Title Page
 Table of Contents
 List of Illustrations
 Florida and Carolina around...
 The English approach
 The siege
 The English withdrawal


The siege of St. Augustine in 1702 /
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 Material Information
Title: The siege of St. Augustine in 1702 /
Series Title: University of Florida monographs
Added title page title: Siege of Saint Augustine in 1702
Physical Description: 67 p., 3 leaves of plates : ill., maps ; 23 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Arnade, Charles W
Publisher: University of Florida Press
Place of Publication: Gainesville Fla
Gainesville, Fla
Publication Date: 1959
Copyright Date: 1959
Subjects / Keywords: History -- Saint Augustine (Fla.) -- Siege, 1702   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Statement of Responsibility: by Charles W. Arnade.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (p. 62-67).
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Table of Contents
        Cover 1
        Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page v
        Page vi
    Table of Contents
        Page vii
    List of Illustrations
        Page viii
    Florida and Carolina around 1700
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
    The English approach
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
    The siege
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 38a
        Page 38b
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
    The English withdrawal
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
        Page 67
        Page 68
Full Text



by Charles W. Arnade

University of Florida Monographs
CB014 96
No. 3, Summer 1959 C



Social Sciences Monographs

L. N. MCALISTER, Chairman
Associate Professor of History

Professor of Education

Professor of Political Science

Professor of Economics

Professor of Sociology

Professor of Psychology






Photo by J. Carver Harris

The English Siege of 1702 gave this Spanish fort its baptism of fire. The cannon
is part of the Spanish 16-pounder which was overcharged and blew up during
the siege.




Research for this monograph was made possible
by a generous grant from the St. Augustine
Historical Society. The grant enabled me to dedicate
a full two months in the summer of 1958 to research
and writing. Mr. J. Carver Harris, Mrs. Doris Wiles,
Mr. J. T. Van Campen, Mr. X. L. Pellicer, Mrs.
Max Kettner, Mrs. Luis Arana, and Mr. William
Griffen of the Society were helpful at various times.
Mr. Albert Manucy, Mr. Luis Arana, and Mr. Ray
Vinten of the United States National Park Service
(which today administers Castillo de San Marcos
National Morenment, the historic fort that is so
much a part f tih Iicrrative) gave valuable tech-
nical and scholarly help. Professors Hale Smith,
Charles Fairbanks, Benjamin Rogers of Florida
State University, and Donald Worcester, Lyle Mc-
Alister, Rembert Patrick, John Mahon, Curtis Wil-
gus, John Goggin, and Ripley Bullen of the Univer-
sity of Florida offered valuable advice. A special
word of thanks goes to Mr. Julien C. Yonge and
Miss Margaret Chapman of the P. K. Yonge Li-
brary of Florida History for their help and for
making many facilities available to me. Dr. Mark
Boyd of Tallahassee, Mr. David True of Miami,
and Mr. Edward Lawson of St. Augustine at one
time or another were extremely helpful. My wife,
Marjorie, as usual had the tedious chore of typing
the various drafts. To these friends, and especially
to the St. Augustine Historical Society, many
thanks. Naturally I assume full responsibility for
the content of the monograph.


List of Illustrations viii

1. Florida and Carolina Around 1700 1

2. The English Approach 14

3. The Siege 37

4. The English Withdrawal 53

Bibliography 62


Castillo de San Marcos Frontispiece
English Advance on St. Augustine 6
St. Augustine and Western Florida, 1702 12
English Advance and Retreat Routes 16-17
Spanish Map of St. Johns River Area 18
The Attack Time Table 23
Plan of the Fort 25
Seventeenth Century Warfare facing 38
Spanish Defense Zone in St. Augustine 43
Diagram of the Siege 48-49
Plan of Port and Fort of St. Augustine 56
The British Withdrawal 58


In 1670 a new English colony had come into existence on the North
American continent. Its first colonists came from England and
Barbados and called their new home Carolina. They established their
towns and plantations in territory claimed exclusively by Spain as part
of Florida. Although Spanish hegemony in the Carolina land was
hardly perceivable since the Spanish frontier had been withdrawn to
the south, the very soil on which the first Carolinians stepped was
historical ground where once the Spanish banner proudly flew. The
famous Pedro Menendez de Aviles had personally established forts and
outposts in Carolina a century before the English arrival. Overextension,
lack of gold and precious metals, apathy, ferocious Indians, maladmin-
istration, jealousies, and other causes forced the Spanish to retreat
toward St. Augustine and Apalachee. Carolina and north Georgia as
well as Alabama remained Spanish only in name and on paper.
The settlers of Carolina, imbued by a restless energy, a religious
fervor, a shrewd business instinct, and a hatred for Catholic Spain,
were determined to remain and expand. This they did. In all directions,
but especially west and south, the pioneers and traders of Carolina
blazed the trail. The forceful story of this chapter of American colonial
history has been written with scholarly pen by Professor Verner Crane
in his study The Southern Frontier (11)*, today a classic of American
history. The men of Carolina, according to the Spaniards, were living,
moving, and expanding on Spanish soil. Surely a controversy, if not
war, was in the making over the "debatable land," a phrase employed
by Professor Herbert Bolton (6).
For more than thirty years an undeclared war was waged in this
disputed land with Guale, or eastern Georgia, as the main battleground.
Spain's efforts to eradicate English Carolina from St. Augustine were
complete failures. Many natives flocked to the English side, the side
which had more goods to offer. Those Indians who remained loyal to
Spain were eagerly considered slave material by the Carolina plantation
owners. Therefore raiding parties by the English and their Indian allies
forced the Spaniards to fall back farther south. One Spanish governor

*Citations throughout refer to the numbered items in the Bibliography.


after another requested help to destroy the English menace, but nothing
was forthcoming. One positive action was undertaken, however, when
St. Augustine was made a main bastion for Spanish defense of the At-
lantic. A massive stone fort, the dream of every governor since Menen-
dez de Aviles, became a reality. It was started in 1672, and by the end
of the century the fort at St. Augustine was the strongest and largest on
the continent this side of Veracruz (17). The stage was set for a larger
English-Spanish engagement. International events slowly led to its ful-
France's ownership of the best waterways of North America was yet
incomplete without sovereignty over the Mississippi, especially its
mouth. By the end of the seventeenth century, just when Carolina was
expanding, France decided to act since Spain had neglected the Gulf
coast. By 1700 France had achieved her purpose and Louisiana was in
the making. The Spanish crown, wishing to forestall the French, occu-
pied Pensacola Bay and in this way a new area of conflict was created.
Furthermore, while Carolinians gained at the expense of Spain in east
Georgia, their more enterprising traders were moving west, approaching
the Mississippi. Another regional clash was shaping up. The outlook
was for a triangular struggle over the Southeast.
To the Carolinians the main enemy had been Spain ever since the
creation of their province. This was most natural as they had intruded
on soil claimed by Spain, and they were living "in the very chaps of
the Spaniard" (11, p. 3, n. 1). At the same time they were disdainful
of the Spaniards, sure that Spain's forced exit from North America was
just a matter of time. The Carolinians underestimated the strength and
might of Spain; they had a more healthy respect for the French. France
was the mightiest nation in Europe with a great colony in North Amer-
ica. Although removed from the battlefield of King William's War
(1689-1697), Carolina knew that England had failed to eject France
from Canada. Both countries had fought to a stalemate in America.
In Carolina France's power was overestimated. The news of the estab-
lishment of Louisiana meant that Carolina traders going west would
meet with Frenchmen moving north and east, and this was considered
a serious matter. The Spanish danger was relegated to a secondary
position. The struggle for the Mississippi, in which Carolina would
play a vital role, surged to the forefront. But a sudden new international
development in Europe brought about a shift in the triangular picture
of the North American Southeast.


In 1700 the JuroQpean nations changed their alliances. The king of
Spain had died without successor. Powerful King Louis XIV of France
claimed the throne for his Bourbon grandson. The other European
nations were unwilling to see Spain and France united under one crown,
and an international war seemed likely. The war clouds soon reached
English North America, causing great consternation. Spain and France
united would mean nearly total encirclement. In Carolina the dismay
was even greater. Professor Crane tells us "that the more timid settlers
talked of removal to safer regions" (10, p. 383) should the union of
the two crowns become a reality. To be sure, the majority of the Caro-
linians who had braved the elements of nature, Indians, and Spaniards
were unwilling to give up so easily. Nevertheless anxiety lay over the
aggressive Protestant colony.
The governor of Louisiana had already formulated a plan to stop-
the English advance westward and to strike at the Atlantic coast via
Spanish Florida in a combined allied offensive. St. Augustine would '
serne as the main base for this flank attack. Spain would recover the
debatable land, with French help, and in return would turn Pensacola
over to Louisiana. Although the plan was only on paper, a fancy of
the French governor and one which apparently failed to arouse the
Spaniards to equal enthusiasm, it did make sense. More than one in-
telligent and far-sighted Carolinian must have pondered the possibility
of a combined French-Spanish offensive in the west, from the southeast,
and by the waters of the Atlantic. If war came in Europe over the
Spanish succession, such an attack was quite probable. A sturdy hand
was needed in Carolina to guide the province through the coming times.
In September, 1700, James Moore, an outspoken colonist, "ambitious
and impecunious planter" (11, p. 40), "active, ambitious and aggressive
high-churchman" (28, p. 157), and ruthless slave dealer, became gov-
ernor of Carolina. Serious research has yet to sketch his true personality.
Professor Crane considers him an important man who played a "great
role in the creation of the southern frontier and of provincial western
policy" (11, p. 40). He was unquestionably intelligent, but also reckless.
Moore understood the forthcoming international danger. He feared and
respected the French and despised and underestimated the Spaniards.
The new governor was aware of the danger that the union of the two
crowns would mean. He had heard of the great Spanish fort and gar-
rison at St. Augustine. It was his opinion that if war came, the English
of Carolina must strike at St. Augustine before it became an allied base.


If St. Augustine were to be reinforced by French troops and equipment
the survival of Carolina would be seriously endangered. He tried to
convince public opinion in favor of war policies.
In May, 1702, the Proprietors in England sent word to Carolina of
the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, known in American
history as Queen Anne's War. By August the official news had not yet
reached Charleston, but Governor Moore had advance intelligence of
the war's outbreak. On August 20, 1702, he urged on the Carolina
Commons "the taking of St. Augustine before it be strengthened with
french forses" (23, p. 64). At first the Commons refused to grant per-
mission for the St. Augustine expedition but rather favored defensive
measures. On August 26 the official news of the outbreak of the war
reached Carolina and the Commons looked with more favor on Moore's
proposal. By early September the legislative body authorized the of-
fensive. Enthusiasm prevailed in the colony and the Assembly pro-
claimed "the Encouragement to free Plunder and a share of all Slaves"
(23, p. 84). It also announced that "all persons that go on this expe-
dition shall have an equal share of all plunder" (28, p. 163). Thereupon
the legislature appropriated two thousand pounds sterling for expenses.
In this way was born the Moore attack on St. Augustine, a vital battle
in Spanish Florida history.
The Assembly had estimated that the expedition should have at least
350 white men, of which the majority should be transported in six or
more vessels. It calculated that attack on St. Augustine could be termi-
nated victoriously in two months. Because of this the body appropriated
seven hundred pounds of the two thousand in salaries for the men, each
man receiving ten pounds a month besides an "equal share of plunder"
(23, p. 85). The Commons House of Assembly on August 28 thought
that Colonel Robert Daniel, Lieutenant Colonel George Dearsley, Major
Will Smith, Captains James Risbee, William Davis, and others were
"fitt to be Commanders on the present Expedition." Some of these men
indeed turned up in the attack on St. Augustine. There was some senti-
ment in the House to appoint Colonel Robert Daniel commander of the
expedition, but the question "carried in the negative" (23, p. 84). It
was resolved that Governor Moore would be commander-in-chief. The
members wrote Moore that "having turned our eyes round about us we
can find no person so very capable as your Honor." The Carolinian
representatives thought that by giving the job to Moore they could not
"in the least doubt of all imaginable success" (23, p. 86). Moore said



"that nothing but delay can make me doubt of Success" (23, p. 92).
In another act during the same month the House ordered "that all
vessels be imbargoed" (23, p. 83). In all, the Commons House of
Assembly had acceded readily to Governor Moore. Once convinced of
the feasibility of an offensive the legislators gathered momentum in
being cooperative. By September Moore was ready to move south.
/ The printed English sources about the St. Augustine expedition are
sparse and somewhat contradictory. In summary this is what happened:
David Ramsay states that about 500 provincial militiamen together
with some 300 Indians, mostly Yamasees, made up the expeditionary
force which gathered at Port Royal, the "fixed place of rendezvous"
(21, p. 127). John Oldmixon tells us that "the Number of Men which
were enlisted for this Enterprise were 1,200, 600 English and 600
Indians" (19, p. 342). Michael Cole reports "five hundred men and
three hundred Indians sayled from hence about ye 16 October" (97).
Fourteen boats, mostly confiscated from private sources, were available
to transport the men south. A very simple plan of operation was adopted.
Colonel Robert Daniel approached St. Augustine by a land route;
Commander Moore attacked the Spanish presidio by sea and blocked
the harbor with part of his fleet. The route to St. Augustine was a
victorious one and several Spanish outposts along the coast were de-
stroyed. According to Oldmixon, Colonel Robert Daniel, "a very brave
Man," marched on St. Augustine "up the River in Periagas and came
upon Augustino on the land side, while the Governor sail'd thither and
attacked it by Sea . . . Col. Daniel in his way took St. John's, a small
Spanish settlement; as also St. Mary's, another little village, belonging
to the Spaniards. After which he proceeded to Augustino, came before
the Town, entered and took it; Col. Moor not being yet arrived with
the Fleet" (19, pp. 342-343). The city of St. Augustine was easily
captured and the English soldiers maivelled at the riches of the town,
with its large church and comfortable Franciscan friary. But the English
land and sea forces occupied only an empty town. The garrison and
inhabitants had retreated into St. Augustine's formidable citadel, the
Castillo de San Marcos.
The conquest of St. Augustine and Florida without the capture of
this fort would indeed have been an empty victory. Governor Moore
decided to take it, but discovered that he lacked the necessary artillery.
He therefore dispatched Colonel Daniel to Jamaica to bring siege can-
non, bombs, and mortars. In the meanwhile Moore laid siege to the



First attack at San Pedro de Tupiqui

. _ 30 Miles


fort, hoping that he might induce the surrender of the garrison by
starvation. The Spaniards inside the castle showed endurance and
strength, and the reinforcements from Jamaica failed to arrive. The
morale of the Carolina force began to crumble after a two-month siege.
Then suddenly, without advance intelligence, two large Spanish ships
with heavy guns arrived from Havana and "bottled up" (11, p. 77)
the eight English vessels. Oldmixon insists that the two Spanish ships
were "two small Frigats, one of 22, and the other of 16 guns" (19,
p. 344). According to John Ash, Moore "resolved bravely to put on
Board his Eight Vessels then riding in the Harbour all their Goods and
Plunder, and with his few men about 500, Fight thro' the Enemy, and
so come Home. But the Pillow, which often let out Heat to make way
for Caution, changed this his Resolution" (4, p. 272). Seeing his pre-
carious situation, Governor Moore set fire to his cornered fleet and
retreated hastily by land 40 miles north to the mouth of the St. Johns.
Here he embarked his tired men in his relief ships and returned to Caro-
lina. Oldmixon tells us that "Arratommakaw, King of the Yanioseaves
[Yamasees?], who commanded the Indians, retreated to the Periagas
[Piragua=small, shallow-draft vessel] with the rest, and there slept
upon his Oars, with a great deal of Bravery and Unconcern. The Gover-
nor's Soldiers taking false Alarm, and thinking the Spaniards were
coming, did not like this slow Pace of the Indian King in his Flight;
and to quicken him in it, bad him make more Haste: But he reply'd,
No; tho your Governour leaves you, I will not stir till I have seen all
my Men before me" (19, p. 344).
The expedition had been a failure from the over-all point of view.
The powerful fort, or castillo, was not conquered and consequently
Spanish Florida continued to exist. The cost of the campaign went far
beyond the appropriated 2,000 pounds, costing exactly 8,495 pounds,
14 s., 9d. (28, p. 163; 24, pp. 87-92 and pp. 126-127). Professor Crane
says that consequently Carolina "entered upon the evil course of paper-
money issue" (11, p. 77). Governor Moore became thoroughly dis- a
credited. The Carolina House voted him thanks "for his Courage and
Conduct" but the powerful Mr. John Ash dissented because "he thinks
the General much wanting in his conduct particularly in not using his
power to punish disobedient and cowardly officers to which in a great
measure he [Ash] thinks our ill success may be imputed" (24, p. 25).
John Archdale, in his survey of Carolina written in 1707, said that
Moore's adventure in St. Augustine "was ready to make a Mutiny among



the People; for many Vessels had been press'd to that Service, which
being burn'd by the Governour's order, because they should not fall
into the Spaniard's Hands, the Masters demanded Satisfaction; and an
Assembly being called, great Debates and Divisions arose, which, like
a Flame, grew greater and greater" (3, p. 313).
Furthermore, Moore and Captain Daniel and some of his officers were
openly accused of having kept the rich plunder and ignoring the law
that had promised free plunder and an equal share of it (24, pp. 86,
126). The failure of the St. Augustine siege encouraged further attempts
to destroy Spanish Florida. Although ending in partial success, it did
not achieve the desired gWal of eliminating Spain from southeast North
America. The march on St. Augustine of 1702 had a few positive
features. Moore and his legions had destroyed the garrisons of Amelia
Island and therefore "forced the Spanish frontier to fall back another
step" (6, p. 60). Although the expedition was costly in funds and ships,
Moore's army lost only two lives. Taken by surprise when the Spanish
reinforcements appeared in the harbor, the governor was able to ma-
neuver his army out of enemy country. One of Governor Moore's per-
sonal political enemies, John Ash, had to admit that Moore "retreated
with such caution and dispatch, that he lost not one man by the enemy"
(4, p. 273)..Carolinians had learned that Spanish Florida was not an
easy prey and that the Spaniards had still plenty of initiative. In sum-
mary, the siege of St. Augustine in 1702 was one of the first large en-
gagements in the international struggle on the North American conti-
nent, a dispute that would assume vast proportions as the eighteenth
century progressed. This particular engagement was more than a raid
for plunder, but rather marked the beginning of a century of warfare
in North America.

The position of Florida in 1702 and the years preceding was fairly
adequate, if compared with a century before. By 1600 Spanish Florida
claimed all of North America east of New Mexico, although in reality
only St. Augustine and a few missions on the southern Georgia coastal
islands were inhabited by the Spaniards. St. Augustine itself was a
miserable place with a rotting wooden fort. By 1700, a hundred years
later, Spain's Florida claimed less territory, but the inhabited places
over which the Spanish banner flew had grown in number. In the west,


Pensacola had come into existence as the second largest Spanish com-
munity of Florida. In between lay the rich region of Apalachee with
abundant natives and Spanish missions, with its center in today's Tal-
lahassee. A considerable cattle-growing region with Spanish creole
ranchers from St. Augustine was flourishing in Timucua, with today's
Gainesville area as its focal point. By 1700 the Georgia missions, which
had achieved their maximum growth by the mid-seventeenth century,
had been severely decimated by the English. Even so, they continued
their existence around Amelia Island. South Florida remained unoccu-
pied by the Spanish. But the St. Johns, Suwanee, Santa Fe, and St.
Marks rivers were Spanish waterways. The presidio of St. Augustine,
still an undesirable place compared with other towns in the Americas,
had improved considerably. The massive fort dominating the city gave
it stature and prestige. A spacious church and beautiful Franciscan
friary added to the decorum. Professor John R. Dunkle, studying the
birth records, estimates the number of inhabitants of the town at 912
in 1701 (12, p. 8). The real size of the population of Florida remains
a matter of speculation.
The most precise census is one from the year 1689 when the Bishop
of Cuba sent the crown a list of Florida doctrinas (Indian parishes
under the supervision of a priest) with their number of native families.
Florida was divided into four provinces. Guale with six doctrinas had
a total of 185 families. Timucua had thirteen doctrinas with 591 fam-
ilies. Apalachee, the most prosperous of the Florida provinces, was also
listed with thirteen doctrinas containing 1,920 families. The fourth
province was identified as "Provincia Nueba" and was unquestionably
located in south Florida. It contained only two villages with 100 families.
The total for the four provinces was 2,796 families, and it was estimated
that each family was composed of five people, making a total of 13,980.
In addition, the city of St. Augustine was listed as having 500 families
or 1,444 people, including whites, Indians, and Negroes (31).
From this census it can be seen that the families in St. Augustine
did not measure up to the ratio of five to a family indicated by the
bishop. This was because St. Augustine was a strictly military town.
The whole life of the place gravitated around the fort. According to
law the garrison for the protection of all of Florida was to be 355 men
strong. Most of these men by 1700 were criollos from St. Augustine and
could be classified as local boys. Even so, the city with its extremely
low birth rate (due to the lack of women) could not satisfy the demand



for the full quota of 355. Requests by the governors to bring the garrison
up to full strength are of common occurrence in the archives. In 1699
the garrison was composed of eighteen staff officers, of which two were
on pension. It had 254 men in the infantry, divided into three companies.
Of these, 30 men were incapacitated for one or another reason. The
artillery was composed of 18 men, one of whom was permanently sick.
The navy had 23 able men. There were two full-time Indian interpreters.
This gives a total of 315 men on the payroll, which was 40 short of
the required quota. But of the 315 men, 33 were either on pension or
incapacitated. Thus, in 1699 Florida had a military garrison of only
282 able-bodied men to guard the vast area that composed the four
provinces (32).
By 1702, the year of the Moore attack, the number of the garrison
had risen to 323, of which 25 were listed as pensioned or incapacitated
because of age or sickness. These men who faced the Moore offensive
were organized and distributed in the following manner. First was the
governor, supreme commander of Florida, who was not included in
the 355-man quota. He held extensive military, executive, legislative,
judicial, and administrative power. Two royal officials, the treasurer
and the accountant, shared the administrative power with the governor;
they too were not part of the garrison quota. The main military figure
was the sergeant major. He was the troop commander, directly respon-
sible to the governor and who in case of vacancy of the governorship
assumed that position until the new governor arrived. Below him were
listed the three captains of the three infantry companies. The infantry
also had three ensigns, three sergeants, twelve corporals, six drummers,
three fifers, and three pages. The artillery had only one captain and
nineteen artillerymen. Besides these there were fifteen more staff or
administrative officers, including a military accountant, a customs offi-
cial, the commander of the fort who had four adjutants, two foremen
who watched the slaves and convicts, two scribes, an armorer, a black-
smith, a barber (physician), and an apothecary. Part of the garrison
were the two Indian interpreters who were conversant in the languages
of Guale, Apalachee, and Timucua. One hundred and thirty-seven in-
fantry soldiers were stationed in St. Augustine, living in the fort which
they and the artillerymen guarded twenty-four hours a day. Thirty sol-
diers and an officer were stationed in Apalachee, especially in the Tal-
lahassee region. They were the soldiers farthest removed from St. Au-
gustine. In 1702 twelve infantrymen and one officer guarded Guale, with



their headquarters on Amelia Island. In the province of Timucua there
were only three soldiers stationed in the Gainesville-Lake Santa Fe re-
gion. Two soldiers were located on the crossing of the Salamototo [St.
Johns] River that led from St. Augustine to Timucua and Apalachee.
These two men maintained contact with the small Timucua garrison. The
various sentinel posts around St. Augustine required 25 men. The navy
had fifteen sailors and a pilot in charge of the small vessels that be-
longed to the presidio. All these men, including the incapacitated and
pensioned and excluding the governor and two royal officials, came to
323. This made the garrison 32 men below the 355-man quota. In fact,
the effective fighting force of Florida, exclusive of Pensacola, which
was not considered part of the provinces, was only 298. The actual
strength at St. Augustine, including the sentinel posts, was 249 pro-
fessional soldiers and officers, plus the governor and the two royal
officials (33). This was the force that must defeat Governor Moore and
his attacking army.
The first news the Spanish governor of Florida, Joseph de Zufiiga
y Zerda, had about the approaching attack of Governor Moore came
from a baptized Indian woman of the Chacato tribe (30, fol. 3280).
She had gone from Apalachee to the lands of the Apalachicolas in
today's western Georgia, a region which had fallen under the influence
of the English traders from Carolina. At the village of Achito in Apa-
lachicola, the native woman had attended a town council in which plans
were being discussed for an English-inspired and -supervised attack on
Spanish Apalachee. The Chacato woman subsequently witnessed some
war preparations by the Apalachicolas. Being devoted to the Spaniards,
she fled to San Luis de Apalachee (today's Tallahassee), where she
arrived on the afternoon of October 21, to report the news. Immediately
she talked to Captain Juan Solana, the Spanish commander of Apa-
lachee, and Captain Francisco Romo de Uriza, who had recently arrived
from St. Augustine with reinforcements. Among other things, the Cha-
cato Indian told the two captains the amazing news that the governor
of "San Jorge," which was the Spanish name for Charleston, would
come down the Atlantic coast with as many as a hundred small boats
to attack St. Augustine. The next day, October 22, Solana and Romo
de Uriza forwarded the news to St. Augustine by a speedy messenger
who arrived at the fort five days later (34, 35).
Governor Zfiiiga was quite worried about this news and thought it
credible, though perhaps exaggerated. He issued a proclamation on



October 27 telling the garrison and people of St. Augustine about the
Chacato information. Zfiiiga asked them to take the news seriously
and said that although he had continually asked for help from Spain,
Havana, Pensacola, and French Mobile, he could expect no immediate
aid. Under these circumstances the presidio and garrison must be
mobilized and put on twenty-four-hour notice. Zfiiniga gave orders that
beginning October 28 no inhabitant of St. Augustine be allowed to leave
the town premises without express permission of the governor. All
reserve soldiers and officers were called into active duty; all leaves were
canceled. The garrison was ordered to check and clean weapons and
have them ready for a moment's notice (36). The governor was an
energetic man of great administrative talents, who had had twenty-eight
years of dedicated service to the crown, including war service in Africa
and Flanders. He was taking no chances since he was well aware of the
aggressiveness of the English. He was also cognizant of the military
weakness of his garrison in terms of men and arms.
On November 1 the worried governor again wrote an urgent letter
to the crown, outlining his extremely weak position. He was short of
men and ammunition to defend the vast provinces of Florida which the
English from Carolina were determined to conquer. Zufiiga identified
Florida as being composed of Apalachee, Timucua, "La Rinconada,
Bay of Tanpa known as La Ascensi6n, the coast of Carlos, that of the
South, Tororo, and Mayaca." All these places the correspondent identi-
fied as having inhabitants, Apalachee and Timucua possessing the

| / , sSAN MARTIN 4^
f .....--AYUBALE r\ N
SAN LUIS St. Johns
APALACHEE / . (alototo) Riv
s^\ . '^. "^ ^ "h SANTA FE.-.


heaviest concentration. The morale of the Indians from these two prov-
inces, composed of four thousand Christians plus infidels such as the
"Sabacolas, Chacates, Tabosas or Catases, Pacanas, Amacanas, and other
nations," was at a low point. The English goal was to wean Indian
allegiance away from the Spaniards and conquer St. Augustine and the



fort, and thereby gain control of the Bahama Channel, a vital Spanish
route. The executive wanted one hundred more soldiers from Spain and
fifty from Cuba, plus weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, Zuiiiiga
again reminded the crown that Spain's goal in the Atlantic must be to
destroy Carolina, once and forever. Since time was of the essence, he
said he was ordering the sloop from Havana, which was in the port of
Apalachee, and the frigate "La Gloria" of the St. Augustine presidio,
to sail to Pensacola and French Mobile to request aid (37).
On the same day the royal officials, with the governor's approval,
wrote a similar letter to the governor and royal officials of Havana. The
immediate need was reinforcements to defend St. Augustine from the
English. The final goal should and must be a counteroffensive. They
said that "the depopulation and expulsion of these Englishmen from
San Jorge is urgent. This can easily be done, because they have no fort
or any other defenses." St. Augustine offered its full cooperation in
the expedition which was recommended for "this spring" (39).
By November 1 the governor and the administrative officers of St.
Augustine were sure of an English attack but had little intelligence
information. A third letter was sent to Solana, the lieutenant governor
of Apalachee. He was instructed to question the Chacato woman again,
and speed any further developments to St. Augustine. He was also
warned to be prepared for an attack by the English and their Indian
allies. Even though material was short at the presidio, some hoes and
axes were ready to be dispatched to Solana for the purpose of erecting
a blockhouse. It is presumed that this wooden structure, "with a palisade
big enough to hold sufficient people" was to be located at San Luis.
Captain Solana was ordered to soothe the various Indian chiefs. The
Havana sloop, anchored at St. Marks, must be confiscated and sent to
Pensacola for aid. This drastic action was adopted by consent of the
war council of all staff officers. Due compensation must be offered her
captain and crew for their work. Should the crew resist the order,
Solana was to put the men under arrest and replace them with expe-
rienced Apalachee soldiers. Captain Jacinto Roque was assigned the
task of taking the request for aid to Pensacola, and Solana was to assign
Roque the soldiers needed to fulfill the order. Zuiiiga informed Solana
that he was dispatching the royal frigate of the St. Augustine garrison
to Havana for further aid. Nicolas Mons6n carried the governor's in-
structions to Apalachee on the royal trail, arriving at San Luis several
days later (38, 76).



WThile Zuiiiga was sending south and west for heithe English were
approacng St. Augustine from the north, entering, to-ans
held Ierritor 'y tgeginning of November. They began their assault
on Guale at midnight of November 3. The Carolina army surprisedthe
guardhouse of San Pedro Bar at Santa MariaIsland (Amelia) which
overlooked the water thiaTTiparate it from San Pedro Island (Cum-
berland). The two Spanish guards, Domingo Gonzales and Juan Tejada,
died defending their post. Immediately afterward the attackers overran
the native village of San Pedro de Tupiqui, which presumably was on
the northern part of the island. Some of the Christian Indians were
able to flee south to the missions and villages of San Felipe and Santa
Maria located on the same island. These two places were close together;
one was the administrative center of Guale and had a wooden fort with
a strong palisade. In it lived Captain Francisco Fuentes de Galarza, the
lieutenant governor of Guale, with his attractive and pregnant wife,
their three charming daughters, and one small son. It was said that
another daughter of Fuentes, voluptuous and beautiful, had an illicit
relationship with Governor Zufiiga in St. Augustine and for this reason
the governor had removed the father and mother to Guale (30, fols.
At one o'clock in the morning of November 4 the fleeing Indians from
the northern part of. the.island. arrived at the stockade, reporting the
unexpected English invasion to Fuentes de Galarza. The captain and
"thf two Franciscan friars, Manuel de Urissa and Domingo Santos, im-
mediately rang the church bells, alerting the people to the oncoming
attack and asking them to defend the stockade, the mission, and the
villages. Instead, panic broke out among the neophytes and spread to
all the natives, who began to flee the island or hide in the woods and
swamps. Fuentes de Galarza and the friars tried desperately to calm
the Indians, but their companions from San Pedro de Tupiqui had
spread exaggerated tales of English atrocities. The lieutenant governor
reported that with his few soldiers he was unable to stop the fleeing
Indians as the native leaders were unable or unwilling to cooperate.
Consequently the captain ordered complete evacuation of the fort
mission, andisland. He" th ars-Tc T t he s rch- ornaments



and statues. Just at this moment the English arrived and showered the
fort and mission with burning spearsw~;'f"iich felltont entto roofs.
Atonce flames engulfed the strihfetres, lighting the dark night of the
island. Apparently everyone got out, including the soldiers, the com-
mander, and the friars. They fled to the next important Spanish outposts
of San Juan del Puerto on Fort George Island the Indian"tvil5agef
Santa Cruz on-tie mainland across from the western shore of the island,
anrido the stockade and mission of Piribiriba located just across from
the sjlnd on the southern shore of the Salamototo River, near today's
Mayport. Captain Fuentes arrived at San Juan del Puerto, the last out-
post of Guale, in the late afternoon of November 4. He immediately
rushed the grave news to the governor in St. Augustine (40, 41, 44).
GCEernor eZji iga received the dispatch at noon on Nembier.i.-5.It.L
told him of capture of Xme-iaTsland by the English and the retreat
to6Saniil'-T n -eT-Pirt"o " cated twelve leas'ir-fro mthe piiesidi'."..
Captain Fuentes de Galarza reported that the Carolina force was com-
posed of "English, Indian, and Negro soldiers." Zfiiiiga, aware that his
fears had come true, thought it of prime important to hold SaznJuan
del Puerto, which he considered as "the key to the province of Guale."
It was also the outer defense line of St. Augustine. And "if the enemy
capture it, they can come overland and besiege the fort," thought the
governor. Therefore he commissioned Captain Joseph de Horruytiner,
who was in charge of the guards at the fort and lookout posts, to take
twenty infantrymen to reinforce the decimated army of Captain Fuentes
de Galarza, and defend San Juan del Puerto and the crossing of the
Salamototo River. Horruytiner's force left immediately (44).
In another order of the day all men, including "free Negroes and
Mulattoes," over fourteen years who were not part of the garrison, were
ordered to go to the fort within one hour to receive arms'and am-
munition. This militia was put on a twenty-four-hour alert. No9inh
itants were allowed to leave the town limits and a fine of two hundred
duc"iios was Id-ecared for infractions of the orders of the day, to be
deducted from the accumulated salary debts owed to each one. A fine
of two hundred lashes was assigned for delinquent St. Augustinians
classified as free persons of color (pardos and morenos) (41). Also,
all farmers were ordered to bring theirproduce, especially corn, and
deposit it inside the fort within twenty-four hours. If wasToBeiia"iei
over to the commander of the fort, who must measure it and give a
signed receipt to the farmers. Every family was allowed to draw out




� 0 30 MILES

g V











Midnight Nov. 3

Nov. 5

Dec. 30

SNov. 8


This undated and anonymous Spanish map shows the places attacked by the
English near the St. Johns River on the approach to St. Augustine. The illustration
is a line facsimile, from a photocopy of the original wash drawing [AI 58-2-8].
Note that Little Talbot Island, the southerly third of which is an accretion since
colonial times, is shown as one with Big Talbot (Sarabay). Note also that D of
the key is on the map as Y. The facsimile omits illegible words, as the names
of the two shore lookouts near B and E, and a phrase written in the narrow
space between Costta and the key.

A-Fort of Piribiriba and two Indian villages, on the mainland with San Agustin.
E-San Pablo Creek, which ends eight leagues from San Agustin.
f-Mouths [of creeks] that lead into the San Agustin mainland.
g-Mouths [of creeks] which end at Aramasaca.
H-Mainland to San Jorge [Charleston].
Y-Sara Creek.
J-Santa Cruz.
L-San Mateo, on the mainland with San Agustin.
m-Fichinuica Channel, through which the enemy came.
N-Channel which runs along all the islands up to San Jorge [Charleston], which
is 60 leagues from this presidio, eight days' travel by the island waterway
and three days by open sea, &c.

Lookout for San Pedro [St. Marys River] Bar.
Santa Maria [Amelia] Island, where the garrison was.
Santa Maria [Nassau River] Bar.
Acale Lookout.
Sarabay [Talbot] Island.
Sarabay [Fort George River] Bar (small).
San Juan [St. Johns River] Bar.
San Juan [Fort George] Island, where there was a village.


the corn needed daily, but an exact written account must be kept of
each transaction. Any infraction of this last order must be presented
to the governor, who would impose a fine according to his pleasure
Planning on the possibility that the English assault might be delayed
on the St. Johns by Fuentes de Galarza and Horruytiner while the
Spanish cautiously retired into the fort for a siege, the governor, treas-
urer, and auditor talked about send another re
Havana~y e ,royafrigate Th decided to telLQftlconqut.f
Amelia IslaandLandtatehl att gjlaj~rid.ear arg-rpl ...
St. Augustine. "iBecause of the lack of men, arms, and ammunition,"
they went on, "we are forced to close ourselves in the fort as soon as
the enemy arrives " Not only did they fear the English, ut they con-
sidered the possibility that some of the Indians might take the oppor-
tunity to rebel, and they recited the obligation to "protect the holy
images, ornaments, jewels of the Church, the clergy, friars, people of
the environs, women, and children." Immediate aid by sea was requested.
A naval task force was thought to be more advisable because it would
help to lift any siege that the English imposed with the Carolina army.
A second choice of at least two hundred infantrymen was listed. A
further request was the sending of twenty soldiers with the royal St.
Augustine frigate to bolster the garrison of Apalachee. All these de-
mands were considered urgent since other help, especially from the west,
was considered beyond the realm of possibility and the presidio's
ammunition was too low for a sustained siege. Zuiiga and the ro
officials agreed that the fri loria" under Ca t
Afsvarezs croua carry tmessagincdt.~to
jTiN-offier e fort could be spared as official messenger, but
the governor suggested the appointment of Fray Francisco Camacho,
who was considered an able and conscientious man. It was decided to
request the permission for Camacho's appointment from the Franciscan
superior, Fray Marcos de Sotolongo. Alonso Alvarez would informally
contact the authorities of Havana and also present St. Augustine's plight
(45, 47).
Just after supper a messenger arrived from the sentinel post at San
Juan del Puerto, twelve leagues from St. Augustine, saying that three
English sails had been sighted. At nine, Zifiiga ordered the alarm
sounded and sent every man to his station for alternate watches (46).
Then, at the end of this eventful day, November 5, 1702, Governor



Zfuniga decided to write one more letter to the crown before retiring
for the night. He was incensed at the present..lightL-o.Eloxida and St.
Augustine, which he blamed on the negligence of the viceroy in Mexico
and the.exeut~i e officers of Havana. Consistently they had ignored
requests for reinforcements and 'if e talk about a counteroffensive "to
throw out the enemy from San Jorge." Even though the enemy was at
the gates of the fort, thoughts about a Spanish attack on Carolina should
not be abandoned. Zuifiiga offered full cooperation in this venture and
suggested St. Augustine as the base for the invasion. The king was
asked to increase the garrison "by 250 men in order to bring it up
to six hundred" and to send fifty new recruits every two years in order
to maintain the roster. With the present garrison it was impossible to
guard the vast expanse of Florida, since it was eighty leagues to Apa-
lachee, thirty leagues to Timucua, and twenty-five leagues to Guale.
It was the governor's opinion that the English had dared to attack
because they knew that Florida was short of armed forces (44).
At two in the morning the governor was awakened by the arrival of
another messenger from the Salamototo estuary, sent by Captain Hor-
ruytiner. The man reported that a Carolinian sloop had landed a launch,
and the Spanish forces had captured three men, two English soldiers,
and "one Indian of the Chiluque nation." The Indian was cooperative
when interrogated by the Guale interpreter and declared that "the
governor of San Jorge is advancing personally with many vessels and
many men by land and sea in order to conquer the fort and town of
St. Augustine." Several hours later more discouraging news arrived at
the fort. The English appeared to have crossed the Salamototo success-
fully, taking San Juan Puerto, Piribiri Santa Cruz TNe-a
happenings along the estuary remain unknown, for Captain Horruytiner
was never able to establish full contact with the Guale force. The
panic of the Santa Maria Island Indians fleeing southward had spread
to the Indians of the three estuary villages and facilitated their rapid
capture. The twenty soldiers of the San Juan del Puerto stockade and
the few at Piribiriba were routed and some were captured by the Eng-
lish. Captain Fuentes, accojripanied by the two Franciscan fathers, was
able to cross the river, still carrying the church ornaments. He wanted
to regroup the men and offer resistance on the south side of the river,
but his army disintegrated and he had to flee into the "woods, swamps,
and palmettos" with his family. Thus he was unable to gather the fifty
men he needed to harass the enemy. The captain praised the courage



and enterprise of the two friars, who were, incidentally, later captured
by the English and sent to Charleston. Fuentes was unable to send a
messenger to St. Augustine until the end of November, keeping the
governor completely in the dark about the Spanish troops in Guale
(46, 87). On an undetermined date the captain and his family were
also captured and taken to Charleston where his wife delivered their next
child (24, p. 51).
Although the news was disjointed, it was obvious that the English had
surmounted the last obstacle before attacking St. Augustine. Consequent-
ly, on the morning of November 6 Zifiiga decidd -ti a frank proc-
lamation to his army and the people of St. Augustine. He told them of
the r 6etreaT '~Ti fGuate"arinimy under Tu;efi-es and its defeat at Santa
Maria Island and at the Salamototo River because of superior English
forces. The governor told his people that "the enemy is approaching
by land and by sea and they are bringing the means to attack and besiege
the royal fort." It was stated that there was a genuine fear that the
loyalty of some Indians was questionable, and the Carolina forces would
take advantage of this. Some natives who were well informed about
conditions in St. Augustine might rush to the English forces, and tell
them "everything about this town, its streets, entrances, environs, creeks,
bars, tidelands, paths to the cattle and other ranches, savannas, and other
places." The proclamation did not hide the deficient situation of the
garrison. Especially bad was the status of the infantry, which since 1687
had not received a recruit from the outside. Zufiiga reminded the people
that he and his predecessors had tried many times to remedy this situa-
tion but were ignored by higher authorities. He had finally dispatched
the popular and extremely capable Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar
to Spain, but he had not yet returned. Furthermore no provisions had
arrived at St. Augustine for the last three months; there was a shortage
of everything.
The governor annoiCL tha e was going to order ejii-
the ?fort. This- mnt aU the inhabitants ofSt Agtnine he envian ro
including friars, r"iests "lomen. ei Negi4lavgyes, free Negroes,
and "all Indians of whatever nation which have rendered obedience to
his Cath litc Aas unoga o
about 1,500 to 1,600 persons. Most of these people were "poor as a
churchmouse"; for a long time the garrison's only pay had been "two
breads a day," so it would be the responsibility of the authorities to
feed everyone inside the fort. This would be a most difficult task. But


First attack at San Pedro de
Tupiqui at midnight, Nov. 3


.; San Juan del Puerto Nov. 5

SPiribiriba Nov. 5


Nov. 8


10 miles


the people were told that it was imperative for everyone to take refuge
in the castle. It would be completely demoralizing for the garrison to
leave their families outside, exposed to English capture. It would be only
human that the garrison would then be hesitant to return enemy fire,
knowing that their wives, children, and other relatives were helpless in
the town. It was also good policy to send the Christian Indians into the
castle because the English might unleash the heathen Indians, such as
the "Jororo, Tucuime, and Aypaje," who would butcher their converted
Florida brethren. Besides, if left outside the fort, the Catholic natives
might return to their old savage customs.
Ziufiiga warned the inhabitanta~ 4nd his garrison that the siege would
last a Ion -tn eftwo baik . seasons e,s tertifaniiry -adly
equipped besides being understaffed and made ii' partly o7ooT^adnd
invalid men plus inexperienced young boys. Second, the enemy -w~to
unquestionably find on the ranches near, St, Augustine "an abund e-
orcattle, corn, beans, and other provisions." Therefore the correct move
was to retreat inside the fort and force the English to a long and cos-ly
siege until reinforcements arrived from "Apalachee, Mobile, Pensacola,
and Havana," to which urgent messages had been sent for men, arms,
and ammunition. He ended his proclamation by saying that he gave his
soldiers' promise to the king that they would defend the castle to the
last drop of blood (46, 54).
As soon as the governor had released his proclamation, he commanded
his sergeant major to announce the order to move into the fort. Every-
one must come with his movable belongings including his "jewels and
ornaments." The priests, friars, and administrators of the religious
confraternities were told to bring the church items including statues,
ornaments, and bells. Indian guides and translators were sent into the
countryside to bring the natives to the fort where their stay would be
made as pleasant as possible, "although the Indians, Negroes, and
mulattoes have no belongings to bring." The infantry was ordered to
carry to the castle "all the shingles possible that are being manufactured
in the treasury house and the ones that have been imported and are
piled up in the plaza de armas to roof the parochial church." Another
task was to remove "the planking [tablaz6n] of the church" and carry
it to the fort to make "lodging and quarters where the women and
children could find refuge . . . against the cold and rain of the winter
that always comes rigorously during these months." Permission was
easily obtained from the sacristan, Sebastian Groso, and the foreman



The plan, although drawn in 1737 by Antonio de Arredondo, represents the fort
substantially as it was in 1702. In this facsimile, important items from the key
are translated below.

San Agustin bastion
San Pedro bastion
San Carlos bastion
San Pablo bastion
Powder magazine
Storeroom with ship's stores
Room with arms
Room with provisions
Room with arms and military
Room with provisions
Quarters of the lieutenant
governor of the fort
Room with provisions
Guardroom officers and men
The "necessary"




12, 13.
16, 17,
22, 23,

Blacksmith shop
Quarters of the overseer
Room with provisions
Royal Accountant's office
Storeroom with artillery
Small closet
Room where rations are
Storeroom for the situado
goods from New Spain
Powder magazine entrance
Storeroom for small stores
Fixed bridge of planks
18, 19. Moat
Entrance to the fort
24. Fresh water wells





of the construction crew, who were consulted by the governor. Before
the end of this day, Zifiiga and his two royal officials again met in a
secret conference to discuss the C maeho-misin which forunrecorded
re�oas&aad.iailed to leave the port. Nqt.hiia.is known about the -
eratioh.t apparently Father Camacho wa relieved ofhis task to sail
t QHavana (46, 47).
At eight o'clock on the morning of November 7, the guards at the fort
sighted three English sails heading south. Several hours later a mes-
senger arrived from Captain Horruytiner, who was still operating along
the mouth of the Salamototo, saying that enemy vessels were heading
toward the castle. Since the ships did not stop at St. Augustine, it was
believed that they were sailing southward to Matanzas Inlet to block
that vital passage, an alternate entrance to St. Augustine harbor. This
news disturbed the governor. The royal frigates "La Gloria" and "Nues-
tra Sefiora de la Piedad y el Nifio Jesus" had been ready to depart for
Havana for two months, but had been delayed because of rough weather
and contrary winds. "La Gloria" was supposed to have carried Father
Camacho. That same day, November 7, the wind and weather were
favorable, but due to the English arrival the sailing was suspended. The
governor rushed a message to the strong watch station at Matanzas Bar
to be on the alert. The post was so located behind the shallow bar that
it was safe from a frontal attack by sea or land. Zufiiiga reminded the
Matanzas garrison to be on guard against any surprise or stratagem
Late in the afternoon further news arrived from Horruytiner, saying
that he had counted ten small sails, including sloops, brigantines, and
a man-of-war (48). The governor realized that the English force might
be even larger than estimated, and that his task of holding the fort
would be difficult. Once more he decided to get in touch, if possible,
with Pensacola and Mobile. If the eastern route to Havana was blocked,
why not try to reach Cuba via these two western ports? It was the
governor's opinion that Father Camacho was not physically able to walk
the eighty leagues to Apalachee and then sail to Havana. Consequently,
he told his lieutenant governor at San Luis, Manuel Solana, to organize
the trip. Solana was to select the capitin of the reserve,'i~ainto Roque
erez, and Ensign Diego de Forencia,.Jott. stationed in Apalachee, to
sail to Pensacola and French Mobile to get "some men, arms, ana am-
munition." 1RPq-Wi was to continue with the sloop from Pensacola to
Havana. Both officers were to leave within a few hours, after having



received their orders from Solana. Zuifiiga recommended that Roque go
by sea and Florencia by land via Santa Rosa [Island?], and that each
carry copies of the other's letters. The governor thought so much of this
mission that he decreed negligence on the part of Solana, Roque, or
Florencia would be punishable by death. Zfifiiga made it clear that
Roque himself must go to Havana, but it was not recorded whether
Florencia was to go to Mobile in person or whether the Spanish com-
mander at Pensacola would make the contact with the French. The mail
messengers, Bias Caballero and Manuel Fernandez, carried the orders to
Solana (48, 49, 76).
At dawn on November 8 Zfiiiga inspected the artillery and came to
the conclusion that it was deficient. There were too few men and they
were not well trained. There were too few guns and what they had were
too weak, since the largest gun in the castle was a sixteen-pounder. He
told his officers that his gunners "had no service record, lack discipline,
and have only a slight knowledge of the bronze and iron guns which
are mounted" in the fort (55). After studying the records, one cannot
but be impressed with the governor's straightforwardness and decisive-
ness. There was nothing pompous, artificial, or exaggerated in his
actions. Although his garrison was short of everything, he was deter-
mined to face up to the English the best way he could.
At eight o'clock, justafter Zfiniga's artillery inspection tahe.enemy
-_" . thee.. s.ea."i een ships were sighted from the
fort, and at around eleven o'clock it was clear that they were heading
toward St. Augustine inlet rather than continuing south as had the three
previous ones. By noon Diego de la Sierra, the pilot, who was stationed
on the royal frigate "Nuestra Sefiora de la Piedad y el Nifio Jesus"
commanded by Luis Alfonso and which lay outside the bar with sixteen
men aboard, reported that the English were fast approaching the bar.
Im ediatl the governor ordered Captain Alfonso and Pilot Sierra
to f arI:ga ring-er ver thbharntather-iir, adanchor
her alongside the o-ther j r ung ra .La1i^ ec
of the fort guns. Both navy men hastened to save their ship from the
enemy. tCoIt" they do it? (55, 56, 50).
While Alfonso and Sierra were rushing to rescue their valuable
frigate, Captain Horruytiner returned to the fort at one o'clock with his
twenty infantrymen from the mouth of the Salamototo. He had failed
in his assigned task to join Fuentes' decimated unit and hold San Juan
del Puerto and Piribiriba. Yet Horruytiner did not return empty-handed,



for he brought with him two English prisoners and a Chiluque Indian
of the Carolina forces, whose capture he had earlier communicated to
Zfiiniga. The two Englishmen were immediately submitted to a prelim-
inary examination by Ziufiiga, the troop commander Adjutant Bernardo
Nieto de Carvajal, and Captain Horruytiner, with the help of William
Carr, the English ex-prisoner who had become a valuable citizen of St.
Augustine and a highly qualified artilleryman. The Englishmen said
that Governor Moore had about one thousand men with him at sea and
on land. The Carolina army brought sufficient equipment to besiege the
castle. They had shovels, spades, pikes, and other items to build trenches
and approach-works. According to the prisoners, Moore had "grenades,"
but did not bring the feared bombs (large explosive shells). It was
their estimate that the English army had provisions for a three-month
siege. Zufiiiga wanted the two men subjected to a more rigorous interro-
gation, since it was vital to determine exactly whether the English did
or did not have bombs. As interpreters he appointed Carr and Juan
Martin, another English ex-prisoner who had joined the garrison and
who also was a gunner on Alfonso's frigate. Horruytiner and Captain
Juan Bernardo were asked to question the Indian, since both men knew
the Guale language. Ziifiiga asked that the intelligence be given him
quickly, so that he could send it on the frigate to Havana (54).
Meanwhile, Alfonso and Sierra were having difficulties with their
frigate. The English enemy was fast approaching the bar, and seeing
the frigate outside the harbor, they were most determined to capture
her. The Spanish crew tried to maneuver over the shallow bar into the
inlet, but failed because of contrary winds and low tide. Captain Alfonso
and Pilot Sierra decided they urgently needed aid from land to sail the
ship over the bar or else to defend her from the enemy. They sent Martin
Sanchez, the guardian of the fort, to get help and bring back the boat-
swain, who was still ashore. Bfour o'c
frigate with orders from gi-ta.case8arPn risky "mane ftW iDM't
sii t ship after removingall y ,a3 i mateil.
Byeight .o'. o'c ra Sefiora de la Piedad y el Nifio Jesus" had
been suikiBad weather and the nearness of the enemy had jeopardized
the task of saving all valuables. The rigging, sails, and artillery had
gone down with the ship; only some slings, hardtack, and flour were
salvaged. No men were lost, however, and everyone reached the fort in
good condition. As soon as they arrived Zufiiiga requested the deposition
of some witnesses, in order to certify to the voluntary destruction of the



frigate. Pilot Sierra, Martin Sanchez, the cook Diego Gutierrez, and
sailors Miguel G6mez and Pedro Belen, all rendered identical written
declarations. The governor next ordered the sixteen-man crew to join
the garrison. Many of them, especially Juan Martin, the master gunner,
would be valuable additions to the weak artillery of the castle. Others,
inept for this task, would have to join the infantry. All sixteen were
ordered to swear loyalty to the defense of the fort. An order was given
that the new men should receive their proper daily ration of meat and
flour (50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57).
Zifiiga had come to the conclusion that the survivingafjjgate, ,a
Gloria must sail under the command of CaplaiiTsos-to-H4 vana-
via Matanzas inlet., He`toilTifs taT ~u~ifif'ta t gh he had sent
Odersito Apalachee to request aid from Pensacola, French Mobile, and
Havana, it was conceivable that the mail might never reach these places
because "of the dangers of the sea and because the enemy is all around.
Ziifiiga thought Captain Alfonso should try to leave the next day, No-
vember 9, after sundown. But he wanted to discuss the trip of "La
Gloria" with his treasurer, auditor, army commandant, and the various
infantry captains in a staff meeting to be held at seven o'clock the next
morning (54).
So came to an end another eventful day. The English arrival by sea
had materialized and the Spaniards had to account for their first ma-
terial casualty. Furthermore, the preliminary interrogation of the two
English prisoners had revealed some new information.
Early next morning the three prisoners were re-questioned. The
first one to testify was a "Joseph Guellemes," apparently Joseph Wil-
liams. He was asked to swear by God and his Protestant Bible to tell
the truth and only the truth. The interrogator warned him that perjury
would automatically lead to death by a firing squad. Williams said that
he was forty-one years old arid born in "Olderemes" [Oldham?] be-
longing to "Seltante" [?] in England. He was married, had children,
and lived in South Carolina as a shoemaker. Even though Williams was
somewhat reluctant in his testimony he revealed some pertinent infor-
mation. He said that he had left Charleston "between fifteen and twenty
days ago" aboard a small sloop called "Lise," which carried nine men
and two boys, had no guns, and was commanded by a "John Nubel"
[Nobel]. He and Nobel went ashore near the St. Johns River when their
sloop became separated from the main contingent. They had been
ordered to sail from Charleston to Port Royal to join seven or eight



other sloops, but rough sea did not permit them to enter the harbor;
they sailed alone to Florida, trying to contact their companion ships.
Williams said that Moore had approximately one thousand men on
land and sea. James Moore came by sea and had as his aide "a colonel
who was an experienced corsair who had commanded the men who had
sacked Vera Cruz. He was a great soldier." The land forces, according
to Williams, were led by another "corsair from Jamaica." Being further
pressed by his interrogators, Willians stated that about five hundred
Carolinian.saied-inr1orteen ships and five hundred men composed
the landLforc, Among the English forces were many Indians-end some
"Lutheran French" and Negroes who had accompanied their masters.
Williams stated that the purpose of the English attack was to "win the
Royal Fort and conquer it because it is a good fortification and by
conquering it.fhey would be strong and free hie_ Frencthrbt since
in Charleston they do not have forts." Carr and Martin were still not
satisfied with Williams' answers and were convinced that he had still
more information. He was ordered to go into more detail.
The shoemaker admitted he knew more. The English had three brigan-
tines which had four-pounder guns. The ship on which Moore traveled
had sixteen guns which were eight- and nine-pounders. Of the sloops
only the larger ones had artillery. One had eight guns and another had
ten, which were all six-pounders. The navy brought along six heavy iron
guns-six-, eight-, and ten-pounders-and gun carriages, round shot,
chain shot, and the necessary powder. This equipment was earmarked
for the capture of the fort. Fearful about bombs, the Spaniards pressed
Williams about this item, but the prisoner insisted that he had never
seen bombs nor heard that the English were bringing them. He knew
that Moore had ordinary "grenades" or shells, but he had not seen
mortars for firing them. Williams also professed ignorance about the
training of the gunners.1

1. The Spanish word granada signifies a round, hollow projectile, filled with
gunpowder. A powder fuze, ignited by hand or by the firing of a cannon, caused
the projectile to explode at a predetermined time. These explosive missiles were
effective against both personnel and structures. Small ones made of glass or iron
about three inches in diameter were used as hand grenades. Iron granadas, or
"shells," from about five and a half to eight inches in diameter were fired from
guns, howitzers, and small mortars. "Shell" is a relatively modern term; in 1700
the word "bomb" was commonly used in English to differentiate between the hand
grenade and the cannon projectile. However, in Spanish, bomba meant the granada
real, a ten-to-thirteen-inch projectile to be fired from powerful mortars that could
deliver a vicious, plunging fire at mile range or more. Small, medium, or large,



In answer to the next question Williams responded that the Carolina
men had plenty of provisions to maintain a siege for three months. They
had much meat, bread, and flour and it was Williams' opinion that
supplies could easily be replenished from Carolina. Carr and Martin
wanted to know who was really responsible for planning the attack. The
Carolina soldier said that Moore was the sole planner and organizer;
the English king had nothing to do with the attack, and it took Moore
three months to set up the expedition. Moore had confiscated all the
ships which entered Charleston; and most of his men were unpaid, but
were promised the spoils of victory.
After this the interrogators, at Governor Zuiiiiga's request, asked Wil-
liams several thoughtful questions. Why did the English want to destroy
their friendship with the Spaniards "when the people of Carolina had
received so many benefits from the presidio?" Had not the Florida au-
thorities rescued, helped, and conveyed the English castaways personally
to Carolina? Not only had they received aid but these people had been
saved from the hands of the savage Indians by the arrival of Spanish
forces. Zfifiiga reminded Williams that just after his inauguration he
had sent to Charl n te conngtiimentnan her cont-n sliTi -I es
woli~d"f aTrtii ashore just north of St. Augustine. As andthieitoken of
friendhipthie indignant governor cited a recdit castr payment, given
to a representative from Carolina as compensation for runaway Negro
sles. (John Archdale in 1707 confirmed that Ziiiga had truly helped
tie English shipwreck victims and wrote of the "kindness" and "wonder-
ful manner" of Governor Zifiiga [3, p. 301].) Shoemaker Williams,
utterly confused, responded meekly that he knew all this, but the honor-
able governor and his interpreters must remember that he was only a
simple soldier who had nothing to do with policy matters. After all, he
said, the "responsibility of making war on Florida rested with the gov-
ernor and parliament of [Carolina]." Asked if he knew anything else,
the Carolinian said that they might as well kill him because he knew
absolutely nothing else. This was accepted as sincere and Zufiiga ordered
the man well treated; if he had told the truth he had no reason for fear.
Shoemaker Williams was then returned to the fort prison (60).
After this William Nobel testified, giving similar answers with minor

exploding projectiles lobbed into the mass of humanity crowded into the fort would
wreak fearful destruction. Hence the Spanish concern as to the nature of the
enemy artillery materiel.



screpanci nd often adding ew ils. He identified himself as
rty-six years old, a businessman born in "Fanton" [Faystown?], New
England, married, and a citizen of Charleston. His son, John Nobel,
owned the sloop "Lizebela" on which they had come to Florida as part
of the Moore expedition. He and his son had come recently from Ja-
maica. When they had entered Charleston, their sloop was confiscated
and they were forced to join Moore's army. Three months ago they had
left Charleston with nine men aboard but outside Port Royal lost their
anchor. He too said that Moore had about a thousand men, which in-
cluded "370 Indians, Yamasees, Chiluques, Apalachicolas and other
nations, plus some Christian [natives] from these [Spanish] provinces."
He said that they had plenty of muskets made in England. The Indians
carried guns manufactured in Holland which were of inferior quality;
they had a narrower barrel which became hot after eight shots. Accord-
ing to Nobel, a certain Captain James Risbee, who had been in St. Au-
gustine, was the most vociferous proponent in the Assembly of the St.
Augustine attack. Risbee had said it would be extremely easy to con-
quer the presidio and fort, and he had talked Moore into proposing
the venture to the legislature.
Nobel claimed that Moore had confiscated forty ships, but used only
fourteen plus forty canoes. On the ships he had five hundred men, in-
cluding some eighty experienced sailors. With him were two excellent
commanders Abw -were corsairsC tainaniel, a veteran il
ofVera Cruz,' and CaaiaAn J wkIa . The attacking army had six
heavy iron cannon of different calibers, the largest a twelve-pounder.
They had no bombs, because these large explosive shells were not avail-
able in Carolina. Nobel was not sure whether they brought mortars for
smaller shells. He had seen the English trying to make mortars out of
lead, but after three smeltings they were not successful. Even if they
tried again after he left, he was doubtful that their gunners had enough
experience to fire mortar projectiles.2 According to Nobel Moore had
provisions, especially barrels of salted meat, hardtack, and flour, for a
three-month siege, and in all other matters his answers agreed with
those of Williams.
2. A properly equipped siege train needed at least two types of cannon: the
heavy, low-trajectory guns that fired solid shot to dismount the fort cannon and
breach the walls; and the high-trajectory mortars which threw projectiles over and
behind the walls to explode among the defenders. As the record shows, the English
had only light, low-trajectory pieces. Their heaviest gun fired a twelve-pound shot
which had little effect on the thick walls of the fort.



Realizing that Nobel was better educated than his companion and
was up to date on current events, the Spaniards decided to ask him
about San Jorge (Charleston). Nobel readily supplied the desired in-
formation, showing none of Williams' reticence. He said Charleston did
not have a fort. The only defense work was "one bastion titiiasiiteen
guns o e1.i.rent caliber.afro S1fma.. a no ga T soldierss. only mi!ityia- _ .i^
- r0nf firing his testimon'iyTIoBeF stated that the colony had few
whites but plenty of slaves. However, two places had many whites. One "
was identified as Yslandra and had up to twenty houses. The
other was in the "neighborhood of sienmillas in the inland plantation
region and had up to two thousand men." The bar at Charleston harbor
had fourteen feet of water at high tide; yet not long ago, Nobel re-
vealed, a forty-gun ship was lost crossing the bar. The talkative busi-
nessman stated that Moore "was married and had many children, and
sheep and goat and cattle ranches, and plantations, and he has plenty
of slaves on his plantation located two days from Carolina [Charles-
ton?], of which he is a veteran settler." Nobel professed to know
nothing about Port Royal because he had never been there. Thus ter-
minated the questioning of this prisoner who was then returned to the
prison at the fort (62).
The Indian was the last to testify. He was not asked to take an oath
in the name of God Almighty but he promised to tell the truth to Lorenzo
Horruytiner and Juan Bernardo. He said that he was Manuel Agram6n;
"he was from one of the places of the Chiluques to whose nation he
belongs." He had no job and had no idea how old he was, but his
interrogators estimated him to be about twenty years old. Agram6n
stated that he did not know why Williams and Nobel wanted him to go
ashore with them at the mouth of the Salamototo. He had come with
the English army because he was an experienced sailor, and his masters
paid him "ten pesos every month." The Chiluque professed ignorance
about the army except to say that they came with iron balls "to kill the
Spaniards." He did say that all the other Indians were coming by land
and that he knew nothing about them, except that each had a flintlock
musket (escopeta), a pistol, and a short curved broadsword, called
alfanje. To all other questions he answered negatively, saying that he
did not speak English and therefore was not aware of the doings of the
Carolinians. The onl important piece of news the Spaniards were able
to get from Agram6n was a statement that another contingent had left
or was to leave from South Carolina to make war on Apalachee (61).



While the four men of the intelligence team interrogated the three
prisoners, the staff meeting called by the governor for seven o'clock
in the morning started punctually, although the various captains were
excused because of more urgent work. Treasurer Luis de Florencia
and accountant Juan de Pueyo, with the governor presiding, discussed
the relif m' Havana It was agreed that a man of common sense,
initiative, and diplomatic tact should go. All three thought that no
officer could be spared in these grave hours since Captain Romo de
Urisa with twenty men was already absent in Apalachee. The three
men named Sebastian Groso, senior sacristan of the parochial church,
for this task. Zuifiiga said that Groso had an excellent record, rising
from common soldier to adjutant of the reserve and then to sexton,
and had shown "enthusiasm on all occasions in which he had served
His Majesty." Permission for a leave of absence was at once requested
S from Ignacio de Leturiondo, vicar and ecclesiastic judge of Florida;
Sit was readily given. Groso was informed of hi orders and at ten
o'clock embarked in "La Gloria," captained by Luis Ae
satledtoiiin ItheMtrffis River to bypas'�the blockading boats and
sL- OutL--ou the Matanzas Inlet, under the protect n i the watch
station six leagues south of the castle. Would the frigate reach Havana
and would Groso and Alonso receive aid? If so, would it arrive on
time? With "La Gloria" went the hopes of the hard-pressed presidio
of St. Augustine (58).
As Groso started down-river, three messengers were sent ahead in
a fast canoe to Matanzas with the news of "La Gloria's" exit maneuver.
The Matanzas garrison was ordered to determine whether there was
a reasonably safe passage over the bar, and if English ships were
blocking it. The guards were to sto eth Spanish frigate to keep her
from beinjtericepted by the eneiy -ThH e'sctape plain f -te aidhi
waisTsed on the caTciuifafiii that theEnglish vessels could not come
close to 7rthe - rbh~&aisof shallow water, wh iithEi SpaihisE frigate
was lighTa~rtdt6uld easily cross it and sail close-inshore. By-fottw-
ing-thts proeed!re;'n Also"'ainad roso did manage to evade the enemy
blockade. The same messengers were also to collect all small craft
on the river and anchor them under the fort, but they located only
one raft. It was across from the Matanzas tower on the west shore of
the river, loaded with stone. Since it was too heavy to sail to St.
Augustine they sank her (64).
Soon after the departure of Groso, two Apalachee Indians arrived



at the fort and said that they had seen and contacted the enemy. They
were immediately taken to the governor. The Apalachees failed to
identify the exact location of the English army-but-hey said i -tie
enemy was about six or seven leagues from St. Augustine and had
"many people" who were rapidly advancing toward St. Augustine by
land. Zfiiiiga estimated that the English land forces might reach the
presidio the next day, November 10,. At once thirty infantrymen on
fast horses left the fort to find the enemy and keep at least one mail
route open (65).
Zfiiiiga and his sergeant major, the old EnrJqu.Erimd'e i&River,.
went into conference to debate whether to give battle outside of town
or to retreat inside the fort. There was pressure on Zfinfiga from some
of his captains, and especially from the town's population, to march
his men into battlefield and prevent the English occupation of St.
Augustine (66). Primo de Rivera promised to present to the governor
within an hour a complete list of everyone o ae'garrison payroll.
An-'s-o he did. His list indicated "three paid companies which
amounted to 174 men including the reserve officersnoTc'soTi
T litia had 44 able men plus some old men and boys of twelve
years and more who had neyer fought. There wer. 123.Indianas fiom
Apalachee, Timucua, and Guale who were experienced with firearms,
although their own weapons were useless. There were 57 colored men.
(free Negroes, mulattoes, and slaves), of which about 20 could'handle
arms. The four bastions of the fort had 14 artillerymen. The men out-
side the fort, made up of infantrymen, Indians, Negroes, and mulat-
toes, "were of little use and service." Primo de Rivera wrote that he
could muster altogether 12 mn but of these only 18 infantry sol-
diers and 18 militiamen were experienced and able to fight an open
battle. The best soldiers were in Apa`acihee," tiffoters were too old'
or too young, and the Indians and Negroes could not be trusted (63).
Studying the sergeant major's memorandum, Governor Zfiiiga came
to the conclusion that the maximum number of men fit for battle that
he could employ in open combat was about seventy. He was sure this
was an open invitation to defeat, and would drain his best men away
from a successful defense of the castle, which must be kept in Spanish
hands at any cost. Ther cd that and
habitants must withdr d sustain a siege (66).
Reviewing the situation the executive became aware that not F TThe
people had followed his previous order to go to the castle. He again



called on everyone to obey his instructions forthwith, to pick up their
belongings and "carry them in carts, horses, canoes, and on their
shoulders" to the fort. By proclamation he informed the people that
when they heard three shots and the sound of the main bell of the
fort, everyone outside the fort must rush in, because the gates would
close soon afterward. No one must fall into the hands of the English,
and people were clearly made responsible for avoiding capture
(65, 66).
ders were sent to the mounted patrol officers of the various sen-
tinel posts, _located "outside.the fort on the roast d an ave o
* . . the enemy will advance." They were to stay at their posts arid
informthe for the movements of thenemy. Thegovernor reminded
the officers of their tremendoand that failure to do
their utmost duty would seriously handicap the defense. The men
were promised that once their reports were no longer needed they
would be brought inside the fort (66).
All during theafternoon of November 9 the people of St.
and refugees from the country si ured into the fort It was a color-
u stream rio os, Spaniards, Negroes, mu attoes, and Indians,
carrying their meager belongings, some driving their animals into the
rapidly decreasing space of the castle. Most spectacular was the sudden
arrival of some refugees from San Juan del Puerto "who had left in
a violent rush because the enemy had burst in with blood and fire,
completely leveling the village." By nightfall the number of refugees
had risen so high that Zifiniga called an urgent meeting of his royal
officials and the employees of the royal treasury to discuss the prob-
lem of the non-garrison element which had gathered within the fort.
At eight o'clock sharp the men met in the governor's quarters. Zfifiiga
said that it was his duty and moral obligation to protect all people
of all races who lived under the Spanish flag. It was decided that
must be fed, free of charge without any discrimination of
rank, age, or race. The supply officer (escribano de raciones y munr-
czones) was made responsible for the welfare of the civilians (59).



At dawn on November 10 several Spanish patrols on fast horses
left the fort to check on the enemy's advance. They quickly re-
turned as the enemy's land Jorces,. led by Colonel Daniel, over-
estimated by jZiiga at one thousand men, soon entered,.St Augustine
and occupied it without any opposition. They had gone uL the St.
Johns River in canoes to a point due west of'St.A;f ugustine and then
marched overland, The heavy gates of the fort closed wVith 1,500
people inside. Six hundred were fairly able men, although many were
unfit for strenuous work. The Englis commander decided to make
his headquarters in the town's largest building, the Franciscan monas-
Tery. In a swift move the English infantry advanced along the royal
highway toward the mission and village of Nombre de Dios, which
had a stone church "a cannon shot" from the castle. At the same time
the English navy maneuvered to land men and materiel. Governor
Ziifiiga said that he counted fourteen English ships, of which seven
or eight were sloops, three brigantines, and one frigate, the others not
being identified. Little else is told about the actual occupation. The
Spaniards, according to Zifiiga's plan, had practically handed over the
town, and the Carolinian army simply walked in without opposition
(68, 71, 72, 73, 9).
As soon as the gates of the fort closed, Zifiiga released an order
freeing all the prisoners witt the exception of the three men captured
from the Moore army. Most of the freed men were Spaniards and
criollos condemned to hard labor in the presidio, Negroes, mulattoes,
and some Indians who were part of the labor gangs for various crimes
committed. The governor did not give the number of prisoners but
he made it clear that his action must be approved by the home office,
since he had requested complete freedom, full pardon, and restora-
tion of their rights. The Florida executive said that his action was a
calculated risk. It would be difficult to watch these men during the
siege while 1,500 persons plus animalswere__crowded into the castle.
Prisoners could easily escape and desert to the English, providing them
with vital information such as the exact strength of the St. Augustine
and Apalachee garrison. Zfiga was fearful that theenermnwould
larn of Groso's successful evasion of the blockade and dispatclhajfast.



ship "to Cayo Hueso [Key West] which they called Cuchiaga . . .
twenty-five leagues from Havana" to intercept the frigate or disrupt the
aid fleet from Cuba. So he gave instructions to watch the prisoners as
much as possible. Included in the pardon was the English prisoner An-
.' drew Ransom, who had been captured in 1686 and condemned to death
as a pirate but who was granted sanctuary by the Franciscans when the
gallows rope broke during the hanging. Sixteen years of legal argu-
ments over Ransom had passed, during which he enjoyed religious
asylum; and in the meanwhile he had become an excellent cabinet-
maker respected by most St. Augustinians (68).
Several more times the fort gates opened that day. Just as the
English troops landed, a fast-riding Spanish patrol stampeded 163
head of cattle through the English lines and in a spectacular show
drove the animals into the fort moat, accompanied by the cheers of
the Spaniards. The governor was delighted by this feat and instructed
the reserve adjutant, Joseph Rodriguez Melendez, to take charge
of the cattle. He was instructed that no owner of the animals should
suffer any loss and that Rodriguez Melendez must carefully record the
fate of each animal and transcribe the brand mark. This information
must then be given to the royal officials, who would reimburse the
owners. The arrival of the cattle made the endurance of the siege a
better prospect (71).
Soon after the cattle arrived, two mail messengers left the besieged
fort with letters to Lieutenant Governor Solana of Apalachee, and
Lieutenant Governor Diego de Jaen -of Timucua, who resided in
Santa Fe. Jaen was ordered to take his few soldiers and move to San
Luis in Apalachee, because it was expected that the English would
likwisie attack "the vast province of Apalachee which is eighty leagues
from this fort." An Indian uprising in Apalachee was not considered
out of the question. Jaen was also told that help for Apalachee from
St. Augustine at this time was impossible. A copy of a letter to Solana
in San Luis was included in Jaen's letter, while another messenger
carried the original to Apalachee. To Solana, Ziiiiiga outlined the
events of the past days. He wrote that he could withstand.a- long
siege, and Solana was ordered to see to it that the Franciscan friars
were recalled inside the stockade of San Luis and therefore avoid the
spreading of false rumors. After this the captain should call a meeting
of the Indian chiefs without interference from the friars, and assure
the natives that the Spanish would smash the English attack. He was



(From Volume III of A. M. Mallet's Le Travaux de Mars, ou l',4rt de la Guerre
published at Amsterdam in 1696, pp. 33, 47, 159, 243.)


(33) The matchlock musket pictured here was .70 caliber and had a 45-inch
barrel. Its range was about 250 yards. Along with the lighter arquebus and the
dependable old pike (note the pikeman at left), it was a standard infantry
weapon in 1702. The flintlock musket was not yet in general use.




reminded to keep in contact by duplicate mail with Pensacola and
Mobile, and he must encourage the French commander's intention to
march on Charleston. Solana was informed that Groso had success-
fully departed for Havana and carried with him "powers and letters
for the French fleet which is over there." It is assumed from this state-
ment that the French fleet was in Havana and that the Carolinian fear
of an aIfi&eaftaick was well founded (72, 73).
The lieutenant governor at Apalachee was asked also to maintain
communications with the fort and to send continuous mail, and Gover-
nor Zfifiiga promised to do the same. He was sure that the messengers
with their expert knowledge of the country could easily make it through
the English lines. The most pertinent news should be handled vocally
and not by letters or memorandums. Each mail carrier should carry
two letters, a short one summarizing the pertinent information in such
a fashion that if the enemy got hold of it he could not understand it,
and the second one, more detailed, should be a false one which if it
fell into the enemy's hands must "inspire terror and discourage him,
thereby causing him to lift the siege." A copy of the vocal information
must be filed with the royal scrivener so that a thorough record could
be kept. It is not recorded if this system was successful or was fol-
lowed, but communication withthewest.was maintained, and the Eng-
lish were unable to stop the passage of messengers who diligently
crossed swamps and palmetto thickets to reach the fort (72).
By midday on November 10 the English were continuing their land-
ings. The Spaniards soon began to open fire whenever the English
came within range of their guns, but without any hits. The artillerymen
were out of practice; this was their first active battle duty for a long

(47) Here is the musketeer in action: A-with match burning, ready for a
command; B-at ease; C-waiting for the order to fire; D-aiming; and E-aiming
from the kneeling position. Musketeers probably comprised 25 per cent of the
Spanish infantry at St. Augustine. The other foot soldiers were arquebusiers
(about 37 per cent) and pikemen.
(159) This picture of mortars lobbing "bombs" explains the Spanish relief at
learning that their attackers had no such weapons. Mortars ranged about a mile,
and walls were no protection against their plunging fire. Note that the center
soldier is using a gunner's quadrant to set elevation. At left the intrepid mortar-
man has just ignited the bomb fuze by means of the matchcord in his right hand;
he will next fire the mortar with the matchcord in his left hand.
(243) Siege trenches, called "saps," enabled attackers to approach a fort in com-
parative safety. Notice the gabions (bottomless baskets) under construction in the
foreground. Set along a shallow trench and filled with earth, they made a musket-
proof wall. Gabions and trenches had a prominent part in the siege at St. Augustine.



time. The western bastions of the fort concentrated fire on the Caro-
linians "who were passing along the playazco [large beach] close to
the shores of the [San Sebastian] river two musket shots away from the
fort." The fire was continuous and the men enthusiastic; then suddenly
the sixteen-pounder iron gun in San Pablo bastion exploded with a
terrific roar, instantly killing Juan de Galdona, the gunner in charge
of the bastion. Another artilleryman and a militiaman were-s6 sseerely
hurt that they died within a few minutes. Five other men were carried
away seriously injured by the splinters, but these men recovered.
Zufiiga, who had rushed to the scene of the accident, ordered everyone
away from the bastion and asked the other gunners to cease firing. He
ordered the artillery officers to meet with him immediately.
It was determined on the spot that the old gun had been overloaded
with round shot, bar shot, and grapeshot, besides being slightly
cracked. The governor blamed the artillerymen for thi disaster since
they had failed to check the gun and had not detected the crack. Zufiiga
did not absolve the crown, which was indirectly to blame because it
had failed to send new guns which had been asked for continuously.
The ones on hand were light iron and so old that they could no longer
be used for their prescribed caliber. Ziufiiga told Sergeant Major Primo
de Rivera to check all the iron and bronze guns and determine the
amount of powder that could be used safely for "the first, second, and
third [proof] charges." The commander was advised to get the expert
help of Juan Martin, master gunner of the sunken frigate, and Alonso
Garcia, master gunner of the fort. When these two men finished, the
governor personally inspected the guns and had each one fired in his
own presence (70). After this, Zufiniga decided that the army com-
mander Primo de Rivera, who suffered from old age, should be partly
relieved, and he named Adjutant Bernardo Nieto de Carvajal as
commander of orders and chief aide-de-camp. Primo de Rivera would
keep the no e title and would be respectfully consulted (74).
On the morning of November 11 Governor Zuifiiga gave his officers
a quick review of the military situation in accordance with the reports
of the patrols. The English land force had taken all of the town and
established its headquarters in the friary of St. Francis "one cannon
shot from this royal fr orrt^" -enTiiglish ships~Tii aTrossed the bar and
were still landing their men, but apparently had not yet crossed the
bay and joined up with the land forces. Till they did so was only a
question of time because the guns of the fort could not stop them. The



greatest obstacles for effective bombardment of the English forces
were the many houses standing near the fort. Furthermore, the English
could occupy these houses, emplace their guns, and do serious damage
to the fort. So out of the war council came orders to organize "a sally
of brave men escorted by two lines of musketeers in order to put to the
torch all the large and small houses." This tactic would~ mak sure
that the English forces could not "set their batteries against this royal
fort at their pleasure." Bernardo Nieto de Carvajal was to contact all
owners of the condemned houses and give them permission to leave
the fort at their own risk and rescue any possession. Ziiiiga wanted the
fire patrol to burn the houses early the next morning. (But probably
this order was not carried out until November 14 [74].)
The next two days are not well accounted for in the documentary
annals of history. Apparently the military situation was calm. The
Spaniards remained inside the castle knowing that they could not stop
the besieging maneuvers. The .Englisho~began to establish positions,
aware that only a long siege could lead to victory. In the interior the
situation was confusing. Guale was lost and the Spanish troops were
captured or were astray in the swamps. On November 13 the lieutenant
governor of Timucua, Diego de Jaen, had led his soldiers from Santa
Fe to San Francisco when he received Zfiiiga's order to move to San
Luis in Apalachee. Jaen called the Indian chiefs into council and then
left for Apalachee. He sent word that the natives were calm and appar-
ently no incident occurred in Timucua during the Moore siege (77).
News from Apalachee was more obscure. Lieutenant Governor Solana
stated on November 13 that he had already received three letters from
Zufiiiga and had obeyed the various orders the best he could. Solana
called in the Indian chiefs and discussed the local and international
situation with them. He was satisfied as to their apparent loyalty.
Solana had some minor problems, however, about sending messengers
to Pensacola and Mobile. Captain Roque was very anxious to go and
the captain and crew of the Havana ship did not object to the gover-
nor's orders, although they did ask to be furnished provisions for such
a journey. It was learned later that the ship leaked badly and had to be
put in drydock, which prevented an immediate departure. Part of the
Apalachee garrison at San Luis was ordered to St. Marks to speed up
the repair. While the work progressed the latest order from Zifiiga
arrived, to dispatch Roque to Havana via Pensacola. Ensign Florencia
was to go with him to Pensacola, in order to get in contact with Mobile.



When Zfiiiga's order arrived, Solana ordered a staff meeting at St.
Marks at midnight, November 11. The ship's captain was in Ayubale,
apparently in search for repair material, and Florencia was also out
of town. But both came by fast horses through the dark night to St.
Marks, as did Roque and Solana. When they inspected the ship they
decided she was not yet ready to go; but as if Heaven intervened, a
ship from St. Joseph's Bay arrived the same night. Next morning, No-
vember 12, Ensign Florencia departed on the St. Joseph's ship to Pen-
sacola, carrying the letters for this Spanish outpost and for the French
in neighboring Mobile. Roque remained in St. Marks until the Havana
ship was repaired, and sailed on her to Cuba on an undetermined date
the same month (76, 90, 96).
Back in St. Augustine, the English occupied the village of Nombre
de Dios, a half mile north of the fort, early on November 14. The guards
from the fort bastions saw the English banner flying "from the stone
church" at Nombre de Dios. Zuifiiga was not pleased with this develop-
ment because, as he said, the Carolinians could now "cover the paths
and roads which our people must take in order to get to it [Nombre
de Dios?], and those who come from Timucua and Apalachee as well
as those who come from other places and ranches in the northern area."
It meant, according to the governor, that the English could use the
thickets along thie road to ambush the men who left the walls to cut
forage for the cat"tlein the moat.
On the same _day i was-- ca~ ietbhat the English had occupied the
house of Adjutant Joseph Rodriguez Melendez, which was located
exactly southwest of the main gate of the fort. The Rodriguez house was
identified as being "the strongest, newest, and highest which had re-
mained standing [and] . .. from its balconies can be seen those who
enter and leave this fort." Therefore whoever occupied this house
could command the ravelin which protected the fort gate. The English
had moved some of their light guns to this house. In view of this situa-
tion, Ziifiiga ordered the chief aide-de-camp, Nieto de Carvajal, to con-
sult with the sergeant major in organizing another sally to destroy the
thickets along the Nombre de Dios road and burn the adjutant's house
and others nearby. The Spanish sallies destroyed a great part of St.
Augustine located in the neighborhood of the fort (78). But even
though the houses were destroyed Zfiiniga still worried about his weak
ravelin, because the Moore forces could build a high earthwork from
which to shoot into the gate. An order wasgiven to Adjutant Fabiain de



Shown on this map of modem St. Augustine is the defense zone the Spanish
cleared by destroying their houses within "a musket shot" of the fort (74).

Angulo, who was the foreman of the royal shops, to build a high and
strong palisade to protect the gate (79).
The wheels of Spanish bureaucracy turned slowly. The governmental
appraisal of the burned houses was not made until August, 1709, under
the governorship of Francisco de C6rcoles y Martinez, although a royal
c'dula of July 22, 1703, had requested it. On January 9, 1708, C6rcoles
appointed Captain Francisco Romo de Uriza, commander of the in-
fantry, and Adjutant Rodriguez Melendez as representatives of the
crown, and Captain Joachim de Florencia and Manuel Gonzales Ven-
tura as representatives of the owners, to appraise the value of the burned
property. The final report showed that the Spanish sallies had destroyed
the property of thirty-one people, valued at 15,430 pesos. The house



of Captain Joseph de Le6n had the highest value, appraised at 6,000
pesos. Three houses were valued at only 50 pesos each because they
were made of "straw and boards." Two other houses were listed at 60
and 70 pesos each. The average house was valued from 200 to 500
pesos. The house of the colorful English citizen, Guillermo Carr, was
burned by the Spanish sally and was valued at 500 pesos because it
was "all of wood." The residence of Joseph Rodriguez Melendez, which
the English had used to fire on the gate and the ravelin, was appraised
at 1,200 pesos. Therefore the burning of St. Augustine of 1702 was not
exclusively an English task, for the responsibility lay also with the
Spaniards (142).
By November 1jt he English were stilL trying to consolidate their
positions, forming a narrower circle around the fort. Spanish artillery
was active and kept the Moore troops away from the immediate
neighborhood of the moat. In some undetermined way a path was kept
open to the west, because on the morning of November 16 Captain
Francisco Romo de Uriza of the infantry arrived at the fort from
Apalachee with two soldiers and a militiaman. With them they brought
in shackles an Indian called Jalaph Baltasar from San Martin de
Thomale in Apalachee. He was captured on November 15 on the king's
road, travelling in disguise to the fort, and paid by the English to
gather intelligence. He was thrown into the fort's prison. When the
contingent had reached the environs of St Augustine Romo de Uriza,
known for his valor and daring, had ventured into the downtown area
and found it lifeless and the English army quiet.
The next week of the siege was evidently uneventful; the records
give little or no detail. On November 22 Ziifiiga reported that the
enemy had "taken possession of this town and its neighborhoods"
but had done nothing to storm the fort, nor was he building trenches
and approachworks; neither was it apparent that he was going to
do so. The Moore army was intermittently shooting at the castle with
nine- to twelve-pounder guns that were completely ineffective against
the thick walls. By now Zfiiiiga knew that Governor Moore had dis-
patched Colonel Daniel to Jamaica for "men, bombs, and bigger guns."
The Spanish governor lacked detailed information, however, so he
gave a secret order for a Spanish patrol of fifteen or sixteen infantry-
men on fast horses to leave the fort during the night and try to capture
enemy soldiers who traveled the road from Nombre de Dios to the
Franciscan monastery (80).



During the night of November 22 the patrol ambushed fourmen
who were riding from Nombre de Dios. In the skirmish, two English-
men escaped on their horses after being slightly wounded. A Thomas
Jones surrendered immediately; John Day was captured when galloping
away, after taking blows from a Spanish lance on his face and shoulder
blade. Both men were rushed to the fort where Day received medical
attention. It turned out that one of them carried a letter from the Eng-
lish commander of Nombre de Dios, identified as John Martin, to
Governor Moore. Zufiiga ordered Ransom to translate the letter. After
this the prisoners were to be questioned by the same team which in-
terrogated the other captives (82, 84). When the letter was shown to
Ransom he said it was hard to read, and asked for the help of William
Carr and Bernard Patrick, another English ex-prisoner turned St.
Augustinian. All three failed to decipher the text, since they had for-
gotten much of English writing. Thomas Jones, the recently captured
soldier, volunteered to finish the task since he knew Spanish (85).
In the letter, Martin, the English commander, complained to Moore
that he had not received the field glass which he would need for twaor
three hours and then return. He was also short of ammunition and
his soldiers' bags were empty. He wanted shovels, iron ones if possible,
irnorder to make trenches "to keep the Spaniards from entering the
marsh in search of grass for their cattle." Mortars were also needed,
for effective bombardment "because the Spaniards are cutting much
grass and therefore must have many cattle in the moat of the fort."
Martin told Moore that the English must stop this grass-cutting; he
said "their ship ought to sail farther up, and then with her canoe pos-
sibly catch those who cut the hay." It could not be done from their
position at Nombre de Dios because the creek was "too narrow and
crooked" and the canoes were "too small and leak very badly." More-
over, wrote Martin, "the machetes which Your Honor had sent us ap-
pear to be useless and do not cut because they are dull." He wanted
the large box of tools from the flagship "Susan," which the authorities
of the ship had refused to hand over. Martin talked about the large
sailing vessel "Colami" [?] and said that Captain Risbee was still
outside the bar not yet out of sight. In conclusion, Commander Martin
wished Governor Moore a pleasant and final victory over the Spaniards
The Spanish governor was extremely pleased with the intercepted
letter. But he was confused about the "Colami" and the role of Captain



Risbee, so he ordered the two prisoners questioned about it. Jones was
the first to testify, after taking an oath "before their God and law"
witnessed by the powerful royal scribe, Juan Solana. He was thirty-six
years old, a carpenter born in Ostardan [?], England, of Catholic
faith but later converted to Protestantism. He said that Moore had one
thousand men to take St. Augustine so the French "would not settle it."
He cited the equipment of the English already known to the Spaniards
from previous declarations, and added fifteen ladders twenty-five feet
high and two or four feet wide. Most of the material was still in the
ships, but the artillery was on land. The English had one hundred men
in Nombre de Dios and had not dug trenches but had eight guard
posts one hundred feet from the church. The English had come with
thirteen ships to St. Augustine, including the one on which Moore had
traveled, which had sixteen guns. One ship was lost when entering the
bay, three had returned to Carolina, and two had sailed for Providence
in the Bahamas. Jones stated that he knew nothing of the two ships
mentioned in the letter, but was informed that a man named Llemes,
which most likely was Daniel, was sailing to Jamaica to procure bombs
John Day's declaration was much shorter, since the man was still
weak from his wounds. He was thirty-two years old, from New Eng-
land, married, and a sailor. Day said that Moore was living in the
Franciscan friary and had sent to JiamaiIca for bombs. The English
governor had told'his troops that once the bombs arrived he would con-
quer the fort. He needed bombs because "this fort was very strong." He
had promised his men that he would not "leave this city even if he
lost his head." According to this wounded soldier, the English had two
companies in Nombre de Dios; some patrols had left to capture cattle,
mail, and Indians but had returned empty-handed. He believed that
the artillery had been landed and positioned and the English were
finishing the siege trenches in St. Augustine. He also spoke of "Llemes."
It remains unknown why Risbee's name appears in the captured letter
as sailing to Jamaica, when the South Carolina history books state that
Daniel went for the bombs, as was confirmed by the two prisoners (82).
The news given by Jones and Day about the artillery in position was
confirmed on November 24 when the English stepped up the fire on
the fort. They had moved four of their heaviest guns into the back
yard of the house of Juan de Pueyo, the accountant. This house, ac-
cording to the Spaniards, was located a musket shot from the castle.



Using these guns the English opened fire with round shot and bar shot.
The Spaniards returned the fire from the San Agiistih and San Pedro
bastions with eighty shots of sixteen- and eighteen-pound cannonballs
during twenty-four hours, directing some of their shots against the..
ships in the harbor. The north bastions, called San Pablo and San
Carlos, went into moderate action, shooting at Nombre de Dios.
The English replied, but finding some of the buildings in the way,
they set the torch to them. Early on November 25 they began "setting
fire to the southern part of the town and the houses immediately next
to the Church of Our Lord, St. Francis. They also set fire to the monas-
tery, keeping intact the aforementioned Church." Apparently Governor
Moore had his headquarters and living space inside the church. The
Spaniards considered it a serious insult and violation of a gentleman's
principles (86).
After this skirmish the situation again calmed down. The English
were digging siege trenches and waiting for the bombs from Jamaica;
the Spanish inside the fort were hoping and praying that a relief force
would come from Havana or the west. Groso had made it to Havana,
and the governor of Cuba, Pedro Nicolas Benitez de Lugo, had decided
on December 2 in war council "to aid this presidio [St. Augustine]
with provisions, ammunition, and infantry of this fort" of Havana. The
Cuban executive appointed Captain L6pez de Solloso as the infantry
relief commander "because he has my full confidence, is honorable and
conscientious in his tasks." L6pez de Solloso was a veteran of European
wars, but had never been in Florida. His orders were to bring the
forces to St. Augustine by way of the St. Augustine entrance, the Ma-
tanzas Bar, or the entrecasco (a narrow but deep channel at the tip of
Vilano Beach) and if this were not possible, to sail up the St. Johns
River. In relieving the fort, utmost care must be used and no unneces-
sary risk was permissible. Once contact was established with the St.
Augustine garrison, Captain tliez de Solloso must put himself under
the command of ZThTga:'ififtir his return to this place [Havana] which
will be whenever the operations are finished and the siege has been
lifted." These last words were underlined and at the margin there was
printed in large letters the word ojo (take note!) (91).
The same day that the governor of Cuba started to relieve the be-
sieged fort, Ensign Diego de Florencia arrived in Pensacola and went
on to Mobile. His journey to Pensacola had taken ten days because
"the winds were so contrary." The acting governor at Santa Maria de


k 4. 4 . - . ANASTAI

Nov. 8-Moore's ships arrive.
Nov. 10-They anchor in the inlet.

A'lk .*******oeq
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_ _ I.4. . ^A Nov. 10-Cattle herded /
ak- At. ue J*- AL^ ^^^ ' into mosLt.
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ak k.Jak e. a J Marsh where the Spanish 0 ak -
l. A& A cut forage for stock. e * bmu - / /
A- "'-. M ' . Nov. 19-Spanish safly
4'4' ^ 4' 4 . r 0 against trench
AL a". r4 * 0
k. -. . ..... ----'-: .---I----HOUI
' C: Ac. .. / *

............. . * * 0�


A&. Sig /#

............ .. 22-Spanish anmbuh and
.... .. ....... . ure er. EC ON
Nov. 10-DanIers troops arrive.


S AL . 0 0 0 0 Nov. 10-English soldiers
750 FEET 0 o 0 - beach are fired
70FE00-v.- 0000000
rC y .. J ,, .900

reinforcements arrive
Cscolta Creek Landing.



N- S


-* .Mw- l- A .19-

This diagram was prepared by Historians Luis R. Arana and Albert Manucy of
the National Park Service staff at Castillo de San Marcos, from the Spanish
descriptions of the siege. The topography is from the Arredondo "Plan de la
Ciudad de San Agustin" of 1737 (AI 87-1-2/2).


Galve (Pensacola), Francisco Martinez, gave him only ten men, com-
manded by Ensign Francisco Montes. The French commander of Mo-
bile, Monsieur Berbila, was somewhat more generous. He could not
spare men "because he said he had very few and many ill, and he has
the work of the fort on his hands." But he gave the Spanish ensign one
hundred brand new flintlocks valued at ten pesos each, one thousand
pounds of excellent gunpowder costing five hundred pesos, one thou-
sand flints worth eight reales each, and two hundred cartridge belts
of undetermined value. Florencia got back to San Luis on December
19, and he and Solana left Apalachee for St. Augustine on December 24
with the Pensacola reinforcements. By the time they reached Santa Fe
the siege had ended and Zuifiiga ordered their return (89, 96, 130, 9).
But what had happened to Captain Jacinto Roque? Apparently he
never reached Havana. On May 24, 1703, long after the siege had ter-
minated, he returned to San Luis, saying that he had gone to Pensacola
and Mobile, where he had picked up fifty muskets and five hundred
flints at a cost of 503 pesos and six reales. He had received a promise
from M. Berbila to help in harassing the English and their Indian
allies. Furthermore he sent Znfiiga a description of Mobile. Roque had
also sent a message to New Spain from Pensacola, but nothing more
is known about his long journey (139).
In the meantime, the Spaniards inside the fort had no idea that
help was coming, and they settled into a tense routine. Although ex-
tremely crowded, the Spanish forces had good morale, while the
Carolinians were dissatisfied with Moore, who had promised them an
easy victory. On November 24 a small launch with Francisco Dominguez
and Lorenzo Ruiz broke the English blockade and sailed for Apalachee
with mail, since Zufiiga had not heard from San Luis and thought that
the king's road was in the hands of the English forces (88). The same
day news arrived from the defeated commander of Guale telling of his
rout into the swamps. Juan de Orta, the messenger, had defied the
English, nature, and Indians in carrying the letter to the fort. He fi-
nally made it after many tries, with the help of two loyal Indians.
Zuiiiiga immediately appointed Matheo Suarez, an "expert of these
places," and some Indians to carry ammunition to Captain Fuentes in
Guale, and told the captain to open guerrilla warfare and raid the
English anchorage at the entrance of the Salamototo. Fuentes was also
instructed to send the Indian scouts to Santa Fe in Timucua and San
Luis in Apalachee to ask for help (88).



As can be seen, Zuiiiiga used every imaginable chance to send mail
to the various posts asking for aid. Finally on December 2, the mail
carriers Nicolas Monz6n and Bias Cavallero arrived at the fort from
Timucua and Apalachee, bringing letters from Jaen and Solana. Zfifiiga
and his staff felt relieved, as it meant that the king's road to the west
was at least partially open (90). There were some interruptions at the
ferry west of St. Augustine. Both messengers had reported that Captain
Juan Asemsio, who was in charge of the ferry over the Salamototo, "was
forced to retreat from the upper river with the canoes and with all the
inhabitants of the village to look for safety." Officer Juan Clemente
Horruytiner and Domingo Lujan, who were "experts of this river and
its neighborhoods," were sent to the Salamototo to "look along the
shores for canoes from the little cattle ranches and haciendas that are
located on the river." They found some peons on the empty ranches
who collected five canoes that were taken to the crossing place. Here a
messenger was waiting with a letter to Zfiiiga from the Indian cacique
of Timucua, Francisco Rico, stating that Jaen had left Santa Fe for
Apalachee. The Spanish messenger Francisco de Castafieda was the
first to cross the wide river on December 6 and galloped off for San
Luis in the company of some cattle ranch peons. He carried another
letter to Solana, requesting help "in case the reinforcements from Pen-
sacola and Mobile have not arrived, of up to six hundred men including
Apalachees, Chacatos, and Timucuans plus the soldiers you can spare
from the blockhouse." Solana was to leave ten soldiers in San Luis to
protect the province with the help of the Indians (90, 92, 93).
The apparent calm at St. Augustine was interrupted on December
14 by a minor accident. At seven in the morning the Yamasee Indian
Juan Lorenzo, his wife carrying a baby, and a small girl entered
the fort and asked for asylum. Lorenzo had a rifle with ample ammuni-
tion, something rare for an Indian. He explained that the English had
given it to him, but he had escaped and was volunteering information.
He said the English had captured the messengers Francisco Dominguez
and Lorenzo Ruiz on the way from Apalachee. The captured letter
stated that help was coming from the west; therefore Moore had de-
cided to retreat "and burn the houses and the monastery of San Fran-
cisco." Ziifiiga and his staff were somewhat wary of Lorenzo but gave
him freedom. Lorenzo then quietly contacted the Yamasee; Guale, and
Apalachee Indians in the fort and proposed that they rebel and capture
the fort from the inside. Loyal Indians rushed the news to Zfifiiga, who



ordered the detention of Lorenzo and his wife. He was tortured for
information but showed great courage and remained silent. His wife
and daughter weakened and admitted they had come to blow up the
powder house. Lorenzo was identified as an Indian with white blood,
a ladino who had previously lived in St. Augustine and who had been
to jail twice and had escaped. He was then recaptured and sent to jail
in Havana from which he also had escaped and joined the English.
Ziifiiga ordered him put in "a pair of shackles" (94).
By December 19 the situation of the besieged fort had deteriorated.
The governor reported that the English had dug trenches and other
appropchworks .where they had moved their artillery. Along the
trenches they had put up gabions [supports for the earthwork]. These
ran from the south to the north-northeast. Another row of gabions ran
to the west on the land side, and a third row of sixty-three gabions
showed up on December 19, running from the northwest to the east.
To the Spaniards this last row, located only a carbine shot from the
fort, was the most dangerous since it disrupted their grass cutting for
the cattle and horses in the moat. Fray Martin de Alacano tells us that
behind the gabions the English had made "dugout caves [bombproofs]
in the earth, where they had cover and stayed in complete security"
(141, fol. 5072). At midday a Spanish sally of fifty-eight men left the
fort to smash this nearest row of gabions. The battle was indecisive.
The Spanish destroyed part of the gabions and forced the English to
retreat, capturing some shovels and bottles of liquor which helped the
English "to stand the rigor of the weather and continuous cold." The
English then reorganized for a counterattack. With help from Nombre
de Dios they routed the Spanish, who fled into the fort leaving one
dead and carrying several wounded. By the end of the day the Eng-
lish had advanced to within a pistol shot of the fort, where they began
to construct new gabions. In view of the gravity of the situation the
Spanish authorities ordered ten infantrymen led by two corporals on
fast horses to leave during the night for Apalachee to get immediate
help. Records do not say if the men were successful in reaching San
Luis (95).



During the next days the front again quieted down, each side still
waiting for reinforcements. Inside the fort, morale was beginning
to break and tenseness and irritation became noticeable. On December
24 the guard in the lookout noticed two ships on the horizon and
sounded an alarm. A tremendous feeling of suspense ran through the
fort. Was it the English reinforcements with the bombs from Jamaica
or was it help from Havana? A decision was near at hand. By noon
disappointment was on everyone's face. The ships were English. It
shook the determination of the troops and, according to the governor,
brought consternation to the women crowded in the fort. Hoping to
alleviate the suffering, the governor ordered a Christmas Eve party
organized, in which harps and vihuelas should be played "as has been
done other nights." Furthermore Zfiiiiga told the treasurer and the
accountant to distribute a Christmas bonus to the troops. When the
two men protested that the garrison could not afford it, Zufiiga told
them to charge it to next year's account. He said that the troops and
people must be cheered up to stop their "melancholic deliberations."
Governor Zfifiiga was still determined to win this battle and he never
wavered in his optimism (98).
On Christmas Day the two ships, a brigantine and a sloop, entered
the harbor. Zfiiiga reported that they brought reinforcements and am-
munition which were disembarked on Anastasia Island. Available Eng-
lish records do not mention the arrival of these ships and it is quite
certain that they did not come from Jamaica with the dreaded bombs.
But this was not known inside the fort, and through the tense populace
of the fort rumors spread that bombs had arrived. The governor was
worried that panic might break out, so he issued an order forbidding
any discussion of the military situation and proclaiming heavy penal-
ties for those who disobeyed. The military commanders were told to
continue the same tactics, to keep a twenty-four-hour vigilance on the
fort walls and bastions, and the artillery was to maintain its night fire
on the enemy's approachworks and trenches. He told the people that
up to this day the enemy had not been able to "damage the fort with
their grenades and artillery" and he expected the final victory to be-
long to the Spanish (99).



Even so, the morale of the people did not take a swing upward; the
whispers in the dark corners of the crowded fort continued. Then sud-
denly on Dcember. 26, around two or three o'clock in the afternoon,
sparks of hope illuminated the whole fort. The lookout had seen "four
sails" belonging to four powerful men-of-war that certainly resembled
the Spanish type. (English sources mention only two vessels.) Zfiiiiga
immediately addressed the people and said that this might be the help
he had asked "from here and from Apalachee to Pensacola and Mobile,
asking them to transmit it to New Spain and Havana." Or possibly
it was the direct result of the Groso mission (100, 114). Indeed, it was
the relief fleet from Havana! Seeing the four men-of-war, Zifiiga
ordered complete silence in the fort so that the guards could "see and
listen to the ship movements and signals," for he had instructed Groso
to use certain signals upon his successful return. The guards were also
instructed to keep a close watch on the enemy, especially along the
Tholomato and Punta del Quartel sectors, and report any move of
theirs in view of the new situation. From these two positions athwart
the inlet the English could do the most damage to the approaching
relief fleet (100).
December 27 and 28 were hectic days. It had been definitely estab-
lished that the ships were Spanish, and this brought a wave of opti-
mism and sheer relief to the frightened people and the tired garrison.
More exciting was the report that the eight enemy ships had begun to
turn their prows and were lining up with the apparent purpose of
leaving the inlet to avoid a trap. Zifiiga hastily summoned a meeting
of his naval experts, who came to the conclusion that the English
blockade force, because of the dark night and favorable wind, could
succeed in its maneuver unless the relief fleet took an aggressive at-
titude, ready to fight a full-fledged naval battle at the bar. Such a
clash was improbable. The Spanish fleet had shown no signs of doing
anything, not disembarking the infantry or even getting in touch with
the governor, who was incensed by this inaction. He criticized the
relief fleet for its lethargy and what he classified as discourtesies. Ac-
cording to the governor, the least its commander could have done was
to send a launch through the entrecasco, a small channel at the north
end of the bar, "rounding the point of present Vilano Beach," then
called San Matheo (15, p. 32), and anchor off the demilune to estab-
lish contact between the fort and the fleet. Zufiiiga chose Adjutant
Sebastian L6pez de Toledo to slip through the entrecasco immediately



and reach the Spanish fleet commander. Toledo took with him a re-
quest to land five hundred men and block the exit of the English ships,
thereby converting the English blockade into a great Spanish victory
/ December 28 and 29 brought the climax of the long siege. Adjutant
L6pez de Toledo, leaving the fort at three o'clock in the morning of
December 28, passed expertly through the entrecasco and at nine
o'clock reached the commandship, the "Black Eagle," anchored three
leagues south of the bar and commanded by General Estevan de Berroa.
The general assumed a haughty attitude from the very beginning. He
had just given orders to swing around and return to Havana because he
had failed to receive news from the fort and had assumed that it had
fallen into English hands. The governor of Havana later said that
General Berroa had signaled four times but failed to get a response
from the fort, a statement which Zfiniiga contradicted. Captain Joseph
Primo de Rivera of the relief infantry admitted that Berroa, under
pressure from his sailors, refused to give battle to the cornered English
ships, and sailed south to a safe position (102, 112, 113,114,137, fols.
In view of the adjutant's arrival, General Berroa decided to remain.
By the afternoon of December 29, 212 infantrymen under Captain
L6pez de Solloso, which included seventy young Galician recruits des-
tined for the garrison, disembarked on Anastasia Island at a place
identified by Diego Caro as "playa de Mattanzas [Matanzas beach]
at the exact spot called Mosquitos," and said by Francisco Basurtto to
be three or four leagues from the bar. They reached the Escolta Creek
landing (about three miles southeast of St. Augustine) at sunset, in-
tending to cross the Matanzas River to the mainland the next day.
Adjutant L6pez de Toledo thought that the initial delay of over a day
in debarking the troops and the stop at the Escolta landing facilitated
Moore's retreat and lost them a chance to destroy the English. He said
flatly that the relief troops refused to go into battle. Later Governor Zui-
fliga, incensed with Berroa's attitude, classified the 212 men as "most use-
less." The seventy Galacian recruits he described as "extremely young,
some sick and all of them without experience and the military train-
ing necessary to handle weapons" (102, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 9).
On the night of January 29 and early during the next morning the
English began their retreat. They hoped to leave by sea and embarked
most of their men and equipment in their eight ships, but in the mean-



Ebtr d MR at a Ne
Es d A /I Bonre d*Aakemea
SCArpuws pr oa ks* AnlSb J o mJ

r A.Ita dr 4S B��isua mA..ls
6 XMjtfyr dr aI. G . Bmr): "Jjds |

HAhuill d, 2er d tes es p as
L.* K mu. de A�A-,Uj

Anchorages and troop movements in the St. Augustine campaign are shown on this contemporary French map. The siege trenches
around the fort are minute, but clearly present. This is a Library of Congress facsimile (WL 255) of the original map (138-4-2)
in the Department de la Marine, Paris.

A-Town, castle, and church. F-Anchorage of the English vessels.
B-Island of the quarry; approach of reinforcements. G-Anchorage of two Spanish vessels.
C-Entrance to the port and the bar. H-Anchorage of two Spanish frigates.
D-Entrance to Matanzas Bar. I-Anchorage for debarkation of the Spaniards.
E-Trail by which the English [Moore] left. I--Retreat of the English [Daniel].




JrCmsuj de G"IMM
3'<-~IY � ~n~w


while Berroa's fleet had sailed back north, blocking the exit. Moore,
therefore, gave up the idea of a sea escape. Hurriedly he landed his
own men at Vilano Beach, setting two brigantines and two sloops afire
about eight o'clock that night, and abandoning in despair three sloops
and one brigantine. Moore's forces with about 500 men marched north
along the beach until they reached the mouth of the Salamototo. The
rest of the troops also got ready to retreat quickly by the overland
route to the Salamototo, where they intended to join the larger con-
tingent that had marched along the beach. As they left the town, they
set the torch to every remaining house, illuminating the darkness of
the night. Ziifiiga immediately ordered all the fort guns fired, thinking
that the concussions might stop the spread of the flames. Although the
attempt was not fully successful, Zifiiga insisted that "with the dis-
charge of the artillery the fire diminished and some [houses] escaped
[destruction]." By noon of December 30 no Englishman was visible and
the flames had been checked. For the first time in months the gates of
the fort opened wide. The siege was over. The fort was still Spanish,
but St. Augustine was in ashes (102, 103, 114, 137, fols. 10434-
10432, 9).
The governor now ordered patrols organized to survey the town
damage, dismantle the English siege works that surrounded the fort,
and collect all war materiel left by the enemy. The demolition was
undertaken by the seventy Galician recruits, in order to rest the veterans
of the siege (102). The men found that the English had practically
destroyed the town. Adjutant Joseph Rodriguez related that the fire
had burned all the houses, including the main church, the Franciscan
friary and its chapel, the governor's palace, the houses of the account-
ant and the treasurer, plus the chapel of Nuestra Sefiora de la Leche
at Nombre de Dios. According to the adjutant, only the chapel of
Nuestra Sefiora de la Soledad remained standing (29, fol. 12452; 30,
fols. 2847, 3568).
Father Martin de Alacano, in charge of the Indian mission of
Nombre de Dios, said that the English destroyed everything "with the
exception of the hospital and twenty houses." He later said that
the English used "furor and rancor" when setting the fire. They were
especially ferocious "when burning the parochial church of St. Augus-
tine, the church and convent of San Francisco, the doctrine [mission]
of Nombre de Dios, and six other doctrinas." The Father said that "the
fire was so voracious that nothing, not even a vestige, was left of these



churches, the convent, and the doctrinas because the construction, in-
cluding the roofs and fences, was of wood." Six other witnesses sup-
ported the statement of Father de Alacano. Captain Manuel Ramirez
declared that the chapel of the hospital, Nuestra Sefiora de la Soledad,
was not burned to the ground but was badly damaged. According to
him the English had left intact only "about twenty houses of no value."
Juan de Urrutia reported that the Soledad chapel was only slightly dam-
aged; Ensign Juan Machado stated that the chapel was severely burned,

10 Miles DANIEL (Dec. 30)
San Dieto Ranch
MOORE (Dec. 30) To Charleston
Matanzas .. .
eMatanz ^ r (Spanish fleet blockades port
. Spanish reinforcements landed Dec. 29


but the English had left standing "twenty or thirty houses," and the
ashes of the friary smoldered for many days. Antonio Sinches de
Andrade Vaamonde wrote that "approximately twenty or twenty-five
houses were left" (141, fols. 5090-5072). The Council of War in 1703
said that all St. Augustine had been burned to the ground and "only
the hospital and some twenty damaged houses remained. All the
others were burned, especially the parochial church, the monastery of
St. Francis, the mission of Nombre de Dios and six other missions,
without a sign of them left since they were built of wood." To the king
the Council also reported: "to this harm was added the great disaster
of the enemy's having burned all the farms and plantings and destroyed
the cattle and crops" (140).
The appraisal made several years later showed that 118 persons lost
houses at the hands of the English. How many houses this included is
unknown, because some proprietors had more than one house, and the
list mentions only their accumulated value. The cheapest house burned
belonged to Diego Carvallo and was appraised at 80 pesos "because
it was the oldest one." Alonso Bernal's house was valued at 100 pesos



because it was of "straw and wood." (It was a wooden house with
thatched roof.) The most expensive building destroyed by the English
fire was the governor's residence appraised at 8,000 pesos. The resi-
dences of the accountant Pueyo and of Captain Pedro Horruytiner were
listed at 1,500 pesos each, while the one belonging to the Zigarroa
family was 200 pesos less in value. Captain Joachim de Florencia lost
two houses which were appraised at 3,000 pesos. The Ponce de Le6n
family claimed the loss of three houses valued at 2,200 pesos; and the
heirs of ex-Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar reported the destruction
of one house that was marked at 1,000 pesos. The total appraised
value of Spanish property destroyed by the English fire came to
47,140 pesos (142).
The siege was finished, the English had failed to achieve their goal
and had retreated ingloriously, losing much materiel but few men. St.
Augustine was in ashes and the work of reconstruction lay ahead. The
task would take a long time, so long that the main church was not
rebuilt until the second Spanish period (133). The days right after
the siege were absorbed in a loud controversy between Governor Znfiiga
and General Berroa, commander of the relief fleet. The two men dis-
agreed violently about several issues. First Zuifiiga was at a loss to
understand Berroa's exact duty and responsibility, since Captain L6pez
de Solloso was in charge of the relief force. Second, Zifiiiga accused
the general of having failed to destroy the English ships. Third, Berroa
had looted the abandoned English ships without giving a share to the
St. Augustine garrison who had valiantly fought the enemy. Fourth,
Berroa had coldly turned down Zuifiiga's request to leave some of the
fleet to reinforce the garrison, especially in view of the expected ar-
rival of Colonel Daniel from Jamaica. Fifth, Berroa even refused to
leave one large ship or some small launches for the same protection.
Sixth, Berroa had opposed the landing of his two well-trained colored
companies (pardos and morenos), to offer battle to the English and
destroy them. Instead the youngest and weakest soldiers were landed
and they became panicky upon facing the enemy, who were thus able
to escape. This was confirmed by the ecclesiatic visitor, Antonio Ponce
de Le6n. Seventh, the general had been extremely discourteous, never
coming ashore, refusing conferences, failing to answer memorandums
and sailing away with part of the fleet without notice on January 8.
Eighth, and finally, Zifiiiga was very incensed with Berroa for not
pursuing the enemy northward with fresh troops and powerful ships,



thereby missing the chance of a great victory. In summary, Governor
Zufiiiga was furiously angry at Berroa, and with apparently good rea-
sons (103 through 129; 30, fol. 3247).
Once convinced that he could do nothing with Berroa, Zufiiiga decided
to call several meetings of his staff officers to discuss whether the Eng-
lish should be pursued by the St. Augustine forces. The governor was
in favor of such an offensive, but in a January 3 meeting attended by
Captains Jos6 Vegambre, Joachim de Florencia, Juan Benedit Hor-
ruytiner, Juan Ruis Mexia, Francisco Menendez, Diego Diaz de Mexia,
Francisco Romo de Urisa, Ensign Antonio Diaz Mexia, and chief aide-
de-camp Bernardo Nieto de Carvajal, the majority voted against
Zfiuiga's proposal. Only Romo de Urisa and Nieto de Carvajal, the
governor's favorite, sided with Ziiiiga. The others thought the garrison
too exhausted, the English already too far north; and there was too
much danger in leaving the fort unprotected. Absent from this meet-
ing, which Ziiiiga said was attended exclusively by criollos (all Ameri-
can-born officers), were Joseph Benedit Horruytiner, Adjutant Sebas-
tian L6pez de Toledo, and the sick and feeble sergeant major, Enrique
Primo de Rivera. Zuifiiga was quite discouraged about the vote but
decided to accept the advice of his men. However, he ordered Captain
Joseph Horruytiner to take forty of the young Galicians north to the
nearby island of Camacho and the little ranch (hato) of San Diego
"on this side of the bar of San Juan," for it was said that the enemy
had left Spanish prisoners and arms behind. The contingent never
reached its destination because, according to relief Captain Joseph
Primo de Rivera, the Galicians were so exhausted from their duties
and the bitter cold of the past days that many collapsed on the sand.
Z6fiiga was furious at the lack of preparation of these recruits who
couldn't even march (107, 108, 109, 112).
Another meeting was held on January 7 with the same officers plus
Joseph Horruytiner, Enrique Primo de Rivera, and Adjutant L6pez de
Toledo. Zuiiiiga again criticized General Berroa severely for his behavior.
The council requested Captain L6pez de Solloso to reinforce the weak
garrison. Afterwards Ziifiiga sent Solloso an order to furnish "within
two hours the names of an additional eighty soldiers who will tempo-
rarily remain at the fort." Solloso responded that he could supply only
thirty men from his relief force. Quite reluctantly the governor ac-
cepted this number, and had the thirty men sign the payroll (122, 123,
124, 125, 126, 128). The next day Berroa sailed away. We have no



record on the departure of Solloso except a provision list dated March
14, 1703, of the "infantry of the city of Havana" (134, 135).
With the departure of Berroa the story of the siege came to an end.
The English governor reached Charleston with his army in good con-
dition. The English sources say he had only two casualties, although
the Spanish Council of War in Madrid reported that Zfiiiga's force
"killed more than sixty men, not counting the ones the artillery blew
to pieces." The Council also announced that Spanish casualties were
"3 or 4 dead and 20 wounded" (19, p. 344, 138). The reliability of
both English and Spanish reports is questionable. Though the English
casualties were low, Governor Moore nevertheless became discredited
and lost his governorship. He badly wanted revenge for his defeat,
and in 1704 he marched into Apalachee, bringing destruction and
death (8).
Governor Zfiiiiga's reputation increased. On January 4, 1703, he
rendered preliminary testimony on the siege to Antonio Ponce de
Le6n, the visitador general eclesidstico, and Manuel Quifiones, the
visiting public notary, both of whom had come from Havana (114,
129). Two days later the governor wrote a condensed report of the
siege for the attention of the crown (9). Eventually ZGiiiga was re-
warded with the more important and desirable governorship of Car-
tagena, leaving St. Augustine on April 9, 1706 (30, fol. 3280). The
new executive, Francisco C6rcoles y Martinez, conducted the residencia,
or official review of his administration. In the residencia the two royal
officials, Juan de Pueyo and Juan Benedit Horruytiner, blamed the ex-
governor for the destruction of St. Augustine, saying that he avoided
an open battle and retreated into the fort (29, fols. 13086-13077).
The residencia included over 1,400 folios, wherein the official records
of the English attack were transcribed (29, 30). These folios were the
major source for this monograph. Zfiiiiga's tactics were accepted as
sound however, and the ex-governor was completely vindicated. By
Zfiiiga's choice, St. Augustine was destroyed but kept Spanish. Other-
wise the town might have been saved, but it would have become English.
Obviously the Spanish authorities preferred destruction and retention
of sovereignty. A Pyrrhic victory had been won.



1. ALMIRANTE, Jose. Diccionario military. Madrid, 1869.
2. ARANA, Luis. "Infantry in Spanish Florida, 1671-1679," seminar paper, His-
tory 778, University of Florida, 1958. 38 pp.
3. ARCHDALE, John. A New Description of That Fertile and Pleasant Province
of Carolina, 1707, in Alexander S. Salley, Jr., (ed.), Narratives of Early
Carolina, 1650-1708. New York, 1911, pp. 282-311.
4. ASH, John. The Present State of affairs in Carolina, 1706, in Salley, 3,
pp. 269-276.
5. BARADO, Francisco. Historia del Ejercito Espafiol. Vol. III. Barcelona [ca.
6. BOLTON, Herbert E. Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to
Georgia. Berkeley, 1925.
7. BOYD, Mark F. (ed.). "Documents. Further Considerations of the Apalachee
Missions," The Americas, IX, 4 (1953), 459479.
8. BOYD, Mark F., Hale G. Smith, and John W. Griffin. Here They Once Stood.
Gainesville, 1951.
9. BOYD, Mark F., translator. "The Siege of Saint Augustine by Governor
Moore of South Carolina in 1702 as Reported to the King of Spain by Don
Joseph de Ziiiiga y Zerda, Governor of Florida," Florida Historical Quar-
terly, XXVI, 4 (1948), 345-352.
10. CRANE, Verner W. "The Southern Frontier in Queen Anne's War," Ameri-
can Historical Review, XXIV (1918-1919), 379-395.
11. . The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732. Ann Arbor, 1929 and 1956.
12. DUNKLE, John R. "Population Change as an Element in the Historical
Geography of St. Augustine," Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVII, 1
(1958), 3-32.
13. GEIGER, Maynard. Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans in Spanish
Florida and Cuba (1528-1841). Paterson, N. J., 1940.
14. JOHNSON, James Guyton. "The Colonial Southeast, 1732-1763; an Inter-
national Contest for Territorial and Economic Control," The University of
Colorado Studies, XIX, 3 (1932), 163-225.
15. LAWSON, Edward W. The Discovery of Florida and Its Discoverer, Juan
Ponce de Leon. St. Augustine, 1946.
16. MANUCY, Albert C. Artillery through the Ages. Washington, 1949.
17. -. The Building of the Castillo de San Marcos. Washington, 1942.
18. - (ed.). The History of Castillo de San Marcos and Fort Matanzas.
Washington, 1945.
19. OLDMIXON, John. From the History of the British Empire in America, 1708,
in Salley, 3, pp. 317-373.
20. Primera y breve relacion de las favorables noticias que con fechas de seis
y veinte y ocho de enero de este aiio de 1703, se han tenido por cartas de
don Luis de Ziiiiga, Governador de la Florida y D. Luis Chac'n, Gover-
nador de la Havana. Madrid: Antonio Bizarr6n [1703] , 2 pp., in John
Carter Brown Library.
21. RAMSAY, David. The History of South Carolina from Its First Settlement in
1670 to the Year 1808. Charleston, 1809.



22. RUBIo Y BELLVE, Mariano. Diccionario de ciencias militares. 3 vols. Barce-
lona, 1895-1901.
23. SALLEY, A. S. (ed.). Journals of the Commons House of Assembly of South
Carolina for 1702. Columbia, S. C., 1932.
24. (ed.). Journals of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina
for 1703. Columbia, S. C., 1934.
25. SHEA, John Gilmary. History of the Catholic Church in the United States.
Akron, Ohio [1886].
26. SoTo Y ABBACH, Serafin Maria de, Conde de Clonard. Historia orgdnica de
las armas de infanteria y caballeria espaiioles desde la creacion del ejer-
cito permanent hasta el dia. 16 vols. Madrid, 1851-1859.
27. TEPASKE, John J. "Economic Problems of Florida Governors, 1700-1763,"
Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVII, 1 (1958), pp. 42-52.
28. WALLACE, Duncan David. The History of South Carolina. Vol. I. New York,

(The following documents are available in the Stetson Collection, University of
29. Demand Puesta Por Los Sefiores Juezes offiziales de la Real Hazienda
Contra el Exmo. Sefior Maestro de Campo General, Don Joseph de Zuifiiga
y La Zerda; Governador de Cartagena Sobre Diferentes Capitulos y Car-
gos. Juez de Residencia, Francisco C6rcoles y Martinez; Escribano Puiblico
y de Gobernaci6n, Juan Solana. St. Augustine, 1707. AGI, 58-2-8, 849 fols.
30. Residencia de Don Joseph de Zuifiiga y la Zerda. Quaderno 4� de Cargos,
Descargos y Sentenzias. Juez de Residencia, Francisco C6rcoles y Mar-
tinez; Escribano Puiblico y de Gobernaci6n, Juan Solana. St. Augustine,
Feb. 11, 1707. AGI, 58-2-8, 593 fols.

(Unless otherwise noted, the following documents are available in the Stetson
Collection, University of Florida.)
31. Obispo de Cuba to the crown. Havana, Sept. 28, 1689. With enclosures.
AGI, 54-2-2, 6 fols.
32. The royal officials [Joachin de Florencia and Juan de Pueyo] to the crown.
St. Augustine, Sept. 2, 1699. With enclosures. AGI, 54-5-15, 20 fols.
33. Governor Zuifiiga to the crown. St. Augustine, March 15, 1702. With en-
closures. AGI, 58-1-27. (Available on microfilm, roll 9, North Carolina
Spanish Records, in the Library of Florida History, University of Florida.)
34. Francisco Romo de Uriza to Governor Zifiniga. San Luis [Apalacheel, Oct. 22,
1702. In 7, pp. 470472.
35. Manuel Solana to Governor Zifiiga. San Luis [Apalachee], Oct. 22, 1702.
In 7, pp. 468470.
36. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Oct. 27, 1702. In 29, fols. 13069-13067.
37. Governor Zifiiiga to [the crown]. St. Augustine, Nov. 1, 1702. In 29, fols.
38. Governor Zufiiga to Manuel Solana. St. Augustine, Nov. 1, 1702. In 29, fols.



39. The governor and royal officials of Florida to the governor and royal officials
of Havana. St. Augustine, Nov. 1, 1702. In 29, fols. 12631-12628.
40. Francisco Fuentes to Governor Zifiiga. San Juan [del Puerto, Guale], Nov. 4,
1702. In 29, fols. 13042-13041.
41. Governor Zfuiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 5, 1702. In 29, fols. 13058-13053.
42. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 5, 1702. In 29, fols. 13050-13046.
43. Governor Znfiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 5, 1702. In 29, fols. 13045-13044.
44. [Governor Zfuiiiga] to the crown. St. Augustine, Nov. 5, 1702. In 29, fols.
45. The governor and royal officials of Florida to the governor and royal officials
of Cuba. St. Augustine, Nov. 5, 1702. In 29, fols. 12624-12623.
46. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 6, 1702. In 29, fols. 13040-13033.
47. Governor Zifiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 6, 1702. In 29, fols. 13031-13030.
48. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 7, 1702. In 29, fols. 13028-13024.
49. Governor Zufiiga to [Manuel Solana]. St. Augustine, Nov. 7, 1702. In 29, fol.
50. Declaration of Captain Diego de la Sierra. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In
29, fols. 13012-13010.
51. Declaration of Diego Gutierrez. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In 29, fols.
52. Declaration of Martin Sanchez. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In 29, fols. 13008-
53. Declaration of Pedro Belen. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In 29, fols. 13010-
54. Governor Zufiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In 29, fols. 13022-13019.
55. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In 29, fols. 13016-13015.
56. Governor Zuiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In 29, fols. 13014-13013.
57. Governor Zuiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1702. In 29, fol. 13001.
58. Acuerdo of the governor and royal officials. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In
29, fols. 13001-12997.
59. Acuerdo of the governor and royal officials. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In
29, fols. 12961-12959.
60. Declaration of Joseph Williams. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In 29, fols.
61. Declaration of Manuel Agram6n. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In 29, fols.
62. Declaration of William Nobel. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In 29, fols.
63. Enrique Primo de Rivera to Governor Zifiiga. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702.
In 29, fols. 12969-12967.
64. Governor Zifiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In 29, fols. 12976-12973.
65. Governor Zfiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In 29, fols. 12972-12970.
66. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In 29, fols. 12966-12964.
67. Governor Ziiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 9, 1702. In 29, fol. 12962.
68. Governor Zfiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 10, 1702. In 29, fols. 12958-12954.
69. Governor Zfiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 10, 1702. In 29, fols. 12953-12950.
70. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 10, 1702. In 29, fols. 12949-12946.
71. Governor Zfiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 10, 1702. In 29, fols. 12945-12943.
72. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 10, 1702. In 29, fols. 12941-12938.
73. Governor Zuiiiiga to Manuel Solana. San Luis [Apalachee], Nov. 10, 1702.
In 29, fols. 12937-12936.



74. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 11, 1702. In 29, fols. 12935-12932.
75. John Martin [Juan Martin] to Governor James Moore. [Nombre de Dios],
Nov. 12, 1702. Original and translated version in 29, fols. 12918-12915.
76. Manuel Solana to Governor Zufiiiga. San Luis [Apalacheel, Nov. 13, 1702.
In 29, fols. 12885-12883.
77. Diego de Jaen [Xaen] to Governor Ziifiiga. Santa Fe [Timucual, Nov. 14,
1702. In 29, fol. 12890.
78. Governor Zulfiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 14, 1702. In 29, fols. 12931-12929.
79. Governor Zifiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 16, 1702. In 29, fols. 12928-12925.
80. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 22, 1702. In 29, fols. 12924-12922.
81. Bernardo Nieto Carvajal, Notificaci6n, St. Augustine, Nov. 23, 1702. In 29,
fols. 12916-12915.
82. Declaration of John Day [Juan Dial. St. Augustine, Nov. 23, 1702. In 29,
fols. 12907-12904.
83. Declaration of Thomas Jones [Tomas Foneil. St. Augustine, Nov. 23, 1702.
In 29, fols. 12913-12908.
84. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 23, 1702. In 29, fols. 12921-12920.
85. Juan Solana, Notificaci6n. St. Augustine, Nov. 23, 1702. In 29, fol. 12910.
86. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 25, 1702. In 29, fols. 12903-12900.
87. Francisco Fuentes de Galarza to Governor Zuifiiga. No place, no date (re-
ceived in St. Augustine on Nov. 28, 1702). In 29, fols. 12896-12894.
88. Governor Zufiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Nov. 28, 1702. In 29, fols. 12899-12897.
89. Diego de Florencia, Receipt. Santa Maria de Galve [Pensacola], Dec. 2,
1702. In 29, fol. 12603.
90. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 2, 1702. In 29, fols. 12892-12891.
91. Pedro Nicolas Benitez de Lugo, Auto. Havana, Dec. 2, 1702. In 29, fols.
92. Juan Clemente Horruytiner to Governor Zifiiga. [Some place along the St.
Johns River, about Dec. 6, 1702.] In 29, fol. 12879.
93. Governor Znfiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 11, 1702. In 29, fols. 12882-12879.
94. Governor Zfiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 14, 1702. In 29, fols. 12878-12875.
95. Governor Ziifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 19, 1702. In 29, fols. 12874-12871.
96. Manuel Solana, Auto. San Luis [Apalachee], Dec. 20, 1702. In Boyd 8,
pp. 38-39.
97. Michael Cole to Mr. William Blathwayte. Carolina, Dec. 22, 1702. In Vol.
306, Colonial Office 5, Public Record Office, London (copy at the St. Au-
gustine Historical Society).
98. Governor Zufiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 24, 1702. In 29, fols. 12870-12867.
99. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 25, 1702. In 29, fols. 12866-12863.
100. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 26, 1702. In 29, fols. 12862-12860.
101. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 27, 1702. In 29, fols. 12859-12854.
102. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 30, 1702. In 29, fols. 12853-12850.
103. Governor Zifiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Dec. 31, 1702. In 29, fols. 12849-12846.
104. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 1, 1703. In 29, fols. 12845-12842.
105. Estevan de Berroa to Governor Zfuiiiga. [Aboard the "Black Eagle"], Jan. 2,
1703. In 29, fols. 12838-12837.
106. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 2, 1703. In 29, fols. 12841-12839.
107. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 3, 1703. In 29, fols. 12836-12835.
108. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 3, 1703. In 29, fols. 12831-12829.
109. Pareceres de la Junta de Guerra. St. Augustine [Jan. 3, 1703]. In 29, fols.



110. Declaration of Diego Caro. St. Augustine, Jan. 4, 1703. In 29, fols. 12786-
111. Declaration of Francisco Basurtto. St. Augustine, Jan. 4, 1703. In 29, fols.
112. Declaration of Joseph Primo de Ribera. St. Augustine, Jan. 4, 1703. In 29,
fols. 12774-12771.
113. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 4, 1703. In 29, fols. 12824-12821.
114. Governor Zfiiga, Auto suplicatorio. St. Augustine, Jan. 4, 1703. In 29, fols.
115. Declaration of Sebastian L6pez de Tholedo. St. Augustine, Jan. 4, 1703. In
29, fols. 12779-12774.
116. Anthonio Ponze de Le6n, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 5, 1703. In 29, fols.
117. Anthonio Ponze de Le6n, Certificaci6n. St. Augustine, Jan. 5, 1703. In 29,
fols. 12771-12768.
118. Pareceres de la Junta de la Guerra. St. Augustine [Jan. 5, 1703]. In 29,
fols. 12820-12817.
119. Governor Zifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 6, 1703. In 29, fols. 12815-12814.
120. Opinion of Esteban de Berroa signed by Sebastian L6pez de Toledo. St.
Augustine, Jan. 6, 1703. In 29, fol. 12816.
121. Pareceres de la Junta de Guerra. St. Augustine [Jan. 6, 17031. In 29, fols.
122. Governor Zuiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 7, 1703. In 29, fols. 12808-12805.
123. Governor Zuiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 7, 1703. In 29, fols. 12800-12799.
124. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 7, 1703. In 29, fols. 12797-12796.
125. Governor Ziiiga to L6pez Solloso. St. Augustine, Jan. 7, 1703. In 29, fols.
126. Governor Zdfiiga to Manuel Ramirez. St. Augustine, Jan. 7, 1703. In 29, fol.
127. Opinion of Esteban de Berroa. [Aboard the "Black Eagle"], Jan. 7, 1703.
In 29, fol. 12809.
128. Pareceres de la Junta de Guerra. St. Augustine, Jan. 7, 1703. In 29, fols.
129. Governor Zfiiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, Jan. 9, 1703. In 29, fols. 12791-12790.
130. Diego de Florencia to Governor Zifiniga. San Luis [Apalachee], Jan. 25, 1703.
In Boyd, 8, pp. 3940.
131. Fray Marcos de Sotolongo to the crown. Havana, Jan. 30, 1703. AGI, 58-2-14,
3 fols.
132. Manuel Solana to Governor Zifiiga. San Luis [Apalachee], Feb. 3, 1703.
In Boyd, 8, pp. 41-42.
133. Fray Marcos de Sotolongo to the governor of Florida. No place, Feb. 27,
1703. In 29, fol. 12423.
134. Governor Zuifiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, March 1, 1703. In 29, fol. 12745.
135. Statistics of Francisco de Veles, Escrivano de raziones y muniziones. St.
Augustine, March 14, 1703. In 29, fols. 12744-12742.
136. Governor Zfiiiga, Auto. St. Augustine, March 16, 1703. In 29, fol. 12741.
137. Duque de Albuquerque, Virrey, to the crown. M6xico, April 10, 1703. AGI,
58-1-27, 110 fols.
138. Pareceres de la Junta de Guerra. Madrid, May 22, 1703. AGI, 58-1-23, 2
fols. (Available on microfilm, roll 9, North Carolina Spanish Records,
University of Florida.)



139. Jacinto Roque Perez to Governor Z6fiiga. San Luis [Apalachee], May 25,
1703. In Boyd, 8, pp. 42-44.
140. Pareceres de la Junta de Guerra. Madrid, July 6, 1703. AGI, 58-1-23, 4 fols.
(Available on microfilm, roll 9, North Carolina Spanish Records, Univer-
sity of Florida.)
141. Memorial de Fray Martin de Alacano. Madrid, Aug. 2, 1703. AGI, 58-2-14,
121 fols.
142. Francisco de C6rcoles y Martinez to the crown. With enclosures. St. Augus-
tine, Aug. 13, 1709. AGI, 58-1-28, 28 fols. (Available on microfilm, roll
12, North Carolina Spanish Records, University of Florida.)
143. Governor Zufiiga to the crown. Cartagena, June 3, 1710. With enclosures.
AGI, 58-1-28, 19 fols.
144. Juan de Pueyo and Juan Benedit Horruytiner, royal officials [Accusations of].
St. Augustine, no date. In 29, fols. 13086-13077.



Social Sciences

No. 1 (Winter 1959): The Whigs of
Florida, 1845-1854
By Herbert J. Doherty, Jr.

No. 2 (Spring 1959): Austrian Catholics
and the Social Question, 1918-1932
By Alfred Diamant

No. 3 (Summer 1959): The Siege of
St. Augustine in 1702
By Charles W. Arnade