Citation
Army reform in America

Material Information

Title:
Army reform in America
Creator:
Thomas, Donna Marie Eleanor, 1951-
Copyright Date:
1980
Language:
English

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
African Americans ( jstor )
Armies ( jstor )
Civil service ( jstor )
Civil wars ( jstor )
Civilian personnel ( jstor )
Navies ( jstor )
Soldiers ( jstor )
United States history ( jstor )
Volunteerism ( jstor )
War ( jstor )
City of Miami ( local )

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
Copyright Donna Marie Eleanor Thomas. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
12575041 ( OCLC )
AAL5476 ( LTUF )
0023434649 ( ALEPH )

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Full Text
ARMY REFORM IN AMERICA:
THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1876-1881
BY
DONNA MARIE ELEANOR THOMAS

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1980




Copyright 1980
by
Donna Marie Eleanor Thomas




ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Given the futility of most searches for employment in the field of history, it has become necessary to justify the existence of yet another doctoral dissertation. Ideally, a dissertation ought to add something
substantial to the knowledge of the human past, not simply present its author with the credentials to obtain professional employment; if any dissertation of the 1970s and 1980s is to be worth anything, it must be as a solid piece of research done for an intelligent and discernible reason. I can only hope that this dissertation will meet this criterion. With this study, I have attempted to write military history outside the conventional mold. Although this study treats the crucial
years of the Indian Wars, the reader will find no battles chronicled here. Rather, it synthesizes and expands elements of the work of several outstanding military historians, chief among them Robert M. Utley, Russell F. Weigley, Don Rickey, Jr., and Jack D. Foner. The focus here
is upon army administration and the attempts of army officers and some civilians to modernize the process. I am greatly indebted to those who have gone before me, and I owe to them the central premise of this study: that the army is a microcosm of the society which it represents.
The forces of modernization and prof essionalization affected the army as much as they did the other aspects of American life in the Gilded Age.




To understand fully the "old army," one must know as much about the administrative changes as the picturesque and dangerous campaigns against the Sioux and the Apache. Indeed, the reformers laid the philosophical groundwork for the modern United States Army of vast power and influence. Their story, I hope, will not only inform readers about the army in the Gilded Age but provoke thought about the development of military
institutions in industrializing societies.
A study of this kind is not possible without the help of kind and dedicated people. This dissertation began as a master's thesis at the
University of Rhode Island, and it is to several people there that I owe many debts. First, I must say a special word of thanks to Vicki Burnett and Roberta E. Doran of the Inter-Library Loan Department of that university. Had it not been for their thoroughness and efficiency in
searching for the books and periodicals I needed, it would have taken many more months to complete the research. Dr. Sharon Hartman Strom helped me to focus my thoughts, and Dr. Maury N. Klein taught me to express them clearly and concisely. They, the other faculty members of the History Department, and my fellow graduate students of 1976 and 1977
took a kind interest in my work and discussed related topics with me. My special friend, Betty Hanke, read and commented on the first chapter and shared with me her vast knowledge of Custer and his era.
As this study expanded to a doctoral dissertation, I encountered the helpful and dedicated staffs of the Navy and Old Army Branch of the National Archives. Like all researchers in the field, I owe to them more than I can say. The people at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress also provided needed assistance, and the staff of the




Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Delaware, saved me much time by kindly providing me with Xeroxed copies of the crucial Emory Upton-Henry A. Du Pont correspondence. Dr. John K. Mahon of the University of Florida treated me with kindness and respect throughout the years I worked with him, and his criticisms of my work improved it greatly and repeatedly demonstrated to me that he is one of the outstanding military historians working today. Without the help of Dr. William Kline, also of the University of Florida, I could never have made it through a hellish year and a half as a full-time doctoral student. As this study assumed its final written form, I spent many aftermrk hours writing and typ ing at the headquarters building of Southern Bell Telephone Company in Miami. Many people there gave me moral support. Outstanding among them are mis amigas cubanas, Ines Gasson, a kind and wise supervisor, and Dory Banga, who encouraged me to finish quickly. Karen Goble, also of Southern Bell, typed the final draft rapidly and exactingly. My parents gave me years of encouragement and a place to live as I wrote this study, and I am very grateful to them, now and always. Finally, I lovingly thank the Sergeant Major, who always tried to be there. I dedicate this study of the army, which he loved so much throughout thirty-one years, to him.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

page iii
viii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS LIST OF TABLES ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
AN ERA OF TRANSITION:
The Gilded Age in America Notes to the Introduction CHAPTER I
A THIN BLUE LINE:
The United States Amy in 1876
Notes to Chapter I CHAPTER II
SHERMAN AND HIS GENERALS:
Amy Leadership and the Beginning of
Professionalism
Notes to Chapter II CHAPTER III
THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL:
The Life and Legacy of Emory Upton
Notes to Chapter III




CHAPTER IV page
THE SOLDIER'S FRIENDS:
Reformers and the Improvement of
Enlisted Life, 1876-1881 114
Notes to Chapter IV 150
CHAPTER V
UNCLE SAM'S ORPHANS:
Black Soldiers and the Modernizing Army 159
Notes to Chapter V 188
CHAPTER VI
CHEVALIERS OR STRIKEBREAKERS?
The Army in Public Opinion, 1876-1881 195
Notes to Chapter VI 221
CHAPTER VII
FRIENDS AND FOES OF THE ARMY
Congressional Plans For Army Reform 228
Notes to Chapter VII 256
CHAPTER VIII
A COMPANY OF GENTLEMEN:
The Military Ideal of Professionalism
and the Civil Service Reformers 263
Notes to Chapter VIII 285
APPENDIX 1
ENLISTED STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMY, OCTOBER 15, 1881 291




page
APPENDIX 2
ORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1876 292
APPENDIX 3
COLONELS IN COMMAND OF REGIMENTS,
UNITED STATES ARMY, 1876-1881 293
BIBLIOGRAPHY 299
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 316

viii




LIST OF TABLES

page
1. Officers' Annual Sal aries, 1876 20
2. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men of the Combat Branches, 1876 27
3. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men Attached as Specialists to the Staff Departments, 1876 28
4. Yearly Earnings and Average Length of the Work Year For Selected Occupations, Massachusetts, 1871 29
5. Brigadier Generals of the Line, 1876-1881 60
6. Brigadier Generals of the Staff Departments, 1876-1881 61
7. Strength of Expansible Infantry Companies, As Proposed by Emory Upton 90
8. Desertions From the United States Army,
1876-1881 115
9. Desertion By Regiment or Branch, Selected
One-Year Periods 116
10. Comparison of Numbers of Black Deserters
With Numbers of White Deserters, Fiscal
1877 and Fiscal 1879 165
11. Occupations of Recruits By Race, July 1,
1880-June 30, 1881 167
12. Mortality and Morbidity Among Enlisted Men,
By Race, Fiscal Years 1876-1881 177




Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the
Graduate Council of the University of Florida
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
ARMY REFORM IN AMERICA: THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1876-1881 By
Donna Marie Eleanor Thomas December, 1980
Chai rTnan: John K. Mahon Major Department: History
By 1876, America was growing and industrializing rapidly, but its army remained a relic of the past. Totalling 25,000 soldiers, the army's scattered units fought Indians and guarded the coasts. Living conditions were primitive, pay was low, and promotions came slowly. Retirement was voluntary only for officers, and there was no retirement system for enlisted men. Half of the enlisted force was foreign-born. Another ten per cent was black and was segregated into separate units, officered by whites. Enlisted men, especially blacks, suffered snubs by civilians. Officers had privileges of rank but led isolated lives; line officers resented staff officers, who were virtually independent of the rest of the army.




Between 1876 and 1881, changes began in the army. Officers started to see themselves as professionals, forming the first professional association for the army. General William T. Sherman revitalized and expanded postgraduate officer education. Often ambivalent toward reform, Sherman did strongly support Lieutenant Colonel Emory Upton, who wrote
authoritatively on foreign armies and presented broad reform proposals for his own. Upton considered officership a true profession, and he
called for the creation of a general staff and for staff-line rotation among officers. His work influenced generations of soldiers, but his ideas became reality only many years after his death.
The army also began to reform aspects of enlisted life, spurred on by an unacceptably-high desertion rate. Officers such as Adjutant General Richard C. Drum and Colonel Samuel B. Holabird ordered improvements in food, barracks, clothing, educational facilities, and recreational opportuniti es. Scome changes, especially prohibition of strong drink and abolition of company laundresses, disheartened the men, but others, such as emphasis upon marksmanship, were popular. The guiding principle of reform was the attainment of greater efficiency in the army; to this end, many officers and politicians proposed abolishing the black regiments. The black regiments, however, endured, to face official discrimination while maintaining fine records in field and garrison.
During the late 1870s, the army faced severe challenges in Congress, as angry Democrats tried to punish the service for its role in Reconstruction by reducing its numbers. The army's friends, especially Representative James A. Garfield and Senator Ambrose E. Burnside, prevented this. Public opinion, divided on the army's role in Indian




affairs and in suppressing strikes, was apathetic to the Democrats' scheme. Middle-class people tended to support the troops as public defenders. In 1878, Garfield persuaded Congress to support a new committee to study army reorganization, and the result was the Burnside bill of 1878-1879, a thorough plan to reorganize the army along Uptonian lines. The staff, angered that the bill reduced its independence and numbers, lobbied against it, and Congress defeated it. However, the bill inspired later reforms, and marked an improvement in militaryCongressional relations.
The first phase of army reform ended in 1881, with the deaths of
Upton, Burnside, and Garfield. The emphasis of army reform shifted inward until the reorganizations of 1903. However, some younger officers still wrote and spoke of reform, and Congress enacted compulsory officers retirement in 1882. In their emphases on merit, education, and professional standards, army reformers resembled civil service reformers; there are links between the movements. The army, though, looked toward the future, not to a past golden age, for its justification. The United States Amy of the twentieth century would vindicate the reformers and fulfill their hopes.




INTRODUCTION

AN ERA OF TRANSITION:
The Gilded Age in America
Post-Civil War America was a society in the midst of great and sudden change. Population grew rapidly, swelled both by births and by an increasingly large stream of immigrants. Cities and towns expanded at
an even more astonishing rate, threatening the rural and small-town traditions which many Americans still cherished. Industry, too, became more central and crucial to the entire national economy. In fact, a truly national economy first began to develop in the Gilded Age. These changes, beneath the surface before the war but most noticeable in the years after 1865, troubled many people. The postwar years are known in
history as the Gilded Age, Mark Twain's apt catchphrase to describe the era's juxtaposition of material excesses, sentimentality, limitless official optimism, and deep corruption masked by stifling respectability.
But, unlike the tranquility which Twain's phrase suggests, these years were also a time of turmoil, stress and self-doubt. 1
The Civil War itself marked a dramatic turning point in American life, for those who lived through it as well as for later historians. The war cleared away the troubling dilemmna of dual state-and-nation loyalties and ultimately reinforced American nationalism by producing




stirring images of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and valor. But the Union's triumph created new problems as well. The questions raised by the mere presence of millions of freed slaves and conquered rebels troubled northerners even before the glow of victory dimmed. Practicality demanded that the rebels be assimilated somehow into the national polity, but fears of new southern dominance and the forfeiture of the hard-won aims of the war continued to haunt northerners of all political persuasions during the late 1860's and throughout the 1870's. The black's role in the postwar order was an even more difficult issue. In an era committed to the philosophy of laissez faire in government, the sweeping economic changes necessary to establish full citizenship for the freedmen were virtually unthinkable. Most whites, in both North and South, believed in the inferiority of blacks, especially former slaves.
Ultimately, the federal government refused to restructure the southern state governments, and Reconstruction politics focused on partisan questions. By the end of Ulysses S. Grant's second term as President, "bloody shirt" oratory had largely replaced the original Radical Republican concern for the future of southern blacks, as a new generation of Republican politicians rose to prominence. 2
For this second generation of Republican leadership, the outcome of the disputed Presidential election of 1876 underscored the chief weakness of the Grand Old Party: its sectional, not national, appeal in spite of fifteen years' control of the Executive Mansion. Now the Republicans, led by President Rutherford B. Hayes, turned to a policy designed to seek the support of white southerners in an effort to broaden the party's base. This strategy lasted nearly twenty years. 3 Thus,
while actual Reconstruction had ended long before 1877 in most of the




ex-Confederate states, Hayes' withdrawal of the last occupation troops was truly a potent symbol of home rule. After 1877, southern politicians had a free hand. The road to segregation and systematic discrimination lay open, and federal authorities showed little inclination to block it. 4
If the war changed the issues and tone of American politics, it
transformed the economy even more in the eyes of its generation. Modern historians might dispute the role of the Civil War upon American industrialization, but to northerners and southerners alike the conflict first spotlighted the rise of the millionaire-businessman. Indeed, a few great fortunes antedated the Rebellion. But John D. Rockefeller,
Jay Gould, and Jay Cooke, among others, used the wartime North's demands for goods and credit to construct financial empires. While these entrepreneurs and their rivals did not dominate all aspects of business in the Gilded Age, they did control those which proved to be crucial to the expanding, industrializing nation. 5 Whatever the positive achievements of the millionaire-businessmen in consolidating business and restructuring it for greater efficiency, their very success made them and the
large corporations they founded fear-inspiring forces to many Americans. The "trusts" were shadowy but awesome enemies to people who still
envisaged economic life in terms of local markets, small businesses, and face-to-face transactions. 6
With industrialization, the rapid growth of the cities, and increasing immigration, a large factory working-class developed and became plainly visible. There had always been poverty in America, both in the towns and on the farms. But never before had the poor, both "deserving"
and "vicious," been so concentrated as they had become in the post-Civil




War years, and improved communications underscored the national scope of the problem of poverty. The long depression which had begun in 1873 added to the ranks of the destitute, as workers lost their jobs or found their wages sharply reduced. Indignant and fearful middle-class observers commented sourly on the rising tide of "tramps" and "hooligans," poor youths with nowhere to go and nothing useful to do. When a series
of long-simmering grievances erupted into the bitter railroad strikes of mid-1877, fears that the poor were about to rise up in revolt seemed con f i med. 7 As the Amy and Navy Journal, the semiofficial newspaper of the military services, proclaimed in the typical prose of the day: "America has thrown open her doors and offered an asylum and a home to the oppressed of all nations of the earth, and she is now reaping the bitter fruits of her generosity. ,8 Solid citizens debated the best ways to handle mobs and demanded a strong militia composed of men of "the better sort" to protect the rights of property. 9 The Gilded Age, despite its conservative philosophical overtones, was an age of bitter
labor turmoil.
Throughout the troubled times of the late 1860s and 1870s, the federal government remained true to the laissez faire ideal. It was no better prepared than the state governments to deal with the problems caused by rapid growth and industrialization on a national scale. To modern Americans, the Washington establishment of the 1870s seems incredibly small and powerless. At mid-decade, a weak executive and a federal bureaucracy of about 70,000 employees, the bulk of whom were local postmasters scattered throughout the nation, could do little about social problems, even if they had chosen to do so. 10 Congress was at the height of its influence, but it, too, was hampered by two evenly




5
balanced political parties struggling vainly to impose discipline upon their members. The distribution of patronage remained a key concern of nearly all federal officials, and office-seeking, not high standards of efficiency, set the tone of the civil service. Although the "spoils system" was a result of this limited concept of the role and scope of government, it was not its cause. Rather, the tradition of strong individualism and the fear of governmental tyranny, the values of rural and small-town America which were so compatible with laissez faire theory, dictated a limited government and hindered rational reorganization along more efficient lines. This tendency was all-pervasive in government, and an example of this thinking, so alien to twentieth-century Americans, will suffice. The Office of Pensions, which handled the claims of millions of American veterans, still kept its records in huge bound volumes, not in files, and it alphabetized its claims in haphazard fashion, based upon the first three letters of the applicant's surname. 11 Such methods befit a small-town archive, not a major national agency; until this attitude changed, the national government would be hamstrung in a modernizing, complex world.
However, times were beginning to change. By 1881, fully 107,000
persons worked for the federal government, double the figure of ten years before. 12 The executive branch was changing in other ways, too. Although no late nineteenth century chief executive would ever be accused of attempting an imperial Presidency, the office would never again sink to the depths it had reached under Johnson and Grant. Even the city of Washington itself began to look like the capital of a prominent nation, with its new parks, paved streets, gas-light system, and even a few telephones and electric lights as the 1880's progressed. 13 As the




government began to expand in response to the country's growth, a new ethic of public service emerged as well, to became the leading reform of its day.
The problems of postwar growth and its excesses led to a movement to reform the civil service. Although civil service reform bills had
occasionally preoccupied Congress since 1865, the celebrated scandals of the Grant years lent new urgency to the reform cause. The ideal of a civil service based on merit, education, and an ordered bureaucracy was
another outgrowth of the Civil War experience, which vividly demonstrated to thoughtful Americans the power of efficient organization. 1 Members of civil service reform clubs tended to be the self-styled "best people," middle- and upper-class men, usually Republicans, of established family and good education. In essence, these reformers demanded a
role in government for men like themselves, to protect the interests of the well-established against the threat posed by militant workers, noveaux riches, and resurgent Democratic politicians. 15
These civil service reformers represented a larger trend, based in the middle class, toward the erection of standards and the creation of order in a changing world. Civil service reformers and the advocates of
prof essi onalizati on hoped both to protect their own status and keep unwelccme interlopers out. The prof essionalization of many occupations, led by medicine and the law, reflected the same emphasis on merit, education, standards, and a common world view as did the civil service reform proposals. 16Thus, the process of bringing order to many occupational fields, which proved to be as essential to urban industrial society as more active government, resulted both from a real need and a deeply felt threat.




Throughout this era of change, the United States Army remained
largely a relic of the simpler, prewar past. It fought Indians, guarded seacoast forts that had been long outmoded, and dreamed fondly of its glory days during the Civil War. Yet the army, despite its small size and isolation from much of American life, began to feel the stirrings of
change which swept the rest of the country. Thoughtful officers, realizing that the era of Indian warfare was ending, studied the art of war with a new purpose, to search for a professional credo of officership to correspond with that of European armies and the ideals of the emerging civilian professions. Between 1876 and 1881, the army embarked on a course of modernization designed to make it more efficient. Some members of Congress supported this effort by proposing reorganization measures and by opposing Democratic efforts to slash the army in retribution for its role in Reconstruction and its aftermath. The reforms and attempted reforms of the late 1870's and early 1880's were but the first steps in a long process of professionalization and modernization, which finally reached its conclusion a generation later. From those early reforms, though, the modern army of incredible power and influence eventually emerged. The late nineteenth century army, like the Gilded Age America which it served, was caught up in the process of replacing a traditional way of life with visions of the future.




Notes to the Introduction
1Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order, 1877-1920 (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1967), 1-10; John A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth, 18771890 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 1-32.
2John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction: After the Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 194-227.
3Stanley P. Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern
Republicans and the Southern Negro, 1877-1893 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 27-77. For the classic account of the Compromise of 1877, see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (revised ed. New York:
Double eday, T56).
4A graphic and often shocking account of this process is Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro: From Rutherford B. Hayes to Woodrow Wilson (New York: Collier Books, 1965).
5Garraty, New Caommonwealth, 78-127.
6Wiebe, Search For Order, 11-43.
7A good account of workers' conditions, as well as of the railroad strike itself, is Robert V. Bruce, 1877, Year of Violence (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970; original edition, 1959T7. For the world of the late nineteenth century poor in striking pictures, see Lally Weymouth and Milton Glaser, America in 1876: The Way We Were (New York: Random
House, 1976), 144-207.
8Army and Navy Journal, August 19, 1877, editorial, "Our Army," 24-25.
9Bruce, 1877, Year of Violence, 311; William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy TWashington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 52-54.
10Leonard H. White, The Republican Era, 1869-1901 (New York:
Macmillan, 1958), 1-44. For a sunmary of the politics of the era, see Garraty, New Commonwealth, 220-308.




11White, Republican Era, 215.
12Ibid., 2.
13Ibid., 3.
14George M. Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York: Harper and Row, 1T68), 183-216, Aicusses this in epth.
15Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana: UnTversity of Illinois Press, 1961), ix-x, 21-22, 190-197; John G. Sproat, "The Best Men": Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York: Oxfodrd Un-i-ve-rFsiTy Press, 1968), 259-270; Wiebe, Search For Order, 60-61.
16Wiebe, Search For Order, 111-132.




CHAPTER I
A THIN BLUE LINE:
The United States Army in 1876
The Centennial year marked a great milestone for Americans. It was a time for all to look backward with pride, to look forward with hope. The Philadelphia World's Exposition, the "Centennial" to its many visitors, symbolized the mood. Among the wonders of the United States Government Pavilion were the army's contributions, uniforms and relics from a colorful but checkered past and examples of the powerful new ordnance as symbols of the future. 1 Through a grim chance, past and future converged during the very height of the festivities. Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, "the beau sabreur of our Army," and five companies of the Seventh Cavalry met death at the hands of an overwhelming force of Sioux on June 25. 2 The news finally reached the East on July 6, stunning the celebrants of the first century of national progress. 3
The Little Bighorn disaster marked the beginning of the end for the "old army" and its traditional duties of Indian fighting and border patrols. Few could have foreseen it in 1876, but the action forever known as Custer's Last Stand was actually the last stand of the Indians as well, for the resulting Sioux Wars of 1876-1877 and 1881, ruthlessly prosecuted by the army in winter campaigns against villages as well as warrior bands, broke the back of tribal resistance. 4 Even as columns




of hard-bitten veterans and newly-recruited Custer Avengers pursued Sitting Bull, the army itself was changing. A new spirit and theory of professionalism emerged as the climax of the Plains wars hinted that a new raison d"e"tre must soon replace the old one of Indian control. Ironically, even as it fought its fierce campaigns against the Indians
of the West, the army's highest leadership looked to Indians half a world away, the havildars and sepoys of Queen Victoria's native regiments in the Indian army, for inspiration in a changing world.
In June 1876, as Custer and his column left for the fatal campaign in Montana Territory, another young lieutenant colonel, Emory Upton of the First Artillery, toured the Old World on the orders of General William T. Sherman, the army's commander. Upton's assignment was to study Asian armies, especially the British forces in India, to determine new approaches to the control of hostile natives along harsh, isolated frontiers. 5 Upton duly spent his time in Asia and warmly praised the British raj, but his intellect came alive upon reaching Europe. He decided to focus his report upon the lessons to be learned from the mass armies of the Continent, developed in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Upton hoped that this would stimulate open discussion of reforms for his own army, still creaking along with an uncoordinated staff and a small, stagnating line. As Custer rode to disaster, Upton was in Geneva, comparing Uncle Sam's rather seedy regulars with the splendid Guards regiments of Europe. He wrote that "since arriving in Europe, I
have discovered that our military organization is so worthless that now I feel that even a thousand pages would not suffice to show it up." 6 The future prophet of military professionalism had found his life's




work, while, half a world away, the gallant beau sabreur of the Plains met his glorious death. The old and the new had converged in 1876, and an era was truly ending.
The post-Civil War army that both Custer and Upton knew was but a shadow of the victorious Union armies, in which each had won major general's stars. In 1866, Congress reorganized the army and reduced it to 57,000. During the following eight years, that number dwindled as Congress sought economy reductions. The regular army finally stabilized at 25,000 enlisted men, paper strength. With only minor fluctuations, that limit remained until 1898, with actual strength hovering within 4,000 officers and men of that figure. In 1876, the army's combat line consisted of forty regiments: twenty-five of infantry, ten of cavalry, and five of artillery. Black soldiers, officered by whites, made up the enlisted components of the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Infantry and of the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry. All other regiments contained whites only. Whether white or black, each of the cavalry regiments contained twelve companies (the term "troop" was not yet in official usage), and each artillery regiment consisted of twelve batteries. All the infantry regiments retained the ten-company, single battalion organization that most armies had abandoned. Regiments rarely served as a unit. Rather, their companies were scattered, often in no logical pattern, to garrison the hundreds of posts and forts which stretched from New England to Florida, from California to Alaska Territory. The cavalry usually served on the frontier, and it conducted the bulk of the active campaigns against hostile Indian bands. Infantry served throughout the West and in the East as well. Artillery usually garrisoned seacoast forts, on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and, to the artillerymen's chagrin, they more




often shouldered rifles than drilled with heavy ordnance. Each artillery regiment was supposed to include a pair of light batteries, which were to be armed with field cannon or mountain howitzers and transported in the field by horse-drawn caissons. These batteries, however, were rarely at full strength and often short of field cannon and caissons; sometimes, the army only authorized one light battery per regiment, despite the fine record of the light artillery units of the Civil War. 7 In 1876, these forty regiments, the total combat force of the army, consisted of 25,331 soldiers, of whom 1,569 were commissioned officers of either company or field grade. 8
To assist in feeding, equipping, and administering the line units, the army had established several staff departments over the years. Not all were exclusively military in scope. The Corps of Engineers, then as
now, did much of its work improving harbors and river navigation, and the Signal Service, which had pioneered battlefield communications systems during the Civil War, contained the forerunner of the Weather Bureau until 1890. 9 The Adjutant General's Department administered the army, in close relationship with the Inspector General's Department, wbich inspected the units and judged the conditions of army installations. Supply matters were handled by three separate bureaus: the Ordnance Corps, which furnished and sometimes manufactured weapons and arrmunition, the Subsistence Department, the source of food and forage, and the Quartermaster's Department, supplier of all other military necessities. The Medical Department sent surgeons and stewards to the line units and administered army hospitals. The Judge-Advocate General's Department, formerly called the Bureau of Military Justice, handled the thousands of court-martial actions of the army. Lastly, the Pay




Department tried, not often successfully, to pay the scattered units every two months.
Rather than acting as supporting units subordinate to the line, the staff bureaus ran themselves, independent of any other military authority, including the commanding general. All of the bureau chiefs were posted to Washington, where they quickly became skillful lobbyists in blue and gold braid, wheedling Congressional support for the staff's pet interests whenever army legislation came up on the calendar. Line officers, serving usually in unpleasant frontier or garrison assignments, with little hope for promotion, eyed the top-heavy ranks of the staff with envy. In 1876, the staff contained eight brigadier generals, while only six one-star generals commanded line departments. There were 257 field officers on the staff compared to a combined total of 150 colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors in the three combat branches. Indeed, a full-time staff lieutenant was a rare creature. Of the 586 permanent staff officers serving during the year of the Custer massacre,
but ninety-three were first lieutenants, and only ten unfortunates were second lieutenants. In contrast, many line officers spent the bulk of their careers in those lowly grades, and subalterns in their thirties and forties were not extraordinary in the post-Civil War infantry, cavalry, and artillery. No wonder so many line officers worked every military and political connection they possessed in their efforts to obtain detached duty with the staff Even if promotion and a permanent staff assignment eluded them, at least they could enjoy several years of duty in a pleasant environment. 10
The ranks of the noncombatant officers also included thirty chaplains, paid as captains but without command authority, who were assigned




to frontier posts and to the black regiments. Opinions of the effectiveness of these men of the cloth varied. Some, like the Reverend George Mullins, popular chaplain of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry who later laid the foundation of the army's educational programs for enlisted men, did much to fulfill the needs of their soldier-flocks. But others were truer to the stereotype presented by Captain Guy V. Henry, a disgruntled line officer who would one day become a general: "I am sorry to say that I think the chaplains are not of much account in the Army. They are generally old men who do not exert a good influence. . The men will have nothing to do with them." 11 A common complaint throughout the period, within the ranks of the army itself, was the lack of Catholic chaplains to celebrate Mass weekly for the large numbers of Irishand German-Catholic enlisted men. 12
Enlisted noncombatants, with the exception of the forty-man detachment of the Signal Service, were charged against the ceiling strength of 25,000 enlisted men, a fact which irked General Sherman. An engineer battalion, a detachment at West Point and another at the Leavenworth Military Prison, recruiting parties and their charges, the ordnance force at the federal arsenals, and detached clerks accounted for 2,266 men who were lost to the line in 1876. To provide needed noncombat services at active posts, a total of 467 enlisted men served as hospital stewards, ordnance sergeants, or commissary sergeants, trained specialists who were the highest-paid enlisted men in the army. Another kind of skilled specialist worked solely on the frontier. These were the 214 Indian scouts. While usually noncombatant guides, many did experience combat,, including several who fell with the Seventh Cavalry at the Little Bighorn. 13




Thus, a very limited number of soldiers tried to patrol a frontier of thousands of miles while performing other duties as well. Even then, Congress debated ways to reduce the army still further. The House Military Affairs Committee suggested that several hundred officers could be dismissed for economy's sake and reported a bill to that effect in 1876. Congress scuttled it, however, in the wake of the Custer massacre and increased the cavalry instead. 14 Such was the tug-of-war the army
faced in 1876; the army's role in Reconstruction angered southerners and Democrats, who often urged drastic reductions in the establishment, but the troops' role on the frontier pleased westerners, who pushed for augmented forces on the Plains. But the threat of severe reductions always menaced the army. As one soldier expressed its mood in dubious verse:
If there was no Army, I wonder,
What Congress would try to reduce;
Not their own pay, I'd wager, by thunder,
Would economy ever induce.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
If the Army of one man consisted,
And but ten cents a month was his pay,
To curtail the expense of "enlisted"
They'd take five of his ten cents away.
If a pea-nut a day was his ration,
Even that they'd reluctantly give-They'd expect that this "brave" of the nation
On the smell of an "oil-rag" should live.15
With such a small, scattered army in danger of becoming even smaller, it is not surprising that the officer corps was restless and discontented. In 1876, there was still a large percentage of the army's officers wfio had seen better days and greater glory, not to mention higher rank, in the Civil War. Custer and Upton were only two of the many postwar officers who could be addressed as "general" by virtue of




volunteer rank earned during the war. One correspondent to the Army and Navy Journal, the semiofficial newspaper of the services, noted that at least one of the second lieutenants of 1876 had been a colonel of volunteers in the early 1860s. 16 This situation, and others less extreme, resulted because many regular army officers took leaves of absence from the regulars during the war in order to take commissions, at higher grades, in the volunteer regiments. They retained their regular rank, because most Civil War promotions were within the volunteer service, not the regular army. When the volunteer units were mustered out of the army in 1865 and 1866, the regular officers were reassigned to duty with regular units, often reverting to the lowly grades they held in 1861.
The tangle over rank was further complicated by the brevet system. Brevet rank was a type of reward for gallant service, bestowed in lieu of medals, which did not exist until the Medal of Honor was authorized for officers in 1863. A brevet entitled its holder to exercise command privileges of the rank only under certain circumstances and to wear the uniform of that rank on some occasions, mostly ceremonial. It could be earned by either regular or volunteer officers and was designated as
such--for example, "brevet major general of volunteers" or "brevet colonel, United States Army." As early as the Mexican War, and certainly by the Rebellion, the brevet system was virtually meaningless, since nearly every competent officer had "won" at least one brevet. Indeed, the lack of a brevet marked an officer as suspect. Many officers detested the brevet system, but in lieu of anything more tangible to set them apart from their fellows, most clung jealously to their Civil War brevet rank. 17




The sloppy rank structure created many problems. One was public confusion about the very nature of the army. As Colonel John Gibbon, himself a volunteer major general who had originally reverted to the grade of captain at the war's end, noted, most Americans seemed to believe that the army contained only generals and colonels, since so many officers used their brevet or volunteer titles whenever possible. 18 Military courtesy allowed them to sign official reports with these titles, and many field-grade officers corresponded regularly with eastern newspapers, affixing their highest ranks to letters and articles. A more serious problem was the question of who commanded whom whenever two or more companies took the field together; a first lieutenant with the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel often rankled under the command of a captain whose highest brevet was only major. The often-ludicrous battle over this complicated rank structure and its relationship to military courtesy raged long after 1876, even as some of the worst abuses of the brevet system were curbed. 19 However,, it indicated many grave problems within the officer corps: slow promotion and little recognition, low pay, and a limited view of the military profession and of the world.
In any small army, promotion opportunities are likely to be limited. In the antebellum army, even as brilliant an officer as Robert E. Lee languished in the grade of captain for seventeen years. Despite universal respect for Lee's talents, his last promotion, to colonel of the First Cavalry, in the course of a thirty-two year career came only
on the very eve of the Civil War and bore President Abraham Lincoln's signature. 20 Perhaps the army was wrong to expect more rapid advancement than that after the war, but many of its officers, and even some of its enlisted men, had tasted of high rank during the 1860s, and they




naturally wanted it again. But the reality of the postwar period was that of an officer corps advancing not in rank but only in age. Representative of this plight is Arthur MacArthur, who later rose to the rank of lieutenant general and command of the occupation forces during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902. A "boy colonel" of the Civil War, MacArthur commanded a volunteer regiment before he turned twenty. After a brief try at civilian life, he rejoined the army as an officer through a program designed to reward the worthiest officers of volunteer regiments with company grade in the regulars. From 1866 to 1889, he remained a captain on the frontier. Not until 1898 did he receive substantial advances despite his excellent record. 21 Hundreds of others, who lacked MacArthur's luck, spent the remaining years of their careers in company grade, commanding but a handful of men at some forgotten backwater.
The possibilities for meaningful command were slim. Forty line
regiments required only forty line colonels, all of whom were Civil War veterans and most of whom held brevet general officer rank in 1876. The military stratosphere, to which only dreamers or social climbers could aspire, consisted of six line brigadier generals and three major generals. The major generals, Winfield Scott Hancock, Irvin McDowell, and John M. Schofield, held key commands, called divisions, and the brigadier generals controlled departments under their supervision. The two highest-ranking officers in the army were both unique, since Congress vowed on several occasions that it would abolish the grades of general, held by William T. Sherman, and lieutenant general, occupied by Philip H. Sheridan, when the two renowned war heroes retired. Another indication of their special position, held by virtue of having saved the Union, was the high pay each received. Sherman collected $13,500 in




base pay with a few thousand dollars in other benefits, while Sheridan received $11,000 plus similar benefits. These were among the most generous federal salaries of 1876. The major generals and the brigadier generals of both staff and line had to be content with the stillhandsome sums of $7,500 and $5,500, respectively. 22
Lesser officers, however, did not receive such generous treatment at the hands of Congress, as their pay scales show: Table 1. Officers' Annual Salaries, 187623 rank yea ly base pay
colonel $3,500
lieutenant colonel 3,000
major 2,500
captain, mounted 2,000
captain, dismounted 1,800
first lieutenant, mounted 1,800
first lieutenant, dismounted 1,500
second lieutenant,, mounted 1,500
second lieutenant, dismounted 1,400
The discrepancies in pay in the company grades accounted for the extra expenses incurred by cavalry and light artillery lieutenants and captains, who had to maintain several horses. Even so, most married officers had very heavy expenses, for frontier posts had poor living quarters, if they had any at all, for families. Some officers' wives and children lived in the East while the soldier-husbands served on active
duty on the frontier, especially if the army families had children of school age to educate.
Since most officers were majors or lower, the expenses were a
crushing burden. Officers' salaries may have looked princely in comparison to average annual wages of working-class civilians, but men of good education and comparable managerial experience could earn at least as much as the average army officer, without the danger and isolation of army life as part of the bargain. It was true, as members of the House




Military Affairs Committee complained in 1876, that the army's general officers each earned more than a United States senator, with his stipend of $5,000, and that a Supreme Court justice only earned as much as a major general. 24 However, Congress' patronage employees, who had very
little to do and who never had to face the threat of legislation to reduce their salaries, earned larger sums than many army officers who faced Indians on the Plains. As Representative James A. Garfield ironically noted, the clerk of the House, paid $4,500 per year, and the sergeant-at-arms of that body, who received $4,000, each made more money than the bravest, most experienced colonel in the army. 25 Even some tradesmen, who did not have the education or the level of responsibility of the army officer, earned average wages nearly equal to those of the infantry subalterns. In Massachusetts, the average railroad engineer or lithographer received $1,050 for his services in 1870-1871; the average engraver earned $1,200. 26 In 1876, the Military Affairs Committee of the House planned, as another economy measure, to reduce second lieutenants' salaries by $200. 27 The second lieutenants raised a storm of protest, claiming with justification that "their pay is now too small," especially in light of their bleak prospects for promotion. 28
There were three reasons why the promotion system of the "old army" was so tangled. One was the lack of a compulsory retirement law. Although officer retirement went into effect in 1861, when the government discovered with alarm that most of its generals and colonels were too old for active service in the field, the law was strictly voluntary. The retirement lists of the 1860s and 1870s were small, since Congress had no intention of paying out large numbers of pensions to regular army




22
officers. The famous "Benzine Boards" of the late 1860s and early 1870s weeded out many incompetent and disabled officers but placed few on retirement status, and they failed to solve to long-range problem of judging and maintaining high standards of fitness in the officer corps. As
will be seen, compulsory retirement became an important issue to the army reformers of the period. In 1882, Congress finally passed a compulsory retirement bill, which helped somewhat to break the logjam in promotions. 29
Another problem, the custom of regimental promotion, remained to be solved. Under this long-established system, a new officer received his commission in his regiment, not to his branch of service. A transfer to another regiment involved much red tape and often years of waiting. Officers received promotions through the grade of captain within the regiment, within the branch from major through colonel, and by discretion of the President within the general officer grades. Thus, promotions in the company grades could be agonizingly slow. As an example of this and how the system worked, take the case of Thomas Custer, who fell with his brother in 1876. He was listed as "captain of the Seventh Cavalry," not "captain of cavalry." It took him more than nine years to attain that rank, despite an outstanding Civil War record graced by two Medals of Honor. Torn Custer had to wait his turn, regardless of how many captain's commissions fell vacant in other cavalry regiments; others waited far longer than he did. As can be imagined, the range of time in grade varied wildly in the regiments, and this fact affected the rate of promotion throughout every officer's career. Some reported that their West Point classmates, who happened to be commissioned into regiments that subsequently suffered heavy officer casualties, outranked them by several




years, despite the fact that they had received second lieutenants, rank on the same day. 30
This was a fiercely debated issue in the army, since most officers worried greatly about their chances for promotion. Most of the young officers wanted lineal promotion through the grade of colonel, to be based upon seniority within each branch of the army. Under the lineal system, field-grade promotions would be as before, but vacancies in the grades of first lieutenant and captain could be filled more equitably.
Thus, a first lieutenant in the Tenth Cavalry, if he had the most time in grade of all his cavalry colleagues, could be offered a captaincy in the Third Cavalry. This was only fair, wrote one officer: "The junior in rank in each arm of the Service, respectively, should, by every principle of right and justice, remain always the junior, and not be promoted over the heads of his seniors in rank, simply because they happen to belong to another regiment. ,3 1 But the opposition, traditionalists and many older officers, appealed to justice as well, claiming that the
officer vacancies suffered in a campaigning regiment were a kind of reward to the hard-fighting survivors. To bring in officers from other, less active regiments to fill the vacancies would be an affront. Tradition and esprit de corps would suffer if the old regimental system were altered: "Officers now take a pride in their regiments, which they would not if they did not expect to spend the greater part of their lives in them." 32 Controversies over the respective merits of regimental and lineal promotion systems raged long after 1876.
Although both regimental promotion and voluntary retirement clogged the pathways to high rank, the third and most fundamental obstacle to
reasonably regular officer promotions remained the size of the army




itself. An army of 25,000 simply did not need a battalion of generals and a regiment of colonels, and Congress refused to authorize such. Only when the army expanded five-fold at the beginning of the twentieth century would large numbers of new officers' billets be opened up, and the inevitable wave of promotions resulted. 33
Limited opportunities for army officers often resulted in limited horizons as well. Major General John M. Schofield, who became the superintendant of the United States Military Academy in 1876, complained that too many younger officers considered their educations completed upon graduation from West Point. 34 Of course, not all officers let their minds waste away. The pages of the Army and Navy Journal demonstrate that some officers continued to read, write, and think, suggesting new regulations, improved weapons and equipment, and revised tactics. But all too many bounded their world by the limits of their own commands, running their units like miniature absolute monarchies. Others found solace in drink, neglecting much of the boring but essential work involved in managing a garrison or commanding a company. All of this was especially tragic because the military justice system gave great authority to officers, whether capricious or fair, in all of their dealings with enlisted men. 35 A caste system of officer-enlisted relations, not part of the regulations but simply a venerable custom of the service rooted deeply in English tradition, further reinforced the
officers' position and authority.
Since an officer could consider himself a gentleman simply by virtue of holding a commission, it was easy to leap to the conclusion that those who did not hold commissions could not be gentlemen. Countless memoirs and letters of officers and their families refer to enlisted men




as a "rough sort."36 The usual stereotypes of enlisted men centered
on three types: the old foreign solder of Irish or German birth, the
uneducated young hick fresh from the farm, and the vicious "Bowery
tough." Without a doubt, some examples of each type wore Uncle Sam's
blue, but most soldiers, both native- and foreign-born, were ordinary,
decent men. However, even the soldiers themselves accepted their public
image as lazy, slightly dishonest "government loafers," so aptly portrayed in the lyrics of a popular vaudeville song, which the regulars
themselves had adopted as their own by 1876:
Three years ago, this very day,
We went to Governor's Isle,
For to stand against the cannon,
In true military style.
Seventeen American dollars
Every month we surely will get,
For to carry the gun and the bayonet
With true military step.
Well, we had our choice of going
To the army or to jail,
For it's up the Hudson River
With a copper-tailed sail.
So we puckered up our courage,
With bravery we did go,
And we cursed the day we went away
To the Regular Army, 0!
There was Sergeant John McCaffery
And Captain Donohue,
They made us march and tow the mark
In gallant "Company, Q.11
Oh, the drums would roll, upon my soul,
And here's the way we'd go,
Forty miles a day on be ns and hay
In the Regular Army, 0!17
The song's narrator explains the reason for his decision to enlist at
the recruit depot at Governor's Island, New York harbor. A judge has
given him and his friends a choice between army blue and the striped




suits of Sing-Sing. After being mustered in, these new soldiers, true to form, wind up in the disciplinary detachment, "Company Q" in the army's slang, where a tough Irish sergeant and captain will whip them into line, getting these rookies used to the life of "forty miles a day on beans and hay" of the cavalry on campaign. The reference to pay, as will be noted, is inaccurate, but, then as now, recruiters told exaggerated stories of army life to gullible candidates for admission. Of course, soldiers have always enjoyed a good laugh at their own expense, often out of sheer necessity, and the stereotyped rankers of "The Regular Army, 0!" made them laugh as heartily as did civilian audiences. But the question still remains: What were the rank and file of 1876 really like?
Good statistics on enlisted men are not readily available before
1880, when reforms within the Adjutant General's office affected recordkeeping. However, figures exist which show the nationality of those recruits who entered the army in 1874. Most of them remained on duty, serving their first enlistment, in 1876. Of the 4,821 new soldiers of 1874, 2,345 were American-born. The remaining half came from twentyfour foreign lands, chief among which were Ireland, with 1,098, Germany, which contributed 575, and England, with 249. Slightly less than a hundred Canadians journeyed south and eventually joined the regulars during that year. Of all the recruits of foreign birth, fully 876 came from non-English-speaking areas.38 Unfortunately, the figures for 1874 do not separate recruits by race, but probably the vast majority of the black recruits of the postwar era were born in the United States. In 1876, a total of 2,757 black soldiers served in the four segregated regiments. 39




The statistics on nationality give the impression of a melting pot, at least in the thirty-six white regiments. First-hand accounts often stress the cosmopolitan, if usually working-class, background of the army's rank and file. 40 One aspiring Kipling, looking back on his postwar army career, satirized that fact:
Maginnis scowls at Johnny Bull, an' Yawcob Meyer roars,
At Jean Duval; an' I have heard the company "countin'
fours"
In seven different languages, on which eventful day, 4
The captain burst a blood vessel, an' fainted dead away.4
However, it was not all one big, brawling, happy family, as the high desertion figures of the postwar era show. In 1876, 1,832 soldiers, nearly one out of every fourteen enlisted men, ran away, part of a longterm trend which began in 1866 and continued until 1898. 42 The army
caught and convicted only 347 deserters during the Centennial year, so the odds for escape were good. 43There were ample reasons for soldiers to contemplate desertion: low pay, poor food, bad material conditions, and little possibility of advancement.
If low pay embittered many army officers, the enlisted men had even more to complain about in the pay scale that Congress had approved for them in the early 1870s. Most enlisted men served in line regiments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery; their pay was less than generous, as the table shows:
Table 2. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men of the Combat Branches,
187644
rank monthly base pay
sergeant major
quartermaster sergeant 23
first sergeant 22
saddler sergeant 22
principal musician 20
chief trumpeter 20
sergeant 17




Table 2. (continued)
rank mo thly base pay
corporal 15
blacksmith or farrier 15
musician 13
private 13
Specialist soldiers, who served with regimental or post staffs but not as
soldiers charged against the line regiments, received better pay in most cases, to the envy of other enlisted men. The following table gives their pay scales in comparison:
Table 3. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men Attached as Specialists to
The Staff Departments 187645
rank mo thl base pay
ordnance sergeant
hospital steward, first class 30
hospital steward, second class 22
hospital steward, third class 20
private first class* 17
private second class* 13
*These ranks were used in the Ordnance Corps and Corps of Engineers only in 1876; later, the Signal Service would use them when it received a permanent enlisted complement. Few soldiers attained those grades which paid the highest salaries, however.
Army pay, even if the free food, shelter, and clothing are taken into consideration, was not very competitive with most civilian occupations open to working-class American men. Only in hard times, as old recruiting officers well knew, did a truly promising crop of men join the army when the nation was at peace. Once men did join, whether knowingly or as the end result of a drunken spree, they were often tempted to desert when they
saw what civilians earned. Figures from Massachusetts, published in the early 1870s, demonstrate the low standing which soldiering had among late nineteenth century occupations:




Table 4. Yearly Earnings and Average Length of the Work Year For
Selected Occupations, Massachusetts, 187146
average length of average yearly
occupation work year in months earnings, adult men
farm laborers 12 $328.00
fishermen 3 300.00
coach drivers, hostelers,
and horsecar-men 12 525.00
teamsters 12 600.00
watchmen 12 600.00
blacksmiths 12 900.00
harnessmakers 12 750.00
railroad engineers 12 1,050.00
railroad mechanics 12 750.00
railroad brakemen and firemen 12 600.00
railroad laborers 12 525.00
seamen 12 435.00
stevedores 12 500.00
retail store clerks 12 600.00
bootmakers and shoemakers 10 625.00
hatters 8 476.00
tailors 10 875.00
hoisery workers 10 457.50
rubber workers 10 530.00
cotton textile workers 12 501.00
woolen textile workers 12 450.00
candlemakers 12 600.00
soapmakers 12 525.00
chemical workers 12 600.00
gasworkers laborers 10 525.00
cigarmakers 12 900.00
brickmakers 7 262.50
pottery workers 12 750.00
glassmakers 12 600.00
quarry laborers 10 500.00
stonecutters 11 825.00
bookbinders 10 750.00
engravers 12 1,200.00
lithographers 12 1,050.00
papermakers 12 551.00
printers 12 750.00
jewelry makers 12 750.00
watchmakers 12 900.00
tanners and curriers 12 600.00
cordage workers 12 501.00
carpenters 10 687.50
masons 8 750.00
painters 8 500.00
plasterers 8 800.00
machinists 12 $755.00
cabinetmakers 12 750.00
uphost l erers 12 900.00




Table 4. (continued)
average length of average yearly
occupation work year in months earnings, adt m en
boilermakers, copper workers,
and brass workers 12 750.00
iron founderers 12 846.00
toolm akers 12 786.00
ti nsmiths 12 900.00
bakers 12 600.00
shipwri ghts 10 675.00
privates, United States Army 12 156.00
As can be seen, only the very lowest-paid occupations could be said to be less desirable than the pay and benefits of the army, at least when most men could find reasonably steady civilian work. In the West, where skilled civilian labor was always at a premium, the military pay looked even worse to soldiers and prospective recruits than it did in the East.
Of course, pay was but one of the factors involved in enlistment. Most men joined the army because they were down on their luck, out of a job, or in some kind of trouble, either with the law or with community mores. 47Others,, mostly Civil War veterans whio never completely got the army out of their blood or youths fired by ambitions of becoming gallant sabreurs of the Plains, enlisted because they wanted to be soldiers. As Jacob Adams, serving the third year of his enlistment in 1876, later noted, "I fairly ached to get into some action that I had heard veterans of the Civil War talk about." A young recruit of 1877,
inspired by the brave Colonel Custer and dreaming of a life in natty blue uniforms awash with brass buttons, confessed: "I had always had army fever." 48 Such patriotic, adventurous young men soon lost their
ardor, and f atigue duty, hard marches, and the threat of an arrow in the back, all at the reward of only $13 a month, did much to disillusion
them.




Other rewards were few as well. Long and faithful service might win an enlisted man the chevrons of a senior sergeant, but length of service was no guarantee of advancement. There were no promotions based solely on time in grade for American soldiers of the nineteenth century,
and some men remained privates through several three- or five-year en1 i stents. For them, the incentive pay of an extra dollar per month for each year beyond the second of an enlistment represented their only reward. Reenlistees, perhaps a quarter of enlisted strength during this period, also received a small bonus. 49 But life at an isolated post was a hard way to earn the pittance granted to experienced enlisted men.
Enlisted life was especially galling to the bright and ambitious, who may have enlisted in the hopes of winning a commission. About nine per cent of army officers in 1876 had once been enlisted men, but the bulk of them had won their rank during the Civil War. Although army policy supposedly reserved twenty-five per cent of vacant second lieutenancies for the promotion of outstanding regular army enlisted men, that policy was moribund by 1876. 50
If army pay and opportunities were bad, army food was even worse. The ration in 1876 consisted of salt pork or stringy range beef, bread or hardtack crackers, beans, and coffee. 51 The government provided no other foods on a regular basis, so some units grew their own vegetables. Most companies preferred to draw the bread ration in the form of flour, converting part of it into cash, which made possible the purchase of extra foods like milk and eggs. Usually the company commander or his lieutenant handled the flour savings money as a company fund. If the officers were negligent or dishonest, the company went hungry. Both officers and men complained about the fund system and the inadequacies of




the issue ration, but changes came slowly. 52 The army's policy toward cooking complicated the problem of food still further. The army never specifically enlisted or trained men to be cooks until the SpanishAmerican War. Rather, policy dictated that officers delegate one or two men per unit to serve a ten-day tour of duty in the mess-hall. All too often, commanders chose their most slovenly, unsoldierly men for the task, which got them off the drill field. The results were predictable. The common army quip had it that the food killed more men than the Indians. 53
Living conditions were not splendid either. A barrack for artillery or infantry at a seacoast fort might be in a dank, cavern-like structure of masonry built in the days of James Monroe. On the frontier, both cavalry and infantry lived in log or adobe barracks, often little more than huts, which contained sufficient cracks to let in freezing air, rain, rats, insects, and snakes. Bunks were iron bedsteads with wooden slats supporting a cloth bedsack, filled with fresh straw once a month. One blanket per soldier was the standard issue, in winter as well as summer. Privates and corporals had little privacy, for they all shared one large room. Sergeants often had a room to themselves; occasionally, each had a separate cubicle adjoining the main barrack room. The army's furniture was strictly functional: a bed and
a footlocker for each man, a large gunrack, one or two small tables, and a few chairs. In 1876, candles remained the sole form of illumination in the barracks at night, thus severely limiting the range of off-duty activities for the enlisted men. Those soldiers who were fortunate enough to receive the captain's permission to marry, much less find a bride, could live with their families in separate shacks near the




barracks. Neither the shacks nor the barracks had running water, and sometimes soldiers at western posts had to cart in all their water from sources miles away. 54
To outfit his regulars, Uncle Sam provided a clothing issue and a limited yearly replacement allowance. In 1876, the dress uniform, which was worn for parades, inspections, and daily guard mounts at all stations, sported a blue, single-breasted coat trimmed in the branch color, light blue trousers, and black leather shoes and belts. For cavalry and artillery, the headgear with this uniform was an impressive black felt helmet with plumes and cords of the branch colors, cavalry yellow and artillery red. Foot soldiers, however, did not have such Prussianinspired finery and had to make do with a French-style blue shako with a wool pompom in light blue for infantrymen and in red for foot artillerymen. For fatigue and campaign wear, a sack coat with five buttons was in general use by 1876. Either a version of the Civil War kepi or a broadbrimmed campaign hat was worn with the sack coat. The biggest problem with this wardrobe was that it did not fit very well, for standardized sizes were still in their infancy. As a result, each post had a tailor,, an enlisted man who altered uniforms for a fee, which he was allowed to keep. This system, as can be imagined, was rife with abuses.
Many men, in disgust, bought cloth and ordered their uniforms made from scratch, often at a lower cost than the alterations. 55 Uniform changes would soon come to the army as part of larger reforms.
With the exception of infrequent campaigns against hostile Indians in the West, enlisted life was a steady routine of boredom. Infrequent paydays accentuated the low pay, especially on the frontier, so when the paymaster finally arrived, all hell broke loose. No organized system of




post exchanges or recreation centers existed in 1876, and army-sponsored team sports had not yet come into their own. Consequently, sudden cash, limited recreation, and isolation led to a rash of heavy drinking, gambling, and whoring on paydays at army posts. Many Americans, both in and out of the army, were appalled by the amount of severe alcoholism in the service. 56 As the Army and Navy Journal argued: "Drunken men mean constant trouble, bad discipline, resistance to officers, tying up, buck and gag Fboth were illegal punishments], stocks, court-martials, desertions . . A drinking post is a troublesome post, with a full guardhouse; a temperance post is a quiet post with an empty or nearly empty guard-house," and the paper pleaded with officers to set a better example. 57 Less often discussed in public was the high rate of venereal disease in the army. Prostitutes, readily available around seacoast garrisons, followed the troops to the frontier as well, where they competed with local women of "loose virtue," whether Indian, half-breed, or Mexican. 58 Only the soldiers' chronic lack of money limited their contacts with these women. Reformers knew these ugly facts, and they determined to make conditions for enlisted men better, both for the good of the soldiers and for the good of the service.
Of all the enlisted men, the blacks fared the worst. Segregated to two regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, they made good soldiers and boasted both large percentages of reenlistees and low desertion rates. However, the army barred blacks from the artillery and from the specialists' positions in the staff departments, since Sherman and many other officers considered these duties beyond the capacity of the black man, the success of slaves and freedmen in the Civil War armies notwithstanding. In 1876, one West Point cadet was black and suffered




considerable ostracism at the Military Academy; no blacks served as commissioned officers. 59All enlisted men received rather shabby treatment from civilians, but blacks suffered special indignities, including the refusal of local merchants to serve them and public outcries in many areas of the West and South whenever it appeared that black units might be stationed nearby. 60
In a "Jim Crow" army, blacks could not depend on their white fellow soldiers for respect. After Brigadier General Edward 0. C. Ord, commanding in Texas, made statements widely interpreted as disparaging black troops, one white soldier sprang to their defense in a letter printed in the Army and Navy Journal. Although "a Democrat," he praised the black soldiers he had known as "sober, obedient and trustworthy" men who made steady fighters. 61 His letter brought a swift rebuttal, one of the most vicious ever printed in the Army and Navy Journal. This letter indicates the bitter prejudice which existed within the army:
You say you ought to know a good soldier when you see
him. Tell me, if you please, what is a good soldier, if you call the colored troops good ones? I suppose you are like a
good many more men of the ranks; you are amalgamated with a
dusky companion smarter than what Usic you are, and
expressing her opinions. You are like a good many renegades,
I presp~e, no matter what the color is as long as it is a
wom an." ,
This letter hints at miscegenation by white soldiers, possibly during occupation duty in the postwar South. Although the subject remains a mystery, since it involved a strict taboo, other aspects of black-white relations are known. Although some white soldiers treated blacks with consideration, more often they snubbed their black comrades-in-arms.
Interracial brawls broke out on some occasions when black and white companies served at the same post. 63




Much of the ill-will which ex-Confederates felt toward the occupation troops resulted from the army's early use of many of the black volunteer regiments, the United States Colored Troops, in the South, since most of the blacks' terms of enlistment did not expire until 1866 or 1867. As these segregated regiments, officered by whites, left the service, Congress authorized six regular black regiments for the peacetime army. Even though these new units, to be reduced to four under the general reorganization of 1869, were also segregated, their establishment was a victory of sorts for Radical Republicans, since it set the precedent for the peacetime role of blacks in the regular army. These units found much the same prejudice as had the volunteer black soldiers in the South, where violence between blue-coated blacks and local whites was hardly unknown. 64
The South pressured the army to remove all the blacks from occupation duty. It succeeded in the face of the army's hesistant policies. Six months after Appomiattox, 107 black regiments served on occupation duty in all of the southern states except Virginia. One year later, only twelve black regiments and parts of a thirteenth served in but seven of the ex-Confederate states. The number of blacks in the occupation force steadily decreased until, by 1870, the only black troops in any southern state were those regular units assigned to the isolated Texas
frontier. Federal troops would continue to garrison parts of the South until 1877, but never again would black units perform that duty. 65
The black regulars soon found themselves posted to very isolated, undesirable areas. From the late 1860s through the early 1880s, they served in the hot and dry Southwest, a place most soldiers dreaded. 66 Sherman felt this to be necessary, for he believed the myth that blacks




were "better qualified for southern stations than troops of our AngloSaxon race." Even though he was "well satisfied" with the blacks, performance of this duty, he believed that white troops were superior in virtually every way: "If I were compelled to choose 5,000 men to go into a fight with, I confess I would rather take 5,000 white men. . ." 67 Despite their faithful service under the worst conditions, the black soldiers remained Uncle Sam's orphans, praised by few and claimed by none.
This, then, was the tiny force which guarded the nation as it began its second century in 1876. The aging Civil War heroes, discontented junior officers, and enlisted men of widely varying backgrounds seemed
quaint reminders of the past as they pursued Indians or guarded outmoded forts. But as the country itself faced an era of rapid change, so did its army. An industrializing country needed an efficient, modern army to protect its interests and reflect its power. These were the thoughts of reform-minded officers in the army and their friends in Congress, as
they advocated changes which were long needed. Over the next half-dozen years, these men began the long task of transforming the "old army" into the new.




Notes to Chapter I
1Army and Navy Journal, June 3, 1876, unpaginated supplement.
For a vivid pctorial representation of life during the Centennial year, see Lally Weymouth and Milton Glaser, America in 1876: The Way We Were (New York: Random House, 1976).
2Armny and Navy Journal, July 8, 1876, "Disaster to Gen. Custer's Comnand," 772.
3New York Times, July 7, 1876, 1, 4.
4See Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States
Arm and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: MacmilT-an-i, 1973), 236-295. A more controversial view is Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West (New York Banrtam Books, T~7), 21-296.
5Sherman to Upton, July 12, 1875, printed in Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton, 1878), iv-vi.
6Quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, "Emory Upton on the Armies of Asia and Europe," Military Affairs, XXVIII (Spring 1964), 27.
7Utley, Frontier Regulars, 10-18.
8United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), I, 24-25.
9For the role of the Signal Service, see Joseph H. M. Hawes, "The Signal Corps and the Weather Service," Military Affairs, XXX (Sumner 1966), 68-76.
10Utley, Frontier Regulars, 11-13; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United Stated Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 284-288. The fTgures are from Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 24, 40-72, and Francis B. Heibtman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; originaT edition, 1903), II, 612-613.
1lUnited States Congress, House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1
session, Reduction of Army Officers's Pay, Reorganization of the Army, and Transfer of the Indian Bureau (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), 148. For Mullins, see Arlen L. Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West, 1869-1891 (Westpoint, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 132.




12See Arm and Navy Journal, May 11, 1876, letter from Hospital Steward Pat-r-ckC~oyne, 646; Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 1865-1898 (New York:
Humanities Press, 1970), 132.
13Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 24.
14For the report, see House Report 354, 44 Congress, I session, 3-4. See also Utley, Frontier Regulars, 61-62.
15Army and Navy Journal, January 29, 1876, 406.
161bid., February 5, 1876, letter from "Second Lieutenant," 418.
17Utley, Frontier Regulars, 12, 20-21, 39. A contemporary
attack on the system is James B. Fry, The History and Legal Effects of Brevets in the Armies of Great Britain and the United States (New York: D. Appl eTn,T87-).
18United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45
Congress, 2 session, Report of a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Miliary Affairs Relating to the Reorganization of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878), 270.
19Utley, Frontier Regulars, 21.
20Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, I, 625.
21Ibid., I, 652.
22Utley, Frontier Regulars, 33-35, 38.
231bid., 19, 38.
24See House Report 354, 44 Congress, I session, 2.
25James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States," North
American Review, CXXVI (March-April, May-June 1878), 464-4657--ther House employees and their annual salaries were:
doorkeeper $2,500
assistant clerk 2,500
clerk of the documents room 2,000
distributing clerk 1,800
uphol sterer 1,400
locksmith 1,400
26See Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor, Annual Report, 1871 (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1871), 222-224.
27House Report 354, 44 Congress, I session, 2.




28Army and Navy Journal, February 5, 1876, letter from "Second
Lieutenant," 418.
29Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position: The Commanding General of the Army of the United States, 1864-1903 (Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs Press, 1975), 70.
30Utley, Frontier Regulars, 19-20. For Thomas Custer, see
Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, I, 348. See also the many letters to the editor in the Army and Navy Journal from 1865 to 1890, when the promotion system was finally reformed. Interesting articles on the subject, by young officers who favored this reform, appeared in the United Service, a military journal,
during 1879, 1880, and 1881.
31Army and Navy Journal, April 22, 1876, letter from "Justice," 598.
321bid., April 15, 1876, letter from "Regimental," 582.
33For the figures which demonstrate this process, see Weigley, History of the United States Army, 567-568.
34Report of the Secretary of War, 1879, I, 14.
35For a detailed discussion of military justice during this
period, see Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 31-58. A full description of officer life on the posts, as seen by military families, is Patricia Y. Stallard, Glittering Misery: Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press/OTd Army Press, 1 78), 15-52, 75-122.
36Don Rickey, Jr., Fort Miles a Day On Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the I-n-d-ian Wars (N-rman: -n-versity-of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 26-28, 63-72; Foner, United States Soldier
Between Two Wars, 59-60.
37This song has been published, with annotations, as Don Rickey, Jr., "The Regular Army, 0!" (New York: William A. Pond and Company, 1962) and is used with permission. It has been recorded, with periodstyle guitar accompaniment, as part of "The Army in the West, 1870-1890" (Washington: Company of Military Historians, Fn.d.j), a selection of authentically-performed ballads, band music, and bugle calls which reproduce the sounds of everyday life on the military frontier during the postwar years.
38House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 228.
39Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 40-41.
40Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 17-23. Rickey's book is based heavily on first-person written accounts and questionnaires completed by former "old army" enlisted men during the 1950s.




41Poem by Private Will Stokes, quoted in Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 131.
42Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 72.
43Ibid., I, 107.
44Based on figures in Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 126-127.
45Based on figures in ibid.
46Based on Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor, Annual Report, 1871, 222-224.
47See Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 18-24.
48Ibid., 24-25.
49See Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 36, for figures provided by Adjutant General Richard C. Drum.
50Utley, Frontier Regulars, 18, states that thirteen per cent of the total number of army officers from 1865 to 1891 were former enlisted men in the regular army. However, a study of Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, I, 149-1069, yields a figure of 9.5 per cent for the period 1876-1881.
51Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 116-120.
52Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 22-23.
53Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 120-122. For some thoughtful suggestions on the improvement of army cooking, which an officer advanced, see Army and Navy Journal, June 3, 1876, letter from "Ninth Infantry," 694.
54Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 40; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 17-19.
55Gordon Chappell, The Search For the Well-Dressed Soldier,
1865-1890: Developments and Innovations in United States Army Uniforms on the Western Frontier (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1972) is the monograph on this subject; see 4-5 for a discussion of the tailors. Excellent on the more specialized subject of dress uniforms is John Phillip Langellier, They Continually Wear the Blue: U. S. Arm Enlisted Dress Uniforms, 1865-19 2 (San Francisco: Barnes-McGe,T976). For a reprint of the regulations with fine illustrations, see Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr., ed., Regulations and Notes For the Uniform of the Army of the United States, 1872 (Stat-en IsTland, New-ork: Manor PuTis thing, 17277. Fine pictures of western regulars in all orders of dress grace the pages of the profusely-illustrated volume by David Nevin, The Old West: The Soldiers (New York: Time-Life Books, 1973).




56Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 156-161.
57Army and Navy Journal, April 22, 1876, editorial, "Standing Threat," 596.
58Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 169-170; Stallard, Glittering Misery, 69-73.
59For a view of West Point through the eyes of its first black graduate, see Henry 0. Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point (New York: Arno, 1969; original edition, 1878).
60Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 132-133, 143-147.
61Arm and Navy Journal, April 15, 1876, letter from "White Soldier, 5 2.
62Ibid., May 13, 1876, letter from "11th Infantry," 646.
63For a good, brief discussion of the prejudice, both official and unofficial, which black soldiers faced during the late nineteenth century, see Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 132-147.
64For some information on black troops during Reconstruction,
see James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 18651877 (Baton Rouge: Louisilana State University-Press, 1967), 95-97, T93, and Marvin Fletcher, "The Negro Volunteer in Reconstruction, 1865-1877," Military Affairs, XXXII (December 1968), 124-131. Fletcher's study is
helpful but far too brief; Sefton's work must be used with caution, for it is marred by its author's uncritical acceptance of the ex-Confederate view that the army dominated politics and life in the postwar South.
65Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 261-262, which is based on official reports.
66For the black regiments' long assignments to undesirable duty, see Fowler, Black Infantry in the West, and William H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967).
67United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 64, 45
Congress, 2 session, Testimony Taken By the Committee on Military Affairs in Relation to the Texas Bor er Troules (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878T7, 20.




CHAPTER II
SHERMAN AND HIS GENERALS:
Army Leadership and the Beginning of Professionalism
Although the postwar army was isolated from much of American life,
the military experience of the Civil War profoundly affected many thoughtful and influential northerners long after Appomattox. The massive Union war machine that had developed by 1864-1865 was something never seen before in America, and it gave its participants a sense of vast power. The war and its requirements of huge amounts of weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, equipment, vehicles, and horses created an organization larger and more efficient than most Americans could have envisaged before 1861. The size of the army far outstripped other organizing efforts, even the armies raised to fight other American wars. The example of the Union army was not likely to be forgotten easily, even if Americans did not like large standing armies and things military. In many fields, the generation that had marched with Grant and
Sherman redefined the meaning of organization and the role of the expert, and the military experience was not lost on these men. In the area of reform, the postwar professional allied with an organized reform group replaced the antebellum romantic. 1 During the late 1870s and the 1880s, new professions emerged, and older ones, such as law and




medicine, sought to consolidate their ranks and to impose uniform standards of knowledge and behavior upon their members. 2
There are certain prerequisites which groups must meet internally and with the general public before they can claim a well-defined professional status. Often the process is a long and complex struggle between elitists and traditionalists; some occupations have risen and then fallen in public esteem or have never forged a true group identity. 3
Those who have completed the process, though, exhibit three characteristics. One is the proof that group members have a certain expertise in their field which laymen cannot easily attain. Another is the group's clear-cut assumption of responsibility for its field. The public must
perceive that the new profession "knows best" in matters relating to its field, and,, thus, it willingly delegates responsibility and authority to the group and its members. The final crucial factor in the process of professionalization is a strong intragroup feeling that all members are colleagues and have common professional interests. 4When these criteria are met, the occupation becomes a true profession.
Military officers in western Europe began to satisfy the criteria of professionalism in the years following the Napoleonic Wars, through the development of the general staff system and subsequent reforms in military organization and training. The concept of the general staff stressed a well-defined military science, which could be mastered fully only by study and field work. Thus, all officers needed thorough training, after which they could successfully perform a wide range of duties both on the staff and in the line units. As a consequence, the general staff ideal not only produced trained professionals but developed common
concerns among all officers. Prussia led the way in developing the




general staff and military education, and its victories in the 1860s and 1870s assured that all major and aspiring continental powers would adapt these systems. Even Britain, usually aloof under the protection of the
Royal Navy, abolished the purchase of commissions and abandoned the old notion of the officer as aristocratic dilettante in favor of the welltrained professional. France, too, after its devastating defeat of 1870-1871, supplemented the Napoleonic tradition of glory with the ideal of the anonymous but ever-prepared general staff. By the late 1870s, modern armies were emerging throughout Europe. 5
In America, however, the situation was different. The United
States worried little about military invasion, separated as it was from Europe by a wide ocean. There was no impetus to modernize the small regular army to thwart potential attacks, a key concern of governments and generals on the Continent. Nor did the United States possess an aristocratic and hereditary officer class which the new professionals could displace for "the good of the country," as young Prussian officers had done during the crisis years of the early nineteenth century.6 Furthermore, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English thought had imparted to Americans a strong aversion to standing armies and an extreme dedication to a militia system that was strong on paper but highly uneven in practice. In the Federalist period, the government's attempt to build a respectably-strong army met stern opposition and came to naught after only a decade. 7 The changes in the franchise after 1800 fostered a democratic ideal that was diametrically opposed to a large standing army and a stable officer corps. This ideal proclaimed the suitability of nearly all white men to fill virtually every government office, including military officership. The traditional opposition to standing




armies and the democratic credo both helped to debase the militia, for most voters wanted little to do with it, and nearly destroyed West Point, considered by many to be simply a bastion of privilege and training ground for would-be aristocrats. 8 During the antebellum period, all of these ideas and traditions combined to produce a small army of trained regular soldiers drawn from the lowest classes, a chaotic militia system free from meaningful federal control, and a tiny regular officer corps composed of old war heroes, political appointees, and West Point graduates who still remained concentrated in the lower commissioned grades. 9
West Point, a national school of applied science as well as a military academy, symbolized the ambiguous military tradition of nineteenthcentury America. The Military Academy in its early years attracted men seeking careers in civil engineering as well as those who hoped to be
professional soldiers, a fact that West Point's critics in the postCivil War period never tired of noting. 10 For many years, the academy did overemphasize engineering and ignore strategy, concentrating the cadets' military studies on small-unit tactics and the duties of noncommissioned and company-grade officers. By the 1830s, however, West Point had begun to produce a group of respectably trained young officers who were dedicated to the military, even if some of them left the regular
army not long after graduation. These men first made their mark in the Mexican War. By 1865, an overwhelming majority of ranking generals,
both Union and Confederate, had shared the West Point experience. 11
The heritage of West Point, however, was a double-edged sword which cut both ways. While Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, with their great opposite numbers, Lee, Jackson, and Stuart, were all celebrated products




of "the Point." there were also many bumblers with starred shoulder straps whose first taste of military life had come on the banks of the Hudson. Nor was West Point the only gateway to military success and fame during the Rebellion. Nathan B. Forrest and John A. Logan were two shining examples of the possibilities still remaining for "natural genius" even as the military art transformed itself into military science. 12 The Civil War, then, could not provide the proper conditions for creating a true military profession. Rather, the war and its legacy of brave volunteers simply exacerbated an already ambiguous heritage. Even leading officers of the postwar regular army could not agree on the war's meaning. When young Colonel Emory Upton, the army's leading theorist, called for a staff subordinate to the line, he drew his arguments from the Civil War experience. 13 In arguing against such a change, Brigadier General Montgomery C. Meigs, quartermaster general of the army, based his rebuttal on the "lessons" of that war. 14 The postwar officer corps had many obstacles to surmount, including the fierce rivalry between staff and line and bitter personal feuds dating back to the war, before it could organize as a true profession. The years 1876-1881 did
not so much mark the epoch of prof essionalization as did they witness the beginning of a long but ultimately successful process, one of crucial importance for the army in the century that lay ahead. 15
The postwar army, it has been noted, was in many ways the peculiar product of its long-time commanding general, William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman's direct influence spanned the years 1869-1883, his tenure as
the nation's ranking soldier, but his spirit and attitudes marked the army for years longer, even after his death in 1891. 16 Not surprisingly, Sherman best symbolizes the ambiguous approach to reform and




change which marked many members of the Civil War generation of military men. The son of an Ohio judge, Sherman was born in 1820, and after the
untimely death of his father, young "Cump" became the ward of a conservative Democratic Ohio Congressman. Sherman attended West Point and graduated high in his class. As an artillery officer, he spent much of his career in the South. Sherman left the old army in the 1850s to pursue a wide range of civilian occupations, in most of which he was an abject failure. The secession crisis erupted while he was headmaster of the small military institute which later became Louisiana State University. Returning to his native Ohio at the beginning of the war, Sherman quickly received the commission of a brigadier general of volunteers. But his career soon came under a cloud amid rumors of his insanity, until Ulysses S. Grant took him under his wing and made a trusted subordinate of the discredited general. He distinguished himself in the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns. When Grant went to Washington early in 1864 to assume supreme command, he left Major General Sherman in control of operations in the Western Theater. There, Sherman battled toward the strategic Atlanta area and then devastated Georgia and the Carolinas,
reviving the concept of total war and smashing resistance in the heartland of the Confederacy. As the war ended, Sherman was the hero second only to Grant in the hearts of northerners. 17
The Civil War was, in Sherman's own estimation, the peak of his
career. At forty-five, he faced the prospect in 1865 of many years of routine duty. From 1865 to 1869, his restlessness and sense of adventure were somewhat placated by his work as commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, in whose vast open spaces he often traveled. 18
In 1869, now promoted from lieutenant general to general, Sherman




reluctantly went east to take command of the army upon Grant's elevation to the Presidency.
Sherman's years as the army's commanding general have been aptly
termed his "years of frustration." Short of temper and uncomfortable in the political arena, Sherman felt slighted at first by Grant and his friend and former chief of staff, Secretary of War John A. Rawlins. Sherman had expected a free hand with regard to command of the army, and he balked when Rawlins tried to set policy. 19 When Rawlins died after only months in office, Sherman himself served briefly as interim secretary of war. Rather than giving him a greater appreciation of the civilian side of the War Department, that experience alienated Sherman even further; he spoke out for abolition of the secretaryship. 20 Grant's new head of the War Department, William W. Belknap, despised Sherman, and the feeling was mutual. After three years of constant bickering with Belknap, Sherman, in disgust, moved himself and army headquarters to Saint Louis, still commanding general but in virtual exile. 21
As a consequence of the move west, the army lost the power of Sherman's influence in Washington from 1874 to 1876, a time when Congress
was determined to reduce the strength of the army as much as possible. Sherman's problems, then as earlier, were aggravated by his great distaste for Congressional Reconstruction, even though he, as commander of the army, had responsibility for its implementation. He had expressed his views on Reconstruction as early as 1865 in a letter to his powerful brother, Senator John Sherman of Ohio: "No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we maintain there an army large enough to hold them in subjugation." 22 His inflexible stance alienated him even




more from politicians, including Republicans who might have aided the army had Sherman been more cooperative.
Things brightened for Sherman in 1876. He returned to the capital in that year, soon after Belknap fell from power in a kickback scandal involving post traders in Indian territories. Reconstruction had virtually ended by then, and during the following year, the new President, Rutherford B. Hayes, removed the last occupation troops. From 1876 until his retirement, Sherman served under a series of complaisant secretaries of war, all of whom allowed him to run the army to his satisfaction. 23 He retired in 1883, still distrusting politicians and their meddling with his beloved army, still clinging to his title of "commanding general" while stubbornly rejecting the European innovation of transforming the ranking general into a more modern "chief of staff. ,24
Sherman was doubtless an old-fashioned general in many ways, but he also held views at least tinged with progressive ideas. He pressed for greater integration of the staff and the line, a major requirement for both greater efficiency and the development of a truly professional officer corps. He stressed the need for postgraduate military education,
even if he sometimes denigrated classroom work or resisted modernization at the citadel of military education, West Point. He encouraged the foundation of the Military Service Institution of the United States, the first truly professional military organization for army officers in the nation. And he also took an interest in the career and writings of
Lieutenant Colonel Emory Upton, his young protege who became the most distinguished theorist of the nineteenth-century American army. Finally, Sherman gave the army a tone and a tradition that helped it to survive in an otherwise bleak period of its existence. During the early




stages of the prof essionalization of officership, he provided the necessary leadership, albeit reluctantly at times, for the implementation of change and the discussion of new ideas. In this and in his ambiguity about what the postwar army should become, Sherman and his ranking officers, the generals and the colonels commanding the forty regiments of the line, had much in commuron. To understand Sherman and the institutional changes he sought between 1876 and 1881, it is necessary to examine his most important subordinates.
Philip H. Sheridan, the army's sole lieutenant general, was Sherman's confidant and trusted subordinate, even if the two often were at loggerheads over the careers and promotions of officers that one favored and the other disliked. Eleven years younger than Sherman, Sheridan was also Ohio-born, hut of Irish Catholic immigrant parentage. His background and his short stature made him a battler; indeed, he was suspended from West Point for a year because he was caught in one too many brawls. Finally graduating in 1853, near the bottom of his class, Sheridan served as an infantry lieutenant until war came in 1861. Even so, he remained a captain until he managed to obtain the colonelcy of the Second Michigan Cavalry in 1862. Promoted to brigadier general of volunteers later that year, he served with distinction under Grant in his great campaigns of 1862-1863.
When Grant went east, he took Sheridan with him to reorganize the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps. Sheridan did his job well; his troopers mauled the once-superb rebel cavalry, killing the legendary J. E. B. Stuart in the process. In 1864, Grant delegated Sheridan to lead
a small army into the Shenandoah Valley, long a source of food for Confederate armies in Virginia and a natural invasion route to the cities




of the Mid-Atlantic region. Sheridan's personal heroism saved the Union cause in the Valley at the Battle of Winchester, and his forces drove out the Confederate troops and laid waste to the region. He played a key role in the last campaign of the war, which led to Lee's surrender. "Little Phil," the bold cavalryman and dashing bachelor, ended the Civil War as a national hero. His reputation and the support of Grant and Sherman assured for him a high place in the postwar army, even though others' major general's commissions antedated his own. He was at the vortex of controversy during the years after 1865, in part because he had been "jumped" over so many others. 25
If Sherman had the respect of nearly all of his officers, Sheridan, by his combative nature, did not. Brigadier General George Crook, his subordinate in the Valley in 1864, despised him, and, thus, two of the army's most legendary and effective Indian fighters rarely spoke to one another. Indeed, the bitterness that Crook felt did not subside even after Sheridan's death in 1888. 26 Some officers resented Sheridan's rapid promotion to major general and then to lieutenant general in 1869; other disliked his flamboyant personal life and gourmet tastes at the division's headquarters in Chicago. 27
Probably the most divisive factor coloring Sheridan's relations with his subordinates was his active support of a group of young colonels, especially Custer, Colonel Nelson A. Miles of the Fifth Infantry, and Colonel Wesley Merritt of the Fifth Cavalry. In a small officer corps obsessed with promotion possibilities and profoundly jealous of each other, such favoritism rankled nearly everybody. Since Sheridan's division was the command in which most active Indian campaigning took place, officers eager for higher rank and public glory knew that they




had to come to terms with "Little Phil" in order to get choice assignments. Sheridan, his enemies charged, used this to his own best advantage. 28 As might be expected, Sheridan's role in the professionalization of army officership was mixed at best, for the man's acts and personality added to the atmosphere of distrust and self-interest which prevented cohesiveness within the officer corps. Even so, Sheridan did take an interest in many reform proposals.
The army had three major generals between 1876 and 1881. The least
active of the three in professional activities was Irvin McDowell, the luckless commander at First Bull Run. Despite his rather lackluster Civil War career, McDowell remained in the army, which he had entered as an artillery lieutenant in 1838 upon graduation from West Point. In November 1872, after the deaths of George G. Meade and Henry W. Halleck
had opened up promotion opportunities for brigadier generals, McDowell got his second star. He commanded the Division of the Pacific throughout the period 1876-1881, from headquarters in San Francisco. 29 He
had been born in 1818 and thus was old by the army's standards; in fact, Sherman thought that he should have retired several years before he actually took that step in 1882. 30McDowell died in 1885. Despite his
apparent distaste for field service, he had had his supporters and allies within the officer corps, for he was an elegant, literarily-inclined gentleman possessed of a private fortune, who set a lavish table for his guests.31
Although he, too, spent the years 1876-1881 away from frontier service, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock had more impact on the army. Born in 1824, he had graduated from the Military Academy in 1844 and had
served as an infantry lieutenant, earning a brevet for gallantry at




Contreras and Churubusco. A captain when the Civil War began, Hancock
became a brigadier general of Pennsylvania volunteers in the fall of 1861. He served with distinction in the Peninsula campaign and there earned his nickname, "Hancock the Superb." He fought in all of the major campaigns in the Eastern Theater during 1862 and 1863; his corps repelled Pickett's Charge. Severely wounded during Gettysburg, he rejoined the Army of the Potomac in 1864, but he never regained his old position as that army's most effective division or corps commander. However, his reputation and career were secure. He received a commission as brigadier general in the regular army while the war was still in progress, and, in 1866, he won his second star, which made him the army's senior major general between 1876 and 1881. 32
During the postwar years, Hancock saw field service in the West as commander of the operations on the southern plains in 1867, a controversial campaign which added to the reputations of Hancock and his young subordinate, George A. Custer, even if modern historians underscore the brutality of their strategy. 33 Hancock served for years in the quiet
Division of the Atlantic, but his command suddenly became a battleground in the summer of 1877, when widespread railroad strikes led to the calling out of most of the line units in Hancock's division. 34 In 1880,
the Democrats nominated him for the Presidency; in an era before active campaigning by nominees, he was not as unlikely a candidate as he might appear to modern eyes. Hancock never left the army, even during his unsuccessful campaign, and he died on active duty in 1886. 35 He, like McDowell, had a reputation for fine living and good dining, as his huge physique suggested. But Hancock also had a reputation as a military reformer. He was an early president of the National Rifle Association,




a society very active in the promotion of military marksmanship. 36 He was also the first president of the Military Service Institution of the United States, and he made sure that the institution's journal would print thoughtful, substantive articles in which many professional concerns could be discussed. 37
The third major general, John McAllister Schofield, was another trusted friend of Sherman and an active reformer throughout his long military career. Born in 1831, Schofield graduated from West Point and served in the artillery, taking time off to teach science in Saint Louis. He was a captain in 1861 and transferred to the Missouri volunteers, becoming a brigadier general in the fall of that year. He served with distinction in the Western Theater. A brigadier general of regulars since 1864, he received his promotion to major general on the day Grant became President. 38 Much of his postwar duty was spent in the
South, where, especially as military governor of Virginia, he earned a reputation as a conservative who sympathized with southern whites and
rejected the Radical Republicans' hopes for civil equality for blacks. Schofield also served briefly as secretary of war during the last months
of Johnson's Presidency; he was a candidate whom all parties in the bitter dispute over the Tenure of Office Act could accept, for he interpreted his powers as being very limited. 39 Schofield served, too, in the Far West. In 1876, he received the appointment as the superintendent of the United States Military Academy, a move which the Army and
Navy Journal applauded, noting that "no choice could certainly have been more acceptable than . Schofield." 40 While at West Point, however he faced controversy, first over proposed new army regulations which he wrote under Sherman's direction and then over the alleged mistreatment




and ultimate dismissal of a black cadet in 1880. Transferred and placed afterwards on waiting orders until a new command could be found for him,, Schofield toured Europe and devoted time to his studies. He replaced the retiring McDowell in the command of the Division of the Pacific in 1882. In 1888, upon the sudden death of Sheridan, Schofield became the commanding general of the army. In essence, he turned the post into a chief of staff and did what he could to encourage military reform. He retired in 1895, and, before his death in 1906, he saw the army he loved modernized and the general staff system finally instituted. 41
Schofield was doubtless one of the most forward-looking officers of his time. He had an obvious intellectual bent and visualized an army of truly professional soldiers experienced in both staff and line duties. 42 He helped to found the Military Service Institution of the United States and gave the statement of its principles at its first meeting. 43 However, even he was not completely above the feuds and bickering which wracked the officer corps, and he was not beyond politics, either. Sherman urged him to stay at the Military Academy in 1880, thus insuring the comm ending general's control over policy at the institution. In an
odd gesture, Sherman, the man who despised politics and politicians, played his two major generals against each other by telling Schofield, "You are as likely to be a candidate for President as Hancock." 44 After Schofield, not fully convinced, insisted on a change of assignment, Sherman agreed to put him in command of the hastily formed Division of the Gulf, a "bungle" of a command in the commanding general's opinion, which lasted only six months. Schofield was unhappy with this
command, manufactured by President Hayes, who did not ask for Sherman's advice in such matters because he had "soured" on the general for his




vigorous defense of Schofield's recent dismissal of a black cadet. 45 Rather than let his dignity as a major general suffer, Schofield accepted waiting orders, at full pay, until a proper command "according to my rank" could fall vacant for him, which finally occurred in 1882. 46
This series of petty incidents demonstrates that even the most progressive of army officers could not resist all of the self-promotion and divisiveness which permeated the atmosphere of the "old army." Schofield was unusual because he did not indulge fully in such intrigues,
unlike most of his colleagues.
The army's brigadier generals are best examined in two groups, those of the line and those of the staff. Seven men filled the six slots available in the line between 1876 and 1881. Sixteen headed the ten staff departments during the same years. All of the line generals
had been distinguished major generals of volunteers who had commanded divisions, corps, or armies in the Civil War. One, John Pope, failed
abysmally against Lee at Second Bull Run, but he had redeemed his reputation against hostile Indian tribes on the frontier during the last years of the war. Most of these men had seen service in the occupation
of the ex-Confederate states; all had headed departments on the western f ronti er. The two who did not attend West Point made good reputations for themselves in combat; in civilian life, Alfred H. Terry had been a lawyer, and Nelson A. Miles, only twenty-two when the war began, was a retail clerk, a fact that his enemies never tired of stressing. George A. Crook, well known as an Indian fighter, was a notable eccentric who rode a mule on campaign but achieved striking results against the Apache. Oliver Otis Howard, the one-armed "praying general," was a man of mediocre military ability but was a noted religious leader and




humanitarian who had once headed the Freedmen's Bureau. Edward 0. C. Ord, born in 1818, was the oldest of these men; he was a tough and impulsive career soldier whose long service in the army had left him with little money to support a large family. Christopher C. Augur served much of his career as a quietly competent officer in the South and on the Texas and Platte River frontiers. Of these men, all but Augur eventually won a second star, and Miles ended his career as the
commanding general, retiring as a lieutenant general. 47
Unlike the line positions, the staff positions evidenced considerable turnover. Five department commanders retired between 1876 and 1881 and one died. Six of the sixteen generals of the staff were at or near retirement age: Edward D. Townsend, Montgomery C. Meigs, Randolph B.
Marcy, Joseph K. Barnes, Benjamin Alvord, and Andrew A. Humphries were born before 1820. This partially explains the relatively high number of openings in the staff brigadier generalcies. Most of the staff chiefs had backgrounds in the departments which they commanded. Contrary to this pattern, William B. Hazen, previously colonel of the Sixth Infantry, became Chief Signal Officer in 1880, but there were no commissioned officers permanently assigned to this department except the department commander. Because several staff departments relied primarily on officers commissioned directly from civil life, it is not surprising that six of the sixteen staff generals were not graduates of West Point.
Regardless of age or background, however, none of these men was promoted to major general and given line commands; perhaps that was the ultimate revenge in the eyes of indignant line officers. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the key points in the careers of the army's brigadier generals of this period.




The army's line colonels were powerful men in their own right.
Sixty-six men commanded the forty regiments during the years 1876-1881; all were Civil War veterans and sixty had earned general officer rank during that war. As might be expected, the longest tenure of regimental command was in the four black regiments. Between 1876 and 1881, none of the black units changed commanders, although Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson of the Tenth Cavalry had long campaigned for his general's stars. There were openings for new commanding officers in three of the five artillery regiments during these years, five in the ten cavalry regiments, and ten of the twenty-five infantry regiments. 48
The colonels were a diverse group. Some, like Samuel D. Sturgis of the Seventh Cavalry, spent years on detached duty away from their commands. Others, such as John Gibbon of the Seventh Infantry and Miles, were dynamic soldiers of considerable ability and campaigned actively through long years with their regiments. Philip Regis De Trobriand of the Thirteenth Infantry was French-born and a volunteer Civil
War general; August V. Kautz of the Eighth Infantry was a West Point graduate who had been born in Germany. Some colonels, like Miles and Emory Upton of the Fourth Artillery, were rather young men, but most were in their fifties or early sixties. Forty-two of these men were West Point graduates; one, Washington L. Elliott of the Third Cavalry, attended the Military Academy but did not graduate. Twenty colonels, concentrated in the infantry, had first been commissioned as volunteer officers in the Civil War. Four had earned their lieutenant's commissions after volunteer service in the Mexican War; two of these, Colonel Henry A. Morrow of the Twenty-First Infantry and Kautz, had been enlisted men in that war. Three, Frank Wheaton of the Second Infantry,




Table 5. Brigadier Generals of the Line, 1876-1881

name
John Pope Oliver Otis Howard Alfred H. Terry Edward 0. C. Ord
Christopher C. Augur George A. Crook Nelson A. Miles

date and type of commission
1842 USMA 1854 USMA
1861 volunteer
1839 USMA
1843 USMA 1852 USMA
1861 volunteer

date appointed brigadier general
1862 1864 1865 1866
1869 1873 1880

date appointed major general
1882 1886 1886 1881
(by act of Congress)
1888 1890
(lieutenant general, 1900)

date left service
1886 (retired) 1894 (retired) 1888 (retired) 1880
(forced retirement)
1885 (retired) 1890 (died) 1903 (retired)

General officer appointments listed are to regular army rank only.
Based on William H. Powell, ed., List of Officers of the Army of the United States From 1789 to 1900 (New York: L. R. Hammersly and Company, 1900), 168, 264, 383, 481, 535, 572, 624-625.

0




Table 6. Brigadier Generals of the Staff Departments, 1876-1881

name, title, and tenure
Edward D. Townsend
Adjutant General,
1869-1880
Richard C. Drum
Adjutant General,
1880-1889
Montgomery C. Meigs
Quartermaster General,
1861-1882
Robert Macfeely
Commissary General of Subsistence, 1875-1890 William M. Dunn
Judge Advocate General,
1875-1881
David G. Swaim
Judge Advocate General,
1881-1894
Albert J. Meyer
Chief Signal Officer, 1863-1864, 1866-1880 William B. Hazen
Chief Signal Officer,
1880-1887
Joseph K. Barnes
Surgeon General,
1864-1882
Stephen V. Benet
Chief of Ordnance,
1874-1891

date and type of commission
1837 USMA
1847
direct
1836 USMA
1850 USMA
1861
volunteer
1861
volunteer
1854
assistant surgeon 1855 USMA
1840
assistant surgeon 1849 USMA

highest Civil War rank
brevet
maj or general brevet brigadier general brevet
major general brevet colonel
brevet brigadier general colonel of volunteers
brevet brigadier general brevet major general brevet major general brevet lieutenant colonel

date appointed brigadier general
1869
1880

1861 1875 1875 1881 1880 1880 1864 1874

date left service
1880 (retired)
1889 (retired)
1882 (retired)
1890 (retired)
1881 (retired)
1894 (retired)

1880 (died)
1887 (died)

1882 (retired)
1891 (retired)




Table 6. (continued)
name, title, and tenure
Randolph B. Marcy
Inspector General,
1861-1881
Delos B. Sackett
Inspector General,
1881-1885
Benjamin Alvord
Paymaster General,
1872-1880
Nathan W. Brown
Paymaster General,
1880-1882
Andrew A. Humphries
Chief of Engineers,
1866-1879
Horatio G. Wright
Chief of Engineers,
1879-1884

date and type of commission
1832 USMA
1845 USMA
1833 USMA
1849 direct
1831 USMA
1841 USMA

highest Civil War rank
brevet brigadier general brevet
maj or general brevet brigadier general brevet colonel
major general of volunteers major general of volunteers

date appointed brigadier general
1878
1881

1876 1880 1866 1879

Highest Civil War rank listed is to regular army grades unless noted otherwise. Dates given for appointments as brigadier general reflect full rank in the regular
Based on Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), 1, 210, 253, 384, 389, 517, 554-555, 665, 689, 702, 739, 856, 938, 967, 1062.

army only.

States Arm 37-45, 161, 192,

date left service
1881 (retired)
1885 (died)
1880 (retired)
1882 (retired)
1879 (retired)
1884 (retired)




John King of the Ninth Infantry, and Granville 0. Hailer of the TwentyThird Infantry, had first entered the army directly from civil life. Hailer, who had been dismissed from the army in 1863, was reinstated as a colonel by act of Congress in 1879. 49Other stories, however, had no happy endings. Colonel Thomas C. Devin, the Civil War cavalry hero who commanded the Third Cavalry, died on active duty in the West. Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie of the Fourth Cavalry, promoted to brigadier general in 1882 for his brilliant, tough campaigning in Texas, went insane in the mid-1880s. 50 Upton, in command of the Fourth Artillery, killed himself in 1881. 51
Whatever their ultimate fate, most colonels spent long years in grade. Of the men who were colonels during all or part of the period 1876-1881, the average time in grade was shortly under ten years. In the artillery, the average was eight years; in the cavalry and the infantry it was ten and one half years; 5 Since only a handful of these
men could expect to achieve general officer rank, jealousy over promotions was severe, and so was the pressure upon those who had the authority to recommend promotions. As an exasperated Sherman noted, "unless room is made for (the promotion of] Miles, McKenzie Fsicl and some of the Colonels the boiler will burst.",5 It nearly did in the case of Miles, the one man who achieved promotion to a line brigadier-generalcy between 1876 and 1881.
Nelson A. Miles of the Fifth Infantry was another of the youthful, vigorous, ambitious Civil War volunteer generals who reverted to relatively low grade in the regular army after the Rebellion. Born in 1839, he was not a West Pointer, but he did have the confidence of Sheridan. His contemporaries assumed that he was also one of Sherman's favorites,




because he had married the general's niece. Actually, as Sherman confided to Schofield, Miles was only "construed to be my Relative because
he married my niece--whom we all love very much--she is a perfect woman but is touched with the Washington Mania and hoped in promotion she ,54
would gain Washington." Miles found another powerful friend, after
his success against the Sioux in 1876-1877, in President Hayes. Miles and his various allies vigorously pleaded his cause, and Sherman was left to balance these claims to promotion against those of Mackenzie,
Colonel George W. Getty of the Third Artillery, Gibbon, Colonel Edward Hatch of the Ninth Cavalry, and Merritt, all of whom were "expectant" of receiving their stars. 55 Since McDowell and Ord turned sixty-two in 1880, a vacancy loomed in the line generalcies. The death of Brigadier General Albert J. Meyer of the Signal Service, who had just received general officer rank, assured that one man would be promoted. Sherman even considered giving the Signal Service post to Miles to placate him. However, Hayes promoted Colonel William B. Hazen, loyal to Sherman but a foe of Sheridan. 56Miles received a greater reward.
Hayes and Sheridan determined to create an opening for Miles by retiring a line general. Since Sherman favored compulsory retirement at age sixty-two and was even then planning his own retirement at that age,
the retirement move could not evoke his opposition on philosophical grounds. 57 The choice of whom to retire, however, irked Sherman.
Amid Sherman's protests, Hayes arranged the retirement of one of the army's least political generals, Edward 0. C. Ord, rather than McDowell,
who was wealthy and had influential friends. Ord, furthermore,, did not want to retire; he was forced to leave the army. The incident infuriated Sherman, who felt that the army had lost a fine soldier of the old




school who relished frontier duty, and the affair drove the wedge between Sherman and Hayes still further.58 Miles got his stars, McDowell remained on duty for two more years, and Ord got only a pension
and the satisfaction of being retired as a major general by act of Congress. 59 Lurking in the background throughout this incident, in Sherman's conspiratorial view, was a plot to bring back Grant on active army rolls as "captain general," to rank above Sherman and to control the army in consonance with Hayes' political designs. 60 Nothing came of the scheme, for Sherinan's friend and ally James A. Garfield succeeded
Hayes soon afterward.
Obviously, the quarreling and jealousy which so often consumed the time and energy of Sherman and his ranking officers set a poor example for their subordinates. As long as special interests came above the good of the service as a whole, the officer corps could not become truly professional. Even so, some first steps toward professionalism occurred between 1876 and 1881. The arTny planned and began to implement a system of postgraduate military education. Military periodicals came into their own, and officers founded a professional association. The process of thought and action had begun, even if the fullest fruits of
military science and professionalism could be harvested only in the future.
Sherman expressed a view of armies which virtually all of his officers could accept when he noted, "an army is not a popular organization,
but an animated machine, an instrument in the hands of the Executive for enforcing the law, and maintaining the honor and dignity of the nation." 61
Contrary notions had only prolonged the Civil War and proven the need for well-trained officers and men. Sherman praised the Prussian system




of regimental depots and a national reserve commuanded by trained officers. 62He deplored Congressional plans to reduce the army and hoped that any reorganization would bring greater efficiency and compactness, not a lower ceiling on enlisted strength. Sherman, like Sheridan, felt strongly about the safety of settlers in the West and the army's role in its maintenance. He agreed wholeheartedly with his chief subordinate when that officer stated: "I could not face the people of the frontier whose wants I know so well if I was f sic__ to consent to any reduction of the Army.",63 On this point, at least, the officer corps was united.
Most officers agreed, too, that the Armny Regulations of 1861, last revised in 1863, were outmoded and needed to be rewritten completely. Many of the regulations' provisions, especially those relating to military justice, were virtually unchanged since 1806. 64When Sherman
brought Schofield to West Point in 1876, he also assigned him to the task of revising the regulations. Schofield's reputation as a scholar gave his work considerable authority. However, any unanimity on the revisions was lost when Schofield, at Sherman's urging, brought up the issue of the subordination of staff departments to the commanding general.
Sherman had long believed that the virtual independence of the staff departments hamstrung the army. In his view, this created grave obstacles to the performance of necessary duties by units in the field. 65 Without a doubt, it made Sheman's own job more difficult, especially since he had no tact and little patience in dealing with bureaucracies. As he observed to members of the House Military Affairs Committee, "if
you still wish me to answer anew those questions Lon army reorganization I will undertake the labor, but am met . .by a difficulty




almost insurmountable, in the fact that all the chiefs of bureaus wfio alone make the estimates . are construed to be parts of the War Department not subject to my orders. ,66 Schofield's new regulations remedied this situation by requiring the staff chiefs to report to the commanding general rather than directly to the Secretary of War.
The proposal upset staff officers, who took Schofield's suggested changes as a direct insult. They believed that their positions and power were threatened by the line officers, and they saw the Schofield proposals as playing into the hands of their rivals. The staff had long relied on its ability to influence politicians in the War Department and in Congress as the surest way to secure the funds it needed. The new regulations would severely restrict the staff's ability to do this, and it is hardly surprising that staff officers bombarded Sherman with objections to the change. Judge Advocate General William M. Dunn even questioned the constitutionality of Schofield's proposed changes. 67
In the end, Sherman and Schofield backed down and left the issue of ultimate authority to the House Military Affairs Committee, then writing one of its periodic reports on army reorganization. 68 During 18781879, the Burnside Committee on army reorganization, composed of members of both houses of Congress, recommended army regulations very similar to Schofield's, but Congress rejected the committee's work. 69 Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend, who opposed the proposed changes, then attempted to revise the Army Regulations of 1861. After he retired in 1880, a board of officers finished the work, issuing it at last as Requlations of the Army of the United States and General Orders in Force on the 17th of February 1881. Unfortunately, the new regulations pleased no one, and the problem of staff independence and the commanding general's




authority remained unsolved until the general staff concept finally won acceptance in 1903. 70
Sherman had more success and created far less animosity in his handling of military education. Nevertheless, the commanding general was a rather reluctant reformer, and the very subject of West Point was something of a sore spot with him. He refused to authorize higher standards of admission in 1878, defending both the rights of poor boys of limited education to compete for appointments and the ideal of "natural genius" in the making of a commander. 71 During several visits to the Military Academy while commanding general, he spoke to the corps of cadets about the importance of discipline and honor, hallmarks of West Point since his own cadet years during the "golden age" of the institution. 72
Sherman did not, however, reverse the academy's shift away from overwhelming emphasis on engineering and related coursework, which had begun in 1866. But, as part of the new stress on broader military study, he also vowed to restrain all civilian influence, somewhat counter to the policies that Schofield fostered during his years as superintendent. 73 Thus, at a time when the best American civilian colleges began to experiment with the elective system and the scholarly methods of the European universities, West Point closed its doors to civilian innovations and retained its program of rote learning and daily recitations. Due in large measure to Sherman's distrust of civilian teachers and methods, and his support of like-minded professors at the Military Academy, West Point changed little until the beginning of the twentieth century. 74
Nevertheless, Sherman was convinced of the necessity of postgraduate training and continuing study for academy graduates and all other




officers. He encouraged Schofield, Hancock, and other leading officers to found the army's first truly professional association, the Military Service Institution of the United States. This organization, which also sponsored a journal devoted to the discussion of a wide range of military questions and issues, was patterned after similar societies of the British services and the United States Navy. Schofield expressed the aim and the professional ideal of the new institute:
Every progress made in the methods of war brings them
more within the domain of science. The elements of the problems which war presents for solution are vastly more complex
and difficult of exact measurement t4n those [with] which any
other branch of science has to deal.
To advance this science still further, Sherman encouraged Hancock to print thought-provoking articles in its journal. 76 The Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, published by William C. Church, the military expert and avid supporter of the army
who edited the Army and Navy Journal, specialized in learned articles on tactics, military justice, military history, elements of strategy, and field service innovations. Its contributors included many of the army's leading officers, including Sherman himself. 77 The new publication joined the Army and Navy Journal, which, through its letters to the
editor columns, was a forum for the suggestions of junior officers and enlisted men, who addressed themselves to a wide range of problems, some of them petty and some of great importance. Nearly as lively as the
weekly Journal, and more scholarly, was the United Service, a magazine which began publication in 1879. It printed articles by officers and civilians about a wide variety of topics, but the most controversial were lineal promotion and compulsory retirement, which generated much debate among officers and interested outsiders. 78 The specialized




journals of the combat arms remained a decade or more in the future, but a vigorous, permanent military press had emerged by 1881 and functioned as a vehicle for promoting professional writing and study.
Probably the most enduring achievement of Sherman's as commanding general was the commitment of the army to a program of postgraduate officer's schools. Although Secretary of War John C. Calhoun had recognized the special educational needs of artillerists and had founded the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe in the 1820s, that institution was all but dead by the 1840s. The Infantry School, at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, and the Mounted Depot, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, established during Calhoun's era, had also vanished with few traces. 79 In 1868, however, General Grant revived the Artillery School, but it was Sherman who actually established its reputation. 80 As the Army and
Navy Journal noted in 1876, the new two-year curriculum approved by Sherman for artillery officers was "both more thorough and less laborious,"1 as befitted higher education. The paper approved the requirement that all new artillery officers attend the course, and it hoped that the revival of the Artillery School marked "a new epoch for the Army of the United States." 81
Attention now shifted to other branches of the army and their needs.
The Corps of Engineers, alarmed by their loss of control at West Point, had already established an advanced school at Willets' Point, New York.82 The Signal School trained "eight subalterns each year in that branch of knowledge" at Fort Myer, Virginia, by 1880. 83 Eventually, the school would graduate the nucleus of a Signal Corps of officers as well as enlisted men, all permanently assigned to that branch. 84Despite attempts to found schools of application for infantry and cavalry,




the army by 1880 still had no classes available for training young officers in the skills of these combat arms. Sherman called for such schools during the 1870s, but lack of money and the exigencies of Indian campaigning delayed his plans. Finally, on May 5, 1881, General Order 42 established the School of Application For Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 85
The establishment of the School of Application was an important
step, albeit faltering at first. Sherman himself considered the school to be an "experiment only," and its initial enrollment was small, being limited to thirty-five lieutenants, one per each cavalry and infantry regiment. The curriculum consisted of a two-year program of tactics, drill, organization, and practical instruction in the field. The
remedial program for first-year students deficient in basic education, which included many of the early students, consisted of work in reading, writing, arithmetic, algebra, trigonometry, geography, and history. 86 Even so, Sherman had originally wanted less classroom work and more field exercises, suggesting that academic work be confined to the winter months only. 87 The students took turns commanding units of the permanent garrison, four infantry companies, one artillery battery, and four cavalry companies. 88 The commandant of the school, Colonel
Elwell S. Otis of the Twentieth Infantry, reported directly to Sherman, a Stipulation upon which the commanding general insisted. 89 The first years of the school were undistinguished, but by the late 1880s, it graduated thirty officers a year from its program and had raised admission standards sufficiently to abolish the remedial courses. 90 Even so, its great days were to come during the twentieth century, when army
officers no longer viewed it as Sherman had characterized it in a candid letter to Sheridan in 1881:




I confess I made the order [General order 421 as a concession to the everlasting demands of friends and families to
have their boys detailed to Signal duty, or to the School at
Fort Monroe to escape company duty in the Indian country. The
School at Leavenworth may do some good, and be a safety valve
for those who are resolved to escape from the drudgery of
garrison life at small posts . . 91
The various postgraduate schools of the late nineteenth century may have been much too small and too cursory to meet all of the army's educational needs. However, they did survive, and their growing network of graduates eventually built army education for commissioned officers into the extensive and comprehensive system which it is today.
Sherman and his generals, then, were a diverse lot, a group of men
who often looked backward to the army's past even as they tried to discern the future of their service. Their ambiguous approach to changing times lay rooted deeply in their years as Indian fighters on the frontier and as conquerors of the rebellious South in a war marked both by set-piece battles and portents of the grim warfare of the future. If few of them could clearly see in which direction they, the army, and the nation traveled, few persons at any time or in any place can predict what will come. At their best, they encouraged study and discussion and contributed to them as well. And, despite the atmosphere of bickering and jealousy which all too often hamstrung the leadership of the "old army," they did produce one genuine visionary. Sherman himself, who was so inclined to draw from the past and uphold tradition in other matters, sponsored this officer and recommended his work to influential civilians and his own officer corps. From this man, Colonel Emory Upton, the army received a well-developed theory of professionalism, at the very time when its officers, disorganized and uncertain still, struggled to find a sense of direction.




Notes to Chapter II
1For a provocative discussion of this transformation and the war's role in it, see George M. Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union --(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 183-216.
2Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order, 1877-1920 (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1967), 111-132; Jerry Israel, ed., Building the Organizational Society: Essays in Associational Activities in Modern America (New York: Free Press, T972), contains essays on the process of professionalization among several occupations.
3For a case of an occupation which has yet to achieve real intragroup unity, engineering, see Monte A. Calvert, "The Search For Engineering Unity: The Professionalization of Special Interest," in Israel, Building the Organizational Society, 42-54.
4Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957T, 7-18. This is still the standard work in the field, despite its age and conservative bias.
51bid., 19-58; H. C. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History
and Development (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1952). The process of military reform in Britain is discussed in Gwynn Harries-Jenkins, The Arm in Victorian Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) and Brian Bond, The Victorian Arm and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972). The changes in French military thought are treated in Raoul Girardet, La societe militaire dans la France contemporaine (1815-1939) (Paris: Librairie Plon, 19537,an-Paul Marie la Gorce, The French Army: A MilitaryPolitical History (New York: George Braziller, 1963). The best work on the war that established Prussian dominance of military affairs is
Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (New York: Collier Books, 1969).
6Huntington, Soldier and the State, 30-54.
7A fine discussion of this military tradition is Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 17751865 (New York: Free Press, 1973). See also Lawrence D. Cress, "The Standing Army, the Militia, and the New Republic: Changing Attitudes Toward the Military in American Society, 1768 to 1820" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976). Divergent views of the impact of




the standing army of the Federalists are Richard H. Fraser, "Foundations of American Military Policy, 1783-1800" (Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Oklahoma, 1959) and Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783T TNew rk: FTree Press, 1975).
8Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, 101-144, 179-212. See also
David T. Childress, "The Army in Transition: The United States Army, 1815-1846" (Ph.D. dissertation, Mississippi State University, 1974), 84132; William B. Skelton, "The United States Army, 1821-1837: An Institutional History" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968).
9Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians, 147-176, 215-286.
10See John A. Logan, The Volunteer Soldier of America (Chicago:
R. S. Peale, 1887), 325-458.
11A good recent history of the Military Academy is Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore: Johns Ho pins University Press, 1966); see also 6-CunTTfTe, Soldiers and Civilians, 172-176.
12For a discussion of Logan, an influential postwar Republican
politician and Grand Army of the Republic leader, see Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Arm : Military Thought From Washington to
Marshall (New Yorl. Columbia Unlversity Press, 1962), 226-401.
13Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (New York: Greenwood Press,-1968; origlaledTtlc n, T94F, 7--T-6.
14Meigs' letter in United States Congress, Senate Report 555,
Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, Reorganization of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), 276-282; Richard Allen Andrews, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the Army, and Reform, 18691883" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968), 162-163.
15For a discussion of the years to follow and the consolidation
of the steps made in 1876-1881, see Peter Karsten, "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes For the American Century," in Israel, Building the Organizational Society, 216-133.
16Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), T4-15.
17The best biography of Sherman is Lloyd Lewis, Sherman, Fig hting Prophet (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958; original edition, 1932), ut for the personality of the man, see James M. Merrill, William Tecumseh Sherman (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1971).
18This phase of Sherman's career is most thoroughly studied in Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 19567.




19Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 32-45. Andrews' work is the
only detailed study of Sherman's years as commanding general.
20Ibid., 45-47.
21Ibid., 47-117.
22W. T. Sherman to John Sherman, September 21, 1865, in Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed., The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between
General and Senator Sherman, From 1837 to 1891 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 256. For Sherman's and other officers' distaste for Reconstruction duty, see James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), passim.
23Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 118-151.
24For an overview of Sherman's problems with the command
structure, see Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position: The Commanding General of the Arm of the United States, 1864-1903 (Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs Press, 1975), 52-74.
25Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), I, 881; Richard O'Connor, Sheridan the Inevitable (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1953); Philip H. Sheridian, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan (2 vols. New York: Charles Webster, 1888).
26Utley, Frontier Regulars, 34.
27Ibid.
281bid.
29Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, I, 664.
30Sherman to Major General John M. Schofield, November 11, 1880, box 50, John M. Schofield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
31Utley, Frontier Regulars, 34, 43.
32Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United
States Army, I, 496-497; Glenn Tucker, Hancock the Superb (-Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960).
33Utley, Frontier Regulars, 111-129; Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West (New York: Bantam Books, T972T, 146-154.
34United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols. Washington: Government Printing OfTTfce_,1877), -I.




35Tucker, Hancock the Superb, 273-311.
36See letters written in 1876 in Letters Received by the
Adjutant General, main series, 1800-1890, letterbook 59, record group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
37Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 260-261; Journal of the
Military Service Institution of the United States, I (January f1880).
38Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionar of the United
States Army, I, 865; John M. Schofield, Forty-Six ears in the Army (New York: Century, 1897).
39Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction, 15, 18, 113, 182, 187; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 261-262.
40Army and Navy Journal, April 15, 1876, editorial, "The Mi li i t ary- cad-ey,5 1.
41Weigley, History of the United States Army, 315, 320; Russell F. Weigley, "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," Military Affairs, XXIII (Summer 1959), 77-84.
42Weigley, "Military Thought of John M. Schofield," 77-84.
43Speech delivered on January 19, 1879, printed in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, I (January T80U, 1-19.
44Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress.
45Sherman to Schofield, December 13, 1880, December 16, 1880, ibid.
46Schofield to Sherman, May 3, 1881, ibid.
47The careers of these men are briefly sketched in Utley, Frontier Regulars, 33, 34, 220.
48Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, I, 54-60, 65-77, 81-125.
49William H. Powell, ed., List of Officers of the Army of the United States From 1789 to 1900 New York: L. R. Ha7mmersFy a-n-d Company, 190-, 27, 300, 32-43 350, 406, 414-415, 446-447, 480, 666.
For a summary of key points of comparison in the careers of line colonels, see Appendix 3.
50Utley, Frontier Regulars, 209, 400.
51Army and Navy Journal, March 26, 1881, 698.




52Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, I, 54-60, 65-77, 81-125.
53Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress.
54Sherman to Schofield, December 16, 1880, ibid.
55Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, November 11, 1880, ibid.
56Sherman to Schofield, November 11, 1880, ibid.; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 292-293.
57Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress.
58Sherman to Schofield, December 16, 1880, ibid.; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 355-356, 366-367.
59Utley, Frontier Regulars, 356.
60Sherman to Schofield, December 13, 1880, December 16, 1880,
box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress; Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 219-220.
61 William T. Sherman, The Memoirs of William T. Sherman,
Written by Himself (2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1875), II, 386.
621bid., II, 387-388, 402.
63Sheridan to Sherman, May 31, 1878, letterbook for 1876-1878, Philip H. Sheridan Papers, Library of Congress.
64See Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 1865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 5-6.
65See United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, Report of a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs Relating to the Reorganization of the Army (Washington:
Government Printing Office 1878), 4, in which Sherman rather sarcastically listed four major reports prior to 1877 in which he had given testimony.
66Sherman to Representatives Levi Maish, Edward S. Bragg, and
Harry White, January 7, 1878, box 90, William T. Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. This is a form of the letter printed in House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, 4.
67Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 156-167.

681bid., 164.




69Ibid., 282. For the text of the Burnside Bill, see Senate Report 5E, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 1-78.
70Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 282; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 5-6.
71Report of the Secretary of War, 1878, I, 9.
72Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, 198-200.
73Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 260-261; Walter S. Dillard, "The United States Military Academy 1865-1900: The Uncertain Years" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), 151-154, 266-291.
74Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, 197-218. Dillard, "United
States Military Academy," 281-282, argues that this is overstated and that the specialization of military knowledge and the demands of a fouryear academic course were incompatible, concluding that the academy's traditionalism was the only solution to the problem. That may be, but it does not explain why rote learning and recitation could not have been deemphasized. The curriculum itself is listed in Henry 0. Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point (New York: Arno Press, 1969; original edition, 1878), 25-26. Flipper was the academy's first black graduate.
75Speech printed in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, I, (an-uary 1880), 1-19.
76Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 260-261.
77See Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, I, (1880), IT-~1).
78United Service, I (1879), II (January-June 1880), III (JulyDecember 1880), IV (January-June 1881), V (July-December 1881). See especially Henry Romeyn, "Lineal vs. Regimental Promotion," ibid., II (December 1880), 719-728; "X" ("An Army Officer"), "The Queslt-ion of Lineal Promotion," ibid., III (October 1880), 484-494; Emory Upton, "Some Facts in Favor of Compulsory Retirement," ibid., II (March 1880), 269-288, III (December 1880), 649-666, IV (JanuaryT881), 19-32.
79Childress, "Army in Transition," 232-279.
80Report of the Secretary of War, 1879, I, 176-187; ibid.,
1880, I, 2-42 T1bTd., 1881, II177--178. See also Weigle-y-, History of the United States Army, 273.
81Army and Navy Journal, February 19, 1876, editorial, "Special Army Sc hools,-4582Weigley, History of the United States Army, 273.
83Report of the Secretary of War, 1881, I, 5.




84For the early Signal Service, see Joseph H. M. Hawes, "The Signal Corps and the Weather Service," Military Affairs, XXX (Summer 1966), 68-76.
85File 3184 AGO 1881, Letters Received by the Adjutant General,
main series, 1881-1889, RG 94, National Archives. The order was printed on May 7, 1881, creating some confusion over its actual date of issue.
86Timothy J. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old
Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 22-24.
87Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 265.
88Report of the Secretary of War, 1881, I, 5; Nenninger, Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 24.
89Nenninger, Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 24.
90Ibid., 25-31.
91Sherman to Sheridan, November 22, 1881, letterbook 95, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress.




CHAPTER III
THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL:
The Life and Legacy of Emory Upton
Although his name appears in no battle reports from the Plains,
Emory Upton affected the history and development of the United States Army more than any other officer of the post-Civil War period. Sherman,
his sponsor, may have shaped the army into his own creation, but his influence began to disappear as the Civil War generation retired or died. Upton, however, left a legacy, a body of professional thought and recommendations for reform which have influenced the army and set the parameters of discussion of military policy ever since. He even began the systematic, thorough study of American military history with his magnum opus, The Military Policy of the United States, which has left an indelible impact upon generations of soldiers and scholars since it first circulated in manuscript and in synopsis a century ago. I The quiet of the post-Civil War years, despite the reductions in force and the relative neglect which they brought the army, did, nevertheless, provide the time for thoughtful officers to ponder the future of their profession and to compare it with others in a changing America. Upton, because of Sherman's support and his own intense and methodical nature, explored this question more fully than his colleagues. In so doing, he left his viewpoint, if not his name, as his legacy to the twentieth-century army.
80




Emory Upton had always wanted to be a soldier. Born in upstate New York in 1839, he entered West Point in 1856, after a year of preparatory work at Oberlin College in Ohio. Oberlin reinforced his intense nature, religiosity, and abolitionist sentiments; West Point instilled a deep love for the army and strong discipline in him. Upton attended the Military Academy at a time when the institution was experimenting with a five-year curriculum. Upton's class graduated just in time to join the regulars and three-month volunteers preparing to march on Richmond. 2
Upton made a splendid war record for himself. He was a soldier's soldier who demonstrated the ability to command artillery, infantry, and cavalry. Beginning his career as a second lieutenant of artillery with a regular battery, he wrangled the colonelcy of a New York volunteer regiment in 1862. Within a year, Upton had received command of a brigade, but the promotion to brigadier general, which he wanted more than anything else, still eluded him. 3 He finally won his stars at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia, in 1864, after he planned and his troops made an impressive demonstration of an attack in column. Although his soldiers could not hold the ground they had gained within the Confederate breastworks, the assault prophesied the future of warfare in an age that was just coming to understand the meaning of rifles and trenches. 4
In the fall of 1864, Upton and his brigade served under Philip H. Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. There Upton received a promotion to major general and a severe wound. When he returned to active duty early the following spring, he commanded a division of cavalry under Major
General James Harrison Wilson, who became one of his closest friends. Wilson and Upton destroyed remaining Confederate resistance in northern Alabama. At the age of twenty-five, Upton's combat experience ended forever. 5




After the war, he reverted in rank to lieutenant colonel and served briefly with an infantry regiment, first in Colorado and then in Georgia. In 1868, he married Emily Martin, a deeply-religious New York lady of good family whom he had first met while home on furlough during the war. A soldier first and a husband second, Upton seemed ill-suited for marriage until, after a year and several separations caused by his military duties, he fell violently in love with his wife. But his happiness was short-lived. Within a year, in 1870, Emily Upton became seriously ill and died while seeking the curative benefits of a tropical climate. The news of her death hit him like a thunderclap. 6 With her passing, the army became once more the center of Upton's life.
In 1870, the young widower received an important assignment which helped put his grief in perspective and set the course of his postwar career. Upton returned to West Point as commandant of cadets, which gave him the time and opportunity to perfect a new system of infantry tactics on which he had been at work since the war years. His assignment to the Military Academy lasted five years, during which time he had his first real taste of postwar success. His Infantry Tactics, Double and Single Rank, completed in 1873, was very well received and adopted by the army under the guidance of Sherman, who respected Upton's combination of intellect and soldierly skill. Since every infantry officer in the regular army and many militia officers had to purchase the official tactical manual, Upton's book earned him steady royalties to supplement his army pay. 7 During this period, he also became the tactical editor of the Army and Navy Journal, gaining an influential civilian friend in its general editor, William C. Church. 8 Upton also supervised the writing of new artillery and cavalry tactical manuals to




complement his infantry tactics, and these, in turn, became the army's standard system. 9 Yet he was not content.
Sherman, taking a paternal interest in the younger officer's career, suggested that Upton undertake a world tour to inspect the major armies. Sherman especially wanted to see Upton's evaluations of Asian armies, for the commanding general believed that Asian conditions, especially those faced by the British in India, were most comparable to the American regulars' problems on the Plains. 10 It took time to get the tour funded properly, but finally, in June 1875, Upton received his travel orders. With him he took two other promising officers, Captain J. P. Sanger of his own First Artillery and Major George A. Forsyth of the Ninth Cavalry, a hero of both the Civil War and the campaigns of the West. 11
Upton and his party visited the Far East first. There, the colonel
approved the rapidly-westernizing army of Japan, although he expressed considerable disdain for the "pagan" religion of the Japanese. 12 He found virtually nothing to commend in either China or Persia, citing both states as examples of decadence and the effects of poor military planning. 13 In India, though, Upton found great promise in the work which the British had done with native troops in the Indian Army. He saw in the "nucleus" of British regulars in India a good model for America's army, stating: "The military institutions of India present more features for our imitation than those of any army or country of Europe. ,14 He, like Sherman, noted the parallels between the Indian frontier and the frontier West of the 1870s. But in Europe Upton found
his inspiration for the future.




The new professional armies of Europe, with their well-trained and subordinate reserves, enchanted the visiting colonel. In Britain, in
Austria, in Italy, even in France, he found much to commend in military policy and organization. The French staff system, just being reorganized in the mid-1870s, suggested to him why France had lost the FrancoPrussian War. 15 Saint-Cyr he believed to be much inferior to West Point, but, he noted to Henry A. Du Pont, his friend and classmate at
"the Point," no other military academy or cadet program could compare to their alma mater. 16 What intrigued Upton most in Europe was the intense interest in military affairs demonstrated by educated civilians and officers alike. He believed that, as a result, the European armies were far superior to his own. Of all the nations he visited, Germany presented the army closest to the model which he had been seeking.
The German military system fascinated Upton. He eagerly sought an
opportunity to view the Imperial Army in formal maneuvers, but his official credentials did not include the names of Sanger and Forsyth, so his request was denied. J. C. Bancroft Davis, the charge daffaires in Berlin, tried to explain to Upton that the Imperial Government was one of the strictest in Europe regarding the credentials of official visitors from other nations. 17 Upton, however, refused to understand, and he blamed Davis for his inability to see the maneuvers. The petty dispute turned bitter as Upton assailed the State Department officials as
incompetent and ineffective; they criticized Upton's stubbornness and self-righteous attitude. Upton lost this battle, which eventually embroiled the highest officials in the State Department and the War Department, Sherman, and Grant. 18 Grant telegraphed Sherman his final words on the matter: "No legation has been requested to intercede for




invitation to Gen. Upton to witness army manuevers [;J the Sec. of State agreed with me that it was best not to make such request."1 Even if he was not able to "occupy a coveted position in a grand military display," Upton did see the German troops in less staged situations. He
felt somewhat uncomfortable with the martial atmosphere of German primary schools, and he deplored the red tape in which the Imperial Government delighted. 20The soldiers, however, enchanted him, and he wrote home enthusi astical ly:
The soldiers are handsome, cleanly young fellows, from
twenty to twenty-three years of age. Their bearing denotes a
good discipline, while the cheerful face denotes an absence of
oppression. The officers, who are well dressed, have no
swagger, but they walk with the self-consciousness thaht in
the social scale, they stand next to the Kaiser. ...
This was the image that Upton hoped would someday apply to his own country's officers and enlisted men.
When Upton returned to America in 1877, Sherman had him assigned to the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia. There, as the newlytransferred lieutenant colonel of the Fourth Artillery, Upton taught infantry tactics and strategy as he wrote the official report of his travels. 22Originally, he had wanted to include sections on American military history to reinforce the recommendations which formed the conclusion of his report, but Sherman convinced him to leave that subject until later, when it could be presented in a book-length argument. 23 Upton's assignment at the school was a happy one, for he devoted himself
to making that institution comparable to the postgraduate military schools which he had seen in Europe. All the while, he worked on his manuscripts, first the official report, then a publishable version of it, and, finally, the military history which began to obsess him. He hoped,




he wrote to Du Pont, to "expose the errors of America's military policy" and "apply the principles of common sense" in proposing a plan for an expansible army in time of peace, so that a quick influx of volunteer privates could fit easily into a well-trained nucleus of officers and non-commissioned officers. Thus could "the blood and treasure" of the
nation be husbanded, not wasted as it had been in all past American wars. 24 Sherman, of course, approved the report of the tour and recommended its findings to the army's friends in Congress. 25 In 1878, Upton's report appeared in print as The Armies of Asia and Europe. Although it sold only 600 copies, the book was very influential in military circles, for William C. Church had already published excerpts of it
and praised its major recommendations in the editorial pages of the Army and Navy Journal. 26 The colonel's ideas, if not his book itself, reached a substantial audience of soldiers and interested civilians.
Although most of The Armies of Asia and Europe described the military systems of the lands Upton visited, the heart of the book is the fifty-four pages of conclusions in which Upton recommended reforms for his own army, based upon what he had seen abroad. Not all were controversial. Upton had generous praise for West Point and said little about change in that institution. 27 He also matched the public mood in his emphasis on economy in military matters; in all of his plans he noted how little additional money needed to be spent to reform military education and training for staff and line officers. He suggested the elimination of recruiting bounties in wartime, which had created considerable debts for states and localities during the final years of the Civil War. 28 Few soldiers could object to his advocacy of the three-battalion




infantry regiment, common in Europe but not often employed in the American army since the War of 1812. Although his own tactics treated the infantry battalion and regiment as interchangeable units, Upton's emphasis on mobility and flexibility on the battlefield made his recommendation of this reform quite logical. 29 Doubtless, his adaptation
of the Prussian depot system, also favored by Sherman, in which each regular army regiment would recruit primarily from its own geographical territory in which it would keep a permanent depot party, antagonized few. 30 However, the major features of Upton's reforms threatened the vested interests of staff officers and militia officers of the states.
Upton envisaged a small professional army in peacetime which could expand five- or six-fold in time of war. This army would not have to rely on militia units or hastily-organized volunteer regiments to bring it up to wartime strength. Rather, volunteers would fill its expansible ranks as privates; extra lieutenants would be men already trained and certified as officer candidates, not political appointees unfamiliar with their duties. Captains, field officers, and generals would all be regular army officers, and sergeants would be long-service regular enlisted men. 31
The basis of his military system, Upton wrote, was the "declaration, that every able-bodied male citizen, between certain ages, owes his country military service--a principle thoroughly republican in its nature." He took this a step further and insisted that the federal government had the "right to draft men into the service whenever a district fails to furnish its quota." 32 Here Upton and most nineteenthcentury Americans parted company, but Upton drew the logical conclusion,
calling for the "inauguration of all the machinery for enrolling and




drafting, the moment war is declared."13 Having stated this point early in his argument, he left it quickly. Perhaps it was his own sense of realism, or perhaps Sherman urged him to tone it down. As the commanding general told him:
No matter how economical and fair may be the "draft," we
can never succeed in making it popular or customary in America.
We must base all our calculations for the near future on "volunteers," which I construe our Regular Army to be in fact, and
I advise you gradually to direct your argument to the great
proposition that war is a science needing military education,
training, and practice. ..4
In any event, Upton's expansible army did rely on volunteers, albeit not state troops. He called his volunteers "National Volunteers," and he envisaged this force as providing officers as well as enlisted men. The officers would be commissioned by the President and be placed on the annual army register below the regular second lieutenants. They would all have to pass examinations in basic military knowledge and
would be drawn from graduates of military programs at colleges, state military school graduates, state militia officers, and former regular army sergeants and corporals. Not a peacetime reserve in a real sense,
these men would not train formally and would automatically leave the register in peacetime upon reaching the age of thirty-five.35 Upton did suggest federal pay for drills of the units which were just beginning to form a National Guard in the mid-1870s, but in general he distrusted state troops. Militia officers and state politicians could not be happy with such a plan. Indeed, Upton's recommendations and his subsequent writings sparked yet another round in the long struggle between advocates of the regular army and the would-be citizen-soldiers. 36
The expansible regular army, to which Upton devoted most of his attention, would consist of the twenty-five infantry regiments, of twelve




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PAGE 1

ARMY REFORM IN AMERICA: THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1876-1881 BY DONNA MARIE ELEANOR THOMAS A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1980

PAGE 2

Copyright 1980 by Donna Marie Eleanor Thomas

PAGE 3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Given the futility of most searches for employment in the field of history, it has become necessary to justify the existence of yet another doctoral dissertation. Ideally, a dissertation ought to add something substantial to the knowledge of the human past, not simply present its author with the credentials to obtain professional employment; if any dissertation of the 1970s and 1980s is to be worth anything, it must be as a solid piece of research done for an intelligent and discernible reason. I can only hope that this dissertation will meet this criterion. With this study, I have attempted to write military history outside the conventional mold. Although this study treats the crucial years of the Indian Wars, the reader will find no battles chronicled here. Rather, it synthesizes and expands elements of the work of several outstanding military historians, chief among them Robert M. Utley, Russell F. Weigley, Don Rickey, Jr., and Jack D. Foner. The focus here is upon army administration and the attempts of army officers and some civilians to modernize the process. I am greatly indebted to those who have gone before me, and I owe to them the central premise of this study: that the army is a microcosm of the society which it represents. The forces of modernization and prof essionalization affected the army as much as they did the other aspects of American life in the Gilded Age. m

PAGE 4

To understand fully the "old army," one must know as much about the administrative changes as the picturesque and dangerous campaigns against the Sioux and the Apache. Indeed, the reformers laid the philosophical groundwork for the modern United States Army of vast powsr and influence. Their story, I hope, will not only inform readers about the army in the Gilded Age but provoke thought about the development of military institutions in industrializing societies. A study of this kind is not possible without the help of kind and dedicated people. This dissertation began as a master's thesis at the University of Rhode Island, and it is to several people there that I owe many debts. First, I must say a special word of thanks to Vicki Burnett and Roberta E. Doran of the Inter-Library Loan Department of that university. Had it not been for their thoroughness and efficiency in searching for the books and periodicals I needed, it would have taken many more months to complete the research. Dr. Sharon Hartman Strom helped me to focus my thoughts, and Dr. Maury N. Klein taught me to express them clearly and concisely. They, the other faculty members of the History Department, and my fellow graduate students of 1976 and 1977 took a kind interest in my work and discussed related topics with me. My special friend, Betty Hanke, read and commented on the first chapter and shared with me her vast knowledge of Custer and his era. As this study expanded to a doctoral dissertation, I encountered the helpful and dedicated staffs of the Navy and Old Army Branch of the National Archives. Like all researchers in the field, I owe to them more than I can say. The people at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress also provided needed assistance, and the staff of the TV

PAGE 5

Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Delaware, saved me much time by kindly providing me with Xeroxed copies of the crucial Emory Upton-Henry A. Du Pont correspondence. Dr. John K. Mahon of the University of Florida treated me with kindness and respect throughout the years I worked with him, and his criticisms of my work improved it greatly and repeatedly demonstrated to me that he is one of the outstanding military historians working today. Without the help of Dr. William Kline, also of the University of Florida, I could never have made it through a hellish year and a half as a full-time doctoral student. As this study assumed its final written form, I spent many afterwork hours writing and typing at the headquarters building of Southern Bell Telephone Company in Miami. Many people there gave me moral support. Outstanding among them are mis ami gas cubanas Ines Gasson, a kind and wise supervisor, and Dory Banga, who encouraged me to finish quickly. Karen Goble, also of Southern Bell, typed the final draft rapidly and exactingly. My parents gave me years of encouragement and a place to live as I wrote this study, and I am very grateful to them, now and always. Finally, I lovingly thank the Sergeant Major, who always tried to be there. I dedicate this study of the army, which he loved so much throughout thirty-one years, to him.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i 11 LIST OF TABLES viii ABSTRACT x INTRODUCTION AN ERA OF TRANSITION: The Gilded Age in America 1 Notes to the Introduction 8 CHAPTER I A THIN BLUE LINE: The United States Army in 1876 10 Notes to Chapter I 38 CHAPTER II SHERMAN AND HIS GENERALS: Army Leadership and the Beginning of Professionalism 43 Notes to Chapter II 73 CHAPTER III THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL: The Life and Legacy of Emory Upton 80 Notes to Chapter III 107 VI

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page CHAPTER IV THE SOLDIER'S FRIENDS: Reformers and the Improvement of Enlisted Life, 1876-1881 114 Notes to Chapter IV 150 CHAPTER V UNCLE SAM'S ORPHANS: Black Soldiers and the Modernizing Army 159 Notes to Chapter V 188 CHAPTER VI CHEVALIERS OR STRIKEBREAKERS? The Army in Public Opinion, 1876-1881 195 Notes to Chapter VI 221 CHAPTER VII FRIENDS AND FOES OF THE ARMY: Congressional Plans For Army Reform 228 Notes to Chapter VII 256 CHAPTER VIII A COMPANY OF GENTLEMEN: The Military Ideal of Professionalism and the Civil Service Reformers 263 Notes to Chapter VIII 285 APPENDIX 1 ENLISTED STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, OCTOBER 15, 1881 291

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page APPENDIX 2 ORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1876 292 APPENDIX 3 COLONELS IN COMMAND OF REGIMENTS, UNITED STATES ARMY, 1876-1881 293 BIBLIOGRAPHY 299 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 316 vm

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LIST OF TABLES page 1. Officers' Annual Salaries, 1876 20 2. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men of the Combat Branches, 1876 27 3. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men Attached as Specialists to the Staff Departments, 1876 28 4. Yearly Earnings and Average Length of the Work Year For Selected Occupations, Massachusetts, 1871 29 5. Brigadier Generals of the Line, 1876-1881 60 6. Brigadier Generals of the Staff Departments, 1876-1881 61 7. Strength of Expansible Infantry Companies, As Proposed by Emory Upton 90 8. Desertions From the United States Army, 1876-1881 115 9. Desertion By Regiment or Branch, Selected One-Year Periods 116 10. Comparison of Numbers of Black Deserters With Numbers of White Deserters, Fiscal 1877 and Fiscal 1879 165 11. Occupations of Recruits By Race, July 1, 1880 -June 30, 1881 167 12. Mortality and Morbidity Among Enlisted Men, By Race, Fiscal Years 1876-1881 177 IX

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ARMY REFORM IN AMERICA: THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1876-1881 By Donna Marie Eleanor Thomas December, 1980 Chairman: John K. Mahon Major Department: History By 1876, America was growing and industrializing rapidly, but its army remained a relic of the past. Totalling 25,000 soldiers, the army's scattered units fought Indians and guarded the coasts. Living conditions were primitive, pay was low, and promotions came slowly. Retirement was voluntary only for officers, and there was no retirement system for enlisted men. Half of the enlisted force was foreign-born. Another ten per cent was black and was segregated into separate units, officered by whites. Enlisted men, especially blacks, suffered snubs by civilians. Officers had privileges of rank but led isolated lives; line officers resented staff officers, who were virtually independent of the rest of the army.

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Between 1876 and 1881, changes began in the army. Officers started to see themselves as professionals, forming the first professional association for the army. General William T. Sherman revitalized and expanded postgraduate officer education. Often ambivalent toward reform, Sherman did strongly support Lieutenant Colonel Emory Upton, who wrote authoritatively on foreign armies and presented broad reform proposals for his own. Upton considered officership a true profession, and he called for the creation of a general staff and for staffline rotation among officers. His work influenced generations of soldiers, but his ideas became reality only many years after his death. The army also began to reform aspects of enlisted life, spurred on by an unacceptably-high desertion rate. Officers such as Adjutant General Richard C. Drum and Colonel Samuel B. Holabird ordered improvements in food, barracks, clothing, educational facilities, and recreational opportunities. Some changes, especially prohibition of strong drink and abolition of company laundresses, disheartened the men, but others, such as emphasis upon marksmanship, were popular. The guiding principle of reform was the attainment of greater efficiency in the army; to this end, many officers and politicians proposed abolishing the black regiments. The black regiments, however, endured, to face official discrimination while maintaining fine records in field and garrison. During the late 1870s, the army faced severe challenges in Congress, as angry Democrats tried to punish the service for its role in Reconstruction by reducing its numbers. The army's friends, especially Representative James A. Garfield and Senator Ambrose E. Burnside, prevented this. Public opinion, divided on the army's role in Indian XI

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affairs and in suppressing strikes, was apathetic to the Democrats' scheme. Middle-class people tended to support the troops as public defenders. In 1878, Garfield persuaded Congress to support a new committee to study army reorganization, and the result was the Burnside bill of 1878-1879, a thorough plan to reorganize the army along Uptonian lines. The staff, angered that the bill reduced its independence and numbers, lobbied against it, and Congress defeated it. However, the bill inspired later reforms, and marked an improvement in militaryCongressional relations. The first phase of army reform ended in 1881, with the deaths of Upton, Burnside, and Garfield. The emphasis of army reform shifted inward until the reorganizations of 1903. However, some younger officers still wrote and spoke of reform, and Congress enacted compulsory officers retirement in 1882. In their emphases on merit, education, and professional standards, army reformers resembled civil service reformers; there are links between the movements. The army, though, looked toward the future, not to a past golden age, for its justification. The United States Army of the twentieth century would vindicate the reformers and fulfill their hopes. xn

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INTRODUCTION AN ERA OF TRANSITION: The Gilded Age in America Post-Civil War America was a society in the midst of great and sudden change. Population grew rapidly, swelled both by births and by an increasingly large stream of immigrants. Cities and towns expanded at an even more astonishing rate, threatening the rural and small-town traditions which many Americans still cherished. Industry, too, became more central and crucial to the entire national economy. In fact, a truly national economy first began to develop in the Gilded Age. These changes, beneath the surface before the war but most noticeable in the years after 1865, troubled many people. The postwar years are known in history as the Gilded Age, Mark Twain's apt catchphrase to describe the era's juxtaposition of material excesses, sentimentality, limitless official optimism, and deep corruption masked by stifling respectability. But, unlike the tranquility which Twain's phrase suggests, these years were also a time of turmoil, stress and self-doubt. The Civil War itself marked a dramatic turning point in American life, for those who lived through it as well as for later historians. The war cleared away the troubling dilenma of dual state-and-nation loyalties and ultimately reinforced American nationalism by producing 1

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stirring images of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and valor. But the Union's triumph created new problems as well. The questions raised by the mere presence of millions of freed slaves and conquered rebels troubled northerners even before the glow of victory dimmed. Practicality demanded that the rebels be assimilated somehow into the national polity, but fears of new southern dominance and the forfeiture of the hard-won aims of the war continued to haunt northerners of all political persuasions during the late 1860's and throughout the 1870 's. The black's role in the postwar order was an even more difficult issue. In an era committed to the philosophy of laissez faire in government, the sweeping economic changes necessary to establish full citizenship for the freedmen were virtually unthinkable. Most whites, in both North and South, believed in the inferiority of blacks, especially former slaves. Ultimately, the federal government refused to restructure the southern state governments, and Reconstruction politics focused on partisan questions. By the end of Ulysses S. Grant's second term as President, "bloody shirt" oratory had largely replaced the original Radical Republican concern for the future of southern blacks, as a new generation of 2 Republican politicians rose to prominence. For this second generation of Republican leadership, the outcome of the disputed Presidential election of 1876 underscored the chief weakness of the Grand Old Party: its sectional, not national, appeal in spite of fifteen years' control of the Executive Mansion. Now the Republicans, led by President Rutherford B. Hayes, turned to a policy designed to seek the support of white southerners in an effort to broaden 3 the party's base. This strategy lasted nearly twenty years. Thus, while actual Reconstruction had ended long before 1877 in most of the

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ex-Confederate states, Hayes' withdrawal of the last occupation troops was truly a potent symbol of home rule. After 1877, southern politicians had a free hand. The road to segregation and systematic discrimination lay open, and federal authorities showed little inclination to block it. 4 If the war changed the issues and tone of American politics, it transformed the economy even more in the eyes of its generation. Modern historians might dispute the role of the Civil War upon American industrialization, but to northerners and southerners alike the conflict first spotlighted the rise of the millionaire-businessman. Indeed, a few great fortunes antedated the Rebellion. But John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould, and Jay Cooke, among others, used the wartime North's demands for goods and credit to construct financial empires. While these entrepreneurs and their rivals did not dominate all aspects of business in the Gilded Age, they did control those which proved to be crucial to the 5 expanding, industrializing nation. Whatever the positive achievements of the millionaire-businessmen in consolidating business and restructuring it for greater efficiency, their very success made them and the large corporations they founded fearinspiring forces to many Americans. The "trusts" were shadowy but awesome enemies to people who still envisaged economic life in terms of local markets, small businesses, and face-to-face transactions. With industrialization, the rapid growth of the cities, and increasing immigration, a large factory working-class developed and became plainly visible. There had always been poverty in America, both in the towns and on the farms. But never before had the poor, both "deserving" and "vicious," been so concentrated as they had become in the post-Civil

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War years, and improved communications underscored the national scope of the problem of poverty. The long depression which had begun in 1873 added to the ranks of the destitute, as workers lost their jobs or found their wages sharply reduced. Indignant and fearful middle-class observers conmented sourly on the rising tide of "tramps" and "hooligans," poor youths with nowhere to go and nothing useful to do. When a series of 1 ong-simnering grievances erupted into the bitter railroad strikes of mid-1877, fears that the poor were about to rise up in revolt seemed confirmed. As the Army and Navy Journal the semiofficial newspaper of the military services, proclaimed in the typical prose of the day: "America has thrown open her doors and offered an asylum and a home to the oppressed of all nations of the earth, and she is now reaping the o bitter fruits of her generosity." Solid citizens debated the best ways to handle mobs and demanded a strong militia composed of men of 9 "the better sort" to protect the rights of property. The Gilded Age, despite its conservative philosophical overtones, was an age of bitter labor turmoil Throughout the troubled times of the late 1860s and 1870s, the federal government remained true to the laissez faire ideal. It was no better prepared than the state governments to deal with the problems caused by rapid growth and industrialization on a national scale. To modern Americans, the Washington establishment of the 1870s seems incredibly small and powerless. At mid-decade, a weak executive and a federal bureaucracy of about 70,000 employees, the bulk of whom were local postmasters scattered throughout the nation, could do little about social problems, even if they had chosen to do so. Congress was at the height of its influence, but it, too, was hampered by two evenly

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balanced political parties struggling vainly to impose discipline upon their members. The distribution of patronage remained a key concern of nearly all federal officials, and office-seeking, not high standards of efficiency, set the tone of the civil service. Although the "spoils system" was a result of this limited concept of the role and scope of government, it was not its cause. Rather, the tradition of strong individualism and the fear of governmental tyranny, the values of rural and small-town America which were so compatible with laissez faire theory, dictated a limited government and hindered rational reorganization along more efficient lines. This tendency was all-pervasive in government, and an example of this thinking, so alien to twentieth-century Americans, will suffice. The Office of Pensions, which handled the claims of millions of American veterans, still kept its records in huge bound volumes, not in files, and it alphabetized its claims in haphazard fashion, based upon the first three letters of the applicant's surname. Such methods befit a small -town archive, not a major national agency; until this attitude changed, the national government would be hamstrung in a modernizing, complex world. However, times were beginning to change. By 1881, fully 107,000 persons worked for the federal government, double the figure of ten 12 years before. The executive branch was changing in other ways, too. Although no late nineteenth century chief executive would ever be accused of attempting an imperial Presidency, the office would never again sink to the depths it had reached under Johnson and Grant. Even the city of Washington itself began to look like the capital of a prominent nation, with its new parks, paved streets, gas-light system, and even a 13 few telephones and electric lights as the 1880' s progressed. As the

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government began to expand in response to the country's growth, a new ethic of public service emerged as well, to become the leading reform of its day. The problems of postwar growth and its excesses led to a movement to reform the civil service. Although civil service reform bills had occasionally preoccupied Congress since 1865, the celebrated scandals of the Grant years lent new urgency to the reform cause. The ideal of a civil service based on merit, education, and an ordered bureaucracy was another outgrowth of the Civil War experience, which vividly demonstrat14 ed to thoughtful Americans the power of efficient organization. Members of civil service reform clubs tended to be the self-styled "best people," middleand upper-classmen, usually Republ icans, of established family and good education. In essence, these reformers demanded a role in government for men like themselves, to protect the interests of the well-established against the threat posed by militant workers, no 15 veaux riches and resurgent Democratic politicians. These civil service reformers represented a larger trend, based in the middle class, toward the erection of standards and the creation of order in a changing world. Civil service reformers and the advocates of prof essionalization hoped both to protect their own status and keep unwelcome interlopers out. The prof essionalization of many occupations, led by medicine and the law, reflected the same emphasis on merit, education, standards, and a common world view as did the civil service re1 f\ form proposals. Thus, the process of bringing order to many occupational fields, which proved to be as essential to urban industrial society as more active government, resulted both from a real need and a deeply felt threat.

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Throughout this era of change, the United States Army remained largely a relic of the simpler, prewar past. It fought Indians, guarded seacoast forts that had been long outmoded, and dreamed fondly of its glory days during the Civil War. Yet the army, despite its small size and isolation from much of American life, began to feel the stirrings of change which swept the rest of the country. Thoughtful officers, realizing that the era of Indian warfare was ending, studied the art of war with a new purpose, to search for a professional credo of officership to correspond with that of European armies and the ideals of the emerging civilian professions. Between 1876 and 1881, the army embarked on a course of modernization designed to make it more efficient. Some members of Congress supported this effort by proposing reorganization measures and by opposing Democratic efforts to slash the army in retribution for its role in Reconstruction and its aftermath. The reforms and attempted reforms of the late 1870 's and early 1880' s were but the first steps in a long process of prof essionalization and modernization, which finally reached its conclusion a generation later. From those early reforms, though, the modern army of incredible power and influence eventually emerged. The late nineteenth century army, like the Gilded Age America which it served, was caught up in the process of replacing a traditional way of life with visions of the future.

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Notes to the Introduction ^Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 1-10; John A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth 18771890 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 1-32. 2john Hope Franklin, Reconstruction : After the Civil Mar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 194-227. ^Stanley P. Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt : Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro 1877-1893 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 27-77. For the classic account of the Compromise of 1877, see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction : The Com promise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (revised ed. New York: Doubleday, T956). A graphic and often shocking account of this process is Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro : From Rutherford B^ Hayes to Woodrow Wilson (New York: Collier Books, 1965). ^Garraty, New Commonwealth 78-127. "Wiebe, Search For Order 11-43. ^A good account of workers' conditions, as well as of the railroad strike itself, is Robert V. Bruce, 1877 Year of Violence (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970; original edition, 19597! For the world of the late nineteenth century poor in striking pictures, see Lally Weymouth and Mil ton Gl aser, America j_n 1876 : The Way We Were (New York: Random House, 1976), 144-207. 8 Army and Navy Journal August 19, 1877, editorial, "Our Army," 24-25. ^Bruce, 1877 Year of Violence 311; Will i am H. Riker, Soldiers of the States : The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy "(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 52-54. 10 Leonard H. White, The Republican Era 1869-1901 (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 1-44. For a surrmary of the politics of the era, see Garraty, New Commonwealth 220-308.

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Hwhite, Republican Era 215. 12 Ibid. 2. 13 ibid. 3. ^George M. Frederick son, The Inner Civil War : Northern Intel lectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 183-216, discusses this in depth. l^Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils : A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement 1865-1883 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), ix-x, 21-22, 190-197; John G. Sproat, "The Best Men" : Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 259-270; Wiebe, Search For Order 60-61. 16 Wiebe, Search For Order, 111-132.

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CHAPTER I A THIN BLUE LINE: The United States Army in 1876 The Centennial year marked a great milestone for Americans. It was a time for all to look backward with pride, to look forward with hope. The Philadelphia World's Exposition, the "Centennial" to its many visitors, symbolized the mood. Among the wonders of the United States Government Pavilion were the army's contributions, uniforms and relics from a colorful but checkered past and examples of the powerful new ordnance as symbols of the future. Through a grim chance, past and future converged during the ^/ery height of the festivities. Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, "the beau sabreur of our Army," and five companies of the Seventh Cavalry met death at the hands of an overwhelming force of 2 Sioux on June 25. The news finally reached the East on July 6, stun3 ning the celebrants of the first century of national progress. The Little Bighorn disaster marked the beginning of the end for the "old army" and its traditional duties of Indian fighting and border patrols. Few could have foreseen it in 1876, but the action forever known as Custer's Last Stand was actually the last stand of the Indians as well, for the resulting Sioux Wars of 1876-1877 and 1881, ruthlessly prosecuted by the army in winter campaigns against villages as well as 4 warrior bands, broke the back of tribal resistance. Even as columns 10

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11 of hard-bitten veterans and newly-recruited Custer Avengers pursued Sitting Bull, the army itself was changing. A new spirit and theory of professionalism emerged as the climax of the Plains wars hinted that a new raison d' etre must soon replace the old one of Indian control. Ironically, even as it fought its fierce campaigns against the Indians of the West, the army's highest leadership looked to Indians half a world away, the havildars and sepoys of Queen Victoria's native regiments in the Indian army, for inspiration in a changing world. In June 1876, as Custer and his column left for the fatal campaign in Montana Territory, another young lieutenant colonel, Emory Upton of the First Artillery, toured the Old World on the orders of General William T. Sherman, the army's commander. Upton's assignment was to study Asian armies, especially the British forces in India, to determine new approaches to the control of hostile natives along harsh, isolated 5 frontiers. Upton duly spent his time in Asia and warmly praised the British raj but his intellect came alive upon reaching Europe. He decided to focus his report upon the lessons to be learned from the mass armies of the Continent, developed in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Upton hoped that this would stimulate open discussion of reforms for his own army, still creaking along with an uncoordinated staff and a small, stagnating line. As Custer rode to disaster, Upton was in Geneva, comparing Uncle Sam's rather seedy regulars with the splendid Guards regiments of Europe. He wrote that "since arriving in Europe, I have discovered that our military organization is so worthless that now I feel that even a thousand pages would not suffice to show it up." The future prophet of military professionalism had found his life's

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12 work, while, half a world away, the gall ant beau sabreur of the Plains met his glorious death. The old and the new had converged in 1876, and an era was truly ending. The post-Civil War army that both Custer and Upton knew was but a shadow of the victorious Union armies, in which each had won major general's stars. In 1866, Congress reorganized the army and reduced it to 57,000. During the following eight years, that number dwindled as Congress sought economy reductions. The regular army finally stabilized at 25,000 enlisted men, paper strength. With only minor fluctuations, that limit remained until 1898, with actual strength hovering within 4,000 officers and men of that figure. In 1876, the army's combat line consisted of forty regiments: twenty-five of infantry, ten of cavalry, and five of artillery. Black soldiers, officered by whites, made up the enlisted components of the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Infantry and of the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry. All other regiments contained whites only. Whether white or black, each of the cavalry regiments contained twelve companies (the term "troop" was not yet in official usage), and each artillery regiment consisted of twelve batteries. All the infantry regiments retained the ten-company, single battalion organization that most armies had abandoned. Regiments rarely served as a unit. Rather, their companies were scattered, often in no logical pattern, to garrison the hundreds of posts and forts which stretched from New England to Florida, from California to Alaska Territory. The cavalry usually served on the frontier, and it conducted the bulk of the active campaigns against hostile Indian bands. Infantry served throughout the West and in the East as well. Artillery usually garrisoned seacoast forts, on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and, to the artillerymen's chagrin, they more

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13 often shouldered rifles than drilled with heavy ordnance. Each artillery regiment was supposed to include a pair of light batteries, which were to be armed with field cannon or mountain howitzers and transported in the field by horse-drawn caissons. These batteries, however, were rarely at full strength and often short of field cannon and caissons; sometimes, the army only authorized one light battery per regiment, despite the fine record of the light artillery units of the Civil War. In 1876, these forty regiments, the total combat force of the army, consisted of 25,331 soldiers, of whom 1,569 were commissioned officers of o either company or field grade. To assist in feeding, equipping, and administering the line units, the army had established several staff departments over the years. Not all were exclusively military in scope. The Corps of Engineers, then as now, did much of its work improving harbors and river navigation, and the Signal Service, which had pioneered battlefield communications systems during the Civil War, contained the forerunner of the Weather BUreau until 1890. The Adjutant General's Department administered the army, in close relationship with the Inspector General's Department, which inspected the units and judged the conditions of army installations. Supply matters were handled by three separate bureaus: the Ordnance Corps, which furnished and sometimes manufactured weapons and ammunition, the Subsistence Department, the source of food and forage, and the Quartermaster's Department, supplier of all other military necessities. The Medical Department sent surgeons and stewards to the line units and administered army hospitals. The Judge-Advocate General's Department, formerly called the Bureau of Military Justice, handled the thousands of court-martial actions of the army. Lastly, the Pay

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14 Department tried, not often successfully, to pay the scattered units every two months. Rather than acting as supporting units subordinate to the line, the staff bureaus ran themselves, independent of any other military authority, including the commanding general. All of the bureau chiefs were posted to Washington, where they quickly became skillful lobbyists in blue and gold braid, wheedling Congressional support for the staff's pet interests whenever army legislation came up on the calendar. Line officers, serving usually in unpleasant frontier or garrison assignments, with little hope for promotion, eyed the top-heavy ranks of the staff with envy. In 1876, the staff contained eight brigadier generals, while only six onestar generals commanded line departments. There were 257 field officers on the staff, compared to a combined total of 150 colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors in the three combat branches. Indeed, a full-time staff lieutenant was a rare creature. Of the 586 permanent staff officers serving during the year of the Custer massacre, but ninety-three were first lieutenants, and only ten unfortunates were second lieutenants. In contrast, many line officers spent the bulk of their careers in those lowly grades, and subalterns in their thirties and forties were not extraordinary in the post-Civil War infantry, cavalry, and artillery. No wonder so many line officers worked every military and political connection they possessed in their efforts to obtain detached duty with the staff. Even if promotion and a permanent staff assignment eluded them, at least they could enjoy several years of duty 10 in a pleasant environment. The ranks of the noncombatant officers also included thirty chaplains, paid as captains but without command authority, who were assigned

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15 to frontier posts and to the black regiments. Opinions of the effectiveness of these men of the cloth varied. Some, like the Reverend George Mullins, popular chaplain of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry who later laid the foundation of the army's educational programs for enlisted men, did much to fulfill the needs of their soldier-flocks. But others were truer to the stereotype presented by Captain Guy V. Henry, a disgruntled line officer who would one day become a general: "I am sorry to say that I think the chaplains are not of much account in the Army. They are generally old men who do not exert a good influence. . The men will have nothing to do with them." A common complaint throughout the period, within the ranks of the army itself, was the lack of Catholic chaplains to celebrate Mass weekly for the large numbers of Irish12 and German-Catholic enlisted men. Enlisted noncombatants, with the exception of the forty-man detachment of the Signal Service, were charged against the ceiling strength of 25,000 enlisted men, a fact which irked General Sherman. An engineer battalion, a detachment at West Point and another at the Leavenworth Military Prison, recruiting parties and their charges, the ordnance force at the federal arsenals, and detached clerks accounted for 2,266 men who were lost to the line in 1876. To provide needed noncombat services at active posts, a total of 467 enlisted men served as hospital stewards, ordnance sergeants, or commissary sergeants, trained specialists who were the highest-paid enlisted men in the army. Another kind of skilled specialist worked solely on the frontier. These were the 214 Indian scouts. While usually noncombatant guides, many did experience combat, including several who fell with the Seventh Cavalry at the 13 Little Bighorn.

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16 Thus, a very limited number of soldiers tried to patrol a frontier of thousands of miles while performing other duties as well. Even then, Congress debated ways to reduce the army still further. The House Military Affairs Committee suggested that several hundred officers could be dismissed for economy's sake and reported a bill to that effect in 1876. Congress scuttled it, however, in the wake of the Custer massacre and 14 increased the cavalry instead. Such was the tug-of-war the army faced in 1876; the army's role in Reconstruction angered southerners and Democrats, who often urged drastic reductions in the establishment, but the troops' role on the frontier pleased westerners, who pushed for augmented forces on the Plains. But the threat of severe reductions always menaced the army. As one soldier expressed its mood in dubious verse: If there was no Army, I wonder, What Congress would try to reduce; Not their own pay, I'd wager, by thunder, Would economy ever induce. If the Army of one man consisted, And but ten cents a month was his pay, To curtail the expense of "enlisted" They'd take five of his ten cents away. If a pea-nut a day was his ration, Even that they'd reluctantly give— They'd expect that this "brave" of the nation On the smell of an "oil-rag" should live. ^ With such a small, scattered army in danger of becoming even smaller, it is not surprising that the officer corps was restless and discontented. In 1876, there was still a large percentage of the army's officers who had seen better days and greater glory, not to mention higher rank, in the Civil War. Custer and Upton were only two of the many postwar officers who could be addressed as "general" by virtue of

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17 volunteer rank earned during the war. One correspondent to the Army and Navy Journal the semiofficial newspaper of the services, noted that at least one of the second lieutenants of 1876 had been a colonel of volunteers in the early 1860s. This situation, and others less extreme, resulted because many regular army officers took leaves of absence from the regulars during the war in order to take commissions, at higher grades, in the volunteer regiments. They retained their regular rank, because most Civil War promotions were within the volunteer service, not the regular army. When the volunteer units were mustered out of the army in 1865 and 1866, the regular officers were reassigned to duty with regular units, often reverting to the lowly grades they held in 1861. The tangle over rank was further complicated by the brevet system. Brevet rank was a type of reward for gallant service, bestowed in lieu of medals, which did not exist until the Medal of Honor was authorized for officers in 1863. A brevet entitled its holder to exercise command privileges of the rank only under certain circumstances and to wear the uniform of that rank on some occasions, mostly ceremonial. It could be earned by either regular or volunteer officers and was designated as such— for example, "brevet major general of volunteers" or "brevet colonel, United States Army." As early as the Mexican War, and certainly by the Rebellion, the brevet system was virtually meaningless, since nearly every competent officer had "won" at least one brevet. Indeed, the lack of a brevet marked an officer as suspect. Many officers detested the brevet system, but in lieu of anything more tangible to set them apart from their fellows, most clung jealously to their Civil War brevet rank.

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18 The sloppy rank structure created many problems. One was public confusion about the very nature of the army. As Colonel John Gibbon, himself a volunteer major general who had originally reverted to the grade of captain at the war's end, noted, most Americans seemed to believe that the army contained only generals and colonels, since so many 18 officers used their brevet or volunteer titles whenever possible. Military courtesy allowed them to sign official reports with these titles, and many field-grade officers corresponded regularly with eastern newspapers, affixing their highest ranks to letters and articles. A more serious problem was the question of who commanded whom whenever two or more companies took the field together; a first lieutenant with the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel often rankled under the command of a captain whose highest brevet was only major. The often-ludicrous battle over this complicated rank structure and its relationship to military courtesy raged long after 1876, even as some of the worst abuses of the 19 brevet system were curbed. However, it indicated many grave problems within the officer corps: slow promotion and little recognition, low pay, and a limited view of the military profession and of the world. In any small army, promotion opportunities are likely to be limited. In the antebellum army, even as brilliant an officer as Robert E. Lee languished in the grade of captain for seventeen years. Despite universal respect for Lee's talents, his last promotion, to colonel of the First Cavalry, in the course of a thirty-two year career came only on the very eve of the Civil War and bore President Abraham Lincoln's 20 signature. Perhaps the army was wrong to expect more rapid advancement than that after the war, but many of its officers, and even some of its enlisted men, had tasted of high rank during the 1860s, and they

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19 naturally wanted it again. But the reality of the postwar period was that of an officer corps advancing not in rank but only in age. Representative of this plight is Arthur MacArthur, who later rose to the rank of lieutenant general and command of the occupation forces during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902. A "boy colonel" of the Civil War, MacArthur commanded a volunteer regiment before he turned twenty. After a brief try at civilian life, he rejoined the army as an officer through a program designed to reward the worthiest officers of volunteer regiments with company grade in the regulars. From 1866 to 1889, he remained a captain on the frontier. Not until 1898 did he receive substantial 21 advances despite his excellent record." Hundreds of others, who lacked MacArthur 1 s luck, spent the remaining years of their careers in company grade, commanding but a handful of men at some forgotten backwater. The possibilities for meaningful command were slim. Forty line regiments required only forty line colonels, all of whom were Civil War veterans and most of whom held brevet general officer rank in 1876. The military stratosphere, to which only dreamers or social climbers could aspire, consisted of six line brigadier generals and three major generals. The major generals, Winfield Scott Hancock, Irvin McDowell, and John M. Schofield, held key commands, called divisions, and the brigadier generals controlled departments under their supervision. The two highest-ranking officers in the army were both unique, since Congress vowed on several occasions that it would abolish the grades of general, held by William T. Sherman, and lieutenant general, occupied by Philip H. Sheridan, when the two renowned war heroes retired. Another indication of their special position, held by virtue of having saved the Union, was the high pay each received. Sherman collected $13,500 in

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20 base pay with a few thousand dollars in other benefits, while Sheridan received $11,000 plus similar benefits. These were among the most generous federal salaries of 1876. The major generals and the brigadier generals of both staff and line had to be content with the still22 handsome sums of $7,500 and $5,500, respectively. Lesser officers, however, did not receive such generous treatment at the hands of Congress, as their pay scales show: Table 1. Officers' Annual Salaries, 1876 23 rank yearly base pay colonel $3,500 lieutenant colonel 3,000 major 2,500 captain, mounted 2,000 captain, dismounted 1,800 first lieutenant, mounted 1,800 first lieutenant, dismounted 1,500 second lieutenant, mounted 1,500 second lieutenant, dismounted 1,400 The discrepancies in pay in the company grades accounted for the extra expenses incurred by cavalry and light artillery lieutenants and captains, who had to maintain several horses. Even so, most married officers had very heavy expenses, for frontier posts had poor living quarters, if they had any at all, for families. Some officers' wives and children lived in the East while the soldier-husbands served on active duty on the frontier, especially if the army families had children of school age to educate. Since most officers were majors or lower, the expenses were a crushing burden. Officers' salaries may have looked princely in comparison to average annual wages of working-class civilians, but men of good education and comparable managerial experience could earn at least as much as the average army officer, without the danger and isolation of army life as part of the bargain. It was true, as members of the House

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21 Military Affairs Committee complained in 1876, that the army's general officers each earned more than a United States senator, with his stipend of $5,000, and that a Supreme Court justice only earned as much as a 24 major general. However, Congress' patronage employees, who had very little to do and who never had to face the threat of legislation to reduce their salaries, earned larger sums than many army officers who faced Indians on the Plains. As Representative James A. Garfield ironically noted, the clerk of the House, paid $4,500 per year, and the sergeant-at-arms of that body, who received $4,000, each made more money 25 than the bravest, most experienced colonel in the army. Even some tradesmen, who did not have the education or the level of responsibility of the army officer, earned average wages nearly equal to those of the infantry subalterns. In Massachusetts, the average railroad engineer or lithographer received $1,050 for his services in 1870-1871; the average engraver earned $1,200. In 1875, the Military Affairs Committee of the House planned, as another economy measure, to reduce second lieuten27 ants' salaries by $200. The second lieutenants raised a storm of protest, claiming with justification that "their pay is now too small," 28 especially in light of their bleak prospects for promotion. There were three reasons why the promotion system of the "old army" was so tangled. One was the lack of a compulsory retirement law. Although officer retirement went into effect in 1861, when the government discovered with alarm that most of its generals and colonels were too old for active service in the field, the law was strictly voluntary. The retirement lists of the 1860s and 1870s were small, since Congress had no intention of paying out large numbers of pensions to regular army

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22 officers. The famous "Benzine Boards" of the late 1860s and early 1870s weeded out many incompetent and disabled officers but placed few on retirement status, and they failed to solve to long-range problem of judging and maintaining high standards of fitness in the officer corps. As will be seen, compulsory retirement became an important issue to the army reformers of the period. In 1882, Congress finally passed a compulsory retirement bill, which helped somewhat to break the logjam in 29 promotions. Another problem, the custom of regimental promotion, remained to be solved. Under this long-established system, a new officer received his commission in his regiment, not to his branch of service. A transfer to another regiment involved much red tape and often years of waiting. Officers received promotions through the grade of captain within the regiment, within the branch from major through colonel, and by discretion of the President within the general officer grades. Thus, promotions in the company grades could be agonizingly slow. As an example of this and how the system worked, take the case of Thomas Custer, who fell with his brother in 1876. He was listed as "captain of the Seventh Cavalry," not "captain of cavalry." It took him more than nine years to attain that rank, despite an outstanding Civil War record graced by two Medals of Honor. Tom Custer had to wait his turn, regardless of how many captain's commissions fell vacant in other cavalry regiments; others waited far longer than he did. As can be imagined, the range of time in grade varied wildly in the regiments, and this fact affected the rate of promotion throughout e^jery officer's career. Some reported that their West Point classmates, who happened to be commissioned into regiments that subsequently suffered heavy officer casualties, outranked them by several

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23 years, despite the fact that they had received second lieutenants' rank 4-U J 30 on the same day. This was a fiercely debated issue in the army, since most officers worried greatly about their chances for promotion. Most of the young officers wanted lineal promotion through the grade of colonel, to be based upon seniority within each branch of the army. Under the lineal system, field-grade promotions would be as before, but vacancies in the grades of first lieutenant and captain could be filled more equitably. Thus, a first lieutenant in the Tenth Cavalry, if he had the most time in grade of all his cavalry colleagues, could be offered a captaincy in the Third Cavalry. This was only fair, wrote one officer: "The junior in rank in each arm of the Service, respectively, should, by every principle of right and justice, remain always the junior, and not be promoted over the heads of his seniors in rank, simply because they happen 31 to belong to another regiment." But the opposition, traditionalists and many older officers, appealed to justice as well, claiming that the officer vacancies suffered in a campaigning regiment were a kind of reward to the hard-fighting survivors. To bring in officers from other, less active regiments to fill the vacancies would be an affront. Tradition and esprit de corps would suffer if the old regimental system were altered: "Officers now take a pride in their regiments, which they would not if they did not expect to spend the greater part of their 32 lives in them." Controversies over the respective merits of regimental and lineal promotion systems raged long after 1876. Although both regimental promotion and voluntary retirement clogged the pathways to high rank, the third and most fundamental obstacle to reasonably regular officer promotions remained the size of the army

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24 itself. An army of 25,000 simply did not need a battalion of generals and a regiment of colonels, and Congress refused to authorize such. Only when the army expanded five-fold at the beginning of the twentieth century would large numbers of new officers' billets be opened up, and 33 the inevitable wave of promotions resulted. Limited opportunities for army officers often resulted in limited horizons as well. Major General John M. Schofield, who became the superintendent of the United States Military Academy in 1876, complained that too many younger officers considered their educations completed 34 upon graduation from West Point. Of course, not all officers let their minds waste away. The pages of the Army and Navy Journal demonstrate that some officers continued to read, write, and think, suggesting new regulations, improved weapons and equipment, and revised tactics. But all too many bounded their world by the limits of their own corrmands, running their units like miniature absolute monarchies. Others found solace in drink, neglecting much of the boring but essential work involved in managing a garrison or commanding a company. All of this was especially tragic because the military justice system gave great authority to officers, whether capricious or fair, in all of their 35 dealings with enlisted men. A caste system of officer-enlisted relations, not part of the regulations but simply a venerable custom of the service rooted deeply in English tradition, further reinforced the officers' position and authority. Since an officer could consider himself a gentleman simply by virtue of holding a commission, it was easy to leap to the conclusion that those who did not hold commissions could not be gentlemen. Countless memoirs and letters of officers and their families refer to enlisted men

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25 as a "rough sort." The usual stereotypes of enlisted men centered on three types: the old foreign solder of Irish or German birth, the uneducated young hick fresh from the farm, and the vicious "Bowery tough." Without a doubt, some examples of each type wore Uncle Sam's blue, but most soldiers, both nativeand foreign-born, were ordinary, decent men. However, even the soldiers themselves accepted their public image as lazy, slightly dishonest "government loafers," so aptly portrayed in the lyrics of a popular vaudeville song, which the regulars themselves had adopted as their own by 1876: Three years ago, this very day, We went to Governor's Isle, For to stand against the cannon, In true military style. Seventeen American dollars Every month we surely will get, For to carry the gun and the bayonet With true military step. Well, we had our choice of going To the army or to jail, For it's up the Hudson River With a copper-tailed sail. So we puckered up our courage, With bravery we did go, And we cursed the day we went away To the Regular Army, 0! There was Sergeant John McCaffery And Captain Donohue, They made us march and tow the mark In gallant "Company, Q." Oh, the drums would roll, upon my soul, And here's the way we'd go, Forty miles a day on beans and hay In the Regular Army, 0l" The song's narrator explains the reason for his decision to enlist at the recruit depot at Governor's Island, New York harbor. A judge has given him and his friends a choice between army blue and the striped

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26 suits of Sing-Sing. After being mustered in, these new soldiers, true to form, wind up in the disciplinary detachment, "Company Q" in the army's slang, where a tough Irish sergeant and captain will whip them into line, getting these rookies used to the life of "forty miles a day on beans and hay" of the cavalry on campaign. The reference to pay, as will be noted, is inaccurate, but, then as now, recruiters told exaggerated stories of army life to gullible candidates for admission. Of course, soldiers have always enjoyed a good laugh at their own expense, often out of sheer necessity, and the stereotyped rankers of "The Regular Army, 0!" made them laugh as heartily as did civilian audiences. But the question still remains: What were the rank and file of 1876 really like? Good statistics on enlisted men are not readily available before 1880, when reforms within the Adjutant General's office affected recordkeeping. However, figures exist which show the nationality of those recruits who entered the army in 1874. Most of them remained on duty, serving their first enlistment, in 1876. Of the 4,821 new soldiers of 1874, 2,345 were American-born. The remaining half came from twentyfour foreign lands, chief among which were Ireland, with 1,098, Germany, which contributed 575, and England, with 249. Slightly less than a hundred Canadians journeyed south and eventually joined the regulars during that year. Of all the recruits of foreign birth, fully 876 came from •DO non-English-speaking areas. Unfortunately, the figures for 1874 do not separate recruits by race, but probably the vast majority of the black recruits of the postwar era were born in the United States. In 1876, a total of 2,757 black soldiers served in the four segregated 39 regiments.

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27 The statistics on nationality give the impression of a melting pot, at least in the thirty-six white regiments. First-hand accounts often stress the cosmopolitan, if usually working-class, background of the 40 army's rank and file. One aspiring Kipling, looking back on his postwar army career, satirized that fact: Maginnis scowls at Johnny Bull, an' Yawcob Meyer roars, At Jean Duval; an' I have heard the comp'ny "countin 1 fours" In seven different languages, on which eventful day, The captain burst a blood vessel, an' fainted dead away. However, it was not all one big, brawling, happy family, as the high desertion figures of the postwar era show. In 1876, 1,832 soldiers, nearly one out of ewery fourteen enlisted men, ran away, part of a long42 term trend which began in 1866 and continued until 1898. The army caught and convicted only 347 deserters during the Centennial year, so 43 the odds for escape were good. There were ample reasons for soldiers to contemplate desertion: low pay, poor food, bad material conditions, and little possibility of advancement. If low pay embittered many army officers, the enlisted men had even more to complain about in the pay scale that Congress had approved for them in the early 1870s. Most enlisted men served in line regiments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery; their pay was less than generous, as the table shows: Table 2. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men of the Combat Branches, 187644 rank monthly base pay sergeant major |23 quartermaster sergeant 23 first sergeant 22 saddler sergeant 22 principal musician 20 chief trumpeter 20 sergeant 17

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28 Table 2. (continued) rank monthly base pay corporal 15 blacksmith or farrier 15 musician 13 private 13 Specialist soldiers, who served with regimental or post staffs but not as soldiers charged against the line regiments, received better pay in most cases, to the envy of other enlisted men. The following table gives their pay scales in comparison: Table 3. Monthly Pay Scales For Enlisted Men Attached as Specialists to The Staff Departments, 1876 45 rank monthly base pay ordnance sergeant 534 hospital steward, first class 30 hospital steward, second class 22 hospital steward, third class 20 private first class* 17 private second class* 13 *These ranks were used in the Ordnance Corps and Corps of Engineers only in 1876; later, the Signal Service would use them when it received a permanent enlisted complement. Few soldiers attained those grades which paid the highest salaries, however. Army pay, even if the free food, shelter, and clothing are taken into consideration, was not very competitive with most civilian occupations open to working-class American men. Only in hard times, as old recruiting officers well knew, did a truly promising crop of men join the army when the nation was at peace. Once men did join, whether knowingly or as the end result of a drunken spree, they were often tempted to desert when they saw what civilians earned. Figures from Massachusetts, published in the early 1870s, demonstrate the low standing which soldiering had among late nineteenth century occupations:

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29 Table 4. Yearly Earnings and Average Length of the Work Year For Selected Occupations, Massachusetts, 1871 46

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average 1

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31 Other rewards were few as well. Long and faithful service might win an enlisted man the chevrons of a senior sergeant, but length of service was no guarantee of advancement. There were no promotions based solely on time in grade for American soldiers of the nineteenth century, and some men remained privates through several threeor five-year enlistments. For them, the incentive pay of an extra dollar per month for each year beyond the second of an enlistment represented their only reward. Reenlistees, perhaps a quarter of enlisted strength during this 49 period, also received a small bonus. But life at an isolated post was a hard way to earn the pittance granted to experienced enlisted men. Enlisted life was especially galling to the bright and ambitious, who may have enlisted in the hopes of winning a commission. About nine per cent of army officers in 1876 had once been enlisted men, but the bulk of them had won their rank during the Civil War. Although army policy supposedly reserved twenty-five per cent of vacant second lieutenancies for the promotion of outstanding regular army enlisted men, 50 that policy was moribund by 1876. If army pay and opportunities were bad, army food was even worse. The ration in 1876 consisted of salt pork or stringy range beef, bread 51 or hardtack crackers, beans, and coffee. The government provided no other foods on a regular basis, so some units grew their own vegetables. Most companies preferred to draw the bread ration in the form of flour, converting part of it into cash, which made possible the purchase of extra foods like milk and eggs. Usually the company commander or his lieutenant handled the flour savings money as a company fund. If the officers were negligent or dishonest, the company went hungry. Both officers and men complained about the fund system and the inadequacies of

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32 52 the issue ration, but changes came slowly. The army's policy toward cooking complicated the problem of food still further. The army never specifically enlisted or trained men to be cooks until the SpanishAmerican War. Rather, policy dictated that officers delegate one or two men per unit to serve a ten-day tour of duty in the mess-hall. All too often, commanders chose their most slovenly, unsoldierly men for the task, which got them off the drill field. The results were predictable. The common army quip had it that the food killed more men than the T a53 Indians. Living conditions were not splendid either. A barrack for artillery or infantry at a seacoast fort might be in a dank, cavern-like structure of masonry built in the days of James Monroe. On the frontier, both cavalry and infantry lived in log or adobe barracks, often little more than huts, which contained sufficient cracks to let in freezing air, rain, rats, insects, and snakes. Bunks were iron bedsteads with wooden slats supporting a cloth bedsack, filled with fresh straw once a month. One blanket per soldier was the standard issue, in winter as well as summer. Privates and corporals had little privacy, for they all shared one large room. Sergeants often had a room to themselves; occasionally, each had a separate cubicle adjoining the main barrack room. The army's furniture was strictly functional: a bed and a footlocker for each man, a large gunrack, one or two small tables, and a few chairs. In 1876, candles remained the sole form of illumination in the barracks at night, thus severely limiting the range of off-duty activities for the enlisted men. Those soldiers who were fortunate enough to receive the captain's permission to marry, much less find a bride, could live with their families in separate shacks near the

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33 barracks. Neither the shacks nor the barracks had running water, and sometimes soldiers at western posts had to cart in all their water from .. 54 sources mi les away. To outfit his regulars, Uncle Sam provided a clothing issue and a limited yearly replacement allowance. In 1876, the dress uniform, which was worn for parades, inspections, and daily guard mounts at all stations, sported a blue, single-breasted coat trimmed in the branch color, light blue trousers, and black leather shoes and belts. For cavalry and artillery, the headgear with this uniform was an impressive black felt helmet with plumes and cords of the branch colors, cavalry yellow and artillery red. Foot soldiers, however, did not have such Prussianinspired finery and had to make do with a French-style blue shako with a wool pompom in light blue for infantrymen and in red for foot artillerymen. For fatigue and campaign wear, a sack coat with five buttons was in general use by 1876. Either a version of the Civil War kepi or a broadbrimmed campaign hat was worn with the sack coat. The biggest problem with this wardrobe was that it did not fit \/ery well, for standardized sizes were still in their infancy. As a result, each post had a tailor, an enlisted man who altered uniforms for a fee, which he was allowed to keep. This system, as can be imagined, was rife with abuses. Many men, in disgust, bought cloth and ordered their uniforms made from 55 scratch, often at a lower cost than the alterations. Uniform changes would soon come to the army as part of larger reforms. With the exception of infrequent campaigns against hostile Indians in the West, enlisted life was a steady routine of boredom. Infrequent paydays accentuated the low pay, especially on the frontier, so when the paymaster finally arrived, all hell broke loose. No organized system of

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34 post exchanges or recreation centers existed in 1876, and army-sponsored team sports had not yet come into their own. Consequently, sudden cash, limited recreation, and isolation led to a rash of heavy drinking, gambling, and whoring on paydays at army posts. Many Americans, both in and out of the army, were appalled by the amount of severe alcoholism in 56 the service. As the Army and Navy Journal argued: "Drunken men mean constant trouble, bad discipline, resistance to officers, tying up, buck and gag [both were illegal punishmentsj, stocks, court-martials, desertions. ... A drinking post is a troublesome post, with a full guardhouse; a temperance post is a quiet post with an empty or nearly empty guard-house," and the paper pleaded with officers to set a better exam57 pie. Less often discussed in public was the high rate of venereal disease in the army. Prostitutes, readily available around seacoast garrisons, followed the troops to the frontier as well, where they competed with local women of "loose virtue," whether Indian, half-breed, or Mexican. Only the soldiers' chronic lack of money limited their contacts with these women. Reformers knew these ugly facts, and they determined to make conditions for enlisted men better, both for the good of the soldiers and for the good of the service. Of all the enlisted men, the blacks fared the worst. Segregated to two regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, they made good soldiers and boasted both large percentages of reenlistees and low desertion rates. However, the army barred blacks from the artillery and from the specialists' positions in the staff departments, since Sherman and many other officers considered these duties beyond the capacity of the black man, the success of slaves and freedmen in the Civil War armies notwithstanding. In 1876, one West Point cadet was black and suffered

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35 considerable ostracism at the Military Academy; no blacks served as com59 missioned officers. All enlisted men received rather shabby treatment from civilians, but blacks suffered special indignities, including the refusal of local merchants to serve them and public outcries in many areas of the West and South whenever it appeared that black units might be stationed nearby. In a "Jim Crow" army, blacks could not depend on their white fellow soldiers for respect. After Brigadier General Edward 0. C. Ord, commanding in Texas, made statements widely interpreted as disparaging black troops, one white soldier sprang to their defense in a letter printed in the Army and Navy Journal Although "a Democrat," he praised the black soldiers he had known as "sober, obedient and trustworthy" men C 1 who made steady fighters. His letter brought a swift rebuttal, one of the most vicious ever printed in the Army and Navy Journal This letter indicates the bitter prejudice which existed within the army: You say you ought to know a good soldier when you see him. Tell me, if you please, what is a good soldier, if you call the colored troops good ones? I suppose you are like a good many more men of the ranks; you are amalgamated with a dusky companion smarter than what Tsic'l you are, and expressing her opinions. You are like a good many renegades, I presume, no matter what the color is as long as it is a woman.^ This letter hints at miscegenation by white soldiers, possibly during occupation duty in the postwar South. Although the subject remains a mystery, since it involved a strict taboo, other aspects of black-white relations are known. Although some white soldiers treated blacks with consideration, more often they snubbed their black comrades-in-arms. Interracial brawls broke out on some occasions when black and white companies served at the same post.

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36 Much of the ill -will which ex-Confederates felt toward the occupation troops resulted from the army's early use of many of the black volunteer regiments, the United States Colored Troops, in the South, since most of the blacks' terms of enlistment did not expire until 1866 or 1867. As these segregated regiments, officered by whites, left the service, Congress authorized six regular black regiments for the peacetime army. Even though these new units, to be reduced to four under the general reorganization of 1869, were also segregated, their establishment was a victory of sorts for Radical Republicans, since it set the precedent for the peacetime role of blacks in the regular army. These units found much the same prejudice as had the volunteer black soldiers in the South, where violence between blue-coated blacks and local whites was hardly unknown. The South pressured the army to remove all the blacks from occupation duty. It succeeded in the face of the army's hesistant policies. Six months after Appomattox, 107 black regiments served on occupation duty in all of the southern states except Virginia. One year later, only twelve black regiments and parts of a thirteenth served in but seven of the ex-Confederate states. The number of blacks in the occupation force steadily decreased until, by 1870, the only black troops in any southern state were those regular units assigned to the isolated Texas frontier. Federal troops would continue to garrison parts of the South 65 until 1877, but never again would black units perform that duty. The black regulars soon found themselves posted to \jery isolated, undesirable areas. From the late 1860s through the early 1880s, they fifi served in the hot and dry Southwest, a place most soldiers dreaded. Sherman felt this to be necessary, for he believed the myth that blacks

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37 were "better qualified for southern stations than troops of our AngloSaxon race." Even though he was "well satisfied" with the blacks' performance of this duty, he believed that white troops were superior in virtually e\/ery way: "If I were compelled to choose 5,000 men to go into a fight with, I confess I would rather take 5,000 white men. . ." Despite their faithful service under the worst conditions, the black soldiers remained Uncle Sam's orphans, praised by few and claimed by none. This, then, was the tiny force which guarded the nation as it began its second century in 1876. The aging Civil War heroes, discontented junior officers, and enlisted men of widely varying backgrounds seemed quaint reminders of the past as they pursued Indians or guarded outmoded forts. But as the country itself faced an era of rapid change, so did its army. An industrializing country needed an efficient, modern army to protect its interests and reflect its power. These were the thoughts of reform-minded officers in the army and their friends in Congress, as they advocated changes which were long needed. Over the next half-dozen years, these men began the long task of transforming the "old army" into the new.

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38 Notes to Chapter J, ^ Army and Navy Journal June 3, 1876, unpaginated supplement. For a vivid pictorial representation of life during the Centennial year, see Lai ly Weymouth and Milton Gl aser, Ameri ca J_n 1876 : The May We Were (New York: Random House, 1976). 2 Army and Navy Journal July 8, 1876, "Disaster to Gen. Custer's Conmand," 772. 3 New York Times July 7, 1876, 1, 4. ^See Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 236-295. A more controversial view is Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee : An Indian History of the American West (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), 261-296. 5Sherman to Upton, July 12, 1875, printed in Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton, 1878), iv-vi. ^Quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, "Emory Upton on the Armies of Asia and Europe," Military Affairs XXVIII (Spring 1964), 27. 7 Utley, Frontier Regulars 10-18. ^United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), I, 24-25. Q For the role of the Signal Service, see Joseph H. M. Hawes, "The Signal Corps and the Weather Service," Military Affairs XXX (Sunnier 1966), 68-76. *Utley, Frontier Regulars 11-13; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United Stated Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 284-288. The figures are from Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 24, 40-72, and Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), II, 612-613. ^United States Congress, House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, Reduction of Army Officers' s Pay Reorganization of the Army, and Transfer of the Indi an Bureau (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), 148. For Mullins, see Arlen L. Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West 1869-1891 (Westpoint, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 132.

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39 See Army and Navy Journal May 11, 1876, letter from Hospital Steward Patrick Coyne, 646; Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars : Army Life and Reforms 1865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 132. 13 Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 24. 14 For the report, see House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 3-4. See also Utley, Frontier Regul ars 61-62. l^ Army and Navy Journal January 29, 1876, 406. 16 Ibi d. February 5, 1876, letter from "Second Lieutenant," 418. 17utley, Frontier Regulars 12, 20-21, 39. A contemporary attack on the system is James B. Fry, The History and Legal Effects of Brevets in the Armies of Great Britain and the United States (New York: D. Apple t on7T8 TTY18United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, Report of a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Mili ary Affairs Relating to the Reorganization of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878), 270. l^Utley, Fronti er Regulars 21. ™Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 625. 21 Ibid. I, 652. 22 Utley, Frontier Regulars 33-35, 38. 23 Ibid. 19, 38. 24See House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 2. 25 James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States," North American Review CXXVI (March-April, May-June 1878), 464-465: Other House employees and their annual salaries were: doorkeeper $2,500 assistant clerk 2,500 clerk of the documents room 2,000 distributing clerk 1,800 upholsterer 1,400 locksmith 1,400 26see Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor, Annual Report 1871 (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1871), 222-224. 2?House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 2.

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40 ^ Army and Navy Journal February 5, 1876, letter from "Second Lieutenant," 418. ^Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position : The Command ing General of the Army of the United States 1864-1903 (Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs Press, 1975), 70. Of) Utley, Frontier Regulars 19-20. For Thomas Custer, see Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 348. See also the many letters to the editor in the Army and Navy Journal from 1865 to 1890, when the promotion system was finally reformed. Interesting articles on the subject, by young officers who favored this reform, appeared in the United Service a military journal, during 1879, 1880, and 1881. 598. 3J Army and Navy Journal April 22, 1876, letter from "Justice," 32 Ibid. April 15, 1876, letter from "Regimental," 582. 33For the figures which demonstrate this process, see Weigley, History of the United States Army 567-568. 34 Report of the Secretary of War, 1879 1 14 35For a detailed discussion of military justice during this period, see Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 31-58. A full description of officer life on the posts, as seen by military families, is Patricia Y. Stall ard, Glittering Misery : Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press/Old ftrmy Press, 1978), 15^57, 75-122. Don Rickey, Jr. Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay : The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars ("Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 26-28, 63-72; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 59-60. " 3'This song has been published, with annotations, as Don Rickey, Jr., "The Regular Army, 0!" (New York: William A. Pond and Company, 1962) and is used with permission. It has been recorded, with periodstyle guitar accompaniment, as part of "The Army in the West, 1870-1890" (Washington: Company of Military Historians, fn.d.]), a selection of authentically-performed ballads, band music, and bugle calls which reproduce the sounds of everyday life on the military frontier during the postwar years. 38House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 228. 39 Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 40-41. 40 Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 17-23. Rickey's book is based heavily on first-person written accounts and questionnaires completed by former "old army" enlisted men during the 1950s.

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41 41poem by Private Will Stokes, quoted in Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 131. 42 Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 72. 43 1 bid. I, 107. 44 Based on figures in Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay 126-127. ~~ 4 ^ Based on figures in ibid 4 "Based on Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor, Annual Report 1871 222-224. 4 'See Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay 18-24. 48 Ibid., 24-25. 49See Report of the Secretary of War 1880, I, 36, for figures provided by Adjutant General Richard C. Drum. 50[Jtley, Frontier Regulars 18, states that thirteen per cent of the total number of army officers from 1865 to 1891 were former enlisted men in the regular army. However, a study of Heitman, Historical Regis ter and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 149-1069, yields a figure of 9.5 per cent for the period 1876-1881. 51 Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay 116-120. 52 Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 22-23. 53 Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay, 120-122. For some thoughtful suggestions on the improvement of army cooking, which an officer advanced, see Army and Navy Journal June 3, 1876, letter from "Ninth Infantry," 694. 54 Rickey, Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay 40; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 17-19. "Gordon Chappell The Search For the Well -Dressed Soldier 1865-1890 : Developments and Innovations in United States Army Uniforms on the Western Frontier (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1972) is the monograph on this subject; see 4-5 for a discussion of the tailors. Excellent on the more specialized subject of dress uniforms is John Phillip L angel lier, They Continually Wear the Blue : U. S. Army Enlisted Dress Uniforms 1865-1902 (San Francisco: Barnes-McGee, T976 ). For a reprint of the regulations with fine illustrations, see Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr. ed. Regulations and Notes For the Uniform of the Army of the United States 1872 (Staten Island, New York: Manor Publishing, T972). Fine pictures of western regulars in all orders of dress grace the pages of the profuselyillustrated volume by David Nevin, The Old West : The Soldiers (New York: Time-Life Books, 1973).

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42 56 R i ck ey Forty Miles a. Day On Beans and Hay 156-161. 57 Army and Navy Journal April 22, 1876, editorial, "Standing Threat," 596. 58Rickey, Forty Miles a Day_ On Beans and Hay 169-170; Stallard, Glittering Misery 69-73. 59 For a view of West Point through the eyes of its first black graduate, see Henry 0. Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point (New York: Arno, 1969; original edition, 1878). 6 ^Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 132-133, 143-147. 61 Army and Navy Journal April 15, 1876, letter from "White Soldier ,""^52. 62 1 bid. May 13, 1876, letter from "11th Infantry," 646. 63For a good, brief discussion of the prejudice, both official and unofficial, which black soldiers faced during the late nineteenth century, see Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 132-147. 5^For some information on black troops during Reconstruction, see James E. Sef ton, The United States Army and Reconstruction 18651877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 95-97, 193, and Marvin Fletcher, "The Negro Volunteer in Reconstruction, 1865-1877," Military Affairs XXXII (December 1968), 124-131. Fletcher's study is helpful but far too brief; Sefton's work must be used with caution, for it is marred by its author's uncritical acceptance of the ex-Confederate view that the army dominated politics and life in the postwar South. 55 Sef ton, United States Army and Reconstruction 261-262, which is based on official reports. 56For the black regiments' long assignments to undesirable duty, see Fowler, Bl ack Infantry in the West and Wil liam H. Leckie, The Buf falo Soldiers : A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967). United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 64, 45 Congress, 2 session, Testimony Taken By_ the Committee on Military Af fairs in Relation to the Texas Border Troubles (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878TT~20.

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CHAPTER II SHERMAN AND HIS GENERALS: Army Leadership and the Beginning of Professionalism Although the postwar army was isolated from much of American life, the military experience of the Civil War profoundly affected many thoughtful and influential northerners long after Appomattox. The massive Union war machine that had developed by 1864-1865 was something never seen before in America, and it gave its participants a sense of vast power. The war and its requirements of huge amounts of weapons, arrmunition, food, clothing, equipment, vehicles, and horses created an organization larger and more efficient than most Americans could have envisaged before 1861. The size of the army far outstripped other organizing efforts, even the armies raised to fight other American wars. The example of the Union army was not likely to be forgotten easily, even if Americans did not like large standing armies and things military. In many fields, the generation that had marched with Grant and Sherman redefined the meaning of organization and the role of the expert, and the military experience was not lost on these men. In the area of reform, the postwar professional allied with an organized reform group replaced the antebellum romantic. During the late 1870s and the 1880s, new professions emerged, and older ones, such as law and 3

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44 medicine, sought to consolidate their ranks and to impose uniform stan2 dards of knowledge and behavior upon their members. There are certain prerequisites which groups must meet internally and with the general public before they can claim a well-defined professional status. Often the process is a long and complex struggle between elitists and traditionalists; some occupations have risen and then fal3 len in public esteem or have never forged a true group identity. Those who have completed the process, though, exhibit three characteristics. One is the proof that group members have a certain expertise in their field which laymen cannot easily attain. Another is the group's clear-cut assumption of responsibility for its field. The public must perceive that the new profession "knows best" in matters relating to its field, and, thus, it willingly delegates responsibility and authority to the group and its members. The final crucial factor in the process of professionalization is a strong intragroup feeling that all members are 4 colleagues and have common professional interests. When these criteria are met, the occupation becomes a true profession. Military officers in western Europe began to satisfy the criteria of professionalism in the years following the Napoleonic Wars, through the development of the general staff system and subsequent reforms in military organization and training. The concept of the general staff stressed a well-defined military science, which could be mastered fully only by study and field work. Thus, all officers needed thorough training, after which they could successfully perform a wide range of duties both on the staff and in the line units. As a consequence, the general staff ideal not only produced trained professionals but developed common concerns among all officers. Prussia led the way in developing the

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45 general staff and military education, and its victories in the 1860s and 1870s assured that all major and aspiring continental powers would adapt these systems. Even Britain, usually aloof under the protection of the Royal Navy, abolished the purchase of commissions and abandoned the old notion of the officer as aristocratic dilettante in favor of the welltrained professional. France, too, after its devastating defeat of 1870-1871, supplemented the Napoleonic tradition of glory with the ideal of the anonymous but ever-prepared general staff. By the late 1870s, 5 modern armies were emerging throughout Europe. In America, however, the situation was different. The United States worried little about military invasion, separated as it was from Europe by a wide ocean. There was no impetus to modernize the small regular army to thwart potential attacks, a key concern of governments and generals on the Continent. Nor did the United States possess an aristocratic and hereditary officer class which the new professionals could displace for "the good of the country," as young Prussian officers had done during the crisis years of the early nineteenth century. Furthermore, seventeenthand eighteenth-century English thought had imparted to Americans a strong aversion to standing armies and an extreme dedication to a militia system that was strong on paper but highly uneven in practice. In the Federalist period, the government's attempt to build a respectablystrong army met stern opposition and came to naught after only a decade. The changes in the franchise after 1800 fostered a democratic ideal that was diametrically opposed to a large standing army and a stable officer corps. This ideal proclaimed the suitability of nearly all white men to fill virtually every government office, including military officership. The traditional opposition to standing

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46 armies and the democratic credo both helped to debase the militia, for most voters wanted little to do with it, and nearly destroyed West Point, considered by many to be simply a bastion of privilege and trainee ing ground for would-be aristocrats. During the antebellum period, all of these ideas and traditions combined to produce a small army of trained regular soldiers drawn from the lowest classes, a chaotic militia system free from meaningful federal control, and a tiny regular officer corps composed of old war heroes, political appointees, and West Point graduates who still remained concentrated in the lower commission9 ed grades. West Point, a national school of applied science as well as a military academy, symbolized the ambiguous military tradition of nineteenthcentury America. The Mil itary Academy in its early years attracted men seeking careers in civil engineering as well as those who hoped to be professional soldiers, a fact that West Point's critics in the postCivil War period never tired of noting. For many years, the academy did overemphasize engineering and ignore strategy, concentrating the cadets' military studies on small-unit tactics and the duties of noncommissioned and company-grade officers. By the 1830s, however, West Point had begun to produce a group of respectably trained young officers who were dedicated to the military, even if some of them left the regular army not long after graduation. These men first made their mark in the Mexican War. By 1865, an overwhelming majority of ranking generals, both Union and Confederate, had shared the West Point experience. The heritage of West Point, however, was a double-edged sword which cut both ways. While Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, with their great opposite numbers, Lee, Jackson, and Stuart, were all celebrated products

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47 of "the Point," there were also many bumblers with starred shoulder straps whose first taste of military life had come on the banks of the Hudson. Nor was West Point the only gateway to military success and fame during the Rebellion. Nathan B. Forrest and John A. Logan were two shining examples of the possibilities still remaining for "natural gen12 ius" even as the military art transformed itself into military science. The Civil War, then, could not provide the proper conditions for creating a true military profession. Rather, the war and its legacy of brave volunteers simply exacerbated an already ambiguous heritage. Even leading officers of the postwar regular army could not agree on the war's meaning. When young Colonel Emory Upton, the army's leading theorist, called for a staff subordinate to the line, he drew his arguments from 13 the Civil War experience. In arguing against such a change, Brigadier General Montgomery C. Meigs, quartermaster general of the army, 14 based his rebuttal on the "lessons" of that war. The postwar officer corps had many obstacles to surmount, including the fierce rivalry between staff and line and bitter personal feuds dating back to the war, before it could organize as a true profession. The years 1876-1881 did not so much mark the epoch of professional izati on as did they witness the beginning of a long but ultimately successful process, one of cru15 cial importance for the army in the century that lay ahead. The postwar army, it has been noted, was in many ways the peculiar product of its long-time commanding general, William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman's direct influence spanned the years 1869-1883, his tenure as the nation's ranking soldier, but his spirit and attitudes marked the I c army for years longer, even after his death in 1891. Not surprisingly, Sherman best symbolizes the ambiguous approach to reform and

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48 change which marked many members of the Civil War generation of military men. The son of an Ohio judge, Sherman was born in 1820, and after the untimely death of his father, young "Cump" became the ward of a conservative Democratic Ohio Congressman. Sherman attended West Point and graduated high in his class. As an artillery officer, he spent much of his career in the South. Sherman left the old army in the 1850s to pursue a wide range of civilian occupations, in most of which he was an abject failure. The secession crisis erupted while he was headmaster of the small military institute which later became Louisiana State University. Returning to his native Ohio at the beginning of the war, Sherman quickly received the commission of a brigadier general of volunteers. But his career soon came under a cloud amid rumors of his insanity, until Ulysses S. Grant took him under his wing and made a trusted subordinate of the discredited general. He distinguished himself in the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns. When Grant went to Washington early in 1864 to assume supreme command, he left Major General Sherman in control of operations in the Western Theater. There, Sherman battled toward the strategic Atlanta area and then devastated Georgia and the Carolinas, reviving the concept of total war and smashing resistance in the heartland of the Confederacy. As the war ended, Sherman was the hero second only to Grant in the hearts of northerners. The Civil War was, in Sherman's own estimation, the peak of his career. At forty-five, he faced the prospect in 1865 of many years of routine duty. From 1865 to 1869, his restlessness and sense of adventure were somewhat placated by his work as commander of the Military Di18 vision of the Missouri, in whose vast open spaces he often traveled. In 1869, now promoted from lieutenant general to general, Sherman

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49 reluctantly went east to take command of the army upon Grant's elevation to the Presidency. Sherman's years as the army's commanding general have been aptly termed his "years of frustration." Short of temper and uncomfortable in the political arena, Sherman felt slighted at first by Grant and his friend and former chief of staff, Secretary of War John A. Rawlins. Sherman had expected a free hand with regard to command of the army, and 19 he balked when Rawlins tried to set policy. When Rawlins died after only months in office, Sherman himself served briefly as interim secretary of war. Rather than giving him a greater appreciation of the civilian side of the War Department, that experience alienated Sherman even 20 further; he spoke out for abolition of the secretaryship. Grant's new head of the War Department, William W. Belknap, despised Sherman, and the feeling was mutual. After three years of constant bickering with Belknap, Sherman, in disgust, moved himself and army headquarters 21 to Saint Louis, still commanding general but in virtual exile." As a consequence of the move west, the army lost the power of Sherman's influence in Washington from 1874 to 1876, a time when Congress was determined to reduce the strength of the army as much as possible. Sherman's problems, then as earlier, were aggravated by his great distaste for Congressional Reconstruction, even though he, as commander of the army, had responsibility for its implementation. He had expressed his views on Reconstruction as early as 1865 in a letter to his powerful brother, Senator John Sherman of Ohio: "No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we maintain there an army large enough to 22 hold them in subjugation." His inflexible stance alienated him even

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50 more from politicians, including Republicans who might have aided the army had Sherman been more cooperative. Things brightened for Sherman in 1876. He returned to the capital in that year, soon after Belknap fell from power in a kickback scandal involving post traders in Indian territories. Reconstruction had virtually ended by then, and during the following year, the new President, Rutherford B. Hayes, removed the last occupation troops. From 1876 until his retirement, Sherman served under a series of complaisant secretaries of war, all of whom allowed him to run the army to his satisfac23 tion. He retired in 1883, still distrusting politicians and their meddling with his beloved army, still clinging to his title of "commanding general" while stubbornly rejecting the European innovation of trans24 forming the ranking general into a more modern "chief of staff." Sherman was doubtless an old-fashioned general in many ways, but he also held views at least tinged with progressive ideas. He pressed for greater integration of the staff and the line, a major requirement for both greater efficiency and the development of a truly professional officer corps. He stressed the need for postgraduate military education, even if he sometimes denigrated classroom work or resisted modernization at the citadel of military education, West Point. He encouraged the foundation of the Military Service Institution of the United States, the first truly professional military organization for army officers in the nation. And he also took an interest in the career and writings of Lieutenant Colonel Emory Upton, his young protege' who became the most distinguished theorist of the nineteenth-century American army. Finally, Sherman gave the army a tone and a tradition that helped it to survive in an otherwise bleak period of its existence. During the early

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51 stages of the professionalization of officership, he provided the necessary leadership, albeit reluctantly at times, for the implementation of change and the discussion of new ideas. In this and in his ambiguity about what the postwar army should become, Sherman and his ranking officers, the generals and the colonels commanding the forty regiments of the line, had much in common. To understand Sherman and the institutional changes he sought between 1876 and 1881, it is necessary to examine his most important subordinates. Philip H. Sheridan, the army's sole lieutenant general, was Sherman's confidant and trusted subordinate, even if the two often were at loggerheads over the careers and promotions of officers that one favored and the other disliked. Eleven years younger than Sherman, Sheridan was also Ohio-born, but of Irish Catholic immigrant parentage. His background and his short stature made him a battler; indeed, he was suspended from West Point for a year because he was caught in one too many brawls. Finally graduating in 1853, near the bottom of his class, Sheridan served as an infantry lieutenant until war came in 1861. Even so, he remained a captain until he managed to obtain the colonelcy of the Second Michigan Cavalry in 1862. Promoted to brigadier general of volunteers later that year, he served with distinction under Grant in his great campaigns of 1862-1863. When Grant went east, he took Sheridan with him to reorganize the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps. Sheridan did his job well; his troopers mauled the once-superb rebel cavalry, killing the legendary J. E. B. Stuart in the process. In 1864, Grant delegated Sheridan to lead a small army into the Shenandoah Valley, long a source of food for Confederate armies in Virginia and a natural invasion route to the cities

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52 of the Mid-Atlantic region. Sheridan's personal heroism saved the Union cause in the Valley at the Battle of Winchester, and his forces drove out the Confederate troops and laid waste to the region. He played a key role in the last campaign of the war, which led to Lee's surrender. "Little Phil," the bold cavalryman and dashing bachelor, ended the Civil War as a national hero. His reputation and the support of Grant and Sherman assured for him a high place in the postwar army, even though others' major general's commissions antedated his own. He was at the vortex of controversy during the years after 1865, in part 25 because he had been "jumped" over so many others. If Sherman had the respect of nearly all of his officers, Sheridan, by his combative nature, did not. Brigadier General George Crook, his subordinate in the Valley in 1864, despised him, and, thus, two of the army's most legendary and effective Indian fighters rarely spoke to one another. Indeed, the bitterness that Crook felt did not subside even or after Sheridan's death in 1888. Some officers resented Sheridan's rapid promotion to major general and then to lieutenant general in 1869; other disliked his flamboyant personal life and gourmet tastes at the 27 division's headquarters in Chicago. Probably the most divisive factor coloring Sheridan's relations with his subordinates was his active support of a group of young colonels, especially Custer, Colonel Nelson A. Miles of the Fifth Infantry, and Colonel Wesley Merritt of the Fifth Cavalry. In a small officer corps obsessed with promotion possibilities and profoundly jealous of each other, such favoritism rankled nearly everybody. Since Sheridan's division was the comnand in which most active Indian campaigning took place, officers eager for higher rank and public glory knew that they

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53 had to come to terms with "Little Phil" in order to get choice assignments. Sheridan, his enemies charged, used this to his own best advan28 tage. As might be expected, Sheridan's role in the professionalization of army officership was mixed at best, for the man's acts and personality added to the atmosphere of distrust and self-interest which prevented cohesiveness within the officer corps. Even so, Sheridan did take an interest in many reform proposals. The army had three major generals between 1876 and 1881. The least active of the three in professional activities was Irvin McDowell, the luckless commander at First Bull Run. Despite his rather lackluster Civil War career, McDowell remained in the army, which he had entered as an artillery lieutenant in 1838 upon graduation from West Point. In November 1872, after the deaths of George G. Meade and Henry W. Hal leek had opened up promotion opportunities for brigadier generals, McDowell got his second star. He commanded the Division of the Pacific throughout the period 1876-1881, from headquarters in San Francisco. He had been born in 1818 and thus was old by the army's standards; in fact, Sherman thought that he should have retired several years before he ac3D tually took that step in 1882. McDowell died in 1885. Despite his apparent distaste for field service, he had had his supporters and allies within the officer corps, for he was an elegant, literarily-inclined gentleman possessed of a private fortune, who set a lavish table for 31 his guests. Although he, too, spent the years 1876-1881 away from frontier service, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock had more impact on the army. Born in 1824, he had graduated from the Military Academy in 1844 and had served as an infantry lieutenant, earning a brevet for gallantry at

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54 Contreras and Churubusco. A captain when the Civil War began, Hancock became a brigadier general of Pennsylvania volunteers in the fall of 1861. He served with distinction in the Peninsula campaign and there earned his nickname, "Hancock the Superb." He fought in all of the major campaigns in the Eastern Theater during 1862 and 1863; his corps repelled Pickett's Charge. Severely wounded during Gettysburg, he rejoined the Army of the Potomac in 1864, but he never regained his old position as that army's most effective division or corps commander. However, his reputation and career were secure. He received a commission as brigadier general in the regular army while the war was still in progress, and, in 1866, he won his second star, which made him the 32 army's senior major general between 1876 and 1881. During the postwar years, Hancock saw field service in the West as commander of the operations on the southern plains in 1867, a controversial campaign which added to the reputations of Hancock and his young subordinate, George A. Custer, even if modern historians underscore the 33 brutality of their strategy. Hancock served for years in the quiet Division of the Atlantic, but his command suddenly became a battleground in the sunnier of 1877, when widespread railroad strikes led to the call 34 ing out of most of the line units in Hancock's division. In 1880, the Democrats nominated him for the Presidency; in an era before active campaigning by nominees, he was not as unlikely a candidate as he might appear to modern eyes. Hancock never left the army, even during his 35 unsuccessful campaign, and he died on active duty in 1886. He, like McDowell, had a reputation for fine living and good dining, as his huge physique suggested. But Hancock also had a reputation as a military reformer. He was an early president of the National Rifle Association,

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55 a society very active in the promotion of military marksmanship. He was also the first president of the Military Service Institution of the United States, and he made sure that the institution's journal would print thoughtful, substantive articles in which many professional con37 cerns could be discussed. The third major general, John McAllister Schofield, was another trusted friend of Sherman and an active reformer throughout his long military career. Born in 1831, Schofield graduated from West Point and served in the artillery, taking time off to teach science in Saint Louis. He was a captain in 1861 and transferred to the Missouri volunteers, becoming a brigadier general in the fall of that year. He served with distinction in the Western Theater. A brigadier general of regulars since 1864, he received his promotion to major general on the day 38 Grant became President. Much of his postwar duty was spent in the South, where, especially as military governor of Virginia, he earned a reputation as a conservative who sympathized with southern whites and rejected the Radical Republicans' hopes for civil equality for blacks. Schofield also served briefly as secretary of war during the last months of Johnson's Presidency; he was a candidate whom all parties in the bitter dispute over the Tenure of Office Act could accept, for he interon preted his powers as being very limited. Schofield served, too, in the Far West. In 1876, he received the appointment as the superintendent of the United States Military Academy, a move which the Army and Navy Journal applauded, noting that "no choice could certainly have been 40 more acceptable than . Schofield." While at West Point, however, he faced controversy, first over proposed new army regulations which he wrote under Sherman's direction and then over the alleged mistreatment

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56 and ultimate dismissal of a black cadet in 1880. Transferred and placed afterwards on waiting orders until a new corrmand could be found for him, Schofield toured Europe and devoted time to his studies. He replaced the retiring McDowell in the comnand of the Division of the Pacific in 1882. In 1888, upon the sudden death of Sheridan, Schofield became the commanding general of the army. In essence, he turned the post into a chief of staff and did what he could to encourage military reform. He retired in 1895, and, before his death in 1906, he saw the army he loved modernized and the general staff system finally instituted. Schofield was doubtless one of the most forward-looking officers of his time. He had an obvious intellectual bent and visualized an army of 42 truly professional soldiers experienced in both staff and line duties. He helped to found the Military Service Institution of the United States and gave the statement of its principles at its first meeting. However, even he was not completely above the feuds and bickering which wracked the officer corps, and he was not beyond politics, either. Sherman urged him to stay at the Military Academy in 1880, thus insuring the commanding general's control over policy at the institution. In an odd gesture, Sherman, the man who despised politics and politicians, played his two major generals against each other by telling Schofield, 44 "You are as likely to be a candidate for President as Hancock." After Schofield, not fully convinced, insisted on a change of assignment, Sherman agreed to put him in command of the hastily formed Division of the Gulf, a "bungle" of a command in the commanding general's opinion, which lasted only six months. Schofield was unhappy with this command, manufactured by President Hayes, who did not ask for Sherman's advice in such matters because he had "soured" on the general for his

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57 45 vigorous defense of Schofi eld's recent dismissal of a black cadet. Rather than let his dignity as a major general suffer, Schofield accepted waiting orders, at full pay, until a proper command "according to my 46 rank" could fall vacant for him, which finally occurred in 1882. This series of petty incidents demonstrates that even the most progressive of army officers could not resist all of the self -promotion and divisiveness which permeated the atmosphere of the "old army." Schofield was unusual because he did not indulge fully in such intrigues, unlike most of his colleagues. The army's brigadier generals are best examined in two groups, those of the line and those of the staff. Seven men filled the six slots available in the line between 1876 and 1881. Sixteen headed the ten staff departments during the same years. All of the line generals had been distinguished major generals of volunteers who had commanded divisions, corps, or armies in the Civil War. One, John Pope, failed abysmally against Lee at Second Bull Run, but he had redeemed his reputation against hostile Indian tribes on the frontier during the last years of the war. Most of these men had seen service in the occupation of the ex-Confederate states; all had headed departments on the western frontier. The two who did not attend West Point made good reputations for themselves in combat; in civilian life, Alfred H. Terry had been a lawyer, and Nelson A. Miles, only twentytwo when the war began, was a retail clerk, a fact that his enemies never tired of stressing. George A. Crook, well known as an Indian fighter, was a notable eccentric who rode a mule on campaign but achieved striking results against the Apache. Oliver Otis Howard, the one-armed "praying general," was a man of mediocre military ability but was a noted religious leader and

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58 humanitarian who had once headed the Freedmen's Bureau. Edward 0. C. Ord, born in 1818, was the oldest of these men; he was a tough and impulsive career soldier whose long service in the army had left him with little money to support a large family. Christopher C. Augur served much of his career as a quietly competent officer in the South and on the Texas and Platte River frontiers. Of these men, all but Augur eventually won a second star, and Miles ended his career as the 47 commanding general, retiring as a lieutenant general. Unlike the line positions, the staff positions evidenced considerable turnover. Five department commanders retired between 1876 and 1881 and one died. Six of the sixteen generals of the staff were at or near retirement age: Edward D. Townsend, Montgomery C. Meigs, Randolph B. Marcy, Joseph K. Barnes, Benjamin Alvord, and Andrew A. Humphries were born before 1820. This partially explains the relatively high number of openings in the staff brigadier generalcies. Most of the staff chiefs had backgrounds in the departments which they commanded. Contrary to this pattern, William B. Hazen, previously colonel of the Sixth Infantry, became Chief Signal Officer in 1880, but there were no conmissioned officers permanently assigned to this department except the department commander. Because several staff departments relied primarily on officers commissioned directly from civil life, it is not surprising that six of the sixteen staff generals were not graduates of West Point. Regardless of age or background, however, none of these men was promoted to major general and given line commands; perhaps that was the ultimate revenge in the eyes of indignant line officers. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the key points in the careers of the army's brigadier generals of this period.

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59 The army's line colonels were powerful men in their own right. Sixty-six men commanded the forty regiments during the years 1876-1881; all were Civil War veterans and sixty had earned general officer rank during that war. As might be expected, the longest tenure of regimental command was in the four black regiments. Between 1876 and 1881, none of the black units changed commanders, although Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson of the Tenth Cavalry had long campaigned for his general's stars. There were openings for new commanding officers in three of the five artillery regiments during these years, five in the ten cavalry regi48 ments, and ten of the twenty-five infantry regiments. The colonels were a diverse group. Some, like Samuel D. Sturgis of the Seventh Cavalry, spent years on detached duty away from their commands. Others, such as John Gibbon of the Seventh Infantry and Miles, were dynamic soldiers of considerable ability and campaigned actively through long years with their regiments. Philip Regis De Trobriand of the Thirteenth Infantry was French-born and a volunteer Civil War general; August V. Kautz of the Eighth Infantry was a West Point graduate who had been born in Germany. Some colonels, like Miles and Emory Upton of the Fourth Artillery, were rather young men, but most were in their fifties or early sixties. Fortytwo of these men were West Point graduates; one, Washington L. Elliott of the Third Cavalry, attended the Military Academy but did not graduate. Twenty colonels, concentrated in the infantry, had first been commissioned as volunteer officers in the Civil War. Four had earned their lieutenant's commissions after volunteer service in the Mexican War; two of these, Colonel Henry A. Morrow of the Twenty-First Infantry and Kautz, had been enlisted men in that war. Three, Frank Wheaton of the Second Infantry,

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53 John King of the Ninth Infantry, and Granville D. Haller of the TwentyThird Infantry, had first entered the army directly from civil life. Haller, who had been dismissed from the army in 1863, was reinstated as 49 a colonel by act of Congress in 1879. Other stories, however, had no happy endings. Colonel Thomas C. Devin, the Civil War cavalry hero who commanded the Third Cavalry, died on active duty in the West. Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie of the Fourth Cavalry, promoted to brigadier general in 1882 for his brilliant, tough campaigning in Texas, went 50 insane in the mid-1880s. Upton, in command of the Fourth Artillery, killed himself in 1881. 51 Whatever their ultimate fate, most colonels spent long years in grade. Of the men who were colonels during all or part of the period 1876-1881, the average time in grade was shortly under ten years. In the artillery, the average was eight years; in the cavalry and the in52 fantry it was ten and one half years. Since only a handful of these men could expect to achieve general officer rank, jealousy over promotions was severe, and so was the pressure upon those who had the authority to recommend promotions. As an exasperated Sherman noted, "unless room is made for (.the promotion of] Miles, McKenzie [sic 1 and some of 53 the Colonels the boiler will burst." It nearly did in the case of Miles, the one man who achieved promotion to a line brigadier-generalcy between 1876 and 1881. Nelson A. Miles of the Fifth Infantry was another of the youthful, vigorous, ambitious Civil War volunteer generals who reverted to relatively low grade in the regular army after the Rebellion. Born in 1839, he was not a West Pointer, but he did have the confidence of Sheridan. His contemporaries assumed that he was also one of Sherman's favorites,

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54 because he had married the general's niece. Actually, as Sherman confided to Schofield, Miles was only "construed to be my Relative because he married my niece--whom we all love yery much-she is a perfect woman but is touched with the Washington Mania and hoped in promotion she 54 would gain Washington." Miles found another powerful friend, after his success against the Sioux in 1876-1877, in President Hayes. Miles and his various allies vigorously pleaded his cause, and Sherman was left to balance these claims to promotion against those of Mackenzie, Colonel George W. Getty of the Third Artillery, Gibbon, Colonel Edward Hatch of the Ninth Cavalry, and Merritt, all of whom were "expectant" of 55 receiving their stars. Since McDowell and Ord turned sixtytwo in 1880, a vacancy loomed in the line generalcies. The death of Brigadier General Albert J. Meyer of the Signal Service, who had just received general officer rank, assured that one man would be promoted. Sherman even considered giving the Signal Service post to Miles to placate him. However, Hayes promoted Colonel William B. Hazen, loyal to Sherman but a 56 foe of Sheridan. Miles received a greater reward. Hayes and Sheridan determined to create an opening for Miles by retiring a line general. Since Sherman favored compulsory retirement at age sixty-two and was even then planning his own retirement at that age, the retirement move could not evoke his opposition on philosophical 57 grounds. The choice of whom to retire, however, irked Sherman. Amid Sherman's protests, Hayes arranged the retirement of one of the army's least political generals, Edward 0. C. Ord, rather than McDowell, who was wealthy and had influential friends. Ord, furthermore, did not want to retire; he was forced to leave the army. The incident infuriated Sherman, who felt that the army had lost a fine soldier of the old

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65 school who relished frontier duty, and the affair drove the wedge beep tween Sherman and Hayes still further.' Miles got his stars, McDowell remained on duty for two more years, and Ord got only a pension and the satisfaction of being retired as a major general by act of Con59 gress.' Lurking in the background throughout this incident, in Sherman's conspiratorial view, was a plot to bring back Grant on active army rolls as "captain general," to rank above Sherman and to control the army in consonance with Hayes' political designs. Nothing came of the scheme, for Sherman's friend and ally James A. Garfield succeeded Hayes soon afterward. Obviously, the quarreling and jealousy which so often consumed the time and energy of Sherman and his ranking officers set a poor example for their subordinates. As long as special interests came above the good of the service as a whole, the officer corps could not become truly professional. Even so, some first steps toward professionalism occurred between 1876 and 1881. The army planned and began to implement a system of postgraduate military education. Military periodicals came into their own, and officers founded a professional association. The process of thought and action had begun, even if the fullest fruits of military science and professionalism could be harvested only in the future. Sherman expressed a view of armies which virtually all of his officers could accept when he noted, "an army is not a popular organization, but an animated machine, an instrument in the hands of the Executive for 61 enforcing the law, and maintaining the honor and dignity of the nation." Contrary notions had only prolonged the Civil War and proven the need for well-trained officers and men. Sherman praised the Prussian system

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66 of regimental depots and a national reserve commanded by trained officers. He deplored Congressional plans to reduce the army and hoped that any reorganization would bring greater efficiency and compactness, not a lower ceiling on enlisted strength. Sherman, like Sheridan, felt strongly about the safety of settlers in the West and the army's role in its maintenance. He agreed wholeheartedly with his chief subordinate when that officer stated: "I could not face the people of the frontier whose wants I know so well if I was tsic to consent to any reduction of the Army." On this point, at least, the officer corps was united. Most officers agreed, too, that the Army Regul ations of 1861, last revised in 1863, were outmoded and needed to be rewritten completely. Many of the regulations' provisions, especially those relating to mili64 tary justice, were virtually unchanged since 1806. When Sherman brought Schofield to West Point in 1876, he also assigned him to the task of revising the regulations. Schofi eld's reputation as a scholar gave his work considerable authority. However, any unanimity on the revisions was lost when Schofield, at Sherman's urging, brought up the issue of the subordination of staff departments to the commanding general. Sherman had long believed that the virtual independence of the staff departments hamstrung the army. In his view, this created grave obstacles to the performance of necessary duties by units in the field. Without a doubt, it made Sherman's own job more difficult, especially since he had no tact and little patience in dealing with bureaucracies. As he observed to members of the House Military Affairs Committee, "if you still wish me to answer anew those questions '.on army reorganization' I will undertake the labor, but am met ... by a difficulty

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67 almost insurmountable, in the fact that all the chiefs of bureaus who alone make the estimates ... are construed to be parts of the War Department not subject to my orders." Schofi eld's new regulations remedied this situation by requiring the staff chiefs to report to the commanding general rather than directly to the Secretary of War. The proposal upset staff officers, who took Schofield's suggested changes as a direct insult. They believed that their positions and power were threatened by the line officers, and they saw the Schofield proposals as playing into the hands of their rivals. The staff had long relied on its ability to influence politicians in the War Department and in Congress as the surest way to secure the funds it needed. The new regulations would severely restrict the staff's ability to do this, and it is hardly surprising that staff officers bombarded Sherman with objections to the change. Judge Advocate General William M. Dunn even 57 questioned the constitutionality of Schofield's proposed changes. In the end, Sherman and Schofield backed down and left the issue of ultimate authority to the House Military Affairs Committee, then writing CO one of its periodic reports on army reorganization. During 18781879, the Burnside Committee on army reorganization, composed of members of both houses of Congress, recommended army regulations very similar 69 to Schofield's, but Congress rejected the committee's work. Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend, who opposed the proposed changes, then attempted to revise the Army Regulations of 1861. After he retired in 1880, a board of officers finished the work, issuing it at last as Regulations of jthe Army of Jbhe United States and General Orders vn Force on the 17th of February 1881 Unfortunately, the new regulations pleased no one, and the problem of staff independence and the commanding general's

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58 authority remained unsolved until the general staff concept finally won acceptance in 1903. Sherman had more success and created far less animosity in his handling of military education. Nevertheless, the commanding general was a rather reluctant reformer, and the very subject of West Point was something of a sore spot with him. He refused to authorize higher standards of admission in 1878, defending both the rights of poor boys of limited education to compete for appointments and the ideal of "natural genius" in the making of a comnander. During several visits to the Military Academy while commanding general, he spoke to the corps of cadets about the importance of discipline and honor, hallmarks of West Point since 72 his own cadet years during the "golden age" of the institution. Sherman did not, however, reverse the academy's shift away from overwhelming emphasis on engineering and related coursework, which had begun in 1866. But, as part of the new stress on broader military study, he also vowed to restrain all civilian influence, somewhat counter to the policies that Schofield fostered during his years as superintendent. Thus, at a time when the best American civilian colleges began to experiment with the elective system and the scholarly methods of the European universities, West Point closed its doors to civilian innovations and retained its program of rote learning and daily recitations. Due in large measure to Sherman's distrust of civilian teachers and methods, and his support of like-minded professors at the Military Academy, West Point changed little until the beginning of the twentieth 74 century. Nevertheless, Sherman was convinced of the necessity of postgraduate training and continuing study for academy graduates and all other

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69 officers. He encouraged Schofield, Hancock, and other leading officers to found the army's first truly professional association, the Military Service Institution of the United States. This organization, which also sponsored a journal devoted to the discussion of a wide range of military questions and issues, was patterned after similar societies of the British services and the United States Navy. Schofield expressed the aim and the professional ideal of the new institute: Every progress made in the methods of war brings them more within the domain of science. The elements of the problems which war presents for solution are vastly more complex and difficult of exact measurement than those [with] which any other branch of science has to deal. To advance this science still further, Sherman encouraged Hancock to print thought-provoking articles in its journal. The Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States publ ished by William C. Church, the military expert and avid supporter of the army who edited the Army and Navy Journal specialized in learned articles on tactics, military justice, military history, elements of strategy, and field service innovations. Its contributors included many of the army's leading officers, including Sherman himself. The new publication joined the Army and Navy Journal which, through its letters to the editor columns, was a forum for the suggestions of junior officers and enlisted men, who addressed themselves to a wide range of problems, some of them petty and some of great importance. Nearly as lively as the weekly Journal and more scholarly, was the United Service a magazine which began publication in 1879. It printed articles by officers and civilians about a wide variety of topics, but the most controversial were lineal promotion and compulsory retirement, which generated much yo debate among officers and interested outsiders. The specialized

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70 journals of the combat arms remained a decade or more in the future, but a vigorous, permanent military press had emerged by 1881 and functioned as a vehicle for promoting professional writing and study. Probably the most enduring achievement of Sherman's as commanding general was the commitment of the army to a program of postgraduate officer's schools. Although Secretary of War John C. Calhoun had recognized the special educational needs of artillerists and had founded the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe in the 1820s, that institution was all but dead by the 1840s. The Infantry School, at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, and the Mounted Depot, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, es79 tablished during Calhoun's era, had also vanished with few traces. In 1868, however, General Grant revived the Artillery School, but it was 80 Sherman who actually established its reputation. As the Army and Navy Journal noted in 1876, the new two-year curriculum approved by Sherman for artillery officers was "both more thorough and less laborious," as befitted higher education. The paper approved the requirement that all new artillery officers attend the course, and it hoped that the revival of the Artillery School marked "a new epoch for the Army of the pi United States." Attention now shifted to other branches of the army and their needs. The Corps of Engineers, alarmed by their loss of control at West Point, had already established an advanced school at Wil lets' Point, New op York. The Signal School trained "eight subalterns each year in that po branch of knowledge" at Fort Myer, Virginia, by 1880. Eventually, the school would graduate the nucleus of a Signal Corps of officers as 84 well as enlisted men, all permanently assigned to that branch. Despite attempts to found schools of application for infantry and cavalry,

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71 the army by 1880 still had no classes available for training young officers in the skills of these combat arms. Sherman called for such schools during the 1870s, but lack of money and the exigencies of Indian campaigning delayed his plans. Finally, on May 5, 1881, General Order 42 established the School of Application For Cavalry and Infantry at 85 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The establishment of the School of Application was an important step, albeit faltering at first. Sherman himself considered the school to be an "experiment only," and its initial enrollment was small, being limited to thirtyfive lieutenants, one per each cavalry and infantry regiment. The curriculum consisted of a two-year program of tactics, drill, organization, and practical instruction in the field. The remedial program for first-year students deficient in basic education, which included many of the early students, consisted of work in reading, 86 writing, arithmetic, algebra, trigonometry, geography, and history. Even so, Sherman had originally wanted less classroom work and more field exercises, suggesting that academic work be confined to the winter 87 months only. The students took turns commanding units of the permanent garrison, four infantry companies, one artillery battery, and 88 four cavalry companies. The commandant of the school, Colonel El well S. Otis of the Twentieth Infantry, reported directly to Sherman, 89 a stipulation upon which the commanding general insisted. The first years of the school were undistinguished, but by the late 1880s, it graduated thirty officers a year from its program and had raised admis90 sion standards sufficiently to abolish the remedial courses. Even so, its great days were to come during the twentieth century, when army officers no longer viewed it as Sherman had characterized it in a candid letter to Sheridan in 1881:

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72 I confess I made the order [General Order 42] as a concession to the everlasting demand's of friends and families to have their boys detailed to Signal duty, or to the School at Fort Monroe to escape company duty in the Indian country. The School at Leavenworth may do some good, and be a safety valve for those who are resolved to escape from the drugery of garrison life at small posts. . ."1 The various postgraduate schools of the late nineteenth century may have been much too small and too cursory to meet all of the army's educational needs. However, they did survive, and their growing network of graduates eventually built army education for commissioned officers into the extensive and comprehensive system which it is today. Sherman and his generals, then, were a diverse lot, a group of men who often looked backward to the army's past even as they tried to discern the future of their service. Their ambiguous approach to changing times lay rooted deeply in their years as Indian fighters on the frontier and as conquerors of the rebellious South in a war marked both by set-piece battles and portents of the grim warfare of the future. If few of them could clearly see in which direction they, the army, and the nation traveled, few persons at any time or in any place can predict what will come. At their best, they encouraged study and discussion and contributed to them as well. And, despite the atmosphere of bickering and jealousy which all too often hamstrung the leadership of the "old army," they did produce one genuine visionary. Sherman himself, who was so inclined to draw from the past and uphold tradition in other matters, sponsored this officer and recommended his work to influential civilians and his own officer corps. From this man, Colonel Emory Upton, the army received a well -developed theory of professionalism, at the ^jery time when its officers, disorganized and uncertain still, struggled to find a sense of direction.

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73 Notes to Chapter II iFor a provocative discussion of this transformation and the war's role in it, see George M. Frederickson, The Inner Civil War : Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of _the Union (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 183-216. ^Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 111-132; Jerry Israel, ed., Building the Organiza tional Society : Essays i n Associational Activities in Modern America (New York: Free Press, T972), contains essays on the process of professionalization among several occupations. %or a case of an occupation which has yet to achieve real intragroup unity, engineering, see Monte A. Calvert, "The Search For Engineering Unity: The Prof essionalization of Special Interest," in Israel, Building the Organizational Society 42-54. ^Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Mil itary Rel ations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19577, 7-18. This is still the standard work in the field, despite its age and conservative bias. 5 lbid. 19-58; H. C. Hittle, The Military Staff : Its History and Development (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1952). The process of military reform in Britain is discussed in Gwynn HarriesJen kins, The Army in Victorian Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) and Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972). The changes in French military thought are treated in Raoul Girardet, J_a societe militaire dans la France contemporaine (1815-1939) (Paris: Librairie PI on, 1953), and~Paul Marie la Gorce, The French Army: A MilitaryPolitical History (New York: George Braziller, 1963). The best work on the war that established Prussian dominance of military affairs is Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (New York: Collier Books, 1969). ^Huntington, Soldier and the State 30-54. 'A fine discussion of this military tradition is Marcus Cun1 iff e, Soldiers and Civilians : The Martial Spirit in America 17751865 (New York: Free Press, 1973~T7 See also Lawrence D. Cress, "The Standing Army, the Militia, and the New Republic: Changing Attitudes Toward the Military in American Society, 1768 to 1820" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976). Divergent views of the impact of

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74 the standing army of the Federalists are Richard H. Fraser, "Foundations of American Mil itary Policy, 1783-1800" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1959) and Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword : The Federal ists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America 1783T8W "(NewTork: Free Press, 1975). 8 Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians 101-144, 179-212. See also David T. Childress, "The Army in Transition: The United States Army, 1815-1846" (Ph.D. dissertation, Mississippi State University, 1974), 84132; William B. Skelton, "The United States Army, 1821-1837: An Institutional History" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968). 9 Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians 147-176, 215-286. 10 See John A. Logan, The Volunteer Soldier of America (Chicago: R. S. Peale, 1887), 325-458. 11 A good recent history of the Military Academy is Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty Honor Country : A History of West Point (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, T966 ) ; see also Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians 172-176. l^For a discussion of Logan, an influential postwar Republican politician and Grand Army of the Republic leader, see Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army : Military Thought From Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 226-401. 13 Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968; original edition, 1904), 127-136. l^Meigs' letter in United States Congress, Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, Reorganization of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), 276-282; Richard Allen Andrews, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the Army, and Reform, 18691883" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968), 162-163. l^For a discussion of the years to follow and the consolidation of the steps made in 1876-1881, see Peter Karsten, "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes For the American Century," in Israel, Building the Organizational Society 216-133. 6 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 14-15. I'The best biography of Sherman is Lloyd Lewis, Sherman Fight ing Prophet (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958; original edition, 1932), but for the personality of the man, see James M. Merrill, Willi am Tecumseh Sherman (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1971). l^This phase of Sherman's career is most thoroughly studied in Robert G. Athearn, Wil liam Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956).

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75 et< 20 1 'Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 32-45. Andrews' work is the only detailed study of Sherman's years as commanding general. Ibid. 45-47. 21 Ibid. 47-117. 22w. T. Sherman to John Sherman, September 21, 1865, in Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed. The Sherman Letters : Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman From 1837 to 1891 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 256. For Sherman's and other officers' distaste for Reconstruction duty, see James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), passim 23 Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 118-151. -4 For an overview of Sherman's problems with the command structure, see Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position : The Commanding General of the Army of the United States 1864-1903 (Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs Press, 1975), 52-74. "Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), I, 881; Richard O'Connor, Sheridan the Inevitable (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1953); Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P^ hL_ Sheridan (2 vols. New York: Charles Webster, 1888 ) 26 27 Utley, Frontier Regulars 34. Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 664. 30sherman to Major General John M. Schofield, November 11, 1880, box 50, John M. Schofield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 31utley, Frontier Regulars 34, 43. ^Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 496-497; Glenn Tucker, Hancock the Superb (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merri 1 1 1960 ) 33utley, Frontier Regulars 111-129; Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee : An Indian History of the American West (New York: Bantam Books7T972T7 146-154. United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1877), I, 86-109.

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76 35 Tucker, Hancock the Superb 273-311. 36 See letters written in 1876 in Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1800-1890, letterbook 59, record group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 37 Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 260-261; Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States I (January 1880). DO Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of jthe United States Army I, 865; John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years Tn the Army (New York: Century, 1897). '~ 39 Sefton, United States Army and Reconstruction 15, 18, 113, 182, 187; Russell F. Weigley, H i story of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 261-262. 40 Army and Navy Journal April 15, 1876, editorial, "The Military Academy," 581. 41 Weigley, History of the United States Army 315, 320; Russell F. Weigley, "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," Military Affairs XXIII (Surrmer 1959), 77-84. 42 Weigley, "Military Thought of John M. Schofield," 77-84. 43 Speech delivered on January 19, 1879, printed in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, I (January T880TT 1-19. 44 Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress. 45 Sherman to Schofield, December 13, 1880, December 16, 1880, ibid ^Schofield to Sherman, May 3, 1881, ibid 4 'The careers of these men are briefly sketched in Utley, Fron tier Regulars 33, 34, 220. 48 Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of jthe United States Army I, 54-60, 65-77, 81-125. 49 William H. Powell ed. List of Officers of the Army of the Un i ted States From 1789 to 1900 (New York: L. R. Haimiersly~"a"nd" Company, 1900), ?8Tr30U7"34T-34TT 350, 406, 414-415, 446-447, 480, 666. For a summary of key points of comparison in the careers of line colonels, see Appendix 3. 50 Utley, Frontier Regulars 209, 400. 51 Army and Navy Journal March 26, 1881, 698.

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11 S^Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 54-60, 65-77, 81-125. 53 Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress. ^Sherman to Schofield, December 16, 1880, ibid 55 Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, November 11, 1880, ibid ^"Sherman to Schofield, November 11, 1880, ibid ; Utley, Frontier Regulars 292-293. 5' Sherman to Schofield, August 31, 1880, box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress. 58 Sherman to Schofield, December 16, 1880, ibid ; Utley, Fron tier Regulars 355-356, 366-367. 59utley, Frontier Regulars 356. ^Sherman to Schofield, December 13, 1880, December 16, 1880, box 50, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress; Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 219-220. 61 Willi am T. Sherman, The Memoirs of Wi 1 1 i am T. Sherman Written by Himself (2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1875), II, 386. 62 1 bid ., II, 387-388, 402. 63 Sheridan to Sherman, May 31, 1878, letterbook for 1876-1878, Philip H. Sheridan Papers, Library of Congress. 64 See Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars : Army Life and Reforms 1865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 5-6. See United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, Report of _a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs Relating to the Reorganization of the Army (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1878), 4, in which Sherman rather sarcastically listed four major reports prior to 1877 in which he had given testimony. ^Sherman to Representatives Levi Maish, Edward S. Bragg, and Harry White, January 7, 1878, box 90, William T. Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. This is a form of the letter printed in House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, 4. ^Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 156-167. 68 ibid., 164.

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78 69 1 b i d 282. For the text of the Burnside Bill, see Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 1-78. ^Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 282; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 5-6. ^ Report of the Secretary of War, 1878, I, 9. 72 Ambrose, Duty Honor Country 198-200. 73 Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 260-261; Walter S. Dillard, "The United States Military Academy 1865-1900: The Uncertain Years" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), 151-154, 266-291. 74 Ambrose, Duty Honor Country 197-218. Dillard, "United States Military Academy," 281-282, argues that this is overstated and that the specialization of military knowledge and the demands of a fouryear academic course were incompatible, concluding that the academy's traditionalism was the only solution to the problem. That may be, but it does not explain why rote learning and recitation could not have been deemphasized. The curriculum itself is listed in Henry 0. Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point (New York: Arno Press, 1969; original edition, 1878), 25-26. Flipper was the academy's first black graduate. 7 ^Speech printed in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States I, (January 1880)," 1-19. 76 Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 260-261. 77 See Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States I, (1880), II (T881T^ United Service I (1879), II (January-June 1880), III (JulyDecember 1880), IV (January-June 1881), V (July-December 1881). See especially Henry Romeyn, "Lineal vs. Regimental Promotion," ibid ., II (December 1880), 719-728; "X" ("An Army Officer"), "The Question of Lineal Promotion," ibid ., Ill (October 1880), 484-494; Emory Upton, "Some Facts in Favor of Compulsory Retirement," ibid ., II (March 1880), 269-288, III (December 1880), 649-666, IV (January 1881), 19-32. 79 Childress, "Army in Transition," 232-279. 80 Report of the Secretary of War, 1879, I, 176-187; ibid ., 1880, I, 231-247rTbTd., 1881, I, 172^178. See also Wei gley THi story of the United States Army 273. "' Army and Navy Journal February 19, 1876, editorial, "Special Army Schools, 452. 82 Weigley, History of the United States Army 273. 83 Report of the Secretary of War, 1881, I, 5.

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79 84 For the early Signal Service, see Joseph H. M. Hawes, "The Signal Corps and the Weather Service," Military Affairs XXX (Summer 1966), 68-76. 85pil e 3184 AGO 1881, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1881-1889, RG 94, National Archives. The order was printed on May 7, 1881, creating some confusion over its actual date of issue. ^Timothy J. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army : Education Professional ism and the Officer Corps of the United States Army 1881-1918 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 22-24. 87 Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 265, 88 Report of the Secretary of War, 1881, I, 5; Nenninger, Leaven worth Schools and the Old Army, 24. 89 Nenninger, Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army 24. 90 1 bid ., 25-31. 91 Sherman to Sheridan, November 22, 1881, letterbook 95, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress.

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CHAPTER III THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL: The Life and Legacy of Emory Upton Although his name appears in no battle reports from the Plains, Emory Upton affected the history and development of the United States Army more than any other officer of the post-Civil War period. Sherman, his sponsor, may have shaped the army into his own creation, but his influence began to disappear as the Civil War generation retired or died. Upton, however, left a legacy, a body of professional thought and recommendations for reform which have influenced the army and set the parameters of discussion of military policy ever since. He even began the systematic, thorough study of American military history with his magnum opus The Military Policy of the United States which has left an indelible impact upon generations of soldiers and scholars since it first circulated in manuscript and in synopsis a century ago. The quiet of the post-Civil War years, despite the reductions in force and the relative neglect which they brought the army, did, nevertheless, provide the time for thoughtful officers to ponder the future of their profession and to compare it with others in a changing America. Upton, because of Sherman's support and his own intense and methodical nature, explored this question more fully than his colleagues. In so doing, he left his viewpoint, if not his name, as his legacy to the twentieth-century army. SO

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81 Emory Upton had always wanted to be a soldier. Born in upstate New York in 1839, he entered West Point in 1856, after a year of preparatory work at Oberlin College in Ohio. Oberlin reinforced his intense nature, religiosity, and abolitionist sentiments; West Point instilled a deep love for the army and strong discipline in him. Upton attended the Military Academy at a time when the institution was experimenting with a five-year curriculum. Upton's class graduated just in time to join the regulars and three-month volunteers preparing to march on Richmond." Upton made a splendid war record for himself. He was a soldier's soldier who demonstrated the ability to command artillery, infantry, and cavalry. Beginning his career as a second lieutenant of artillery with a regular battery, he wrangled the colonelcy of a New York volunteer regiment in 1862. Within a year, Upton had received conmand of a brigade, but the promotion to brigadier general, which he wanted more than 3 anything else, still eluded him. He finally won his stars at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia, in 1864, after he planned and his troops made an impressive demonstration of an attack in column. Although his soldiers could not hold the ground they had gained within the Confederate breastworks, the assault prophesied the future of warfare in an age 4 that was just coming to understand the meaning of rifles and trenches. In the fall of 1864, Upton and his brigade served under Philip H. Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. There Upton received a promotion to major general and a severe wound. When he returned to active duty early the following spring, he commanded a division of cavalry under Major General James Harrison Wilson, who became one of his closest friends. Wilson and Upton destroyed remaining Confederate resistance in northern Alabama. At the age of twenty-five, Upton's combat experience ended forever.

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82 After the war, he reverted in rank to lieutenant colonel and served briefly with an infantry regiment, first in Colorado and then in Georgia. In 1868, he married Emily Martin, a deeply-religious New York lady of good family whom he had first met while home on furlough during the war. A soldier first and a husband second, Upton seemed ill-suited for marriage until, after a year and several separations caused by his military duties, he fell violently in love with his wife. But his happiness was short-lived. Within a year, in 1870, Emily Upton became seriously ill and died while seeking the curative benefits of a tropical climate. The news of her death hit him like a thunderclap. With her passing, the army became once more the center of Upton's life. In 1870, the young widower received an important assignment which helped put his grief in perspective and set the course of his postwar career. Upton returned to West Point as commandant of cadets, which gave him the time and opportunity to perfect a new system of infantry tactics on which he had been at work since the war years. His assignment to the Military Academy lasted five years, during which time he had his first real taste of postwar success. His Infantry Tactics Double and Single Rank completed in 1873, was ^jery well received and adopted by the army under the guidance of Sherman, who respected Upton's combination of intellect and soldierly skill. Since e\/ery infantry officer in the regular army and many militia officers had to purchase the official tactical manual, Upton's book earned him steady royalties to supplement his army pay. During this period, he also became the tactical editor of the Army and Navy Journal gaining an influential civilian friend in its general editor, William C. Church. Upton also supervised the writing of new artillery and cavalry tactical manuals to

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83 complement his infantry tactics, and these, in turn, became the army's 9 standard system. Yet he was not content. Sherman, taking a paternal interest in the younger officer's career, suggested that Upton undertake a world tour to inspect the major armies. Sherman especially wanted to see Upton's evaluations of Asian armies, for the corrmanding general believed that Asian conditions, especially those faced by the British in India, were most comparable to the American regulars' problems on the Plains. It took time to get the tour funded properly, but finally, in June 1875, Upton received his travel orders. With him he took two other promising officers, Captain J. P. Sanger of his own First Artillery and Major George A. Forsyth of the Ninth Cavalry, a hero of both the Civil War and the campaigns of the West. 11 Upton and his party visited the Far East first. There, the colonel approved the rapidly-westernizing army of Japan, although he expressed 12 considerable disdain for the "pagan" religion of the Japanese. He found virtually nothing to corrmend in either China or Persia, citing both states as examples of decadence and the effects of poor military 13 planning. In India, though, Upton found great promise in the work which the British had done with native troops in the Indian Army. He saw in the "nucleus" of British regulars in India a good model for America's army, stating: "The military institutions of India present more features for our imitation than those of any army or country of Eu14 rope." He, like Sherman, noted the parallels between the Indian frontier and the frontier West of the 1870s. But in Europe Upton found his inspiration for the future.

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The new professional armies of Europe, with their well-trained and subordinate reserves, enchanted the visiting colonel. In Britain, in Austria, in Italy, even in France, he found much to commend in military policy and organization. The French staff system, just being reorganized in the mid-1870s, suggested to him why France had lost the Franco15 Prussian War. Sai nt-C yr he believed to be much inferior to West Point, but, he noted to Henry A. Du Pont, his friend and classmate at "the Point," no other military academy or cadet program could compare to their alma mater What intrigued Upton most in Europe was the intense interest in military affairs demonstrated by educated civilians and officers alike. He believed that, as a result, the European armies were far superior to his own. Of all the nations he visited, Germany presented the army closest to the model which he had been seeking. The German military system fascinated Upton. He eagerly sought an opportunity to view the Imperial Army in formal maneuvers, but his official credentials did not include the names of Sanger and Forsyth, so his request was denied. J. C. Bancroft Davis, the charge d'affaires in Berlin, tried to explain to Upton that the Imperial Government was one of the strictest in Europe regarding the credentials of official visitors from other nations. Upton, however, refused to understand, and he blamed Davis for his inability to see the maneuvers. The petty dispute turned bitter as Upton assailed the State Department officials as incompetent and ineffective; they criticized Upton's stubbornness and self-righteous attitude. Upton lost this battle, which eventually embroiled the highest officials in the State Department and the War De18 partment, Sherman, and Grant. Grant telegraphed Sherman his final words on the matter: "No legation has been requested to intercede for

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85 invitation to Gen. Upton to witness army manuevers [";_] the Sec. of State 19 agreed with me that it was best not to make such request." Even if he was not able to "occupy a coveted position in a grand military display," Upton did see the German troops in less staged situations. He felt somewhat uncomfortable with the martial atmosphere of German primary schools, and he deplored the red tape in which the Imperial Govern20 ment delighted. The soldiers, however, enchanted him, and he wrote home enthusiastically: The soldiers are handsome, cleanly young fellows, from twenty to twenty-three years of age. Their bearing denotes a good discipline, while the cheerful face denotes an absence of oppression. The officers, who are well dressed, have no swagger, but they walk with the self -consciousness that, in the social scale, they stand next to the Kaiser. . This was the image that Upton hoped would someday apply to his own country's officers and enlisted men. When Upton returned to America in 1877, Sherman had him assigned to the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia. There, as the newlytransferred lieutenant colonel of the Fourth Artillery, Upton taught infantry tactics and strategy as he wrote the official report of his tra2? vels. Originally, he had wanted to include sections on American military history to reinforce the recommendations which formed the conclusion of his report, but Sherman convinced him to leave that subject 23 until later, when it could be presented in a book-length argument. Upton's assignment at the school was a happy one, for he devoted himself to making that institution comparable to the postgraduate military schools which he had seen in Europe. All the while, he worked on his manuscripts, first the official report, then a publishable version of it, and, finally, the military history which began to obsess him. He hoped,

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86 he wrote to Du Pont, to "expose the errors of America's military policy" and "apply the principles of common sense" in proposing a plan for an expansible army in time of peace, so that a quick influx of volunteer privates could fit easily into a well -trained nucleus of officers and non-commissioned officers. Thus could "the blood and treasure" of the nation be husbanded, not wasted as it had been in all past American 24 wars. Sherman, of course, approved the report of the tour and re25 commended its findings to the army's friends in Congress. In 1878, Upton's report appeared in print as The Armies of Asia and Europe Although it sold only 600 copies, the book was very influential in military circles, for William C. Church had already published excerpts of it and praised its major recommendations in the editorial pages of the Army and Navy Journal The colonel's ideas, if not his book itself, reached a substantial audience of soldiers and interested civilians. Although most of The Armies of Asia and Europe described the military systems of the lands Upton visited, the heart of the book is the fifty-four pages of conclusions in which Upton recommended reforms for his own army, based upon what he had seen abroad. Not all were controversial. Upton had generous praise for West Point and said little about 27 change in that institution. He also matched the public mood in his emphasis on economy in military matters; in all of his plans he noted how little additional money needed to be spent to reform military education and training for staff and line officers. He suggested the elimination of recruiting bounties in wartime, which had created considerable debts for states and localities during the final years of the Civil War. Few soldiers could object to his advocacy of the three-battalion

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87 infantry regiment, common in Europe but not often employed in the American army since the War of 1812. Although his own tactics treated the infantry battalion and regiment as interchangeable units, Upton's emphasis on mobility and flexibility on the battlefield made his recom29 mendation of this reform quite logical. Doubtless, his adaptation of the Prussian depot system, also favored by Sherman, in which each regular army regiment would recruit primarily from its own geographical territory in which it would keep a permanent depot party, antagonized 30 few.' However, the major features of Upton's reforms threatened the vested interests of staff officers and militia officers of the states. Upton envisaged a small professional army in peacetime which could expand fiveor six-fold in time of war. This army would not have to rely on militia units or hastily-organized volunteer regiments to bring it up to wartime strength. Rather, volunteers would fill its expansible ranks as privates; extra lieutenants would be men already trained and certified as officer candidates, not political appointees unfamiliar with their duties. Captains, field officers, and generals would all be regular army officers, and sergeants would be longservice regular en31 listed men. The basis of his military system, Upton wrote, was the "declaration, that every able-bodied male citizen, between certain ages, owes his country military service— a principle thoroughly republican in its nature." He took this a step further and insisted that the federal government had the "right to draft men into the service whenever a 32 district fails to furnish its quota." Here Upton and most nineteenthcentury Americans parted company, but Upton drew the logical conclusion, calling for the "inauguration of all the machinery for enrolling and

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33 drafting, the moment war is declared." Having stated this point early in his argument, he left it quickly. Perhaps it was his own sense of realism, or perhaps Sherman urged him to tone it down. As the commanding general told him: No matter how economical and fair may be the "draft," we can never succeed in making it popular or customary in America. We must base all our calculations for the near future on "volunteers," which I construe our Regular Army to be in fact, and I advise you gradually to direct your argument to the great proposition that war is a science needing military education, training, and practice. . .34 In any event, Upton's expansible army did rely on volunteers, albeit not state troops. He called his volunteers "National Volunteers," and he envisaged this force as providing officers as well as enlisted men. The officers would be commissioned by the President and be placed on the annual army register below the regular second lieutenants. They would all have to pass examinations in basic military knowledge and would be drawn from graduates of military programs at colleges, state military school graduates, state militia officers, and former regular army sergeants and corporals. Not a peacetime reserve in a real sense, these men would not train formally and would automatically leave the re35 gister in peacetime upon reaching the age of thirty-five. Upton did suggest federal pay for drills of the units which were just beginning to form a National Guard in the mid-1870s, but in general he distrusted state troops. Militia officers and state politicians could not be happy with such a plan. Indeed, Upton's recommendations and his subsequent writings sparked yet another round in the long struggle between advocates of the regular army and the would-be citizen-soldiers. The expansible regular army, to which Upton devoted most of his attention, would consist of the twenty-five infantry regiments, of twelve

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89 companies divided into three battalions each, the ten cavalry regiments, and the five artillery regiments, which Upton believed could be profitably consolidated into an artillery corps. Each regiment, or its equivalent, would have two depot, or skeleton, companies, of which only the officers and non-commissioned officers would actually be on active duty in peacetime. A major would comnand each regimental depot. The depot would be located in the state or region from which the regiment would 37 recruit its enlisted component. The adoption of the depot system and a reliance on federally-recruited National Volunteers in wartime would, Upton noted, "at once federalize and popularize our army," while insuring trained officers and non-commissioned officers would lead the 38 troops in war as well as in peace. Upton's plan called for the greatest influx of volunteers to be assigned to the infantry, for "the infantry is more easily improved and 39 made efficient, than artillery and cavalry." In peacetime, each infantry regiment would consist of two active battalions of five companies each, plus the skeleton battalion formed by the two depot companies. The battalions would be conmanded by a lieutenant colonel and two majors. The junior major would command the depot battalion, which would have no staff of its own except in time of war. The active battalions would each have a staff of an adjutant, a quartermaster, a sergeant major, and a quartermaster sergeant. The regiment would have a separate staff under the colonel, in which all of the positions listed above 40 would also be represented. In wartime, Upton's plan would have a marked effect on the size of the army's smallest formal unit, the company. The table below shows the normal strength of the company of infantry and how Upton's proposed system would subsume the volunteers

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90 into the regular army structure: Table 7. Strength of Expansible Infantry Companies, As Proposed by Emory Upton^l

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91 the active battalions would have four companies, the other two would have three each. The remaining two companies would form the regimental depot. Each active company would have sixty-two enlisted men, as authorized by law since 1842. In wartime, thirty-eight volunteer privates 44 would join each company. Similarly, Upton proposed, artillery regiments would consist of three active battalions, one of four batteries and the others of three batteries each. There would also be a depot battalion of two batteries. One of the active batteries would be designated and trained as light artillery; Upton suggested that each active battery in each of the five regiments take turns serving a two-year tour as light artillery. The light batteries would have eighty enlisted men in time of peace, while the other batteries in the active battalions would have fifty-five. The depot batteries of artillery could guard arsenals and armories as well as train recruits. Upton's wartime artillery relied heavily on light artillery batteries of 100 enlisted men each, the number of such batteries to vary with the amount of infantry raised. An army of 100,000 infantrymen, Upton figured, would require seventy-five light batteries plus two heavy batteries of 250 men each. He wrote that these batteries could be formed by reshuffling the officers and sergeants of artillery, as well as adding volunteer privates, as needed by the field command45 ers. Upton, an artillerist himself, had rather more flexible ideas about artillery organization than that of the other combat arms. He suggested either a corps or regimental organization and also proposed an alternate plan of one light battalion per regiment, or five for the corps. Each of these battalions would consist of two batteries each. The remaining battalions would consist of four "heavy," or dismounted, batteries each.

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92 Having limited the role of volunteer soldiers in any future war, Upton now turned to the problem of the staff. He, like Sherman, believed that staff officers were too independent, powerful, and privileged. He proposed sweeping changes and thus antagonized the majority of staff officers, who preferred that things remain as they were. For one thing, Upton proposed that no officer below the grade of major be permanently assigned to the staff. All captains and lieutenants serving with staff departments were to be assigned to a regiment but as supernumerary officers, so that the companies could have a full complement of officers at all times. Furthermore, Upton suggested, these officers must serve on duty with troops for two years after e^jery four-year staff assignment. When staff-trained officers became eligible for promotion to field grade, they could take an examination which would qualify them for a permanent position with the staff department in which they had 47 served. With this system, Upton reasoned, the army would soon have a large group of officers trained in staff work and line command. As he noted, "The chief object to be kept in view in the proposed reorganization is that the army in time of peace shall be simply a trainingschool to prepare officers for staff duty, and to hold high command; and to this end it is indispensable that an interchangeable relation be es48 tablished between the staff and the line." This, however, would also put an end to the long tours of duty at comfortable stations, to which many line officers aspired and for which they pestered superiors and friendly politicians to obtain. Command of a company at an isolated frontier post was hardly a prospect that many of those officers relished, and the long, bitter resistance to rotation between staff and line owed much to this ^ery human factor.

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93 Upton also hoped to rearrange the staff departments. Some of the departments, such as the Quartermaster's Department, the Subsistence Department, the Pay Department, and the Corps of Engineers, he would retain essentially as they already existed, with the addition of supernumerary line captains in some cases. The engineer company-grade officers, like the captains of the other departments, would not be permanently assigned to the corps. Upton said nothing about the Medical Department or the Judge Advocate General's Department; had he had his way, however, he would have abolished the latter, although he did not 49 state that opinion in The Armies of Asia and Europe Upton, like the army's chief Congressional critic, Representative Henry Banning of Ohio, wished to merge the Ordnance Corps with the artillery. This new branch would have a brigadier general as chief of artillery and ordnance, assisted by five colonels, five lieutenant colonels, and ten majors as full-time ordnance specialists. Fifteen captains and fifteen first lieutenants, detailed from the line of the artillery, would be 50 trained in ordnance work and then rotated to the batteries.' The Signal Service would continue to have only one permanent officer, the chief signal officer, who would remain a colonel. Twenty lieutenants detailed from the line would assist him, learning the duties of communi51 cations officers before being reassigned to line units. The biggest staff change, however, involved the most influential department, the Adjutant General's Department. Upton saw the Adjutant General's Department and the Inspector General's Department as the nucleus of a true general staff. The colonel believed that a modern army must have a group of efficient, thoroughlytrained staff officers who could assist field commanders in gathering

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94 and analyzing intelligence, planning strategy, and making and evaluating maps. These officers would be assisted by others, trained in handling 52 the day-to-day paperwork of a major command. To achieve this for the United States Army, Upton recommended merging the two departments into a new department, commanded by the Adjutant General, of six separate sections. The first section should handle routine correspondence of the army and transmit orders to field commands. The second and third sections, which would report more or less directly to the civilian staff of the War Department, would examine and correct the returns of the army's units and assist the secretary of war in military matters. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections, Upton suggested, ought to report directly to the commanding general. The fourth section would have the task of gathering information on all foreign armies, with special reference to the Mexican army and to those colonial forces posted to Canada and Cuba. The fifth section would write "the military history of our wars, both Indian and civilized," to provide case studies of actions fought under actual American conditions. The sixth section would compile and update 53 detailed personnel files on all officers. Each section would be commanded by a colonel, assisted by a lieutenant colonel or major as assistant chief of section. Three lieutenant colonels would serve as the chiefs of staff of the three major military divisions: the Atlantic, the Missouri, and the Pacific. Ten majors would play similar roles on the staffs of the departmental cormianders. Twelve captains, detached from the line, would be assistant adjutant generals at divi54 sional or departmental headquarters. In all, this super-department would consist of a permanent staff of one brigadier general, six 55 colonels, six lieutenant colonels, and twelve majors.

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95 Upton hoped that such a general staff organization would allow the permanent staff officers to "study the art of war." "By thus emancipating themselves from the routine of paperwork, this system, and this system only, will enable us in future wars to provide competent chiefs 56 of staff, who have been so sadly needed in all of our past wars." Even so, the staff officers involved resented any attempts to combine the departments, whether by economy-minded Congressmen or by Upton's professionally-oriented reform program. Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend had always opposed any merger of the Inspector General's Department with his own, stating flatly that the two departments had \/ery 57 different duties and roles. The staff officers would frustrate all attempts to reorganize the departments in this manner throughout Upton's lifetime. Having proposed a rational organization for line units in peace and war, a reorganization of the staff, and a plan for rotating promising officers between staff and line assignments, Upton tackled the problem of officer evaluation and promotion. Promotion was at the heart of most disputes in the postwar officer corps, so Upton's plans disturbed many. Upton favored lineal promotion as the only rational and fair system, and he proposed a special wartime promotion list in both the original commissioning branch of each officer and the other department or departments for which he may be qualified. This, he noted, would allow the 58 abolition of the brevet system. Furthermore, he recommended that all officers from second lieutenants to colonels be examined for promotions. Those second lieutenants who did not pass the test would be dropped from the army register. First lieutenants would receive a second chance to pass the examination. Captains who failed twice would

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96 not be dismissed from the army, unlike first lieutenants, but they would 59 be permanently barred from promotion to field grade/ Upton also strongly recommended professional courses of study for officers, much like that of the Artillery School, and the curriculum of these programs would form much of the examinations given to determine eligibility for promotion. In all, Upton's plan would create quicker promotions, but it would also remove officers who, while not the best the army could obtain, nevertheless preferred to continue their military careers. In The Armies of Asia and Europe then, Upton had advanced a reorganization of the army which would aid the professionalization of the officer corps. The value of professional training pervaded Upton's expansible army, and the rotation of line officers to staff positions would, in time, have led to the integration of the two rival factions of the officer corps. Lineal promotion and promotion examinations, coupled with formal coursework in postgraduate schools for officers or in post classes, would establish concrete criteria for professional retention and advancement. Now Upton needed to provide the historical justification for the truly professional officer corps and its new expertise. This justification, while it did not receive the amount of contemporary discussion that The Armies of Asia and Europe attracted, had wider application for the future. Upton summed up his justification as follows: If only America's wars had been fought rationally by professionallytrained soldiers much waste and bloodshed could have been avoided. To prove this point, so central to his reform program, Upton began writing a systematic history of the military policy of the United States. Shortly after he completed the manuscript of The Armi es of Asia and Europe Upton began to write his "Military Policy of the United States."

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97 Although it was an ambitious project, he counted on Sherman's help in providing him with statistics and copies of documents, and he originally CI believed that he could complete the work in 1879. Several persons read all or part of the manuscript to suggest revisions. One was his friend and former commander, James Harrison Wilson, now out of the army and employed as a railroad executive. Henry A. Du Pont, the West Point classmate who was probably Upton's best friend, corresponded with the colonel and read the entire work. To him, Upton poured out his thoughts. "I am going to trace our military policy from the beginning of the Revolution to the present time, and if possible expose its folly and irresponsibility ," he informed Du Pont late in 1877. Upton told him to check the work for Upton's own personal bias and tendency toward an overly-complex writing style, adding that he had "given up" the notion of writing a book for the general reader. Upton preferred, he said, to produce a book "filled with facts and statistics" which would impress and persuade members of Congress. Upton told his friend his deepest fears: "Gen. Sherman is very anxious to have me go on with 65 the work; but he tells me that I will receive much abuse." Du Pont began to read the chapters late in 1878; in mid-1880, he was reviewing the chapters on the first year of the Civil War as Upton's time-table for completing the manuscript had slipped to 1881, "if Garfield should be elected." From the wealthy scion of the Du Pont chemical empire Upton received moral support and critiques offered "freely and like a friend." However, other persons, better known and even more influential, also spurred the young colonel on in his writing. General Sherman, who had aided Upton in so many ways, now brought to the attention of military experts in Congress the work that Upton had

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98 produced. He told a joint Congressional committee about the importance of the colonel's report on his tour even before The Armies of Asia and Europe had been published. He also told Representative James A. Garfield about the military history manuscript, which interested the Congressman greatly. Garfield, a Republican leader in the House of Representatives and a volunteer general of the Civil War, was himself a friend of the army who had opposed reductions in the force during the late 1860s and throughout the 1870s. He had recently authored, with Sherman's assistance in the gathering of materials, a favorable article 69 on the army for the North American Review Upton, interested in the ideas of the friendly politician, wrote Garfield about his latest project, which intended "to show that instead of securing natfional] economy by keeping the army too small, and without a proper expansive organization, we have prosecuted all our wars with a waste of life and treasure which find no parallel save in China." He sent Garfield his chapters on the Revolution, which "delighted" the Ohio politician. Garfield suggested that Upton explore "our traditional prejudice against a standing army," made some technical suggestions, and called on Upton to denounce the "evils and iniquity" of the bounty system. Upton, for his part, was pleased, and he told Garfield, "I hope that you will give me the full benefit of your knowledge of the temper, and feelings Congress, or any other body of men." Upton was serious about reaching Congress as well as the officer corps with his message, and he was willing to tone down his sometimes ascerbic style to achieve that end. 72 Garfield, Upton's modern biographer notes, served the colonel's 73 purposes well. The congressman shared the colonel's view of the

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99 militia and the problems that state troops had presented. He wrote: . Your plan for a national army, modeled somewhat on the German plan ... is excellent, and I hope you will work it out so fully in its details that we can embody it in a bill to be introduced into Congress. I am satisfied we shall never be able to organize an effective militia on the old plan. . .74 Upton himself feared that his harsh criticism of militia policy during 75 the War of 1812 would be "a dose too bitter to commend." But Garfield reassured him that he need not "soften the history of the horrible management" of that war. "I think the country just now will bear a good deal of plain talk on the whole subject fof military affairs], in view of the dangers of communism." Garfield used his influence to get Congress to appoint a special joint committee to study reorganization of the army. The chairman of this committee was Senator Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, a Civil War general and West Point graduate who was a long-time friend of army reform. The committee began its work in July 1878, with several days of testimony. Sherman was the first witness; he cited Upton's book as the definitive work of its kind. He also told the legislators of the manuscript history, which "will contain 78 much valuable matter bearing on all questions submitted" to them. Upton himself did not appear before the Burnside committee, but it did solicit his views by letter and published the letter in full in the doc79 uments section of its final report. The Burnside committee produced an army reorganization bill heavily influenced by Upton's ideas. The bill reduced the staff in numbers but allowed for staff and line rotation much as Upton had envisaged it. It

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100 also set up a General Staff Department by merging the Adjutant General's Department with the Inspector General's Department, and it placed this new department under the authority of the commanding general. It provided for officer promotion boards and compulsory retirement, a cause which Upton favored in private but had not yet advocated in public, because he himself would most likely be promoted to the grade of colonel and the command of the Fourth Artillery whenever such a policy became 80 law. But if Upton rejoiced in the provisions of the Burnside Bill, he soon realized that the staff had quickly united to defeat the measure, which endangered many of its vested interests. "The staff, I expect, will defeat the present bill, and as a result the next Congress will not spare. Very shrewdly the pretend that it is designed to exalt the [Commanding] General above the Secretary (of War], or the Military 81 above the civil power." ~ After a valiant fight by Burnside and his committee, Congress defeated the army reorganization bill, and Upton turned to his manuscript with an even more heightened sense of purpose. Upton focused his manuscript on two problems: the waste and inefficiency created by the use of militia and untrained volunteers to fight America's wars, and the meddling of politicians in military policy. Upton had already proposed a way in which to deal with state forces, and his new study attempted to prove the validity of his arguments through examples in United States military history. The colonel's anger toward what he called political meddling led him to examine in great detail the role of the secretary of war, who, he concluded, was a mere "usurper" of 09 military authority whenever he attempted to set policy on his own. Upton determined to prove that the roots of the Union's early failures

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101 in the Civil War lay in Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's assumption of dangerously-broad powers. Upton accused Stanton, especially in his relations with Major General George B. McClellan, of attempting to control armies in the field. By forcing McClellan to withdraw from the Richmond area after the Seven Days' battles and by redistributing parts of McClellan' s army to the force led by the unfortunate Major General John Pope, Stanton had caused the Union disaster at Second Bull Run and oo the crisis caused by Lee's subsequent invasion of Maryland. Thus, a mere politician had hamstrung a trained soldier, entrusted with the command of a powerful army. Upton's view of civilian meddling and incompetent behavior at the War Department did not differ much from the private views of Sherman and many other officers. Few of them, however, could easily accept Upton's evaluation of McClellan as a maligned military genius. Indeed, Upton must be credited with impartially following his theories of professionalism wherever they led, for "Little Mac," a life-long Democrat, had not only run against Lincoln in 1864, but he had also been notoriously soft on the issue of the abolition of slavery, and a lack of abolitionist 84 fervor was a failing for which Upton could never forgive him. To Upton, there could be no true "military policy" until the federal government and its military experts gained undisputed control. In analyzing the Civil War, Upton expanded his criticisms to include the Union's recruiting policies in general rather than simply denouncing the bounty system. He condemned the early war legislation of 1861, which or firmly established state control of volunteer units. He contrasted this with the official Confederate policy of abandoning states' rights oc in military matters, but he badly overstated his case on this point.

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102 Moving to the current military situation, Upton cited the main evils as the continuing reliance upon the militia, short terms of enlistment in wartime, the federal government's reluctance to draft men, the states' meddling in the employment of troops and the commissioning of officers, the bounty system as a means of obtaining volunteers, the lack a depot system for regular army regiments, and the "assumption of command by the 87 Secretary of War." Upton had reached an impasse. His disdain for the effects of civilian control during the Civil War had led him to envisage an army virtually independent of the War Department as the best remedy. But the Democrats, resurgent in Congress after the scandals of the Grant Administration, not only blamed the army for its role in Reconstruction but also retained much of their states' rights orientation, refusing to approve a larger and more professional standing army. Congress had even rejected the moderate Burnside Bill, which had contained some troop reductions. Even Upton's mentor, Sherman, presented problems for the colonel's plans. Sherman rejected for himself the role of chief of staff, desiring instead the old position of commanding general, the heroic combat leader. Furthermore, he had no use for the staff unless it was clearly subordinate and subservient to him. Not until 1888, when John M. Schofield began his seven-year tenure as commanding general, did the army have a commander who would accept the role of chief of staff in 89 all but name. Frustrated, Upton turned his attention to the one topic which he had not discussed publicly before, compulsory retirement. Upton had privately railed against overage colonels, such as his 90 own, William H. French of the Fourth Artillery. He said nothing in public, however, because he believed such a move would be in bad taste.

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103 However, in 1880, he broke his silence and wrote a three-part article on the subject, which United Service published. Unlike its title, Upton's "Some Facts in Favor of Compulsory Retirement" was a long disquisition on military history and policy which argued that, rare individuals excepted, officers peaked in efficiency by the time they reached their early sixties. With promotion examinations, Upton noted, there ought to be meaningful commands to which to promote young and talented officers in time of peace as well as in war. He concluded on a note of support for his younger brother officers: . The captains and lieutenants of our army are not greedy for promotion. In time of peace they do not ask for a regiment at one-half the proposed £age3 limit of compulsory retirement [sixtytwo]; but, in view of their capacity for higher command, they 'do ask that they shall have a chance to be colonels at least eight years before reaching the age of threes coreandten. 91 Upton's article, as might be expected, was a welcome addition to the literature favoring compulsory retirement. However, it also aroused a storm of controversy in the officer corps, which must have once again demonstrated to Upton that his fellow officers remained badly divided on 92 matters of extreme professional importance. Upton put aside his manuscript on military policy, in the hopes of finishing it later, as he watched the 1880 elections to see if a Republican sweep would replace the army's Congressional foes with new friends. Although his own friend Garfield won the Presidency, Upton's personal outlook became gloomier as the months passed. A painful sinus condition and frequent pounding headaches, signs of what was probably a developing tumor in his brain, forced him to take a leave of absence for medical treatment. When Upton returned to duty, now as commander of the Fourth Artillery in San Francisco, the recently-promoted colonel found

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104 concentration and prolonged sleep nearly impossible. His friends noted with alarm his rapid shifts in mood and his occasional periods of incoherency. Despairing in self-proclaimed failure, Upton left his military history unfinished and brooded over imagined defects in his system of infantry tactics. By mid-March 1881, he could not go on. On a night of intense pain, he thrust aside his correspondence and hastily scratched out a letter of resignation. Grasping his loaded revolver, he put it to his head and pulled the trigger. His death stunned Sherman and shocked 93 the entire officer corps. Despite Upton's visions of personal failure, his ideas influenced the army for generations. While alive, he had reached his fellow officers through the Army and Navy Journal As early as 1877, Church had printed some of Upton's observations on foreign armies and had editorialized in favor of the young officer's reform proposals. "The views of General Upton are interesting, and in some respects original, and we commend them to the consideration of our readers," Church concluded, after praising the proposal for staff and line rotation and the concept of 94 the National Volunteers. In 1880, Church also editorialized in favor of Upton's case for compulsory retirement, calling the colonel's article "the most convincing yet made on the question." Even though noting that Helmuth von Moltke, the Prussian military genius, might be a "living refutation of the compulsory retirement doctrine" that only youthful men made great commanders, Church agreed with Upton that the good of the service demanded compulsory retirement, "because any sound system must 95 be founded on the general rule and not the exception." Within two years, this view prevailed, and compulsory retirement, much as Upton 96 had proposed it, passed both houses of Congress in 1882.

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105 After Upton's death, his friend on the West Point faculty, Colonel Peter S. Michie, published a biography which contained large excerpts from Upton's letters and useful sumnaries of both The Armies of Asia and Europe and the still-uncompl eted military history. In this form, Up97 ton's ideas reached a wider audience than before. Henry A. Du Pont, whom Upton had charged with the care and completion of the manuscript of "The Military Policy of the United States," never honored its author's request to publish it, but he did make it available for several army officers to study. In 1899, when Elihu Root became Secretary of War, he rediscovered the value of Upton's work. Under official War Department auspices, a lightly-edited version of The Military Policy of the 99 United States went to press in 1904. Acknowledged by both military theorists and professional historians as a classic in its field, the book has influenced disputes over the relative merits of the regular , .100 army and the National Guard ever since. The meaning of Upton's greatest work has been debated by experts in and out of uniform. One school of interpretation, dominated by the National Guard and its supporters, considers Upton's emphasis on the Prussian military system as a model and his contempt for American citizensoldiers to have been a tragic deepening of the long-standing rift between the regulars and the state troops. Other critics focus on Upton's rejection of civilian control and deplore his inability to com102 promise with political realities in nineteenth-century America. Both of these lines of thought are valid, and they point to the limitations of Upton's work when it is carried to its logical conclusions. However, Upton is more profitably examined as a man of his era, both a visionary and a conservative. He anticipated, as did the military

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106 thinkers of Europe in his day, a future filled with conflicts like the Franco-Prussian War, short actions best fought by skilled professionals 103 who could keep the impact of war limited. In much the same way that civilian professionals and civil service reformers viewed efficiency, Upton stressed the order and savings that military professionalism would bring. Upton himself favored civil service reform and was influenced by its approach, "a one-term President, life-tenure, and good salaries" as the way to produce an honest, efficient government to work 104 with the army. Upton believed that professional soldiers alone could manage the defense policy of the nation. He and they sought "to present the best system to meet the needs of judicious economy in peace, and to avert un105 necessary extravagance, disaster, and bloodshed, in time of war." Like the civilian members of professions, Upton stressed the need for the public to give the professional soldiers a freer hand in their field. His military system, he argued, "would enable us to prosecute our campaigns with vigor and economy, and with that regard for human life which becomes a free people." The amateur soldiers of the Great Rebellion could hardly have made the same claim. Realizing that, Upton attempted to forge a theory of military professionalism based on the European armies which he admired and suited to peculiarly American conditions, and he did it at a time, the closing years of the Indian Wars, when the army's traditional peacetime raison d'etre was in doubt. Only pieces of his program were adopted, but its spirit and substance influenced the development of the army from the turn of the century to the present. Upton deserves his high reputation simply for advancing a coherent program and stimulating thought at a time when lack of true group

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107 solidarity within the officer corps prevented professional ization from progressing further. Moreover, time was on Upton's side; his vision of the new, professional army was the wave of the future. Perhaps William C. Church, tireless propangandist for the army, best expressed the professional dream. "The army and navy of the future," he wrote in 1880, "will have a wider sphere of usefulness than at present. We think they will have a more intimate connection with our 107 civil service. They might form the nucleus of a true civil service." Upton's writings, and many of the policies of his commander and friend, William T. Sherman, tried to make that future come to pass. They failed to do so in the nineteenth century. But their successors, the generals of the post-World War II United States Army, succeeded in that task, beyond even Upton's and Sherman's wildest dreams. Notes to Chapter III *For a good discussion of Upton's influence, see Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army : Military Thought From Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbi a University Press, 1962), 100-126. -Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 3-15; Peter S. Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), 1-41. ^Ambrose, Upton and the Army 18-28.

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108 4 Most Civil War assaults were based on a two-rank formation. Upton used twelve regiments in four ranks for his attack in column, to provide greater firepower and shock effect once the lines were breached. Had he received prompt and coordinated support, Upton could have broken the Confederate lines permanently. For full correspondence, see United States War Department, The War of the Rebel lion : A Compilation of the Offical Records of jthe Union and~Confederate Armi es (128 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), series 1, XXXVI, part 1, 67, 665-671. 5 Ambrose, Upton and the Army 29-53; Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 42-178. 6 Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 179-243. Ambrose, Upton and the Army 54-84; Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 244-283 o Donald N. Bigelow, William Conant Church and the Army and Navy Journal (New York: AMS Press, 1968; original ed i tTon7T957J7 T25, 207208. ^Ambrose, Upton and the Army 76-82. 10 See Sherman to Upton, July 12, 1875, in file 5021 AGO 1876, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1871-1880, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This correspondence is printed in Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton, 1878), iv-vi. HFor the correspondence relating to the tour and the orders of Sanger and Forsyth, see file 5021 AGO 1876, RG 94, National Archives. -^Upton, Armi es of Asia and Europe 1-12. 13 1 bid ., 13-32, 88-95. 14 1 bid ., 75. 15 Ibid ., 238. 16 1 bid ., 360-362; Upton to Du Pont, April 1, 1877, Henry A. Du Pont Papers, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Delaware. 17 Davis to Upton, July 22, 1876, Upton to Davis, July 26, 1877, Davis to Upton, July 29, 1876, in file 5021 AGO 1876, RG 94, National Archives. lSee the correspondence in ibid l^Grant to Sherman, telegram, August 26, 1876, in ibid ^Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to Secretary of War James Donald Cameron, January 13, 1877, ibid .; Upton's letter from Berlin, October 8, 1876, in Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 385.

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109 ^Upton's letter from Berlin, October 8, 1876, Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 385 22 Upton to Du Pont, April 1, 1877, Du Pont Papers, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library; Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), I, 978-979. ^Ambrose, Upton and the Army 97-98. ? 4 Upton to Du Pont, September 30, 1877, Du Pont Papers, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library. 25united States Congress, Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, Reorganization of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), 78-79. ^Ambrose, Upton and the Army 121; Army and Navy Journal February 3, 1877, editorial, "General Upton's Plan," 408. ^Upton, Armies of Asi a and Europe 360-363. 28 Ibid., 323, "Ibid 337; Emory Upton, Infantry Tactics Double and Single Rank Adapted to American Topogra~phy and Improved Fire-Arms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968; original edition, 1874), 117, 149. 30 Upton, Armi es of Asia and Europe 323-324. 31 Ibid ., 324, 343-344, 367-369. 32 Ibid 323. 33 lbid 34 Sherman to Upton, November 18, 1878, box 91, William T. Sherman Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 35 Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe 343-344, 367. 36see Weigley, Towards an American Army 137-249. 37 Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe 323. 38 1 bid ., 368. 39 1 bid., 340. 40 41 Ibid ., 338-339. Based on ibid., 338-342.

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110 4 ?Ibid., 342. 43 1 bid ., 342-343. 44 Ibid., 344-346, 45 Ibid. 346-350. 46 1 bid., 346, 347. 47 Ibid ., 325, 330, 333, 334, 335, 336. 48 1 bid ., 324-325. 49 1 bid 333-335; Upton's letter, printed in Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 504-504. SOllpton, Armies of Asia and Europe 335. For Representative Henry Banning' s plan to reduce the army, see United States Congress, House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, Reduction of Army Officers' Pay Reorganization of the Army and Transfer of the Indian Bureau (Washington: Government Printing Office, 187677 1-4. 5-Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe 334. 52 1 bid., 327-329. 53lbid., 330-331. 54 Ibid ., 331-332. 55 1 bid ., 330. 56 Ibid., 331. 5 Townsend's notes on HR 2935, the Banning Army Bill of 1876, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1800-1890, letterbook 50, RG 94, National Archives. 58 Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe 324, 353-354. 59 1 bid ., 356-358. 6 0lbid ., 362-366. 61Upton to William C. Church, December 12, 1878, William, C. Church Papers, Library of Congress; Upton to Du Pont, September 30, 1877, Du Pont Papers, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library. ^Ambrose, Upton and the Army 77-79, 117. •"Upton to Du Pont, September 30, 1877, Du Pont Papers, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library. Italics in original.

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Ill 54 Upton to Du Pont, November 6, 1878, ibid 65 1 bid 66upton to Du Pont, June 19, 1880, ibid 67 Upton to Du Pont, November 29, 1879, ibid ^Sherman to Garfield, June 21, 1878, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress; Sherman's testimony of June 1878, printed in Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 78-79. 69 James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States," North American Review CXXVI (March-April, May-June 1878), 193-216, 442-465. 70 Upton to Garfield, May 6, 1878, book 53, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. Garfield to Upton, June 28, 1878, printed in Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 451 72 Upton to Garfield, June 26, 1878, book 54, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress; Ambrose, Upton and the Army 117-118. ^Ambrose, Upton and the Army 118. 74 Garfield to Upton, July 22, 1878, printed in Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 451. 75 Upton to Garfield, November 16, 1878, book 56, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 76 Garfield to Upton, July 22, 1878, printed in Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 451. 77 Ambrose, Upton and the Army 115; Donna Thomas, "Ambrose E. Burnside and Army Reform, 1850-1881," Rhode Island History XXXVII (February 1978), 3-13. 78 Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 78-79. 79 1 bid ., 503-504. 80 Upton to Church, August 18, 1879, February 27, 1880, Church Papers, Library of Congress. 81 Upton to Du Pont, January 13, 1879 (misdated 1878), March 6, 1879, Du Pont Papers, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library. 82 Upton to Du Pont, January 13, 1879 (misdated 1878), ibid 88 Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968; original edition, 1904), 363-376.

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112 8 Ambrose, Upton and the Army 131. 85 Upton, Military Policy of the United States 226-268, 402-429. 86 1 bid ., 444-495. 87 1 bid xiii-xiv. 88 Ambrose, Upton and the Army 103-104. 89 Russell F. Weiglev, "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," Military Affairs ," XXIII (Sunnier 1959), 77-84. 9 0upton to Church, August 18, 1879, Church Papers, Library of Congress. 9lEmory Upton, "Some Facts in Favor of Compulsory Retirement," United Service II (March 1880), 269-288, III (December 1880), 649-666, IV (January 1881), 19-32. The quote is from IV, 32. 92 Ambrose, Upton and the Army 142-145. 93 1 bid ., 142-148; Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 474504. 94 Army and Navy Journal February 3, 1877, editorial, "General Upton's FTan," 408": 95 Ibid. March 16, 1880, editorial, "Compulsory Retirement," 627. ^"Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position : The Command ing General of the Army of the Un i ted States 1864-1903 (Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs Press, 1975), 70. Although Upton had suggested retirement at age sixtytwo, this bill set it at sixty-four. 97 Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 416-473. 98 Ambrose, Upton and the Army 151-153. ibid 155. See also Root's short introduction, included in most editions of The Military Policy of the United States lOOpor a summary, see Weigley, Towards an American Army 137249. See also Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965 ) lOlweigley, Towards an American Army 100-126. Perhaps the strongest pro-Guard interpretation is Frederick P. Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," Military Affairs V (Sumner, Fall 1941), 73-86, 152-170, especially 164. 102 Ambrose, Upton and the Army 108-111, 151-159.

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113 103jhe best discussion of the war and its impact is Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (New York: Collier Books, 1969). lO^llpton's letter from Constantinople, May 7, 1876, printed in Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 373. See also Upton to Representative Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island, January 14, 1869, Thomas A. Jenckes Papers, Library of Congress. 105 106 Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe 369. Ibid., 370. l Q7 Army and Navy Journal September 25, 1880, editorial, "The Literature of War," 146.

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CHAPTER IV THE SOLDIER'S FRIENDS: Reformers and the Improvement of Enlisted Life, 1876-1881 Between 1876 and 1881, many officers of the United States Army began to focus their attention on the development of officership and professional standards. This activity and thought led officers to take a new look at the conditions of life and work for the rank and file, for they realized that an efficient, modern army could hardly develop if the soldiers they commanded remained discontented with their lot. Officers interested in enlisted men's conditions took their cues, not surprisingly, from contemporary civilian reformers who stressed the need to uplift both the living conditions and moral sensibilities of the unfortunate classes. The growing temperance movement, as well as various charitable societies' programs of aid through "visitations" of the poor, represents this approach to reform, which had its roots deep in the antebellum past. It appealed to the middle class, civilians and officers alike, because it mixed genuine humanitarian impulses with a spirit of noblesse oblige and a strong sense of one's own fortunate distance from the world of the povertystriken. In the army, the result of the convergence of mil itary prof essionalization and these reforming impulses based upon 114

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115 humanitarian ism and noblesse oblige was a noticeable improvement in the material conditions of enlisted life. The improvements, however, remained within the parameters of the traditional caste system of officerenlisted relations. There were good reasons why the army's leadership should reexamine the problems of enlisted life. The most obvious was the high desertion rate, which hamstrung all attempts to make the postwar army more efficient. As has been noted, the trend of heavy desertions began in 1866 and did not end until 1898. The seriousness of the problem is apparent from statistics for the span of time which this study covers: Table 8. Desertions From the United States Army, 1876-1881 1 fiscal

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116 Table 9. Desertions By Regiment or Branch, Selected One-Year Periods 3

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Table 9. (continued) 117 desertions desertions regiment or branch fiscal 1877 fiscal 1879 Detachment at Fort Leavenworth 3 2 General Non-Commissioned Staff 3 1 TOTAL 2,516 1,965 Fiscal years began on July 1 of the previous year and ended on June 30 of the listed year. In fiscal 1879, the number of desertions from the army exceeded the number of reenlistments by 853. Since the average cavalry regiment contained about 600 to 1000 men during this period, compared to 300 to 600 for artillery and infantry, the sheer number of desertions in cavalry regiments was higher, especially in 1876 and 1877, after the hasty enlargement of these regiments to fight the Sioux after the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Even so, only the four black regiments could boast consistently low desertion rates. Other units, recruits, known as "general service" men, and even trained specialist soldiers of the staff always had a large proportion of future deserters in their midst. Recruiters tried to do something about the problem by attempting to spot and deny enlistment to potential deserters. Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend noted in 1876 that "less than twenty per cent" of applicants had actually been inducted. "The high standard of qualifications . together with the great care exercised by recruiting of5 ficers . have secured for the army a superior class of men." Three years later, the general, while "making due allowances for the fact that want of employment in civil life" affected recruiting favorably, praised the recruiting officers for their "care exerted to cause the rejection of unworthy applicants." "High conmendation," he wrote,

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118 "is given to the character of men generally composing the rank and file." But this did not stem the high desertion rate. The army faced the monumental task, completed only in the twentieth century, of impressing upon both soldiers and civilians the serious criminal nature of desertion. Another factor involved in the army's reexamination of enlisted life was the non-commissioned officer's role in the chain of command. Since so many company grade officers spent time on detached duty, first sergeants exerted a powerful influence in the daily life of every company and battery. Everyone, from generals through privates, tacitly reo cognized this fact of army life. Furthermore, as officers began to see themselves as professionals, they also came to realize that their assistants, the sergeants and corporals, ought to have new .expertise in the fields of administration and basic military knowledge. Post schools, first stressed for all regiments during the late 1870s, arose as a result of this trend, with the goal of producing more literate non9 commissioned officers to do their unit's routine paperwork. More and more officers understood the value of trained, reliable, intelligent non-commissioned officers, and they became deeply concerned over pay scales for these soldiers. Some officers thought that army pay was too low to attract and retain "the class of men" who could handle the duties of sergeants and corporals in a modern, professional army. Captain 0. W. Pollack of the Twenty-Third Infantry, who became known as an expert on the subject, stressed the need for better pay in an open letter to Congress. He suggested that corporals receive $20 per month, that sergeants' pay be raised to $30, and the first sergeants, sergeant majors, and some staff specialists receive $40 per month. The Army and

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119 Navy Journal reprinted his plan and commended it as a great improvement "which may solve the desertion problem ^jery effectively," despite the fact that Captain Pollack would have cut the privates' pay by $2 per month. Nothing came of the open letter, but other soldiers continued to urge that Pollack's plan or something similar be adopted. The Burnside Bill of 1878-1879, which included many important changes in the army, did not neglect the pay question. It, like an earlier bill introduced by Representative George Dibrell, a Tennessee Democrat and former Confederate general, featured provisions for pay rates of $16 12 per month for corporals and $20 for sergeants. But neither bill passed, and the soldiers' pay remained low. Other suggestions also aimed to raise the status of non-commissioned officers, whose "position is at present far below that of the non13 commissioned officers of the European armies and decidedly unenviable." William C. Church, of the Army and Navy Journal suggested that military courtesy be revised so that "the same outward forms of respect, salutes, etc., should be paid the wearers of chevrons as fare] now provided for commissioned officers." That, of course, never happened. However, promotions to commissioned officer grades did open up slightly to men in the ranks. Although Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend disparaged promotions from the rank and file of the army as "unwise" and stated that a "large per cent" always "turn out badly," a limited program for the promotion of qualified sergeants and corporals to lieutenancies be15 gan in 1878. By an act of Congress passed during that year, a few meritorious non-commissioned officers of two or more years' experience in the service could be promoted to the grade of second lieutenant, provided that any vacancies remained after the West Point graduates

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120 received their commissions. The first promotion under the act occurred in 1878. By 1880, a total of nineteen second lieutenancies had been filled from the ranks. Although very limited in scope, this program was the forerunner of Officer Candidates' School and other commissioning programs for former enlisted men which the army developed in 1 ater years. The major reasons for desertions, however, were not the poor pay and relatively low status of non-commissioned officers, who at least received some recognition for their services. The chronic problem the army faced with non-commissioned officers was to convince them to reen18 list, not to stop them from deserting. Privates, especially the newer ones, made up the bulk of deserters. In June 1879, Major General Irvin McDowell, commanding the Division of the Pacific, filed a report based on the cases of 674 men who had deserted between 1876 and 1879. "It will be observed as a significant fact," the general wrote, "that one-fifth of the desertions occur within three months of enlistment; 19 one-third within six months; three-fourths within one year." Why did soldiers run away from the army? That was a question debated in the halls of Congress, at every army post, and in the pages of the Army and Navy Journal The commanding officer of Alcatraz federal prison had interviewed "over one hundred deserters" in 1872 and had reported that "the great majority" listed a combination of insufficient food, neglectful officers, and brutal sergeants as their reasons for de20 serting. General McDowell believed that most deserters felt the same. Pondering the problem of desertion, Secretary of War George McCrary, writing in 1877, blamed the lack of intellectual stimulation at isolated posts. "I suggest the supply of more and better reading matter for the

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121 21 Army," he recommended, as the means to stem the number of desertions." William C. Church editorialized for increased pay and better selection 22 of non-commissioned officers as the ways to end the problem. Soldiers themselves voiced their opinions. A non-commissioned officer stationed in Montana Territory derided the theory that low pay caused desertions: . The primary cause of most of the desertions is in the kitchen. . Feed him fthe soldier; well, and he is contented; but when you put a man down to a few spoonfuls of dry hash, a slice of bread, and colored water ... it is enough to drive many more from the ranks. One Catholic hospital steward felt permanent Catholic "chaplains or missionaries" for the army would help the morale of his coreligionists, a 24 large percentage of the army's enlisted force." Another soldier believed that good chaplains of any Christian faith would provide a "sure 25 cure for excessive desertions, dissipation and immorality." One man bitterly complained of the fact that enlisted men so often served as ipso facto servants for officers' families, imposing "extra duties" on already-busy men. He suggested that lieutenants not be allowed to bring dependents on army posts or on campaign, thus ending much of this morale-destroying work." Other enlisted men condemned cruel officers, agreeing with Trumpeter Ami Frank Mulford: I believe the principle cause of desertions is the manner in which many of the harsh officers treat enlisted men. . This applies to men put through the military "cracker machine" on the Hudson at West Point. . Bad officers are sure to spoil good soldiers. As a rule an army officer does not mix with or recognize the fact that enlisted men have any rights or attributes to be respected. . .*' Mulford raised an important point. The army had a long tradition of neglect, and even disdain, for enlisted men, and this created the po stereotype of a depraved, immoral, lazy, stupid rank and file." In

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122 the antebellum army, such an attitude inspired officers to flog, spread29 eagle, and buck-and-gag offenders and to brand deserters on the hip. This view of the true character of the average soldier did not die out with the last shots of the Civil War. An unsigned article in the Army and Navy Journal expressed the old-line opinion: . Men desert because they are vicious vagabonds who ought to have been detected as such when they presented themselves for enlistment. If they were to receive $100 per month instead of $13 they would desert just as soon. There are one thousand professional deserters in the army to-day. . .30 Doubtless, there were a few professional deserters, but the soldiers' own testimony about desertion demonstrates that good men, too, simply reached their full of all the hardships of army life and took what they 31 believed to be the only way out. Other officers, although not cruel, were not sympathetic to the plight of the average private. First Lieutenant Edmund Rice of the Fifth Infantry liked immigrant troops because they were usually contented with their lot and agreed with him that "the pay of the soldier 32 is greater here" than in Europe. Inspector General Randolph B. Marcy hoped to institute for the army an official system of officers' servants, as existed in the navy. He proposed that "every company officer in the Army" be permitted to take a soldier as a "waiter," with each officer paying the government for his servant's "pay, rations, clothing, etc." This, Marcy believed, would be an economy measure for the government and the officers, too, who had much trouble obtaining civilian servants to work at frontier posts. The morale of the troops never entered 33 into the calculations of the inspector general on this matter. Even Colonel Wesley Merritt, the hard-fighting corimander of the Fifth Cavalry, while sympathizing with the need to pay senior sergeants more money

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123 and to extend the privileges of these men, dismissed the privates' grievances with this sweeping statement: The pay of the private soldier in our cavalry is all that it should be. The fare of the men in well-regulated companies could scarcely be improved . Nor should the discipline in the Army constitute an objection to serving in it. . .34 Enlisted men, however, did have some defenders who wore shoulder straps. Lieutenant Rice, for example, truly liked his foreign-born troops, even though he was somewhat condescending in his praise when he noted that they possessed "a certain amount of intelligence." He unhesitatingly told Representative Harry White that the army "has a better class of men to-day than ever before, except the volunteer force of 35 1861." The statistics gathered by the Adjutant General's Department, presented to Congress each year, quietly belied the notion, held by many Americans, that the vast majority of enlisted men were ignorant foreigners. In 1880, for example, fully 3,441 of the 5,006 recruits in the army were American-born. Of those born abroad, 889 came from Engl i shoe speaking lands. Enlisted men, too, were not all criminals or ne'erdo-wells. Chaplain George G. Mullins of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry stoutly defended the soldiers in an article he wrote for United Service : . They are not hardened wretches who fled from the dens of crime to avoid prison or the halter, but are hopeful, adventurous young men, generally under thirty years of age, who came from field and village and city, led by innocent and honorable motives. . They were men from all walks of life, as the tables of occupations of accepted applicants for enlistment show. Although 1,405 of 5,006 recruits in 1880 had listed their occupation as "laborer," another 483 had been farmers. There may have been 564 ex-soldiers and 135 former seamen enlisted in 1880, but there were also more than a hundred each of

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124 blacksmiths, carpenters, clerks, musicians, painters, teamsters, hostiers, and shoemakers accepted. In all, the rank and file of the United States Army was similar to the total population of working-class American men between the ages of twenty and forty. The fact that these men deserted had little to do with any innate depravity on the part of enlisted men. If officers, Congressmen, and War Department officials had listened carefully, they could have learned that a whole complex of reasons led soldiers to desert. Enlisted men themselves wrote and sang verses of their song, "The Regular Army, 0!," which graphically describe the irritants of enlisted life: There's corns upon my heels, me boys, And bunions on my toes, And from lugging a gun in the red-hot sun, I got freckles on me nose. England has her Grenadiers. France has her "Zou-zous," But the U. S. A. never changes, they say, But continually wears the blues. And when you go out on parade, You have your musket bright, Or it's off you go to the guardhouse, There to while away the night. And when you want a furlough, To the colonel you do go. He says, "Go to bed and wait 'til you're dead In the Regular Army, 0!" We went to Arizona For to fight the Indians there. We came near bein' bald-headed, But they newer got our hair. We lay among the ditches, In the dirty yellow mud, And we never saw an onion, A turnip or a spud.

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125 So on the "telegraphic wire" We skipped to Mexico, And we blessed the day we ran away From the Regular Army, 0! It is all in the song: the bad food, the rigors of Indian campaigns in ungodly climes, the boring routine of garrison life, the uncomfortable army blues and shoes, and the erratic system of military justice which indeed sent men to the guardhouse for a dirty rifle or an unbuttoned coat. Since there was no retirement pension as an incentive to long service, soldiers faced with this abysmal environment may have felt quite justified in a decision to desert, and the majority certainly did not want any part of a second term of enlistment after their first hitch ended. But change was in the air. During the late 1870s and early 1880s, some army officers, prominent among them the new Adjutant General, Brigadier General Richard C. Drum, faced the problems of desertion and discontent squarely. They began a series of much-needed reforms. In Congress, Senator Ambrose E. Burnside provided vocal support for enlisted men and tried to enact legislation on their behalf. As a result, enlisted life improved markedly between 1876 and 1881, and these improvements continued and multiplied with the passing years. It is ironic that the efforts to help the lowly "rankers" were the first substantial successes in the programs of army reform articulated during these years of budding professionalism in the officer corps. Soldiers' rations did not improve in quantity or variety during the late 1870s and early 1880s, but at least the army recognized the need for improvements in food. Hardtack, tough as "an old fire-brick," in

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126 the words of one veteran, and salt pork remained the staples of the diet 40 while troops were in the field. However, officers at last realized that preparation of food should be taken more seriously. In 1877, Commissary General Robert Macfeely, chief of the Subsistence Department, requested that Surgeon General Joseph K. Barnes appoint a board of officers to produce a manual of cooking instruction for the army. Barnes did so, and the board received an appropriation of more than $5,000 to set up an experimental kitchen at Omaha Barracks, Nebraska, at which re41 cipes and suggestions could be tested. By late 1879, the board had completed a manual of instructions with hundreds of practical recipes for meals based on the issue ration and the foods most often purchased 42 through company funds. This first official gesture toward alleviating a serious complaint about army life marked the start of a series of improvements during the 1880s and 1890s. These included the addition of a pound of vegetables per day to the ration, the inclusion of canned tomatoes to the field ration, and, finally the enlistment of trained 43 specialists as cooks and cooks' assistants. The canteen movement also helped to improve the diet of the average soldier. Although the canteens, which the army began to establish during the late 1870s, were primarily recreational centers, they also had a lunchroom as well, in which soldiers could buy pies, cakes, sandwiches, biscuits, fruit, and, regulations permitting, alcoholic beverages by the glass, all for small sums of cash or special canteen checks 44 to be deducted from their next pay allotment. Before the canteens opened, soldiers could purchase those items only from the post trader, a civilian licensed to do exclusive business with a military post. The traders, holding a guaranteed monopoly, usually charged all the traffic

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127 45 would bear. The rise of the canteen movement allowed soldiers to supplement their sparse official ration more easily and cheaply. Thus, the army had begun, indirectly but steadily, to improve meals and the availability of food for enlisted men. Reform-minded persons hoped to improve the quality of off-duty army life also. One important effort began in 1879, when General Sherman charged his aide, Colonel Alexander McDowell McCook, with the task of visiting each post to inspect the school facilities which the regulations required. McCook had the authority to advise commanders of 46 any defects and to suggest improvements in methods of instruction. During 1880, before assuming command of the Sixth Infantry, McCook included in his official report a table of all post schools. In that year, there were seventy-eight schools in operation, plus twenty-seven under construction. The schools had a total enrollment of 2,305 en47 listed men and soldiers' children. New vigor entered the school program when Chaplain George Mullins became its head in 1881. He encouraged the establishment of reading rooms at all posts, terming them "a pronounced success" in his first report. He noted that approximately 4,800 men attended the reading rooms 48 each day, a total which amounted to one-fifth of the rank and file. Mullins had first-hand teaching experience as the chaplain of the allblack Twenty-Fifth Infantry, and he had a degree in education. Despite that, he found the school program harder to expand. Although 912 enlisted men attended post schools in 1881, fully thirty-eight of the army's 49 post commanders reported that they had "no facilities for school." Chaplain Mullins vowed to remedy the problems of post schools. He made two important recommendations: the enlistment of well-educated

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128 men, to rank as commissary sergeants, who would teach at the schools, and the establishment of mandatory literacy standards for all noncommissioned officers. Those sergeants and corporals who did not pass 50 would have to attend elementary classes.' Although Mullins' suggestions did not become army policy until a series of orders in 1889-1890 finally set mandatory literacy requirements and provided subsidies for post schools, he had defined the goals of army education and helped to 51 stress the importance of formal education in the "new army." To most enlisted men, however, the canteen overshadowed the post school as the most popular off-duty institution which the army sponsored during these years. First developed in England, the canteen was an army-administered establishment where troops could spend their off-duty hours. As noted, it usually contained a lunchroom which sold beverages and snacks, but the heart of the canteen was its reading room, filled with popular magazines and newspapers, and its gameroom, where soldiers could play cards and checkers, talk, or simply relax in a more pleasant atmosphere than the barracks. The canteen, its defenders claimed, gave the troops a wholesome place to spend both time and money, away from the influence of gamblers, prostitutes, and other undesirable civilians. Because it sold beer and wine by the glass, it helped to encourage the sensible use of alcohol, in contrast to the payday drinking spree in local saloons notorious throughout the army. However, the post traders, with their monopoly and their vested interest in the policy of alcohol sales by the bottle, resented their rivals and bitterly lobbied against the establishment of canteens. Although the traders nearly succeeded in their efforts to destroy the canteen system, it survived and, by the 52 late 1880s, flourished.' The Department of the Dakotas had the

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129 reputation of being a stronghold of the canteen system since the early 53 1880s.' Colonel Emory Upton established a canteen for his Fourth Artillery at the Presidio in San Francisco, as the movement spread from 54 the frontier to the coastal posts as well. The canteens retained their early popularity, and from them evolved the post exchanges and recreation halls of the modern army. The army improved the clothing issue during these years as well. The army had made major uniform changes in 1872, when stocks of many Civil War issue items ran low. The new uniform, however, contained many features unpopular with the soldiers. The first was the poor proportion of the sleeves and length of the dress coat. In 1876, a special army 55 board recommended the lengthening and redesigning of these coats. Soldiers complained loudly about two items of the fatigue and campaign uniform, too. One was the blouse, made with a pleated front which was despised by the enlisted men who had to wear it. The other was the black felt campaign hat, which usually lost all semblance of shape dur56 ing its first exposure to rain.' By the late 1870s, new items had replaced the objectionable blouse and hat. The five-button sack coat, introduced in 1875-1876, proved popular with the men. The model-1876 campaign hat, while more durable than its predecessor, received mixed reviews from the troops, many of whom bought civilian hats to wear while 57 on campaign. The helmets worn in dress by mounted troops, while of a popular style, received criticism for being too heavy and for causing 58 headaches as a result of the steep visors in both front and rear. The shako of the foot troops was far less admired, and a large group of officers petitioned that it be replaced by something more stylish and 59 less cumbersome. In 1881, the Quartermaster's Department authorized

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130 a new, lighter helmet for all branches of the service. Officers' helmets had a cork base covered with black cloth, while the enlisted men's model was of an improved felt body. The new style retained the cords and plumes for cavalry and light artillery and introduced a spike instead of the plume for all dismounted enlisted men. The new helmet also sported revised brass insignia which bore distinctive devices for each branch of the army. As another attempt to boost morale, the army in 1878 authorized meritorous non-commissioned officers, who had been designated officially as candidates for promotion to officer grade, to wear a gold-lace stripe on each sleeve of their dress coats as a special honor. Although General Sherman protested against any changes in the uniform and preferred the old styles which the Civil War had made "familiar to evey man, woman, and child in the country," the army had CO begun to modernize its dress. Not surprisingly, the styles of the 1880s bore a marked resemblance to Imperial German military dress, as the new, more professional United States Army consciously patterned itself after the world's premier professional troops. During the late 1870s and early 1880s, the Quartermaster's Department began to experiment with special field uniforms for winter and summer use. Although lightweight summer uniforms had been issued to troops in southern stations before 1851, that practice ended with the regulations of the year, and only a thinner lining differentiated summer fatigue blouses from those worn in the winter. In 1880, Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs authorized a cork helmet covered with white cloth, patterned on the famous British model used in India as modified for West Point cadets in 1877. This was a first step back to the issuing of special warm-weather items. Not all soldiers appreciated the

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131 practicality of this light, relatively cool headgear, but it was a real attempt to design campaign clothing and accessories for the climate of the desert Southwest. In the opposite climatic extreme, winter clothing was transformed during these years. The Sioux Wars created a great demand for coats heavier, warmer, and drier than the light-blue wool overcoat issued to all enlisted men. Soldiers needed better gloves as well, for the issue 64 glove was simply a knitted wool item. One soldier suggested the 65 usefulness of thick fur caps, gloves, and coats. While a board of officers in Washington pondered this question, Brigadier General George Crook purchased winter items for his men on his own authority. His COmmand campaigned in fur coats, gauntlets, and furtrimmed hats. In 1878, the army tested and adopted muskrat caps and gloves, which proved r-j to be more durable than earlier test patterns made of sealskin. In 1880, Colonel Samuel B. Holabird, a reform-minded officer, became chief of the Clothing Bureau of the Quartermaster's Department. Holabird, a long-time staff officer whose first service had been as an infantry lieutenant, expedited the issue of new fur caps and gloves to the troops who needed them most. Perhaps his own field service had made him aware of soldiers' vulnerability to the cold, for he soon authorized snug buffalo coats for troops stationed on the northern Plains. The army tried to improve its shoes also. In 1876, Inspector General Marcy reported grimly that the issue shoe, while sturdy, had a sole fastened to the upper "by oval brass screws, which arrangement, . it is found (as far as the infantry are concerned) that the screws will work through the soles in long marches and wound the feet." He 69 suggested a return to sewn shoes for foot troops. Although this did

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132 not happen for several years, shoe quality improved after 1878, when inmates at Leavenworth Military Prison began to produce enough shoes to meet the army's demands. Many officers commented on the improved workmanship of these shoes compared to older types, as did some soldiers, but not all enlisted men seconded these sentiments. Soldiers still needed to employ tailors to alter some items of the uniform, but Holabird, who became quartermaster general in 1882, ended some other grievances of the enlisted men. He authorized the army to provide suspenders, cavalry gauntlets, paper collars for dress shirts, and other small items previously part of the post traders' monopoly. The government did not give these things away, but it did price them at cost, thus saving the soldiers some money. As the years passed, the army also tried, with some success, to produce coats and trousers that 72 actually fit most enlisted men without extensive alterations. The army may have "continually worn the blues" until the twentieth century, but those blues and their accoutrements were now more stylish, comfortable, and modern. While the army could and did improve the food, recreational facilities, educational programs, and uniform design, it faced serious obstacles in reforming the system of military justice and punishment. It did try, in a sincere but misguided way, to remove the cause of much of the discipline problem, excessive drinking. Most officers and men understood the connection between heavy drinking and the commission of courtmartial offenses. They, like the rest of the nation, debated the issue of temperance. Of course, virtually everyone deplored the drunkenness so often exhibited on paydays. The Army and Navy Journal railed against the old custom of treating at the bar among army officers, even though

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133 73 Church himself opposed temperance by compulsion. Church's plea for officers to set better examples for the rank and file was no mere rhetoric. Many officers were hard drinkers themselves and escaped dismissal for their conduct while intoxicated only by the isolation of their stations or the connivance of brother officers. Even so, several prominent officers were suspended from duty for repeated drunken sprees, the most spectacular case being that of Major Frederick W. Benteen of the Seventh Cavalry, once the leader of the regiment's anti-Custer faction, in 1887. 74 Even if their officers did not always set a good example, many enlisted men favored temperance in one form or another. A sergeant major argued the case for the kind of moderation symbolized by the canteen: Liquor is detrimental to good order and military discipline, only when men indulge too freely in it. ... We all know that if a soldier has a quart or a gallon of whiskey, ... he is far more liable to become intoxicated than if he were allowed to walk up to the bar, "take a drink" and know that when he desires some more he can get it without committing himself by "absence without leave." . .'* Some posts had strong temperance societies. The Good Templars had organized lodges within the army since the late 1860s. Fort Keogh, Montana Territory, Fort Sisseton and Fort Randall in Dakota Territory, and Fort Sully in Nebraska all had temperance societies. At Fort D. A. Russell in Wyoming Territory, 179 enlisted men signed a temperance petition in 1881. During the same year, sixty-nine enlisted cavalrymen, twentynine infantry soldiers, and six officers at Fort Fred Steele, also in Wyoming Territory, sent a similar petition to Washington. On the other hand, only one man at the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virgin78 ia, agreed to pledge his name in the temperance cause.

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134 The enlisted men might disagree about total abstinence, but they all knew first-hand the effects of alcohol and the consequences of the harsh system of military justice applied to erring soldiers. Their wry but honest ballad, "O'Reilly's Gone to Hell," which dates from this period, chronicles the decline and fall of a model artillery sergeant: O'Reilly was a soldier, the pride of Battery B, In all the bloomin' regiment, no better man than he. The ranking duty non-com, he knew his business well, But since he tumbled down the pole, O'Reilly's gone to hell. Well, O'Reilly hit the bottle after six years up the pole. He blew himself at Casey's Place and then went in the hole. He drank with all the rookies and shoved his face as well. The whole outfit is on the bum; O'Reilly's gone to hell. Well, O'Reilly swiped a blanket and shoved it up, I hear. He sold it for a dollar and invested that in beer. He licked a coffee-cooler because he said he'd tell. He's ten days absent without leave; O'Reilly's gone to hell. They'll try him by court-martial; he'll never have a chance To tell them that his mother died or some such song-and-dance. He'll soon be down in "Battery Q" a-sleeping' in a cell, A big, red "P" stamped on his back— O'Reilly's gone to hell! O'Reilly's gone to hell, since down the pole he fell. He drank up all the bottles the whiskey-man would sell. They ran him in the mill; they've got him in there, still. His bob-tail's coming back by mail— O'Reilly' s gone to hell. 79 When men "fell down the pole," or resumed drinking heavily like the apocryphal Sergeant O'Reilly, they often pawned, or "shoved up," government property to pay for more alcohol. This was strictly forbidden, and the army punished it severely when discovered. Drunken sergeants and corporals lost the respect of "rookies" and often found themselves thrown into the company of loafing "coffee coolers" and other disreputable soldiers. Such a drunken spree as O'Reilly managed meant time in the "mi 11 "--the guardhouse— or the disciplinary company or battery, and, for non-commissioned officers, it meant the loss of those prized

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135 chevrons. As in O'Reilly's case, it led to court-martial and, often, to a "bobtail" or bad character discharge. The army would not change its system of military justice to give poor O'Reillys "a chance," but it did, under the prodding of President Rutherford B. Hayes, try to remove the temptation to drink from the army's posts. Hayes, a long-time friend of temperance, signed an executive order in February 1881, shortly before he left office, which prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages on military installations. Adjutant General Richard C. Drum complied by issuing, in Sherman's name, General Order 24: "By direction of the President the sale of intoxicating liquors at 80 Military Posts and Stations is prohibited." This order, it seemed, would remove alcohol from the army at the stroke of a pen. Indeed, Drum later praised the order and stated that it greatly aided sobriety among 81 the rank and file. Meanwhile, the order created confusion, intensified by the post traders' lobby and by Drum himself. At the urging of the traders and many officers, Drum chose to define "intoxicating liquors" as "ardent spirits— brandy, whiskey, gin, rum, and liquors containing a large percentage of alcohol." He specifically exempted cider, op beer, light wines, and ale. This pleased the post traders, who had large stocks of these beverages in their inventories, but it confused many post corrmanders who were valliantly trying to enforce General Order 24. National temperance groups assailed Drum's clarifying statement as a betrayal of the President's intentions, and the governor of Kansas, a dry state, complained that the trader at Fort Riley used the order to commence selling beer and wine, quoting the Adjutant General as the ul84 timate authority for this illegal action.

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136 The enlisted men turned to their own devices. Some, like the petitioners at Fort D. A. Russell, applauded the policy and cheered that sales of "rank poison" would no longer allow post traders to live in "comfort and luxury." "The punishment . that the enlisted man suffers . £is] for the most part but the effects of a drunken spree either begun or ended at a Post Traders f_ s i c j bar." Most of Company E and Company I, Third Cavalry, and Company E of the Fourth Infantry, all stationed at Fort Fred Steele, liked the army's new policy on liquor sales and told Congressman James A. Garfield just that. However, most soldiers still wanted to drink, at least occasionally. By all kinds of exotic means, these men brought liquor clandestinely onto posts. Other soldiers increasingly patronized the "hog ranches" near e^ery fort. These grubby saloons were far worse than the post traders' bars, in the view of most army officers, because they also harbored big87 time gamblers and hordes of prostitutes. Hayes* order was a magnificent failure, and compulsory temperance for the army did not last. However, it tried to eliminate heavy drinking, much as the canteen concept tried to discourage drunkenness. Both reinforced the new image of an efficient, respectable, professional rank and file. The army always retained the option of forcing soldiers to conform. The temperance order and the canteens may have played upon the pride, fellowship, and decency of enlisted men. However, the military justice system, as thousands of enlisted men discovered, operated upon their fear of punishment. The Army and Navy Journal editorialized in praise of the fairness of the system, and even an officer as astute as Emory Upton accepted its basic premises and methods of prosecution and 88 punishment. Throughout this period, the court-martial remained the

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137 only avenue through which all offenses, even minor ones, could be handled. As a result, there was an average of one court-martial conviction for evey ten soldiers per year during the post-Civil War period. Some crimes, such as absence without leave, desertion, embezzlement, assault, mutiny, and manslaughter, had to be tried by court-martial by their very nature. But minor offenses, such as loss of a buffalo-fur coat or a pickaxe, or failure to attend roll-call on time, were court-martial of89 fenses, too. In 1876, there were 2,027 convictions for "failure to attend drill, roll-call, etc." and 1,568 for "drunkenness, not on duty," 90 out of a staggering 11,941 total court-martial convictions. By 1880, the number of convictions had dropped to 1,650, but the army still 91 wasted a great deal of time trying petty offenses. Minor offenders and soldiers not yet sent before a court-martial continued to be locked up in small, foul-smelling post guardhouses. However, the army did improve its system of incarcerating major offenders during the midand late-1870s. It constructed a military prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and there, rather than at the state penitentiaries to which it previously sent them, were housed soldiers found 92 guilty of major crimes. By 1878, Leavenworth, under the command of Captain A. P. Blunt, contained 337 convicts. Blunt's prison regimen was a rigid mixture of farm work, to make the prison as self-sufficient as possible, and carpentry or shoemaking as part of a vocational program to supply the army with furniture and shoes while teaching the convicts a 93 useful trade to pursue upon their release. Another welcome improvement in military justice was the virtual elimination of especially vicious forms of punishment. These punishments, illegal relics of the antebellum army, included tying up by the

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138 thumbs, staking out the soldier in a spread-eagle position for hours on end, branding on the hip, hand, or cheek, and bucking-and-gagging, or tying up the offender in a doubled-over position and placing a firm gag 94 in his mouth. Doubtless, the long-overdue abandonment of such torturous punishments prevented some soldiers from deserting, but basic inequities in the army's system of military justice still remained. A very serious grievance enlisted men had was the lack of standardized court-martial sentences. Each court-martial could impose penalties upon soldiers as it saw fit, and since no enlisted men could serve on a court-martial, soldiers often felt themselves to be helpless pawns in the hands of vindictive superiors. As a result of the composition and authority of courts-martial, these bodies handed down wildly varying sentences for similar offenses. "No wonder Private Bayonet loses faith in justice," one soldier explained in 1877, "when he finds that Private Ramrod receives only one month's imprisonment for precisely the same 95 offense for which he received three." Soldiers complained, too, of special privileges granted to officers under the system. For instance, a soldier accused of an offense went to the guardhouse, remaining there through the trial and until the court announced a verdict. He received no pay during the entire period. Before the court-martial could announce the verdict, a reviewing officer had to examine the records of the proceedings. Sometimes the complete court-martial process took six months to a year. For those found innocent, there was neither compensation nor apology; for those found guilty, the months in the guardhouse did not count toward completion of the sentence. Officers charged with an offense, however, were simply confined to their quarters, with pay. If found guilty and deprived of all or part of their pay, officers could

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139 appeal the verdict and retain their full pay until the day on which the 96 appeal was rejected. During the 1880s and 1890s, the army grappled with these inequities in the light of several sensational cases which brought it unwanted publicity. Not until 1916, though, did it enact substantial changes in the system of military justice. The appointment of Brigadier General Richard C. Drum to the position of Adjutant General in July 1880 brought a wide range of reforms within his crucial department. The retiring Adjutant General, Brigadier General Edward D. Townsend, was not blind to the need for reform and had taken great interest in raising standards of recruitment. However, his first concern had always been the protection of the staff's favorable 98 political and military position. Drum, on the other hand, had known life in the ranks. He had been a volunteer private in the Mexican War, 99 winning a lieutenant's corrnission in the regular army. Drum had a natural concern for improving the lot of enlisted men and easing the boredom and monotony of life at army posts. Quite possibly, this concern, as well as pressure from the post traders, led him to allow sales of beer, cider, and light wines at army installations after Hayes 1 order of 1881. Drum also reported to Congress the number of men eligible for longevity or reenlistment bonuses. He pushed for the recognition of heroic corporals and sergeants through the issuance of certificates of merit, revived in 1878, and he devised a series of competitions and prizes for excellence in rifle marksmanship. The new Adjutant General also curbed the post traders' opportunities for fleecing new soldiers at the army's recruit depots. He ordered the government to sell at cost the mess utensils and cleaning supplies which recruits needed, thus preventing the traders from selling these items as a monopoly and

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140 overpricing them. In 1881, Drum ordered oil lamps to replace candles in the barracks, and this made the soldiers' living quarters far 10? more pleasant after dark. Drum's series of reforms continued into the 1880s. His initiative led to the issuance of The Soldier's Handbook the first manual for recruits ever published by the army. Drum also attempted to keep new soldiers at recruit depots long enough for a thorough basic training before sending them as replacements to line units. He waged a successful campaign for Congressional appropriations for major improvements in bari no racks construction at many posts. When Drum retired in 1889, his assistant, Colonel John C. Kelton, succeeded him. Kelton, a reformer who had advocated revision of the military justice system and had supported the establishment of canteens and sports programs for enlisted men, continued Drum's work and the reforming tradition within the Adjutant General's Department. 04 Drum and his successors revolutionized recordkeeping and the reporting of statistics related to the troops. With Drum's appointment in 1880, he began regular reports of the civilian occupations of recruits, nationality of new soldiers, average age and height of accepted candidates, and reasons for the rejection of those not enlisted. From these figures, published annually in the War Department's report to Congress, a far sharper picture of the army's rank and file emerges. 105 Drum also instituted a new section in the report which treated the strength and readiness of state military units. Although not all states sent him returns, he printed the figures he did receive, thus providing accurate information on the emerging National Guard. Doubtless, as a result of this modernized recordkeeping, officers could see more clearly many

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141 basic facts about enlisted men of the regular army and their counterparts in the state forces. The enlisted men found a sympathetic friend in Congress as well. Senator Ambrose E. Burnside, a well-known Union general of the Civil War, took an active interest both in reorganizing the army and in reforming conditions of enlisted life. It is Burnside" s great misfortune to be forever linked with the disaster at Fredericksburg, for he actually was a humane and popular commander who showed a deep interest in the welfare of his men. Many Civil War veterans remembered his frequent inspections of mess halls to insure the quality and quantity of food served. Burnside' s concern for the safety of his command, at the risk of his own, during the ocean voyage preceeding his successful North Carolina coastal expedition of 1862, was legendary in his Ninth Corps. 1 07 As a young lieutenant only a few years out of West Point, Burnside had invented a practical breechloading carbine for mounted troops, and he had also designed a comfortable and utilitarian uniform for his First Rhode Island Infantry in 1861. 108 Burnside' s military career was stormy and controversial, but he, as a former commander of the Army of the Potomac, was one of the Union's best-known generals. Despite his lack of sophistication in his dealing with Copperheads and their sympathizers in wartime Ohio, Burnside parlayed his military fame into a successful political career in postwar Rhode Island. In 1875, this colorful and still-popular Civil War hero entered the Senate, where his military experience led to his appointment to the Committee on Military Affairs. The sudden illness and death of his wife in 1876 created a severe personal crisis, possibly a nervous breakdown, for Burnside. By 1878, however, he put his grief behind

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142 and busied himself with Congressional duties, including the advocacy of important changes for the army. Burnside proposed a number of reforms within the large army reorganization bill of 1878-1879 which bears his name. The bill was an attempt to institute far-ranging reforms to modernize the army, to make it more efficient, and to condense all army regulations into a compact, updated code. Burnside did not forget the enlisted men while planning these reforms. Doubtless with the support of Democratic Representative George Dibrell, who served on Burnside' s joint comnittee and had already shown an interest in pay increases, Burnside proposed a new pay scale of $16 per month for corporals, $20 for sergeants, and proportional increases for senior sergeants. 110 The reoganization bill also provided for the abolition of the position of post trader. This bow to free enterprise would have helped enlisted men by eliminating the monopoly on necessary goods which the traders enjoyed, which would have lowered prices on many of these items. Burnside's bill also required monthly paydays whenever feasible, to replace the official policy of paying the troops once every two months. 112 The bill stressed the need for regular paydays, even on the frontier, and that would have made the enlisted men's financial condition considerably better. Burnside's committee proposed as well a standard five-year first enlistment and reenlistment terms of three years, in the hope of making retention more attractive to 113 good soldiers. Although Burnside's bill did not pass, the changes it advocated were indicative of things Congress could do to improve the army. Burnside's legacy to the rank and file of the army included the introduction of a crucial issue, retirement provisions for enlisted men.

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143 Since 1861, officers had had the option of retirement with pensions, but old soldiers could turn only to the Soldier's Home in Washington, established in 1851 and supported by a monthly withholding of twelve and one 114 half cents from each enlisted man's pay. Some kind-hearted officers, worried about the fate of their aging long-service men, waived reenlistment physical examinations for them, so that they could remain in the army longer, or helped them to save their money toward the day when 115 they could no longer serve in the army. Other old soldiers, however, had no such friends in shoulderstraps and found themselves turned loose with little money and few useful skills when the army deemed them physically unfit. It is not surprising, therefore, that soldiers batted around retirement schemes within the pages of the Army and Navy Journal which always welcomed discussion. One "old soldier" suggested a monthly pension for enlisted retirees, to be paid to them whether they remained 1 1 c in the United States or emigrated upon retirement. Another writer called for a pension of "seventy-five per cent, of their pay at date of discharge, noncommissioned officers to have not less than five years in their rank . otherwise the pension of the next lower grade." In April 1880, the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate reported a bill to grant small pensions to non-commissioned officers with a minimum of thirty years' service. Burnside, a member of the committee, had argued hard for the inclusion of privates in its provisions. Nevertheless, he recognized the importance of the legislation as a first step, and spoke strongly in its favor: . The retired list created by this bill will be very small, as few non-commissioned officers live to serve thirty or thirty-five years. These men could not have remained on duty and served as non-commissioned officers for thirty years without being good men, . and the same amount of industry,

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144 faithfulness, and bravery in civil life would have given them competencies of some sort, in all probability. They are unable to take care of themselves now; and here we are higgling at the passage of a bill which will put probably sixty or one hundred of them on the retired list. We were not actuated by such feelings when the country was in danger. . A™ Some opponents of the bill denounced its cost to the taxpayers, and others argued that civil servants deserved retirement e\/ery bit as much as did soldiers. Burnside, seeing the justice in the arguments of the latter group, agreed to vote for a retirement bill for the civil service when one was reported from the proper committee. However, that pledge did not save the soldier's retirement bill, which passed the Senate only 119 to die in the House. But victory was not far away, even if Burnside did not live to see it. In 1885, Congress finally passed a retirement law for the rank and file, thus encouraging good men who liked mil120 itary life to make a career of the army. Of all the reforms begun during the years 1876-1881, perhaps the most symbolic, and certainly the most popular with army officers, was the new emphasis on marksmanship and target practice. Prior to the late 1870s, official army policy had frowned on target practice as an unnecessary expenditure of amnunition, a reflection of the economy moves which affected all aspect of army life as well as an attitude toward military proficiency rooted in the era of smoothbore muskets and limited firepower. Some off i cers and civilians, however, challenged the traditional army policy for many years. William C. Church propagandized endlessly for the National Rifle Association and its Creedmore rifle meets, and letters in his Army and Navy Journal demonstrate that many officers 121 shared his enthusiasm. The National Rifle Association, founded to encourage marksmanship in the army and the militia, counted Burnside and

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145 Major General Winfield Scott Hancock among its early presidents and 122 Church as its driving force. United Service and the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States devoted articles in their issues to the subject of rifle proficiency. Doubtless, Emory Upton's infantry tactics, which called for frequent use of skirmishers, 123 demanded skilled troops with marksmanship ability. The single-shot model-1873 Springfield rifles and carbines which the army issued to the troops had a long range but a relatively slow rate of fire, so soldiers using them had to be accurate shots to obtain an advantage over Indian 124 foes armed with repeating rifles or swift, deadly bows and arrows. These reasons had some weight in changing army policy regarding the use of precious, expensive ammunition in practice sessions, but the most compelling reason for instituting regular target practice was that voiced by Church in 1877: The adoption of a systematic course of instruction in the use of the rifle . and the competitions which would follow . would do much to induce the privates and noncommissioned officers to take an additional interest in their duties, and help to make the Service more popular than it is at the present time. Its military advantages need no argument. 125 To this end, Adjutant General Drum established an army marksmanship program in 1881. Individual soldiers would receive badges for proficiency with small arms. Companies would compete amongst themselves for trophies. Artillery batteries would challenge each others' accuracy of fire and deftness in handling the guns; the best battery would also get a special cannoneers' trophy. In Drum's program is the basis for present-day army marksmanship awards and competitions. The army's success at the Creedmore meets of 1880 gave Drum's program great impetus 127 and acceptance. The immediate effect of the marksmanship program

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146 was a new pride and esprit de corps among enlisted men, who no longer viewed themselves merely as government-paid day laborers or uniformed 128 errand boys for their officers. In the long run, the soldier became an efficient, interchangeable part of a smoothly-run, truly military machine. In terms of the personal lives of the men, however, this change had its drawbacks. For everything gained through progress, something else is lost. For the enlisted men of the 1870s, the emergence of a "new army" with more professional attitudes and expectations led to the abolition of an archaic but essential feature of life as they had known it. Since 1802, each company in the army had been allowed to keep varying numbers of women on its rolls as laundresses. In the 1870s, the ratio of laundresses to enlisted men was two per thirty-seven men in each company or battery; each woman received a ration per day and two dollars a month from each 129 soldier for whom she washed clothes. Not surprisingly, most of the laundresses were the wives of enlisted men, and their earnings played a crucial role in stretching their soldier-husbands' pay sufficiently to support a family. Indeed, without the laundresses, virtually no enlist130 ed men could have married and enjoyed any form of family life. Laundresses, like the enlisted men they served, were a veritable crosssection of working-class America. Some were shrewish, dishonest, and foul -tempered, but most were hard-working women devoted to their husbands, their children, and the army. Many officers and officers' wives objected to the laundresses' presence on posts; the washerwomen, their 131 critics claimed, were raucous and bawdy. Such complaints had been heard for half a century, but laundresses remained a feature of the "old army" nevertheless.

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147 The new army, however, had no room for the merely traditional or sentimental. When the House Committee on Military Affairs considered abolishing the position of laundress as an economy measure, many officers sprang to second it. The most influential officer of all, General Sherman, wrote: "In the field they are out of place. . Soldiers can do their own washing, therefore, laundresses could be dispensed 132 with, and there would be a saving. . ." Others were more vehement. "Get rid of them!" stated Lieutenant Colonel R. I. Dodge. "It is an absurd continuation of a custom which grew out of other wants 133 of the men of the company than washing clothes." Those who spoke out for retention of the laundresses, however, noted only the savings to the army which they believed the washerwomen created. Adjutant General Townsend, a traditionalist on some matters, favored keeping the laundresses, at the rate of only two per company, because he foresaw no 134 cheaper method of keeping uniforms clean. Army officers, who never during this period granted or accepted any absolute right of enlisted men to marry, rarely commented on the human misery that would be caused if the army ended its official sanction of company laundresses. Enlisted men viewed the issue of laundresses in terms of that personal hardship. One, writing in 1876, argued that economy and the truism "that women are created for household duties" insured that the custom of company laundresses would always be best for the army. To abolish the washerwoman's jobs would be ewery bit "as impracticable as the plated fsicl blouse" of 1872, the despised article of clothing which the 135 army had jettisoned after only three years. However, when it became apparent that the officers and their Congressional friends would have their way and abolish the laundresses, many enlisted men pleaded

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148 with them to change their minds. In 1878, an act which abolished the position of laundress over a five-year period, as their soldierhusbands' enlistments expired, passed Congress as part of the Army I or Appropriations Act. This provision was coupled with more stringent restrictions on the enlistment and reenlistment of married men. As one anguised sergeant wrote to Burnside, this legislation disrupted many lives in the army's rank and file: ... I ask you in the name of God ... to do something for us. ... I have given the best years of my life to my country. ... I have three beautiful children whom I idolize, and if I am thrown on the world the poor-house will be my lot, and death sooner than that. At least allow all who have re-enlisted as married men to remain in the Army as long as they wish, and let the laundresses die out as their places become vacant by means of death or non-re-enlistment. But the Burnside Bill, which would at least have raised the pay of such a sergeant and allowed him a better chance of supporting his wife and family, met defeat in Congress. There was no one to champion the cause of the enlisted man in such a matter as the retention of the laundresses, an archaic, unprofessional, but, from his point of view, vital portion of his everyday life. The soldier's friends, then, presented him with a mixed bag of reforms. Some reforms benefited him and made his life more pleasant in little ways. Other gave him esprit de corps and pride, molding him into the image foreseen by his officers as that proper for modern armies. Still others, such as temperance by compulsion and abolition of the laundresses, disrupted his daily life, removed what few choices he had from his grasp, and oftentimes disheartened him. Perceptive soldiers probably noticed that truly fundamental changes, especially the abolition of the severe caste system of officer-enlisted relations and the equalization of the harsh and discriminatory system of military justice,

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149 never received serious discussion among army officers, in Congress, or by military periodicals. Rather, all reforms in enlisted life in the "new army," as in the post-1890 United States Navy, were predicated on a single factor, "the good of the service," as defined by officers. In the navy, this meant preference for enlisting "all -American" sailors from small-town and rural America, and the virtual exclusion of firstgeneration European immigrants, Chinese-Americans, and blacks from all 100 navy ratings but messman and servant by 1910. In the army, always the larger and less aristocratic service, the same process led to a less spectacular but steady decline in the number of immigrants in the ranks by the turn of the twentieth century, as well as the continuation of 139 segregationist policies toward black soldiers. All of this is not to cast doubt upon the ultimate motives of the reformers. Burnside, Drum, Holabird, Kelton, and their like-minded colleagues were sincere men who wanted to improve life for the rank and file of the United States Army. But they were men of their class and of their time. They viewed reform as being definitely confined within the boundaries of a military caste system, which seems too rigid and stern to more modern eyes but seemed a simple fact of life to their contemporaries. The system, being so necessary to the army as they envisaged it, had to be preserved at any cost, even if that cost included a dual system of military justice. Enlistment, they believed, was a bargain; if the soldier received food, clothing, and shelter, he gave up autonomy and individuality for these items. Servicemen's rights and the conflict between citizenship and military duty were concepts defined and debated nearly a century later, but if few army officers could imagine a world in which such issues existed, then so could few of the nineteenth-century

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150 enlisted men who accepted as simply a part of life the problems and inequities of the "old army." The soldiers' friends, then, brought needed changes to several aspects of army life in the 1870s and 1880s, but it would be the task of post-World War II reformers to bring to the lives of the rank and file some semblance of democracy. Notes to Chapter IV iTaken from the table by Jack D. Foner, The United States Sol dier Between Two Wars : Army Life and Reforms 1865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press, "1970 ),~2~23. These figures have been verified by consulting the relevant volumes of United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols, each year. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876-1881), tables appended to Sherman's report in the first volume for each year. 2 Ami Frank Mulf ord, Fighting Indi ans rn the Seventh United States Cavalry Custer's Favorite Regiment (Fairfield, Washington: Ye Galleon Press, 1972; original edition, 1878), 56. 3 Based on tables in Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, I, 49, and ibid ., 1879, I, 34. 4 Ibid., 1879, 5 Ibid., 1876, 6 Ibid., 1879, 7 Ibid., 1877, 35. 72. 32. :, vii-viii; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 74; Don Rickey, Jr., Forty Miles a Day_ on Beans and Hay : The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indi an Wars (Norman: University of Okl ahoma Press, 1 963)TT52^T5 3

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151 8 Rickey, Forty Miles a D_ay_ on Beans and Hay 58-62. ^ Report of the Secretary of War, 1878, I, v. 10 Army and Navy Journal February 5, 1876, editorial, "Our NonCommissioned Officers," 416-417. 11 .Ibid. October 27, 1877, 187. 10 x,1 United States Congress, Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, Reorganization of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), 65, section 706; United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, Report of a SubCommittee of jthe Committee on Military Affairs Relating to the Reorgani zation of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878), xi. 13 Army and Navy Journal February 5, 1876, editorial, "Our Noncommissioned Officers," 416-417. 14 Ibid ., February 3, 1877, editorial, "The Enlisted Man," 408409. 15Townsend's notes on HR 2935, the Banning Bill of 1876, April 18, 1876, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1871-1880, letterbook 59, record group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. l 6 Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 70-71. 17 Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 72. 1 o xo For the testimony of several former non-commissioned officers on this point, see Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay 336-341. 19 Reprinted in Army and Navy Journal July 26, 1879, as part of an editorial, "Causes and Cures of Desertion," 934-935. 20 Ibid. 2 Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, I, vii. 22 Army and Navy Journal February 3, 1876, editorial, "Our NonCommissioned Officers," 417. 23 1 bid June 21, 1879, letter from "A Non-Commissioned Officer," 832. 24 Ibid May 11, 1878, letter from Hospital Steward Patrick Coyne, 646. 25 Ibid ., June 21, 1879, letter from "*," 762. 26 Ibid ., February 3, 1877, letter from E. C, 410.

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152 -?Mulf ord, Fighting Indians in jthe Seventh United States Cavalry 56-57. Mulford's example of a good officer was Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, under whom he had never served. Many soldiers of the Seventh Cavalry, who did know Custer, disagreed with Mulford's view. ? 8 Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians : The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865 (New York: Free Press, 197377~H1-126, 264-267. 29For the harsh life of the late antebellum soldier, see Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue : The United States Army and the Indian 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 18-58. Although the war brought abolition of corporal punishment in theory, disciplinary practice did not change in all units, either volunteer or regular. See Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank : The Common Soldier of the Union (Indianapolis: Bobbs-MerrTTT, 1952), 192-223. Of) "Army Abuses— Our Recruiting System," part 2, Army and Navy Journal May 6, 1876, 650. 31 Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay 144-151. •30 House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, 249. 33 Report of the Secretary of War, 1878, I, 32. ^Wesley Merritt, "Some Defects of Our Cavalry System," United Service I (October 1879), 557. 35House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, 249. 36 Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 43. 3 ?George G. Mullins, "Education in the Army," United Service II (April 1880), 479. 38 Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 43-45. 3 9"The Regular Army, 0!," as recorded on "The Army in the West, 1870-1890" (Washington: Company of Military Historians, fn.d.j). 40 The quote is from Mulf ord, Fighting Indians in the Seventh United States Cavalry 19 See Townsend's letter to the board. May 7, 1878, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1871-1880, letterbook 61 RG 94, National Archives. 42 Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 505-506; Army and Navy Journal November 15, 1879, editorial, "Army Cooking," 284-285. 43 Rickey, Forty Miles a p_ay_ on Beans and Hay 119, 201-202; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 111.

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250. 153 44 Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars 78-79. 45 1 bid 28; Rickey, Forty Miles a JJay_ on Beans and Hay 24946 Report of the Secretary of War 1879, I, v. 47 Ibid ., 1880, I, ix, 293-297. 48 Ibid ., 1881, I, 579-580. For information on Mull ins, see Arlen L. Fowler, The Bl ack Infantry jn the West 1869-1891 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 94-104. 49 Report of the Secretary of War, 1881, I, 579-580. 50 1 bid ., I, 580. 5lFoner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 26, 112; Fowler, Black Infantry in the West 102-104. 52Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 92-94. 53 Ibid ., 78-79. 54peter S. Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), 466. 55 Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 204-205. 5Gordon Chappell The Search For the Well -Dressed Soldier 1865-1890 : Developments and Innovations in United States Army Uniforms on the Western Frontier (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1972), 15, 18-20; Army and Navy Journal February 19, 1876, letter from "Rank and File," 454. The 1872 regulations and major amendments to them are reprinted in Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr., ed., Regulations and Notes For the Uniform of the Army of the United States 1872 (Staten Island, New York! Mltnor Pu'bns'hTng, r972~T. 57 Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 225-226; Chappell, Search For the Well-Dressed Soldier 19 58 Army and Navy Journal May 11, 1878, letter from First Sergeant Thomas Kelly; Chappel 1 Search For the Weil-Dressed Soldier 37. 59 Army and Navy Journal November 20, 1880, 314. ^Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr., ed., Regulations and Notes For the Uniform of the Army of the United States 1882 (Staten Island, New York: Manor PubTTshing,~T97TT, sections 2616-2520, 2759-2762 (unpaginated); see also unpaginated illustrations. The best discussion of the subject is Edgar M. Howell, United States Army Headgear 18551902 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1975), 62-71. The

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154 descriptions in Army and Navy Journal January 22, 1881, 495-496, are misleading and incorrect in points; they created confusion in the army. 61 General Order 52, August 16, 1878, RG 94, National Archives. ^Sherman to Secretary of War George W. McCrary, [l879?j, quoted in Randy Steffen, The Horse Soldier 1776-1943 Volume II: The Frontier, the Mexican War the Civil War the Indiari~Wars 18"5T^T880 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 147. 63 Howell United States Army Headgear 1855-1902 73-74; Chappell, Search For the WeTT-Dressed Soldier 32-34. 64 Jacobsen, ed. Regulations and Notes For the Uniform of the Army of the United States 1882 section 2780. "5 Army and Navy Journal May 3, 1876, letter from "Fur Cap and Gloves," 630. 66 Chappell, Search For the Well-Dressed Soldier 27, 29. 67 Report of the Secretary of War, 1878, I, 323. 68 1 bid ., 1880, I, 398-404; Chappell, Search For the WellDressed Soldier 29-32. For information on Holabird, see Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), I, 536. ^ Report of the Secretary of War 1876, I, 75. 70 Ibid ., 1878, I, 32; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 20; Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay 123-124. ''Chappell Search For the Well-Dressed Soldier 38. 19 See John Phillip Langell ier, They Continually Wear the Blue : LL S^ Army Enlisted Dress Uniforms 1865-1902 (Belmont, California: Barnes McGee, 1976), 18-20. 73 Army and Navy Journal April 22, 1876, editorial, "Standing Threat," 596. 7 ^Patricia Y. Stall ard, Glittering Misery : Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press/Old Army Press, 1978), 111. ^Sergeant Major Thomas V. Turney, quoted in "Temperance By Compulsion," Army and Navy Journal May 20, 1876, 662. 7 ^Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 79, Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay 161-163.

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155 ^Petition to Congressman James A. Garfield from Fort D. A. Russell, 1881, petition to Garfield from Fort Fred Steele, March 21, 1881, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, file 1231 AGO 1881, RG 94, National Archives. ^Testimony of Sergeant Major Turney, "Temperance By Compulsion," 662. ^"O'Reilly's Gone to Hell," as recorded on "The Army in the West, 1870-1890" by the Company of Military Historians. 80 General Orders 24, February 22, 1880, RG 94, National Archives. 81 Report of the Secretary of Mar, 1881, I, 45. 82 See McClellan Brown, National Prohibition Alliance, to Garfield, May 5, 1881, file 1231 AGO 1881, RG 94, National Archives. ^For the pleas of the post traders and their allies, see Brigadier General John Pope to Drum, March 7, 1881, Major J. M. Beaumont, Fourth Cavalry, to Sheridan, March 8, 1881, James Hay, post trader at Governor's Island, New York, to assistant adjutant general, February 27, 1881, ibid For the commanders' dilemma, see commandant, Fort Adams, Rhode Island, to assistant adjutant general, February 27, 1881, commandant, Fort Columbus, New York, to assistant adjutant general, February 27, 1881, ibid 84 Brown to Garfield, May 5, 1881, Governor John St. John to Garfield, May 11, 1881, ibid 85 Petition, Fort D. A. Russell to Garfield, 1881, ibid ^Petition, Fort Fred Steele to Garfield, March 21, 1881, ibid 87 Rickey, Forty Miles a JJay on Beans and Hay 55, 168-169. 88 Army and Navy Journal January 29, 1876, editorial, 401; Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton, 1878), 358-360. 89 Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars 31-34. 90 Report of the Secretary of War, 1876, I, 107-108. 91 1 bid ., 1880, I, 301. For the other years, see ibid ., 1877, I, 161-162; ibid ., 1878, I, 239; ibid ., 1879, I, 191. The figures for 1881 are incomplete. 9 ^Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 54-55. 93 Report of the Secretary of War, 1878, I, 32, 518.

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156 ^For testimony on changing attitudes toward the imposition of these harsh punishments, see Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay 179-183, and Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 40-43, 45. ^"Quoted in Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars 96 Ibid. 33-54, 105-110. 97 Ibid 5. 98 For biographical information on Townsend, see Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I 967 For his views on the staff, see House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, 37-38, and Senate Report 555, part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 265-272, 444-445. 99Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 384. lOO Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 36-37; ibid ., 1881, I, 41-45. lOlFoner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 78. 102lbid. 103 1 bid 77, 84-85. 104 1 bid 78-79, 82, 101, 150-151. For biographical information, see Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 590-591, and Charles D. Rhodes, "John Cunningham Kelton," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Mai one, ed., The Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958), X, 313-314. 105 See Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 35-47; ibid ., 1881, I, 41-48, 62-63. 106 See ibid., 1880, I, 243-286; ibid ., 1881, I, 179-196. 107D onna Thomas, "Ambrose E. Burnside and Army Reform, 1850-1881," Rhode Island History XXXVII (February 1978), 3-13, treats this aspect of Burnside' s career. The only full-scale biography is Benjamin Perley Poore, The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside (Providence: J. A. and R. A. Reid, 1882). Burnside' s account of the North Carolina expedition, written in 1880, is printed in Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (4 vols. New York: Century, 1884-1887), I, 660-669. 108p oore) Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside 72-73, 83-88, 93-94. Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War I, 660, illustrates the uniform, which featured a slouch hat, loose-fitting blue blouse and trousers, and a poncho.

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157 109poore, Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside 322-323. The Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence, are obviously incomplete and do not provide enough personal material to determine what happened to his mental state at that time. HSenate Report 555, part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 65, section 706. 111 Ibi d 4, section 39. 112 Ibid 18, section 186. 113 Ibid ., 10, section 210. H^Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Mars 72. ilo Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay 52-53. I-*" Army and Navy Journal October 7, 1876, letter from "Old Soldier," 138. 117 1 bid November 11, 1876, letter from "Pension," 218; see also ibid September 7, 1878, letter from "Beans," 74. HS congressional Record 46 Congress, 2 session, 2151. H9 lbid 2147-2151, 2686-2588, 2903-2906, 3550. 120poner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 84. l^Donald N. Bigelow, Wi 11 i am Conant Church and the Army and Navy Journal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968; original edition, 1952), 184. Church's opinions on the subject appear in virtually e\jery issue of the Army and Navy Journal from the 1870s through the 1890s. l 22 Bigelow, Wi 11 i am Conant Church and the Army and Navy Journal 184. For Hancock, see letters in Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1800-1890, letterbook 59, RG 94, National Archives. l"Emory Upton, Infantry Tactics, Double and Single Rank, Adapted to American Topography and Improved Fire-Arms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968; original edition, 1874), 117. l^Robert m. Utley, Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 70-72. l? 5 Army and Navy Journa l, May 5, 1877, editorial, "Target Practice in the Army," 625. l? 6 Report of the Secretary of War, 1881, I, 44-45.

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158 1 91 lc 'See "The Army at Creedmore," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States I (October 1880Y7 513-536. l^Russell Gilmore, "'The New Courage': Rifles and Soldier Individualism, 1876-1918," Military Affairs XL (October 1976), 97102; Rickey, Forty Miles a Day on Beans and~Hay 104-105. 129stallard, Glittering Misery 57-61. 130 1 bid ., 57-59. 131 Ibid ., 62-63, 64-66. l^Sherman to Representative Henry Banning, February 5, 1876, Letters Sent by the Headquarters of the Army, RG 108, National Archives. l 33 United States Congress, House Report 354, 45 Congress, 1 session, Reduction of Army Officers' Pay Reorganization of the Army and Transfer of the Indian Bureau (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), 120. l^Townsend's notes on HR 2935, April 18, 1876, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, letterbook 59, RG 94, National Archives. 13 ^ Army and Navy Journal February 19, 1876, letter from "Rank and File," 454. 136 Stallard, Gl ittering Misery 66; Utley, Frontier Regulars 89. 13 'Sergeant Hugh McDonald, Company H, Twenty-Second Infantry, to Burnside, November 13, 1878, printed in Senate Report 555, part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 450-451. 138 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy : The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Naval ism (New York: Free Press, 197277 74^92; Frederick S. Harrod, Manning the New Navy : The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force 1899-1940 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978) 34-73. l^Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 112, 120, 132-141.

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CHAPTER V UNCLE SAM'S ORPHANS: Black Soldiers and the Modernizing Army The reforming impulse affected directly the lives of all enlisted men. But the army really listened to the problems of the rank and file in only thirtysix of the forty regiments. The remaining four were different in a way that marked all aspects of their military career, for their enlisted force was composed entirely of black men. Viewed by many in the post-Civil War army as an experiment, the two black cavalry and two black infantry regiments made splendid records for themselves in combat and in garrison. However, their achievements went largely unnoticed in their day by all Americans except their fellow blacks. Only with the rise of black consciousness and Afro-American studies in the 1960s did the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Infantry and the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry take their rightful places in the military history of the United States. Although blacks rarely received credit for their military exploits, there had been black soldiers and sailors in most of America's wars. Colonial militia laws were often contradictory on the subject of blacks in arms, especially as the institution of slavery established itself after 1650. Whites feared slave revolts, and poor whites resented bearing the heaviest burdens of militia duty, but all whites recognized, too, 159

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160 that they needed the services of every able-bodied man when Indian attacks threatened. As a compromise measure, many colonies enrolled blacks primarily as musicians and laborers. in wars, however, the role expanded. Blacks served in varied combat and non-combat capacities during the colonial wars against the French; in some colonies, such services led to emancipation for soldier-slaves. Slaves and freedmen volunteered readily for service in the Revolution, even though George Washington at first opposed their use. Despite continuing disapproval by the southern colonies and a Congressional attempt to discharge all black soldiers during 1775, New England leaders 3 and military units accepted and employed black volunteers. By the end of 1776, the desperate position of the patriot cause forced more states to recruit blacks at least as substitutes, with promises of emancipation for those still in bondage. Led by the example of Rhode Island, which employed an entire battalion of slaves and freedmen, other New England states, New York, and Maryland accepted blacks for service in regiments of the Continental Line; Virginia allowed blacks to enroll in its militia, provided they were already free men. Most blacks served with or near whites, and many black musicians entered oth4 erwise all-white companies. The manumissions which resulted from the service of black Revolutionary War soldiers helped to create a substan5 tn al free black community in several northern and border states.' The revolutionary idealism of the 1770s and early 1780s ebbed as the eighteenth century ended, and, as one result of this process, blacks lost the right to military service. The Militia Act of 1792 required enrollment of all able-bodied white males of military age, and all states except the Carolinas and Georgia interpreted it to exclude the

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161 enlistment of blacks, slave or free. Freedmen served in the North Carolina forces until 1812; thereafter, as in the other two states, they served as musicians only. Despite this policy, black volunteers fought in the War of 1812, and free black militiamen played a crucial role in the New Orleans campaign. The postwar regular army, however, restricted enlistment to free white males by general order in 1820, in official army regulations the following year. Thus, army policy, not an Q act of Congress, prohibited blacks from serving. Slaves and freedmen continued to labor for the army in a variety of projects throughout the antebellum period, and blacks offered invaluable services as scouts and g guides during the Second Seminole War. But white Americans largely forgot the black military tradition, until necessity once again forced the army and Congress to turn to blacks to provide crucial manpower. When civil war broke out in 1861, northern blacks recognized the contest as an opportunity to destroy slavery in the rebellious states, and they flocked to the colors. They were promptly turned away by federal and state authorities, who insisted that the war was a white man's fight. The Union's first use of blacks was its employment of runaway slaves in a traditional role, as laborers for invading northern armies. The employment of southern blacks, which reached the tens of thousands before the war ended, freed many white soldiers to perform duties related to combat. Meanwhile, Union generals of abolitionist sentiments tried to enlist southern blacks as soldiers. Despite official rebuffs in the early days of the war, these men succeeded in changing government policy by the end of 1862, as the ebb in Union fortunes and a shortage of white volunteers forced the Lincoln Administration to change its mind on the proper role of blacks in the fighting. The First

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162 South Carolina Infantry, formed in 1862, was the first black unit, but others soon followed under the sponsorship of the state governments of Kansas, Ohio, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and Massachusetts. These state units included both northern blacks and southern slaves whom the state recruiting agents had persuaded to sign up. Most of these regiments came under ultimate federal control, but the two from Massachusetts remained in the state forces and became the most famous black units of the war, due in part to the stirring and romantic charge of the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts on Fort Wagner, South Carolina, 12 in 1863. In all, over 180,000 blacks served in more than 140 regiments and independent battalions, the bulk of these within the federally-organized United States Colored Troops. Blacks served with distinction in all three combat arms, and sixteen black soldiers won the Medal of Honor. Although only six enlisted blacks received battlefield commissions, dozens of influential, educated northern blacks were commissioned directly from civil life. The highest-ranking black officer was a lieutenant 13 colonel. In any event, black troops faced enormous barriers of prejudice. Many northern whites, especially Irish immigrants, despised blacks, at least until they realized that black soldiers could stop a 14 bullet as well as any white. The white soldiers themselves often rejected the notion of arming blacks, until the War Department announced that it would officer many black companies with white enlisted men se15 lected by commissioning boards. The government paid black privates only $10 per month, and it deducted $3 from that sum for uniform replacement costs. After a prolonged fight by black leaders and their

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163 abolitionist allies, Congress, in June 1864, passed an equal-pay bill 1 c providing retroactive pay for all of their military service. The record of black troops in hundreds of fights from Millikin's Bend to Richmond was excellent. Many general officers applauded their courage, tenacity, and discipline. Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, however, were never completely convinced, probably because these men, the North's most distinguished generals, never happened to have served with substantial numbers of black troops in their immediate commands. This fact would have ill effects for blacks in the regular army during the postwar period. In 1866, as regiments of the United States Colored Troops continued to garrison the conquered South, Congress debated the status of blacks in the regular army. Republicans created in the act of July 28, 1866 six black regular army regiments, two of cavalry and four of infantry. These regiments, by law, had white officers only; blacks filled all enlisted ranks from sergeant major to private. This was official segregation and an indirect rejection of the black army officers of the Civil War, who, unlike their white volunteer counterparts, received no offers for commissioned service in the postwar army. Blacks had no place in the artillery, because Grant and Sherman, ignoring the record of black batteries in the Rebellion, believed artillery skills to be too complicated for "docile" and "ignorant" ex-slaves to master. Despite these points, the six black regiments authorized in 1866 constituted a large step forward in the military history of American blacks. The new black regiments began recruiting during the sunnier of 1866. The Ninth Cavalry found many of its initial recruits in the New Orleans 18 19 area. The Tenth Cavalry recruited at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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164 The Thirty-Eighth Infantry established its headquarters at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, while the other black infantry regiments, the ThirtyNinth, Fortieth, and Forty-First, recruited in the states of the ex20 Confederacy." After they were organized, the two cavalry regiments went west, the Ninth to Texas and the Tenth to the route of Kansas Pacific Railroad. Of the infantry regiments, the Thirty-Eighth and Forty-First followed the Ninth Cavalry to the Texas frontier. The two remaining infantry units garrisoned North Carolina and Louisiana and 21 enforced Reconstruction. In 1869, Congress reorganized and reduced the regular army once more; the black infantry regiments were among those consolidated. The act of that year merged the two infantry regiments in Texas and redesignated them the Twenty-Fourth Infantry. Similarly, the two regiments then in Louisiana became the Twenty-Fifth 22 Infantry. By the end of 1869, all black regiments had been assigned to serve on the Staked Plains of Texas and in the Indian Territory, some 23 of the roughest duty in the West. From 1875 to 1881, the Ninth Cavalry campaigned in New Mexico, moving next to Kansas and the Indian 24 Territory." The infantry regiments moved north in 1880, the TwentyFourth being stationed throughout the Indian Territory and the Twenty25 Fifth going to Dakota Territory." Always far from well-settled areas during the 1870s and 1880s, the black troops received difficult assignments and little recognition for their services. Black cavalrymen played a crucial role in the campaigns against Indians in the Southwest, especially the Apache and their leader Geronimo. Troopers of the Tenth Cavalry rescued Major George A. Forsyth's command after the Battle of Beecher's Island in 1868. From the earliest campaigns of 1867 until the Wounded Knee fight of 1890, black troopers served

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in the campaigns of all the departments to which they were assigned. 165 26 They also delivered the mail or guarded regular mail couriers in time of 27 need, such as occurred in the Indian Territory from 1867 to 1870. The Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Infantry fought sporadic skirmishes with the Kiowas and Comanches in Texas and the Indian Territory during the 1870s. However, the bulk of their time was spent in guard and fatigue duties, including the improvement of barracks. Infantry details also strung military telegraph wires, a lonely and sometimes dangerous job. Escorts of infantrymen, on foot or mounted especially for the mission, accompanied stagecoaches and railroad construction parties. Black soldiers of the infantry routinely traveled hundreds of miles dur?8 ing their tours of duty in the West." What kind of black men did the army attract? First and foremost, it attracted few who chose to desert. Desertion figures for the black units were consistently among the lowest in the army throughout the period 1865-1898. The ratios were especially striking when compared to the records of white troops: Table 10. Comparison of Numbers of Black Deserters with Numbers of White Deserters, Fiscal 1877 and Fiscal 1879^ 9

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166 Blacks enlisted initially at an average age of twenty-three, like white 30 troops. Most were native of the United States. Between 1865 and 1874, only five recruits listed their birthplace as Africa; none reported 31 the continent as their land of origin in 1880. During the first ten years after the Civil War, 118 recruits listed the West Indies as their place of birth, another twenty-five reported Brazil, and seventy-five 32 stated that they were born at sea.' Although these figures are not separated by race, it is fair to assume that at least a few of the men in this group were black. In 1880, however, only the three West Indianborn recruits, of all the recruits born abroad, were likely to be black 33 men. Although 1,255 white applicants for enlistment in 1881 failed because of "imperfect knowledge of English," no blacks were rejected for 34 that reason. The evidence hints strongly that almost all blacks in the army were born in the United States and were firstor secondgeneration freedmen. Whites had all kinds of theories to explain the lower desertion rates among black soldiers, and most of these theories stressed the supposed docility of the Negro race. The real clue to understanding the startling difference in the rates of desertion between the two races lies in the restricted economic opportunities available to blacks. Black poverty and lack of economic mobility among black men were most severe in the South, the region in which the bulk of the American black population lived in the late nineteenth century. In 1881, Adjutant General Richard Drum reported figures on the former occupations of the 5,637 men who enlisted in the army between July 1, 1880 and June 30, 1881. The figures strongly suggest the limited range of jobs available

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167 to black men and show how little awaited the black who chose to desert from the army: Table 11. Occupations of Recruits By Race, July 1, 1880-June 30, 1881 35 occupation

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168 Table 11. (continued) occupation

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169 Even though the black regiments had few problems with desertion, white soldiers widely disparaged them. Their most important critic was General Sherman, who strongly believed that blacks made only second-rate soldiers and that units composed of all-black enlisted forces were naturally inferior to white units. Sherman, who had spent much of his prewar career in the South, was never friendly toward blacks. Never questioning slavery until military necessity demanded the seizure of all rebel property useful in the war effort, Sherman discouraged the black refugees who followed his armies through Georgia and the Carolinas in the last months of the war. No black troops served with his armies; he 37 refused them. He wrote that he wanted as soldiers only "the best young men of the land. ... I have the question put to me often: 'Is not a negro fsic ] as good as a white man to stop a bullet?' Yes, and a sand-bag is better; but can a negro do our skirmishing and picket duty? ... I say no." Always a foe of Congressional Reconstruction, although as commanding general from 1869 to its end he had to carry much of it out, Sherman greatly preferred white southern home rule. He bitterly wrote to his wife early in 1866: "Stanton wants to kill me (politically) because I do not favor his scheme of declaring the negroes of the South, now free, to be loyal voters, whereby politicians may man39 ufacture just so much pliable electioneering material." Of the tumultuous postwar South which his policy of total war had helped to 40 create, Sherman lamented, "I did not dream of such a result." It is not surprising, then, that Sherman had little use for the black troops of the postwar regular army. Although he once wrote to a minor public official, "I have always felt most kindly toward the colored people of the United States and wish them all success," his record

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170 41 hardly supports that statement. Sherman dismissed the fine record of the black troops in Texas when he testified before the House Military Affairs Committee in 1877. "We have kept the colored regiments . there, because they are better suited to the climate." Although he stated that the blacks had done "admirably, better than I had any reason to expect," he agreed with Representative George Dibrell, an exConfederate officer, that the "interests of the country" demanded that 42 white troops only patrol the sensitive Texas-Mexican border. Sherman wanted to send the black soldiers elsewhere "whenever you gentlemen 43 give us money enough to make the change." Sherman himself preferred, and made known that preference, that the black regiments be abolished. Never caring at all for "niggers," as he indelicately termed black people in private conversations, he worried ^ery little that such a measure could mean that no blacks would be able to serve in the 44 army. Other officers took their cues from Sherman and from the whitesupremacist environment of their era. Sheridan, admitting that he had seen "the colored troops only in inspections" and that the Ninth Cavalry was regarded in the army as "an exceedingly fine regiment," testified in 1877: I think it would be better to do away with the law which specifies colored regiments and let them be merged togetherand if they could stand the test of that, all well and good. 45 Noting the high rate of illiteracy among black recruits, Sheridan suggested literacy requirements "to cover this case" only, not to apply to 46 whites as well. Other officers were far less charitable than Sheridan and his philosophy of military survival of the fittest. "Colored troops

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171 require a good deal more care than white," noted Brigadier General Edward 0. C. Ord, commanding in Texas, and he suggested that black regi47 ments contain twice as many company-grade officers as white units. Lieutenant Colonel John Mason, inspector general of the department which Ord commanded, would not "pretend to say that colored troops are not fit for anything anywhere," but he stated flatly that his "judgment is, that 48 on the Texas frontier the colored troops are of little use." Colonel Henry B. Clitz of the Tenth Infantry told Congressmen in 1877 that black cavalry units cost one-third more than white units, just as black infantry cost onefifth more than their white counterparts. Black soldiers were "not self-sustaining," he noted. "They are good fighters 49 . though not so reliable even in that respect as white troops." Many white officers justified their prejudices in the terms used by First Lieutenant Edmund Rice of the Fifth Infantry: "I think we should never mount a black soldier. He may ride better in many cases that a white man, but he does not take as good care of his horse. They are not disposed to take care of each other. If one is sick, some one . will perhaps . take care of him, but they are not of an affectionate 50 disposition like white men." Some white officers, the most famous being two old antagonists, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer and Captain Frederick W. Benteen, refused to serve in black regiments. Others, reflecting the sentiments that the officers demonstrated in their Congressional testimony about black soldiers in 1877, viewed service with a black unit as a distasteful temporary assignment, to be endured only until something better became available. Because this attitude prevailed throughout the officer corps, company-grade officers in the four black regiments found that

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172 they far outdistanced in seniority and promotions their fellows in the white regiments. Cadet Hugh L. Scott, destined in later years to be army chief of staff, noted this fact in a letter he wrote to his mother during his first-class year at the Military Academy: I am thinking seriously of the 10th Cav. as my stopping place. You know they are all moxies which creates a great prejudice against them here but there are four vacancies there now and soon will be another, and if I go into it as the ranking man I will start with five men below me instead of being foot myself which is a long step for promotion. ... I would like much better to get into a white regiment but my class is crazy for the cavalry and there are few vacancies. As for them being moxies I would have near as much to do with them as you would with a black cook. ... I have taken up this time to justify myself for such a proceeding for most of the men here will hoot me, but I don't care so long as I see it is to my advantage. 51 Young Scott received his second lieutenancy in the Ninth Cavalry upon graduation in June 1876. Even so, he had influential relatives lobby for his transfer to a white regiment, now that he had entered the army list as a subaltern assigned to a company, not as an "additional second lieutenant." He succeeded, receiving a transfer to the Seventh Cavalry which was dated one day after the Custer Massacre had occurred; Scott's 52 sense of timing was superb. He was only one of the many promising officers, among them Lieutenant Colonel William Shafter and Major George A. Forsyth, who spent a brief period in a black regiment but then moved 53 on to more "acceptable" assignments. Those officers who served for long periods in black units were often less fortunate. Of the four colonels of these regiments during the years 1876 through 1881, two, Benjamin H. Grierson of the Tenth Cavalry and Joseph H. Potter of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry, won their stars, but only a few months before each man retired. The average tenure of a colonel commanding a black 54 regiment was twenty-three years.

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173 Those officers who served with or near black troops often refuted the grosser charges made against them, and, in some cases, they defended the blacks' record with fervor. Colonel Grierson, never popular with many of his fellow officers, earned a reputation as a scrapper in part 55 for his heated defense of his troopers. German-born Captain J. W. Clous spoke out for his men when he testified before the House Military Affairs Committee in 1877. "In my opinion they are as good as other troops," he said, and he lamented that all enlisted men of the 1870s, not just blacks, were not of as high a "quality" as were the volunteers 56 of the Civil War. Captain Lewis Johnson, a fellow officer of Clous in the Twenty-Fourth Infantry and, like Clous, an officer who had once been a regular army enlisted man, expressed the same attitude, defending the black units as being "as good and as efficient as a good many white regiments." He also longed for the soldiers of 1861-1865, stating that the decline in the standards of recruits was universal. "It makes no 57 difference, white or black." One officer who had spent a decade in a black regiment refuted criticism of black troops by General Ord within the pages of the Army and Navy Journal : I could name many instances of important duties being intrusted i. sic j to colored soldiers, but do not think they have been more negligent or unfaithful than others. In conclusion, . the government should investigate this matter, and that if the colored troops, after having been weighed and found wanting, should be discharged, and if, on the other hand, their record compares favorably with white soldiers, let them not have this rank injustice done them by doubting their fidelity. As in the case of the letter quoted above, the statements, by the selfappointed defenders of black soldiers usually implied that the four black regiments were an experiment, not a fully permanent part of the army. This attitude, and paternalism toward their black "charges,"

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174 could well have impeded the development of these units and proved detrimental in the effort to convince the white majority to accept black 59 soldiers as the equals of white enlisted men. White sergeants, corporals, and privates did not serve in the four black units, although many persons, including members of the House Military Affairs Committee, believed that white non-commissioned officers fifi ought to be assigned to black regiments to "improve" them. These men pointed especially to the chronic need for black sergeants who were literate enought to do the paperwork in their units. What would have occurred if white sergeants were posted to black regiments never concerned the critics' public statements. Racial relations in the postwar army, with segregated units the rule, were uneven. In posts where white and black companies served together, sometimes the races got along quite well. At other times there were bitter brawls. Since companies were usually self-contained social units, the men of the two races were exposed to each other far less than might be expected, because of army custom as much as racial attitudes. Even so, there were strong feelings on both sides, which came to the fore more readily later in the 1880s and throughout the 1890s than they did between 1876 and 1881. Skirmishes of words did mark the earlier period, as an exchange of heated letters in the Army and Navy Journal illustrates. In 1876, one white veteran wrote a strong letter of praise for his black comrades-in-arms: I see at this late date the efficiency of colored troops are Csicl brought into question. As one who has seen them fight . ; who has seen them put up with ill-treatment and injustice without complaint— I pronounce all the tales that have been told against them to be false. No white soldier who is a man will refuse the black soldier justice because of his color. And any man who has served at the same posts with them, will tell you that they are sober, obedient and trustworthy, and will fight as long as their officers will stand.

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175 ... So I hope you will publish this from a White Soldier, who has served twenty years . thirteen as a noncommissioned officer, who ought to know a good soldier when he sees him, and who, although a Democrat, likes to give every man a "white man's chance."" This letter brought a vicious reply, which was also published. "Tell me, if you please," an Eleventh Infantryman asked the "White Soldier," "what is a good soldier, if you call the colored troops good ones?" After he accused the "White Soldier" of miscegenation and compared him to renegades, the enraged man of the "11th Infantry" concluded, "I will state, that I firmly believe that every officer and enlisted man ... in the Department of Texas, freely endorses the opinion of . General Ord, in regard to [the inefficiency of) colored troops." If the army harbored many Negrophobes like the Eleventh Infantryman, it is hardly surprising. In an era of federal neglect of the freedman and active attempts by the Republicans to court the white southern vote, blacks had few defenders who admitted them to full equality rather than treating them condescendingly as children. A rising wave of violence against blacks began during the late 1870s and early 1880s, and it increased as the nineteenth century waned. Blacks lost what political power and influence they had won during Reconstruction and thus were helpless in preventing the violence and degradation of segregation. The army only mirrored the society it defended. As enlisted men, black soldiers did benefit from the reforms introduced during the 1870s and 1880s. Doubtless, this made army life even more attractive to them, as the outside world grew more hostile toward black people. The army made some concessions to the needs of blacks, as army leadership interpreted those needs. It fretted about illiteracy among black troops and, by law, provided one chaplain for each of the

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176 four regiments. The chaplains' duties consisted of preaching the gospel, thus instilling the moral values that whites believed the ex-slaves lacked, and educating the troops in the basics of reading, writing, simple mathematics, the major points of American history, and the principles of good citizenship. All of the chaplains were white until the mid-1880s. The most famous of them, Chaplain George G. Mullins of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry, not only won the respect and affection of his unit's soldiers but also laid the foundations of modern army educate tional programs for all enlisted men. Inspector General Randolph B. Marcy also suggested improved educational opportunities for black soldiers, "so that they may become more efficient clerks, and that the noncommissioned officers may reach a higher grade of intelligence." He proposed that an abandoned fort be reactivated and used for a school for black soldiers. Of course, Marcy' s interest was in the efficiency of the army, not in the benefits which would accrue to the blacks so educated after they returned to civilian life. Indeed, no one seriously considered promoting black sergeants to lieutenancies, despite the act of 1878 which promoted a few white sergeants to officer grade. Those educated and ambitious young black soldiers who had hoped that the army CO would consider them to be officer material were sorely disappointed. The post-Civil War army viewed its black troops as a medical as well as a military experiment. Throughout the postwar years, the surgeon general kept separate files on mortality and morbidity for blacks and whites, long before separate figures on black and white recruits were reported. In all, the blacks exhibited a lower proportion of deaths to total strength than did white soldiers:

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177 Table 12. Mortality and Morbidity Among Enlisted Men, By Race, Fiscal Years 1876-1881 69 whites blacks total total fiscal year illnesses deaths strength illnesses deaths strength 1876 37,561 518* 21,681 3,462 26 2,002 1877 40,171 260 23,284 4,348 32 2,075 1878 30,962 256 20,794 3,436 32 1,895 1879 37,810 266 21,716 3,932 28 1,947 1880 39,111 219 22,100 4,052 46 2,368 1881 37,408 187 21,160 4,650 48 2,344 Reflects in part the Custer Massacre at the Little Bighorn, June 25, 1876. In some years, there was an average of two reported illnesses per black soldier, higher than the white ratio. However, as the table shows, the army as a whole had a high rate of disease during the period 1876-1881, due in part to imperfect medical knowledge and care, as well as poor conditions under which soldiers lived and campaigned. Even so, the Medical Department and the army's general officers continued to view the black soldiers as part of a medical experiment in racial characteristics. The decision to move the Twenty-Fifth Infantry to posts in Dakota Territory, finally accomplished in 1880, had been debated by ranking officers throughout 1879 and 1880, for no one was sure how the blacks, who were supposed to have flourished in southerly climates, would stand up to bitterly-cold Dakota winters. The entire question of the use of black troops received sporadic debate in Congress. There were many motives behind the desires to retain or to abolish the black regiments. Some of the white proponents of separate black regiments preferred the segregation which those units meant. Others who supported black units did so with the genuine hope that these would insure blacks the right to serve in the army; these men feared that army recruiters would simply refuse to accept blacks if the

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178 separate regiments did not exist by law. Conversely, some opponents of segregated regiments argued sincerely that separation impeded the progress of individual black soldiers of talent and hampered the efficiency of the army, since it made color a criterion in the selection of personnel for many skilled positions within the service. However, there were other white men, ostensibly allied with the genuine integrationists, who were actually Negrophobes and who hoped that the abolition of black regiments would soon drive all the blacks from the army. In 1876, with the presentation of the army reorganization bill produced by Democratic Representative Henry Banning of Ohio, several Congressmen attempted to include the black infantry and cavalry regiments in the total of fourteen regiments to be eliminated in the reduction of the army. Banning' s bill did not cut the total enlisted strength of the army, but the troops from the regiments thus eliminated would have been spread throughout the other units. Several Congressmen hoped that this would discourage blacks from reenlisting and cut drastically the number of black recruits, all for the "good of the service." The bill lost, however, and the black regiments remained untouched. The issue of the proper military role of blacks was not closed. A letter sent to Benjamin F. Butler, notorious Republican politician and former Union general who had once commanded an army composed largely of black troops, touched a sensitive nerve in Congressional controversy over separate black regiments. A black soldier named E. K. Davies, stationed in Texas, wrote to Butler, lamenting "the series of assaults" 72 "by the Democrats against the colored soldiers in the regular army." Butler mistook the signature for that of E. J. Davis, a prominent Texas Republican. He sent the letter on to the War Department, adding his own

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179 commentary and opinions, and the correspondence eventually reached the 73 desk of General Sherman. Sherman quickly condemned Davies 1 letter as a "libel on the army" and bluntly expressed his own opinion of the proper recruiting policy and the military capacity of blacks: The blacks are a quiet f, ] kindly, peaceful race of men. Naturally not addicted to war, better suited to the arts of peace. The experiment of converting them into soldiers has been honorably, and in good faith, tried in the Army of the United States, and has been partially successful; but the army is not and should not be construed as a charitable institution. Congress limits its numbers for financial reasons, and we must go along with a minimum number, which should be the best I advise that the word black be obliterated from the Statute Book. . J* Congress debated the propriety of segregation in the army and the role of black troops again in 1878. This time, the issue was even more controversial than in 1876. A measure to desegregate the army was introduced in the Senate by a Republican, Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, who had interested himself in army reform and who had a record of friendship toward blacks. The Burnside Bill created a strange set of alliances and divided the black comnunity as well. Burnside was rather liberal on the race question. He had encouraged the enlistment of black troops in Kentucky in 1863 and had commanded a corps which contained a black division during the Virginia campaigns of 1864. He thought enough of the discipline and fighting ability of his black division to assign it to lead the assault into Petersburg in what became known as the Battle of the Crater. However, Grant and Major General George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, overruled Burnside' s choice, even after he had had the blacks well trained in 75 scaling the trenches and mounting a rapid surprise attack. As a result, untrained white troops led the attack, and the assault failed

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180 miserably. After the battle, Burnside's last active command, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War cleared Burnside of blame in the 7fi failure and seconded his faith in the ability of the black division. After the war, as governor of Rhode Island, Burnside presided over and actively supported the desegregation of many public facilities in that state. As a senator, he shared the traditional Republican commitment to certain basic human and civil rights of blacks. Others of his party did so with words only. However, Burnside seems to have been quite openhanded and fair in his dealings with men of other races. His inseparable confidante and aide, Robert Holloway, was an ex-slave whom Burnside had met in the West in the 1850s. Their friendship lasted throughout Burnside's army career and his years in government, ending only at the general's sudden death in 1881. On April 2, 1878, Senator Burnside introduced a bill which would allow blacks to enlist in any branch of the army for which they could meet the standard qualifications. Upon introducing his bill, Burnside stated: "The position of an enlisted soldier in the United States Army is the only position not freely open to our colored citizens, and I can see no reason why they should not be as free in this respect as in all 78 others." Noting that the United States Navy functioned well with an integrated enlisted force, the former general defended his bill and his own motives in presenting it, as he argued its merits: ... My purpose is to remove an obstruction which rest upon the colored people of this country. ... My object is to open all the arms of the service to the enlistment of colored troops. I do not mean to say that this is going to put a sprinkling of colored troops in all the regiments . but a process is going on in the United States. . The prejudices of our people are being overcome every day. . Men will

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181 sit down at the mess-table with colored troops, just as I sit down now in the omnibus and the horse-car with the colored man. ... 79 Others who debated this issue, however, had different motives than those expressed by Burnside. Sherman supported the bill, as he had the other attempts to remove the provisions which kept four separate black RO regiments on the army rolls. Sherman's many public and private statements leave little doubt that he hoped such a measure would drive black soldiers from the army. In Congress, men like Senator Samuel D. Maxey of Texas stressed their desire to limit severely the number of blacks in the service after the bill was passed. Stating that he was "in favor of taking the \jery best recruits that can be obtained for the service," Maxey trumpeted, "I believe the white man makes the best soldier." The Texan then noted that, if he were a recruiting officer, he would, "without hesitation" and as "a question of duty," take whites 81 over blacks for that reason. Maxey' s remarks upset several senators, including John J. Ingalls of Kansas and William B. Allison of Iowa, both Republicans, who feared that such a bill might forbid the enlistment of blacks should the army so interpret it. Burnside, sensing the need to clarify the language of the bill, agreed to refer it back to go the Military Affairs Committee. On April 8, the bill reappeared on the calendar for the consideration of the whole Senate. Burnside based part of his supporting argument this time on the injustice of barring both blacks and whites from certain positions. He probably intended to defuse the contentions of the Democrats by this tactic, which he had first tried out during the debate six days earlier. At that time, while lauding the open enlistment policy which the navy officially supported, Burnside needled the

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182 segregationists by commenting, "What would be thought of a statute which required that four specified states should be represented by colored Senators?" Burnside, unfortunately, relied too heavily on statements and figures supplied him by Sherman, which led him to believe that the army had serious problems filling the ranks of the black regiments. These statements and figures were incorrect and biased against the black troops, and, since most of the black companies were stationed on the remotest frontier, Burnside and many other white Americans believed Sherman. In an exchange with Senator Thomas Bayard of Delaware, the Rhode Islander noted Sherman's complaints about black enlistments and stated that the inclusion of white soldiers would make the four regiments "more 84 efficient." At this, Ingalls and Senator James G. Blaine of Maine ambushed Burnside, questioning Sherman's statements and reasons for supporting the bill, concluding by predicting that, if the bill passed, there would be no blacks in the army within two to five years. Burnside, astonished and apparently stunned by this line of argument and 85 criticism, made no reply. Republican Senator George Edmunds of Vermont sounded the death knell of the Burnside bill on April 17, calling it "equivalent to disbanding those [four] regiments as colored regiments" and arguing that it was "no reproach" to blacks if he and his colleagues were to protect their right to serve in the army against those who would bar blacks from any military role. The Senate postponed a vote indefinitely, and Burnside did not raise the issue again. Some have impugned Burnside's motives in advancing the desegregation bill, arguing from the perspective of the twentieth century that blacks had to be protected during the first decades of their freedom. However, many black contemporaries of the general supported his measure and argued

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183 for it or something similar. The nation's highest black officeholder, Senator Blanche K. Bruce of Mississippi, was prominent among them, and 87 he voted for the Burnside bill in 1878. The question that Burnside raised continued to trouble many Americans for three quarters of a century, until Harry S Truman finally desegregated the United States armed forces by executive order in the post-World War II period. As for Burnside himself, he reluctantly changed his views on the integration of the army after a brutal incident took place at West Point in 1880. The Military Academy accepted its first black cadet in 1870, and its first black graduate, Lieutenant Henry 0. Flipper, received his commission in 1878. In all, during the Indian Wars period, members of Congress appointed twentytwo young blacks to cadetships, of whom twelve 88 passed the rigid entrance examinations of plebe summer. The blacks who remained at "the Point" faced extreme disadvantages and pressures. Most were freedmen or the children of freedmen, and, as southerners, they found that their native section's lack of decent schools for either blacks or whites put them behind their classmates in academic work. Naturally, they quickly discovered that their race set them apart and 89 prejudiced many instructors and fellow cadets against them. Flipper, who wrote a moving account of his West Point years, overcame the petty harassments directed solely at him, because of his color, by being \/ery conscientious in his studies, remaining friendly but somewhat reserved toward white cadets, and suppressing any show of bitterness toward those who hazed him. Most of his classmates grew to respect, if not like, 90 this young Georgian. With Cadet Johnson Whittaker, who entered th< academy after Flipper had graduated, the situation was different.

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184 Unable to meet the academic demands of West Point as well as Flipper had, Whittaker seems also to have angered his white fellow cadets, although whether through his own actions or because of their own prejudice 91 against blacks remains uncertain. In any event, on a morning early in April 1880, a group of cadets found Whittaker tied to his bedstead, bleeding from wounds on his face. He claimed that masked young white men had entered his room, threatened him, and struck him repeatedly. Major General John M. Schofield, the 92 superintendant of the academy, ordered an immediate investigation. Initial public response to the incident was shock and revulsion that such lawlessness could occur at the institution that trained future army officers. Senator Burnside and many of his Republican colleagues expressed outrage that cadets could do such a thing to a comrade. Burnside publicly reversed his position of two years before, now stating that he favored giving the President the power to appoint black cadets and that if segregated black units and special legislation were the only ways to ensure fair treatment to blacks in uniform, he would support 93 such measures. Meanwhile, Schofield's investigation found Whittaker guilty of engineering a hoax to protect himself from dismissal over low grades. The superintendant ordered the black cadet expelled from the Military Acad94 emy. The West Point faculty and staff, led by Colonel Peter S. Michie, a prolific writer on military subjects, vociferously presented 95 justifications for Schofield's decision. Schofield himself corresponded regularly with Sherman about the incident, and the commanding general wholeheartedly supported his subordinate general. Sherman pronounced that "these howls and these speechs" about the Whittaker incident

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185 96 "were made before the facts in the case were known." In a neat derogation of Whittaker's character based on the levelheadedness under pressure that he might have praised in any other cadet, Schofield told Sherman: . The transparent character of the fraud attempted exposed it almost immediately to all who were permitted to know the facts, viz: Whittaker's glaring attempt at deception, by feigning unconsciousness, his palpable falsehoods respecting his pretended injuries, and the unmistakable hand-writing of the alleged note of warning. Yet, when confronted with those overwhelming evidences of his guilt, he manifested not the slightest surprise or concern, but cooly demanded a court of inquiry with a promptness which showed evident forethought. The army officially closed the incident late in 1880 with Sherman's annual report to Congress: "A thorough, patient, close investigation in the midst of a tumult of abuse, resulted in a perfect vindication of 98 the authorities of that Academy." Until recently, most historians have accepted that verdict at face value, weighing the words of Schofield more than the contentions of a young black cadet who had struggled 99 with his studies.' However, the most recent and fullest study of the Military Academy in the late nineteenth century notes the aura of unreality surrounding the inquiry and casts strong doubts on Schofi eld's verdict that Whittaker's wounds were self-inflicted. The 1880s brought mixed results for blacks in the army. In 1882, Lieutenant Flipper was dismissed from the service for embezzlement and "conduct unbecoming an officer" under circumstances that strongly suggest dual standards for white and black officers. In 1976, the Department of the Army cleared Flipper's service record and issued him a posthumous honorable discharge. Two other black cadets graduated from the academy, both during the 1880s. One of them, John Hanks Alexander,

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186 died on duty in 1894, still a second lieutenant nearly eight years after 102 his corrmissioning. The other, Charles Young, graduated in 1889 and served with the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry as well with the Twenty-Fifth Infantry. For a brief period he was even on the roster of the Seventh Cavalry, still all white, although he spent the entire time on detached duty as a military science instructor at a small black college. Young saw combat in two wars and earned the rank of colonel before being retired, against his will, not long before he would have become eligible 103 for selection to brigadier general. No other blacks attended the Military Academy during the nineteenth century, and no other blacks re104 ceived officers' commissions in the regular army during that time. For black enlisted men, however, the picture was somewhat more favorable. In 1884, the elite Signal Service accepted its first black, a young college graduate. Within another year, the Hospital Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster's Department, and the Commissary De105 partment also enlisted and trained black specialists. Many years of prejudice lay ahead, but these advances and the records of the four black regiments assured at least some significant role in the army for black soldiers. 106 In time, Burnside's vision of an integrated military would come to pass. The senator, however, had no way of knowing that the very navy which he had used as a model of good race relations would soon begin to restrict the enlistment of blacks to any but the lowest grades. In Burnside's liftime, the navy had enlisted black sailors for most ratings below the rank of petty officer and had assigned them to ships without consideration of race. However, after 1890, naval recruiters and personnel officers began to exclude blacks; without legislative

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187 requirements that a certain percentage or portion of the fleet be black, the navy was free to choose whomever it would. As the navy decided to attract more "desirable" and "efficient" sailors, it defined those terms in the light of the social Darwinist notions prevalent in the 1890s and in the context of severe racial violence and prejudice. Thus, blacks found it more and more difficult to enlist for any but the most menial service ratings of the "new navy." By World War I, blacks were servants and mess stewards only, not full-fledged deck hands or fighting men. The very existence of the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry and the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Infantry assured that this process could never be so complete in the army. So, too, did black fighting men in the army give other blacks a sense of pride and achievement, as well as a collective group of black heroes, the "buffalo soldiers," as their Indian adversaries admiringly called them. With unit records among the best in the army, the black soldiers never lost pride in themselves or in their fighting abilities as they patrolled the vast reaches of the West. The Tenth Cavalry proclaimed that pride and esprit de corps in song for all to hear: Goin' to fight all day; goin' to ride all night, I'll put my money on the "buffaloes," Somebody bet on the fight. 108

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188 Notes to Chapter V^ Ijack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military jn American History : A New Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 3-5. ? Ibid ., 5. 3 lbid ., 6-10. 4 Ibid., 10-16. 5 lbid ., 16-18. The fullest account of black participation is Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940). Sjack D. Foner, Blacks and the Mil itary in American History 20-21. " 7 Ibid., 22-25. Slbid., 27. 9 Ibid ., 27-28. 10 Ibid., 32-33. n Ibid ., 32-51. 12 Ibid., 35-38. The best studies of black troops in the Civil War are Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm : Negro Troops in the Union Army (New York: Longmans Green, 1956), and Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953). l^Foner, Blacks and the Mil itary in American History 40, 43; James H. McPherson, The Negro' s Civil War: How American Negro' s Felt and Acted During the War For the Union (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 161-192, 205-239. l^Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History 40; McPherson, Negro' s Civil War 69-76. l 5 Foner, Blacks and the Military j_n American History 42-43. 16 McPherson, Negro's Civil War 193-203.

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189 l^Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History 61-62. 18 Lieu ten ant Grote Hutcheson, "The Ninth Regiment of Cavalry," in John M. Carroll, ed., The Bl ack Military Experience vn the American West (New York: Liveright, 1971) 27-29. ^Lieutenant John Bigelow, "The Tenth Regiment of Cavalry," in ibid ., 40-41. 20 1 bid ., 40; Lieutenant H. W. Hovey, "The Twenty-Fourth Regiment of Infantry," in ibid 54; Lieutenant George Andrews, "The Twenty-Fifth Regiment of Infantry," in ibid ., 57; Arlen L. Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West 1869-1891 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 12. 21 Hutcheson, "Ninth Regiment of Cavalry," in Carroll, Black Experience in the American West 29-34; Bigelow, "Tenth Regiment of Cavalry," in~~ ~Tbid 42-43; Hovey, "Twenty-Fourth Regiment of Infantry," in ibid 53-54; Andrews, "Twenty-Fifth Regiment of Infantry," in ibid ., 57-58. 2 Hovey, "Twenty-Fourth Regiment of Infantry," in ibid ., 54; Andrews, "Twenty-Fifth Regiment of Infantry," in ibid 58. 23 Fowler, Black Infantry j_n the West 16-46, 24 Hutcheson, "Ninth Regiment of Cavalry," in Carroll, Black Experience in the American West 34-36. 25 Fowler, Black Infantry in the West 47-91. 26 The best account of the black cavalry in the West is William H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers : A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry vn the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967). 27 Army and Navy Journal March 11, 1876, letter from "Ten Years in a Colored Regiment," 502. 28 Fowler, Black Infantry j_n the West 23-34. 29 Based on figures in United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1877), I, 49; ibid., 1879, I, 34. 30 Ibid., 1880, I, 41-43. 31 United States Congress, House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, Reduction of Army Officers' Pay Reorganization of the Army and Transfer of jthe I nd i an Bureau (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876), 228. 32 Ibid.

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190 33 Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 43. 34 Ibid. 1881, I, 62-63. 35 Ibid. 3 ^Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars : Army Life and Reforms 1865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 112, 128-129. 37Robert K. Murray, "General Sherman, the Negro, and Slavery: The Story of an Unrecognized Rebel," Negro History Bulletin XXII (March 1959), 125-130. ^Quoted in Lloyd Lewis, Sherman Fighting Prophet (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958; original edition, 1932), 393-394. ^Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, quoted in Murray, "General Sherman, the Negro, and Slavery," 128. ^William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General Wi 1 1 i am T. Sherman Written By Himself (2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1875), II, 245. ^Sherman to Judge Charles Cowley, May 9, 1881, Letters Sent by the Headquarters of the Army, record group 108, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Italics in original. United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 64, 45 Congress, 2 session, Testimony Taken By the Committee on Military Affairs jrj Relation to the Texas Border Troubles (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878), 20. 43 Ibid., 29. ^ Report of the Secretary of the Secretary of War 1880 1,6; Fowler, Black Infantry in the West 114-144. 45 House Miscellaneous Document 64, 45 Congress, 2 session, 69-70. 46 ibid. 70. 47 ibid ., 103. 48ibid., 115. 49 1 bid ., 120. ^United States Congress, Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, Report of a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Mil itary Affairs Relati ng to the Reorganization of the Army (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1878), 249.

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191 51 Scott to Mary Elizabeth Scott, December 24, 1875, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 52willi am H. Powell ed. List of Officers of the Army of the United States From 1789 to 1900 (New York: L. R. Harrmersly anU Company, 1900), 577. 53 Ibid ., 314, 581. Shafter became colonel of the First Infantry in 1880; Forsyth became military secretary and aide to Sheridan after his assignment to the Ninth Cavalry. 54 Ibid 163, 342-343, 362, 537. The other colonels were George L. Andrews (Twenty-Fifth Infantry), and Edward Hatch (Ninth Cavalry). "Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 27. ^House Miscellaneous Document 54, 45 Congress, 2 session, 130. 57 Ibid 142. 5 8 Army and Navy Journal March 11, 1876, letter from "Ten Years in a Colored Regiment," 502. S^For a sample of the paternalism apparent in the officer cadre of the black regiments, see the offical sketch of the Ninth Cavalry written in 1896 by Lieutenant Grote Hutcheson, adjutant, in Carroll, Bl ack M i 1 i t ary Experience in the American West 27-37. 60For example, see the questioning by Representative Edward S. Bragg in House Miscellaneous Document 64, 45 Congress, 2 session, 69-70. GlFoner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 133-147; Utley, Frontier Regulars 27; Don Rickey, Jr., Forty Miles a Day On Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the I nd i an Wars (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 77-82. 62 Frank N. Schubert, "Fort Robinson, Nebraska: The History of a Military Community, 1874-1916" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toledo, 1977), 104-120; Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History 52-71. 63 Army and Navy Journal April 15, 1876, letter from "White Soldier ,""^82. 64 Ibid ., May 13, 1876, letter from "11th Infantry," 646. *^See Stanley P. Hirshorn, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt : Nor thern Republicans and the Southern Negro T877^T893 (Blooming ton: Indiana University Press, 1962), 29-77, and Rayford W. Logan, The Be trayal of the Negro : From Rutherford B. Hayes to Woodrow Wilson (New York: "ColTTer Books, T96T).

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192 56 Fowler, Black Infantry in the West 94-104. ^ Report of the Secretary of War 1876, I, 76. ^Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 137-138. ^Figures are from Report of the Secretary of War 1876, I, 317; ibid ., 1877, I, 355-356; ibid ., 1878, I, 425; ibid ., 1879, I. 405; ibid .71880, I, 517; ibid ., 1881, I, 525-526. 70 Fowler, Black Infantry jn the West 47-49. ^ Congressional Record 44 Congress, 1 session, 3357, 3457-3569. ^Davies to Butler, December 7, 1876, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, file 510 AGO 1877, RG 94, National Archives. 73 1 bid .; Fowler, Black Infantry in the West 118-120. ^Sherman's endorsement, January 30, 1877, Davies letter, file 510 AGO 1877, RG 94, National Archives. 7 ^Fred Albert Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army (2 vols. Cleveland: Arthur H.~CTark Company, 19287, II, 164; Benjamin Perley Poore, The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside (Providence: J. A. and R. A. Reid, 1882), 240-253. '"Poore, Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside 253-263. 77 1 bid., 70-71, 136-137. ^ Congressional Record 45 Congress, 1 session, 2190. 79lbid. SOReport of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 6; Sherman's endorsement, January 30, 1877, Davies letter, file 510 AGO 1877, RG 94, National Archives; House Miscellaneous Document 64, 45 Congress, 2 session, 20, 29; Murray, "General Sherman, the Negro, and Slavery," 125-130. ^ Congressional Record 45 Congress, 2 session, 2191. 82 1 bid. 83 1 bid., 2190. 84 1 bid., 2325. 85 1 bid ., 2325-2326. 86 1 bid., 2602.

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193 8?For the ant i -Burn side point of view, see Fowler, Black Infantry in the West 117-125. An opinion favorable to Burnside is in Poore, Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside 334-335; for black support of the bill, see ibid ., 358, Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars, 138-140, and Congressional Record 45 Congress, 2 session, 2603. 88Foner, Blacks and the Mil itary in American History 64. ^Walter S. Dill ard, "The United States Military Academy, 18651900: The Uncertain Years" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), 183-225. ™See Henry 0. Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point (New York: Arno Press, 1969; original edition, 1878), and Dill ard, "United States Military Academy," 202-207. 91 Dillard, "United States Military Academy," 207-220. ^Schofield to Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend, April 6, 1880, Correspondence Relating to the Military Academy, box 33, entry 214, RG 94, National Archives. 93 Congressional Record 45 Congress, 2 session, 2248-2249. 94For a summary of Schofield's report, see Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 226-230. See also John M. Schofield, Forty Six Years Tn the Army (New York: Century, 1897), 445-446. 95peter S. Michie, "Caste at West Point," North American Review CXXX (June 1880), 604-611. For much favorable reaction to the West Point position on the incident, see letters and editorial in Army and Navy Journal April 1880 through January 1881. 96sherman to Schofield, August 9, 1880, box 50, John M. Schofield Papers, Library of Congress. 97 Schofield to Sherman, July 31, 1880, ibid ^ Report of the Secretary of War 1880, I, 6. 99 For example, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty Honor Country : A History of West Point (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 232-237. 100 Dillard, "United States Military Academy," 217-218. Id See the introductory notes to the modern edition of Flipper, Col ored Cadet at West Point ; Powel 1 List of Officers of the Army of the United States 312; Patricia Y. Stall ard", Glittering Misery : Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army (San Rafael California: Presidio Press7DTd Army Press, 1978~h 108-109.

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194 l 2 Powell List of Officers of the Army of the United States 157. 103 ibid 694 ; Foner, Blacks and the Military jn American History 64, 131. "" "" l 4 Foner, Blacks and the Military j_n American History 64. l 5 Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 140. 106 Ibid ., 141. 107 See Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy : The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972T, 74-92, and Frederick S. Harrod, Manning the New Navy : The Development of _a Modern Naval Enlisted Force 1899-1940 XWestport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 34-73. 108 Chorus of "The Buffalo Soldiers," as recorded on "The Army in the West, 1870-1890" (Washington: Company of Military Historians, [n.d.]).

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CHAPTER VI CHEVALIERS OR STRIKEBREAKERS? The Army in Public Opinion, 1876-1881 The debates over the Army Bill in Congress have been interesting rather for the picture they present of Congressional feeling about the army than for any effect they are likely to have on the army itself. . There is no sign anywhere of a strong public desire that the army should be dismissed or even reorganized. . The hostility to the army, and the preoccupation about it, in fact, seem to be confined to the class in and out of Congress known as "politicians," and this hostility is partly instinctive and partly due to the notion that "capital" may be made out of it. . E. L. Godkin, 1878 E. L. Godkin, acerbic editor of the Nation well summarized the views characteristic of his own "best people," the comfortable reformers of the post-Civil War period. Although his views reflect his biases against both the lower classes and the politicians, his statement is a necessary corrective to the pages and pages of bills and Congressional reports urging the reduction or reorganization of the army, the subjects of lengthy debates which polarized Congress during the late 1870s. Many people, both enlightened reformers and average working-class men, simply believed that Congress and its concerns over the influence and power of the army, as well as so many other issues, had nothing to do with their own lives. The limited scope and vision of the postwar government underscored this attitude. Fights over the army's role in supervising 195

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196 elections and occupying the defeated South, already of diminishing importance by 1876, did not interest any but rabid partisans and diehard ex-Confederates. The country as a whole concerned itself with newer issues, relating to the growing pains of an urbanizing, industrializing nation. The paralysis of Congress resulted from the precarious balance of political power during the period. During the late 1870s and early 1880s, control of the houses of the national legislature shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats and back again; often, one party controlled the House and the other the Senate. Thus, neither party had votes to spare, and the Democrats, back in strength after nearly a decade and a half as outsiders, believed it was time to settle some old scores. These included Congressional Reconstruction policy, the bete noire of the South, and the election of 1876, which most Democratic politicians believed had handed the Presidency to the rival party as a result of fraud and treachery. Because the army played a role in both, and because it was small and bereft of powerful special-interest defend2 ers, it served as a convenient target for the Democrats. If the regular army had many enemies in the Democratic party, it also had less than enthusiastic support among many Republicans. For the party of Lincoln, the events of the Civil War years proved most useful in linking Republicanism with the preservation of the Union and in saddling the Democrats with charges of secession and treason. In its campaign propaganda, the Republican party was the political home of "our brave boys in blue," the now-middl eaged men who had volunteered in the state regiments and fought with Grant and Sherman. "The brave boys in blue," however, did not necessarily include the regular army. For one

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197 thing, many Republican politicians, exponents of laissez f aire in government, were as willing as the opposition party to cut federal military spending in peacetime. More importantly, the Republican mythology and the role of the Civil War in establishing the party's pantheon of heroes often downgraded the regulars in favor of the volunteers. After all, some of the old-army generals had run afoul of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a fountainhead of early Republicanism, and the most successful of the Union conmanders, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, had never been marked as brilliant young men on their way up by the regular army leadership of the antebellum era. Of them, only Sheridan was still in uniform in 1861, and as a very junior and obscure lieutenant at that. Rather, the consensus of the prewar officer corps was that soldiers like Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston were the army's finest, and, as all good Unionists were to discover, these men became the traitors who led the Rebellion. Suspicions of the regular army and West Point, often strong during the antebellum decade, hardly decreased 3 as a result of the Civil War. From the politicians' viewpoint, the regular army was not a fitting ally. The regulars had no state or regional ties to speak of, since America did not have the depots and regional recruiting policies of most of the modern western armies. Many army officers did not vote and considered that a point of pride and professionalism; most enlisted men either could not or did not care to do so. The "brave boys in blue," however, did vote and did sway the politics of many northern states, and they were, as they and their flatterers always said, untainted by the charge of being a standing army. Thus, the veterans' groups, too, had little reason to defend the regulars. For instance, the most powerful

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198 veterans' lobby, the Grand Army of the Republic, worked hard for pensions for all Union volunteers, regardless of service record, and preferential civil service hiring for the Civil War veterans of the North. 4 It had little interest in a strong postwar regular army. The most powerful spokesman of the veterans in Congress and in the public press was Senator John A. Logan of Illinois. Logan's own career demonstrates the mixed feelings which many Civil War veterans in public life manifested toward the regular army. Despite the belief of Sherman and other critics, Logan did not oppose everything that the regulars 5 wanted. On occasion, he helped to block attempts by House Democrats to hobble the army by tinkering with annual appropriations bills. At other times, though, he used his position on the Military Affairs Commi t tee as a forum to attack the regular army. Logan's behavior partly reflected a deep personal grievance against Sherman which dated from 1864. During the Atlanta campaign, when the brilliant young commander of the Army of the Tennessee, Major General James B. McPherson, died in action, Logan, the second in command and a competent major general, expected to be appointed in his place. However, Sherman placed Oliver 0. Howard, a West Pointer, in command, for he and another subordinate, Major General George H. Thomas, never really trusted the ability of Logan, undoubtedly the North's best political general but a politician for all that. Logan, a prewar Democrat who embraced the war, the army, and the Republican party, never forgave them. Despite the feud, Logan had another reason for opposing the postwar army on several issues: a personal philosophy of military affairs which stressed the undesireable nature of standing armies and relied on the well-trained, well-organized citizen soldier which the Civil War had posed as a \jery real possibility

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199 for the United States. Logan praised volunteer soldiers, such as his Civil War comrades, as "standing for and in place of a permanent g army—that curse of monarchies, and despoiler of the masses." As a senator, Logan strongly supported military education in civilian schools and colleges as a great experiment in democracy and as an inevitable re9 placement for West Point and the regular army itself. Had he lived beyond the mid-1880s, Logan probably would have played a major role in forging the National Guard or a similar force, because that was the direction of his arguments. As such, sometimes Logan's attitudes converged with those of the army officers, at which times they worked together; other times, they were totally opposed. Throughout the 1870s and early 1880s, Logan was a force with whom the army must reckon, both because of his prestige in veterans' affairs as a founder of the Grand Army of the Republic and because of his role as one of the most powerful and popular of Republican politicians. Other leading politicians who had once been high-ranking Union officers refused to support the army on many issues. Unlike Logan, most of these did not have a well-defined military philosophy and drifted to wherever the political advantages of the moment might take them. However, there was little incentive for them to support the army, so many did not. For example, Benjamin F. Butler, the notoriously-incompetent political general whose one shining hour had been as military administrator of conquered New Orleans, was a master spoilsman of the postwar era whose views shifted to positions all over the political spectrum. By the late 1870s, Butler had vented much of his legendary wrath on the regular army and West Point, to which he had been denied admission as a young man. In 1878, he opposed the army appropriations bill, suggesting

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200 11 that the military funds be distributed among the poor instead. Two of the army's most caustic critics, Democratic Representatives Henry Banning of Ohio and Edward S. Bragg of Wisconsin, were former Union generals themselves. Banning had even begun his career as a Republi12 can. The army, then, was not the safe and uncontroversial issue that it would be in the post-World War II era when national defense outweighed economy in government in Congressional values. After the Civil War, the army met with hostility and indifference more often than it found supporters in Congress. The army did have one good friend in Congress who influenced his party, the federal government, and the public opinion of the nation. Representative James A. Garfield of Ohio, a war hero himself, was a leading figure of the times. Even through the twentieth century only vaguely recalls Garfield as the post-Civil War President who fell victim to an assassin in the early months of his term, he was a powerful Republican leader who had a sterling reputation as a scholar-statesman and as a "practical" exponent of reform. Despite a provincial and fundamentalist background in Ohio's frontier Western Reserve, Garfield obtained a decent education and served for a time as a college teacher and president. He also demonstrated an early interest in local Republican politics in the Reserve, soon to become a stronghold of the party. When the Civil War came, Garfield received a lieutenant-colonelcy in the Ohio volunteers. He later commanded a regiment and, briefly, his own brigade. His war record, however, rested chiefly on his staff service as a brigadier general with Major General William S. Rosecrans in Tennessee. At the Battle of Chickamauga, which proved his chief's undoing, Garfield made a fine reputation for himself as a courier and coordinator

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201 between the two parts of the Union army, separated in the ferocity of the Confederate attack. The contemporary press accounts of the battle equally credited Garfield and George H. Thomas for saving the Army of the Tennessee from destruction, even though historians years after the fact emphasized Thomas' role and reduced Garfield's part to a footnote. Nevertheless, Garfield received both praise and a promotion to major general for his services. After savoring them briefly, he resigned his commission to take the seat in the House of Representatives which he had won the year before. As much a politician as a soldier, Garfield had taken a leave of absence from his staff duties during the fall of 1862 13 to campaign as a Republican supporter of Lincoln. Garfield became a leading voice of the Republican party after the war, for he quickly mastered the art of compromise. A supporter of Congressional Reconstruction during the early postwar years, he, like most of his colleagues, was willing to write off the social side of that experiment by the 1870s, requesting that federal troops intervene in the southern states only to uphold Republican governments at election 14 time. Some scandals of the Grant era touched Garfield. Evidence of improper gifts of railroad stock linked his name to the notorious Credit Mobilier affair in 1873-1874, but his relationship to the swindlers re15 mams obscure. Despite the hint of scandal, his constitutents returned Garfield to Congress in 1874, and he soon became House minority leader. Garfield retained his image as a moderate reformer throughout this period, and it helped him to win the Republican Presidential nomination in 1880. As a loyal Union man and a volunteer officer who came to admire the military expertise of West Pointers, Garfield supported the army against

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202 extreme reductions during the 1860s and 1870s. When Banning and his allies presented reduction proposals to the House in 1878, Garfield countered this attempt to slash the army by 5,000 men in a speech which defended the army's role both as frontier peacekeeper and as protector of the urban propertied classes against the dangers of mob rule and so18 cialism. With stong support of the Texas delegation, which supported the army en bl oc because it feared border troubles with Mexico, Garfield led the pro-army forces in killing most of the Democrats' 19 harshest proposals for changing the army. Garfield also advocated strong programs of military education at civilian colleges as a means of securing well -trained officers for the army and for wartime volunteer 20 regiments of the future. He spoke out as well for elementary education on post for enlisted men, thus becoming one of the earliest politicians to argue that service in the regular army could develop citizenship, patriotism, and a higher degree of literacy in young American 21 men. In 1878, Garfield set many of his thoughts about the army and its reform on paper for the North American Review an influential journal of the day. This article caught the appreciative eye of Lieutenant Colonel Emory Upton and led to Garfield's extensive review of Upton's 22 study of American military policy. The article also gave fairly wide public exposure to the views of several generals, including Sherman, Hancock, and Pope; indeed, much of the two-part work consists of long quotations strung together with Garfield's commentary. Sherman had corresponded with Garfield while the congressman prepared the manuscript, and the general provided official papers and War Department sta23 tistics to make the research easier. In sum, "The Army of the United

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203 States" was the fullest and best general article on the army and its future to appear in a civilian periodical during the postwar years. Garfield based his article on the assumption that there must be a reasonably strong regular army, for two reasons: "to keep alive the knowledge and practice of military science" and "to have constantly at our command an active, disciplined force" to protect the country's borders, "to protect the public property and preserve the peace in all places," and to repel invasion and quell insurrection. "Probably every intelligent citizen," he noted, "recognizes the necessity of maintaining 24 a regular army in time of peace." Much of the controversy in Congress regarding the reduction of the army was partisan and artificial, because, Garfield stated, "It is significant fact that, while numberless petitions and remonstrances upon almost all subjects of legislation have been constantly pouring into Congress, yet, during the last eight years, not one petition has been addressed to either the Senate or the House praying for a decrease of our military establishment or for the 25 reduction of the pay of its officers or enlisted men." Even so, he argued, the army did need reorganization to make it more efficient and modern; the House Democrats were simply approaching the issue from the wrong direction. Reform and reorganization were proper spheres for Congress, with the advice of eminent officers. Unfortunately, "the officers and friends of the army," in their criticisms of the structure and policy of the army and in their recommendations for its reform, "disclosed such differences of opinion, that Congress has frequently been more confused than aided by the multitude of counselors." Garfield's own task, as he defined it, was to sort out these recommendations and criticisms, analyze the most logical and feasible of them, and present

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204 them as a coherent program of military reform to Congress and the country. Garfield's first point was the necessity of curbing the power of the secretary of war. Noting Washington's active role as commanderinchief during his years as President, Garfield argued that the most successful of the antebellum secretaries had been those who viewed their office as that of a civilian staff officer to the President. Friction began in earnest when Jefferson Davis, with his "early training as a soldier, his spirit of self-reliance and habits of imperious command," assumed the secretaryship and clashed with that consummate soldier and 27 egotist, Winfield Scott." Davis bested the general, a fact that Garfield deplored, and "the office of lieutenant-general fScott's brevet rank in 1855 n was virtually stripped of all authority, and the command 28 of the army was usurped by the Secretary of War." John B. Floyd, the infamous pro-secessionist secretary of war who later became a Confederate political general, followed the "evil example" of Davis in his own dealings with the leadership of the army. The policy of control of the army by the secretary, Garfield argued, thus became "firmly rooted in custom" before the accession of Edwin M. Stanton to the post. Stanton had long been assumed to have set the precedent, and he figured as the villain in Upton's writings on 29 the army and its problems." General Grant himself requested of Stanton, in the aftermath of the Civil War, that the commanding general now have the staff departments under his direct control. If that could not be done, Grant urged, at least put the Adjutant General's Department in subordination to the general commanding the army, so that he 30 would issue all orders to troops in the field. Nothing came of this

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205 or of Grant's efforts as President to reform the command structure of the army, for his appointment of John A. Rawlins and then William W. Belknap to head the War Department brought ex-generals to the office. "In a short time, the new order of things was revoked," Garfield said of this, "and the Secretary of War became again virtually the military head 31 of the army." The results were unpalatable, as the scheming, dishonest Belknap drove General Sherman out of the capital and into exile in Saint Louis, "where he wielded less actual authority than a captain 32 in command of a frontier post." After Belknap resigned in disgrace, the new secretaries restored the commanding general to "his rightful authority" in the daily affairs of the army. Garfield lauded this policy as one "of wise discretion and patriotic self-restraint" on the part of 33 the War Department. Congress must act now, he concluded, to define and limit the powers of the secretary of war, while expanding those of 34 the commanding general. Garfield next turned to the dispute between staff and line officers of the army and the problems it posed for the service. He praised the "efficient and distinguished service" of the staff during the Civil War and contended that "an effective armystaff is, of necessity, a work of years," to be cultivated in time of peace so that it may function 35 smoothly during war. Doubtless alluding to the attempts of Congress during 1876 and 1878 to reduce the staff drastically, Garfield warned: "Any military legislation, therefore, which destroys the staff, puts out the eyes of the army, impairs its intelligence and fatally cripples its strength." Having written this, he turned to the concerns of the line commanders, which he considered to be equally just. Staff officers ought to be always subordinate to the line officers on whose staff they

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206 served; "proper subordination and the efficiency of the service" demand37 ed nothing less. The roots of the staff's often belligerent and dangerous posture of independence in relation to the line could be found in the centralization of too many functions within the War Department in Washington, a direct result of the "usurpations of the Secretaries of 38 War." Realizing that neither Congress nor the army could turn the clock back to a simpler time, Garfield adopted instead Upton's suggestions for increased and regular rotation between staff and line assignments for promising officers of company grade, with all permanent staff 39 assignments to be held only by officers ranking as majors or above. Unlike Upton, though, Garfield based most of his supporting arguments on appeals to fairness, noting the hardships of line officers "assigned to duty on the frontiers, at posts remote from civilization; while a majority of the staff serve in Washington . where they frequently receive the honors and favors of the service in undue proportion." Probably Garfield believed such comparisons would deeply affect the sensibilities of his civilian audience more than appeals to military efficiency and projections of staff needs in wartime. The claims of the Democrats in Congress notwithstanding, Garfield argued that few Americans really wanted a smaller army. The nation had learned its lesson from the Rebellion; "the science and art of war can be acquired only by the thorough and patient study and practice of its elements." Indeed, the people perceived the army as a form of "national insurance" against invasion and anarchy, and they cheerfully paid the premiums, even if their elected officials sometimes balked at doing 42 so. After all, most Americans realized, Garfield wrote, that the army performed many useful tasks, sometimes unmilitary in nature, during

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207 peacetime, even as the service kept "alive the knowledge and practice of military science" and preserved and protected the nation's boundaries and population. He noted that 104 of the total number of staff officers in 1878 handled undertakings purely civilian in character, and of these officers, forty-seven were members of the Corps of Engineers, military men who designed and supervised the construction of those "pork barrel" 43 civilian projects long beloved by politicians and voters. With these civilian duties, more than 12,000 miles of coastline and boundaries "excluding Alaska" to patrol, and eighteen arsenals and 161 posts to garrison, the army could not possibly do everything expected of it with less than 25,000 men, Garfield argued. Even so, an army of that size meant that there was only one soldier per 200 civilians, and the upkeep 44 of the army cost each civilian in America only sixty cents per year. The riots of 1877, in which striking railroad workers held the state militias at bay and paralyzed local police, demonstrated that the regular army would probably play a major role in rescuing the "lives and property of many millions of citizens" from dangerous labor radicals and 45 lawless hooligans during the coming years. The American people, Garfield stated, "have not asked for its [the regular army's] reduc46 tion." Rather, they demanded efficiency. Garfield borrowed several proposals from Sherman and Upton which could accomplish this, especially the three-battalion infantry regiment and the depot system of recruit47 ment, training, and supply. As for the staff reductions which Congress so often discussed, Garfield believed that a general reorganization of some departments might be warranted, but not at the cost of cut48 ting drastically the number of positions on the staff as a whole. With these changes summarized, Garfield turned to the proper role of the Congress in regulating and funding the army.

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208 Contrary to public demand for an adequate and efficient army, Congress had impeded, not aided, the service in recent years. Garfield noted the "growing spirit of unfriendliness, if not positive hostility" in Congress since 1876. Even routine appropriations bills did not escape major and divisive debate. The Military Academy, "the fountain of military honor" which instilled in its graduates "a thorough and liberal culture" and the "spirit of national patriotism," had become the target of bitter denunciations among a faction of the members of 49 Congress. Garfield deplored these attacks and urged that military strength and spending be kept at least at the current levels, noting that Congress paid more money per position to its patronage employees than it paid to the experienced fieldand company-grade officers to 50 whom it entrusted the safety of the nation. Even worse, Garfield argued, would be the effects of Banning's proposal to disband the army if appropriations bills should fail to pass in the future. To underscore further the absurdity of this proposal, Garfield noted that the statutes of the United States barred from the army another potential source of trained officers, those men who had served the Confederacy. Should Congress disband the army in such a fashion and an emergency occur, "the new army" to be formed of volunteers "could not be offi51 cered" for all practical purposes. "The friends of good government and fair dealing will not be slow to condemn these repeated assaults upon the honor and usefulness of the army," Garfield warned his colleagues in Congress. Garfield's article was but one of several pieces in the national periodical press to treat the army and its concerns sympathetically. Newspapers, intensely partisan during this period, often disagreed on

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209 the issue of army appropriations, with Republican papers usually favoring the current size and strength of the army as Democratic ones called for reductions in troop strength and levels of spending. Harper' s Weekly most popular weekly newspaper of the era, usually presented the army in a favorable light. Thomas Nast, its editorial cartoonist, endeared himself to the soldiers with his powerful pictorial denunciations of the "false economy" of reduced appropriations and lower enlisted 53 strength. In 1877, enlisted men even took up a collection to buy an inscribed silver flask, in the shape of an army canteen, to honor Nast for his years of defending the army's interests through biting cartoons 54 and captions. The national magazines of the late 1870s and early 1880s were Harper' s New Monthly Magazine the Atlantic Monthly Scribner' s Monthly which became the Century in 1881, Galaxy which merged with the Atlantic Monthly in 1877, and the North American Review None of them published any articles critical of the army's role in the recent past or favorable to Congressional efforts to reduce the size and budget of the army. The one article examining the state troops, a laudatory piece written by an officer of the elite Seventh New York Regiment, stressed the role which citizen-soldiers could play in augmenting, not replacing, the regular 55 army. The Nation the liberal weekly newspaper whose political and social influence on the upper and middle classes far outweighed its circulation figures, generally looked favorably upon the army. It expressed in one editorial the attitudes of many of its readers regarding the service and its proper place in society: The question of maintaining a standing army in this country is simply a business question. We have only to ask

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210 ourselves whether this or occasional levies of militia is the more efficient and cheaper method of doing certain work. . All modern police is a standing army, and has to be. . The assertion . that American institutions would be put in peril if 50,000 men were scattered in garrisons over the whole continent, is a striking illustration of the soundness of the growing opinion that we have too much Congress. . Although soldiers and former soldiers more often expressed their views in United Service or the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States when they wrote article-length papers, the civilian magazines occasionally printed their articles on the state of the American army. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Williams of the Adjutant General's Department, a literarily-inclined officer who later headed the department, contributed thoughtful pieces about reforms for the staff departments and changes in the system of officer promotions. His writings ap57 peared in the Atlantic Monthly and the Galaxy He argued that "the ordinary business principles used in every-day life" not only justified the current size of the army but inspired the reforms which he and other 58 officers proposed to increase the efficiency of the service. An anonymous writer, obviously a past or present officer of the army, also published an article in the prestigious Atlantic Monthly which suggested several military reforms based upon Upton's Armies of Asia and Europe These included replacing the militia with a system of National Volunteers under the control of the federal government, reforms to increase the efficiency of the regular army, and the establishment of military 59 science departments in secondary schools and colleges. This author, who one modern scholar believes to have been John W. De Forest, the realistic novelist and Union officer, presented his arguments within an analysis of American military history which was decidedly Uptonian in style and tone, even though the manuscript of the colonel's "Military

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211 Policy of the United States" was not yet well known among army officers and interested civilians. Popular magazines, however, played a larger role in the popularization of the army, especially its officer corps, as brave, chivalric, and selfless defenders of the public, much as a similar antebellum romantic literature and graphic representation had idealized the soldier even CI while Americans continued to distrust a standing army. The stories of Captain Charles King, the frontier officer who turned to writing after he received a disabling wound in 1879, began to appear in the early 1880s and soon reached a wide and appreciative civilian audience, who learned much of what they thought they knew about the army and the frontier from King's stories and novels. King stressed the loyalty, steadfastness, and comraderie among the officers and the men they commanded; he placed his soldiers against a colorful western background and CO moved them through thundering, if not especially imaginative, plots. Other novelists treated some of the other aspects of military life which Victorian readers deemed "suitable." An example was Frederick Whittaker's West Point romance, The Cadet Button published in 1878. In her review of this soon-to-be-forgotten novel, Mrs. Harriet Waters Preston expressed the appeal which the traditional values and the color of military life at its finest and most sanitized had for many literate Americans of the Gilded Age. The "chief value and timeliness" of Whittaker's story, she wrote: . lie in the fair and just picture which it presents of the esprit de corps of the American regular army: of strict honor, simple bravery, patience under poverty and exile, and somewhat scornful superiority to sordid conditions which have characterized its officers as a class. We have no other school, North or South, which so regularly and effectually as West Point has made its pupils gentlemen in the

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212 plainest, soundest, and proudest sense of that term, and it is very well worth while to have our memories refreshed about this matter now that the army and the nursery of the army are being made the object of insidious attack by unscrupulous civilians. . .63 Thus, in the middleand upper-class literature, both fiction and nonfiction, of the late 1870s and early 1880s the army appears alternately as the defender of national honor and civil peace or as the noble repository of selfless service and antique virtues, far above and beyond the materialistic society it was charged to protect. Some scholars have argued that the Gilded Age manifested a trend toward "business 64 pacifism" or "antimil itarism." In a sense this was the case, but there was a stronger countertrend of acquiescence in or open support of the postwar regular army and the missions assigned to it. Even so, the army played a key role in several issues over which public opinion was badly divided, and, therefore, it had its vocal minority of vigorous enemies. The army's use of force in the South and in the West alienated many Americans. Even after the removal of the last troops from the ex -Confederate South in 1877, Reconstruction remained a bitter issue for southern Democrats, even those who came to admit that the abolition of slavery was probably for the best. Northerners were likely to be tolerant of southern attitudes after the early 1870s, and they were receptive toward the southern demands for "home rule" by moderate ex-Confederates. Indeed, 1 aissez f aire theories of government and the considerations of practical politics dictated a Republican strategy to attract moderate southern whites to the ranks of the Grand Old Party. All of this went hand in hand with the new policy of "benign neglect" of the freedmen of the region, for whom many north65 erners believed the federal government had done enough.

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213 At best, the army's record during Reconstruction was mixed. Some officers, notably Sherman, never accepted the necessity for Congressional Reconstruction and in essence undermined it by their attitudes. Some of the companyand field-grade officers in the local occupying forces were vigorous in their support of the rights of the blacks, but many others were condescending and paternalistic, siding with white landowners in crucial labor contracts which deeply affected the economic future of the freedmen in a society still heavily agricultural. Other leading soldiers, especially Brigadier General Oliver 0. Howard in his capacity as commissioner of the Freedmen 's Bureau, were hamstrung by the sheer size of the problems of the postwar South, the attitudes of subordinates and the civilian population, and their own paternalistic R7 approach to reform and social change. Above all, there were never enough troops in the South after 1866 to enforce federal policy evenly and promptly, had the generals really desired to do so, for conditions on the frontier made serious demands on the strength of the army during this period of increasing westward migration. After 1877, the army was more than happy to put Reconstruction behind it. As the leadership of the service discovered as it readied for publication the official records of the Civil War, both northerners and southerners of the late 1870s and 1880s preferred a nonpartisan approach to the recent past. Rather than dispute the morality of the war or the issues which caused it, the nation preferred to remember the heroism and endurance of both sides. The army prepared the records of the war dispassionately and as fully for both sides as possible, and the result was national acclaim and the long-term Congressional appropriations essential to the comple69 tion of the massive task.

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214 As many people believed that America had solved the problems of reintegrating a rebellious region and absorbing a newly-freed black population in the South, several humanitarian groups and prominent reformers increasingly devoted their attentions to questions not directly related to the war and its aftermath. One of these, steadily growing in importance during the late 1870s and 1880s, was the cause of the Indian. Such concern brought the army, whose traditional policy toward the tribes included liberal use of force, into conflict with some influential Republican reformers and humanitarians. Central to the conflict over Indian policy was a series of attempts by members of Congress to transfer the Indian Bureau from the Department of the Interior to the War Department, of which it had been a part prior to the establishment of the former department in 1849. During the late 1860s, some Republicans in the House of Representatives, trying to embarrass the Senate, presented bills intended to transfer the Indian Bureau as a means of wresting control over Indian policy from the Senate. After 1874, however, the Democratic majority in the House picked up the issue of transfer and used it as a partisan means to harass the Republican party. Public opinion on the wisdom of transfer was divided, but by the late 1870s influential liberal Republicans such as E. L. Godkin and Carl Schurz stridently opposed putting the Indian 71 Bureau under the control of the War Department. Eastern evangelical churches and reform groups opposed to the use of force in dealing with the Indians waged a bitter campaign against transfer, especially because they believed that the army, the instrument that the War Department would have to use to oversee the enforcement of Indian policy, would brutalize the tribes. The propaganda of the extremists of the antitransfer

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215 movement purposely antagonized the army, whose generals and colonels overwhelmingly favored transfer as the best means to coordinate federal Indian policy. Feelings on both sides of the transfer issue were tense. Alfred B. Meacham, editor of Council F i res the magazine of the most tenacious opponents of transfer, decried Indian fighters like George A. Custer as mere murderers in uniform and proposed the abolition of the army. George W. Manypenny's Our Indian Wards published in 1880, condemned the army's use of force in its century of carrying out Indian policy; he based his arguments on moral and religious grounds, stirring up great 73 debate. On the other hand, the army and its friends scoffed at the "misguided" missionaries and muddled idealists who ignored the savagery of Indian attacks against white soldiers and civilians. These religious fanatics refused to admit the folly of their cause out of "a desire not to give up what they have undertaken." Although Congress dropped the transfer issue after 1880, the army and the humanitarians never came to terms, despite the fact that the army's opponents advocated policies which ultimately were as destructive to Indian tribal identity as the reservation policies advocated by officers like Colonel Nelson A. Miles, 75 who hoped thereby to isolate the "hostiles" from the subdued tribes. In the end, Meacham' s and Manypenny's view of the regular army as savage butchers of Indians became the "black legend" of the American West, despite the roles played by civilian officials, western politicians, and settlers in establishing policies that virtually destroyed the Native 7fi Americans. The third issue which the army faced during the late 1870s had even greater impact on the national future. In 1877, the regulars received

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216 their first real taste of riot duty. The great railroad strike of 1877 was the culmination of a long series of workers' grievances in a time of economic depression. In July, a new wave of wage reductions, the means by which the railroad owners had dealt with the depressed economy since the panic first hit the business community in 1873, went into effect on the eastern lines. This drove the desperate brakemen and yardmen to organize a strike, which quickly spread as it gained the support of virtually all types of railroad workers. The strike began in West Virginia but rapidly engulfed the entire Northeast, most of the Midwest, and parts of the West. State troops proved to be inadequate to support police forces overwhelmed by the magnitude and violence of the strike, which had simply been exacerbated by the use of private detectives as strikebreakers by the railroads. President Rutherford B. Hayes, alarmed by events, ordered out the troops of the Division of the Atlantic and mobilized those units of the Division of Missouri stationed near large cities. The soldiers ended the violence, and the strike was broken by late sunnier. Even so, the sumner of 1877 was industrial America's first glimpse of a nationwide strike in a major industry; the workers had tied up rail traffic throughout the country and raised the specter of a radicalism that the middle class was just beginning to call "communism." By the time Hayes and his cabinet concluded that order had been restored throughout the country, most of the troops in the Division of the Atlan78 tic had experienced strike duty. Their commander, Major General Winfield S. Hancock, noted that his men "moved steadily with calmness 79 and celerity. The presence of the troops had a powerful effect." The troops faced considerable danger from working-class men, much like themselves, but the army proved itself to be quite adept at quelling riots. 80

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217 The army's role in suppressing the riots had vastly different meanings for the various groups in American society. What little testimony that has been recorded of the workers' reactions presents an ambiguous view of the regulars. One soldier who had been a union man before his enlistment declared that "a change of dress" did not require "a change of principle," but strikers were often startled to discover that the enlisted men of the army, despite the poverty and poor living conditions of their own experiences, would not hesitate to fire upon unruly and 81 violent crowds if their officers ordered them to do so. For the prosperous men and women of America, however, the strike was a dark sign of coming crisis, in which the army became a reliable bulwark against anarchy. James A. Garfield feared that the "dangers of 82 communism" had crossed the Atlantic with radical immigrants. Colonel Upton, in his book published in 1878, based his proposition of the National Volunteers upon the need for a federally-controlled reserve 83 to augment the army faithfully and quickly during strikes and riots. For William C. Church and the Army and Navy Journal the "lesson" of the railroad strike was the necessity for a larger regular army and federal 84 control of the state forces. Church warned: America has thrown open her doors and offered an asylum and a home to the oppressed of all nations of the earth, and she is now reaping the bitter fruits of her generosity. The ignorant and depraved have formed (of late years) a large percentage of our increase from foreign immigration. . As it is, the events of a week have shown us that we stand on the brink of an abyss as formidable as that which yawned before us in 1861. Shall we heed in time? . 85 Thomas B. Nichols, a West Point graduate and former cavalry officer writing in United Service more than a year after the riots, echoed Church's theme. "It is doubtful if any system can be devised in

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218 America by which soldiers, in any numbers, can be made, except in schools of the regular army, to successfully deal with the strikes and riots which all labor communities must pass through, and with the rise and growth of communistic sentiments among the lower classes the day will come . when we will have learned that it would have been better 87 economy to have had a larger regular army." Struck by these warnings as well as the labor violence itself, the state militias of the East and Midwest began to transform themselves into the National Guard. As a result of the strike and riots, business groups increased their support in the formation and maintenance of volunteer companies, which had previously existed as much as social 88 clubs than as military units. There may indeed have been elements of romanticism and "playing soldier" in the revival of military volunteering in the late 1870s and 1880s, but much more was at stake. Furthermore, many of the officers of the state units realized this ^ery plainly. In 1881, the two-year-old National Guard Association of the United States met in Philadelphia to discuss the common problems of units in all of the states represented. The one subject which occupied most of the members' time was the relative usefulness of the various combat arms in riot control. The Adjutant General of Rhode Island, obviously an advocate of Church's emphasis on target practice, favored infantry as both "equal to all emergencies in time of riot" and as economical to train and maintain. His counterpart from Pennsylvania argued for a different arm: "There can be no question of the efficiency of the artillery of the National Guard in putting down riots. ... A battery loaded with grape and cannister has a most discouraging effect upon a body of rioters." But the Adjutant General of Illinois spoke out for a

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219 mixed force of mounted troops, noting that the cavalry had effectively charged mobs in 1877 and that light artillery could quickly dispatch 89 "any unorganized crowd." By the late 1890s, as strike duty decreased, the social atmosphere of military service and training in the state units again became the hallmark of the National Guard. Before that time, however, they were more often portrayed as riot police and as the auxiliary of the regular 90 army in times of civil disturbance. Eventually, the regular army and the National Guard would clash bitterly over Congressional appropriations and the relative authority of each component, but in the late 1870s and 1880s, social turbulence and the formation of the guard probably created a more favorable climate of public opinion toward the army in general among middleand upper-class Americans. Thus, the public's attitude toward the army was ambiguous during the Gilded Age. The institution of a standing army appalled some Americans and bored others, but only a handful of religiously-oriented pacifists, militant socialists and anarchists, and vindictive politicians ever seriously considered its abolition. There is considerable evidence that middleand upper-class people came to believe the army to be a vital protection against class warfare and general lawlessness, just as westerners had long felt the troops were their bulwark against hostile, bloodthirsty Indians. This, of course, did not change either the social standing of enlisted men in the regular army or the desirability of life in the ranks for young American males. Indeed, the enlisted men of the late 1870s and early 1880s long remembered the social snubs they received, in both the East and the cities of the West, by the 91 ^jery civilians whom they were bound to protect.

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220 The officer class, however, fit in well with the "better sort" of civilians, and many of those civilians were willing to romanticize and idealize the life of professional military men. As a type, the army officer in this incarnation symbolized the selflessness, nobility, honor, and devotion to duty that Americans long prided themselves on and suspected could have been lost beneath the corruption and materalism of politics and business in the Gilded Age. Part chevalier, part strikebreaker, the army officer was realistic as well as proud. Even if his West Point background made him appear clannish and aristocratic, he did preserve the social order so dear to the comfortable men and women of late nineteenth century America. He and his troops may have cost sums that sometime made the taxpayers uneasy, but he could be counted on to execute policies dispassionately, so the idealistic argument went, and he inspired a certain respect, even if love for a standing army did not accompany that respect. As the Army and Navy Journa l phrased the ideal of the professional officer in 1876, the gentlemen in blue "are, as always, as a body, independent of sectional feeling of any sort" and 92 above crass partisan politics as well. No wonder many articulate, reform-minded molders of public opinion viewed the army as a model upon which honest civil government could be based. "We carefully train and educate our naval and military men, and we ripen and perfect their capabilities through long services and experience, and keep hold of these excellent servants through a just system of promotion," Mark Twain told a Republican rally in Hartford in 1876, presenting an idealized picture that some officers might dispute. "This is exactly what we hope to do with our civil service."' Even in its "dark age," the postwar army was never totally abandoned by the American public.

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221 Notes to Chapter VI 1 "Congress on the Army," Nation May 30, 1878, 352. -The classic account of the disputed election of 1876 and its aftermath is C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction : The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (revised ed. New York: Doubleday, T956). ^See the discussion in Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians : The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865 (New York: Free Press, 1973), 318-334. ^For background on this powerful postwar lobby, see Mary Rulkotter Dearing, Veterans in Politics : The Story of the G^ A^_ R^ (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952). ^Logan, for example, strongly supported retirement pensions for enlisted men. See Congressional R ecord 46 Congress, 2 session, 26852688. ^Theodore Clarke Smith, The Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield (2 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), I, 420421; Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 6T: ?For Logan's side, see his brother's biographical sketch of him included in John A. Logan, The Volunteer Soldier of America (Chicago: R. S. Peale, 1887), 25-73. For Sherman's side of the dispute, see William T. Sherman, The Memoirs of William T. Sherman Written By Him self (2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 187577 II, 85-86. ^Logan, Volunteer Soldier of America 78. 9 Ibid 93-323. l^See Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army : Military Thought From Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962J, 127-136. •'''•See Hans C. Trefousse, Ben Butler : The South Called Him Beast (New York: Twayne, 1957), 2~W. For Butler's own account of his career, see his incomparable Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major General Benjamin F. Butler : Butler's Book (Boston: A. M. Thayer, 1892?:

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222 12 For biographical information, see United States Congress, House Document 783, 69 Congress, 2 session, Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-1927 (Washington: Government Printing DTFice, 1928 ), 667-668 ,~T2T. 13 Smith, Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield I, 64-364. Ibid I, 373-393, 519-523. He was a prominent member of the Electoral Commission, which ultimately produced the compromise which elected Hayes. Ibid ., I, 631-645. 15 1 bid ., I, 531-546, II, 940-941. 16 1 bid ., II, 652-739. 17 Ibid., I, 420-421. ^ Congressional Record 45 Congress, 2 session, 3635-3638. l^For the Texans and their interest in the border question, see United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 64, 45 Congress, 2 session, Testimony Taken By the Committee on Military Affairs in Rela tion to the Texas Border Troubles (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878T: 20smith, Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield II, 785-786. 21 Ibid II, 770. 22 Upton to Garfield, May 6, 1878, book 53, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Garfield to Upton, June 28, 1878, printed in Peter S. Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), 451. 23 Sherman to Garfield, March 23, 1878, March 27, 1878, March 29, 1878, William T. Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. 24 James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States," North American Review CXXVI (March-April, May-June 1878), 197. 25 Ibid., 458. 2 6 lbid ., 442. 27 Ibid ., 450-451. 2 8_Ibi_d. 452. 2 9lbid. 30Grant to Stanton, January 29, 1866, quoted in ibid ., 453. 31 Ibid. 453.

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223 32ib 33ibid.

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224 5 ^R. Williams, "Army Organization in the United States," Galaxy XXIV (November 1877), 594-602, and "The Staff of the Army of the United States," Atlantic Monthly XLIV (March 1878), 376-384. 58 Williams, "Army Organization in the United States," 602. 59 "0ur Military Past and Future," Atlantic Monthly XLIV (November 1879), 575. 60 Ibid ., 561-575. C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 231, attributes the article to De Forest, whose best-known work is the Civil War novel Miss Ravenel s Conversion From Secession to Loyalty, published in 1867. 6*See Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians 65-81; for excellent examples of this romantic image in the popular artwork of the antebellum period, see ibid ., passim 62For a discussion of King's writings and their influence, see Oliver Knight, Life and Manners in the Frontier Army (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978). King's career is sketched briefly in William H. Powell ed., List of Officers of the Army of the United States From 1789 to 1900 (NewTork: L. R. Hanmersly and Company, 1900), 414. ^Harriet Waters Preston, Poganuc People and Other Novels," Atlantic Monthly XLII (October 1878), 434. ^Samuel p. Huntington argues that military professionalism was a result of the climate of "business pacifism" and open hostility to the army which forced the late nineteenth century officer corps to look inward; see his The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Pol i tics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957J7 222-269. As this chapter attempts to demonstrate, Huntington's analysis of public opinion in the Gilded Age is too simplistic. The argument for "antimilitarism" as the major current during the period is advanced by Arthur Ekirch, The Civilian and the Mil itary : A History of the American Antimilitarist Tradition (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myers, 1972), 109123, a shallow work which fails to differentiate among the wide range of motives behind opposition to increased military spending. A good study of articulate civilian opinion regarding the army, which rightly stresses the confusion of viewpoints during the period, is Kemble, Image of jthe Army Officer jn America 99-153. 65For Republican abandonment of the freedmen and attempts to court the white South, see Stanley P. Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt : Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro 1877-1893 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 29-98; Vincent P. De Santis, Republ icans Face the Southern Question : The New Departure Years 1877-1897 iBltTtTmore: John Hopkins Uni veTsTty Press, 1959), 19-147 ; Rayf ord W. Logan, The Betrayal of _the Negro : From Rutherford B^ Hayes to Woodrow Wilson (New York: Collier Books, 1965), 23-47, 175-194.

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225 66For the problems of the army during Reconstruction, shown in a light very sympathetic to the anti-Radical officers, see James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). Sefton's deep research often transcends the limits of his conclusions. "'For Howard and his limitations, see William S. McFeely, Yankee Stepfather : General 0. 0. Howard and the Freedmen (New York: w. w.

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226 75 Mardock, Reformers and the American Indian 30-46, 211-226; Nelson A. Miles, "The Indian Problem," North American Review CXXVIII (March 1879), 304-314. 7This is not to say that some regulars did not deserve condemnation for savagery. For the kill-or-be-killed attitude that a significant proportion of Indian Wars enlisted men held toward the "hostiles," see Don Rickey, Jr. Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay : The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars ^Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 230-234. However, some of the most gruesome atrocities against Indian women and children were the work of local volunteer soldiers of the western states and territories. For the worst of all, the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864, see Dee Brown, Bury My Heart _at Wounded Knee : An Indian History of the American West (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), 83-91, and Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen j_n Blue : The United States Army and the Indian 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 289-299. The best account is Robert V. Bruce, 1877 Year of Violence (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970; original edition, 195977 78 See Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, I, 86-109. 79 Hancock to Major General John M. Schofield, July 30, 1877, John M. Schofield Papers, Library of Congress. 80 See the discussion of the troops' performance at the Cabinet meeting of July 24, 1877, quoted in Bruce, 1877 Year of Violence 222. 81 1 bid ., 89, 309. 82Garfield to Upton, September 16, 1878, quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964TTH8. 83Emory Upton, The Armi es of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton, 1878), 369. 8^See Army and Navy Journal July 28, 1877, editorial, "The Lesson of a Week," 816-817, and ibid August 4, 1877, editorial, "Amateurs and the Army," 832-833. 85 1 bid August 18, 1877, editorial, "Our Army," 24-25. 8"Nichols graduated in 1872, served as a lieutenant in the Sixth Cavalry, and resigned his commission in 1876. See Francis B. Heitman, ed. Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), I, 747. 8 7 Thomas B. Nichols, "The Pittsburgh Riots," United Service I (April 1879), 262. """"""

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227 atj See Willi an H. Riker, Soldiers of the States : The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 47-54. "^ Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the National G u ard Association of the United States in Philadelphia March 7_ and 8, 1881 10-17, quoted~in ~Tbid ., 52^51: 90 1 bid ., 53-52. See also Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Pol itics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965 ), 15-18. For evidence of the army's changing attitudes toward state troops, see Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 243-286, and ibid 1881, I, 179-196. 91-See Rickey, Forty Miles a_ Day on Beans and Hay 26-28. 9 ? Army and Navy Journal November 11, 1876, editorial, "Under Which King," 216. 93 Speech by Mark Twain, September 30, 1876, Hartford, Connecticut, quoted in Lai ly Weymouth and Milton Glaser, America in 1876 : The Way We Were (New York: Random House, 1976), 127-128.

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CHAPTER VII FRIENDS AND FOES OF THE ARMY: Congressional Plans For Army Reform Do these gentlemen fof the House of Representatives] suppose that our much-criticized army and navy are the only branches of the public service to be held to public reckoning? . What reformers are these who demoralize the army to save a few millions, and the same week . pass a bounty bill opening the doors of the Treasury to a demand . for over one millions from claim agents and that ilk? William C. Church, 1876 1 The Capitol was a turbulent place in the late 1870s, as members of Congress battled each other for partisan, personal, and, occasionally, ideological reasons. Yet many Americans, both supporters of the army and persons apathetic toward all but the most pressing military issues, could agree with William C. Church of the Army and Navy Journal that much of the Congressional concern over economy and civilian control of the military was mere posturing. Much of this skepticism was the fault of Congress, because its members centered so many of their battles on the old issues of Civil War and Reconstruction, rather than squarely facing the new problems of a tenuously-reunited, rapidly industrializing and urbanizing nation which was becoming a major world power in spite of itself. Indeed, many voters, including the most influential and active as well as the relatively powerless and uninformed, felt deep alienation from Congress and its concerns. As E. L. Godkin implied in 228

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229 his editorial in the Nation on Congressional attempts to reduce the army, such matters were indicative not of the popular mood but of the fact that "we have too much Congress," in which individual politicians 2 used spurious issues to gain their own narrow ends. Part of the problem with Congress did lie in the precarious balance of power between the two parties, a serious concern in an era which emphasized party discipline in the legislative branch as well in the patronage jobs of the executive branch. Since the elections of 1874 had weakened Republican strength in the wake of the Grant Administration's scandals, the House of Representatives of 1875 had a Democratic majority, the first in more than a decade. Republican power had eroded in the Senate as well, and the Grand Old Party shifted from the majority party to the minority and back again between 1879 and 1881. During its years as the majority party in the upper house, it rarely had a margin of votes to spare. In both houses of Congress, the resurgent Democrats believed that the time had come to settle several scores with the rival party and its allies, one of whom, many Democratic partisans argued, was the United States Army. These men pointed to two reasons for their distrust of the army: the soldiers' role in the enforcement of Radical Reconstruction policies and the part that troops played in the disputed Tilden-Hayes Presidential election in 1875. Southern "redeemers," the Democrats who began to replace the Republican Congressmen of the ex-rebellious states as Reconstruction ended, remembered bitterly the army's occupation of the South, in reality half-hearted but in regional legend brutal and arrogant. Feelings of racism, because blacks had played a role in the Republican party in most of the ex-Confederate states, mingled with partisan animosity and

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230 sectional pride. Northern Democrats, crying that they had been robbed of the Presidency, joined their southern colleagues in denouncing the army's role in the election of 1876, charging that military activity in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina had purposely been ordered to affect the outcome of the vote in those crucial states, all under the 3 guise of "guarding" the polling places. It is hard to say whether the turbulent events of the late 1870s had a major impact on attempts by Congress to reform and reorganize the army. Indian policy and the army's role in ending violence in labor disputes seemed to be only secondary matters, as Democrats raged over Reconstruction and some Republicans fumed over old personal disputes dating back as far as the war. John A. Logan and Benjamin F. Butler opposed increased military spending on key occasions in part because they disliked Sherman and the "aristocratic" officer corps of the army. Indeed, the most visionary proposal to reform the army, the Burnside Bill of 1878-1879, appeared more than a year after the great strike of 1877 ended, and the testimony and letters to the Burnside Committee by leading army officers stressed the part the army could play in maintain4 ing civil order. However, most members of Congress responded to the Burnside Bill as they did all other army-related legislation of the years from 1876 through 1879: on the basis of the posse comitatus clause, which forbade soldiers from aiding law enforcement officials, except as individual private citizens. This, Democrats argued, would prevent an abuse of the executive power, and they added the clause to each appropriation bill during these years. In part, Reconstruction policy had been based on the use of military occupation forces to aid Radical state governments; by inserting the posse comitatus clause,

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231 Democrats were both trying to prevent a similar situation and curbing 5 the powers of the army. In focusing upon this issue and upon the necessity of reducing the enlisted force of the army as an economy measure, Congress framed its debates on army reorganization in very narrow terms. The needs of the army and its proper role in American society were more complex, but no one in Congress during the 1870s and early 1880s could or would discuss them in the depth they deserved. Partisan feelings and expediency won out over any farsighted approach to defining an institution that was destined to become larger and more important than ever before in American history. Representative Henry Banning of Ohio, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, led most of the Democratic efforts to limit the size and power of the army, and he symbolizes the strengths, weaknesses, and ambiguity of Congressional opposition to the army. This former Union general, once a Republican politician, was the nemesis of the service during the late 1870s, but he also was a complex man who included genuine reforms for the army, reforms that officers long considered necessary, within bills which were designed to cut troop strength to the bone. A self-proclaimed advocate of economy in government, Banning probably believed, at least part of the time, that he was cutting wasteful spending. Sometimes he obviously mixed economy with vindicti veness, as in the pay reductions which he sought for parts of the officer corps in 1876. Chief among the officers affected were the lowly second lieutenants, whose pay he would have reduced by $200 per year, and the army's generals, who were well paid by government standards of the time. The cuts in the subalterns' pay would have caused these men serious

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232 hardships, but the reductions in generals' pay and allowances were probably designed as much for nuisance value as for genuine savings, for there were only nineteen generals on the active list in 1876. 7 Probably the major targets of Banning's bill were Sherman and Sheridan, who sustained the largest cuts, $8,081.91 and $5,593.86 in pay and benefits, respectively. Indeed, much of the bill smacked of that false economy of which Republican friends of the army complained so bitterly. Even the cuts in the second lieutenants' salaries would have saved only about $10,000 per year, all at the expense of destroying morale in the army. Regardless, Banning pressed on, revealing the jealousy and anger behind this particular army bill, complaining that Sherman's new salary of $10,00 per year would be "double that of a Senator, 25 per cent, more than that of a cabinet officer or a supreme judge Qic ]." Naturally, Banning's insistence had the effects he desired on the army brass. Major General John M. Schofield wrote to Sherman bitterly that this "constant agitation of pay can not fail to have a disastrous result upon the character of the Army, to reduce army officers from the high standard of honorable faithful public servants for life, to the level of those whose interests in the public service is measured by the amount of money the can make out of it." But this same Henry Banning could also propose three-battalion infantry regiments, promotions from the ranks for deserving young non-commissioned officers, and tough promotion boards and examinations for army officers. The bill in which Banning presented the reductions in pay was part of a larger package of changes regarding the army. The other portions reorganized the army and transferred to the War Department control over

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233 the Indian Bureau. The vast majority of the sixty officers who testified before the committee reconmended that the bureau be removed from the auspices of the Department of the Interior, which had contained the Indian Bureau since 1849, the date the department was formed. Before that time, the War Department oversaw the bureau, and the officers argued that Indian policy was better coordinated under the old arrangement. Controversy over the proper stance of the federal government toward the Indians insured the defeat of the Banning proposals of 1876, since humanitarian groups joined with the majority in Congress in refusing to assign the entire responsibility for the execution of policy toward the tribes, both friendly and hostile, to the army. However, army officers themselves were horrified at the thought that Banning' s report would have increased their responsibilities while reducing the size of the officer corps and cutting the staff. Banning did not recommend a reduction in the size of the enlisted force, perhaps realizing that the army could hardly enforce all aspects of Indian policy with fewer than the current 25,000 men. Only a few positions on the non-commissioned staff of some of the regiments were abolished. Rather, Banning and his committee struck at the officer corps in the name of economy. As a beginning, they reorganized the artillery regiments into a corps organization, which reduced the number of field officers' billets in that branch. Furthermore, the report recommended the reduction, through unit consolidation, of ten infantry regiments and four cavalry regiments, again at the expense of the majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. For the staff, Banning proposed merging the Subsistence Department with the Quartermaster's Department to create a Department of Supplies, with the reduction of nearly half

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234 of the total officer's positions in the two departments. He also sug13 gested that twenty paymaster's positions be axed. In all, over a hundred officer slots would be eliminated in the reduction, with field officers the hardest hit in the short run. However, all officers would soon feel the effects of the Banning proposals if they became law, for promotions, already slow, would become slower than ever. Understandably, few officers believed Banning when he wrote that the proposed reduction "does not muster out or discharge a single worthy or efficient 14 officer." The Banning proposals, introduced as two separate bills, passed the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives. In the Senate, however, John A. Logan refused to release the legislation from his Military Affairs Committee, so House Democrats shifted to the tactic of adding riders to reduce the army's troop strength onto the annual ap15 propriations bill. In July 1876, the situation in Congress suddenly changed as word of the Custer Massacre reached the East. The outcry over the deaths of Custer, long a national figure, and his men led Congress to increase the size of cavalry companies to 100 privates, thus authorizing the recruitment of 2,500 additional cavalrymen, whom the press termed the "Custer Avengers." The needs of the frontier and public opinion against the Sioux forced Banning and his allies to abandon their battle to cut the army, but only for the moment. As part of the provisions of the new appropriations bill of July 1876, Congress established a commission to study the reorganization of the army. The proposal, at first, pleased all sides, for the army, the Democrats, and the Republicans all hoped that the commission would endorse proposals favorable to their interests. The commission had as its chairman Senator J. D. Cameron, recently secretary of war and now

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235 representing Pennsylvania as a Republican. It also contained two other senators and two representatives, equally divided by party, as well as Sherman and Major General Montgomery C. Meigs, the traditionalist quartermaster general, to represent the viewpoint of army officers. Banning had secured for himself a place on the commission and continued to press both for reductions and for solid reforms such as the threebattalion infantry regiment. The Cameron Commission met throughout the fall of 1876 and extended the Congressional deadline for submission of the report from late December to January 27, 1877. Even so, its members could not agree on any basic scheme for army reorganization and disbanded when the new deadline passed. Sherman, furious over the impasse which he hoped could have been avoided by his own presence on the com18 mission, denounced Banning for the failure. Meanwhile, the disputed Presidential election of 1876 increased tensions in Congress and the country to the breaking point. Banning, in a fit of vituperative oratory, vowed that an armed Democratic mob would resist the inauguration of Hayes should the electoral commission 19 appointed by Congress to certify the winner find for the Republican. The fifteen-man commission awarded all of the disputed electoral votes, and with them the election, to Hayes near the end of February 1877, leaving the disgruntled Democrats to lead not a revolution but another series of attempts to reduce the army. The mere presence of soldiers at the polls, the Democrats believed, intimidated many voters and allowed the Republicans to stuff ballot boxes. Once again, Congressional Democrats turned to the tactic of tacking riders to the army appropriations bill. One of these measures would have reduced the army to 17,000 enlisted men. It passed the House but died in a Senate still controlled

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236 by the Republicans, who viewed such a reduction as merely a partisan measure. Another rider added the posse comitatus clause to the appropriations bill. It, too, died, but when Congress adjourned for the session on March 3, 1877, it had appropriated no money for the army for 20 the fiscal year which began on July 1, 1877. As a consequence, the soldiers, from newest recruit to General Sherman, received no pay or allowances after June 30. For the enlisted men, the government still provided food, shelter, and clothing if not money, but for officers, who had to buy their own uniforms and most of their food, the situation was desperate. The War Department, trying to help, contracted with the banking firm of Drexel, Morgan and Company to loan $400,000 to army officers, with limits based on their usual salaries. However, Drexel, Morgan charged a fourteen per cent interest rate, which outraged the regulars, most of whom felt their salaries were low enough already, especially since they were paid in scrip, which was discounted at a customary rate of fifteen to forty per cent in the West. Even so, President Hayes refused to call a special session of the new Forty-Fifth Congress until the fall of 1877. When the new Congress assembled in October, it debated the army appropriations bill heatedly for nearly a month, finally passing a compromise bill which put the army back on the 22 federal payroll in November. During the first regular session of the Forty-Fifth Congress, Banning and the Military Affairs Committee of the House presented another report on army reorganization. This one, completed early in 1878, called for an enlisted complement of only 20,000 and a reduction in the number of regiments to fifteen of infantry, six of cavalry, and four of ar23 tillery. Obviously, the role of the regulars in quelling the riots

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237 and strikes of 1877, still fresh in many minds, did not predispose Banning to be any less harsh with the army. Like the proposal of 1876, this one would affect the army's field officers most drastically, for the total number of companysized units would not be greatly reduced, thus sparing most of the company-grade officers from a reduction in force. Banning proposed natural attrition, retirements, and slower promotions as the means of ridding the army of the surplus officers. He was especially harsh on the general officer positions, recommending that the army in the future be commanded by a lone major general, assisted by only three brigadier generals of the line. When Sherman and Sheridan retired, the ranks they held were to be abolished. 24 For the staff, Banning again proposed the creation by consolidation of a Department of Supplies, with the cut in size that that entailed. His report also included a special cause of his: the disbandment of the army should Congress ever again fail to vote appropriations for it prior to the end of a session." As a final insult, Banning again recommended a reduction in the salaries of general officers to $12,000 for Sherman, $8,000 for Sheridan, $6,000 for each major general, and $5,500 for a brigadier general. For the lowerranking officers, the report recormiended one increase in salary, $100 per year more for majors. However, captains would receive $200 less, first lieutenants of light artillery and cavalry would be cut $300 in pay per year, and other first lieutenants, along with all second lieutenants, would lose $100 in pay each year. 27 These features of the bill were \/ery harsh, but, to the chagrin of the army and its friends, there was also much in the way of genuine reforms in Banning' s report.

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238 Banning, who after all was an ex-general himself, probably knew and understood many of the army's weaknesses. Possibly he hoped to balance the severe reductions in strength by linking them with substantial reforms. Whatever his reasoning, Banning included in the report several reforms urged for years by army officers and the Army and Navy Journal These included a revival of the program to commission outstanding young non-commissioned officers, a measure which did become law in 1878, and the elimination of direct commissioning of civilians, a point which Con28 gress rejected but which the regulars had long supported. Banning' s report also provided for the establishment of promotion boards to evaluate all candidates for the grades of first lieutenant through colo29 nel. Compulsory retirement upon reaching age sixty-five or the completion of forty-five years of service, whichever came first, was another 30 progressive feature of the report. For the infantry, Banning and the committee again proposed the three-battalion regiment of twelve com31 panies, four per battalion. Sherman favored just such an organization, and William C. Church and Emory Upton also supported the three32 battalion regiment, in a slightly different format, \/ery strongly. Banning also endorsed the bill sponsored by Representative George Dibrell, which increased the pay of non-commissioned officers. Under its terms, a sergeant major would receive $30 per month, a quartermaster sergeant $27, a first sergeant $28, a sergeant $20, and a corporal 33 $16. The committee, which two years before had wanted to increase the pay of first sergeants only, to the improbable sum of $40 per month, 34 seems to have adopted the Dibrell scheme as a compromise. Banning 's report troubled the friends of the army. On one hand, they strenuously opposed the reduction of 5,000 enlisted men in an army

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239 they already believed to be as small as feasible. They deplored the pay cuts and their effects on officer morale. However, on the other hand, they realized that Banning had pointed out several shortcomings of the army as currently organized and that he had advanced some very good reforms. The Army and Navy Journal hoped that the favorable parts of the committee's report could be embodied in alternate legislation, but it flatly opposed Banning's own bills because they cut the size of the army so much, while linking its \/ery existence to the caprice of Congressional 35 votes on army appropriations bills.' As Church put it sarcastically in one of his editorials in the Army and Navy Journal the bill was another "model of legislative wisdom, showing us precisely how we can contrive to always have the right number of men in the right place at the right time, without expending a cent on soldiers, except when they are actually in line of battle, or wasting money on recruiting, fatigue parties, or other men in uniform, except those who are visibly standing ready at all times to prod some one with a bayonet; how to command without officers . | and] without employing a 'useless staff. 1 In Congress, the Democrats were once more unable to get Banning's bills approved by the Senate once the House had voted in their favor. As in 1876 and 1877, partisans turned to the appropriations bill, tacking riders to it. Some of these amendments, including the reduction of the army to 20,000 enlisted men and a ban on the use of federal troops to supervise elections, won the assent of the House of Representatives. The Senate, however, rejected the appropriations bills as amended when the package reached the upper house toward the end of May 1878. Several weeks of debate followed as the two houses tried to devise an appropriations bill acceptable to most members of Congress. Finally, a compromise

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240 measure, which left the troop ceiling at 25,000, passed the House and Senate. This compromise, however, did mark a genuine turning point in the army's relations with Congress, because, as part of its terms, a new joint committee of Congress would form and meet to recommend reor37 ganization proposals for the service. Army officers had long wanted a Congressional committee composed of friends of the army to recommend solid measures to reorganize the service; most officers believed that some changes would definitely be for the best. Sherman had held great hopes for the Cameron Commission as such a vehicle, but it had failed dismally. This new joint committee was the brainchild of Representative James A. Garfield of Ohio, the powerful minority leader who was a key figure in the Republican party. Garfield was in a unique position to know the views of the army's top leadership. He had corresponded with Sherman about the army and its problems while he was preparing an article about army reform for the North American Review Sherman sent him correspondence and papers from some leading officers and provided him with statistical and historical op materials/ Garfield, long a supporter of the regular army, was a former Union volunteer general with both a heroic reputation and a great admiration for the West Pointers with whom he had served. Every inch the politician, Garfield also had pretensions and some solid claims to being a scholar and a statesman. As a result, he maintained strong ties with Republican intellectuals and reformers, all the while stressing his own more "practical" approach to social change. Most Republicans, and many outside the Grand Old Party, considered Garfield a humane, rational, 39 congenial man. In sum, the Ohioan had many allies and connections in Congress, and he succeeded in his quest to create a new committee to

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241 study army reorganization within the appropriations bill for the fiscal year of 1879. In the Senate, Garfield found an active ally in Senator Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, who spoke out strongly for the committee on June 4. Burnside quickly became chairman of the committee, an obvious choice. He was not only a good Republican but a member of the Senate Mil itary Affairs Committee, as well as one of the leading living figures of the War of the Rebellion. Furthermore, the army had reason to welcome the choice, because Burnside was a stout friend of the service and 40 had an inclination toward military reform. With Garfield's work behind the scenes and Burnside's appointment to chair the new joint committee, the army had another chance of receiving solid reform proposals from Congress. The army had good reason to be pleased, as the report of the Burnside Committee would demonstrate. To complete the membership of the joint committee, Congress suggested two additional senators and five representatives. The second Republican was Preston Plumb of Kansas, a party loyalist who nevertheless nearly wrecked the committee before its work had properly begun by refusing to serve on it if it would not tour frontier posts to take testi41 mony. Finally, Plumb relented and signed the committee's final report. The lone Democratic senator was Matthew C. Butler of South Carolina, an ex-Confederate general who voiced the opinions of the unreconstructed 42 elements of his home state. The House, dominated by a Democratic majority, sent only two Republicans, Horace Strait of Minnesota and 43 Harry White of Pennsylvania. The Democratic members were a diverse group, all experienced in work on the Military Affairs Committee of the House. One was a southerner, George Dibrell of Tennessee, who despite

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242 his Confederate past and his devotion to economy in government spending, had sponsored a bill to increase the pay of the army's non-commissioned 44 officers earlier in 1878. The two northern Democratic representatives named to the committee, Banning and Edward S. Bragg of Wisconsin, were ex-volunteer generals well known for their vociferious oppostion to the regular army. Banning served actively on the Burnside Committee and probably contributed many ideas to the resulting bill, but Bragg denounced the committee, refused to meet with it, and neither signed its 45 report nor issued a minority report of his own. The committee, selected on June 18, 1878 by votes of the two houses, began to meet in Washington two days later. The members determined the methods of taking testimony and, over Plumb's opposition, voted to hold the hearings at the resort town of White Sulphur Springs, Virginia. William C. Church was lukewarm toward the committee at this point, expecting "that the committee will disagree, . but we have great hopes that the majority report will be that of the friends of the army, and that this report will commend itself to Congress." Furthermore, Church editorialized, "if ... the committee had adopted Senator Plumb's suggestion of visiting the frontiers, it might perhaps have learned more of the practical life in the army in a week than it could at the springs in 46 a month." The hearings lasted only ten days during July, at which time Burnside adjourned it for the season, probably so that some of its members could return to their home states to campaign for reelection. On November 18, the chairman reconvened the group, this time in New York City, where, after some delays caused by late arrivals, the members wrote the final report. On December 12, 1878, shortly after the new session of Congress had begun, Burnside presented the report and introduced a detailed army reorganization bill in the Senate.

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243 The Burnside Conmittee had early "deemed it good and sufficient 49 ... to conduct the proceedings with closed doors." This probably allowed for extensive compromises and discussions on sensitive issues among its widely-divergent membership, but the secrecy precludes any attempt to trace in detail the roles of committee members in shaping the final report and the bill. However, Burnside must have realized that many compromises had to be made if anything were to come of his committee's work. After all, the ill-fated Cameron Commission had deadlocked hopelessly on many of the same problems only two years before. The new committee's report and the Burnside Reorganization Bill were thus moderate in tone, compromise efforts containing some elements to please all sides. Never lost in the effort, however, was the key intent of the bill: the modernization of the regular army along the lines which many thoughtful officers had long proposed. The Burnside Bill went about this reform in a thorough-going, comprehensive way. The committee's report briefly summarized Burnside's massive bill. The bill itself, printed in January 1879, consisted of 724 separate sections, including one which listed the Articles of War in full. Congressmen were somewhat dismayed to find that the legislation took up seventy-seven closely-printed pages. Accompanying it were more than four hundred additional pages of letters and supporting documents from army officers and interested civilians, and thus the huge volume discouraged many readers by its bulk. The Nation always somewhat skeptical about the need for army reorganization and the motives behind it, complained the "the bill to reduce and reorganize the Army ... is 50 alarming in size as well as in some of its contents." Even Sherman, who favored the bill, admitted that it was "infernal long" in its

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244 original state, and he fretted about its fate in a hostile Congress. Actually, Burnside and his committee had produced such a large bill because they recognized the need for a "condensed and complete military code" more modern than the revised army regulations of 1861, which the 52 postwar situation had proven to be inadequate. Eventually, Burnside gave in to criticism of the bill's size and withdrew all but those 53 sections touching specifically upon army reorganization. As a compromise measure, the Burnside Bill showed not only its namesake's influence but that of Banning and the southerners as well. While the size of the enlisted force would remain at 25,000 under its provisions, the total number of officers would be reduced. Probably, Banning pushed hard for the section abolishing the grades of general and lieutenant general upon the retirement of Sherman and Sheridan, a section which also reduced the number of major generals to two and briga54 dier generals of the line to four. The bill also reduced the number of regiments, both as an economy measure and as a means of making the line more compact. Chiefly field officers and non-commissioned officers of the regimental staffs would be affected by this change. However, Burnside's plan was less severe than Banning's of 1878. Under the new proposal, all five artillery regiments would remain intact, the infantry would have eighteen regiments, and the cavalry would be reduced to 55 eight. Unlike Banning's report issued earlier in 1878, the Burnside EC Corrmittee did not recommend the abolition of separate black regiments. Other portions of the new bill were relatively uncontroversial. The Signal Service and the Corps of Engineers, two staff departments with extensive civil duties, would remain about the same. Regimental chaplains for all infantry and cavalry regiments would replace the

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245 thirty-six chaplains assigned to specific posts. The rationale behind this change, implementing for the entire army the system in use in the four black regiments since 1866, was a mixture of economy and sincere desire to bring religious services with greater frequency to the troops 57 on the remote frontier." The bill also provided for the army's enlisted men to be paid monthly whenever possible, and pay increases were also included for non-commissioned officers, as a way to reward and retain good men. These were similar to Dibrell's proposals for pay increases included in the Banning report of 1878. The bill reduced the size of the staff departments substantially, and this point turned these officers overwhelmingly against it. These powerful men soon made their displeasure known by lobbying against the bill in Washington. However, Burnside and Banning both sincerely believed the staff to be top-heavy, and they determined to trim it. The Burnside Bill did try to cut the staff in logical places. One of its most important recommendations was the consolidation of the Inspector General's Department with the Adjutant General's Department to form a General Staff that would do the army's planning as well as its paper59 work. This was a reform found in most of the western armies of the time, and, in the form adapted by the committee, it was borrowed almost directly from the writings of Emory Upton. This new "superdepartment" would also contain a total of six fewer officers than the two separate departments. Burns ide's committee did not recommend Banning's perennial proposal for a consolidated Department of Supplies, a plan that several ranking officers considered ill-advised. Instead, the joint committee suggested a reduction of officer strength in the Quartermaster's Department and the Subsistence Department by a combined

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246 CO total of sixty-five. Similarly, the committee believed that the Pay Department could be reduced by twenty-seven paymasters, seven more than CO the Banning proposal for the department in 1876. The Medical Department, with a large number of surgeons and assistant surgeons, would 54 lose eleven officers as well. The Ordnance Corps, which Upton had wanted to combine with the artillery as a logical way to centralize authority for all heavy weaponry, remained a separate bureau under the Burnside Bill. However, the corps would lose the services of forty-nine officers and its authority to manufacture arms and anmunition as well. The latter point may have been a bit of free enterprise politics on the part of Burnside, once an arms manufacturer in antebellum Rhode Island. The bill contained another bow to the notion of the free marketplace, and this one pleased the soldiers on the frontier greatly. The bill abolished the position of post trader by ending the government monopoly granted such individuals. This measure, though, allied two powerful groups in Washington, the post traders and their lobby and the disgruntled staff officers and their friends within the government. In all 333 officer's positions would be eliminated through the workings of the Burnside Bill. 67 Essential to the program advanced by the committee and the officer reductions of the bill was a system of compulsory retirement. Any talk of compulsory retirement enraged many older officers who wanted to spend the rest of their lives on active duty. The plan for retiring officers CO which the bill presented can be attributed to Burnside's influence. The provisions of the bill required all officers of company or field grade to retire upon reaching the age of sixtytwo. Once an officer became sixty, his name was placed on a special "reserved list," and he was

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247 assigned to active duty if the army believed it needed his services; otherwise, he remained inactive during the twenty-four months remaining 69 before his actual retirement. Thus, the army could effectively remove mediocre but faithful officers as early as their sixtieth birthday, all without jeopardizing their deserved pensions or unduly embarrassing them. At the age of sixtytwo, all officers ranking as colonels or below who had twenty or more years of service would receive a regular pension. Those who had served less than twenty years would not be formally retired but rather discharged with a lump-sum gratuity, based on the individual's record of active service in war and peace, as part of the settlement. General officers could retire at sixtytwo or remain on active duty until reaching sixty-five, at their option. With this plan of compulsory retirement, the Burnside Bill also included a system of fitness boards to rule in the cases of younger officers accused of being physically or mentally unfit for military duty. The bill did not ignore the need for a reformation of the army's promotion policies. Burnside, a West Pointer who had waited in frustration for five years before receiving his first lieutenancy, was probably sympathetic to the arguments of Upton and other youthful officers who longed for more rapid advancement in rank. Borrowing from the defeated Banning proposals of 1878, the Burnside Bill recommended a system of lineal promotion based on seniority within each branch as a replacement for the old regimental system of promotion within the company grades. Furthermore, candidates for promotion to field grade would have 7? to pass an examination given by a board of senior officers. This, the committee hoped, would make it possible for very talented younger officers to receive substantial commands while still active and aggressive.

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248 As another means of cultivating talent within the officers corps, the bill provided for rotation between staff positions and line commands, another idea fostered by Upton. Like Upton, Burnside and his committee hoped that rotating assignments would provide a large cadre of potential staff officers for future wars while broadening the experience 73 and education of promising officers during peacetime. All of these provisions obviously disturbed the army's traditionalists, especially in the staff departments. As a result of the wide-ranging reforms it presented, the Burnside Reorganization Bill created controversy and split the officer corps. Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend summarized the attitude of many of the men in the staff bureaus, whose pleasant worlds would be upset by the bill's changes, when he proclaimed flatly that "our present system 74 is good enough." Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan did see some good in the bill, but he wrote that he could not support it because "the 75 present system is good and well suited to our western frontier." Sherman did support the bill strongly, as well he might, because it met many of his own criteria for army legislation. While he did not favor reductions in the staff, he did advocate the reduction in the number of regiments. With the 25,000-man troop strength that Sherman long demanded, the bill's reduction in the number of regiments would mean both the three-battalion infantry regiment and companies and batteries with larger enlisted complements. Small companies, which in the infantry often averaged less than thirty men, always irked the commanding general, who called such tiny units "almost ridiculous" and unsuited for the tasks to which they were assigned. Sherman was confident from the 78 beginning that Burnside would "give us a good bill." Although the

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249 commanding general briefly waivered from that opinion when he saw the size of the bill, he soon changed his mind. He wrote to Burnside that at first, "I doubted the wisdom of attempting so much law, but on more careful examination I find that the bill is consistent in all details 79 and will probably bring harmony to all parts of the service." Doubtless, Sherman was a good ally to have, but he could have done much more to make his views prevail. Rather than remaining in Washington to lobby for the bill, he left the capital in mid-January for a southern 80 vacation trip. He did, however, provide William C. Church with the glowing recommendations of the bill written by two of his favorite officers, Major General John M. Schofield and Colonel Upton, which Church 81 pri nted i n the Army and Navy Journal Schofield and Upton had played important roles in supplying the ideas which shaped the Burnside Bill. Both had wide reputations as soldier-scholars. Schofield had cooperated with the committee members since the summer, with Sherman's blessings, and sent them materials for op their study. ~ The commanding general himself had recommended to Burnside Upton's Armies of Asia and Europe and the committee had sent a draft of the proposed bill to the colonel for his comments. Upton rego sponded, in considerable detail. When the legislation appeared, Schofield wrote to Sherman that "the bill merits the cordial support of the army. The provisions relating to organization, command and administration, are in conformity to the principles recognized by the foremost military nations of the present day." He noted that the staff officers would raise objections to some of these provisions, but he urged them to 84 support the legislation for the good of the service. Upton's letter on the bill was \/ery enthusiastic:

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250 The new Army bill is received, and I must say agreeably disappoints me. Congress had never shown as favorable or friendly a disposition before. The provisions for reduction are extremely liberal, while the proposed settlement of many vexed questions is so manifestly for the best interests of the service that I hope the bill may become a law.5 The Army and Navy Journal was not as positive about the effects of the proposed bill. Originally chiding the committee for containing no army officers as members and for holding its hearings at a summer resort far removed from the problems of daily life in the army, William C. Church began to look more favorably upon the Burnside Committee after it issued its report. Church reprinted the entire text of the Burnside Bill in his paper, which necessitated an unusual double issue. However, the Army and Navy Journal still opposed any reductions, whether of officers or enlisted men, on general principle, arguing that the cuts were a "concession to a purely imaginary need" which only Congress was able to see. Even so, Church liked the rest of the bill and applauded the committee's "industry, intelligence, sound judgement and general 87 good will" in planning for the army's future. But not all of the paper's readers saw it that way. One officer despaired of ever getting reforms without crippling reductions accompanying them. In sardonic tones, he wrote an open letter to Upton, only partly in jest, suggesting a "tactics" for army reorganization to complement the colonel's famous infantry tactics. These "tactics" featured officers breaking a mass formation by the numbers and engaging in a mad scramble for place in the "reorganized" officer corps, with "those having large political influ88 ence" forming the front rank. Church may have believed that the demands of the small -army group in Congress were based on imaginary fears and greatly overestimated in their importance, but at least some army

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251 officers realized that these fears were a genuine force to be reckoned with by the army and its civilian friends. Division of opinion was also intense in Congress when the Burnside Bill was introduced in midJanuary 1879. Banning' s strong support for the bill split the Democratic contingent in the House. After several days of debate, opponents of the bill managed to kill it by a close 89 vote, 95 to 90. Meanwhile, Burnside defended his bill in the Senate against those who criticized its sections relating to the roles of the President, the secretary of war, and the commanding general in relation to the comnand of the army. Critics, echoing the complaints of the Nation in its editorial on the bill, feared that it hobbled the authority of the civilian leaders and concentrated too much power in the office 90 of comnanding general. Burnside responded to charges that the bill unconstitutionally limited the President's power to appoint staff officers by noting that there had always been certain logical and just restrictions on the civil appointment powers, for the good of the nation. "Under this bill," Burnside said, "he [the President] cannot appoint an officer in the staff departments unless he is in the Army. . Otherwise, they [the appointments] will be left entirely to the will of the 91 President ... at the solicitation of friends outside the Army." In other words, Burnside hoped to curtail a military version of the spoils system, which civilian appointments to the officer corps of the army had verged on becoming in the past. Such notions probably lay behind Banning' s similar attempt to end the direct commissioning of civilians in 1878. Despite Burnside' s arguments, the Senate refused to vote on his bill, and the House version died before the committee could get its work considered on the floor of the Senate.

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252 On January 20, 1879, Burnside presented a second version of his bill, trimned of all but the seventy sections which actually reorganized 92 the army. In a matter of days, Banning moved that the House attach these sections to the army appropriations bill, then being debated in the lower house. This tactic, apparently devised by Republican Congressman Horace White, another member of the committee, won the approval of the House on February 8, by a vote of 101 to 91. 93 This action gave Burnside more time to maneuver in the Senate. However, the Senate Appropriations Committee, dominated by James G. Blaine, Presidential hopeful from Maine, and William Windom of Minnesota, refused to review the revised bill. Claiming that a heavy workload prevented the Appropriations Committee from giving this new appropriations bill a thorough study, Blaine and Windom recommended that it be dropped. Burnside, angry and frustrated by this tactic, denounced the recommendation: There has been a hue and cry against this bill from the yery day it was reported. Where has this cry come from? Much of it from the staff bureaus of the Army. . I must say that some of these staff officers have gone beyond the line of duty, particularly ... in Washington, which has almost turned itself into a bureau of newspaper correspondence. . .94 While officers of the staff may have influenced Blaine and Windom in their arguments for tabling the revised bill, there is no evidence of improper activity on the part of either side. Burnside was correct, however, in stating that the staff's lobbying efforts were the most intense seen in some time. With the majority of staff officers posted to Washington or near-by areas, and with a smaller proportion of line officers assigned to the nation's capital, the presence of the staff was overwhelming, and this bill did alarm these officers, for it threatened

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253 95 some of their most cherished interests. There were, too, some legitimate points upon which men of good will could disagree with the Burnside Bill, depending upon their own philosophical position. As the Nation once noted, the staff performed civil as well as military functions, and thus its numbers could be justified beyond the size required 96 of it by military necessity alone. Obviously, the staff could be expected to see things this way and to try to make others believe the same arguments. The line of the army always suffered because it could not mount the lobbying efforts of which the staff, by geography and by temperament, was so capable. Burnside did convince the Appropriations Committee to allow the Banning-White amendment to the army appropriations bill to be placed on the calendar. The amendment came to a vote that yery day, February 22, 97 but it lost by the lopsided tally of 45 to 18. By then, Congress had shifted the major focus of the army debates from reorganization to the inclusion of the posse comitatus clause, a favorite tactic of Bangs ning and his Democratic allies. The session ended on March 3, before an appropriation for the army had been approved. However, this time Hayes quickly called a special session of the new Forty-Sixth Congress to meet during the spring of 1879. This session finally approved 99 money for the army in June. Although one modern critic of the bill held Burnside' s leadership responsible for its failure, he had done all he could have done to save the bill. He had compromised with Banning and adapted many of his ideas into the Burnside Bill. While hoping to codify all major army regulations and statutes, he did settle for reorganization alone when others raised objections to his ambitious scheme. Others acted less

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254 vigorously and less wisely than did Burnside. Garfield took little part in the proceedings of the committee and the bill it produced after the joint committee had been selected in June 1878. In early 1879, when his active presence in Congress could have helped the cause of the army, Garfield was preoccupied with monetary policy and fiscal matters, which he apparently believed to be more pressing than reform of the army. Sherman, always manifesting his disgust for politics and most politicians, made few attempts to capitalize on his prestige and lobby for the bill. Rather, he left the capital on an ill-timed vacation, thus giving the staff officers who opposed the bill an even freer hand in their own lobbying efforts. One modern historian notes that the Burnside Bill itself upset few except the special interest groups directly affected by some of the reductions, and that, under normal circumstances, this legislation should have passed without undue difficulty. However, the late 1870s were not normal times, and in that statement lies the epitaph for Congressional attempts to reform and reorganize the army. The army issue, so closely tied to the emotional politics of the war and its aftermath, remained touchy for most Democrats. It is doubtful that they would have supported any reorganization bill unless it contained massive cuts in troop strength. The Republicans, carrying their own burdens from the 1860s and early 1870s, would just as certainly have blocked any attempt to reduce the army much below 25,000 enlisted men. No one could resolve the dilemna until much ill will abated. Despite the impasse, the Burnside Bill marked a turning point for the army. The Forty-Fifth Congress proved to be the last one so hostile to the army's interests. The elections of 1880 brought both the House of Representative and the Senate under Republican control, and when the

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255 Democrats regained the House two years later, they seemed to have forgotten some of the bitterest memories of Reconstruction. After 1879, there were no more wild fights over army appropriations. Congress even enacted a few long-needed reforms for the service during the 1880s, which included compulsory retirement for officers in 1882 and a program of retirement pensions for enlisted men in 1885. In 1890, it even replaced the regimental system of promotion, so long the bane of the 102 army's subalterns, with a lineal system. Even with these changes, no general reorganization measures reached Congress until the \/ery end of the century. In 1898-1899, in the wake of the Spanish-American War and the scandals over its management, Congress reconsidered the plight of the army. A new committee produced a reorganization bill which incorporated many aspects of the old Burnside 103 Bill. Although this attempt at reform also failed, in large part through the opposition of Major General Nelson A. Miles, the aging Indian fighter who proved to be the army's last commanding general, the time for reorganization and modernization had come at last. In 1903, the "new army," complete with a general staff, emerged under the leadership of Secretary of War Elihu Root. Although the chief Congressional friends of the army from the previous generation were long since dead, their vision of a modern and efficient United States Army laid the groundwork for the major reforms of the early twentieth century.

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256 Notes to Chapter VII 1 Army and Navy Journal June 24, 1876, editorial, "Disbandinq the Army," 740. 2 "Congress on the Army," Nation May 30, 1878, 352. J John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction : After the Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 194-217; C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction : The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (revised ed. New York: Doubleday, 1956). 4 United States Congress, Senate Report 555, Part 2, Reorganiza tion of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), 78-79, 240-372, 420-454, 503-504. 5 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 64. 6 For biographical information on Banning, see United States Congress, House Document 783, 69 Congress, 2 session, Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-1927 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), 667^668^ Banning has not received his due from historians. Utley, Frontier Regulars 61-63, is the standard treatment and portrays him as a one-dimensional figure and an irresponsible critic of the army. 7United States Congress, House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, Reduction of Army Officers Pay Reorganization of the Army and Transfer of the Indian Bureau (Washington: Government Printinq Office, 1876), 2. 8 1 bid 9 Ibid ; Army and Navy Journal April 8, 1876, 564-565. 10 Schofield to Sherman, April 14, 1876, John M. Schofield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. ^House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 4-6. c See Loring Benson Priest, Uncle Sam's Stepchildren : The Reformation of Un i ted States Indian Policy 7 ~l865-1887 (Lincol n : University of Nebraska Press, 1975; original edition, 1942), 21-23.

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257 l^House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 3-4. 14 1 bid ., 3. ^ Congressional Record 44 Congress, 1 session, 3356-3364, 3457-3469, 3837-3851, 3874-3875, 4720-4721, 4743. 16 1 bid ., 5674-5675, 5694-5696. "The senators were Joseph R. West, Republican of Louisiana, and Francis M. Cockrell, Democrat of Missouri. The representatives were Banning and Illinois Republican Stephen A. Hurlbut. ^ Congressional Record 44 Congress, 2 session, 1866, 2088, 2092, 2119, 2156-2160, 2193, 2214, 2241-2252. ^Theodore CI arke Smith, The Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield (2 vols. New Haven: YaTelJnTversity Press, 1925), I, 625. ^ Congressional Record 44 Congress, 2 session, 2111-2120, 2151-2152, 2171, 2230, 2241-2242, 2246-2252. 2lRichard Allen Andrews, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the Army, and Reform, 1869-1883" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968), 183-184. ^ Congressional Record 44 Congress, 2 session, 415-423, 510-514. ^United States Congress, House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, Report of _a Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Military Affairs in Relation to the Reorganization of the Army "[Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878), v, sections 1, 2. 24 1 b i d viii, sections 21, 22. -^ I bi d vi, section 11. g6 Ibid ., x, section 41. ?7 Ibid xi-xn. ^ Ibid ix, section 26. 9 Ibid ., ix, section 24. 30 Ibid x, section 30. 31 lbid v, section 5. ^Sherman to Secretary of War J. 0. Cameron, September 1876, printed in James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States," North American Review, CXXVI (March-April, May-June 1878,) 202-203; Emory

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258 Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton, 1878), 338-339; Army and Navy Journal October 27, 1877, editorial, "Army Reorganization," 184. 33 House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, xi. 34 House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session, 2. 35 Army and Navy Journal February 9, 1878, editorial, "Mr. Banning's Bill," 424. 36 Ibid February 2, 1878, editorial, "Reorganizing the Army," 409. 37 Congressional Record 45 Congress, 2 session, 3589, 3615-3625, 3631-3646, 3669-3684, 3715, 3730-3736, 3793-3813, 3836-3855, 4059. 38 Sherman to Garfield, March 23, 1878, March 27, 1878, William T. Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. ^The most recent biography of Garfield, which attempts to probe his psyche as well as chronicle his public life, is Allan Peskin, Garfield (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1978); however, it contains nothing about Garfield's role in army reform. 4Donna Thomas, "Ambrose E. Burnside and Army Reform, 18501881," Rhode Island History XXXVII (February 1978), 3-13, treats Burnside' s career as a reformer. The only full biography is Benjamin Perley Poore, The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside (Providence: J. A. and R. A. Reid, 1882). 41-House Document 783, 69 Congress, 2 session, 1417. For Plumb's behavior, see United States Congress, Senate Report 555 [Part lj 45 Congress, 3 session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878), 4, and Army and Navy Journal August 10, 1878, editorial, "Camp and Committee Room," 8. 42House Document 783, 69 Congress, 2 session, 769. 43 1 bid., 1578-1579, 1690. Ibid 903; House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, xi. Army and Navy Journal August 10, 1878, editorial, "Camp and Committee Room," 8; Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 207. > Army_ and Navy Journal August 10, 1878, editorial, "Camp and Committee Room," 8^ Senate Report 555, 45 Congress, 3 session, 1-2.

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259 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., 1. 50 CG. Mallery), "The Burnside Army Bill," Nation January 16, 1879, 42-43. SlAndrews, "Years of Frustration," 211-213. 52 Senate Report 555, 45 Congress, 3 session, 2. For the army's problems with regulations and statutes, see Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars : Army Life and Reforms 1865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 3-6. 53 Congressional Record. 45 Congress, 3 session, 714. 54 Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 1-2, sections 1, 2, 3, 13, 16, 18. 55 Senate Report 555, 45 Congress, 3 session, 4. ^House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session, x. 57 Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 1-3. sections 3, 9, 38. 58 Ibid ., 18, section 186; ibid ., 65, section 706. 59 Ibid ., 2, section 8. 60 Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe 329-332. 61 See Sherman to Cameron, September 1876, and Major General Winfield S. Hancock to Cameron, October 19, 1876, printed in Garfield, "Army of the United States," 205, 213-214. 52 Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 2, sections 26, 27. 63 Ibid ., 2, section 34. 64 Ibid ., 2, section 31. 65 Ibid ., 2, section 29. For Burnside' s career as an arms manufacturer, see Poore, Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside, 78-87. 66 Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 4, section 39. 67 Senate Report 555, 45 Congress, 3 session, 4.

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260 ^See Burnside's letter of November 12, 1878, printed in Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 417-420. 69 1 bid ., 4-5, section 40. 70 1 bid. 7] -For Burnside's five years as a subaltern in the antebellum regular army, see Poore, Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside 47-78. 72 Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 11, sections 107, 110. 73 Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 3. '^Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 265-272, 444-446. Sheridan to Sherman, January 4, 1879, printed in United States Congress, Senate Miscellaneous Document 12, 46 Congress, 1 session, Papers in Relation to the Reorganization of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), 26-27. '"Sherman to Cameron, September 1876, printed in Garfield, "Army of the United States," 202-204, 208. ''Sherman's annual report as commanding general, in United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Off ice, 1881), I, 32. ^Sherman to Schofield, August 6, 1878, box 91, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. 79 Sherman to Burnside, December 15, 1878, ibid SOsherman to Secretary of War George W. McCrary, February 5, 1879, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1800-1890, letterbook 62, record group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 213. 81 Army and Navy Journal December 28, 1878, 359. 82 Sherman to Schofield, August 6, 1878, box 91, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 79, 503-504. Schofield to Sherman, December 20, 1878, box 91, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. 85 Upton to Sherman, December 19, 1878, ibid.

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261 86 Army and Navy Journal August 10, 1878, editorial, "Camp and Committee Room," 8; ibid ., December 21, 1878, 325-341. 87 1 bid ., December 28, 1878, editorial, "The New Army Plan," 356-357. 88 Ibid ., December 28, 1878, letter from "File Closer," 359. 89 Congressional Record, 45 Congress, 3 session, 1041. Garfield, even though he was minority leader of the House, had little to do with the maneuvering over the Burnside Bill. Smith, Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield II, 671-682. Garfield did fight, unsuccessfully, for an appropriations bill for the army at the wery end of the session, after the final version of the Burnside Bill had been defeated. 90 "Burnside Army Bill," 42-43; Congressional Record 45 Congress, 3 session, 299-300. """ ^ Congressional Record 45 Congress, 3 session, 300. The portion of the bill which effectively barred direct commissioning was section 100. Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session, 10. ^ Congressional Record 45 Congress, 3 session, 660. 93 1 bid ., 1059-1069; Army and Navy Journal February 15, 1879, editorial, "The Army Bill in Congress," 498-499. ^ Congressional Record 45 Congress, 3 session, 1758. 9 See Townsend to Windom, February 4, 1879, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1800-1890, letterbook 62, RG 94, National Archives; Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 211-213. 96 "Burnside Army Bill," 42. 97 Congressional Record 45 Congress, 3 session, 1759-1760. 98 See Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 214-216. Congressional Record 46 Congress, 1 session, 2258, 2280, 2404-2405. lBernard L. Boylan, "The Forty-Fifth Congress and Army Reform," Mid-America LXI (July 1959), 185. 101-Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 217. 102Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position : The Comnanding General of the Army of the United States 1864-1903 (Manhattan, Kansas: Mil itary Affairs Press, 1975), 70; Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 84; Utley, Frontier Regulars 19-20;

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262 Lester D. Langley, "The Deomcratic Tradition and Military Reform, 1878-1885;" Southwestern Social Science Quarterly XLVIII (September 1967), 192-200. l 3 Graham A. Cosmas, "Military Reform After the Spanish-American War: The Army Reorganization Fight of 1898-1899," Military Affairs XXXV (February 1971), 12-18. 104 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 315-320.

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CHAPTER VIII A COMPANY OF GENTLEMEN: The Military Ideal of Professionalism and the Civil Service Reformers The movement to reform and reorganize the United States Army was not an isolated element in the political and social climate of the late 1870s and early 1880s. The impact of professionalism affected much of American life, in ways that led directly to the formation of the industrial, urban, specialized society of the twentieth century. The most noticeable feature of this change in attitudes and in organizations was the emergence of the civil service reform movement in the years after the Civil War. This was a political movement, or at least one which appealed to Congress and the electorate to change an existing system through political acts. Army reform was not of so public a nature, and many leading officers hoped that Congress would do as little as possible to the army, hardly dreaming that that body would ever do anything for the service. Even, so the movement to reform the army, loosely-organized as it was, did have much in common with the civil service reform movement, although the army remained isolated from much of American society in an era of limited defense spending, troop concentrations on the remote frontier, and few military contracts let out to business firms. At the time that army reform interested progressive officers, civil 263

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264 service reformers began to organize on a national scale, a process culminating in the foundation of the National Civil Service Reform League in 1881, two years after the army formed the Military Service Institution of the United States. After 1880, army reform shifted inward, away from public view; civil service reform underwent the same process after the passage of the Pendleton Act, the first major piece of civil 2 service reform legislation, in 1883. Besides these similarities in the development of the movements, civil service reform and army reform had some common figures, attracted adherents of similar backgrounds, and reflected a common view of the world. If 1881 became an important year for the civil service reform movement, it was a crucial year for army reform, because it marked a dramatic changing of the guard in leadership. Colonel Upton, the intense theorist whose work synthesized and expanded upon the ideas of many other thoughtful officers, killed himself in the early morning hours of March 3 15. The news of his death shocked General Sherman, who was then establishing the School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry, one of / i 4 his protege's favorite projects. Sherman oversaw the opening of the school later in the year, but it proved to be the last major event in the career of a soldier now yearning for the peace of retirement. James A. Garfield seemed headed for a grand future as 1881 began. In twelve months' time, he had won a senate seat from Ohio, received the Republican nomination for President as a surprise compromise candidate, and defeated his Democratic opponent, Major General Winfield S. Hancock, in the general election. But after only four months in the Executive Mansion, Garfield fell victim to an assassin. After lingering throughout the summer, the President in whom both Upton and Sherman had placed

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265 great confidence died of an infection on September 19. Garfield's last illness and the national concern over the fate of the stricken President all but overshadowed the sudden death of Senator Ambrose E. Burnside at his home in Bristol, Rhode Island on September 13. And, before the year was out, Henry M. Banning, the old foe of the army who had nevertheless proposed comprehensive reforms for the service, was o dead also. These deaths and the virtual withdrawal of Sherman from the public arena swept the stage of the most important figures in the movement to reform and reorganize the army, thus changing the focus of that movement. But if the cause of army reorganization and reform appeared less often in the public spotlight than it did during the days of the Congressional debates and the publication of Upton's ideas, it had gained important adherents in the key staff departments by the 1880s. Brigadier General Richard C. Drum, a tireless reformer who believed that improvements in conditions in the army could and must stop desertion and inefficiency, became Adjutant General in 1880. Upon his retirement in 1889, his chief deputy, Colonel John C. Kelton, replaced him and inherited his stars. Kelton continued and expanded Drum's reform programs, 9 becoming known as "the friend of the enlisted man." When Kelton retired in 1893, his successor was Colonel Robert Williams, another reform-minded officer who had spent many years on the staff. In the Quartermaster's Department, the bureau so crucial to the material comforts of the soldiers, dynamic leadership came to the fore in 1882, with the accession of Brigadier General Samuel Holabird to the post of quartermaster general. Holabird, former chief of the Clothing Bureau, in which he had instituted reforms in dress and campaign uniforms, replaced

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266 the retired Brigadier General Montgomery C. Meigs, the man who had brilliantly run the department during the Civil War but who had become irritable and conservative in his later years. Holabird, who served throughout the 1880s, began a major effort to improve all aspects of liv12 ing conditions for enlisted men. These programs finally bore fruit during the last years of the century, when the desertion rate finally 13 dropped to a manageable level. After Sherman retired in 1883, the post of corrmanding general lost much of the prestige that the old war hero and consummate soldier had given it. Sherman, however, had done little to develop the institution along modern lines, preferring to regard himself as a troop leader, not an administrator and coordinator. His successors, less popular with the American public, could not or would not do much to change the position. Sherman's immediate successor, Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, was not as interested in reorganization and the reform-minded officers as was his old boss, and he resisted efforts to reorganize the staff departments. Rather, he spent his time in quarrels with the civilian leadership of the War Department in an unsuccessful attempt to gain greater authority over the daily operations of the army. A frustrated, aging Jx>n vivant who disliked many of his senior officers and could not capitalize upon his Civil War career as had Sherman, Sheridan died suddenly in 1888, only months after an unimpressed Congress had finally voted him the rank of full general. Major General John M. Schofield, the senior surviving officer, thus found himself thrust into the post of commanding general. Schofield, a favorite of Sherman and something of a scholar in uniform, attempted to reform the army from within. He viewed his role as that of a European chief of staff and tried to form a de

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267 facto general staff. Younger, progressive army officers applauded Schofield, but he was unable by himself to institutionalize these reforms. 15 When Schofield retired in 1895, Major General Nelson A. Miles, much more a traditional general, petulantly tried to reassert what he firmly believed to be his prerogatives as the commanding general. 16 In the end, Schofield' s vision prevailed, and the reforms of 1903 established the general staff and placed the chief of staff in the stead of the old commanding general. Each incumbent had defined his role in his own way, and only Schofield really interested himself in comprehensive reform and modernization for his command. Nevertheless, some younger officers continued the Uptonian tradition of scholarship in the field of military science and the advocacy of reform, with or without official sponsorship. Major William H. Carter, who had served on Upton's staff as a lieutenant, wrote and spoke in favor of the general staff concept and higher professional standards of officership. Carter's ideas and advice influenced the reform and reorganization program of Secretary of War Elihu Root at the turn of the century. Although the best known member of this group of officers, Carter was but one of the men, most of whom had received their commissions in the 1870s or early 1880s, advocating modernization of the ser18 vice. During the late 1880s and throughout the 1890s, they added to the professional institutions established or revitalized during Sherman's tenure as commanding general. Carter and his associates founded the first officers' associations devoted to study in each of the three combat arms. From the late 1880s, when the cavalry officers founded their group, officers began to organize and publish important journals devoted to theory and practice in infantry, cavalry, and artillery

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268 19 skills. This generation of army officers capped their careers with key troop corrmands during World War I, the war in which the American 20 military professional came into his own. Like Upton, some of these later reformers derived their inspiration from the armies of Europe. After 1870, the major powers of Europe experimented with mass armies during peacetime. Led by the Germans and the French, officers on the Continent developed a literature of military science and a professional spirit, which, especially in Germany, led to military dominance over civilian influences in all matters related to national defense. In most of Europe, peacetime conscription based on the old Prussian model made possible huge armies reminiscent of those which fought the Napoleonic Wars. These mass armies, when combined with late nineteenth century advances in lethal technology, produced the mas21 sive carnage and destruction of the First World War." Despite the admiration which most American officers had for the Imperial German staff system, the British experience more nearly paralleled their own. Britain did not adopt peacetime conscription and depended on a strengthened and reorganized volunteer system of territorial regiments to augment its regular army. Reforms within the British army between 1870 and 1895 reorganized the line and staff, reformed the ways in which commissions were obtained, and improved professional training for officers. 22 However, civilian control over the army remained unbroken. When reforms came for the United States Army in the early years of the new century, they brought much the same results. Undoubtedly, the mass armies and the military thought of Europe affected American military reformers, but the process of profess ionalization which transformed so many occupations in late nineteenth century

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269 America probably influenced their thinking at least as much. At a time when society became increasingly complex and when industrialization and modernization seemed to threaten all of the traditional values of the republic, many groups felt as isolated and restless as the officer corps of the army. Middle-class professionals, especially doctors and lawyers, coped with this change by forging professional associations and connections, reinforced by uniform standards of training, certification, and behavior. The ideals often outweighed the reality until the early years of the twentieth century, but the attempt itself is significant. The middle-class occupations were trying to secure their places in American social and economic life, both by regulating themselves and by attempting to keep unwanted outsiders from entering these occupations. During the 1880s and 1890s, many occupations did begin to develop as true professions, establishing or strengthening professional organizations for doctors, dentists, lawyers, economists, historians, accountants, architects, and bankers. These new, rather self-conscious professions stressed education in their fields, efficiency, recognition by merit, and the prerogative of setting their own regulatory standards. The similarity between these civilian concerns and the points that Upton and Sherman raised in relation to military officership as a profession suggests a phemonenon common in both military and civilian circles in respectable nineteenth-century American society. It is fair to state that many military officers reacted to their changing environment in much the same way that their civilian counterparts did. Thus, it is not surprising that civil service reform surfaced at about the same time as the reform movement in the army and the navy. The civil and the military aspects were but two sides of the same coin. Both army reformers

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270 and civil service reformers advocated higher personal and career standards, improved professional and general education, and promotion based on a combination of seniority and merit as the means of providing the best possible public servants for the nation. Civil service reform was a crusade of the "best people," many of whom identified with the military officer, as the keys to the renovation of American politics and society by insuring their control by an educated, cultured, worthy, dis24 passionate elite. Garfield was the most obvious link between the civil service reformers and their military counterparts. As an influential and intelligent Republican politician who had served with distinction as a volunteer general, the Ohioan moved gracefully through both worlds. Hailed as a "practical reformer," Garfield adopted a pragmatic approach to re25 form, never allowing himself to be bound by any rigid program.^ Thus, he could cultivate his image as a friend of civil service reform while complaining bitterly in private of one of Rutherford B. Hayes' attempts to curb the power of the patronage system. Hayes had shunned the time-honored system of assessing political appointees to federal jobs during election campaigns, a means by which parties raised their war chests to wage national elections. Garfield fumed that this action by the President had "done much to discourage and weaken our party strength." Garfield was thinking in terms of wise political moves, but he also reflected some of the fears of men like himself. To Garfield and his counterparts, a Democratic victory put the nation in peril, for they firmly believed the opposition to be controlled by corrupt bosses who exploited the votes of ignorant immigrants and by ex27 Confederates who still harbored treason in their hearts.' Despite

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271 Garfield's obvious partisanship, he remained associated with the reform element in his party. He was the man of action who could transform theory into workable legislation. His defense of Congressional appropriations for programs to establish civil service examinations summarized his view of practical reform: The simple question before the House now is not whether the civil service examination that has been devised is a wise and just thing and the best thing that can be done. It is whether we will try any longer to do anything to better our civil service. . Now I do not believe in most of the things that have been done in this matter of civil service examinations. Much of it is trifling. It is too schoolmasterly. There is a good deal in it that does not come up to the level of our practical necessities. But let us try, try on. . .28 Garfield the friend of reform made his bows to both sides of the debate, trying always to present himself as the level-headed compromiser. As President, Garfield and this cautious approach to reform frustrated the vanguard of the civil service movement. However, after his assassination by a deranged man described widely in the nation's press as "a disappointed office seeker," the reformers invoked Garfield's image for their own cause and portrayed him as a martyr to civil service reform, a cause in which he believed but which he could not fully advocate until 29 the time was right. Thus, the Ohioan served the civilian reformers much as he had served the proponents of army reform: he left a legacy of stirring words and a symbolic presence, not bold deeds. General Sherman himself distrusted all politicians except his brother John, but the general's intense young protege, Emory Upton, was 30 more openminded. Upton shared with the civil service reformers and their friends their view of good government. As he phrased it in a letter he wrote in 1876 :

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272 We need reform, permanent and sure—not a wave of indignation that sweeps a few knaves from office, to be succeeded only by others, but a new system that shall induce good men to enter the service of the Government. A one-term President, life-tenure, and good salaries, must lie at the foundation of any system that will bear good results. . .** Upton had been interested in civil service reform at least since 1869, when he took out time to write a letter to an important early author of civil service reform legislation, Representative Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island. Inquiring about the bill, the colonel noted that he had not yet been able to read it but that he understood its object "to be that officers in the Civil Service, as in the Army and Navy, shall hold office during competency and good behavior, thereby insuring to Government on the part of its officers a greater degree of efficiency, economy and integrity, than have ever been known under the working of the perni32 cious Rotation principle." In sum, Upton concerned himself with efficiency and modernization for both the civil and military portions of the federal government. Perhaps had he lived longer, he may have made an important impact on civil service reform, for his ideal army, as expostulated in The Armies of Asia and Europe fit nicely with the schemes of the civilian reformers. Ambrose E. Burnside never entered the Congressional debates over civil service reform. The private papers which span his Senate years, 33 1875-1881, do not clarify his stand on the issue. He may simply have ignored the question of governmental reform, believing that whatever insured the good of the Republican party was in the best interests of the nation. Perhaps, though, his stand in favor of military retirements and his willingness to vote for similar civil service retirement pensions in 1880 suggest an openminded approach to reform of the

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273 34 federal government. Burnside had also defended his reorganization bill of 1878-1879 by noting that, in restricting Presidential appointments to the staff departments and in effect prohibiting the direct commissioning of all but surgeons and chaplains, it removed the iniquitous system of politically-motivated officer appointments "at the solic35 nation of friend outside the Army." Certainly, Burnside opposed a military "spoils system," even if he remained silent on its civilian counterpart. The Army and Navy Journal the semiofficial voice of the armed services since 1867, naturally paid great attention to proposals for the 3fi reform of the army. Its editor, William C. Church, wrote often in a spirit similar to the civil service reformers' and stressed professional education and advancement by a rational combination of seniority and merit. In discussing the Til den-Hayes election and the army's role in it, Church noted that the country hoped in the outcome both to "conserve the results of our great war" and "forget the animosities of that war." He stated proudly: . With this conclusion the military services can, certainly, have no quarrel, as they were among the first to give expression to the spirit which prompts it. They are, as always, as a body, independent of sectional feelings of any sort. . 3 By 1880, Church envisaged a broader future role for the services in a country characterized by learning and merit in its government: We incline to think that our Army and Navy in future years will have a wider sphere of usefulness than at present. We think they will have a more intimate connection with our civil service. They might most usefully form the nucleus of a true civil service. . The prizes of the future will undoubtedly be for the educated officers, skilled in their profession, and cultivated by reading and discussion. 38

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274 His view not only reflected the reform attitudes toward the public service, but it also predicted the close connection between military officers and civilian officials that would characterize the American government from the 1940s to the present. Modern studies of civil service reformers stress their upperor 39 middle-class, well educated, "old family" backgrounds. It is easy to picture these men working with the officer corps of the United States Navy, which began to develop a sense of professionalism at the same time 40 as did the army. The naval officer, almost always an Annapolis graduate if commissioned after the Mexican War, was usually of middleor upper-class, native-born stock and adhered to one of the mainstream Protestant denominations, with Episcopalianism especially strong among these men and their families. Naval officers sensed that they were part of the national elite by birth and training, and their conduct and attitudes were strongly tinged with noblesse oblige Those few officers, such as the volunteer officers of the Civil War navy who tried to stay with the service after the conflict, who did not fit the typical social and economic pattern found that their careers stagnated and their mess41 mates ignored them. Officers of the army, however, could not form such an exclusive club, because their backgrounds were much more varied. The army was the older and larger of the two services, and thus it required more officers and obtained them from a variety of sources. Between 1876 and 1881, the navy had a maximum of 1,866 and a minimum of 1,591 commissioned officers. During the same period, the army officer 4? corps fluctuated within a limit of 2,127 and 2,181. Of the 2,546 individuals who held commissions in the army during these years, 1,070 or 42 per cent, had graduated from the United States Military Academy.

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275 However, some of these men, concentrated in the classes of the late 1860s, had seen experience in the Civil War as young volunteer enlisted men. The 1,476 officers who did not graduate from West Point were a diverse group, but a majority had seen service in the Civil War as volunteers or regular soldiers. A total of 237 were chaplains, surgeons, and military storekeepers; the army employed a much larger group of these noncombatant officers than did the navy, and none had attended the academy, as might be expected. A full 242 of the non-academy graduates, or 9.5 per cent of all army officers during the years 1876-1881, had once been enlisted men in the regular army. These men had mostly received their conmissions during the Civil War, when the army desperately needed many officers with solid military experience. Unlike the navy, the army also contained a significant contingent of foreign-born officers. There were 218 of them, of whom 107 had once been enlisted men of the regular army, and they included the children of American diplomats and businessmen living abroad, foreign military officers who had immigrated to America and volunteered their services to their new land, young American-bred men of substantial immigrant families, and penniless Irishmen or Germans whose only trade was soldiering. The largest group of foreign-born officers was from Ireland, and there were eighty-eight Irishmen in the army officer corps during the six years from 1876 through 1881, a full 40.3 per cent of the foreignborn commissioned officers and 3.4 per cent of all officers. Sixty of the Irish had risen from the ranks, mostly during the increased commissioning which the Civil War produced, and they usually experienced a long career during which they were lucky if they reached the grade of captain. There were also officers of Irish birth who began their ca-

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276 reers as volunteer officers during the war, and one native of Ireland even graduated from West Point. There were significant groups of officers born in other lands: Germany contributed forty-four, England twenty-six, and Scotland twelve. The balance came from a sprinkling of other countries or exotic locations. Some were surgeons, eight were West Pointers, but most were either ex-regulars commissioned during the Civil War or volunteer officers from the Union forces. Indeed, the safest generalization about the postwar officer corps that can be made is that nearly all of its members who were born before 1840 had served in some military capacity during the Civil War. If it is hard for the historian to generalize about the obvious characteristics of the postwar army officer corps, any speculation on the socio-economic status of these men and their families is mere speculation. Most of these men remained obscure, since the army remained small and was active in few major campaigns until World War I. Even generalizations about the graduates of the Military Academy are hazardous. Some were the children of the powerful, wealthy, and established, but others were of the middleor working-class families which composed the bulk of the voting population. Americans long recognized that the Military Academy provided a good, free education for many young men of limited means who could persuade a member of Congress to submit their names for an appointment. These upwardly-mobile youths were at least as common at West Point as the aristocratic cadets of fine families and proper breeding, the type usually associated with the southern boys at the school and the kind of West Pointer ridiculed by the academy's 44 nineteenth-century critics. It may be true, as Richard Brown suggested in his study of the men who attained general officer rank in the

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277 regular army between 1898 and 1920, that those officers who came from solid middleor upper-class backgrounds, native American stock, and the AC. conservative Protestant denominations went furthest in the army. These men may have been very similar to the officers of the navy, but the army as a whole was more diverse. A full statistical study of the post-Civil War officer corps of the army is needed, but all preliminary indications suggest that a good proportion of the officers commissioned from the ranks, estimated as high as thirteen per cent for the period 1866-1891, could not be considered members of the middle class, either socially or economically. They may have striven to become middle class, but this striving in itself could 46 have created great tensions. Until the mid-1880s, when programs to commission outstanding young enlisted men got well underway, the bulk of promotions from the ranks had occurred during the early 1860s and had raised long-service enlisted men of the regular regiments to second lieutenancies. As Adjutant General E. D. Townsend once sourly observed, 47 such promotions would often "turn out badly." Whether for substantive reasons or as the result of blind prejudice on the part of officers from more traditional backgrounds, a large percentage of the officers promoted in that way ended their careers in voluntary resignations to escape the Benzine Boards of the late 1860s and early 1870s which they believed would weed them out, were cashiered by their fellow officers, 48 or received dishonorable discharges for some misdeed. This all suggests considerable friction within the army officer corps, as those men who had all of the polish and culture of the Eastern cities clashed with 49 rough and ready men not far removed from life in the barracks.

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278 If diversity and potential conflict marked the real officer corps, most civilians still held fantasy images of the men in shoulder straps. This image was based in part upon lingering romanticism about the profession of arms and upon the army's own contention that the officer's commission was the mark of a gentlemen. To the army's admirers, the officer was a gallant, well-bred person with a strong sense of honor, much as Harriet Waters Preston described when she praised the esprit de corps of the military officer and his strict honor, simple bravery, patience under poverty and exile, and somewhat scornful superiority to sordid conditions. ... We have no other school, North or South, which so regularly and effectually as West Point has made its pupils gentlemen in the plainest, soundest, and proudest sense of that term. . 50 Although this romantic view of the army officer must have amused many reformers, both civil and military, of the 1870s and 1880s, their own conception of the officer as a symbol of virtue, nonpartisanship, and obedience to lawful authority differed from Mrs. Preston's courtly gentlemansoldier only in style. Central to the vision of the ideal military man was the experience of the Civil War, the greatest war Americans had seen up to that time. The war was the central event in the lives of many who lived through it, and it created a deeply-felt common bond among veterans. The effect of the conflict was not always purely related to warfare itself. The military experience of the 1860s affected many reformers by introducing them to large, relatively well-disciplined organizations for the first time. The Union armies, of course, hardly matched twentieth-century armies in size, organization, or discipline, but to nineteenth-century intellectuals, influenced by the romantic tradition of individualism, the vast blue-clad hosts of Grant and Sherman must have been extremely impressive

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279 and thought-provoking. As a result of wartime service in the armies, or in their support, many reformers reevaluated their views of man's role in society and adapted a more pragmatic, group-oriented approach to social change. Civil service reform was one of the fruits of this new approach which manifested itself in the careers of many civil service advocates. One of the most important of the "good government" reformers, Carl Schurz, began his career as a German revolutionary in the romanticallyinspired uprisings which swept Europe in 1848. After seeing his dreams dashed and making his escape to the United States, Schurz settled down and became a leader in the German-American community. In this capacity, he received a major general's commission in the Union volunteers. After service in the armies, Schurz 's career led him to the posts of United States senator and secretary of the interior, as well as establishing him as the gadfly of his party, and he devoted much of his time to the campaign for a civil service based on merit, secure tenure, and rational 52 organization. In a very real sense, Schurz tried to adapt sound military principles to civil government. E. L. Godkin, an immigrant of English parentage who did not experience the war first hand as did Schurz, represented another side of pragmatic reform. He considered the army debate of the late 1870s to be purely "a business question," not a genuine political issue, and he concluded that the country's need for "50,000 regulars, scattered in garrisons" to preserve order outweighed 53 any threat that a standing army might pose. Godkin's influential Nation was skeptical of Congressional plans to reform the army because it did not trust Congress to do the right thing: establish nonpartisan54 ship, efficiency, and rationality, whether civil or military.

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280 Artists felt the new attitudes as well. Mark Twain was yet another man associated with the reform faction of Republicanism who cited the military example as a guide for reform. As Samuel L. Clemens, the famous humorist had been a surrmer soldier for the Confederacy, resigning a lieutenancy before the war had fairly begun in order to migrate to the Union-held West. In the Gilded Age, Mark Twain skillfully berated corruption in his novels and stories, and he pointed to the military and naval officer corps, so loyal and efficiently trained, as examples of what a good federal civil service could approximate. 55 Thomas Nast, the crusading cartoonist, attacked corruption through the medium of his drawings. Nast was a German irnni grant who had never served in the American army, but his enthuasiastic work for the Union cause led Lincoln to characterize him as the North's best recruiting sergeant. After the war, Nast sardonically attacked the corruption of the Tweed Ring and national politics-as-usual; he lauded the army as a disinterested, dedicated force constantly imperiled by irresponsible and potentially treasonous foes who attempted to cut its strength. Nast's employer at Harper's Weekly, George W. Curtis, supported the cartoonist in his denunciations of the bosses, the ex-Confederate diehards, and those Congressman who would abolish the army. Curtis, himself a literary figure of the Gilded Age, was a strong supporter of civil service reform and rational government. 56 Probably the civil service reformer most clearly influenced by the military ideal was Dorman B. Eaton, chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Eaton was a lawyer who had not served in the Union armies; indeed, for many years he was partially disabled as the result of a severe beating administered by toughs in the employ of the corrupt "Erie Ring,"

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281 which meant to intimidate investigations of railroad fraud. Despite, or perhaps because of, his physical disability, Eaton adopted the military example in his ideal picture of government reform. 57 He praised the army and navy officer and contrasted these faithful public servants in uniform with the unrestrained, unscrupulous civil officers produced by the "spoils system." Eaton wrote in 1878: ... But everywhere and always to be in the public service means something yery unlike mere working for wages,— means a relation, with rights, duties, and proprieties, far different from those which pertain to any mere private station. Does the long toleration of abuses by one class of officers [civil] and not the other [military) make any real difference in the right or the peril? ... The constitutional provisions for regulating official conduct, in the army, in the navy, and in the civil service, are the equivalent of each other. . .58 In 1879, Eaton received an opportunity to view the army at first hand. He became vice president of the annual West Point Board of Visitors, a group of civilians appointed by the President to inspect and report on the Military Academy. Eaton, Noah Porter, the president of the board, and Henry L. Abbot, its secretary, wrote the official re59 port. In it, they praised the curriculum of West Point as proper to a professional school and as a good example of intellectual rigor. 60 Recomn ending no changes in the discipline of the cadets, except in those cases which involved hazing, the board lauded "the traditions of the Academy, or its unwritten law" which "sustain and enforce the verities of truth and honor with an energy and impartiality which deserve the CI highest conn endat ion." Eaton and his colleagues suggested modifications in the system of selecting young men for appointments to the academy, however, for they feared the influence of politics on West Point. 62 As they expressed it in their recorrmendation that general examinations,

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282 not Congressional nominations, be the means of obtaining men for the Military Academy, "That method of selecting the future officers of its army can only be the best which enable the country to avail itself of CO the best of its citizens who are animated by this desire." Clearly, the sons of the "best people," those of proper breeding, good education, and sufficient leisure to pursue their studies, could be expected to do well on such examinations, and Eaton and his colleagues no doubt believed that young men of that type would make the best officers and continue the fine old traditions of the academy and the army. Eaton's attitudes suggest a major difference between civil service reformers and military reformers. Despite his sympathy for the army and navy, Eaton's ideal America was rooted in the past, and in an idealized past at that. To many military men, however, the true place for the services lay only in the future, for America traditionally ignored its army and navy throughout it history, except when dire emergency intruded. One perceptive student of the late nineteenth century naval officer corps noted that career navy men tended to support civil service reforms as much in the hope that they would diminish civilian influence in the Navy Department as for any other reason. Emory Upton's attitude toward civilian control of the army, especially as personified by the secretary of war, suggests much of the same motivations. To Eaton, the first half-century of American nationhood was a time of selfless, dedicated, intelligent, and patriotic statesmen. That era was a true golden age of the republic. But with the accession of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency in 1829, bitterly partisan politics and the pernicious "spoils system" of civil service blighted public life and ruined the American Eden. If disinterested, public-spirited, intelligent

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283 men could regain control of the federal government through a reform of the civil service, a new golden age would dawn and prove Americans to cc be worthy of their glorious past. Nothing could be more opposite the view of the American past which Eaton espoused than Upton's military history. To Upton, the first fifty years of American independence was a time of military unpreparedness and gross blundering, which reached incredible depths during the War of 1812. The Jacksonians 1 war with Mexico, with its splendid regulars and those well -trained volunteer companies which emulated them, indicated the future of the service. To Upton, the Civil War reinforced all previous evidence that the early republican tradition of reliance upon the militia was foolhardy and dangerous. Upton looked to the future, in which trained professionals would direct brief, decisive wars on the model of the Franco-Prussian War; America's own military past was but a shabby record of neglect and wastefulness. Perhaps Garfield and Upton could have bridged the gap between civil service reform and military reform had both lived longer. Certainly, both exhibited a rational approach to army reform relatively free of CO romanticism or unrealistic expectations. Garfield had influenced and symbolized elements of both movements, and Upton seemed to be genuinely sympathetic to many civilian reform issues. As it turned out, the civil service reform movement became largely dormant after the passage of the Pendleton Act of 1883, shortly after the reform elements in the army turned their own attentions inward. The civil service reformers had the satisfaction which comes from success, however limited it may be. The army reformers had few tangible rewards to show for their efforts by the early 1880s, and the leadership

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284 of the movement itself quickly vanished from the scene. Yet the loosely-grouped movement had in six years laid a sound basis for the future. It had begun to improve conditions of daily life for enlisted men, and, even though desertion remained a problem for the army for several more years, that battle was being won. Systems of compulsory retirement for both officers and enlisted men, first proposed in the 1870s, came during the 1880s and helped to make the army more efficient. There were still long years of inactivity for the army, and many officers had few intellectual pretensions beyond light novels and poker, but the young lieutenants and captains of the 1880s and 1890s would live to 69 serve in and eventually to lead a \/ery different army. Boredom and frontier service characterized army life until the late 1890s, but a new role for the army was taking shape nevertheless. The brief war with Spain in 1898 hinted at the army's place in an American empire. Upton i an thinking heavily influenced the highest councils as the new century began. The dreams of the early reformers came true in 1903, when the War Department, under the command of Elihu Root, reorganized the army along modern lines, with a general staff to replace the outworn position of commanding general and the chaotic system of independent staff bureaus. The "new army" was born at last, and it was to receive its baptism of fire in the Great War which engulfed Europe only a decade later. The professional army of John J. Pershing, Peyton C. March, and Douglas MacArthur won a confidence and a preeminent position which, even in times of widespread pacifism and economic depression, it has never really lost. Its great days came during the twentieth century, but its origins rest firmly in the precarious but heady times of the late 1870s and 1880s, when a few men thought they had glimpsed the future.

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285 Notes to Chapter VIII ^George M. Frederick son, The Inner Civil War : Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 183-216; Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 111-132; Jerry Israel, ed., Building the Organizational Society : Essays i n Assoc i at ion a 1 Activities j_n Modern America (New York: Free Press, T97"2~J~i 2 The best general study of the civil service reform movement is Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils : A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement 1865-1883 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961). 3 Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 142-148; Peter S. Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), 474-504. ^Richard Allen Andrews, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the Army, and Reform 1869-1883" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968), 264-276. 5 Ibid., 272-292. 6 Theodore CI arke Smith, The Life and Letter of James Abram Garfield (2 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), II, 1179-1207. A good modern account of the confusion and bathos surrounding Garfield's death is in John M. Taylor, Garfield of Ohio : The Available Man (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 263-289. 7 Benjamin Perley Poore, The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside (Providence: J. A. and R. A. Reid, 1882T7 387-389. 8United States Congress, House Document 783, 69 Congress, 2 session, Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-1927 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), 667-668. Banning was defeated in the election of 1880; he served in the "lame duck" session of the old Congress, dying on December 10, shortly after the new Congress convened. 9 Jack D. Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars : Army Life and Reforms T865-1898 (New York: Humanities Press7~l970), 57-58, 77-85, 149-150. 10 Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary

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286 of the United States Army (2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903), I, 1042. 11 The standard work on Meigs is Russell F. Weigley, Quarter master General of the Union Army : A Biography of M_^_ C_;_ Meigs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 12 Foner, United States Soldier Between Two Wars 85-87. 13 1 bid., 94-95, 113, 115-126. ^Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 287-289; see also Richard O'Conner, Sheridan the Inevitable (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1953), 336-357, afar less critical account. 15 See Russell F. Weigley, "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," Military Affairs XXIII (Sumner 1959), 72-84. 16See Graham A. Cosmas, "Military Reform After the SpanishAmerican War: The Army Reorganization Fight of 1898-1899," Military Affairs XXXV (February 1971), 12-18. For Miles and his problems as cortmanding general, see Graham A. Cosmas, An Army For Empire : The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press", T97TT7 59-62, 139-146, 284-286. 17 Weigley, History of the United States Army 314, 317-320. ^Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army : Military Thought From Washington to Marshall "[New York: Columbia University Press, 196TT, 137-143. ^Weigley, History of the United States Army 274. -See Edward M. Coffman, "American Command and Commanders in World War I," in Russell F. Weigley, ed. New Dimensions in Military History (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1976), 177-195. 2l For the European armies of 1870-1914, see Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism : Romance and Realities of _a Profession (New York: W. W. Norton, 1937), 197 -24T. ? 2 For the British reforms, see Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London: Eyre MeTJiuen, 1972), "and W. S. Hamer, The British Army and Civil-Military Relations 1885-1905 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). 23wiebe, Search For Order 111-132. ? 4 The classic account is Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils but for a more critical approach, see John G. Sproat, "The Best Men" : Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 257 -"271.

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287 25see "The Republicans and Their Candidates," Atlantic Monthly XLVI (August 1880), 258-263, and Jonas M. Bundy, In Memoriam : James A. Garfield Twentieth President of the United States (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1881), 192-197. Bundy' s book is the thinly-revised second edition of a campaign biography first issued in 1880. 26Harry James Brown and Frederick D. Williams, eds., The Diary of James A. Garfield (3 vols, to date. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967), III, 526-527. 27 Sproat, "The Best Men" 73-90, 137-138. 28 Speech of June 12, 1874, quoted in Burke A. Hinsdale, ed., The Works of James A. Garfield (2 vols. Boston: J. R. Osgood, 1882-1883), I, 519. For some of Garfield's other comments on this subject, see ibid ., I, 499-518. ^Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils 198-214, is a good discussion of how the civil service reformers manipulated the image of Garfield to aid their cause. 30 See Andrews, "Years of Frustration," 32-62, 89-117, 152-221. ^Upton's letter from Constantinople, May 7, 1876, printed in Michie, Life and Letters of Emory Upton 373. 32 Upton to Jenckes, January 14, 1869, Thomas A. Jenckes Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 33jhere is a small collection of postwar Burnside letters and papers in the Rhode Island Historical Society Library, Providence, but none of these deal with political questions. There are no other major Burnside collections extant. 34 See United States Congress, Congressional Record 45 Congress, 2 session, 2151. 35 Ibid 45 Congress, 3 session, 300. 36 In 1867, Congress authorized and required the Army and Navy Journal to print all of the general orders of both services, which insured the paper a hearty circulation among officers. Donald N. Bigelow, Wil liam Conant Church and the Army and Navy Journal (New York: AMS Press, 1968; originaT~edTtTon7T952T,"T9l'. 37 Army and Navy Journal November 11, 1876, editorial, "Under Which KingT'HB". 38 Ibid ., September 25, 1880, editorial, "The Literature of War," 146. 39 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils ix-x, 21-22, 190-197; Wiebe, Search For Order 60-61.

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288 40 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy : The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emerg ence of Modern American Naval ism (New York: Free Press7T977T, .277-325. 41 Ibid., 3-22. 42united States Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), 736-737. The figures for total number of commissioned officers in the two services are: fiscal year army navy 1876 2,151 1,646 1877 2,177 1,591 1878 2,153 1,582 1879 2,127 1,695 1880 2,152 1,713 1881 2,181 1,866 Unlike the army, which had approximately eleven enlisted men per officer, the navy during this period had a ratio of four or five sailors per commissioned officer. This condition jeopardized promotion opportunities in the sea service, caused alarming inefficiency, and helped spur younger naval officers to advocate a variety of reforms during the 1880s. See Karsten, Naval Aristocracy 277-325. 43 This discussion is based on an analysis of the biographical and career data in Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 149-1069, the most complete published informati on and, in pi aces, more complete than the service records contained in the National Archives. 4 ^See Marcus Cunliffe, Soldier and Civilians : The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865 (New York: Free Press, 1973), 106-111, 170-172, 360-359. 45Richard C. Brown, "Social Ideas of American Generals, 1898-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1951), 3-17. 46Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 18, suggests that percentage for the period as a whole. Edward M. Coffman of the University of Wisconsin has been working on a major social history of the late nineteenth century army. 47 Townsend's notes on HR 2935, the Banning Bill of 1876, April 18, 1876, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, main series, 1871-1880, letterbook 59, record group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. ^Based on information in Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army I, 149-1069, which is unfortunately brief in all discussions of such cases.

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289 49 See Utley, Frontier Regulars 18-22, and Patricia Y. Stal 1 ard, Glittering Misery : Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press/Old Army Press, 1978), 103-122. This is an important issue but very difficult to document. 50 Poganuc People and Other Novels," Atlantic Monthly XLII (October 1878), 434. ^Frederickson, Inner Civil War 183-216. 52 0swald Garrison Villard, "Carl Schurz," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Mai one, eds., The Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958), XVI, 466-470, is laudatory. See also Hoogenboom, Outl awing the Spoils 59-61, 140-151. 53 "Congress on the Army," Nation May 30, 1878, 352-353. 54 [G. Mallery], "The Burns ide Army Bill," Nation January 16, 1879, 42-43. 55 Speech by Mark Twain at a Republican rally in Hartford, Connecticut, September 30, 1876, quoted in Lai ly Weymouth and Milton Glaser, America in 1876 : The Way We Were (New York: Random House, 1976), 127-128. 56 For Nast, see Morton Keller, The Art and Politics of Thomas Nast (New York: Oxford University Press, 196877 For Curtis, see Sproat, "The Best Men" 51-54, 257-270. 57 For biographical information, see Bennett Munro, "Dorman Bridgeman Eaton," in Johnson and Malone, Dictionary of American Biograph y, V, 607-608. 58 Dorman B. Eaton, "The Public Service and the Public," Atlantic Monthly XLI (February 1878), 241-252. ^See United States War Department, Report of the Secretary of War (4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879), I, 423-435. 60 Ibid ., I, 428. 61 1 bid ., I, 426. 62 ibid ., I, 434-435. 63 i bid ., I, 431. 64|
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290 66 Dorman B. Eaton, "A Century of Civil Service," Scribner's Monthly XV (January 1878), 395-402. 67 Upton, Military Policy of the United States 70-222. 68 For the contradictions inherent in the romantic tendency to stress honor in the military, see Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians 418-423, and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier : A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960T7 215-232. 69 See Coffman, "American Command and Commanders in World War I," in Weigley, New Dimensions in Military History 177-195. 70 The best study of the war and its implications for the army is Cosmas, Army For Empire

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APPENDIX 1 ENLISTED STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, OCTOBER 15, 1881 First Artill ery

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298

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Contemporary Materials Manuscripts Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. William C. Church Papers James A. Garfield Papers Thomas A. Jenckes Papers John M. Schofield Papers Hugh L. Scott Papers Philip H. Sheridan Papers William T. Sherman Papers Navy and Old Army Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group 94 Office of the Adjutant General Record Group 107 Office of the Secretary of War Record Group 108 Headquarters of the Army Special Collections, Winterthur Manuscripts, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Delaware Emory Upton Letters, Henry Algernon Du Pont Papers Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence, Rhode Island Ambrose E. Burnside Papers Documents Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor. Annual Report 1871 Boston: Wright and Potter, 1871. 299

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300 United States Congress. Congressional Record vols. IV-XII. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876-1881. House Miscellaneous Document 56, 45 Congress, 2 session. R~eport of a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs Relating to the Reorganization of the Army. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878. House Report 354, 44 Congress, 1 session. Reduction of Army Officers Pay Reorganization of the Army and Transfer of the Indi an Bureau Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876. Senate Miscellaneous Document 14, 46 Congress, 1 session. Papers in Relation to the Reorganization of the Army Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879. Senate Report 555, Part 1 45 Congress, 3 session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878. Senate Report 555, Part 2, 45 Congress, 3 session. Reorgan ization of the Army Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879. United States War Department. Regulations of jthe Army of jthe United States and General Orders in Force on the 17th of February 1881 Washington: Government Printing Off i ce, 1881. Report of the Secretary of War 4 vols, per year. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876-1881. The War of the Rebellion : A Compil ation of the Official Re cords of the Union and Confederate Armies 128 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901. Periodicals Army and Navy Journal 1876-1881. Atlantic Monthly 1876-1881. Century 1881. Galaxy 1876-1877. Harper's New Monthly Magazine 1876-1881. Harper's Weekly 1876-1881. Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 1880-

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301 Nation 1876-1881. New York Times 1876-1881. North American Review 1876-1881 Scribner's Magazine 1876-1880. United Service 1879-1881. Books Blaine, James G. Twenty Years of Congress : From Lincoln to Garfield 2 vols. Norwich, Connecticut: Henry Bull, 1884-1886. Bradley, James H. The March of the Montana Column : A Prelude to the Custer Disaster Edited by Edgar I. Stewart. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961. Brady, Cyrus Townsend. Indian Fights and Fighters Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971; original edition, 1904. Brown, Harry James, and Frederick D. Williams, eds. The Diary of James A. Garfield 3 vols, to date. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967. Bundy, Jonas M. In Memori am : The Life of James Abram Garfield Twentieth President of ^hinihTtea' States New York: A. S. Barnes, 188E Butler, Benjamin F. Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major General Benjamin F. Butler : Butler' s Book Boston: AT M7 Thayer, 1892. Carriker, Robert C, and Eleanor R. Carricker, eds. An Army Wife on the Frontier : The Memoirs of Alice Blackwood Baldwin 1867-1877 Salt Lake City: Tanner Trust Fund, 1973. Carroll John M. ed. The Bl ack Military Experience in the American West New York: Liveright, 1971. Flipper, Henry Ossian. The Colored Cadet at West Point New York: Arno Press, 1969; original edition, 1878. Fry, James B. The H i story and Legal Effects of Brevets in the Armies of Great Britain and the United States New York: D. Appleton, 1877. Finerty, John R. War-Path and Bivouac or Conquest of the Sioux Norman: University of Okl ahoma Press, ~T961; original edition, 1890. Heitman, Francis B., ed. Historical Register and Dictionary of the

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302 United States Army 2 vols. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965; original edition, 1903. Hinsdale, Burke A. ed. The Works of James Abram Garfield 2 vols. Boston: J. R. Osgood, 1882-1883. Hinsdale, MaryL., ed. Garfield-Hinsdale Letters : Correspondence Between James Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1969; original edition, 1947. Howard, Oliver Otis. Autobiography of General CL (L Howard 2 vols. New York: Baker and Taylor, 1907". Jacobsen, Jacques Noel, Jr., ed. Regulations and Notes for the Uniform of the Army of the United States 1872. Staten Island, New York: Manor Publishing Company, 1972. Regulations and Notes For the Uniform of the Army of the United States 18§2T Staten Island, New York: Manor Publishing Company, 1971. Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War 4 vols. New York: Century, 1884T887. King, Charles. Campaigning With Crook and Stories of Army Life. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1890. Logan, John A. The Volunteer Soldier of America Chicago: R. S. Peale, 1887. Michie, Peter S. The Life and Letters of Emory Upton. New York: D. Appleton, 188FT Miles, Nelson A. Serving the Republic : Memoirs of the Civil and Military Life of Nelson A. Mi les .' Freeport,~rTew~Torkl BooFs For Libraries, 1971; original edition, 1911. Mulford, Ami Frank. Fighting Indians Jjn the Seventh United States Cavalry Custer's Favorite Regiment Fairfield, Washington: Ye Galleon Press, 1972; original edition, 1878. Poore, Benjamin Per ley. The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside Providence: J. A. and R. A. Reid, 18877 Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years i n the National Metro polis Philadelphia: HubbaTH Brothers, 1881T. Powell, William H., ed. List of Officers of the Army of the United States From 1779 to T900 New York: L. R. Hanmersly and Company, 1900. Ridpath, John Clarke. The Life and Work of James A. Garfield Hartford: James Betts, 1881.

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303 Rodenbough, Theophilus F., and William L. Haskins, eds. The Army of the United States : Historical Sketches of Staff and Line New York: Maynard, Merrill, and Company, 1896. Schmitt, Martin F., ed. General George Crook an Autobiography Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960. Schofield, John M. Forty-Six Years in the Army New York: Century, 1897. Sheridan, Philip H. Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan 2 vols. New York: Charles Webster, 1888. Sherman, William T. Memoirs of General Wi 11 i am T^ Sherman Written By_ Himself 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1875. Thorndike, Rachel Sherman, ed. The Sherman Letters : Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman From 1837" to 1891 New York: Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1894. Upton, Emory. The Armies of Asia and Europe New York: D. Appleton, 1878 . Infantry Tacti cs Double and Single Rank Adapted to American Topography and Improved Firearms New York: Green wooT" Press, 1968; original edition, 1874. The Military Policy of the United States New York: Greenwood Press, 1968; original edition, 1904. Woodbury, Augustus. Major General Ambrose E^_ Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps Providence: Sidney S. Rider and Brother, 1867. Secondary Materi als Government Documents United States Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1957 Washington! Government Printing Office, 1960. United States Congress. House Document 783, 69 Congress, 2 session, Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-1927 Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928.

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304 Articles Ambrose, Stephen E. "Emory Upton and the Armies of Asia and Europe," Military Affairs XXVIII (Spring 1964), 27-32. Boylan, Bernard L. "The Forty-Fifth Congress and Army Reform," MidAmerica, LXI (July 1959), 173-186. Brown, Richard C. "General Emory Upton: The Army's Mahan," Milit ary Affairs XVII (Fall 1953), 125-131. Coffman, Edward M. "Army Life on the Frontier, 1865-1898," Military Affairs XX (Winter 1956), 193-201. Cosmas, Graham A. "Military Reform After the Spanish-American War: The Army Reorganization Fight of 1898-1899," Military Aff airs XXXV (February 1971), 12-18. Edwards, Knight. "Burnside, a Rhode Island Hero," Rhode Island History, XVI (January 1957), 1-23. Fletcher, Marvin. "The Negro Volunteer in Reconstruction, 1865-1877," Military Affairs XXXII (December 1968), 124-131. Gilmore, Russell. "'The New Courage 1 : Rifles and Soldier Individualism, 1876-1918," Military Affairs XL (October 1976), 97-102. Hawes, Joseph H. M. "The Signal Corps and the Weather Service," Mili tary Affairs XXX (Sumner 1966), 68-76. Hocker, Barton C. "The United States Army as a National Police Force: The Federal Policing of Labor Disputes, 1877-1898," Military Affairs XXXIII (April 1969), 255-264. Langley, Lester D. "The Democratic Tradition and Military Reform, 18781885," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly XLVIII (September 1967), 192-200. Murray, Robert K. "General Sherman, the Negro, and Slavery: The Story of an Unrecognized Rebel," Negro History Bulletin XXII (March 1959), 125-130. Rickey, Don Jr. "The Enlisted Men of the Indian Wars," Military Affairs XXIII (Surrmer 1959), 91-96. Thomas, Donna. "Ambrose E. Burnside and Army Reform, 1850-1881," Rhode Island History XXXVII (February 1978), 3-13. Todd, Frederick P. "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," Military Affairs V (Surrmer, Fall 1941), 73-86, 152-170. Weigley, Russell F. "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," Mili tary Affairs XXIII (Surrmer 1959), 77-84.

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305 Books Addington, Larry H. The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff 1865-1941 New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, T97L Ambrose, Stephen E. Crazy Horse and Custer : The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1975. Duty Honor Country : A History of West Point Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966 Upton and the Army Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 196"4~T Ashburn, Percy M. History of the Medical Department of jthe United States Army Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1929. Athearn, Robert G. Wi 11 i am Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. Bailey, John W. Pacifying the Plains : General Alfred Terry and the Decline of the Sioux 1866-1890 Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979. Barnard, Henry. Rutherford B^ Hayes and His America Chicago: BobbsMerrill, 1954. Bernardo, C. Joseph, and Eugene H. Bacon. American Military Policy : Its Development Since 1775 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1955. Berry, Mary F. Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy : Black Citizenship and the Constitution 1861-1866 Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1977. Bigelow, Donald N. W i 11 i am Conant Church and the Army and Navy Journal New York: AMS Press, 1968; original edition, 1952. Bond, Brian. The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 London: Eyre Methuen, 1972. Brown, Dee. Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee : An Indian History of the American West New York: Bantam Books, 1972. The Year of the Century : 1876 New York: Charles Scribner' s Sons7T966 Bruce, Robert V. 1877 Year of Violence Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970; original edition, 1959.

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306 Buck, Paul H. The Road to Reunion 1865-1900 Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937. Caldwell, Robert Granville. James A. Garfield Party Chieftain Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965; original edition, 1931. Challenger, Richard. The French Theory of the Nation in Arms 18661939 New York: Russell and RusseTT,T965. Chappell Gordon. The Search For the Well -Dressed Soldier 1865-1890 : Developments and Innovations in United States Army Uniforms on the Western Frontier Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1972. Cornish, Dudley Taylor. The Sable Arm : Negro Troops in the Union Army New York: Longmans, Green, 1956. Cosmas, Graham A. An Army For Empire : The United States Army in the Spanish-American War Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971. Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 London: Oxford University Press, 1955. Cunliffe, Marcus. Soldiers and Civilians : The Martial Spirit in Amer ica 1775-1865 New York: Free Press, 1973. " Davidson, Kenneth B. The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972. De Santis, Vincent P. Republicans Face the Southern Question : The New Departure Years 1877-1897 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959. Dearing, Mary Rulkotter. Veterans in Politics : The Story of J^he G^_ A^_ R^_ Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Urn versity~~P>ess, 1"9T2. Demeter, Karl J_he German Officer-Corps in Society and State 1650 1945 New York: Praeger, 1965. Derthick, Martha. The National Guard in Politics Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Dobson, John M. Politics in the Gilded Age : A New Perspective on Reform New York: Praeger, 1972. Downey, Fairfax. Indian-Fighting Army New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941. Downey, Fairfax, and Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr. The Red/Bluecoats : The Indian Scouts \L_ S^ Army Fort Col lins"7~C"olorado: Old Army Press, 1973.

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307 Dupuy, R. Ernest. The National Guard : A Compact History New York: Hawthorn, 1971. Eggert, Gerald G. Railroad Labor Disputes : The Beginnings of Federal Strike Policy Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967. Ekirch, Arthur A. The Civilian and the Military : A History of the American Antimilita rist Tradition Colorado Springs: Ralph Myers, wrr. Foner, Jack D. Blacks and the Military in American History : A New Perspective New York: Praeger, 1974. The United States Soldier Between Two Wars : Army Life and Reforms ~1865-189ir New York: Humanities Press, 1970. Fowler, Arlen L. The Black Infantry in the West 1869-1891 Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971. Franklin, John Hope. Reconstruction : After the Civil War Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Frederickson, George. The Inner Civil War : Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union New York: Harper and Row, 1968. Fritz, Henry Eugene. The Movement For I nd i an Assimil ation 1860-1890 Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963. Ganoe, William A. History of the United States Army New York: Appleton, 1933. Garraty, John, The New Comnonwealth 1877-1890 New York: Harper and Row, 1968. Girardet, Raoul. La societe militaire dans la France contemporaine (1815-1939) Paris: Librairie PI on, 1953. Gray, John S. Centennial Campaign : The Sioux War of 1876 Fort Collins, Colorado: Old Army Press, 1976. Hamer, W. S. The British Army and Civil-Military Relations 1885-1905 London: Oxford University Press, 1970. Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn. The Army in Victorian Society Toronto: University of Toronto Press, T977T Harrod, Frederick S. Manning the New Navy : The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force 18997T940 Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978. Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence : Military Atti tudes Policies and Practice 1763-1789 New York: Macmillan, T97T7

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308 Higham, Robin, and Carol Brandt, eds. The United States Army in Peace time : Essays J_n Honor of the Bicentennial 1775-1975 Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs Press, 1975. Hill, Jim Dan. The Minute Man j_n Peace and War : A History of the National Guard Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1964. Hirshson, Stanley P. Farewell to the Bloody Shirt : Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro 1877-1893 Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. Hittle, H. C. The Military Staff : Its History and Development Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1952. Hoogenboom, Ari Outlawing the Spoils : A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement 1865-1883 Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. Howard, Michael. The Franco-Prussian War New York: Collier Books, 1969. Howell, Edgar M. United States Army Headgear 1855-1902 Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1975. Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966. Hutchins, James S. Boots and Saddles at the Little Bighorn : Weapons Dress Equipment Horses ,~and Flags of General Custer' s Seventh U. S^ Cavalry in 1876 Fort Collins, Colorado: Old Army Press, 1976. Israel, Jerry, ed. Building the Organizational Society : Essays on Assoc iational Activities in Modern America New York: Free Press, 1972. Jacobs, James Ripley. The Beginning of jthe LL S^_ Army 1783-1812 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947. Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier : A Social and Political Portrait Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960. Johnson, Allen, and Dumas Malone, eds. The Dictionary of American Biography 22 vols. New York: Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1928-1958. Johnson, Virginia W. The Unregimented General : A Biography of Nelson A. Miles Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962. Josephson, Matthew. The Politicos 1865-1896 New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938.

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309 Karsten, Peter. The Naval Aristocracy : The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Naval ism New York: Free Press, 1972. Keller, Morton. The Art and Politics of Thomas Nast New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Kemble, C. Robert. The Image of the Army Officer in America Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973. Knight, Oliver. Life and Manners in the Frontier Army Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978". Kohn, Richard H. Eagle and Sword : The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment vn America 1783-1802 New York: Free Press, 1975. La Gorce, Paul Marie de. The French Army : A Military-Political History New York: George Brazil ler, 1963. Langellier, John Phillip. They Continually Wear the Blue : U. S. Army Enl isted Dress Uniforms 1865-1902 San Francisco: Barnes-McGee, 1976. Langley, Harold D. Social Reform vr\ the United States Navy 1798-1862 Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967. Leach, Douglas E. Arms For Empire : A Military History of the British Colonies in North America 1607-1763 New York: Macmillan, 1973. Leckie, William H. The Buffalo Soldiers : A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967. Leech, Margaret, and Harry J. Brown. The Garfield Orbit New York: Harper and Row, 1978. Leonard, Thomas C. Above the Battle : War -Making in America From Appomattox to Versailles. New York: Oxford University Press, T977T Lewis, Lloyd. Sherman Fighting Prophet New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958; original edition, 1932. Lewis, Michael. The Navy in Transition 1814-1864 : A Social History London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965. Logan, Rayford W. The Betrayal of the Negro : From Rutherford B. Hayes to Woodrow Wilson New York: Collier Books, 1965. Luvaas, Jay. The Military Legacy of the Civil War : The European In heritance Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

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310 McFeely, Wi 1 1 i am S. Yankee Stepfather : General 0. 0. Howard and the Freedmen New York: W. W. Norton, 1968. McPherson, James M. The Negro' s Civil War : How American Negroes Felt and Acted During the War For the Union New York: Vi ntage Books, 1967: Mahon, John K. The American Militi a : Decade of Decision 1789-1800 Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960. Mardock, Robert W. The Reformers and the American Indian Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971. Masland, John W., and Laurence I. Radway. Soldiers and Scholars : Mili tary Education and National Policy Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957. Matloff, Maurice, ed. American Military History revised ed. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969. Merrill, James M. William Tecumseh Sherman Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. Mil lis, Walter. Arms and Men : A Study in American Military History New York: Putnam, 1956. Monaghan, Jay. Custer : The Life of General George Armstrong Custer Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959. Morgan, H. Wayne. From Hayes to Harrison : National Party Politics, 1877-1896 Syracuse, NewTork: Syracuse University Press, 1969. Morgan, H. Wayne, ed. The Gilded Age revised ed. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970. Nenninger, Timothy J. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army : Education Professionalism and the Officer Corps of the United States Army 1881-1918 Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978. Nevin, David. The Old West : The Soldiers New York: Time-Life Books, 1973. 0' Conner, Richard. Sheridan the Inevitable Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1953. Peskin, Allan. Garfield Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1978. Priest, Loring Benson. Uncle Sam's Stepchildren : The Reformation of United States Indian Policy 1865-1887 Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975; original edition, 1942.

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311 Prucha, Francis Paul. The Sword of the Republic : The U. S. Army on the Frontier 1783-1846 New York: Macmillan, 1969. Quarles, Benjamin. The Negro in the American Revolution Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940. The Negro in the Civil War Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1953. Radine, Lawrence B. The Taming of the Troops : Social Control in the United States Army Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977. Rasor, Eugene. Reform in the Royal Navy : A Social History of the Lower Deck 1850 tb~ l880 Hamden, Connecticut! ATchon Books, 19T6". Reedstrom, Ernest L., and Don Russell. Bugles Banners and War Bonnets Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1977. Rickey, Don Jr. Forty Mil es a Day On Beans and Hay : The Enlisted Soldier F i gh ti ng the I ndTan Wars Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963. Riker, William H. Soldiers of the States : The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army : A History of the Corps Washington: Department of the Army, T962. Rister, Carl C. Border Command : General Phil Sheridan in the West Westport, Connect! cuTi GTeenwood Press, 1974; original edition, 1944. Rosinski, Herbert. The German Army New York: Praeger, 1966. Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon Bloomington: Indi ana University Press, 1978. The Army of Francis Joseph Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1976. Rothman, David J. Politics and Power : The United States Senate 18691901 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Sarkesi an, Sam C. The Professional Army Off i cer in a. Changing Society Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975. Sefton, James E. The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877 Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Shannon, Fred A. The Organization and Administration of the Union Army 2 vols. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1928.

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312 Smith, Theodore CI arke. The Life and Letters of James Abram Garfield 2 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. Spaulding, Oliver L. The United States Army in War and Peace New York: Putnam, 1937. "~ Sproat, John G. "The Best Men" : Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Stall ard, Patricia Y. Glittering Misery : Dependents of the Indian Fighting Army San Rafael, California: Presidio Press/Old Army Press, 1978. Steffen, Randy. The Horse Soldier 1776-1943 Volume II: The Fron tier the Mexican War the Civil War, the Indian Wars 1851-1880 Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978. Stohlman, Robert F. Jr. The Powerless Position : The Commanding General of the Army of the United States 1864-1903 Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs Press, 1975. Taylor, John M. Garfield of Ohio : The Available Man New York: W. W. Norton, 1970. Tomsich, John. A Genteel Endeavor : American Culture and Politics in the Gilded Age Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1371. Trefousse, Hans C. Ben Butler : The South Called Him Beast! New York: Twayne, 1957. Tucker, Glenn, Hancock the Superb Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1960. Utley, Robert M. Frontier Regulars : The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891 New York: Macmillan, 1973. Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian 1848-1865 New York: Macmillan, 1967 Utley, Robert M., and Wilcomb E. Washburn. The American Heritage History of the Indian Wars New York: American Heritage Publishing C om p any, 1977T Vagts, Alfred. A History of Militarism : Romance and Realities of a Profession New York: W. W. Norton, 1937. Van Riper, Paul P. History of the United States Civil Service Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1958. Walton, George. Sentinel of the Plains : Fort Leavenworth and the American West. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

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313 Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue : Lives of the Union Comnanders Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy New York: Macmillan, 1973. History of the United States Army New York: Macmillan, 1967. Quartermaster General of the Union Army : A Biography of M^_ C^ Meigs New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Towards an American Army : Military Thought From Washington to Marshall New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Weigley, Russell F., ed. The American Military : Readings in the His tory of the Military in American Society Reading, Massachusetts: AdTTson-Wesley, 1969. New Dimensions in Military History San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1976. Wellman, Paul I. Death on Horseback : Seventy Years of War For the American West. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1947. Weymouth, Lally, and Milton Glaser. America in 1876 : The Way We Were New York: Random House, 1976. White, Leonard D. The Republican Era 1865-1901 New York: Macmillan, 1958. Whitman, Sidney E. The Troopers : An Informal History of the Plains Cavalry 1865-1890 New York: Hastings House, 1962. Widder, Keith R. Reveille Till Taps : Soldier Life at Fort Mackinac 1780-1895 Mackinac, Michigan: Mackinac Island State Park Commission, 1972. Wiebe, Robert H. The Search For Order 1877-1920 New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. Wiley, Bell I. The Life of Billy Yank : The Coirmon Soldier of the On i on Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952. Williams, T. Harry. Americans at War: The Development of the American Military System Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960. Woodward, C. Vann. Reunion and Reaction : The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction revised ed. New York: Doubleday, T956.

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314 Dissertations Abrahamson, James L. "The Military and American Society, 1881-1922." Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1977. Andrews, Richard Allen. "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the Army, and Reform, 1869-1883." Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968. Brown, Richard C. "Social Ideas of American Generals, 1898-1941." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1951. Brundage, Lyle D. "The Organization, Administration, and Training of the United States Ordinary and Volunteer Militia, 1792-1860." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958. Carlson, Paul H. "William R. Shafter: Military Conmander in the American West." Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Technological University, 1973. Carroll, Sharon Ann. "Elitism and Reform: Some Anti si avery Opinion Makers in the Era of Civil War and Reconstruction." Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1970. Childress, David T. "The Army in Transition: The United States Army, 1815-1846." Ph.D. dissertation, Mississippi State University, 1974. Cooper, Jerry Marvin. "The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention in American Labor Disputes, 1877-1900." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971. Cress, Lawrence D. "The Standing Army, the Militia, and the New Republic: Changing Attitudes Toward the Military in American Society, 1768 to 1820." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976. Dill ard, Walter S. "The United States Military Academy, 1865-1900: The Uncertain Years." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1972. Fraser, Richard H. "Foundations of American Military Policy, 17831800." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1959. Johe, Richard E. "The American Military Establishment: An Investigation of a Conservative Enclave in Liberal America." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1975. Lavery, Dennis S. "John Gibbon and the Old Army: Portrait of an American Professional Soldier, 1827-1896." Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1974.

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315 Schubert, Frank N. "Fort Robinson, Nebraska: The History of a Military Comnunity, 1874-1916." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toledo, 1977. Skelton, William B. "The United States Army, 1821-1837: An Institutional History." Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968. White, William B. "The Military and the Melting Pot: The American Army and Minority Groups, 1865-1924." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1968. Music Rickey, Don Jr., ed. "The Regular Army, 0!" New York: William A. Pond and Company, 1962. Smith, Franklin, producer. "The Army in the West, 1870-1890." Washington: Company of Military Historians, "[n.d.].

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Donna Marie Eleanor Thomas was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1951, and moved to South Florida four years later. After attending public schools in Miami, she enrolled at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota, in 1969. In 1973, she received the B.A. in history with special honors and election to Phi Beta Kappa. After two years out of academic life, which included brief service as an enlisted woman in the United States Army, she entered Florida International University in Miami, where she earned an M.S. in secondary social studies education. During 1976 and 1977, she taught at the University of Rhode Island and studied for her M.A. in history. As editorial assistant of the Florida Historical Quarterly in 1978 and 1979, she completed doctoral coursework at the University of Florida. Upon completion of the qualifying examinations, she returned to Miami to work full time and complete her dissertation. Her professional memberships include Phi Alpha Theta, the American Historical Association, and the Company of Military Historians. She has published articles in Rhode Island History Trends in Social Education and the Florida Historical Quarterly 316

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ohn k. Mahon, Chairman Professor of History I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr. Professor of History I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ^ \ J David Bushnell Professor of History I certify tfiat I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 1 \ Lyle N. McAlister Distinguished Service Professor of History

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. C. John Sommerville Associate Professor of History ^ I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is full, adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree, of Doctor of Philosophy. Jerald T. Mi lanich Associate Professor of Anthropology This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of History in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Dean for Graduate Studies and Research December, 1980

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