book. The paper praised the openness of the organization but reminded 18 artisans to be on their guard because of the upheavals of the times. 15 Sociedad de Artesanos, Reglamento. 16 El Clamor de la Verdad, November 14, 1847. 17 rn Dfa, December 11, 1847. 18 El Clamor de la Verdad, December 26, 1847.

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The Society had some 300 members by April of 1848 according to Agustin Rodr!guez, but he also reported that it was often difficult to meet the 20-person quorum necessary for a meeting. This changed, however, after May 4, 1848, when the group met to consider which candidate to back in the June presidential election, which paralleled that of 1836 in its importance for political alignment. 19 83 Mosquera had not proven to be the doctrinaire ministerial that many had hoped, and by opening the Pandora's box of reform, his administration had splintered the party. At least four presidential candidates came from the divided ministerial ranks. Foremost was Mosquera's vice-president, Rufino Cuervo. Cuervo attracted the support of more conservative party members, but he did not appeal to moderates, who instead favored Joaqu1n Jose Gori, who had led internal party opposition to Mosquera. Gori opposed the new tariff, primarily on the grounds that it would cause a large revenue loss for the government, and consequently was supported by many artisans. Two generals, Eusebio Borrero and Joaqu{n Barriga, also sought the presidency. The leading progressive was Florentino Gonzalez, who had been at the group's forefront since the death of Vicente Azuero in 1844. His service in the Mosquera administration alienated potential progressive support however, and Gonzalez was forced to enlist the service of ministerial moderates such as Lino de Pombo and Julio Arboleda. With all these men drawing support from the ministerial ranks, progressives selected war hero General Jose Marfa Lopez as a unity candidate. As a military leader Lopez calmed the fears of those 19 Rodr{quez, Al director, 3; El Aviso, October 8, 1848.

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remembering the ineffective peace-keeping efforts of Marquez ten years earlier. Lopez was closely identified with the exiled General Jose Marfa Obando, but he did not share Cbando's stigma of having revolted. Lopez too was favored by many artisans, to whom he promised tariff protection. 84 In was during this period that young liberals of the Generation of 1849 began to speak at the Society's meetings and to assume an important role in its deliberations. 20 Some speakers presented the ideas of European thinkers such as Saint Simon, Proudhon, and Louis Blanc, or of the revolution that was occurring then in France, which has led some historians to argue that the programs of the Society and these French thinkers shared many common points. Such a conclusion needs to be qualified, as will be pointed out in the conclusion to this 21 chapter. In add it ion to hearing "socialist" doctrines preached, the Society listened to its guests' opinions on the various candidates. Francisco Javier Zaldua spoke in favor of the progressive Lopez; Jose de Obaldia praised Jose Marfa Obando; and Ezequiel Rojas also pledged his endorsement of Lopez, claiming that the general would return 22 Colombia to the legality of the days of Santander. 20 Ambrosio Lopez issued many of the invitations. Ambrosio Lopez, El desegano o confidencias de Ambrosio Lopez, primer director de la Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogota, denominada hoi "Sociedad Democratica" escrito ara conocimiento de sus consocios (Bogota: Imprenta de Espinosa, por Isidoro Garcia Ramrez, 1851), 1-5. 21 For example, see Jaramillo Uribe, "La influencia de los romanticos ranees y de la revolucion de 1848 en el pensamiento polf"tico colombiano del siglo XIX," in La personalidad historico de Colombia y otros ensayos, 181-201. 22 Latorre Cabal, Mi novela, 72.

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The Society's election committees reported their findings to the membership on May 15. Francisco Londono, now director of the Society, personally favored Joaqu{n Jose Gori, but a lengthy discussion led to an agreement to suppport Lopez. Their adherence centered on his demonstrated capacity to preserve the peace of the country. What other thing can be more important to us than peace, order, and liberty, whose benefits provide us the free exercise of our work, the development of our industry, the happiness of our h~~es, and the tranquility of our domestic hearth? The Society made no mention of Lopez's political program, only that he 24 represented liberal principles and order. 85 The decision to support Lopez was reaffirmed at the June 10 session, attended by some 400 people. Acting on a proposal by Ambrosio Lopez and Jose Mar(a Vergara Tenorio, the Society voted almost unamimously to work for Lopez's election. 25 It accordingly appealed to artisans of the Province of Bogota, acclaiming Lopez as a fighter for liberty, a soldier of the people, and a Catholic democrat. "Citizen General" Lopez was said to have "learned republican principles in the most sublime evangelical maxims of Christianity, and would make real the brilliant democratic theories and holy dogmas of equality." It was argued that he would eliminate laws which favored the privileged and speculators. The Society's cause was said to be that of the people, which was triumphing in Europe and America and, with Lopez, would 23 24 25 La America, June 4, 1848. Ibid. Ibid.

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86 26 triumph also in Colombia. (The influence of young liberals can be clearly seen in the language of this appeal.) Lopez was not the only candidate favored by artisans, however. As early as April 8, an author claiming to be a painter began a series of letters to the editors of El D{a describing the various candidates. Lopez was rejected as being too susceptible to outside forces and was said to be unlikely to sustain the dignity of the office. Gonzalez was dismissed as a political novice. General Barriga drew mild praise from the painter, but not as a viable candidate. Rufino Cuervo was described as a man who spoke differently to all peoples in a courtly manner unbecoming a republican. Joaqufn Jose Gori, on the other hand, was said to be preeminently fit for the role of a republican president. He was described as dignified, experienced, a moderate man of laws, and one who could direct the nation to rational progress. He was not, according to the author, the candidate of Mosquera, an identification which all candidates sought to avoid in this election. 27 Another letter signed "Some true artisans" also supported the Gori candidacy. It railed against military candidates, most notoriously Mosquera, insisting that their insolence only brought misery and war to the country's people. Gori by contrast was said to be an honorable 26 El Aviso, June 18, 1848. A list of presidential electors favored by the organization was published which included the names of the leading liberals of the capital, as well as numerous artisans. Artisans proposed from the barrio of Catedral included Martin Plata, Jos~ Marfa Vergara Tenorio, Evanjelista Duran, and Rudecindo Suner; from San Victorino, Carlos Mart{n, Francisco Londono, Ambrosio Lopez and Francisco Torres Hinestrosa; and from the barrio of Las Nieves, Pedro A. Castillo and Ramon Groot. Ibid. 27 El D{a, April 8, 22, 29, May 6, 13, 24, 1848.

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87 liberal, who would calmly tolerate opposing beliefs; more than a man of 28 a party, he was a candidate who represented all of the people. Inevitably the artisans supporting Gori took issue with the Society's support of Lopez, cautioning potential voters not to be misled by promises that L6pez would repeal Mosquera's tariff legislation and would deny entry into the country of foreign artisans. After all, one handout reminded its readers, such powers were constitutionally reserved for the congress and not the president. Artisans were cautioned not to put faith in men whose interests were opposite to their own, who laughed at the artisans in private and who would abandon them when they were no longer needed. The handout ended 29 with the prophetic phrase: "Time wi 11 disillusion you." Another proGori letter alleged that artisans comprised only one-tenth of the Society's 200 members. Even those artisans were described as being manipulated by outside forces, while the few craftsmen who did understand the situation were said to be resigning from the organization. Even Agustin Rodriguez reportedly handed in his i i 1 h i . d 30 res gnat on, on y to ave t reJecte . The Society formally rebutted these charges. Its board of directors protested insinuations that artisans were unable to make political assessments by themselves. They could, and would, refuse to be misled by individuals who only wanted to divide and exploit the artisan class. A "great majority" of the organization's members was 28 29 30 Ibid., June 7, 1848. "A los artesanos de Bogota" (Bogota, nd). El Dia, May 31, 1848.

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31 said to be supporting Lopez. Interestingly, the Society's response used the word members instead of artisans--and said nothing about the defection of Rodriguez, who was at the time on the conservative electoral list for Gori. 32 88 When the presidential election finally took place, no candidate obtained a majority. In the nation as a whole, Lopez led the count with 725 electoral votes, Gori garnered 384, and Cuervo totalled 304; other candidates, mostly ministeriales, shared 276 votes. Together ministerial candidates received the greatest number of votes, but the election clearly demonstrated the deep fissures in their ranks. Of the 242 votes in the Province of Bogota, Lopez won 102, Gori 95, Cuervo 27, and 18 votes were garnered by others. Despite the efforts of the Society of Artisans in mobilizing support for Lopez, he fared worse in the capital than he did in its province; Gori tallied 31 votes, 33 Lopez 12, Cuervo 8, and Mariano Ospina Rodriguez one. 31 32 33 La America, June 18, 25, 1848. El Nacional, June 11, 1848. David Bushnell, "Elecciones presidenciales colombianas, 18251856," in Compendio de estad1sticas histo'ricas de Colombia (Bogot~, 1970), 258-59, 265; El Nacional, June 11, 1848; El Dia, June 28, July 1, 19, 1848. Twenty-nine of Gori's votes came from electors in the parrochial districts of Catedral, San Victorino, and Santa Barbara, while it appears that L6pez won the nine votes from Las Nieves. A curious change in the first and final electoral counts merits mention. In the first announcement, Agust(n Rodrfguez, on the conservative list, and the artisan Jenaro Ru{z, a progressive elector, both artisans were named as winning electors. Their names were absent from the final list; this happened to only one other of the thirty-one electors from Bogota. El D{a, June 28, July 29, 1848. The Society reportedly spent 800 pesos on its campaign effort. The the money was recovered by a 20 de julio festival, a 250 peso gift from Julian Gomez, and a 200 peso donation from Ambrosio L6pez. Cabal LaTorre, Mi novela, 35.

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In Londono's October report on his term as the Society's director, he called the victory in Las Nieves a "splendid triumph." He claimed that fraudulent voting had denied liberals a win in Santa Barbara and that liberal victories in the other two barrios were prevented by 34 reprecussions from an incident on June 13. Yet these results clearly 89 show the strength of the Gori candidacy in Bogota and, when coupled with various pro-Gori announcements in the press, suggest that artisans in Bogota were not completely swayed by the Society's electioneering. The artisan alliance with the young liberals who backed Lopez was far from secure even at this early date. Nonetheless, the Society of Artisans had demonstrated its potential as a political action group, a role which would be expanded in the coming years. The Society also participated in local politics. In the December 1848 election for a new cabildo, 69 progressives were elected out of a total of 166. Five members of the Society were seated: Ambrosio Lopez, Cayetano Leiva, Juan Evanjelista Duran, Francisco Torres Hinestroza, and Francisco Vasquez. Conservatives assessed these elections, which were quite heated, as proof of the progressives' unpopularity among the citizens, as they were unable to obtain a majority. 35 34 El Aviso, October 8, 1848. On that day students and artisans rejoicing a verdict of innocent against several newspaper editors who had been accused of libeling the president were threatened with violence by the president. Only calming advice prevented Mosquera from using force against the celebrators. Helguera, First Mosquera Administration, 234-37; Helguera, "Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera as President," SELA, 25:1 (June 1981), 12. See El Progreso and La America, both June 18, 1848, for opposing interpretations of the day's incident. 35 El Nacional, December 25, 1848.

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90 Meanwhile, political tension was rising in anticipation of the selection of the president by the congress in March 1849. One paper claimed that a "certain" group of people were trying to spread the idea among the pueblo that an aristocracy existed in Colombia, one that should be ended just as it had been in France. The aim of such propaganda, the author wrote, was to agitate the artisans, because in fact no blooded, commercial, or political aristocracy existed. Artisans were warned of the motivations behind such propaganda, and reminded that, even if craftsmen had not yet been elected to high office, that was due to their lack of education, not the system's 36 rigidity. Ambrosio Lopez responded that artisans could see perfectly well that an aristocracy of politicians did exist which lived off public monies and welfare. Insulting the artisans' intelligence did 37 not, Lopez concluded, contribute to public tranquility. Beginning in mid-February 1849, the Society held meetings almost daily to prepare an election strategy. The agreed upon approach "was to frighten the weak (members of Congress) and do nothing more .... 1138 36 37 38 Ibid. El Aviso, January 11, 1849. El Patriota Imparcial, March 1, 1850. It is difficult to determine who led the preparations for the elections. Both Ambrosio Lopez and Emeterio Heredia later claimed responsiblilty; others, however, contend that the locksmith Miguel Leon directed the Society'~ plans; still others believe that young liberals were in charge of its maneuvers. Lopez, El desengano, 23; Lopez, El triunfo sobre la serpiente roja, cuyo asunto es del dominio de la nacion (Bogot:1l: Editorial Espinosa, 1851), 10; Emeterio Heredia, Contestacion al cuaderno titulado "El desengano o confidencias de Ambrosio Lopez etc." por El Presidente que fue de la Sociedad de Artesanos El 7 de Marzo de 1849 (Bogot~: Imprenta de N~cleo Liberal, 1851), 41-45; Restrepo, filstoria de la Nueva Granada, II, 102; Angel and Jose Rufino Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo y noticias de su ~poca 2 vols. (Bogot;: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombians, Prensas de la Biblioteca Nacional, 1946), II, 126-28; La Civilizaci6n, December 27, 1849.

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On March 1, the Society appointed a committee to ask the governor of the province to provide arms to members so that they might serve as a standing militia, ready to defend the country's republican insitutions at a moment's notice. The arms were denied to the Society, but it was reported that they purchased all the pistols, knives, powder, and 39 ammunition in the capital. While the credibility of this report is 91 doubtful, it does illustrate the anxiety aroused by the Society and its plans for the 7 de marzo. Anxiety was not calmed when a group of artisans entered the congress on March 2 and shouted down conservative speakers, an action 40 which led to their expulsion. Such activities, in fact, recalled to many minds the incident that had occurred a year earlier in Caracas, Venezuela, when the Venezuelan Congress was invaded by a government inspired mob. In the attack on congress of January 24, 1848, several deputies and members of the guard were killed or wounded, bringing to an end congressional resistance to President Jose Tadeo Monagas. Mosquera prepared for similar disturbances in Bogota. The 500-man Fifth Battalion was placed on alert and charged with maintaining order. On the night before the selection, cannons filled with grape were 41 placed at key intersections of the city. 39 La Civilizaci6n, January 10, 1850; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 102. 40 Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 127. 41 Latorre Cabal, Mi novela, 24; Isacc F. Holton, New Granada: Twenty Months in the Andes (New York: Rarper and Row, Publishers, 1857), 521.

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92 The morning of the seventh broke clear and sunny. Congress was scheduled to open at 10:00 a. m., but long before a large crowd had occupied the spacious church of Santo Domingo where the selection would be held. First to enter were the artisans, next the goristas, then the cuervistas, and finally the students, who sat nearest the congressmen. The various sides were said to be about equally represented. A barrier of heavy tables separated the audience, estimated at 1,600 people, from 42 the congressmen. The session opened on time, and the voting began. At the end of the first round of voting, both L~pez and Cuervo had received 37 votes, and Gori 10, which removed him from the contest. In the second round, Cuervo improved his total to 42, Lopez to 40, and two votes were blank. At this point many people in the crowd thought that Cuervo had won. A tumult swept the audience that was calmed only when Jose de Obaldia leaped to the top of a table, shouting "Todav{a no hay elecciones." When order was restored, the third round of voting began. Due to insistent shouts by the audience it took over two hours to complete. At its conclusion, Lopez had 42 votes, Cuervo 39, and now three votes were blank. The last vote was that of Mariano Ospina Rodrtguez, which according to traditional accounts read: "I vote for General Jose Hilario Lopez so that the deputies will not be murdered." At this time, about 3:00 p. m., the spectators were expelled from the church. The crowd, now swollen to 4,000, waited ouside in the rain, which had begun between the second and third ballots. At 5:00 p. m. it was announced that the fourth round had resulted in the same talley as 42 .Jose Marfa Cor<1ovez Moure, Reminiscenicias de Santa Fe de Bogot~, 9 vols. (Bogot~: La Cruz, 1910), III, 343-46.

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-had the third, which according to the Constitution meant that the leader received the blank votes--General Jose Hilario Lopez was l.3 president-elect. Lopez supporters in the plaza were over joyed; celebrations an , ong progresives lasted far into the night. The next day El Aviso praised the conduct of the crowd and proclaimed: Long live the Congress cf 1849! Long live the popular president! Long live the people of the capita! 4 Long live the democratic artisans! 93 The Society circulated a handout which proclaimed that the 7 de Marze would be remembered with the same patriotic enthusiasm as was the 20 de 45 julio; equality and fraternity had now joined Colombian liberty. The 7 de Marzo began a new era, both for Colombia and for the Society of Artisans. It brought the twelve-year conservative reign to an end and heralded the acceleration of the reform era. While the exact impact of the Society on the election's results will remain debated, it undeniably was important. If the efforts of the Society 43 La Gaceta Oficial, May 17, 1849; El Neo-Granadino, March 10, 1849; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, 103-06; Jaime Duarte French,Florentino Gonzalez: Razon y sinrazon de una lucha politics (Bogota: Banco de la Rep~blica, 1971), 425. 44 7 I:1 Aviso, March 8, 1849. 45 "La Sociedad de Artesanos de Bo got~, a la nacio"n 11 ( Bogot~, March 8, 1849.) The Society's meager treasury had been drained by the election efforts. Fortunately, as an expression of gratitude for the artisans, several wealthy "patriots" decided to sponsor a civic dinner in honor of Lopez to replenish its coffers. It was held on March 25, the day of Lopez's return to the capital and earned 650 pesos. A letter circulated to various liberals requesting support netted another 89 pesos. These monies, after expenses -were paid, left the Society with a treasury balance of 805 pesos. Rodriguez, Al director, 4, 5.

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swayed only one or two votes, which appears likely, it sealed L~pez's election. Certainly Lopez and his liberal supporters acknowledged the artisans as having made an important contribution to the victory and they would soon mobilize this organization in support of their programs. 94 It was a far cry from the Society's humble beginning s a year and a half earlier. The Society of Artisans had begun on worker ir.itiative, in pursuit of specific artisan interests. It was the first such organization in Colombian history. Yet, the struggles of the political process brought young liberals into the group and eclipsed its original autonomous character. This relationship was somewhat contradictory, as would become evident during the Lopez administration. Nor should it be forgotten in the attention paid to the Society of Artisans that other voices were raised in defense of craft interests, by artisans who were not members of the Society. This, too, would be of importance in the next four years. Las Sociedades Democraticas, 1849-51 The first months of the Lopez administration, begun on April 1, represent a period of transition for the Society, now renamed the 46 Democratic Society of Artisans. One of the goals of the Society had been to place artisans in the government who could represent the 46 Between August 1849 and February 1850, the Society was referred to both as the Society of Artisans and as the Democratic Society of Artisans. It is not clear exactly when the name change occurred, or at whose initiative. After February 1850, the name Democratic Society was used predominantly.

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opinions of the group. The first artisan to be so re w arded was Ambrosio Lopez . On April 3 he was summoned to the office of Jose de Obaldia, a representative from Panama and soon to be the vice president, where Obaldia, acting on behalf of the president, offered him the job of either jefe polftico of Bogota or prefecto of the Territory of San Martfn. The jefe politico had an extremely important position, but Ambrosio, wanting to avoid potential conflicts with his 95 .,, l..7 friends in the city, chose the San Martin post. In November, a second artisan, presumably Miguel Leon, who served as a capitan in the L..8 National Guard, was named to a position in the Military College. The December cabildo election saw artisans again forward a list of L..9 proposed vocales which included both artisans and young liberals. This in itself did not represent a change from earlier policy, but forces were at work which would radically redirect the organization. In particular, members of the Lopez government were quick to appreciate the potential of the Democratic Society as a mobilizing force in favor 50 of its reforms and Liberalism in general. The Democratic Society was 47 Lopez, El desengano, 18; Lopez, El triunfo, 14-16; Latorre Cabal, Mi novela, 73. The announcement was officially made on September 2. La Gaceta Oficial, September 2, 1849. 48 El Sur-Americano, November 18, 1849. 49 Ibid., November 29, 1949. 50 Until 1849, neither poltical orientation was sufficiently cohesive or precise in their ideology to warrant the title of party. After the election of 1848, however, both groups undertook a refinement of their orientations so that after this year, one can justifably refer to them as parties. Therefore, both Liberals and Conservatives will be capped when referring to individuals aligned with one or the other group, and lower cased only in reference to non-partisan use of the word.

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thus made increasingly to be a tool of the Secretariat of Government, 51 to whose head, Francisco Javier Zaldua, it reported. Chapters cf the Democratic Society were established throughout the nation in an effort to support the 7 de Marzo regime. 96 In Cali two election societies had been created in 1848, one which had supported Gori and the other Lopez. Following Lopez's victory, the Lopez society became the nucleus of a new organization with the objective of training Liberal newcomers to fill vacant government positions. While poorly organized, the society did publish its own ~2 gazette, El Sentimiento Democratico, and maintained five branches.At least that was the situation before the arrival of Juan Nepomuceno Nunez Conto from Bogota in mid-1849 to urge the Cali society to remodel itself along the same lines as the Democratic Society in Bogota. On July 20 the group met and did just that, forming the Sociedad Democratica de Cali. The new Democratic Society was endowed from the outset with the organizational structure of its Bogota predecessor, and its nature soon began to mirror that of the Bogota society as well. It was noted that its program of popular instruction ceased, and sessions became dominated by a spirit of partisan politics. In time its agitation came to represent a pure attack on the oligarchy 51 Correspondence from the Societies in La Gaceta Oficial was directed to, and responded by Zaldua, although the precise nature of the relationship has yet to be determined. 52 El Sentimiento Democratica, May 3, June 14, 1849; Resena historica de los principales acontecimientos politicos de la ciudad de Cali, desde el anode 1848 hasta el de 1855 inclusive (Bogota: Imprenta de Echeverrfa Hermanos, 1856), 14, 27.

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It came to form a democratic dogma that only those who wore a ruana and ~~lked barefoot constituted the sovereign people. 97 Beginning with the Society in Cali, Democratic Societies began to appear in other provincial cities. Announcements of their organization were made in the Diario Oficial, evidence of their strengthened relationship with the government. By October Societies from Cali, La Plata, Sogamoso, Cartago, and Facatativa had reported to the Democratic tfDciety of Bogota, which in turn promised to work with them. As of January 1850, ten other Societies had been founded. Countrywide membership was reportedly over 10,000 people. Bogota's chapter was said to number over 2,500, and Cali's over 2,000 members. The Democratic Society had become the core of a national network dedicated to the reform principles of the 7 de Marzo. Government employees ~ere incorporated into the organization, and young intellectuals were sent 54 throughout the country to address the various groups. The administration endeavored to employ this national organization in numerous ways. Perhaps one of the most significant uses in the long run was its relationship to the National Guard, the militia which supplemented the standing army. The political use of the National Guard by the regime was evidenced in September in a circular to jefes pol!ticos throughout the nation that instructed them to build a strong 53 54 Resena historica, 27-28. El Sur-Americana, January 19, 1850.

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55 guard, composed of individuals loyal to the 7 de Marzo. These frequently were the "Democrats" of the towns. As ties with the government strengthened and geographic expansion occurred, certain changes were visible in the nature of the movement. 98 Its political consciousness was maturing, and perhaps its class consciousness as well. 56 Writing in October 1849, Agustin Rodrfguez spoke of a common thread in all Democratic Societies. Their objectives were to foment industrial knowledge in the working classes of the pueblo, now in order to improve their instruction in areas concerning their political and social rights, and in the end to construct a liberal and patriotic coalition, that will guarantee and sustain our inalienable rights, so many ti~,s choked under ignominious despotism. This was a more forceful statement of social objectives than had characterized most earlier statements. Perhaps it was a consequence of internal processes, but it is also likely that association with young liberals had lent artisans the political vocabulary by which to express themselves. 55 El Porvenir, September 15, 1849. 56 Although more non-artisans were now part of the Society, artisans of the organization had learned from the political struggle of the past year many techniques and lessons that had sharpened their consciousness. Association with the young Liberals also brought a clearer realization of the differences between the children of the upper classes and themselves, distinctions that would become evident in the next year when artisans attempted to pursue political interests of their own. 57 Rodr{guez, Al director, 7.

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99 Most of the Society's original concerns were still in evidence as well. The tariff problem was not entirely forgotten. Congress had not yet raised tariff rates, but the Bogot; Society did not doubt "that the wisdom of the Congress will weigh and meditate for the good of the country's industry in the most assertive and convenient manner." Rodr{guez further noted that the Society had continued its programs of teaching members how to read, to write, and to count, which he called "indispensable notions for all persons who want to acquire and 58 propagate the light of civilization." Others disagreed with his assessment. Isidoro Garcia Ramirez announced his resignation from the Society in August 1849, claiming that it was not providing the industrial education and philanthropic functions that had been its intention. Garcia alleged that the Society was totally preoccupied with political rhetoric and had become a tool 59 of demagogic liberals. The Society promptly protested these charges. It said that educational classes were being offered and that it was Garc{a who had acted contrary to the principles of the organization. 60 For his public insults against the group, Garc{a was expelled. The truth probably lay somewhere between Garcia and Rodriguez's claims. Certainly some formal instruction was taking place within the Society, but the more dominant education was political, being in part due to the organization's growing relations with the government. 58 59 Ibid., 4. El Dia, August 11, 1849. 60 El Sur-Americano, September 6, 1849. For Garc1a's response, see El D{a, October 10, 1849, in which he said he had been admitted to the Society by 47 out of SO votes.

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In promoting both new and old objectives, the Society had to operate in an increasingly polarized political environment. In December 1849, La Sociedad Popular de Instruccion Mutua i Fraternidad Cristiana was definitively organized in Bogoti as a Conservative 61 response to the Democratic Society. Its founders observed that 100 Conservative lethargy, inaction, and disunity had allowed the Liberals into power, and that the time had come to once again assert the will of the "majority party." In order to do so, the party had to unite, 62 consolidate itself, and form associations. The popular base for such associations was to be found in the artisan classes of the nation, although the linkages of the Popular Society to the Conservative party were never hidden. While its first president, Simon Jose Cardenas, was an artist, officers of the group included the Conser v ative leaders Jose Eusebio Caro, Jos~ Mar1a Torres Caicedo, Jose Manuel Groot, Urbano 63 Pradilla, and Mariano Ospina Rodriquez. The Popular Society announced four principal objectives. It hoped to pursue the perfection of public institutions; to promote the country's progress; to work for the triumph of principles based upon evangelical morality; and to put into political power men of honor, patriotism and morality. The first three objectives could only be 61 Some confusion exists as to the precise date of the Popular Society's foundation. Its newspaper, El Amigo de los Artesanos, its first meeting as having taken place on December 10, a second 18th (with 400 present), and a third on the 21st (700 present ) . sources suggest that its first meetings had taken place in 1848, that it was reinstalled on December 17, 1849. El Amigo de los Artesanos, December 21, 28, 1849; El Dia, December 26, 1849. 62 El Di.a, December 26, 1849. 63 r I1 Ami d 1 A D b "8 1849 go e os rtesanos, ecem er L , cited on the Other and

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attained upon the success of the fourth, so political efforts were to 64 be the primary focus of the group's energies. 101 The Popular Society proposed to help industry by creation of funds from which artisans could draw to purchase tools and books necessary to their trades. Such funds would also be available to poor artisans in the case of sickness, as well as to reward "virtuous actions" by its members. Educational objectives included teaching reading and writing; grammar lessons; arithmetic and geometry; and lessons on the government's structure, the constitution, and the rights and obligations of citizens. In order to strengthen the marital institution, a fund was to be created so that poor artisans could pay parochial costs and other necessary marriage expenses. Together these methods would serve to enhance the "principal bases of civilization"the family, property, and instruction. Diffusion of these principles through membership in the Popular Society would insure the "legal triumph" of the Conservative party. 65 The government immediately began a campaign against the Popular Society, which eventually included use of the Democratic Society as one tool of its repression. As early as December 31, 1849, two members of the Popular Society, Francisco Cristando and Florentino V. Posse were called before Governor Jose Marfa Mantilla and warned that the government would use measures to repress the group if rumors about their collection of weapons proved true. On January 2, 1850, Society 64 El D!a, December 26, 1848; Reglamento organico de la Sociedad Popular de instruccion mutua i fraternidad Cristiana (Bogota: Imprenta de EL DIA, por Jose Ayarza, 1849), 1-4. 65 El D!a, December 26, 1849.

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102 vice-president Simon Espejo was also called before 1-!anti lla and cautioned of potential reprisals if he continued to verbally assault the government. Espejo responded that he would use his rights as a citizen to speak his ~ind. Mantilla then allegedly threatened him with exile. 66 On December 28, two members of the Popular had announced their resignation, saying that they were deceived into thinking the organization would have only philanthropic and humanitarian ends. The two claimed suprise to learn that the objective of the Popular was to "win the popular masses" so that they would vote for the Conservative 67 party. According to the Popular Society, these two men were Democrats who had been ordered to join their group and then resign so as to lessen the impact of Garc1a's earlier resignation from the Democratic 68 Society. The political rivalry visible in these accounts erupted into violence on January 15, 1850. That night the Popular Society held a meeting said to be attended by over 1,000 Rodri'guez and Jose Eusborio Caro were in ,,. ,,. Maria Baraya, jefe politico of the city. Nicolas Tanco took the floor and soundly 66 67 Ibid., March 23, 1850. El 7 de Marzo, January 6, 1850. persons. Mariano Ospina ,,. the audience, as was Jose After opening remarks, criticized those who said that 68 El Dia, January 5, 1850. Accusations and counter-accusations of this type continued when a list of 819 members of the Popular Society was published. Democrats responded by saying that many of those included in the list were in fact members of their organization, who protested the use of their names. Ibid., January 17, 1850; El Canon, January 13, 1850.

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103 the Popular Society was a dangerous organization. "Red Liberals," he continued, were a far greater threat that Populars. The jefe politico interrupted his speech to protest such statements, but his voice was lost in the shouts of some 30 to 40 Democrats in the crowd. The meeting broke into turmoil, which was calmed only when a blank pistol was fired. According to Conservative accounts, Democrats then left the assembly and began shouting in the streets that a Conservative revolt had begun. Inside, the meeting calmly began again. Caro proposed a resolution to deny entry to potential disrupters in future meetings, but the jefe politico reminded the group that such actions by public societies were illegal. Caro countered his argument, and the proposal was carried. At 10:00 p. m. the Society adjourned the session. 69 Liberals related that, when the meeting became disorderly, a Democrat in the crowd left and went to notify those at a regular meeting of the Democratic organization. That session broke up, with some of its participants going to the governor to request arms to restore order. Others went to the Popular meeting. Finding calm amid their rivals, they reconvened their own session and considered steps to counter the opposition movement. Jose Mar1a Samper proposed that the Democratic Society should present petitions to the president the next day calling for the expulsion of Jesuits and dismissal of all Conservatives from public office. Mart1n Plata proposed that the National Guard be called out to prevent disruption of the public order. Both resolutions carried. 70 69 La Civilizaci6n, January 17, 1850; El D{a, January 19, 1850; El 7 de Marzo, January 20, 1850; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, 137. 70 rn 7 de Marzo, January 20, 1850; El Canci'n, January 17, 1850.

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104 On the 16th the city walls were covered with announcements calling upon all "good Liberals" to meet at 12 noon to present the petitions to 71 the president. By 11 in the morning, a large crowd, estimated by Conservative sources at 300 and by Liberals at around 6,000, had gathered. The commission of Democrats was escorted to the president's office, where the demands were delivered. Lopez promised to review the 72 petitions, but indicated no course of action. However, the petitions did have at least part of their desired effects. Three Conservative judges were removed from the Supreme Court, and General Jose Maria Ortega, Conservative director of the Military College, was dismissed along with several of his subordinates. The questionable legality of the firings so infuriated Lino de Pombo that he resigned his postition 73 as head of the Supreme Court. Vice-President Rufino Cuervo was sufficiently alarmed by conflicts between the two groups to invite their leaders to his home on January 18th to urge calm. He suggested that both Societies consider a ban on 71 El Dia, January 19, 1850. 72 Ibid.; El 7 de Marzo, January 20, 1850; El Can6n, January 17, 1850; La Civilizaci6n, January 17, 1850; Gustavo Arboleda, Historia contemporanea de Colombia (Desde la disolucion de la antigua republica de ese nombre hasta la epoca presente) , 5 vols. (Bogota: Casa Editorial de Arboleda & Valencia, 1919), III, 39; Restrepo, Ristoria de la Nueva Granada, 136. The commission was headed by Francisco Londono, and included also Agust1n Rodr1guez, Dr. Carlos Martfn, Miguel Leon, Jos~ Mar1a Samper, Enrique parra, Carlos ~aenz, Bartolome Ibarra, Raimundo Russi, Francisco Vazquez, and German G. Pinares. La Civilizaci6n says that the group also asked for the break up of the Popular Society. See El 7 de Marzo, December 23, 1849, for an argument in favor of such an idea. 73 Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 136.

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105 meetings until after the opening of congress in March so as avoid 74 further violence. fublic gatherings do in fact appear to have been curtailed by police order in February, due to the cholera epidemic which was ravaging the city. In March, after the Democrats had resumed their meetings, the Popular Society asked for permission to do the same. Police representative Placido Morales gave permission for the group to meet, but only in the open air or in the Democratic meeting hall, not in their accustomed location. Simon Jose Cardenas, the Popular's president, protested, stating that the Society need not ask permission to meet in the open and that restriction of its meeting place was unwarranted as the cholera was gone from the city. Morales stood by his decision, and warned the Popular leader of his arrogant 75 attitude. Cardenas himself came under attack in what became one of the more publicized personal controversies of the period. On February 16th he visited jailed Popular Ignacio Rodriguez who had written to the Society asking for aid in his legal defense. When Cardenas offered him the free legal services of Dr. Agapito Medina Celi, he was informed by the jailed artisan that because of the group's delay he had been forced to hire his own defense. A heated argument between the two men ensued, which drew the attention of jailer Camilo Rodr{guez. The jailer questioned Cardenas for "harassing" the prisoner, and ordered him to 74 Arboleda, Historia contemporanea, 97; El Neo-Granadino, January 25, 1850. Somewhat later the moderate paper, El Patriota Imparcial, reminded all artisans that they were brothers and noted that the political fighting only created dissension within the artisan class. El Patriota Imparcial, March 15, 1850 . 75 El D{a, April 17, 1850.

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leave the jail. Cardenas and the jailer then exchanged hostile words, and, according to Cardenas, the jailer pushed him down the stairs. 106 This caused more arguments, whereupon Rodr{guez arrested the Society's president. Cardenas protested that the jailer had no right to detain him, and his companions Francisco Suarez and Juan Evanjelista Rodr{guez left to seek the help of Governor Mantilla, who aloofly responded that the affair was under the jurisdiction of the jefe pol1tico, not his. In time, jefe Jose Marfa Baraya was summoned to the jail by Popular members Manuel Urrutia and Juan Malo. Baraya criticized Cardenas for his conduct, but did release him. 76 Cardenas protested his treatment in an article en tit led "Tyranny under the 7 de marzo." He said that he was being singled out because of his political activity for the Conservative party. The Conservative artisan leader harshly criticized jailer Rodr{guez, alleging that he was unfit for public office because of a 1839 criminal conviction, whereupon Rodriguez promptly accused both Cardenas and Juan Malo of libel. They were tried in May. Cardenas was found guilty and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. To Conservatives, the trial was not concerned with libel, because Rodr!guez did have a criminal record; rather, it was political persecution, which to them was characteristic 77 of the 7 de marzo regime. If so, it appears to have been effective, for by June it was reported that the Popular Society was suffering 76 Ibid., February 13, 16, 1850; La Civilizacion, May 24, 1850. 77 TEl. Dia, February 16, 1850; La Civlizacion, May 24, 27, 1850. See also, Simon Jose Cardenas, "El juicio de imprenta celebrado el dia 13 de mayo de 1850, promovido por Camilo Rodr1guez contra el infrascrito" (Bogota, Imprenta del "El Dia" por J. Azarza, 13 de Mayo de 1850.)

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107 under the press restrictions imposed by President Lopez after expulsion 78 of the Jesuits in May. Governmental repression seems to have effectively silenced the popular mobilization of the Conservative party. One of the most hotly debated issues of Mosquera's administration as well as of the early stages of the Lopez regime was the Jesuit question. Readmitted to Colombia in 1843 after a 76-year absence, the Jesuits were central to the struggle for control of social direction. Conservatives such as Ospina regarded them as a positive force in the creation of a moral society, whereas Liberals and many moderate Conservatives thought that the Jesuits were antithetical to a republic and demanded their expulsion. This had nearly been accomplished by the 79 1846 congress. Attacks on the organization intensified when Liberals took office in 1849. Jesuits had been quick to rally artisans to their cause. The year after their arrival they had begun an institute for artisan education. Simon Jose Cardenas worked closely with the order. Some evidence exists that Jesuits were responsible for foundation of workers' congregaciones designed both for mutual aid purposes and to introduce "proper" notions of spiritual and temporal values. Sou:e reports suggest that the meetings of the Jesuit groups drew upwards of 800 80 participants in the late 1840s. There is no reason to doubt that the 78 El Cernicalo, June 10, 1850. 79 Jay Robert Grusin, "The Colombian Revolution of 1848 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1978), 199. 80 El Dia, June 26, 1845; Reglamento de la Sociedad de Artistas (Bogota: Zalamez Hermanos, 1891.)

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Jesuits were closely involved with the foundation of the Popular Society as well. As the 7 de marzo focused its attention upon the order, it was only natural that would play an influential role in the foundation of the Popular Society. Liberals were certainly not reluctant to employ artisans of the Democratic Society in their effort to expel the Jesuits. Josi Mar!a Samper had successfully convinced the Democrats to petition their expulsion in January 1850. This plea was repeated on April 28, 81 It proved rather difficult to convince President Lopez, who resisted strong anti-Jesuit pressures during the first months of 1850. But on May 18, citing the April 2, 1767 decree of Charles III that had previousl y expelled the priests, he ordered the Society of Jesus once again to leave Colombian soil. Two days later, some 200 artisans of 82 the Popular Society guarded their exit from the capital. Praise for this Liberal victory came from Democratic Societies d h h h h 83 C h h h d an ot ere t roug out t e country. onservat1ves, on t e ot er an , 108 lamented it as further evidence of the decay of society since the 7 de marzo. El D!a and La Civilizacion were closed for one month by Lopez in order to calm Conservative emotions; he also armed Democrats in case 84 that move did not prove successful. Moderate opinions were present as 81 El D!'a, May 1, 1850; See "Dialogo entre un artesano i un campesino sobre los Jesuitas" (Bogota, 1850), for an example of the Liberal propaganda on the Jesuit question. 82 83 84 Triana y Antorveza, "El aspecto religioso," 277. See, for example, La Gaceta Oficial, July 4, 11, 1850. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, 152; Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 152.

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109 well. El Patriota Imparcial, which claimed to be neither friend nor foe of the Jesuits, appealed for calm. The Jesuit question had been manipulated for partisan objectives, it argued, and had had a terribly divisive effect upon the country. In reality the proper role of the Jesuits was a social one, and not the political problem as claimed by 85 Liberals or a question of religion as claimed by Conservatives. w~ereas the Jesuit issue divided the artisans of the Popular and Democratic Societies--in reflection of their relationship to the political parties--other issues drawn more from tradesmen's o~n interests began to separate artisans and certain Liberals. For example, a shoemaker announced his resignation from the Democratic Society in September 1850, claiming that the 7 de marzo regime had 86 failed to live up to the pledge to establish industrial workshops. More significant was the revival of the tariff question. Thirty-four artisans from Cartagena had petitioned the 1849 congress to increase tariffs on imported articles which were produced domestically, to establish schools to train artisans, and to examine the competence of 87 shop owers so that internal quality could be improved. A similar petition was sent to the 1850 congress from about 180 Cartagena artisans. This request further asked for the free importation of 88 machinery so that production methods could be improved. 85 El Patriota Imparcial, June 15, 1850. 86 TE]. Dfa, September 7, 1850. See also, La Civilizacion, May 1, 1850. 87 AC, Camara, Proyectos de leyes negados, 1850, X, folios 4344r. 88 Ibid., 45-49r.

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110 In May of 1850 the Bogota Democratic Society presented a petition which reminded legislators of its faithful service to the ideas of the 7 de marzo and clearly implied that tariff protection would be the just compensation for that support. The petitioners felt that tariffs should be increased for all the republic, or at least for the provinces of Bogota, Mariquita, Neiva, Tundama, Tunja, and Velez, which were supposedly the most affected by manufactured imports. Trades which would particularly benefit from protection were said to include those of tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, cobblers, and leather workers. Against these who argued that tariff increases would aid only a small sector of society, the artisans presented the interesting calculation that each shop had 20 journeymen, then 4,000 workers and their families would be hurt by low tariffs in Bogota alone. They estimated the population of consumers of foreign products at 2,000. To them, this clearly demonstrated that low tariffs favored a minority of the population, not the reverse as proponents of free trade insisted. The petition made clear that artisans were suspicious of foreign ideas as well as foreign products. The notion that worship of foreign ideas might help the nation materially was called the "vanity of 89 thereoticians and the greed of speculators. Juan Jose Nieto of Cartagena introduced the artisans' petition to the chamber on May 5, stating that Colombian artisans were suffering due to competition from foreign goods. England, the economic model praised by many, prohibited importation of articles competitive to those of its workers. Why, he asked, could not Colombia offer the same 89 Ibid., 28-31.

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protection to its artisans? The chamber, not impressed with his 90 arguments, rejected the petition by a vote of 22 to 12. The proposal was re-introduced by Alfonso Acevedo on May 13. The projected law now contained three components which reflected the study of the subject by 91 a commission headed by Lorenzo Marfa Lleras. The first section 111 provided for a reduction of tariff rates on machinery and industrial equipment so as to facilitate the importation of components necessary for development of internal manufacture. The second part ordered a tariff increase on items competitive with national production. The final section of the proposal called for creation of schools in Bogota, Cartagena, and Popayan to train artisans in industrial skills. 92 A study of the debate on this new proposal, which lasted four days, reveals many of the contemporary attitudes regarding the tariff question and the opposition encountered by artisans in their attempts to win protection. Camilo Manrrque began the debate with a sarcastic recital of anti protectionist logic. Such economists, he claimed, opposed a rise in duties because it would hurt consumers and stimulate contraband which in turn would lower revenues as illegal imports by-passed customs. If duties were raised, and contraband were increased, foreign articles would sell for less in the market, and native artisan production would be more severely threatened. Low tariffs were therefore in the best interests of artisans. Manr!que concluded that such free trade logic 90 91 92 Diario de Debates, June 5, 1850. AC, Camara, Proyecto de leyes negados, 1850, X, folios 32-40. Diario de Debates, June 15, 19, 20, 26, 1850.

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112 was obviously ridiculous . He continued by stating that most imported objects were luxuries, which appealed to a limited market and sold at high prices. If inexpensive imported goods such as shoes entered the country, however, the artisans lost their jobs and ~ere forced to steal to provide for their families' welfare. Fe closed his statement by recalling England's protection of its lower classes, which contrasted with the Colombian policies that aided tyranny against the poor, and showed favoritism on the side of the wealthy. 93 Lorenzo Maria Lleras noted that as an economist he had studied proponents of economic liberalism such as Say and Bastiat. As head of the commission which had studied the plight of the country's artisans, he reported that "it makes me sick to see the conditions of the artisans." He was thus forced to abandon his economic training, realizing that what might work in other countries was not necessarily applicable in Colombia. Lleras insisted that Colombia provide for the welfare of its citizens. He went on to point out that in theory no duties should be levied and the consumer should pay only the cost of the item plus transportation. Yet, if this were the case, how could the government function? Already it was forced by revenue shortages to cut back projects, reduce expenditures, and fire employees. Even anti protectionists realized the economic necessity of tariffs, Lleras 94 concluded. Silvestre Serrano replied in turn by casting doubt on protectionist logic. By raising duties, favoritism would be sho~n to 93 94 Ibid., June 17, 1850. Ibid., June 18, 1850.

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113 the artisan class. He noted that while one could employ a skilled cobbler in the capital or in Cartagena, other areas of the country were not so fortunate. It was unfair to deny the consumers of such areas good shoes. ftlso, Serrano reasoned, over the long term artisans would suffer from increased tariffs. They would have no incentive to impro v e their art, and the quality of their crafts would decline. (An angry restlessness was reported among the audience at this last statement.) 95 The thesis that the proposal would favor a single segment of the population, to the detriment of the upper classes, was bluntly stated by Juan Nepomuceno Neira: "the project is not only anti-economic, it is essentially socialistic or communistic. Because they want to tax the luxuries of the rich for the benefit of the working class!" Lleras then responded that "if we do not deal with the interests of the laboring class called artisans, then we do not legislate for the great majority 96 of Colombians." Finally, Alejo Morales reminded the representatives that they had discussed only one aspect of the proposal. He considered that the first section, which called for lowered tariffs on machinery, was a wise economic suggestion which deserved adoption. On May 17, after four days of debate, the proposal was accepted for consideration, and referred to second debate. It died at that stage of legislation. 97 The 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. , June 19, 20, 1850. 97 Ibid., June 26, 1850.

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artisans' campaign to provide protection for their industries had once again failed. 114 One can clearly see elements of an ideological clash between more individualistic and more social-minded thinkers in this debate. These ~mo favored the artisans' petition tended to feel that the government was obligated to ensure the welfare of its citizens. This line of reasoning was countered by those who felt that a specific class of society should not be protected; it was the artisans' responsibility to provide for their welfare, not the government's to do so at the expense of the consumer. The defeat of the proposal was, of course, consistent with the general laissez-faire tendency of economic legislation of the reform era. This ideological clash revealed the inherent flaw in the artisan/student union supporting the national network of the Democratic Societies. The Society of Artisans had as its original objective the interests of its artisan membership, primarily increasing tariff rates. Students, invited into the group as a means of reaching that goal, had used the Society as an electoral force through which their own reform objectives could be gained. In its national extension, the Democratic Society succeeded in mobilizing popular support for many reform measures. On the positive side, the students had influenced artisans to become more politically mature and had helped to increase their self-consciousness. But the economic measures favored by students and many Liberal politicians were exactly what the artisans desired to negate. Artisans needed the protective economic structure that reformers were eliminating. Increasingly, the two groups would move to support their own interests, which were basically in opposition.

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In the meeting of April 25, 1850, meanwhile, a serious lack of funds had forced the Society to name a fund-raising commission to appeal to good Liberals to support the organization, arguing that it was "useful for the liberal party and helped hold at bay the 98 "absolutist conservative party." The fund-raising drive must have been successful, because on May 15 the Society began publication of a newspaper, El Democrata. Extant copies of the short-lived paper serve to reveal the depth at that point of "Golgotan" influence in public manifestations of the Society. (Jost! Maria Samper once argued that the "martyr of Golgotha" would have surely supported their efforts to liberalize Colombia; thereafter, golgota became a label of identification to denote the radical reformers.) 115 El Democrats was primarily a mouthpiece for Liberal reformers, ~ith Jose Mar{a Samper the most influential. Samper penned a series of articles on morality and politics blaming Colombia's political problems on "immoral" Conservatives. Early editions railed against the Jesuits, and then praised Lopez for their expulsion. Calls were made for a constitutional convention to replace the 1843 document, eliminate slavery, lessen the power of the church, reform the clergy, and establish religious toleration. The extent to which Liberal issues took precedence over artisan issues was apparent in one letter from "el artesano." The letter praised artisan participation in the Lopez government, especially their role in the expulsion of the Jesuits. Nothing was said of the request for increased tariffs. Perhaps the ultimate indication of the paper's bias was its accolades to Flcrentino 98 El D{a, May 11, 1850.

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116 Gonzalez upon his return to the country, which suggested that this "man 99 of progress" be given a cabinet position. In a "mouthpiece" of artisans, such a claim was quite odd. A some~~at more predictable opinion of Gonzalez was presented by Emeterio Heredia in El Estandarte del Pueblo in July. Manuel Murillo Toro had proposed that Gonzalez be considered as a candidate in the upcoming vice-presidential election. Heredia noted that some support for the nomination existed in the Society but that the vast majority vehemently opposed it. Most favored the candidacy of Jos~ de Obaldia. Heredia warned Murillo that if he continued to support Gonzalez, he too 100 would lose the backing of the Society. In addition to that for vice-president, which Obaldia proceeded to win, elections were also held in July for both provincial legislaturs and national congressmen. The election of Obaldia was celebrated by the Society at their August 7 meeting. The president, his cabinet, and many leading Liberals were present. The same men were present at a September 12 meeting when the Society was treated to a discourse by Jose Marta Samper against Pope Pius IX. Samper noted that the Pope's picture used to hang on the walls of the Society's meeting place, but that now it had been removed. "So falls Pius IX in the democracy, and socialist bogotanos cross the Rubicon." Samper's speech was said to 99 El Democrata, May 15, 19, 26, June 2, 9, 16, 1850. 100 El Estandarte del Pueblo, July 7, 1850. Murillo in turn denied that he favored the Gonzalez candidacy. El Neo-Granadino, July 12, 1850. Similar opposition to the proposed vice-presidential candidacy of Gonzalez was expressed by a "thousand artisans," who claimed that Gonzalez "was not a good liberal" and that his attitude toward artisans had been proven in 1847. El Estandarte del Pueblo, July 14, 1850.

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have been received by shouts of "Long live communism," "Long live Vice 101 President Obaldia," and "Death to Conservatives." A more appropriate forum for this sort of rhetoric was estabished on September 25, when the rector of the National University, Vicente Lombana, and 25 Liberal intellectuals founded the Escuela Republicana. The Republican School offered radical reformers and intellectuals a 117 society in which to examine their particular interests and ideas. Its membership included the core of the Golgota activists. Conservatives claimed that the objective of the Republican School was to defend the ideas of socialism, but this statement must be understood in the spirit 102 of the times. Orlando Fals Borda described these student members of the elite as trying to disassociate themselves from their elders of the established order. The socialist label was thus adopted as a gesture of protest; very few of the measures which Bogota's "socialists" 103 ,,. { favored can be seen as socialist in any strict sense. ~~bse Mar a Samper, after he moderated his political opinions, observed We were all socialists in the School, but without having studied socialism nor understood it, enamored 1 tl 4 th the word, with its political novelty. In the early months of 1851, as young liberals gravitated toward the Republican School, the influence of Golgota members of the Bogota 101 102 103 La Civlizacion, August 15, September 19, 1850. Ibid., October 10, 1850. Orlando Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 83. 104 Duarte, Florentino Gonzalez, 454.

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Democratic Society waned. The creation of the Republican School was thus influential in resolving the artisan-student conflict in the organization. Artisans began the lengthy process of making the Democratic Society more reflective of their interests. On another front, La Sociedad Filot~mica was founded in October as a Conservati v e 105 response to combat the ideas of the Republican School. While it was 118 never very influential, it does further illustrate the spirit of association--and of polarization--that characterized the times. At the same time, it also shows the movement away from political coalitions that included popular elements. Division and Realignment, 1851-54 After the failure of their request for tariff protectio~, artisans of the Democratic Society began a slow process of self-examination. Defections from the Society and complaints about its direction increased throughout 1850. In September of that year "some conservatives" directed an open letter to Ambrosio Lopez. They reminded Lcfpez of the importance of artisan objectives in the foundation of the Society of Artisans. When L6pez had helped to draw Liberals into the group, it had been with the hope of forwarding those objectivep, He was reminded of their refusal to increase tariffs and of the insensitivity with which Lopez's own service to the regime in San Martfn had been received. L6pez was challenged to assess his links to both the government and the Society, and to reflect on how best to 105 Restrepo, Ristoria de la Nueva Granada, 166.

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119 serve the artisans' real needs. 106 Artisans were also challenged by the Conservative Sociedad Filotemica in January 1851 to reevaluate their fortunes in the Democratic Society. 107 For at least Ambrosio Lopez, these appeals for introspection had the desired affect. In early 1851, he published a critical analysis of the Society's history that concluded that the group had been disgraced. After its artisan-based inception, according to Lopez, leadership had been lost to imitators of the "red serpents" of the 1848 French Revolution. Re expressed regrets for his central role in bringing them into the Society and thus undermining artisan economic objectives (i.e.: tariff legislation) in order to help the Lopez campaign. Lopez lamented that upon his election President Lopez did not bring the Society happiness. Instead of the true democratic institutions hoped for by the artisans, Colombia now had an "oligarchy with the name of a .. 108 democracy Lopez's harshest words were directed against the "red serpents" and their attack on religion. He did not approve of the expulsion of the Jesuits nor of the attacks upon the Church and its dogmas, which he saw as necessary for a just republic. He noted that religious debates had been prohibited in the Society until the Liberals repealed that 106 El Dia, September 7, 1850. See also La Civilizacion, May 1, 1850. 107 Among the many pointed questions raised was whether or not artisans could reverse their steps if they came to realize that they had been misdirected by the interests of others? Were artisans being rewarded for their service to the Liberals? Had the antagonism between Liberal and Conservative artisans brought any tangible good? What did they see for the future? El Filotemico, January 26, 1851. 108 Lopez, El desengano, 1-5, 17, 20, 40-41.

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120 regulation. The disillusioned Lopez did not, however, aim all his blasts toward the Liberals and the 7 de marzo. Conservatives were said to be using their economic power to oppress artisans. Indeed, both Conservatives and Liberals offered the artisan only "worse misery." To Lopez, the future was bleak. Fellow disillusioned, beloved friends, there exists a strong opposition that strengthens every day, and I believe that the day is not distant that our affiliatioy 0 ~ill force a civil war among ourselves. Artisans, as Lopez saw it, had only one option. They must abandon the men who had led them astray and reassert their solidarity. Only some military men and moderate liberals could be trusted in this process. It would then be possible to fulfill the artisans' hopes of protected arts, of our luck improved, and with our families living happily in the soul of a true Republif 10 where citizens are not denied their real rights. For his slanderous publication, Lopez was expelled from the 111 Society. The blacksmith Emeterio Heredia published his own pamphlet to refute L6pez's charges. It included a strong defense of the Society, a vindication of the Liberal regime and a personal attack upon Lopez. P.eredia's defense of the 7 de Marzo administration was generous and detailed. 109 110 111 Did not Ambrosio like freedom of the press? And, he asked, Ibid., 19, 30-35, 41, 84. Ibid., 42. La Gaceta Oficial, June 7, 1851.

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121 what of Zaldua's proposal in the Senate to create industrial workshops? As for the struggle to increase tariffs, Heredia reminded Lopez of the support the artisan petition had received in the Chamber. Surely this provided evidence of a republican government that was responsive to the needs of artisans. Lopez himself bore the brunt of Heredia's sharpest criticism. He charged that Lopez had been involved in shady distribution of land while prefect of San Mart{n. Re was also accused of abusing his police powers in the arrest of several of his personal enemies. Heredia felt that a man of this nature, a "conservative without principles," had no right to censure the Society and the b 1 h f i h . lf 112 Li era government wit out irst censur ng 1mse Lopez promptly responded to Heredia's charges. Most of the personal attacks were dismissed as defamation. Re did admit to a serious error, however. His acceptance of the job in San Mart:Cn was a political reward for his efforts during the 7 de Marzo and it had caused him great embarrassment. Lopez made a limited response to Heredia's defense of the Society and Liberal government. He felt that his charges had gone unanswered and that his expulsion was evidence that they had hit the mark. Lopez wrote that his expulsion was contrary to free liberal expression, and proof of the influence of 113 "red" Liberals in the Society. Clearly, the debate between Lopez and Heredia raised the issue of whether artisans had lost control of the organization. The fissures in the organization continued to grew 112 113 Heredia, Contestacion, 9, 10, 13, 16, 54. Lopez, El triunfo, 8, 14-16, 19-21.

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throughout 1851, although Democrats would continue to work with the Lopez government. 122 About 240 artisans of the Democratic Society petitioned the 1851 congress for an increase in tariff duties on competitive foreign goods. Like previous requests, this petition focused upon the desperate economic situation facing artisans and their families. Repeatedly the petition argued that their request was based not upon economic theory but upon social reality. Economic theory dealt with nations as single entities, not as amalgamations of various classes and peoples. What might cause "advancement" for the whole nation did not necessarily help its separate parts. The artisans thus questioned the advice of those who felt they could remedy their plight by changing trades. Only agriculture and commerce were real alternatives, and both required start-up capital which they lacked. In conclusion the artisans reminded legislators that their petition was not a party matter, but 114 reflected the needs of a threatened social class. The opening of congress in 1851 also saw the revival of clashes between the Democratic and Popular Societies. The Popular group held a meeting on March 11 which resulted in the worst violence to date among these two groups. Earlier in the day a group of Populars had euphorically welcomed Conservative General Eusebio Borrero into the city. This roused Democratic ire. That night, as a police patrol passed the Popular meeting at the house of Manuel Arjona, they heard agitated voices deriding the government. Apparently they tried to 114 AC, Camara, Informes de Comisiones, 1851, VI, folios 46473r.

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123 break up the meeting, and gunfire was exchanged. One member of the Popular Society was killed and several policemen were seriously injured. This incident served to revive demands for the supression of the Popular Society, and it was forced to curtail meetings for the next 115 few months. While the Popular Society was a less visible organization after the March incident, its supporters did not cease their attacks on the Democratic Society. In early 1851 the activity of a criminal gang of thieves proved to Conservatives that the dangerous socialist notions of radical Liberals had penetrated the Bogota Democratic Society. The gang preyed upon such propertied institutions as haciendas, commercial houses, and churches. One attack on a commercial house in March resulted in the arrest of a gang member who confessed to being a member of the Democratic Society. The gang was apparently well organized, and its members avoided easy capture. This led to speculation that, since the government supported the Society and a member of the gang had been 116 proven to belong to it, the violence was government-sanctioned. In May Raimundo Russi, a secretary of the Society and a precinct judge, was arrested for his role in the robbery of several churches and the murder of Manuel Ferro. Russi was shown to be the gang's leader, and in July he and another man were sentenced to death. Other members 117 of the gang were sentenced to hard labor in Cartagena and Panama. As 115 14, 1851. 116 La Gaceta Oficial, March 13, 1851; El Neo-Granadino, March El D{a, May 3, 1851; Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 197. 117 Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 205-06.

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124 Russi had delivered many socialistic lectures to the Society, the discovery of his criminal activities seemingly justified the belief of some that Democrats had taken to heart the Proudhonian thesis that "property is theft." Measuring the validity of this accusation would be difficult, but the violence further tarnished the reputation of the Society among the wealthy sectors of society, Conservative and Liberal alike. This had the effect of alienating the support of moneyed Liberals from the Society at a time when it was reassessing its own direction. It also added to the disillusionment of many Democrats themselves; according to some reports, the group's reunions barely met 118 its quorum. In May the Popular Society resumed its meetings with reorganizational sessions in every barrio of the city. In the barrio Egipto session several disgruntled Democrats were in attendence and suggested formation of a Sociedad de la Uni6n de los Artesanos. The proposed Society would be dedicated exclusivly to artisan interests and would not serve as a tool for the parties. 119 Nothing came of the proposal, however, and soon events in the Cauca Valley overshadowed those of the capital. Political fighting in and around Cali had been rampant since the Lopez victory. Conflicts were aggravated by disputes regarding ejidos (communal pastures). After the formation of a Democratic Society in Cali in July 1849, a Conservative Sociedad de Amigos del Pueblo was founded to counter its strength. The Society of Friends was supported 118 119 El D1a, May 17, 20, 1851. Ibid., May 15, 1851; La Civilizacion, May 15, 1851.

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125 by local aristocrats and clergy and numbered many artisans among its membership. It also claimed to protect artisan interests, but like the Liberal group it occupied itself almost solely with political 120 questions. A series of conflicts between the two Societies began in March 1850, which finally forced Governor Dolores Camacho to suspend their meetings. After sessions were allowed to resume, the conflicts reappeared, but with a somewhat different tone. Encroachment by hacendados upon ejidos served as a justification for attacks upon haciendas by Democrats. The early months of 1851 were so dominated by these actions that the period was given the name El Zurriago, after a ~hip used by Democrats in their attacks. Violent assaults upon landowners were especially virulent around Palmira, where attacks were 121 made in broad daylight. Conservatives claimed that the government sanctioned these actions, as force was seldom used to quell them--seemingly an accurate complaint. The jefe politico of Cali dismissed one case of the burning of an hacienda, saying that, after all, its owner was a "dangerous 122 conservative." This violence against Conservatives played a major role in provoking the unsuccessful Conservative revolt of 1851, which began in earnest on May 1 and quickly spread throughout the Cauca Valley. Conservatives in other areas, notably Antioquia, also rose in rebellion. 120 121 122 Manuel Ib~nez and Julio Arboleda emerged as the most Resena historica, 29-30. Ibid., 31, 32, 36-39. La Gaceta Oficial, May 2, 1850.

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126 powerful of the Conservative leaders. Local forces, consisting largely of National Guards (many of whom were Democrats), proved unable to quell the disturbances. On May 23 General Obando was named Chief of the South, and Tomas Herrera was given charge of the fighting in Antioguia. Dy mid-July Obando had quieted the Caucs, but Herrera needed until September to suppress the Antiogueno revolt. The Democratic Society of Bogota saw service in Antioquia as part of the 123 National Guard and returned to Bogota on December 9. In the wake of the Conservative defeat, Liberals were left without serious opposition, and consequently differences within their own party became more apparent . One series of incidents pitted Democrats against jefe po11tico Dr. Eustaquio Alvares, starting on June 30, when Conservative leader Mariano Ospina Rodr{guez was jeered and threatened by Democrats on the way to detention . Alvarez arrested some Democrats for this abuse, which Miguel Le6n felt betrayed the blood spilled by artisans for the liberal cause. Alvarez defended his actions, saying that he was obligated to defend the law, and that Democrats were not above its sanctions or exempt from service in its 124 defense. A scathing indictment of the artisan-Liberal relationship was published by artisan Cruz Ballesteros in December 1851. Ballesteros noted that craftsmen had shifted their attention from their own objectives to helping the Liberals when that party promised to help 123 El Baile, November 24, 1850; El D{a, December 21, 1850; La Reforms, August 24, 1851; El Neo-Granadino, December 12, 1851. 124 Miguel Leon, "Senor jefe polfrico Doctor Eustaquio Alvarez" (Bogota, August 31, 1851); La Reforms, September 7, 1851.

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127 them upon their victory. Artisans did help, and Liberals "confessed their debt" in the first months after the victory. Liberal aid to artisan objectives was delayed, according to Liberals, by the need to drive Conservatives from Congress in 1850. ~~en that was accomplished, artisans were shocked to find the "splendid offers" of tariff protection unfulfilled. The few appointments of artisans to public posts were no more than false tribute it was an expression of the concept that had been formed of our ignorance and boobery, and of the persuassion that we are stupid, and liberals sufficiently intelligent to m,~!pulate us by their flattery and lying discourse. Indicative of the insolent and unappreciative attitude of Liberals toward artisans in Ballesteros' opinion was their seeming disregard for the lives of artisans who served in the National Guard: the latter had been poorly clothed and fed and had been used as cannon fodder in the field. And, when they had returned to Bogota, their compensation consisted of little more than Liberal speeches. 126 Clearly Ballesteros felt that the artisan relationship with the government was far from what they had expected. In January 1852, a similar attitude was revealed in an exchange between Miguel Leon and Manuel Murillo Toro. Murillo, perhaps the most outspoken gdlgota ideologue, had accused Leon, who was then director of the Society, of deceit and misuse of funds invested in the 125 Cruz Ballesteros, "La teoria y la realidad" (Bogota, December 17, 1851.) 126 Ibid.

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128 organization. Leon denied the charges on January 19, 1852, and then turned on Murillo, asking him of what use he and others of his "circle" had been to the artisans in their repeated requests for tariff protection. Murillo wanted artisan electoral support, but offered them nothing in return. Leon reminded Murillo that the Society was an independent organization, and he appealed to artisans of both parties to remember that their strength was in unity. The next month Murillo issued a weak response, noting that he had been a member of the Society since 1849, and that if its members felt he was handling his position 127 as Secretary of Finance poorly, well, that was their right. The growing division between artisans of the Society and the golgotas was evident when they took different positions on the election of 1853. Democrats formally adopted Jose Marfa Obando as their presidential candidate on February 22, 1851. Obando was an enormously popular candidate, with strong support among both the lower classes and the military; and he lived in Las Nieves, where he frequently attended Society meetings. Obando did not favor the Golgota reform platform, especially their plans for reduction of the military, although his 128 campaign statements were rather muted. General Tomas Herrera of Panama was favored by many G~lgotas. He was not as radical as most of his supporters, but he did favor some of their proposals, particularly those which offered Panama more regional 127 " .,, El Pasatiempo, January 24, 1852; Miguel Leon, "Satisfaccion, que da el que escribe, al Sr. M. Murillo, Secretaria de Hacienda" (Bogota, January 1852). 128 Restrepo, Ristoria de la Nueva Granada, 180-82. See also Los Principios, an Obandista newspaper.

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autonomy and economic opportunity. Conservatives, subdued after the 1851 fiasco, presented no candidate, although they undoubtedly opposed the Obando candidacy. 129 In Bogota, the Democratic Society worked for the election of Obando. He won 28 of the capital's 39 electors. Chosen as an elector was Emeterio Heredia, who also served as president of the asa!blea electoral. In the nation, Obando received 1,548 electoral votes to Herrera's 329; 131 votes went to other candidates or were blank. 129 What had been a fairly cohesive Liberal party now had two distinct branches: moderados or draconianos--who had backed Obando; and the Golgotas--who had generally favored Herrera. It is ironic that this conflict in the ranks of the Liberal party came at the apparent pinnacle of its power, although clearly understandable in that the rival factions no longer needed to maintain unity in opposition to the Conservative threat. The Democratic Societies, meanwhile, were at their institutional apogee. In Bogot"'a alone over 4,000 members were claimed, although that number was clearly an exaggeration. Of the 801 parochial districts throughout the country, 499 reportedly had a chapter of the Society. However, many of the bodies met infrequently, and one must question its strength as a truly national organization. The government press made fewer and fewer references to it in 1852, evidence either of the declining influence of the Societies, or of 130 declining official support for the Societies--or both. Many upper 129 El Pasatiempo, June 9, 1852; Los Principios, June 30, 1852; El Neo-Granadino, August 5, 1852; Bushnell, "Elecciones presidenciales," 227. 130 El Pasatiempo, May 26, 1852. Between 1849 and 1853 La Gaceta Oficial carried notices of the founding of 112 Democratic Societies; of these, 16 (14%) were established in 1849; 21 (197.) in 1850; 66 (597.) in

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class collaborators had abandoned the Democrats the previous year, and without Conservative opposition, much of their usefulness to reformers vanished. 130 There were ideological and programmatic reasons for the division in Liberal ranks. In general, draconians did not favor the more radical reforms that had been adopted in the last few years, although few issues widely separated them from their intra-party opponents. Draconians had supported the artisans' tariff petition, had not been in a hurry to expel the Jesuits, and did not fully support the anti clerical legislation of the G61gotas; but they had not made a concerted effort on these issues. Consequently, by mid-1852 almost all the major reforms had been enacted. One of the few yet to be carried out was reduction or abolition of the permanent army. This proposal would be fought by the draconians. To most G61gotas, a permanent army was incompatible with republican principles, which posited that government should count on the spontaneous support of the people for its defense. The army was also criticized for consuming an exessive share of limited treasury funds. Accordingly, G6lgotas desired the permanent army's elimination, or at least its reduction in size. 131 This was absolutely unacceptable to the draconians, many of whom were military men. General Jose Mar1a Melo, commanding general of the Department of Bogota and Chief of the 2nd Division of the Army, founded El Orden in late 1852 to join the 1851; and 9 (8%) in 1852. 131 ; Alirio Gbmez Picon, El golpe militar de 17 de abril de 1854 (Bogota: Editorial Kelly, 1972), 70.

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pro-draconian La Discusi6n in combating anti-army sentiment. La Discusion asked the g6lgotas why, if a permanent army was incompatible with liberty, both the United States and the United Kingdom, two nations regarded as shining examples of freedom, had strong permanent armies? It saw the army-less utopia envisioned by the gclgotas as leading to anarchy or dictatorship, similar to what had occurred in 132 France. The debate over the army was one of the first topics of 131 discussion when congress reconvened in March 1853. Florentino Gonzalez led attempts to curb the institution. Despite his eloquent appeals, a 133 proposal to eliminate the permanent army was defeated 55-14. Shortly after this draconian victory, Obando took office on April 1, 1853. His cabinet appointments were mainly from the his own wing of the party: Patrocinio Cuellar was selected as his Secretary of Government; Jose Marfa Plata, Minister of Finance; Lorenzo Marfa Lleras was Secretary of Foreign Relations; and, as a conciliatory gesture, 134 Tomas Herrera was named Secretary of War. The need for order was central to the draconian program. They felt that radical reformers had destabilized Colombian institutions and society; it was their pledge to halt the trend toward "anarchy." In large part, theirs was a reactionary program. They were against: suppression of import duties; reduction of the power of the executive; moves to make education independent of the state; the proposed reduction in the power of the military; and the agrarian laws. They 132 133 134 La Discusion, December 11, 1852. El Neo-Granadino, March 11, 1853; El Orden, March 20, 1853. Gomez, El golpe militar, 109.

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claimed that the law favoring redemption of censos needed to be reversed in order to bring money back to social institutions such as hospitals, charity houses, national colleges, and public schools. Draconians declared If we wanted a reaction, it would be for the good of the country: a reaction that assures the priesthood of its independence and rights; the laborer of the fruits of his work; the artisan the price of his industry; to all peace, order, 1 ,~d liberty rights and social guarantees. The audience to which such appeals were made included the "patriotic and respectable clergy." Draconians wanted to reverse some 132 legislation restricting the church, but at the same time reminded it that ''spiritual" power should not dominate civil power. Proprietors deserved protection for their property. Artisans and workers were told that their production should be protected, and that they should be recognized as more than just an election tool. Support of the permanent army, the "protector of the nation's independence," was a central element of their platform, and so too was the pledge to provide h i h d d 1 i . 136 yout s wt nee e mora nstruct1on. In the initial stage of the Obando regime, he was asked rhetorically by El Pasatiempo what his attitude toward the Democratic Societies would be: would he protect them and lead them, or would he allow them to run the country as Lopez had done? Obando's response is unrecorded, but Rufino and Angel Jose Cuervo suggested that he attributed his election to their labors and valued their for defense of 135 136 El Orden, May 1, 1853. Ibid.

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133 137 the permanent army. Obando's sympathies clearly lay with the Democratic Societies, now draconian allies. Artisans of both parties, organized by the Democratic Society, tried to take advantage of e x ecutive support to press for reestablishment of a protective tariff. On May 17, they prepared a petition to the Chamber of Representatives. In a bellicose mood, they pledged a caraquenada if the request was not granted. On May 19, the petition, which called for a 25% increase in tariff rates, was heard by the chamber. After a brief discussion, it was referred to the senate, which, since it was controlled by Gonzalez and the Golgotas, meant sure 138 death for the proposal. When the chamber moved on to other matters, artisans in the gallery were said to have reacted violently. Golgotas in the crowd replied in kind, and a fracas began outside the legislative chambers. The combatants in the plaza were distinguished by their dress, the artisans wearing their "official" red and blue ruanas, and the 139 Golgotas, coats. Although both Obando and General Jose Mar1a Melo lived just a few houses away from the plaza, neither moved to stop the fighting. Finally Colonel Ram6n Acevedo and Commander Jose Mar{a Rojas Pinzon arrived with 100 soldiers to break up the fracas. There had 137 El Pasatiempo, April 14, 1853; Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 252-53. 138 Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 255; La Gaceta Oficial, May 23, 1853. The reference is to events in Caracas on February 24, 1848. 139 As early as 1850 Democrats had worn a long ruana, red on one side and blue on the other, and a straw hat, to demonstrate their association with the Society.

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134 been many injuries to both sides, and a black mason, Bruno Rodriguez, 140 died from a knife wound to his back. Following the episode, numerous artisans were arrested by the government. On the 25th Emeterio Heredia, Tiburcio Cardenas, Carles Navarrete, and others asked that they be released from jail. They claimed that it would be impossible 141 to judge their guilt due to the complexity of the disturbances. The May 19 incident caused an uproar in the city. Many saw the students as having saved the day. What is certain is that without the bravery of the decent youths, or should we say 1 a~chacos, some deputies would have been lost. La Gaceta Oficial voiced its approval of the petition, but chided h h h i 143 Th artisans tat tis was not t e manner to gain ts acceptance. e Golgota press queried if such anarchistic behavior was indicative of future conditions. If so, who might lead these "dangerous Democrats?" Obando? No. 140 The chief of these champions will be General Melo? .... Bah! No, we have such a low idea of this chief that we do nyt 4 think he could see past the point of his nose. 11 Democracia. Documentos para la historia de la Nueva Granada," (np, nd); W., "Breves anotaciones para la historia sobre los sucesos del 19 de mayo ultimo" (Bogota, 27 Mayo 1853); Coraovez Moure, Reminiscencias, 371-74; Alcance a la Gaceta Oficial, May 20, 1853; Gomez, El golpe militar, 112-15; Restrepo, Diario pol1tico y militar, IV, 288 . 256. 141 142 143 144 AC, Camara, Proyectos negados, 1854, III, folio 77. Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, Alcance a la Gaceta Oficial, May 20, 1853. El Pasatiempo, May 25, 1853.

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135 Not all sources condemned the artisans and the Democratic Society, however. El Orden--which spoke for Melo--denied that artisans had been at fault, observing that they had only repeated the scandalous behavior 145 of the Golgotas on April 3. Moreover, that violence had not been ir. support of a principle or in response to a political question; it stemmed merely from hatred of Obando. The poorly educated artisans, by contrast, were motivated by the well-being of their families, and by the weakness in their industries. They were said to have committed a wrong, but one that others who supposedly knew better than they had 146 committed previously. Quite significantly, the volatile situation in the capital revealed a clear class division. The very names given to the two sides, guaches (or the artisans) and cachacos (after the coats worn by the rich), indicate class labeling. Artisan participants in the protests had come from both political societies, evidence that class unity now overshadowed party affiliations--or perhaps that political alignments were now being determined on the basis of class origins. 145 While both Obando's personal popularity and support of draconian policies were widespread, he faced strong opposition in the congress, especially in the senate. Florentino Gonzalez dominated senate proceedings and promptly applied pressure on the adminstration by submitting a proposal to ask Vice-President Obaldia's resignation. In an apparent move to test the administration's support, Obaldia tendered his resignation on April 3, forcing Congress to meet in full session. During the debate, a group of some 600 Gclgotas tried to shout down pro-Obaldia speakers, while they cheered those who favored his resignation. This agitation forced President of the Congress Vicente Lombana to clear the building of its audience. Congress then voted, 57-37, not to accept the resignation. El Patriots, April 28, 1853. 146 El Orden, May 22, 1853.

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Golgotas--mostly upper-class youths--and many Conservatives took the lead in berating the artisans, while the latter were increasingly linked with draconians, who included many military men of humble origin. 136 Publication of a new constitution on May 21 did little to calm the political situtation. Debate on the document had ended on May 16, and it was approved 33-24 on the 20th. The Constitution of May 21, as it came to be known, was both highly liberal and semi-federalist. Included in the long list of reforms incorporated into the new law of the land were: separation of church and state; suffrage to all male citizens over the age of 21; direct secret elections; popular election of governors and many other officials; a more decentralized 147 governmental structure; and weakened executive powers. To the dismay of many observers, Obando signed the document without protest. Artisans saw the Constitution of May 21 as an indication of further erosion of order under Golgotan influence. Much had changed since artisans and Liberal students had worked together to spread the 7 de Marzo doctrines. While the objectives of Golgotas had remained basically unchanged, artisans had come to feel alienated from the new order, as it ran counter to many of their own interests. In addition to their concern over the tariff question, they had become increasingly uneasy over the weakening of both the church and state, and they were particularly distrustful of the groups responsible for the changes. 147 Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, 191-214; Antonio Pombo and Jose Joaqu!n Guerra, Constituciones de Colombia; Recopiladas y precedidas de una breve resena hist~rica, 4 vols. (Bogota: Prensas del Ministerio de Educacion Nacional, 1951), IV, 5-27; Gomez, El golpe militar, 115-18; La Discusion, May 21, 1853.

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137 As the June celebrations of Corpus Christi neared, a volatile situation existed in the capital. The barrio of Las Nieves was said to have become closed to cachacos. One could not transit out of the central streets of the city without being exposed to verbal lances provoked by the workers, and from six in the evening onward it was di~erous to be caught outside of one's house. One of the highlights of the festival period was the running of the bulls through the streets. Realizing the potential for conflict, Governor Nicolas Escobar Zerda ordered the jefe pol{tico of Las Nieves not to permit the event. Placido Morales allowed the traditional running to take place, which numerous cachacos attended. Despite 149 obvious artisan displeasure, only minor skirmishes were reported. On June 8, artisans paraded through Las Nieves, Ehouting mueras against cachacos and Golgotas. After passing the San Francisco bridge, they headed toward the town's central plaza, only to be assaulted by cachacos. Rocks were thrown and a large disturbance developed. General Melo watched the conflict from his balcony, laughing as the gauches bested the cachacos. But when armed cachaco reinforcements arrived and forced gauches back over the bridge, he ordered out the guards. In their successful effort to clear the streets, a soldier, Isidoro Ladino, was killed. Later that day, Florentino Gonzalez was attacked by a group of men in ruanas in front of the Peruvian embassy and severely beaten. A contemporary observer described the June 8 148 149 Cordovez Moure, Reminiscencias, 383. Ibid., 377.

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150 violence as "class struggle in action." Inevitably the authorities were lambasted by G61gota sympathizers for their failure to curb the "government of Las Nieves." In spite of conciliatory gestures toward such opposition, including replacement of the governor, it was clear that artisans enjoyed a great deal of official support. A "thousand citizens" distributed a leaflet on the 9th which criticized the aid of Obando, Melo, and the permanent army for the "barbarian" guaches. It claimed that the latterguaches lt. T ere savagely attacking legitimate representatives of the people and their supporters. These citizens warned that they would take action to end anarchy's reign in the capital. They would thereafter carry firearms and would fight to defend their lives and those of the "legislative body of the new institutions. 11151 138 "More than a thousand artisans" responded in their own leaflet that they would continue to defend morality, religion, and institutions against General Herrera, Gonzalez, and other enemies of the people. The leaflet reminded the public that only artisans and soldiers had been killed in the recent conflicts -they did not deserve the title of murderers. Artisans promised Obando and Melo that they, too, would be armed and were prepared to defend their rights and the national 152 government. 150 Ibid., 376-88; Gomez, El golpe militar, 119; La Gaceta Oficial, June 17, 1853; Cuervo and Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 25759. Florentino Gonzalez later said that Ladino was probably killed by cachaco bullets. El Neo-Granadino, September 22, 1853. 151 152 1853). Mil ciudadanos, "El 8 de junio" (Bogota, June 9, 1853. Mas de mil artesanos, "El 8 de junio" (Bogota, June 9,

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--139 Yet another leaflet from a "friend of the artisans" warned that artisan reputations had been tarnished by recent events. They had run too readily from the fight against "aristocratic offenders." Its author concluded in this land democracy is an illusion, we are republicans in theory and slaves in practice ..•. We are called the sovereign people, but the day that we speak, a rain of stones falls upon our august sovereignty; what can we do to install a positive Democracy? Make our own valiant eff35ts, and not flee at the sight of the oligarchs. The newly appointed Governor of Bogota, Jose Mar(a Plata, made an overture to the citizens for restraint, especially to the artisans Honorable artisans! If you are truly friends of Democracy, if you have confidence, as you say, in the first magistrates of the Republic, give proof of tha~ 5 fronfidence and return peacefully to your shops. This was followed by an appeal from the Democratic Society signed by the junta directiva and 835 members, calling on its supporters to unite to end the chaos and restore the good name of the artisan. It also reminded the government that they were ready to defend it against 155 threats from "delinquents." Despite pleas for calm, almost any incident could ignite the tension. On the night of the 18th, Antonio Par!s Santamar{a was 153 Un amigo de los artesanos, "El valor de los artesanos" (Bogota, June 9, 1853). 154 : .bee Mar!a Plata, "El gobernador de Bogota a los habitantes de la capital" (Bogota, June 13, 1853.) 155 / Blas Lopez et al., "Protesta de los artesanos Blaz Lopez, Miguel Leon, Anselmo Florez y otros" (Bogota, 1853.)

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140 stabbed and killed near San Francisco bridge by a group of men in ruanas. They fled, and Paris's friends went for the police. When they returned, Nepomuceno Palacios was recognzed as one of the assailants in the crowd of persons surrounding the body. He was promptly arrested and charged with the murder. Later, Eusebio Robayo, a blacksmith, Cenon Samudio, and E. Amezquita, a small trader, were also apprehended. Palacios was sentenced to death for the murder and his companions to 21 years and four months in jail. On August 2 the Coneejo de Gobierno denied a commutation of the death penalty. Palacios was garroted on 156 Friday, August 5, in the Plaza de Santander. Miguel Leon protested this rapid execution. Why, he asked, was Palacios killed so quickly when Bruno Rodriguez's cachaco murderer had not met the same fate? "Because he did not have the title of Doctor or Golgota!" Disillusioned! Our independence worked to give us positive liberty, to save us from those called European tyrants; and now we are despotized wit?S? false tribunals, who smother us without appeal. Obando had meanwhile reorganized the National Guard on July 15, 158 and in doing so strengthened the positions of artisans within it. The move naturally enhanced artisan sympathy toward the president and encouraged them to seek cooperation with draconians in the October 156 El Constitucional, July 8, 1853; La Gaceta Oficial, August 2, 1853; Cordovez Moure, Reminiscencias, 384-93. 157 Miguel Leon, "Artesanos !desenganos!" (Bogota, August 6, 1853). 158 CN, 1853, 661-68; Cuervo y Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo, 258.

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141 elections, the first in Colombia under universal male suffrage as established by the new constitution. Emeterio Heredia, for example, suggested an electoral slate that included at least four artisans for legislative positions along with numerous draconians, many of whom would play active roles in the 17 de Abril coup of the coming year. Heredia stressed that recent reforms, based solely upon theory and backed by the "youths" (Golgotas), were the cause of the nation's current crisis. He presented a draconian analysis of such problems and in doing so suggested that a conspiracy between G~lgotas and Conservatives existed to drive Liberals (draconians) out of office. The broadening of the suffrage, he said, offered artisans the opportunity to dominate the legislature and secure passage of legislation in their O'WD best interests. But this could only happen if they remembered the "crimes" of May 19 and June 8 and voted as a 159 unit. The apparent understanding between the Democratic Societies and draconians forced Goigotas and Conservatives into a fragile alliance in the latter half of 1853. The depth of the union was questionable, but clear signs of cooperation were present. Florentino Gonz~lez thus ran for procurador general with Conservative support in the October elections and won. In practice, however, the broadened electorate created by the new constitution benefited mainly the Conservatives, who won resounding victories, much to the dismay of G~lgotas. Conservatives gained control of the lower house of congress, and they 160 greatly reduced Liberal strength in the senate. In the Province of 159 160 El Termometro, September 4, 11, 18, 1853. Venancio Ort1z, Historia de la revolucion del 17 de abril de

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142 Bogota, Conservative Pedro Fernandez Madrid won the senate seat sought by Heredia and Miguel Leon by polling 8,121 votes. Heredia garnered 2,112 votes and Leon 1,974--respectable totals, but far from enough. Pastor Ospina won the provincial governorship by a three-to-one margin, 161 denying the office to draconiano Rafael E. Santander. Throughout the country Conservative victories underscored the deep Liberal divisions. Speaking for the draconians, Lorenzo Marfa Lleras suggested that the October election revealed the existence of three political parties: Conservatives, Golgotas, and Liberals. Conservatives had failed to obtain power through revolt, Lleras wrote, so they appealed to "fanatics" and the superstitious in the name of religion. Golgotas supposedly promised the masses a classless socialist utopia as their appeal, which, in his opinion, ignored social distinctions based upon merit. True Liberals, who were in control of the executive, recognized the social reality created by work and sought to guarantee the rights of individuals according to law. However, they were now being threatened by collusion between Conservatives and ...., f 162 Gv~gotas, neither o whom could obtain po~er on their own. At the close of 1853, Bogota was deeply rent by divisions. Class differences pitted artisans against cachacos and tended to place non elite military members on the side of the former. Elite Conservatives tended to side with Golgotas where politically expedient, as they too 1854 (Bogota: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1972), 44; El Catolicismo, July ~1853; El Constitucional, October 18, 1853. 161 El Repertorio, November 8, 1853; Bolet!n Eleccionario, October 4, 1853. 162 El Neo-Granadino, October 20, 1853.

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disliked Obando, the military, and the social threat represented by organized artisans. These alignments would dominate 1854, El 17 de Abril 143 Ominous signs of impending political strife were present throughout the country. On December 6, an armory in Cali was raided by Democrats and some 600 weapons stolen. Despite governmental condemnation of this action, reports claimed that the raid was officially sanctioned. A similar theft of arms took place in Choconte, and public disturbances by supporters of the Democratic Society ,,. l 63 occurred in Santa Marta, Neiva, Sabanilla, Tunja, and Zipaquira. Obando scheduled a military parade on January 1, which many anticipated he would use to effect a coup. Rather, he took the occasion to praise and declare loyalty to the Constitution of May 21. 164 After the parade, Obando gave a dinner which was attended by General Melo and several upper-level members of the administration. That evening Corporal Pedro Ramon Quiros was severely wounded at the entrance to the military barracks. He was taken to the military h i 1 h h di d J 4 1 f h . i . i 165 osp ta , were e e on anuary as a resu to is nJur es. 163 Resena historica, 64; Ortfz, El 17 de abril, 45-50. 164 Samuel S. Green to William L, Marcy, January 4, 1854, United States Department of State, General Records, Diplomatic Dispatches (DD). 165 G~ez, El golpe militar, 138-62.

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144 The historical interpretations of the Qu1ros affair have been extemely contradictory. Traditional accounts relate that when Melo returned to the barracks he found Quiros outside, against the general's standing orders. Melo was said to have then beaten the corporal, which led to his death. Melista revisionists instead argue that Melo was framed. Alirio Gomez Picon contends that Qutros admitted on his deathbed that one or two men wearing ruanas attacked him. Alcalde Lorenzo Gonz;lez then supposedly pressured witnesses to place the blame on Melo. Melo, on his part, responded that the accusations were part of a pattern of hostility deriving from his May 1853 refusal to fire 166 upon the pueblo. Wherever the truth lies in this debate, Melo's alleged responsibility for Quiros's death was subsequently used by anti-military elements to generate hostility against Melo and support for the proposed reduction in the size and function of the military. Once congress opened its sessions on February 1, debate quickly turned to the projected size of the army. Obando requested funds for an army of 1,240 men, a slight reduction from the previous 1,300-man force. Congres~, however, offered to fund only an army of 800, including a reduced officer corps that would include no generals. This last clause was specifically directed at Melo. Debate on the topic 167 dragged on for weeks, with neither side willing to compromise. The disarray of the Liberal party provided the incentive for a reorganization of the Democratic Society on January 6. The meeting was 166 See Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 60, for an example; Gomez, El golpe militar, 155, 168. 167 G6mez, El golpe militar, 155; Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 70-71; Causa de la responsibilidad, I, 95.

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145 held at Lorenzo Marfa Lleras's Colegio del Esp1ritu Santo, where Lleras was chosen director over his objections that an artisan should head the organization. The Society formed a junta central directiva to work for reorganization of the Liberal party as a whole. It consisted of 21 persons, dra~~ from leading draconians and artisans. Letters were directed from the central body to provincial capitals which urged formation of juntas directivas provinciales. These would in turn coordinate smaller district units. Each of the provincial bodies was to organize Democratic Societies in as many towns as possible; all of these groups were to follow the directives of the central body. The Society proclaimed several objectives: to sustain liberal institutions; support national authorities; guarantee public order; promote the country's intellectual, political, moral, and material progress; help Liberals exposed to legal or political attack; block political appointments of "conservative fanatics;" and work for victories in both 168 local and national elections. The newly reorganized Democratic Society was no more purely artisan in nature than it had been in 1850. Draconian non-artisans held most of the important positions and were quite influential in its direction. It seems, nonetheless, that artisan political objectives 168 El Neo-Granadino, January 12, 1854; Causa contra Obando, I, 72; Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 59. Andres Soriano Lleras, I.orenzo Mar{a Lleras (Bogota 1958), 78. The junta consisted of: Patrocinio Cuellar, Alejandro Gaitan, Jose Mar{a Melo, Ramon Mercado, Lorenzo Marfa Lleras, Rafael Elise o Santander, Ramon Ardila, Lisandro Cuenca, Jose Mar1a Gaitan, Erazo Madiedo, Nicolas Madiedo, Rufino Azuero, Ambrosio Gonzalez, Jose Maldonado Neira, Emeterio Heredia, Miguel Le~n, Ram~n G~mez, Francisco Antonio Obrego'n, Tom;s Lombana, Miguel Vargas, Juan Nepomuceno Conto, Meliton Escobar, Camilo Carrizosa, Juan de Dios G~mez, Jos~ Carazo, and Alejandro MacDowell.

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were more closely in tune with draconian than Golgota goals. No division of interests could be seen in the draconian/artisan organization in 1854 paralleling that of the Golgota/artisan relationship of 1850. Some public apprehension surrounded the new group. The leading Golgotan newspaper publicly questioned Lleras's intentions. If the group were to focus upon artisan needs, such as eductation or mutual aid, then Lleras should be applauded. However, if it were to be used as a political club with the violent traits of the previous year, then his motivations must be condemned. Apparently the Governor of Bogota had much the same fears, as he called Heredia and the shoemaker Jose Antonio Saavedra into his office for questioning about the group's 169 activities. 146 During February, the Society considered numerous proposals which it presented to the congress on March 20. In general the petition demostrated a concern with artisan interests as distinct from larger doctrinaire issues. The Society wanted abolition of imprisonment for debts, as contrary to the principle of personal liberty. In a similar vein, it was proposed that a debtor should be liable for criminal punishment in the case of fraud, but if an "innocent impossibility" prevented repayment of the debt, he would be free to work after cession of his available goods. This proposal would prevent forced labor for non-payment of debts. Monetary reform was called for, including minting smaller coins for day-to-day use. The Society wanted congress 169 El Pasatiempo, January 11, 1854; El Liberal, January 24, 1854.

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147 to approve a national road from Bogota to the Magdalena. It also requested establishment of an industrial workshop for children of the poor and working classes so that they could learn new arts. Reforms were requested in military recruitment, roaking military service voluntary, with higher remuneration. The Society also proposed that service in the Guard be limited to national emergencies, and not include peacetime chores such as escorting prisoners. Such changes would prevent disruption of the members' occupations. Lastly, the Society wanted an end to compulsory free labor services demanded by municipal governments and a reconsideration of municipal taxes upon the poor. Other proposals that were suggested but not approved included a call for establishment of a national bank to reduce interest rates on loans, and formation of a Muzu emerald lottery to help reduce the national debt. 170 The fifth anniversary of the 7 de Marzo was enthusiastically celebrated by the Society with a session dedicated to the leaders of the independence movement at which Obando, Obaldia, and numerous members of the administration spoke. The next day a country excursion and picnic was enjoyed by over 1,300 Democrats, including General 171 L6pez. At the same time, rumors were abroad of a possible coup by the Conservatives, by the military, or by the military with the 172 Democrats--or even G6lgotas and the military. A circular released on 170 AC, Camara, Informes de comisiones, 1854, folios 296-300; Causa contra Obando, I, 179, 34]-44; El Neo-Granadino, March 20, 30, 1854. 171 172 El Neo-Granadino, March 16, 1854. La Gaceta Oficial, March 11, 1854.

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148 March 5, signed by Democrat Francisco Antonio Obregon, had contributed to the general alarm. It described the chaotic conditions throughout the country and called upon Democratic Societies nationwide to arm themselves, so that they could meet force with force. Notices of a seditious nature were also posted on city walls, and groups of parading 173 Democrats became common in late March. Under these circumstances, the senate presented a request for 1,000 weapons to the Governor of Bogota so that "respectable" citizens could arm themselves. President Obando himself overruled the request, stating that he knew of no threat to order and that, if one did exist, 174 the National Guard would maintain order. Since Democrats dominated the Guard, this response did little to calm the senators' fears. Congress then passed a law on March 24 giving all inhabitants the right to freely commerce in all types of weapons, and the right to train with them and carry them. Obando vetoed the proposed law, saying that individuals already had extremely liberal access to weapons under the constitution--more liberal, in fact, than he favored. He reminded congressmen that under the proposed law even criminals would have the right to bear arms and denounced the proposal as threatening to destablize the central government and public order. The bill was passed over his objections and became law on April 3, although congress did limit the privilege to those who possessed their personal 175 liberty. On March 28, the congress passed the project for reducing 179, 41. 173 El 341-44, Neo-Granadino, March 20, 30, 1854; Causa contra Obando, 371-72. 174 Urrutia, The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement, 175 La Gaceta Oficial, March 29, April 6, 1854; CN, 1854, 23.

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149 the size of the army and of the officer corps. Obando also vetoed this law because of its threat to the army institution and to public 176 order. Debate on the presidental veto was scheduled for April 17. Leaders of the Democratic Society met in secret amid the rising tension in early April. 177 Divisions between the various political groups were in no way set aside for Holy Week, which began on April 10. On that day, a parade of Democrats and guardsmen was interrupted by Golgotan youths who shouted insults at the military and Melo. A brick throwing melee ensued, which most accounts agreed was won by the artisan faction. When the parade continued, observer Jose Manuel Restrepo commented The ill-fated doctrines of Murillo, Camacho Roldan and associates have corrupted the artisans of Bogota and it will be very difficult to r!'tablish conservative social doctrines among them. A more serious clash pitted guardsmen and artisans against Golgotas on April 14. On the 15th news of a Melista uprising in Popayan reached the capital, adding to the general alarm. Some 600 soldiers had revolted in that southern city on April 8 in response to a false report of a Golgotan rebellion in Bogota. The movement did not last long, as the 179 governor was able to convince the men to lay down their arms. 176 La Gaceta Oficial, April 4, 1854. 177 Causa contra Obando, I, 341-44, II, 33-35; Restrepo, Diario politico y militar, 361. 178 Restrepo, Diario politico y militar, 36769. 179 Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Res~en historico de las acontecimientos que ban tenido lugar en la Republica, extracado de los diaries y noticias que ha podido obtener el General Jefe del Estado

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150 The Guard and armed artisans marched through the streets of the capital on Easter Sunday, April 16. In their hatbands were signs which proclaimed "Long live the army and Democrats; down with monopolists!" Some 400 artisans gathered in the Plaza de la Constitucion at noon in a noisy demonstration. Later that same day, Juan Francisco Ortiz noted a peculiar incident at Obando's home. In the company of Obaldia and Antonio HerP~n, he saw a sheet of paper fall from the president's hand which read "death to Golgotas and down with monopolists." When asked about its meaning, Obando requested to be left alone. After the same group returned for dinner, they were interrupted at 9:00 p. m. by the arrival of Melo. He and Obando retired from the room for a lengthy i lk 180 pr vate ta . When he concluded his talk with Obando, Melo returned to his barracks, where he sat, his head in his hands, in deep thought. Colonel Juan de Jesus Gut(errez asked him if he should call for the men to mount up as was planned. Melo dejectedly looked up and told him to wait. At 1:30 a. m. Melo rose and ordered the cavlary mounted. He led his troops to the Plaza, where some 700 artisans waited. The general greeted them with a cry of "Down with the Golgotas," to which the artisans responded in kind. The military band struck up a festive tune and cannons were fired, The coup against the Constitution of May 181 21 had begun. Mayor, T. C. de Mosquera (Bogota: Imprenta del Neo-Granadino, 1855), 12. 180 Juan Francisco Ortiz, Reminiscencias de D. Juan Francisco Ortiz (1808-1861) (Bogota: Libreria Americana, 1914), 300-01. 181 Ibid., 301-02.

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The people of Bogota awoke on Monday, April 17, to the sound of cannon fire. Armed Democrats were parading through the streets shouting, "Long live the artisans and the army, down with agiotistas!" The long anticipated coup had arrived a new order of things has been proclaimed with the object of putting an end to the anarchy which was devouring the entire Republic, to protect property, to give citizens a positive protection, and to r1 8 ~rm the country by means of a National Convention. 151 Formalization of the coup's leadership was the first order of business. A commission composed of Melo, General Gutferrez de Pineres, Lino Garc{a, Francisco Antonio Obregon, Pedro Martir Consuegra, and Miguel Leon visited Obando and invited him to accept direction of the movement. The commission believed that their mission was merely to formalize an understanding already reached with Obando, but to their suprise he declined leadership of the 17 de Abril. Obregon and Leon insistently attempted to persuade Obando to head the movement. Leon told Obando that the people demanded his leadership, but the president responded that, while he was grateful for their accolades, he deplored the situation that had developed, especially since so many of his friends were intimately connected with the rebellion. He said further that he had always supported the written law and that he would not abandon his principles now. Repeated attempts to change his mind 182 Francisco Antonio Obregon to Green, April 29, 1854, DD,

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failed, so that finally all but Pineres, who declared his loyalty to 183 Obando, left the room to assume leading roles in the movement. 152 Obando's refusal to take command obviously came as a shock to the leaders of the coup. Its first proclamation had cited Obando as jefe supremo, but the next statement, issued on the 18th, identified Melo as 184 the supremo jefe del estado. The United States charge d'affaires, James S. Green, wrote that it is also pretty generally believed that he was privy to the whole plan and proceeding of General Melo, and that it was an understanding that he, Obando, should be put at the head of the Revolution. The most substantial and respectable citizens ... condemned the movement, and deterred him from taking an open part, and [Obando] chooses to remain a voluntary show prisoner, as an excuse for not discharging his iS~cutive duties, to suppress the Revolution. When it became clear that Obando would not take charge, a rash of defections began. Obando, Lleras, and Jose de Obaldia had made up the draconian political hierarchy, while Obando, Jose Hilario L~pez, and Melo were it military leaders. Lleras issued a statement late on the 17th that "he had not made, nor did he accept the revolution. 11186 Obaldia, whom many thought was instrumental in persuading Obando not to lead the coup, sought refuge in the United States consulate. Melo 183 Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 80; Gustavo Vargas Martinez, Colombia 1854: Melo, los artesanos y el socialismo (La dictadura artesanal de 1854, expresion del socialismo ~topico en Colombia) (Bogot~: Editorial la Oveja Negra, 1973), 74-75. 184 185 186 G6mez, El golpe militar, 260. Green to Marcy, April 29, 1854 1 DD. Soriano Lleras, Lorenzo Marfa Lleras, 67-69.

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153 announced that Lopez, who had left Bogota on April 4 for alleged reasons of health, favored the coup, but on May 2 news to the contrary 187 reached the capital. All major draconian political and military leaders save Melo thus rejected the attempt to sustain what was commonly seen as their cause. While Melo came to direct the coup, it seems obvious that this was not intended by its planners, who remain to some extent in obscurity, as does the genesis of the movement itself. The most clearly identifiable point of origin for the coup was the reorganization of the Democratic Society on January 6. The creation of a central body to supervise that effort might also be seen as establishment of an organizational network for the coming rebellion: its directives to provincial bodies leave little doubt that it had more than traditional political designs. It follows that Lleras, as director of the Society and a key member of the junta central, should be seen as a primary figure in the preparation of the coup. Lleras was the most eminent political member of the Society, and his close relationship to Obando was extemely valuable. But by the beginning of April, Lleras did demonstrate certain hesitancies; as he began to distance himself from the plan, the influence of Jose Antonio Obregon rose. All evidence suggests that Lleras and Obregon were in fact the primary planners of 188 the 17 de Abril. But, when Obando refused to head the movement, Lleras abandoned the effort. 187 Restrepo, Diario pol{tico y militar, II, 363-64. Restrepo noted that "others attributed his trip to revolutionary intentions." 188 Ibid., Diario poritico y militar, 361; El Neo-Granadino, April 27, 1854; La Gaceta Oficial, April 24, 1854.

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154 Melistas cited the "pandemonium of anarchy" created by new institutions as the reason for the coup. Those responsible were said to be the young members of the Republican School, whose introduction of "foreign ideas" into the country resulted in the Constitution of May 21, regarded as a primary cause of anarchic conditions. Melo therefore abrogated that document on April 27 and replaced it with the 1843 Constitution until a National Convention could meet to frame a new document. Specific features of the 1853 constitution to be corrected in the new law of the land included: universal manhood suffrage; popular election of provincial governors; the reduced powers of the 189 executive; and various restrictions on the church. The 17 de Abril movement can be divided into two distinct periods. The first, until May 20, had a primarily political focus. The second, after that date, was dominated by military actions. 190 When Obando removed himself from the coup, Melo moved to organize his government. Obregon was selected as secretary general; Pedro Martir Consuegra, secretary of Interior; Jose Mar{a Gaitan, secretary of war and navy; and Ram6n Ardila, minister of finance. Ram6n Berina was chosen as governor of Bogota. The funds in the national treasury were seized on April 17 from Treasurer General Juan Nepomuceno Nunez Conto, who, after briefly resisting, joined the rebellion himself. In addition, Melo levied a forced loan on merchants, bankers, and hacendados on the 19th, which was followed by an emergency tax on the 24th. The jefe supremo 189 El Neo-Granadino, April 27, 1854; El 17 de abril, May 14, 1854; La Gaceta Oficial, April 24, 1854. 190 Vargas, Colombia, 1854, 97-98.

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155 issued a decree on April 23 to conscript men up to 70 years of age into the military, which raised the size of his army to 4,000 by the end of April. On June 1 the legal size of the army was expanded to 8,000, and in July it ~as raised to 20,000. 191 Although Melo had thus moved rapidly to secure his power, he and his associates cot111J1itted several serious errors in the process. Cn the 17th, Democrats arrested enemies of the movement--both Golgota and Conservative-throughout the city. One of the first to be detained was Lorenzo Gonzalez, who had led the investigation of the Qufros killing. However, several major opposition figures were inadvertently allowed to slip through the net. General Tomas Herrera, the designado, sought refuge in the consulate of the United States, as did Obaldia and many owners of commercial houses. Herrera shortly thereafter escaped northT ard with General Manue 1 Maria Franco. Obaldia used the consulate as an inttial base of operations against Melo, of which Green was fully aware. Obaldia fled the capital on July 27, the same day as Green, and 1 . h h " i 192 apparent y wit is ass stance. Herrera's escape underscored the fact that the 17 de Abril would not be uncontested. Melo began the coup with some 2,000 troops at his disposal, which included a large number of Democrats. In the words of German Colmenares, "the artisans were organized in militias in order to 191 Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 82, 91; Vargas Martinez, Colombia: 1854, 99-105; Gomez, El golpe militar, 215-16, 234, 254. 192 For a review of Green's behavior during the coup, see David Sowell, "Agentes diplomaticos de los Estados Unidos y el golpe de Melo," Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, No. 12 (1984), 5-13.

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156 sustain the army [which]] constituted the firmest prop of the provisional government " In fact, as he observed, Melo would not have been able to do anything without the support of the artisans. 193 Ironically, the artisans' strength was a by-product of Golgotan efforts to reduce the standing army and replace it with the National Guard, which the artisans dominated. The Guard both supplemented the army and served as police in the capital. Numerous artisans were officers in the Guard, and they made up the majority of its common soldiers. Miguel Leon was a capitan, and other / officers included Joa~ Marra Vega, Cruz Ballesteros, Jose Antonio Saavedra, and Francisco Torres Hinestrosa. 194 Leon and German Pineres were closely involved in procurement of supplies for Bogota in the months following the coup. Emeterio Heredia was appointed as jefe politico in Fusagasuga. Other artisans such as Vega helped to maintain order in the city. Artisans were less active in the military defense of the Melo regime until its final stages. Melistas won a major battle against constitutionalist forces on May 21 north of the capital. Another victory on May 26 served to protect northern access to the city and to permit the Melistas to advance in that direction. By July, most of the eastern highlands was in their hands. / The Cauca Valley revolted at about the same time as did Bogota, although only the Cali area was ever firmly controlled by Melistas. 193 Germa""'n Colmenares, "Formas de la conciencia de clase en la Nueva Granada," Bolet{n Cultural y Bibliografico, Vol IX:12 ( 1966), 2412. 194 Causa contra Obando, I, 346-49.

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157 That city stubbornly resisted occupation by constitutionalists for most of June, when some 800 Democrats surrendered to Jose Hilario Lopez. The north coast offered weak verbal support for Melo and practically no military aid. Only in Cartagena did serious mobilization take place, b 1 d b 1 195 ut it ~as prompt y suppresse y Genera Mosquera. Shortly after the constitutionalists' defeat at Tiquiza on May 26, General Mosquera was designated as chief of the Army of the North. General Par!s was tagged as chief of the Upper Magdalena, and General L6pez was named chief of the Army of the South. Political moves were undertaken as well. On June 8, a letter was circulated to all senators and representatives to meet on July 20 in Bogota, or in Ibague if that were not possible. A skeletal congress of 23 congressmen met and decided to convene as a provisional government when they had a 196 quorum. On August 5 General Lopez made a major statement of loyalty to the "legitimate" government. Although he had captured Cali and had been charged with leadership of the Army of the South, many Melistas still doubted his opposition to Melo. Some even thought that this final statement was a forgery. They waited for his cooperation with Melo but in vain. 197 195 See Fals Borda, Historia doble de la costa. Vol. II: El Presidente Nieto (Bogota: Carlos Valencia Editores, 1981) for process of the coup. 196 Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 200-08; Gomez, El golpe militar, 254. 197 See Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 337-41, for the speech. El Artesano, October 22, 1854.

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158 The constitutionalist congress opened on September 22 under the leadership of Obaldia. Its first action was to denounce all activities of the 17 de Abril regime and to name a commission to investigate the conduct of those involved in it, including Obando. ~ben the commission reported on the 28th, it labeled as criminals all who were connected with the insurrection and called upon loyal citizens to rise against the dictatorship. On October 13 Obando was accused of misconduct in the exercise of his responsibilities as president and was dismissed from the military. On the 28th, congress closed its sessions and vowed 198 that it would reconvene in the capital. Conditions in Bogota, which had been well supplied in the early months of the conflict, began to deteriorate by July and August. Opponents of the regime complained of general violence and attacks on property in the city, eventhough others praised its order. Various decrees by Melo indicate that some violence must have occured. For example, on August 8 he sent Governor Berina to Fusagasuga to investigate reports that its military leader, Pablo Bohorquez, and jefe 199 politico Heredia had committed numerous "excesses." Meanwhile, the Melista advance northward had been halted at Pamplona on July 22, and they had been forced to retreat from that city a month later. The defeat marked the beginning of the constitutionalist advance in the northeast. By September Tunja had fallen, and Socorro fell a month later. Nothing remained to stop 198 Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 360-63; Gomez, El golpe militar, 27785. 199 Ortiz, El 17 de abril, 273, 302; Gomez, El golpe militar, 302.

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Mosquera's advance upon the capital from the north after October. La Mesa, the southern gateway to the sabana of Bogota, was occupied without resistance on September 11. The Army of the South, consisting of 4,600 men, made that town its headquarters. Melo did not counter the move into La Mesa, preferring to keep his army group stationary at Facatativa. The Army of the South began its march on the capital on November 18. On the 22nd, Melo's "regeneration army" was for the first time committed to battle at Cuatro Esquinas, but it was defeated. The next day Lopez made an uncontested move into the barrio of Las Cruces. Diego Castro tried unsuccessfully to drive out the army the next day but was forced to return to the center of the city. Mosquera's 4,000man Army of the North arrived in Tunja on November 24 and reached Chapinero by December 2. On the third, the two anti-Melo combat groups met at the Quinta de Bol{var to prepare the final assault. Their combined strength was 8,600 men to Melo's 2,000. 159 The battle for Bogota was joined on December 4. Constitutionalist General Herrera was mortally wounded early in the day, but his less did nothing to change the tide of battle. By 1:30 p. m. only the barracks of San Francisco and San Agust1n resisted the constitutionalist attack. In Mosquera's final assault on San Francisco, Miguel Leon was killed, and Jose Mar{a Vega, along with Joaqufn Posada, the editor of El Alacran, were critically wounded. By 4:00 p. m. the fighting had ceased, and Generals Lopez, Mosquera, and Herran met in a fraternal abrazo at the foot of Bolfvar's statue in the Plaza de la Constitucion. The attempt of the 17 de Abril to wrest governmental control from the "anarchists" had failed.

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The defeat of the coup was felt by the capital's artisans for years to come. As acting president, Obaldia previously had signalled the central government's plan to pardon all crimes against the constitution and public order, excepting those committed by military personel, government employees, and leading Melistas. On December 8 the pardon was extended--in principle--to common soldiers, but not to zoo members of the National Guard. When the capital was captured, 160 hundreds of its Guard defenders (along with many innocent citizens) were taken prisoner. Governor of Bogota Pedro Gutrerrez Lee appointed a commission to determine who among those detained were guilty of seditious or criminal activity. One account later claimed that this process depended on citizen denunciations of those captured. If a prisoner was denounced, he was kept captive, if not, he was freed. (Allegedly no attempt was made by judicial authorities to determine the 201 accuracy of the denunciations.) The fate of these prisoners remained in doubt until December 18, when Obaldia issued a "pardon" to 197 individuals who had been caught with weapons in hand. Those men, while not leaders of the coup, were deemed by the executive to be dangerous to society. Their pardon was contingent upon accepting four years of duty in the army. Those who refused to accept the terms of the pardon would be tried in the circuit court of Panama, so as to relieve the burden on Bogot~'s courts. A similar pardon was offered to 83 individuals, most of them soldiers, on 1858. 200 201 La Gaceta Oficial, December 10, 1854. El Bogotano Libre, January 22, 1855; El Tiempo, May 13,

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January 4, 1855. These men, however, were only required to serve in the army for three years. A third pardon was offered to 44 more Melistas on the 12th, contingent upon four years in the army. These pardons also included the clause of judgment in Panama, and neither exluded criminal charges, only political ones. 202 161 Melistas from the December pardon began arriving in Panama January 24, although at least 18 escaped en route. Toward the end of February, men f d h h 203 rom the secon and t ird groups had reached t e Isthmus. Exact numbers of those sent to Panama from Bogota either as "recruits" or for trial are impossible to determine. The three "pardons" were offered to 324 people. Eighteen, as noted, escaped en route, but authorities in Panama reported the arrival of at least 20 persons not included in the 204 official pardons. Artisans later complained that many people had been sent without even determining their names, much less their guilt. While a precise figure cannot be determined, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least 300 to 400 Melistas were sent from Bogota to Panama after their defeat. Not all of these men went alone. Lorenzo ,,. Maria Lleras told of receiving a letter in May which reported the 202 El Repertorio, December 20, 1854; La Gaceta Oficial, January 5, 15, 1855. Although the pardons had not so indicated, the military service of those accepting its terms was also to be served in Panama. Clearly constitutionalist leaders intended to purge the capital of its Melista element. Rebels elsewhere shared a similar fate, being "pardoned" in Cali upon acceptance of 12 to 16 year exile. More Melistas were exiled from Cali, Pasto, Socorro, Popayan, and other cities. See, for example, La Gaceta Oficial, January 1, March 13, 1854. 203 El Panameno, January 26, February 21, 1855; 204 Archive Ristorico Nacional (Hereafter AHN), Republica, Guerra y Marina, Torno 843, folio 953.

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deaths of 20 of the 25 women who had accompanied their husbands into 205 exile. (The same letter reported the deaths of 40 men.) 162 On February 28 Obaldia issued yet another pardon, which stated that in spite of the previous decrees a "considerable number" of people still remained in jail. The terms of this pardon differed from those of the previous ones, as did the individuals it affected. Most of those included in this decree had been minor officials in the Melo government or who had been closely linked to it. Numerous artisans were included, notably Agust!n Rodr!guez, the first director of the Society of Artisans, Jose Antonio Saavedra, and Francisco Torres Hinestosa. Terms of the pardon varied from three years' exile for Rodrfguez and others to one-year exile from certain provinces for still others. Those who refused to accept these tenns would be held for trial. Even after this fourth pardon, 38 non-military Melistas 206 remained imprisoned as leaders of the movement. The principal leaders of the coup remained in jail until June 6, when Melo and several members of his cabinet were expelled from the country for eight years. Other major Melistas were exiled for periods 207 of four or more years. The fact that Melo was not executed came as a surprise to many. One reason was that, despite his claim of total responsibility for the rebellion, much of the blame for the coup was shifted to Obando, who underwent a grueling trial for his behavior 205 Lorenzo Maria Lleras, San Bartolome en 1855 (Bogota: np, 1855), 12. 206 La Gaceta Oficial, March 1, 1855. 207 Ibid., June 8, 25, July 11, 18, 1855.

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163 during the coup. It was not until December 20, 1855 that the Supreme Court reached its verdict--not guilty of crime or treason, but, because he did not fight the rebellion, guilty of having failed to fulfill the responsibilities of his office. 208 With the exile of the artisans of the National Guard and the other Melistas, this chapter of artisan political activity reaches a logical conclusion. However, more would be heard from the leaders of the Democratic Society, and the repercussions of the revolt would be felt for some time. The next chapter will discuss the subsequent relationship of artisan rebels with various political groups and will continue to trace artisans' political activity in the years from 1855 to 1869. Conclusion Artisan political activity was markedly different during the era of liberal reform from what it had been during the Neo-Bourbon period. Whereas artisans earlier had been used to further the interests of elite political groups in organizations such as the Sociedad Catolica and the Sociedad Democratica Republicans de Agricultores y Labradores, the Society of Artisans expressed artisan class interests. The impetus to their mobilization was a threat to their previously sheltered trades and welfare by laissez-faire economic policies, specifically the 1847 tariff reduction. It is important to stress that the Society was formed in reaction to economic liberalization which enabled North 208 Restrepo, Diario politico y militar, 576.

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Atlantic capitalism more directly to affect their lives. Artisans preferred retention of those colonial economic policies which afforded them a degree of economic protection. Tariff reform threatened their economic position as a class and thus represented a threat to their social status as well. Consciousness of the threat led directly to their political mobilization. The Society of Artisans independently attempted to apply the political lessons taught in the SDRAL, namely that in a republican system the members of all organizations had the right to express their political opinion and that the political process would be receptive to 164 such participation. However, while artisans this time organized independently, they were in no way strong enough to achieve their collective interests in isolation from other political factions. Renee alliances were formed with groups whose objectives seemingly resembled their own. Many artisans supported the presidential candidacy of Jose Joaquin Gori at least in part due to his stance on the tariff issue. The Society of Artisans officially backed Jose Hilario Lopez in hopeful expectation of the political future promised to artisans by Lopez's supporters. The relationship between young reformers and artisans of the Democratic Societies undoubtedly hastened implementation of some of the reformers' objectives. The specific needs of artisans were not, however, satisfied. This was certainly predictable given the basic opposition of the two groups' interests. The relationship between the two could be accurately compared to the SDRAL's use of artisans as political tools to further essentially non-artisan interests. However, in contrast to the 1830s, artisans manifested a clear recognition of

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their own class concerns and exerted a strong effort to obtain their own demands in the late 1840s and 1850s. 165 If this expression of artisan class interests was new, the use of artisans as political tools was not. Conservatives as well as Liberals appealed to artisans in support of their party platforms. In this regard the Popular Society closely paralleled the Catholic Society in purpose, although verbal recognition of non-elite concerns was more evident in the Popular. The Conservative artisan organization proved unable to survive Liberal repression, but it seems clear that it did represent artisan opposition to various of the liberal reforms. Keen disillusionment among artisans of the Democratic Society occurred as it became clear that their utility to the reformers was not to be repaid through an increase in tariffs. Artisans recognized that they were being exploited and demanded effective political participation to pursue their own interests. This led to alignment with the draconians, whose ideology seemed to coincide more closely with their own. By 1854, several themes were consistently expressed by artisans. Tariff protection was undoubtedly the most frequently voiced, but other economic concerns included requests for control of interest rates and assumption by the government of certain banking and credit functions. State sponsorship of industrial education and road construction were also solicited. Effective political participation was seen as the means to secure these interests. Many politically active artisans expressed discontent with reforms which redefined the traditional social function of the church. Social disorder was blamed on other

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reforms. At the same time, artisans claimed that they were no longer recognized for their positive social contributions. Together these beliefs and attitudes illustrate the reactionary nature of artisans' political beliefs during the reform era. This "1as most clearly manifested in their participation in the 1854 coup by Melo. Historians of violence by workers and artisans in Europe of the 166 same era stress the reactive nature of artisan mobilizations against capitalist threats to artisanal production. That reaction was directed against non-economic social threats as well, specifically many of the reforms initiated during this era. The reactive nature of artisan political activity in the reform era should be a warning against the tendency to see "socialist" ideas as being accepted and forwarded by artisans of the Democratic Society. Both Conservative contemporaries and leftist writers of the present argue that socialist influences were strong, albeit from different points of view. In either case, the socialism of the Societies has been misstated. Contemporaries applied socialist labels as a means to undermine the group's appeal. Modern writers attempt to analyze the socialist content of the era's speeches and proclamations, but generally draw upon the works of young liberals such as Jose Maria Samper, Manuel Murillo Toro, or Francisco Javier Zaldua. Socialist rhetoric is to be found in their writings, but laissez-faire 209 individualism guided their reforms. The same messages are not found in the words of Ambrosio Lopez, Cruz Ballesteros, or Emeterio Heredia, 209 Gilmore, "Nueva Granada's Socialist Mirage," Hispanic American Historical Review, 36:2 (May 1956), 190-210.

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167 who are more truly representative of the artisan movement. Their words and deeds were directed against "socialists" such as Murillo or Samper. It would, however, be a mistake to label artisan political mobilization during the era of liberal reform as purely reactionary. Artisan political activity came to be a radical threat to the desires of established elites to reshape the country, and to that extent challenged the existing sociopolitical order. In the face of such threats elites of both parties tended to lay aside their differences and repress the coup. The constitutionalist union of Liberals and Conservatives illustrates that while parties did differ on the issue of the church's role in state and society, they had far fewer differences on other political issues, and none on who should direct the state. If similarities are to be seen between the socialist reaction of Parisian workers in 1848 and bogotano artisans in 1854, it is because both were reacting to similar threats to their traditional social positions and economic well-being and that they met a similar fate. Capitalization and industrialization of production threatened Parisian workers directly and bogotano artisans indirectly. While the reaction of tradesmen in these two countries took very different paths, both sprang from similar circumstances. The eventual violent response of bogotano artisans to the reforms challenged elite control of the Colombian 210 state, but it must properly be labeled as reactionary radicalism. Whatever the label, artisan political participation in this stage of 210 Craig Calhoun coined this phrase to describe the reaction of English artisans and townspeoples to the advances of Industrial capitalism in late-eighteenth century England. The Question of Class Struggle (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1982)

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the reform movement was significant; the same would be true of such activity in the following years, although the results would be quite different. 168 J

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CHAPTER 5 THE TRIUMPH OF RADICALISM, 1855-68 Overview The fifteen-year period after the defeat of Jose Mar{a Melo's coup witnessed some of the most complex political manuevering in Colombia's history in which organized tradesmen continued to be central characters in the struggle among the parties. The Radical Liberals and Conservatives who had allied to defeat Melo shared power at the national level until 1857, but moves were begun immediately at the local level to set up bases by which one or the other party could gain political domination over the other. Radicals courted the support of Melistas and draconians in their bid for power and consequently by 1857 the Liberal party had healed many of its earlier wounds. The 1857 presidential race was livened by the candidacy of Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera at the head of the National party, which he himself created and which drew support from moderates of both the major parties. The Conservatives came out ahead in the contest, placing Mariano Ospina Rodr1guez in the presidential chair. The Conservative administration proceeded to sponsor a new constitution, which differed from its predecessor only in its greater degree of federalism. While Liberals supported Ospina in the promulgation of the Constitution of 1858, other issues, such as his 169

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170 invitation to the Jesuits to return to Colombia, ran counter to Liberal ideology. More important for Liberals than ideological differences was Ospina's drive to restrict the power of states, despite the constitution, and to enhance the strength of the federal government. Ospina's threats to Liberal and Mosquerista regional power cliques led to their revolt in 1860, which drove the Conservatives from power two years later. The Constitution of 1863, which was even more federalist than its predecessor, was promulgated in the wake of the Conservative loss. Anti-clerical reforms accompanied and were incorporated into the new constitution at the insistence of Mosquera, who proved to be far more jealous of church power than the Radicals. This issue, along with the perceived lust for power on the part of Mosquera, drove a wedge between the victors in the civil war, a division that dominated the national scene for the remainder of the 1860s. The war's destruction came at a time of declining tobacco prices and contributed to the disruption of the Colombian economy. Artisans in Bogota were especially hard hit by the depression and suffered perhaps a decade of economic hardship. This, in combination with continued partisan exploitation, gave rise to the "Union Society of Artisans," which was dedicated to independent political action to improve their social, economic, and political fortunes. By 1867 the extreme mutual antagonism between Mosquera and the Radicals resulted in the former's attempt to establish himself as dictator. His coup of April 29, 1867 was unsuccessful, thanks in part to a Radical alliance with Conservatives. The Union Society contributed to Mosquera's defeat by its withdrawal of artisans from

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171 partisan political activity. Mosquera was then expelled from the country, and a Radical/Conservative front governed until 1868. In that year the front dissolved, and the Conservatives moved to embrace Mosqueristas in their drive for power. The Union Society proved unable to isolate tradesmen from hostile external political forces and it collapsed in 1868. Liberal Reunification, 1855-59 The failure of the 17 de Abril had both shortand long-term consequences for politically active artisans. Participants in the coup attempt learned that deviators from the political norm would be harshly treated. Thereafter, artisans never radically challenged the status quo, instead they worked within the system to achieve their specific objectives. Moreover, the experience helped augment anti-war sentiments within the artisan class. In the years that followed, this attitude assumed increasing significance, especially after the civil war of 1859-62. In the months following Melo's defeat, the fate of the Melistas and the reunification of the Liberal party dominated Bogota's political scene. Imprisoned Melistas complained about their treatment, as well as the narrow legal grounds for the government's pardons. One such statement of grievance, forwarded to Attorney General Florentino Gonzalez, protested that the prisoners be allowed to exercise their rights as citizens. One such right was judicial review, which, by late March, had not taken place. Melistas claimed that, to make matters worse, their treatment had been inhumane. "Even the most barbarous

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172 Spanish military ordinances had allowed prisoners at least two hours of sun per day," they wrote, but "we have not been able to enjoy one hour of its beneficial rays." A speci fie complaint dealt with the treatment of 21 men on December 12. These men, mostly leaders of the movement, had previously been heavily guarded and kept in bathrooms; but on that date they were awakened early, shackled at the ankles, and taken outside. In front of a hostile crowd they were marched at bayonet point from the San Francisco barracks to San Bartolome, a distance of some ten blocks. At both the start and the finish of the parade they 1 had been displayed to the public for long periods of time. ~~en the pardon of February 28 was announced, many accepted it because "in exile there will be misery but at least there will not be paid governmental torture!" The terms of the pardon drew pointed criticism, nonetheless: " to exile a man for three years is not a pardon, nor is it forgiveness for his crimes " Such alleged pardons were clearly unconstitutional "because the Constitution does not give the Executive the faculty to impose penalties, nor to judge the degree of guilt of a criminal, nor to determine who are leaders or agents and who is not " Moreover, they ~ ere "monstrously unjust." Melistas were not alone in questioning the legality of Obaldia's decrees . Somewhat suprisingly, G6lgotas, in an obvious fence-mending excercise, now came to their defense. According to the editors of El Tiempo, pardons were within the executive privilege, but they claimed that Obaldia's decrees contained disguised penalties, which were the l Algunos presos, "Senor procurador general de la nacion" (Bogot~: Imprenta de Echevarr!a Hermanos, March 25, 1855).

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responsibility of judicial authorities. Moreover, the editors questioned the wisdom of the pardons when they asked, rhetorically, what good could come of enlisting Melistas in an army bound to protect the constitution against which the rebels had just fought? And how could those sent to Panama for trial be expected to defend themselves? Obaldia's actions, according to El Tiempo, were a disgrace to the concept of national justice and would only serve to deepen the period 2 of anguish caused by the revolt. Such accusations of "irregularities" in the pardons led Jose Mar(a Gaitan to introduce a resolution of impeachment in the chamber, charging that Obaldia had not only exceeded his constitutional authority but had also violated the express law of the land. The representative body, however, by a vote of 31-14, ruled that no legitimate grounds existed for the charges and refused to forward the 3 case to the Senate. 173 Despite the fact that most Melistas had either been sent to Panama or jailed, rumors of conspiracies alarmed the city in March and then again in May. Leading Melistas remained jailed even after the final political pardon of June 6, as they had not yet stood trial for civil crimes. In late August the imprisoned men wrote Obaldia complaining that alcalde Lino Marta Pena was unjustly harsh towards them. Additionally, Melo, Obregon, Heredia, and others noted that rumors abounded that an effort was being hatched to free them, and that guards 2 El Tiempo, January 9, 16, 1855. The editors of the paper included Murillo, Anc(zar, Arosemena, Camacho Roldan, Parra, Pradilla, Miguel Samper, Pereira Gamba, Rafael Nunez, and Herrera. 3 ARN, Republica, Congreso, Legajo 31, folios 723-37.

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174 had been ordered to kill the prisoners if such came to pass. They petitioned the ex-vice-president for his assistance in avoiding such a fate and for securing their legal rights. Less than three weeks later, Pena was removed from office, and the prisoners were released to begin l,. service of their pardons. Lorenzo Maria Lleras, among the many citizens arrested in December 1854, was a central character in the Liberal moves to reunite their party and to recruit former Melistas to that effort. Even before his February release, Lleras joined the Liberal attack in favor of the 5 jailed rebels, with an article in El Bogotano Libre. In Lleras's opinion, the entire process had been fraught with illegality from the .,. moment in December that Pedro Gutierrez Lee had set up the commission to deal with the prisoners, thus usurping a power reserved to the courts. Obaldia's "parodies of pardons" were, in Lleras's belief, no more than sentences--a clear abuse of his office. Although the law, as Lleras pointed out, stipulated that they be tried in the nearest court, those who had not accepted the pardon were to be tried in Panama, "as 4 Ibid., folio 77; Algunos preses, "Senor procurador"; El Tiempo, May 15, August 7, September 9, 11, 18, 1855. 5 Lleras was denounced by Melista General Jose Marfa Mantilla and others as being an important member of the Junta Central, especially in regard to the March 5 circular which had urged regional juntas to arm themselves. After his December 5 arrest, Lleras was incarcerated in San Bartolome, from which place the long-time Santanderista presented a detailed examination of his case (amid claims of his innocence) to judge on January 27, only to have his detention upheld on February 3. However, further testimony by Mantilla convinced the judge that Lleras had not planned the coup despited his membership in the junta. Lleras was ordered released on the 28th of that month. On the charges against Lleras, see El Repertorio, February 18, March 5, 1855. For his defense, see Lorenzo Mar1a Lleras, "Senor Juez del crimen" (Bogota: January 27, 1855); and Lleras, "San Bartolome en 1855" (Bogota: np, August 24, 1855).

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if Panama was the circuit court nearest Bogota!" Lleras's attack concluded: "We want the legal punishment for those truly guilty of the crime of the 17 de Abril and its consequences; we do not want it duplicated in arbitrariness and tyranny." 6 175 In addition to his articles in the press in support of the rebels, Lleras served as Jose Marfa Vega's lawyer against the charges stemming from "Chepe's" role in the invasion of the U. S. consulate in November 7 1854. Lleras continued to enjoy close political relationships with other artisans of the old Society, who, despite the coup, had not lost their political importance. He thus played an important role both in the reunification of the Liberal party and in drawing artisans into that union. Although Lleras had been found innocent of criminal involvement in the coup, both his service as director of the Democratic Society before the revolt and his ongoing relationship with Melistas after it suggest that his connections with the 17 de Abril warrant further study. On June 17, 1855, Lleras was one of the draconian representatives who met with Manuel Murillo Toro and Rafael Mendoza to study the reunification of the party. Clearly the meeting was successful, because Lleras was actively involved in recruiting artisan support for Mendoza in the latter's August candidacy for the governorship of 8 Cundinamarca. Like Lleras, Murillo also cultivated the political support of Melistas. As one of the editors of El Tiempo, the future 6 7 8 El Bogotano Libre, January 28, 1855. Sowell, "Los agentes diplomaticos," 11. La Esperanza, August 9, 1855; El Tiempo, July 24, 1855.

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~--7 176 president soundly criticized Obaldia's conduct of the pardon process. When Melo was finally released from prison in September, Murillo posted an 8,000 peso deposit to guarantee the general's prompt departure from Colombian soil. 9 Much of Murillo's political courtship of both Melistas and draconians originated from his desire to become the nation's next president. Meanwhile, at the expiration of Obaldia's term, Conservative Vice President Manuel Mar{a Mallarino had assumed executive responsibility on April 1, 1855. Obando's trial, and his official removal from office, meant that Mallarino would continue as executive until an election designated the president for the 1857-61 term. The Conservatives forwarded Mariano Ospina Rodrfguez as their candidate for ,, that period; most Liberals united behind Murillo; and Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera launched himself as the candidate of the "National party." Mosquera, a nominal Conservative, had the potential to draw votes from Ospina, but he appealed more strongly to many members of the draconian wing of the Liberal party. Both Murillo and Mosquera made strong appeals to artisans and Melistas in their efforts to gain the presidential chair. The program of Mosquera's National party was presented at a Bogota meeting in June 1855. It proposed restricting public intervention in religious matters; abolition of civil matrimony; establishment of public and private banks; and government sponsored public works projects to construct roads. All of these planks could elicit support from the craft community, as would plans for expanding primary 9 Restrepo, Diario pol{tico y militar, IV, 586.

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177 education and industrial training for the poor. Among the tradesmen who were present at this meeting were Leocadio Camacho, Juan Francisco Leal, and Felipe Roa Ram!rez, all of whom would play important roles in artisan organizations of the 1860s. Their names, however, were absent from a pro-Mosquera declaration of February 1856, although Felipe Beltran, Narciso Garai, Narciso Lequisamo, and Ambrosio Lopez were 10 among its artisan signers. Appeals by Murillo and his backers to artisans were more direct and, apparently, more successfull. On April 8, 1856, El Tiempo printed a statement of adherence to Murillo signed by 25 notable 11 Melistas, including several artisans. The next month Lorenzo Marfa Lleras, with the help of Emeterio Heredia, began publication of El Artesano with inclusion of a letter of support for Murillo by almost 200 craftsmen. Lleras used many ploys to obtain artisan backing, but one tactic predominated--the appeal to the Liberal political tradition of artisans. In comparing the fate of artisans under Liberal and Conservative regimes, he claimed that the tradesman had had more independence under Liberals, an obvious appeal to artisan pride and independence. That party had worked closely with artisans and had not treated them as subjects bound to a priest or political machine, as had the Conservatives. Another appeal by Lleras dealt with the attitudes of young Liberals toward Melistas after December 4. While Mosquera, Obaldia, and Conservatives had abused the law in their attacks against the defeated rebels, Liberals had requested clemency and justice. 10 El Nacional, April 3, 1856. 11 'El Tiempo, April 8, 1856.

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178 Artisans were frequently reminded of the stance assumed by El Tiempo in 12 their defense. Interestingly, El Artesano directed most of its political venom at Mosquera rather than at Ospina. Conservatives were described as fanatics who used the church to further their political ambitions and who gladly used the repressive power of the state to enhance their control. They, moreover, were the traditional enemy of Liberals. Mosquera, the "wild card" in the contest, was painted as single mindedly driving for personal power and as a representative of the old aristocracy of Popayan. Continual references were made to the strength of the Mosquera family and to the general's anti-republican lust for I h . 13 ru ers ip. In a similar manner, supporters of Mosquera aimed the most vicious of their editorial comments at Murillo rather than Ospina. The central argument used to discourage craftsmen from supporting the radical candidate was to remind them of the long series of abuses and disillusionments experienced by craftsmen in their relationship with Liberals. Artisans were reminded of the Golgotas' refusal to raise tariff rates in repayment for their services in the 7 de Marzo. Both Mosquera papers, El Ciudadano and El Nacional, harped on the Golgotan betrayal of artisans in May and June 1853, and in April 1854. In essence, Mosqueristas claimed that radicals were simply seeking artisan votes, and would--once again--promptly forget their campaign promises . Mosquera backers singled out El Artesano as audaciously using the name 12 13 El Artesano, May 22, 1856. Ibid., June 16, July 3, 1856.

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179 of craftsmen, when its editors had previously abandoned them on the morning of April 17. Conservatives did not escape criticism, of course, most of which centered upon that party's historic disinterest in the needs of the people. In contrast to the insensitive records of the Liberal and Conservative parties, the emerging National party claimed to offer artisans order and protection, which could only come from a party concerned with all the people. Mosquera promised not to profane religion--as had Conservatives--nor liberty, as had Liberals. He would instead rule firmly, but justly, with an eye for the nation's 14 progress. In addition to artisan testimony in the partisan press, Melistas issued a series of leaflets announcing their positions on the electoral contests. Joaqu{n Pablo Posada began the series with a broadside dealing with the proper attitude of the revolutionaries of 185~ in the elections of 1856. Posada suggested that Melistas had always thought of themselves as a political party and had the obligation to conduct themselves as such in 1856. The 17 de Abril had, in the first place, been against radicals and the 1853 constitution; thus craftsmen could hardly support the man who personified that political ideology. In the second place, Melistas had moved to counter resurgent Conservatives, and obviously they could not support one of the principal traitors from the short-lived revolt of 1851. At least for Posada, Mosquera best represented their ideals of liberty (with order) and religion (without fanaticism.) 15 14 'El Ciudadano, May 31, June 26, July 29, 1856; El Nacional, May 29, August 7, 1856. 15 Joaqufn P. Posada, "Los revolucionarios de 1854 en las elecciones de 1856" (Bogota, July 5, 1856).

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I I 180 Pedro Neira Acevedo, who claimed to have just returned from exile, also spoke of the cause of the 1854 revolt, which he asserted was to effect a moral and political regeneration of the country. To him, the people had been subjected to a painful process of disillusionment with the defeat of that effort, but their objectives had been just. Acevedo cautioned Melistas to abstain from the upcoming elections, to bide their time, and to gather strength until the moment that when they 16 could "reclaim our lost rights." The recommendations of both Posada and Acevedo were rejected by fifteen Melistas (mostly ex-military men) in a public declaration of support to Murillo. These men judged Mosquera's candidacy self-serving and called him an "assassin of liberals." Artisans, they wrote, must also work to keep Conservatives, who had been their persecutors in 1854, out of power, which was difficult because the power of universal suffrage was "in the hands of fanatic priests." In declaring for Murillo, the leaflet sustained that Melistas and artisans were liberal at heart and compared their earlier differences with Golgotas to sibling rivalry. As that "squabble" had now ended, Liberals were 17 advised to unite against their mortal enemies, the Conservativies. The effect of this electioneering upon the voters of Bogota is difficult to assess. When the election was held, Ospina tallied the most votes (844); Murillo closely trailed him with 673 votes; and 18 Mosquera finished a distant third (380 votes.) Clearly Liberals and 16 Pedro Neira Acevedo, "Carta abierta" (Bogota, July 21, 1856). 17 Hubacuc Franco et al., "A los revolucionaries del 17 de abril" (Bogot~, np, August 4, 1856). 18 El Porvenir, September 2, 1856.

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181 Mosqueristas did well, but the division of their efforts may have given Ospina the victory in the capital. However, the country-wide vote was not close; Ospina won the election by over 20,000 votes, which suggests that in the final account, rural political machines were the lifeblood of nineteenth-century political parties. w~atever impact the pursuit of melista voters might have had on the outcome of the 1856 presidential election, the process undoubtedly signaled the return of the rebels, or at least the draconian wing of the Liberal party, to the capital's political scene. For Conservatives, this was hardly a welcome return. Their fears were realized when, in October 1857, leading melistas began to hold meetings (allegedly in Lleras's house) to reestablish themselves as a cohesive political force. Artisans apparently played only a minor role in the process; men such as Ram6n Mercado, Francisco Antonio Obregon, and 19 Ramon Berina were its organizers. Needless to say, these meetings caused great distress among the 20 Conservative hierarchy in Bogota and even to Ospina. The editor of the leading Conservative paper charged that a blatant effort was being made to incite the working classes against the rich and conservative sectors. He felt, however, that such seditious intentions would fail 21 because workers had the good sense not to be manipulated again. A 19 Jose Marfa Vega et al., "Los artesanos de Bogota a la nacion" (Bogota, November 15, 1857); Unos artesanos de 17 de abril, "Contestacion preliminar al cuaderno titulado 'La revolucion' " ( Bogota , nd) . 20 El Tiempo, December I, 1857; Restrepo, Diario pol{tico y militar, IV, 700, 704. 21 El redactor del Porvenir, "Al pueblo" (Bogota: Imprenta de la Nacion, November 10, 1857).

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l 182 lengthy rebuttal, signed by a considerable number of artisan melistas, countered that no violence was to be feared from their organization, as the entire power structure of the state was against them. They sarcastically noted that after eight years Conservatives finally had recognized the valor of the artisans, which the authors suggested was 22 due to the fear caused by the reunification of the Liberal party. In this climate of escalating tensions, a memorial service was held in honor of the men who died on December 4, 1854. Some 250-300 Democrats celebrated a mass at the San Francisco Church on November 30, after which they marched in candlelit silence to the cementery carrying portraits of Diego Castro and Miguel Le~n. Several speakers there praised the melista effort to "effect true Democracy" within the country, which led outraged Conservatives to insist that the event be 23 treated as a threat to public order. On their behalf, the melistas argued that if a conspiracy existed, it was the government's against them, not the contrary. As evidence of this claim, they noted that artisan Rafael Tap1as was harassed in his house on the night of December 1 by government soldiers looking for 11 d h 24 T i b 1 h d D a ege t ieves. won g ts ater, rumors tat arme emocrats were meeting in the streets swept through the gaming houses, resulting in a mobilization of "respectable citizens" who desired to defend public order. The latter group congregated at the houses of Obregon, Mercado, 22 Vega et al., "Los artesanos de Bogota a la nacion." 23 La Patria, December 5, 1856; Restrepo, Diario pol{tico y militar, IV, 705-06. 24 El Tiempo, December 1, 1857.

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and Berina to intimidate them into inaction. That threat in turn brought Democrats into the streets, and violence was narrowly 25 averted. When the third anniversary of Melo's defeat passed, political passions calmed--aided no doubt by an influenza virus that ravaged Bogot~ in December. Conservative fears were not entirely stilled, especially as El Nucleo began to be published in January 1858 as a mouthpiece for the 26 Melista-draconian political tendency. El Nucleo, for which Lorenzo 183 Maria Lleras as well as Manuel Mar!a Madiedo wrote, noted in its first edition that Colombia was being threatened by anarchistic liberties released by federalism and also by the endemic abuse of public coffers by egoistic politicians. While calling themselves Liberals, the editors distanced their liberalism, which they described as "practically based," from that of the radicals, which they claimed was based purely on theory. Conservatives, especially those of the Ospina government, were seen to be equally dangerous to the nation's future. El N6cleo hoped to serve as a beacon of unity for moderates, drawn from the people, the army, and other social sectors, so that "truly" 27 democratic causes could be advanced. 25 Tom~s Lombana, "Manifestacion" (Bogota: Imprenta de la Nacf'on, December 10, 1857; Restrepo, Diario pol(tico y militar, IV, 706. 26 Restrepo, Diario pol{tico y militar, 725; La revoluc1on: Orijen, progresos, fines i estado actual de la revoluct1on democratica que se prepara en esta ciudad,3rd ed. (Bogoti: Imprenta de F. T. Amaya, April 1858); Unos artesanos del 17 del abril, Contestacion preliminar al cuaderno titulado "La Revolucion" (Bogota: Imprenta de •t n Nucleo, II nd). 27 El Nucleo, January 26, 1858, passim. Many of the editions of the paper which I consulted were not dated, thus necessitating the use of passim.

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Aside from promoting the draconian political ideology, El Nucleo played an active role in local and regional political processes. In November 1858 it presented a list of candidates to the town council that included the artisans Cruz Ballesteros and Emeterio Heredia as principal nominees. 28 The December 19 election returned a Conservative victory, which the paper said was barely won even with widespread 29 fraud. A February 1859 adherence to Ramon Mercado's governorship bid was signed by many craftsmen, including Agustin Rodr!guez, Hilario Novoa, Emeterio Heredia, and Calisto and Cruz Ballesteros. 30 Heredia was nominated by the paper as an alternate candidate to the state assembly, while Conservatives, for their part, nominated the ex President of the Popular Society, Simifn Jose Cardenas, as a state 31 deputy. The June elections returned some 1,033 votes for the 184 Conservative assembly list, and 623 for the Liberals. This result sent Cardenas to the state assembly as one of the first craftsmen to he so honored. The Liberals claimed that fraud once again had permeated the elections, which, as might have been expected, contradicted 32 Conservative claims of general order in the election process. 28 29 30 31 Ibid., November 30, 1858; El Comercio, December 14, 1858. El Nucleo, January 5, 1859. Ibid., February 22, 1859. El Porvenir, May 13, 1859. Cardenas had left the country after he was jailed in 1850, going first to Europe and then to the United States. On July 4, 1853, he was in New York, where he commemorated the U. S. independence day by giving the New York Historical Society a painting of the signing of Colombia's declaration of Independence. La Esperanza, July 20, 1855. 32 El Nucleo, June 28, 1859; El Porvenir, June 7, 1859.

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185 Meanwhile, events were in motion that would lead the country to civil war. Liberals throughout Colombia were outraged by the passage of two laws in 1859 which appeared directly to challenge their control in regions such as Santander. One law gave Conservatives control of local and district election councils nationwide, which was naturally seen by Liberals as a clear violation of the federalist precepts of the 1858 constitution. Another sought to reduce the size of the army, while enhancing national control of militia groups, a move which potentially strengthened Conservative military power in Liberal controlled states. Together, these measures broke the fragile peace between the parties which had begun in 1854. 33 In March, ex-Melistas revolted against the Liberal government in Santander, a move that promptly attracted Conservative support. The revolt was suppressed within a few months, only to begin again in late August, when it was decisively defeated. In September, however, President Ospina declared the nation's public order threatened, a move which aggravated existing tensions. Early in 1860 Conservatives revolted in the Cauca, which, although they were defeated, convinced state president Mosquera that Ospina had illegal designs for the entire nation. Mosquera consequently declared Cauca a sovereign state in May, a move that precipitated a nationwide war that pitted mosqueristas and 34 Liberals against Conservatives. 33 Antonio Perez Aguirre, 25 anos de historia colombiana: 1853 a 1878; Del centralismo a la federacion (Bogota: Editorial Sucre, 1959), 94-95. 34 Ibid., 108-09. See David Church Johnson, Santander: Siglo XIX-Cambios socioeconomicos (Bogot-a: Carlos Valencia Editores, 1984), 10014 for a discussion of the war's origins.

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186 War, Reforms, and Economic Crisis, 1860-66 The revolt begun by Mosquera's declaration of the Cauca's sovereignty ended in a Liberal victory, the only successful rebellion in Colombia's history. Mosquera's troops captured Bogota on July 18, 1861, but fighting in Antioquia and elsewhere did not end until late 1862. Artisans of all political persuasions shed their blood in the conflict, but their only noteworthy military action came in the February 1862 defense of the capital. Mosquera and his army were in Antioquia, leaving the capital to its own defense. On February 4, a band of Conservative guerrillas from Guasca attacked the city, seemingly wishing to spark a general uprising. That objective was not met; instead Liberal civilians and veterans resisted the assault, ~hich resulted in numerous looting incidents and a Conservative retreat. Artisan members of the 3rd and 4th federal batallions were commended 35 for their aid in the incident. Three weeks later, on February 25, a Conservative force estimated at 1,000 men made a major assault upon the capital. Warned of the impending attack, governmental authorities decided to use the convent of San Agust{n as resistance headquarters. Urgent pleas for volunteers mustered a force equal to that of the attackers, although half of the men were allegedly unarmed and inexperienced. For almost 30 hours the convent withstood a strong attack, which included burning nearby buildings in the hope of driving its defenders out. Rumors of the 35 El Nuevo Mundo, February 8, 1862.

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187 arrival of regular army troops forced Conservatives to retreat early on the 27th, leaving the convent's embattled occupants to bask in their" glorious triumph." The official report of the defense contained a long list of the convent's defenders, among whom were numerous artisans, including Cruz Ballesteros, Emeterio Heredia, Pedro Aguilar, and Jose ,,. 36 Maria Vega. Even before the war was concluded, the military government directed by Mosquera enacted several important reforms. On July 20, 1861, it was decreed that church officials must be authorized by the government in order to continue in such functions. Six days later, the Jesuits, who had been brought back to Colombia by Ospina in 1858, were once again expelled from the country. On September 9 corporate properties were disamortized and offered for public sale, leaving the church with only its temples and chapels. Finally, religious communities such as convents and monasteries were ordered abolished on November 5. The government also ordered the expulsion of individuals from the country who resisted the decree, or the July 20 or September 9 edicts. Among those expelled was Archbishop Antonio Herran, because of 37 his opposition to disamortization. 36 Boletin Oficial, March 5, 1862; Cruz Ballesteros and Emeterio Heredia, "El 25 i 26 de febrero de 1862" (Bogot:a: np, February 23, 1863); P~rez Aguirre, 25 anos, 161-64. 37 Perez Aguirre, 25 anos, 150-59; Villegas, Colombia: Enfrentamiento iglesia-estado, 1819-1887, 57. For a discussion of ,,. disamortization and general church/state relations, see Fernando Diaz Diaz, "Estado, iglesia, y desamortizaci~n," in Manual de historia de Colombia, 3 vols. (Bogoti: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1982), II, 413-66.

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Public opposition to these measures was limited, as Mosquera had demonstrated his willingness to expel or execute opponents that public resistance was both useless and dangerous. In years to come, artisans complained that disamortization had seriously hurt the church's capacity to deliver needed social services, but they were quiet in 1861. Whatever their personal religious attitudes, more affluent craftsmen were not above purchasing church property when it became available. For example, Cruz Ballesteros bought a house with a store at its front on September 13, 1862, for 3,000 pesos. Other artisans who made purchases of former church assets included Jose Antonio 38 Saavedra, Fuljencio Roa, Francisco Olaya, and Cruz Sanchez. When the war finally ended, a constitutional convention was held / 188 in Rionegro, Antioquia, beginning February 4, 1863, to replace the Pact of Union by which the country had been governed since 1861. The convention was marked by clear, and sometimes open, hostility between prd-Mosquera delegates and those who followed the Radical Liberal line. (Distrust between these two alignments grew during the next few years.) The Constitution of Rionegro, promulgated on }lay 8, was even more federalist than its predecessor, and incorporated most reforms sought by Liberals during the long reform era. The national government was constituted of a union of the nine states, and all powers not expressly allowed the federal body were vested in the states. Liberal fear of Mosquera's executive ambitions resulted in a two-year, non-repetitive 38 Bolet{n del Credito Nacional, November 22, 1862, February 7, October 5, 1863.

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189 presidental term, a limitation also allotted to congressmen. Although the religious issue greatly aggravated the Liberal/Mosquera division, all of the latter's decrees were incorporated into the constitution: loyalty oaths to the government were mandated; a ban on church ownership of non-essential property continued; and the economic functions of the church were restricted. Before the convention closed, Mosquera was selected to continue as president until April 1864, when the first popularly elected president of the United States of Colombia 39 would assume office. Publication of the new constitution and formal establishment of the new government were followed by the opening of a floodgate of protest which had been closed during the war. Sentiments held by some craftsmen were consisely stated in an open letter of June 1863 to General Santos Gutierrez, recently appointed governor of Cundinamarca, by "an artisan" who claimed to have heard Gut(errez's speech upon his entry into Bogota. The author noted that the discourse contained accolades to those who had sacrificed their lives, limbs, and health in the recent struggle for "liberty," but went on to state that, had Gutierrez lifted his eyes above the partisan crowd, he would have seen Catholics on the periphery who, like himself, had made the same sacrifice in a losing effort. To those listeners his words had left a bitter taste: "The people now have liberty of the press, but do not know how to read or write." They had liberty of education, but all the 39 Helen Delpar, Red against Blue: The Liberal Paty in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899 (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1981), 11-13; Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, 264-71; Perez Aguirre, 25 anos, 188-92, 205-26; Salvador Camacho Roldan, Memorias (Medell!n: Editorial Bedout, 1971), 283-84.

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schools in which free education had been offered were closed as a result of anti-church legislation. Liberties existed, but, since churches were closed, the people had no place to baptize their children, marry, or bury their dead. In short, the pueblo have all the liberties they do not need, and are deprived of the one indispensable liberty that of giving worship to the God of our fathel~ and to receive the sweet consolation of Religion. Loe derechos del pueblo, a pamphlet, raised similar objections about the religious reforms and also questioned the benefits of other changes. Its author noted that "liberal gamonales" had traditionally enticed the people with promises of their rights but that after the recent war, in which he had fought, he had come to question the value of those rights. Under Ospina, the author contended, his children had had free access to public schools which were now closed because of the disamortization of church property, and yet it was claimed that the people had the right to education. Disamortization had, moreover, raised the rents of shops and stores and had eliminated other social services provided by the church. In a similar vein, political rights had suffered. For example, suffrage had been restricted, and the political machine created by Daniel Gomez in Cundinamarca precluded democratic participation in spite of freedom of political expression. Moreover, Conservatives were said to have been persecuted both politically and economically. The pursuit of rights through war had economically devastated the pueblo, many of whom could barely feed 40 Un artesano, "Al senor Jeneral Santos Gutferrez" (Bogota, June 29, 1863). 190

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191 their families. After long deliberation, the author concluded that artisans had been deceived so that a Liberal minority could achieve its 41 own interests. The artisan Juan Francisco Leal, who had supported Mosquera in the 1850s, joined the protests in two leaflets released in June and July. His complaints paralleled the others cited, but with specific emphasis on the deception used by those in power to win artisan support, which had once again been rewarded with disdain. The anti-clerical measures represented the most grievous governmental error for him, and Leal pledged his strength toward restoring the former status of the church. The disgrunted artisan was jailed in September, presumably for his 42 public statements. Such complaints were not without rejoinders by artisan supporters of the government. One of these observed that the clergy, like laborers, artisans, and merchants, were part of the pueblo, and thus subject to the laws of the nation. No part of the pueblo was said to be entitled to special protection. The author insisted that the religious functions of the church had not been attacked, nor had the people's freedom to worship been infringed; only the temporal functions 43 of the church had been assumed by the state, as was its right. In June 1863, Cruz Ballesteros appealed to artisans to avoid becoming 41 Un companero de Rodriguez Leal, "Los derechos del pueblo" (Bogota, July 26, 1863). 42 / Jul}n Rodriguez Leal, "Alianza catoli ca" (Bogota, June 29, 1863); Rodriguez Leal, "Alianza catolica (Esta es la bala)" (Bogot~, nd); El Conservador, September 19, 1863. 43 "Al pueblo" (Bogota', July 21, 1863).

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192 weapons in Conservative plans for violently rescinding the religious decrees. Cruz warned that the question was not really a religious issue but a political debate in which craftsmen were once again desired as cannon fodder. Ballesteros claimed, like many Liberals, that disamortization had been necessary to strip the church of funds which it had used to finance revolution. Like earlier Conservative writers, Ballesteros reminded artisans of the devastation and economic misery 44 which they had suffered due to previous armed conflicts. At the same time, there were some, like the artisan Agapito Cabrera, who favored non-involvement in the partisan struggles and warned both Liberal and Conservative artisans that they were being manipulated to satisfy the interest of political magnates. Tradesmen should, according to Cabrera, return to their homes and workshops, and therein find the happiness afforded to all by the political system. Artisans were advised to reject political manipulation and to unite for their own interests "because when the powerful fight, the humble b 1145 succum .... It is impossible to assess the precise relative strengths of any of these currents of thinking among the artisans, but withdrawal from partisan politics was difficult to practice. For in the midst of these debates, the United States of Colombia prepared to elect its first president, and the State of Cundinamarca its first governor. In the presidential contest, once again many ex-Melistas supported the 44 corazon" 45 1863). Cruz Ballesteros i su circulo, "A los artesanos de buen (Bogota, June 17, 1863). Agapito Cabrera, "Dios, libertad i trabajo" (Bogota, June 18,

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193 candidacy of Murillo, countering statements in the press that they were alienated from the Radical wing of the Liberal party. One declaration in favor of Murillo, signed by Carlos Ordonez, Cruz Ballesteros, Fruto Castaneda, Manuel Torres, Narciso Lequisamo, and others, asserted that neither appeals to religion and politics, nor memories could divide 46 Liberal ranks. While statements of political support have numerous shortcomings, they do serve to indicate the allegiance of politically active artisans. All the political factions sought to include in their lists of endorsements the names of artisans who could conceivabley influence the votes of other craftsmen. Thus, a July 3, 1863, adherence to Santos Gut{errez for governor included the names of Jose A. Saavedra and Jose Maria Vega, men whose political skills had long been 47 recognized by the Liberal party. Moreover, those artisans who were good political recruiters were often rewarded with minor political positions. This suggests the dual function of artisan leaders: as clients to political bosses, and as patrons to artisan clients. (This mediator role will be discussed at length later.) Agapito Cabrera's earlier call that artisans look to their own political fortunes was more forcefully repeated in October. During the evening of October 7, large numbers of artisans peacefully rearched 46 La Opinion, July 1, 1863. Elections were held for the municipal council later in the year on which occasion one list included the names of both Radical and traditional Liberals, as well as those cf five artisans. Only one of those artisans, Antonio Cardenas, won a seat on the council. Ibid., December 8, 1863; El Municipal, December 21, 1863. 47 rE1 Liberal July 16, 1863.

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through the streets of the capital, causing fear and speculation as to their intentions. The purpose of the march was revealed the next day when a commision from the craftsmen, composed of Antonio Cardenas, ; ; Fruto Castaneda, Gregorio Espinel, Jos~ Maria Quintero, Jose A. 194 Saavedra, and Jose Marfa Roa, issued a leaflet, claiming that after three years of fratricidal war in which artisans had fought and died as soldiers, the time had come to express themselves as men of work. Craftsmen, it went on, faced near-disastrous economic conditions, in part due to the war, but more as a result of the large amounts of foreign merchandise in the capital's market. Their rally of the night before had been to determine what steps could be taken to improve their situations. The signers stressed that their only political alignment 48 was with their class--not with either party. Two days later four of the six artisan "commissioners" issued another leaflet in which they spelled out their conviction that tariff 49 protection was the fundamental means to resolve the crisis. Anticipating the time-worn response that such legislation infringed upon the liberty of merchants, they countered that all legislation should be "governed by morality." Public authority had two functions, to protect and to foment. Protection consisted of warding off negative influences and fomenting meant sponsoring positive effects, by such techniques as tariff protection. They indicated their intention to ask 48 1863). 49 Antonio Cardenas et al., "Manifestacio"n" (Bogot~, October 8, Chly Cardenas, Roa, Espinel, and Castaneda signed the second document. Cardenas et al., "Segundo manifestacion de la comision de los artesanos" (Bogota, October 10, 1863).

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the next congress for such help, but in the meantime the commission asked merchants to restrict imports voluntarily. The commissioners also announced that the meetings would cease, because old political hatreds had been reopened in spite of their peaceful intentions, which in turn had led to threats against foreign merchants. 50 195 The artisans' campaign had indeed stirred the political situation. The Radical paper La Opinion posited that such activities were simply another attempt to incite the passions of the pueblo. As the religious issue had failed to do so, appeals were now being made to the artisans' purse, "in the language of their o~ interests." In rebuttal to the thesis presented by the commission, the political organ presented the alleged testimony of a blacksmith who admitted that his industry would be helped by protection. However, the rhetorical figure went on, he was also a consumer, and, if his industry merited protection, so too did the producers of the goods that he purchased. If protection were to be justly applied, then prices would increase to unbearable levels. Re thus favored liberty of industry over monopolistic practices. The paper went on to say that no true economic crisis existed. To be sure, civil war had disrupted the economy, but peace, and not legislation, would restore its well-being. 51 The moderate Liberal La Libertad, on its part, agreed that the artisans' complaints were all too accurate. The editors observed that the Liberal interpretation attributed to the blacksmith was, of course, scientifically accurate, but that since economic laws were intimately 50 51 Ibid.; La Libertad, October 20, 1863. La Opinion, October 20, 1863.

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intertwined with social laws and other factors, to ignore the current social predicament of craftsmen and their families would be a greivous 52 moral error. 196 A hardening of viewpoints could be seen in still another entry in the pamphleteering battles which analysed the "fruits" won by tradesmen as a result of the past revolution and described the division between Liberal artisans and Radical party leaders. The authors of this sheet cited their historic betrayal at the hands of the Radicals, beginning with their failure to obtain promised tariff reform after the 7 de ,,. Marzo. The memory of the May 19 incident lingered in Bogota, as did treatment of craftsmen after the fall of Melo. Liberal craftsmen claimed to have fought for the Radicals in the last war, only to be disillusioned once again. Their religious beliefs had been mocked by Radical legislation. Educational funds were monopolized for the children of the rich, while free Catholic schools had been closed, leaving no educational opportunity for their own children. And, as always, Radical tariff policy continued to create economic hardship among their class. The leaflet claimed that just payment of the debt to craftsmen would entail both tariff protection and sponsorship of 53 road projects to improve the local economy. 52 La Libertad, October 18, 1863. In the next edition of the paper, it was noted that many leading merchants (caballeros de la calle real) had returned the earlier number due to this stance. Jbid., October 20, 1863. 53 ,,. Unos Artesanos que no seran sino simples espectadores de los hechos ulteriores, "El fruto que los artesanos hemes cojido de las revoluciones pasadas" (Bogot;, October 19, 1863).

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Unlike earlier tracts, this one was not limited to analysis and suggestions; it also included a clearly stated threat. Its signers, "some artisans who will not be simply spectators in the future," wrote that the reward for their cooperation with Radicals had been dismemberment and death, betrayal and hunger. This would not be the case, they stated, in the future. Were a call to arms to be made now, the hoja asked, could artisans defend this regime? The obvious answer was no. Moreover, it was implied that merchants, especially those who sold ready made clothing, would increasingly become the targets of the 54 public's wrath. The brazenness of the latter comments led La Libertad to question the authenticy of the leaflet. It suggested that Conservatives had conceived the publication hoping to aggravate a 55 "minor" division within the Liberal party. Despite this claim, the contents of the leaflet undoubtedly reflected artisan disillusionment with Radical politics and the increasing clamor for independent political action by craftsmen. 197 Artisans not only took part in debates over political issues, but also joined in the discussion over the depressed economic situation of the Colombian capital. Although most observers had predicted that peace would restore to Bogota the economic prosperity it had enjoyed before the war, all accounts agree that the city was economically depressed through the 1860s. The most famous analysis of the situation was Miguel Samper's La miseria en Bogota. Samper blamed the capital's 54 55 Ibid. La Libertad, November 1, 1863.

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198 miserable situation on the war, on the government's failure to implement fully economic liberalization, and upon a myriad of social defects, foremost of which was parasitism upon public coffers. His analysis was generous and detailed, with neither Liberals nor Conservatives spared from his barbed pen. Artisans were singled out by Samper as a leading example of public reliance upon governmental support. Rather than begging for economic protection, Samper suggested that craftsmen abandon poor work habits, abstain from political 56 activity, and pursue improvements of their arts. Among the numerous other expanations offered for the crisis, of specific interest from the standpoint of this study is the heretofore unstudied response to Samper by Jose Leocadio Camacho, perhaps the most important artisan political leader in the last four decades of the 57 nineteenth century. The 34-year old carpenter began his reply to Samper--which took the form of a series of four letters-by agreeing that artisans, as the first victims of the poverty Samper had described, rightly deserved a central place in the analysis, but his assessment differed greatly from that presented by the Liberal statesman. Camacho's rebuttal focused upon several themes: the current state of misery; alleged economic practices by craftsmen which had hurt their position; moves by capitalists that aggravated the situation; political tactics, including artisans efforts to unify 56 Samper, La miseria en Bogota, passim, but especially 90-102 for his comments on artisans. 57 Camacho's letters to Samper are found in La Republica, October 2, 9, 16, 30, 1867. Samper's responces are in El Republicano, November 1, 12, 27, 1867. For other views, see La Prensa, October 7, 1867; La Repuolica, January 28, 1868.

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themselves; and a strong criticism of the public disdain for manual labor. The misery among the people of Bogota was, according to Camacho, far worse than Samper had described. Camacho felt that the nation's industries were losing ground rather than making progress, and they seemed incapable of stopping the retrocession. Industry and arts were in miserable shape, businesses were suffering, and the "proletarian classes" were said to be in the most depressed condition since the colonial period. He wrote that many families had not eaten meat for months and subsisted on only one meal per day. Some trades were so ravaged that their practitioners could barely survive. 199 One of Samper's suggestions had been that artisans could improve their status by saving money to buy better raw materials and thus enhance their production. Camacho scoffed at this idea. First, many craftsmen could hardly afford to eat, much less save money. As for raw materials, Camacho reminded Samper that most shops used imported items due to the scarcity of national products; if the quality of materials used was low, it was the fault of the importer who sought large profits, not that of artisans who had to purchase inferior materials. To Camacho, the solution was to construct national industries to fabricate intermediate goods of high quality, which of course was beyond the capability of artisans and in the hands of the capitalists, who, with few exceptions, preferred to import rather than invest in Bogota. Another of Samper's allegations had blamed the decline in certain trades on the abundance of labor created by admission of too many

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200 apprentices, a problem which he felt could be corrected by taking up more "lucrative" professions such as farming tobacco instead of creating more competition in traditional trades. This touched a raw nerve in Camacho. "If you were not as honorable as you are ... it might be said that you agreed with those who sustain that the poor do not have the right to life." Apprenticeships, he continued, gave many poor their only chance for an independent life. In addition to learning a trade, apprentices also acquired ideas of morality in the shop; without such positive influences, Bogota would probably be inhabited by a "mob of bandits" within ten years. The carpenter did admit that most artisans realized they were committing an economic error in teaching others their craft, but they had a moral obligation to help the children of their companions. Camacho commented that apprenticing the young was all the more necessary since the "adorers of free trade" had closed the church's places of public refuge. As to Samper's suggestion that the poor seek out more lucrative trades, Camacho questioned what might those trades be? Economic misery was affecting all trades, save perhaps government employment. If the government had protected the nation's industries, he chided, the "empleo-mania" that now drained its resources would not have developed. Camacho observed that nations which valued and protected their workers did not find themselves in such dire straits; parasitism was bound to increase in Colombia if its manual arts were not stimulated. The carpenter posited that bad work habits among artisans were not the cause of the economic situation that they faced; it was, in large part, due to the wars generated since 1851 by poor political institutions. Political struggle simply had to cease before the

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economy could be improved. Before 1849, Camacho asserted, the working classes had been dedicated to their labors and had associated only for mutual protection. Part of the solution thus lay in putting aside political passions for the general well-being, a task which artisans had already begun. (These efforts will be discussed below.) 201 Political passions had not hurt the craftsmen only through stirring up disorder. Camacho noted that the "comfortable" people of the capital showed favoritism to artisans of their political inclination, despite the quality of a man's work. Such political relationships permeated sources of credit, social relations, and friendship to the detriment of honesty, skill, or domestic virtue. By contrast, Camacho staunchly defended traditional artisan practices which helped to support fellow artisans who were suffering deprivation and called on the nation to intervene in favor of the people's economic well-being, emphasizing that reality was more important than theories of political economy. All in all, these ideas--and Camacho himselfwere quite representative of the character of artisan political sentiment an d activity in Bogota in the 1860s and the years thereafter. Aside from the remedies proposed by Samper and Camacho, certain practical steps were taken to relieve the misery of Bogota's working class after 1864. One such effort was the commissary of national products established by Juan Malo in that year. The commissary was intended to be a clearing house where craftsmen could bring their finished products instead of waiting for consumers to come to them and order an item manufactured. It was hoped that seeing ready made products would enhance sales. The commissary would also act as an exchange for raw materials, which artisans could pay for by their

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"8 commissions from products sold.Although artisans of the Union Society later asked the federal government for funds to aid similar ventures, there is little evidence to suggest that Malo's "commissary" helped artisans in any significant manner. 202 The absence of affordable educational facilities for children of craftsmen led artisans to found a Colegio de Artesanos in early 1865. Planning meetings were held in the disamortized San Francisco convent, which the government made available for the school. Numerous officials and public figures offered their free services as instructors for the .,. school, including President Murillo, Archbishop Antonio Herran, Lorenzo Maria Lleras, Teodoro Valenzuela, and Jos; Maria Vergara Vergara. The school was scheduled to open on February 1 and to offer a wide variety of instruction, ranging from reading, writing, and languages, to morals, religion, political economy, algebra, and constitutional law. Students would also be able to obtain instruction in trades such as woodworking, tailoring, or shoe making. Two methods of enrollment were offered for the ten-month academic year: an internal program which included meals and laundry services for 140 pesos; and an external "9 program for 80 centavos per month.The school was opened, but not without some criticism. Questions were raised as to the utility of teaching geometry to students whose primary needs were practical education. Most commentators, however, 60 praised it as an excellent idea. Unfortunately, Francisco Vega and 58 El Simbolo, June 14, 1864. 59 .,. Francisco Vega et al., "Cosas de artesanos" (Bogota, March 22, 1866); La Opinion, January 4, 18, 1866. 60 Vega et al., "Cosas de artesanos"; La Libertad, January 18, 1866; El Bogotano, March 9, 1866.

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others of the school's organizers did not have the financial capacity to sustain the school, and it promptly closed. Later in the same year they began a fund-raising drive to reopen the institution, but they were unsuccessful. In March 1866 the Conservative El Bogotano printed an article seeking to discover what had become of the funds collected for the school during the previous year. It was unjust, the paper claimed, to 203 falsely raise the hopes of the pueblo on such an important issue. 61 The accusations led to a detailed response from the school's organizers in which they noted their unsuccessful efforts to get official support for the project and bitterly included the governmental reply that these were "things of artisans." ' , The organizers were left with no choice but to close the school, but, to avoid unjust rumors, they included a complete statement of the institution's expenditures. The leaflet concluded with another appeal to legislators to reconsider support for the school, or creation of a government School of Arts and Trades to 62 help educate working class children. Typically, nothing came of the latter request until artisan political support was needed. In February 1867, amid growing tension between congress and President Mosquera, Francisco de P. Mateus, a representative from Cundinamarca, submitted a bill calling for 3,000 pesos worth of support for the project. Although the bill was approved in first debate, it was thereafter tabled for consideration of "more important" issues. 63 61 62 63 El Bogotano, March 9, 1866 . Vega et al., "Cosas de artesanos . " 'fil Nacional, February 23, 1867.

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204 The School of Artisans was only one sign that artisans were attempting to forward their own cause in the mid-1860s. Another was visible in the publication of El Obrero, edited by Jos~ Leocadio Camacho, beginning in August 1864. Camacho's purpose in publishing the paper was to promote the "cause of the workers" by uniting them independently of other groups in order to halt their manipulation by political gamonales. Just as upper class antipathy toward workers was not confined to a specific party, so too did Camacho reason that tradesmen should not be divided politically in seeking their material improvenment. Workers were unified by their material conditions and should work together, since they could expect no help from any other social sector. The early issues of El Obrero approached this goal quite passively, leading Emeterio Heredia to call upon Camacho to take a bolder public stance on issues that affected artisans. Apparently the suggestion was heeded, as the next issue recommended two tradesmen for Cundinamarca's assembly election. In forwarding their names, Camacho noted that tradesmen's voices ought to be heard, even though it 64 was not necessary that they rule politically. 'El Obrero dealt with workers' issues frequently, although its analyses were seldom expressed in a "plebeian" manner; Camacho's style was highly literate and even learned. Central to the miserable condition of the country's workers, he wrote, was the government's refusal to pass adopt higher tariff rates. Another of his constant themes was Colombia's habit of not honoring work, a fault characteristic of the upper class, which he said neither knew how to 64 El Obrero, July 15, October 6, 18, 1865.

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work nor appreciated its value. Camacho thought that the secret of maintaining public order was sufficient work for all, he therefore 65 criticized the government for its failure to support the arts. La Sociedad de Union de Artesanos, 1866-68 205 The last issue of El Obrero was released in October 1865, but its principles continued to be the fundamental political objectives of organized artisans in the capital. In late 1866, the themes that had emerged in the 1860s--rejection of partisan manipulation, artisan self help, and independent political action--provided the basis for the most important political organization of tradesmen in that decade. This was La Sociedad de Union de Artesanos. Established in September 1866, the Union Society operated during the turbulent period which encompassed Mosquera's abortive coup the following year, an event which contributed to the eventual demise of the Society in November 1868. The Society had as its primary objectives the removal of partisan politics from the artisan class and representation of the tradesmen's interest in the political arena. It drew its leadership both from artisans who came to political prominence in the 1860s and from those who had been active in the Democratic Society, but the former were more important in determining its direction. In order to understand the thrust of the Society in the capital's political scene, its ideology must first be examined. 65 Ibid., August 1, October 6, 7, November 1, 186j .

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206 The most detailed expression of nineteenth-century artisan political ideology emerged in the pages of the Union Society's official organ, La Alianza. (The Union Society itself was frequently referred to as "La Alianza".) Numerous craftsmen contributed to the elaboration of how a society should properly function and how a government should justly represent its citizens. They felt that not only did government in mid-nineteenth century Colombia differ from their republican ideal, but so too did the society which rewarded wealth and political power over positive social contributions. Artisans viewed the ideal republic as a collective social organism--a nation--composed of various elements, each of which contributed to its symbiotic operation. Citizens of the nation, because they were created by God, were equal at birth; no distinctions of nobility or inferiority divided the society. After birth, stratification emerged based upon one's positive social contributions, or one's negative manipulative abilities. Positive contributions consisted of virtuous behavior or work, while negative factors of stratification included inherited privilege, force of arms, 66 or political gamonalismo. Just as God's creation had endowed humanity with equality, so too did it dictate a moral basis for social well-being. Moral restraint was needed to bridle the passion of absolute liberty and contribute to the self-control and virtuous behaviour essential for a republican society. Human fallibility, moreover, precluded development of a moral society without religious guidance (See Ch. 2), but a republic required freedom of intellectual expression and could not be dominated by a 66 La Alianza, January 4, April 11, 1868.

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207 moralizing church. For a republican society to function properly, both moral and intellectual forces thus needed to be in balance: citizens guided only by moral considerations tended to be fanatics who denied others their due rights, while purely intellectual (rationalist) influences produced a vain scientificism that also curbed free 67 expression . The family was held in high esteem as the primary vehicle for diffusion of these principles. Through the family children learned morality and traditions, as well as the craft by which they would become a contributing part of society. Education was closely aligned with the family as an integral facet of republican society. By education citizens could distinguish between crime and virtue and develop an awareness of their rights. Without education good citizenship was difficult because ignorance allowed for anti-republican 68 manipulation. A nation, as conceived by the artisans, was composed of numerous different social elements, foremost being producers and consumers. Craftsmen stressed the positive social importance of work and production, suggesting that people who consumed without producing were . violating the will of God as expressed in the curse laid upon Adam. Producers were not limited, however, to manual laborers; merchants, lawyers, and farmers, to cite only a few occupations, all contributed to the productive process. Ideally, these elements of society were 67 1867. 68 Ibid., October 10, December 1, 1866, January 10, 20, May 14, Ibid., October 20, December 1, 1866, April 13, 1867.

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208 positively balanced in a symbiotic relationship which Jose Leocadio Camacho illustrated in a discussion of the social function of property. Workers produced by their labor and skills, while their social opposites consumed and caused capital to circulate. Camacho equated these two functions with the poor and rich, noting that the poor had the social obligation to work and produce, while the rich must consume and stimulate the arts. In a nation in which property's proper social function was fulfilled, neither the rich nor the poor abused their role, and a balance existed between producers and consumers. (Camacho 69 lamented that such was unfortunately not the case in Colombia.) According to La Alianza, a republic was the only form of government able to represent the interests of the nation. Such a government was bound by social contract to act for the people, and thus should be popularly elected, justly representative, with parties alternating in power, and, most importantly, responsible to the nation. Ambrosio L6pez spelled out the terms of the contract between governed and government in detail. The people were obligated to delegate much of their individual liberty to the government so that it could manage for all; they should support it by both their taxes and labor; and, when necessary, citizens should defend the government with their blood. In return, the republican government was to maintain order and peace; rule in the best interests of the nation; administer justice with respect for the law and property; and instruct and protect its citizens, in the first case to foster their republican spirit and in 69 4, 1868. Ibid., October 10, 20, 1866, August 10, 1867, January 4, April

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the second to guard their industry. The contract was complete, Lopez concluded, when both nation and government fulfilled their respective obligations. The grandfather of Alonso Lopez Pumarejo was forced to note, however, that in practice the government most frequently acted for itself and abused the transfer of power in violation of the 70 contract. 209 The most ardent criticism of the present government concerned the never-ending battle between the two parties. This was a constant thread in the artisans' political thinking; the very purpose of La Alianza was to avoid the multiple ramifications of the party struggle. According to the Union's ideology, parties should represent the various interests of the nation, keeping in mind its collective nature. In actuality, however, their impassioned antagonism was based upon a struggle for power and control of the nation's treasury. Both parties were equally at fault, their leaders wanting nothing more than to enrich themselves at the public's expense. Obviously their political bosses merely sought the people's votes in times of peace or their arms in times of war. Since Independence the passions of the people had been manipulated in this manner by self-serving parties, leading one artisan to refer to them as a "social gangrene." The party struggle also permeated the judicial and legislative process, preventing 71 deliverance of justice or passage of virtuous laws. 70 Ibid., May 14, 1867, February 8, 15, 22, 29, March 14, 1868, 71 Ibid., October 20, December 10, 1866, January 20, February 13, March 4, April 3, September 5, 1867, January 25, 1868.

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210 In addition to causing the division of the artisan class, party struggles were the principal cause of the civil strife in which the poor and craftsmen paid dearly. Artisans accepted that citizens had the obligation to defend the countr y in the event of foreign aggression, but, contrary to their principles, military sacrifices to date had been the result of inter-party strife. Both the army and the municipal guard (which acted as a local police force and as a supplement for the army in times of war) were composed largely of artisans, especially the guard. In theory, this service was obligatory for all citizens, but in practice the rich were able to avoid service while the poor and artisans were forceably recruited. To make matters worse, officials were often political appointees who used their powers quite arbitrarily. Agustin Novoa proposed that one ~ay to avoid these problems would be to make military duty voluntary, and that guard members should elect their officers. In discussing the consequences of civil strife, Camacho himself noted that, while the poor and workers died in battle, all social sectors suffered in turn. The rich, he observed, lost not only their capital in forced loans, but also their crops, equipment, and animals, while merchants lost capital, business, . 72 and credit. If the desired republic were to become a reality, craftsmen stressed that much progress had to be made in both political and general education. The government had the education of its citizens as one of its primary obligations, because without popular education 72 Ibid., October 10, December 10, 1866, January 3, April 3, 5, September 5, 1867.

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211 neither freedom nor the hallowed notion of "popular sovereignty" could be obtained. Equally important to the tradesmen was training in technical skills, which would improve their arts and also decrease the possibility of being s~ayed by political obligations formed by economic 73 dependency on certain upper-class patrons. One of the obligations of the nation's citizens was support of the government by paying taxes, in return for which it was responsible for guarding their interests and industry. However, in the best statement of La Alianza's economic ideology, Camacho emphasized that citizens of Bogot~ were taxed by the federal, state, and district governments, which placed upon them a tremendous burden. Yet none of these governments, least of all that of Cundinamarca, looked after the people's well-being. He complained bitterly that high taxes upon sales, shops, and production, in addition to foreign competition, were decimating native industries. Camacho recommended several changes in economic policies to rectify that situation. Camacho's multi-faceted proposal included: sponsorship of programs of immigration for skilled craftsmen; establishment of government-protected industries and training programs; higher tariff rates; rewarding native arts by way of expositions and prizes; rigorous suppression of contraband; and lifting of direct taxes upon the consumer. Together these reforms would, in the carpenter's opinion, cause industry to flourish and the nation's wealth to grow. (Nothing could be done, he cautioned, until good 74 representatives were elected to serve the people.) 73 Ibid., October 20, December 1, 1866, January 20, February 6, 13, April 13, 1867. 74 Ibid., January 10, February 13, 1867. Other recommendations by Felipe Roa Ramfrez were to improve the local economy by means of

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212 Several authors were critical not only of the actions of the national government, but also of its federalist structure. On the one hand, Novoa argued that Bogota was the only area of the country that had not profited from decentralization; it suffered the burden of three governments--federal, state, and district--and thus could not control its own destiny. Others argued that a return to centralization was necessary to stop political conflicts between the regions of the country, and govern for the nation as a whole. Federalism had served to expand the numbers of well-paid officials, who "1ere becoming increasingly unresponsive to the needs of their constituents. In addition, Congress was particularly guilty of abdicating its responsibility. Camacho claimed that it met yearly, collected its salaries, and did nothing positive. Yearly meetings were simply too frequent and two-year terms were too short to do any good--though long enough to cause trouble. Camacho proposed that Congress meet every six years and attend to the obvious needs of the state, including election 75 of a president who would also serve for six years. By no means did tradesmen of the Union limit themselves to criticism of the national government; the rulers of Cundi.namarca were . fiercely attacked as well. While one author noted that the region had never been governed well, after the political machine of Ramon Gomez came to power in 1861, the situation had seriously worsened. The road construction, jointly sponsored by the governments of Boyaci and Cundinamarca, which would facilitate expansion of the regional market. Ibid., October 20, 1866. 75 Ibid., November 10, 1866, February 13, May 4, 14, 1867, March 14, 1868.

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213 sapista governments (as they were called) were universally condemned by La Alianza as being corrupt and self-serving. Camacho alleged that collusion existed between the "rich and the great" to exploit the people, especially by means of a heavy tax burden. ~~en a constituent congress was held for the state after Mosquera's aborted coup, the 76 group campaigned vigorously to help end the sapista stranglehold. Tradesmen viewed society and government from their class position, which was deteriorating economically and was subject to continual political manipulation. The path of economic development incorporated into the governmental structure since the 1840s had caused foreign products to undermine their once secure productive niche. As a consequence of their losses, artisans were experiencing a threat to their social status. Much of their political expression evolved from that threat. These, then, were the ideological suppositions the Union Society sought to adhere to from its inception in September 1866, while .,, organizing artisans of Bogota. On September 15, 1866, a circular had been distributed to politically-active craftsmen seeking their support for foundation of a society dedicated to eliminating partisan divisions within the artisan class and promoting measures favorable to that social sector. The circular requested that each interested artisan subscribe to La Alianza as a measure of their support. The circular was released by the Directive Body of the proposed organization that .,, _ . consisted of: Antonio Cardenas, president; Saturnino Gonzalez, vice president; and Felipe Roa Ramirez, secretary. Other members of the 76 Ibid., February 13, May 29, June 14, 1867, April 25, 1868.

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214 Directory included Calisto Ballesteros, Ambrosio Lopez, Genaro Mart!n, / 77 and Jose Leocadio Camacho. The Union Society's first general meeting was held on October 1, with a claimed membership of 300. The rules of the organization, formally approved at a November 18 general meeting, reiterated the group's intention to work for the well-being of its members and improvement of their arts. Membership was contingent upon several prerequisites: excercise of an art or manual profession; honorable private and public behavior; and satisfaction of various mutual obligations. These included: mutual aid; observance of the Society's rules and sanctions; preparation of a work for proposed yearly expositions; and payment of monthly fees according to one's ability. Members were prohibited from wearing or possessing foreign made clothing or shoes, and they had to subscribe to La Alianza. They were also obligated to be politically independent and committed not only to abstain from disruptive public activities but to denounce threatening manipulation before the Society. Members had to pledge to further educational endeavors favorable to the artisan class, such as the Colegio de Artesanos, and they were obligated to vote for honorable men irrespective of their party. A tentative slate of officers was also selected at the November 18 meeting. Jos~ Leocadio Camacho was chosen to be its president; Saturnino Gonzalez continued as vice president; 77 Antonio Cardenas va'squez et al., "Varios artesanos de todas los gremios ..• " (Bogota, September 15, 1866). The remaining members were Anjel Mar(a Gomez, Cruz Sanchez, Camilo Vasquez, Mariano Gonzalez, Daniel Boada, Rafael Tapais, and Jose Marla Pedraza.

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Sanchez was selected tresurer; and Felipe Roa Ram!rez was asked to 78 serve as secretary. La Alianza's first political recommendations, a slate for municipal council, ~ere true to its non-partisan stance. Seven Union 215 members were part of the 22-name list, which also featured Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara (Conservative), Ezequiel Rojas (Liberal), Nicolas Leiva (Liberal), and Manuel Pombo (Conservative). These ~en were referred to as honorable men who would work for all the people, and who 79 deserved a unified artisan vote. Unfortunately for the Society, it was organized during the time when the antipathy between Mosquera and the Radicals erupted into open conflict. When Mosquera assumed the presidency in May 1866, Radicals in congress challenged several of his proposals and refused to authorize an English loan the president had negotiated while representing the country in England a few years earlier. Matters worsened after the close of congress's session; Mosquera decreed reorganization of state militias, ordered review of sales of properties of manos muertas, and expropriated additional church holdings. These moves met with public and political opposition which, when Mosquera realized their unpopularity, drove him to submit his resignation and call for a national plebiscite to select a new executive. The resignation was not accepted, however. 80 78 79 80 La Alianza, October 1, November 10, 20, 1866. Ibid., December 12, 1866. Delpar, Red against Blue, 91; H!rez Aguirre, 25 anos, 261-62.

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216 At the opening of congress on February 1, 1867, the hostility between that body and the president had increased greatly from the year before. Radicals had secured control of both branches of congress by working with Conservative delegates in opposition to Mosquera, an alliance he and his followers tried to break by denying five Conservative senators the right to assume their duties. The extent of the conflict was demonstrated on February 10, when Radicals were able 81 to select presidential designates not favored by Mosquera. In March congress attempted to revoke Mosquera's November 1867 expropriation of church buildings, and to pass a public order law which reduced the already limited capacity of the federal government to interfere in case of internal conflicts in a state. On March 14, Mosquera declared broken his relations with congress, a move that he revoked two days later on counsel from his advisors and in the face of public opposition. The Pact of March 16 temporarily calmed the situation, but it did little to settle the fundamental differences between Mosquera 82 and the congress. This manuevering for power led, as before, to attempts to recruit artisan support. Numerous disturbances in the congressional galleries 83 were blamed on craftsmen attempting to influence the deliberations. On February 13, Mosquera reportedly met with a delegation of some 20 81 Santos Gut{errez, Santos Acosta, and Jose Mar1a Villamizar Gallardo. 82 La Prensa, March 5, 15, 19, 1867; Perez Aguirre, 25 anos, 16466; Delpar, Red against Blue, 61; Gustavo Humberto Rodr!guez, Santos Acosta: Caudillo del radicalismo (Bogota: Biblioteca Colombians de Cultura, 1972), 128-31. 83 La Alianza, February 20, 1867; La Prensa, March 15, 1867.

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217 craftsmen, desiring to secure their allegiance. Newspapers also joined in the recruitment efforts. The Radical newspaper El Mensajero responded to this by praising tradesmen for having "intelligently" rejected political manipulation in favor of legitimate representatives and self-help programs. According to the paper's editors, official attempts to mobilize Liberal artisans were well-known, as were the shortcomings of those efforts. 84 Not to be outdone, Mosqueristas replied that the president did have widespread support among the craft sector, citing as evidence congressional limits placed upon the artisan-dominated guard. In language reminiscent of the 17 de Abril, El Nacional accused Golgotas and Conservatives of conspiring to destroy 85 the nation's institutions at the expense of the people. It is likely that the pro-Mosquera mobilization of artisans spoken of in this exchange was conducted by shoemaker Jose Antonio Saavedra, who had been active in politics since the 1850s. Saavedra, a colonel in the National Guard, helped to organize a Democratic Society in March, which was denounced by La Alianza as a "small band of artisans" who were trying to break their union by drawing its members into the political fray. Only 30 craftsmen were responsible for the efforts to return Bogota to the days of the Democratic and Popular Societies, according to the paper. They were, however, doomed to failure because of lingering memories of 1854 and the work of the Union Society. Rumors of conflict, wrote Dionisio Soto, meant that the Society had to 86 redouble its efforts to unify the artisan class. 84 El Mensajero, February 15, 21, 1867. 85 El Nacional, February 23, 24, 1867. 86 La Alianza, March 4, 1867.

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In spite of the political atmosphere of the capital, La Alianza made plans to press the artisans' cause before the national legislature. Laws were needed, the organization felt, to protect the people from attack on their religious beliefs; to lessen their onerous tax burden; to provide for free public education; and to gain tariff 87 protection. These appeals appear to have been lost, however, in the developing political crisis. 218 In late March, Murillo reopened the political conflict in an address to the congress in which he labeled Mosquera's conduct toward that body criminal. Congressional consirleration of a bill revoking Mosquera's November expropriation of church property heightened the tension; so too did passage of the public order law. In April, rumors that pro-Mosquera mobilizations were taking place in various areas of the country swept through Bogota. When congress made known its intention to investigate Mosquera for his secret acquisition of a warship from the United States for possible use in Peru's conflict with Spain, the president lost all restraint. On April 29 he declared the 88 nation to be in a state of war and closed the congress. La Alianza maintained a reserved and passive attitude toward the 29 de Abril coup. On April 31, a delegation from its Directive Body visited Mosquera requesting the release of Conservative publisher Nicolas Ponton, who had been arrested for his multiple attacks against the president in the press. Mosquera refused to release Ponton, 87 Ibid., January 20, February 6, 20, 1867. 88 7El Nacional, April 30, 1867; Jerez .Aguirre, 25 anos, 267-68; Humberto Rodr{guez, Santos Acosta, 128-31.

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219 referring to him as a scandalous threat to public order. Mosquera did promise, however, to respect the liberty of the press for those who conducted themselves properly. Efforts to recruit tradesmen by force into the National Guard elicited criticism from the Union Society, which asked for the freedom of men illegally taken. The paper thought it noteworthy, however, that Saavedra had treated his men well in the Guard. Aside from these few comments, the Society did little more than urge artisans to stay in their shops until the presidential adventure 89 ended. Few public manifestations against Mosquera marked his brief dictatorship, but plans were laid for a counter-coup from its opening day. These coalesced on the night of May 22, when Mosquera was arrested without resistance. On May 23, the army declared its loyalty to second designate Santos Acosta, who then assumed the presidency: the Mosqueran dictatorship was concluded almost as uneventfully as it had begun. Indalecio Lievano Aguirre has written that artisans supported the 29 de abril with the same enthusiasm as they had backed the revolt of Melo 13 years earlier. L{evano cited the role of Saavedra as evidence of this support, but does little else to prove his claim. 90 Saavedra was, indeed, extremely active in the coup, it is likely that he was responsible for much of the agitation among artisans in the months 91 prior to the coup. Later in the year Saavedra was the only prominent 89 90 senado: 62, 64, 91 La Alianza, May 4, 14, 1867. Indalecio Lievano Aguirre, El proceso de Mosquera ante el Tree conferencias (Bogota: Editorial Revista Colombiana, 1966), 92, 99. La Alianza, May 29, 1867.

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220 craftsman who signed a statement in defense of the beleaguered general, although his was not the only artisan name on the document. 92 Although rumors of widespread artisan involvement in the coup were rampant, the behavior of this single cobbler and those artisans who may have joined him stands in poor contrast to the widespread support for Melo in 185~. ,, There thus seems to be little evidence to support Lievano's thesis. By contrast, evidence that artisans refused to participate in the threat to public order is w~despread. Numerous leaflets praised the May 23 restoration of legitimate order and pleaded for political 93 calm. The Union Society attested that if liberal artisans had joined the coup as they had 13 years earlier, then it would have been very difficult to restore order. That they did not was "in large part due 94 to the Society of 'La Alianza'." lbwever beneficial to the cause of peace the influence of La Alianza may have been, the unity of the organization itself was shattered by the coup. Immediately after Mosquera's fall, a rumor circulated through Bogota that "notable" citizens were collecting funds to ship artisans in mass to the llanos in order to still their voices. The Union Society denied the truth of the rumor, and also downplayed allegations that secret meetings of discontented tradesmen were taking 95 place. El Diario Oficial also discounted the rumor in a clear 92 La Libertad, October 31, November 6, 13, December 4, 11, 25, 1867, January 1, 1868. 93 Un liberal honrado, "A los artesanos sensatos" (Bogota, June 1, 1867; Uno que no vive de empleo sino de su trabajo, "Degollacion de los artesanos" (Bogota, June 11, 1867); Dos artesanos, "A los artesanos" (Bogota, June 11, 1867); El Republicano, July 17, 1867. 94 95 La Alianza, May 29, 1867. Ibid., June 14, 1867.

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221 attempt to dampen the impact of such a threat to Bogot;'s artisans. It related that shop owners realized the inaccuracy of the report, but that the mass of workers could be easily swayed by such a threat. The government charged that the perpertrators of the rumors were those who had taken part in the coup attempt, and who still desired to disrupt 96 law and order. In late June, artisans from both parties, including Emeterio Heredia, Cruz Sanchez, Calisto Ballesteros, Ambrosio Lopez, ,,. ,,. ,,. Genaro Martin, Tomas Rodriguez, and others declared that they would not be agitated by those trying to disturb the peace and promised to do all 97 in their powers to maintain peaceful conditions. Charges and counter-charges about the alleged threats to public 98 order involving artisans continued over the following weeks. In the midst of this situation, the Union Society struggled for survival. La Alianza ceased publication from June 14 until August, and then from early September until late-November. During the first interlude, Agust{n Novoa published El Pueblo, which presented the same message as the other paper, an indication of the weakening of the Union's 99 bonds. On July 20 the Society elected a cabinet of unity to deal with the crisis. It met again on the 28th and on August 15. ~ben publication of the paper resumed in August, the subject of unity and the struggle to restore the alliance of workers "against the league of lazy exploiters 96 El Diario Oficial, June 7' 11, 1867. 97 r El Re2ublicano, July 17, 1867. 98 La Re2ublica, August 14, 1867 . 99 , Fl Pueblo, June 22, 29, June 6, 13, 1867.

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of the people" were its dominant themes. At the meeting of the 15th, Doctor J. Peregrino Sanmiguel noted that disunity, in the form of partisan politics, had firmly gripped their group. Only a handful of 222 its members remained, which in his view forced the organization to reform itself in order to broaden its appeal. One measure proposed was establishment of a "School of Arts and Trades" to train craftsmen; another was to extend the Society throughout the nation; and the last was to admit foreign craftsmen and non-artisan supporters such as 100 Sanmiguel to the Society. One factor possibly contributing to the group's unity problems was the electioneering surrounding the selection of a contituent assembly for the State of Cundinamarca. The election was called following Mosquera's defeat and the Society proclaimed it a splendid opportunity to effect desperately needed reforms. It urged members to select progressive young men as representatives who could end sapista 101 domination of the state. Two election slates were formed for the Bogot~ district, one by Conservatives and the other by Liberals. Jes~ Leocadio Camacho was the only person included on both lists--indicating either his political importance, or the parties' recognition of the 102 need for the artisan vote, or both. The Conservative slate won the contest, polling about two-thirds of the 1400 votes cast; Camacho's 103 vote total was second highest of the candidates. In the constituent 100 101 102 14, 1867. 103 La Alianza, August 1, 10, 5, September S, 1867. Ibid., May 29, June 14, 1867. "Union de artesanos" (Bogota, June 19, 1867); La Prensa, June La Prensa, June 25, 1867.

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assembly, which rewrote the state's constitution, the artisan leader sat on the election committee. Elections were also held later in the year for other state and national offices, including the governorship, which was won by Conservative Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara. Numerous artisans were forwarded by two Conservative factions and the single Liberal slate, and Camacho was elected as an alternate to the National 104 Congress. In November, Mosquera was tried by the congress on multiple charges and officially removed from the presidency. The general's three-year jail sentence was commuted to exile in Peru, where he resided until 1871. The pro-Mosquera La Libertad carried a detailed defense of the ex-president during the last few months of the year, supposedly made by artisans and others of his supporters. It centered upon Mosquera's lifelong support of the people against anarchistic Radicalism, whose criminal actions had at last conquered legitimate rule. Artisan signers of the document included Saavedra, Ignacio Beltran, Bartolom'e Paniagua, Ram~n Ordonez Torres, Agust{n Garai, and Prajedes Bermudez, many of whom had fought with Melo and some of whom Al b 105 were ianza mem ers. In November steps were once again taken to reform the Union Society, largely on the initiative of Cruz sa'nchez. A meeting of some 100 members was held on November 10. Another gathering on the 18th redesigned the group's charter to reflect the proposals of August; 104 Ibid., September 4, 1867; La Patria, October 4, 1867; La Libertad, December 25, 1867. 105 La Libertad, October 31, November 6, 13, December 4, 11, 25, 1867, January 1, 1868. 223

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membership was opened to non-artisans and emphasis on educational aspects of the group was increased. A meeting of the general membership on December 5 marked the formal reintegration of the Society. It was said to have been attended by over 400 artisans and their supporters. New officers selected to head the Directive Body during its next six months included: Juan Caceres, president; Agustin D(az, vice president; Mariano Gonzalez, secretary; and Fuljencio Roa, 106 treasurer. Speakers at the general session focused upon the central 224 principles of the organization and the ongoing need to avoid partisan alignment. At the same time, the Society agreed on a political agenda: to work for a 107. tariff increase on competitive foreign goods; to ask the governor of Cundinamarca for an end to taxes on books used for public education and to establish free schools for children of both sexes; and to call on church officials to end the active political role 107 of clerics. In the new year, both the Society and its paper presented a more aggressive character. Jose L. Camacho continued as one of the paper's editors, but he was now joined by Venezuelan-born Manuel de Jesus Barrera, whose editorial style added a new dimension to the paper. Moreover, outside writers, notably Manuel Maria Madiedo, began contributing to La Alianza on a regular basis. These changes apparently did not hurt the group's reorganization, as 800 people 106 La Alianza, December 5, 21, 1867, February 1, 1868. 107 La Prensa, December 13, 1867. The speeches of the meetings are in La Alianza, January 4, 18, 25, 1868. A non-artisan participant, J. Joaqu{n Borda, told the meeting of plans to start a Sunday School program for "children of the pueblo," which began operation in 1868. La Prensa, December 13, 1867.

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attended a January 26 meeting to approve the new charter. At that meeting Saturnina Gonzalez was chosen as the Society's general 108 president, and Antonio Cardenas as its vice-president. 225 Through the early months of 1868, the Union Society placed a great deal of emphaisis on what it considered the worsening economic situation of the capital city, which was indiscriminately blamed on the expensive governmental apparatus, usurious capitalists, a lack of coinage, all too frequent wars, and floods of foreign imports. The city was said to suffer from high food prices because a few "monopolists" had been able to gain control of the market's food supply. As part of its own effort to alleviate the people's misery, the Society made plans to start a Savings Bank, using members' deposits, which would then be made available in the form of loans. When congress opened on February 1, the Society refused to deliver the normal honorific accolades, saying that until the congressmen began to act like representatives of the people, the group would continue to withhold its approval. The measures needed to win the Society's support were: maintenance of peace; prompt governmental assistance in l 09 ending the general misery; and tariff protection. In keeping with its December resolution, the Society presented a petition to congress on March 14 in support of higher tariff rates. It requested two actions: an increase of duties on competitive foreign merchandise and lowered tariffs on raw materials used in the production of national goods. Some 250 names ~ere included on the petition, and 108 109 La Alianza, February 1, 1868. La Alianza, January 18, February 1, March 7, 28, 1868.

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it was claimed that 3,000 more were archived in the 110 Society's offices. Three weeks later the Junta Piadosa, whose 226 president was Ambrosio L6pez, presented a similar request in support of 111 La Alianza's petition. The Chamber of Representative reviewed the petitions on April 3, only to soundly reject them. A bitter article in the Society's paper related that three of its commissioners had presented their case with decorum and humility, in stark contrast to the disruption that had marked the submissions of previous petitions. It was clear to Camacho and Barrera, however, that the representatives had the same amount of respect for moderate behavior as they had had for turbulence. As elections for new representatives were approaching, the Society reminded its members that only those people who had supported their 112 appeal deserved artisan votes. While the Society was submitting its tariff request, political activity in anticipation of the May election for state legislators began to stir the city. The Directive Body of the Society met on numerous occasions to consider possible candidates; its members were llO Gonzalez et al., "lepresentacion al Congreso Nacional"; La Alianza, March 15, 1868. 111 La Alianza, April 13, 1868. 112 La Alianza, April 11, 1868. The Conservative La Prensa described the petition process in detail, claiming that the true cause of the economic misery was not foreign imports, but the result of party-generated wars which had robbed consumers of their funds. Thus it noted that the people who rejected the petition were the same people who had caused the problems in the first place. The paper warned that political agitators were ready to take advantage of the artisan's dissapointments, and counciled craftsmen to remain peaceful. La Prensa, April 14, 1868; La Alianza, April 18, 1868.

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227 reminded that they had to register in order to vote and also of the organization's mandate to vote as a bloc. By the end of April, an independent slate of Alianza candidates was decided upon which included 113 both artisans and their supporters. In this election, rowever, the Union Society faced organized competition for the artisan vote, for in late March a group of about 150 men had met to organize a Democratic Society. It elected Jose P. Saavedra as its president; Eliseo Pay~n of the Cauca as vice-resident; and Joaquin Calvo Mendivil as its 114 secretary. Saavedra's leadership of the new Democratic Society firmly linked it to the Mosquera wing of the Libera 1 party, wl: ich '{,; as attempting to reverse its setbacks of the previous year. The May 3rd election was widely interpreted as a victory for the .,. mosqueristas, but the Conservative list did well also. Jose A. Saavedra was elected to represent the barrio of Catedral, while Conservative printer Nicolis Ponton was chosen to represent the town of Mosquera. Also returned to the state assembly was "El Sapo," Raui'on Gomez, who had been dethroned along with Mosquera the year before. Jose Leocadio Camacho, who was listed in both Alianza and Conservative slates, drew sufficient votes to serve as an alternate. No other artisans were so honored and the Alianza slate drew only 114 115 votes. The election was marred by numerous accusations of fraud, particularly from Conservatives. I.a Prensa blamed their loss on the 113 La Alianza, April 4, 11, May 2, 1868. 114 La Inde:eendencia, March 28, 1868. 115 La Paz, June 5, 1868.

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228 Union Society, alleging that its independent slate had allowed the 116 Liberal victory. La Alianza, in reply, argued that it was not responsible to either of the parties and was trying only to open the door to the people's political participation. Despite the mediocre showing of its slate, the Union announced that it was preparing the way for long-term victories. (The same article, however, noted serious divisions within its organization.) 117 Unfortunately, whatever unity the Society might have achieved in the months after its December reorganization was irreversibly lost in the wake of this election contest. On May 13, numerous members of the Society's Directive Body, led by Rafael Tapfas and Francisco Olaya, resigned in protest over what they called the politicization of the group. They claimed that recent months had witnessed a marked change in the Society, as it abandoned its independent character to form an open political alignment with our "worst enemies . 11 (The enemies were not named.) The protesters promised to return to the organization when 118 it returned to its original path. Both the Society and one of its founding members, Calisto Ballesteros, strongly denounced the dissidents. Ballesteros claimed that the Society had always been politically oriented and, if it had changed, it was to become even more representative of the tradesmen's interests. 116 117 118 The organization was ridding itself of influences such as La Prensa, May 5, 1868. La Alianza, May 9, 1868. Calisto Ballesteros, "Protests de varios miembros (a) de la Junta Directivairectiva de la Sociedad de la Alianza" (Bogot&, nd).

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229 that of Tapfas, whom he called a slave of "those who wanted to keep 119 workers in obscurity." 'The Society accused the men, especially Tapias, of having violated both the letter and the spirit of the 120 organization, and expelled them on May 21. The political divisions among Bogota's artisans ~ere further revealed when a Popular Society was founded in the Egipto barrio in 121 June. Determining the cause of these rifts is not an easy task, but they illustrate the difficulties of maintaining artisan organizational solidarity. The Democratic Society's alignment is easily seen. Saavedra and Payan were solid supporters of Mosquera. At least insofar as Saavedra is concerned, the Democratic Society represented the artisan body that backed the political ambitions of the caucano general. The Popular Society \!las much less influential that the Democratic Society, but it too was strongly aligned with a major political party, the Conservative. No artisan names were, however, linked to it, making its relationship to the craftsmen's political spectrum impossible to determine. With regard to la Alianza, it seems that while a core cf its members remained true to its original non-partisan objectives, the organization itself underwent noticeable changes in 1868 that in part reflect the influences of Barrera and Madiedo. Madiedo's presence 119 Ibid. The reference is to Tapias 's June 1867 article "El Lunes," in 'Which he criticized worker's celebration of St. Monday as contributing to political conflict, as well as to a waste of time and money. 'The article elicited a large negative reaction at the time. La Alianza, June 14, August 1, 1867. 120 Ibid., May 23, 1868. 121 La Paz, June 5, 19, 23, July 3, 1868.

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suggests that Tapias's protest may have been at least partially valid because the mavarick politician used the pages of La Alianza to engage 122 in several polemics. Numerous contributions to La Alianza by tradesmen were significantly more aggressive after the December reorganization as well, which suggests that Madiedo was not solely responsible for its new face. It is likely that the Society's 230 experience, combined with the worsening economic situation, contributed to the new political stance. In short, it appears that the multiple currents that the Union Society had been founded to avoid engulfed it after May 1868. Many artisans continued their efforts to politically unify their class, but others seemed to think that their goals could only be reached by more direct support for Mosquera or the Conservatives. The only political faction that artisans did not support were the Radicals, who were coming to control the nation's political machinery. The Society's Directive Body met on July 26 to select new officials and to once again attempt reunification. RaDlbn Jimenez was chosen president; F~liz Izasa was elected vice-resident; and Tomas Rodr{guez, the son of the Society of Artisans' founder, Agust1n Rodr{guez, was named secretary. The meeting was described as the best since December and was praised for having started the recovery from the "ill-advised" 122 An indication of Madiedo's influence was an article entitled "El Cristo y los Ricos" published in April that presented an articulate analysis of the labor theory of value which coincided well with the ideological stance revealed by artisan contributors to La Alianza. La Alianza, April 25, May 9, 30, 1868. This article produced a splendid polemic. See La Prensa, June 2, 1868; La Paz, May 26, June 2, 9, 16, 1868. prensa On Madiedo's social thought see Jaramillo Uribe, El pensamiento colombiana, 187-97.

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231 May resignations. The Directive Body officially protested preparations for war that were being undertaken in Cundinamarca and vowed that it 123 would do all that it could to avoid more civil conflict. Unfortunately for the Union Society, its fragmentation had not ended. In early August, Cruz Sanchez criticized moves to prepare the state for war as president of the Supreme Directive Body of the newly founded "Union Society of Artisans." Sanchez apparently began this group in order to return to non-partisan alignment as professed by the 124 original Union Society. Initially, La Alianza praised the goals of what they referred to as the Supreme Society, observing that they were the sa~e as those of La Alianza. Soon, however, La Alianza informed its subscribers that correspondence was being sent to the wror.g society because of the confusion between the names. The matter quickly came to a head 'When, on August 24, Sanchez was expelled from the Union Society for not returning Society property; for violation of the constitution; and for founding an antagonistic group with the Society's second 125 name. As might have been expected, artisan unity in the face of civil 126 strife was once again the Society's central theme. By October, 123 124 (Bogota, Alianza' 1868). 125 126 La Alianza, August 15, 1868. Saturnina Gonzalez, "Dos palabras en la cue st i~n Alianza" June 13, 1868); Isidor Madero, "El senor Cruz sa'nchez i J 'La ante el tribunal de la opini~n publica" (Bogot;, September JC, La Alianza, August 15, 25, September 15, 1868. It concerned itself as well with other topics. It petitioned the state assembly for public funds to send four artisan children to the Colegio de la Merced, a request that was favorably received but not immediately funded. La Alianza, August 25, September 5, 1868.

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signals of approaching conflict in Cundinamarca led the Society to increase the tempor of its pacifist campaign with a large petition in which the tradesmen pledged their solidarity to prevent war, and expressed their refusal to serve as cannon fodder unless upper class citizens vere also called to service. 127 At the same time, Liberal artisans were actively supporting their party through the Detr.ocratic 128 Society, also in anticipation of looming conflict. The cause of the impending crisis was, according to La Alianza's editors, nothing more than a "question of men, salaries, and power;" principles 'lo ere not at 232 stake. On November 7, the last issue of La Alianza was released with the message that it would resume publication when the crisis had passed. Three days later the Conservative state administration was overthrown by the Liberal federal authorities. There is no evidence of 129 the Union Society's operations after that date. The November 10 arrest of Governor Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara was precipitated by months of conflict with the more Liberal state assembly. In early October Gutierrez had reorganized the National Guard and shortly thereafter began distributing weapons to Conservative citizens. On November 9, he denounced much of the assembly's recent legislation, set up new election guidelines, and called yet another constituent convention. Liberal federal authorities labeled the governor's actions unconstitutional and had him arrested the ne x t day. 127 Ramon Jimenez et al., "La situacion" (Bogota, October 6, 1868); La Alianza, October 4, 25, 1868. 128 El Noticioso de Cundinamarca, October 8, 1868. 129 La Alianza, October 29, November 7, 1868.

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Although the Supreme Court did not uphold the legality of the federal move, power in Cundinamarca shifted from Conservative to Liberal 130 hands. Conclusion The political activity of artisans from 1855 until 1868 shared many features with that of the earlier period, but it also had several significant differences. The most important similarity was the continued appeal to and use of tradesmen by political parties in their pursuit of power. This was clear after the defeat of Melo, when golgotas quickly forgot their differences with Melistas and draconians 233 in order to rebuild the Liberal party to counter Conservative strengths. Artisans, by their positions as losers in the Melo coup, were unable to assert their objectives autonomously within the reunited Liberal party, but their potential power was evident by the tenacity with which Golgotas pursued them. The rapidity with which radical appeals to craftsmen ended after the 1857 presidential contest illustrated the opportunistic nature of this recruitment process. Lorenzo Mar{a Lleras's post-war role provided a logical linkage to earlier periods, but he too suffered by the loss of draconian prestige. In the pre-Civil War period, the most important new component was the appearance of Manuel Marfa Madiedo as a recruiter of artisar: support. Madiedo's editorship of El Nucleo foretold a political relationship which bore fruit in the 1860s, that of artisans and maverick 130 Perez Aguirre, 25 anos, 282-90.

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politicians cut more from Conservative than from Liberal cloth. Orthodox Conservatives, the obvious beneficiaries from universal manhood suffrage, saw no need to pursue the artisan vote, and made no effort to appeal to tradesmen. 234 The Civi 1 War of 1859-62 had momentous consequences for bogotano artisans. Cn the political level, Conservatives suffered a defeat from which they needed 25 years to recover. The Radical/Mosquera coalition emerged from the war with only themselves as competitors, which proved to be more than enough. Mosquera took advantage of his wartime powers to strip the church of many of its remaining temporal assets, not sc much because of the Gran General's ideological commitments, as because of his appraisal of power politics. For artisans, the war reinforced a feeling of political exploitation, as once again they were used as cannon fodder, only to be forgotten when the battles ended. Moreover, anti-church decrees alienated many tradesmen who felt that the church's capacity to fulfill its social responsibities ~ere crippled by Mosquera and his followers, and that their ability to live a "good Catholic life" was threatened . Equally as important for craftsmen was the economic depression which affected Bogota after the war, a condition w~ich contrasted with the relatively prosperous pre-war situation. Artisans suffered not only from economic disruption because of the war, but also because the earlier reforms were affecting the bogotano marketplace in a much more significant fashion than in the 1850s. Lo~ered transportation costs, along with reduced tariffs, caused economic dislocation in many trades. These factors, combined with the effects of war, resulted in economic misery at all social levels, but perhaps worst in the artisan sector.

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235 The impact of economic dislocation upon artisan mobilization in the 1860s had its parallel in the 1840s. Just as the credit crisis after the War of the Supremes and plans for reduced tariff rates acted as the stimulus for the founding of the Society of Artisans, so too did economic crisis spur organizational efforts in the 1860s. In the face of economic misery, wartime abuses, and political disillusionment, artisan political activity underwent a major change. The Union Society represented a far more independent and mature political movement than any previous artisan organization. Earlier groups shared many of its aspirations, but none synthesized artisan interests into a clearly expressed ideology. The Union Society sought to reject the system that used tradesmen as both political and economjc tools, and tried instead to assert both the value and potential power of united artisans within the political process. Their eventual failure does not belie the importance of the sentiments expressed by the Union Society. Rather, it speaks of the capacity of the "system" to protect itself from threats, and of the essential socio-economic weakness of artisans in contrast to the dominant classes. Craftsmen had little ability to organize independently of traditional parties as . the appearance of partisan passions within the Union Society made clear. It the years that followed the disintegration of the Society, the decreased need of the parties to mobilize artisan voters and the fragmentation of the artisan class combined to create a very different environment for tradesmen to express themselves in.

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CHAPTER 6 FRAGMENTATION OF THE ARTISAN CLASS, 1869-99 Overview The thirty years prior to the start of the War of 1000 Days in 1899 are examined as a unit for different reasons than were the years that delimited earlier chapters. It is the diversity of organizations in which members of the artisan class participated and not their unified mobilization that characterizes the period. New types of organizations make their appearance during the 1869-99 period, most notably the mutual aid society, which reflected the efforts of artisan elites to look after their own material and social welfare. Other artisans were left to their own fortunes, which, during periods of crisis, contributed to their participation in riots in attempts to rectify socioeconomic injustices. One still sees examples of pre election mobilizations, but even these became less frequent as the years passed. The last thirty years of the nineteenth century were a period of transition, in which old patterns of mobilization were left behind and foundations were laid for the "modern" era which opened with the next century. Just as artisan political adventures during the 1869-99 period were notable for their varied nature, so too was the larger political process in which craftsmen operated. The shifting political alignments between Liberal, Conservative, and third party groups were perhaps the 23 6

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outstanding characteristic of these years. In the early 1870s, disillusioned followers of Mosquera found reason to side with Conservatives, at least until an Independent Liberal group supporting Rafael Ntinez emerged. Conservatives then revolted in 1875, hoping to draw Independents into a coalition against Radical Liberals. The two Liberal factions, however, joined hands long enough to put down the uprising, only to renew maneuvers against each other immediately after their victory. 237 In 1880, the Independent Rafael Nunez was elected to his first term as president with Conservative backing. Nunez promptly began a reorientation of the Colombian economy away from doctrinaire liberal issues. Since part of that redirection included the erection of moderate tariff barriers for the country's industries, many artisans expressed sympathy for the Nunez presidency. Orthodox Liberals, on the other hand, feared not only the consequences of Nunez's policies, but also his alignment with Conservatives, a move they feared would reduce their party to impotency. Faced with such a threat, Liberals rebelled in 1885, only to be defeated militarily by a Independent-Conservative union in the guise of the National party. After the victory, the dominant forces put together the Constitution of 1886, which restored to Colombian politics centralism, a strong executive, the influence of the Catholic Church, and numerous other "conservative" features. Rafael Ndnez continued to head the government, as Colombia entered a new period known as the Regeneration. The National party was not a "natural" amalgamation, and it was able to maintain its domination only by strict control of the political process and by moderate repression. Artisans profited from many of the

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238 Regeneration policies, although they too felt the weight of governmental oppression, especially after their involvement in the riot of 1893. Liberals fared far worse than artisans, as their party was subjected to systematic repression for most of the period after 1886. This goaded party militants to rebel in 1895, a move not supported by moderates in the party. Meanwhile, Nationalists themselves were quarrelling, a struggle which divided the group in the 1891 presidential election and permanently broke it during the 1897 contest. After the latter election, militant Liberals took control of their party, and, in October 1899, began the last and the worst of Colombia's nineteenth century wars. The War of 1000 days ushered in the new century and a new period of artisan political activity. Mutual Aid and Partisan Politics, 1869-79 The presidential election of 1869 did not result in coordinated efforts to recruit artisan voters, a somewhat surprising turn of events given the heated competition for their support in earlier y ears. The low profile of craftsmen was even more unusual given that many of the same actors and political forces that had earlier been closely associated with artisan mobilizations were again involved in the 1869 contest. Most Liberal leaders supported the candidacy of Eustorgio Salgar, who had been important in the 22 de Mayo movement that had deposed Mosquera. Mosqueristas were not quiescent, even though their leader was suffering exile in Peru. On April 5, 1869, they joined with Conservatives, who had been alienated from Radicals after the October 10, 1868, political coup in Cundinamarca, to form an alliance (liga) in

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support of the exiled general's candidacy. The alliance, which was engineered by Conservative Carlos Holguin, did not prevent Salgar's election, but it did open an era of cooperation between dissident Liberals and Conservatives. 239 While craftsmen were not active in the 1869 presidential election, their organized voice continued to be heard in the Colombian capital. La Sociedad Industrial de Artesanos, formed in late 1869, sought to further many of the nonpolitical objectives of La Alianza. 1 The Industrial Society was made up of the most active persons from the earlier group, including Ambrosio Lopez, Felipe Roa Ram{rez, Fruto Ramirez, Rafael Tapias and Ramon Ordonez Torres, the latter being the Society's president. Political issues had previously alienated many of these men from each other in La Alianza, but they apparently had no qualms about cooperating in pursuit of goals that would enhance their economic positions. Illustrative of the Industrial Society's activity was its response to an 1870 pamphlet by Luis B. Valenzuela criticizing public officials for a seeming lack of concern for the nation's poor industrial condition. The Society praised the ideas contained in Revolucion industrial in March and pledged to impress its message upon public 2 officials when it could. That promise was kept the next month when representatives of the organization met with newly-elected President Salgar. Spokesman Rafael Tap1as told Salgar that the country's craftsmen were suffering due to foreign competition and that repeated 1 2 El Liberal, September 27, 1869. La Ilustracion, February 26, March 25, 1870.

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attempts to solicit tariff protection from the congress had proved fruitless. The Society had therefore decided that one of their few remaining options was to appeal personally to the president. Salgar reportedly acknowledged the depressed condition of the nation's industries and pledged to do what he could to bring about . 3 improvement. 240 The same sentiments were publicly reiterated by Rafael Tap1as at the comemmoration of the beginning of Colombia's independence movement on July 20. According to Tapias, Colombia's working classes had since come to find themselves in a worse position, as the industrial revolution had brought increasing competition to their production. The lack of official support for arts and trades had been the motivation for founding the Industrial Society, and, he proclaimed, it would repeatedly remind Salgar of his promise to help the nation's industry . Tapias noted that one step toward that goal had already been made with the government announcing plans for an industrial exibition the 4 following year. In June of 1871, the Society announced that the exhibition would take place on July 20, and it urged craftsmen to prepare pieces for 5 display. Reactions by local craftsmen to the invitation were not uniformly positive. A letter to El Bien P~blico by "many artisans" said that the group's intentions were good, but that it would have been far better had the government systematically supported the arts instead 3 4 5 Diario de Cundinamarca, April 8, 1870. La Ilustracio'n, July 27, 1870. Diario de Cundinamarca, June 21, 1871.

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241 of offering periodic prizes for good craftsmanship. The letter pointed out that the exhibition was intended primarily for producers of agricultural exports and not tradesmen, who could not afford the time required to prepare an exhibit. Moreover, the letter alleged that many of the sponsors of the exhibition were personally guilty of seeking low costs rather than high quality when they made purchases locally, a 6 practice which rewarded "semi-artisans" and not skilled craftsmen. Later in 1871, the Society supported an ill-fated project to organize a "deposit of national artifacts." The depository was intended to serve as a clearing house where a customer could buy a finished product rather than having to commission its production. One function of the depository would be to free competent (but poorly paid) artisans from the control of unscrupulous shop owners who impeded their advancement to productive independence. A similar project by Pablo Garcia in the 1860s had failed when Garcia was unable to obtain the 7 necesary capital to sustain the early phase of his venture. The 8 deposit of 1871, like Garcia's before it, remained primarily an idea. 6 El Bien Publico, June 31, 1871. Later that year a chair made by Genaro Mart1n that had won a prize at the exhibition was presented to Robert Bunch of the British Legation in recognition of Britain's support for Colombia during its war of independence. Ibid, October 13, 1871. 7 Diario de Cundinamarca, December 13, 1871. 8 Other moves by the Society to improve the condition of local industries included a drive to raise money for Nicolas Pereira Gamba's trip to Europe. Pereira had long been active in bringing European machinery to Colombia, a policy the Society thought was far superior to importing foreign merchandise and one that consequently was worthy of their support. Ibid., April 6, 1871.

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242 During the Salgar administration, steps initiated in the 1860s to organize an institute for artisan industrial education finally came to fruition. An "Institute de Artes i Oficios" had been included as part of the National University when it was founded in 1868, but it planned to offer only classes such as geometry and chemistry . A March 1872 petition to congress by craftsmen urged that it appropriate funds to begin desperately needed industrial training at the Institute. Colombian workers were not without the desire to learn and to improve their skills, the petition read, but they simply lacked the opportunity to do so. If the country wanted an industrial future, the petitioneers suggested that foreign engineers and masters be brought to Colombia from Europe to train native craftsmen . This policy, they added, would not only improve industry, but also public order. The working class is tired of Liberty crowned with coats and swords; it wants to see her crowned with spikes, with a hammer in one hand and a compass in the other. It hopes to enter a new path of true liberty founded in work and the ind~vidual enterprises that are work's result. The Institute opened its doors to artisans on March 31, 1872 at a ceremony attended by President Salgar and many tradesmen. Yet it did not incorporate all the suggestions of the craftsmen's petition, and three years later, after some 700 artisans had received various types of education, protests were again raised in favor of more practical training. One commentator observed that "in order to obtain all possible benefits from this institute it is necessary to found model 10 shops, a machine gallery, and an industrial museum." A presidential 9 10 Ibid., March 15, 1872. Ibid., January 17, 1874; El Tradicionista, April 2, 1872; La

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decree in late 1874 called for foundation of a "School of Arts and Trades" that would have brought European masters to Colombia to train 11 artisans in three model shops, but the proposal was never carried out. Bogotano artisans would have to wait until the 1890s for such training to be available. 243 When Manuel Murillo Toro succeeded Salgar as Colombia's president in April 1872, he too met with a commission from the Industrial Society. The Society's spokesman, Felipe S. Orjuela, who had also been an Alianza member, presented the craftsmen's wishes for active governmental support. Orjuela observed that the Society had been favorably impressed with Murillo's intention to reduce the nation's debt burden by recognizing the real value of government bonds as opposed to their nominal value and to use the balance gained by that adjustment to provide credit for industrial ventures. Murillo saluted the Society for its comprehension of the relationship between capital and labor, noting that the high cost of capital was indeed hurting the country's laborers. The president then sparked a heated public debate by relating that many Colombian capitalists had proven unwilling to invest in industrial development and that now the government had to 12 take up the slack. El Tradicionista, founded by Conservative Miguel Antonio Caro, expressed outrage at Murillo's comments. It noted that the notion of America, November 16, 1872. 11 Diario de Cundinamarca, January 5, 1875. 12 Diario Oficial, April 19, 1872; Diario de Cundinamarca, April 22, 23, 1872.

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changing the rules of credit on existing bonds was economically unprincipled and that his pro-labor stance was reflective of "class antagonisms" and the rise of the "International." Caro's mouthpiece concluded its attack with the hope that such governmental attitudes 13 would not lead to the same type of outcome as they had in the 1850s. The leading Liberal daily, Diario de Cundinamarca, was quiet on the presidential statement, which ran counter to doctrinaire Liberal thinking. It did, however, include a letter from the Industrial Society which denied that it had espoused "socialism" in its meeting with the president. Rather, the Society's intention had been to support a proposal which it felt could help their industries. By the same token, the Society approved of Murillo's plans to push completion of the Railroad of the North--a project dear to Radical leadersbecause it would expand the nation's commercial network. 14 Although the meeting of the Industrial Society's delegates with Murillo indicates that the association was vital and even gaining in political stature, shortly thereafter it disappeared from public view. It is unclear whether or not the group disbanded, and the Society certainly merits further study. In any case, many of the group's members became prominent in various mutual aid societies, the first of which was formed shortly after the April encounter with Murillo, which suggests a transfer of their organizational energies to the new group. 13 1872. 14 El Tradicionista, April 23, 1872; El Bien fublico, April 23, Diario de Cundinamarca, May 2, 1872. 244

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245 Bogot~'s first mutual aid society, La Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos, was formally inaugurated on July 20, 1872, when 83 men, most of whom were identified with the Conservative party, pledged to cooperate for their collective benefit. The organization was designed to help members in case of illness or death with funds collected for those purposes. Each member had to be approved by the Society as being of sound moral character and was obligated to pay a two peso entrance fee and 10 centavos a week in dues. Special donations gave the Society an intial savings account of 2,000 pesos. The Mutual Aid Society was not exclusively intended for artisans: two years later, when its membership had grown to 148, about one-half did not earn their living from a skilled trade. Merchants, lawyers, musicians, and others joined craftsmen in making up the Society, and its multi-class character continued for many years. Nevertheless, by the mid-1880s, it was generally identified as an artisan organization. The early months were not without problems for the Society. In February 1873 the group's secretary reported that many members failed to pay their dues and that a rash of sicknesses had decimated its savings. He therefore urged that prospective members be carefully screened for both their moral standing and their fiscal responsibility and that a ceiling of 150 15 members be adopted. In spite of initial setbacks, the Mutual Aid Society proved to be very successful and functioned at least until 1920. Moreover, its 15 Diario de Cundinamarca, August 5, 1872; Meliton Angulo Heredia, "Informe del secretario de la Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos" (Bogota, February 6, 1873); membership data is taken from El Tradicionista, September 8, 1874.

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2 46 foundation spurred others to form similar groups. In May 1873, for example, the Typesetter's Mutual Aid Society was founded by 69 members of that trade. It had as its objectives: mutual aid; self-improvement; and improvement of the typographic art. The moral improvement of its members, a hope of the Mutual Aid Society as well, was emphasized in its initial report we ought to be aware that our mission is not limited to simply being mechanical workers who produce in order to satisfy the dietary needs of ourselves and our families; we recognize the necessity of nurturing our spirit, mainly by cultivating and developing our intellectual faculties, because this will yield the most positive benefits for our aygociation and will affect our social position. Neither of these two organizations intended to assume a political role, but the turbulent political scene of the Colombian capital occasionally thwarted that desire. After the repeated political crises of the 1860s, the early 1870s were comparatively calm, at least at the national level. The Mosquerista-Conservative liga of 1869 did not lead to civil disorder, even though it did portend future troubles. In Bogoti, in any case, artisans were most directly involved in municipal and state politics. Most city councils after the 1859-62 civil war had included at least one elected artisan member, a pattern that continued through the 1870s ; Jose Antonio Saavedra, a cobbler whose political career dated from the days of the Democratic Society, was often part of the Liberal party's council slate. Saavedra was not the only artisan to serve the city of 16 La America, May 28, 1873.

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247 Bogota, however. Antonio Cardenas, one of the founders of La Alianza, was appointed as supervisor of the city's market place in 1870, and Calisto Ballesteros, who was also active in La Alianza, served as a tax 17 collector for three years. Craftsmen took part in other municipal services as well. Artisans had frequently served as nightwatchmen (serenos), and, in a reorganization of Bogota's police force early in 1870, both Emeterio Heredia and Ambrosio Lopez, long-time artisan notables, were among the craftsmen called upon to watch the blocks where they lived. The reorganization in question was followed by citizen complaints of arbitrary police conduct, which forced the council to name a commission to investigate the charges and (while it was at it) to look into allegations of fraudulent tax collections. Artisan Tiburcio Ruiz, who would become president of the resurrected Democratic Society in 1875, 18 was one of the men named to the commission. The presence of tradesmen on the city council in no way assured that that body would adequately respond to the city's needs. Repeated complaints were heard about garbage-filled streets, poor water service, high taxes, and high food prices. Citizens expressed the opinion that monopolists periodically cornered a particular item in the city market and drove up its price, and they called on the council not only to stop such monopolies but also to put a ceiling on prices. As the decade of the 1870s wore on, complaints by citizens increased, leading to a 17 La Ilustracion, February 12, 1870; Diario de Cundinamarca, January 31, 1874; Rejistro Municipal, November 15, December 16, 1874. 18 La Ilustracion, January 7, November 5, 1870; Diario de Cundinamarca. March 14, 1870.

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reform of the council by Cundinamarca's state legislature which paved 19 the way for more effective city government in the 1880s. 248 Before such changes took place, Bogota was shocked by the motln de pan a cuarto in January 1875. In the months preceding the riot the price of bread made from wheat had risen by about 20% in the city, and although corn flour was more widely used among the lower classes, inexpensive loaves of wheat bread were important to their diet as well. In January, a coalition of bakers suddenly stopped production of quarter-peso loaves, causing indignation and hardship among the city's populace. Thousands of people gathered in the Plaza de Bo11var on Saturday night, January 23, in response to a poster of the day before calling for "War and death to those who make us hungry." The protesters appealed to President Santiago Perez to force prices downward, only to be told that in a country with "free" industry such actions were illegal, The crowd then imposed its own system of justice by stoning the houses and shops of those bakers allegedly involved in monopolistic practices. No one was hurt in the movement, but numerous properties were heavily damaged. Neither the city nor the state ordered their forces against the rioters, although a state of siege was imposed and 20 the militia called out. Repercussions from the riot would influence the preparations for the 1875 presidential contest, as will be 19 La Ilustraci6n, February 6, 15, 1873; Diario de Cundinamarca, January 15, 1874; El Tradicionista, May 14, June 1, 4, 1872; El Deber, December 16, 1879. 20 / La America, January 26, 27, 29, 30, 1875; La Ilustracion, January 25, 26, February 5, 1875; El Tradicionista, January 26, 19, 1875; Eugenio Gutierrez Cely, "Nuevo movimiento popular contra el laissez-faire: Begot~, 1875," Universitas Humanists, 11:17 (March 1982), 177-212.

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discussed later. In addition, reactions to the riot revealed not only characteristics of the political climate of the capital but also the gulf between the popular classes and the artisan elite. Of particular interest to this investigation is the reaction by leading artisans to the riot. In the days following the movement of the 23rd, numerous leaflets signed by "the artisans" urged the people to end their acquiescence to socioeconomic abuses and to assert their power. Released from the so-called "popular democratic palace," these notices cited the memory of Danton, Marat, and Delecluze--hero of the Paris commune of 1871--as incentives for their cause. The language of the circulars and their anonymous nature cast some doubt on their origin, however. This doubt is heightened by the response of kno~n craftsmen of all political leanings such as Jose Maria Vega, Praxedis ~ Bermudez, Jose Antonio Saavedra, and Jose Leocadio Camacho, who 249 uniformly condemned the violence. In their statements, these men expressed their sympathy for those suffering in the current crisis, but criticized individuals who would exploit it to their own ends in the 21 name of artisans. Whoever the perpetrators of the radical leaflets may have been, . several points are clear. The label "the artisans" was thought to be a useful method for mobilization of the lower classes, which indicates the political importance of that sector. At the same time, protests by leading craftsmen reveal the distance between themselves and the pueblo and suggest one possible reason why large political associations of non-elite groups were infrequent in this period. Finally, the riot was 21 La America, January 27, 30, 1875.

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250 a clear example of popular outrage against what was perceived as unjust speculation by monopolists, which in turn shows that some notion of a "moral economy" was still present among the capital's populace. Direct action by crowds was a relatively infrequent mode of political expression; generally the pueblo was quiescent or had their energies harnessed by organized parties. Even elections for municipal councilors, which had a direct bearing upon the populace's daily lives, seldom generated enthusiasm or violence. The same was not true of state elections, which during the early 1870s often decided whether or not the sapo forces of Ram6n G6mez would control the state government. These elections often resulted in violent confrontations. The May 1870 state elections were won by sapista candidates, amid widespread allegations of fraud. Passions were so elevated that when the Cundinamarcan congress was seated, numerous disturbances marred its sessions, leading in the end to a coup that unseated Governor Justo 22 Briceno in favor of anti-sapo Cornelio Manr1que. Various handouts, prepared by artisans of all political persuasions, praised the coup but warned against threats to the public order that could result in their call-up to militia service. War did not break out because of this coup, but the August election for convention delegates was every bit as 23 disputed as had been the one in May; only now sapos fared poorly. 22 Various artisans were presented as candidates for the resulting constitutional convention by Manuel Maria Madiedo, including Manuel de Jesus Barrera, Jose Leocadio Camacho, Felipe Roa Ramirez, and Rafael Tap(as. La Ilustracion, July 27, 1870. 23 La Ilustracion, May 10, July 19, 22, 26, August 19, 24, 26, 1870; Los artesanos, "Basta de abusos" (Bogota, July 18, 1870); El Bien Publico, August 2, 1870.

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251 Allegations of fraud also marred the May 1874 election for delegates to the state congress, a contest that resulted in widespread 24 confrontations. These election incidents may well have been influenced by increasing tensions between the two wings of the Liberal party (dissidents and Radicals). In the presidential election the year before, dissident Liberals and Conservatives had formed an informal / liga in support of mosquerista Julian Trujillo. Radicals backed 25 Santiago Perez, who easily won the election. The 1873 presidential election did not, however, produce notable political agitations; the same was not true of the 1875 contest. In January 1875, while Bogota was still recovering from the bread riot, El Correo de Colombia declared its allegiance to the presidential / 26 / candidacy of Rafael Nunez. Nunez had emerged by this time as the standard bearer for Liberals dissatisfied with Radical control of the nation's government. Nunistas claimed that Radicals practiced oligarchic domination of the party which excluded their voices and ignored their regional interests. Mosqueristas certainly agreed with these allegations and consequently they declared that they too would back Nunez's candidacy. The "Oligarchs" for their part chose Aquileo Parra to follow Perez in the presidency. In Bogota, preparations for 24 El Tradicionista, February 28, 1874. Artisan political tempers flared that day as well. Cruz Ballesteros and Saturnine Gonzalez, both of whom had been key Alianza members, were reportedly involved in a scuffle at the Plaza de Bolfvar polling table. Ibid., May 2, 5, 1874; La America, May 4, 11, 18, 1874. 25 Diario de Cundinamarca, May 27, August 15, September 1, 1874. 26 El Correo de Colombia, January 27, 1875.

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252 the August elections began early and brought artisans directly into the 27 fray. As early as March, rumors circulated through the capital that efforts ~ere being made to reorganize the Democratic Society as an electoral force. On April 17, artisan Jose Antonio Saavedra, a long time activist and personal supporter of Parra, helped arrange an organizational meeting of the Society in Bruno Maldonado's theatre. Some 400 persons, mainly described as artisans, showed up for the meeting, but to Saavedra's dismay most were N~nez supporters. In vain Saavedra tried to extol Parra's virtues to the orderly crowd, but their loyalties were made clear when they warmly greeted Jose Mar!a Samper's ,,. message in favor of Nunez. In time the meeting was broken up by the ,,. Colombian Guard, controlled by Secretary of War Ramon Santodomingo Vila, a Nunez supporter who no doubt feared the supposedly pro-Parra organization. Parra partisans then "serenaded" Nunista Eustorgio 28 Salgar, while Nunistas went to Perez's house to jeer the president. Another meeting of the Democratic Society on May 9, attended by some 600-800 people and clearly controlled by the Nunistas, elected Tiburcio Ruiz as its president. Speakers at the meeting included engineer Camilo A. Echeverr{~ Manuel de Jes~s Barrera, Luis Maria Lleras (Lorenzo's son), and Jose Marfa Samper. Their talks reveal a few of 27 Delpar, Red Against Blue, 110-11, 114-17; D!lpar, "Aspects of Liberal Factionalism in Colombia, 1875-1885," Hispanic American Historical Review, 51:2 (May 1971), 255-65. 28 Diario de Cundinamarca, April 24, 29, 30, 1875; El Tradicionista, April 20, 1875; El Combate, April 24, 1875.

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253 the issues at stake in the election: defense of the state government against sapista and Radical attacks; loyalty to the pro-Nunez Colombian Guard; and criticism of Farra's support for the Railroad of the North. Criticisms were also leveled against an alleged Parra-Conservative 29 liga. Election sentiments were not confined to the meeting hall and press. Beginning in April, groups paraded through the streets almost nightly in support of their preferred candidates. The potential for violent confrontations led "many artisans of the capital" to call for an examination of the craftsmen's role in the campaign and urged them not to be misled by traficantes en pol{tica such as Samper. They were reminded of La Alianza's principles and urged not to become tools for 30 people who would not serve their interests. That same message was seconded in a letter to Manuel Marfa Madiedo's newspaper La Ilustracion, and in numerous other calls to lessen public displays of 31 electoral passions. Most incidents had ended by late May, but the calm was only on the surface as was made lethally clear on election day. In various 29 El Correo de Colombia, May 12, 1875; El Tradicionista, May 14, 1875. One of these points, Nunez's opposition to the Railroad of the North, caused artisan Felipe S. Orjuela to change his allegiance from the costeno to Parra. In announcing his new stance, Orjuela said that the nation's industries needed the route and added that Nunez's ideas for protecting industries did not appeal to him. (Nunez's protectionist stance was poorly defined at this time. It was strengthened by 1880, according to Ospina, precisely to attract artisan voters.) El Correo de Colombia, January 27, May 10, 1875. 30 Muchos artesanos de la capital, "Artesanos, juicios" in El Diario de Cundinamarca, May 18, 1875. 31 La Ilustracion, May 18, 1875; La Epoca, May 17, 19, 1875.

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confrontations between voters, agitators, and the Guard, at least five people were killed (including four guardsmen) and many were injured. Parra sources related that Nunistas used force to intimidate their 32 opponents, a charge that seems equally applicable to both sides. The violence of the August 1 election led to nullification of Bogota's votes. Nationwide, neither Parra, N6nez, nor Conservative Bartolome Calvo won the requisite number of states; congress thus had to determine the victor, and Parra easily outdistanced Nunez and Calvo in the February 1876 congressional selection. The rupture in the Liberal party was not easily mended however. Conservatives in the Cauca Valley and elsewhere saw this as an opportunity to redress some of their grievances, especially those on religious issues. A Conservative revolt, which could almost be called a religious crusade, began to gather momentum in March and April. Liberals in the Cauca Valley responded by forming numerous Democratic Societies in support of the existing order, and by July fighting had broken out in earnest. 33 254 Liberal artisans who had been bitter enemies the year previous now closed ranks in support of the government, a stance that mirrored th~ behavior of Liberals throughout the country. On August 2 the reunited Democratic Society of Bogota declared its loyalty to the Parra administration and offered its services in defense of the country's public order. Cruz Ballesteros echoed this position the next day with 32 Diario de Cundinamarca, August 2, 4, 1875. 33 See Ibid., March 11, April 25, May 17, 23, 24, 27, 1876, for information of the founding of the Democratic Societies.

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255 a call for Liberal unity in the face of Conservative insurrection. The Mutual Aid Society, whose artisan members tended to be Conservatives, issued a circular stating that it could not sit idely by while partisan politics threatened the outbreak of war. Each member was urged to calm 34 passions whenever possible. The plea came too late. On August 11 the government called the militia to service and it was mustered the next day. Once again artisans provided the bulk of the militia's manpower; of the 1,035 men who filled the four militia batallions and one squadron from Bogota, all but 95 were skilled laborers. Moreover, their chiefs included Cruz Ballesteros, Democrat Tiburcio Ruiz, Liberal artisan Antonio Sanchez, .,. 15 and moderate craftsman Pablo Bermudez.The militia forces were absent from Bogota until July 1877, during 'Which time they undoubtedly contributed to the defeat of the Conservative revolt. In welcoming one batallion back to the capital, Julian Trujillo, soon to be elected president, said: Return then to your homes, satisfied with your noble conduct ... and to your mothers, wives, and daughters, return with the consciousness that you have completed your ob1igations and have given good account of your names. Such accolades were small comfort to the war's casualties. An observer noted : 34 35 36 a poor woman of the pueblo ... anxiously scanned the rows of the 2nd Batallion of Bogota, as if Ibid., August 2, 3, 12, 1876. Ibid., August 14, 24, 1876. Ibid. , July 14, 1877

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looking for something hidden from her view .•. finally she approached a soldier and asked about a loved member of her family, to which the soldier replied; They killed him. Tears were the only recourse left to the unhappy soul. Taking her child by the hand, she excla~l}led, "God bless those who make war!" and she left. Just as it had after the revolt in 1851, the Conservative defeat allowed divisions among Liberals to come to the fore. During the war Julian Trujillo had been selected as a unity candidate, and he was elected president without opposition, but soon after he took office in April 1878 numerous differences between his supporters, now called Independents, and the Radicals became apparent. These disagreements most frequently manifested themselves in clashes between Trujillo and the Radical-dominated congress, but they were also seen in the August 1878 elections for state deputies in Cundinamarca, a contest for which both sides tried to recruit artisan voters. Numerous people were injured in the Radical victory that presaged similar confrontations in 1879. 38 256 In February 1879, the Sociedad de Juventud Radical was formed by youths who claimed to adhere to the principles of doctrinaire liberalism. The Society promptly presented the congress with an offer to help defend it against threats from los draconianos (Independents), who had their own group, La Sociedad Liberal Independiente. Throughout March and April rumors abounded that movements were planned against the 39 congress, rumors ~~ich unfortunately proved true in early May. 37 38 39 Ibid., July 19, 1877. La Doctrina, April 17, August 7, 10, 1878. Diario de Cundinamarca, March 12, 1879; El Liberal, February 8, 15, March 8, 1879; La Doctrina, April 23, 1879.

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257 The most obvious spark for the May 6 violence was a request by the chamber to Secretary of War Andres Ceron to explain the government's use of federal troops to help Independent Eliseo Pay~n take charge of the Cauca government. Jorge Isaacs, a Radical representative from the Cauca, violently questioned Ceron, a tactic that angered the Independent gallery. As Isaacs left the congress, he was greeted by jeers and stones and was saved from injury only by the timely intervention of the Radical Society, which in turn confronted Independents throughout the city. The next day's meeting of the congress was conducted before an armed gallery of Independents and Radicals. After an hour or so of uneventful debate on the budget, heated discussions began and a shot was fired, whereupon the chamber became the scene of sustained gunfire which killed one participant. The Guard belatedly forced the combatants into the plaza, and Trujillo appeared before the congress to tranquilize the situation. Congress then convened for the day, but as the representatives left the session, both Independent and Radical congressmen were assaulted and several were injured. Pitched street battles between the partisan forces lasted into the night, which led Trujillo to declare public order 40 disturbed, a move Radicals said should have been made much earlier. Considering the agitation that had rocked Bogoti in May, the presidential elections of August were surprisingly calm. Nunez was forwarded by the Independents as their presidential candidate and Wenceslao Ibanez as their choice for governor of Cundinamarca, both 40 La Doctrina, May 7, 1879; Diario de Cundinamarca, May 6, 7, 10, 13, 1879; El Deber, May 9, 13, 27, 1879; La Reforma, June 10, 1879.

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258 with Conservative backing. Radicals decided upon General Tomas Renifo and Rudecindo Lopez as their candidates. Many of the Independents who had been associated with the events of May and Conservative artisans active in the Mutual Aid Society undoubtedly worked for the Nunez candidacy, as they worked closely with the costeno during his later presidencies. Indeed, the Nunez organization was quite successful, for the election resulted in an impressive victory for Nunez, giving him not just the presidency, but also control of the congress, while in Bogota Independents and Conservatives wrested control of the municipal council from the Radicals for the first time since the 1860s. ~~en N~nez took office in April 1880, only two states remained in Radical hands. For both Bogota and the nation, 1880 promised the start of a new era. Nunez, War, and the Regeneration, 1880-89 Nunez and the Independents espoused several principles that could attract artisan support. His candidacy as an Independent seemingly offered an alternative to the partisan system that had spawned the conflicts and waste of resources that craftsmen had criticized. For artisans, Nunez's appeals for coalition government promised a certain fulfillment of that goal. Consequently, N~nez enjoyed a personalist following for much of his later career that often cut across traditional political boundries. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Nunez's ideas of stimulating industry and economic growth touched a responsive cord among the craft sector. His inaugural address to the national congress called for innovative reform of the

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country's economic orientation, including: implementation of a protective tariff system to foster industrial development; creation of a national hank to provide investors with credit; and support for t..l public works projects to improve the nation's infrastructure. w~en N~nez introduced plans for tariff reform, artisans expressed their wholehearted support for the measure. A handout signed by "many artisans" implored congressmen to open their eyes to the "misery" of the populace so that they could see the need for tariff reform. They urged that congressmen not listen to "exploiters of the poor ... who have no God other than gold and only their wallets as their country." (Liberals all, one presumes.) The proposed tariff reform, along with the National Bank and law of public order to increase the power of the national executive, '" ' ere referred to as the "trinity" that would save the country. The signers added that "if these are not passed, we do not know what type of a regeneration will he offered to the Colombian 42 people, or that it will be given." As had been the case since the 1850s, Miguel Samper rose to the defense of laissez-faire principles in opposing both the proposed tariff and the National Bank. His article, "La protecci~n," was an eloquent appeal not to abandon the economic route taken some 30 years earlier, but followers of his ideological persuassion were now the political minority. 43 Over such objections, the congress approved the 41 El Diario Oficial, April 8, 1880. 42 Muchos artesanos, "La reforma de la tarifa aduana i la camara de representantes" (Bogota', May 12, 1880); La Reforma, May 26, 1880. 43 Samper, "La proteccion, II in La miseria en Bogota; Diario de Cundinamarca, May 12, 1880. 259

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tariff measure. It raised basic rates on most finished products, including footwear, clothing, and wooden furniture, and gave the president discretionary power to impose a surcharge on selected 1..4 items. Some debate has developed regarding the motivation for Nunez's tariff reform. Ospina Vasquez suggests that the costeno was perhaps more concerned with the potential political support that it would win 1..5 from craftsmen than with strict economic planning. Bushnell seems to 260 agree with this assessment, but notes Nunez's desire to improve the economic security of craftsmen and thereby foment "creation of a stable 46 middle-class of citizens " A contrary opinion is forwarded by Indalecio L{evano Aguirre, who holds that Nunez's actions were motivated by economic nationalism and by an appreciation of Colombia's industrial needs. 47 While it is difficult to describe the president's motivations with any certainty, it is clear that the 1880 tariff favored carpenters and joiners, trades practiced by several of his leading artisan supporters, Camacho, Felix Valois Madero, Cruz Sanchez, Genaro Martin, and Rafael Tapias. One should not, however, overlook the fact that these trades were also among the most prosperous at a time when the city was experiencing strong growth. A realistic appraisal of the capital's (and nation's) industrial situation 44 45 46 Bushnell, "Two stages in Colombian tariff policy," 15-16. Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, 290-91. Bushnell, "Two Stages in Colombian Tariff Policy," 14-17. 47 ; Indalecio Lievano Aguirre, Rafael Nunez (Bogota, Segundo Festival del Libro Colombiano, 1960?), 183-93.

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certainly would have recognized the potential returns from protection of the aforementioned trades that had already proven themselves competitive; other considerations would have underscored the political advantages of the move as well. ~batever the intentions of the president, the Tariff of 1880 was favorably received by the capital's tradesmen. Two years later, when Nunez had been succeeded as president by Francisco Javier Zaldua, Secretary of Finance Miguel Samper attempted to lower rates to their previous levels. Various petitions to congress by artisans of all political allegiances urged that no changes be made in the existing tariff. One representation noted that some trades, most notably carpentry, had improved greatly under protection. The petitioners continued that secondary industries such as wood suppliers had also profited as a result, demonstrating the positive multiplier effect which disproved the notion that protection favored the few. 48 The two branches of congress failed to agree on the proposal to reduce rates, thus the 1880 tariff remained in effect. A proposal of a similar 49 nature the following year met the same fate. 261 Tariff reform was not the only measure undertaken by the first N~nez administration that artisans favorably received. Two executive decrees in 1881 set in motion plans for establishment of a taller modelo. Jose Leocadio Camacho, Sim~n Sanmiguel, Fulgencio Roa, Ignacio 48 La Luz, July 28, 1882; Bushnell, "Two Stages in Colombian Tari ff Po Hey," 20 -21. 49 Bushnell, "Two Stages of Colombian Tariff Policy," 20-21. When the Chamber dealt with Nunez's 1884 tariff reforms, numerous artisans praised their efforts. La Luz, February 20, 1884.

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262 --Lopez, and Benjamin Amezquita were appointed to select five youths to go abroad and be trained in industrial arts. Upon their return to Colombia, the men were supposed to train others in their newly acquired trades. This program proved fruitful later in the decade. For the moment such ventures fell victim to the system of biannual changes of administrations that had plagued Colombia since 1863. Most would not profit from stable funding or support until after implementation of the Constitution of 1886. 50 The Independent-Conservative coalition that had won the presidency in 1880 had given Jose Leocadio Camacho a Conservative seat on that 12person body. Camacho, who had first appeared as a spokesman for artisan interests in the 1860s, was then selected as the speaker for a council committee charged with welcoming N~nez to the city in March 1880. 51 This coalition proved unable to sustain itself, and the 1882 contest saw Francisco Javier Zaldua draw many Independents back into the Liberal camp in his successful bid to become president. 52 Liberals had been alarmed at their loss of power to N~nez and took several steps 50 El Progreso, March 11, 1897; Diario de Cundinamarca, October 12, 1881. The youths selected were Pompilio Beltrtn (mechanics), Juan Nepomuceno Rodriguez (casting), Benjamhl Herrera (lathe and construction), and Zolio Cuellar (foundry). 51 La Justicia, January 13, March 9, 1880. Artisans were active in municipal politics throughout the 1880s. In 1881, for example, the election list presented by a mutual aid organization founded in 1879 proved the most popular among voters. In that election, Camacho again won a seat on the council. In 1884, as well, artisans presented the winning slate in an election that saw Independents and Conservatives join forces in their attempt to restore the political momentum they had gained in 1880. Diario de Cundinamarca, February 25, 1881; La Epoca, March 4, 1884; La Luz, February 27, 1884. 52 Diario de Cundinamarca, June 28, 1881.

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263 to consolidate their power and to avoid future losses. One such tactic was foundation of the Sociedad de Salud Publics on December 4, 1881. Organized by Colonel Ricardo Vanegas, the Society had reestablishment of the Liberal regime and combating "reactionary" threats as its primary objectives. By early 1882, it claimed 382 members and was actively preparing for the city's municipal elections. Conservatives charged that political violence was part of the Public Safety Society's repertoire of tactics, an allegation that seems true, especially in light of assassination attempts on Independents Daniel Aldana and Ramon Becerra. After the September attack on Aldana, public opposition to the group's use of violence caused the Zaldu'a administration to distance itself from the organization. By December it ~as no longer active, although it did revive momentarily for the 1883 presilential 53 election. Artisans were apparently not active in the Public Safety Society, a rather significant development considering their central role in previous political societies. Liberal party leaders and students from the Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario and the Universidad Nacional, many of whom had been active in the 1879 Radical Society, made up the core of its membership. This suggests the increasing distance between politically active artisans and the Liberal party, but also that other forms of political organizations that no longer 53 Diario de Cundinamarca, January 6, 14, 20, February 1, 3, 10, March 9, 22, April 15, 26, 1882; La Ilustracion, September 26, 1882; El Comercio, August 30, 1882; El Patriots, August 27, 1883. The best sources of information of the SSP are the DC, its newspaper, Salud Publics, and numerous leafets it published, many of which are in the Hemeroteca of the Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango.

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necessitated artisan recruitment were being instituted by that 54 party. 264 Nevertheless, partisan violence remained a central means to attempt transfer of political leadership from one party to the other. Signs of impending unrest that in 1885 erupted into civil war could be traced to the 1883 presidential election that pitted N6nez against Liberal Salon Wilches. Again Nunez ~as able to secure support from Conservatives for his Independent candidacy. Liberal party leaders were increasingly fearful that if such a coalition were to be made permanent, they would lose their domination of the country's political process. It was thus widely feared that the violence initiated by the Public Safety Society would reappear for that election, but the contest was peacefully conducted in Bogot~. N~nez reportedly won 3,154 votes to Wilches's 483 55 in the capital. Political tensions throughout the nation were heightened by the sudden failure of quinine as an export product. Liberals judged that the economic crisis would produce popular discontent that could help them in their planned revolt. The 1885 rebellion originated in Santander over control of that state's governorship. When the unrest spread into Boyaca, federal authorities hesitated to move to suppress it, at least until December, when Nunez appointed Conservative General Leonardo Canal to muster a reserve force to supplement the Colombian Guard. Liberals in other areas of the country then joined the rebellion. Independents and Conservatives joined forces under the 54 55 Delpar, Red against Blue, 125-27. La Luz, March 17, September 5, 1883.

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rubric of the National party and were victorious on the battlefield by August. Now, at last, the stage was set for a permanent restructuring of the government. 265 The Constitution of 1886, greatly influenced by the thought of Conservative Miguel ft.ntonio Caro, reversed many of the tenents of liberalism and federalism that had dominated the country since the 1850s. It established a centralized government in which the president had strong control over departmental authorities and was given extensive powers to be used in the case of internal emergencies. Civil liberties, such as the right to possess arms and freedom of the press, were restricted. Suffrage requirements were raised somewhat and prerequisites for holding public office were raised substantially. In keeping with policies begun earlier by Nunez, the central government's economic function was enhanced, including the right to print paper money. Roman Catholicism was again made the official state religion, and though tolerance was granted to all Christian sects, the church's precepts were to govern public education. And, although it was not part of the constitution, a concordat with the Vatican, signe
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proven unable to maintain control by either legitimate or violent political means, they were forced to bide their time for the present. They acted as had Conservatives following their defeat of 1862--as an occasionally significant third political force, seeking to take advantage of splits in the government camp, or as a belligerent in extreme cases. For men such as Jose Marfa Samper or Rafael Reyes, the National 266 party was the hope by which the country could rid itself of the evil of 57 partisan strife. In fact, that utopic ambition was realized only when Nunez was in direct control of the government, something that never happened after August 1888. Conservatives profited from the absences of Nunez from Bogota, as the Independents had never coalesced as an established political party. Independent power eroded continually from the first days of the new constitution, a process that quickened after Nunez permanently left for the coast. By the 1891 presidential election, which will be discussed later, rival factions of the Conservative party, and not former Independents, were the leading contenders. One of the most avid supporters of the National party was artisan Jose Leocadio Camacho, whose paper El Taller, founded in 1884, was filled with praise for the Nunez government in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Given Camacho's long-standing advocacy of the reduction of partisan conflict, this was certainly understandable, but substantive moves by the government could also be seen to favor artisans. One such 57 See Jose Marfa Samper's ideas on the party in La Nacion, March 12, 1888.

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267 measure was creation of the Instituto de Artesanos, decreed by the president in February 1886. The Institute had as its fundamental objective education of craftsmen and their children and was teaching some 500 students by the end of 1886. The government allowed the church to determine what curriculum would be used, so that the Institute had a highly religious tone. While it was an obvious success in exposing students to the values deemed proper by the church, it did little to advance the industrial knowledge long sought by artisan 58 leaders. Nunez had of course won much support from craftsmen by his earlier sponsorship of protective tariffs and these loyalties carried into the post-1886 period. El Taller made frequent references to the pro 59 protectionist stance assumed by Nationalists. Carpenters had fared especially well under the 1880 tariff, and in 1887 leading practitioners of that trade praised the administration for its support 60 of national industries. Some observers, to be sure, thought that protection fostered poor workmanship, particularly in the carpentry trade: one commentator noted in 1886 that wooden furniture had decreased in quality while increasing in price under the higher 61 tariff. Rafael Tapias, a carpenter whose public defense of artisan interests dated from the 1860s, refuted such charges, stating that 58 El Institute, December 8, 1886, January 1, February 23, 1887; La Nacion, March 16, 1886. 59 El Taller, January 15, 1887. 60 El Orden, December 15, 1887; El Renacimiento, December 4, 1886. 61 La Nacion, December 17, 1886.

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consumers were at least partly responsible for shabby workmanship because they commonly frequented lower-skilled craftsmen in search of reduced prices and refused to pay for the quality demanded by the ,; commentator. Tapias added that masters were forced to pass on rising 62 material and living costs as well. Many of the same defenses were 268 voiced by F~lix Valois Madero, himself a carpenter, who would play a significant political role in the 1890s. 63 This polemic also served as an organizational stimulus for the capital's carpenters, who formed a Guild of Carpenters and Cabinetmakers on January 24, 1887. Valois Madero was chosen president of the guild, which totaled about 150 members, many of whom had been active in Bogota's political scene since the 1860s. 64 Mutual aid societies continued to be the most prominent organizations in which artisans participated throughout the period. Although non-artisans, as before, held important positions within these bodies, they increasingly concerned themselves with workers' issues. Speeches by members extolled the virtue of work, the need for protection of Colombian industry, and the contributions of artisans to 65 Bogota's society. Two of the more important mutual aid groups, the Mutual Aid Society and the Philanthropic Society (which had been 62 63 64 65 Ibid., January 11, 1887. El Taller, January 8, 22, 1887. Ibid., February 2, 1887. See , for ex amp 1 e , ..;C..;;o..;;n;..f...;e..;r;..e..;n;..c.;..,i;,.a;.;..;;.s_..;.l..;;e..;;i_d.,;;a..;s ____ e..;n__,1,..a __ ' S_o_c_i_e_d.,.a_d_d_e Socorros Mutuo' (Bogota: Imprenta de "La Luz," 1888); La Nacion, September 10, 1886; El Heraldo, June 18, 1892; La Cronica, August 11, 1898.

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founded ten years earlier) merged in January 1889 so as to provide better services to their 300+ members. At that time, the capital of 66 the new society was estimated at over 11,000 pesos. Such 269 organizational strength, which at first glance emanated from an alliance of more elite, conservative craftsmen and their social peers, would later serve as the basis for surprisingly radical action in 1893, as is discussed below. Legislative elections, which had in the 1870s been the source of considerable agitation involving workers' groups, were relatively uneventful in the late 1880s. The 1888 election for deputies to the departmental assembly did provoke El Taller to urge that artisans play an active role in close contests, but no formal organization was set up for that purpose. As Jos~ Leocadio Camacho was himself a candidate, the paper's stance was undoubtedly self-serving. In any case, Camacho and the National party slate won the contest, with the carpenter/editor 67 receiving 2,940 votes from the 4,319 participating voters. As the decade drew to a close, it became clear that socioeconomic pressures were of far more immediate concern for artisans and the lower classes generally than political issues. Prosperity had followed the end of the 1885 rebellion, but by early 1889 complaints of rising food prices were common. Most sources blamed revendedoras, women who would gain a monopoly of foods in the market and then charge exorbitant 1889. 1889. 66 67 Las Noticias, January 22, 1889; El Telegrama, January 22, For a partial membership list, see El Telegrama, July 13, 16, 7fl Taller, April 1, 1888; El Orden, March 22, April 4, 25, May 29, 1888; El Telegrams, May 4, 1888.

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prices. Public outcry forced the alcalde to take action to limit speculative practices, and by June most prices were reportedly back to normal. However, prices again skyrocketed in the second half of 1890, more likely because of the inflation that was a side effect of Regeneration monetary policies than monopolization by revendedoras. Whatever the cause, high food prices, as well as those of rents, 68 seriously threatened Bogota's lower classes in the 1889-92 period. One proposed remedy for the increasing pressure upon the poor and working classes was state-sponsored housing projects. Camacho had in 1889 suggested such actions, and early in 1892 the pro-government !1 Orden suggested that the government undertake construction of housing for workers in Bogota and other major cities, which could be purchased at a low rate of repayment. This paper stipulated that recipients of 69 the housing should be practitioners of a trade. Legislation to that end was discussed in congress a few months later, drawing prompt criticism from adherents of the dejad hacer school who claimed that state-supported housing should not be made available only to workers, as other social sectors were equally needy. Moreover, they argued, lower-priced housing in Bogoti would only serve to attract more 70 migrants to the city, thus worsening crowding and sanitary problems. 270 In the end, no legislation emerged from that congressional session; not 68 ; El Taller, January 17, June 1, 1889; La Union, June 7, 1881; Las Noticias, March 5, 1889; El Correo Nacional, September 9, 1890; El Amigo del Pueblo, August 3, 1889; La Capital, October 10, 1890; El Heraldo, September 10, 1890; El Telegrams, February 13, 1889; Diario de Cundinamarca, August 3, 1889. 69 El Taller, June 1, 1889; El Heraldo, March 30, 1892. 70 El Taller, July 27, 30, August 3, 1892.

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until fifteen years later would the government actively sponsor such projects. Riot, Repression, and Rebellion, 1890-99 271 The National party, whose unity had been strained for some time, was shattered by the presidential election of 1891. Nunez let it be knolffl that he would serve as titular president for the 1892-98 period while he remained in Cartagena, but that the vice president would continue to be the country's de facto head. He hoped that the party would unite behind a single candidate, but both Marceliano Velez and Miguel Antonio Caro emerged as contenders for the open position. Nunez guarded his silence until September 1891, when he declared Caro his preferred running mate. Velez then bolted the party and ran as a dissident presidential candidate with Jose Joaqu{n Ortiz. Liberals either half-heartedly cast their votes against Caro or continued their policy of electoral abstention. The only visible indication of artisan preference in Bogota was El Taller's predictable support for Nunez and Caro. Camacho wrote, in declaring for those men, that the National party had faithfully supported the arts and had ended years of partisan violence and bloodshed. 71 Nationalists, who favored Nunez and Caro; "Historical Conservatives," who backed Velez; and Liberals, who supported no official candidate, all presented lists of electors for the December 6 71 Ibid., April 21, 1891. Camacho was vice president of the electoral board working for Nunez and Caro's victory in Cundinamarca. See his speech for the two in La Prensa, November 14, 1891.

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272 72 voting. Of the 5,000-odd legal ballots cast in the capital, 3,357 went to the Nationalists, 1,350 to the Liberals, and only 150 to the antioqtieno Velez. 73 Throughout the nation, the voting easily returned a victory for the Nationalists, although the party remained divided by the presidential election. The division of the National party undoubtedly pleased Liberals. Various forms of political repression by Regeneration authorities had prevented that party from recovering its losses after the 1885 rebellion, the two most important being a press law that prohibited slanderous statements and was quite effective in silencing opponents to the regime and the so-called "Law of the Horses" that was employed to curb loosely defined "political crimes." Both had their desired effect, as Liberals were unable to operate freely for much of the 1886-1899 period . The division in the ranks of the regenerators, however, inspired attempts to revitalize the party; Liberals presented their own candidates for the May 1892 congressional elections. But, the next year, after a serious riot in Bogota, the government used the Law of 74 the Horses to once again quiet its opponents. Liberals were not the only group to be negatively affected by the repressive tendencies of the Regeneration. Toward the end of 1892, a writer for the newspaper Colombia Cristiana, the unofficial voice of the archbishopric, penned a series of articles attacking the moral 72 73 74 See them in El Heraldo, December 5, 9, 1891. Ibid., December 9, 12, 1891. Delpar, Red against Blue, 144-45, 150-57. For examples of the applications of these laws, see El Heraldo, August 13, 1890 and El Precursos, September 12, 1889.

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273 habits of the capital's working classes. The author, Jose Ignacio ,,. Gutierrez Isaza, singled out artisans as particularly notorious in the misuse of alcohol and for that vice's deteriorative effect upon their 75 families' well being. Artisans of the Philanthropic Society, the "elite" of their class, immediately protested the account as slanderous and thereby contrary to the 1888 press law, which prohibited inciting one class against another. The Society, on a resolution made by Jose Leocadio Camacho, insisted that Gut(errez retract his allegations and that the government castigate the author. Neither demand was met. Over the course of several days in mid-January 1893, tension between crowds of workers, Gut{errez, and police guarding the author's house rose. After a January 16 meeting between artisan leaders and Minister of War Antonio B. Cuervo, then in charge of the government, in ~ich Cuervo refused to apply the press law, the situation turned violent. Police opened fire upon the crowd and sparked a ten-hour riot that resulted in assaults upon several government offices and the houses of public officials. The rampage was only controlled by imposition of martial law and deployment of the Army. Hundreds of rioters were arrested, an untold number were wounded, and between 40 . 76 and 45 killed in the violence. 75 Colombia Cristiana, December 14, 21, 28, 1892, January 4, 1893. 76 Details of the riot are drawn form various sources. Pnless otherwise noted, the accout given is a composite of information from: AHN, Republics, Policia Nacional, Tomo 2, folios 432-52lr; Ibid, tomo 3, 409, 625-26; Diario Nacional, February 2, 3, 1893; El Correo Nacional, February 1, 1893; El Orden, March 4, 1893.

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274 The 1893 riot was in several ways more complex than the 1875 "motfn del pan." As in the earlier incident, adverse socioeconomic pressures affected the lower classes and laid a volatile foundation for collective action. However, in contrast to the bread riot, neither the spark nor the objects of the crowd's anger were associated with the sources of the socioeconomic pressure. And, unlike the 1875 movement, the artisan elite played an integral part in the development of the 1893 unrest. In fact, the slanderous article against artisans was central in the initial stages of the violence. When the government refused to censure Gutierrez's allegations, as was its legal obligation, the crowd, egged on by the Mutual Aid Society, took matters into its own hands. Attacks against the police and their stations can also be explained, in part, on the basis of reorganization of the city's police department the year before that had redefined its relationship to the populace. By giving it a more professional character, the reorganizational move enhanced the sense of distance between its members and the citizenry. The riot, then, came about due to a complex series of interconnected factors sparked by insults to the reputation of both the artisan elite and the rest of that class. The government not only made numerous arrests during and shortly after the riot, it also suppressed the Philanthropic Society as having instigated the tumult. Jose Leocadio Camacho protested the government's decree, saying that it was ill-founded. In February, he petitioned vice president Caro to allow the Society to resume its meetings. The petition was approved, but only ~~en permission tc meet was obtained in advance and, even then, a representative of the police

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77 had to be present to monitor any "subversive" discussions. For the rest of the decade, the government's fear of conspiracy resulted in close supervision of all organizations that offered the potential base for collective action. 275 In April, after martial law had been lifted and calm had returned to the city, F~lix Valois Madero, one of the artisans who had attempted to convince Cuervo to censure Gutierrez, founded El Artesano in an attempt to improve the tarnished image of the artisan class. Valois Madero filled the pages of his paper with articles pertaining to craftsmen, such as the Model Shop and the artisan's right to determine his own hours of work. El Artesano was combative, engaging in polemics with Miguel Samper and Carlos Holguin, and with other papers. Its central thrust was political unification of the artisans compact workers' guilds are a force which yields results in all areas; they are the life of industry, 7 8f progress, of national wealth, and of politics. During the eleven months after Valois Madero began publication of the paper, he emerged as one of the most visible figures of the artisan class. It is questionable, however, that the artisan public image improved as he had hoped. In March 1894, police informants told authorities of a workers' conspiracy to overthrow the government; on 79 March 11, Madero and numerous others were arrested on that charge. 1893. 77 78 AHN: Rep~blica, Gobernaciones varies, Tomo 28, 954-55. El Artesano, April 8, 15, June 2, 17, 79 Those arrested included Genaro Gomes, Pedro Daza, Carlos Maza, Ricardo Castro, Ricardo Mafla D., Bernardino Ranjel, Jorge Miguel Alvarez, Aparicio Reyes, Leonidas Histrosa, and Genaro Zeno Figuedo.

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Most of those detained were described as artisans, who were said to have been affiliated with all political groups. In the shop of Bernadino Ranjel, agents reportedly found some 6,000 leaflets with the slogans "Viva el trabajo," "Viva el pueblo," and "Abajo los monopolios." At the same time, in Facatativa, authorities confiscated some 500 rifles and ammunition to match. Many of those arrested, including Madero, were tried under the "Law of the Horses," found guilty of planning a movement of an unspecified nature against the government and sentenced to several months' imprisonment. 276 In spite of such actions, it was the Liberal party, and not workers, that was the primary concern of the government. In May 1893, Liberal chieftain Santiago Perez released a platform that signalled his hopes for the party's future operations. The Caro administration at first allowed Liberals the freedom to pursue their political reorganization, but in August 1893, amid fears of conspiracy and lingering effects of the January riot, Liberals throughout the country were arrested, their newspapers closed, and the party's treasury was confiscated. Liberal militants responded to the repression by preparing to revolt against the government. Such a course of action was not uniformly supported . within the party, and, as a consequence, the revolt that began in Cundinamarca in January 1895 was put down with relative ease by the 80 government. Numerous artisans were arrested in the opening days of the rebellion in Bogota, although there is little evidence to indicate 81 widespread support for the insurrection among that class. 80 Delpar, Red against Blue, 149-57; Charles W. Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), 49. 81 El Telegrama, January 12, 1895; Los Hechos, January 23, 1895.

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277 In any case, artisans were involved in more than subversion and repression during the 1890s. Many of their earlier objectives, most notably model shops, finally were met, although not necessarily because of their pressure. The measures undertaken by Nunez in 1881 to train a few craftsmen abroad first bore fruit in 1890. In that year, Juan Nepomuceno Rodriguez, a mechanic who had acquired foundry skills in Europe, was named as director of the Taller Modelo. Located on the Plaza de Narino, the shop was in operation by 1892, although it was not fully funded until 1896. Rodr{guez was able to train craftsmen in several different foundry skills and undoubtedly made a positive 82 contribution to the capital 1 s industrial expansion in those years. Two other ventures were undertaken during the same period to teach industrial arts in the capital. In 1893, the National Institute of Artisans was reorganized so as to place more emphasis on practical arts, though without fully abandoning theoretical training. By December of the next year, the Institute had graduated almost 80 83 students. Artisans seemed to have been generally satisfied with the Institute, but the same was not true of the education offered by the Salesian fathers after their arrival in Bogota in 1890. In the latter part of that year, the Instituto Salesiano was founded with the intention of offering to lower class youths courses in carpentry, weaving, and shoemaking. The Salesian Institute came under attack 82 La Capital, November 7, 1890; El Progreso, March 4, 11, 1897; Los Hechos, August 1, 31, September 26, 1894; El Correo Nacional, July 1, 1891; El Grito del Pueblo, June 16, 1897. 83 El Correo Nacional, May 6, 1893; Los Hechos, December 6, 1894.

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278 innnediately for "robbing" jobs from adult craftsmen and for undermining the "proper" method of apprenticeships. One of the slogans reportedly heard in the 1893 riot was "Down with the Salesians," and similar attitudes were expressed throughout the decade. F~lix Valois Madero used the pages of El Artesano to criticize the Institute, a tactic 'Which led Miguel Samper to respond in its defense, 'Which in turn evoked 84 a debate reminiscent of Camacho and Samper in the 1860s. Accusations that the Salesian Institute was undermining artisans' employment prospects were only one of several indications that craftsmen were striving to look after their own well being. Mutual aid groups, before their suppression in 1893, represented similar aspirations. So too did establishment of various other organizations, beginning with the Sociedad de Seguros de Familia in 1890. The Family Insurance Society, an offshoot of the Mutual Aid Society, was desi . gned to extend finnacial aid not only to members stricken with illness but to their families. Most of its members were described as artisans or 85 workers. The Family Insurance Society did not engage in politics, but this was not true of the Typesetters' Society. Founded in 1887 to help typesetters and advance their art, this organization was able to survive the crackdowns of the mid-1890s to emerge as one of the few politically active artisan organizations in the latter years of the 84 Diario de Cundinamarca, May S, June 20, 1893; El Telegrama, February 15, 1890, May 22, 1895; La Capital, October 31, 1890; El Correo Nacional, May 11, 1891, may 28, 1892, May 7, 1894; El Orden, March 1, 1893; Colombia Christiana, May 13, 1894. 85 El Taller, July 2, 1891; El Heraldo, April 9, 1890; La Patria, August 3, 1894; El Republicana, March 10, 1896.

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nineteenth century. Once again, however, it was partisan competition for office, and not the inherent strength of artisan organizations, that accounted for the opening for political expressions. 279 The presidential election of 1897 was a wide-open affair that resembled that of 1849 in complexity. The preferred Nationalist candidate was Caro, although the constitutionality of his candidacy was questionable. In the end, a nomination process akin to musical chairs resulted in Manuel A. Sanclemente and Jose Manuel Marroqufn at the head of the Nationalist ticket; Guillermo Quintero Calderon and Marceliano Ve1ez as the Historical Conservative slate; and Miguel Samper and Focion Soto as the Liberal candidates. In Bogoca, Jose Leocadio Camacho published El Grito del Pueblo in which he praised the Nationalist's support for crafts training and their protectionist policies, just as he had from the pages of El Taller. Craftsmen were also active in support of Liberal and Historical Conservative 86 candidates. The election of 1897 was a crucial turning point for Liberals. While militants had not been widely supported in their 1895 revolt, the legitimate participation in politics counseled by moderates had also proven unsuccessful. For the latter, the party's showing in the election raised hopes for the future. But for the former, it steeled their resolve to oust Nationalists from the government by force of arms. Part of the moderate effort in preparation for the presidential election, which was engineered by Aquileo Parra, had been to 86 See, for example, El Guasca, December 4, 1897 and La Cronica, September 17, 1897.

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280 incorporate leading craftsmen into the party's departmental administrative body. Typesetter Alejandro Torres Amaya, chocolate manufacturer Enrique Chaves B., and Pompilio Beltran, one of the youths sent to Europe for crafts training, were brought into party affairs in this manner and were Liberal electors in the 1897 election. 87 Presumably they helped to organize the December 1897 pro-Parra demonstration in front of his Chapinero home that drew an estimated 88 6,000 people. They certainly were active in organizations of Liberal artisans in the months after the elections. Liberal electors tallied the most votes in the capital, easily outdistancing the Nationalist and 89 Conservative slates. In the country as a whole, however, Nationalist control of the political machinery resulted in their return to office. In December of 1898, Liberal craftsmen founded the Club Industrial Colombiano, which was dedicated to advancement of the arts and the country's industrial interests, and also to unite individuals of "democratic and republican" persuasions. Selected as the Industrial Club's president was Pompilio Beltran and as its general secretary, 90 Alejandro Torres Amaya. At least one newspaper identified this group as being in the camp of militant Liberal Rafael Uribe Uribe, an alignment that, if true, could indicate its function was to mobilize craftsmen's support for the coming conflict. Further indications of 168. 87 88 89 90 El Republicano, March 13, April 17, 1896. La Cronica, December 21, 22, 23, 1897. El Nacionalista, January 5, 1898; Delpar, Red against] Blue, La Cronica, December 30, 1898.

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widespread preparations could be seen in the installation of similar 91 clubs in the towns of Sogomoso, Popayan, and Barranquilla. Even as the war was approaching, Liberal artisans were continuing organizational efforts of a pacific nature. In September, the Typesetters' Society helped found the Sociedad de Sastres for the betterment of that trade and, one presumes, Liberal recruitment. A Sociedad de Zapateros was established for many of the same reasons the 92 following month. The outbreak of war in October meant the quick 281 demise of these groups. Even so, they portended characteristics of workers' organizations after the end of the conflict, in that they were organizing along trade lines and, since they met in the same building as the Philanthropic Society and Family Insurance Society, indicated increased cooperation between all varieties of workers' groups. Conclusion Artisan political mobilization during the 1869-99 period exhibited several characteristics that differed from those of previous years. Organizations continued to appear before crucial elections, but this was much less the case after the beginning of the Regeneration. Two new types of groups appeared, mutual aid societies and, toward the end 91 Ibid., January 3, 19, 26, 1899. The club founded in Barranquilla had more than political interest, on at least two occasions it engaged in strikes to improve worker's conditions. El Autonomista, May 26, 27, 1899. 92 La Cronica, September 20, October 1, 5, 14, 1899.

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of the century, trade organizations. For the first time significant incidents of direct action involved artisans as well. 282 A most vexing question is why no broadly-based artisan mobilizations comparable to the Democratic Society or the Union Society took place during this period. The various social, economic, and political interests of active craftsmen which had been elaborated earlier continued to dominate these years, as did many of the same leaders. Factors that contributed to earlier activity, such as economic crisis or partisan competition, were every bit as evident in these years, but sustained movements did not materialize. One possible explanation is the nature of the evolution of the artisan class during these years. As was suggested in Chapter 1, it remained fairly homogeneous through the 1860s, when the redefinition of Bogot~'s economy brought about by economic reforms began to form political groups that could tap large numbers of its members. After the crisis of the 1860s, social distances between craftsmen increased and leaders lost touch with the mass of artisans. Thereafter, the nature of artisan political organizations reflected the reduced influence of the artisan elite. Prominent craftsmen organized, but fn more exclusive mutual aid societies. The artisan rank-and-file were left without political outlets and made its interests kno'Wtl through direct action, a new form of artisan political expression. The 1875 riot was a "classic" bread riot sparked by a sharp rise in bread prices and the elimination of the quarter-peso loaf, a commodity of popular consumption. Artisan leaders unanimously condemned the unrest. The second riot, in 1893, sparked by the elite, confronted a slanderous author and a "professional! zed" police force and was exacerbated by

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harsh socioeconomic conditions. In sum, it seems likely that the nature of artisan mobilizations during these years reflected the division of the class more than its unity. Concerted action was possible onl y in the single incident when the concerns of the artisan elite coincided with the socioeconomic reality facing the rest of the class. 283 One additional factor deserves mention. In the score of years after the War of the Supremes, political parties came into their own as institutional entities. Throughout this period, pre-electoral groups were quite important for their ability to turn out voters, including artisans, on election day. By the 1870s, however, parties developed local institutions such as permanent directories that made these groups less essential. ~oreover, individuals by the 1870s were identifying themselves with a particular party not only on the basis of contemporary appeals, but also on the basis of familial traditions. In the 1869-99 period, the decreased need of the parties to mobilize artisan voters and the fragmentation of the artisan class combined to create a very different environment, which in turn encouraged tradesmen to e x press themselves through new forms and institutions.

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CHAPTER 7 THE RISE OF THE WORKER'S LABOR MOVEMENT, 1899-1919 Overview The War of 1000 Days began in late 1899 and lasted until November 1902, when Liberals and Conservatives signed a peace treaty aboard the U. S. S. Wisconsin. Many areas of Colombia experienced widespread destruction during the war, which in its latter stages threatened to transform itself from a "typical" nineteenth-century partisan conflict to a struggle between social classes. That threat convinced many leaders that the time had come to resolve partisan differences in a manner other than war. The United States's assisted separation of Panama from the nation in 1903 shocked the nation and prepared it for fundamental political change. The presidency of Rafael Reyes (1904-09) reflected the sentiment that both parties should have an ongoing role in the country's administration. Nonetheless, Reyes himself was dedicated first to instituting a strong government whereby the nation might enjoy a period of stability and growth following the chaotic conditions prevailing after the Liberal revolt of 1895. The quinquenio of Reyes was brought to an end in 1909, when moderates of both parties, and men of similar temper belonging to the Republican Union, restored a normalized political life with a bipartisan orientation as evidenced in the 284

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285 constitutional reform of 1910. Carlos E. Restrepo, ostensibly an adherent to the principles of Republicanism, presided over the nation's government for the next four years (1910-14). By the end of his administration, the spirit of Republicanism had faded, and Conservative , Jose Vicente Concha followed Restrepo in the presidential mansi . on. Artisans and other workers suffered through the War of 1000 Days much as they had through earlier conflicts. In response to ever present foreign competition, workers at various levels of the productive hierarchy formed the Society of Industrialists and Workers in 1904 in order to obtain tariff protection and to create a unified political voice. The Society failed to convince the congress to approve higher duties, but Reyes's plans for the nation's recovery included substantial tariff increases, which he accordingly enacted in 1905. The Society did not continue to operate; only workers' mutual aid groups were visible during the quinquenio. One of the central characteristics of the labor movement and its relation to politics during the first score of years in this century was the often conflicting interaction between artisans, industrialists, and workers. The fragmentation of the artisan class in the latter years of the nineteenth century and the appearance of larger-scale manufacturing and transport industries produced a far more complex laboring population than had before existed. The problem of defining these groups, one addressed earlier, is particularly important for this chapter. Many artisans continued to operate their own shops with a few journeymen and maintained their economic and social independence, even though their production undoubtedly represented a decreasing percentage of the city's output. Others, such as the shoemaker Martin Silva, are

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286 more properly referred to as "industrialists." Silva practiced his craft as the owner of a shop that became increasingly larger until, in 1908, he employed thirty workers, produced a wide range of shoe styles, 1 and had two sales rooms. The "industry" of Silva did not compare to the fully mechanized Bavaria beer factory, which by the same year had almost 400 laborers, but it was probably typical of shops whose owners had taken advantage of the division of labor to expand their productive capacity. The workers who toiled for Silva and other industrialists probably faced a life of wage labor that offered some the hope of achieving the independence of the artisan and only a very few the status of the industrialist. Concerns such as the Railroad of the Sabana employed a range of workers, from highly skilled to untrained manual laborers. The more skilled wage laborers in that venture often referred to themselves as artisans, although they of course lacked the economic independence of the "true" artisan. The problem of terminology in reference to artisans, industrialists, or workers is of central importance and, in this chapter, is treated by using the labels that the actors used in describing themselves, except when otherwise noted. The obvious conflict between the interests of these different laborers was one that organizations grappled with at length; in the 1910s it was a leading factor in the evolution of such groups. In any event, it is safe to ,,. say that in Bogota, as in other cities with a complex laboring population, artisans--either as independent or skilled workers--played 2 a central role in the labor movement. 1 El Concurso Nacional, October 12, 1908. 2 For discussion of this topic in French towns of the same period, see Michael P. Hanagan, The Logic of Solidarity: Artisans and Industrial Workers in Three French Towns, 1871-1914 (Chicago:

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From 1910 onward, a multitude of workers' organizations operated in Bogota, beginning with the National Union of Industrialists and 287 Workers. The Union assumed an active political stance, presenting itself as the Workers Party in the elections of 1911. It, however, was divided over whether to affiliate with the Liberal or Republican partys--or whether to attempt an independent political life. In time the Union sided with the Liberals, though some of its members left to work with the Colombian Workers Union, which had Republican sympathies. During the 1909-15 period, it became increasingly clear to many organized workers that alignment with political parties meant that their interests would be secondary to the primary quest of electoral victory. Consequently, a drift toward the rejection of partisan alignment and a central concern with socioeconomic issues developed. In time, this tendency matured into a socialist attitude that generally rejected involvement with established parties. The inclination towards socialism was clear in the 1916 Workers Party and obtained a coherent expression in the 1919 Workers Assembly, a meeting that set the stage for a new chapter in the Colombian labor movement. Recovery and Reyes, 1899-1909 While the War of 1000 Days was fought primarily in rural areas, urban inhabitants suffered from reduced food supplies, stagnant University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Joan Wallach Scott, The Glassworkers of Carmaux: French Craftsmen and Political Action in a Nineteenth-Century City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).

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economic conditions, and liability to recruitment as soldiers. The economic situation did not markedly improve with the end of the war in 1902. Throughout that year and the next public and religious groups set up charity kitchens to deal with continuing shortages of food and the lack of money to purchase that which was available at high 1 prices.In September 1903 a group of industrialists, artisans, and workers argued in a petition to the chamber that the peso's depreciation, combined with heavy taxes, had made their lives miserable. The petition reasoned that the chamber could improve the situation by lifting taxes on consumption which, it argued, further 4 reduced their already low incomes. 288 Some months later, in April 1904, Juan Ignacio Galvez began to use the pages of Los Hechos to promote the formation of a "Workers Party." Galvez argued that the traditional parties were "anarchized," corrupt, and simply unable to respond to the needs of the people. Re therefore proposed the organization of a non-partisan group that would further 5 the interests of workers. The precipitant of this notion appears to ,, have been a circular from artisans in Popayan to their counterparts throughout the country to mobilize a petition drive to seek higher tariffs from the next congress. The circular claimed that only concerted action could stem the flood of imports that followed the end of the fighting. 6 Owners of small shoemaking shops, who called 3 La Constituci~n, October 11, November 26, 1902; La Juventud, January 18, 1903; El Impulso, March 4, 1903, 4 AC: Senado, Memoriales con informes, IV, 24-40r, 49. 5 Los Hechos, April 23, May 10, 1904. 6 Ibid., May 20, 1904.

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themselves artisans, seconded these sentiments in a complaint against U. s. imports by Colombian merchants who they claimed worshipped the "corrupt dollar." Los Hechos observed that the proposed legislation 289 would increase the tariff on manufactured items, reduce it to a minimum on raw materials used for national production, and remove it altogether f h . 7 rem mac 1nery. In June, an estimated 2,000 people attended an organizational meeting of the Union de Industriales y Obreros to prepare Bogota's petition drive. Emeterio Nates, a shoemaker, presided over the session, which was attended by General Rasprilla of the National Police--undoubtedly to avoid repetition of events of years past. The session voted overwhelmingly to respond positively to the initiative begun by Popayan's artisans; it was resolved that a newspaper directed by Galvez should be the Union's mouthpiece, an honor Galvez accepted only when Jose Leocadio Camacho agreed to work with him in order to f 8 1 demonstrate the non-partisan nature o the organization. At its forma foundation on the 8th, Camacho was selected to become president of the Union; Nates, vice-president; and Jesus Gonzalez F., secretary. The same meeting resulted in the appointment of a commission to recruit representatives from various trades to act as the Union's Board of D . 9 1rectors. Twenty-five trades responded to the call and were present at the next meeting on the 11th. Camacho, now 71 years old, informed the 7 Ibid., May 27, 1904. 8 Ibid., June 7, 1904. 9 Ibid. , June 11, 1904.

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delegates that their task was to unite Bogoti's workers for the betterment of all persons involved in industry. Unity was the central theme of his delivery, which, he commented, was more feasible now due to greater awareness by workers of their social reality. Lamentably, the aftermath of the war had caused them great material misfortunes, Camacho continued, and thus the necessity of their petition to the 10 congress. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate any copies of the Union's newspaper, Paz y Trabajo, so it is impossible to analyse the organization's ideology. Articles reprinted in other papers suggest that unity was an important theme, as was its stress on the equal 11 importance of "humble" workers and "comfortable" industrialists. The Union of Industrialists and Workers seemed most concerned with the 290 petition drive, which culminated in the presentation of signatures from Bogota, Popayan, and Cali to the congress in early October. The Union undoubtedly thought that the proposal stood a good chance of being accepted, as President Rafael Reyes had included tariff reform as part of the fiscal package he presented to the congress when he took office. That stance and his less-partisan approach to politics accounted for a march organized by the Union of some 2,500 workers past the president's 12 house late in October. However, despite the organized effort in favor of higher tariffs and the support of the president, congress adjourned without enacting the desired legislation. In his telegram to 10 11 12 Ibid., June 18, 1904. El Correo Nacional, September 28, 1904. Ibid., October 5, 13, 1904.

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the caleno supporters of the bill, Camacho protested the insensitive attitude of the congress, while reaffirming the Union's hope for obtaining tariff protection. 13 291 In January of the following year, President Reyes demonstrated his penchant for personal control when he issued an executive decree raising tariffs. The stated goal of the 70% increase was to "protect national industries," a move Ospina Vazquez claims "put teeth in" the ; 14 industrial protection begun some 25 years earlier by Nunez. There is no record of the Union of Industrialists and Workers' reaction to the new tariff, as the association appears to have lost momentum and organizational unity after the petition drive, although it did not disappear entirely. The Union was, in any case, a transitional workers' group, evidencing both old and new characteristics. Clearly the Union drew upon past leadership (Camacho) and dealt with goals seen in earlier periods, but, at the same time, its very title reflected the widening division of the working population. It also represents the first time that a bogotano group tried to form a syndicate of different trades. While some of its leaders were well known, many were new actors who would dominate labor organizations over the next fifteen years. The five years following the Union's eclipse, bowever, were times of relative quiet, as the guinquenio of Rafael Reyes (1905-09) did not provide the proper climate for politicized labor organizations. Reyes had emerged from the Three Years' War as a leader relatively unscathed by the bitter partisan struggle. Although a Conservative, he 13 14 Diario Noticioso, January 11, 1905. Ospina va'squez, Industria y proteccion, 334-44.

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292 favored the cooperation exemplified by the National party over the antagonisms of traditional Liberal and Conservative politics. His absence from Colombia during the war years made him an attractive presidential candidate in 1904, favored by some old Nationalists and by most of those Liberals who enjoyed the opportunity to vote. Historical Conservatives and other Nationalists backed Joaqu{n F. Vele~, an equally, if not more qualified candidate, but one who in the end lost a notoriously corrupt election. Reyes entered office ready to put into practice the "scientificism" he had observed in the Mexico of Porfirio Diaz and forcibly to take charge of the nation's development, for which protective tariffs were only one aspect of his program. Others included the reorganization of the country's beleaguered monetary system, improvement of its infrastructure, and promotion of export agriculture . Reyes also undertook substantial political reforms, most notably in bringing Liberals into his government to break the deadly partisan cycle of the nineteenth century. The president's antipathy toward congress increased during the first months of 1905, leading him to dismiss that body, convene a National Assembly in its stead, and 15 force through an e x tension by four years of his term in office. Reyes's bipartisan inclination, combined with lingering resentment of the fraud which gained him office, alienated some Conservat i ves to the point that they prepared to assassinate him on December 19, 1905. The conspiracy was discovered however, and its planners were arrested and put on tria 1. Men of similar persuasion fired upon the president's 15 Eduardo Lemaitre, Rafael Reyes: Biografia de un gran colombiano (Bogota: Banco de la Rep~blica, 1981), 246-55; Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict, 219-23.

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carriage on February 10, 1906. The assassination attempt inflamed Reyes and led him to complete the assumption of dictatorial powers 16 begun the year earlier. Furthermore, although it was not immediately apparent, these attacks on the president aborted another effort to organize Bogota's workers. In late 1905, two newspapers sympathetic to workers' issues began publication. El Faro, printed by the Liberal artisan Alejandro Torres Amaya, was the more radical of the two, printing articles such as "The Second Social Class," which praised artisans' natural goodness and called for strong governmental action to improve their material condition. The same article spoke of an apocalyptic uprising of 17 displaced individuals in assertion of their rights. El Yungue was 293 somewhat more moderate, addressing itself to the need for tariff protection and educational reform favorable to workers. The paper insisted that industrialists and workers should continue to close ranks politically, so that when elections were held in 1908 they could break the bonds of partisan policies by electing their own representatives. Many of El Yunque's editors and directors had been active in the Union of Industrialists and Workers and the paper reflected many of the same 18 concerns. A third conspiracy, allegedly set to begin on June 1, brought to an abrupt end the efforts of both El Yunque and El Faro. The June 1 16 Lemaitre, Rafael Reyes, 316-24. 17 , fl Faro, February 18, 25, 1906. 18 El Yunque, February 16, March 15, April 14, 19, 27, May 17, 24, 26, 1906.

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conspiracy, which has not been subjected to historical scrutiny, was said to involve a plan to cut electrical wires to the city and undertake a movement against the government. Military authorities subverted the supposed plan, arresting large numbers of artisans, workers, and others. El Faro became involved in the incident when it published a petition asking permission to hold a public rally in support of the government, which some in the administration considered a subterfuge; the government denied the request, termed the paper a danger to social order, and arrested its editors. The capital's press in the following days was filled with conflicting accounts as to the degree of worker involvement in the alleged conspiracy, which the government in the end admitted did not exist. Nonetheless, since editors of both newspapers were arrested and sent to military colonies or to prisons in other areas of the country, the affair merits further investigation. 19 In any event, the incident brought on an era of close governmental supervision of politicized workers' groups that did not end until Reyes was driven from power. 294 Although organizations with openly political ends were not present during the remainder of the Reyes administration, numerous mutual aid societies, characteristic of earlier years, operated and would provide the basis for future political mobilizations. The spirit of association among different trades that had been visible in the Union of Industrialists and Workers similarly characterized these organizations. For example, the August 7, 1907 meeting of the Mutual Aid Society--Bogota's oldest--was attended by representatives from the 19 El Correo Nacional, June 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 1906.

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Philanthropic Society (which had apparently split from the other group), the Sociedad de Amigos de Paz, the Sociedad de Caridad, the Typesetters' Society, the Sociedad de Carpinteros Unidos, and the / 20 Sociedad Union. Many members of the carpenters' group had been members of the carpenters' trade organization in the 1880s, which 295 21 suggests a certain persistence of trade groups. Four of the societies had been founded prior to the war, but the others, along with some not present, had been established after its conclusion. Most of them would cooperate in the creation of the Union Nacional de Industriales y Obreros in 1910. 22 As might have been expected, the established groups had to struggle to survive the War of 1000 Days. Typical perhaps was the experience of the Mutual Aid Society. It lost its office and furniture, its archives, and suffered severe fiscal losses. Not until 1905 did it formally reorganize, but within two years the Society had started a savings bank for its members and resumed its position as the 23 largest organization of its kind in the capital. The 1889 merger between it and the Philanthropic Society seems not to have survived the war, and the latter group was reorganized as a separate entity in 1906. 24 20 XYZ, August 17, 1907, 21 Ibid., May 9, 1907. 22 La Fusion, January 17, 1910. 23 El Correo Nacional, March 1, 1905; La Prensa, August 13, 1907; XYZ, January 31, 1907; El Publico, January 30, 1907. 24 Estatutos de la Sociedad Filantropica (Bogota: Imprenta Electrics, 1906).

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296 In the years immediately preceding the war, the Typesetters' Society had been very active politically, and it experienced much hardship during the war. Nonetheless, it too revived by 1905, but now with an apolitical stance. According to press reports, abandonment of its partisan past drew most members of that trade into the Society. Typesetters recognized their obvious importance among the city's working population; the group noted in 1906 that "the typesetter is now, more than ever, conscious that he is in the workers' vanguard" and 25 therefore should be obliged to work for peace. The church appears to have been closely connected to many mutual aid groups founded after the war. The Sociedad de la Protectora, established in 1902, was probably the first such body. Its members were described as "industrialists" and "artisans" who pledged mutually to protect one another and to pressure the government to control the high prices of foodstuffs facing Bogota's inhabitants. 26 Two similar organizations, the Charity Society and La Sociedad de la Cruz, were f . i by 1907. 27 A fi 1 h h d 1 id unction ng na c urc supporte mutua a 25 El Correo Nacional, January 18, 1905; El Artista, January 26, September 29, December 1, 1906, March 21, 1908. The Society was given juridical status in November 1906, even though it had been organized nine years earlier. This underscores the shortcomings of employing juridical recognition as a conclusive measure of the numbers of labor organizations, a method used by Urrutia and others, albeit with acknowledgement of its weaknesses. Urrutia, Development of the Colombian Labor Movement, 53, 60; Mauricio Archila, "De la revolucion social a la conciliacion? Algunos hipotesis sobre la transformacion de la clase obrera colombiana (1919-1935)," Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, No. 12 (1984), 98-102. 26 La Constitucion, October 8, 1902. 27 El Correo Nacional, July 8, 1904; XYZ, September 21, 1904; El Nuevo Tiempo, January 16, 1909.

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organization, La Sociedad de Santa Orosia, began to operate in January 1907. It too appealed principally to workers and had certain connections to prewar groups, as Felix Valois Madero was its first secretary. By 1909 the Society had almost 500 members and substantial funds. The Santa Orosia Society, perhaps more than any church affiliated society, cooperated actively with non-religious groups of 28 the same nature. While the preceding societies had clear mutual aid objectives and less apparent political significance, the Sociedad Union, founded in April 1907 by Eduardo Boada R., had a more openly political nature. The Union Society attempted to bring all social classes together under the theme "Amor al trabajo", but loyalty to the "honor" of work was hardly its sole concern; many of its members ~ere active in the 29 fledgling Republican movement in opposition to Reyes. 297 The quinquenio did not experience direct opposition after the 1906 assassination attempts: although antagonisms against the president were not far from the surface, Reyes did not have to worry about keeping control. In early 1909, nonetheless, the president was forced to reconvene the National Assembly in order to ratify the treaties his government had negotiated with Panama and the United States to settle the conflict resulting from the loss of the Isthmus. The terms of the proposed treaties favored both the U. S. and the now independent 28 El Correo Nacional, March 24, August 20, 1908; El Nuevo Tiempo, January 13, June 14, 1909; La Unidad, July 22, 1911; La Gaceta Republicana, January 12, 1912; and La Sociedad, Abril 27, 1912. 29 El Republicano, April 24, 1907; El Artista, April 8, 1908; and El Correo Nacional, April 15, September 4, 1908.

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department, and they did not reflect the feelings of most of the assembly's members or much of the nation. On March 11, Nicolis Esguerra disavowed the assembly's constitutional power to ratify the treaties, a move that undermined the legitimacy of the entire Reyes regime. Two days Inter, on the 13th, amid student-led demonstrations in the capital, Reyes delegated power to Jorge Holguin, who promptly declared a state of siege. Reyes reclaimed control the next day, but the opposition of the previous days had broken the perception of his political authority. Shortly thereafter the president called for congressional elections, and set about preparing to "normalize" the 1 1 30 po itica process. ,, Medofilo Medina has amplified the role of artisans and workers in 298 the 13 de Marzo to the point of describing them as the "popular sector" at the front of the first great urban protest of the twentieth 31 century. Such a claim is exaggerated, as it seems most likely that the demonstrations on the 13th represented a popular seconding of the sentiments expressed in the assembly against the treaties, the closed political system, and unfavorable economic conditions. However, industrialists, artisans, and workers did in fact take part in the drama of the 13th. Apparently the Union, Mutual Aid, and Philanthropic Societies joined in some of the mobilizations of that day, although the 32 Union Society later denied any involvement. 30 Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict, 242-45; Lemaitre, Rafael Reyes, 336-39, 345-57 31 ~edofilo Medina, La protesta urbana en Colombia en el siglo XX (Bogota: Ediciones Aurora, 1984), 19, 24 passim. 32 El Concurso Nacional, April 2, 1909; Uni6n Industrial, August 29, 1909; Medina, 24; El Nuevo Tiempo, March 13, 1909. Many contemporary sources do"Wilplayed the role of artisans in the events of

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299 If the exact participation of workers in the 13 de Marze remains nebulous, the behavior of the self-styled industrialists and workers in the political events of the months and years that followed is much more evident. A significant number of the men who would emerge as labor activists in the coming years were connected to the Union Republicana, a political conglomeration of moderate Liberals and Historical Conservatives that seized the opportunity made available by Reyes's fall from power. The Republican Union was formally organized in April by Carlos E. Restrepo, Guillermo Quintero Calderon, Nicolas Esguerra, and others; leading industrialists were involved in the Union from its inception. Its principles included bipartisan politics, open elections, and religious toleration. 33 Republicans were very successful in the June 1909 elections, and they would be a powerful force in Colombian politics through the 1910s. Once again artisans, now joined by industrialists and workers, would assume increased importance with the momentary collapse of the two-party system. Industrialists and Workers, 1909-15 Much to the country's surprise, Rafael Reyes left Colombia for England in June after delegating power to Jorge Holguin. The newly elected congress then appointed General Ramon Gonzalez Valencia as president until August 1910, by which time his successor would be the 13th. 1909; El 33 See, for example, El Nuevo Tiempo, March 16, 17, 18, 26, Correo Nacional, March 24, 1909; and XYZ, March 19, 1909. See the circular in El Nuevo Tiempo, April 5, 1909.

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chosen. In November 1909, elections were held throughout the country for municipal councils, who in turn selected delegates to a National Assembly the following April. That assembly enacted major constitutional reforms, including the reduction of the presidential term of office to four years, the establishment of direct popular presidential elections, and guaranteed minority party representation (1/3 of all seats in congress). The assembly also selected Carlos E. Restrepo as the country's president for a four year term. 300 While these events were unfolding at the level of national politics, unprecedented steps to politically organize the working class of Bogota were made. In August 1909, Emilio Murillo proposed forming an Union Obrera to further the interests of that class. (Murillo had been an active supporter of the Republican Union since its founding and had been a key figure in the Directorio de Industriales y Obreros associated with that party.) The call was successful, and the Union Industrial began publication on the 15th as the association's mouthpiece. The paper, which was apparently published only one month, announced that it was dedicated to protection of the nation's 34 industry. The Workers' Union lent its backing to some Republican candidates in the November municipal council elections, a contest that returned a strong Republican victory. Support by Murillo's group was seemingly an advantage, as the candidates with the largest vote totals 35 were those backed by both Republicans and the Union. 34 Union Industrial, August 15, 21, 29, September 5, 1909. 35 La Gaceta Republicana, November 12, 15, 1909.

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301 The spirit of association visible in the latter half of 1909 gave rise in February 1910 to the Union Nacional de Industriales y Obreros (UNIO). The National Union met in an organizational session on the 12th, in which one of its founders, the typesetter Alberto Navarro B., clearly articulated its principles and objectives. The UNIO was, according to his account, first and foremost an attempt to unify workers for their common wellbeing and protection of their trades, and to help their families. Its intent was to avoid partisan political alignments, he continued, although temporary dealings with traditional parties were not to be dismissed. The Union's organizers recognized that its members were Catholics, and thus vowed not to attack their religion, but at the same time pledged not to abandon the group's basic interests in conflicts with the official line of the church. Free, obligatory education was a goal Navarro thought should be actively pursued, along with trade schools for industrial education and adult schools. He added, in another familiar plea, that a savings bank would provide a greatly needed service to all the group's members. Finally, Navarro noted that the group that we are going to form will work in all elections by common accord, and its candidates will be those citizens who fulfill the indispensable conditions to be genuine r~gre sentatives of the people who elect them. At first glance, the organizational efforts undertaken by workers in 1909 led directly to the establishment of the UNIO in 1910, which is true in so far as the fall of Reyes created the opportunity for such 36 El Sufragio, February 19, 1910; La Fusion, January 17, 24, February 16, 1910.

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302 ventures. However, as time revealed, two distinct political tendencies were present among workers. Members of the Workers Union of 1909 tended to align themselves with the Republican movement until it weakened later in the decade. By contrast, most of those associated with the UNI0 ~ere more clearly affiliated with the Uribe Uribe camp of liberalism, a circumstance that would hamper efforts to unite non Conservative workers' groups until after Uribe's assassination in 1914. Nonetheless, in the early months of the UNI0's existence this polarization was not visible and workers of both tendencies took part in its formation. The UNI0 began publication of a newspaper, La Razon del 0brero, in early March. The paper's primary emphasis was to publicize the Union's principles and to address issues relating to workers. Articles on education, tariff protection, living conditions, and the developing workers' movement filled its pages. In April, the UNI0 held elections, which resulted in Domingo E. Alvarez becoming its president; Alejandro Torres Amaya, vice president; Juan N. Paniagua, secretary; and Andres Luna E., treasurer. At the same time, the group's organizational objectives were restated along the same lines elaborated by Navarro two months earlier. In the months that followed, the UNI0 quietly pursued its goals while building a unified organization in anticipation of the elections of 1911. 37 Although the National Assembly met from May until November 1910, the UNI0 refrained from commenting on most of its deliberations. In its one direct observation, it expressed support for free and 37 El Razon del 0brero, April 16, 1910.

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obligatory primary education. Other workers, however, reminded the 38 assembly of their protectionist needs. When the assembly deliberated on candidates for the country's next president, the UNIO made no official endorsement, although many of its members signed statements 19 backing Guillermo Quintero Calderon as their preferred candicate.Since both he and Carlos E. Restrepo, the assembly's choice, were active in the Republican Union, it is unlikely that many politically expressive workers were upset with the incoming president. As the nation returned to normalized political activity, the UNIO prepared to represent itself as the Workers Party in the elections of 1911. These were to he held for departmental assemblies in February, for senators and representatives in May, and for municipal councils in 40 October. The UNIO elected a "Central Workers Election Directory" to 303 oversee the effort of the Workers Party and it undertook the task with extreme vigor. The Election Directory immediately circulated a call to shop owners, industrialists, and workers to form committees in each barrio to work with the central body. The UNIO decided that the Directory should be represented by a newspaper, hence El Proteccionista began publication on October 29. By that date, eleven . barrio committees had been formed, and the Directory's intentions well defined. Central to its political objectives was winning tariff protection, which it coupled with reductions in duties on essentials for internal consumption and elimination of export duties on coffee, 38 Ibid., July 22, 1910; La Correspondencia, June 10, 1910. 39 El 13 de Marzo, June 15, 18, 29, July 2, 1910. 40 El Proteccionista, November 26, 1910.

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measures it felt would benefit the nation as a whole. Protection was hardly a new demand, but the Directory insisted that, to be effective, it had to come about as the result of political pressures by workers, not in the form of "state socialism," a clear reference to the thought of the Literal chieftain Rafael Uribe Uribe. (The split between pro and anti-Uribe Uribe forces in the UNIO would take place the following year.) 304 In order to receive the support of the Directory, a potential candidate had to be a worker or industrialist who had helped in its efforts; he should preferably be young and thus, according to the UNIO, less likely to have a partisan background; ideally the candidate would live in the area he was to represent; and, most critically, the perscn had to be committed to the group's ideology. If candidates satisfied these prerequisites, the Directory reasoned that the Workers Party could break free of traditional partisan constraints and its adherents might begin "self-representation." The Directory did not preclude alliances with established political groups, but, as when it met with Republicans, it insisted on a genuinely reciprocal relationship. The Directory did not limit itself to mobilizing the workers of the capital; it also urged formation of similar groups throughout the nation. By December, it had received favorable replies from Popayan, Cali, Ibague, Zipaquira, and numerous other towns. On November 26, the paper reported 1,500 subscribers in the capital alone, while its Li.I Directory included representatives from all of the city's barrios. 41 Ibid., October 29, November 5, 12, 19, 26, December 4, 1910.

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The UNI0, of course, was not the only organization making preparations for the February elections. The Conservative, Liberal, and Republican parties all were busy in the first full political campaign since the fall of Reyes. While Conservatives questloned the legitimacy of the Workers Party, the other two parties recognized that successful alignment with the new organization could spell the margin of victory in a close election. The Republican daily, La Gaceta Republicans, made repeated appeals to the Workers Party, but an informal agreement was reached between that group and Liberals to vote for a slate containing representatives from both groups. In a serene election, marred only by registration difficulties encountered by workers, the Liberal Bloc tallied 5,124 votes; Conservatives garnered 3,593; and the Republican list trailed with 1,907 ballots in their favor. According to 1910 election reform laws, this meant that both Liberals and Conservative deputies were to make up Bogota's representation in the departmental assembly. 42 There were varied reactions to the electoral contest. The most heated voice was probably that of Conservative Laureano Gomez, who, in an editorial for La Unidad, adamantly denounced the UNI0 as an "unnatural" union between industrialists and laborers. Industrialist members of the UNIO, Gomez rightly observed, were the only portion of the combination who won representation, and he argued that their interests were very different from those of workers. The latters' needs, he continued, were largely social in nature and could be best 42 La Gaceta Republicana, January 24, 25, 28, February 1, 4, 6, 1911; La Unidad, February 7, 1911; El Tiempo, February 24, 1911. 305

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43 met by the church, not by political action. Spokesmen for the UNIO made certain objections to Gomez's allegations. Writing in El Proteccionista, Juan N. Paniagua noted that while no dogmatic differences separated the UNIO and the Catholic Church, political disagreements did exist, and for that reason the UNIO did not support the Conservative party (as did the church hierarchy.) Paniagua alleged that his Union was being denounced from the pulpits of the city as a 44 consequence of that political decision. 306 On their part, Republicans announced that their finish hardly represented a total defeat, in that they had won seats in the assembly in other areas of the department. They argued further that the Workers could not claim a victory for themselves, as they had allegedly sold 45 out their interests to the Liberals. Indeed, the alleged Worker/Liberal alliance was, to some Republicans, reminiscent of the days when Golgotas verbally accepted some draconian beliefs in order to win artisan votes. The president of the UNIO denied the existence of a true alliance, insisting that it only made a temporary agreement for electoral advantage. To Rafael Fl~rez, who was elected to the assembly on the Worker/Liberal slate, the dual support was not contradictory and in no way lessened his fundamental loyalty to the Workers Party. (Flaminio Guzman, selected as an alternate under the same conditions, 46 made a similar statement.) 43 La Unidad, February 9, 1911. 44 La Gaceta Republicana, February 6, 1911. 45 El Tiempo, February 10, 1911. 46 Ibid., February 11, 15, 20, 1911; La Gaceta Republicana, February 22, 27, 1911.

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307 Republican accusations that formation of the Workers Party had been premature seemed partially borne out when the UNIO and its paper both were reorganized in the aftermath of the election. Both survived, however, and were active in the l-lay selection of national representatives. Cooper at ion bet•;. ; een Libera ls and Republicans against Conservatives made the May election a decidedly different affair. For Conservative analysts, the accord represented an "illogical" betrayal of the principles of Republican moderation and a return to a biparty system. The Workers Party appears not to have been party to the deliberations leading to the temporary union, but in time it too decided to work against the Conservatives. Again the Workers Party formed barrio committees, although by the end of April only six of eleven had been organized. wllen the election ...,as finally held, it was reportedly rather peaceful, marred only by sporadic clashes between "Catholics and Workers." The liga received 7,083 votes in Bogota as opposed to 4,936 ballots for Conservatives, a total that earned the candidate backed by the Workers, Dr. Ricardo Restrepo Callejas, a seat . 47 in the Chamber of Representatives. In a manner reminiscent of the 1850s, Bogota's public life was becoming highly politicized, which increased the importance of workers' organizations. This was made clear in early May, when the Spaniard Pedro Gonzalez Blanco, who was conducting lectures opposing the organized church and in favor of "individualism," was beaten by persons 47 El Comercio, June 1, 1911; La Gaceta Republicans, May 29, June 23, 1911. See El Liberal, June 24, 1911, for a list of all those elected and their factional affiliation. See Comentarios, July 8, 1911, for an interview with Restrepo.

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s h outing ''long live the Conservative party" and "Long live religion." Gonzalez's defenders in turn proclaimed "Long live the Workers Party," and sporadic violence between the two groups spread throughout the city; Conservatives claimed that Catholic meeting places were subjected to attack. Later in the month, trade organizations representing cobblers and leatherworkers rejected the request of the archbishop that they sponsor aspects of the Corpus Christi celebration. Their refusal was based upon their impoverished state and, probably closer to the truth, that they felt that they had been defamed by the church for their political activities. (The groups claimed that church officials had condemned their political activities from the pulpit, but no formal stance appears to have been taken by the church against the UNIO or other organizations, although the unofficial press cf the church did criticize the groups.) To counter these public declarations, Catholic workers of the same trades declared that they would be happy to 48 cooperate with the archbishop's plans. Despite these incidents just mentioned, the UNIO had earned a sufficient degree of legitimacy to be invited to participate in the upcoming 20 de julio celebration by organizing much of the parade. According to all accounts, the march was well prepared and a success, but, unfortunately, the bull fight held later that evening witnessed a violent confrontation between spectators and police. After several hours of disturbances, at least nine people had been killed and scores wounded. Because of its role in the day's activities, and because many 48 El Comercio, May 6, 1911; La Unidad, May 4, June 6, 1911; La Gaceta Republicana, May 1, 2, 4, 9, 30, 1911; El Contemporaneo, Jun;-3, 1911; El Tiempo, May 2, 1911.

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309 of the casualties were workers, the UNIO promptly began a fund-raising drive for the victims. Most observers agreed that the UNIO had nothing to do with the violence; nonetheless its image was badly u9 tarnished. Meanwhile, the outlook for the October municipal council elections was confusing at best. The Republican/Liberal/Worker league had broken up after the May contest, and frenzied efforts to bring about its revival failed. In September, various voices expressed concern that the willingness of the UNIO to cooperate with other political forces represented an abandonment of its original purpose, and urged that it use the October election as the opportunity to begin an independent political career. In the end, the group did just that, presenting one 50 of the ten slates that greeted voters on election day. The results of the voting illustrated very clearly the various political currents flowing through the capital. The Conservative list finished first with 2,750 votes; the Liberal list received 2t050 votes; the Workers Party was third with 1,850; Republicans tallied 1,350; and other groups shared 500 votes. The Liberal press immediately blamed the Workers for their loss, claiming that negotiations with the UNIO had begun a month prior to the election to form a common slate, but failed because the Workers had preferred to go their O'Wll way. El Liberal proclaimed that the outcome was proof of the necessity for 49 La Gaceta Republicans, July 5, 21, 24, 27t 29, 1911; El Tiempo, July 22, 25, 1911; El Dia Noticioso, July 22, 25, 1911; Colombia, July 8, 1911; La Unidad, July 27, 1911. 50 ,n Tiempo, September 15, 1911; 3 y 2, September 13, 1911; Comentarios, September 28, 1911.

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310 cooperation between the two camps. In a contrasting account, the secretary of the Workers Party, Rafael Reyes Daza, charged that at the last moment Liberals had usurped the names from the UNIO slate, causing numerous voters to erroniously think that a pact had indeed been arranged. Even so, he expressed a degree of satisfaction because those three candidates had received the most votes of any on the Liberal slate. Despite the loss by his own party, Reyes Daza concluded that the stance assumed by the organization would enhance the real po~er of the Workers Party, and that the 1800 votes it collected held promise ~1 for future victories.The elections of 1911 revealed a voting pattern that held firm throughout the decade. Four groups, Conservatives, Liberals, Republicans, and Workers, exerted significant electoral strength. Only Conservatives, however, had demonstrated the capacity to achieve electoral victory without alliances. When alliances or pacts could be reached between the other parties, they could achieve victory. As a consequence, the votes held by workers and their political societies were crucial to either the Republican or Liberal parties, a point not ignored by either group. On the other hand, the UNIO was not strong enough to win elections by itself, and faced the dilemma of victory through cooperation and possible betrayal of its raison d'etre. After the hectic pace of 1911, the various political parties used the subsequent non-election year as a time of reassessment and reorganization. Church officials as well took steps to counter 51 El Liberal, October 2, 3, 1911; La Gaceta Republicana, October 3~ 7~ 11, 1911; La Sociedad, October 3, 1911.

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311 political intiatives undertaken by workers, moves that were undoubtedly supported by the Conservatives. Father Jose Mar{a Campoamor opened a ., Circulo de Obreros office in the city early in 1911 in a frank effort to defuse nontraditional workers' activities by raising living standards and workers' commitment to the church's principles. The Workers' Circle, in addition to its political role, installed a Savings Bank, resturant, school, and various other social services for its members. The church's endeavors met with official approval, receiving 4,000 pesos annually from 1913 until 1927. 52 Some of the most significant initiatives, at least for the UNIO, were made by Liberals. The leader of that party, Rafael Uribe Uribe, met with a group of industrialists and workers in late 1911 to discuss with them his party's attitudes toward issues concerning the working class. Uribe Uribe reminded the audience of his long identification with workers' needs, which dated, he said, to his 1904 speech in favor of "state socialism." Now, he forwarded four ideas to improve the condition of the country's workers: electoral reform; better public educatio11; improved public hygiene; and "rational protection" of the nation's industries. 53 Officials of the UNIO promptly protested the press coverage of the meeting, which they claimed was worded to convey the impression that the UNIO and Uribe were cooperating politically. 54 That, they insisted, was not true. In the months that followed, other 52 Guillermo y Jorge Gonzalez Quintana, El cfrculo de Obreros: La obra y su espfritu, 1911-1940 (Bogota: Editorial de la Litograf1a Colombians, 1940), 9-21. 53 El Liberal, October 27, 1911; Vincent Baillie Dunlap, "Tragedy of a Colombian Martyr: Rafael Uribe Uribe and the Liberal Party, 18961914" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1979), 221. 54 La Gaceta Republicans, October 31, 1911.

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312 Liberals continued to court workers and the UNIO in an attempt to convince them that their party was the appropriate forum for expression of their needs, a campaign which in the end had its desired effect. 55 Republicans had fared poorly in the elections, and they now moved to regain the relationship they had ~aintained with workers after the fall of Reyes. In a May 1912 reorganization, several new planks seem to have been shaped to achieve that result. These included declarations in favor of expanded public education, development of the nation's industry with moderate protectionist barriers, and unspecified 56 measures to develop workers "morally and economically." These "proworker" planks were, of course, practically the same as those of Uribe Uribe. The UNIO faced the task of continuing its momentum toward an independent political role, but it proved unable to avoid pressures from Liberals and Republicans. Moreover, although the organization announced in April that new officers had been elected, various accounts in June raise doubts as to the degree of the Union's organizational cohesiveness. One of the non-political objectives of the UNIO had beer. to form a Casa del Pueblo as a center for education and public health. Funds to that end had been collected, but the June critics claimed that no monies had been expended. Furthermore, they questioned what had become of the subscription monies from El Proteccionista, which had ceased publication earlier. They alleged that some leaders of the UNIO 55 See, for example, Ramon Rosales's editorial in El Liberal, April 25, 1912. 56 La Gaceta Republicana, May 14, June 27, 1912.

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and its central electoral committee had used the funds for political 57 ends and in particular to promote their own careers as pol{ticos. Several important points were raised by these charges. They reveal, once again, the existence of conflicting opinions as to the priority of political versus "social" and economic considerations within the UNIO, a dispute obviously won by the pro-political members in 1911. The choice of this strategy suggests that some of the UNIO's membership envisioned it as a primarily political force even while others urged that the body stress social issues. The inactivity and disorganization of the UNIO in 1912--a non-election year--further hint that, without the political struggle, much of the catalyst for the group was lost, in spite of pressing social concerns. This conflict would permeate the UNIO and subsequent workers' societies throughout the decade. The failure of the UNIO to represent workers' needs outside the political arena was underscored several times after the complaints voiced in June. In August, members cf the shoemaker's trade, ~any of whom were also part of the UNIO, directly petitioned the Chamber of Representatives to double the existing rate on imported shoes. This. they felt, was necessary to maintain the competitiveness of national 58 shoes. The following month typesetters, who were also prominent members of the UNIO, were faced with a concerted effort by printing shop owners to drive down their wages. The Typesetters' Society, 57 El Liberal, April 13, 1912; El Tiempo, May 13, June 8, 18, 1912; Gil Blas, May 8, 1912. 58 Tfl Liberal, August 14, 1911. 313

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314 organized in favor of the workers, while the UNIO seemingly ignored the 59 problem. As part of its initial preparations for the 1913 electoral season, the directory of the UNIO met in October 1912 to determine its political objectives. It agreed to a list of nine goals: to ask departmental authorities to foment industries so as to make importation of foreign goods unnecessary; to make the judicial process more equitable in its treatment of all classes; to request the same of police officials; to lower taxes on articles of primary necessity and to eliminate them altogether on real estate valued at less than 500 pesos; to control rents; to sponsor savings banks; to improve expenditures of public service funds; to improve transportation routes in order to bring more foodstuffs into the city; and to increase salaries paid by the department. The same meeting agreed that a central electoral group should be organized in December to oversee the 60 selection of candidates who would best represent these proposals. At the same time, amid reports of severe dissension within the UNIO, Liberals stepped up their efforts to influence the organization. Uribe Uribe met with the UNIO on two occasions, as did several other 61 Liberal leaders. The results of the Liberal recruitment became clear in December when their forces completely dominated selection of the UNIO's electoral directory. Liberal tactics were roundly condemned by 59 La Gaceta Republicans, May 14, 1912; El Tiempo, September 23, 1912; El Domingo, September 21, 1912. 60 El Liberal, January 30, 1913. 61 El Domingo, October 27, December 8, 1912; El Liberal, October 24, 1912.

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some leaders of the UNIO, who claimed that the meeting was packed with illiterate street cleaners obligated b y patronage ties to Liberal officials. Marco T. Amorocho, who would play an important role as a political activist in the coming y ears, alleged that the electoral committee did not represent the "artisans and workers who constitute the nerves and strengths of Bogota." Amorocho insisted that if the "unrepresentativeness" was not corrected, he would pursue a path independent of the UNio. 62 Members of the Directory vehemently denied the charges, as did El Liberal, Uribe's mouthpiece. The Directory attributed the negative reactions to personal frustrations and described them as an effort to 63 divide the group when it had made considerable progress. lbwever, 315 various Republican industrialists and workers committees were also formed early in January 1913 and appear to have weakened many of the Liberal inroads. The Republican slate of three candidates for the February election for the departmental assembly included typesetter Victor Julio Corredor and two other workers as alternates. The Liberal ticket had no workers as primary candidates, although the mechanic Pompilio Beltran was listed as a second alternate. 64 The striking fact in these developments is that the earlier pledge of an independent Workers Party was foresaken, almost without comment, in the wake of intense partisan appeals to working class voters. The 62 El Domingo, December 15, 22, 1912; La Gaceta Republicana, December 16, 17, 1912; El Liberal, December 19, 1912. 63 TE]. Liberal, December 23, 1912, January 18, 1913. 64 La Gaceta Republicana, January 8, 11, 15, 22, 30, 31, February 5, 7, 1913; El Liberal January 18, 22, 30, 1913.

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election thus saw Republicans emerge victorious with 4,147 votes, closely followed by the Conservative tally of 4,118, while Liberals trailed with 3,128 votes. Republican analysts felt that the returns demonstrated the futility of a Workers/Liberal union and the advantage 65 of that group's association with themselves. A more accurate assessment of the entire electoral process might note the enormous 316 difficulties facjng individuals wishing to forge an independent workers' party and the lack of influence on the part of those workers dedicated to socioeconomic issues, a central characteristic of workers' political acti v ity in much of the decade. In any case, in the months following the election, it became clear that independent political groups of workers had been seriously compromised. It " ' as evident as well that the Republicans and Liberals were more concerned with defeating the Conservatives than with making workers an integral part of their operations. Once again they formed an alliance for the congressional elections in May and soundly defeated the Conservative opposition. Not surprisingly, no workers ~ere 66 included on any electoral slate. Individuals seeking to redirect the concerns of the workers' movement in the capital in May formed La Union Cbrera Colombiana (UOC). Founders of the Colombian Workers' Union wrote that the UNIO had been a positive precursor to true workers' groups, but that it was dominated by "industrialists" whose primary concerns were different from those of 65 El Tiempo, February 2, 1913. 66 La Gaceta Republicana, February 21, April 1, 14, May 4, 1913; El Liberal, April 1, 1913.

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workers. Industrialists, who owned large shops and small "factories," were very much interested in political action according to the UOC, which did not feel that such an organizational objective could satisfy the social and economic needs of most workers. In declaring the UOC's dedication to the real issues (as it saw them), a spokesman wrote our path is the old one to those of us who run a shop; our task, that of always attending to the needs of our homes ... to be more autonomous, more practical, less simgte and innocent, and more involved with ourselves. 317 Achievement of the UOC's goals required the unity of all workers in the capital in a "militant program," he continued, one which favored d h d h id f i 1 i . 68 tra es, t e country, an t e avo ance o part san po tics. Membership in the UOC was limited to people who practiced a trade or who worked for a salary. The group announced that it was dedicated to the establishment of an independent union of workers which would pursue an end to illiteracy; a program of public education; an increase in salaries and protection of national industries; protection of workers of both sexes against "exploitation" by "capitalists"; savings banks; mutual aid; and political autonomy. Various groups of thirty workers or more made up the UOC, with each group supplying two representatives to a board of directors. By August, some fifteen groups were said to be in existence, with a membership claimed to be almost 3,0oo. 69 67 La Union Obrera, July 16, 1913. 68 Ibid., July 10, August 2, 1913. 69 Ibid. , July 16, 27, August 2, 1913.

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318 One of the first steps taken by the UOC to help workers was establishment of an "Oficina del Trabajo" to act as a clearing house where workers could solicit employment and owners employees. The Work Office was not limited to members cf the UOC, and by August it was claimed that the office was functioning smoothly with over 4,000 people registered. In another instance the UOC praised the efforts of a few representatives who had spoken in favor of workers' legislation in the new congress. The Union used the pages of its newspaper to put pressure upon local authorities to improve basic services to areas of the city inhabited by workers and urged groups in other to~~s to do the 70 same. The Workers' Union not only called attention to the economic and social needs of workers in a manner different from the UNIO, it did so from a socialist perspective. The Union denied in its first statements that it wished to "juxtapose" capital and labor, but few of its public analyses avoided doing just that. From the beginning the UOC denied that industrialists and workers had the same interests. In an article entitled "The Vampires of the Pueblo," one of the group's members commented on the traditional inability of workers to resist exploitation by capitalists. As a result, workers rented "miserable hovels" and shops at exorbitant prices they could ill afford at their 71 low wages. This sort of rhetoric, which was heard the first time in 70 6, 1913. 71 Ibid., July 16, August 2, 14, 31; La Gaceta Republicana, June La Union Obrera, July 16, August 19, 1913.

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319 the UOC, became increasingly more common ir. the years that followed its formation. The appearance of the Workers' Union did not go unnoticed by the UNIO. Almost from the date that the former was founded, the two groups made overtures to each other. These moves culminated in a joint session on June 22, which 1,000 people reportedly attended. The Workers' Union would not, however, recognize the legitimacy cf the earlier organization's claim to represent workers and assumed that 72 right for itself. Thereafter, there seems to have been little official interaction between the two organizations. The October elections for new members of the municipal council offered an opportunity for political cooperation, but none was forthcoming. The UNIO again worked closely with the Liberals, but their com b ined efforts failed to defeat the Conservative slate. Liberals mustered 2,500 votes to the Conservatives' 3,450, while Republicans, probably the primary losers from the apolitical stance of the UOC, polled only 850 votes. One paper claimed that Republicans had a pact with "something called the Workers' Union," but the latter group made no mention of its 73 electoral sentiments. The presidential election of 1914 witnessed surprisingly little political activity by workers. Early in the year the central electoral directory of the UNIO announced that it would support the Liberal Party's choice for the presidency, and then duly proclaimed for 72 8, 1913. 73 Ibid., July 16, 27, 1913; La Gaceta Republicana, June 24, July La Gaceta Republicana, October 9, 1913; La Sociedad, October 11, 1913; El Tiempo, October 8, 1913.

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Conservative candidate Jose Vicente Concha when the party made its decision. Republicans apparently made even fe,;.. er overtures to "their" workers, although Marco T. Amorocho did make a public speech in favor ,, 320 of Nicolas Esguerra. When the election was held, Concha received 4,963 votes to Esguerra's 4,520 in the capital, although he easily outdistanced Esguerra nationwide. 74 As industries began to absorb a greater percentage of Bogot~'s working class, the question of work-related accident compensation was one issue where concerted political action could improve the work environment. Prior to the 1910s, Colombia had no legislation tc protect the worker injured on the job, a state of affairs frequently mentioned in the platforms of groups such as the UOC. The time consuming route to passage of a Ley de Accidentes del Trabajo, however, demonstrates the difficulties facing even widely-applauded legislation. A law patterned after Spanish legislation was introduced within the chamber in August 1911 by a representative from Cundinamarca, Gustavo Gaitan Otalora. The proposed legislation would have reimbursed a worker injured on the job from funds collected for that purpose from owners cf industries of over five employees. Even though Gaitan Is ht} 1 won some Conservative support, it died in the second debate, amid rumors that it was "socialistic." Attempts to get the legislation through the 1912, 1913, and 1914 congresses also failed. Finally, the 1915 congress approved legislation providing six forms of accident 74 El Liberal, January e, February 7, 1914; El Tiempo, February 7, 1914; La Sociedad, January 8, February 13, 1914.

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compensation; the maximum award was one year's salary to the family of a worker killed on the job. 75 However, numerous complaints were voiced regarding the shortcomings of the legislation as passed. Critics emphasized first the low levels of compensation and, second, the lack of any clause forcing owners to take preventive measures to protect workers from accidents. These defects were supposed to be resolved by the Council of State, but as late as August 1918 repeated petitions from the UOC had failed to get that body to take any 76 action. Another problem Bogota' 1 s workers faced was the high price and shortage of adequate housing. Calls for some form of government sponsored housing for workers were first heard in the 1890s, but not until 1912 did the municipal council of Bogota tske any steps toward alleviating that need. In that year, the Gonzalez Ponce brothers donated an eighteen-block area in San Victorino to the city to be used as a barrio obrero-sufficient land for 597 lots, which could be purchased by workers at reduced prices. The city in turn agreed to provide water, city services, educational assistance, and a monthly stipend of 100 pesos (gold) for its management. The Gonzalez brothers insisted that a church, school, and meeting hall be built in the 77 barrio, and offered adjoining land for sale as well. 75 El Tiempo, August 2, September 29, 1911; La Sociedad, August 5, 25, 1911; El Ariete, August 16, 25, 1912; El Liberal, September 17, 1914, July 29, August 6, 31, November 12, 1915. 76 El Liberal, May 1, 1916, April 9, July 27, 1917; La Gaceta Republicana, September 4, 1918. 77 La Gaceta Republicana, September 11, 1913; La Sociedad, September 12, 1913, February 19, 1914. 321

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322 The neighborhood was officially dedicated on February 22, 1914 and renamed "Antonio Ricaurte." Some seventy houses "ere then under construction and ten had been completed. The city declared that plans were well underway for extension of water lines to the barrio and noted that several "fine" artesian wells kept it fully supplied until pipes were laid. (Two years later, water lines were still not in place.) The barrio's meeting hall quickly became a focal point of worker activity, 78 most notably at celebrations such as May Day. The assassination of Rafael Uribe Uribe in October 1914 recast the shape of the workers movement for the remainder of the decade. Without Uribe, the singular leader of the Liberal Party, that organization lost the dominance over the UNIO that it had enjoyed since 1911, and the UNIO itself faced a difficult adjustment. As a result, the challenges to the UNIO that had been developing over the years previous became stronger. The Republicans, the UOC, a new Partido Obrero, and the maturation of socialist tendencies all flourished in the wake of Uribe's demise. Numerous workers' groups from the capital and other areas of the country expressed their shock and dismay at the assassination of the . Liberal chieftain, although at the same time they began measures to take advantage of his absence. 79 Republicans were especially active in trying to mobilize workers for the February 1915 departmental elections, and they included Marco T. Amorocho as one of their 78 La Gaceta Republicana, February 19, 24, 1914; El Partido Obrero, February 19, 1916. 79 r El Liberal, October 13, December 1, 1914; La Gaceta Republicana, October 19, November 25, 1914.

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principal candidates. The UNIO attempted not only to recover from the death of Uribe, but also to counter the UOC's apolitical, pro-"social" orientation that was apparently gaining wider acceptance. Conservatives, on the other hand, faced no such difficulties, and 323 i 1 h 1 80 I l M i 1 1 . h eas y won t e e ect1on. n t 1e ay congress ona e ect1ons, . owever, the Conservative Party '{,;88 divided, and a Liberal Uni.on/Republican 81 slate polled the most votes. Both appeals to workers and public statements by them played a small role in the May contest. The same was not true of the municipal council election of October and during the months that followed. A reunited Conservative party faced an alliance of Republicans, Liberals, and Workers, only to lose a close election that placed three workers on the council. Marcho T. _,. Amorocho, Jose Joaquin Munevar, and Antonio Aguirre took their seats on the body expecting to express themselves autonomously, but they were shocked when the council met to make appointments for various city jobs. According to Amorocho, Liberals and Conservatives secretly worked out an arrangement so that they could dominate the appointment process to the exclusion of the workers. While workers' representatives on the council disrupted its operations with their complaints for a while, they could not overcome the Liberal/Conservative collusion. 82 This confrontation further undermined the faith of workers' leaders in conventional political activity, and, 80 La Gaceta Republicana, January 11, 19, February 2, 1915; El Liberal, January 18, 26, February 2, 12, 1915. 81 La Gaceta Republicana, May 3, 1915; El Liberal, April 28, 29, 30, May 1, 1915. 82 La Gaceta Republicana, October 8, December 9, 10, 1915.

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in so doing, set the stage for the founding of the second Workers' Party and its open acceptance of socialism. The Dawn of Workers' Socialism, 1916-19 324 On January 1, 1916, approximately 800 workers issued a manifesto announcing the foundation of the Workers' Party. This new group, the second organization to bear that name, drew its membership from most of the societies in the city, and quickly showed that it had profited from the experience and lessons learned by worker activists during the first half of the 1910s. Central to its call was a rejection of partisan politics in favor of social and economic measures that would more directly benefit the Colombian worker. El Partido Obrero, the group's newspaper, described a two class society that denied the proletarians power, influence, and socioeconomic rewards, a condition it planned to 83 rectify by workers' unity and the propagation of socialist ideas. These two themes, political non-alignment and a leaning toward socialism, would characterize the more dynamic aspects of the workers' movement in the final years of the decade. The first of these focal points, the rejection of partisan politics, had slowly gained force throughout the decade. Although the UNIO was supposedly interested in social and economic concerns, it so involved itself in the political process that as early as 1911 calls were made for its reorientation. When supporters of Uribe Uribe came to control that organization, the UOC declared itself--by contrast-83 El Partido Obrero, January 22, 1916.

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325 dedicated solely to the socioeconomic needs of workers and their legitimate representative. Because of its rejection of political activity, the labor of the UOC was less visible, although it operated at least until 1919, and many of its members also played leading roles in the Workers' Party. Like the founders of the UOC, the organizers of the Workers' Party saw Liberals as the principal political threat and announced that it was best to abstain from political participation as long as the traditional parties were abusive and workers unorganized. It was stupid, party leaders wrote, blindly to vote for colors, although they did see the practicality of legitimate accords with the 84 established parties on occasion. The new group did not deny that Liberals had helped workers in a limited fashion over the years, but the failure of parties to obtain specific worker legislation was clear in their minds. If the traditional parties had passed compulsory education, given protection to small industries, or established savings banks, then the Workers' Party claimed there would be no need for their organization. Moreover, both Liberals and Conservatives accepted the idea of private property, which, in the opinion of the party's newspaper's editors, spawned the problems that the workers faced. 85 In their analysis of the difficulties laborers were forced to endure, the editors of El Partido Obrero employed clearly socialist viewpoints to describe a society where inequities between classes 84 Ibid., January 22, 29, April, 8 1916; El Domingo, January 16, 27, April 16, 1916. 85 El Partido Obrero, January 22, 1916.

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denied the worker equal enjoyment of material possessions or sccial rewards. They believed that labor, not capital, should control production and the distribution of its benefits, and that fundamental social changes would be necessary for such a goal to be realized. As objectives obtainable in the short run, the group voiced a list of needs: worker education, improvement in social services, wage 326 increases, and increased cooperation between the trades. These demands had all been heard before, but new grievances expressed concern for the particular problems of women laborers, regarded strikes as legitimate tools for the rectification of injustices, and called for a National Workers' Convention. The holistic social ideology expressed by the Workers' Party, then, represented a qualitative change in the ideology of working class groups in Bogota, although similarities between it and the UOC are clear. 86 The organizational structure of the Workers' Party, like its social and economic perspective, was reminiscent of the UOC, but certain key differences were present. Neither the Workers' Party nor the UOC used the barrio as its unit of organization, a move that turned their backs on the potential political strengths of that subdivision 6f city politics. The UOC employed affiliated groups of workers to form a central directory, while the Workers' Party proposed organizing each trade in a body that would select two delegates to a Workers' Directory, which in turn would assume control of the party on May 1. Until May Day, the founders of the Party coordinated its activities. Its leaders thought that such an organizational format would allow the 86 Ibid., January 22, February 6, 12, March 11, May 20, 1916.

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sometimes diverse interests of the various trades to be heard with no 87 single trade's concerns dominating the others. 327 Even though the Workers' Party presented obviously socialist tendencies, its spokesmen stressed that the Party did not favor an anarchistic socialism that desired elimination of all property, but rather "protectionist socialism," by which the state in cooperation with workers woulc carry out the task of restructuring society. It hesitated, however, to call itself a socialist party, a stance unabashed socialists criticized. The Party's rationale in determining its label, the editors of El Partido Obrero wrote, took account of socialism's negative public image and the fact that the title "Workers' Party" conveyed the desired sentiment; a union of "workers that asks for social guarantees, education, work, [and] just remunerations ...• 1188 La Libertad, edited by Hernan Caster, G. Arturo Camargo, and Samuel A. Ramos, which was probably the most vocal critic of the decision not to declare for sccialism, observed editorially that the name "Workers' Party" conveyed the notion that the group was dedicated to political action, which was obviously not the case. Moreover, it continued, the exclusivism of the workers cut off the group from many of its real allies, who were not manual laborers. Nonetheless, the editors of the paper declared that they would 89 cooperate fully with the Party. The Party welcomed that pledge, but insisted that the label "socialist party" would address the particular 87 88 89 Ibid., April 1, 15, May 1, 1916. Ibid., January 29, February 19, 1916. La Libertad, March 4, 12, 17, 1916.

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ambitions of others not belonging to their association and that the title would detract from their own immediate objectives. 90 Fellow socialists were not the only individuals to criticize the Workers' Party; Liberals associated with the UNIO and loyal to Uribe Uribe e x pressed more pointed opinions. The most virulent attacks came from Ramon Rosales, who would become Minister of Labor under President Alonso Lofez Pumarejo in the 1930s, who claimed that the group represented merely a Republican device to confront the Liberal party. If one favored workers' issues, he insisted, then the party of Uribe was the only place to find support. Leaders of the UNIO made similar 91 comments. In response, members of the Workers' Party charged that 328 Rosales was a political boss whose sole concern was to use the votes of workers and that his allegations were hardly cause for them to cease 92 their labor. Rosales's comments that Republicans were intimately involved in the foundation of the Workers' Party were accurate at least in part. Republicans had been losing cohesion as a party for some time, with some of their adherents returning to the Liberal fold and others striking out in new directions. La Gaceta Republicana, the party's organ since 1909, had changed hands in late 1915, when Juan Ignacio Galvez become its director. Galvez, it will be recalled, was active in the 1904 Union of Industrialists and Workers; that he promptly invited workers' groups to use the paper for their announcements indicates that 90 El Partido Obrero, May 20, 1916. 91 El Liberal, January 11, 14, March 29, 1916. 92 7Fl Partido Obrero, January 23, 1916.

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93 Rosales's point had a degree of validity. Nonetheless, antecedents such as the UOC suggest that the Workers' Party was more an outgrowth of working-class movements as a brain child of desperate Republicans. The relationship of the Workers to the other parties after the group was organized reinforces this point. Invariably, as the date for the 1917 departmental elections approached, appeals by the parties to workers for their backing increased. The Conservative party, divided at least since the 1914 presidential election, made few overt efforts to court workers. Liberals and Republicans, who were bitterly opposed according to Rosales, decided nevertheless to unite in a "Liberal Union" for the contest, and, as was the norm, appealed for workers' votes. One paper 329 backing the Union reminded the workers that their plan to steer free of politics may have been well-intended, but that partisan politics did 94 remain the only legitimate route to fundamental change. Even the socialist La Libertad suggested that were the Liberal group to allow true worker representation, then it would be the appropriate vehicle 95 for advancement of workers' causes. The February 1917 election made clear the decreasing strength of partisan allegiances among voting workers. The Liberal Union defeated the two slates presented by Conservatives, but it proved unable to draw the Workers' Party into the alliance. Most observers commented that 93 La Gaceta Republicana, October 8, 1915. 94 El Domingo, September 10, 1916. 95 La Libertad, October 5, November 26, 1916; La Gaceta Republicana, December 11, 1916.

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large numbers of workers refused to take part in the election, which, as a consequence, drew the smallest number of voters for any 96 departmental election in the decade. Both Liberal and Republican editorialists condemned this new variant of workers' politics, 97 insisting that they could satisfactorily address workers' needs. 330 Officials of the Workers' Party in turn condemned "los dirigentes de la politica" who had consistently denied that workers could shape their own future by their own hands. They noted that changing socioeconomic conditions had produced a more aware working class, one that was, 98 through the Workers' Party, planting the seeds for its o,;.m future. In spite of this attitude, the Party decided to cooperate with Republicans for the May congressional elections, forming a liga that defeated the 99 "nationalist" wing of the Conservative party. Nevertheless, with the formation of the Workers' Party, the drift from actions of a political nature to those more directly concerned with social and economic conditions accelerated. This is certainly clear from the platforms of both the UOC and the Party, as well as from the attention devoted to workers housing. It is also visible in the Workers' Party's inclusion of strikes as weapons in the struggle to improve working conditions and wages. 96 1917, 5,684; 1915, 9,200; 1913, 11,398; 1911, 10,624. 97 La Gaceta Republicans, January 29, February 1, 20, March 3, 13, April 10, 1917; El Tiempo, February 2, 5, 1917. 1917. 98 99 El Tiempo, April 9, 1917. El Tiempo, April 24, May 3, 13, 17, 1917; El Liberal, May 13,

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331 Strikes were not unknown in nineteenth-century Bogota, but, given predominance of artisan production, they were generally spontaneous, short-lived actions. As "modern" industries began to take root, the frequency of strikes increased, although not necessarily their duration. Early strikes were most common in transportation industries, especially, in Bogota, on the Railroad of the Sabana, were often in reaction to wage reductions or in favor of wage increases to offset inflation. 100 In the first days of 1918, a wave of strikes, spawned by similar grievances, swept the major cities of the northern Colombian coast, stimulating railroad workers in Bogota to demand higher 101 wages. When the Cartagena strike turned violent, the government issued a decree that acknowledged the right of native-born workers to strike, but prohibiting permanent strike committees or the use of violence by workers. The same decree imposed a state of siege until 102 the situation was brought under governmental control. The outbreak of strikes in 1918 most likely resulted from the economic pressures created by the First World War; a "modern" response to modern phenomena. At the same time, workers in Bogota were using "modern" methods to counter sources of an age old problem, that of international competition. The tariff of 1905 had lessened, though not quieted, clamors for protective legislation, but in the 1910s another 100 La Gaceta Republicana, October 25, November 11, 1909, January 24, 27, 1914, 101 Urrutia, Development of the Colombian Labor Movement, 57-58; El Diario Nacional, Jan 16, 1918; Archila, "Algunos hipotesis," passim. See La Gaceta Republicana, January 1918, for coverage of the strikes. 102 La Gaceta Republicana, January 14, 1918. The reference was to foreign-born organizers who had been active on the coast.

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332 form of foreign competition emerged. During this period, when the government solicited bids for production of needed items, foreign producers often underbid native firms, which caused a flurry of protests. In October 1916, for example, cabinet makers expressed outrage that the Railroad of the Sabana had ordered windows and doors from the United States, cal ling the move typical of the "extranjerismo" 103 that denied the competence of native producers. Three years later, the government's announced intention to purchase military uniforms abroad spurred workers to stage a massive demonstration on March 16, 1919. During the course of the protest, confrontations broke out between demonstrators and police; police and army authorities opened fire, killing at least seven people and wounding an unkno~~ number. In order to understand the size and ter.or of the demonstration, however, and the reaction it precipitated by the government, it must be placed in the context of the meeting of the Asamblea Obrera, in many ways the culmination of the workers mobilizations of the 1910s. The call for a Workers Assembly had been issued in late December 1918 by the Sindicato Central de Obreros and the Confederacion de Accion Social. The latter group, presided by Dr. Eduardo Carvajal, was formed to help bogotanos cope with the 1918 outbreaks of typhoid and influenza. Members of the Confederation were a varied lot, united only 103 La Gaceta Republicana, October 20, 1916; El Domingo, October 22, 27, 1916; La Libertad, October 18, 1916. When orders were placed with Colombians, they were were oftimes greeted with praise, such as from shoemakers in 1914. La Gaceta Republicana, January 28, 1914. Two years later, however, the same trade, while thanking the government for an army contract, said that the order should have been given to smaller producers instead of a large factory. El Domingo, March 16, 1916.

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by the fact that they had shown concern for social issues throughout the 1910s. They included labor activists such as Pablo Amaya and Luiz Espeleta; Liberals such as Alberto Sicard and Bernardino Ranjel; and ,, 104 , the dissident Conservative Laureano Gomez. , The origins of the 333 Central Workers' Syndicate are somewhat more obscure, although it ~as rooted firmly in the tradition of the UOC and the 1916 Workers' Party. Pablo E. Mancera, one of the founders of both the Syndicate and the UOC, related that it was created in 1917 as a group of five people to study the city's socioeconomic misery. Members of the Syndicate, a mix of laborers and professionals, Mancera noted, reached the "socialist" conclusion that economic changes were necessary, so they tried to begin 105 a savings bank, restaurant, and charity house, all for workers. Toward the end of 1918, in his account, the Syndicate met to determine possible alternatives for the future, the result being cooperation with the Social Action Confederation, promulgation of a "socialist program," 106 and the call for the Workers' Assembly. Those present at the January 19 opening of the Assembly represented the same broad spectrum of individuals and groups that had been connected with organized workers over the previous fifteen years. Delegates from the Mutual Aid Society, the UOC, the Society of Death Insurance, the Barbers' Society, and at least five other groups were among the estimated 500 people in attendance. From the outset, it was 104 La Gaceta Republicana, December 26, 1918. 105 Only the bank lasted. 106 La Gaceta Republicana, May 2, 1919. 1918 for the program. See ibid. December 18,

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334 evident that the Assembly had strong socialist inclinations. An account of the first sessions related that the delegates were committed to social, moral, and economic unity and that they saw themselves as part of the international workers' moverr.ent. Nonetheless, delegates required three weeks to agree upon an organizational plan and tentative 107 plat form. An initial accord, reached in mid-February, openly declared the Assembly's socialism, while rejecting anarchism or "extreme socialism." The organization, which took to calling itself the Socialist Party, proclaimed that it did not seek the elimination of the state or property, but that it desired an activist state program, to be directed by workers, to combat social injustices such as poor housing, illiteracy, and the unequal material conditions that led to labor disputes. The Assembly included in its platform a clause calling for nationalization of the police, the telegraph, and the teaching trades, which, it presumed, would improve their social benefits. Various components of the platform directly addressed the needs of workers: an eight hour work day; maternity benefits; protective tariffs; the right to strike; wages to be determined by workers' committees; a strengthened workmen's compensation law; paid May Day holidays; and state-managed retirement funds. The platform did not envision the state to be the primary catalyst for workers' betterment; that improvement, it insisted, would come from education and material progress, which, in turn, would enable the Socialist Party to place reformist pressure upon the state. In regard to political action, the 107 La Gaceta Republicana, January 21, May 6, 1919.

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335 Assembly declared itself to be independent, supportive only of those who favored the socioeconomic advancement of the proletariat. The group moreover declared that it would practice abstention when no clear 108 pro-worker candidates were available. The departmental elections of February provided an indication of the group's ability to effect this last clause. In spite of appeals by Liberals to unite with their party, the official Assembly stance was pro-abstention. Conservatives easily won the contest, polling 2,762 of the 4,219 votes reportedly cast. This was less than half of the turn out for the 1915 elections (9,200) and considerably less than the 5,684 votes two years later, an election also characterized by workers' 109 abstaining from voting. The degree to which the marked decrease in voters can in fact be attributed to the Assembly is impossible to determine, but it seems to have been a significant factor. In early March, the Assembly released plans for the creation of a "Central Workers Syndicate," which would serve as the basis for future action. Local syndicates would have responsibility for organizing laborers and other pro-socialist sympathizers for the development of programs such as savings banks, mutual aid societies, consumers' cooperatives, and workers' housing. Representatives of local groups would then form the Central Syndicate which would be charged with direction of political plans, coordination of agencies for improvement of socioeconomic conditions, and communication with international groups. A national workers' congress, scheduled to meet on August 7 of 108 Ibid., February 15, 1919. 109 Ibid., January 4, 12, February 4, 1919.

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that year, was to formalize the creation of the Central 110 Syndicate. 336 As the Assembly continued its deliberations, it invited other groups to organize and become affiliates, ~~en they accepted the meeting's platform. That call resulted in the establishment and affiliation of various organizations, ranging from those of tailors and cobblers to cabinetmakers and railroad workers. Within two weeks after its opening, the number of affiliates had doubled from the initial ten. By the time the Assembly declared its work completed in June, it claimed over 100 affiliates. 111 It was in this climate of an increasingly vocal, dynamic, socialist workers movement that the ill-fated March demonstration took place. It is unclear whether the plan for the the demonstration was prompted by President Su~rez's decision to purchase the Army's uniforms abroad, or whether the two things were coincidental--both seem to have 112 been announced on March 12. There is no doubt, however, that the Assembly promptly declared the demonstration to be in protest of the decree, proclaiming: "Workers, the hour of our justice begins!" Heated debates took place in the partisan press over the planned march, the 110 Ibid., March 8, 12, 1919. 111 La Gaceta Republicans, February 5, 7, 10, 15, 18, March 4, 10, 12, May 7, 11, June 6, 1919. 112 Miguel Urrutia insists that the entire pretext for the demonstration and resultant loss of life was unnecessary, pointing out that the government annulled the decree on the 15th, the day before the demonstration. Urrutia, Development of the Colombian Labor Movement, 63. In fact, the government only suspended bids for uniforms on that day. In early April, an order was placed for 30,000 yards of cloth from a U. S. company. La Gaceta Republicana, April 11, 1919.

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most embittered between A. Manrique Paramo, director of La Gaceta 113 Republicana, and Luis Cano, director of El Espectador. 337 An estimated 5-10,000 people gathered in the Plaza de Bolivar on Sunday, March 16, to protest the government's decision. The crowd peacefully listened to the Assembly's president, Marco T. Amorocho, and others criticize the plan. su,rez himself stepped forward to address the multitude, only to be met with disorder and stones. Isolated shots rang out, then barrages of machine-gun fire, and the demonstrators fled for safety. Although gunfire and minor disturbances lasted until nightfall, reports indicate that the crowd was intimidated by the response of the authorities, which caused seven deaths and unknown numbers of wounded. Numerous leaders of the protest were arrested, including Amorocho, Eduardo Carvajal, and Alberto Manrique Paramo, and 114 the government imposed a state of siege. Not surprisingly, those involved in the organization of the protest strongly condemned the government's action, but so too did others. Many of the people connected with the Social Action Confederation joined with Liberals to visit the president and demand an official inquiry into the event. Suarez responded officially several days later by insisting that the victims were part of an armed uprising against the government and that the military's response was totally justified. In April, however, General Sicard Briceno was subjected to 113 El Correo Liberal, March 14, 17, 21, 1919. 114 La Gaceta Republicana, March 22, 1919; El Correo Liberal, March 17, 18, 1919 ,

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a governmental investigation for his alleged unwarranted shooting of 115 the demonstrator Gabriel Chaves. Somewhat unexpectedly, the government did not suspend the meeting of the Assembly, and it quickly released those arrested. The Assembly then resumed its activity by elaborating the planks of its final 338 plat form, making plans for May Day, and considering the posit ion it would assume vis-a-vis the May congressional elections. The Assembly initially announced that it would support only those individuals who would best represent their socialist goals and that in no case would it assume an active role. It nonetheless gave a list of possible workers' candidates to the committee of Liberals, Republicans, and dissident Conservatives preparing for the contest--men whose socialist credentials were on the whole rather questionable. Negotiations between the three groups failed to concur on a common slate, so Liberals presented a list separate from the unified slate presented by dissidents and Republicans; the latter slate included Marco Amorocho as a principal candidate. True to its pledge, the Assembly abstained from active electioneering, and the election was won by the Nationalist C . l 116 onservat1ve sate. Meanwhile, the Assembly was involved in producing the final components of its platform. In late April, it issued Accord No.~. which dealt with creation of an Executive Socialist Directory, which was then elected on May Day. By-laws for the directory were approved 115 El Correo Liberal, March 18, 20, 21, 1919; La Gaceta Republicana, March 22, 24, 25, April 1, 2, 1919. 116 La Gaceta Republicana, April 2, 16, 22, 26, 28, May 8, 13, 1919; El Correo Liberal, May 6, 9, 16, 1919.

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339 two weeks later, and the Assembly's "Socialist Platform," Accord No. 6, was approved on May 20. In recognition of the deliberations of the Assembly, the final document formally renamed the organization the Socialist Party. It declared itself both free of established parties or religious groups and e x clusively dedicated to measures that would favor the cause of the proletariat. Most aspects of the platform had been previously elaborated and represented a mature e x pression of the grievances expressed by earlier groups. With its work accomplished, the Assembly moved to adjourn, but not before a National Executive Socialist Directory ~as elected and declarations of solidarity signed by the groups that had been included in the Assembly's deliberations. 117 On the surface, it seemed that the Assembly had resolved the nagging problem faced by all workers' groups in Bogota during the 1910s--how to balance political and socioeconomic action and not to become a tool for the interests of non-workers. Seemingly, the route to that end ,;.;as to be the Socialist Party, "adapted to the needs and aspirations of the Colombian public ," which, by assumption, were 118 those of the workers. In fact, the conflict of interests continued. In May, members of the Socialist rirectory had e x tensive meetings with representatives of the Workers' Directory of Girardot who were grappling with the same problem. Would their organization be socialist, and more political, or merely pro-worker, and more concerned 117 La Gaceta Republicana, May 2, 6, 7, 14, 20, June 6, 18, 1919. 118 Ibid., June 6, 1919.

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340 with socioeconomic issues? Members of the Bogota group who were not workers urged them to consider the broader implications of the workers' needs, which, in their view, made it necessary to emphasize the socialist cause. Even Amorocho seemed to agree with this, although he cautioned that workers' trade organizations had to serve as the base for any such movement. When the same non-worker members cf the Bogota directory commented on the May election, they insisted that the apathetic attitude displayed by workers in that contest needed to be changed if they were to progress, seemingly suggesting the priority of political action. Finally, it is noteworthy that none of the delegates who signed the closing manifesto of the Workers Assembly were selected as members of the National Executive Socialist Directory, a clear i di i f 1 b h i . 119 n cat on o a c eavage etween t e two or entat1ons. Conclusion The first two decades of the twentieth century constituted a transitional era for Bogota's labor movement, from one that had been dominated by artisans to one that reflected the particular interests of wage laborers. Certain issues were common to both types of workers, foremost among these being the demand for effective political participation. There were, however, far more points of departure than convergence in the platforms expressed by the two classes of laborers due to fundamentally contrasting social and economic realities. Whereas the need for tariff protection had been central to artisan 119 La Gaceta Republicana May 7, 13, June 6, 18, 1919.

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341 political statements, this issue was seldom raised after the Three Years' War, and even then more often by industrialists than by workers. For the Colombian Workers' Union, the tariff question, which originated from the artisans' desire to protect established professions, took a backseat to socioeconomic priorities such as increased educational opportunities and higher wages. While tradesmen certainly had raised their voices in favor of the former, the question of wages was not relevant to the independent craftsmen, although the more general issue of income was. Similarly, demands for accident compensation and the right to strike were only pertinent to "modern" wage laborers. Both types of laborers issued calls for effective political participation, albeit with different goals. During most cf the nineteenth century, men claiming tc speak for craftsmen had espoused the virtues of republicanism, an ideology that they felt would properly reward their social and economic contributions with true political influence--if it were not subverted by partisan egoism. Artisans, as a middle-sector group, did not desire to rewrite the political rules, only to reform them, which, presumably, they could accomplish. By contrast, the 1910s saw a gradual evolution by certain bogotano workers toward a socialism that would alter the basic economic, social, and political norms of the Colombian state. The point of departure for workers was the same as it had been for artisans; a bipartisan system seemingly run by and for the elite. Groups such as the UNIO posited that if a united industrialist/worker political front could be formed, then it could bring about the reforms necessary to make the "system" more responsive to their will and needs. Ideally, members cf the UNIO hoped, such a movement was to be independent of the established

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342 parties, but reality dictated relations with Republicans and Liberals, compromises not dissimilar to those made earlier by artisans. However, the groups of the 1910s did not fall back to earlier positions when their exploitation became obvious. Rather, they came to believe that abstention from traditional parties in favor of socialist politics may have been the appropriate way to achieve effective workers' participation. It is not surprising that politically conscious workers, aware of their seeming inability to alter their subordinate position within society, would seek a solution that would create a new system, as opposed to reforming the old one. It was nonetheless the case that while the needs of Bogot;'s workers were articulateley expressed, and a socialist solution for the basic problems elaborated, the ever-present question of cooperation with or independence from traditional political parties persisted. At no point during the 1910s did the capital's workers, to say nothing of workers from other areas of the country, obtain sufficient power or unity to impose their wishes upon local, departmental, or national politics. The labor movement entering into the 1920s was more conscious, politically mature, and better organized, yet it had to confront the decision of cooperation (and possible cooptation) with other groups or an independent route and probable impotence.

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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION The Partisan Struggle for Power The conjunction of two factors--the republican ideal and the partisan struggle for power in early Colombia--shaped the initial stages of artisan political participation. Together they resulted in the "top-down" recruitment of craftsmen so that partisan groups could enhance their base of electoral support. This in turn gave artisans the political opening to express their special concerns within a political system that is conventionally considered to have been the near-exclusive terrain of the "oligarchy." The interests particular to bogotano artisans were shaped by a multiplicity of factors, including the political environment of the Colombian capital, the redefinition of the state's relationship to social welfare and to the church, and, fundamentally, the integration of the country into the North Atlantic economic network, which caused foreign goods to undermine the once insulated production position of the city's craftsmen. The leaders of the Colombian movement for independence and those who shaped the country's constitutional structure not only rejected Spanish domination but also the rule of absolute monarchs, which they felt fostered tyranny and lessened opportunity for social, economic, or moral progress. Those who compared the fortunes of Spain with that of the United States reached the conclusion that republicanism fostered 343

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344 economic prosperity, social progress, and political stability; it was therefore the "ideal" form of government for the emerging nation. The republican model implied popular participation in the election of representatives to govern the nation and, to the relief of many, it had been demonstrated that a "responsible" citizenry could both avoid the popular anarchy experienced in revolutionary France and generally select the "natural" elite to rule. Throughout the nineteenth century, with only a ten-year exception, constitutions granted citizenship to "respectable" individuals, as defined in terms of property holdings, 1 income, occupational status, or literacy. Artisans thereby constituted a significant portion of the urban population deemed worthy of participation in the republican system. The granting of this right surely evoked a favorable response from craftsmen, who reasoned that as honorable citizens, as defenders of the legitimate order, and in recognition of their productive contributions, they deserved a role in the government. The reality of Colombian politics, however, was not an ideal republic, but an intense struggle for power and frustrated efforts to form a stable governmental structure. In early nineteenth century Colombia, a dominant and unified landed, commercial, or military elite that could have quickly established political stability did not exist. Rather, extreme competition for power and control of the state promptly 1 Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, 120, 162, 204, 227, 316. For about the same amount of time in the State of Cundinamarca suffrage was granted to all males over 21; after 1865 literacy requirements were required of all state voters. Recopilacion de leyes y decretos del Estado Soberano de Cundinamarca, 1857-1868 (Bogota, 1868), 145-46, 355. 7

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345 became the norm. It generally was not a struggle of radically opposing ideologies, even though some fundamental differences did exist on social and church-related issues; instead, control of the nation's purse strings and appointive powers was the central bone of contention. As economic opportunities for the elite were limited, governmental positions were highly desired. Since no single group could monopolize power, it was necessary for competing partisan organizations to broaden their bases of support. In rural areas, traditional patronage ties simplified the matter. It was not difficult to translate the power of local clerics or landlords into votes, and in the course of the century one-party political enclaves were carved out that often persist today. Some of the same patronage relations, notably those of the church, influenced urban politics, but the presence of relatively autonomous individuals such as artisans made cities a distinct political environment. The efforts of potential patrons to broaden their support among urban groups demanded various trade-offs: promises of monetary rewards, patronage, or granting of certain concessions particular to clients. The necessity of partisan groups to recruit clients and the ideal of popular participation in a republican government resulted in the appeal for the political allegiance of artisans. This was clearly evident in 1838 when the struggle between factions of the developing Conservative and Liberal parties led directly to the recruitment of artisans in the Catholic Society and the Democratic-Republican Society of Artisans and Laborers. Both Societies soli~ited votes and attempted to instill in their members a particular ideology. There is, however, little evidence to indicate either that a rigid alignment between __ ___ _ _ _J

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346 politically-active artisans and parties emerged, or that craftsmen accepted without question partisan ideological stances. This is true for the 1830s and for later years, although during some periods the tendency was that more craftsmen would work for the endeavors of one or the other party. More often than not, however, the most visible political associations linked artisans to the leaders of dissident or third-party movements such as the draconians (1850s), Manuel Maria Madiedo (1860s), the Independents (1870s), Ntinez (1880 and beyond), and the Republicans early in the twentieth century. Various reasons underlay craftsmen's associations with third parties, or with groups that did not fit neatly into the Liberal or Conservative camps. In the early 1850s, I suspect that much of the Democratic Societies' relationship with the draconians stemmed from their shared loyalty to General Obando, from a common interest in slowing down, if not halting altogether, several aspects of the reform agenda, and from the necessity of joining forces to enhance their potential strength in opposition to groups favoring the reform process. These three factors--loyalty to particular leaders, ideological similarities, and the mutual advantages of concerted action by "outsiders"--account for the majority of the artisan/third party associations, with the desire to advance each other vis-a-vis the dominant parties probably being the single most important factor. However, until systematic studies are made of the non-traditional parties, the precise nature of their relationships with artisans and others remains rather speculative. The relationship between artisans and the mainstream Liberal and Conservative parties was considerably less complex, motivated primarily

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by the parties' need for popular support. During periods of intense political rivalry, artisans were regularly recruited into partisan ranks. The record of the two societies of 1838, the Popular and Democractic Societies in the reform era, and electoral groups thereafter illustratives this tendency. Significantly, the frequency of such organizations dropped off sharply in the 1870s, to almost disappear between 1880 and 1910. One factor for the decreased incidence of the tendency of artisans to align themselves with the parties, to be discussed below, was the fragmentation of the artisan class that occurred after the 1860s. Another factor, properly discussed here, was the development of party infrastructures. Prior to the late 1870s, no permanent infrastructure supported 347 either the Conservative or Liberal parties. Even ideological platforms were not clearly articulated until the late 1840s, the years in which when one can definitively place the birth of the parties. Before the creation of formal committees dedicated to the preparation of electoral slates and permanent party structures, which were in place by the 1870s, local boards, leaders, and legislators were responsible for the 2 management of party affairs. By the 1870s, after years of propaganda and efforts to inculcate party loyalty into the voting populace, it seems that people were coming to identify themselves spontaneously as Liberals or Conservatives in most elections. This lessened the need to use artisan-based ad hoc electoral groups as recruiters and diminished the political importance of artisan associations. The revival of open recruitment in the 1910s can be attributed to the damage done to party 2 Delpar, Red against Blue, 98-109, 126-27.

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loyalty by the National Party and the Reyes government and by the need to rebuild the party system. 348 The initial opening whereby artisans could participate politically thus came not from their own pressures, but rather from above, as a result of the partisan struggle for power. Partisan patrons recruited political clients, who in the urban setting were drawn from the ranks of the artisan class. In return for their votes, craftsmen expected that their special interests would be heard and that the ideal republic would function in fact. That it did not is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, the expression of goals and objectives particular to the artisanal population, and the collective activity undertaken to satisfy those desires, despite repeated failures, did leave a record that deserves careful examination for the routes not taken by Colombia and Colombians as they made the transition to the national period. Artisan Social, Economic, and Political Interests Artisans and their handicrafts evolved during the ninety years examined by this study from the single most important productive component in the Colombian urban economy to one facet of a complex mix of laborers and productive techniques. This was hardly a rapid transformation, one that might have provoked craftsmen violently to resist threats to their socioeconomic wellbeing. Rather, it was a long process that slowly eroded the importance of the role of artisans within the productive and social hierarchy. Members of the artisan class shared a rather common set of socioeconomic experiences during the early decades of the nineteenth century, but the reorientation of

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349 the nation's economic structure amplified the negative effect of foreign competition on the artisan class, and caused its experiences to diverge in the 1860s and 1870s. Not all trades were affected in the same manner or at the same time; some were fundamentally transformed while others retained many traditional features. Although artisanal production continued, the class was fragmented. The loss of a common class experience contributed to the disappearence of general craft mobilizations after the 1860s, and to the diversity of collective actions in the last third of the century. Public statements by craftsmen are perhaps the surest route to examination of issues affecting their socioeconomic condition, especially as detailed analysis of artisan lifestyles awaits further study. Public declarations do not reflect the full range of craftsmen's concerns, but they do serve as a possible barometer of crisis, revealing pressing issues that threatened the way of life held dear by artisans, or at least by their public spokesmen. Repeated declarations on particular topics indicate either their perceived importance or the intensity of the threat--or both. How the content of those statements varied through time furthermore suggests internal changes in the artisan class and even "w hen the class began to lose some of its cohesion. The most commonly voiced concerns can be arranged into four general categories: economy, politics, social welfare, and the projection of a favorable "image," Grievances placed within one of these categories were often directly related to another, but this grouping allows for ready examination. Within the economic heading lay the most frequently expressed items, foremost being the desire for tariff protection.

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350 Others included industrial education, internal trade order, credit, and the economic dislocations caused by war. Political comments, also regularly heard, centered on the desire of craftsmen to gain legitimate representation in political institutions. Welfare concerns varied from the desire for better educational and health facilities to support for agencies that afforded a degree of social protection, such as the church or mutual aid societies. Finally, craftsmen desired to project the social, economic, and political contributions of their class in order to earn the positive public image they felt their due. This pride de ser artesano is visible in all of the documents declaring the interests of the artisan class and served to reinforce the claim of craftsmen to express themselves publicly. The structure of tariffs that insulated native production from foreign competition was fundamental to the artisans' economic livelihood. The moderately protectionist tariff that persisted into the 1840s buffered bogotano craftsmen from the sale of lower-priced items produced abroad by industrial techniques. 'h"hen liberal reformers enacted the tariff law of 1847, which substantially reduced the level of protection, craftsmen from Bogota and other areas of the country dh h hi di i . 3 To f proteste t et reat toter pro uct ve pos t1on. erea ter, artisans repeatedly petitioned for restoration of an official policy of protecting national industries. When tariff rates were raised in the 1880s, craftsmen praised the Regeneration government, and certain trades benefited from the decrease in foreign competition. However, 3 Gootenberg describes a similar process in Lima during the same period in "The Social Origins of Protectionism," 329-58.

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neither the tariffs of Nunez, nor that of Reyes in 1905, were intended necessarily to foster a resurgence of artisanal production, but rather were designed to foment development of manufacturing industries within the country. Thus while certain artisans may have enjoyed short-term benefits from these tariffs, the long-term effect was the displacement of artisanal production by native manufacture. State economic policies, therefore, especially those of laissez-faire liberals, represented a dire threat to many artisans through most of the period covered by this study. 351 Craftsmen thought that other governmental measures in addition to tariff barriers could be instituted to help their industry. Coupled with protectionist demands was the notion that the primary products and machines used by native craftsmen in their trades should be allowed to enter the country with a minimum of duties and restrictions. These ideas were presented first in the 1846 petition and were included in almost every other petition thereafter. As early as the 1840s, opinions were heard that Colombian craftsmen could benefit from exposure to the new techniques of foreign artisans even if they were critical of those in Bogota~who refused to associate with their native counterparts. Thereafter, artisans requested that the government organize workshops to disseminate new skills and that it try to attract foreign craftsmen willing to train natives, or send Colombians abroad to learn the latest skills. An additional concern of artisans centered on the limited sources of credit and the high rate of interest on available loans. Craftsmen resorted to the Caja de Ahorros beginning in the 1840s and 1850s and repeatedly tried to start their own savings institutions. Every mutual

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aid society included at least plans for a bank, as did political associations such as the UNIO in the 1910s. These ventures rarely met the needs of artisans, who recognized that the government was the logical source of credit assistance and asked for the creation of appropriate institutions. 352 Conceivably, artisan political pressure could have forced the Colombian government to protect their industries, begin programs of industrial education, and establish credit institutions. It could have done less to affect the cost of transportation, another factor in the price of foreign goods in Bogota, which generally worked to buffer native production with additional costs, and also to raise the price of export products, certainly not an end favored by the government in its push to expand commercial agriculture. The importance of high transportation costs as a protector of interior craftsmen was apparently not appreciated by artisans, even though they probably equalled tariff duties in adding costs to the consumers of foreign products. Permanent steamboat navigation of the Magdalena River coincidentally was established at the same time that tariff schedules were adjusted downward, aggravating the onslaught of foreign goods. While the decline of transportation costs has not been studied systematically, some scholars suggest that rates may have been halved by the 1860s. The combination of reduced transportation costs and tariff schedules was clearly felt by the capital's artisans in the 1860s. The wars that so often resulted from ever-present partisan strife hurt artisans in several ways. All instances of armed conflict disrupted the local and national economy, and lengthier wars, such as

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353 the civil war of 1859-62, caused serious dislocations. Artisans lost many orders during the wars and saw credit, which in the best of times was expensive and in short supply, rise in price and be diverted to fund military adventures. 'Moreover, artisans frequently ~-ere called to service as members of the militia, an obligation that kept them from working and sometimes led to injury and death. It is hardly surprising that craftsmen repeatedly demanded an end to "useless" partisan strife. War was almost as much a political as an economic issue to craftsmen. Since partisan machinations caused practically every conflict, artisans urged that parties alternate in control or share power. The partisan struggle also resulted in the manipulation of tradesmen as political marionettes, which helped produce calls for its end. This undoubtedly accounted for the popularity of Nunez and perhaps contributed to the appeal of Mosquera or Reyes, all men who seemed dedicated to the notion of political stability, even at the expense of constitutional guidelines. Craftsmen thought that partisan abuses denied them a political voice, which in turn provoked demands for more effecti . ve representation in politics. On numerous occasions this sentiment was expressed by the complaint, "we were used as a ladder for Liberal (or Conservative) ambitions, only to be thrown away when we were no longer needed." The artisans' economic and political interests shared the characteristic that they could be furthered primarily by power or influence within the sphere of political activity. This was generally not true for their immediate social welfare concerns, which required different tactics and which artisans frequently tried to resolve on their own. The church offered artisans and their children educational

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354 programs and limited health care until the reform era, when clerical authorities were stripped of many temporal functions and resources, a move artisans condemned in several public statements. The Society of Artisans, the Popular Society, and La Alianza all attempted to ans~er the need for adult education by conducting their own classes, and after the 1860s craftsmen appealed to the government to expand its educational programs. Social welfare needs ~ere met in a similar fashion, with general mobilizations such as the Union Society attempting to look after the needs of their membership. The mutual aid societies responded directly to these concerns, even if their membership was limited to the artisan elite. At least some of the support for the Regeneration can be attributed to the restitution of the church as a recognized agent in the development of Colombian society. It is important to ask, why did artisans think that their complaints should be recognized and addressed? A reading of craftsmen's public manifestations suggests that artisans thought that their social, economic, and political contributions to the nation were sufficiently valuable to afford them the right to be heard and to be taken into account. Craftsmen's self-consciousness seems to have been based upon the belief that the labor of producing the nation's consumer goods, while not always rewarding financially, was both honorable and necessary. The 1858 article "The Artisan of Bogota" stressed that while the rich and social luminaries refused to abandon the colonial attitude that "the arts dishonor," artisans themselves maintained that "it is worth more to be an honorable poor man than a rich man and a 4 ; thief." Jose Leocadio Camacho, writing in the 1860s for La Alianza, 4 "El artesano de Bogota'; El Nucleo 1858, nd

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355 argued that production itself contributed socially by its creative function and justified the resultant feelings of self-respect, personal 5 worth, and economic remuneration. The trades that craftsmen practiced afforded them a feeling of economic independence and a middling social rank that set them apart from the "masses." This status was a source of pride and self-respect. The work of an artisan might not produce wealth, but it did avoid vagabondage. By contrast, artisans often juxtaposed the value of their production with the "social evil" of empleoman!a. The employee who consumed the scarce taxes of the nation and produced nothing tangible was anathema to many craftsmen, especially when the government worked to hurt their own interests. Craftsmen viewed themselves as positive political forces as well. They paid taxes to support local, state, and national governments; acted as nightwatchmen in their barrios; served in the militia; defended the constitutional order; and in general acted as good republican citizens. The aims that craftsmen tried to satisfy, either through organizational pressure or by individual initiative, originated in their socioeconomic status as independent producers, and from their political rights as citizens. The transformation of Bogota and Colombia's economy in the nineteenth century threatened the ability of many artisans to preserve their traditional social position, and caused most of the pressures which craftsmen tried to alleviate by political 5 Jacques Ranciere, however, warns against idealization of work and workers in assessing past social attitudes, suggesting that many artisans glorified work in order to enhance their own self-concept. See Ranciere, "The Myth of the Artisan: Critical Reflections on a Category of Social History," International Labor and Working Class History, No. 24 (Fall 1983), 1-16.

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action. The persistence of demands such as tariff protection and industrial education throughout the nineteenth century indicates the failure to remove the threat to the artisans' socioeconomic status. 356 The appearance of new demands in the 1910s, for laws pertaini~g to work accidents and for basic education, evidences the emergence of the wage laborer as an important component of Bogota's working population and, by implication, the eclipsed status of artisans at the head of the labor movement. Similarly, artisan demands for effective political participation within a republican system gave way to workers' calls for a vaguely defined socialist state. Craftsmen had had a strong stake in Bogota's social, economic, and political life; they wanted not to abolish it, but to transform it more to their advantage. The same was not necessarily true of the wage laborer. The attitude of political parties to artisans and workers, by contrast, was rather similar. With the exception of the last third of the nineteenth century, both sectors were critical factors in establishing political domination. Both craftsmen and workers were woued by the parties in their struggle for power. Craftsmen's Organizations: A Typology Artisans employed various types of organizations to defendexpress their social, economic, and political interests from 1832 until 1919. These may be categorized as: temporary electoral groups; broad-based mobilizations; mutual aid societies; trade organizations; and direct action. The functions of these associations and the years in which

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357 they operated combine to reveal important clues as to the nature and tempo of artisan political activity. The periods in which one or another type of organization predominated were so clear as to define the periodization of this study. By contrast, the functions of the organizations were not mutually exclusive, and at times they overlapped considerably. Nonetheless, they were sufficiently distinct to require separate analysis. Five periods of organizational activity divide the years from 1832 until 1919. The first, 1832-45, was characterized by "top-down" pressures from partisan elites to mobilize craftsmen in order to expand the popular foundation of the emerging Conservative and Liberal parties. The "party-dominated" Catholic Society and the SDRAL were formed around the 1838 congressional election, but they did not immediately fade from the scene as did later temporary electoral groups. Rather, they persisted in the effort to instill in craftsmen and others the particular beliefs of the two parties. No mutual aid organizations or other groups mobilizing in favor of socioeconomic issues operated during these years, presumably because traditional social arrangements satisfied most needs and because artisans perceived no major threats to their status. The 1845-68 era saw the most intense artisan political activity of any period in the nineteenth century. During most of this time the general mobilization of artisans exercised a marked influence upon Colombian politics. Before 1855, these broad-based artisan organizations tended to be Liberal, while after the defeat of the Melo revolt they "'ere more oriented toward the Conservatives. Therefore, the entire era merits analysis as two periods, 1845-54 and 1855-68.

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358 The Society of Artisans, founded in 1847, represents the first formal effort by laborers autonomously to influence the workings of the Colombian state. The Society criginated in opposition to the tariff of 1847, which it perceived as threatening the trades of its members. The Society pledged as well to enhance the intellectual "awareness" of its members and to work for their mutual aid. The Society of Artisans thus independently attempted to apply the political lessons taught in the SDRAL, namely, that in a republican system all citizens had a right to express their political opinion and that the government would be receptive to that input. Very soon after the Society's establishment, it became involved in the 1848 presidential election and came under the influence of non-artisans associated with the Liberal party in the mistaken belief that Jose Hilario Lopez favored both their economic and political interests. The Liberal victory of March 7, 1849, cemented the relationship between artisans and Liberals in the amplified guise of the Democratic Society of Artisans. The Liberal/artisan alliance spurred Conservatives to form the Popular Society, a group that articulated the interests of both the Conservative party and those craftsmen who had favored the candidacy of Gori in 1848. Partisan confrontations between the Democratic and Popular Societies resulted in the suppression of the latter group, while the former successfully advanced the reform objectives of its Golgota patrons. The relationship between artisans and Golgotas could accurately be compared to the SDRAL's use of craftsmen as political instruments to further essentially non-artisan interests. However, in contrast to the 1830s, artisans manifested a clear recognition of their own class concerns and their notions of how Colombia should properly be structured. Many

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crc,.f t ~ine n argued that the reformers had no intention whatsoever of favoring their demands for a protective tariff or responding favorably to their other economic concerns such as control of interest rates or "'"" . , ' ... industrial education. Moreover, the redefinition of the role of the church in Colombian society removed what many craftsmen viewed as a beneficial moral force and a helpful agent of social welfare. Finally, many Democratic craftsmen joined with draconian Liberals and disgruntled elements of the military in the ill-fated 17 de Abril insurrection. The movement away from reformers evident in the 17 de Abril coup accelerated in the 1855-68 period and eventually led to the formation of the Union Society of Artisans in 1866. The most important similarity between this and the earlier period was the continued appeal to and use of tradesmen by political parties. This was clear after the defeat of Melo, when G6lgotas quickly forgot their differences with Melistas and draconians in order to rebuild the Liberal party. The rapidity with which Radical appeals to craftsmen ended after the 1857 presidential contest illustrate the opportunistic nature of the recruitment process. The civil war of 1859-62 reinforced a feeling of political exploitation among craftsmen, as once again they were used as cannon fodder, only to be forgotten when the battles ended. Mosquera's anti-church decrees further alienated tradesmen who felt that the church's capacity to fulfill its social responsibilities had been crippled, and that their ability to live a "moral" life was threatened. The depression that affected Bogot:i after the war resulted in economic misery at all social levels, especially in the artisan sector.

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360 In the face of economic misery, wartime abuses, and political disillusionment, the Union Society sought to reject the system that used tradesmen as partisan tools and tried instead to assert both the value and potential political power of united artisans. Like the Society of Artisans, the Union Society was a general organization established by artisans to defend their special interests, which, by 1866, were conceptualized in a more conscious and ideologically mature fashion than had been the case in 1847. The Union Society focused on concerns over the tariff, the need for industrial education, the shortage of agencies to which craftsmen could turn for social welfare assistance, and a powerful rejection of partisan manipulation of artisans as political puppets. The Union Society earnestly attempted to shape an organization that could meet the needs of mutual protection and thus alleviate some of the economic pressures upon its members and the artisan class as a whole. It assumed an essentially non-partisan stance, but tended to side with dissident Conservatives such as Madiedo. Radical-oriented political action was rejected outright by almost all craftsmen, but for the elections of 1868, artisans were recruited into temporary electoral groups such as the Democratic (pro Mosquera) and Popular (pro-Conservative) Societies. (These groups were in no way remnants of the earlier organizations with the same names; their functions had to do with the immediate partisan competition, and they quickly faded from the scene.) No broad-based organization of artisans appeared during the last three decades of the nineteenth century in Bogoti. Considering the importance of such organizations during the previous years, this is, at

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361 first glance, surprising. However, two fundamental factors that had earlier contributed to the broad mobilizations of artisans were absent during the 1869-99 period: artisans had lost much of their unity as a class by the 1870s, while in the meantime parties had begun to become institutionalized in a manner that made the active wooing of popular support less important to partisan pursuit of power. In the stead of general mobilizations, temporary electoral groups, mutual aid societies, trade organizations, and direct action occupied the collective energies of craftsmen. Temporary political groups periodically appeared around elections, continuing to function as recruiters of partisan voters. Associations such as the Mutual Aid or Philanthropic Societies reflected the efforts of more privileged artisans to look after their own social welfare concerns, as did trade organizations and the occasional demands of individuals in support of causes such as industrial education. With members of the the artisan "elite" seeking mutually to protect themselves, and in the absensce of general mobilizations, the "mass" of artisans and other popular elements of bogotano society were left without means to express their socioeconomic grievances. This may help to explain why the only two major incidents of direct action that occurred during the whole of the years under investigation took place during the 1869-99 period. Since no institutional vehicle was available to alleviate the very real needs of the rank-and-file craftsmen, the bread riot of 1875 and the police riot of 1893 attempted to rectify perceived injustices. The divergent courses of action taken by "elite" and "mass" artisans during the 186999 period support the notion that the artisan class had fragmented beginning in the 1860s.

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362 The organizations that dominated the final years of this study, 1899-1919, illustrate the decline of the artisan and appearance of the wage laborer. Mutual aid societies persisted, but their visibility tended to be eclipsed by organizations such as the National Union of Industrialists and Workers. The UNIO reflected the more complex nature of Bogot;'s laboring population, which consisted of artisans, industrialists, and workers. The group attempted to form a coalition of these sectors, but it soon became apparent that the contrasting concerns of industrialists and workers doomed the venture. Organizations such as the Colombian Workers' Union, representing increasingly articulate wage laborer, replaced the UNIO. Craftsmen probably identified themselves intellectually and socially with industrialists, but their socioeconomic situation was undoubtedly more akin to workers. By the end of the period, artisans and workers were cooperating politically. Partisan efforts to use labor organizations intensified after the collapse of the Reyes quinquenio; Uribista Liberals fared well with the industrialists of the UNIO, while the Republicans found more favor with the UOC and fledgling socialist groups. However, just as happened with La Alianza in the 1860s, the parties' manipulation of workers' organizations brought about a powerful backlash, which contributed to development of a socialist ideology and a rejection of partisan politics. The Conservatives also made efforts to mobilize workers on their behalf, with one thrust being an orthodox clericaly dominated Workers' Circle that tried to counter the influence of "foreign" ideologies. This organization did little more than previous informal mobilizations by Catholics of workers, but

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it demonstrated that Conservative forces would not abandon workers to Liberals and others without contention. Artisan Political Activity The organized activity of craftsmen of Bogota between 1832 and 1919 took place within a dynamic political system that enabled them to seek goals relevant to their social sector. The initial key to this activity was not, as many Marxists would suggest, pressure originating from the artisans' class position, but rather the necessity of the parties to recruit additional support in their struggle for power. 363 When Conservatives and Liberals began to develop a core of supporters who automatically identified themselves as members of one or the other party, a process speeded by the intense recruitment tactics undertaken in the years before 1870, and when they formed more or less permanent structures in the 1870s, the top-down pressures to bring artisans into politics came to an end. Party loyalty and institutional apparatus tended to supersede active partisan recruitment through the 1900s, when the nation was forced to redefine its political process in the wake of the War of 1000 Days and the Reyes quinquenio. Once more, however, in the 1910s, elite-dominated parties sought out potential supporters in a struggle for power, and again artisans, now joined by workers, were the objects of partisan pursuit. Conservatives and Liberals regrouped by the mid-1910s and established themselves in a fashion that would last at least through the 1930s, with Uribe Uribe's pursuit of workers' allegiance followed by other Liberal leaders in a manner reflective of that party's strong ties with labor. However, workers generally were

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left to their own energies to achieve their particular sectoral interests. In rejecting an analysis that would treat artisans as singularly responsible for their own organizational destiny, I do not mean to suggest that the special socioeconomic conditions of the artisan class did not affect their political activity, only that it was not the initial precipitant. In reaction to top-down pressures from partisan groups, artisans took advantage of the political opening to pursue numerous objectives originating in their particular social positions. Fundamental to artisans was their status as indpendent producers; thus most of the craftsmen's economic demands centered on the necessity of maintaining their competitiveness in the face of foreign goods, a necessity which they reasoned could best be acheived by protective tariffs. Craftsmen seemed content to provide for most of their own social welfare needs, especially if the church were allowed to retain its traditional social functions and if their economic wellbeing was not damaged. Politically, artisans insisted that they deserved the right of full participation in a truly "republican" Colombia and that partisan politics subverted the development of such a system. With only a few exceptions, the interests expressed by artisans differed from those presented by the political parties and therefore merit careful consideration. 364 Craftsmen participated in various organizations in order to obtain their objectives. The years prior to the 1870s were characterized by a more homogeneous artisan class e x perience, threats to many trades in the form of foreign competition, and partisan appeals to the artisans to serve the limited interests of the parties. During this period,

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365 craftsmen's collective interests were voiced through broad-based organizations. When the artisan class fragmented after the 1860s, accompanied by a notable decline in recruitment tactics by partisan groups, collective activity tended to reflect the interests of the divisions of the artisanal population, and not the entire craft sector. As a new wage-labor population emerged in the early years of this century, and as industrialists replaced craftsmen as the most "prominent" producers, artisans who had retained their independent status fluctuated in aligning themselves politically with workers or industrialists. The tendency among craftsmen initially was to side with industrialists, men who often came from the artisan ranks and who shared many characteristics with artisans. However, the closer positions between workers and craftsmen as laborers whose futures were less promising, resulted in association between these latter groups. This was especially the case when industrialists fell victim to traditional partisan tactics and as socialism emerged as an alternative to "politics as usual." Artisan leaders such as Jose Leocadio Camacho, Jose Antonio Saavedra, or Emeterio Heredia were central characters in the relationship between the political parties and artisan organizations. They acted as middlemen and their ability to persist as leaders depended upon the fulfillment of their role of negotiating the interests of the two sides. The parties sought loyal followers, and as potential patrons they had to offer some form of return to artisans in payment for craftsmen's clientage. For craftsmen, attention to their specific socioeconomic interests was the price that parties were expected to pay in exchange for their support. Many of the grievances

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366 that artisans expressed came from the failure of politicians to fulfill their election pledges made to craftsmen. In this context, it was the function of the artisan leaders both to seek objectives consistent with the needs of the broader artisan sector, as well as to turn out voters on election days. Leaders such as Camacho, who maintained his preeminent stature for almost SO years, were men who consistently voiced concerns held by the rank and file artisans. By contrast, the fall of Heredia from his leadership role in the Democratic Societies probably lay in his inability to recognize the more conservative tendencies among his fellow craftsmen and from his ardent commitment to partisan politics even after the Melo coup. Although he lived through the 1880s, after 1857 he was unable successfully to mobilize large numbers of craftsmen. Leaders, then, were men who satisfied the interests of political patrons by turning out the vote, but who also satisfied the interests of artisan clients by representing their needs to the parties. It does not seem to have been critically important that artisan needs be met by the leader's action, but they had consistently to defend such interest in their dealings with the parties. / The political activity of artisans in nineteenth-century Bogota was bound up in both the struggle between parties for political domination and the declining socioeconomic position of artisans as a class in the face of foreign competition. Characteristics peculiar to Colombia, albeit mirrored in other areas of Latin America, determined both the form and the rhythem of artisan political participation. Certainly artisans in most major cities faced the problem of foreign competion, and reacted as best they could to defend their status as

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independent producers. When competition for power was heated, as it often was in Mexico City, Caracas, or Lima, artisans offered political associations an additional weapon to be recruited and employed in the pursuit of political domination. I therefore suspect that the general pattern of artisan political activity observed in Bogota between 1832 and 1919 could perhaps be applied to the study of other urban laborers in nineteenth-century Latin America, even if the verification of that notion awaits further research. 367

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Archives Consulted Archivo del Congreso Senado, Camara, Proyectos Negados Memoriales con Informes Proyectos de Leyes Negados Informes de Comisiones Archivo Historico Nacional Republica, Congreso Policia Nacional Guerra y Marina Other Primary Sources Causa de responsibilidad contra el ciudadano presidente de la Reptblica i los senores secretarios del despacho. Bogota. Imprenta del Neo-Granadino, 1855. Causa de responsibilidad contra el ciudadano presidente de la Republica, Jeneral Jose Mar1a Obando, i las ex-secretarios de Gobierno i de Guerra, senores Antonio del Reali Valerio Francisco Barriga. Bogota. Imprenta de Echeverria Hermanos, 1855. Republica de Colombia. Codificaci6n nacional de todas las leyes de Colombia desde el anode 1821, hecha conforme a la ley 13 de 1912. 34 vols. Bogota. Imprenta Nacional, 1924. Robledo, Francisco. "Yntruccion de gremios en gral. Pa todos oficios aprobada pr el Exmo Sor. Virrey del Rno. Siguense a ella quantos papeles y providens se han creado en el asunto." Revista del Archivo Nacional. Nos. 10-11. October-November 1936, 13-37 . Handouts Un albanil. "Artesanos laboriosos de Bogota." Bogota. Imp. por Juan Vanegas, 1840. Un amigo de los artesanos. "El valor de los artesanos." Bogota. np, June 9, 1853. 368

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Un artesano. "Al senor Jeneral Santos Gutierrez." Bogota. np, June 29, 1863. Los artesanos. "Basta de abusos." Bogota. np, July 18, 1870. Muchos artesanos. "La reforma de la tarifa de aduana i la camara de representates." Bogota. np, May 12, 1880. "A los artesanos de Bogota. II Bogota. Imp. de J. A. Cualla' nd. Unos artesanos liberales desenganados. "Unos artesanos a sus companeros." Bogota. np, nd. Unos artesanos que no seran sino simples espectadores ulteriores. "El fruto que los artesanos hemes cojido de las revoluciones pasadas." Bogota. np, October 19, 1863. "!Artesanos trabajadores propietarios!" Bogota. np, July 16, 1853. Ballesteros, Calisto. "Protesta de varios miembros (a) de la Junta Directiva de la Sociedad de la Alianza." Bogota. Imprenta de Nicolas Gomez, nd. Ballesteros, Cruz. "La teoria i la realidad." Bogota. Imprenta de Echeverria Hermanos, December 17, 1851. Ballesteros, Cruz, and Emeterio Heredia. "El 25 i 26 de febrero de 1862." Bogota. np, February 23, 1863. Fellesteros' Cruz i SU circulo. "A los artesanos de buen corazon." Bogota. Imprenta de Echeverria Hermanos, June 17, 1863. Cabrera, Agapito. "Dios, libertad i trabajo." Bogota. np, June 18, 1863. Cardenas, ftntonio et al. "Manifestacion." Bogota. np, October 8, 1863 "Segunda manifestacion de la comision de los artesanos." ----Bogota. Imprenta de Nicolas Gomez, October 10, 1863. Cardenas, Simon Jose. "Al juicio de imprenta celebrado el dia 13 de mayo de 1850, promovido por Camilo Rodr1guez contra el infrascrito." Bogota. Imprenta del "El Dia" por J. Azarza, May 13, 1850. c;rdenas Vasquez, Antonio et al. "Varios artesanos de todos los gremios ..•. " Bogote. np, September 15, 1866. Unos catolicos sin desfraz de artesanos. "No hai peor sordo que el que no quire oir." Bogota. np, nd. 369

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Un companero de Rodr{guez Leal. "Los derechos del pueblo." Bogota. np, July 26, 1863. "Contestacion al articulo inserto en el numero 504 del 'Dia' titulado 'Opinion de un artesano' ." Bogota. Impr. por B. Gaitan, 1848. "Democracia. Documentos para la historia de la Nueva Granada." Bogota. np, nd. Unos desterrados. "Grat itud i justicia. II Bogota. Imprenta del Neo-Granadino, April 3, 1855. 370 "Dialogo entre un artesano i un campesino sobre los Jesuitas." Bogota. np, nd. Dos artesanos. "A los artesanos." Bogota. Imprenta del Estado, June 11, 1867. Franco, Fabacuc et al. "A los revolucionarios de 17 de abril." Bogota. np, August 4, 1856. Garcia, Pablo. "Una idea." Bogota. np, February 26, 1868. Gonzalez' Saturnino. "Dos palabras de la cuestion Alianza. II Bogota. np, June 13, 1868. Gonzalez, Saturnino et al. "Representacion al Congreso nacional." Bogota. Impreso por Manuel de J. Barrera, 1868. "Sociedad de la Alianza." Bogota. np, February 4, 1868." Jimenez, Ramon et al. "La situacion." Bogota. np, October 6, 1868." Leon, Miguel. "Artesanos !Desenganados!" Bogota. r.p, August 6, 1853. "Satisfaccion que da el que suscribe, al Sr. Doctor M. Murillo Secretario de Hacienda." Bogota. np, January 19, 1852. "Senor jefe pol{tico doctor Eustanquio Alvarez." Bogota. Imprenta de Echeverrfa Hermanoe, August 31, 1851. Un liberal honrado. "A los artesanos sensatos." Bogota. Imprenta Constitucional, June 1, 1867. Lleras' Lorenzo M. "Republics de la N. Granada. II Bogota. Imp. por Juan N, Triana, October 30, 1838. Lombana' Tomas. "Manifestacion. II Bogota. Imprenta de la Nacion' December, 10, 1857. Lopez, Ambrosio. "Laguardia nacional de Bogota .... " Bogota. np, nd.

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371 Lopez, Blas et al. Anselmo Florez June 17, 1853. "Protesta de los artesanos Blas Lopez, Miguel Leon, y otros." Bogota. Imprenta de Nicolas Gomez, Madero, Isidor. "El senor Cruz Sanchez i 'La Alianza' ante el tribunal de la opinion publica." Bogota. np, September 30, 1868." Manrique de Cardenas, Gregoria e hijas. Popular que pretenden renunciar." por Jose Ayarza, May 17, 1850. "A los miembros de la Sociedad Bogota. Imprenta de EL DIA, Mas de mil artesanos. "El 8 de junio." Bogota. np, June 9, 1853. Mil ciudadanos. "El 8 de junio." Bogota. np, June 9, 1853. Morales, Ignacio et al. "Invitacion que Bogota 8 los f ieles de la America. 11 Cuallo, May 10, 1838. hace la Sociedad Catolica de Bogota. Impreso por J. A. Neira Acevedo, Pedro. "Carta abierta." Bogota. Imprenta del NeoGranadino, July 21, 1856. Plata, Jose Marta. "El gobernador de Bogota a los habitantes de la capital." Bogota. np, June 13, 1853. Posada, Joagut'n P. 1856." Bogota. "Los revolucionarios de 1854 en las elecciones de Imprenta de Nicolas Gomez, 1856. Algunos presos. "Senor procurador general de la nacion." Bogota. Imprenta Echeverr!a Hermanos, March 25, 1855. "Al pueblo." Bogota. Imprenta de la Nacion, July 21, 1863. Quijano, Bonifacio et al. "HH. senadores i representantes." Bogota. Impreso por J. A. Cualla, April 16, 1839. El redactor del Porvenir. "Al publico." Bogota. Imprenta de la Nacion, November 10, 1857. Rodr(guez, Agustfn et al. "HR. senadores." Bogota. Imprenta de Nicolas Gomez, May 5, 1846. Rodriguez Leal' Juan. "Alianza catolica. II Bogota. np, June 29, 1863. "Alianza catolica (Esta es la bala)." Bogota. np, nd. Seiscientos artesanos. "Muchos artesanos ante la sancion publica." Bogota. Impreso por F. Mantilla, July 30, 1869.

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"La Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogota a la Naci6n." Bogota. Impr. de Slnchez y Compania, March 8, 1849. "Union de artesanos." Bogota. Impreso por Focion Mantilla, June 19, 1867. Uno que no vive de empleo sino de su trabajo. "Degollacion de los artesanos." Bogota. Imprenta de la Nacion, June 11, 1867. Vega, Francisco et al. "Cosas de artesanos." Bogota. Tmprenta de Echeverr!a Hermanos, March 22, 1866. Vega, Jose Marf"a et al. "Los artesanos de Bogota a la nacion. II Bogota. Imprenta de Echeverr1a Hermanos, November 15, 1857. W. "Breves anotaciones para la historia sobre los sucesos del 19 de mayo ultimo." Bogota. Imprenta de Nicolas Gomez, May 27, 1853. Pamphlets Angulo Heredia, Melit6n. Informe del secretario de la Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos. Bogota. Imprenta de Gaitan, February 6, 1873. Unos artesanos del 17 de abril. Contestaci6n preliminar al cuaderno titulado "La revolucion." Bogota. Imprenta del "El Nucleo Liberal," nd. Conferencias leidas en la "Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos." Bogota. Imprenta de "La Luz," 1888. Estatutos de la Sociedad Filantr6pica. Bogota. Imprenta Electrica, 1906. Heredia, Emeterio. Contestacion al cuaderno titulado "El desengano o confidencias de Ambrosio Lopez etc." por El presidente ,9ue fue de . la Sociedad de Artesanos el 7 de marzo de 1849." Bogota. Imprenta de Morelos y Compania, 1851. Lleras, Lorenzo Mar!a. San Bartolome en 1855. Bogota. np, August 24, 1855. Senor juez del crimen. Bogota. np, January 27, 1855. L6pez, Ambrosio. El desengano o confidencias de Ambrosio Lopez, primer director de la Sociedad de Artesanos de Bogot~, denominada hoi "Sociedad Democratica" escrito para conocimiento de sus consocios. Bogota. Imprenta de Espinosa, por Isidoro Garc1a Ramfrez, 1851. 372

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El triunfo sobre la serpiente roja, cuyo asunto es del dominio de la nacion. Bogota. Impreso por Marcelo Espinosa, 1851. Reglamento de la Sociedad de Artesanos, Bogota, 1848. Cited in Jaime Jaramillo Uribe. "Las Sociedades Democraticas de Artesanos y la coyuntura politica y social colombiana de 1848." in La personalidad historica de Colombia y otros escritos. Bogot~. Instituto Colombiana de Cultura, 1977. 181-201. Reglamento de la Sociedad de Artistas. Bogota. Zalamez Hermanos, 1891. Reglamento organico de la Sociedad Popular de Instrucci6n Mutua i Fraternidad Cristina. Bogota. Imprenta de EL DIA, por Jose Ayarza, 1849. Resena historica de los principales acontecimientos pollticos de la ciudad de Cali, desde el anode 1848 hasta el de 1855 inclusive. Bogota. Imprenta de Echeverr!a Hermanos, 1856. La revolucion. Orijen, progresos, fines i estado actual de la revoluci6n democratica que se prepara en esta ciudad. 3rd ed. Bogot~. Imp. de F. T. Amaya, April 1858. Rodr{guez, Agust!n. Al director i miembros de la Sociedad Democr~tica. Bogoti. np, October 10, 1849. Sociedad de Artesanos. Reglamento para su rejimen interior i economico. Bogota. Imprenta de Nicolas G6mez, 1847. Newspapers Unless otherwise noted, all papers were published in Bogota. Years cited are listed. Two papers with the same name are included in chronological order. Alcance a la Gaceta Oficial. 1853. La Alianza. 1866-68. La America. 1848. La America. 1872-74. El Amigo de los Artesanos. 1849. El Amigo del Pueblo. 1838. El Amigo del Pueblo. 1890. El Ariete. 1912. El Argos. 1838. El Artesano. 1854. El Artesano. 1856. 373

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El Diario Oficial. 1867, 1872, 1880. El 17 de Abril. 1854. La Discusi6n. 1852-53. La Doctrina. 1878-79. El Domingo. 1912, 1916. La Epoca. 1875. La Epoca. 1884. La Esperanza. 1855. El Estandarte del Pueblo. ]850. El Faro. 1905. El Filotemico. 1851. La Fusion. 1910. La Gaceta Oficial. 1849-55. La Gaceta Republicana. 1909, 1911-19. El Grito del Pueblo. 1897. El Guasca. 1897. Los Hechos. 1904. El Heraldo. 1890-92. La Ilustraci6n. 1870, 1873, 1875. La Ilustracion. 1881. 7 Fl Impulso. 1903. La Independencia. 1868. 7 Fl Instituto. 1886-87. El Investigador Catolica. 1838. La Justicia. 1880. La Juventud. 1903. , F1 Labrador i Artesano. El Liberal. 1853. El Liberal. 1863. El Liberal. 1869. El Liberal. 1879. El Liberal. 1911-17. La Libertad. 1863. La Libertad. 1867-68. La Libertad. 1916. La Luz. 1882-84. El Mensajero. 1867. El Municipal. 1863. La Nacion. 1886-88. El Nacional. 1848. El Nacional. 1856. El Nacional. 1867. El Nacionalista. 1898. 1838-39. El Neo-Granadino. 1849-51, 1853-54, 1857. 375

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Las Noticias. 1889. El Noticioso de Cundinamarca. 1868. El Nticleo. 1858-59. El Nuevo Mundo. 1862. El Nuevo Tiempo. 1909. La Opinion. 1863-66. El Orden. 1853. El Orden. 1887-88, 1893. El Obrero. 1865. Pan. 1910. El Panameno. (Panama City). 1855. El Partido Cbrero. 1916. El Pasatiempo. 1852-53. La Patria. 1856. La Patria. 1867. La Patria. 1894. r Fl Patriota. 1853 El Patriota. 1883. El Patriota Imparcial. 1850. La Paz. 1868. El Porvenir. 1849. El Porvenir. 1856, 1859. El Precursos. 1889. La Prensa. 1867-68. La Prensa. 1891. La Prensa. 1907. Los Principios. 1852-53. El Progreso. 1848. El Progreso. 1897. El Proteccionista. 1910. El P6blico. 1907. El Pueblo. 1867. El Raz6n del Obrero. 1910. La Reforma. 1851. La Reforma. 1879. Rejistro Municipal. 1874. El Renacimiento. 1886. El Repertorio. 1853, 1855. La Rep6blica. 1867-68. El Republicano. 1867. El Republicano. 1896. El Republicano. 1907. Salud P"oblica. 1882. El Sentimiento Democratica. (Cali). 1849. El 7 de Marzo. 1849-50. El Simbolo. 1864. La Sociedad. 1911-14. El Sufragio. 1910. El Sur-Americano. 1849-50. 376

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El Taller. 1887-89, 1891-92. El Telegrama. 1888-90, 1895. El Termometro. 1853. El Tiempo. 1855-58. El Tiempo. 1911-14, 1917. El Tradicionista. 1872, 1874-75. El 13 de Marzo. 1910. 3 y 2. 1911. La Unidad. 1911. La Uni~n. 1881. Union Industrial. 1909. La Union Cbrera. 1913. XYZ. 1904, 1907, 1909. El Yunque. 1905-06. Contemporary Sources Calder6n, Cl!maco, and Edward E. Britton. Colombia. 1893. New York. Bureau of American Republics. 1893. ; Gu!a oficial i descriptiva de Bogota. Bogota. 1858. Imprenta de la Nacion, Bettner, Alfred. Viajes por los andes colombianos (1882-1884). Bogota. Archivo de la Econ&mica Nacional, Banco de la Republica, 1976. Reclus, Eliseo. Colombia. Bogota. Papeleria de Samper Matiz, 1893. Rothlisberger, Ernst. El Dorado: Estampas de viaje y cultura de la Colombia suramericana. Bogot;. Banco de la Republics, 1963. Steuart, John. Bogota in 1836-7. Being a Narrative of an expedition to the Capital of New-Granada and a residence there of eleven months. New York. Harper & Brothers, 1838. Secondary Sources Arboleda, Gustavo. Historia contemporanea de Colombia (Desde la disolucion de la antigua republica de ese nombre hasta la epoca presente). 5 vols. Bogot~. Casa Editorial de Arboleda & Valencia, 1919. Archila, Maricio. "De la revolucion social a la conciliacion? Algunos hipotesis sobre la transformacion de la clase obrera colombiana 377

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"Extranjeros y grupos etnicos en los gremios neogranadinos." Bolet1n Cultural y Bibliografico. 8:1 (1965), 24-32. "La libertad laboral y la supresion de los gremios neogranadinos." Bolett'n Cultural y Bibliografico. 8:7 (1965), 1015-24. Urrutia, Miguel. The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement. New Haven, CT. Yale University Press, 1969. Vargas Martinez, Gustavo. Colombia 1854: Melo, los socialismo (La dictadura democratica-artesanal del socialismo ut6pico en Colombia). Bogotti'. 0vega Negra, 1973. artesanos y el de 1854, expresion Editorial la Villegas, Jorge. Colombia: Enfrentamiento iglesia-estado, 1819-1887. Bogota. La Carreta, 1981. Young, John L. "The University Reform in New Granada, 1820-1850." Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1970. 384

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH The author was born in Jacksonville, Florida, on April 8, 1,s2. He lived mostly in southern areas of the United States, and was graduated from high school in South Haven, Michigan. Mr. Sowell earned undergraduate degrees from Western Kentucky University in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and from Grand Valley State Colleges in Allendale, Michigan. Mr. Sowell was awarded an M.A. from the University of Florida in 1980. He is happily married to M. Christine Sowell and has a lovely daughter, Emily Rene Helen Sowell. 385

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a disserration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. . ... , \ --------,--------------' David Bushn , elV, Chairman Professor of History I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Lyle'-fN. McAlister Distinguished Service Professor of History I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. David M. Chalmers Professor of History I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Paul L. Doughty: Professor of Anth pology This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of History in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. August 1986 Dean, Graduate School

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